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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

19980203 393

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NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-89-029

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20 December 1989

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Survey Results on Restructuring of Ideological Work

90UM0090A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 17, Sep 89 (signed to press 27 Aug 89) pp 9-16

[Unattributed report: "Approving the Ideology of Renewal"]

[Text] The discussion of Major V. Kuznetsov's letter "How Long Will We Be Skidding?" (*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* No 23, 1988) in our journal lasted over half a year. The editor's office received dozens of responses, the authors of which raised urgent problems concerned with upgrading the quality of political training, posed incisive questions and offered concrete proposals. As was reported in a previous issue of the journal, the editor's office communicated the opinions and conclusions of the readers to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The problems of restructuring political training were examined not that long ago at a meeting of the bureau of the Main Political Directorate. The materials of our correspondents published here describe this meeting, summarize the discussion and answer many of the readers' questions.

Over 2 years have passed since publication of the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Restructuring the System of Political and Economic Training of Laborers." The work of fulfilling it in the troops and fleets went on during this entire time. This work made it possible to somewhat improve the organization, content and procedures of personnel political training, with regard for the realities of our life, the interests of students and the tasks they perform, and to introduce more active ways of conducting lessons. Novelty and a creative approach—and hence effectiveness—of political training are typical of military collectives of the Belorussian, Leningrad, Moscow and Turkestan military districts, the Western Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet.

But in very many places things are not like this yet. Cases exist where political training does not correspond to the growing spiritual needs of the personnel, and where it is not exerting the needed influence on performance of missions of the troops.

Some political organs, especially local ones, and official ideological workers have failed to become organizers of deep analysis of recommended works by V. I. Lenin, party documents and the unsettling problems of our society.

Qualitative changes occurring among the personnel are frequently not fully accounted for in political training, the principle of a differentiated approach is not implemented adequately in work with students, and formalism, primitivism and dogmatism are being eradicated too slowly. People are often excused from their lessons. Political organs, commanders and political

workers lack persistence in improving the training material base of political training. The tasks of generalizing, disseminating and practically introducing progressive experience are being carried out weakly in the troops and fleets. And all of this taken together leads to a situation where political training is having an insufficiently effective influence on growth of qualitative parameters in political training, on tightening military discipline and on instilling morality in the soldiers.

In what stage of perestroika is political training today? What has the experience of its renewal brought forth that is positive, requiring reinforcement and further development? In what is the action of the inhibitory mechanism manifesting itself here? What immediate measures are needed to eliminate it? These and other timely questions, born of the times, and stated in the course of discussion of Major V. Kuznetsov's letter "How Long Will We Be Skidding?" on the pages of this journal, were examined and deeply analyzed at a meeting of the bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. In the report by Lieutenant General G. A. Stefanovskiy "On the Status of and Measures to Accelerate Restructuring of Political Training in the Army and Navy," in its discussion by comrades V. S. Rodin, V. A. Silakov, V. G. Samoylenko, A. I. Maslov, M. D. Polkov and A. I. Shirinkin, and in the statement and remarks of Army General A. D. Lizichev, attention was turned primarily to the key factors—the organization, content and procedures of political training of the personnel, and its material and equipment base. It is in this sequence that we will dwell on each of them in greater detail.

From the Research Materials

"Forty-two percent of interviewed students in groups consisting of privates and junior commanders were not satisfied with the organization of political lessons. Their attendance averaged 63 percent. Around 85 percent of the soldiers noted that political lessons are conducted regularly. A fifth of the respondents were not satisfied with either the periodicity or the time or place of the lessons."

Of course, these data cannot be rendered absolute. As was noted at the bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, steps have been taken to restructure the organization of political training for the personnel. They became possible owing to the greater initiative of political organs, and they are directed at effectively shaping the personnel's scientific philosophy, elevating political culture, confirming an individual approach to political training and developing the social and political activity of the people.

Thus a decision to encourage all political personnel of subunits, units, ships and formations to lead groups is being implemented. From 65 to 67 percent of all political workers are now participating. Understandably in view of their professional training this is having a favorable influence on the quality of political lessons.

The experience of creating individual groups addressing special subjects for students in charge of subordinates is justifying itself in the political training of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers. This approach brings the training, especially of company first sergeants and platoon commanders, more in tune with work experience, and makes it possible to individualize the work of elevating the political culture of this category of servicemen.

Appointment of two or more unofficial assistant propagandists to multinational groups has also been given the go-ahead. For example subgroups of four to six soldiers of the same nationality are created from among those whose Russian is poor in the Belorussian, Turkestan and Leningrad military districts. They study under the guidance of the best-prepared unofficial assistant propagandist, who is also a representative of their nationality. A number of military construction units and the Air Defense Forces are accumulating experience in work with political lesson groups formed out of soldiers of the same call-up.

Certain corrections have been made in the organization of the training of unofficial propagandists in the Moscow, Kiev and some other military districts, and in the Western and Central groups of forces. The focus is on individual instruction and assistance locally in mastery of pedagogical skills. For this purpose the best teachers conduct open and demonstration lessons, and under the guidance of the regiment deputy commander for political affairs, a propagandist or party committee secretary they conduct seminars with unofficial propagandists at the battalion level. This makes it possible to significantly increase the attendance of lessons and their effectiveness.

Shifts have undoubtedly occurred in improving organizational work in personnel political training, which is such an important area. But this does not at all mean that we can close our eyes to the rather alarming figures obtained as a result of the research.

From the Research Materials

"From 40 to 67 percent of interviewed officers were generally satisfied with two-day courses of instruction for group leaders as a form of training, from 30 to 60 percent were satisfied with lessons conducted in instruction methods, and from 42 to 57 percent were satisfied with monthly four-hour seminars. More than half of the political training leaders were displeased with the way their work is evaluated, and only 6-10 percent of the officers are pleased with the practice that has evolved for stimulating labor."

Numerous readers of our journal who took part in the discussion of Major V. Kuznetsov's letter "How Long Will We Be Skidding?" have the same opinion, according to responses to questions concerning the organization of political training. The statements of readers were concerned with a wide spectrum of problems. Among them were the quality of courses of instruction,

seminars and lessons in instruction methods conducted with unofficial propagandists. It was noted that being something akin to twin brothers, all of them frequently pursue only one goal—"cramming" group leaders with all kinds of information and lecturing them on morals.

From the Editor's Mail

"We can no longer conduct courses of instruction like we did before," writes Major V. Burchenko. "For example, is it really possible to listen to six or seven lectures in a day, and get anything out of them? Moreover they are usually uninteresting, providing almost nothing new. Technical propaganda resources are used very rarely in them. Visual aids are employed, but sometimes they are hard to make out from one's seat. Try to learn anything from such 'examples.'"

"The plans of courses of instruction do not account for the interests of their participants; whatever the political organ has decided is simply forced on us."

"From my point of view," suggests Senior Lieutenant V. Makashin, "the forms of training in courses of instruction should in the larger part be of informational-cognitive and discussional nature. For example, round-table discussions, business games, analysis of problematic situations, meetings with prominent specialists in various areas of knowledge, and collective discussions of new work methods."

Senior Lieutenant Yu. Tarasov and many other authors of letters to the editor also think the same way.

This issue was not left without attention at the bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. It was noted that major flaws still remain in the training of group leaders and their assistants, and that this work has not undergone significant changes. Demonstration of concrete experience and of the most effective political training procedures is rarely foreseen in courses of instruction, seminars and in lessons in instruction methods. Progressive forms such as open lessons, business games and others have not been adequately introduced. This is what was revealed by inspections conducted in the Ural and Siberian military districts and in the Pacific Fleet.

Growth of qualifications, of the activity of group leaders and of their responsibility for their work is being held back in a number of formations by the absence of due concern for creating conditions allowing unofficial propagandists to improve themselves, and for the system by which to stimulate their work.

A number of other problems associated with the organization of political training were also raised in the course of discussion of Major V. Kuznetsov's letter in our journal. The principles of planning and forming groups and some other issues were discussed in particular. Critical marks were expressed in regard to excessively centralized determination of the subject matter of political lessons, and in regard to rigid directions that make it

difficult to individualize the work with students, primarily with ones who have poor facility with Russian. Sharp, sometimes rough questions were asked as well. Like the following. Until what time will we be hearing only talk and promises of stimulating the work of group leaders? When will changes finally be made in the programs for training future unofficial propagandists in the schools? When will we see an end to the pursuit of outstanding soldiers in political training, which encourages false reporting?

But for the most part the ideas were concrete and business-like, touching upon the most diverse aspects of the organization of political training.

From the Editor's Mail

"We can often hear it said," writes Major A. Kuleba, "that we need to reject centralized planning, and transfer this right to the political directorates and primary political organs. I am opposed to this. However, I would like to note the following. I do not understand the reasoning behind the effort to literally 'stuff' the heads of soldiers, in the course of 2 years of service, with the principles of Soviet military development, legislation, scientific communism, political economics, history, and so on and so forth. From my point of view the planning is clearly divorced from the life of the troops, and all the more so the country. Decentralization is not what it needs. What it needs primarily is to be made relevant."

Lieutenant Colonel O. Tararukhin, Major I. Blokhin, Lieutenant A. Gurinenko, Warrant Officer Sh. Saidov and some of our other readers shared their ideas concerning the suitability of changing the principle on the basis of which political training groups are formed. These same problems, these "painful points," which trouble people the most today in connection with the urgent need for improving the organization of political training, did in fact become an object of deep analysis and weighted examination by the bureau of the Main Political Directorate. This is seen as a good sign of the times, as evidence that people in the upper echelons of political leadership are keeping their fingers on the pulse of the life of the troops.

Suggestions such as the following were offered during the discussion by bureau members, for example. Creating political lesson groups with regard for their training and their knowledge of Russian. Trying this out as an experiment in, for example, the Belorussian Military District and the Black Sea Fleet. Organizing the theoretical and procedural training of group leaders into a unified system. The following should become elements of this system: the military school and academy; advanced training courses; courses of instruction, seminars and lessons in instruction methods; universities of Marxism-Leninism and party aktiv schools, the propaganda faculties of which should be staffed to the greatest extent by group leaders and their assistants, making the appropriate changes in the study plans and programs. The most important practical objective of political organs,

party committees and bureaus is to encourage all commanders and political personnel to conduct lessons in the political training system. Their activity and their personal contribution should be evaluated strictly both through party channels and in conjunction with job performance, to include in relation to certification.

It must be said that opinions on these and other suggestions varied when they were discussed by the bureau. Truly constructive, principled discussion was held on the urgent problems of organizing political training. And what the resolution embodies is not only a guide to action but also simultaneously a response to many questions from our readers.

From the Resolution of the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy

"That the political directorates of the arms of service, military districts, groups of forces and fleets, the political departments of major formations, staffs and directorates, formations, military educational institutions and units analyze the status of political training on the basis of the directions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference concerned with improving qualitative parameters in all spheres of armed forces training, and plan and implement additional practical measures to raise the effectiveness of political training, to intensify influence on completion of combat training tasks, and to tighten military discipline. That this problem should be brought up as necessary at meetings of military councils and conferences of commanders and political workers, and discussed in party organizations.

"That the Main Political Directorate should define the philosophical subject matter of all forms of political training and develop the corresponding programs, plans and literature on training methods annually.

"That political directorates of the armed forces should be permitted to make changes, with the consent of the Main Political Directorate, in the content of up to 30 percent of the topics of training plans, with regard for the particular features of service and the missions of the troops and fleets, and that the priorities attached to studying topics concerned with military, moral and legal education should be changed.

"That the practice of conducting one three-hour lesson per week and of creating separate political lesson groups for soldiers having poor facility with Russian should be confirmed in troops and in fleets serving alert duty and combat duty.

"That a system of continuous training and advanced training of political study group leaders of all categories should be created. That study of the organization and procedures of the work of political training group leaders in the troops and fleets should be foreseen when the programs of military educational institutions are updated.

"That the ideological work administration of the Main Political Directorate and the political directorates of the armed services, districts, groups of forces and fleets should foresee wider use of the facilities of Marxism-Leninism universities to raise the theoretical and methodological level of political training group leaders, and that the necessary program for this should be developed. That monthly conduct of demonstration lessons in the units, especially on new, active forms of political training, should be introduced into practice.

"That assistant political lesson group leaders in fully manned companies, in reduced battalions and in subunits equal to them should be trained under the guidance of political workers. That the experience of individual work, in the training and utilization of the training material base and in international indoctrination of privates and NCOs should be brought up for discussion. That party aktiv schools should be used more fully to upgrade the quality of training provided to assistant political lesson group leaders.

"That political organs must display initiative in seeking out and implementing measures directed at raising the interest of group leaders and their assistants in high end results. That the evolved system of incentives should be used more fully for this purpose, and that the contribution of unofficial propagandists to political training should be reflected at the time of their certification.

"That political organs and party organizations must persistently implement measures to encourage all executive command and political personnel to conduct lessons on timely political, economic, moral and legal problems."

From the Research Materials

"Twenty percent of the interviewed group leaders are satisfied with the content of political training. Forty-four percent of officers and warrant officers feel that the lessons are now being tied in more closely with the practical affairs of the units. Forty-five percent are of a different opinion—that this has not yet occurred."

Of course, no final conclusions of any sort should be made on the basis of these data. They sooner reflect only a trend, serving as food for thought. After all, it was only last year that corrections were made in the content of political training with regard for decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the February (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: The list of Lenin's works to be studied by different categories of servicemen was updated, introduction of a section titled "In Accordance With V. I. Lenin's Behests" was recommended, and study of the place and role of the CPSU in perestroika, the problems of war and peace under the conditions of the new way of political thinking, and implementation of defensive doctrine were included as study subjects; the section "The USSR—A Multinational Soviet State" was introduced into the training plan, and individual specific plans were developed for military builders, for road construction troops and for

shore-based and seagoing warrant officers in charge of subordinates. In addition political organs were granted significant independence in tailoring the subjects of lessons with regard for the particular missions and for the real situation in the country and in the military collectives. Study and analysis of political training in seven districts, in three groups of forces and in two fleets make it possible to conclude that the content of studied topics and their quantitative reduction received approval on the whole.

Nonetheless great concern over the state of precisely the content of personnel political training was voiced in the report given by Lieutenant General G. A. Stefanovskiy, in the exchange of opinions, and especially in the statement made by Army General A. D. Lizichev.

Today, political training is falling even more seriously behind the rate of politization of the people's consciousness, including in military collectives. Many political organs, commanders and political workers—this includes group leaders as well—are making poor use of political training as the basic means of shaping social consciousness with the purpose of developing correct, objective ideas in students, and especially young ones, about the past, present and future of our socialist motherland, about the values of the Soviet way of life, and especially about facets of it such as patriotism and internationalism.

Many political organs are unable to discern the shift in focus of certain forces attempting to erode the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and Lenin's premises concerning the role of the armed forces in defense of the socialist fatherland. They are failing to note that former members of informal associations, strike participants and nationalistically predisposed young people are joining military collectives in increasing numbers.

All of this is frequently disregarded when determining the subject matter of political training, which political organs are entitled to change. In a number of cases the political lessons are not supplemented by purposeful political briefings, evening discussions on specific subjects, and meetings and discussions of executives with soldiers. Many division, regiment and ship commanders and their deputies have started conducting discussions with the personnel on political subjects more rarely. A shift in the direction of sharing opinions on an unofficial basis is clearly noted. This was revealed by work in the Carpathian and Northern Caucasian military districts, in the Northern Group of Forces and in the Baltic Fleet.

The inability and sometimes the reluctance to regard the real situation and the requests and moods of the personnel, and to respond to them often leads to formalism, outright waste of training time, and development of indifference to political lessons. This trend is especially dangerous.

From the Editor's Mail

"When asked why political training has become uninteresting and boring," writes Major V. Burchenko, "many students say that the topics do not correspond to today's events in the country, and that they do not reflect the restructuring processes they see in civilian life. From my point of view the content of political lessons should include not only specific military issues but also general state problems. This would promote development of the interest of the soldiers in training, expansion of their outlook and elevation of their political culture."

"Problems troubling the young should be examined in lessons," Captain V. Dernovoy shares his observations. "Here is what Private A. Avros said to me about this: 'I like discussions about perestroyka and about relations between states, especially between the USSR and the USA, and about Afghanistan....'"

Lines from letters written by Captain 3d Rank N. Saratov and many other authors ring in unison with these thoughts.

It is no accident that the need for making refinements in the subject matter of lessons in the next school year, and subsequently defining only the basic philosophical topics that would be common to all, and developing the corresponding literature on training methods, was emphasized at the meeting of the bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The thought was voiced that it would be suitable to let the political directorates of the armed services, districts, groups of forces and fleets determine the priorities for studying military, moral and legal issues.

Significant corrections pertaining chiefly to making the content of political training relevant and bringing it into correspondence with the process of politization of the consciousness of soldiers were introduced into these proposals during the discussion.

From the Resolution of the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy

"That the content and organization of all forms of political training is to be brought into full correspondence with the ideology of renewal. That special attention should be concentrated on the profound problems of Lenin's conception of socialism, the activity of the CPSU as the vanguard of the Soviet people in the struggle for perestroyka, the place and role of the armed services in the system of the socialist state, decisive intensification of international indoctrination of the personnel, and improvement of the combat training activities of troops and fleet forces. That with these purposes in mind, jointly with political directorates of the armed services and arms the ideological work administration of the Main Political Directorate is to make the necessary refinements in the subject matter and training plans for the summer period of the 1989 school year and the entire 1990 school year.

"That deep study of the principal reports and concluding remarks of M. S. Gorbachev at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies is to be planned for the summer training period of the current year, in all forms of political training."

From the Research Materials

"As a form of lessons, lectures are interesting to only 8 percent of interviewed students, and 80 percent of them expressed preference for discussions. Sixty-seven percent of group leaders note that they know how to conduct dialogue and discussions in lessons."

We would have to think that there is an element of subjectivism in these data. But one thing is clear from them: There is a gap between what students want and what group leaders can do. Up to 50 percent of training time is reserved for active forms of study—debates, discussions, roundtable discussions, interviews and others. It is precisely in these that personnel display the greatest interest, meaning that these forms increase the effectiveness of political training. However, it is obvious that new procedures are being assimilated nonuniformly, with great difficulties and setbacks in many regiments, ships and formations. Active forms are being introduced into practice too slowly, and they have not become dominant. For practical purposes they have been mastered by only 30-40 percent of group leaders, and primarily political workers at that. Many unofficial propagandists have an extremely simplistic view of the new means of activating cognition, and conduct their lessons in the old ways, in the form of so-called lectures or dictation, leaving no imprint on the heart or consciousness of the students.

From the Editor's Mail

"Effective techniques such as 'firing' on the leader, maneuver and review of information, brain attack, self-testing questions, structural-logical charts, role-playing and many others are still timid guests at political lessons," feels Lieutenant Colonel A. Kovalev. "Most group leaders have a vague idea about them. And what a pity! The quality of political training, you see, suffers noticeably from this."

Majors Yu. Vtorushin, Ye. Murygin and S. Konin, Captain Yu. Savchenko and many others are in solidarity with the author of this letter. They associate improvement of the procedures of political training with the use of technical propaganda resources. Unfortunately there are many weak points here as well.

Experience shows that political training lessons are not yet being supported adequately with the available technical propaganda resources, literature and visual aids. Weak use is being made of the rich possibilities of libraries, which contain 125 million copies of books, including 50,000 sets of V. I. Lenin's complete collected works. The reason for this is simple: There is a fear of releasing literature to the subunits—it gets lost.

From the Research Materials

"Only 8 percent of interviewed officers and warrant officers note active use of technical propaganda resources, while 92 percent said that technical propaganda resources are practically unutilized. Among privates and NCOs this ratio is correspondingly 6 and 83 percent."

A wide range of problems associated with practical introduction of progressive lesson forms and procedures into political training and with effective use of technical propaganda resources in them was examined in detail and discussed by members of the bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. It was said that political organs of all levels need to increase the purposefulness and persistence of their work in this area of restructuring political training. This increase should ensure development of the interest and the sociopolitical activity of the students, and help develop their skills as debaters and political warriors. This task should be made the focus of the combined efforts of political organs, a special department of the Center for Research on Social and Psychological Problems being established under the Main Political Directorate, the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, the Central Club of the Soviet Army and all military journals and newspapers.

Plans were made to conduct a comprehensive scientific research project in 1990-1991 titled "Political Training—92," the purpose of which is to create for the future a clear conception of political training in the army and navy.

The need for organizing a planned, integrated effort to create the new training material base of political training and improve the existing one was noted. Carrying out an integrated program foreseeing both expansion of the supply of technical propaganda resources and development of creativity locally—setting up reference centers and training method offices and manufacturing useful visual agitation in Lenin rooms and classrooms—was implied.

From the Resolution of the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy

"That progressive procedures and active forms of political training are to be introduced persistently into the training process. That political organs at all levels should diversify lessons and make wide use of interviews, roundtable discussions, discussions, business games, debates, political standoffs and so on. That the progressive experience of conducting lessons should be generalized and developed. That the quantity of lessons with a practical orientation should be increased in courses of instruction for official propagandists, and that more should be taught about organizing individual work among students. That the quality of publications on these problems in the journals KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL,

journals of the armed services, LEKTORU I PROPAGANDISTU and the information bulletin IDEOLOGICHESKAYA RABOTA—NA MARSHE PERESTROYKI should be improved. That an appendix to the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL should be used to make available training materials and methods of instruction in officer Marxist-Leninist training.

"To order the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin to develop methodological recommendations on the study of Lenin's works foreseen by the program for different categories of servicemen. To organize and carry out the "Political Training—92" scientific research project in 1990-1991, and present the results to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy in July 1991.

"That the Central Club of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze is to establish a methodological council on study, generalization and dissemination of progressive work experience of cultural and educational institutions of the army and navy in aid of political training. That the methodological council is to draft and publish two or three methodological collections and visual aids for group leaders annually. That official and unofficial lecturing groups of the Main Political Directorate, the political directorates of the armed services and of the Central Club of the Soviet Army conduct training and instruction method lessons with political training leaders in their visits to the troops and fleets.

"That the ideological work administration should draw up a long-range plan for improving the material base of political training in the troops and fleets prior to 1 November 1989 jointly with the Main Political Directorate's department of technical propaganda resources. To make proposals for updating the norms for supply of technical propaganda resources to subunits, units and ships, and the list of newspapers and journals available by group subscription at libraries and Lenin rooms (quarters). That the political directorates of the armed services, districts, groups of forces and fleets, and the political organs of formations, military educational institutions and units make fuller use of the possibilities of television centers, radio broadcasting centers, reference and information centers and methodological offices in the interests of improving political training.

"To order the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense to foresee, beginning with 1990, preparation and publication of the necessary number of copies of brochures cataloging works of V. I. Lenin recommended for study and the training, methodological and visual aids to be used in political training of various categories of servicemen."

And so, the reasons why restructuring of political training is skidding in a number of places were examined substantially, fundamentally and from realistic positions at the meeting of the bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Specific

measures directed at correcting these problems were developed. Now the main thing is to begin work both centrally and locally without going through the motions of a wind-up, without waiting for additional directions from above. So that as it confirms itself in the consciousness of soldiers, the ideology of renewal would work in behalf of perestroika, in behalf of growth of the qualitative parameters of combat skills, in behalf of tighter military discipline, and in behalf of formation of real patriot-internationalists, and dependable protectors of the fatherland's security.

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Russian Weekly Excerpts Estonian People's Front Bulletin

Demand for Soviet Troop Removal

90UN0077A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian No. 37 15 Sep 89 p 8

[Excerpts from articles appearing in the Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, circulation, 15,000]

[Text] From an article by M. Lotman "Soviet Troops Should Be Withdrawn from the Baltic States."

That which signified a division in the sphere of influence for two aggressors, turned into horrendous suffering and destruction for the people of the occupied territory. The political reforms were accompanied by mass terror and the unpardonable lies and demagoguery of the occupants' propaganda apparatus. Hundreds of thousands of Finnish refugees who fled from the Soviet troops invading Kareliya. Thousands of imprisoned Polish officers executed in the Katynsk Forest near Smolensk, and thousands more who have disappeared without a trace. Tens of thousands who were physically destroyed, hundreds of thousands forcibly deported to Siberia and hundreds of thousands more who were forced to seek safety in foreign lands, which marked the beginning of the policy of genocide toward the people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The political reforms also began with a crude falsification: the farce of the "first free elections" and the "petition" concerning the acceptance of the Pribaltic states into the USSR system.

It is not enough to talk about the crimes of Stalinism or even judge them, we must somehow correct the situation. The Estonian People's Front has chosen several programs and measures directed toward strengthening the political and economic sovereignty of the republic. Under the auspices of the Party for National Independence and the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments, Citizens' Committees are being created which are calling for the convention of the Estonian Congress, which will be authorized to resolve questions concerning Estonia's future.

Nevertheless, an end to Estonia's occupation is the key problem of its future. Only after the withdrawal of Soviet troops will it be possible to talk about the expediency of

signing (or not signing) the union agreement and conducting really free elections or a referendum. The withdrawal of Soviet troops is in the interests of every honest person living in Estonia, regardless of his nationality or native language. Under the conditions of continued occupation, it is senseless, for example, to talk about the nation's right to self-determination. Consequently, the indigenous peoples of the Pribaltic should be counted among the enslaved.

(Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, No. 24, 1989)

From an article by O. Sandrak and T. Liyv "Peace, only Tartu Peace!..."

What should Estonia do to aid the restoration of Lithuanian and Estonian independence? Become independent first. We were the first, after having signed the Tartu peace treaty. We are still ahead of our southern neighbors. The dangerous majority of aliens primarily complicates the prospects for Latvia; the "danger" for the Lithuanians, on the other hand, is the small percentage of aliens and, in addition, the precarious future of Kaliningrad Oblast. Our prospects are better. To abide in the hope of others is only a waste of time.

What would our prospects of independence become against the background of the aggravated situation concerning the striving of other nations of the Soviet Union for separation? They would come to nothing. What Moscow can allow with respect to much-promised self-expression will become almost impossible if the country splits apart at every seam. More likely, we will be seen as the cause of the evil and dealt with accordingly. The recommendations to expect the collapse of the empire are irresponsible and criminal, for they harbor the danger of losing not only time but also any chance at all, not to mention the possibility of remaining under the ruins ourselves.

Can our statehood be restored without a referendum? Of course, since the matter does in fact concern restoration. Technically this means recognition by the Soviet Union of the effectiveness of the Tartu agreement and the voluntary transfer of power on Estonian territory to a transitional government.

(Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, No. 25, 1989)

'Citizens Committees' Respond to Charges

90UN0077B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian No 40, 6 Oct 89 p 5

[Excerpt from article appearing in the Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, circulation 15,000: "The Baltic: What Next?"]

[Text] Statement by the provisional committee concerning Estonian Citizens' Committees.

On 24 July 1989, at the 12th session of the ESSR Supreme Soviet of the 9th convocation, deputy P. Panfilov condemned the action which created the Party for

National Independence of Estonia, the Estonian Peasant Union and the extremist wing of the Republican Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments, so-called Estonian citizens' committees, which are striving to restore the bourgeois system to the Estonian SSR, as provoking and promoting destabilization of the political situation in the republic.

The Estonian Citizens' Committees (ECC) are accused of adventurism, separatism and instigation of tension between nationalities.

In connection with this, we have been authorized to report the following:

1. Citizens' committees are concerned with the registration of legal citizens of the Estonian Republic, no power in the world can forbid any committee or citizen this right.
2. The accusation of instigating enmity between nationalities is unfounded. A large number of Russian citizens of the Estonian Republic have been registered, as well as thousands of visitors who wish to obtain citizenship in the Estonian Republic in the future.
3. The accusation of separatism is does not make sense. Estonia cannot separate from that to which it does not belong. The Estonian Republic never joined the USSR, but was annexed. Restoration of legality in the Estonian Republic is self-evident.
4. The accusation of adventurism and destabilization of the political situation is demagogical. The activity of the ECC is based on generally accepted norms of international law in accordance with which the Estonian Republic is a legally existing state. The immediate creation of normal legal relations between Estonia (and also Latvia and Lithuania) and the USSR is a factor of stabilization of security in Europe and consequently also in our country.
5. The accusation of restoring a bourgeois system in Estonia is premature. The resolution of this issue is only within the jurisdiction of the parliament of the Estonian Republic.
6. The Estonian Land Union is still not officially affiliated with the ECC. However, the Estonian Christian Union has been affiliated.
7. There is no extremist wing of the Society for the Preservation of Estonian Monuments (SPEM). However, there is a unanimous decision of the Council of representatives of SPEM concerning the creation of ECC.
8. Misunderstanding of the goals and essence of ECC was caused by the recent obstacles erected in their relationship with the mass media. The difficulty of obtaining adequate information is a dangerous factor in the destabilization of society.

9. We are prepared to present an explanation of the goals and activity of ECC no matter where, including in the ESSR Supreme Soviet and its commissions.

(Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, No. 25.)

Gen Army Shkadov on Draft Evasion, Foreign Threat

90UM0084B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by Army Gen I. Shkadov: "A Sacred Duty!"; first paragraph is the writer's introduction]

[Text] The position the Army occupies in the life of our society is determined by the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law). There is no problem here as far as I am concerned. The law is unambiguous in its intent: "All males who are citizens of the USSR are obligated to serve on active duty in the USSR Armed Forces, regardless of their origin, social and property status, racial and ethnic classification, education, native language, religious affiliation, nature of occupation, and place of residence."

Journalist G. Drugoveyko in his remarks entitled "Stay Out of the Army, Son" and the editorial comments suggest that draft-age youth adopt the attitude "If I so choose, I will serve; if I choose not to, I will not serve."

Quite a number of draft dodgers skillfully get around the law: They do not refuse the draft *de jure*, and they do not serve *de facto*. Thus, M. Klimov's article informs us that more than 1,500 Muscovites do not honor their call-up notice, while 290 maliciously avoid the draft.

It seems to me that in this kind of situation, it would be more fitting for the journalist to write an article entitled "If Everyone Were the Same as You, Gawkers, What Would Become of Moscow and Russia?" However, he took it into his head to analyze the platform of the "refusers," attempting to mitigate the social danger by his deliberations on the inadequacies of the existing law.

The editorial staff apparently shares these opinions, justifying them with the statement that "no one has come forth with economic facts and figures pointing out the infeasibility of placing the Army on a professional footing." However, this topic was addressed a number of times complete with facts and figures in PRAVDA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and in a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet by both Minister of Defense Army General D. Yazov and Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff and first deputy minister of defense. Therefore, if you do not agree with them, comrade editors, let us have your calculations. But is this really a matter of mere economic considerations? The 19th All-Union Party Conference warned the party and the people that, in our struggle for peace, we cannot forget about the militaristic nature of imperialism; we must maintain the Armed Forces in a state of reasonable defensive sufficiency.

In addition, I have no doubts about the fact that—whether we wish to do so or not—we must train for the defense of the Motherland not individual volunteers in a professional army, but the entire Soviet nation.

