


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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vulkov Meets With Dienstbier, NATO's Woerner

AU2604200591 Sofia BTA in English 1942 GMT
26 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 26 (BTA)—Today Mr. Viktor Vulkov, Bulgaria's deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, who attended the international conference on the future of European security in Prague, met Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, minister of foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia.

The two ministers exchanged views on the development of their countries' bilateral relations after the meeting between Bulgarian President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev and Czechoslovak President Mr. Vaclav Havel. Mr. Vulkov and Mr. Dienstbier outlined specific measures for wider relations between the two countries in different fields and discussed the promotion of the CSCE process.

Mr. Vulkov conferred with Dr. Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general. The two considered practical matters related to the forthcoming visits of Bulgaria's Prime Minister Mr. Dimitur Popov to Brussels and of Dr. Woerner to Sofia. Mr. Vulkov and Dr. Woerner exchanged views on the political and military aspects of European security under the new conditions.

In a statement for the press Mr. Vulkov described his talks as frank and fruitful. "Bulgaria will have its say in NATO circles," Mr. Vulkov pointed out. "My Czechoslovak colleague Mr. Dienstbier and I exchanged useful information on the problems of European security and its structures. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia hold identical or similar views on the problems discussed and share a desire to be integrated into the existing European structures."

"There are no disagreements between us. We are trying to find new approaches, to rediscover the markets and the capacities of the two countries' economies," Mr. Jiri Dienstbier told a press conference later on. "We have agreed to discuss these problems at different levels and to seek ways to cover Bulgaria's 350 million rouble trade deficit with Czechoslovakia," Mr. Dienstbier said.

Later in the day Mr. Vulkov left Prague.

BULGARIA

Constitutional Alliance Wins Registration Case

AU0705193091 Sofia BTA in English 1620 GMT
7 May 91

[Article by Stefan Gospodinov: "Royalist Lion Overpowers Republican Court"]

[Text] Sofia, May 7 (Stefan Gospodinov of BTA)—A lion royally crowned over a tricolour bend [as received] on an escutcheon surmounted by a crown: This is the emblem of the Constitutional Alliance which became the 91st Bulgarian Party after a Supreme Court ruling ended

a several months long legal battle over its registration according to the Political Parties Act.

The Constitutionlists had to take their case to the highest court of the land for a procedure which took other political parties just a couple of days.

Back on January 5, 1991, when the Constitutional Alliance was formed in Plovdiv and adopted its policy declaration, it became clear that its founders viewed the 1946 referendum which changed Bulgaria's form of government as an "unlawful, coercive and unprecedented act in the history of democratic states." Moreover, the founders of the alliance blamed that unconstitutional act for all events that led Bulgaria to its current grave political, economic, spiritual and moral crisis. The Constitutional Alliance proclaimed that its principal objective would be the drafting of a constitution based on the most democratic and solely legitimate Bulgarian Constitution, the Turnovo Constitution of 1879, and to eliminate the negative effects of the 1946 referendum.

This unabashed pledge, reiterated by the Constitutional Alliance leader, Mr. Manol Zhurnalov (MP of the Union of Democratic Forces), before the Grand National Assembly, shocked ardent republicans. The alliance found itself on the receiving end of public attacks which in the long run predetermined the Sofia City Court's refusal to register the new party. The principal motive was that the monarchic form of government laid down in the Turnovo Constitution is incompatible with the republican form of government established under the effective Constitution, and the proclaimed objectives of the Constitutional Alliance therefore disqualified it from registration under the Political Parties Act. Essentially, the court denied citizens (the founders of the alliance) their legitimate right to freedom of expression of political opinions concerning, among other things, the form of government. The court furthermore ignored Article 143 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria which allows the adoption of a new constitution and therefore a change in the form of government.

A Supreme Court panel reversed the lower court decision, describing it as unfounded, and ruled that the Constitutional Alliance, founded in the city of Plovdiv, be registered as a political party. To put it in legalese, the ruling is final. The republican court gave way to the royally crowned lion.

Democratic Party's View on Ethnic Issues

91BA0531A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
4 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Stefan Savov, chairman of the Democratic Party in the Union of Democratic Forces, by Boyan Gyuzelev: "Expressed Attitude Toward the National Problem"]

[Text] [Gyuzelev] The Democratic Party in the Union of Democratic Forces [DP] is the only party in the Union of

Democratic Forces [SDS] that pays significant attention in its platform to the national problem. Can you explain the reason for this?

[Savov] The DP is a party with rich history and traditions. It is the oldest party in the SDS. We have always paid particular attention to anything related to the national problem. It would have been unnatural and illogical had we had not especially emphasized this set of problems in the new political platform that we adopted at our congress last December. If the programs of some parties and movements do not include the national problem, this indicates, on the one hand, the extent to which national nihilism has left its mark on Bulgarian society, and, on the other, that history and the continuity of a political line are not without significance.

[Gyuzelev] What is your attitude toward the Macedonian problem?

[Savov] As a historical party of Bulgarian society, the DP has long had a defined attitude toward the Macedonian problem. Noted DP leaders such as Trayko Kitanchev, Andrey Lyapchev, and many others were also leaders of the Macedonian movement, by which we mean the movement of Macedonian Bulgarians for national awareness and freedom. One of the problems about which the DP has never been able to achieve an understanding with the BCP was the national problem or, rather, the nihilism displayed by the BCP, which included the struggles waged by Bulgarians in Macedonia. As for the Republic of Macedonia, we respect international treaties and all the provisions in the charter of human rights and the respective pacts. We consider it natural that, if people in the Republic of Macedonia feel Bulgarian, they should be given all the necessary rights and freedoms.

[Gyuzelev] In your view, how should the rights of Bulgarian minorities abroad be protected?

[Savov] We have included this in our platform. It is necessary to encourage cultural and economic ties as well as ordinary human contacts with Bulgarian ethnic communities abroad. It is our view that the cultural and ethnic rights of Bulgarians living in other countries must be safeguarded, as stipulated in the documents signed by all European countries.

[Gyuzelev] Do you believe that the SDS policy on the national problem should be changed?

[Savov] I believe that the electoral platform of the SDS includes the basic, the most essential, aspects of a proper policy of the national problem. Unfortunately, carried away by the difficult struggle of dismantling the totalitarian structures, a struggle that is absorbing virtually all our attention and efforts, we are neglecting some important aspects of the national problem. In this respect, we are justifiably criticized. This is a question not only of change but also of delayed implementation of our electoral platform, which, naturally, should be further developed and enriched.

More on Purging of Party Members' Police Files

AU0605190591 Sofia FAKS in Bulgarian 25 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by Stefan Georgiev: "The Personal Files of the 'Party Department' Have Presumably Been Destroyed"]

[Text] The archives of the Sixth Department of the former political police in Bulgaria were purged as early as prior to 10 November 1989. This is the opinion of a former official from the Sixth Department, who wishes to remain anonymous for the time being. As a rule, the chief of the department in question was also the deputy chief of the whole administration and directly subordinate to Todor Zhivkov. The busiest periods in the life of the department were at the time of Communist Party congresses. Great concern prevailed that someone might take the floor to express critical remarks.

The source thinks that if a "Sliver Plan" on infiltrating agents into the ranks of the young opposition had actually existed, the destruction of the archives belonging to the party political police would have been a must.

As far as the issue about which the National Assembly is so excited—namely, the method of dealing with the files (whether to use the hot method by burning them, or the cold treatment of freezing them)—the former secret service official cannot make up his mind: "As a policeman looking back at 20 years of experience, I would not like any documents to emerge in broad daylight. On the other hand, so much dirt has been accumulated in the files that society should see it."

The source expressed himself quite ironically on classifying the names in the list published by FAKS. "As early as in our school days, we were taught that a written statement on collaboration with secret services has no legal value whatsoever. For this reason, many of the people mentioned in the list have not signed any statements. The recruitment of an agent is a prolonged process, and a statement is not a necessary condition but, rather, a method of intimidating the informer. It is meaningless to confront a person with legal training—Georgi Markov, for example—with a written statement."

The former official also thinks that quite a few blunders were committed in the Sixth Department. The case of Pirin Vodenicharov is one of those, for example. Some young employee presumably needed a good mark, as a result of which he presented absolutely straightforward information provided by Mr. Vodenicharov as an act of collaboration. "No matter how preposterous it may sound to you, we had a plan on the number of agents we were supposed to recruit."

The system selected its own people and promoted them at the expense of others who may have been much more capable.

The heated disputes that took place at the National Assembly in connection with the publication of the

names' list reveal the total lack of information of our public. The statements by elder members of parliament about the inhuman methods of extorting promises of collaboration were certainly not exaggerated, the anonymous official stated. Nevertheless, such methods were applied only until the beginning of the 1960's, according to him. Later on, each piece of information was verified and recorded, and the methods of recruitment were infinitely more subtle and perfidious.

The list is by all means incomplete, the source claims. The Ministry of Internal Affairs can always filter the information. This is a natural self-defense reaction. The fact that the Sixth Department is charged with all sins jeopardizes the whole national security system. The destruction of the personal files of the Sixth Department does not eliminate the relations with other departments that are not in charge of police tasks but are protecting our national interests.

Street passions inflamed by the issue of personal files are likely to serve as cover for another, more dangerous, game. It is no coincidence that information leaks at certain specific moments. The former official from the Sixth Department is convinced that this is a battle between "lobbies." The information against agent Bonchev is a strike against the "French lobby," while the personal file of agent Dimitur is supposed to affect the "monarchist" lobby. The source himself admits having worked on the "Turkish connection" and is convinced that such leaks serve the interests of a great power and its chief ally in the Balkans.

New Bulgarian Policing Arrangements

*AU0805082091 Sofia BTA in English 0708 GMT
8 May 91*

[Unattributed article: "Law Enforcement News"]

[Text] Sofia, May 8 (BTA)—Nearly 20,000 policemen will start today a series of protest actions to focus public attention on crime and crime control in the country, the president of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions at the Ministry of the Interior announced yesterday.

The policemen in Silistra, northeastern Bulgaria, support the demands of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions at the Ministry of the Interior that parliament should "consider on a priority basis the Ministry of Interior organization bill, lift the moratorium on the carrying out of death sentences and lay down maximum sentences for assaults on police officers."

"The transport police has declared a war on the gangs of gypsy looters who lately have been attacking freight trains," transport police chief Colonel Viktor Mikhaylov told a news conference yesterday. In his view, the gypsy gangs stand no chance. The transport police roster has been increased tenfold. The members of the force are well armed and will act according to the police in combating gang crime.

At the same news conference, the National Police Force Directorate circulated a declaration on the growing economic crime rate in Bulgaria. The declaration emphasizes that a new social phenomenon has appeared: groups of criminals operating in an organized and highly professional manner. In view of the expected rise in economic criminality in the period of transition to market economy and privatization, and especially the growth of profiteering, the economic police calls on the management of companies, the local authorities and the members of the public to abide strictly by the trade laws and regulations.

The National Service for Protection of the Constitution will be renamed National Security Service, according to the new ministry of interior organization law. Although parliament has yet to pass the legislation, the Ministry of Interior Chief Secretary General Todor Boyadzhiev said the new name of the service may go into circulation right now. He specified that that particular service had never been attached to the Office of the President. The only two services attached to that office are the National Intelligence Service and the National Bodyguard Service.

Interviewed for "VECHERNI NOVINI", the official spokesman for the Sofia City Council declared himself in favor of the establishment of a metropolitan police force. There is also an idea to enforce environmental protection with the help of green patrols. Unlike before, however, professionals and not amateurs will be on green patrol service.

The government has decided to revise the financial arrangements for departmental police forces and fire services reporting until now both to the Interior Ministry and to the municipal people's councils. From now on the members of these forces will get their pay from the Ministry of the Interior and not from the local councils. The municipalities will only receive budget outlays to provide those police officers with accommodation and logistics.

Battle Against Computer Viruses in Bulgaria

*AU0705143391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 1 May 91
p 1*

[Report by Katya Yaneva: "A Bulgarian Nicknamed 'Dark Avenger' Is Spreading Computer Viruses Around Europe by Telephone"]

[Text] Using a special device, the "Dark Avenger" contacts computers all over Europe by telephone and sends them programs he has infected with a virus. "Dark Avenger," as he himself signs the viruses created by him, is a Bulgarian. Veselin Bonchev, director of the newly created laboratory on computer viruses at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, announced that, going on circumstantial data, Dark Avenger is a young man about 24 or 26 years old.

In messages that he exchanged with Veselin Bonchev by amateur electronic mail, Dark Avenger confided that it gave him pleasure to destroy information. In Veselin Bonchev's opinion, Dark Avenger's viruses destroy a great deal of information, but, even worse, this happens slowly, so that by the time they are detected it is too late.

The 30-year-old director of the laboratory on computer viruses said that the laboratory was not ready to cope with the computer viruses being created and disseminated in Bulgaria. We do not have a single computer in the laboratory, and our budget is 163 thousand leva per year. Out of this money must come the salaries of 12 permanent staff, even though, at present, only two have been appointed. But the fight against computer viruses is not even within the capabilities of a center on virology. A worldwide movement is needed, Veselin Bonchev thinks.

Out of 500 known viruses, 150 are made in Bulgaria, which makes us top of the league. In contrast to the rest of the world, where the writing of viruses is a criminal offense, in Bulgaria it is a sign of a sense of humor and a cranky sport.

Veselin Bonchev is developing a fundamentally new decontamination program. He is the author of a package that contains programs against hundreds of different viruses, but they are already old. The new program will check all the files simultaneously and get rid of any viruses. The problem is that each week a new virus appears, and it is difficult enough just keeping track of and finding out about all the new types.

There are about 20 persons in Bulgaria who are actively producing viruses. Only four specialists are producing antivirus programs. Almost all Bulgarian computers are infected, claimed Veselin Bonchev, our best specialist on computer viruses and a member of several international bodies on virology. He said that, around the world, viruses are feared but rarely seen, whereas, in Bulgaria, the opposite is true, and they are a phenomenon rather like the common cold.

Todor Todorov, a student of computer science, has created a special system for exchanging viruses. He has about 200 different types of viruses in his bank. Anyone who suggests anything new to him gains access to his bank. This accelerates the writing of viruses and leads to the creation of a chain of such systems, Veselin Bonchev explained. In reality, in Bulgaria, anyone can write a virus or get hold of one already written and rework it.

The misconception that Bulgaria should produce computers and not programs, when we have qualified people for this job, is one of the main reasons for viruses being created. The large-scale theft, transfer, and sale of foreign programs have made manufacturers think up new defenses against copying. A lot of our programmers have been involved only with getting rid of these protections. Thus, they have totally mastered the computer, and then it has not been difficult to infect the system.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

President Havel's NATO Speech Analyzed

91CH0472A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Karl Feldmeyer: "Havel Morally Convincing and Rhetorically Brilliant: On a Difficult Mission at NATO"]

[Text] "Ever since my boyhood I was accustomed to hearing the representatives of my country, as well as all of its media, saying only one thing about NATO, namely that it was a bulwark of imperialism, the incarnation of evil, and a danger to peace which wanted to destroy us. I am happy that I have the opportunity today to tell the truth from this rostrum: reflecting the will of its democratically elected governments, NATO was and remains a democratic defense community which has essentially contributed to the fact that this continent did not need to experience a war for more than half a century and that a large part of Europe was kept safe from totalitarian control...I am happy to be in a position to be able to apologize to you in the name of the Czech and Slovak people for all the lies which my predecessors spread about you in the name of these same people over the years. I am also happy that I am permitted to speak to you today as a representative of a democratic and independent country which shares the same ideals and desires with you and which wishes to collaborate with you on a foundation of friendship."

These were the first sentences uttered by Vaclav Havel, the Czechoslovak head of state, on Thursday in Brussels, and were directed at the NATO Council. For the first time in NATO history, 10 foreign ministers have come together to listen to a man and accept and acknowledge his expressions of respect, a man who represents a country which, until recently, was among its determined opponents. Upon hearing Havel's words, many a listener was wont to cock his ear so as to be certain that he was not dreaming. They heard words and opinions such as those which the alliance, which is frequently criticized by the Western public, normally hears from its secretary general when he is protecting it. The guest impressed the assembly.

Havel was convincing with his moral integrity and he was rhetorically brilliant. He began with his apologies for the lies of his predecessors in office, whose prisoner he had been, and ended his speech by noting that the 1948 defenestration of Prague had been the final motive for the establishment of NATO. However, by making this statement he simultaneously reminded his listeners that the West did not and could not provide any aid and protection to him and his compatriots against Stalin's henchmen at that time. Havel avoided any kind of reproach, but the connection between those times and the present is unmistakable—even if the actual desire of Prague, the question of alliance, remains unspoken.

The structure of his speech is clever; he begins with a generous compliment, so as to point up the common objectives from the standpoint of democrats who are convinced of the joint position: a unified Europe, in peace and freedom, which includes America and the Soviet Union. Really, the Soviet Union? This is the central question in Havel's speech. His wording is precise and does not escape any of his listeners. A future security structure of a democratic Europe is said to be "unthinkable" without participation of a "democratic community of the people of today's Soviet Union." This includes the assertion that the present-day Soviet Union is not a democratic community and that, consequently, no security structure is "thinkable" including it, as Havel states. For a speech on the occasion of a first visit, this is downright exciting and the speech in no way remains undisputed, even if this contradiction is not expressed openly. Foreign Minister Genscher acknowledged Havel's visit with warm words and the clarification of the German position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is contained in that which he had disseminated as the text of his brief remarks: "For this new architecture involving all of Europe, a stable and action-capable Soviet Union is also an unrenounceable factor." This is something altogether different from that which Havel has in mind. But that which needed to be clarified here remains unsaid in public.

However, the Soviet Union is not at the center of this visit, which is far more than a protocol gesture. NATO knew before the guest arrived what moved him: the desire for security partners, if possible, after joining NATO. That is why, even before his arrival, it became clear that NATO considered the utterance of this desire to be counterproductive. NATO members had agreed to do nothing which might lead to the marginalization of individual countries in Europe, and particularly nothing which could drive the Soviet Union into political isolation. This means that the former ally of the Soviet Union would not be offered anything which one was not prepared to also concede to Moscow.

Thus, this visit leaves behind it the knowledge as to how strong the desire of the former East Europe allies of the Soviet Union is to become integrated with the West and with its organizations. Economically, but primarily with respect to security policies and militarily. NATO has no satisfactory reply to this need to lean on someone. For NATO, an extension toward the East is currently out of the question. Since the London summit meeting of last year, a security policy, which is primarily based on balancing interests with Moscow, takes priority for NATO over facilitating security with military means. This position becomes all the more difficult the more the influence of Gorbachev's Moscow opponents, who wish to terminate his policy of balanced interests and return to the former situations, grows. Understandably, this makes primarily the Soviet Union's neighbors nervous. This must not become the motive for once more adjusting NATO policy toward increasingly military

criteria. It is precisely now that it is important for NATO to stay the course: Opportunities like those under Gorbachev do not occur again.

Alignment of Political Forces Reviewed

LD0305215291 Prague CTK in English 1449 GMT
3 May 91

[Text] Prague May 3 (CTK)—The Civic Democratic Party, ODS, is not seeking any reshuffle in the governments, but if a seat is vacated in the Czech government, the party wants it to be filled with ODS representatives, ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus told a press conference here today.

Klaus said ODS has two candidates for the post of Czech deputy premier, now held by Frantisek Vlasak who might leave for health reasons. The candidates are Federal Deputy Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik and Deputy Director General of the Commercial Bank Jan Strasky.

The latest political developments in Czechoslovakia indicate that a fundamental realignment of forces in the Czech government and among the Slovak deputies of the Federal Assembly could take place.

The realignment of forces is a result of the split in the Czech Civic Forum movement, OF, into the liberal Civic Movement, OH, and the conservative Civic Democratic Party, and the breakaway of the socially populist For Democratic Slovakia faction from the Slovak Public Against Violence movement, VPN. The Civic Forum/Public Against Violence coalition won last year's parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia.

In the 17-member Federal Government OH has eight seats, VPN four, the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, KDH, two (in addition to its nominated unaffiliated minister), ODS one and the Civic Democratic Alliance, ODA, one seat. In the 18-member Czech government, OH has 10 seats, the Christian Czechoslovak people's party has one, the Christian Democratic Party has two seats, and ODS and ODA one each. Three ministers have not joined any of the organizations that [words indistinct].

[Words indistinct] would accept the post only if certain conditions were met.

Also yesterday, ODA Deputy Chairman Daniel Kroupa said the offer of the post would be accepted only if Dlouhy were invested with sufficient powers in carrying out economic reform policy in proportion to his responsibilities.

Today's OBCANSKY DENIK, published by the OF coordinating centre, quoted Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa as saying that any talk about Dlouhy's departure from the Federal to the Czech government would be premature.

The departure would be possible only if there were an adequate replacement, Calfa said. He added Dlouhy's addition to the Czech government would be an important strengthening of the cabinet of Petr Pithart. The only adequate replacement for Dlouhy would be Federal Minister Pavel Hoffman.

Czech government press spokesman Petr Prihoda said in OBCANSKY DENIK today Dlouhy's appointment to the post of Czech deputy premier is in the offing and other changes in the Czech government are being discussed. In any way, we respect the agreement that new appointments to the government will be made from the right, Prihoda added.

More shakeups in the Czech government were urged also by Kroupa yesterday when he said if Dlouhy goes to the Czech cabinet, a number of changes will have to be made, especially in economic ministries.

Also today, OBCANSKY DENIK quoted ODS spokesman Milan Kondr as saying that the ODS and ODA will discuss a new composition of the Czech government this afternoon.

The same paper also quotes the press spokesmen for the OH and the Czechoslovak People's Party, Vladimir Zelezny and Jarmila Matouskova respectively, who believe changes in the Czech government must be agreed upon at talks of the government coalition partners.

