




JPRS Report



Near East & South Asia

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Iranian Delegation Arrives in Tripoli

LD1905212191 Tripoli JANA in English 1417 GMT
19 May 91

[Text] Tripoli, Al Maa [May] 19, JAMAHIRYA NEWS AGENCY—A delegation from the Iranian Consultative Council arrived last night in Tripoli on a visit to Great Jamahirya. The delegation consists of 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Fakhreddin Hijazi, Akbar Barfush, Mohammed Datsma Legian, Mohammed Astana, and Reza Shiarni.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Islamic Jihad Leader Interviewed

91AE0412A Amman AL-RIBAT in Arabic 14 May 91
p 5

[Interview with Islamic Jihad Leader Dr. Fathi al-Shaqaqi, by 'Azzam al-Tamimi: "PLO Must Withdraw Recognition of Jewish Entity;" first two paragraphs AL-RIBAT introduction; place and date not given]

[Text] During the Arab and Islamic People's Conference, held last April, I met with Dr. Fathi al-Shaqaqi, representative of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine. I had not met him before, and I was struck by his energy as he met with members of delegations participating in the conference and as a group of young men gathered around him. None of them, upon meeting him, took any offense at his directly admitting that he was from 'Jihad.' I stopped him, identified myself, and asked if he would object to being interviewed for publication in AL-RIBAT. He welcomed that, and expressed his willingness to be interviewed.

One day before that, I had met with Yasir 'Arafat, who mentioned Jihad during his interview. He made it clear that, in its recent session, the Central Council had resolved to call for a preparatory committee for the election of a new Palestine National Council [PNC], and that Hamas and Jihad would be invited (or had been invited) to participate. At this point, the interview with Dr. al-Shaqaqi began.

[Al-Tamimi] What is the Islamic Jihad's position with regard to participating in the PNC? What are the conditions, and what is the percentage of representation you expect or make conditional?

[Al-Shaqaqi] As for us, the problem is not the form or percentage of representation; rather, the problem is the political line, the political program proposed. When the PLO was founded, it was under general Arab sponsorship. It then changed to the Fedayin organization in 1968. This change was significant in the course of events for the Palestinian people because, to a considerable extent, it took the issue out of the Arab regimes' hands. However, the elite that led the PLO was an emigre elite,

or an expatriate elite, somewhat isolated from the masses. They laid their tactics on international tables, and took us to a series of criminal concessions. Despite that, this does not alter the fact that the PLO was a special development in the progress of the Palestinian people. We don't think it would be useful or beneficial today to look for an alternative framework. However, it is our right, starting from our concept of our doctrine and our Islam, that we search for an alternative substance, an alternative program. We are prepared to cooperate with our brothers in the PLO, on any level, without considering the size of representation in any one of the PLO's institutions, under the following conditions:

1. Rejection of recognizing the Zionist entity's legitimacy over any part of our nation;
2. Reliance on armed jihad as a solution for opposing the Zionist entity;
3. No retreat from the Palestinian National Charter.

This represents our minimum aspirations as Islamists, because our basic strategic view is continuation of the jihad under the banner of Islam. What concerns us now is political dialogue first, not the form of participation.

[Al-Tamimi] PLO sources say that the Islamic Jihad will be invited to a meeting of the preparatory committee. Will they invite Jihad?

[Al-Shaqaqi] They are aware that there is only one Jihad in Palestine. If they want to continue in the Palestinian game, they are free.

[Al-Tamimi] What is your relationship, then, with other jihad groups, such as Shaykh As'ad Bayud al-Tamimi's group, as well as the group led by Shaykh Ibrahim Sarbal, both of which are now in Jordan?

[Al-Shaqaqi] These groups are unorganized, and have no presence in Palestine. There is only one group in Palestine.

[Al-Tamimi] With regard to what you said above, they tell me that your theses are no different from those of the other Islamic organizations in Palestine, especially the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. What are your special characteristics?

[Al-Shaqaqi] The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine is a fighting Palestinian Islamic movement, which crystallized in the early eighties, after an ideological debate which lasted the second half of the seventies. This debate began with a concept of the program. That is to say, as young, educated Palestinian men—we were studying in Cairo at that time—we wanted to achieve an Islamic program, clear in the concept of Islam, the world, and reality. We were greatly preoccupied with that, intellectually, amidst the absence of clear, defined concepts inside the Islamic movement. The nucleus of the debate was the Palestinian issue; we discovered what we later expressed as our strategic slogan: "The Palestinian issue

is the central issue of the Islamic movement, and for the Islamic community as a whole."

At that time, we noted ambiguities, which can be summarized as follows:

"Nationalists without Islam," and "Islamists without Palestine," i.e., there were those who said liberate Palestine, and who turned their backs on Islam, which represents the doctrine and legacy of the *ummah*, and there were those committed to Islam, who called for it, but who asked for the Palestinian matter to be put off.

This is the existing disagreement between us and our other Islamic brothers, i.e., a dispute about the program and about Palestine.

With the onset of the intifadah, most of the Islamists turned to the scene of the confrontation with the Zionist enemy and, therefore, the gap between the political spokesmen for both Hamas and Jihad lessened, and our aspirations coincided, because it was necessary.

[Al-Tamimi] Are there efforts in this regard? Do you have any specific ideas?

[Al-Shaqaqi] For the sake of unity, we submit—without any limits or conditions—to our Islamic brethren, particularly the Hamas Movement, that we have no conditions for undertaking any unified political program that you devise, so long as the jihad in Palestine remains steadfast.

[Al-Tamimi] Did the young men who founded the Islamic Jihad Movement in the eighties have any previous connections or ties with the Islamic movement, or with any other organizations?

[Al-Shaqaqi] The young men who founded Jihad came from Islamic movements, and from certain nationalist orientations, while others were independents. There was no breakaway formation or schism from any Islamic or nationalist organization.

[Al-Tamimi] What about Jihad [military] detachments? Are they connected with you?

[Al-Shaqaqi] Jihad detachments [saraya al-Jihad] is a name, and not a specific organization. This name was chosen in 1985-86, in order that our jihad operations could be announced under that name. These operations were conducted in coordination with certain Islamists within Fatah, particularly the two martyrs, Hamdi and Abu-Hasan, who were killed in Cyprus in 1988.

Sidon Leader on Palestinian-Lebanese Relations

91AE0397A Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic
5 May 91 pp 19-20

[AL-HURRIYAH interview with Mu'in Shabaytah, Fatah representative in Lebanon, in Sidon; date not given: "On the Palestinian Presence, Its Worries and Its Relations With the Lebanese Government"]

[Text] After our interview with Mustafa Ma'ruf Sa'd, head of the Popular Nasirite Organization, we interviewed a number of Palestinian officials in Lebanon. The following is an interview we conducted with Mu'in Shabaytah (Abu-Iyad), the Fatah movement's representative in the Lebanese region.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Following the cabinet's recent decision to dissolve Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and statements by official and unofficial Lebanese sources equating Palestinian weapons and Lebanese militia weapons, what is the Palestinian position on this decision?

[Shabaytah] First, Palestinian weapons are weapons that belong to a cause, not domestic weapons. These weapons have been used in fighting the Zionist enemy and his hirelings to free Palestine and liberate land. Never have they been domestic weapons.

Second, these weapons are located on the Lebanese scene until the Palestinian cause matures and solutions acceptable to the Palestinian people and its leaders are granted; then these weapons will withdraw into the Palestinian state that will obtain its independence.

Third, the weapons located on the Lebanese scene were approved by an Arab League charter issued in 1964. The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and armed struggle is the way to liberate Palestine.

We therefore say to the legitimate government that we are not against deploying the army over all Lebanese territory. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that attention is being paid to Palestinian weapons, while Lahd's weapons and Israeli weapons are still on Lebanese territory. By no logic, either regional or domestic, can Palestinian weapons be taken away while part of Lebanon remains occupied by the Israeli enemy. Our weapons are a component of resistance, of liberating the South, and of liberating Palestine.

Furthermore, we affirm that these weapons are disciplined and engaged in a definite direction—fighting the Zionist enemy and the enemies of the Palestinian people. They are engaged in protecting the Palestinian people and the Palestinian camps. We have had many experiences in this field—we need only mention the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres. Our Palestinian people have been burned by plots and conspiracies.

[AL-HURRIYAH] There have recently been many Palestinian calls, justifiably, for the Lebanese government to negotiate with the PLO to arrange relations on the basis of reciprocal commitments, obligations, and rights, so as to guarantee the welfare of the two peoples. What is the outlook for this dialogue?

[Shabaytah] The Lebanese government must affirm that there is a concentrated Palestinian presence on the Lebanese scene. This concentrated presence is here not by its own will. If it had a homeland, it would not remain

here. Thus, there must be a solution—a just solution, not just any solution. The solutions proposed by America and Israel, or even by the reactionary Arab regimes, are humiliating to the Palestinian people. Thus, until there is a just solution for our people, we ask the Lebanese government to hold a dialogue; otherwise, how can the weapons or the Palestinian presence be regulated?

[AL-HURRIYAH] After the American administration's alleged victory over the Iraqi people, the attack has begun to turn in the direction of the PLO in an attempt to nullify its role as sole representative of the Palestinian people. What is your view of this?

[Shabaytah] This is not the first time that the PLO has been a target of the United States or of a Western imperialist attack. Contemporary and modern history testify to many stages of this imperialist attack on the national identity of the Palestinian people. I would mention the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, and the 29 November partition of Palestine. All were historical stages in which the colonial nations cooperated to strike at the national identity of the Palestinian people. This attack has continued unabated since the Palestinian revolution was launched in 1965. There was the battle of al-Karamah, the September massacres, the Lebanese civil war, the 1978 invasion, and the 1982 invasion. All these stages aimed at hitting and erasing the PLO. So we say that the Palestinian cause has been a target for a long time. The PLO came to embody this cause and this identity; so now there is also an attempt to erase the PLO or make it conform in the context of what has been termed the American victory in the Gulf war. Naturally, the gun that fights the enemy and American imperialism is targeted, particularly since this gun has hosted many liberation movements in its camps since the beginning of this revolution. No wonder that this cause has been targeted by American imperialism!

[AL-HURRIYAH] There is currently a discussion about the PNC and the possibility of electing its members. What do you think about electing the representatives of the Palestinian community in Lebanon?

[Shabaytah] All PNC members are appointed. How can I hold elections in the occupied territory, Syria, or Jordan, where there are difficulties that prevent holding elections? If the Lebanese government, on its own soil and in its own land, appoints parliamentary deputies, what about a scattered people? What shall I say to Palestinians in America? What shall I say to Palestinians who have migrated to Sweden and Denmark to escape from a stifling economic crisis? What shall I say to Palestinians throughout the world? For there to be free democratic elections, I must have a homeland where I can stand firmly. How can I guarantee that the elections will not be dictated by the local authorities in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon? Democratic elections can take place only on the soil of Palestine. That is the reason for appointment. As regards the Palestinians in Lebanon, perhaps the number [of representatives] is insufficient.

One might ask for a larger number of representatives for us in the PNC. As for having the masses participate in national policy, the truth is that for more than a year and a half there has been an unparalleled opening to the Palestinian masses. One need only mention the fact that the popular committees represent not only the [armed] groups, but all the popular associations. We have made use of neighborhood committees, which are independent and represent independent figures and personalities. The neighborhood committees have entered into the popular committees. So we say that there is freedom. Although there are some incidents that have disturbed Palestinian security, I confidently say that the Palestinian revolution is the only revolution that still continues on soil not its own. This has made the revolution the target of Arab interference that sometimes enters through splits in the body of the Palestinian resistance. We are working hard to maintain discipline. The PLO's revolutionary court and revolutionary judiciary have ruled against many people who have been proved to have disturbed security, either Palestinian security or the security of Sidon.

[AL-HURRIYAH] In the course of your conversation, you mentioned that there was an opening to the Palestinian masses. Before that, you mentioned that Palestinian youths were emigrating to distant countries to escape the economic crisis. Since the PLO leadership realizes the extent of the problem, what solutions has it proposed?

[Shabaytah] We have to realize that people emigrate not only because of financial crisis. There are many other reasons, some related to security and economics, others having to do with love of adventure. It is not just because there is fear. Don't forget that the PLO is under siege. One need only mention that for over a year or slightly more the oil countries haven't given the PLO a single penny in aid. Instead, they have begun giving aid to the other Islamic organizations. Don't forget the intifadah and how many millions of dollars of expenditure it needs. If the PLO does not hasten to support the intifadah and its movement, how can the intifadah continue? The leaders of the PLO are overburdened with worries. Our people in Lebanon have been under siege since after the 1982 war. It has been a bitter siege. One need only mention, as you doubtlessly know, that thousands of our sons and family members and people were imprisoned in Syrian jails, and hundreds are still there. These people are of working age, the age when they could provide and improve the economic living conditions of their families. When they were arrested, the other son, although unable to work, was forced to look for other areas of work. Intelligence agencies also play a part in facilitating the operation of forcing citizens to emigrate and of depriving the revolution of fighting, nationalistic youths. This is one of the attempts aimed at effacing the PLO so as to deprive it of an effective, fighting arm and to portray the lands of emigration as countries of butter and honey. Unfortunately, when young people arrive in these countries, they collide with the bitter reality. It is a life more like that of a vagrant than a life of self-esteem.

and honor—a life of humiliation, banishment, and emigration a second and third time. Furthermore, some young people stray into European ways, either morally, sexually, in behavior, or in using drugs. What has the PLO done? It has striven to the extent of its power and within its resources and is still striving to solve this problem. There are thousands of recruits on the PLO's rolls. Some are old, some are widows, some are disabled, some are handicapped persons who receive allowances and salaries. There is the Organization of Families of Martyrs, that used to offer assistance, whether the martyr was civilian or military. In this organization they are not all victims of military battles.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Since the Palestinian peace initiative was authorized as a basis for the Palestinian national struggle, the Fatah movement in particular has avoided military operations launched from the South. Is armed struggle incompatible with this peace initiative?

[Shabaytah] First, armed struggle is a strategic, not a tactical action. Sometimes we need political action, because our struggle with the Zionist enemy is not only a struggle with Katyusha rockets and guns, but also an intellectual and political struggle. I have to enter the heart and mind of every citizen who sympathizes with the Zionist entity. One enters into the hearts and minds of American, Australian, African, and Asian citizens by political proposals. I must tell these citizens that I am not a terrorist, that I do not love to shoot as a hobby or as part of my life, but turn to armed struggle when the world obstinately refuses to recognize my natural right to have a homeland and an identity. The gun is a strategic goal, not a tactical one—a strategic means, not a tactic. Although we have sometimes put political action ahead of military, when the circumstances are ready for military action to implement a political objective, we in the Fatah movement will spare no effort in this domain. The question of political or military activity is not tied up with specific dates, but with specific factors. The question is how I am to enter into the mind of citizens who have given themselves to the Zionist entity. That is why it is important for me to work politically. How else did I convince the world to recognize the state of Palestine? Talk of this came not only because of guns; it also came because of unflagging political workers. Guns without political action are like highwaymen.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What is your assessment of the joint experience of the Lebanese national resistance and the Palestinian resistance?

[Shabaytah] Certainly, in the past there was a period when Palestinian-Lebanese military activity flourished. It was a period of siege for the conspirators against Palestinian and Lebanese national activity. Then came the Gulf war and its results. Now the counterattack has begun—the two-part imperialist, American attack. Its first part aims at hegemony and control over the capacities and talents of the peoples of the region. The second part is to preserve the safety and security of the Zionist entity and prolong its life as long as possible. In this area

two things are required. First, the Arab regimes must be tamed and intimidated. The bombing of fraternal Iraq and the plot to divide and fragment confirm this. Thank God, it will emerge from it healthy! It is also a process of intimidating and taming—of concentrating military bases in Bahrain or in Saudi Arabia. Bases will perhaps be placed on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. There is talk of American bases to be established in the Jawlan. The second part is the campaign to strike at and erase the PLO through regional conspiracies. Israel and Egypt are to sit down, then Israel and Syria, then Israel and Saudi Arabia. In other words, the Arab states are to come to Israel, not the other way around—assuming, of course, that the PLO is erased; which God forbid! America would then have guaranteed Israel's survival for many years to come. In all this action of theirs, they overlook the will of the peoples. But the will of the peoples will not be subjugated.

Hamas Representative on PLO, PNC, Elections

91AE0412B Amman AL-RIBAT in Arabic 14 May 91 p 4

[Interview with Hamas Representative Engineer Ibrahim Ghawshah, by 'Ali Naji: "Hamas Representative Comments on AL-RIBAT's Interview with 'Arafat;" first paragraph AL-RIBAT's introduction; place and date not given]

[Text] In a previous edition, AL-RIBAT published the text of an interview with Yasir 'Arafat. In view of the interview mentioning the subject of Hamas representation in the Palestine National Council (PNC), and 'Arafat's insistence that Hamas is represented in it, we asked Engineer Ibrahim Ghawshah, the representative of the Hamas Movement, the following questions:

[Naji] Despite the denial by the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, that it is represented in the PNC, 'Arafat insists that it is represented. What is your comment on that?

[Ghawshah] More than once, we have stressed in numerous statements, as well as to our brothers in the Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Abu-'Ammar ['Arafat] himself, that Hamas has no representation in the PNC, or in any PLO institution. We want to make it clear that in the 18th session, and in light of the acceptance of the Palestinian Communist Party, Fatah introduced four independent Islamists, who were neither from the Muslim Brotherhood nor Hamas. One of them had belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, but he left them 10 years ago. He also lost no time in resigning directly from the PNC after that 18th session. The second returned from Algiers before the PNC session was convened, and took no part in it. The third is a member of Fatah, and has Islamic tendencies, and the fourth is an Islamist, who attends the National and Central Councils. The fifth and last has been a Fatah member for a long time, but is an Islamist and supports Hamas policies.

[Naji] What about the seat of the deceased Khalil al-Wazir, which Abu-'Ammar says is being appealed?

[Ghawshah] We are proud, in every sense of the word, of the deceased Abu-Jihad's seat, which Abu-'Ammar presented to the Hamas Movement, especially since Abu-Jihad was born and raised in the arms of the Islamic movement. We emphasize that the Hamas Movement, when it demands its true size, reflected by the Palestinian scene both at home and abroad—and which is its right, in accordance with democratic standards—will only demand that in order to sincerely express the views of the Palestinian people, out of commitment to their doctrine, sanctity, nation, and sole pathway in jihad and martyrdom, no matter how long a time or how high the cost.

[Naji] It was observed in the interview with Abu-'Ammar that there was a likeness between Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement with regard to talk about representation in the PNC. Do you see any specific evidence of that?

[Ghawshah] Some people fall into an error, either with good intentions or otherwise, when they compare the power of Hamas among the Palestinian people with other Islamic organizations. We are proud of every genuine Islamic movement—which we recognize is itself of modest size—when they meet with Hamas under the aegis of the program of Islamic coordination and cooperation. Moreover, some are concerned about dwelling on the fact that Hamas is a new Palestinian Islamic movement, only as old as the intifadah. I have made it clear, and Abu-al-Adib has also discussed this matter in a recent interview, that the Hamas Movement's roots go back to the first stages of jihad in 1936 and 1948, during which the brethren's mujahidin plunged into a holy jihad against the English and the Jews. The movement then participated in jihadist activities in the northern bases along with Fatah, in 1968-70 and other times.

[Naji] 'Arafat stated that you have been invited to take part in the preparatory committee, which will be convened to form the new PNC. What is your position vis-a-vis participation?

[Ghawshah] We submitted a memorandum to the PNC speaker on behalf of the Hamas Movement nearly a year ago, in which we set forth the movement's unshakable factors and conditions for entry into the Council and the PLO's institutions. We made it clear that, as an ideological Islamic movement, we could not enter the PNC in light of the Algiers resolutions of 1988, which recognized the state of the Zionist entity, and relinquished more than three-fourths of the area of Palestine. This position is part of our beliefs that cannot in any case be circumvented. Brother Abu-'Ammar stressed in his interview with AL-RIBAT that "America and Israel have buried the Palestinian peace initiative, because they don't want a peaceful, political solution, but only want surrender." We agree with Abu-'Ammar in this regard, and we call on our brothers in Fatah, with sincere hearts, to abandon

the Palestinian peace initiative, by the Executive Committee's submitting it to the current Central Council, and obtaining its approval, preparatory to its sanction by the new PNC. We do not think that this is impossible, so long as intentions and unity of efforts are sincere.

[Naji] With regard to discussing the new PNC, does Hamas have a specific concept about a mechanism for representation of new members of the people's sectors, and about the proposed ratio for internal and external people?

[Ghawshah] The Hamas Movement believes that representation of Palestinians in foreign areas is important to the same degree as in the internal area. The accuracy and validity of internal representation gives strength of credibility to foreign representation. In other words, the PNC must give a true democratic expression of the representation of the Palestinian people at home and abroad. The new council is capable of sanctioning the correct policy for whatever these people want. We think free, honest elections should be held in all the Palestinian people's meeting places, and we will accept Hamas (the Islamic Movement)'s percentage of representation, whether it be 5 percent or 50 percent, if elections are held. While Hamas believes that its representational strength ranges between 40 and 50 percent, it has not expressed that arbitrarily, but only in light of election results in the people's federations and unions, held both at home and abroad, which confirm the credibility of this percentage.

Arab Groups Demand Inquest Into Prison Treatment

91AE0420A Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 May 91 p 12

[Communique by the Jerusalem-based League of Arab Journalists, and Arab Lawyers Committee: "'Nitsan' Called Graveyard for the Living;" first paragraph FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH introduction; Jerusalem; 8 May 1991]

[Text] A joint statement by the League of Arab Journalists, Jerusalem, and the Arab Lawyers Committee, Jerusalem, calls for the formation of a neutral, international committee of inquiry, concerned with investigating the crude and persistent Israeli violations of the rights of Palestinian prisoners. Perhaps, at least, it could replace the 'asbestos' with wood in Junid Prison. Here is the text of the communique:

From the first hour of the occupation, the authorities have made daily arrests of individuals and groups among the Palestinian people, in their villages, towns, and refugee camps.

The numbers of Palestinian detainees began to increase, until it reached a climax with the launching of the Palestinian intifadah, along with an increase in acts of resistance to the occupation. The number of Palestinian

detainees in Israeli central and military jails has reached approximately 17,000. Note that the annual arrests total almost 40,000 cases.

At the beginning of the occupation, Palestinian detainees contended that they were prisoners of war, and should be treated on that basis. However, the occupying power rejected that, and gave them a new name, "security detainees." The Palestinian prisoners boldly embarked on measures to change the detention circumstances, demanding a minimum level of humane treatment. For that, scores of them fell as martyrs.

Palestinian prisoners used many ways to struggle, and their levels varied. They declared hunger strikes on numerous occasions, for differing periods of time. Some of them chose to die of starvation rather than live in shame and degradation. The battle of starvation was a battle of living consciences for all those concerned with the humanity of man.

Always, their demands were simple and not impossible: they may be summarized by a demand for more sunshine, pure air, and acceptable medical treatment; lifting the social and cultural blockade around them; valid conditions of arrest; prevention of overcrowding in cells; no sleeping on the floor; eating food in a special dining room, instead of in the place where they sleep; and an end to the policy of provocations, bodily violence, and spraying and suffocation with internationally condemned gas.

The following is a brief description of the conditions of Palestinian detainees in Israeli internment camps:

1. From the beginning, the depriving prisoners of religious rites, banning Friday sermons, and reducing the numbers of worshippers permitted;

2. Imposing emergency laws and daily conditions, and depriving prisoners of their acquisitions, under the pretext of a state of emergency. For example:

a. Reducing the exercise period in all prisons to one hour per day;

b. Withdrawing televisions, radios, and the exercise hour, and preventing visits between cells and different sections of the prison, and often using these two practices as pressure tactics, while threatening to withdraw them completely;

c. Neglecting medical care, which includes [a policy of] not operating on prisoners, on the grounds that operations must be done at the prisoners' own expense;

3. Practicing violence, beating prisoners, smashing limbs, and fracturing skulls, on groundless pretexts;

4. Reducing supplies of cleaning materials and food-stuffs, stealing sums of money, and demanding that the detainees procure these things from the "canteen;"

5. Not providing uniforms from storerooms, and demanding that the detainees procure the same kind and color from relatives;

6. Cutting off cold and hot water, sometimes for periods of more than 10 days, as a means of collective punishment, as well as using widespread individual and collective punishment against prisoners for long periods of time, cutting off electricity from some cells during the day, and withdrawing electricity cables, so as not to give an opportunity to prepare tea or coffee;

7. Imposing a cultural blockade:

a. Banning the entry of books into prisons;

b. Banning celebrations and expressing opinions on various national holidays;

8. Undertaking cell searches twice a day, on the pretext of security and prevention of escape, at which time oil is mixed with sugar, coffee, and salt, wardrobes overturned, and ashtrays dumped on the mats;

9. Searching prisoners, especially naked-body searches during transfers, whose purpose is to abuse the prisoners' dignity and feelings;

10. Overcrowding prisons:

a. Cramming a number of prisoners in a small cell that is inadequate for the number of prisoners;

b. Sleeping on the floor;

11. Banning visits to military prisons, such as the Negev and Megiddo, and declaring them military areas;

12. Reducing provisions, on the pretext of prison budget reductions;

13. Imposing a policy of solitary confinement, particularly in Nitsan, which the prisoners consider a graveyard for the living;

14. Killing prisoners as a result of bodily torture in underground interrogation cellars and prison cells;

15. Attempting to damage the relationship between lawyer and client, by putting restrictions on lawyers' visiting their clients;

16. Detaining a number of prisoners who have completed their sentences, especially those arrested on the borders;

17. Instituting measures that block and delay required treatment for many detainees who are ill, constituting a real danger to their lives.

Accordingly, we stress the need to achieve the following just demands:

1. Form a neutral, international committee, from agencies concerned with human and prisoner rights. There would be no objection to having Israeli and Palestinian agencies in this formation;
2. Remove asbestos from Junid Prison, and if that is impossible, replace it with wood;
3. Allow the entry of cultural books and recordings into prisons;
4. Provide or improve dining rooms and dining tables, instead of having prisoners eat and sleep in the same room.
5. Provide sunshine, air, and food as vital human necessities;
6. Improve circumstances for family visits, and add sufficient time, in the event the visitors come from abroad;
7. Cease provocative search campaigns;
8. Provide enough hot water to achieve a minimum level of cleanliness, in order to prevent the spread of disease;
9. Provide adequate ventilation and light;
10. Stop the reduction in the supply of cleaning materials;
11. Provide shelves and wardrobes for clothing;
12. Cease random transfers, inform prisoners of transfers in advance, and permit them to inform relatives of their transfer;
13. Allow lawyers sufficient time for visits, and improve visit conditions;
14. Set a date for appeals, as rapidly as requested, for administrative detainees;
15. Bring specialized doctors into the prisons, and stop treatment with the magical aspirin substitute [*al-Akmul*].

ALGERIA

Minister Warns Against Violence, Foreign Intelligence

91AA0375A Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 23 Apr 91 p 1

[Text] (ANA) Interior Minister Mohamed Salah Mohammadi emphasized, in a television interview on HIWAR [Dialogue], that the government is determined to restore the people's trust in the holding of advanced legislative elections on 27 June 1991.

Responding to questions posed by the program's host, the minister said that "we are not willing to relinquish power without waging an election campaign."

The interior minister disapproved of the parties' opposition to the Elections Law and the Electoral Districting

[taqsim] Law, given that the democratic parties' recommendations were incorporated [in the two laws]. He stated that one should not become alarmed over the Islamic Salvation Front's statement that "our base is broad."

The minister added: "No political leader is to be blamed for violent acts committed in the name of religion and for imported traditions. However, some political leaders have played a role in these phenomena."

The minister stated there is a major conspiracy against Islam, and that responsibility for this conspiracy lies with a group that is in daily contact with foreign interests.

The people must be aware of the danger of this situation, which stems from the collusion of foreign intelligence agencies with some elements in the country.

Mr. Mohammadi pointed to another type of violence, which is represented in extremism, and the violence of the political sermon, which generates violence, especially among youths, and, consequently, the perpetration of crimes of all types.

The minister questioned whether the call to civil disobedience was justified at a time when the door to acquisition of power has been opened. He concluded by calling on youths to preserve the nation's security and to avoid inclining toward what comes to them from abroad and from different directions, especially in the country's current circumstances.

Daily Publishes Text of FLN-FIS Televised Debate

91AA0402A Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 8, 9 May 91

[Text of Televised Debate Between FLN's Abdelhamid Mehri and FIS's Abassi Madani, with Morad Shibin as Moderator; "Mehri and Madani in Debate Between Two Fronts; Mehri: Elections Tailored to People, not Parties; Abassi: Either Our Terms Are Accepted or There Will Be a Strike; Mehri: Your Radical Language Nurtures Excesses and Violence; Abassi: Statement on Conflict in FIS Is Result of Naivete of Some in Consultative Council, and They Will Deny It; Mehri: Call for Political Strike Does not Serve Democratic March; Abassi: Let Elections Be Legislative and Presidential Simultaneously or There Will Be a Strike"]

[8 May p 5]

[Text] [Mehri] Before we pursue the forthcoming legislative elections which will be held prematurely, I believe that a number of parties, led by the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], are demanding that we take another step on the path of transforming the one-party system into a multi-party system. Our view is that the demand is very important because we believe that this is the sphere in

which party pluralism will find its real meaning. Debate between the parties in the legislative council after the elections are held will be a debate on the country's objective problems. But now, this dialogue between the parties often strays from the country's real problems to center on marginal issues. If you want an answer to your question, we want these elections tailored to suit the people, not to suit any party whatsoever.

[Shibin] How about you, Mr. Abassi Madani?

[Madani] The fact is that judgment on anything must be based on given facts. If we examine the preludes presented by the government in drafting the two electoral laws, we find that the elections have been tailored for the ruling party and definitely not for pluralism. I don't know what to name or call a law that divides Algeria's territories according to the logic that says "as much for the mouse as for the elephant." Let me give you examples. There are two municipalities that are close to each other: (El Bouni), near Annaba, has a population of 120,000 people and is represented by one deputy and Ain Berd, which is adjacent to El Bouni, has a population of 2,000 people and is also represented by one deputy. This means that 2,000 people are equal to 120,000 people! On the basis of what logic or what law have these districts been divided? They have said: We are the ruling party, we divide as we deem fit, and we promulgate laws as we see fit. The truth is that if the ruling party is the party that promulgates the law and if the law is a one-party law, then pluralism has no meaning. The same applies to the second law which gives control to a single party, i.e., to the regime. We do not say that the election is as we wish it but rather that it has been rigged even before it takes place. I don't at all believe that the administration... The fact is that we should not tell you that the regime should have been objective. What is this new language? The minister of interior says: We are not prepared to give up power easily. Is this, Mr. Mehri, may God keep you, the mentality of a pluralism founded on justice and on a liberty that allows the Algerian people to be free, and they are entitled to be free with all the sacrifices they have made for their freedom. The promulgation of these two laws is tantamount to an attack on the people's freedom and sovereignty and on our country's unity and it has not taken into account the possibility of the revival of tribalism [al-'urushiyah] or the need to rely on individualism, not on programs. The truth is that these endeavors have demonstrated the regime's insincerity on the issue of pluralism.

[Shibin] Mr. Mehri, what is your response to this?

[Mehri] Negative features may, of course, surface in any law when it is applied. I say that there is no party that has problems with Algerians who have one (seat) and Algerians who have two (seats). It is assumed that we know how Algerians will vote in the forthcoming elections and that we have given our supporters a number of seats and denied such seats to others. The fact is that Mr. Abassi Madani, because he was in the FLN until 1974, I believe, and he was a deputy in the Provincial People's Council

for Algiers, the capital, is aware that the problems of tribalism are present to this moment in the same party and he knows that everybody is aware of the difficulty we endured in reconciling strugglers in the same party and sons of the same front. Thus, the law does not create the social structure. Rather, social structure creates the law. If we have gone along with the social structure, then we have done so because it is a reality. What is important is that we do not totally submit to the logic of this structure. As for the redistricting mentioned by brother Abassi Madani, it encompasses other things. It expands representation and it gives the underprivileged areas a bigger opportunity. It is the experience of the Latin American countries that the fortunate are concentrated in the major urban centers and that in addition to all their privileges, they are enabled to make the political decision and awarded a larger number of seats. This is what I want to correct. The less-developed and less-advanced districts have been given the opportunity to be present at the decision-making. Our brothers in the south have always complained—and this has been instigated by colonialism—that their districts provide 96 percent of Algeria's wealth, that they are underprivileged, and that their share is small. This instigation exists and we, on our part, are moving to block all pretexts.

[Madani] I don't think that either the scientific or historical justifications you have offered are convincing. El Bouni and Ain Berd, which I have cited as an example, are both in the north. Tribalism surfaced under the FLN. During the revolution, the FLN opposed the secessionist tendency. But after the revolution, the FLN stirred this tendency, and it is responsible for stirring it. Neither I nor anybody else can absolve the FLN of this responsibility. However, the current redistricting has taken into its account the FLN map, i.e., the conflict map. What is regrettable, brother Mehri, is the promulgation of laws through one's party identity. The government was supposed to have remained neutral. I and all the Algerians have heard you say that you are the ruling party. The fact is that the rule belongs to Algeria, not to you. Government is established when an individual or a group that gains power implements the program on whose basis he has been elected and when the government belongs to all. The government cannot belong to the party. We notice that the parliament that has passed and ratified these laws is the one-party parliament and that the criteria and objectives serve the one party. We regret that this plan continues to exist. I will refer to another issue that is more serious. We are actually living the tragedy of lying to the people. After the October incidents, the leadership promised that everything will change on the basis of the people's will. But what has happened is that the regime has sought to stay in power in spite of the people's will. To the regime's credit, we should note that the [previous] election was free. But when the results appeared, the municipalities' powers were taken away and given to the daira [district]. This is tantamount to post-election counterfeiting. This is why we have raised the question: If we go to the parliament with an overwhelming majority, how do we know that

the parliament's powers will not be withdrawn and the parliament will not be restricted by all sorts of shackles? This is why the FIS is raising the presidency issue and the need to change the president who is 'Jiha's nail' in the political issue. Unless President Bendjedid is replaced and unless a new president is elected, the political problem will never be solved. These elections and slogans are worthless unless we start from the beginning. We now realize that it is not the FLN and we believe that the FLN suffers from the same problem because the president has not nominated candidates according to the FLN's wish. The proof is in the conflicts within the FLN. The problem is that the FLN continues to have loyal people who are more concerned with the country's interest than with Chadli Bendjedid's personal interest. These people, all of us, and everybody who has a patriotic conscience must raise the issue of replacing the president through election. We believe that (presidential elections should be held) either prior to or simultaneously with the legislative elections. Unless the presidential (ballot box is passed the way the wilaya box was passed), the elections will be meaningless. ing a clear question: Will the FIS take part in the forthcoming elections or not?

[Madani] It will take part, but on condition.

[Mehri] And if this condition is not met?

[Madani] If it is not met, then we, as a political party, must take a political position with the Algerian people. But if you agree to a referendum, then we are prepared to submit to the people for a referendum. Why do you marginalize the people?

[Mehri] I am asking: Will you take part or not?

[Madani] Yes, we will participate, and we are entitled to it. But there has to be guarantees.

[Mehri] Okay. So a condition is demanded by a party from a national assembly. True?

[Madani] We will call for a strike. If we opt for a strike, it is because we still seek dialogue. We do not want a revolution and we do not want our blood to be shed. The soldier is our son and the policeman is our son. One brother may not strike another. We wish to solve our problems through dialogue and on the basis of understanding. We wish to refer our issue to God and the apostle or refer it to the people. We have the referendum [tradition]. So why haven't you submitted the two laws to the Algerian people for a referendum and why isn't this problem, namely the presidential issue, also submitted to a referendum? You know the constitution. Read it. How was Bedjedid given all the powers, thus rendering the parliament absolutely worthless, unless it agrees with the president's will?

[Mehri] Mr. Abassi, your problem is not just the problem of elections. It is first the problem of elections, then of the president, and then of the constitution. This means that you are not pleased with anything. Say it frankly.

When a law containing flaws is promulgated, you say: We want a bloody revolution. Why a bloody revolution and why the call for a bloody revolution? Are the Algerian people prepared to stage a bloody revolution for the sake of election arrangements, regardless of whether the circle urging the revolution is the FIS or any other party? This is why we say that threats have no place to even be mentioned at a political meeting. The Algerian people experienced revolution and they are aware of its ordeals and meaning. They also know how to engage in political debate. Why didn't the FIS raise the presidential election issue previously? The FIS came to the National Assembly and expressed its opinion. This means that there is a sovereign assembly. You call it the FLN assembly and it is my opinion that it is the legitimate assembly until it is replaced. The proof of this is that it has promulgated numerous laws, including the parties law. We are required to take these steps under the canopy of security. After a date was set for the legislative elections—elections which you had demanded and which you had tried to turn into a subject of conflict, threatening that this and that will be done unless these elections are held—you said that the laws are not fit and that we need presidential elections. Now you say that the constitution is also unfit. So you want to blow up everything in existence. Say frankly that everything existing now is unfit and then we will debate the issue on this basis.

[Madani] I thank you, anyway. We have said that if we want to think with the logic of history, then the people have been denied the right to express their will and their wish in selecting the political leadership and regime. This means that the door of history has been shut in their face. I believe that the people are entitled to rebel. But we have adopted parties as political frameworks in order to permit the Algerian people to express their will through these parties. When you call for a march, the response should be positive but when we call for a march, the response should be negative. When you advocate a strike, the response should be positive but when we advocate it, the response should be negative. It is as if your violence is an act of compassion and our dialogue is a rebellion! No, I don't think that there is a justification for this. We adhere to legitimacy and to logic. Is the president supported? Is he entitled to impose himself on the people? If the Algerian people say no to Bendjedid, then it is no to Bendjedid. We do not have a monarchy. I believe that it has become necessary to tell you that if the regime had not rigged up the municipal and wilaya elections by withdrawing the [municipal] powers, we would have been content with the promises made by President Bendjedid. But considering that he has breached his pledges regarding the lower institutions, how would he fulfill his promises in connection with higher and more important issues? The fact is that this issue is connected with the meetings we have had with the president. Prior to and during the Gulf war, he had expressed his readiness for change. But since the Gulf events, the regime's language has, regrettably, changed. Now that this language has changed, the only thing left

for us is struggle. But we have chosen organized struggle and a legitimate position. We opt for strike and for a peaceful, disciplined, and organized march. I believe that the people are entitled to defend their right. "Why have you enslaved people who were born free" is what 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab asked.

[Mehri] Mr. Abassi Madani, have you set a date for this strike?

[Madani] The date has not been set. We are still awaiting President Chadli Bendjedid's response. He hasn't responded in writing or orally and neither the regime nor the party has called yet. It is as if the FIS has been screaming in a different valley.

[Mehri] Brother Abassi Madani says that the president has many powers. I cannot imagine that he is making an unconstitutional demand on the president. Madani is asking him to repeal laws promulgated by the legislative National Assembly. This does not fall within the president's powers and the president is not empowered to repeal laws.

[Madani] (Interrupting) But he has the right to refer the issue to a referendum.

[Mehri] The law is above all. Even the president is subject to the law. You are asking him to do the impossible. You are asking him to violate the constitution and to trample on the laws. This is in conflict with the idea about which you are talking. On the one hand, you say that the president has many powers and, on the other hand, you are launching a full campaign for the president to violate the law. The president is not entitled to alter or replace a law ratified by the National Assembly. It is the opinion of one party to base its demand for premature presidential elections on the fact that the laws are not altered. But there is in the country another opinion to the effect that it is in the country's interest for the change to take place gradually. You have mentioned the municipal elections and you have touched on the municipal powers. I recall that prior to those elections, everything you wrote about the laws promulgated by the National Assembly in connection with the elections said that those laws sought to forge the people's will and that the laws were tailored by the single party to fit the single party. It then became evident that those laws applied democracy and gave the victory not to the one party but to another party, namely your party. When the elections were over, we instructed our strugglers in the municipalities to cooperate in solving the people's problems, regardless of who the party with the majority is. At a meeting you had with the prime minister, he offered to hold other meetings with you to familiarize the new deputies with the principles of management and to train them on management. Several seminars were actually held. But on the way, you declared that the municipalities were boycotting the government. We have some testimony, which I am not going to confirm, by people who were FIS members and

municipal officials and who were asked to freeze some projects so that it could be proven that the FIS was indispensable.

[Madani] (Interrupting) Did any FIS group go to any non-Islamic municipality and shut it down? Your strugglers did come and shut down some [Islamic] municipalities.

As for the (prime minister), we are the ones who proposed the training seminars to him, not vice versa.

[Mehri] And did the government hold those seminars or not?

[Madani] What did the government do? [Words missing] if they were private, not joint between the two sides. You created two authorities: An elected base authority and a central authority with which you smothered the base authority. Everybody is aware of these issues. Isn't it better to create a climate of cooperation that serves the citizen's interest?

[Mehri] This is what we are demanding.

[Madani] But who is it that has taken mayors to the courts? Was any mayor in Algeria's history referred to the courts when mayors accepted bribery? When bribery was prohibited and when affairs came to be run ethically, mayors were taken to the courts! Here are lists of the governors, whom you wanted to be custodians of the election, who fabricated cases and referred mayors to the courts. We are now living under suppression in the name of suppression. It has not been police suppression but legal suppression.

[Mehri] The reason cases are taken to the courts is a number of actions in the municipalities and elsewhere. Is it any bother to Islam to have simple symbols of the independent Algeria? What is the top priority that makes us remove the slogan of "from the people to the people" from the municipalities? What are the priorities that make us remove the president's pictures? What are the priorities that make the struggle always center on these issues?

[Madani] If they removed the slogan of "from the people to the people," it is because this is not an [Algerian] symbol. It is a communist symbol. Was it present on 1 November? This slogan was not present when "Allah is great" was present in the Ouras. This slogan came from Cuba, from a communist party, and was planted in our path. We have "there is no god but God" and we have Islam. The posted Koran verses are sounder and greater and they come from the venerable Koran. Verses from the Koran were placed on the expressway and they ordered that they be removed. Who has empowered you to change the course of values from a course of Islamic revolutionary values to a course of communist slogans?

[Mehri] (Interrupting) At the time when things changed, we were together. You did not leave the FLN until 1973. Weren't you a member of the People's Council of the Wilaya [province] of El Djazair?

[Madani] It is true that I took part in the wilaya's first provincial council. But we were in conflict and I was not one of the strugglers following your line. Islam is the basis of our revolution (and of) the 1 November proclamation. We took up arms and swore not to lay them down until a free and independent Algerian state was founded on the basis of Islamic principles. Do you deny this, Mr. Mehri?

[9 May p 5]

[Text] [Shibin] It is certain that you are not the only two in Algeria's political arena today. Perhaps you disagree on numerous issues and agree on other issues. The common thing between you is that the other parties say that both the FIS and FLN scare the people with one another. The FLN tells society: Here is the alternative (FIS), beware of it. The FIS says the same thing about the FLN. So what do you two say?

[Madani] When this is said about the post-1962 FLN, then those who say it may be right. When it is said about the FIS, then the FIS has not ruled, and who knows that it will? By what law does a man judge a future that has not yet materialized? By what logic?

[Mehri] By God, what I hear from the people is: The FIS has not ruled and yet some terrible things have issued forth from it. I will cite, for example, all the excesses and feuds going on in mosques, the acts perpetrated in the martyrs' cemeteries, and all the actions that try to correct society with violence. The FIS disavows all these things but I say that the radical language is what nurtures these acts and provides them with cover. So, the FIS is responsible. The mosques have been aware of this fact for more than three years. After uttering the phrase "in the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate," the Koran verse says: "Nor speak ill of each other behind their backs. Would any of you like to eat the flesh of his dead brother? Nay, ye would abhor it" [Koran, 49:12]. The Koran describes speaking ill of others behind their back as eating the flesh of one's dead brother. In a hadith transmitted by al-Bukhari, speaking ill of others is characterized as mentioning about others that which they abhor. The apostle, God's peace and prayers be upon him, was asked: "Have you seen in my brother that of which I speak?" The apostle answered: "If your brother has that of which you speak, you have spoken ill of your brother behind his back and if he does not have it, you have lied about him." How can one justify the fact that the language used in mosques currently is a language of vilifying the FLN as an organization and as individuals. They have vilified individuals in mosques in the name of and under the cover of Islam, using the basest characteristics to revile them. If these are the means of preaching Islam, the people are entitled to ask: If the FIS commits such acts when it is just in the opposition, how will it act if it gains control of the means of suppression?

[Madani] I will answer you, Mr. Mehri. You accuse the FIS of having burnt corpses whereas you are the ones who did this thing prior to the election campaign. FLN

strugglers in the town of (Jelfa) perpetrated this crime. Is it possible that a Muslim would dig out a corpse, regardless of whether it belongs to a martyr or to somebody else? Rather, you are the ones who committed a premeditated act against the Shari'ah. You cannot deny that you moved the martyrs' bodies from their graves to false cemeteries in front of the entire world. Those who collected the bones of those bodies and brought them are the same ones who perpetrated this act. This is the first point. We accuse you here because evidence is available. We wish it were available at the time.

Another point is that what is happening in the mosques is perpetrated by the intelligence service. You use the media, intelligence, and rumors. We very much regret, Mr. Mehri—you who are the son of a good and deep-rooted Muslim family—that you are unaware of the value of the mosque in our country's political renaissance. If we took away the mosque at the time of the revolution and at the time of the Association of Ulama... If we took it away... France had tried [to remove the mosque]. France was able to control the media, the educational establishment, and everything except the mosque. France is the originator of this opinion. You have abandoned the FLN and the Islamic awakening.

