


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CONTENTS

10 September 1990

CHINA

Article Discusses U.S. Military Cuts [SHIJIE ZHISHI No 14, 16 Jul]	1
European Conventional Forces Talks Analyzed [RENMIN RIBAO 5 Aug]	2

EAST EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Soviet Troop Withdrawal on Schedule [CTK 23 Aug]	3
--	---

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

No CW's Reportedly Stored at Hohenleipisch [Hamburg DPA 14 Aug]	3
Soviet Troops To Begin Pullout From Neuruppin [ADN 17 Aug]	3

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Lab Director Cited on Akash Missile Program [Hong Kong AFP 15 Aug]	4
--	---

ISRAEL

Arrow ABM Missile Tested, Defense Minister Comments	4
No Decision on Procurement [Jerusalem Radio 9 Aug]	4
Further Technical Details [M. Shlonsky; Jerusalem TV 9 Aug]	4
Missile, U.S. Role Viewed [HA'ARETZ 10 Aug]	5
Link with U.S. SDI Program Recalled [D. Gold; THE JERUSALEM POST 27 Jul]	5

SOVIET UNION

Iraqi, Israeli Missile Capability Noted [M. Mikhaylov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Jun]	8
Grinevskiy Interviewed on Progress of Vienna CSBM Talks [V. Smelov; TASS 10 Aug]	9
Tank, Armored Vehicle Issue Stalls Vienna CFE Talks [S. Tosunyan; IZVESTIYA 12 Aug]	9
Analyst Discusses Prospects for Vienna CFE Talks [V. Chernyshev; TASS 14 Aug]	10
UN Conference on Arms Reduction, Conversion Held in Moscow	11
Yakovlev Addresses Forum [PRAVDA 14 Aug]	11
Press Briefing Conducted [TASS 15 Aug]	11
Semipalatinsk Underground Nuclear Test Televised [Moscow TV 14 Aug]	12
'Constructive Spirit' Desired in Vienna CSBM Talks [V. Chernyshev; TASS 15 Aug]	12
Flawed Arms Control Reporting Criticized [G. Khromov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Aug]	12
Government Orders Mukachevo Radar Station Mothballed [N. Burbyga; IZVESTIYA 15 Aug]	14
Norway Receives 'No Promises' on Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Testing Plans [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN 15 Aug]	14
Shevardnadze Letter to UN on Arms Transfers Published [IZVESTIYA 16 Aug]	15
Chief Delegate Batsanov on Geneva CD's Work Toward CW Ban	16
Addresses Conference on Chemical, Biological Arms [TASS 16 Aug]	16
Izvestiya Interview [24 Aug]	17
TASS Interview [24 Aug]	18
FRG Inspectors Find No Chemical Arms in GDR [V. Chistyakov; TASS 16 Aug]	18
U.S. Senator McCain Interviewed on Defense Conversion [TASS 16 Aug]	19
Military Analyst Chernyshev on Missile Technology Proliferation [TASS 20 Aug]	19
Soviet-U.S. Chemical Arms Talks End in Geneva [TASS 17 Aug]	20

CFE Envoy Grinevskiy Attends European Security Meeting in Spain [N. Aleksandrov; TASS 21 Aug]	20
Americans Tour Chapayevsk CW Destruction Training Center [M. Ivanov; TASS 22 Aug]	20
Chernyshev Views FRG Position on Personnel Cuts at CFE Talks [TASS 22 Aug]	21
U.S. Delegation Visits Chemical Arms Storage Facility [Moscow TV 27 Aug]	21
Deputy Minister Rejects Unilateral Nuclear Test Moratorium [V. Mikhaylov; TASS 27 Aug]	22

WEST EUROPE

AUSTRIA

Sales of IRBM Technology to Iraq Recapped [H. Langser; PROFIL 13 Aug]	23
---	----

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Iraqi Purchases of IRBM Technology Examined [W. Hoffmann; Hamburg DIE ZEIT 10 Aug]	24
Aid for Iraqi Chemical, Biological Weapons Production Viewed [DER SPIEGEL 13 Aug]	25
United Germany To Renounce Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Arms	28
GDR-FRG Statement at Nonproliferation Conference [East Berlin ADN 22 Aug]	28
Genscher Addresses Conference [DPA 22 Aug]	29

FINLAND

Neutrals' Role in CFE Process Viewed [S. Forss; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET 2 Jul]	29
--	----

UNITED KINGDOM

Thatcher Warns Against Deeper Cuts in CFE II [THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 6 Jul]	30
--	----

Article Discusses U.S. Military Cuts

HK0708133890 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 14, 16 Jul 90 p 10

[Article by Li Weiguo (2621 5898 0948): "The United States Cuts Its Military Strength"]

[Text] Recently the United States has been readjusting its military deployment and cutting its military strength, concentrated in the following aspects:

Cutting down troops stationed abroad. Not long ago, foreign ministers from 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries met in Ottawa and reached an agreement: Both the United States and the Soviet Union will respectively reduce their troops stationed in central Europe to no more than 195,000 (the United States is allowed to preserve its 30,000 troops stationed elsewhere in Europe); that is, one-third of U.S. troops stationed abroad will be cut. Not long ago, the U.S. Department of Defense submitted a plan to Congress suggesting that U.S. troops stationed in Asia be cut in three stages. In the first phase, 14,000 to 15,000 troops—accounting for 11 percent of the total, will be withdrawn from Allied countries in Asia over three years. Of them, 5,000 ground forces troops and 2,000 of the Air Force will be withdrawn from South Korea; 5,000 to 6,000 from Japan; and 2,000 from the Philippines. To meet domestic demands for a bigger cut in military personnel stationed abroad, the U.S. Government has asked South Korea to help support U.S. troops stationed in the country, and the latter has promised to increase its present share of \$300 million to \$600 million. The United States has also formally asked Japan to support U.S. troops stationed in Japan on its own, and the latter has indicated it will "try its best to meet the demand."

Closing down military bases. The United States is to close down 14 military bases abroad and 60 at home. At present, the work of closing down military bases abroad is well under way, but the plan to close down domestic military bases has been criticized by Democratic congressmen, because closing down these military bases, most of which are located in Democratic constituencies, will deprive those constituencies of some benefits, such as jobs providing services to military personnel, thus jeopardizing the Democratic Party's interests.

Giving up the plan to modernize the Lance short-range nuclear missile. Since there have been great changes in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact "has ceased to exist except in name," and the process of German reunification is being accelerated, the Lance short-range missile deployed in West Germany, which has a range of 180 km, will have little role to play. Again, the U.S. Congress will not agree to appropriate funds to develop a new generation of Lance missile. Therefore, the plan to modernize the Lance has in fact been shelved. President Bush simply announced in early May the abandonment of the plan to update the Lance and the nuclear cannon [he da pao 2702 1129 3517] deployed in Western

Europe. As short-range missiles have become less significant, the United States will hold talks with the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons, after the agreement on reducing conventional forces in Europe has been reached at the end of the year.

A large-scale disarmament package is under consideration. Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, at the U.S.-Soviet summit which has just concluded a joint statement was signed defining the framework of the treaty on cutting strategic nuclear weapons, and reiterating that the treaty will be signed by the end of the year. The Army, taking into account future reduced military expenditure, has come up with a plan to reduce its regular soldiers from the present 764,000 to 580,000, a decrease of one-fourth of the total, and reserve forces and the National Guard from the present 776,000 to 645,000, by 1997. The Air Force is planning to reduce its air squadrons from the present 36 to 28 and the order for B2 Stealth bombers from the original 132 to 75, and to gradually eliminate multiple warhead missiles. The Navy is planning to cut its aircraft carriers from the present 14 to 12, and its warships from the present 549 to 488. In addition, senior U.S. defense experts say in a research report that in the late 1990's NATO will work out a new defense program. So it is desirable for U.S. troops stationed in Europe to be reduced to 70,000 to 80,000. Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested that U.S. troops stationed in Europe be reduced by two-thirds within five years. Therefore, the United States may further cut its military strength.

Military strength is not affected. From a short-term point of view, U.S. military muscle as a whole will not be affected by its readjustment plan. For instance, for U.S. troops stationed in Asia, only soldiers of logistic support units will be reduced, while the fighting units will basically remain unchanged; and the plan to reduce U.S. troops stationed in Europe by a big margin will be put into effect only when a U.S.-Soviet agreement on reducing regular forces stationed in Europe has been signed by the end of the year. In the meantime the United States is making great efforts to develop new weapons. For instance, it is developing highly accurate tactical air-to-ground nuclear guided missiles of a new type so that they will play an important role after the short-range missiles stationed in Europe are removed; and it is also developing nonnuclear missiles, which are designed to become "superweapons" after the strategic weapons treaty is signed. On top of that, the United States has shifted its emphasis onto the research and development of "lighter and more lethal weapons." The present U.S. effort to readjust its military strength only signals the beginning of a large-scale disarmament later on. However, even if the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement on exercising control over their armaments, and the former cuts its military strength by a big margin, the United States will still possess more mobile, flexible, and technologically advanced globe-oriented military strength. It will remain the number one superpower.

European Conventional Forces Talks Analyzed
HK1108083990 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
5 Aug 90 p 6

["News Analysis" by Zhang Zhuji (1728 4376 5487):
"Progress in the European Conventional Forces Talks"]

[Text] The seventh round of the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] talks are now under way. Public opinion estimates that a first-phase CFE agreement is likely to be initialled at the upcoming November summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The CFE talks between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO] began in March 1989. The targets of disarmament in the talks were confined to tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery; later fighter planes, helicopters, and the number of troops were included, and there are now six items on the agenda. From the angle of the talks' progress, there were breakthroughs in the first five rounds. At the beginning of this year, the USSR and the United States reached an accord on the ceiling of their troops, allowing 195,000 of each side to be stationed in central Europe; the USSR even agreed to the United States deploying another 30,000 troops in southern Europe and the United Kingdom. However, in March this year, when the sixth round of talks was under way, they reached a deadlock. This was because the USSR demanded limiting the volume of troops stationed in central Europe to 700,000 for each bloc. In other words, the United States would have to axe 110,000 of its troops stationed in central Europe, with the remainder being less than 195,000; moreover, the Allies' troops stationed in West Germany and the five NATO central European countries would have to cut back their troops by a wide margin. NATO held that the Soviet demand was unacceptable.

Obviously, this issue involved the number of troops in the wake of German reunification. Originally, the first-phase talks did not involve the Allies, only the USSR and the United States alone. In view of the prospects of a unified Germany and its inclusion in NATO, the USSR now believed that it must take into consideration the military strength of a unified Germany, on the grounds that first, the WTO was facing the danger of dissolution, and some East European countries had already demanded the USSR pull out its troops. Under such circumstances, the USSR could only maintain 195,000 of its troops in East Germany. Second, the West German Government had not officially responded to the Soviet's intention of continuing to station its troops in East Europe for some time, in the wake of the German reunification. Therefore, the USSR felt that a grave imbalance would occur between the military forces of the two blocs in central Europe should disarmament be realized early next year. Consequently, the CFE talks were linked to German reunification. The United States and the USSR were bargaining on this issue; consequently, the sixth round of talks reached a stalemate.

It was not until mid-July when West German Chancellor Kohl visited the USSR, that an accord was reached between the two sides: The Soviet troops stationed in East Germany will be pulled out in three or four years in the wake of German reunification, by then, the volume of German troops will be cut back to 370,000, and this removed a huge hurdle to the CFE talks. Prior to this, the two sides had accepted the joint proposal of France and Poland, and reached an accord on the definition and ceiling of tanks and armored vehicles. Therefore, the once "stuck motor" of the CFE talks resumed its normal operation.

In reality, the problem was not confined to military affairs. West Germany has promised that in the wake of German reunification, it would continue the agreement on economic relations and trade between the USSR and East Germany, and would be responsible for the expenditure of the Soviet pullout and the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany during the transitional period. West Germany has also urged the EC to provide the USSR with aid in terms of \$15 billion, and decided that West Germany alone would provide the USSR with a loan in terms of 5 billion marks. All this has played a role in the Soviet relaxation on the aforesaid issues.

The CFE talks are in fact the prolongation of the central European arms talks. How can we account for the fruitlessness of the central European arms talks that lasted 15 years, and the great progress made in the CFE talks in a matter of less than 18 months? The reason is the great differences in the world situation. The central European arms talks were held between 1973 and 1988, and it was in the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's that the two superpowers were fiercely contending for hegemony. However, such contention resulted in grave unfavorable effects. A major cause of the difficulties in the Soviet economy were the burden of war preparations. Shevardnadze acknowledged that one-fourth of the Soviet budget was for military expenditure. The USSR has spent 700 billion rubles on military confrontation with the West over the past 20 years. What about the United States? The annual U.S. military expenditure has been in the neighborhood of \$300 billion, of which 60 percent was spent in Europe. Since the beginning of the 1980's, financial and trade deficits have surfaced in the United States, and the U.S. Congress has repeatedly called for the lowering military expenditure. Under such circumstances, when the USSR proposed resumption of the CFE talks, the United States readily responded to it. Besides, the East-West confrontation has somewhat relaxed. With the drastic change in the East European situation, the West believes that the military threat the USSR formed to them has been somewhat reduced. It is precisely under such a situation that the two sides have continued to compromise with each other in fierce bargaining.

The 15-year central Europe arms talks were fruitless while the 18-month CFE talks have been fruitful. From an angle, this reflects the changes in the European and world situation.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Soviet Troop Withdrawal on Schedule

*LD2308193790 Prague CTK in English 1832 GMT
23 Aug 90*

[Text] Prague, August 23 (CTK)—The Soviet withdrawal is advancing in line with schedule. Altogether 35,514 Soviet soldiers and 19,367 family members have left the country from last February until August 23.

Withdrawn were also 664 tanks, 976 combat vehicles and armoured carriers, 9,602 lorries, 30 launching pads, 706 guns, 212 anti-aircraft defence weapons, 62 planes and 92 helicopters.

The withdrawal, which will take place in three stages, should be finished next June.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

No CW's Reportedly Stored at Hohenleipisch

*LD1408193890 Hamburg DPA in German 1803 GMT
14 Aug 90*

[Excerpts] Leipzig (DPA)—No chemical weapons are stored at the Soviet military facility in Hohenleipisch in the Cottbus Bezirk in the GDR. This emerged today from the first inspection by Bundeswehr experts of Soviet units in the GDR. Speaking to journalists in Leipzig this evening, Frigate Captain Hans-Dieter Jopp, head of the inspection team of 11 officers, viewed the inspection as an important trust-building measure. The Bundeswehr experts were accompanied by a Foreign Ministry official.

The inspectors had unrestricted access to all technical and administrative areas of the military facility, as did four officers from the GDR National People's Army, Jopp said. The inspection was announced 24 hours in advance. No indications emerged that chemical weapons

[CW's] are stored or have recently been stored in Hohenleipisch. Only conventional ammunition, not suited for use with chemical agents, is stored at the inspected site.

He said he assumes that speculation about the storage of Soviet chemical weapons in the GDR is now dispelled. [passage omitted]

Jopp announced that a second Soviet facility on GDR territory of their [the FRG's] own choice could be visited. However, within the framework of reciprocity, a Soviet Army inspection of the Bundeswehr is envisaged first. The time and place must also be agreed with the U.S. Government.