It is reasonable to question the basis of the editors' flat statement: "Lads are afraid of the Army, and that is certainly no secret." What lads? I see thousands of lads. I myself have grandsons who dream of becoming officers; one is about to graduate from a military school. Take this year's competitive examinations for entrance into military schools: There are three to five and more applicants for each vacancy. Papas and mamas are much more afraid of the service. Their darlings grew up in comfort and idleness, eating pirozhki, rump steaks, kebobs, chocolate, and jellies. They are the dear sons that are afraid of the Army and are troublesome once they are inducted.

However, the truth lies elsewhere. In most units I have seen in the last two years, I—an old soldier—envy the pleasant barracks, mess halls, club rooms, food, and leisure conditions. I have not heard a mention made of nonregulation relationships. You will not see anything printed about this in any newspaper, with the exception of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. When a rare article does appear, it is printed in fine print, so to speak. Also, we are rarely given the opportunity to say something. All we hear is reproaches: "You haze new conscripts!" However, if we are to be truthful and not play the hypocrite, this hazing is something common to all of us. This disease starts in the lower schools and the PTU [professional-technical school]. Unfortunately, the Army receives quite a number of drug addicts and alcoholics after they have served time in a place of confinement.

Is it really necessary to try to convince someone of the difficulty involved in reeducating a morally twisted youth? Therefore, putting the entire blame on the Army is unconscionable. This is a matter for all of us. Let us work together—all of society—to seek a cure for this disease.

I have served in the Soviet Armed Forces and in the ranks of the CPSU for more than 50 years. It grieves me to say that I have never seen such attacks on the Soviet Army and Navy—especially the officer corps—or such slander. I consider to be exceedingly timely the decree issued by the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee relative to publishing information on the life and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces in the central press.

It would be wiser to hold the officer corps in a different light—one befitting a national treasure, not continually discuss the corps on the pages of newspapers, often without cause, merely as a journalistic exercise.

What is the result of all this? It is obvious. Instead of concern over the Army's rejecting their son, as in the past, at the present time many parents do all they can to keep their sons out of the Army.

Baltic MD Official on Military Provisions of LPF Draft Program

*90UN0114A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
3 Oct 89 pp 2, 3*

[Article by Maj Gen V. Sein, first deputy chief of the Baltic Military District Political Directorate: "Drafts and Realities: Comments Regarding the Military Portion of the LPF Draft Program"]

[Text] At the Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum in August, the speeches of a number of Communists contained demands for complete demilitarization of the Soviet Baltic. The Latvian People's Front (LPF) also has not ignored this issue. As we know, the drafts of the new LPF Program and Rules are a unique compass of one of the most influential and mass republic sociopolitical organizations. Will it sincerely strive for mutual understanding, compromise, and consolidation of forces, or will it prefer the path of further supercharging political and inter-ethnic passions? Time will tell, but today people are giving a detailed and comprehensive assessment of the LPF program documents. As a military man, I would like to talk a bit about the aspects of the program affecting the army.

What caught my eye during the first reading? It was the general nature of all eight paragraphs of Section 11—particularly emotional, isolated from life, and, one could say, utopian. Even the very title of the section—"Demilitarization"—is not in keeping with the political, economic, historical, and military realities that have taken shape today.

It is known that, in a situation in which various sociopolitical systems and opposing military blocs exist in the world, demilitarization cannot be structured on a unilateral basis. Yes, in May 1987, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact adopted a new—both in form and content—defensive military doctrine. Its main political and strategic goal is to prevent war. And this policy is demonstrated not only in political commitments, but also in the orientation of military organizational development, planning, combat training of troops, and operational training of staffs—in everything that pertains to the military-technical aspect of the doctrine.

They may ask: Is someone really a potential adversary for us today? After all, the various sides claim that the threat of war does not come from them. But this, so to speak, is in words. But in actuality, both the United States and NATO do not hide the fact that they still consider the USSR and the Warsaw Pact states to be their potential adversaries. This is also confirmed by the NATO exercises taking place near the Baltic region, where they are practicing namely offensive and not at all defensive troop actions.

Reliance on force and deterrence—that is the militant philosophy which, unfortunately, was reflected in the Brussels Declaration adopted by the NATO military-political leadership in May of this year. And it was

adopted not during the "cold war," but today in the new, positive conditions of development of the international situation.

We in the military know well the capabilities of the U.S. aircraft carrier strike task forces and NATO's naval forces, which surpass the forces of the USSR Navy many times over. Sea-launched cruise missiles, which the United States refuses to limit and deploys on submarines and surface ships, pose a great danger today. The American administration actually opened the flood gates for series production of B-2 "Stealth" bombers—a first-strike weapon (incidentally, the flight time of cruise missiles to the borders of the Baltic region is only several minutes), refuses to suspend nuclear testing, and is nurturing plans to compensate for the medium-range missiles being eliminated.

The NATO states that belong to the Baltic Basin also are not at all thinking about melting down their tanks and aircraft, and the NATO military fleets continue to ply the waters of the Baltic. As far as we know, even traditionally neutral Sweden and Finland do not consider demilitarization of their countries to be a task of the immediate future. Does all of this really give us real grounds to "lay down our weapons," as the LPF is already calling for today, proclaiming the policy of demilitarization of Latvia?

Yes, the Soviet Union is restructuring its defense organizational development, ensuring its effectiveness primarily by qualitative parameters with respect to the equipment and military science as well as the composition of the armed forces. The USSR has rejected "mirroring" the West in producing the latest types of weapons. The decision of the Soviet Government on the unilateral reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, announced at the United Nations, was a large practical contribution to the change from "super-armament" to the principle of **reasonable sufficiency** for defense and to building a common European home. As we know, over a period of 2 years (1989-1990) the personnel strength of conventional armed forces will decrease by 500,000, and the number of tanks and other weapons will decrease by 10,000. It is also rather interesting to recall that, besides this, the USSR military budget will decrease by 14.2 percent. Production of armaments and military hardware will be reduced by 19.5 percent.

But this is on the scale of the USSR Armed Forces. What changes have taken place directly in the Baltic Military District? I must admit, many paragraphs of the section on "Demilitarization" reflect the incompetence and lack of information of its compilers.

What can the LPF's appeal in the fourth paragraph to "immediately cease increasing the military contingent in Latvia" evoke other than surprise? To what "increase" are they referring, if the planned reduction of the army on the territory of the Baltic Military District is virtually complete? The number of personnel has already been

decreased by 3.4 percent. And what about the early discharge of VUZ students? As we know, they number 176,000, including several thousand for our district. The same can be said for equipment and armaments.

Or let us take an aspect such as conversion, the "reprofiling" of military equipment. The Baltic Military District has sold to the national economy and also to cooperatives hardware, equipment, and assets in the amount of 4.081 million rubles: 1.392 million rubles worth of motor vehicles of various makes alone, 902,000 rubles worth of engineering equipment, and 300,000 rubles worth of property and communications equipment have been transferred. In addition, 640,000 rubles of written-off equipment and property have been sold through the district's material resources department.

The provision of the draft LPF Program on the control of republic authorities over the activities of units and subunits stationed in Latvia also makes one wonder. In my opinion, the authors of the draft are simply passing off what they desire as reality. You see, it is clear that Soviet Latvia is a component part of the the unified federation of Soviet republics, and the Baltic Military District is an integral part of the USSR Armed Forces which, according to generally accepted world traditions, enjoy the **right of extraterritoriality**. Therefore, before making such a serious demand, it would be a good idea to address world experience, above all, the experience of Western countries, which, in the eye of many LPF figures, are truly the indisputable authority. You see, it certainly would have appeared absurd to the authors of the draft, for example, to demand that the states of the United States break down their country's army into individual formations and regulate their activities not so much in the interests of national defense as in local interests? I think that, even without such proposals, it is clear that **decentralization** of command and control of the armed forces can only lead to disastrous consequences and reduce the fighting effectiveness of troops, especially in carrying out tasks of a strategic nature.

The strategists of the LPF also chose a "weighty" argument with respect to the demand to eliminate air force bases and military training grounds: "Considering...the limited areas of agricultural lands." This, it turns out, is why Latvia's agriculture is "spinning its wheels." It does not have enough training ground land. But, you see, weeds often do not even grow there, and before the land was scarce and rocky. How and where, may I ask, will we train soldiers to shoot, drive combat vehicles, and practice tactical actions if the training areas are eliminated? On our fingers, or on paper...

"The USSR Ministry of Defense must pay rent for the land and facilities which the USSR Armed Forces occupy in Latvia. When transferring to the national economy previously occupied territories, the military department must conduct a complete recultivation of the surroundings." This is categorically stated in the LPF Program. But what if you look at this paragraph realistically? Are military installations really built at the

expense of **republic appropriations**? The authors of the draft did not stop to think that, in demanding unique financial "satisfaction" from the army for the land and facilities which the USSR Armed Forces occupy in Latvia, they may receive financial counterclaims from the army for the facilities it erected using its forces and resources of the Ministry of Defense, the housing fund, and so forth. You see, this does not take place in practice. What is more, last year alone the district's Billeting Directorate transferred free of charge to local authorities and organizations barracks and housing inventory with a total area of 12,138 square meters. Before the end of 1989, it is planned to transfer two more barracks areas with a total area of 2,163 square meters and also 1,726 hectares of land. Do these facts really not attest to the Baltic Military District's readiness to help the economy of Latvia cope with economic difficulties? However, the authors of the draft have tried not to "notice" them.

The totally unrealistic demand to re-create in the foreseeable future a territorial Latvian military formation migrated without changes or amendments from the existing program to the pages of the new draft program. It would be interesting to find out: What do the leaders of the LPF see as the material basis for such a formation? And how, in particular, will its command cadres be manned, if you consider that one of the paragraphs of Section 11 of the program again calls for and demands "the elimination of military youth camps" and the "withdrawal from the territory of Latvia higher military educational institutions of the USSR"? Here, with a stroke of the pen, the authors are trying to eliminate even the military school bearing the name of a prominent son of Latvia—Yakov Alksnis.

"The LPF categorically protests making permanent residents of Latvia perform military service outside the republic against their will." Doesn't this protest contribute to the spreading of a variety of pacifist moods among Latvia's draftees, the result of which, for example, was the recent desertion (prolonged absence without leave) of 13 lads, which was reported in the local press? Now they all will answer the full strictness of the law. But what responsibility, I would like to ask, will those bear who incited them to do this?

The demand to serve only on the territory of one's own republic is nothing more than speaking out against the extraterritorial principle of manning the troops. It is time to understand that the stationing of troops and the associated need for people do not correspond to the availability of induction resources in a number of regions. The territorial principle of manning the troops is contrary to the interests of defending the state. As is emphasized in the CPSU Platform, adopted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 20 September 1989, the USSR Armed Forces are organized on a multinationality basis; all citizens, regardless of nationality, must perform military service in accordance with the all-union laws. As we know, the USSR Ministry of Defense has accommodated the numerous desires of

citizens of the Soviet Baltic, and now more than 20 percent of the draftees from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are left to serve in the Baltic Military District.

One of the paragraphs of the program formulates the provision on revising military instruction in schools, "intensifying physical and ethical instruction." I have nothing against sports or ethics. But, you see, comprehension of military science in a school lecture-hall is impossible without sufficient reinforcement by practical actions. Without initial military training, the draftee is "doomed" to a longer period of mastering the military specialty. So, is this a matter of increasing the terms of service instead of reducing them?

Finally, why do we forget about the educational function of our army? Can we really ignore the generally recognized fact that it is in the army that young people go through a good school of moral and physical training, a school of patriotism and internationalism?

The requirement of the LPF Program that "individuals whose religious, political, or pacifist convictions do not allow serving in the armed forces be granted the right to work for this period in the national economy" is not at all in keeping with the known provisions of the USSR Constitution and the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation.

Did the authors of the draft stop to think how many there would be in this case who desired not to experience for themselves the rigors and deprivations of a soldier's life, quickly changing their views and convictions? This is particularly true if you consider that the local mass media, waging an energetic anti-army propaganda campaign, contributes to this to no small extent.

By the way, and I particularly want to emphasize this, the fall draft in the Baltic republics, despite the complexity of the political situation in the region, was fairly efficient and organized. Of course, there were individual miscues and blunders, but as a whole all the young men who were supposed to be drafted and sent to the troops. According to the comments of commanders and political workers, they are serving in a fitting manner. Somehow, the attitude toward them on the part of those who believe it is necessary to **reject** the participation of military members in compulsory term of service in the elections to local soviets does not work out well against this background. After all, from all appearances, the authors of the draft advocate that human rights and freedoms on the territory of Latvia be guaranteed for any person, regardless of race, skin color, sex, nationality, religious or political convictions, social origin, position held, place of birth, and other circumstances. Why then openly discriminate against military members in compulsory term of service drafted from other regions of the country?

Our army is inseparably linked to the people and to the party. I could cite many examples in which people in uniform were the first to come to help in a time of need, a time of trouble. These include the Chernobyl tragedy,

the earthquake in Armenia, saving crops on virgin lands, and helping the workers of the Soviet Baltic. However, despite this, massive attacks on the army continue.

It looks like the authors of the draft, in drawing up Paragraph 11 of the LPF Program, also tried to drive a wedge between the people and the army, to run down and discredit the armed forces in the eyes of the public and draft-age young people. It seems to me that the fallacy of such attempts is obvious.

Anti-Military Editorial Bias of MOLODEZH ESTONII Asserted

90UM0084A Tallin MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian
4 Oct 89 p 2

[Letter to the editors by S. Smirnov and D. Borisov: "A Defective Genetic Memory"]

[Text] We, the same as many Soviet people, are receptive to constructive criticism by the press and other mass media in the area of definite shortcomings in the life of the Army and Navy, the state of military discipline, the work of party and Komsomol organizations. We look upon this as a manifestation of society's concern for further strengthening of perestroika taking place in the Armed Forces.

However, certain central, republic, and local publications present a biased and one-sided picture of Army life; they print misinformation on perestroika as it pertains to the Army and on yet unresolved problems. In addition, some publications in their prejudice undermine the authority of the Armed Forces, the prestige of military service, and the bond between the Army and the people.

There are publications that cast doubts on the absolute observance of the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation by all citizens of our country.

Instead of serious and thoughtful discussions of the life and activities of the Army and Navy, the average reader is served up unfounded "hot" facts and fictitious situations of a sensational nature.

Unfortunately, the newspaper MOLODEZH ESTONII, organ of the Central Committee of the LKSME [Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia], adds its bit to this unseemly matter. We arrived at this conclusion after we analyzed, with this in mind, all issues of the newspaper for the period 1 April to 31 December 1988 (Nos 64-250), and from 3 January to 2 August 1989 (Nos 1-148). Thus, we went through 335 issues.

What does our analysis indicate?

It bears witness to the fact that the editors show little interest in problems of military patriotic and interethnic education of the republic's youth. Moreover, from time to time the newspaper prints "propaganda" views and thoughts, judgements and assertions that do nothing to promote attainment of these goals.

Thus, in the last 16 months not one issue contained any articles on imperialism's aggressive plans with respect to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

This is amazing! Has the military danger disappeared? It hangs above mankind as a kind of sword of Damocles. This is attested to by the nuclear weapons that have been stockpiled in the world—weapons that are capable of destroying everything that has been created by human intellect, even all life on earth. Witness the facts, such as the armaments buildup and modernization by the NATO armies; continuous nuclear testing and scientific research geared toward militarization of space; designation of funds for military purposes in the U.S. and other Western countries; the offensive nature of U.S. military doctrine and directives issued by American military authorities calling for a nuclear first-strike capability; the existence of 1,500 U.S. military bases and facilities on the territory of more than 30 countries; the presence of a 300,000-man American Army in Western Europe; and other facts.

However, MOLODEZH ESTONII stated its position especially clearly and unambiguously in the article "From a Fence to the Table," by S. Sergeyev (ME, 2 August 89). The gist is expressed in the writer's following revelation: "I never entertained feelings of love for the Army." He explains his attitude as follows: "This is most likely due to a genetic memory or the makeup of my body." Basing himself on this "genetic memory," Sergeyev shares his reminiscences of Army service in the spirit of the new political thinking, as it were.

In a judgmental and satiric tone, the former member of the military informs the reader of the life, details, and political training peculiar to a tank regiment, and the relationships between servicemen. He does this using only "hot" facts. This apparently is an indication of his "genetic memory," which supplied nothing but "negatives." With his two-year Army service experience as a basis, he arrives at the global conclusion that there are troubles not only in the Ground Forces, but in the "Strategic Forces, aviation, and PVO." For some reason, he does not mention the Navy.

S. Sergeyev in his article of memoirs casts doubts on the unshakable truth of the inseparable bond between the Army and the people. "We always declared that the Army and the people are one," writes S. Sergeyev. "I do not believe this slogan," he states emphatically.

Once again the "genetic memory" or journalist's "body makeup" is to blame. Indeed, is there not an inseparable bond between the Army and people? Thousands of servicemen are people's deputies and have been elected to serve on local party committees. Military units maintain close contact with collectives in industrial enterprises, sovkhoses and kolkhozes, educational institutions; they provide leadership for children in schools and children's houses.

The Army has participated in resolving highly complex tasks, such as harvest work, construction of the BAM,

laying of roads in the Non-Black Earth Region, and cleanup after the accident at the Chernobyl AES and the earthquake in Armenia. Servicemen have joined the struggle against the forces of nature without regard for their lives. Only a person who has something wrong with his genetic memory would not know about these and other examples of the bond between the Army and the people.

With regard to the "nonregulation" relationships in the Army, S. Sergeyev makes the statement that "It is not the fault, merely the misfortune, of servicemen that do not acknowledge this phenomenon or that shift the entire blame to the 'civilian sector.' This is a bluff," the writer protests decisively. But he does not provide any arguments for his own protestations. After dividing second-year soldiers into three categories, the journalist has this to say about the third category: "They are animals... wretches disdained even by boys who have served one year."

The question here is: How can it be that they, inducted into the Army as 18-year-olds, very nice, innocent boys, can become "Derzhimordy" and "wretches" after only one year of military service? Can it be that they became "wretches" before they were inducted into the Army—a point made by officers of the Baltic Military District Training Center (ME, 2 August 89)? What were they taught in school and the PTU [profession-technical school], etc?

We, the same as those officers, are of the opinion that the Army is not particularly to blame for the hazing of new conscripts. Shifting the blame for hazing onto the Soviet Army is an attempt to dishonor and stir up hatred for the Army among the people. It seems to us that this is the purpose served by S. Sergeyev's article "From a Fence to the Table."

The Army hazing is a continuation of the civilian hazing that crept into Army collectives from the "civilian sector." For a "sick" society "gives birth to" sick children (criminals, alcoholics, drug addicts), who are brought into the Army's units and subunits. For this reason, we feel that all of society, not only the Army, should wage a struggle against hazing.

In his recollecting a recent visit made by servicemen's mothers to military authorities, military procuracy and party organ representatives, our leading journalist writes that he was "shocked at the severe panic the Army causes in our women." If this indeed is the case, it is an indication that most of the cause of the fear is attributable to the press, including the newspaper MOLODEZH ESTONII.

Let these women not panic over their sons; let them ignore rumors, which they themselves sometime spread. Let these moms read a letter written to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (1 August 89) by their own fellow countryman from the city of Tartu:

Dear Editors!

I am the father of Private Toomas Yalak. Our son has been home on short-term leave twice—the second time for family reasons. Although he kept telling us that all is well with him in the service, Marya—my wife—insisted that I visit his unit to have a look at the situation for myself, since one hears all kinds of things, especially about hazing.

So I went. That is why I am writing these words of sincere gratitude to our son's command authorities and superior officers, including Lieutenant Colonel N. Kochkin and other officers. I and two relatives were received cordially and told about Toomas' subunit and progress. The main thing was that we became convinced that Estonians, Uzbeks, Belorussians, and representatives of other nationalities feel that they are a family in this interethnic collective. We saw no trace of hazing. The only thing I could do was to give our son's commanders a parent's thanks.

Respectfully yours,
Kheldur Yalak
Tartu

A large role in the spiritual life of the Estonian SSR is played by the press. It is at the cutting edge of the struggle for renewal of all aspects of the republic's life.

A considerable contribution to this party matter is also being made by MOLODEZH ESTONII. We have no intention of belittling the newspaper's merits. It is also not our purpose to point out what the paper should and should not do. This is a matter of duty, honor, and conscience for the journalists. However, as communists and Armed Forces veterans, as ideological workers involved with communist education of youth, and, finally, as MOLODEZH ESTONII subscribers and readers, we decided to make known our opinions on certain problems that disturb and alarm us. This we have done. Frankly.

Report on LiSSR Draft Decree on Military Service

90UN0091A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
4 Oct 89 p 3

[Yu. Antanaytis, people's deputy: "Report of Deputy Yustinas Antanaytis, Chairman of the Editorial Commission for the Draft Decree 'On Military Service of LiSSR Citizens'"]

[Text] We have inserted a number of corrections in the draft. Over the relatively short time we have not, perhaps, succeeded in formulating everything precisely and in literary fashion, but the essence and the content are there. Here are the new suggestions.

Deputy Yu. Nekroshyus suggested that the following text be inserted in the introductory section: "The session holds the opinion that it is necessary to democratize the Soviet Army, and that everything should be done to establish the spirit of perestroyka there, and to ensure

that respect for each man, his safety, health, and dignity become the primary concern of the Soviet Army." This would be added to the end of the first paragraph.

The preamble to the first item reads as follows: "To propose to the USSR Supreme Soviet" (earlier it was "to the Presidium") "to bind the USSR Ministry of Defense, and to charge the LiSSR Council of Ministers to begin negotiations with this ministry immediately, so that:

a) beginning in 1990, LiSSR citizens will serve on LiSSR territory or, if the opportunity does not temporarily exist, in the Baltic Military District, if they so desire; to take measures to begin to implement this in the current year;

b) the subitem has not been changed;

c) the wording of the subitem is as follows: "the conscription of LiSSR citizens into Ministry of Defense construction units will be halted and, in the future, military units of this type in the country will be eliminated entirely." And here I wish to add that Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, a deputy who participated in the work of our committee, also supported this wording;

USSR people's deputy Yu. Olekas suggested that subitem "d" be reworded anew:

d) the opportunity for alternative service will be created for those youths who refuse to serve in the military on grounds of personal convictions.

As the specialists will agree, this conforms to international legal norms and would represent one of the subjects of future negotiations.

e) Subitem. (As the respected G. Kakaras and other deputies proposed)—ensure that pensions, compensations, and other privileges are increased to provide adequate aid to youths disabled in the military and to parents of youths killed in the military.

A new item 2 is also introduced: To charge the republic's Council of Ministers (this would be a sort of summary of item 1) to inform the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium by 1 January 1990 of the results of these negotiations and to systematically report to the people of the republic concerning the results of negotiations. If the demands that have been raised are not met in this fashion, then apparently it will be necessary to seek out other ways of implementing these planned legal demands.

A new item 3 is proposed: To establish that, starting this year, those youths in the republic who are orphans will be sent to serve on the territory of Lithuania, if they so desire. As you have heard, the military commissar said, and even guaranteed, that this would be implemented.

In the draft decree, the former point 2 will become number 4, without any changes. In point 3, which is now point 5, there are certain changes after the words "order No. 260 on the medical examination in the Armed Forces" to be inserted into the text: "And order No. 317

of 1 September of this year are incomplete," so that our doctors will prepare alternative proposals.

And, as our deputies suggested, to make the following entry at the end of item 3, which has become item 5: "To publish in the press the last names of the members of the draft boards created under republic, as well as city and rayon, military commissariats."

Point 6 (formerly point 4) remains unchanged.

The wording of point 7 would be as follows: (the proposal is from deputy Yu. Nekroshyus): "To propose that the Council of Ministers resolve the issue of the perpetuation, at the Antakal'nskiy military memorial, of the memory of the republic's youths who have perished in the military in peacetime as a result of combat operations, and that it publish the last names of Lithuanian youths who have perished as a result of nonregulation treatment while serving in the military.

Point 8 (formerly point 5) remains unchanged.

The following wording for point 9 was proposed: To charge the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with the immediate resolution of the issue of hiring permanent employees to strengthen the republic's commission on military service.

The beginning of point 10 has not been changed, but it continues in the following manner: "And to inform the people of the republic of this regularly." There were additional proposals. For instance, there was a proposal to change the stationing of the military unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But there is no need to note this in the present decree, because the republic's Council of Ministers has undertaken to resolve the issue. Several other proposals will be introduced into our other documents. We unanimously agreed to present the amended draft decree at a session of the Supreme Soviet.

The commission thanks all those who helped us with constructive and professional proposals and materially improved the initial draft decree that we have prepared.

LiSSR Supreme Soviet Decree on Military Service of Lithuanians

90UN0096A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian, 5 Oct 89 pp 1-3

[Decree of the LiSSR Supreme Soviet, issued on 29 September by V. Astrauskas, chairman of the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and L. Sabutis, secretary of the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On Military Service of LiSSR Citizens"]

[Text] Having discussed the report of the Yu. Antanaytis, chairman of the Commission on Matters of the Military Service of the Republic's Youths, concerning the problems of military service for the republic's youths in the USSR Armed Forces, the LiSSR Supreme Soviet notes that these problems give rise to profound concern on the part of the public. Among servicemen on active

duty, nonregulation treatment and discord on the basis of nationality has been widespread. As a result of the conflicts servicemen are abandoning their military units without permission, and quite a few of the republic's youths are returning from the military with physical injuries, illnesses, and psychological disorders.

The Supreme Soviet of the republic believes that it is necessary to democratize the Soviet Army and to do everything possible to ensure that it is founded on respect for each man, his dignity, and care for the health of the youths performing their military service.

With a view to the creation of normal conditions for the republic's youths performing their military service in the USSR Armed Forces, the LiSSR Supreme Soviet **decrees:**

1. To propose to the USSR Supreme Soviet to bind the USSR Ministry of Defense and to charge the LiSSR Council of Ministers to begin negotiations with said ministry immediately, setting as their goal:

a) to guarantee, starting in 1990, that LiSSR citizens will serve on LiSSR territory if they so desire, or, if that should not prove possible, in the Baltic Military District; and to implement this on at least a partial basis in the current year;

b) to reconstitute on LiSSR territory national military combined units in which LiSSR citizens may perform their military service;

c) to halt the conscription of LiSSR citizens into construction units which are not subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Defense; and to resolve the issue of eliminating such construction units in the future;

d) to render real aid to youths who have received severe injuries while serving in the military and to parents of soldiers who have perished in the army—to increase the size of pensions and compensations paid them, and to specify other supplemental privileges.

2. To address the USSR Supreme Soviet with a request to revise the USSR Law on Universal Military Service in order to specify the creation of an opportunity to perform other, alternative service for youths refusing service in the USSR Armed Forces by reason of conscientious objection.

3. To oblige the Council of Ministers to report to the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium by 1 January 1990 concerning the results of the aforementioned negotiations and to regularly inform the people of the republic of this.

4. To charge the LiSSR Military Commissariat with retaining on LiSSR territory for military service, beginning this year, those of the republic's youths who are orphans, if they so desire.

5. To establish that questions of basic military training of the republic's youths are under LiSSR jurisdiction, and

to charge the LiSSR Council of Ministers with specifying a system for the practical implementation of this statute.

6. Noting that the current USSR Ministry of Defense orders of 9 September 1987 No. 260 "On the Introduction in the USSR Armed Forces of Regulations on Medical Examination" and of 1 September 1987 No. 317 are incomplete with respect to determining the fitness of youths for military service, to charge the LiSSR Ministry of Public Health with preparing, by 1 January 1990, proposals enumerating illnesses and physical defects for which youths may not be drafted into active military service, and to present them to the LiSSR Council of Ministers.

To publish in the press the personnel of the republic, city, and rayon draft boards, their location, and their hours of operation.

7. To consider it necessary that the USSR Ministry of Defense, in accordance with the proposals of the Commission for Military Service Affairs of the Republic's Youths under the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, transfer for further service on LiSSR territory or some other place those youths of the republic subjected to nonregulation treatment, as well as those who cannot perform military service due to unaccustomed climatic conditions, state of health, or family circumstances.

8. To propose that the LiSSR Council of Ministers resolve the issue of the perpetuation, in the Military Memorial of the Antakalnskiy Cemetery, of the memory of the republic's youths who have perished in the line of duty, and that the LiSSR Military Commissariat publish the last names of other Lithuanian youths who have died as the result of nonregulation treatment while performing military service.

9. With a view to the development of cooperation between the public and the military commissariats as well as the military units in the oblast, and to the improvement of work on drafting youths for active duty service, and to the struggle against negative phenomena in the Armed Forces, to recommend to the city and rayon Soviets of People's Deputies that they form commissions for military service affairs of the youths and grant them support.

10. To charge the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with augmenting the personnel of the Commission for Military Service Affairs of the Republic's Youths with permanent employees.

11. To charge the LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with exercising control over the course of implementing the present decree and with informing the people of the republic of this.

* * *

The LiSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium believes that any hasty, ill-considered acts of people, such as, in particular, attempts to return military cards or boycott the draft,

only hamper the dialogue that has begun with the government and the USSR Ministry of Defense, and can have negative consequences not only for the draftees, but for those of the republic's youths currently performing military service.

Informal Uzbek Group Said To Consider Draft Boycott

90UM0060A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Oct 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Kosarev: "Conjectures and Reality"]

[Text] In the Kremlin, in the hall of sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in the "Moscow" Hotel where the parliamentary members live, one can often meet people's deputies who are not members of the Supreme Soviet. Including deputies who are service members. What brings them here? Is it only the desire, the need, to take part in the work of the session, in the activity of the standing commissions and committees?

I asked many deputies this question and heard a great variety of answers. Some came to Moscow especially to discuss legislation being debated in the parliament, others to carry out the mandates of their voters, to resolve urgent problems in ministries and departments. For example, here is what people's deputy of the USSR Maj. R. Zolotukhin from Tashkent said in answer to my question:

"By the nature of my deputy work, I often have to meet with voters, to speak at meetings that have become a regular phenomenon in our republic, and at discussion clubs. And one of the subjects worrying the people that has constantly been discussed recently has to do with the alleged numerous cases of death of Uzbek service members in their period of service in the Armed Forces. Leaders and activists of the informal organization "Barlik", which enjoys rather great popularity among some portion of the Uzbek-speaking population, particularly harp on this subject. All sorts of rumors and conjectures are spread. At the initiative of the "informals", a sort of campaign has actually begun, demanding a boycott of the draft, and they are seeking to create national formations on the territory of the republic, an Uzbek army. These calls are spread in leaflets and in articles in the local press.

Naturally, as a people's deputy of the USSR from Uzbekistan, and as a military man, I cannot overlook these incidents, and I decided to look closely into the whole story. I went for assistance to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy...

Did you make a deputy's request?

Considering the importance of the matter, I appealed directly to General of the Army A. D. Lizichev, that he see me and assist.