Advocates of the Islamic awakening in mosques are the ones who produced these results. We are on the threshold of a surprise: the emergence of an Islamic state. The reason for this emergence is this cornerstone, the mosque. This is why you have to shackle the mosque and this is why you have to exert efforts against it. You were with us against France and against the prohibition on sermon-making. You were with us then. At the time, France expelled our ulema from the mosques. Today, you are watching the mosques. In Boumediene's days, an imam's sermon was censored by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Incidents occurred between us. Wasn't this violence? Wasn't this an attack on the mosque's freedom. Today, you justify this attack against and this harassment of the mosque. Today, the man in the street has gained his freedom but the mosque has no freedom and it must be harassed! You have promulgated the harassment law. You allege that you are preachers of Islam. In the south, they [imams] have been prevented from giving lessons. They have to get a permit. Who has empowered you to do this? Is the mosque God's house or your house? No man is empowered to legislate for God. God has said: "And the places of worship are for God alone. So invoke not any one along with God" [Koran, 72:18]"

[Mehri] I agree with you, but provided this is applied to all. Content is the important thing. We are going through an initial correction now. I have said that these violations are committed by a few well-known groups who are nurtured by your radical language, which urges jihad for the smallest thing, and who permit themselves to use the mosque, where only God's name should be mentioned, to speak ill of other Muslims, both as groups and as individuals.

[Madani] This is just an accusation. The people have their mind, their Shari'ah, and their opinion. The government has no right whatsoever to restrict the mosque's freedom. We cannot be free if God's house [is not]. Brother, do you think that congregations are mere recorders? They have their mind. Let them think for themselves. God be thanked, they are vigilant. You can see them. During the revolution, they were the ones who carried the rifles and the torch. Here they are today carrying the torch of change. In any case, we emerge with the question: Isn't it better for the government to know its bounds and not to legislate for the mosque? God has legislated the call for prayer for the mosque. Suppose that there are those who have erred. How do we discipline them? Do we discipline them with police oppression and political oppression or do we guide them with wisdom and educate them? You employ the means of oppression where education is needed. Those who erred are people and the mosque is an educational institution, not an oppressive institution. You have sought to transform it into an oppressive institution. I believe that your offense before God is very grave, not to mention your offense against the country's freedom and the Algerian people's will for this freedom.

[Mehri] I agree with you. If the call is used to preach God's path, then one calls to God's path with wisdom and gentle words. This is very sound and it applies primarily to those who step forward to undertake the Islamic call. I see it when swords are brandished in any celebration, regardless of its cause, in the name of Islam, not to say in the name of the FIS.

[Madani] Sir, you come to me with rumors and with fabricated incidents. If I told you that intelligence men are the ones who employed these tactics, who would be the judge between us? I tell you that this activity and these incidents—I am referring here to the Harsha and the Atlas incidents. Even where these are concerned, do you find it wise, Mr. Mehri...?

[Mehri] Do you denounce such acts?

[Madani] Yes.

[Mehri] Then I will put you on record as having said this. These means have, regrettably, been employed on other occasions and in mosques.

[Madani] Did I order this?

[Mehri] Mosques have been used in a manner that has led to an unhealthy climate.

[Madani] This is what is served by the rumor you spread.

[Mehri] I believe that in our actions, we have not embarked on verbal oneupmanship and we have not responded to the insults, accusations, or provocative sermons made at mosques. As the FLN, we have adhered with all the other parties to maximum self-control in order to keep the dialogue open. The one thing that I deny the advocate of any just cause, especially if the cause is connected with Islam, is to raise the threat of

strikes in the people's face on every occasion. This is a weapon which, regrettably, does not serve Islam. Faced with this language, large segments of the people do actually feel worried and scared. What is the purpose behind this, especially during an election period like this one? Why are we preaching jihad at the mosque? In Islam, jihad has just one meaning, not many meanings. So what is the justification for these judgments? Even insofar as political judgments are concerned, brother Abassi Madani has made extremely cruel judgments against the FLN and its deputies. He has said that the FLN has inflicted on the municipalities more than the secret military organization inflicted on them in 1962. Does this whitewash the French organization's history or does it blacken the FLN's history? Madani has also characterized the people's deputies as a "movement" and has accused them of high treason.

Such judgments, brother Abassi, are excessive and those who make them do not appreciate their significance.

[Madani] Mr. Mehri, regarding your statement that the FLN and the government are the victims of a ferocious campaign of revilement, I will say briefly: For God's sake, check the media and look at the national and world press. Who is the party targeted by their rumors? Isn't it the FIS? You can [not] disavow the newspapers that you manage or the information media that you direct. This is the first point.

A second point is that if we wish to rise to a lofty level, we must refer to right as the authority. We must refer to the given facts on whose basis the country and the government are built. Permit me. We have not yet embarked on the political dialogue. All these rumors have marginalized our debate and dialogue. For God's sake, FLN, Algeria triumphed after 1962, thanks to the revolution. Algeria made gains and the most significant of those gains was freedom of the Algerians. Have the Algerian people actually lived in freedom since that time? Has their will to work and to invent been free? This is a single point.

Another point is: Who has embroiled the country in this crisis? Where have the country's resources gone? A total of 28 or 30 billion have been lost. Where has the country's wealth gone? Which party ruled the country when this waste was going on? You said: We were the rulers.

[Mehri] First, what guarantees do you give Algeria that you will not take it back to the backwardness of the past, considering that you have furthered its political, economic, social, and cultural backwardness?

What guarantees do you have to make the Algerian people trust you and entrust you with their future—a future which you have totally disregarded?

Who has dragged the Algerian people to this political, economic, and social crisis?

[Madani] May God be praised when you speak. You are still talking about burning corpses and raising false problems so that we would steer clear of the main issues.

What is the way to transform an unjust, corrupt, and manipulative single-party regime into a serious regime?

Regarding these constitutions, permit me to say that you promulgated a constitution during Ben Bella's administration, another constitution during Boumediene's administration, and two constitutions under Chadli Bendjedid's administration. You make these constitutions and you change them as you change your clothes. So, we are embracing a revolving and unstable policy. Till when will we continue to live in this legislative chaos? You have raised the constitution issue. Who made the constitution? Has Chadli Bendjedid made the constitution or has the constitution made Chadli Bendjedid? Who came first? Bendjedid was elected and then the constitution followed. This constitution serves a certain administration and a certain regime. Why don't we consider a constitution that rules Algeria and that has constants and changeables? Where are the constants? Have you preserved them? How can we establish firm legislative rules that do not change with the change of circumstances? Why don't we consult Islamic law, God's law? Why are we content with Islam as the state religion? What does it mean that Islam is the state religion? Why shouldn't the state be an Islamic state and why shouldn't Islam be the state religion? God be thanked, we are all Muslims. Our people are a Muslim people.

[Mehri] By God this is good. Stress it.

[Madani] We are Muslims. All of us are Muslims. Brother, why don't we think? Don't you feel that this is a trust given us by God and His apostle?

Why don't we think collectively and establish the state on a stable and just legislative foundation and on a law that is higher, nobler, and more just, namely God's law. Why don't we begin from the start?

[Mehri] I say that we may disagree in evaluating the negatives and positives of the regime that Algeria has known. To say that Algeria, and I am not saying the FLN, has not done anything, that our entire experience is a failure, and that it has led to a crisis, and to corruption and conscience-wrecking—to make such a generalization and to issue such absolute judgments is offensive. We have invited all the parties, and I think that you have received the invitation, asking them to have the country's intellectuals and prominent experts—ones who are not connected with any party—make an objective evaluation of our experience. This evaluation will permit us to know the weak and flawed points and, consequently, to correct our conditions.

As for referring to Islam, the basic problem is: Who is to implement Islam? We in the FLN cling to Islam. The FLN was founded on constants which it continues to preserve. But when Islam is applied, who is the individual or the group to be elected to apply it. God be

thanked, Algeria offers absolute freedom to all tendencies. The only thing is that all the parties and tendencies agree on developing solutions to the country's problems because holding the FLN accountable for all the mistakes of 30 years is not sound or fair.

Brother Abassi Madani says that the FLN has not ruled. For the people, the FLN has ruled morally and is responsible. But there are those who exploited the FLN. Some have used the revolution as a cover despite the respect the people harbor for it. But there are those who have also used Islam in Algeria and elsewhere for the same purpose.

[Madani] First, you cannot deny, Mr. Mehri, that after independence, the FLN tried to implement socialism and did not apply Islam. It tried to emulate communist peoples and nations and did not refer to the Islamic experience. It tried to import all ideas and to exclude only Islam. We were in a struggle, Mr. Mehri. Don't forget that we were in jail during the independence era because we advocated Islam, called for an Islamic government, and engaged in educational action which no reasonable man could dispute. Don't forget the means of oppression that were unleashed on the call and the preachers of the call. We find that other religions had the right to move and to exist. They, but not Islam, moved freely. We cannot forget what is happening in Tunisia now to our brothers in Ennahda and what is happening to our brothers in Egypt and in other Islamic countries. The regime of free and independent Algeria, revolutionary Algeria, and the Algeria of "Allah is great"—in this Algeria, Islam has experienced a kind of suppression that no struggler or martyr could imagine. To put it briefly, I do not wish to reopen the past.

In response to the questions the citizens addressed to him, Abdelhamid Mehri responded:

[Mehri] Regarding the first question which asks why no women have been nominated so far, I say that the list of nominations has not been decided to this moment. I personally don't know all the proposed nominations received from all the provinces.

Regarding the statement I made yesterday, I did not mean young and middle-aged men. I meant to say that the door must be opened for other generations to shoulder the responsibility. I added that the question is not a question of age. This is why the statement should be read as it was made. No FLN congress could be held before the legislative elections.

Abdelhamid Mehri characterized the other questions as internal questions which concern the party's internal system. He stressed that capable and competent strugglers who have enough credibility among the people to gain the people's trust must be put forward to serve the people.

To a question on the struggle between conservatives and reformists in the FLN, Mehri said that struggle exists in all political parties.

To the questions addressed to him by the citizens, Abassi Madani responded:

[Madani] Thanks for the questions. Regarding the first question, when acts of violence break out, we are summoned to stop them. The Algerian people summon us, we come, and they obey us. If we are charged with responsibility for the fire when we extinguish it, then all those who have fire extinguishers must go to jail. This is because [it is the government's logic that] he who extinguishes a fire is the one responsible for igniting it. This is illogical. However, this action is proof of the credibility of the FIS which intervenes to solve problems. When violence breaks out in the country, as happened in El Taref where lives were about to be lost, it comes to an end when we arrive at the scene. The same applies to the Mohamedia incidents. Neighboring quarters were trying to rescue a homeless family surrounded by the gendarmerie. When we intervened, we got results because the people obeyed us. This also goes for Sour El Ghozlan and numerous other parts of the country. So we are always summoned by the people to solve problems. If you want us to let problems ignite, we cannot allow the fire to burn on when we can extinguish it.

As for the talk about the tribal area which has always been a stronghold of Islam, if there are obstacles then they are due to the adopted policy. France always tried, even with the Association of Muslim Ulema, to prevent preaching the call in these parts of the country for a well-known reason. When the FLN arrived, it too tried to keep that area stultified. The FLN did not wish to see an Islamic awakening emanating from the area, i.e., it did not wish to confront an Islamic awakening and call in the tribal areas. This colonialist policy was established by France and it continued under our government. We have incidents that we can cite.

The second point concerns the conflict within the FIS. It is true that these statements have been made by people who are members of the Consultative Council. But they did not get the council's permission to issue them. The truth is that they issued them out of their naivete. They do not at all intend the statements to signify conflict. Even if there is a sign of conflict, the truth is that I don't actually call it conflict. Rather, there is dialogue within the Consultative Council. Perhaps, a denial will come from those who made the statement. It is better that this denial come from them. The FIS is still cohesive, God be thanked. Islam's enemies, and Algeria's enemies in particular, have been waiting for the FIS to explode. When a LE FIGARO correspondent came to us last year and told us that intelligence had infiltrated the FIS and that they can blow it up at any moment, we told him: They can blow up the FLN palace. But what we have is a tent erected on sand. If a grenade is detonated in this tent, it will only blow up in the face of those seeking to detonate it. The fact is that I believe that these statements have no political legitimacy within the FIS.

[Mehri] We wish the talk would focus on the future. Brother Abassi Madani has only noted that the incidents

that he extinguishes are fabricated by the police. He has said: When we go, the people listen to us. There is something that I don't understand. Is it the people, not the intelligence men, who got angry and caused the incidents?

[Madani] I cannot generalize, as I have already said. In the Mohamedia case, for example, the gendarmerie surrounded a homeless family at a place in which it was living temporarily. The place belonged to the horse racetrack. The gendarmerie surrounded the family and inhabitants of the Mohamedia quarters came and confronted them. The problem was solved when we arrived at the scene. There also was the shorts issue which almost turned into a problem and a town was nearly surrounded by the forces of oppression and intervention. We had to intervene. The town is a conservative town and its inhabitants said that in a town which has its culture and morals, a tourist who comes to visit us must respect the country and must not enter the town wearing shorts. We intervened. The inhabitants of the town, Delles, behaved as was desired, may God reward them well. Mr. Mehri, if you pass by a forest in which a spark is burning, would you leave the spark alone or would you stamp it out?

[Mehri] The call for what is good is required but...

[Madani] Is it wrong? Let us leave it here and let us beseech God to give you success.

[Mehri] The argument here is that what encourages the incidents is this kind of inflammatory language. I hope that in the phase of transition from one regime to another, we will enjoy democratic conditions.

We must be eager for this course and must avoid verbal violence which generates real violence. Regarding the forthcoming elections, I wish to tell our brothers and the parties, especially if the objective of the party action is Islam, that I hope that they will work to secure all the circumstances of security and reassurance for the people so that they can perform their electoral duty.

This is why I believe that the call for a general political strike does not serve this course. Naturally, we urge the people not to respond to such a call.

[Madani] Now, we get to the main point. First, I believe that preserving security is a joint responsibility because it depends on common will. Common will is founded on right. When you advocate a strike, it is reasonable and desirable.

[Mehri] It was a unionist strike.

[Madani] Please don't interrupt me. The Algerian people are entitled to political strikes, especially since the strike we are advocating is not violent and not chaotic, unless the violence and chaos come from you. However, we hope that there will be no recurrence of what happened in (Hennaya) when a group attacked Muslims while they were performing their prayers at the mosque. God be thanked, the congregators apprehended the attackers and handed them over to the police. The fact is that we are

well-known for being disciplined, God be thanked. You spread rumors about our march last year and the regime made threats. The FLN threatened to stage a counter-march. Yet, we remained patient and promised that the demonstration and the march would be silent. Now, we have said that the president is required to announce early [presidential] elections and to hold them before the legislative elections. Otherwise, there would be no justification for the legislative elections. If the president does not respond, what means can be used? A political strike, which is not an innovation, becomes a must. Permit me to say that this is not an innovation. We innovate in politics as we innovate in the identity of politics. Algeria used strikes to proclaim its word during the greater liberation revolution. God willing, the strike will be peaceful, safe, and orderly and it will reflect the people's position. We pray to God that you will be convinced by the people's position. On our part, we have called for a political strike because strikes have been used for bread. So why shouldn't they be used for protecting sovereignty and for imposing this people's will? We have called on the Algerian people, and nobody else. The Algerian people are entitled to respond or not respond.

If the Algerian people respond to this call, it will become a political problem. The ruling party and ruling regime must rise to the level of their responsibilities. We warn you not to resort to violence. The hope is that the Algerian army will remain Algeria's army and will not be Chadli Bendjedid's, the FLN's, or FIS's army. God be thanked, this army accomplished a feat in the wake of the October catastrophe when it abandoned politics, i.e., chose to stay clear off politics. We hope that the political struggle will continue to be a political struggle so that justice, security, peace, and fraternity can be preserved. Let us move with the Algerian people according to their will and freedom. You are not entitled to prevent the Algerian people from staging a strike to express their opinion to President Bendjedid. If the law is opposed to the people's will, the people are entitled to change the law. The law may not shackle the people.

[Mehri] I notice that when brother Abassi Madani speaks, he speaks as if he were the Algerian people. This is why he has caused a lot of misunderstanding. What is right is to say that such and such a party's opinion is so and so. As for the people's opinion on presidential elections, our brothers must examine the issue well. Procedurally, it is very difficult to carry out all these activities simultaneously. With this transformation at a certain level, interest dictates that we make certain that the plan is sound so that we can take another step. I am confident that the Algerian people realize fully that the change that they have demanded, and it is a change that serves their interest, must be accomplished under an umbrella of tranquillity and reassurance.

Burning the phases produces no result. I hope that the brothers in the FIS will examine this issue deliberately because the country's domestic and external conditions dictate that we be alert in every step so that we do not leave any inlet to the perils engulfing us.

[Madani] Regarding the political language, the truth is that we represent the people. The people have given us the majority. You were entitled to say what you have said before the elections. But in the wake of the elections, you have no right to object.

Second, in our Koranic approach, one individual equals a nation. Whoever attacks right commits aggression against the nation. God, may He be praised, has said: "If any one slew a person—unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land—it would be as if he slew the whole people; and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people" [Koran, 5:35].

The FIS does not defend a segment or a group of parties but defends the Algerian people. The Algerian people's cause is our cause. This one point.

Another point is that we are facing a political crisis. Election is a means, not an end, and unless the election is real and fair, it will not be an election. The time when elections could be rigged has ended. We cannot enter into your venture and accept your injustice while waiting for you to become just. We will never take part in such a crime. This is why we urge the Algerian people and why we warn them to be vigilant and to beware of this scheme, i.e., the scheme of a game of elections that are founded on unjust laws. What is founded on an unjust law cannot but end in injustice.

Therefore, we again urge President Chadli Bendjedid to submit to the people's will, to respond to the people, to call for early elections, and to let the Algerian people select any candidate they want from any party, including the FLN. The FLN is entitled to offer its candidate and if it wishes to offer Chadli Bendjedid, then let it do so. But the presidency issue must be submitted. If he fails to respond, we have to prepare for a general, organized, and disciplined strike that dictates God's will and the people's will for a comprehensive change in order to set up a fair structure. We beseech God to grant us all success so that we can cooperate in solving the country's problems and cooperate for what is benevolent and pious. God, may He be praised, has said: "Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancor" [Koran, 5:3]. We implore God to give us and you success.

[Mehri] This is good, shaykh. You have at least allowed us the right to nominate a candidate.

MAJD Leader Calls for Equal Press Coverage

91AA0383A Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 5 May 91 p 3

[Article: "Mirbah Acknowledges Single-Party Democracy"]

[Text] Tizi Ouzou (WAJ)—In a lecture delivered two days ago before a large audience in the town theater of Tizi Ouzou, Mr. Qasdi Mirbah, head of the Algerian

Movement for Justice and Development (MAJD), discussed his party's program, the coming legislative elections, and reforms.

Regarding the political side of his party's program, Mr. Qasdi Mirbah said, "Algeria is a Muslim country. We are for Islam, which rejects violence and calls for mastery of the sciences and progress—for that Islam that inspired the Europeans with their renaissance and heyday."

Regarding Tamazight, the lecture discussed the sacred trio of Tamazight, Islam, and Arabness that forms the national personality.

In his discussion of the coming legislative elections, the head of MAJD criticized the election law, the apportionment, and the moving up of the dates of the process. He indicated that matters ought to be clear and transparent from the beginning. "We must be democrats to the utmost, as we were during the war of liberation and during the one-party system."

In this context, Mr. Mirbah believes that the information media should be placed at the disposal of the parties in a just manner, taking away from the government its surveillance of the public sector press.

Article Examines Political Attitudes in Oran

91AA0418B Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 14 May 91 p 3

[Article by al-Husayn al-Zawi: "Silent Majority for the Liberation Front"]

[Text] In light of the 27 political parties with candidates for the legislative elections, Oran will have reached the highest level in the nation with regard to parties in the coming elections. However, this numerical momentum has not had a great impact on the electorate in Oran. The parties that have the best chance to win more seats than the other parties remain the National Liberation Front [FLN], the Islamic Salvation Front, and the Movement for Democracy in Algeria. The situation in Oran University is not much different, except for one important element of the leftist movement, represented specifically by the Socialist Vanguard Party which, as is well known, will boycott the elections.

In general, party affiliation—according to the majority of students with whom we met—will be secondary, especially since the electorate will vote for a nominal slate, which causes the personality and reputation of the candidate to be in the forefront, as the basic indicator in the election process for the citizens. Regarding the general atmosphere inside the university, Professor Sulayman Akrati, director of the College of Literature, believes that: "The elections have not yet caught the complete attention of students. Psychologically, fixed elections, which were prevalent under the one-party aegis, are still uppermost in the minds of the university."

Furthermore, the university is experiencing a trade union movement, which covers even pedagogical

activity. An attempt, by the political parties, to gain control over the student body has not produced the expected results. In any event, we should note that the basic atmosphere in the university was more active in the single-party era. That was in reaction to speeches prevalent at that time on the official agency level. At the present time, with the emergence of pluralism, we can say that there is a kind of numbness and satiation among the students and professors, particularly since the university no longer is the only outlet for free political expression, as it was in the past.

If the most organized group in the university is the Islamic movement, the nonpartisan majority of students prefer the FLN to any other party. That is the impression we found among a large number of students. One veiled student from the College of Philosophy told us: "I think that the majority of people will vote for those who led the country to independence, and for those who have the most management expertise." In general, the students' interpretations about the outcome of the next elections can be broken down into five parts, according to the opinion of one professor:

1. Some students say that the current election law will allow the FLN to gain the majority of seats.
2. The struggle currently emerging between Hamas and the Islamic Salvation Front is only on the foreign level, in order to avoid any attempt that might be aimed at the alliance process. Therefore, the alliance will be clearly evident in the second round.
3. The Islamic Salvation Front's boycott of the elections will not be in its best interests, particularly since it claims to have the majority of votes.
4. A majority in Parliament must be to the FLN's benefit, because the rest of the small parties will be forced to ally together in the second round, and inside Parliament as well.
5. The Islamic Salvation Front will need a majority in several areas of the country, such as the south, and consequently, Algeria does not consist only of the capital, as some believe.

Professor Benmuzyan, in turn, picks the FLN to win in the elections, in view of the historic fund which it possesses, while a master's degree student, M. Beryah, was content to say that "Algeria was divided into three elements: history, represented by the FLN; religion, which the Islamic Salvation Front claims to represent; and, sweat [could also mean race], which some believe is represented in the Socialist Forces Front."

EGYPT

Manpower Minister Discusses Unemployment Problem

91AA0364A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
3 May 91 p 6

[Interview with Egyptian Minister of Manpower and Training, 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haq, by Haytham Sa'd-al-Din: "Unemployment;" first three paragraphs AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI introduction; place and date not given]

[Text] Unemployment is a worldwide problem, with economic and social implications. It is found in most countries, both advanced and developing. Unemployment is either obvious or veiled; the latter is a characteristic of developing countries, in addition to open unemployment. The source of obvious unemployment in developing societies is the high population growth rates, economic growth rates that are inadequate for the population growth, weakness in local savings, and the inability to provide investments required to create employment opportunities. This curbs the developing nations' progress toward high development growth rates, which would make possible opportunities for everyone willing, able, and searching for work.

No matter how varied the estimates are concerning the size of the unemployment problem in Egypt, either by statistics, estimates, or identification, the fact is certain that there is an unemployment problem. It is impossible to count the increasing unemployed only, but it is possible to differentiate one group that represents more than 90 percent of the unemployed. They are the skilled, trained work force, either out of universities, higher institutes, or secondary technical schools.

Therefore, a serious step to deal with that problem will occur, when the recommendations of the conferences and forums, which have been held concerning the unemployment problem, are placed before the Supreme Council for Human Resources Development, chaired by the prime minister, Dr. 'Atif Sidqi, in its upcoming session to study these recommendations, and take the actions required to apply them in practical ways.

['Abd-al-Haq] The unemployment problem has resulted from an accumulative process over a long period of time. Since the seventies, the state has had to assign all graduates of educational institutions to the governmental and public sector, in positions that are not needed today, and in jobs totally outside their specialties. These numbers of people have grown considerably, at a time when the population growth rate rose 26 percent over 10 years. It was presumed that the number of government employees would increase by the same percentage or less, but the growth rate of employees—during that same period—increased 200 percent. The inflation in numbers of government employees grew from less than 1 million in 1972, to 3.6 million employees. The number of public sector employees also rose from less than 0.7 million workers to 1.4 million,

with the total number of workers reaching 5 million in the governmental and public sectors.

Wages of governmental and public sector employees have become inflated; the total is 12.25 billion Egyptian pounds, including 6 billion pounds for the public sector workers' annual wages.

The unemployment problem is also attributable in part to the education policy in Egypt where, for a long time, a big gap has prevailed between the education and training that youth receive, and the needs and requirements of the real world. So far, this has not led to the end of illiteracy, because nearly half the population of Egypt—49.4 percent—are illiterate, despite the efforts made in this regard since, in 1960, the illiteracy rate was 70.5 percent. If the policy of increasing matriculation rates, and limiting the different stages of education, has led to absorbing a part of the labor force, it has still not in fact achieved a solution to the unemployment problem. However, it has put off the problem, so that—at the present time—it appears in the form of unemployment of the educated, instead of the illiterate.

There is no doubt that the first form is more costly to the national economy than the second. On the other hand, the education system's need for vocational direction, and its inability to adjust to society's requirements, has led to the system becoming unbalanced, in terms of supply and demand of various labor skills.

State policy with regard to employment has for many years been based on insuring a job opportunity for every graduate. This policy, in its totality, has resulted in certain negative effects on policies of employment of workers. Despite the present tendency to go in the right direction, this negative impact on the labor market still exists. The following should be included among these negative effects:

- An imbalance in the labor force with regard to the true needs of the various economic sectors, with a surplus of graduates of commercial education, secondary agricultural, and theoretical colleges, as opposed to a shortage of graduates of technical schools and universities.
- In light of the nonexistence of policies providing effective incentives for special qualifications and skills, those who possess those qualifications look for work in the private and investment sectors. This has a negative impact on the governmental and public sectors' ability to attract those skills and, at the same time, the state bears the burden of employing unqualified workers.
- Certain specializations characterized by a labor surplus have occupied other positions for which, because of deficiencies, they are unqualified.
- The emergence of so-called veiled unemployment, which is prominent in the governmental and public sectors. Some estimate it to be 38 percent of the current work force in those two sectors. This has a definite impact on labor productivity in those sectors,

and on the efficiency of performing their duties.

Moreover, the regional method of distributing investments, directing the majority of them to urban areas, at the expense of rural areas, has resulted in the emergence of domestic migration, and ensuing unemployment rates among unskilled labor groups along with, at the same time, a downturn in the ratio of agricultural workers.

The governmental method of determining wages and incentives was adopted in the public sector, a method based essentially on wage gradation, tied to financial grades and employment levels, some of which go up despite the disparity in types of positions. It has become clear that pursuing this method has resulted in public sector workers being preoccupied with thinking about their financial grade and their job, and more desirous of transferring from the production labor sector to sectors of administration, clerical, and service work and, consequently, the stability of their wage level, without having to put out the effort required for production labor.

Further, the subject of financial grades, functionalism, and promotions occupy a great deal of time and effort on the part of labor and administrative leaders, so that each year the promotion cycle takes up a percentage of the volume of labor's time. This is aside from the time and effort expended to prepare for the promotion cycle, and the effects of all that on the stability of labor and production, which has resulted in inflating the services workers' groups at the expense of production workers. In turn, all of that has been reflected by the decline of worker productivity in the public sector.

Moreover, the wage system in the private sector can, in turn, be described as frozen, although wages there were flexible, in order to permit the sector's production capacity to absorb the largest possible number of workers.

It is necessary, as we review the unemployment problem, to deal with the Arab and foreign capital investment sector, and its influence on the labor market in Egypt. The most recent field study, conducted by the Central Agency for Organization and Administration on industrial and investment projects, measured those companies' contribution to the creation of jobs, and the absorbing of surplus workers in the Egyptian labor market. This study identified the companies' role in enriching the labor market, through policies followed to develop and raise workers' skills and, consequently, to influence the excellence of skills available to the labor market, for the following reasons:

Despite the advantages, exemptions, and freedom of action for companies in the Arab and foreign investment sector, results indicate a limited role for those companies with regard to attracting and employing individuals. That is attributable to their technologically intensive methods of using capital for their production operations which, to a great extent, is incompatible with the trend to increase job opportunities.

Moreover, most of the jobs that have been created were filled through relying on workers in other installations, especially in the local public and private sectors. This causes one to say that most of the opportunities that the investment sector has offered do not present opportunities in the true sense. In addition, there are the negative effects resulting from the migration of those skills from the governmental, public, and private sectors to those companies. This represents a downgrade in the performance level of units, in which those workers were employed. Additionally, there is the rise in the average cost of products or services offered in certain units, as a result of this phenomenon.

Other factors are the dependence of those companies on domestic sources, in transferring and assigning a large part of these jobs; the absence of mutual coordination between education and training agencies, and the administration of those companies; the disagreement over the government's role in influencing those companies' decisions, by choosing the mode of technology that would absorb the largest amount of labor; the lack of planning by labor forces; and, the clear disregard in the majority of those companies of the changes that govern labor supply and demand operations.

One could say that those companies' contributions were unexpected, despite some positive aspects they offer with regard to creating additional job opportunities, which basically would not have existed in those companies' absence; providing the economy with new methods in the production and administration arenas; and, encouraging individual initiative among individuals to continue their hopes for education and training, with the goal of gaining appropriate skills, in order to strengthen their opportunities to join those companies.

Treatment

The unemployment problem has lay hidden in the deficiencies of the Egyptian economy since the early seventies, in a form that led to the inability of the commodities sectors to absorb all the new entrants into the labor market. The biggest part of the problem continued to be structural unemployment. The only way to achieve balance in the labor market is to restructure, by following a growth strategy, aimed at the ideal use of all available resources, most importantly, the human element, out of consideration that this element's development represents the chief goal.

Drawing up the employment strategy cannot start from a vacuum. On the contrary, it is most strongly tied to the totality of economic policies. At the present time, Egypt is undertaking a program of reforming those policies, especially as pertains to the exchange rate, interest rates, and credit and pricing systems.

Naturally, some of these changes could have direct or indirect repercussions on the labor market, and sector distribution of employment. Accordingly, it was decided—for the purpose of maximizing the positive

effects of these changes in economic policies on employment—that they would be accompanied by a group of policies pertaining to wages, education and training, sector distribution of investments, and technological testing.

In this regard, it is important that we point out that the success of these policies lies in reaching an agreement with public opinion on their feasibility. This agreement requires full discussion on the national level among all groups—workers, employers, and government.

Moreover, a solution to the employment problem in Egypt requires a cohesive strategy of medium- and long-range policies. For this strategy, one should deal with the problem on three levels:

1. Attention must be paid to mobilizing national savings, so as to be sufficient to cover the debt servicing, while providing the maximum surplus possible for investment. How can this goal be achieved by the year 2000? The only treatment is to renew growth.

2. A strategy of intensifying employment must be defined. The challenge here is in choosing the sector or sectors that could play a leading role in this area. At the present time, we note a regression in the role of the traditional sectors with regard to absorbing labor. We find that agriculture's share in absorbing labor has decreased overall and relatively, and that the role of the processing industry has also lagged behind. Stagnation has also occurred in the construction sector, after rapid growth in the seventies and, finally, the governmental sector is no longer capable of absorbing the increasing numbers of graduates. The result of all this is the emergence of the unregulated sector, as a principal field for employment.

[Sa'd-al-Din] What are the leading sectors, especially since the opportunity to migrate abroad has decreased?

[Abd-al-Haq] The employment strategy must be concentrated on three principal axes:

- Efficient industrialization, through replacing imports with exporting;
- Development of small and medium-sized projects; and,
- Development of rural industries and production services.

3. This level of the employment strategy is the family, and concerns dealing with the negative effects that might stem from economic policies over the short term. Accordingly, the problem of decline in income for some rural and urban groups requires decisive action, such as subsidies, and projects that generate income to supplement the diminished incomes. There should also be a program directed at the remote and less progressive areas in Egypt. In this regard, the cooperative is considered an appropriate form to collectivize the efforts of these groups. Therefore, attention must be paid to this

sector, encouraging whatever will assist in creating job opportunities for the craftsmen, especially in the field of rural development.

Problems of Small Industries

The second five-year plan has resulted in an important and integrated role for the private sector, along with the public sector's important role. One of the problems that small projects face is the unavailability of credit on easy terms. It is necessary to find useful ways to encourage the banking system to assist new projects, as well as to develop the infrastructure these industries require. We must also work to derive benefit from the abilities, expertise, and savings of Egyptians returning from abroad, and to direct them toward small and medium-sized projects, suitable for their practical abilities and resources. This would make new job opportunities available to citizens, and would contribute to the accumulation of capital.

The unregulated sector—whose labor force is estimated at 2.5 million workers—should also be encouraged. This could lead to its development, and to raising its capabilities, facilitating credit and training, and ending the legal and administrative restrictions, which might spell the end of its activities. The creation of new cities and industrial collectives should also be encouraged. A portion of these new installations could be allocated for workers in that sector, and could represent a new impetus for it.

The public sector is also in need of encouragement, in order for it to attain a level of higher capital productivity, and higher quality levels for its products. Progress in this sector requires eliminating the obstacles that impede the efficiency of its production units, by instituting a number of reforms, most importantly, the separation between ownership and administration, by permitting public sector establishments to increase their capitalization, through offering shares for public subscription. This profit could then be used for expansion and improvements in production and distribution methods, using economic procedures for pricing the requirements of production and products, and eliminating the administrative restrictions and regulations in production units.

There must be harmony between the desire for technological development, and raising the productivity level, and the employment circumstances in local and private markets. This obviously demands the use of labor-intensive processes with regard to certain production stages. This would not initially be incompatible with adopting intensive methods of capitalization in other areas with higher returns, especially those producing for export.

Reviewing the Wage Structure

There is a consensus that the current wage system requires radical reform, if we want it to play an effective role in maximizing productivity and achieving social

justice. This reform should be aimed at reviewing the relative wage structure, in such a way as to reflect reality in the Egyptian economy, use the true differences in productivity efficiency to encourage workers to acquire skills, find a realistic connection between wages, productivity, and prices, and simplify the current wage system, by linking the wage to the current job structure.

Encouraging Technical Education

Egypt has suffered for a long time from a lack of harmony between education and employment. Therefore, there must be concentration on encouraging technical education, in accordance with the requirements of, and specializations required for, the current and future labor markets. Matriculation systems in universities should be reconsidered in light of requirements, as well as the guidelines for acceptance in colleges, and the specializations of graduates who are unemployed.

Attention must also be paid to continuing education. This is directed at graduates who suffer unemployment, because they graduated at a time when they had no opportunity for a job. The information and skills that they had received in their education were not compatible with modern developments in society. Continuing education is aimed at modernizing their information, and giving them the skills required by the labor market.

Reorganization of Government Advocated

91AA0371A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
3 May 91 pp 14-15

[Article by Nabil Rashwan: "Does Egypt Need 26 Ministries; Reorganization of Egyptian Government Apparatus"]

[Text] In Egypt, speculation about an imminent cabinet reshuffle is very active and it is getting constantly hotter despite the weather changes. With the speculation, the names of certain ministers are mentioned as candidates likely to depart and other names as candidates likely to get in.

The names of likely candidates are not, of course, plucked out of the blue. A lot of reports are leaked about change and are subjected to explanation, interpretation, and addition.

Egypt in its entirety is talking about the coming cabinet reshuffle—its form, dimensions, and men, and the developments motivating it—and about the details of the new phase that we are approaching, especially since a letter of intent has been signed and the conclusion of a final accord with the IMF is imminent. Egypt is also talking about the tendency to liberate the economy and to restructure the administration and about the government's desire to rid itself of the burdens of an arrogant bureaucracy that has turned the Egyptian Government apparatus into a "mythical dragon" confronting any change.

To date, the change depends on President Hosni Mubarak's thinking. He alone makes the decision at the proper time on the basis of his assessment of all of Egypt's internal and external circumstances.

There remains the big question: Does Egypt need a cabinet with 26 ministers, tens of undersecretaries, and hundreds of subsidiary agencies without which government work and citizens' interests cannot be served? Do we have useless ministries which must be dispensed with?

What will be the fate of the structures of these ministries in case they are dispensed with? Which is beneficial: To merge or abolish them?

AL-MUSAWWAR presents here the visions and opinions of a number of ex-ministers, management and planning experts, and university professors on a cabinet reshuffle on the basis of government reports and studies by the Consultative Assembly.

Egypt's public administration suffers from serious obstacles, the most significant of which are: organizational instability of the administrative agencies, unsuitability of organizational structures for the activities that need to be performed, multiplicity of the top agencies, overlapping of the organizational levels, deficient integration of the general administrative structure, the government's inflated public administration apparatus and the many components forming this apparatus in a manner incompatible with the national needs and developmental requirements, and failure to benefit from surplus labor in meeting the labor deficit in certain positions.

Official figures demonstrate that the government apparatus is growing at an immense pace that does not befit the tasks entrusted to it. For example, the government's administrative apparatus grew from 319,000 workers in 1982 to 417,000 workers in 1987. The number of local government employees rose from 1.2 million to 1.8 million employees in the same period. Labor in the service organizations rose from 266,000 workers to 314,000 workers. Generally, the number of government workers at all levels rose from 2.64 millions to 3.53 millions in the period from 1982 to 1987.

Five Lean Years

The most serious period underlined by reports of the Central Organization and Management Agency and the Consultative Assembly is the 1975-80 period. Those five years experienced the biggest inflation in Egypt's administrative structure when the economic, social, and political changes were reflected in the form of more agencies, authorities, and ministries. With the open-door economic policy, the Public Authority for the Investment of Arab and Foreign Money and for Free Zones and the Public Securities Market Authority were founded. The Ministry of Economic Cooperation was created and then canceled and the Ministry of International Investment

and Cooperation was founded. This ministry was then restructured in the form of the Ministry of State for International Cooperation.

With the tendency to develop the public sector, sectorial higher councils and technical secretariats under their control were created. They were then abolished and the public sector authorities were created to replace them. With the tendency to adopt the local government system, to transfer jurisdiction, to assign powers to the local units, and to develop the local government laws, the Higher Local Government Council (the Council of Governors) and the provincial planning authorities were created.

With the interest in the public sector's role and with the endeavor to encourage this sector to increase its contribution to economic projects, whether in the form of national or joint capital, the position of minister of state for popular development was introduced. It was then abolished and a series of regional development banks lacking the material and human requirements were formed at a time when branches of the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank, a major bank, were spreading to all parts of the country.

With the emergence of the economic power of expatriate Egyptian workers, the position of minister of state for emigration control was created. With the emergence of the economic power of Egyptian tourism resources, the Egyptian Public Authority for Promoting Tourism was created. With increased interest in the Council of Ministers, the Central Bank, or other parties, with the continued use of loans, and with the growing conviction in the idea of development and new communities, the Public Authority for New Communities was created.

Without Studies

Most often, no deliberate studies were conducted on the majority of these agencies. Consequently, they were born burdened with all the obstacles and problems experienced by the other units of the state's administrative apparatus, except for one aspect, namely that their workers could be granted higher salaries and benefits than those obtained by workers in the state's conventional agencies.

On the other hand, some of the state's administrative apparatus units have followed another system in the face of economic and social changes, namely the system of introducing superficial change into the unit's legal structure by adopting a new organizational pattern called the national authorities, as we see in the Egyptian Railroad Authority, the National Drinking Water and Sanitary Disposal Authority, and the National Telecommunications Authority. The public sector laws have also produced artificial structures and formations such as board of directors and general assemblies, which totally lack what these structures signify and which barely merit these names.

Development Impossible!

While some believe that it is possible to develop the government apparatus and while they chart for it flowing lines that give it content and objective and relieve it of the burden of bureaucratic inflation, others believe this to be difficult and attribute the difficulty in this regard to the fact that the approval of at least the following authorities has to be obtained before any change is introduced to any organizational entity of the government apparatus:

1. The Central Organization and Management Agency.
2. The Ministry of Finance.
3. The Council of State.
4. The ministerial committee concerned, be it a service or a production committee.
5. The Ministerial Committee for Legislative Affairs.
- e. The Council of Ministers.
7. The People's Assembly committee concerned.
8. The People's Assembly.

Developing Government System

It is proposed that the state's main administrative apparatus be organized on the basis of making a distinction between the various government activities so that proper organizational structures may be allocated for every group of activities. For example, the activities can be divided into sovereignty activities, namely activities connected with the authority of the state and involving the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, justice, defense, and irrigation, and service and production activities. This requires the presence of liberated and active organizations capable of planning and managing work. This is a pattern that is fit to encompass the areas of petroleum, electricity, energy, transportation, maritime shipping, communications, civil aviation, tourism, reconstruction, and insurance. It is proposed that the ministries in these sectors be abolished and replaced by ministers of state who represent constitutional accountability and who coordinate with public authorities.

The local activities are activities connected with the local governments and encompass culture, education, health, the environment, supply, agriculture, labor, social welfare, and housing. It is proposed that they be developed into service directorates or local public authorities controlled by the governorates.

The proposed development introduces the creation of "planning councils, coordination councils, and a ministerial council." This is similar to the idea of ministerial committees which are concerned with certain matters. It also introduces the idea of a "general organizational law" which provides for organizing the state's administrative agency by a constant law.

[Box on page 14] There Are 500 General Directors in Egypt

According to the 1989-90 statistics, a total of 256 officials were in the super grade (sector chairman), 1,412 held the top grade (ministry undersecretary), and 5,101 held the grade of general director. Official statistics confirm that the total number of workers in the government and the public sector is 3.5 million workers collecting wages of 8.2 billion pounds annually.

New Regulations Encourage Foreign Grants, Not Loans

91P40313B Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
10 Jun 91 p 4

[Text] The Ministry of International Cooperation has drawn up new groundrules for economic cooperation with [other] countries and international organizations in order to limit loans, increase nonrepayable grants, and encourage small-scale projects. The following explains the groundrules:

The amount of loans is to be less than the amount of nonrepayable grants, and borrowing is to be [only] for financing projects that increase employment and exports and that provide foreign currency. The ministry is determined not to agree to any new loans until confirming the borrower's ability to pay the debts and obligations of the loan from his own resources. The ministry is also determined not to finance any project unless it is in accordance with the national plan.

New Law Regulates Worker Travel, Addresses Problems

91AA0395A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
18 May 91 p 5

[Article by Mahmud 'Abdullah: "Labor Problems in Iraq, Jordan, Yemen Still Pending"]

[Text] The Egyptian ministries concerned are preparing for a migration of the labor force to work abroad, particularly to Arab countries, by beginning to take the executive steps required to enforce the new law with regard to regulating Egyptian workers' travel abroad. This law was enacted as a result of successive crises faced by Egyptian workers abroad, the latest being the experiences of Egyptian workers in Iraq immediately after the end of the war with Iran, which escalated until reaching a climax in November 1989. This caused the Egyptian government to think seriously about resolving the problems of the Egyptian labor force abroad, and was the starting point for preparing new legislation.

With the new law, the government aimed to eliminate practices of fraud and chicanery with regard to the travel of Egyptians abroad without sufficient guarantees, and to eliminate travel agencies, transforming them into stock companies with a capitalization of not less than 100,000 Egyptian pounds each. After this law was issued,

and its implementation underway, the question is: Are the problems of Egyptian workers abroad over, and does the new law contribute to resolving them, by ending the difficulties of Egyptian workers abroad?

At the outset, 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haq, the Egyptian minister of manpower and training, says: "Egypt is pursuing a policy of promoting opportunities to work abroad, as one of the main goals to eliminate the unemployment problem, because the labor market each year is entered by an additional 413,000 citizens, whom the domestic labor market cannot absorb. Originally, Law No. 119 of 1982 was issued, regulating the travel of Egyptian workers abroad, and permitting individuals to open travel agencies. As a result of practical application over the past 10 years, many loopholes emerged."

The minister of manpower went on to say: "The number of those agencies reached 160; 89 of them were closed down, because of being in poor repute. Many of them were demanding large sums of money from workers. Accordingly, it was agreed to issue the new law stipulating the establishment of stock companies, in order to eliminate the agencies, on condition that the companies receive only 1 percent of the worker's wages the first year, in exchange for providing the job opportunity for him abroad. The goal of the law's philosophy is for stock companies to have the capability and resources to study the market, by traveling to Arab countries and endeavoring to attract many offers for the Egyptian labor force, together with protecting Egyptian workers against middlemen and agents."

'Asim 'Abd-al-Haq pointed out that the new law did not deal with the problem of Egyptian workers' travel to certain countries that permit the entry of Egyptians without prior entry visas, i.e., Jordan, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq. This will require searching for a solution to this problem, in order to prevent a repetition of the events of 1979, 1985, and November 1989 in Iraq.

Inadequate Law

Husayn Washahi, former chairman of the Manpower Committee in Parliament, says that the new law's goal is to prevent agents' exploitation of Egyptian workers who wish to travel abroad. However, this will not be achieved by merely applying this law, since the owners of the current travel agencies will be the very ones who establish stock companies. They will try to exploit those wanting to travel, and obtain the most money possible from them, without being committed by the law's provisions. Those agencies will be changed from an operation of swindle and brokerage against a narrow field, to a swindle in the form of stock companies. In addition, the law has done away with the practice of contracting through embassies and consulates of Arab states accredited in Cairo. This will lead to narrowing the opportunities available to work abroad, especially with regard to teachers under personal contracts.

Husayn Washahi says that the important thing is connecting the work force to political relations. The occurrence of any disturbance in those relations will impact on the work force. This calls for a collective Arab agreement within the framework of the Arab League, to protect the rights of Egyptian and Arab workers in any Arab country, safeguard their funds and earnings, and spare them the experience of those events in Iraq, since thousands of Egyptian workers have not yet been paid their earnings.

Agreements with the Arab Countries

Dr. Mustafa al-Sa'id, former Egyptian minister of economy, and a member of Parliament, pointed out that the new law faces an issue of extreme importance. The Egyptian labor force abroad is a most important source of foreign currency for the Egyptian economy. It represents more than 50 percent of our foreign currency revenue. Egyptian remittances from abroad annually equal six times the tourist revenues, as well as six times the Suez Canal revenue.

Dr. Mustafa al-Sa'id added: "Issuing a law to regulate workers' travel abroad was vital, and we welcome it. Stern measures against those who undertake to arrange travel is desirable because, in past years, travel arrangements for workers revealed a number of negative practices. This matter could not be left without regulating every adventurer who opens an agency to exploit Egyptian workers. Moreover, the matter could not be left to embassies and consulates. Giving this right to stock companies will help strengthen them, make them capable of marketing abroad, and make Egyptian workers competitive with Asian workers. Putting the travel process under government supervision will help protect Egyptian workers abroad."

