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BULGARIA

Youth Leaders View Political Situation

90EB0225A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
18 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Morten Fyhn: "Bulgarian Opposition Needs More Time"]

[Text] Sofia, 17 Jan—"The communists will not make us a gift of democracy. We must fight for it," prominent opposition figures in Sofia say. They believe they will win but they do not want free elections before they have had time to prepare themselves.

Emil Koshlukov is not an easy man to meet these days. It was easier before, when he was in safe custody behind lock and key, serving a sentence of three years and eight months. Former despotic party strong man Todor Zhivkov cracked down on the few who dared to protest the communist power monopoly and the flagrant injustice in Bulgaria with an iron hand.

Emil began complaining when he was as young as 16 and a few years later he ended up in prison as a result. One of his sins was a public statement that people in the capitalist United States are better off than they are in the communist state of Bulgaria. Now he is 24 years old and a student at the university in Sofia. The years in jail have left their mark. He gives a somewhat brusque but not unfriendly impression. He does not smile unnecessarily and talks with the ardor that only someone who has sworn to totally eradicate the detested old regime can have.

Student Leader

When Zhivkov was removed by his own party on 10 November of last year, Emil quickly emerged as one of the most prominent opposition people. He now leads the new independent student organization and he is also part of the leadership of the Union of Democratic Forces, an umbrella organization for about 10 different opposition groups. It is with this union that the communists have now begun holding roundtable talks on the country's future and Emil participates in these discussions.

We asked what the situation is like now.

"It is not bad for us, but the communists still have a strong position. However, I think time will work for us and the workers will probably be marching in the streets soon as the economic crisis worsens. That will strengthen us and weaken them," replied Emil Koshlukov. We were sitting in a dark and smoke-filled basement cafe for students and the conversation was constantly interrupted by people who wanted to talk to him. The political activity at the university is intense. There is not much time for studies when the country is in the midst of a fateful period when a new future is being shaped.

No Press

"They have promised that free and democratic elections will be held in May, but we have no chance in such an early election. We have no press of our own and the opposition needs to get more time on radio and television. The communists want an early election, because they think that will make it possible for them to win. But we can go along with holding special interim elections, as several seats in the national assembly have been left vacant as a result of the removal or resignation of people who discredited themselves too much."

Party's Role

This week the Union of Democratic Forces won approval for the elimination of the article in the constitution that establishes the leading role of the Communist Party. But that is only a beginning, for the communists still have power both centrally and locally, according to Emil, who strongly underlined the importance of acquiring an official status, legitimacy, for the union. That is necessary to enable it to become better organized before the upcoming election.

"We want a clear division between the party and the state in Bulgaria, we are demanding that the Army be depoliticized and that newspapers, radio, and TV be allowed to operate freely and independently," he said.

Sitting with us was 24-year-old Rossen Ruskov. He intends to run in the election as an independent candidate, but he also supports the Union of Democratic Forces. "We want to cut off the arms of the communist octopus. Therefore, the union is prepared to fight for power in a free election and wants to form a government without communist participation," he said. It makes no difference to Rossen whether the new Bulgaria is called a socialist or a capitalist state as long as it is a democratic state in the true sense of the word. "We are still far from reaching this goal," he said.

"The time when one man ruled everything must come to an end. Today the Communist Party still holds the key to everything in this country. Everyone was subject to the party. The courts received orders from the party and so on down the line."

Academic Freedom

For Emil and Rossen, the struggle for political democracy also applies to the struggle for academic freedom. The new independent student organization wants an end to instruction that is marked by totalitarian political propaganda. "We are calling for independent institutes and faculties at the university without ideological interference," said Emil who stressed that in plain language this demand means that education must occur without being distorted by the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Fighting Spirit

Both have apparently gone through the role change from student to politician without difficulty. They gave the

impression of being full of fighting spirit while constantly referring to political systems in western nations like the United States and Great Britain. They were happy about the fall of the dictator but were not entirely convinced how sincere the new communist rulers are with their statements about choice and democracy.

We will meet again at the national assembly. For the moment Emil and Rossen must sit in the gallery to follow the debate. But perhaps both of them will soon sit in the hall as elected representatives of a new and democratic Bulgaria.

HUNGARY

Party To Protect Environment Formed

25000602B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
13 Jan 90 p 12

[Article by R. N.: "Voks Humana Party Announced Its Program"]

[Text] "If necessary, we will repair with our own hands the hole we have pierced on this earth; otherwise our descendants will point at us and charge: Here are those who betrayed the earth in the 20th Century."

The above sentence is quoted from the Voks Humana Party program presented at the party's press conference Friday morning.

The truth of these words is supported by a multitude of facts and figures, for instance the fact that during the final decade of these thousand years, half of the living species will be extinct, unless humanity is willing to change its violent habits which extort and destroy the biosphere. It was said on the basis of facts and figures that the 20th century carries the greatest catastrophic situation ever since the beginning of life, and that in reality this is the ongoing third world war.

The Voks Humana Party, which will run in the elections, has a tiny office in the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] Budapest committee headquarters at Koztarsasag Square. There Party Chairman and writer Janos Seboek said that recently they issued a proclamation on behalf of Voks Humana to all democratic organizations in the world. To the superpowers, to the governments of numerous states, to everyone who understands the message: The live world will have become endangered by the millennium. Man is preparing to destroy the biosphere which gave birth to man and permitted man to live. This proclamation was reported at the Rome congress of the Transnational Party, and was distributed to many.

Seboek reported his party's program to representatives of the press. It does not promise miraculous programs which can save the country, because Voks Humana is not a political party. The program discusses some important practical actions that cannot be delayed. It mentions that agricultural production free of chemicals can be realized, and can also be applied to a market economy. The

program talks about the fact that the ancient Hungarian beechwood forests which still exist may be saved, and that humane, individual protection of animals is our human obligation. This plan includes a number of topics ranging from the humane slaughtering of animals to gentle animal experiments, and to the protection of domestic animals living near people. Voks Humana's program proposals in the field of health care and education are noteworthy.

At present, Voks Humana—meaning: Vote for Humanity—has about 1,700 members. They are aware of the fact that "even though we represent elementary interests, society has not yet acquired a level of consciousness to recognize the importance of our goals, and therefore we seek representation in Parliament."

MTV News Management Changes Described

25000601E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
10 Jan 90 pp 1, 5

[Unattributed article and interview with MTV President Istvan Nemeskurty: "Changed Leadership at TV News"]

[Text] The presidium of Hungarian Television [MTV] has relieved Endre Aczel of his duties as editor in chief of the TV News and of the program A HET, and has appointed MTV presidium member Istvan G. Palfy to perform the functions of editor in chief.

News of the change dumbfounded leaders of the TV News and the entire editorial office. According to their knowledge, the meeting that was called for 1500 hours yesterday was intended for the president to announce the confirmation of Aczel in his position. Employees at TV News were also aware of the fact that on Saturday Nemeskurty had told Aczel that he could continue as editor in chief and that he would not be "supervised." Apparently the former editor in chief wanted this assurance because in his absence Palfy had played this kind of role. In the end the MTV president and presidium informed the 150-member staff of TV News that they had made a change as compared to Saturday's announcement. Aczel learned about his dismissal only 15 minutes prior to the meeting. He was also told that the reason for his dismissal was that he had made a statement published in MAI NAP that had a destructive effect on the dignity of the presidium. (This interview was also published in NEPSZABADSAG in the column "Others Have This To Say.")

According to persons attending the meeting, President Nemeskurty mentioned the fact that three days ago he had promised something entirely different to Aczel, but added that he [Nemeskurty] is heading the presidium and that this was the presidium's decision.

The newly appointed editor in chief asked to be heard at the conference. He requested TV news persons to take his word with regard to the fact that he did not want that job. He asked that he be judged on the basis of his actions. According to our information all the dismissed

editor in chief had to say in his emotional state of mind was that "they found a pretext for an execution that was decided earlier." Aczel refused to make a statement to NEPSZABADSAG.

One can only guess with regard to the real reasons for the dismissal. The internal affairs of the television had become an issue quite some time ago, but thus far no TV personality issuing statements had been removed from his position; one was even appointed a member of the presidium.

And one more item: Istvan Sandor and Janos Elek, the two deputy editors in chief of TV News, had asked the MTV management on Tuesday to relieve them of their duties. Elek did not take part in preparing the Tuesday evening program.

According to our information Palfy's successor, Andras Deak, has been acting editor in chief at NEPSZAVA since 23 December 1989 [as published].

Unanimous Decision

[NEPSZABADSAG] Why did you dismiss Endre Aczel?

[Nemeskurty] I am not inclined to respond to this question, because in my view the presently fashionable method of unavoidable personal changes takes place much too frequently [as published]. But I will respond to NEPSZABADSAG as long as I have been asked.

I regard Aczel as an excellent professional; I harbor no ill feelings toward him. The simple fact is that intolerable tension arose between him and the MTV presidium appointed by the government, and this could have had a damaging influence on the undisturbed workings of TV News, particularly in today's situation, with the upcoming elections.

MTV is managed by a presidium, and I am the chairman of that presidium. I am obligated to abide by the decisions reached by that body. And the decision to relieve Aczel from his duties was unanimous.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How do you feel about the voluntary resignations of Sandor and Elek?

[Nemeskurty] I see that as virtually natural phenomenon. In a well functioning team subordinates must like and respect their leader. I regret their decision, but I am not surprised by it.

Court Decision on Party Property Salvaging Under Review

MDF Charges Cover-Up

25000600 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
9 Jan 90 p 7

[Interview with Dr. Balazs Horvath, Veszprem County MDF chairman, and Dr. Imre Szekeres, MSZP Veszprem County Political Steering Committee chairman, by Janos Czingeraber: "Cimbriana Under Cross Fire? The Burden of Veszprem Party Property"; date and place not given]

[Text] Cimbriana was the name of the Roman settlement that existed at the present site of Veszprem. This, however, was not a well-known fact in the city located at the foothills of the Bakony mountains. The public has become familiar with this Latin term during the past few months; The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] used this name in June to establish a limited liability corporation for the more effective operation of party assets. At least this was the official justification.

The fact is that the former party school and its well-equipped college—now the two-star Hotel Jutas—together with the elegant guest house of the former county party committee, the party garage, and a resort that resembles a family home in Tihany have become the property of the limited liability corporation, and thus, in theory, do not constitute part of the party property to be accounted for. The book value of these pieces of real estate amounts to almost 66 million forints. The real value is higher by far. Together with the money deposited, Cimbriana's basic assets amount to 95 million forints.

Virtually since its establishment Cimbriana has been under cross fire. The opposition regards the establishment of the limited liability corporation as just another impermissible salvaging of MSZMP property. They tried to prove in the course of lengthy court proceedings that the establishment of the corporation was illegal, but recently a final decision rendered by a Budapest court found the establishment of the corporation to be consistent with law.

Abuse of Authority at the Land Office?

In Veszprem, the local chapter of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] spearheaded the attack on Cimbriana. Does the present decision change your mind, we asked MDF county chairman Dr. Balazs Horvath.

[Horvath] Our view is unchanged. Cimbriana's registration is surrounded by the grave abuse of power. The time when this took place is interesting only to the extent that never before has the land office completed a case as fast as it transferred these pieces of real estate to the limited liability corporation, considering the fact that some of the required information was missing, and therefore the official documents had to be returned to complete the information required. More important than this is the fact that at that time Cimbriana was not registered, meaning that they transferred party property to a nonexistent firm. We also find the one-sided registration to be illegal. That is, real property may be acquired only as a result of a purchase, the receipt of a gift, an official determination, or through auction. In this instance everything took place on the basis of a one-sided request. In our view, in late June a huge value was simply stolen from the pocket of the Hungarian state, in spite of the fact that property cannot be transferred to the possession of the property manager after the change in the land law that went into effect in early July.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You initiated action to void the transaction.

[Horvath] That's right! We asked the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor either to file a criminal complaint against the employees of the land offices in Veszprem and in Balatonfured, or to file a civil suit. In our view, they essentially covered up this matter as a result of collusion.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What does that mean?

[Horvath] It means that based on a directive received from the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor the chief county prosecutor submitted a simple protest to the city land offices. In this way the same people dealt with this case as those who issued the determinations in violation of laws. Is it any wonder that they did not act on the basis of the protest? We filed an appeal, but frankly, I do not believe that the county will change its decision. We will not acquiesce, of course, with regard to this matter. We are preparing to go to Parliament. Let them dispatch a committee to investigate the role played by the prosecutor's office.

Let There Be a University

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could it be that you are simply incapable of losing?

[Horvath] In my judgment the loser in this case is the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. Even if Cimbriana is declared at every level to be legally valid, the MSZP will come out of this case with a moral defeat....

[NEPSZABADSAG] ...which is good for the MDF, isn't it?

[Horvath] Don't believe that! We would very much like to see a clean MSZP, not stigmatized by anything, with evolving forces of political power. I wish we could finally deal with real politics, rather than with suspect property matters! On the other hand, Cimbriana raises questions about the MSZP's acceptability in this area....

[NEPSZABADSAG] Will you take advantage of all of this in the upcoming election campaign?

[Horvath] Of course we will! It would be nice to develop the University of Veszprem into a university of sciences, and the former party school building is indispensable for accomplishing this. And then here are Cimbriana ventures like Home Movie Limited Liability Corporation, or the party's planned investment in the limited liability corporation to be formed at the county newspaper. Here we are already talking about the laundering of the profits of a dubious enterprise.

Dr. Imre Szekeres, chairman of the MSZP Veszprem County Political Steering Committee sighed deeply when he learned what I wanted to discuss.

[Szekeres] We have a thousand problems with organizing the party, with election preparations, and meanwhile we are constantly subject to immoral attacks because of Cimbriana.

[NEPSZABADSAG] They are attacking the MSZP because according to several people we are dealing here with the salvaging of party property. What is your view of all this?

[Szekeres] This was not even true in the original situation. The issue here is business management with a different outlook. The primary issue is that available values must be taken advantage of. I will not argue: Initially the appearance of things may have supported the suspicion of salvaging property, and for this reason the late September party conference decided that the Cimbriana case must be clarified.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What does this mean in practice?

[Szekeres] We are not willing to pursue any salvaging of property, regardless of the court decision. We recommended to the MSZP presidium that it present all of its real estate affairs—including Cimbriana—to the government, to the negotiations concerning party property. We would agree with whatever decision is reached there.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could there be a university of sciences located in the old party school?

[Szekeres] They are already training skilled workers there. Most certainly, the institution will become city property; all that we insist upon is that it indeed be used for educational purposes. I trust that the university will gradually take over this building from the intermediate school.

Statements and Denials

Szekeres and I discussed the rest of the charges leveled by the MDF. Szekeres said that they did not at all intend to participate in the county newspaper's limited liability corporation. And the Home Movie Limited Liability Corporation is an entirely legitimate venture.

[Szekeres] I believe that as long as we own these values, it is not only our right, but also our duty to manage these properties to the best of our ability.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How much did Cimbriana produce in profits?

[Szekeres] Profits? Even the original plans called for a zero balance in the first year.

Asked why all these things are not known to the opposition, Szekeres showed anger:

[Szekeres] They obviously know these things. For quite some time the issue did not concern law or morality. We are dealing with some conscious political action: They are trying to destroy our credibility with white lies and half truths. And it is a fact that we are at a great disadvantage in this regard, because party property constitutes a huge moral burden. I hope that we will finally free ourselves from this after completing negotiations with the government, and that we will have only enough property left to satisfy our elementary working conditions. And we will make good use of whatever is left for

us. I am convinced that no party will be able to get along in the long term without enterprising.

State Prosecutor Files Suit

25000600 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
13 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Lajos Bodnar: "Did the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor Cover Up the Cimbriana Case?"]

[Text] In response to public pressure, a limited liability corporation known as NEXT 2000 has been liquidated. At the same time, the legality of Cimbriana Limited Liability Corporation in Veszprem has been affirmed by the court. Nevertheless, the business organization established in June 1988 for the more economical utilization of the MSZMP's [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] real property in Veszprem County has been under cross fire ever since its establishment. Dr. Balazs Horvath, Veszprem County MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] chairman, confirmed this in his statement to our newspaper: "We are preparing to go to Parliament: Let them dispatch a committee to investigate the role played by the prosecutor's office."

In their view, "as a result of personal collusion they essentially covered up this matter." In the MDF view, even the registration of the property constituted a criminal act, therefore the MDF filed a complaint against the employees of the land offices in Veszprem and Balatonfured. At the same time they condemned, so they say, the fact that at the direction of the Supreme State Prosecutor the county prosecutor submitted only a protest. On the basis of all this, the MDF local leader concludes that the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor did not do all he could to deprive Cimbriana of the property.

We paid a visit to the office of the chief prosecutor to find out whether they had covered up the Cimbriana case.

"Previously the MDF county leader strongly criticized on the radio the activity of the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor. In his criticism he made reference to facts which do not correspond with the truth, to put it mildly," Dr. Janos Satori, prosecutor department head, rejects the charge. "Whatever he said served no other purpose than to discredit the prosecutor's organization. In my view his statement could also be regarded as slanderous, and it manifests a great lack of legal preparedness."

What is the basis of all this? Satori underscores the fact that the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor initiated action to review the legality of the land office determination concerning Cimbriana's property acquisition not at the MDF's initiative, but in response to action taken by the justice ministry. The official request arrived last 20 September, and the office immediately assumed jurisdiction in the matter. They

obtained the needed documents, and they did not sit for too long on the case. On 25 October they issued a decision by which they would submit a prosecutor's protest against the determinations made by the land offices. The County Chief Prosecutor's Office informed the Veszprem County MDF chapter in a separate letter in early November.

The MDF approached the chief county prosecutor's office first on 20 September 1989, and a second time on 5 October. In their letter they requested that the land office be investigated, and they raised the idea of initiating criminal proceedings. The office denies the charge that they tried to prevent proceedings by prolonging the investigation for months. And the legal view concerning remarks objecting to the submission of a protest is outright detrimental to the MDF. They believe that the prosecutor's office did the only thing possible under the law governing prosecutors; the prosecutor filed a protest to the land office decision which was contrary to law, even in the view of the prosecutor.

The Veszprem County Chief Prosecutor's Office suggested that they void the determination concerning the limited liability corporation's acquisition of property. Considering this fact alone, the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor rejects any presumption about collusion. The essence of their proposal was to void Cimbriana's proprietary rights.

In examining the statements presented by the MDF the prosecutors found nothing to suggest that a criminal act had been committed. The transfer of state property in itself does not constitute a criminal act. At the time Cimbriana was founded, the land law did provide an opportunity for social organizations to transfer property under their management. The MSZMP tried to exercise this right, although it is true that it did so in the final hours.

The prosecutor's office agrees with the MDF to the extent that the corporation's retroactive acquisition of property is illegal. That is, Cimbriana did not exist in the legal sense at the time the land office registration took place.

A citizen less versed in law may ask of course, whether the prosecutor's office will rest its case now that the protest has been rejected. Will the Cimbriana case enter the Corpus Juris as a legal precedent for the successful salvaging of the state party's property? Or will it perhaps share the fate of NEXT 2000? Most certainly, the answers to these questions will come as a result of a judgment in a proceeding that just started. As we were told, the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor will take advantage of this final opportunity. This week the office will file a suit against Cimbriana, to change the determination issued by the land office.

Accordingly, independent from the possible dispatch of a parliamentary investigating committee, we may soon hear again about the criminal case of Cimbriana Limited Liability Corporation.

POLAND

PZPR-Funded Publisher Said To Still Control Most of Polish Press*90EP0256A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
1 Dec 89 p 2*

[PAP article: "What Kind of Future for Workers Cooperative Publishing House?"]

[Text] The Polish Press Agency received a declaration from the National Commission of NSZZ Solidarity of the employees of RSW "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" [the "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" Worker's Cooperative Publishing House]. It supports the resolution of the ZG SDP [Main Administration of the Association of Polish Journalists], which states that "the structure of the ownership of the Polish press is completely opposed to the new arrangement of political power." Defenders of RSW, our employer, are endeavoring to convince society that "RSW has forfeited its role as a large concern." Now it seems, the declaration proclaims, that 264 titles, or approximately 85 percent of the Polish press, are managed in an uneconomical way and are subjugated to the "political line" of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], its chief, though not its only, partner.

In connection with the crisis that we are currently living through, the futures of many editorial boards and RSW employees are threatened. The majority of editorial offices is being wooed by the search for other sources of financing in the form of companies or sponsors. We are not disturbed, proclaims the declaration, by the formation of various companies that are controlled neither by RSW's employees nor by society.

The declaration stipulates the creation of a special parliamentary commission that will research the legal, financial, and economic bases of the ownership of RSW and its partners; the socialization of parts of its holdings in such areas as the parliamentary commission deems justified; research on whether RSW was ever legally assigned to the Central Committee of the PZPR; the enablement in the future of employees of the concern to become financially and politically independent from RSW and the PZPR through, for example, taking advantage of legal action.

National Party Reactivated, Presents Resolution*90EP0264A Warsaw LAD in Polish 17 Dec 90 p 7*

[Article by Stanislaw Brzeg Wielunski under the rubric "The Polish Political Scene": "The National Congress of the National Party"; includes brief interview with Adam Krajewski, chairman of the SN Main Committee]

[Text] The colorful mosaic of political groups in Poland added another element on 8 July 1989. On that day, the Convention of Senior Members of the Polish National Movement, chaired by Jan Matlachowski, proposed the official reactivation of the National Party [SN] in Poland. In accordance with the 1935 SN Statute, the SN was

governed by the Convention and its Presidium. The next step to reactivating the SN was the National SN Conference, called for 9 September. At this conference, the date was set for the first SN National Congress since 1939.