We had a meeting. I found full support and participation, and obtained access to all the necessary documents and statistics. And now I am involved in studying them. Perhaps I will have to visit some units. I will do everything to look into it all deeply and objectively. I will convey the results of my work to the voters, since this question greatly concerns the public.

"Of course, the final conclusions are yet to be made. But still, what do the statistics that you have learned indicate?"

"Overall the state of traumatic injury in the Army and Navy, including those involving deaths, is alarming. Nevertheless, the numbers indicate that there are hardly grounds for the conclusion of which individual hotheads among the 'informals' are convinced. But you know, we need to prove it with specific facts."

Major V. Zolotukhin recounted a specific case, when the father of a service member who had died in the Turkistan Military District came to him. This soldier had left his post with his weapon in hand, had put up armed resistance, and then killed himself. But the father conducted his own investigation and claimed that it was murder. The people's deputy took this matter to the district procuracy, and insisted that another investigation be done.

But here another problem arises, Zolotukhin said. It is impossible to show a true picture without making public the statistics of accidents in the Armed Forces.

In the opinion of the people's deputy, this is long overdue. He cited experience of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which at regular briefings reports all the figures reflecting the general state of crime and deaths of persons in the country. All sorts of innuendoes lead to all sorts of rumors and gossip. This is not in the interest of the Armed Forces.

Distribution of Ministry of Defense-Financed Housing

90UM0084C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the editors by A. Ryabkov in the column: "A Letter with Comments": "Bypassing the Collective"]

[Text] More than 30 percent of the workers in our military aircraft repair plant are on the waiting list for housing. We were overjoyed to hear that an 84-apartment building was to be erected for our collective. Funds were allotted for this specific purpose by the USSR Ministry of Defense. However, our joy was not to last. On 20 February, the plant administration was informed of a plan for distributing housing in this building. The plan called for assigning only a third of the apartments to the plant. The lion's share of the housing was to go to district Air Force personnel, the remainder to military builders.

The plan was drawn up in secret, as far as we were concerned, without regard for the opinion of the administration and workers. It hit the collective like a bolt of lightning out of a clear blue sky. We appealed to the Ministry of Defense, complaining about the unfair action on the part of district officials. We received a reply in the form of a copy of an official letter from Marshal of Aviation A. Yefimov, commander in chief of the Air Force, to Major General of Aviation G. Bednov, commander of the district Air Force. The letter read that "the decision concerning reassignment of housing funds for the satisfaction of the needs of other organizations and institutions should be made with consideration of the opinion of the labor collective and management of the aircraft repair plant." It was suggested that General Bednov "meet personally with the labor collective's council for the purpose of arriving at a mutually-acceptable solution to housing distribution."

Once more we were heartened. We could not imagine that the aviation commander would do other than comply with this request. In other words, we had hopes that the plan would be reviewed. However, General Bednov did not show up at the plant. He merely summoned the chairman of the trade union committee and, in a military manner, explained to him that the plan for allocating housing in the building under construction was not subject to review. Attempts to object were met by a threat: "If you do not agree, we will fire you."

The effect of this voluntaristic—the only word I can think of—approach to resolving the highly acute housing problem in our enterprise was very sad: people started to leave. From February to September, the plant lost more than 100 persons due to the lack of prospects for obtaining housing. Our attempts to persuade them to stay are unsuccessful; they simply do not believe us. How can they believe us after this episode of distribution of housing in the new building? Can something still be done? The building has not yet been made available for occupancy.

I am acting at the request of the collective.

A. Ryabkov, Plant Trade Union Chairman

(Comments by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent
Lt Col V. Kovalev, Transbaykal Military District)

After reading A. Ryabkov's letter, I contacted Major General of Aviation G. Bednov. He offered the following explanation of the conflict.

The base is suffering a catastrophic situation with regard to providing housing to officers and warrant officers who have no living quarters, including flight personnel. For years people have knocked about in shared cramped quarters and dormitories. There are 19 "Afghans" alone on the waiting list. With this in mind, we had no choice but to allot half the building's apartments to servicemen's families, leaving 31 apartments for the plant. Colonel Shevtsov met with the enterprise's collective at my direction way back in July; he explained our position on this problem.

Everything appears to be all right. But the plant workers are still dissatisfied. He is writing a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at their request. Why? In my opinion, the housing distribution plan for the new building was drawn up behind closed doors, without consulting the collective and enterprise administration. In past times people would probably have gone along with this in silence, but today they wish to speak up, rightly considering that they should be heard.

The servicemen's housing situation on the post is indeed difficult, but before the plan was drawn up to allocate housing in the new building, it apparently would have been necessary to visit the plant to offer a frank explanation of the difficult situation. I am sure that the workers' collective would understand the needs of the military pilots and would arrive at a satisfactory compromise. Unfortunately, this was not done. The old approach prevailed: Everything was decided in "high" offices.

Case for Military Cuts: Reduced Threat, Economic Constraints

18160018b Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian
No 8, Aug 89 pp 5-19

[Article by Sergey Yevgenyevich Blagovolin; doctor of economic sciences; department head, IMEMO, USSR Academy of Sciences: "The How and Why of Military Power"]

[Text] The reappraisal of what the Soviet Union has done and is presently doing in the area of military preparations occupies a special place among the infinite multitude of problems confronting the nation today. This reappraisal, an important contribution to which was made at the Congress of USSR Peoples Deputies, is extremely complex and even torturous because in the very recent past, they tried to convince us (and almost succeeded): the greater our military might the better, the greater our peace of mind, the greater our security. No matter what it cost, any price was incomparable with its "product": security in a world where we had so many enemies for whom military victory was virtually the only chance for the survival of "their" social system. All this was superimposed on very understandable historical reminiscences.

Of course, even in the past the questions had been raised: why did the imperialists not attack us when they had a monopoly on nuclear arms and why did they not do so after they lost this monopoly but still retained overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons? Why did they not exploit the sharp reduction of conventional armed forces by N. S. Khrushchev at that time? Finally, why was it that more weapons did not in any way mean greater security and why was the end of this insane race nowhere in sight? We also began to realize that the West's economy would not soon collapse "under the burden of excessive military spending" (as was the customary expression), but that our own economy was deteriorating as time went on.

But it was not until 1985 that we could speak about all this openly and pose the actual problem of analyzing the organizational development of our military and the parameters of our military power.

The new political thinking demanded new approaches to the security problem (they were formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress), a critical view of what we are doing in this area and of our picture of the realities of today's world. Specifically realities and not the picture, created by the joint efforts of numerous politicians, scientists, journalists, and military leaders, that is far from the truth—the picture of the victorious procession of our ideas, the indestructible might of the armed forces, and the unsurpassed quality of our weapons against the background of the current stage in the general crisis of capitalism and total spiritual and material disintegration in the enemy camp (specifically the enemy camp!).

The reappraisal naturally also incorporates the entire complex of problems associated with the determination of the role and place of the military factor in foreign and domestic policy.

The resolution of the 19th Party Conference quite clearly notes that only a political approach to the resolution of the contradictions of world development will open up to the USSR the possibility of winning its historically ordained role in securing the survival of mankind and in future progress; that foreign political activity must make an ever greater contribution to freeing up the nation's resources for the needs of peaceful construction; and that the organizational development of our defenses must strictly accord with our defense doctrine. This raises the question of military power in general and the question of what the military power of our country should be in particular. Naturally, the appraisal of what we need cannot be made in isolation from the appraisal of the situation outside our country.

The aim of this article—in addition to many well known publications by a number of specialists—is to make at least a modest contribution to the examination of certain timely questions regarding the current and prospective development of military power.

We believe that the analysis should be focused in three principal directions: military power and security (more precisely, the part that is secured by military means); military power and the economy; and military power and the foreign political situation. Naturally, there is a considerable degree of overlapping in this rather arbitrary division, but nevertheless there appear to be specific features characteristic of each of these directions.

I

Thus I shall initially attempt to answer the question of the degree to which Soviet military power ensures the nation's security and vital interests, the degree to which it corresponds to the situation existing in the world. Its quantitative parameters are very impressive: the USSR has approximately tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles in commission as all the rest of the world; three times more multipurpose submarines than the USA (and more than NATO as a whole), two-plus times more tactical aircraft, etc.¹ Finally, and this is especially important, it has stable parity with the USA in nuclear missiles. No other single country has or, honestly speaking, can have such parity. I believe that the USSR is no exception, having what it cannot have and what is to a considerable degree connected not with the task of national security (if, of course, we understand this to mean the inviolability of the state's basic, vital interests). The result is that we have unbeknownst to ourselves long ago resolved this key task in the organizational development of our military and have continued to follow the path of increasing our military power which, in my deep conviction, is already "divorced" from this, its initial purpose.

It should be immediately emphasized that no serious specialist has the slightest doubt that military power will for a very long time continue to be a necessary element that is vitally important for securing our country's national interests. But military power, if it is not optimized with respect to the entire complex of external and internal conditions (such is probably attainable only in theory), at least takes them into account to the maximum possible degree and adapts to rapid change. However it appears that our military power does not by any means answer these demands and that serious grounds exist for doubting that it can be sufficiently effective tomorrow.

I will try to show why this is so. There are several aspects here. One of them is the scale and structure of our preparations. Until parity was reached in nuclear missiles, the USSR did not have the full guarantee of security at the highest, strategic level independently of the practicability of plans for attacking us. During this period, many efforts seemed justified. But parity was attained and this truly became a historical landmark in the entire international situation. Did this become the turning point in our military preparations? Alas, it did not. They continued in unabating tempo in all the same directions as in the "pre-parity" period. In our view, this was a serious—economic and political—miscalculation. Of course, the decisions were made by the political leadership of the time and not by the military. But this misfortune of that leadership (and of the entire country to an even greater degree) was that with rare exceptions it thinking did not rise to the necessary qualitative level, to the ability to see the interrelationships and interdependences that to a very great extent determined its situation. And this frequently meant the inability to resist military technical thinking. The race for tank, artillery, chemical, etc., "superiority" essentially continued despite the fact that it was no longer necessary from the standpoint of the nation's security and that it was fraught with grave economic consequences and, what is no less important, with the entirely negative perception of the sense and substance of our preparations in both the West and the East and with the growing fear of Soviet military power.

Hardly anyone will now deny the existence of a number of serious asymmetries in Europe in our favor, including not only various quantitative indicators but also the offensive structure of Warsaw Treaty Organization armed forces, their deployment and a number of other factors (this has already been written about by both Western and Soviet specialists). Here we will not discuss the case of the SS-20 missiles—one more illustration of same ideas about ways and principles of enhancing power.

During the same "post-parity" years, the buildup of the navy—a factor that in our view played a very substantial role in what can be called the development of events at the geopolitical level—acquired special scope. Between 1978 and 1987, we even built almost as many large

surface ships and twice as many multipurpose submarines as the USA. The construction of the largest ships of the latest type—aircraft carriers, atomic cruisers—began.²

The fleet—a special type of armed force with most clearly expressed political and "demonstration" functions—is an ideal means of what is called "power projection" in the West. The impression was created that the reference was to the creation of a fleet capable of opposing the U.S. Navy and its allies on the ocean, of operating on their sea lanes, and, in addition, of successfully operating in remote regions of the world with the aim of resolving a number of political problems. In other words, a fleet was built to ensure our global military presence. Everything was done without regard to whether such goals were actually posed or the degree to which they were actually attainable: this was the subject of discussion not only by those wishing us ill in NATO countries, Japan, etc.

Admiral S. G. Gorshkov characterized the situation as follows: "The Navy has acquired the ability to open new directions of struggle for the Armed Forces that since ancient times were considered beyond our reach."³ He writes further that the creation of a Soviet ocean fleet is comparable in significance to such most important events in the recent past that have influenced world politics as the USSR's development of nuclear arms.⁴

It is also written that we have become a most influential world power and that our striving to pursue foreign policy, including military policy, in all directions of world development, is therefore entirely natural.⁵

We are beyond question a great country and it hardly need be proven that we now have and will in the future have economic and political interests in all corners of the world. But what is the nature of these interests and how can what was discussed above be related to them? After all, it was not for nothing that our greatest military figures—A. A. Svechin, M. V. Frunze, and M. N. Tukhachevskiy—emphasized that we need a fleet that is oriented toward defense, that takes the specifics of the country's geographical location and its economic situation into account. One might object that more than a half-century has passed and that much has changed during that time. Yes, that is true, but one fundamental principle has remained the same: we have remained a primarily continental power and have not acquired such transoceanic political and economic interests that would require the globalization of our military presence and the creation of a fleet to support it (all the more so because this is obviously the costliest part of military preparations).

It is obviously unnecessary to argue countless times that expansionism, arrogance, etc., are frequently present in American politics. All this is unquestionably true. But nevertheless the American globalization of its military presence reflects existing realities. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not become a country with global

economic ties. The volume of Soviet foreign trade (even in value terms without regard to its character) is many times less than the corresponding indicators of the leading Western countries, to say nothing of other forms of economic cooperation. But as regards the USA, its NATO allies, Japan, and many other developed and developing countries (given all differences between them), their interdependence is enormous and is constantly increasing, and ocean communications are truly vitally important arteries. Any threat, albeit hypothetical, is perceived not only by the USA but also by the other countries that have been mentioned as a threat to its/their existence.

This circumstance has been very purposefully exploited by the USA to create what was at one time called the "total military power" [TMP] of imperialism. A paradoxical situation developed: the more impressive the Soviet Union's military preparations were, the more intensive did centripetal processes within TMP develop, and the greater was the number of potential enemies appearing on the horizon. There were obviously sufficient arguments to view Soviet military power as offensive power oriented not so much toward the protection of its own global interests (bearing in mind their limited nature) as toward the acquisition of the possibility of influencing the interests of others. And, frankly speaking, from time to time its use (directly or "through representatives") reinforced this perception. Suffice it to recall Afghanistan and not only Afghanistan.

But let us ask: what happened during that time to the military threat to us from the West and in general to the role and place of military force? Were the efforts to create such colossal "nuclear-nonuclear" military power perhaps justified in the "post-parity" period as well? Should we perhaps, at the "risk of our life," continue this policy? Should we fear a 1941-type military catastrophe and therefore, in particular, extend the perimeter of our defense to a global scale? I do not believe that the answer to all these questions can be found in the conventional solutions. Fundamental changes in all spheres of life have radically altered the usual ideas about the nature of the military threat and the security role of military power.

The basic thing that must be noted is that war between East and West has become inconceivable as a conscious act. The inevitability of the fatal consequences of nuclear conflict is, strictly speaking, at the basis of so-called nuclear deterrence. In the opinion of D. G. Yazov, USSR defense minister, the development of the productive forces, the intensification of economic relations of the entire system, and the improvement of conventional weapons over time have resulted in a situation where the massive use of non-nuclear weapons will also inevitably lead to global catastrophe.⁶

The wholeness of the world we live in, which is manifested to an ever greater degree, has become another important factor that determines the growing understanding of the danger of military conflict and the

senselessness of the arms race. Ecological and medical problems know no boundaries. Other problems—raw materials, energy, etc.—will inevitably arise in the relatively near future. All of them, to say nothing of the preservation of life on the planet, can only be resolved through common efforts. And it is by no means the intellectual elite alone that now understands all this and the inadmissibility of military conflict. The entire civilized world is now essentially keenly aware of the new realities. It is specifically the ability to perceive them and to act in accordance with them that becomes the yardstick of civilization to an enormous degree.

Most profound changes have taken place in the living standard and the quality of the life of the broadest strata of population in the West in the postwar decades. It is well known that aggressive wars in the past usually started with the support of a considerable part of society which viewed them as a means of acquiring living space, resources, and thus of resolving their own urgent problems. Now—I have already had occasion to write about this—the scientific-technological revolution in combination with flexible social policy has made it possible to solve a large part of them in a completely different way. No one would any longer think of equating territorial size and resource availability with national well-being and prosperity (which is, alas, largely connected with our experience). All the moreso, in no single developed country is there any kind of solid social base for carrying out aggressive actions against the USSR or in general for implementing a policy that could lead to a big war. There is a combination of factors here: tight controls by legislative bodies over executive bodies; developed civilian society (which has placed militarism under quite stable control); and awareness of the deadly danger of such actions. Frankly speaking, there are no very discernible factors that might encourage someone to engage in military conflict with us as some kind of last, desperate step—"to go down with a fanfare!"

It is specifically by virtue of what has been said that where Western countries are concerned, war with the USSR is impossible as a means of resolving political and other problems. Does this mean that we have no need for military power whatsoever? Does this no contradict what was said at the beginning of the article? By no means, because in order to exclude surprises connected with technical, political, or any other reasons, the Soviet Union must have the guaranteed ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacking side.

It is obvious that we have such ability and therefore as long as the technical reasons on the basis of which all existing weapons—nuclear and conventional—exist, as long as the age of fundamentally new weapons has not dawned (this will be discussed in greater detail below), the USSR will have a guaranteed "window of vulnerability" or "period of guaranteed military security." It lasts roughly 10-15 years, whereupon a situation requiring different evaluation criteria may develop.

There is no doubt—and there is daily practical confirmation of this point—that the existing realities are also perfectly well understood in the West. As already stated, the West is not looking for a ruinous, no-win conflict. It is therefore impossible to understand the logic that the condemnation of nuclear war in the political lexicon and Western military doctrines is nothing more than a declaration to soothe the public, that has not and does not play any kind of restraining role in NATO military activity⁷, that we will now have to prepare to repel possible NATO aggression involving both nuclear and conventional arms. Of course, the professional load of military leaders is very heavy. But in such evaluations one nevertheless sees the desire to apply old criteria to a new situation. But this may seem extremely unfavorable both from the standpoint of seriously improving the entire international situation and of resolving specific national security problems. Obviously, the existence of such a “period of security” that is bestowed upon us by history and the logic of world development must be used with maximum effectiveness in all spheres, including the military sphere, which is presently the subject of discussion.

It seems especially important to secure such changes in the scale and structure of our military power that would bring it into line with the situation that actually exists today and that would pave the way for its future evolution. It is first of all necessary to continue to restructure our armed forces in accordance with the adequate defense concept, which is discussed in party documents, in materials of the Political Advisory Committee of Warsaw Treaty member-participants, etc. The unilateral reduction of armed forces and conventional arms, as is the case in the USSR, brings us closer to specifically this type of power. But structural balance is also very important. Of course, the Vienna talks and all other negotiations are very important. But it is unquestionably true that the Soviet Union should not connect its steps to optimize military power exclusively with them. There is much that we not only can but should do unilaterally to make our “grandiose war machine” (as Corresponding Member O. N. Bykov called it) more compact and flexible. The reference here is above all to those of its clearly hypertrophied elements that create well known asymmetries, without adding anything to our security, and that “subtract” from it on a long-term, strategic basis. Of course the reference is to those of its elements (and trends in their development) that, while not creating asymmetries in a physical sense, seriously yields to the combined power of the West but nevertheless create a serious “asymmetry” of a military-political nature, that willy-nilly give Soviet military activity features that are very undesirable for us. This is first of all the fleet or more precisely part of its composition and operational activity that is specifically oriented toward the performance of those “global” functions that only multiply economic and political difficulties.

Finally, in the structure of our military power there are also elements that are “exotic” according to modern

concepts, such as the nation's enormous PVO [anti-aircraft defense] system (A. Arbatov also wrote about this recently⁸). Expenditures on it comprise—once again according to Western estimates—up to 15 percent of the military budget, while its effectiveness, as experience shows, is none too high. At the same time, even its routine modernization swallows up tens of billions of rubles. Naturally, we must make a sober evaluation of the kind of PVO system we need today with due regard to the decisive role of nuclear missile weapons. But the fact that we produce seven time more ground-to-air missiles than the USA (four times more than NATO as a whole) and have 30-plus more PVO fighters than NATO countries in Europe is in itself quite eloquent. What is more, all the armaments and several thousand radars are operated by 0.5 million service personnel.

Optimization is also directly connected with armed forces manpower acquisition and with the level of combat training. It can hardly be denied that sophisticated equipment, especially in the future, will require an increasing degree of professionalism. According to available Western estimates, the combat training received by our tank crewmen in a year is one-tenth the training received by their American counterparts (at the same time that we have five times more tanks); our fliers receive one-third the flying time⁹ [of American fliers] (at the same time that we have almost three times more tactical aircraft), etc. If this is the case, the situation must be altered starting with armed forces manpower acquisition and ending with their size and structure. The effectiveness—military and economic—of the induction system is steadily declining. I will add that the twice-a-year callup, which each time results in the relocation of a large number of people, is in itself a very complex and controversial measure when we consider ethnic problems. It is of course possible to replace the analysis of the situation with announcements in the press that all citizens must be ready to defend the Homeland, otherwise as Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev wrote in the pages of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 14 January 1989, social justice will be violated. But this does not reduce the urgency of the problem.

It is not the purpose of the present article to analyze the problem in detail. Many complex questions arise here and the discussion will not center on decisions with the simplicity and clarity that are so dear to our heart. But whatever the case, it is necessary to bear in mind the following: when the USA made the transition to a professional army, personnel maintenance costs did not increase (in constant 1987 prices, they totaled \$79 billion in the 1968 fiscal year and \$72 billion in the 1988 fiscal year).¹⁰ As regards total real economic costs, they unquestionably declined primarily because of the higher skill level of the professional army. It is therefore entirely impossible to understand the estimate that a professional army would cost us 5-8 times more than an army of draftees. This is only possible if we keep the structure, scale and quantity of equipment of the armed forces the same and raise pay if not to the U.S. level then in any event to the level of the West European countries.

The thrust of what has been said is that there is need for in-depth military reform (as an element of the entire complex of reforms in our society) starting with the public formulation of the concept of national security, the role and place of military power in its realization, the assessment of real current and future threats, the identification of what is connected with the East in Western military preparations, what is connected with problems of North-South relations, etc. As in all developed countries, military activity in our country is an integral part of all economic and political activity, and as in all countries, the determination of its scale, structure, and trends in its development must be the prerogative of the corresponding institutions, particularly of the new Supreme Soviet.

This does not mean disbanding our armed forces or reducing them by 50 percent (or by 30 or 70 percent) or "moral disarmament." Everything is much more serious and complex: our military power must see to the nation's security at a minimum cost so that its parameters would correspond to the Soviet Union's new look, without which it would be quite difficult for us to find our proper place in the world.

The determination of these parameters is one of the most important tasks of the military, of politicians, and of economists. The new political thinking—inter alia, in the military sphere—is not Manilovism [smug complacency], is not starry-eyed idealism, is not wishful thinking. Quite to the contrary, this is, the unfortunately long years overdue "hour of truth" that made it possible for us to understand more or less clearly the entire depth of problems and the total difficulty of their solution. And military power that in any case will cost less must become one of the clearly expressed features of our society that attest to the force, to the reason, and to the clear understanding of its interests, and to the realization that we are driven not by dull enmity, but by the striving to resolve together with others world problems of great complexity, without of course forgetting the very difficult problems that have accumulated at home.

II

Among these problems, there is hardly a problem that is more important than the resolution of the country's economic crisis. The relations between military power and the economy, which are always acute and contradictory, have therefore acquired many new alarming features of late.

What has been the price of creating the power that we now possess? What is the price we have paid for attempting to compete with virtually the entire world by ourselves? First several figures. The Soviet Union's GNP is roughly one-fifth that of the USA, the European NATO countries, and Japan. Let us also add to this Canada, Australia, South Korea, and certain other countries that have very strong military ties with the United States and Great Britain. Let us attempt to introduce here a qualitative coefficient that takes our threatening

scientific-technical lag into account. According to American estimates, we lag behind the USA in 14 out of 20 of the most important, basic branches of technology, have rough parity in only 6, and do not lead in any branch.¹¹ And after all there is also Japan and Western Europe.

The real correlation of economic power also appears to be such. I think that it is difficult to doubt that the reference is to a gap that is measured as an order of magnitude. My only fear is that there will not be a 1 in front of the 0. One of the main answers (I most definitely emphasize—not the only answer) to a question that millions of people ask themselves every day—how can it be that tens and hundreds of billions of rubles are underinvested in literally all branches of the economy—from railroads to health care—clearly suggests itself. Given such a correlation of potentials, in the last decade we have produced 2.2 times more tanks than all NATO countries and Japan (and over 3 times more than the USA), 2 times more infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers (4.5 times more than the USA), and 4 times more artillery pieces (8 times more than the USA). We have already mentioned submarines, surface-to-air missiles, and basic classes of surface ships (these are the only things that we have built appreciably less of than all the aforementioned countries combined). I would like to see information of "domestic" [Soviet] origin that refute these figures and provide a fundamentally different picture. But it does not exist and the entire experience of the past shows that given the sophisticated technical means of intelligence and analysis, errors of this type in Western estimates are quite minor.

One would like to see different—entirely different—figures because they are totally stupefying. Let us try to imagine what they mean. According to the most common estimates, military spending accounts for 9-17 percent of our GNP (for the sake of comparison: less than 6 percent of the U.S., approximately 3 percent of the West European, and 1 percent of the Japanese GNP). Even if we leave all the conditionalities of calculating GNP, ruble-dollar comparisons, etc., aside, I do not believe that these figures give the full picture of the burden borne by the USSR national economy. Indeed, the best resources, the best equipment, and the best personnel are used to satisfy defense needs. This is even the subject of discussion today.¹² But it is also a fact that our economy's military sector is wont to live "outside the economy": materials are centrally allocated, equipment is made or "obtained" overseas at any price, and wages are also very different from the generally accepted norms in the national economy. The enduring penchant of our military industry and obviously its clients as well for practically never completing the deployment of a weapons system before embarking on the development of the next generation of the system (unlike the USA and other Western countries who do not do so for economic reasons) also costs enormous additional sums that no one has evidently even attempted to calculate up until now.

Let us try to solve a simple arithmetical problem ("arithmetical" because qualitative and certain other parameters exceed the framework of the problem). Approximately 3.2-3.4 million persons (15-16 percent of the work force in the manufacturing and extractive industry) in the USA are employed in the production of weapons and military equipment. Let us assume in round figures that the Soviet Union produces only two times more [weapons and military equipment] than the USA and that its labor productivity is approximately one-half of the American level. The Soviet manufacturing and extractive industry employs 38.2 million persons. Consequently about one-third of them are employed in the production of weapons and military equipment. Let us subtract from this the work force in the extractive, light, local, printing, and other branches of industry. And let us imagine that the machine building complex and chemistry—the fundamental basis of the entire economy, without the decisive restructuring of which absolutely nothing can be accomplished—are left to the "nonmilitary" sector! This is truly the leftover principle [ostatochnyy printsip] but in an unexpected, maximally hypertrophied form. Here they are—the railroads and health care, at least a considerable part of them. Was everything that these millions of people did even after parity in nuclear missiles was attained really necessary for security, for defense?

I agree entirely with those who say that the conversion of military production in itself cannot produce the so earnestly desired economic effect if it is carried out like a political campaign. Of course, there is need for precise analysis: which plants should be converted to the production of a given product, which plants should be mothballed, what to do about the principle that we cannot have a manpower surplus, how to give manpower a mobility even remotely resembling that of American manpower, how to avoid generating additional social tension, etc.

Nevertheless, something else here is entirely clear: unless the military sector of the economy is substantially reduced, unless normal economic relations are introduced here, no matter how brilliant the people carrying out the economic reform are, no matter how favorable the conditions to its implementation, they will hardly succeed in their effort because unless these conditions are met there will simply be little left to reform! Consequently, in the process of military organizational development, it is also necessary to take the state of the economy fully into account. Our reduction of our military production by almost 20 percent is unquestionably an important step in the right direction. But only thorough analysis of the situation and a review of priorities in the course of the military reform will make it possible to create conditions for major structural changes in the national economy.

However this aspect of the problem is directly connected with another: what does the present state of the economy

mean for military preparations—especially in the future, for the solution of the problem that has already been discussed above?

It appears that the new state of the scientific-technological revolution is destroying every vestige of the "enclave" system of functioning of the war economy, including, first and foremost, the production of arms and military equipment and, of course, R&D. There are already a sufficient number of indications that advances in the "civilian" sphere can decisively alter the qualitative characteristics of conventional arms and increase their effectiveness 10-20-fold. New areas of science—biotechnology, superconductivity, further breakthroughs in the development of computers—are in general opening up such promising directions in the development of the means of armed struggle (or their functional elements) that can hardly be evaluated at present. The inevitable result of the breadth of the front of the scientific-technological revolution and its immediate impact on literally all spheres of activity is that in the military area it is no longer possible to compensate for quality by quantity, to compensate for general backwardness by a crash program to concentrate material resources and brainpower in one or two directions (as was done in the USSR initially in the development of nuclear arms and subsequently in the development of missile and space technology). The question is now posed on the following plane: a country either does or does not have the ability to keep in step with the advances of the scientific-technological revolution. A choice no longer exists. Of course, there may be lag in some respect, but if there is lag in all or almost all respects, it will be inconceivable to maintain our defensive military might even at a merely adequate level in the future.

It is very important to appreciate this new quality of the situation. Our truly self-sacrificing people are even now ready to make all the customary material sacrifices required to maintain the country's defensive capability. I will not dwell on what is also on our—international affairs scholars'—conscience: the reasons why people still have this "siege" mentality. But whatever the case may be, they are as usual prepared to make sacrifices. But it is essential that everyone understand that no kind of sacrifices, no kind of material deprivation can change anything in the existing situation. Academician L. I. Abalkin was absolutely correct when he recently expressed deep concern over the fact that it is very difficult to get the kind of personnel that are required by the modern level of technology without raising the general level of interpersonal, consumer service, engineering, etc., culture. Naturally, this also applies to the armed forces proper (it is a paradox that the nation's military spending is enormous but the working and living conditions of both privates and officers and their families are often simply unacceptable; this is one more facet of the military reform). For this reason, the low standard of living begins to reproduce itself in a certain sense and becomes a serious obstacle on the road to

resolving the problems that arise. But the search for a solution along extensive lines is hopeless.

In a word, a situation has finally developed in which the economy has become a key component of the strategic balance (in the broad sense of the term). This means not merely the dependence of the armed forces on the economy, which was described by F. Engels, but rather the emergence of an irremediable situation in which—without the dramatic acceleration of the country's overall scientific-technical development, without serious positive change in the economy—the armed forces run the risk of finding themselves in a situation where they simply cannot perform their functions effectively. Therefore the period of "guaranteed security" should be used in such a way that would, by large-scale maneuvering of resources, constantly move its frontier so that it would not end as long as the need exists for such a military guarantee.

I suggest that there are those who may construe this as an appeal for an arms race but only in a new quality, at a new technological level. I would like to explain my position clear. I encountered such evaluations several years ago at the time when work started on the study of "aggregate military power" and the first publications appeared. But already then I attempted to prove that we—if we continued our previous policy—would ultimately encounter unsolvable economic (and political) problems that objectively overwhelm us in all parameters of power, but did not by any means try to convince anyone that all we had to do was allocate twice as much of our GNP to military needs and everything would be wonderful. The issue continues to be that we must secure the qualitative and quantitative parameters of military preparations that are written into the conception of defensive sufficiency and no more!