Khalid Muhi-al-Din, leader of the opposition Nationalist Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, said: "The new law serves the national and nationalist goals of Egyptian workers, and we approve of it. There is a need for more guarantees and control over the stock companies, which will take over the process of contracting and making travel arrangements for workers. Moreover, there is also a need to have a follow-up process, after the worker has gone abroad, to confirm the validity of the contract, and to see that he gets all his rights as stipulated in the contract, in order to prevent a repetition of the events of past years. The government should reach future agreements with Arab countries for Egyptian workers, to the effect that they would have job priority."

"Egyptian manpower offices abroad must have a role in preparing studies, as well as with regard to contracts, in order to protect Egyptian workers. Maintaining good relations between Egypt and the Arab nations will be in the interests of Egyptian workers abroad."

Pending Problems

Kamal al-Shadhli, assistant secretary of the ruling Democratic National Party, stated: "Issuing this law was the

government's response to the demands of the people's deputies to protect the Egyptian worker, and safeguard his rights and amenities abroad. Regulating the travel process, beginning inside Egypt, will eliminate a number of difficulties faced by the worker after his trip, including the chicanery and fraudulent practices of the travel agencies.

"The subject of Egyptians traveling to countries that do not require them to have entrance visas will require a material solution, so as not to conflict with or violate the constitution, which stipulates freedom of movement. An Egyptian cannot be prevented from traveling abroad, out of respect for the constitution, but problems have arisen recently for Egyptian workers in Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, which must be faced, particularly since the government does not have a total accounting of numbers of Egyptian workers in those countries. A solution to this problem is needed as well, in order to protect Egyptian workers, and safeguard their rights in those countries."

It is worth noting that the new law has given a six months grace period to the present travel agencies, in order to reconcile their situations, begin to establish companies, and abrogate the special licenses required to practice the job of sending Egyptian workers abroad.

Success of New Corn Variety Reported

91AA0371B Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic
27 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghaffar: "Giant Corn in Our Country"]

[Text] Nobody expected giant corn to succeed in Egypt!

The fodder crisis poses a threat to the poultry industry and to the livestock resources. The price of imported corn has reached \$200 per ton and we need 2-3 million tons annually. By calculating the figures, we find that we need \$500 million annually to import corn!

The success of the giant corn has been a surprise. A field was turned into a green forest where each stalk grew to a height of more than 4 meters, with the ear weighing 700 grams. One Egyptian farmer has been able to achieve the highest productivity ever, producing 45 ardebs per feddan.

The giant corn story is a purely Egyptian story which started in 1985 at the hands of a team of young Egyptian scientists whose experiments lasted five years. The idea began as a glimmer in the head of Dr. Muhammad Khalifah and a team of experts who work to develop pure strains so as to stem the drain of dollars that go for importing corn. Two individual hybrid strains were used to produce this pure strain which possesses great hereditary qualities, which has great ability to fight and completely wipe out the paralysis [as published] plight, and which is distinguished by its verdant growth. The outcome—a big surprise for the team of scientists—consisted of a giant plant that grows to a height of more

than 4 meters and that can be used as animal fodder. The experiment has proven the superiority of the new production.

But there remained one problem.

How could farmers be convinced of the new strain which carries the words "discovered in Egypt?"

It was a pure accident that led farmer 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shandidi and his son, Shabrawi, from Itay al-Barud to the office of Dr. Muhammad Khalifah, the Ministry of Agriculture first undersecretary and maker of the new discovery, to complain about what had afflicted the corn crop in the previous year and about the losses he had suffered.

The undersecretary found it an opportunity to present the idea to the farmer. He explained to him how to cultivate the new strain and the two agreed that the farmer would cultivate his land with this strain which had gone beyond the sphere of research and experimentation. The Egyptian farmer agreed to cultivate 29 feddans all at once and returned to his village, Abraj Hamam, carrying the new Egyptian seeds with him.

He could not have dreamt of or expected what has happened.

With great joy, Hajj 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shandidi said while holding an enormous ear of corn in his hand: I received the seed from the ministry and prepared the land at the same time. The volume of manure used was 10 trailers per feddan. The seed was cultivated in rows.

A feddan contains 30,000 very strong stalks of corn. This crop causes the growth of a second growth of plants similar to reeds. This is the most difficult part because it is necessary to remove this secondary growth in order to ensure a strong crop. The secondary growth is used as fodder. The production has amounted to 45 ardebs. Next year, I will change the method and will cultivate 16 rows instead of 10 [per feddan] so that the production may amount to 60 ardebs. This has been calculated with pen and paper.

Dr. Muhammad Khalifah, the maker of the new discovery and the Ministry of Agriculture first undersecretary, reveals another surprise. Agreement has been reached with the government of the Sultanate of Oman to cultivate seeds of Hybrid-9 and Hybrid-10 there because of the difference of temperatures so that the seedlings can be ready to be cultivated in Egypt on schedule.

But the remaining question is: Can the giant corn experiment be spread to all parts of Egypt now that it has succeeded in this manner?

I have interviewed Dr. Yusuf Wali, the deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, who has followed the experiment since its inception. He said: The experiment started within 200 feddans, and its productivity was observed for three years. This year, singular and

trilateral hybrid seed will be cultivated in an area of one and one-half million feddans during the summer cycle. It is expected that the average production will amount to 28 ardebs per feddan, even though distinguished farmers like al-Shandidi have produced more than 40 ardebs per feddan. It is expected that a big and good crop will be produced. These varieties have been greatly successful and highly productive. This will lead to solving the wheat problem by mixing corn with wheat and to solving the fodder problem also.

This is how the solution has been developed for one of the food problems by Egyptian scientists and an Egyptian farmer who has achieved the highest productivity in the history of Egypt's corn cultivation.

Human Rights Organization Election Results Announced

91P40313A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
10 Jun 91 p 6

[Text] The Egyptian Human Rights Organization's council of secretaries has elected former foreign minister Muhammad Ibrahim Kamal as president, Ambassador Najib Fakhri as vice president, journalist Baha al-Din Hasan as secretary general, and attorney Najad al-(Bar'i) as treasurer.

Writer Opposes Resettlement of Farmers in Libya

91AA0367A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 2 May 91 p 4

[Article by 'Abbas al-Tarabili in "For All Egyptians" column: "Egypt's Land Is Most Entitled to Egypt's Farmers"]

[Text] I know beforehand that this article will arouse many against me. Some of them will think I am against opening doors and having people benefit from the wealth of the oil countries. However, with careful, alert consideration, the danger of what I am pointing out will become clear.

I do not know why some newspapers are beating the drum, welcoming and supporting the idea of sending a million Egyptian farmers to emigrate to the brother nation of Libya, where they would work, produce, and sweat without clear regulations and without rules and laws binding the host, before binding the guest. Before we become deeply involved in the matter, let us evaluate together the experiences of emigration by Egypt's technical and agricultural workers—before we fall into error again.

For us to allow Egypt's workers to leave in this way without rules would mean wasting or squandering our work forces. Trained workers are a resource not to be taken lightly. Egypt has educated, trained, and given them the best part of her experience throughout history. Our brother countries then obtain all their expertise ready-made. Of course, the workers earn good salaries,

but Egypt has spent money on them unstintingly until they reached their present level of expertise.

If one argues that such workers return the cost to Egypt through their remittances, I reply by asking whether we have estimated the size of Egypt's loss through loss of her potentials and capacities, when she spends 45,000 pounds on every Egyptian who obtains his university degree!

Furthermore—and this is the important point—if we look at those who leave to work abroad, even if they are industrial workers or farmers, we find that those who leave are always the best, the most able, and the ones with the most expertise and knowledge. Only the less able and more sluggish remain at home. Among specialized workers, the skilled leave, and the apprentices remain. Certainly, this is the cause of the low state of craftsmanship, especially among skilled handworkers, such as builders, electricians, plumbers, etc.

If we consider the agricultural sector, we find that wide-scale emigration has drawn skilled workers, and this has affected agricultural production and the price of agricultural products. A time has come when the wages of a young agricultural laborer have risen to 10 pounds a day.

I do not know what has come over the agricultural worker, whose love for the land used to be the stuff of proverbs and stories. “‘Awwad Who Sold His Land,” turned into a folk song satirizing anyone who would not only neglect his land but also sell it. Egypt was never one of the countries that evicted their workers, because Egypt used to possess the constituents of sound labor—agriculture, industry, and trade.

It is from this point of departure and to protect Egypt's human resources that I write today—not to reject going out to seek a livelihood, nor to restrict people's freedom to do what they want, but to try to grasp the end of a thread that may restore to Egypt part of what she has lost. So I say that before opening the door to a million Egyptian farmers to emigrate to Libya, we should first study and evaluate the experiment of Egyptian farmers emigrating to Iraq and Jordan. Did the experiment succeed in terms of what its architects first said at the time—that the Egyptian farmer would be treated better than the Iraqi farmer? Did we protect these farmers when relations between the governments of the two countries worsened? As I say this, we know the amount of pain and suffering that Egyptians experienced even during the days when all was sweetness and light between the two governments. How is it now, when matters have gone as far as fighting and war between the two armies? Gentlemen, the problem is that we in the Arab world deal with each other according to passions or according to political relations. Our dealings grow gentle when these things are gentle; they grow harsh when these things grow harsh. Thus it is, without any guarantees for the farmer who has given without any guarantees.

This being the case, why do we rush, announce our readiness, clap our hands, and beat the drums because our brother country Libya will open its doors? We are going to send a million Egyptians to reclaim Libya's land and farm it. They will offer the fruit of their toil to their brothers, while they themselves receive a mere pittance.

What is required here is not mere guarantees provided on paper. How easy it is to tear up treaties and suspend agreements! Our Arab world has seen that happen, and even more! What is required is that every person able to work remain in Egypt. How?

For example, we say more than we actually do about cultivating new land in Sinai, the north coast, and al-Nubariyyah. People reply that the water available now is insufficient for all the agricultural expansion projects that would absorb excess workers, if there are excess workers. What they say may have an element of truth, but I would reply that it is a misleading truth. They are still talking about farming with traditional irrigation systems that depend on flooding the land with water. Other countries, however, now rely on sprinkler irrigation over large agricultural areas and on drip irrigation in small garden areas. In addition, we have not been sufficiently successful in using brackish water or in successfully reusing agricultural drainage water treated to remove side effects as happened, for example, at the al-Jabal al-Asfar farm.

Speaking in these national terms, we say that if we were to mix the water of the Peace Canal, after it crosses the Suez Canal into Sinai, with brackish ground water, we would be able to change the face of life in the whole of Sinai. We have seen how the people of al-'Arish have cleverly succeeded in producing delicious fruit such as peaches, almonds, and cantaloupe and excellent cucumbers, zucchini, and hot peppers with brackish water and only light yellow sand for soil. So, based on the experience of the people of Sinai, we can reply and say that if, for example, an estimated 400,000 feddans can be cultivated in Sinai with water from the Peace Canal, 1 million feddans could be cultivated after mixing the canal's fresh water with well water. Such an area can absorb at least 1 million farmers, if we bear in mind that Egypt as a whole lives on about 5 million feddans around the Nile River. Egypt will gain from the cultivation of 1 million feddans and the settlement of 1 million Egyptians there. In 50 years, Egypt will thank us for it, when life advances into Sinai, and when Sinai becomes a shield to stop attackers and a granary that gives Egypt food.

If Egypt is going to send 1 million Egyptian to farm desert land in Libya, there is better desert land in Egypt than there is in Libya. In the al-'Uwaynat area in the southwest of Egypt, not far from Libya, there is a golden agricultural opportunity such as nature has not given Egypt for centuries. An enormous reservoir of fresh—exceedingly fresh—ground water has been proved to exist, in addition to level land perfectly suited for

farming. This area could be a great attraction for Egyptian agricultural workers. With a comprehensive program, it could turn into an area of integrated agricultural and industrial production, i.e., for producing food products using the most modern methods. We might succeed in establishing a new integrated community far from the Nile Valley with its diseases. Instead of working the land of brother countries, the farmer would be working his own land. Instead of becoming a partner in the land of a neighboring country, he would be a partner in land inside his country, which will not expel him if relations worsen and will not impose the condition that he turn over a certain percentage of what he produces by the sweat of his brow. If we submit a complete plan for reclaiming and farming al-'Uwaynat to any foreign funder, he will be forthcoming in short order, providing that we give the farmer a share of the ownership, so that his dedication increases. Isn't this better than farming the land of brother countries? Let us establish a new, integrated community in al-'Uwaynat!

One could talk on and on about the northwest coast and possibilities for agriculture there. The region is not completely arid. It used to be rich in oases, especially as one goes farther south. We need only realize that there is a huge reservoir of ground water there. Since 1962, a flowing well of water 179 km southeast of Matruh has been spouting about 40,000 tons of water to more than 30 meters. Since we have left it, a lake 10 km long and 6 km wide has formed there of fresh water with a salinity of 200 parts per million—i.e., sweeter than mineral water. This water indicates the existence of a subterranean reservoir. Studies have confirmed that it contains well water whose life could extend for 150 years to come, since the reservoir's area extends 70 km and contains more than 3 billion cubic meters.

If we are looking for a new community for Egypt's farmers to settle, why shouldn't it be in this region, and not in fraternal Libya? If people say that this water is far from arable land, what are we to say about the "Pipeline River" project that Libya is implementing to carry fresh water from wells in the south near Libya's border with the Sudan and Egypt? Is it too difficult for us to extend a line to carry water from its sources south of Matruh or in al-'Uwaynat to irrigate Egyptian land? What am I to say about this, when history testifies that Egypt is the world's master of the best methods of irrigation and transporting water?

I see the settlement of a million Egyptian farmers outside Egypt as a great national crime that we must all oppose. At the same time, we must force the government to establish emergency programs to reclaim the proposed lands in Sinai, al-'Uwaynat, and the northwest coast. Isn't this better than sending the sweat of Egypt abroad? Let Egypt's farmers farm 'Ayn Jifar, which is Egypt's, or Bi'r Qifar, instead of farming the regions of al-Sawigh or al-Sarah in Libya.

Gentlemen, Egypt's land is most entitled to Egypt's farmers!

IRAQ

AL-QADISIYAH Criticizes Western Powers on Maintaining Sanctions

JN1705093991 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0820 GMT
17 May 91

[Text] Baghdad, 17 May (INA)—The newspaper AL-QADISIYAH says that the West's insistence on maintaining the economic blockade imposed on Iraq clearly demonstrates the West's true policy against Iraq and the intentions it has always tried to conceal under the cover of international legitimacy.

In an article published today under the headline: "Economic Blockade: The West's Ugly Face," the paper says: It is clear to the world today that the game of international legitimacy that the West tried to hide behind under the pretext of "Kuwait" was not real, but the first and final objective of their attempts was to target the entire Iraqi people. The paper points out that this has revealed the premeditated intentions against Iraq, beginning with imposing the sanctions, despite the fact that the reasons for imposing them are no longer valid and despite the suffering inflicted on the Iraqi people by this policy, which reflects a lack of moral responsibility.

The paper adds that the West imposed the sanctions against Iraq through the UN Security Council months before the West's aggression under various pretexts and excuses. We realized then that such acts aimed principally at providing the opportunities for aggression and giving the U.S.-led aggressive alliance against Iraq superiority in the war, especially since the United States used these methods to exercise the ugliest campaign of starvation against a peaceful people using various means, which are as savage as the trade of cheap death pursued by the United States, Britain, and France against the peoples of the world.

The paper says that great Iraq has remained as it is and that the plot of fragmentation and division has failed despite the various parties and methods used in it, a plot that reached its peak with the events of the blind sedition started by those who infiltrated into Iraq under the protection of U.S. aircraft. The paper adds: The sides of the aggressive triangle [United States, Britain, and France] found no other way but to continue the economic blockade against Iraq, a policy adopted by the British prime minister, who said he would oppose any measure that may be taken to end the blockade.

The paper adds: Those who have shown their yellow [a term usually used to refer to anti-Arab sentiments] teeth of hatred and began to exercise the ugliest base and rancorous methods are only showing their failure and weakness in the face of the ability of the Iraqi individual, who has become a shining mark, not only in Arab history, but also in human history after becoming a symbol of heroism and steadfastness in the face of the evil tyrants, the emperor of injustice, and the merchants of death, starvation, and vice.

SAIRI Dismisses 'Aziz Claims as 'Shameless Lies'

LD1605231491 Tehran IRNA in English 1701 GMT
16 May 91

[Text] Tehran, May 16, IRNA—A spokesman for a leading Iraqi opposition group on Thursday dismissed as “shameless lies” Iraqi Deputy Premier Tariq 'Aziz's recent claim that Saddam Husayn was popular with the Iraqi people and was likely to be elected as president.

“Shi'ites and Kurds who respectively make up more than half and one fifth of the Iraqi population, have not yet forgotten the crimes of the Ba'thist regime against them, particularly its chemical attacks on Halabjah and the marshlands of the south,” a spokesman for the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI) told IRNA.

The forced dislodgement of millions of Iraqi people and destruction of cities and holy sanctuaries in particular were proof of “Saddam's unpopularity with the Iraqi people,” he added.

He also scoffed at other “tall claims” made by 'Aziz in his interview with the American daily “WASHINGTON POST” on drawing up a new constitution, holding a referendum and establishing a multi-party system in Iraq.

“It is too late to make such remarks since such statements have coincided with new international efforts to file a suit against Saddam and bring him to justice as a war criminal,” said SAIRI.

The spokesman termed 'Aziz's claims as a “futile bid by Saddam to escape the wrath of the Iraqi people brought about by two decades of his reign of terror and suppression.”

“The best way 'Aziz and other Baathists can do to make good on their atrocities is to step down, disband the Ba'thist clique and to hold free elections,” he advised.

Possible Successors to Kho'i Profiled

91AE0425A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 8 Apr 91
pp 22-23

[Article by Hasan Sabra: “What After Kho'i? Central Shi'ite Juridical Authority or Local Authorities?”]

[Text] The uproar about the real condition of the world's highest Shi'ite authority on religious practice and law, the [Marja'] Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim Kho'i, has now died down. Kho'i has returned to exercising his juridical authority in al-Najaf. Those who accused Baghdad of having summoned him to proffer expressions of loyalty under force and compulsion have fallen silent, or the protest about his condition has become restricted to some of his relatives.

As for Baghdad, it obtained what it wanted from Sayyid Kho'i. For the first time in the history of the Shi'ite

juridical authority in Iraq, the *marja'* came to the ruler in the capital to pronounce pleasing words in his presence against those who had rebelled against him and threatened the very state with a fate worse than the one it nearly met at the hands of the American-led international coalition.

As for Kho'i, he communicated to Baghdad the message he wanted—a message of his deepest religious, fatherly, and legal concern.

True, the elderly man told the president that he does not support the frenzy of certain people against state property and officials and that he himself lost two cars that were in front of his house. However, in this case he was, as it were, defending the most important tenets of Shi'ites throughout the world—the resting places of some of the imams in al-Najaf and Karbala'. In his eyes, all the concessions he is thought to have offered in coming to Baghdad to condemn the disturbances and pray for the ruler faded to insignificance compared to this objective.

Kho'i brought to Saddam Husayn his unremitting defense of the resting places of the sinless imams against any reprisal that might occur due to action and reaction between the demonstrators and the government. Such a reprisal could cause ruin and destruction. The Baghdad authorities could allege that they were pursuing people who had come from outside the country, while the demonstrator's sources could allege that they were confronting a tyrannical government.

He then returned to al-Najaf with the government's return to that city, Karbala', and the south.

What Next?

Now that Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim Kho'i is over 90 years old, he has opened during his lifetime, as never before, the issue of the destiny of the world's Shi'ite juridical authority after his departure, which, God willing, will be after a long life.

Kho'i links the preeminent central Shi'ite juridical authority to an Arab location, under the shadow of a constant call that Qom, the Iranian site of juridical authority, has a claim to loyalty to its men and to it as a place.

Although, as we have written previously, Sayyid Kho'i is not an Arab, he has preferred to remain in an Arab location. He did not move to Qom, nor did he agree to support anyone who chose another course of action politically in the religious authority structure and who sanctioned Qom as its location—i.e., Imam Khomeini after his revolution in Iran.

Who will be the central Shi'ite juridical authority after Kho'i?

What has been spoken in whispers for a time about a replacement has now begun to surface and is moving with lightning speed between places of central and local Shi'ite juridical authority.

The question of a successor to Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim Kho'i—may God preserve him—is not new in terms of Shi'ite adherence to central religious authority and finding a replacement for it. Whenever there was an important holder of central juridical authority, the question raised during his lifetime and afterwards has been who would be the replacement.

When Sayyid Abu-al-Hasan Esfahani was at the height of his authority in the forties of this century, Shi'ites asked about the name of a qualified replacement after his departure. In fact, two great central juridical authorities became prominent after his death: Sayyid Mohammad Hosein Borujerdi in Qom, who was one of Imam Khomeini's teachers, and Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim in al-Najaf.

After Sayyid al-Hakim had risen to prominence and reached an advanced age, questions again arose about his replacement. Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim Kho'i became prominent in al-Najaf and subsequently assumed the position. Imam Khomeini became prominent alongside of him from 1979, after the success of his revolution in Iran, until 1989. Although the question of a replacement has been left open for a number of juridical, political, and financial considerations, with lesser jurists [*muqallidun*—i.e., scholars who, not being deemed competent to formulate independent judgments on matters of religious practice and law, give allegiance to a specific *marja'* in all juridical matters] rallying around one or another authority, we will quickly review the most important Arab and Islamic sites of Shi'ite religious authority to highlight certain names that have been nominated for the position in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran.

In Iran

Several central Shi'ite juridical authorities can be found there with varied political and juridical approaches.

On the political level, there is of course a single authority represented by the Supreme Guide of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sayyid 'Ali Khamene'i. Although he does not fulfil the conditions for being a qualified juridical authority [*marja'*], he was chosen to succeed Imam Khomeini, the architect of the Islamic republic, as part of a political settlement to entrench the philosophy on which the republic was based: the unlimited or universal competence of the legal scholar [*wilayat al-faqih al-muttaqah*]. It had become difficult to guarantee that the other more qualified religious figures, who were more learned, more authoritative in their legal pronouncements, and had more supporters and imitators [*muqallidun*], would adhere to this principle of unlimited competence.

Although those who followed him as their authority in jurisprudence were a minority in Iran, he had political

ascendancy in the government. Furthermore, the government gave him complete economic ascendancy, allowing him to have supporters, *muqallidun*, and agents in social, financial, economic, and political institutions at home and abroad.

The political choice of Sayyid Khamene'i obliges his supporters to back him, as long as they uphold the principle of the legal scholar's universal competence. Those who believe in it, although a minority, rely on a government financially, materially, and militarily strong and on institutions tied not only the daily life of lower-level religious figures, but also to that of millions of Muslim Iranians. In particular, the disagreement with upholders of the principle of the legal scholar's special competence [i.e., limited to his area of expertise] falls only within the context of a choice of legal judgment, without any intentional political background.

In discussing the successor to central juridical authority Kho'i, we will not pay as much attention to the political choice as to highlighting those qualified to be Kho'i's replacement because of a belief in Kho'i's philosophy of the [jurist's] special [i.e., limited] competence.

Who are these men in Iran?

1. Sayyid Reza Golpayegani, who recently returned from London to his headquarters in Qom after medical treatment. He is in his nineties.

Sayyid Golpayegani has followers and imitators [*muqallidun*] by the millions. He upholds the special competence of the legal scholar. He did not adhere to the principle of the scholar's unlimited competence or support the establishment of an Islamic republic. During Khomeini's lifetime and afterwards, he naturally embodied a competing—if one may use the expression—central religious authority.

During Khomeini's lifetime, he was an obstinate religious leader who shared the position of the other central juridical authority, the late Sayyid Mahmud Shari'atmadari, who opposed the idea of unlimited competence, along with the late Sayyid Mar'ashi Najafi.

However, Imam Khomeini's presence in Qom at the seat of political and juridical authority, the presence of Sayyid Kho'i in al-Najaf, and the presence of Sayyid Shari'atmadari also in Qom canceled the roles of the latter men. In the same way, the political presence of Sayyid Khamene'i now cancels any direct role of Sayyid Golpayegani in Qom.

2. Sayyid Sadeq Ruhani, who is another central juridical authority [*marja'*] in Qom. He also does not now adhere to the principle of the legal scholar's unlimited competence. He has many supporters and imitators [*muqallidun*] in Iran, Iraq, and abroad. He has a seminary in Qom where he teaches, and has written important works on Shi'ite jurisprudence.

3. Shaykh Araki: After the death of Imam Khomeini, his name was raised to assume the central Shi'ite juridical

authority in Iran based on the philosophy of the legal scholar's unlimited competence, but his advanced age prevented him from assuming the role. Subsequently, however, he was made responsible for the Imam Khomeini Tomb Committee, with its budget of billions of dollars. The tomb is to involve a complete modern-style city.

Voicing a fundamental objection to the choice of the aged Araki to replace Sayyid Kho'i (may God preserve him), an Iraqi cleric said, "One should not begin with what is already dead!"

In Iraq

Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim Kho'i has disciples who are *mujtahids* [scholars qualified to derive religious precepts by exercising independent judgment on the basis of authentic articles of the shari'ah] qualified for the position of central juridical authority [*marja'*]. They follow his approach and his position on the legal scholar's competence and his advocacy of special [i.e., limited] competence. The most prominent of them are:

1. Sayyid Sabzevari: He still lives in al-Najaf and is a supporter of the moderate political line represented by Sayyid Kho'i.
2. Sayyid Reza Khalkhali: He also supports Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim's political line.

In Lebanon

In Lebanon, the only name qualified for the role of central Shi'ite juridical authority is Shaykh Muhammad Taqi al-Faqih, son of the late *Marja'* Yusuf al-Faqih, who died in 1957 and was one of the teachers of the other *marja'*, Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim, who died in 1970.

Shaykh Muhammad Taqi al-Faqih, winters in Tyre and spends the summer at his village of Haris in Bint Jubayl district. He is 82 years old and has authored voluminous writings, the most important of which are: *Qawa'id al-Faqih* ("Rules of the Legal Scholar"), and *'Umdat al-Mutafaqqih* ("Support for Those Who Understand Jurisprudence"), which is his practical treatise. He wrote a theoretical book entitled *Sharh al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa wa Manasik al-Faqih* ("An Explanation of 'The Most Firm Handhold' and the Observances of the Legal Scholar"), and a historical work entitled "The 'Amil Mountains in History," in addition to his qualifying thesis for the degree of *marja'*.

Shaykh Muhammad Taqi teaches jurisprudence and advanced studies relating to *ijtihad* [deduction of religious precepts from the articles of the shari'ah] at his home. He has disciples throughout Lebanon and a few in the vicinity of al-Kut and Qal'at Sikkar in Iraq.

He has devoted himself completely to writing, reading, preaching, and teaching and has retired from public political and social life in Lebanon. If he agrees to receive any young or old Lebanese politician or cleric

who seeks a visit, he stipulates that the meeting will be limited to receiving preaching and counsel.

The obstacle to the choice of Shaykh Muhammad Taqi al-Faqih for the position of Shi'ite religious authority lies in himself. He believes that the position of *marja'* does not come by effort, contact, propaganda, and the media. Furthermore, he is not sufficiently known to the public, especially to its younger generation, which is attracted to names that shine in the information media.

Shaykh Muhammad Taqi al-Faqih considers the position of juridical authority a great burden and responsibility. He adheres to the philosophy of the legal scholar's special competence that investigates matters of religion and regulations without crossing over into political questions.

Central Juridical Authority or Local Authorities?

If it becomes impossible to agree on an all-embracing central juridical authority for the Shi'ah throughout the world, either Arab in Lebanon and Iraq, or non-Arab in Iraq and Iran, can one talk about local juridical authorities each playing a juridical and religious role in its territory, but linked to the others by firm but flexible links?

This is a matter for the experts and for gatherings of agents and imitators [*muqallidun*]. However, one must indicate the factors that play a fundamental role in the selection of any particular *mujtahid* as senior *marja'*.

First there is the number of followers, adherents, and agents in the various areas of Shi'ite presence. One must note that the Persian-Iranian element holds an important card in this area, inasmuch as it possesses two decisive advantages: a numerical advantage in people and wealth, and a practical advantage in patience, steadfastness, and perseverance, especially in the area of legal knowledge and study.

The Arab element, Iraqi or Lebanese, is at a disadvantage in this regard for two reasons. First, it is involved directly in political activity, which gives few if any of its men the opportunity to persevere in the serious study which is a foundation of central or local juridical authority. Second, the Arab element is numerically small and therefore lacks the economic and financial resources that would allow it to support agents and institutions, maintain connection with adherents, and help students engaged in study around the scholar.

These differences in any case will play a decisive role in determining the central juridical authority. Today there is a tendency toward a plurality of local replacements, rather than an all-embracing one. There are differing points of view on the matter. We will talk about them in a subsequent article.

Future Iraqi Shi'ite Leadership Examined

91AE0425B Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 15 Apr 91
pp 24-25

[Article by Hasan Sabra: "What After Kho'i? Arab or Iranian Juridical Authority?"]

[Text] According to Shi'ite sources and the doctrine of Twelver Shi'ites, the Imam Muhammad Ibn-al-Hasan al-'Askari, known as "the Awaited Mahdi," went into hiding. This was the first or "minor occultation." It began at his birth in 256 A.H. and lasted 74 years.

During this period, he was seen by ambassadors and perhaps by others also. He had four ambassadors during this occultation:

1. Abu-'Amr 'Uthman Ibn-Sa'id Ibn-'Amr al-'Umari al-Asadi, known as al-'Umari,
2. Abu-Ja'far Muhammad Ibn-'Uthman (the son of the first ambassador),
3. Abu-al-Qasim al-Husayn Ibn-Ruh, and
4. Abu-al-Husayn 'Ali Ibn-Muhammad al-Saymarri.

The latter were considered men to whom one should have recourse [*marja'*] in affairs of the community. At the same time, they were the connecting link between the imam and his followers.

With the death of al-Saymarri, the last of the ambassadors, the lesser occultation ended, and the "major occultation," which has lasted until now, began. It was during the major occultation that the institution of a universal figure of recourse [*al-marja'iyah al-'ammah*] originated between the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century [A.H.].

Such universal competence as a figure of recourse belongs to someone who unites the following attributes:

The *marja'* must be mature, intelligent, a believer, male, a *mujtahid* [a scholar deemed qualified to exercise independent judgement in deriving religious precepts from the shari'ah], just, and of legitimate birth. His mastery must not fall below the recognized standard in Arabic grammar. He must be moderate and righteous. He must be a living person, it being inadmissible to begin by taking a dead person as model. Anyone who fulfills all these conditions is qualified to become a *marja'*.

Anyone who is not qualified to be taken for reference as a model is forbidden from issuing fatwas, just as anyone who is not qualified for the office of judge is forbidden from passing judgment, nor may cases be referred to him.

The justice required of a *marja'* taken as a model consists of uprightness on the path of the sacred law and not deviating to the right or left from it. He must not commit sin by omitting a duty or doing what is forbidden, save with a legitimate excuse. A *marja'* must be obedient to

the Lord and must renounce his own inclination. He must be a *mujtahid* [one qualified to exercise independent judgment in matters of jurisprudence], and ordinary believers must take him as a model.

As for the practical application of these rules, the position of Shi'ite religious *marja'* first belonged to the Arabs through the hidden Imam al-Mahdi himself and his representatives, the four ambassadors, who were Arabs.

The rule is that they should be descendants of Fatimah, the daughter of the Messenger of God (upon whom be blessing and peace) and wife of the Imam 'Ali. Thus, they must be descended from Quraysh, the Arab stock that God ennobled by revealing the Koran in their language.

The rule for the descent of Muslim caliphs also is that they should be of Quraysh, and, more specifically, the Banu Hashim.

A shift in this matter toward other tribes and nations began only during the period of Turkish dominion over the Islamic lands in the time of the Ottoman Empire.

Religious recourse among Shi'ites also saw diversification when persons who assumed it were honored without their being Arabs—for example, al-Kulayni, al-Sadduq, Shaykh al-Mufid Muhammad Ibn-al-Nu'man, Sayyid al-Murtada 'Alam al-Huda, Shaykh al-Tusi, al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, al-'Allamah al-Hilli, Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqin, and al-Shahid al-Awwal.

We find both Arabs and Iranians among these, although one should bear in mind that all the sayyids who were *marja's* were originally of Arab stock. The late Sayyid Husayn Hammami, a teacher of an older generation of Lebanese scholars who studied in al-Najaf, said: "A *marja'* is a small imam."

The most prominent holders of the office of *marja'* during the 20th century were: Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim, Shaykh Muhammad Rida Al Yasin (the maternal uncle of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr), Sayyid Sadr-al-Din al-Sadr (the father of Sayyid Musa al-Sadr), Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Kashif-al-Ghita' (who married the sister of Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif-al-Zayn, publisher of the famous magazine AL-'IRFAN; he was the first to issue a fatwa pronouncing communism to be infidelity and atheism, even before the fatwa of Sayyid al-Hakim in 1959, during the Nur al-Sa'id government in Iraq). These Arab holders of the office of *marja'* were the authors of treatises [on Islamic law]. The most prominent of them in terms of the extent to which he was taken as a model for imitation [*taqlid*] was Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim because of his many followers. They chose to study under him because of his extensive learning, his virtue, skill at deducing religious precepts, and diligence from his youth. Those who knew him used to tell anecdotes of how he had lived his childhood not in fun and games like his peers, but in study and upright behavior on his way to the position of religious authority.

The most prominent non-Arab names are Sayyid Borujerdi in Qom, one of Khomeini's teachers; Sayyid 'Abd-al-Hadi Shirazi; his most eminent aide, Sayyid Mohammad Sa'id Fazlallah, the father of Sayyid Kazem, the son-in-law of Sayyid Mohammad Hosein Fazlallah; Sayyid Mahmud Shahrudi, and Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim Kho'i, who is now the supreme reference for imitation [*marja' al-taqlid*] in the world.

Among all these, only Sayyid Borujerdi was in Qom; the others were and remained in al-Najaf.

It was in Qom that Sayyid Reza Golpayegani, the late Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shari'atmadari, and the late Sayyid Mar'ashi Najafi became prominent—not to mention the late Sayyid Ruhallah Musavi Khomeini.

Figures of Recourse Arab and Non-Arab

Although Islam united peoples and tribes, and although a prophetic tradition says, "An Arab has no superiority over a Persian save in piety," the choice between an Arab and non-Arab figure of recourse in juridical matters is not determined solely with reference to these two Islamic axioms, but also by objectively influential factors involving the nationality of the authority.

The first of these factors, the previously mentioned conditions having been fulfilled, is the loyalty of the authority's partisans. This depends on two things:

The first is the number of followers who take him as a model for imitation and of his students and agents. It is always from them that the advocates emerge who rely on his fatwas, and they form a decisive numerical partisanship.

Along with this numerical partisanship, there is a prominent material economic factor. Just as numbers provide the *marja'* with supporters and imitators, those who support his position also back him with money and the sinew of movement, send emissaries and preachers, establish institutions that link people to him, hold meetings, build mosques, found charitable associations, and establish *husayniyat* [Shi'ite mosques for teaching and preaching].

Therefore, the chances for an Arab's success in becoming *marja'* diminish in the face of any other nationality, especially Iranian.

Iran contains the largest number of Shi'ites in the world. A *marja'* in Iran naturally has available the largest number of followers who take him as a model for imitation.

He therefore also has the sinew of money. The believer who follows him as a model and wants to pay *zakah* and *khums* will prefer to pay them to a nearby *marja'*, whom he can visit and whom he may know, particularly if the believer is a rich man who can travel easily and seek a meeting and advice about his social, economic, or political position. By comparison with the Arab authorities and their social position, what has been and is available

to the Iranian ones was always modest. On this basis, the choice of an Iranian authority follows from the existing state of affairs, regardless of the degree of political and national influence in it.

Two Realities, One Significance

When conflict erupted between the shah of Iran and the Qom *marja'* Sayyid Borujerdi at the time when Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim served as *marja'* in the venerable city of al-Najaf, the shah printed and distributed Sayyid al-Hakim's treatise at his own expense as an expression of his displeasure with Sayyid Borujerdi. There were various interpretations of the episode. One group thought that the shah's initiative was meant to spoil Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim's cards in Arab terms. Another group thought that he was seeking strength in the Arab *marja'* at the expense of the Iranian one. During the Khomeini revolution in Iran, when people said that the world's supreme Shi'ite Islamic *marja'*, Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim Kho'i, had not approved the proclamation of the revolution or its goals (see the first article in this series), a rumor emerged among Khomeini's supporters that Sayyid Kho'i had accepted a gift from the shah's wife, Empress Farah Diba, and that the great *marja'* had replied with another gift as an expression of his acceptance of the shah's initiative. In explanation of the rumor at that time, it was said that the objective had been to rely on the religious authority of al-Najaf to counteract the possible return of a religious authority opposed to the shah in Qom.

Destructive Weapons Do Not Decide Course of History

JN1605113291 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1030 GMT
16 May 91

[Text] Baghdad, 16 May (INA)—The newspaper AL-THAWRAH says the Iraqis have the right to feel proud that life returned to normal in all human, spiritual, moral, and material aspects.

In an article today, the paper says that despite all its huge material losses and its sacrifices in confronting the conspiracy by imperialism, Zionism, and the world reactionary forces, great Iraq emphasizes that it can rise again because it is a star with a civilized, pioneering, pan-Arab strategy based on Arabism and Islam and on a futuristic human outlook leading the world and its nations toward liberation from the slavery of Western imperialism, in whose prison peoples' rights, human rights, justice, and contemporary civilized aspirations are held.

The paper says that the technology of destructive weapons does not decide the course of history. The historical weapons possessed by the Iraqis and the leading mentality of the 17-30 July revolution are always the decisive factors subjectively and objectively. They are the weapons of spirit and the divine values increasingly taking root in the minds and conscience of Iraq's brave men.

The paper says that Iraq has recorded bright pages in the pan-Arab and human history and gave concrete examples of legendary and magical action. This gave Iraq much patience and ability to confront challenges; it also gave it abundant earthly and heavenly values guarded and protected by the sacred divine tide against the forces of conspiracy, aggression, evil, atheism, and vice.

ISRAEL

Histadrut Chief Said Changing Image, Not Policies

91AE0424B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 May 91
p B2

[Article by Judith Winkler: "His Own Confidant"]

[Text] In the corridors of the Va'ad Hapo'el [Histadrut Executive Committee] it is said, half jokingly and half cynically, that Yisra'el Qeysar's confidant and the person closest to him is Qeysar. In 1984, when Yisra'el Qeysar assumed the leadership of the Histadrut in the wake of Yeruham Meshel's retirement agreement, one year before he had to compete for the job in elections, Va'ad Hapo'el members hastened to mourn the passing of the era of centralization. Today many of those who wanted to have Meshel replaced are ready to eat their hats. Centralism is still a reality and the only difference is in style. Qeysar is better than Meshel at working with the media and he has the charisma of a trade union activist capable of establishing good communication with both workers and ministers. He is pragmatic and he has improved his talent for skipping over mines almost to perfection.

No real change has occurred in the hierarchic structure of the decisionmaking apparatus. The Central Committee—the Histadrut's government—is still a bloated body incapable to really debate and forge Histadrut policy. As in the past, it mainly serves as a formal decisionmaking forum, although its members currently reflect the various centers of power more faithfully, because some of them were elected, not appointed.

Officially, Qeysar did not establish a narrow body around him for formulating positions and policies. However, on Fridays there is a meeting of department heads, which in fact is a kind of small board of directors of the Va'ad Hapo'el. The forum of department heads does not have a legal place in the Va'ad Hapo'el's hierarchy. The department heads are the personal appointees of the secretary general and they derive their power primarily from their closeness to him. Their dependence on him is already great. Some of them won their appointment also thanks to their position in the Labor Party, but the party's power to influence Histadrut policies and personal staff has become weaker. Meshel consistently blocked every endeavor to create a common platform for the Histadrut and the party in order to preserve his own

power, under the guise of preserving the independence of the Histadrut, and Qeysar embraced his approach with open arms.

Qeysar reports to the forum of the department heads on current issues; he listens to their remarks and suggestions, but he is not obligated to adopt them. He is not obligated to convene the forum regularly and no one among the participants deceives himself that the forum is anything more than a venue for exchanging views.

Qeysar did not consult the forum members about appointing Professor Eytan Shashinsky as chairman of the Workers' Association, just as he did not ask them when and how to remove Danny Rosolio from the Workers' Association. They did not share in his decision to draw the religious parties closer and to reach agreement with the religious before the latest Histadrut elections with a view to ensuring that the latter would not run. In exchange he offered SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardis] an armor plated seat on the Central Committee on a silver tray, much to the displeasure of many. The forum members were also not asked to share in the decision to end Yeshayahu Gavish's office as director general of KOOR and to appoint Benny Ga'on as his replacement. More than a few people secretly complained that Yitzhaq Ofek should be removed as head of Hapo'el long before Qeysar put in motion his release. On the other hand, the forum of department heads worked closely with Qeysar during the electoral campaign; for that purpose they worked with party activists and outside experts as an extended electoral staff.

For most of his years as a secretary general Qeysar remained free of the shadow of Ya'aqov Levinson, who was viewed as Labor's economic chef. Levinson's suicide and the tremors that affected the Workers' Association and the Labor Party strengthened Qeysar's position as chairman of the Workers' Association, too, until he decided on the separation of powers and passed the baton of the Workers' Association to Prof. Shashinsky. It seems that the Workers' Association was run all these years by the Steering Committee, which was made up of the representatives of the coalition parties in the Va'ad Hapo'el. In practice, the Steering Committee was and still is a toothless group. Moreover, although some of its members are directors of Histadrut plants, the Steering Committee is supposed to supervise those plants' activities and guide their policies. In order to strengthen it, Qeysar promised to select from it a narrow secretariat, but he gave up the idea without any announcement.

The Steering Committee has in fact become a rubber stamp committee. The decisions are made in Qeysar's office in consultation with the heads of the Workers' Association, KOOR directors, and sometimes in coordination with Labor Party officials. Anyone who tried to protest was silenced and removed. For example, Raya Retig of MAPAM [United Workers Party]. Retig, a member of the Coordinating Committee, sounded the alarm and demanded explanations. In one of his rare

explosions, Qeysar promised to remove her. He kept his promise—MAPAM did not reelect her to the Histadrut.

The Professional Association Department [PAD] is the heart of the Histadrut. Its head is traditionally viewed as heir to the secretary general. Qeysar vaulted from that position into Meshel's seat. Hayim Haberfeld, who is currently the chairman of the PAD, still hesitates to unequivocally declare his intention to candidate for secretary general, although Qeysar has already said that this was his last term in office and that he intended to run for the Labor Party leadership. Haberfeld is keeping a low profile at Qeysar's side, although he does not always guard his tongue.

The body which is supposed to steer PAD is made up of the secretaries of the professional associations; it is not a forum protected by Histadrut law, but a kind of consultative forum. Operating in parallel at the political level is a departmental coordinating commission made up of representatives of the various factions in the Va'ad Hapo'el. Labor has a majority in the commission in keeping with the balance of forces established at the elections, so that in practice the commission has no power to map out policy or to dispute steps taken by Qeysar or Haberfeld.

One core of potential power are the secretaries of the professional associations. They can bring pressure to bear, influence, maneuver, and formulate pay agreements up to a point, but no one among them deceives himself as to who decides the general framework. Qeysar's perception of the professional associations and of the Histadrut's professional policy is predicated by his perception of the place of the Histadrut as a central factor in the economy whom every government has to involve at the macrolevel. That perception has not changed since the foundation of the Histadrut. It is against this backdrop that one must consider the references to state budgets and economic programs. This is also the basis for salary agreements and cost of living agreements, in the course of which Qeysar, like Meshel before him, more than once gave up cost of living and pay increases in exchange for advantages for the Sick Fund and the Workers' Association. According to them, the Sick Fund and the Workers' Association are of no lesser importance to the employees than direct pay increases and compensations for higher prices, and on this point the heads of the professional associations are not allowed to view the bottom line of the pay slip as the employees' only interest.

This was also the backdrop for various agreements—once an even shekel pay increase in exchange for giving up percentage points from the cost of living increase and once an increase in percentage points, while the professional associations were left little room to maneuver and to spread out special step increases, as was the case in 1985—designed to bring about salary erosion in order to save the country from economic collapse.

The heads of the professional associations are aware of their power limitations. They derive their power primarily from the party. The political structure of the Histadrut makes it impossible for an extra-party candidate to run for the leadership of a professional association. For this purpose the senior party representative also stands at the top of the pyramid in the Va'ad Hapo'el; nevertheless, within the party the associations sector does not enjoy even the position assured to the moshavs, minorities, or neighborhoods groups.

One example of this power limitation became evident on the eve of the 1985 Histadrut elections, when Qeysar arrived at a secret agreement with the three academic professional associations; the agreement was deposited in a safe at Bank Hapo'alim until after the election and featured a promise to give them organizational autonomy in exchange for their agreement not to withdraw from the Histadrut and support an independent list in the election. The publication of the agreement stunned the heads of the associations, but they felt consoled by the fact that in time they may attain to a similar status. To this day they have not achieved that, but neither have the academic associations managed to fully implement the autonomy agreements. Two of the three heads of the academic professional associations that led the autonomy process are now residing abroad—Yitzhaq Raz, secretary of the Engineers Association was sent to represent KOOR's foreign trade interests in Budapest; his deputy Ely Kagan is the labor attache at the Israeli Embassy in Washington; the third, Ya'aqov Onikowski is still secretary of the Humanities and Social Sciences Histadrut Association.

The heads of the professional associations have chalked up partial achievements to their credit, by their lights: so far they have blocked the implementation of the recommendations of the Zussman Commission on reforms in the structure of public service salaries, although Qeysar and the Coordinating Commission had adopted them. In general terms, however, this is not an achievement, because sooner or later—apparently later—there will be no stopping a shake-up in the public sector. In this case Qeysar did not try to force through his opinion, both because from his viewpoint the conditions in the field were not ripe for reform, and because no one in the Va'ad Hapo'el believes in the capability of the government to carry it out.

