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New Pattern of Power Balance In Europe Viewed

HK1805141590 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 9, 1 May 90 pp 2-3

[Article by Ji Yin (1323 1377): "Unpredictable New Pattern in Europe"]

[Text] For more than 40 years, Europe has been split in two. The NATO and Warsaw Pact are two major blocs that have been confronting each other. Ostensibly, this situation is quite stable and may go on for quite some time. But this is not the case. Kissinger proposed the year 1973 as the "Year of Europe," with a view to maintaining the position of the United States as the alliance chief. However, West Europe did not honor him and the proposal came to nothing. In 1989, East Europe went through a drastic change which unexpectedly turned that year literally into the "Year of Europe."

Pattern Changes: The New Replaces the Old

The year 1989 may be taken as a turning point in the postwar European history. The postwar period terminated there. The 1990's inaugurates the "post-postwar period" for Europe. This is also a transition period wherein a new pattern is replacing the old in Europe: The so-called "Yalta" pattern that has lasted for over 40 years is rapidly crumbling and a new European pattern is gradually taking shape in the context of various forces contending with one another.

For the first time since the Second World War, the opportunity for Europe to end the misery of being carved up has come. The issue of German reunification long in abeyance has been brought up to the top of Europe's political agenda. The old balances of power have all been overturned and new ones have yet to be struck; the old spheres of influence have been breached and a new European political map has yet to be drawn; the old security system based on the two major blocs is failing while a new European security system is still in obscurity. With the contention among forces such as the United States, the Soviet Union, West Europe, and even those within Europe, the whole of Europe is tending toward great unrest and large-scale reorganization. Destabilizing seeds are sown and there are some elusive factors under cover.

The "Yalta" pattern grounded on the separation between Europe and Germany has survived many crises in the past twenty years. The main reason is that such a pattern is in line with the strategic balance on the global scale between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the balance of power within Europe. It also conforms to the balance of the strength of the United States and its allies with that of the Soviet Union and its allies. In the context of heated East-West confrontations and those between the two major blocs, the dichotomy between the East and West respectively headed by the Soviet Union and the United States prevailed. East and West European countries chummed up with their respective leaders. The United States and the Soviet Union,

though at daggers drawn with each other, tacitly recognized each other's sphere of influence and dared not upset the situation by military means. Therefore, this pattern was marked with cold wars, confrontations, and tensions. Today, however, the status of the United States and the Soviet Union has relatively lowered. Particularly, the Soviet Union, hit by internal as well as external difficulties, has been adjusting policies, pushing forward "new thinking," and working for detente. As a result, the bloc mentality has weakened, the relations within each bloc loosened, and the dichotomy between the blocs is no longer as clear-cut as before. The long-standing balance of power in Europe has been disturbed to a greater extent by the abrupt turn in East Europe and the pressing question of German reunification. The foundation for the postwar pattern in Europe has been shaken.

The change in Europe is bound to have a strong impact on the overall situation. Since Europe is a strategic region and the focus of U.S.-Soviet contention. Any change there will lead to a change in the global structure of power. The old pattern of Europe was the main body of, and basis for, the bipolar system on the world scale. Therefore, the ruin of the "Yalta" pattern is one of the important signs indicating that the bipolar system has disintegrated and the world is heading for multipolarity.

Remapping Europe and Reorganizing Forces

The Second World War distorted the European topography beyond recognition. The halved Germany was a major characteristic of this change. Today, Europe is going through the third big topographical change of this century. The dramatic change in East Europe has moved eastward the original political demarcation line between the East and the West. Once German reunification is realized, the East-West military line of demarcation that originally runs through both parts of Germany will be obscured. Where should this line be drawn? The answer will largely depend on the relationship of the prospective reunified Germany with the two military blocs. It also shows a tendency to move eastward.

Strategically, West Europe has always tried to turn East Europe into a certain buffer zone between the Soviet Union and itself. This wish may well come true so far as the outlook of development is concerned. Economically, the European Economic Community is eager to step beyond the boundaries of West Europe and deal East Europe in. This is not only an attempt to make East Europe a new market and receptacle for investment but also a way to remap the political Europe according to the changed situation. East Europe is also quickening its pace in approaching the EEC and seeking for a part in West European economic integration in a variety of ways. Some East European countries may become full members or associate members of the EEC in future. Negotiations have started between 12 EEC countries and six countries of the European Free Trade Association (namely, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Norway, and Iceland) on establishing the "European Economic Zone" in which manpower, commodities,

capital, and labor may flow without restraint. In the days to come, there may appear a "Pan-European Economic Circle" covering the area from the Atlantic to the Bug (i.e. the border river separating the Soviet Union and Poland). The EEC is at the core. The European Free Trade Association forms the second ring and the third ring probably consists of a number of East European countries. The "Pan-European Economic Circle" will make up a unified economic basis for Europe and will play an important role in remolding Europe's political pattern.

The division of Germany was the basis of the old pattern of Europe. Therefore, the issue of German reunification is the key to a new design of European pattern.

The prospective German reunification will upset the balance of power in Europe since the Second World War, thus affecting the overall situation. East Germany and West Germany are the leading members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact respectively. U.S. and Soviet military presences are concentrated in the two parts of Germany. The European security framework is based on the division of Germany and on the condition that the two parts of Germany belong to different blocs. A fundamental change of this basis will throw European power off balance again.

German reunification has an especially direct impact on the EEC. The economic strength of the unified Germany will surpass that of other EEC member states by a big margin. According to an estimate, by 1995, the GNP of Germany will level with the combined total of France and Britain. The subtle balance among France, Britain, and West Germany that has kept the EEC alive will be gone. Since the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1950, the unique relationship between France and Germany has always been the major contributor to the economic integration of Europe. When Germany is reunified, it will be very hard for France to continue to counterbalance, with its political influence and its status as a nuclear power, the economic strength of the new Germany. The French-German axis will have a dubious future. France's plan to establish a West European economic and political entity based on the French-German alliance and led by France, which it has always endeavored to push through since de Gaulle took office in the late 1950's, will also fall flat. In the future, the leading role in the EEC will undoubtedly go to the reunified Germany. Reorganization of forces within the EEC is an inexorable trend.

Cold War Ends; Alliances Linger

The former cold war characterized by U.S.-Soviet confrontation is now history. The most revealing evidence is: On everyone's lips in the West nowadays is no longer how to contain the Soviet Union but how to help Gorbachev. It seems that the trilogy of "detente, understanding, cooperation" advocated by de Gaulle in those days is now being turned into reality. Many westerners

still emphasize that the cold war is not over, but they are actually emphasizing a peaceful evolution that "transcends containment."

The termination of the cold war and the dramatic change in the political situation in Europe has caused an important and large-scale military rearrangement in both the East and the West. Big reduction of conventional armaments in Europe is the inevitable outcome of political development. Stationing huge, long-standing forces in Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union is an important contribution to safeguarding the old order in Europe and also an expression of the cold war. Since both the old order and the cold war have changed, the forces stationed there by the two powers are bound to be greatly reduced within a few years. The negotiation on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe will have to be substantially stepped up. The drastic changes in East Europe will probably cause the actual disarmament to exceed, in speed and in amount, what is agreed upon over the conference table.

The Soviet Union has always had a much greater conventional strength in Europe than the United States: 540,000 for the Soviet Union and 320,000 for the United States at present. Within years, the Soviet superiority in conventional forces will probably give way to the advantageous position of the United States. According to President Bush's new proposal advanced at the beginning of this year, the ceiling for the stationed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union is 225,000 each, of which a maximum of 195,000 can be placed in Central Europe. As the Soviet Union cannot put its Army anywhere except Central Europe in practice, Soviet acceptance of this proposal from the United States is nothing different from approving the latter's right to put 30,000 more in other areas in Europe. The Soviet Union has recently agreed to withdraw all its forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and it is unlikely to be able to retain its present forces (365,000) in the eastern part of the prospective reunified Germany. Therefore, there is bound to be a huge reduction on Soviet forces in Central Europe in effect. The reversal of the relative conventional strength of the United States and the Soviet Union will be totally new to the postwar age.

And will the NATO and Warsaw Pact, which are the product of the cold war and the means to preserve the "Yalta" pattern, continue to exist?

As far as reality is concerned, the Warsaw Pact has stopped functioning and its military significance is even more dubious. The cohesive force of the NATO lies in joint resistance against the Soviet Union. Since the West has admitted that the Soviet Union is no longer a practical threat, the reason for NATO's continuance is no longer there. It is against this background that both the United States and the Soviet Union emphasize the need to change the nature of the alliances from military-political ones to political-military, or largely political, ones.

Nevertheless, it seems that the two blocs are not going to collapse within a short time. The reason is: **These two blocs have always been the major factor in balancing the power of the East and the West and may still help prevent the elusively changeable situation in Europe from slipping out of control, therefore, all parties concerned feel the need to keep the alliances.** Not only do the United States and the Soviet Union wish to control the developments in Europe and safeguard their respective interests and influence by means of blocs, but European countries also need blocs to serve as umbrellas because they cannot afford to take the risks brought about by the change of the pattern. During the turbulent transition period, retaining blocs may contribute to the stabilization of European geopolitics and territorial status quo and also help reduce the fear for German reunification. But, after all, alliances are related to the "Yalta" pattern and therefore cannot be permanently retained. A new European security structure will eventually replace the old one which is based on the two blocs and has been shaken.

Two Superpowers Have Weakened; Future Is Unpredictable

The strength and the power to influence international affairs of both the United States and the Soviet Union have weakened. The two superpowers do not have much control over the rapidly changing situation in Europe. The designers of the "Yalta" pattern can no longer work out a new pattern for Europe while leaving the Europeans aside.

So far, no one has been able to put forward a blueprint for the new pattern. Gorbachev advanced the plan of a "European Common Mansion" which is to span from the Atlantic to the Urals; Bush talked about a "unified, free Europe"; U.S. Secretary of State Baker advocated a "new Europe based on neo-Atlanticism"; and French President Mitterrand proposed to establish a "Union of European States." These are only plans that reflect the proposers' respective interests and needs, but nothing of true blueprints.

A new pattern of Europe is looming up on the ruins of the old one and is hard to describe in detail for the time being. It seems that **a new pattern may gradually take shape on the basis of the following fundamental facts: Reunified Germany; further enlarged and deepened EEC; unstable East Europe; weakened, yet still considerable presence of U.S. influence; declining, yet militarily still strong Soviet Union with an uncertain future.** The new pattern will come into being amid repeated contention and trials of forces among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe. It will never be plain sailing. The general tendency is: **A new pattern of Europe with Europe as the main body will replace the old one wherein the United States and Soviet Union control Europe.**

U.S. National Security Strategy Viewed

HK2905044190 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 21, 21 May 90 pp 24-26

[Article by Li Qinggong (2621 1987 0501: "Analysis of the New U.S. National Security Strategy"]

[Excerpts] In March 1990, U.S. President Bush submitted his first report on "the U.S. national security strategy" to Congress. In this report Bush established the target of "protecting U.S. security and promoting U.S. interests," along with suggesting the comprehensive application of political, economic, diplomatic, and military means for achieving this target. Now the new U.S. national security strategy has been announced and will serve as a guideline for the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and defense policy in the 1990's. [passage omitted]

The Target

To cope with the military, political, economic, and technological challenges facing the United States, the Bush administration has drawn up six national security strategic targets in detail, according to the general target of "protecting U.S. security and promoting U.S. interests." [passage omitted]

Reducing and removing military threats. The report points out that military threats have remained the main threats to the United States during the Cold War period since World War II. Although the "Cold War is phasing out," global and regional military threats have not completely disappeared. In terms of overall security, the United States will be able to handle its economic security and regional stability only when its "military security remains secured." The formulation of this target has actually issued a permit for the United States to maintain its powerful military forces, pursue its modernization program, and even resort to military power. [passages omitted]

Policy

To achieve the above targets, the Bush administration has formulated a security policy characterized by "unanimity between target and method," under which it will strive to get the best possible results by treating different regions according to their different conditions.

It will continue to look upon the Soviet Union as its main strategic opponent. In contrast to the past, the Bush administration no longer regards the Soviet Union as an "enemy country" and has expressed appreciation for Soviet political reform. But it is still on the alert against the Soviet Union and has misgivings about the prospects of Soviet reform. Therefore, the United States will continue to practice an "overcontainment" strategy against the Soviet Union, with the aim of "dragging it into the international system." In politics, the Bush administration has urged the Soviet Union to systematize its reform and opening up, demanded that a

dialogue be conducted between the Baltic republics and the Soviet Union, and encouraged the Soviet Union to continue to take a noninterference attitude toward East European "self-determination." In the economic field, to support Soviet political and economic reforms, the Bush administration is making efforts to sign agreements with the Soviet Union on bilateral trade and investments and is considering providing most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union. It supports the Soviet Union in joining the GATT as an observer and is urging it to shift to a free market economy as soon as possible. In the military field, the United States is seeking a low-level military balance with the Soviet Union on a global scale, will continue their bilateral exchanges, and has demanded Soviet cooperation in handling regional conflicts, apart from trying to reduce the Soviet threat and lower its armaments level through arms control talks and disarmament negotiations. [passages omitted]

Prospects

Bush's "U.S. national security strategy" report indicates that the United States is most concerned about Europe. German reunification, European alliance, changes in East Europe, and Soviet reform have made the United States give priority consideration to Europe in formulating its security policy. Because no final conclusion can be drawn on the situation in Europe and changes there are occurring irregularly, it is believed that the Bush administration will adjust its security policy according to the situation in Europe and the rest of the world.

Although the new U.S. security strategy stresses that the United States is facing a military threat, the present military confrontation is weaker than the past. Therefore, the Bush administration is focusing its attention on political changes and economic challenges. It is generally believed that the present military threat will gradually weaken following the conclusion of arms control and disarmament agreements, German reunification, and formation of a European alliance. In such cases, economic security will become prominent. In its security strategy, the United States will give great consideration to its contradictions with the Soviet Union, East Europe, its West European allies, and the Third World. The United States has made preparations for this development trend.

In short, based on the execution of U.S. policy for the last 40 odd years, the new U.S. national security strategy is aimed at achieving a bigger political, economic, military, and diplomatic strategy in the 1990's, by taking advantage of the changes in the current international security situation. The Bush administration's judgment of the situation, the formulation of its strategic target, and its choice of security policies all give expression to its style of "moving forward cautiously." It can be predicted that the Bush administration will go ahead along this established line but will encounter new unstable factors and difficulties along the way. The United States will make a new adjustment of its security strategy on this basis.

U.S. Policy on Soviet Union, Europe Viewed

OW2605110090 Beijing XINHUA in English
0604 GMT 26 May 90

[Commentary: "New Problems Facing U.S. Diplomacy" by Wu Jin]

[Text] Washington, May 25 (XINHUA)—The relaxed situation following the confrontation of 40-year cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union is far from stable, as difficulties stand in the way of resolving a number of international issues.

The two countries face regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Central America and the Middle East, and problems over nuclear and conventional arms reduction, all of which remain the fundamental strategic concern between the two superpowers.

Moreover, the drastic political changes in East Europe are causing a U.S.-Soviet debate over the future political and military status of a unified Germany. The Soviet Union disagrees to the unified Germany's joining NATO, while the U.S. and other Western countries insist on its membership with the organization.

The U.S. Government refuses to make concession because a unified German presence in NATO will not only place the West in a superior position of Europe's military strength, but will facilitate U.S. influence and restraint on Germany.

Meanwhile, the cry for independence among the three Baltic Soviet Socialist Republics has added tension to U.S.-Soviet relations.

The White House has always refused to recognize Soviet sovereignty over the three republics and repeatedly declared its support for their "self-determination", which undoubtedly is an encouragement to the secessionist forces of the republics while Moscow expressed its rejection of foreign interferences in its internal affairs.

Although both sides realize that bilateral relations should be taken into account when attempting to alleviate the contradiction over this issue, the prospects for a solution to the problem seem virtually bleak.

Though the U.S.-Soviet relations are viewed by the White House as the core of attention in diplomacy, it is not the only hard nut for the United States to crack. Just when the U.S. boasts its "gains" in East Europe, its traditional domain in West Europe faces the threat of being squeezed out.

Under the pretext of being confronted by powerful Soviet military strength, the U.S. has been underlining NATO's role as "the principal instrument for guaranteeing peace in Europe."

According to U.S. president George Bush, NATO "will continue to be vital to America's place in Europe."

NATO remains "the main institution that channels U.S. political influence into the Council of Europe," as *TIME* magazine commented in its latest issue. Any weakening of the institution means a crippling of the U.S. Government's right to speak on European affairs, which will certainly not be accepted by the United States.

However, West European countries have long been reluctant to obey to Washington as their economic strength continues to grow, their economic integration is gradually being realized, and military confrontations heading for a relaxation.

Not long ago, an unanimous agreement was reached at the European Community (EC) summit that a "political alliance" should be established while the setting up of an "economic union" is sped up, which signals a trend for West European countries to make rival claims as an equal with the two superpowers not only in the economic but also political fields.

West Europe still can not break away from dependence upon the U.S. and, therefore, there is no immediate move to dissolve NATO, but appeals for promoting the EC's role, and maintaining and influencing East Europe and the Soviet Union through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are on the rise.

Europe has always been of vital importance in U.S. diplomacy. The White House will certainly address such issues at the U.S.-Soviet summit, scheduled later this month in Washington, which occurs just less than six months since their last December's meeting in Malta.

'News Analysis' Welcomes Trend in U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks

OW0206100090 Beijing XINHUA in English
0937 GMT 2 Jun 90

["News Analysis: New Achievements in U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks (by Huai Chengbo)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, June 1 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today signed a joint statement on a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), outlining the progress they have made in their arms control talks over the past 10 years. They reaffirmed their "determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year."

The two leaders agreed during their last December Malta summit that they would sign a framework on the reduction of 50 percent of the strategic weapons at this meeting.

According to Richard Burt, chief U.S. representative to the strategic arms talks, 97 to 98 percent of the work on the treaty have been finished by the two sides, but there still remain problems to be resolved.

The joint statement says that an agreed provision in the treaty sets out that each side limits its land-based, sea-launched and air-based missile carriers and heavy bombers to the ceiling of 1,600. The warheads to be

carried by the missiles and bombers will also be reduced to 6,000 each in three phases in seven years under strict verifications. The treaty will be in effect for 15 years.

Strategic arms reduction is the most complicated and difficult issue in the whole U.S.-Soviet talks on arms control, vital to their security and strategic arrangements.

Since the talks began in June 1982, every step forward has been made through hard bargainings and sometimes deadlocks. The two sides had reportedly finished 90 percent of the work by the time when President Bush took office in 1989.

In the past six months, the talks moved along a long and winding road, though U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze have pushed it forward after meeting more than once.

However, as the two sides still differed over some issues at the last minute of the talks today, the signing ceremony was finally held through the collaborated efforts of Baker and Shevardnadze only after repeated postponements.

During the more than 40 years after World War II, arms expansion and war preparations between the two superpowers have been increasingly intensified and nuclear weapons piled up. The arms race has seriously threatened the world peace and security. Countries, particularly those of the Third World, have strongly demanded arms reduction by the United States and the Soviet Union. It was not until the recent years that the two superpowers began to take some steps to control their nuclear armament, in view of the new developments in the international situation and out of their own needs in economic development, foreign policy and global strategy.

However, the joint statement issued today is far from being the culmination of the matter. Since the international situation is unpredictably changeable, anything can happen to prevent the treaty from being finished. Even if the treaty is signed by the end of this year, the reduction will be limited in both the variety and quantity of the arms involved.

According to some experts quoted by AP today, the arms control talks had initially aimed at a 50 percent reduction on each side, but the present document calls for only a one-third, and some sources even estimate the decrease is actually 10 percent since some kinds of weapons on both sides are not included in the treaty.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union intended to leave themselves an option for a renewal of military equipment while talking over arms control. This obviously makes the treaty less significant and mainly "symbolic."

At today's ceremony, the two presidents also signed accords on chemical weapons, nuclear tests and conventional arms in Europe. All this shows that the two superpowers have moved somewhat toward arms control. Although their steps are still not quick and big enough to meet the demand of the people in the world, the trend suggested deserves welcome.

INTERBLOC AFFAIRS

Military Pact Changes, Need for New European Security Viewed

90WC0073A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
5 May 90 pp 6-7

[Article by Janusz Reiter: "Jumping Over One's Own Shadow"]

[Text] President Bush was discussing the future of NATO and the issues of armaments and disarmament, at which point a journalist asked him a difficult question: "Mr. President, where is the enemy we should defend ourselves against?" Somewhat surprised, Bush answered after thinking for a moment: "Instability in international relations is the enemy." Some people were not satisfied with this answer. Columnists may consider it original, and politicians may believe that it is adequate, but what are generals to do? How can soldiers be trained to combat "instability?"

A paradoxical situation has existed from the moment the communist governments collapsed in East Central Europe and the two German states embarked on the road to unification. Structures have not changed. The same military blocs exist which existed in the time of cold war, as well as the armies with insignificantly reduced numbers of soldiers and even military doctrines conceived in a completely different era. The only thing missing is the enemy. Nobody in Western Europe feels threatened by the East. The notion that Poland governed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki or the Czechoslovakia of Vaclav Havel could threaten France or the Federal Republic of Germany is too absurd for anybody to seriously entertain. Even Russia under Gorbachev does not evoke fear as an expansionist superpower.

It is the same on the Eastern side. Here, theories about the NATO threat have always been treated with, at the very least, skepticism. At present, the concern of the people in this part of Europe is how to join the West rather than defend against it. In one of the Polish units, a confused silence followed when soldiers were asked who the enemy is. Only one of them, having made sure that he was out of the earshot of all so-called career personnel, whispered an answer: "The sergeant is the enemy."

The recognition that the security system built several dozen years ago does not fit the new European reality is due not only to democratic changes accomplished in the former Eastern bloc. Events in Germany were the factor which not only prompted but altogether compelled the governments to look for a new security model. Agreeing to the unification of Germany meant the beginning of the end of the European security system.

The changes may develop in keeping with three scenarios. One of them, which is clearly preferred by the Soviet Union, is to give the united German state a

neutral status which rules out its participation in military blocs. As early as the 1950's, Moscow insisted on such a solution to the German question. However, it is clear that what Gorbachev and Shevardnadze propose now is not merely a dusted-off note of Stalin from 38 years ago. At the time, the ambition of Soviet policy was to draw Germany into the orbit of its influence. At present, the goal is much more modest: At issue is preventing the unilateral reinforcement of NATO and averting being pushed into the back seat of European politics. The West responded to the Soviet proposals as unfavorably as to the offer of Stalin in its time, and in addition it received the support of the countries of East Central Europe, including Poland. This unanimous attitude is due to the conviction shared by all of these countries that a united Germany taking its own path alone would be a source of concern rather than harmonious cooperation in Europe.

The incorporation of a united Germany into NATO is another possible scenario of changes. This solution has gained the most adherents. It is favored by all the main political forces of both German states, as well as the Western allies of Bonn. The states of East Central Europe do not oppose this variant either. This broad agreement as to the inclusion of a united Germany in the North Atlantic Pact is the result of the fact that this is, to be sure, a quite conservative solution but a relatively simple one. It does not call for creating new structures or developing new models. It would suffice to move the border of the Atlantic alliance from Elbe to Odra and Nysa on staff maps. This simplicity appears to especially appeal to the Americans for whom the extension of the territory of the pact to the east would be a logical consequence of the collapse of communism and the confirmation of victory for the Western world.

Of course, the issue is not as simple as it might appear. The Soviet Union opposes the swallowing of the GDR by NATO. To be sure, this is not a problem of a military threat for Moscow. Nobody in the Kremlin believes that the North Atlantic Pact would be eager to conquer the Soviet Union. This is rather a matter of the prestige of a large superpower shaken by a domestic crisis and now forced to make concessions in foreign policy. It is also a problem of the place of the Soviet Union in European politics. The right to have a voice in decisions on the German issue and military presence in the GDR were one of the attributes of a superpower for Moscow, and at the same time a guarantee that no essential decisions affecting Europe could be made without its participation.

The Soviet Union has too little political power to impose its own vision of the future united Germany, but enough to hamper and delay the process of unification. For this reason alone, the West should take Soviet reservations seriously. However, there also is another and, perhaps, even more significant reason to take the interests of Moscow into account. The West does not want a defeat in the game for the position of Germany, whether real or merely presumed, to weaken Gorbachev and provide

new arguments to his domestic opponents. America and Western Europe are not interested in weakening the Soviet Union. Their interests rather prompt them to ensure that this erstwhile enemy does not begin to act in a nervous and unpredictable manner. This is exactly what President Bush had in mind when he mentioned "instability" in response to who the enemy of the West is.

In the capitals of NATO countries, considerations are under way about the manner in which Moscow can be persuaded to reconcile itself with the unpleasant prospect of losing influence in Germany. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG Hans-Dietrich Genscher is suggesting that the territory of the present-day GDR could belong to the political structure of NATO but not its military structure. Reportedly, the West German minister is thinking about adding the Soviet Union to the so-called major seven—the most developed countries of the world which make fundamental decisions on global economic and political problems. Leaders of the United States, Canada, Japan, the FRG, France, Great Britain, and Italy belong to this exclusive club. The possibility of leaving some Soviet troops in eastern Germany for a period of time is also discussed.

The participation of the Soviet Union in this discussion involves listening rather than talking. What the West has to offer does not remove the fundamental dilemmas which the Soviet Union has to face in the nearest future regarding its security policy. First of all, the Warsaw Pact is breaking down, at least in its format to date. One of its elements, the East German army, can already be written off as a loss. The strength of the National People's Army of the GDR has dropped by 40,000, and continues to decline. The recent allies of the Soviet Army are already applying for admission to the Bundeswehr or withdrawing to civilian life. However, the erosion of the Warsaw Pact is not restricted to the GDR. In Hungary, the idea of neutrality is gaining supporters. Czechoslovakia, as well as Poland, demand fundamental changes in the pact, and do not appear convinced that the pact has a bright future.

The West is not facing dramatic challenges, but NATO should also reckon with the fact that its reason to exist will be questioned. A certain influential West German columnist says: "No pact can exist longer than is necessary to accomplish its task." NATO was set up in order to defend the West against the expansionist policy of the Eastern bloc. Now, when this reason no longer exists, NATO has become unnecessary; its life may be artificially prolonged, but not for long. Representatives of the pact try to beat back these attacks by referring to its transformation from a defensive union to a political treaty, but this is a dodge rather than a response to criticism.

Are the pacts necessary at all? Their old rationale has been exhausted. At present, their existence can be defended by using the argument that a sudden breakdown of the existing structures could undermine rather

than reinforce the feeling of security of the Europeans. The entire concept of disarmament talks is built on the assumption that two military pacts exist. Abrupt shifts in the array of forces and changes in the existing structures would only serve to hamper the disarmament process. An arms-control expert says: "You cannot rebuild a streetcar which is in motion."

The pacts would render a great service to all if they prepared not only for disarmament but also for the emergence of a Europe without pacts. At one point, this was merely a nice slogan; at present, the most serious and cautious politicians consider this kind of evolution conceivable and even attainable. This would be the third scenario of changes in the European security system which is the most difficult but at the same time the most promising. The creation of a joint security system, that is, a network of treaties and ties which would bind together the interests of all participants, would be the goal which the changes would strive to achieve.

The idea of collective security has never had as many proponents as at present. At one time, it was considered to be a leftist utopia removed from the reality of this world. At present, it is advertised by even conservative politicians who do not succumb to the temptation of utopian thinking. This idea is attractive because it responds to the yearning for thinking in all-European categories while at the same time eliminates a customary question: Who stands to win, who stands to lose? Collective security means that everyone wins, nobody loses.

The lack of specifics is the weakness of this idea. As of now, very little is known about how it is to be implemented. The assumption that the scope of participants in this security system corresponds to that of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is beyond a doubt. Therefore, this includes Europe with the Soviet Union, as well as America and Canada. In general, the view that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe must create an institution capable of current operations rather than just meeting once in several years or even months does not cause reservations. As early as several months ago, Prime Minister Mazowiecki suggested that the Council of European Cooperation become such an institution. Recently, Vaclav Havel made a proposal which points in exactly the same direction. West German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher has referred to a council of the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, that is, a somewhat looser structure, but based on the same assumptions. Specialized institutions coordinating cooperation in various fields would fit under its umbrella. The European center of preventing military crises would be one of them.

This institution, which could be called the Council of European Cooperation, should be endowed with greater powers so that it would not share the fate of the pre-war League of Nations. Transferring to the council some of the national powers in the sphere of defense is under consideration in many capitals. Some are talking about

the need to altogether create joint European armed forces. The Polish proposal to create a Polish-German brigade belongs in this very school of thought on security matters.

Time is short. The vision of a new European security system should at least have a clear outline by the fall, when the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is held. If this were accomplished, it would be easier to find an answer to the question of how to build a united Germany into the general European security model. To be sure, former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger does not believe in the success of these efforts. In his opinion, collective security is a dangerous illusion which only brings about collective chaos. However, it may be that Kissinger is too attached to Bismarck-style thinking in terms of equilibrium in order to believe that the European states can transcend traditional divisions and biases. It could be that they need to jump over their own shadow in order to create a new system of collective security. However, it is a fact that there have never been so many of them willing to jump.

ADN Reports Initiative to Institutionalize CSCE Process

LD0506171690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1504 GMT 5 Jun 90

[Text] Copenhagen (ADN)—The trilateral initiative by the GDR, the CSFR, and Poland on the institutionalization of the CSCE process was the subject of a short talk on Tuesday [5 June] between Foreign Minister Markus Meckel and his counterparts from the FRG, Denmark, and the CSFR. The foreign ministers met on the fringes of the second CSCE human rights conference in Copenhagen.

As was learned in Copenhagen about the trilateral proposals, the initiators will strive to get the CSCE states to adopt a six-point document setting out security structures. According to this, CSCE summits are to be held at least once a year to discuss fundamental issues concerning developments in Europe. A council for security and cooperation should meet twice a year at the foreign minister level, while there should be monthly meetings at the ambassadorial level. A permanent secretariat based in Prague should carry out the technical-organizational and administrative functions. There are also plans to create a center for confidence-building, arms control, and verification in Berlin. In order to fulfil its tasks it should use the technical facilities which will be made available when the rights and responsibilities of the four powers for Germany as a whole and for Berlin finally end. There is also to be a center for the prevention of conflicts.

Speaking to ADN, Foreign Minister Meckel pointed out that the trilateral initiative agreed on several points with USSR proposals. Hans-Dietrich Genscher received the document on Friday of last week along with an invitation to participate in the initiative.

At a meeting between Minister Meckel and James Baker, the U.S. secretary of state informed his GDR counterpart about the results of the summit between President George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. Meckel had a further meeting with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. Meckel exchanged views with his colleagues from the United States and Great Britain about the Two plus Four talks, about Poland's Western border, and about the alliance membership of a united Germany.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Warsaw Pact Declaration

*LD0706175290 Moscow TASS in English
1741 GMT 7 Jun 90*

[Text] Moscow, June 7 (TASS)—A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member states was held here today. It discussed prospects of the all-European process and the formation of new structures of the security and consolidation of stability in Europe. The meeting adopted the following declaration:

1. Modern development in Europe creates conditions for overcoming a bloc security model and the division of the continent. This development is becoming irreversible. It meets the interests of nations wishing to live in mutual harmony, without artificial barriers and ideological hostility. Participants in the meeting favor the formation of a new, all-European security system and the creation of a single Europe of peace and cooperation.

The states represented at the meeting are taking an active part in this process. This is why they find it necessary to reconsider the character and functions of the Warsaw Treaty. They are sure that only in this case the Warsaw Treaty will be able to reach new topical targets during the transition period, dealing with disarmament and the creation of an all-European security system.

Participants in the meeting are unanimous in their opinion that the ideological enemy image has been overcome by mutual efforts of the East and the West, while the East and West notions are again acquiring their purely geographical meaning. They believe that danger could come only from those who would threaten the security of countries in any form, including the threat or use of force, no matter who resorts to it. Confrontation elements contained in documents of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, that were adopted in the past, are no longer in line with the spirit of the time.

In this new situation the states represented at the meeting will begin to review the character, functions and activities of the Warsaw Treaty, and will start its transformation into a treaty of sovereign states with equal rights, formed on a democratic basis. With this in view they created a provisional commission of government representatives, which will present to the Political Consultative Committee proposals on this subject before the

end of next October. The proposals will be examined by the Political Consultative Committee before the end of November. Warsaw Treaty member states want to contribute in this way to the consolidation of peace, security and stability in Europe and to the development of the Helsinki process.

The meeting reiterated the readiness for constructive cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance, its member states, neutral and non-aligned countries of the continent on a bilateral and multilateral basis in the interests of European stability and disarmament, confidence-building and the firm establishment of the defence sufficiency principle.

Participants in the meeting believe that consistent and all-round institutionalization of the Helsinki process is an important stage of these developments. This is the purpose of proposals submitted recently by some countries—participants in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Participants in the meeting expect the first important decisions on this problem to be taken at the forthcoming summit of European countries, the United States and Canada.

Warsaw Treaty member states positively assess some of the steps taken recently by NATO. They expect the new trend of changes in NATO to be accelerated and deepened and to be matched by corresponding changes in the activities of this alliance.

II. Warsaw Treaty member states went on record in favor of a successful termination of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, so that corresponding agreements could be signed at a meeting of leaders of the states—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe late in 1990.

So far as external aspects of Germany's reunification are concerned, they expressed their unanimous conviction that it should be carried out in the context of the all-European process and on the basis of its principles, should stimulate and deepen its development, take into consideration lawful security interests of Germany's neighbors and all other states and ensure firm guarantees of the inviolability of European borders.

The states represented at the meeting will actively promote the creation of a European economic and legal space, as well as full implementation of the basic human rights and freedoms.

Participants in the meeting pointed out that the agreements reached at the Soviet-American summit promote a further advance towards disarmament and the improvement of the international situation.

Warsaw Treaty member states express their conviction that all the states—participants in the Helsinki process fully realize their responsibility that the history-making chance to create Europe without blocs and hostility not to be missed.

BULGARIA

Balkan Aspect of Washington Summit Examined

AU0606085890 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 1 Jun 90 p 4

[Captain Ivan Genov military-political commentary:
"The Frankfurter Sausage Effect"]

[Excerpts] The latest Soviet-American summit meeting began with great hopes and expectations. The agenda contains innumerable items, with subjects submitted for discussion ranging from a united Germany and the situation in the Baltic regions, to bilateral relations and all aspects of disarmament, as numerous commentators automatically recite, but do the talks really apply to all these aspects?

It is true that an agreement on chemical weapons is expected to be signed in Washington; that visible progress related to strategic offensive weapons, the discussions on which seem to be stagnating, is expected to be achieved. It is also true that considerable incentives for progress in the Vienna negotiations should result from the aforementioned talks. All this is true; nevertheless, the serious and difficult problems of naval disarmament and the balance of forces on the periphery of the ancient continent, meaning the Balkans primarily, seem to remain somewhat in the background, presumably as a result of mutual compromises.

Any of us could try his hand at a very simple kitchen experiment. If we take a frankfurter sausage in our hand and squeeze it in the middle, it will inevitably swell at both ends. A similar situation is emerging in Europe today. Things seem to function relatively well in the central part of Europe. The withdrawal of Soviet troops deployed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland started even before the signing of the Vienna agreement. A reduction of the U.S. military contingent in Central Europe is expected in the near future. The Bonn government reassures us that a future united Bundeswehr is expected to serve the United Nations and would be made available in case of natural disasters and so forth.

In the Balkans, however, the drastic disproportions to the advantage of NATO are still untouched. There is even more: Several reports from competent, foreign sources indicate that some of the armaments made available by the reductions in Central Europe are expected to be transferred to that small corner of our continent where nearly half of the Turkish Armed Forces are concentrating, with the intention of modernizing them.

A little farther to the south, several offensive aircraft carrier formations of the U.S. Sixth Fleet are still patrolling in Mediterranean waters, undisturbed and untouched by any negotiations whatsoever. [passage omitted]

Some people may reprimand me by saying that I am painting a dark picture of the situation. Nevertheless, the strategic intentions of all naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean are directed against the north, and regardless of all political reforms underway in our country, the scenario has not changed.