And if someone in a certain time studies these problems after us and possibly in place of us, they will decide that the situation has changed and that the economy that—God willing!—has been put in order again makes it possible to once again create something that is "comparable in importance" but that does not correspond either to the character of threats or to the geopolitical interests, or finally, to the country's potential, once again to promise to "bury" someone—this will be an irremediable mistake. The only result can be a new cycle in the formation of the "aggregate military power" opposing us. It will be much more "aggregate" and much more "powerful" that it is at present because of the continuously increasing interrelationship between its potential participants and the increase in the number who are capable of making a quite substantial independent contribution to its functioning with all its consequences. To be sure, no one wants to think about this. After all, in the quite near future, this would mean the return to economic stagnation, the rejection of the rise of the living standard that has been so long awaited and necessary from various points of view for the sake of goals that primarily unnecessary, to say nothing of the fact that they are totally unattainable and will be even more so

tomorrow than yesterday and today. Finally, this would mean international isolation, I fear, much harsher than what we have encountered to date.

III

Thus we come to the next aspect in the examination of the problem: military power and foreign policy. The problem of proportionality of development of the military component, one of the three (economic, political, and military) that determine to an overwhelming degree the role and place of individual countries and their associations in the world¹³, is by no means of a theoretical nature. The importance of the correct application of this correlation to the economy was discussed above. But where the political aspect is concerned, proportionality or the expedience of the level of development of the military component is determined predominantly, at any rate, by the degree to which the scale and structure of military power correspond to the long-term political interests of the state and the degree to which they promote (or hinder) the creation of a maximally favorable "environment."

Japanese researcher H. Seki notes that "global militarization is focused on an international "power structure" in which the hostility of superpowers is prevalent and extends to the horizontal and vertical forms of struggle between countries, encompassing both the intermediate and peripheral parts of the world."¹⁴ This is unfortunately quite an accurate picture and the present place of Soviet military power in this picture is clearly seen. I think that this position must be changed on the basis of long-range political interests. Military power must correspond to the geopolitical realities. In other words, it seems very important to me to strive for a situation in which Soviet military power will be directed not *a priori* against someone and shoulder to shoulder with someone (which usually has virtually a mystical nature and is quite remote from corresponding to reality), but will become an equal element of our new flexible but purposeful foreign policy, that is oriented toward lowering the level of the military threat and toward the creation of truly constructive international relations.

It is obviously also necessary to take a new look at the problem of alliances. Military power cannot in any way be replaced by natural alliances, i. e., alliances that are based on long-term interest in one another's stability and prosperity irrespective of the degree of the external threat. All postwar alliances (especially NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization) have specifically been created under its influence since then. But it must not be concluded on this basis that they are unnatural. If positive changes continue but the level of military confrontation in Europe substantially diminish, there will inevitably be profound changes in the hierarchy of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization tasks that may also affect their structure, nature, and configuration. In NATO, for example, there are many who think that the political significance of this union will grow as the role of the military factor diminishes. I think that the same path

would also be correct for the Warsaw Treaty. Under the new conditions, timely evolution of such a type could play a very positive role. Of course, perestroika in Soviet military preparations will also have to take this turn of events into account. There is absolutely no necessity that military collaboration be a "central" point of joint activity. What will take its place is another problem requiring special analysis.

I would like to note that the time has come in both Eastern and Western Europe to discontinue brushing aside the term "Finlandization." While this suits some countries and not others, Finland's experience—both politically and economically (especially under the new conditions) appears indisputably positive and deserving of the most attentive analysis. But we should also not forget the reliability of the Finnish border and the lack of numerous torturous problems in respect to this country.

The new structure of international relations may lead to *de jure* and *de facto* alliances while not necessarily changing the composition of military power in the process and hence not every trend of this type will immediately tell upon the Soviet Union's military activity. The reference point will not by any means be whether or not the USSR will be a participant in one or another alliance.

Generally speaking, the awareness that by no means everything that is done in the military sphere in the world is always directed against us, is geared toward us, or is solely connected with us is one of the very important considerations from the standpoint of the nation's foreign policy interests. Such a view is a kind of anachronism, a rudiment of a bipolar world that has disappeared into the past for all time. This is how it always is or almost always has been. To accept this situation in such a way today means ignoring many obvious realities.

For example, as has been entirely correctly noted, West European military integration (we will not go into its other characteristics here) is connected not only with East-West relations, but with West-West relations and, on an ever increasing scale, with North-South relations as well. The possibility is not excluded that the lower limit to the military activity of West European countries will be determined by this line.¹⁵

The situation in the Asian-Pacific region (ATR: aziatsko-tikhookeanskiy region) also requires serious reappraisal. Naturally, there are certain elements that alarm us about the American military present in this region. But in my view they are entirely offset by the previously discussed factors that deter any large conflict. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that the West is not making preparations for an aggressive war but that the East is making such preparations. It is entirely obvious that with such a state of affairs, Europe (or conversely, Japan) would simply be in the position of hostages. It is also necessary to take something else into account. Ya. Nakasone was entirely right when he defined the military balance in the ATR as an eastern miniature—"several thin and indeterminate strokes with an empty space between them"¹⁶ (unlike the

existing situation in Europe). The rapid development of many countries in the region may be accompanied by many different variants for filling this void. Is it important to maintain stability here? It is extremely important. But after all, the American military presence specifically performs certain functions in this regard. This is explicitly stated, for example, by Lee Kwan Yew, Singapore's prime minister. Nor can one ignore the view that the formation of a "vacuum" in the ATR might mean the rapid doubling or even trebling of Japan's military spending. But would this in turn mean an increase in instability in view of the general picture in the region? What is more dangerous to the USSR? Where is the threat more real? And above all, must we tortuously and hopelessly attempt to fill the void in the military balance?

Therefore our military power in the ATR must to a much greater degree correspond to our real positions in this part of the world.

Of course, the list of situations requiring a new approach to the evaluation of the impact of "external development" on USSR military preparations is by no means confined to the cited examples.

And so there is one more area where we must abandon stereotypes (which, of course would be desirable in general). We must do so without going from one extreme to another but with a clear understanding of the relative pluses and minuses.

This is directly adjoined by one more problem—the degree to which military power can compensate other "components of influence" and serve as the basis for the long-term strengthening of positions in the world. Judging by everything, our experience in the '70's created a very distorted view of its potential. At one time it seemed that the true means of strengthening our influence had been found: directly or "through representatives." But the time has come to pay the bills. And how incredibly difficult it is to make these payments! The lesson must be remembered—military might can never take the place of economic and political components and its foreign political potential is ultimately very limited in our time. It is also necessary to draw further practical conclusions from what has happened and hence to reduce not only the military presence but the arms trade as well. Even its purely instantaneous benefits are questionable and the general losses—economic and political—are enormous. The fact that according to Western estimates, the Soviet Union is the world's largest arms supplier does not make us more influential and does not win us reliable friends, because they need not only weapons but also loans, technology, and food. But when all these are combined, it is another matter. Generally speaking, the sale of weapons and licenses for their production must be eliminated altogether (except for certain special cases) from this list before it is too late, before the situation gets entirely out of hand.

This is one more facet of the military reform in our country and it is one more very important point on the agenda of negotiations with the West.

When we speak about the problem of "military power and foreign policy," we inevitably encounter the degree to which interaction between them considers the fact that the postwar era has ended.

Naturally this does not mean the virtually automatic repudiation of all agreements and realities, that are discussed by H. Kissinger, for example, associated with the end of World War II.¹⁷ But a fundamentally different, political, and military "space" has been unquestionably created (after all, it is itself in large measure the result of the war), in which the division into victors and vanquished is of a very conditional nature if only because it is entirely inappropriate to the concepts "strong" and "weak" in their modern interpretation that necessarily includes the category of economic prosperity and scientific-technical leadership. I believe that if we seek the reference point of the end of the postwar era, it will prove to be specifically the period in which this inadequacy appeared and strengthened in combination with the irreversibility of West European integration and the advent of other new growth poles in the world.

Therefore, military power which formed over decades in our country and in the West according to the "postwar" scheme must invariably undergo serious structural and vector changes in order that it also become an organic element of the new space.

What are the main properties of this power? What does it need to acquire such organic nature? I think that the answer already exists: defensive sufficiency. Moreover this is sufficiency that is based not only on the new evaluations of the required number of divisions, equipment, etc., which are, of course, very important. But as historical experience shows, no government, no general staff since the beginning of the century has been able to correctly calculate the forces that are really required or, above all, to correctly understand the significance of the political situation, the significance of what is "written" into it, and how military preparations influence the situation. Therefore the discussion must be of defensive sufficiency in which the restructuring of the armed forces is in full unity with the most important reality of our time—the impossibility, senselessness, and criminal nature of military conflict between East and West.

I do not belong to the number of optimists who believe that peace and tranquility will reign on earth in the foreseeable future. The road to this will probably be long and tortuous. Therefore it is so important that the country approach already existing, extremely acute global problems and possible aggravated situations as a fully equal, active participant in a community of many highly developed countries, including the military aspects of its activity. Foreign policy in the post-April period has been oriented toward attaining this—it can be said without exaggeration—important historical goal.

The period of guaranteed security must be used in the foreign policy sphere to effect this "integration," this decisive change in the character of interrelations. Then all development during and beyond the 10-15-year period of time will look different and the boundaries of security will be expanded (on a continuing basis) not only by our internal conditions that were discussed above, but by the general change in our international position and status as well. Military power should be a help rather than a hindrance (albeit occasionally involuntarily) in this area.

Thus the characterization of power, the content and form of the decision-making process—all this must correspond to the goals, tasks, and priorities of foreign political activity. Otherwise the erroneous impression—fraught with grave consequences and failures—might be created that military power has a political function of its own and this, of course, is inadmissible.

In the relatively recent past, the struggle between the two systems was considered the basic content of the epoch and the so-called class nature of foreign policy led us into impenetrable jungles (in both a literal and figurative sense). Strictly speaking, it quite soon developed that military power was the principal and later on virtually the only instrument of this struggle and this foreign policy. The results are common knowledge. We fortunately came to understand that this is a road that leads nowhere and that our country and our ideas deserve a better fate and better argumentation. This is also one more proof of the need for extensive military reform.

Thus, the question is: military power—how much, what kind, and why? Realizing that my answers will of course be incomplete and will by no means satisfy everyone, I nevertheless propose my own variant. How much—no more than the level required to protect the country's vital interests in accordance with the character of real threats and economic potential given the transition to the principles of defensive sufficiency and the lack of political, economic, and other potential and motivation on the part of both West and East to engage in a conflict that is both suicidal and senseless (even with the hypothetical possibility of survival). What kind—flexible, mobile, with clearly expressed priorities of development, capable of reacting promptly to changing situations. Why—to secure the comprehensive participation of the country in peaceful development processes and in the support of the principal directions of foreign political activity.

Military reform is unquestionably just as essential as reform of the political system and the economy. External conditions favorable to military reform are taking shape: in addition to the long-range obligations and factors that were already described above, we cannot fail to see other, entirely tangible manifestations of this fact. The USA has cut its military spending 5 years in a row and signs of favorable change in Europe and Asia are gradually multiplying. While nothing in this world is free of ambiguities, further steps of the USSR in the already

chosen direction will dramatically accelerate positive changes today and secure positions worthy of us tomorrow.

The biggest risk today is to change nothing, to stop, deciding that a sufficient amount has already been done (there is such a point of view). A great politician in the last century said that the most unpleasant thing is to make a decision and that the most dangerous thing is not to make a decision. Our country today has with its own hands created a chance for cardinal change for the better everywhere, including the military sphere. We must use all 100 percent of this chance.

Footnotes

1. See "The Military Balance. 1987-1988," London, 1987. I do not address this question in greater detail because it has been very competently dealt with in a number of publications, in particular in the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN.
2. See "Soviet Military Power," Washington, 1988, pp 34, 38.
3. S. G. Gorshkov, "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva" [State Naval Might], Moscow, 1979, p 276.
4. Ibid., pp 411-412.
5. See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 1, 1984, p 66.
6. See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 April 1989.
7. See PRAVDA, 13 March 1989.
8. See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 3, 1989, p 41.
9. See C. Levin, "Beyond the Bean Count," Washington, 1988, pp 24, 25.
10. Calculated according to: "Budget of the United States Government" for the respective years.
11. See "American Defense Annual. 1987-1988." Ed. by J. Kruzel, Lexington, (Mass.), 1987, p. 65.
12. See, for example, KOMMUNIST, No 4, 1989, p 116.
13. For more detail, see "Voyenno-ekonomicheskiye svyazi stran NATO" [Military-Economic Relations of NATO Countries], Moscow 1988, pp 222-224.
14. H. Seki, "The Asia-Pacific in the Global Transformation," Tokyo, 1987, p 35.
15. See ME I MO, No 2, 1989, pp 106-107.
16. THE ECONOMIST, 24 December 1988, p 48.
17. See THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 May 1989.

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Role of Armed Forces in Prevention of War

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 89
(signed to press 27 Aug 89) pp 21-27

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Serebryannikov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Preventing War: The Army's Contribution"]

[Text] While wars of the past, even world wars, were destructive and they decimated the population, they did not place mankind on the brink of annihilation. Prior to the nuclear era they were believed to be a fully permissible means of policy. But now any nuclear and even nonnuclear war between major states and alliances is objectively equivalent to world catastrophe. Regional wars and local armed conflicts also harbor the danger of growing to global scale with lethal consequences to all mankind.

Under these conditions the objective of defending socialism is essentially consistent with the objective of all mankind—averting a new war, and ensuring a firm peace. These are the ends pursued by the military doctrines of the USSR and other socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Armed Forces bear great responsibility for protecting the socialist fatherland and preventing war. Their efforts are perpetually concentrated on this, and they will continue to be so until the danger of war is completely eliminated.

Prevention of war is the objective of purposeful, planned, multilateral and unilateral measures, implemented by states (blocs) by both nonmilitary (political) and military means, with the purpose of excluding the possibility of war.

Simultaneous elimination of the material resources of warfare—weapons and armies—by all states and blocs would be the most radical means of eliminating the danger of war. The interests of mankind's survival objectively demand acceleration of the transition from an over-armed to an unarmed world. The new way of political thinking is based on the idea that universal disarmament is possible in a world in which states with different social structures exist, if they work together. The Soviet Union has proposed an integrated program of disarmament, supported by other socialist countries. A recent appeal by Warsaw Pact states to NATO states says that "the realities of the modern world require a new conception of security—mutual and shared security, based on continuous reduction of military confrontation and arms reduction to the point of complete elimination of the threat of war, by way of eliminating the resources themselves and the potentials of its conduct."

Understandably elimination of weapons and armies is not an instantaneous action. Their roots have grown too deeply into the life of states and peoples; the dozens of armies of developed states, and the more than 100

armies of developing countries, containing a sum total of 27-29 million men; the military-industrial complexes, which employ 60 million workers; the mountains of conventional and nuclear arms. Influential circles in the West striving to perpetualize nuclear weapons and the danger of their use, to continue the course toward military superiority, and to act from a position of strength in international relations are creating obstacles not only to eliminating but also reducing arms and armed forces. Supporting the interests of "hawks," many theorists are vainly trying to prove that armies are something permanent, that without them mankind would supposedly fall into an abyss of chaos, such as might occur with the matter of the Universe, were the forces of gravity to be taken away from it.

Arms and armed forces may be dismantled only simultaneously and synchronously by the USSR and the USA, by the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This is a complex, contradictory and relatively lengthy process having a number of stages: halting the arms race; equalizing the levels and removing imbalances, significantly reducing arms and armed forces; realizing the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency, eliminating the capability for attacking and for conducting a large-scale offensive; destroying nuclear arms; eliminating military alliances (blocs) and their joint armed forces; disbanding national armies under the conditions of an absolutely reliably operating political mechanism maintaining an inviolable peace.

Restructuring of the policies of states (blocs) on the basis of the new way of political thinking, which is itself based on the impermissibility of war as a means of attaining any goals, on the impossibility of victory in it, on its destructiveness to mankind and to life itself on earth, and on the universality of the objective of averting war and then totally excluding it, is called upon to play the main role in realizing the ideal of disarmament.

Policy based on the new way of thinking stakes its hopes mainly on political rather than military means of ensuring security, on creating a reliable mechanism by which to block wars and military conflicts, on peaceful means of resolving disputes in international relations. Implementation of the principle of reasonable sufficiency is an important step on this road. This principle presupposes a minimum of arms and armed forces which would ensure reliable defense of a state (alliance) and fundamental transformation of arms and armies, such that they would lose primarily their capacity for attacking and for acting outside the borders of their states.

The objective of preventing war must be pursued today under conditions in which the world is over-armed, the arms race is continuing in a number of directions, sources and centers of warfare and military conflicts remain, and the new way of political thinking is just beginning to penetrate into the minds of the most farsighted Western politicians. Preventing war means keeping the existing possibilities for war from turning

into reality, and ensuring that force in the form of armed conflict is not used to attain any goals. It is also important to eliminate the threat of force, since such actions harbor the danger of war and military conflicts.

The military defensive doctrines of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact embody the principles of the new way of thinking, and they lay emphasis on changing relations between states (blocs) to a point where starting a war would become impossible. USSR Minister of Defense Army General D. T. Yazov emphasizes: "The concept of the policy of restructuring in defensive development is expressed in concentrated form in Soviet military doctrine. The objective to which this doctrine is subordinated is prevention of war, and it is based on the need for radically reducing the level of military confrontation, halting the arms race and gradually achieving real disarmament."

Expansion of the sole external function of the Soviet Armed Forces is now a common topic of discussion in connection with their inclusion in the process of working for the objective of preventing war. Emphasis is laid in this discussion on qualitative changes, which are a real revolution in military development. The army, you see, must now include itself in the global peacemaking process. While restraining the aggressor and maintaining a readiness to decisively repel an attack from him, at the same time the army is called upon to assist in relaxation of tension, and to participate in reduction of arms and armed forces. The turn of military-political relations from confrontation to dialogue presupposes development of contacts between the command and personnel of armies of the Western and Eastern states, of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Active participation of military leaders of both sides is promoting creation of a mechanism by which to block wars and military conflicts, and to achieve synchronous transformation of the armies with the goal of eliminating their capabilities for attack and for offense.

At the same time it should be kept in mind that changing the external function of the socialist army and imparting to it a general humanitarian nature does not mean eliminating its social-class content. The main factor is the high combat readiness and fighting capability of the socialist army, which is called upon to deprive the aggressor of any hopes of success in armed provocations, and to eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack and a blitzkrieg. Karl von Clausewitz suggested long ago that an invasion may be prevented by means of an obvious show of decisive retaliation, of the improbability of success. The crises of the last decades, in which our military might compelled "hawks" to abandon the use of nuclear weapons (the Caribbean crisis and so on) attest to this persuasively. Nor can we forget the lessons of the pre-nuclear era. For example Marshal of the Soviet Union A. V. Vasilevskiy suggested that had the fighting capabilities of our army been sufficiently high in 1941, and had they not been undermined by the purges of command and political personnel, the invasion by fascist Germany may never have occurred. Other authoritative

politicians and scholars feel the same way as well. And although this is only a hypothesis, an object of a developing scientific debate, I think that it accurately reflects *the exceptionally large role the combat readiness and the combat efficiency of our army has in maintaining peace and preventing aggression against socialism.*

Only a cadre army can ensure sufficient combat readiness and combat efficiency in modern conditions. On the other hand a transition from a cadre to a militia army, which is something the authors of some publications propose, would significantly reduce its combat readiness and combat efficiency, and it would mean a loss of military-strategic parity and a worsening of the situation, since this would automatically ensure that the cadre armies of Western states would be decisively superior to it. A militia army is weaker than a cadre army in mobility, training and fighting power. Clear evidence of this can be found in the almost 15 years' experience of development of a territorial militia army in our country (from the mid-1920s to the late 1930s). One of the reasons for our failures at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was the slowness of its transformation into a cadre army. This was pointed out by both Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov and other prominent troop commanders of our country.

In its decree "On the Basic Directions of the USSR's Domestic and Foreign Policy," the Congress of USSR People's Deputies naturally stated its support "to further qualitative development of the Soviet Army in correspondence with the existing principles of its formation."

Maintaining the army's high combat readiness is a matter requiring considerable exertion and art. It is presently being maintained in the conditions of weakening tension, reduction of armed forces, and their restructuring on the basis of defensive doctrine.

It must be considered that under these conditions pacifist, demobilizational sentiments may be revived, and relaxation and reduction of active service by soldiers may be condoned. Therefore it is important to utilize all means of educating the personnel in order to keep this from happening, and to preserve high combat readiness and military-strategic parity.

The assertion that the socialist army promotes attainment of the objective of preventing war chiefly by maintaining high combat readiness and combat efficiency has nothing in common with the conception of ensuring peace through force, which is so widely accepted in the West, including among leaders of the USA and NATO countries. On the contrary socialist states basically feel it necessary to reduce military confrontation, to eliminate military violence and to reinforce trust in international relations. A shift in Soviet military development to predominantly qualitative parameters differs fundamentally from the course toward "modernization" of NATO armed forces, since the former is oriented not on enhancing the attack capabilities of the army but on gradually implementing

defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency, which should not elicit any fears in any country for its security, even imagined ones. Socialism needs strong defense in order that no one would feel the temptation to transgress upon its accomplishments and values.

In addition the socialist army is having an increasingly more powerful peacemaking influence on the world situation through its *example of reducing the numerical strength of personnel and armament.* The Soviet Union and other socialist countries favor making the level of arms as low as possible, since the fewer arms there are, the greater is the security. Unilateral measures undertaken by socialist states to reduce their armed forces and arms are enjoying growing recognition and approval of the peoples of all countries, of world public opinion and of sober-minded politicians and scholars, and it is bringing about a growing, albeit slowly growing, constructivism and realism in the policy and actions of Western countries. For example for the first time in history, in June of this year the NATO Council gave a serious and concrete response, albeit not a consistently complete one, to our disarmament initiatives, and agreed to reduce the strength of its troops in Europe, including its offensive resources.

Typical in this respect was a report by a group of influential experts on military and foreign policy of Johns Hopkins University's Foreign Policy Institute in Washington titled "The Future of USA-USSR Relations," which contains recommendations for the Bush administration. The authors of the report include prominent American politicians such as former state secretaries E. Muskie and C. Vance, former defense secretaries M. Laird, H. Brown and J. Schlesinger, former American ambassador to the USSR A. Hartman and former CIA director R. Helms.

Measures implemented by the Soviet Union after 1985, including unilateral steps toward reduction of armed forces and arms, "cannot be characterized as cosmetic..." the document's authors point out. "These initiatives create the conditions for making American-Soviet relations less dangerous, based to a greater degree on cooperation, and more stable."

It stands to reason that unilateral reduction has its limits, ones which cannot be overstepped without detriment to our and universal security. A decision has been made in the Soviet Union to set a ceiling of 3.7 million persons for the armed forces.

The Soviet state and the CPSU are directing the development of the armed forces in such a way that their state and their activities would maximally promote reinforcement of the role of political (nonmilitary) means of ensuring security and the effectiveness of a peace-loving foreign policy.

Military circles of the major states (blocs) are having an influence on the international situation, world policy, public opinion and the psychology of nations and of all

mankind. They affect each other's state and activities. The socialist army positively influences the entire "world system of armies." After all, it takes the will of two sides and their armies to prevent war, although one side possessing sufficient force may exert an influence on the development of events.

Fulfilling the directions of the political leadership on developing relations with Western armies is an important direction in the socialist army's efforts to prevent war. This process is unfolding on the basis of treaties and agreements signed between states with different social structures, it is acquiring increasingly greater scope, and it is taking shape in legal, organizational, technical and planning respects. Active communication among military officials is making it possible to substantially compare and discuss military doctrines and conceptions, understand each other's intentions more deeply, and strengthen confidence in the predictability of the actions of each side. Relations are developing along military lines with the USA, France, the FRG and other countries. Regular contacts between representatives of the higher military leadership of countries and blocs, and between scientists, instructors of military educational institutions and groups of servicemen are making an important contribution to improving relations between states having different structures, as is exchange of annual plans of military activities and of observers at military exercises.

As the USSR minister of defense emphasizes, the trend toward expansion of dialogue between Eastern and Western military officials, were it to develop further, could make it possible to ensure peace through common effort not only for the present generation but also for our descendants.

Agreements to prevent war, military conflicts and incidents, to create commissions and centers for exchange of military-political information, to reduce the danger of a surprise attack and to maintain stability have special significance. Treaties to prevent incidents at sea and in airspace (1947, 1972 etc.) have been recently supplemented by important documents such as the "Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to Prevent Dangerous Military Activity," which became effective 1 September 1990, an agreement on mutual relations between the armed forces of the USSR and France, signed during M. S. Gorbachev's visit to France in the beginning of July of this year, and others.

Imposition of the objective of preventing war on the Soviet Armed Forces requires *scientific analysis of the entire complex of problems and creation of a new field of knowledge and fundamentally new resources, means and forms of action by the command and the troops at all levels*. Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy minister of defense, writes: "...One of the complex tasks

of military science is to develop the strategy of preventing war. This problem has never yet been raised in our armed forces. Deep scientific research and development of concrete recommendations to control organs, troops and naval forces are required."

I think that scientific development of the theory of preventing war should proceed within the framework of the teaching on war and peace, military science, military doctrine and military art. The theory and practical means of actions taken by an army to prevent war have not yet essentially been developed, inasmuch as all attention was concentrated in the past on developing the means of conducting combat activities. The history of military theoretical thought contains only weak suggestions as to the possibility for preventing, delaying or halting war by means of strong defense and through skillful use of the army.

The ancient Chinese philosopher Sun-Tzu topped the hierarchy of the means of struggle with the ability "to shatter the plans of the opponent before reaching the point of actual fighting," to prevent war "by preliminary calculation," by certain "signals" to the other side. Karl von Clausewitz expresses certain ideas on this account as well.

Engels specially analyzed the problem of transforming armies in the interests of preventing wars under the conditions of unshared domination of the entire world by exploiting orders. He felt that the following would be necessary for armies to serve this goal: to fundamentally change the direction of their development—to successively reduce the capacity for surprise attack and for offense, using "defense exclusively for reinforcement"; to reduce the numerical strength of armies in stages, and to replace permanent armies by militia armies, by universal armament of the people; to effect these transformations simultaneously and harmoniously throughout the entire "system of European armies" without detriment to the security of any state; to boldly set the example of unilateral reduction of numerical strength by the countries and armies most prepared for this, beginning with reduction of the time of active military service, which is "the best yardstick" of the fitness of troops for decisive "strategic and tactical offense."

The program for transforming armies developed by Engels was not implemented, though it did achieve wide public recognition. As Engels himself noted, the obstacles to its implementation were created not by military but by purely political considerations of bourgeois governments, which needed militarism both for foreign conquest and for suppression of their own people and of revolutionary and liberation movements.

In new historical conditions, V. I. Lenin developed the theory, strategy and tactics of struggle against imperialist wars, and substantiated the principles and means of foreign political activities of the socialist state to prevent and halt wars.

This objective aroused exceptional interest in late 1919 and in the early 1920s, when the civil war basically ended and the interventionist troops of foreign imperialist powers went back home. The lull was actively utilized to foil a mortally dangerous joint attack on Soviet Russia by bordering states—Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Romania, prepared by the great powers. The overall numerical strength of their armies was over 1 million, and they enjoyed a superiority in the quantity and quality of weapons and equipment.

The conception of preventing war developed under V. I. Lenin's guidance had a striking effect: The "minor states" with the exception of Poland refused to obey the Entente, and instead of going to war with us they sought peaceful relations. As V. I. Lenin noted, we were able to win the sympathies, trust and support of not only the peoples but even the hostile governments of the minor states, and to persuade them of our peace-loving nature, our desire to cooperate, to act "without violence," to develop mutually advantageous relations. At the same time the readiness to repel an attack and efforts to strengthen defenses, "so that they would not look at us from abroad as a weak state," were a decisive guarantee against military intervention. The barrier to war was erected out of diplomatic, legal, trade and economic relations, in combination with strong military defense. Lenin emphasized: "Our army is a real guarantee that imperialist powers will not make the slightest attempts, the slightest transgressions...."

Terms for ending the war were proposed in the course of repulsion of Polish aggression not only at times of military failures but also in times of victories. But our peace-loving nature was perceived then, as it often is even today by the way, as weakness. As V. I. Lenin showed, the language that was most "persuasive and comprehensible" to imperialists was "the language of the Red Army," which compelled them to discuss peace, trade and mutually advantageous relations with us.

Lenin's conception of preventing aggressive wars has always been the core of Soviet policy, though deviations did occur in certain stages: weakening of the role of political means, of interaction between them and military means, unilateral "reactions of force" to aggressive challenges, insufficiently weighed and justified use of the army in conflict situations, and so on. I think that the idea that war is inevitable prevailed over Stalin. He felt war to be a catalyst of revolution, that it was more dangerous to capitalism than to socialism, and he understated the possibility imperialist states had for engaging in armed struggle against the socialist state. At the threshold of the Second World War Stalin underestimated the peace movements and failed to achieve a sufficiently flexible combination of political and military means of preventing war. After the end of World War II, the possibilities for creating dependable security systems and improving relations between states with opposing social structures were not utilized. Nor was the power of socialism's peace-loving example fully realized.

It stands to reason that former experience and the legacy of the classicists on the problem of preventing war as a methodological tool for reaching fundamentally new objectives must be creatively analyzed.

The nature of modern weapons and warfare requires *change in the logic itself of the military thinking and actions of the command, staffs and the personnel of the army as a whole.*

It has become more difficult in moral, psychological and operational respects to combine steady resolve and aggressiveness in defeating an invading enemy with the readiness to stop the conflict if the aggressor abandons his intentions and goals.

It has also become exceptionally difficult to attain the objective of blocking and halting a conflict that has already begun in connection with the diversity of the ways in which events can develop: a) The attacker surrenders as a result of retaliatory blows; b) he stops his actions and sues for peace; c) he prepares new blows, and regroupes; d) he has terminated his actions, but he is not taking any diplomatic steps, he is not reacting to our proposals, and so on. Of course, specific actions are determined by the situation. But one thing is clear: No matter how the other side behaves under these conditions, defensive doctrine demands maximum effort on our part both in the struggle against the aggressor and in measures to halt the conflict. Efforts to halt military conflicts provide instructive experience on this account (both positive and negative): a unilateral cease-fire, withdrawal of troops to certain positions, appeals for negotiations, announcement of terms and a suggested procedure for settling relations, establishment of contacts between military commands and state leaderships, creation of international peacekeeping forces, and so on.