Whom does Qeysar really consult? The reasonable assumption is that the person closest to him is Histadrut Treasurer Arthur Yisra'elowitz. Qeysar does take ideas and suggestions from additional people, but in the Va'ad Hapo'el there is no forum that serves to steer or influence the secretary general.

The Va'ad Hapo'el, which is the counterpart of the Knesset within the Histadrut hierarchy, has no significance. It automatically endorses any proposal that is put on its desk. There is no internal opposition to Qeysar and the influence of outside opposition is limited to the media. The Va'ad Hapo'el is used by the leadership,

especially by Qaysar, as a propaganda tool and at times as a whip to threaten the government. And at times, in the best defunct European tradition, as a poster for internal purposes.

Qaysar's working and leadership style in the Histadrut will undoubtedly cause more than a few surprises if and when he wins the nomination for his party's leadership.

Qaysar on Labor Policy, Histadrut Politics

91AE0408D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 1 May 91 p 11

[Interview with Histadrut General Director Yisra'el Qaysar by Yoram Peri, Dani'el Blokh, Levy Morav, Efrayim Davidi, and Amir Noyman; place and date not given]

[Text]

[DAVAR] Why is May Day different from all other days of the year?

[Qaysar] Two symbols are intertwined on this day. The first is the central focus on workers and the value of work at least once a year, and the second is solidarity among all workers in Israel and between them and their counterparts in the free world.

Israel suffers from an erosion of the value of labor and the value of the working person. This is much more prominent now because of what is happening to us in the political arena, the economic arena, the immigration arena, and in the territories—the intifadah with all of its effects including the tireless attempts to import foreign workers. In my opinion, the working person must be returned to the center of economic-social action in Israel. May Day, the only day of the year when attention is devoted entirely to the value of labor and the worker, helps to strengthen this trend.

The second symbol, solidarity, is also vital at present, perhaps more than in the past, because, in a modern society, there is a growing trend toward "every man for himself." This trend is called by different names, such as the reduction of the government's involvement in the economy and in society, liberalism, a free market, and the like. The names are different, but the result is the same: Every man for himself, and no one is another's guarantor. Thus, people are turning into egotists and becoming insensitive to others' suffering. One can provide abundant examples from abroad. Even when a people is being threatened with destruction, they are concerned only for their own comfort. We saw the behavior of some of the European countries on the eve of the Gulf war. According to my estimation, and I am saying this to the German and French missions, this stems from their inability to concede their comfort.

For that very reason, it is necessary to preserve an event that attempts to strengthen a sense of caring. One day should be maintained on which we try to be responsible for each other, a day on which we attempt to cultivate

solidarity, precisely amid the general trend—which is seemingly impossible to curb—of transferring responsibility increasingly from society to the individual, with all of its implications.

[DAVAR] It seems that this year, more than in other years, you have a reason on May Day to be happy, celebrate, and even drink, whether in honor of the arrangement that was obtained regarding Koor, which was finally concluded formally, or Bank Hapo'alim's recent balance [giving it top ranking among Israeli banks], or the Co-op's issue, or the recovery of Hasne [Insurance Company] and Solel-Bone [construction company]. In your opinion, are all of these achievements coincidental, or are they the fruit of the recovery process? Will this process continue?

[Qaysar] I do not pretend to take all of the credit. It is wrong to give credit to one person, just as it is wrong to attribute all of the failures or economic difficulties to one factor. There is never any single decisive factor, but always a combination of factors.

If there were some defect in the Hevrat Ha'ovdim [the Workers Company] system, we would see a sick workers economy, while the rest of the economy's sectors would be healthy. If this were the case, I would say: A virus is afflicting only Hevrat Ha'ovdim to the general exclusion of the private or public sector, and this virus must be searched out.

However, unfortunately, this applies to the entire economy. Of the many companies that went bankrupt or face difficulties, 59 percent are private companies. They attracted no attention, because political factors are not involved, and no political profit can be gained from their collapse. It is precisely in private companies where the workers have been hit harder than in the workers economy, because they are leaving with nothing.

We, and leading figures as well, have learned quickly to derive conclusions. The blame does not rest with the goals. The goals are correct. I believe in a mixed economy. I also think that the economy will be a mixed economy in the future. We are seeing this now in the world at large. It is impossible to mobilize financial sources from private entrepreneurs alone. The amount of money that can be mobilized from private entrepreneurs is insufficient for development needs. Therefore, it is always necessary to return to the workers, to transform them into an element that invests and cares about producing the pie, not just dividing it up.

[DAVAR] What about the Histadrut's relations with the current government? In your estimation, does the government have an economic and social policy?

[Qaysar] They publish an economic program every Monday and Thursday—if they would only call it something less bombastic than a program. If one is to take the government to task, it should be over the concept rather than the program. First, it is difficult to speak about the government as a unified entity. It was thought that once

the Labor Alignment left the government, it would become more homogeneous. I can testify that no such thing has happened regarding economics. On the contrary, it is impossible to bring together three ministers to discuss the economy's problems. I have been unable to do so.

In the past, we used to sit in the Tripartite Economic-Social Council: ministers, coordinating committee, and industrialists. Even if we produced nothing, sitting together was positive in my view. It is now all the more necessary to convey to the people that we are seeking that which unites rather than divides. The political and economic problems and the problems of providing employment to the new immigrants are so onerous. There are days when you have to fight, but there are days when you must say: Come, let us see what we can do together.

I believe that a solution stemming from cooperation is much better than each party unsheathing its own separate plan pursuant to its authority: I, as a representative of the workers, the government pursuant to its authority, and the employers, by force of their ownership of capital. However, if there is no choice, we too behave in this way.

It is no secret that the government does not speak in one voice. The ministers of commerce and industry, finance, housing, and tourism all have different policies. How do you bring them together? I favor a common denominator. However, if all of the pertinent ministers cannot meet, I am ready for a minimum plan. Under this plan, at least three ministers are to meet, the finance minister, the president of the industrialists, the secretary of the Histadrut, and perhaps senior officials of the minister. We should at least sit together. However, this did not work out, but not because of us. We had no objection. On the contrary, we always endeavor to engage in dialogue. The defect is in the government's policy. It attempts to imitate the changes occurring in the free world, without understanding that it is impossible to apply them, as they are, to a country such as ours. Hence, discussion of a market economy, the attempt at free [unregulated] exposure to imports, and the declarations that the government is not interfering. Even the construction of apartments is being left to the free market.

[DAVAR] What about the pension funds dispute?

[Qaysar] Our argument with the government is over the concept. We tell the finance minister that a pension plan cannot be maintained if the saver or worker does not know what his future rights in the fund are. Even a saver in a bank is not treated as such. He is told: You receive such and such a percentage that is linked. If he wants, he is in a position to calculate how much he will have at the end of the period. The situation regarding pension funds is absurd. It is inconceivable for a worker who contributes to a pension fund for 35-40 years not to know what his rights will be when he stops contributing to the fund.

The finance minister actually suggested ending companies' obligations with respect to insured persons. It is

ludicrous for workers to set aside a portion of their salaries for the pension funds and not to know what they are entitled to, while the rights of a person who does not pay into a pension fund, but has a pension under an agreement or a budgetary pension law, such as ministers, Knesset members, senior officials, are protected by law, without any questions being asked about the actuary position of the organizations in which he serves. Is a Knesset member who receives a pension asked, what is the Knesset's actuary position, or whether there is a deficit in the budget? There is a law that stipulates that anyone who receives a budgetary pension is entitled to 2 percent per year multiplied by the years of service. Moreover, there are arrangements that permit such people to receive an early pension. And I am not talking about the Army.

Only salaried workers who, with their employers, contribute monthly to a pension fund to ensure their future as they do not know what will be their fate when they reach old age, because the finance minister tells them: It does not interest me, invest in the stock exchange or elsewhere. Has he examined the implications? What would happen if 3 billion per year were invested in the free market? That in itself would lower the interest rate and disrupt all trade in the stock exchange for a year.

[DAVAR] The Histadrut is involved, willingly and unwillingly, in two internal, party disputes, which are also connected to each another. The first concerns an attempt to change the Labor Party's constitution, so as to sever the connection between party membership and Histadrut membership. The other is the struggle surrounding the party census. What is your position on these matters?

[Qaysar] Regarding the first dispute, it poses more of a problem for the party than the Histadrut. If we are fighting this separation, it is because we are concerned for the party. The separation, as it is, will not detract from the weight of the Histadrut. On the contrary, it will make the Histadrut more independent.

Why is it thought that such a separation should influence the Histadrut? Do I obtain members through the party? The party is the one that stands to be damaged by the separation. In the recent Histadrut elections, the Labor faction obtained 55 percent. In the census which the Labor Party is conducting, 10,000 persons have been counted to date. However, as is known, the Labor Party's supporters in all of Israel number 0.5 million.

I will not reveal to you all of the secrets. However, the party is currently involved in selecting representatives of the Histadrut. If there is a separation, we, the [Labor] faction within the Histadrut, will ourselves select our representatives. I know that there are people in the Histadrut who are interested in this, and I know that if I run for elections in the trade union, I would perhaps be elected with a large majority. However, I want to be elected by the center of my party. That is one factor. A second factor is the Labor Party's sociopolitical outlook.

The party, from the outset, because of its outlook, conceded the tools, organizations, and arms possessed by every party, even the smallest party. The Labor Party has no youth movement, newspaper, or settlement. I could cite additional examples. Only the Labor Party lacks such organizations, because it has viewed the Histadrut as the executive arm of its social outlook. In other words, the party produces the social concept, values, and principles, and the Histadrut implements them.

If there is a separation, the party will be left completely naked. I do not know if it currently has the power to establish a youth movement, newspaper, or settlement movement, which are the inalienable goods of any political movement. One can learn from what happened to the Democratic Movement for Change, which had intellectual and leadership potential, but, one day, it was as if it had never existed. By contrast, the Labor Party has been in a depressed state, and it is like a righteous man who falls seven times and rises up again. Why? Because it has a base. The settlement movement, the kibbutz movement, the moshav movement, the Histadrut, the newspaper, and a youth movement.

Let us assume that there is a separation. Who would implement elections in the Histadrut for the party? Who would implement elections for the municipalities and the Knesset for it? Our branches? Our branches for the most part are inactive. Where are they active? Where there are disputes. That may sound cynical, but it is unfortunately the case. There are indeed several good branches, but they are exceptions to the rule.

There is also the question of financing. Once a separation occurs, the [former Labor] faction in the Histadrut would receive financing funds rather than the party. Another problem is faithfulness to ideas. What kind of labor party preaches organized labor, while its members—those who do the preaching—are unorganized? What kind of Hottentotic norms would we present to the workers? This is what happened to the Likud in Histadrut elections. Beni Begin and other members of the Likud conducted Histadrut elections. However, they presented one defect: They are not Histadrut members.

Could we permit ourselves such a situation in the Labor Party? Therefore, I said that a separation would not be negative from the Histadrut's standpoint. The Labor Party would be the loser. I think that we, within the Histadrut, are the true members of the Labor Party, because we at least are trying to apply the Labor Party's policy, which is fundamentally an economic, social policy that goes by the name of the Labor Party. Political concern is unique to the state of Israel, but not to the Labor Party.

The Labor Party's uniqueness is its concern for economic and social matters. Unfortunately, party members have, been very compromising and pragmatic on these matters. I agree that it is necessary to be pragmatic from time to time. However, we have principles. We alone approached the election campaign on a socioeconomic

basis, without the blemish of political interests. I strongly prohibited political interests from entering the Histadrut. I said: We will be judged on the basis of our purview, which is the socioeconomic realm, within the bounds of which the Histadrut operates. Thank God, we obtained good results.

Now, to the second subject. Some of my friends in the Labor Party have become accustomed to thinking in terms of internal struggles. From their standpoint, the struggle for the soul of the voter is secondary. If Labor wants to lead some day, it must begin to think about how to contend for votes, rather than how one camp can gain victory over another camp. I said that we had to find a way to reach voters. With all modesty, that is what I did in the Histadrut. The party has already lost the Histadrut, but we went to the workers, and, thank God, they have given us their confidence. Subsequently, confidence in the party leadership was also restored.

We told the party leadership: You want a census? No problem. Come, let us say to the members: If you have between 150 and 200 people who are mustered for the party in a workplace, let us give them the possibility of directly electing a representative to the party committee. The workers in the workplace need to say: We are the Labor Party, even if we are not activists in a branch. What is to be done? If it is desirable for people to feel a commitment to the party's interest, they must be motivated, and personal motivation is currently the determining factor in all fields. First, a person must be checked out. If he says, for example, I can win the committee chairman not only of the Electricity Company and Bank Hapo'alim, but also a factory of 400 persons, he must be told: Go, count the voters, choose a representative, and send him directly to the committee. In this way, he develops an interest. For that purpose, it is necessary to seek workers who do not identify with the party on a daily basis, who are elected on a personal rather than a political basis, and all workers committees are elected on a personal rather than a political basis.

I am thinking out loud. Few like me think out loud. In other words, the census is, in my opinion, not only a propaganda tool, but the essence of the struggle to bring the voter to the Knesset and to external [general] elections, which represent the important struggle. True, the party leadership is usually elected, but even the election of the best leadership in the absence of sufficient voters would not help us.

The Labor Party needs to contend for a position among the masses of youths, the moderate religious population, the neighborhoods, and among the new immigrants. People [in the party] do not see this as a problem. Just announce you are running, and the rest is set—the voter is standing by. I see the problem. Nonetheless, we saw cause for hope in Histadrut elections. The Histadrut made a relatively decent gains precisely among the population that have not been considered Labor Alignment supporters in the economic-social realm. I mean

the neighborhoods and the development towns. Whoever wishes, may check the data. In the neighborhoods and development towns, the Labor Movement increased its power significantly, even compared to previous Histadrut elections.

Sometimes, when I go in search of votes, it is very pleasant for me to think that Kfar Shmaryahu supports us. However, to search out the voter, I must travel a half km from one house to the next. By contrast, when I come to a neighborhood, in one building, I have all of Kfar Shmaryahu twice and three times over. It is important for the people of Kfar Shmaryahu to support us, and if there are those who cannot be Histadrut members and want to be party members, I have no objections. I have no need for a millionaire to be a Histadrut member. In the previous convention, there was a definition to which I agreed: Whoever cannot be a Histadrut member, will not be a Histadrut member.

[DAVAR] You are speaking about the party's contest. What about the convention?

[Qaysar] I am in favor of primaries.

[DAVAR] Some time ago, Yoram Ovrivovitz stated: I am a party member, a member of the center, and a member of Qaysar's camp. Is there such a thing as Qaysar's camp?

[Qaysar] I never maintained camps, because every camp creates an opposing camp. Sometimes, you have no choice. If you cannot mobilize power from among the masses of the members, you have no choice but to focus on a camp. The weaker a leadership is, the more that leadership is connected to a camp and the more it strengthens that camp. And vice versa: The more acceptable a leadership is to everyone, the less it needs a camp.

If I were to feel, God forbid, that I were weak, I would also need a camp, which is the lesser of two evils. I would know that at least one segment supported me. Therefore, one hears statements that Qaysar is an individualist, because he is not always in a camp. What is a camp if not dependence? Dependence runs both ways. In other words, I support you, provided that you support me. If it is a matter of Knesset members, this means: I will support your bid for the premiership, provided that you pull me along with you. This applies to all camps, on our side, or on the other side. I have always based my career on obtaining general support. As long as you feel that you can obtain general support, the entire party is your camp, because you are the party's representative. I am not the representative of some faction. I am the representative of the party. The moment there is a camp, there are coalitions, and they neutralize each other.

We once had this difficulty with MAPAM [United Workers Party], when MAPAM and Labor neutralized each other. Now, it is the leadership. The camps are neutralizing each other, and it is no coincidence that they are causing thinking to be directed inward instead of

outward. They fear any new element, because they do not know whom it will join.

Soviet Cultural Adjustment Examined

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p B2

[Article by Nilly Mandler: "Not Moving Without the Babushka"]

[Text] A 19-year-old student who recently failed an exam in the course of his university preparatory studies, went to the teacher after class and offered her 50 shekels to raise his grade. He could not understand why she was stunned.

This example of internalization of corrupt norms among many new immigrants from the Soviet Union, caused by the continual struggle to survive in a totalitarian regime, was cited by Dr. Julia Mirsky, a counselor for new immigrant students at the Hebrew university, in a lecture delivered at the annual convention of the Association of Education Counselors held in Hertzlyyia. Mirsky, who came at the age of 11 from the Soviet Union, explained some of the behaviors of new immigrants that we have difficulties digesting. She examined the average family structure in large cities and the impact of the regime on the family.

Soviet parents are the ultimate authority in the life of growing children, just as the state is master over the fate of the man in the street. "Parents decide even what their son will study in college. There are 17-18 year old immigrant students who come to enroll at Israeli universities with their parents and grandparents. The Soviet family raises the child to be integrated into a totalitarian society. The child has no autonomy and he remains dependent on the parents regarding the limits of what is allowed and what is forbidden. Once he comes to a society in which the limits are different (like Israel), he becomes confused."

"People who grew up in the Soviet Union experience a second trauma when they arrive in Israel. The first trauma was the perestroyka. Considering the fact that citizens there recently learned that the values with which they lived in the past were false and that they were exploited by the system, when perestroyka came everything fell to pieces. The youth who lived in the USSR in the past four years still do not know what the right value boundaries are.

"When young people arrive in Israel having experienced the disintegrating system there, with parents who only pretend to supervise them (because they were busy looking for work and housing) and with a still immature inner system, they are mixed up. Children misbehave in school. One week they sit in a corner and do not say a word, and the next week they become the biggest problem in class."

Mirsky claims that teenagers are more mixed up than elementary school children. "When they see the liberal and informal relations between Israeli parents and children they get the idea that everything is allowed. They imitate this behavior indiscriminately and uncritically in their relations with their parents. They break all the boundaries. When immigrant students see an 18 year old girl and an 18 year boy talking together, they assume that the two will immediately proceed to have sex. They interpret the local codes in an extreme fashion.

"The Soviet family is different from the Israeli family. They arrive here with a 'babushka' (grandmother in Russian) who is an integral part of the family. They are astonished to see that apparently we do not have babushkas. The Jewish babushka in the USSR, who usually speaks Yidish, is the glue that holds the family together. She and the grandfather were the main bread winners in the family. In the beginning young married couples live with the parents because of the difficulty involved in finding an apartment. The circumstances create a situation in which the young generation is dependent on the old generation. The kindergarden system there is as developed as in a banana republic, and if there is a nursery attached to the mother's workplace, it is overcrowded and health conditions are bad."

"Intellectual parents try to leave the child at home under the grandmother's supervision. The most important thing for parents is their children's education and career. The grandmother will stay home with the baby so that the daughter can graduate from medical school. The dominant position of the grandparents in the Soviet family continues after their arrival in Israel, especially in view of the fact that there are many divorces and single-parent families among the new immigrants, including single fathers.

"In Israel, as well as in the USSR, when people live in crowded conditions the child does not have a room of his own and he will not dream of saying (to the mother or grandmother) 'I'm closing my door and you knock before you come in.' But even if he had a room he would not say that because the totalitarian system did not allow for this kind of intimacy. That was particularly prominent under Stalin. There was brutal interference even in people's sexual life. If a man did not spend the night at home, the neighbors reported him to the authorities.

"A student who graduates in the USSR does not have to look for a job. He is immediately assigned a salaried post. The assignment may not be where he would like it or in his specialty, nevertheless, the state takes care of employment. New immigrants never had to deal with having to look for work and housing. When people realized that the state was not looking after them properly, they felt angry and rebellious. At the same time, the citizen state model is still internalized in the case of the new immigrants. It was not the model that was disappointing, but its implementation. Israel is expected to do its part regarding the contract between citizen and state, precisely because the USSR did not do it properly. The

new immigrants may rationally claim that they came here in search of freedom, but subconsciously they want the state to take care of them. We view this attitude as demanding. We do not understand why they think that they deserve things. But this is how they were raised. They were disappointed there and they hope that here it will be different. Because of the citizen state relationship and the disillusion they suffered there they were forced to seek means of survival.

"The Soviet regime did not permit challenging the establishment, at least not until a few years ago, and the phenomena of reporting friends and relatives to the authorities were routine. The Soviet individual (Jews, too) was forced to manipulate and to seek dishonest and circuitous solutions; to fix the regime, the establishment, the system. That required a very high level of intelligence, and those very intelligent and very resourceful people, we do not like.

"Most of those laws do not work here. But when new immigrants run into favoritism, for example, they say: That is exactly like in the Soviet Union. That is not true. Here favoritism is a norm, i.e., it is a matter of activating personal connections, but bribery is not a norm. The new immigrants are confused by the similarity.

"To the new immigrants, the Israelis are not Jews. We are too colorful, too noisy, too nonchalant, and we do not behave according to the standards of Moscow or Leningrad Jews. We are not thin, we do not play the violin, and we are natives. Sometimes they say to us: "You are barbarians. You do not go to the theater. The Moroccans and other oriental Jews that the new immigrants meet here do not fit the Jewish image they have in their heads.

"In the wake of or because of the antisemitism they suffered in the Soviet Union, the new immigrants are very antisemitic toward themselves and us. They internalized the 'you're not equal' mentality and they attempted to deal with it through a 'we're better than everyone' attitude. And now that mentality is at work against everyone else in Israel. Those are unpleasant mechanisms, but they helped them survive. Those people and children grew up in an environment that hated Jews. Being a Jew was something bad, it was something shameful. Children suffered discrimination among their peers. The famous joke in the USSR is that you do not beat someone up because of his passport, but because of his nose. This antisemitism makes it difficult for the new immigrants to identify with us and with the state. The manipulation, double standards, and especially the need to survive by circumventing the establishment are expressed in the behavior of immigrant children. They are expressed in theft and difficulty in setting boundaries. The moral double standards have been internalized by the children."

Parents, too, are confused by the new behavior of their children. In view of the employment difficulties, economic problems, and not speaking the language, their standing in the eyes of the children is disturbed.

According to Mirsky, the parents continue to be held hostage by the behavior models and the education they acquired in their homeland. A Russian immigrant complained to her during the Gulf war that her four year old son had become very aggressive. "He said to her: 'Mother, I hate you.' Then he pretended to be calling the police and asking them to arrest Saddam Husayn. She thought that was abnormal."

Other speakers at the convention and the counselors themselves reported intense struggles between parents and children about clothes styles. Young girls went to the other extreme, wearing tight, low cut blouses and heavy make-up even in school. Little girls, whose mothers tie their pony tails with huge bows, take the bows off as they approach the school.

Many parents apply tremendous pressure on the children to excel in school. A former Soviet academy lecturer was in the habit of going to his daughter's school every day to monitor her achievements. She made B-average in exams, but he wanted her to have A average. Parents feel powerless about their children misbehavior in school. The mother of a 12 year old boy asked the counselor why she did not slap him for his behavior, and she hit him with her fists in the presence of the counselor. The grandmother of an eight year old who stole four shekel from a boy in his class burst into tears during the talk with the counselor and shouted that he was ostracized in the USSR and is now ostracized here. The child beats up children during recess and they beat him up. Many new immigrants are convinced that Israeli schools are too tolerant and they praise the conservative and tough educational methods practiced in Soviet schools.

Several counselors told me that one should not generalize from a problem minority to all immigrant students. Many of them, they stressed, become well integrated in the study material and among the Israeli students. Nevertheless, some of the phenomena reported by the counselors are difficult to swallow, such as prostitution among 15-16 year old immigrant high school girls and drinking among teenagers.

One of the counselors said that the prestigious school where she works decided to organize a workshop against drinking and drugs after it was found that many immigrant students came to school in the morning smelling of liquor.

Yafo Arabs Difficulties Discussed

91AE0424E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 May 91
p B2

[Article by Avirama Golan: "Where Will Yafo's Arabs Live"]

[Text] Nadar Hananiya, a 29-year-old accountant from Yafo, has unwittingly become a media star. For the past three weeks the journalist Ziva Yariv has been reporting on his case in her permanent column in YEDI'OT

AHARONOT. The story, Nadar said smiling, is neither unusual nor particularly scandalous. Altogether it was just an unpleasant incident.

Nadar called the Shikun Ovdim Company, which is building apartments for young couples on the boundary between Yafo and Bat-Yam, and asked whether they had any apartments available. He was told that they did. Nadar asked whether he had to bring an entitlement paper in order to buy an apartment. He was told he did not need to and that sales were open. The question of Nadar's ethnic origin did not come up on the telephone. But when he showed up at the company office in La Guardia St. in Tel Aviv, there was some embarrassment. There has been a mistake, Nadar was told. You need an entitlement certificate.

Nadar Hananiya is a very nice young man, but stubborn. He requested to know why he had been previously told one thing and now he was being told something else; and as he was given an unclear answer, he sent a Jewish friend to find out whether an entitlement paper was needed or not. Once again they said no. When Nadar, informed, came back he was told that the apartments were earmarked for army veterans. Nadar insisted and wanted to know whether Shikun Ovdim was willing to sell an apartment to a yeshiva student, for example.

Two weeks had passed in the meantime and the price of the two available apartments rose by 20,000 shekel. At this stage Ziva Yariv intervened and requested an explanation from the company spokesman. After several unpleasant discussions and two sharp articles she was promised that the incident will be immediately handled. The apartment that Nadar wanted to buy was in fact meant for his younger brother, one of six, who was about to get married.

Nadar himself lives in an apartment he bought a few years ago from a private builder who had made the Jewish tenants sign a special clause that they will not sue the builder when the value of their apartments drops when some of them are sold to Arabs. "I've been looking for an apartment for my brother for five months now and it is very difficult to find anything," Nadar said. "Opportunities are limited; you cannot force a private builder to sell to Arabs, and prices on the free market are exorbitant. Monthly rent is also almost impossible: rents are high and there are very few apartments. No apartments are being built in Yafo for young couples, and of the 200 boarded up apartments that Amidar has decided to open up and refurbish, it is now putting up for sale only 17 apartments earmarked for entitled Jews and Arabs not necessarily residents of Yafo, 18 for new immigrants, and 14 on the free market. So what about the rest?"

On the basis of past experience Nadar can guess what will happen with most of the apartments that Amidar decided to fix up. The best among them will be sold to the highest bidders, which means to speculators, emigrant Israelis or wealthy Jews from abroad, who will use the apartments as a safe investment.

There is no appropriate solution for the young couples of Yafo, for whom the Knesset Domestic Affairs Commission decided already in 1982 to build 750 housing units. Most of them will continue to live crowded in the parents' homes. A few will occasionally squat in boarded up houses until the police evicts them. And a few will rent an apartment for \$500 out of an average pay of \$1,500. The problem of planning and population in Yafo is discussed every time someone at Tel Aviv City Hall announces some ambitious program or daydreams aloud about turning the beautiful, ancient port city Jewish.

Yafo's history since the establishment of the state now looks like an evil parade of blunders, hazy intentions, lack of vision, and bureaucratic cumbersomeness. In its wish to rebuild everything, the young State of Israel did not view Yafo, most of whose Arab residents had abandoned it leaving behind the weakest population, as an antique asset on the sea shore, but as a huge lot. For years thousands of houses were demolished illegally and without appropriate permits, some of them beautiful houses in good condition. The big immigration wave brought many Jewish residents to Yafo and by the beginning of the 1950's Yafo was a mixed city. The demolition and evacuation policy gradually prompted the Jewish residents to leave the city. The houses that were abandoned and evacuated, most of them the property of Amidar, were boarded up on the grounds that they were not fit for habitation. Other houses, whose Arab tenants refused to evacuate, were declared unsafe buildings. Amidar did not allow the tenants to either improve or sell them. There have been more than a few known cases of Jews who wanted to purchase houses from their Arab tenants, but just as the deal was about to be closed, Amidar offered the tenants an equivalent price to evacuate, then boarded up the houses. Yafo became a neglected Arab town. Crime, prostitution, and drugs hastened the departure of the Jewish residents.

The Arabs had no alternative. They stayed. A few years ago an awakening began. Tel Aviv City Hall officials rallied together and the mayor even appealed to the Jews of Yafo. In the wake of protests by the city Arabs, he went back and apologized. With the declared design to turn Yafo into a mixed city, a project began to restore the city neighborhoods, of which the city hall was very proud, but most of the residents scornfully say that the project is superficial and does not involve the residents in its decisions. They add that only three percent of the population owns houses whose value went up in the wake of the project. Attempts were made to house young Arab couples in the Adjami neighborhood, but there was almost no response at all. Community activists claim that it was because of the suspicion and indifference of the Arab residents toward the authorities. Engineer Nahala Shaqir said this is a poor population, whose self-image is low, and who is unaware of its rights. Only when the empty apartments began to be given to new immigrants did the Arabs let out a hue and cry.

In parallel to the restoration project, in the past 20 years there has been a quiet process of increasing demand by

romantically inclined residents of Tel Aviv. This trend was thoroughly exploited by builders and businessmen who purchased houses from Amidar, restored them, and sold them to wealthy customers. Apartment prices in Yafo are continually rising. On the surface this development seems to have done the city some good, but in reality the gap between the new home owners and the old residents is growing. The project that most worries both Jewish and Arab Yafo residents is the project known as "Yafo Slopes." According to this plan, a considerable area of the sea will be drained at the spot that has already been blocked by a huge, illegal mountain of waste created by Tel Aviv city Hall, and on the new slope, which in fact will put more distance between Yafo and the sea and will rob it of its ancient and special Mediterranean and eastern character, terraced apartment houses will be built for what Tel Aviv City Hall calls a "strong" population.

The main danger lies in what urban planning experts define as "deceit instead of restoration." On the surface Yafo is pegged to get an energy shot in the arm by means of a well-to-do population that will propel it upwards and will contribute to its development. In practice, however, the new population will be completely isolated from old Yafo and the latter's old residents, who belong to a low socioeconomic category, will become the service pool for the new neighborhood. According to the project opponents, they will become the neglected backyard of a posh area.

Above all, Yafo planning suffers from an insensitive sociopolitical approach that refuses to take into account the circle of failure of the weak population and ignores the culture and leadership patterns of the community. The fear of involving the local leadership in decision-making stems from a political outlook and is in fact a two-edged sword: The planned population policy creates suspicion, despair, and unrest in the community and ironically, it prevents interested Jews from coming to Yafo in masses. This policy also creates a problem for Arabs whose houses were boarded up 20 years ago as unfit for living, and who now look out from their rental apartments to see a rich builders selling the same restored houses, as well as for Yafo or Tel Aviv Jews who cannot afford to buy the restored houses.

Old residents claim that if it hadn't been for the long arm of city hall and Amidar, a mixed Jewish-Arab Mediterranean environment would have naturally evolved in Yafo, made up of people who came to Yafo or stayed there out of love for the place and out of a desire to participate in building it up. A good example of such an opportunity that was realized is the neighborhood located between Yehuda Ha'amit St. and the Nikanor Gates. The houses there were not demolished because of various pressures; buildings were purchased and restored by tenants, and the entire small area, say the inhabitants, in fact restored itself hoping to recapture Yafo's special character. Without any premeditation the neighborhood was filled with new Jewish residents alongside old Arab

inhabitants. "Yafo Arab residents have no alternative," said Nahala Shaqir. "They have nowhere to go and they have no money."

Even if someone is pursuing a quiet transfer, and Shaqir does not consider such a possibility seriously, that someone has nothing to look for. The 15,000 Yafo Arabs, 75 percent of whom are under the age of 30, will continue to crowd into the existing housing. The local leadership does not know how to act cleverly. "But we are learning," Shaqir said. "Even the Druze have now abandoned their silence. Perhaps we, too, the desert generation of Yafo, will improve our struggle." Yafo Arabs know from their experience that their struggle was successful only when they worked together with the Jewish residents, but this kind of cooperation is not easy. "In the current political situation it is difficult to put the issue of Yafo Arabs on the agenda," Shaqir said, "and evidently, with the economic difficulties facing the State of Israel, the weak population is the first to suffer. We have to work together, otherwise we have no chance of saving Yafo."

In the meantime, Nadar Hananiya's business has been settled. Shikun Ovdin did not like the media uproar aroused by his case and informed him that he could come to purchase an apartment. The price has gone up, as we said, by 20,000 shekel, but Nadar hopes that this problem will be solved, too. As it is, he says smiling, the prices will soon drop, now that an Arab will be living there.

Radio Station for Immigrants Profiled

91AE0424A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 May 91
p B3

[Article by Irit Rosenblum: "Immigrants on the Airwaves"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the past month REKA [Qol Israel Immigrant Absorption Network] has been working in close circuit as if it were already on the air and broadcasting 18 hours a day. The morning desk works on newspapers, identifying important news in general and in particular news of interest to Russian immigrants; production assistants call up government offices for reaction; interviewees are brought into the Qiriya radio studios for interviews. "The potential is tremendous," says Yosef Rubin, the Qol Israel official in charge of special jobs and the founder of REKA; "This network is truly Zionist." Aside from Russian, the network will also take charge of broadcasts in other languages, which until now had been aired on Station A: Amhari, Maghreb Arabic, English, French, Romanian, Spanish, Yidish, Georgian, and Ladino.

When the idea of establishing such a network first emerged there were no reports published about it. Some 80 men and women came to the studios in the wake of the rumors. Among them were a theater director, drama teachers, musicians, engineers, Russian language teachers, and journalists. Only a tiny minority among

them had employment in their own field in Israel. In the end, 12 candidates were chosen. The date for the official opening of the network has not been announced and it depends on agreements with the workers' committees.

According to Rubin, the first and most important purpose of the network is to teach the new immigrants and their children Hebrew and to contribute to their speedy integration in the Israeli system. He composed the programs after consultations with many factors, including veteran immigrants like the former Zionist prisoners, but also with rank and file new immigrants. The network is intended to present all the facets of the Israeli experience to the listeners: culture, entertainment, family, Israeli history and geography, and songs. Rubin expects that the network will be heard not only by more than one quarter of a million new immigrants, but also by veteran immigrants of the 1970's and perhaps even earlier, who have not forgotten their mother tongue. "The veterans think that the network will keep playing Russian songs and that it will be some sort of nostalgia station. It turns out, however, that the new immigrants hate Russian songs. Our line will be Hebrew songs with a few spots of good quality Russian songs."

The network activities are divided into a morning desk and an evening desk. The two desks are headed by editors from the Tel Aviv Russian section: Dorit Golender (morning) and Mordekhay Shoham (evening). Both are members of the old core of the Russian section.

The morning broadcasts will begin with a press review and a newscast in Russian. Next will come a Hebrew lesson with answers to listeners' questions, news in easy Hebrew, and a current events program between 0900 and 1100. The first hour will report the day's events with commentaries and reports from the field, while the second hour will focus on issues regarding immigration absorption, employment, professional retraining, and advice from experts. Golender stressed that all the work is done in cooperation with competent factors and on the basis of verified information: "We want to provide the new immigrants with an objective picture of what goes on. We won't be able to help with everything, but at the least we will listen."

The network is operated by two groups of personnel: the old section and the group of new immigrants. As far as the news are concerned, they do not yet go out in the field and they do not conduct investigations. They limit themselves to reactions to written and broadcast reports in the Israeli media. The new immigrants tend to be in awe of the authorities: they are afraid to ask provocative questions of ministers and Knesset members.

One of the major problems is finding Russian speaking people in government offices. In order to get a reaction they have to have statements translated into Russian. They are still not at the point where they have a reserve of sources, commentators, and advisers who can provide

reactions within five minutes, in Russian, and thus avoid becoming another Station B with simultaneous translation.

The programs will devote considerable space to religion, tradition, history of the people of Israel, and Zionism. "Some new immigrants complain that the Hebrew-language studios are run by religious people, but our intention is to bring them information about what is happening in the country and about our way of life. Knowledge of our traditions is a real must. After all, they did not live in isolation from all this of their own choice," said Golender. Half an hour in the morning and in the evening are devoted to Zionism and religion: one day history and Zionism, and one day religion and traditions. Among the writers are Yuli Edelstein and Yosef Mendelewitz.

Current events are followed by citizenship. Terms like municipal system, Knesset composition, parties, Israeli law and judiciary, transportation, and even consumerism will be explained every day. "The new immigrants must be apprised of the fact that the consumers have rights and that there are laws. We will provide suggestions for cooking vegetables and fruit with the stress on saving, and children's programs." The noon hour will be set aside for open microphones. Present in the studio will be an expert to answer questions like new immigrants' rights, labor relations, social security, means of joining a kibbutz, or university acceptance conditions. There will also be a corner for searching for relatives.

One of the new reporters is Alexander Medvedenko, 36, from the Ukraine, married and father of one, 10 months in the country, and living in a rented apartment in Petah Tiqva. In his country of origin he was a mathematician, but he also worked for the radio preparing cultural programs and he specialized in programs on composers who play their own songs. Here he is in charge of the current events program and the press review, but he will also do programs on songs in Russian, as he did there. Medvedenko, a graduate of a ulpan [Hebrew language school], expresses himself in slow Hebrew. "Many of the newcomers in the recent immigration wave are intellectuals who cannot live without culture, but they still do not have access to Hebrew culture. They will have access to it in the future, but for the time being they are like a hungry man who sees a loaf of bread and snatches it. We will provide the loaf."

Medvedenko is happy with his job at the network. According to him, he dreamed of a radio job even before he immigrated. "I enjoy meeting people and living among the radio world. Now we are limited by the language, but I hope that soon I will be able to interview you."

Anna Lein, 25, a production assistant, is a veteran immigrant from Baku. She came to Israel at the age of eight, but the cultural trauma and the trauma of growing up as an immigrant are still fresh in her memory. "I am a child of the integration and I suffered under it very

much. Integration and Hebrew culture must not be forced upon them. They come from such a rich and dominant culture. Some of them will perhaps want to forget, but the majority stays within their own circle. That is one of the rights of the immigrants, to preserve their identity. Their identity may be Jewish, but in a cultural sense it is certainly Russian, also. If the parents want to go to the 'Gesher' theater, they must be given the opportunity."

According to Lein, one of the problems of the Russian immigration is the absence of a supporting local community. Recently the television showed a group of Bulgarian immigrants being warmly received by the Association of Bulgarian Immigrants here. "They need a strong back like the groups that helped other immigration waves. Someone with influence in political and economic areas," she added.

"At present the network is perhaps a help network, whose purpose is to offer vital services and to direct new immigrants to havens such as Na'amat or clothes distribution centers, to warn them against dishonest real estate agents, and to prepare them for the future." To Anna Lein it is clear that in order to preserve its reason for being in a few years time, when most of the new immigrants would have learned Hebrew, the network must be on a par with the other Qol Israel stations.

Zahava Qanterowitz, 28, single, one year in Israel, lives in a rented apartment in Tel Aviv, and is a production assistant. She immigrated from Vilnius, where she worked as an ecological engineer. About half a year ago she tried her luck on the radio and when the decision was taken to establish the network, she was called in. According to her, all the offices she approaches show sympathy and willingness to help—"Everyone understands that this is still important for the new immigrants." Her economic situation, like that of all the new immigrants, is difficult, but she does not complain. "For the time being I am happy, later we will see."

Another member of the new personnel is Anna Lapid, 19, who got a job with the radio as a cleaning woman. Talking to her we found out that in Russia she worked as a television announcer on youth programs; when the interviews started for the network jobs, the head of the drama section, Efraim Stan, brought her in and asked that she be given a chance. Today she is a production assistant. The oldest among the new employees is Leonard Goldstein, 61, from Baku, who used to work for the Soviet Press Agency TASS.

Soon a class will be organized for immigrant studio writers to learn the professional radio language. According to Qol Israel director Amnon Nadav the resources available for the REKA network are not large: 1.6 million new shekel, which are expected to cover salaries, equipment, and studios. The issue of whether to have advertizing on the network has not yet been decided—on the one hand, tempting the new immigrants with products they cannot afford to buy can only cause

frustration, but on the other hand commercials can increase the station's budget and allow for higher salaries.

Ethiopian Single-Parent Families Profiled

91AE0424C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 May 91
p B2

[Article by Judith Greenblat: "Opening the Door in Amhari"]

[Text] The dilemma of the single Ethiopian mother is focused on her front door. According to the rules of the Ethiopian community, opening the door to a man is viewed as a sign of the woman's willingness to have sexual relations with him. In effect, in Ethiopia an unmarried woman had no defense against men because she could not prevent them from opening the door and coming in. In Israel, on the other hand, a woman can defend herself by locking the door. Consequently, her willingness or unwillingness to change her lifestyle takes on a concrete expression in her hesitation whether to open the door or not.

The importance of the "door" is one of many details that Dr. Shalva Weil learned in the course of her study of single-parent Ethiopian families and divorced Ethiopian women. Weil is an anthropologist with the Fostering Studies Institute of the Hebrew University who is specializing in Ethiopian community studies. Her study describes and analyzes every kind of single-parent family among Ethiopian Jews in Israel on the basis of observation and interviews with immigrants throughout the country conducted between February 1989-February 1990, when Israel had about 19,000 Ethiopians immigrants.

The study was commissioned by the Immigration Absorption Unit of the Personal and Social Services Department of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare in the wake of difficulties encountered by social workers and absorption authorities in understanding the lifestyle and functioning of Ethiopian single-parent families.

Weil found that the percentage of Ethiopian single-parent families was four times higher than that of single-parent families in the entire Israeli population, although in both groups women are the most numerous. The number of children in Ethiopian single-parent families is higher than in veteran Israeli families, but as yet there are no exact statistics because many families arrived in Israel separately.

Like in the Israeli families, Ethiopian single-parent families are created by divorce, although that is not the only circumstance. The study found that the rate of divorce in the community is very high and that divorce has been wide-spread among the Jews of Ethiopia at least since the 19th century. Marriage and divorce laws in Ethiopia were very simple. Divorce was possible immediately after attempts at reconciliation failed in the presence of family friends or community elders, and the customs of

levirate marriage [obligation to marry deceased brother's childless wife] or halitzah [release from that obligation] were not practiced. The low marrying age of girls (9-15) and their adjustment difficulties away from the parents' home were among the reasons for frequent divorce, as was the discovery that the bride was not a virgin. However, in addition to divorce, single-parent families were also created by the widespread occurrence of husbands abandoning their wives and children and the death of one of the couple, especially in the difficult conditions prevailing in Ethiopia or involved in emigration. Similarly, families became separated in the course of the "Moshe campaign."

In addition, the number of single-parent families caused by divorce was augmented in Israel by the dissolution of fictitious marriages contracted while Ethiopians were in refugee camps in Sudan. Those marriages were intended to protect single Ethiopian women from rape and to meet the needs of single men.

Many Ethiopian single-parent families in the end tend to create reconstructed families to which both parents bring their own children. The chances of such couples breaking up are very high.

According to Ethiopian custom, a divorced or separated woman may maintain relations, including sexual relations, with her former husband. Very often he will offer "protection" to his former spouse and supply her economic needs in addition to those of the children. As a result additional children are born to them although the man may be already married to another woman.

The children in reconstructed families usually do not distinguish between siblings and half-siblings and they view each other as sources of mutual help. The relations between children and step parents are not necessarily emotional, but they are viewed as a given fact. Paradoxically, those relations often improve when a new baby is born.

The habit of women and men to quickly establish this kind of relations and to frequently break them is viewed by the Israelis, especially by immigration absorption workers who come into direct contact with the new immigrant population, as a lack of sexual restraint. This is precisely how the new immigrants view the behavior of the Israelis, who attach no importance to brides being virgins and to the laws of purity and impurity.

The single Ethiopian woman in Israel enjoys a physical safety and economic independence that were unknown in Ethiopia, where she depended on being defended by the men in the family and on the economic support of the family of origin. On the other hand, the economic difficulties in Israel prevent her from being really independent.

The per capita income of Israeli single-parent families is about 30 percent lower than that of two-parent families, but the situation of Ethiopian single-parent families is even harder than that. Many Ethiopian single mothers

do not get child support because the husband was left in Ethiopia or because no rabbinical court decree was issued on child support payments—either because of bureaucratic delays or because the woman failed to demand it in the hope of reconciliation. Even when the former husband does pay child support, he pays very little because of his low income. The economic difficulties existing in Israel prevent the extended family from offering help.

The children, who in Ethiopia where a major source of income to their mothers, in Israel become an economic burden. Consequently, women have trouble finding a job outside the home, especially since their language skills are poor and they lack formal education or a trade.

The study cites a painful monologue by a mother of four: "They took me to the labor exchange and I was afraid that they would send me to work, and my children being young. She said to me: 'If you do not register for work you will not see a penny!' and she took me to the central bus station. She said to wash dishes. 'You don't work, you don't get anything.' What to do with my children? I cried next to her like the day my husband died. All the children are small and the eldest boy is crying. We go out at 0600. How to dress my children? I go to work, my child does not eat, and two little girls are in kindergarten. At 0500 I made them tea and bread. I came back, everything was there. And my son cries. All my family got upset, they were angry, why don't they take care of a widow with four children, and there is a government. I left work because it was difficult for me and the children have no food."

Ethiopian families present two apparently conflicting patterns: on the one hand there is the model of the "ancient family" as it existed in Bible times, in which relations between men and women resembled marriage/concubinage relations, and the modern world model, rather than the Israeli model. According to the modern model, the nuclear family is gradually disappearing, the divorce rate is rising, and more children are born out of wedlock.

Dr. Weil assumes that in the long run the family institution among the Ethiopian community will stabilize and that the rate of marriages between Ethiopians and Israelis of other origins will gradually increase. In time a special model of Israeli family of Ethiopian origin will emerge, which will more closely resemble the veteran Israeli family and will find its place between the ancient model and the postnuclear models.

Industrial, Service Sector Data for 1990

91AE0396B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew (Business Supplement) 16 Apr 91 pp 14-17

[Article by Uri Ginosar: "Very Little Excitement"]

[Text] The opening song of praise should be sung to a company that is not leading in any of the Dunn and

Bradstreet charts. Not the largest in sales, not the company with the highest rating, not the largest in growth percentage, but the most efficient company in the [Israeli] economy—Scitex, products for the prepress market. In the magical ratio of net profit over turnover, it was in first place in 1990, with a net profit of \$76.6 million and a turnover of \$351 million. Further, in terms of increase in sales over the past year (plus \$114 million), it is in third place after the Electric Company (plus \$189 million) and Israel Aircraft Industries (an increase of \$129 million). Scitex is the hit of 1990, with capital proceeds of 37 percent, profitability of over 20 percent of the turnover, and \$120 million in cash in the treasury. The sales turnover per employee is also handsome—approximately \$200 thousand. In the general rating, it is listed in eighth place.