If the situation should remain the same, the "frankfurter sausage effect" would quickly become evident both here in the Balkans and in the territorial waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. We can hardly expect any changes for the better, considering the agenda of the Washington negotiations which has been drafted in advance. Nevertheless, I am convinced that such changes could be quickly made, provided that both sides take the initiative. I am talking about the United States...and Turkey. NATO's military naval superiority in the Mediterranean is 54:1 compared to that of the USSR. As far as Turkey is concerned, nearly three times more troops than the entire Bulgarian Army are stationed in Eastern Thracia. As we see, there is much room for showing initiative and good will in the form of unilateral disarmament. It is hardly necessary to wait for summit meetings. Such initiatives would always be welcome, as long as there is good will of course.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Slovak Premier Discusses Troop Withdrawal

*LD2805121190 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak
1000 GMT 28 May 90*

[Report by correspondent Lubos Krno from Kovacova]

[Text] I am reporting from Kovacova where a special meeting of the council of the Zvolen district national committee has been held attended by Slovak Prime Minister Milan Cic, Slovak Health Minister Stanislav Novak, and other officials. The sole item on the agenda was the situation concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Sliac and Zvolen. In this context a representative of the towns of Banska Bystrica, Zvolen, Sliac, and Kovacova presented an open letter to the Slovak prime minister expressing fears that the airport at Sliac might become a Czechoslovak military one following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The letter demands that the airport be turned into a civilian one, mainly because it is situated in the vicinity of the spa at Sliac.

In his reply Prime Minister Cic said that he has already discussed the issue with the minister of national defense, and the situation, as he put it, is developing favorably.

The meeting was also addressed by Major General Svetozar Nadovic, chief of the federal Ministry of National Defense's directorate supervising the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, who gave assurances that in Zvolen all facilities vacated by the Soviet troops will be turned over to the town and that the Czechoslovak Army does not expect to use the airport at Sliac for training purposes. He added that the Soviet

troop withdrawal continues in accordance with the agreed timetable and that by six o'clock yesterday 24,669 soldiers and officers and more than 11,000 civilian employees, which is more than one third, had left Czechoslovak territory.

Defense Minister Cited on USSR Troop Withdrawals

*LD3005114290 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak
1000 GMT 30 May 90*

[Text] A press conference took place in Prague today with Army General Miroslav Vacek, minister of national defense. Among the newsmen present was editor Bernard Rostecky, whom we asked by telephone for a more detailed information.

[Rostecky] In his opening speech Army General Miroslav Vacek assessed in positive terms the preparations and training of the recruits who have already joined their regular units. He also spoke positively about the training of rocket and artillery troops and the air-defense units, which is now culminating in shooting practice in the training grounds in the Soviet Union and over the Baltic Sea.

The minister dwelled in particular on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our homeland. He noted that the tasks of the first stage of the withdrawal, which will end tomorrow, have been fulfilled and even exceeded in many cases. By this morning 26,827 Soviet troops had left the republic. The total balance yesterday was 551 tanks; 400 more infantry combat vehicles left than planned; 11 military garrisons were completely vacated. Another 19 garrisons will be vacated in the second stage from 1 June until 31 December.

However, General Vacek has avoided neither the problems nor the difficulties against which the army struggles at present. One of them is also an incorrect interpretation of the law on civilian service, which so far 7,849 compulsory service soldiers have asked for. Of them 3,153 have already left the army. The minister voiced the view that many applicants count on the benevolence of our laws and that their application for civilian service is motivated by self-interest. Replying to our question of when the true data on the republic's defense expenditure will be published, the minister said by the middle of next month.

Vacek Envisages Closure of Training Sites

*LD3005153990 Prague CTK in English
1457 GMT 30 May 90*

[Text] Prague, May 30 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Defence Minister Miroslav Vacek said at a press conference here today that three training sites—in Mimon in North Bohemia, Dobra Voda in the Sumava Mountains and Kamenica nad Cirochou in East Slovakia, will soon stop being used for training of troops and will be opened to the public and used for economic activities.

He told journalists that at another six training sites, the training will be limited and the areas will be partly opened to the public.

Journalists were given a publication of the Czechoslovak Defence Ministry "The Czechoslovak Army—Facts". According to it, the Czechoslovak Army had on 1 May 1990 a total of 389 aircraft, 4,252 tanks, 5,397 armoured vehicles, 130 helicopters, 81 launching-pads for operational-tactical and tactical missiles, 566 anti-tank missile systems and 3,674 rocket launchers, guns and mortars.

A number of these weapons will be reduced in the future, mostly by the end of 1990. The number of aircraft will be cut to 356, helicopters to 76, tanks to 3,735, armoured vehicles to 4,735, rocket launchers, guns and mortars to 3,360 and the number of launching pads to 77. The number of anti-tank missile systems will be preserved.

According to the publication, the Czechoslovak Army has 14 training sites on Czechoslovak territory on an area of 2,664 square kilometres, i.e. 2.06 per cent of the territory, eight of them in the Czech republic and six in Slovakia.

Delegate to Vienna CSCE Talks Comments

*LD3005210190 Prague CTK in English
1920 GMT 30 May 90*

[Text] Vienna, May 30 (CTK)—Colonel Vladimir Mohyla told CTK here today that confidence and security building measures of quite a new type should be worked out at the Vienna talks to change the otherwise vague concept of its activities.

Vladimir Mohyla, who is a member of the Czechoslovak delegation at the Vienna talks, said that further development of the talks is unpredictable. A number of countries, including the Soviet Union, re-evaluate and further differentiate their standpoints. The approaches to solving the principal priorities—the navy and air force—have not been clearly defined as yet. The oncoming Bush-Gorbachev summit cannot be relied on to solve the problem. The Czechoslovak suggestion to create a European security commission was received officially in a reserved way by the North-Atlantic alliance countries, Vladimir Mohyla said.

Vladimir Mohyla went on to say that the problem is that the talks cannot determine their new content without external political impetuses. It is expected that this new content will be offered by the prepared summit of the "35" grouping (33 European countries, the United States and Canada, participating in the Vienna talks).

Last week Czechoslovakia together with Hungary submitted their joint suggestion and they prepare to elaborate a whole range of initiatives. Czechoslovakia is interested notably in the issue of publishing information on military budgets and expenditures. It must be mentioned that the Warsaw Treaty countries lack a joint

negotiating line, which limits the possibilities of the new suggestions to a certain extent, Vladimir Mohyla said.

Commentary on Soviet Troops Withdrawal

*LD3105140990 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak
1000 GMT 31 May 90*

[Excerpts] Today marks the end of the first stage of Soviet troop withdrawal from our republic's territory on the basis of the well-known documents which are also consistently supervised by parliament. Editor Viliam Roth has prepared a commentary concerning some circumstances of the withdrawal.

[Roth] [passage omitted on Vacek press conference 30 May] I will therefore recall another circumstance of the withdrawal, because it is unavoidably projected in the all-European context of creating a new military situation on the continent. I had an opportunity to ask this here in Bratislava of Valerian Mikhaylov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna disarmament talks, during the visit Tuesday by a group of diplomats from Vienna.

[Begin recording] [Mikhaylov in Russian, with superimposed Slovak translation] It is clear that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory is not directly related to the decisions which are now discussed at the Vienna talks. Nevertheless, they will play their part when an agreement on reduction to the level which is being discussed is reached. And the fact that this process is going according to schedule creates a real prerequisite that the disarmament process should go even further, including a unilateral reduction of armaments, in a direction which will result in an agreement on the date agreed at Vienna talks. [end recording]

[Roth] So, this is what the head of the Soviet delegation said. In order to further specify things, I will add that Europe is expecting that the Vienna talks will be completed no later than by the end of this year, that this topic will even be discussed in Washington between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, and that the Soviet troop withdrawal from our territory will be completed by the middle of next year.

Soviet Spokesman Says Security Initiative 'Positive'

*LD0206131190 Prague CTK in English
0830 GMT 2 Jun 90*

[Text] Washington, June 2 (CTK correspondent)—Soviet presidential spokesman Arkady Maslennikov has described Czechoslovakia's proposal to set up a European security commission as a positive contribution towards the search of a system in Europe that would be acceptable for all participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

After Friday's American paper WASHINGTON POST reported the Soviet Union's suggestion to the USA to strengthen the Helsinki process and to set up a big council of Europe, the CTK correspondent here asked

Mr Maslennikov to compare this suggestion with the Czechoslovak initiative. Mr Maslennikov stated that the basic platforms of the two concepts are similar in seeking a European security system different from the existing one which is based on the existence of military-political blocs. The Czechoslovak proposal is a positive contribution towards the search for a system in Europe that would be acceptable for all CSCE countries. At the same time, however, it must be seen that there are many different approaches to this issue and a common solution can be found only through mutual compromises and not by imposing one's own position upon others, Arkady Maslennikov said.

Dienstbier Says Prague Will Stay in Pact

*LD0506180990 Hamburg DPA in German
1720 GMT 5 Jun 90*

[Text] Berlin (DPA)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier described German unity as a fact. Dienstbier told Berlin's RIAS [Radio in the American Sector] radio today that his country also supports Germany remaining in NATO because it generally favors integrating states in larger communities. For the same reason, the CSFR itself wants to remain in the Warsaw Pact. Under present conditions, in which all members of the Pact are independent states, the alliance could become an instrument to keep the Soviet Union within the European process.

If the USSR were isolated and pushed back beyond the border of Asia, then a Greater Russian nationalism might emerge, Dienstbier said. It is important, therefore, to keep it in Europe. For his country, the function of the Warsaw Pact could not be that of coordinating the disarmament negotiations. He added that it is quite simply better to negotiate disarmament between two groups than among 35 independent states. In this way, Prague could influence the Soviet Union's position on armament matters and could help shape the new European structures.

Dienstbier went on to say that the process of perestroika in the Soviet Union is not reversible. Any attempt to hold up the development would lead to disaster. This would result in not one civil war, but several. The foreign minister stressed that even in this case, unthinkable for him, it would not halt the reforms in the CSFR or in other states of the former Eastern Bloc.

USSR Troops To Begin Leaving N. Bohemia in July

*LD0606165190 Prague CTK in English
1553 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[Text] Prague, June 6 (CTK)—The main withdrawal of the Soviet troops from North Bohemia will begin, according to the timetable, in July and August with one half of 18,000 troops scheduled to leave Czechoslovakia.

The second half of the Soviet troops will leave the region by the middle of 1991. During the past 10 years Czechoslovakia spent (on the basis of a Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement) more than 100 million crowns on the construction of sewage disposal plants and further equipment in Soviet Army's military regions in the territory of North Bohemia. However, it failed to prevent water from contamination and further damage. It was caused notably by improper storage and repumping of fuels and oil and the manipulation with it. A total of 450 notices of this fact handed in by the citizens met no response. The damage, together with the expenditures on the maintenance of the territory, total 500 million crowns.

Six commissions which evaluate the state of the buildings and the possibilities of their further utilization, have been established by the regional military and billeting administration of the Czechoslovak Army in the City of Litomerice. However, it has not been decided yet, who would own the buildings in the future.

Balcar on Summit Failure to Promote Disarmament

*LD0706214190 Prague CTK in English
1321 GMT 7 Jun 90*

[Text] Vienna, June 7 (CTK Correspondent)—Czechoslovakia's representative at the Vienna talks on conventional weapons said today that the Soviet-American summit meeting failed to produce recipes for solving the main contentious issues, required by the Vienna negotiations.

Ladislav Balcar, leading a Czechoslovak delegation to the Vienna disarmament forum of delegates of 23 member states of both military alliances, told CTK that "troop numbers in Central Europe is a question closely linked to the issue of Germany's unification and will evidently constitute a separate chapter at the 'four plus two' negotiations. On the issue of the air force, both the USA and the USSR have done nothing but confirmed their earlier positions".

Balcar added that possibilities of boosting the talks existed in all other spheres. A contribution towards expanding this scope was produced by a debate at the level of experts during the summit, at which the USSR came up with new suggestions concerning tanks and armoured vehicles.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SIPRI's Stuetzle on Pacts

*AU2905194290 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 23 May 90 p 7*

["Exclusive" interview with FRG disarmament expert. Walter Stuetzle, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, by Jochen Reinert; place and date not given: "Binding Germany Into NATO Not the Only Variant"]

[Text] [Reinert] According to some Western military experts, the Warsaw Pact has become largely unable to mount an attack, in other words, the level of the threat has considerably decreased. What is the resultant option for NATO, and in what way has it made use of this option, do you think?

[Stuetzle] The Warsaw Pact as a military organization has practically ceased to exist. That has essentially to do with the fact that the governments of the participating countries have essentially changed in character, are pursuing a different course from the policy they pursued in the past, and have ceased to primarily consider military aspects. NATO is finding it extremely difficult to draw the relevant conclusions from this fact. In my view, it could go much farther than it has. Without giving up any security interests, it could start withdrawing its land-based nuclear weapons. It could start submitting to the Soviet Union specific cooperation offers for the conversion process. For instance, it is urgently necessary to settle the problem as to how the Soviet Union should remove its chemical weapons; to our knowledge, it is unable to do so because it does not have the necessary technology.

[Reinert] Shouldn't specific bodies for international coordination also be created in the area of conversion?

[Stuetzle] I could conceive of an international conversion agency being set up in the scope of the CSCE process, which would tackle the economic, technological, and financial aspects of conversion and would in particular help the countries that are economically and financially unable to get rid of the arms they bought.

[Reinert] However, some staffs in the West are apparently considering redeploying rather than converting nuclear missiles, for instance....

[Stuetzle] I am not sure whether it is really true that new missiles will be deployed. If that is what is intended, there also has to be a country to do so—such a country does not exist.

[Reinert] In the GDR, a demilitarization process has begun in practice. Military spending has decreased, whereas in the past we were criticized in the annual reports published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] for our high rates of increase. Our arms production is also decreasing to zero. How do you judge this development?

[Stuetzle] That is unilateral disarmament. It is a sovereign decision of the GDR which is connected with other priorities. Perhaps it was no longer possible to keep the National People's Army together on the old level. We understand that the soldiers' motivation has greatly decreased. In such a situation, it is sensible to send the troops home. However, cutting back the military budget is not a phenomenon that is confined to the GDR alone. We are also observing this in other European countries as well as in the United States and the Soviet Union. To that extent, it is a CSCE process.

[Reinert] What should the two German states which are growing together do to reduce the arms level further?

[Stuetzle] This is already taking shape. There will be a reduction in forces, a reduction in equipment, and there will certainly also be an upper ceiling for the German forces. The arms level will have to be reduced correspondingly.

[Reinert] Would an all-German initiative in this direction not also be desirable?

[Stuetzle] The Vienna negotiators are cooperating much more closely than has been generally realized.

[Reinert] However, a Vienna I agreement is apparently a long way off, isn't it?

[Stuetzle] I think Vienna depends on two things for the moment. The two big powers—the USSR and the United States—concentrate entirely on the upcoming summit which will essentially deal with the observance and continuation of the accords reached in Malta. The second reason is that the issue discussed at the conference is more complicated than any other matter in the history of disarmament negotiations....

[Reinert] The changes in Eastern Europe and in particular the process of Germany's unification have apparently also led to irritation in Vienna....

[Stuetzle] These changes are, of course, a complicated factor; there is no doubt about that. The future security policy status of a united Germany is, of course, of decisive importance for what the USSR or France—to mention only two countries concerned—are willing and able to accept.

[Reinert] Do you think that binding a united Germany into NATO—something which is being widely discussed—is the only possible security policy variant? Or should the Shevardnadze proposal not be rejected right away, as Professor Freedman of London University wrote in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND?

[Stuetzle] I found Shevardnadze's idea interesting and useful, because it referred to the simple fact that an unusual situation also requires unusual solutions. Such solutions can only be had if people are ready to think along unusual lines. The idea of double membership—which, by the way, was not invented by Shevardnadze—contains a number of interesting aspects, above all the aspect that Germany's neighbors must know what will go on in Germany. The Germans, on the other hand, must know what will go on in the neighboring countries. Whether that will be possible with NATO membership or double membership, is hard to say at this point unless we know the respective security interests in detail. However, I think that reiterating the claim that NATO is the only option produces a negative effect. I do not see why that should be the case. It leaves so little room for the Soviet Union to move at the negotiation table. However,

because there will be no settlement without the Soviet Union, we would be well advised to consider the Soviet security interests more.

[Reinert] SIPRI is also known to predict developments. What do you think could be achieved in disarmament in the next 10 years.

[Stuetzle] I do not want to predict events for 10 years. However, we may realistically assume that if Vienna I is a success, and the Soviet Union continues to function, in much less than 10 years we will have a situation where military events in Europe will be totally obvious. That is a prerequisite for reducing armaments further.

Liberal Spokesman Says German NATO Membership 'Imperative'

LD2505162190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1517 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Germany's full membership in NATO, with special status for the present-day GDR territory, is imperative during the transitional period until there is an effective CSCE security system. The Liberal People's Chamber deputy Dr. Gert Meissner stated this today, on behalf of his parliamentary group. A double membership in the two alliances would be impossible acrobatics [ein nicht zu haltender spagat]. If no NATO troops are stationed on the "territory of the present-day GDR" then the legitimate security needs of all neighbors have to be taken into account.

It is "the highest possible gain for the European unification process" if the changes on the continent are reflected in the concepts of the armies.

Eppelmann on Army Reforms, Disarmament

AU3005075090 East Berlin BERLINER ALLGEMEINE in German 26-27 May 90 p 3

["Exclusive" interview with GDR Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann by Oliver Michalsky; date and place not given: "I Would Have Wanted a Bit More Time for Us"]

[Text] [Michalsky] First of all, Mr Minister, I would like to know what is true about the rumors that you moved alone into a house with nine rooms in Karolinenhof and that you do not have to pay any rent.

[Eppelmann] The only thing that is true about the story in BERLINER ZEITUNG is that I am moving to Karolinenhof. The house has six rooms, the apartment is a few square meters larger than my current one. Thus, in the past I had not lived quite as modestly as the article claimed. It was an official apartment of the parish, which I have to leave now, because my successor has to move in. The rent for my new apartment amounts to almost 500 GDR marks, which I naturally have to pay. By the way: If I were not moving in, a well-known GDR entertainer might have bought it for his daughter.

More Democracy

[Michalsky] Now to the topic. About one month ago you, a former construction soldier and prisoner, were introduced into the office of minister of disarmament and defense. What have you managed to achieve since then?

[Eppelmann] I have tried to continue what my predecessor, Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, started, in particular to push ahead with the military reform in the direction of more democracy and fewer soldiers. The number of soldiers has been reduced by 35,000 to 135,000. In addition, budget expenditures in the material-technical sphere have been reduced.

[Michalsky] How?

[Eppelmann] Savings were made in the purchase of combat equipment and spare parts and in the construction of new military facilities. Perhaps we will be able to increase the savings of 30 percent to about 40 percent if the Soviet interlocutors are willing to permit us to get out of contracts which we have already concluded.

Hopefully, I have also contributed to the return of a bit of self-confidence and trust in the National People's Army [NVA] and in its future, and perhaps also to finding new motivations for the army members in the sense that they will continue to have tasks even if the enemy image, the "evil NATO army," disappears. Part of the tasks are outlined by the change of name of the ministry. Disarmament cannot be implemented by decree within 24 hours. This has to be done in a way that is serious and that does not cause distrust but trust among the allies and among the NATO people, because all of this is to happen so as to make peace in Europe more secure.

Crisis of Motivation Has Not Been Eliminated

[Michalsky] Has it been possible to really eliminate the crisis of motivation in the NVA, which stemmed from the time of the so-called change?

[Eppelmann] Certainly not completely. For this the problems and the questions of 135,000 people are too different. For some it has been eliminated, for others it has been partly eliminated, and for some it has not been eliminated at all.

[Michalsky] The most glaring expression of this was probably the well-known letter by three officers to the FRG Defense Ministry....

[Eppelmann] This letter was written at the end of February, at a time when similar ideas were relatively frequent in the NVA. (In this letter the officers demanded the dissolution of the NVA and the extension of the Bundeswehr to GDR territory—the editor.) The mistake of these three men was that they did not turn to their own defense minister but to that of the FRG. Therefore, we had to dismiss them. But at the moment these are not urgent questions. The best proof of this was the commanders' meeting of 2 May, which showed that

the officer corps of the NVA supports the policy of the De Maiziere government and "their" minister.

[Michalsky] How long will the NVA continue to exist?

[Eppelmann] At the moment no one can answer this question because it depends on too many factors. For the time being I assume that the NVA should exist as long as there are two military alliances in Europe. Only when a unified security system has been established, to which all European states have access, should the NVA be permitted to cease to exist.

[Michalsky] Why?

[Eppelmann] Because we have to link equal and different interests with each other—those of the GDR citizens, those of the FRG citizens, those of the immediate neighbors, those of the other CSCE states, and in particular those of the Americans and the Soviet Union. They are not always identical.

Troops at the Borders of Europe

[Michalsky] Thus, the NVA should not be abolished as soon as possible. Is this view not in contradiction to what you wanted to achieve as the protagonist of the peace and human rights movement at the beginning of the 1980's? Catchword "Swords to Ploughshares."

[Eppelmann] No. I would act in a unhistorical way if I repeated today what I said in February 1982. In the meantime enormous things have occurred. Conditions today are different from those in the past. If today we had the situation of 1982 I would still say the same thing. And at that time I was not of the opinion that peace in Europe could be created by eliminating the NVA within the shortest possible time. Talk to Soviet officers. At the beginning I did not understand this: During my first visit to Moscow with Lothar de Maiziere I met with incredibly irritated officers and commanders in chief, who were irritated just because there are two terms for disarmament in German—"Abruestung" and "Entwaffnung." In Russian there is only one term! These are the kind of problems we sometimes encounter. And they suddenly no longer knew what this had to do with loyalty to the alliance. On the one hand, the promise to stick to treaties—see the government statement—and now total disarmament.... This misunderstanding made it clear that one cannot impose disarmament by decree. I would like to ask Gregor Gysi or Vera Wollenberger whether they would have said in my place as minister: "All soldiers have to go, we have to get out of all treaties, and we do not care what our neighbors think."

I think that what we are doing now—and it did not start with me but with the outstandingly good work of Admiral Hoffmann—contributes to making it possible that by the end of this century we will live on a continent which has a drastically reduced military and where stronger troops will probably only be deployed at the continental borders, because I do not assume that we will already have a world peace system by then.

[Michalsky] This week you held talks in Poland with Jaruzelski and Mazowiecki, among others. Were you able to eliminate the security policy reservations of our eastern neighbors concerning German unification?

[Eppelmann] They were very reassured to hear that the question of the Oder-Neisse border is not a topic of discussion for the De Maiziere government. The more urgent question was: "What about the treaties and contracts?"—in particular the economic contracts.

The Poles fear a further deterioration of their situation if a united Germany does not feel bound by the contracts, which were negotiated by the GDR in the past. In this place, by referring to the government statement, I made clear again: We stick to the contracts. The GDR—as long as it exists—will not unilaterally cancel contracts. If the political, economic, or military conditions change, one has to negotiate for an agreement. However, we assume that a united Republic of Germany will observe the agreements that were concluded by the GDR. The relevant passages of the state treaty confirm this.

[Michalsky] You are an advocate of the version that a united Germany might be a political member of the NATO but that NATO or Bundeswehr soldiers must not be stationed on GDR territory. Is this practicable at all, and does the GDR have a realistic chance to bring its view to bear on such a question? Is the GDR Government sovereign in this respect?

[Eppelmann] From the military-technical point of view it is possible, even though more expensive, if two armies with partly different equipment are deployed on the territory of one country. However, we would have to accept this for the sake of unity and for the sake of the trust of our European neighbors.

It will depend on the domestic development in the GDR as a whole how assertive our government will be in political terms. It is important that a government can give the impression that it is supported by the people. And I think that it has become clear that the De Maiziere government really understands itself to be a fair administrator of the 16 million GDR citizens. Its main goal is not doing Helmut Kohl a favor.

No Arms Exports

[Michalsky] You said that the arms imports from the Soviet Union are being cut down. What about arms exports from the GDR?

[Eppelmann] At the moment the GDR does not export any weapons at all to other countries.

[Michalsky] Disarmament is a relatively expensive thing. Where do you want to get the money for it? Might there be a halt to disarmament one day because of the costs?

[Eppelmann] Purely on the basis of calculations this is possible. But I assume that, for the foreseeable future, we will still have a budget that is not cut down too much. If we manage this, we will redistribute the money.

[Michalsky] What does this mean?

[Eppelmann] For every modern missile which we do not have to buy, we can either scrap a tank and, at the same time, perhaps build a small enterprise or finance early retirement for a former officer. I would hope that the largest portion of the financial means which were available to us over the past years will remain available for a certain period. However, now this money is no longer used to "increase defense capacity and combat readiness" but a considerable part of it is used for everything that involves disarmament in the broadest sense of the word.

[Michalsky] Thus, the NVA is no longer usable in war but only capable of disarmament?

[Eppelmann] Yes. Furthermore, we have had to take over an enormous amount of weapons from the "beneficial" State Security Service. Experts told me: Taking into account the current technical possibilities, it would take—please, do not turn pale now—60 years until all these weapons have been destroyed and scrapped. These are enormous heaps of weapons, which also have to be guarded....

[Michalsky] Which other tasks is the NVA facing now?

[Eppelmann] At the moment we are working out concepts which show how many facilities—barracks, shooting ranges—an army with 100,000 or 70,000 soldiers needs. We will give up large areas. They have to be cleared, particularly of ammunition. This will certainly take years.

These are tasks which are completely independent of all soldierly activities. But there are still necessary remnants of these soldierly activities: As long as the Poles, the French, the Austrians, and the Czechoslovaks also still have armies, you will not find many people who want a demilitarized Germany. At the moment only Soviet officers want this. They say so in order to get out of the calamity they are forced into by their calculation of balance—if Germany is no longer in the Warsaw Pact it must not be in NATO either.

Just imagine Germany completely demilitarized. As the only country. We could spend billions for charitable purposes every year and all others would have to spend—to quote Honecker—billions for devilish equipment. What an economic difference would develop within two or three years!

[Michalsky] On 20 July troop units are to be renamed. Which names will disappear and which new names will be awarded?

[Eppelmann] I cannot yet say which names will disappear. July 20 is not just any day. I think that the new names will come from the resistance movement of 20 July 1944. I could also imagine that one might completely give up using the names of persons for troop units.

[Michalsky] Mr Minister, in the past—and I quote from formerly top secret State Security information—you were described as a fanatical, implacable enemy of socialism, who is driven by his sense of mission, and were thus put into a certain corner. Where do you stand today?

[Eppelmann] It would be tempting to ask this question of those who classified me in this way. Looking at it realistically, I could say that—like others—I am a driven person; as a priest I worked 12 to 14 hours a day and now I work equally long as a minister and I must admit: I enjoy it.

Looking Into Others

[Michalsky] Which qualities of the character of a priest can one actually use as a minister?

[Eppelmann] As an answer I would like to tell you two brief anecdotes: In my first talk with Army General Lushev, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, I met with a very suspicious, distanced, slightly restless man. I was only the exotic person, the only civilian in this round, and now also a man whom he thought was the minister of disarmament [Entwaffnung] and defense. We were in Leningrad together—I wanted to see the heroes' cemetery—and when we bade farewell to each other at Leningrad Airport, he asked me whether we should say goodbye in the Russian way. This is what we did. We hugged each other. And when I was in Poland this week, I also left my Polish counterpart as a friend.

I hope that over my 15 years as a priest I have become able to understand myself and also others a bit, to see, to look into them. Perhaps I was able to do this with these two gentlemen. At least I have the feeling that I impressed them favorably. I hope that I will be able to do so in the future, too.

[Michalsky] Is that which is currently happening in Germany something like what you wanted to achieve with your involvement in the peace and human rights movement—not only in autumn 1989?

[Eppelmann] I would have wanted a bit more time for us. I also would have wanted a bit more leeway to test new things, to conduct some experiments—in the hope that the united Republic of Germany would be influenced by this new GDR to a greater degree than this will be possible now. But I have to state: 9 November has changed much. By the way, I do not help anyone—least of all myself—when I now sit down in a corner and cry. I have to try to get the optimum out of the changed conditions with all my strength.

No German Unification This Year

[Michalsky] When should the political unification of Germany be concluded, in your view?

[Eppelmann] It should not happen this year under any circumstances. I can understand the worries of parts of

the FRG Government, but I am concerned that their hurry might also accelerate events which one wants to prevent with this haste. I do not know whether a quick German unification will advance good European unification. The date I want would be the end of 1992; this would then also fit in very well with European unification.

[Michalsky] What will you do then?

[Eppelmann] In my mid-thirties I had a serious traffic accident and since then I have considered my life as a second life, as a gift. Since then I have tried to harmonize joy and pleasure and my tasks much more intensively. To come back to your question: What I will do then—this depends on where I see a meaningful task.

[Michalsky] It need not necessarily involve the military?

[Eppelmann] It must be a meaningful task, which is important for me. Like my current one.

Marczinek on German Membership in NATO

LD0506210590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1931 GMT 5 Jun 90

[Text] London (ADN)—The GDR's state secretary for disarmament, Frank Marczinek, has described the extension of NATO to the present territory of the GDR as totally inconceivable. After talks in the British House of Commons and the Defense Ministry, Marczinek told the press on Tuesday that at his meeting he had made it clear that an unchanged NATO was unacceptable for the membership of a united Germany. In a new Europe the security interests of both the USSR and all other states must be fully integrated. However, if something new can be made of the old concept of NATO, which met the demands of the present, then it would be conceivable that a united Germany could belong to NATO.

The GDR will work actively to ensure that the Warsaw Treaty will become a political system, a factor of stability, Marczinek continued. This requires both the politicization and the democratization of the alliance. Hence, the GDR will gradually withdraw from the command structure of the Warsaw Treaty. It sees its task in fulfilling the function of a bridge-builder in Europe, the state secretary said.

Marczinek had meetings on Tuesday with the minister of state at the Foreign Office, William Waldegrave, and the minister of state for Defense, Archibald Hamilton. In the Defense Committee of the lower house, he had a detailed exchange of views on the future European security order, particularly on the security policy integration of a unified Germany. Marczinek set out his government's ideas on the reduction and restructuring of the GDR's National People's Army during the discussion.

At the meeting, it was agreed that the GDR Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann would visit London in June. Marczinek invited the British side to attend the founding ceremony of the Institute for the

conversion of arms factories in Dresden on 8 June. People's Navy training ships will visit Great Britain. The British side will examine a proposal on establishment of contacts between National People's Army soldiers and British soldiers stationed in West Berlin.

New Soviet Envoy Rules Out NATO Membership

LD0506172290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1559 GMT 5 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—Moscow's new ambassador to the GDR, Gennadiy Shikin, hopes that German unity will bring "no grounds for conflict in the future." As he stressed in an interview with ADN today, "only good signals" should emerge from it for European security, "for all Europeans."

Shikin, who had just made his inaugural visit to the acting GDR head of state, Dr. Sabine Bergmann-Pohl, sees every possibility of a consensus in the redefining of the "political-military status of the united Germany." Full German membership in NATO, however, met with rejection. "Nothing has changed about this," said the 51-year-old successor to Vyacheslav Kochemasov and knowledgeable expert on German matters.

According to Mrs Bergmann-Pohl, the external and internal aspects of German unification were not discussed in detail "We have to wait for the Two Plus Four talks first," she summed up, saying that Shikin took the view that the summit talks between Bush and Gorbachev were "very successful."

Shikin, who has been chief of the USSR mission in Vienna for the last four years, feels that it can be assumed that he will be Moscow's last ambassador to the GDR. Only if he "does his work badly" could there be another change here.

A meeting with GDR Premier Lothar de Maiziere is also planned for the evening of his first day in office. [passage omitted]

Changes Planned in NVA Size, Structure

LD0606141890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1309 GMT 6 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Strausberg (ADN)—The National People's Army [NVA] in the future will no longer be a fully operational army and is to take on the structure of a training and basic army with reduced readiness for action. The members of the Disarmament and Defense Committee of the People's Chamber heard this today at a meeting in the Ministry of Disarmament and Defense in Strausberg, near Berlin, where they were informed of the state of the GDR armed forces. In the course of the planned reductions, the NVA is to be cut to a peacetime strength of 100,000 men, Lieutenant General Manfred Graetz, chief of the NVA Main Staff, told the deputies.

The committee members were interested in obtaining a genuine picture of the armed forces in order to be able to

act "constructively and concretely for the benefit of Germany's security situation and for the conversion," it was said on the margins of the meeting. They also intend to use their parliamentary activity to help further promote the idea of the state citizen in uniform. In the view of the people's representatives, it was necessary for the army members to reappraise the NATO concept. They must learn that information given them hitherto has not always been correct, but also should be signals from the NATO side so that the soldiers could come to terms with this concept more easily. [passage omitted]

Meckel on Proposal for E. Europe Security Zone

LD0606135190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1303 6 Jun 90

[Text] Copenhagen (ADN)—At the next Two-plus-Four conference in Berlin, the GDR is to propose the formation of a security zone in Eastern Europe, which should exist for a transitional period as an "alliance between the alliances." In an interview with FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU on the sidelines of the CSCE conference in Copenhagen, GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel said that this zone should consist of the Eastern part of Germany, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. In Meckel's view, the alliance must be capable of defense "on both sides." The goal of this model was to give the Soviet Union "a certain security." At the same time, it was a step toward thinking in the direction of "pan-European structures." "Only a new experience can bring about the readiness no longer to accord NATO the central role it still has at present," said Meckel, who currently considers it to be "unwise" to talk of the dissolution of NATO. This was not likely to be agreed to.

The Eastern military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, is facing a change, in Meckel's view. An alliance oriented increasingly toward political cooperation can, in the view of the GDR foreign minister, be a point of reference for a future Germany.

Together with the CSFR and Poland, the GDR is presently working on an initiative to institutionalize the CSCE process. According to the plan of the three states, two "centers" are to be created to deal with "arms control, confidence-building, and verification" and with "the prevention of conflicts and the peaceful resolution of disputes." Both centers should support a council of foreign ministers of the 35 CSCE states, meeting on a regular basis.

This interview was prereleased to ADN.

De Maiziere Addresses Pact Meeting

LD0706130790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0957 GMT 7 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—"The new GDR Government is in favor of embedding the process of German unification in the pan-European unification endeavors," GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere said in Moscow

today at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states. "We want to create a unified German nation-state of this kind as successfully and as swiftly as possible, a state all European states can refer to at all times as a predictable and reliable partner that can be trusted, a country oriented toward Europe, a pillar of a bridge between East and West." German unification, the government leader continued, should lend further substance to the process of overcoming the bloc confrontation. "Thus it appears possible that the united Germany will become the hinge of such a development. The unity of Germany therefore should benefit all states."

Lothar de Maiziere went on to present the GDR's views on the CSCE process which, he said, offered an appropriate opportunity for marking out the contours of a new European security system. The root of this was the creation of an autonomous, institutionalized security policy dimension for the CSCE, the establishment of a pan-European security union. Security structures hitherto should, like all functionable European structures, be developed in a pan-European direction. In this connection, Lothar de Maiziere also supported a "fundamentally reformed NATO," "that rejects on principle its existing strategy of 'flexible response' with its guiding principles of nuclear first use and forward defense. To a NATO as radically altered as this, the united Germany, with a special status for the present GDR territory for a transitional period," could belong. [the word "belong" did not occur within the portion of De Maiziere's remarks appearing within quotation marks]

The head of government demanded a new quality and a new dimension for the CSCE process. In this connection, he explained a joint initiative on the part of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR on the institutionalization of the CSCE process, which is shortly to be put before the 35 CSCE states. It concerned the creation of the bases and structures for a united Europe. In this regard, the GDR was in favor of maintaining at all costs the dynamics of regular meetings within the framework of the CSCE process. A council for security and cooperation should be formed which should meet every six months at the foreign minister level, and every month at the ambassadorial level. A small secretariat should be formed in order to insure that the body can function properly. In order gradually to create all-European security structures, there were plans to set up centers for security policy cooperation in areas such as confidence-building, arms control and verification, conversion, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The process of institutionalization within the CSCE framework should gradually be extended to nonmilitary areas of cooperation.

The GDR took the view that "our community of treaties would have important services to render with clear political dominance," De Maiziere said, referring to the very difficult phase through which the Warsaw Pact currently was going through. Together with NATO, an ordered transition from East-West confrontation to a

European peace order should be completed and guaranteed. There were many issues the solution of which was in the interests of all the Warsaw Pact states, including the GDR. These included, according to the GDR head of government, the working out of strategic ideas for all-European security structures; the putting forward of new proposals on disarmament and confidence-building, primarily on the convening of negotiations on battlefield nuclear weapons; the drawing up of structures and modalities of a verification structure; mutual briefing on the participant states' stances in disarmament negotiations; and strategic considerations about the further shaping of the CSCE process, particularly the preparation of the CSCE summit in 1990, the follow-up meeting in Helsinki in 1992, and questions associated with institutionalization.

