


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INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Lower Carpathia: Mandatory Ukrainian, Russian Courses

25000709A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian
20 Apr 90 p 15

[Article by Munkacs [Mukacsevo, Soviet Union] Hungarian physician Istvan Majorosi in Hungarian language newspaper KARPATI IGAZ SZO: "Ukrainian in Hungarian Schools"]

[Excerpt] The adoption of laws usually presents new tasks, new things to be done. The law that has gone into effect in the Ukrainian SSR is no exception. This law mandates the teaching of the Ukrainian language, which has achieved official language status, as well as of the Russian language used for communications by our [various groups of] people. In addition, the law guarantees the equality of the languages used by ethnic minorities, thus also of the Hungarian language, as well as an opportunity for our sons and daughters to study in their native language at all levels of education. All of this requires significant changes in nationalities schools, and in the public education system. [passage omitted]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Professor Cic on Slovak Relations With Czechs

90CH0109A Prague TVORBA in Slovak 18 Apr 90
pp 6-7

[Interview with Prof. Milan Cic, LL.D, Dr. Sc., by Ivan Rossler; place and date not given: "Who Is the Benefactor, Who the Beneficiary"]

[Text] Biographical Note: Prof. Milan Cic, LL.D, Dr. Sc., born on 2 January 1932 in Zakamenne (Dolny Kubin okres). Graduated from the law faculty of Komensky University in Bratislava (1956-61). Joined the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] in 1961 (returned Party card on 10 March 1990). Until 1967 he was on the staff of the Justice Commissioner of the Slovak National Council, subsequently for two years expert assistant at the law faculty of Komensky University. In 1968 became expert adviser to the Office of CSSR Government Presidium. In 1969-70 was deputy minister of justice of the SSR [Slovak Socialist Republic]. From 1970 to 1987 held a teaching position at the faculty of law of Komensky University in Bratislava. Since 1987 academician of the SAV [Slovak Academy of Sciences], since 1989 academician of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. During the last three years he was successively director of the SAV Institute for State and Law, first deputy chairman of SAV, SSR minister of justice, ultimately prime minister of the SSR and deputy prime minister of the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] Government, the last two offices he holds today. He is also member of the State Defense Council. In his field (criminology and criminal law) he has written

a number of scientific papers, studies, scientific articles for popular consumption, and instructional texts.

[Rossler] How would you define the concept of a nation in relation to the concept of a state? And how, from the point of view of this definition, do you interpret Slovaks abroad and their notions of these concepts?

[Cic] On our territory the Slovak nation is carrying on its economic life, with its own language, with its own culture, with its thousand-year-old traditions, with national consciousness, and its own identity. The Slovak nation's relation to its own republic is at the same time its relation to the republic of Czechs and Slovaks as well as the nationalities living on our territory. It is also its relation to the federative state which was created through the period of Masaryk's republic—marked by strong Czechoslovakism—and through its breakup, through the period of the Slovak State, the cruelty of World War II, February 1948, the Prague Spring of 1968, the so-called normalization period, and all the way to the present concept of the republic.

Our nations are bound together by common interests which also took shape in the course of their history. They are today entering European integration as independent entities. The principle of self-determination for the Slovak nation was confirmed clearly in the documents of the Slovak National Council and the Slovak Government. Our nation has thus expressed its will which has to be respected in the forming of a federative state and a modern European community.

It is from this point of view that I look also at Slovaks abroad of whom 1.5 million are living in the United States alone, representing three Slovak generations. From among them rose the presidents of many organizations, outstanding entrepreneurs, architects, lawyers, and doctors: Indeed, the Nobel Prize winner for medicine, the epidemiologist and hygienist Dr. Gajdusek from the United States is a Slovak. These people affirm adherence to a democratic Czechoslovakia and its federative arrangement.

[Rossler] The Czech-Slovak relationship was handled in different ways in the past. We've been through the era of Masaryk's Czechoslovakism, breakdown of the republic, the foundation of a Slovak state during World War II, the post-February concept, and now a federalized state. Could you describe your attitude toward the various stages of our mutual relationship?

[Cic] Czech-Slovak relations have a much longer history than you have cited. They reach much farther back than the origin of the First Republic. Even if we do not go as far back as the period of Greater Moravia, the first joint state formation of our ancestors, they reached great intensity at least as early as in the 14th or 15th centuries. But especially so in the last 200 years—since the beginning of the national awakening. Palacky studied in Slovakia, Kollar was known in Bohemia, Safarik worked in Prague. One can cite prominently the cooperation of

the Stur group in the revolutionary year of 1848, especially at the Slovak Congress as well as on other occasions. And even long before them Komensky and other Moravian and Czech exiles were active in Slovakia. We could also note the activity of outstanding Charles University professors originating from Slovakia, and vice versa: primarily Jan Jesenius, Vavrinec Benedikti, and others. At the turn of this century the cooperation of Masaryk, Benes, and Stefanik helped in the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Our mutual relations have weathered many a storm. That they have lasted means that they are based on a firm foundation. They are based not just on neighborhood and geographical proximity, but also on the fact that they are two nations that are closest to each other in every respect. Insofar as Czechoslovakism is concerned as a concept of a unitary nation, it has been shown to be a fiction. Even to those who had promoted it in good faith and with sincerity. And fictions can never have a long life. Much worse however was that the ideology of Czechoslovakism during the First Republic was translated into an ideology of hegemonism and predominance of the larger nation over the smaller one, of the stronger over the weaker, so that it rendered impossible a genuine brotherhood and equality. And this had its inevitable result in fostering not only a feeling of being wronged but also persistent disputes. Indeed, as we see, even disputes and tragic conflicts abetted further by intrusions of foreign powers into our joint community, especially Hitler's Germany and Horthy's Hungary after 1938. But in the national liberation struggle during World War II the majority of the Slovak nation, despite the often unpleasant experience from the pre-Munich republic—which however brought us also much that was good—unequivocally declared in favor of continuing to live with the Czech nation in a common state, yet one based on new principles of equality. Alas, the principle of a federation already then being bruited about, did not materialize—to the detriment of our relations due to the surviving notions of Czechoslovakism which were spread mainly in the Czech parts of the state under the aegis of President Benes. And after February 1948, owing to the adoption of the overall totalitarian power model adapted from the Stalinist concept, the centralizing tendencies were further strengthened. During President Novotny's era it came so far as to abolish the heretofore existing all-Slovak executive bodies which the nation had created in the Uprising, and the Slovak National Council became an altogether meaningless appendage of the unitary centralized power. It wonders little that all of this again erupted in major conflicts which were later resolved only by the federative arrangement of our state in the memorable year 1968. Yet the brutal intervention of foreign armies and the whole so-called normalization regime lasting over 20 years in its practice caused a significant deformation in these constitutional relations as well. And so today, after the revolutionary events of 17 November 1989, we again face the task of completing our federation based on genuinely equal relations in a democratically built pluralist society utilizing experience with the mechanism of our federation.

[Rossler] How then, in your opinion, should the concept of an ideal relationship between both our nations look like?

[Cic] We know that few things in this world are ideal or perfect. Or, rather nothing is. But nevertheless one has to have an ideal and cultivate it constantly. Fulfill it in everyday work, improve on it in the interaction between theory and practice, ceaselessly work to approach it. I am convinced that the relationship between our nations can be firm and satisfactory (let's not say ideal) only when it is based on mutual respect, on the principles of equal rights, mutual cooperation, mutual benefit and esteem. On an all-sided and mutual enrichment of life of our nations. On making trust stronger. Only in this way can we overcome the undesirable feelings of suspicion, mutual recriminations, and the tensions stemming from them. It is precisely in this spirit that we need not only politics and education, but also construction of our federation in new constitutional laws. We have to develop both Czech and Slovak and thus also joint Czechoslovak federative statehood. Only in this way can we—as equals, with our relationship set right—integrate ourselves with the new democratically formed Europe.

[Rossler] In 1988 Gustav Husak criticized A. Novotny for his Slovak policy. He criticized the then surviving view that Czechs bestow benefits on Slovaks. This question keeps returning from time to time. What do you think about it?

[Cic] Feelings of mutual suspicion and recrimination, talk about who benefits whom, recur and persist precisely because between our republic and the federation there are many relations which need clarification. In the Czech provinces there has long been the feeling that they are Slovakia's "benefactors," a feeling that drags on from the days of the First Republic and more recently from Novotny's era. In Slovakia the feeling is largely to the opposite: It is prevailingly one of unequal rights and injustice. Many Slovaks believe that the Czech nation still somehow sees advantage in the expressions or remnants of the asymmetrical model (in which it is easier to apply centralism) than in a federalism of equal rights based on a mutual constitutional agreement and a most precise limitation of the powers and rights of both parts of our common state. These relationships therefore need clarification, a cleaning up of the powers as well as responsibilities. I personally oppose theories, or often merely loose talk, about "beneficence" which lead to nothing but suspicions and discord. The more so because of the existing jungle of distorted statistical and other data and grossly deformed economic relations which hardly anyone with good conscience can use to supply exact proof of who actually benefits whom. I might as well tell you that Slovak economic experts who have studied this issue have a substantially different view of the "beneficence" issue than some of their colleagues in the Czech lands who are spreading these views with the help of the public. Let me repeat: Nothing will help us but a clarification of our relations—basing them on the

principles of a mutually agreed, democratically constructed, and mutually beneficial federation. Doing it in a way which in the new entrepreneurial spirit and expanding market will lead to increasing our wealth, not to weakening but rather developing and strengthening our voluntary mutually beneficial life in common.

Let me add that an answer to this question is not helped by mechanical, statistical, and certainly not nationalistically, tinged comparisons. Only on the margin it should be noted that this evaluation process ought not to omit issues such as the raw materials input into the production process, product finishing, their sale on the foreign market, a balance sheet showing labor movement between the Czech and Slovak Republic, labor which creates the Czech Republic's national income.

Not negligible are the prices of alumina, nickel, ferroalloys, sheet metal, lumber, wool, semimanufactures including meat which are processed in the Czech Republic's enterprises.

Of course we in turn must recognize what the Czech Republic offers to the Slovak Republic. Just to mention a few examples, it is transmission of energy, supply of coke for metallurgy, some interesting textiles and of course part of the consumer goods supply (for instance cars). But in no way can one forget in all this the help of the Czech nation not only in the industrialization of Slovakia in the postwar period, but also in organizing higher education, setting up cultural institutions, educating the modern Slovak intelligentsia already during the First Republic.

The uninformed may have their views distorted to a large extent by the large investment in energy and heavy industry projects which represent a contribution on the federal scale (Mochovce, Ziar nad Hronom, Nagymaros).

I am not in the least trying to draw up a profit and loss account or engage in some sort of a cheap defense. These questions will be addressed jointly with the Czechoslovak Republic's Government, in an effort to arrive at a truly objective answer.

[Rossler] What do you regard as the main element in strengthening Czech-Slovak relations?

[Cic] I think I have already answered this question to a large extent.

I see the main element in strengthening Czech-Slovak relations in developing the democratic principles of our life in common, thus also in a democratic approach to formulating the constitutional acts of our federation, respect for the constitutional powers of the national republics. And on this basis in developing all our political, economic, educational as well as cultural activity. In education on both sides toward respect and honesty in dealing with each other, in the development and affirmation of our common traditions.

[Rossler] In many fields the asymmetrical model endures, as in the Czechoslovak and Slovak Academy of Science—that is, Slovak institutions do not always have a Czech equivalent. Many people persist in the view that the other nation enjoys better conditions. What is your view?

[Cic] The fact is that Czechoslovak institutions in the Czech Republic are Czech institutions. Based on the principles of Czechoslovak federation, Czechoslovak institutions should grow out of national Czech and Slovak institutions. This should be resolved definitely by their new constitutions.

The better situation of the Czech nation in the economy, culture, and other fields is the result of a thousand years of different historical development of the Czech and Slovak nation. The new Constitution should safeguard equal conditions for both nations which are not equal in the present-day economic context. This includes particularly a different standard of living, the question of wages, pensions, and so on. To get the precise facts on all this is difficult for our economy because the Czechoslovak economy is hard to survey, not adequate to the real situation and requires a profound analysis by experts.

[Rossler] How, in your opinion, should the economic system of our country be developed further taking into account the fact that we have a federal arrangement. Were the investments proportionate for the individual republics?

[Cic] It is my view that as we go over to a market economy the first part of your question loses in importance. A market economy knows the enterprise as a producer, a supplier, and the citizen as a consumer, customer. The enterprise must pass a part of its profits on to the municipality, community—as a contribution to the infrastructures which its employees and town inhabitants need. A part must be handed over to the republican government for the social, investment, and other expenses for which it is responsible. And still another part will be transferred to the federal government to pay for responsibilities entrusted to it by the republican governments—such as defense, currency, representation abroad, and so on. From this point of view it will be irrelevant where the enterprise is located, or who had invested more in it in the past.

I find the second part of your question quite irrelevant. Let us concede that more had been invested in power plants in northern Bohemia than in Slovakia. Power transmission is cheaper than shipping coal. Slovakia has a 20 percent energy shortfall which it must make up by purchases from Bohemia. Should the Czech resent it that more was invested in his country at the cost of destroying the land, or the Slovak that we must be buying electric power? As for the iron works, the aluminum smelter which spews noxious pollutants into the land, the nickel plant at Sered which has the same ecological effects, the situation is the other way around.

The regime as it existed until now had serious shortcomings. It can be said that it has caused harm to everyone: Slovaks, Czechs, as well as other nationalities. Atheists, Catholics as well as Lutherans. Workers as well as the intelligentsia.

I see no solution in battling over who suffered greater harm under the previous regime. More important in my view is searching for common ways to do away with all these shortcomings.

Daily Answers TASS Criticism

90CH0128A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
2 May 90 p 1

[Article by Jiri Forejt: "Gratitude or Ingratitude"]

[Text] Boris Bazhanov, the Prague correspondent of TASS, termed as virtually an act of ingratitude the recent unveiling of a memorial plaque for the fallen American airmen at Litice near Plzen. That is, ingratitude toward the USSR. In Czechoslovakia people allegedly are forgetting that "without a Soviet Army victory there would not even be a second front." Well, let's not get onto the thin ice of speculations beginning with an "if." Some say that without the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact there would not have been a World War II either. For my part, I believe that it would have taken place anyway.

But in one regard Mr. Bazhanov is definitely in error. The act was not an unveiling but rather a restoration. For many years a small memorial stood there, was a thorn in the side of Communists, so in the end they razed it, as by the way they did half of Bohemia.

I don't know whether it was a boyhood legend but as a Plzen native (born in 1938) I used to hear that these airmen did not perish directly in the air raid but after parachuting from their damaged planes were taken prisoner by fanatical Nazis in Litice, were bestially tortured and their bodies buried in a dung heap. If so, it would follow that even a small memorial to murdered prisoners of war was thought offensive.

Since the Prague representative of the Soviet press agency—noted otherwise for its slowness—managed such a quick calculation comparing, according to his data, 136 fallen Americans with 144,000 Soviet soldiers fallen on Czechoslovak territory, I must assure him that the numerical comparison between the number of Soviet memorials, plaques and other mementos and those for Americans comes out surely at least 1060 to 1. And as far as the fallen are concerned, we did not and will not forget each one of them whether he was American, British, Russian, or Romanian. Even though TASS and the Soviet leadership did their best for 20 years to make us forget.

This is not the first invective aimed at contemporary Czechoslovakia which has issued in recent days from the Prague bureau of TASS. It is beginning to be reminiscent of the period just before August 1968. The reason, in my

opinion, may be that the writers are either the same people, or their disciples and offspring.

I am waiting for a discovery of an arms cache in the vicinity of Sokolovo.

Benda Explains His Neutrality in Sacher Affair

90CH0128B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
2 May 90 pp 1-2

[Open letter by Dr. Vaclav Benda, chairman of KDS (Christian Democratic Party)]

[Text] An open letter to my friend Jan Dus and all those who have recently called on me to make a public statement on behalf of one side or the other in the "Sachergate" affair, or conversely to avoid any statement at all.

In the first place, I regard the whole affair as a thoroughly deplorable incident in which a third of the background does most of the laughing. Moreover I see it as an incident which cannot be understood properly without a reference in both timing and substance to the foundation of the Christian and Democratic Union and the subsequent recall of Minister Reichl, with the affair centering around Procurator Sokol and Brno Mayor Trmac, with ethnic problems and a host of other matters. Criticism of the slow progress in setting things right at the Federal Ministry of the Interior is without any doubt justified—save for the fact that in similarly sinister departments, be it the corresponding republican ministries, the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, or Justice and Transport, apparently much less has been done (and often practically nothing) without anyone finding it necessary to direct his criticism at them and work for the fall of the respective ministers. I am totally satisfied and even have some material evidence to prove that neither Lis nor Sacher presented complete and unvarnished truth to Parliament. I do not agree with the method of public defamation to which both sides resorted. (However, I must note that the group within the Civic Forum was decidedly the aggressor.) As a Christian I feel bound to forgive those who have repented their past misdeeds and proved that they have mended their ways, and this regardless of whether they did so two or twenty years ago, or whether or not they were Chartists. But as a citizen I cannot and must not display any solidarity toward possible capital crimes which apart from the victim only God may forgive, but not human law.

After this more or less telegraph-style introduction I wish to focus on the issue of the so-called inquiries [lustrace] on which the whole dispute has ultimately centered. First of all I'd like to disabuse the public of an error which has been suggested to it with great vehemence: These inquiries do not involve any kind of investigation of constitutional or other public officials which of course would be contrary to law, but merely a finding whether the Interior Ministry has their dossier and what it contains. Until recently such dossiers were accessible to all higher level officials of the totalitarian regime's

repressive services; the question now is whether they should be made accessible to someone else or promptly destroyed, raising the risk that their originals (we are talking about duplicates from the central archive) are in uncontrollable possession of other subjects who may manipulate them in various ways and use them for extortion.

I believe it would be neither wise nor realistic to unleash a witch hunt—after all, in this country there were likely several hundred thousands of both conscious and unwitting collaborators of the StB [State Security]. At the same time I believe that we will never be rid of the burden of collective guilt and lies, that we will never extricate ourselves from the extortionists' manipulation, unless we find in ourselves the courage to perform a sufficiently radical surgery. That is, forgiving those who had been secret agents of totalitarianism only unwittingly or out of naivete. Then we have those innumerable individuals who turned this service into a profitable business, who worked as paid informers or professional agents with all the proper paraphernalia, with the promise of cooperation, a cover name, an official handler, and so on. Perhaps we also have to forget those who exercised at least a minimum of sound judgment by receding into the background after November and trying to expiate their guilt or at least let it pass into oblivion. But a tolerant attitude toward the shameless ones intent on continuing to play a role in public life and exercise influence on it by capitalizing on their sinister connections from the past, would involve an unacceptable security risk for our country, indeed conscious cultivation of the cancerous growth which could ultimately engulf us all. History teaches us that it was precisely the Russian Bolsheviks who after the revolution pushed through and carried out a lightning raid on the Okhrana archives, which contributed to no small degree to the horrendous acts which today we describe as Stalinism while still coyly avoiding the word Leninism.