There are very few surprises this year in the rating of the large industrial companies. The opening six have not changed, and there is no chance that anyone else will get in there in 1991, either. Apparently, Batei Zikuk and Tadiran will merely change places between them. Elbit joined the opening ten, thanks to the incorporation of Elscint into its balance. Emanuel Gil is the man. Elbit pushed Motorola, with Elisha Shachmon, out of the opening ten. Scitex, Teva, and Mifalei Niyar made cosmetic changes between the seventh and the tenth places. Next year, there should be a new company in the ratings—Elite, if the company's merger with Israel Food Products is approved. This year, Elite boycotted the ratings, due to prestige wars with Osem over the title of the largest food company in Israel. In retrospect, its protests were vindicated. Osem admits this year that it includes in its consolidated balance Helena Rubenstein, as well. Elite-Israel Food Products' anticipated rating next year: ninth.

Since the rating is done in dollars, most of the companies had no difficulty presenting an increase in the sales turnover. Food companies are in the majority among the first 100 companies in the ratings: 24. Electronics have 19 companies, and metals have 18. Yet, the percentage of sales of the electronics companies out of the total sales of all of the 100 companies is 39 percent. The group surprise belongs to the textile and fashion branch. It has nine representatives among the 100, with a total increase in sales of 52 percent. It is crowded this year at the top of the textile companies—Polgat, with sales of \$167 million, Delta, with sales of \$146 million, and Kitan, which recorded an impressive increase of 33 percent in sales, with \$140 million.

Exports: Seven out of the ten largest in sales are also among the ten largest exporters. Only Tnuva, Hevrat Hehashmal, and Mifalei Niyar are not in the picture. The five largest exporters in the order of size are Israel Aircraft Industries, Yam HaMelach, Tadiran, Elbit, and Scitex. Eleven companies among the first 100 do not export at all—Hevrat Hehashmal (number 2), Nesher (15), Strauss (36), Redimix (46), Even V'Sid (46), Tara (52), Pioneer (56), Matmor (64), Ambar (66), Etz Hazeit (81), and Milover (93).

Three companies out of the 100 export 100 percent—Intel (29), Luz (47), and National Semiconductors (59). This company had a nice year, with an increase of 83 percent in sales and a rise of 23 stages in the ratings—a matter of a sales turnover of \$75 million. Giora Yaron did it.

Leaps: Yifora-Tabori jumped 43 points in the ratings, from 91 to 48, but this is due to the merger between the two companies. Actually, the consolidated group registered a 24 percent decrease in sales, mainly because of Tabori. This is the largest percentage decrease among the 100 companies. What is called the greatest. Both leaping and decreasing. Ta'asiyot Rehev also had a nice leap of 24 points, from 114 to 90, and with a 258 percent increase in exports, to \$16 million.

Falls: The most amazing fall is that of Mapro, from 36 to 154. Yitzhar is also in receivership now, and is no longer in the ratings. Yitzhaq Mittleman accompanied Yitzhar on its way out. Nine companies out of the 100 recorded a decrease in sales last year—Tadiran, Negev Phosphates, Electra, Yifora-Tabori, Nilit, Cohen and Sons (diamond dealer), Carmel Systems, Soltam, and Matmor.

Proportions: The dairy market is Tnuva and all of the rest. Tnuva's sales were \$617 million. Strauss, \$101 million, and Tara, \$83 million. The soft drink market is first and foremost Coca Cola, which does not provide statistics. The Dunn and Bradstreet ratings contradict the prevalent opinion that Yifora-Tabori is now the second in size. Tempo has a sales turnover of \$147 million, while Yifora-Tabori has only \$90 million. In oil, the leader is Shemen, with \$100 million, before Tet-Bet, with \$78 million, Etz Hazeit, with \$46 million, and Olivaks, with \$25 million.

Kibbutzim: After Mapro's fall, Gat Enterprises, belonging to the Givat Haim kibbutzim, returned to the top of the kibbutz ratings, with a sales turnover of \$85 million. Following it in the kibbutz league are Netafim (Hatzerim, Magal, and Malkiyah), with \$52.8 million, Shimurei Gan Shmuel, with \$49.8 million, Plasson (Ma'agan Micha'el), with \$39.3 million, and Lagin (Yagur), with \$35.4 million.

New participants in the ratings: Gottex in 87th place (and the only woman among the 100—Lea Gottlieb). And another new participant in the ratings: Carmel Carpets, under the management of Avraham Shapira, with a turnover of \$48 million and in 78th place. The shrinking Cor concern still has four representatives among the first 20 (Tadiran, Nesher, Machtshim, and Telrad).

At the bottom, of course, is construction. There still are not a lot of homes for immigrants, but the industry is booming. Cor's Mifalei Plada jumped 21 stages, Even V'Sid jumped 18 stages, Redimix jumped 16, and Ram-Ta'asiyot jumped 13 stages. Who will build us a home?

1991	1990	Company	Sales in Thousands of Dollars	Senior Director
1	1	Israel Aircraft Industries	1,418,143	M. Keret
2	2	Hevrat Hehashmal	1,299,167	M. Katz
3	3	Tadiran	800,000	G. Meltzer
4	4	Betei Zikuk	797,000	M. Bar-Ilan
5	5	Tnuva Mazon	617,113	Y. Landsman
6	6	Mifalei Yam Hamelach	566,755	A. Ben-Nun
7	16	Elbit	363,211	A. Gil
8	8	Scitex	351,507	A. Rosenfeld
9	7	Teva	295,200	A. Horowitz
10	9	Mifalei Niyar	260,469	Y. Yerushalmi
11	12	Vishi	249,811	M. Shamir
12	10	Motorola	243,550	A. Shahmon
13	11	Rotem Fertilizers	221,400	A. Moses
14	13	Osem	217,300	D. Proper
15	17	Nesher	215,000	A. Menahem
16	14	Negev Phosphates	178,149	A. Moses
17	18	Mahteshim	172,000	A. Levita
18	24	Polgat	167,019	M. Braun
19	23	Iscar	165,365	S. Wertheimer
20	19	Telrad	162,000	Y. Zamir
21	21	Haifa Chemicals	155,300	A. Cohen
22	26	Tempo	147,000	M. Bornstein
23	28	Delta Galil	145,907	D. Lautman
24	31	Kitan	140,000	—
25	22	Food Products	139,000	Y. Ibn-Ezra
26	30	Yacin	135,900	A. Aviv
27	29	Iscor	135,000	B. Loten
28	34	Petrochemicals	128,400	A.M. Papushado
29	32	Intel	122,000	D. Froman
30	33	El-Op	121,900	Y. Toran
31	27	Protarom	117,849	Y. Geva
32	25	Electra	113,850	S. Sharaf
33	40	Elco	107,100	G. Zelkind
34	37	Egen	107,057	M. Pickerski
35	48	Ram Ta'asiyot Matehet	102,000	R. Asa
36	39	Strauss	101,500	M. Strauss
37	35	Shemen	100,380	Y. Habersfeld
38	59	Mifalei Plada	100,022	A. Weida
39	38	Deshenim	98,096	D. Yakir
40	46	Alliance	97,910	Y. Ezroni
41	52	Etz Lavud	97,481	A. Yehuda'i
42	45	Tambor	94,804	R. Solstein

1991	1990	Company	Sales in Thousands of Dollars	Senior Director
43	44	Kaniel	94,373	B. Davidai
44	47	Amcor	92,990	A. Bernstein
45	61	Redimix	92,337	A. Dotan
46	64	Even V'Sid	91,200	A. Levine
47	41	Luz Industries	90,720	A. Kreuzer
48	91	Yifora-Tabori	90,000	D. Bibro
49	42	Gadot	89,556	G. Meyuhas
50	51	Pecker Steel	85,000	Y. Pecker

Service Sector

Dunn and Bradstreet's "nonindustrial" rating is new. Dunn and Bradstreet is presenting it this year for the first time, and it can already be said that it will be "making waves." The explanation is simple—the older ratings, the industrial list, are much less problematic. In industry, there are neat balances and clear ways of measuring sales. In contrast, in the new ratings there are too many loose ends. Besides, not all of the large companies provided statistics, and the Dunn and Bradstreet people simply made estimates. Several large examples in two big fields—the marketing chains and automobile importers—prove that there is a problem here. It follows that this rating will be irksome to many. It must also be remembered that it does not yet include construction companies, insurance companies, and the banks. These are expected in a separate rating.

The marketing branch (marketing chains and companies) contributed 20 companies and 26 percent of the scope of activity to the 100 leading companies. The energy branch, in contrast, came in with seven companies, but with 24 percent of the scope. Three gasoline companies—Paz (sales of \$1.144 billion), Sonol (sales of \$617 million), and Delek (sales of \$528.5 million) are in the opening ten.

Who catches the eye in the new rating? First, who has heard of the Council for the Manufacture and Marketing of Decorative Plants? Seventeenth place with a sales turnover of \$225 million proves that, apparently, cacti are also business. Much more anonymous is the Beni George Shokha Company, an import, marketing, and distribution agency that reached 71st place. Who is acquainted with it, who knows of it?

Motivated, the national transporter, is strong on the top section of the table with a turnover of \$335 million. On the other hand, Dan is rated only in 30th place, with \$117 million, despite the fact that half of the country lives in Gush Dan. Arkia, which subsists on short flights, finds itself in 60th place, with sales of \$49 million. Israel Railroads, in 72nd place, with a turnover of \$35 million, is in need of much more revenue. Its volume barely allowed it to make it into the list of 100 industrial companies.

Other famous [companies]—the Hamama brothers, the kings of sunflower seeds, snack nuts, and legumes, are

rated 40th, with a reported turnover of \$75 million, in contrast with Williger of the canned goods, with \$24.5 million, and only in 98th place. One place behind them is Eliezer Jorban's Dahaf advertising agency, with \$24.5 million. And where are the really big companies of the advertising world?

The hotels, too, have only one representative among the 100, via Reshet Dan in 47th place. Among the diamond dealers, Moshe Shnitzer, the eternal president of the diamond exchange, is symbolically rated first, in 35th place with almost \$94 million. Second after him is Simha Lustig, who was for years his deputy, with \$81 million and in 38th place. And last but not least in this section, there is also a Rekanati in the ratings—Yaaqov Rekanati (the non-banker brother of Rafael Rekanati), who manages El Yam, I.D.B.'s shipping company.

Cars—the seniority of the internal league of automobile importers, by a tremendous lead, belongs to Subaru, seventh place in the general rating. After there is Mahsherei Tnuah (Ford, Chrysler, and Suzuki), 18th in the general rating, and ColMobil-ColMotor (Mercedes and Mitsubishi), 25. Fiat-Lancia, 34, Renault, 37.

In computers, IBM Israel is in 23rd place with \$165 million, and Digital is in 32nd place with \$107 million.

And, again, regarding possible scandals. The list indeed contains questionable figures. In electrical products, Tuvia Nadav from "Central Salon" was granted seniority, despite the fact that his \$120 million also include German kitchens that he imports. Strauchler from "Best Buy" (75) was ahead of "Salon Tokyo" (94).

And the most exciting story of all is in the marketing chains—Supersol, with \$433 million (11) and Shekem with \$355 million (14). Co-op, which is considered "equal to Supersol" initially appeared with only 164 million, in 24th place. And there has already been a tempest—after Yossi Rosen, director general of Co-op, found out about these results, he protested to Dunn and Bradstreet. Only after he agreed to provide it with his own statistics did the company update them, and Co-op was raised in the ratings to 12th place, immediately following Supersol.

In sum, one must speak about Tnuva, the first in the ratings, the surprise of the season. Please meet Tnuva, the largest company in the State of Israel, larger than Israel Aircraft Industries. Not airplanes, not missiles, just yoghurt and yellow cheese. The people of Israel live and eat. Tnuva, the food giant, is of the type that is always near you, to the point that you simply fail to notice.

Tnuva was established by farmers in order to market their produce. Once, it imposed fear upon everyone and was the exclusive distributor. As years passed, the farmers began to market on their own, as well. How is that void filled? Ten years ago, Tnuva also became a retailer, establishing the Hippershuk chain.

As an association, Tnuva has a secretariat (that anyplace else is called management) and a secretariat [as published] (which is actually a board of directors). All of the position holders in both bodies come from kibbutzim and moshavim. The same director general, Yitzhaq Landsman, has been in charge for the past 21 years. The director general of Tnuva is elected every four years and Landsman is already in his sixth candidacy. Sixty one years old, a member of Kibbutz Ayelet Hashachar, he was the head of the Upper Galilee Council and, subsequently, the director of the fruit division of Tnuva. A phenomenon. "He survives," say those close to the settlement movement, "because there is no replacement for him in sight and, thus, a war is prevented between the kibbutzim and the moshavim regarding who will appoint the next director." When they want to say something nice about him, they mention that Tnuva is one of the only organizations of the settlement movement that has not collapsed in recent years.

Unbelievable, but there is also a lot of export here—\$48 million, mostly to feed the American troops in the region. Every ship that docks at Haifa port is loaded with products, mainly milk that does not require refrigeration. If you were unable to obtain this product during the Gulf war, now you know why.

There is only one small problem in this story—profit. Only a few million shekels on this tremendous turnover. Landsman, who vigorously refused to be interviewed, left the question open.

1991	Company	Sales in Thousands of Dollars	Senior Director
1	Tnuva	1,450,000	Y. Landsman
2	Bezek	1,386,186	Y. Kaul
3	Paz	1,144,000	A. Levi
4	Zim	1,009,000	M. Morgenstern
5	El Al	713,500	R. Harlev
6	Sonol	617,000	A. Shachar
7	JapanAuto	557,000	D. Berkowitz
8	Delek	528,524	A. Agmon
9	Agrexco	485,000	D. Tzimhi
10	Cial Marketing and Trade	482,000	A. Shalem
11	Supersol	433,000	D. Alfendri
12	Co-op	429,000	Y. Rosen
13	Cor Trade	382,181	S. Tzafrir
14	Hamashbir Hamerazi	363,996	Y. Genshar
15	Shekem	355,886	Y. Gur
16	Egged	335,000	S. Levine
17	Citrus Council	250,000	Y. Weinberg
18	The House Plant Council	225,000	S. Tirosh
19	Mahsherei Tnuah	220,000	T. Neta, M. Ron-Nes

1991	Company	Sales in Thousands of Dollars	Senior Director
20	Nesher Trade	216,000	A. Pe'er
21	Co-op North	180,000	D. Kashov
22	Hamashir Letzarhan	180,000	M. Einan
23	Techan Enterprises	169,822	H. Neumann
24	IBM Israel	165,000	Y. Ma'or
25	Colmobile-Colmotor	142,000	S. Harlap
26	Telcar	140,730	R. Ungar
27	David Lovinsky	120,390	D. Lovinsky
28	Pan El Import and Marketing	120,000	T. Nadav
29	Meir Automobiles	120,000	Y. Kaz, Y. Shachar
30	Dan Cooperative	117,000	Y. Horowitz
31	Champion Motors	114,179	Y. Chichik
32	Digital	107,000	G. Weiser
33	Hevrat Hamizrah	100,000	P. Rotenberg
34	Middle East Automobiles	97,620	A. Tiber
35	M. Schnitzer Diamonds	93,664	M. Schnitzer
36	Kirur V'haspaka	90,700	A. Me'iri
37	Bnei Moshe Carasso	86,220	A. Carasso
38	Lustig Diamonds	81,000	S. Lustig
39	Techen Marketing Company	76,635	R. Erez
40	Hamama Brothers	75,000	S. Hamama
41	Hahevra Hadromit	74,000	B. Landsberg
42	Co-op Jerusalem	73,000	M. Goldstein
43	Hevrat Hashmira	65,000	A. Sharmeister
44	R. Hayon	64,995	R. Hayon
45	Tadiran Marketing	64,000	M. Erez
46	Hahevra L'Traktorim	64,000	T. Borowicz
47	Dan Hotels	63,600	A. Hirshtein
48	Cohen Metals Enterprises	60,000	S. Cohen
49	Oreq	60,000	D. Clemenson
50	Alfa Diamond	59,657	M. Rimer

MK's Say Mortgage Figures Prove Sharon Wrong

TA1505193891 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
1900 GMT 15 May 91

[Text] Knesset Members [MK's] Hayim Oron [United Workers Party] and 'Oded Tzucker [Citizens Rights Movement] have claimed that the average mortgage offered in the territories to those eligible for housing is 50 percent higher than the mortgage offered in development areas.

Our correspondent Ze'ev Kohen reports that in a letter the two MK's sent to the prime minister and the finance minister, they assert that the average mortgage given to young couples in the territories this year amounts to

84,000 shekels, as opposed to 56,000 shekels in development areas, and 48,000 in the central part of the country. The two MK's claim that this data proves that Construction and Housing Minister Ariel Sharon's statements regarding settlement in the territories are not true.

'New Deal-Type' Projects To Stem Unemployment

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in English 12 May 91 pp 1, 10

[Report by Alisa Odenheimer]

[Excerpt] The government will invest NIS [new Israeli shekels] 1.9 billion over the next year in New Deal-type development projects, as part of the Finance Ministry's plan to stem unemployment, a spokesman for the ministry announced on Friday.

The projects will concentrate on building and improving roads, railroads, airports, communications infrastructure, energy and electricity plans, water and sewage systems, and 12 new industrial parks.

Funding for the projects will come, in part, from the state budget, but will also be shared by state-owned companies, which will participate in the projects. The state budget's share in the project will come to NIS 400 million.

The plan also calls for state-funding of "industrial ulpanim" at 10 large companies, that will absorb thousands of jobseekers and train them at government expense.

The two programs will take some 40,000 people off the unemployment lines, according to Finance Ministry projections.

The ministry is planning a number of other steps to ease the growing unemployment crisis, such as government participation in high-risk investment, more on-the-job training programs, encouraging state-owned companies to hire more workers, and additional government aid for marketing exports. The ministry spokesman added that the government plans to create jobs by encouraging foreign investment in Israel and sub-contracting by Israeli firms for foreign companies, but did not say how this would be accomplished. [passage omitted]

Support for Double-Column Partition Urged

91AE0398A Tel Aviv *MA'ARIV* in Hebrew 3 May 91 p B8

[Article by Talma Admon: "The 1991 Partition Plan"]

[Text] Not one of them liked being photographed. The time that it took for an interviewee to reveal his public self proved that this group will not go on to a political career. A childlike embarrassment spread over the modest bench next to the old sidewalk in Ma'agan Micha'el, and Yohai Ben-Nun, a member of the kibbutz, suffered more than the others. I never liked this, he said. He had been commander of the navy, and, in any case,

was not an anonymous figure. Although distinguished persons from the academic world and the kibbutz movement had come together around the **Double-Column** plan, the story of **DASH** would not be repeated. Not only because the lessons of the Yadin trauma still scorched their memory, but mainly because of the lack of personal ambition for power and leadership. Only one person in this group, Uri Or, is identified with a party (the Alignment), and to the question of what motivates them, Ben-Nun replied, almost nonchalantly—as the answer is supposed to be self-evident: "Concern."

The **Double Column** was first presented to Yitzhak Rabin, then to the prime minister, in 1976. Avraham Wachman, a professor of architecture at the Technion and an expert in regional planning, who conceived the idea and is its main proponent today, succeeded at the time in arousing real interest in the plan, and a steering committee was set up under Hayyim Givati. The upset in 1977 buried this trend of thinking. The intifadah caused it to sprout anew, and this time a society is pushing this overall plan for the future of Israel.

Wachman and his friends are propelled in the direction that, regardless, an overall plan is preferable, and certainly in the case of a country that is subject to severe pressures. All the governments of Israel since 1967 decided not to decide what the country's permanent boundaries would be, they say. This lack of clarity was adopted by the Alignment and the Likud governments, and now is the time to unite the two blocs precisely in an initiative. To say not only what is acceptable, but what is not acceptable as well; to give a geopolitical image to a country whose borders have become blurred.

What is lacking in the plan of these good fellows is a starting mechanism. The connection between theory and practice is weak in their case, and not by chance. Dudik Rottenberg says, "This is already a matter of tactics." That is, a group of persons who are convinced of their practical approach to life and who will voluntarily invest their efforts to implant the plan in the consciousness of the influential circles, while understanding that these circles are likely to leave the plan in the drawer and forget about it. It is clear to each of the members of the society which is initiating the **Double Column** that Israel is approaching its last opportunity to maneuver independently towards a realistic solution in the Middle East. Hence, their proposal. But they will be able to live with the knowledge that their inability begins precisely where their efforts are supposed to produce results. This is a certain arrogance that afflicts precisely the salt of the earth, for the same reason that they do not like to be photographed.

"For such things, a revolution is necessary, and we will not carry it out," says Rottenberg, and it is precisely he who is responsible for a minirevolution. Kibbutz Beyt Oren stands in its modern form on a green mountain, no small thanks to its secretary, who also carries modestly a record of a senior position in the paratroops, a scar on his arm, and a quiet and strong personality.

There are other former fighters in this group. Aside from Ben-Nun, who today coordinates the health committee of Ma'agan Micha'el and is the chairman of the board of the Oceanographic and Lake Research Institute. Dubie Helman of Yotvata, who up to a short time ago was the internal secretary of the United Kibbutz Movement, and Micha'el Gal, who was born in Kibbutz Yagur and is today director-general of the Jerusalem Municipality. No one on the list would be an embarrassment: Elisha Shalem, is currently the secretary of Ramat Yohanan; Yo'av Gelber, is a historian and the head of the Herzl Institute for the History of Zionism at Haifa University; Elisha Haas, born in Kibbutz S'deh Eliyahu, an observant Jew, is today a senior scientist at the Weizman Institute in the field of protein research; and, Avshalom Dolav, the head of the Dairy Council and a member of Tirat Tzvi, is also an observant Jew.

Even if thinking and committed people (were the people like that) were asked to choose physically and spiritually attractive leaders, this would obviously be the kind of persons that they would choose to make decisions affecting the future of their children. They are profound, farsighted, express themselves fluently and with originality, their weltanschauung does not revolve around personal interests, they are neither violent nor cowardly, they seek consensus and they have a map. Homeland, what more could you ask?

Their timing in announcing the plan is astonishing. Is it not already too late to come forward with proposals that require a deep furrow in the soil of prejudices? Baker has come and gone, the extreme left and the extreme right are exercising themselves to remind us of their red lines, and Shamir is involved more than ever in fending off plans. Why are they only now going to the media?

Wachman: "We simply now want public support, so as to reach the decision makers. There is a feeling that the decision is drawing near. There have already been many occasions when we felt that the time of decision had come. First, we thought of direct meetings with them, and only afterwards going to the media. We feared creating a few fireworks and that the matter [then] would die out. But now, in meetings with individuals, we hear more and more appeals in the vein: Why do we not hear about it? We decided that there would never be a more or a less appropriate time."

The Double-Column plan seeks to satisfy the main blocs in the Likud and the Alignment, as well as the Palestinians. It is essentially designed for step-by-step implementation, elections in the territories, autonomy, thickening of Jewish settlement in the Jordan Valley, but it also has addenda that are likely to make it accepted by broader circles:

The permanent borders of Israel (including the Golan and the Jordan Valley) will be determined in advance and will not be open to negotiation. Along the eastern border, from the Golan Heights to Eilat, and especially in the area from 'Arad and 'Eyn-Gedi to Beyt She'an, the Government of

Israel will establish a Jewish population that will be called "the Eastern Column." At the same time, Israel will recognize the right of the Palestinians to self-determination as an independent entity in the territories of Judeaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. The annexation of the Jordan Valley is to be offset by allowing a Palestinian state.

Israel will not rule out a priori the establishing of an adjacent Palestinian state, and it will propose to it a confederative Israel-Palestine framework. The Jewish settlements in the territories will be able to remain in place, and their residents will be able to choose Israel or Palestine citizenship. The Arabs of Israel will enjoy the same right. Israel will put forward as a condition for negotiations a demand to separate Judea and Samaria into two different areas. The autonomy arrangements will not apply to the territories that will later come under Israel law. The first stage will be elections in Judeaea and Samaria, followed by negotiations with the elected representatives on a five-year autonomy agreement.

How can a plan for resolving a conflict be drawn up so as to be acceptable to an initial forum of more than 20 individuals? First of all, those concerned are acquainted with one another from the army, the university, the kibbutz. Wachman, who is known in his circles as Avremeleh, and Rottenberg, [known as] Dudik, were the originators and the first formulators. They sent the first draft throughout the country, and received comments in the mail, until they arrived at the final version. And it, too, still arouses certain reservations, even among these two. For example, there is the threat expressed at the end of the plan. This is how it is worded: "If the initiative is rejected in advance by the Palestinians, if the negotiations fail, or if the process stalls, Israel will carry out unilaterally the following measures: imposition of Israel law and administration on those regions that are vital to it in Judeaea and Samaria. The intensified and accelerated development of "the Eastern Column."

Dudik was not convinced of the need for such a conclusion, [while] Wachman is sure of its necessity. They are still arguing over the paragraph politely, very patiently and righteously, and with mutual respect. They met in the same atmosphere with Yitzhak Shamir, who listened attentively and asked many questions; with Yitzhak Rabin, who listened with interest; and many times with representatives of Gush Emmunim, in order to answer serious questions. They also spoke before academics at the Weizman Institute and Bar Ilan University, and with Palestinians at Al-Najah University.

No one rejected the plan. In the vacuum of this embroiled place there is now a great hunger for a solution that will not cause too much pain to any side. The impression of the society's public relations teams was that the Palestinians and Gush Emmunim are ready to swallow the plan even if they do not admit it formally and openly that they would accept a future proposal

which would include a Palestinian state, though it be small, divided into three separate blocs, and surrounded by Jews.

[MA'ARIV] Why should the Palestinians be interested at all in your proposal?

[Ben-Nun] In our conversations with Palestinians, in a group and also one-on-one, we were told—and how!—that many of them were unwilling to say openly that they were inclined to accept our proposal. We say: You can get your own state, with currency and law, with one reservation, that it be demilitarized except for a small army for police purposes. They are in a position that they want to be forced to accept such a solution.

[Dudik] Who would have believed that Israeli Arabs would want to accept Israel citizenship in 1948? We are once again confronted by a partition plan. Their leaders are wiser then they were in 1947. They would not want to refuse.

[Wachman] The Palestinians are now engaged in their Zionist drive. They learned from us. They have an exile like ours, they have created their own nationalism. They are our most natural partners. Clearly, there is one side that is stronger in any agreement that comes out of friction. Clearly, all of them want peace, but peace is only a situation between wars. There are no unilateral agreements in the world, when wars for existence are involved. So they fight, and shed a lot of blood, until they get tired and sit down to work out an agreement.

[MA'ARIV] With our existing leadership, do you see a chance for the process which you regard as desirable?

[Wachman] We do not presume to create the process among individuals, but rather to present the solution.

[Ben-Nun] We thought of collecting the signatures of 61 members of Knesset, in order to hold a plebescite. The timing now indicates that the leadership will be under pressure. The Americans will take off their gloves and our body armor. To the extent that we invest in public relations, we will hasten the stage of implementation.

They are investing a lot of their time, contributing energy of thought and feeling. During that time, they could have continued with their personal work or read a good book. That, perhaps, is what makes such wise individuals different from others, who grasp what is happening but do not lift a finger to change things. They are trying, at least, in their serious and aesthetic way.

"Agility is what is required here," says Ben-Nun, meaning that the existing political system is supposed to act with dispatch. But in the Alignment, they peeked into their plan and said to them: take out the issue of the Palestinian state and then the Likud will agree. And in the Likud they said to them: take out the issue of the Palestinian state, and then we will accept it. And the fixation remains.

[MA'ARIV] The road to realization also requires a concession. Is there any room for changes in your plan?

[Wachman] No plan is absolute. Under different conditions it will be possible to think of changes. In the existing situation, we will not forego the eastern border and the recognition of the Palestinian entity in Judaea and Samaria. It is understood that at a later stage there can be arguments over the demilitarization, or over the nature of the open borders.

[Dudik] Our point of departure is unilaterally Zionist. Because we are in the stages of Zionist realization, we cannot give up several principles. 'The Eastern Column,' the push for a confederation with Israel and not with Jordan, in order to block a hostile line from Tulkarem to Baghdad, and conduct the negotiations first with the Palestinians—and I definitely prefer the PLO in the territories over the PLO in Tunis. We are trying to create relations with anyone directly relevant to our lives, and to aim for whatever we consider necessary for us rather than what is necessary for them. It is clear in advance that neither of the sides will get everything that it wants.

They know that they first have a war with the Jews. Those Jews who want all of the territories and those who want to be rid of all the territories. They are sowing a feeling of sanity, something that is different from that to which we have been accustomed in the circles of idealists, fanatics, and those who hunger for Plafones and trips abroad. In their opinion, the two lines of ambition of the right and the left will take us nowhere. Not one square inch, in the most raw meaning of the concept. They are certain that the heat under the feet is already perceptible to everyone, that the ground is burning also under the homes of those who would not admit it. The **Double Column** seeks to open an alternative channel of thought, a calm one, precisely now.

[Dudik] The world is standing before the creation of the Palestinian state. It would be better for us to come out with our own initiative to meet this trend. The social and cultural reason for our existence here must begin, and not only the territorial meaning.

If they are capable of utopian thinking, something that is difficult for people such as they, they would want to go back to the moment before the return of the Sinai. Wachman, who readily foregoes one more settlement in Judaea-Samaria-Gaza, bade farewell in the Sinai to the dream of the settlement of the western border. His motives are neither messianic nor military. It is a geopolitical and social outlook that is not easily understood by those who were educated between defined and mined borders.

Nevertheless, the society for the "Double-Column Plan" is again preparing for trips throughout the country in order to spread the idea that a solution can be found, if you want to live.

2,500 Muslims To Go on Pilgrimage to Mecca

TA1605140591 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 May 91 p 2

[Report from Nazareth by Muhammad Khalilah]

[Text] The cabinet, through an interministerial committee made up of officials from the prime ministers' office, the attorney general's office, and the Interior and Religious Affairs Ministries, has decided to allow 2,500 Israeli Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca this year.

The figure was set by Saudi and Jordanian authorities. The pilgrimage will take place in approximately two weeks, and the representatives of the Mecca Pilgrims Association were given the opportunity to list, on special forms supplied by the Interior Ministry, the names of those interested in fulfilling this religious tenet. Registration will end next Monday afternoon, when the representatives of the association come to Jerusalem to hand the forms to the Interior Ministry for approval.

This year it was decided to allow those who have never before gone on a pilgrimage to enjoy that right. The Jordanian ministry in charge of the Israeli pilgrims has reported that Israeli pilgrims will be allowed this year to go to Saudi Arabia by air from Amman Airport. Other pilgrims will be guaranteed transportation in new, air-conditioned buses.

KUWAIT

Cabinet Affairs Minister Discusses Internal Politics

91AE0391B London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13 May 91 p 2

[Text] Kuwait—The Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Dari 'Abdallah al-'Uthman, emphasized that the ministerial committees are performing a major role in the activity of the executive authority, in supervising the implementation of emergency and reconstruction plans, and in monitoring the files of missing persons. He added that the Civil Service Council, which is responsible for studying the organizational and functional situation in the governmental administration, will convene this week in its first meeting after the latest governmental change.

Al-'Uthman stated that Kuwait has now become a model of human cooperation. He stressed that the Iraqi invasion has made it necessary to review Arab relations, with a view toward basing them on new foundations. On another point, he disclosed that pertinent Kuwaiti agencies have taken custody of, and handed them over to the Kuwaiti judiciary, eight individuals belonging to the alleged provisional government formed by the occupation authorities.

Al-'Uthman also said that operations to extinguish the [oil well] fires are proceeding in an organized manner

amid mutual understanding on the part of all relevant parties. He stated that Kuwait is recovering its vitality through the efforts of its people and all of its officials.

Regarding the formation of ministerial committees, he stated that "when the government began its efforts, a number of these committees were formed to study topics on the cabinet's agenda in a way that is compatible with the government's current concerns, orientations, and plans, which are defined in the letter which his grace the crown prince and prime minister submitted to his grace the emir."

Al-'Uthman indicated that "a prime concern of the government is to monitor the release of our imprisoned brothers and to obtain information on missing Kuwaitis still in prison."

In this regard, al-'Uthman added: The cabinet is translating this concern into the formation of a committee to monitor prisoner and missing person affairs. This committee is designated the "National Committee to Monitor Prisoner and Missing Person Affairs." The cabinet has deemed it appropriate—in order to mobilize all national capabilities—for this committee to be composed of ministers and citizens who possess the capabilities and willingness to cooperate with the government regarding this national and humanitarian matter. This committee was among the first committees formed by the cabinet. It is headed by Justice and Legal Affairs Minister Ghazi al-Sammar and its members include Interior Minister Shaykh Ahmad al-Hammud, Information Minister Dr. Badr Jasim al-Ya'qub, and citizens Dr. Ghanim al-Najjar, 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Kharafi, Dallal al-Zabn, and lawyer Fahd 'Abdallah al-Khazzam.

We hope that our fellow committee members will succeed in the mission that has been entrusted to them and that the program and plan adopted by this committee will lead to the speedy release of our imprisoned brothers.

Return Committee

Minister al-'Uthman added that "among the government's top priorities mentioned in the speech by his grace the crown prince are the reactivation of public utilities and the reconstruction of what was sabotaged and destroyed by the tyrannical aggressor during the occupation period."

He stated that "the cabinet, out of concern for this subject, formed a public utilities and services committee and a number of other model committees usually formed in the cabinet, such as a judiciary and legislative committee and an economic and finance committee."

He added that "a special committee has been formed to arrange all means needed to guarantee the appropriate and comfortable return of citizens through the border crossings of al-Salimi and the al-Nuwaysib, or through the Kuwait International Airport. This committee has been striving to facilitate the easy, comfortable return of

our fellow citizens from abroad, who will doubtlessly be a good source of help in efforts to rebuild and reactivate public utilities."

Humanitarian Cooperation

Al-'Uthman stated that: "The calamity to which Kuwait has been subjected because the Iraqi regime set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells is a primary concern of the government. The government previously announced that these fires are a national disaster, and it implored all specialists throughout the world and in concerned organizations to help contain this disaster and to control the oil well fires as quickly as possible to protect our national wealth and the environment."

He indicated that "the cabinet has formed a committee that is authorized to take all measures and make all decisions needed to facilitate the speedy control and containment of this disaster. This committee is composed of: Oil Minister Dr. Hammud al-Rugbah, the minister of state for cabinet affairs, and Finance Minister Nasir al-Rudan. This committee, in its first meeting, will carefully study the situation following the visit undertaken by his grace the crown prince and prime minister and ministers to the oil wells to study from up close the efforts that have been made to date to control the oil well fires."

Al-'Uthman emphasized that "there are no disagreements between the Kuwaiti Government and the oil fire extinguishing companies." He added that "matters are proceeding in the best way, and Kuwait greatly appreciates the role of American companies and all friends and brothers who have stood by us in this trial. We hope and pray to God, the sublime and exalted, that they will help us to quickly contain these enormous fires, which are unmatched in history. God willing, the operation to control these oil fires in Kuwait will become a model of humanitarian cooperation to defend truth and justice in various ways and to defeat falsehood."

The Civil Service Council

Regarding the formation of the civil service council and the results and developments stemming from its first meetings, Minister al-'Uthman stated that "the civil service council, as is well known, is composed of its chairman, his grace the crown prince and prime minister, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah, and a membership comprising the minister of state for cabinet affairs as the deputy chairman, and a number of ministers. Recently, five national, prominent figures were appointed to the civil service council. They are: 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Ghanim, 'Abdallah al-Dakhil al-Rashid, Hamzah 'Abbas Husayn, Dr. Shu'ayb 'Abdallah Shu'ayb, and Sulayman 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Mutawwi'.

The council will convene its first meeting next week to study the organizational and functional situation in Kuwait following liberation and to formulate rules and regulations pertaining to the reactivation of the governmental administration.

Regarding the return of state employees to their jobs, Minister al-'Uthman stated: "Officials located in Kuwait have for the most part taken up their jobs. Senior officials have also returned and have taken up their tasks. As for officials in supervisory positions, it is assumed that they will have taken up their positions. The return of other officials below the supervisory level will coincide with the return of citizens from abroad. We hope that most of these officials will have taken up their activities before the end of this month.

New Arab Relations

Minister al-'Uthman added: "The oppression to which Kuwait was subjected during the tyrannical Iraqi occupation period will lead to the formulation of new foundations for Kuwaiti-Arab relations, given that Kuwait has always been, and will continue to be, God willing, an inseparable part of the Arab world." He stated: "We are keen on Arab relations being firmly established far from influencing factors. The Arab world will no doubt benefit from the lessons it has derived from Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the oppression, maltreatment, and terrorism to which the Kuwaiti people were subjected by the criminal Iraqi forces." He added: "I believe that the disgraceful acts to which the Kuwaiti people and the State of Kuwait have been subjected, and the perfidious Arab positions that accompanied them, will motivate all Arabs to review the situation with candor and clarity with a view toward reassess the basic foundations of Arab relations." He indicated that "before the Iraqi invasion, there were no obvious disagreements among the Arab countries requiring reconciliation. Therefore, we are not discussing Arab reconciliation. Rather, we are discussing the reassessment of Arab relations, with a view toward ensuring that the Arab orientation in the future will in all cases support the truth and be as far as possible from encroachments and support of aggression."

Al-'Uthman stated: "Kuwait finds some Arab positions on the matter of Kuwait unacceptable by all measures, because these positions flatter and support falsehood. Therefore, we are not broaching Arab reconciliations as much as we are broaching the extremely important matter of Arab relations, to ensure that all Arab positions support the truth and are as far as possible from supporting falsehood, as several Arab brothers did during Iraq's tyrannical occupation of Kuwait.

Minister al-'Uthman stated: "Had Arab relations been firm, stable, and based on strong, clear foundations, several Arab brothers would not have supported the aggression during the occupation of Kuwait."

He added: "Therefore, the Arab world and the Arab countries must all move quickly to reassess Arab relations."

The minister stated: "We believe resolutely that, had the Arab world done what it should have done clearly and

forcefully, the Iraqi regime would have hesitated greatly regarding the repugnant crime against Kuwait which it committed.

Everyone knows that when the Iraqi regime first started stirring up the crisis, Kuwait hastened to hold a series of contacts with the Arab countries to try to resolve the dispute concocted by the Iraqi regime within the Arab family. However, unfortunately, the position taken by some Arab governments regarding this Kuwaiti initiative encouraged the Iraqi regime to commit the treacherous crime of invasion."

Al-'Uthman emphasized that: "Arab policy must, in the future, be based on the principle of disclosing the lies of tyrants and not concealing the crimes." He stated: "Kuwait will no doubt remain as it has always been, and we will be faithful to those who stood by us in our ordeal."

The Political Future

Addressing Kuwait's political future, al-'Uthman stated: "His grace the emir of the country defined the horizons of Kuwait's political future in the speech that he delivered on the occasion of the last ten days of Ramadan. He emphasized that the next elections for the National Assembly will be held in the coming year God willing, and that he is very optimistic about Kuwait's political future. He expressed his belief that all Kuwaiti brothers will work together to advance and rebuild Kuwait, in affirming to the entire world that Kuwaitis were and will continue to be united, and that Kuwait's domestic front is united. Even if there have been differences in judgments regarding several matters, the entire Kuwaiti people agree on the preservation of national unity and teamwork to promote Kuwait and to build a bright future."

Minister al-'Uthman emphasized that "Kuwaiti youth will have a very important role in Kuwait's present and future. Kuwait's vitality will be restored to what it was before the Iraqi aggression only through the labor of its sons. Therefore, I hope that the graduates in the reconstruction groups, who received their training abroad, will play a major role in supplying the country's specialized manpower needs for several tasks. Kuwait can flourish again, and its public utilities can function efficiently, only by relying on Kuwaiti youth and awakening their ambitions."

Obstacles That Have Faced the Government

Minister al-'Uthman stated that the obstacles that have faced the Kuwaiti Government are many. However, praise God, these obstacles have been surmounted in an on-going manner thanks to a number of Kuwaiti brothers working in the public utilities.

He stated that the main obstacle is the unimaginable extent of damage. A UN working team visiting Kuwait was amazed at the extent of the damage and destruction

inflicted by the tyrannical occupier on public utilities, in addition to the fact that the occupier strove to destroy the commodities supply.

He emphasized that the government is moving quickly to refurbish this supply and to fulfill the people's needs for basic commodities. The Commerce and Industry Minister, through the efforts of its employees, has been able to provide sufficient food and a strategic reserve that suffices to meet the people's needs.

Another obstacle, states Minister al-'Uthman, is that "the destruction of the inventory of commodities was not limited to the private sector and governmental agencies, but also extended to private companies and facilities. Consequently, most people working in commerce and the private sector need time to rebuild this inventory, so that commercial stores can respond to, and fulfill, the people's daily non-food commodity requirements.

Also, the specialized, technical labor force emigrated during the occupation period, and the process of recalling this manpower requires time. We are making strenuous efforts to provide the appropriate means for the return of citizens from abroad, so that they can help in reconstruction and construction.

He stated that another major obstacles is our lack of revenues, which we previously obtained from the sale and export of oil. Minister al-'Uthman emphasized that, with patience and steadfastness, all of these obstacles will be surmounted.

Regarding the fate of persons with whom the Iraqi regime formed a provisional government after its odious occupation of Kuwait, al-'Uthman stated: "They are in Kuwait and are being investigated by the pertinent agencies." He disclosed that they number 80 individuals, and that charges against them and the investigation of the crimes which they committed will be referred to pertinent agencies for investigation. "Subsequently, they will be referred to the judiciary agencies to be tried."

He added that there is no chance of rebuilding Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations, given the presence of the current ruling regime. Commenting on the agreement concluded between the Kurds and Saddam Husayn, he stated: "From a humanitarian standpoint, we truly hope that Iraqi, Kurdish citizens are in a place that is safe from this regime's attack."

A Radiant Kuwait

At the conclusion of his remarks, Minister al-'Uthman stated that "the future of Kuwait for which we are striving will be bright, because the lessons of the occupation will help us in reviewing our needs and formulating a new *modus operandi* according to which the goals that we set are embedded in the human dimension. I believe that the first lesson that must be heeded is that we must incline toward God the sublime with pure hearts, reinforce our faith in God, and rebuild human

relations on firm foundations that derive their strength from our true and tolerant Islamic Shari'ah."

He pointed to the fact that Kuwait has become a model for humanitarian cooperation and a symbol of the defense of international legitimacy and the new international order in which we are living. He stated that "we must cooperate in various fields and transcend differences of opinion to focus on the basic issue, namely the reconstruction of Kuwait, which requires great effort and patience, so that we can restore Kuwait's radiance and smiles to the faces of the people of Kuwait."

King Husayn's Behavior in Gulf Crisis Criticized

91AE0389A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 3 May 91 p 13

[Article by Kuwaiti writer and journalist Ahmad al-Jabr: "Husayn Did Not Reject Occupation, Helped It Continue—Kuwaitis Will Not Forget His Stands"]

[Text] At a time when countries are preoccupied with rebuilding Kuwait, infusing blood and life into its veins, and cleansing Kuwait of the traitors, hirelings, collaborators, and remnants of the occupation, and although the general atmosphere does not permit the handling of rabble-rousing subjects, we are confronted with an article in a local newspaper by Shakir al-Jawhari entitled, "The King's Calculations."

Frankly, I couldn't restrain myself from replying to this article, if only to tell al-Jawhari and his like who pave the way for raising these subjects, "Don't overstep the mark! Put down the pen, and don't write! The pen you hold does not tell the truth. The paper on which you write is not white. The heart within you is not pure. The newspaper for which you write is not a stage for actors." But first of all we say, "The goals for which you write have been exposed and are clear. The clouds have dispersed, and the intentions have become visible." So to al-Jawhari and his like we say, "Don't overstep the mark!"

Someone may ask, "Why this attack on al-Jawhari?"

I reply that it is not an attack on him, but a defense of Kuwait and a revelation of facts that lay "sleeping" in the closet undisturbed for dozens of years until last August 2nd. Someone else may ask, "And what are those facts?" To answer the question, we will examine al-Jawhari's article and its author. We shall need to bring up certain examples, and these examples will require quotations, citation of facts, and perhaps names.

More than 130 nationalities, representing all countries of the world, lived in Kuwait. Indeed, Kuwait rivals the United Nations in the number of its members. Those who lived there, those who received sustenance, those who earned their living, and those who received an education—all did so in Kuwait as if they were Kuwaitis. Yet as soon as the dark day came, the malicious gloated, and the silent spoke out, as if they had been waiting ever since coming to Kuwait for the day when the people of

Kuwait were struck by a disaster and thunderbolt unprecedented in history. The fact that Kuwait had given them their daily bread meant nothing to some of them, and they showed themselves ungrateful for the favor. Even worse, we saw boundless sympathy for the occupation forces, as if they owed a debt that had to be paid. For example, some journalists and writers, especially Palestinians, who worked for the Kuwait-based newspaper AL-NIDA', made demands and threatened others with trouble if they did not work with them. One need not mention the journalists who left the country and wrote articles and analyses in the Jordanian press revealing their dubious attitude toward the occupation. This was also the case with doctors, employees, managers, "bansharjis," workers, intellectuals, and clergymen.

This treachery is not like other crimes. It is no misdemeanor or felony. It is much greater than that. It is too great to be written, described, or defined. It is a son's betrayal of his father. It is a neighbor's betrayal of his neighbor.

Accordingly, I say that any person, whoever he may be, who defends someone who was a cause of the tragedy of an entire nation, with all its nationalities, does not deserve an opportunity to write or even to remain in Kuwait.