At the press conference today, Klaus rejected any shakeup in the Czech government which would not benefit the ODS. He did not recommend Dlouhy's departure from the Federal cabinet saying he holds in high esteem his economics qualifications.

The daily MLADA FRONTA DNES deals with the concrete consequences of the latest developments in Slovakia, i.e., the breakaway of former Premier Vladimir Meciar's platform from the Public Against Violence movement, VPN, at the beginning of March and the shakeup in the Slovak government, including Meciar's dismissal, last week.

The split of the VPN has dramatically changed the balance of forces in the Federal Assembly. The parliament consists of the 150-seat House of the People and the 150-seat House of Nations. A vote on a bill is taken separately by deputies to the House of the People, the 75 deputies to the House of Nations elected in the Czech Republic, and the 75 deputies to the House of Nations elected in the Slovak Republic. MLADA FRONTA DNES says earlier, the VPN and the Christian Democratic Movement, KDH, had 47 seats on the Slovak part of the House of Nations, the VPN and KDH are the two bigger of four Slovak Government coalition partners, which was sufficient for pushing through a bill. Now eleven deputies, who had been elected for the VPN, support the VPN-ZDS faction. If they combine forces with the 27 deputies for opposition parties, i.e., the Party of the Democratic Left, SDL, the Slovak National Party,

SNS, and the coalition of national minorities Coexistence, they could bar passing a bill which requires 38 votes in the Slovak part of the House of Nations.

These figures show that the VPN-ZDS will play a key role in the parliament's decisionmaking. It will either contribute to the blocking of the work of the parliament and the government (including passing of a vote of censure on the government), call for new elections to the federal parliament, or it will resort to political blackmail. Or it could start talks on its entry into the federal coalition (which is not probable). In that case it would certainly demand an important post—let's say the post of premier for Vladimir Meciar, the paper adds.

Background of Political Tension in Slovakia Viewed

91CH0489A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Slovak
15 Mar 91 p 6

[Article from ECHO, "11th week 1991," abridged by LIDOVE NOVINY editors: "Comments and Contexts"—first paragraph is LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Among those analyzing the crisis in Slovakia is the student biweekly ECHO. Its latest issue carries commentaries as well as interesting facts unmasking the actors in a process the ECHO editors call a "gentle counterrevolution."

Background of the "Gentle Counterrevolution"

How is it possible that in Slovakia what is going on is going on? That the situation has become so acute, that there is so much tension in society?

Many people unnerved from the start by the authoritarian personality of Vladimir Meciar and critical of the coalition parties for their willingness to accept him as premier of the Slovak Republic are today hard put to discern the reasons for his great popularity.

Similar problems, that is problems of coping with authoritarian leadership, are being encountered in Hungary, Poland, and in the Czech provinces as well. Perhaps the only difference lies in the intensity and individual character of this or that personality, but enjoying popularity are people like Jozsef Antal, Lech Walesa, or Vaclav Klaus—that is, people capable of pressing for their interests by less than strictly democratic and mostly populist means, and offering people a broad protective shoulder in a paternalistic fashion.

Wherein lies the main risk? Probably in that the new leaders may abuse the trust of the nation of nations, that they may be ready to circumvent parliamentary solutions to problems, viewing them as cumbersome and impractical for fast action. But at the same time they may well hinder the gradual self-assertion of a civic society and the creation of self-regulatory mechanisms on the various levels of society.

International Aspects

There is yet another level to these international contexts. Along with Hungary and Poland, Czecho-Slovakia holds a virtual entry ticket to the various European political, economic, and security structures. This privilege, or luck, is not accorded to the other countries of the former East bloc: Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. There are at least two reasons: One, that the West was prepared to digest right away only these three countries with a disrupted economy and an uncertain domestic political climate and, second, that those other countries—often summarily and with a certain dose of superiority—are in Europe designated as countries of the Balkan type which is not a regional or geographical term but an eminently historical-political one.

In the situation of an unstable Slovakia which presently appears as the virtual neuralgic spot in the region from the geopolitical point of view, we are holding at the same time also a second ticket—precisely one ranking us with countries of the Balkan type.

What Will the KDH Reactions Be?

With its constituent congress on 17 February 1990 KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] entered upon the scene as the most agile and, for a certain time, most convincing political entity. It had the best prospects for winning the election and becoming the leader on Slovakia's political scene. Already prior to the election KDH undertook several steps which the intellectuals, still stuck in a post-November euphoria, found unnecessary or overly political and thus somehow unsuitable in the atmosphere of Havel's "nonpolitics" or "antipolitics."

The first awakening from the anticipated political supremacy came after the June parliamentary elections when top KDH leaders realized to their surprise that they had not won the election and that not even two letters from bishops and open support from church authorities failed to assure election victory in "Catholic Slovakia." But it seems that since that time KDH has to some extent learned from its own mistakes. Gradually KDH shifted emphasis from short-term to long-term goals, thus beginning to act in a truly political fashion, indeed in every respect that this implies.

Presently KDH has two big pieces on the chess board. One is their alternative economic program which they rather futilely sought to present in public but which, owing to its attractive contours, is sure to delude a part of the citizenry. The second piece is the issue of the constitutions. Already at their Nitra congress, but also on all subsequent occasions KDH representatives repeated that for now they are determined to maintain a common state with the Czech Republic. At the same time KDH is fashioning a door that could easily open for passage from a common, for instance confederative Czecho-Slovak state to two cooperating but self-existent and independent state entities, even though KDH leaders have distanced themselves from the goals and practices of the Slovak National Party and its extremist political kin.

In the beginning of the crisis Jan Carnogursky said that he would not take a stand on the internal VPN [Public Against Violence] disputes but that he did not like them since they weakened Slovakia's position in negotiations on the shape of the future constitution. By itself this may well be true but if anyone these days is laughing up his sleeve it is precisely KDH. Christian Democracy is becoming the third who wins today.

What Happens If There Is No Early Break in the Situation?

It is to be assumed that consideration of scenarios of this kind always contemplates several alternatives. They will have a few arguments handy right away.

The first will be used the moment the first social difficulties attributable to the reform will emerge. Immediately there can be assertions that, of course, it's because of them, it is all on their conscience since they wanted to suppress the social aspects of reform. In Slovakia these arguments have a great chance of being heard and accepted, internalized, mainly due to the persisting appeal of egalitarianism. In their everyday life it is very hard for many Slovak citizens to reconcile themselves to the fact that someone else is richer, abler, more successful than they. As soon as they begin to feel this very inequality more acutely, they will easily fall for the voices of false prophets that things could be different. It is interesting that when this happens these people arrive at the same platform with KDH which, as one of the authors of the government's reform program, simultaneously distanced itself from it, thus creating the paradoxical situation in which KDH emerges as a victor regardless of whether the program succeeds or fails.

The authors of the "gentle counterrevolution" scenario have one more chance, meaning that there is one more risk for democracy. Nationalist passions which are surging in waves, mainly on the occasions of celebrating Slovak national figures and approbation of laws on matters of "Slovak national concern" such as the name of the Republic, the sharing of powers and the Slovak language law, may reach their culmination when the time comes to approve the constitutions.

There is a distinct danger that if the principle of sequential adoption of constitutions is accepted, that is, first of the national constitutions and only subsequently the federal one, following the first step there will be efforts to block acceptance of a federal constitution. The argument is simple: we tried our best with those Czechs, did what we could, but there is just no way with them ("I no longer have confidence in Czech politics"—Andrej Ferko). Divergent concepts will lead to effective nonacceptance of a federal constitution, thus creating ideal conditions for the emergence of a Slovak state.

In this dangerous game there are also cards which may cause the situation to slip from the hands even of its main players. An unleashing of nationalist passions in Slovakia can easily incite a similar atmosphere in Hungary, not to mention the fact that similar signs have

appeared in the Ukraine as well. And so Slovakia, as the neuralgic spot in this "stable" part of the former East bloc, may spread unrest to several hot spots.

Background of Slovak Issues Examined

91CH0494A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER

ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Apr 91 p 33

[Article by Jacqueline Henard: "The Wedge That Is Supposed To Split Europe: Slovakia and the World of the Future; Secret Alliances Between Communists and Nationalists"]

[Text] It is still too early to evaluate the place which Magda Vasaryova will occupy in the foreign policy annals of Czechoslovakia in the days to come. In any event, the Viennese public was enchanted by her first speech; she is married, has two children, a pleasant slight accent, and, in public appearances, is always a little uncertain of herself. This is no insipid career diplomat personality, but rather an actress who, in the beginning, still traveled regularly back to Bratislava to give her evening performances. Just the right thing for the Viennese tabloid press which immediately introduced her in a full-page article as the "beautiful Czech ambassador."

This supposed compliment by the paper has given offense in her homeland to this day. The *Czech* ambassador? Magda Vasaryova is a Slovak, a woman of the people who come off as an appendage to the Czechs, not only in the name used for the country, but also in the atlas and in the consciousness of the world. The Slovaks are a small people who were considered to be unimportant by all their neighbors for a long time. The Czechs have revised their judgment in recent months; following the troublesome squabbles regarding such questions as the hyphen in the name of the state or the rotational principle at the head of the central bank, they now find them to be primarily burdensome. They have also appeared to be more uncomfortable for the rest of the coinhabitants of Europe in recent times with their nationalist demonstrations against language rights of minorities and commemorative celebrations recalling the clericofascist state established by the grace of Hitler. In the eyes of a Western observer who had experienced the liberation of central Europe, particularly using the example of Czechoslovakia with its romantic transfiguration, the Slovaks have damaged the myth of the successful revolution under the leadership of the poet-politician Vaclav Havel.

What is the matter with the Slovaks? The most favorite explanation for their sudden rebelliousness—that they are precisely a "backward people"—is a bit too brief. Two factors stand behind the unrest in the eastern portion of Czechoslovakia. One involves the decades-long and centuries-long neglecting of their interests. The Slovaks were never able to freely elect association with the Czechs. At first they were the serfs—held in ignorance—of the Hungarians; later, they repeatedly lacked a

firm elite during any decisive moments. This creates a favorable climate for strengthening the second factor which is becoming ever more clear these days: the unbroken desire of the Soviet Union to retain its influence in central Europe. There are many signs indicating that the repeated manifestations of separatism are backed by the conservative forces of the old Soviet power apparatus, which have concluded a rare special-purpose alliance with the altogether differently conservative exiled Slovaks of the immediate postwar period. Their undemocratic authoritarian views act as a unifying force.

Hungarian politicians in Slovakia are circulating rumors of an "Operation Klin [Wedge]"; the tireless KGB is alleged to be attempting to prevent the stabilization of the Poland-Czechoslovakia-Hungary axis together with its old contacts in the Czechoslovak secret police (STB) by driving a wedge into that axis—"just look at the map." The ticking of the Soviet clock will always be more clearly discernible here than it is in Bohemia. It is said that the plot advanced some in planning on the occasion of the journey to Moscow and Kiev by the controversial Slovak premier, Meciar, in mid-March. There is allegedly proof that the communist structures of the Catholic Church in Slovakia are involved and were engaged in fueling the fear of the Western-inspired economic reform and economic system in the rural areas with Slovak-neo-Pan-Slavic slogans.

Orientation toward Russia as a saving force has a tradition in Slovakia and the fear of the evils which would accompany the Prague-inspired adaptation processes in the economy is deep-seated in the collective memory. Between 1918 and 1938, 350,000 Slovaks emigrated in the face of hunger and misery. During that time, only 20,000 Czechs and Moravians emigrated. In large part, industry did not arrive until World War II when German armaments production came to Slovakia. Later, the communists built large-scale enterprises on this foundation, following the Soviet example. The Kosice Steel Mill (annual production, 3.5 million tons) or the group of armaments factories (which employ 70,000 to 250,000 workers, depending on with whom one is talking) are giants among such major plants as the shoe factory at Partizanske (18,000 employees). Cities have grown up around these combines, but are lacking in internal stability. Their rootless masses virtually offer themselves to social demagogic troublemakers.

It is alleged that the clandestine activities of the old Communists and secret service types did not really develop until the summit meeting of the three heads of state—Walesa, Havel, and Goencz—at Visegrad was considered to be a success. A student newspaper in Bratislava, ECHO, reported in detail, polemically, and specifically on a left-nationalist coup a few weeks after the meeting. It used charts to show which key positions in the Slovak Ministry of the Interior were occupied by former agents. Naturally, one asks where the students obtain these documents. Is it only beginner's luck, this research by dilettantes? Other questions come to mind.

In the provisional government of December 1989, Meciar had been minister of the interior, responsible for the dissolution of the STB; how had he actually managed this career leap from a position of an insignificant corporate lawyer at the Nemsova Glass Factory? And why is he so vehemently opposed today to the disclosure of names of agents in public office?

There are still other plausible explanations for the separatist-nationalist swings in Slovakia. In West Europe, so says the Christian Democrat Jan Carnogursky, the political process after 1945 was shaped by the great powers. In this regard, a vacuum exists in central Europe—consequently, the political forces are developing over a “broader spectrum.” Carnogursky is the key figure of the Christian Democratic movement, which has other traditions and greater opportunities in Slovakia than it does in Bohemia. He is from the opposition and comes from a political family which played a role prior to 1945. His future picture is a Slovakia which occupies “its own place” in the European community. After detailed discussions, almost all Slovak politicians admit that they use this or other vague formulations to actually mean independence.

Inquiries tend to indicate, however, that the population does not stand behind them; at most, 15 percent favor secession and full independence. But what should the politically inexperienced Slovak population imagine under the alternative “federation or confederation” concept? These concepts sound just as hollow as the International of the proletariat. On the other hand, Slovaks have generally very little in common with their neighboring nations. With respect to the Czechs, they are disturbed by the patronizing manner; they are bothered by the Poles and their eagerness to shop; and as for the Hungarians, they are bothered by the fact that 600,000 people in Slovakia speak Hungarian; and they all constantly signal the Slovaks that they know better.

Over time, this results in a turning inward. It was a bad omen for the future when, in the fall of 1990, barely a year after the student-inspired “velvet revolution,” it was precisely the students—the elite of tomorrow—who stood at the head of the nationalist movement. Slovakia is a mountainous land, separated from its neighbors by a chain of peaks. And so, nature has already barred it from easy access to the rest of the world.

Current Events in Slovakia Analyzed

AU0605100191 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak
27 April 91 p 3

[Commentary by Sergej Michalic: “Who Is Who”]

[Text] The recent debates in the Slovak parliament clearly demonstrated who is who on the Slovak political scene.

The finale of the dramatic days was completely symbolic—the speech by Federal Assembly Deputy M. Knazko resounded through Slovak National Uprising

Square on Wednesday. If not peculiar, then it is definitely paradoxical that approximately 17 months ago this man asked from the identical spot for free elections and a parliamentary democracy. On Wednesday he cast doubts on the same principles by claiming that what was happening in the Slovak National Council was predetermined: An association has been formed of a curious opposition of formally former communists—the Party of the Democratic Left, the Slovak National Party, and the Public Against Violence-For Democratic Slovakia [ZDS]. Even though for the ZDS, Deputy Hoffbauer took exception to the allegation that the entire platform was crossing over to the opposition, it is difficult to find any other explanation for the resignation of its ministers and the refusal to support Prime Minister Carnogursky's motion for a vote of confidence in J. Kucerak. It seems that his departure was more than just a “political levy” for the fall of the beloved V. Meciar from the prime minister's post. The result of the vote against the advocate of a liberal economy unequivocally confirmed the gradual movement of parliament to the left—to the social and national ideas of unspecified content or consequences. Moreover, it demonstrated that the new prime minister apparently will have great difficulties even in the future with the loyalty of the government coalition deputies, and that some of them are hazardously ignoring the political risk of a self-confident opposition. This risk is so great that even the two brothers from the Christian Democratic Movement leadership indicated the possibility of perceiving this development at such a critical moment as an effort by the opposition forces to accept responsibility for leading the country in the government. The secret ballot in the voting on Kucerak prevents a precise disclosure of where the votes disappeared that were needed to keep the conceptual thinker Kucerak in the Slovak government. Some of them probably belong to the Democratic Party, the leading representative of which, O. Keltosova, expressed her attitude toward the resolutions of the Slovak National Council Presidium in an unconventional and, for a member of this presidium, certainly an unusual manner when she preferred to address a demonstration rather than to speak from the place where she belongs, according to the will of the voters—that is, from her seat in parliament. Thereby she must have brought quite a lot of confusion to the ranks of this party that claims to be liberal. In addition to the fact that she herself stood up against the legitimate decision of the parliament's supreme body and thus cast doubts on the valid parliament's rules of procedure (while the acceptance of their legitimacy is one of the fundamental preferences of liberal parties), the head of the party, Holcik, after the support he had given to V. Meciar, stated on Wednesday evening on television that “under certain conditions” their party would remain in the coalition, and thereby it would indirectly support the conclusions of the Slovak National Council Presidium. However, even the “hesitation” of the Democratic Party would not suffice to recall one of the chief brains behind the economic transformation, and it seems that this time the Christian

Democratic Movement deputies did not pay much attention to the voice of a man who was by now their prime minister.

The very decision of the ZDS to transfer to the opposition in the Slovak National Council is actually consistent with the previous behavior of this platform. The near future will certainly show whether it was just a gesture or a premeditated maneuver that will permanently complicate the situation in the Slovak National Council and bring the date of the next elections closer (which the ZDS representatives themselves are calling for more and more openly), and whether the political strategists of the new political star, the ZDS, are sufficiently aware that every political step directly brings on the next one and that too many twists and turns and contradictory maneuvers do not bring lasting success. Among the consequences of such conduct is the ZDS' activity on the federal level, that is, in the Federal Assembly. On that level, it would mean a complication for the ZDS officials and their supporters in the federal parliament. The reason is that it would be very difficult to imagine a situation in a parliamentary democracy in which a politician did not consider the need of having support from his party and from the entire coalition that nominated him for his post. Nevertheless, it is possible that in the current tumultuous days in Bratislava such considerations are for many Slovak politicians too theoretical—if they have not criticized them already as contemptible principles of parliamentary democracy that hinder the spontaneous will of the nation.

The way out of the political collapse in Slovakia will largely depend on what happens under the windows of the parliament and throughout Slovakia. Even if the legend of the "velvet" November platforms was recalled at the ZDS' successful demonstration in Bratislava on Wednesday, the aftermath of this demonstration in front of the Slovak National Council was marked by something unprecedented. There was open violence, injuries. It seems that although some like the analogies between November and April, there will be some differences. Otherwise, it would be a revolution. That would require, however, specifying what kind of revolution it is and against what principles, particularly as it is accompanied by tear gas attacks on the freely and democratically elected parliament.

Jan Carnogursky Speaks of His Life, Ideas

91CH0481A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Slovak 8 Mar 91 pp 1, 10-11

[Interview with Jan Carnogursky, prime minister of the Slovak Republic, by Lubos Jurik; place and date not given: "Equal Rights and Equal Worth"—first two paragraphs are LITERARNY TYZDENNIK introduction]

[Text] Dr. Jan Carnogursky (b. 1944) graduated from the School of Law in Prague, worked as an attorney, was persecuted and tried in court for his political convictions. He served as a deputy chairman in the Federal

Government of National Accord, and at present is the first deputy prime minister of the Slovak Republic. He is chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia. In addition to many magazine articles he has published "They Persecuted Us for Faith" (1990).

Such is the briefest portrait of a Slovak politician whose rich spiritual world is hidden behind the appearance of an inaccessible, cold person. This conversation is not meant to be a psychoanalysis but rather a dialogue on matters mainly political; yet it has the ambition to delve under the surface and bring out a little more than is generally known.

[Jurik] However much our present time is a time of politics (but, let's face it, which time is not?), it is nevertheless the individual who is at the center of politics. The individual, his needs and aspirations determine the measure of politics as well as of the politician. Beyond doubt, it applies to you too. Because your political decisions too are influenced by your mental potential, experience, family background, or how you were raised. And all this, the human and personal element, finds reflection in political activity. So let us begin our conversation precisely with this: your past, distant and recent, your childhood, education, how you came to your view of the world....

[Carnogursky] I know the first year of my life in Mala Frankova, Zamaguri district, only from what I heard from my parents. It was where we lived through the advance of the front, in our house were lodged the staffs of two Soviet partisan brigades of Majors Belov and Volkov. After the war—this I already remember—we lived in Bratislava's Palisady, parents and five children. At that time there was a lawn in front of the Grassalkovich Palace and my elder sisters who were then raising rabbits went there to gather grass.... But these are merely nostalgic reminiscences. Afterward we lived for two years in Cerveny Kamen Castle, my father worked in the museum there. In 1951 my father was arrested in connection with the trial of bourgeois nationalists but after nine months was released from prison. Already prior to that Mother had moved back to Mala Frankova, together with us children. Later we returned to Bratislava but after completing grade school I could not get admission to secondary school; through acquaintances I gained admission to an 11-grade school in Kezmarok. After a year I returned to Bratislava but the same situation arose after graduation when I was denied admission to university. I attended extension courses, subsequently went to construction engineering and ultimately to law study which was what I had originally aimed for. I began study at the law school in 1964 when already we had a minor political thaw. The school was publishing a near-samizdat journal, MLADY PRAVNIK, and I became a member of the editorial staff. After printing each issue had to be presented to the dean for censorship and only then could it be distributed. In one issue I had an article on Marx's anti-Slavic statements and after that we had to present the materials for vetting before they went to print. After three years I transferred to Prague, just in the

fall of 1967 when big changes were in the offing. I graduated in Prague in 1969 and did my military duty in Bratislava. It was my original plan to specialize in legal theory but it was in the early period of normalization and I realized that I had no chance to engage in free scientific inquiry. So in September 1970 I joined a law firm. I started as a law clerk working for Doctor Sarkany and it was an exciting and formative period. Dr. Sarkany acquired a high profile as a renowned jurist, published in KULTURNY ZIVOT, specialized in labor law, and defended those who failed to pass loyalty tests and were thrown out of work.