The GDR would use its membership in the Warsaw Pact to intensify the political cooperation between states within the framework of the organization, with the aim of helping to shape European security structures, De Maiziere said. "We should start with adjusting the text of the Warsaw Pact to the new political realities in Europe. This should happen not through renegotiation of the pact, but through the deletion of those elements that are no longer in line with the new situation." This applied, for example, to statements in the preamble to the pact. It should be declared that these statements directed against NATO and the Western European Union are no longer valid. Lothar de Maiziere suggested that a message should be sent from the Warsaw Pact meeting to the forthcoming NATO summit "in which these changes in the character of our pact community are set out and the approach of the Warsaw Pact to the questions of overcoming the military alliances and the creation of all-European security structures are explained."

Meckel on CSCE, NATO, Warsaw Pact

AU0706202390 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 7 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel by Axel Vornbaeumen in Copenhagen; date not given: "A New Military Supremacy in Central Europe—a Trauma for the Soviet Union"]

[Text] [Vornbaeumen] Mr. Meckel, you are the foreign minister of a state which is dissolving. Is this a role that inspires or hampers?

[Meckel] It is rather a role that inspires. Because it is a clearly delineated task, which I think simply has to be done. And it should be done by people who have tried to be politically active over the past few years.

[Vornbaeumen] But your prospects, which have been limited from the very start, also mean that you will not be able to implement certain ideas during your term of office. Your first appearance here at the CSCE conference in Copenhagen may already be your last one at this level.

[Meckel] This applies to every politician who is bound by legislative periods. Only in this case the period is a bit shorter.

[Vornbaeumen] Well, your leeway is limited not only in terms of time. Only recently an intra-German committee has been formed, which is to coordinate the foreign policy of the two states. And FRG Foreign Minister Genscher already spoke of a "new algebra": 2 plus 4 equals 5 and 12 plus 1 equals 12. Does this not restrict you?

[Meckel] This does not bother me at all. We have one advantage here over all other Western politicians: the clear mandate of the population as a result of the elections. And we bear the responsibility for really wanting to act for the people, namely in the interest of these people for unification and against instability in Europe.

[Vornbaeumen] However, as a result of the high degree of coordination of the foreign policy of the two German states, which is striven for, some of your independence will be necessarily lost. Does the joint committee and Genscher's policy restrict your leeway?

[Meckel] The committee does not restrict us. The committee organizes the necessary coordination and discussion. It does not prevent the freedom of our own policy.

[Vornbaeumen] Were, for instance, the speeches of the two German foreign ministers here in Copenhagen coordinated before the conference?

[Meckel] I have just heard Genscher's speech. He will not be able to hear mine, because he will not be here then. I will revise my speech in one point, because we used an almost identical formulation. This I do not consider a good idea.

[Vornbaeumen] How important is the CSCE as a field of action for you?

[Meckel] We are already active. We have close contacts with Poland and the CSFR, because of their proposals for the institutionalization of the CSCE process. A specific plan will soon be presented. An expert meeting is to start work on 10 July. Today I handed the draft to the Hungarian foreign minister and last Friday [1 June] I handed it to Genscher with the question of whether they are interested in participating in it. We would think well of this. But even if this does not happen, the proposal will still be presented.

[Vornbaeumen] It is no coincidence that Prague and Warsaw are the addressees of your policy. They have repeatedly spoken about the GDR's function as a bridge to Eastern Europe. Why has the Soviet Union not been addressed?

[Meckel] First of all, it is useful if the circle of states that start an initiative is not so big. Otherwise, it is on longer an initiative. The Soviet proposal from last week (the

establishment of a large European council—the editors) is compatible in many respects, by the way.

[Vornbaeumen] What are the details of your plan to institutionalize the CSCE structures?

[Meckel] It is important to set down exactly the intervals in which meetings take place and what the planned centers for conflict prevention and verification should look like. This will not totally change the world, but it is the attempt to put various ideas into one concept.

[Vornbaeumen] The alliance question is an obstacle to the process of German unity. Which offers would the West have to make to the Soviet Union, in your view, so that things start to move?

[Meckel] We not only need clear statements, we also need binding statements. This includes giving upper thresholds for the number of troops in central Europe and statements about the role of the Bundeswehr and of the troops stationed in the FRG and those that will be stationed in the united Germany in the end. Moscow's rejection of NATO membership is connected with the fear that a new military supremacy is developing in central Europe—a trauma for the Soviet Union. If this is prevented by clear binding statements, Moscow's readiness to accept other ties will increase. Of course, it will always be with the reservation that NATO's military component does not shift farther to the East.

[Vornbaeumen] In the past you already went further in your imagination, when you spoke of "all-German security structures." However, the term has now disappeared. Now the GDR position is limited to the desire that NATO will be reformed from the inside.

[Meckel] I am still in favor of speaking of all-European structures and of considering all other solutions only as transitional solutions. In particular now, after the summit, we have to think in detail about how security toward the East can be organized from Germany. One has to ask about the future of the Warsaw Pact. The political and military aspects of the Warsaw Pact will deviate very clearly in the future. The military aspects will decline, the political ones will not do so. Thus, this kind of cooperation and consultation is important concerning disarmament issues in the near future. This can also be a potential point of reference for a future Germany.

[Vornbaeumen] So, the Warsaw Pact is on its way out?

[Meckel] Yes. It is certainly conceivable that the future Germany can be integrated in this consultation process so that security and trust may grow here. In addition, there should be treaties either between NATO and Warsaw Pact or between the future German and states, which now belong to the Warsaw Pact. It is also conceivable that there will be a security zone, which—for a transitional period during which the Soviet troops are still deployed on German soil—comprises the eastern part of Germany, Poland, and the CSFR. Here a zone

should be established which is clearly regulated by a treaty and is also conceived as a military zone.

[Vornbaeumen] Who should regulate this by treaty?

[Meckel] This must be negotiated among these three partners—while recognizing the two alliances. Such a zone would also provide the Soviet Union with a certain security. If you want to put it this way: an alliance between the alliances. It must be constructed in such a way that this new alliance says: We would defend ourselves against both sides if there were problems. Perhaps this is a bit absurd as regards its structure, but it could create security for a transitional period. At the same time it would make clear: Here one has to think further in the direction of all-European structures. This transition would be made very clear in this way.

[Vornbaeumen] Is there a connection between the dissolution of this new alliance of the CSFR, Poland, and the GDR and the dissolution of NATO? Thus: If NATO dissolves, this constructed alliance will also be dissolved again?

[Meckel] The issue is simple transformation. At the moment, I do not consider it politically prudent to talk about the dissolution of NATO, because one simply knows that it is impossible to reach a consensus on this. The important thing is that the new structure is established and that on this basis it will then be decided: How important is NATO? Only a new experience can give rise to the readiness not to give NATO the central role anymore, which it still has. First, new experiences have to be gained in security matters in order to talk about prospects in this respect. This means: It is important to find solutions, which have all-European dimensions from the very start.

[Vornbaeumen] How detailed is the model of the "alliance between the alliances"? Does Bonn know about it?

[Meckel] At the moment it is just an idea. But we want to present clearer concepts by the time the "two-plus-four" meeting in Berlin.

[Vornbaeumen] What does the CSFR say, what does Poland say?

[Meckel] Poland's Foreign Minister Skubiszewski finds it interesting. There is no rejection from this side.

[Vornbaeumen] GDR Defense Minister Eppelmann recently broached the proposal of a German-Polish brigade. Is this going into your direction?

[Meckel] Yes, this fully fits into this context.

HUNGARY

Premier on Withdrawal From Pact

*LD2905222690 East Berlin Domestic Service
in German 2010 GMT 29 May 90*

[Interview with Hungarian Premier Jozsef Antall by correspondent Hans-Juergen Wittenburg; time and place not given; Antall remarks in Hungarian with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[Text] [Wittenburg] Mr Prime Minister, you went to Berlin on your first foreign trip. Can one draw conclusions from this about possible new priorities in Hungary's foreign policy?

[Antall] My first trip did indeed bring me to Berlin, but I was taking up an invitation from Chancellor Kohl to participate in the 90th Catholics' Conference. But in any case I had planned to go first either to Germany or to Austria as the Federal Republic has always been by far the most important among the Western partners. I am also friendly with Chancellor Kohl and we regard the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] as our sister-party.

On the one hand, the GDR, after the Soviet Union, has a special importance for Hungary among the East Bloc states, even if we have been politically far apart from one another in the past few years. After all, the orthodox wing was dominant in the GDR whereas the former government and even the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] had long been pressing on with reforms in Hungary. However, economically, there have been close contacts, which can now receive fresh prospects. We have always supported German unity, without which we cannot envisage European unity. We see a future united Germany as a democratic state based on the rule of law which can only be useful to Europe.

[Wittenburg] A first step toward that unity is the creation of the currency and economic union. This currency and economic union may create a complicated situation in relations between the GDR and other East European states. You discussed this with Herr de Maiziere. What solutions spring to mind?

[Antall] First, one must state that the currency union is in fact accompanied by certain difficulties. But it can also be accompanied by indisputable advantages. If the treaties which the GDR has concluded are kept, and we have assured Herr de Maiziere and Chancellor Kohl of this, then this could provide Hungary with a new channel in the direction of the EC, irrespective of the fact that we ourselves are seeking a bilateral agreement between Hungary and the EC. Moreover, we regard the utilization of the Soviet market as a further important factor where the GDR occupies a prominent position. Its knowledge and experiences—and that, incidentally, also applies to Hungary—together with the FRG's economic might,

could help to secure that position. We could also quite easily envisage joint German-Hungarian projects (?in) the Soviet market.

But I should once again emphasize that Hungary regards relations with a future united Germany as being of paramount importance, without undervaluing cooperation with countries such as France, England, Italy, Japan, or the United States and their presence in Europe, which we will continue to regard as important. At any rate, we will soon strive to coordinate diplomatic steps between Hungary, the FRG, and the GDR.

[Wittenburg] Hungary intends to start negotiations as soon as possible on leaving the Warsaw Pact. As far as I know, you are not thinking of any unilateral solutions or unilateral departure, but you are seeking a solution in a new European security order. What specific ideas exist on this?

[Antall] The Hungarian parliament has decided to thoroughly investigate in the relevant committees the circumstances of a speedy withdrawal, as demanded by the opposition. But we maintain the following position on this: First, Hungary already publicly declared its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in 1956. But the ensuing developments are well-known. Second, we regard the withdrawal of the Soviet troops as fundamental. There is no basis under international law for their presence. Third, it is, however, a fact that they have been stationed here for the past decades and that Hungary belongs to the Warsaw Pact, which applies equally to the military and political sphere. Fourth, we believe nonetheless that there is no longer any justification for the existence of the Warsaw Pact because the reasons leading to its creation, even in Soviet eyes, have ceased to apply. Fifth, we believe that it must therefore be replaced by a European security order. But, and sixth, since numerous complex political, military, and military-technological issues must be cleared up in this respect, we do not regard unilateral steps as appropriate. We are thus in favor of bilateral negotiations with all involved parties, particularly of course with the USSR, without wishing, however, to enter into endless negotiations.

Discussions on Warsaw Pact Membership Continue

*LD2905175190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 29 May 90*

[Text] Without the assent of the president of republic and the premier, the Warsaw Pact cannot have disposal of the Hungarian Army. This is what Peter Zentai has learned, from the closed session of the [National Assembly's] Foreign Affairs Committee. You will hear the details from him.

[Zentai] Can the Warsaw Pact headquarters order the Hungarian Army to do anything? According to indications, this was the most popular issue at today's session of the Foreign Affairs Committee, according to indications, says the reporter, because he has only indirect

information at his disposal. Owing to the sensitivity of the topic, the journalists were asked to leave the room at the very beginning.

However, I learned from some participants, during an interval in the session, that in the event of an extraordinary situation, Hungary is obligated to place 100,000 soldiers at the disposal of the Warsaw Pact. At this, the participants in the committee session became somewhat nervous, and bombarded the guest speaker, Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz, with questions.

During the second half, the following points were clarified, or at least the following leaked out: If a situation is judged, in the Warsaw Pact's political and military consultative organs, to be extraordinary, then the leaders of the member states must be informed of this. Therefore, in the case of Hungary, the president of republic and government cannot be omitted from the decision-making procedure. The president of republic could veto the pulling out of 100,000 Hungarian soldiers from under the national command. At any event, the protocol which regulates the collaboration of the Hungarian Army in Extraordinary situations will expire this year, and it supposedly emerged from the words of Kalman Lorincz that it is in our interests to reexamine this protocol.

It also is in our interests not to withdraw unilaterally from the Warsaw Pact, because: First, this would create unnecessary tension with the USSR, Second, it would be more than irresponsible, in a fluctuating international political situation, to leave the Hungarian Army without replenishments of arms and components. Nota Bene: It emerged at the committee session that our Army's supplies will last for one year, in any case.

In conclusion, the Foreign Affairs Committee is continuing the consultations, approved by parliament, on the future of the relationship between Hungary and the Warsaw Pact.

Colonel Keleti on Soviet Troop Pullout

*LD0106165290 Budapest MTI in English
1553 GMT 1 Jun 90*

[Text] Budapest, June 1 (MTI)—A total of 196 Soviet military trains have left the area of Hungary by 8 a.m. on 1 June 1990. This number coincides exactly with the number set down in the timetable, said Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, to MTI on Friday.

Apart from that, 11 passenger and 11 container trains have also left. These latter are carrying Soviet soldiers who were stationed in Hungary, their family members, and property.

Under the timetable, 116 Soviet military trains will have to leave Hungary in June.

The headquarters of the Soviet Southern Army Group informed MTI that so far more than 9,000 people (privates, officers, family members) had left Hungary.

The 2,450 military-technical facilities withdrawn from the country included over 320 tanks, 100 armoured vehicles, 130 artillery facilities, over 1,300 vehicles, 44 military planes and 15 helicopters.

Assembly Committee Urges Withdrawal From Pact

*LD0606183790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1800 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[Text] The National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee proposes that the Hungarian Government begin talks as soon as possible on suspending cooperation with the military organization of the Warsaw Pact. The body recommends that the sides should attain this objective through joint agreement. The parliamentary parties envisage withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in two phases; they urge, first, the soonest possible suspension of activity in the military organization, and then the final withdrawal. According to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the basis for negotiations could be the Vienna convention, which declares that any member country can initiate a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, on the basis of mutual negotiations.

Defense Minister Orders 2 Units Disbanded

*LD0606230290 Budapest MTI in English
2220 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[Text] Budapest, June 6 (MTI)—The air defence missile regiment of the Hungarian Army, which has been stationed in Miskolc since 1951, and the radio-technical battalion also serving there, will be eliminated without a legal successor. Both units bid farewell to the city on Wednesday.

The order of the minister of defence read out on the occasion noted that the Government of the Republic of Hungary, starting out from its long-term defence-political targets, is implementing troops reductions as part of the joint, unilateral confidence-building measures with the Warsaw Treaty member states. This process closely fits into the process of creating a smaller army than at present, but one that is more modern regarding its organization, weapons and preparedness.

More than half of the officers and sub-officers of the troops being eliminated will be transferred to garrisons in and around Budapest, 30 per cent will be placed into the reserve staff, or discharged. Most of the regular soldiers will serve on in barracks in the capital.

Antall Says Warsaw Pact 'Obsolete,' Views Army Role

*LD0606173690 Budapest MTI in English
1610 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[Press conference with Finnish Premier Harri Holkeri and Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in Budapest on 6 June, held at the conclusion of Premier Holkeri's meeting with Hungarian Government]

[Excerpts] Budapest, June 6 (MTI)— Mr Antall said that Finland's achievements during the past 15-20 years, particularly its successful march into the ranks of the international elite, should be taken as a model by Hungary and the entire Central and East European region.

Hungary, said Mr. Antall, wishes to cooperate with Finland both in the economic and foreign political spheres.

"Hungary also wants to maintain good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, but not through copying the Finnish-Soviet agreements or adopting its model. [no closing quotation mark as received]

He would say on behalf the Hungarian Government that the Warsaw Treaty, as the organization of European confrontation, was an obsolete system which had lost its function. Therefore, the Hungarian Government is of the position that the Warsaw Treaty military organization should be dismissed, and considers it desirable to wind it up by late 1991.

Under the Hungarian foreign political strategy, the organization should be replaced by a new European security system which would guarantee the security of the countries in the region.

"What is required," he said, "is a consultative mechanism which would make for Hungary's closer affiliation to European institutions [no closing-quotation mark as received]

At far as the relations between Hungary and the Warsaw Treaty are concerned, the Hungarian people has made its intention manifest in the declaration of 1956.

This should, however, be reviewed today with respect to international legal and diplomatic, military and political considerations.

At the Moscow conference of the prime ministers of WT member states, the Hungarian prime minister will propose setting up a list of the elements in the WT cooperation that infringe upon the sovereignty of the member states. These points should be discharged (?from the WT operational mechanism).

Answering a question, Mr. Antall listed some of the elements he had in mind, such as the Hungarian Army's employment within our borders or in the territory of other countries, the presence of other armies in Hungarian territory, the issue of the highest army leadership, or the Hungarian Army's role in the country's defence.

Hungary should never be a means or venue of the advance of Soviet troops.

The government is to restore its full sovereignty over the Hungarian Army. This should not invosed [as received], any interruption of links with the other WT member countries.

Bilateral Hungarian-Soviet agreements should be renegotiated, as they were signed by sides occupying unequal positions of negotiation.

The new Hungarian Government wishes to set up relations with the Soviet Union based on mutual appreciation, trust and equality of rights, said the prime minister.

'Considerable Success' Gained at Pact Meeting

*LD0706174790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 7 Jun 90*

[Text] The Warsaw Pact's summit meeting has concluded in Moscow with the issuing of a joint communique. Hungarian Government spokesman Balazs Laszlo, spoke to our correspondent Gabor Izbeki about the results.

[Begin recording] [Laszlo] I believe that this Moscow session of the Warsaw Pact's member states concluded with a considerable Hungarian success. Already, our premier, Jozsef Antall, who was chairing during the first half of the session, managed to get the participants to accept, when approving the agenda, that as the second point, it should not be the radical reforming, transformation of the Warsaw Pact's military organization but its review [feluevizsgalat] which should be discussed. And this was the Hungarian objective.

As regards the statement, and thus the summary of the session's results, the essence from the Hungarian viewpoint is in the fourth and the sixth point. In these two points, of key importance, there was success in asserting the Hungarian objectives, the Hungarian viewpoints.

They contain the essential sentences, thus: The states represented at the session will actively take part in this dynamic process, that is in the transformation of Europe, and for this reason, they consider a review of the character and functions of the Warsaw Pact to be indispensable. Their conviction is that only in this case will the Warsaw Pact be suitable in the transition period for performing the new, timely tasks related to disarmament, the creation of an all-European security system.

The second essential circumstance in the sixth point is that in this new situation, the Warsaw Pact states will begin work on reviewing the pact's character, functions, and activity. And for this purpose, a provisional committee of government representatives was set up, which by the end of October this year will submit to the political consultative committee its concrete proposals pertaining to this. These proposals will be examined by the political consultative committee by the end of November.

I should like to add to this that also figuring in the minutes which were not made public is that the organization will hold an extraordinary session of the political consultative committee, moreover in Budapest, sometime in November, and there, on the basis of the committee's report, recommendations, the measures will be

determined, by means of which the above-signalled review and—in practical terms and according to our objectives, hopes—the winding up, dismantling of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact will begin. According to my information these same minutes also provide that in the event of agreement, these measures, the implementation thereof, will begin as of the beginning of the year, 1 January.

[Izbeki] Can this be assessed in such a way as to claim that in effect the Hungarian delegation has completed all its tasks at this political consultative committee session?

[Laszlo] Yes, and what's more, without a break, without confrontation and collisions.

[Izbeki] Then what is the explanation for the fact that at the session—with the exception of the Hungarian delegation—still no one dealt in a concrete fashion with these plans?

[Laszlo] Various, partly similar but much more hesitant and incoherent proposals have been made by the Czechoslovak president and the GDR prime minister. But it was only the Hungarian delegation which put its proposals in such a rational, comprehensive, coherent system.

[Izbeki] Then, in the end, the closing communique reflects the fact that really everybody was expecting that something like this should happen because—we must not be too modest—it was not thanks to the aggressiveness of the Hungarians to get such a decision, but because the situation matured for the birth of such a decision.

[Laszlo] The situation did mature for a decision but of course the game has not been played out yet. And it has also come to light at this session that considering the aims and direction of the transformation of the Warsaw Pact and its adjustment to the spirit of the times, significant differences also exist between the member states.

Essentially, it was the Hungarian delegation alone which formulated the position that time had passed over the military organization of the Warsaw Pact and the most rational thing would be to gradually abolish the lot. The others, the rest of the member states took in general the position that the Pact, after thorough reform, could still fulfill a positive—what's more, a constructive—role in bringing closer the two sides of Europe and in shaping a new, comprehensive European security system.

[Izbeki] Does the adoption of the Hungarian proposal mean that the Soviets completely agree with it?

[Laszlo] The acceptance of the Hungarian proposal roughly means that we could try to carry out our aims with the help of a suitably worked out channel, institution. Whether in the final analysis it will succeed in this way, whether it will materialize in this way, can only be shown by the coming months. [end recording]

POLAND

NATO Forces For Poland Suggested

Commentator Offers Proposal

AU0606080090 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
1 Jun 90 p 5

[Waldemar Piotrowski commentary: "NATO Forces in Poland? An Opportunity for a New Role"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The proposal in the article that follows seems astounding, and today it is still perhaps rather unrealistic. Nevertheless, in the past few months so many cardinal principles governing international relations in the past have been questioned that everything seems possible. ZYCIE WARSZAWY does not yet have its own considered view on this matter, but nonetheless the editors feel that it is worthwhile to acquaint the paper's readership with the personal concept formulated below by Dr. Waldemar Piotrowski, a specialist in international affairs in the office of the President of Poland.

What strong cards does Poland hold in its efforts to gain entry to the EEC and a future united Europe? An honest appraisal of our assets does not allow us to hold out a great deal of optimism, although it ought not to rule out our hopes and chances.

Poland, with its vast foreign debt, outdated industrial structure, and presence of a strong trade union movement is not a very attractive proposition for Western business. It is true to say that Balcerowicz's reform program and the show of determination manifested by part of our political groupings to implement the reform package have gained us many admirers in Western business circles as well as in international financial organizations, but this of itself will not be sufficient for the Polish economy to become an attractive and sought-after partner for the West.

Second, any concrete and evident results of this reform program will only become visible in five to 10 years, and no earlier, and it is very doubtful whether Polish society will accept its living standards being kept this low for such a long time.

Thus, if seen from the point of view of foreign investment, other countries of our region, for example, Czechoslovakia or Hungary, come higher up the list than Poland, and Western capital is already beginning to flow in their direction. In view of this, what factors can lend support to the proposition that the Polish economy could be a serious contender for incorporation into the Western economic system?

One such factor could be Polish acceptance to play a role of a political stabilizer in an Eastern and Central Europe that is presently undergoing an upheaval. What the West fears most in our region is not, as in the past, a military

threat, but rather a situation of instability and uncertainty and the fear of a new balkanization of Europe. In order to prevent this, Great Britain, France, and the United States are ready to make specific political and economic investments in our part of Europe.

The West is conscious of the fact that the best way to build lasting democracy in post-communist states is to assist these countries in creating economic prosperity. However, the period of access to easy and generous finance is over. Only those countries in Eastern and Central Europe that can guarantee the optimal application of the financial aid received and commit themselves readily to create a lasting democratic and political infrastructure can count on the West's financial involvement.

Does Poland have a chance to comply with these conditions and through this become a factor of stabilization and development throughout the whole of Eastern and Central Europe? Undoubtedly yes, although it will put the onus on our country to conduct a wise, well-thought-out policy, both on the domestic and international fronts. On the internal front this will require the maintenance of an evolutionary policy, avoidance of any upheavals, and during next year the completion of the system of democratic state structures. On the international front Poland must first and foremost make a determined effort to elaborate new relationships with Bonn and Moscow.

As a nation we have to make the effort to rid ourselves of anti-Soviet and anti-German feelings and resentments. The Polish church showed the way forward in the 1960's. If this does not happen, then our prejudices will effectively impede us in our efforts to conform to the new conditions of European cooperation and coexistence.

One of the possible ways in which to calm the anti-Soviet and anti-German fears that are so prevalent in our society might be to make an overture to the Western powers to give some consideration within the overall framework of a new security system in Europe to the possibility of a temporary stationing of a limited contingent of British, French, and U.S. forces on Polish territory.

Of course, such an option could not be implemented with any anti-Soviet motive or against the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. To reach agreement on this would no doubt require long and tough international negotiations and the creation of a system of guarantees and security for the Soviet Union. Further, the military status of a unified Germany and the question of stationing foreign troops on German territory would first have to be solved.

From the Polish point of view, the stationing of a limited NATO military contingent on Polish territory—and here I repeat, only in the case of prior negotiated agreement to such a solution and with a general consensus of all interested parties—would have certain specific advantages.

I have spoken about the psychological element of this issue. West European and U.S. troops stationed along certain flash points near our Western borders would act favorably to calm Polish fears of a German threat. This is exactly the way in which the German problem was solved after the war in Western Europe.

From the political angle, the presence of these troops in the area of tension and crisis in our region would be an additional element of stability that sought to guarantee the peaceful transition of the post-communist states toward a democratic system.

Stationing NATO forces on Polish territory would also have its economic spin-offs for Poland. Local populations living in the vicinity of military bases tend to make a very good living from them and the sector providing civilian services to the bases would develop. There are no reasons to suspect that this could not be the same in the case of Poland.

The stationing of forces of the Western powers in Poland does not necessarily imply a Polish withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In the coming transition period of one to three years and in the light of the creeping disintegration of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact, this issue should become a subject of negotiation between the governments of Poland and Soviet Union. It appears that the desirable way forward in this sphere would be to configure our relations with the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis. In this process the superpower interests of the Soviet Union must not be weakened, or the delicate balance of forces in Europe upset. The Soviet Union still ought to remain our political ally and one of our main economic partners.

There are no rational circumstances for antagonizing our relationship with our Eastern neighbor. Additionally, in time Poland could become a bridge between the Soviet Union and a united Europe with benefits flowing to all parties.

Presidential Spokesman Issues Disclaimer

LD0506221490 Warsaw PAP in English
2017 GMT 5 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, June 5—Polish president's press spokesman Wlodzimierz Lozinski conveyed to PAP today the following statement:

"The ZYCIE WARSZAWY daily printed this June 1 Waldemar Piotrowski's article headlined 'NATO troops in Poland?—A Change in a New Role.'

In an introduction the editors said that the author had presented his 'personal concept' but added that Waldemar Piotrowski is specialist in international affairs in the Chancellery of the Polish President.

"Using the information, certain foreign press agencies and periodicals speculated as to the possible ties linking the Polish President's Chancellery and the presented view.

"I feel obliged to state that the so-called concept presented by Waldemar Piotrowski in the ZYCIE WARSZAWY daily runs counter to the philosophy and practice of the foreign policy and has been never considered in the Chancellery of the Polish President."

Siwicki, Netherlands Counterpart on Test Inspections

*LD0406223890 Warsaw PAP in English
2053 GMT 4 Jun 90*

[Text] Warsaw, June 4—Polish National Defence Minister Gen Florian Siwicki and Dutch Defence Minister Relus ter Beek held a press conference here to discuss a memorandum of understanding on staging test inspections of conventional armed forces in both countries, signed today.

Under the memorandum the Polish side will hold a test inspection in Holland of a tank battalion, a mechanised battalion, an artillery division and an air force base between next 10 and 14 September. The Dutch will inspect mechanised, artillery and fighter-combat plane regiments between 26 and 30 September.

This venture mainly intends to express both states' will to cooperate in the interest of Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, Siwicki said. We have been dealing with one of the most difficult problems in negotiations, that is the search for efficient forms of verification of realization of reached settlements. Our suggestions and experiences might contribute to the signing of an agreement in Vienna, he stated.

It is also significant that Poland and Holland will become the first countries belonging to former East and West which have agreed to make this common effort, the Dutch minister told newsmen. I am extremely glad that Poland immediately accepted the proposal we put forward several months ago. The short period during which the two countries' experts worked out all the details of the memorandum shows immense great mutual confidence. It is just confidence that is a key notion in determining our mutual relations, he summed up.

Soviet Military Presence Reduced in Brzeg

*LD0606153790 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1005 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[Report by correspondent Leszek Opalacz]

[Text] [Opalacz] I have news for you, ladies and gentlemen, on reductions in Soviet troops at Brzeg. On this

subject, here is Jan Pikor, who is conducting negotiations on behalf of the Brzeg administration:

[Pikor] Work is currently in progress on a new intergovernmental agreement by which the presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory, and therefore in Brzeg, will be subject to the principle of full reimbursement.

[Opalacz] So at long last, a normal situation will exist, under new conditions, with a new local self-government structure and ownership of communal assets. For you, this is a splendid thing.

[Pikor] the 70 planes which are currently at Brzeg Airport will be reduced to 30 in around July-August. In view of this, and in accordance with a statement made by General Debicki, Soviet families will move out of apartments in the city by the end of the year, and as many will stay as can be accommodated in apartments at the airport. The Soviet side is at present using 510 of our apartments, and by the end of the year they will be returned to the city.

10,000 Soviet Troops To Be Withdrawn in 1990

*LD0606135690 Warsaw PAP in English
1301 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[Text] Warsaw, June 6—"Ten thousand Soviet soldiers will be withdrawn from Poland by the end of this year," GAZETA WYBORCZA Solidarity daily quoted today government's plenipotentiary for the Soviet troops' stationing in Poland Mieczyslaw Debicki as saying in a letter to the Council of Ministers of 30 May 1990.

"It means that there will be some 48,000 Soviet troops in Poland by the end of this year," the daily said.

"On 1 June a pullout of the commando brigade in Bialogard (northern Poland) started together with the liquidation of the material depot of an air force unit and withdrawal of a logistics unit from Torun (central Poland). Also two heavy helicopter squadrons and a MiG-25 fighter group from Brzeg (southern Poland) are to be withdrawn till the end of this year," GAZETA reported.

"Also the command of the Northern Group of Soviet troops is expected to be moved from Swidnica (southern Poland) to Legnica, the capital of the neighbouring region," the paper said.

GAZETA quotes adviser to the government spokesman Grazyna Jaskula as saying that the withdrawal of a bigger number of troops is currently impossible, because the Soviet authorities do not have an appropriate number of flats for those returning home.

ARGENTINA

Construction, Development of New Weapons Reported

PY2805192490 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish
1910 GMT 27 May 90

[Text] Buenos Aires, 27 May (DYN)—Factories and shipyards under the Defense Ministry or the Armed Forces are building submarines, tanks, a new type of mortar, and a ground radar system to equip the Navy and the Army. These weapons will also be introduced to foreign markets, particularly in the Middle East.

The new submarines and tanks were designed in the FRG. The tank design, however, was later improved by Argentine technicians.

The Pampa advanced training plane was built following a similar scheme. Many specialists in many developed countries consider the Pampa plane very advanced. The plane will be mass produced in the United States in cooperation with a U.S. firm for sale to the U.S. Armed Forces.

Despite the importance of this technological achievement, experts consider that their greatest technical achievement will be the upcoming launch of a conventional submarine, a fact that will place Argentina in a privileged position in the Americas because the United States is the only other submarine producer on the continent.

The new unit still does not have a name. Its construction began in sections nearly two years ago in the "Domenco Garcia" shipyards. It will be probably launched at the beginning of 1991, several months later than originally scheduled.

The submarine is of the TR1700 type, based on a design of the FRG firm Thyssen Lametal. The submarine was considered the fastest and quietest among conventional submarines some 10 years ago. It is similar to the "San Juan" and "Santa Cruz," which were built in FRG shipyards and which are serving in the Argentine Navy.

The original plan contemplated the construction of six submarines but three are still on the drawing boards because of the country's economic situation. The program will continue if the economic situation improves or if the country finds potential foreign buyers.

It is worth noting that the State Navy Factory and Shipyard (AFNE) is building destroyers and "Meko" type missile-equipped frigates with FRG designs. They will be called "Gomez Roca" and "Spiro."

The "Parker" was the last frigate launched by the AFNE. The ship was delivered slightly less than a month ago.

Other factories are working to improve the Argentine Medium-Size Tank (TAM). The combat tank beat some of the most famous tanks in the world in a test in Ecuador designed to purchase tanks for the Ecuadoran Army. The deal was thwarted after the new government took over in Quito.

The TAM is a 30-ton tank that runs at 70 km an hour. It is equipped with a 155-mm cannon—replacing the old 105-mm cannon—and a system that allows it to rapidly move from a position after four 30-km-range shots in four minutes.

According to an Argentine military source, the tracking system developed in the country is revolutionary. Authorities expect to sell the tank to Arab countries which up until now have been supplied mainly by the Brazilian factory ENGESA [Specialized Engineers, Inc].

According to the source, the CITEFA [Armed Forces Scientific and Technical Research Center], the Armed Forces scientific branch responsible for the production of new weapons, is working on the prototype of a new mortar which "makes no noise, fire, or smoke, and is therefore very difficult to locate."

The CITEFA is also developing a short-range ground radar system which is easy to transport and install, according to the specialized magazine TECNICAS Y ARMAS PARA LA DEFENSA [TECHNOLOGY AND ARMS FOR DEFENSE].

Experts include among its specific uses the short-range combat area supervision and the peacetime control of permanent or field installations such as factories or airports.

Baltic Fleet Experiments With 'Professional' Missile Boat Crew

90UM0445A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "Professionals on the Missile Boat"]

[Text] **This Experiment Was Proposed for the Baltic Fleet**

Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak has been made a permanent correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the Baltic Fleet. This is his first article.

The initiators of the idea were two missile boat commanders, Capt 3rd Rank I. Yakovenko (the officer received this rank ahead of his peers), and Capt-Lt S. Krivenchuk. They devised all the documents related to the experiment over several months.

"For several years I have observed the same picture," Capt-Lt S. Krivenchuk confides. "A crew is knocked into shape in a year of combat training. And then some specialists are discharged to the reserve, and officers are promoted. What has been achieved collapses like a house of cards. The training year begins, and again we start practically from scratch. I shared my thoughts with Igor Yakovenko, and together we began to figure..."

The idea of the commanders was also appealing to Capt 1st Rank Yu. Krivenko. On the basis of his service experience, Yuriy Ivanovich had long ago concluded that present-day equipment can only be serviced well by professionals.

He reasons: "For example, while a missile cruiser has seven cadre servicemen in an air defense missile battery and headquarters (officers and warrant officers), on a small missile boat there are only two. But operator's skills and sound knowledge are equally necessary on a cruiser and on a small boat. What will we gain from the formation of a professional crew? First of all, a higher quality, not to say entirely different level, of combat readiness. Secondly, we will eliminate problems with so-called service maintenance of complex equipment. To some extent we will eliminate questions related to military discipline, and special training will become more orderly. Basically it will be independent..."

Here then is an incomplete list of the main questions for which it was proposed that the experiment be started. In other words, the formation went from general talks about military reform to specific proposals. The ideas of the boat commanders, the staff officers, and the staff specialists of the formation acquired material form in the document "A study of the possibility of changing a missile boat to manning by officer and warrant officer personnel."

With the new organization, it was proposed to have five officers, 12 warrant officers, and eight extended-service seamen in the crew. Of course, there are some in the fleet

combat training directorate who also want to include several compulsory-service seamen in the crew. For auxiliary positions, so to speak: cook, medic, boatswain. But these are mere details.

As you see, the basic idea of the experiment is a radical change in the organic structure in the direction of reduction. The question arises: will the reduction in personnel not affect the combat readiness of the boat? Everyone I talked to answered this question in the negative. The boat commanders believe that combat readiness will be achieved by raising the level of professional training.

The combat training directorate also has its arguments. The first deputy chief of combat training of the fleet, Capt 1st Rank E. Reznikov, told me: "I support the initiative of the boat men. If we consider the formation of professional crews from the military standpoint, there will be a significant gain in combat readiness. After all, professionals will work in the combat posts. And not, to put it in the words of one writer, 'every Tom, Dick, and Harry.' If we succeed at this, then there will be a revision of many long-held concepts in combat training, in the organization of training, which will allow us to do without one third of expenditures for combat training. And this is an enormous amount."