Therefore it is my view that before the election it is still absolutely necessary to carry out an inquiry involving at least all the candidates for constitution-making bodies (the results need not be made public; let those who may be affected make their own decision before a trustworthy commission whether they will quietly withdraw from political life or prefer to defend their honor before the public). All major political parties are officially in favor of a thorough cleansing of our future political life from all police agencies. But just as soon as the talk of an inquiry involving political figures acquires a more concrete form and as soon as this happens in public view, nearly all parties try in unison to thwart and defer it. It is said that it would destabilize the political situation if suddenly and without explanation one-fourth of the names were to disappear from the candidate slates of the main political parties. I fear that a future Parliament of which one-fourth are agents could destabilize the political situation much more seriously. Our party is convinced that truth should prevail over lies and that it ultimately pays off. We are asking the competent bodies

to carry out an immediate and unconditional check on all our candidates and we challenge the other parties to submit to the same procedure or state clearly that they do not intend to do so. The endurance game is getting to be tiresome and threatens to bring about an intractable political situation after the elections.

HUNGARY

Fate of Interior Ministry Personnel, Police Force Discussed

90CH0030A Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
2 Apr 90 p 7

[Interviews with Hungarian Democratic Forum executive Jozsef Schamschula and Deputy Minister of the Interior Dr. Sandor Ilcsik, by Erzsebet Nogradi Toth; places and dates not given: "Is There Going To Be Blacklisting in the Interior Ministry? Escaping Policemen"]

[Text] Will there be another blacklist in Hungary? Could there be a repeat of the government decree based on the decision reached by the parties, on the basis of which state administrative and public service officials were decimated? One wonders whether a script similar to the decree of those days has been prepared. What perceptions do the party leaders who are about to assume power have? In our previous issue we ended our report by saying that the executive of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] had announced that in every democracy public officials stand in the forefront of party political struggles. But with the power of openness, mafias may be prevented from taking over the direction of public power anywhere.

In the understanding of many, Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] Chairman Jozsef Antall made a statement somewhere, referring to a possible blacklisting.

[Schamschula] "As one who works directly with him, I am not aware of this," said MDF National Steering Committee member Dr. Gyorgy Schamschula. "Jozsef Antall has also stated publicly on television that suitability must be the decisive factor in choosing state officials, independent of party membership."

[Toth] "Accordingly, there has been no talk of the fact that the MDF is preparing to make changes up to and including the level of division heads if the MDF governs."

[Schamschula] "No. Changes will be made up to and including doormen. And this will be accomplished on the basis of suitability. This can be the only basis for personnel changes in a democratic country. Unfortunately, this was a less popular point of view during the past 40 years in this country. That is why counterselection was significant, and why the country went bankrupt."

Counterintelligence Agents Are Needed

[Toth] "What do MDF plans call for in the Ministry of the Interior, if the MDF assumes power?"

[Schamschula] "If the MDF becomes the governing party, the minister of the interior will be a person who represents our party's policies. Quite naturally, below that level we intend to use suitability and competence as fundamental criteria in making appointments. In my view, from the standpoint of the citizen it is not the person of the police chief that is interesting, but the way he performs his work, whether he is capable of shoring up public safety that has deteriorated, whether he is capable of reorganizing the cumbersome, bureaucratic specialized police apparatus. We cannot agree with an outlook like the kind we experienced with the economic police. It is outrageous that this body fought entrepreneurial ventures. It also follows from this statement that we do not intend just to effect personnel changes; we want to change the organization of the Interior Ministry instead. At the same time, we presume that a decisive majority of the Interior staff will be able to change their outlook. We want to provide an opportunity to everyone to learn and to try to accept the new kinds of expectations. Persons who do not want to do that must be severed. I believe, however, that only a narrow stratum will have to count on experiencing existential concerns.

"It would be naive to believe that the new system will not need a national security, counterintelligence apparatus. We are aware of the fact that those who pursue this profession perform valuable work. But it must be established that the supervision of the national security function will be performed by politicians. The persons who will direct the police organizations, the national security organ of the future Hungary, are important. But the party affiliations of the implementing professionals is a private matter. The police must be depoliticized. In this way only those persons who do not have the specialized knowledge that is required for their work, those who were appointed to leading positions in the days of the party-state as a result of political counterselection, will have anything to fear as a result of a change in the system." [end interview]

Just how many persons can count on the future government saying "thank you" for their past work is not known even by the present Interior leadership. On the other hand, each person may decide for himself whether he will be able to meet the conditions established by the governing party or parties.

[Begin interview] [Ilcsik] "Significant changes have taken place in the Interior Ministry in the course of the democratization process that began during the past years," according to deputy interior minister Dr. Sandor Ilcsik. "What is referred to as the political police no longer is under the ministry's supervision. A National Security Office was established last February, and the Hungarian Republic Information Office was formed. The former is designed to serve the purposes of internal

security, while the latter represents the intelligence staff. Both organizations are supervised by the prime minister.

Changing Captains

"At present the organizational separation of the National Police Command [ORFK] is taking place," the deputy minister continues. "The deadline for the latter reorganization is 15 April. Only the head of the ORFK is appointed and supervised by the interior minister, but he cannot interfere with the daily workings of the police.

"Almost all county police chiefs were exchanged in the course of a year. This took place after the views of every party were asked about," Dr. Ilcsik enumerates the changes.

The deputy minister replied in the affirmative to our question of whether it is indeed true that the police leadership is escaping. He said that 120 leaders have retired since January 1989. Ilcsik has been a leader for the longest period of time in the ministry (he has served as deputy minister for two years). Two or three of the group leaders and five division heads are among those who have been there for a longer period of time. (Under 'longer period of time' one should understand five to six years of employment).

[Ilcsik] "During the past year a rapid generational exchange has taken place, that before would have taken 20 years. It is unfortunate that in the course of the exodus many specialists departed, as a result of which the ministry is almost incapable of functioning. The process has not ended. Unfortunately the number of interior ministry investigators is becoming increasingly smaller. Of the 1,800 investigators of the Budapest Police Command, 180 are missing at present. The protection of public safety and traffic safety is also struggling with personnel problems. On a nationwide scale we are missing the work of 1,500 policeman (belonging to the uniformed staff)."

[Toth] "Who will protect the internal order of the country if the exodus continues?"

[Ilcsik] "That is the function of the police force that has been detached, and not of the Interior Ministry. But I must say that they must be able to maintain public safety. The country cannot afford to permit fear and uncertainty to continue to prevail within the police. The parties establishing the government must recognize that public order and public security are first-rate political issues. The appropriate conditions must be established for that. Along with the rapid improvement of money and the technical level, the police also need moral support. A law abiding policeman must feel that the government supports him, because it is only as a result of this faith that he will dare, and will be able to take action. Otherwise he will prefer to turn away whenever he discovers disorder on the street."

So That the Interior Ministry Does Not Become Vacant

[Toth] "In your view, does anyone on the police staff have anything to fear, and if so, who?"

[Ilcsik] "I believe that no one has anything to fear based on his political affiliation. I hope that no political force will regard public administration functions as a bounty. It would be a shame to prolong the forming of a coalition. The governing parties should reach an agreement as soon as possible regarding the state apparatus functions in which they plan to change personnel as a result of the change in the system. They would also have to agree below what level they are able to provide a clear-cut assurance to the professional staff. I am afraid that public administration will be incapacitated if we have to wait very long for that decision."

[Toth] "And what will happen to you, Mr. Deputy Minister?"

[Ilcsik] "I am aware of the fact that high-level assignments are decided upon in the course of political bargaining. I have been a policeman for 27 years; I have prosecuted people for crimes and have served as a county chief; I have dealt with personnel and business matters, and for a short period of time I was with state security. I took part in the development of the Interior Ministry reform process. I can say one thing: I have never compromised myself in the political field. I own no property, and I am able to account to my conscience. If, nevertheless, the new government does not regard me as suitable to perform my present assignment, they will obviously say so. I do not want to escape, and I have no reason to do so. I would like to see others stay, because I am concerned that there will not be anyone who can hand over the ministry to the new government."

Victims' Restitution: Constitutional Conflict Seen

90EC0346C Szekszard DATUM in Hungarian
6 Dec 89 p 1

[Report by Dr. Bela Kemenyfi: "What Is the Present Generation Paying For?"]

[Text] Statute 1989.XXXVI, dealing with the redressing of sentences in connection with the 1956 popular uprising, was ratified by the National Assembly at its 20 October 1989 session. The last sentence of Paragraph 4 of the preamble appended to Article 4 reads as follows: "Compensation to the victims is not possible because that would put undue burden on the present generation." (MAGYAR KOZLONY, No. 78, 1 November 1989)

The present generation is carrying the burden of unrealistically high pensions for those who committed unlawful acts during the past 40 years. It is carrying the burden of indebtedness arising from the mistaken economic policy of the past decades. It is paying the horrendous pensions and the expenses of building residences for those who caused the country's near bankruptcy. It is shouldering the salaries of the former

MSZMP's [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] Central Committee secretaries and the MSZP's [Hungarian Socialist Party] leaders, amounting to tens of thousands of forints, and the expenses of a trip to the Scandinavian countries for the MSZP's president. All of this is taken from the national budget, for it cannot be covered by the membership dues paid by the diminished 31,000-member MSZP, or by MSZMP members whose number is even lower.

According to the Parliament, the present generation cannot carry the burden of compensating the few thousand victims of that former generation who are still living. Yet that generation suffered through a criminal period of legal violations, during the course of which it lost everything and languished innocently in prisons and camps in Hungary and in foreign countries. They had to begin their lives again from nothing after eight, nine, or occasionally even more years. The damages arising from the victims' moral, existential, and physical deterioration, and their financial losses, are incalculable, but the state leadership cannot refuse to offer a more or less realistic restitution that is acceptable for everyone! No, it cannot, because Chapter XII, Article 5, Paragraph 2 of our Constitution says, "A person who has been a victim of unlawful arrest or detention is entitled to restitution."

Mr. Speaker, there is a discrepancy between the Constitution and the preamble to Statute XXXVI.

Independent Trade Unions in Agreement With FIDESZ

25000677D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
21 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by F. Gy. A.: "Independent Trade Unions: Should They Remain Nonpartisan?"]

[Text] In a recently begun series of discussions with political parties, representatives of the League of Independent Trade Unions met with the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]. Both organizations began their activities prior to the great party founding wave, which most certainly explains their "friendship," their tolerance and understanding for each other, it was said at the meeting.

League representatives presented a detailed report on the life and concerns of trade unions. At the same time they articulated some tasks for FIDESZ in case they become members of the government as part of the opposition coalition. Thus, for example, they criticized the Law on Labor, some paragraphs of which still have not recognized pluralism in the trade union world. In the League's view it would be desirable for trade unions to remain nonpartisan for a while. Otherwise party struggles would disintegrate the barely nascent trade unions, building from the grassroots.

Representatives of both organizations agreed that immediately following the elections they should begin the

preparation of a comprehensive agreement encompassing a broad array of economic and social issues. They also agreed that it would be desirable to negotiate disputed issues both at the enterprise and the governmental levels in the future with a sense of social partnership, rather than trying to resolve such disputes with strikes which seem like operettas.

In conclusion the negotiating partners agreed that representatives of the independent trade unions and FIDESZ will hold continuous discussions concerning employment policies as well as their perceptions concerning the management of unemployment. At the same time, League representatives announced that they support the restoration of autonomous governance at universities and at academies, a matter regarded as being important by FIDESZ.

SZOT Coordinating Council Critical of SZDSZ

25000677E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
21 Feb 90 p 5

[National Council of Trade Unions public affairs office statement: "SZOT versus SZDSZ"]

[Text] The National Coordinating Council of Trade Unions [SZOT] held a meeting yesterday. The council discussed the legislative proposal concerning the management and organization of social security. In the council's view even during the period before social security reform becomes a reality there is a need to establish an autonomous organization, because only such an organization is able to ensure independent management of the Social Security Fund and the enforcement of the interests of insured persons and employees, and to exercise societal control over social security provisions.

The council urged the earliest possible enactment of the law concerning the direction and organization of social security, and for this reason recommended that Parliament debate the related legislative proposal during its February 1990 session.

The National Coordinating Council was outraged and concerned about the position expressed by the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] concerning trade unions. Trade unions involved in the establishment of the SZDSZ are outraged by the fact that a party would qualify, or call for the destruction of organizations independent from that party, and for doing so in an election period for the obvious purpose of incitement, thus trying to deflect obstacles that stand in the way of economic policies which strike the working masses. The council also expressed concern about the fact that these same political forces are already planning postelection antitrade union measures, and are attempting to establish a legal basis for the liquidation of trade unions endeavoring to establish an alliance.

POLAND

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup

90EP0531A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 15,
14 Apr 90 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

The Sejm has adopted laws on the ministry of internal affairs (240 votes for, 6 against, 18 abstentions), on the police (240 for, 2 against, 16 abstentions), and on the Office of State Protection (240 for, 3 against, 11 abstentions). The ministry of internal affairs will be a civilian ministry. The Office of State Protection will be formed only at the central level, and it will handle intelligence, counter-intelligence, and protection of government institutions and departments and of the individuals associated with them. The police will replace the Citizens' Militia and will have criminal, traffic, and prevention divisions. The last will consist of anti-terrorist and special units.

The Gdansk Shipyard will be transformed into a partnership of the state treasury according to the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers. The charter of the partnership will consist of stock in the amount of 400 billion zloty, and each share will have a par value of 500,000 zloty. The employees and retirees of the shipyard will be able to purchase 20 percent of the shares at half the par value. The plans prepared by the experts call for the shipyard to have a loss of \$21 to \$31 million in 1991 and to earn a profit of \$77 to \$94 million in 1994.

At the beginning of April 1990, the number of unemployed had reached 267,000 individuals and had grown by 100,000 individuals during the course of the previous month. During the same period of time, the number of job offers fell to 24,000. The highest levels of unemployment have been noted in Lodz Voivodship (12,000, 487 job offers). Then come the Olsztyn, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and Katowice Voivodships.

Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy president and minister of finance, took up the problem of unemployment in the Sejm: "We know that it is painful for the individuals affected. It is necessary, however, to point out that at the level of the whole economy it does not exceed 2 percent of the total number employed, and one-third of those registered so far never were employed anywhere." The deputy premier gave assurances that "we will strive to make the period of unemployment as short as possible."

Alfred Miodowicz in response to a question whether he feared for "his position" after the congress of the trade unions: "I am not afraid because I will not be a candidate. In my opinion, my task was to bring the trade union movement through its most difficult period, and I have done that. It is in good condition and has more than 6 million members, and, as a union should, it is fighting for workers' rights." The OPZZ chairman declared that

of the 16 proposals the union had forwarded to the government barely four have been implemented and that as a result the unionists have a collective dispute with the government.

Protest actions. Farmers have blocked the approach roads to Ustrzyki Dolne. On Tuesday, 3 April 1990, they also halted train traffic. The farmers demanded talks with representatives of the government. The local Solidarity Citizens' Committee condemned the actions as "trouble-making aimed at the government of Premier Mazowiecki." Farmers organized in Solidarity of Individual Farmers blockaded the main roads in the Szczecin Voivodship to protest "against the anti-agricultural policy of the government." The protest action begun by the railway workers in the Tarnow Mountains has spread throughout the entire District Directorate of State Railroads. The issues involve wages and work organization. [passage omitted]

Two civilians will reinforce the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense. The two deputy ministers named are: Bronislaw Komorowski (age 38), a degree in history, who made his debut as a journalist with SLOWO POWSZECHNE and taught history at the Maksymilian Kolbe Seminary in Niepokalanow; a Workers' Defense Committee and Solidarity activist, interned after the introduction of martial law, he recently worked in the office of the Council of Ministers; and Janusz Onyszkiewicz (age 53), doctorate in mathematics, in 1976-79 a lecturer at the university in Leeds in Great Britain, a Solidarity activist, interned in December 1981, a Sejm deputy.

Tadeusz Fiszbach, the leader of the Polish Social Democratic Union (previously the Social-Democratic Union of the Republic of Poland). His candidacy for the chairmanship of the party was accepted by acclamation. The deputy chairmen are Deputy Wieslawa Ziolkowska (chairwoman of the deputy club of the Polish Social Democratic Union, responsible for parliamentary affairs) and two individuals associated with the 8 July Movement—Prof. Jacek Wodz (program affairs) and Kazimierz Kik (organizational affairs). [passage omitted]

The heads of the Polish State Railways have demanded that beginning 1 June 1990 prices for train tickets increase by 290 percent; the ministry opposed the increase. The increase should not exceed 100 percent, but it will not be the last this year.

It is not true that the Autosan Bus Factory will be liquidated this year. It is true, however, that beginning on 2 April 1990 the 5,000 employees will be given a 14-day vacation—the third forced halt at the factory this year. The buses are not selling. [passage omitted]

The Polish Community is the name of the association which replaced the Polonia Society. Prof. Andrzej Stelmachowski, the marshal of the Senate, was elected president. Among those elected members of the National Council in secret balloting are: Prof. A. Ajnenkiel, Prof.

W. Findeisen, Col. W. Borzobochaty, Min. A. Hall, Senator R. Reiff, J. Turowicz, Bishop J. Dabrowski, and Min. K. Skubiszewski. Among those not elected were Bronislaw Geremek, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Jozef Slisz, and Hieronim Kubiak. [passage omitted]

The Press Office of the Episcopate has published statistics on the church in Poland. On 20 October 1989, there were 24,678 priests in Poland; the number has grown by more than 4,000 since 1981 and by 602 since 1988. The seminaries are training 8,819 students for holy orders.

Who's Who News. Sobieslaw Zasada, the well-known Polish race driver, has become the representative of two German car firms for Poland—Mercedes and Porsche. He intends to open showrooms in Krakow and Warsaw to sell the firms' cars. Jacek Baluch (age 50), a philologist, docent at the Jagiellonian University (he studied in Prague in 1957-62) has been named ambassador to Czechoslovakia by the president. He is a Solidarity activist. The minister of industry has named Henryk Piatkowski, an engineer and the head of the Solidarity factory committee, the manager of the Mining Equipment Assembly Enterprise in Katowice. The president has named Stefan Staniszewski (age 59) ambassador to Libya. He studied philosophy and social sciences and has been working in the diplomatic service for many years.