But not only Party members were subject to loyalty testing; it extended to nonmembers as well, and so the question arose of my position on the entry of the [Warsaw Pact] forces. I responded in a way that my answer was double conditioned. The conditions were such as to make the end effect negative—but the test commission found it so complicated that they passed me. It was a tactic that I used also in interrogations by the State Security when I gave them multiple-conditioned answers. This bad habit has probably stayed with me since even now I am being reproached for expressing myself in an overly complicated manner and that I am hard to understand. At that time Dr. Sarkany defended Roman Kalisky who was thrown out of television, Perla Karvasova fired from radio, Rudolf Lesnak, people from the film industry.... He defended members of the Slovak intelligentsia who on grounds of principle filed suit against loyalty tests as invalid. It was with him that I learned the secrets of the legal profession, especially in regard to cases of this kind. When I myself became an attorney I continued to work in the area of labor law and defended especially religious activists, as well as those who failed the loyalty test or were expelled from the Party. In 1981 I was drummed out of law practice. I was defending a young woman in Moravia who copied dissident materials on her typewriter. At the time I already maintained contact with dissidents in Bohemia and Moravia, especially among Catholic circles, I also defended Chartists—for instance two of the earliest Chartists in Slovakia, Catholic priests Robert Gombik and Marian Zajicek. Even though StB [State Security] tried by various legal shenanigans to make a defense impossible, I persisted in my intent to defend them until they ultimately had to shelve the case.

[Jurik] Let me interrupt your story by a subsidiary question: I have heard that in the defense you were not only persistent but also sticking to your principles and in particular unyielding. Has this principled and unyielding trait become translated also into your political positions?

[Carnogursky] First I have to ask the question whether the case in point requires a principled stance, and then whether I can afford or sustain such a principled stance. When there are overwhelming forces arrayed against my position, it is futile to be unyielding because these forces

will simply crush me. Before I take up a strong, principled stand I must search and weigh. When I am convinced of my truth and know that I can defend it, I do not yield.

[Jurik] Let us return again to your life's narrative....

[Carnogursky] In April 1981 I was thrown out of the legal profession and subsequently worked as a driver in Doprastav. Some time in January 1982 I heard that either the Central or City Committee of the Slovak Communist Party issued a ruling that I may work as a company legal counsel, that I am not totally banished. So by way of an ad I got a job with the Housewares enterprise where I worked for three years as a staff lawyer. But I was then already known as a lawyer defending dissidents, and this reputation followed me further. When I was banished from legal practice the Voice of America carried a report on it and so a part of the opposition sought me out when they had problems. Thus I became active as a legal counsel to a large segment of the opposition. My conflict with the State Security was getting increasingly more acute and in 1985 I was subjected to the first house search. The management of the Housewares enterprise was behaving very correctly toward me, I felt quite happy there, but when I refused participation in the company's political education courses, as deputy head of the legal department, relations became complicated. So we agreed that I leave the company and I took a laborer's job in associated production. But there too State Security found me, so I was transferred to Slatinske Lazy near Zvolen where the cooperative was located. I commuted there for some three months but my family was in Bratislava so I left there too. As of 1 January 1987 I was unemployed. I tried to find a job but had no luck. My conditions were that it had to be legal work and in urban Bratislava. I had no success. In summer 1989 I was arrested and jailed.

[Jurik] The agitated political atmosphere in the fall of 1989 was stirred even more by the trial in which you were to be a defendant. Tell us, to put things in order, why you were arrested and put on trial.

[Carnogursky] There were several reasons. Publishing the samizdat BRATISLAVSKE LISTY, then our plan to place flowers at the Bratislava University and the Post Office on the anniversary of the occupation, the Povazska Bystrica branch of the Movement for Civic Liberty having held a memorial observance on the anniversary of M.R. Stefanik's birth and me making a speech at his statue in Predmier demanding free elections in the country. In the course of investigation the circumstances changed and ultimately I was tried only for BRATISLAVSKE LISTY and the placing of flowers. Criminal charges were filed against five: Kusy, Ponicka, Selecky, Manak, and me. We represented a colorful spectrum, the traditional dividing lines in Slovak society—Protestants, Catholics, former Communists.... Actually this was what gained us the support of the large majority of the public. Signers of petitions for our release ranged from Dubcek to Bishop Korec. State Security, as apparently also the

Central Committee, realized this and tried to divide us by separating my case from the rest. Kusy was released a month earlier and I was tried separately, which was to put at least optically a dividing line between us.

[Jurik] Your father Pavol Carnogursky was a noted politician in the period of the Slovak State. The history of the Slovak State (as well as the person of your father) has again become a subject of press comments, is being debated in seminars, undergoes reevaluation. How do you personally feel the effect and influence of your father's political past?

[Carnogursky] There certainly was an influence, even though not directly in the sense that I accepted all that my father did and thought. In our family we often discussed politics, past and present, and clearly under the influence of this environment I became interested in politics. I read newspapers, studied politics, decided to go into law. Father was sought out by many acquaintances and friends from the Slovak State days who debated and retrospectively analyzed that entire period. I liked to sit during such discussions and listen quietly; I learned much but, understandably, much was beyond my comprehension.

[Jurik] Your education was evidently influenced also by Catholicism, religion.

[Carnogursky] In the 1950's, 1960's, Slovak religion was relatively traditional in the sense that each Sunday one went to church and the believers' life ran in established patterns, in a certain rhythm. These established patterns, rhythm and an established base of ideas shaped a life with strong elements of stability. This is what I regard as one of the great advantages of religion in general. In this respect religion did have an influence on my education. Each Sunday we went to church and there we came together with people about whom I could be certain that they more or less shared my ideas. Only later, after my studies, did I begin to concern myself also with the Catholic social doctrine, to approach religion intellectually as well.

[Jurik] In Slovak national policy Catholicism always represented an important element not merely from the point of view of stability. Is this true also today?

[Carnogursky] I believe it is. At least in the sense that it shapes a large national group into a relatively stabilized form. Stability is of great importance in politics as well.

[Jurik] When you were active among the opposition important contacts and links were formed which ultimately resulted in an action-capable political force. How would you characterize that period?

[Carnogursky] In the 1960's it was mainly around KULTURNY ZIVOT that leftist-oriented Slovak intelligentsia formed a group; it was one of the most important components of the opposition. But I had virtually no contact with this group; rather, I moved within the Catholic milieu. When I went to Prague to study I gained

much intellectually but I was left there in relative isolation. Only in law practice did I begin meeting Slovak opposition intelligentsia, this time not just from among Catholic circles. Toward the end of my law practice I maintained contact with the whole spectrum of opposition. I was legal counsel to Hana Ponicka, Vladimir Manak, Jozef Jablonicky, Milan Simecka.... In Bohemia I first maintained contact with the Catholic segment of the intelligentsia, with Vaclav Benda, Josef Adamek, and through these contacts I became involved also with civic opposition, thus including the Chartists. Starting about 1984 the Charter began to organize meetings of the broader opposition, that is, not only Charter members. I began to attend these meetings, initially delegated by the Bratislava dissident group, and with the passage of time I began to act on my own. As travel was no problem to me I did a lot of traveling especially to Prague, and so I became rather quickly and on the whole organically enmeshed also with the Prague dissident circles.

[Jurik] Do you think that it was already in these dissident meetings that something like a political program took shape which acquired a real form in the beginning of 1990?

[Carnogursky] Only in a very general sense. At the time the Charter and the opposition movement could function only on the basis of defending human rights and religious activities. This basis was understandable also in the West. Western governments were ready to accord major political assistance to people engaged in this effort. If anyone here had embarked on direct political activity he would have been liquidated by State Security. The East-West power balance permitted us to act in defense of human rights which had profound political effect. But we were in no position to come up with any political program. If we discussed politics it was rather in the sense of analyzing the political situation. We did not expect such a rapid collapse of the old regime. A politician should judge his position skeptically rather than optimistically, and we too had to reckon with the worse scenario—viewed from our position—rather than the better one.

[Jurik] I don't want you to offer an analysis in this conversation but perhaps you could offer at least an opinion on how to explain the social change in our Republic. What were the forces, the vectors, the causes of the old regime's collapse?

[Carnogursky] The whole Communist system was weak even in the 1970's when it seemed to be at its apex. I could see it in my own experience. When acting as a defense counsel, even after my expulsion from law practice, on behalf of people in the opposition, I went to courts, to offices, and everybody, or almost everybody, was helpful. The system was corroded internally and beneath a false veneer of stability almost the entire society was actually in opposition. The corrosive forces were increasing steadily since the economy too was failing. When eventually the international support vanished as well, everything in our country crumbled.

[Jurik] How would you react to the Dolejsi articles in the Czech EXPRESS in which the publicist asserts that the overturn had been organized by State Security, CIA, and KGB?

[Carnogursky] State Security, which had available the best information—after all, it followed the situation closely—evidently recognized that the trend was irreversible and the regime would collapse. The final stage of the changes was speeded up by accumulation of international events. When I became a member of the Federal Government I had several visits from former State Security officials who told me ex post facto that in their estimate the regime would fall three years later.

[Jurik] Following the November events you became deputy prime minister in the Federal Government. Could you now give us a closer picture of the period between your release from prison and joining the Government?

[Carnogursky] Starting on 14 August 1989 I was in prison and there encountered an atmosphere so militantly anti-Communist that even I found it frightening. For a time I shared a cell with a former policeman arrested for attempting to escape to the West. I was shocked to see how much downright furious hatred was stored in him. The prisons had a so-called first department [prvohlavove] section housing political prisoners. It was isolated more strictly but in prison there are ways and means of communicating, such as through washbasins or toilets.... That section was saturated with a special anti-Communist mood. I had the feeling that if the regime falls in an uncontrolled manner there may be brutal revenge. I was released on 25 November and at that point there already were contacts between the opposition and the government of Ladislav Adamec. I quickly got in touch with my Czech friends, first of all with Vaclav Benda, and requested that Slovakia be represented in these consultations. While VPN [Public Against Violence] was already in existence, it somehow failed to register this dimension of the problem and did not generate any activity in this regard. The Prague center of the Civic Forum [OF] recognized that Slovakia must be represented in the consultations and since I had earlier developed good cooperation with the Czech opposition movement I was included in the delegation which on Tuesday, 28 November, held talks with L. Adamec. While not a VPN member I nevertheless regarded it as proper to inform VPN, which in Slovakia played the role of the revolution's leading force, that I was going to Prague and that I would be a member of the delegation. On Saturday I was released from prison, on Sunday I addressed a meeting Slovak National Uprising Square, on Monday I informed VPN of my going to Prague to join the talks. I did not come to ask them for permission or consent; for their part, they did not want me to act in VPN's name. I sought to persuade them to arrange their own agreement with OF to see that VPN was represented in the talks. I don't know the reasons why no agreement was reached, so I went to Prague on the understanding that I would not represent VPN. My

feeling was that VPN was cautious toward me. Thus I was a member of the delegation led by Vaclav Havel, we held talks with L. Adamec. Only in the following days did I become member of the VPN coordinating committee and began to work in VPN. Events accelerated rapidly. The VPN delegation had to travel to Prague more frequently to hold talks with OF which was then located in Laterna Magika. There we started discussing opposition participation in the government. I remember that some time in early December at Jiraskov I got a call from Vaclav Havel and his secretary told me he had a question for me which I could answer only by yes or no: Whether I was willing to accept the post of a deputy prime minister in the Federal Government with responsibility for organs of power, the army, security, and legislature. I replied then that if the opposition is joining the government and accepting a share of responsibility for the state and government, the answer is yes. So it happened that the opposition designated me for the Federal Government. From that period I remember hour-long discussions in Laterna Magika; there I became acquainted with many people, among others also Vaclav Klaus. He used to sit in the back because he did not belong to the dissident core; he acted rather as an expert, though clearly sharing the ideas of our platform. It was evident that between him and people around Havel there are no close affinities which can develop only in years of oppositional activity. When it came to filling top posts I realized how few people Slovakia has. There is an unwritten rule that when the president is a Czech, the prime ministership must be held by a Slovak. Since we did not know how the talks will come out we had to reckon with both alternatives. For the office of the president one could find candidates from Slovakia, but no candidate for the post of prime minister could be found in the opposition. It was indeed a risky thing to tackle it; after all, none of us had been previously admitted to the mechanisms of power or to politics in general. A similar situation obtained in the Czech lands as far as the opposition was concerned. I recall a funny episode when the demanding post of minister of fuel and energy could not be filled and it was being offered to Slovaks. We did not have a candidate, until someone suggested in jest to give it to Budaj, for he is something of a stoker....

[Jurik] How do you yourself evaluate your activity in the Federal Government?

[Carnogursky] It was a terrific onslaught. The Government of National Accord began working on 10 December. We were at the Castle and swore the oath of office to Gustav Husak....

[Jurik] Let me interrupt right here: It was a moment of paradox as only days earlier you had been Husak's prisoner....

[Carnogursky] I used the occasion to tell him "I do not recognize the offense for which I was jailed but you amnestied me and for that I thank you." Gustav Husak replied: "It was not I who had you jailed."

[Jurik] He used the familiar form in speaking to you?

[Carnogursky] There is such an unwritten rule among jurists that the older ones use the familiar form in talking to the younger colleagues. I respect that. Later I learned that Gustav Husak possibly even wrote to Jakes that he disagreed with my imprisonment.

[Jurik] Let us return to the Government of National Accord.

[Carnogursky] After the oath we had a formal, get-acquainted government meeting. We adopted a declaration on Human Rights Day. It was a text I found generally without fault, but anyway it was a mere formality: Who will remember today a Federal Government declaration on the occasion of Human Rights Day? Yet the new, mainly Czech opposition members of the government started protracted discussions on individual formulations.... It seemed to me totally useless. But then it dawned on me psychologically that my work in the government begins to be a serious matter. When we broke up, Valtr Komarek said to me "Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, you seem pale...." I shared responsibility for the Interior Ministry. Soon I began getting visits from members of the State Security, present as well as former officials of the ministry who provided information on the structure of this apparatus. It took a week before I got a notion of the mechanisms of this colossus. Everything was so conspiratorial that we literally had to study how the ministry is set up. Some top officials, especially of the first administration, the intelligence branch, were so secretive that even their closest collaborators learned their true names only after some time. I also devoted time to legislation and drafting new laws, traveled abroad, established contacts particularly with representatives of Christian Democratic parties and handled the routine agenda connected with my office.

[Jurik] At approximately the same time, that is, while you were in the Federal Government, the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] began to organize. Surely it is no accident that you emerged at the helm of this movement and participated in formulating its program. What was the genesis of KDH in Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] The opposition in Slovakia had a predominantly religious orientation. The Movement for Civic Liberty too was composed mainly of believers. It was my intention to publish BRATISLAVSKE LISTY already as a journal of the Christian Democracy and so indicate in the masthead. But the movement was being joined also by members of secret churches who were forbidden to participate directly in political life. Frantisek Miklosko too was a secret church activist and was ordered by it to abstain from political action in the opposition. Among the Catholic activists I was the one oriented more toward political than religious activity. I did not involve myself in organizing religious societies, but neither could I recruit members for the kind of political activity which was constantly on my mind. Publication of BRATISLAVSKE LISTY was delayed by

about a year because I wanted to persuade Jan Budaj to work with me; however, he declined because he had other intentions. It was only toward the end of 1987 when Jan Langos became my collaborator and by 1988 we were able to publish BRATISLAVSKE LISTY. As I said, in the subtitle we already wanted to state that this is a journal of Christian Democracy, but Langos, Miklosko, as well as others, persuaded me that it did not have to be spelled out there in print if the contents bore it out. My political orientation was always connected with Christian Democracy because I regard it as the most correct one. When I was released from prison and during those revolutionary days I began to carry out my intention. The appeal to form Christian Democratic clubs is dated 30 November 1989. So in my case I view proceeding in this direction as altogether natural.

[Jurik] For the purposes of our conversation you may want to recapitulate the goals and program of the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia.

[Carnogursky] The Christian Democratic Movement proceeds from an economic program of free enterprise, protection of private ownership, but also from mitigation of social inequalities by a tax system and other government and nongovernment measures. In other words, a social market economy. All these are concepts known and traditional not only in Slovakia but throughout the world. Hence there is no need for KDH to be overly specific in its program. In their philosophy the Christian democracies are moving along these lines. Let us add to it protection of the family, protecting public morals and the like. This also makes clear where we fit in internationally. I repeat: KDH need not formalize its program; it can ground itself on recognized and time-tested values. True, this may result in a relative disadvantage, as if we had been remiss in failing to work out our program in sufficient detail.

[Jurik] Do you think that the Christian Democracy's program is modern and promising for Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] The entire Christian social theory is grounded in natural human relations which are then transferred to the sphere of social life. The natural relations are the family. In the past it was the tribe, clan; presently it is the nation as the natural community of people. Aside from these natural relationships there are also communities established by formal acts of people, for instance democracy, political parties, citizenship, states. We prefer natural communities to those created artificially. I do not hesitate to say that we prefer communities created by God. It remains for me to add that all kinds of people have a tendency to mistake KDH for some sort of a successor to the HSLS [Hlinka's Slovak People's Party]. Karl Marx made the wise observation that history usually repeats itself twice: the first time as a drama, the second time as a farce. From the start it was clear to me that KDH cannot be that farce or a farcical continuation of HSLS policy.

[Jurik] Let us now turn to the problems which are directly connected with Slovakia's standing in the federation. Since KDH ranks with the policymaking political groups in the power structure, in the parliament as well as the lower executive bodies, it has an important role in shaping national identity, the Slovak nation's perception of its place, but also in setting direction to the national economy and as a result in shaping the relationship with the Czechs—in its entire complexity and contradictoriness.

[Carnogursky] We regard the nation as the basic macrosocial unit. This is to say that the nation is the starting point of our policy. The nation, not other social units. Hence the state too is derived from the nation, not the other way around. What flows from this is that the Slovak nation possesses a fundamental sovereignty. And everything else necessarily follows from this, including the Slovak nation's place in a state structure. But it is here that some problems arise. Let's be realists and recognize that common life of nations is not harmonious but also that we are a small nation. A small nation which in a thousand years has not managed to constitute itself into a state of its own—apart from a brief period during the war. We simply cannot make it without cooperation with other nations. We must also recognize that we live in central Europe which is very exposed both politically and economically and that our problems are not ours alone but are all-European problems. Instability in central Europe would mean instability in Europe as a whole. If we were the ones trying to cause instability we would be opposed by all. Each change in the existing stability, or let us call it the status quo, would be possible only by way of a certain instability. Transition from one stability to another is possible only through instability—that is, by destabilizing what is and replacing it with a new stability. In history transition from one stability to another is customary, but to find the right moment is the great art. Besides, we must reckon also with such aspects as economic prosperity. True enough, a nation can tell itself: freedom is worth more than economic prosperity and to gain freedom we must tighten our belts. The fundamental question which must be addressed by each state is the question of security. A state must before all else guarantee the security of its citizens. Only when it is able to guarantee security can it turn to other issues. For more than 40 years we have been living in peace, and so issues of security have disappeared from the citizen's consciousness. But when in 1968 tanks appeared in our streets the citizens quickly realized that armies are a prominent reality in our life. In the present time too the security of the state is a basic issue which we must address. It is the natural inclination of each nation to try to reach the level of other nations, also in terms of their government status. This trend is unstoppable. So let us ask ourselves: If Slovakia is dissatisfied with the present government arrangement, how can it achieve a different government status without seriously endangering stability and its own security? When the question is put this way, the first answer is that it cannot be done quickly and without being sure that this move will not get out of

control. Also, it would have to enable our environment to adapt itself to this process and understand that we do not wish to disrupt their security, their stability and, in a broader sense, their economy as well. Sometimes we are puzzled that people abroad have a negative picture of Slovakia. I believe this is due only in part to poor or distorted information. In my opinion this is primarily due to the fact that opinion abroad knowingly or instinctively fears a threat to the stability of central Europe and thus a threat to stability in general including their own when hearing about Slovak "separatism." So it is in the first place a question of self-interest, and only afterward of information.

[Jurik] If what you say is true, isn't it the duty of the Slovak political representation to explain Slovakia's positions, goals and interests? To explain and articulate them not only in a more lucid fashion but also on a higher diplomatic and intellectual level?

[Carnogursky] It is its duty in the sense of having to make the effort. But let me repeat: we cannot expect some dramatic break in the attitudes of our environment and Europe generally because the international community, primarily in the West, sees its own interests threatened by instability in Czecho-Slovakia. Besides, foreign policy is very expensive. The best possible way of bringing Slovakia into Europe's consciousness is by creating a dependable legislative system beginning with protection of foreign investments and ending with a democratic legal order including a parliament. Slovakia must enter the community of European nations as a legal entity which can be depended upon in every respect.

