




JPRS Report



East Europe

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19980204 094

East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-060

CONTENTS

6 May 1991

POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Foreign Ministry Criticizes Loncar Meeting [Sofia Radio] 1

ALBANIA

- Former Political Prisoner's Experiences Described
[Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET 24 Mar] 1

BULGARIA

- Uruguayan Foreign Minister To Arrive 1 May [BTA] 3
Informants Among BCP Nomenklatura Named [BTA] 3

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Ex-Communists Still Active in Interior Ministry [LIDOVE NOVINY 15 Mar] 4
Rychetsky on Political Situation in Czech Republic [MLADA FRONTA DNES 20 Mar] 5
Suspension of Majority Rule Questioned [FORUM 2 Apr] 9
Prague Weekly Reports on Bratislava Demonstrations [RESPEKT 31 Mar] 11

HUNGARY

- Chairwoman Anna Petrasovits Denies Resignation [Budapest Radio] 14
Independent Smallholders' National Board Meets [MTI] 15
RMDSZ Dissociates Itself From Kiraly's Views [Budapest Radio] 15
Court Reprimands Former Secret Service Leaders [MTI] 15
Confiscated Self-Defense Weapons To Be Returned [MTI] 15

POLAND

- Number of Lay Judges Still Insufficient [RZECZPOSPOLITA 19 Mar] 16
Presidential Council on Jewish Relations Meets [GAZETA WYBORCZA 29 Mar] 17

YUGOSLAVIA

- New Croatian Law on Citizenship Explained [VJESNIK 7 Apr] 18
Serbian Radical Party Leader Seselj Interviewed [POLITIKA 9 Apr] 20
Demands by Serbian Papers for Freedom of Press [NIN 29 Mar] 21
Changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina Media Discussed [DANAS 2 Apr] 24
Muslim Leader Criticized for Banning Paper [NIN 29 Mar] 27
Role of Church in Croatian, Slovene Separatism [NIN 29 Mar] 28

MILITARY

YUGOSLAVIA

- FEC Analysis Calls for Changes in Army Laws [OSLOBODJENJE 17 Apr] 32

ECONOMIC

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Norwegian Firm Expands Activity to East Europe [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN 22 Mar]	33
--	----

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Deputy Minister on Challenges to Federal Economy [RESPEKT 31 Mar]	33
---	----

HUNGARY

Government To Convert Electricity Board [MTI]	36
---	----

POLAND

Planning Minister Predicts Economic Recession [PAP]	36
Regional Development Agencies Aid Restructuring [RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 Mar]	36
French Publisher Purchases 2 Regional Dailies [GAZETA WYBORCZA 29 Mar]	37
Uncertain Future for Some Research Institutes [RZECZPOSPOLITA 13 Mar]	38
Public Opinion Poll Assesses Balcerowicz Program [TRYBUNA 19 Mar]	38
Walbrzych Region To Close 3 Coal Mines [RZECZPOSPOLITA 25 Mar]	39

ROMANIA

Stolojan on 'Standby' Accord With IMF [LIBERTATEA 23 Apr]	40
---	----

YUGOSLAVIA

Croatian Economic Policy Reviewed, Criticized [DELO 16 Mar]	41
Bosnian Government Leaders on Economic Program [OSLOBODJENJE 4 Apr]	43

SOCIAL

BULGARIA

Chernobyl Accident Consequences in Sliven Reported [BTA]	45
--	----

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Foreign Ministry Criticizes Loncar Meeting

AU2904145591 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1300 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] In connection with the statement of the spokesman of the SFRY Federal Secretariat on Foreign Affairs, made at a news conference in Belgrade last week, according to which, during his visit to Bulgaria, Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, has received with the approval and consent of the Bulgarian authorities gentlemen who are Bulgarian citizens and belong to the Macedonian national minority, Boris Chakurov, spokesman for the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said the following:

[Begin Chakurov recording] The meeting of the SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs with the aforementioned persons was not coordinated with the Bulgarian side. The meeting took place at the Yugoslav Embassy in Sofia, outside the official program of the visit, without notifying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the meeting, and without requesting and receiving the consent and approval of the Bulgarian authorities.

The principles of democracy and diplomatic traditions cannot prevent any meeting with anyone on the territory of the Yugoslav Embassy in Sofia. However, in this particular case, it is strange that the federal secretary announced the meeting only at the news conference, a few minutes before he departed from Sofia. The Yugoslav side claims that the persons who took part in the meeting belonged to the Ilinden Organization, an organization that is illegal in Bulgaria.

Obviously, this is an unfriendly act that shows disrespect for the laws of the host state and the universally accepted protocol. Under those circumstances, the move by the Yugoslav side can only be assessed as a demonstrative attempt to attribute an official character to the contacts of the Yugoslav authorities with representatives of this group, which serves foreign forces and pursues propaganda goals of a domestic and international nature.

During the visit, the Bulgarian side was led by the understanding that, at this difficult moment for Yugoslavia, it is easier to again hear the Bulgarian position on noninterference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and the preserving of its territorial integrity. Attempts to interfere from outside cannot be beneficial for the well-known disputed issues of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria informed the Yugoslav Embassy in Sofia about its position on this matter. [end recording]

ALBANIA

Former Political Prisoner's Experiences Described

91BA0534A Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 24 Mar 91 p 24

[Article by Elisabet Linge: "Eleven Years Lost in Albanian Prisons"—first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] The first free elections in the history of Albania will be held one week from now. Albanian-born Alfons Hasa will then be in Stockholm, hoping that his homeland will be on the right track. Alfons Hasa escaped to Sweden in the 60's, got a job, and married a Swedish woman. When he suddenly became a widower, the idea of moving back to his homeland was born. This return ended in an Albanian prison, an existence filled with the horror of physical and mental torture.

In June 1979, he made the mistake of his life. With his soul full of loneliness, sorrow and emptiness after the recent death of his wife, he decided to return to his country of birth, Albania, after 16 happy years in Sweden. The visit was intended to be short, but it turned out to last 11 years; all of these years he suffered mental and physical torture in prison before he was able to return to Swedish soil. On 2 March this year, at 2230, he landed at Arlanda in an SAS aircraft that came from Budapest. Alfons Hasa was home again.

"Now, in retrospect, I cannot understand how I could do such a stupid thing, but sometimes the brain does not function quite as it should," says Alfons Hasa as we are sitting in a brown-walled hotel dining room at Odenplan in Stockholm.

"But I am very happy to be back—it feels as if I am born again."

Difficult Childhood

Alfons Hasa is 52 years old, slender, and has light brown eyes that indicate many troublesome memories. His grayish hair curls in the back of the neck, and his shoes are brand new in brown suede with white rubber soles. He tells about his fate in a very low voice, as if there is the risk of being overheard.

Alfons was born in 1939 in the small town of Zerqan in northern Albania. His father was a farm laborer, his mother died when he was quite young, and he grew up under very poor circumstances along with his sister who is three years older. After high school, he worked as a teacher for six years. It was during this period that his awareness of the political oppression emerged.

In May 1962, he decided to try to escape, and one night, he crossed the mountain over to Skopje in Yugoslavia where he immediately reported to the police. After three months in an isolation cell and daily interrogations, Alfons was released, and he went to Sweden via Greece.

Shortly thereafter, in 1964, he got a job as a spot check quality controller at LM Ericsson in Midsommarkransen. He became a Swedish citizen, and married Gunvor, a nurse from Bradarp in Västergötland in 1967.

Staggering Blow

Alfons lived a regular Swedish life. He read a lot (Harry Martinsson, Vilhelm Moberg, Artur Lundkvist), went to the movies, and liked the outdoors and sports. He was not politically active.

Then came a staggering blow. Gunvor died after an operation and Alfons was alone. His circle of friends was small: He did not associate with other Albanians, and the Swedish friends he and Gunvor had mingled with gradually disappeared.

Little by little emerged the fateful idea of returning to Albania. At a meeting of the Swedish-Albanian Association in June 1979, Alfons Hasa met the Albanian ambassador at that time, Dimitri Lamani, and Kutjim Jaho, the commercial attaché.

"I trusted them when they said that I could go and visit my homeland. 'You can stay if you want, of course, or return. And you do not risk anything because you did not do anything,' they said."

In reality, the embassy personnel probably knew everything about Alfons and saw the opportunity to punish him for his previous escape from the country.

(I puzzle how he actually dared think about returning, and Alfons keeps coming back to that.)

"Everybody asks me, and I do not know how many times I have asked myself how I could be so stupid. It was pure suicide, 11 years of my life thrown away!"

He then gave up his job and arrived in Tirana on 5 September 1979 where he was met by security police from the Interior Ministry dressed in civilian clothes. Alfons was immediately arrested "in the name of the people," accused of high treason, suspicion of being a CIA spy, and for attempting to overthrow the government.

The police confiscated all his effects and he was given an Albanian prison uniform to wear. He was sent to the prison in Zërqan, his birth place, where he was tortured mentally and physically for four months.

"Alexander Solzhenitsyn's prison descriptions are no exaggerations. It was exactly like that, and I keep on having nightmares about it."

Burned the Wife's Picture

In addition to physical torture (supervised by the security police doctor) with electric shocks over the entire body, among other things, Alfons recalls what was perhaps the worst:

"They hit my weakest spot when they discovered a picture of my dead wife. They burned my wife before my eyes. They threw the picture in a fireplace."

As Alfons Hasa did not admit to anything, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison without any judicial process whatsoever. The following years were hard. With a shovel and a hoe he worked with 840 fellow prisoners in the copper mine in Puka under life-threatening conditions.

The prison, or the work camp, was only for political prisoners. Almost 100 of them were squeezed like books on a bookshelf in a hall where the beds were 60 cm wide, and the mattresses were stuffed with straw. The roof and the walls had no insulation, and during the winter when the outside temperature could drop to minus 17 degrees centigrade, their breath was transformed to icy deposits on the walls.

To the question of whether torture was a common occurrence during his imprisonment, Alfons smiles tiredly.

"Torture? Yes, we were used to that. It was so common that we almost paid no attention to it. In fact, I cannot understand how I could withstand all this. Anyone who has not been exposed to it, will never be able to understand it."

Revolt in the Mine

In 1985, one month after the death of Enver Hoxha, the country's leader since 1944, Alfons and the other interns in the prison found out how three of their colleagues had been executed by the prison leaders, accused of having led a revolt. The background for this was the working hours in the copper mine. The day was divided into three shifts, and it was not uncommon that people worked double shifts. But one day, three of them had had enough. Tom, Sokol, and Sander had worked from 2300 to 0700, and immediately after having eaten a little, they were ordered back to the mine for an additional eight-hour shift. They refused and asked to sleep several hours, but were not allowed to do that.

After the three prisoners were subjected to cruel torture, the current prison chief (head of all Albanian prisons), Edmond Caja, contacted the Interior Ministry and in accordance with a direct order from Deputy Interior Minister Agron Tafaj, he directed the execution.

Alfons's eyes darken when he talks about the incident.

"I have the names of all the responsible people," he says. "Edmond Caja was a dangerous and insidious man. And he was only 27 years old when he executed my friends."

Crazy Swede

On August 24, 1987, Alfons Hasa was released from prison. The condition for his release was that he would work in the mine in Bulqiza where he had to report to the

police every 24 hours. After one year, however, he was sentenced again to prison for five years for agitation and anti-Albanian propaganda.

Alfons's heart beat so strongly for Sweden that he could not but tell his colleagues about life there.

"I was called the 'Swede' because I always talked to myself—in Swedish. That was the only way of maintaining the language," he says humbly as if it were self-evident, even under the most difficult circumstances.

This new sentence meant that Alfons, along with two pickpockets, and a man charged with trying to escape, were transferred up to the mountain, 1,500 m above sea level. On an area that was little over 625 hectares, they worked in forestry with the "country guys." They were not allowed to move outside the area, and were required to report to the probation officers with the security police every day.

Brutal Thermometer

Then, he was released in February 1990. "You have worked well," was the only explanation he received, but Alfons was not surprised.

The democratization process began in May when all the citizens were given the opportunity to receive a passport, freedom of religion was introduced, and firms received greater economic independence.

"I had noticed through newspapers and radio transmissions which we were forced to listen to that something was about to happen. After the development in the other eastern countries, the newspapers began a desperate song that 'Albania will definitely not follow the other countries' foreign policy.' The police brutality was also a form of thermometer of the situation in the country. The more they beat, the calmer it became, and when the unrest began, the police became more careful."

However, it was not that easy to get a passport as promised. In December of the first year, he got money from friends, equivalent to six months' work, and he succeeded in using this money as a bribe to get documents from the security police. He immediately contacted the Swedish Embassy in Belgrade where Ingrid Johansson arranged a trip home to Sweden for Alfons Hasa through the embassy in Budapest.

"Ingrid Johansson was fantastic," says Alfons. "I made a telephone call to Belgrade, and because the lines are bugged, I was forced to express myself very carefully, despite the fact we were speaking Swedish. But Ingrid understood my synonyms without any problem."

Closed Door

During the student unrest in the beginning of the year, Alfons kept to himself. When the Hoxha statue was toppled on February 20, the students came and wanted him to come along. He was the only one who knew

anything about real democracy, they said, but Alfons locked his door and avoided taking any risks.

And now, Alfons is back in the "world's most democratic country." There is no limit to the gratefulness he feels over being back, and he has already visited his old place of employment, Ericsson, to inquire about a job. But no, there was nothing.

"My boss had retired and there were not many faces there I recognized," says Alfons. "But I hope that I will soon find something else."

BULGARIA

Uruguayan Foreign Minister To Arrive 1 May

AU3004200291 Sofia BTA in English 1839 GMT
30 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 30 (BTA)—Tomorrow Dr. Hector Gros Espiell, minister of foreign affairs of Uruguay, is arriving on an official visit at the invitation of Mr. Viktor Vulkov, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of Bulgaria.

The diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Uruguay are of more than 30-year-long standing. They were established in 1958. The latest visit of Uruguay's foreign minister to Bulgaria was in 1989. Two official Bulgarian delegations visited Uruguay in 1990.

Although the two countries have signed a trade and credit agreement and an agreement on economic, scientific and sci-technical cooperation, experts say that their economic contacts are below the desirable level and that the volume bilateral trade is too small.

The two countries are facing similar problems: foreign debts, denationalization and inflation. They can exchange experience in this field. Agriculture is considered a suitable sphere for cooperation which could be conducted mainly by setting up joint ventures. Uruguay has already shown interest in it.

Informants Among BCP Nomenklatura Named

AU2904211091 Sofia BTA in English 1453 GMT
29 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 29 (BTA)—Even before the files scandal exploded in the Bulgarian parliament, the opposition repeatedly asserted that the secretaries of the Communist, "now Socialist," Party were informers. One of their duties was to provide their party superiors with information about the Communists, and perhaps not only about them.

Today's issue of the opposition daily DEMOKRATSIYA carries an extensive article about the activity of the Academy for Social Sciences and Social Management which in Zhivkov's time was headed by the present leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Mr. Aleksandur Lilov. The present leader of the Socialists'

parliamentary group, Prof. Nora Ananieva, used to work there too. The academy was directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP].

Today's DEMOKRATSIYA calls the academy an agents' center. In 1988 the BCP's publishing house Partizdat brought out a book titled *The Party Organization—A Major Source of Information* by a Mr. Dimitur Penev, a name unknown to the broad scientific circles. The book abounds in quotations of Todor Zhivkov and Milko Balev, now defendants in a trial.

According to Mr. Penev, it was a usual practice of the BCP for its organizations in the districts and enterprises to "present monthly written reports on public opinion and general feelings in the work teams and population centers." It was the duty of the primary party organizations "to report on the problems agitating the working people and of any unfavorable trends or deviations from the goals set."

A network of informers was set up with the sociological center of the City Committee of the BCP in Sofia. Most of the informers were activists of the Communist Party. Information was collected by means of a special questionnaire using the "mailbox" method.

The feature in DEMOKRATSIYA makes it clear that the party organizations at the enterprises, scientific institutes and educational institutions sent information directly to the Central Committee [CC] of the BCP. This practice was established in 1986 through a resolution of the Secretariat of the CC.

In his book, Mr. Penev writes that collecting information through Communist Party channels was "a question of style and method of work."

The author of the article in DEMOKRATSIYA on the "Communist Party as a spying organization for eavesdropping, dogging and informing against the Bulgarian people" stresses that Bulgarians were double-checked and their fates depended on their two files: in the secret services and in the BCP.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Ex-Communists Still Active in Interior Ministry

91CH0488A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Slovak
15 Mar 91 p 6

[Article by -vm- : "The Key to Power"]

[Text] When we look at the events of February 1948 as an exemplary case of preparing and carrying out a coup d'etat and compare them with some facts which have emerged in Czechoslovakia since 17 November, we find several startling similarities.

The basic requirement for initiating a successful coup is gaining control of the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Many officials of these departments are total professionals, meaning that they will work hard for anyone authorized to give them orders. Others, for the most part the younger ones, are capable of acting even in an unconstitutional manner in the interest of their career. So let us now take a closer look at the department of the SR [Slovak Republic] Interior Ministry from where we notice signals indicating that it may be directed from a center other than the present Interior Minister.

The structure of the present SR Interior Ministry is built on the Stalinist model in which all departments report to the Minister. One of the authors of the design for directing the MV [Interior Ministry] was Premier Meciar as a former Interior Minister. The Slovak MV has twelve sections. This system of supervising 12 sections on the one hand endows the Minister with awesome power; on the other it offers twelve opportunities to liquidate the minister. The more sections report to the minister, the more demanding is the supervisory and control activity.

It was still under SR Interior Minister Mr. Meciar that a reshuffle took place involving the heads of okres ZNB [National Security Corps] administrations. Many of these posts were given to former okres or kraj State Security chiefs, former nomenklatura cadres and ideological secretaries of KSS [Slovak Communist Party] kraj committees—in other words, to political operatives. This action can be viewed as effectively aimed against the security of our state. The interior minister has put in office people with a dirty past. This has created a dangerous, interlinked system in which everyone has something on everyone else. A network so constructed is capable of continuing operation in response to accustomed conspiratorial orders. For instance, they may organize promotion of their people to other important posts until they reach the necessary degree of action capability and operational readiness. As an example of setting up such a network let us cite the Bratislava municipal headquarters of the police force. Its key positions were recently occupied by former nomenklatura cadres and StB [State Security] officials who are busily reconstructing and expanding the foundations of a new power.

Heading up the SR Police Corps is its president Colonel Lastovka, a former Central Committee [CUV] member of the KSS.

The Bratislava municipal headquarters of the police force is commanded by Major Sitian, a long-term KSS functionary. He had been on a stay in the United States. His present deputy Captain Kopcan is also a long-term KSS functionary.

Dr. Cerny, chief of transport for the Bratislava MV PZ [municipal headquarters of the police] was for many years member of the Central Committee of the KSS and KSS treasurer in the Organization of Local Industrial Enterprises. He too returned recently from a stay in the United States.

Other officials deserving of special attention include Major Vamiak and Lieutenant Colonel Baca, former students at the University of Marxism-Leninism and leaders at the Slovak Socialist Republic's Ministry of the Interior.

Captain Adame, a former political officer at PMJ [expansion not given] Bratislava, graduated from an institute of higher learning in the USSR. Today he runs the Defense and Protective Service section.

Major Scevik is chief of the MV PZ operational center. In the past he was recalled from the post of chief, Bratislava Police department of economic control, for bribery and for leaking classified information.

Lieutenant Colonel Horsky is a former chief of OS [okres administration] Bratislava III of the ZNB. He was in charge of StB.

Captain Biznar, leader of the police force unions, is a former CUV KSS member.

Captain Soos, chief of the administration section, is a former KSS chairman.

Deputizing for the PMJ PZ commander is presently Captain Krsak, a former KSS functionary. First Lieutenant Hoskova was a member of the KSS shop committee.

Major Engineer Fusek used to be chief of the MV PZ Bratislava section responsible for building protection, with Captain Engineer Rasman as his deputy. Both were outstanding experts in their field but in spite (or perhaps precisely because) of this fact they were released from their posts and transferred to the rank of ordinary technicians. They were replaced by Major Antal, a former political officer at the Bratislava III okres administration of ZNB and Captain Sedlak, both of whom are laymen in the field. Moreover, the section has suffered a substantial reduction in technical personnel which became reflected in a rapid deterioration of the technical standard and dependability of the special equipment serving to protect buildings.

A similar situation in the personnel sphere obtains also in the individual sections within the Bratislava MV PZ. In the Bratislava I section the chief is Major Smolisek, formerly a political officer at the ZNB okres administration. Prior to that he was in charge of StB.

In the Bratislava II section the chief is Lieutenant Colonel Vcelar who was in charge of StB, and the Slovnaft local branch of the Public Security is headed by Captain Lukacs, a former functionary of the KSS factory organization and moreover a notorious alcoholic who uses an official car daily to frequent drinking establishments.

The Bratislava III section has as its chief Major Sloboda, for many years a political officer at the Bratislava II okres administration of ZNB where he was also in charge

of StB and was a longtime friend of Comrade Rybar from the KSS City Committee.

The present chief at the Bratislava IV section is Major Hamar who was a KSS functionary. In addition he is a notorious alcoholic.

So this is what the Bratislava PZ Municipal Headquarters and its individual sections looks like. It is no better on the okres level. The controlling posts are in the hands of former KSS functionaries, political officers and StB officials. Just recently in Michalovce Major Dicky was recalled from the post of chief of the ZNB okres administration. The reason for his recall was collaboration with StB. He had been appointed to the post on 25 May 90 by the then Interior Minister Meciar.

Already now one can observe Premier Meciar's efforts to bring the Interior Ministry under his control. As an example let us also cite the Unit for Protection of Constitutional Officials which until recently reported to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. But Premier Meciar pushed through an arrangement whereby Slovak officials would be protected by Slovak authorities. About two weeks ago Mr. Meciar asked Minister Pittner to place this unit directly under him. Were this to be done, the protective unit would be turned into Meciar's private information service. The Premier would have a perfect watch over what the Slovak constitutional officials are doing. For there are people who in the interest of their protection against anonymous attacks or assassination attempts are required to have their phone lines tapped and are constitutionally guaranteed physical protection.

When we put together several facts, for instance only the large number of ideological officials (many of whom had studied in the USSR) and professionals from the StB officer ranks, together with this typically Stalinist personnel policy, we have no difficulty identifying this process. The activity of reform Communists in the political sphere is safeguarded in the background by the power of the SR police apparatus loyal to them. When the time comes to take power, it will directly assure a smooth process of the takeover.