The Silesian-Dabrow region of Solidarity in agreement with the Katowice clergy has initiated efforts to rename Red Army Street for Bishop Herbert Bednorz. W. Krywulko, deputy chairman of the region, which has its offices on the street, said that "the regional board should not have such an address." [passage omitted]

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Col. Jan Wojtowicz, commander of the Lublin garrison:

(Interviewed by Slawomir Nadlonek, DZIENNIK LUBELSKI, 19 March 1990)

[Answer] During the last few days, I have held meetings with the commanders and the garrison chaplain in order to discuss cooperation in training the soldiers. We have decided, among other things, the dates for Easter confessions. They will be held between 24 and 28 March 1990. The garrison church beginning 25 March 1990 will celebrate Mass for the soldiers at 1030 every Sunday. During the same meeting organizational issues involved in religious instruction at the Military General High School were discussed. There are sixteen groups of pupils, and we will have to ask for help from civilian priests because our three chaplains cannot manage by themselves.

Col. Prof. Julian Kaczmarek of the Academy of the General Staff:

(Interviewed by Piotr Biernat, TAK I NIE, 30 March-1 April 1990)

[Question] Reportedly, our balance of forces in comparison with our neighbors is worse than in 1939.

[Answer] I will tell how things are. Our forces plus those of the GDR and Czechoslovakia are equivalent of those of the FRG. If we judge that the Germans will fight together, then the balance of forces is very unfavorable. In spite of everything, however, I claim that we are strong enough to defend our own territory. Obviously there is no question of our military conducting offensive operations. [passage omitted]

Mazowiecki Probes Complexities of German Union, Border Issues

90EP0549A Hamburg *DIE ZEIT* in German
4 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki by *DIE ZEIT* staffers Helga Hirsch and Robert Leicht; place and date not given: "A Trial Period for Germans and Poles"]

[Text] [*DIE ZEIT*] Mr. Prime Minister, this week President Richard von Weizsaecker will be making a state visit to Poland. When the visit was initially planned in the spring of last year it was overshadowed by the memory of Hitler's invasion of Poland which marked the start of World War II 50 years earlier. Now the visit is affected by the fact of impending German unity. The German past and the German future: what are the hopes and apprehensions which concern the Polish nation as it contemplates its newly unified Western neighbor?

[Mazowiecki] Allow me to start with a few remarks regarding Richard von Weizsaecker's visit as well. We await the President's arrival with full openness and in the hope for good conversations. Richard von Weizsaecker is known as a political figure of great moral authority. He has commented on German-Polish relations on various occasions in the past and has always struck the right note. In that sense, his visit will no doubt contribute to progress in the common existence of our peoples and to reconciliation between them.

Now a word to your underlying question: we are aware of the fact that our neighbor will be a unified German state in the near future. Our position, like that of many Europeans as a matter of fact, has always been marked by two elements which are to some extent contradictory. On the one hand, we recognize the indubitable right of the Germans to national unity—a fundamental right which we ourselves have always wished to have accepted throughout our history and which we, in turn, respected vis-a-vis others. On the other hand, there are various concerns. What will this unified Germany look like? What will its weight be in Europe? How far has it transformed itself into another Germany? And what course will European history follow after German unification? In this connection we often think of Thomas Mann's statement: will Germany become European or will Europe become German?

In addition to these more general fears there are our own specific experiences in neighborly relations which have known good times as the saying goes but also bad ones—in particular the time of the Second World War. If one takes all this into consideration, it is not surprising that fears crop up in Poland. This is even less surprising in view of the fact that the West German side has maintained an ambiguous position with regard to our Western border and has yet to make a definitive statement on the issue.

The goal of our policies has been and still is to enter into a new stage of history without ambiguity so that our life together will not be hampered and made more difficult. The basis of our relationship must be clearly defined.

[*DIE ZEIT*] You just recalled the words of Thomas Mann. Foreign Minister often quotes and emphasizes another one of his utterances, i.e., "We do not want a German Europe but a European Germany."

[Mazowiecki] We are aware of that and fully appreciate it.

[*DIE ZEIT*] The Polish desire for an unequivocally guaranteed border has the support of all European states and the two German parliaments. What is your concept of the specific nature of this guarantee and what are the basic elements of the Polish draft for a border treaty?

[Mazowiecki] As you know, we submitted our draft to the ambassadors of the two German states on 27 April. We are also submitting it to the four other participants in "two-plus-four" talks. I do not want to go into the specific terms contained in the draft because it will be the subject of diplomatic negotiations. But I can say a word about the basic principles which guide our policy on this issue.

We sincerely appreciate the declarations made by the two German parliaments, both the very definitive statement by the new, democratically elected parliament of the GDR and the declaration by the Bundestag of last November. There is talk of still another declaration to come. All these declarations are important—but they are only declarations. What we are looking for is a solution which is followed by legally binding consequences because we find it hard to imagine that the Karlsruhe judgment which is based on a German Reich within the borders of 1937 would still hold after German reunification. Any settlement must be legally binding and it must remove all ambiguities. For another thing—and I have said this a number of times—our aim is to conclude these talks rapidly, i.e., to reach agreement on the draft treaty with the two German Governments during the course of the German unification process and then to sign it with an already united Germany.

[*DIE ZEIT*] Do you think that anyone could still cast doubt on the treaty? Why do you make such an issue of the border settlement in your policy toward Germany?

[Mazowiecki] In the course of the discussions of the past few months I once said that our relations are presently going through a trial period. For Poland this is a trial period in the course of which we must demonstrate the extent to which we are resolved really to enter into a neighborly relationship. For the German side it is a trial period in which it must demonstrate the extent to which it is willing to take account of its neighbors' security concerns and of the fears connected with them.

The answer to your question, in other words, depends on how well we stand the test. From a purely logical point of view we should not be facing any further obstacles. But who is to say whether there will not be an inclination to substitute mere declarations for a treaty. So let us wait and see. As far as we are concerned, we approach the final settlement with good will. I think the statement by Foreign Minister Skubiszewski before the last meeting of the Sejm was proof of that.

It was not the first time that we stressed the fact that we also show consideration for the feelings of the Germans, the suffering they underwent at the end of the war in particular—not for the first time. I think that is an expression of our good will.

[DIE ZEIT] We can appreciate the emotional overtones of your last statement in particular, Mr. Prime Minister. For that matter, the most recent Bundestag resolution of 8 March regarding the western border of Poland specifically mentions that this issue is to be settled in a formal agreement. To that extent the Bundestag, too, has thwarted all efforts to resolve the problem below the treaty level.

[Mazowiecki] Yes, the Bundestag resolution certainly does represent a step forward. But the real point is to agree on the treaty language with us and to initial the draft treaty right now and not after German reunification.

[DIE ZEIT] Couldn't the trial period between our two peoples which you mentioned be made more difficult, if the threatening aspect of the Germans is stressed to such an extent in Poland? There has been an absolute majority in the FRG for a long time which favors the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border. Wouldn't it make more sense to give far more emphasis to the chances for future cooperation?

[Mazowiecki] Your question suggests that we do not have enough faith in these chances. I think that that is not true. We have frequently talked about these chances and have never deviated from this course in our policies. And it is not true either that we have particularly dramatized these fears. We have never ceased talking about reconciliation. Let me repeat what I myself said at the Solidarity conference of delegates, i.e., that I view reconciliation with both sides, with the German and the Russian people as a basic principle of my government. But if the impression should arise that there is too much talk about these fears, then one must first of all try to remember that it is not we who brought this situation

about and secondly that these fears originated quasi naturally with different segments of the society. At any rate, the government has not stirred this up....

[DIE ZEIT] ...but it did not actively oppose this development either.

[Mazowiecki] It did not oppose it because it is difficult to oppose a fact, a social situation. But we never intended to exploit it and stir up a wave of anti-German sentiments. On the contrary, we never stopped talking about the need for reconciliation and cooperation.

[DIE ZEIT] The role which the western border of Poland has played in the domestic contest for votes in the FRG, Mr. Prime Minister, cannot be discounted and must be deplored. Have the problems connected with the German-Polish relationship also played a role in the power struggle in domestic Polish politics?

[Mazowiecki] That is the way it was in the past; but no more. I would like unequivocally to deny the contention that the government is playing games with the German question and I repeat what I said once again: we are aware of the fact that the united Germany will be our neighbor. We are interested in fruitful cooperation.

One should not forget that the renewed discussions about Poland's western border started up shortly after Chancellor Kohl's visit to Warsaw. At that time, in November, there were circles among the Polish public which criticized our joint declaration. But our government has observed all of its provisions, e.g., with regard to the question of the German minority. It would not be logical for us to do a kind of about-face within a short period of time for domestic policy reasons. And in my view our policy offers no proof and no indication of anything of the sort. There is absolutely nothing to justify such a contention. But one should not lose sight of the fact that we acted under circumstances in which the statements by the West German side were marked by a certain lack of clarity.

[DIE ZEIT] You have just referred to the German-Polish declaration of last November, saying that the Polish Government fulfilled all its provisions. Does that statement of yours reflect a certain disappointment—in the sense that Bonn has not complied with all the provisions?

[Mazowiecki] No. That was not what I meant to suggest. But I would have expected a clear statement to be made so soon after the joint declaration on the most important problem of concern to us, i.e., the security of our borders, e.g., as part of Chancellor Kohl's 10-point plan.

[DIE ZEIT] The "two-plus-four" foreign ministers conference is scheduled to begin on the final day of the FRG President's visit to Poland. Originally, Poland wished to be directly represented at these negotiations. Now it will participate in those talks which deal with the border issues. What do you expect from this conference? A

border guarantee—given by Germany? A border guarantee—given by the Four Powers? A border guarantee by the Germans guaranteed by the Four Powers?

[Mazowiecki] We said from the start that we wished to participate in the conference *directly* and we will be participating directly. This is another way of saying that we will not only be consulted but will be taking part directly. Nonetheless, we said from the start that our participation cannot be equated with that of the two German states or the Four Powers but that it will be of a special nature and be related only to those issues which concern the security of our country.

We expect the conference to come up with firm language on the final treaty settlement and we hope that a way will be found (while I would rather not be specific on this) for the Four Powers also to confirm, guarantee or take note of this treaty document. This last question is still open and subject to further discussion.

[DIE ZEIT] You just said that Poland would like to see its security guaranteed at the "two-plus-four" conference. Aside from the border issue, what other questions are you thinking of? Shouldn't the entire subject of disarmament and arms control be discussed at different conferences?

[Mazowiecki] I can only respond to that question in a very general way because the response depends on the extent to which the united Germany will be integrated into the future Europe. This problem is of interest to all Europeans—not just Germany's neighbors.

Aside from the security policy issues there are other questions which affect our relationship, e.g., how our economic cooperation with the GDR will be continued. Questions of this sort which are of vital interest to us will also have to be negotiated.

[DIE ZEIT] If Polish-German relations depend on the manner in which a united Germany will be integrated into the Europe of the future, does that mean that you intend to link your security interests to the Warsaw Pact until an all-European solution can be achieved? How long are Soviet forces to remain on Polish soil?

[Mazowiecki] I believe that the solution which all sides are apparently leaning toward is the plan proposed by Foreign Minister Genscher—expanded by those points which arise from the acceptance of the continuing need for balance of power in Europe. I am aware of only one unequivocal public response to the question, i.e., Mrs. Thatcher's statement to the effect that it is to be expected that Soviet forces will remain in East Germany for a certain length of time. Your West German politicians are also saying that they respect the balance of power and that they do not wish to create unacceptable difficulties for the Soviet Union by tampering with it.

[DIE ZEIT] Will the Soviet troops in the GDR serve Soviet security interests or Poland's?

[Mazowiecki] I think we must all give serious consideration as soon as possible to the question of how a new collective security system is to be established in Europe—not just in terms of slogans but on the basis of real projects. That is what we are getting ready for. Following a certain transition period during which an agreement can be found which is based on the existing balance of power, we will move toward a new collective security system in Europe the concrete shape of which we cannot as yet conceive or even imagine today but with the elaboration of which we must immediately begin. We believe for example that the council for European cooperation we have proposed can serve as the basis for this. In other words, the transition to a new collective security system will move through different stages, indispensable stages. All those who will be dealing with the issues at the conference will find it hard to accept a different solution.

[DIE ZEIT] The balance of power concept worked as long as one knew where the line of separation lay. But that is no longer clear. In his speech to the Sejm on 26 April, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, your foreign minister, said that Poland intends to use its forces solely for the defense of the nation and only on its own territory. That represents the end of bloc thinking for Poland, doesn't it. It almost amounts to a declaration of neutrality.

[Mazowiecki] Our foreign minister's response clearly states what use we intend to make of our Armed Forces as an independent and sovereign nation. The decision-making power lies in the hands of our government. But that does not mean that we would not accept the obligations which result from the alliance to which Poland continues to belong. To be sure, we would like to change the world we live in—and, for that matter, our point of departure is that the entire image of Europe should be changed. But that cannot happen from one day to the next.

[DIE ZEIT] By resorting to these particular arguments, aren't you allowing yourself to be guided by the experiences of the past rather than the goals for the future as compared to your East European neighbors such as the Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians? By clinging to the balance of power, aren't you assuming the possibility of a collision which no longer exists?

[Mazowiecki] Are you thinking of declarations or of reality? I don't think you are right as far as reality is concerned. In the first place, we are no more inspired by categories of the past than others. Absolutely not. The point is rather to define our terms sufficiently so that they correspond to reality. And second, we really are situated in a central spot in Europe. There are certain consequences to be drawn from that fact.

[DIE ZEIT] What is it that you view as a danger today? Doesn't the construction of the future lie in the very idea of guaranteeing a reconciliation which reaches from the Germans via the Poles all the way to the Soviet Union?

[Mazowiecki] If you ask me where the danger lies today, then I will say to you that it lies in the collapse of the

process which is going on at the moment and which could serve the construction of a Europe of the future—a Europe of common security. One can only approach this kind of Europe step by step by taking the demands of all concerned into consideration—and that includes the demand for balance of power. If one were suddenly to disregard this demand and if one believed that one can leap into a different international reality from one day to the next, then this could result in the breakdown or the reversal of the process. I think our Polish Government is acting on the basis of a vision of the future—but also of an idea of how to get there.

[DIE ZEIT] Aren't the present dangers to the process located to the east or north of Poland rather than in the West, i.e., in a disorderly dissolution of the Soviet empire?

[Mazowiecki] If things really were as you say, it is necessary to proceed in ways that do not endanger the process as a whole.

[DIE ZEIT] We have spoken about German unification. This unification is merely a part of a larger process, i.e., the unification of Europe. The Polish nation probably has the first opportunity ever to develop without inhibitions as part of a concert of Europe. How does Poland view its role in the new Europe? What role does it intend to play in the concert? And—couldn't the unified Germany serve as Poland's very bridge on the way to Europe?

[Mazowiecki] My assumption is that Poland is and will be a significant player in the political life of this new Europe because what does it mean if we stress reconciliation with the East and the West as a basic premise of our policies? In that way we hope to transform the old theory of the two enemies into the theory of the two friends.

That is identical to a change in our geopolitical situation—in De Gaulle's sense who said that geography cannot be changed but geopolitics can. France which was engaged in conflicts with all of its neighbors throughout its history no longer has any geopolitical disputes with them now. In that sense, I also see Poland in a Europe of the future without any conflicts with its neighbors. That will be a lengthy historical process, to be sure, but that is the premise which guides us.

If we take this horizontal east-west line as our point of departure, we can also start thinking in terms of a vertical north-south line. But this vertical line will only take on greater importance once the horizontal line has been settled.

It goes without saying that these political conditions for cooperation with our neighbors and the remaining European countries should match the economic and cultural conditions. In my view, these are the most important principles for Poland's role in Europe. Our domestic policy efforts are another part of this. We are resolutely

carrying out our democratic changes and are simultaneously seeking to maintain stability as a nation. For these reasons I think Poland is a factor not just in verbal but in real terms which contributes to shaping the new image of Europe in a resolute and stable manner.

[DIE ZEIT] How do you think the new and conflict-free cooperation between Poland and Germany could find symbolic expression? How do you feel about establishing a German-Polish brigade modeled after the German-French one?

[Mazowiecki] That would certainly be a good example. But I think we need hard facts rather than symbols today for sound cooperation on the various problems which still await settlement. Let me speak about two quite disparate issues.

Markus Meckel, the GDR foreign minister, recently visited Warsaw. We have a large number of common friends and acquaintances, especially in Protestant circles in the GDR, who have been working on behalf of German-Polish reconciliation for years. I mentioned to him how important I thought these initiatives were but that they covered only a small circle and that they had to be pushed through against the official policies of the then GDR Government. Now was the time to get things really moving between the societies of our two countries. We have to make up for the lost time during which there was talk of friendship and cooperation on the official level but nothing actually happened in real life. I view this as an extremely important task.

The second issue is of an entirely different nature. Germany—I am now talking about the FRG and of the united Germany of the future—is a major economic power in Europe. Its voice counts for a great deal in the international economic organizations. As is well known, the Polish debt is one of the fundamental problems facing the nation in the very near future. The Germans could lend us a helping hand in this vital and difficult matter—the more so since the FRG itself profited from debt reduction on the basis of the London agreement which benefited its own economic and political reforms at the time. We are hoping for its understanding for the fact that the success of political reform in our country and elsewhere depends on the success of Poland's economic reform program. In this particular case help could lie in a specific solution. That would be tremendously important for us.

We are therefore asking ourselves: As far as the Germans are concerned are we confronted above all with the perception that they presently have economic problems of their own in connection with the GDR or will they show understanding for the fact that a courageous solution for Poland must also be sought?

[DIE ZEIT] When the Polish reform process resulted in your becoming the first noncommunist head of government in East Europe last summer, the West made a promise of initial economic assistance. Have we met the Polish expectations or does Poland feel shunted into the

background at the moment because of the attention being paid to the German unification process?

[Mazowiecki] I think we have no reason to complain. All the agreements have been kept. To be sure, the question is whether they are adequate as compared to what could be done.

[DIE ZEIT] The German minority in Poland will also have an impact on the German-Polish relationship. Under your leadership it [the German minority] was given the right to establish its own organizations and to carry on its own cultural activities. But many are bitter about the fact that for 40 years they were denied the opportunity to speak about the injustice done to them particularly after the end of the war. If the West German and Polish media accuse them of living in the past only the refugee organizations will bother with them. Shouldn't we, in Germany and Poland, reach a new understanding based on the whole truth rather than to continue repeating the old recriminations?