[Jurik] Let us now move from the area of foreign policy to the domestic political scene. It now turns out that the seemingly trouble-free coalition partnership has a good many minor or major disputes in practical politics and that even VPN itself is beginning to show notable differentiation. Slowly but surely we are being faced with a new election period and clearly the time has already come to think of a new configuration of political forces. How do you view the current developments and what in your opinion are the future prospects of political development in Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] Virtually all political movements or parties in Slovakia are crystallizing and at the same time undergoing internal differentiation. Such differentiation can be observed also inside VPN, although not as dramatically as in the Czech OF. These changes in VPN have not yet found a formal expression and apparently this has something to do with the fact that in Slovakia VPN does not enjoy such a prominent position as OF in the Czech lands. Let us look at the Slovak political spectrum from the point of view of the national program. A certain segment of VPN sees Slovakia's future in some kind of a Slovak cultural inclusion among European nations. This VPN segment is overly fearful of the risks connected with change in the status of Slovak government. The branch of VPN which emphasizes a national profile—its most prominent representative seems to be

Prime Minister V. Meciar—is formally bound by the VPN program meaning the so-called authentic federation, but in fact presses Slovak demands which go beyond. I see the dilemma for this current in VPN that on the one side it attracts support in Slovakia, while on the other arousing equally strong opposition outside Slovakia. The dilemma also is rooted in the fact that the answer to the Slovak cannot be exclusively Slovak. The answer must be European, or at least Central European. I see another problem in VPN's disproportionate emphasis on Slovakia's economic independence while neglecting other spheres of national life. These are the limits of a concept which will exhaust itself sooner or later. The trend represented by the Slovak National Party and in part also by Matica slovenska [Slovak Foundation] accentuates Slovak statehood issues, but in a way that invites support in Slovakia but arouses opposition on the outside. It runs into a dilemma which it is incapable of resolving, except at the price of an excessive internal mobilization of Slovak society. The Slovak National Party's national program could be put into practical effect only if Slovakia were to be turned into a single large military camp defending itself in a circle against all. But already in the local elections this line has been found impractical.... The posture of nationalist radicalism injects an element of instability not only into Czecho-Slovakia but also into Central Europe and Europe in general. The world is afraid of disturbing stability; we see it in the cases of the Baltic republics or Yugoslavia. Central Europe is a great deal more important than the Baltics or the Balkans, so that any instability would get much greater forces into motion. My vision is for us to achieve a position of equal worth. I say equal worth because Slovakia has already attained a position of equal rights. Equal worth also in terms of protocol so that we can become the subject of interstate relations. Slovakia should attain such status not by breaking up Czecho-Slovakia but by changing Czecho-Slovakia into an open community of nations and nationalities which will eventually join the broader European community on the basis of equal rights and equal worth. But this status we must achieve gradually and in a smooth manner, without endangering anyone or ourselves. In this we must not pose a threat to the Czechs either because it is precisely the Czechs who are our most natural strategic allies. Such a development is possible only by peaceful means, avoiding anti-Czech rhetoric and the various affronts and provocations. If we want to reduce to a minimum the period of instability—which constitutes the transition from one stability to another—elements of that future stability should be attained within our present political steps. Also, elements of the future interstate arrangement should find reflection in the present-day intrastate arrangement. From this point of view Slovakia should eventually function as an independent subject in an integrated Europe. This concept alone offers the prospect of bringing Slovakia up to the level of other nations also in terms of protocol. We must watch out that we will not become a satellite of either East or West, and that we capitalize on our natural

geographical position in the center. An overly conflict-laden process of pressing for Slovak self-assertion would most likely drive us into an excessively tight embrace by one or the other. Therefore we must endeavor to maintain balanced relations with all neighbors, but on the basis of equal rights and equal worth.

Slovak Parliament Passes Laws on Police, Budget

*AU0605154991 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
30 Apr 91 pp 1-2*

[Article by Antonia Vymazalova and Stefan Hrcko: "Policemen Yes, Doctors No"]

[Excerpts] (From our parliamentary correspondents)—Following the weekend break, the Slovak National Council [SNR] reconvened yesterday for the fourth and final day of its 13th session. [passage omitted]

The first point on yesterday's agenda was the government SNR bill on the Slovak Republic's police force. The law was proposed by Slovak Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner (Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]) on behalf of the Slovak government. In his opinion, the bill is being introduced in harmony with the approved jurisdiction changes between the federation and the republics in the internal law and order and security spheres. The bill abandons the principle of a single national security corps in the sense that it concurrently eradicates the undesirable concentration of power within a single federal central organ. He also stated that the law's stipulations make it impossible for police officers groundlessly or indirectly to harass citizens since the law directly amends police officers' authority under rigorously specified conditions and restrictions. On the basis of this police officers should have no doubt as to whether they are adhering to the letter of the law when carrying out their duties.

In conclusion, the minister expressed his conviction that it will be possible to reduce the crime rate by the adoption of the proposed law.

Deputy Peter Hatapka (KDH), the SNR committees' joint rapporteur, spoke in detail about the majority of the committees' 62 comments. He said that the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee disagreed with the bill, but the other committees recommended it with changes and supplements. Fourteen deputies made speeches in the subsequent debate. They focused mainly on making sure that the executive authorities are unable to use the police force against citizens. Some of them expressed themselves for or against establishing a service to protect the Slovak Republic's economic interests. Deputy Jozef Moravcik (Public Against Violence [VPN] movement—For a Democratic Slovakia [ZDS] platform) put forward a whole series of amendments and supplementary proposals on which members of the SNR Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee had agreed. Deputy Eduard Barany (Party of the Democratic Left) warned that

Section 4 Paragraph 5 makes it possible for the executive authorities to abuse the law.

Minister L. Pittner defended the establishment of the Service for Protecting the Slovak Republic's Economic Interests. He justified this move by stating, among other things, that we have been warned from abroad to watch out for money laundering and that many state enterprise directors are setting up—or alternately, are members of—shareholding companies and are impoverishing the state enterprises they manage to these companies' benefit. He did not support the move to abolish detoxification stations.

During the midday break, the deputies met in their deputies' clubs. We found out that the VPN—ZDS Club has 19 deputies (the original VPN has 24 members and the VPN-Hungarian Independent Initiative has five members).

After the break, the plenum voted on the individual comments. Many of them were adopted, including the suggestions put forward by J. Moravcik and E. Barany. In the end the deputies approved the SNR Law on the Slovak Republic's Police Force in a version containing the adopted changes and supplements; 123 deputies voted in favor of the law, two were against, and six abstained. [passage omitted]

It was thought that it would be simple to debate and approve the SNR National Economic and Budget Committee bill that will alter SNR Law No. 593/1990 on the Slovak Republic's Budget for 1991. Committee Chairman Ivan Luptak (VPN—ZDS) submitted the bill. The Slovak Republic voluntarily surrendered, in favor of the Czech Republic's state budget, part of the 1991 proceeds from income tax and the agricultural tax on total wages and special payments paid by workers with permanent residence in the Czech Republic who work in the Slovak Republic. This stipulation is being abolished because the Czech Republic has not adopted a similar course of action. Among other things, the draft asserts that the proceeds from income tax and taxes on total wages collected from community enterprises should fall to the community that founded the enterprise. [passage omitted] The deputies approved the amendment to the SNR Law on the Slovak Republic's Budget for 1991 as proposed by the SNR National Economic Committee. [passage omitted]

Religious Revival Detailed, Discussed

91CH0490A Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Apr 91
pp 1, 3

[Article by Jean-Michel Dumay: "Springtide for Czech Faithful"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] Prague—For six centuries, the history of the Czech church has unfolded over a few square meters of polished tiles, the Straromestske [Old Town] Square, in Prague. As precursor of the Reform—and as the national conscience erected as a statue after proclamation of the

Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1918—Jan Hus, burned at the stake in 1415 for heresy, directs his bronze gaze, reprovingly, toward the Church of Tyn, symbol of Catholic supremacy under the Habsburgs. A few paces away, 27 crosses on engraved bases recall the hanging, a few meters overhead, of 27 Hussite nobles, who in that baroque era of state-controlled Catholicism preferred death to exile or conversion.

For the second consecutive time, Czech Christians have been able to celebrate Easter in freedom, three days after the pope's appointment of Monsignor Miloslav Vlk as the new archbishop of Prague (see LE MONDE of Friday 29 March).

In casting off the cape of 40 years of atheist communism, the "velvet revolutionaries" have also, in fact, revived the historic foundations of their culture and of their national conscience. By way of light touches, keeping a close watch over the exercise of cults, the communist authorities had played intelligently on differences.

A sample of the sensitivities that remain: Today, some Catholics are still demanding, by forthright petition, the reconstruction of the Marian column that had stood in front of the Church of Tyn and was destroyed in 1918... just six days after the declaration of independence and the fall of the Habsburgs. While in Slovakia, rural country, the religious landscape has never ceased being monolithic—80 percent of its population is Catholic, and the percentage of practicing Catholics remains high—the religious history of Bohemia-Moldavia is one of pendulumlike swings between Catholic and anti-Catholic governments.

True, today, the former "collaborator" priests of the Pacem in Terris movement—connected with the communists, forbidden by the Vatican, and now dissolved—have adopted a low profile, and the 700 clandestinely ordained priests are coming out of the shadows weakened. But clearly, the fear of a resurgence of the power of the Catholic clerical establishment remains.

The friendliness being shown toward the Catholic hierarchy by the Czech authorities—foremost by President of the Republic Vaclav Havel—is a constant source of irritation for the Protestants, the nationalists of the Hussite Church,¹ and most of the atheist groups. The clichés abound. In a recent televised debate on the religious revival in the country, there was an endless outpouring of questions... on the Vatican's budget. This mistrust was also evident in June 1990 in the crushing defeat of the Christian Democrats, who, in the end, won less seats than the Communist Party.

Like it or not, the Catholic Church, in Bohemia, retains the negative image of its Habsburg model. The vacillation around the thorny issue of separation between the state and the Church is, today, its most direct attestation. Currently, the Church is balking at demanding full restoration of the assets "confiscated" from it in 1950, which included 320,000 hectares of land and forested

areas. Meanwhile, the priests continue being paid by the state, as under the old regime, and as are the Protestant and Hussite pastors.

"Even were the Church to recover all its assets, it would be unable to pay for the maintenance of its properties," says Monsignor Lobkovicz, auxiliary bishop of Prague. "And above all," he insists, "looking toward the future, we do not want the Church to be branded 'a rich Church.'" In due time, Church and state are also very likely heading for a separation, which the Vatican itself has proposed, modeled on the Italian Concordat.

At the same time, the Church's position is made all the more difficult for the moment by the fact that it is being pressed by the state, as are all the other denominations, to provide social services, especially education and health care. These services require the use of large premises. In Brno, for example, a Catholic lycee was returned to the Church, together with the burden of providing the education at its own expense. In Prague, a nursing school and a household services training school were turned over to the nuns.

40 Years of Spiritual Void

Progressively, religion is finding its place again in Czech society. Openly persecuted, the Catholic Church has recently revised its structures. The heretofore vacant dioceses have each been provided with a bishop. A Bishops Conference was created just before the pope's arrival in April 1990. The colleges of theology, all denominations combined, have, on average, quadrupled their staffs, and, irony of ironies, Prague's Djevice Seminary has turned its former premises into an institution devoted to the teaching of the dogmas of "real socialism"....

"First and foremost, we must reinstitute pastoral life," says Monsignor Lobkovicz. "Who, today, still knows what catechism is? It will take us all of 20 to 30 years to fill the spiritual void left by the communist presence." Jesuit Father Petr Kolar, exiled in France since 1968, and now head of religious broadcasts on the national radio network, adds: "To say nothing of the fact that the reform wind blowing from Vatican Council II has hardly touched this Church in the shadows."

Little by little, the religious orders are also returning to life. Felicitously or less so. Jesuit spirituality, for example, Father Kolar notes, appears to have disappeared in the dense fog of clandestinity. The elderlies, trained "under the rules," are now in their 70's and 80's and widely dispersed. In Prague, 15 Dominican friars—six of whom are novices—have recently reactivated St. John's Church and the imposing monastery adjoining it. Brother Wojcek, 37, was ordained clandestinely in Leipzig. As a computer engineer in "civil" life, he spent the last five years translating the Jerusalem Bible on his personal computer, and is now happy that very soon he will be free to publish the first few copies.

The faithful as well are organizing their daily lives. Some have changed parish, deserting former "collaborator" priests for the erstwhile underground priests. "The situation has changed," remarked one layman, "but the forces are limited. The underground priests, who, by force of circumstances, became workers, continue to identify closely with the concerns of all,² but today they are overworked and cannot meet the demand." In fact, lay persons have taken on responsibilities in enterprises, in the schools, and even, in some cases, in public life.

Catechism can be taught legally now not only in churches but also in some public schools on an extracurricular basis. At the same time, Prague's archbishop has set up a three-year course in theology to train lay persons in catechism. The course already has 360 enrollees.

Other lay persons, previously engaged in samizdats (underground publications), have embarked on political careers. Mrs. Maria Kaplan, mother of 10 children, had become adept at playing the game of hide-and-seek with the police. Every Friday evening, she would organize prayer meetings around a cross installed in her living room. After coming out of the shadows, she became a founder of the Czech Christian Democratic party and was elected a member of Parliament. Mrs. Kaplan is worried about her countrymen's passivity, their progressive resignation, and the new government's family policy, which, in her view, disadvantages large families.

Lure of Slovak Separatism

True, over the past 10 years, the Catholics and Protestants have been rediscovering the virtues of dialogue. They had already had a meeting of minds with each other in the underground, around Convention 77. In 1988, the Protestants wrote a letter asking the Catholics for forgiveness of their passive complacency toward the state during its persecutions of the 1950's. And some Catholics are seeking a revision of Jan Hus's trial.

But, unlike the Catholic priests, who are more concerned with responding to the spiritual call, the Protestant pastors seem more inclined to elaborate the political in their sermons, transforming them into a social discourse. "It is a pressing need," says Pastor Kocab, one of the signers of Convention 77, who was dispossessed of his official license as a pastor in 1974, and who, after having worked as a heating engineer for 15 years, has just had his church given back to him.

Nevertheless, other questions remain. The Catholic Church, like the country itself, is not monolithic. It too finds itself having to confront the problem of nationalities. In April 1990, at the start of the Czech Bishops Conference, the Slovak Church, having organized its own episcopal conference in 1989, different in form from that of the Bohemia-Moravia alignment, made clear its intent to retain a distinct identity. The Catholic federal structure was held together only by the personality of old Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, 91, a true symbol of the unity between Czechs and Slovaks, who has been replaced now by Monsignor Vlk.

"Czechoslovakia," says a Catholic lay person, "is searching for a point of equilibrium between the economic and the spiritual... if only to keep up its spirit!" To this end, it draws on its Christian roots, as did Minister of Education Petr Vopenka in a recent radio speech addressed to all Czech students and schoolchildren, in which he emphasized the value of the Bible, calling it "a cultural, literary, and ethical jewel." Some remember as well that a passage in Convention 77 (dating back to 1985), headed "The Right to History," asserted the Christian consanguinity of Czech and Slovak culture.

And the famous dictum of Tomas Masaryck, founder of the Republic—"The Czech question is a religious question"—has not lost its merit in Czechoslovakia. The quest for meaning, crushed yesterday by the absurd, verges upon the quest for history, obliterated by forgetfulness. It is probably in this sense that President Vaclav Havel's open arms to John-Paul II...and to the Dalai Lama can be explained.

Footnotes

1. In Czechoslovakia, the Catholic Church represents 51 percent of its 15 million inhabitants. The Evangelical Church (200,000 members), which brings together Calvinists and Lutherans, is termed "unified." Incidentally, there are some 10 or so Protestant denominations, which, all together, including the Evangelical Church, total some 500,000 members. In 1972, the Czech National Church, founded in 1918 after the independence, took the name "Hussite" (although it no longer has any generic ties, so to speak, with the 15th century reformer). The members of this Church are estimated to number at least 800,000, with 300 pastors (40 of whom are women), five bishops, and a patriarch.

2. Significantly, the Czech Bishops Conference has entrusted its public relations to a French Mission priest, Father Noel Choux, who trains priests for the work.

HUNGARY

Zwack Fire Investigation Reportedly Quashed

LD0705090291 Budapest Radio in Hungarian
0800 GMT 7 May 91

[Text] According to NEPSZAVA, a telephone call from a higher state-political level put an end to the investigation into the fire in Peter Zwack's flat. Fire broke out in the former Washington ambassador's rented flat in Budapest on 19 April. According to the engineer, who does not wish to give his name, the samples of parquet that were collected at the scene were handed over to an expert who was later told that his report was not needed any more as the investigation was over. The insurance company did not start an investigation either; in fact, there was no police action conducted in the matter, although it is true that Peter Zwack did not contact the

police, either. The expert, who wishes to remain unnamed, told NEPSZAVA that he could prove his allegations.

Envoy on Relations With Israel, Arabs

LD0605202591 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1805 GMT 6 May 91

[Interview with Dr. Janos Gorog, Hungarian ambassador to Israel, and Dr. Yosef Govrin, deputy director general in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by correspondent Istvan Kulcsar in Tel Aviv; date not given: "Finding Each Other Once Again"]

[Excerpts] [Kulcsar] Within a week, Jozsef Antall is travelling to Israel. This will be the first official visit of a Hungarian head of government in this Near East country. Taking into account that this is taking place hardly a year and a half after the two countries restored diplomatic relations, the warming of relations can unquestionably be regarded as fast. One of the participants of this process is Dr. Janos Gorog. Dr. Gorog is important not only because today he is the Tel Aviv ambassador of our country, but because he is one of those Hungarian diplomats who prepared and discussed with the Israeli partner the full restoration of relations.

Mr. Ambassador! You have been here in Israel now for a year and a half. During this time how have relations between this country and Hungary developed?

[Gorog] I think that our relationship has continued to develop even since I have been here. But in reality, if we had want to examine the development of this relationship, we will have to go back to the middle of the 1980's when it all started. If such relations could be given a numerical indicator, because such indicators do demonstrate something, then I would say that very typical data was in Hungarian-Israeli economic relations in 1986, the full value of trade was 13 million [currency not specified], and this year will be 51-52 million. This figure demonstrates an annual 25-to-30-percent increase in the relations.

For the numerical data I mentioned economic relations, but this could be transferred to every area, for example cultural links, tourism. I think that by now we have reached the position whereby we have so-called normal relations. Today there are no sensations, no great happenings. We are maintaining the same kind of relations with Israel as with any other European country.

[Kulcsar] I understand you mentioned Europe intentionally, because although Israel is in the Near East, a great majority of its population is of European origin.

[Gorog] I did mention it, if not intentionally, then certainly not by accident. Israel, because of the whole of its socioeconomic structure, can and must be treated as a European state. So I did not mention it in this way by accident; Israel is close to us, and we are not regarding it

as just another country, because this is a country where 250,000 people know, understand, and speak Hungarian. [passage omitted]

[Kulcsar] What kind of image does Hungary have in Israel?

[Gorog] The Israelis know very well that to some extent we always did stick out in Eastern Europe. They know about our 1956 revolution, our economic reforms, and they look at us as pioneers of the Eastern European changes. The positive view has to a very great extent been reinforced by the fact that we were the first to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel and they do not want to forget this. [passage omitted]

[Kulcsar] I wonder, is it not taken amiss in Israel that Hungary is maintaining good relations with the majority of Arab countries?

[Gorog] Our relations have not deteriorated; I would even risk to say that in many areas, they have even improved. Within the political thinking of the Arab countries there is an element that perhaps the Israelis are outbidding the Arab world, and that they have to therefore compete in this respect. Therefore, I do not see and do not feel that this could have a negative influence on our relations with the Arab world, especially because as far as I know, the Hungarian foreign policy is carefully evenhanded in order to maintain the balance in our relations in both directions. Here in Israel we used to argue when discussing various political questions that now we are speaking to both sides, it is in the interests of Israel to find some form of settlement with the Arab world somewhere and at some stage. Therefore, I am not sure they would mind finding some kind of links perhaps even through us. [passage omitted]

[Kulcsar] Let us hear an official opinion from Dr. Yosef Govrin, deputy director general in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was in Budapest not long ago, first and foremost in order to discuss issues related to the Hungarian prime minister's visit.

Dr. Govrin, what place does Eastern Europe, first and foremost Hungary, have in Israel's foreign policy?

[Govrin] As you may well know, the process of reestablishing relations between Israel and certain East European countries, including Hungary, began before diplomatic relations were established. I am of the view that Hungary's distancing from Soviet influence, and the democratization process which the government there has begun, definitely accelerated the process of reestablishing full diplomatic relations.

Allow me also to mention the very important factor that Hungary, like the other East European states, has, according to all indications, recognized and acknowledged that the breaking of relations in the past did not facilitate either bilateral relations or the peace process in the Middle East. I could say precisely to the contrary.

The image of Israel which has developed is that of a tiny country which has lived through calamity, as the country which has achieved considerable success in the spheres of technology, science, agriculture, and medical sciences. This positive image has probably also contributed to the process of finding one another again.

As regards our current relationship, this is characterized by the ever increasing relations which considerably exceed the level attained in the first period of earlier Hungarian-Israeli relations. This also pertains to political dialogue as well. I am of the opinion that the possibilities in both Budapest and Jerusalem are much more considerable, greater than the current level, and here the question of how much of these we are able to realize in our bilateral relations depends on us, the two sides. [passage omitted]

MSZP Comments on Negotiations With MSZMP *91CH0455C Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET* *in Hungarian 5 Mar 91 p 6*

[Interview with Sandor Csintalan, MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] executive, by (cseke); place and date not given: "Are the MSZP and the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] Winking At Each Other? Only Trenches Exist Between The Parties"—first two paragraphs are MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] It has become customary in recent times that representatives of the various parties try to come to an agreement behind closed doors. Last week, it was the representatives the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] who sat down at the conference table. One cannot really know what went on, because representatives of the two parties made conflicting comments. It seems, on the basis of statements made to the press, that while the MSZMP unequivocally welcomes the new relations, Gyula Horn is not as enthusiastic about the rapprochement. Even outsiders evaluated the meeting. Parliamentary representative Csaba Ilkey, for instance, fears an extreme leftwing threat resulting from the meeting of the two leftwing forces.

We asked MSZP Executive Sandor Csintalan whether the MSZP and the MSZMP are winking at each other, or if last week's dialogue was a mere getting-to-know-each-other.

[Csintalan] There is no question of establishing closer relations. We would like to establish good relations with all parties in order to deal with recently raised concerns, e.g., with workers' representation or the solution of other regional economic issues; this is, and nothing else, what we are discussing. We are striving for professional dialogues of consultation with the MSZMP, too, and this is the reason for the present talks.

[(cseke)] Up to now, the MSZMP emphasized that it distanced itself from the MSZP. In view of these statements, this rapprochement is rather strange—even if it is only being done routinely.