We can hardly agree with the opinion that the objective of preventing war can be reached only at the strategic level by supreme military organs and leaders. There can be no doubt that they do play a highly important role in this area. But this does not mean that the "lower army echelons" sit idly on the sidelines. The reader can persuade himself of this simply by looking at the agreement between the USSR and the USA on preventing dangerous military activity. It discusses special measures, resources, signals and other means of operations of armed forces, their subunits, servicemen, civilian workers, airplanes, ships and technical devices in zones of contact by which to prevent or immediately block the possibility of armed collisions as a result of prior incidents or incorrect assessment of the intentions of one of the sides, and immediately settle such incidents by peaceful means. The emphasis is on cutting off the possibility of creating and enlarging military incidents "from below"—from the tactical level.

As we know, the West is attempting to actively influence our defensive affairs, to compel us to increase expenditures on defense, to force us into a qualitative arms race, and to preserve "the image of an enemy." This is the

orientation of the new American military-political conception titled "The Strategy of Rivalry," which is intended to remain in force until the 21st century. Its general orientation was defined by the U.S. president as follows: "To make part of the enormous Soviet military machine obsolete, and to compel the Russians to distract resources into directions which might not be preferred for them." Three directions are distinguished: "Stealth" technology, which makes airplanes and rockets invisible to radar; use of superconducting materials to create new generations of computers and exceptionally economical engines; implementation of SDI. The United States has drawn up a major program to modernize the entire complex of American enterprises producing nuclear weapons. This is a 20 year program, one reaching all the way to the year 2010. The objective is to wear the USSR down economically, and force us to shift additional assets to defensive needs, and reduce our peace initiatives to naught.

Hopes are being laid on maintaining the arms race into the 21st century and creating a fundamentally new material and technical base of war; new scenarios of military conflict are being written, and computers are being used to play out versions of combat operations

involving weapons that will hypothetically exist in the late 1990s, and especially invasion plans and plans for the beginning of a war.

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We are forced to pursue the objective of preventing war in a contradictory situation, in which the danger of war is weakening but the USA and NATO are still continuing their militaristic preparations, while their military doctrines maintain a clearly expressed aggressive nature. This is why maintaining the high alertness, combat readiness and combat efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces is an indispensable prerequisite of successfully reaching this objective.

Preventing war and the readiness to reliably repel aggression no matter what the conditions under which it is initiated are inseparably related objectives. They can be reached through the flexible use of political and military means, and through stubborn, purposeful and coordinated work of the country's military-political leadership, the Ministry of Defense, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations, and all personnel of the army and navy.

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Changes Introduced by Draft Combined Arms Regulations

90UM0093A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 17 in Russian Sep 89
(signed to press 27 Aug 89) pp 43-50

[Article by Col V. Smirnov, chief of the Department of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces: "In Accord With the Demands of the Times (On the Drafts of the New Combined-Arms Regulations)"]

[Text] In the carrying out of responsible tasks by the Army and Navy in defending the Soviet motherland, an important role is played by the combined-arms regulations of the USSR Armed Forces and which govern the conduct and activities of the servicemen, their life, routine, the standing of duty, military and political training. It has been 14 years since the approval of the currently active regulations. Over this period we have adopted a new USSR Constitution, a new version of the CPSU Program and a new Soviet military doctrine. Significant changes have also occurred in the political structure and sociopolitical life of our society and this cannot help but be felt also in the Armed Forces. There has been testing for the provisions on the service by officer personnel, warrant officers ["praporshchik, michman"], sergeants, petty officers, soldiers and sailors as well as the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on the Filling of Various Positions With Servicewomen. There has also been renewal in the organization and establishment, in the life and routine of the troops, and increased demands have been placed on the maintaining of combat readiness, the standing of alert duty and the state of military discipline. All of this has necessitated the incorporating of the corresponding amendments and supplements in the draft regulations as well as a fundamental reworking of them for certain provisions.

At the request of the editors, Col V. Smirnov, department chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces describes the new changes found in the drafts of the new regulations.

First of all, it is essential to point out that as the basis of the drafts of the new regulations they have adopted the current ones many provisions of which have kept their significance at present. In this manner succession has been observed in the bases of military service. At the same time, for the first time they have reflected the demands of the USSR Constitution and military doctrine on the Armed Forces, the general concepts of military service, internal order, one-man command and other provisions a knowledge of which is essential for each serviceman to thoroughly understand his responsibility for defending the motherland and a conscientious attitude toward carrying out his military duty (UVS [Interior Service Regulations], Articles 1-5).

Previously, the combined-arms regulations set out the duties of the servicemen but did not indicate their rights. For this reason, the second section of Chapter 1 of the Draft UVS is titled "General Rights and Duties of

Servicemen." It (Article 6) points out that the Soviet state guarantees the social and legal protection of the serviceman's personality. He also benefits from all the socioeconomic, political and personal rights and freedoms and performs all duties provided by the USSR Constitution and the other legislative enactments considering the particular features stemming from the conditions of military service. The state authorities, the commanders of the troop units, the leaders of enterprises, institutions and organizations ensure the social protection and the realization of the rights and advantages established by legislation for the servicemen and their families.

In eliminating the presently found formalism and bureaucratic approach to the rights of the servicemen, Article 11 of the Draft UVS states that for personal questions a serviceman should turn to his immediate superior, and in the event of illegal actions against him by other servicemen or with particular necessity he can turn to the senior chief, to the military justice bodies and to other state bodies right up to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

For these same goals it is proposed that a subunit commander should receive subordinates on personal questions at any time free from alert duty, the performing of duties on daily detail and exercises (Article 61 of the UVS). It is also provided that a commander (chief) should respond carefully and sensitively to the incoming proposals, requests and complaints. He bears personal responsibility for their prompt review and the adopting of measures (Article 114 of the DU [Disciplinary Regulations]). Here it is also stated that proposals, requests and complaints be considered resolved if all the questions raised in them have been reviewed, if the necessary measures have been taken on them and exhaustive replies given corresponding to the current legislation.

In considering the existing threat of war and the harsh lessons of the past, the drafts of the new regulations pay greater attention to maintaining combat readiness and vigilance. For the first time, the procedure has been worked out for the organizing and standing of alert duty. Thus, in the new Chapter 6 "Alert Duty" (UVS) the basic essence of the given question is briefly set out. The chapter sets out the legal basis for alert duty which is the most important type of activity of the USSR Armed Forces in terms of tasks and one of the largest in terms of time of execution and the number of servicemen involved in standing it. Its incorporation in the regulations should be one of the organizing bases for carrying out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on increasing the vigilance and responsibility of the servicemen in carrying out the tasks of defense and ensuring the security of the USSR.

Significant changes have been incorporated in Chapter 14 of the Draft UVS "Actions Upon Alert." This states that alerts are to be divided into actual and training (according to the current regulations, combat alerts and assembly).

Also concretized are the duties of the personnel on daily detail in ensuring constant combat readiness of the regiment and its subunits. Thus, the person on duty in a regiment bears responsibility for promptly notifying the subunits and the regimental headquarters of the announcing of the alert. He is also given the duty, in receiving the alert signal and before the arrival of the regimental commander and his deputies, to direct the departure of the subunits to the assembly points. The draft of the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties (Article 232) gives the procedure for relieving the guards with the announcing of an alert.

The draft UVS (Article 9) includes the unjustly forgotten provision concerning the rules of conduct for servicemen when taken prisoner; this did exist in the 1960 Regulations. The necessity of this can be seen from the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the occasions of the taking prisoner of our servicemen in Afghanistan.

In contrast to the previous regulations, the published drafts show the importance of the combat and political training and give the demands on its organization in the Armed Forces: "Combat and political training is the basic content in the daily activities of the servicemen in peacetime. Exercises and drills should be conducted without oversimplification in the aims of high-quality instruction for the servicemen in actions in modern combat" (Article 201 of the UVS). Here it is stated that a commander guilty of diverting personnel from the exercises in combat and political training is to be held responsible under disciplinary procedures. The content and essence of leadership over combat and political training are disclosed in the general duties of the commanders and other direct superiors (Article 52 of the UVS). These provisions are also highlighted as the main areas in the service activities for the official duties of subunit commanders.

In line with the organizational and establishment changes occurring in the Armed Forces, the Draft UVS clarifies the duties and subordination of many regimental officials. Thus, in the current UVS the regimental commander and all five of his deputies are the direct superiors of the entire regimental personnel. At the same time, the battalion commanders and the chiefs of the branches of arms and certain services are directly subordinate to the regimental commander. The presence of such a subordination procedure in the units and subunits has led to violating the principle of one-man command and to the rise of numerous misunderstandings and unclear points and for resolving these the servicemen have turned to the central bodies of the Ministry of Defense and to the military press. For this reason, the draft regulations assume that the direct superiors of all the regimental personnel remain only the regimental commander, his first deputies and the deputy for political affairs, as was the case during the years of the Great Patriotic War and up to 1960. The deputy regimental commanders for weapons and for rear services are the direct chiefs of the personnel in the subordinate services

and subunits and for all the regimental personnel only within the limits of their service duties (Articles 79, 81 of the UVS).

One of the important areas in reworking the regulations is the questions related to improving the operation and storage of weapons, equipment and other property which are the material basis for the combat readiness of the regiment and its subunits. For these purposes they have clarified the duties of the officials and have concretized their responsibility for the operation, safekeeping, repair and operation of military equipment. In particular, they have clarified the periodicity for a unified inspection system by the officials: on the regimental level (with the exception of the rear services) at least twice a year; on the battalion level at least four times a year. The inspection procedure has been concretized and provision made for involving the community in them. For example, it has been designated that the regimental commander should conduct planned and surprise inspections on the presence of military equipment in the services both personally and involving the officials, the internal inspection commissions and the people's control groups (Article 71 of the UVS). Chapter 11 of the Draft UVS "Internal Service in Equipment Parks" includes additional provisions aimed at ensuring the safekeeping of weapons and equipment.

Significant attention has been given to strengthening the guarding of weapons and equipment in the draft of the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties. In particular, for the first time they spell out the principles for the guarding and defense of aviation equipment. The measures involved in organizing and running troop services and administration have been worked out in greater detail. Here, for the first time, they have specified the duties of the commanders (superiors) for one of the most urgent problems at present—environmental conservation.

At present, the demands significantly increased on the state of discipline in the Armed Forces. And it is completely understandable that in the drafts of the new regulations great attention has been given to the ways of strengthening this. The definition "military discipline is the strict and precise observance by all servicemen of the procedure and rules set by the Soviet laws and military regulations" has been supplemented with the words "and the orders of commanders (superiors)" (Article 1 of the DU). By this addition, the definition of military discipline has been brought into conformity of the content of the military oath and thereby raises the authority of the orders of commanders (superiors). At the same time, in considering numerous proposals, the procedure has been clarified for the issuing of an order by a commander (superior) and his responsibility for the consequences of the issued order: "The commander (superior) before issuing an order must thoroughly assess the situation and ensure its fulfillment. The commander (superior) bears responsibility for the issued order" (Article 7 of the DU).

In this regard, the duties of the commanders (superiors) have been clarified. Their particular attention should be paid to maintaining the rules set by the regulations for establishing relations between subordinates, for uniting the troop collective and for strengthening friendship between servicemen from different nationalities. Here the commander (superior), in relying skillfully on the party and Komsomol organizations, should in every possible way use glasnost and the force of the community. He must personally analyze the state of military discipline, sum up the results of the work done and set out specific measures to improve discipline and not permit the covering up of infractions of military discipline, crimes or accidents (Article 5 of the DU).

Years of army experience indicate how high the role of the commander, his personal example and moral image are in the strengthening of military discipline. For this reason, the drafts of the new regulations provide increased demands on the command personnel, their example set, their relations with subordinates: "The commander (superior) should be close to subordinates, he should know their needs and requests, seek their resolution, not permit coarseness and the humiliating of the personal dignity of subordinates, he should constantly serve as an example for them of strict observance of the Soviet laws, the military oath, the military regulations and orders, he should be an example of moral purity, honesty, humility and justice" (Article 5 of the DU).

The high responsibility in selecting the most effective types of commendations and disciplinary reprimands for incorporation in the draft of the DU and the complexity of introducing them into troop practices have required a particularly careful examination of the given question. As a result of this work, new types of commendations have been included: for soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers (Article 19) permission for a single leave out of turn up to 24 hours; for warrant officers (Article 27) the early awarding of the military rank of senior warrant officer; for officers (Article 30) entry in the military unit's Honor Book and the awarding of the military rank up to colonel or captain 1st rank inclusively, by one grade higher than the military rank provided for the held regular position. Here the rights have been broadened primarily for employing commendations for subordinate subunit commanders directly engaged in the educating of the personnel.

As for disciplinary reprimands, for all categories of servicemen, they have excluded the reprimand of "comment" as having virtually no practical use. Incorporated in the draft regulation is a new reprimand "reducing or lifting the awarded skill class in a military specialty." Soldiers and seamen can be appointed out of turn to detail not only for service, as is stated in the current regulations, but also for work. Here the right to employ this reprimand has been granted also to the junior commanders (from the squad commander and higher).

The law and hence the regulations cannot and should not seek vengeance. Punishment is not an aim in itself but rather a means for restoring social justice and a means of education and this is particularly important for the Soviet Armed Forces. For this reason, proposals were not adopted to harden the punishments (the introduction of strict and house arrest, granting the right to commanders to send wrongdoers to a disciplinary battalion, employing various withholdings from pay and so forth). As a whole, there are enough disciplinary reprimands stated in the draft regulations and it is merely a question of employing them skillfully and intelligently.

In considering the great experience and the extended service of senior officers, as well as their high conscientiousness, it has been provided that they should not be subjected to arrest with incarceration in the guardhouse (Article 68). Troop experience has shown that such a reprimand has been employed extremely rarely against senior officers.

In the drafts of the new combined-arms regulations, there are also many other provisions aimed at strengthening troop discipline, organization and order. This is the purpose of the supplements pointing to the necessity of the constant closeness of the commanders with subordinates, increased concern for them, and the inadmissibility of the isolation found in certain units between the commanders (superiors) and the personnel.

We all recognize how interethnic relations in the nation have become so strained. The troop units and subunits are multinational collectives. The new provisions of the draft regulations demand that the commanders unswervingly follow the principles of Leninist nationality policy and show particular attention, principledness and concern for strengthening friendship and fraternity between the men of different nationalities (Article 57 of the UVS).

In the aims of protecting the rights and dignity of the servicemen, the Section "General Rights and Obligations of Servicemen" sets out that a serviceman is obliged to struggle constantly against violations of socialist legality. And this means to prevent in relations between servicemen coarseness, humiliation and persecution as well as restraining them from unworthy deeds. In the event of the rules set by the regulations for relations between servicemen, immediate measures are to be taken to instill order and report immediately to one's commander (superior). This provision should also help combat such an infamous phenomenon as the notorious "hazing" and prevent it.

The draft regulations give great attention also to such urgent questions for the servicemen as their social protection and improving living and routine conditions. Much in this question depends upon the garrison chief. For this reason, his duties are to include: to be constantly concerned with observing legality toward the servicemen by the state and command authorities; to direct the activities of the garrison housing commission showing

sensitivity and attention, examine and approve the allocating of housing in the garrison in strictly following the current legislation and the principles of social justice, in considering public opinion and providing broad glasnost (Article 20 of the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties).

But the questions of improving concern for subordinates and their service conditions are not limited to the confines of the duties of the commanders (superiors). The draft regulations include a whole series of new provisions aimed at improving the everyday life of the servicemen, providing them with the stipulated types of supplies and improving their health.

In the company positions, provision has been made to have a room (area) for sports exercise as well as a dressing room. Chapter 4 of the UVS "Billeting of Servicemen" introduces a number of provisions which clarify the rules of social hygiene in the quarters and military camps. The order of the day has been substantially altered and this makes provision for assigning time for mass sports work as well as cultural-educational and sanitary-hygiene measures.

The procedure for dismissing servicemen from the regiment's position has also been clarified: "On Saturdays and the days before holidays it is permitted to grant a leave up to 24 hours, and on Sunday and on holidays until taps. Leave granted to regular servicemen for a period of 24 hours as a commendation is to be provided on Saturdays and the days before holidays.... With the permission of a battalion commander, the company commander can provide a regular serviceman with a leave for valid reasons on other days of the week after training exercises until taps or until the morning of the following day (but not later than 2 hours before the start of exercises)" (Article 207 of the UVS). Such leave procedures provide for the fulfillment of the provisions in the draft Disciplinary Regulations and, in addition, provide the opportunity for granting leave to servicemen for valid reasons (the arrival of parents and so forth) on workdays.

It is no secret that there still are numerous shortcomings in organizing the meals for the personnel. In order to ensure the consumption of the stipulated diet by the soldiers and NCOs, it has been proposed that control be strengthened and for this purpose it is the duty of the regimental commander daily (according to the UVS "periodically") to personally inspect the quality of the food being prepared (Article 71 of the UVS). In addition, a physician (feldsher [middle-level medical personnel]) prior to the distributing of the food should, together with the regimental duty officer, conduct a test weighing of the portions (Article 204 of the UVS). It has also been established that patients at the medical station are to be fed according to the hospital ration standards (Article 206 of the UVS).

A new approach has been instituted to maintaining the health of the servicemen and strengthening this.

Recently, as research has shown, the Army and Navy have been receiving young recruits who are not sufficiently strong. In line with this, the draft of the UVS (Article 275) states: "The maintaining and strengthening of the health of the servicemen are to be achieved by the following: by having the commanders and superiors carry out measures to improve the service and living conditions, by constantly observing safety rules by the servicemen; by the systematic conditioning of the organism and by regular exercises in physical training and sports; by carrying out sanitary-hygiene, antiepidemic and general medical measures." The draft regulation recommends that the servicemen abstain from harmful habits (Article 376 of the UVS) and they state that "a sober way of life should be a daily standard of conduct for all servicemen. Appearing in an inebriated state, no matter where this might be, is a major infraction defaming the honor and dignity of the serviceman" (Article 47 of the UVS). This provision reinforces the hostile attitude toward drunkenness in the Armed Forces. At the same time, the draft regulations set out more specifically the procedure for conducting medical measures.

A significant place has been given over to the observance by the servicemen of safety measures the violating of which under modern conditions, when the might of the weapons has risen many-fold and the weapons and combat equipment are significantly more complex, can lead to extremely severe consequences. The basic article on this question (Article 62 of the UVS) states: "A commander (superior) must institute the necessary safety measures on alert duty, in working with the weapons and equipment, in carrying out a march, in conducting exercises, field firings, flights, ship cruises, special exercises or jobs, in standing guard and interior (duty and watch) services, in promptly informing subordinates of these measures and strictly observing their execution."

For daily maintaining firm inner order and strong military discipline in the regiment and its subunits, it is essential to have a precise organization of administration within the unit. The basis of this organization should be the written order of the regimental commander issued by him prior to the start of each training period with a determining of the procedure for carrying out those provisions of the UVS and the garrison and guard service regulations and which he has the right to control (Article 72 of the UVS). The draft also sets out recommendations on the contents of this. Such a standard organizational order facilitates leadership over troop service in the regiment and reduces the number of documents which have to be worked out.

Particular attention has been given to carefully preparing the daily detail for standing service as this is a guarantee for high vigilance and the precise performance of duties by the detail personnel. For example, three-stage preparation has been set for serving in the guard. The duties have been significantly reworked for the members of the daily detail in the aims of maintaining internal order.

In line with the need to strengthen discipline and order in the garrisons and the increased amount of equipment and motor vehicle shipments in them, many provisions of garrison service have been revised. The new chapter "Garrison Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate" shows the purpose of the VAI [Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] and its personnel, it determines the duties of the inspectorate's officials and the bases of its organization. As the basis of its content, they have used Article 33 of the current regulation, "The Regulation on the Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate," as well as the demands of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 13 February 1985 "On Granting the VAI the Right to Review Certain Matters Concerning the Violation of Road Traffic Rules."

Guard duty is of important significance in maintaining the troop units in constant combat readiness and ensuring order. The new chapter "Particular Features in Organizing and Standing Guard Duty Using Security Equipment, Security and Fire Warning Systems" has been included in the draft regulation in line with the increased demands on the reliability of guarding facilities, the need to reduce the number of personnel in the guards and the presence of technical capabilities for widely introducing warning facilities into guard duty. Many provisions determining its organization, duties and the procedure for standing duty by the personnel in guards have also been revised.

The new chapter sets down the most promising, modern method of guarding facilities and which is being introduced more and more into guard duty in the troops.

Considering the necessity of strengthening fire protection in the units, the drafts of the new regulations provide measures aimed at ensuring the strict fulfillment of fire safety rules by the servicemen. The daily detail of a regiment includes a fire detail which is appointed by the regiment's firefighting team, its duties are stipulated and it is stated what it is to be provided with. A system of fire tags has been introduced and this serves to confirm to the chief of the guard that the fire safety rules have been carried out in a storage area, dump, parking area (Articles 286, 316, Appendix 18 of the UVS and Article 163 of the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties).

In line with the wider staffing of positions of the officer corps, warrant officers, NCOs, petty officers, soldiers and seamen with female personnel who have volunteered for active military service, the draft regulations include supplements which specifically outline the particular features of the organizing and standing of interior, guard and garrison duty by servicewomen.

A series of provisions which have lost their importance has been excluded and certain obsolete terms have been replaced.

For example, the article obliging a serviceman to reply to a question from a superior "Yes, Sir" or "No, Sir" has been deleted from the Section "On Military Courtesy

and Conduct of Servicemen" of the Interior Service Regulations. Excluded from the regulations are the term "line officers," the word "report" ["raportovat" has been replaced by "dokladyvat" and "instruction" ["rasporyazheniye"] by "order" ["prikaz"].

The drafts of the new combined-arms regulations contain many other amendments, supplements and clarifications which cannot be described in a brief article.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that, regardless of the extended and painstaking work carried out in the course of preparing the draft regulations, a number of their provisions is still not perfect. This applies to reflecting the demands on ensuring the combat readiness of the units and subunits as well as the processes of perestroika occurring in the Armed Forces. Also felt is the absence up to the present of a Law Governing Soviet Defense. Although present in the draft regulations are the questions of democratization, glasnost, ensuring legality and social justice, the solidarity of the troop collectives and the establishing of comradely relations in them, their weak legal formulation and affirmation in specific deeds are apparent.

Undoubtedly, in studying the draft combined-arms regulations, the servicemen and all other citizens involved in the strengthening of our Armed Forces will voice other comments on their content.

The published drafts of the combined-arms regulations are presently being studied and broadly discussed in the troop units and subunits. For this we recommend giving lectures, conducting talks with the officers and warrant officers as well as independent work. Planned exercises at the time stipulated by the programs for combat and political training are conducted with the NCOs (petty officers), soldiers and seamen for this purpose. In addition, they also employ time allocated for independent study for preparing to stand duty in a daily detail.

Proposals and comments made on the draft regulations are to be forwarded up the line of command and here each serviceman is given the right to forward his proposals directly to the Commission for Preparing the Draft Combined-Arms Regulations.

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Supreme Court Official on Civilian, Military Justice

90UN0113A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Oct 89 1st Edition p 2

[Interview with A.S. Koblikov, doctor of jurisprudence, professor, member of the Scientific Advisory Council under the USSR Supreme Court, by S. Pashayev: "The Authority of the Court"]

[Text] Objective investigations, an effective defense, and an independent court. This was how the USSR Congress

of People's Deputies defined the formula for socialist justice in a concluding document. Our correspondent talks with A. Koblikov, doctor of jurisprudence, professor, member of the Scientific Advisory Council under the USSR Supreme Court, about some of the problems connected with the implementation of these principles.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Semenovich, in the tremendous amount of reader mail dedicated to the problems of legal reform, perhaps we hear most often about the need to enhance the role of the court, to raise its authority, and to guarantee genuine independence and the subordination of the judges and people's assessors to the law alone.

[Koblikov] This is perfectly natural. Indeed, the principle of the independence of the judges, repeatedly declaimed in the past, has been shamelessly flouted through interference in the activities of the organs of justice on the part of those who hold power. On 1 December 1988 the USSR Supreme Soviet for the first time (how strange it seems) directly prohibited interference in the exercise of justice. From the legal point of view this is of principal importance.

[Correspondent] In the context of our conversation, there is clearly a need to delve further into problems of the independence of the military court as well. It certainly has its own specific character, inasmuch as it has long been accepted that military justice is subordinate to the military authorities. The military justice regulations of tsarist Russia, for instance, established that the war minister would exercise "general supervision over the military courts and the officials of the military department, having the Chief Military Prosecutor under his authority."

[Koblikov] I would emphasize that even then the situation provoked the most emphatic objections. It is no accident that, with the very first decree concerning the court system, signed by Lenin on 24 November 1917, the Soviet power abolished military and naval courts of all designations. The army court began to build itself on the general principles of soviet democracy common to all courts.

[Correspondent] How genuine is the legal independence of the military tribunals and military procuracy from the local and military organs today?

[Koblikov] Here, it seems, one may agree with the answer that Major General of Justice A. Katusev, Chief Military Prosecutor, gave when he was appointed by the USSR Supreme Soviet to the office. Even today a formally independent prosecutor turns out in the final analysis to be actually dependent on the various officials in charge of the supply of materials and machinery to the organs of military justice, or of the resolution of housing problems, or of the conferring of military rank, etc. I must say, though, that in the course of judicial and legal reform, legal guarantees are beginning to be strengthened organizationally and materially.

Legislators are finally paying attention to this aspect of the issue. A Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR, passed this year, established a direct relationship between the number of guarantees of independence of the courts and the creation of the necessary organizational and technical conditions for their functioning, as well as the material and social maintenance of the judges, appropriate to their high status. In particular, pay for the judges is set with regard to their proficiency recommendation. The local soviets are obligated, no later than 6 months after the election of a judge, to provide him with comfortable lodgings. Without touching on the other organizational and material problems that will be resolved on the basis of laws already passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, I will note that a draft Law on Military Tribunals, which takes into account the distinctive character of the Armed Forces, is currently being developed and will also embrace these issues.

[Correspondent] And which of the real guarantees of independence for the judges and people's assessors of the military tribunals is it expected to strengthen?

[Koblikov] The main thing, as I already said, is to move from declarations about the independence of the judges (they appeared in the 1936 Constitution and have been repeated many times since) to the creation of concrete legal preconditions protecting the justice system from any attempts to influence it when it is ruling on the fate of this or that person. In particular, this law must provide a system of electing and dismissing the judges of military tribunals which does not make them dependent on the discretion of one or another group of people. In my opinion it would be best, in this context, if the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium were to elect them for a 10-year term. And dismissal of a military judge before the expiration of his term would be allowed only under exceptional circumstances. Only on a limited number of grounds which are concretely defined by law. For example, judges who are elected and who reach the age limit for active military service may not be discharged and deprived of their judicial powers before the end of the term.

Of course, military judges must also in full measure enjoy guarantees of immunity. In particular, they must not be subject to arrest and arraignment, or even to legal action, without the consent of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The people's assessors of the military tribunal must, in my view, enjoy these same guarantees of immunity in the execution of their responsibilities.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Semenovich, it has been reported in the press that 1,750,794 crimes have been registered in this country over 9 months of this year, which is a 33 percent increase over the corresponding figure for last year. The organs of justice, as we see, need not fear unemployment. In this context, how does the situation look in the Armed Forces?

[Koblikov] At first glance one might get the impression that the case is different here compared to the country as a whole. It was reported at the Congress of People's Deputies that the Army and Navy have managed to reduce crime over the last 3 years by more than a third, and that the number convicted in the military tribunals has fallen by more than 50 percent. But it appears that these figure should not in any fashion reassure us. We must keep in mind that crime in the Army is not an isolated phenomenon. It is engendered by those same economic, social, and moral causes which are characteristic to the whole of our society. And there is no basis for optimism in the thought that several dozen crimes each year, to be honest, go undiscovered. Furthermore, these include the most serious ones as a rule. Of course, the absence of the rudiments of order in some of the sub-units more often than not contributes to this. But to a great degree the careless functioning of the legal mechanisms existing today also prove to be a contributing factor, including delays in getting information to the military prosecutor, "homespun" investigations, and, in general, attempts to cover up the incident. These mechanisms, beyond any doubt, also require improvement.

[Correspondent] Today we speak with a shudder of the illegal actions of Stalin's assistants, who fabricated "cases" against innocent people. All of that, it would seem, is in the past. However, does the problem of ensuring the objectivity of investigations still remain on the agenda?

As we know, only the truth, and not some sort of statistics in an account, or "higher" consideration, or calculations of momentary advantage, must be the compass and reference point for the law. This is always the first consideration. Well, even today from time to time glasnost has its cases of legal proceedings instituted against the innocent as a result of biased, tendentious, or unskilled investigations, or the desire to get a "confession" from the accused at whatever cost. Confirmation is provided by the fact that each year military tribunals deliver a number of "not guilty" verdicts, and the military prosecutors discontinue a portion of the court cases involving criminal charges with full rehabilitation of the accused. Here is an example from the recent past. Private Makhmudov was convicted by the military tribunal of one of the garrisons for assault and battery and inflicting grave physical injuries on a fellow serviceman. The investigator drew up a conclusion of guilt, the military prosecutor affirmed it, and the military tribunal "rubber-stamped" the charge. Finally, the okrug military tribunal reversed the sentence. In the course of a supplementary investigation it turned out that Makhmudov had not broken the victim's jaw... It was a certain Troitskiy who had testified in court as a witness, and whose testimony had proved convenient for the investigator and had not been verified by the court.

[Correspondent] The question inevitably arises: Why did the mechanism of a legal defense for the accused in court not work in this instance?

Precisely because it is imperfect too. That is also why there is such a heated discussion today concerning the issue of the participation of the counsel for defense, not at the very end of the investigation as the present law specifies, but specifically from the moment charges are leveled, or even immediately after the arrest. In all cases. And only now, for the first time, is one of the foundations of the right to a defense, judging by everything, going to be secured—the principle of a presumption of innocence. It is specifically these legal devices that create the conditions for a strong defense, which is a component of a "formula for justice."

[Correspondent] But can, let us say, the military man avail himself of all these blessings? Particularly the ordinary soldier involved in a criminal case?

[Koblikov] To be honest, that is not an easy question. And here is why. In a criminal case advocates perform the actual defense, and they are paid for their labor by those to whom they have rendered the legal aid. Demonstrating its well-known concern for this category of jurist, the USSR Ministry of Justice last year adopted new regulations on the system of pay for their labor. As a result, the services of an advocate have become noticeably more expensive. For example, to conduct a relatively minor criminal case, instead of 25-30 rubles, it is now necessary to pay 120-130 rubles. The authors of the new departmental regulations "did not forget" (unfortunately) soldiers and sailors either. Formerly, members of the military in compulsory terms of service were able to get legal help in many instances free of charge, and now they have been deprived of that right. Even though the soldiers' pay has not increased. So we might as well not ask about a strong defense, but whether a defense will in fact be available.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Semenovich, our time is notable for its heightened attention to the problems of justice and its energetic steps in the creation of new laws. How do you, a scholarly jurist, evaluate this process?