Rychetsky on Political Situation in Czech Republic

*91CH0465A Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech
20 Mar 91 p 3*

[Interview with Pavel Rychetsky by Karel Hvizdala and Jiri Leschtina; place and date not given: "A Man of the Center; An Interview With Pavel Rychetsky, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Government"]

[Text] [MLADA FRONTA DNES] Our political stage is becoming more clearly defined, and Vaclav Klaus and his party are beginning to be called conservatives. Where will your Civic Movement be placed on the new political ladder?

[Rychetsky] I do not believe that we need to depict ourselves as being for or against something or someone; however, we must be able to perform at least a minimal analysis of the political spectrum that is the fundamental basis of our country. And this puts us in a very difficult position because a characteristic of our country is that over the course of 40 years it succeeded in erasing a true political milieu.

The road from absolute, in other words not only political but especially economic, totalitarianism toward a market economy is an unbeaten path, which obviously cannot be traveled without relatively serious social impacts. But being aware of this fact should have only one consequence—to speed up the journey. The disappointment that naturally occurs, leads to the appearance of a social phenomenon that I take the liberty of calling social and political deviation. A phenomenon that manifests itself, for instance, in looking for enemies, looking for offenders to blame for the social impacts or for other personal failures. In our country this phenomenon is significantly graduated by the fact that moral devastation was so widespread that almost every citizen is influenced by the subconscious factor that he has a guilt complex to some degree about collaborating with the past regime. Only a few individuals dared to take a stand against it. In my opinion, these individuals played a positive role, but at the same time they pointed out some unpleasant facts to the majority of the population. The combination of all these factors has resulted in people seeking paths other than those of understanding and of positive, constructive solutions. Enemies and offenders are being sought. This is manifesting itself in very different ways in the Czech and in the Slovak lands. In the Czech lands it has taken the form of primitive, hysterical anticommunism, in Slovakia it is in the form of overt, extreme nationalism.

In view of all these facts, the Civic Movement is trying to establish a firm position at the political center. It would be naive to believe that the political center is something that has no structure, something that has no program.

The political center must always simultaneously delineate itself against what is to the left and what is to the right of it.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] What is immediately to your right and to your left?

[Rychetsky] It is not possible to define this position with absolute precision because there is no democratic Left, which would represent a sufficiently clear and strong political power at this time. We are saddened by the fact that in a year and a half we have not succeeded in creating a political party or movement of a social democratic nature, such as exist in Sweden, France, or Italy, and practically all of civilized Europe.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] So you do not intend to adopt the position of the strong left center?

[Rychetsky] Naturally this forces us to have the ability to recognize even this unfilled area if we wish to keep the center. But we would welcome it, and we will support it as long as it is filled by an independent political entity. To the right of us, obviously, is the Civic Democratic Alliance because, to a certain extent, its program includes our ideas on liberal policies about a minimal state and emphasizes the human element, the rights and the freedoms of the citizen.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] How far from you do you perceive Vaclav Klaus' party to be?

[Rychetsky] This is impossible to determine precisely at this time, because so far it has not announced a new program. But I would like to emphasize that our democratic center policies mean policies that are able to perceive signals both from the right and from the left. The policies of the democratic center assume that in a number of cases it will act like rightist policies, and in another, specific case it will, to the contrary, adopt leftist signals. In normal social relations, under market economy conditions, the Civic Movement would emphasize social, cultural, and ecological concepts to a much greater extent. But in a situation where we have very limited resources, all we can do is to insist that these aspects must not be ignored. The solution of problems must not be put off for a later time. That is what the communists used to do.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] How would you define your place in politics between personalities like Vaclav Klaus and Petr Pithart?

[Rychetsky] As far as I have seen, Vaclav Klaus is a very capable, very energetic, and a very goal-oriented politician, but these dominant features of his character and his actions result in his being unwilling not only to perceive and listen to the opinions of others, but also to concern himself with the reasons why these differing opinions came into being. In my opinion, one cannot pursue politics by ceasing to perceive other points of view. The basis for policies that have long-lasting success is the ability to analyze the causes for the different points of view and the ability to react to them. In other words it is not primarily the ability to listen, but the ability to react. Petr Pithart is the exact opposite. He is a person who is occupied to such an extent in questioning political ideas, sometimes even his own, in attempting to correct them, attempting to be receptive to all differing viewpoints and all the reasons leading to them as far as possible, and attempting to incorporate them all into one political concept, that it results in his vacillating. His customary intellectual skepticism is a detriment to his own political actions. Therefore, from this perspective, I am again in the center.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] While Vaclav Klaus talks about a market system, you tend to use the term social market system. Can you explain the difference to us?

[Rychetsky] Vaclav Klaus in creating a party of entrepreneurs, bankers and businessmen—a party that is

absolutely necessary but cannot represent the broader currents. All of us have an equal interest in the largest number of people taking their fate into their own hands, starting enterprises, and showing initiative in the economic sector. But we all know that among the people there will never be more than 10 to 15 percent private entrepreneurs, and that 80 to 90 percent of the population will continue to be employees.

The Civic Movement should create a political entity that does not give preference to the interests of the entrepreneur, but to economic interests as such, i.e., it must take into consideration both the interests of the entrepreneur and the interests of the employees. If the employee does not have a high enough standard of living and sufficient security, the entrepreneur will be powerless, because he will not have anyone to whom to sell the products from his sector.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In other words, you mean a third road between socialism and capitalism?

[Rychetsky] There is no third road. But a market economy is the means, not the end product. It is ridiculous to use the term capitalism, which has disappeared from the political vocabulary of Western democracies. For example, Germany is described as a social constitutional state. We must disencumber ourselves of the thinking and vocabulary of the past and look for other roads to move ahead.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] But what is ahead in your opinion? I do not quite understand the idea that a market economy is merely the means and not the end. I hope that we are moving toward an efficient market system, which alone can ensure the resources for a high standard of living for our citizens. An integral part of this is made up of rich entrepreneurs who will create sufficient resources by paying taxes for the state to look after its poor. Or do you envision a different goal? In what other way can the state get money?

[Rychetsky] You are touching on the eternal human problem—distribution. Communist visions changed from the initial utopia into a blind alley of totalitarianism, including economic totalitarianism. Due to economic and political plurality, the Western democracies succeeded in creating a flexible system of enterprise development and simultaneously of protection for the weak.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] What is your Movement's attitude toward the present situation in Slovakia?

[Rychetsky] Social fear and apprehension about the future are much greater in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. In Slovakia it was not a conflict about significantly different constitutional or economic concepts, but a conflict about method, a conflict about the fact that Mr. Meciar was not able, or was not willing, or did not have time to communicate sufficiently with the movement that placed him at the head of the Slovak government. He did not participate in some basic actions of this

movement, and clearly gave priority to targeted personal policies aimed more at the public than his political base. Within 10 days, this conflict mushroomed into a conflict of opinions, a conflict between two political and possibly also economic concepts, but, above all, it grew into this state because it was exacerbated from outside. For example, it had the help of Czech communications media, which sometimes played up to some extreme trends. For example, one cannot demand that the demonstrations in Slovakia be answered by demonstration in the Czech lands. The reaction of some of the media and some political movements was politically unwise and dangerous for our state. I believe that the development in Slovakia is dangerous for our state.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] But it is simplistic to believe that reporters are to blame. In the political vacuum, which you mentioned yourself, the entire development in the VPN [Public Against Violence] and in Slovakia was to be expected. Is it not, strictly speaking, a political mistake by the government in letting things go so far?

[Rychetsky] In that case you do not properly understand the function of the government. A government is a political agency, made up of a coalition of the victorious political powers. In this case, it is made up of the OF [Civic Forum], the VPN, and the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement]. Thus the Federal Government is an agency, which has succeeded admirably in uniting three rather incompatible political entities in the process of transforming society. In fact, it is an agency that succeeded in taking very vigorous first steps and not allowing itself to be diverted from its path, despite extremely difficult circumstances. I believe that setting up a federal government as successfully as President Havel did, presuming we preserve a federation at all, will hardly be possible in the future. The situation that has now arisen in Slovakia is very serious. On the one hand, no one questions the inalienable right of the Czech nation or the Slovak nation to set off on its own road, i.e., the true right to set up its own independent state. On the other hand, there is a problem how to express such a right in a democratic and constitutional manner. Again, I feel I must point out the personality of the President, because it is becoming apparent that he is a farsighted politician. As early as 10 December last year he submitted a draft for a constitutional law on a referendum. On 10 December last year he foresaw what we are witnessing now.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Therefore you do not believe that the Federal Government could have prevented much that has happened by being a step ahead, rather than by merely reacting to the demands of the Slovak government in the majority of cases? Don't you think that this would push the extremist powers, which have become so fanatical in Slovakia now, to the outer fringes?

[Rychetsky] I do not believe that the escalation in demands made by extraparlimentary and extraconstitutional entities is a process that could be prevented by the position taken by the federal or any other government. But at the same time—and you should take this as self-criticism—I now believe that the way the three governments drafted the new delimitation of jurisdiction within the framework of the federation to be a wrong approach. The idea of transferring jurisdiction “from the top to the bottom,” from the federation to the republics, is an idea based on mechanical thinking. The correct approach to building a federation, and here I like to use the term “authentic federation,” is the exact opposite: the level of the republics should be pulled up to the level of the federation. This means presenting the federation as an agency or entity that belongs to the republics, that is their own, for which they bear full responsibility, and about which they make decisions together. We simply chose an unfortunate form, we should have approached the constitutional problem from the other direction.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] How do we get out of it now?

[Rychetsky] First, it is necessary to make a firm decision as to whether there will or will not be a joint state of Czechs and Slovaks. That does not merely mean a referendum, it means, above all, finding a new approach of Czechs to Slovaks and vice versa. I consider it to be totally unacceptable when anticonstitutional slogans are shouted out on the SNP [Slovak National Party] square in Bratislava. In the Czech lands, on the other hand, it would be good to remember that, although there was no communist putsch in Slovakia, there could be one if we all continue to behave in this way.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] We have the feeling that a part of the Czech population perceives the problem in the sense that if there were to be a perestroika-like overthrow in Slovakia, it would also mean a deadly danger to reforms in the Czech lands.... What is your opinion of this?

[Rychetsky] There is no doubt that any step backward, and I mean in any form, would be a detrimental relapse in respect to our future. The past regime already reached the very edge of the abyss—and that is why it collapsed so easily. But simplified views of our past will in no way help us move forward faster. We should avoid stereotyped views.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Nevertheless, one cannot deny that some of the reform communists from 1968, especially in Slovakia have strengthened their attacks on radical economic reform.

[Rychetsky] Today there are a lot of attacks especially against the so-called sixty-eighters. I cannot agree with this, although I was not a sixty-eighter, I was 24 years old in 1968. At the time it became very clear that communism cannot be reformed. But one cannot condemn people who tried to bring down totalitarianism at that time and tried to get our country away from Soviet

domination. Blackening these people seems to me to be a manifestation of weakness and lack of self-confidence.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] We are facing a very complex development. For the sake of political stability, are you prepared to conclude a democratic agreement with your greatest partner, and at the same time rival, Vaclav Klaus' party in the future? Or do you still insist on what you recently said in the *Laterna Magica*, that one can only deal with Klaus from a position of strength?

[Rychetsky] Whatever anyone may think, we are sufficiently responsible politicians to know how absolutely necessary it is to follow a common goal and common policies, at least up to the next elections, and to ensure that the fundamental political obligation, which issued from the elections is fulfilled at this time. The question of coalitions after the elections is, as is well known, a very mathematical question. The coalition must crystallize in such a way that the numbers reach at least 51 percent of the body of delegates—so that it will be possible to form a government. From this point of view, there is no doubt that neither Vaclav Klaus, nor I, will tie our hands before we hear the election results.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Who will head your movement in the elections?

[Rychetsky] The April citizens' assembly of the Civic Movement will provide the answer to that. All I can say is that I would be glad if it would be someone other than myself.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] I have the feeling that there will necessarily be major differences of opinion in your movement, which includes an extremely heterogeneous spectrum of politicians ranging, for example, from Petr Miller, via Jiri Dienstbier, to the extremely conservative Petr Pithart.

[Rychetsky] Within the framework of the Civic Movement, we do, in fact, have people who are often not totally compatible. But the fact that they are willing, able, and determined to seek accord and to create it together is positive, because this provides us with our own correctives, and this is the basis of democracy. What is important is that other opinions really are listened to, and that minority opinions can become majority ones through the democratic process.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] We would like to call this interview “The Man of the Center,” Do you really believe that in the present unclear political situation your tenet will be sufficiently explicit to attract the people?

[Rychetsky] I am convinced that there is enormous strength hidden below the surface in our people—decency, culture, and self-sacrifice. I am convinced that what will convince them in a crisis situation will be the desire to move forward without extremism and without swerving from the path. My mother always used to say: “Never fear, and never lie!”

Suspension of Majority Rule Questioned

91CH0493A Prague FORUM in Czech 2 Apr 91 pp 8-9

[Article by Oldrich Smotlacha: "A Sick Federation; The Twilight (?) of Czechoslovakia?"]

[Text] From the lips of politicians we again hear that our state is faced with a threat of its disintegration, and what catastrophic consequences that would have. Crises threatening the state's disintegration recur with relentless regularity. I think that the recurrence of such crises is not accidental; rather, it is a necessary consequence of the federation's existing dualistic constitutional arrangement.

It is common knowledge that the Federal Assembly is a bicameral institution. Besides the House of the People that is based on proportional representation from all the election districts, the Federal Assembly also has a House of the Nations, with equal representation from both the Czech and the Slovak Republic. Therefore, important decisions in the House of the Nations must be approved separately by each of its two "national" parts (to avoid rule by the [Czech] majority over the Slovak Republic in federal matters). Consequently, legislation can be enacted only on the basis of a consensus between the decisive political forces in the two Republics. But should the balance of political power differ significantly in the two Republics, the requirement of a consensus could prove an insurmountable obstacle and cause parliament's permanent paralysis, or perhaps consensus could easily become a tool for practicing blackmail. That will probably become clearly evident when parliament begins considering the new constitution. If the parliamentary delegations from the two Republics reach a consensus on some matter and, as a result, the House of the Nations passes a bill, its passage in the House of the People becomes a mere formality. In the longer term, the latter chamber could become merely an insignificant appendage of the former one.

Equal representation in the House of the Nations, in combination with separate voting, necessarily creates pressure for equal representation also in other federal institutions; lately, for instance, in the composition of the Constitutional Court or of the diplomatic service. Carrying that principle to its logical conclusion would also lead to equal funding of federal agencies by the two republics. That, of course, would be unacceptable to the Slovak Republic and merely serves to illustrate the absurdity of the aforementioned principle. To my knowledge, nothing similar to our constitutional arrangement exists anywhere in the world, for understandable reasons.

The requirement of a consensus tends toward concluding political deals on federal matters not in the Federal Assembly, but directly between the elected representatives of the two "national republics," and then confronting the National Assembly with accomplished facts, as happened in the case of the law on power sharing. Thereby the federation of two republics is actually

changing into a de facto confederation, with the prospects of continually weakening mutual relations and eventual independence. The present system was able to function only in a situation where the real decisions were made somewhere else, and the Federal Assembly served merely as a figleaf. There is some sense in giving the smaller republic guarantees regarding matters that affect its vital interests, but the rationality of doing so disappears in a situation where, after extensive transfers of power, the federation retains power only over matters that by their very nature are common to both Republics, and they in turn have exclusive powers to make the aforementioned decisions affecting their vital interests.

In other words, our constitutional arrangement is such that we must radically change it if we wish to avoid the gradual extinction of our state. In Slovakia lately, demands are being voiced that the federation must be built democratically, from below. But the basic unit from which building the state must start out is perceived to be the nation as a legal entity, in the sense of the totalitarian, nationalistic errors; rather than the free Czechoslovak citizen who determines how state powers are to be divided among the federation, its components, and the self-governing communities. And regardless of how power will be divided among the aforementioned levels of government, in the interest of the state's viability it will be necessary to enforce the principle of equal rights for every citizen; in other words, to abolish equal representation and so-called guarantees against majority rule within the federation's institutions. That means a unicameral federal parliament whose deputies are elected on the basis of proportional representation (today's House of the People). Naturally, the elimination of guarantees against majority rule would require safeguards that the federal parliament does not change the republics' status as defined in the constitution. This could be achieved by requiring that constitutional amendments passed by the federal parliament be then ratified by the legislatures of the two republics. The requirement of ratification, of course, would not apply to ordinary legislation. As smoothly functioning federations, Germany and Austria ought to be our examples of constitutional power sharing between the federation and its constituent parts.

Naturally, such a change presupposes a reassessment of the attitudes of Slovakia's elected representatives toward a common state. Verbal assurances of a willingness to live in a common state are not enough here. The point here must be willingness to live together in a functioning and viable state, without any privileges. It will be appropriate to recall here that "states are maintained by the ideas on which they were founded." Our state was founded on the idea of a Czechoslovak nation. Due usually to misunderstandings, that idea is often rejected in Slovakia, in the same way as the traditional name of our state is being rejected. The idea of a Czechoslovak nation does not mean denying the existence of separate Czech and Slovak nations in an ethnic sense. It merely combines those ethnic nations into a unit of a higher

order; namely, into the Czechoslovak nation in a political sense, which means in the sense of awareness of belonging and allegiance to the Czechoslovak Republic. If Czechoslovak citizens lacked such allegiance, efforts to preserve the common state would be just as ridiculous as efforts to join Europe without becoming Europeans, i.e., the heirs of European cultural and political traditions. One way or another, the common state would be condemned to extinction, and only the time of its demise could be delayed by bribing the dissatisfied with budgetary reallocations, subsidies and other advantages, to make them feel that it was more advantageous for them to remain in the common state for the time being. But that would merely defer the problems until a later date, and also deepen them. Slovak politics has two traditions: the democratic European traditions of Stefanik, Srobar and Derer, and the authoritarian nationalist traditions of Hlinka, Tiso and Tuka. Slovakia is facing a fundamental decision as to which of these traditions to choose. The time to make that decision is clearly now.

Besides the mentioned main cause of the endless crises, there is also another cause: namely, the dualistic state structure that vividly brings to mind one-time Austro-Hungary with its periodic compromises and development toward the eventual independence of both components. (There is a striking similarity between Austro-Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, the unofficial Slovak name of our state.) This unfortunate situation could be eliminated in conjunction with resolving the problem of Moravia, which is more than ripe for solution. The objections of Slovakia's elected representatives to restructuring Czechoslovakia into a tripartite federal state are motivated merely by concern that it would then be more difficult to defend their equal-representation privileges. Therefore such objections must be rejected, and it must be said clearly that this problem is solely the present Czech Republic's problem. In the Czech Republic the objections to a federal [Czech] state stem from the idea of the nation-state, and from the fact that Moravians, because they speak Czech, are merely a part of the Czech nation, rather than a separate Moravian nation. The idea of the nation-state, which was typical of 19th-century Europe, still survives in East Europe, particularly in the Balkans. Paradoxically, it manifests itself in Moravia in efforts to prove the existence of a separate Moravian nation. In this century, equating nation with state became a preferred stage prop of the most diverse totalitarian regimes. In West Europe, however, the idea of the nation-state is now dead as a doornail. States and their components are perceived as territorial entities which have evolved over time, and the decisive criterion of statehood is not nationality in our ethnic sense, but awareness of belonging and allegiance to the given entity. It is now up to us to decide whether we want to be a part of Europe or the Balkans. There can be no doubt about the nearly thousand-year historical existence of Moravia as a separate province with a legislature of its own (and hence with autonomy). If we, inhabitants of Bohemia, can bring ourselves to abandon the historically obsolete idea of the nation-state, we should leave the decision

regarding Moravia's status to the Moravians themselves; in a referendum, for instance.

Nobody today questions the need for radical changes in Moravia's status. But, obviously, the proposals advocating various forms of a regional arrangement would not fully satisfy Moravian aspirations. Instead, they would merely defer the solution of the problem of Moravia, would be regarded as provocations by the Moravians themselves, and would be grist for the mills of the demagogues and extremist forces. [Czech] Prime Minister Pithart has proposed two negotiable versions of a solution: in addition to a federal arrangement, also provincial autonomy within the Czech Republic. That solution seems acceptable, because it partially satisfies Moravian aspirations and at the same time does not prevent Slovakia's present elected representatives from holding on to their privileges of equal representation. But the problem arises here of power sharing between the Provincial Government and the Czech Government. If Moravian aspirations are to be truly satisfied, the Czech Government would merely assume the role of a superfluous and costly intermediate stage between the Provincial Government and the Federal Government. Doubts about the ability of such an arrangement to function are justified. To dualism at the federal level there would be added also dualism within the Czech Republic.

I have intentionally omitted Silesia. Almost all of that province is now a part of Poland. There still remains in our republic merely a small section that originally belonged mostly to Moravia. It was annexed to Silesia only in the 15th century, but ethnically it remained firmly linked with Moravia. Therefore that section of Silesia may be regarded as an integral part of Moravia; in the same way as, for instance, the Cheb area is an integral part of Bohemia.

In his proposed federal constitution, also the president of the republic has spoken out on the questions of our constitutional arrangement. According to his proposal, our state would be a federation of two national republics; its legislative body would be a unicameral one, in which majority rule would be banned. This proposal is evidently a major concession to Slovakia's political representatives, in an effort to preserve the common state. It is typical that some of Slovakia's elected representatives are dissatisfied with even this proposal and are making additional, entirely absurd demands for declaring Slovakia's state sovereignty and for concluding a state treaty between the Czech and the Slovak Republic, which evidently would lead to the disintegration of the common state already in the immediate future. In view of the catastrophic economic consequences that disintegration would have for Slovakia (for instance, the loss of the multibillion annual subsidies from the resources of the Czech Republic), and of a restored Slovak state's doubtful international standing, I assume that in the end these demands will be withdrawn in the familiar manner, in the interest of preserving the state. That will be done in order to avoid a debate on what Slovakia's representatives actually want to achieve and what is contained in

the president's proposal. If the deputies from the individual republics are to vote separately, and if the principle of equal representation is to be retained, it will be entirely immaterial how large the parliamentary delegation of either republic is. There will merely be a pretense of respecting equal franchise. These concessions, then, will not lead to preserving the state, merely to its further agony that, sooner or later, will end with the state's demise.

Most probably the mistake is to try to preserve the common state at all cost. It is paradoxical that, in order to maintain the common state, we evidently have to be prepared also to split it up, as the alternative of its democratic and functioning arrangement. If such an arrangement were unacceptable to Slovakia, it would make no sense to keep prolonging the common state's agony. But the decision should not be left to politicians blinded by their thirst for power. Instead, the decision should be expressed by a qualified majority in a referendum. I am firmly convinced that the citizens of Slovakia will prove capable a distinguishing between their real interests, on the one hand, and the demagogic slogans of irresponsible ambitious careerists and fanatics, on the other hand. Abolition of equal representation in federal organs will automatically mean also the removal of the boulders blocking the way to recognizing Moravia's rightful status.