[Mazowiecki] I fully agree with you that we must create a broad public in order to be able to overcome the problems of the past and look ahead to the future. A lot can be done in this respect, e.g., once the Goethe Institute and other comparable institutions begin their operations. As far as the German minority is concerned, I recently saw on television that a joint German-Polish magazine is being published in Upper Silesia. It would be very important for this magazine to publish articles by people who represent a new spirit. This type of thing cannot be made to happen, of course; but I hope that things will develop along these lines.

[DIE ZEIT] The neighbors in East and West have their eye on the courageous economic reforms your government has introduced. When Poland began its reform program, it was the first Warsaw Pact country to do so. Now all of Europe is characterized by democratic reform and the other nations—or so it seems—have made greater progress because they started out at a later date, having the advantage of using Poland as their model. What can the Poles do to succeed with their economic reforms?

[Mazowiecki] I do not agree with your point that others have made greater progress at all. Please give me a single example of where we are lagging behind.

[DIE ZEIT] For example a parliament which was elected on the basis of totally free elections...

[Mazowiecki] ...the Czechs and Slovaks do not have one either. I really cannot see where others have done better than we. Be patient a little while longer and we, too, will have free elections. For that matter, the situation in parliament does not hamper our reforms.

Particularly after the communal elections in late May we will be far ahead—because then the grass roots situation will be transformed—and that you will not find in any of the other nations. A few days ago the Senate approved

the law on the reform of the interior ministry which permits us to make far-reaching changes in this area. And finally I believe that there is a link between political and economic reform—and in the economic field we have made the greatest advances. In a word, I don't think we are lagging behind. That is a very superficial way of looking at things. In this regard we have no inferiority complex whatever.

The real problem we have to contend with is how to mobilize our society on as broad a basis as possible—especially with respect to economic initiatives but also with respect to political and social life. No legal barriers exist on this score any longer, but the situation is difficult. We may also be too impatient and want to see results too soon. I don't wish to be a prophet of doom, but it is conceivable that the countries you speak of will yet have to deal with the problems which we have already overcome.

[DIE ZEIT] Let us conclude this interview with a personal question, Mr. Prime Minister. When was the first time in your life that you dealt with a German and how have these first encounters influenced your future life?

[Mazowiecki] Shortly before the war I started to study German as a boy. Later, during the war and the occupation, I had to continue studying it under different circumstances. Many members of my family, such as my mother's brother or my older brother, perished in concentration camps. My brother died shortly before the end of the war in Stutthof. Of course it has had an impact on my later life but I always set store by the wise saying of Zofia Nalkowska: This destiny was forced on human beings by human beings. Not by the Germans on the Poles but by human beings on their fellow men.

[DIE ZEIT] Mr. President, this gives us a feeling for the weight to be attached to your speaking about reconciliation.

[Mazowiecki] I am truly convinced of the fact that the cornerstone of our policy must be reconciliation with the West as well as the East. Only if we succeed in bringing about this reconciliation will it be possible to speak of a new Europe. Otherwise the new Europe will comprise only one part of the continent and the other part would persist in the old historical conflicts. We are confronted with a great historical opportunity for us—and I think for Europe as well. I can only be one of those who launch this process. But I consider it extremely important to move it forward.

New Association of Polish Marxists Formed

90EP0548B Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
7 May 90 p 3

[Article by WLS: "Marxists Unite!"]

[Text] An initiatives group of the Association of Polish Marxists has been created. It includes 19 persons—

primarily philosophers, economists and political scientists from academic institutions in Warsaw, Gdansk, Wroclaw, Czestochowa and Opole. Among those are representatives from the middle and younger generation of scholars. The group is led by Prof. Jaroslaw Ladosz.

According to the intention of the organizers, the association is supposed to be exclusively academic in nature. Thus, it has no ambitions to create a political party. Anyone who is interested in Marxist study, regardless of his views, affiliation and level of education, may be a member of the association. It is an open formula.

Prof. Jaroslaw Ladosz says, "We are thinking of embarking upon various kinds of specialized research, including research on the reasons for the failure of the various concepts of socialist development and on the future prospects of socialism. An important task for the association will be to reestablish the recently broken contact with foreign institutions studying Marxism. We would like to exchange experiences, views and publications. Likewise, we plan to open libraries with Marxist literature. We wish to expand our work by means of sessions, lectures and courses. We are especially interested in spreading Marxism as one of the many sources of knowledge about reality.

"The members of the initiatives group do not fear isolation. Preliminary discernment has shown that in spite of the various attempts to lower the status of Marxist scholarship, in many communities there is real interest. These tendencies are likewise observed in Western countries. In Poland, on the other hand, scholars who are involved in Marxist scholarship, are sometimes treated with enmity. The recent case of the 'expulsion of Marxism' from Wroclaw University, which has nothing in common with pluralism in scholarship, is an example of this."

The association will embark upon its statutory activity immediately following registration in the court. The motion on this case awaits a decision.

Report on Congress of the Polish Right Discussions

90EP0565A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 19,
12 May 90 p 3

[Article by Anna Matalowska: "With the Right Foot Forward: This Will Be a Land of Genuine Poles"]

[Text] On May 1 the Congress of the Polish Right was held in the Congress Auditorium under the slogan "Enough of Rule by the Left—The Truth Is the Polish Right." To be sure the attendance demonstrated that the time of mass parties is over, as Janusz Korwin-Mikke pointed out, and the participants could be successfully accommodated in a parish social hall, but they greatly enjoyed meeting each other.

The rightists shouted, "In this auditorium for years the Left had been working out programs for enslaving the

Nation and the Church and brought on the misery we all are experiencing. It is our duty and behest to appropriate from the left May Day as our own holiday. Hitler and Stalin ordered celebrating it under red banners. No more rule by the Left, not even Michnik's and Kwasniewski's Left with a human face! There is no room for the Left, except perhaps at Syrena Theatre."

The rightists gathered in order to diagnose the situation in this country and present their ideas for its recovery and for the future. [Their sentiments were that] the Commune is still strong, which threatens a disaster, and the Neo-Commune is trying to come to power under various slogans such as those of amnesty for all equally, of abolition of the death penalty, or of broader entitlements. This situation is being promoted by "Michnik and Company," who are tolerant and indulgent toward Communists. The PZPR has been replaced by the PZRO, the Polish United Citizens' Movement, which strives to freeze the situation in order to maintain unity at any price. People are divided into ours and not ours, with the latter already selected and posted abroad. We are being ruled by newspaper editors: Editor Rakowski has been superseded by Editor Mazowiecki, while other editors are creating a new nomenklatura, taking ministerial posts.

A Way of Rescuing Democracy

In the meantime the economy has suffered in the last 6 months greater losses than in the past 9 years. The economic drain abroad has grown to an inconceivable extent! Billions of dollars have leaked out. Who is the father of this program? A bureaucrat from the International Monetary Fund [Leszek Balcerowicz, the author of the shock therapy plan], and its executors are university professors who mostly bear extremely beautiful Polish names. And who is the mother of this program? The secular Left, in whose interest it is to maintain the PRL [Polish People's Republic, i.e., communist] economy. Thus Polish entrepreneurial spirit is being destroyed under the slogan that supposedly all entrepreneurs come from the nomenklatura. A Pole still may be only riffraff and the source of raw manpower.

The Left is concealed under the banner of Solidarity, and this is extremely frightful! Already in 1968 a secret agreement was reached between Wiesz and Znak [pro-regime Polish Catholics] and it was the genesis of the oppositionist block, i.e., of those who are ruling us nowadays. These forces desire to transform the society into the so-called civic society, an impotent herd ruled by intellectuals! And what are the consequences of the claim that religion is a private affair? They are homosexuality, abortions, and divorces—such deviations already are spreading!

It is high time to wake up!

Long live the great Catholic Poland!

Long live the the Polish National State!

Forty-five years of demoralization have produced results: materialism, nicotinism [as published], alcoholism, consumerism—these traits characterize today's youth. Ever since Solidarity has gained power, pornography has grown. Somebody is promoting demoralization! The Sejm was and has remained mute on the subject of protecting the unborn fetus. And the depraving activities of the mass media are growing despite the change of the ruling administration! Pornographic accents are present in films and in some theatres as well, while at the same time there is a shortage of paper for textbooks and books. Even periodicals for children and youth are not free of these accents. The result? Harm to the society, juvenile pregnancies, loose morals.

The millions of victims of criminal mothers and criminal fathers, of criminal grandfathers and criminal grandmothers, and of the criminal legislation that permits abortion, remain mute. The rescinding of the decree permitting abortions is not a curtailment of democracy but a way of rescuing democracy!

The Commune has led to deformations and hurt national defense. The army was supposed to protect the party's monopoly, and so citizens became mistrustful, which has encouraged elements who deny the need for military service at all. The parliamentary circles cherish the strange belief in the diminishing role of military forces in international politics: regular servicemen are the worst paid and ideology dominates teaching at the expense of combat training.

And in the meantime German might is growing—and yet we rejoice over the demolition of the Berlin wall? This is premature and unjustified rejoicing. Our government was asleep too long before it woke up and began a diplomatic offensive. But the Germans are sly. We face the threat of their economic domination of Poland. Even now every second car in Gdansk bears a white license plate. And a German store, "Sezam," has opened in Wrzeszcz. Can a Pole afford slippers costing 100,000 zlotys? Perhaps new allies will have to be sought? Perhaps the allies behind the Bug River [the Soviets] will prove most loyal? And if one considers in depth why is it that the Europeans suddenly want to abolish national boundaries, one wonders in whose interest this is. And in whose interest it lies to provoke anti-Semitism in Poland? In order to show to the world that we do not deserve help and, when we collapse, we deserve no sympathy. All the anti-Christian forces in the world may desire this. But let us not be blackmailed by unfounded accusations of anti-Semitism!

What System of Society Should Exist Here in Poland?

The pope answered this question in his address to bishops: "You teach the faith and the politicians should conduct themselves according to that faith. Let us suppose that the economists urge building a nuclear power station in Poland, and then the politicians say, "Stop!" what if it operates improperly? Or let us suppose that the

economists propose reducing population growth [i.e., through abortions] in order to increase the GNP, and then, following the faith taught by the Catholic Church, someone will say "Stop!" The state may hold 20 percent of rule, with the remainder to belong to local governments.

Let us stop the hemorrhage of dollars in payment of alleged debt interest. (Being enslaved by that debt interest we have been toiling for decades on behalf of capitalism.)

Let us withdraw Poland from the economic region [CEMA]. Credit should be provided for Polish entrepreneurs. The Erhard road will lead us toward the goal, just as it had transformed the postwar German economy into a burgeoning one within 3 years. Instead of devaluing the zloty, let us immediately revalue it. We do not need help from the West: it has caused a drain of billions of dollars from Poland and it consists in shipments of low-grade food: elderly cows from EC stockpiles and brewery grain.

This road will lead us to a happiness whose plenitude we shall reach in the year 2000.

Our country then will become a country of Polish entrepreneurs, Polish parliamentarians, Polish families educating future generations in a patriotic spirit, telling them tales about the achievements of our ancestors, and in a Christian spirit. Of course, if one is a Pole! The Polish Committee for Freemasonry has already marked out down to the third generation those who ruled us, and it has determined who would manipulate Walesa's Solidarity behind the scenes. "All so-called repentant Pole-haters continue to act in harm's way toward Poland and are agents of Germany, Zionism, and Freemasonry." The Catholic Church has purged itself of Communist agents, but they unfortunately infiltrated it too.

Then citizens will avail themselves of unlimited liberties. Polish capital will flower on Polish market and sponsor Polish education, Polish culture and science.

Then, too, unprofitable and environmentally polluting enterprises will be eliminated from the market, while the survivors will grow and trade with the world as equals. Farming will not be ruined by imports. The Germans will repay the 300 billion marks they owe for the forced labor of Poles, once this is demanded of them. The foreign debt will be repaid, and the Treasury will still not be impoverished. Poland will care for its landsmen abroad. National interests will be guarded by a strengthened army. The writing of wall graffiti will end under the watchful eye of civic-minded police.

All this on condition that Poland will be a land of genuine Poles.

* * *

If anyone shares these views and feels close to the vision presented above, let me say that their authors are: the Liberal-Democratic Party "Independence," the Union for Real Politics, the National Party, the National Word,

All-Polish Youth, the National-Liberal Movement, and the "Right" Union of Democratic Youth, gathered at the Congress of the Polish Right on 1 May. Even if some might believe that the date was wrongly selected and 1 April would be a more appropriate date.

Sejm Deputies Submit Alternative Privatization Plan

90EP0548A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
5-6 May 90 p 2

[Article by Zbigniew Wyczaszany: "The Deputies' Privatization Draft: Give It Away or Sell It?"]

[Text] The discussion surrounding the privatization of state enterprises is accelerating and becoming more animated. According to procedure, the draft law which covers this question was sent to the Extraordinary Commission which examines draft laws for making system changes in the national economy. This commission is led by deputy Andrzej Zawislak.

On Friday, 4 May, a second draft law made its way into the workshop of this commission. The Extraordinary Commission was authorized to examine this alternative draft for the privatization of state enterprises—during what was considered a first reading. The draft law on the property changes of state enterprises arose as a result of the initiative of eight OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] deputies, who included Andrzej Milkowski and Jerzy Dynier. It was signed by a total of more than 20 deputies, including 10 deputies from the Polish Social-Democratic Union, 2 from the SD [Democratic Party] and 2 independents.

Not all deputies from the Extraordinary Commission were convinced that the Sejm Presidium had made the right decision when it treated its meeting as the first reading. After an exchange of views, they came to the point. Deputy Andrzej Milkowski, who reported on the draft law, emphasized that the privatization of state enterprises is intended to create conditions for effective management and to build the economic sovereignty of citizens by widely expanding the ownership of productive capital. This widespread expansion should take place both to benefit the citizenry (through stockholding by citizens) and to benefit the employees of privatized enterprises (employee stockholding), to the extent that the latter is the will of workforces.

According to the deputy draft, privatization should be based on the restructuring of state property into companies or trading companies in such a way that at least 20 percent of the stocks or shares will not belong to the state. The draft law likewise projects other kinds of property changes for enterprises, such as transfer to the territorial self-government, leasing and liquidation in order to sell organized parts of property and entering these parts into the trading company, as well as giving them over to profitable use (only in cases where enterprise employees constitute the majority of the founders).

In addition to deputies, others who spoke out in the debate were experts and advisors to the government plenipotentiary for property restructuring affairs Grzegorz Domanski and Jacek Kwasniewski. In their opinion, employee shareholding is only one of the possible forms of privatization.

Society's hopes and expectations associated with privatization are enormous, but this operation is not taking place merely for the sake of privatization itself, but primarily to increase management efficiency. It was brought up during the discussion that both draft laws, the government draft and the deputy draft, concur on many issues. However, the representatives of the government side taking part in the debate brought up the fact that privatization cannot be based on the gratis distribution of state property. There will be a follow-up, when both draft laws will be subjected to detailed analysis during the further deliberations of the Extraordinary Commission.

Legislation Designed To Eliminate Designated Funds From Budget

90EP0548C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
7 May 90 p 2

[Article by E. Sz.: "Draft Law for the Liquidation of Designated Funds: For the Sake of Budgetary Clarity"]

[Text] The minister of finance has directed a draft law to the Office of the Council of Ministers to eliminate and liquidate certain funds, as well as a draft Council of Ministers resolution to eliminate certain designated funds.

The draft law stipulates that beginning 31 December 1990, the following will cease to exist:

- 1) the Central Fund for Tourism and Recreation;
- 2) the Cultural Development Fund;
- 3) the Central Fund for the Development of Physical Culture;
- 4) the Drug Addiction Prevention Fund;
- 5) the Housing Management Fund and the Land Management Fund;
- 6) the fund for building housing for judges, notaries and public prosecutors;
- 7) the stipend fund for those undertaking university legal studies and those obliged to work in the courts and public prosecutor's office;
- 8) the State Youth Fund;
- 9) the Cinematography Fund;
- 10) the Seed Production Fund;
- 11) local funds for the renovation of monuments;

- 12) the Gmina Fund and the Municipal Fund;
- 13) the Housing Construction Development Fund;
- 14) the Export Development Fund;
- 15) the Rural Social Fund;
- 16) the Central Fund for the Development of Science and Technology;
- 17) the Fund for the Management of Geodesic and Cartographic Resources.

Under the force of law, in addition to the funds named above, the corresponding funds of a local character are likewise eliminated.

The proposals for eliminating designated funds were made through the study of finance law, by the Council of Ministers chairman's Legislative Council and, in many cases, by the Ministry of Finance as well. A designated fund is supposed to be an exceptional institution which does not drawing funding from the budget. Meanwhile, the lion's share of the funds which exist at present are generated from budgetary revenues or budget subsidies and are a tool for the unnecessary freezing of funds. Moreover, a portion of the funds derives from public gifts. This encumbers economic organizational units and makes it difficult for them to achieve their basic end, i.e., profit.

The elimination of the funds listed above would be accompanied by a change in the principles of the financing of the goals for which they were once created. Hence, these would be implemented out of budgetary funds from the central budget or from gmina budgets. However, it is not anticipated that the financing of such tasks would be cut back as a result.

The following funds would also be liquidated:

- 1) the Fund for Structural Changes in Industry;
- 2) the Fund for Market Development and Trade Demonopolization;
- 3) the Fund for the Construction of Super Highways and Express Highways.

These three funds have legal status. It is stipulated that such funds as the Fund for Structural Changes in Industry, the Fund for Housing Construction Development, and the Fund for Market Development and Trade Demonopolization may be transformed into banks. On the other hand, the Fund for the Construction of Super Highways and Express Highways would be liquidated.

The Council of Ministers draft resolution stipulates the elimination of the following designated funds:

- 1) the Housing Funds of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- 2) the Housing Fund of the Ministry of Justice;

3) the Fund for the Reconditioning of Arms and Technical-Military Equipment;

4) the Reconstruction Fund of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

5) the Family Aid Fund;

6) the Retread Tires Fund;

7) the Central Fund for the Conservation of Fuels, Energy and Raw and Other Materials;

8) the Central Antialcohol Fund and voivodship antialcohol funds;

9) the Fund for the Development of Water Supply Systems and Sewage Systems in Cities;

10) the Voluntary Labor Detachments Fund.

The Council of Ministers draft resolution covers only funds created by Council of Ministers resolutions. Likewise it stipulates that only certain funds will be eliminated. For example, the Secondary Raw Materials Fund will remain, since both the need for waste management and environmental protection considerations warrant this.