Colonel Boris Ivanov of the Soviet Armed Forces paid tribute to the visit as a great event with regard to the progress of the Geneva negotiations aimed at banning chemical weapons. He said that there is no Soviet unit stationed in the GDR which was designed for the use of chemical weapons. The Soviets' only chemical unit on GDR territory was in Chemnitz. It served only the ABC [atomic, biological and chemical] protection of their own troops and reconnaissance.

Soviet Troops To Begin Pullout From Neuruppin

*LD1708085690 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 0659 GMT 17 Aug 90*

[Text] Neuruppin (ADN)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the garrison town of Neuruppin in Potsdam Bezirk [Potsdam Area] will begin this month, Ernst Bahr (SPD) [Social Democratic Party], chief administrative officer of Neuruppin Kreis [Neuruppin District], told ADN today. The date he gave was 25 August. Tank troops will be the first. Bahr said he is certain that all Soviet troops will have left the town by the spring of 1991. The withdrawal of the units, which belong to the Western Group of Soviet Forces, is taking place within the framework of the disarmament measures decided on by the Soviet Union.

INDIA

Lab Director Cited on Akash Missile Program*BK1608040890 Hong Kong AFP in English 1735 GMT
15 Aug 90*

[Text] New Delhi, August 15 (AFP)—India has successfully test-fired a new surface-to-air missile, a senior official quoted by the PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) said Wednesday. The medium-range multi-target "Akash" (sky) missile was fired from the interim test range at eastern coastal Orissa state's Chandipur area Tuesday, PTI said.

Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, director of the Defence Research and Development Laboratory, reportedly said that with the latest missile "we have commenced the flight-test programme for Akash, which consists of a series of nine flights over a two-year period." "We hope to have four more flights of the system this year," PTI quoted Mr. Abdul Kalam as saying in a dispatch from Bhubaneswar, the capital of Orissa on the Bay of Bengal coast.

Mr. Abdul Kalam was also quoted by PTI as saying that the first flight trial of the Akash was to test its high-energy propulsion system. Its next launch would use a different propulsion system, which he did not specify. He said the Akash was expected to be deployed by 1993. It is the fifth missile developed as part of India's billion-dollar integrated guided missile development programme launched in 1983.

Two of the five—the surface-to-surface Prithvi (Earth) and multi-role, short-range surface-to-air Trishul (Trident)—are already in production and are to be brought into service by 1991-92, he said. A third missile, the Agni (Fire) with a range of 2,500 kms (1,500 miles), was successfully tested in May 1989, while the Nag (Cobra), an anti-tank missile that can be fired from the ground or air, was tested in June this year.

ISRAEL

Arrow ABM Missile Tested, Defense Minister Comments**No Decision on Procurement***TA0908135190 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1300 GMT 9 Aug 90*

[Text] Israel carried out the first test of the Arrow antimissile missile an hour ago. It was launched from a site in the country, lifted at a tremendous speed to an elevation many kilometers high, and was destroyed according to plan. The launch was observed by the heads of the defense establishment, Israel Aircraft Industries representatives, and guests from the United States, which finances a large part of the project.

The defense minister said that when the system is completed it will be able to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. He noted, nonetheless, that so far no final decision has been made on whether Israel will procure the missiles, although that is the intention.

Air Force Commander Major General Avihu Bin-Nun said that the missile constitutes Israel's response to the missiles Iraq has. These reports were filed by our correspondents Karmela Menashe and Meron Tzur.

Further Technical Details*TA0908195990 Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew
1800 GMT 9 Aug 90*

[Report by army affairs correspondent Moshe Shlonsky]

[Text] Over the last few days, television and press crews waited at the beach front opposite the Arrow missile's launch base. That secret, too, seems to have leaked, but this time it appears that no special effort was made to conceal it. Was there a link between the launch and the Persian Gulf crisis? Well, the launching of the Arrow had been planned many months in advance and was scheduled for July or early August. Technical hitches prevented the launch before today, but the defense establishment is not too sorry about that delay.

The Arrow was launched at 1535 [1235 GMT], marking the end of the first stage of its development, and headed seaward. What you can see is part of the booster, which plunged to the seawater. The missile exploded over the waters. In a real test, the missile is supposed to encounter another missile in flight and hit it.

The project involves approximately \$800 million, most of which will be defrayed by the United States. The success in developing the missile will constitute a technological breakthrough on an international scale. In fact, the Israel Aircraft Industries has been developing technologies that do not exist even in U.S. research laboratories.

This is the launch base. It seems that some people came to the beach this morning to work while others came to have a good time. It should be remembered that this missile will become operational only in another five years. Israel plans to purchase the missile, but involved is an extremely high financial expense and the source for that kind of money is unclear.

The launch of the Arrow missile is similar to the firing of a rifle bullet, which is supposed to hit another bullet in mid-trajectory.

The Arrow system will be based on an acquisition and tracking radar, one which will give an alert immediately upon the launch of the missile from a great distance. After locating the missile, the Arrow will be launched at the missile moving toward Israel at a distance of dozens of kilometers and at great heights. The Arrow's velocity will be extremely high, as it is expected to overcome fast-moving missiles, not aircraft. Its velocity is 10 times the

speed of sound, equal to the velocity of the missiles it is supposed to counter. If the Arrow fails to hit the first time, the launcher will have sufficient time to launch a second missile. There is a 90-percent chance that the enemy missile will be destroyed en route to Israel. The ultimate goal of the Arrow system is to contend with a large number of missiles launched at several targets in Israel, as one cannot expect only one missile to be launched.

Missile, U.S. Role Viewed

TA1008105290 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
10 Aug 90 p A3

[Commentary by Re'uven Pedatzur: "Until the Arrow is Developed the IDF Does Not Have an Operational Answer to Ballistic Missiles"]

[Text] Yesterday's successful first test launch of the Arrow missile gives the Israel Aircraft Industries [IAI] an impressive head start on the long road toward developing the first system in the world to intercept ballistic missiles. The launch was only the first step in the long and difficult process which is to last about five years and is aimed at becoming a far-reaching technological breakthrough.

The Arrow launch was aimed at testing only the launching mechanism, the missile's engine, and part of the computer system's functioning. It was not aimed at hitting any target and was ordered to self-destruct after a trajectory of about one minute.

Although the timing of the launch was not influenced by events in the Gulf and was postponed time after time in the past month, the impression created was that it was a message by Israel and the United States (the boss of SDI, under which the missile is being developed) to Saddam Husayn during such a tense period. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and Saddam Husayn's threats to Israel and other countries in the region have given an additional perspective to the success of the test launch.

Although it is, as the defense minister said yesterday, only the earliest stage of the development process, the U.S. Administration rushed ahead to make political capital out of the success of the launch. The IAI drafted the wording of the press release and handed it over to the SDI command for the album it is to issue. At that stage, however, the White House entered the picture and President Bush's closest advisers personally worked on the wording of the release to the media, stressing the system's strategic future value.

It seems that the coincidence of the latest Middle East events and the timing of the launch will increase the support of the U.S. Congress, which is supposed to decide on the amount of U.S. funding for the second stage of the missile's development.

The Arrow project has a three-stage plan. The first, which is supposed to be completed in the coming months, will end after the Arrow will be launched at

another missile and intercept it; this is planned for next month. The cost of the first development stage is put at \$158 million, 80 percent of which is U.S. funded.

The cost of the second stage is estimated at some \$250 million, and it is still not clear what percentage of that will be American funded. White House excitement over the successful launch and the use it quickly made of it is evidence that pressure will be exerted on Congress to increase funding.

The IAI estimates that the total cost of development will reach some \$1.25 billion, and the IAI hopes that Israel's contribution will not exceed \$750 million.

The missile launched yesterday was one-phased while the final version will be dual-phased with a velocity of more than ten times the speed of sound. In addition, the missile will have unprecedented maneuverability in relation to any other missile—some 200-G.

The Arrow system will be made up of a sophisticated radar with long-range detection capability, and the missile's launchers will fire two missiles simultaneously in order to assure the best possible chances of hitting the hostile missile. According to IAI engineers' estimates, the Arrow's destructive capability will be over 90 percent, a percentage currently not existing in the air defense system.

It has lately been learned that the Israel Military Industries and the manufacturers of the U.S. Patriot missile have an agreement aimed at achieving joint development of a defense system against dual-phase missiles. Within that framework the Arrow is meant to shoot down hostile long-range ballistic missiles while the Patriot will intercept the short-range missiles which penetrate the Arrow missile shield.

The defense establishment stresses that until the development process is completed in five years, the IDF [(Israel Defense Forces)] will not have an operational answer to the Iraqi missile threat.

The IDF is aware of the problem that might be created when it is decided to procure the Arrow because of the high cost of the system, estimated at billions of dollars. Nevertheless, the defense minister decided that the completion of the development is of the highest priority.

Link with U.S. SDI Program Recalled

90WC0102A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 27 Jul 90 p 7

[Article by Dore Gold, director of the U.S. Foreign and Defence Policy Project, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. The Arrow anti-missile programme continues to receive U.S. support because it is best-suited to cope with the threat represented by countries like Iraq.]

[Text] The understanding Defence Minister Moshe Arens brought back from his recent visit to Washington on continued U.S. support for the joint U.S.-Israeli Arrow anti-missile programme, underlines the importance both countries still attach to missile-defence systems even in the post-Cold War era.

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme—of which Arrow is a part—was initiated by then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan back in 1983 in the heyday of the “evil empire” period of fighting the Soviets. Many U.S. weapons systems originally conceived for contending with the Soviet threat, are now being slashed by the Pentagon and the armed-services committees of Congress.

Arrow, on the other hand, continues to draw a great deal of interest in Washington; it is directly relevant to the emerging environment in which new Third World adversaries like Iraq will more prominently challenge U.S. and Israeli joint interests as the Soviet challenge loses its salience. The support for Arrow is particularly remarkable considering that the United States already has an operational air-defence system, called Patriot, which has been proven to have impressive anti-missile capabilities as well.

Israel's preference for continuing with Arrow instead of buying the already existing Patriot air-defence system is understandable, considering the current state of Middle Eastern missile threats and the likely trends that will follow. Patriot was originally built by its manufacturer, Raytheon, in the mid-1970s as an air-defence missile intended for intercepting incoming enemy aircraft at considerably greater ranges than the well-known Hawk air-defence missile (already deployed by Israel since the 1960s).

By 1986, modified Patriot missiles were proven to be able to intercept a U.S. Lance ballistic missile in flight at an altitude just under eight km.

Subsequently, Patriot succeeded in intercepting various other ballistic missile targets, simulating the flight paths of several Soviet short-range missiles, including the SS-21 (range 100-120 kilometres) and SS-23 (range 500 kilometres) missiles.

But even with these impressive anti-missile achievements, due chiefly to software modifications, Patriot still was chiefly an air-defence missile with clear performance limitations. According to JANE'S WEAPONS SYSTEMS, Patriot's speed is “in excess of Mach 3.” Given its speed and the altitudes it was designed to optimally operate at, Patriot was defined by most analysts as chiefly a *point-defence* system, capable of defending itself against a ballistic-missile attack as well as protecting an area with a very restricted radius.

Last week, a spokesman for Israel Aircraft Industries assessed on Israel Radio the radius of the area that Patriot could defend as 15 kilometres. Thus Patriot was ideally suited, in its anti-missile mission, for protecting

Nato airbases in West Germany against a surprise surgical Soviet SS-21 missile attack, that was expected to be followed by waves of Soviet aircraft.

If Israel had chiefly to contend with a Syrian SS-21 missile threat alone, then Patriot might be well-suited for protecting Israeli airbases in the north that fall under the Syrian missile threat. But at present, Israel's central strategic concerns are shifting from Syria to Iraq.

Iraq, unlike Syria, has deployed intermediate-range (about 500 kilometres) missiles like the 650-kilometre al-Husayn and the nearly 900-kilometre-range al-Abbas.

Moreover, while the Soviet-supplied SS-21 is known to have sufficient accuracy to hit military targets (most hits are generally within a 150-metre radius), the longer-range Iraqi missiles are expected to miss their targets by more than a kilometre. In short, Patriot may be well suited for contending with the older Syrian counter-military missile threat; but assuming that Iraqi missiles are used to strike civilian areas like they did in Iran, where accuracy is unimportant, Patriot cannot provide a wide enough area of defence to protect Israeli cities.

Arrow could offer the protection that Patriot was never designed to provide. Israel Television reported that Arrow is being designed to fly at an intercept velocity of Mach 10—considerably faster than Patriot. It will also meet its target at considerably greater altitudes than Patriot. As a result, the defended area that Arrow provides could have a radius of as much as 100 kilometres according to IAI's figures supplied to Israel Radio.

Rather than being a *point defence* for protecting small military targets, Arrow could provide an *area defence* for Israeli population centres. Moreover, it should be able to cope with the enormous speeds associated with intermediate-range missiles as against the slower short-range missiles that Patriot is suited to handle.

In adopting missile defences, generally, Israel would have an enormous advantage over its Arab rejectionist adversaries; for the first time its small size would be a strategic advantage, as the defence of the enormous expanses of the Arab states would be far more costly than the defence of Israel.

For the United States, defences against Third World threats, like that of Iraq, will be essential if the American military is to continue to have a worldwide role in the future. The current crisis in the Persian Gulf best exemplifies the kind of post-Soviet threats the United States will have to face. Should the United States determine that it has to use military force to protect Kuwait from the two Iraqi divisions currently sitting on the Kuwaiti border, then any intervening U.S. forces will have to take into account Iraqi missile threats.

For example, in several years' time, should the U.S. Air Force obtain permission from the Saudis to use Dhahran Air Base to protect Kuwait in a similar scenario, the Iraqis might then have sufficient missile accuracies to

threaten any intervening American aircraft. At that time, American Nato bases in Turkey will also come within range of a future generation of Iraqi missiles. A U.S. ground force in Kuwait could already come under the accurate fire of Iraqi SS-21s, should they be supplied by the Soviet Union. In these sorts of situations a rapidly deployed U.S. Arrow system could become critical for defending American bases, facilities and personnel from Middle East missile threats.

Arrow is of interest to the United States, moreover, because of considerations involving the protection of the United States as well. The SDI programme, at present, is designing missile defences with a space-based component (called "Brilliant Pebbles") and a ground-based

component (called Eris)—both of which are intended to deal chiefly with the residual Soviet threat or accidental launches. Arrow has little to offer the space-based elements of SDI; but Israeli technological breakthroughs in ground-based missile defences could be of great interest to American planners.

As the Pentagon budget faces further cutbacks, the relative importance of the ground-based components of SDI might well increase, as space-basing becomes prohibitively costly. Israel's cooperative venture with the United States, thus, is largely in line with the basic security concerns and fiscal constraints shaping America's post-Cold War defence policy.

Iraqi, Israeli Missile Capability Noted

90UM0683A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by M. Mikhaylov: "Jericho", 'Shavit', and Others"]

[Text] Proliferation of Nuclear Missile Weapons in the Near East

A number of "Third World" countries already have or are on the threshold of developing their own nuclear missile weapons. This phenomenon is accompanied by exacerbation of relations between states, something which is especially characteristic of the Near East. Thus the persistent striving of Israel to build up its nuclear missile potential threatens an increase in Israel-Arab military confrontation.