Someone might say that this argument applies to those who left Kuwait during the crisis, but that those who were in Kuwait during it—Kuwaitis and others—may have been unable to condemn the occupation out of fear for their lives at the hands of the occupation forces. I would say yes or maybe. But over 200,000 Palestinians left the country for their homeland Jordan, and what did they do there? Do you know what they did there? Most of them marched in endless demonstrations, not on behalf of Kuwait, and not to protest the Iraqi occupation or to condemn the savagery and brutality against the Kuwaiti people. The demonstrations marched in support of Iraq and its leader, demanding that the Kuwaiti issue be linked with the Palestinian issue—despite their knowing that the linkage was not serious. They knew who Saddam was and what Kuwait was. Some representatives of the Palestinian leadership in Jordan went so far as to refuse to meet the Kuwaiti popular delegation that visited Jordan to try to publicize the dimensions and effects of the occupation and remove any uncertainty about it. They bluntly refused to deal with the Kuwaiti delegation, for no reason but that it was Kuwaiti! A member of the delegation has told me that things become so bad that the chairman of the press conference, which the Jordanian press did not cover, introduced him as being from the "19th province."

This introduction is necessary if we are to understand the nature of the relation between the article and its writer and between the writer and the spirit of the article.

In fact, I was amazed, flabbergasted, and perplexed when I read the first line of the article: "Many do not know

King Husayn's real position." In explanation, the article's author, al-Jawhari, says that King Husayn is the king of Arab balances, since he as "leader" was able to bring together Saddam and Hafiz al-Asad. What, I ask, does Saddam's meeting with al-Asad have to do with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait? Does al-Jawhari mean that just as King Husayn was successful in bringing together Saddam and al-Asad and had a role in this meeting, he also had a role in the Iraqi occupation? If the answer is yes, it is a disaster, since the writer is defending Husayn and his positions. It means that the writer is for the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. In other words, the writer supports King Husayn's position in bringing Saddam and al-Asad together, and he also supports the king in his position on the Iraqi occupation, which King Husayn supported as far as he was able. In other words, the writer of the article supports King Husayn's positions in both cases!

What balance is the writer of the article talking about, when he sides with the Iraqi aggressor against Kuwait and its people? Does the writer think that Husayn's pro-Iraqi stance can be considered a balanced position? Are we to think that the writer approves this position in this case?

Some may say that the writer mentions that Husayn condemned the Iraqi occupation. We reply that Husayn did not condemn the occupation, but tried to extend its period indefinitely until further notice. I ask the writer of the article to refresh his memory, particularly from 2 August 1990 to 26 January 1991. He will discover that he is wrong.

If the writer cannot remember, or feigns ignorance, our memory is still strong and will remain so. Jordan's monarch Husayn, his government, his political parties, his press, his men, his children, his women, and his people, as well as the PLO leadership with all its factions, writers, intellectuals, and defenders—all of them stood together in an unprecedented unity unlikely to recur in dozens of years.

I will mention a few examples of King Husayn's position—not all of them, for it would take many pages, perhaps many newspapers, to list them.

The Jordanian monarch delivered an angry speech the day the air war began. He went so far as to warn the American president, George Bush, of the consequences of continuing the war. He tried to stir up Jordanian and Arab public opinion against the coalition countries. He never mentioned Kuwait by name in his speech, nor did he mention the Iraqi occupation by name. It was as if it were war between Iraq and America.

The master chess player Husayn stated that he knew the date of the attack two weeks before it took place and that he had known the Iraqis' intentions toward Kuwait even before Saddam delivered his speech raising the issue on 17 July 1990 on the occasion of the July celebrations! Husayn and Saddam, in other words, were the only two "leaders" who knew the date of the attack, and he was

the only Arab and international "leader" who knew Saddam's intentions. Yet he did not have the courage to make these intentions public!

Husayn sent the commander of the Jordanian army to Iraq to meet with the chief of staff of the Iraqi army on the 15th floor of the Iraqi al-Rashid Hotel on Saturday, 21 July 1990, to arrange certain military matters.

We later learned the nature of these matters. It became evident from the Jordanian ammunition and weapons that the Iraqi army left behind after its withdrawal and rout from al-Khafji and Kuwait.

For your information, I was personally informed of some of these things. And does the chief of staff of the Jordanian army dare to meet with his Iraqi counterpart without "his master's" knowledge?

Husayn sent a letter to an American child. Has the writer read it, or does his memory fail him when it comes to recalling the faults of his great king? By means of this letter and this child, Husayn made every effort to convince the American people that the American army would suffer great losses if it entered a war with Iraq. He took pains to call on the American army and Congress to oppose President Bush. He tried to create some sort of popular discontent in an attempt to persuade Bush to overlook Saddam's crime. His efforts failed, thank God!

Do you know why? Because Husayn did not take a balanced stand. He took a feeble and isolated stand when he sided with Iraq against Kuwait.

On the other hand, I would like to ask the author of the article a question: What if Husayn and his people had stood by Kuwait? What if he had sent no letter or representative to Iraq? What if all the Arab states had taken a stand against the attack? Would it have come to war? The answer is no. Saddam kept telling the world that all the Arabs were with him and that the Arab poor were with him. He proved it by means of the crowded demonstrations in Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, the Sudan, Libya, and Mauritania.

Had these demonstrations not marched due to the destructive, lying media, what would Saddam's excuse have been?

Husayn's stands were an attempt to unify his and Saddam's camp. Every week, we saw Husayn sending his ministers to the Arab countries in an attempt to unite the alleged "Arab ranks." Sadly, he played a leading role in this operation, thereby aggravating and complicating the crisis.

As for Husayn's positions on the Palestinian issue, I invite anyone who can read to read Husayn's positions on the 1970 Black September massacres, when over 100,000 Palestinians were killed or wounded. No comment needed!

As for the position of the Jordanian press, I would like to mention just one example. I won't mention the enormous amount of support directed and given to Iraq. I won't mention the military and political analyses of the war. I won't mention the intellectual and journalistic struggle to support Saddam and his position.

The example is an advertisement published on the front page of several Jordanian newspapers. It read: "Wanted a Kuwaiti maid and driver to work immediately in a Jordanian family." No comment needed!

As for the Jordanian political parties, there is no end to what one could say. I will mention only one example. These parties refused to meet the Kuwaiti popular delegation that visited Jordan in an attempt to explain the dimensions and circumstances of the issue—even though Husayn and his brother al-Hasan met the delegation. I will not mention to you what happened for a number of reasons. Perhaps a day will come when we shall read what happened in the Kuwaiti newspapers. When you read it, you will discover that Husayn had been promised a piece of Kuwaiti soil and some barrels of Kuwaiti oil!

Returning to the writer's article, we find a crucial paragraph that proves what we said above. It reads: "Husayn tried to persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, although he was certain that Saddam would not withdraw from Kuwait through persuasion." Therein lies the trouble, since in that case he was merely engaging in word play and not working for a peaceful solution of the Kuwaiti problem. So why all the idle talk?

We should ask the writer: If Husayn knew that Iraq would not withdraw from Kuwait through negotiations, why did he side with it? These are questions that need an answer!

I would like on this occasion to bring up what some Palestinians, their leaders, and their political parties, as well as the Jordanian people, its leaders, and its political parties were saying—how the Palestinian and Jordanian people could not stand side by side in the American camp and how they were against the foreign presence in the Gulf. In turn, I ask whether the Palestinian and Jordanian leaders were against the Iraqi occupation as they now maintain. Can you not say that the Palestinian and Jordanian people could only stand side by side with the Arab camp? Why do you focus on the American side and forget to mention the Arab side?

As for the foreign presence in the Gulf, everyone knows that it was the result of a cause—Iraq's occupation—and that after Iraq occupied Kuwait, the coalition forces came to the region at the invitation of Kuwait's leaders. Has Husayn forgotten that he was the first Arab leader to summon foreign forces in 1958? Jordan was not even under occupation at the time!

Husayn and 'Arafat say that they support Saddam's claims that Iraq has historic rights in Kuwait. Despite the falsity of this claim, we would like to remind Husayn

that Jordan as an entity did not exist 73 years ago, when British and French colonialism divided Greater Syria into the four states of Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. Jordan was subsequently given to King Husayn's grandfather, so that he could be crowned its king. What position will King Husayn take when Syria demands that the branch be reunited to its root, and that Syria has historic rights in Jordan?

Another point becomes evident here: Kuwait existed as an entity more than 200 years before Jordan. I will leave King Husayn or the writer—it does not matter who—to answer the preceding questions.

As for the Palestinian leaders, there is no end to what one could say about them, especially during the occupation—both those who were in Kuwait and those outside. Most of them behaved ungratefully. The time has come to repay these leaders for their "favor." They made a mistake that cannot and should not be forgotten, whatever reasons there might be for forgetting. The blow is no small one, the wound is still unhealed, and the tears have not dried. The joy will become complete only if we keep our eyes on the positive aspects of this crisis—the fact that we now know our enemies from our friends. We will continue to remember, lest we be stabbed in the back again!

So stop writing these stupid articles! Don't overstep the mark!

Political, Economic Development Issues Discussed

91AE0406A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 12, 16 May 91

[Article by Ahmad al-Jabar, a Kuwaiti journalist]

[12 May p 3]

[Text] Many months ago, specifically, before the liberation, we began to hear about the reconstruction of Kuwait. After the liberation, reconstruction became a primary concern on a large scale, preoccupying the small before the large, the citizen before the official. When the new Kuwaiti Government was formed last month, it was nicknamed the "reconstruction government." In meetings with officials, the question of reconstruction is always brought up. Even abroad, everyone is pursuing the reconstruction of Kuwait.

One insistent question concerns whether Kuwait has actually been destroyed and thus requires reconstruction, or whether it is already developed, but needs repair, maintenance, and spare parts? This question begs an answer, and I will leave most of that answer to the experts, economic analysts, and businessmen, answering the balance myself.

I believe that Kuwait needs neither construction nor reconstruction, but restoration and maintenance, with the exception of several hotels, markets, and oil wells.

That sample does not require the expression "the reconstruction of all of Kuwait," because that would imply that Kuwait is destroyed and in ruins.

That is not the case. If we agree in principle that Kuwait is not destroyed and does not need reconstruction, we must then ask: What does Kuwait need? We maintain that what was stolen from Kuwait represents a loss [that must be replaced] and that what was burned must be rebuilt. If we exclude the oil wells, several hotels and organizations, and the commercial markets, we find that all of the remaining companies suffer from a loss of the equipment which they were marketing before the occupation, and that these companies are in control of their situations.

Every businessman can by all means reopen his establishment, company, or factory gradually, either independently or through governmental support or collective support, i.e., in cooperation with other companies.

A prime indication of that is what happened after WWII, which destroyed and divided Germany and destroyed Japan. These two countries rose from the rubble to become giants that now compete with the victors in the war. For example, nothing of Germany remained, except three towers, several houses and villages, a severely defeated people, and a country to which no one would extend aid without conditions. Nonetheless, the German people built its republic. Within 30 years, West Germany became a top-ranking industrial country. Do you know why? Because the state strove to rebuild the German people before rebuilding buildings. It is the people who built Germany. Germany could not have been built up if the people had not been developed.

The Kuwaiti Government, which is the victor in the war, must give precedence to developing the Kuwaiti person before building the Kuwaiti economy, because it is the Kuwaiti who builds the economy, not vice versa. It is well known that Kuwait previously attempted to develop its economy without developing its indigenous manpower. Kuwaitis have become soft and indolent, merchants in name. That is wrong. The correct thing is for the new government and subsequent governments to develop Kuwaitis anew, so that they can build their state, instead of signaling the "reconstruction of Kuwait," which is wrong, because, in that case, much would be lost!

What is the role of Kuwaiti companies and organizations following liberation? This question also begs an answer. However, I will answer it differently.

Kuwaiti companies have a major role in this difficult period being experienced by our beloved Kuwait, because these companies will attract foreign and Arab countries to assist us. However, will Kuwaiti companies determine the role of the foreign companies, or will the foreign companies determine the role of Kuwaiti companies? Will we ourselves think, or will they think for us? Will we determine what we want, or will the foreign companies determine what they want for us? If we want

to proceed correctly, properly, and safely, will we ourselves determine what we want? What is the role of foreign companies? In other words, will we be thinking of our country and its interests? In entering upon this course, we must adhere to the following:

First, we must seek to develop the Kuwaiti person through modern, scientific means, so that he can serve his country.

Second, we must consider the interests of Kuwait first, placing the national interest above personal interests.

Third, there must be careful planning, organization, and guidance, which must be preceded by supervision on the part of a wise administration.

The planning process involves determining the goals to be achieved in the period covered by the plan and the method for achieving them. The organization stage entails all operations pertaining to organizational structure and the determination of the organizations and authorities responsible for the tasks targeted in the plan. Guidance is the process of controlling the performance of subordinates during their implementation of the plan and its related operations. Finally, the function of administration is to establish the criteria for measuring performance in light of the plan, ascertaining results, and correcting deviations. These latter tasks represent control. The government regards control as the link between planning and the achievement of goals.

Fourth, wise, skillful field leaders must be appointed to achieve the desired goals. In other words, we must be concerned with the qualifications of the leaders that supervise the restoration or reconstruction of Kuwait. There should be no discrimination. A leader's competency should not [laha; read: la] be gauged by his proximity or distance from an official or minister.

A leader issues instructions and recommends the ways and means needed to exercise the authorities granted to him. In addition, he supervises, bears the responsibilities given to him, and is accountable for errors.

Five, we should determine what we want, not what they want. In other words, we should determine how Kuwait is to be rebuilt or restored and who should do it.

Six, we should set reconstruction and restoration priorities. In other words, we should not concentrate on a specific sector to the neglect of another, meaning, when we extinguish the oil fires, we should not forget to put into operation utilities, the university, hospitals, etc.

Seven, it is important for Kuwait's reconstruction, or restoration or maintenance, to be carried out for Kuwait's sake, as opposed to for the sake of other interests, repayment of a debt, the implementation of a promise or "habbat al-khashm [meaning unknown]," flattery of a posture, or the realization of a personal or selfish interest.

Eight, the focus should be on skilled manpower when reexamining the importation of foreign labor to Kuwait. The door should not be left opened wide to everyone. Unskilled labor is required [yantaju; read: Yahtaju] only on a limited skill.

Nine, foreign think tanks, especially American, European, and Japanese, should be brought in on an equal basis. The field should be opened to the most competent and the best, to the exclusion of any other factors. We must show the think tanks the current conditions, the extent of the destruction, and the requirements of putting Kuwait back on its course of progress.

We see a need in this difficult period to follow a policy of controlling spending, rather than spending freely, because Kuwait is no longer filled with wealth. It can no longer not refuse anyone. It can no longer loan to any country, be it Arab or Western. Therefore, spending policy should channel general expenditures toward public welfare, and expenditures should be distributed in the framework of a comprehensive view of the requirements of public utilities according to the relative importance of the services that each utility provides. Also, those responsible for public spending must avoid waste by preventing the loss of public funds in inappropriate contracts. For example, we should focus on the electricity sector, the water sector, the streets, and the extinguishment of the burning wells before the amusement park, popular coffee houses, theatres, the beach, etc.

[16 May p 13]

[Text] In the first part of the series, we dealt in some detail with whether Kuwait requires development and reconstruction or restoration and maintenance, the extent to which Western and Asian governments and companies are seeking to win reconstruction contracts, and the role of Kuwaiti companies in this phase. We also outlined a number of points which we think should be followed by the state and the private sector in offering tenders to several Western or local companies.

In this article, we will deal with the Kuwaiti economy's special features and the nature of the basic problems facing it. Before the invasion, Kuwait enjoyed a considerable volume of investments based on its oil revenues, but suffered from a narrow production base. Thus, the industrial sector has had a weak share in domestic product, requiring Kuwait to depend greatly on imports financed by oil income to fulfill its needs. Therefore, the Kuwaiti economy is considered to be fully open to the external world. Kuwait's economic problems include a low rate of participation of women in the labor force (they make up 17 percent of the labor force), a high percentage of youths under working age, the trend of foreign workers to bring their families with them to settle in Kuwait, the sectoral distribution of manpower and the high percentage of Kuwaiti workers in the government services sector, the effects of the [collapse of the unofficial stock exchange, the] al-Manakh Market [in August

1982], and the cost of rebuilding Kuwait. When Kuwait's economic problems are solved, we will have surmounted the first obstacle in laying the foundation of Kuwait's future edifice.

Kuwait will not be rebuilt by refurbishing a building, importing spare parts, or building a complex, but by rebuilding the Kuwaiti, who has suffered from neglect for many years, because all organizations are based on individuals and thus depend for their success on successful people. If a number of individuals does not come together in the organized pursuit of common objectives, there is no organization. Kuwait is similar to developing countries, which complain of hidden unemployment (because the work load is far from requiring the capabilities of the manpower that is actually employed) as well as the low quality of their manpower. This problem can be solved by training these workers and translating their reserve capacities into an efficient ability to carry out the necessary tasks. We must take into account the content of training, its objective, method, time, place, and amount, and the quality of the trainee.

After the training process, when implementing the supervision process, it is necessary to take into account the need to form a senior administration or ministry for reconstruction, which was supposed to be presented in the new ministerial composition, given Kuwait's great need for development or restoration. However, the new ministry has been designated the Reconstruction Ministry. It would be more appropriate to propose a ministry for reconstruction, whose tasks would be to supervise reconstruction, determine general and long-term goals, outline comprehensive policies, decide on long-range plans and programs, time and coordinate basic operations in projects, authorize plans and programs drafted by middle management and groups of experts and specialists, make basic strategic decisions regarding activity areas and vital aspects of administration regarding projects, and provide general monitoring of operational aspects and rates of progress toward established goals, evaluate achievements, make appropriate decisions, and correct the course of implementation, or redefine goals and outline new plans and programs.

To illustrate what we stated previously, we will cite the example of the extinguishment of the oil wells. Everyone will recall that some said the burning wells would require three years to be extinguished. The period was then reduced to seven months! If there had been a clear, defined, competent agency able to organize and monitor, we would not have had such varying estimations. When two American companies were asked to submit recommendations, "it was not us but they who gave consideration" to this topic. We proceeded on the assumption of the three-year period that had been set for extinguishing the burning wells. When we brought in a number of companies, the time period was reduced, and when we brought in a larger number of companies, we discovered more effective methods than in the past, which are less costly than what was estimated previously.

The process of beckoning to every single foreign company to help us is a mistaken methodological principle, because we ourselves should determine the companies which are to cooperate with us, after those wishing to do so submit their proposals and outline their capabilities. Then, the senior administrative committee can determine which companies are the most competent to extinguish the burning wells. In other words, we ourselves, not others, should make these considerations, placing the national interest above all other considerations. For example, the deputy secretary for international economic affairs in the American Department of Commerce, David Jensen, states that Kuwait needs everything from door knobs to expressways. We ask: Who determines Kuwait's needs? Is it Mr. Jensen or Kuwait? If it is the former, we are in for endless trouble!

Therefore, when we say that Kuwait is embarking on the disbursement of tens of billions to reactivate utilities and to restore and build Kuwait, we ring bells [that warn] that this process requires an administration, and moreover a ministry, supervised by the most competent, talented personnel from an academic, administrative, and patriotic standpoint. Lest we lose the "drinking cup," according to the Kuwaiti expression, we must pause for hours and days before signing any contract with any company to perform any operation. In this respect, we should stress the role of the Kuwaiti private sector, which has been incapable, confused, and immobile in past years. Perhaps quickening the process of merging the commercial banks with the investment companies and reducing administrative and bureaucratic constraints on these organizations will stimulate them to seize the initiative and take action, taking into account the role of Kuwaiti citizens and the preparation of Kuwaiti citizens for this and subsequent stages, because Kuwait will depend on their role, which is basic, in coming years.

The reconstruction or restoration of Kuwait will require enormous efforts and time and will cost \$20 billion. The current Kuwaiti Government will be focusing on this point. This process, which could last for more than three years based on the most far flung estimate, will entail the participation of dozens of countries and perhaps hundreds of companies. These companies or countries will have to submit bids and applications to Kuwait, either through tenders, or at the request of the Kuwaiti Government itself. There will thus be strong competition among companies, especially in the event of tenders. In order to rank these companies, there must be a tenders committee, with a high degree of competency, from either the private sector or the governmental sector, because the economist's role in planning general policy is very important. In order to play the role demanded of him, the economist must have a number of outstanding skills that qualify him to assume responsibility for these tasks and to be accountable for policy results.

An economist's skill is based on his acquisition of expertise by studying economic systems and analyzing

aspects applicable to all societies. An economist's proficiency depends on his ability to view matters in purely academic terms and to analyze the general balance based on a number of variables. These skills qualify the economist and make it his duty to defend a general theory and to define his position on a specific economic policy. The economist can also recommend a specific policy or an alternative to an existing policy, which could be very useful in setting forth tenders or determining Kuwait's reconstruction policy.

Finally, Kuwait is approaching a new stage unprecedented in its history. Kuwait has emerged from an occupation which has lasted more than seven months, an occupation from which it has suffered greatly in different areas. It can go in a number of directions. The safest direction is to place the national interest above every other consideration. That could require sacrifices, the foremost being the abandonment of flattery of countries or companies, regardless of their nationality, as well as the abandonment of making use of a certain party or specific group or the method of "habb al-khushum."

Kuwait will make music of this symphony imposed on it by the reality of the occupation for a long time, and the government and the people will bear their burdens. Therefore, we must say to all: Brothers and friends, let us treat each other kindly.

Impact of Invasion, Liberation on Students Assessed

91AE0391A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 15 May 91 p 10

[Text] Kuwait—Kuwait University has conducted a study on the effect of the Iraqi invasion and the liberation operation on psychological, social, and learning aspects of Kuwait University students. The study aims to formulate a research, analytical conception of the effect based on a survey of the literature on psychological disturbances stemming from wars, disasters, and crises, and on an analysis of these effects in light of a field study employing a questionnaire distributed to a random sample of these students.

Questions

The study sought to respond to a number of questions, which are:

1. What were the basic psychological, social, and learning aspects of university students during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and after the liberation operation?
2. What is the effect of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the attitudes and values of university students regarding basic issues in their lives?
3. To what extent do these attitudes and values vary according to gender and social and economic environment, and how do they differ compared to traditional values before Iraq's invasion?

4. To what extent did the liberation help to mitigate the negative effects and strengthen the positive attitudes of students?

The study contains five chapters (and one appendix), which are:

Chapter One

This chapter contains an introduction on the psychological and social effects of disasters, crises, and wars on the individual and society, and the development and persistence of these effects in the future. It also deals with the study's goals, problems, the need for it and its importance, and its limitations.

Chapter Two

This chapter presents studies and research pertaining to the study's subject. It indicates the types of psychological and social effects and their role in influencing university students, their values, and their existential problems during the tyrannical Iraqi invasion and the beginning of the liberation operation. It then presents the most salient, basic aspects pertaining to these effects, which are:

1. Psychological, social, and learning aspects of youths in general, and Kuwaiti youths in particular.
2. The psychological, social, and economic effects of crises, disasters, and wars, and their effect on the individual.
3. The attitudes and values of youths regarding basic problems in their lives during and after crises, catastrophes, and wars.
4. Traditional values and the extent to which they persist during crises, disasters, and wars, and the emergence of traditional or non-traditional values in these events.

This chapter presents a general commentary on the most important relevant studies and research.

Chapter Three

This chapter deals with the study's methodology and means. It indicates the method used in the investigation and the types and methods of statistical analysis used in it. The study's sample is composed of a random sample representing the original study population. The number of respondents in the study totals 58.

Of the original sample of 60, 58 (96.7 percent) responded. The computational average is 15.77 percent for the group of eight main aspects in the questionnaire. The standard deviation is 20.38 percent, the veracity coefficient is 0.9711, and the reliability coefficient is 0.9431, which is high.

Chapter Four

This chapter is devoted to a presentation, discussion, and analysis of the results. It presents the results in the following main areas:

1. The Iraqi invasion's effect on psychological, social and learning aspects of university students.
2. The effect of the operation to liberate Kuwait on psychological, social and learning aspects of university students.
3. Other aspects (predictions and controls [dawabit]) dealing with Iraq's invasion and the liberation operation and their effect on the security of the Arab Gulf countries and that of the Arab countries.

This chapter then discusses and analyzes the results of the study in the light of the data and the relevant literature. It includes the following headings:

1. Findings on the psychological, social, and learning aspects of Kuwait University students during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
2. Findings on the psychological, social, and learning aspects of Kuwait University students after the operation to liberate Kuwait.
3. Gender-linked variation in attitudes and values in the university population during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and after the operation to liberate Kuwait.
4. The personal and emotional balance [tawafuq] of university students after the liberation operation.

Chapter Five

[I.] The results obtained by the study are summarized in this chapter, and several conclusions are made in light of these results. The most salient results are the following:

- a. 89 percent agreed that the Iraqi invasion had a negative, direct, strong psychological effect on Kuwait University students, which is represented in eight areas, as follows: 1) a feeling of dissatisfaction with one's self at the beginning of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 2) a feeling of dissatisfaction with [one's] behavior at the start of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 3) a feeling of anxiety, psychological tension, and dissatisfaction regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 4) a feeling of a lack of adjustment and alienation in the host country [to which the student emigrated] as the result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 5) a feeling of being a social minority in the host country; 6) a feeling of anxiety produced by daydreams and fantasizing during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 7) a preference for being alone rather than with others in the host country; 8) acute problems in interpersonal relations due to extreme anxiety and nervousness stemming from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
- b. 86 percent agreed that the operation to liberate Kuwait had a positive, direct, strong psychological effect on Kuwait University students. This emerged in four

areas: 1) a feeling of self-satisfaction after the operation to liberate Kuwait; 2) a feeling of satisfaction with [one's] behavior after the operation to liberate Kuwait; 3) a feeling of contentment with daydreams and fantasizing during the operation to liberate Kuwait; 4) the nonoccurrence of any acute interpersonal problems between students and others due to the liberation operation.

c. 84.8 percent agreed that the Iraqi invasion had a negative, direct, strong psychological effect on Kuwait University students, which emerged in six areas: 1) the loss of several customs and values of Kuwaiti society at the start of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 2) the existence of a contradiction between words and deeds at the start of the invasion; 3) the Kuwaiti Government's resolutions stemmed from the citizens' desires for the liberation of Kuwait; 4) the press did not practice full freedom of expression before the invasion of Kuwait; 5) a sense of families breaking up in the face of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 6) the feeling of not being in tune with the host country's society due to the Iraqi invasion.

d. 83.5 percent agreed that the operation to liberate Kuwait had a positive, direct, strong social effect on Kuwait University students, as expressed in five areas: 1) a feeling of adherence to customs and values of society after the liberation operation; 2) the realization of the existence of harmony between words and deeds after the liberation operation; 3) greater social cohesion rather than conflict after the liberation operation; 4) the absence of a feeling of intense distress caused by insults on the part of others in the host country; 5) a preference to be with others rather than self-seclusion.

e. 79.8 percent agreed that the Iraqi invasion had a negative, direct, strong effect on learning by Kuwait University students. This was expressed in four areas: 1) a feeling of a lack of motivation and initiative at the start of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 2) a feeling of a weak ability to think at the start of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 3) the encountering of difficulties in studying during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; 4) the encountering of academic failure as the result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

f. 81.6 percent agreed that the operation to liberate Kuwait had a positive, direct, strong effect on the learning of Kuwait University students, as expressed in two areas: 1) a feeling of a serious need for academic achievement at the start of the operation to liberate Kuwait and after it; 2) an increase in the ability to cope with any academic problem following the liberation operation.

g. The Kuwait University students indicated that both Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the operation to liberate Kuwait had a direct, strong effect on the security of the Arab Gulf countries and on the security on the Arab countries in two ways: 1) 70.4 percent agreed that the Gulf countries are incapable of protecting their security without foreign intervention; 2) 78.5 percent agreed that the current Arab situation will not improve politically, economically, militarily, or in terms of solidarity.

II. A ranking of the psychological and social effects according to the intensity of their effect on students during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait:

The university students ranked the psychological and social effects of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on them, as follows: 18.45 percent gained weight; 19.64 lost weight; 19.91 percent became emaciated due to poor health; 20 percent experienced forgetfulness or negligence; 20.64 percent experienced fatigue and [mood] fluctuations; 20.82 percent experienced a feeling of imaginary happiness upon taking drugs; 21.27 percent felt psychological pain; 22.36 percent experienced tension; 22.64 percent experienced isolation; and 23.27 percent experienced depression.

III. A ranking of the psychological and social effects on students according to their intensity after the operation to liberate Kuwait:

The university students ranked the psychological and social effects after the operation to liberate Kuwait as follows: 20.54 percent experienced emaciation due to poor health; 19.82 percent experienced forgetfulness or negligence; 19.54 percent experienced weight loss; 19 percent experienced depression; 18.64 percent experienced exhaustion; 18.09 percent experienced weight gain; 16.18 percent felt psychological pain; 15.09 percent experienced imaginary happiness upon taking drugs; 14.18 percent experienced isolation; 14.09 percent experienced tension; and 14 percent experienced [mood] fluctuations. The study concludes by summarizing its most important results and by answering the questions that it poses. The most salient results are represented in the affirmation by 84.5 percent of the respondents that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had a major, direct, negative effect on psychological, social, and learning aspects of Kuwait University students, while 83.7 percent agreed that the operation to liberate Kuwait had a positive, direct effect in reducing the negative effects of the invasion. In addition, the conclusion states that there is variation regarding the attitudes of the Kuwait University students and their values as the result of the Iraqi invasion and the operation to liberate Kuwait according to gender, economic situation, and achievement level. Examples of variation include the loss of some customs (such as dependency) and adherence to new values (such as harmony between words and deeds). The study expresses the hope that the ordeal experienced by the Kuwaiti people will result in the birth of a national, scientific, social, and economic consciousness.

Professor Considers Postwar Foreign Relations

91AE0391C London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9 May 91 p 13

[Article by Dr. Badriyah al-'Awdi, former dean of the Kuwait University Law School]

[Text] A review of the results of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait permits us to derive several lessons and precepts,

in light of which we can review Kuwait's domestic, Arab, and international positions and relations.

On the international level, the Gulf war underscored the importance of international solidarity in liberating Kuwait and of the use of military force to strengthen the rule of international law to repel aggression against small countries by any country that does not respect the principles of the UN Charter, especially paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, which requires UN member countries to refrain from threatening the use of force or using force against the security of territories, or against the political independence of any country, or in any other way incompatible with the goals of the United Nations.

If many relevant legal experts have deemed the precepts of international law to be ineffective in restoring international security and stability in international society, due to gross violations of the principles of international law since the United Nations was established in 1945, these views and other claims are no longer valid, after more than 30 countries joined to liberate Kuwait based on Security Council resolutions and the forceful application of these resolutions to an aggressor state in a way that restores confidence in and respect for the principles of international law among civilized countries.

Another lesson of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the need to review paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the United Nations from intervening in the domestic affairs of a country to protect human rights, despite the tragedies to which the people in that country are subjected, because respect for human rights is considered an internal affair of that country. This passive position has led dictatorial regimes to continue violating the rights of their peoples and to deny them the most basic human rights, such as the right to live in peace and security within their country, the right to express dissatisfaction over the management of domestic affairs in their country, and [the right to make] efforts to prevent the violation of their basic rights. Accordingly, it can now be said that international intervention under UN supervision to protect human rights has become an international quest to protect people everywhere. The establishment of protected areas in Iraq is an international precedent of the utmost importance in international relations in an age of international regulation. It is also a pioneering step for the sake of respect for human rights in many Third World countries, with a view toward curbing the misuse of power in those countries.

On the Arab level, the lessons and precepts to be derived from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait include the need to review the regulation of relations among the Arab countries by following a rational approach and refraining from an emotional approach and personal relationships, because the Iraqi invasion proved that the controlled Arab media serves only the purposes and interests of the ruling regimes and could not be further from the Arab people's aspirations and hopes. The Arab governments were able to create hidden enmity among their peoples

for other Arab peoples based on a purely materialistic view, thus sowing the seeds of hatred and envy among Arab peoples, based solely on an economic disparity that has placed some Arab countries in a better economic position than others. More calamitous than that, we find that the political theories used as a basis for structuring Arab relations were inadequate, because they are empty theories synthesized by the ruling regimes themselves and established without the Arab people's participation, or at least the elicitation of their opinion. As for collective Arab security, the lessons that we derive from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait emphasize that official efforts by Arab states during the past 30 years have been inadequate in protecting the Arab countries, not only from foreign forces, but also from each other. The Arab countries do not believe in the theory of collective Arab security, as indicated by Iraq's military build-up outside of the framework of the Arab League or the Arab Cooperation Council, and despite the existence of Arab organizations, councils, and committees for arming and joint defense.

Accordingly, the lessons and the precepts to be derived from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait include the need to reexamine the notion of collective Arab security and efforts by each Arab state to independently guarantee its own security and stability. There is no objection to restoring a type of Arab military cooperation to defend the Arab states in a collective manner, if circumstances warrant that. However, reliance on a theory of collective security and a joint defense pact has become a delusion for which the ordinary person ultimately pays. What happened to the Kuwaiti people is a bitter lesson not to be repeated with respect to the peoples of other Arab countries.

On the domestic level, the lessons and precepts derived from Iraq's invasion are many. The most important include the need to review Kuwaitis' lifestyle and respect for the rule of law, the renunciation of personal disagreements, the giving of precedence to general interests over individual interests, and the need to respect the human rights of others who live with us in the state to avoid what happened during the occupation.

Iraq's invasion and occupation have perhaps transformed us into another people, a people that is better than what it was before. The important thing is that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait highlighted the fact that, had it not been for the bonds of solidarity and true brotherhood between the peoples of the Arab Gulf countries, and their cohesion and mutual assistance during the trial or great calamity visited upon the Kuwaiti people, the Kuwaiti people would have suffered greatly. Consequently, we must benefit from this true bond by formulating joint plans and projects and rejecting negative factors that impede this human, social, economic, and political integration.

Citizens Returning From Iran

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AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9 May 91 p 2

[Text] Teheran—The reader can almost hear the words as they roll spontaneously and excitedly off the tongues of Kuwaitis residing in Iran: "Happiness is inadequate for us [to describe our feelings] as we near the time of our return. We are all waiting impatiently for that happy day to arrive."

With the approach of the date for the return to Kuwait, beginning on 15 May, Kuwaitis residing here are dominated by the feeling that time is passing unusually slowly. Everyone wants the historical moment to come now, not tomorrow, this hour, not the next. They want "to shut their eyes and open them to find themselves back in the precious homeland, among its dear inhabitants."

The charge d'affaires at the Kuwaiti Embassy in Teheran, 'Adil Hamd al-'Ayyar, describes the return as the embassy's main problem, especially since liberation, "because everyone is longing to return in a hurry, they want to return as soon as possible," he states.

A young Kuwaiti man, Badr 'Abd-al-'Azim, 17, became tearful as he painfully explained: "Since the liberation, I have been possessed by the idea of returning. I had hoped to be among the first to return. However, I did not realize my hope, because my father is working voluntarily at the embassy."

Badr did not realize his hopes, because the volunteers on the committees decided that, given the desire of all Kuwaitis in Iran (about 11,000 at present) to return quickly, the volunteers would be the last to return, to give others an opportunity to return earlier.

The Kuwaiti Embassy in Teheran has completed measures and arrangements to facilitate and ensure the return at its scheduled time. During the past two days, Ambassador Fawzi al-Jasim and a number of embassy staff members visited the city of Shiraz in southwestern Iran, near the Iranian coast facing the Kuwaiti coast, because more than half of the Kuwaitis residing in Iran are concentrated in Shiraz or nearby areas, to examine final arrangements for the return with citizens and members of the committees there.

Last Monday, the final stage of the return began. It involved the registration and checking of the names of those traveling on daily flights being organized by Kuwaiti Airlines from Shiraz to Kuwait.

The embassy, in cooperation with Kuwaiti Airlines, established a system to transport the returnees based on the order in which they registered. Thus, priority is being given to persons who were first in line to have their names verified and registered on the lists of travellers. This system was established in meetings held by the committee pertaining to the return of citizens, which includes the charge d'affaires, the consul, the security

committee chairman, and an official from Kuwaiti Airlines. Each citizen will be given an airplane ticket and be allowed to travel with up to 35 kg of baggage. Excess baggage will be transported on cargo flights organized by Kuwaiti Airlines, the cost of which is to be born by citizens who ship baggage on these flights. Also, there will be vehicle ferry trips for car owners to the United Arab Emirates, from where citizens with cars will continue to Kuwait by car.

Among the special arrangements provided by the Kuwaiti Government to facilitate the return of citizens residing in Iran is the issuance of a resolution to exempt these citizens from having to fill out personal identification cards, a process that entails a waiting period while the cards are dispatched to Kuwait and input into the computer. This exemption was allowed due to the difficulty of communications from Iran and the approach of the return date. Accordingly, Kuwaitis residing in Iran will return using their passports.

'Adil al-'Ayyar, who heads the committee pertaining to the return process, states that "citizens must only bring a passport and register their names on the list of travellers, and they must also comply with Iranian laws, especially regarding goods prohibited from being taken out of the country in large quantities, such as rugs, silk, gold, and other items."

Regarding return flights, al-Ayyar states:

"The Kuwaiti flights will originate initially from Teheran and subsequently from Shiraz. Each plane can carry 131 passengers and will make one trip daily. This number was determined based on the capacity of the Kuwait Airport, which was greatly damaged during the Iraqi occupation, and is not due to Kuwaiti Airlines' inability to provide additional flights or aircraft." He indicated that, "after the names of persons returning by air are registered, the lists of names will be sent to Kuwaiti Airlines, which will issue travel tickets. The tickets will be delivered to citizens with instructions regarding the return process." He stated that "the embassy and the financial committee have notified citizens in advance of everything concerning this process."

Regarding difficulties and problems that have faced the embassy and citizens recently, al-'Ayyar stated: "One cannot speak of major problems. However, initially, when the number of citizens residing in Iran due to the occupation and its circumstances reached 34,000, the main problems concerned the maintenance of direct contact with all of these citizens, given Iran's large size and the distribution of the citizens in different areas and cities in Iran. In addition, domestic and foreign radio and wire communications are not rapid. Initially, we also faced the problem of reunifying families whose members had become spread out in the different countries."

Al-'Ayyar stated that "all of the problems were surmounted due to the close cooperation between the embassy and citizens, and the many young people who volunteered to run the committees and work in them."

These committees include three sustenance committees, in Teheran, Qom, and Shiraz, a financial committee that supervises these committees, a security committee, and an information committee that issues information bulletins to citizens. We were also able to surmount the customs problem arising from vehicles accompanied by their owners, in cooperation with the competent Iranian authorities."

The chairman of the committee pertaining to the return process enthusiastically praised the Kuwaiti young people who worked with enthusiasm and self-sacrifice to serve citizens and the homeland. He stated that "the embassy and the headquarters of the committees were transformed into busy activity cells working 24 hours a day nonstop. Moreover, some young men among the volunteers and the diplomats slept at the embassy and the headquarters of the committees, so that they could continue to perform their duties and provide services to citizens."

Having examined administrative problems and aspects pertaining to the return, we turned to recording the impressions and feelings of returnees, who have experienced hours of waiting and preparation to again set foot on the territory of the homeland.

Any Kuwaiti here will tell you that he has been completely prepared to return since the day of the liberation, and that he is waiting on tenterhooks to return.

Badr 'Abd-al-'Azim recalls the day he left Kuwait to head with his family to Iran through Iraq in early October. He states that he will never forget the image that became etched in his mind when his family's car crossed the al-'Abdli point to Safwan. Badr adds: "I turned around to look back at Kuwait. I felt distressed, because I was leaving my homeland. This feeling continued to pervade me until the day of liberation. When I heard the news, I was seized by an overwhelming feeling of happiness, and the flag of Kuwait was raised high."

Badr is looking forward to returning. He says that he will "kiss the ground of Kuwait" as soon as he gets off the plane. Finally, Badr said: "God willing, we will return in peace, and Kuwait's honor will be everlasting."

Shima' Muhammad Dashti, 13, recalls that she was sad and cried on the day she left Kuwait: "I wanted to stay in Kuwait." She says that she felt fear when she entered Iraq: "I was afraid that they would seize me." She felt secure only when she arrived in Iran, "although I continued to feel distress, because Kuwait had become much more distant," states Shima', who emphasized that she has been following news of Kuwait by the minute and carries a radio at all times to hear the news. When the news of the liberation was announced, "I was very happy, because my homeland had been liberated and Saddam had left it. I was so happy I began to cry. I cannot express my feelings of happiness now, because they have overcome me."

Shima' is sorry that the return has been put off to this extent. "I have always yearned for Kuwait. I long to return today, not tomorrow." Shima' states that when she gets off the plane "I will kiss the ground of Kuwait and will go directly to visit my family, going around in the streets and visiting all of the places that I know."

Shima' hopes that "Kuwait will change quickly and return to its prior, and to even a better, state." She says that she has learned from difficult past experience that repression, however long it prevails, will not last, and that good and justice prevail in the end.

Najla' Muhammad Husayn, 16, in her second year of secondary school, has lost a year of school because of the occupation. However, she is not concerned about the loss after the liberation of Kuwait, because her return to Kuwait is drawing near.

Najla' expresses her feelings in beautiful language: "I have always felt yearning for my homeland, and sometimes fears of losing Kuwait came over me."

Najla' adds: "Abroad, I felt greater longing for Kuwait." She says that she did not believe the news of the liberation initially. However, when the news was confirmed, "I felt overflowing happiness. My emotions were in a tumult. I did not know what to do. I could only think of returning."

What will Najla' do when she reaches Kuwait? She says: "I do not know now how I will behave. I think that I will kiss the ground and say a prayer of thanks. When I head home by car, I will go around all of Kuwait. I think that I will greet the entire people of Kuwait, even those whom I do not know."

Dr. Khalil Rayyis Kamal, 24, and his wife, Diya' Jasim Karam, 29, had returned to the homeland a week before the invasion and the occupation, after finishing their graduate studies in Britain, where he obtained a doctorate in fire-proofing engineering and she a master's degree in education. However, the occupation prevented them from enjoying their return to Kuwait after a long absence. Nonetheless, they and their three children attempted to defy the occupation authority. They remained in the country for more than two months after the occupation began. During that time, Dr. Khalil worked with the Kuwaiti resistance until he was forced to leave Kuwait after the occupation authorities harassed him, causing him to fear that his activities would be uncovered and to become anxious for the female members of his family. He was thus compelled to decide to leave with the rest of his family using forged documents.

Diya' states that she "did not want to leave Kuwait," and that she "had hoped to personally witness the glorious liberation." Despite the imminence of the return, she feels that the date is distant. "I want to return quickly." She adds that she has been prepared to return since the liberation: "I have no desire to go to the market, nor am I thinking about purchasing anything to bring back to Kuwait. I want only to return to Kuwait."

Dr. Khalil speaks excitedly of the day of liberation: "At first, I did not believe the news. Because of my overflowing happiness, I shouted at the top of my lungs. On that day, I asked myself: If the liberation had not occurred, and if Kuwait had not been returned to us, God forbid, how would we have lived and worked? It is frightening to think of living outside Kuwait or in a country ruled by Saddam Husayn."

Dr. Khalil speaks about what he considers his life's work, which he studied many years, i.e., the subject of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Wales in Britain last year, which is "The Benefit of Establishing an Academic Institute for Fire Extinguishment Technology and Sciences, Security, and Safety Research for the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries." He states that all of his dreams are connected to the establishment of this project, which is important for the region. He hopes to realize his dream after returning, and he hopes "that officials in Kuwait and the other Gulf Cooperation Councils countries will realize the importance of this vital project and its benefit to the countries of the region in light of current circumstances."

Dr. Khalil, who works as a volunteer in the Kuwaiti Embassy in Teheran in the area of security and the affairs of Kuwaitis released from Iraqi prisons who have reached Iran, hopes for a quick return to his homeland: "I hope to close my eyes and open them to find myself on the divan, feeling the moisture, the sweat, and the home soil, hearing the clamor, the cry of father together with people and the voice of mother."

Khalil and Diya' are now prepared to bear the hardships of the reconstruction of Kuwait: "I am prepared to concede many of my personal rights for the sake of speeding the reconstruction of the country. I feel that I must work more and better to help restore Kuwait to what it was in the past, and moreover to make it better. Diya' says that everything "becomes easy in the service of the homeland."

LEBANON

Personalities on National, Palestinian Issues

91A50123A Nicosia AL-HADAF in Arabic
5 May 91 pp 20-23

[Interview With Lebanese Minister Muhsin Dallul, Popular Nasirist Organization Chairman Mustafa Sa'd, Anonymous Hizballah Leader, and With PFLP Political Bureau Member Abu-Jabir by Muhammad al-Misri; place and date not given: "AL-HADAF Interviews Official and Political Notables in Lebanon; Opinions Are Unanimous on Need to Establish Government Authority and Preserve National Weapon"]

[Text] Disarming militias; armed Palestinian presence; organizing Palestinian-Lebanese relations to ensure Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the legitimate Palestinian political, social, and security rights;

and keeping Palestinian rifles raised in the face of the Zionist occupation are the concerns and problems that have recently been the subject of direct or indirect dialogue and discussion between parties from the Lebanese Government, the PLO leadership, Palestinian factions, and the Lebanese political forces with their varied tendencies and inclinations.

Out of its eagerness to find out the truth and to learn the true positions of the influential political parties and forces, AL-HADAF hastened to interview a number of Palestinian and Lebanese political notables and forces, led by Cabinet Minister Muhsin Dallul who, despite his numerous concerns, has kindly answered our questions, and brother Engineer Abu-Ma'ruf (Mustafa Sa'd), chairman of the Popular Nasirist Organization. The response of our brothers in Hizballah has also been positive and fruitful.

We started with the following question:

[Misri] As you are aware, the Palestinian issue as a central Arab issue is the subject of consensus. In light of this, how do you see the possibilities of concluding an agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese Government, especially since the PLO has expressed its readiness for a sincere and true dialogue with the Lebanese Government?

[Dallul] It is our utter and definite conviction that the Palestinian issue is the central Arab issue. There is no need for clarification and detail.

Regarding dialogue, we can assert that we in the Lebanese Government are fully prepared to embark on a serious and true dialogue with our Palestinian brothers in the PLO and with the other Palestinian factions in order to develop a formula that ensures that the State of Lebanon spreads its authority over all of Lebanon's soil. This dialogue will begin at the right time and as soon as possible.

Moreover, we on our part have no predetermined position on dialogue with our Palestinian brothers.