[Csintalan] This question suggests a dramatic misunderstanding. As if representatives of differing views could not sit at the same table. The main flaw of the present political institutional system is that only trenches exist between the parties. They shout over to each other, and rapprochement is slow in starting. If a party speaks to another, the event is immediately used for political speculations. For instance, when the MSZP meets with the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], then people say that it is becoming liberal; when it meets with the MSZMP, then they talk about a communist threat; and when it meets with the Christians, then it is accused of shifting in the populist-national direction. Those analyzing the situation forget only one thing: Society's interest demands the establishment of routine professional diplomatic relations between the political forces, otherwise the clarification of concerns becomes impossible.

[(cseke)] Are you not afraid that your talks with the MSZMP will elicit a fear in MSZP circles, because nowadays the MSZMP's name does not have a nice ring to it, the party does not attract the masses?

[Csintalan] I believe that neither our membership nor our sympathizers overestimate these talks. Besides, I think that as long as the MSZMP continues to be a constitutional party and receives state subsidy, the fact that we want to establish normal relations with it must not be viewed as an issue of legitimacy.

SZDSZ Opposition to World Expo Criticized

*91CH0502A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
22 Mar 91 p 3*

[Article by Laszlo Rab: "Alone in the Chess Game"]

[Text] Most probably, the government coalition, i.e., its largest party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, will take even the last crutch away from the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]. The latter miscalculated the timing of its citizen's attitude toward the 1995 Vienna-Budapest World Expo and, as we all remember, came forward with the rather impossible idea that the World Expo should take place in 1996. To date, the reason for this recommended delay has not been explained, and to say that Hungary cannot afford the Expo is too general and can be applied to anything.

The 1996 "argument" was welcomed by those who thought that it was better to wait and see. Prime Minister Jozsef Antall himself did not take a stand in the Expo issue, allowing the various ideas to soar, and he was bothered neither by the Budapest-City concept nor by the lack of concept of the Expo's official bureau. The prime minister, who is well versed in the practice of the

"wait-and-see" policy, supposedly knows why it was not worth it to him to expose himself in connection with the Expo issues.

Now that several organizations and groups have expressed recently that they find it important to have the Expo, the government will also take a stand. More and more often is the argument heard that the Expo may help Hungary in its predicament by providing jobs, circulating money, and offering opportunities of various kinds. If public opinion turns in this direction, the coalition will not pass the chance. And the free democrats would be politically defeated again through their 1996 idea of "I want it and I do not."

I will not say that the overwhelming majority of Hungary's population supports the Expo but I will state that many people are for it. The news indicates to me that more people are for it than against it. The more we are running into the crisis, the more people will view the Expo as the last great chance. It is another matter how much farther ahead we would be if the political forces had not used the Expo for their own purposes.

The government coalition, no matter how much it is being criticized, is more united than the opposition. The coalition partners will vote, even on the Expo issue, as the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] will direct them. The latter is the majority and that is how it should do it. The SZDSZ and the other opposition parties are incapable of any coordinated action. The FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth] did not openly support the 1996 proposal, and the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] is expressly pro-Expo. Several regional SZDSZ organizations are pro-Expo. This further increases the distance between the leadership and membership of the largest opposition party. If, in the aftermath of its defeat during the course of the debate on the compensation law, the SZDSZ loses again in the Expo issue, party members may become used to constant defeat. And the party, known for its actions and mobility, may lose its momentum that it still had during the local government elections.

The opposition is more divided than the government coalition, and the MDF will exploit this in the Expo issue, just as it does in any other issue. It is understandable that the SZDSZ did not embrace the MSZP during the night of the parliamentary elections; why should one love his onetime enemy? But it must be recognized that the SZDSZ would still prefer to say no rather than yes. With these frequent no's, it is constantly being left by itself in the political chess game. As long as it will stand by itself, its insistence on its ability to govern will seem really illusory.

Now, in this country, it is impossible anymore to occupy a government position by mere denial, refusal, and defiance.

DEMISZ Implicated in Theft of KISZ Funds*91CH0455G Budapest HETI KIS UJSAG in Hungarian
8 Mar 91 p 8*

[Article by Marton Balla: "This Is How KISZ [now DEMISZ, the Hungarian Democratic Youth Organization] Stole; How About DEMISZ [Hungarian Democratic Youth Organization]?"]

[Text] If the saying that money does not make one happy is true, then someone must be really unhappy now. Someone who put his hands on the sum of about 2.5 billion forints, or on part of it, which is missing from the former KISZ [now DEMISZ, the Hungarian Democratic Youth Organization] property and which disappeared into thin air; that is, if one can believe the property accounts.

The State Accounting Office does not believe them. It does not believe either the DEMISZ' repeatedly submitted accounts, or just as Moscow during the old times, the easily elicited tears of orphaned KISZ-babies that water the extinct state party's grave. There are indeed reasons for crying: It is the fourth time now that that wicked Accounting Office found the DEMISZ's property account unacceptable. The youth leaders, who are accustomed to a different tone of voice, became so outraged that they threatened a civil lawsuit against the ASZ [State Accounting Office] director for defamation.

This constant requirement of accounting property is a real hassle for sure. The revolutionary youth is indeed doing everything to free itself from the painful burdens it must carry, for example, from the former KISZ Central Committee's headquarters building which was hastily sold in the summer of 1989 to the Hungarian Credit Bank for 780 million forints. It is only a small blemish that the KISZ palace was state property and that the DEMISZ had only management rights. But thanks to the legal loopholes of those times, the deal is valid, and it is an open question whether it will be changed because of parliamentary representative Dr. Pal Becker's remarks made last October in which he questioned the transaction's legality.

Of course, there were good uses for the money: 268 million was distributed among the member organizations as financial support. (Six million for each member organization? Not bad at all.) Ninety million went to the Jack-of-All-Trades Commercial Company, 100 million to the MISZOT [expansion unknown] fund, and 71 million to cover the costs of the trade school built in Nicaragua, to mention only the larger items. The latter noble act must have been very close to the heart of the onetime young communists who, still under KISZ auspices, spent \$50,000 dollars for travelling in West Europe, looking for appropriate furniture for the school.

What malicious people would say to this is that it came easily and went easily, but they would be wrong because we all know that it did not go easily. That is, moving into the new headquarters did not go easily, because the costs

of the move totalled 15 million in the end, even with an apparatus reduced through an expenditure of 3.5 million.

But let us leave the headquarters building alone, the millions will give us a headache. Let us look instead at the real estate that has not been sold, as well as at other KISZ successors who are present in public life in large numbers. Here is, for instance, the BIT, the glorious Leftwing Youth Rally which earned the admiration of all of us by tearing down posters and painting graffiti on the sidewalks ("Europe is to the Left") during the election campaign, and my own personal admiration by their captivating self-confidence in using a little palace on Rozsadomb, only having management rights and valuing it at half-price, as fixed capital for a joint venture.

Of course, it would be an exaggeration to say that everyone wants to get rid of the inheritance. As an example to the contrary, the TEDISZ [expansion unknown] of Terezvaros is fighting tooth and nail for its shabby little house on Andrassy Avenue that used to belong to Manfred Weiss. They do not have to fear its loss, for the building is guarded by the Young Guards which, as we all know, leads the battle, attacks courageously, and has no mercy.

This is how the impassioned youth are quietly fighting, keep fighting, against evil society. They are the champions of the only ideal of salvation, reminding me of certain Japanese soldiers who kept defending the occupied island even after the end of the war. The only difference is that the Japanese did not even think of selling that island, and for whatever reason, did not form a joint venture. And they did lose the war.

1 May Suggested as Holiday of Social Solidarity*91CH0455E Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 1 Mar 91 p 5*

[MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] report: "In the Name of Social Solidarity, Let Us Make 1 May a National Holiday"]

[Text] (MTI) Parliament's Constitution, Legislation, and Justice Committee continued its work on Thursday with a debate on the bill concerning the local governments of Budapest and its districts. Although this time, too, the debate on the proposals of the bill's modification lasted several hours, the representatives were only able to deal with hardly more than half of the alternative proposals. To date, a total of 221 proposals have been presented to modify the bill, which has 31 articles. However, this figure is probably not final because, on several issues, the Constitution Committee has not yet received the committees' written reports on local government.

The committee did receive SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] Representative Istvan Vass' modification proposal, in which he urges making 1 May an official holiday of the Republic of Hungary—a day of social solidarity. In his opinion, this day had been expropriated

by the fallen party state for itself, and its dictatorship distorted its significance according to its power interests. It made the "Day of Work" a work-free holiday only as a gesture, ranking it next to 4 April and 7 November. According to Vass' reasoning, social solidarity is one of the basic principles of Hungary's democratic social order, and the state must put great emphasis on helping it develop. For the time being, the committee did not put the proposal on its agenda, just as it has not dealt yet with the bill on the official holiday of the Republic of Hungary.

MTI Gives Details on New Budapest Newspaper
*LD2904094891 Budapest MTI in English 1317 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, 26 April, 1991 (MTI-ECONews)—UJ MAGYARORSZAG (NEW HUNGARY), a new Hungarian daily which professes to be a middle-class paper close to the government, hit newstands here on Friday.

It is the ninth national daily in Hungary; the other eight are NEPSZABADSAG, MAGYAR HIRLAP, MAGYAR NEMZET, NEPSZAVA, ESTI HIRLAP, MAI NAP, KURIR, NEMZETI SPORT, and VILAGGGAZDASAG.

UJ MAGYARORSZAG is published by Publica, PLC.

Publica has an initial capital of 250 million forints (3.4 million usd), of which noncash assets account for 38.4 million forints.

The largest shareholder in the company is the newspaper publishing company (Hirlapkiado Vallalat) with 99 million forints.

The other major shareholders are Budapest Bank, the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank, the Hungarian Credit Bank, and the Post office Bank, each with a 20-million-forint stake.

A number of other companies and institutions hold smaller stakes.

Talking to ECONews this afternoon, Gabor Czako, Publica's president, stressed that, contrary to what 'slandermongers' had suggested, the paper will not be funded from taxpayers' money.

The banks participating in the venture consider the paper will become a good deal in the future.

According to information from the economic weekly HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, the publishers do not expect the paper to be profitable in the first three years of publication.

With its 327,000 readers, NEPSZABADSAG is currently the Hungarian daily with the widest circulation, followed by NEPSZAVA with its circulation figure of 181,000.

UJ MAGYARORSZAG will have an initial circulation of 70,000.

1,800 Illegal Aliens Captured Since 16 Jan

*91CH0455D Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 1 Mar 91 p 8*

[Article by (tr): "As of Today, Tight Border Patrol Is Discontinued; 1,800 Illegal Aliens Have Been Captured Since the Outbreak of the War"]

[Text] During the present phase of the Gulf war, the likelihood of terrorist actions is gradually decreasing. But the possibility cannot be entirely dismissed. At any rate, as of Friday, tight border patrols will be discontinued. It was on 11 January when tight patrol was ordered by Dr. Balazs Novaky, the Ministry of Interior National Border Guard commander. In accordance with his rank, the duty hours of both the professional and conscript personnel were increased by two hours. This way the patrols were better able to oversee their border sections, and those on duty at the traffic control and crossing points were better able to thoroughly inspect entering cars.

As of this morning, the two-hour extra duty will be discontinued, meaning that it will be possible to allow the soldiers to leave the barracks and to go on leave.

In reply to my question, border guard spokesman Lt. Col. Janos Zubek said that orders for tighter patrolling of crossing points will continue to be in effect, i.e., entering cars will be subjected to thorough inspection, and documents will also be inspected in the usual manner. In addition to their usual tasks, border guards have also been guarding some public buildings since the outbreak of the Gulf war. They will continue to carry out the latter task in the near future as well.

Zubek said that about 1,800 illegal aliens have been arrested since the beginning of the war. They came from 34 countries, most of them (1,145) from Romania. The arrested included 172 Pakistani, 81 Turkish, 64 Bangladeshi, and 62 Soviet citizens. In addition to the persons caught at the green border, 100 individuals wanting to enter at the crossing points have been sent back because of some kind of suspicion. Incidentally, in the investigations conducted jointly with Customs and Internal Revenue Police officials, persons arriving from the Gulf region do not receive any special treatment.

Controversial Holy Crown Society Described

*91CH0455F Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 2 Mar 91 p 5*

[Article by (y-beth) including interview with Father Othmar Faddy, president of the Holy Crown Society; place and date of interview not given: "The Palatine Would Represent the Crown; The Holy Crown Society's Purpose Is To Revive Morality"]

[Text] Father Othmar Faddy, the Holy Crown Society president, stated at their press conference yesterday that "pure thoughts and sincere talk" are the Society's main objectives. For centuries, we have been Europe's point of collision, but we also have a mission regarding the

future: We must play the role of a bridge. Thus, the world owes much to Hungary, and consequently, in Faddy's words, "we should not be the ones to go to Europe, Europe should be the one to come here!"

Leaders of the Holy Crown Society said of the Society's recent past that it was formed in February 1989. As of January 1990, Dr. Miklos Kallay (son of the onetime prime minister) has been its president, and Istvan Kallay was its secretary general, until it turned out that he committed rather compromising acts during the communist regime and, thus, the membership thought that it would be better to have him go. He subsequently formed the Holy Crown Alliance and, using (taking advantage of) his connections abroad, created many opportunities to confuse the two organizations. It would be hard for an ex-communist to identify with the Society's basic principles of belief in God, Christian morality, St. Stephen's concept of the state, the idea of Regnum Marianum, and the fight against atheism. Miklos Kallay attempted to "bulldoze" the membership into accepting the two organizations' merger, but after failing, he resigned from his post. This is how Father Faddy now occupies the president's chair.

Their objective is to morally revive the country and society. In reply to the inquiry of how they will attempt to do that, the leaders said that it would be through "supporting the good and guiding those who have swerved back onto the right path." In addition, although they cannot round up a cavalry escort, they want to organize a thousand motorcycles and a thousand cars to escort Cardinal Mindszenty's remains from the border. Moreover, they will have a thousand-member honor guard on Hosok Tere during the Pope's visit in August.

The Society puts great emphasis on finding and helping the lonely and the poor elderly. But they will not give a penny to those who do not want to work. After all, "even engineers became street sweepers after the war." And besides, Budapest's cellars and court yards are still in shambles, trees should be planted and, in general, the country should be beautified.

Othmar Faddy is quite willing to offer further information on the Thesis of the Holy Crown.

"The world's legal experts envy us for our Thesis of the Holy Crown," he says, "and we still do not make any use of this treasure of ours."

[y-beth] What is the essence of this thesis?

[Faddy] It is that the Crown is a legal person who possesses all power in the country. Only those can have power to whom the Crown will give power. If their crowning was delayed for some reason, Hungary's kings could not even recognize themselves as real kings. I could cite Karoly Robert and King Matyas as examples.

[y-beth] How do you intend to make this thesis work in practice?

[Faddy] We would need a two-house parliament which would appoint a palatine for a specified term. In the absence of a king, it would be the palatine who would represent the Crown. Every public servant would have to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown.

[y-beth] What would be the practical value of all this?

[Faddy] Compensations, for instance, could also be settled on this basis. At the millennium, it could be announced that all property is to be reverted to the Crown. Then it could be redistributed.

[y-beth] On what basis?

[Faddy] According to merit. That is to say, according to the amount of loss suffered and the amount of work done for the country, and according to past actions.

POLAND

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 7-13 Apr

91EP0413B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 15,
13 Apr 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

The president and the prime minister made foreign visits. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki visited Moscow. Lech Walesa visited Brussels and France.

On Wednesday of last week, Minister Janusz Lewandowski presented a government reprivatization program, and on Thursday of last week, Jerzy Grohman, the president's plenipotentiary, presented another program. According to him, the principal differences between the programs are that "the Belweder program" supports a return "in kind" to the owners of assets taken after the war and the government [program call for compensation] in the form of capital coupons (with certain exceptions).

Slawomir Zielinski, the editor in chief of TELE-EXPRESS, is the new director of news programs for television; he replaces Lech Dymarski who resigned after working for three months. EXPRESS WIECZORNY sharply attacked the nomination and recalled Zielinski's old associations with the PZPR Polish United Workers' Party]. Solidarity at Polish Television and the Association of Polish Journalists also officially opposed the nomination. [passage omitted]

Center Accord and activists of citizens committees have formed the Center Citizens' Coalition. The Solidarity organizations were invited to join. The Christian National Union (ZChN), which, as Jaroslaw Kaczynski said, is too distant from the Center Accord in terms of its program, was not invited. The motion of Stefan Kozlowski, a member of the National Citizens Committee, to ask the Sejm marshal to recall Bronislaw

Geremek from the position of chairman of the Constitutional Commission was adopted almost unanimously. Geremek told KURIER POLSKI: "That is a ridiculous initiative. The citizens movement of which I was a founder has entered the path of political adventurism. I think it will reconsider." [passage omitted]

The price for a Fiat 126p has increased. Beginning 10 May 1991, a Fiat 126p 650fl in the basic version will cost 34 million zlotys. Previously it cost 26 million zlotys [Z]; a "B" version, Z38 million; previously, Z32 million.

The Constitutional Tribunal received a request from 54 deputies to examine the constitutionality of the law on the expropriation of the assets of the former PZPR. The deputies think that the law violates, among other principles, the principle on the protection of property, the principle of legality, and the prohibition on ex post facto laws.

At midnight on Friday, the deadline for entering nominations for the presidency of the Supreme Chamber of Control passed. The nominations were made at the last moment. On Friday evening, Jan Komornicki of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and Andrzej Wybraniec of the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP] and Center Accord [PC] were nominated.

Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in an interview for TRYBUNA: [Answer] In international relations the Third Republic is not a new state because People's Poland was also a Polish state, in spite of what many try to claim today. The continuity of statehood as a participant in international life was retained. The minister rejected the idea of Poland's neutrality as placing Poland "in a rather passive role as a participant in international relations"; on the other hand, asked about the possibility of Poland being accepted into NATO, he responded that Poland has not sought to be a candidate for NATO membership and that it does, however, want some contacts and cooperation with that alliance. [Answer] The North Atlantic alliance cannot be indifferent to the security or possible violation of security in this part of Europe, which does not, however, equal the stationing of NATO divisions along the Bug. No, excluding indifference in our security means that if events threatening the security of any state, including Poland's, occurred in this region, NATO should react. [Question] Why do you think that is the case? [Answer] Because at present, the reality is that NATO is the only pillar of European security. There is not any other. [Question] Because the other collapsed? [Answer] Gentlemen, there is the question: "Was that a pillar?" But there was a balance.

The Sejm restored the old names for the higher schools in Warsaw. The Main School of Planning and Statistics is again the Main School of Commerce. The Main School of Rural Economy-Agricultural Academy is again the Main School of Rural Economy.

If the elections were held in March, according to a survey done by the Social Research Workshop in Katowice Voivodship, the Democratic Union [UD] of Tadeusz

Mazowiecki would win (15 percent of the respondents) ahead of the party of Stanislaw Tyminski (13 percent); NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity (11 percent); the Citizens Committee (9 percent); the Liberal-Democratic Congress (8 percent); Citizens Movement—Democratic Action (ROAD); the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic; and the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] (7 percent each); Center Accord (6 percent); and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] (4 percent). Other groups did not exceed the two percent threshold. In Gdansk, NSZZ Solidarity (19 percent) would out poll the UD (14 percent), the Citizens Committees (12 percent), and the Liberal-Democratic Congress (10 percent). Tyminski would get two percent of the vote.

"The Collapse of a Union Daily" is the title of a report in GAZETA WYBORCZA on changes in the format of the Wroclaw DZIENNIK DOLNOSLASKI. It will become a weekly. Since September 1990, when the daily was founded, its press run has fallen from 30,000 to between 7,000 and 8,000 copies. The publisher, the partnership Norpol-Press (50 percent Solidarity and 40 percent a Norwegian publishing company) has resigned from publishing the daily; the Norwegian partner stated that the Polish partners are not meeting their obligation of covering the deficit.

The Public Opinion Research Center summarized the results of a survey on anti-Semitism in Poland. The conclusion: "Extreme anti-Semitism occurs among five percent of Poles. Strong anti-Semitism occurs in 10 percent, and moderate or weak in 16 percent of those surveyed. Responses that can be classified as philo-Semitic occur in four percent of the respondents. Some of them may, however, be the effect of a demonstrative separation from anti-Semitism."

In a letter to ROBOTNIK, from a comparison of the readership of the weekly NIE (J. Urban) and TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, Jan Rulewski draws the conclusion: "If one takes into account the 'codependence' of these papers, one should speak of a posthumous victory of the nomenklatura." ROBOTNIK published a report on the sales of the two titles in Bydgoszcz: TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC—1,000 sold copies 179 returns; NIE—3,860 sales, 44 returns. The readership of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in the entire Bydgoszcz Voivodship (returns in parentheses): at the beginning in 1989, 274,000 sold copies (17 percent); in June 1990, 155,000 sold copies (41 percent); in November 1990, 111,000 sold copies (37 percent). [passage omitted]

From an open letter to university students from Bishop Jozef Michalik, chairman of the Episcopate Commission for Pastoral Care in the University Community: "It is only an illusion that various parties, groups, and ways of realizing your aspirations are being formed; in reality Good eternally struggles with Evil. Television and the mass media still do not have any positive, responsible models of social, ethical, and moral life to offer. Some former ministers do not hesitate to publish disgusting

papers and create programs continuing the unlimited struggle to destroy the morality of the nation, promote negation, the destruction of what is good.... Today in Poland a decisive, strong battle is underway, and it will become increasingly vicious. It focuses on the conception of man and the state, on the place of God and the Church in society, on whether God will rule man's conscience through the law of nature and the Gospel, or whether another man through ideas, social class, or other invented myth." (SLOWO POWSZECHNE 5-7 April 1991)

There was to be an 40-percent increase of rail fares, but it was rescinded. The proposal by the Polish State Railways was not sufficiently justified. The Ministry of Finance explained that none of the cost factors had risen since the previous increase a couple of months ago (also by 40 percent) at such a rapid rate.