The First Time in 50 Years

On 18 November 1989, 120 delegates to the First SN National Congress met in the conference hall of the complex of government buildings located at 1/2 Wspolna Street in Warsaw. The hall, which was splitting at the seams, could not hold all of the invited guests and SN sympathizers. Most of these were elderly people, some of whom still remembered the last SN Congress and the NKVD purges of the postwar years, aimed first at the activists and members of the SN. Those gathered in the hall said a prayer for the SN members murdered by the gestapo and the NKVD, and Adam Krajewski shared his memories of the deceased Jan Matlachowski, who did not live to see the implementation of the idea of the SN National Congress, for which he had returned to Poland in 1961. On behalf of the Junior Members of the National Movement, Tomasz Szukala expressed his thanks to the SN activists for their efforts to preserve the legacy of national thought. Bronislaw Ekert, one of the animators of the congress, underscored the contributions of the Roman Dmowski Institute, the Roman Dmowski Foundation and other institutions and SN authorities in emigration towards preserving the national identity of Poles living in the totalitarian system. Jan Dzizynski gave the SN program report, in which he included a proposal for transforming the present "citizens state" into a "state of the Polish nation"—in his opinion an indispensable step in a society that is threatened with the loss of its identity and the economic expansionism of the FRG. Boleslaw Tejkowski of the Polish Union of the National Community, who was present in the hall, proposed to the SN leadership the far-reaching integration of the national movement, while Krzysztof Bolkowski of the Union for Real Politics offered the SN a tactical alliance within the framework of an understanding of the political forces of the right.

The election of SN officials and talks defining the political goals of the reactivated SN took place behind closed doors. Bronislaw Ekert was elected chairman of the Supreme Council, the highest SN organ. Aleksander Czajka was chosen to be his deputy and Marian Petrykowski was elected secretary. The Main Committee, which deals with SN political affairs, chose Adam Krajewski as its chairman. Krystyna Mastalska and Dariusz Markowski were chosen as deputies. They will be aided by Tomasz Szukala as secretary. The SN Main Board, the executive power, will be composed of the president, Prof. Stefan Jarzebski, two vice presidents, Jan Dzizynski and Zbigniew Jacniacki and members Jerzy Oplustil, Wieslaw Olichwier, Antoni Rusin and Boleslaw Rybicki. SN presidents from the seven districts of Katowice, Konin, Krakow, Lodz, Plock, Warsaw and Wielkopolska were also elected. The SN officials are elected for only 1 year (this differs from the 1935 SN Statute), while the Supreme Council will determine the final form of the governing board.

Resolutions of the SN National Congress

The resolutions prepared during the deliberations and confirmed by the National Congress define the relationship of SN officials to the phenomena of Poland's social life and to the problems of foreign policy. As we read in the SN ideological-political assumptions, the party is: "the political-personal continuer and heir of the Polish League, the National League, the Democratic-National Party and the Camp of Great Poland and it is an extension of the National Party established in 1928. (...) The party is aware of its service role and duties to the Nation (...) It treats its past realistically, and also makes use of the legacy of its predecessors (...) it takes into consideration in its actions the objective conditions existing in Poland, Europe and the world at the end of the 20th century." The National Party strongly emphasizes its integral nature: "The SN is a supraclass political movement (...) it is a secular political organization independent of all external institutions, but it recognizes the authority of the Catholic Church in matters of faith: it is led in its actions by the social precepts of the Church's teaching and it acts in tandem with the Church to build the moral strength and welfare of the Polish Nation." So as not to be suspected of nationalistic accents, the SN officials prepared an appropriate section in their program: "The National Party will develop its activity on the basis of the values of the Latin civilization and Polish Catholic traditions supplemented by love and tolerance, responsibility and action."

The SN considers its fundamental goal to be "the education of the nation and future generations in the spirit of Catholic values and creative concern for the family." The resolution of the SN National Congress regarding the Polish World Community defines the methods to be used in dealing with the affairs of Poles living abroad. This is to be done by means of the establishment of an organization uniting Poles living on many continents, by means of the establishment of the Polish World Community and by taking into considerations the problems of Polonia in the programs and work of the SN.

The delegates to the National Congress passed a special resolution covering the "prosecution of crimes against Polish patriots and the restoration of their collective form to the memory of the Polish Nation." They call for the state organs of prosecution to initiate investigative proceedings against "employees of the Stalinist apparatus of oppression" responsible for the crimes of genocide committed by them from 1939-55 against Polish patriots, including SN activists and soldiers of national military units."

The SN National Congress expressed its relationship to the emigration's National Party. It stated in the resolution that the reactivation of the SN in accordance with the 1935 Statute does not conflict with the status of the emigration's SN whose supreme authorities are not covered by the Statute. In accordance with the position of the emigre First and Second Central Congresses of SN Delegates from 1955 and 1961: "A Supreme Council

may be called only in Poland, it alone may pass a statute, elect the Main Board and announce the program." As the Congress delegates state, the National Party is a political organization independent organizationally of the emigrational SN, although it considers itself to be linked ideologically to the emigrational SN. The German issue has put a strong mark on the course of Congress deliberations. The delegates reacted positively to the Bundestag declaration regarding Poland's western border, but they were skeptical of the spectacular Polish-German "reconciliation" in Krzyzowa. They express the fear that the economic aid program for Poland has as its goal the peaceful implementation of the pan-German Mitteleuropa concept. The SN activists believe the West Germans must depart from the legal interpretation of the existence of the German Reich at its 1937 borders and that they must pay wartime damages to Poland and to those persons who have been harmed (including through forced labor) as a preliminary to a real breakthrough in Polish-FRG relations.

The SN recognizes the validity of the international agreements and treaties concluded by the Polish State. At the same time, it emphasizes the need for cooperation with the Slavic nations. It is opposed to "the sale of property of the Polish Nation to foreign capitalists." It believes that the economic power of the Polish State should be comprised of: "the development of private ownership, including family and domestic agriculture, crafts, industry and trade," maintaining the necessity of being independent of foreign debt.

The delegates to the National Congress criticized the "Solidarity dualism" cultivated in conjunction with the PZPR. In response to a question put to him by a journalist regarding the attitude of the SN to the government of T. Mazowiecki, Adam Krajewski replied that overall he is positive, but that the SN officials cannot fully comprehend some of the government's moves. The SN activists attack the government's negligence in liquidating monopolies and pseudo-cooperatives, which in their opinion delays the stabilization of prices. Some economic ideas of the SN leadership were far from realistic, including the demand for withholding the export of goods that are lacking on the domestic market and the demand for state intervention in the profit margins system.

[LAD] What is the attitude of SN officials to the competitive National Party of Marian Baranski and to Maciej Giertych?

[Krajewski] The ambitions of Mr. Baranski and those persons tied in with the Roman Dmowski Association have led to the creation of a second party. We do not attack it, because we are concerned with the most rapid reactivation possible of the SN throughout Poland and we want to see which party will do this faster. Our contacts with Maciej Giertych are as positive as they could be; despite our proposal to include him in the SN structure, he decided to devote himself to publishing activity in the *Slowo i Czyn* [Word and Deed] Company.

[LAD] You do not want liberal capitalism. Why not?

[Krajewski] There is no need in Poland to reanimate capitalism "with an ugly face," as they say in England. We are afraid of rapacious capitalism in the name of profit at any price, where the value of the human being is measured only in terms of the size of his bank account. You know, I returned from England in 1985 and over and over again since my return I have heard that we must catch up to the West. That is true in some areas, of course, but never in such things as child prostitution, insensitivity and violence. I do not think that we shall ever have to imitate them in this. We believe that the West has much to learn from us.

[LAD] Thank you for the interview.

Coal-Mining Reform: Breaking Up Is Hard To Do

Mining Expert on Reforms

90EP0313A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
5 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Adam Jerschina, adviser to the minister of industry and president of the Supervisory Board of the Hard Coal Association, by Barbara Cieszevska: "Will They Be Independent?"; date and place not given]

[Text] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] The miners were about to lose hope that changes in the economy would reach them, but the changes finally came. You went to the post of advisor to the minister on the issues of the reform from your position of chairman of the National Mining Commission of Solidarity and assumed the responsibilities of president of the Supervisory Board of the Hard Coal Association. Is this to say that the Solidarity draft has won out? A RZECZPOSPOLITA journalist approached Adam Jerschina with this question.

[Jerschina] Our draft, that is, the one of the National Mining Commission, has been largely referred for implementation; in the process, the government has taken a somewhat different path but the one that leads in the same direction: demonopolizing the mining industry, eliminating intermediate echelons, and transforming the board of the association. The Solidarity draft called for creating a chamber of hard coal mining instead of the association whereas the government concept envisages setting up the Geological and Technical Inspectorate.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What responsibilities do you have in your capacity as president? Are you not a figurehead?

[Jerschina] I think that this cannot be interpreted in this manner. My responsibilities? I am not going to quote here the provision of the law which enumerates all of them. I am an advisor to the minister of industry and at the same time the president of the Supervisory Board; the latter is a volunteer post. I have strictly defined responsibilities—to make sure that the economic reform,

mainly demonopolization and the acquisition of independence by mines, is accomplished in mining. However, the point is for all of this to proceed without harming the populace. In short, coal production should not suffer due to this.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] However, does this not mean that the reform will be slowed down?

[Jerschina] By no means. Quite the contrary. There is evidence of that. Effective 1 January, the mines became corporate persons, and from this day on the PEW [Coal Mining Enterprises] have been in liquidation. They will continue operating in the first quarter at the most. In February, they will draw up a balance, and subsequently they will transfer the buildings to their new occupants. These are the details which allay the suspicion that the reform is being slowed down.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] I am afraid, however, that the radicals will remind you: At issue was the liquidation of the association rather than its transformation which we get to hear about increasingly often.

[Jerschina] Let us call a spade a spade. These are issues which fall within the scope of the notion of the basic task of mining, that is, the point is to produce enough coal in order not to create difficulties for Poland. Someone has to see that common interests dovetail. This involves, for example, preventive activities in the field of environmental protection, geological research, investment projects, rescuing people during accidents, and so on. To this end, some kind of a superstructure is necessary. We cannot liquidate the board of the association right now because there is nothing that can replace it. We accept the principle of transforming the association into an agency of a new type, without imperious powers, which plays a coordinating and even service, advisory role.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] However, will the people who until now have ruled the mines be able to change into guardians and advisors?

[Jerschina] I know what you are driving at—replacing the cadres. Of course, this is unavoidable. As early as my first day on the job, I gave the association information to the effect that it would be transformed and that this will entail proposals for cadre replacement. I am not saying that I will fire people. The minister of industry makes decisions in the matter.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] All of us know that the board of the association is a bureaucratized Moloch...

[Jerschina] Indeed, it is definitely too extensive, and you don't even have to engage in precise analysis in order to see this. The principle of connections applied here; jobs were created which were of no consequence. In a word, the board of the association will be transformed into a new kind of institution, with different responsibilities, certainly not superior with regard to the mines.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Let us switch to the mines themselves. It was said that 23 mines were to be independent.

We now know that from the legal point of view all of them are already independent.

[Jerschina] Yes, and 23 mines are no longer managed by the board of the association. We might say this makes them more independent, though it must be mentioned that the association will continue to provide technical supervision for them.... This is the first step associated with the implementation of a fundamental novelty in the economic and financial system—the introduction of a so-called mining rent which will provide equal opportunities for mines operating under different geological and mining conditions.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] In view of this, what is going to happen to the worst mines which draw the largest subsidies? Is it planned to close them down?

[Jerschina] No. Nothing of this kind is envisaged. Life will tell. For now, there is demand for coal. The liquidation of mines will become an option when this coal of theirs no longer matters. Drastically increased prices for coal should force the customers to save. We should reduce our inland demand for coal. This will increase the export quota, and the issue of profitability of mines will emerge in the context of world prices. The mines which are described as unprofitable, frequently without foundation, may show the resourcefulness needed and enter into some interesting partnerships, for example, with nearby large consumers. This will be a game of some kind. This is exactly what the philosophy and tactic of the government come down to—finally giving the mines an opportunity to shape their existence. If the government began to mark the mines for liquidation it would mean that the government thinks the old way. Meanwhile, the government does not want to use administrative methods. It wants to provide an opportunity for looking for one's place in the sun independently.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Will we perhaps sell the mines to foreign capital? Such views can be heard.

[Jerschina] Nobody has made this a slogan; there is no such plan. However, in some cases this would be our salvation. The Budryk Mine is a case in point. This is a mine under construction; the work is at an advanced stage; several shafts have been sunk to the target depth—more than 1,000 meters. Theirs is very high-quality coking coal. Unfortunately, we cannot continue this investment project. Effective 1 January, it will be dropped from the central list [of financing for investment projects]. About 30 percent of the amount which would ensure the continuation of the investment project should be contributed in order to keep this mine. It would be extremely beneficial if some Western coking-industry tycoon took interest in the mine. We could make it possible for Western capital to build a coking plant. At the same time, it would cover the cost of continuing the investment project.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] So, you would like to build yet another Stonawa for us?

[Jerschina] God forbid! I can see that you do not know how modern coking plants look. They are so ecologically

modern that they appear to be toilet soap factories. Therefore, a way out of this situation would be particularly valuable and socially acceptable.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Have any offers been made?

[Jerschina] Not yet. I promised the management of the Budryk Mine to help in the search for a Western partner. In summation, I think that national assets should not be sold. However, we should definitely act in keeping with the principles of international division of labor. Certainly, for the good of the country we should make sure that we have adequate control.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Thank you for the interview.

Credit, Transport Fees Threaten Bankruptcy

90EP0313B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
5 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Cies: "At the Bottom—Hot"]

[Text] The atmosphere in the coal mines is hot, and the emotions are still mounting. Since 1 January, coal mining enterprises have been in liquidation. The mines have become corporate persons, and 23 of them are no longer under the management of the Board of the Hard Coal Association. Coal prices have increased by a factor of 5. Therefore, we might acknowledge that everything is fine, the reform has finally taken off, and all we have to do now is implement it intensively.

Meanwhile, the miners who know the situation of the mines best maintain that the reform began disastrously.

What is the point? Almost all the mines have been left penniless.

Krzysztof Młodzik, the Solidarity chairman in the Piast Mine, says: "What use is being independent if we have no money for wages, for conducting mining operations, for anything?" This mine, one of the best, is forced to secure bank loans at 220 percent interest which have now reached 10 billion zlotys because since November it has not received the money due it from the Coal Sales Center. Of course, the mine itself will be responsible for the interest.

The Coal Sales Center owes the July Manifesto Mine a total of about 200 billion zlotys. The mine owes 16 billion zlotys but has nothing to pay it with. Are they to secure expensive loans or go bankrupt? This is one aspect of independence.

The mines want to get rid of the troublesome middleman which is what the aforementioned center amounts to, all the more so because it deducts 31,100 zlotys per ton of coal for the cost of transportation. At the Piast, they have calculated that this is costing them 800,000 million zlotys a day. As the minister of industry has determined, for now this brokerage is mandatory.

The liquidation of coal mining enterprises is yet another hot issue. It turns out that their astute directors requested

in the last days of December that the directors of many mines hire the people laid off at the PEW's [Coal Mining Enterprises]. There are 29 people in the Sosnowiec Mine, 10 people in the Makoszowy Mine, and so on. Almost all mines got "their share." The miners are exasperated because they maintain that the reform was supposed to eliminate unnecessary bureaucrats whereas new and most often entirely unnecessary people are being hired. Trade unionists from Solidarity protest this, but they are not sure what the result will be. Those laid off at the PEW's will be paid at least through the end of April. Therefore, these people are not left out in the cold.

As the miners see it, the concept of creating branch offices of the chambers of geological and mining supervision, each of which would employ about 50 to 60 people, instead of the former PEW's is controversial.

The miners are bitter about the fact that only one coal price, 194,000 zlotys, has been released to the public. The prices for other grades range between 90,000 and more than 200,000 zlotys.

The problems are many, and it is hard to discuss all of them here. For example, it is known that the Federation of Trade Unions is inflaming passions by promising, say, a higher "13th [wage bonus]" through public address systems in a situation when it is hardly likely. One can imagine what the reaction of the people is going to be when they fail to get what has been promised.

This is how Grzegorz Stawski, the Solidarity chairman at the July Manifesto Mine, one of the 23 independent mines, comments on the first days of the reform: "Unfortunately, they just put one over on us. Initially, we were the ones to demand a radical reform; after all, we developed a draft of it. Government commissioners and advisors slowed us down. For example, they maintained that leaving the association is a process, that everything has to be done gradually, in stages. Therefore, we started explaining to the people that you cannot get everything at once. Meanwhile, we were suddenly made independent, but we were left within the old command-and-allocation arrangement. We cannot sell our coal ourselves but only through the wretched center. We do not set sales prices for coal ourselves."

What next? Many Solidarity chiefs from the mines who gathered at the National Mining Commission on Tuesday 4 January said that unless several basic issues are settled by 15 January bad things may happen. Chairman of the National Mining Commission Andrzej Lipko sent an urgent telex to the minister of industry and the minister of finance asking for negotiations in the matter.

ROMANIA

Swedish Reporter Attends Public Meetings

90EB0208A Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 12 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Anna-Maria Hagerfors: "Laborious Road Toward Romanian Democracy"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Democracy is being born in an icecold schoolhouse in a Romanian village. For the first time, 50 toothless, careworn men and women are going to make their own decisions and choose their new leaders. It is slow as molasses. In schools and universities votes are being cast for new deans and for revolutionary committees. The party members must leave. Under Ceausescu, the deans and professors were forced to have a party card.

Secas—Time after time, the engineer from the agricultural cooperative explains how the farmers are supposed to vote, but they do not understand. Finally a light dawns in the congregation:

"Oh, you are going to count our hands!"

This is where democracy is being born, in an icecold schoolhouse in a Romanian country village.

After the Revolution

Each city, village and workplace all over Romania is in the process of electing their new leaders and revolutionary committees.

Here in the village of Secas, about an hour by car northeast of Timisoara, 50 toothless, careworn men and women are making decisions bythemselves for the first time in 45 years.

Everyone speaks at the same time, they are ravaged and bitter. Many of the younger men are obvious alcoholics.

"We are going to put this village back on the map, but there has to be some order to this meeting," the engineer roars at the excited farmers.

Outside, women are standing in the snow, washing clothes at the village water pipe. It is warm water that runs down in a cement basin, but the women are awfully poorly dressed in the bitter cold. A young girl dressed in a tattered wool sweater and a worn padded nylon robe is rinsing her wash.

Hours pass by before it is time to vote because everyone wants to tell the long story of his or her sufferings under the dictatorship of Ceausescu.

Old Inquiry

A rough young farmer without front teeth storms forward with a cassette player:

"I want to clear myself in front of the whole village. I did not steal corn! Those were false accusations. Here, listen to the inquiry!"

He plays an old inquiry from a trial and the engineer, who is the chairman, becomes increasingly impatient:

"That's enough. We do not have the time to hear all of it!"

"Then I am not going to join in the vote!"

The engineer becomes angry in earnest:

"We did not have a revolution so that everyone can do what he wants! We must have some discipline!"

Everyone becomes quiet.

"We do not know how to act in a democracy," whispers the village school mistress.

Everyone titters selfconsciously.

It is finally time. The chairman ceremoniously reads the names of the candidates. The village elder speaks:

"Think about what you are doing now that you are electing people. The way you vote will decide the future of the village," he warns.

"And those of you who are elected must remember that you will not get any fine cars and high salaries like it was before," says the chairman and chuckles.

Too Late

Patiently he explains the voting procedure, but it does not work. Some raise their hands so timidly that they cannot be seen and some raise them too late. Finally a light dawns in the congregation:

"Oh, you are going to count our hands!"

Embarrassed laughter. The younger farmers protest that only old people are being elected.

"We do not want any lazy alcoholics," the chairman answers shortly and the young men protest wildly.

It is awfully slow going. Instead of voting the people shout:

"No, not him. That one has never done any good in all of his life!"

"He has so! Be quiet!"

"There are many of us in this village who never did any good under Ceaucescu, so if that is going to be the criterion, we will not get a committee together," says the chairman and the schoolroom rings with laughter.

"But that one was a member of the party, we do not want anyone like that," protests a woman in a black shawl.

"Then you will really have to search," says the chairman. "There were more than three million party members. We had to be."

Wants To Explain

The candidate stands up and starts to explain why he was a member of the party.

"We know! We know!" people shout and once again the chairman has to yell for silence.

The student he brought as an interpreter from Timisoara intervenes:

"Excuse me, but you cannot have 12 people on the committee."

"Why not?" says the chairman.

"You have to have a deciding vote."

"How is that?"

"Otherwise you might be deadlocked in a vote. It might turn out 50-50."

"You are right," says the chairman and scratches his head.

He quickly reduces the committee from 12 to 11. And now it is a question of who is going to be the chairman.

"Look to your own feelings and do not keep looking to see how the others are voting. This is important. You must have the best man as chairman," urges the engineer.

An intoxicated farmer starts a long harangue, but is hushed.

Unanimous Vote

The female head of the cooperative who sits at the very front as an observer, adjusts her conspicuously elegant earrings and says:

"There are only three to choose from: the minister, the teacher, and the veterinary assistant."

The minister is chosen almost unanimously. Then a farmer with a profile like Dracula stands up.

"Who will have the right to speak for us to the Swedish journalists?" he asks.

"Anyone can talk to the journalists!" says the chairman and laughs.

The farmers shake their heads. Before the revolution you were thrown in prison for speaking with foreigners. You were not even allowed to answer if a foreigner asked directions.

When we leave the meeting, we are assaulted by the peasant women who talk incessantly, pull on us and cover our cheeks with kisses.

Teachers in Meeting

We drive to another meeting at the university in Timisoara. There the teachers and professors, on Christmas vacation, are in the process of choosing new principals and directors.

There appear to be meetings in all the lecture halls.