Of course, this idea also has many opponents. Whom do I have in mind? First of all those who talk of the expense of the experiment. But who has counted the cost of breakage of combat equipment through the fault of personnel?

Specialists believe that the situation with respect to maintenance and repair of combat equipment and arms in the fleet is more chaotic than planned.

Says Capt 1st Rank Yu. Krivenko, "The formation also has very many representatives from the manufacturing plants doing guaranteed and planned repairs of equipment and arms on our boats. Colossal sums are spent on all this. Guaranteed service just on the propulsion systems on eight or nine boats costs around 300 thousand rubles per year."

The staff specialist of the formation, Capt 2nd Rank V. Butko, expands on the thought of the Capt 1st Rank: "A radar complex on a boat costs several million rubles. If it is broken through the fault of a seaman, we can take, at the most, 100 rubles, and punish him. And as for maintenance and repair, this is the Minister of Defense's order, which long ago prescribed the creation of professional technical maintenance groups for combat equipment and arms. And it requires us to separate the functions of users and repairers."

There are analogous problems among the specialists of the electromechanical service.

Capt 2nd Rank Yu. Bayzert, deputy formation commander for the electromechanical service, believes: "The

times force us to begin manning crews with professionals. If we count the economic losses inflicted on the fleet by the malfunction of main and auxiliary engines through the fault of personnel, we get a number with quite a few zeroes after it."

But in the fleet technical directorate they were restrained with their "zeroes". The chief of one of the sections, Capt 1st Rank V. Karasayev provided the following information. In 1988 there were three breakdowns of main engines and nine of auxiliary engines in the fleet. Last year there were three and thirteen respectively. But the total cost—no one at the technical directorate counted it up.

Yet another fundamental question arises: where will we find the cadres? After all, it is well known that there is a very grave situation in the fleet now with respect to warrant officers and extended-service seamen. The chief of the personnel officer of the formation, Capt 2nd Rank V. Tyulkin, assured me that if the experiment is approved for implementation, it will enhance the prestige of the warrant officer service.

And Vladimir Erestovich told me: "They are prestigious even now on the missile boats; in the unit where they propose to conduct the experiment, there is a one-hundred percent strength level. This has also become part of the system here: we ourselves go to the warrant officer schools and academies, and to the training detachments, and pick our own people."

The fleet personnel office has its own opinion on this subject.

The chief of the personnel office, Rear Admiral A. Petrov, told me, "Certain conditions have to be created in order to shift to professional crews. Namely: personnel have to work only at their immediate duties. To support the ships it is necessary to create security, commandant, and other auxiliary subunits. The second problem: where do we get the money? The way I see it, officer and warrant officer positions should be reduced in all special and rear support units. I think that employees of the Soviet Army should work in the fuel, clothing, and food warehouses."

Many of the people I interviewed touched on the question in one way or another: where to find the additional monetary resources? The financial side of the experiment also very much disturbs the crewmen. Professionals must be paid more for their labor. By the terms of the experiment, plans are to increase wages by 100-150 rubles. According to careful calculations by the boat personnel, this adds up to several additional tens of thousands of rubles a year.

The chief of the fleet finance service, Col S. Leponov, was succinct: "I am not against this experiment, but does the project have a significantly scientific basis? For it to take place, for the additional monetary resources to be allocated, the main thing required is a decision."

...For more than a year the idea of the experiment has been stirring the formation. The question of whether it will be, or not be, is still up in the air.

Commentator Calls for Rethinking, Publicizing Arms Sale Practices

90WC0071A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 15, 6-12 Apr p 1

[Article by Yuriy Zhuravlev, ZA RUBEZHOM observer:
"The Principle of Morality and Arms Sales"]

[Text] It has often been said that in recent years conventional weapons have taken on new qualities in terms of their development and improvement. The destructive and strike capacities of some of them are approaching those of tactical nuclear weapons. Some of the developing countries are working on chemical and bacteriological weapons on an ever larger scale. Missiles, including ballistic missiles, are ominously spreading throughout the "third world". By the year 2000, specialists believe, three different countries "on the periphery" will be able to create missiles with a range of up to 5,500 kilometers and to successfully complete programs on the development of nuclear weapons. This dangerous tendency is largely associated with the unceasing activity of the arms market.

The existence of "hot spots", as before, promises great profits for the states and companies who sell the instruments of war. There are naturally different evaluations of the volume of this death-dealing business, which is truly reminiscent of an iceberg—most of which is submerged in the water and therefore unknown. On the average, according to the computations of the Stockholm International Institute on the Study of World Problems (SIPRI), world arms sales annually total \$60 billion. To this we may add the unpublicized "black market" operations which account for about another \$9 billion.

The list of major international arms suppliers, as Western experts believe (cf. pg. 3), is headed by the USA and USSR. In our country, most unfortunately, all the information on this topic, even in the times of glasnost, has been submerged into a mire of secrecy. Therefore, we must rely only on the figures of foreign sources. A special report prepared by an investigative committee of the American Congress last year pointed out that in 1988 the USSR sold \$9.9 billion worth of arms to the developing countries, and the USA—\$9.2 billion. Moreover, the total deliveries of American arms rose by more than 60 percent as compared with the previous year, while Soviet deliveries declined by 43 percent. The lion's share of the arms sales went to the Near East.

Quite recently we rightly assumed that Soviet arms for the Arab states were a necessary attribute in the defense of their sovereignty and national boundaries. However, "Scud" missiles (that is how they are called in the West, in our country—unknown.—Yu. Zh.) with an effective radius of up to 300 kilometers were used in the "city war" in the Iran-Iraq conflict. During a briefing held at

the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center it was at one time stated that Iran, possibly, had used Soviet missiles which had been given to it by Libya. Iraq, however, with foreign help, modernized its existing "Scuds" so that they could reach Teheran. Peaceful city residents were among the victims of the numerous shellings.

There is also another unpleasant aspect. Soviet arms in the hands of certain Near Eastern states are being turned against the peoples of neighboring countries. What arms did Libya use to fight against Chad? Whose modern artillery systems did the contingent of Syrian forces use in Lebanon, including also against the peaceful population? Certain recipients of our arms generously share them with those whom they consider to be their allies or brothers in religion. The Ethiopian separatists are fighting against the government army with Soviet arms, which they received from certain Arab states.

I believe that the approaches to giving military aid and to arms sales require additional interpretation on the basis of the new thinking and the new defense doctrine of our country. We must not forget that the USSR has spoken out in favor of introducing the concept of morality into foreign policy.

Evidently, the time has come for Soviet diplomacy to act more decisively on the international arena in terms of establishing control over international arms sales.

Specifically, the first useful step might be the creation of an appropriate data bank on this question within the UN. This should be followed by a discussion of the possibility of holding an international conference under the aegis of the UN. The agenda of this conference should include the curtailment of production of conventional weapons, the reduction of their reserves, and the limitation of export of death-dealing goods to the "hot" regions. The time has come to begin developing approaches within the framework of the international community for reducing the armed forces and arsenals in the "third world" to a rational level necessary for defense, with appropriate guarantees of security from the UN.

We may also utilize more fully the potential of Soviet-American interaction. Its circle may more broadly include the practical questions of limiting the arms trade and the spread of missiles and chemical weapons. We will recall that in 1978 the USA unilaterally broke off Soviet-American talks on limiting arms trade. Yet today it is 1990, and the status of the bilateral relations is qualitatively different. Why not renew these talks, making them multilateral? Furthermore, in April of 1987 at the initiative of the USA the regimen of control over missile technology (MTKR), unifying 7 Western countries, went into effect. Perhaps we should expand this "club" by means of the Soviet Union and other countries, developing more effective standards for its operation? We should also see to it that the conventional

weapons which are "liberated" as a result of the Vienna talks are not moved en masse to the developing countries.

Within our country, we may also do our share to increase the moral aspect of arms sales. It is no secret that in our country, as in the West, we have our own military-industrial complex. It has flourished for many years, making use of its lack of answerability and shrouding itself in secrecy. The questions of arms trade and arms deliveries abroad at the present time have been placed under the complete control of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) and the Ministry of Defense. And what about the Supreme Soviet? As yet, there has not been a single manifestation of glasnost on this question either in the Committee on International Affairs or in the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security. As Goethe once said: "There is nothing more frightening than to act in complete ignorance".

Yes, our military aid to a number of states is pure commerce and brings income in freely convertible currency. I do not oppose these operations even in the future. Yet they should be under the full control of legislative authority. Let the executive power complain about the legislative in this respect, just as U.S. Secretary of State James Baker did in a recent interview. He said: "The executive branch today is faced with such a situation where Congress ratifies 92 percent of our military deliveries to foreign countries and over 82 percent of our foreign aid funds". This is much better than various shady transactions and tank deals with the ANT concern.

Understandably, we are just now gaining experience in the sphere of parliamentary action. The initial oversights of our state push other questions into the background. Yet we will nevertheless have to deal with these questions. The Supreme Soviet should review and ratify specific foreign policy programs and statutes, including the development and publication of national legislation on arms deliveries and transfer of military technology. The people have a right to know how many weapons we are giving to whom, how many we are giving away, and with what motives.

These, in my opinion, are certain questions which must be considered in the legal, democratic and highly moral state which we are beginning to build.

Last R-12 Missile Destroyed Under INF Treaty

*PM2905140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 May 90 Morning Edition p 6*

[Viktor Litovkin dispatch under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Last R-12 Missile Destroyed"]

[Text] On 23 May, at 0900 hours Moscow time, the last of the 149 R-12 intermediate-range missiles was destroyed at the "Lesnaya" missile destruction base in Brest Oblast.

Our correspondent asked Colonel General S. Kochemarov, chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff, to comment.

In one week's time—1 June 1990—it will be two years since the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles, Stanislav Grigoryevich said. The last shorter-range missile was totally destroyed at the beginning of this year. Now it is the turn of one of the two types of "intermediate-range" missiles—the R-12. This is a liquid-fuel missile. It had been in service for around 30 years.

Altogether, 809 intermediate-range missiles have to be destroyed in our country under the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, including 155 R-12 and R-14 missiles. They are all being destroyed in an environmentally clean way—by cutting. First the rocket nozzles and then the instrumentation compartment and the fuel tanks are cut off using an autogenous welder or by plasma cutting, then the airframe of the missile is crushed in a press and melted down. The metal obtained from this will thereafter be used in the national economy.

The Strategic Rocket Forces have transferred to the national economy free of charge 23 military installations worth a total of 14 million rubles [R] and have sold to enterprises and organizations 2,606 units of military hardware worth a total of over R8 million.

I would like to add that both sides party to the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are conducting very strict verification of the precise and timely fulfillment of treaty commitments through national technical means of verification and on-site inspection, the colonel general continued. Since the treaty has been in effect, over 220 inspections of our Rocket Forces installations have been carried out by the American side. U.S. representatives are also present at the current stage of the elimination of the R-12 missile.

Brigadier General R. Lajoie, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, is one of these representatives, and V. Medvedev, chief of the USSR National Center for the Reduction of Nuclear Danger, is also present.

Only 200 RSD-10 missiles and 177 launchers remain to be destroyed during the last year of elimination, before June 1991. In a little over a year's time, you will only be able to see missiles of this kind in a museum.

NATO Military Planning Committee Document Viewed

*PM2905130990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 May 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[Own correspondent B. Moskvichev dispatch: "NATO: A Time of Changes?"]

[Text] Brussels—At first reading, the final communique of the NATO Military Planning Committee session,

which took place in Brussels, is reminiscent more of a document prepared by politicians than by the military. And it is this subtle distinction that is particularly significant in the situation now taking shape in Europe. And that is why you can readily agree with the first sentence in the document, which says that the spring session of the committee marks the beginning of a new era.

Of course, we must not forget that it is not only the spring mood that is affecting the defense ministers of 14 countries belonging to NATO (not France and Iceland), but first and foremost an awareness of the consequences that have occurred in the USSR and East European countries, as well as the increasing pressure by politicians who realize that radical adjustments must be made to the activity of the North Atlantic alliance.

A kind of sensation was caused by the committee's statement on the need to revise NATO's military-strategic doctrine, since, in the opinion of the military, a sudden attack should not be expected from the Warsaw Pact, although a certain risk, or a possibility of confrontation between blocs, remains.

Also testifying to the political orientation of the adopted document is the fact that of its 11 points, only a few concern purely military problems. Bearing in mind the new conditions that have taken shape in Europe, the defense ministers have declared that it is necessary to try to reduce the level of combat readiness of some subunits on alert duty. It is planned that the number of military exercises and the combat training programs will be reduced.

A proposal on the creation of multinational forces was put forward. Although, according to certain observers, this provision is primarily aimed at justifying the maintenance of a presence of U.S. subdivisions "on the old continent." It is evidently to these very ends that the participants in the Brussels meeting are stressing that despite the reduction in Soviet armed forces that has taken place, they are still sufficiently well equipped both as regards nuclear forces and conventional weapons.

The defense ministers devoted a great deal of attention to questions of preserving security. Remaining loyal to the existing mechanism for ensuring security based on the NATO structure, they nevertheless advocated the possible use of the Helsinki accords too in this respect.

The communique gave great significance to the successful conclusion of the Vienna talks and to the situation that will develop in Europe under the influence of the agreements reached at those talks.

Nazarkin on Progress Toward Arms Treaty

PM2605180990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent I. Melnikov report on interview with Yuriy Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva strategic offensive arms reduction talks: "Geneva: By No Means a Sisyphean Labor. Final Touches to Draft Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty"]

[Text] Geneva, May—There is an expression in German—"Salzgurkenzeit," meaning cucumber pickling season—used jokingly to describe the time when people in official positions take their traditional summer vacations and political life everywhere dies down.

But every rule has its exceptions, of course. I experienced this vividly during my current visit to Geneva. The weather here has been quite summery for a long time, yet the participants in the Soviet-U.S. talks have not had time even to glance at the azure sky. The talks have now gathered such momentum that the most that diplomats and military experts can hope for is six or so hours of sleep. And then it is back to polishing and honing the text of the future treaty on 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms.

I have known Yuriy Nazarkin, the head of our delegation, for almost two decades, and I have seen him in all kinds of situations. Nonetheless, the current situation is special. No, it cannot be described as an extreme situation. The daily schedule of the ambassador for special assignments remains outwardly the same as it was six months ago: The daily one-on-one meeting with the head of the U.S. delegation to settle questions that may have arisen, consultations with Moscow, working conferences with the participation of experts, and the summing up at the end of the day. However, the pace of the talks has accelerated appreciably, and this is dictated by one key circumstance—in a matter of days in Washington the presidents of the USSR and the United States must be able to rely on thoroughly elaborated basic provisions of the draft. Is there any need to explain that the last "blank spots" of the treaty text are being filled in here in Geneva?

The delegation head agreed to meet me for an hour, but we spent an hour and a half together—the current picture at the talks includes all too many important features.

What is most important in Geneva at the moment?—Yuriy Nazarkin began with a question. It is, of course, the translation into treaty language of the decisions reached at the Moscow ministerial meeting. Painstakingly minute work is under way with regard to the formulations....

A few days ago the heads of both delegations, the Soviet and the American ones, returned from Moscow, where they attended the talks between E.A. Shevardnadze and

J. Baker. The ministers examined in detail all outstanding issues. They managed to eliminate key problems concerning both air-launched (ALCM) and sea-launched (SLCM) cruise missiles. This most important leap forward was achieved thanks to solutions involving balanced packages. In order to assemble these "packages" and to unravel the tiny but crucial knots, great skill on the part of all the apexes of the "working triangle"—Moscow, Washington, and Geneva—was needed. The ministers resolved the question of the SLCM's on the basis of the principle of parallel, politically binding commitments designed for the whole term of the treaty. As for the ALCM's, a mutually acceptable range from which the missiles will be subject to limitation was agreed. Questions pertaining to missile numbers were also settled.

It was precisely this dual problem of sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles which defied solution until the May ministerial meeting in Moscow. This was the main stumbling block. Progress on other controversial questions was assured in Geneva. This is how Yuriy Nazarkin describes it:

"From the first months of the current year our partners at the negotiating table displayed greater flexibility. Evidently the U.S. delegation began to receive constructive instructions more frequently. There was a sense that a political decision had been made in Washington to conclude the treaty before the end of the year. As a result, we made progress on the questions concerning the term of the treaty and on mobile—both railroad- and ground-based [gruntovyye]—ICBM's. These are major questions and, frankly speaking, they are very complex...."

The topic of mobile ICBM's, incidentally, requires a brief explanation at least. For a long time we were unable to conduct talks with the American side on this question since the sides' fundamental approaches clearly did not coincide. They insisted on a total ban on these ICBM's since they did not intend to build them, placing the emphasis on nuclear submarines and bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles. Then the U.S. delegation changed its stance and agreed to negotiate mobile ICBM limitation rather than a total ban. This was of fundamental importance if only because the Soviet Union, which is mainly a land power, has traditionally relied on ground-launched missiles in the development of strategic offensive arms. In comparison with the Americans we have more silo-based ICBM's, and we also developed mobile missiles. The latter, by the way, are comparable in terms of "survivability" to missile submarines, in which the United States has a clear advantage. Both categories find it easier to avoid being hit. Therefore, from the viewpoint of parity an official accord to the effect that mobile ICBM's will be subject to limitation under the treaty rather than a ban was of great importance.

As regards other spheres of successful progress at the Geneva talks, my interlocutor mentioned the question of the ban on rapid reload. Naturally, it is not the most

important point in the treaty, but it is nonetheless significant. It is a question of banning the use of launching installations for repeat launches.

The question of the phased destruction of strategic offensive arms stocks has also been elaborated. Back in 1987 an accord was reached at summit level to the effect that delivery vehicles would be reduced to a level of 1,600 units and charges to a level of 6,000 units, and that the destruction process would be carried out over a period of seven years. In Geneva this plan is being elaborated in detail so as to ensure the preservation of parity at all the stages, taking account of the differences which exist on both sides. It is a known fact that the United States has more charges and that we have more delivery vehicles. This difference has to be taken into account to ensure that the balance is not disrupted.

An entirely legitimate question arises: Who is responsible for the time pressure which has arisen at the Geneva talks before the Washington meeting? Despite the delicate nature of this question, I put it to my interlocutor.

"The problems are far from simple," he answered. "Nonetheless, there is evidence of a certain amount of foot-dragging. But I must say that the 'debt' as regards providing answers to proposals is greater on the U.S. side. On our side it is smaller, although it does exist, let us not hedge about it."

[Melnikov] Are the delegations, or foot-dragging in the respective capitals, to blame for the delays on either side?

[Nazarkin] "Undoubtedly, from the delegations' viewpoint the capitals are to blame, and from the capitals' viewpoint the delegations are to blame. It depends on your vantage point, so to speak. We try to find accords as quickly as possible here and to forward proposals to Moscow as quickly as possible. This cannot always be managed since we depend on our negotiating partners. After all, it takes two to tango...."

Yuriy Nazarkin has headed our side at the talks for almost a year now. Has the delegation gained in independence and scope for maneuver since he took over?

"I could not say that we have either more or less independence now," he replied. "In any case, even in the very beginning, my hands were not tied. The delegation head has relatively broad powers. And no one is holding me by the 'apron strings' now, it is simply that the momentum of the talks has accelerated considerably, and there is not enough time."

I raised another "delicate" topic. How is the atmosphere at the Geneva talks affected by the prevailing general political climate, by the whole range of events which are taking place in our turbulent world?

"This is a complex question," my interlocutor admitted. "For instance, prior to the meeting between the Soviet and the U.S. leader in Malta the negotiations were

making virtually no progress because Washington had not yet adopted a political decision to conclude a treaty on strategic offensive arms as quickly as possible. Or take the events in Lithuania. I cannot complain that they have introduced a chill in the atmosphere at the negotiations. The caravan went on its way."

...Right now, in the final days of May, the Geneva caravan is still moving. On the eve of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush it has sharply accelerated its pace. The outstanding volume of work is now calculated in fractions of percentages rather than percentage points. The effort put into the negotiations will not be a Sisyphean labor. The rock which we have pushed to the top of the mountain will not roll back down again. This is guaranteed by the political will of the leaders of the two states and the responsibility of the Soviet and U.S. diplomats and experts who are working flat out in Geneva at the moment.

Air Defense Officer on Moscow ABM System, Peaceful Uses

90WC0077A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Interview with Colonel General Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy by TRUD Correspondent V. Badurkin: "Just What Is ABM?"]

[Text] The Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) is considered to be one of the most "restricted areas" in the country's Armed Forces. A paradoxical situation has developed when the entire world knows that the Soviet Union deployed an anti-ballistic missile defense force around its capital in accordance with the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems [1972] but there has not been a word about it in our own press! But, glasnost has also finally penetrated into the Army's activities. TRUD Correspondent V. Badurkin met with Colonel General Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy, one of the PVO [Air Defense] leaders, and asked him to answer some questions for TRUD's readers.

[Correspondent] Volter Makarovich, considering the total absence of any information at all about anti-ballistic missile defense, first of all tell us about its place in the Armed Forces system.

[Kraskovskiy] Organizationally, Moscow's anti-ballistic missile defense is part of the Air Defense Troops. It consists of command and control facilities based on the most modern computers with software containing one million commands, acquisition and guidance radar sites, and firing complexes with anti-ballistic missiles deployed dozens of kilometers from each other. All of this has been developed and functions based on the very latest achievements of command and control theory, mathematics, electronics, radar, and other sciences.

[Correspondent] You emphasized the word "Moscow" in your answer....

[Kraskovskiy] I did that intentionally. I think a small historical digression is necessary to clarify it.

In the 1960's, when the Cold War was at its height, the need arose to reliably defend the country from an American ballistic missile (ICBM) surprise attack. However, it soon became clear that creation of an anti-ballistic missile defense system, not even for the entire country but only for primary strategic areas, would be a very expensive and futile venture. The fact is that if we covered, say, 10 targets with anti-ballistic missiles, the Americans would accordingly soon increase the number of their missiles in order to penetrate this shield. We, in turn, would once again strengthen our ABM System to protect ourselves from them.... And so on and so forth ad infinitum. A classic pattern of the arms race.

Fortunately, both sides had enough common sense to think it over in a timely manner and to begin negotiations to limit strategic weapons and anti-ballistic missile defense systems. As a result, as we all know, the 1972 Treaty was concluded between the USSR and U.S.A. which permitted each side to have only one area protected by ABM's on its territory. Furthermore, the radius of the ABM weapons system deployment areas must not exceed 150 kilometers. The Americans decided to cover their Grand Forks strategic missile base in the northern portion of their country and the Soviet leadership decided to cover the capital of the USSR.

[Correspondent] What played the determining role during selection of the region? We really have regions that are much more important in a strategic sense....

[Kraskovskiy] The Soviet side proceeded from the fact that Moscow is the most important political, administrative, and industrial center of the State. All organs and all threads of command and control, including with the country's defense, are concentrated here. If we did not cover it, then it could occur in such a way that there would be no one to make a decision on a retaliatory strike or that the decision would not reach the executors.

[Correspondent] I think the time has come to tell our readers about the ABM System in greater detail: How does it function and what missions does it accomplish during peacetime?

[Kraskovskiy] During peacetime, the system is in a state of permanent combat readiness and it "monitors" outer space. Its eyes and ears are early warning radar sites. They are capable of ascertaining the fact of an attack against the Soviet Union in seconds and transferring to automatic tracking of ballistic targets, having discriminated nuclear warheads from false targets and decoys.

Anti-ballistic missiles are simultaneously brought to their readiness condition automatically, they are distributed among the targets, predicted target destruction points are calculated, and anti-ballistic missiles are automatically launched at the designated time. At first, the

exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic missile interception echelon is employed and undestroyed ballistic missile warheads will be shot down in the atmosphere by short range interceptors. Anti-ballistic missile command and control is carried out by ground-based and on-board computers according to a calculated and confirmed point that is reflected by combat algorithms and programs and implemented on domestically produced supercomputers using target tracking radars and anti-ballistic missiles. This is a brief outline of our operations.

[Correspondent] I am afraid that, putting it mildly, not all of our readers will know how to sort this out....

[Kraskovskiy] I will attempt to explain it in more understandable terms. Imagine a man who is being steadily fired at from practically all directions but he manages to react to each shot. At the same time, he selects only those bullets for destruction that are flying directly at him. If he sees that he cannot hit all of the bullets, he selects those bullets that are aimed at vitally important organs.

[Correspondent] We all know that the Americans have already mothballed their ABM System that protected their ballistic missile base in the 1970's. Why did the Soviet leadership not resort to that same step?

[Kraskovskiy] Let us begin with the Americans. The Americans have actually mothballed their Safeguard [ABM] System but they have left its primary element, the PAR [Perimeter Acquisition Radar] site, to serve as a nuclear missile attack early warning system. Furthermore, they are constantly improving ABM technology and conducting scientific research and experimental design work for this purpose. And considering the U.S.'s high scientific and technical potential, I can state with certainty that they are planning and are capable of deploying their own combat [ABM] complexes in a very short period of time if the need arises.

In addition, we should also not forget that, for seven years now on that side of the ocean, they have been intensively developing the SDI Program that envisions deployment of an ABM system, including space-based elements, along with the total build up of strategic offensive force capabilities.

As for our system, we think: It is not economical to "freeze" the enormous sums spent on its development. Therefore, it not only defends the capital of the USSR from ballistic missiles but also accomplishes other missions.

[Correspondent] That is, you want to say that the Soviet ABM System also performs peaceful operations?

[Kraskovskiy] Of course. It is needed by many sectors. ABM radar systems are utilized for monitoring outer space where thousands of artificial Earth satellites [AES] are permanently located. They monitor AES's while they enter into their calculated orbits, search for space vehicles that have changed the position of their orbit as a result of an accident or due to other causes, determine

state affiliation of AES's and monitor their activities. We frequently have occasion to participate in supporting space vehicle docking, elimination of accident situations on them, conduct various maneuvers and carry out their landings. For example, I can remind your readers about the test flights of Buran-Energiya, the new Soviet space system, and the docking of the Mir Orbital Station with the Kvant-2 Astrophysical Module.

The responsible portion of our work is surveillance of Shuttle reusable space vehicle flights. (For example, from 1 through 4 March 1990, we observed Atlantis in outer space for the Pentagon). We also participate in determining times and possible reentry areas of space vehicle fragments, especially those that have nuclear power plants on board. Using ABM systems, we can determine space vehicle movement parameters with a very high degree of accuracy and check the characteristics and adjustment of new radar sites located in remote areas of the earth's surface.

I can list many more missions accomplished by the ABM system in peacetime but nevertheless our primary mission is maintenance of all systems at constant combat readiness to repel an enemy nuclear missile attack and to intercept ballistic missiles launched as a result of erroneous or arbitrary actions of individual subunits (for example, a submarine) or, finally, during disruption of stability in a country that has ballistic missiles with nuclear or chemical warheads.

[Correspondent] And the last question, Volter Makarov-ich. Everything that we have talked about until now concerns armed confrontation. But if we pose the problem in a different and maybe unusual plane for a military commander: How do you assess the possibility for cooperation between the USSR and U.S.A. in the area of security, including monitoring air space and outer space?

[Kraskovskiy] By the way you posed the question, I see the reflection of an attitude that has developed that military people are somehow only engaged in those things that prepare them to fight and that they do not at all want to think about detente for some reason. I personally think it is not such a fantastic idea to establish an all air and space monitoring system data correlation facility somewhere in the center of Europe where information would flow in from radar, optical, and other systems not only of the USSR and U.S., but of other countries and joint combat crews would perform alert duty there. Although in this case, obviously it would be more appropriate to call these alert forces not "combat" but peace crews.

It seems to me that during implementation of this idea, the world community would at least be guaranteed that nuclear war would not begin due to a ridiculous error in a combat program or due to a meteorite or a falling satellite that is perceived to be a ballistic missile.

Grinevskiy Sees Danger of Vienna Talks Being 'Rolled Back'

*PM2805132590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 May 90 Second Edition pp 1,7*

[Igor Melnikov dispatch under the "Abroad. Correspondents Comment" rubric: "Hardening Their Positions"]

[Text] Vienna, 27 May—There is an indisputable connection between the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe and the all-European summit scheduled for the end of this year.

The treaty is destined, without any exaggeration, to be the key element in the new security system on the continent. On the other hand, the closeness of the all-European meeting is stimulating dynamic progress at the talks in the Hofburg Palace.

This is logically as it should be. But sometimes logic does not suit everyone. The mass media are, for instance, inflating rumors that the Soviet Union is allegedly slowing down the pace of the meeting of the 23 countries, involving all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Complaints can be heard that Moscow is trying to impose limitations on the future united Germany's armed forces.

The talks are indeed marking time. If you look at things objectively, this is happening primarily in three areas. The first being the reduction in the numerical strength of Soviet and U.S. ground and air force personnel in Europe. The Soviet side's position is certainly not the reason for the delay. On the contrary, we are proposing to immediately get down to elaborating the provisions of a treaty in strict accordance with the formula adopted at the recent meeting in Ottawa. A bilateral exchange of one or two trial inspections with the United States has already been cited as the first specific step along this path. Soviet and U.S. troop units stationed in Central Europe would be the object of these inspections in the second half of this year.

Aviation is another area. Specific proposals are also needed here. The Soviet Union has just submitted proposals at the last plenary sitting. The proposals concern the quantitative level of front-line (tactical) aviation combat aircraft and medium bombers and the conversion of a large proportion of Soviet combat trainer aircraft into trainer aircraft, along with our readiness to postpone the resolution of the question of air defense interceptors until the second phase of talks.

The third area is the procedures involved in destroying the arms to be cut back. Soviet experts have also made proposals here, the implementation of which prevents any circumvention of the treaty. They have also recommended environmentally safe methods of destroying the arms and equipment—cutting, crushing [deformatsiya], and smelting.

During a conversation with USSR delegation head O. Grinevskiy I inquired about the current situation at the talks.

"To be frank," he replied, "the state of affairs is still arousing concern. Fresh grounds for disquiet have emerged of late. Things are going slowly. There is no movement on some issues. Artificial obstacles are being raised in the way of resolving other issues. At the end of the last round of talks Western delegations appeared to have hardened their positions and sometimes went back on their own proposals. These were questions of tanks and armored personnel carriers at the time. There now seem to be fresh clouds appearing on the horizon. The 'spring vacation' saw some strange changes in our partners' approaches to the delicate question of the regional division and storage of arms. I told my Western colleagues bluntly that canceling accords that have already been secured is fraught with the danger that our talks may be rolled back."

Scientists Discuss Nuclear Test Halt

LD3005082890 Moscow TASS in English
1837 GMT 29 May 90

[Text] Moscow, May 29 (TASS)—Scientists can and should make their contribution to halting nuclear tests. This was confirmed by a consultative meeting of nuclear physicists and experts from the USSR, the United States and Britain, which ended here today. The meeting was organized by the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity.

Celebrated specialists from research centres in Princeton, Los Alamos, and Soviet laboratories, which are directly linked with the development of nuclear weapons, analysed possible steps on the path towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

"Until recently, this problem had been discussed at the level of politicians," academician Spartak Belyayev, deputy director of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute and co-chairman of the meeting, told TASS.

He noted that despite differences in views, participants have concurred that joint efforts were needed to upgrade verification methods. Scientists emphasised that the parties should complement the halting of explosions with mutual arms reductions.

Soviet and American scientists will inform interested commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress about the results of the meeting.

Kulikov on Putsch Rumors, Military Blocs

AU3005101990 Vienna DER STANDARD in German
30 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov by Georg Possanner in Vienna; date not given: "Soviet Marshal in Vienna: Generals Back Gorbachev"]

[Text] [Possanner] To begin with, let me ask you a very direct political question: Do you consider it possible that based on dissatisfaction, the Soviet generals could take measures against President Mikhail Gorbachev, in other words, stage a putsch against him?

[Kulikov] I can state here clearly that the officers' corps and the generals as well as the armed forces on the whole fully and unreservedly back the president's policy—perestroika, glasnost, and pluralism. And they will defend it, too.

[Possanner] What do you think about the rumors of a putsch?

[Kulikov] They are sheer fabrication.

[Possanner] The Soviet Union has discontinued withdrawing its troops from the GDR. Why?

[Kulikov] The reintegration of officers and troops into the work process and the provision of housing are currently decelerating the withdrawal. We have committed ourselves to withdrawing 22,000 men by 1 July 1991, and we will keep to this commitment. To date, 11,620 troops have gone back. The same holds true for the situation in Hungary; however, Hungary's political leadership has not ruled out membership in NATO following our troop withdrawal.

[Possanner] What would be your comment on such a step?

[Kulikov] No one has the right to give a sovereign state directives. Personally, I would be opposed to such a step because every effort should be made to liquidate the blocs.

[Possanner] How much time do you give the two alliances?

[Kulikov] It is difficult to define the timeframe. Events in Europe and the Soviet Union are changing so rapidly. However, I do not believe that the blocs will be dissolved in the next few years.

[Possanner] Regarding the Warsaw Pact, do we not have to talk about a disintegration process?

[Kulikov] I do not use this term. We should much rather say that a number of countries intend to solve this problem in their own way. CSFR President Havel has pledged to Gorbachev that his country will maintain friendly relations between neighbors and will fulfill its military obligations within the pact.

[Possanner] Militarily, the Soviet Union is extremely concerned about a unified Germany. Would it not serve your security interests better to see a unified Germany bound into NATO where the United States, Moscow's most important partner in talks, has the say?

[Kulikov] No, I do not share this opinion. That would be comparable to the integration of the Bundeswehr into the Warsaw Pact.

Shevardnadze Calls for Permanent CSCE Organs

PM2905160890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 May 90 Morning Edition p 5

[E. Shevardnadze article: "Europe: A Generation's Mission"]

[Text] The changes that have taken place in Europe are today setting politicians a question: What next?

For decades people used to talk about the dangers of confrontation between the two military-political alliances, the high price of the Cold War for Europeans, the need to end the division of the continent, German unity, the progress of the Helsinki process, and the strengthening of security and cooperation.

Now all this appears in a different light, in different dimensions, and opens up formerly inconceivable prospects, but it also creates new problems.

That is why, amid the torrent of euphoric statements, assessments, and commentaries, doubts can be heard—as to whether we will find ourselves back on the old road leading to the rebirth of rivalry among nation states and a repetition of the mistakes that more than once led Europe to tragedy.

I do not think this will happen, provided that we do not forget the past and that we remember our obligation and duty to think and work to prevent hitches in our common progress and to make full use of the opportunities that history has given us.

I am confident that it will not happen, provided that politicians have sufficient ability realistically and critically to analyze the situation and to grasp the pressing need to reinterpret many familiar ideas on the foundations of European security and cooperation.

There must be no delay here, especially in the light of the processes associated with the building of German unity.

The alternative, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his interview for TIME magazine, has already become clear: It is the institutionalization of all-European development and the creation of totally new structures on an all-European basis, with, of course, the active participation of the United States and Canada.

It would be naive to suppose that in the new circumstances, the old political and organizational instruments will suffice. It will certainly be necessary to create a structure that will oppose the forces that are working to break up the still fragile European community [obshchestvo].

Fortunately we already have some elements of this structure. There is the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the associated accords, rules, procedures, and standards.

The Helsinki package of principles and agreements is a living, active political organism with enormous potential for evolutionary development.

Its main strength lies in the principle of consensus. Not simply proclaimed consensus, but actually functioning consensus. In difficult periods the European countries have succeeded in finding mutually acceptable options in virtually all spheres of interstate relations.

Consensus is the only foundation on which it is possible to build collective—as we say, or cooperative, in the terminology of some of our partners—all-European security structures. Given this approach, nothing can be imposed and no one's interests will be flouted or disregarded.

The principle of common consent is not easy to adhere to—really new thinking is needed here, but then the outcome is a lasting, reliable decision that is strictly observed by all parties.

In the new conditions of the assertion of high standards of democracy, to conduct international affairs in any other way is impossible and will not work.

Why are all-European security structures needed? Because the bloc system was designed for a scenario of direct, face-to-face confrontation between the sides' armed forces—and confrontation at an ever higher qualitative level of means of mutual destruction.

Behind the talk about the blocs' defensive nature there has always been another reality—the orientation of their armed forces toward the conduct of offensive military operations.

The blocs sprang up as a consequence of the cold war. They cannot remain the same when the cold war has become a thing of the past. The Warsaw Pact was the first to react to this—both through large-scale unilateral reductions in troops and armaments in the member countries, and through the transition to a defensive doctrine as a whole, as a bloc, and the building of its armed forces on the basis of the principles of nonoffensive defense and reasonable sufficiency.