More than 140 countries of the world have joined the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. Possessed by nuclear ambitions, to this point Israel has not signed it. Thus it deliberately maintains an equivocal position with respect to its nuclear status. According to reports from the foreign press, work to create and develop nuclear potential has been carried out in Israel for roughly twenty years. The nuclear reactor at Dimona (Negev Desert) is capable of developing 20-40 kg of weapons-grade plutonium a year, which is sufficient for the production of 5-8 nuclear munitions. At the present time Israel may have more than 100 nuclear munitions. The achieved technological level and information received from various capitalist countries on the design and results of testing of nuclear explosive devices frees Israel of the need to conduct its own testing.

The Dimona reactor, which is not under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], is a heavy-water reactor operating on natural uranium. It is thought that Israel might acquire this material from Argentina, South Africa, Belgium, France, and other countries. Heavy water, which is a neutron decelerator, was purchased abroad, including from the U.S. and Norway. According to estimates of western specialists, Israel now has the necessary potential for independent production of reactor fuel and heavy water in quantities sufficient to maintain operation of the nuclear reactor.

In addition, at the Dimona research center there are two units for chemical refinement of irradiated fuel. The first unit, of the laboratory type, was constructed with the help of Great Britain. The second, more powerful, is a source of weapons-grade plutonium, and was constructed with the help of France. It makes it possible to produce from 15 to 40 kg of fissionable plutonium a year.

Israel has mobile surface-to-surface missile systems to deliver the nuclear munitions to their target. The single-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile "Jericho-1," with a range of 450-550 km, was developed using the technology of the French "Avionics Marcel Dassau" company. Israel

has around 160 Lance missiles (range up to 120 km) supplied by the U.S. In 1987 flight tests were begun on the new Jericho-2 missile system developed by the Israelis, with a range of around 1,450 km. American technology was used to develop the most important assemblies and systems.

A two-stage Shavit launch vehicle was developed on the basis of the Jericho-2 missile, and was used to launch the Ofek-1 and Ofek-2 artificial earth satellites into low near-earth orbits in September 1988 and April 1990 respectively. Their orbits were chosen so that the satellites would pass over territories of Arab countries bordering Israel at minimal altitude, which is very important, since according to the data of western specialists they are designed to collect reconnaissance information.

In this regard, the idea was put forward in the Arab world of developing their own military space potential in retaliation. But soon it became clear that launching an Arab military satellite into space was a very complex task. The possibility of acquiring a missile strike potential through purchase of missile complexes abroad, or development of their own missiles, was admitted to be more feasible.

Iraq, which has no small experience in the use of missiles in the course of armed conflict with Iran, is considered the most advanced in this field. Iraqi specialists have been able to increase the range of fire of missiles purchased abroad by modernizing them. The "Al-Hussein" operational-tactical missile, with a range of fire up to 600 km, was used to bombard Teheran and other Iranian cities. The "Al-Abbas," with a range of fire of 900 km, was tested in 1988. Specialists of Argentina, the FRG, and other countries participated in modernization of both missiles. The Tammuz-1 ballistic missile, with a range of fire of 2,000 km, is being developed on the basis of the Argentine-West German missile Kondor-2 (in Arab countries it is known as the "Badr-2000"). It can be equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation or dispenser warhead with fragmentation or chemical submunitions.

Iraq is conducting intensive development of launch vehicles designed to orbit artificial earth satellites, including for military purposes. Within the framework of this program, in Dec 1989 a test launch of the "Abed" launch vehicle was performed at the Al-Aibar range. It was developed on the basis of local and foreign technology, and is capable of putting satellites with a mass up to 150 kg into low near-earth orbit. The purpose of the launch was to demonstrate Iraq's capabilities in the field of missile technology, and as the press reported, to demonstrate that it had eliminated its lag behind Israel in this field. However according to estimates of western specialists, analysis of launch data showed that it was not as successful as Baghdad had announced. Iraq is preparing for another launch of its delivery vehicle in the immediate future.

Other countries which are developing their own missile weapons or acquiring them abroad in order to "balance out" the Israeli threat include Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and Iran.

As for the creation of their own nuclear weapons, near-eastern countries (with the exception of Israel) do not have the necessary scientific-technical base. In the opinion of western specialists, they are doing theoretical and laboratory work there using research reactors (Iran, Iraq, Egypt). However, monitoring of the operation of these reactors by the IAEA rules out the possibility of creating plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons. According to estimates of western specialists, if the corresponding decisions are made by the governments of these countries, the development of an experimental model of a nuclear device is possible in Iraq at the end of the 90s and in Iran no earlier than the year 2000. In the other Near-Eastern countries, the question of the possibility of creating such weapons is not seriously considered for the time being. Considering the clear advantage of Israel in this field, certain Arab countries, particularly Iraq, are working to develop new types of chemical weapons.

Thus Israel is the first in the Near East to acquire mass-destruction weapons. Connivance in this on the part of a number of western countries promotes destabilization of the situation in the region and beyond its borders.

Grinevskiy Interviewed on Progress of Vienna CSBM Talks

*LD1008185590 Moscow TASS in English
1804 GMT 10 Aug 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, August 10 (TASS)—Participants in the Vienna talks must work out a significant document on confidence building and security measures [CSBM] before the November all-European summit in Paris.

A technical break was declared today at the talks which have achieved considerable progress in a number of minor issues.

The sides reached a consensus on the exchange of information on military budgets. There has been noticeable progress in the creation of a unified communications system. Participants are discussing annual conferences to implement the already agreed upon confidence building and security measures. They have reached accord on the development of some provisions of the Stockholm agreements.

These provisions are not sufficient for a truly substantial, final document. This can be reached only by extending confidence building measures to military activities on the land, in the sea, and in the air and by including a provision on the limitation of military activities.

NATO countries reject this point of view. Such differences arouse a well-grounded concern among other participants in the talks. They stress that a breakthrough is only possible if the states who differ over the extension of confidence building measures to include the Air Force and Navy display a readiness to compromise.

"We still believe that while elaborating a qualitatively new set of confidence building and security measures, it is impossible to ignore the extension of these measures to military activities of land forces, navies, and air forces as well as it is impossible to avoid the problem of limiting military activities," the head of the Soviet delegation, ambassador at large Oleg Grinevskiy, told TASS.

"But taking into account the time factor, and in fact little time is left before the all-European summit, we propose that participants in the talks concentrate on reaching an agreement and including in a document for the Paris summit the following provisions concerning the Navy: Exchange of statistical information, extension of notification and supervision to military activities of the Navy that are held together with land forces and amphibious operations, and a seminar on naval doctrines within the framework of the CSCE," Grinevskiy said.

The creation of all-European institutions has become another important direction at the talks. New structures, together with other functions, will have to increase the efficiency of current and future confidence building measures. The measures themselves should give content to the security structures that are to be created.

In other words, the institutionalization of the CSCE process and the elaboration of new confidence building and security measures are two sides of the same process of the confidence building and security process.

This close identification has been highlighted by the problems in the establishment of a center to prevent conflicts and exchange military information. Participants in the talks are almost unanimous about having the center become a link to new models of security in Europe. When determining the center's range of activities, proposals have shown a high degree of similarity.

Tank, Armored Vehicle Issue Stalls Vienna CFE Talks

*PM1308140990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Article by correspondent S. Tosunyan: "Provided They Don't Run Out of Time. Will Vienna Talks Participants Keep to Allotted Time"]

[Text] Vienna—There are still 100 days left before the Paris summit begins. It is scheduled for 19 November, and the signing of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] by the 35 CSCE states' presidents and heads of state will be one of the main items on its agenda. NATO and Warsaw Pact delegations are now preparing the draft treaty in Vienna.

Almost 18 months of talks are behind us, only 100 days lie ahead. Will the diplomats succeed in putting a document ready for signing on the table in Paris? I put this question to members of many delegations at the Vienna forum and invariably received an affirmative answer with one reservation: Provided the negotiating process is speeded up.

A considerable amount has indeed been done. The sides' agreement on levels of tanks and armored vehicles this June can be described as a very major breakthrough. The problem of cutting these categories of arms had long been the most difficult to overcome. From the military viewpoint they are considered the most dangerous.

According to experts, roughly one-third of the text of the actual treaty and the subtext of the protocol on inspections are now ready. That is substantial baggage which must not be disregarded.

Nonetheless diplomats do not hide the fact that the pace of the talks has slowed down of late. Why? Take the protracted dispute over naval aviation. The West claims that these aircraft must invariably be encompassed by the agreement but refuses to take into consideration our side's concern about carrier-based aviation. However, it is well known that carrier aviation can be used like land-based aviation. No way out of the deadlock has yet been found.

The resolution of problems of establishing levels for the weapons and hardware subject to limitation has also dragged on.

When defining the rule of sufficiency it must not be forgotten that a different situation has taken shape in Europe today. Hence the treaty must also take into consideration the possibility of a particular state's declaring itself neutral or even leaving one alliance and joining another. The impending unification of Germany confirms that this is possible. A whole series of problems is arising. German membership of NATO, along with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe, is creating a new situation in the region; the balance of forces and the balance of interests of many European states is changing. If this is not taken into consideration the sides will be placed in unequal positions.

The completion of the talks on schedule depends on the timely resolution of the verification question.

A position on the procedure for and monitoring of the destruction of the arms being cut back has not been fully agreed. General accord has been reached on the fact that artillery and certain other system must be destroyed within two or three years. But what about tanks and armored vehicles? To our cost we manufactured far more of them than the West. Consequently we have more to cut back. It is impossible to confine ourselves to the proposed time frame. What is more, our country could use some of this hardware for road building following its conversion as bulldozers and tractors. But

our Western negotiating partners cannot bring themselves to make this compromise. In short, there are considerable problems.

The delegations will go home 13 August for a short time in order to consult with their governments and will hold the final phase of the talks on their return to Vienna.

Analyst Discusses Prospects for Vienna CFE Talks

*LD1408180990 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT
14 Aug 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 14 (TASS)—European political analysts are waiting to see whether 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries will manage to hammer out a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] in Vienna before a European summit in Paris in November.

This question is undoubtedly on the minds of representatives of both East and West. Indeed, the summit will begin in less than 100 days.

The Vienna negotiators have done much: They have agreed over 30 per cent of the treaty, over 50 per cent of a protocol on inspections and reached an understanding on the very difficult question of armoured forces.

Nevertheless, there are still many outstanding issues.

One of the most important is the problem of air force reduction. It was discussed with difficulty for a long time. The differences have somewhat narrowed, although there is a long way to go before full agreement is reached.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the chances for an understanding would rise if the West took account of the USSR's geostrategic interests when discussing the issue of air defence interceptor fighters.

It is also high time for NATO countries to think about a compromise on naval aviation.

Western representatives claim that only land-based naval jets should be cut, disregarding the East's concern over warplanes based on aircraft carriers.

They know that sea-based aviation can inflict as much damage as a land-based air force.

There are also problems concerning control and the order of destroying weapons and military hardware to be reduced.

An understanding was reached to destroy artillery and some other systems over two to three years after the treaty goes into force. As for tanks and armoured cars, the Soviet Union which has greater numbers of them

than NATO countries, will need much more time for their destruction and re-equipment for utilisation in the economy.

Since the West is interested in equalising these weapons in the two blocs, it should display more reason in determining a realistic time for the East to destroy tanks and armoured cars.

Together with these and other issues which were put on the agenda of talks long ago, other problems have emerged recently.

The new situation in Europe in connection with German unification and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe has meant that the sides will find themselves in unequal conditions if changes in the balance of forces and interests of many European states are not taken into account.

Therefore, it is necessary to change the present conceptual framework of the Vienna talks and to review the distribution of regional sublevels of weapons and military hardware as well as the principle of restricting weapons for a single country.

Thus, the remaining period is becoming a serious test for negotiators and their ability to display flexibility, a constructive approach and dynamism.

UN Conference on Arms Reduction, Conversion Held in Moscow

Yakovlev Addresses Forum

*PM1508151990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Conversion: Ideal and Practice"]

[Text] Conversion is an important part of disarmament, which can help make this process permanent and irreversible. More than 130 politicians, experts, industrialists, and businessmen from 40 countries gathered in Moscow 13 August to assemble the best world experience of transferring the military-industrial complex to a peaceful footing.

They are participating in the UN conference "Conversion: Changes in the Economic Sphere in the Era of Arms Reduction." The forum is being conducted by the UN disarmament department with the assistance of the Soviet Peace Foundation and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Messages from USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar were read out at the opening.

Speaking at the opening ceremony, USSR Presidential Council member A.N. Yakovlev noted that mankind reached the threshold of the 21st century before it acquired the wisdom and the level of civilized maturity to be able to voluntarily begin the practical process of

real disarmament. It must be understood that conversion is not an aim in itself and not a compulsory payment for past errors and former political goals and priorities. It is not even simply a demand of life. The conversion of military production facilities and spheres of activity can and must be an integral part of the creation of a better world—on a national and global scale, he stressed.

The UN conference ends 17 August.

Press Briefing Conducted

*LD1508195990 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT
15 Aug 90*

[By TASS correspondents Vyacheslav Akimov and Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, August 15 (TASS)—Participants in the international conference "Conversion: Changes in the Economic Sphere in the Era of Arms Reduction," currently in session in Moscow, today broke into working groups to discuss various aspects of military production conversion.

At a news conference during a break between sessions, Peter Richards, a representative of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), emphasised that the participants focused on the problem of redistributing manpower resources freed as a result of converting military-oriented factories to consumer goods production.

Speakers at the news conference stressed that today's session of the conference was notable for the pluralism of views.

The conference has seen arguments between supporters of the market variant of effecting conversion and the authors of the draft government programme for conversion. It was outlined by USSR State Planning Committee First Deputy Head Valentin Smyslov at Tuesday's session.

Among the points of the programme which sparked the most heated debate at the session, was the provision on state aid to the converted businesses, the majority of which remain under the authority of the USSR Defence Ministry.

"These factories should be self-supporting," said Alexey Izyumov from the Soviet Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute. "It is necessary, above all, that market incentives be put into operation." He believes that the success of military conversion will hinge on these principles.

Responding, USSR State Planning Committee representative Viktor Kotov said the government intended to give aid to the converted factories only within two to three years, after which "these factories will have fully mastered consumer goods production and will not need aid any more."

He drew participants' attention to the Soviet bill on military production conversion. It includes several serious measures to give social aid to working people who may suffer as a result of conversion.

Semipalatinsk Underground Nuclear Test Televised

*PM1708120190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1250 GMT 14 Aug 90*

[Captions from a 40-second broadcast showing an underground nuclear test at the Semipalatinsk Test Range; from the "Scientific Bulletin" program]

[Text] The area of the test range is 1.8 million hectares. The average cost of a single nuclear test in the USSR is 20-25 million rubles. Between 16 and 18 underground tests were carried out annually at the Semipalatinsk Range. Between 1949 and 1989 there were 636 nuclear tests in the USSR—Greenpeace data.