Prague Weekly Reports on Bratislava Demonstrations

91CH0497A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 31 Mar 91
pp 7-8

[Article by Jan Brabec including brief interviews with Slovak Interior Minister Pittner and former Slovak Prime Minister Meciar in Bratislava on 20 March: "Slovakia Brewing"]

[Text] The crowd attacking President Vaclav Havel and the jeers "Scram back to Prague, you Jewish swine" expressed the whole tragedy of the struggle for Slovak self-determination. Clouds have gathered over the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. They might not be dispelled even by a referendum.

After the hateful explosion on 14 March, the Slovak capital seems back to normal. The nationalists have dispersed among those whom Slovak politicians call the "silent majority." But excitedly arguing small crowds formed around the SNP [Slovak National Uprising] memorial even on the following days. An old man shouts in a hoarse voice: "We will have an independent state even if I have to shoot." It is being rumored that even the castle played a secret role in those disturbances. To some Slovaks the whole affair is beginning to seem as a provocation by President Havel. The daily press published Prime Minister Meciar's commemorative statement: "It is time to speak of Czech chauvinism as well."

Police Keep Out of Politics

On the initiative of the Slovak National Council, the prosecutor general's office has begun an investigation into the crimes of rioting, offending the head of state, and advocating fascism. Demonstrations organized by nationalists are taking place in Bratislava's First District. The Slovak National Union has filed with the District Office the message of the program National Celebrations Commemorating the Formation of the Independent Slovak Republic: "Observance of the Ideological Heritage and Present Relevance of the 52d Anniversary of the Independent Slovak Republic's Formation."

How was it possible for whatever took place to have happened? That was the question to which I attempted to get answers from the appropriate authorities of the Slovak Republic.

Mr. Albin Sladovnik, head of the District Office: "Pursuant to Law No. 84 on the Citizens' Right of Assembly, no permit is needed for a meeting, merely a notice has to be filed of the proposed meeting. The municipal authorities can only designate the areas where the public may assemble. We know what is happening on SNP Square, but the law enacted in 1989 has been enacted specifically to enable citizens to express their views or to protest. After all, we are living in a democratic state. For the things that happened there we could impose fines of 1,000 korunas at most. The matter is now being investigated by the authorities. I am not qualified either to criticize or to defend the individual political parties and movements. This is a local government agency that has no political affiliation."

Answering my question as to how it was possible that anti-Semitic slogans were being shouted, and the flags of the fascist Hlinka Guard were waving, in the very center of Bratislava, Police Chief Colonel Lastovka said: "Don't ask me. The police are here to maintain the peace and public order. The entire matter is being investigated, and official statements will be issued only by the prosecutor's office. So far as the political part of the question is concerned, you know very well that the police do not adopt political standpoints and should not get involved in politics."

In the interior minister's anteroom I am received by his secretary, a tall, muscular and stone-faced man. He asked me about the relationship between RESPEKT and Milan Zitny, the editor in chief of the magazine ECHO, against whom the Interior Ministry has filed a complaint in conjunction with a recent TV appearance of his. Another question was whether the sons of VPN [Citizens Against Violence] activists Fedor Gal and Martin Butora were employed in the editorial office of ECHO. This strange interrogation lasted 30 minutes. After which Ladislav Pittner, the Slovak Republic's interior minister, received me. His disclosure was interesting more for its timing, rather than for its suspect content. And it is

likewise not quite clear why he chose specifically RESPEKT. One can only guess about the real purpose of the minister's very unlikely disclosure.

Western Intelligence Services the Organizers

[Pittner] We have requested from Slovak Television its videotapes in order to investigate the incident. The prosecutor general of the CSFR will ensure that the investigation is conducted objectively. It is very likely that purposeful organization by a third party was also involved here. Not just by those neofascist or nationalist fanatics, but by those who wanted to strike a blow at Slovakia in the past as well.

[Brabec] Whom do you have in mind?

[Pittner] I do not exclude the possibility that, in addition to former members of State Security and chauvinistic Czechs, also foreign sponsors may have participated in organizing that demonstration; namely, the foreign sponsors who already last year had an interest in the painting of anti-Semitic slogans in Slovakia. I worked for the intelligence service at that time, and we had tips that those slogans were being financed by Western intelligence services that have an interest in such destabilization. Well, why would Western capital not be interested in buying factories in Czechoslovakia cheaply? And when would it actually buy them? When there is disorder here to scare away the dollar. Money did indeed come here from Western countries to finance such anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and anti-Hungarian acts. After all, we are in our Western neighbors' sphere of interest.

[Brabec] Mr. Minister, are you aware of the seriousness of such allegations? Are you able to substantiate them?

[Pittner] Of course, such things can be supported by intelligence reports. I gave an interview last September, in which I warned that dismissed members of State Security were getting assignments from Western intelligence services, and that their role was to gather information about certain politicians, economic information, and information about the overall economic situation in the factories.

[Brabec] Why have you not informed the public already then?

[Pittner] The appropriate authorities responsible for our policies were informed. Intelligence data are not something to trumpet from housetops.

[VPN Slovak] Council Expresses No Confidence

On Friday, more than 700 of the citizens gathered at the SNP memorial signed a petition condemning the advocacy of fascism. "We demand that the public prosecutor's office of our republic prosecute every such act on its own initiative in the future, as the criminal code requires." Those who signed included Milan Sutovec, the deputy chairman of the Federal Assembly; Professor Miroslav Kusy; and Jozef Kucerak, the Slovak Republic's deputy prime minister.

On Saturday morning, the Slovak Council of the VPN met in the beautiful baroque Mozart house in the Old City. The pro-Meciar radio and television propaganda that day presented the victorious movement practically as an underground "anti-Slovak" organization. The clever journalists did not miss a trick. For instance, they placed an equals sign between VPN and Fedor Gal, knowing very well that his Jewish origin would be unacceptable to many latently or openly anti-Semitic "pure-blooded" Slovaks.

Delegates of Meciar's For a Democratic Slovakia [ZDS] platform also attended the meeting. Although they declared that the VPN Council was "illegal and undemocratic," they nevertheless voted and participated in the debate. Mr. Cifra, a ZDS member and a former official for special tasks at the Slovak Writer Publishing House (he was in charge of monitoring antisocialist manifestations), also spoke in the debate. He accused the VPN Council of a defensive approach to the national dimension, as evident already in the language bill's debate and during the "hyphenation war." The VPN Council then adopted a resolution expressing no confidence in Meciar and Minister Knazko. A small group of loyalist gathered under the window and shouted "Long live Havel!" and "Long live the VPN." The strains of the national anthem could be heard from the street that had suddenly become quiet.

"I Am Afraid"

On the street, occasional passersby commented on the situation.

"In my opinion, this is not dangerous. Do you see anything happening here? Do you see any fascists or nationalists? The few loudmouths who come to the square are not representative of the entire Slovak nation. I think that the Czechs are separated from Slovakia. They have not the slightest idea of what is actually happening here." (A man of 25.)

"I am for a strong federation and weak republics, the exact opposite of what the nationalists want. This is dangerous, and the journalists are to blame. Because they should have noticed the trends at the very beginning, and not let them assume their present proportions. That is shocking. The Slovaks in Canada, who advocate an independent Slovakia, are to blame the most. I am for Gal and Kucerak and those civilized people. Some people have no character whatsoever. They break their word and are not experts. Everyone just wants to govern and hold power." (A woman of 49.)

"I see only uncivilized people who believe everything the newspapers print, instead of forming their own judgments. The more sensation-seeking and vulgar the newspapers are, the more entertaining those people find them. The Slovaks from Canada do not leave us alone, and then there are those former Hlinka guardsmen. I lived through the onetime Slovak State, and it was just horrible. We are here as the opposition to the guardsmen. [In 1938] we reproduced posters of Stefanik,

and those guardsmen came and tore them down. Now those nationalists are clinging to Stefanik, because they know that the nation has nobody else besides Stefanik. I think Prime Minister Meciar is dangerous, because he is misleading the people." (A woman of 65.)

"So far as manifestations of fascism are concerned, they are here but are not typical of entire Slovakia. Slovakia's fascist past is done and over with, and has been condemned. Every normal, reasonable person must condemn such manifestations. Let us not be amazed that also abroad people are looking askance at Slovakia, because of a few hundred loudmouths. It is clear that there is growing mistrust also in the Czech Republic. Prime Minister Meciar is a likeable chap, even though some people see him as inflexible and unwilling to compromise. And that is a good thing." (A man of 59.)

"I am afraid of this. Prime Minister Meciar seems to me very authoritarian, and I suspect that he is not playing the game fairly. I don't know but that the separatists might win. I seem to be alone with my views. About 40 percent of the population supports the federation. On 14 March, Vienna [TV] showed Tiso blessing the tanks. There must be such material also in our archives. People are being promised prosperity of the kind that allegedly existed in the Slovak state. But it is never mentioned that it was a fascist state." (A woman of 38.)

"For a federation there must be two independent republics that simply join forces for those most important matters. If that cannot be, then I am for an independent Slovakia. I do not believe that the president took that stroll just for his health. It was clearly intentional, and he knew what would happen. Radio Free Europe and similar stations are broadcasting in a tone different from what the people in Slovakia feel. Not so long ago the president was a prisoner himself, and now it is the president who points out that the guilty should be punished. And we learned recently that it was the Hungarians who had financed our revolution with millions of dollars. People have a right to their own opinion. I am not saying that they are fascists. And explain to me how Mr. Zantovsky is able to say that Mr. Meciar's policies threaten [to restore] national socialism"? (A man of 22.)

"There have been fascist manifestations at every demonstration, and I suspect that they have not yet reached their peak. I am for Meciar, even though also bad things are being said about him occasionally. But Meciar is definitely the man who now and then said something specific." (A woman of 22.)

"Slovaks, I think, should have a right to their own state. Mr. Knazko and Mr. Meciar are leaning the way the people feel. The only course left for us Slovaks now is to go for that drastic cut in the centralism we are experiencing from Prague." (A man of 25.)

"I think it is impossible to preserve the federation. Today the VPN would get 10 percent of the vote at most. Meciar and Knazko are with the people. Slovakia longs for self-determination. And once we are in the United

Nations and have become completely sovereign, we will be able to join common Europe. If you have nothing, you cannot eat." (A man of 41.)

Strike Committee Petitions

On Tuesday, 19 March, the Presidium of the Slovak National Council considered behind closed doors a motion to recall Minister Knazko and Prime Minister Meciar. As time passed, a crowd assembled in front of the building. At first the demonstrators watched the windows of the building in silence, but later they became increasingly vocal in expressing their impatience. "The nation is disgusted with Kucerak and Kusy." Behind the demonstrators, the window of a small shop with the sign "Needlework." In the shopwindow, three primitive aquarelles hanging between crocheted tablecovers. The first aquarelle shows Tiso with his right arm raised. Underneath it, Hitler pulling on leashes small figures dressed in uniforms. And at the bottom, guardsmen in black uniforms dragging emaciated figures through a door marked "Gas." The entire trilogy ends with a large sign "Our Crime 1933-1944." One of the demonstrators noticed the pictures in the shopwindow. The people were demanding that the policemen on duty arrest the shop's owner. Allegedly a Jew, defaming the Slovak Republic.

Meanwhile the crowd shouted "Judases" and shook fists at the silhouettes seen behind the windows of the office of F. Miklosko, the Slovak National Council's chairman. The choir masters of the claue introduced an entirely new slogan, "Meciar for President." The outcome was that the meeting ended in the evening. Parliamentary committees would review the activity of the Slovak Interior Ministry after 17 November, and examine the circumstances of the recent foreign trips by Slovakia's highest elected officials. During the proceedings, the presidium received a number of petitions. In them, workers reassured the Slovak National Council of their willingness to even go on strike in support of the prime minister. That evening, when accepting the "Politician of the Year" award, Prime Minister Meciar shocked the public by announcing: "I know that if I were to turn to the workers, they would support me and might choose even extreme means of support."

Crowds That Will Sweep You Away

On Wednesday morning, the Slovak National Council met to act on the Presidium's motion of the day before. This time the entrance to the building was closed off with barriers. The bodyguards who had accompanied the President on his walk in Bratislava were in evidence. Commenting on the tight security, a female editor of Slovak Radio said: "The hysteria has reached its zenith. Upon entering the building, the ladies had to surrender even their purses."

On the presidium, the prime minister's chair was empty. The deputies began their deliberation. "There was nothing fascist about the meeting on 14 March," said Deputy Marian Andel, the founder of the Slovak

National Party [SNS]. "The people simply expressed their views in democratic fashion. Unlike in the past, we cannot expect everyone to hold identical views. Can you imagine Mrs. Thatcher attending a demonstration in Northern Ireland? If the president had been an astute politician, he would not have visited her, and absolutely nothing would have happened."

Around 1330, Prime Minister Meciar entered through a side door. The journalists gathered in the corridor immediately fell silent. I asked the prime minister to grant me an interview. "RESPEKT..., you wrote something not very nice about Slovakia," he replied and agreed to an interview. Members of the ZDS platform closeted themselves with the prime minister in the small sitting room.

"We cannot accept the prime minister's statements, which are very dangerous," said Deputy Zuzana Mistríkova (VPN). "All this is leading to one great problem that might arise here. The social problem, the national problem, the problem of the federation and the constitution. The systematic circumvention and second-guessing of the parliament are beginning. Exploitation of the social problem for one's own political advancement I regard as flagrant irresponsibility. People should be aware of the danger they are getting into. Mr. Meciar's actions are threatening to create an explosion."

Professor Miroslav Kusý, a member of the Slovak National Council's presidium: "In any developed parliamentary democracy, one would have to resign for such statements. That was a threat to the parliament and to people critically opposing him. To all them Meciar is saying: I have here one more argument—the crowds that will sweep you away."

About an hour later, the prime minister rose to speak. The journalists rewarded with loud laughter and applause his jokes at the expense of the VPN and the "Feds." A cheerful man with a small mustache, who introduced himself as the Slovakia correspondent of a certain Soviet daily, asked: "Why is Prime Minister Pithart offending the Slovak nation by rejecting a state treaty?"

Last Hope

After his speech, the prime minister went behind the podium and then, with unsteady steps along the empty corridor, into the small sitting room. His exhausted face was streaked with perspiration. He sat down in his chair and answered my questions in a tired voice.

[Brabec] You said that the people would support you even with a strike in the extreme case. Don't you regard such statements by a politician as dangerous?

[Meciar] Not in the situation that existed when I said that. By then the strike alerts were already issued. That was at a stage when all the notices had already been delivered to me.

[Brabec] Could you explain what you meant by your comment regarding Czech chauvinism?

[Meciar] In the Czech press one reads so many shameful lies about Slovaks in Slovak politics, and we know they are untrue. They offend us by regarding us as inferior people, with lower political standards, less educated and with substandard educations. It is so degrading that we cannot remain silent. I spoke of Czech chauvinism not as a phenomenon typical of the entire Czech nation, but only of a certain part of those people who are setting policies in Bohemia. Even some editors are helping to shape them. If our people who in principle support federalism were to read their articles, they would begin to think differently. To me it seems that the play unfolding here is about two deep suspicions. The Czechs suspect the Slovaks of wanting to secede and form an independent state. And the Slovaks? They suspect the Czechs of acting deliberately so as to force the Slovaks to form that independent state, for which they would then be the ones to carry the can.

As I was leaving the building of the Slovak National Council, I met Mr. Kucerak, the [Slovak] Government's deputy prime minister. I asked him whether he still believed in the existence of a silent majority? He replied: "Please don't say anything. That is our last hope."

HUNGARY

Chairwoman Anna Petrasovits Denies Resignation

LD2804055891 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2000 GMT 27 Apr 91

[Interview with Anna Petrasovits, Socialist International chairwoman, by correspondent Janos Hollos; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Hollos] At the Budapest party-member session of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party today, it was said that the Socialist International had written a letter calling on you to resign. Is the news true?

[Petrasovits] It is not true. It is a further example of a series of deliberate acts of misinformation distributed by a militant group excluded from the leadership. [passage omitted]

I did not receive any such letter last week. What is more, I received the invitation to the session of the council. [passage omitted]

[Hollos] At the party-member session this morning, it was also said that the MSZDP [Hungarian Social Democratic Party], in practice, has only a legal existence, that in practice it has ceased to exist, and has only the slightest effect on today's public life. In actuality, how big is the membership of the MSZDP now?

[Petrasovits] There were 23,000 applications to join 18 months ago. Of these, we have about 6,000 regularly paid-up members. It is true that its effect on political

public life is considerably smaller than if it would politicize as a parliamentary party. But, to deny that the MSZDP is functioning is just as much of a poorly considered, hasty statement as the statement that the party is supposed to have been suspended from the Socialist International. A few months ago, this rumor was also going around.

Independent Smallholders' National Board Meets

*LD2704220991 Budapest MTI in English 1632 GMT
27 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, 27 April (MTI)—The national board of the Independent Smallholders' Party (ISP) is meeting in session in Budapest.

The party's unity is at stake. The advocates of Jozsef Torgyan, the relieved head of the ISP parliamentary group, insisted that the board should hold a special session, draft a new party constitution, and elect a new leadership. Nevertheless, the other group, headed by the party's current leaders, resumed the session that had been suspended on December 14-15 last year.

Sandor Olah, ISP general secretary, emphasized that the Smallholders achieved an almost complete success with the parliamentary approval of the compensation law. Under the law, 98 percent of the former owners will get back their land, Olah said. The ISP invariably insists on its original programme of full compensation. Olah said the law marked the first step on a long road towards final victory. In his view, the national board should confirm its preparedness to take part in the coalition, but it should also call attention to the absence of unambiguous rules within the coalition. Olah emphasized that the party was amidst a personnel crisis.

Deputy president Gyula Kiss said the party had never given up, and would never give up, its principles within the government.

Geza Zsiros, who is coordinating the committee drafting the party's manifesto, said the ISP was the single parliamentary party to develop an unambiguous image. It is obvious for all that the ISP represents the proprietors and the middle class, Zsiros said.

After that, the national board began a debate, while the advocates of Torgyan were demonstrating in the street. (MTI promises more)

RMDSZ Dissociates Itself From Kiraly's Views

*LD2504222991 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2000 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] The press office and the presidium in Bucharest of the Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania dissociated themselves from the statements, interviews, and views of Karoly Kiraly, the senator who is staying in Hungary. The leader of the presidential office of the RMDSZ [Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania] pointed out that to his knowledge, the vice

president of the Romanian Senate had travelled to Budapest for medical treatment as a private person and not on behalf of the RMDSZ. The press office of the Romanian Senate issued a similar statement.

Court Reprimands Former Secret Service Leaders

*LD2504211591 Budapest MTI in English 1909 GMT
25 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, 25 April (MTI)—On Thursday the Budapest Military Court gave its verdict in the trial of retired Police Brigadier Generals Ferenc Pallagi and Dr. Jozsef Horvath, former chiefs of the Hungarian Secret Service. The court reprimanded both, and acquitted Pallagi of the charge of power abuse in the absence of conclusive evidence.

The accusation against the officers was that after proclamation of the Republic of Hungary on 23 October 1989 and the amendment of the constitution, the internal security service continued to tap telephone calls of opposition party leaders, and invariably checked their correspondence. Ferenc Pallagi, former deputy home office minister, was also accused of having permitted the destruction of confidential documents.

Previously, both the prosecutor and the council for defence applied for the defendants' acquittal.

Giving grounds for the verdict, Military Judge Robert Hildebrand pointed out that, in defiance of the constitution, the one-time state security service had collected information on certain social organizations operating as parties and their leaders. For failing to effect the discontinuation of unlawful activities, the defendants were found guilty of negligence.

Ferenc Pallagi was acquitted of the charge of file destruction for lack of evidence to prove that he had acted on purpose when giving permission for the destruction of secret files with no official record being made.

On passing its verdict, the court duly considered the fact that in the meantime the country had undergone a change in system, which had included the disbanding of the internal security service, and that previously the defendants had carried out their responsibilities properly and for a long time, making several initiatives towards a change in secret service activities.

Confiscated Self-Defense Weapons To Be Returned

*LD2504223791 Budapest MTI in English 1648 GMT
25 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, 25 April (MTI)—The 12,000 policemen and soldiers, mostly pensioners, who were deprived of their weapons of self-defense last year at the order of the former minister of Home Affairs, Balyzs Horvath, are soon to have them back.

The measure will follow the Constitutional Court's ruling that the ministerial instruction was unconstitutional. Back in September of last year, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office objected to Horvath's decision on legal grounds, namely that citizen's rights and responsibilities must not be decreed by orders, only by legal rulings.

POLAND

Number of Lay Judges Still Insufficient

91EP0401A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 19 Mar 91 pp IV

[Article by Izabela Lewandowska: "Shortage of Judges: Not Many Want To Serve"]

[Text] "Consideration and resolution of cases in courts occurs with the participation of lay judges except in cases described in the law," is the statement in Article 59 of the Constitution. The exceptions are numerous, but in practice more than half the cases are considered exclusively by professional judges. These may be even more numerous, as is indicated by the great differences in the percentage of court cases in different courts. According to studies done in 1985, for example, in the Jelenia Gora [Court] District 59.4 percent of all cases were considered by lay judges, but in the Wroclaw District, only 38.8 percent were considered by lay judges. Civil procedure presents great potential for limiting the participation of lay judges; if the presiding officer of the section recognizes that the case is not complicated, he may order its resolution exclusively by a professional judge.

Lay judges continue to be indispensable for considering approximately one million cases; the so-called board of judges consists of two lay judges and one professional judge.

For Four Years

The number of lay judges—in keeping with authorization contained in the law on the general court system—is established for specific districts by the presiding officers of the voivodship courts. It depends mainly on the number of cases coming to the specific courts of the given district. Simply stated, the number of lay judges must be such as to ensure adequate staffing of judge-ships. The law on court organization of general courts permits the appointment of a lay judge to participate in trials for a term no longer than 12 days per year. The number of days may be increased only for serious reasons, specifically, to conclude a trial with the participation of the lay judge involved. Obviously, if the lay judge can manage his own time and wants to give more time to the court, these limitations are not obligatory.

As a result, the need for lay judges on a nationwide scale is very great, especially since in determining their numbers, the presiding officers must take into account that

some of them may drop out during their tenure due to resignation, moving to a different location, long-term illness, etc.

Lay judges are elected for a four-year term. There was an election campaign in the second half of last year which resulted in lay judges being elected for the 1991-94 term. In the same campaign, gmina councils chose members of councils with jurisdiction over minor offenses; these were moved as of the middle of 1990 from the office of internal affairs and placed under the supervision of the minister of justice.