All of the school leaders of the region have gathered in one lecture hall. Lorin Fortuna, the leader of the National Salvation Front of Timisoara, is sitting on the dais. He is already very well known. A messenger from the new education minister in Bucharest is reading an announcement:

"On Monday all schools are supposed to elect a principal and a revolutionary committee. The various groups of teachers are to be called according to a quota system so that all of them are fairly represented...."

The principals are making notes in their appointment books. All of them have been members of the party. All of them risk losing their jobs on Monday.

The various faculties are holding preliminary meetings in other rooms in anticipation of the final vote. We end up among humanists and linguists.

The professor of esthetics has bushy, white hair and says:

"Perhaps everyone who knows a foreign language has cooperated with the Securitate. How would we know!"

The head of the faculty is the chairman and searches for a conciliatory line of thought:

"We know that there are informers here among us, but we must remember that they were under orders!"

"The students do not need to see old party affiliates in new functions when they return from the holidays. It is our duty to promote the brilliant students. That is something we have not done for many a day," says the professor of dialectics.

Informer

"It is easy to find the informers. There are bound to be documents in the principal's office. Otherwise we can go and dig at the headquarters of the Securitate," says a young teacher of sociology.

The English professor begins to defend the dean of the university:

"She should be allowed to stay. To be sure, she was the party secretary here, but she did help students who went to prison."

"No! All of her functions were political. Now we need a scientist!" exclaims a German teacher.

When the humanist faculty goes to vote, there are no party members among the candidates. That means no professors.

They had to have a party card. Nor could any of them have any relative, no matter how distant, who had fled abroad.

Retirees

That is why a number of retired professors have been called. They belonged under the old system and are considered "clean."

The first name is a very old professor of French literature. Then a number of retirees are elected together with teachers and assistant professors.

"Pooh, titles," says a man who is only an assistant professor because his sister fled to West Germany.

"When Elena Ceaucescu appropriated all the academic titles there were, even though she was barely literate, we stopped worrying about titles."

YUGOSLAVIA

Zagreb, Titograd Polls on Markovic's Policies

90EB0154A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
21 Nov 89 pp 7-10

[Article by Dejan Jovic: "How Much Do We Believe Markovic?"]

[Text] Are you satisfied with the results that the Federal Executive Council has achieved since Ante Markovic has been its chairman? Do you feel that he should remain in office as Yugoslav prime minister? What is your attitude toward his cabinet's foreign, domestic, and farm policy, and are you satisfied with the anti-inflation measures taken so far? Do you support the statement that the federal government is conducting a policy which suits only Croatia and Slovenia, but is harmful to the rest? Is it your desire that the powers of the FEC be limited exclusively to economic affairs, or do you think that it should have greater authority within the limits of the political system? Do you care today which republic the federal prime minister comes from? Do you agree or not with the policy of freezing personal incomes and prices, and do you recommend such measures to the federal government in lowering inflation? Do you foresee that Markovic and his government will have to resign before the end of their term, or do you think that they will retain the preference of the necessary majority in the federal Assembly? Finally, what do you think today about the successes (or failures) of the previous three federal governments and their prime ministers—Veselin Djuranovic, Milka Planinc, and Branko Mikulic?

These questions were posed in an anonymous poll of a representative sample of inhabitants of Zagreb and Titograd by five DANAS public opinion researchers on behalf of the editors. Political science students from Zagreb (Goran Beus-Richembergh, Dejan Jovic, Ines Lovric, Gordana Skaljic, and Milica Sundov), with the help of their colleagues from the School of Political Science at Belgrade University and with computer processing by the enterprise Prizma in Zagreb, polled 714 respondents in Zagreb and 273 in Titograd. Those two cities were selected because of the deep-seated assumption that the attitudes of their citizens and political leaderships toward the measures and policy of the federal government are diametrically opposed. Once a certain distance had been established in Slovenia from certain moves of the government, Zagreb remained the center most consistently exhibiting firm support for the prime minister, while Titograd has been challenging him fiercely for a long time. The survey was designed to show on what questions the differences between Titograd and Zagreb public opinion are great and on which they are only slight. Another goal was to prevent or at least minimize the effect of manipulation of public opinion by the respective political leadership on "its own" territory.

Finally, it is interesting to see what level of cohesion there is in views related to geography, and what (if any) unity there is in views and interests associated with the

respondents' membership in the League of Communists, social status, and ethnic background.

Pensioners Showed the Greatest Satisfaction

Responses to the question about general satisfaction with Markovic's government showed significant differences between respondents in Zagreb and Titograd. Whereas in Zagreb 61.5 percent of the respondents declared that they were satisfied with the results of Markovic's government to date, 26 percent of the respondents in Titograd were satisfied. Slightly more than one-fourth of people from Zagreb and more than half of those from Titograd answered that they were not satisfied with Markovic (26.5 and 54.6 percent, respectively). In Zagreb, pensioners showed the greatest satisfaction with Markovic's results (74.1 percent), followed by farmers and university students, while far less satisfaction was expressed by workers in the social services (59.6 percent), and the unemployed (46.2 percent).

In Titograd the federal government has its greatest support among the retired (45.5 percent) and farmers (50 percent). This support from farmers is surprising, since only 29.7 percent of them in Zagreb declared that they were satisfied with Markovic's agricultural policy. It is interesting that students of the School of Economics at Zagreb University are highly satisfied with the government's results: Three-fourths express favor, while only one-third of their counterparts in the same school at Titograd University do.

In Zagreb, even those production workers whose work organizations have been having a hard time keeping up with the competition of imported products (such as the vegetable oil factory in Zagreb) are still highly satisfied with Markovic's policy. In Titograd the relationship between business success (and therefore the standard of living of the workers) and satisfaction with the federal government can be seen very clearly. For instance, the percentage of workers there who are satisfied ranged from 7.1 percent at Radoje Dakic to 34.1 percent in the Aluminum Combine, where personal incomes average 19 million dinars, incredibly good by Titograd standards.

In Zagreb, it is significant that in the health service, education, and cultural fields (the theaters especially), the percentage of those satisfied falls below 50, which is certainly related to the financial situation of workers in those social services.

Nevertheless, in both the Zagreb and Titograd samples we note a high number who are not satisfied with the government's results to date, but who still feel that Markovic should stay on as prime minister. In Zagreb, 136 (out of 189) dissatisfied respondents selected answers to that effect, while in Titograd 63 (of 149) people who were dissatisfied still put their confidence in the government.

In any case, a majority of citizens in both cities declared their confidence in Markovic's government. In Zagreb, this was a slightly embarrassing ("simply sensational")

92.7 percent, but the 61.2 percent in Titograd was still high. If the results are analyzed, it will be seen that these percentages belie the hypotheses—used to dispute Markovic—that legitimacy is given in advance to that policy which appeals to the "will of the people." There are five prominent theories to explain why the percentage of those dissatisfied with the results of the government is far higher than the percentage who think that the government should be brought down. First, many people think that Markovic is today the best among the possible prime ministers, and that he should be kept in that office regardless of personal dissatisfaction with the results. Others feel that it is still early for more visible results, so that they place confidence in him although the results have not been good. Still others think that he is the right man in a system which is no good, and they channel their dissatisfaction into agitation for political changes rather than changes in personnel. A fourth group believes that no one resignation is going to be a solution to Yugoslav problems and they are against every resignation, especially a resignation which would be the consequence of political pressures. A fifth group decides without any serious insight into political processes, and they feel that although the political results have been unsatisfactory, there are reasons (tending to be outside politics) for Markovic and his government to remain in office.

On Continuation of the Term of Office

But those who relate their attitude toward the future of the FEC to their own satisfaction with the whole of results achieved still constitute a larger group than those in five other groups who are dissatisfied yet find it desirable for government policy to continue.

It is interesting that there is hardly any work organization in either Zagreb or Titograd where a majority would not favor the continuation of Markovic's term. The only exception is the Tobacco Combine in Titograd, where the workers are receiving about 6 million dinars a month. A majority of the work force at Radoje Dakic also finds that he should remain prime minister (64 percent of the respondents), while at Radio Zagreb all those surveyed (51) answered in the affirmative (at Radio Titograd the percentage was 66.7 percent). It is a fact, nevertheless, that production workers in the two cities produced results slightly below the average (88.9 percent in Zagreb and 55.8 percent in Titograd), while Zagreb University students and farmers and Titograd pensioners showed the highest confidence in the government.

But while satisfaction with Markovic is fairly high, as is the readiness to support continuation of his term, the respondents are far less inclined to approve the government's individual actions in four essential areas. Thus, only the foreign policy of the Yugoslav Government is satisfactory to more than half of the respondents in the two cities, while the dissatisfaction is much greater concerning its domestic, anti-inflation, and agricultural policies.

In Titograd, 58.8 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the government's foreign policy, while 21.2

percent explicitly do not agree with the government's measures in this area. In Zagreb, 66.1 percent agree with those measures, and 16.9 percent of the respondents do not agree. If we look at the specific groupings in the sample, we see that in Zagreb the unemployed and farmers showed the least satisfaction with foreign policy, and pensioners slightly more than the average. In Titograd, however, only 45.8 percent of the workers directly involved in production supported the country's foreign policy.

In Zagreb, the government's measures in domestic policy scored worst—36 percent of the respondents are satisfied with them, and 47.3 percent are not. The most dissatisfied are the workers directly involved in production (28.8 percent satisfied) and farmers (27.7 percent). In Titograd, however, in contrast to Zagreb, domestic policy is acceptable to far more respondents than anti-inflation policy and agricultural policy. There, 26.4 percent of the respondents were satisfied with it, and half were not satisfied.

In Titograd, only 19.8 percent of the respondents supported anti-inflation policy, while in Zagreb 45.9 percent did. However, in Zagreb markedly few farmers were satisfied with that policy (23.4 percent), but far more university students were (60.2 percent). This percentage goes as high as 65.9 percent of the students at the School of Economics at Zagreb University. Since it is (precisely) the agricultural policy of the FEC that has received many objections during Markovic's term, it is interesting that 29.7 percent of farmers polled in the vicinity of Zagreb support his measures, while 61.7 percent feel that they have not been satisfactory. In Titograd, there are no farmers who marked on the questionnaire that they supported the government's agricultural policy, while 87.5 percent were explicitly against it.

In answering a question that gave respondents an opportunity to explain their attitude toward the policy of the FEC, citizens surveyed showed a greater readiness to express general satisfaction with the government than an ability to document what specific measures they are satisfied with. Although the citizens seem to decide for or against continued terms of office according to the general impression which the government has left, their assessments are relatively unfavorable on almost every area in which they are specifically questioned except foreign policy. This attitude by respondents might also be explained in terms of the widespread propaganda drives which have created in many of them fairly clear (although highly simplified) ideas about the government. It is evident that the respondents are far more inclined to automatically answer that they are satisfied and that they favor continuation of Markovic's term as prime minister, than they are willing to state the reasons for their decision. Finally, there are a notably high number of respondents who are not satisfied with any particular action of the government, but who still think that Markovic should remain prime minister, thus placing themselves among the passive malcontents.

On the Freezing of Personal Incomes

In the Zagreb sample of respondents 38 of 714 (5.3 percent) saw as accurate the extensively propagated thesis that the policy of the federal government benefits Croatia and Slovenia exclusively, and is harmful to the rest. In Titograd, 28.9 percent of the respondents felt that this assertion, which incidentally symbolizes the aggressive version of the "antibureaucratic revolution," is true. In the Titograd sample, this view was held by 22 percent of all the respondents who are members of the Montenegrin LC. In the Zagreb sample, however, it turned out that there is a certain correlation between the ethnic background of the respondents and support for that assertion. Thus, only 3.5 percent of all the Croats covered by the sample answered affirmatively to this assessment, while the percentage among respondents of Serbian nationality was 23.9. Nevertheless, even these results show that relatively few respondents find that Markovic's government has not been objective toward the various republics "just because of what they are," and that this position cannot be characterized as the position of a majority of people even in Montenegro.

Those respondents who think that the FEC should concern itself exclusively with economic affairs are in the substantial majority. Those in favor of an economic government comprise 60.8 percent in Zagreb and 70 percent of the respondents in Titograd. In Zagreb, this is the opinion of 76.3 percent of the workers in direct production surveyed, but of only 47 percent of those in the social services. The results are similar in Titograd—82.5 percent of those directly involved in production. It is surprising that only 27.3 percent of Titograd pensioners favor an "economic government," and it is a significant datum that this is the desire of 75 percent of students at the School of Economics of Zagreb University.

A majority of the citizens surveyed does not care what republic the prime minister comes from (60.9 percent in Zagreb and 49.5 percent in Titograd), although many say that while in principle they do not care, in the political situation today they are not altogether indifferent. It certainly could be asserted that it is Markovic's destiny to become the "property" of all Yugoslavs equally in his federal political office. Which is why he is equally interesting to the Titograd and Zagreb public as one of the central Yugoslav political figures.

Large differences are also evident in the attitude of respondents from these two cities toward the policy of freezing personal incomes and prices. In Titograd, the freeze is favored by 52.7 percent of the respondents, but in Zagreb by only (or should we say all of) 26.2 percent. But it is interesting that there are large differences toward this economic measure within the Zagreb sample. While the freeze is a desirable measure to only 16.3 percent of workers in the social services and 16.7 percent of the pensioners, it would be supported in Zagreb by 55.3 percent of the farmers. And while a third of the university students at the School of Economics of

Zagreb University would support a possible policy of freezing prices and wages, two-thirds at that same school at Titograd University circled this choice. In Titograd as well, a high percentage of the farmers (75 percent) favored the freeze. In an analysis, it is certainly important to mention that Markovic personally and his ministers particularly have emphasized several times that this option in the conduct of economic policy does not come into consideration, and it is generally considered quite undesirable with the political public.

Whereas differences toward the policy of freezing personal incomes are immense, and they are correlated to geography, differences in attitude toward greater powers for the FEC within the framework of the political system are minimal. That is, when asked whether the FEC ought to have greater powers than those the system has guaranteed it today, 63 percent of people from Zagreb and 66 percent of those from Titograd answered that they agree. There are no very significant differences in the attitude on this point from one social group to another within the samples.

Concerning Djuranovic, Planinc, and Mikulic

The respondents were also asked for a forecast: Will Markovic have to resign before the end of his term of office? Although there are certain differences, a majority in both Titograd (72.2 percent) and Zagreb (84.5 percent) still feels that Markovic will not be brought down before the end of his term. The results, then, are influenced above all by a projection of the respondents' own desire for the future of the Markovic government, although there are those who wrote in "unfortunately" beside the assertion that he would be forced to leave his office. In both cities, workers in direct production are the greatest pessimists, while the pensioners in only rare cases felt that he would receive a vote of no confidence that would require his withdrawal.

Nevertheless these results do refute those assessments of the Yugoslav political situation which insist on the marked superiority of those political forces which are considered dogmatic and conservative (in contrast to Markovic's forces, which are considered "reformist" and "market-oriented"). It is also of interest that there were some who concluded exclusively on the basis of Markovic's specific self-confidence and decisiveness, which the media have emphasized, that he is the last person who will decide to resign. But regardless of the many motives with which one can explain the attitude of the respondents toward Markovic's political destiny, we can conclude without any doubt whatsoever that his resignation today would be an immense surprise to the public in both Titograd and Zagreb.

Finally, we asked the respondents to offer their judgment of the last three Yugoslav governments. It is notable that the respondents extended their dissatisfaction with political development in Yugoslavia over the last decade to their attitude toward prime ministers. Branko Mikulic "felt" this particularly; only 3.9 percent of people in

Zagreb and 0.4 percent of those in Titograd were satisfied with his government. Today, about 4.5 percent of the respondents in both cities are satisfied with Veselin Djuranovic and his cabinet, and in Zagreb a fourth of the respondents had no attitude toward that makeup of the Yugoslav government.

The government of Milka Planinc was actually the only one that avoided political disaster to some extent. Although a high majority was dissatisfied with the results which she achieved, 117 of the respondents in Zagreb (16.4 percent) and 27 (9.9 percent) in Titograd gave passing grades to the only woman to have been prime minister of Yugoslavia. Milka Planinc has continued to be given relatively good marks by respondents who are members of the Croatian LC (31.6 percent of the members of the Croatian LC in Zagreb) as well as by farmers (23.4 percent) and workers in the social services (19.3 percent). Journalists of Radio Zagreb stand out particularly, with 31.4 percent looking favorably on the results of that FEC team. It was not uncommon for respondents to explain their position in terms of the assessment that her government, by contrast with the others, was still remembered for its decisive actions and attempts to turn around a very adverse economic situation. But some people feel the greatest mistake of her government made was not offering enough resistance to the pressures which were strong in the second half of her term. That is why respondents remarked that the very end of the term of Milka Planinc, when she was being criticized by the party leadership, should stand as a warning to Markovic as a possible (but not really desirable) scenario. It is Markovic's refusal to give in to the demands for a strict program of measures against inflation (which have been coming even from the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee) which was perceived most favorably and agreed with by the major portion of the public surveyed.

Ante Markovic is certainly a person who enjoys today the broad confidence of the public, even in those communities which spawned the rumors about his incompetence and the demand for his resignation. But at the same time, besides the generally favorable judgments of the government and the prime minister, there are also serious reasons for him to be concerned because of the unfavorable assessments of his domestic, anti-inflation, and agricultural policy. The absence of more decisive measures in these areas of government policy could amplify the influence of those forces which even today defend their adverse attitudes mainly in terms of assumed public support.

Finally, we should not forget that the influence of public opinion on the actual political decision to continue or end the tenure of the federal government is only indirect, and that in the federal Assembly they do not count percentages of respondents, but the votes which Markovic gets in the ranks of the political teams. Their attitude, however, even towards this Yugoslav issue (perhaps even most of all toward this one) is somewhat different than the attitudes of other citizens.

Aside from that, the federal government, although today it has a markedly more favorable position on the popularity scale than all other political institutions at the federal level, is still the leadership to which demands and criticism are addressed most easily and most frequently. That could place the government in a position of "highly perishable goods," so that just a few days of facing urgent events could lose it a large number of adherents. The attitude of the public toward the government can also oscillate considerably depending on specific decisions it makes, so that it is far from a safe assumption that these results of the public opinion survey can be taken as an announcement of "calm water." The confidence of the citizens in his government should certainly encourage Markovic in a situation in which his resignation is being demanded. However, it could turn into a double-edged sword if the promises which have boosted confidence in him are not fulfilled. Finally, Markovic will not be able to make use of the standing justification that he was not elected on the basis of a program, that he did not choose his associates, and that he did not have confidence as he encountered the obstructions themselves during his term of office.

The question is whether all that will be enough for him.

[Box, p 10]

How We Conducted the Survey

The public opinion survey concerning the policy of the Federal Executive Council was conducted from 2 to 10 November in Zagreb and on 9 and 10 November in Titograd. The Zagreb sample included 714 respondents—93 students (the School of Economics and Law School and the Student Center), 198 workers in direct production (the Vegetable Oil Factory, Chromos, Croatia—OOUR "Lamps," and private service shops), 270 workers in the social services (Zagreb Electric Transport, the Culture and Education Chamber, the theaters, Radio Zagreb, the Marko Oreskovic Elementary School, the Educational Center for Culture and Art, the city's unified self-management community of interest for culture, the self-managed community of interest for housing and municipal services of Centar Opstina, health care centers in Ivanicgradska and Runjaninova Streets, the editors of PRIVREDNI VJESNIK, and NAMA—Remiza), 52 unemployed people, 54 pensioners, and 47 farmers. The average age of the respondents in Zagreb was 38, and 15.6 percent of them were members of the LCY. The ethnic composition of the respondents corresponds to the composition of the citizens of Zagreb (75.9 percent Croats, 7.1 percent Yugoslavs, 6.44 percent Serbs, 6.6 percent uncommitted, and 4 percent members of other nationalities). In Titograd, 273 citizens were surveyed. Forty were students in the Schools of Economics and Law, 120 were workers in direct production (Titograd Aluminum Combine, Titograd Tobacco Combine, and Radoje Dakic), 78 workers in the social services (Institute for Socioeconomic Research, History Institute of Montenegro, Radio Titograd), 16 unemployed persons, 11 pensioners, and 8 farmers. The

average age was the same as in the Zagreb sample—38. Members of the LCY comprised 38.1 percent of the sample. Montenegrins represented 63.7 percent of the sample, Yugoslavs 19.8, Muslims 6.6, Serbs 4, uncommitted 2.9, Albanians 2.6, and Croats 0.4 percent.

Young Montenegrin LCY CC Member Supports Serbia

90EB0152A Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian
10 Nov 89 pp 4-8

[Interview with League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] Central Committee [CC] member Milo Djukanovic by Dragan Gavrilovic: "The Link by Destiny Between the Peoples of Montenegro and Serbia"; date and place not given]

[Text] Something quite unusual has happened in Yugoslav public opinion: among the most striking new political figures is a young man, 27-year-old Milo Djukanovic, of whom every unbiased analyst will say that he radiates an unusual maturity. The public, which knows how to value political courage and sense, and which, finally, does not consent to being outwitted, recognizes his political individuality, which, obviously, is no longer gained just by the accumulation of years, but rather, fortunately, by somewhat stricter criteria: intelligence, honesty, and work.

Djukanovic actually won the public's sympathy with a simple "technique" that is characteristic of democracy. Everything that he has to say, he says in public.

The key thing for Djukanovic, and also for his comrades in the new Montenegrin leadership, the youngest in Yugoslavia, is that they came to power during the greatest crisis of socialism and the communist movement to which they belong. It is with that fact that this interview ought to begin.

[INTERVJU] Communism has made itself questionable on a global level. For decades now, since the October Revolution, so to speak, that project has been ruined by quasi-communist leaders. With their feudal despotism, communist leaders have stopped time and made their societies closed, inefficient, and paralyzed. How much do such experience and such blunders hamper the future of this movement and of the new ideas that it could offer?