Officials of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] separated themselves from the declaration by president Roman Bartoszcze, who called for a cleansing of the party ranks of "communist ZSL [United Peasant Party] members." "There have not been and there will not be any witch hunts in our ranks," said the leadership body of the party. "The peasants and the peasant intelligentsia associated with the peasant movement have not in the past and also will not in the future be embarrassed by their biographies."

Judge Andrzej Cubala, spokesman of the Ministry of Justice, in a survey for ZYCIE WARSZAWY on why crime is increasing: "The rising wave of crime in Poland, (in 1989, 547,589 crimes were committed; a year later, 883,346) marks a 61-percent increase in crime over a year. Simultaneously, crime detection was 55.5 percent in 1989 and 40 percent a year later. The situation is worst in Warsaw. The capital city police have uncovered only 6.2 percent of the perpetrators of break-ins; they have caught barely one in every 16 criminals."

The Association of Polish Lawyers has taken a position on the proposal of the Center Accord to develop a proposed so-called law on decommunization. In the opinion of the Main Board of the Association of Polish Lawyers "the above document contains proposals whose implementation is not possible in a democratic state; however, it creates illusions in society that can lead to incalculable, negative consequences, both in domestic and in international relations." The document was published in PRAWO I ZYCIE on 6 April 1991.

Leszek Miller, secretary general of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, in a letter to Marian Terlecki, the chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television, protested against the membership of the newly formed committee, which is a politically homogeneous body, and disregards the relations of parliamentary forces, of the existing political parties (except for the Center Accord and the Democratic Union [UD]).

Opinions

Stefan Kisielewski, journalist:

(Interviewed by Piotr Gabryel, WPROST 31 March 1991)

[Question] What do you think of the Christian Democrats, the Catholics who make such a display of their Catholicism, and, on the other hand, just this afternoon call for something which they themselves call decommunization? I am thinking of the Center Accord.

[Answer] Bitterness, hate, the desire to settle accounts from the past period are taking on degenerate forms. I am opposed to taking revenge on everyone who took part in the previous life because there was no other. Three million people belonged to the party in all; whoever wanted to do something had to join the party. That party was degenerate; that country was degenerate. Nearly all of us, to a greater or lesser degree, share the guilt. And searching now for sacrificial lambs is surely not an activity for an honorable Christian.

[passage omitted]

Eduard Shevardnadze, former minister of foreign affairs of the USSR:

(Interviewed by Adam Michnik, GAZETA WYBORCZA 6 April 1991)

[Question] I would also like to return to our history, to 1981. Was there a real threat then of Soviet intervention?

[Answer] There was; no doubt, there was. There were people who wanted it, who demanded "the introduction of order." We understood that force could be of no help in the Polish situation. And, moreover, we were already involved in Afghanistan.

The fact that you went through that difficult period with relatively little pain is due to Jaruzelski. I know his views; I talked with him frequently. I sensed that he is a Polish patriot; one felt in him a certain pride, a sense of honor. He was the key figure and I felt that he would not allow the worst to happen.

Administrative Court Reviews Complaints

AU2904082991 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by (D.Fr.): "The Administration's Mistakes"]

[Text] The 12,500 complaints received by the Supreme Administrative Court last year occurred against a background of rapid and extensive legislative changes—alongside new laws that are still less than perfect—a reform of the state administration and an increase in the gambit of the administrative judicial systems powers.

Most of the complaints came from the large urban voivodships: Warsaw, Katowice, Poznan, Gdansk, and

Krakow. Over 80 percent of them—the pattern was similar to that in previous years—were filed by citizens who called into question decisions made by regional administrative organs. Every third complaint received by the Supreme Administrative Court was deemed to be justified in that the law had been violated by the administration, concrete examples being: the violation of procedural regulations; erroneous interpretation of legal material; and issuing decisions with no legal basis or in flagrant violation of the law. On more than one occasion the court received files that had not been properly kept, were incomplete, from which vital evidence was missing, or were received a year or more after a complaint was lodged, despite the 30 day deadline.

Most of the complaints concerned decisions on municipal economic matters and housing, followed by taxation and construction work. There was a significant increase in the number of complaints pertaining to import duties. At the end of last year, the Supreme Administrative Court began to consider the first cases regarding obligatory military service, which mainly concerned the deferral of military service. During the second half of the year, 318 complaints were received concerning local government, and 277 of these cases related to decisions on individual matters issued by sejmik appeal tribunals.

Reports on the work of the Supreme Administrative Court in 1990, which have been sent to the president of the Republic of Poland, the prime minister, and the National Judicial Council, indicate that there are still delays in administrative procedures and a significant delay in the implementation of Supreme Administrative Court decisions by administrative organs.

We will shortly carry more extensive information on these reports in our legal column.

ROMANIA

Lawmakers Debate Constitutional Theses

91BA0577B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 17 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Florin Gabriel Marculescu and Petru Clej: "A High-Level Debate"]

[Text] Yesterday the Constitutional Commission [CC] resumed its proceedings after a rather lengthy break. The debates focused on the theses that make up Chapter II of Section III: Romania's president. As many speakers emphasized, that is probably the most important chapter for the future of the democracy we all hope will be asserted. In this context, the theses in question must necessarily be related to the first thesis of Section I (Fundamental Principles), adopted by an utterly uncertain ballot, according to which "Romania is a national sovereign and indivisible state. The form of government of the state is the republic." That thesis deserves criticism not only because of the imprecise terminology used—since the form of state (a republic, as opposed to

a monarchy) cannot be contrasted, as is the case in the text adopted, with the form of government (absolute or constitutional monarchy; parliamentary, presidential, or presidential attenuated republic, according to the model of the French Constitution of 1958). It deserves criticism primarily because the decision on a form of state should normally have been submitted to a referendum, the results of which should have served as the basis for the draft constitution. In our opinion such a referendum would have served as a necessary compromise between those who say that, by way of cause and effect, after the December 1989 revolution our 1923 Constitution should have been reinstated, and those who, ignoring the traditions and value of legal principles, are content to take into account only the post 30 December 1947 republican practice. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the republic was imposed by the Soviet occupation by a genuine forcible coup and was never legitimized by referendum. And now let us attempt to summarize the CC debates.

The first speaker was Mr. Florin Vasilescu, presidential adviser and an expert on the CC. Under the guise of an objective legal expose he did nothing but support with all his might the semipresidential republic proposed in the constitutional theses. To attain his purpose he invoked partisan arguments and illustrated his ideas by means of references to various constitutions while failing to mention the advantages of a parliamentary republic. He went as far as to claim that the election of the president by the parliament may be viewed as an extension of the practice of the communist states. Which is perfectly true, except that under the communist regimes the entire power was by constitution assigned to the sole party, the Communist Party, while parliamentary activities were nothing but a stage prop. Mr. Vasilescu said nothing about the example of parliamentary republics such as, for example, Italy and Germany, countries with a very progressive democracy which, like us, have lived through the painful experience of totalitarianism.

Subsequent addresses gravitated around the method of electing the president (by direct vote by the people, or by indirect vote by Parliament) and consequently around his functions, which were more extensive in the first version (in view of the greater legitimacy enjoyed by a president elected by universal ballot) and of course more limited if he were elected by indirect ballot. The first category was joined by the parliamentary groups of the FSN [National Salvation Front], PUNR [National Unity Party of Romanians], the Democratic Agrarian Party [PDAR], and the Socialist Democratic Party [PSDR]. In favor of a parliamentary republic spoke the representatives of the parliamentary groups of the PNL [National Liberal Party], PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], the Ecologist Party, and the Social Democrat Party [PSD]. A more varied position was expressed by the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] parliamentary group. The UDMR deputies spoke out for having the president elected by direct ballot, but Mr. Gyorgy Frunda, a CC

member, made a point of expressing his own personal preference for having the president elected indirectly by parliament and by representatives of administrative-regional units. Later the UDMR group in Senate joined the supporters of a parliamentary republic in the belief that such a republic will protect us from the risk of sliding into dictatorship.

The semipresidential form of republic was supported, among others, by Senator Vasile Vacaru (FSN) and deputies Marian Enache and Petre Ninosu (both FSN), Gabriel Nicolescu (FSN—20 May), Octavian Capatina and Coriolan Bucur (PUNR). Some of them even pleaded for expanded presidential prerogatives such as the president's discretionary participation in government meetings.

Among those who spoke out in favor of a parliamentary republic were Deputies Ion Diaconescu (PNT-cd), Dan Lazarescu (PNL), Sergiu Cunesco (PSD), Mihai Carp (PNL-Young Wing), Stefan Cazimir, (PLS)[Free Party for Change], and Senators Mihai Rova (PNL) and Gabor Koszokar (UDMR). Essentially, the latter suggested that the president be elected by the two chambers of parliament by secret ballot with a two-thirds majority in the first three rounds and an absolute majority afterward. They also contested the prerogatives which, in their view, pave the way toward a potential dictatorship, namely chairing government meetings, the right to dissolve Parliament and to call a referendum, command of the armed forces, issuing secret decrees, etc. Many of the amendments proposed were aimed at specifying the conditions in which the president may be removed without holding a referendum. One important moment was marked by the address of Liberal Senator Mihai Ruva, who requested that the CC pass decisions on all Chapter II theses by secret ballot.

One fact that seemed noteworthy to us was that for the first time the debates proceeded in a civilized atmosphere and were generally of an uncommonly high quality. For that reason, space permitting, we intend to come back with a far more detailed report on some of the addresses.

P.S.: At the end of yesterday's session, with the permission of Mr. Al. Birladeanu who was presiding over the proceedings, the floor was taken by Mr. Adrian Severin, minister for the reform and for relations with Parliament, who presented the government's viewpoint on the chapter dealing with Romania's president in the Constitution theses. Essentially, he agreed with having the president elected by direct vote, but, quoting Ionel Bratianu, he said: "The president presides, he does not govern," in a very transparent allusion to the need to ensure that the president does not interfere in government affairs. We wonder on the basis of what regulation was someone who does not belong to the CC or its body of experts allowed to take the floor in plenum. Now that this precedent has been set, subsequent sessions may be addressed by Romania's president, the prime minister, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, etc. While

Mr. Severin was speaking, Senator Gheorghe Dumitrascu, shirt sleeves rolled up, had fallen asleep in a box under a television light....

Peasant Party Comments on Mitterrand Visit

91BA0598B Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian
19 Apr 91 p 1

[Statement by the leadership of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party: "On the Arrival of the French President in Romania"]

[Text] The Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd] looks forward with interest to the visit of Mr. Francois Mitterrand, the president of France, the eternal friend of the Romanian people.

The visit to Romania of the highest ranking French dignitary gives every Romanian a reason to rejoice. The common Latin origin of the two sister nations, their old and traditional ties, the contribution of the French spirit to shaping many Romanian intellectuals and illustrious figures, and France's contribution to shaping the major principles of democracy, especially the international recognition of human rights and equality among nations, as well as the aid extended by France at decisive moments in Romania's modern and contemporary history are only a few of the reasons for which we warmly welcome such visits. Suffice it to recall the decisive assistance provided by French military advisers in the legendary battles of Marasesti, Marasti, and Oituz in 1917 which changed the fate of the war on the Romanian front and paved the way for the nation's reunification, i.e., the unification of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina with the motherland. Especially under the leadership of General de Gaulle, France was one of the big powers that energetically and systematically struggled against the division of the world into zones of influence, a division that caused incalculable damage to the Romanian people and contributed to the introduction of communism into our country and to the political and physical destruction of the democratic forces beginning with the National Peasant Party and the great statesman Iuliu Maniu.

France is still one of the world's big powers from the military, technological, scientific, and economic aspect and particularly in the cultural area. We are aware of the fact that in the new Europe that is being built under our very eyes, closest relations with France are essential for our people, too.

It is evident that genuine democracy cannot be achieved in Europe without authentic openness in the relations of all the European states and political groups. We cannot conceivably pull out of our economic bog without the solidarity of the other European nations, and the security of each state on the continent is indissolubly tied to the security of all these states.

Consequently, our party will never cease to defend the Romanian-French relations from possible disruptions

and to continuously promote these relations for the benefit of the Romanian and French peoples and of Europe in general.

In connection with the French president's visit to our country, the democratic forces are alarmed by the unconditional support extended by the French authorities to the National Salvation Front [FSN] political group.

This visit may confer an additional moral legitimization to this heterogenous, poorly defined, and confused group that has been using mostly antidemocratic practices and has profoundly corrupted Romanian politics.

The democratic opposition parties criticize the FSN for more than what under a normal democratic regime would be natural differences of views in dealing with the country's current affairs. What we, one of the country's democratic parties with hundreds of thousands of years in jail and tens of thousands of victims sacrificed on the altar of democracy, accuse the FSN of is that it monopolized power through totalitarian-type means and is striving to keep it by the same methods. The facts have been widely reflected by the mass media and the French authorities, who are so interested in Romania, cannot be unaware of them.

The elections were neither free nor correct, because the FSN violated the law both when it decided to run in the election and during the electoral campaign. The electoral campaign was profoundly corrupted by the FSN's acts of terrorism which systematically prevented the free expression of the opposition forces and intimidated and manipulated the electorate. Anyone who asserts that the elections were free either ignores the reality or does so out of cynicism or hypocrisy.

Although the FSN is not a Western-type social democratic party, immediately after the Romanian revolution the French Socialist Party [PSF] sent two prominent representatives in support of that group. The Romanian prime minister's first and most frequent visits abroad were at the invitation of the French socialist government authorities. The PSF took upon itself to help the FSN organizationally and especially ideologically, and more recently the French police took upon itself to organize the Romanian police.

President Mitterrand's visit constitutes a first in the sense that he is the first head of state in the world who agree to visit our country under the FSN leadership. Aside from the real joy it gives the Romanian people, this visit constitutes a form of credit extended to the current power, especially because of the circumstance that the only attempt to justify the sinister intervention of the miners in June 1990 came from the French authorities.

The PNT-cd is a firm supporter of relations with the French political parties, the French Government, and France. Our only concern is that these relations should not favor forces that have amply shown themselves as

antidemocratic but that they should actually help reestablish the basic human rights and freedoms and authentic democracy in Romania of which the Romanian people were deprived for half a century.

The declaration made by the president in the summer of 1990 about Transylvania contributed to producing a general feeling of surprise and bitterness among the Romanian public because it indicated an apparent change in the consistent attitude expressed by France and because it ignored the historical truth.

The roots of the Romanian-French friendship are too deep and the common interests of the two nations are too great to be shaken in their foundation by ephemeral actions stemming from ideological motives.

The PNT-cd wants to express the Romanian people's profound and sincere sentiments of affection and it will consistently pursue its traditional line of placing France in the forefront of Romania's foreign relations.

In this spirit it will most arduously struggle to develop the eternal friendship between Romania and France.

[Signed] PNT-cd Leadership

Reconstruction Party General Secretary Queried

91BA0488B Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
26 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Dr. Nicolae Simescu, general secretary of the National Reconstruction Party, by Silviu Achim; place and date not given: "Pragmatism, Guide for the Transition Period"]

[Text] [Achim] Except for your contributions at the Assembly of Deputies and in the mass media, the National Reconstruction Party is not very present in public life. Why is that?

[Simescu] The public presence of any party is hard to determine in many respects. Most often, public manifestations result from press releases and statements, television shows, or from splits, mergers, or disputes within the party or in connection with the government. Without such internal events, and aware of the specific problems and difficulties of the transition from corrupted socialism to a market economy, we have understood that it is not possible to implement our party's slogan "Prosperity for All" by pouring gasoline on the fire or by second guessing negative, objective, or subjective aspects in the activities of the government or other parties. I hope the future will show that we adopted a correct attitude.

[Achim] Have any changes taken place in the party's platform program?

[Simescu] We consider that the national reconstruction objectives listed in our party's platform program have a high priority, as economic and social areas evolve during this transition period, and in the counties, in terms of

specific problems as well, even if some of these objectives are being completed and detailed.

[Achim] At the Assembly of Deputies you associated with the parliamentary group PUNRE. Is this just a coincidence, or is it a signal?

[Simescu] The formation of parliamentary groups is an organizational step consistent with the organization and operation rules of the Assembly of Deputies, and our affiliation with the parliamentary group was based on regional criteria, more or less as a result of a political option used at the start of parliamentary activities. When we determine that affiliation with this group no longer matches very well our party of the center and the balance which we have planned, I will decide a shift to another parliamentary group.

[Achim] Have you tried any alliances, mergers, or integrations with other political organizations?

[Simescu] For the time being, no. We were honored by the fact that other political organizations have approached us in this respect, and it has strengthened our conviction that a party of the center which plans the country's reconstruction on the basis of a market economy, of a state of justice and of economic and social equilibrium, can become powerful and can play a significant role in the current opposition, even if it does not tie and retie old traditions. In fact, we consider that the pragmatic and practical spirit at the foundation of our activities must guide the steps of the transition period.

[Achim] A lot has been said about constructive opposition. How do you think it is characterized?

[Simescu] I don't think I still need to stress the need for a strong and constructive opposition. But I do believe I need to emphasize this need at the present stage of legislative agitation, when the parliamentary opposition must determine the adoption of laws intended to last for decades. If they are necessary only for the transition, then they should have the expected effects for democracy and for social protection. But I consider the "opposition" to be constructive more in words than deeds, including the times when debates were remote from legislative objectives and subordinated to group interests.

[Achim] You have made statements praising the government program of the Roman cabinet. That was about nine months ago. Have you reconsidered last summer's judgment in any way?

[Simescu] At that time, comments about a government program more liberal than expected could only be complimentary, although I personally don't remember exaggerated praise on my part. But the liberalism of a program's provisions cannot constitute its absolute merit, considering that the December revolution has already placed us on a liberalization path. And if the government has deemed it necessary to reassess some of the program's points through the present report, I, as well as

any supporter of a pragmatic and especially practical position, have enough reason to be dissatisfied with the implementation of the government program, which we find to be a declaration of good intentions that cannot be analyzed.

[Achim] You were elected deputy from Transylvania. How do you perceive the situation there now, one year after the ethnic conflicts of Tirgu Mures? What should be done to fully clear it?

[Simescu] I believe that the ethnic conflicts of Tirgu Mures could have been avoided or reduced through serious intervention from the government, which was notified in time. The apparently ethnic conflicts are in fact confrontations between people, groups, and interests, generally based on poor public order enforcement, encouraged by the lack of political dialogue, and aggravated by outside interference. The legislative framework will guarantee conditions for a normal interaction among ethnic groups, fully corresponding to universally accepted standards.

Police General Describes Duties, Views Problems

91BA0577A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 17 Apr 91 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Major General Ioan George Danescu, secretary of state and head of the Police Department, by Petre Mihai Bacanu; place and date not given: "What the Police Should Look Like"]

[Text] [Bacanu] What do you think is the case that left the deepest impression on you since the Revolution?

[Danescu] Among all the cases that the police units have had to handle, I was most affected by the triple murder committed by a deserter who shot three innocent people at the Dirza station. This case proves—if proof was needed—that weapons are a great threat when they fall in the hands of irresponsible people.

[Bacanu] Are the police units big or small in relation to the duties they have to handle?

[Danescu] They're not small, they're very small! We would need twice as many troops to fulfill our duties properly, that is about 78,000 policemen. This figure is sufficiently justified by the high crime situation we're dealing with. I think that by now no one still doubts this need.

[Bacanu] Do you think that our police has modernized?

[Danescu] All we have is only a beginning. The uniforms of some of the troops have changed, a number of compromised cadres have been removed from the apparatus, many young officers have been promoted in the job, and I insist on establishing a new, civilized, correct, and firm working style, something that is urgently necessary in the conditions of a state of law.

[Bacanu] Could you give us a profile of the crime situation?

[Danescu] The first conclusion is that crime increased alarmingly both in 1990 and in the first quarter of this year. Last year, prosecutable violations, especially violent crime and theft of private and public property, increased two to four times over. The crime explosion continued in the first quarter of 1991 and penal offenses of every kind practically tripled. However, the police acted more firmly, something that I am convinced was responsible for the fact that we didn't have even more crimes, especially crimes whose perpetrators initially went unidentified. That police action has been more firm is also proven by the fact that in the first three months of this year 7,466 thefts of public property were recorded and apprehended compared to 2,353 in the same period last year, while the number of cases of embezzlement, fraud, abuse, negligence, and corruption handled doubled or tripled.

[Bacanu] General, what did you say to yourself when you were appointed chief of the Police Department?

[Danescu] What could I say to myself? "What did I ever do to you?" I thought it would be very difficult and that the job carries great responsibility. If it hadn't been difficult I don't think I would have accepted. I am a fighter by nature and I want to do something for the Police, to which I dedicated my entire life. As you may know, a policeman's life involves many hardships, long hours, and very little time for oneself and one's family.

[Bacanu] Are you in anyway connected with all the colonels and generals bearing the name Danescu?

[Danescu] Should I be? I've been asked that question before. The only thing we have in common is that both my mother and their mothers were women. On the other hand, my father was a corporal in reserve.

[Bacanu] What do you think we, the citizenry and you, the police should do to come to like each other?

[Danescu] Each person should correctly fulfill his duties and first of all respect the law, something that implies recognition of the people called upon to implement it, and on the police side, a correct implementation and civilized but firm behavior toward violators of the law. The police needs the citizens' support in order to handle difficult situations, and respect. I want my police force to be respected.

[Bacanu] When do you think we'll achieve the kind of situation where traffic policemen come to the aid of drivers in trouble?

[Danescu] Policemen helped drivers in trouble before and they continue to do so. However, I think that well equipped automobile assistance points should be established along the main traffic routes to efficiently help drivers who need help. The police will do so, too, but as a rule technical assistance should be provided by professionals.