Offenders Considerable in Number

From information obtained by the Ministry of Justice from presiding officers of voivodship courts, it seems that on a nationwide scale we should appoint 76,600 lay judges. One-quarter fewer, fewer than 57,800, were selected. The situation in specific districts varies. Only eight districts (Lomza, Piotrkow, Plock, Przemysl, Siedlice, Sieradz, Tarnow, and Wloclawek) succeeded in electing 90-100 percent of the lay judges needed. The situation is worst in the Bydgoszcz, Gdansk, Krakow, Lodz, Opole, Poznan, Torun, and Warsaw Voivodships where this number is less than 70 percent.

The situation is somewhat better with the councils for minor offenses. Presiding officers of the courts requested the gmina councils to appoint 28,400 individuals; almost 23,000, or approximately 20 percent fewer than requested, were appointed. In 30 districts, their number is at the 80 to 100 percent level. In Plock, Tarnow, and Legnica, more were appointed than the court stipulated, but in five districts—Warsaw, Krakow, Radom, Lodz, and Wroclaw—there are decidedly too few.

We could write much about the reasons for this state of affairs. But we must begin with indicating the lack of interest in selecting lay judges and members of councils for minor offenses on the part of bodies authorized to nominate candidates. These are associations, organizations, trade unions, and groups of 25 citizens. Gmina councils and town councils had the duty not only to nominate, but also to prepare elections (for lay judges and members of councils for minor offenses). Many of these made no effort to advertise elections, and some did not even fulfill the duty, stipulated by law concerning the organization of general courts, of forming a committee to give opinions on candidates nominated. Not everywhere were investigations made as to whether the candidates nominated met the basic formal requirements (age, agreement to serve, residency in the district of the given court or council).

Many mistakes and inadequacies in campaign organization and conducting the elections themselves were due to lack of experience of the gmina councils and to their being absorbed in other matters. Many councils treated these campaigns as a second-rate matter, for example, the Krakow Council, occupied with political affairs, assumed at the outset that they would not be able to elect all the lay judges by the end of 1990. As a result, the

Krakow courts have scarcely one-third the stipulated number of lay judges, and Legnica, Lublin, Opole, Rzeszow, Torun, and Wroclaw have approximately one-half.

Understandable Reasons

But the councils cannot be blamed for everything, nor can the courts or councils, were not always concerned about providing the councils appropriate aid or simply with information that would facilitate proper conducting of a campaign. Most people believe that they have troubles enough of their own without becoming engaged in any kind of public activity. In many districts it is simply difficult to find anyone willing to be a candidate. This pertains specifically to councils for minor offenses that are not socially acceptable, despite recent organizational changes. A particular reluctance to be candidates for membership in these councils was observed among workers in large plants victimized for labor strikes, in small localities remote from metropolitan areas, and among village residents. In Lodz itself, scarcely one-third of the number of members of the council for minor offenses required by the court were elected.

However, not only lack of interest is responsible for the inadequate number of lay judges and members of councils for minor offenses. A frequent cause for refusing to be a candidate is the fear of how this public function will be accepted in the workplace and the fear of a loss of some part of earnings. Employers look askance on all leaves, even those for fulfilling public duties in a court or council for minor offenses. Despite the legal requirement that a lay judge (or member of a council for minor offenses) given leave from work retains his right to full pay and services connected with his position, in practice this is treated differently. Some plants refuse that part of the pay dependent on presence at work, and people do not want to pick a quarrel with an employer, go to court or dispute, especially in a situation where there are many more looking for work than positions available.

Unreplaced Retirees

Because of a lack of those willing to be candidates, it happened that lists of candidates presented by some organizations or unions may have contained everyone who agreed to carry out these functions, including persons who did not have the moral or intellectual qualifications. For lack of a sufficient number of candidates, these people also were authorized to be members of the court or the council for minor offenses.

As a result, probably to a degree even greater than in previous terms of office, the courts will be forced to use the help of lay judges of retirement age and members of councils for minor offenses who have free time and do not have to fear how an employer will consider frequent presence in court or at council sittings. However, in districts where the number of lay judges is lowest in relation to needs, there will probably be no solution other than confirming elections. In addition to the five

districts mentioned, elections of this kind will probably have to be conducted in Gdansk, Koszalin, Krosno, Legnica, Lomza, Olsztyn, Gorzow, Poznan, and Rzeszow.

Justice cannot be rendered without judges, and a lay judge is also a judge, albeit a lay judge. We cannot count on a rapid solution of problems by further limiting the types of cases decided with the participation of lay judges. This would require legislative changes and, primarily, thorough rethinking as to whether giving up lay judges is really compatible with the vision of rendering justice as this should be done in a rule-of-law state.

The Statistical Picture

In conclusion, some information [is given] about those lay judges and members of councils for minor offenses that we succeeded in electing in spite of everything. Almost 59 percent of lay judges are men, 41 percent, women. The largest group, more than 88 percent, are persons age 31-65; only 4.7 percent are less than 35 years of age. More than 60 percent of lay judges have secondary education, 19.4 percent have higher education, and 16.7 percent are retirees or pensioners. Of the elected lay judges, 21 percent have served a previous term.

Also, among members of councils for minor offenses, men predominate (64 percent). Only 8.2 percent are less than 30 years of age, and 5.3 percent are older than 65; the remainder are 31-65 years old. Almost 58 percent have secondary education, and 26 percent have elementary and basic trade school education. Slightly more than 16 percent are individuals with higher education, and of these, one-third have legal and administrative training. Scarcely 6.5 percent of these served in adjudicating associations during the previous term.

Presidential Council on Jewish Relations Meets

91EP0396B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
29 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by (knysz): "Polish-Jewish Council"]

[Text] The president's Council on Polish-Jewish Relations met Thursday (28 March) at Belweder for its first session. Lech Walesa participated. "The new, democratic Poland should be free from all manifestations of racism and xenophobia. It should be and it will be," declared the 20 members of the council.

"In Poland, interest in the Jewish people and culture is more and more common. Numerous Jewish circles have favored Poland and Poles with warm feelings. It is necessary to go in this direction, to build a future free from stereotypes and prejudices. We owe this effort to future generations," we read in the declaration.

The council also expressed regret that instances of the shameful phenomenon of anti-Semitism occur in public

life and have made themselves known, among other times, during the election campaign.

"Our aim is for the word 'Jew' to stop being offensive," said Andrzej Friedman during a press conference after the council meeting.

Czeslaw Bielecki said the council's main goal is teaching the public respect for all minorities.

"People who have Jewish ancestors should have the right to acknowledge their Jewish heritage. And they should have the right not to be a Jew if that is what they want," Stanislaw Krajewski stressed.

On the question of whether the president would separate himself from the anti-Semites who supported him during the election campaign, Arkadiusz Rybicki, the president's political secretary and Lech Walesa's delegate for contacts with the council, explained that Lech Walesa is president of all Poles. "It would be a mistake to believe that the president would want to isolate himself from anyone. The president wants to persuade the people that close relations between Poles and Jews are possible."

Rybicki emphasized that it will not be possible to introduce changes in the way of thinking about Jews immediately, and thus the council attaches great importance to developing new educational programs. He added that there are already several proposals before the Ministry of Education dealing primarily with education about Jewish culture.

The president has appointed to the council: Prof. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, historian and Polish ambassador to Austria; Czeslaw Bielecki, architect and publicist; Prof. Jan Blonski, historian and literary critic; Rev. Dr. Waldemar Chrostowski, member of the Episcopal Commission on Dialogue with Judaism; Dr. Andrzej Friedman, physician; Prof. Jozef Gierowski, historian; Pawel Hertz, writer; Prof. Krystyna Kersten, historian; Stanislaw Krajewski, doctor of mathematics; Witold Lutoslawski, composer and conductor; attorney Jan Olszewski, presidential advisor and member of the National Citizens Committee; Marek Rostworowski, historian and minister of culture and art; Senator and Prof. Stanislaw Stomma; Prof. Adam Strzembosz, president of the Supreme Court; Prof. Jerzy Tomaszewski, historian; Jerzy Turowicz, editor in chief of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY; Zofia Wasilkowska, member of the Helsinki Committee; Stefan Wilkanowicz, editor in chief of the monthly ZNAK; Maciej Zalewski, until recently assistant editor in chief of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC; Senator and Prof. Janusz Ziolkowski, secretary of state in the presidential chancellery.

YUGOSLAVIA

New Croatian Law on Citizenship Explained

91BA0505A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
7 Apr 91 p 9

[Interview with Vladimir Seks, vice president of the Croatian Assembly; place and date not given: "Seks: It Will Be a Good Law"]

[Text] We are told that the first of a number of debates lasted all of five hours and was frequently spiced with constructive polemical sparks exchanged between eminent legal experts in the closed meeting for expert examination of the draft of the Croatian law on citizenship, which was organized last week in the Assembly. Those who participated directly or through their constructive suggestions in drafting the law, from Dr. Eugen Pusic, Dr. Drago Medvedovic, Dr. Velimir Ivancevic, Dr. Kresimir Sajk, Dr. Stjepan Ivanisevic, Dr. Zeljko Pavic, and Dr. Mira Alincic, all professors, Dr. Branko Babac, Vico Vukojevic, Srecko Latic, and Mira Martinec, all the way to the vice president of the assembly Vladimir Seks, whom we interviewed about this important law, will obviously have more things to add to the draft up until the last moment in order to find the most worthwhile and legally precise provisions.

[VJESNIK] Tell us why a new law had to be enacted when there already exists the Law on Citizenship of SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia and the SFRY Law on Citizenship? Is this only a continuation of the "legislative housecleaning," are there only legal reasons for this move, or are there, after all, political reasons?

[Seks] The present law has almost no validity because its application does not have any legal or political consequences. It is not based on the new constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Under the constitutional provisions, only citizens of Croatia may be elected to important public office, for example, judges, prosecutors, parliamentary offices, and so on. However, that citizenship was verified, if at all, exclusively on the basis of residence, so that theoretically the citizen of any republic could be elected public prosecutor. But it is a still greater problem to apply the law when it comes to elections. Only citizens of the Republic of Croatia have the right to vote and be elected under a provision of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. If you are going to enact an election law based on the Constitution, you also have to enact a law on citizenship, and it, of course, must also be based on the constitution and must contain precise provisions on who is a citizen of Croatia, how is that citizenship acquired, and how is that status relinquished. All citizens of Croatia must have the right to vote regardless of where they are living at the moment of the election, in France or Slovenia, it makes no difference.

Controlled Immigration

[VJESNIK] The present republic and federal provisions are not sufficiently precise?

[Seks] Even if they are, they "conflict" with the new provisions of the republic constitution. I will give you the example over which there has been the most dispute. Under our constitution, citizenship may never and under no conditions be taken away, because that is something you are entitled to by birth. You can renounce that right, but that is a matter of your personal decision, not of coercion by the state. But Yugoslav citizenship may be taken away under certain conditions under the provisions of the federal law on citizenship, and Croatian citizenship is thereby automatically lost.

[VJESNIK] The Western democracies protect themselves with a similar law against the onslaught of immigrants which they have had for several years; perhaps they once needed them as cheap manpower, but now they give them only problems. It seems to us that this proposal has laid down rather lenient conditions for acquiring Croatian citizenship. Do you not think that the door remains rather open for a possible onslaught of immigrants?

[Seks] Every state controls immigration onto its national territory, and we also will do so, especially because there could be a time when Croatia would be a country attractive to immigrants. It has been proposed that a foreigner, let us take that term in the broad sense, must live in the country at least 10 years before he can even apply for citizenship. I think that that is an altogether solid barrier to uncontrolled immigration. Perhaps during the debate that period of time will be changed. But that period is not such a solid barrier that a foreigner could not be attracted into "Croatian ranks" in the interest of Croatia. If the state of Croatia wants some exceptional foreign expert, scientist, or athlete, it could grant him citizenship in urgent proceedings even if that foreigner had not lived a single day in Croatia. This is done by a majority of the Western countries: Just recall the cases with the Soviet scientists and specialists.

Who Is an Emigre?

[VJESNIK] Who defines that "interest"?

[Seks] That will be in the jurisdiction of the district office or the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Justice, whichever version is finally adopted. At present, the proposal is for this entire area to be in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[VJESNIK] Will Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia be treated as foreigners?

[Seks] They cannot, of course, be treated the same as foreigners, when that term is used for people from other countries. So, they will not be treated as foreigners, and the conditions for acquiring citizenship will be loosened to the maximum for them. The same applies to our emigres because you cannot on the one hand constantly appeal to them, and then before they come home set up a barrier they cannot cross. But it was noted in the very first debates that the term "emigres" was not defined with the greatest precision in the draft. According to the

proposed version, an emigre is "a person who has emigrated from the Republic of Croatia with the intention of living abroad permanently and has lost his Croatian citizenship." Perhaps it needs more work.

[VJESNIK] One of the conditions that must be met by a foreigner who wants to take Croatian citizenship is this: "...that it can be concluded from his behavior that he will be a loyal citizen of the Republic of Croatia." Is not that condition too "elastic"?

[Seks] In the first debates, there were in fact quite a few objections to that article, and the sponsor will probably take them into account in preparing the final text. It is, of course, difficult to evaluate "loyalty."

[VJESNIK] In the draft of the law, the state is given the discretionary right to reject or accept a foreigner's application. Why was that necessary?

[Seks] Almost all the Western democracies have that discretionary right. Nevertheless, in a coordinating meeting it was proposed that that article of law should also be linked to article 16 of the constitution concerning rights and freedoms, so that in appeal proceedings protecting his rights, the foreigner would have something to which to refer. We dare not allow a return to the old practice in the system that has collapsed, when, for example, they could take away your passport without any explanation whatsoever, by the law of force, rather than by the force of law.

Renunciation of Citizenship

[VJESNIK] What other objections have been voiced?

[Seks] Those pertaining to renunciation of citizenship are interesting. That is, the draft prescribes that a person does not have that right unless he has met all his material obligations, be they contributions and taxes, or obligations to family or citizens of Croatia. It has been proposed that this provision be stated more precisely, that is, that it pertain only to obligations which are legally valid and covered by a final court judgment. It has also been proposed that marriage could be the basis for a spouse to acquire citizenship. Article 27 ought to state more clearly that under the Croatian constitution a citizen of Croatia cannot lose his citizenship.

[VJESNIK] Was the draft of the law prepared for Croatia as a part of Yugoslavia as is now the case, for some future confederal model, or for Croatia as an independent state?

[Seks] It was prepared both for Croatia as a part of some future Yugoslav confederation, but also for a completely independent Croatia, and it will also serve for the status quo at the moment. But you must realize that there is no such institution as "confederal citizenship," which means that Croatian citizenship is primary in any case. When the law on citizenship is adopted, the provisions of the federal law on citizenship will no longer apply; that is, the republic law takes precedence. Now it is the

other way about. So long as Croatia is a part of Yugoslavia, or until the Croatian Assembly provides otherwise, a citizen of Croatia will at the same time be a citizen of Yugoslavia, or, in other words, it will not be possible to acquire Yugoslav citizenship before acquiring Croatian citizenship. Acquiring or losing Croatian citizenship will be independent of acquiring and losing Yugoslav citizenship.

[VJESNIK] When do you envisage adoption of the law, and do you expect a "ruckus"?

[Seks] In the course of this year, but I hope before the summer vacation of the parliament. No, I do not expect problems, precisely because the very best experts took part in drafting the law and there will be occasions and time for all objections and for them to be incorporated into the draft. It ought to be a good law.

Serbian Radical Party Leader Seselj Interviewed

91BA0505B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
9 Apr 91 p 8

[Article by R. Dj., incorporating excerpts from a television interview with Dr. Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], by Rajko Djurdjevic in Belgrade on 6 April: "Revive the Serbian State in the Balkans"]

[Text] Dr. Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], took part on 6 April in Rajko Djurdjevic's program "Conversations Before Daybreak," broadcast by TV Politika. We are presenting excerpts from the transcript in order to show the views held by the leader of the SRS on certain current issues.

[Djurdjevic] How do you evaluate the political situation in Serbia was one of the questions.

[Seselj] We no longer want Yugoslavia in any form, Dr. Seselj replied. We are striving for revival of an independent and free Serbian state in the Balkans, which will embrace all the Serbian lands. That means that, in addition to the present narrow Serbian federal unit, it would include: Serbian Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Hercegovina, Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Banija, Serbian Slavonia, Serbian Kordun, and Serbian Baranja. For us, there are no compromises whatsoever on this.

Today We Are All Appealing to Democracy

As for the other political parties, our subject continued, today we all appeal to democracy, yet few know what democracy is. Democracy is a form of government. If you do not have a state, you cannot have democracy, you cannot have autocracy, you have the confused state in which we live today. We feel that democracy can be attained only when we revive the Serbian state. It has not been revived....

[Djurdjevic] How do you view the present regime and the opposition?

[Seselj] The regime is too overbearing, arrogant, the regime is tardy in both the political and economic spheres to take certain measures which are indispensable, and it is particularly late in the economic sphere because it does not accept the concept of renewing the economy of Serbia on a truly private basis, on foundations of private ownership of the means of production. The opposition is also displaying certain types of behavior which are not appropriate to its political life.

[Djurdjevic] What can you say now about the persistent effort of Slovenia to disassociate itself from Yugoslavia?

[Seselj] It is in the interest of both the Slovenian and Serbian people that they part as soon as possible. Fortunately, there are no unresolved territorial issues between us. This could be done immediately. I hope that the Slovenes will be intelligent enough and will not hesitate to leave Yugoslavia. The Croats are holding them back now because they know that if the Slovenes go, their position will immediately be much more difficult. Up to now the Slovenes have consented to be prisoners of Croatia in Yugoslavia. If the Slovenes stay in Yugoslavia for any length of time, that will be to the mutual detriment of both the Serbs and the Slovenes.

All that remained was to see the extent to which the Slovenes would participate in Yugoslavia's total state debt and how much is to be paid by factories which Josip Broz Tito moved from Serbia to Slovenia. For us Serbs, that would signify 1.5 million fewer bitter enemies within the borders of the unified state. We must support that, Dr. Seselj said and went on:

A Model for All of Civilized Europe

If Yugoslavia remains and survives, it never will be able to be democratic. Yugoslavia's historical development up to this point has demonstrated that Serbs and Croats cannot live within the borders of a unified state if that state is truly democratic. Why? Because the Serbs are a people with markedly democratic traditions. We in Serbia have had parliamentary political life for a long time now, we had it even under the Kingdom of Serbia before Yugoslavia was created, before World War I. A very highly developed parliamentary life. In its democratic achievements, Serbia was a model for all of civilized Europe at that time.

For 900 years now, the Croats have not had their own state and all democratic achievements, all democratic traditions, are alien to them.

At the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Serbs had a sizable number of political parties, and almost all Croats were members of the Croatian Peasant Party or certain other parties which operated under its sponsorship, and, just as today, they had a harsh and extremist policy, a seemingly extremist policy, so that the Croatian Peasant Party could achieve more in political life by

pointing to it, if the Croatian Peasant Party did not succeed, then others would come along more extreme and radical, and so on. We have something like that even today. From time to time, Tadjman displays somewhat milder political views, but the hawks even in the other political parties are expressing those true aspirations and strivings of the Croatian people which Tadjman does not express in such open form, but they all have the same political goals and operate in coordinating fashion, by contrast with us Serbs, who, when we divide up into political parties, use and spend much more energy in conflicts with one another than in opposing our objective enemies, Dr. Vojislav Seselj said.

Demands by Serbian Papers for Freedom of Press

91BA0516A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 91
pp 14-16

[Editorial: "Instead of an Apology, the Fall of a Bastille"]

[Text] There was a time when everyone knew: "NIN is something different." Later came the slogan: "With NIN one knows more." At the beginning, this seemed to make sense. The public knew that NIN always looked at everything askance, put questions to various people, acted the part of an opposition in the one-party state.... It doubted, then, and it existed. It is clear that with NIN it was not possible to know exactly everything, but one did know as much as could be known under "those conditions."

NIN's troubles began in recent years. To be specific, in the editorial office it is felt that NIN has been losing ground with the public over the "last five years"; some people think so and are keeping silent. More precisely, that it "does not represent what it did represent throughout its entire history—a model of professionalism, a pillar of liberal thought, and a center of refusal to carry 'absolute truths' fabricated in political power centers."

This past year has probably won the race without competition for "the most painful year at NIN." From issue to issue there were fewer and fewer figures in the Serbian and Yugoslav public, although in general it does exist, who were "morally and politically fit" for NIN's columns. There were fewer and fewer topics. There were more and more "perpetual scapegoats" in other communities and more and more "traitors to the Serbian people" in our own. Fewer and fewer viewpoints were permitted.

The horror of the situation lies in the fact that the changes in society are the most tumultuous and problematical since Yugoslavia came into being. The one-party state, social ownership, the 1974 Constitution are quite seriously withering away and relinquishing their role on the social scene. National "awakenings" are beginning, along with unruly squabbles among the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic minorities, national leaders

are rising up out of the ashes, political parties are being formed, multiparty elections are being prepared throughout the country....

NIN has been covering all that like a party bulletin. The "only truth" has not been crossing swords at all with different truths and truths of other people. "Liberal NIN"? It cannot be said that the editors have not had objective signals to the effect that they are on the wrong track. NIN's readers are retreating step by step. Circulation is falling.

How Did It Start?

This editorial nevertheless intends to remind the reader that the entire editorial staff never consented to the "new formula" which was advertised as a "creative manuscript." (At this point, this sounds rather cynical!)

The reaction to the first "full-fledged signals" from the public back on 8 June 1990 was to form within the editorial staff—"in order to preserve the traditional high standards of professionalism of NIN journalists"—the Community of Journalists, which was later renamed the NIN Forum. It was joined by 20 journalists.

Last summer, when NIN, along with the other "Politika" publications, "portrayed the opposition protests in Belgrade unobjectively," on 2 July Forum published its "Statement." Its basic position was that this question "does not reflect all the drama, complexity, and depth of changes in Serbia and throughout the country." Second, that NIN "cannot devote itself to producing total devotion to any political projects or ideologies." That, then, was last July.

In late September 1990, Forum wrote an open letter to Dr. Zivorad Minovic, director of the "Politika" Newspaper Organization. "All the faults of NIN about which we spoke in the Statement...are now still more pronounced, and the need for the pages of NIN to be open to different political conceptions is still more urgent at the beginning of the election campaign."

Again at that time there was a public demand that "election of the editor in chief and editorial policy of the paper be returned to the editorial staff of NIN." The response to the 17 signatories was the reproach that "our problems" should not be aired outside the house. About the problems themselves, however, nothing was done.