This process is developing in the West too. Thus the communique of the NATO Military Planning Committee adopted on 23 May this year says:

"We have decided to undertake a review of NATO military strategy and bring our defensive tasks into line with the new, developing situation in future. We will have to adjust our concepts and operational doctrines."

The North Atlantic alliance has abandoned the goal of an annual three-percent increase in military spending and adopted measures to reduce the level of combat readiness of certain of its permanent forces. NATO has dropped the program for modernization of American tactical nuclear missiles in Europe and expressed readiness to enter into talks on the limitation and reduction of this type of weapon.

We will, of course, watch carefully how these intentions are realized in NATO's practical activity. But another objective necessity also arises—to take a fresh look to see whether the foundations exist today for establishing relations of partnership between the blocs. They cannot go on indefinitely confronting and standing up to each other!

In the new situation, the question of security guarantees for those European states that do not or will not belong to military blocs arises in a new way. Only new all-European security structures can give them such guarantees.

The real situation in Europe dictates the need to go over to the resolution of all aspects of the problem of security, disarmament, and confidence-building within the framework of forums of all 35 CSCE states.

A most important component of European security is the talks of the 23 and the 35 in Vienna. These talks cannot be conducted actively and productively without due attention being paid to them at political levels.

That is why political institutions of the all-European process should be created.

In our opinion, these should be:

—The Council (Assembly) of Greater Europe—a forum of the top leaders of all the CSCE member states. This would examine cardinal questions of European policy and formulate fundamental political principles and concrete decisions on a consensus basis.

Sessions of the Council (Assembly) would be held at least once every two years.

—The Committee (Council) of Foreign Ministers. It would prepare questions for examination at meetings of the top leaders and monitor the fulfillment of their decisions. The ministers would be responsible for leadership of other organs that might be created.

Obviously, between meetings of the top leaders and conferences of ministers problems and situations could arise that would require examination at political levels.

Here it would help to set up "triumvirates" ["troyki"] (the former, current, and future chairmen) of the leaders and ministers, endowed with mandates of some kind for holding urgent consultations.

For day-to-day needs, it would be worth coming to an agreement on the operation of a consultative machinery consisting of envoys of the 35 countries in the capital where the CSCE's permanent secretariat will be, with the minimum necessary number of experts and technical staffers.

In our view, it is important to create a center for ensuring stability in the military-political sphere throughout Europe as the first module of the future new security structures. It could comprise two organs. The first would

tackle questions concerning the collection and dissemination of data on states' military activity and would help enhance its transparency. Its functions would also extend to questions of coordinating inspections, clarifying unclear or disputed situations, and preparing appropriate reports and recommendations for the foreign ministers' committee.

The second organ would concentrate on the task of solving crisis situations. It could dispatch good offices missions, mediate between sides, and assist in easing frictions and tension.

Of course, the activity of this center should fit in with the already existing Stockholm accords on confidence building and security measures and with other control and verification [kontrolnyye i verifikatsionnyye] procedures agreed at the Vienna talks.

We advocate the siting of the center for prevention and solution of conflicts in Berlin. This would be of considerable symbolic importance.

In our opinion, the question of establishing such a center could be agreed during preparations for the all-European summit meeting, with the meeting itself announcing the establishment of this organ.

It is well known that all participants in the future summit meeting have already agreed that it would discuss questions of the future Helsinki process in breadth.

It is obvious that the leaders of CSCE states will speak out firmly in support of the principles of democracy, free elections, political pluralism, and the multiparty system, and will place emphasis on association and other aspects of the humanitarian and legal spheres.

We assume that the summit meeting at year's end will form a special group to prepare recommendations for coordinating the activity of already existing organizations dealing with the economy, the ecology, communications, and exchange of information and people.

Evidently, this will also require the creation of some new institutions, but the main point will be to make utmost use of the potential of the Council of Europe, the EC, the UN European Economic Commission, CEMA and its organs, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the OECD, the European Free Trade Association, the Nordic Council, and other European organizations and associations in the West and the East alike.

It is understandable that we will attach special importance to synchronizing and interlinking the institutionalization of the Helsinki process and the building of German unity.

The fundamental questions associated with the external aspects of German unity will be examined, as already agreed, within the framework of the "two-plus-four" mechanism which has already been created especially for this purpose. It is already functioning and, as everyone

agrees, it is not functioning badly. The results of its work and the accords which have been reached will be submitted to the meeting of top leaders from all European states.

Of course, "the Six" still have to solve some very difficult questions like, for example, Germany's future military-political status. The Soviet leadership's views on this problem were recently outlined yet again by M.S. Gorbachev at the joint press conference by the president of the USSR and France in Moscow.

An option must be sought here which would be acceptable to all and would take into account the interests of Germany, the Soviet Union, and others.

I would like to say the following in this context. We do not think that this question ought to be approached exclusively from today's positions, the positions of current realities. The situation here will not remain static. Therefore, the final settlement formula ought to be geared more to the future than to the present, let alone the past.

The determining factors when we decide on our position will be: First—the dynamics of changes in NATO's concepts and strategic doctrines and the degree of this bloc's transformation into a political-military rather than a military-political alliance.

Second—the pace and depth of the all-European process of disarmament and, naturally, the Bundeswehr's military parameters.

Third—the speed and scale of the creation of all-European structures and institutions, primarily in the security sphere.

We would like to think that we will soon be able to obtain a clearer picture of what could be expected along these three avenues.

If the process of building German unity were to be organically and properly incorporated in the multifaceted European security context, a solution to what now appear to be its burdensome aspects could be found without detriment to anyone.

Only one aspect of the need to create all-European structures and institutions touches upon the problem of German unity.

An incalculably more significant goal of this large-scale enterprise concerns the future stability and predictability of the European situation and solves the task of preventing a new split and fragmentation of Europe.

All states are certainly interested in this, because peace, tranquillity, and mutually advantageous cooperation in a Europe marching along the path of integration and creation of single spaces—in security, the legal sphere, humanitarian cooperation, and economic and ecological collaboration—will ultimately depend on it.

I would like to say that the submission of the question of institutionalizing the all-European process and creating new security structures within its framework is widely supported.

A nucleus of practical proposals and conceptual approaches is already taking shape. It is gratifying that our proposals in this regard follow along the tracks of other countries' ideas, that there are many similar and close elements.

We welcomed with interest President F. Mitterrand's idea of a European confederation, U.S. President Bush's idea of an integral democratic Europe, Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher's idea of a new peace order in Europe, Foreign Minister M. Eyskens' idea of a European confederative community, Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki's idea of a European Cooperation Council, Foreign Minister J. Dienstbier's idea of a European Security Commission, and others. Despite all their nuances and differences, they are imbued with concern for Europe's peaceful future.

They are all in active political circulation.

We exchanged opinions on questions of all-European building with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, with Foreign Ministers H.-D. Genscher of the FRG, R. Dumas of France, D. Hurd of Britain, De Michelis of Italy, and with other colleagues.

Their response is positive and promising. We consulted at working level with representatives of a number of other West and East European states and encountered understanding by them.

It must be said that other states' politicians have also expressed quite a few original ideas about ways to further develop and improve the Helsinki process. They contain valuable rational elements and promising notions.

It has been agreed that experts from all 35 CSCE states will begin consultations on all these questions in the first half of July.

Our delegation will actively and constructively work to find consensus.

I would like to end on the following idea. The United Nations Organization emerged after the end of World War II. The task of modern diplomacy is to draw a line beneath the Cold War by laying firm foundations for the future all-European home.

TASS Views UN Disarmament Session Conclusion

*LD3005091390 Moscow TASS in English
0859 GMT 30 May 90*

[Text] United Nations, May 30 (TASS)—The United Nations Disarmament Commission ended its session at

U.N. Headquarters late on Tuesday, adopting a package of recommendations on a wide range of arms limitation and disarmament issues.

For the first time in the 11 years of its existence, this consultative body at the U.N. General Assembly managed to adopt coordinated documents on almost all issues on the agenda.

The recommendations, the majority of which were adopted without vote, deal with ways to curb the arms race and eliminate the danger of nuclear war, naval disarmament, the UN role in disarmament, South Africa's nuclear potential and conventional arms disarmament.

The session was held on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. summit, said commission chairman Nana Sutresna from Indonesia in his concluding remarks.

The prospect of signing a number of Soviet-U.S. agreements on global problems helped create a constructive atmosphere for our discussions, he said. The forthcoming summit testifies to the two leaders' sincere wish to move negotiations forward. This could help strengthen collective security, he said.

The commission hopes the summit will search for ways to conclude effective agreements to curb the arms race and to lead to nuclear disarmament, Sutresna said.

The success of the sessions should be viewed first and foremost in the context of great positive changes in the world, Soviet representative Boris Krasulin said at the final sitting. New political thinking and confidence building in recent years led to overcoming confrontation stereotypes and ended the "Cold War." It also helped reduce military danger and start real disarmament.

The session's result confirm the growing significance of a multilateral dialogue on ways to increase international security in all aspects, Krasulin said. The UN undoubtedly plays the central role in the integration of all steps taken.

The Soviet Union will continue to promote international security. first and foremost it seeks to limit all countries' military arsenals within the strict bounds of sensible defence sufficiency.

Bovin Questioned on Arms Reductions

*LD3005182190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1430 GMT 30 May 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [S. Levskoy, identified by caption] In what way will the summit change our relations with the United States? Are we going to feel safer after it? This was discussed at a meeting of Soviet foreign political experts with foreign correspondents. A journalist from the Voice of America asked whether the concessions made by the

Soviet Union in preparing the agreement on reducing strategic offensive arms were not too high.

[A.Ye. Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer, identified by caption] In the final analysis, parity does not mean that I have, say, 100 missiles and you have 100 missiles. If we can destroy the United States, and if the United States can destroy us, then parity and balance are maintained. And within this balance and such a view of parity, there are still great reserves, both for us and the Americans, I think, for reducing arms.

[Levskoy] Aleksandr Bovin and other participants in the press conference noted that the agreement that is being prepared does not involve programs for modernizing strategic arms of the two countries. It is only the first step toward a safe world. It should be followed by others to stop the arms race for good. [video shows Bovin, Arbatov, Shishlin answering questions at a conference hall]

Vorobyev Comments on Troop Pullout From CSFR

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Interview

*PM3105134190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 May 90 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with Colonel General E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces, by APN correspondent V. Fedorov specially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "How the Troop Withdrawal From the CSFR Is Proceeding"—date and place unspecified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The first phase of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia ends on 31 May. Col Gen E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces, shared his thoughts on this subject with an APN correspondent:

[Vorobyev] Despite certain difficulties, which are not fundamental, the withdrawal schedule is being strictly fulfilled. The bilateral agreements initially proposed that 30 percent of the troops would be withdrawn. But by late May we had withdrawn 32 percent of the personnel, 45 percent of the tanks, 31 percent of combat vehicles and armored transporters, 36 percent of weapons and mortars, 63 percent of helicopters, and 34 percent of other vehicles.

We are working intensively but precisely—largely thanks to the Czechoslovak side. It is ensuring timely supplies of freight and passenger cars and guaranteeing the safe movement of truck convoys to the state border. On the Soviet side I would note the well-organized work of the Ministry of Railways, particularly the Chop Transshipment Region, the Defense Ministry Central Military Communications Directorate, and the Main Customs Control Administration.

Problems? Yes, there are plenty. I would dwell on the main ones. First, there are the difficulties in providing rolling stock on Soviet territory, which leads to "hold-ups" at transshipment stations.

Second, the lack of a unified view together with the Czechoslovak experts of the value of the facilities left behind. The protocols on their handover to the Czechoslovak side indicate their physical condition and two values—Soviet and Czechoslovak. The Central Group of Forces controls 5,408 different installations, and 2,795 of them—that is, around 50 percent—were built with Soviet funds and belong to the Soviet Union. A session of Soviet and Czechoslovak experts will be held in the first half of June on this problem.

The third problem is ecological. I can officially state that currently the Soviet Army in the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federative Republic] poses no ecological threat to Czechoslovakia through its actions, as has sometimes been written by certain journalists. But we are understanding and responsible about the serious concern of the Czechoslovak leadership and public about the ecological situation in the areas where our troops are deployed, and we are taking immediate measures to instill order. Proposals for our governments on the creation of a separate Soviet-Czechoslovak commission to resolve the ecological problem and work out methods to make good any ecological damage were prepared 11 April.

[Fedorov] Has the population's attitude to you changed?

[Vorobyev] Local citizens' reaction to our troop withdrawal has been entirely explicable. In any state, be it in the West or the East, the activeness of troops creates a certain amount of discomfort for residents. When it comes to a foreign army, the perception is exacerbated all the more. So in the first stage of the troop withdrawal there were emotions. There were protest demonstrations at a number of garrisons. Feelings have quieted down now, and prudence and a sober approach have prevailed.

[Fedorov] What are the feelings of the personnel?

[Vorobyev] I would call them businesslike. Most of the officers and men are preparing to return home. The thoughts of the servicemen have turned entirely to their new postings, and to their housing and everyday problems.

[Fedorov] Are there many difficulties associated with the return?

[Vorobyev] Many, particularly with housing and settling children into schools. But our people realize this. We have sent operational groups to resolve all issues in all districts where units have been dispatched.

[Fedorov] It is said that there have been cases of weapons being sold to the local population.

[Vorobyev] All these are just rumors. But they have prompted some people from the local population to take

practical action. Thus in May alone there were three cases of proposals from the local populace asking our servicemen to sell their weapons. These people were arrested by CSFR organs—and with the help of our officers and men—when they attempted to close the deals.

[Fedorov] Is it true that female volunteer servicemen are making every effort to put themselves forward as brides just to stay in the CSFR?

[Vorobyev] These pseudofacts have prompted a negative reaction among the Central Group of Forces women's collective and have been seen as an attempt to compromise our women in the eyes of the Czechoslovak public. There have been several announcements on city streets written in broken Russian—but this is not serious!

[Fedorov] Recently CTK reported that several dozen mines left by Soviet troops had been found in the town of Frenstat pod Radhostem. What's it all about?

[Vorobyev] Fifty-two training mines—that is, mines made out of wood and iron—were discovered. Our commission is investigating this sloppiness. And although it is not a question of combat mines—just imitation mines with no explosives—an order has been issued to set up additional sapper groups to carry out thorough checks of the installations that are being left.

[Fedorov] Will exercises and troop movements take place during the coming 8 June elections?

[Vorobyev] The first phase of the withdrawal ends 31 May, we will be summing up its results. From 6 through 10 June the withdrawal will be halted to prevent any misunderstandings.

IZVESTIYA Interview

PM0106134390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Telephone interview with Colonel General E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces, by own correspondent V. Litovkin: "Returning Home. First Phase of Withdrawal of Soviet Troops From Czechoslovakia Has Ended"—date of interview not given; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Is the withdrawal proceeding on schedule, what problems are our officers and their wives and children encountering, how are these problems dealt with—these and other questions were put by our correspondent to Colonel General E. Vorobyev, USSR people's deputy and commander of the Central Group of Forces, when he called him on the telephone from Moscow at the Milovice military garrison some 40 km from Prague, the headquarters of the Group of Soviet Forces.

[Vorobyev] In our view, and according to the opinion of the Czechoslovak side, the withdrawal of Soviet troops is proceeding strictly on schedule. Naturally, we are not immune to minor hitches and misunderstandings, but

we are resolving all problems quickly and in a coordinated fashion and we are able to firmly guarantee today that the deadline for the return of our people, hardware, arms, and materiel will be strictly met.

At the time of our conversation 24,600 people, or 34 percent of the group's total personnel, and also 11,000 women and children, or 30 percent of those due to return to the union, have already crossed the border. As for combat hardware, the figures are as follows: So far 551 tanks, or 45 percent of tanks subject to withdrawal, have returned, and also 859 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 440 guns and mortars, 22 rocket launchers, 92 helicopters, and 5,717 motor vehicles. Add to this some 40,000 tonnes of materiel. Compare this information with the data published in IZVESTIYA on 26 February and you will see for yourself that more than one-third of the personnel, hardware, and property has been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia during the first stage. And in the case of launchers and helicopters this ratio has been exceeded and totals 74 percent and 53 percent, respectively.

The withdrawal goes on round the clock at an average pace of three trains carrying troops, hardware, and arms, plus two trains carrying materiel per day. One high-speed passenger train a day leaves Milovice for Moscow with servicemen's families on board. Sometimes the Ministry of Railways supplies additional passenger trains at our request.

[Correspondent] As far as I know, the materiel of the Group of Forces is being shipped out not only by rail but also by road. What is the situation on the highways?

[Vorobyev] Fortunately, there have been no incidents. This is the result of a careful overhaul of the vehicles, people's responsible attitude, and, of course, much assistance from our Czechoslovak comrades. The state road safety service is ensuring free passage for our convoys of 25 to 30 trucks. It provides an escort from the point of departure to the border. There have been no breakdowns or vehicles that have failed to keep up.

Incidentally, I must mention not just the smooth work of the Czechoslovak side, but also of our Ministry of Railways, their colleagues from the Ministry of Defense Central Directorate for Military Communications, workers of the Chop transshipment center, border guards, and customs officials. The latter inspect the baggage of our officers and members of their families at the group's garrisons while the goods are being loaded into containers outside people's houses, where they are then sealed. The goods are handed over to the Ministry of Railways and conveyed to the new deployment station without delay.

[Correspondent] How is the handover to the Czechoslovak side of the housing stock, barracks, and other installations either leased from the host country or belonging to us progressing? What problems are arising?

[Vorobyev] We have already handed over 18 of the 25 military base compounds which we are due to vacate during the first stage. This comprises 27 apartment blocks, 2,810 apartments with a total floor space of 86,200 square meters, of which 1,678 apartments with a floor space of 57,600 square meters belong to our country. And also 12 hostels for 727 people, and other installations which are also our property.

Everything that has either been leased by the Soviet side or built for our money is being handed over to the official Czechoslovak organs and a detailed protocol is being compiled and signed. Why is this? Certain differences remain between us as to the value of the Soviet installations and the rent paid for the leased facilities. Each side has its own assessment and its own arguments. They are to be settled by experts who are currently at work here.

In addition, measures connected with the marketing of Soviet installations are being elaborated under the leadership of experts from the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations. This concerns officers messes, military unit clubs, housing, administrative buildings, hardware depots, technical servicing and repair facilities, gas stations, and even airfields—anything that might in the future be used either by joint ventures or by Soviet organizations operating in Europe. These include "Sovtransavto," "Intourist," "Sputnik," and others.

[Correspondent] What is the value of the equipment that is being left behind?

[Vorobyev] That is a commercial secret of the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations.

[Correspondent] What is the mood among the departing servicemen? After all, it is no secret that certain of our officers chose to go abroad partly because they hoped to improve their material position. And now, a few months later, they are having to return. There must be a certain amount of disillusionment and disappointment....

[Vorobyev] Yes, quite. Let us not close our eyes to the realities. This did occur, but only at the beginning. Now, and I can say this with the utmost responsibility, a radical change has begun. The moral climate here has changed as a result of the official assessment of the events of August 1968. People have grasped that although they do not bear any personal responsibility for all this, they are uninvited and therefore unwanted guests in the country. And therefore all their thoughts are now devoted to returning home and to life and work in the new place.

Furthermore, the group's command and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense are making every effort to remove even the slightest tensions and not to allow resentment to build up.

You probably know that all children who are attending school and whose fathers have departed on the troop trains are allowed to complete the academic year in the

Group of Forces. They have stayed behind with their mothers. They have been given food allocations and had Soviet money changed into Czechoslovak currency.

Our operational groups have been dispatched to all the areas of new deployment. These groups comprised generals and officers representing the command and also members of social organizations. They saw for themselves on the spot that everything is ready to receive the troops and their families and have reported to their comrades on returning to their units what has been done and how.

I can add that people had been worried that they might be deployed in the Belorussian and Moscow Military Districts in areas which had been affected by the Chernobyl tragedy. Our representatives saw with their own eyes that such fears are unfounded. And in the one and only case where dosimeters produced background radiation readings which were very slightly above the permissible level, the place of deployment was changed by decision of the General Staff.

We are trying to make sure that people know the whole truth, and also that everything possible is being done for them, and this is helping to remove tensions.

[Correspondent] What welcome are you getting at home?

[Vorobyev] A good one, on the whole. The command of the Belorussian, Moscow, Volga-Urals, and Siberian Military Districts, together with the party and soviet leadership in the new areas of deployment, is providing us with every possible assistance. Barracks for servicemen, housing and hostels for families and bachelors, and schools for children have been prepared. Problems pertaining to job placement, registration, and provision of material, everyday, and medical services and other questions are being resolved.

Alas, for the time being it will be necessary to live in confined circumstances. A room per family. Wherever there are no cooking facilities, officer-family messes will be organized where all the inhabitants of the base compound will be catered for. People are morally ready for difficulties. They know that they will have to cope with a certain amount of deprivation. They know that nothing will fall into their laps. There is only one thing that we do not understand. How can anyone brazenly exploit our difficulties connected with the troop withdrawal in order to make political capital?

NASHA GAZETA, which is published in the Kuzbass, announced to its readers that the two Soviet Army battalions due to arrive there are allegedly being sent for "policing purposes" to deal with the rebellious Kuzbass. An insulting, inflammatory lie. The battalions in question are purely technical—a communications and a radio engineer battalion. I am convinced, of course, that the article was not a reflection of the opinion of the region's working people. We are not strangers among our own people.

[Correspondent] What other problems are causing you trouble?

[Vorobyev] There are relatively many of them. They include ecological questions, which we are resolving jointly with the Czechoslovak side, questions of combat training, which have been noticeably pushed into the background, the reinforcement of discipline....It is impossible to list them all. The main thing is to withdraw the Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory strictly in accordance with the intergovernmental agreement, on time, and in an organized fashion. We are totally confident that this task will be implemented by 30 June 1991.

Vague NATO Concepts for European Strategy Hit

PM0106142790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 31 May 90 First Edition p 3

[V. Pustov "Observer's Column": "Dangerous Defects"]

[Text] An official Pentagon spokesman has confirmed press reports about defects in W-79 nuclear artillery shells. Defects were discovered in munitions stored at dumps not only in the United States, but in Italy and the Netherlands too back in 1988, and, given "certain conditions," the possibility of a "nuclear device detonating" is not ruled out. An alarming new piece of news will soon appear in THE WASHINGTON POST: Speaking at impromptu hearings in Congress, the leaders of three U.S. laboratories conducting research in the sphere of nuclear weapons stated that all short-range nuclear-tipped U.S. missiles should be removed from aircraft, since they pose an unacceptable security risk. It is a question of SRAM-AS missiles, which are fitted to the B-1B and B-52 strategic bombers, as well as to the FB-111 medium-range bombers designed for combat standby duty in Europe.

These new facts confirm that a fatal danger could overtake mankind even in peacetime—in connection with the very existence of mountains of deadly weaponry. This danger is piled on top of the no less threatening dangers stemming from military confrontation and inertia with respect to force as a tool of bloc policy. All this naturally causes great concern. The need to demilitarize the European and world process as a whole is becoming particularly obvious at a time when an increasingly positive impact is being made on its development by new political thinking and the changes in the USSR and the countries of East Europe.

To a certain extent this was reflected in the work of the recent NATO Military Planning Committee session. Its participants recognized the need to make changes to the bloc's strategy—adopted during the "cold war" period—by adapting it to the new political situation taking shape in Europe. It is noted for instance, that the concept of "forward-based defense" should be reviewed, since the "forward line" itself would disappear in the form in which it had been viewed in the West hitherto. The GDR, the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland are no longer considered potential enemies by NATO. Moreover, for

the first time in its history the NATO alliance has adopted a decision on certain reductions in future military spending.

Given the likely importance of these and other measures, we cannot fail to note what I would call their quite vague nature. First and foremost this applies to strategic installations. It is not clear what new concepts such as "minimal defense" and "minimal deterrence" will be like. Will the notorious "nuclear deterrence" concept be reviewed, and to what extent? Hitherto the gamble on nuclear weapons has been based on the Warsaw Pact's advantage in conventional arms. However, even under the new conditions, nuclear weapons are being allotted key importance within NATO. Moreover, the question is being raised of improving them by replacing the nuclear weapons already in Europe with more accurate and longer-range weapons. There is not even any hint as yet of an abandonment of the first use of nuclear weapons.

The guiding hand of the United States can largely be seen in this. It is Washington that is showing particular activeness in embellishing the appearance of NATO by giving it credit for maintaining peace during the "Cold War" period and promising that it would make a positive contribution to future European building. This is linked not only with the attempts to include a united Germany in the bloc. Washington sees NATO—with its continuing military presence and U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe—as the guarantee of the maintenance of its dominating position in the Western community. The idea currently under discussion of the creation of "multinational formations" in order, as THE NEW YORK TIMES notes, to make the siting of U.S. troops in Germany "more acceptable to the local public," is directly bound up with this too.

For the Soviet Union, NATO remains a symbol of a confrontational approach incompatible with the building of the all-European home. The news of the existence of dangerous defects in U.S. nuclear weapons, including those sited in European countries, THE WASHINGTON POST stresses, has wrong-footed the Pentagon. We cannot allow "defects" in the U.S.-NATO scenario for the development of events in Europe to wrong-foot the peoples of our continent.

PRAVDA Cites Data on Withdrawal From Czechoslovakia

*PM3105172990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jun 90
First Edition p 8*

[Dispatch by own special correspondent V. Izgarshv: "Return: First Stage of Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Czechoslovakia Coming to an End"]

[Excerpt] Prague—Moscow—Formations and units of the Soviet Army will be returning home from Czechoslovakia. Some will be disbanded, others will continue their service. In all 73,500 personnel, 1,220 tanks, 2,505

combat vehicles, 1,218 artillery pieces, 77 combat aircraft, 146 combat helicopters, and other military equipment will be withdrawn. [passage omitted].

Arms Negotiator Cited on Vienna Talks

*LD0106150290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1330 GMT 1 Jun 90*

[Text] Talks on measures for strengthening confidence and security are continuing in Vienna. Here is what our Vienna correspondent Viktor Mikheyev says about it.

[Mikheyev] There have been heated debates at the Vienna talks on measures for strengthening confidence and security. But they are marked out for their constructiveness. What is the most important feature and how can their progress be described at present? Envoy Mikhail Petrovich Shelepin, member of the Soviet delegation, answers this question.

[Begin Shelepin recording] I would describe the state of affairs at these talks with a certain optimism. The most important thing, in my view, is that now practically all the participants in these talks, in other words, 33 European states, the United States, and Canada, agree that the all-European summit, which is to take place this fall, must draw up a document on measures for strengthening confidence and security in Europe that is weighty and substantial in content. And I must say that of late some states have put forward very interesting proposals. For example, the Swedish delegation put forward a proposal on exchanging information about programs and plans for developing armed forces in the zone where confidence measures are to be applied. From our point of view, it seems that the idea incorporated into the foundation of the Swedish proposal is in harmony with our approach to this problem, too.

Finally, we support Hungary's new proposal on holding annual meetings for analyzing the implementation of the accords on measures of confidence and security. So, our position is very constructive. We strive for consensus [soglasie] wherever possible. And we proceed from the need to develop, for the forthcoming European summit, a sound document containing substantial measures of confidence and security which, naturally, would cover military activity on land, in the air, and at sea and would stipulate its considerable limitation. [end recording]

TASS Reports Cheney Comments on Summit Talks

*LD0206084190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1615 GMT 1 Jun 90*

[By TASS correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington, 1 June (TASS)—Richard Cheney, the U.S. secretary of defense, today gave a high assessment of the Soviet-U.S. summit talks taking place in the U.S. capital. Giving a speech on one of the NBC Television programs, he said the upcoming Soviet-U.S. treaty

regarding strategic offensive armaments, which is to be signed today by the USSR and U.S. presidents, includes many agreements that have been achieved in the course of the last few months in this area, beginning with cruise missiles.

In this connection, R. Cheney pointed out substantial difficulties the Soviet and U.S. sides faced while preparing a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments. According to him, talks on these problems were started about 15 years ago. "I remember, he said, "the mid-1970's when questions linked with cruise missiles were being discussed. Some arguable questions, which are to be solved before an appropriate treaty—already practically prepared—is signed, still exist today. I do not think we are setting some artificial framework for this process. In my view we ought to go on working on remaining problems, which is exactly what we are doing."

The U.S. defense secretary positively assessed efforts undertaken by the Soviet and U.S. sides on solving questions linked with the treaty on the reduction of strategic armaments. According to him, the Soviet side is doing everything depending on it in order to "solve as soon as possible the remaining problems and achieve an appropriate agreement." R. Cheney likewise expressed his hope for the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe and spoke for achieving the possibility of signing this year an appropriate treaty on this question, "which is of great importance and solves fundamental problems of the Cold War."

At the same time, referring to an alleged "overpowering Soviet military superiority in Eastern Europe," the U.S. defense secretary repeated a well-known U.S. stand with respect to questions hindering the achievement of an agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe and problems of Germany's unification.

'Top Priority' on U.S. Summit

*LD0206154390 Moscow in English to North America
2200 GMT 1 Jun 90*

["Top Priority" program hosted by Irina Tkachenko with Andrey Shemikhin, head of the U.S. Regional Policy Department of the United States and Canada Institute, and Jonathon Sanders, CBS correspondent in Moscow]

[Text] [Tkachenko] The topic for today obviously is the Soviet-U.S. summit in Washington and its implications for the two countries and on the international, broader scale. The first issue, which was pointed out by President Gorbachev as the main point on the agenda, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the first of its kind in the Soviet-U.S. history that would trim the nuclear arsenals by some 30-35 percent if signed by year's end. Consider, however, that there is still a tremendous overkill potential on both sides in terms of nuclear weapons. How much of a gain is this agreement in this context, Andrey?

[Shemikhin] I think that overall, psychologically, it is more than important. We can say that without any doubt. Politically, indeed nothing can be better than to have another agreement of this sort. From the point of view of military hardware, the amount of what is going to be reduced, this is for the specialists to discuss. Some say that even the previous agreement was only a small step forward. However, from a purely political point of view—and this is my speciality and my approach—I think that we can not overestimate this agreement if it is adopted.

[Tkachenko] Do you think, Jonathon, that the two sides would be ready to make much deeper cuts, which would be required to substantially reduce the nuclear threat?

[Sanders] Well I agree with Andrey. I think that psychologically this is important. I think it is psychologically important to the negotiators who have been sitting around for too long and haven't thought up anything new and very radical. I think they have to go on to have three or four more START treaties. They are reducing weapons that make a marginal difference but don't reduce the overkill. We have many more weapons now than we did before the treaties of the 1970s; we have multiple entry warheads. Not only is it a question of safety—it is a question of expenditure. Developing new weapons to replace weapons that are ageing is very expensive. The weapons themselves are not that expensive compared to maintaining conventional forces—both countries can use the reduction to do things for their people. I think it is important because it pushes things forward but we should put the emphasis on the political and the psychological and not the military. In military terms it is not that significant.

[Tkachenko] Well coming from the most promising, probably, to the most divisive issue on the agenda of the current summit, the cuts in conventional weapons, the new shape of Europe which so heavily depends on the future status of a unified Germany. The divisions of course are clear, with the U.S. Administration insisting, hanging on so far in full, on Germany's membership of NATO. The Soviet Union seems to be moving from Germany's neutrality to its partial membership in NATO, in the political structure but not in the military structure. Do you think the announcement which came on Thursday [31 May] from both presidents that they were prepared to find common ground on the German issue can be indeed indicative of a possible compromise, a give and take on the basis of this latest Soviet proposal Jonathon?

[Sanders] Well, I think that they are going to find a compromise because events dictate that they have to find a compromise. I think that the Soviet Union has been changing its policy very rapidly to keep up with events and because there was not a set policy toward a united Germany. I think some of it has to be facesaving and I think that the United States has been relatively accomodating in not making outrageous statements too often. I think the insistence on an East Germany [as

heard] being a part of a military alliance with the potential to strike at the Soviet Union is naturally a very disturbing thing in the Soviet Union. I think it is a false step and I think that both countries are avoiding their historical lesson. The historical lesson is they once settled on one German state: The Soviet Union got out of Austria, it became a neutral country guaranteed by both sides. I don't know why that isn't being discussed more.

Do you agree, Andrey?

[Shemikhin] Jonathan, I would agree with you almost 100 percent. What really is important in this issue is the international implications of the reunification of Germany, which will come—we have no doubt about that. When President Gorbachev was in Canada he said that some of the proposals put forward by NATO countries are interpreted in Moscow as aimed at reducing Soviet security. This perhaps could be again interpreted as the kind of thinking of the past: The proposal comes from NATO, why do they propose it, we are afraid of it. But these things are very real, as you said yourself. Soviet-German relations were very complicated, to say the least, in the past. What is the future of these relations? What is the role NATO countries are going to play in that? I think that the suggestion you made by the end of your little presentation is quite true; perhaps neutrality is the best way out. Anyway, there should be more agreement, more discussions on this issue, and more compromise.

[Sanders] Well, Andrey, you know the one thing we're not talking about in changing Germany is that they are going to have a new weapon and the new weapon is going to be much more important to future relations between Central Europe and the Soviet Union than nuclear weapons, than conventional weapons or political agreements. They are going to have a very mighty deutschmark, which is going to play a role in trade with the Soviet Union and in trade with East Europe, and nobody is talking about how to regulate that trade, what forms it's going to take, or what kind of secret guarantees or understanding there are going to be as tradeoffs for economic concessions to get political agreement.

[Shemikhin] This is another reason why this whole problem should not be discussed only through its purely military dimension. Let us discuss the role of Germany in the economy of Europe, let us discuss the role of Germany in the EEC, and perhaps the Soviet role...

[Sanders, interrupting] And after this week, with Mr. Ryzhkov talking about there being a convertible ruble by the year 2000, maybe that'll happen, maybe it won't, we can begin to think about that. I am surprised actually that the economic side of this has been so under-discussed and under-consider...

[Shemikhin, interrupting] So am I.

[Sanders] I think that's where the future of the relationship lies.

[Tkachenko] Let's go on to the more specific issue, specific to the bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the trade agreement. A benefit for both sides if signed, although perhaps in a different measure. What do the U.S. businessmen, what does the United States as country, stand to gain from this agreement?

[Sanders] Well, the Soviet Union is obviously a tremendous market that has been underdeveloped by U.S. businessmen. Their opportunities for doing trade are restricted by two things, by the reality of U.S. law, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the fact that import duties are so very high in the Soviet Union, and by the economic realities on the other side, that there are very difficult conditions for profit being taken out of the Soviet Union and that the repatriations of profits have to be done through a very convoluted system, which is complicated when you cannot bring goods in at the duty level of Most Favored Nation trading status. I think that it is a tremendous market for the U.S. businessmen, manufacturers. Since the 1920's U.S. businessmen have tried to do things in the Soviet Union: Armand Hammer, Averell Harriman, Ford Motors in the 1930's in Gorkiy, and we've seen a willingness and an eagerness. But there are restrictions on trade, and if Calvin Coolidge said the business of America is business it's about time they got on with the business.

[Tkachenko] Andrey, a question to you. Considering that the Soviet economy is in such bad shape, what with the crisis in almost every area and the nonconvertible ruble, do you think the agreement, again if signed, is more of a political gesture, probably of political good will, rather than an economic advantage to the Soviet Union?

[Shemikhin] Indeed, this is how it appears to me. I would also add to what Jonathon said that [here speaker changes thought] to his very reassuring statement that U.S. business is prepared to do business with the Soviet Union.

[Sanders, interrupting] If they can make money.

[Shemikhin] If they can make money. This is very important. The economic side of it is something which will come as a next stage provided the political obstacles are removed. However, let us think for a while about the economic side of it. How prepared will the two sides be for trading? I have my doubts about this. We have traditional partners in Europe already. We are building up partners and relationships of an economic and trade nature. In Asia the Japanese and South Koreans are coming and perhaps there will be a thoroughly competitive environment in which the U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs will have to rethink their policy. Perhaps they will abandon the Soviet market for the time being, or perhaps they will increase their activities in this market. I don't know. Indeed, we need more McDonalds but we also need more important U.S. enterprises to come here. Will they come?