[Djukanovic] One type of socialism is undoubtedly completely exhausted. That is the model whose key characteristics are collectivist and statist, and which to the greatest extent has been created under the general supervision of the communist parties. Nevertheless, although that is undeniable, although that type of socialism has entered the dangerous waters of spiritual and material disaster, I think that one cannot yet pass a definitive verdict either on socialism or the communist movement.

[INTERVJU] Where was the mistake?

[Djukanovic] The fundamental mistake was made at the very start: in the attempt to have socialism base its development exclusively on anticapitalist principles. Socialism thereby entangled itself, and became unable to answer two key questions: how to be economically efficient, and how to establish democracy. That is simply not possible with a complete negation of capitalist principles, especially since some of the rejected solutions do not have the nature of ideological achievements—and, thus, are neither capitalist nor socialist—but rather of major achievements in civilization. Furthermore, one of the basic and still reliable Marxist hypotheses, that socialism as a “transitional society” retains within itself solutions from the society from which it arose, has been completely downplayed.

To put it briefly, the communist leaders at that time wanted to escape from capitalism as soon as possible and as quickly as possible, naively believing that by doing so they would prove the inevitability of its end. That impenetrable fear of capitalism produced the isolation, paralysis, and inefficiency of the socialist model, which then predictably led to our lagging behind the evidently developed capitalist world, and discredited many of our authentic solutions.

[INTERVJU] And now, new reforms are being undertaken in order to save the communist option in Yugoslavia. Are reforms a reliable solution?

[Djukanovic] The reforms are being undertaken in order to live better, i.e., in a wealthier and more democratic manner. So far all the reforms in the so-called socialist states, and in ours as well, have failed. I agree that the viability or nonviability of the LC [League of Communists] on the political scene will depend on the one now being carried out in Yugoslavia, like it or not. To simplify things, aware of the theoretical reduction of any conversation for the newspapers, I will state that at the present time, the LC has not kept pace with the turbulence and complexity of the changes that have begun in the Yugoslav economic and political system. It is not only not keeping pace with the changes, but in many respects is on the periphery. It is thereby de facto demonstrating its weakness, obsolescence, political impotence, and its old ideological rheumatism.

But let me respond to the direct provocation in your question. Are reforms a reliable solution? Can what Yugoslavia needs be called a reform? As long as by reform we mean improvement of the existing system, I am afraid that there will be no use in it. As long as reform is understood as change that does not touch the foundations of the existing system, it is questionable whether it will be advantageous.

Of everything that is inferred and deduced from the concept of reform, the most important thing for us today is “reformatio in capite,” i.e., reform in heads! Above all, in the heads of Yugoslav communists and their leaderships.

[INTERVJU] How is it that the LCY is on the periphery of social changes?

[Djukanovic] The answer is complicated, just as much as the Yugoslav crisis is complicated. What is evident to everyone today, and a serious problem, is the quarreling, which could even be called infantile, among the LC leaderships. That disunity, however, is not the cause of the crisis. In fact, the disunity of the LCY is not only because of the disunity of its leaderships; the reasons are much deeper, and systemic. Naturally, the fundamental catalyst of the divisions within the LCY is the quarrels among its leaderships, which only help to make the dead end more obvious.

[INTERVJU] What are the causes of that disunity? How did the schism occur?

[Djukanovic] My impression is that in political analyses we casually dismiss the reasons that have led to that disunity. Someone who neglects even to verify the causes will not even understand the meaning of the consequences.

In fact, the LCY is a political organization, the vanguard of the working class. Is there unity today among the working class throughout the entire territory of Yugoslavia? No! Why? The working class in Yugoslavia lives in drastically different socioeconomic areas delimited by republic and provincial boundaries. How did that happen? There are several reasons. One would have to be blind, however, not to see how much the intensification of those differences has been promoted by an unjustified, ideologized, and economically inefficient economic system. The contractual economy, the parochialization of the unified Yugoslav market, the institutionalization of republic (national) economies, and based on all that, the emergence of total economic voluntarism and unscrupulous economic frauds among the national oligarchies and many other nebulous things had their institutional foundation in the 1974 constitutional project. The transfers of income for several reasons have been enormous, and still are today.

In my view of things, therefore, the disunity of the LCY is a derived consequence of such irrefutable facts.

[INTERVJU] In that case, the so-called unity of the LCY remains an “idle dream” for Yugoslav communists?

[Djukanovic] There is no devil as black as he is pictured. In spite of the evident differences, it is possible to build programmatic unity. In doing so, of course, we have to renounce monolithic aspirations in the LCY. I am convinced that in a constructive, tolerant dialogue we can arrive at important joint positions with respect to the creation of a new economic and political system, and accordingly the position of the LCY in Yugoslavia as well.

It is also evident, however, that there is no willingness within the LCY for the affirmation of such unified views—as undoubtedly exist, for instance, with respect to the further democratization of society—in making a commitment to a market economy, in supporting the establishment of a law-governed state, etc.

[INTERVJU] A large number of people attribute the main responsibility for a Yugoslav crisis of universal dimensions to the communists, because they have held all the power.

[Djukanovic] That is only half true. In fact, I think that we cannot blame either the communist movement or the LC for the Yugoslav crisis in general, because I simply think that the communist idea has not led Yugoslav society into a dead end. We have been brought to this state of material and spiritual disaster by the bureaucratized, dogmatized communist leadership of Yugoslavia, which was the creator and remained the prisoner of that inefficient and authoritarian system, drunk with the power it had acquired and incapable of building a new, democratic option for socialism and a new democratic option for the communist movement.

[INTERVJU] What is the reason for that "need" of communists to govern all social existence, and finally and most absurdly, all social opinion? Depersonalization, the creation of stereotypes, the singing of chorales, the endless repetition of refrains, the promotion and perpetuation of cults...?

[Djukanovic] All socialist revolutions, including ours—which is not surprising, in view of what the very concept of revolution implies—have not been accompanied by a corresponding "cultural revolution." The absence of a "cultural revolution" produced that noncultural need to deny the life of the individual, to manage it, and subordinate it to the collective.... The chief sin of socialist revolutions is that they made a forcible break with everything that had existed until then, and wanted what emerged to be the negation of what had preceded it, at any cost. An attempt was even made to prove that difference by turning history back and scorning some cultural achievements, which was understandably disastrous and had to be avenged sooner or later. One path, singlemindedness, a one-way street—perhaps that is possible for Orwell's robots, but not for live people! After all, didn't certain communist oligarchies literally work on making robots out of people?

[INTERVJU] The market economy also implies a market of political ideas. Is there a suspicion that the LC will fake that market?

[Djukanovic] Naturally, that suspicion of faking is not unfounded, since anyone who is in power wants to preserve that power at any cost. We in Montenegro think that the LC's position should be defended only through new programs, in a competition in which all political ideas and programs will have the right of citizenship. I say that the political environment is, de fact, plural, and failing to acknowledge that fact is the most dangerous thing for the LC today. That would be suicide for it. And the fact that it is protected in the Constitution can easily become a dead letter on paper, because it is doubtful that there is any correlation between life and paper!

[INTERVJU] Why is political pluralism treated differently among the so-called parts of the LCY?

[Djukanovic] The resistance to recognizing political pluralism is a reflection of the Bolshevik way of thinking within the LC. That is, of course, fatal, antihistorical, and even inhuman, and through that fact alone is condemned to failure.

That unwillingness of the LC to enter into an open dialogue with other options, which could be talked about for a long time, has led to the destruction of its fabric and the paradoxical political cacophony that the entire Yugoslav public has witnessed.

[INTERVJU] The LCY has been broken up into national parties. Many people think that nationalism also originated from behind its wings; until recently, at least, communist theory said that nationalism represented anticommunism.

[Djukanovic] In some parts of the LCY, there has been a sort of symbiosis of communist and anticommunist ideas. In that framework nationalism, which is anticommunism, primarily denotes the disastrous lack of creativity of the LC. Nationalism, however, has its own institutional stronghold in Yugoslavia. It is not heresy to say that the 1974 Constitution provided the prerequisites for the rise of nationalism, because it inaugurated national states, national economies, national histories, etc., etc., and it finally established a basis for a confederate system in Yugoslavia. That constitution produced national homogenization, and directly or indirectly caused the national migrations that are taking place on Yugoslav territory. Its confederate nature has been most crudely manifested through the "war" of the Yugoslav states: we are witnesses of the great lack of fulfillment through statehood of the "federal units," in which certain Yugoslav peoples are passing through their own genuine state puberty. Their primary goal is to prove the sovereignty of their own state, its exceptional nature, and even its exclusive significance for Yugoslavia! Naturally, that produces counterreactions among the other Yugoslav peoples.

[INTERVJU] All in all: a sad, melodramatic, confused, and poverty-stricken reality, and gloomy prognoses?

[Djukanovic] I agree that our everyday reality could be described as you say, but for the second time, may I maintain that the devil is not so black? It is true that all those nationalisms that are flourishing in nearly all parts of Yugoslavia show an exceptional amount of aggression. They are ominous, but I nevertheless think that they cannot inspire a wide circle of their champions, because rationality and soberness prevail in most people. I recall what Ivo Andric wrote about that: "Sometimes a person wonders whether the spirit of most of the Balkan peoples has not always been poisoned, and whether perhaps nothing can ever be done except for one thing: to suffer violence, or to commit it." And Andric thus speaks hypothetically about our "nationalist fate"—"sometimes" and "perhaps." What have we done? Instead of behaving politically sensibly and analytically,

like all rational states, we have reduced that "sometimes" and "perhaps" to the minimum possibility, and we have done the complete opposite: we watch calmly while the poison of nationalism spreads.

[INTERVJU] Have you thought about how it is primarily intellectuals who are dancing with that "devil"?

[Djukanovic] That is really astounding. It would be easiest to say that these are quasi-intellectuals, which is not quite true. I think that a great crisis is taking place among Yugoslav intellectuals. Undoubtedly one day they will be ashamed of having signed a contract with the devil of everyday political nationalist provenance. Until recently, I esteemed many Slovene intellectuals so much for the openness of their works and views, for their general cultural values.... What has happened to some of them, and how did the metamorphosis take place that left them blind, full of gloom and hatred toward the "southern" peoples? I really do not know how to answer that.

[INTERVJU] Perhaps it has to do with a sort of intellectual depression because of the humiliating situation in which all of Yugoslav society finds itself?

[Djukanovic] I recognize the depression of the impotent and weak, but here we are talking about something else: aggressive involvement in the national, religious, and, I would say, racist division of individuals and peoples. That is not depression—it is intellectual pressure! Next, aren't intellectuals inherently characterized by rebellion, dissatisfaction with what exists, and critical evaluation of everything that is internationalism? Furthermore, isn't an intellectual the one who must understand the world and processes within it in all their complexity, without being a prisoner of singlemindedness, either communist-Bolshevik, or something else? It is understandable that intellectuals, like all people in this country, are shaken by the crisis and poverty of this state, and that it is not easy to think when one's stomach is growling, but not even an empty stomach can stop a real intellectual's head from giving at least a small cry of reason, dissatisfaction, rebellion, that mental and free "Eppur si muove!"

[INTERVJU] Is there enough sense in Yugoslavia? It seems that a "Gallup poll" would show that there is more sense outside the communist organization than inside it.

[Djukanovic] The old communist leadership would never acknowledge that. Ten years ago, you would even have experienced major unpleasantness because of such an assertion. I really do not know for certain where there is more sense, and I maintain that for a modern, democratic, and well-intentioned LC leadership inclined toward dialogue and tolerance, that is not even essential. Naturally, as a communist I would like to have all the intelligent people in my "society," but I do not have any right to influence people's political, religious, and other convictions. The leadership to which I belong does not

engage in blackmail and pressure by primitive institutions, like the one of "moral and political suitability." Membership in the LC has not certified anyone's intelligence and knowledge.

[INTERVJU] After October 1988 and January 1989, I have the impression that nothing in Montenegro is the way it was anymore. The political agents are becoming the people and the citizens—who, admittedly, are still learning to walk—and that is a new fact in political rule. The people brought you in the new leadership to power, and you are responsible to it. Are you really prepared to answer to the people?

[Djukanovic] The democratic processes taking place in Montenegro are such that the question does not even arise of whether I, for example, am prepared to answer to the people. It is simply that nothing else is possible. The people which seized power, which has become the agent, in the full sense of that word, of everything that is happening and that should happen and be done, will never give up those freedoms and rights again. Viewed pragmatically, accountability is meaningful only if the accounts are submitted to the people...

[INTERVJU] And that is undoubtedly a new characteristic of government?

[Djukanovic] Of course, but here there is no longer any government; there is only representation of the people. In order to be able to represent someone, everything that you do has to be done publicly and you bear the responsibility for every step that you take.

[INTERVJU] The October and January events in Montenegro were denounced by the mass media in Slovenia and Croatia, and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the awakening of the mob. There has been an unbelievable amount of insulting cynicism, ridicule, sneering, manipulation, and fabrications in the press coverage from those republics, so that a coherent dialogue with that press is simply impossible. All of this is quite obviously taking place with the agreement of the leaderships there...

[Djukanovic] I would not say that this is only a question of "agreement of the leaderships there" with the mass media; the press is also acting in complete agreement with the basic assessments given publicly and privately by those leaderships. So much the worse for that "free" and "independent" press, and so much the more regrettable for the "Yugoslav synthesis," "European culture," "principles," and "democracy."

The pejorative assessment of the "antibureaucratic revolution" and the "awakening of the people," as a "ruse of the political mentality" of those leaderships, emerged out of fear that the people might happen to them as well.

In Montenegro, as in Serbia, the people really did awaken, and I think that until the people awaken throughout all of Yugoslavia, things will not go well for

this country, because only policies that have their foundation in that awakened, politicized, and self-aware people have any real chances.

[INTERVJU] Recently in Montenegro you had a talk with the directors of Yugoslav radio and television centers. Was a "cease-fire" signed?

[Djukanovic] It was a productive conversation between our leadership and the top people of Yugoslav radio and television. At the end of the talk, some of them said how disgraceful it was how little was known in their regions about what was happening in Montenegro. Two days after this talk, which, as I say, was productive, Sarajevo TV broadcast "Black Without White" (that was its real title!), in which it again caricatured, distorted, and "invented" the facts about the Montenegrin people, its leadership, and the policies being conducted here. We are not surprised by the lies and forgeries about Montenegro, but by something else: the boldness of those mass media and leaderships in insolently deceiving their own people.

[INTERVJU] There are several options in this game: a federation, a confederation, or an asymmetrical federation. How do you view the new Yugoslav constitution?

[Djukanovic] There are really no fundamental differences between a confederation and an asymmetrical federation. The latter would only represent one more experiment, not needed by anything or anyone, with Yugoslav society, which has been fed up in any case with its role as a "guinea pig" for several decades now. Yugoslavia, in fact, without any measure and without any particular need, has been a testing ground for the experimentation of various mechanics, teachers, secondary school students, or frustrated doctors of science. I am making a distinction, of course, between those seeking better social solutions and the magical experimenters. There have been few of the former, and too many of the latter.

My opinion, and I believe that of the majority of Yugoslav citizens as well, is that the only acceptable solution is a modern federal system for Yugoslavia, with a market economy, direct elections, political pluralism, and all those components of democracy which are implied in the kind of modern socialist state that we outlined at the 10th extraordinary congress of the Montenegrin LC through the new development philosophy.

[INTERVJU] Wouldn't a general Yugoslav referendum on the constitutional dilemmas be the most democratic way of getting out of the constitutional chaos and obstruction?

[Djukanovic] I absolutely give my vote for a Yugoslav constitutional referendum. I believe that it is the only real solution that can lead to basic guidelines for the Yugoslav social system. The institution of referendums is used everywhere in the civilized world for such major questions, as the most reliable and most authoritative "gauge" of the will, mood, and desires of the people.

[INTERVJU] Some leaderships, however, like the Slovene one, are avoiding a referendum like the plague. Why?

[Djukanovic] Even little children in elementary school know that in democratic expression there are always a minority and a majority, and there is always someone who can arbitrarily feel himself to be the victor or the defeated party. If someone is aware in advance, however, that he has a minority in favor of his own solution, and still stubbornly persists in not respecting the opinion of the majority, then that person is obviously not ready for democracy. It is very important to keep in mind the distinction between democracy and a minority's torture [as published] of the majority. The latter simply does not exist anywhere in countries that bear the epithet "democratic."

[INTERVJU] Why is every proposal that comes from Serbia and Montenegro, even this one about a referendum, burdened in advance by suspicion?

[Djukanovic] For a long time now, even a long time historically, an irrational Serbophobia has been present in Yugoslavia. The fear of the majority people has continually grown, and "exploded" recently, during and after the adoption of the constitutional amendments through which the Serbian Socialist Republic [SR] finally gained the same status as the other (con)federal states in Yugoslavia. Everything that has been Serbian, from a little song to any symbol of national tradition, has had the connotation of possible Greater-Serbian nationalism. All other peoples have been able to have their national heroes, national songs, national histories, and national cultures; it was just somehow politically inappropriate for Serbs to have them, because there was the specter of hegemonism!

The Serbophobia is quite evident. After all, Milan Kucan publicly acknowledged it by saying at the LCY CC, in defending the Slovene constitutional amendments, that to a considerable extent they had resulted from fear of Serbia and Greater-Serbian hegemonism!

[INTERVJU] As a member of the Montenegrin people, do you feel Serbophobia?

[Djukanovic] I lived in Serbia, and now I live in Montenegro again, and as you can see from the enclosed, Greater-Serbianism has not had me for a snack! I have to joke, because it is simply impossible to conduct a political discourse on those irrational phobias. Fear is in any case an irrational phenomenon, and it naturally cannot have any primarily political treatment, because another science is responsible for its observation and treatment—psychiatry. Let us understand each other: One can only talk about Greater-Serbian nationalism if there is a threat to some other nation from the Serbian nation. Today, when with a new Serbian leadership that is no longer showing any willingness for calculating idolatry toward federal officials a certain more pronounced revival has begun of national tradition, culture, and

history, in which there may also be individual exaggerations, that is automatically interpreted by the western and northwestern republics as aggression by Greater-Serbian hegemonism. That more pronounced national feeling among the Serbian people, in my opinion, is a quite natural reaction to several decades of the suppression of national attributes.

[INTERVJU] Without asking either the people of Serbia or the people of Montenegro what and how they feel, malicious people are denying their common ethnic origin?

[Djukanovic] What is irrefutable and what represents the historical fact is that Serbs and Montenegrins have a common ethnic origin. Not one serious scientific approach questions this. Furthermore, the peoples of Montenegro and Serbia have been brought together by destiny throughout history. Whether someone likes it or not, that is simply something that one cannot argue with, and that simply does not leave any room for dispute.

[INTERVJU] One question, in conclusion: do you believe in Yugoslavia, and in a better, more dignified, and richer life for its citizens?

[Djukanovic] Stanislav Jezi Lec has a pointed thought: "I like the sign 'Entry Forbidden' better than the notice 'No Exit.'" If I did not believe there was a way out, I would not do what I am doing. Finally, how can I have any right to pessimism, when the people, whose representative I am, have never in their history submitted to a stronger enemy, compared to which the present misfortunes are a trifle. At any rate, when I state "black" and "pessimistic" facts and sentences, I am not doing it out of fear. I never promise the moon, because I know for certain how good Roger Bacon's advice was that hope is good for breakfast, but is not pleasant for supper. We have a great deal of work ahead of us, and we will do that work properly, along with the people who elected us and in the country in which we live.

Serbian Official Cites Danger of Demagoguery

90EB0157A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
26 Nov 89 pp 14-17

[Interview with Slobodan Vucetic, member of the Presidium of the Serbian Socialist Alliance of Working People and candidate for the state presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, by Milorad Vucelic: "Elections and Democracy—The Federation and Serbia"; date and place not given]

[Text] Slobodan Vucetic is a member of the Presidium of the Serbian SAWP [Socialist Alliance of Working People] and one of the candidates for the Presidency of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia. In interviewing him, then, one cannot bypass topics such as the elections, pluralism, the multiparty system.... Slobodan Vucetic is also chairman of the Group of the Presidency of SR Serbia for Reform of the Political System, so that one of the first questions had to be related to the program for

political reform adopted this summer by a commission of the Presidency of SR Serbia.

"That document appeared at a very important moment, at what I would call a turning point. This is a document originating from the Republic of Serbia which in Yugoslavia's constitutional system has since 1974 been placed in an absolutely inferior and unequal political position compared to the other republics. Many of its political, social, and other powers were curtailed, since it was organized in such a way that the provinces within it objectively represented a destructive element in the arrangement and life of the republic itself and of Yugoslavia. In many respects, the successive leaderships in the republic itself have been focused on themselves and their own relations."

[NIN] How accurate is the assessment that the current political crisis is above all the consequence of the arrangements contained in the 1974 Constitution?

[Vucetic] Accurate in that the 1974 constitutional arrangements took to the far extreme, to the point of absurdity, two theses in all domains of social and political life: the first is that "The republics are everything, and the Federation is nothing," and the other is: "A weak Serbia means a strong Yugoslavia." However, these two theses originate in the remote past, back with the first day of Yugoslavia's formation, in 1918. A broad anti-Serb coalition was formed even by the beginning of the twenties, and hegemonism and an oppressive mission were attributed to the Serbian people. The Comintern and Catholic Church were equally zealous in that regard. Korosec, a leading Slovene, said in 1921 that "Serbophobia was political capital." Today, it is evident even to a layman that the collection of interest on that "capital" at the expense of Serbia and the Serbs has actually never ceased.

[NIN] What has changed today?