No ray of light from anywhere. And circulation is falling.... It is increasingly difficult to find a man who reads NIN. The "list of people" who cannot be our collaborators is getting longer and longer. Not only do we not talk to "external enemies" from other communities, but we have contempt for our own opposition: Dragoljub Micunovic, Vuk Draskovic, Dragan Veselinov, Zoran Djindjic, Ivan Djuric, Nebojsa Popov, Leon Koen, Vojin Dimitrijevic.... Then, some people managed to "get into" NIN and then committed a faux pas and vanished again: Jovan Raskovic, Jovan Opacic, Nenad Kecmanovic, Miroslav Solevic, Ljubisa Stankovic.... But

there was also something new here. And there were more and more public figures who refused to speak or write for NIN. (Yet at one time this newspaper had a department: "I Am Writing for NIN.") A few people dropped out of NIN's editorial collegium: Aleksandar Tijanic, Ljuba Stojic, Velizar Zecevic, Bogdan Tirmanic, Milo Gligorijevic.

At the beginning of March 1991 (before 9 March!), the Forum of NIN Journalists prepared a new letter to the director of "Politika." "We decided on this step because there has been no dialogue in the editorial staff, because debates have dried up, there is no longer a give and take of opinions about our product; in short, the critical spirit has died." NIN was on its knees. Poisoned by our own powerlessness, we begged: "NIN could become a pro-socialist weekly, but it would reveal that orientation—if it sticks to its trade—only in its commentary, by no means through the absence of news, facts, and rumors from other political currents and orientations." Fortunately, we never managed to send that letter.

Days of Decision

That is the state we were in on 9 March, the day of the tear gas, the tanks, and the university students.... A dozen people from NIN followed those events on their own from minute to minute, completely aware that what had been seen by Belgrade, Serbia, Yugoslavia, and the entire world could not go in our newspaper. We were on Republic Square, we took shelter from the "special forces," we roamed with the "forces of darkness and chaos" from Terazije to the Serbian Assembly, across Pioneer Park to the television studio at No. 10 Tenkovska Street, waited in Brankova Street for the students to cross the bridge, days later we came to the Terazije fountain.... And when we felt and realized that we were finally on the same wavelength with the public in this city, that the student sit-in at the fountain had changed the "blood picture" of this society, on 18 March in the Jazz Club of the Youth Center—we were not allowed to meet in our own editorial office—Forum again spoke out, but now, carried by the waves of the "velvet (r)evolution," we spoke out as the "Free NIN Journalists." In some other time, it is clear, no one would have had to announce that he was free, and especially—we hope—not NIN journalists, and "liberal NIN," alas, succumbed to those days of enthusiasm.

"The NIN Forum, an association of this newspaper's journalists absolutely above parties and politics, demands the unconditional resignation of Teodor Andjelic, editor in chief, and the members of the collegium." In that same announcement, we reminded the public, this time more resolutely, of our demands last year: The Forum demands that the editor in chief and collegium be chosen by the editorial staff. And that "NIN should set itself up as a periodical of the Serbian intelligentsia above political parties and should never again lose its integrity in the face of the authority of any form of government." It was signed by the following: Bogdan Tirmanic, Boro Krivokapic, Aleksandar Tijanic, Milo

Gligorijevic, Ljuba Stojic, Luka Miceta, Dragan Jovanovic, Toma Dzadzic, Slobodan Reljic, Miodrag Sindjelic, Svetislav Spasojevic, Sava Dautovic, Zoran Miljatovic, Zoran Mihailovic, Velizar Zecevic, Stevan Niksic, and Stevan Stanic.

No answer was forthcoming even three days later. On Wednesday, 20 March, Forum notified the director of the "Politika" Newspaper Organization "that beginning on Monday, 25 March 1991, we would go on a protest strike." We scheduled a press conference on Monday, 25 March, at 1100 hours in the International Press Center should our demands not be met. At noon on Thursday, Director Minovic received a delegation of Forum (Ljuba Stojic, Sava Dautovic, Milo Gligorijevic). He called a meeting for noon on Friday at which he would inform the editorial staff of his decisions. At noon on Friday, the meeting was canceled. The director sent word "because he was busy." The Forum saw this as "tactical foot-dragging." The suggestion, after all, was that it would "be best if we met after the weekend." Forum held an urgent meeting at 1700 hours. A five-member delegation (Milo Gligorijevic, Ljuba Stojic, Aleksandar Tijanic, Velizar Zecevic, Miodrag Sindjelic) went off to report that Forum was not withdrawing its demands and that they as a delegation had neither the intention nor the mandate to "bargain" because a more minimal program of NIN simply could not be accepted. It was agreed: All the demands are adopted! Forum, at the urgent request of Director Minovic, sent a list of five names from which he would select the acting editor in chief: Sava Dautovic, Velizar Zecevic, Milo Gligorijevic, Ljuba Stojic, and Slobodan Reljic.

These Days...

At the same time, the "other side" of the NIN editorial staff spoke over "TV Politika" about Forum as an "informal and illegal" little group of journalists. In NIN, No 2099, 22 March, several authors poured down heavy words over all of six pages of our paper. That was presented for every curious person to see, and the NIN Forum simply did not want to respond to that. Any reader who "studies" that material will see why.

On Saturday, 23 March, there was a long conversation with the director of the "Politika" Newspaper Organization. A letter was also read from the other part of the editorial staff (Teodor Andjelic, Milorad Vucelic, Tomislav Peternek, Rajko Djurdjevic, and Miroslav Vujovic) which explicitly demanded "prevention of any further hindrance of work in the editorial office by the illegal group which calls itself the 'independent Forum'" and that "the 'Politika' Newspaper Publishing Enterprise [NIP] institute normal and lawful proceedings through legal authorities to resolve the well-known problems." But in the meeting the demands of the Forum were nevertheless adopted. Director Minovic proposed that Sava Dautovic be acting editor in chief. Because Dautovic was reluctant, the director suggested that he "work on Dautovic alone." And that was agreed.

On Monday, 25 March, there was a meeting of the Workers' Council which as a formal matter was supposed to confirm the director's decision. The editorial staff waited for hours. Only in the evening, at 1900 hours, did we learn that our demands had been adopted even officially, but.... For the first time, the Workers' Council "did not obey" the director (!?), and this body, which is the most competent for such decisions, decided that Velizar Zecevic should be acting editor in chief. Why did it go against the director's request? In the situation in which we have been for days, a segment of the Forum (even though two days earlier no one cared which of the people proposed would be appointed to the position of acting editor) felt that the director probably did not insist enough on his proposal for reasons known only to himself.

The Forum met again in the evening. We lost valuable time because Monday is the crucial day for preparing the new issue of NIN.

And on Tuesday, at noon, Forum discussed the "strange" decision. Forum concluded that the entire proceedings seemed incorrect, but this opinion prevailed: This should be borne in mind, but we had to continue to prepare the new issue. We would send a letter to the director concerning this. In any case, on Thursday, 28 March, came the debate about the remaining two demands of Forum: "That the new editor in chief and collegium be chosen by the editorial staff and that NIN be set up as a periodical above parties." Next comes development of a method of realizing these demands. We hope that the "times of heroes" will soon be over and that NIN will be able to concern itself with its own content, which is what might interest our readers the most.

[Box, p 15]

Forum: What We Will and What We Will Not

The Forum of Free NIN Journalists, in a meeting held 27 March 1991, adopted the following resolutions:

1. We, free NIN journalists, recognize no decision nor act of a statutory nature of the Serbian SAWP whereby that political organization has unconstitutionally usurped the right of founder of the newspaper NIN and has assigned itself the right of appointing the newspaper's editor in chief. We will not recognize any decision whereby the ruling party or any other party has "inherited" that right.

2. We will initiate establishment of democratic procedure for election of the editor in chief and managing editor of NIN. We feel it is inevitable to overcome the present confusion, which is a consequence of the vagueness of the legal position of the "Politika" [NIP] and the newspaper NIN, so as to ensure that the editor in chief and managing editor may not be chosen against the will and without the consent of the editorial staff.

3. We declare null and void the competition for selection of an editor in chief and managing editor of NIN which was advertised by the Workers' Council of the "Politika" NIP, and we postpone a selection until the necessary conditions are brought about for that competition to be conducted in accordance with democratic procedure.

4. When the next editor in chief and managing editor are chosen, a majority of the members of the competition commission must be chosen from the editorial staff of NIN, and this editorial staff must confirm the candidate chosen.

5. The management of the "Politika" NIP will not in future transfer personnel from NIN or to NIN without prior consent of the editorial staff and the personnel in question.

6. We do not agree with the way in which the Workers' Council chose the acting editor in chief and acting managing editor of NIN because it violated an agreement reached previously between the director of the enterprise and the Forum of Free NIN Journalists. We feel that this has done damage to the reputation of Sava Dautovic and Velizar Zecevic, members of Forum, who were our equal candidates for this position.

7. We protest most vigorously the flagrant abuse of the publications and media of the "Politika" NIP—in particular NIN, POLITIKA, and TV Politika—committed in recent days in order to defend the compromised editors, whose removal was demanded by the entire democratic public of Serbia and Belgrade, by the independent trade union of journalists of the "Politika" NIP, and by the Forum of Free NIN Journalists. We also protest use of the periodicals of the "Politika" NIP to spread an atmosphere of pressure, witch-hunt, and show-down with the journalists who belong to the independent union and Forum.

What was printed in the last issue of NIN on the pages misused to fling mud at a majority of the journalists of this newspaper, and what appeared in the pages of POLITIKA—where in an underhanded attack on our colleague Aleksandar Tijanic the purpose was even to falsify a statement of Vuk Draskovic, leader of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement]—are incredible examples of a violation of professional, moral, and legal codes.

The management of POLITIKA must immediately study this case and establish the professional and all other accountability for this scandalous act. We expect heavy penalties for those who are to blame and a public apology to our colleagues and people in the cultural life of Serbia who have been subjected to unprecedented attacks in recent days.

[Box, p 16]

Message of the Peaceful Protest of Independent Journalists of the "Politika" NIP to the Public of Serbia

This is the decisive hour of the battle for freedom of the press in Serbia. As it always has been in this century, the role of POLITIKA is decisive in this.

Our demands are modest. We demand that POLITIKA go back to its roots. That truthful, honest, and objective news once again take over its pages.

We demand that the editorial policy of manipulation and one-sidedness be abandoned: that "Politika" and its publications cease to spread discord among Serbs and accentuate their conflict with the other nationalities of Yugoslavia; that "Politika" and its publications cease their devoted service of the interests of only one party and its leaders.

We demand an end of everything that has lowered the reputation of POLITIKA in Serbia, Yugoslavia, and the world to the lowest level in its long history.

We consider the following necessary to achieve that:

1. That the director and all editors in chief leave their positions if they have been appointed directly or indirectly by the Socialist Alliance, which today does not exist. That Zivorad Minovic, Slobodan Jovanovic, Teodor Andjelic, Petar Jankovic, Ljiljana Bulatovic, and others who violated the rules of the craft, the dignity of the profession, and the tradition of POLITIKA leave their positions.
2. That the journalists select their own editors in chief.
3. That the present, undemocratically appointed Workers' Council of the enterprise be dissolved and new members elected by secret ballot from among multiple candidates.
4. That a referendum, announced by the present management of the enterprise, be conducted only on the question of whether the editorial policy of the "Politika" NIP is professional, free, and above parties, or, on the other hand, is that of a devoted supporter, and that the answer to this can be given only by readers and journalists whom that policy most closely concerns.
5. That "Politika" and its publications will be newspapers above political parties.

We are committed to the successful business operation of the "Politika" NIP and its stability. However, we are convinced that that commitment can and must be pursued with clean hands and a clean reputation.

Changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina Media Discussed

91BA0515B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 2 Apr 91
pp 28-29

[Article by Senad Avdic, including interview with Stjepan Kljucic, leader of the Croatian Democratic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina; place and date not given: "The Truth in Three Parts"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Despite protests, the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina [BH], acting in emergency session, enacted a law on the information media.

The Belgrade scenario did not repeat itself in Sarajevo on 27 March, as deputy Rasim Kadic announced the evening before at the session of the Bosnia-Herzegovinan parliament. The protest rally organized by journalists from OSLOBODJENJE and Sarajevo Radio and Television before the Bosnia-Herzegovinan Assembly building drew 2,000 to 3,000 mostly curious people, which did not unduly agitate the Bosnia-Herzegovinan authorities, to say nothing of engendering the type of nervousness that would have given rise to repression. A delegation of the rally organizers was received by the leading figures of the Assembly and government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who promised that they would "consider" their demands "in the regular proceedings." In this way, the several days of conflict between Bosnia-Herzegovinan authorities and journalists moved into more peaceful waters, which should have meant that provisions from the modification of the Law on the OSLOBODJENJE and RTV Sarajevo Public Enterprise would be put into effect very quickly, provisions that were adopted at the request of the Bosnia-Herzegovinan government by the republic's Assembly last week in emergency session. As the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovinan parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik reminded the delegation of dissident journalists that the republic's Constitutional Court must still hand down its opinion on the changes in the law in question, or more precisely, about the most controversial part, which states that future directors and chief and responsible editors of the central Bosnia-Herzegovinan media will be selected and appointed by the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not solely by workers employed by those media.

Since the conclusion of the November elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a question has been circulating among journalists, to which an answer was provided only recently: What will the newly established authorities, who are dependent on a shaky coalition of three victorious national parties, undertake in the area of public information media? Will the sources of information in Bosnia undergo the fate of those in Slovenia and Croatia, or will the Bosnia-Herzegovinan public media remain an oasis in the Yugoslav information desert? Those who were better informed contended that the new authorities would "take action" on the press, radio, and television once they had performed some other more

important tasks, such as forming the republican government, which was completed with a delay of a full two months. This was confirmed by statements made by leading figures of the national parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina (they practically dictate the work and orientation of the parliament and government), who warned that talk of free, independent, and nonpartisan journalism is an out-and-out construction, and that what appears to some to be a free oasis is nothing more than the usual mirage concocted by skillful sellers of a smoke screen in the Bosnia-Herzegovinan media.

Speaking publicly about the future of journalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of last year, this was made known by two of the people who are in any case among the most entertaining (and perhaps most unpopular as well) representatives of the new authorities. Muhamed Cengic, in his first television appearance after the elections (when he was only the vice president of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], but not vice president of the BH government as well, which he is today), confidently divided the world of journalism into print journalism and television, while the general secretary of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] at the time, "one of the top language editors" at Sarajevo Radio (as his biography states, which served as the basis for his appointment shortly thereafter as minister of information), Velibor Ostojic, openly threatened an imminent stock-taking of the Bosnia-Herzegovinan media. On the evening before the Assembly session, Cengic and Ostojic were once again in front of television viewers, in a broadcast in which leading figures of the public media also participated, and they announced that the new authorities had no intention of retreating in the face of any pressure and ultimatums from editors, journalists, and other information inveterates. The perplexed editors in the studio of Sarajevo Television were unable to achieve what opposition deputy Muhamed Filipovic did the next day in the Bosnia-Herzegovinan Assembly; specifically, he instructed Minister Ostojic to complete his education. But not even Filipovic's words kept the deputies of the national parties from voting for the government's proposed law on the information media.

But what in fact will happen now that the changes in this law have been enacted by the Assembly and there need be no illusions whatsoever about how the republic's Constitutional Court could in any way whatsoever raise questions about its constitutionality? The Bosnia-Herzegovinan Assembly will probably find the occasion at its very next session to appoint new directors and chief and responsible editors for the republic's three biggest information enterprises. The law states that the competition for the posts of director and chief editors of the public media will be public and that the Assembly commission, together with representatives of the information enterprises, will propose their future executives. The people who currently occupy those posts at OSLOBODJENJE and Sarajevo Radio and Television can compete and continue to perform their present-day duties.

But essentially the situation is different. It is certain that the tripartite structure in the Bosnia-Herzegovinan government and in the leadership of the public media will coordinate matters among themselves according to the same pattern applied to other areas of state power. And this means on the basis of rigid and precise national parity, directly dependent on the electoral success of the three (national) parties. Behind the scenes in the government, it has been easy to verify that the victorious parties have for the most part already decided on who will get what part and how much of the information empire.

Based on these considerations, the Party of Democratic Action will receive the post of general director of Sarajevo Television (the most frequently mentioned name is that of film director and current director of Bosna Film Bakir Tanovic); the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] is counting on the post of director of Sarajevo Television (many see Smiljko Sagolj in this post); the director of OSLOBODJENJE will be appointed by the Serbian Democratic Party, and the chief editor of OSLOBODJENJE will be selected from among Muslim ranks. While recently verifying the accuracy of calculations such as these with prominent members of the national parties, the DANAS correspondent was told that the principle according to which the leading people will be chosen will look something like that.

Bearing this in mind, the new Bosnia-Herzegovinan authorities face a major dilemma in making their decisions: Do they want to use the announced personnel changes in the Bosnia-Herzegovinan information enterprises to ensure party influence and establish in Bosnia-Herzegovina the already witnessed and dearly paid for obedient complaisance of journalists, or do they want to achieve a national balance in the editorial bodies of Sarajevo's information enterprises?

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, then there is no doubt whatsoever that the victorious national parties will be taking on too much responsibility, which sooner or later will certainly backfire on them in a merciless and painful way, which is, moreover, unmistakably evidenced by recent historical experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, however, it is quite clear that it is no coincidence that the initiative to change the Law on Information Media was in fact launched by the Croatian Democratic Community.

Naturally, it is not possible to effect an overnight change in the national structure of the leading media—which to members of the Croatian nationality have been extremely unfavorable for some time now—but it is possible at least to forestall the quite frequent avalanches of anti-Croatian bias that issue forth from the columns of the Bosnia-Herzegovinan press and especially from the studios of Sarajevo Television. From the other leadership, the leadership of the Party of Democratic Action, it has been possible lately to hear that they are seriously considering calling on that party's members and sympathizers not to read OSLOBODJENJE, and securing several pages in VJESNIK for the party! Because it is a

far cry from impartial, supranational, and suprapartisan journalism when the announcer on Sarajevo Television introduces Alija Izetbegovic as a former convict and the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or when OSLOBODJENJE's leading commentator, writing on the front page, says that Stipe Mesic "looks as if he has 'lost it.'" Neither these nor a series of other, perhaps even more brutal examples from Sarajevo Television and OSLOBODJENJE that provided evidence of national exclusiveness and political agitation "for one's own people" met with any reaction from the journalistic caste in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 29]

Stjepan Kljucic: Croats Do Not Have Equal Rights

[DANAS] The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has accepted the initiative by the caucus of Croatian Democratic Community deputies to the Bosnia-Herzegovinan Assembly to change the Law on OSLOBODJENJE and Sarajevo Radio and Television. What motivated your deputies?

[Kljucic] As far as the information media in Bosnia-Herzegovina are concerned, the Croatian Democratic Community made observations from the time of its very own formation, and thus before the elections. These related primarily to the catastrophic national structure in the leading Bosnia-Herzegovinan media in terms of the representation of journalists and editors of Croatian nationality.

At OSLOBODJENJE, for example, of the 23 people who edit that newspaper, only the technical editor is a Croat! Or on Sarajevo Television's political news program, besides two journalists who identify themselves as Croats (Nenad Pejic and Ivica Puljic), but who for all practical purposes operate from anti-Croatian positions, we have only two or three Croats who appear on the screen.

[DANAS] What do you mean when you say that they operate from anti-Croatian positions?

[Kljucic] First I must say that in the elections the Croatian Democratic Community received the support of an enormous part of the Croatian people in BH, and that this party is their legitimate political representative. So the chief and responsible editor of Sarajevo Television cannot say in his commentary that Karadzic sold out Bosnia-Herzegovina to Milosevic and that Kljucic will sell us out to Tudjman tomorrow. How can he say that when the policy pursued by the Croatian Democratic Community, which was affirmed at its convention in Mostar, was utterly clear as regards Bosnia-Herzegovinan sovereignty, and when I personally am responsible for the fact that the Croatian people in BH are not being led by extremists and adventurists who would be willing to sell out Bosnia-Herzegovina? I would even say that the Croatian Democratic Community is more concerned about Bosnia-Herzegovina and is doing

more to preserve it than Kurspahic's OSLOBODJENJE and Pejic's Sarajevo Television!

[DANAS] You have frequently criticized the press and television in recent months. They have not remained beholden to you.

[Kljucic] I will tell you that if there had been respect for anything that I, but also the membership of the HDZ in BH, put forth and about which I warned, there probably would not have been any reason for the change in the law that we sought. However, my criticisms would have been followed by efforts by journalists to defend themselves, and these are things for which there is no defense. For example, OSLOBODJENJE, absolutely tendentiously and untruthfully levels charges against the minister of territorial defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jerko Doko, and lets Miroslav Lazanski denounce him. And then the HDZ or Doko himself would have to deny these charges. Is it really possible that these people at OSLOBODJENJE have more faith in a Miroslav Lazanski, about whom everything has already been said, than in a minister in its own government!? On Sarajevo Television there is the show "Club 91" on which host Dubravka Kenic has had only one Croat (Veselica) out of the 18 guests thus far, or the show "The Knack of Living," where three journalists from Belgrade bring in whom-ever they want (from Draskovic to Karadzic to Raskovic to Micunovic). Moreover, of the 30 guests, they find room for only one person elected by the Croatian people—Mr. Stipe Mesic. To me, this is unacceptable, and I believe that it is unacceptable to the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina too, and we will change it!

[DANAS] But still, is not the insistence on a national quota a type of vulgarization of both the authorities and the profession?

[Kljucic] I do not think that it is a vulgarization for us to demand proper respect for national representation. On the other hand, I want to state definitively that the Croatian cadre in BH in the future will consist solely of the Croatian Democratic Community, because the Croatian people have committed the party to this by voting for it. But this does not at all mean that the HDZ will appoint only Croats to its share of posts in the information media; we will also rely on professional journalists. I believe that the SDS and SDA will act in a similar fashion. I do not want to forget to mention this: What is the source of the fear that, say, the HDZ will bring in only obedient, unqualified, unprofessional people when we have shown through our choices for our people in the BH government (Pelivan, Lukic) that our only consideration is expertise, which is why some of these people are not even members of our party. So the executives of OSLOBODJENJE, Sarajevo Radio, and Sarajevo Television should not delude themselves into thinking that the three of them are more important than the three parties to which the people gave their trust in the elections!

[Box, p 29]

Kemal Kurspahic: Preserving What Has Been Achieved

Quite often, we are resented as in fact being a band of editors concerned about our positions, as communists who do not want to relinquish control over the media. Moreover, that we are an anti-Serbian, anti-Croatian, and anti-Muslim newspaper, that we criticize the authorities and push for the opposition. In their protests, however, the journalists of OSLOBODJENJE have never alluded to their current management; rather, they are simply defending the right, which they won back in the one-party days, for them and no one else to decide on who will head the editorial staff based on the criteria of professionalism—success in one's job and respect among the public.