[Sanders] I agree with that. I mean, I think that trade with the Soviet Union is never going to be the first export-import business on the U.S. agenda, but I think there are tremendous opportunities. The political side of this is extremely interesting and I think it reveals something that I don't think many Soviets or many Americans want to talk about. We know that when the Soviet Union was denied most favored nation status in the 1970's such status was right away given to China. Once again we're having that happen. After the horrible events, the massacre in Tienanmen Square last year. In a way, if you were to do a reductionist formula, it is to say a country that sticks by Stalinism is rewarded with trade agreements while a country that's moving away from Stalinism is denied them. Is that the case? I mean, it certainly looks like it. There is more at work here and I think what's at work in some ways is the fact that this is the first post-Cold War summit. It's the first summit where the enemy image is disappearing somewhat. Some of the anti-Sovietism that animates U.S. foreign policy is disappearing, but behind that is a Russiophobia, an anti-Russianness driven by some of the minority groups that live in the United States, that existed before the revolution. I think we have to be wary that that kind of sentiment is going to interfere again and again with political relations and ultimately with economic relations. I think we have to pay attention to that anti-Russian fervor that can be stirred up again in the United States. It has little to do with socialism, communism, or the Soviet Union. It has to do with historic conditions and very active groups of Americans who are very effective at getting legislation passed or, more importantly, blocking legislation.

[Shemikhin] I would say only in some cases. In others this doesn't work at all, and we all know that U.S. businesses were dealing with certain regimes, countries, and economies that were far from democratic, that were opposed by certain interest groups inside the United States. However, business was being done. Take South Africa, Chile...

[Sanders, interrupting] Oh, the Americans liked Chile, it was kind of like what China is now, repressive and dictatorial.

[Shemikhin] Not all of them, I would say.

[Sanders] The other thing, of course, that's interesting in finding trade developments and changing laws is the example of China, which in developing free enterprise zones and bringing in capitalism has depended a great deal on what are called expatriate or overseas Chinese. And it's going to be interesting to see how much political relations are going to interfere with overseas Soviets getting involved in trade. Are we going to see Soviet-born Israeli businessmen coming here? Are we going to see Soviet emigres in the United States? We're beginning to see that already with the opening up of the ability to come back. So there are a variety of ways that border changes, immigration changes, and political changes have a strong impact on economic development.

[Tkachenko] To follow up on what you've just said, the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union, as well as the economic difficulties and the anti-Russian fervor in the United States, (?along with) some other problems of an economic nature as well, like the savings and loan debacle called by some observers the biggest financial crisis in U.S. history, are problems which the two presidents are facing in their countries. How much do you think the popularity of the two presidents hinges on the outcome, the results of this summit, Jonathon?

[Sanders] Well, I think, in broad terms, President Bush has centered his foreign policy on reactions and interactions with Gorbachev's reforming Soviet Union. I don't think, unless there's some incredible disaster, unless a tree falls down on Raisa or something, that any specific results or lack of results at this summit will have a great effect on Bush's popularity at home. He'll be a congenial host, there's a lot of show, if they make progress that's good, I don't see what the downside is for him. And I think on the Soviet side people are so preoccupied with events at home that this is a sideshow. I think it's interesting, it'll give Gorbachev some credit, but where his popularity rises or, in this case, continues to fall is at home because of drastic increases in the price of bread, macaroni, and things like that. These are difficult problems and now he's got to contend with the rising popularity of Mr. Yeltsin in the Russian Federation. So I think on the U.S. side it'll probably stay about the same. On the Soviet side, not much influence. Domestic policy, domestic problems take great precedence.

[Shemikhin] Unless, I would say, and I agree to a large extent with the order of priorities that Jonathan mentioned as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, but unless there are tangible results coming from the summit, even for the Soviet consumer—I had a chance to be involved in what is called people's diplomacy in the Soviet Union, and we know how many U.S. groups of various hues are involved in bilateral people-to-people relations. And this particular summit has this dimension. If it opens up a larger interchange of ideas, humans, resources, and whatnot between the two countries, that could be a tangible result that could be very helpful and could certainly augment President Gorbachev's popularity because this is basically what everyone is looking for at this time coming from the outside.

[Tkachenko] Andrey, do you see the popular sentiments toward Gorbachev in this country as a growing opposition, a decline for Mr. Gorbachev and a rise for Boris Yeltsin, like Jonathan has just mentioned?

[Shemikhin] I wouldn't be very categorical in making assessments on this account, especially since we lack something which our U.S. counterparts have had for a long time, which is evaluating and understanding the public opinion. It struck me that before the summit our Soviet papers were full of reports on what the U.S. attitude is toward our president, their president, toward the summit, and so on and so forth. There were practically no such evaluations, at least the ones that I could

see, dealing with the Soviet reaction. Now how are we to gauge all these things here? We need a more elaborate mechanism to understand all these things, otherwise there is always a danger that a single individual, guided by his emotions, by his biases and preferences, will say yes to your question or no, and this is not (?safe) because we are talking about politics and, depending on who that individual may be, it may influence public opinion. So let us hope that we will have a mechanism sooner than later that will allow us to have [here speaker changes thought] to be able to make a better judgement on what the public thinks on all these issues.

[Tkachenko] Let me put a final question to you. Both Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush stated after their first working session that the summit is proceeding in an extremely constructive and positive atmosphere and they were prepared to make progress on virtually every major item on the agenda. Someone called this summit, the seventh summit in the last five years, a transition from a sweet honeymoon between the two former superpowers to a tough marriage. How workable do you think this marriage is going to be, Jonathan?

[Sanders] Oh, I think it's a workable marriage. I think both the sides, though, are getting into something that they have no conception of. They've got to formulate policies for a post-Cold War world, and nobody knows what that's going to be. There hasn't been much thinking about the shape of those relationships, the interaction between politics and economics, the kinds of psychological interactions between the two peoples. And when you're dealing with something that is so unknown it's very difficult to get along real well because you don't even know what you're perceiving. You may argue about perception rather than about how to change reality, and I think that's their problem.

[Tkachenko] Andrey?

[Shemikhin] Could I perhaps add another dimension to this metaphor of yours? We all know that in marriage it is not only the newlyweds that matter but the in-laws—in this particular case, the outside world, their reactions. And by the outside world I mean certainly allies and clients and friends and foes and all that. Their reactions will be very important for the marriage because we know that in some cases, in some instances, some regions, some of the allies and clients have gained the power of a very obnoxious mother-in-law who has the power basically to dissolve or to make a marriage happy. I would simply like to add that we have to look for signs of things to come not only in the bilateral relationship but in the overall international relationship, in the way others, the in-laws, react to this particular marriage.

[Sanders] I love the idea of Fidel Castro with his long beard being an angry irate mother-in-law.

[Shemikhin] Well, he's a father-in-law, that's for sure.

[Tkachenko] And on that let me bring to an end this edition of Top Priority. Thank you Jonathan Sanders,

CBS correspondent in Moscow, and Andrey Shemikhin, an expert in U.S. regional policies from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. I'm Irina Tkachenko, saying goodbye until next time.

TASS: Gorbachev, Bush Arms Talks 'Completed Successfully'

*LD0206094390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0715 GMT 2 Jun 90*

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 2 June (TASS)—The state visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR president, to the United States and his meetings with President George Bush have yielded inspiring results which undoubtedly will promote further progress toward a world without arms and wars.

For 65 years, since the 1925 Geneva protocol on banning the use of chemical weapons in warfare was signed, the issue of further measures for completely eliminating this dangerous and perfidious means of killing people has been discussed at various official and unofficial international forums. The talks on combat toxic substances, which lasted for many years, alternately brought hope and disappointment to the world community.

At one time the United States stopped producing chemical armaments, whereas the Soviet Union did not follow its example. Then the countries swapped roles. The USSR stopped the production line for poison gas, whereas the United States started producing new, in principle, binary arms. Now, however, such zigzags in the sphere of chemical arms production seem to have reached an end. The two presidents have reached an agreement on both countries discontinuing the production of combat poisoning substances. The accord stipulates that each side should reduce at the first stage the stockpiles of chemical weapons by 80 percent.

This is not yet a full ban on one of the most disgusting means of mass killing. The Washington bilateral accord, however, is the first important step toward outlawing this weapon by all the world states. No doubt, it will impart a new impulse to the talks on chemical weapons at the Geneva disarmament conference, speed up the process of harmonizing a convention on fully eliminating the threat of chemical warfare in people's lives.

Sixteen years have passed since the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and 14 since the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. However, the U.S. Senate has refused to ratify these agreements so far. Now is not the time to make a critical assessment of these actions by Washington. Protocols to the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 and 1976 have been agreed and signed in the U.S. capital, envisaging "unprecedented improvements" in the procedures for verifying their

observance. This opens up the path to ratification of the treaties by both countries' legislators.

Unfortunately, the prospects for a total ban on nuclear weapons tests are much less encouraging than the prospects for the total elimination of chemical weapons. The Americans still do not wish to stop all nuclear explosions, at least in the foreseeable future. However, we live in a rapidly changing world. Let us hope that the American side will ultimately move toward the demands of world public opinion in the field of nuclear tests as well.

As Secretary of State James Baker has noted, the summit meeting has helped to reduce differences in the sides' positions regarding conventional weapons in Europe. The sides have pointed to their determination to achieve the conclusion of that agreement this year.

The two presidents have signed a joint statement laying down the main agreed provisions of the future treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons, although until the last minute journalists were expressing doubts as to the possibility of that document being adopted. The sides have agreed, in particular, not to produce or deploy MIRVed sea-launched cruise missiles. It should be recalled that problems of strategic naval weapons have for many years remained a stumbling block at the Geneva negotiations, and still are. Mutually acceptable solutions have been found during the summit meeting on a number of disputed issues. Many provisions of the future treaty on strategic offensive weapons still remain unagreed. However, the presidents of the two countries have decided to give instructions to their delegations at the Geneva negotiations to accelerate work and prepare the treaty on strategic offensive weapons for signing at the end of this year.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush on disarmament problems have been completed successfully.

Washington Summit Documents Evaluated

*PM0406081590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jun 90 First Edition p 1*

[Telephoned dispatch by special correspondent Captain First Rank V. Kuzar: "M.S. Gorbachev's Visit to the United States: Important Documents Signed"]

[Text] Washington, 1 June—On the second day of the Soviet-American summit its participants reached the highest peak. And that perhaps is precisely how one might describe the official White House ceremony at which the joint documents were signed.

That the road was not an easy one is shown by the fact that the ceremony was somewhat delayed—the agreeing of the documents being protracted. But that merely underlines their importance and significance, which was noted by the presidents of both countries in their statements. Thus George Bush noted that documents are

being signed which affect many spheres that touch upon vitally important interests of the two countries and the world as a whole.

"It is extremely important," M.S. Gorbachev said for his part, "that we do not just declare our commitment to embark steadfastly upon the path of improving international relations and achieving a world free of violence, but that we also take practical steps."

The agreements concluded in Washington and the joint statements made constitute such steps. It can be said with certainty that each of them not only extends the bounds of collaboration of the two greatest countries of the world but also helps to develop equitable cooperation and strengthen the security of the peoples. Nevertheless a special place among the documents signed is occupied by those which are directly bound up with questions of disarmament and the reduction and destruction of lethal arsenals. I asked B.A. Omelichev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, who is in Washington, to give his assessment of them:

"As far as the joint statement on the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms is concerned, it is a very important document. It sums up the results of long, intensive work continued over several years. It has been worked on by diplomats and military experts. Talks have been held at foreign minister level. Its basic provisions were discussed at preceding Soviet-American summits. The statement enshrines the basic provisions and those areas which have already been achieved and those on which painstaking work is still required if the treaty is to be signed by the end of the year.

"The agreement on the reduction of chemical weapons, including binary weapons, which are the most dangerous and sophisticated form of them, is no less important a document. Specific questions concerning the implementation of this agreement still have to be agreed. But the main thing is that the agreement is already in place. And it opens up the way to the adoption of a general declaration on the prohibition and destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

"The sides have also agreed their actions for the long term which leads to general nuclear disarmament. That is to say, what M.S. Gorbachev called for back in January 1986—to embark on the new century without nuclear weapons. The statement concerning conventional forces in Europe is also important as it opens up the possibility of finalizing the preparation of a treaty on their reduction. It forms the essential basis for the creation of a future European security system.

"I repeat once again: The significance of these documents cannot be overestimated, they have been impatiently waited for by all people of goodwill.

"The course of the discussion of the Soviet-American documents signed today showed that there are still quite a few difficulties remaining. And much tough work lies in store for both sides. The dismantling of such a mighty

monument of the cold war as is represented by the destructive potential now stockpiled is far from simple work, and is even dangerous. Ill-considered haste or lack of coordinated balance when dismantling it could lead to a dangerous destabilization of the whole international situation. [Omelichev's remarks apparently end here without closing quotes].

That is why the preparation of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms proceeded in Geneva with such difficulty. In the words of U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker speaking at the international press center, it was only in Washington that accords on a number of hitherto outstanding questions were achieved and, in particular, the sublevels for mobile missiles defined.

Among the questions of the future agreement which need resolving, James Baker cited problems of verification, the possible limits for the testing of heavy missiles, and whether the Soviet bombers known in the West as "Backfire" are to be taken into the calculation. There can be no foot-dragging here, as the sides have agreed to sign the treaty at the end of the year. Likewise the treaty cutting conventional arms in Europe.

Among the other documents signed at the White House I would like to highlight the trade agreement. Unfortunately, the United States has attached strings to this important document, which is of equally usefulness to both countries: They have linked the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, which is enjoyed by most countries in the world, to the adoption of a law on emigration by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Pending this, the agreement will not be submitted to the American Congress for examination.

M.S. Gorbachev's U.S. visit will continue on Saturday. The Soviet leader is due to visit Camp David—American presidents' country retreat. Access there is open only to members of the president's family, cabinet members, and a restricted number of the highest ranking foreign guests. Part of the Soviet delegation will remain in Washington to continue talks. The signing of a number of other agreements is expected.

'Roundtable' Discusses Summit

LD0306155790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1130 GMT 3 Jun 90

["International Observers Roundtable" program, chaired by Boris Andrianov, with Gennadiy Vedenyapin, All-Union Radio political commentator and Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political observer]

[Excerpts] [Andrianov] The state visits of the USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Canada and the United States have been events of world importance. That is true above all, indeed, of the new Soviet-U.S. summit held during the week now ending.

[Vedenyapin] It's not for nothing, of course, that the attention of the international public has been glued, as

they say, to the capital of the United States. It's easy to see why—because the issues discussed at the talks between the leaders of our two countries are of vital importance to all inhabitants of our planet. The talks were preceded by a whole series of direct contacts at summit level which formed the subject of analysis and prediction by diplomats, politicians, and journalists. [passage omitted: Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Watanabe said summit was important]

[Kornilov] [Passage omitted: Willy Brandt's hope for its success; world press comment in similar vein.]

[Andrianov] I imagine we'll have more to say about this later on in our conversation. Nonetheless, I want to acquaint listeners with the opinion expressed before the talks between the two Presidents began by former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. [passages omitted: Shultz, veteran of five summits, said there was a good chance of signing an agreement on strategic offensive arms this year; Vedenyapin recalls Malta summit and strong public interest in disarmament and arms control, Kornilov says Gorbachev's visit to Canada was short, busy, and important; Andrianov says the Canada visit picked threads of Mulroney's visit to Moscow last year; Vedenyapin says Gorbachev and Mulroney noted the successful development of relations]

[Kornilov] [passage omitted: East-West relations were discussed in Ottawa, with special attention to "external aspects of German unification and the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe"; Gorbachev spoke of need to preserve strategic balance.] The persistent desire to prove that the NATO membership of a united Germany would not harm the Soviet Union—and the Canadian prime minister, incidentally, also attempted to do this—is unconvincing in face of the fact that insistence on precisely this, and on this option alone, in itself arouses suspicion.

As we know, the Soviet Union considers that the discussion on the external aspects of German unification is not yet over, while the NATO countries assume that it is. Is it not obvious that such approach runs counter to just that main positive trend in the world which presupposes trust?

[Andrianov] [passage omitted: We must be extremely careful and responsible when making decisions which could affect the whole course of world development]

[Vedenyapin] [passage omitted: responsible dialogue need in rapidly changing world.] It is very important that our president's conversation with the prime minister of Canada took place immediately before his visit to the United States and the summit with President Bush.

[Kornilov] Well, as for the meeting with President Bush: the reactions to that meeting run to millions of pages in newspapers and magazines and thousands of kilometers of teleprinter sheets. Of course they are not all similar. If we extract the main points from the statements and articles, there is every reason to say that, from whatever

angle the politicians, experts, or journalists have approached the agenda of the Washington dialogue, they all agree that even today, at a period when the trenches of the cold war are disappearing, the problem of strengthening peace and of disarmament remains a problem of the first importance—the task of tasks. Mankind cannot afford to spend \$1 trillion a year on arms while a billion people in the world are going hungry, the U.S. public organization Bread for Peace declared on the eve of Gorbachev's visit to the United States.

[Andrianov] Well, in this statement, as far as I understand it, it is primarily the developing countries which are dealt with: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Mont Blancs, weapons are of course a dangerous and heavy burden, not only for these countries but also for the United States and for other Western states, in the first instance for those who are members of the NATO bloc. Our country, living through such a difficult and complex stage in its development, standing on the threshold of drastic reforms called upon to render our economy more healthy, sees—and these days we talk about this frankly—a sharp reduction in military spending without, of course, damage to our security as one of the important linchpins summoned to extricate us from the crisis.

[Vedenyapin] It is correct, of course, Boris Vasilyevich, that disarmament is one of the key points in the Washington dialogue. But in this point itself, on the agenda, there is, as it were, a pivotal element of its own—a reduction in the most powerful and threatening weapons which Moscow and Washington have at their disposal, that is in strategic weapons. It is not coincidental that in his first speech on U.S. soil Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed, I quote, that the distinctive feature and the significance of the current summit was first and foremost that people expected from it the first major decision on a reduction in these very strategic offensive weapons. A day later, a joint statement was issued on behalf of the two presidents on the main clauses of the future treaty on the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. Thus the statement on the next stage of the talks on the problem at hand.

[Kornilov] The next stage. But surely, it is not so long ago that people were saying that the decision to reduce strategic weapons would be reached during the Washington talks themselves. What has happened, was an agreement not reached?

[Andrianov] That is quite the case. Or, if you wish, it is not at all the case. The reduction in strategic offensive weapons is not only the most important but it is also the most complex of all of the disarmament problems. The talks on this problem, and, I remind you, they have been underway since 1982, represent a difficult, a very difficult process. What is important here? I think that the first place should not be allotted to the issue of what results have been achieved in relation to some previously planned event or other, even if this is a summit meeting. I would give first place to the clearly and firmly expressed political will of both sides to achieve success

on the basis of reasonable compromise. But I would also put forward to this same first place the fact that however complex, however difficult talks may be, things are moving forward, step by step, and the result is evident. Following on from the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, another, major and, the main thing, realistic step is being taken, to be more precise has already been taken, so as to remove the nuclear threat forever from the life of humanity.

[Vedenyapin] I agree with you, Boris Vasilyevich, it is precisely so. After all, it is not for nothing that President Bush described the documents signed as historical. This, as far as can be judged, is far from the only problem, whose resolution has become closer as a result of the current Soviet-U.S. summit. I mean in the disarmament sphere. Documents of such paramount importance have been signed in Washington as an agreement on the elimination and non-production of chemical weapons, a protocol on the talks on nuclear tests, a protocol on the talks on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and finally a joint statement was made on the talks on conventional arms which are taking place, as you know, in Vienna.

[passage omitted: Kornilov also agrees that the agreements reached are important, he recalls Gorbachev's speech in Washington where he speaks about the dangers implicit in dismantling the cold war structures and the complexity of the process. Andrianov says that the meeting should demonstrate that practical steps are being taken in the creation of a non-violent world and states that the overall picture is not simple. He quotes a recent WASHINGTON POST report that the Pentagon has started new experiments on the Strategic Defense Initiative program and asks how this should be understood in the light of current disarmament as well as agreements and articles in the same newspaper expressing fears about the extent of Soviet military strength and its possible implications if the international climate changes]

[Vedenyapin] Well, to tell the truth, we have ourselves in our time given certain grounds for the intimidation of the Western man in the street. We now know that the overall volume of military spending not so long ago reached 18 percent of national income in our country. There are few countries in the world, you know, who could afford this, perhaps not a single state. Not a single state had such a thing. But our army of four million, I add, even today surpasses the U.S. Army in numbers, twofold.

[Passage omitted: Kornilov sums up current Soviet defense policies—the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency, the freeing of military spending, conversation and the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe and asks why what has already been done by the Soviet Union is not recognized by certain circles in Europe and the United States]

[Andrianov] Of course, strange, let us put it like this, topics may be encountered in the U.S. press. I will cite as an example articles by the not unknown authors of dubious sensations, Evans and Novak, which appeared on the eve the summit meeting on the pages of the WASHINGTON POST newspaper. In one of their opuses, they leveled the accusation that Moscow was, allegedly, refusing to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. In another they asserted that Soviet arms production was increasing. I will state frankly that both of these are pure inventions. All the same I would not undertake to maintain that the American readers today, in their masses, are misinformed and do not know the true state of affairs. This same WASHINGTON POST only a few days ago, citing the results of an opinion poll, reported that whereas 18 months ago more than half of all Americans saw the main threat as Soviet military power, today only 20 percent of them do.

[Vednyapin] Well, this process is a natural one. It in my view once again confirms that in our times it is immeasurably more difficult to manipulate facts, it is immeasurably more difficult to turn white to black. But, on the other hand, the 20 percent which the WASHINGTON POST writes about is no small number. This means after all that every fifth citizen of the United States still in one way or another, to some extent or other, believes the rubbish about Moscow's aggressiveness. If the classic question is put: to whose advantage is this? The answer—do not let listeners reproach me with adherence to the old cliché—the answer will be in general unambiguous. It is, of course, the producers of arms and various types of "Ultras" who are not at all in sympathy with our prestroyka and who have no interest in a further improvement in the political climate when, in the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the mist of prejudice, lack of trust and enmity is lifting.

[Kornilov] And yet, as against those forces, the present summit meeting gives a powerful boost to the movement toward a new and wiser world. The political landscape has changed, but the military situation is lagging behind those changes, said U.S. Secretary of State Baker addressing a White House press conference recently, on 23 May. Now, summing up the first results of the Soviet-U.S. summit dialogue, we are entitled to express a fully justified confidence that that lagging behind will be noticeably reduced and is already being reduced.

[Andrianov] In itself, the list of the Soviet-U.S. documents signed during the summit meetings speaks eloquently of how rich has been the palette of the talks between George Bush and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. It's not at all surprising that the German question occupied an important place at the talks. It was fitting that it should since what is at stake is the future of Europe, and therefore, the model of a new world which we all so badly need.

[Kornilov] Yes, it's very far from being a simple issue. Because if the overcoming of the splitting of the German nation removes what is possibly the most significant

hotbed of tension in Central Europe, the integration of a united Germany into NATO, on which the West is so strongly insisting, would so far alter the correlation of forces on the continent that it would not fail to arouse—and is, indeed, already arousing—concern, and at times alarm, among many West Europeans.

In general one can say that the situation that has now developed on the continent is unique, and if we assume that a future unified Germany will occupy a position midway between the two blocs—the Warsaw bloc and the North Atlantic bloc—it could, without any doubt, help to bring about a decisive turn on the continent from confrontation to close interaction and the final overcoming of the split. But if such a Germany becomes merely a member of NATO, this would mean, in my view, only one thing: that the West is after all still putting its stake on the policy of acting from strength. Need one say, in such a case, how negatively that would affect all the positive processes that are now gathering strength, and how much it would worsen the climate of trust?

[Andrianov] There aren't many politicians now in the West who would venture to claim that the Warsaw Pact poses a threat to security. So what sense could there be, in the circumstances, in attaching a united Germany to the military machine of NATO? [passage omitted: Vedenyapin says French Defense minister Chevenement says a new system of collective security is needed; Kornilov says Bush thinks a unified Germany in NATO would be no threat to the Soviet Union, but should enhance stability in Europe; Andrianov says it was agreed that the issue will be studied in greater depth by foreign ministers and experts. Improved understanding is a hopeful sign. New structures, relations, and security guarantees are necessary; Vedenyapin says there is no lack of goodwill on the Soviet side. De Maziere says USSR has proposed many models of the status of a future Germany. Moscow and Washington are willing to seek an optimal solution.]

[Kornilov] Well, if we're talking about the present time, then for Washington, Germany's participation in NATO is an all-important matter of principle; and from our viewpoint this creates enormous problems. Perhaps in this case it is better to answer the question of what the North Atlantic bloc will be like in the foreseeable future, and what its relations with the Warsaw Pact will be.

[Vedenyapin] [passage omitted: some people think Germany in NATO would not create a military situation dangerous to the USSR. Perhaps they believe the psychological factor—including "the inertia of the kind of thinking associated with the military blocs and the stereotypes that have not yet disappeared"—would predominate. Military confrontation certainly still exists; but NATO is changing and is about to review its entire strategy.] I think the Washington administration's decision not to modernize the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe and its willingness to begin eliminating them is also one of the results of the positive changes that are happening in the NATO structures. I am, of course, far from idealizing the situation in the

world, but I'm not inclined, either, to be excessively afraid of the image of the enemy which is now—and we acknowledge this—being increasingly eroded.

[Andrianov] However that may be, the West cannot fail to take into consideration our negative attitude to German membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. Here everyone is going to have to look for solutions that are, shall we say, not of a very conventional kind. Many political observers assume that what is most likely to happen at the next meeting of the Six in June is that a compromise will be achieved according to the formula which is being proposed by West German Foreign Minister Genscher. In other words, the reduced NATO troops will not be transferred to the East, where our units will remain for some set period. Such a situation appears paradoxical. But on examination, it would only be a consequence of the anachronism which bloc thinking represents today. That same situation would prompt a search for further solutions; and here, actually, a global compromise seems realistic only on the basis of turning both blocs into political-military entities and creating general European security structures. That won't, of course, be achieved tomorrow; but I don't think it can be avoided.

[Kornilov] Yes, the idea of universal unity is becoming more and more dominant in the world, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in one of his speeches in Washington. Its practical embodiment, as he stressed, is an epochal task.

[Andrianov] There we end our Roundtable meeting. All those taking part thank you for your attention, esteemed listeners. Goodbye, and all the best.

Shevardnadze Views Arms Control Progress, U.S. Ties

*LD0606154690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 21, 3-10 Jun 90 p 1*

[Interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Aleksandr Makhov: "Promising Progress"—date, place not specified; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Following talks between the U.S. Secretary of State and the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze granted this interview to an MN analyst.

[MN] Before Baker's visit to Moscow the Western media were pessimistic about the chances of coordinating the main points of the future strategic offensive weapons treaty in time for the Washington summit. The talks lasting longer than usual added substance to such predictions. Only now are the results of this round of negotiations seen as promising. What lies behind such a drastic change of tone? Has a breakthrough been achieved?

[Shevardnadze] In recent months work on the future treaty slowed down considerably because of difficulties

regarding sea-based cruise missiles and air-borne cruise missiles. A formula acceptable to both parties has been found only now, during the Moscow round of talks. And it was not easy. There were times when the talks seemed to have reached stalemate, but both parties continued their work, refusing to yield to panic. Once again I would like to give Mr Baker his due for showing self-control and professionalism.

Long-standing key problems have been resolved. Earlier this week Soviet experts left for Washington to make preparations so that the two presidents should be able to declare that the basis of the future treaty had already been agreed on. We are confident that the treaty will be ready for signing before the end of this year.

[MN] Speaking at the press conference in Moscow, Mr Baker also assessed the talks positively. According to him, considerable progress was achieved in many spheres, with the exception of reductions in conventional weapons. He said Moscow proved unprepared for new American initiatives.

[Shevardnadze] The key issues negotiated in Vienna are aviation, the number of troops in Central Europe, tanks, armored vehicles and arms control. The Soviet delegation tabled a series of proposals. Accordingly, the American party came up with counterproposals. Time will be needed, I believe, to think these matters out. Both we and the Americans need to consult the allies before making final decisions. We agree that the Vienna negotiations ought to be accelerated. At the present round of talks we agreed that objective political developments had outpaced the Vienna talks. I feel there are opportunities to accelerate matters.

[MN] What do you think can impede the progress of Soviet-American relations?

[Shevardnadze] As representatives of the U.S. administration tell us, the aggravation of the situation in the Baltic republics at the present moment might be an obstacle to further development of Soviet-American relations. I don't see any other objective reasons capable of freezing what I would call the historic processes of further normalization.

TASS Observer on Strategic Arms Issue

*LD0406200890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1542 GMT 4 Jun 90*

[TASS Observer on the Summit and on the Problems Connected with Strategic Offensive Arms—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 4 June (TASS)—Vladimir Bogachev, TASS observer of military issues, writes:

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, answering journalists' questions about the three most important problems of the strategic arms which have not been resolved in the course of the USSR-U.S. summit, did not mention the

disagreements regarding long-range cruise missiles for the first time in many years. And this very fact alone tells us about the tremendous progress achieved on the way to an agreement between the two great powers on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms.

For seven years cruise missiles, air and sea launched, were considered to be the most complicated and at the same time a very important problem at the strategic offensive arms negotiations in Geneva. Disagreements which have cropped up concerned the criteria by which these weapons are to be included among strategic arms, as well as the methods of counting air-launched cruise missiles. The difficulties connected with the total U.S. refusal to include restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles in the text of the treaty being worked out seemed insurmountable.

The joint statement made by the USSR and U.S. Presidents on the main provisions of the future treaty on the reduction of the strategic offensive arms contains a compromise on this issue. A rather complex accounting system for the air-launched cruise missiles in aggregate limits for the carriers and nuclear warheads has been developed. The sides have agreed that according to the treaty the sea-launched cruise missiles will not be limited. However, the USSR and the United States will present declarations regarding their plans for deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles for the coming year. The total number of such missiles for each side should not exceed 880 units. This figure, as is noted in the joint statement, is politically binding for both sides for 15 years, that is, for the whole period the treaty on strategic offensive weapons will be in force.

It should be stressed that the high-level negotiations on the problems of disarmament have been carried out in the spirit of searching for mutually acceptable decisions and compromises. In the course of the summit, agreements on the number of questions have already been reached: The limit on the number of nuclear warheads on mobile ICBMs is 1,100 units; the verification procedures have been extended to the mobile ICBMs on railway transporters; and it has been forbidden to place so-called heavy missiles on the mobile launchers.

As expected, the two presidents have not been able to solve all the disputed questions. In particular, the United States insists on its right to pass the latest 'Trident-2' sea-launched missiles to Britain. The Soviet side naturally assumes that in this case the United States will gain an opportunity to simply transfer weapons from one NATO country to another, instead of destroying the weapons systems according to the treaty. Washington has also insisted on stopping the tests of Soviet heavy missiles without offering anything in exchange for this, as Stan Norris, the American arms control specialist, has expressed it. The third unsolved problem, whose essence, by the way, James Baker could not remember at once at the press conference, concerns the Soviet 'Back-fire' aircraft which Americans would like to consider both at the Vienna talks and in Geneva. This aircraft, as

is known, is incapable of flying from the USSR's territory to the United States and back, i.e., it is not of strategic class. The Soviet side has previously given assurances that it will not refurbish this airplane to impart strategic characteristics to it.

Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush have also signed the joint statement on perspectives for further Soviet-U.S. talks on arms control which, in particular, should increase the survival rate of the sides and remove the motives for a first nuclear strike.

The Washington summit has confirmed once again that in our age military and political stability, mutual trust, and predictability of actions of the other side are much more important than mountains of nuclear weapons.

Chernyshev Welcomes U.S.-USSR CW Agreement at Summit

*LD0406105990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0938 GMT 4 Jun 90*

[By Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS observer on military questions]

[Text] Moscow, 4 June (TASS)—A bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreement on chemical weapons was signed at the Washington summit. The USSR and the United States undertook, without waiting for the conclusion of a multilateral convention, to begin reducing this type of weapon of mass destruction, and to eliminate the overwhelming majority of the stocks they have accumulated during the long years of military rivalry. Chemical weapons arsenals will be reduced by 80 percent. Only 5,000 tonnes (i.e. roughly 20 percent of the current U.S. arsenal of chemical weapons) will remain. Elimination of these will begin in 1992, when there has been sufficient time to prepare special installations for the work of destruction.

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this agreement, and I think it is easy to agree with the view expressed in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress that if this had been the only agreement to be signed at the meeting, it would have been sufficient grounds to consider the Washington "summit" a success.

What is especially noteworthy about this agreement? Above all, the fact that the Soviet-U.S. calls for a reduction of armaments are being backed up by specific, practical steps. In my view, not only the undertaking to destroy the greater part of the arsenals of chemical weapons is important, but also the decision by the United States to halt production of this type of weapons. Undoubtedly, this constructive change in Washington's official position is to be welcomed, since the United State's previous refusal to give such an undertaking was a serious obstacle to hammering out a Soviet-U.S. agreement.

The agreement signed in Washington bears witness to the fact that the two powers have attained a certain degree of mutual trust. It also serves as an example of

what our countries can do to satisfy real security requirements during the transition process from "deterrence" to cooperation.

Speaking in the White House, President George Bush described the Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons as epoch-making, and voiced the hope that it would immediately result in a global ban on chemical weapons. This sweeping joint Soviet-American document and the practical example set by the USSR and the United States will indeed serve as a catalyst for the multilateral talks that have been going on in Geneva for many years now with the aim of drawing up a comprehensive convention.

This is extremely important. Chemical weapons are spreading fast across the planet. All the indications are that apart from the developed industrial states, they are already possessed by some developing countries. It is perfectly clear that considerable effort will be needed to persuade all governments to relinquish these weapons of mass destruction. The fact that the USSR and the United States have already taken this path should play an important role in freeing our planet from the threat of chemical war.

Shevardnadze Outlines Arms Cuts in Europe

*LD0506134990 Moscow TASS in English
1258 GMT 5 Jun 90*

[Text] Copenhagen, June 5 (TASS)—The Washington U.S.-Soviet summit "has affirmed still more the priority of common human values and drawn nearer the transformation of this philosophical category into a practical instrument of peace," Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the 35-nation East-West conference on the human dimension, which opened here today.

Shevardnadze emphasised the "direct relationship" between the Gorbachev-Bush talks, which ended on Sunday, and the Copenhagen conference.

"The talks in Washington and Camp David involved the destinies of all Europe, which is experiencing a crucial period in its history," he said. "For all the multi-scope nature of the dialogue, man was its starting-point."

The minister said the summit marked a "further departure from the ideology of division and confrontation, to which humans fell victim throughout the postwar years."

Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush "sought to be above prejudice and differences in the name of man's real freedom."

"The fact that the summit focused on the entire set of European problems is logical, because it is in Europe that the Soviet Union and the United States are on the very edge of the East-West confrontation," Shevardnadze continued.

"The two countries now must politically convert their relations. Deideologisation must be followed by military de-escalation."

Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union had long been proposing destroying nuclear armaments, "including nuclear components for dual-purpose weapons."

"To create favourable conditions for negotiations, the Soviet Union will unilaterally reduce in central Europe 60 tactical missiles launchers and more than 250 nuclear artillery pieces and will withdraw 1,500 nuclear warheads. By the end of this year, reduction will total 140 launchers and 3,200 nuclear guns.

"Ridding Europe of nuclear weapons, we will give more scope to man."

Shevardnadze emphasised that participants in the Copenhagen conference "help form a unified democratic space of rule-of-law states in Europe, within which the universal declaration of human rights, international pacts on civil, social, political and cultural rights and the Vienna accords on humanitarian cooperation among countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are in effect."

The minister said the Soviet Union supported France's and Britain's proposal for a rule-of-law state and the supremacy of law, Switzerland's proposal for the presence of foreign observers at court trials, and the initiative of the United States and Britain, which proposed a declaration on the principles of a democratic political system, based on free elections, a multiparty system and political pluralism.

At the same time, Shevardnadze proposed discussing ways to solve problems of migrants and refugees and to achieve a "reasonable regulation of the flow of migration."

He also proposed exchanging experience on political, legal, social and economic aspects of ethnic relations within the CSCE framework.

He pointed to the need to give "keen collective attention" to ethnic conflicts, which he said "accumulate a destabilising charge everywhere."

Shevardnadze also proposed "considering measures to build confidence and verify human rights," adding that the Soviet Union "is ready to broaden its participation in international verification human rights mechanisms and to help these bodies prevent violations of human rights mechanisms and to help these bodies prevent violations of human rights and the freedom of personality, rather than just register them."

The Soviet minister assured participants in the conference that the third conference on the human dimension, which will be held in Moscow next year, "will be held in full accordance with the Vienna accords on openness and access to its work."