[Koblikov] It seems to me extremely important that we all begin to acknowledge how great the role of the law is in the economic, political, and spiritual life of our society and of each individual person. And, simultaneously, how neglected our "legal economy" has turned out to be. It is no accident that, at the Congress and the first session of the Supreme Soviet, it was necessary to pass, repeal, and amend a number of laws and resolutions "right off the bat," as they say. But I and apparently many others, felt that some of the people's deputies were not well versed in legislative activity and did not quite grasp the complexity of creating legal norms able to function effectively and with reasonable stability. Even a correct idea, if it is transposed into the language of a law unsuccessfully, can turn out ineffective or even produce a negative effect. I cannot help but think of Lenin's celebrated warning that "one must legislate with threefold caution."

Incidentally, I remember a discussion at today's session of the Supreme Soviet of a draft document on an

amnesty for former servicemen who were taken captive, of a limited contingent of our forces in Afghanistan. At the first discussion, as you remember, the deputies did not arrive at an agreement and the draft was returned to the committees and commissions for revision. It seems to me that this occurred because several of the deputies did not have a clear idea of the legal nature of the document. And unfortunately the jurists did not have time to make the discussion clearer. At base there was confusion about the concepts of amnesty and pardon, which are essentially distinct. Had they analyzed these terms in a legal sense from the start, I believe the participants in the discussion would have reached a mutual understanding more quickly.

And I would like to mention one more thing here—the moral example of the parliamentarian-legislator, who must be very upright. In any civilized state the parliament first and foremost is the bearer of the idea of legality and the defender of the constitution. Our Constitution, of course, needs to be seriously reworked. But a law remains in effect until such time as it is repealed. Otherwise we have illegality, anarchy, and arbitrary rule. Therefore, any calls to ignore it or to disregard the binding nature of this or that statute in the least fashion are incorrect. Let us hope that these are the difficulties of the growth of our democracy.

Chernavin in Round Table on Development of Naval Reactors

90UM0063A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Oct 89 First Edition p 3

[Discussion recorded by Captain 1st Rank S. Bystrov in the column: "Annals of the Fatherland": "A Reactor for Submarines"; first six paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] We are all children of the sun. It is food for our lives; its energy is converted into energy that enables us to move about, think, and experience feelings. We do not often think about the sun's essence—the universe's nuclear reactor. Because the sun is both a star and a reactor, it predetermined life on this planet.

The prospect of the sun's cooling—remote as it is—is troubling to people. Even more troubling is the thought of exhaustibility of the earth's resources of solar energy—the familiar fossil fuels that for thousands of years have made it possible for us to fill our ever-increasing demand for energy. The discovery of radioactivity and mastery of the controlled nuclear reaction are a qualitative and inevitable step in mankind's development. One that is more significant than the taming of fire. For this discovery lends tangibility to a boundless and plentiful future for us.

Putting thoughts of the future aside, at the present time it is natural and necessary to speak of a more civilized approach to nuclear energy; of awareness of its double-edged power; of skill needed to apply it, without subjecting mankind to danger.

Although the first reactors were built on solid earth, their first application on a mass scale was to ships. At this time, as reported by the American press, plying the world's oceans are 400 atomic vessels powered by 550 nuclear reactors, with the vast majority flying military flags.

Operational reliability of the reactors in the service of our Navy is taken for granted. However, the road to this reliability was long and difficult. It began with the creation of the reactor for the first nuclear submarine.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA requested that one of the founders of Soviet nuclear power—Academician A. P. Aleksandrov—tell us about that beginning. Anatoliy Petrovich accepted the offer without hesitating. He organized in the House (presently Museum) of I. V. Kurchatov a kind of "round table", inviting persons who participated in the creation of the first submarine reactor, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet V. N. Chernavin; and our correspondent, Captain 1st Rank S. I. Bystrov.

[Slavskiy (Yefim Pavlovich Slavskiy; three times a Hero of the Soviet Union. From 1957 to 1963 and again from 1965 to 1986 he was USSR minister of medium machinery manufacture; he is a Laureate of the Lenin

Prize and of two USSR State Prizes)] Now that we are here, why were we asked to get together? What is it that we want?

[Chernavin (Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin; Admiral of the Fleet; Commander in Chief of the Navy; Hero of the Soviet Union)] What do we want? History teaches us about the present and the future. But for this you must know history. How well do our people know the history of the origin of atomic power in our country? Hardly well enough. To say nothing about the history of how this power was mastered by the Navy. It is instructive in addition to being interesting.

I venture to say that today the nuclear-powered submarine is commonplace. It is something that is quite natural, often being accepted in a straightforward manner. I remember that I was already a commander of a submarine division. We assembled young officers that had been assigned to us to tell them that they must be extremely mindful of detail in working with nuclear energy. Not only in the operation and servicing of reactors, but also in matters of seemingly secondary importance: radiation monitoring, measurement, cleanliness aboard ships. Later I was to hear with my own ears how the lieutenants said to one another: "They are merely trying to frighten us." It was natural that by that time service aboard nuclear-powered vessels had become simpler.

I was given command of one of the first nuclear-powered submarines. We tried to start up the power plant for three days. Every time we tried, there would be another leak. Unrecognizable in our respirators, we would cease all other operations to look for each leak. Then we would try again. Now all you have to do is sit down, start up and sail away. Everything is set up and reliable. Few people know that it was not always like this; it was extremely hazardous and not as simple. It was the awareness of danger that led to reliability in the work. Nuclear power will never permit of a careless attitude. If we recall how it was discovered and how it was mastered, this will undoubtedly be useful to those who stand watch at reactors on land and sea and those who are to become involved with nuclear energy. To all. Therefore, perhaps we can start by talking about how the concept of the nuclear reactor had its origin in the country.

[Slavskiy] That is very simple. The Americans had already made the bomb and dropped it. Our people started to work on nuclear weapons in 1943. Igor Vasilyevich was appointed head of work on application of nuclear energy. I had been serving as Deputy People's Commissar for Ferrous Metallurgy for about a year. Suddenly, Zavenyagin summoned me to the NKVD. He was Beriya's deputy and deputy to our Vannikov. Vannikov held the rank of Colonel General of Artillery Engineer Services. He served as People's Commissar of Munitions for practically the entire period of the war. And so, I was asked to visit the NKVD. I was scared to death! What times they were! Before the war even Boris Lvovich Vannikov was repressed.

Upon my arrival, Zavenyagin greeted me with a smile and said: "Greetings, old atomic worker." At that time, the word "atom" was not to be mentioned. I said to him: "How can you do that, for heaven's sake!"

[Chernavin] You mean that everything below the level of the molecule was classified?

[Slavskiy] Exactly. Then he said to me, "I am to talk to you about transferring here." What did he mean by "here?" There was nothing there yet. Zavenyagin and I studied together at the mining academy in 1927 and 1928. We were on comradely terms. I asked him straight out: "Avraam Pavlovich, where am I to go? I have no idea of what you mean." He calmed me down by saying, "We know nothing about it ourselves. Nevertheless, do not mention to anyone that I spoke with you. In several days there will be a decision signed by Stalin." I became even more upset. What was I to do there? I grew up in ferrous metallurgy. I was at the same time Deputy Chief of the aluminum, magnesium and electronics industry. In the aluminum industry, a current-carrying anode mass is used. It would appear that this mass was to be used to make pure graphite for an atomic reactor. That was why I was needed.

Four decades have passed since we started the first industrial reactor. It was in the Urals. [And it was] in a forest. It was there that all technology for the extraction of plutonium was developed. Indeed We were following our own, unexplored route. We encountered difficulties and unexpected obstacles at every step.

I remember an incident when we cast a hemisphere made of plutonium. We could not remove it from the mold. I picked up a sledge hammer and struck such a hard blow that sparks flew; the hemisphere popped out. An old-fashioned method. Note that this was the hemisphere for the first atomic bomb.

[Chernavin] So how did you move up to the reactor for the first submarine?

[Slavskiy] That was when we had already exploded the first bomb in 1949, after which there were the series in the Urals. I returned to Moscow. At the suggestion of Igor Vasilyevich, we started to build the first nuclear power station in Obninsk.

[Chernavin] Yes, the Obninsk reactor to some extent was the prototype of the shipboard reactor. Both were designed by Nikolay Antonovich Dollezhal.

[Aleksandrov (Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov; headed research and development on atomic science and technology in the USSR; an academician and three times Hero of Socialist Labor; headed the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Atomic Energy imeni I. V. Kurchatov; Laureate of the Lenin Prize and four times of the USSR State Prize)] That was not a copy of the Obninsk station reactor. The design was different. There

was Boris Buynitskiy from Merkin's sector. It was in his sector that the work was initiated. But that certainly was not the beginning.

[Chernavin] When did the beginning take place?

[Aleksandrov] Igor Vasilyevich and I worked in the same Leningrad institute—the Physicotechnical Institute. The Nuclear Physics Laboratory passed in 1933 from Abram Fedorovich Ioffe to Kurchatov, who continued the work. There were other nuclear workers there, but his was the main effort. At that time, I was working in polymer physics. On top of that, I was tasked with degaussing of ships as protection from magnetic mines.

When the war broke out, my comrades and I were in the Baltic region. In the evening before June 22, we were taken by ship to Kronshtadt, where we immediately undertook work on demagnetization. All of a sudden, I received a phone call from Academician Ioffe. He was the director of our institute. "Have you forgotten about the doctoral thesis you are to defend tomorrow?" "I don't remember anything," I answered. "The war, you know." He then said, "This is something you should not let slip. Everyone will be there. Next time, when we get together... I have spoken with the command authorities; they will let you go to Leningrad."

I did go and defended my thesis.

The question of evacuating the institute arose. Igor Vasilyevich understood that evacuation of his laboratory was impossible, and that the work on nuclear physics would be interrupted.

Igor Vasilyevich wanted to do something significant for the front, and he and his colleagues joined our laboratory. Soon afterward, in the first part of August, Admiral L. M. Galler assigned us to Sevastopol to work on degaussing.

Igor Vasilyevich was with the Black Sea Fleet until the end of 1941; at the very end of the year he arrived in Kazan. That is where the Leningrad Physicotechnical Institute had been evacuated. I was sent to the North.

Something interesting occurred at that time. There was a change in nature of papers published in foreign physics journals. The names of all those who were working in the area of nuclear physics disappeared from the pages of the scientific press. This was noticed by Igor Vasilyevich and all physicists. G. N. Flerov, who did nuclear physics work with Kurchatov in Leningrad, discovered spontaneous fission of uranium nuclei. He wrote a letter to Stalin stating that we were not doing anything with nuclear physics, but the Americans and Germans were working intensively on the creation of atomic weapons, something that was obvious from the absence of papers. About six months passed. Igor Vasilyevich was summoned to Moscow. He was handed the urgent task of organizing work on the uranium problem. Kurchatov

started to gather together the people he would need, and as early as March of 1943 undertook work on the uranium problem.

In the fall of 1946, my laboratory and I were transferred from Leningrad to Moscow by Beriya's order; I was appointed director of the Institute of Physical Problems, replacing Academician P. L. Kapitsa, who had been removed from the position. Kurchatov assigned to us the theoreticians S. M. Feynberg and V. S. Fursov. A powerful staff of scientists was selected. They were organized into a group that took up various aspects of reactors.

[Chernavin] Did you know that the Americans were working on reactors for ships?

[Aleksandrov] No.

[Chernavin] Then what prompted you?

[Aleksandrov] We of course were thinking all the time that atomic energy could be used for something other than military applications. And we always reasoned that a chain reaction could be attained by means of slow electrons, not only fast electrons. To produce electricity, for example. Igor Vasilyevich held to this notion since before the beginning of the war. Also, our theoreticians—Khariton, Zeldovich—were of the opinion that a controlled reaction was possible.

At some time in 1948 I organized a group and tasked it with looking into the feasibility of building a submarine that would be driven by nuclear power. We did a physical analysis and determined the approximate dimensions the nuclear installation would have. We arrived at a result. That was before the explosion of the first bomb, which took place on 29 August 1949. I showed Igor Vasilyevich our developmental work. I asked him if we could proceed along that line of work. We got a refusal from Beriya.

[Chernavin] Why? I would like to know.

[Aleksandrov] So that we would not "divert ourselves from the principal task." The prohibition was one thing, but we continued to think about a reactor for submariners.

Some time after Stalin died, Khrushchev transferred me here, to the institute. Up until then I occupied the position of Igor Vasilyevich's deputy. Vladimir Iosifovich Merkin with his large sector was placed under me. The comrades sitting there—N. S. Khlopin, G. A. Gladkov, and V. A. Buynitskiy—were from that sector. They came mainly from the special faculty of the MEI [Moscow Power Engineering Institute]. They were to write their theses on the application of atomic power to all types of ships.

Previous to that, I had the following experience. In the latter part of 1952 I was lying in the Kremlin hospital. Igor Vasilyevich came on a visit and said to me, "We have decided to put you in charge of submarine work." He knew that such work had been done in the past, I

suppose. "Why such a decision all of a sudden?" I asked. "You know a great amount of things no one else does," he answered. Yes, my knowledge of the boats came in handy. We came out with about 16 reactor versions.

A. I. Leypunskiy, for his part, suggested that we try working on a liquid-metal cooled reactor. We organized a council. It was headed by Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev, who was deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. We were instructed not to have any contact with the Navy; that there was a Captain 1st Rank Ivan Dmitriyevich Dorofeyev with whom we were to do all our business. The purpose was to maintain secrecy.

The actual task differed somewhat from what we had imagined. Plans called for the boat to carry an enormous torpedo—2 meters in diameter—armed with a powerful hydrogen bomb. When work on the craft was fairly well along, we had the first inspection by the Navy. N. G. Kuznetsov was invited. He took one look and said, "I don't need that kind of boat."

[Chernavin] On what did he base his refusal?

[Aleksandrov] He simply had a realistic approach.

[Chernavin] That is to say, he was displeased with the combat application, the supertorpedo.

[Aleksandrov] After that, we were tasked by Malyshev to come up with a version carrying conventional torpedoes. Vladimir Nikolayevich Peregudov, the chief designer, redesigned everything in fairly short order. Nevertheless, what resulted was a boat that offered somewhat larger displacement than that specified by the design. Malyshev was furious, saying, "Peregudov and Aleksandrov got together behind our back and immediately added 300 tons." We studied everything in detail, with the result that the boat was extremely successful. However, we had to fight for everything. For example, we requested that the Navy remove the luminous markings made of radioactive paints. People would be irradiated by these paints, and they would blame us, thinking that the reactor is at fault. We fought a long time over that.

[Chernavin] That was because the submariners always had those markings.

[Aleksandrov] The problem was resolved (I am moving on with my story) when the first boat was built. There were three of us looking her over: Navy Commander-in-Chief Gorshkov; State Committee for Shipbuilding Chairman Butoma; and I. We were passing by a telephone. A seaman tore off the letter "T". I showed it to Gorshkov, remarking that this should not be aboard the ship. Boris Yevstafyevich Butoma took the letter from me and inserted it into Gorshkov's pocket when he was not looking. We continued our inspection of the ship and left the space. We came up to a radiation monitoring station. All of a sudden, a guard stepped in front of the commander-in-chief, blocking the way with his rifle, shouting: "Comrade Commander-in-Chief, I cannot let you pass!" Sergey Georgiyevich, his faced turned red,

said: "What do you mean, you cannot let me pass? What is the matter?" The guard answered: "Comrade Commander in Chief, you are not clean." That made it even worse! We have a standard for amount of radioactive contamination. Then Butoma stretched out his hand, pulled the letter out of the Comander-in-Chief's pocket, and showed it to him, saying: "Look at this, Sergey Georgiyevich. This is why you are not 'clean.'" He threw it into the water. All the sound signals stopped, the small red lights went out, and the guard stepped back with his rifle. We were in agreement with the seamen after that.

Now let us get back to the first reactor. There was a small building located next door, where in 1946 the first reactor was put together with the very pure graphite that we tore away from Slavskiy.

[Slavskiy] You should have tried to make it. So, when a reaction was initiated in the first experimental reactor, Igor Vasilyevich phoned, saying, "Come on over here as soon as you can." When I arrived, they were observing the first chain reaction. Dogs were still being tied there to ascertain the reactor's radioactive effect on living bodies. You should realize that it was no joke. There was a device called the "nutcracker," of course. It would crackle loudly when a reaction commenced and proceeded.

[Chernavin] Do you mean to say that the first reactor was started there? Then in the Urals? Was that an industrial type in the Urals?

[Slavskiy] Yes, but the chain reaction was successfully attained there. I had a look and then went home. By that time Igor Vasilyevich had already informed my supervisor that a chain reaction had been attained. Stalin was notified immediately. Suddenly, I received a phone call from Igor Vasilyevich, who asked, "Have you told anyone that you spent several hours here?" "Not yet," I answered. "Do not tell anyone anything about this," he said. A secrecy lid was put on everything. Here I was—one of Vannikov's deputies—pretending for about two months that I knew nothing about it. Vannikov and Zavenyagin knew, but I was not supposed to know. Everything was supersecret.

[Aleksandrov] There was a critical incident that occurred while we were developing the work. We had already built the reactor in Obninsk. When we started the reactor the first time, which was on 8 March 1956—Women's Day—we discovered that all the system's small pipes were leaking. We threw them away. I even did something bold: I also threw away the system controlling water flow through the individual channel.

[Gladkov (Georgiy Alekseyevich Gladkov, doctor of technical sciences)] The original reactor cover looked terrible and was sure to cause us trouble. Anatoliy Petrovich always said that Nikolay Antonovich and I would sit next to it. If anyone is to perish, then let it be the main culprits. At that time, all the channels came out through the reactor cover; it was assumed that they would become overloaded, even during a cruise at sea.

[Slavskiy] Let me tell you how we developed the second reactor. I was simultaneously Vannikov's deputy and chief engineer of a combine in Chelyabinsk. However, the second reactor was under development at another location—a very large machine building combine headed by Amo Sergeyevich Yelyan. Quite a general; and a Hero of Socialist Labor, to boot.

[Aleksandrov] I believe that he was married to Beriya's sister, or something like that.

[Slavskiy] Yes, he acted more or less on his own. They discovered channel leaks in the reactor. Designers came up with a leak warning system. They boasted about that. Vannikov paid them a visit and was given a demonstration of the system. Since he was not heavily involved with reactors, he naturally could not provide an evaluation. He phoned me: "Why don't you and Aleksandrov visit Yelyan, have a look, and make a decision right then and there?"

So we went on a visit. We had a close look at the "invention" produced by Yelyan's designers and rejected it out of hand. That evening Aleksandrov left for Moscow, and I decided to lodge for the night in a guest apartment. We wrote our report. We visited Yelyan in his office. We sat down. He was sitting there behind his desk in his rotating chair. He was in a foul mood. He, rolling a cigarette, spun around away from us and did not say a word. His deputy—the chief of the design office—entered the office. He was young, but very talented. He was reporting on the results of our examination.

Yelyan: "So, what did they say?"

Deputy: "They rejected everything."

Yelyan: "Off with them!"

That was his remark.

We: "You are a hooligan, you SOB!"

As we were leaving, Yelyan was taken aback.

Some time later he visited me. He said, "Let me show you a new technology. While there, I will order fresh fish from the Volga; we'll have supper in the evening."

Yes, there were many incidents, some dramatic, and others funny.

More than one bomb had been made. Events were moving along splendidly at the second industrial reactor and the combine. Academician Abram Isaakovich Alikhanov and his people were working for us, in Chelyabinsk, making adjustments on a heavy-water moderated reactor.

All the bugs were ironed out; everything was functioning properly. The people were due to leave. A farewell party was arranged for that evening. I received insistent invitations. I refused, pleading that I had no time. Suddenly,

I was informed that the reactor's heavy-water heat exchanger froze up. It seemed that heavy water freezes at +2°.

[Aleksandrov] That is, that was known previously.

[Slavskiy] Nevertheless, they continued to drink. I said to them: "Well, boys, let's get on the bus and leave." Alikhanov is quite excitable. At first he did not believe that the heat exchanger had frozen.

Alikhanov: "That can't be."

I: "Why not? Water is not circulating."

We had cast-iron valves and two heat exchangers that were really large cylinders.

I: "Let's go have a look."

They: "What do you mean? There's radioactivity there!"

Nevertheless, I entered, felt with my hand; the heat exchanger was cold. It was supposed to be hot.

I: "Come have a look!"

Only then did they understand.

[Gladkov] We had a phenomenal incident when we were starting up the first apparatus. We were lowering a bucket. Suddenly, it became lodged in the vertical tube. A uranium slug fell into a crevice, and the bucket was stuck in the center of a high span. Here we were: no cooling and enormous radioactivity, since about a half ton of radioactive slugs had just been added. And radiation was spreading throughout the building. We just could not get to the particular unit. What to do? It was necessary to cut away either a slug or a section of pipe to free the bucket. Welder Pronin volunteered to do the job. (Igor Vasilyevich was also there.) So, the welder proceeded with his torch. Yefim Pavlovich said, "I'm going, too." But he was not supposed to go. Nevertheless, he went with the welder to accomplish the job in short order. We estimated that each one received 400 roentgens.

[Slavskiy] I was irradiated a number of times. Nuclear reactions are no joke, of course. In the beginning, there was an engineer Karatygin (who recently wrote me a letter); he received such an overdose that it was necessary to amputate both his legs.

[Aleksandrov] This is what happened. To start a reaction, it was necessary to have a definite amount of dissolved uranium or plutonium and a definite amount of liquid. The major factor is the shape of the volume. For instance, if the liquid is contained in a narrow cylinder, nothing will happen; if in a wide cylinder, a reaction occurs immediately. We arranged the tank accordingly, and a reaction occurred.

[Slavskiy] At that time, Aleksandr Pavlovich Vinogradov was in charge of radiochemical and plutonium purification technology. This was in the Urals, in

the same plant that was producing plutonium for the bomb. In solutions, however. The technology was quite complex. We would carry the solutions from one plant to another. We maintained a very accurate concentration. Vinogradov used to say that they were worth their weight in gold. For that reason, whenever the concentration was insufficient, we would add saturated solution or vice-versa. That was what Tymanyuk and Karatygin were doing, when all of a sudden a reaction began. They threw the container, and the solution spilled. Later we collected all of the solution, of course, with no one the wiser—not even the combine. Otherwise, there would have been trouble. Both persons were subjected to neutron radiation. Karatygin was seriously injured, but Tymanyuk suffered virtually no consequences. She recently retired on a pension. She has a granddaughter; she probably is a great-grandmother by now.

The point here is that susceptibility to irradiation varies with the person. This became clear when we started our work. We had a workman— Ivan Pavlovich Frolov-Domnin (who lives close by; 86 years old) that took no precautions against radiation. We had no idea of how much radiation he received. But as far as consequences are concerned, there were none. He did much and helped us a great deal, especially in hazardous situations. But he is a rare person, of course.

[Chernavin] We had cases where people were subjected to considerably less radiation and actually were rendered unfit for duty. The cause of radiation in many cases was steam generators.

[Aleksandrov] Yes, we were greatly troubled by reliability problems of steam generators. They were designed by Genrikh Gasanov and his design office. Their products were splendid. We came out ahead with them, since the designers built in a cycle that included some overheating. This enabled us to achieve a high efficiency and gain a power advantage over the Americans.

[Chernavin] But the service life of the first steam generators was extremely short; I found that out myself.

[Aleksandrov] That is just what I wanted to talk about. In our tests, the operating time before failure was 18,000 to 20,000 hours, but installed on the boat, they started to leak within a short period of time. The first ones started to leak after 800 hours.

[Chernavin] That is quite true. When we were able to make them last for 1,200 hours, we felt like heroes.

[Aleksandrov] Yes, yes. The situation was very difficult. "You have abandoned the American system," we were told. "You have overheating; that is why you are having trouble. Change to the American system." If we were to do so, we would lose out in both speed and dimensions. We all mustered our courage and, in a special meeting, said: "No, better to leave the steam generators as they are. All we have to do is change the metal. Then

everything will be all right." We were lucky that we made the right decision at that time.

[Chernavin] Let me tell you how we felt. We accomplished several cruises in our plant testing to chalk up 600 hours. By the time we were ready for the Navy, we had logged 800 hours. Then it started: On the first cruise, one steam generator started to leak. Since they were in pairs, we could not determine which one was at fault. The craft was returned to the plant; two-thirds of them broke down in a period of several months. Literally one after the other.

Everyone was in shock. You may recall that at that time, Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Chabanenko was accused of disliking atomic submarines. In reality, this was not exactly true. Andrey Trofimovich said, "What kind of atomic-powered boat is this? It is supposed to cruise endlessly; a diesel-powered craft is better, more reliable. We do not need boats like that."

[Slavskiy] The first atomic-powered ice breaker was not accepted by the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet until our comrades would run in everything. On the other hand, military seamen bravely learned how to operate the ships.

[Aleksandrov] Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov was in charge of acceptance of the first craft. We set out to start up the reactor with the commission present. All of a sudden—water hammer. There was a bang—the devil take it—and all the pipes shook. Then a second, a third bang, and there we were, wondering what went wrong. Commission members ran up to me, asking: "What is going on? Why the delay?" They looked at their watches: That was not according to schedule. Ustinov came up and asked, "Can I be of assistance?" I said, "Get them the hell out of here!" He did everything without saying a word.

We thought about it for a while, looked here and there, and determined that the water supply was too slow. The water was being transformed into steam, which was being condensed by the next portion of water, thus producing the water hammer. In about 15 minutes the problem was solved: The water was being supplied properly to the steam generators, and the installation commenced to operate correctly. We fed steam to the turbine and the power to the propeller. The propeller was rotating. The commission members came running, had a look, and declared they that were satisfied with the boat.

[Chernavin] When the first steam generators showed up and the first one operated for about 7,000 hours, we were overjoyed. We could sail with generators such as those. And when they later were to operate for several tens of thousands of hours, the problem was no more.

[Slavskiy] The first reactors we used to produce plutonium were incomparably simpler than the shipboard reactors. When we were building the shipboard reactor prototype, we had nothing but bad luck. A leak here, another one there. I had a look and said to one of

Dollezhal's engineers who was in charge of installation, "You are in too much of a hurry. Throw away all the pipes, then start over, taking your time. We will pay whatever it comes to." They went back to the beginning and everything came off without a hitch.

[Aleksandrov] We stopped just at the time the development branched off into two directions: the water cooled reactor and the liquid-metal cooled reactor. The liquid-metal type was very promising. An experimental boat powered by a liquid-metal cooled reactor spent some time at sea. The rating parameters were impressive, but reliability was poor. It was reliability that concerned us and occupied our attention.

As I already said, the boat was designed by Peregudov. We usually met with him on a weekly basis. We used to refer to that as "Negroes fighting at night on the Zambezi River," since we were looking out for our interests, and he for his. We drew a square, indicating where we wanted to locate the reactor installation. "Where will the center of gravity be located?" "Here." Then we marked the location with a dot. That meant that we and he would be so guided in the future. There were to be no delays in the design work. For this reason, each one of us was responsible for where he placed his dot. Our work at that time was amazingly friendly.

[Chernavin] Were you being urged on from above in your design and construction work?

[Aleksandrov] There was no need to be urged on. We took all the young comrades away from Merkin's sector. The main one was Nikolay Sidorovich Khlopin. He had been in charge of that effort since 1962; now and then he would ask me about certain problems. He spent time aboard submarines on virtually all projects. The reactors were being improved at a rapid pace. Many new developments were intended for the Navy.

[Chernavin] As you know, seamen were displaying great interest and enthusiasm while they were learning to operate the new ships and the new reactors. I served more than 30 years with the Northern Fleet, and all this was taking place right in front of me. Later, in my position as Fleet Commander, I was appointed Chairman of the State Committee for Acceptance of the "Tayfun" submarine—the one that was the counterpart of the American "Trident."

[Aleksandrov] It was my misfortune not to have been aboard the "Tayfun."

[Chernavin] Sergey Nikitovich, her chief designer, was with us during all the testing. I must tell you that the ship was very successful. Most important of all were the reliable and modern reactors. They were virtually trouble-free during the trials.

[Aleksandrov] That is natural. Decades had passed. Nuclear power had advanced enormously, primarily in the reliability area. The Chernobyl AES was another warning to us and to all mankind that the creation,

operation, and servicing of atomic power demands the highest qualifications and greatest responsibility. Everything is attainable, technically speaking. There can be no doubt about the future of nuclear power, but we must approach it with respect. Igor Vasilyevich Kuznetsov here, in his own house, never tired of telling us these seemingly mundane truths. Yes, the atom is capable of rendering man all-powerful; the atom cannot be blamed if man sometimes is negligent in his use of this great power.

Without belittling anyone's efforts and virtues, I would like to say that as far as mastering atomic power is concerned, for military seamen there was much to learn and much remains to be learned.

Operation of Degaussing Ships Noted

90UM0065A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Capt Lt Ye. Tarasov, Pacific Fleet: "Magnetic Field Subduers—Reporting From an Unusual Ship"]

[Text] Secured to buoys in a bay protected from winds and heavy sea waves is a nuclear powered submarine. Nearby on its starboard side is a small ship bearing the flag of the auxiliary fleet. Why did they meet here? An experienced person could say immediately that the nuclear submarine is preparing for a distant cruise, or has returned from an ocean voyage. What about the auxiliary vessel? Especially since that yet does not look like a rescue ship, or the usual companion of nuclear vessels, a sea going tug.

It turns out that the vessel has been along side the submarine for a number of days already. And it has not merely been along side, but has been working. Black cables stretched out from its side to the submarine and wound around the hull of the nuclear powered vessel in every which way. What is taking place is an operation extremely necessary for a warship—degaussing. In our country academician A. P. Aleksandrov knows the theory and practice of this matter more thoroughly than anyone else. Back in the 1930s he began to take up the problem of degaussing. At that time, on the eve of the war, it was done almost in a semi-amateurish way. And now the navy has special degaussing vessels, abbreviated SR [suda razmagnichivaniya].

Degaussing can be carried out by several methods. And all of this is done to protect the ship from exploding on mines which have proximity magnetic or magnetic induction fuses, and from torpedoes.

The degaussing device of a ship employed in the period of the Great Patriotic War consisted of coils of cable installed on the ship in various levels. Through them passed a continuous electrical current of such strength and direction that the magnetic field created by this current was directed opposite to the magnetic field of the ship, and thereby reduced it to an amount that would not

cause mines to explode. A coil of cable installed only in the horizontal plane along the perimeter of the ship served as a simpler device.

However, a reasonable question may arise: what is the sense of degaussing ships in peacetime? In order to answer this question, we visit the degaussing ship commanded by Capt 3d Rank V. Seletin. In his day the officer completed the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. He began his service as a degaussing engineer.

"Not only warships, but also civilian vessels make use of our services," the captain third rank states.