[Vucetic] Now that Serbia has become a unified and equal republic, now that its overall position and prestige are strengthened and dignity and legitimacy returned to the Serbian people and to its history and culture, now that a large intellectual and ethnic potential have been set in motion in that direction, it is natural that Serbs outside the territory of Serbia should also begin to raise the issue of recognition of their ethnic, above all linguistic, cultural, and historical, identity. This is in any case a key constitutional right of all our nationalities recognized back during the National Liberation Struggle. The most important part of that right is the right to nurture one's spoken and written languages, one's cultural and historical traditions, and ties to the parent nation. This is an essential prerequisite for equal and complex life together with other nationalities in these republics. Unfortunately, the reaction to those constitutionally legitimate demands and rights which have not yet been realized has been extremely uncivilized and undemocratic in those communities, i.e., there have

been accusations of Serbian nationalism, arrests, a spread of Serbophobia, and so on.

[NIN] Does the document of SR Serbia concerning reform of the political system also touch upon these issues?

[Vucetic] Naturally, in addition to firm advocacy of full ethnic equality as the basis for organizing the Federation and the functioning of the federal state, we particularly emphasized the need for the republics in their constitutions to "consistently guarantee ethnic equality and provide the forms for its realization and protection." This is especially important in a multinational state like Yugoslavia, in which large segments of several nationalities live outside their parent community, in another federal unit where they are a minority people. Ethnic assimilation is inevitable in this case if there are no constitutional, legal, and other forms of protection of ethnic equality.

Finally, I think that the new Constitution of Yugoslavia, precisely in order to guarantee ethnic equality, should establish specific criteria and procedures for the formation of provinces in Yugoslavia. The present solution of having provinces only in Serbia is not only inconsistent with principle, it is even absurd. Other solutions are probably also possible for protecting the rights of minority peoples, such as constitutional guarantees of their specific representation in the bodies of government of the republic in which they live, the requirement of consensus in settlement of matters related to ethnic equality, the right to form ethnic cultural institutions, and so on.

[NIN] The republic that did not exist until yesterday, Serbia, has become the originator of important political initiatives?

[Vucetic] For the first time since the war, an integral program has emerged in Serbia for economic and social reform and democratic renewal. At the same time, Serbia is the first and so far only republic which in the midst of this desperate and lengthy crisis has offered a relatively complete document on getting out of the social crisis in both the economic and the constitutional and political respect.

[NIN] Tell us briefly what are the principal features of the document for reform of the political system which is being proposed by SR Serbia?

[Vucetic] It is based on several features: revitalization of democratic freedoms and human rights, reaffirmation of the citizen as the basic political entity, of course, fully respecting and honoring the ethnic criterion in organizing the Federation, the concept of the Federation as a modern, democratic, and effective state, advocacy of the law-governed state, redefinition of self-management and political pluralism. It advocates a conception of human freedoms and rights based on people's right to the freedom of thought and freedom of expression of

thoughts, freedom of expression of diverse and objectively and necessarily differing economic, social, and political interests. The reference is to the right to organize in the way that suits the nature of their political and social interests.

[NIN] Your efforts in favor of the Federation have met with rejection. It has been said that it amounts to a political platform for renewal of bureaucratic centralism with Serbian hegemony.

[Vucetic] Those are very superficial and untenable theses. We have explicitly stated in the document that there would be no majority rule on the most important issues, but that the criterion of unanimity should apply, but only concerning the most important issues crucial to ethnic equality. In all other domains, as in all other modern states in the world, decisions should be made on the basis of the majority principle. In the end, even if the principle of a simple majority prevailed, no nationality in Yugoslavia, not even the Serbian nationality, would have an absolute majority.

The real reason for resistance to our program is that people want to preserve the status quo established in 1974. It is those interests and those forces which in the late sixties and early seventies, first of all in the form of the mass movement, then the Highway Affair, and also in the form of the separatist demonstrations of Albanian nationalists, managed to confederalize Yugoslavia and which today are rising up against the changes of anything essential in the system of relations established at that time. The national economies, that is, were established at that time and lean to a more favorable economic structuring of certain parts of the country as well as more favorable economic conditions which are not the result of better quality and more productive labor, but of a more appropriate economic structuring of the various parts of the country, as well as other privileges in the price system, and so on, and the tendency is simply to preserve the monopoly that exists.

Accordingly, behind the resistance to our concept of the Federation lies a rather naked, short-term, and above all economic interest, not a threat to anyone's ethnic identity. Slovenia has less right than anyone to that objection, since in essence no nationality in Yugoslavia has so consistently and effectively accomplished ethnic homogenization, affirmation, and integration of its ethnic identity, its statehood, and its culture as the Slovenian nationality has done. To conclude, our point of departure is this: ethnic equality and no opportunity for dominance by the majority on all vital issues.

[NIN] The fact still remains that it is in Slovenia that that concept of the Federation has been criticized most sharply.

[Vucetic] The Slovenian public has not been given any opportunity to examine this document. Excerpts have not even been published in the Slovenian press. Accordingly, the elementary assumption of a democratic dialogue, that is, an objective and critical examination and

judgment of this document, have not been fulfilled. Let me say in passing that we are being offered from Slovenia and certain circles in Croatia "democratic" formulas which have been dictated by a clerical, anti-Yugoslav, and antisocialist policy.

[NIN] Adoption of the constitutional amendments in Slovenia seems to signify that the Federation has been rejected as a possibility for organizing Yugoslavia. What now?

[Vucetic] We in Serbia do not intend to draw up any other platform, since we could only spoil it. But at the same time in the proceedings to amend the Yugoslav Constitution and in the democratic dialogue we intend to stick patiently and obstinately to our own views.

[NIN] Your words seem to emit a certain optimism.

[Vucetic] I think that there are real prospects for reason to prevail and that pessimism is spreading on the basis of current political conflicts, which are both obvious and inevitable. There is room for optimism.

Of course, if any of the members of the Federation does not agree with certain elementary things, such as the need for Yugoslavia to be a federation, but feels that it should be an asymmetrical federation and an asymmetrical confederation, then that becomes an essential obstacle to adoption of the new Constitution. As I see it, then we would have to conduct a referendum throughout all of Yugoslavia in which citizens in all the republics would declare whether they do or do not want Yugoslavia. And at the same time, whether they want a federal or confederative Yugoslavia, and the lessons should then be drawn from that.

If a majority of any community decides against federation, against the Yugoslav Federation, I think that the constitutional prerequisites for exercise of the right to self-determination and secession should be realized. We cannot allow ourselves to get into a situation in which someone would hamper and block the interests of the others, the vital interests of the others to live together. The turning of the Yugoslav peoples toward one another and their aspiration to live together is a historical process that has lasted a long time and dates back even considerably before 1918.

Those who do not want Yugoslavia to be a federation should be allowed to exercise the other option. Of course, that can occur only within the framework of "rules of the game" jointly agreed to, and by no means through unilateral constitutions and political decisions. The state is not a store which you can enter and leave when you like. It is an institution with hard and fast rules and is not something to be knocked around in political games of the moment.

[NIN] An objection to the program of the Commission for Political Reform of SR Serbia is that it does not fully spell out its position toward political pluralism.

[Vucetic] In our commission's program, we have offered a formulation which is relatively clear, but is not spelled out. We said that pluralism is actually a real expression of differences in economic, social, and political interests in society and that it is the right of the citizen to freely organize and enter into association in order to pursue those interests. We emphasized that in socialism other forms of pluralistic political organization should not be precluded either, provided they are based in a general way on the socialist and Yugoslav option.

I am aware that this should be stated more clearly. I do not think it is good for the controversies about this to last too long. We should move more boldly into the definition of pluralism, since pluralism is a politically natural state in any society, including ours.

I feel that it is completely clear that we should proclaim the right of the citizen not only to express his opinion and his interest, but also to organize and associate freely to create various forms of associations, alliances, and political organizations such as he himself considers suitable for expression of his interest. The citizen should have legitimate opportunities not only to express his view and his social demands and programs in those organizations and alliances, but he should also have the legitimate right and opportunity to fight for his views and demands in the institutions of the system, in the election system, and the assembly system. That right is, of course, acquired by representatives of citizens insofar as they have received support from the social base of society, the population, citizens, the constituency.

[NIN] We still have the impression that in Serbia views which would indicate a readiness to do away with the party monopoly are not being articulated clearly enough.

[Vucetic] Perhaps that impression is created because we have not been specific enough in defining our position on this, although in principle it is clear. My personal belief is that the readiness absolutely exists and that the conception has been built up in the broadest strata of the people in Serbia, and indeed even in the Serbian LC, that it is absolutely essential to abandon the one-party monopoly, since it is not compatible with the project of a law-governed state and democracy.

[NIN] What, then, is the role of the League of Communists?

[Vucetic] No political organization in the world claims to be the advocate of all social interests equally and at the same time. Attempts have been made up to now, but this is actually absurd. I think that the League of Communists [LC] should define itself very clearly as a political organization equal with other organizations which might possibly be organized. The LC should take part in the country's political life as a legitimate force which has its program, its membership, its legal place in the political system, in the democratic dialogue that is conducted either in the Socialist Alliance or in some other way. And it likewise should have its place in the assembly system of government, in which it will be legitimized so that it

will obtain confidence and support from the citizen according to and in proportion to the persuasiveness and strength of its arguments and the results it achieves in its efforts and its struggle for social prosperity, economic development, and expansion of the scope of democracy.

No design of a social system can succeed unless in the economic, social, and democratic areas it offers some program superior to the programs being offered by others. The League of Communists must achieve its democratic legitimization in a democratic competition, a competition on the public stage, in political life, and in the election proceedings. The legitimacy which was deservedly won by the triumph of the socialist revolution and by writing down that position of the ruling party in the Constitution cannot be eternal.

[NIN] What are the Serbian LC and SAWP doing in this regard?

[Vucetic] A certain slowness and vagueness in realizing this conception gives the appearance of an inferior position of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. I think it is absolutely indispensable that the Serbian LC escape from that position which seems inferior in the eyes of others, since it is not inferior at all in the Republic of Serbia. I would like the Serbian LC to go to the congress with a clear vision of political pluralism as the right of all citizens of this republic to organize politically in accordance with their will and interests, on a democratic platform, and in accordance with the Constitution. All civilized countries in the world contain such restrictions in their constitutions and laws. I think that as a member of the League of Communists I should not have any greater right to the truth or participation in political life than others have.

The entire election system and assembly system, which should operate to verify the validity of every concrete program and everyone's rule and authority, should be adapted to this right of the citizens and to the infrastructure of society.

[NIN] What chances would the League of Communists have in this competition of ideas and programs?

[Vucetic] I believe that today the Serbian LC could freely enter into competition with any program offered by anyone, since the program of the Serbian LC constitutes a program of economic reforms, a program for reform of the political system, as well as the achievement accomplished in the struggle to establish the unity and integrity of SR Serbia as a state and its equality in the Federation.

I do not want to predict results and to make forecasts on the basis of "what if," but I think it is absolutely indispensable to legalize all democratic forms of political pluralism and that in a wholesome competition of that kind the party can only build its own strength. Only in competition is its own strength increased, the mistakes in programs corrected, responsibility pinpointed, and personnel elected within the party who will be able to fight in the government system for their program, for its

realization. Then it would not be possible, as has happened for a long time, and indeed to a large extent it is so even today, that the criterion for someone's election would not be ability, but obedience and devotion to superiors.

I do not, of course, idealize the multiparty system, but I am only saying that as I see it, it is less bad than the one-party system. In both systems, the citizens and democracy are cramped.

[NIN] What worries you most today in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia?

[Vucetic] Not so much the immense differences in views in the highest bodies as the fact that those differences are absolutely defined by narrow and day-to-day regional interests, in the absence of a Yugoslav criterion. And perhaps even more that Communists in the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Central Committee can be recognized more easily by what ethnic or religious community they belong to than for their communist or socialist ideology and the Yugoslav idea.

[NIN] One of the basic objections to the last elections in Serbia is that they were carried out below the level of the program of the commission which you chair.

[Vucetic] The elections which have now been conducted are below the level of the program and are below that democratic level which I hope we will achieve when we adopt the new Constitution. After all, unfortunately, there still exist certain constitutional restrictions, so that elections to all assembly chambers have to be organized and legally regulated for democracy to truly be a real process.

[NIN] Cite just some of the restrictions.

[Vucetic] In the assembly system we still have political chambers which are the long arm of the party and other political organizations in the operational system of government. This is nonsense in and of itself. What is more, they are so constructed that it is very complicated and almost impossible to guarantee democratic elections to them. The election base or electoral unit of the Political Chamber of the Serbian Assembly, which has 90 delegates, is the entire republic. Which means that in 15,000 polling places people voted on a list containing 110 candidates, and so on. It is obvious that in the coming constitutional reform those chambers have to be abolished first of all, and there should be a citizens' chamber, as we have proposed in the program.

Another constitutional restriction lies in the so-called nominating conferences, which are a kind of filter for candidates who will run for the delegates' seats. They have been a necessary evil which should also be removed in the constitutional reform, above all because the electoral units to all assemblies should be reduced to the opstinas, and a direct nominating procedure should be adopted on the basis of a certain number of supporters. We have already abolished certain filters institutionally, so that there are no longer the various personnel and

coordinating commissions responsible for nominations and various other bureaucratic inventions which have governed our system.

I think that what we have now achieved in the election system constitutes great progress. The introduction of direct and secret elections with twice as many candidates or more candidates than positions to be filled, for all the faults that the law contains, objectively represents a big step forward. Nor should it be forgotten that the centers of power are still outside the assemblies and through the coming constitutional amendments we should perfect the election system for the assemblies as well, but we must also democratize much more the election system in political organizations.

Precisely because of the major defects of the election system and personnel policy as a whole, especially for what are called the positions of leadership, the demands are now very pronounced for the referendum as the form of election to those offices.

[NIN] What prospects do you give to the democratic processes in Serbia?

[Vucetic] I think that the general orientation of a majority of the social structures in our republic toward democratization of political life in general is beyond dispute. But I think that in the heads of many people, above all local power brokers, there is still an extremely formal attitude toward democracy. According to them, democracy is achieved by our having adopted some document or by having voted on something or even held some meeting. There are also those oversimplified conceptions whereby the doors of democracy are wide open and its unhindered development is guaranteed by the mere fact that people in large numbers are on the public scene. There is no doubt that the large-scale political activity of the people has been an extremely strong factor for democratic unity in Serbia. Citizens have come out onto the public scene, since the system did not make it possible for them to make themselves felt as a political entity, and social and political conditions drove them to defend their bare existence as human beings, as social, political, and ethnic entities. I think that by this point we have only brought about certain basic political and normative prerequisites for a true democracy; that lies ahead of us, and we have just begun to achieve it. If we do not understand that, nothing will come of democracy. That is, we may fall into certain new forms of alienation and manipulation which will cause a new profound disappointment and new dissatisfaction of the broadest social strata.

[NIN] What other dangers hover over democratic processes in Serbia?

[Vucetic] I think that still greater use should be made in our republic of the basic progressive democratic impetus and orientation of the majority of the people. Finally, we should revitalize and renew the Serbian democratic tradition.

The worst thing for democracy now might be if in our republic the League of Communists and Socialist Alliance and all the others go to sleep. If we go to sleep and

are satisfied merely with the level of mobilization that has been achieved. I think that it is a big mistake for broad mobilization of the people to be equated with democracy in certain dogmatic minds. This is actually a form of manipulation and demagogic playing with democracy. What they want to do is to flatter and court the people in a cheap way, and at the same time go on ruling in its name. That is terribly dangerous. It is a danger that exists in every system which has not been sufficiently democratized and which is not based on the citizen as the legitimate political entity.

Conference of Army Communists Analyzed

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[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "March Step: The Army Is Against Federalization of the LCY"]

[Text] After last week's meeting of Army communists it might be said that the Yugoslav Army is playing the part of a political 'boutique' in which ideologies change with the fashions of the season. This was apparent even from the setting in the auditorium, where Comrades Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Tito were seen together for the first time after a long interval. In addition, the press center packed with a recordbreaking number of newsmen was adorned with a sign reading "Comrade Tito, we swear to you that we will hold to your course." It should also be noted that the Army communist group meeting began before the official opening of the negotiations on the military's position on questions also troubling civilian communists.

So it was that curious persons dug up the fact that the discussions preceding the congress revealed a certain discrepancy between the statements made in public by Simeon Buncic, Anton Tus, and Konrad Kolsek and the interpretations given by Veljko Kadijevic, Petar Simic, Staneto Brovet, and other generals. Even foreign analysts observed that, contrary to expectations, the Army would tolerate a possible disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), preserving the country above all else but without controlling the party. But the entire situation resulted from erroneous interpretation of the term 'political pluralism' about which the military spoke and the 'multiparty system' which the analysts had in mind. Nevertheless, it is debate of this kind that contributed to the "cleaning up" of the 9th Congress of the SKY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia, LCY) organization in the Yugoslav People's Army, and the entire internal system and the debate itself proceeded in an atmosphere of unanimity, tolerance, and in a calm tone of voice, and was in general a model party discussion which was recommended in vain for the forthcoming civilian congress.

But even superficial analysis reveals that the discussion as a whole also presented new aspects. For example, the lexicon of the party commissars was for the first time in the mainstream of modern civilian political discourse. There was talk of democracy, civil liberties, the importance of

science and knowledge, and there were also several sophisticated analyses of the current crisis in Yugoslav society and the socialist system. At the same time, there were the traditional, ritual repetitions of old formulas.

What is essential is that the military favors changes but precisely defined ones within carefully circumscribed limits. Consequently, there were no sensational developments, and the conference confirmed what the generals had told the politicians and the public in numerous speeches. As regards the military's views, it was stressed that the country must defend itself effectively and that the defense system must develop as society develops. It was also stated that the current situation demonstrates the unpredictability of the two factors represented by external and internal security. Poverty has also threatened the ability of the army mechanism to arm and equip itself. According to Lieutenant Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, our army is about 20 years behind modern armies. That the military system is suffering from civilian diseases was apparent from the sharp tone of Major General Ahmet Hodzic, who obviously had arrived ready for an even stormier debate, to judge by the fact that the shorthand transcription of his speech had more than 40 lines expunged from it by a hidden censor.

As expected, the concept of party pluralism was rejected, because "adoption of such pluralism means shattering the unity of the Yugoslav defense system or total depoliticization and professionalization of the armed forces." The Army came out in favor of radical reforms and "building of the SFRY as a modern, democratic, legally organized, economically successful, and efficient state entity opening up to all its peoples and ethnic groups the prospect of full self-assertion." Insofar as the LCY is concerned, military personnel are against its federalization and, simply put, this is the well-rounded platform which communists in uniform will support when they collide with other options at the 14th Congress. The watchword is "nothing new." The Army demonstrated unanimity and firmness, and, since they were seated next to each other in the front row irrespective of differences—Branko Mamula, Nikola Ljubicic, and Veljko Kadijevic—the continuity of the Yugoslav People's Army's role, determined long ago, was also apparent.

However, the analysts and the newsmen present missed one detail in the speech by Petar Simic. After a passage about the "unacceptable recommendations and demands that the Yugoslav People's Army be depoliticized and the LCY be abolished in the Army," in stylistically imperceptible fashion he introduced the view that "at the present moment we can not agree to such changes." By a strict interpretation of these words—and they will come up again in discussion, of this there can be no doubt—in other societal circumstances the Army would not be adverse to significant changes in its own position and organization.

To judge by all appearances, the Army demonstrated by its behavior at the conference that it was clearly aware of and rejected out of hand the possibility of any military intervention, despite the fact that this rigidly hierarchical system is anguished by the sight of "civilian

anarchy." Civilian communists will themselves have to eat the dish they have concocted, without the assistance of their military colleagues. However, the entire conference of military personnel served merely as a mild prelude to the main congress, and the military has probably held back some of its trump cards and analyses for the direct confrontation with "republican" options.

In the meantime, military analysts must know that time is working against them and that they do not yet have an openly stated program for its conduct in the event that the LCY really falls apart, or a program later for its conduct if the communists lose power in one republic or the entire country in free elections.

Some domestic analysts believe that the Army is faced with highly significant reforms and that "it would be better for it to concern itself with them more than with the political situation and its potential role in the outcome." However, there can scarcely be an outcome unless the opinions of military leaders are consulted, even though they made no direct contribution to the weaving of the situation. The times are difficult and different. This was apparent from the enthusiasm with which the military rendered its oath, "Comrade Tito, we swear to you" in the concluding scene of this year's meeting of Army communists. It did not have the sound it did in the past.

'Self-Management' Socialism Course at University Abolished

*90EB0160B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
3 Dec 89 p 33*

[Article by Slobodanka Ast: "Novi Sad University: 'Self-Management Abolished'"]

[Text] The "self-management socialism" course has been abolished at Novi Sad University. The decision was made in November, after several postponements, but it was unanimous.

Professor Sergije Flere, head of the department of Marxism at Novi Sad University law school, stated in an interview with NIN that the subject was abolished without many disputes but after quite a bit of discussion. It is true that there were isolated expressions of opposition ("This move is a mistake, because it strikes at the heart of self-management as the institutional framework of our society"), but the majority of the teachers thought otherwise, according to Flere. Some facts were apparent to the naked eye. According to him, this subject can hardly be taught except as a demonstration of a normative system and institutional arrangement, something which very easily leads to excessive ideologization and idealization, and, of course, the disparity between the actual and the normative is becoming increasingly obvious.

"An enormous chasm has opened between what young people believe, what they can see for themselves, and what they invariably have to teach if the subject is

defined as 'socialist self-management.'" The value judgments of the young are different; they are strongly oriented toward the private property concept. As Professor Flere puts it, young people are largely cynical.