Chernyshev Assesses Nuclear Test Limitation Talks*LD0506164790 Moscow TASS in English
1623 GMT 5 Jun 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, June 5 (TASS)—Soviet and U.S. leaders signed protocols limiting nuclear tests at the summit meeting in Washington, which pave the way for the ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

The United States did not ratify these treaties, alleging that the verification mechanism was not sufficiently reliable. As President George Bush admitted, after prolonged, sometimes tense, negotiations, the sides managed to agree on the unprecedented upgrading of on-site verification for the observance of these "threshold" treaties.

Undoubtedly, Moscow and Washington made an important step. The treaties will be ratified, according to American senators, without a hitch. According to Senator Sam Nunn, the debates will focus on the next move.

The "threshold" treaties, although not ratified, in actual fact have been observed by the Soviet Union and the United States. The main advantage of the verification mechanism that was sealed by the protocols is that it paves the way for further progress at the nuclear explosions talks.

It was agreed early in these talks that in subsequent stages the sides must agree upon further intermediate restrictions on nuclear tests. These restrictions would apply to explosion yields and their annual number. Eventually the complete prohibition of nuclear tests was sought as part of the effective disarmament process.

Is the United States prepared for this work? There is no simple answer to this question. Some part of American legislators make it clear they want to move ahead. In the middle of the last year a letter was sent to the White House, signed by nearly a quarter of the members of the Senate and a third of congressmen. It asked the President to pursue a policy leading to the conclusion of agreements on significant new restrictions of underground nuclear tests.

This April the Congress asked the Department of Energy for its assessment of this problem and recommended that the department be prepared for new limitations on nuclear tests, for a simplified design of nuclear weapons, which could eliminate the need for nuclear tests, and study ways to preserve the U.S. stockpiles by expanding non-nuclear tests.

Nevertheless, in its report to the Congress the Department of Energy said it cannot predict whether or not the U.S. can restrict nuclear tests over the next 10 years

without damaging the country's security. The Pentagon is also opposed to introducing any new restrictions on nuclear explosions.

This approach obviously contradicts the promise given by the White House in 1986 to take further steps to limit nuclear tests "in the near future." It is also inconsistent with the new relationship between the USSR and the U.S., as well as with general changes in the world military strategic situation. One wants to hope that while ratifying the "threshold" agreements in the U.S. Congress, the problem of further progress at nuclear tests talks will be positively solved.

Shevardnadze Speech at CSCE Speech in Copenhagen*LD0506160990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1340 GMT 5 Jun 90*

[Text] Copenhagen, 5 June (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, spoke today at the second conference of the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, which opened here today. He said:

My esteemed colleagues!

Just two days ago we were in Washington, where the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting took place. Still under the strong impression of what I experienced at the summit, I sense the direct link between this event and our conference.

They are on the same scale, which we call the human dimension. This was broadly manifested in the profoundly personal interaction of the will, the characters, and the realism of the two leaders, and, perhaps more importantly, this dimension has introduced into international life a new measure of humanity higher than before.

The human dimension has assumed an all-European and global scale. The destiny of the whole of Europe, which is going through a crucial moment in its history, was drawn into the negotiations in Washington and Camp David. Despite all the breadth and multidimensionality of the dialogue, however, its majestic point of departure was man. Big politics, operating with interests, the huge mass of which sometimes pushes into the background this main aim of its efforts, on this occasion pushed that aim into the foreground.

The Washington meeting heralded a move further away from the ideology of schism and confrontation, of which throughout the post war years the human personality was the victim, everywhere feeling itself fatally doomed in an immoral game of opposed political forces.

This meeting asserted even more strongly the priority of human values, bringing closer the transformation of this philosophical category into a practical instrument of peace.

As a participant of all the USSR-U.S. summit meetings since 1985, I can testify: The last summit was unprecedented precisely because of its human content. All the preceding ones bore the imprint of crisis, and the sides were trying to extinguish it. At this meeting they worked as designers of cooperation. The Malta storm cleared the horizon of storm clouds, and though clouds blow over from time to time, the leaders of the two powers are paving the way to interaction with confidence.

The human scale of the Washington meeting showed itself also in their aspiration to rise above prejudices and differences of opinion for the sake of the real freedom of the individual.

This is for the sake of his freedom from fear of the threat of nuclear and ecological catastrophe, regional explosions, from the restrictions imposed by the excessive burden of expenditure on military ends, and by poverty and deprivations.

Throughout these days—whether the discussion was about nuclear tests or destruction of chemical weapons—we had before our eyes the faces of our fellow citizens, tormented by the destruction wrought upon nature and upon the health of their children.

We thought about the people who were overcoming the walls of enmity, and with concern reflected how to ensure that the feeble shoots of long-awaited unification were not crushed by the fragments of these walls.

How to ensure that one lack of freedom should not be replaced by another, that the foam of hatred and vengeance should not bubble up on the waves of joy and jubilation.

It is legitimate that the entire set of European problems was at the center of discussion at the presidents' meeting: It is, after all, here more than anywhere that our two countries find themselves on the very knife-edge of East-West confrontation.

The USSR and the United States must now effect a sort of political conversion of their relations. Military de-escalation must follow their de-ideologization. Its main line in Europe runs through restructuring the military and political blocs. This is already beginning to assume material outlines. The successful completion of the Vienna talks on conventional forces—and the presidents spoke in favor of this, they spoke confidently in favor of it—will be an important factor in building a new Europe.

Other steps are also being taken. NATO has reviewed its decision to modernize tactical nuclear missiles and the United States intends to withdraw part of its nuclear artillery and to begin talks on the nuclear missiles which are still on the continent.

I will remind you that we have for a long time been proposing the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the nuclear component for dual purpose weapons, as well as planes which carry nuclear weapons.

In Washington we called for talks to start as early as this autumn. In order to create favorable conditions for them, the Soviet Union will reduce unilaterally in central Europe 60 launch facilities for tactical missiles and more than 250 units of nuclear artillery and will withdraw 1,500 nuclear weapons. All in all, by the end of this year, 140 missile launch facilities and 3,200 nuclear artillery pieces will have been cut. In freeing Europe of nuclear weapons, we will give man greater scope.

I look at the results of Washington from the point of view of my compatriots who are asking what they will give them and how will they lighten life's burden. I could say that achieving mutual understanding with our American partners on human rights has created a qualitatively new life situation for them, opened the door to the big, wide world, and given them the chance to associate extensively with people in other countries. I could refer to the new, previously inconceivable, opportunities for young people who have access to new sources of modern knowledge and the centers of world culture. Not least of the arguments here is the trade and economic agreements.

But nevertheless I would still put in first place the political and moral support of perestroika and recognition of the fact that the world needs it in objective terms, that the world needs its success, and that the people, therefore, who have taken on themselves the difficult burden of breaking with the past and which to a large extent has predetermined the changeover to a new structure in Europe finds reliable points of support in the broad international backing.

The optimistic subtext of the Washington meeting is more than obvious at the current European crossroads, on the threshold of very important events of the year which are called on to ensure a synthesis of the construction of German unity and the formation of new structures of European security.

The Soviet-U.S. summit logically anticipates the all-European summit meeting, practical preparations for which are beginning here in Copenhagen. We hope, as is correctly being noted in Denmark, that the constructive impetus of the talks between Presidents M.S. Gorbachev and George Bush will be picked up and developed by multilateral efforts.

For its own part our meeting in Copenhagen seems to me to be the link between the Soviet-U.S. summit talks and the events that follow the present conference. I have in mind the forthcoming meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the states and governments of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and the London Session of the NATO Council at summit level.

On the agenda of both meetings is the transformation of the alliances and the establishment of relations of cooperation.

We are confident that the Warsaw Pact will set an example of the creation of a genuinely democratic political organization of sovereign states having equal rights. As we have already stressed in the past on more than one occasion, it is precisely on such a path that a compromise on the German question is possible.

During the discussions between the presidents of the USSR and the United States it proved possible to widen mutual understanding on this problem. They stressed that a solution must be found within the framework of the "six," and not somewhere else, behind the backs of the Germans or of any of the other Europeans.

All of this gives heightened importance to the second conference on the Human dimension of the Helsinki process which is taking place at a time of great transformation of Europe. It puts on to the agenda the question that was formulated so clearly by Mr Ellemann-Jensen, my Danish colleague, that I quote him with pleasure. Europe, he said, needs structures of security and cooperation that are larger than those now in existence and that include the Soviet Union and North America. The Danish approach is in tune with our ideas in this connection.

We also support the proposals by Mr Mock, Austria's minister for foreign affairs, and by others who have spoken here, that we should conclude our meeting with an impressive document.

I will remind you of our views on the future of the European process: What we are talking about are:

- summit meetings held every two years;
- annual meetings of ministers;
- formation of "leading troikas" for these levels;
- the formation of a mechanism for consultations between the ambassadors of 35 states;
- a center for preventing and resolving conflicts;
- a permanent CSCE secretariat.

These proposals have much in common with what is being proposed by Mr Genscher, Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterrand, Mazowiecki, prime minister of the Polish Republic, President Havel, Mrs Thatcher, and other political figures in Europe. The matter concerns structures which guarantee security, stability, and the formation of new European expanses, and we absolutely must not delay this. There exists a considerable risk of lagging behind events and trends which are capable, by the uncontrollable speed of their development, of overturning our hopes for building a new Europe. This is the reason we are also in solidarity with the idea of the hosts of our conference for formation of a "committee on the human dimension of the CSCE."

This idea, like the proposals of other participants in the conference, will promote the forming in Europe of a

single democratic expanse of law-governed states within the confines of which the principles of the universal declaration of human rights and of international pacts on civil, social, political, and cultural rights are in force, along with the Vienna accords on humanitarian cooperation of the CSCE member-states.

This is a unified process of joint creativity, which was started in Paris, where the Soviet proposals linked in with the similar initiatives of our partners. Such as the proposal worked out by France and Great Britain on the law-governed state and the supremacy of the law; the Swiss idea of sending foreign observers to court trials; the initiative of the United States and Britain, which suggested a declaration on the principles of a democratic political system based on free elections, a variety of parties and political pluralism.

We would like the site of our meeting—Copenhagen—to become a place of accord and of understanding of the problems present in the life of every country.

There was a time we presented each other with bills, demanding that other bills be paid and not our own. Now the time has arrived for conducting a conversation about common troubles and common efforts to overcome them.

Here I would single out the problem of migrants and refugees, with regard to whom, regrettably, a different and restricted measure of freedom and equality applies. But here we ought to give thought to a sensible regulation of flows of migrants, which can have a negative effect on the situation within one or another country. We are already encountering these in the Middle East, with regard to the Palestinian lands.

The dangerous obstacles arising at sharp turns of history bring with them a general destabilization of the situation, and exacerbate social, ethnic, and economic ills.

No country, not even one with longstanding democratic traditions, has reliable immunity from them.

At the current stage of perestroika they have made themselves known in our country as well. Paradoxical as it may be, perestroika has also provided its opponents with opportunities and they are taking advantage of them to undermine this policy. However, nothing and no one will force us to deviate from our chosen path. Our path is the construction of a state based on law in complete accordance with the obligations assumed by the Soviet Union within the framework of the Helsinki process and the UN Charter.

Recent amendments to the USSR Constitution affirm the supremacy of the law and the principle of political pluralism and the multiplicity of forms of ownership. Whereas a year ago in Paris we were talking about intentions, today about 60 laws that fundamentally alter the nature of relations between the individual and the state have become reality.

This year alone our new parliament has adopted the fundamentals of legislation on land, and laws on ownership, local self-government, and legal proceedings.

A whole series of draft laws on citizens' rights have been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet and many have already been supported in the first reading.

These are the laws on the procedure for the entry and exit of citizens of the USSR, on the press, freedom of conscience and religious organizations, on public organizations, and others. Their exacting parliamentary and public expert examination is coming to an end.

Perestroika has placed onto a practical plane the tasks of transferring from a unitary system to a genuine union, of expanding the rights and opportunities of the national autonomous formations and of satisfying the specific interests of each nation, and each people.

Of course, this takes time. But laws on the division of authority between the union and its subjects, on the free national development of USSR citizens—in whatever place of the country they are living, i.e. essentially about provision for the rights of the national minorities—have already been adopted.

New laws on the languages of the USSR peoples, on increasing liability for the violation of national equality, on the general principles of local self-government, on the procedure for resolving questions connected with secession of a union republic from the USSR, are already in force. A law on the status of all types of national autonomy is being prepared. The right to freedom of movement is gaining a material and judicial base.

National and interethnic relations are probably the sharpest, I should say, the cutting edge of the human dimension. In this sense the background against which the Copenhagen conference is unfolding has been a stormy one for the Soviet Union. However, this does not apply to us alone. Interethnic disagreements are gaining a destabilizing momentum everywhere: all the more reason for us to pay close collective attention to them.

It would be good to compare our experiences in the political, legal, social, and economic aspects of interethnic relations within the CSCE framework, having organized to begin with, let us say, an all-European seminar on these problems.

We should also like to examine the question of governments' liability in the same context as the liability of the peoples.

If a people are realizing their sacred right to follow their own destiny, this should be happening, as it has been recorded in the final document, "in accordance with the aims and the principles of the United Nations Charter and the corresponding norms of international law, including those referring to the territorial integrity of the states." The optimum design for the human community in today's integral and interdependent world demands the unity of rights and responsibility.

It is our hope that Copenhagen will help to set in motion the bank of suggestions and ideas formed in Paris, providing a good foundation for developing a unified position for all the countries that are participants in the Helsinki process. Hence, having developed such a position, we could go further, toward Moscow 1991, where the third stage of the Conference on the Human Dimension will take place.

As a result, we will be proposing to the all-European meeting in Helsinki in 1992 a program for the further work of the Conference on the Human Dimension, although it would probably have been possible to record our intention to continue it even earlier, that is, at the end of this year, at the CSCE summit meeting.

An increase in confidence must be a key concept for future work. Why should we not think about confidence-building and monitoring measures in the field of human rights? We propose to jointly work out the criteria for such measures.

I will recall that, speaking at the United Nations, M.S. Gorbachev voiced the Soviet Union's intention to extend its participation in international monitoring mechanisms on human rights. We are prepared to reach a point whereby such bodies not only record violations of rights and freedom of the individual but also prevent them from occurring. In this respect use should be made of the rich experience of the Council of Europe.

The idea of annual meetings of parliamentarians of all the countries participating in the all-European process, put forward by the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, which is in keeping with the proposals voiced by the Soviet Union and Bulgaria at the Paris conference, deserves support.

We see the Copenhagen conference in the context of preparations for the conference in Moscow. We want to take into consideration and make maximum use of the experience of this forum to ensure the third stage of the Conference on the Human Dimension in our capital is a success.

We once again assure everyone that the Moscow conference will be conducted in full accordance with the Vienna accords on openness and access to its work.

I would like to mention one more thing: I cannot fail to express deep satisfaction with the fact that a delegation from Albania is present at our conference. This is an event that is out of the ordinary and we welcome it.

Mr Chairman!

I have an excellent reason for addressing the government and people of Denmark with words of greeting and gratitude. This reason was presented to me by the calendar of Danish history and today's Danish national holiday, Constitution Day. There are many reasons why the Danish people have achieved striking success. I believe one is their respect for the law and for the letter

and spirit of the Constitution. Without this, there is not, nor can there be, a modern democratic, civilized, and free society.

There is an enormous lesson here for us all.

Abandonment of Deterrence Strategy Justified

*PM0606144390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Jun 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel V. Dmitriyev, candidate of technical sciences, and Colonel V. Strebkov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "From the Strategy of Deterrence to Strategic Stability"]

[Text] In the article "Outdated Concept" published on 10 April, we said that in present-day conditions reliable security cannot be guaranteed if one is guided by the concept of nuclear deterrence and a recognition of the permissibility of a nuclear first strike. In our opinion, the search now for ways to prevent war should no longer be conducted in the framework of the strategy of deterrence but through ensuring strategic stability. Herein lies the basis of the transition from deterrence and the balance of force to the balance of the sides' interests. The new political thinking offers that possibility.

Can the present strategic situation in the world be called stable? Only very relatively. The parity situation in the strategic sphere gives the sides not so much equal security as equal danger. Stability will grow only as the level of nuclear confrontation falls progressively lower until nuclear weapons are completely excluded from the military arsenals.

Let us note right away that at the moment this is only a prospect although, as the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit show, it is a realistic one. But the mechanism for a secure world is still being created. A considerable quantity of nuclear weapons still exist and forces which rely on them are still operating. The times demand different approaches. What are they?

The essence of military stability, in our view, is that at each lower level of equilibrium the sides must have a strategic nuclear forces potential which enables them to achieve qualitatively comparable results in the event of an exchange of nuclear strikes. The fulfillment of this condition removes the potential aggressor's hope of gaining any strategic superiority at all. Because the relative qualitative equality of the nuclear forces' combat potential, which is the decisive condition of strategic stability, removes the incentive to try to outdo the opposing side. A nuclear first strike no longer offers any military advantages which, undoubtedly, helps to reduce international tension and promotes the search for other, peaceful ways of resolving conflicts. Of course, the structure of the sides' strategic nuclear forces may vary but the potential at any level—and this is especially important—must be of equal effectiveness of use.

It would seem that the maintenance of equilibrium even at reduced levels does not automatically guarantee strategic stability or solidity. The opportunity to achieve strategic surprise in delivery of a nuclear first strike or the outbreak of nuclear war as a result of an accident, miscalculation, or provocation still remains.

It should be noted that with the increase of technical potential, the obsession with technology has an increasingly strong impact. For example, the apologists of confrontation in space are already stating that the radical change in the technology of war leads to a reduction in the danger of war and that ultimately SDI will stabilize the situation in the world more than it destabilizes it.

This is nothing more than a pipedream. Only the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on a global scale will remove the nuclear threat. And until that happens it is necessary to neutralize as much as possible the military-strategic preconditions for the occurrence of nuclear conflict. And despite the importance of military technical factors, which may determine this or that decision, it is still the political means of preventing war which are of crucial significance. The new thinking rejects the traditional, essentially technocratic, approach to questions of war and peace because it is now sharply opposed to the very idea of the prevention of war and the survival of mankind.

Quite wide-ranging forms and methods are accumulating in the arsenal of political means of ensuring stability. First, there is the expansion of contacts with representatives of other countries, ranging from heads of states and governments to ordinary citizens. Military contacts play an important role here. Mutual understanding in this sphere is a special factor in increasing the predictability of military activity. As a result the conditions are being created for regulating the levels of nuclear equilibrium through the joint conscious actions of the policymakers. Such contacts bring military political thinking increasingly into line with actual reality and promote movement toward the ultimate zero goal.

Second, strategic stability during the phased lowering of the level of equilibrium down to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is based on the principle of the deideologization of interstate relations. This gives an opportunity to develop the process of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems within the kind of framework whose chronology is difficult to define. This is the particular advantage over the completely ideologized concept of deterrence. Crisis situations (for instance, the Caribbean crisis) were due considerably to "crisis thinking" and the extent to which the latter lagged behind the new objective realities of the nuclear era. To prevent such a development of events it is necessary not only to bury the Cold War hatchet but also to exclude ideological confrontation from the sphere of interstate relations, including military-political relations.

Third, one of the main conditions for achieving strategic stability at the minimum level of forces is to balance the views of military doctrines and to reduce them to a common defensive denominator. The concretization by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries of their defensive doctrine influences the general thrust of this process. That was shown by the discussion on Warsaw Pact and NATO military doctrines held in Vienna. The discussion centered in particular on individual strategic concepts and the guidelines which are a component of them.

Fourth, the increasing confidence and openness in the military sphere are gaining ever greater political significance for the strengthening of strategic stability. As this process gains content so the framework of the system of measures of confidence and verification will inevitably expand. The maximum possible openness—up to a certain degree of transparency—would be, on the one hand, an incentive to the formation of the new model of security and, on the other, would be a guarantee of the effectiveness of such a model.

The deepening political confidence will necessarily introduce many new and hitherto unknown forms in relations between the sides and ensure the involvement of the people's masses in the solution of vitally important defense problems.

Those, in our view, are some of the views on the matter of ensuring security in conditions of the implementation of the program of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The idea of strategic stability makes it possible to find points of contact between the interests of the USSR and the United States. It "removes" the oneness of the doctrine of deterrence and rejects its main postulates: the immutable "enemy image" in the form of the USSR; the striving for the superiority of strategic might; and the possibility of a preemptive use of nuclear weapons. The removal of these elements creates the preconditions for the transition from the principle of superarmament to the principle of defense sufficiency at the lowest possible level of equilibrium. And then to move on to the truly reasonable sufficiency of the sides' military potentials from which nuclear weapons would be totally excluded.

We do not claim, of course, that the opinions that we have expressed are the ultimate truth. The only thing that is absolutely clear is that, on the one hand, security today cannot be based on the doctrines of nuclear deterrence handed down from a completely different era and different military-technical reality, and on the other ensuring security in a mutually vulnerable world brooks no improvisation, as has often been shown in the past. It demands a reliable scientific base, varied approaches, and the prediction of possible trends.

Bogachev Notes 'Huge Progress' at Summit

*LD0506140690 Moscow TASS in English
1324 GMT 5 Jun 90*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, June 5 (TASS)—Asked by reporters about the three most important aspects of strategic arms that were not resolved during the Soviet-American summit, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker did not mention differences on long-range cruise missiles, for a change.

This very fact bespeaks of the huge progress achieved on the road towards an agreement between the two great powers on 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive arms.

Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles were regarded as the most complex and most important problem at the Geneva talks on strategic offensive arms over the past seven years. There were differences also as regards the criteria of classing these armaments with strategic ones, and methods of counting air-launched cruise missiles. Difficulties stemming from the United States' refusal to include restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles in the treaty seemed to be insurmountable.

The joint statement by the Soviet and the American presidents on the basic provisions of the future treaty to reduce strategic offensive arms includes a compromise on this matter. An intricate system has been worked out, which counts air-launched cruise missiles with the total ceilings on carriers and nuclear warheads.

The sides agreed that sea-launched cruise missiles will not be restricted under the treaty. But the Soviet Union and the United States will be annually supplying each other with the declarations regarding plans to deploy sea-launched cruise missiles in the subsequent year.

The total number of sea-launched cruise missiles owned by each side should not surpass 880 units. The joint statement says that this limit is binding for both sides for 15 years, that is throughout the operation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms.

The summit talks on disarmament problems were a quest for mutually acceptable solutions and compromises. Arrangements on a number of questions were reached during the summit: A ceiling was imposed on the number of nuclear warheads on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (1,100 units). Verification procedures have been extended to comprise mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles on railway cars. The deployment of heavy missiles on mobile missile launchers has been prohibited.

The two presidents have been unable to resolve all disputed matters within two days. The United States insists on the right to transfer the latest sea-launched cruise missiles Trident-2 to Great Britain. Meanwhile the Soviet side, naturally, holds that instead of destroying a weapon system under the treaty, the United

States will get an opportunity to move armaments from one NATO country to another.

Washington also insisted on terminating tests of heavy Soviet missiles, while suggesting nothing to replace the tests, as U.S. arms control expert Stan Norris noted.

The third unresolved problem relates to the Soviet "Backfire" aircraft that Americans would like to include in calculation at the negotiations in Vienna and in Geneva. Baker could not remember exactly where the dispute lies.

The aircraft is incapable of making a flight from the USSR territory to the United States and back, that is, it is not a strategic weapon. The Soviet side has earlier made assurances that it will not be re-equipping the plane to make it strategic.

Gorbachev and Bush also signed a joint statement about prospects for the further Soviet-American talks on arms control, which should enhance the sides' ability to survive and remove the motives for a first nuclear strike.

The Washington summit confirmed again that in the present age military-political stability, mutual confidence and predictability are of greater importance in international relations than nuclear arms stockpiles.

Chernyshev Notes Missile-Reduction Initiative

*LD0606140390 Moscow TASS in English
1345 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[By TASS Military Writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, June 6 (TASS)—The Soviet Union has taken another step towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, speaking in Copenhagen at the second human rights meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, announced that by the autumn of next year the Soviet Union will unilaterally eliminate in central Europe 60 launchers of tactical missiles and more than 250 units of nuclear artillery and will withdraw 1,500 nuclear charges. Altogether 140 missile launchers and 3,200 artillery nuclear guns will be reduced by the end of this year.

This Soviet initiative is aimed above all at creating favorable conditions for starting talks with NATO on tactical nuclear armaments in Europe.

The USSR has long been proposing to eliminate these armaments, including the nuclear component for dual-purpose means, as well as nuclear delivery vehicles. At the summit in Washington, the Soviet president made a call to start talks on this problem in the autumn of next year.

It should be noted that there are at present certain positive changes in the stand of the North Atlantic Alliance that has been rejecting proposals for negotiations over a long time.

In May NATO abrogated the program of modernization of U.S. nuclear tactical missiles in Europe and expressed the readiness to start talks on the limitation and reduction of these armaments. The United States intends to withdraw part of its nuclear artillery from West German territory.

Favorable conditions are thus shaping for a dialogue on this problem between the two military-political alliances. True, NATO is not yet showing the striving to fully eliminate tactical nuclear armaments in Europe. In Western capitals there is only talk about decreasing nuclear confrontation. But the main thing is to begin such a bilateral process. The advance to the final goal should be made stage-by-stage. At the first period, as the Soviet Union proposed, it would be expedient to discuss substantial cuts in tactical nuclear arsenals in Europe. As the United States and NATO are not fully prepared to eliminate nuclear arms, the Soviet Union suggested last year the idea of joint definition of parameters of the "minimum nuclear deterrence", including tactical nuclear weapons.

Correspondent Reports on Troop Withdrawal from Hungary

*LD0706092490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 6 Jun 90*

[Ye. Shirokov video report on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is continuing. [video shows two military aircraft taking off and being observed by Soviet and foreign military on the ground; tanks being transported on trains and military men of various countries inspecting the transfer station; Burlakov is shown addressing civilians and military; video then switches to shots of apartments and other former Soviet military facilities being inspected; the mayor of the town of Veszprem being interviewed and shots of the town's facilities]

[Shirokov] The withdrawal of troops, and the transfer to new deployment garrisoning of tens of thousands of people and a great mass of fighting equipment, is a large-scale operation which, with tactical consideration, has to be coordinated with the usual civilian routine of surrounding life.

The military attaches of many countries and numerous journalists have seen for themselves that the transshipping point organized on the Hungarian-Soviet border works like clockwork 24 hours a day; that the permanent military camps vacated by our troops are being surrendered neat and tidy to the protection of their new master; that the schedule of the withdrawal outlined by the intergovernmental agreement is being fulfilled precisely.

Colonel General Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces, reported that so far 204 echelons had been dispatched which have taken away over 10,000 soldiers and commanders, i.e. one-fifth of all personnel,

and around 2,500 units of fighting equipment. However, there are other figures, too: 363 apartment blocks, and that is almost 15,000 apartments, 150 spacious barrack buildings, six first-class aerodromes, depots, boiler houses, canteens. All these buildings, erected with Soviet resources, are valued at approximately 50 billion forints.

How can this outlay be compensated? Talks are underway, but so far, some Hungarian experts are inclined to think that nothing needs to be paid for at all, in keeping with Roman Law, that everything which has been built ought to share the fate of the master of the land. Looking around one of the eight vacated barracks near the town of Veszprem we saw for ourselves the value represented by the houses, the new club and the shop. Rezso Martin, the mayor of the town, told us that the town needs all of it and the council of Veszprem is prepared to acquire some facilities itself and to resell others to Hungarian and foreign firms. I think that such a businesslike approach will assist a sensible solution to the question of compensation.

[Presenter] Yes, you will agree that the situation is highly delicate. There's no escaping that. The Hungarian experts whom our correspondent mentioned, of course, are defending their national interests. One can understand them. However, one would like to ask the Ministry of Defense leadership why, in actual fact, weren't completely clear, mutually beneficial, and correct conditions for the future transfer of Soviet military property remaining in the country which our troops are leaving not agreed upon and set down in good time in some kind of international agreement? Why wasn't that done?

UK Paper Cited on NATO Missile 'Memorandum'

PM0706122390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Jun 90 First Edition p3

[TASS report: "Secret Memorandum"]

[Text] London, 4 June—"Tomahawk" cruise missiles installed on U.S. warships and submarines could be placed at the disposal of the NATO Command in the event of a "crisis situation" arising. These plans are envisioned in a so-called "memorandum of agreement" adopted by the leadership of the North Atlantic alliance and still being kept strictly secret from the public and parliaments of countries in the alliance. This has been reported by the newspaper THE INDEPENDENT.

With regard to Britain's role in the implementation of these plans, the newspaper reminds us that, under the terms of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the process of withdrawing U.S. land-based intermediate-range missiles from the country's territory is currently under way. At the same time, U.S. nuclear submarines equipped with these missiles are still stationed at the naval base in Holy Loch (Scotland). Moreover, the British leadership is continuing to "press within NATO for British air force free-fall nuclear bombs to be replaced with air-launched

intermediate-range missiles." Although the country's Defence Ministry stubbornly refuses to confirm these plans, they fit in well with the NATO Command's "memorandum of agreement," THE INDEPENDENT believes.

According to the newspaper, this secret memorandum "is an integral part of the general strategy to move away from land-based intermediate-range nuclear missile systems in Europe in favor of air- and sea-launched systems."

U.S. Officials Review Summit, Relations

LD0606082390 Moscow TASS in English
0821 GMT 6 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington, June 6 (TASS)—The Soviet-American summit became an important step forward both in bilateral relations and from the viewpoint of positive processes taking place in the world as a whole.

This is the the keynote of lively discussions that are now under way in the United States, with people pointing out that the summit in Washington drew the line under the era of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and inspired hope for a better future.

Any talk about a Soviet military threat is now devoid of any sense, Paul Warnke, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told a symposium at the National Security Information Council on Tuesday.

The time has come to seek radical reductions in strategic nuclear arms targeted both on the United States and the Soviet Union, he added.

At present there are no reasons to build up nuclear arsenals for the conduct of a protracted nuclear war under conditions when the risk of military confrontation between the two countries is the least since World War Two, Warnke said.

It would be simply unreasonable to think that such a war would take place, said Warnke, recalling the commitment jointly expressed by the Soviet and American leaders to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war.

Warnke, reflecting the sentiments of many U.S. prominent arms control experts, called for signing a treaty on a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive arms as soon as possible.

The START treaty, he emphasised, will become an important step forward towards the accomplishment of the main task: to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. The presence of American nuclear weapons on the territory of a reunited Germany is absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union, Warnke pointed out.

Admiral (retired) Eugene Carroll, director of the Defence Information Centre, emphasised the Soviet Union's interest in reaching a START accord by the end of 1990, and voiced the view that effective verification and control measures concerning sea- and air-launched cruise missiles could be worked out.

He said his recent trips to Moscow convinced him that the Soviet Union seeks to establish an effective control over cuts in naval arms and is interested in deeper cuts in strategic nuclear arms.

Competition in the development of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles does not meet the national security interests either of the United States or the Soviet Union, Carroll said.

Considering geographic peculiarities, sea-launched cruise missiles undoubtedly pose a greater threat to the Soviet Union than to the United States, the admiral said, specially pointing out that an upgrading of any variety of cruise missiles would only seriously complicate the arms control process. He also described as an unjustified step the U.S. Navy's intention to build 24 new submarines armed with Trident nuclear missiles.

Andreas Zumach, a prominent West German anti-war figure, touching upon the German question, voiced the view that Chancellor Kohl ignores the tremendous difficulties that still stand in the way of German reunification.

Zumach regards as a stumbling block the intention of the leadership of the United States and the Federal Republic to keep a reunited Germany within NATO's military structure.

There is every ground for Soviet concern over NATO membership plans for a reunited Germany, the expert emphasised.

Such stance of the West, he said, should be reviewed within the framework of ensuring European security, which was to a large extent promoted by the Soviet-American summit.

Briefing on Results of Pact Meeting

*LD0706202890 Moscow TASS in English
2017 GMT 7 Jun 90*

[Text] Moscow, June 7 (TASS)—“The Warsaw Treaty will be subjected to radical changes,” Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinsky told a briefing here today.

The briefing was devoted to the results of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

Speaking about ways to transform the pact, Kvitsinsky noted that greater emphasis would be laid on the political consultative aspect and some obsolescent structures will be altered.

Stressing that measures devised by the meeting are expected to be taken in coordination with the development of the Helsinki process, Kvitsinsky said that they are aimed at transforming the Warsaw Pact into an alliance of sovereign, equitable states based on democratic principles.

It was decided to create a provisional commission, including government officials, which is expected to come up with specific proposals for the transformation before the end of October this year. The proposals will be submitted to an extraordinary session of the Political Consultative Committee, which is expected to consider the proposals before the end of November.

“Common confidence was voiced,” Kvitsinsky said, “that German unification should proceed within the context of the Europe-scale process and on the basis of its principles, it should stimulate and deepen the process, taking into account the legitimate security interests of Germany's neighbors and all other countries, and ensure firm guarantees of the inviolability of European borders.”

The opinion prevailed among the participants in the meeting that a united Germany should have a military-political status which would preclude its turning into a “power tool on the side of any one bloc.”

Kvitsinsky told the briefing that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev addressed participants in the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. His lengthy speech contained an analysis and a concept of the Warsaw Pact new tasks. Gorbachev spoke of his vision for Europe's future development and prospects for the transformation of the alliance. He presented a detailed account of his meetings with President George Bush of the United States of America and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada. His presentation was received by participants in the meeting with great interest, the Soviet deputy minister told the briefing.

Responding to questions, Kvitsinsky stressed that during the meeting, he had heard no statements whatsoever concerning any country's desire to withdraw from the alliance. On the contrary, speakers at the meeting stressed that the Warsaw Treaty had a role of its own to play. The organisation should be transformed and improved to become consistent with the new circumstances. Membership in the treaty had its political and other usefulness for its member-states, it was stressed.

It was also stressed during the meeting that the Warsaw Treaty is part of the existing structures, whose disruption would lead to imbalances and change the very basis of current talks, including in Vienna.

Touching upon prospects for NATO-WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] relations, the Soviet deputy foreign minister said that participants in the meeting expected NATO to make its own contribution to the establishment of contacts between the two alliances. He pointed out that “confrontational elements, contained in the

documents of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted in the past, were no longer consistent with the spirit of the times."

Soviet-U.S. Summit Assessed

*LD0706140190 Moscow TASS in English
1032 GMT 7 Jun 90*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovsky]

[Text] Washington, June 7 (TASS)—The arms control association held a new conference on Wednesday on the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. Opening the news conference, the association's president and executive director Spurgeon Keeny said that the majority of comments on the summit describe it as a very important event, regard it as a success and expect it to influence the development of American-Soviet relations.

Keeny said that arms control obviously remains the key component of the summits, just as summit meetings are key components in decision-making and concluding work on arms control agreements. He said that great progress has apparently been made at the summit.

Agreement was reached in principle on most of the issues that remained unresolved and hampered formulating a treaty on strategic defensive arms. Both presidents also agreed to finish drafting the treaty this year.

Although a new agreement on conventional armaments in Europe has not been achieved, the two president agreed to formulate the treaty in the current year.

Noting that the presidents had signed an agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons and banning from their production and protocols to the treaties on nuclear tests and peaceful nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Keeny emphasised that this was an important step towards achieving arms control agreements.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

WEU Assembly Vice President on Satellite Verification

90MI0207 Rome SPAZIO INFORMAZIONI in English
4 Apr 90 pp 6-7

[Excerpt from a report by Jean-Pierre Fourre, Vice President of the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly: "Verification: Towards a European Satellite Agency;" report (No. 1159) presented on behalf of the Defense committee and adopted by the Assembly of the WEU; date of report not given]

[Text] Why Europe Must Have a Satellite Verification Agency

The dictionary defines "verify" as a transitive verb meaning "to ascertain, confirm or test the truth or accuracy of". Verification is now considered to be one of the most important aspects of the growing number of agreements on the control of existing or potential armaments.

An arms control agreement is a compromise by which each party, where its own security is concerned, relies at least partly on promises by the other signatories rather than on the power of its own arms. It is consequently essential for all the parties to be convinced that their partners will fulfil their commitments, in particular where mistrust and uncertainty prevail. Since the benefits derived by each participant depend on the other signatories respecting the agreement, it is therefore necessary to have some form of external guarantee that all the participants will fulfil their commitments. It is evident that means of verifying arms control agreements include many technical systems, but everyone agrees that satellites are among the most important because of their relatively low degree of intrusion. To date, the United States and the Soviet Union have possessed most of the world's capacity for verification from outer space. Apart from the 1986 non-proliferation treaty, there is at present no multilateral treaty so wide in scope that it can justify the high level of technical development and finance required by a remote monitoring system based in space. However, as the arms control process evolves, it seems increasingly likely that major multilateral treaties will be signed. Among the immediate possibilities which come to mind, mention may be made of treaties relating to outer space itself, chemical weapons and, more specifically, the control of conventional arms in well-determined regions, including Europe.