The charge that we are former communists applies in equal measure to the majority of deputies to the Bosnia-Herzegovinan Assembly and high-ranking officials of the new government who are now denying us our previously won freedom. The fact that the pages of OSLOBODJENJE were open to the opposition well before the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina was very helpful to the current ruling parties; we allowed them to present their programs, candidates, and ideas on an equal footing.... But now that they have taken power, they want to take over the media as well. Just like the communists before them. It is not possible that we are at the same time anti-Croatian, anti-Serbian, and anti-Muslim; rather, we are open to all views of our joyless reality, so that journalists are held accountable for that which some of the highest ranking representatives of the national parties say about others in the middle of their conflict, and these things are often neither kind nor courteous.

Muslim Leader Criticized for Banning Paper

91BA0515A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 91
p 17

[Article by Slobodan Reljic: "Parable of Our Times"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] The editorial staffs of Sarajevo's Muslim newspaper PREPOROD and of the monthly ISLAMSKA MISAO decided to talk about what they think of the move by the president of the Mesihat, who appointed new chief editors without their consent. The president did not even want to hear them, and he banned the newspaper. Any similarity between this story and others in this country is clearly no coincidence.

The press is a "necessary evil" to all authorities.

And lately, Yugoslavia is proof of this.

We would all like to have a "good press." But what is that? The authorities think that they know. The opposition knows that it is certainly not what the authorities think. The readers, in turn, want information, but also a selection of reading material.

The duality is eternal. Professional journalists spend their lives with the curse of never achieving freedom. To the authorities, in contrast, the press is never obedient enough. Democratic societies have found that the solution lies in the "continual struggle."

The situation in our country is well known. We have only just begun to create democratic foundations. In Belgrade, civil war nearly broke out over the question of a "free press." This gave new impetus throughout the country. Thus, there is a question being raised lately in Sarajevo, in connection with the enactment of a new law on public information: Will what happened to Serbia happen to Bosnia?

The example that we intend to cite here definitively refutes the charge that communism is the only enemy of a free press. This theory is in fact very widespread in our country. But now it has happened—and this is clearly no coincidence—that "the devil" has even found his way into the Muslim Religious Community. The last issue of PREPOROD was banned. This publication was "never even banned by the communist regime," as noted gloomily by those who do not understand that there are "communists" everywhere and that this word refers to a type of holder of authority, regardless of what he calls his regime.

But who is banning PREPOROD now?

According to the newspapers, the president of the Mesihat (superiorate) of the Muslim Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Salih Effendi Colakovic, was not pleased with the editorial commentary on the title page: "Alahemanet, dear readers." Translated, this would mean, "Goodbye, dear readers."

What kind of "goodbye" was this? The editorial staffs of PREPOROD and the monthly ISLAMSKA MISAO did not like the fact that the new chief editors were abruptly imposed on them from above, "without consulting the editorial staffs."

This cannot go on, Mr. Colakovic, the journalists and editors said. First of all, they had raised the circulation and reputation of these publications. PREPOROD doubled its circulation; it now prints 50,000 copies. After many lean years, ISLAMSKA MISAO has managed to attract young, open-minded people who publish, without complexes, articles by the most relevant Islamists in the world. When they assumed their posts in the public domain, which was definitely not easy, the journalists at these publications were not ready to lose them overnight. This is why they reject "the attempts at personal and everyday political instrumentalization" and the "imposition of editors whose moral and journalistic credibility do not justify such an act."

And why are the "authorities" in the Community doing this? Dzemailudin Latic, the well-known poet and former

deputy chief editor of PREPOROD, says that the authorities, personified here by the Mesihat, want to "neutralize any sort of intellectual force in the Muslim Community in order to facilitate a continuation of their manipulations." To put it more simply: in order to facilitate holding on to power. And it is hard for the authorities to give up their perks. And so, following the logic of the "supreme masters," the Mesihat is replacing people "without any explanation whatsoever." Just like that. At a meeting, "filling the position of chief and responsible editor was discussed," and it was decided "that the previous chief and responsible editor, Enes Durmisevic, should be acquitted of these duties which he has performed up to now in a part-time capacity." And suddenly it was easy "to decide that Mr. Sefik Kurdic should be hired permanently as chief and responsible editor." This action is frivolous. The employer, the Mesihat, has a part-timer who is excellent at his job, but it nevertheless takes a chance "without reasons" and brings in a new person in a permanent capacity which, when all is said and done, is vastly more expensive. But according to the logic of our "masters," this is normal.

And based on the tried-and-true Yugoslav formula, the announcement to the public complicates everything even further. Thus, the reason given for throwing out 6,000 printed copies of the subsequently banned PREPOROD was Ramadan. This is the ninth month in the Muslim calendar, during which Muslims subject themselves to a strict regime of fasting. The reason that believers make such a sacrifice is that "during the month of Ramadan, the revelation of the Koran began." What is meant by this announcement is that it is not good during that time to protest, to demonstrate publicly, to submit one's resignation, to write big words such as "Alahemanet." But perhaps it also means that it is good to put people in a situation where they must work if they want to preserve their reputation and position with the public.

Word is being sent out that the Mesihat is "willing to publish the controversial articles immediately after Ramadan." Even if this "willingness" is in fact subsequently transformed into published articles, this message has a cynical effect on those people who understand the nature of newspapers and the patterns of public opinion. Time passes, the public forgets, and new days require "new heroes."

Clearly, this announcement also contains a reproach. Because in Balkan consciousness, the authorities have the right to reprimand anyone at any moment. Thus, the people on the editorial staff of PREPOROD—just imagine!—are not redeeming their very existence; rather, according to the Mesihat, they are voyeuristically "initiating media attention for the purpose of presenting themselves to the broad public as the victims of certain religious-regressive forces." But it is obvious to everyone that this is untrue, because this announcement, as well as all official announcements, was written by "progressive forces."

And so in Sarajevo as well, we have an encounter with the "forces of darkness and chaos" who do not choose the means and impartial men of the "legal institutions of the system, who have had enough of the "opposition's meddling." Journalists are always plotting. They do not like this, they do not like that, and they criticize their president of the Mesihat. But where does this lead? We know—to inestimable damage. Just imagine: The others will find out that these people in the community are not united, and they expect only that. The journalists cannot understand that this "is not the right time" for any sort of fragmentation either. "We must be unified now more than ever."

This would be the end of this story, in which those who have always fought against godless communism and in the name of the supreme heavenly being and the highest liberties are now saying that democracy and a free press are "not for everyone," and not in a time marking "the beginning of the revelation of the Koran." But who they are for, and when, will be announced later without "the initiation of media attention," because there is almost no greater sin than this. All of this can be nicely resolved peacefully, they say for the umpteenth time. Once again, the idea that is gaining ground around them, like an infection, is: This cannot go on. And it is obvious that the fact that someone does not understand that "this cannot go on" will not halt the processes in society, nor in the community itself. Let us just be reminded of this.

Role of Church in Croatian, Slovene Separatism

91BA0521A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 91
pp 42-44

[Article by Dr. Desanka Savicevic: "Clericalists—The Soul of Separatism"]

[Text] Someone said long ago in our country that "Yugoslavia had turned into a confederation of nationalistic bureaucracies." One of the sources and inspiration of that kind of Yugoslavia is the conception advocated in 19th-century Germany which saw the spirit of the nation as an absolute and as the principal driving force of human history. In his 1808 "Address to the German Nation," the German philosopher Fichte strongly influenced the preparation for unification of the German people and creation of a common state. In Fichte's individualistic and romantic philosophy, not only the nation, but also the state experiences apotheosis. According to Fichte, the state is an absolute, the highest universal principle. The romantic and idealistic conception of the state and the nation was also carried over to the South Slav lands, which were backward provinces of the feudal and conservative Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Slovenes, who never had their own state, and the Croats, who have not had an independent state for nine centuries, have been dreaming about their own national states.

Since the 1970's and the 1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia, under the pressure of nationalism and separatism in

certain republics and provinces, was transformed from a federation to a confederation with certain elements of federalism. The primacy, idealization, and absolutization of the nation were instrumental in the republics proclaiming themselves sovereign states, and the autonomous provinces "constituent elements of federalism." They were turned into states or quasi-states on a par with the federal units. That degraded Serbia and reduced it to an unequal, subordinate, and humiliating position. Serbia lost the status of a republic, became unequal with the other republics, and lost its equality even within the federation itself.... The federation of six republics was transformed into a confederation of eight states with eight exclusive, bureaucratically alienated, and particularistic ruling groups, usually lacking sufficient ability and inventiveness, led in turn by an oligarchical coalition.

The superiority of the nation and the national state, the imposition of the interest of the nation as the primary interest, the creation of autarkic and self-satisfied national economies, the absence of a unified economic policy essential to the unified Yugoslav market, provincialism and separatism in the economy, education, science, and culture, disintegration of economic, political, social, and spiritual life, government's loss of authority, exaggeration of national, regional, and local differences, fetishization of ethnic divisions, the penetration of nationalism and narrowmindedness into everything, the flaring up of national atavisms and aggressive nationalism and neofascism, and revival of the ghosts of the past have been weakening and destroying Yugoslavia.

The national state has been renewing nationalistic ideology and mythology, has been making a fetish of the state and nurturing the cult of the personality and the cult of the leader and "father of the nation." These phenomena and tendencies are essential characteristics of our sociological and political reality. The problems of the nation and the national emancipation of the 18th and 19th centuries have become the predominant problems of our society. Yugoslavia has been disintegrating and breaking down at a time when Europe and the world are inevitably integrating and establishing closer ties. Chauvinistic nationalism and separatism and obscurantist Catholic clericalism are the principal causes and factors in Yugoslavia's disintegration and destruction. In our time, this began with the nationalistic movement, the so-called mass movement in Croatia in the seventies. On the excuse of fighting so-called Serbian centralism and unitarism, Croatian separatistic nationalism, bound up with militant clericalism, reached full-blown expression. The 1974 Constitution was favorable to nationalistic, separatistic, and autonomistic demands of Croatia and Slovenia.

Before World War II, Croatian separatism, fueled by a desire and hope of creating a Croatian national state, relied on what was called the Croatian popular movement, and then, after Yugoslavia's downfall, under the protection of fascism and Nazism, the Ustashi and clerofascists and a segment of the Croatian Peasant Party

[HSS] devoted to Ustashism, and their numerous sympathizers established the Independent State of Croatia [NDH], that monster of a state, with its bigoted clerofascist and Serbophobic ideology.

Clericalism in Croatia, as well as in Slovenia, was always antidemocratic, always at the service of foreign policy and foreign interests, the policy of the Roman and German Drang nach Osten. At this point, we will briefly explain the role of Catholic clericalism in preparation and creation of the Yugoslav divisions and destruction. Croatian clericalism, which dates back to Juraj Haulik, bishop of Zagreb, emerged on the initiative and at the instruction of the Curia in Rome in the 1840's. At that time, it still did not have any great influence either on the clergy or on the broad strata of the people. Haulik wanted and strove to build a monastery and church and to have instruction in the schools turned over to the Jesuits, to that "black seed" Ignatius Loyola, as Petar Preradovic once wrote. But neither Haulik nor others managed to do that at the time. This was opposed by the anti-Jesuits, the progressive patriots, and particularly by Strosmajer, Franjo Racki, and Natko Nodilo, who warned of the dangers threatening the people from the most monstrous immorality and destructive activity of the Jesuits. Nevertheless, in 1981, by dictate from Rome and Vienna, the cornerstone was laid in Zagreb for a Jesuit residence and church.

At the dawn of the 20th century, two opposing political conceptions were formed in Croatia: the Yugoslav conception and the Frankist-clerical conception. In 1900, clericalism organized and became a significant factor in Croatia's political life and formed strong ties with the Frankist and anti-Serb currents and movements, but also with Rome and Vienna. At the first "All-Croat Catholic Congress" in Zagreb in 1900, its driving spirit, Dr. Josip Stadler, archbishop of Sarajevo, imbued with anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav sentiments, a well-known inciter of enmity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was divided along religious and ethnic lines, set forth a "clerical program for the 20th century" together with his "Jesuit collaborators."

This congress equated the faith with the nation, Catholicism with Croatism, and concluded that Catholicism is the vital substrate of Croatism. Retrograde clericalism plucked out at the root and rejected the idea of creating a South Slav state and was persistent and heedless in advocating establishment of an expanded Croat state. At that congress, the eastern border of that state was drawn from Kotor to Zemun along the Drina.

Croat clericalism established ties with Frankism and then on the eve of World War I melted into frankofuturism, later became fascist, and just before and during World War II the most sinister clerofascism arose out of this clerico-frankist symbiosis. The merger of Frankism and clericalism created Ustashism, which the Catholic Church prepared, advocated in every way, closely collaborated with, and abundantly aided.

Austrophile Slovenian clericalism, organized in the Slovenian People's Party [SLS], under the leadership of Dr. Ivan Sustersic and Dr. Anton Korosec, and later Bishop Antun Jeglic, was, just like that in Croatia, at the service of Vienna and its policy in the Balkans. Slovenian clerofascism, again brought together in the SLS with Bishop Rozman and Dr. Marko Narlacen, called for a shameful betrayal by the clergy and people in 1941 and placed himself at the service of the Italian, and later also German, occupier, praising him, glorifying him, and collaborating with him, as well as with black-and-yellow imperialism during World War I.

There is an unbroken line of Croat and Slovenian clericalism and clerofascism and of their bigoted spiritual tyranny, chauvinism, and atavistic nationalism and criminal inhumanity from archbishops and bishops Bauer, Stadler, Saric, Jeglic, Rozman, and Stepinac, and almost the entire high clergy to the many other clerical and clerofascist leaders and their collaborators, from the lowest to the highest, all of them austrophiles and germanophiles themselves.

The terror and most terrible crimes against the Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, torture reminiscent of the Inquisition, the most savage butchery and murder and genocidal eradication of the Serbs in the numerous torture chambers and death chambers, the horrifying inferno at Jasenovac, are the most horrifying expression and confirmation in history of the unprecedented cruelty and savagery of the Ustasha and clerofascist terror in the Pavelic-Stepinac Civitas Dei, which was, in the words of Archbishop Stepinac, "an ideal long dreamed of and desired," while for Dr. Franjo Tudjman it is the expression of "the historical aspirations of the Croat people." This ghastly zoologism arose out of the full agreement and closest cooperation of Ustashism and clerofascism, with the approval, sympathy, and blessing of the powerful Curia in Rome and the Ustasha Archbishop of Zagreb Alojzije Stepinac. Croatian clericalism bears a part of the immense responsibility before history for the death of nearly a million innocent people.

Along the general line of Catholicization of the Balkans, as a true Roman Drang nach Osten, the Vatican worked out a plan in the 17th century for the spread of Catholicism among the Orthodox Serbs. With the help and cooperation of the Vatican, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy persistently and consistently worked to win over the "schismatic" souls to the Catholic faith. With establishment of the NDH, amoral and bestial proselytism raged in the most criminal forms. Simultaneously with the mass murders of people, conscience and religious sentiments were murdered on a large scale. The large-scale Ustasha-clerical terrorist conversion to Catholicism, which also signifies Croatization of helpless and disenfranchised Serbs, which were approved by the Vatican and the Stepinac Curia, while the Ustashi carried it out and participated in it, from the logornik [an officer rank in the Ustashi] to the people around the leader and the ministers and the Ustasha priests, from parish priests and chaplains to bishops and archbishops, Ustasha

monks and entire swarms of their helpers in that hypocritical and mystifying deception, was supposed to augment and strengthen Catholicism as a barrier against the supposed Western penetration of odious Orthodoxy and Serbism. This was at the same time the political formula for clerofascist resolution of the Serbian question, in that the Catholicized and Croatized Serbs would become Croats, and the rest would be removed by force or mostly slaughtered.

That was the fate destined for the Serbs in the "Holy and Divine Croatia," in the clerofascist NDH in which Serbs were referred to as the "robbers," "dregs and trash of the Balkans." The rabid serbophobe Ante Starcevic, an anticlericalist, spoke in racist and nationalistic terms to the effect that the Serbs are the "Wallachians," "Wallachian progeny," "progeny ready for the ax." In that militant Croat expansionism, there was fervent advocacy of the idea of "not recognizing in Croatia any Serbian nationality nor Serbian name." Cardinal Kuharic, archbishop of Zagreb, does not even mention the remnant of the surviving and long-suffering Serbian people in his public addresses, but only "the Croat people and all those who live in Croatia." Are we supposed to be horrified and astonished by Kuharic's recent perfidious denunciation: "The Serbs are getting ready to kill again"? No, because he is a worthy pupil of his teacher Stepinac, who back in 1935 launched the principle: "We do not bring you peace, but war!" which he would carry out in fact during the bloody Ustasha state. The Serbs in the Republic of Croatia, referred to today as "terrorists" and "highway bandits," decades after the Ustasha genocide against them, after the bloodshed in the antifascist struggle for liberation, after the decisive contribution they made to the victory in that struggle, are still in an inequitable, subjugated, and threatened position, exposed to discrimination and assimilation, without human and national rights, living under repression and terror.

Not all Catholic priests were monsters, worse than beasts, although most of them were. There were also the honorable, although very rare, exceptions, whose honor was bright and whose hands were clean. In this bottomless hatred and senseless atavism of the bigots and reactionaries, there were the shining figures of Strosmajer, Racki, Ucelini, Ritig, Mikuz, Tomasovic, and others.

Croat and Slovenian clericalism, disinclined and hostilely disposed toward everything, has accentuated Croat and Slovenian separatism and autonomism. The national policies of Croatia and Slovenia today have largely been inspired and led by clerical ideology, whose main characteristic in its historical continuity is fanatical and destructive anti-Serbism and anti-Yugoslavism. Accordingly, it is no accident at all that the process of the disintegration and destruction of Yugoslavia began in Croatia and Slovenia, where nationalistic separatism and autonomism first appeared and in our time have managed to become dominant through their decisive

influence in centers of political power and decisionmaking.

Clericalism in Slovenia has urged the policy of DEMOS in the direction of broad sociopolitical activism toward secessionism. Clericalism is supporting Slovenian autonomism and exclusivism. Slovenia broke with Yugoslavia in the December plebiscite and is hurrying to establish a sovereign and completely self-sufficient and independent state.

When the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] came to power in Croatia, it established an Ustashoid, Serbophobe, and theocratic state and revived the Starcevic-Franko-Pavelic-Stepinac national-chauvinistic ideology and policy, as well as fanatical anti-Serbism and anti-Yugoslavism of broad negative and destructive strata of the people on behalf of creating a self-sufficient and independent state of Croatia and the shattering of Yugoslavia.

YUGOSLAVIA

FEC Analysis Calls for Changes in Army Laws

*AU2504075691 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE
in Serbo-Croatian 17 Apr 91 p 24*

[TANJUG report: "Changes in Two Stages"]

[Text] Belgrade, 16 April—It is necessary to make changes in the system of defense for it to function in a coordinated and efficient way. Changes could be made in two stages. This is cited in an analysis by the Federal Executive Council [FEC] of constitutional-legal and political relations in the country and their effect on the implementation of the reforms.

In the first stage, changes and supplements would be made in an urgent procedure to the law on all-people's defense and the law on military service, as has already been proposed by the Federal Government. These laws should be implemented over this period in all republics, with the simultaneous fulfillment of the established obligations as regards the financing of the Yugoslav People's Army in the transitional period.

After this, in the second stage, the constitutional concept of all-people's defense and its adaptation to the multi-party system in Yugoslavia would be more fully coordinated.

In proposing changes to these two laws, the federal Government had in mind the fact that the "functioning of the system of all-people's defense has been seriously undermined." Therefore, urgent changes and additions

to these laws have been proposed which, if they are adopted, will "ensure that the constitutional functions of the Federation and its organs in this exceptionally important field will be efficiently carried out," the FEC analysis says.

This analysis also cites some of the most important ways in which the system of all-people's defense is undermined. Thus, military service has been completely prevented in the Republic of Slovenia. In March, for example, recruits from this republic were not sent at all to do their military service, save for 100 volunteers. The Republic of Croatia is also beginning to apply similar decisions—in March, 32 percent fewer recruits than the set number were sent to the Yugoslav People's Army.

Changes to the constitutions and laws in certain republics, primarily Slovenia and Croatia, are seriously undermining the unity of the Armed Forces of the SFRY—constitutional-legal conditions are being created for the formation of republican armed forces. Contrary to the regulations on military service, military conscripts in Croatia, who have been distributed in wartime units, are being moved to the reserve militia forces.

Moreover, the FEC analysis says, with the failure to fulfill obligations to the federal budget, the Yugoslav People's Army has been put into the position that it is unable to meet even the most basic needs of the units and institutions.

The Yugoslav People's Army has so far been engaged only in separating belligerent sides with the aim of preventing bloodshed. The Army has not taken any other steps in any of the well-known cases of Kosovo, Pakrac, Belgrade, and Plitvice, the FEC analysis states.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Norwegian Firm Expands Activity to East Europe

91BA0543A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
22 Mar 91 p 17

[Article by Per Roste: "EB Also in East Europe"—first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] EB is in the final stages of negotiation concerning large-scale collaboration with another undertaking in East Europe. Like its mother company, ABB, EB sees great possibilities in the East. An extensive offshore involvement will be a second investment area in the future, according to company chief Kjell Almskog.

Almskog says that the cooperative project in East Europe is a big project by Norwegian standards.

"Collaboration based on joint ownership will be established, while EB will have control over development and management. The matter is now awaiting a decision by the authorities in the country concerned, but I hope we can get a clarification in the course of a relatively short time," Almskog told AFTENPOSTEN. He does not want to be more specific at present.

EB is thus following up on the ABB (Asea Brown Boveri) investment in East Europe. At a press conference in Berlin, ABB company chief Percy Barnevik advised that the concern counts on having 30,000 employees in East Europe by the end of 1991.

Offshore activities are also an area EB has great faith in for the next few years. Following last year's purchase of Global Engineering, EB now has an engineering department of 1,000 persons and wants also to make a strong bid internationally.

"This means that EB is getting another leg to stand on," maintains Almskog.

Advantages of ABB

Even though, during the three years it has been a member of the ABB family, EB has been at the lower end in terms of results, the gap has steadily become smaller. This year EB has improved its result grade—the relationship between profit and turnover—from 3.4 to 3.6 percent, while the ABB concern went down from 4.4 to 4.2 percent.

"We have been a little out of step with developments in ABB the entire time. When we came in, in 1988, EB was experiencing a sharp domestic drop in demand, while ABB on the whole was making good use of improving business conditions. Now, however, the international economy is on the way down, something which also will have an influence on ABB. That we have already been through a restructuring process will perhaps contribute to EB being more strongly equipped to achieve better results," Almskog opines.

He has no doubt that EB would have survived as an independent concern without having joined ABB three years ago. At the same time, he admits that EB is stronger today as a member of a large international company.