Engineer Mustafa Sa'd answered with greater detail, saying:

[Sa'd] For any serious and responsible discussion to be ultimately fruitful, it must take the form of a direct dialogue, especially on an issue as delicate and sensitive as the nature of the dossier of official Lebanese-Palestinian relations. There is no doubt that the dialogue by proxy undertaken by comrade Muhsin Ibrahim, secretary general of the Communist Action Organization, who acted as a mediator between the legitimate Lebanese Government and the PLO, has constituted the objective foundation, created the proper climate, and dispersed the fears that have engulfed the dossier of official Lebanese-Palestinian relations and kept it inaccessible to a serious approach for fear that it would explode.

If comrade Muhsin Ibrahim's consultations have dealt with the main issues in this dossier that need to be

discussed, it has become necessary now to launch a direct dialogue between the legitimate Lebanese and Palestinian authorities in order to discuss these issues in detail and to develop controls that regulate future Lebanese-Palestinian relations in a manner that takes into account the Palestinian people's civil, social, and political rights and the special character of the Palestinian struggle, considering that it is the legitimate struggle of a people who have been scattered to all four corners of the world and who are using their right to employ all the means permitted by international laws and traditions to regain their usurped right.

A dialogue at this level has now become required to develop a formula that serves Lebanese-Palestinian relations at official and popular levels, especially since the communique issued by the Palestinian Central Council which convened in Tunis recently deals with utter positivism with the decisions made by the Council of Ministers, thus making it necessary for the Lebanese Government to move promptly to meet this positivism with similar positivism in order to demonstrate and reaffirm its goodwill. Such positivism is embodied in a prompt request for a central dialogue between Lebanon and Palestine.

The Hizballah leader to whom we addressed the same question said:

[Hizballah] The Palestinian issue is the issue of the Muslims generally. Palestine's soil is sacred soil by Shari'ah criteria. Not a single grain of this soil may be squandered because it belongs to nobody other than the sons of Palestine, as long as they preserve its sanctity. On this basis, we view the Palestinian people in Lebanon as the symbol of the issue. Any discussion concerning the presence of this people must take into account this symbol and must ultimately preserve and strengthen the cause. This is why we see no possibility of dealing with any Lebanese problem unless the path of peace and understanding is followed. Any other approach will not serve the interest of the Lebanese or the Palestinians.

We must consider the existing situation objectively and employ all the capabilities—Palestinian, Lebanese, and others—to liberate South Lebanon and to strengthen the Palestinian people's intifadah [uprising] and cause which is the cause of the Muslims and of the world's free men.

[Misri] As you are aware, the Palestinian national struggle in Lebanon is part of the struggle of all the Palestinian people who are fighting for a just cause that requires political, propaganda, and military action simultaneously. Within these bounds, what is your view of reorganizing the Palestinian presence in Lebanon in such a way as not to be in conflict with the Palestinian people's legitimate rights?

[Dallul] Having completed establishing its legitimate authority, the Lebanese Government is prepared to secure full support for our Palestinian brothers so that they can establish their just rights. The Palestinians are entitled to engage in political, propaganda, and social

action in Lebanon. As for military action, everybody knows that the PLO has dropped the slogan of armed struggle and retained the slogan of political and diplomatic action. This is the PLO's business and we have nothing to do with this decision.

Moreover, to be fair, Lebanon's capabilities at all levels do not permit it to shoulder alone the burdens of the Palestinian issue. Lebanon alone is incapable of shouldering this heavy burden. All the Arab countries must contribute to shouldering this burden for Arab and national Lebanese and Palestinian reasons.

It is absolutely not nationalistic or fair for Lebanon to strain under the weight of this major central Arab issue. Else, the consequences will be devastating to both Lebanon and the Palestinian cause.

[Sa'd] It is normal for a responsible dialogue between official PLO and Lebanese delegations to lead by necessity to binding resolutions in the form of formulae that will necessarily regulate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon in a manner that ensures full Palestinian rights, such as the right to work and to political and propaganda expression, in addition to social rights at all levels, excluding the right of citizenship. In return, the PLO and all its factions should adhere to and take into account the new political developments in the Lebanese arena, especially within the context of implementation of the al-Ta'if accord and of the official endeavors to implement Resolution 425 which concerns the occupied Lebanese territories. In fact, if we backtrack to the resolutions of the Palestinian Central Council which convened in Tunis, we find that they give the impression of profound Palestinian positivism toward and understanding of all these developments and of the nature of the political climate prevailing in Lebanon. This climate reflects, to some degree, the international and regional climate and the desire to move in the direction of crystallizing internal Lebanese peace and concord.

At the military level, until the implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 and its appendices calling for the Zionist enemy to withdraw to the border of the occupied Palestine, the resistance, with all its Lebanese and Palestinian organizations, will continue to exist as an increasingly legitimate and rightful actor until Israel withdraws from the last inch of the occupied Lebanese territories.

[Hizballah] The Palestinian presence in Lebanon is the presence of brothers among kinsmen. The Palestinian people are entitled, exactly the same as every Lebanese, to acquire all the requisites of an honorable life, but within bounds that do not undermine their cause. This is why we support giving the Palestinian people all their civil, political, and propaganda rights, except those rights which constitute an end to their cause, considering that preserving the Palestinian identity is tantamount to preserving the symbol of a people who have been driven away from their land unjustly and aggressively. It is within this perspective that we view the citizenship issue.

The Palestinian may not be naturalized in any Arab country. Rather, he must be careful to retain his Palestinian identity. As for the other rights, we support them to the extent that they serve the cause and bring support for the Palestinian people's struggle to accomplish their rights and objectives in Palestine.

[Misri] There is talk about collecting weapons from all the armed political forces in Lebanon without consideration for the mission of these weapons, meaning the weapons of the Lebanese, Islamic, and Palestinian national resistance movements. How do you view this issue, keeping in mind that a part of Lebanon's territories is under Zionist occupation now?

[Dallul] As you know, the United Nations has adopted Resolution 425 which calls for Israel's unconditional withdrawal from the Lebanese territories.

Thus, it is our right and our duty to work with all the methods and means, including our right to resistance, to implement this resolution.

Therefore, we find that resistance against the occupying enemy will continue to be legitimate until Resolution 425 is implemented and Israel withdraws from all the Lebanese territories. Here, I recall a statement made by his excellency the president of the republic to the effect that we will all become resistance members if Resolution 425 is not implemented.

[Hizballah] We have already declared frankly and explicitly that weapons which played no role other than to ignite domestic sedition and commit security violations may not be confused with resistance weapons that has performed its role and duty in confronting the Zionist invaders and contributed to foiling their schemes and defeating their occupation of a large part of Lebanon. A distinction must be made between these two kinds of weapons. As long as there is Zionist occupation in Lebanon or in any Arab territory, it is the duty of all to unite, cooperate, and coordinate our efforts in order to fight the occupier. We support the resistance weapons of any faction until the full liberation of the land, provided that these weapons perform their noble role and duty and that they do not slide into the labyrinths and swamps of domestic sedition and political manipulation in which these weapons are used for oppressive schemes that do not serve the cause of resistance to the occupation.

The Palestinian weapons of resistance and the Lebanese weapons of resistance, in cooperation with other forces, especially with the countries opposed to the schemes intended to liquidate the Palestinian issue, led by Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran, must unite their collective efforts and must coordinate within a program that leads to supporting the Palestinian people's cause and their blessed intifadah and to liberating all of Lebanon's soil.

[Sa'd] It is my opinion that the weapons used in internal fighting must be totally separated from the weapons

which were used as a fundamental instrument in the process of liberating a large part of the Lebanese territories that were under Israeli occupation. Closing the books on the domestic civil war in accordance with the al-Ta'if settlement on which all the parties have agreed dictates by necessity withdrawing the weapons that were used for internecine fighting. Meanwhile, the dictates requiring continued clinging to the weapons that resist the occupation are still extant by virtue of the continued Israeli occupation which sits atop a part of the south that is not insignificant. It is unreasonable, for example, that we in the Popular Liberation Army-Martyr Ma'ruf Sa'd Forces should hand over our weapons with which we defend Sidon, its people, and its refugee camps on the Kafr Falus front at a time when the Zionist enemy and its agents are still present in Jazzin and the border strip and when the enemy continues to threaten our Lebanese and Palestinian peoples' security with its attacks, shelling, and raids.

The objective justifications for our clinging to our resistance weapons continue to exist. When these justifications, i.e., the direct Israeli occupation or the Israeli occupation by proxy, are eliminated, then everything has its time and place.

Abu-Jabir: We Are Prepared To Enter into Negotiations With Our Brothers in the Lebanese Government

If there are those who believe that the Palestinians in Lebanon are trying to impede the legitimate Lebanese Government's effort to establish its authority over all of Lebanon's territories, we hasten to reiterate what the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly declared about its welcoming Lebanon's restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But simultaneously, the Palestinians stress the need to regulate the relationship with the Lebanese Government in a manner that guarantees their political and social freedom and their security and ensures that they perform their role as struggler against the Zionist enemy. This is what brother Abu-Jabir, the PFLP Political Bureau Member and Lebanon branch official, stressed when he answered the following questions:

[Misri] Comrade Abu-Jabir, there is extensive talk nowadays in the Lebanese arena about contacts and meetings held by the PLO with some Lebanese circles and government officials. Are there contacts in which comrade Muhsin Ibrahim is playing the role of the mediator between the PLO and the Lebanese Government?

[Abu-Jabir] To begin with, I wish to emphasize that the al-Ta'if accord which was concluded by the Lebanese parties has lessened our apprehensions about the security of our Palestinian people who live in the Lebanese arena, especially since we are aware that this accord is embraced by Lebanese and Arab parties that support the struggle waged by our Palestinian people.

We can say that this accord, if it is destined to be implemented, will contribute to embodying Lebanon's

Arabism and its territorial integrity and to enabling Lebanon to perform its pan-Arab duty in supporting the Palestinian cause.

This dictates a serious and fraternal dialogue be launched between the PLO and the Lebanese Government. On our part as the PLO, we have declared in the communique issued by the recent session of the Central Council meetings that we are totally prepared to embark on negotiations with the Lebanese Government to reach an accord that ensures that the Lebanese Government establishes its authority and that guarantees our legitimate rights to defend our people and their national cause. We believe that the dialogue is imminent. It is essential for both sides, provided that neither side undermines the legitimacy of the other. We in the PLO believe that we have offered a goodwill initiative. We are now extending our hand to our brothers in the Lebanese Government so that we can chart together a new phase in the official relations between us.

Based on the results we have achieved on the one hand and on the commendable efforts that comrade Muhsin Ibrahim has made within this context, we can say that we are moving in the right direction. We hope that the ongoing contacts will result in initiating negotiations that lead to an agreement between us.

[Misri] Within the context of the talk about concluding any accord with the Lebanese Government, direct mention is made of reorganizing the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. What are the bounds which can be discussed in this regard?

[Abu-Jabir] We are prepared to hold dialogue with the Lebanese Government in order to agree on the bases of organizing the Palestinian presence in Lebanon so that it (new arrangement) would not obstruct our Palestinian people in Lebanon from assuming their role and performing their tasks within the Palestinian struggle process as a whole or would not be in conflict with our Palestinian people's legitimate right to defend their national cause. Under such an arrangement, honesty and serious cooperation will be the symbol of our relationship with the legitimate Lebanese Government. We will be fully eager not to let our presence constitute an obstacle impeding the government's establishment of its legitimate authority over all of Lebanon's territories.

This is our position. Our understanding of the Palestinian presence is that it should not undermine the Lebanese Government's legitimacy and that the Lebanese Government's legitimacy should not contradict the legitimacy and justness of our cause. Within this context, we want to clarify and make a distinction between our armed presence and the presence of the militias.

[Misri] Comrade Abu-Jabir, this will be the subject of discussion in our third question which deals with the Palestinian weapons.

[Abu-Jabir] We see that all issues are inter-connected, meaning that the dialogue with the Lebanese Government will be comprehensive and deep and will deal with the Palestinians' civil rights and with our right to propaganda, political, and military activity. The Palestinian armed presence poses no obstacle to establishing the government's legitimate authority or to stable conditions in Lebanon.

[Misri] There is talk now about disarming all the armed political forces in Lebanon without consideration for the task of these weapons, meaning the weapons of the Lebanese, Islamic, and Palestinian national resistance movement. How do you view this, keeping in mind that a part of Lebanon's soil is still under Zionist occupation?

[Abu-Jabir] We want the talks, which will be held by the Palestinian delegation upon its arrival in Lebanon, to include Palestinian weapons because we believe that as long as we have not attained our legitimate national rights, we must retain our weapons. We have a cause. Without a just solution to our issue, we will continue to cling to our weapons and continue to be prepared to defend our people and their legitimate rights.

Our weapons were present before the start of the civil war and they will stay to fight the Zionist enemy. As long as our land continues to be occupied, this is a right legislated by the United Nations itself.

The weapons of the Lebanese national resistance, Islamic resistance, and Palestinian resistance are present in the south to defend the Lebanese and Palestinian people and to liberate the border strip from the Zionist enemy and from Antoine Lahd's gangs. It is essential to make a distinction between the militias' weapons and the weapons of the resistance which has reaffirmed its legitimacy throughout the years and which forced the Zionist enemy to withdraw from a large part of the Lebanese territories without any shackle or condition. If the south is disarmed, can our Lebanese and Palestinian masses live securely in the face of the attacks of the Zionists and their lackeys?

We believe that the armed struggle, which we consider fundamental in our struggle against the enemy, gains its legitimacy from Israel's failure to implement the resolutions of international legitimacy.

For example, UN Resolution 425 on Israel's unconditional withdrawal from South Lebanon has not been implemented.

Israel's failure to withdraw and to implement Resolution 425 gives us, as Lebanese and Palestinian national forces, the right to continue to carry arms and to fight the enemy. Moreover, Israel's failure to agree to implement the UN resolutions on the Palestinian issue gives us the full right to continue to carry arms until our national rights to repatriation, self-determination, and establishment of the independent Palestinian state are attained.

Not only this. The Zionist entity's determination not to implement the internationally legitimate resolutions connected with acknowledging the Palestinian national rights, embodied in the right to repatriation, to self-determination, and to establishing the Palestinian state, dictates that the Palestinians, and all the Lebanese national and progressive forces along with them, continue the armed struggle as an important part of the process of the struggle to strengthen the intifadah and force the enemy to succumb. This determination also dictates that all the Arab national and progressive forces aid this just struggle of the Palestinian and the Lebanese to liberate their occupied lands. It further dictates that all the peace- and justice-loving forces that cling firmly to international legitimacy support this struggle until Tel Aviv submits to the will of the international community.

MOROCCO

Report Claims King To Form 'Unity Government'

91P40291A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
10 May 91 p 10

[Text] King Hassan II is moving toward forming a national unity government in which most opposition parties will participate. This comes after studying these parties' requests within the framework of consolidating the domestic front and preparing for the referendum to decide the fate of the Western Sahara.

It is expected that the upcoming government will be more comprehensive and representative of political and party activities, and will include a national plan to confront the dangers of the near future.

Report Examines Officials' Views on Saharan Referendum

91AA0369A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
5 May 91 p 14

[Article by Talhah Jibril]

[Text] A Spanish journalist has written a commentary in the newspaper ABC on a report by UN Secretary General De Cuellar concerning the Sahara, which the Security Council adopted last Tuesday, proposing opening the borders between Tinduf, Algeria, where the Polisario camps are located, and the Saharan regions. In which case, according to the journalist, the referendum would then be held without the need for the United Nations to spend \$200 million, the cost of organizing the referendum. Explaining his idea, the Spanish journalist says that if the camp residents return to the Saharan regions, it would mean that the Saharan people prefer to remain within Morocco's framework. They would thus be expressing their desire spontaneously. It is noteworthy that Spain officially announced that it will contribute \$24 million to organize the referendum. The Spanish

journalist seems not to relish the idea of his country paying this amount of money for a problem that can be solved differently.

Commenting on the Spanish journalist's proposal, a Moroccan official described it as plausible and consistent with reality "because the Moroccans believe that Polisario is forcibly withholding the camp residents".

When I asked the official why there was no Moroccan reaction to Resolution 690 on holding a referendum, which the Security Council adopted unanimously, he said that in March last year Morocco expressed reservations about certain proposals by De Cuellar. He suggested that the final report took his country's viewpoint into consideration.

The Moroccan official says that Morocco had then objected to two critical points: The first concerns the proposed reduction of the Moroccan forces, and the second concerns the timetable for holding the referendum.

The Moroccan official points out that all the details have been discussed during the meeting held between Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Abdelatif Filali and UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in New York last month.

Although the Moroccan official's explanation does not necessarily represent Morocco's official attitude toward Resolution 690 on the Sahara, information available so far indicate that Morocco will deal with the Security Council resolution, which has become mandatory.

It is noted that Moroccan reaction so far was limited to a request by the opposition to convene a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Representative, and for Foreign Minister Filali to submit official explanations on the subject.

Also, some of the opposition papers criticized the idea of a referendum on the grounds that the matter has been decided and that Morocco will not surrender the Sahara.

This dispute, which has been debated at the African summits, the OAU, and the United Nations, has certainly entered an important stage of political resolution. After a long-drawn struggle Morocco resolved the matter militarily after the Moroccan forces erected defense barriers to repel Polisario attacks.

One of the facts of the Sahara dispute is that while Morocco sought to consolidate its positions on the ground, its diplomatic efforts, particularly on the African level, suffered several setbacks.

There are some who believe that the Moroccans did not well exploit the early tendencies of the Polisario, before the front reversed its political concept of things. Mustafa al-Wali, a prominent founder of the front, spoke clearly about his views of the situation, saying: "It can be said that, since ancient times and until recently, the area was a Moroccan region like the rest of the Moroccan regions,

and since the tribal system is dominant in North Africa generally and in Morocco particularly, this system has moved to the Sahara through its inhabitants who came from the north."

After the Moroccans consolidated the security situation in the Sahara and when it was supposed to be the time to look toward the outside world in order to fight the diplomatic battle, Morocco got involved in complex Arab problems, such as the Arab summits. It is no secret that the convening of these summits enhanced Morocco's political and diplomatic standing, but the Sahara diplomatic problem was certainly not tackled inside the Arab League.

Logically, Morocco had to offer to the OAU what some Moroccans consider to be concessions so that it would accept holding a referendum in the Sahara.

There is no doubt that Morocco is coming under pressure from some of its friends in order to accept the principle of self-determination as a way out of the impasse matters have reached in the OAU.

But later Morocco withdrew from the OAU after it recognized the so-called Saharan Republic because, in Morocco's view, the organization has preempted the referendum and accepted a "state" the fate of whose population has not yet been determined. Therefore, the Moroccans preferred to deal with the United Nations in order to hold the referendum and frankly announced that they no longer care for the OAU resolutions. A noteworthy fact in an objective and honest analysis of the situation is that the Moroccans are fully convinced that the referendum results will be positive and will confirm the "Moroccan nature" of the Sahara.

The inhabitants of the region—excluding residents of the refugee camps in Tinduf—often have, in nonpartisan circumstances, expressed their affiliation with Morocco.

But because self-conviction is not to be relied upon when a problem has foreign dimensions, Morocco seems to be anxious to resolve this situation internationally, since the existence of a Saharan republic as a full member of the OAU and the increasing recognition of it outside Africa as well, are two matters causing anxiety to the Moroccans.

"Extracting an imaginary republic from Morocco's chest bone is a noncreative African madness," as one African said. Nevertheless, the Africans went along with this madness.

The OAU role has now receded, although De Cuellar refers to it in his report. The matter now is in the hands of the Security Council in circumstances where international changes and developments have significantly enhanced the effectiveness of its resolutions.

Following the issuing of the Security Council resolution last Tuesday, I asked a Moroccan politician about his expectations regarding the referendum, he said: I believe that the Saharans who are at present in the Saharan

regions and towns will vote for a Moroccan Sahara. But the situation could be different for those who now live in Polisario camps in Tinduf.

But a Moroccan writer and thinker believes that those in Tinduf will definitely vote for a Moroccan Sahara in view of the deplorable living conditions they are in.

In any case, the area will finally be breathing again after four months which the Security Council has fixed for holding the referendum.

Spanish Accord Set for June Despite Land, Visa Issues

91AA0396B Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 13 May 91 p 1

[Article: "Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla Problems; Eliminate Colonialism"]

[Text] Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, during his recent meeting with the British, stated that the problem of Gibraltar was a "remnant of history," and that its continuation "would complicate" relations between the United Kingdom and Spain. He asked the British to use their imagination to avoid continuing the existing situation. In this speech, Gonzalez was logical to a high degree, and mindful of Spain's best interests, and its relations and ties with its European partner, the United Kingdom, with which Spain itself will be united in a single vast and unlimited market, after the Spanish have passed through the remaining period of the second transitional stage imposed upon them, before total integration into the EEC.

However, there was something illogical and unpalatable about Senor Gonzalez's words, and the speeches of other Spanish officials. This is their insistence on maintaining a distinction—which doesn't exist—between the problem of eliminating colonialism in Spanish Gibraltar, and the elimination of colonialism in Moroccan territory, which is still under Spanish occupation—Ceuta, Melilla, and the Mediterranean islands—and, consequently, their continuation of the colonial status quo in these portions of Moroccan territory. The statement of the Spanish prime minister concerning Gibraltar was completely correct as concerns Ceuta, Melilla, and the Mediterranean islands. The colonial status quo in Moroccan territory is one of the "remnants of history," and its continuation "will complicate" relations between Morocco and Spain. It remains to request the Spanish to use their imagination, and to exert efforts on this level to open the way for the elimination of colonialism, as was done before in other areas of northern Morocco, and in Sidi Ifni, Tarfaya, al-Saqiya al-Hamra', and Oued Dahab in southern Morocco. It is presumed that the government that is in power now in Spain will be more understanding of the Moroccan request, aimed at completing the unity of its national territory, and more sensitive toward a colonial situation, than previous Spanish governments, with which Morocco eliminated colonialism in those above-mentioned Moroccan areas,

in view of the current Spanish government's ideological, historical, and other commitments.

We believe that Spain is mindful of the status of Ceuta, Melilla, and the Mediterranean islands. Despite its decision to exempt the citizens of Tetouan and Nador from visa requirements, starting from defining Spanish interests, and the undesirability of strangling the economy of Ceuta and Melilla, which greatly depends on smuggling to Morocco, one should point out the Spanish government's perception of the two cities' ties with their Moroccan origin, and the bonds between their Moroccan population and their Moroccan extended families, etc. This perception must be translated into mental effort, and the beginning of preparation for dialogue in numerous ways, including creating a mutual framework of thought in preparation for the elimination of colonialism.

After the recent visit of the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs and cooperation to Madrid, the Spanish and Moroccan foreign ministers announced that a Spanish-Moroccan Cooperation and Friendship Agreement would be signed in June 1991. This is a very positive step in the present circumstances of Spanish-Moroccan relations, following our neighbor Spain's joining of the EEC. However, that accord might remain without any great impact, unless Spain takes into consideration the need for liberation of the "remnants of history," which could complicate relations between the two countries, and unless it also takes into account the totality of things imposed by the neighbor, friction, and foreign relations. These things include mutual development, managing Mediterranean relations positively in the interests of the two parties and other Mediterranean parties, particularly the Maghreb and Arab countries, and avoiding a clash of interests, especially with regard to the European market, in which Spain will be provided with collective priorities. Note that there is basic competition between Spanish and Moroccan agricultural products.

Dialogue is always difficult, particularly when the history of that dialogue is loaded with disputes, which have left behind remnants. However, it also represents a great opportunity for mutual and positive construction.

Trade Imbalance With Europe Continues

91AA0399B Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 16 May 91 p 4

[Article: "Chronic Deficit in Trade Balance With Europe, Continued Development of North African Trade"]

[Text] Morocco's 1990 foreign trade was as usual marked by European predominance in Morocco's exports and imports. Europe accounted for 65 percent of Morocco's import bill (5.673 million tons and 36.972 billion dirhams) and 72 percent of Morocco's exports in terms of value (12.937 million tons and 25.137 billion dirhams). Exports to Europe covered 68 percent of imports from Europe. The imbalance remained large in terms of quantity and value, as shown by the above

figures. This is due to the kind of products we import from Europe—materials for finishing, semi-manufactured goods, manufactured goods ready for consumption, etc.

Other regions taken together account for only 35 percent of our imports and 18 percent of our exports in terms of value. In addition to the weakness of trade in general, there is the weakness of the rate at which our exports cover our imports and the weak bilateral trade with Africa and America.

The EEC forms Morocco's primary trading partner, with 65 percent of our import bill, but only 54 percent of the total value of our exports (3.338 million tons and 30.873 billion dirhams of imports, 9.677 million tons and 22.671 billion dirhams of exports). These figures clearly show that the trade deficit is large and that the imbalance is very large in terms of quantity and value.

France, as usual, leads the list of our trading partners within the EEC, with 127,064 tons and 13.058 billion dirhams on the imports level, and with 1.562,573 million tons and 10.996 billion dirhams on the imports [as in source] level, followed by Spain, Germany, Italy, Britain, Holland, etc. This order is based on value, not volume.

Trade between Morocco and the countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) saw continued development in 1990, although it remained limited in relation to total foreign trade. This development was great in relation to Algeria, although Libya remained the primary North African market for Moroccan products.

The value of Moroccan import and export trade with the four Arab North African countries moved from 2.481 billion dirhams in 1989, to 3.595 billion dirhams in 1990.

Morocco's imports from Algeria amounted to 142,279 tons and 315 million dirhams, while our exports to Algeria amounted to 82,545 tons and 473 million dirhams. Morocco's imports from Tunisia amounted to 125,568 tons and 224 million dirhams, while our exports to Tunisia were 108,735 tons and 509 million dirhams.

Our imports from Libya amounted to 543,251 tons and 1.060 billion dirhams, while our exports to Libya were 71,129 tons and 976 million dirhams.

At the same time, our imports from Mauritania were close to 361 tons and 3 million dirhams, while our exports to Mauritania were 2,179 tons and 35 million dirhams.

The trade balance with the UMA countries is clearly in Morocco's favor, with the exception of the balance with Libya, exports to which cover 92 percent of imports from that country. In other words, the deficit is no more than 8 percent and is offset by the surplus realized with the other North African countries. Important possibilities in the Libyan market remain to be discovered and exploited.

Article Details Measures To Sell 112 Public Companies*91AA0386A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
18 May 91 p 9*

[Article by Muna al-Bustani]

[Text] Rabat—An announcement is shortly expected in Morocco regarding the formation of a committee to supervise the sale of state shares in 112 organizations to the private sector. In addition, an appraisal committee will be formed to determine the prices of shares to be offered to the public. These measures are in implementation of the Privatization Law promulgated last year and its implementing regulations.

The privatization process was expected to begin in early 1991. However, the Gulf crisis generated circumstances that exacerbated Morocco's economic crisis, disrupted investment projects, and made it difficult to estimate economic development in the short term. The crisis also led the government to freeze a number of planned economic reform measures, including a bill to amend the Finances Law, and the implementation of measures needed to start the privatization process. Also, the presentation to parliament of a bill to reform the securities exchange was delayed. This bill includes a number of measures considered necessary by economic circles to attract savings to invest in stocks and bonds and thus ensure the success of the privatization process itself. The draft stock exchange reform law provides for these measures to greatly facilitate the sale and circulation of shares of companies that will be subjected to privatization.

Public organizations, in addition to being sold to the private sector through subscription to shares, will be sold through four other channels provided under the Privatization Law promulgated on 11 April 1990. These channels include the financial market, the solicitation of bids from interested investors, a combination of these two methods, or direct sale to investors given precedence as purchasers by the state.

Business circles in Morocco are waiting for the announcement of the first batch of companies to be privatized and their sale prices. Private-sector leaders are now preparing for the intense competition expected to accompany attempts to obtain the best deals at the most favorable prices.

Business circles will especially be scrutinizing the Finance Ministry's recently released figures on the proceeds of the operations of the companies slated for privatization during 1989. It is known that the privatization schedule extends to all sectors and includes: 44 industrial companies; 18 public organizations operating in the transportation, communications, distribution, real estate services, and tourism sectors; two companies in the insurance sector; three agricultural companies; eight financial organizations, including four banks; and 37 hotels. The latest figures show that 75 companies

(excluding the hotels) being offered realized total sales worth 29.4 billion dirhams in 1989, which is an increase of 6 percent compared to 1988. Also, the added value generated by these companies increased by 11 percent to 6.2 billion dirhams. However, their net earnings dropped by 5 percent from 1 billion dirhams in 1988 to 946.8 million dirhams in 1989, compared to about 846.4 million dirhams in 1987.

However, these total figures conceal differences between companies, inasmuch as 21 companies recorded losses, while a clear difference in earnings can be seen with respect to the rest of the companies.

Regarding the companies whose capital is controlled by the state treasury, it is noted that the El Cha'bi Bank realized the highest level of earnings, 153.7 million dirhams. The earnings of the National Bank for Economic Development did not exceed 23.9 million dirhams. The Sonasid Company, the premiere iron factory in Morocco, realized 95.3 million dirhams in earnings, while the National Investment Company, which is a stock company, had earnings of only 47 million dirhams. The tire producing company, General Tires, 52 percent of whose capital is owned by the American parent company, realized earnings of 17.4 dirhams, and the earnings of the only car manufacturer in Morocco, Somaco, totalled 9.5 million dirhams. Somaco's capital is held by the state treasury, the Italian Fiat Company (20 percent), and the French Peugeot Company (20 percent). Three companies whose capital is controlled by the state treasury recorded losses. The greatest loss, 12 billion dirhams, was recorded by the sugar production and refining company, Sucrafor, whose capital is shared by the treasury, Italians, and Belgians. In the same sector, the Sucral Company, in which Hitachi has an 8.33-percent share, recorded earnings of 2.5 million dirhams.

Finally, there is a group of companies in which the state has a share through the National Company for Petroleum Material. Within the latter, the Drakon-Gas Company realized the highest net earnings, 122 million dirhams. This group includes a number of companies that are being offered for privatization. The capital of some of them is shared by international companies, such as Agip Petroleum Amsterdam, Mobil France, and Shell Petroleum.

Real Estate and Tourism Loan, the premiere real estate investment financing organization, realized earnings of about 73.8 million dirhams. The United Arab Emirates, represented by the SUMED [Suez-Mediterranean (Pipeline) (Egypt)] Company, shares in the capital of the said company. The Moroccan Foreign Commerce Bank is in third place after the El Cha'bi Bank and the Drakon-Gas Company in terms of earnings, with activity that resulted in net earnings of 114.8 million dirhams. Its capital is controlled by the El Cherif Phosphates Bureau [Office Cherifien des Phosphates]. The premiere textiles companies in Morocco being offered for privatization, Kutif

and Aykoz, realized earnings of 9 million dirhams and 16 million dirhams respectively.

It is likely that foreign capital will hasten to purchase state shares in the companies in which they originally have had a presence with a view toward gaining control of them. However, it is difficult to predict how willing foreign companies will be to share in the privatization process in Morocco, despite the promulgation of a number of measures to encourage foreign investment, especially the abrogation of the Moroccanization Law and the creation of free trade zones. Financial experts believe that the lack of sufficient interest on the part of foreign capital in the privatization process might complicate the problem of financing privatization, especially given the transitional phase through which the banking sector is passing. In this connection, the elimination of constraints on banking credit as of early 1991 has led to a monetary liquidity surplus. The banks' participation in the financing of privatization thus depends on the fate of the banking sector liberation experiment. However, strong competition is nonetheless expected to emerge between large private groups to acquire the most economically important companies that are expected to be profitable. It should be noted that ONA [Omnium Nord Africaine] constitutes an important presence among the companies to be privatized. The state shares in ONA through the Bureau of Research and Mining Shares [Bureau de Recherches et de Participations Minières]. However, the likelihood that ONA will purchase the state's shares in those companies was checked by ONA's announcement last year that "it will not participate in the privatization process."

AL-'ALAM Gives Economic Indicators for 1990

91AA0389B Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 9 May 91 p 4

[Text] Domestic product grew, in fixed prices, by 3.6 percent in 1990 (106.60 billion dirhams) according to official, provisional figures, compared to 1.3 percent in 1989 (120.86 billion dirhams). In current prices, the increase amounted to 9.84 percent (208.72 billion dirhams).

Applications for permits to invest in industry grew by 35.3 percent (10,980 billion dirhams) compared to 40 percent in 1989 (8,046 billion dirhams), and the gross formation of fixed capital increased by 15.14 percent, from 43,708 billion dirhams in 1989 to 50,324 billion dirhams in 1990. The index of distribution prices increased by 6.7 percent, while the index of wholesale prices increased by 7.6 percent.

The trade balance deficit increased by 20.98 percent to total 22,164 billion dirhams, compared to 18,320 billion dirhams in 1989, despite an improvement of about 1 percent in the rate at which exports covered imports. The deficit in the current balance of payments account totalled 5,404 billion dirhams, compared to 8,007 billion dirhams in 1989, thus constituting 2.59 percent of the GDP, compared to 4.21 percent in 1989.

The money supply increased by 18.5 percent to total 114,802 billion dirhams, compared to 96,853 billion dirhams in 1989.

Regarding domestic financial accounts, 1990 realized a surplus of 4,566 billion dirhams regarding current operations, compared to a deficit of 0.446 billion dirhams in 1989, which is attributed to the surplus position realized in 1987 and 1988 and the decline of the treasury's total deficit to 6.719 billion dirhams, compared to 11.369 billion dirhams in 1989. However, these figures must be read taking into account the various financial measures included in the amended finances law, which establishes the payment of back taxes and the advance payment of taxes, i.e., impermanent exceptions.

AL-'ALAM Gives 1990 Phosphate Production Figures

91AA0389A Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 9 May 91 p 4

[Text] Sales of the Cherif Phosphate Bureau, which manages the country's primary mining resource, dropped 12 percent, phosphate exports dropped by 5.6 percent, phosphoric acid exports increased by 3 percent, and fertilizer exports increased by only 4 percent.

Raw phosphate exports totalled 11,672,000 tons, phosphoric acid, 1,170,000 tons, and fertilizer, 2,393,000 tons. As indicated by these figures and the preceding percentages, the end of the phosphoric acid and phosphate crisis with India in November 1989 did not greatly alter the balance of phosphate and phosphate product exports. It should be known that, from September 1990 until recently, the Indian situation, which covered most of 1989, recurred for different reasons, which was naturally reflected in exports, as indicated by the commodities inventory in the first three months of this year (which the reader can find on this page). Actually, the Cherif Phosphate Bureau recently signed a contract to supply India with 300,000 tons of phosphoric acid until the end of May 1991 and another contract to supply it with 600,000 tons of raw phosphate.

The Disbursement Bureau determined that revenues from phosphate exports in 1990 total 9,855 million dirhams, distributed as follows:

- Raw phosphate: 3,600 million dirhams (compared to 4,148 million dirhams in 1989).
- Phosphoric acid: 2,868 million dirhams (compared to 1,454 million dirhams in 1989, which was marked by the crisis of exportation to India).
- Fertilizers: 3,387 million dirhams (compared to 2,653.2 million dirhams in 1989).

In 1990, for the first time in recent years, phosphoric acid retreated to fourth place among Moroccan exports, while raw phosphate and fertilizers occupied second and third place respectively, and ready-made clothing returned to first place (3,636.9 million dirhams).

Also, 1990 saw the emergence of the problem of phosphoric acid production costs stemming from the import requirements of this production process. Imports of basic sulphur, which is needed to produce phosphoric acid, totalled 2,373.6 million dirhams.

Domestic sales totalled 9,703,000 tons of raw phosphate (primarily for processing), 0.1 thousand tons of phosphoric acid, and 275,000 tons of fertilizers.

It has also been reported that the Cherif Phosphate Bureau concluded a contract in early March with the Aminoza Company, which is subordinate to the National Institute of Spain for Industry, Spain's largest public organization) for the provision of mining equipment and the necessary infrastructure to exploit the Sidi Chnan phosphate mine in the district of Khouribga and Beni-Mellal to replace the Sidi El Dawi mine. It is assumed that 1993 will begin with annual production of two million tons, which will increase after 1995 to 12 million tons per year. The project will cost \$200 million.

The new general director of the Cherif Phosphate Bureau, Mohamed Mouftah stated to the AL-HAYAT AL-IQTISADI newspaper that the bureau has decided to invest \$2.5 billion in the coming five years, relying on French, Spanish, and Japanese financing. The money will be invested in projects of Morocco Phosphorous 5 and Morocco Phosphorous 6, the construction of an electricity station at Jorf El Asfar, etc.

'Elite' European Tourists Beginning To Return

91AA0368A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
5 May 91 p 10

[Report from Rabat: "Morocco Seeks To Attract High-End Tourism"]

[Text] The tourism sector in Morocco is gradually recovering. Tourist inflows are multiplying at a rate that experts say should return the sector to normal by next November.

The Moroccan Government is presently working to neutralize the effect of the Gulf crisis on tourism and to identify the reasons for the slow-down of European tourism, especially from Germany and France.

Some sources attribute that slow-down to the high cost of hotels, restaurants, and other services as well as to remission by certain guides. The sources also point out that focussing on common tourism in European markets would not be in keeping with current trends in the tourism services sector to attract select tourists, as indicated by recent tourism investments in Morocco. Moroccan investors and financial institutions founded a company for the construction luxury hotels and other investments in Agadir. The government built a yacht marina at the city's harbor. The 'Liwa' company of the UAE entered the tourism sector by acquiring five-star luxury hotels with the intention of refurbishing them to attract high-end tourism.

The manager of the Four Seasons Travel Agency in Agadir said that Morocco still enjoys considerable tourism capability and is able to accommodate more than three million tourists annually. He added that [tourism] sector development could be expedited by promoting investments, offering facilities to travel agencies, and removing various disincentives.

Tourism department sources said that [Morocco received] more than 60,000 tourists last month, most of them from Germany and Scandinavia, to bring hotels up to more than 45 percent of service capacity. Some tourism clubs, such as Club Med and Beach Club, are sometimes operating at 100 percent of capacity. Foreign tourists stay three nights on average. Demand has increased for restaurants, cafes, and traditional handicraft shops.

The Agadir tourism department told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that more than 40,000 tourists, most of them from France and Italy, visited the city last month and even more are expected this month. Sources at Holiday Service For Travel indicate that tourism is on the increase and that the agency has received additional reservations from a major international [travel] agency.

Agadir, the country's largest tourist destination, currently receives four charters a week, down from five charter flights in the past. The Four Seasons Travel Agency says it brings in more than 400 tourists a day, up from only 100 during the Gulf crisis.

The National Tourist Bureau is currently conducting wide-scale promotions in European markets, with emphasis on traditional tourist sources such as Germany, France, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries. Air Maroc, in cooperation with the Bureau and with travel agencies, is conducting familiarization trips to Morocco for a number of travel writers and representatives of international travel agencies.

Moroccan travel agencies are eagerly awaiting initiatives by the Ministry of Tourism, now that it is under a new minister, to reform various laws, define government oversight over restaurants and cafes, and expand its regulation of tourist guides and land operators to include Moroccans, especially since travel agencies are now allowed to organize domestic and foreign tours for Moroccan tourists.

Industrial Investments Rising in 1991

91AA0396A Casablanca RISALAT AL-UMMAH
in Arabic 10 May 91 p 3

[Article: "Rise in Volume of Industrial Investments"]

[Text] One of the distinctive characteristics of the 1991 economic year is the significant increase in percentage of local production, registering 3.6 percent, compared with 1.3 percent for 1989. The investment sector played a big role, inasmuch as the net capital formation reached the 15-percent limit, and the percentage of investment

amounted to 23 percent of 1989's domestic production, and reached 24.1 percent of 1990's. It should also be noted that industrial investments easily kept pace with the tangible rise. Moroccan private sector investment represents 72 percent of the total, while foreign investment constitutes only 24 percent. The satisfactory results recorded by investment output was accompanied by an increase in value of 6.7 percent over the 6.1 percent in 1989. With regard to the foreign balance level, current accounting of the balance of payments shows a deficit in the amount of 5.4 billion Moroccan dirhams.

The resurgence of Moroccan exports was greatly influential in achieving the percentage of this deficit, inasmuch as they contributed 24 percent, including revenues from the tourist sector, and remittances from our workers abroad, while imports rose 22 percent. The value of Moroccan exports was the result of normal activity by the al-Cherif Phosphate Company, after the 1989 marketing problems were resolved. Therefore, our exports recorded a significant increase in processed materials, amounting to 30 percent, compared with 16 percent in 1989.

The increase in imports was attributed to energy materials, which rose by one third. Moroccan purchases of processed materials rose 28 percent. As for debts, they went from 30.3 billion to 33.2 billion Moroccan dirhams.

Unemployment Figures Listed by Economic Sector

91AA0399A Casablanca RISALAT AL-UMMAH
in Arabic 8 May 91 p 3

[Article: "Economic Measures"]

[Text] The unemployment rate in Morocco has been calculated at between 5 and 6 percent, i.e., 476,123 unemployed, including 95,458 holders of various degrees. With Morocco's population at 24.5 million according to the latest statistics, the proportion of active individuals is 7.6 million, that of working people is 6.6 million, and that of unemployed people is 1 million. There are 300,000 job applications registered annually. The amount that the state spends annually on a single student has been estimated at between 1,350 and 50,000 dirhams. When the student leaves the school or the institution, the state wastes nearly 5,000 million dirhams a year. To do away with this crisis, an overall reform of the education sector is needed. The current situation according to statistical data on work for the active sector of the national economy is as follows: The agricultural sector employs 2.9 million, and the energy and mines sector about 120,000 workers, for a total of 3.02 million, or 45 percent. The industrial sector employs 400,000 workers, construction 390,000 workers, and traditional crafts 920,000 workers, for a total of 1.71 million, or 25 percent. The commercial sector employs 780,000, the administrative sector 690,000 workers, services 480,000 workers, and the transportation sector 160,000 workers,

for a total of 2.11 million, or 30 percent. The overall total is 6.84 million, or 100 percent.

It should be noted that there are 400,000 unemployed in a village milieu and nearly 300,000 unemployed degree holders in an urban milieu. To curb the unemployment crisis according to the conclusions of ongoing studies in this area, state investments in education sector construction (institutions, schools, and universities) should be diverted. Part of them should be directed toward establishing industrial institutions, which are considered the nucleus of prosperity and a timely weapon for doing away with unemployment and achieving the desired economic upswing.

Column Warns of Dangers From Foreign Television

91AA0399C Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 15 May 91 p 1

[Article by A. Ghallab in column "With the People"]

[Text] Television is on the march across continents.

Morocco is one of the countries over which it will advance from Europe and soon from America.

Television is a civilized means of communicating ideas, culture, and information. It is a medium on the march whose advance cannot be stopped. Those to whom it has advanced by satellite, either directly or using parabolic antennas, become unwitting victims of an operation of pillage. Their sons and daughters sit until after midnight, mouths agape in astonishment, eyes wide with terror, as they witness bestial practices that the Devil would blush to mention coming into their bedrooms via "civilized" telecommunication. Their fathers cannot suppress this "freedom," and their government has not been able to block the media "cultural agreements" that permit European and American "civilization" to advance via the little magic screen.

Some Spanish, French, and Italian channels have reached northern and eastern Morocco due to their proximity, just as they have reached Algeria and Tunisia. Parabolic antennas have begun to visit the roofs of apartment buildings and villas in Morocco, so that licentiousness can jump from the roof into the small rooms where fathers and mothers sit with their sons and daughters and into the bedrooms of adolescent boys and girls.

I am not suggesting any particular means of stopping what is knocking at our door. My only responsibility is to sound the alarm. He who has been warned....

The alarm I am sounding comes with the report that has been circulating for weeks, that the Ministry of Information will soon release the French television channel TF-5 after having suppressed it since it crossed the border in a media raid on Morocco. In fact, what was reaching Morocco on this channel had a good informational, news, and cultural character and had been carefully

thought out to transmit francophone thinking to the audience. That this was a raiding operation is now beyond dispute. However, the channel sometimes took the place of the degenerate francophone thinking that the two Moroccan channels broadcast.

Whatever the case, the French fifth channel will be added to the two Moroccan channels. There is no objection. However, opening Moroccan airspace to other uncensored channels either directly or by means of the parabolic antenna involves a danger that threatens the society with disintegration and dissolution. So we sound the alarm.

SUDAN

Political Developments, New Measures Discussed

LD0505152591 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1008 GMT 5 May 91

[Station commentary: "The Trend of the Political Situation in Sudan"]

[Text] Within the framework of measures adopted by the Sudan Government to hand over to the people the management of the affairs of the country, the ruling military council has approved a measure to establish a popular committee system in that country. These measures were also approved by over 3,000 representatives from various Sudanese groups which recently gathered in the national congress in Khartoum; it is something similar to the ruling system in Libya.

Experts on African affairs see the setting up of the popular committees in line with General 'Umar al-Bashir's continued political measures for increasing the participation of various strata of people in the affairs of the country, and also take into consideration their religious tendencies, ethnic groups, and tribal characteristics.

The same experts believe that the government's earlier political measures, such as implementation of the law of Islamic shari'a in the Muslim provinces of Sudan, and the establishment of a federal system in that country, and also 'Umar al-Bashir's recent suggestion pertaining to the freedom of political prisoners, and above all, the amnesty given to those involved in riots in the south of

Sudan on condition that they surrender their weapons to the government—all these are the outcome of efforts by the leaders of Sudan to reduce domestic and even foreign pressures.

On the domestic front, the current regime in Sudan, which has run the country's affairs since the end of June 1989, is facing a series of political, military, economic, and social problems. Economic disorders resulting from drought and famine, political disputes between more than 40 parties and political movements, and tribal disputes, have all created problems for the current government. Therefore the government has taken various steps toward reform.

Foreign pressures exerted on Sudan, which stem from that country's internal problems, and also the tendency for democracy which has now spread to the entire horn of Africa, have considerably affected the trend of the current situation in Sudan. Opponents of the al-Bashir government's current policies, and particularly his pro-Islamic policies which are being consolidated, which they see as a danger to other regional governments, have so far resorted to various stratagems in order to weaken the central government by spreading rumors about a coup, increasing military attacks in the south, discontinuing economic aid, and so on. Those actions were taken in order to destabilize the internal situation and to topple the Government of Sudan, or at least to force it to change its current policies.