Financial tasks will be implemented by the liquidated funds out of funds from the central budget or gmina budgets. Both the resolution and the law would take effect on 1 January 1991.

YUGOSLAVIA

Serbian Democratic Party Leader on Pluralism

90BA0091A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
4 May 90 p 5

[Interview with Democratic Party chairman Kosta Cavoski by Mirjana Urosevic and Vesko Garcevic; place and date not given: "Kosta Cavoski, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party, on Changes in Yugoslavia and the Possibility That Serbia, Too, Will Hold Multiparty Elections: Relearning Forgotten Lessons"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The League of Communists [LC] of Serbia has the most to lose by postponing elections; Kosovo should be like other autonomous regions in Europe, but the Albanians would have the right to choose their own legitimate representatives; maximum and minimum demands by Croatia; confederation—a calamity for Yugoslavia.

The Democratic Party, which was founded on 3 February 1990, is the upholder of the ideals of the prewar democrats led first by Ljuba Davidovic and later by Milan Grol. The party with high "ratings" as recently as during the era of the other Yugoslavia was last seen in our region immediately after liberation. Like an underground river, the Democrats disappeared from the "face

of the earth," blown away by the winds of "direct" democracy, only to emerge again in recent times.

Continuing with a tradition, unlike the majority of newly formed parties, its name does not feature any ethnic designation, which does not mean that it is not ethnically committed. In Serbia, it is known for something else: It has gathered together a large number of academics, professors, doctors of science, writers, and artists. It appears that this intellectual nucleus is the strongest trump card and guarantee of the democracy that the party advocates.

The first goal that the Democratic Party has set for itself is that all parties in Serbia exist under the same conditions, that they not be transformed into semilegal organizations.

"Democracy presupposes a corresponding procedure for debate and a process for decisionmaking. In a multiparty system, this means that all parties must have the same opportunities to present their own political program and to compete for the confidence of the voters. However, this is not possible if all parties—both the one in power and those in the opposition—are not allowed equal access to all information media, especially those that are financed by subscriptions from the state or municipal budget," says Kosta CAVOSKI, chairman of the executive committee of the Democratic Party.

We Have Not Been Welcomed

[BORBA] Why is the Democratic Party active primarily in Serbia? There is talk of hampering and preventing activity by this and other parties—in your opinion, who is behind all this?

[CAVOSKI] The LC Serbia is ostensibly in favor of democracy, but in fact it wants to preserve its monopolistic position, especially in the information media. This is why it has yet to occur to the ruling Communist Party that, say, Belgrade television should make the time available to all political parties completely equal in order for them to present their programs and views. Recognizing this unwillingness by the LC Serbia to give up its monopoly on the information media, the Democratic Party has organized a petition campaign demanding, among other things, the abolition of all party organizations in the information media, the dissolution of single-party program councils, and the granting of one hour of daily programming time on Belgrade television to all parties. Thus far, this petition has been signed in one day by more than 7,000 Belgrade residents.

[BORBA] In recent months, there have been two attempts at political manipulation of the Democratic Party, and of you personally. Is this also part of the game of which you speak?

[CAVOSKI] The unwillingness of the ruling communist party to accept a true party system with an opposition can be seen in the continual attempts to compromise alternative or opposition political parties. Thus, for

example, the Democratic Party has for some time now been the victim of vile intrigues and imputations. Immediately after the founding meeting, there was a false report to the effect that Prof. Dr. Jovan RASKOVIC had left that meeting dissatisfied with its work. The goal was to create a split between the Democratic Party in Belgrade and the subsequently formed Serbian Democratic Party in Knin. This is why POLITIKA for nearly a month concocted a story about an alleged fracas between two groups of democrats in Svetozarevo. The vilest intrigues occurred only recently, when, on the basis of false internal information from TANJUG, a false report alleging that I am in favor of the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and Yugoslavia was carried by POLITIKA, POLITIKA EKSPRES, and Third Journal on Belgrade Radio and Television. When after several days an exact transcript of my interview arrived, and when the radio station "Deutsche Welle" announced that my interview would be rebroadcast in two installments, TANJUG officially apologized. However, POLITIKA did not regard any apology whatsoever as being necessary, while Third Journal broadcast in two sentences TANJUG's apology and an explanation that the earlier report was not true.

At home we are experiencing even greater difficulties; on the eve of a presentation by our party in Vranje, organized within the framework of the speaker program of the Cultural Center, the chairman of the Municipal Committee of the LC Vranje warned the editor who invited us that he could lose his job.

[BORBA] Recently, there has been talk in Serbia as well of the need for new elections in which the newly formed parties would also participate. Will you run in these future elections independently or in a coalition with others?

As if There Were No Elections

[CAVOSKI] We do not recognize the November elections, not as free or legitimate elections, nor as elections in any sense. We demand that while organizing elections to the Federal Council of the Assembly of the SFRY, new republican and municipal elections be organized at the same time. Naturally, for this to happen it is necessary that all parties be in a completely equal position, that the electoral campaign last four to six months, that the campaigns be financed from state resources or from voluntary contributions, but in that case that the LC, SAWP [Socialist Alliance of Working People], and SSO [League of Socialist Youth] be deprived of income from state funds. All parties would have to have equal access to the media, especially television, and in this way the conditions would be created for holding the elections at the end of this year.

[BORBA] It is being said that elections will not be held until the end of next year?

[CAVOSKI] There is no doubt that the LC wants to hold on to power as long as possible. They are now talking about new elections, but no date is being mentioned. It is

normal that the opposition parties are organizing and demanding these elections. It could easily happen that an election alliance of all opposition parties will be formed in Serbia, whose goal is to have the elections called as soon as possible. In elections, our party would enter into a coalition with parties that have a similar political program. It is very likely that such alliances will be created in the subsequent elections, so that the communists would become a minority and join the opposition. I think that this would be better for them as well, because they would be freed of fellow travelers who entered the LC not because of its program, but rather out of self-interest.

[BORBA] What is your opinion about whether the LC Serbia wins or losses through this delay tactic?

[Cavoski] There is one contradiction in their statements: Although they assert that they would certainly win new elections, at the same time they hesitate to call them. This means that they do not believe in that first assertion, while their refusal to disclose a date and call elections indicates their desire to hold on to power, since they are not sure that they will win in the first free elections.

[BORBA] Whenever we talk about Serbia, the Kosovo question is inevitable. What exactly is the position of the Democratic Party on the events in Kosovo?

[Cavoski] The Kosovo question is extremely difficult and crucial to the Serbian nation, and for that reason it should be the concern of state organs, not an issue that individual parties compete over and auction off. A superpartisan, state policy should be pursued with respect to Kosovo, with participation by all parties, not just the one in power. Thus, decisions cannot be made about Kosovo at plenums of the Central Committee or by main committees of this or that party; rather, it should be a matter for parliament and the state Presidency. Kosovo autonomy should be boiled down to the framework of autonomy that is standard in Europe, such as in Italy or Spain. Thus, it should be under the sovereignty of the Serbian state, and the state organs of Serbia must be able to intervene whenever local organs of power fail to do so. We do not question the cultural autonomy of the Albanian population in Kosovo, but we propose that our country conduct talks with the Albanian leadership on protecting our minorities in Albania and that a joint position on minorities be established on a reciprocal basis. Of course, we should not diminish the rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia, but rather augment the rights of our population in Albania.

[BORBA] In the event that a true multiparty system is revived, do you leave room for a political organization (or party organization) of an Albanian alternative?

[Cavoski] All citizens of Serbia must be accorded equal rights, including the right to political association. In addition, all citizens, Serbs as well as Albanians, must have the right to choose their own legitimate representatives. Once these legitimate representatives are chosen,

then we can and must enter into discussions with them. This does not mean that we have to accept all their proposals and demands, but there must be dialogue, naturally within the framework of the Serbian parliament.

Communists as Losers

[BORBA] Elections have already been held in some republics. What is your assessment of the developments in Slovenia?

[Cavoski] We have seen how many votes Communists are able to get, and as far as I know Communists have never won a single free election ever since 1917, nor did they manage to do so in Slovenia. The share that they received corresponds to their current strength, although according to some assessments they could receive even fewer votes in following elections. The second question concerns the policy of the Slovenian opposition that is coming to power now. I think that Yugoslavia is falling prey to great temptation and that its future is uncertain, because DEMOS is insisting on a completely independent Slovenia, which means the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The months ahead will show what will become of Yugoslavia.

[BORBA] Even before the elections, a great deal of dust was raised because of the demands by the Slovenian alternative. Is this not an ideologized approach to the "Slovenian Spring," whereby all of their demands must be rejected a priori?

[Cavoski] You must make a distinction between the position of Slovenian parties towards the political regime as it is and their position towards the political order of Yugoslavia. They are in favor of a multiparty system, free elections, and the principle of tolerance towards those who think differently from them. This is the liberal-democratic position, basically acceptable, that it is sometimes forgotten in Serbia. Completely different is their position towards the political order in Yugoslavia. They ignore the fact that almost the entire Slovenian nation lives in one federal entity, while Serbs and to a certain extent Croats live in several Yugoslav republics. For this reason, it is impossible to insist that the existing federal entities (with the borders from 1943-45) be structured as independent national states. In that case, some nations—the Slovenians, for example—would have their own national state, but others would not. Perhaps for this very reason, some Slovenian parties exhibit a pronounced national egotism that is concerned only with their own interests, and not with the interests of other nations.

Hamlet-Like Dilemma in Yugoslavia

[BORBA] Regardless of how exciting events in Slovenia are, the dominant thought is that the elections in Croatia will decide the future of Yugoslavia. Will the arrival of Franjo Tudjman at the helm of Croatia topple the second

Yugoslavia, built on the accomplishments of AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia]?

[Cavoski] Hypothetically, Yugoslavia is conceivable without Slovenia or Macedonia (as Aleksa Djilas formulated in her doctoral dissertation), but it is inconceivable without Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. That is the central territory on which Yugoslavia rests, so that Serbo-Croatian relations constitute the question on which Yugoslavia will stand or fall. However, one must be acquainted with Croatian history, especially the policy pursued within the framework of Austria-Hungary, and then within the framework of Yugoslavia. The thing that has bothered the Serbs somewhat is the fact that they have not distinguished between the first-tier and second-tier Croatian demands. Croats have always had two programs, a maximum and a minimum one. In their maximum program, they demanded independence from Austria-Hungary or the old Yugoslavia, but were satisfied with autonomy. On the other hand, Serbs, who in the words of Slobodan Jovanovic have not cared very much for the psychological intuition and understanding of this Croatian mentality, have looked at nearly all Croatian maximum programs as they are. Time will tell whether this is once again the old strategy or if in fact something new is happening in Croatia, whether it was a question of electoral competition with ever-stronger slogans, or serious demands that, if realized, will lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

[BORBA] The question now is federation or confederation. How do you picture the future Yugoslav state?

[Cavoski] The Democratic Party supports the federal arrangement, provided that all the nations of Yugoslavia accept it. If some nations have doubts in terms of their participation in the Yugoslav political community, then it must be put to a democratic test—through a referendum. If some insist on a confederation, then our response is this: The existing internal borders between the federal entities are not well suited to a confederative order. If they still want it, then the first thing that must be done is to form independent states, after which their mutual borders must be fixed, and only then can they create a confederative alliance that cannot be joined by all the current countries that comprise Yugoslavia. We think that a confederation would be a major calamity for the countries that comprise Yugoslavia, and that we should stick with the federal order, which functions very successfully in the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia...

[BORBA] The majority of the newly formed parties emphasize their political goals and programs, while the economy is a secondary problem. Judging from the current situation in Yugoslavia, the economic and political question should be on the same level. The same is

true of the Democratic Party: While nearly everyone knows about your political program, the economic part has remained shrouded.

[Cavoski] We will support a radical reprivatization and transformation of existing state ownership into private ownership on the one hand, or rather into state and public ownership in those sectors where competitiveness and true market competition are not possible. The result will be higher unemployment figures, primarily affecting those who were working in unproductive enterprises. If one wants these sorts of changes, then one must accept the risk. Enterprises that fare poorly could be offered for sale to those of our citizens who have money, to foreign investors, banks, or the workers themselves. In these enterprises, which would become joint-stock companies, the workers could have a joint say in decisions, but not self-management rights.

It is also necessary to make a clear distinction between the economy and the political sphere. The economy cannot be partisan, but the ruling Communist Party has always felt that a managerial role in the economy is part of the party's nomenclature and has appointed its people according to the criteria of aptness and obedience. It rewards its leaders by giving them managerial positions in the economy, and the best ones at that. The party that comes to power could not occupy a position in the economy, only the leading position in the state administration.

[BORBA] When all is said and done, we are left with the observation that a large number of "ordinary people" are afraid of elections and change. We have lived in peace for the past 45 years, the people have had the illusion that they are doing well, that they are free, and it is hard to give that up. Won't that be an obstacle to you in the elections?

[Cavoski] That fear comes from the fact that this economic and political system does not have stable state and political institutions that would remain in place when there is a change in the party in power. In normal political systems, the economy does not change its managers after political elections. It is independent and stable with regard to political change. There is a civil service in the state administration that also does not change when ministers and their deputies are replaced. Finally, there is an independent judiciary that is not affected by a victory by this or that party. In our country, the economy, the state, and the judiciary are all sustained by one party. After the elections, if the communists lose, we can expect to see upheaval, but only after the first elections. If the rule of law, parliamentarism, and an independent economy are established, then there will not be such a dramatic turnover after the second elections. The memory of true democracy has been eradicated from today's generation, and it does not know what party competition is, what parties, election campaigns, parliament, and opposition are, and that is why there is fear of elections. It will take years before this knowledge is acquired once again.

POLAND

National Defense Committee as 'Supergovernment' Denied**Activities Outlined**

90EP0517A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
28 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Gen. Bde. Zenon Poznanski, chief of the Secretariat, Deputy Secretary of KOK [National Defense Committee], by Stanislaw Reperowicz; place and date not given: "Is KOK a Supergovernment?"—first paragraph is TRYBUNA introduction]

[Text] Gen. Bde. Zenon Poznanski. Forty-seven years of age. He has commanded a regiment and divisions. He was chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District. For several months, he has been head of the Secretariat and deputy secretary of the KOK [National Defense Committee].

[Reperowicz] Is the National Defense Committee a "supergovernment" as TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC recently wrote? Or perhaps ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI was closer to the truth when it called it the controlling organ in the state's defense system. What sort of mutual relationship exists between state power and administration on the one hand and the KOK on the other? And who are its members? With these questions I address Gen. Bde. Zenon Poznanski, chief of the Secretariat of the KOK.

[Poznanski] The KOK was created by the law on universal defense obligation in 1967 that was passed by the Sejm. In 1989, the fact of its existence was affirmed in the Constitution of the RP [Polish Republic]. The regulations of these acts define the character and sphere of activity of the KOK. Their full texts were published in the DZIENNIKI USTAW and are no secret. What is more, it is taken for granted that they are universally known.

[Reperowicz] I do not think that everyone is so familiar with the law. So I propose that you refresh our memory regarding where the above-mentioned law puts the KOK.

[Poznanski] In short, it is a collegial state organ, working in the area of defense and national security in parallel with the units of the government and the state administration. It is subordinate in relation to the Sejm and the Senate. This is a result of the Constitution of the RP, which explicitly states that the Sejm exercises control over the activities of all other state organs. This applies to the KOK as well. After all, the parliament passes bills defining the place and tasks of the KOK.

Activity connected to the execution of the decisions of the KOK is controlled by the Supreme Chamber of Control, which is an organ of the Sejm. Normative legal acts issued by the KOK come under the jurisdiction of

the Constitutional Tribunal. Also, the Human Rights Ombudsman may approach the KOK on all issues concerning defense in which a violation of the rights and liberties of citizens took place.

It follows from the law that the KOK does not act in questions under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers, and the KOK's decisions cannot violate the Council's rulings. Thus, there cannot be any question of whether there is some sort of "supergovernment" or "superauthorities."

[Reperowicz] What does the KOK concern itself with on a daily basis?

[Poznanski] The Constitution of the RP stipulates that the KOK is the proper organ on matters of defense and national security. In agreement with this, it establishes general principles of national defense, including defense doctrine. Such a document—after numerous consultations—was enacted by the Committee on 21 February.

Within the framework of the universal defense obligation, the KOK assigns tasks to state offices and institutions, enterprises, cooperatives, and other economic entities, and also to paramilitary social organizations. It decides on the militarization of the national economy and administration. It has influence on the structure of civil defense. It establishes the organizational foundations of the armed forces.

The law also authorizes the KOK to undertake indispensable activities in situations of general threats. This concerns not only military threats or threats to social order, but also ecological threats. It can approach the proper state organs about the application of extraordinary measures.

Bringing these legal rulings closer to life, it may be mentioned that during the last session of the KOK on 13 March, motions resulting from the process of German unification, the matter of stationing Soviet forces in Poland, and the problems of the national defense department were considered. Corrections to the restructuring of the army were recommended and the directions of change in the system of military training were approved.

[Reperowicz] It remains to be learned who is personally authorized to undertake such decisions, that is, who belongs to the KOK?

[Poznanski] The establishment of just two positions is required by the law. The chairman of the KOK is from the office of the president of the RP, and the deputy chairman for issues of the armed forces and strategic-defense planning is the minister of national defense. The remaining places on the Committee are filled by the president. He established that in addition the following persons are members of the KOK: the chairman of the Council of Ministers is the first deputy chairman; the minister of internal affairs is the deputy on internal security affairs; and the finance minister is the deputy on economic affairs. The members of the KOK are: the

marshall of the Sejm; a minister of state (namely, Jozef Czyrek has been appointed by the president); the minister of foreign affairs; the minister of transportation and the sea economy; the chief of the Chancellery of the President; the deputy minister of national defense on general matters; the chief of the General Staff of the WP [Polish Army]; the first deputy minister of internal affairs; and the chief of National Civil Defense. The secretary of the KOK, personally appointed by the president, is currently deputy minister of national defense, Gen. Arms Jerzy Skalski.

As one can see, the personnel composition of the KOK is closely tied to the leading state positions. These are representatives of the organs of power and the state administration, civilians and military personnel. Thus, the representation is very broad. This is not surprising, because, after all, they are supposed to decide problems that concern the entire nation and that guarantee it its most vital values.

[Reperowicz] I have encountered the objection that the KOK is a product and remnant of the period of real socialism.

[Poznanski] That is a very funny objection which betrays either complete ignorance or the exceptional malice of the author. Such and similar institutions have existed for a long time, not only in Poland, but in the majority of countries, both in the East and the West. In the USA, the National Security Council operates under the leadership of the president. Presidents also direct the following organizations: in France, the Defense Council; in Italy, the Supreme Defense Council. The Federal Security Council operates in the FRG, and the Defense Committee operates in Great Britain. In the Soviet Union the president is chairman of a similar committee . . .