"Advantages like marketing channels, technology influx, and an addition of industrial culture means that we are holding our own better than we would have done alone," he says.

A third of EB's exports go through the ABB apparatus. At the same time, Almskog adds that EB sells ABB products in Norway for a corresponding amount.

"And this is happening at competitive prices," he adds.

A Thinner EB

During the past three years, EB has reduced its organization by between 2,500 and 3,000 employees.

"This has been a consequence of overmanning resulting from the fusion between the NEBB, Asea Per Kure, and EB in 1988. In addition, we have strongly felt the domestic business downturn. Today, we have no plans for large cuts. I believe we have found a suitable level. We are working intensively on a further increase in exports from Norway," says Almskog.

At the same time, he cannot promise more positions in Norway during the very near future.

Final Figures

Yesterday, EB presented its final figures for 1990. Turnover grew last year by 700 million to 10.1 billion kroner. Profits before extraordinary items were 365 million kroner, which is five million better than what the tentative figures indicated. Moreover, this is 45 million kroner more than one year earlier and affirms the earnings rise EB has had during the past three years. The share of exports is now up to 45 percent, an increase of seven percentage points from 1989.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Deputy Minister on Challenges to Federal Economy

91CH0496A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 31 Mar 91
pp 4-5

[Interview with Eng. Ivan Kocarnik, deputy federal minister of finance, by Jan Machacek; place and date not given: "Federation as Superstructure"]

[Text] [RESPEKT] Vaclav Klaus recently stated that authority has been blurred. A few weeks earlier he stated in an interview for REFLEX that after passage of the authority laws the federation lost effective levers for implementing reforms. According to the vice chairman of the Federal Government, Vaclav Vales, the authority laws are intruding on reform scenarios to a greater extent

than first estimated. Could you first make some general comments on this problem?

[Kocarnik] This is an extremely serious problem that keeps getting worse. Dividing authority the way this was done in the updated constitutional law on the federation places a significant burden on the regulating role of the center both when implementing particular economic reforms and when executing economic policy generally. The reason for this, in my opinion is a single sentence that got into this constitutional law: "Czechoslovakia is the integration of two economies." It should be clear to any economist that this sentence is nonsense. Either we are a single country with a single economy and market, or we will act like two countries within another one. And that is something completely different.

The Republics today often behave as though they are really two countries. In questions concerning a single market, agreement must be obtained from three distinct governments. This was evident for instance in the problems we experienced with eliminating fuel price subsidies. Economic policy objectives and reform scenarios assumed that subsidies would be eliminated by 1 January. The Republics had different views, each one made a different decision, and the Slovak Republic at first refused to remove subsidies.

[RESPEKT] Where in your view does the scope of authority exceed reasonable bounds?

[Kocarnik] I'll give you an idea with one example. I happen to have studied fiscal federalism, which is currently a serious problem for Czechoslovakia. In economic theory it is a well known problem: how much taxes should be collected at what level in the context of federated countries, and what should expenditures be.

For us, these problems began with the passage of the constitutional law in 1968, which basically assumed that economic policy would be in the hands of the Republics and that the federation would be only a kind of super-structure without specific authority in economic policy. Not even the federal budget was supposed to have autonomous revenues. All tax revenues were supposed to flow to the republic budgets, which were to transfer monies, as a kind of subsidy, to the federation budget. We opened this discussion again last year and it is still very much with us.

The Issue Is Not Territory but a Market

What is wrong with a return to this 1968 model? I will illustrate using the example of the budget, where the issues are most obvious. In all market economies the government plays a role in the financial policy aspects of agriculture. Since 1968, this has been a matter for the republics in Czechoslovakia. To be sure, a Federal Ministry of Agriculture was formed, but without clear authority. This means that there is a different subsidies policy for agriculture in Bohemia than in Slovakia. At the same time there is only one market and our joint goal is to provide the least expensive foods possible for

everyone. If we have agricultural surpluses (as we have today in milk and meat) production should be limited, especially in those areas where production costs are highest. Instead, the republic ministries of agriculture and finance continue merrily subsidizing high cost producers. Production remains steady, surpluses result which put pressure to export at a loss, which in turn must be subsidized.

These issues are resolved at the center in all civilized countries, including confederated Switzerland. It is an intrusive policy by the government in a market, but in the market for all of Switzerland, or all of Germany, not in a market for some region or territory. The moment we begin intrusive policies in a region, competitive conditions are no longer the same for everyone.

In short, what is important is not a territory, but a market. If a firm is able to produce at a lower cost and can supply all our citizens, that firm should be able to sell throughout the country.

A second, similar, problem is that of social security. The constitutions of federated, or confederated countries guarantee for all citizens the same basic social security, whether that includes medical insurance or pensions. The necessary financial resources are a part either of the federal budget, or are in an independent fund, but always at the federal level. If certain problems arise in a region (for instance a lack of resources and high pension requirements), the situation can be handled within the context of the whole. We have left social security policy up to the Republics and are now facing the possibility that there will be different social policies in Bohemia and Slovakia.

[RESPEKT] Could you provide some details concerning current disagreements in the area of tax policy?

[Kocarnik] Matters related to a single market should be dealt with by an entity with authority over the whole country. However, the Slovak Republic wants to have its own tax laws. This can result in a situation where multiple tax systems can exist for a single market, which makes no sense at all. If this happens we would have to begin negotiating a treaty limiting double taxation (if someone lives in Bohemia, for instance, but works in Slovakia), which is an act of international law.

Clearly, a number of taxes could be under republic control, such as local taxes and fees. There is no argument here. The problem arises related to corporate and individual income taxes. The Slovak Republic argues that the Slovak economy is poorer, and therefore needs lower taxes, to allow enterprises to accumulate capital to reach the economic level of the Czech Republic.

The Slovak side thinks that if it has lower taxes it will be able to attract more foreign capital. The difficulty is that foreign capital can come to Slovakia, establish a headquarters, but conduct its business from somewhere else. This would also lower Slovak tax contributions to the federal budget.

The financial council has decided for the time being that these taxes should be the same for the whole country, with some exceptions possible. Such arrangements elsewhere in the world, however, are such that any exceptions involve additional taxes added on to a base, not the other way around. Certain regions can therefore pay for what they need from higher tax revenues. If we are not successful in passing a base federal tax law, we are going to have to deal with basically two national tax systems.

Preventing Blackmail Impossible

[RESPEKT] Is there not a danger that republics with increased authority will force changes in budgetary policy that will disrupt economic equilibrium? Is it not possible for republics to create deficits and then blackmail the federal budget in six months? What conflict resolution mechanism exists?

[Kocarnik] An important part of the reform strategy is certain restrictions on government demand. Government expenditures account for a large portion of current demand. There must be restrictions everywhere to prevent the government from injecting inflationary trends into deregulation processes occurring in the economy. One budget cannot be allowed to run a deficit that will negate the overall economic policy of the country. This is of concern right now, because of recently appearing tendencies to moderate the impact of reforms. We have no mechanism of control, however. The International Monetary Fund is constantly asking us how we are going to prevent one budget from running a deficit, since the two budgets are independent. At present we are dealing with this in the financial council, which consists of the ministers of finance, ministers of privatization, and the governor of the issuing bank. We have no other mechanism.

[RESPEKT] What incentive do the Republics have not to run a budget deficit?

[Kocarnik] The budgets have been compiled and approved. If overall they run a surplus of 8 billion Czech korunas [Kcs], as we promised the IMF, and which we ourselves want, nothing bad will happen. Some problems may arise if the priorities of one budget are different from those of the other. The Slovak side has already allocated more money for health care. There can be movements of labor between the Republics that may result in market problems.

It would be more serious if one of the budgets ran a significant deficit. This would call into question the entire financial policy and its restrictions.

Everyone Talks About Something Different

[RESPEKT] Did the passage of the authority laws help anything, in your view, or is pressure still building and new surprises still appearing?

[Kocarnik] The passage of the laws has complicated many things. For example, the unsolvable price problems (for instance food, coal and other product prices). The role of the center in economic transformation and the regulation of future development is unwieldy and complex. Many things have become easier and require less work. For example we do not have miners here every day now. But the reality is different. The moment there are complications the resolution of which is a republic responsibility, their representatives immediately come running to the Federal Government.

For example, 99 percent of the budget discussions related to the assertion that the federal budget should be as low as possible. Both Republics emphasized this. The federation, after all, does not need money for ecology. But then the Czech government sent materials to the Federal Government asserting the need to resolve ecological problems at the federal level.

Another example. There have been problems with loans to cover inventories, which are one of the reasons for the insolvency of enterprises. We finally decided to solve the problem by establishing a consolidation bank, which would isolate these loans from normal loans at commercial banks. This bank would be nonprofit. It would have a temporary existence, and would assist firms in working out payment problems. We specified that the bank be managed by a computer. It would therefore not require any personnel. The director would include this work in other work at the ministry and would not receive a salary. We were mainly concerned with solving the immediate problem. So the first thing that happens, just today, is that the Slovak side announces that it wants to divide the bank into two banks.

This is one of the typical problems of federation. In principle it should be true that whatever can be done jointly should be done jointly, because this reduces fixed costs. The Slovak side does not acknowledge this principle. Instead of concerning itself with ways to help enterprises it is concerned with how to split up the bank. We continue to make decisions about different things.

[RESPEKT] How are authority conflicts affecting privatization?

[Kocarnik] It turns out, for instance, that Slovakia wants to implement coupon privatization another way. First they wanted Slovak citizens to be able to buy coupons only for Slovak firms. They later backed off from this demand.

Now they have another idea. The fundamental idea of coupon privatization is that it is not necessary to make a market evaluation of businesses being privatized, because a market evaluation of stock will increase demand for coupons. Once a coupon has a predetermined price it is impossible to perform a market evaluation of a business. The Slovak side is now demanding that coupons have a predetermined value, which shows a complete misunderstanding of the entire purpose of coupon privatization.

Inflation Policy

[RESPEKT] Could you comment on redistribution? In Bohemia we hear that in Slovakia tens of billions continue to flow. Many Slovaks on the other hand are protesting that Bohemia generates 80 percent of foreign currency income.

[Kocarnik] The issue of redistribution is made too much of. Sometimes we forget that a properly functioning federation makes it possible to support those regions that need social assistance.

If the koruna is convertible, it makes no difference who generates foreign currency. If financial policy will be strict enough and the market parameters the same for all businesses on the territory of the federation, then anyone can purchase foreign currency as needed for korunas.

If however the Slovak Republic pursues an inflationary policy and the Czech Republic does not, the koruna cannot be the same. This would allow the Slovak Republic to come by money very easily, with redistribution occurring through the mechanism of inflation.

[RESPEKT] Is it easy to recognize the beginnings of an inflationary policy?

[Kocarnik] It is. The conditions for doing business begin to moderate. Enterprises are not allowed to fail, wages start to increase, budgets begin to run in deficit, etc. It can be said, in other words, that all efforts to place excessive emphasis on regional specifics in order to moderate reform, are essentially inflationary trends.

HUNGARY**Government To Convert Electricity Board**

LD2604133191 Budapest MTI in English 1124 GMT
26 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, 26 April 1991 (MTI-ECONews)—At its Thursday session, the Hungarian Government decided to convert the Hungarian Electricity Board (HEB) into a number of economic associations by 1 January 1992.

The HEB is made up of 11 power stations, six power supply companies, a national power distribution centre, and four back-up companies.

These will be converted into economic associations, probably with the involvement of foreign capital.

French Canadian and German investors are reported to be showing interest in the privatization of the Hungarian Electricity Board.

The Hungarian state would like to maintain a majority stake in the converted company.

The HEB has a book value of 170 billion forints, but its market value is much more.

Hungary's electricity consumption for this year is projected at 38 billion kwh.

Soviet deliveries will account for 6.2 billion kwh of this amount.

POLAND**Planning Minister Predicts Economic Recession**

LD2704090391 Warsaw PAP in English 2236 GMT
26 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 26—In an economic prognosis released to a press conference here today head of the government's Central Planning Office, Minister Jerzy Eysymontt, warned that the national income would fall just like this year's industrial production by five to six percent and predicted a \$2 billion trade deficit.

Eysymontt forecast a nearly 90-percent inflation this year, which is high above what the finance ministry had planned in the beginning of the year. The planning office chief can see no possibilities to stabilize the average incomes and real wages but [foresees] their 6-8 percent decline instead. Unemployment may reach 1.9 million by the end of the year.

Minister Eysymontt said modifications to Poland's economic plan were inevitable, and he pointed out that changes in customs policy and an adjustment of the dollar exchange rate were possible measures to bring about recovery.

Regional Development Agencies Aid Restructuring

91EP0407B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 12 Mar 91 p II

[Article by Ewa Zychowicz: "Regional Development Agencies Emerge: Money Is Needed"]

[Text] Our economy is experiencing structural changes, accompanied by numerous negative phenomena from the social point of view: unemployment, intensification of the disproportion among individual regions of the country, as well as the lack of a clearly defined policy on local communities.

In this situation, more and more often people talk about the need for the emergence of an institution that by its activity would contribute to minimizing these negative effects and, at the same time, inspire local restructuring programs. It is these tasks that regional development agencies will take upon themselves, by supporting financially all restructuring activity at the local level.

The main initiators and authors of restructuring programs should be the voivodes, who are in the best position to define the needs of their region and the institutional forms for implementing the programs. The most appropriate form for the regional development agency is undoubtedly the joint-stock company, whose shareholders would be voivodship offices, banks, the

Agency for Industrial Development [ARP], as well as other institutions interested in economic initiatives in a given area. It is assumed that the holding of the ARP will be a minority one, because the economic activity of the region's managers are most at stake.

In 1991, ARP plans to take part in ten undertakings of this kind, anticipating its financial contribution at about 100 billion zlotys [Z]. In the first quarter, three regional agencies will be established, two each in the second and third quarters, and three in the fourth.

On 12 February, a notarize document was signed in Walbrzych creating the country's first Regional Development Agency, as a joint-stock company whose initial capital amounts to Z10.25 billion. Company shareholders are ARP, which took on 500 voting shares worth Z5 billion, the Walbrzych City Council, which bought 200 shares worth Z2 billion and the State Pit Coal Agency, which bought shares valued at Z1 billion. Among the other shareholders are the Bank for Socio-economic Initiatives in Warsaw, the Nowar Silk Industry Works in Nowa Ruda, and the City Council in Dzierżoniowa.

The formulation and initiation of restructuring programs, economic advice and, above all, organizational and financial support for all economic programs serving to improve conditions in the region were acknowledged in the notarized document as the most important activities of the new company.

The new company is now waiting for registration, and it will be possible to evaluate its operation only in several months. But a good start has been made, demonstrating that the regions will now have institutional allies in the process of economic changes necessary for their proper functioning. As usual, money is most important, but equally significant is concentrating all initiatives operating in the region which are eager for the proper economic development of their immediate environment around emerging partnerships.

French Publisher Purchases 2 Regional Dailies

91EP0396C Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
29 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by (luk): "Hersant Daily"]

[Text] French publishing magnate Hersant has bought two more Polish newspapers, [including] Bialystok's S[olidarity daily] GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA. The contest for GROMADA-ROLNIK POLSKI was won by the Warsaw firm Corso, which the president supported.

On Thursday (28 March), the RSW [Worker's Cooperative Publishing House] Liquidation Committee sold DZIENNIK LODZKI for 26 billion zlotys [Z] to the Lodz Press partnership, whose partners are Socpress S.A. (owned by Robert Hersant's French group), the Lodz

gmina, the PKO bank in Lodz, and the Finryan International company. Seventeen former DZIENNIK reporters supported the offer.

Among those bidding for DZIENNIK LODZKI were the Maxwell corporation, which along with the Polish Complex firm offered Z12 billion; the Lodz Territory Health Foundation, established by Lodz Solidarity (Z8 billion); the Buratti partnership, supported by the Lodz Center Accord [PC] (Z8.5 billion) and the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] (Z8.05 billion).

Hersant also became co-owner of another Lodz daily, EXPRESS ILLUSTROWANY. The Liquidation Committee sold the paper for Z13 billion to the Illustrated Press partnership in which the PKO bank in Lodz, a reporters' cooperative and the Finryan International company are participating, in addition to Hersant.

Losing at the sale were offers from the KPN (Z3.055 billion), the Racom partnership (Z6.5 billion) and Alfred Miodowicz, supported by the Lodz City Board and Lodz Region Solidarity Board.

We recall that Hersant is also a shareholder in the partnership that previously offered the winning bid in the sale of DZIENNIK BALTYCKI, WIECZOR WYBRZEZA, and the Krakow daily TEMPO.

On Thursday, the Olsztyn Gazette Publishing House became the owner of GAZETA OLSZYNSKA and must pay Z2 billion. Among the rejected bids was that the Semeco partnership, which publishes GAZETA GDANSKA, associated with the Liberal-Democratic Congress.

The Regional Solidarity Board in Bialystok bought the local GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA for Z1.5 billion.

The committee sold Tarnow weekly TEMI to the Tarnow Illustrated Magazine partnership for Z420 million. Losing with its bid was the Liber partnership, whose shareholders are the head of Tarnow Solidarity, chairman of the PC branch, also supported by the KPN.

The Liquidation Committee also sold the GROMADA-ROLNIK POLSKI periodical to the Corso enterprise of Warsaw for Z2.5 billion. The bid had the support of President Lech Walesa, 111 delegates and senators (including Jozef Silsz, Mieczyslaw Kaczynski, and Ryszard Bugaj) and the Polish Peasant Party—Solidarity.

Withdrawing from the bidding was the journalists' cooperative, whose president is Leszek Lesniak, currently editor in chief. The cooperative reached an agreement with the Liquidation Committee to publish the periodical until 11 April, and thereafter begin publishing a new daily entitled GROMADA ROLNIKOW.

Uncertain Future for Some Research Institutes

91EP0407C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish
13 Mar 91 p III

[Article by Krystyna Forowicz: "State of Suspension"]

[Text] Will they survive or fall? More than 70 research and development entities may succumb to liquidation. Twenty thousand employees will lose their jobs. In the scientific environment, one can observe clear anxiety about the future.

The research and development units were established under conditions and for the needs of a centrally planned economy. Currently, their number and organizational structure have essentially experienced no changes. The law in force until the beginning of 1991 on research and development units (whose amendment is at the final phase of the legislative proceedings) does not meet the requirements of current socioeconomic reality. The research and development base, built up beyond the needs of departments, constitutes a kind of untouched enclave that does not react to the changes taking place in the economic environment.

At the end of last year, the Ministry of Industry conducted a review and evaluation of 152 research and development units (including 52 institutions and more than 90 research and development centers) employing 55,000 workers. These penetrations helped in working out a preliminary notion of structural and property modifications of the base.

In the opinion of Wieslaw Kolsut, director of the Department of Technological Policy in the Ministry of Industry, only about half of the institutions with the greatest scientific potential are in a position to maintain their full status as research and development units.

New regulations will have serious consequences for research and development units supervised by the Ministry of Industry; of 152 research and development institutions, 31 units do not employ any workers with academic degrees or titles, and 38 employ less than four, which makes it impossible for these institutions to appoint academic councils. And it follows that by virtue of the amended law, they will be subject to modification to another organizational form or liquidation. So it is no wonder that many institutions are supplementing their staffs at a rapid pace.

The weaker institutions, turned out onto the free market with the results of their scientific and institutional activity, will go bankrupt.

"Many units, the Institute for Heavy Organic Synthesis, for example, want to privatize," said Director W. Kolsut. "The new law, still not signed by the president and not published, will significantly simplify the course of property modification in the future."

Last year research and development units of the Ministry of Industry received 1,672,410,000,000 zlotys [Z] from the Central Fund for the Development of Science and Technology. Current proposals for financial decisions for this year, worked out by the Committee for Scientific Research [KBN] and concerning statutory activity, continuation of selected assignments from former central and department research, and development programs and general technological activity, are limited to Z1,390,000,000,000.

Seventy institutions will receive no money from the KBN. They may rely on grants, or conditional donations, or additional financing from work executed on orders from enterprises. But now it is difficult to specify what these amounts will be.

So we have a situation of great uncertainty in which research and development institutions have found themselves.

Yet it appears that the further fate of the research and development base depends to a great extent on the flow of financial resources from industrial enterprises. And they, as we know, will not absorb technological progress because they have other problems on their minds. And when they are in a position to absorb it and by the time the intended structure of the research and development base is established, there will be no trace of some institutions.

Public Opinion Poll Assesses Balcerowicz Program

91EP0396A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 19 Mar 91
p 3

[Unattributed article: "What We Think About the Economy and the Balcerowicz Program"]

[Text] More than half (59 percent) of those responding to the Public Opinion Research Center [poll] at the end of February assessed the economic situation in Poland as poor. In the opinion of 27 percent, it is neither good nor bad, while according to 14 percent, it is good. At the same time, 41 percent of those surveyed expect that in the next two years, the state of the Polish economy will improve, every fifth respondent (19 percent) believes it will be unchanged, and a worsening of the country's economic situation was predicted by an equal number (20 percent).

To the question of whether the policy of the new government will generate opportunities for getting out of the economic crisis, 45 percent of those surveyed answered yes (43 percent in the January survey), nearly one-fourth (23 percent) disagreed (in January, just under 12 percent), while 32 percent (previously 45 percent) had no firm opinion on the subject.

February proved to be the worst month as regards public assessment of the Balcerowicz program: for the first

time, those declining to support it (32 percent) outnumbered supporters (19.6 percent). The number of respondents who admitted they know too little about the program also increased (31.2 percent, compared to 25.8 percent in the January survey).

Twenty-nine percent of those surveyed (37.1 percent in January) responded in favor of continuing Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz's program, but after the introduction of significant changes: in the opinion of 24.5 percent, a new program should be worked out, including in it those elements of the Balcerowicz program that have proved themselves; in the opinion of 22.9 percent (16.3 percent in the January survey), following experience thus far, a completely new program must be worked out; only a few respondents (6.4 percent) were in favor of continuing the Balcerowicz program in its present form, while 17 percent had not formed an opinion on the subject.

Nearly half of the respondents (46.2 percent) believe the sacrifices the public has already made as a result of the implementation of the Balcerowicz program are much greater than might have been expected; in the opinion of 21.3 percent, they are slightly greater than expected; according to 14.9 percent, they are as might have been expected; in the opinion of a few (3.2 percent), they are slightly or significantly less than expected, while 12 percent of those surveyed had no specific opinion.

Walbrzych Region To Close 3 Coal Mines

91EP0407A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 25 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by Malgorzata Szyszlo: "Walbrzych Restructuring: The Region Looks to the Center"]

[Text] The low level of modernity of a large part of industry, high unemployment, ecological pollution of part of the region—these are just a few of the "disasters" occurring in the Walbrzych region, a region whose restructuring has been discussed for nearly a year.