[Bacanu] Immediately after the Revolution and perhaps now, too, the police experienced guilt feelings. Don't you think that the entire police force is having to suffer because of a few who manhandled or perhaps even killed demonstrators on 21 December 1989 and whose heads no one demanded? If those who ordered the shooting received no more than the punishments of which you know, you realize that those who carried out the order wouldn't have received even that punishment. However, if the truth were known the general suspicion would disappear; the civilian society would be ready to forgive them and the constant question of who it was who sent 2,000 youths to Jilava would cease to be asked.

[Danescu] For a good while policemen did have guilt feelings. There have been abuses, as we know, but steps have been taken against those guilty, although I think that some did not match the truth. I want to specify for the benefit of your readers and the entire public that the police did not fire on demonstrators in any town in the country. It may be illuminating to stress that during the December 1989 events 40 policemen were killed and 60 were seriously injured. The fact that this was never openly stated allowed a lot of completely unfounded suspicion to hover over us, the police.

[Bacanu] What do you think is the explanation for the large number of young delinquents that have emerged? Who is responsible for this situation?

[Danescu] We have often sounded the alarm about this because the phenomenon is extremely worrying. The explanation lies in the fact that democracy and freedom are wrongly understood. Democracy requires order and respect for the law, not freedom to ignore it. The responsibility lies with both the institutions in charge of educating minors and youth, as well as the family. If we don't do something for the country's youngest generation the consequences will be disastrous.

[Bacanu] Does the press help or hinder you in your work?

[Danescu] It helps very much by presenting the real situation concerning crime, police work, and the problems we have to handle. At the same time, we are hindered—and considerably so—by newspapers which lie, which print unverified material, and which distort the truth about us.

[Bacanu] Will the Financial Watch lead to the disappearance of the Economic Police?

[Danescu] That doesn't even come into question! The duties of the Financial Watch consist of implementing and executing fiscal laws and customs regulations; its purpose is to preempt any tax fraud or evasion and to enforce the laws of commerce, and especially to record penal violations in accordance with Law No. 30/1991. The Financial Watch then notifies the bodies of penal prosecution, including the police of course. So it will be in relations of cooperation with the police, especially the Economic Police. As for the latter, its mission is to

identify crimes such as embezzlement, abuse, negligence on duty, theft, etc., as well as the offenses assigned to its care by law. Consequently, the Economic Police and the Financial Watch are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other.

[Bacanu] Every country that has mountains also has a special mountain police. Do you think that such a corps could be formed here, too?

[Danescu] I think that such a police corps could exist in our country, too, because as far as I know it has proven its usefulness in many other countries. However, this is a matter for the future and its solution does not depend only on the Ministry of the Interior.

[Bacanu] In what area do you think that the police has made rapid progress?

[Danescu] First of all there has been a rapid integration among European police forces, who accepted us without reservation. I have traveled to Europe with several delegations who were well received by the hosts, so that the exchange of experience was very useful. Similarly, the appearance of police publications in every county has met with rapid success among the public. But perhaps I should first cite the openness that the Romanian Police has been practicing in its relations with the mass media and the public. One small detail, if you like, is that our press bureau has been in operation since the first few days after the revolution. The Police Force has proven its professionalism. There have been many particularly difficult cases that were resolved very quickly and I find it difficult to dwell just on one. I will mention only the apprehension, with citizens' help, of Gheorghe Florea merely half an hour after his photo was shown on national television, who was responsible for one murder and the rape of an eight year old girl; the arrest of the criminal Nicolae Pascu in Bucharest on the same day on which we managed to identify him. I mentioned the apprehension of the author of the triple murder at Dirza. And there other cases.

[Bacanu] What should a police force look like, forgetting the notorious "militia" as soon as possible?

[Danescu] The militia did make mistakes, considering the circumstances in which it carried out its activities, but that does not mean that its entire work at the service of the society must be forgotten. A new police force, with a new authority in the eyes of the citizenry, must have a civilized behavior toward the citizens, but it must also be firm with all those who ignore the law. And not last, equipment, beginning with uniforms, vehicles, and radio equipment contribute to both its image and raising its efficiency, and in this respect I think we must rank somewhere at the periphery of Europe. To have policemen prepared at any time to even sacrifice their lives if necessary, we will have to ensure that their pay allow them to provide a decent life for themselves and their families. I also hope that the police will have as few opportunities as possible to go out into the streets, none if possible.

[Bacanu] Is there any question you would like to ask yourself?

[Danescu] If we don't get what we need to consolidate our equipment and troops, if the citizens don't help us, if state and private enterprises don't take measures to protect their property, if we don't teach those around us to beware of imprudences that may make them fall victims to criminals, how long can we, the police, keep up at this rate?

[Bacanu] Do you have any question to ROMANIA LIBERA?

[Danescu] Yes. Is ROMANIA LIBERA indeed independent? And do you still believe that by patronizing children's homes, which policemen helped with an open heart, the Interior Ministry is training "terrorists?"

Official on Industrial Pollution, Solutions

91BA0555A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 5 Apr 91 p 3

["Excerpts" of an interview with State Secretary Angheluta Vadineanu by Doina Doru-Chirca; place and date not given: "Incipient Environmental Protection"—first paragraph is ROMANIA LIBERA introduction]

[Text] For years we knew that we lived in a polluted and damaged environment, without however realizing the scope of the disaster. For example, we knew that fruit and vegetables were free of worms because of the high concentration of chemical fertilizer but we ate them although we suspected that they were toxic. The air is loaded with dust, car emissions, and toxic gases emanated by various industries. A large number of rivers have become stagnant or even poisonous. Forests have been felled thoughtlessly and the mountains are eroded because of hostile clearings cut in a spirit of "after me the deluge." This is another of the "legacies" of communism; by attacking the condition of the environment, our health and our genetic dowry were attacked. An Environmental Ministry was established as a first step toward restoring the environment; its mission is to hammer out programs and strategies along this line and to monitor the observance of environmental protection norms. We conducted an interview with State Secretary Angheluta Vadineanu in order to find out more details. Because of space limitations, we will carry excerpts—the most interesting, we think—of the extremely interesting discussion we had with him.

[Doru-Chirca] Are there differences among the various zones in our country from the viewpoint of pollution?

[Vadineanu] The answer is rather difficult. We have, of course, identified the critical areas. There are various degrees of environmental degradation. A program of investigation is currently under way—and will continue for a period of three years—designed in the final analysis to identify categories of ecological systems and their

conditions. You must know that "degree of deterioration" refers not only to pollution degradation but also to extensive economic projects which can strip and impoverish ecological systems. Also, a complete map must indicate not only the degree of pollution but also the distribution of sources that cannot be regenerated and their condition. This will allow us to channel the entire recovery process and to establish a system of priorities.

[Doru-Chirca] Can the noxious substances be listed by hierarchy?

[Vadineanu] It depends from what angle we consider them: Some may be viewed as more harmful because their effects are immediate. But heavy metals, for example, cause very long-term environmental damages. Any noxious substance is dangerous and none may be viewed as "secondary" or "minor." That is why I believe that it is very important to stage a consistent campaign to educate everyone, both those expected to protect the environment, and the public, who must realize that by damaging the environment they damage their own biological heritage.

[Doru-Chirca] From previous years we know that some enterprises, the chemical combines of Govora and Fagaras, and various agricultural and livestock units operated without authorization. What is currently the situation?

[Vadineanu] We must realize that we are only at the beginning of the road. As we adopt the necessary legislation, if we see that they're not making any efforts, within a reasonable period of time we may withdraw their permission to operate.

[Doru-Chirca] Why not do it now?

[Vadineanu] For the time being it cannot be done, for two reasons. The first is of a social nature. Imagine we were to close down the Copsa Mica Combine. Thousands of people would be jobless. They themselves don't even want to hear of such a thing, even though they know it's dangerous for themselves and for their children. But they're not the only ones; our industry is linked in a "chain" and that defect is difficult to repair. If we stop one factory—regardless which—the whole chain breaks. What do we do with the people employed in such plants? That is why we are obligated to plan a gradual change of technology. Another obstacle is of a legislative nature: We don't have the legislative framework to do it. But in any event, the social factor compels us to opt for a slow solution. Can we close down the agricultural and livestock combines that either don't have purification stations or have some that are too small? What do we do with the pigs then? You see, we have to persuade every economic factor to make investments for this purpose. And of course, we need the legal framework...

[Doru-Chirca] Where are we from the viewpoint of environmental deterioration in comparison with other East European countries?

[Vadineanu] It's difficult to tell. Of course, pollution doesn't stop at borders. But you see, each East European country claims that its situation is even worse. That is the case with Czechoslovakia. But I will venture to state that, considering the density of pollutants per unit of area, we are in a far worse situation than Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Bulgaria. Naturally, by admitting and claiming a very bad situation, each one of these countries hopes to secure larger funds for technological changes. For years on end we claimed that everything was fine and now that's coming back to us like a boomerang. Nevertheless, now we hope that a number of loans will be rechanneled our way.

[Doru-Chirca] Is there a concrete antipollution program?

[Vadineanu] Such a program is being worked on. But it would be the biggest mistake to think that pollution alone is responsible for environmental damage. It is only one of its causes. Another cause is the excessive exploitation of resources, of forests, and major hydropower projects, all of which contribute to changing the environment and thus its quality, and to the disappearance of some species. Similarly, biotechnologies and genetic engineering also contribute to impoverishing the species. To hammer out a program to combat environmental deterioration we must be familiar with all these factors in detail, establish their long-term impact, and decide on means of prevention. For the time being we must learn the real scope of the disaster in order to establish a strategy for recovery.

[Doru-Chirca] What is the amount required for technological changes and how much is the yearly allocation for this purpose?

[Vadineanu] The investments are enormous all over the world, not only in our country. Regional and global disturbances have generally caused such a situation in ecological systems that the future development of society is in extreme danger. As far as we are concerned, we are working on assessing the costs. The ministries and departments involved have requested investment funds for environmental protection. Evidently, the Environmental Ministry has pointed out the need for certain projects, such as water purification stations in large urban centers, installations to control atmospheric emissions, and so forth. Approximately 8 billion lei have been allocated in the present circumstances of our economy, which is insufficient to sustain a high rate of recovery process, but this amount in lei can cover expenses for requirements that can be met internally, while for the rest each unit can obtain external loans without any limits set by the executive.

[Doru-Chirca] What is the ministry's position on restructuring the industry?

[Vadineanu] One of the main objectives is to evaluate the future impact of every action. In fact we are preparing a report for next year's meeting in Brazil on "The Environment, Its Protection, and Development." This means that, once we know what technology and raw

materials are used, what the product of each technological stage is, and where an investor wants to locate a given plant then we can determine the consequences and all their economic, social, and ecological effects. Then we can determine the conditions on which a permit for operation may or may not be issued.

[Doru-Chirca] We are a poor country in great need of foreign currency. Are there plans to stop trends developing or to prevent hosting industries that pollute or deposit waste?

[Vadineanu] The environmental law that will soon be submitted to Parliament envisages all of that. Simultaneously work is under way on bills regarding the collection and storage of noxious substances and the right to produce and handle such substances. We intend to use European standards adapted to our experience and we will also tap the experience of European specialists in the area. The coming law will stipulate that the impact of every restructuring and every new economic unit must be evaluated. For that we will receive foreign aid; the PHARE [expansion unknown] program also envisages such an operation.

[Doru-Chirca] Speaking of standards, how do those practiced in our country compare with world standards?

[Vadineanu] All of them were close to the European standards and some of them are even stricter, but what's the use if they were not observed? We don't have standards for atmospheric emissions, so we will adopt European guidelines. The fact that we have signed international conventions on environmental protection obligates us to now observe these standards.

[Doru-Chirca] Are the environmental monitoring agencies properly equipped?

[Vadineanu] No.

[Doru-Chirca] How much authority do they carry?

[Vadineanu] For the time being they implement the laws in effect, such as they are. These agencies are in charge of reporting and providing data to evaluate the environmental situation. The fact that we have joined a number of international conventions—of our own free will—will in the future impart great authority to these agencies. So far they can't do much. In Giurgiu, for example, the workers have threatened that if we recommend that the plant be closed down they'll blow us away from there. Each one dreams of getting rich as quickly as possible and never mind protecting the ecological systems. Until we get rid of this kind of thinking we won't make too much progress. The implementation of a legislative regime depends on the existence of a competent department of inspectors. Environmental protection is expensive and it must not be left to the discretion of economic units, whose main concern is immediate economic gain.

[Doru-Chirca] Environmental pollution is undisputably a world problem that does not recognize borders. How is

your cooperation with similar institutions in the world and what aid can they offer Romania?

[Vadineanu] Most similar world organizations are non-governmental and consist of ecology experts with access to data bases. Such bodies, in cooperation with governments, have initiated a world program designed to promote research programs, provide equipment, train specialists, and channel funds. The amounts required are enormous, but equally important is that the money not be funneled along closed channels. Programs have been established for Govora, Rimnicu Vilcea, and Copsa Mica in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, which has expanded its field of activities, and with other similar bodies with a view to evaluating the impact in critical areas and establishing a certain order of priorities towards which to channel the funds, so that Romania should not remain a disruptive factor. It's easy to say that we need help, but we must be realistic. Only when we show that we know where we stand and especially where we want to get and how, in other words, only when we will have a real picture of the material aid we need, will we get help. Today no one is tossing money around for the sake of helping. I can tell you that there are firms which wish to form joint associations with us in order to procure equipment for controlling atmospheric emissions and build filter installations for the cement industry. It is up to us to demonstrate that we have a good grasp of how to utilize such aid.

YUGOSLAVIA

NIN Journalists Protest Editor Election

*AU3004135791 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
26 Apr 91 p 15*

[Letter from the NIN editorial board to Dr. Zivorad Minovic, director of the POLITIKA News and Publishing Enterprise, and to the workers council of the POLITIKA News and Publishing Enterprise]

[Text] At a meeting held on 22 April 1991, the NIN editorial board decided the following:

1. The NIN editorial board demands that the chief and responsible editor of NIN not be elected until the out-moded normative acts of the POLITIKA News and Publishing Enterprise, which are at variance with positive legal regulations, are changed and that the term of office of the acting chief and responsible editor of NIN be extended, which is legally admissible and has been coordinated with the director of the POLITIKA News and Publishing Enterprise and the workers council of the POLITIKA News and Publishing Enterprise.

2. The NIN editorial board demands that the NIN editorial board have the final say in the election of the chief and responsible editor of NIN.

3. Since the necessary democratic conditions have not been provided for electing the chief and responsible editor of NIN, the NIN editorial board demands that the advertisement for the post of chief and responsible editor of NIN (POLITIKA, 26 March 1991) be annulled.

At a meeting of the free NIN journalists forum, held on 22 April 1991 immediately prior to the meeting of the NIN editorial board, a somewhat more detailed reply to the director of the POLITIKA News and Publishing Enterprise and the workers council of the POLITIKA News and Publishing Enterprise was adopted whose basic stands are identical to the conclusions and demands of the NIN editorial board.

HUNGARY

Defense Official Explains Resignation

*LD0605165691 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0445 GMT 6 May 91*

[Interview with Mihaly Boti, deputy state secretary in the Ministry of Defense, by Erno Kardos; place and date not given]

[Text] [Announcer] Another leader has submitted his resignation in the Ministry of Defense, and from the weekend papers it has become clear also that Lajos Fur, the minister of defense, has accepted the resignation. Mihaly Boeti, deputy state secretary, has never hidden in his statements the fact that in his view the new military doctrine, contrary to the declared principles, is not of a defensive character. In the following interview the deputy state secretary declares nothing more than that the government does not fulfill its promulgated program.

[Boti] There is no question of my being in a political or professional conflict with the minister. The latter would be absurd anyway because the minister is a historian and I was originally a graduate engineer. The difference of views, which was the basis for my resignation application, was much more the result of the majority view of the higher military leadership on such important and fundamental questions like defense requirements, the basic principles of the republic, and the major parameters of the new structure of the Army.

[Kardos] By the way, you have made statements about this in the weekend papers too. But you have not spoken about the basic difference between your views and the general staff regarding the defense doctrine of the republic, which is the subject of the conflict.

[Boti] In my view the country needs such basic defense requirements which, on the one hand, contain very unambiguous, clearly, and a strictly defensive philosophy.

[Kardos] Does this mean that the view of the general staff is that [Hungary] must not only prepare for defense?

[Boti] This is not what is at stake. In other words, there is no dispute with the general staff and the higher military leadership, in that this country must strictly confine itself to thinking only in terms of defense. However, the practical requirements do not necessarily fulfill in the best way possible this expectation of principle. This is what is at issue. There is no talk of such an intention or resolution within the general staff to the effect that anybody would consider this small country

capable of offensive military warfare, or that he would feel the need for this. This is out of the question.

[Kardos] At the same time, it is also a fact that quite a lot has been happening recently within the Army. The crew has rebelled, soldiers have committed suicide, and there have been resignations in the leadership corps. It automatically occurs to one that this is not the situation in which you want to leave the Army; it appears as if our defense is disintegrating.

[Boti] The situation should not be simplified. The Army is in poor shape, both in respect of its material supply, whereby it lives within narrow limits, and also in terms of discipline and personnel relations. It is not in a desirable state of affairs. However, it would be a great mistake to believe that it is the stormy consequence of recent months. No, this state of affairs has developed over years; the only novelty of recent times is that we have been talking about this more openly.

[Kardos] Can the dissatisfaction of the crew be trailed back in some way to the existing tensions, differences of views, possibly political differences of views, within the leadership corps?

[Boti] No, it can be trailed back much more to the changed disciplinary state of affairs, changed posture, the change in patience of all society, and also to such extremist phenomena like the growing crime rate, characteristic throughout society. The Army is too big an organization, too big an institution to be substantially different from society as such.

[Kardos] Let us return to the defense doctrine because this is the direct cause for your resignation. If my information is correct, it has not yet been accepted by the government of the republic. In other words, you still have a chance that the government may, in opposition to the ministry, perhaps take your side. If any information is correct the minister has been contemplating taking your side, has he not, even against the general staff?

[Boti] Undoubtedly, I have some hope and optimism in that the basic principles and the new Army structure which is going to be debated in midday may still take a favorable direction in this phase of its elaboration. I wanted to call attention by my actions to the existence of such opinion and such a viewpoint, according to which the possibility of a grave mistake has arisen here, the possibility of a serious deviation from the government program, the program of renewal declared at the end of the summer last year. At the same time I also think that this step directs the government's attention to the fact that the material which the ministry is going to present in the coming days is not completely unambiguous and indisputable.

BULGARIA

Vuzrazhdane Commercial Bank Described

91BA0421A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
11 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Marina Kozovska, president of the Vuzrazhdane Commercial Bank in Sofia, by Mara Georgieva; place and date not given: "Banks Are Not Interested in Customers With Worsened Finances"]

[Text] [Georgieva] Mrs. Kozovska, please introduce us to the Vuzrazhdane Commercial Bank, which you head.

[Kozovska] This bank is one of the newly established commercial banks. It is modeled after the third branch of the BNB [Bulgarian National Bank], which was founded in 1947. At the very first stockholders' general meeting, in March 1990, we increased the statutory capital to 20 million leva, which was paid up. As of the end of last year, we have been selling shares at 10,000 leva each, until we reach the 40 million statutory capital. Our bank is the only one among the commercial banks, except for the specialized ones, to be allowed to engage in foreign exchange activities without any other bank in the country functioning as an intermediary.

[Georgieva] What were the bank's financial results last year?

[Kozovska] Our profits declined because of the worsened economic condition of producers and the lower interest rates we charged them. However, we increased our own funds by selling shares and, from the 13 million with which we started, they now total some 30 million.

[Georgieva] Will the bank continue this rate policy?

[Kozovska] Again, we charge moderate interest. The prime interest rate is sufficiently high for us not need to increase it substantially. In the final account, no one is interested in worsening the finances of producers because bankruptcies in producing companies trigger a chain reaction that cannot fail to affect the banks.

[Georgieva] Do you approve of the new interest policy of the government?

[Kozovska] The policy of the government will be unquestionably successful if, as a result of the increase in interest rates, the industrial potential of the country is not eliminated but, instead, triggers its natural restructuring. This result could be achieved by establishing a stable legal foundation and by clarifying the possibility of initiative and competition and even industrial debts, which may reach into the billions in the future, and the assumption of strict financial commitments by the very institutions that are demanding precisely this type of conversion to a market economy. For the time being, such conditions are unavailable.

[Georgieva] How will the bank cope?

[Kozovska] By finding new sources of revenue through specific bank deals and joint activities. We shall carefully expand our activities in the country and abroad. In the area of credit policy, we have adopted the tactic of "maximal restraint." Our commitments in granting new loans are based on the task of surviving and on mutual interest.

[Georgieva] What aspects of current bank practices in our country would you like to see eliminated?

[Kozovska] Bureaucratism in decisionmaking, a nonprofessional attitude toward customers, and petty supervision on the part of the Central Bank.

[Georgieva] Does the draft for a new law on the banks make this possible?

[Kozovska] No. It provides for a rather extensive system of permits. An administrative approach rather than objective realities will be regulating the banking system, in terms of structure and content. No possibilities are stipulated for tolerating Bulgarian bank capital in the country as a reaction to the expected invasion of foreign investments, including in banks. No solution has been provided for the problems of electronizing the banking system, which includes supplying programs for legitimate banking operations.

[Georgieva] Is this not just a draft law?

[Kozovska] I do not believe that it will be subject to substantial changes because the discussion of the draft with specialists has ended. I am convinced that other options could have been found, which would make the administering activities of the Central Bank unnecessary. For example, the network of banks and their branches could be regulated by mandatorily installing electronic systems in any new bank or branch within a stipulated period of time.

[Georgieva] Does the draft for a new law also determine the new role that banks will play in society?

[Kozovska] This role is made necessary objectively, with the change in the objectives and values in society. The requirement of economic interest as the basic motivation of individuals and companies makes of the banks significant social institutions.

[Georgieva] Are you ready to assume this responsibility?