In interwar Poland, the Council for the Defense of the State, the Committee for the Defense of the State, and finally the Committee for the Defense of the Republic existed. They were always directed by the president of the RP. Thus, we have had good patterns and traditions for many years.

[Reperowicz] Thank you for the interview.

Monetary Problems Viewed

90EP0517B Warsaw ZOLNIERZ
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ in Polish 27 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Professor Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, Marshal of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, by Janusz B. Grochowski; place and date not given: "It Is Not a Supergovernment!"]

[Text] [Grochowski] What role will be played in the Polish political arena by the National Defense Committee, of which you are a member?

[Kozakiewicz] It is rather difficult for me to answer that question. Because we have only had two sessions. I believe however that participation in the works of the

committee will allow us to understand the appropriateness of the army and the department of internal affairs, because this body is concerning itself with these problems, which on other planes would be impeded. I never served in the army, and some of the civilian members of the KOK finished their military careers at the rank of corporal. This does not mean, however, that we will always give in to the requests or insistence of the chiefs of the two ministries—who, as it is generally known, are concerned with what? Money! This is certainly also a good foundation for building an understanding, which from the point of view of the state's interests is indispensable for the army and the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and which may be recognized as dispensable or unnecessary. I do not maintain that a unanimity of views prevails here. A lot of what the generals are demanding is not taken into consideration. For various reasons. Financial ones, sometimes substantial ones. Which of course does not impede the reaching of a consensus on crucial, or as I would say, strategic questions.

[Grochowski] There exist fears that the National Defense Committee [KOK] is to a certain degree replacing the government. At least when it comes to defense issues.

[Kozakiewicz] That is an absolute misunderstanding. The KOK is no supergovernment! Although that theme is frequently (because it must be) considered in a wide context, for example, the international context. But here the position of the minister of foreign affairs is dominant. His position may be subject to discussion; one may draw his attention to other aspects which he does not take into consideration.

[Grochowski] One of the issues that you gentlemen have been occupied with lately is "the defense doctrine of the Republic." How do you evaluate this document? For opinions have appeared—even if expressed by Prof. Geremek—that it is archaic and does not take into consideration the changes that have occurred in Europe.

[Kozakiewicz] Archaism is not a trait of our defense doctrine, but of the Warsaw Pact. When we were discussing the matter of the Soviet forces stationed in Poland—which for the time being is undoubtedly a necessity—I asked what world we were talking about: the one divided into East and West, in which the West, as everyone knows, is aggressive and dangerous; or the one that is aiming at unification? The comments of the civilians led to changes in certain emphases in the doctrine, of which we examined three successive versions. However, until changes in the whole structure of the Warsaw Pact and the principles according to which it functions take place, it will be difficult to talk about any other formulation of affairs, even in such a mitigated form as we have proposed. Elements of the divided world will have to remain in the doctrine, although they are ceasing to be adequate to the emerging reality.

Similarly, the issue has to do with the quartering of Soviet units, their type and number, which is also connected to a definite conception of military doctrine. But it also has to do with many questions which still remain unanswered. New facts may appear, both in the East and the West, which will cause this doctrine to require essential changes in certain of its parts.

[Grochowski] I understand that you do not treat defense doctrine as a document on which work will be completed once and for all.

[Kozakiewicz] This is a document for a definite historical stage.

[Grochowski] However, defense is not only a question of what is written on paper, but above all, of a country's military strength. I do not want to hide the fact that among people in the military and also in part of society the fear exists that our defensive system is insufficient and that the financial resources allotted for this goal are too modest.

[Kozakiewicz] In light of the assurances of the generals, the state of the army, in spite of reductions, is good. Of course, one may have doubts about whether training on simulators, though cheaper, fully replaces training on a firing range, or whether military personnel are getting the latest generation of equipment. For it is generally known that they are not getting it in sufficient quantities. But at this moment there is no possibility or really even a need to allot a significantly greater portion of the gross national product for the army. On the contrary, we are saving money on it. It is being supported—as seems to be the conscious policy of the government—on a subsistence level, but at the same time on a level sufficient to secure the basic interests of the state. The line of argument based on the premise of insufficient resources was taken up at the committee's sessions, but this insufficiency is not tied to the modesty of the allotted sums, but rather to the fact that they are "eaten" by inflation and indexation, which cause disadvantageous shifts in the structure of military expenditures. Since it is not possible to touch certain personal expenses, money is saved on the purchase of equipment.

[Grochowski] Thank you for the interview.

Modernization in Frontier Guard Ranks Viewed

Conforming Units to New Era

90EP0523A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
15 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Jolanta Kroner: "On the Frontier—The Frontier Guard"]

[Text] One of the functions of the reformed internal affairs department will be the protection of the national frontier. The Border Guard Troops, which are subordinate to the MON [Ministry of National Defense], will be replaced by the Frontier Guard, which will be an organ

of the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Therefore the rules that regulate the principles according to which the national border is protected must be changed. All the more because the decree from 1956 that is currently in force does not fit the times in which we are living. Rigidity of the sort that has been imposed upon persons who live in the frontier zone or who are trying to cross the border is simply superfluous in times of peace.

The bill on protection of the national border has been submitted to the Marshal of the Sejm. Its title emphasizes that its goal is not the strengthening of the existing legal borders. That is not a problem for us. It has to do with the method and principles of protecting the borders and adapting them to current needs.

"The national border of the Polish Republic is a line that divides the territory of the Polish state from the territory of other states and from the open sea. The national border also delimits air space, water, and the interior of the earth." That is how Article 1 of the bill sounds. Article 2 says generally that the layout of the borders is defined in international agreements. However, their layout is not defined in the bill, rather those international agreements are referred to.

In a fundamental way, the bill changes the division of the frontier. Up until now, there existed three belts: the border road; the border zone, which extends 6 kilometers into the territory of the country; and the frontier belt which extends 30 kilometers. This belt reached 22 voivodships, which together make up one third of the country's territory, and in all of them the Border Guard Troops were active.

The bill completely withdraws the frontier belt. Thus, the 15-meter-wide border road remains. It is reserved for demarcation, for the building of installations serving to protect the frontier, and for the activities of the officers of the frontier guard as a route on which to make their rounds.

On the other hand, the border zone will have a width of two kilometers. The properties of the terrain, and nothing else, can cause this zone to be widened to six kilometers. The voivodes will determine whether this belt is to be widened. This will be the frontier guard's region of operation in which it will be authorized to inspect personal identification, control traffic, and also—this is new—maintain public order. Previously, the latter had been the exclusive domain of the MO [Citizens Militia].

This will no longer be the army. The armed and uniformed frontier guard will become a paramilitary organism, and in the future it will become completely professional. During the transition period only, service in the Frontier Guard will be based on the law of universal defense obligation, but this will be only after written agreement as to its character. The guard will be endowed with the authority of the police. The units of the WOP [Border Guard Troops], relieved of mobilization assignments and transformed into frontier guard,

will be subject to significant reductions, which will be accompanied by a reduction in strength and resources.

Among its basic assignments will be the protection of the inviolability of the state border—both on land and at sea—the control of border traffic, the assurance of public order in this region, the performance of tasks resulting from international agreements, and cooperation in the supervision of frontier air space—with units of the Air Force and the Air Defense.

No country would fail to protect its borders; we, too, must protect ours. However, the philosophy of this protection is changing. Colonel Ryszard Dobrowolski, chief of the Legal and Administrative Section of the WOP and one of the cocreators of the bill, says that many times we ourselves posed a threat to our frontier in that we were imposing completely superfluous limitations on border traffic. There is no longer a need to strive for the absolute air tightness of the borders; and this absolute air tightness is no longer maintained. Besides, due to passport policy, those trying to cross the border illegally, aside from genuinely dangerous persons, such as, fugitives, are almost exclusively juvenile runaways.

The authority of the frontier guard must be adjusted to fit this understanding of protection. What may it do? It may administer border control and issue visas; enforce personal control in order to eliminate opportunities to commit crimes; establish identity and detain persons whose identity can not be established or who are in some way suspect; and take such persons to a watchtower or control station. The guard also has the right to search people, their baggage, and their vehicles.

Soldiers of the WOP had the right to use just one means of force: arms. By equipping the border guard with police authority, this paradox will be eliminated: arms may be used only in four precisely defined instances, while the permitted means of force are: handcuffs, prods, chemical disabling agents, and road spikes.

The frontier guard may only use arms in a case of necessary defense or in a case of a higher emergency: in order to repel an attack on an officer, to prevent the use of a dangerous instrument by an adversary in an attempt to disarm and disable an officer of the SG [Frontier Guard], or to repel an attack on defense installations or those important to the economy. The use of arms may not have the goal of taking a life and should take place in a manner making possible the least damage.

Types of forcible means and the principles of their use by officers or individuals operating under the frontier guard's banner have been defined for the first time in the bill. This has essential significance in protecting the rights of persons crossing the border from possible unlawful activities of the frontier guard. It also has essential significance for the guard who is obliged to protect the border and yet is exposed to many different situations.

Primary Duties Viewed

90EP0523B Warsaw ZOLNIERZ
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ in Polish 20-22 Apr 90 p 5

[Interview with Colonel Ryszard Dobrowolski, chief of Legal and Administrative Section, Frontier Guard, by Captain Jan Moskwa; place and date not given: "Halt! Frontier Guard"]

[Text] [Moskwa] In Jolanta Kroner's article "On The Frontier—The Frontier Guard," which was published in RZECZPOSPOLITA No. 63, I read that the Border Guard Troops are going from the MON [Ministry of National Defense] to the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Assuming I have adequate knowledge, something does not seem quite right to me here.

[Dobrowolski] Indeed, there are certain inaccuracies in the above-mentioned article, because currently—and it has been that way for a good many years—the Border Guard Troops are part of the internal affairs department. It is true that supervision of airspace frontiers is exercised by the Army's National Air Defense, and supervision of the sea frontier is exercised by the Frontier Protection Ship Brigade. These comprise a military force of sorts and a tactical union and are part of the MON. However the WOP [Border Guard Troops]—its fundamental substance—is an integral part of the MSW.

[Moskwa] It was not our purpose to talk about inaccuracies in the press, but rather about the approach to defending our national border, which is so famous at present, represented in the bill that was recently submitted to the Marshal of the Sejm. Where then does the far reaching need for legal resolutions—in other words, the Sejm bill—come from? What are all these changes for?

[Dobrowolski] The cause is at once simple and important. The decree of 1956, which is currently in force and on which is based the entire system of protecting our border, no longer fits the transformations that are taking place and will take place in our country. This decree arose in the years when, let's tell ourselves honestly, each citizen was treated as a potential border criminal. At that time, and indeed until recently, a passport, that is, the right to a legal trip abroad, was obtained by the privileged few. This was a characteristic way to distinguish people for the loyalty they had shown in one way or another to the state or party authorities. Those who proved themselves to be unworthy of such trust had to look for other ways to leave the country. That is where the need to tighten the national border and to expand its protection system comes from.

[Moskwa] Should one therefore understand that the point of the new bill is to establish a method and principles, which would be applied to current needs, in regard to the protection of our frontier?

[Dobrowolski] In effect, that is exactly right.

[Moskwa] So, which way are the transformations moving?

[Dobrowolski] Perhaps at the beginning we will define the concept of a border. Here, under the concept contained in the bill sent to the Marshal of the Sejm, the national border of the Polish Republic is understood as the line that divides the territory of the Polish state from territories of other states and from the open sea. The national border also demarcates air space, water, and the interior of the earth.

[Moskwa] This line is seemingly an abstract concept and at the same time physical in the form of a strip of land.

[Dobrowolski] Yes. In order to protect the national border, a border-road strip and a border zone have been established. The border-road strip is an area 15 meters wide extending into the country from the border line, from border waters, and from the sea coast. The border zone embraces an area two kilometers wide that extends into the country from the border line or from the sea coast. In cases justified by properties of the terrain, the width of the border zone may reach six kilometers.

[Moskwa] That is how the proposed bill reads. How has it been up until now?

[Dobrowolski] Different. Precisely in this regard, significant changes have taken place. Until now, the operational area of the WOP was divided into three belts. The border road, the border zone, and the frontier belt, which extended 30 kilometers into the territory of the country. The bill completely relinquishes the frontier belt.

[Moskwa] What sort of activities will be undertaken in the areas of the border road and the border zone?

[Dobrowolski] The border-road strip has been set apart for the building of installations that will serve to protect the national border. The border zone has been set apart for activities directly connected to the protection of the border by officers of the Frontier Guard.

[Moskwa] You said "Frontier Guard," not soldiers of the WOP, would that mean that...

[Dobrowolski] Exactly. One may say that we are approaching the core of the matter, that which is the most essential in the changes that are being brought about, in other words, the transformation of the Border Guard Troops into the Frontier Guard.

[Moskwa] Should it be inferred that this is not merely a matter of a name change, but something considerably deeper?

[Dobrowolski] Of course. In the opposite case the changes being introduced would not make any sense.

[Moskwa] And therefore?

[Dobrowolski] In order to protect the inviolability of our national border on the land and on the sea, the Frontier Guard is being created as a uniformed and armed formation subordinate to the minister of internal affairs. At the head of the Frontier Guard stands the main commandant of the Frontier Guard, who is the central organ of state administration subordinate to the minister of internal affairs. The main commandant of the Frontier Guard is appointed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers on the motion of the minister of internal affairs—after consulting the opinion of the Political Advisory Committee in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Moskwa] What will be the fundamental tasks of the Frontier Guard?

[Dobrowolski] There will be a number of them, including: to protect the inviolability of the national border, to organize and exercise control of traffic at border crossings, to ensure public order in border-crossing areas and in the border-road strip, and to cooperate in the protection of the national airspace frontier of the Polish Republic by observing airliners and flying objects that cross our sea frontier at low altitudes and by informing the appropriate units of the Air Force and Air Defense of these overflights.

[Moskwa] What will be the character of these activities?

[Dobrowolski] The activity of the Frontier Guard will have the character of police work; it will not be of a military character as was previously the case. Its functioning will be similar to that of frontier guards in Western countries. For a worked-out concept of the Frontier Guard, we referred to the interwar period. There will not be a brigade or battalion structure, and also—in this is important—in comparison to the current Border Guard Troops, this will be a considerably smaller formation in regard to the number of people serving in it.

[Moskwa] You said "the Frontier Guard is being formed as a uniformed and armed formation." So, what sort of uniforms will be provided for?

[Dobrowolski] We thought about that for a long time. We took various arguments into consideration, but in the end the economical option predominated. Currently our country cannot afford to bear the large expenditures required to put people in new uniforms. Therefore, the uniforms that we currently wear will remain.

[Moskwa] And what of ranks?

[Dobrowolski] They too will remain the same. That means their insignias will remain unchanged. However, changes will take place in the names. For example, the expression "of the frontier guard" will be added to the rank of captain and so on and so forth.

[Moskwa] The Frontier Guard will be a formation....

[Dobrowolski] Aimed at becoming professional. For the time being, recruits will serve in it, but exclusively upon their own request. Those who want to remain in the

profession as a functionary of the Frontier Guard will have their service shortened to twelve months.

[Moskwa] The bill on the protection of the national border that has been proposed to the Marshal of the Sejm has many dimensions and contains many detailed solutions. For understandable reasons, we only touched upon some of the problems in our conversation, what would you recommend to our readers?

[Dobrowolski] The bill itself makes for interesting reading. I therefore propose that they get acquainted with it in detail after it is published in DZIENNIK USTAW of the Polish Republic, because the far-reaching simplifications regarding border crossings will result in their having more and more frequent contact with what is called the new approach to border protection.

[Moskwa] Thank you for the interview!

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Ways of Penetrating World Markets Discussed

90CH0079A Prague MODERNI RIZENI in Czech
Mar 90 pp 52-57

[Article by Eng. Jaroslav Jirasek, candidate of science, Prague: "How To Penetrate the World Market?"]

[Text] To this there is no guaranteed answer. But the basic rule is quite clear: with world-class products and at world prices. Only it is easier said than done. Attaining world class for our products is only rarely the result of lucky circumstances. A company scrambles its way to the world class by painstaking management of its development, prudent investment, creative R&D activity, the level of its staff's qualifications, and so on.

Precisely because it requires much ingenuity and effort, experts add a third condition: with world-class people. With managers, experts, and skilled labor rising to world standards.

We may succeed in having world-class products and offering them to the world market at world prices. But even that does not necessarily guarantee that the world market will open up to use and offer us a place. We must recognize that the contemporary world market is filled up, that its individual sectors (segments) are governed by tough competition which does not make it easy for a newcomer to get in.

1. Establishing Profitably Requires Effort

Let's cite some cases which point to a variety of opportunities. The new factor on the world market are Japanese companies. Not so long ago this wasn't the case at all. After World War II the defeated Japanese ran up debt, made up their minds to practice maximum diligence in work and constraint in consumption, and embarked on the laborious road to the world market.

Today they control a part of the American steel industry. But this has evolved from rather modest beginnings. The first large Japanese shipments to the American market consisted of barbed wire. American farms need it in enormous quantities, but no one wanted to produce it any longer. The war made barbed wire into a common item but mass production brought down its prices and after the war no one wanted to go on making it. There were other opportunities; barbed wire was not profitable. Japanese companies nevertheless picked up its manufacture, but even they with cheaper labor did not make a profit on it. But they got a foothold in the American market, set up a distribution network there and through it later supplied other steel products. In small volume at first, but increasingly larger as time went on.

Today there are steelworks in the United States with Japanese capital and a joint production program. Thus the chosen strategy was clearly not oriented to a quick profit but rather to gaining a solid market foothold.

Japanese electronics, especially for consumers, is virtually a Japanese monopoly. Some items of consumer electronics are not, or almost not, any longer produced in the United States where they had been invented. These include for instance color TV sets, tape recorders, VCR's and now telefaxes.

Again, the Japanese did not start out with finished products but items neglected by American firms in their pursuit of profit. The first Japanese products to reemerge in the American market were quality diodes, resistors, condensers and other components. Again they surveyed the horizon, created a distribution network through which later followed other components, parts, and ultimately finished products.

Last but not least, Japanese cars are also a relative newcomer on American and West European markets. But it is so potent that both the United States and West Europe are ringing alarm bells. They demand caps on Japanese imports and other restrictions to halt the influx and carry out needed technical and structural changes.