'Constructive Spirit' Desired in Vienna CSBM Talks

*LD1508163490 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT
15 Aug 90*

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 15 (TASS)—There is now a brief technical recess at the Vienna talks on confidence and security building measures [CSBM] in Europe. The situation at the talks is now being analysed in the capitals of the participating countries.

One would like to hope that, as a result, all the sides will elaborate additional proposals making it possible to resolve the remaining problems soon and in a constructive spirit. There is less than three months to go before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Paris.

It should be recognised that positive results have already been obtained: The sides agreed to develop some provisions of the Stockholm accords on confidence building measures, reached consensus on the exchange of information on military budgets, and there is appreciable progress in the establishment of a single communications system.

There has been headway over problems concerning the establishment of a conflict prevention and military information exchange centre. The negotiators agree that such a centre may become an element in the set of new patterns of security in Europe. Elements of agreement in approaches to the determination of a sphere of activity for such a centre have also appeared.

However, what has been done is not enough for the document, which is being prepared for the Paris summit, to be genuinely substantive and to constitute a significant step forward in strengthening European security.

One should feel particular concern, in my view, over NATO countries' persistent negative stand on the question of spreading confidence-building measures over to the activities of naval and air forces and on limitations on such activities.

Can one ignore these problems when elaborating a new package of confidence-building and security measures?

I think that to evade this way of posing the problem is to seek to ensure some special advantages for the side which has the balance of forces, say, in the naval field, tipped in its favour.

NATO as is known, has an edge in this field. Therefore, in the absence of changes in this respect, the Soviet Union and its allies will remain seriously concerned over the closed nature of the naval activities of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Soviet side, considering the time element, tried to formulate anew its attitude towards naval forces. At this stage it is suggested limiting oneself so far to accords on the following: exchanges of statistical information, notifications and monitoring covering naval activities conducted jointly with land forces, as well as amphibious operations, and the holding of a seminar within the CSCE framework to discuss naval doctrines.

One would like to hope that these new proposals will help the negotiators make considerable headway in elaborating the document on confidence-building measures.

It is important for Western negotiators to appreciate this compromise version and, for their part, move closer to the Soviet position.

Flawed Arms Control Reporting Criticized

*90UM0856A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Aug 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by G. Khromov, member of the Soviet delegation on nuclear and space weapons negotiations in Geneva: "Militant Incompetence; Concerning Weapons Reductions and Certain Soviet Press Articles"]

[Text] Soon after the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles went into effect, articles began to appear in a number of press organs with criticisms of its individual provisions and "recommendations" as to what the approach should be in the preparation of new agreements concerning weapons limitations, first and foremost the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] treaty. Articles of this kind continue to be published now as well. But the newspaper RAB-OCHAYA TRIBUNA, with its own views on this score, formulated an appeal to the 28th CPSU Congress.

In assessing these materials, it must be observed that as a rule they are prepared without the required knowledge of the subject. At the same time their authors, and the

mass media organs in which they are published, confuse the reader, and the proposed recommendations are far from objective reality.

Facts? Unfortunately, as many as you want. Thus, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI asserts that mobile launchers for medium-range Soviet missiles are eliminated by means of an explosion. But this does not correspond to reality, it is not provided for in the treaty, and contradicts it.

The statement that the medium-range missiles themselves are blown up entirely (RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA) also requires clarification. Only 65 percent of these missiles are destroyed by means of an explosion. But before this, the most complex and expensive elements are removed—guidance system apparatuses, for example. Moreover, the explosion itself as a method of eliminating missile parts is selected based on the need for economy of means and not regardless of it, as some newspapers write.

In selecting the methods of destruction, besides economic considerations many other considerations were taken into account: the periods of elimination—all shorter-range missiles were to be destroyed in 1.5 years, and intermediate-range in three years; the workload of the production capacity; transportation difficulties; inspection complications, and ecological requirements. And a lot has to be paid for all of this.

Incidentally, with respect to ecological problems there is either especially a lot of confusion or there is intentional distortion. Thus, in comparing methods of missile elimination, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA wrote: "Those same very valuable chemical compounds that the Americans transform into hard currency, we risk turning into components that are lethal for the environment." But in actual fact the chemical compounds that are released into the air both through the elimination of Soviet missiles by means of explosion and by American missiles burning fuel are practically the same.

We should dwell especially on the "recommendations" applicable to the future START treaty.

This treaty deals with a reduction in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers (HB). Together with missiles, their launchers must also be reduced. The reductions must be implemented in the course of seven years after the treaty goes into force—by the years 1997-1998.

The operational life of strategic arms are assessed to be 10-15 years (with the exception of nuclear submarines, whose period is 25-30 years). Considering that the START negotiations have been going on for a long time, it can be asserted that, under the reduction, those equipment models that have virtually "served their time" will be "surrendered" under the reduction first of all. Naturally, they will not be replaced by new ones.

So the authors' recommendations that we are talking about demand, in a categorical way, the utilization for satellite launches of missiles removed from service, the utilization of heavy bombers as "flying laboratories" for environmental monitoring, the utilization of nuclear submarines as launch platforms for meteorological rockets in the ocean, and the utilization of ICBM silos to store waste products from nuclear power stations or from "poison gas elimination facilities." This is true daydreaming. The only things lacking are suggestions to build bridges and retail shops full of all sorts of colonial products.

At the START talks both the Soviet and American sides have already agreed that it would be expedient to use some portion of the missiles to be eliminated to launch useful payloads into the upper atmosphere or into outer space. Furthermore, when possible former military missiles are already being used for such purposes. But unfortunately, this approach cannot be the basic one.

First of all, liquid-fueled military missiles use highly toxic fuel components. And for peaceful launches the transition to rockets built for types of fuel (kerosene, hydrogen or oxygen) which cannot pollute the environment. And secondly, adapting military missiles to launch payloads into space would require design work which would cost at least several tens of millions of rubles and significant reconstruction work (adding an additional rocket stage, altering the control system and launcher, and so forth).

Taking this into account, and proceeding from the limited demand for light-weight satellites, on the order of ten to twenty per year—and rebuilt missiles could carry only such satellites into orbit—it will often be better to use rockets which have been specifically designed for this and which are now being produced on a series basis.

Further, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of reequipping a heavy bomber—the most ecologically "dirty" aircraft—in a laboratory for monitoring the cleanliness of the environment. Indeed, this is not in any way economically expedient, either from the standpoint of fuel consumption or from the standpoint of surplus lift capacity. In addition, we are not really faced yet with the real task of eliminating bombers. We have less of them than the number agreed to in the draft treaty. Consequently, our heavy bombers will be removed from operation only after the full completion of their service life, and when flying them will no longer be permissible.

I will note also that design elaborations and economic estimates of the possibility of employing nuclear submarines as platforms for the launch of research rockets from various points of the world's oceans have not yet produced positive results. Especially as the question here also is about nuclear submarines that have reached the end of their designed service life.

It is probably time for all of us to become competently and professionally involved with our own work and not to be carried away by proposals of the composers of

versions of economic reform, proposals of former party workers to restructure bank affairs, and proposals of literary figures to reequip ICBM launch silos into plants for the elimination of chemical weapons (such launch facilities have limited dimensions and are located most frequently in the kinds of places that do not pertain to the specific features of such work.

I will note in conclusion that quite a few articles also appear in the American press about agreements on limiting and reducing weapons. Special attention is being given to the future START treaty. Opinions are sometimes polarized, but, as a rule, they should not be recognized as unqualified or amateurish. The authors of these articles—Smith, Gordon, Bert, and other journalists—not only themselves analyze in detail that which was published before, but they consult with representatives of the administration and with independent experts.

It is not clear why some organs of the Soviet press, including the leading ones, do not work according to such a plan. We would only gain from this effort.

Government Orders Mukachevo Radar Station Mothballed

*PM2108151090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 6*

[Report by N. Burbyga under the rubric "From Competent Sources": "Transcarpathian Radar Construction Halted"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA has written on several occasions about the construction of a major radar near the village of Pestryalovo, Transcarpathian Oblast, and the population's protests about this. Here is another report. Construction of the radar has been halted by order of the USSR Council of Ministers and all the facility's installations are to be mothballed.

The USSR Defense Ministry is obliged to recultivate areas of woodland and pasture that have suffered as a result of the construction work. The work of mothballing the buildings and installations and recultivating the land will be paid for with funds allocated by the USSR Defense Ministry for the radar's construction.

At IZVESTIYA's request, Colonel V. Butenko, deputy chief engineer of an Air Defense Forces Directorate, commented on this report.

[Butenko] We are obliged to carry out the USSR Council of Ministers' orders. All work on the radar has now been suspended and the facility's installations are being mothballed.

[Burbyga] Valeriy Vladimirovich, in one way or another the money allocated for the construction of the radar has been poured down the drain. For what purpose will the building be converted?

[Butenko] I think that we need to discuss not so much the material losses as the detriment to the country's defense.

Although outmoded, the station is still performing its tasks. There is a breach in our early-warning system owing to the fact that the United States has taken the "Trident-2" system into its arsenal and put it on alert status.

In accordance with the orders of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry, the USSR Defense Ministry, and the USSR and Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academies of Sciences, proposals will be drafted and submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers on ensuring a reliable early-warning system in this area with an eye to the ABM Treaty of 1972.

[Burbyga] How will the woodland and pastures be recultivated?

[Butenko] We have already embarked on this work. Quarries have been earmarked and soil is being taken into those areas that have been disturbed as a result of the construction work.

Norway Receives 'No Promises' on Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Testing Plans

*PM2308150690 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
15 Aug 90 p 3*

[Report by NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA: "No Clarification Over Nuclear Base on Novaya Zemlya"]

[Text] Foreign Ministry Under Secretary of State Knut Vollebaek was given no promises that the Soviet nuclear testing program will not be moved to Novaya Zemlya when he met yesterday with representatives of the Soviet authorities. However, the rumor that a Soviet nuclear test is imminent was denied.

During the talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev and disarmament department head Anatoliy Belov it was stressed that the Supreme Soviet has not yet reached a decision on the matter. At present a special Supreme Soviet committee is looking at the consequences of using two possible nuclear test sites, one of which is Novaya Zemlya. The committee will report back to the government, which will then advise the Supreme Soviet.

"I do not think therefore that there is any reason to expect any immediate surprises. It will take a fair while, perhaps months, for the matter to be decided," Vollebaek told NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA.

He said that the Norwegian authorities, who have raised the matter with the Soviet authorities four times, want an open process where there will be contacts between parliaments in addition to contacts at the government level.

**Shevardnadze Letter to UN on Arms Transfers
Published**

*PM1608110590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4*

["E.A. Shevardnadze Letter to UN Secretary General"—
IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] The Soviet Union considers that the inclusion on the UN agenda of the problems of restricting international sales and supplies of conventional weapons is a logical development of the trend toward the internationalization of the dialogue on most important questions of world politics and one of the avenues of the shaping of a new model of security in conditions of further progress toward mutual understanding and reciprocal action.

Conventional arms supplies are an often dangerous channel for the spread of the arms race to different parts of the world. They broaden access to weaponry in its most diverse forms and increase the destructiveness and bloodiness of regional conflicts. The spread of conventional weapons is also closely associated with the problem of nonproliferation in three dimensions: nuclear, chemical, and missile. Because they become competitive and, in a number of instances, essentially uncontrollable, arms supplies often fuel mistrust, reduce the level of predictability in world politics, and run counter to the current positive development of the international situation.

Diverting resources from socioeconomic development programs, expenditure on the acquisition of arms is an additional burden on the economies of many developing countries, complicates the foreign debt problem, and, as a result, makes balanced and stable world development more difficult.

The Soviet Union advocates seeking new approaches to the question of international sales and supplies of weapons while taking full account, of course, of states' inalienable right to individual and collective self-defense enshrined in the UN Charter. In our view, this search must become an integral part of efforts to cut back the arms race, settle conflicts, solve socioeconomic problems, achieve a qualitatively new level of trust, and generally strengthen guarantees of states' security.

For our part we reiterate our readiness for dialogue on restrictions on conventional arms sales and supplies with the United States and other supplier states, also with recipient states, and also with regional organizations, bearing in mind that all efforts—bilateral, regional, or global—by being mutually complementary and encouraging each other, would promote the development of a productive negotiating process.

It is our conviction that the authority of the United Nations Organization must be involved in full measure in resolving these questions. The United Nations has a mandate from the first special General Assembly session

on disarmament, which mapped out basic guidelines for the international community's efforts in this field.

First and foremost the problem of restricting international sales and supplies of conventional weapons requires the application of the principle of making a transition from overarmament to reasonable sufficiency for defense, whereby the possibility of creating offensive potentials would be ruled out, and the imposition of limits on the proliferation of the most destructive and destabilizing means of making war. The creation of an effective multilateral regime governing the nonproliferation of certain types of missiles and missile technology, in particular, would be of great significance. Another urgent measure is the prohibition of supplies of types of weapons covered by the convention on prohibiting or restricting the application of specific types of conventional weapons that can be considered as causing excessive damage or are indiscriminate in their action. There is evidently also a need for an understanding that accords on reducing arms in some parts of the world must not open the floodgates for military rivalry in others.

Progress in the matter of restricting international supplies of conventional weapons is inseparable from asserting glasnost and eliminating excessive secrecy. Here too openness would make it possible to elucidate the real situation, remove many concerns, and see more clearly the possibilities for getting to reasonable sufficiency.

We advocate that questions of arms sales and purchases be examined in the supreme legislative organs of UN member-states in accordance with adopted national legislation governing the procedures for arms supplies or purchases. We for our part envisage elaborating a corresponding all-Union law and submitting it for examination by Soviet legislators.

The USSR supports the idea of creating at the United Nations a register of arms sales and supplies and is ready to participate in elaborating its parameters. In our view, thought should be given to states submitting to the United Nations data on supplies of the main categories of weapons such as combat missiles and missile complexes, tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters, and warships and combatant craft. It would also be possible to analyze the possibility of UN member-states publishing annually—without detriment to their security as either exporters or importers of arms—information on the scale and country spread of export supplies of arms and military equipment and aid in organizing their production, creating (upgrading) facilities for military purposes, training military personnel, and also other services of a military nature. For their part importing countries could also submit information linked with the acquisition of weapons. We hope that this would encourage the joint elaboration with all interested countries of a common regime of transparency in the sphere of international arms transfers.

A combination of measures of openness in the context of arms supplies with states' participation in a standardized UN statistical reporting system for military expenditure would also be important. Such an approach could help to create an objective picture of the military potentials of arms-producing and arms-importing states alike.

In our view thought must also be given to regional approaches to the restriction of international arms flows. Consideration here must of course be given both to states' requirements for self-defense and also to the specific features of each region.

Another approach which looks promising is reaching an understanding on specific procedures for self-restriction and mutual restraint on the part of either suppliers or recipients of arms in the field of regions of conflicts in the context of their political settlement. The potential for this is now very real—on the basis of respect for freedom of choice and a collective quest for a balance of all parties' interests.