All these examples show that other countries, some of which have more than one interest in space, consider it to be their responsibility to become more closely associated with certain aspects of space monitoring.

Five European countries members of WEU (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are already closely associated with the bi lateral treaty recently implemented between

the United States and the Soviet Union banning intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF treaty). These countries, and others too, are determined to play a role in future multilateral conventional arms control agreements by contributing not only to the drafting of the agreements but also to their verification after they come into force.

Does Europe Have the Means To Finance This Ambition?

At the United Nations special session on disarmament (UNSSODI) in 1978, France proposed that the United Nations set up an international satellite control agency to help to verify current or future treaties and other aspects of crisis management. The agency was to be set up in three stages which give an interesting idea of the cost of this type of operation.

Investment necessary for the first stage amounted to approximately \$8 million (excluding land and buildings) and the annual operating budget to about \$25 to 30 million.

In the second stage, a ground-based receiving station belonging to the agency would cost \$6 to 8 million in investment and \$2 million in annual running costs. The agency's network would consist of a maximum of about ten stations.

Finally, in the third stage, there would be the following significant cost items:

- system of three regional monitoring satellites: approximately \$1,000 million in investment and \$50 to 200 million per year in replacement and running costs;
- single close-up inspection satellite: \$1,500 million in investment and \$120 million per year in replacement and running costs. These are certainly high figures.

However, even during the third stage in which the structure of such an agency would be at its most complete, they represent far less than 1 percent of total annual expenditure on armaments.

Why a European Agency?

A joint European satellite verification system would have considerable political impact. Europe could thus ensure respect for treaties and states' behaviour in time of crisis without having to rely on others and would have a say in appropriate bodies.

European countries cannot expect to take part in East-West negotiations or sign multilateral treaties relating to their security if they do not have an independent capability to monitor respect for treaties.

Furthermore, such a system would allow crises to be followed without having to rely on proof received indirectly. Whatever the purpose (respect for treaties and monitoring crises), each member government could retain its independence to take decisions while benefiting from a source of information that it would share

(and could even, if necessary, interpret images totally independently). A wholly independent European analysis would be more of a contribution than an obstacle to transatlantic co-operation. A satellite verification capability seems inherently essential for Western Europe's future international and diplomatic role. The control of armaments plays a catalysing role in the development of that capability and, if the CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] talks in Vienna prove to be fruitful, far greater attention will be paid to the balance of conventional forces.

A Framework Already Exists: WEU.

By taking the initiative of setting up such a satellite verification agency, WEU would offer all its partners a coherent observation system in space. It would thus help to ensure recognition of its special role at the side of Europe's strategic ally, the United States. Assuming that the WEU member states have the political will to take the initiative of setting up a satellite agency, it would clearly be possible to progress only by stages. A logical plan might consist of the following stages:

(a) 1990(?) establishment of an agency to control measures of confidence (e.g. verification of fixed installations with the possible assistance of SPOT images). A small centre to purchase SPOT images, limited to about a hundred persons, would cost about Fr 100 million [French francs] but, from a political investment standpoint, it would be an inestimable demonstration of Europe's political will. Since France and Belgium are shareholders in SPOT, the use and interpretation of images should not raise problems. At this stage, processing equipment might be envisaged.

(b) 1995(?) purchase/launching of a satellite. France, Italy and Spain are members of the HELIOS consortium which should be operational in 1993. HELIOS 2 should be available two years later, i.e. in 1995, and two other WEU countries, the Netherlands and perhaps the Federal Republic, are believed to have signified their interest already. It would be much more practical to make HELIOS 2 a WEU project and to enhance our capability considerably by investing about Fr 1,000 million in order to take part in a programme that is already well established and possibly in an independent ground-based receiving system.

(c) 2005(?) completion of optical capabilities by investing Fr 15 to 20,000 million in a radar satellite or other satellites.

Verification is not necessarily cheap, but is it not more useful to invest in the control of armaments than in armaments themselves?

One of the main questions is when a satellite verification agency should be set up. Should we act as quickly as possible in order to be able to propose such an agency at negotiations in general, or should the establishment of such an agency await the signing of a specific agreement?

In view of the speed at which the situation is now evolving in regard to arms control, the two hypotheses will soon come together, so it would appear that the European Council of Ministers should act immediately if Western Europe is to make a specific contribution to a particular verification system, i.e. the Vienna negotiations on the control of conventional arms.

If Europe undertakes to play its full role at the side of its strategic allies, it must make a full contribution to verifying the agreement which is of the utmost concern to its security: it must act decisively and it must act now.

Belgian Defense Minister Stresses EC Security Aspect

AU2705195590 Vienna *DIE PRESSE* in German
26-27 May 90 p 4

[Interview with Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme by Otmar Lahodinsky; place and date not given: "EC Needs Security Dimension"]

[Text] [Lahodinsky] NATO wants to reconsider its strategy. However, Britain in particular is increasingly trying to exert pressure on NATO to stick to the old principles, such as the threat of a first nuclear strike, flexible response, or forward defense. There has been criticism that NATO only wants to use new names.

[Coeme] Practically all NATO defense ministers have spoken in favor of reconsidering the entire strategy which is based on a document from the year 1967. There may be certain reservations on the British side, but we really do not want to change only the words. There must be specific consequences because the alliance's credibility is at stake.

NATO is adapting to a historic development. German unification will lead to changes in the principle of forward defense. NATO will not defend a border that no longer exists.

[Lahodinsky] GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel has pointed out that a united Germany can only belong to NATO if NATO is transformed into a political organization.

[Coeme] This question will be discussed by the heads of government of the NATO countries at the July summit. However, the military aspect of NATO will certainly lose some of its significance because we no longer live in the Cold War period.

We have just given up the three-percent increase in defense spending and are reducing the strength and the operational readiness of our troops. In addition, we partly renounce large-scale maneuvers. In this way, we show our population, but also the Warsaw Pact and Moscow in particular, that we adapt to the new situation and do not pursue offensive strategies, as has often been claimed by the East.

This will also make the German question easier, in which connection the deployment of multinational troops is planned. These units that are to comprise mainly European but also U.S. and Canadian soldiers, for political reasons, will meet with more acceptance among the population.

[Lahodinsky] A new conflict over the use of air-to-surface missiles that are to replace short-range nuclear missiles seems imminent.

[Coeme] There will certainly be no decision on this issue this year. A great deal will also depend on the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe.

[Lahodinsky] There has been talk among the EC of the need to build a new NATO pillar within the community. Does the EC really need a military dimension?

[Coeme] Europe is in the process of restructuring itself. Is it conceivable that a continent, an economically strong community that we want to build, should give up its capability of defending its citizens? I do not see such a development in the next three years. In the long run, the EC must devote more attention to security and defense policies.

[Lahodinsky] As a replacement for NATO?

[Coeme] No, this will not mean an end to the alliance. Quite the contrary: If we add a European pillar to the American pillar, it will not only be possible to preserve a sensible solidarity between the United States and Europe, but we will also create an alliance that is more politically oriented than militarily oriented. A fully responsible EC can participate in the construction of an all-European security system within the framework of the CSCE process.

[Lahodinsky] Austria wants to join the EC as a neutral state. The neutral Ireland is also a member of the EC. How is neutrality compatible with your concept of a military dimension of the community?

[Coeme] There is a logical answer to your question on the basis of what I just said. In my view, the defense aspect will become more important in the EC in the long run. What this means is clear. However, we will see. The doors are open; maybe there are other possibilities. If Hungary and the CSFR apply for EC membership, the circumstances might change for Austria.

[Lahodinsky] As the first NATO member, Belgium concluded some kind of cooperation agreement in the military sphere with Hungary, which is still a Warsaw Pact member. Was this your idea?

[Coeme] Yes, I said that one must take specific steps to bring about detente. Next week, 60 Belgian officers will travel to Hungary and then to Moscow. Representatives of the Warsaw Pact will attend a seminar in Brussels in the near future.

Woerner Views NATO's Future

*AU2805185290 Vienna Profil in German
28 May 90 pp 60-61.*

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by Fred David in Brussels; date not given: "Cooperation Instead of Confrontation"]

[Text] [David] In East Berlin, a pacifist clergyman is GDR defense minister. Being a German NATO secretary general, reserve lieutenant colonel, and former defense minister, does that make your blood run cold?

[Woerner] I am observing what pastor Eppelmann is doing very closely. The statements he has made so far are oriented toward security. While I am not really a pacifist, I am a man who loves peace. By the way, a united Germany will have one defense minister.

[David] The GDR National People's Army [NVA] is being disbanded. Thousands of soldiers have defected. Tens of thousands have registered for civilian service, and entire battalions are on strike. After a few weeks, nothing is left of these elite troops whom the peoples feared in the past. Did NATO not create a bogey for many years by its comparisons of forces?

[Woerner] The rapid disruption has surprised us too, but it is explicable. The meaning of military service surely has totally changed for the GDR citizens. This army was educated with a rigid enemy image. We never considered that necessary.

[David] I beg your pardon?

[Woerner] We never were totally fixed upon the enemy. The National People's Army was indeed subject to an extremely strict discipline; the officers' corps believed in the system and served loyally.

[David] Do you agree that NATO, for whatever reasons, has overestimated Eastern Europe's military strength?

[Woerner] No.

[David] Do you not think that you were insufficiently informed by your civilian and military services because armaments in the West, which cost billions, had to be defended ideologically and argumentatively?

[Woerner] No, that was not necessary. Even in Gorbachev's first few years, the USSR produced more tanks than existed in the arsenals of Great Britain, France, and the FRG together.

[David] Looking back, could we not have been spared the expenses on both sides, which ran into the billions, if we had pursued a better policy and had not only counted the warheads?

[Woerner] Hardly. It was NATO and not some well-meaning conference which put an end to Soviet expansionism. We made it clear to them that it was a waste of money, and that the Soviet Union could win nothing,

and has won nothing, by the arms race. The lesson that we have been taught is a political one: Military might is no longer the most important part of state power. What is decisive today is economic and technological efficiency.

[David] That sounds as if NATO had invented Gorbachev.

[Woerner] I certainly do not want to minimize what he has achieved.

[David] Thus the lesson is that in reality, NATO has above all always been a political rather than a military alliance. However, anyone who has read the newspapers in recent years must remember something different. The heated counter-armament [Nachruestung] debate in the 1980's is just one example.

[Woerner] This alliance has from the start been a political and military alliance. Nobody should be astonished that the military aspects prevailed during the times of Cold War. However, I am a civilian, and my entire leading staff is composed of civilians; in addition, there is the military apparatus which is assigned to SACEUR, the supreme commander for Europe.

[David] When will the military officers within NATO be unemployed?

[Woerner] The focus of our work is in fact shifting from confrontation to cooperation, from defense against the threat to prevention of a crisis. However, credible defense remains important for preventing war.

[David] NATO is a child of the Cold War. Can it be the proper instrument to develop a political security system which must also include the East European countries?

[Woerner] I do not know of any serious alternative.

[David] The CSCE—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—has considerably grown since its very modest beginning. Could a security body develop from it, which would make NATO and the Warsaw Pact unnecessary?

[Woerner] The CSCE process will be developed to become such a European security system. That is what we are working for. However, it will not make NATO unnecessary.

[David] Do you take the CSCE not very seriously?

[Woerner] On the contrary. The CSCE will play a very useful role in crisis prevention, in dialogue, and in cooperation. However, in a conflict, it will never be able to guarantee that one organization is responsible for all, as is the case with NATO.

[David] Is NATO not already about to be disbanded? As of July, a NATO state—the Federal Republic—will pay the considerable deployment costs of the Soviet Army in the GDR. That is virtually the end of the Western defense alliance, is it not?

[Woerner] It is primarily for the Germans to decide how to deal with this. The deployment of Soviet troops on German soil for a transition period does not basically change the alliance.

[David] The development seems to be that the united Germany will be a member of NATO, but NATO troops can only be deployed on the soil of what is today the Federal Republic. Does that not mean that a makeshift structure is replaced by another one, whereas the insecurity factor—Germany—continues to exist?

[Woerner] Germany is not an insecurity factor. However, it will continue to have a special status. Both German states have clearly stated that they do not want the territory of what is now the GDR to be demilitarized. The troops that are based there are not to be assigned to NATO. The alliance can live with that.

[David] Will the Soviet Union accept NATO membership for all of Germany without any further conditions?

[Woerner] We assume that it will accept that, even though Moscow has said that NATO membership for all of Germany is out of the question.

[David] Have you received any new signals in this direction?

[Woerner] No; however, it is clear that the Soviet Union needs new partners, because it has hardly any reliable allies. A Germany that is bound into NATO is a stability factor for Moscow. That will be decisive.

[David] This year, you will be the first NATO secretary general to visit Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw. Being a pilot, will you also fly a MiG?

[Woerner] No, but I was offered to fly a Sukhoi 27 on another occasion. That shows how much things have started moving.

[David] Lord Ismay, one of your predecessors as NATO secretary general, defined NATO's three goals in the fifties as follows: To keep the Americans in, to get the Russians out, to keep the Germans down. In view of the fact that Germany has become very powerful again, will the latter become NATO's main objective with which even the Soviets could identify themselves?

[Woerner] Some people actually see it this way; however, this is not the alliance's position, and, of course, it is not my position either. We are certainly not a controlling body. However, binding all of Germany into NATO is a central element of European security. That does not mean that one does not trust the Germans, and that one wants to keep them down; otherwise, one would not have elected a German to head NATO.

[David] But that was done in entirely different circumstances.

[Woerner] I have repeatedly heard that it is fortunate for a German to be at the top of NATO at this time.

[David] However, not all NATO members think so.

[Woerner] That is correct.

[David] In April, the ITN U.S. television network carried a report which received broad attention and which said that Gorbachev "won a trial of strength against the military" in February, and "the Soviet Union was on the brink of civil war" on 25 February. Is there anything to it?

[Woerner] It is a massive exaggeration. One of our Soviet specialists claimed that there had been an incident, and weapons were issued in view of demonstrations. We all know that Gorbachev has huge problems. We have an interest in the success of his reforms.

[David] Even if the military people in Moscow took power, the democratic development could not be stopped, at least not outside the Soviet Union, and it would even be more senseless and more unlikely that the Soviets would attack a foreign country. Do you share this assessment?

[Woerner] I do, however, only under the condition that NATO continues to exist.

AUSTRIA

Mock To Present New CSCE Strategy

AU3105102890 Vienna DER STANDARD in German
31 May 90 p 2

[Georg Possanner report: "Austria's New CSCE Strategy"]

[Text] Vienna—Austria's new strategy for the further development of the CSCE process is aimed at strengthening Vienna's function as a link and at backing the efforts of Prague and Budapest to become the seat of permanent institutions. In this way, the CSCE will be institutionalized and decentralized step by step.

At the same time, the emphasis will gradually be shifted from cooperation within the group of neutral and non-aligned states to cooperation within the so-called Pentagonal Association (Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, and the CSFR).

For instance, on Tuesday [29 May], experts of the Pentagonal Association—not the neutral and nonaligned group—drafted a joint document on the issue of minorities which will be submitted at the CSCE conference on the "human dimension" in Copenhagen next week. The five countries also plan to draft the final document jointly.

The process of institutionalizing the CSCE would begin with regular foreign ministers' meetings which would be prepared by a small permanent secretariat in the Austrian capital. The concept will be presented by Foreign Minister Alois Mock in a speech he will deliver in Rome today on the "new European architecture."

The reason Austria's new CSCE concept is being presented now is the other governments' sudden activity. "Everybody believes he is late," Foreign Ministry officials say. There is, for instance, a Finnish memorandum suggesting that a preparatory committee for the 1992 meeting, to be based in Helsinki, should be set up immediately following the CSCE summit in Paris. Sweden intends to suggest creating a CSCE secretariat in Stockholm.

Austria is concerned about lagging behind and is intensifying its efforts in the race for the permanent CSCE secretariat. Its most important points are the following: Existing organizations in the human rights area, such as the Council of Europe and the ECE (UN Economic Commission for Europe) should be consulted in connection with the institutionalization process. In a second phase, a CSCE agency for verifying disarmament agreements, and a security agency for preventing conflicts by means of qualified arbitration proceedings should be set up. In addition, a pan-European environment agency should be created. At a later time, a consultation mechanism of the chiefs of staff should be created.

CANADA

Clark on Reduction of Canadian Forces in Europe

LD2605214690 Montreal International Service
in English 2100 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] Canada's minister for external affairs, Joe Clark, has issued a major policy speech on Canada's relations with Europe. Mr Clark proposed a new direction for NATO, a larger role for the 35 member nations of the conference on Security and cooperation in Europe, and closer relations between Canada and the European Economic Community.

On the question of European security, Mr Clark said this area must become cooperative rather than competitive. He said NATO must make an urgent and comprehensive review of all parts of its nuclear and conventional arms strategy. Mr Clark also said Canada's armed forces in Europe should be reduced. Canada now has 7,500 troops and three squadrons of fighter aircraft in Western Europe and Mr Clark said that Canada would increase its aid program to Eastern European countries moving towards democracy. Mr Clark's comments were the results of a four month review by external affairs.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Trade in ABC Weapons Banned

LD0106094890 Hamburg DPA in German
0920 GMT 1 May 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—In future Germans will not be allowed to trade in nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, even abroad. The participation of German

enterprises and their foreign subsidiaries in the development, production, or trade in ABC weapons in other countries will also be illegal. The Lower House majority of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and the Free Democratic Party passed relevant government bills on Friday, but they reduced the planned minimum sentence to one year, so that it could also be commuted to probation. [passage omitted on details of debate]

Kohl Addresses Bonn Disarmament Conference

LD2505090790 Hamburg DPA in German 0700 GMT
25 May 90

[Embargoed until 0830 GMT]

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] has affirmed the demand for NATO membership for the whole of Germany. In a speech at the concluding session of the Interparliamentary Disarmament Conference in Bonn Kohl spoke on Friday at the same time in favor of troops from the United States and Canada remaining in Europe. The chancellor made a binding statement that, in a united Germany, no Alliance facilities and units will be advanced onto the territory of the present GDR.

With reference to the former isolation of Germany following lost wars, the chancellor said: "The suffering of history only allows one conclusion: There must not be a second Versailles." Kohl thanked USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev for also reaching this conclusion and added: "For this reason, any thought of the united Germany being neutral, demilitarized, free of alliances or blocs, is out of the question. This is, to put it briefly, old thinking."

In Kohl's words, the transatlantic security system is "existential" for the Germans and for Europe as a whole. Only NATO can "create real balance in Europe." He is, for this reason, in favor of the continued existence of U.S. and Canadian military presence in Europe. European cooperation in security questions should be expanded parallel to this.

The NATO alliance, which will adapt its strategy to the changed situation, is agreed, according to Kohl, that "we do not wish to draw one-sided benefits from the development in central, eastern and southern Europe, or in Germany either."

Among "voluntary obligations" for a united Germany, Kohl mentioned doing without the possession, manufacture, and power to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The whole of Germany would also remain a signatory state of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Basic Law, Article 26, with its ban on the preparation for an offensive war, would continue to be valid.

Kohl emphatically advocated in his keynote speech further disarmament steps in Europe. But, the demand

for a world without nuclear weapons is utopian. He is concerned rather with a "global concept," in which "a minimum of nuclear weapons guarantees the security of us all in the future as well."

Kohl expressed his concern that the last round of negotiations in Vienna on conventional armed forces has "lost momentum." Following a first Vienna agreement, there should be no break in negotiations for a second in order to achieve a further reduction in the armed forces of all states, including the unified Germany.

The chancellor called the CSCE process the cornerstone of the security structure embracing the whole of Europe. The time is now ripe in this matter to create proposals for the establishment of all-European CSCE institutions. In detail, Kohl advocated summit meetings of the CSCE states at two-year intervals, the formation of a permanent council of the delegation leaders, and of a center for the verification of agreements on arms control.

Further steps mentioned by Kohl: a European center for the avoidance of conflict, the building of a highly modern communication system between all 35 CSCE states, and regular meetings of the chiefs of general staff.

Chemical Weapons To Be Removed by Late Sep

LD0106140690 Hamburg DPA in German
1347 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—The removal of all U.S. chemical weapons on FRG territory will begin in the second half of August and be finished by the end of September. This was learned by DPA from a reliable source on Friday. The approximately 100,000 grenades with some 400 tonnes of nerve gas will be transported by road and rail from the U.S. depot in Clausen near Pirmasens to the Dutch port of Nordenham. They will be taken by ship to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific and finally destroyed there.

For reasons of secrecy, the Defense Ministry refused to give a precise date. It spoke merely of a period between July and September. [passage omitted]

Report Says NATO Plans to Expand Nuclear Arsenal

AU0506223990 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 5 Jun 90 pp 1,2

[Edgar Auth report: "NATO Expands Nuclear Arsenal"]

[Text] Frankfurt/Main, 4 June—Already in 1989, unnoticed by the public and parliaments, NATO decided to include U.S. cruise missiles, which are stationed on ships and submarines and which have so far been exclusively subordinate to the U.S. military, in its nuclear planing in order to make them subordinate to its supreme command. This is stated by a report of the "British-American Security Policy Information Office" (BASIC), to which renowned military men and armament researchers belong, a report which is available to FRANKFURTER

RUNDSCHAU. At the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of NATO in April 1989 a formal agreement was concluded which permits sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) to be made subordinate to the NATO supreme command.

The agreement belongs to the restructuring of the NATO nuclear forces in line with the INF Treaty, which envisages the destruction of the land-based intermediate-range missiles. The focal points are long-range air- and sea-based systems, which could hit the Soviet Union. This means a partial substitution of the land-based cruise missiles, which have to be withdrawn because of the INF Treaty, according to the Information Office. The project is in contradiction with the publicly represented position of the Western alliance not to want to have any new weapons itself.

The report quotes Admiral Eugene Carroll, former director of the Operations Planning Department of the U.S. forces in Europe, who said that according to the agreement sea-launched cruise missiles—like the 400 nuclear warheads on previously on strategic U.S. submarines—can be made subordinate to NATO. At the moment the United States has about 325 nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles on more than 80 ships and submarines.

The second part of the restructuring of the NATO's nuclear forces is formed by air-to-ground missiles, which were heatedly discussed by the Western public, when the NPG held a session in Calgary recently. With this, NATO now has a firmer position than at the climax of the Cold War, BASIC notes critically. At that time, the stationing was part of a double-track decision, which also included negotiations with the Soviet Union. Now the West has introduced a new nuclear arms category into NATO without taking into account the Soviet readiness to eliminate these weapons by negotiations.

In the treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons (START), which Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev intend to sign before the end of the year, the sea-launched missiles are excluded at the insistence of the United States. In a politically binding statement, however, it is to be noted that no side will introduce more than 880 nuclear cruise missiles at sea. This would permit the United States to add again to its planned program of a maximum of 758 SLCM's, if it can get the money for this. In spring it had still been considered to limit the SLCM program to 442 missiles.

FRG: Genscher Addresses Copenhagen CSCE Conference

AU0506120190 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 5 Jun 90

[Text] According to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, the process of German unification will give new impetus to disarmament, the CSCE process, and development toward a European union. Increased willingness to make

basic improvements in Europe can already be ascertained, Genscher said at the second CSCE human rights conference which opened in Copenhagen today.

The European states are determined to also fulfill their responsibility for security in the development of an environmental union. Genscher advocated the establishment of a European court of justice for the protection of human rights and renewed his demands for the establishment of a CSCE secretariat and regular meetings between the European governments.

In the course of the day, discussions on Germany policy are planned between Genscher and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Baker. A meeting between Genscher and Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski is also planned.

In the evening, Baker and Shevardnadze want to come together to discuss the proposals for a new security structure in Europe which were submitted at the Washington summit.

Kohl Welcomes Soviet Disarmament Initiative

LD0606144290 Hamburg DPA in German 1354 GMT 6 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl assesses the announcement by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze about withdrawing a limited number of Soviet nuclear weapons from central Europe by the end of the year as a "step in the right direction." Government Spokesman Norbert Schaefer today went on to say that this announcement meets a demand the chancellor made several times.

Kohl last called on the Soviet Union to reduce its overwhelming superiority in short-range nuclear weapons—Bonn talks about a ratio of 16 to one—at the disarmament conference of the Interparliamentary Union in Bonn at the end of May. To assess Shevardnadze's announcement fully, however, a thorough examination is needed as to how this intention fits into the framework of earlier withdrawal plans by the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

FRANCE

Comments on Future Course of National Defense

90ES0827B Paris LIBERATION in French 4 May 90 p 7

[Commentary by Paul-Marie de la Gorce, editor in chief of DEFENSE NATIONALE: "Defense: Old Doctrines Reexamined"]

[Text] France must inevitably rethink its defense policy. A similar task of course also faces the member states of the Atlantic military organization: The very foundation of their military policies, strategic doctrines and defense plans has collapsed along with the Warsaw Pact.

All the conflict scenarios drawn up by NATO envisaged some form of conventional Soviet attack, reinforced to greater or lesser degree by the armies of Eastern Europe and probably by tactical nuclear weapons, especially if the western forces used theirs. And in the face of these threats, NATO always drew its inspiration from the doctrine of "graduated response," which called for massive commitment of western forces against the Warsaw Pact, in a conflict of great scope in which actual use of the American tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe could be decided only by the U.S. president himself.

These concepts have always been very vulnerable to criticism, but today they have become absurd. First of all, because it is difficult to imagine the Soviet Union embarking on such colossal military adventures in the European theater at a time when its armies are receding from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps one day from East Germany and Poland as well. But also because it is clear that the armies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland can no longer be considered prospective enemy forces, the East German Army is being dissolved, and East Germany itself will soon be extinguished. If NATO intends to draw up new war plans against the Soviet Union—and that, as we know, is its sole justification for existence—the least one can say is that it must think up something different. But France is not at all in the same position.

France's strategy of nuclear deterrence was clearly designed and explained from the start as a strategy of defense against any potential aggressor. When General De Gaulle presented it for the first time on 3 November 1959 at the war college, he said very clearly: "We must endow ourselves with a strike force capable of being deployed at any time and against any foe. It goes without saying that the foundation of this force will be atomic weapons, and since France can theoretically be destroyed from any point on the globe, our force must be able to reach any point on the globe." The international situation and the balance of power made it natural to regard the Soviet Union as the main potential aggressor. To borrow an expression used by Defense Minister Chevenement back when he was a deputy in the opposition, there was no "finessing" the issue. But it is essential to recall that France's nuclear deterrence strategy was originally designed so as to be able to strike "anywhere on earth"—the literary equivalent to the mathematical concept of "omnidirectional"—in other words able to deter any aggressor that might emerge in years to come.

The new international environment completely justifies France's strategic doctrine and the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent whose sole purpose is to deter attacks from whatever quarter against France's vital interests—these latter being defined by the president in terms of our international commitments, the political and strategic context, and the manifest intentions of the aggressor. Never has there been such overwhelming justification for a doctrine flexible enough to respond to any aggressor, to adapt to expected or unexpected changes in

relations between the great powers, a doctrine that can be maintained independent of present or future decisions by France's allies, including the policy and strategy adopted by the United States toward Europe.

If one incontestable conclusion can be drawn from the upheavals of recent months, it is that the French strategy of nuclear deterrence must be maintained and preserved. It remains to be seen by what means, and with what consequences for the posture of our Armed Forces. But it is clear that the best instruments will be those that best preserve the "omnidirectional" strike capability of our strategic nuclear forces: thus it is the maritime strategic force, in its present and future forms, which best responds to this demand and should be given absolute priority—complemented in due course, and in the light of possible technological advances in the meantime, by an intercontinental surface-to-surface missile. There is also no doubt that the political authorities will still want to have "final warning" armaments to give themselves the necessary freedom of maneuver before strategic nuclear arms are unleashed. The systems chosen for this purpose naturally have both advantages and disadvantages, strong and weak points: The airborne ASMP [medium-range air-to-surface missile] has mobility, flexibility of use, adaptability to various strategic and tactical situations, but at the same time is vulnerable on the ground and in the air; the surface-to-surface Hades missile offers security of use and near-invulnerability but poses problems in terms of target acquisition and the excessively rigid limitations imposed by its range. The main point here is that "final warning" forces should be quantitatively limited, and qualitatively adapted to their unique purpose.

The most serious question, but one which must inevitably be faced, has to do with the posture and organization of our Armed Forces. Everyone knows that up to now, with the exception of resources specifically dedicated to overseas operations, those forces have been structured to respond to what is considered the least plausible of threats, that of a conflict in Europe. The guiding principle that ought to be followed is simply that France should continue to have the means to project force beyond its borders and take action in any sector of the European theater—or in any other theater—where it is reasonably conceivable that France might have to intervene. In other words, the main principle in the inevitable reorganization of French conventional forces should be maintenance of sufficient resources, mobility, and adaptability of materiel and personnel to meet this twofold requirement. No doubt this will cause considerable problems. This change will almost certainly require significant personnel reductions, with the inevitable consequences for military career professionals and for that part of the force which must be called up each year—that is, if we are determined at all costs, for reasons we will not discuss here, to keep compulsory military service. These problems must not falsely serve as excuses for rejecting a transformation which one way or another has to come. Nothing would be worse than to maintain—

whether out of inertia, conservatism or corporate interests—structures which everyone knows are ill-adapted to the new political and strategic environment. In any case, reassessment cannot be avoided. Far better to launch into it now and face the resulting problems squarely than to allow ourselves to be overtaken by shifts in public opinion inspired only (and unthinkingly) by a legitimate desire to lighten the country's military burden—or, more dangerously, by the desire to impose some docile return to an Atlantic orthodoxy which events have already discredited.

GREECE

Minister of Defense Comments on Missiles

NC01061623 Athens *ATHENS NEWS in English*
1 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] Greece has lodged a protest with the NATO alliance concerning the allied exercise code-named Distant Thunder, which took place between May 21-25, for violations of Greek airspace by Turkish and American warplanes and for radar interference.

National Defence Minister Ioannis Varvitsiotis, who made this statement, added that government policies on the question of the renewal of tactical nuclear weapons were crystal-clear. He added that the recent NATO conference had made no new suggestion concerning nuclear weapons.

He said we are currently experiencing a historic era during which a rapprochement is taking place between East and West. He added that he personally believed that sooner or later nuclear weapons will no longer constitute a part of world arsenals.

Referring to the prospect of the installation of TASM missiles in Greece, Varvitsiotis said that it was not possible to discuss a weapon which will be operational in 1995 and which is destined for the U.S. armed forces in 1996.

Varvitsiotis said that the government did not intend to purchase 20 additional F-16 warplanes due to the state of the country's economy.

TURKEY

Defense Ministry Issues Statement on Missile Deployment

TA3105191690 Ankara *ANATOLIA in English*
1557 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Ankara (A.A)—A possible NATO proposal to deploy tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASM) in Turkish territory will be appraised in line with Turkey's nuclear policies, the Defense Ministry said on Thursday.

A ministry statement, referring to Defense Minister Safa Giray's speech at the NATO ministers meeting last week

in Brussels, said Giray declared that Turkey would not object to the deployment of such missiles in NATO territory in a "just and balanced" way.

"TASM deployment in Turkish territory is, however, a subject which should be appraised in line with the nuclear policy Turkey has followed over the years," it said.

Turkey's nuclear policy is against undertaking new nuclear responsibilities in the Turkish territory.

UNITED KINGDOM

Need for Fourth Trident Submarine Under Study

51500103 London *THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH*
in English 8 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Simon O'Dwyer-Russell: "Fourth Trident Sub May Be Cancelled"]

[Text] The government is re-examining Britain's need for a fourth Trident nuclear submarine in view of progress in secret talks with France over co-ordinating nuclear policy and the easing of East-West relations.

Senior officials are examining whether only three submarines could provide an "acceptable level of deterrence" if their patrols were co-ordinated with France's own nuclear submarine fleet and their wartime targets shared with the French.

Initial estimates are that at least £1 billion and possibly as much as £1.5 billion could be saved, taking into account both construction and life-cycle costs, if the fourth submarine were cancelled.

The process is part of the "review of options" for future strategy being conducted by Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence referred to by Defence Secretary, Tom King in the Commons in January.

Senior Whitehall sources stress that the Trident re-examination is merely an exercise in "identifying options" and that the Government has not yet reached any decisions.

However, sources concede that pressure is mounting within the Government for the Trident system to be included in any unilateral reduction in Britain's standing forces made possible by the diminished threat from the East.

But cancelling the fourth Trident submarine would have a grave effect on the town of Barrow-in-Furness, where Vickers Shipbuilding, builders of Britain's nuclear submarines, is the main employer. The company is relying heavily on all four Trident orders as the basis of its commercial viability over the next 10 years and redundancies would result from any cancellation.

The Government has apparently been persuaded that all four submarines may not be necessary after what have

been described as "highly fruitful" talks between London and Paris over the past few months.

Until the momentous events of last year, the Government was traditionally against any co-ordination between London and Paris over nuclear deterrence.

However, because of the recent strain in relations with West Germany over the pace of re-unification, Mrs Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd have become convinced of the need for a new security alignment to be forged between Britain and France.

The Government hopes that by entering into talks with France over nuclear co-operation, strategic links with Europe could be reinforced by London and Paris controlling a "Euro-deterrent."

Labour's Defence Spokesman, Mr Martin O'Neill, said last night that news of the Government's fresh look at Trident was "recognition by the Government, at long last, that its ambitions for a fully-fledged independent nuclear deterrent are unrealistic in view of the changing situation in Europe."

Last month, the Defence Ministry's Deputy Controller (Nuclear), Mr John Mabblerley, told the Commons Defence Committee that between £5-600 million could be saved immediately if the fourth Trident submarine was cancelled in the near future.

The MOD does not expect to invite Vickers to tender for the fourth Trident submarine until the end of this year, according to a recent Commons written answer. This has fuelled speculation that by that date the need for a so-called "Cold War deterrent" will have become redundant.

The Government has always said that four Trident submarines were the minimum necessary force to ensure that one was on patrol at all times.

However, Whitehall sources argue that because of the Trident D5 missile's increased range, it would be possible for Britain to maintain a submarine ready for action round-the-clock with only three Trident boats.

A former First Sea Lord said last week that even a Trident submarine at Faslane undergoing maintenance could be made ready to fire "in under fifteen minutes."

A strong precedent exists for the cancellation of the fourth Trident submarine. The Labour Party, on taking power in October 1964, cancelled the fifth Polaris submarine.

The Trident programme has been dogged with technical problems and delays in the construction of a new warhead manufacturing facility, known as A90, at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston in Berkshire.

Last week the Commons Public Accounts Committee report on major defence equipment projects expressed concern over the slippage in the Trident programme and warned that these delays would become more accentuated later in the programme.

Analysts believe that because of the problems encountered by the Government in manufacturing sufficient warheads to deploy the first Trident submarine in 1994, cancelling the fourth submarine would cut costs and allow available warheads to be split among fewer operational submarines.

FRG Refuses to Accept TASM's

LD0706172190 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1451 GMT 7 Jun 90

[Text] The likelihood of new air-launched nuclear missiles being based in Britain increased today after West Germany insisted it would not accept them on its own soil.

The U.S.-designed tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) is intended to be a key element in NATO's future nuclear deterrent in Europe, as the emphasis moves away from land-based weapons.

There were clear signs the missiles will be based at RAF Bentwaters in Suffolk for use on the U.S. Air force's new potent F-15E Strike Eagle fighter bomber.

NATO planners anticipate a reliance on both air-launched nuclear weapons and U.S. submarine-launched cruise missiles, which can be allocated to NATO command in a time of crisis.

But at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Turnberry, a West German official said: "There is no question of TASM. We won't have the TASM in Germany."

Britain and the U.S. are determined that deployment of the TASM, with a range of more than 250 miles, should go ahead.

In February, the U.S. announced the withdrawal of the 527 Aggressor squadron of F-16 fighters from RAF Bentwaters used for combat training, clearing the way for the deployment of Strike Eagles.

Building work for a Strike Eagle simulator facility is due to start this summer, but U.S. and British authorities insist no decision about basing the aircraft at Bentwaters has been taken.

Some analysts estimate as many as 450 TASM's could be based in Britain by 1995, representing a 50 percent increase in U.S. nuclear weapons on British soil.

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