In addition, because the subject of socialist self-management is not backed up by any scientific discipline, it has been extremely difficult to find instructors for this subject, and so their place has been taken by a wide variety of specialists—economists, sociologists, legal experts, and political scientists. All this has led to the conclusion that it is essentially counterproductive to give instruction in this subject because, according to Flere, the educational goals really could not be reached.

Sociology and political economy replaced socialist self-management at Novi Sad University this fall.

Professor Flere believes that this move at Novi Sad University represents a step in the direction of professionalization especially in the area of sociology. In earlier years, when the subject was known as socialist self-management or "fundamentals of the science of society," almost everyone interested felt competent to give instruction. NIN's interviewee believes that the name of the subject, sociology or political economy, has been firmly settled. He also thinks that the curriculum now rests on a more solid foundation, has been brought up to date, and has been freed from ideological ballast.

Novi Sad University has arrived at the conclusion that so-called Marxist education should be linked to a field of specialization and that beyond general knowledge emphasis should be placed subject areas representing a link between general and professional education, such as the sociology of the countryside, the sociology of education and culture, the sociology of art, the economics of health care, and other subject areas (to give an example, students at the School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics will study the philosophy of natural sciences). "Everything will, of course, be placed in a contemporary context, so that no one can accuse us of taking refuge in abstraction. We have not retreated from reality. We have set somewhat more flexible limits to the approach to these problems," explains Flere.

This sociologist of the middle-aged generation responds cautiously to the question of whether he thinks that there will be better rapport between this subject and students, saying "I am unable to express an opinion on this point. Neither now or in the past have students been highly motivated to study the subject. This is my impression. But something else entirely different is involved here. Our students are highly dedicated to solving the problems of their day-to-day existence."

According to Professor Flere, all dilemmas and problems have not been resolved ("possibly a curriculum as thus conceived does not allow enough time for study of systems of state power, and such study would not be out of place").

Only practical experience in giving instruction under this curriculum will show how much success has been achieved in modernizing instruction, where the greatest difficulties have been encountered, and how much should be changed. It can be said to be a good beginning in designing an important subject area in higher education.

Conceptual discussions are still in progress in other parts of Yugoslavia. According to some persons, there is too much Marxism in the curriculum, and too little according to still others.

Where is the Marxism in this "Novi Sad model"?

"We proceeded from the assumption that we will do Marxism a greater favor if we teach Marxism as a theory, by transforming it into a formative theory, than by teaching it as a science in higher education. And Marxism cannot be perceived as inferior in science, sociology, economics. Marxism can also survive in the eyes of students merely on the basis of the fact that it has withstood the test of time, that it reveals the present day, and that it enables us to understand the present day. At the same time, at least insofar as higher education is concerned, it is unacceptable to present it otherwise than by constituting it a science," according to Professor Flere.

Opacic on Activities, Goals of ZORA

90EB0155A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
10 Dec 89 p 8

[Interview with Jovan Opacic, ZORA president, by Nikola Solic, in Opacici, Croatia: "No Democracy Without Plurality of Parties"; date of interview not given]

[Text] The establishment of a cultural society with an ethnic connotation, such as the Serbian cultural society ZORA, is above all an expression of the real cultural and ethnic needs of the Serbian people now living in Croatia who, in keeping with the elementary democratic and cultural values and achievements of mankind, want to preserve their cultural and ethnic existence, and above all their language, script, and other cultural and social-ethnographic characteristics. With these words Jovan Opacic, one of the founders and the president of Zora, explained in his welcoming address at the founding meeting on 25 November in Plavno near Knin the need for establishing such a cultural society. The following interview was conducted several days later in the hamlet of Opacici near Plavno, at the home of Zora's president.

[VJESNIK] Let us talk about the spiritual values which have been suppressed in our country for years, now that your Serbian cultural society ZORA wants to reassert these values of the Serbian population in Croatia. What about the Croatians in this region? They do not have special cultural societies of their own. Have both Serbs and Croatians not struggled through their lives under the same difficult circumstances?

[Opacic] I believe that the cultural situation of both the Serbs and the Croats is very similar, if not identical. There is a difference in that the Serbs, I would say, and this is my personal observation, have to a greater extent than Croats abandoned certain forms of traditional consciousness during the postwar period. This is especially typical in the area of religion, where the Serbs have probably been more heavily influenced by the Comintern way of thinking, the Comintern ideology. And possibly also because the Croats belong to Catholicism, which is a universal world religion and not autocephalous as is the case with the Serbian Orthodox Church. This fact also probably explains the greater discipline and the greater organizational capability in the church itself and in church life among the Croats, who are consequently in a somewhat more favorable situation.

[VJESNIK] How will ZORA operate? That is, what will the object of its work be?

[Opacic] We feel that we should have a library here, along with an area in which work can be done in sections, such as ones for preservation of folklore or traditional musical culture. We believe that we should have a separate choral group to preserve the greatest musical compositions. We must strive for spiritual and cultural transformation of man, because he no longer creates things for himself. That is, in some way we must force the animalistic tendencies out of him. We must cultivate, we must turn to certain values in order to create the essential intellectual, cultural, and psychological context for a healthy society, for the sake of tolerance, reciprocity, understanding, progress, and democracy.

[VJESNIK] This also depends on personnel. Generally speaking, what are the personnel requirements in this country?

[Opacic] We in ZORA have assembled around 40 intellectuals from the North Dalmatian region and from the Lika area, so that I can say without making exaggerated claims that we have formed a personnel nucleus that can be culturally active and possibly start up a newspaper of its own, organize discussion groups, etc.

[VJESNIK] The former Prosveta operated over a much larger area than that projected at least initially for ZORA. Have you given any thought to expanding ZORA's territorial range?

[Opacic] ZORA's area, that is, its range of operation, is not restricted by its bylaws. The nominal area we have specified is the three-border region and Northern part of Dalmatia and a broader area in Croatia. We believe that this must be determined primarily by our potential influence. It goes without saying that the higher the qualitative level of our influence, the larger this area will be, and vice versa.

ZORA for Democracy

[VJESNIK] The appearance of ZORA in the spring was linked to the revolution against the bureaucracy in Serbia

and Montenegro. Then your organization in Croatia began to adopt an orientation as a continuation of the "revolution linked directly to Milosevic's program."

[Opacic] I would say that everything which I and my colleagues have done in Knin since this spring has been done entirely independently of any policy of Milosevic or any policy from the outside. Consequently, ZORA is the result of specific indigenous cultural and political forces present in this area, ones made up of persons who work and live here, persons who are interested in development both of the economy, culture, and the role of this region in society. We must also say that we do not repudiate our links to our motherland Serbia, because we believe that the Serbs in Croatia are a part of the Serbian people in the ethnic, spiritual, and national sense. Of course, we do not deny that we are living here in Croatia. However, I want to say that I personally consider Yugoslavia to be the only true state, and I view the borders of the republics to be rather administrative borders. I believe that it would be neither politically nor economically productive today to create new countries in the territory of Yugoslavia. Why? Because Yugoslavia represents a complex conglomerate of people and ethnic groups, and it would be extremely difficult and counterproductive to divide them today. And in order to make certain in some way that every person will continue to be what he is from the cultural, ethnic, religious, and ideological viewpoints, we must fight for a democratic organization of society, because democracy is the true homeland of all peoples.

[VJESNIK] What does democracy mean to you?

[Opacic] In the political semantic sense, democracy today means what it has also meant from the second period after the French Revolution to the present. Democracy is rule by the people.

[VJESNIK] Yes, but this depends on the model of the state. Under which model of the state is there more democracy? Under a single-party or a multiparty system?

[Opacic] There is no democracy without a multiparty system, because it is synonymous with a democratic society. Democracy under a single-party system would be a contradiction in terms.

[VJESNIK] Is this opinion of yours prevalent in ZORA? That is, do the other members of the society think like you?

[Opacic] Listen, we have now established a unified cultural program under which specific political claims are not mentioned either in our program guidelines or in the bylaws. However, it is certain that the establishment of a cultural society, like any other event in society, has certain political implications. As for the persons in the ZORA leadership group, to the extent that I know them I may say that they are persons of the broadest democratic orientation.

[VJESNIK] Then what is your view of the current policy in Serbia, which demonstrates precisely the opposite

trend. It tends toward monolithic unity and has virtually anathematized pluralism or a multiparty system. Is this monolithic unity not the greatest enemy of democracy?

[Opacic] One highly essential element has to be taken into account here, Kosovo. I believe that without this element it is not possible to arrive at an objective picture of the situation in Serbia, especially in the so-called Serbian policy. I believe that Kosovo is one of the elements which essentially determines current Serbian policy. Consequently, I think that I am not wrong in saying that the Kosovo problem has led to significant political and ideological monolithic unity not just of Serbian society but also of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia. This is a fact. Consequently, in view of the fact that a separatist ideology is at work, one that is efficiently derived from the political viewpoint and has the ultimate aim of separating Kosovo from Serbia, I believe that in this situation a certain monolithic unity and political uniformity are, unfortunately, necessary and understandable. I say "unfortunately" necessary and understandable.

Uniformity on the Subject of Kosovo

[VJESNIK] Does this mean that, in your opinion, it is easier to solve the Kosovo problem under a monolithic single-party system than under a democratic multiparty system?

[Opacic] No, no, no. I believe that this problem, like all other problems, is easier to solve under multiparty systems. However, aside from the Kosovo problem, I simply want to explain the reasons for the monolithization and uniformity in the Serbian nation. The Serbian people naturally wants a democratic social order or system. But in this situation in which Albania and who knows what concatenations of specific historically relevant factors are at work in world politics, world strategy, and so forth, caution and vigilance are naturally necessary and productive.

[VJESNIK] The Kosovo problem arose long ago, but the Serbian nation became homogenized because of the problem after a specific policy made its appearance! It had not been a homogeneous unit previously, at least not after the war.

[Opacic] No, I cannot agree with you. I believe that this mental attitude would have arisen in the Serbian nation even if Slobodan Milosevic had not made his appearance on the scene. You must not forget when analyzing the Serbian question that the year 1941, when the Serbian nation was subjected to genocide, was yesterday. Almost 50 years have passed since 1941, when hundreds of thousands of Serbs suffered merely because they were Serbs. This horrendous fact has become a part of the genes of the Serbian nation, and whether it wants to or not the Serbian nation cannot easily forget it. This fact must be respected. This is one factor which has significance beyond the ideological, from which it may be inferred that ideology does not represent the totality of human social existence and that in the final analysis a

specific historical situation should not be critically evaluated exclusively in accordance with the criteria of ideological "reason." It seems that the methodological coherence of the ideological approach to social phenomena decreases in parallel with strengthening of ethnic polycentrism and other phenomena of intensive sociocultural diversification of a specific society, such as our Yugoslav society. And at present the Serbian nation naturally is not interested in unanimity. Why? Because there is no economic development and no progress in culture, in life. Everything stagnates in a single-party system. And why does it stagnate? Because both losses and profits are socialized. In other words, they are equated with each other. Good and Evil have equal standing, or, as Dostoyevskiy says, all are slaves and are equal in slavery.

[VJESNIK] Were the recent elections, which were said in Serbia to be the most democratic ones since the war, with several candidates belonging to the same party and same ideology, not a part of this stagnation?

[Opacic] My immediate answer is yes. It is clear that they were the most democratic elections during the postwar period, but I also admit that they were not free elections as well. I think that by saying this we have said everything that needs to be said.

[VJESNIK] Let us get back to the question of Kosovo. Kosovo is of almost mythological importance to the Serbian people. To what extent is this element present among the Serbs in Croatia and how much has this question involved them during the recent events relating to Kosovo?

[Opacic] Insofar as I can determine, all these questions affecting both Serbia and Yugoslavia, in connection with the problems of Kosovo, have the strongest influence on the Serbian people here in Croatia as well. Even this winter, I believe at the meeting in Knin at the end of February, we decided that we would give our support to the Serbian people and that we would fight against genocide, regardless of the people involved. Consequently, I believe that a fateful relationship exists here. Now, we have no desire to deny the rights of anybody else. We want to live on an equal footing with other peoples in a common state, because if every people in Yugoslavia has the right to form a state of its own, it would be entirely logical for the Serbian people to proceed to create a state of its own in accordance with the same political principle. It is clear that the Serbian people does not live exclusively in the Socialist Republic of Serbia today. There are so many Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slavonia, Lika, Dalmatia, Kordun, and so on. Hence it is clear that the Serbian ethnic question has not been resolved in the context of such an anti-Yugoslav policy. So what does it mean that Slovenia has the right to secede? It means that Croatia has the same right, as does also Serbia, and this would lead us into civil war. It is clear to everyone that this must not be allowed to happen.

The Fear of the Slovenes

[VJESNIK] What is it a question of here? Borders or something else?

[Opacic] It is a question of borders, of course. That is why I favor a collective state in which every person will be whatever he wants to be. I take the individual, the citizen, as a basis. Let the individual be whatever he wants to be from the ethnic viewpoint. But he must not bother his fellow citizen, he must not be a bother to his government, and so forth. Even the most democratic states exhibit hypersensitivity when it is a question of their territorial integrity. Examples are Corsica, the Basque lands, Northern Ireland, the Southern Tirol, and so forth.

[VJESNIK] What is your view of Europe in 1992, and where do you see us as being then?

[Opacic] This is our goal, to be a part of the cultural tradition of Europe and not a part of Asia, not to be a sort of despotic Asian state.

[VJESNIK] We will not become a part of Europe unless we introduce true political pluralism, a market economy, and other democratic institutions. You mentioned Slovenia. From the viewpoint of internal organization it has made the greatest strides toward our common goal. Does it not seem to you that Slovenia has been frightened by the monolithic system in Serbia, which is slowing down progress toward this goal?

[Opacic] The Slovene people probably have been frightened. This is more a question of fear than actual relationships. I believe that the Serbian people will really follow a democratic path in Serbia as well. Of course, the democratic forces in Serbia will emerge more promptly, the more successfully is the Kosovo problem solved.

[VJESNIK] The Kosovo situation has done nothing but made this process of homogenization worse.

[Opacic] I believe that the Kosovo problem is not an ideological problem at all, and, in keeping with this basic position, cannot be solved by ideological means. Forces are at work there which want to ruin Yugoslavia, and this cannot be assigned to any ideological option whatever. This is called betrayal of one's homeland for the sake of a foreign power, and we well know how the matter of attack on the territorial integrity of a country is handled. It is, of course, resolved only by counterattack, and not by any naive ideological hesitancy in the face of the enemy about withdrawing away of the state and proletarian internationalism, which made all theoretical knowledge of the state and its immanent characteristics relative. In peacetime and in a normal situation in a country, things such as a multiparty system and the like are normal, but in an emergency? And this is an emergency situation. I will tell you that in Serbia the prevailing opinion up to the present has been that people favor a multiparty system, which everyone wants to establish to eliminate the single-party system, but this would be counterproductive at present precisely because of Kosovo.

[VJESNIK] How will the Serbian cultural society ZORA participate in democratic processes?

[Opacic] ZORA operates primarily as an integrative and political factor, and, of course, a cultural factor as well, both in Croatia and throughout Yugoslavia. We believe that culture is precisely the area in which we must achieve our daily political integration, because it means recognition of every person and makes room for every person, regardless of his ideological commitment. We are also for the Communist Party, but within the limits of the political influence which it actually exerts among the people. Let me add that I am convinced that a country which "cannot" be democratic does not deserve to exist at all, because it is not based on creative forms of human freedom but on terror and tyranny. In order for us in Yugoslavia to create a democratic society, we must first recognize Yugoslavia as our only and true homeland and state and not trade away the initial gains in political rights for interethnic quarrels. In this way, with our false democratism, we objectively are helping the Comintern bureaucratic forces in Yugoslavia, which proclaim their ideological singlemindedness (it would be better to say mindlessness) as the only solution which can save all of us. And just what is this solution? It is graphically demonstrated by the multiple-digit inflation and by the universal spiritual resignation and hopelessness of all thinking and feeling people, whether they be Serbs, Croats, or other ethnic groups.

Cardinal Kuharic Attacked for Defense of Stepinac

90EB0169A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
31 Dec 89 pp 26-27

[Article by Ratko Dmitrovic: "A Reopening of the Stepinac Case?"]

[Text] It is difficult to believe that just two months ago even Franjo Kuharic, cardinal of Zagreb, was himself merely dreaming about the possibility of delivering his Christmas message to his spiritual followers over the mass media. Nevertheless, this has occurred. Since we are passing through a period in which the term "sensation" loses its original charge, what has happened in the life of Croatia in the last month should be taken exclusively as something that never happened before, and so Kuharic's promotion in the media at Christmastime must be viewed exclusively as a segment in a series of unexpected occurrences.

We must emphasize here that we are constructing this point of view on the reactions of an immense number of inhabitants of Croatia, which understandably signifies that in that republic there are also those who for quite a long time now have been fully aware of what should happen and when.

It began with the initiative for Christmas in Croatia to become a republic holiday, a day off. It is hard to say at this point who first raised his voice. It is not important anyway, but it is important to mention that all the talks about making Christmas a holiday in Croatia contained

the assurance that there must be no exclusiveness nor discrimination here. If 25 December is to be celebrated as a holiday, then the same also applies to 7 January. This issue went all the way to the Croatian Assembly, but there the ball was dropped, and a longer period was requested for enactment of the law that would regulate all that. It is obvious that the delegates appreciated the unenviable situation created in Croatia concerning the recent All Souls' Day. At that time, a law was enacted through urgent proceedings, five days before 1 November, making a holiday of that day, that is, of whatever day is fixed for the members of a religion to visit final resting places.

As far as Christmas is concerned, it was left to enterprises to do what they wished, and the same applied even to educational institutions. At that time, there were no obvious factors that would suggest the conclusion that at Christmas-time Kuharic would take over the news media. It all started with the telephone. GLAS KONCILA and certain other periodicals let it be known that all those who wanted the Christmas message could call a certain telephone number, and Kuharic would speak to them personally. It was, of course, a taped message and a number that could receive several hundred incoming calls, which made it possible for large numbers to hear his message.

The day before Christmas, on Christmas Eve that is, VJESNIK of Zagreb published a long interview with Cardinal Kuharic, and it was learned that same day that "his eminence" would also address his flock over television.

Although some of Franjo Kuharic's Christmas greeting, broadcast on the prime-time news program of Zagreb television, was politically colored, it was generally acceptable in its content (Kuharic greeted the Orthodox with "Hristos se rodi!"). But what he had to say in the pages of VJESNIK will be remembered for the reopening of the Stepinac case. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish whether this constant topic of the Catholic Church in Croatia was reopened by Kuharic or the VJESNIK journalist. Judging by the intonation of the question, we are more inclined to think that a review of the Stepinac trial is more important to the latter than to the cardinal himself. We allow the possibility of a mistaken assessment or even of "an agreed initiative."

The VJESNIK journalist asked: "It is well-known that in Catholic Church circles the conviction (in 1946) of its former primate, Cardinal Stepinac, who was the last cardinal, is rejected. Do you think that opportunities are opening up for a review of that verdict, that is, how would you envision the framework of a possible review?"

Kuharic, who clearly could hardly wait for such an opportunity, answered that the conviction of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac was a great blow and insult to the church, adding that the democratic world public had included this trial among trials of the Stalinist model. Kuharic went on to say that this was a political trial with an indictment that had no basis and that Stepinac was highly sensitive about justice, that he went to the point of

self-sacrifice in working for the rights of man and the people, not only the Croatian people, that he raised his voice in defense of all those who were persecuted, and that is why, Kuharic said, he was among the bravest bishops of occupied Europe, and himself became the victim of persecution.

This is very reminiscent of the assertion that Draza Mihailovic was Europe's leading guerrilla fighter.

As far as Kuharic is concerned, this view is nothing new, but one certainly is surprised by VJESNIK's magnanimity in opening its space to the views expressed above, which obviously head in the direction of Stepinac's rehabilitation, and this at a moment and in a time which even the "professional gardeners" judge to be extremely problematical in political terms. Especially since the role of Alojzije Stepinac has been clearly laid out and examined during the time of the monstrous Ustasha Independent State of Croatia. If the Catholic Church in Croatia rejects the indictment against Stepinac as "communist revenge" or a classic example of a Stalinist trial, can we believe that the result of the investigation, assertions, and testimony of some of its people is not being renounced? Especially when that testimony was verified in the Vatican.

We are referring to the book by Brother Aleksa Benigar "Alojzije Stepinac, hrvatski kardinal" [Alojzije Stepinac, Cardinal of Croatia], which was published in Rome by the Vatican's Catholic Publishing House. Before we set Benigar's view of Stepinac in opposition to Kuharic's propositions, we should say that the publisher in the Vatican wrote the following for the author of this book: "Benigar is completely free of personal inclination to one side or the other in the matters in dispute, but he has a sincere intention and the courage to speak the truth as it flows from the documents he has found and the historical facts, without offense to anyone."

From what Kuharic says, the conclusion is inescapable that Stepinac opposed Ante Pavelic and what is more fought against him. That does not turn out to be the case. The documents indicate otherwise. During a visit of Ante Pavelic to the Archbishop of Croatia on 26 June 1941, Stepinac said: "I will take this occasion to cordially greet you as the legitimate representative of God's church in the Independent State of Croatia, as its head of state, with a promise of sincere and loyal cooperation for the better future of our homeland."

Kuharic is probably building Stepinac's great "courage" and fight for the rights of man on the content of a letter which Stepinac sent on 21 July 1941 to Ante Pavelic. That document, which is kept even today in the Archives of the Zagreb Archiepiscopate under No 5997, says in part: "I will also take the liberty to mention certain individual matters in the direction of reducing the severity of treatment: a) that when people are sent to camps, they be allowed to prepare the most necessary things, to perform their most urgent obligations both to family and employment; b) that transport not be in overcrowded sealed freight cars, especially not when the destinations are far away....," except that Stepinac says at

the beginning of the letter: "I hear that occasionally there has been inhumane and cruel treatment of non-Aryans during deportation."