The activation of mechanisms of self-restriction in arms supplies and purchases, together with the implementation of the principles of openness here, up to and including the conclusion of corresponding agreements and the submission of the necessary information to the UN secretary general, would bolster the quest being made inside and outside the United Nations for ways to settle regional conflicts. And as a result it would be possible to reach a situation where the restriction of such supplies on a reciprocal basis or the introduction of a moratorium on them would become an integral part of any package of commitments for a political settlement of conflict situations. In this context thought could also be given, in our view, to the creation under the UN secretary general of a mechanism for investigating instances of the supposed violation of Security Council decisions or international accords in the sphere of the restriction of arms supplies.

The United Nations could also make a contribution to the important matter of regulating the re-export of arms and also play a role in the struggle against the illegal circulation of arms, which is often closely linked with terrorism and the drug business. In the context of elaborating international accords on combatting the arms "black market" there could also be a discussion of, in particular, measures to strengthen national systems for monitoring the production and export of arms. Nor do we rule out here the possibility of organizing reciprocal action and cooperation between states' customs and law enforcement services—as in the problem of the illegal circulation of drugs.

The implementation of measures to achieve openness and restrict the weapons trade would open up the prospect of the elaboration under UN auspices of a draft convention on the restriction of international arms sales and supplies.

To date the quest for common accord in the sphere of the arms trade has not yet reached the stage of negotiated

decisions. But we are convinced that through the joint efforts of states it is possible to find a constructive distillation of interests and thereby bring an additional element of stability to the international situation and contribute to the reliability of a peaceful period in the history of mankind.

With respect,
[Signed] E. Shevardnadze

Chief Delegate Batsanov on Geneva CD's Work Toward CW Ban

Addresses Conference on Chemical, Biological Arms

*LD1608173290 Moscow TASS in English 1559 GMT
16 Aug 90*

[Text] Geneva, August 16 (TASS)—Sergey Batsanov, Soviet representative at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, took the floor here today to speak on a chemical arms ban.

This year's work by the special Committee on Chemical Arms highlighted the problems that have to be resolved.

These include a system of verification, including challenge and special inspections, "ways to make the future convention banning chemical arms universal, a ban on the use of chemical arms, protection from a chemical attack, cooperation in peaceful chemistry, the line-up of the executive council of an international organisation in the framework of the future convention and its financing," Batsanov said. [no closing quotation marks as received]

The Soviet representative backed the [word indistinct] proposal to hold a special session of the conference on disarmament at the level of foreign ministers, in order to remove the last obstacles to the universal convention on chemical arms.

Ministers could approve the basic provisions of the convention and tell their representatives to hammer out the necessary technical documents and appendixes to the convention within the shortest possible time. This would lay the groundwork for preparing the [word indistinct] convention for signing by heads of state and governments before the end of 1991, he said.

A conference to discuss the implementation of a conventional banning of the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons will be held next year. "[word indistinct] believe that the experience of [words indistinct] effective verification, confidence-building measures and openness gained during preparations for the chemical arms convention will be of great use in the forthcoming joint work to improve the convention banning biological weapons," Batsanov said.

The Soviet delegation presented concrete proposals on verification, notification and information-exchange procedures that could considerably strengthen the ban on biological arms.

The sides should also discuss what should be done to make countries who have not joined the convention do so, he said.

Izvestiya Interview

*PM2408103590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[Telephone interview with S. Batsanov, USSR representative at Geneva Disarmament Conference, by correspondent G. Deyev: "Can Disarmament Conference Disarm Us"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] We think that this way of raising the question is correct, considering that in contrast to the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe and the bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic arms, the disarmament conference in Geneva is the only global forum of this kind. What is its point in the USSR's opinion—that is the question which IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Deyev put to S. Batsanov, USSR representative at the conference, linking up with him by telephone in his office in Geneva.

[Batsanov] In my view, he said, the conference is a quite mature negotiating forum: It has been in operation since 1962 and in its present form since 1979. Some 40 states, including all five nuclear states, have become members of the conference.

The conference's agenda is a sufficiently wide range of problems of disarmament, including the banning of nuclear tests, the prevention of an arms race in space, nuclear disarmament, the banning of chemical weapons, and so forth. But real talks at which the breath of a future universal all-embracing convention can be sensed already are being conducted only on chemical weapons.

In my view, for all the importance of the dynamic development of the disarmament process in the East-West context, including between the USSR and the United States and in Europe we should not forget that the 35 participants in the all-European process will not be able to create a security basis for themselves if the arms race continues and instability increases beyond their borders. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait has become a sorry confirmation of that. That is why the Soviet Union is vitally interested in ensuring that bilateral and regional disarmament is backed up by the relevant measures on a global scale, since there are problems which can be definitively resolved only at such a global forum.

[Deyev] What will the future conference on chemical weapons give us?

[Batsanov] The elimination of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction which in terms of its characteristics

presents a danger primarily to the civilian population, since in contrast to modern armed forces this population is not provided with effective means of protection against a chemical attack. The convention will also provide the certainty that chemical weapons will not appear in ever new countries, including close to our borders which, unfortunately, is happening. In addition it must not be forgotten that chemical weapons, even if they are not used, present a considerable threat to the ecology of the entire planet.

[Deyev] What is now delaying the completion of the drafting of the convention?

[Batsanov] There are not that many unresolved problems remaining at the talks but they are of a fundamental nature and a quest for package compromises, so to speak, will be needed to resolve them. It is primarily a case of elements like inspections on demand, the inclusion in the convention of a provision on the nonuse of chemical weapons, the ensuring of its universal nature, the rendering of aid to the victims of the use of chemical weapons, and the problem of international cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of chemicals. In the opinion of many delegations taking part in the talks, the final coordination of a convention would be greatly promoted by holding, within the framework of the disarmament conference, a special conference of foreign ministers devoted to talks on chemical weapons. France, for instance, has already suggested holding such a conference early next year.

[Deyev] What is the role of the bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreement on chemical weapons signed 1 June by M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush on the content of the future convention?

[Batsanov] In my view it attests primarily to the readiness of the USSR and the United States to assume leadership in the elimination of chemical weapons. The most important element of this agreement was the two states' renunciation of the further production of chemical weapons. For us that means not only that the dangerous and destabilizing program of the United States' chemical rearmament, based on the production of new binary chemical munitions, is being halted but also that the Soviet Union will now specifically not be compelled to spend funds on producing chemical weapons and subsequently to spend even more money on destroying these selfsame weapons. Of course, on the condition that the agreement is approved by the two countries' parliaments and enters into force.

[Deyev] But we will still have to destroy the chemical weapons which have already been produced. And that is a complex, expensive, and ecologically dangerous process. Do we have the power to fulfill the commitments we have assumed regarding the destruction of chemical weapons?

[Batsanov] There is no way for us to avoid the destruction of chemical weapons, even if there were no agreement with the Americans. After a while we would still

have to begin the process of destroying obsolete stockpiles, or they would be turned into a terrible threat primarily to those regions where they are concentrated. Those same Americans had elaborated and begun to implement programs for the destruction of old chemical weapons long before the opportunity appeared for concluding a bilateral agreement. The expenditure which we will inevitably have to incur in implementing the ecologically clean process of eliminating chemical weapons is nothing compared with the potential consequences of chemical catastrophes.

[Deyev] How is the Soviet side preparing for their destruction?

[Batsanov] The draft program for the destruction of chemical weapons, in whose elaboration the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of the Chemical Industry, Ministry of Health—about 20 departments in all—took part has now been submitted for examination in the USSR Supreme Soviet. It contains several options, including options which differ in terms of the number and siting of establishments for the destruction of chemical weapons.

Frankly, I fear that the different power structures may be carried away by prolonged debates about the level at which a particular specific decision should be taken. That is why it is important to think about creating legislative bases for the Soviet program of destruction.

TASS Interview

*LD2508001290 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT
24 Aug 90*

[By TASS Correspondent Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva, August 24 (TASS)—By TASS correspondent Boris Shabayev: A summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, which lasted two and a half months, ended at the Palace of Nations in Geneva with obvious signs of new elements in its work, Sergey Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation, told TASS.

Until recently the activity of the conference was marred by many elements of routine. Now many delegations want to boost the efficiency of the conference, he said.

“We have successfully finished the first stage of consultations to reform the conference and agreed that we will start holding three and not two sessions every year in 1991. [as received] They should be shorter and more intensive sessions, interspersed by rounds of talks on banning chemical weapons. The number of plenary meetings will also be reduced.”

Another important element is creating a special committee to ban nuclear tests, which has long been demanded by the USSR and other countries. It is not a matter of elaborating a relevant treaty now, for which some countries, including the United States, are not prepared. But it is possible to begin work on the essence of the test ban problem.

There has been some progress on one of the main issues on the agenda of the conference—the elaboration of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons and eliminating stockpiles. One has to admit that the possibilities of attaining further progress on technicalities of the future convention in the framework of the conference have been exhausted. They depend on the need to take political decisions clearing the way towards settling outstanding technical problems. This has prompted the French to propose a special meeting of the conference at foreign ministers' level. There was a positive response to this proposal. The Soviet delegation also supported it. The relevant preparatory work has already begun in the framework of the special committee on chemical weapons.

Asked whether the crisis in the Gulf and, particularly, Baghdad's threat to use chemical weapons if the conflict exacerbates affected the work of the conference, Batsanov said that any statements concerning the possibility of use of chemical weapons, no matter who made them, are inadmissible. They can in no way improve the international situation and build up trust between states. These developments confirm how dangerous chemical weapons are and add urgency to the need to complete work on the comprehensive convention concerning their full prohibition and elimination.

FRG Inspectors Find No Chemical Arms in GDR

*LD1608205390 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT
16 Aug 90*

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Chistyakov]

[Text] Bonn, August 16 (TASS)—An inspector group of the West German Defence Ministry has not found chemical weapons that would belong to the Western Group of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

According to a statement by group leader Hans Dieter Jopp, only conventional weapons were found during an inspection of depots in the area of the city of Hohenleipisch in Cottbus district. The inspectors found no signs that would indicate that chemical weapons had been stored there earlier.

Specialists of the Bundeswehr received an opportunity to inspect all the premises on the territory of the Soviet military facility, the group leader said. West German officers used special gauging equipment, including a mass spectrometer and an X-ray outfit.

This was the second trip by West German military inspectors to the GDR. A month ago the Bundeswehr inspected other military facilities belonging to the National Army of the GDR and, likewise, found no signs of the siting of toxic agents there.

What prompted the need to carry out the second inspection? The Soviet leadership is known to have repeatedly stated that there were no chemical weapons on East

German territory. However, some local news organisations kept asserting the opposite, stepping up a clamorous campaign over the issue.

With reference to Western intelligence services, they wrote in particular that the Soviet Union ostensibly sited about 30,000 tonnes of toxic agents in nine storages along the border with West Germany.

The inspection is over and unambiguous conclusions have been drawn. These are expected to put an end to speculations on the subject. At the same time it has become clear that the inspection was of importance not only from a purely military point of view.

Local political circles believe that the inspection will promote the removal of one of the last barriers, which have remained since the cold war times, to the building of trust between the two countries.

U.S. Senator McCain Interviewed on Defense Conversion

*LD1608200590 Moscow TASS in English 1953 GMT
16 Aug 90*

[By TASS correspondents Vyacheslav Akimov and Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, August 16 (TASS)—In a TASS interview, U.S. Senator John McCain (Republican, Arizona), who is attending an international conference in Moscow on the subject "Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Era of Arms Reduction," today set out his view of how the "peace dividend," released as a result of conversion, should be used.

Conversion should be considered as the product of a significant improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, he told TASS.

"For years the Russians and Americans have been making a lot of financial sacrifices, spending money on the conduct of the cold war, whereas now we speak of 'peace dividend,' McCain said.

"Of course, we should take care of those who for years have been ensuring our security and who may now find themselves out of business as a result of conversion," he said.

The senator believes that it is primarily lawmakers that should take care of these people, envisaging certain guarantees for them.

At the same time McCain thinks that the "peace dividend" should not be used to implement new huge-scale social programmes, because this would inevitably entail the emergence of new costly bureaucratic structures.

"Conversion should help us give more freedom to the individual," McCain said. Therefore the "peace dividend" should be used to free people for onerous taxes and get rid of excessive state spending, he added.

Military Analyst Chernyshev on Missile Technology Proliferation

*LD2008170190 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT
20 Aug 90*

["TASS Comment" by military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev: "Rocket Technology Is Spreading"]

[Text] Moscow, August 20 (TASS)—Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, together with many political and military issues, again put the problem of rocketry proliferation before the international community.

Access to weapons of various modifications creates a chance for spreading the arms race to various areas of the world and raises a possibility of unleashing destructive and bloody regional conflicts.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, over 20 developing countries have missiles capable of hitting targets in other countries. Both Western countries and the Soviet Union actively contribute to spreading rocket technology.

Here is an example of the Middle East. Israel has mobile ground-to-ground missile systems purchased from the United States or developed with the use of French technology.

Arab countries, including Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, are working on missile weapons or purchasing them abroad. Iraq is a "front-runner" in this field. It has experience of using missiles during the armed conflict with Iran.

Baghdad which bought missiles in the USSR improved them with the assistance of specialists from West Germany, Argentina and other countries. Taking into account present missile stockpiles, crises, similar to the present one in the Gulf, are unpredictable.

In a letter to the U.N. secretary-general, Eduard Shevardnadze made timely proposals to limit arms sales and to put obstacles in the way of missile technology proliferation. The following items are the most important in the new Soviet package.

Firstly, a call for openness in arms trade. The Soviet Union proposes that data on the deliveries of offensive weapons, including combat missiles and missile systems, should be forwarded to the United Nations.

Secondly, the spread of openness to various spheres, including aid in the organisation of arms production, construction of military projects and training of military personnel.

And, finally, understanding about specific limitation procedures on all the above issues in their application to areas of conflicts.

The practical implementation of the above proposals would create such a situation, in which the limitation of deliveries of missile weapons and technology or the imposition of a moratorium on them could become a

component part of any package of commitments of interested countries on a political settlement of regional conflicts.

Talks on export and import of missiles and technology should also take into account the rights of states to individual and collective defence.

However, the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency and the prevention of a chance to create offensive potentials, dangerous for some or other regions of the world, should play the decisive role.

Soviet-U.S. Chemical Arms Talks End in Geneva

*LD1708192890 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT
17 Aug 90*

[Text] Geneva, August 17 (TASS)—The 16th round of bilateral Soviet-American consultations on a chemical weapons ban ended in Geneva on Thursday.

During this round of talks the delegations began to draw up a document on inspection procedures. The document will set out detailed provisions for inspections under the agreement signed by the Soviet and U.S. presidents on June 1, 1990, on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to promote a multi-lateral convention banning chemical weapons.

The preparation of a document on inspection procedures is expected to be completed by December 31, 1990.

On August 21-22, a group of American specialists will visit the Chapayevsk centre for the training of personnel for work at chemical weapons disposal facilities.

A visit by a group of Soviet experts to Johnston Island is scheduled for this autumn. The Johnston Island facility began operations in July to eliminate U.S. chemical weapons.

The sides agreed to hold the next round of bilateral consultations in autumn this year.

CFE Envoy Grinevskiy Attends European Security Meeting in Spain

*LD2108203190 Moscow TASS in English 1734 GMT
21 Aug 90*

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Aleksandrov]

[Text] Almeria (Spain), August 21 (TASS)—The outline of a new Europe and the changing nature of its military and political situation are coming to a bolder relief in kaleidoscopically changing events on the continent, said here participants in the international conference "Treaty on conventional armed forces and future structure of European security."