One of the main elements is the process of liquidating mines characterized by their poor technological condition and worsening geological conditions for extracting coal. Expensive coal. Because the cost of its extraction significantly surpasses the cost of mining coal of similar parameters in the Upper Silesian Basin.

The restructuring of the region was discussed on 23 March during a meeting between Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz and representatives of the voivodship administrative authorities, regional self-governments, employers, trade organizations, and trade unions. Besides the deputy prime minister, Michal Boni, minister of labor and social policy, Maciej Nowicki, minister of environmental protection, natural resources, and forestry, members of the leadership of several other departments, and a group of Sejm deputies and senators, came to the meeting which was organized by SPRING-92 (Social Movement for Economic Initiatives).

Decisions on the liquidation, by the end of 1995, of three mines, Walbrzych, Victoria, and Thores, have already been made, but, unfortunately, there is not yet a program for restructuring that would give discharged miners the opportunity to find new jobs—it was said during the hours-long discussion. For many people this produces psychological barriers to announced retraining. There also arises the question of management of the significant property the mines own, especially that located above ground. And although they plan, among other things, to create new economic entities, this cannot be done with regional funds alone, it was emphasized. We are counting on the government help in establishing a modern system of banking and employee training, among other things. The center was also called on to create instruments that would encourage investment of capital by foreign investors and to grant tax relief favoring investment by native entrepreneurs.

Representatives of other industries—light manufacturing, ceramics, and glass—also presented their own problems. About 25,000 people work in the plants of the first industry and they are unsure of their future, it was said, because they are grappling with problems, including the barriers to demand in the domestic market and collapse of exports to the Soviet Union. Most of the representatives of the enterprises complained of the high interest rate on credit, which hampers investments, in their opinion, and the banks' reluctance to grant loans to state firms.

Also discussed were actions on behalf of environmental protection, necessary both to improve the living conditions of the region's residents and to develop health resort services and tourism. Responding to a question on this issue, Minister Maciej Nowicki emphasized that the economy and ecology are tied closely to each other. Obsolete industry and the devastated environment are the result of longstanding underinvestment and the flow of pollution across the border. A change in energy carriers, especially construction of gas pipelines, may help the environment significantly. Work is continuing on the utilization of methane which accompanies coal seams in the Walbrzych mines. Considerable funds will be allocated to eliminating the effects of ecological devastation.

Minister Michal Boni called attention to the social dimension of restructuring, including the conducting of sociological research, which is to provide an answer to the question of what the expectations of residents are and to facilitate miner retirements.

Commenting on the discussion and responding to questions, Deputy Prime Minister L. Balcerowicz stressed that the government has not left the region on its own. We have noted all demands. We await a list of specific initiatives, while on the government's part we are accelerating work on a comprehensive program of restructuring and development of the region. One should look at the problem of Walbrzych Voivodship not only through the question of liquidating mines, but also at the

question of transforming the economy so that the benefits derived from quick, efficient liquidation of unprofitable lines might be used to support those that have opportunities for development in the market economy in the making. Thus, in the place of eliminated jobs, new ones will emerge. The government will try to help in gaining access to foreign capital, e.g. from the EEC fund. Also anticipated is relief for foreign investors if their financial contribution is not less than the equivalent of 2 million ECU [European Currency Unit], and they invest in regions threatened with high unemployment, Walbrzych among them. Among other forms of relief, L. Balcerowicz mentioned accelerated depreciation. As soon as more specific proposals emerge, it will be possible to allocate additional funds from other sources. In talking about credit policy towards enterprises, the deputy prime minister said that in granting credit, the banks always analyze the possibility of its repayment. Under market economy conditions, the notion of released credit does not exist.

ROMANIA

Stolojan on 'Standby' Accord With IMF

AU2904120891 Bucharest *LIBERTATEA* in Romanian
23 Apr 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Finance Minister Theodor Stolojan by Emil Jurca in London; date not given: "The Disarming Sincerity of the Minister of Finance"]

[Text] [Jurca] Mr. Minister, how do you assess the recent opening by the IMF of a line of credit, worth approximately \$1 billion, for our country?

[Stolojan] One can say that the "standby" agreement concluded by Romania with the IMF has a triple significance: First, it is an acknowledgement of the Romanian reform program as a valid program which can work and produce results; this is very important, because the whole world knows and trusts the fact that Romania is indeed implementing a program that has been validated. Second, this arrangement also means money, that is, \$1 billion, which we need at this time to ensure an even balance of payments and to set up our currency reserves. Third, this arrangement is a key with which we can enter the international financial market, hence the key with which we can also resort to other foreign financing sources which otherwise would be denied us without this guarantee from the IMF. This is an international practice that does not apply only to Romania, but to all countries wishing to enter the international financial market; hence, this "standby" agreement is very important for Romania at this particular moment.

[Jurca] Tell us, please, whether the fact that our country has participated in the founding of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] with approximately 50 million ECU's [European Currency

Units] has played a part in all this or is this yet another step undertaken by Romania to regain its due place among European countries?

[Stolojan] I would say both things are true. This is a step which Romania had to take, along with all other European states. We could not afford to be left out. However, it is important to emphasize that this bank was especially created to support the transition of East European countries not only toward a market economy, but also toward real democracy; that is why we were vitally interested in participating. Romania's participation quota, although small, does not affect our ability to obtain loans. There is only one impediment here: our country's ability to present projects that fulfill crediting conditions. We do not imagine that this bank, which must support all countries currently in a stage of transition, would practice a discriminatory policy toward a given country. This can happen, but it is certainly not the bank's goal. So, I repeat, the participation share does not amount to a ceiling for possible loans to Romania. The participating countries can take loans without a credit ceiling. At least, this problem has not yet arisen. The bank's statute does not envisage such a thing—everything depends on the ability to present a valid project, something which is not at all easy. In 1990 Romania was not able to submit such a project.

[Jurca] What about Romania in 1992?

[Stolojan] Yes, it is possible. Our trade companies have woken up and are already moving in the right direction!

[Jurca] Mr. Minister, how do you view from here, from London, Mr. Petre Roman's statement on the need for a new governmental formula and a government reshuffle?

[Stolojan] How do I see this from London? Quite simple! To work in the government at this time is a most difficult task. Maybe some people think that we are sticking to power, that we do not want...well, this is not true. It is a titanic work; you are always subjected to all kinds of pressures as well as slander. Not everybody can put up with such a pace. Maybe the time has arrived for several other political forces to participate in the executive governing of the country, just to see how difficult it is. Once again, we must show that we are not clinging to power.

[Jurca] Another question for you—as a private person: Can you still put up with it all, Mr. Stolojan?

[Stolojan] Let me tell you that I have a high degree of physical resistance, which has been tested quite a bit in the past when I had to put up with all kinds of ghastly things and ineptitude. However, there is another aspect: We live in a new world and I am in charge of a sector that I am not sure many people crave for. I am an old-fashioned man, so to say—I do not know whether this is the best wording, since it could be interpreted differently—anyway, I am an orderly man and I can work as long as I have a clear picture of the problems facing me.

When this clarity is gone, as a result of some decision or other, then I will have to ask myself whether I can go on doing my job.

You should know that there are people who can run a country's finances even under less clear circumstances. Such things happened in Poland or Latin America, with their billion-high budget deficits; but as long as I run the Ministry of Finance, I will not permit the budget to be tampered with in such a way as to create as much disorder as possible or let it degenerate into chaos. Of course, I do not exclude the unforeseeable. For example, nobody knows the effect of CEMA's disintegration on our economy. There has been a total collapse in all member countries. This can have an impact, but it is understandable. However, when I reach the conclusion that a premeditated decision is leading to budgetary disorder, then I will no longer be able to trudge on and assume responsibility for it. But you should know that the government—the government members I had problems with—realized the significance of this problem and I believe that, generally speaking, the situation is beginning to be better understood now. You see, people are making comparisons with the situation in France and the United States, which have deficits. Well, those are normal economies! Ours is an abnormal one! In our economy we cannot simply allow expenditures to grow without reason. One has to create order here—the sooner, the better. When we have a stable economy, then we can practice higher or smaller deficits, but for the time being we should not overextend ourselves! Particularly in the sphere of consumption. I am not against borrowing abroad for investments, technology, and so forth. Unfortunately, the pressure now is for consumer goods.

[Jurca] In my opinion, you are waging a right and proper struggle. I believe you are a technocrat in the Romanian Government, not a politician. Do you feel alone or do you enjoy the support of others?

[Stolijan] Sometimes I feel quite lonely, but I am sure that this applies to any finance minister in a transition government. My situation is quite difficult. My wife made an analogy with a kitchen. Of course, I am not confusing the budget with a kitchen pot, but they have a common element: If you put nothing in a pot, you will get nothing out of it! The same is true for the budget! My wife told me: When you appear again on television, tell them that if you put nothing in a soup pot, you will get no soup out of it. In our country this seems to be the inclination now: to get something out without putting anything in.

YUGOSLAVIA

Croatian Economic Policy Reviewed, Criticized

91BA0439A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Mar 91
p 23

[Article by Drago Buvac: "The Blunders of Manolic's Government"]

[Text] On what basis can we even decide on the success or failure of some government? If it rightly seems to you

that with politics burdened with immeasurable ideological prejudices it is that much harder to decide, it is not really any easier in the economy, even though we have much better statistics and more tangible numbers in that area of human activity. I will take the Croatian government as an example.

Just as in the other states where "socialism has withered away," the inhabitants of Croatia have also already tasted the first sweet and bitter fruits of "young democracy." Impartial economic statistics, however, show that a "better life" has not begun in the economic area.

It is certainly not sufficient and it cannot be any comfort to us if we say that things are going badly for everyone in Yugoslavia. The economic crisis, in fact, is becoming increasingly worse, not only in the republics that are deeply stuck in the old socialist system, but also in the new sovereign states with much stronger democratic attributes. That is a poor recommendation for democracy, which is extremely hard to preserve with such economic foundations.

The latest statistical reports, consequently, were not favorable to the Croatian government either.

If we look first of all at the old data of "socialist industrialization," industrial production in Croatia declined last year by 11.3 percent, which is even more than the Yugoslav average (10.9 percent). In January 1991, that trend continued: Namely, Yugoslav production followed the "headlong trend" and declined by 34 percent, and in Croatia by 46 percent annually. Consequently, this is no longer just a question of a legacy of the old government's economic policy, but also of the new government's measures.

Perhaps we should not be too concerned about these growth rates. Every anti-inflation policy, in fact, requires such a sacrifice, although economists continually wonder where the lower limit of social endurance is. Such a pronounced decline in industrial production in Croatia as well has not been compensated for in other areas. The data on the abrupt growth of unemployment tell about that in their own way: Namely, in the middle of 1990, 150,000 people were in the "labor exchange," but at the beginning of March 1991 there were about 225,000. We can certainly expect even worse social upheavals, since about 436,000 people are employed in insolvent Croatian enterprises, and the Croatian economy is also seriously illiquid. At the end of January, Croatian enterprises had about 10 billion dinars in unsettled obligations (or about 23 percent of the total Yugoslav amount).

The Croatian economy, which is more oriented toward foreign trade than the Yugoslav average, is achieving increasingly poorer results. In 1990 its foreign trade deficit was almost \$1.5 billion, or approximately a third of the total Yugoslav deficit. In comparison with 1989, last year in Croatia there was also a decline in the so-called coverage of imports by exports (from 80 to 66

percent), which was lower than the Yugoslav average (84 percent). Markovic's overvalued convertible dinar is being blamed for such poor export results for Croatia. Without going into the justified—and also unjustified—reasons for these accusations, it should be stated that with a dinar equally valuable for everyone, Croatia's accomplishments in foreign trade were worse than the Yugoslav average.

Likewise, it could not be claimed that Croatia was much more disciplined than any other republic in implementing Markovic's uniform anti-inflation policy. (In this regard, I am excluding the types of arbitrary conduct shown by Milosevic's Serbia, such as, for instance, the trade boycott or the raid on the monetary system, because that is no longer a matter of economic policy.) In the area of somewhat purer economic policy, it was still particularly important for curbing inflation that personal incomes and all forms of public spending be kept under control in a more disciplined manner. Otherwise, in fact, no inflation can be curbed.

If we look at how personal incomes varied during the implementation of the anti-inflation program, we see that they grew more rapidly in Croatia than the Yugoslav average. In 1990, net personal incomes increased 6.65 times in Croatia (in comparison with 1989), but 5.95 times in Yugoslavia. If we also compare December 1990 to December 1989, it turns out that wages in Croatia increased 2.18 times, while wages in Yugoslavia increased 1.9 times.

Croatian public spending also stepped ahead; in 1990, it increased 7.4 times in comparison with 1989, as opposed to 6.95 times at the Yugoslav level. In Croatia there was also particularly rapid growth in so-called general or budgetary expenditures—in January 1991 they were 3.6 times higher than in January 1990 (the same figure for Yugoslavia is 1.94 times).

These numbers indicate that the new Croatian government has not been any more disciplined economically than the others (at one time, it strongly attacked the anti-inflation program and Prime Minister Markovic personally), and in spite of that, it did not achieve better economic results!

However, this sort of attempt to weigh the achievements of the economic policy of a certain government also has considerable shortcomings. First of all, we are ignoring the fact that even numbers do not infallibly reflect the real situation. Above all, such an analysis can be criticized because the new government of a new state was not completely independent in conducting its economic policy, but instead had to adapt to the uniform Yugoslav tactics and strategy—in this case Markovic's—more or less successfully. Furthermore, nine months is too short a period for even the best economic policy to be able to achieve results.

I am not saying this to protect myself against the sting of my own criticism at the expense of the Croatian government. A much more reliable measure for assessing its

work, nevertheless, seems to me to be something that is not statistically measurable even in economics: namely, what is the new government's economic philosophy like? And it is precisely in this question that most of the criticisms of that government are concealed.

Preoccupied with national economic sovereignty, the Croatian government, in view of its composition and the fact that it does not have any appropriate concept, has so far not even been able to outline the means of economic recovery. The proof is the frequent replacements of people without any real reason and with even poorer explanations. Neither the former Mesic government nor the present Manolic one, nor individual members of the government have had the reputation among the professional and business public of being any particular authorities, and have not formulated any recognizable modern economic concepts. (Where such concepts did appear, at least in outline, their proponents, just as Drazen Kalogjera, for instance, or Stjepan Dunic, were the victims of personnel changes.) Manolic's government is now acting more and more as the advocate of a sort of state-creating, redistributive economic mentality and policy.

We can support that critical thesis in various areas. Above all, it has to do with the "basic production relationship," i.e., property. In spite of sharp criticisms from a majority of influential professional economists and most of the opposition, the Croatian government is stubbornly persisting in its concept of "property transformation," which can only lead to strengthening state property. No economic proofs of the harmfulness of this solution can convince the stubborn national technocrats, and probably will not even be able to until they have convinced themselves of this (just like their contractual and real-socialism predecessors).

Such a strategy aimed at creating strong state property—based on motives of political authority and its influence upon the economy—is also consistent with the attempt to centralize economic life as much as possible, centered on the capital of Zagreb, with the surrounding area that belongs to it. That is why they are so strongly advocating the powerful ideology of a Croatian New Deal, based primarily on public works and road construction, and economic recovery on that basis. Also in accordance with that ideology is the emergence of large public enterprises (the railroads, the post office, the electrical industry, INA [Petroleum Refining and Sales Enterprise], Astra) and holding companies (from the failed industrial giants).

On the macroeconomic level, more and more attention is being devoted to the growth of public spending. Every new state, of course, costs something, but the excessive growth of public spending in Croatia so far also reveals the true face of the New Deal economic philosophy.

Incidentally, they are trying to ingratiate themselves with more consumers, for instance, by importing about 20,000 passenger cars, at the expense of federal customs

duties and taxes. Let us leave aside the fact that our automobile industry should be set up completely differently (it should have been exposed to international competition a long time ago); this time it is not just a question of a lack of financial discipline, but also of a large-scale use of citizens' savings, i.e., "fresh money." Instead of investing it in new investments and development, it went for steel horses. At the same time, Croatia is striving to obtain "fresh money" as well by borrowing money from Croats abroad, i.e., after the example of the "Serbian national loan." "Fresh money" from abroad, however, cannot flow into any state until it has shown that it is prepared to economize and that it is capable of enterprise and investment.

If we reduce all these steps by the Croatian government to their common denominator, it will show the economic philosophy of a distributive, statist, and centralist orientation, and not one of opening up to enterprise and the market, regardless of how much someone swears by it in words.

Such an economic mentality and policy are not the right way, not only to strive to save Croatia from the Yugoslav economic crisis, but also for its young democracy.

Bosnian Government Leaders on Economic Program

91BA0546A Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE
in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by D. Stanisic and Lj. Grkovic: "BH [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Government Presents Plan for Resolving Crisis: Two Years To Correct Mistakes"—first paragraph is OSLOBODJENJE introduction]

[Text] Draft document on development and economic policy up to 1994. Branko Djerić: Catastrophic mistakes cannot be effaced overnight. Velibor Ostojic: We are establishing the foundations for developing a modern bourgeois society. Muhamed Cengic: We will do everything possible to pay off debts. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic: Radical changes in social activities. Miodrag Simovic: State administration one-third smaller.

The economic and social situation in BH [Bosnia-Herzegovina] is more than a crisis; it is catastrophic and chaotic. The republic's economic situation is worsening every day to such an extent that its present level of development is 66.2 percent of the level of development of Yugoslavia. The deficits and the decline in the efficiency of the economy are the result of many years of poor management. It was with these words that Dr. Branko Djerić, the minister for development in the BH government, speaking at a press conference yesterday, began his elucidation of the BH government's program for the next four years. Furthermore, yesterday's press conference is the first in a series to be held before the session of the Assembly of the SRBH [Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] (scheduled for 11 April) at which the government's program will be also debated.

In this way, government officials will present the draft program for development and economic policy in the SRBH for the period from 1991 to 1994. Besides government organs, the process of formulating this program will include participation by the SRBH Assembly, people from professions and science, economists, and other affected parties in the republic. The final version of the program, following the Assembly session, will be drawn up by the SRBH government.

Too Many Pensioners

This document, said Minister for Information Velibor Ostojic as he opened yesterday's press conference, is intended as a program for resolving the crisis, adding to the democratic patterns that have been initiated, and establishing the foundations for developing a modern bourgeois state.

Expounding on the conditions under which the government has been collecting data for a month now in order to formulate its mandated program, Djerić talked about the significant level of bad debts in the republic. Among other things, he referred to the internal debt, which has surpassed \$3 billion, and the republic's foreign debt, which is greater than \$2 billion. Applying the total debt, which amounts to more than \$5 billion, to the number of inhabitants of BH, he said that the this republic's debt amounts to \$1,000 for each citizen, including newborn infants. Rounding out BH's present unenviable situation are figures indicating that there are 288,000 people without work, and it is estimated that around 80,000 people will remain unemployed this year alone, as a technological and economic surplus. Djerić noted that there are around 380,000 pensioners in the republic, which is disproportionately high in terms of the number of people working and which is, he said, the result of the imprudent and careless retirement of workers, especially in recent years. Payments of social assistance, currently received by around half a million people, will no doubt continue to be a further strain on the republic's budget. All in all, he said yesterday, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is such that time is necessary, because catastrophic facts cannot be effaced overnight, and the government, Djerić asserted, is not entitled to make mistakes.

Everything Depends on the Economy

Indeed, the new BH government has no intention of biting off more than it can chew. It is not promising anything revolutionary, nor any short-term work. For these reasons, its mandated program can be divided according to goals.

For the first two years, work will be done on rectifying current failures, on improving the financial situation, and on stabilizing economic and overall conditions in the republic. But more meaningful results should not be expected until the second half of the mandated period, and thus in 1993 and 1994.

Naturally, all these real expectations are subject to the major limitations with which the BH government has undertaken the formulation of its program. Here, one must consider first of all the state of the economy, uncertainty concerning the development potential of BH, the country's overall political situation, and the uncertainty surrounding its future structure. But according to government officials, the success of this program will depend on the behavior of economic subjects, the responsibility of enterprises, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina—but also the federal—government. Also mentioned yesterday were the unsettled debts owed by the federation to BH, as well as the irretrievable losses resulting from the suspension of business with Iraq.

“The government, by opening up to foreign countries and putting forth this program, wants to create a market economy gradually, because our market is narrow enough. In so doing, we will rely on the modern, dynamic industrial sectors, gradually abandon heavy industry, encourage more rapid development of agriculture and the infrastructure, development of the tertiary sector of the economy, etc.,” said Djeric.

There Is Money

In its program, the SRBH government also announces a break with previous practices in the area of social activities. It will consolidate some of its obligations in this area, while otherwise handing the superstructures over to the beneficiaries of their services. In other words, it will specify exactly what the obligations of the state are in terms of financing and what the obligations of the social activities and the beneficiaries of its services are. However, producing realistic government evaluations will naturally depend on two separate, essential levers: the restructuring of the economy and the transformation of ownership relations.

But what is needed in order for all that has been mentioned not to remain simply a list of ideas is money that the republic does not have right now. Some of the sources for financing the program were mentioned yesterday. Muhamed Cengic, vice president of the SRBH government, said that the federation owes BH around 1.4 billion dinars, and that the republic's new government will do everything possible to see to it that these obligations are met and that the debt is paid off. According to the minister, the needed resources can also be obtained by selling off or buying up social housing through privatizing business property and through more appropriate exploitation of natural resources.

Acknowledging Mistakes

Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, vice president of the SRBH government, spoke yesterday on important segments in the area of social activities that will undergo radical changes. In a word: Changes will occur in all areas, and concretely in the school system—from elementary to university education. The third government vice president, Miodrag Simovic, explained the goals of the Pelivanov cabinet in the area of transforming and reorganizing state administrative organs. He asserted that among other radical changes, the state administration would be reduced in size by at least one-third.

Finally, let us note that despite criticism of the previous government, the members of the new government of the SRBH did not sidestep their own mistakes. Thus, they acknowledged their own failures, which are the result of political inexperience and are related to the fact that they did not ask their predecessors for complete information on the function of state organs, the economic situation, financial developments in the republic, the situation of the rule-of-law state, etc., which would have made their work easier and shown them where to start.

BULGARIA

**Chernobyl Accident Consequences in Sliven
Reported**

*AU3004171891 Sofia BTA in English 1656 GMT
30 Apr 91*

[Text] Sofia, April 30 (BTA)—The number of stillborn infants, neonatal deaths, congenital malformations and

under-weight infants in the Sliven region has increased according to statistics of three years before the Chernobyl accident, and four years after it. Two in one hundred new-born children in 1989 had congenital anomalies, while 59 per cent of the dead ones suffered lethal disorders affecting different organic systems and in all cases it was compounded by a damage of the cardio-vascular system.

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.