Great courage, no doubt about it. Stepinac went so far as to argue that the cars carrying people away to their death should not be overcrowded and sealed, especially not when non-Aryans are being taken to distant places. The cars going to Jasenovac, then, could be overcrowded.

And after the war, after it became clear to the entire world that Pavelic had sent 1 million people to their death, Stepinac did not conceal his liking for him. According to the testimony of Branekovic, a parish priest, when he heard in Krasic, where he was serving a prison sentence, the news that there had been an assassination attempt against Pavelic in Argentina, Stepinac said: "I would be sorry if anything bad happened to him."

All of this and much more of the same can be found in Brother Benigar's book, and there is no doubt that this is also well known to Cardinal Kuharic, while in the case of VJESNIK's journalists, we would like to believe that he was uninformed. In any case, Stepinac is buried in the Zagreb Cathedral.

On Christmas Day, Zagreb television not only carried the program from Bethlehem, but it also carried a live broadcast of the midnight mass in Zagreb Cathedral, which was celebrated by Cardinal Kuharic, and the midnight services in Saint Peter's Church in Rome. There is no doubt that these moves should be welcomed, with a necessary caveat if something similar is not repeated on 6 and 7 January, when the Orthodox faith celebrates the day when Christ was born. We will have something more to say about Bajram when the time comes.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Economists Comment on Market Mechanisms, Price Reform

90EG0133A East Berlin JUNG WELT in German
29 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with Profs. Hans Knop and Gerd Wilde of (East) Berlin's "Bruno Leuschner" School of Economics by Renate Zucht: "Using Your Head To Get Onto Your Feet"; date and place not given]

[Text]

- What are the causes of our economic crisis?
- What will the new economics mechanism be like?
- Is a planned economy passe?
- Will there be a labor market?
- Capitalistic firms in the GDR?
- Where can economic reforms be begun?

[JUNG WELT] Our economy is in the midst of a crisis. Its symptoms include declining growth rates, sparse distribution of goods in the internal market, a decline in innovative capacity, low earnings from exports, etc., etc., etc. Where, in your estimation, are the causes for this to be found?

[Knop] The first attempt was analogous to an industrial accident. A few people were at fault, but the underlying cause is to be found not in the wrongful actions of the few, but in the flawed construction of the entire system. We remained fixated on the Stalinist view of social control. That affects all facets of life, including the economy—centralized decisionmaking, administrative methods, omniscient leaders, a "democracy" that was limited to performance. For this reason, I consider reforms to be of highest priority. But not even the administering mechanism's game plan was adhered to when it came to the economy.

[JUNG WELT] How so?

[Knop] The planning became distorted, it was robbed of its real purpose. For example, the economic plans of the last 10 years did not even remotely come close to being balanced, not even in the most rudimentary way. Even the decision to implement plans of this type meant that they would not be fulfilled.

[Wilde] That is why so much more than simple repairs are needed. What is needed is a completely new economic mechanism centered around a market economy.

[JUNG WELT] What form would that take?

[Wilde] The focal point has to be the market and its underlying relationships between goods and money.

[JUNG WELT] Thus far, the planned economy has been a sort of "sacred cow." Why market mechanisms now?

[Wilde] The market mechanism was used as early as 8,000 years ago. It is a highly efficient, system-neutral mechanism that the slave owner, the feudal lord, and the capitalist have used to good advantage. We have found nothing to replace it in Socialism.

[JUNG WELT] What does market mechanism mean in concrete terms?

[Wilde] It means negotiating prices under competitive conditions. That presupposes, in the first instance, that the buyer has the dominant role over the seller. The seller has to run after the buyer. In order for this to work, money has to be the most generally available commodity; in other words, it must be convertible. Secondly, the supply must exceed the demand, and finally, the producer must be prevented from forming a monopoly. The third prerequisite consists of the fact that demand is determined by the tendency of need to grow, so that the producers always have a stimulating incentive to produce more.

[JUNG WELT] In this way, the producers are always economically compelled to produce, in as efficient a manner as possible, those products that the consumer wants. At the present time, however, the conditions you just enumerated are not being met. Shortage is the rule rather than surplus.

[Wilde] Of course, it would be madness to institute a market economy here as of 1 January 1990. Inflation would result. But in the short term, it would be possible to take the first steps in this direction in those areas where production capacity outstrips the demand, for example, in the textile industry, in the clothing industry, in leather goods, and in the shoe industry.

[JUNG WELT] Is the planned economy a thing of the past, then?

[Knop] Not at all. We must construct and renew the economic mechanism in such a way that the market, with its interrelationship between goods and money, becomes an organic component of the socialist planned economy. What we must do is construct a socialist planned economy without any bureaucratic distortions, one that fundamentally differs from the administratively centralized management of the whole society. It would be wrong to hold the Marxist or the Leninist idea of planning for a socialist economy responsible for the disproportions that existed, but rather, the onus should be borne by the Stalinist distortion of these basic ideas.

[JUNG WELT] So the moving forces in the economy must be the producers and the consumers, not the central authorities. In the Declaration of Government, Modrow speaks of a Socialistic economic system in which the plan and the market are linked in such a way that independent decisions can be made without the intervention of centralized planning bureaucracy. What does that mean in concrete terms?

[Knop] (It means) a totally new role for production facilities in the economic system with autonomous function and responsibility on the market. To this end, in-house bookkeeping must be instituted, and with it, the principle of self-management of funds. The achievement principle is connected to this, for that means that there must be partial material and moral responsibility on the part of the plant collective and the individual worker for the well-being, or lack thereof, in the plant.

[Wilde] Planning begins at the plant. That is, the plants really do have the right and the duty to do 100 percent of their planning. They are in the best position to process the myriad of millions of bits of information about the market so as to determine for themselves how best to plan. Heretofore, we have always had tight planning. Then we had Mittag's variant: three days' worth of advance planning. In this way, no plant could react to a market situation. The plan was supposed to be exact. There were no such plans; there can be no such plans. A plan can only be a definite, intended reaction to the market, that is, it must constantly make corrections to allow for the real situation. Heretofore, just the reverse has obtained.

[JUNGE WELT] For a long time now, we said that the plan was an express law. That was probably nonsense. And yet, central planning probably is necessary.

[Knop] But, it has assumed a new function. It must make provision for goals and strategic variants. In keeping with the democratic character of the concept of our economy, there will be alternative suggestions that will be discussed openly. For society as a whole, basic directions for meeting social needs, or for covering our needs for energy, for scientific and technological development centers, or for structural changes in the economy that cannot develop from the plants' own economic initiatives, must be mapped out. The basic principles of revenue policy cannot be left to chance. Decisions regarding the areas of education, health, culture, and defense must be reached by society as a whole.

[Wilde] Planning of this sort is far more comprehensive than planning the economy. The economy is a part of the whole. It is not the goal, but rather the instrument. The needs of the people are the goals. The projected number of coats to be produced will no longer be an issue, but the planning will be of a long-term, strategic nature.

[JUNGE WELT] Will quota figures play any kind of a role at all in future?

[Knop] As far as the total concept is concerned, that will disappear by itself if I refuse to have direct management. Then all that is left, really, is that the societal owner stands in a special relationship to the collective that manages and uses the property. Of course, there are total state claims and interests in the form of taxes, expenditures, duties, tariffs, credits, interest charges. The only good evaluative measure for the smooth functioning of a plant is its profit.

[Wilde] The net profit is, thus, a "burning glass" of the totality of all achievements from construction to the delivery of the product, including customer service. It is here that the proper choice of the range of goods, the amounts, the quality, the technology, etc., are reflected.

[JUNGE WELT] What happens to those plants that are running in the red?

[Knop] The logical consequence when plants enjoy a greater degree of economic independence is that they also assume a greater risk. It cannot be precluded that a plant might not make a profit. If the plant at issue is a state-owned plant, the owner, that is, the state, must take action. With its banks, it must seek ways to save the plant, ways of increasing its effectiveness. In the most extreme case, the plant might have to undergo restructuring. Even in enterprises in which the state owns half interest, or in private enterprises, the owner must bear the risk, and he must, in conjunction with the banks, and in cooperation with other plants, seek solutions.

[JUNGE WELT] In this concept of an economy, will there be a labor market, that is to say, unemployment?

[Knop] We maintain the position that a labor market is counter to the Socialistic principles of our society. Assuring full employment is an basic social goal that cannot be tampered with. It must be added, however, that the practice of assuring a job, with payment assured even for work of poor quality, a policy that one can still encounter today, is a practice that is not in keeping with the principle of performance; in point of fact, it contradicts the principle of autonomous responsibility for the plant.

[JUNGE WELT] That would leave the question of a capitalistic market in the GDR.

[Wilde] We are interested in, and, indeed, we must be interested in, acquiring the know how of capitalistic industrial operations. We must do so in order to produce consumer goods, particularly technical ones, of a sufficiently high quality and in a sufficient quantity, something our industrial plants have not been able to do for the past 20 years, nor is it something they will be able to do so in the short term. Incorporating capitalistic firms into our economy is therefore absolutely necessary, and if we wish to do that, we must also be in a position to offer the capitalistic enterprises those conditions which will make our market lucrative. To do so, certain forms of a capitalistic market will, of a certainty, be necessary.

[JUNGE WELT] Which ones?

[Wilde] Participation in state-owned operations, the admission of foreign, capitalistic enterprises, and, one point that warrants consideration is the question of whether we should work with shares of stock.

[Knop] In my view, the question of a capitalistic market is more than just a question of technical levels and ranges of products; it is a question of strengthening the investment power of our national economy.

[JUNGE WELT] What steps, in terms of economic reform, should be taken first in your view?

[Knop] Economic reform cannot be the first. First, the most rudimentary economic processes have to be restored and brought under control. The experiences of all Socialist countries that began economic reform show that reform measures must be given careful consideration. Potential alternatives must be discussed, and stages have to be established.

[Wilde] Initial steps that would cost nothing, would be a combination of revenue and price reform, the more equitable distribution of social services and the transformation from a system of product-linked subsidies to one that was person-oriented. Then, measures would have to be instituted to increase the pool of goods to improve the ratios between suppliers and producers of the finished product to assure a competitive situation in our market through the dissolution of a few superfluous cooperatives, and by assuring incorporation into the international division of labor.

[Knop] The gradual adjustment of our internal price relationships to the currently prevailing international situation should be part of the transitional process as well. I believe it will be a long process of transition, one that is fraught with contradictions in order to create a socialist economic system in which democracy and socialistic notion of property are linked to each other.

Immediate Vacancy of Emigrees' Apartments Disputed

90EG0135A Frankfurt/Oder NEUER TAG in German
20 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with Manfred Schroeder, Bezirk Council member for Housing Policy and Administration, by Waltraut Tuchen; date and place not given]

[Text] [NEUER TAG] Citizens continue to leave our country for the West. Apartments are vacated. People who are staying on and in urgent need of housing consider this an opportunity for themselves. Because nothing happens about many of the vacated apartments, the impression arises—and this is reflected in letters from our readers—that they are kept vacant for the benefit of possible returnees.

[Schroeder] No, these apartments are not reserved. Once we know that the respective citizens have emigrated for good, their apartments revert to the housing stock of the community or municipality. They are then at the disposal primarily of citizens who are next on the list of housing space as decided by the people's representations. There is no other criterion. If the matter is handled any differently, justice and the law are being bent.

[NEUER TAG] Why does all this take so terribly long, from emigration to reallocation of the apartment?

[Schroeder] After all, we can reallocate the apartment only when we have definite proof that the former tenant

has gone for good. Who would say so before leaving? Unless family or friends are notified, weeks are bound to pass before People's Police precincts, city, and community councils are quite sure that the citizen will not return.

[NEUER TAG] Even then not much is gained, because most apartments are crammed with furniture and household equipment. What happens to property left behind?

[Schroeder] The order by the Ministry for Finance and Prices, published on 23 November 1989, provides an answer to that question. Citizens who, without prior permission, have established permanent residence in other states and West Berlin, were not up to now able to directly dispose of their property. In the past it was administered by trustees. The new order canceled that provision. In other words, the individual emigre is responsible for the administration and safety of the property left behind after emigration, or he may appoint trustees to handle it. Whenever the address of the emigre cannot be ascertained, it is possible for city and community councils to apply to the State Notary Agency for the appointment of a conservator, as a result of which the apartment will be cleared.

[NEUER TAG] If everybody is personally responsible for property left behind—in other words, if less bureaucratic interference is involved—we have reason to hope that apartments will be cleared faster.

[Schroeder] Unfortunately you are wrong here. It is almost unbelievable how many people are obviously quite indifferent to the fate of their property. This indifference blocks apartments. In these cases, the local organs have the right and the duty, after expiration of an appropriate period of time and in compliance with the law, to dispose of the property or have it disposed of, and to clear the apartments at the expense of the former tenant.

[NEUER TAG] Though many people are still daily leaving the GDR, there is now no comparison with the giant wave of emigration last summer. Does this mean that the situation is easier with respect to apartments left behind?

[Schroeder] By no means. The problem is increasingly pressing. In this district we have some 27,000 housing applications. Everyone on the list would like to see his problem dealt with. On the one hand, therefore, we have the justified desires of many, on the other a slow advance with respect to vacancies.

[NEUER TAG] Many letters from our readers—for example, those submitted by Waltraut Salzwedel and Joachim Koenig from Eisenhuettenstadt—ask with some sarcasm whether it is necessary first to abandon the GDR in order to get an apartment here.

[Schroeder] That sounds a bit like the claim that people here need to first commit an offense to have an apartment allocated to them after leaving jail. In fact it is not

so. We merely maintain the principle that there should be no homeless here. Returning former GDR citizens are initially housed for a short time in reception camps. The authorities then get in touch with the respective city and community councils to facilitate the allocation of housing space. The guiding principle in this procedure is everybody's right to an apartment but not to his former apartment. In other words, we do not keep anything vacant. Once the apartment is cleared and properly registered in the local housing stock, it is available for reassignment, and the returnee has forfeited his right to it.

[NEUER TAG] It only remains for us to hope that this is the general practice, not that each municipality makes its own laws for such cases.

POLAND

South Korean Representatives Open Discussion on Business Ties

90EP0263A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish 2 Dec 89 p 8

[Article by A.K.: "South Korean Entrepreneurs Interested in Investing in Poland"]

[Text] During the last few days, at the invitation of the Agency for Foreign Investment Affairs, a delegation from the International Private Economic Council of the Republic of Korea (IPECK), led by its vice president In Joung Whang, visited Poland. This was the first visit of representatives from South Korean economic circles following the recent establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

This organization was created in the fall of last year by 200-plus firms and 5 associations joining together units from the private sector. Its task is to develop economic cooperation with states having nonmarket systems, i.e., China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. IPECK is composed of both production and trade enterprises. Banks and service firms are also represented. The reforms of introducing market mechanisms and cementing economic ties with the industrialized West that have occurred in socialist countries have been an incentive for the creation of this organization.

Due to the changes occurring in Poland and its significant economic potential, South Korean business has become very interested in Poland. The best proof of this is the visit of the IPECK delegation. The primary goal of the visit was to establish preliminary contacts with the representatives of the government and economic circles and to create a favorable climate for future cooperation.

The South Korean guests conducted talks with the deputy ministers of foreign affairs, economic cooperation with foreign countries, industry and finance. In addition, an agreement was signed between IPECK and the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade. This agreement provides for the creation of a bilateral committee to

coordinate cooperation in the sphere of investments, joint ventures and the flow of technology, i.e., in fields which transcend the conventional trade exchange. The same agreement set up the institutional framework for contacts between the South Korean private sector and partners in Poland.

During talks held in Warsaw, the possibilities for cooperation in fields considered by the Polish government to be priority areas were defined. The participation of South Korean entrepreneurs was recognized to be indicated in the modernization of our iron and steel metallurgical industry, our machine industry (particularly in the precision equipment sector), in electronics, in the production of electrical household equipment and even in agricultural-food processing. Since all ventures had to be undertaken by particular South Korean firms at their own risk, their industrial-trade circles point out the need for concrete ventures within the framework of the economic reform taking place in Poland. Our future partners are concerned, above all, with the convertibility of the zloty, with setting interest rates at a realistic level and with a rational taxation system.

At the same time, it is worthwhile to add that they are experienced in investment cooperation with states having a nomarket economic system. This should facilitate cooperation with our country. South Korean firms are already implementing more than 20 projects in China, while twenty other ones are in the planning stage. Three investment ventures have also been agreed upon in the Soviet Union.

The talks conducted in Warsaw have made it possible to establish a plan of operation for the next half-year. It was proposed that in mid-December 1989, the government in Seoul in conjunction with IPECK will send a group of experts to research overall economic conditions in Poland and the climate for foreign investments. In February or March of 1990, a representative IPECK delegation is expected in Warsaw. It is anticipated that at that time a formal bilateral economic commission will be created and a program of cooperation for the period of a year will be formulated.

The next step is to be a visit by Polish specialists to South Korea to present South Korean industrial trade circles with a picture of our economy that is as precise as possible and to encourage them to invest in Poland. Finally, in May 1990, a South Korean task force will take part in an investment forum in Poland to study proposals for concrete ventures.

'Great Poland Economic Society': Regional Structural Characteristics

90EP0283A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 50, 10 Dec 89 p 5

[Interview with Michal Wojtczak, president, Great Poland Economic Society "Association of Profit-Making Groups," by Marzena Kowalska: "A New Stage of the Longest War"; date and place not given]

[Text] [ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] From among the many recently formed economic societies, the Great Poland Economic Society is considered to be the largest and the most vigorous. What are the peculiarities of this society?

[Wojtczak] The Economic Society of Great Poland was set up by about 100 private enterprises and 80 individuals. Actually, it was formed 2 years ago. However, due to complicated procedures it was registered as an association as late as in March of this year. We had it our way after a fight with, among others, the Voivodship Administration Office and the minister of internal affairs which lasted 1.5 years. The decision of the minister was appealed all the way to the Office of the Council of Ministers.

Two elements show that our society is different. I believe that these elements were responsible for the tremendous difficulties with registration which the society had. First, the society is supra-voivodship in scope and is markedly regional in nature. Second, economic units, that is, entrepreneurs and enterprises, belong to it along with individuals. Due to this structure, the Great Poland Chamber of Industry and Commerce which operates under the law on economic chambers and consists exclusively of companies was spun off easily by the society more than a month ago. The chamber exists along with the WTG [Great Poland Economic Society]; however, the two institutions have very similar structures (at least for now). The WTG is more concerned with promoting economic thought and formal and legal arrangements whereas the chamber engages in aiding specific enterprises.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Therefore, this is yet another stage of "the longest war in modern Europe"?

[Wojtczak] I would not object; this is an attempt to transplant into the end of the 20th century the marvelous idea of the "Association of Profit-Making Groups" which we deliberately invoke in the name of our society as well.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Does this mean that there is still something in Great Poland that may be termed the Poznan ethic of an entrepreneur and of enterprise?

[Wojtczak] I am not a sociologist, and it is difficult for me to make unequivocal statements on such matters. However, it seems to me that there is a substantial difference between economic management in Great Poland and outside of it. If nothing else, the tremendous number of companies (about 7,000 have been registered, and a majority of them are in operation) and Polonia and foreign companies which are being set up in Poznan Voivodship testifies to this.

We also have a sizable agricultural sector here. Strong farms with long traditions, considerable potential, and great opportunities for development exist here. In December, we will open the agricultural section of our society which, to the best of my knowledge, similar

societies in other regions do not have. I should note that there also were farmers among the founders of the WTG, but they operated under commercial law. We are now drawing private farmers into our activities, and we see that they are interested in this form of cooperation.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] What kind of help do you give to private enterprises?

[Wojtczak] Among other things, the WTG has started an investment bank which will operate as a joint-stock company with the participation of individuals, including foreign—French and West German—capital. On 15 November, a commodity exchange started operations dealing, for starters, in slaughter cattle and meat. However, a securities exchange will be our greatest undertaking, but this is in the future. At present, we sponsor lively training activities. To this end, we run English-language and foreign-trade courses for entrepreneurs and provide advice on formalities, legal, and organizational matters. We also broadcast an educational miniprogram locally. We publish an internal newsletter and WIELKO-POLSKA GAZETA HANDLOWA. We are also thinking about starting a merchant guild. Its embryo exists in the form of merchants' Monday events at which those interested eagerly gather in order to share views and experience. We are gradually expanding a data bank which has scored its first successes in matching enterprises.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Domestic enterprises only?

[Wojtczak] Not necessarily. We have a preliminary agreement with the West German Chamber of Industry and Commerce on sharing information on opportunities for cooperation between the companies of our countries, on the needs of the market, and so on.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Are these activities purely promotional?

[Wojtczak] To a great degree. We do this free of charge until preliminary contacts are established. When a venture is consummated we join it with a participation of 1 or 2 percent or, in the case of following registration procedures, generate proceeds from this for the statutory activities of our society.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Many of these profits will be received in the future. How does the WTG support itself at present?

[Wojtczak] We set up several companies engaged in the production of processed wood and construction materials. A dozen or so new companies are being formed. In the future, this will also be a meaningful source of revenue for us. At present, we live off membership dues. Enterprises pay 25,000 zlotys a month and individuals 2,000 (admission dues are twice as high).

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] The WTG engages in brisk activities abroad. Meanwhile, voices are increasingly heard warning against allowing an excessive influx of foreign, especially German, capital to our market.

[Wojtczak] I am cautious in evaluating the opportunity for the influx of foreign capital. I am not a believer in a financial bonanza which will bring big money to our country, though we should admit that interest in the Polish economy has been picking up slowly.