The conference ended in the Spanish city of Almeria and was sponsored by Madrid Complutense University. Speakers noted that military confrontation is yielding way to a dialogue.

New forms of Europe's more secure and stable setup are being developed in discussions and through contacts between representatives of various countries and political organizations.

The conference was attended by members of the Soviet and American delegations at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE], representatives of the NATO Command and experts, specialists in international affairs from France, Italy and West Germany and high-ranking officials from the Spanish foreign and defence ministries.

"We believe it is possible to complete drafting a treaty on conventional armed forces before the forthcoming CSCE summit in Paris in November where it is planned to sign it," said ambassador at large Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna talks.

Participants in the talks have come to agreement on three out of five arms categories, agreed over 30 per cent of the treaty text, 50 per cent of the text of a protocol on inspections and many parts in other documents.

The sides have to exert efforts to cover the remaining part of the road, Grinevskiy emphasized.

Americans Tour Chapayevsk CW Destruction Training Center

*LD2208184390 Moscow TASS in English
1804 GMT 22 Aug 90*

[By TASS special correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Chapayevsk, Volga Region, August 22 (TASS)—A group of American experts today visited the Soviet Defence Ministry training centre for testing the technology to destroy chemical weapons.

The centre was created as a chemical weapons destruction factory, but soon was converted into a training centre under the pressure from local residents, who feared that the factory will endanger the environment.

Officers of Soviet chemical troops showed the guests the centre's technological lines and answered their questions.

Vladislav Sheluchenko, an expert in chemical weapons destruction at the Soviet Ministry of the Chemical Industry and one of those who designed the centre, shared his views with American colleagues.

"Such meetings and information exchange can help specialists in both countries effectively handle problems of chemical weapons destruction and ensure ecological safety," Sheluchenko told TASS.

"Ecological safety issues go beyond national borders," Sheluchenko believes. "This is why we are opening our facilities to foreign specialists. Secrets are now being relegated to the background before parties' desire to check the correctness of technical solutions meant to

ensure maximum safety in operating chemical weapons destruction facilities. [sentence as received] We are guided by this approach in our cooperation with American specialists," Sheluchenko emphasised.

At a meeting with journalists upon the completion of the tour of the centre today, Robert Mikulak, who heads the American delegation, said that the Americans were impressed by Soviet specialists' professionalism.

He said Soviet specialists were very frank with their American counterparts and answered all of their questions.

In his view, the American delegation's visit to Chapayevsk was part of the technical cooperation between the USSR and the United States, the beginning to which was set at the recent summit between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.

The political decision is now being put into practice by experts, Mikulak emphasised.

Chernyshev Views FRG Position on Personnel Cuts at CFE Talks

LD2208132590 Moscow TASS in English 1229 GMT 22 Aug 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 22 (TASS)—In an interview with the WELT AM SONNTAG newspaper, West German Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg touched on a very substantial issue related to the Vienna Talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

Stoltenberg believes that as a result of the talks, the number of NATO troops on the territory of a united Germany will be considerably reduced.

According to Stoltenberg, the troops of West Germany's NATO allies could be cut from the present level of over 400,000 men down to 150,000-170,000.

It is hardly expedient now to discuss the specific figures cited by Stoltenberg. The very fact that Bonn recognised the need to reduce the foreign military presence on the territory of a future single Germany is important.

Why should this statement draw attention? The NATO countries are known to have refused to discuss a reduction in the personnel of the alliances' armed forces in Europe from the very beginning of the talks. In view of this, the Soviet side repeatedly emphasised that this important indicator of the level of military confrontation could not be ignored.

The personnel are the key component of the armed forces. They have military equipment and weapons and, using NATO terminology, "play the central role in seizing and holding territory".

For this reason, the Soviet Union proceeds as ever from the premise that the countries of both military-political alliances should assume specific commitments to reduce troops strengths.

The United States has taken the first step towards narrowing the parties' positions on this issue. It proposed to cut down to definite levels the troop strength of the USSR and the United States.

The agreement reached by Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, which directly concerns the military-political aspects of German unification, signalled the second step in this direction. The issue of the strength of a future single German state's armed forces was resolved.

At the Vienna talks, the West German Government expressed a readiness to pledge to reduce the present strength of the Bundeswehr and the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic from the aggregate level of 600,000 men down to 370,000.

The reduction of national armed forces and the withdrawal of part of troops from West German territory is being considered in several capitals of the North Atlantic Alliance member-states at present. Strategists in the West German Defense Ministry seem to be working in the same direction.

One would like to see troop reduction projects to be developed in NATO countries as soon as possible and the specific proposals by the Western participants in the Vienna forum, which were elaborated on their basis, to be presented at the talks.

U.S. Delegation Visits Chemical Arms Storage Facility

LD2708211590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] And now we have a report for you from the south of Udmurtiya, from a facility which quite recently still bore the seal of strict secrecy.

[Unidentified correspondent] A group of U.S. specialists on chemical weapons has come to a military facility in Kambarka for work under the memorandum signed by the leaders of the foreign policy departments of our two countries in September 1989. [video shows helicopter landing with the members of the delegation, then an interview with P. Mikulak, head of the delegation]

A few days ago a Soviet delegation visited a similar facility for storing chemical weapons in the United States, so our arrival in Kambarka is a return visit. During this visit we would like to examine in practice what provisions are essential in an agreement on eliminating chemical weapons, and what could raise the level of trust between our two countries in this matter.

Since the beginning of the 1950's the Kambarka facility has been storing the toxic substance lewisite, which is based on arsenic. As army specialists stated, there has not been a single serious accident at the facility over all the years of storage. In their view, the tanks made from special steel have a sufficient safety margin for another 25 years of faultless work, but in just 12 years, under the treaty signed, our two countries' quantities of toxic substances have to be reduced to a minimum. Our country began working on the development of technology for the destruction of the stocks of lewisite from the beginning of the 1970's.

The U.S. delegation was presented with materials on six such technological processes, and moreover, one of them provides for the utilization of the toxic substance, with the use of enriched arsenic, for the needs of the national economy. In the course of the two-day visit, the U.S. delegation was acquainted with the practical aspects of storing, monitoring, and inspecting the storage of chemical weapons in the containers. As military chemists believe, they now have fewer secrets, but there is more work for the Supreme Soviet and Congress, which have to examine the question of ratifying the bilateral treaty.

Deputy Minister Rejects Unilateral Nuclear Test Moratorium

*LD2708163590 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT
27 Aug 90*

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow, August 27 (TASS)—Only a comprehensive ban on nuclear arms tests can stop a new round in arms race, Soviet Deputy Nuclear Power Industry Minister Professor Viktor Mikhaylov told TASS.

He said he was worried about the discontinuation of nuclear tests in the Soviet Union, since the United States continues to modify its nuclear potential.

He said the United States is discussing a 20-year modernisation programme for objects connected with nuclear weapons development and production. The programme attaches great importance to underground tests.

Work to increase the precision of nuclear weapons and to develop less vulnerable weapons and ones that hit objects situated deep in earth continue, he said. It should be noted that these are first strike weapons and the NATO countries, unlike the Soviet Union, have not pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Mikhaylov noted.

The existing, approximate parity between nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States is the basis of stability in the world, Mikhaylov said. Our country's unilateral disarmament could lead to a U.S. monopoly fraught with unpredictable consequences for the whole of the world community, he said.

The U.S. monopolised nuclear weapons between 1945-1949. Progressive people understood the tragedy of the situation and "there is no reason to conceal that some of them helped us, at the cost of their lives, in our titanic work to create the nuclear shield," he said.

Soviet nuclear test sites have been inactive for two and a half of the past five years, Mikhaylov said. Demands to stop nuclear testing in the Soviet Union, voiced over television and radio, for Supreme Soviets' rostra, at various meetings and conferences are persuading the public to support unilateral steps in this direction, he said.

It seems that the ascent in the struggle for comprehensive nuclear disarmament has moved in recent years to the Soviet Union's unilateral disarmament. Statements by professionals that our country cannot afford to become a hostage to other nuclear powers' political ambitions are muffled by people whose emotions overwhelm reason, Mikhaylov said.

Within the framework of the sufficient defence doctrine, the Soviet Union stands for the immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear tests, Mikhaylov said. "We are not to blame that they still continue."

In 1985, the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium and in 1986 it put forward a programme to create a nuclear-free world by 2000. The calls were not heard in the United States, which conducted 26 underground nuclear blasts during the Soviet moratorium.

Mikhaylov said he doubted that the Soviet Union would continue to keep its nuclear test sites silent. Only a comprehensive ban on nuclear arms tests can stop a new round in arms race, he said.

AUSTRIA

Sales of IRBM Technology to Iraq Recapped

AU1308103690 Vienna PROFIL in German
13 Aug 90 pp 32-34

[Herbert Langsner report: "Shopping With Saddam"]

[Excerpts] It was in June 1989, somewhere in southern Styria. A team of reporters from the U.S. NBC television network, accompanied by PROFIL, had been looking for the house of businessman and engineer Rupert Trummer for hours. Finally, they found him, peacefully mowing his lawn. "Mr. Trummer, we want to talk to you," a journalist addressed the rather confused man; at the same time, the camera started to roll.

Mr. Trummer did not hesitate long. He launched himself at the camera and tried to grab the heavy machine from the filming reporter. In his eyes there was blind rage and open fear, as if he was not threatened by a television camera but by a machinegun.

The comparison is not inappropriate. Styrian Rupert Trummer was heavily involved in the construction of facilities for the development of intermediate-range missiles in Iraq. Anyone who makes such deals and then turns up on television could easily suffer some untoward fate.

Coincidentally, the German engineer Ekkehard Schrotz, one of the main sources of missile technology for Iraq, was not in his car when it was blown to pieces by a car bomb in the summer of 1988. Arms designer Gerald Bull, inventor of the Noricum cannon GHN-45 and heavily involved in Iraqi arms deals over the past years, died of two bullets in the neck in front of his apartment in Brussels in March. One week earlier British journalist Farzad Bazoft had been executed in Baghdad for alleged espionage—he had snooped around a secret military facility.

An Austrian engineer who reported anonymously in PROFIL and then on SPIEGEL-TV about his work on an Iraqi construction site for missiles was not hit quite as hard. Clumsily filmed by the SPIEGEL people, the informer was identified immediately: On the same evening that the program was carried, a Mr. Ali called the Austrian and told him that he would die soon. However, he only suffered several breaks-ins at his apartment and the destruction of his car.

On 13 May 1990, a fire broke out in the offices of the engineering company Delta Consult in Salzburg. This company, too, was part of that secret technology and construction concern which helped Saddam Husayn to achieve his greatest goal: becoming the most important military power of the Arab world, with missiles which can carry nuclear and poison-gas warheads for thousands of kilometers and target them precisely.

Unlike nearly any other state, Iraq has stocked up its arsenals over the past years and has tried to get its hands on modern weapons technology—in Austria it received rather good service in this respect.

Repeatedly and until the last moment, the more nationalized Hirtenberger ammunition factory, which has been owned by Styrian industrialist Emmerich Assmann for one-and-a-half years, sold ammunition components to Baghdad. "We delivered civilian products," Assmann spokesman Klemens Grossinger said, referring, for instance, to the popular percussion caps, which, according to Austrian law, are not considered military materiel and are, therefore, not subject to permission for export.

According to Grossinger, "we rejected" an offer from Germany to participate in a production facility for special ammunition (base-bleed) [preceding word in English].

Assmann, who also delivered arms to Kuwait, has been deprived of his business by the latest developments, since Austria will stop any trade relations with Iraq and Kuwait beginning this week. The loss: "A double-digit million sum." (Grossinger)

The oldest known arms delivery comes from the Steyr-Daimler-Puch company. An alleged nonferrous-metal factory (project name: Saad 21), sold to the Iraqis under the aegis of the then Steyr chief, Hans Michael Malzacher, about 10 years ago, soon turned out to be a production facility for cartridge cases.

Then came the infamous 200 Noricum cannons, which, including spare parts, were shipped to Baghdad between 1982 and 1985, and from which VOEST made a profit of 1 billion schillings according to the managers, who are now standing trial. The necessary traction machines, which are not considered to be military materiel, again came from Steyr-Daimler-Puch.

On the other hand, the rumor that Steyr delivered 200 tanks to the warring Saddam has never been confirmed. Even though Steyr applied for export permits, it never dispatched the vehicles, according to the investigations.

The internationally most spectacular deal, which links Austria with Saddam Husayn's armament mania, was the technology transfer for the development of the Condor-2 intermediate-range missile—the weapon which cost the German Ekkehard Schrotz and the Austrian informer for PROFIL and SPIEGEL their cars, the Styrian Rupert Trummer his nerves, and journalist Farzad Bazoft probably his life. [passage omitted]

The Condor missile, on which the Iraqis and their Western helpers have been working for years, is still not ready for use. If Saddam Husayn wants to wage a war, he will have to make do with the Scud missiles which the Russians delivered to him in the past and which were further developed in Iraq.

In addition, he now has that materiel which Austria sent to Kuwait: Steyr guns, Hirtenberger ammunition, Swarovski night-vision equipment, and Glock pistols.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Iraqi Purchases of IRBM Technology Examined

90WP0138Z Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
10 Aug 90 p 19

[Article by Wolfgang Hoffmann: "Deadly Business: Saddam Hussein's War Arsenal. Weapons from East and West Making Iraq Strongest Military Power in the Arabian Region"]

[Text] Federal Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was undiplomatically clear: "I am of the opinion that Iraq is a classic example of what happens when surplus arms production in Europe is sold and thus arms a country, actually enabling it to be able to conduct two wars in succession."

This statement is concurrently an admission of individual responsibility. Because European countries are, in fact, among the most important arms suppliers of the Persian Gulf States—a region disturbed by war and crises. According to investigations by the Sipri International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm, France, Italy and the Federal Republic are to be classified as prime suppliers of Iraq among western industrialized countries. From the East, up to now, China, the USSR and Czechoslovakia have belonged to the same category. However, it is conspicuous that the USSR, for example, has been cautious with sales of the most modern arms technology to Iraq. Moscow, in fact, never appeared stingy in supplying Iraq with tanks. However, the Kremlin was cautious with the exportation of rockets with multiple warheads and the know-how which goes with them.

Lead by France, which supplied Iraq with a broad array of rockets and missiles up to the effective Exocet anti-ship rocket, the West Europeans were different. Leading German rocket builders such as MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH] only appeared on the fringe with exports to Iraq. However, this has to do with the fact that German rocket deals involving the Milan, Hot and Roland systems are entrusted to the French partner Euromissile, the joint subsidiary of MBB and Aerospa-tiale. Such arms collaboration is a simple path to achieving successful arms transactions, without conflicting with the restrictive arms export policy of the Federal Government.

France has considerably reduced its arms exports to Iraq since the end of the Gulf Conflict; of course, not for political or moral reasons, but for financial ones. Iraq had become so delinquent in its payment of bills that the suppliers ran the risk of becoming needy themselves.