"We monitor magnetic and electrical fields; if they are higher than normal we reduce their level. Why is this necessary? An electrical field is a kind of catalytic agent, which hastens corrosion of the hull. A magnetic field effects the operation of magnetic compasses. The ship stops deviation only after appropriate processing. Yes, and mines appear in the world's oceans.

Just as a sportsman needs not only regular training, but also medical examinations, so a ship needs not only cruises, but also appropriate inspections. This preventive measure, in particular, reduces the likelihood that submarines will be detected from the air by an airborne magnetometer.

A measuring team begins the work of degaussing; it determines all the necessary parameters using a special apparatus. From these data a picture of the fields is compiled and the type and amount of processing are determined. A cable is wound around the ship in all directions. An electrical current is fed through it. In short, the wedge is driven out by a wedge.

Capt 3d Rank V. Seletin has numerous "god children" to his credit. He is an acknowledged specialist in his field. And the degaussing ship that he commands, according to last year's results, was the best in the unit among vessels of its class. It must be noted that there are degaussing ships much newer than this one. A special feature of this degaussing ship crew is that the majority are civilian seamen. Turnover of cadres for support ships is a common problem. Capt 3d Rank V. Seletin does not have such problems. Like-minded, enthusiastic people serve and work with him.

The authority of Sr Lt I. Kolodenskiy, commander of the electromechanical section, is high. He is jokingly called "god of all fields." In his day he completed school with distinction and joined the ship at his desire. Therefore, he knows and loves his work. Sr Eng V. Loyko, his subordinate, has been working on degaussing ships for 25 years. All that time he has kept diaries in which he enters the characteristics of fields and processing times of ships and other vessels with which he has dealt. Practically all the young specialists in the section see him for consultation. The degaussing ship has its "patriarch," Aleksey Nikitovich Kudryashov. He is 72 years old! Kudryashov has been serving on auxiliary fleet ships for

a half century. Aleksey Nikitovich is a shift mechanic. He even turned down his pension in order to continue his active working life. At times even the young ones cannot keep up with him. And if something breaks in Kudryashov's area of supervision he does not go ashore until the malfunction has been eliminated. There is an example for the young people!

However, Capt 3d Rank V. Seletin also cannot complain about them. You see, he selects his people himself.

Finally, the degaussing ship has left the nuclear powered vessel. And it is already awaiting a surface ship, which is preparing for a voyage to the Persian Gulf.

Further Note on Aircraft Landings on 'TBILISI'

*18010015 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 89 First Edition p 1*

[Caption following photographs, entitled: "The Cruiser 'Tbilisi': Thunder Over the Deck".]

[Text] The photographs published today are of a benchmark day in the history of our Navy and aviation. They were made on that day when on the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser [tyazhelom avianesushchom kreysere] "Tbilisi" the first take-offs and landings were made by [the following] aircraft: the Su-27 fighter-interceptor, the Su-25 ground attack aircraft in its two-seat training variant, and the front [frontovogo] fighter MIG-29.

For the first time aircraft took off and landed not vertically, as it was done on our other aircraft-carrying cruisers, but by the conventional method, as on an airfield. The initiators were flight-test pilots of the OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni L.O. Sukhoy, Viktor Pugachev and Igor Botintsev, a representative of the Experimental Flight Institute, Aleksandr Krutov and a flight-test pilot of the OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan, Hero of the Soviet Union, Taxtar Aubakkirov. And there is the last report from on board the cruiser "Tbilisi": successful take-offs and landings were carried out by military pilots.

Civilian Misuse, Underpayment of Construction Detachments

90UM0097A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 3 Nov 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by N. Belan: "The Detachment Comes To the Construction Site: The Procurator's Office Defends Military Construction Workers"]

[Text] It probably was not an easy decision to use military construction detachments (MCDs) in putting up top priority national economic projects. It is evident, however, that such a step was taken because of certain difficulties. The Ministry of Defense used to dispatch a detachment to various construction projects, and to various Union or republic ministries only in exceptional cases, and only by special decision of the USSR government. Who would have thought that in time the most pressing problems would arise in places where such problems should not have existed at all. These are not departmental problems, but problems having a sweeping social impact and affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The Collegium of the Chief Military Procurator discussed these problems yesterday..

The MCDs have been assigned to the ministries and agencies. This means that people have been placed under their full subordination. A peculiar situation has emerged when a person with shoulder boards reports to civilian authorities. I came across the leave pass of a construction worker, a private,—that was signed by a plant manager. So what is life like for these fellows?

On the one hand, the ministries are doggedly persistent in trying to get hold of new detachments for themselves. But they are unable to provide them with work. For example, the Ministry of Construction in the Urals and Western Siberia utilized only 50 percent of military construction workers for doing building work proper. Many construction project managers say that the detachments are not needed. In 1984, the head of the construction administration of the Ekibastuz Electric Power Station II sought to refuse to use a MCD, but the Ekibastuzenergostroy trust management forced him to accept a detachment again. Since then, only 50 percent of the detachment personnel were used at the electric power station construction sites in 1988, and only 7 percent as of June 1, 1989. What is left for a soldier to do in such situations? Do they go job hunting—and work in cooperatives, as dishwashers in civilian canteens, as janitors and even as kindergarten nurses? And they do take these jobs, since military construction workers pay for their uniforms and rations out of their pockets. One cannot but agree with the conclusions made by A. Katusev, Chief Military Procurator and Lieutenant General of Justice, that it is too easy for the ministries to receive a labor force from the military agency, while bearing no real responsibility for its rational utilization.

A shabbily dressed military construction worker is an everyday sight in the streets of the towns and villages. Some people will be tempted to make a derogatory remark. And yet there is no one who has fewer rights and more

frustrations than this fellow. In many detachments these fellows receive a mere pittance and this kind of glaring abuse has in fact been planned. Major General of Justice V. Kaunin cited the example of V. Katunin, the head of the general supervisory administration and head of the RSFSR US-103 Minvostokstroy, in the second half-year planned an average monthly salary of 46 rubles 80 kopecks for military construction workers, while military construction workers at the SU-264 construction administration are to get 25 rubles, with a 7-9 rubles increase in August and September. The rationale is all too simple—a soldier will put up with anything. He can be made to do the hardest and dirtiest work, which is the kind of job often assigned in most places.

But even these wages are not paid on time everywhere. Sometimes wages are deliberately underestimated. An inspection performed at the VSO (Military-Construction Section) of the RSFSR Minvostokstroy has unveiled the fact that military construction workers account for the bulk of profits generated at the US-105 projects. But their average monthly pay is six times lower than that of civilian specialists.

Many MCDs find themselves in scandalous everyday living conditions. They have neither canteens, nor clubs, nor drying places. Their quarters are often located in ex-colonies, prisons, workshops, in the territory of sanitary protective zones which have hazardous emissions, where human habitation is prohibited.

Nutrition is also a problem. Members of one of the detachments of Minvostokstroy regularly get canned fish instead of meat. The summer has passed and the soldiers have yet to be given fresh vegetables. Minuralsibstroy military construction workers went on a hunger strike in the summer to protest the low quality of cooked food and the absence of fats, vegetable oil and potatoes. Meager rations and lack of everyday amenities provoked a strike by the RSFSR Minyugstroy MCD in July.

Is it accidental, then, that the detachments reassigned from the Ministry of Defense have loose military discipline and growing crime? They account for a sizeable share—more than 42 percent—of all the crimes committed in the Armed Forces.

The Collegium has concluded that the situation was not normal and had to be remedied.

"Take, for instance, a proposal to institute special uniforms for military construction workers," says Lieutenant General of Justice A. Katusev. "This conceals a sophisticated moral aspect. The Army people do not want to be mixed up with the detachments assigned to other agencies. But even if military leaders feel ashamed at the military construction workers looking like soldiers, and if the press explains to the population that a shepherd wearing a military uniform, a cooperative worker and any other manual laborer do not represent the Army, then morally speaking what are the feelings of the military construction workers themselves?"

The Collegium considered the issue acute and passed specific decisions to provide legal protection to military construction workers and reinforce the procurator's supervision of the MCDs.

Success of Conversion at All-Union Aviation Materials Institute*90UM0074C Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 5 Sep 89 p 2*

[Article by V. Savelev: "Defense Industry to the Consumer: VIAM [All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Materials] Invites You To Shave"]

[Text] As far as we know, no one has ever succeeded in shaving with a brick. But, it looks like conversion is approaching this historic event. In any case, I saw an experimental model of a razor blade made of clay: A milk-colored ceramic weightlessly lay in the palm of my hand. This razor blade is the eternal embodiment of a dream of our men who are compelled to painfully scrape their cheeks with dull steel. Just where did this miracle appear?

Among the reactions to the news articles "Composite" and "Butcher with a 'Space-age' Knife" (VM [VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] 20 July 1989) from NPO [Scientific Production Association], there was an invitation to one more "well known in narrow spheres" scientific center: VIAM, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Materials. The technology for the "eternal shaver" was developed right here. This is only one example of how unique scientific achievements will be placed into service for our future needs. But before I talk about the successes of conversion, I must say several words about VIAM itself.

This institute will soon be 60 years old. It was "split off" from TsAGI [Central Institute of Aerodynamics imeni N.Ye. Chukovskiy] in 1932 in order to concentrate on development of materials for aviation, and later also for space technology and materials. I cannot list all of the technologies and materials which were born in its laboratories and transferred to aircraft.

Currently the institute is a powerful scientific production association. The range of its research is from non-combustible cloth for aircraft seats to super-modern alloys and composites. But nonetheless, the sign of the times are not only these undoubtedly first class achievements. They existed even before now. But right now it is as if VIAM is coming out of a shadow and is completing the breakthrough to the mass consumer.

It is no accident that guests have been visiting here more frequently of late. The institute and enterprises of seven ministries have developed a program for utilizing the institute's latest scientific and technological achievements within the framework of conversion. Financing for just the first year totals 40 million rubles.

"We ourselves are investing enormous resources into conversion," says Ye. Kachanov, first deputy general director. "The market is presenting its demands. It is difficult to adapt to them. Here is one of the most difficult tasks: Reduce the costs of new materials without

worsening their characteristics. Additional tests of suitability for their 'peaceful' uses are also required."

Conversion is a difficult and complicated process and it does not fit into a simple antithesis: Before cannons, now toys. It is absurd to transition from missiles to meat grinders. An enormous intellectual and technical potential that has been accumulated in the military industrial complex for decades is being impermissibly squandered and changed over to knickknacks. It is bad when under the slogan of "more consumer goods" defense enterprises are being forced under administrative pressure to take up the first thing to come along and not utilize a hundredth of their capabilities. They are capable of the most complex scientific production.

Manufacturing sports planes is not a new a direction but it is now getting a lot of attention. The SU-26 aircraft, which has brilliantly demonstrated itself in the sky of Tushin, is manufactured from light weight and very durable carbon plastic. It is capable of withstanding 12 G loads, more than any fighter aircraft. Thanks to the outstanding qualities of the new aircraft, our pilots gathered 10 of 11 gold medals at the last European Championship.

The Letuva and Nida gliders and the Nyamunas powered glider are also manufactured from carbon plastic. The main thing is that these aircraft are competitive. This is the best characteristic of any consumer goods. You agree that not many of our items are now worthy of it. Here the aircraft builders are also ready to help their neighbors in the machine tool complex—the vehicle manufacturers. How many problems they have with materials! Body, chassis, and spring corrosion.... VIAM together with the Minsk and Gorky auto plants and ZIL have begun to combat it. A practically "eternal" composite material has been developed for automobiles and it is light, durable, and high-technology. I saw a Moskvich hood made of this material, a cast aluminum alloy, at an institute exhibition. One-piece wheels are made from this material instead of being welded.

The institute's developments also found an application in the food and light industries. The same ceramic filters [are used] for ultrafine juice straining. Or a ribbon-foil for a loom. The use of carbon plastic made it several times lighter. Just thanks to this, production capacity was doubled and noise was reduced by a factor of two. We are also saving hard currency that was previously used to acquire foils abroad.

The range of conversion is unusually broad. The wastes from composite production are also being used for manufacturing skates. VIAM's speed during this period of time is less than that of their colleagues from Kompozit. But there is a long road ahead.

"What is keeping us from moving more rapidly?" Ye. Kachanov asks again. "The situation at the institute is generally typical for VPK [Military Industrial Complex]:

Almost 100 percent state order. This undoubtedly constrains self-reliance in the search and selection of partners and customers.

Not everything has been put in order by the recently adopted amendments to the Law on State Enterprises. They stimulate the output of goods, that is, the end product. But here we have components. How can that be? VIAM and other enterprises and institutes that do not work directly at the market lose the stimulus to carry out conversion. Moreover, it is becoming profitable to restrain growth to a level of three percent below which taxes do not "shave off" profits. Or did the legislators not take this into account?

Yes, it is difficult to transfer the former "boxes" to the peaceful track. There are the razor blades themselves. The idea is really marvelous and there is nothing like it in the world. But meanwhile VIAM has not provided any more samples. Who would support it?

Non-Military Work By Aircraft Engine Design Bureau

90UM0099C Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by T. Surovtsev: "Designers Seek Partners"]

[Text] When soviet military aircraft appeared at an international air show in Paris, it was a sensation. The well-known SU-27 fighter enjoyed special success: specialists remarked that it significantly surpassed its opposite number, the American F-15.

The engines were one of the main advantages of the SU-27 and were developed at the Design Bureau imeni A. M. Lyulka.

It has worked for many years on the development of jet engines for the nation's Army. Now, with its enormous experience and qualified cadres, like many other defense enterprises the bureau faces the task of harmoniously and effectively filling orders for the domestic economy. I talked with chief engineer Genadiy Zuyev on this subject:

"We have interesting designs in the fields of thermodynamics, heat technology, gas- and hydrodynamics, strength, reliable element design, materials, etc.," he said. "I am not exaggerating when I say that in a number of these areas we are ahead of the world level.

"We are ready to begin performing very complex domestic economic tasks. Incidentally, even before we sometimes were involved in civilian production. In 1963, for example, our specialists joined an experimental youth design bureau that developed a unique automated milking system designed for 200 cows an hour. However, some of the leaders of the day said that we were not sticking to our own business, and some time later the country bought a system abroad that used the very same principle. But for 17 million dollars.

"Now we and the Leningrad Plant imeni Kirov are developing a plan for the development of ecologically clean electric power plants on the basis of aircraft engines. The expected efficiency is 50 percent or more. Thanks to its gas turbines, the unit will eject one third to one fifth the pollutants into the atmosphere that current models do.

"In addition, we are preparing a plan for a gas-pumping unit in which the drive for the pump is a gas turbine; small 6-8 hp diesels have been developed for use in mini-tractors, power units, pumps, saws, and portable electric power stations with a power of to 4-5 kW. We can develop an improved diesel that will be ecologically cleaner than a gasoline engine. We are also ready to begin developing turbo-supercharging for transport and stationary diesels. We have experimental models of turbo-prop engines for light aviation of the 90s, very high-economy engines. Next year we plan to produce several hundred original ovens to fire porcelain—for our stomatology, which now buys them abroad.

In general, they have more than enough plans. You see, their technical capabilities and creative potential is enormous. But unfortunately, much of all this is still plans, experimental models... It is perplexing that for the time being only foreign firms are showing enormous interest in these ideas, while the national organizations are in no rush with their suggestions.

Of course the design bureau may be asked to produce coffee machines. But shouldn't our sights be higher? Wouldn't another way be better: joint enterprises, international integration, quality production, and hard currency?

In Moscow, in Gagarin square, there is a tall statue dedicated to the first Soviet cosmonaut. But there are few who know that it was made by workers of the design bureau, and welded from separate titanium sheets. Let it not be simply a monument, but a symbol of the wisdom of our conversion.

Kharkov Tank Plant Lags in Civilian Production

*90UM0074A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 2*

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent A. Kleba, Kharkov: "The Tank Works is Spinning its Wheels and the Market is Waiting for Goods from the Military Plant"]

[Text] The Plant imeni Malyshev is the cradle of the T-34 and a modern Soviet army tank plant. General Director V. Pivovarov, speaking at an oblast party conference, admitted that the giant had reduced the volume of output of nonfood consumer items. IZHYU-5 motors, tents, clothes trees, small balcony tables, "Magnetic Letters and Numbers" game, food storage trays.... They had planned to develop six new items in 1989.

At the present time, the association has begun fulfilling the task on designing and developing equipment for processing sectors.

I recently visited the association's Dergachevskiy affiliate where IZH-Yupiter motors and motorcycles and the magnetic letters are produced. A letter from workers and engineers brought me there. They wrote that the collective is working a third below its capabilities. The leaders of the production association treat them like stepchildren.

The affiliate's collective wants to find self-reliance but the association "needs an indicator" of consumer goods output and is therefore putting obstacles in the affiliate's way.

They just announced a conversion policy. But even today there are no substantive changes: The tank manufacturing giant remains indebted to the country. V. Raduto, director of the Soyuzpromvnedreniye zonal affiliate said:

"The Plant imeni Malyshev continues to reduce the output of consumer goods. For incomprehensible reasons, production of cast aluminum cookware which enjoys enormous demand both here and among our foreign partners has ceased at our plant. During the next five-year plan, we intend to produce 50,000 multi-purpose four-wheeled all-terrain vehicles. They will replace the small trucks and tractors, circular saws and well pumps...." But what is keeping the plant, which has sharply reduced tank output from already producing the all-terrain vehicle during the current five-year plan?

Here it is appropriate to reveal one more of the Malyshev plant workers' "military secrets." Last September the designers received the task to develop dough-rolling equipment for major public catering centers. The path from the drawing board to the first prototypes took seven months. The equipment cuts up to a 130 kilogram batch of noodles or various kinds of rolls per shift. But... there is only one model left right now.

Why is the tank manufacturing giant delaying production of needed goods? The issue remains unresolved of using powerful all-terrain prime-movers capable of operating under extreme conditions and of transporting 12-20 ton cargoes. Kharkov bulldozers [tyagachi] can demolish all types of barriers, build roads through rock and taiga, and dig foundation pits up to 3.5 meters deep in permafrost ground. This entire arsenal is frozen and waiting for the association's leaders to find out where they need to look for consumers of powerful equipment.

The situation which has taken shape at the plant imeni Malyshev reflects the attitude that Kharkov's other defense enterprises also have toward conversion. Thus, the radio electronics plant is not hurrying to produce dual-cassette stereo tape recorders, high class "com-bines," modern portable color televisions, video recorders, computers, and radio-controlled toys. Here it

is hoped that the word "conversion" was found accidentally. However the time to work only on military orders has passed, it is now time to work for the welfare of the population.

Cost, Results of Minlegpishchemash Transfer to Defense Sector

90UM0074D Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 22 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA Special Correspondent L. Pertsevaya: "Economics of Disarmament: The Market Cannot Tolerate Orders"]

[Text] Our land produces more than enough of every product and stores are empty only because transport, storage, and processing losses are too high. This is an axiom which no one any longer doubts. Let us get the processing sector straightened out and everything will be in order.

During the stagnant times, this action would have begun in accordance with appropriate resolutions and would have ended with them. And the efficiency measure of transferring all USSR Minlegpishchemash [Ministry of Light Food Processing Machine Building Industry] enterprises to the defense industry complex was stipulated in the transition-perestroyka resolution of 1987. There, they said, the military has strict execution discipline and they are not lazy, they will do it. Once again there are no reform innovations nor cooperators—leaseholders, no shareholders, no markets or bazaars that can balance the socialist economy just like in the old good times when orders still worked.

In short, society was justified in counting on an active assault of the problems and rapid results.

I am not saying that the defense industry complex immediately exerted itself to the extreme. And today a year and a half later, former Minlegpishchemash plants produce 85 percent of the food industry's equipment. But nevertheless, 134 design bureaus and design institutes and 176 enterprises which previously worked exclusively on Army equipment were tasked with this work. As a result, they succeeded in producing almost 1.3 billion rubles of various equipment and production lines for processing agricultural products. Is that a lot or a little? According to the memories of food industry experts, it is a small stream that momentarily quenches the inexhaustible thirst of the desert. Yes and it was repeatedly emphasized at a meeting of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Military Industrial Issues that if it is oriented on the national economy's requirements, almost nothing has been done thus far. They stated the numbers: Of 585 nomenclatures of new equipment, they planned on producing 120 types but succeeded in producing only 23. Only 12 percent meet the world [quality] level.

It is clear that customers are not happy with the new chiefs. They showed me the first Lastochka, a vacuum

mixer with forming equipment dashed out from the Ministry of Defense Production, in the sausage shop of the Kharkov Meat Combine. The metal skin of this line is made in the USSR and all of the electronics are imported. Accordingly, the packaging material, film, and paper must also be bought abroad and we have to look for spare parts in the FRG or Sweden. Naturally, the manufacturer is not assuming responsibility for its brainchild during the warranty period. The equipment costs 120,000 rubles which is almost ten times more than a similar old one.

Alas, many defense complex plants are trying to increase prices of equipment for the "civilian sector" to the level of "firing irons" and prices for 27 types of food processing equipment have increased by a factor of 10. But imagine, for example, how long it will take to pay off a bird carcass packaging line if it costs 232,000 rubles! Thus a weighty monetary wave of 1.3 billion rubles is not quite so weighty in its natural replenishment in units. For some reason food industry enterprises are being renewed so slowly and only 60 of 274 start-up facilities have been equipped with machinery this year.

We can suggest that the defense ministries have spent the past one and a half years on the take-off runway; They have rebuilt the base, prepared draft documentation, and have studied demand in our country and the latest achievements abroad. But all of the speeches at the aforementioned meeting of the Commission on Military Industrial Issues are also proof that the defense industry is only opening these issues for itself.

I cite Minister of the USSR Defense Industry B. Belousov's speech. He stated that the 10 Minlegpishchemash enterprises given to Minoboronprom [Ministry of the Defense Industry] need to be re-equipped and accumulated social issues need to be resolved. They need to study the agricultural production processors regional requirements for the appropriate equipment. They are continually totaling savings for equipment deliveries to civilian sector plants and it turns out that it is impossible to get by without cooperating with them...

Defense industry complex enterprise ministers, directors, and designers got up on the speaker's dais and set forth ever new reasons which are delaying them from beginning production. O. Shishkin, Minister of General Machine Building, admitted he had discussed the problems of manufacturing equipment for the food industry 11 times at the collegium! He managed to complete the plan in the monetary expression but the expectations of many customers will be disappointed. They have only produced 9 of the 57 types of new equipment. The prices to purchasers are excessively high. Instead of technologically closed lines, they are only getting their elements with productivity limited by manual labor (for example, bakeries without dough machines). Do you know how the defense industry reacts to customer complaints about high prices? They are ready to punish "capricious" native consumers and to search abroad for customers for their output. I think that commentary is superfluous.

Thus, a year and a half has gone by just for recognition of the problems. How much time will the process of organizing and setting up production itself take?

The defense industry is thinking solidly and basically and the realization of their proposals will take quite a long time. The appropriate institutes from the civilian sphere—milk, meat, potato, and others, that develop technology for processing these products need to follow on the heels of the Minlegpishchemash enterprises. We need to organize an information coordinating system that will concentrate all developments that already have native and foreign examples of equipment that process agricultural products. All civilian sector enterprises need to "get into their heads" the appropriate components in the state order and strictly demand its fulfillment. And the main thing is to "set forth the case so that it is beneficial for us to manufacture this equipment."

In short, They are thinking of establishing a closed production system that could operate on total self-servicing and like a monopoly with a guarantee of a well paid rhythmic order and easy sales. Thus, the defense industrial complex is accustomed to operating as the strictest sector of our state economy. So that each plant can conduct its business independently, in an enterprising manner, with careful accounting, under conditions of competition, and the sector as a whole can be centralized and guaranteed in a measured, progressive march.

I can imagine how the impatient reader will exclaim: "Well, that is just great! The defense industry succeeded in insuring a high level of equipment to the Army for all those years and with solid deliveries, now let it serve the people."

It succeeded. Due to its special position in raw materials supply, immeasurable and incalculable financing, priority equipment deliveries, and provision of the best personnel. In other words, due to unconditional dependence and existence under exclusive conditions. And the fact that it operates under exclusive conditions can hardly become an ordinary daily routine. We have decided to produce both consumer goods, equipment for light and food industries, and sales equipment at the expense of the defense industry... We are going to paint all transport vehicles fire engine red and we are going to give them all access to the green lane [translator's note: high speed commuter lane]. A traffic jam is unavoidable!

However, let us return to the Oval Hall of the USSR Council of Ministers where the high commission met. In 1990, nearly all ministries of the defense industry complex plan to double output of vitally important equipment and the defense industry as a whole will make almost 42 percent of all equipment and processing lines for the food industry. A decision has been made that a special commission will track price formation. Yet one more special agency will compile a list of equipment coming in from the "civilian sector" and will monitor the flow of deliveries. All through a centralized system.

And insofar as there are already disruptions in carrying out these proposals, enlisting the aid of defense industry enterprise party committees and reinforcing orders with slogans and organizational work is recommended.

Familiar methods and levers tested by life. It is true that the entire economic complex is renouncing them today, these unreliable ones that have frequently resulted in and led us toward the present crisis. Economic reform is beginning to gain speed and one after another sectors are getting out of the strict administrative command system: Concerns, leased enterprises, and cooperatives... And we are artificially attempting to maintain the most important sectors of the economy in this system. Is this justifiable?

Consumer Goods Production More Profitable than Defense

90UM0074B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed Article: "A Shortage of Striped Vests"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Light Industry has examined the issues touched upon in Captain 2nd Rank M. Lukanin's correspondence published in the August 25, 1989 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the same title.

E. Razumeyev, deputy minister, reports that the main cause for not fulfilling the USSR Ministry of Defense's special delivery are the items' return on investment and their low profit margin (up to 3 percent) in comparison with production of consumer goods (up to 30 percent).

Equipment retail price lists have been developed and approved with the USSR Ministry of Defense which provide for a 20 percent increase in profitability for the purposes of interesting the sector's enterprises in producing items specially designated by the USSR Ministry of Light Industry. The time period for introduction of the new price lists will be determined through an appropriate government decision.

Furthermore, disruptions in deliveries of certain assortments of clothing items have occurred which were caused by raw materials supply problems and the closure of a number of USSR MVD institutions that manufacture clothing items in accordance with agreements with the RSFSR Ministry of Light Industry.

USSR Ministry of Light Industry and union republic ministries of light industries carry out constant monitoring of timely fulfillment of special item deliveries. Thus, at a meeting of the board of the RSFSR Ministry of Light Industry, the causes of unsatisfactory work at Vladivostok Industrial-Trade Clothing Association were discussed. The Association is currently taking steps to insure fulfillment of the state order for 1989.

Delivery plans have been carried out in accordance with the established task for the 9 months of 1989 by the

clothing knitwear sailors' striped vest factory and the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Light Industry for soldier's box-calf boots.

Armor Not Cost Effective for Conversion Products

90UM0078A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain A. Ostrovskiy: "Tanks Into Fittings?"]

[Text] I wandered around the shops of the Enakievskiy Metallurgical Works feeling both pride and anxiety. After his discharge into the reserves my father, a combat veteran, worked here many years. My brother got his first job here.

My father told me that immediately after the Great Patriotic War the blast furnaces were not "fed" with ore, but with scrap metal from dismantled cannons, combat vehicles, and other equipment. Now the factory is one of the country's first to be connected with the conversion of military production—it has begun melting down tanks.

But the factory workers do not understand why it is this way: The high-quality alloy armor will go into the production of construction fittings, I-beams, and angle pieces? As though the usual "crude" scrap were not good enough for that. And the price for the steel from the tanks is set at only 30 rubles per ton—hardly enough, probably, to cover the delivery costs borne by the Ministry of Defense.

"Maybe it would be better to convert the tanks into tractors and sell them on the national economy," said A. Nikitchenko, chief of the impact machine workshop at the EMZ [Enakievskiy Metallurgical Works], sharing his doubts. "Even with the uneconomical engine they could be used for some sort of mobile work. Say, for cleaning up after natural disasters or putting out forest fires... I am sure that our factory would also purchase equipment with such excellent running gear."

The opinion of the metallurgical engineer was seconded by Lieutenant Colonel N. Demchenko, who had arrived at the factory with equipment: "This type of combat equipment could serve as a tractor in the North. It has been well protected against corrosion, and it runs like a clock in temperatures below zero..."

The factory has concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Defense to scrap 400 tanks. So that the landing of the impact machine shop, where the brigades of cutters do their work, does not become overstocked, the tanks will be delivered in monthly batches of 30. Dozens of tanks have been melted down. Is there perhaps some sense in stopping and finding a wiser use for the metal?

Military Products Displayed For Civilian Purchase

90UM0099A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by A. Dokuchayev: "For Peaceful Purposes"]

[Text] On 28 November, the first sales exhibition of "Military Equipment For Peaceful Purposes" is opening in Moscow.

It is being held by the Ministry of Defense and the All-Union Association of Scientific-Technical, Cooperative, and Cost-Accounting Organizations and Enterprises. At the "Sokolniki" exhibition complex (pavilion No. 3) visitors will be able to learn about various models of military equipment that will enter the domestic economy in the future.

A press conference was held yesterday at the USSR Ministry of Defense press center. The chairman of the association, E. Kalinin, exhibition director Yu. Vorontsov, and member of exhibition management and representative of the Ministry of Defense Col. G. Rodionov remarked that the models of military equipment offered for sale possessed high technical characteristics.

For instance, a great deal of electrotechnical equipment will be represented. Stabilized-current sets, power supplies and distributing devices, voltage stabilizers, automation and control systems, transformers, as well as package transformer sub-stations may find extensive use in civilian sectors of industry.

The MAZ-547V chassis, capable of carrying up to 60-tonne cargoes over any roads and negotiating fords of almost one meter, will find quite varied application. This is a very powerful transport means, previously used to haul intermediate-range missiles; it can handle a maximum ascent of 27 degrees with a full load.

Quite sophisticated mobile living quarters, mounted on the base of the cross-country MAZ-547, were developed for military needs. The unit contains eight compartments, four of which are equipped like train compartments. The mobile living quarters come with a microclimate system, including heating, ventilation, and water supply. The design of the aggregate permits use at any time of day and in any season, under any weather conditions, at a temperature range from -40 to + 50 degrees.

The spray-and-neutralization machines, designed for washing and fire-fighting operations, may be widely used under field conditions. The powerful pump moves 1,200 liters per minute. This aggregate includes a water boiler with a capacity of 1,900 liters, as well as tanks for alkali and foaming agents.

Visitors and buyers will also be shown various auxiliary equipments: ventilators with electric motors, hydraulic motors with pressure regulators, electrically-driven jacks, automatic switches, dynamometers, manometers,

automatic circuit breakers, pipes, hoses, and gas cylinders. Specialists of the exhibition will be able to advise interested visitors on how to acquire selected items. Contract prices are set on the items bought at the exhibition, but some military equipment can be acquired only at auction.

Will the sales-exhibition be successful? Its director, Yuriy Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, responded to this question:

"We expect so. You see, many models are simply unique. For example, a unit is being offered that heats and cools air. It's cold production is very impressive..."