[Kozovska] The main problem is that of cadres and their salaries. The laws being drafted by the Council of Ministers on regulating wages in the state sector will predetermine the undesirable social status of the personnel in that sector. The natural reaction will be a "brain drain" on private business. Conditions are being created for unequal competition among the various forms of ownership.

[Georgieva] Is it difficult to be a lady banker?

[Kozovska] As you know, before the 1989 reform, what the banks were doing, most of all, was administrating, while the executive cadres were pursuing technical activities. That created objective conditions for the feminizing of the banks. In a while, men will return to this profession, including as accountants and other specialists. As for me personally, I would be lying if I told you that I find the position easy. However, I love both my children and my profession. That is why I do not find it unpleasant to carry "two watermelons under one arm," as the folk saying goes.

Pushkarov Order on Demonopolization Reported

*AU0505172691 Sofia BTA in English 1639 GMT
5 May 91*

[Text] Sofia, May 5 (BTA)—The first demonopolization in Bulgaria of five companies already started.

13 new independent companies will be formed out of one of them, "Metalokeramika" in Sofia.

The minister of industry, trade and services Mr. Ivan Pushkarov issued an order appointing commissions in 60 companies. The commissions will undertake the reorganization, they will specify the liabilities to the banks and solve all problems with debit and credit sides after decentralization and demonopolization.

On Tuesday [7 May] the ministry will consider the proposals for demonopolization of 10 more companies.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Number of Double-Taxation Agreements Expanded

*91CH0476F Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 21 Mar 91 pp 1-2*

[Unattributed article: "Legal Guarantees for Entrepreneurs; The Second Day of the Federal Assembly's 14th Joint Session"]

[Text] The parliament has ratified the agreements on the avoidance of double taxation that the CSFR Government concluded with the British and Tunisian Governments, respectively. The number of such agreements that Czechoslovakia concluded to date has thus increased to twelve. Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus introduced both agreements on the avoidance of double taxation. In his exposition he noted, among other things, that lately Czechoslovak-British relations have been expanding and deepening considerably. The emphasis in current economic relations is primarily on commodity trade. The mutual trade turnover last year was \$713 million, including \$367 million of Czechoslovak export and \$346 million of Czechoslovak import. It is favorable that the Finance Ministry's records show 67 enterprises in which British capital is participating. Therefore the

conclusion of the agreement is exceptionally important, and it greatly simplifies mutual business relations for the mentioned enterprises.

Rejection of the bill on the CTK [news agency] on Tuesday [19 March] indicated the difficulty of discussing the bill defining powersharing among the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic [CSFR], the Czech Republic [CR], and the Slovak Republic [SR] over matters pertaining to the press and other media. Opposition to the government's bill came from the Slovak National Council, which introduced a version of its own. The presiding Milan Sutovec called attention to the agreement among the parliamentary committees to discuss in plenary session the report of the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committees, which is a compilation of the two preceding reports. Federal Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Miklosko spoke for the bill's sponsor.

He addressed himself to the bill's three controversial points: demonopolization of the media in the CSFR, and the right of other legal entities and individuals to establish stations; the licensing authority; and the question of a Czechoslovak Public Television and a Czechoslovak Public Radio at the federal level. In his opinion, the introduced bill solves all three problems and defers merely certain minor disputes to future legislation. He also emphasized that although the republics' radio and television networks do enjoy a degree of independence, they actually do not exist under law, and this fact is reflected in their foreign relations, business deals, etc.

In summing up the debate, Deputy Josef Mecl (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), the bill's reporter for the House of the Nations, said that the purpose of the bill is merely to divide authority, assets and other rights. Further laws of the Federal Assembly and of the National Councils will regulate the organization and operation of the CST, Czechoslovak Radio, and other institutions. The bill was passed in the sense of the presented report.

The next item on the calendar was a bill to amend the Constitutional Law on the State Defense Council. In conjunction with the new power sharing, the bill defines the authority of the CR Defense Council and SR Defense Council, with due consideration for the State Defense Council's scope of authority; it also establishes a Defense Council in Prague and one in Bratislava, and permits the establishment of such councils in the okreses as well. The bill received the necessary two-thirds majority in both houses and was enacted.

Deliberation of the proposed Military Doctrine of the CSFR produced extensive debate. This proposal had already been considered by the two preceding joint sessions and was now resubmitted, after incorporation of the deputies' comments. Federal Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky underscored the sense of responsibility of those deputies who realize the importance of the country's defense and security. We should overcome, he continued, at least two instances when we failed to

demonstrate our determination to defend our country, which established a bad tradition. On both occasions it was the political representatives who failed, rather than the Armed Forces. He appealed to the deputies not to regard the military doctrine merely as another parliamentary resolution, but as an important document that comes as close as possible to being a law. In the final vote the deputies agreed on the following introduction: "The Federal Assembly hereby proclaims the following Military Doctrine of the CSFR."

The joint session of both Houses will continue on Friday [22 March]. The main item on the calendar will be the report of the Committee Investigating the Events of 17 November. Today the parliamentary committees will meet to finalize the texts that the plenum is to consider. The House of Nations and the House of the People will meet separately in the afternoon. Among other things, they will be dealing with the election of members of the Federal Assembly's Presidium, and will be considering a proposal to create a petitions and initiatives committee in [each of] the two houses.

HUNGARY

Hungary 'Counts On' Japanese Investments

91CH0473D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
8 Mar 91 p 3

[MTI [Hungarian Telegraph Agency] report: "Hungary Counts on Japanese Capital; Tax Breaks for Foreign Investors"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Hungary begins this year with active foreign capital amounting to about \$800 million to \$1 billion. This would mean a doubling of foreign investments, and we also expect contributions from Japan.

It was said in an investment conference held on Wednesday in Tokyo with the participation of Hungarian leaders, that Japanese business representatives are expected to play a big role in investments in Hungary and in speeding up privatization. This includes the implementation of the privatization of the traditional Hungarian wine-producing regions, that of Tokaj among them.

The Hungarian foreign trade section in Tokyo worked out a program to increase Japanese capital inflow. In connection with this, a program supported by the Association of Japanese Industrialists (Keidanren), among others, was organized which will be followed by a series of lectures in Osaka and Kobe, in Tokyo's vicinity.

Zoltan Gombocz, deputy state secretary of NGKM [Ministry of International Economic Relations], emphasized that the four-year economic program's aim is Hungary's continued integration into the world market and to ensure that Hungary has an interest in the diversification of its relations, i.e., it counts not only on

Europe but also on Japan. Gombocz sketched the institutional framework of investments, the first in Central Europe, and described the regulations that help the functioning of joint companies. As he said, although Hungarian entrepreneurs are not overly enthusiastic about these regulations, they are necessary for the transformation of the Hungarian economy. He added that a consensus was reached in Hungary's parliament regarding the issue of special tax breaks provided to foreign capital.

State Property Agency Director Dr. Lajos Csepi, in giving a detailed description of the purpose and methods of eliminating state properties, said that in the near future the AVO [State Property Agency] will announce the third and fourth privatization packages which are aimed at the reconstruction of Hungary's construction industry and the privatization of the well-known Hungarian wine-producing regions. He expressed his hope that 100 Hungarian state enterprises can be sold in part or in whole yet this year, partly through the introduction of the new privatization method initiated by investors. In this, he also counts on Japanese participation, specifically in the selling of the three largest Hungarian enterprises.

Dr. Frigyes Harshegyi, who happened to be in Tokyo, provided his Japanese audience with favorable financial data. Harshegyi, vice president of the Hungarian National Bank, said that last year's process of improving the balance surplus of foreign trade is continuing. After last year's \$1 billion balance surplus, the surplus during the first two months of this year was \$500 million. He said that Hungary assigns a high priority to paying its debts, and the cost of credit will decrease by a significant amount through decent earnings from exports, through revenues from exports and tourism that amounted to \$7 billion last year and are expected to amount to \$10 billion this year. Harshegyi said that through long-term credit contracts, we have been, and will continue to be able to raise the \$2-2.5 billion needed for these payments. The use of credit offered by private banks is also continuing, including those offered on the Japanese money market where the Hungarian National Bank is planning to issue bonds this year in the amount of \$1 billion. Thus, the conditions for repaying our debts do exist.

MDF Holds National Economic Conference

91CH0473B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
11 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by Lajos Kovacs including interview with Minister of Finance Mihaly Kupa; place and date of interview not given: "Steps Toward Supply Market: Mihaly Kupa on the National Strategy of Privatization"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] (From our county correspondent) Last weekend Miskolc University hosted the Hungarian Democratic Forum's national economic congress in which ministers,

MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] experts, MDF representatives from all over the country, and representatives of industrial firms and economic and social organizations participated.

Balazs Horvath, MDF executive president, struck a tone of criticism and self-criticism. He stated in his opening speech on Saturday that the government made two great mistakes. In his opinion, one of them was that it failed to establish appropriate relations with the electronic and printed media. The other one was that conflicting government concepts of economic policy lead to the various concepts eliminating each other.

Then the finance minister presented the concept which was recently adopted by the government and which is widely known as the Kupa program.

Mihaly Kupa connected keeping the country running and building a socially oriented market economy to carrying out three tasks: changing the ownership structure, having a strong foreign trade strategy, and fighting poverty. He described the first half of the four-year economic program, called Stability and Convertibility, as an orientation program in which the legal and institutional system will be transformed, offering both the foreign investor and the Hungarian entrepreneur information on the direction in which the change of the economic system is progressing in wake of the change in the political system. As he said, a working market economy that is accepted by society as a whole must be built by 1993-94. The minister specified 1996 as the earliest date when Hungary can become a member of the European Economic Community. We have taken the first steps toward a supply market, but some monopolies are still present in certain areas and, thus, the apparent liberalization is merely illusory. The minister stated that there are not enough small and midsize ventures. He also voiced his opinion that a separate economic policy program of crisis management must be developed for the crisis belt, i.e., for the region of Borsod, Baranya, Szabolcs, and Bekes Counties.

Minister Without Portfolio Katalin Botos, speaking on the new bank law and the transformation of the banking system, was one of those who presented details of the comprehensive economic program's implementation. Csaba Siklos, minister of transportation, telecommunications and water management, speaking on the infrastructure's pace of development, said that an international bidding will be announced by the year's end to complete the construction of the M1, M3, and M5 expressways. As a result of the telecommunications program, the number of telephone lines will be doubled by the end of 1993. As of next year, they want to help the development of public works with state subsidies.

Parliamentary Economic Committee chairman Istvan Szabo's report was an interesting dash of color in the Sunday presentations. In it he emphasized the importance of the Vienna-Budapest World Expo. The point of

view adopted by the congress was that the MDF should support the World Expo again.

In his report, Minister of Finance Mihaly Kupa mentioned a national strategy of privatization. We asked him during the recess about the purpose of this program.

[Kupa] It will determine the areas which we want to keep mostly under Hungarian control in the future. The point is not to keep these companies and firms in state ownership but to preserve the Hungarian entrepreneurs' decisive influence in the privatization process. We want to guarantee this through techniques of priority stocks.

[Kovacs] What kind of companies will be affected by the program?

[Kupa] I can mention Malev as an example. In general terms, the program will involve those large and substantial companies over which we want to maintain national control.

[Kovacs] When will the national strategy of privatization be made public?

[Kupa] The State Property Agency and the Economic Cabinet's special committee are working on the strategy. The deadline is mid-April.

[Kovacs] To what extent will all this affect the so-called spontaneous privatization?

[Kupa] The further privatization of midsize and small companies must not be disturbed. There is a need for spontaneous privatization, but, I must emphasize, only under strictly controlled circumstances.

MNB President on Debt Management, Inflation

*91CH0533A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
28 Mar 91 p 21*

[Article by -mj: "Rescheduling, Inflation, Banking Law"]

[Text] At a meeting sponsored by the financial division of the Society of Economists, Gyorgy Suranyi (37), the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] president, conversed with Zoltan Farkas in an open interview and consultation. After discussing personal biographical events, I inquired about his official career in economics. I wanted to know just how he became the last head of the National Planning Office slated to be discontinued during the Nemeth cabinet, why he accepted a state administrative function after the scientific work he liked so much, and how he assessed the economic activities of the previous government and the present situation.

The central bank president said that he felt very good among the outstanding, intellectually stimulating staff members of the Financial Research Institute. Accordingly, he had some reservations when he agreed to perform a state function as part of the Nemeth government. In Suranyi's view, as far as preparing for the

political transition and foreign policy were concerned and considering the possibilities, the Nemeth government accomplished more than the possible maximum. It prepared the perhaps historically unprecedented change in an honorable and appropriate way.

Suranyi has rather mixed feelings about the Nemeth government's performance as far as the economy is concerned. He regards the handling of the change that resulted from the Grosz government's initiative to liberalize individual tourism as the biggest mistake made by the government of those days. The Grosz government promulgated the passport decree, under different circumstances to be regarded as a human right to improve the public mood, but this measure caused a minor economic catastrophe due to missing financial and other provisions. For example, they "forgot" to assess an added value tax on privately imported goods, moreover, they discontinued assessing customs duties on private imports. Some durable consumer goods, including personal vehicles were imported duty-free to the country as a result of this omission. Aside from other problems, this triggered a hardly tolerable convertible currency outflow. Thus, the Nemeth government also endangered the solvency of the country.

From among the main current issues, Suranyi spoke primarily about our international debt service and installment payment conditions. Consistent with his previously voiced convictions, he continues to feel that initiating a change in payment conditions would not be appropriate. In part he agrees with the reasons given by Imre Tarafas, the MNB deputy president in an interview, and in part because Poland will not benefit in the long run from the credits that were forgiven and from the reduced interest payments. As a result of these actions, Poland will continue to be unable to change over to a private capital market economy.

Regarding the favorable start in 1991 the central bank president said that the years 1988-90 also began in a similar favorable way. In the course of three years, exports increased by 50 percent and exchange rates have been improving for the past three years. But the structure of exports payable in convertible currencies has also evolved favorably: About 75 percent of our exports were destined to OECD countries. According to preliminary data the actual figures are substantially better than expected: The budget has performed as planned; individual savings are on the increase, moreover, the increase is greater than what the MNB predicted, and twice as fast as in the previous year. The current balance of payments is largely active; last year the number of businesses active in the economy doubled from 12,000 to 24,000, and within that the number, the number of joint enterprises increased from 1,100 to more than 5,000.

With respect to controlling inflation Suranyi stressed that the great, negative lesson to be learned was that wages must not be liberalized in the absence of definitive

market competition and private owners. Without independent self-regulation and in the absence of appropriate internal competition, doing so is life threatening. Fortunately, trends which hinder the growth of inflation counteract this process, such as individuals' increased propensity to save, or the fact that enterprises endeavored to increase their liquidity and solvency primarily for fear of liquidation, which in turn reduced the volume of mutual, interenterprise indebtedness.

Regarding the central bank and the banking law, the MNB president said that the drafting of the two legislative proposals was complete. The MNB legislative proposal includes all conditions which ensure the central bank's independence: The MNB will report directly to the parliament; limits were established for the extent to which the state budget may be financed; the bank will be fully independent regarding interest rate policies, but a joint decisionmaking mechanism will remain in place concerning exchange rate policies. Although the latter constitutes a compromise, joint authority regarding exchange rates is customary in the West and is an acceptable relationship. The proposed banking law was based on recommendations received from the Basel Committee, and was adapted to Hungarian conditions. It deals liberally with privatization and the establishment of banks, but a certain discretionary authority remains because that appears to be necessary under the present conditions.

Entrepreneurs To Research Compensation Claims

*91CH0506C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 19 Mar 91 p 8*

[Interview with Zoltan Horvath and Dr. Gyorgy Dobos, the chairman and the legal counsel, respectively, of the Strazsa Property Protection Service and Commercial Small Cooperative, by Sara Pogany; place and date not given: "Are Compensation Claims a Good Business?"]

[Text] A new kind of business activity is unfolding in Hungary, and sharp-eyed entrepreneurs have been quick to identify it. Even persons to whom the Compensation Law will otherwise not apply are hoping to make a bundle on compensation claims. Small and large firms, attorneys, and private individuals are advertising their services to represent individuals longing for their one-time properties. The Strazsa Property Protection Service and Commercial Small Cooperative is one such firm, but its fees are stiff.

[Pogany] The Compensation Law has yet to be enacted, but you have already begun work that will make it easier for qualified claimants to obtain compensation.

[Horvath] You have to be in the market. We are not the only ones developing this idea. Our competitors, too, are doing so.

[Pogany] What are you offering to do?

[Horvath] First of all, we are offering to prove reliably, in every respect, the validity of a person's claim who is seeking compensation for a given property. Thus, if someone comes to us who says that the corner building across the street was once his, and intends to file a claim for compensation once the Compensation Law has been enacted, we will investigate, in accordance with his and our own interests, whether or not his claim is valid, by searching records and using other methods. If that person then wants to give us a power of attorney to represent him before the Compensation Office, we will undertake to do that too, of course.

[Pogany] On the basis of what statutory regulation are you able to verify a claimant's assertions, in a manner acceptable even to the courts, if necessary?

[Horvath] That is a business secret.

[Pogany] What is the risk your client and you, respectively, have to reckon with?

[Horvath] The client runs the risk of having his assertions disproved if he lies to us. In that case we will immediately cancel his commission, without claiming damages. So far as our own risk is concerned, I am able to assure you that we are working with professionals, and therefore, the probability of error can be said to be practically zero. If we should nevertheless make a mistake, we naturally would assume moral and financial responsibility for it.

[Pogany] Within a certain circle, qualified claimants are former Hungarian citizens who in the meantime have acquired foreign citizenship. How are you able to check on them?

[Horvath] We have extensive contacts with private investigation firms in foreign countries.

[Pogany] To use the same example that you did, how much will it cost a claimant to prove, with your help, that the corner house across the street was his?

[Horvath] According to our present estimates, between 8,000 and 15,000 forints, commensurately with the value of the property in question.

[Pogany] Let us assume that you have established beyond any doubt that your client is the rightful owner. Are there any extra charges for the documents you obtain from various archives, land offices, cadastral records, etc.?

[Horvath] Of course. With the help of our legal staff, we prepare all the documents pertaining to the claim, in a way such that any authority will find them acceptable.

[Pogany] How much does a client have to pay you if you agree to represent him in the prosecution of his claim before the Compensation Office?

[Dobos] I am unable to quote you a specific figure at this point, but we are planning to charge between 2 and 6

percent of the value of the property. We will probably come to an agreement with the client regarding the size of our fee.

[Pogany] Don't you think that your service is too expensive, when you are providing every phase of the work in question?

[Dobos] That is not the way I see it. A better attorney would charge you more for a single consultation. When we decided to venture into this field, we had in mind primarily that the persons, mostly elderly, to whom the Compensation Law will apply would certainly be willing to spend money to get their rightful property back. For them it would already be a burden to have to go to the various authorities, not to mention their probable lack of expertise.

[Pogany] Knowing the amounts of the pensions the elderly are receiving, would it be compatible with your business philosophy to agree on a contingency fee, i.e., to advance your services, as a percentage of the value of the property in question?

[Dobos] Yes, but if it turned out that the client's assertions were false, we would hand back the case to him because in that case, there would eventually be no compensation.

POLAND

Poles Procrastinating Over French Investments

AU2804172991 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 23 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by (kak): "Who Does Not Want Money From Paris?"]

[Text] French firms are willing to invest about \$300 million in Poland, and have been waiting for months for Polish offices and firms to grant them permission.

Following President Lech Walesa's visit to Paris, during which he encouraged good business dealings in Poland, Alain Bry, French ambassador to Poland, wrote to Walesa telling him that a few large French enterprises have been wanting to invest millions of dollars in Poland for a long time. The French think that Poland's indecision and lack of permission are a frequent obstacle to business dealings.

Total wants to invest between \$100 million and \$400 million dollars in the Gdansk oil refinery, and is waiting only for its permission.

Alcatel Cables of Lyons would like to open a telephone cable factory in Lublin, utilizing local copper deposits, but the Copper Mining Combine objects.

Air Liquide wants to invest \$40 million in the Polgaz plant, but the French fear the talks may never succeed because there is no permanent negotiating partner inside

the Ministry of Ownership Transformations and a lack of agreement on the procedure to be adopted for the privatization process.

Thompson will invest \$40 million in the Polkolor plant in Piaseczno if the recently concluded agreement is ratified.

Rhone-Poulenc has opened a joint venture company called Biopharm (an investment of \$60 million), which is to supply preparates derived from blood, but the Hematological Institute is selling the necessary plasma to the Austrians and Germans.

The Societe Generale Bank has been waiting for months to open a branch in Warsaw.

BULGARIA**Cooperatives' Revival, Defense Committee
Founded**

*AU0505144391 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 27 Apr 91 p 1*

[Report by Liyana Kirilova-Marinova and Kiril Panayotov: "A Committee for the Revival and Defense of the Cooperatives Set Up"]

[Text] From whom and from what does the cooperative movement have to defend itself? Thirty billion leva worth of its property, seized and owned by the state during the years of totalitarianism, has to be returned to it. High interest rates and taxes, on a par with those for state enterprises, could lead to bankruptcy for hundreds of cooperatives that are the only suppliers of essential goods to thousands of towns and villages. Under such

circumstances, will the 2 million cooperative members and their families manage to survive?

The Yanko Sakuzov, Aleksandur Stamboliyski, and Evropa Foundations, the Fatherland Union, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, the Pensioners' Club, the Central Cooperative Union, the Central Union of Trade and Production Cooperatives, the Union for the Disabled, the Union of Forestry Cooperatives, and OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK are to take part in the Initiative Committee for the Revival and Defense of the Cooperatives, independent of party, professional, trade union, and other public commitments. The aim is to form a broad public movement, open to everybody, working for the revival and defense of the cooperatives. The Fatherland Union's National Council is the headquarters of the Initiative Committee.

Interested parties, if they wish to express their support or ideas or take part in the movement, should phone 87-32-37.

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