Paris did, in fact, convert Baghdad's debts of about \$4 billion but simultaneously decided not to finalize any new arms deals.

While the French arms industry has primarily been visible as a seller of ready to use weapons, German firms have become less conspicuous with hardware exports. All the more spectacular were the deals with software, the know-how for construction of an independent Iraqi arms machinery. Best known is the case of the Hessian concern, Kolb GmbH, against which an investigation has been in progress for years because of suspicion it gave Iraq production of poison gas weapons. If this allegation holds up, it will be of greater import than the arms deals with tanks or aircraft. The effect of chemical warfare agents such as mustard gas or Tabun nerve gas is much more disastrous than the use of conventional weapons of war. Victims of Iraq, which also used poison gas against Iran, document this. Once Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has secured his hold on affluent Kuwait, he should also have the means to fulfill his further dreams of weapons. Now that Hussein already possesses "the poor man's atomic weapons," in the form of chemical weapons, real nuclear weapons with the appropriate carrier rockets are his next goal. William Webster, Director of the American intelligence service, CIA, reckons with a rapid propagation of nuclear delivery systems: "Around the year 2000, 14 developing countries will be capable of producing their own ballistic rockets."

Iraq has already started that with European, and primarily German, assistance. According to information from peace researchers in Stockholm, Iraq already possesses a carrier rocket with the "Condor" model designation developed in Argentina. Argentina, on the other hand, got the Condor technology from Europe—from Austria and the Federal Republic. MBB is the sponsor of the Condor in the Federal Republic, if not even the secret father of this type of rocket. Originally, Condor 1 was supposed to have been a weather research rocket. Such camouflaging of actual military aims is a part of arms producers' daily gadgetry.

At any rate, Condor 2—further developed in Iraq—has since lost its peaceful character of weather research. However, it has not yet been determined that German enterprises, such as the tool manufacturing firm, Gild-enmeister [AG] and MBB, which have been implicated as helpers in the Iraqi rocket center at Mosul, have breached Federal German laws. Of approximately 1,500 rejected supply items, not a single one manifested itself as improper for exportation to Iraq.

Nonetheless, Iraq will have to forego direct or indirect assistance from German firms, for the time being, due to the total UN trade embargo. And even the new Export Law of the Federal Republic, if it should come into force this year, imposes increased punishment for involvement. Iraq has taken precautions against this eventuality, though. It has maintained a close relationship with Brazil for some time. Both countries are bonded by a

comradeship in arms which is especially pursued by arms exporter Brazil, and is based on crude oil and money. For example, the Iraqis have already profited from the Brazilian "Sonda" rocket program (range up to 600 kilometers). According to an investigation by the "Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control," based in Washington, Sonda technology with all production rights has already been sold to Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, the technology was used to manufacture surface-to-surface rockets.

Possibly, Saddam Hussein was just prevented in the nick of time from gaining possession of intercontinental rockets sooner or later. In 1984, the French firm, Arianespace, made Brazil a special offer, in order to particularly support Brazil's civilian outer space research, so that the country decided on the Ariane to transport its satellites into space. Sale of the Viking rocket engine with comprehensive know-how was also included in the offer package. Thus, Brazil would soon have been in a position to build intercontinental rockets. At least that is what Wisconsin director, Gary Milhollin, who recently publicized the case in the United States, asserts.

The propulsion technology of the Viking engine is, in fact, hardly utilized for military purposes because it is too elaborate. However, it is beyond question that it is utilizable. This technology can have devastating consequences in the hands of political daredevils. In the opinion of Wisconsin director, Milhollin, Brazil had no misgivings about supplying Viking technology even to Iraq and comparable countries. Milhollin: "Brazil, as one of the largest arms exporters to developing countries, sells everything to every willing customer, including customers in the Middle East." As proof, Milhollin presented a computer deal about to be closed between IBM (United States) and Brazil. At stake is the sale of a supercomputer that will assist in considerably reducing development expenditures for a rocket program. Milhollin reported in the NEW YORK TIMES that Brazilians had already intensively familiarized Iraqi development teams with rocket know-how in the past and draws the conclusion that they will also make the IBM super computer available for similar purposes.

Nonetheless, the European-Brazilian deal with the Viking engine did not materialize. The United States protested against the transaction. The Viking system is specifically subject to the "Regulation Jurisdiction for Rocket Technology," established in 1987 by the United States, the Federal Republic, Italy, Great Britain, Japan, Canada, and France. In the agreement, the countries obligate themselves not to make any technology available that could be suitable for constructing rockets with a range of more than 300 kilometers and more than 500 kilograms effective load. Arianespace took the American protest seriously and suspended the deal one year ago. Joerg Feustel-Bilechl, director of space systems with the European space organization, ESA [European Space Agency], on the Viking deal: "It is really old hat."

Aid for Iraqi Chemical, Biological Weapons Production Viewed

AU1308160590 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
13 Aug 90 pp 81-85

[Unattributed report: "Worse Than the Plague"]

[Text] Agitation ran high in the Federal Intelligence Office [BND] in Munich-Pullach, the FRG espionage headquarters. One of the agents, Iraq expert Al Kadhi [spelling as published] had fallen into the hands of Saddam Husayn's intelligence service and been sentenced to death. In a prison in Baghdad the spy was awaiting his execution.

A race against time started; prominent supporters came out in favor of the delinquent. President Richard von Weizsaecker sent a plea of clemency to the Iraqi head of state. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher used political talks with Dictator Saddam Husayn to ask for mercy for the German Iraqi.

During Genscher's visit in November 1987, the death sentence was turned into a life term. Soon afterwards Al Kadhi was released. When he arrived in the FRG, he was not awaited only by his German wife. Customs authorities were also interested in the returnee, and issued a request to ascertain his residence.

The BND man is now also faced with a trial in the FRG. The Darmstadt public prosecutor is investigating Al Kadhi, 51, on suspicion of violation of the Foreign Trade Law (file number 21 Js35285 6/87). Reportedly, together with former Preussag managers, he is integrally involved in the production of poison gas in Iraq.

Through the Hamburg company Water Engineering Trading GmbH (W.E.T.), co-owner Al Kadhi reportedly delivered facilities to Iraq which are used for the production of basic chemical substances for the manufacture of the nerve gases tabun and sarin. The plant (name: "Project 33/85") was taken in sections via Turkey to Falluja, which is strictly guarded by the military.

Dictator Saddam also had W.E.T. deliver tonnes of chemicals, such as methylene chloride and sodium fluoride. They are indispensable for the production of tabun.

It is still unclear what and how much the BND knew about the sensitive activities of its man in Iraq. It is, however, certain that Al Kadhi, who represented Preussag in Baghdad in the past, was an extremely successful businessman.

Because Al Kadhi had good contacts with the Iraqi Government until he was uncovered, he moved from adviser to managing director and co-owner at W.E.T. In financial terms, it was a profitable involvement. Just for mediating and delivering plant 33/85, which has a planned daily output of 17.6 tonnes of the basic substances for poison gas, he is said to have received 1.2 million German marks [DM] in provisions.

A BND man as deliverer of poison gas technology, who got out of prison with the help of top-ranking politicians—this is something which so far one could perhaps imagine only as an unrealistic thriller. The Al Kadhi case demonstrates how deeply FRG business and politics are entangled in the armament of the Middle East war-monger.

When Saddam had airplanes and ground forces equipped with chemical weapons last week, the production sites were no secret to the U.S. intelligence service, the CIA. In Salman Pak on the banks of the Tigris river, there is the research center for the production of poison gas; in Falluja, basic materials are manufactured; and in Samarra, the poison gas weapons are built.

It is certain that German companies performed decisive construction and development work for the death emanating from the laboratories at each of these three places. Germany has helped Saddam, as no other nation, build up the largest and most comprehensive chemical weapons arsenal in the Third World. Experts estimate the production capacity at several hundred tonnes of poisonous substances per year.

Many have committed sins in Iraq. The export balance sheet of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, carries the Germans only in second place in the sale of murderous hardware to Baghdad. The main deliverers are, above all, the Soviet Union, France, and China, which have provided Iraq with tanks, combat aircraft, and guns.

But hardly any other country has provided the lunatic from the Middle East so comprehensively with highly dangerous stuff as the FRG. Companies from the FRG helped in the construction of missiles that are to reach Israel, and even in the development and production of his own nuclear bomb.

The state with the fourth largest army in the world, which wants to become self-supporting in armament, could rely on the largest export nation in the world. Germans are highly valued as lecturers at the Saad 16 military research center, where sometimes 38 German companies held training courses; they have become indispensable as engineers and technicians in arms production in Taji and elsewhere.

An effective alliance: the dictator, who obviously stops at nothing; and German businessmen, who attempt to procure any kind of dangerous goods. The main thing is, the cash is right.

Recently, the CIA briefed the BND on an alarming suspicion. An Egyptian who lives in Minneapolis in the U.S. state of Minnesota is traveling around the FRG to purchase poisonous substances for bacteriological warfare.

Saddam is dead set on acquiring this still-missing part of his destruction machinery. According to information of the BND in Pullach, Iraq is busy with research and

development of bacteriological weapons, in particular in Salman Pak, 35 km southeast of Baghdad. According to SIPRI peace researchers, such weapons are "a hundred times more lethal" than the current chemical agents.

Baghdad is mainly interested in mycotoxins. Above all, the substances HT-2 and T-2, which are counted among the trichothecenes, are coveted by biological weapons researchers. Military men consider the substances far worse than the viruses of plague, cholera, anthrax, and typhoid fever, which were produced in biological weapons laboratories in the past.

The new substances, which are often produced by genetic manipulation of microorganisms, have the advantage that, if applied correctly, they do not endanger one's own troops or population because these people can be immunized against the viral agent. Such toxins are particularly well suited for sabotage acts and terrorist attacks.

Once again, it was the Germans who delivered mycotoxins to Iraq. Three years ago, Josef Kuehn from Neustadt am Tuebenberge, Lower Saxony, mediated the sale of 100 milligrams of the mycotoxin TH-2 and more than 100 milligrams of the mycotoxin T-2 to Baghdad. The poison from the FRG, the BND learned, had a lethal effect during tests on animals; even in a highly diluted state they could cause cancer in people. However, the businessmen played dumb: Kuehn said he did not know what the Iraqis wanted the poison for.

Buyers, such as the Egyptian from the United States, have quite obviously bought up bacterial strains, nutrient solutions, and fermentation facilities on their tours. However, even the CIA, normally well informed about arms research in Mesopotamia, has to rely on speculations about how far Iraq has come with its biological weapons development in reality.

The fact that the BND and highest-level Bonn Government bodies get information from the United States—as in the case of the Egyptian—is not an exception. "Far more than a thousand times" the Americans have briefed the FRG services and high-ranking Bonn ministry officials about sensitive arms deals with the Middle East, the Far East, and South America over the past six years, according to findings by Norbert Gansel, arms expert of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Not much has been done as a consequence. Many of the written warnings, which have been declared so-called nonpapers in Bonn, immediately ended up in the trash can.

In particular, the "negligence of FRG export control authorities," the highly renowned Washington Carnegie Foundation noted in a study in April, has considerably exacerbated the situation in the areas of tension. The role of FRG citizens and companies is "disquieting."

The obstacles concerning the export of military equipment and accessories can be overcome all too easily. The number of personnel of the responsible Federal Economic Office (BAW) in Eschborn alone prevents the

officials from making all too thorough investigations. About 75,000 applications for export permits are received each year.

The foreign trade law clearly tells the investigators how to do their work. The regulations, the authors of the commentary on the law write, are "to be interpreted in favor of the principle of freedom in case of doubt"—that is, in favor of industry. Export of the so-called dual-use goods, which can be used for both military and civilian purposes, can hardly be prevented by the Eschborn officials.

Even though military materiel must not be delivered at all to areas of tension, this regulation is easily circumvented: The goods first go to a NATO partner. Where it is passed on from there can hardly be checked.

The arms and aviation concern MBB [Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm], for instance, delivered combat helicopters via Spain and Milan; and Hot and Roland missiles via the German-French sales company Euromissile to Iraq. In the middle of the Gulf War, Saddam's officers were trained by German military advisers on antiaircraft missiles.

"Now one has to appeal to the ethics of the boys," a BAW spokesman said last week, looking rather helpless.

This will hardly work. German deliveries have proved to be extremely resistant to ethical considerations, particularly in the case of poison gas. For years Iraq received from the FRG poison gas plants from the Hamburg W.E.T. and Pilot Plant, a sister company of Karl Kolb KG of Dreieich in Hesse.

Officially declared factories for pesticides against date pests, the facilities were obviously plants which are suitable "for the synthesis of chemical combat agents," according to an internal report of the Darmstadt public prosecutor. It is only disputed whether they were "especially constructed" for this purpose.

Despite international protests in the mid-1980's, the combat agent exporters continued their deliveries. However, they were obviously too sure of themselves. About 12 tonnes of material were seized at W.E.T., Kolb, and company by the Iraq Special Commission of the Cologne Customs Criminal Investigations Office.

W.E.T. trader Al Kadhi and his associates must probably expect an indictment. According to the investigations, the permits necessary for the facilities in Falluja, where mainly phosphorous trichloride and phosphorous oxytrichloride are produced, were missing. The two chemicals are basic substances for nerve gases. The investigations have already had consequences at W.E.T.: At the beginning of the year the company applied for settlement proceedings.

Kolb may have hopes. The investigations are protracted; experts are continually leaving. The investigators cannot even rely on the help of federal authorities.

The Hesse investigators complained to the Frankfurt prosecutor general that there have been "certain problems in cooperation with the Bundeswehr" during the investigation of the case. Thus, in mid-1988, the Federal Office for Military Technology and procurement promised an expert opinion on the Kolb case. Last April, the Federal Office announced that it was impossible for the authorities to answer the essential questions. Previously, an expert of Bayer AG had taken leave. The public prosecutor's office had to ask other chemical companies for support.

On the other hand, the investigators will hardly have any problems in the most recent case of Ferrostaal. As general agent, the Essen MAN subsidiary delivered a cannon factory to Taji near Baghdad. Evidence of this is unambiguous.

Last week investigators searched the administrative office of Ferrostaal partner Buderus in Wetzlar and took quite a lot of material with them. The Feldmuehle subsidiary is suspected of having delivered important know-how for the cannon factory.

The investigators also made a catch in the offices of the medium-sized Export-Union GmbH in Duesseldorf. There they found the documents of an explosive Iraqi deal.

A company called Teco from Baghdad had ordered 40 tonnes of metal sheets and 14 tonnes of steel rings for the Iraqi oil industry from company owner Wolfgang Boehm. The price struck the investigators. While this amount would normally have cost about DM100,000, the Iraqis were prepared to pay the gigantic sum of DM3.8 million.

It is also striking that in the contract Iraq insisted on a special material check by the Saarland Technical Control Association. In mid-June, three Teco employees went to Saarbruecken to monitor the test and to receive training in processing the material, which was produced by Saarlust in Voelklingen.

As the investigators learned, the special alloy is a so-called maraging steel. Because of its special hardness and tensile strength, the metal is used—according to the official export list—"for the production of components of a gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment."