It was not at first the Japanese car heading for the American market but parts and components which the American manufacturer preferred to buy abroad. Japanese firms proved themselves as suppliers of quality products, at favorable and even attractive prices and dependable in meeting delivery terms. Only after them came the small Japanese car which was not available on the American market and which found its niche in it at a time of rising gasoline prices. Today that market is being penetrated in a broad drive by Japanese cars ranging from subcompacts to luxury sedans.

Sweden is noted for its high labor cost. It practices a so-called wage solidarism, meaning that wage levels between physical and mental labor and between branches of professions are maintained within certain deliberately established modest ratios, so that among capitalist countries Sweden has the smallest differentials in labor incomes. Hence the people are not afraid of change in their work assignment and thus the Swedish industry was able to carry out within a short time incredible structural changes (for instance shifting a mass of workers from shipyards to other industrial sectors and services).

High labor costs place a much higher premium on automation and so after Japan, Sweden has become the second homeland of industrial robots. It has not sought to offer them to the world in a broad array. Swedish industries have specialized in welding robots, needed originally in the shipyards. The suppliers equipped them with highly sensitive automation which they like to document by a robot playing the piano.

In this case the Swedish industry has chosen a strategy harmonizing domestic needs with its penetration of world markets, while backed by its proven record and a base in domestic production and domestic market.

Italy has some large enterprises firmly established in world markets, as well as a multitude of small companies of mostly local importance. The Italian economy's tradition includes the industries located in major cities. There, and in their vicinity, specialized firms have flourished, in mutual competition but also exchanging production experience.

This is not enough for the world market. Therefore the firms have become even more specialized but most importantly they joined in networks. One supplies the other, they make joint use of the famous Italian design, jointly resolve some problems of materials supply, training of young workers and preparation of experts, make use of computer technology.

From the outside it may seem that the market is crawling with a multitude of small companies, but in reality they represent a formidable combined strength. Thanks to it, they were able to go into the world market with remarkable offerings of modern consumer goods and attain a high level of design and fabrication, as well as offer acceptable prices. In the world market they are represented by powerful marketing organizations.

This is by no means only an Italian phenomenon. Around West European cities there are now growing numbers of factories with something like 50-100 employees which by themselves do not look very big. The buildings are usually neat, in most cases on a single floor, which means without unnecessary supporting pillars and thus easily adaptable to different purposes. Occasionally one sees a "For Lease" sign on the building which means that the previous entrepreneur failed and someone else will introduce a new production line in the factory.

These small enterprises only seem to be lone strugglers trying for the entrepreneur's luck. They are usually part of a net, pulled into business groupings. Each by itself is very flexible, capable of responding quickly to new demands or new opportunities, but at the same time all share common concerns, utilize jointly a variety of services.

Frequently they form associations with major companies to which they offer a facilitation of the entrepreneurial job by supplying promptly and inexpensively components and parts which would otherwise cause a slowdown in a big enterprise. If they are not tied up with a big firm they form their own associations enabling them to coordinate their business activities.

Large enterprises already established in the world market maintain their position by constant innovation: either introducing a new product, or a new fabrication method. Their large mass does not tolerate hesitancy in action; their large production capacity must be put to work.

When a large manufacturing enterprise only just begins to enter the world it should consider carefully with what it will start. It should be something it may be able to offer or gradually develop in a way that makes it a better

enterprise than the others, if possible so much better that the others will have a hard time catching up.

One could go on; there is an infinite number of examples of a successful entry into the world market. They share something in common, and this needs to be distilled out and converted into a more general guidance.

2. Filling Market Gaps and Enterprise Activity

Those entering today's world market as a rule (with the exception of pioneering firms which open up new kinds of markets such as recently the Japanese telefax manufacturers) find the market already occupied. There is no open room in it and no one will step back willingly to make room. What it requires is a smart way to open it, or pushing one's way into it.

Each country, each firm is out primarily to find its own niche, nook, "gap" or "corner" where its products will not be exposed to crushing competition. It must be something it can do better than the others. The best is when it can offer something that already is, or soon can become, the best in the world. This is hard to achieve, but even the effort is praiseworthy.

A firm wishing to penetrate the world market usually "returns" to its "assets"—the basic potential accrued from its development to date. It gives consideration to where its capabilities and dynamic strengths lie, what it can significantly improve and in what it can excel over others.

This is wholly different from the method we usually employ in projecting ahead, when the enterprise focuses on products it is currently manufacturing or on the sector it is serving and seeks ways to expand and improve the production. In this way the past which may well be long exhausted continues to be carried forward into the future.

"Working with enterprise assets" is based on different principles. The firm considers what it can do intellectually and materially or what it can develop, what its engineers, its experimental base can achieve, what can its planners, designers and technicians, its maintenance and repair crews, its production workers, traders and financial personnel do. Which technologies and fabrication methods has it mastered? What can it develop, test experimentally, gauge and analyze, handle in production, equip for sale? In what can it advance regarding quality improvement and vice versa, in what can it reduce production cost? How significant is its location for transport to the places of consumption?

Thus it no longer focuses solely on what it produces but rather on what it could produce to capitalize on its human, technical, and other capabilities. It examines itself, its creative and productive potential. Most often such examinations return to the question of what kind of people and technology it has. But other aspects too may be of importance for determining how to get into the "world class."

A combination of perceived market gaps and assessment of enterprise assets then leads to devising a basic strategy for entry on the world market. The firm need not be tied to its capabilities where they are found limited, but can decide to join forces with other domestic enterprises or seek backing by entering into agreements with world firms which could assist it in penetrating the world market.

3. Economic Cooperation With Capitalist Countries. Why?

We have missed much and must hurry to catch up. The world has run ahead of us not because we ourselves were not moving forward but because the world was moving much more decisively and faster than we did.

In the last approximately 20 years there were changes in world industrial production which we did not catch on to and which are now pushing us to the back of world class. The notion that we can go on just by ourselves must be totally rejected.

The world's industrial production is interlinked; it has advanced to a new degree of division of labor. Industry's productivity is ever more contingent on this "international factor." Whoever fails to adapt to it runs into a competition not with this or that country but with the whole world.

In the 1970's under the strong pressure of the first oil shock the industrialized countries managed to restrain excessive consumption of raw materials and fuels. Gradually they found ways to detach production growth "from mass and energy" and to continue growth even with lower material, fuel or energy inputs.

In the 1980's this was joined by the advent of "high technology." It is an entirely new technological genus which so to speak interrupts the evolutionary line in the technologies of the industrial revolution begun roughly 200 years ago and ushers in new "postindustrial" technologies possessing certain remarkable qualities which promise to make significant contributions to shaping the society's future.

High technologies for instance no longer call upon the worker's hands but rather his head. They introduce into the immediate production process a much greater proportion of brainwork than before. Their result is intellectually refined (sophisticated) products which therefore require a worker of a new type. At the same time they are less demanding in terms of "mass and energy," offering the prospect of developing production without grossly violating the environment. They require support from information services and telecommunications.

The profound technological changes which have taken place in the last 20 years draw a sharp dividing line between countries which have mastered these changes and are taking advantage of them, and those which have not yet managed them. In just 20 years our industry has tumbled about 20 rungs on the world's ladder.

To make up for this lost time means above all making up for the loss of technological, organizational and managerial know-how. We can try to do it on our own but the result will be uncertain. If we manage to associate ourselves with firms which have advanced they can pull us up faster. They won't do it for free and without profit also to themselves; it will cost us some. But one usually has to pay for being taught.

In principle each major enterprise should strive for a working association with one or several of the world's leading firms. And on this basis it should accelerate its profitable entry into the world market. This should be regarded also as a yardstick for assessing the ability of top executives.

4. Economic Cooperation With Capitalist Countries. How?

Economic cooperation with capitalist countries is cooperation of a special kind. Not unselfish but on the contrary, cooperation in raising profits, benefiting both partners. This cooperation too requires substantive knowledge, mutual recognition and trust.

There are many forms suitable in this or that case. One can start with normal foreign trade in which one exports and the other imports. Then one may try more intimate forms of cooperation than a simple exchange of goods for currency: for instance exchanging research information (the so-called premarket research information) or possibly joint research before the object becomes commercially marketable (our research often enjoys a good reputation, especially its creative and experimental technical component).

Another example is industrial cooperation where the partners agree on dividing up production and supply tasks, assume responsibility for a certain portion of the production program and guarantee the quality and promptness of deliveries. They cooperate so as to complement and supply each other with parts, components, prototypes, trademarks etc. for their products.

Coproduction is an advanced form in which the enterprises agree on joint production, assign tasks between them and also mutually guarantee subassemblies for their products. They can operate on the world market separately or jointly.

The highest form is a joint venture in which enterprises join together not only their production capacities, know-how and experience but also their capital. They share the business expenses and risks, and divide profits (or loss) according to the agreement. Thus emerges a new combined enterprise (joint venture).

But combined enterprises are not the only one, and frequently also not the best, form of joint business activity. (CTK)

HUNGARY

Exodus of Enterprise Managers Reported

90CH0005C Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 17 Feb 90 p 7

[Unattributed article under the "Seven Days" rubric:
"Flight of Chief Executives"]

[Excerpt] There has been no large-scale changing of the guard among the chief executives of Hungarian enterprises, emphasized Mihaly Hosszu, the head of the Personnel Main Department within the Ministry of Industry, when he denied to HETI VILAGGAZDASAG the rumor that in recent weeks a dozen chief executives have applied for retirement. According to our information, incidentally, the chief executives of 20 important industrial enterprises are preparing to leave their jobs. Mihaly Hosszu said that hundreds of enterprise chief executives would probably be retiring in 1990 and 1991, because their five-year appointments by the enterprise councils were expiring, and many of them would have little chance of having their appointments renewed. Over and above all this, a contributing factor was that the rules for the selection and appointment of chief executives had changed in many respects. Pursuant to the Enterprise Law, for instance, the founder (ministry) had to consent to the chief executive's election, but such consent has not been required since July of last year. Another change is that the chief executive who managed his enterprise successfully did not have to apply anew for the post when his five years were up. But he will be able to occupy the chief executive's chair only if the enterprise council again entrusts him with managing the enterprise. [passage omitted]

POLAND

Enterprise Directors Present Needs to Balcerowicz; USSR Trade Viewed

90EP0553A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
5-6 May 90 p 1

[Article by (abo): "Balcerowicz and 31 Directors"]

[Text] "At this stage of the implementation of the economic program, the center of gravity has shifted to the enterprises," said Leszek Balcerowicz on Friday as he opened a meeting with the directors of 31 enterprises which are able to function under the new conditions (although they do not always pay their bills on time).

What the directors say:

- that enterprises which create new jobs should have tax breaks;
- that the growth of wages should be tied to a growth in production;

—that the only active participants in retail sales are the small dealers, which drive up to the plant every two weeks for goods;

—that privatization must be speeded up, especially the small privatization;

—that the profitability of export to the USSR must be increased;

—that investment reliefs are needed;

—that large enterprises have greater problems in changing their production, therefore they need cheap credits;

—that the government is wrongly reporting on its economic activity ("you tell us that we should sell our goods and you are not able to sell your own").

"Indeed, domestic trade has turned out to be a weak element in the economy," admitted Balcerowicz. "In the second half of the year, the government will primarily try not to lose what it has already gained; therefore, a general relaxation of financial policy should not be counted upon." Such supply-oriented actions will be undertaken as will "not threaten the return of inflation." A gradual removal of barriers restricting foreign trade can also be expected, including the turnover tax. However, the acceleration of the process of privatization depends mainly on parliament.

Leszek Balcerowicz also talked about trade with the USSR. "There is a conflict of interests between the state (there should be no large surplus) and the enterprises (they want to export). In the future, the rules of trade will be different; right now we are holding some difficult talks." Andrzej Podsiadlo, deputy minister of finance, added that after all, every enterprise can export to the USSR, but what it does with the rubles is its problem.

After the meeting, Alfred Biec, secretary of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers, told GAZETA: "They are attempting to do on a small scale what we are doing on a large scale. It does not appear from what was said that the reforms should change direction. But the conclusions drawn from this meeting will help in making certain revisions."

Foreign Trade Chamber Functions Go to National Chamber of Commerce

90EP0498B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
3-4 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by M.K.: "Polish National Chamber of Commerce: From Government to Self-Rule"]

[Text] The future of the Polish Foreign Trade Chamber is no longer in doubt. Its affairs, obligations and assets will be turned over to the National Chamber of Commerce in agreement with the ruling on government chambers. The formation of the National Chamber of Commerce [KIG] took a long time. Let us recall that as

early as in December 1989, two groups of chambers of commerce applied to be registered as founders of the National Chamber. Reason and good will prevailed. A joint founders' meeting was called and on 15 February, KIG was registered.

Economic self-rule representing the interests of all manufacturers is extremely necessary at present. One of its tasks is to reorganize the Polish Foreign Trade Chamber from an institution subject to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation into an organization serving the self-rule of enterprises.

The takeover and change of the Polish Foreign Trade Chamber [PIHZ] cannot interfere with the normal flow of work (promotion of Polish economy, organization of exhibitions, etc.). Concerning the method of the PIHZ takeover, on 2 March, Marcin Swiecicki, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, spoke before the presidium of the National Chamber of Commerce and with its president, Andrzej Arendarski. A determination was made that work on the new statutes, form and tasks of PIHZ will be done by a special commission (representatives of the National Chamber of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, PIHZ and deputies). Bases for consultation with the National Chamber of Commerce concerning plans for legislative acts pertaining to foreign trade were also agreed on.

Universal: Share Sales Begin; Plans To Buy Out Failing Enterprises

90EP0553C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 May 90 p 2

[Interview with Dariusz Przywieczerski, general director, Universal Foreign Trade Enterprise Corporation, by A. Zielinski; place and date not given: "Nobody's Done It Before Us"]

[Text] [Zielinski] Prospectuses have appeared announcing the sale of stock in Universal and giving full details about the firm's status. This is perhaps the first such invitation to purchase stock.

[Przywieczerski] Yes. No one has done this before us. With full responsibility, I can say we have succeeded in being the first in Poland (in the postwar period) to treat potential purchasers with the full respect due them. We do not attempt to supplement anything, remain silent about anything, or conceal anything. We have described our financial status exactly as it is. We have also said what we want to do with the money we obtain from the stock issue.

[Zielinski] Yes, in a very general way. May we ask you to decipher the statement regarding the further development of the firm.

[Przywieczerski] We will use all of the new capital to increase our profits. We want to earn money not only by acting as an intermediary, we also want to produce

products which can be sold abroad. We will buy out plants and enterprises which are going bankrupt or help them avoid bankruptcy.

Such help will consist of replacing the stock of machinery with modern machinery which will permit us to manufacture products which are competitive on all markets. I want to remind you that in Europe the stock of machinery is replaced, at the maximum, every 8 years. In Poland the last large investment purchases in enterprises were made in 1978. This already tells you how much we want replace. Of course, there are plants in which we are interested which can really export, and not just produce tons or kilometers of products.

[Zielinski] What will the person who buys Universal stock get out of this? I am referring to the ordinary person, the individual, and not a large state or foreign firm.

[Przywieczerski] First of all, the stock issue must end with a predominance of private capital. The "ordinary people," as you describe them, have priority over state capital. We have allocated 31 percent of the stock for foreign capital, which we want to offer to recognized banks and insurance societies.

Second, and this is most important, through our stock we want to offer society the most favorable form of investment for their capital. Today people are investing their savings in valuables, real estate, and dollars.

Valuables may soon become an investment which is difficult to sell. Real estate prices, too, will not remain at their present level very long. Finally, the price of the dollar can drop after the fund for the stabilization of the zloty is activated. It is estimated that it may even drop to 6,500. The ratio of payout for our stock next year will be 1:3. Certainly it should be worth buying.

[Zielinski] Can such stocks be sold?

[Przywieczerski] Of course. They are registered in the name of the purchaser, but after the stock company is registered they can be sold through the Bank of Economic Initiatives, BIG S.A. Beginning 1 January 1991, our stocks will appear on the world markets (including buying and selling bids). And one more bit of important information. Dividends will be paid in dollars, if the owner of the stock so wishes.

[Zielinski] This sounds very attractive. But will a person who wants to purchase your stock not be unpleasantly surprised when he finds that the sale of stock is restricted to privileged parties, as is now generally the case?

[Przywieczerski] We are truly a responsible firm. Something like that is unthinkable to us. Even our employees, if they wish, can buy stock at the same price and on the same terms as everyone else. I assure you, no one has any special privileges.

[Zielinski] Finally, why are the shares priced so low?

[Przywieczerski] Precisely so that everyone who wants to buy them can do so. People have less and less money, unfortunately, and we have to take this into account.

Agriculture: Credit Policy Attacked, Less Seed Planting Noted

90EP0553B Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
7 May 90 p 2

[Article by Wladyslaw Bielski: "Changes in Agriculture?"]

[Text] The farmers have again reminded us of their difficulties. The spectacular gesture of dumping potatoes in front of the ministry building, which in the city was received with mixed feelings, is really a symptom of much more serious problems in the countryside.

With the exception of the owners of commodity farms, which in Poland comprise about 20 percent, the others do not have money to purchase the means of production which would guarantee development. Most of the farmers sold their grain immediately after last year's harvest, at prices six to seven times lower than they are now. Yet at the end of the year, the price of hard coal rose 600 percent, electric power 400 percent, pesticides thirteenfold to twenty-one-fold, etc.

It is estimated that compared with last year, the financial burden of the private farmer will increase elevenfold by virtue of the farm tax, seventeenfold by virtue of social security, and fivefold by virtue of property insurance.

A solution to this might be, following the example of other countries, a credit policy appropriate to agriculture, with the indispensable preferences, for in the main, we are talking about credits for production which is obtained only after a certain amount of time. Unfortunately, in the final days of last year, the government set a drastically high interest rate on current and past credits, to which the farmers were forced to react by selling off large amounts of their stock, which they had not planned. With an artificially increased supply (everyone wanted to pay off their credit immediately, and first get the money for this purpose) they sold at very low prices.

Those, for the most part, are the reasons that the countryside does not have money, and because of this, the sale of fertilizers shrunk 53 percent last year, while sales of pesticides dropped 68 percent. In the spring of this year, the farmers bought over one-third less certified seed than the year before.

This portends badly for plant production.

The protesting peasants, therefore, demand that economic conditions be created which would make it possible to produce food more efficiently, and thus more cheaply. They are also acting indirectly in the interests of the consumers, because a barrier for demand for food has appeared, particularly for meat. From the beginning

of summer of last year to the present time, meat production remains about 10 percent lower than previously, but the drop in demand for meat is about twofold greater. The situation with the production of milk is just as bad. People in the city cannot afford to buy the expensive products, which are expensive mainly due to reasons having nothing to do with the producers.