The profit received from the sale of military equipment will go into the state budget to develop the social and consumer sphere of service members, as well as officers and warrant officers, discharged to the reserve from the Armed Forces.

Some of the funds will also go to the budget of the All-Union Charitable Fund "Intellect", whose purpose is to provide assistance in developing the creative abilities of youth. The experience of this exhibition will be used subsequently in the organization of sales exhibitions of military equipment, the need for which will also arise after a 50% strategic offensive arms reduction treaty comes into force, and after troop cuts in Europe.

Questions from Soviet and foreign journalists were answered at the press conference.

Cartographic Enterprise Producing Civilian Maps

90UM0099B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj G. Logvin: "Conversion: Products in Demand"]

[Text] Several years ago, the cartographic enterprise now headed by Lt Col V. Popov began to produce goods for domestic consumption. But their production has especially increased this year. Products such as "Yakutsk Municipal Transportation Map", "Khabarovsk and Environs", "Primorye Automotive Map", photographic wallpaper, and much else enjoy great buyer demand.

This year the enterprise has produced goods worth more than eighty thousand rubles. Among the packages of orders: maps of the environs of the cities of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Ussuriysk, Dalnerecheisk, Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and many others.

For the present all products are produced with conserved materials. Only ten percent of machinery time is used for them. The enterprise has high hopes for introduction of a new shop. Only after this can production be sharply increased. The collective also has an interest here; it receives considerable pay increases from the production of these items.

Shortage of Tank Repair Equipment

90UM0099D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 11 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Sgt I. Zheleznyakov: "It Might Happen Again, After All"]

[Text] Even though a long time has passed, I cannot forget my mishaps on hundred-kilometer march. It so happened that my tank "threw a track" and settled into a deep hole. That would appear to be a fixable breakdown, but we couldn't take care of it—we didn't have the right tools. The technical maintenance convoy couldn't help us—they didn't have the tools either. Swearing, we waited for the company to conclude a fifty-kilometer circle. At that point, how could we not recall the fervent

appeals to perform the march excellently, and the promises to provide us with everything necessary to do this, from the mouths of many communists at the komsomol meeting, particularly Lt Col V. Voloshin.

An old matter which would be remembered, you would think. Voloshin went on to a new post, and was replaced by a different officer. But the tool and instrument kits were not fixed. And some of our leaders keep quiet about this. They apparently are afraid to remind the leadership of its "duties". But you know, this isn't some trifling matter at stake here; basically it is combat readiness.

Well, then I remind them. I've got nothing to lose, as they say.

State of Pre-draft Training in Porkhovskiy Rayon

90UM0013A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian

No 7, Jul 89 [Signed to press 6 Jun 89] pp 12-13

[Round table discussion with B. Kushakov, chief of the CPSU RK [Rayon Committee] ideological department; V. Nikitin, second secretary of the All-Union Komsomol RK; N. Stolyarov, rayvoyenkom [rayon military committee] colonel; V. Belikeyev, deputy chairman of the DOSAAF obkom; S. Chernova, rono [rayon public education department] chief; V. Yegorov, chairman of the DOSAAF RK; and, Great Patriotic War Veterans N. Vildtgrube and M. Nikolayev: "A Time for Action: How We Train in DOSAAF; How Our Secret Projects Turn Out; Lider [Military Patriotic Club] Finds Support; We Cannot Let our Pamyat [Military Patriotic Club] Grow Old"] txt

[Text] Those participating in the VZ [VOYENNYE ZNANIYA] traveling editorial staff round table discussion are B. Kushakov, chief of the CPSU RK [Rayon Committee] ideological department; V. Nikitin, second secretary of the All-Union Komsomol RK; N. Stolyarov, rayvoyenkom [rayon military committee] colonel; V. Belikeyev, deputy chairman of the DOSAAF obkom; S. Chernova, rono [rayon public education department] chief; V. Yegorov, chairman of the DOSAAF RK; and, Great Patriotic War Veterans N. Vildtgrube and M. Nikolayev.

[VOYENNYE ZNANIYA] Training young people for service in the Armed Forces is a complex process. We are convinced that this work is being skillfully conducted, there are successes, and definite experience has been amassed in the rayon. But there are obviously also difficulties and problems. We would like today's discussion to be precisely about these problems.

[Stolyarov] I will begin precisely with problems. For example, it is not a secret that year after year the rayon does not fulfill "its quota" on the number of young men sent to DOSAAF schools. And it cannot fulfill it—the number of pre-conscription age young people is decreasing. But the numbers "reduced" five years ago have also not been reviewed since that time and they really are a third higher than our true capabilities.

Furthermore, SPTU [Rural Professional-Technical School] No. 27 is the only one in the rayon. Incidentally, there are more young people in it than in other educational institutions. However, we cannot send boys to a DOSAAF school and cause a three month disruption of their studies.

[Yegorov] But if we train specialists locally?

[Vildtgrube] It seems to me that is the way it used to be.

[Belikeyev] It is possible but you must consider that all Oblast DOSAAF educational organizations were established long ago. They have surrounded themselves with

solid educational facilities and there are skilled personnel at them. It is practically impossible to replant all of this on other ground.

Additional information: There are 80 primary DOSAAF organizations and one auto school in the rayon.

[Stolyarov] Many young people do not want to drive back and forth to a DOSAAF school for three months since there are no dormitories there. In Pskov and Ostrov cadets have to huddle in personal "corners." Furthermore, they have to pay for housing out of their own pockets, including expenditures for apartments, since they are reimbursed only after they complete their training. And there are families that cannot support a son out of pocket for that period of time far away from home.

[Belikeyev] That is all correct. And this is not the first year that we probe this issue in the Oblispolkom but so far without results. In 1986, a decision was made to build 220 bed dormitories in Velikiye Lyuki and Pskov. However—once again—the oblispolkom did not allocate building materials and did not identify contractors. Incidentally, this story has already been repeated three times. Designs are made up, we pay for them, but we are also not able to begin construction. The cost of the three completed designs is already approaching the cost of one dormitory.

Of course, there are also other problems. For example, I think that three months training is obviously inadequate. Experience has shown: Young people who have graduated from a DOSAAF school enter the Army and spend two to three months in a specialty to achieve the required level. Enrollment at naval and electronics schools is proceeding with difficulty. The reasons are that young men are acquiring skills that they cannot use anywhere after service in the Army.

[Nikolayev] I often visit schools and speak to cadets about our kray, about the history of the city of Porkhov, I reminisce about the Great Patriotic [War], and I see that the young people have an enormous desire to find out more about our kray and about their fellow countrymen who became famous while defending the Fatherland.

[Chernova] I agree with Mikhail Nikolayevich. Actually, it is not only DOSAAF that prepares young men for service. This process is impossible without schools and without military patriotic work. The leaders of Polonskiy and Berezovskiy secondary schools have manifested fine initiative. Students have done some exploring and have organized a museum of military and labor glory. And what rich historical material has been collected at Slavkovskiy Secondary School and Tineyevskiy Eight-year School! In my opinion, the situation is also good with regard to NVP [Initial Military Training] training materials, but then I do not think that we have enough experienced military training officers...

[VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA] Svetlana Nikolayevna, are there any warrior internationalists among the military training officers?

[Chernova] Alas, no. Although they help us in military patriotic education of school children as incidentally do Great Patriotic War veterans.

[Vildtgrube] Yes, we and the Afghan veterans work in complete contact since we perform a common and very necessary job.

Additional information: Sixty eight soldier-internationalists who completed service in the Republic of Afghanistan and 1609 Great Patriotic War veterans live in Porkhovskiy Rayon.

[Chernova] But we also have problems. The most pressing is the absence of approved designs of schools, firing ranges, and weapons storage rooms which must be built in the rayon. This is an obvious violation of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Sovmin [Council of Ministers] resolution of 10 June 1986. Unfortunately, rono cannot become acquainted with the design of a new school before the design is adopted. They just do not allow us access to it. And sometimes we do not see it at all, it immediately ends up in the hands of the builders. This results, for example, in the fact that the 1st City Middle School was constructed without a firing range. That is how our "secret" projects turn out. In my opinion, physical training in schools is not turning out very well. There are few gymnasiums and there are no swimming pools.

[Kushakov] I will point out that there are a total of six gymnasiums in the rayon. Of course we are trying to increase our sports facilities and enliven our mass sports work. All the more so since we view it as a very important component of military patriotic work. Today when the number of people in the Army is being reduced and the issue of quality of training of each soldier is being raised, we are attempting to devote particular attention to physical, moral, and psychological preparedness of conscripts. We have amassed good experience by conducting "street holidays" and competitions dedicated to "red dates" on the calendar. We are trying to combine sports competitions first of all with interesting ideological activities. We send agitation teams to the villages where our conscripts are from to talk about the best people of the village and about their career paths.

[VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA] Since the conversation turned to physical training of young men, I would like to dwell on Lider Military Patriotic Club's problems.

Additional information: Lider Military Patriotic Club was organized in 1987. More than 200 of Porkhov's young men are involved in it—beginning at 10 years of age. V. Nikitin, second secretary of the raykom All-Union Komsomol and former investigations operations worker, is head of the club.

[Nikitin] Lider does not have a roof over its head. We used to train in the boarding school's gymnasium and now the DYuSSh [Children and Youth Sports School] has temporarily provided us with shelter. We often simply train in the streets even when the DYuSSh gymnasium is empty.

[Chernova] Actually, we in rono analyzed the capacity of the DYuSSh gymnasium and came to the conclusion that it is inadequate. We are coordinating training times so that both the club and the school are accommodated.

Additional information: There are four sports masters and 2,100 rated sportsmen in the rayon. Militia agencies have about 100 so-called difficult teen-agers on the books.

[Kushakov] The party raykom guarantees its support to Lider and we are also attempting to help other military patriotic clubs by providing equipment and other supplies. Based on the conditioning section established by sports master Leonid Petrov, we became convinced that sports enthusiasts are capable of doing quite a bit and let them not be shy about turning to us in the raykom for support in all organizational issues. Emphasis on the young and on their enthusiasm and independence is the policy which has proven its appropriateness and promise.

[Yegorov] Obviously such support will also be valuable for our Pamyat. The club performs an important service but we have also recently run into specific difficulties. Our club has begun to "grow old." The flow of young people into it has been reduced. This is an alarming signal—young men are less interested in the heroic spirit of their kray.

Additional information: Pamyat Military Patriotic Club was organized in 1980. The club's charter tasks are: Study of the kray's history, exploring, and installation of monuments and obelisks to our fallen soldiers, partisans, and members of the underground. To the club's credit: The found a partisan camp and printing press, they conduct annual multi-day "snow assaults" at battle sites, and they conduct sports competitions. The club's commander is V. Yegorov, chairman of the DOSAAF RK; the commissar is A. Dementev, master of SPTU No. 27.

[Nikolayev] To some degree, you, the members of the club, are yourselves to blame: In time, you attempted to withdraw into a narrow circle of enthusiasts and explorers and you were afraid that the young men would interfere. That is how you lost the initiative.

[Yegorov] I agree, we allowed this error. Now we need to correct the situation. We really do conduct very important and responsible work. It could be a real school of civic maturity and patriotic tempering for young men.

[Nikitin] And what if, Vyacheslav, we include the young men from Lider in Pamyat's work? I think the boys are interested. Furthermore, we will be working in "a bunch" at the defense sports health camp and my young men from the club will also be there. Let us conduct a

joint trip through the sites of combat glory and the young men will get a feel for what real exploring is. Agreed?

[Yegorov] Of course, we certainly must work together. We are all really performing a very important task, we are attempting to educate our young men with real patriots and defenders of their native Fatherland.

Things Will not Wait for Us

Major A. Rozhdestvenskiy, section chief of the Porkhovskiy RVK [Rayon Military Commissariat], writes:

We in the military commissariat are carefully monitoring the state of NVP in the rayon. We accept the "product" of the school military training officers and therefore the quality of training for conscripts selected for future Army service depends on how much we and they achieve in our work.

Before the beginning of each training year, military committee and rayon representatives drive out to all of the schools and once again insure the readiness of military-science study rooms and the all NVP training facilities for the new training year. We try to help as much as we can.

I think that [teaching] methodology association monthly training on NVP will be very beneficial. Military commissariat representatives must certainly speak at them. We will sum up the results of work on military professional orientation and share our observations and conclusions on the results of the last conscription. We will organize trips for them to schools with the best training facilities and we will conduct instructor training. Such a combination of efforts of military commissariat and military training officer workers allows us to maintain NVP teaching at a good methodological level.

I would especially like to talk about construction of the defense sports health camp. The rayispolkom decided to build it in 1987 and since that time the rayon military commissar has been specially monitoring work progress. All of the rayon's enterprises have a partial share in the construction work. Of course, there are quite a few difficulties and the transition of enterprises to cost-accounting is forcing managers to count each kopek, but nevertheless funds are being regularly allocated for establishing the OSOL [Defense Sports Health Camp]. Today, two buildings have been built at an estimated cost of 80,000 rubles and we are equipping the obstacle course.

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Announcement of Cost, Orders, Source of Pre-draft Equipment

90UM0013B Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 89 [Signed to press 6 Jun 89] p 25

[Article by V. Marlov, department head, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "DOSAAF Manufactures: What? Where?"]

[Text] The new NVP [Initial Military Training] program clearly defines primary tasks for training young people during all phases. Military training officers or instructors will be able to properly carry them out only if materials are provided for each lesson. Without this, it is impossible to properly organize training on any topic of general military regulations, tactical training, small arms training, or drill, or on other sections. First of all, a modern training facility must be established which is equipped with a military-science study room, firing range, training facilities, ranges, and other necessary elements. DOSAAF production enterprises are manufacturing NVP training visual aids to help training leaders.

A mock-up of a Kalashnikov assault rifle (cost: 5 rubles 60 kopeks) is being manufactured in the cities of Simferopol and Gomel. It is used during practical training and battle drills throughout all phases of the program. Output has recently been significantly increased which will allow educational institutions and defense sports health camps to be completely supplied with them in coming years.

Crimea and Kharkov Production Combines are producing an NVP small arms simulator (cost: 180 or 200 rubles). It is used while conducting drills on topic four of the "Small Arms Training" phase. While studying small arms techniques and rules at training sites, conscripts will use the simulator to master small arms techniques, holding [the weapon], aiming, and trigger release. The STP-66 Small Arms Training Device manufactured by the Odessa Production Combine (cost: 15 rubles) permits [the conscript] to master these very skills.

A Kalashnikov assault rifle firing mechanism training display (manufacturing enterprise: Gorkiy Plant; cost: 77 rubles) provides the capability to develop in detail topic one of the "Small Arms Training" phase. Students will not only become familiar with the operation of the mechanism's parts while conducting single-shot and automatic fire, but also with certain possible malfunctions encountered when firing, and techniques for eliminating them. Production of electrical small arms training displays has been set up in Gorkiy.

Omsk Production Combine has begun production of a set of military-science study room training displays (cost: 700 rubles) which meets contemporary requirements and recommendations. It consists of 26 rectangular wooden panels which contain the names of topics, a graphic portion with explanatory text, photographs, drawings, diagrams, and tables. Dimensions: one panel—0.6 X 0.8 m; three—0.3 X 1.4 m; 10—0.5 X 1.4 m; and, 12—0.6 X 1.4 m. Of these, you can combine 20 training displays on various topics, for example as follows: "Defense of the Socialist Fatherland is a sacred duty of each citizen of the USSR," "Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is the honorable duty of Soviet citizens," "The Military Oath," "Military Unit Military Banner," "Soviet Armed Forces Guarding the Fatherland," "Command Personnel of the

Armed Forces of the USSR," and also on all combat arms and branches of the Armed Forces, military topography, and civil defense.

At the end of 1989, the combine will begin production of a set of drill training displays (initial cost: 460 rubles and they propose reducing it in the future). It consists of six metal boards on which the basic drill movements are depicted—position of attention, facing movements, movement while marching at attention, and saluting. They will be installed along the perimeter of the drill pad.

In 1989, Rostov Production Combine will begin production of a set of 75 "Initial Military Training" placards on the theme of the new training program (tentative cost: 60 rubles). One placard will be devoted to the introductory lesson; 17 will be devoted to the topic of "Soviet Armed Forces Guarding the Fatherland;" 21 to lessons on tactical training; 12 to small arms training; eight to drill instruction; 11 to USSR Armed Forces Regulations; two to military topography; two to medical and sanitary training; and, one to physical training.

DOSAAF Printing Plant will produce targets for carrying out five small bore rifle firing exercises: No. 7a—head and chest silhouette target for firing from 50 m; No. 6a—head and chest silhouette target for firing from 25 m; No. 8b—full-length silhouette target for firing from 50 m; and, No. 8g—full-length silhouette target for firing from 25 m. Cost—from 59 kopeks to 1 ruble 25 kopeks per thousand.

Attention Customers!

A centralized system of supplying training visual aids exists in the Defense Community.

The DOSAAF Central Committee of the union republics, kray and oblast committees have until 15 February of this year to present orders for next year in the appropriate form to the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, considering the capabilities of production enterprises and the announced quantity of training visual aids, will distribute them among the DOSAAF committees. The committees will subsequently provide them (for payment, of course) to educational institutions and other organizations at which initial military training of young people is conducted.

Public education agencies must study the requirements of secondary education schools, professional technical schools, and tekhnikums and send consolidated orders with indication of paid requisitions to DOSAAF committees of union (without oblast divisions) and autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts.

I must point out that sufficient quantities of the Kalashnikov assault rifle mock-up, sets of placards on initial military training, and targets are being produced. And the required quantities of the remaining aids cannot be [manufactured] since funds for materials are limited.

Therefore, we must search for other ways to resolve problems. Thus, the issue of manufacturing sets of military-science study room training displays is being examined by one Moscow cooperative for a price not exceeding 700 rubles. Public education agencies are now already authorized to send orders for the required quantities of sets of training displays to the appropriate DOSAAF committees so that they can present guarantee letters in the near future to the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. This will help to fulfill orders for 1989-1990 in a timely manner. For your information, we are printing the addresses of production enterprises that manufacture training visual aids for initial military training.

Kalashnikov Assault Rifle Mock-up—Simferopol Master Sports Modeling and DOSAAF Training Aids (34 Klary Tsetkin Street, Simferopol, 333011, Telephone: 5-50-38, 7-45-71); Gomel Sports Modeling and DOSAAF Training Aids Plant (8 Shilov Street, Gomel, 246007, Telephone: 57-54-93, 57-08-10).

Military-science Study Room Training Display Sets, Drill Training Display Sets, and NVP Placard Sets—DOSAAF Obkom Omsk Production Combine (73 Omsk Street, Omsk, 644070, Telephone: 33-84-44, 33-16-49).

Kalashnikov assault rifle firing mechanism training display—Gorkiy DOSAAF Plant No. 11 (15 Sennyy Square, Gorkiy, 603024, Telephone: 36-93-68, 36-96-66).

STP-66 Small Arms Training Device—DOSAAF Odessa Production Combine (9 Zaslavskiy Street, Odessa, 270045, Telephone: 222-61-23, 25-29-91).

Small Arms Simulator—DOSAAF Crimea Production Combine (174 Krylov Street, Simferopol, 333039, Telephone: 7-77-77, 5-05-05).

Small Arms Simulator and F-1 Defensive Training Grenade (for throwing)—DOSAAF Kharkov Production Combine (44 Sverdlov Street, Kharkov, 310052, Telephone: 22-64-24, 22-09-33).

NVP Placard Set—DOSAAF Obkom Rostov Production Combine (68 Krasnoarmeyskiy Street, Rostov-na-Don, 344082, Telephone: 66-60-05, 32-48-57).

Electrical Weapons Small Arms Training Display—Gorkiy Priokskiy Rayon DOSAAF STK [Sporting Equipment Combine] Shop (25 Golovanov Street, Gorkiy, 603107, Telephone: 66-02-88).

Target No. 7a (6a)—Head and Chest Silhouette; Target No. 8a (8g)—Full-length Silhouette—USSR DOSAAF Printing Plant (22 Olimpiyskiy Prospekt, Moscow, 129110, Telephone: 288-10-54).

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Joint Resolution on Improving Military-Patriotic Education

90UM0111A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 8 Nov 89 p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Spirit of the New Thinking"; first paragraph is SOVETSKIY PATRIOT introduction]

[Text] The board presidium of the all-union Znaniye society, the presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, and the presidium of the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans have passed a joint resolution calling for improving the dissemination of information on military subjects and military-patriotic and inter-ethnic education for workers and youth.

Presidia of the Znaniye society, DOSAAF committees, Councils of War and Labor Veterans, and sections of the SKVV [Soviet Committee of War Veterans] are urged to become actively involved in disseminating military-patriotic information, carrying out this task in the spirit of the new political thinking, in close harmony with the military-political situation evolving in the world. It is necessary to resolutely counter attempts to disparage the role of military-patriotic and inter-ethnic education and displays of pacifism and negative attitudes toward military service; promote the dissemination of information on military-technical skills and attainments of the scientific and technical revolution; shed more light on the role of technical sports and military-related sports.

It is recommended that lecture groups, reporting specialist groups, ideological commissions and youth commissions enlist the aid of propagandists capable of carrying on a dialog with youth; convincingly explain dynamic and critical events taking place domestically and in foreign countries, and the need for readiness for armed defense of the Motherland; regularly organize appearances by lecturers on military-patriotic themes in primary, training, and athletic organizations of DOSAAF, and in schools, tekhnikums, and SPTU's [rural vocational and technical schools]; regularly hold training methods meetings and seminars with instructors and specialists in industrial training and with leaders of groups engaged in political activities and political information; arouse the interest of large numbers of draft-age youth by offering activities to be held in people's universities and faculties, in circles and sections, and in technical sports clubs of the DOSAAF.

Recognized as necessary are the awakening of interest in the activity of Houses of DOSAAF in the area of military-patriotic education and training for propagandists; improvement of work performed by Houses of

Scientific and Technical Information relative to technical creativity of youth and the creation of technical circles, shops, and social design offices; generalization of the experience gained by the above in professional orientation of the young generation.

It is planned to take more complete advantage of the authority and extensive knowledge possessed by war veterans and military-patriotic reserve associations, especially internationalist soldiers, to disseminate information on combat and labor traditions in the youth environment; in all ways to protect and support the authority of the Armed Forces.

It is recommended that committees, school leaders, and flying clubs of the DOSAAF regularly invite war and labor veterans and young servicemen to meet with students. Plans have been drawn up to arrange for veterans to assume leadership positions in schools and flying clubs of the DOSAAF, and take measures in collaboration with military commissariats to enlist the aid of large numbers of Soviet Armed Forces veterans to work with pre-draft age and draft-age youth in educational institutions.

The resolution stresses that it is necessary to render assistance to the All-Union Association of Military-Patriotic Youth Groups, the Federation of Military History Clubs, and the All-Union Young Armymen's Movement, to include their sponsoring of the games "Gaydarovets," "Heat Lightning," and "Eaglet"; collaborate as much as possible with search squads, the Book of Remembrance project, the work of museums and rooms of combat and labor glory.

It is proposed to take specific measures intended to effect extensive development of interaction between social organizations and to tie plans for dissemination of military-patriotic information to the efforts of trade unions, the Komsomol, political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy, and educational organs.

It is recommended that organs of the Znaniye society, DOSAAF, and veterans' councils solicit the membership of the most highly trained workers and propagandists; regularly generalize joint activity practice; and adopt measures celebrating the 45th and 50th anniversaries of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The year 1990 has been designated as the year of an all-union seminar of lecturers and propagandists, who will discuss topical problems relating to military-patriotic and international education; and of arrangements for widespread participation in charitable and mercy movements.

It is deemed necessary to provide greater moral encouragement and economic incentive for military-patriotic education activists.

Turkish Exercise 'Mekhmetchik-89' Noted*90UM0048A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Oct 89 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed article: "'Mekhmetchik-89'"]

[Text] On the territory of Turkish Frakia, as well as in the waters of the Sea of Marmara and the southwestern part of the Black Sea, a joint exercise of the national armed forces of Turkey is being held from 2-19 October, under the code name "Mekhmetchik-89."

The main goals of the maneuvers are to train the troops and headquarters to conduct operations under conditions as close as possible to those of combat, and to organize coordination among different types of forces and resources in the course of preparing for and waging joint operations.

In terms of scale, composition of the forces and resources involved, and content of the tasks being worked out, the exercise is the largest operational measure by the Turkish armed forces this year. Headquarters, large units and units of the 1st Field Army, aviation of the 1st Tactical Air Cmd, and the fleet of the Northern Naval Zone are active in the maneuvers. Approximately 18,000 personnel are involved in the exercises, as well as 370 tanks, more than 70 field artillery guns, and up to 100 combat aircraft and helicopters. The leadership of the North Atlantic bloc places great importance on the military maneuvers being organized on Turkish territory, since they are being held in direct proximity to the state borders of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

The "Mekhmetchik-89" exercise is the logical conclusion of the large scale exercise by the NATO Combined Armed Forces, "Display Determination-89."

Fedorov Commentary on Global Character of U. S. Exercises*90UM0048B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Oct 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Col N. Fedorov: "'Global Shield,' 'Autumn Forge,' 'Team Spirit,' and Others"]

[Text] I would like to read on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about the thrust of the operational and combat training of the U. S. Armed Forces. Maj F. Pilipenko

Important distinguishing features of the operational and combat training of the U. S. Armed Forces at the present stage are that many of its measures are accomplished jointly with the armed forces of allies of the United States, encompass huge expanses of the earth, and are, in essence, global in nature. This stems from the doctrinal purposes of the military and political leadership of the country. Their essence, as defined by the Pentagon, is that security policy "must be global in nature," and the armed forces must be prepared for operations, if "the strategy of deterrence fails."

Taking this into account, the main direction in the preparation of the U. S. Armed Forces is to ensure their ability, jointly with their allies, to wage wars of various scales, intensities and durations, in the west, east and south, with the employment of both conventional and nuclear weapons. And exercises by troops and naval forces are recognized as one of the main means of achieving this capability.

Such exercises encompass numerous continental, ocean and sea theaters, especially adjacent to the territory of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, and are held by large forces and resources against a single strategic backdrop, according to a unified concept, and under the overall leadership of the Pentagon.

Thus, virtually all of the country's top military and political leadership, the highest armed forces control organs, and the entire force composition of the strategic offensive forces take part in the largest exercises of U.S. strategic offensive forces, "Global Shield," which for 10 years already has been conducted annually. During the course of these exercises, plans are worked out for waging nuclear wars. Hundreds of strategic aviation aircraft actually take off, and strategic bombers establish combat patrol on routes leading to the territory of the Soviet Union. In short, "Global Shield" is essentially a rehearsal of general nuclear war, war on a global scale.

The U. S. strategic offensive forces also systematically organize other exercises, drills and tests. In September, an exercise of the U. S. Air Force Strategic Air Command, "Mighty Warrior-89," took place on the territory of the U. S. and Western Europe, and in the waters of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. The forces and resources of an air army, and several strategic air divisions took part.

The most important operational training measures of the U. S. general purpose forces are included in the "Autumn Forge" series of annual maneuvers by the NATO Combined Armed Forces in Europe. This series consists of 20-30 different exercises. This year, more than 200,000 personnel, 1,000 tanks, 2,000 combat aircraft, and 400 warships are taking part in these maneuvers, which began during the first 10 days of September.

In the Far East, the large American-South Korean exercise, "Team Spirit," is held annually. Its main goal is to work out plans for waging war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Besides American forces permanently stationed in South Korea, units of the Army, Marine Corps, and of strategic, tactical and carrier-based aviation of the U. S. Armed Forces located in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, and on U. S. territory, are active in "Team Spirit." In 1989 this exercise was held in March-April. More than 200,000 personnel, including 61,000 military personnel of the U. S. Armed Forces, more than 800 aircraft of the American and South Korean air forces, and the strike forces of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, took part in it.

In this region, the scale of American-Japanese maneuvers is also expanding, and combined waging of combat operations against the USSR is envisioned. Thus, beginning in 1978 the "Koup nort" [transliteration] American-Japanese air force exercises have been held quarterly. In these exercises the missions of gaining air superiority, and making air strikes against sea and land targets, including targets located a substantial distance from the Japanese islands, are worked out. Reinforcement of the U. S. Air Force grouping in northern Japan is accomplished by transferring aviation from other air bases in the region.

In the Middle East, combined exercises by forces of the U. S. Rapid Deployment Force and the armed forces of Egypt and certain other countries of the region, have become regular. At these exercises, under the code name "Bright Star," American troops and tactical aviation crews are mastering this theater of military operations and working out an entire set of tasks of training and transporting troops (forces) and waging combat operations. Plans are to conduct the next exercise in the series, "Bright Star-90," in November. It will encompass almost the entire zone of responsibility of the Combined Central U. S. Armed Forces Command (CENTCOM), including the territory of 19 countries in the Middle and Near East, and the northeastern part of Africa.

Much attention in the operational training of the U. S. Armed Forces is paid to the operations of naval forces on a regional and global scale. Of most importance here are working out two military-strategic tasks: maintaining stable sea lines of communication and gaining naval superiority by waging offensive naval operations in the Atlantic, and in the zone of the Pacific and Indian oceans, against the USSR navy.

In May of this year an exercise was conducted by the joint command of U. S. Armed Forces in the Atlantic

zone, entitled "Solid Shield-89." It took place in the western part of the Atlantic Ocean and on adjacent territory in the United States. Over a 20 day period, almost 48,000 military personnel, more than 300 combat aircraft and helicopters, and up to 30 warships, worked out missions of "rendering military assistance to a friendly country" located in Central or South America. Let us recall that, under a similar scenario, the invasion of Grenada by American forces in 1983 was carried out.

An even larger naval exercise, in terms of the scale and composition of participating naval forces from the U. S. and a number of other NATO countries, is being held in the eastern Atlantic and the North and Baltic seas. It has been given the codename "Sharp Spear-89." Some 270 warships and more than 300 aircraft from the armed forces of 11 NATO countries are taking part in it.

At the present time, a large scale U. S. Armed Forces exercise, "Pacex-89" is taking place in the Pacific Ocean region. Taking part in it are hundreds of warships and aircraft of the main strike forces of the U. S. 8th and 7th Fleets, as well as armed forces from Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia. As the Japanese press emphasizes, this exercise is "unprecedented in nature." Its active stage is unfolding in the sea areas adjacent to the Far Eastern borders of the Soviet Union.

Overall it is not difficult to note that the operational and combat training of the U. S. Armed Forces, conducted according to both national plans and combined plans with U. S. allies, have an openly offensive thrust. Stress is placed on working out in full scale the missions of preparing for and waging local, regional and global wars. All of this is accomplished under the hypocritical pretext of protecting the "vital interests" of the United States. Such militaristic activity runs contrary to the efforts that are being undertaken in the interests of improving the international situation, and does not contribute to reducing military confrontation.

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