By last year, the small company H and H Metallform in the Muensterland region aroused conspicuous with deliveries for military nuclear technology to Baghdad. The two owners of the company, Peter Huetten and Dietrich Hinze, had delivered machines with which Iraq could produce gas centrifuges. In such facilities, the 90-percent enrichment of uranium 235, the material which is used for the construction of nuclear bombs, is possible.

It seems to be a delicate case for the Export-Union. There is no official permit which is required to export this special material.

However, those responsible from Sairstahl and the Technical Control Association will also have problems finding plausible explanations. It is, for instance, unclear why blank papers with the name of one of the Technical Control Association employees were among the documents found. There is the suspicion that this was intended to fool export authorities.

During their research concerning Ferrostaal, the investigators again came across the H and H company. It is said to have purchased an auto-hooping [Autofrettageanlage] facility from the Zorge factory of Schmidt, Kranz, and Company in the Harz region and to have then sold it to Iraq. A similar computer-controlled facility for material checks and the hardening of cannon barrels and cartridge cases was sold to the Bundeswehr by H and H.

H and H feels completely in the right. The company can present an official permit from Eschborn for its order in Zorge and the export to Iraq. According to this permit, the plant—a completely harmless facility—was intended for pressure checks of bottles and containers.

Hot Stuff for Iraq: German Contractors and Subcontractors for Products That Can Be Used for the Production of Armament Goods

Buildings and Facilities for Poison-Gas Research and Production

Karl Kolb, Dreieich;
Pilot Plant (in liquidation), Dreieich;
Water Engineering Trading, Hamburg;
Preussag, Hannover;
WTB Walter-Thosti-Boswau, Augsburg;
Heberger Bau, Schifferstadt;

Weapons and Ammunitions Facilities

Ferrostaal, Essen;
Buderus, Wetzlar;
Schirmer-Plate-Siempelkamp, Krefeld;
Hochtief, Essen;
Kloekner, Duisburg;
Marposs, Krefeld;
Mannesmann Demag, Duisburg;
SMS Hasenclever, Duesseldorf;
Dango and Dienenthal, Siegen;
Georg Fischer, Singen;
TBT Deep Well Drilling Technology, Dettingen;
LOI Industrial Furnace Facilities, Essen;
Leybold, Hanau;
Zueblin, Stuttgart;
ABB, Mannheim;
Lasco Metal Forming Technology, Coburg;
AEG, Frankfurt;
Thyssen, Duesseldorf;
Fritz Werner Industrial Facilities, Geisenheim;
Siemens, Munich;
Machine Factory Ravensburg, Ravensburg;
Dynamite Nobel, Troisdorf;

Military Research

Gildemeister Projecta, Bielefeld;
MBB-Transtechica, Taufkirchen;

Karl Kolb, Dreieich;
Integra Sauer Informatic ICME, Neumuenster;
Degussa, Frankfurt;
Carl Zeiss, Heidenheim;
Deutsche BP, Hamburg;
Blohm Machine Building, Hamburg;
Mauser-Werke, Oberndorf;
Aviatest (subsidiary of Rheinmetall), Neuss;

Missiles, Helicopters

MBB, Munich;
Leifeld, Ahlen;
H and H Metalform, Drensteinfurt;

Nuclear Technology

Nukem, Hanau;
H and H Metalform, Dreinsteinfurt;
Sairstahl, Voelklingen;
Export-Union GmbH, Duesseldorf;

Transportation

Faun, Lauf;
MAN, Munich;
MAN-Roland, Offenbach;
Iveco Magirus, Ulm;
Daimler-Benz, Stuttgart;
Rhein-Bayern Vehicle Construction, Kaufbeuren.

United Germany To Renounce Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Arms

GDR-FRG Statement at Nonproliferation Conference

LD2208110390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1027 GMT 22 Aug 90

[Text] Geneva (ADN)—The text of the joint statement by the governments of the FRG and GDR at the fourth verification conference on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is as follows: "The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic affirm their contractually and unilaterally accepted renunciation of the production and ownership of and power to dispose of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. They declare that the united Germany, too, will adhere to these obligations.

"The rights and duties resulting from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 will continue to be valid for the united Germany. The united Germany will work to ensure that the Nonproliferation Treaty will be valid beyond the year 1995 and calls for the strengthening of nonproliferation measures. At the Geneva disarmament conference the united Germany will work for a comprehensive, worldwide, and verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest possible time, and intends to be among the first signatories to such a convention."

Genscher Addresses Conference

LD2208122790 Hamburg DPA in German
1022 GMT 22 Aug 90

[Excerpts] Geneva, (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today affirmed that a united Germany will renounce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In a speech to the fourth verification conference for the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is attended by delegations from over 100 countries, he said in Geneva that disarmament and arms control policy would be a "central element" of the united Germany's peace policy. [passage omitted]

Genscher further announced that in the course of a tightening of the German foreign trade law "new and important commitments on exports of nuclear materials" to states not in the nonproliferation treaty, which will "as a matter of principle" be permitted only if those states put "all raw materials, particularly fissionable material," under the control of the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

Genscher pointed out that the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force in 1970, has proven to be an "important cornerstone of international security." Therefore the Federal Republic advocates a long-term extension of the agreement beyond the year 1995.

The minister called for a worldwide ban of chemical weapons, as the events of the last few weeks have shown clearly that such a ban is "today more urgent than ever." The Federal Republic would be among the first states to sign a chemical-weapon convention.

FINLAND

Neutrals' Role in CFE Process Viewed

90WC0092A Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLEDET
in Swedish 2 Jul 90 p 2

[Guest commentary by Dr. Stefan Forss: "Our Role in the Europe of Disarmament"]

[Text] There has been tough going at the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe (CFE) since March of this year, but after the summit meeting in Washington a month ago the mood improved and some progress has been made. The goal is for the CFE agreement to be concluded before the summit meeting of the 35 CSCE nations toward the end of the year.

Many central questions are still open, however. So far, one has agreed to the definitions of artillery and tanks. The definitions of fighter aircraft and helicopters still have not been agreed on.

It is entirely possible that the problems that are most difficult to solve will be swept under the rug, that is to

say postponed until the next round of negotiations, to begin immediately after the first stage of the CFE has been concluded.

The CFE agreement will in all certainty contain at least two important loopholes. Its territorial application ranges from the Atlantic to the Urals, which provides the various parties with the opportunity to circumvent the agreement and move materiel outside the CFE zone before the agreement has been signed.

There is already information in the West that the Soviet Union has done exactly that with units which were unilaterally withdrawn from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Soviet sources neither confirm nor deny this.

Similar redispositions are also planned in the West: You don't want the most modern materiel in Central Europe to have to be destroyed, after all. Turkey occupies a special position, since the intended CFE limit goes straight through that country. It is said that the now remaining time is being used to move considerable amounts of materiel outside the CFE zone.

The future CFE agreement will not contain any form of monitoring of military production facilities. This is a considerable weakness in the agreement.

The United States had wanted such a clause, but met with solid resistance from its allies; corresponding American facilities would by definition have remained uninspected due to the zone rule.

Despite these shortcomings, the CFE agreement will become a milestone in the history of disarmament. NATO looks to be bringing off a complete victory over the Soviet Union, which will be forced to destroy or convert 30,000-40,000 tanks, among other things. The corresponding cuts on the Western side will be around 2,000 tanks.

Roughly speaking, it may be said that the Soviet Union will undertake cuts on the order of 50 percent in most categories, while NATO's reductions will be five percent.

After the realization of this agreement, the two military alliances, of which the Warsaw Pact (WP) has already ceased to function in a military sense, will have equal numerical strength.

One of the central objectives in the negotiations, abolishing the existing imbalance in land-based military forces, will be achieved. On the other hand, it may be debated whether the goal of eliminating the possibility of surprise, large-scale, offensive operations is being achieved. It might be asserted that the superior technology in the West will mean that NATO, at least theoretically, will have a major advantage in military capacity.

No wonder that conservative Soviet military officers are terrified that the country's western flank will soon be wide open to an attack from the West. Another thing which also worries the Soviet military, of course, is that

its entire military operational planning must be redone after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The situation could perhaps be likened to the one after the Winter War, when the Soviets' military weakness was exposed and soon exploited by Hitler.

But now there is no Hitler threatening the Soviet Union. NATO is an alliance of 16 sovereign democratic nations, which have never allowed themselves to be dominated by any individual nation in the same sense as the Soviet Union commanded the Warsaw Pact. It is totally inconceivable that NATO would unilaterally undertake to attack the Soviet Union militarily.

"What would we gain from that?" was one American comment I recently heard.

How should we in neutral Europe act toward the disarmament process in our part of the world?

Both in our country and in Sweden increasingly loud voices are heard that we should jump on the disarmament bandwagon as soon as possible. Otherwise, we might soon find ourselves in bad company.

In my opinion this is a totally wrong attitude toward this set of problems, which are of vital importance for us as well. What we should ask, instead, is how we might best contribute to a development that increases stability and confidence in our vicinity in a way that also takes our national interests into account.

During a long trip some time ago, I was able to put essentially that same question to a number of diplomats in both the West and the East; most of them were directly involved in the ongoing negotiations.

The answer I got was surprisingly unanimous, in some cases very discreetly worded, in other instances more matter-of-fact: Finland and Sweden play an important stabilizing role in northern Europe. It is important that this situation be maintained, at least for the imminent transition period.

It is now important for us to be sensitive in particular to our neighbors' needs, but also to those of other major actors. We quite clearly have a major responsibility to which we must live up.

We must carefully weigh what the consequences will be, for ourselves as well as for our immediate environment, if we decide to try to join the subsequent disarmament phase.

Our country's defense resources are so small that it is likely we need not make more than marginal cuts; our disarmament was stipulated more than 40 years ago in the peace agreement in Paris. Since then, military expenditures in our country have been at a very low level.

Compared to us, most other countries would have to disarm to a fraction of their present levels.

The situation is different in Sweden. That country has one of the strongest air forces in Europe, considerable tank forces and highly qualified forces in other respects as well.

If Sweden joins the CFE 2, it might turn out that it has to destroy a large part of its Air Force. At the same time a considerable portion of its capability to defend against aircraft and cruise missiles would disappear.

This would immediately transfer a greater burden on the air defenses of the eastern neighbors. It might well be remembered, after all, that the U.S. cruise missile programs have already been realized to a large extent, and that only marginal cuts are to be anticipated in the future.

A marked shift away from nuclear-armed cruise missiles has taken place, however. The START agreement on cutbacks of strategic nuclear weapons has as its cornerstone a shifting of the focus away from ballistic missiles toward bombers and cruise missiles.

When the START 2 negotiations begin, this trend will be further accentuated.

Taken together, these arguments imply that interest in the air space of northern Europe will increase markedly.

One is also not consoled by a comment made by a NATO official recently with regard to the ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union: "It is entirely conceivable that the north-western corner of the Soviet Union will become its ultimate military fort."

UNITED KINGDOM

Thatcher Warns Against Deeper Cuts in CFE II
90WC0107A London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 6 Jul 90 p 8

[Article by George Jones and Ian Brodie]

[Text] Insisting she was cautious and not a Cold War warrior, Mrs Thatcher called on the Nato summit yesterday to avoid being carried away by changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Mrs Thatcher said she accepted that Nato had to "match the moment," but counselled caution over the pace of defence cuts. "What we have to do is prevent war," she said.

She registered her strong objections to a second round of conventional forces negotiations, known as Conventional Forces in Europe II, putting herself at odds with other delegations.

Mrs Thatcher said: "We must implement what has been agreed in CFE I [Nato-Warsaw Pact talks in Vienna], rather than press for further cuts."

The summit was facing decisions as momentous as those taken in 1948 when Europe's defensive structure for the post-war world was established.

Nato would need the same sense of wisdom, courage and foresight. "A wise man guards against the future as if it were the present. We are now at a turning point in Europe's history," she told the other leaders of the 16-nation alliance.

Nato must achieve the right balance between retaining the capacity to defend itself, whatever might happen, and adjusting its policies to the radical changes wrought by the crumbling of communism and the loosening of the Warsaw Pact.

Mrs Thatcher acknowledged that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe had greatly reduced the threat of a surprise attack on Nato.

Now, the Alliance needed to encourage that process of change and the creation of democracies with full human rights in the East. "We want this Nato meeting to be positive, constructive and imaginative, looking to the future and the relationship between East and West," she said.

"That is what people want to hear. They want to believe the danger is over."

But she said it was the duty of Nato leaders to put the other side of the equation as well. "We need to keep our resolve to defend ourselves. You never know where the next threat might come from."

Soviet military might remained formidable. No-one knew what would happen inside the Soviet Union, nor the ultimate consequences of ending the Kremlin's grip on Eastern Europe.

Mrs Thatcher urged the summit to remember that the Soviet Union's "considerable military forces" continued to be built up and modernised.

She reeled off a list of examples: six tanks and two combat aircraft manufactured every day, 100 tactical air-to-surface missiles every week and a submarine every six weeks.

Mrs Thatcher said she was in danger of being classed a "Cold War warrior" because she reminded people of the facts and the need for caution.

But two years ago in Washington she had suggested that if President Gorbachev survived in office the Cold War would be over.

"That caused people to blink at the time. I am not a Cold War warrior, but I am very cautious on defence. What we have to do is prevent war."

The starting-point for the future of Nato must be to strike a balance for the strategy and forces that will be needed, rather than concentrating on "what we can discard," she said.

She dealt with the debate within Nato over its existing policy of flexible response, which allows for first use of United States tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe.

She would resist any attempt to abandon the principle of first use, insisting that Nato had never spelt out precisely the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be unleashed.

"We must never say no first use to nuclear weapons. That would expose Europe once again to the threat of conventional war. It would remove flexibility and gravely weaken the deterrent effect."

"We must not replace flexible response with an inflexible response," she said.

However, one signal the summit could send was its readiness to reduce the number of short-range nuclear warheads in Europe along with conventional forces.

Reforms in the East certainly opened the way for changes in Nato's force structure, but Mrs Thatcher emphasised the continuing need for forward defence in the region of Europe which bordered the old Iron Curtain.

There would need to be a greater reliance on mobility, reinforcement and reserves, as well as ensuring reinforcement from across the sea.

She cautioned against focusing on further cut-backs in military equipment because the Nato-Warsaw Pact talks under way in Vienna were already proposing huge reductions.

She underlined her scepticism for CFE II by recalling her meeting in Moscow last month with Marshal Yazov, the Soviet Defence Minister, and other military chiefs.

They were not prepared to consider further substantial reductions of equipment and were having difficulty coping with the cuts to which they were already committed.

The way to reassure the Soviet Union, she said, was to propose cuts in manpower. But it was vital to keep ahead with Nato's military technology.

She believed ex-President Reagan's Star Wars initiative had been the factor that persuaded Mr Gorbachev to conclude that the Soviet Union could not keep up with the West and must change.

Above all, the United States and Canada should remain committed to Nato and keep some of their forces, including nuclear weapons, in Europe.

She said Nato should develop its political activities and increase its contacts with Eastern Europe.

It must ensure the Alliance is just as strong in the new world as in the old, and not give the impression there was no longer any danger.

"Our task is to demonstrate that Nato will continue to be our shield—not as an alliance against anyone, but as an alliance for defence, freedom, justice and democracy," she said.

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