Experts analyzing the political policies of the Government of Sudan say that 'Umar al-Bashir's regime has realized the extent of his domestic and foreign opponents' intentions and knows that a soft approach should be adopted against the hurricane-like currents of democracy; it has already taken steps toward involving the people in the management of the country, and the popular committee system would probably be able to open the way out of the current crisis in Sudan.

Summing up the situation in Sudan, those experts believe that, by resorting to the system of popular committees, 'Umar al-Bashir—while trying to rid himself of the political labyrinth created by the West—also hopes to take advantage of the Libyan regime's political and economic support by getting as close as possible to it in order to solve his current problems. How much success al-Bashir will have is a question to be answered by future developments.

AFGHANISTAN

Defense Official's Views on Khowst, Army

91AS0918A Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
21 Apr 91 pp 1-2

[Article: "Serious Danger Threatens the Nation"]

[Text] The ever increasing combat potential of the Afghan armed forces has become the order of the day, specially at present that foreign intervention in our domestic affairs has got new dimensions in the recent past.

Naturally, political enlightenment plays a tangible role in augmenting the combat might of the forces.

Our reporter has interviewed Col. Gen. Manoki Mangal, head of the political affairs department of Defence Ministry concerning the situation in Khowst and its repercussions, party-political work within the army ranks and the fundamental changes brought about in the Watan Party in this connection. The text follows:

Q: Please explain the Khowst incident, its peculiarities and its aftermath for the general situation?

A: Before going through this incident, I have to point out that serious danger threatens the independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of our nation today.

Our people should keep cautious that dangerous plots and intrigues have been hatched against all the Afghans, their honours and their country which our people and the armed forces for sure are well informed.

They also know that the militarists of Pakistan are now out to seek in vain to implement their heinous and its coward scheme for disintegration of the Afghan land and merger with Pak soil.

However, in view of the positive developments in the international arena for de-escalation of tension through political means, the frequent peace efforts of the state of the Republic of Afghanistan and its sincere willingness to normalise relations with Pakistan, the Pakistani militarists were expected to cease their interference in the Afghan home affairs.

But contrary to our expectations, the offensive on Khowst by the extremists and the Pak regular, militia and other units, the illegal intrusion into Khowst by Qazi Hussein Ahmad, a Pak Senator along with some other Pakistani Generals and his irresponsible utterances on recognition of no border up to the Amu (Oxus) river indicated vividly that the Pak military and war like circles have not given up their previous stance and objectives about Afghanistan.

Therefore, the Khowst incident must enhance further the awareness and alertness of the personnel of the armed forces however, this incident cannot be considered a

military or political victory for the extremists or their Pakistani upholders. Invasion of Khowst by the extremists, and their Pak collaborators for looting people's properties, its complete destruction and forcible displacement of the inhabitants can, by no means, be called a victory.

Moreover, under the heavy counter-blows by the armed forces the aggressors were forced to flee and utterly defeated if the Pak regular tanks and heavily armed forces did not enter the war scene directly. This provoked the wrath and the indignation of the Khowst people and the valorous personnel of the armed forces.

Constant strengthening of the armed forces must remain in the focus of our attention for effective implementation of the national tasks specially under current conditions that serious dangers are threatening the existence of our nation. Certainly, political work plays a significant role in enhancing the combat morale and political awareness of the armed forces.

To this end, extensive political work is in progress in the armed forces.

Worth noting is the fact that President Najibullah called for keen attention to political work among the armed forces ranks and laid emphasis on further improvement of the work.

A campaign has been launched that the prevailing military-political situation in the country be precisely evaluated and new directives and tasks be specified in order to further invigorate the combat morale and preparedness of the armed forces ranks. And, currently, the tasks achieved last year is thoroughly under study to pinpoint shortcomings and adopt more effective measures for improved combat alertness during the current year.

I believe that by doing away with the shortcomings and deficiencies we would be able to take fresh and effective steps in consolidating the armed forces ranks for the defence of independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity and further deepening of the national reconciliation peace offer.

As a whole, I can say that our armed forces are now enjoying complete political awareness and they understand their national mission well.

Having full confidence in the effectiveness of the present changes in the political work, the personnel of the armed forces believe that this would further consolidate their ranks and strengthen their determination and will in the defence of the independence, territorial integrity and the honours of the prideful Afghan homeland, Mangal believes.

Protest to Pakistan Over 'Interference'

*LD1505221991 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1530 GMT 14 May 91*

[Text] The charge d'affaires of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this afternoon. The text of a protest note from the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan concerning armed interference and aggression by units of the Pakistani Army in parts of Qandahar Province was conveyed to him by the director of the first political section of the ministry.

The Pakistani charge d'affaires was told that the Government of Afghanistan demands that the Government of Pakistan prevent such interference and aggression against the Republic of Afghanistan. Otherwise the responsibility for the grave consequences arising from these actions will rest on the Government of Pakistan.

Planning Minister Meets RSFSR Counterpart

*LD1605080991 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1530 GMT 16 May 91*

[Text] Afghan Planning Minister Ghulam Muhayuddin Shahbaz, who has recently arrived in Moscow as head of an Afghan delegation at the invitation of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, met RSFSR Deputy Prime Minister Maleyev Mikhail Dmitriyevich on 14 May.

Both sides talked about the bilateral economic and trade cooperation between the Republic of Afghanistan and the RSFSR.

According to another report, during the visit of the Afghan minister of planning, an economic and trade protocol between the Republic of Afghanistan and the RSFSR was signed. In the presence of the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan to Moscow, the protocol was signed for Afghanistan by Gulam Muhayuddin Shahbaz and for the RSFSR by Yorisheko Viktor Nikolayevich. Both sides also signed a protocol aimed at forming an economic and trade society between the Republic of Afghanistan and the RSFSR.

USSR Party Delegation Visits Academy

*LD1705085891 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1530 GMT 16 May 91*

[Excerpt] The USSR high-ranking party delegation, which has come to Kabul led by Yuriy Alekseyevich Manayenkov, visited the Sarandoy Academy today, accompanied by Engineer Nazar Muhammad, member of the Executive Board of the Central Council and deputy chairman of the Homeland Party, and by Dr. Raz Muhammad Paktin, minister of interior affairs.

According to a report by the Bakhtar Information Agency military section, the delegation talked with the

teachers and students of the academy and familiarized themselves with the teaching methods and living conditions of the students.

According to another report, the delegation visited this afternoon the Kabul Garrison General Headquarters. The delegation, accompanied by Engineer Nazar Muhammad and General Muhammad Nabi Azimi, first deputy defense minister and general commander of Kabul Garrison, spoke with the personnel of a unit and company attached to this command. The delegation also met with the leadership of the Kabul Garrison General Command. General Muhammad Nabi Azimi, briefed the delegation on the gains of the units of this command. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister on Soviet Railway Cooperation

*LD1605100291 Kabul BAKHTAR in English
0448 GMT 16 May 91*

[Text] Kabul, May 15, BAKHTAR—Fazl Haq Khaliqyar, prime minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, received a delegation of the Soviet Central Asia railroad network here today, reports press office of the prime ministry. The Afghan prime minister exchanged views with the delegation about the matters concerned.

During this meeting, the Afghan prime minister emphasized the need to expand the transport networks including the establishment of railway projects and extension of transport networks for the rehabilitation and restructuring of the country. The prime minister lauded the cooperation rendered by railway administration of the Soviet Central Asia for the transfer of transit and other goods needed by the people of Afghanistan.

The Afghan prime minister appreciated the transfer of over one million tons of needed goods for Afghanistan during the year 1990. He awarded medals and orders which were earlier approved by President Najibullah to the members of the delegation in recognition of the worthy services rendered by the railway staff of Soviet Central Asia to Afghanistan.

V. Mikhailovich, the head of the Soviet delegation, promised his cooperation for the timely transportation of goods at (?all) possible speed.

At the end of the meeting, the head of Soviet railway delegation thanked for the kindness of President Najibullah and Prime Minister Fazl Haq Khaliqyar.

Similarly, Mahmud Barialai, first deputy prime minister, met with the guest delegation and exchanged views with them.

The Soviet delegation expressed readiness of this country for the realisation of the proposals of Afghanistan for the establishment and extension of railway between Hairatan [place-name as received] and Mazar e Sharif.

Mujahidin Control Khvajeh Ghar District

*BK1805101891 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 17 May 91 p 9*

[Text] Peshawar, May 16—According to a wireless message of Commander Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, Division 55 of Khvajeh Ghar district, '50 kms South of Russian borders, Takhar province,' was totally conquered by Mujahidin yesterday, and 5,000 armed militias and soldiers were captured too.

Casualties of both the sides were not reported yet, reports MIDIA [Media Information Department of Islamic Afghanistan].

Since Taloqan, the capital of Takhar, was under control of Mujahidin so Kabul regime announced Khvajeh Ghar district as the new capital of that province since one year.

Division 55 was located on an strategic hill in the river-bank of Kowkcheh and was considered as an important base of the Kabul regime.

According to another report Mujahidin have captured 25 outposts of Yangi Qala district of the same province since May 14 and concentrating their attacks to conquer Hakeem Siddiqi's militia headquarters of the regime in that district.

Fierce fightings are going on for capturing Yangi Qal'eh and Rostaq districts.

An important strategic security post of the Communist regime along with military personnel and arms ammunition surrendered to Mujahidin in Dara-i-Pashaie of Paghman district on May 12.

The MIDIA also learnt that the regime forces used to bomb the bases of Mujahidin in Paghman continuously, however, Mujahidin received no any loss till now.

The report added Mujahidin also killed two soldiers and wounded others after launching an attack over the security posts of the communist regime in Arghandi and Qal'eh-ye Heydar areas on the same day.

The Amir of Hezb-e Eslami Afghanistan, Eng. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has congratulated Mujahidin over the capture of three districts in Takhar province which well to Mujahidin during the past two days, reports Afghan News Agency.

In a wireless message from inside Afghanistan, Mr Hekmatyar said that the fall of three districts foretells the victory of Mujahidin in the near future.

He assured Mujahidin, at the war fronts, of their military victory in toppling over the puppet regime in Kabul and establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan.

He called upon them to escalate jihad all over the country to bring an immediate end to the prolonged war in Afghanistan and restore the sovereignty of the Afghan Mujahid nation.

Rebel Center in Herat Destroyed

*LD1905093991 Kabul BAKHTAR in English
0505 GMT 19 May 91*

[Text] Kabul, May 18 BAKHTAR—Contingents and detachments of the Armed Forces of the country set (?ablaze) one of the main centres of the extremists located in Rubat area, Zende Jan District of Herat Province recently.

A BAKHTAR military correspondent reported that during this purging operation more than 158 Sacker 60, 30 and 20 type U.S.-made ground-to-ground rockets, a reactive set with 70 of its shells, nine heavy machine-guns, 70 mortar shells, 217 rockets, and amount of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, 282 heavy machinegun bullets, 56 boxes of cartridges and more than 300,000 cartridges of light weapons and two food-stuffs depots were seized.

Likewise, a large number of heavy weaponries including three rocket launchers, two mortars, two Dashakas, a Zico-1 set, three vehicles loaded with arms and over 34 of the warmongers strongholds [as received] were destroyed.

Report adds: Colonel General Abdul Rauf Bigi, [name as received] commander of the Herat garrison, appreciated the Armed Forces personnel [that] took part in the operation and underlined their subsequent tasks and responsibilities for ensurance of peace and security as well as implementation of the policy of national reconciliation in the country.

Extremists' Arms Cache Discovered

*LD1605153691 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1430 GMT 16 May 91*

[Text] The units and subunits of Sarandoy in Tangi Waghjan, Logar Province, discovered and seized today a cache of weapons belonging to the Gulbuddin extremist group. BAKHTAR's military section reported that these weapons, including 50 antivehicle mines, 200 shells for 82 mm artillery, 1,200 antipersonnel mines, and thousands of rounds of light weapon ammunition, which were deployed in this region by the warmongering extremists for shedding the blood of our Muslim and religious compatriots, were discovered and removed.

Qandahar Elders Seek End to Armed Operations

*LD1605180291 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1430 GMT 16 May 91*

[Text] Following the national and humanitarian objectives of the policy of national reconciliation and in order to prevent fighting and bloodshed around Qandahar Province, the ulema, clergymen, elders and chiefs of the city and districts of Qandahar Province have recently repeated their request to the authorities of the Armed Forces in this province as well as the opposition forces for the units of the armed forces to refrain from combat

and clearing activities. They also asked the opposition to refrain from firing missiles at the city and districts of Qandahar Province as well as ceasing other armed activities.

The demand by the ulema, clergymen, elders and chiefs of Qandahar Province which is being made in accordance with the principles of the sacred religion of Islam and the objectives of the national reconciliation policy, has been accepted by the authorities of the Republic of Afghanistan provided that the opposition also accepts this demand made by the peace-loving people of Qandahar to observe the policy of refraining from firing missiles and carrying out other armed activities.

Five Killed in Kabul Rocket Attack

*LD1705225491 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1530 GMT 17 May 91*

[Text] As a result of missiles being launched by the extremists—these enemies of the people and homeland—five citizens of Kabul City were killed today and another 10 people were injured.

The Bakhtar military section reports that these Sakr-type missiles were fired by the warmongering extremists on the instruction of Pakistan's military intelligence, and against all international principles and standards. These missiles hit the residential regions of the eighth ward. Those injured in this mishap were quickly transferred to hospital where they are under medical care.

The report adds that the missiles fired today also caused extensive material losses to our compatriots.

'Extremists' Weapons Seized, Destroyed

*LD1805164591 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto
1430 GMT 18 May 91*

[Excerpt] Units of the country's armed forces recently eliminated a major center of the extremist groups located in the region of Robat Valley, Zendajan district, Herat Province.

According to a BIA military section report, 20 Sakr-60 missiles, 35 Sakr-30 missiles, 120 Sakr-20 missiles, one rocket missile set, 70 shells, 2 artillery pieces, 169 mortar mines, 7 machine guns, 317 rocket launcher shells, 280 recoilless gun shells, 56 boxes of ammunition for various weapons, over 300,000 rounds of ammunition for light weapons, 3 boxes of hand grenades, 48 antipersonnel mines, 50 trap mines, 2 clothing depots, 2 foodstuff depots, and 2 vehicles were seized. During the operation, three launchpads for surface-to-surface missiles, two mortars, two DSHK's, one ZK-1, four light machine-guns, [word indistinct] weapons and ammunition vehicle, one communications center, 18 hideouts, and 33 [words indistinct] positions of the extremists were destroyed. [passage omitted]

IRAN

Mohtashami on International Palestine Conference

*LD1905105191 Tehran IRNA in English 0940 GMT
19 May 91*

[Text] Algiers, May 19, IRNA—The visiting head of the defense committee of the Iranian Majles, Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami here Saturday outlined objectives of the international conference in support of the Islamic revolution of Palestine to be held in Tehran in autumn.

Speaking in a press conference before ending a three-day visit to Algeria and heading for Tripoli, Libya, Mohtashami said imperialist powers led by the United States are working to remove the issue of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people from the agenda of all international conferences.

Further in the press conference the Hojjat ol-Eslam said political and Islamic personalities including parliamentarians from Islamic countries and the Palestinian officials will be invited to the conference to be held on the anniversary of the Islamic uprising of [words indistinct] the occupied territories, intifadah, next autumn.

On Tehran-Baghdad Iran-Iraq ties, he said Iran's foreign policy calls for cordial relations with all countries which are not hostile towards the Islamic Republic. This has been the policy towards the neighbouring countries including Iraq. Although there have been some fluctuations in Tehran-Baghdad ties, Iran's policy has not changed, he said.

He stressed Iran is against disintegration of Iraq and said that the West and the United States were pursuing such plans.

As for changes in Iran's domestic and foreign policy and its impact on the issue of Palestine, Mohtashami reiterated that Iran's policy towards the Palestinian revolution and campaign against the usurper regime of Qods has remained unchanged.

Meanwhile Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohtashami in separate meetings with speaker of the Algerian parliament Abdelaziz Belkhadem, leader of the Movement of the Islamic Society of Hamas of Algeria Mahfuz Nahnah and leader of al-Nahza Islamic Movement of Tunisia Rashid al-Ghanushi, invited them to attend the conference.

Iranian Envoy to Lebanon on Peace Plan

*LD1805041191 Tehran IRNA in English 1431 GMT
17 May 91*

[Text] Sidon, Lebanon, May 17, IRNA—Iranian charge d'affaires to Lebanon Mohammad-Javad Zamanian said in an interview with reporters Thursday [16 May] that as long as the Zionist entity continues to exist no peace plan has any chance of holding out.

He also condemned Zionist occupation of southern Lebanon, and said as long as peace initiatives are based on the U.S. support for Zionist aggressions those initiatives are not likely to get anywhere.

Asked to comment on the Western hostages in Lebanon he said Iran has always been against kidnapping and has been a first victim of it. He commented that the Iranian officials have not yet received any reliable information on the status or whereabouts of the Iranian hostages in Lebanon.

Earlier on the Iranian official had conferred with Lebanon's Minister of the Interior Nazih al-Bizri.

The Lebanese interior minister said Iran-Lebanon relations are fast developing, and observed that Iran would shortly improve her diplomatic representation in Lebanon to the next higher level.

He commented also that the foreign minister of Lebanon would shortly visit Tehran for further solidifying diplomatic and economic relations with Iran.

Bosnia Leader Views Cooperation Prospects

*LD0505151191 Tehran IRNA in English 1357 GMT
5 May 91*

[Text] Belgrade, May 5, IRNA—The current visit by the president of the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, to Iran, the first of its kind, goes to open new prospects for economic, cultural and political cooperation between the two sides.

Izetbegovic, a Muslim believer whose party is the strongest political organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina and rallies Yugoslav Muslims, began his tour of the Islamic Republic, while facing serious political and economic problems at home.

The industry in the republic like all over Yugoslavia is facing serious financial crisis which is mainly due to its social ownership. These crises are directly reflected in the lives of a major part of the republic's work force and have brought about social unrests.

However, in certain fields the republic's industries have considerable potentials which could be very interesting for Iran and good basis for establishment of a totally new bilateral relationship.

Haris Silajdzic, the republican foreign minister who forms part of Izetbegovic's large economic delegation to Iran, told IRNA before leaving for Tehran that a possible cooperation between the two sides could be Iran's investments in Bosnia-Herzegovina's industries.

The proposal, with regard to the geographical position of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the central part of Europe, and to those industries whose raw materials could be found in Iran and the market of their products in Europe, like petrochemical industries, may find positive answers in Tehran.

Muslim intellectuals in Yugoslavia believe that in the event of inevitable privatisation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina's industry, the capital from the larger neighbouring republics of Serbia and Croatia could flow into these industries and outvote Muslims in the republic's economy. This will lead to their political weakness, they fear, adding that Islamic countries' investments in the republican economy could change such unfavourable developments.

As Izetbegovic said in Tehran there are considerable potentials for promotion of the cultural cooperation between the two sides as well. Islam has very deep roots in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Islamic life is quite alive in the republic which opens the doors for cultural exchanges.

Iranian officials however, hold that all these potentials could be used only on the condition that ethnic conflicts and passions in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina calm down and political stability returns to that part of the world.

In a situation where the territorial integrity of the republic is brought under question especially by Serbs living there, and while ideas of reshaping the republican borders are quite alive and are being discussed, any negotiation on a long-run economic cooperation is deemed to be prevailed by doubts.

Izetbegovic however, is still optimistic and believes that "the reason will finally prevail," and the inter ethnic conflicts between Serbs and Croats which have already led to the loss of 19 human lives in Croatia will not infiltrate Bosnia-Herzegovina and will die out very soon.

EC Contributes \$32 Million in Refugee Aid

*LD0705091191 Tehran IRNA in English 0654 GMT
7 May 91*

[Text] Tehran May 7, IRNA—Total value of the European Community's [EC] contribution to the Iraqi refugees in Iran was put at \$32 million in a statement issued by the EC office in Tehran.

To date, the EC has funded activities by the UN agencies here to the extent of \$23 million. Another \$9 million have gone to the Red Cross. In addition, governments of individual member states have made their own donations to these organizations, the statement said.

The contributions consisted of financing the purchase, for use in Iran, of 45,000 tents, 1.2 million blankets and about 10,000 tons of foodstuffs, it added.

More than 200 special flights from Europe have landed in Iran since the airlift began in the first week of April, the statement said.

Paper Faults Poor Management for Brain Drain*LD0205101591 Tehran IRNA in English 0924 GMT
2 May 91*

[Text] Tehran, May 2, IRNA—The English Daily KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL Thursday commented on the pitfalls on the road to development and professional motivation in Iran saying in part:

"One of the major problems confronting us right now is poor management, and sometimes even the lack of it. This malaise pervades the whole country, from manufacturing entities to service management objectives and goals is practically nonexistent or improperly disseminated to the employees. There is not delineation of duties and responsibilities, hence there is a lack of sense of accountability and the prevalence of the passing the buck mentality. Operations are too centralized and the delegation of authority is quite limited, though these practices might give rise to certain advantages, they somehow result in bottlenecks and a host of otherwise avoidable delays....

"There is a direct need for the country to enhance its human capital, the investment it makes in people to refine their talents and capabilities, the most basic of which are education and health. A healthy, informed person is capable of functioning better than an ill-fed illiterate one.

"Closely linked to the quality and motivation of management are financial and nonfinancial incentives and disincentives.... It goes without saying that there should be adequate financial reward for a fair day's work, possibly with extra pay for extra effort....

"These financial and nonfinancial disincentives gives rise to complacency in the attitude of the labor force—there is this gnawing feeling that the quantity and quality of the effort would not cause significant changes in remuneration and benefits....

"Too often, important positions are awarded to certain persons not necessarily based on their qualifications but more on the connections and contacts they have. This abhorrent practice of 'partibazi' and nepotism undermines employee motivation and morale....

"Whatever the figures may be, the fact is that Iran is ripe for growth and its human resources, given a more favorable environment, could develop into a potent factor for economic development. Responsible agencies should therefore hasten their efforts to address the legitimate grievances of the working class and thus prevent a 'brain and brawn' drain."

Job Seekers Deported From Japan*91AS0933D London KEYHAN in Persian 9 May 91 p 4*

[Text] The continued onslaught of Iranians seeking work in Japan and their failure to observe the regulations for residency in that country has resulted in the Japanese

Government continuously expelling significant numbers of Iranians from that country. Reports from Tokyo state that Japanese immigration officials have unequivocally arrested wrongdoers and those who have ignored the regulations for residency and work in that country, and forced them to leave Japan on Iran Air flights or on some other airline. Early last week the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY reported from Tokyo that 55 Iranians were expelled on charges of exceeding the residency limit. An additional 27 who came to Japan on Iran Air or other airline flights and failed to gain admission were expelled by that country's police. Quoting a number of those expelled, this news agency wrote that these people went to great expense to make their unsuccessful journeys, and most of them went into debt.

Zahedan-Quetta Railroad Resumes Operation*91AS0933E London KEYHAN in Persian 9 May 91 p 4*

[Text] To expand its commercial relations with the Islamic Republic and to create the necessary facilities to exchange goods and passengers between the two countries, the government of Pakistan has connected the city of Quetta in southwest Pakistan by rail to the city of Zahedan. The Zahedan-Quetta railroad, which was retired about 20 years ago, by transporting goods and passengers to Pakistan and back, will henceforth be able to play a basic role for economic expansion and expanding the area's commercial activity. It will also enable the area's merchants and tradesmen to transport Iran's imports through the port of Karachi to Zahedan, and then send them to other parts of the country from there. In a cable sent in the middle of last week, REUTERS reported the resumed operation of the Zahedan-Quetta railroad, and quoting the Pakistani minister of railroads, it wrote: The express railroad between Zahedan and Quetta located in southwest Pakistan will make one round trip each week carrying passengers and freight, and based on plans that have been made, in the future this railroad's freight and passenger hauling will increase.

Construction of Gas Refinery Begins*LD0405123991 Tehran IRNA in English 0831 GMT
4 May 91*

[Text] Bandar-e 'Abbas, Hormuzgan Prov., May 4, IRNA—Construction of "Sar Khun" gas refining complex of Bandar Abbas in this southern province started Friday. The plant has the capacity of refining 550 million cubic meters of gas per day.

Forty six billion rials has been allocated for construction of the project.

Habibi Commissions Dehloran Power Plant*LD2705161591 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1430 GMT
27 May 91*

[Summary] First Vice President Habibi commissioned the 132 kilovolt Dehloran power plant at noon today, as

part of his two-day tour of Ilam Province. The power plant, which cost 1.3 billion rials, financed by the Organization for the Reconstruction of Ilam war-stricken areas, will supply power to the Dasht-e 'Abbas area and nearby villages. Vice President Habibi left Ilam this afternoon.

Officials Respond to Workers Complaints

91AS0958B Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
28 Mar 91 p 4

[Text] Bushehr—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI correspondent—Following a complaint from a group of contract workers at the Vali 'Asr-e Kangan Gas Refinery concerning an order to dismiss them, their demands that officials investigate the matter was addressed at a meeting of provincial officials, the Ministry of Oil, the National Iranian Gas Company, and other workers, where their problem was solved and arrangements were made for them to return to work.

Our correspondent reports that these workers, who were all local people and residents of the Jam va Riz area, located near the Vali 'Asr Gas Refinery, were participating in phase one of the construction of this refinery as contractors with the Kangan Gas Delivery Company. Because the refinery handled most of the work and turned over the rest of the work to the company itself, this company had no choice but to dismiss a group of local workers. This led to the workers' protests, and their demands that officials investigate the problem.

The same report states that following the workers' demands, several provincial officials, the Ministry of Oil, and the National Iranian Gas Company attended a meeting of worker representatives and regional residents to study their problems.

At this meeting it was also decided that in addition to cancelling the dismissal order, the aforementioned workers would return to their jobs and the demands from the residents of the Riz area concerning water procurement, electrical power, and other matters would be honored.

Acute Respiratory Ailments Reportedly Down

91AS0958C Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
6 Apr 91 p 8

[Text] With the implementation of the project to control acute pediatric respiratory ailments in the Municipality of Quchan, the mortality rate of children under five years of age declined in the second half of the year 1369 [22 September 1990-20 March 1991] from 37.5 percent to 1.7 percent. The central news unit reports that this was announced by Dr. Yusef Nezhad, chief of the Mashhad Municipal Health Center, at a meeting of a group of specialists in family medicine (experts and technicians in the fight against illnesses in the Municipality of Mashhad). He added: "Currently the project to control acute pediatric respiratory ailments is also being

implemented in all the villages in the districts of Kalat and Fariman and classes have been organized to teach paramedics at the clinical houses in these villages. During the three days of this meeting participants will learn about the latest findings of the World Health Organization concerning the control of acute pediatric respiratory infections. It is worth mentioning that the project to control acute pediatric respiratory ailments is being implemented experimentally this year in the Municipality of Quchan in Khorasan Province, in the Municipality of Sarab in East Azarbaijan Province, and in the Municipality of Shahr-e Kord in the Province of Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari."

Gift To Fight Cholera, Provide Books for Zambia

91AF1138Z Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English
17 Apr 91 p 1

[Article: "Iranian Envoy Donates K150,000 for Anti-Cholera"]

[Text] Iranian ambassador to Zambia Mr. Mohsen Pakaein yesterday donated a K[kwacha]150,000 cheque to fight cholera on the Copperbelt and reference books worth K300,000 to Copperbelt University.

Mr. Pakaein said the books donated to the Copperbelt University were asked for by the university last year.

It was learnt that last year his government had donated books worth more than \$5,000 and because of the cordial relations they were thinking of donating them on a regular basis.

Iran was donating books to a number of African countries but Zambia was given first priority because of the warm bilateral relations enjoyed by the two countries.

During his Copperbelt tour yesterday accompanied by the embassy's second secretary Mr. Hanid Shoapour, Mr. Pakaein paid a courtesy call on the Ndola Urban senior District governor Cde. Levy Mbulo and the provincial Member of the Central Committee Cde. Alexander Kamalondo.

He wanted the friendship between Iran and Zambia to flourish because they all fought for equality of man.

He hailed President Kaunda for his support of human rights and his fight for peace in the Middle East.

"Now that Iran is liberated, we feel it is time to fight for the liberation of Palestine," he said.

Later, the envoy laid a foundation stone at the school being built by his government in Mushili township.

A sum of K500,000 had so far been spent on the school on which more than K3.5 million would be spent.

Iran would soon donate 100 spray pumps towards the fight against malaria. Arrangements for the tour of housing and shoe making experts to Zambia has reached an advanced stage.

BAYAN on Resumption of Publication*NC2305182791 Tehran BAYAN in Persian
21 Apr-21 May 91 p 4*

[Editorial: "A Statement to the People"]

[Text] It has taken us a long time to be able to tell this story. Toward the end of the month of Dey [22 December-20 January] last year, when the BAYAN editorial board was busy preparing for its special "Bahman" [21 January-19 February] issue commemorating the anniversary of the grand Islamic Revolution, we received an "order" to move our offices. The problems resulting from this relocation were compounded by the "special" holidays to celebrate the new year, which made it difficult for the editorial board to resume operations. For this reason, this magazine had to suspend publication for a few months.

The problems of the move were aggravated by a shortage of newsprint. We apologize to those sincere and loyal readers who wondered why BAYAN had suspended publication and expressed some apprehension. We hope, God willing, that the regular appearance of future editions will allow us to show our appreciation to our dear readers and the sympathizers of the Imam's line.

Your increasing support, dear readers, has given firmness of purpose and peace of mind to the staff at our magazine, which presents issues and events of interest to our society in a way that expresses the sentiments of the many faithful and sympathetic followers of the "imam's path." In fact, all media must draw their strength from the supporters and sympathizers of the Islamic system and the revolution who have pledged to follow only the path of the imam and his aspirations.

BAYAN's presentation of these problems may be spiced with "criticism," but it must be recognized that this is the main duty of a magazine like ours. The imam considered "criticism and even castigation" to be "divine blessings," and anyone who attempted to deny the loyal friends and associates of the path and legacy of the imam, may God be pleased with him, the opportunity to fulfill this duty would be holding himself up as "more royalist than the king."

In light of the trend of recent events at home and abroad, the intensity and extent of plots and moves against the Islamic revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran are increasing as the powers of world arrogance and their domestic agents hatch new plots by the minute. To combat these plots and diabolical schemes with strength and resolve and to remain steadfast requires that the system, the government, and the officials be confident of the correctness and firmness of their policies and their political, economic, and cultural programs. Such confidence is possible only if the followers and sympathizers of the imam and the revolution are free to express "criticism."

Those publications which, for "personal" or "ideological" reasons, content themselves with being sycophantic "propaganda mouthpieces," merely applauding "well done!" are doing the greatest harm to the pillars and policies of the system. Criticism is the most fundamental and Islamic obligation of those publications which believe in the Islamic revolution and the path of the imam. Because they remember what is desirable, they can spot any deviations and thus separate the "wheat" from the "chaff."

Publications ought not to act as "public relations spokesmen" and merely attempt to justify all that occurs. Publications which are Islamic and follow the path of the imam must measure performance and policy against the standard of the guidance and exhortations of his eminence the imam and warn of misleading and discordant repercussions. This is only possible in a society and government that accepts and makes room for "criticism."

Publications today must bring themselves closer to the people and address their problems and anxieties. They must pay close attention to their "communication" with the people, so that the "presence of the people on the scene," something constantly emphasized by our late imam, can be facilitated. To popularize "wishful" thinking and to try to justify any "discrepancies" will only help undermine the social and popular bases of the system. If any shortcomings and problems are not criticized by the forces who believe in the people and the imam's line, others will try to cast doubt on the system by spreading their deceptive and godless concepts and calling for "change" in society in line with the wishes of their foreign mentors.

Furthermore, there is today a great need for magazines and newspapers which follow the imam's path.

International events and the depredations of the United States around the world have given new hope to its domestic agents and affiliates, and the activities of those "enamored with the West" have increased markedly. In such circumstances, the role publications can play in countering these threats should be given its due importance.

Daily Discusses Need for Political Parties*NC2705120191 Tehran SALAM in Persian 16 May 91 p 2*

[Unattributed commentary: "Political Installations and New Necessities"]

[Excerpts] The recent remarks regarding the freedom and actions of the political parties has brought up new points of ambiguity. Despite these remarks, which claim that such political activity is impractical, the political organizations in most Third World countries are the most important sources of providing the manpower needs in the main sectors of society. [passage omitted]

Following the revolution's victory, the spirit of popular participation, which was an incentive for creativity and an active presence, was immensely heightened. However, due to certain inflammatory factors, the use of this massive human potential was not possible and therefore it sometimes brought about negative results. However, even now this spirit is one of the revolution's greatest assets and its utilization is imperative and unavoidable for the expansion and progress of the revolution's objectives. [passage omitted]

The sole means for resolving our social problems is the establishment and activity of our political parties, which at first glance may be considered detrimental to the system. However, a realistic approach and assessment reveals it to be the best means for the preservation and amelioration of the system. This is a point which most of the officials of the Islamic Republic have chosen to ignore.

The higher echelons of the Islamic Republic's system still currently hold a firm place in the hearts of the people. In order to prevent this advantage from being dissipated the social, political, and economic management should change into one of liaising with organizations instead of people; that is, the freedom of parties and political organizations should be ensured as a reliable and effective source for identifying and providing manpower. Otherwise, any movement in this regard will become more and more difficult. It may become so difficult as to manifest itself in the form of another revolution.

BAYAN Views Questions on Foreign Policy

*NC2305195691 Tehran BAYAN in Persian
21 Apr-21 May 91 pp 24, 25, 82*

[Mohammad Mohseni commentary: "Foreign Policy or Deviation From Principles?"]

[Excerpts] For some time now, students, seminarians, workers, and members of other social strata—in short, a considerable segment of dedicated religious and revolutionary people—have raised questions soon after an announcement on foreign policy is made or when measures are taken to implement existing economic, political, cultural, and social policies. Their questions concern just how closely these policies conform to the norms and criteria enunciated by Imam Khomeyni (peace be upon him).

Such a display of interest and spirit on the part of our Hezbollah people can be considered one of the most important tools guaranteeing the perpetuation of the revolution. Any supporter of the Islamic revolution should value this eagerness to ensure the perpetuation and dynamism of their movement and to honor the exhortations and the decrees of the imam—that is, the pure Islam of Muhammad (peace be upon him and his scion)—and they should be able to provide an appropriate response within the framework of the imam's line.

It is obvious that indifference on the part of officials to this positive display of interest or any attempt by them to suppress it by attaching various labels to it will not only fail to remove these questions and doubts but will also ultimately lead to their losing their popular base. In this way, the system, the strongest pillar of which is the people, will face a great danger.

Unfortunately, there are some who have given much less attention to issues such as the expediency of the system and the revolution than to attaining power. They are today monopolizing the various loudspeakers at their disposal to take steps to suppress and condemn this constructive popular interest, and they try in various ways to term such a show of interest as "counterrevolution" or "anti-Velayat-e Faqih" and so on. They also try to stifle all such thoughts by every holy or unholy means, to distort the eloquent gemlike utterances of the imam, and to offer a vehement defense of most incorrect policies.

Despite the propagandistic insinuations and approaches of this faction, what should be of the greatest importance to the officials are the people and the expediency of the system and the revolution. It is clear that acting in the way mentioned above is not in keeping with their dignity.

It is not appropriate for officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran to respond to questions and doubts in a way which gives the impression that they are trying to hedge rather than enlighten. The following are some of the questions we repeatedly encounter:

"Why are we deviating so blatantly from the stances and principles enunciated by our late imam and the great leader of the revolution for the continuation of the line which we proclaimed to the world in questions of foreign policy?"

"Why did the U.S. airplane land in the Islamic Republic of Iran?"

"Why are relations being forged with such a filthy regime as the government of the traitor Husmi Mubarak?"

"Is that not a country which, as our imam said, signed a treaty with Israel?" [passage omitted]

"How is it that we are witnessing the reopening of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, while the establishment of relations with the filthy Al Sa'uds has been placed on the Foreign Ministry's agenda?"

"How will recognition of the rule of the traitor of the holy mosques benefit the objectives of the revolution, the Muslim people and the system?"

"Has the criminal and traitorous nature of the Al Sa'uds so improved since the Mecca catastrophe that we are now forging ties with that servile government, and has our desire to send pilgrims to the house of God led us to link relations with that country to the question of the hajj?"

"Have Fahd's and his servile regime's invitation to the filthy United States and British soldiers to maintain a presence on the land of revelation and their consistent pursuit of the path of peace with despotic Israel made them worthy of forging relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran?"

These are serious questions about our foreign policy, and anyone who has had any contact with the people has seen many examples of this. The Foreign Ministry should not consider that a terse announcement that relations have been established with this or that country enough to decide the matter. Such actions seem to indicate that the direction of our foreign policy has undergone a radical change.

Trying to answer such questions with brief statements such as "these measures are in conformity with our previous policies and this is the line enunciated by our imam only serves to deepen the doubts and officials concerned are accused of insincerity."

Another example of these questions about foreign policy concerns the resumption of relations with Britain and the recent release of British spy Roger Cooper on 2 April 1991. [passage omitted]

Larijani, who is said to be one of the advisers to the Supreme National Security Council, once stated: "Prison sentences are reviewed a few times during the course of the year in Iran and are revised and reduced for various reasons. If the British Government makes such a request regarding Cooper, it is possible that he might be eligible for such a reduction of his term." [passage omitted]

Based on the strategy of the revolution—that is, enmity toward the criminal United States—should we not display the categorical opposition befitting the Islamic revolution—so that we can at least disturb the slumber of the Satan and his offspring—toward the military presence of the Archsatan and its allies near the borders our Islamic homeland aimed at destroying, or at least destabilizing, the region?

We have, however, not seen any practical steps in this regard, and, even in interviews with foreign correspondents, the military presence of the United States is referred to as casually as if we were talking about East Germany's closeness to West Germany. Should we not protest against both this indifference and this encroachment?

These are enough questions on our foreign policy. Questions in other fields will be dealt with on another occasion. It is hoped that those responsible for our foreign policy makers will conduct a correct and principled assessment of their performance and will refrain from anything that contravenes the norms and criteria of the Islamic revolution. We also hope that the questions which arise in the minds of the sincere people in our country who are devoted to the Islamic revolution are given satisfactory answers.

Daily Calls for End to 'Rows' in Majlis

NC2705152391 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 18 May 91 pp 1, 11

[Editorial: "Necessary Conditions To Confront Plots in the Region"]

[Text] The profound developments in the Middle East are undoubtedly to the detriment of the Islamic ummah. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran—as the world's Islamic base—bears a great responsibility because of all Muslims' expectations about this divine system. The officials in charge of the Islamic Republic of Iran require certain conditions in order to play their historic role at this important and sensitive point in Islamic history. It is the duty of anyone who wants to participate to identify these conditions and then take the necessary steps to create them.

Before referring to those necessary conditions, let us look at the developments taking place:

1. By simultaneously sending their foreign ministers to the Middle East in order to make preliminary arrangements for a Middle East peace conference, America and the Soviet Union have shown that they hope, more than at any other time, to stabilize the usurper Zionist regime.

2. The Arab governments in the southern Persian Gulf with most of the region's wealth have, first, agreed to economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation with the Zionist regime. Second, they have agreed to participate in the Middle East peace conference and to endorse decisions officializing the regime occupying Jerusalem.

3. The Zionist regime's experts were present for the first time at the recent Arab League session in Cairo. During this session, 'Isamat 'Abd al-Majid, Egypt's foreign minister and the one who implemented the diplomacy that extended the Camp David agreement to include all the Arab world, was elected secretary general of the Arab League.

This happened though Egypt was ousted from the league 13 years ago because of Camp David.

4. Despite its promises to the Arabs about removing Saddam, it seems that America is determined to keep him in power until the regime occupying Jerusalem is recognized: First, it will thus fulfill its objectives regarding the Arab-Israeli problem; second, it will suppress the Islamic and national forces in Iraq and thus pave the way for another dependent rule to come to power; and third, it will seize this opportunity to fully stabilize its military presence in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey.

Under these conditions, the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have much to say to the Islamic ummah. They must definitely make plans to prevent the implementation of these plots. But in order to say what must be said, to make the plans that must be made, and then to implement these plans, they should have peace of

mind. In addition to this peace of mind, a consensus of opinion can help them arrive at a valid decision. Anything the Islamic Republic can do to strike at American and Israeli interests and to prevent plotting definitely calls for the Majlis deputies, writers, and influential people to agree. Without this almost nothing can be achieved.

Those who believe that America's military presence near our borders is a serious danger—not those who do not believe it—should try to create a meeting of minds among the officials so that plans can be made and a wise policy on confronting the enemy's plots can be adopted. Turning the Majlis into a stage of rows among factions and turning the newspapers into an arena for backbiting—even if we assume that this is the correct thing to do, which it is not—will only benefit the common enemies of Islam, of the Revolution, and of Iran. The news of the world in general and of the Islamic world in particular is grave. Some who read reports on these rows will laugh while others, who sympathize with Islam and the Islamic Revolution, will cry.

If current regional developments threaten our country and our revolution, then the backbone of a government that wants to confront this danger is the people. When we resort to rows and venomous words and do something that will disappoint the people, how can we expect the people's support when we need it?

May God preserve us from discord. Those who stir up this situation will not be able to answer to God. May God make each and every moment of our life, each and every drop of ink we use, and each and every word we speak consolidate the unity of this nation. Amen.

Paper Lauds SALAM's Policy

*NC2405065191 Tehran BAYAN in Persian
21 Apr-21 May 91 p 37*

[Unattributed report: "SALAM and New Hopes"]

[Text] The newspaper SALAM published by Ayatollah Musavi Kho'iniha has strengthened hope in the hearts of the supporters of the pure revolution that in the current circumstances they will have a newspaper differing from the official and semiofficial newspapers. Following the elimination of start-up problems and difficulties experienced by all new publications, they hope that this newspaper will soon find its place among the people and will fill a conspicuous vacuum in our society today.

SALAM appears at a time when some thinly veiled efforts are being made to eliminate revolutionary forces and personalities who have pledged to forge ahead on the noble path of pure Islam and oppose the rule of capitalism and class differences. Using various pretexts, they have ignored or censored reports regarding these activities in their daily newspapers and other mediums of public propaganda.

A glaring example of this "joint" and "coordinated" effort occurred during the Council of Experts' elections when in "their interest," the fanatic supporters of the system censored reports about the faction loyal to the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran and paved the way for the headlong advance of their faction!

This situation is similar to that in other countries where the propaganda means are in the hands of the ruling faction. Today it has been clearly confirmed to what extent the "most neutral" publications and the most widely circulated newspapers of the country are tied to various interest groups. These groups do not permit their publicly funded newspapers to serve all factions impartially and equitably, especially those factions whose legitimacy and popularity have been specially endorsed by the Imam—may God be pleased with him—and those people whose goodwill, motivation and sincerity have received the Imam's seal of approval.

Despite all of the one-sided propaganda, hopes have risen that a newspaper such as SALAM can define a pure line of the Imam and the revolution in all political, cultural, and economic spheres instead of merely using the utterances of the Imam to justify all its actions and can identify the true path of the revolution as a guarantee for the wholesomeness and dynamism of the system in a world fraught with agitation and sedition. God willing.

SALAM Views French Press 'Stupidity' Over Relations

*NC2705142491 Tehran SALAM in Persian 13 May 91
p 16*

[Unattributed commentary: "France—the Stupidity of Diplomacy or the Press"]

[Text] France could have had a special place in Iran's foreign relations following the victory of the Islamic revolution, but its disgraceful behavior during the imposed war cost it this opportunity. An analysis of the real reasons for its blunders requires more time and space than we have here.

In any case, it seems that the new era of relations initiated between the two countries will also be fraught with difficulty. The French foreign minister had not even left Tehran when the French press began reacting negatively to his visit. This applied to both right-wing publications, which are considered to advocate U.S. policies, and those affiliated with the ruling Socialist Party, which reportedly are controlled by the Zionists.

In an editorial entitled "The Stupidity of French Diplomacy," the right-wing newspaper LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS criticized the warmth and enthusiasm the French minister displayed during his visit to Tehran. Repeating the cliched [preceding word in English] accusations about the Islamic Republic of Iran's violations of human rights, the paper stated: "The fact that all these cases appear to have been forgotten indicates the stupidity of our diplomacy."

While admitting that Paris armed Iraq to prevent the strengthening of Iran's position in the region, the paper added that Dumas' use of the term "friend" for his Iranian counterpart was not very prudent, as Saddam also was once considered France's friend.

Such hostility was not limited to right-wing publications. LE MONDE also accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of violating human rights and criticized the flexibility with which the French foreign minister approached this subject during his visit.

In an editorial entitled "The Ambiguous Normalization of Relations Between Tehran and Paris," the paper wrote: It is possible that, like Syria, Iran may have shelved its government-sponsored terrorism for the moment. In the present circumstances, however, is it not dangerous to give official sanction to Tehran's so-called appropriate behavior in upholding human rights?

The editorial added: In fact, in view of Iran's consistent policy on human rights, any endorsement of this country can be considered a "risky" bet.

LE MONDE went on to say that Roland Dumas' actions in Tehran were the result of "a pragmatic political approach" and that his first objective was to resolve the financial disagreement between the two countries.

The delay in resolving these differences—which should have been ironed out long before—is to the benefit of the French industrial magnates, who are trying to justify

their procrastination by pointing to similar behavior on the part of the Japanese, Germans, and Italians.

In conclusion, while stressing that any kind of regional equilibrium cannot long withstand Iran's lust for power, the paper stated: Peace and compromise with Iran for the sake of maintaining a pragmatic policy is one thing, but helping to exacerbate the conflict between Arabs and non-Arabs is something else entirely and represents a major mistake.

An AFP report on Dumas' briefing at a French cabinet session noted, however, that Dumas said he had raised the matter of human rights during his visits to the PRC, Iran, and Kuwait, and that, although violations exist in all these countries, they are not to the same extent.

Coinciding with the outcry by the press, the former French defense minister—who was removed from office for taking Saddam's side—announced that he was amazed to see that France was ignoring the Arab world and leaning toward Iran.

In light of such opinions, it appears that the stupidity of the French press far exceeds that of French diplomacy in understanding realities of the region. If France wants durable ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the basis of equality, then it should uncover the source of this U.S. and Zionist influence in its press and prevent it from creating an atmosphere that may crush any newly emerged hopes.

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