When this capital does come in, it comes in relatively small amounts marshaled to specific medium-size and small enterprises. This is a desirable phenomenon, especially insofar as the production of consumer goods or food- and farm-products processing is concerned. I would not fear these phenomena, especially given the fact that, contrary to what is thought, this does not amount to buyouts of entire enterprises. It is rather the creation of a new kind of enterprise, mostly private, because this is what the Western partners are interested in.

They exaggerate a lot when they say that it is mostly German capital. Objectively, 60 percent of the companies are those with German participation. However, the foreign capital invested in them is relatively minor.

The entrepreneurs who get involved in Poland act very cautiously. First they reconnoiter and test the market through small-scale undertakings. These first steps make it possible for them to learn about Polish legislation and the prevailing conditions for investment. They are really lost. The society offers them advice and help through, among other things, the data bank mentioned above. In a word, apprehensions about Western capital are definitely premature, and I am nowhere close to panicking on this account.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] However, lawyers say that many issues in evaluating assets, including land, have not been resolved yet, and for this reason we should not hasten to make decisions on entering joint ventures.

[Wojtczak] This is true. However, please note the small, altogether negligible amounts which are invested in Poland. Since the law on joint ventures took effect, this has come to a total of about \$300 million which for the country as a whole is a ridiculously small amount.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] However, we lack not only adequate legal arrangements which would protect national assets from being given away for peanuts but perhaps also the awareness that this is a danger.

[Wojtczak] Indeed, and this is why organizations such as the Great Poland Economic Society have a tremendous educational role to play. The objective, among other things, is to make people aware of where value is and what amounts to value because, indeed, we must be extremely cautious in evaluating assets which, after all, are not necessarily associated with foreign capital. Nonetheless, I am not otherwise a believer in perfect techniques making it possible. This is done most efficiently and most diligently by an exchange. For as long as there is no exchange we have to be prepared for many shortcomings.

However, it is a fact that we should reconnoiter Western markets very carefully. After all, you do encounter on

occasion foreign partners operating in the gray zone between the law and illegality and acting through fraudulent arrangements. Many serious entrepreneurs are thinking about doing business in Poland being unaware of the reality which prevails in our country and actual opportunities for exports to the European and world markets or restrictions such as embargoes, export and import quotas, and so on.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] This is a wide-open field for the Chamber of Industry and Commerce. As you have said, the society intends to get involved more in searching for a concept of economic development and the mechanisms which drive it. This was also confirmed by the Forum of Independent Economic Thought which the WTG organized in September (we reported on it in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, 1989, No 41). At that time, the society expressly came out in favor of the neoliberal option. Therefore, what is the attitude of the WTG toward the government economic program which is under attack from various quarters?

[Wojtczak] The course which this government has set is correct. We identify with it strongly. However, it is difficult for me to evaluate specific tactical and organizational measures. I believe that betting on a market-oriented reform and private property is the right choice. They also came out properly in favor of the law of supply and demand without large social safeguards by the state except for two interventions, that is, in the sphere of antimonopoly policy and the policy of protection for the most vulnerable social groups. Outside of these two areas, the role of the state ceases to exist in a liberal economy, and I am in favor of this. This form which has proven itself in the world is the only effective solution for us.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] As a rule, the liberals renounce interventionism; you and, as I understand it, the WTG as well do not entirely reject it.

[Wojtczak] To tell you the truth, I get the impression that recently they have been brandishing this slogan too frequently, perhaps, concealing different meanings behind it. In keeping with the neoliberal doctrine, the notion of state interventionism amounts to direct interference with specific economic arrangements and social actions. Clearly, we do not support this. However, it is beyond doubt that the state must provide a field for economic activities, for example, by making antimonopoly, tax, and tariff policies together with an entire sphere of legislation. Nobody will relieve the state of this responsibility.

Therefore, I, as a liberal of the late 20th century, can accept state interventionism which will be based on preferences, for example, under our, Polish conditions, for processing foods or farm goods or agriculture. In this case, the state should give incentives for development but stay away from enterprises and refrain from setting up specific ventures.

Also, we cannot disregard the time and economic and social conditions in which we live and turn a blind eye to

the populist and social-democratic mood which is a fact whether we want it to be or not. The point is to use them wisely. I believe (and by this I could antagonize some orthodox liberals) that in order to be able to think about the future of the country and preserve the populace we should approach seriously the protection of the least affluent, mainly retirees and annuitants and young families. However, I believe that we should not resort to strictly economic measures in this field but rather to state interventionism. This is why, to use an example from recent weeks, I am against subsidizing milk but in favor of food vouchers.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] The Great Poland Chamber of Industry and Commerce operates in a large area; more than 100 units belong to it. Under the law on the economic chambers, it could call itself the NATIONAL Chamber of Industry and Commerce. Do the society and the chamber have such aspirations?

[Wojtczak] Indeed, we could proclaim ourselves the All-Poland Chamber of Industry and Commerce and monopolize activities of this nature. This is not the objective, however. We want to preserve a certain Great Poland uniqueness because it does exist in our way of thinking and in our economic activity. As adversaries of monopolies, we do not want to stake out exclusivity on a

national scale. However, we know that some people in other centers have such ambitions even before they establish themselves at the lowest level.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Does this experience confirm the need to modify the law on economic chambers?

[Wojtczak] Yes, it needs to be revised somewhat. The law should be more flexible and liberal with regard to, for example, the establishment of a National Chamber. The arrangement allowing the group which will be the first to recognize itself to be such a chamber to monopolize such activities (including, among other things, the takeover of the assets of the currently existing PIHZ [Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade]) is dangerous. The Sejm Commission for Foreign Economic Relations and the Maritime Economy which I chair has recently proposed that the law on economic chambers be amended because it has long been known that all monopolies are harmful.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Thank you for the interview.

P.S. For those interested, we give the address:

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INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Prospects Bright for Cultural, Educational Relations With Romania*25000603D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
17 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by Otto Oltvanyi: "Turnaround in Hungarian-Romanian Cultural Relations"]

[Text] Culture Minister Ferenc Glatz took part in official discussions in Bucharest yesterday. He and Romanian Minister of Culture Plesu Andrei and Education Minister Sora Mihail reviewed the matter of cultural and educational cooperation between the two countries. Deputy ministers of the Romanian ministries, including Attila Palfalvi and Andor Horvath [Hungarian names], also took part in the discussions.

In summarizing the discussions Glatz told MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] and the NEPSZABADSAG Bucharest reporter that he had brought along a five-point package plan, including recommendations to help revive the long defunct system of relations, as well as the evolution of beneficial cooperation in both the cultural and educational areas.

"Discussions progressed along the lines of mutuality," the Hungarian minister said. "We went through a virtual bidding process in making bigger and better suggestions; I did not count on such great understanding. We proposed the urgent development of an action program for this year, and the scheduling of a series of negotiations concerning long-term cooperation. Our initiative was very well received. Both of my ministerial-level negotiating partners will visit Budapest on 3-4 February. We are going to establish a Hungarian-Romanian joint cultural committee, and will sign the related agreements.

"We made a proposal that would permit us to become more familiar with Romanian culture. For this purpose we presented invitations for Romanian artists, writers, and scientists. This action was also very well received. And what made me feel very good is the fact that they added a statement according to which Hungarians from Romania and Romanians from Romania will respond to these invitations jointly.

"An agreement in principle was reached to the effect that they will provide books and teachers for the operation of Romanian language schools in Hungary. We made an offer to train young Romanians under a scholarship program. Their needs in this regard would call for higher education in computer sciences, as well as training in the agricultural and chemical industry fields, and would provide an opportunity for training in the field of marketing. They were particularly pleased with this idea because there is no such training in Romania. Engineering training may also be linked to this program, by way of either Hungarian language or English language courses.

"We spent much time discussing the situation of Hungarian education—how to remove and to quickly make up for the consequences of past failures to act. We received information concerning the fact that this coming fall Bolyai University will begin its operations in Cluj [Kolozsvár]. We will provide personal and scientific support for the renewed start of the university, because our partners asked us to do so. We will also provide support for the rapid revival of the elementary and intermediate school system. To assist Hungarian schools in restarting their operations we will provide textbooks and visual aids, as well as an opportunity for the continued education of teachers. The Romanian party requested that we help increase the educational level by providing summer courses for the continuing education of teachers. There will be cultural and artistic exchanges, and we will renew the activities of the Hungarian-Romanian committee of historians. The preparedness and support manifested by the Romanian partners was also complete in this respect. There will be a Hungarian-Romanian historians' meeting in the second half of February; in the framework of that meeting we will examine the role of historical sciences in the Stalinist Soviet system, and we will deal with the handling of national issues. Artistic exchanges will be entirely open and free, there will be no need for permissions from the government, and the higher leadership will not provide financial support for this. In this framework the National Theater, the Operetta Theater, and the State Opera will present guest performances in Romania this spring. Representatives of Romanian fine arts will introduce themselves in Budapest.

"I view the fact that an agreement has been reached regarding the subscription and distribution of Hungarian newspapers and periodicals in Romania as very significant. Our partners made promises that earlier prohibitions will be lifted. The [Hungarian] Ministry of Culture will provide subsidies to bridge price differentials. In this way, subscription fees for Hungarian newspapers, periodicals, and scientific publications will be adjusted to Romanian price conditions, and we will pay the difference. This is necessary because newspapers and books are much more expensive in Hungary than they are in Romania. There will also be an opportunity for professionals residing in Romania who are in need of scientific publications to subscribe to scientific publications, periodicals, and documents published in foreign languages in Hungary. In summary, I am pleased to state that I found understanding in Bucharest, sensed manifestations of mutuality, and that all opportunities for the evolution of Hungarian-Romanian cultural and educational cooperation exist.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG Unions Seek Ties to GDR Counterparts*90EN0243Z Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Jan 90 p 13*

[Article by ank: "Separate DGB Trade Unions Looking for Partners in GDR"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 9 Jan—"You have sat at the same table with Harry Tisch far too long." Thus far, the individual trade unions that make up the DGB [Federation of German Trade Unions] have responded only indirectly to this accusation by a spokesman for the New Forum. Now they are preparing to sit down with many GDR unions at many tables. Each DGB affiliate is looking for a partner. In most instances, it is said, there are two reasons for this. For one thing, the unions do not wish to leave the field to the Western business firms trying to participate in joint ventures in the GDR. IG Metall, the metal workers union, argues that this is the only way to keep the GDR from becoming "Europe's low-wage nation" and "the extended workbench for West German industry." At the same time, say all the FRG unions, the changes in the GDR and the concomitant restructuring of the separate unions have created an opportunity for the first time ever to deal with independent partners in the other part of Germany.

The fact is that the time has now come for different interests to reemerge in the GDR. Lenin wanted the labor unions to serve as "transmission belts for the party," and that is how the FDGB [Free German Labor Union Federation] perceived its mission. The leadership role of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] was accepted as a matter of course; the SED basic guidelines called on the FDGB to serve as the "organized vanguard of the working class" and to fight for "democratic centralism." Once private property had been abolished and all members of society were equal, the fight for better wages and labor contracts and the right to strike became superfluous. Accordingly, the 16 separate trade unions inside the FDGB were subject to central supervision. They perceived themselves merely as technical departments, lacking all the characteristics of sovereignty and autonomy, e.g. the right to handle their own financial affairs and freely and independently to approve labor contracts.

In the meantime, the FDGB, which proudly laid claim to being the largest mass organization in the GDR, has lost some 800,000 of its 9.6 million members. This loss of membership is to be halted at a special congress scheduled for 31 January and 1 February in East Berlin. The draft for new statutes which is being published and debated in the pages of TRIBUNE, the labor union newspaper, has repeatedly been cited by FRG labor unions as the reason why the time has come to establish initial contacts for new partnerships. The draft calls for transforming the separate trade unions into "free and independent organizations," free to handle their own finances and to hold strikes. It also calls for an abolition of the centralist structure which will enable the separate unions to exercise more influence within the labor movement itself.

Now that the FDGB is in ruins, the FRG IG Metall proposes to concentrate all of its efforts on cooperation with the GDR metal workers union. A crash program was approved in December which calls for factory

partnerships, joint training programs, and the exchange of experts. IG Metall Chairman Franz Steinkuehler says that his union will do its best to support the efforts of its GDR counterpart to transform itself into a free and independent labor organization, "if need be in a bitter struggle with the FDGB."

IG Medien, the FRG media employees union, will conclude a similar agreement with the GDR's printers union, Druck und Papier, later this week. A union spokesman reported that the preparatory discussions last weekend between Heinz Mueller and Detlef Henschel, the deputy chairmen of the two unions, were conducted in a "businesslike atmosphere similar to a works council training session." The FRG policemen's union has also promised its support to the members of the Volkspolizei who now wish to form their own union for the first time. HBV, the commercial, banking and insurance employees union, has also taken a pragmatic approach. The focus of the GDR commercial employees, food, and restaurant workers union has primarily been on efforts to learn more about the FRG's industrial relations law. HBV, too, is looking forward to the establishment of partnerships. But thus far direct contacts have only taken place in areas close to the borders between the two Germanys. An HBV spokesman said that his union is not as fortunate as IG Metall which has a genuine opposite to talk to in Hartwig Bugiel, a former metal worker known to be untainted politically in both sides of the border, who has gone straight from his workbench to the post of chairman of the GDR metal workers union.

Both IG Chemie, the chemical workers union, and OeTV, the public transport workers union, have decided not to make a move until after the leadership structures in the new (or old) trade unions have been clarified. Future emphasis will mostly be on exchanges at the working level, with the OeTV pointing out that contacts at the executive committee level need to be sharply reduced while meetings at the "local and district level" should be fostered. An even more cautious approach is being taken by GEW, the educators and scientists union, which has thus far been holding joint seminars with the GDR educators union on "education for peace." GEW chairman Dieter Wunder says that the leadership of the GDR union is "uncertain of its direction and its goals," adding that GEW would rather establish contacts with opposition elements in the education field than with the "conservative, Stalinist union."

When asked about their previous contacts with the FDGB, the response given by most FRG labor unions is one of painful embarrassment. DGB sources point out that there was no other choice, since no opposition existed in the other part of Germany. OeTV spokesman Rainer Hillgaertner notes that the standard communiques regularly issued after such meetings tended to paper over the controversies that had definitely arisen. IG Chemie sources observed that "no one really took these meetings very seriously anyway."

YUGOSLAVIA

Poor Hygiene, Poverty Blamed for Disease Toll

90EB0164A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
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[Article by Milan Milosevic: "Epidemics: Under Quarantine of Crisis"; first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] We are afflicted with the diseases of some poor, unstable country, a country with miserable public hygiene and unstable social and urban conditions, and even AIDS is threatening us.

We can wait out the flu in bed, but...

The "yellow lady" takes another area into her arms every year. With 14,242 new cases of tuberculosis in 1988, Yugoslavia holds on to its position within Europe as the country with the highest rate of incidence. For every 100,000 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 87.2 suffer from tuberculosis, while the figure for Kosovo is 73.8 for every 100,000. This is more than double the rate of new infection foreseen in the Yugoslav goal for the year 2000—that the number of new cases of tuberculosis be reduced to 30 per 100,000. Another unattained goal—an epidemiological X-ray—simply from a lower camera angle accentuates our social trauma.

In 1988, the appearance of 35 infectious diseases was recorded in the SFRY, from which 483,868 people died. This is a little more than in 1987. Some of these diseases caused 427 epidemics in our country in 1988, affecting 53,553 patients, according to the Analysis of Trends in Infectious Diseases in the SFRY, drawn up by the Federal Health Care Institute and the Federal Secretariat for Labor, Health, Veterans Affairs, and Social Policy, and presented this week to the Federal Chamber of the Assembly of the SFRY.

Dangerous Salmonella

The greatest was contagious food poisoning, with 5,397 cases in 164 epidemics. We are afflicted with aerobic, gram-negative, rod-shaped organisms one to three micrometers long, known as salmonella (74 epidemics with 2,968 cases from ingesting infected water or undercooked animal products). These epidemics in fact reveal the chaotic situation in food production, control, and circulation.

More than half of the cases of contagious food poisoning were recorded at communal restaurants. From 1985 to 1987, between 16 and 26 percent of all controlled food was contaminated with bacteria, it was emphasized at the ecological meeting held at the end of September as part of the Novi Sad Fair.

At its session at the beginning of September, the Assembly of Serbia concluded that there continues to be a high percentage of tainted food. However, a large number of municipalities do not have enough inspectors. In order to achieve an optimal level of health inspection, the government figures that one sanitary inspector should be employed

for every 15,000 people. Based on this estimate, Yugoslavia, which has 955 sanitary inspectors, falls 583 inspectors short.

At the Rakovica Motor Factory, 242 workers fell victim to food poisoning during the month of October. The cause of the poisoning was salmonella enteritidis. The chicken in the workers cafeteria was apparently bad. Among those who became sick was one child, whose father brought the food home to him. The epidemiological picture must be multifariously connected with the crisis in which a large number of people are put into a situation of having to struggle for their very survival.

A survey among 1,394 presumed socially endangered people in Belgrade two years ago revealed that as many as 39 percent of workers with low family incomes have health problems. The majority of the workers interviewed were in the most productive period of their lives, between the ages of 30 and 40.

For want of social intervention, medical services, which can scarcely keep going amidst the crisis, have their hands tied by material shortages. Infectious-disease clinics are in an exceptionally difficult situation; some of them, such as the one across the street from Karadjordje Park in Belgrade, are completely run down, with cracked walls and poor, dilapidated sewerage systems. In Yugoslavia, there are 319 epidemiology specialists, which is not enough to deal with the epidemiologically complicated situation of a country that is suffering from poor people's diseases; moreover, since it is located at a crossroads of the world, the epidemics of developed countries are also turning up. Yugoslavia does not have a well-developed information system about infectious diseases.

AIDS Victims

AIDS, the "new plague," is showing a rise in the number of cases and a high mortality rate. The number of known, registered HIV cases thus far in the SFRY is 1,685. As of 1 July 1989, there were 86 registered cases of AIDS, of which 47 were dead, and as of 1 September 1989 the number of cases had climbed to 91, of which 49 were dead. The largest number of cases of AIDS are in Serbia (44), and the groups at highest risk are intravenous drug users (32) and bisexuals (23).

The government has suggested to the Assembly a resolution expressing concern about the increase in morbidity involving enterocolitis and food poisoning, in addition to concern about the steady increase in the number of AIDS cases and in the spread of hemorrhagic fever. Requested is money to eliminate native forms of measles, money for a program to protect against AIDS, money for a program to wipe out hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, and money for a program to wipe out infectious diseases that are transmitted by water and food. This could be a general outline for our health strategy.

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia has not been entirely unsuccessful in caring for its people. Diphtheria has been wiped out, thanks to the immunizations carried out from 1981 to the

present day. After the introduction of compulsory immunization in 1966, the number of cases of whooping cough fell significantly. Following the 1972 immunization, the number of cases of measles dropped off, although the fact that there are 4.27 cases for every 100,000 people in Slovenia and as many as 102 in Kosovo says a great deal about the drastic differences in the degree to which the possibilities offered by medicine in combatting these diseases are being taken advantage of. The epidemiological picture may reflect the social situation. Epidemic meningitis is also rare. Since the sudden epidemic in 1977, things have been quiet on the polio front; tetanus, against which immunization is compulsory, is on the decline; malaria was practically wiped out in 1964, and since then the only cases have been imported ones...

Viral hepatitis, with 24,000 cases a year, of which the highest morbidity rate is in Macedonia (215 victims in 100,000), is a relatively serious threat to us. Gonorrhea (2,700 cases) is on the decline, as is syphilis, with 144 cases.

Hydra of Epidemics

Our epidemics are more social than medical in nature, so that social strategies are more important for the health of the nation than are medical ones.

For example, there is a very high level—164,475 cases in 1988—of infectious intestinal diseases. They account for nearly one-third (30.7 percent) of all illnesses. This is possibly our most pronounced epidemiological and social-medical problem, and it epitomizes the poor hygiene habits, improper urbanization, irregular nutrition, wretched municipal services, and a poor water-supply situation in smaller places. The government's analysis emphasizes the problem of "unresolved disposal of fecal matter," which is a relatively elegant substitution for a much earthier popular expression. This part of the report calls to mind the poor Marinkova swamp and the relatively wealthy but run-down Kaluderica, an unofficial settlement near Belgrade which, because it is "unofficial," does not have sewerage service. An epidemic

breaking out on the outskirts of a city of a million residents would be difficult to stop.

Intestinal infections are also widespread in more developed areas, and are deadly wherever there is poverty. Officially, bacillary dysentery (12,000 cases) and enterocolitis (74,000) are most widespread in Slovenia (658 cases in 100,000 people) and Kosovo (541). However, if we look at a 10-year period (1979-88), a very dark picture emerges: Of a total of 1,254 deaths from this disease, 1,173 were in Kosovo. This alone shows that the epidemic is running wild there, and that medical services are not up to it.

In terms of disease, we are far off in the Orient. The report says that the morbidity of abdominal typhus (102 cases) is on the decline, but it also worries about an increase in its hydra of epidemics.

The analysis by the Federal Health Care Institute showed that every fifth sample of water was hygienically bad. It is believed that 75 percent of the population of the SFRY drinks water from the water-supply system; investments in the water-supply system are ever smaller, and in 1986 it was established that as much as 26 percent of the water-supply system has inadequate purification and chlorination equipment, worn-out screens, or simply no safety zones. Should we really have to thank a fortunate concurrence of circumstances for the fact that there are no epidemics?

What suggests itself in this situation? The Labor, Health, and Social Policy Council of the Assembly of the SFRY concluded on 7 November that the implementation of preventative measures to combat infectious disease is lax. Among other things, it requested speedy passage of a federal law to protect the air and water, which could improve prevention.

We are afflicted primarily by the diseases of some poor, unstable country, a country with miserable public hygiene and unstable social and urban conditions.

Under these circumstances—wash your hands?

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