If the farmers are saying, often not concealing their desperation, that they are able to alone supply enough food to feed the nation, without donations, then by doing so they are not demanding, as has been suggested, any special breaks for themselves, but they are demanding that the government provide the conditions adapted to the peculiarities of this branch of production.

The state cannot afford at this time to bring about the situation which exists in the West, where 60 percent of all of the EEC money is working for agriculture (I am quoting from Prof. Jerzy Szyrmer's statement for TYGODNIK ROLNIKOW SOLIDARNOSC). However, it is certainly possible to conduct a stable, meaning also a flexible, economic policy.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy announced that it would shortly announce a program for the development of agriculture which is adapted to present needs. Quick and comprehensive measures are indispensable so that there does not have to be a situation in which there is less, and even more expensive, food.

Monopoly on Auto Sales 'Slowly but Systematically' Breaking Down

90EP0498A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
3-4 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by K. Sz.: "The Polmozbyt Monopoly Is Breaking Down"]

[Text] The fossilized monopoly system of automobile sales that existed thus far is slowly but systematically disintegrating. High bank interest made it unprofitable for Polmozbyt to get credit from the bank and made car sales in general unprofitable. The manufacturers, on the other hand, do not agree with the universal bank practices of transferring funds to their accounts after two or three months. In order to survive in the face of a limited demand, they must sell their product quickly and have ready cash with which to pay their suppliers.

Following this reasoning, the Zeran FSO auto plant opened four of its own factory outlets in Warsaw, and three more will open soon. Directors of Polmozbyt enterprises from Katowice, Wroclaw, Lodz, Kielce, Poznan, Krakow and Gdansk as well as the Lublin Polish Motorists Union were invited to discuss offers of direct trade agreements. In general, the issue is maximum extension of the sales network for Polonez and FSO 1500 cars, which even modest, small-town retailers with garages accommodating only several cars could sell. This

is how things are organized in the West, perhaps this system will be accepted in our country as well.

Regardless of this, FSO representatives started out and are insistently convincing their suppliers to come down a peg and stop counting on 20-30 percent profit since it will then be necessary to raise the prices of the cars and sales will stop completely and every one will be left with an empty bag. This new thinking is evidently penetrating despite great opposition.

Housing: Current Reform Efforts, Necessary Corrective Measures

90EP0561A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 18, 5 May 90 p 4

[Article by Andrzej Mozolowski: "Where Is That Artillery?"]

[Text] When the team of Prime Minister Mazowiecki is ranked, Minister Aleksander Paszynski holds the undisputed last place. Recently, the Union of the Homeless, even before its congress was held, organized a spectacular demonstration in front of the ministry building in order to put the head of the ministry to shame, and public opinion received with approval the absolutely false report to the effect that the above minister was to be "dismissed."

Undoubtedly, we are facing the state of a housing disaster. One and a half million people are on the waiting lists for apartments, and they will keep waiting for a long time. The number of 180,000 to 190,000 apartments built annually in the past decade with public and private funds, miniscule in comparison with the needs, fell last year to an altogether catastrophic 160,000. There are half a million messed-up apartments in the country the construction of which proceeds at a snail's pace for years and frequently grinds to a halt. In turn, the costs of construction grow at an altogether breakneck speed. A person currently moving into a new cooperative apartment now faces the prospect of paying 1.5 to 2 million zlotys per square meter, though as recently as last year this cost amounted to several hundred thousand. To be sure, the new resident has been saving for years and paid a cooperative contribution in full a long time ago, but what's the use: Yesterday's zlotys have lost almost all of their value; in turn, the PKO [General Savings Bank] revalues his contribution on the basis of the average price per square meter last year which amounts to 200,000 zlotys per square meter. Meanwhile, he has to pay seven, eight, or nine times that much...

This is not yet all. The new owner (resident), the unfortunate lucky man, has to take out a loan for the remainder of the amount due, the rate of interest on which takes one's breath away, and, to finish him off... pay a couple hundred thousand zlotys every month in rent. Horror.

The members of older cooperatives are not doing that much better. To be sure, it is easier for them to pay back

the loans, but their rents are growing and will keep getting higher. The same applies to those who have purchased their apartments as property hoping that this will reduce monthly encumbrances to a minimum; the same applies to the residents of rental apartments. Meanwhile, the costs of maintenance are snowballing. At the same time, the state is discontinuing subsidies. Let us add the two together and tell a renter: So far, you have been paying only 16 percent of the cost of maintaining the building, now you are going to pay 100 percent!

To be sure, out of the goodness of his heart Minister Paszynski administered this cruel operation in installments; Effective 1 October, we will pay rents in the amount of the full cost of current maintenance and repairs only; the costs of overhauls will be calculated into rents three years from now. However, this is enough to shock the people. I will recall an example of rent (including central heating, water, and so on) for a 60-meter apartment which was recently cited in *POLITYKA* (No 17). A renter is already paying 50,000 zlotys per month for it; from July on, he will pay 79,000 zlotys, and after 1 October—128,000 zlotys. A cooperative member, from "the old lot," will pay respectively 79,000, 107,000, and 149,000 zlotys. Please note that at issue is only rent, without the repayment of credit which increased greatly for "new" cooperative members.

So, What Will Be Done to Them? Nothing!

Not only many of the residents of cooperative and rental buildings but also their owners and investors will face a critical financial situation. Until recently, there were two powerful obstacles to housing construction for dozens of years: the exacerbating shortage of materials and the downright tragic shortage of the so-called processing capacity of construction enterprises. Money was the easy part, but nothing hinged on money. At present, for the first time the producers of bricks, cement, prefabricated elements, plumbing supplies, and all kinds of contractor supplies ask insistently that all of it be purchased from them; they offer rebates and their own transportation; they are overjoyed to accommodate esteemed customers. For their part, contracting enterprises, the dethroned monarchs, meekly seek the favor of the investing gentlemen. However, there is no artillery...

After all, three things are needed in order to rescue the housing sector: money, money, and more money.

All of a sudden, the PKO [General Savings Bank] began to feel like a real bank and preferred to give rapid half-a-year credit rather than uncertain loans for 30 years. The WSM [Warsaw Housing Cooperative] chairman said in a businesslike manner: "We have three buildings under construction, and the bank is refusing credit altogether! The bank says that they are not going to give us credit because there is no guarantee that the future residents will be in a position to repay, and the bank will lose the money..."

Can anybody give the bank such a guarantee? This is a rhetorical question. A square meter in these buildings, taken as an example, will cost 1.8 million zlotys.

The WSM has just turned over two new buildings to the occupants. People are saying: They were to be commissioned as early as last year! At the time, loans were cheap. We are not going to pay for current loans at insane interest rates. The cooperative should sue the builder for failing to meet the deadline...

Technical credit is money (a lot of it!) which building owners received in order to restore mining damage, to reinsulate the walls which were freezing through, to change poor central-heating pipes which would rust through after three years in operation, and so on. Until recently, such loans were written off, and the budget paid the debt of the cooperatives to the bank. The budget does not do this anymore. Therefore, the banks are no longer giving loans. The pipes will rust in peace, the walls will freeze through, and houses in the Silesian Coal Basin will subside. Rents have got to be raised if this is to be prevented!

There were subsidies for building maintenance, but not anymore. Leaking roofs and peeling plaster are left alone. What remains to be done? Raise the rents...

That Communist Paszynski...

Artists who have studios, naturally, large ones, also declared war on Minister Paszynski. Where are they to get money for these horrendous rents, two rents, because there is another one for the apartment, where?! Let the minister tell us....

The answer is simple: This money needs to be made. As it were, many artists make so much that they will not even feel the raises. Those who will not be able to make money will have to do without a studio.

However, it appears that this answer does not satisfy the interested parties. No wonder. It is not easy to root out the conviction that the state has to provide, and an artist will do fine if he has the right connections.

Finally, the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement] got on the minister's case. As is known, Miodowicz is not to be trifled with: Paszynski is to be recalled—this is a formal demand of the trade unionists who are proceeding from their sincere conviction that as soon as the minister is changed money will be found, housing construction will soar, and nobody will oppress the working people with rents. Such thinking has a beautiful tradition developed by the previous prime ministers who, in the same hope as that of Alfred Miodowicz at present, changed ministers of construction every now and then, which, however, is of no earthly use to the aforementioned economic sector.

However, it may be expected that Prime Minister Mazowiecki will not follow in the footsteps of his predecessors. If he were to follow, I believe that this would not

satisfy those making the proposal. The successor of Paszynski would do the same thing as his predecessor, because what else could he do? Except, of course, if he yielded to the pressure of those who, like Kusmierek in GAZETA WYBORCZA, label the current minister of construction a communist for his overly socially oriented approach to the issue and his excessively ceremonious conversion of the housing sector to a market-based model. Is this what the protesters want?

Give Us the Culprit!

So what, if appeals to slow down rent increases and continue subsidization are heard everywhere? These are nonsensical appeals because, in the absence of high rents, our homes will fall apart altogether, whereas money for subsidies has to be first taken from our pockets either through higher prices on goods (turnover tax) or lower wages (income tax), to say nothing about the really trifling matter of undermining the principles of market reform in this manner.

As is usual in such cases, the people want to direct at a specific culprit their bitterness and anger with the new financial burden which is in stark contrast with the stagnation of construction, many years of waiting for an apartment, and the misery of sloppily built and neglected "new" apartment buildings. Nobody is interested in what has caused the housing catastrophe in Poland; everybody wants to know who has caused it. Such is human nature: Guilt must be personified; otherwise, anger does not find an outlet and the frustration of the wronged party will only grow worse.

Unfortunately, such a social need cannot be met in this case, as well as in many others. The accused minister of construction, called to the carpet, would point his finger with a clear conscience at the chairman of the National Bank of Poland and the minister of finance, because, after all, this is a question of money; in turn, they, being equally innocent, would point their fingers at the government which sets the economic policy. The latter would point at the Sejm which has approved the economic program. The Sejm, if it were to be asked, would say that the economic situation of the country, which is at fault, compels this very solution rather than another one under the slogan of the Balcerowicz program.

In reality, the blame devolves on decisions made by the party and the government of the initial postwar years, which proclaimed socialism to be the giver of apartments, a basic asset which everybody is entitled to have. It is clear that even the richest states of the world cannot afford to give away apartments (to everyone) at a symbolic fee, to say nothing of a country such as Poland, devastated by war and governed incompetently. Apartments stopped being commodities and became an asset distributed by officials. Economics evaporated from construction and the construction materials industry. It was replaced by striving for statistical effects which was

accompanied by incredible waste and overwhelmed by special interests, overall chaos, and the demoralization of construction workers.

Pardon me for this banality, but restoring the market is the only way to untie this knot. This is exactly what the program is. Apartments have to become a commodity; they must cost as much as they cost, taking into account the ratio of supply and demand. The only opportunity for apartments to cost less is given by competition overseen by local self-governments true to their name. The government is gradually moving both the housing sector and construction in this direction, certainly, not without mistakes, but consistently (for example, a mistake was made in underestimating the rate of inflation this year and thus an increase in the cost of apartments, during the compilation of the budget for this year). In a couple of years, we will evaluate the results.

However, the burning issue is to make sure that construction and the housing sector do not come a cropper for us in the meantime, before we get out of the recession. It is true that the total lack of loans combined with the eventual insolvency of residents may do unimaginable damage in the above sectors and set our development many years back.

So, What Is To Be Done?

Privatize construction as soon as possible. This incredibly messed-up sphere changes beyond recognition in private hands. Here is an example which is gaining notoriety: The private enterprise of Engineer Reclaw in Wroclaw is building homes at one-third of the average cost of state contractors....

Second—this is addressed to housing cooperatives: Think. In the aforementioned "Settlement of the Young," cooperative members pay less than elsewhere because the cooperative has set up its own, large construction and repair facility (at present, it employs 400 people, and in the near future will employ 1,000). They do it cheaper and faster. The same applies to commercial groups set up here and there.

Third—this is addressed to the government: Let up on credit somewhat. The rate of decline of inflation makes it possible. I hear that this possibility was discussed recently at a KERM [Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers] meeting. The injection of money into the bloodstream of construction and investment cannot be postponed.

Fourth, return to those waiting for apartments what inflation has taken away. This wish has already been granted in part: The PKO will revalue apartment deposits at a more decent rate, taking into account the considerably higher price for a square meter in the fourth quarter of last year rather than the average price growth in all of last year.

Fifth: investors (private and cooperative) should learn to earn their keep. In other words, we should return to

building commercial space together with apartments, and renting it at a respectable profit which makes it possible to alleviate the rent burden on residents. In the past, housing cooperatives built stores and stands because they had to. Now they can do it for a considerable financial gain. It pays to take out a loan even at the highest rate of interest for this type of construction.

Into the bargain, it would be worthwhile to charge the government, and the minister of land use and construction in particular, with putting in order at an accelerated pace the legal and economic foundations of all types of housing construction: guidelines for land sales, expropriation of land, issuance of siting permits, and so on. The current maze of regulations ties the hands of investors, discourages the industrious, and stifles hundreds of initiatives over the long years of intricate bureaucratic procedures.

Without the Law of the Jungle

How much longer are the rents going to grow? This question should be worded differently: What share of the budget of the average Pole should fees for an apartment claim?

It is assumed that the monthly rent will account for roughly seven percent of family income. Therefore, in the case of two gainfully employed people with a combined income of, say, 1.8 million zlotys, it would amount to 126,000 zlotys. A Western economist would say that this is ridiculously little; over there, housing absorbs between 20 and 25 percent of income. However, those are affluent countries in which a three times lower share of earnings is spent for food than our 60 percent. ...besides, these apartments are very different.

This, however, leads to the conclusion that the proportions of our spending will change as the standard of living in Poland grows (may it begin growing very soon!). An increasing share will be allocated for apartments. This means an important evolutionary change in social consciousness which has already begun: The things which we have gotten used to regarding as virtually free social benefits over many decades will become significant as basic costs of our existence.

Finally, something very important needs to be said: The laws of the market in Poland cannot be the law of the jungle. There are, and will still be for a long time, families, frequently with many children, who live in want or altogether in poverty, sometimes afflicted by a personal misfortune, frequently cooped up in apartments which are not worthy of that name. Many families do not have any opportunity to pay high rents or pay back loans at high rates of interest. Minister Kuron is not the only one who should pay attention to them and have them on his conscience.

However, the entire point is for aid to such people not to assume the form of relief, exemptions, or some payment privileges which constitute a departure from the economic and financial system of the housing sector. These

families should be simply given permanent financial aid the amount of which will depend on their earnings, and which will make it possible for them to pay "regular" rents or pay back "regular" credit.

Where is the money to be found for it? They have figured out where. They have come to the conclusion in the ministry (we are discussing the same ministry all the time) that a tremendous, 9-trillion sum, thus far allocated to the housing buildings management, which, as is known, enjoys the worst reputation, should be allocated for this purpose. This would make it possible for the poorest residents of rental apartments, as well as the cooperatives of residents, to pay all fees. In the course of

this, it will also discipline the administration somehow, forcing it to get rid of incompetent structures and work more efficiently.

This begs the following question: When will the new construction and housing policy produce results?

Of course, when the entire market reform of the economy begins to yield results. If everything boils down to money, it has to be generated first in industry, agriculture, trade and services. They will be the ones to finance all construction and housing undertakings in various forms. Therefore, talking about any kind of priority (as was frequently done in the past) does not make sense. There may be only one priority: to get the entire economy moving.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Education System Changes Outlined

90GE0101A East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German
8 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Prof. Dr. Hans Joachim Meyer, minister of Education and Science, by Gudrun Skulski; place and date not given: "Salient Points for Future Development Must Be Set"—first paragraph is NEUE ZEIT introduction]

[Text] Prof. Dr. Hans Joachim Meyer, minister of Education and Science, was born in 1936 in Rostock. His father was a certified chemist and pharmacist, and his mother was a teacher. After graduating from high school, he studied at the Academy of Political Science and Jurisprudence in Potsdam-Babelsberg. In 1958, his degree was withdrawn for political reasons. For one year, he worked as unskilled worker at the Babelsberg locomotive manufacturing plant. From 1959 to 1964, he studied Anglistics/Americanistics and history. Upon completing his studies, he received the philosophical faculty diploma and became an instructor and senior assistant at the Humboldt University foreign language department. After earning his doctorate, he was appointed lecturer of applied languages (English) at Humboldt University in 1982 and associate professor in 1985. Dr. Meyer is known as a nationally and internationally respected linguist who studied, and gave guest lectures, in Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR. He is director of the intensive language training department and, for several years, was deputy director of the foreign language department. In February 1990, Prof. Dr. Meyer was appointed chairman of the GDR Joint Action Group of Catholic Christians. He is married and has three children.

[Skulski] Misguided education policies have plunged the system of education into a deep crisis. State-controlled structures have had a profound effect on schools, vocational training, and the university system. Although from the outset, there have been strong public demands for education reforms, changes in the school system were very slow in coming. What do you think about the current status of efforts to reform our school system?

[Meyer] At this point, our schools work very differently. The spectrum ranges from lethargy in making limited use of new opportunities to abusing areas of freedom as though it were to be expected in periods of transition. The issue now is to develop key points for the future development of our schools. However, we can only consider such processes because we are led to believe that these tasks in the future will fall within the sphere of cultural and educational freedoms of the Laender. Hence we will limit ourselves to discussing fundamental reforms. On this basis, we are seeking to work by consensus and count on the trust of the teachers, parents, and students in this cooperative effort. We have to

design structures of acceptable guidelines and find concrete forms for them, because we currently have high expectations with regard to what must be done. In addition, we must explore the extent of our differences. Some things have already been accomplished. To begin with, the requirement for a four-year study program for students to graduate from high school has been reinstituted. The subject of civics has been abolished. This must now be followed by a reform of foreign language training. For instance, we are at a complete loss as to how to handle such subjects as German and history in the future. I think we must get rid of the idea that teachers need detailed instructions. A teacher is experienced and knowledgeable enough to decide for himself how to conduct his lessons at a specific class level, provided the parameters of the educational program have been established. We must strengthen our teachers' sense of responsibility and encourage them to freely handle the subject matter in a way they deem best. These are tasks we must tackle during the current school year.

[Skulski] Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education has thrown out for discussion some hypotheses on educational reform. What is your view on the diversity of ideas developed before you assumed office?

[Meyer] The educational reform hypotheses are interesting and valuable interim results which should be considered a basis for discussion. I do not share the view that it provides the basis for a new law on education, because I believe that this is unrealistic, especially with respect to what a law on education could accomplish, since the laender have the responsibility for cultural issues. We also have to ask ourselves whether the concept of one law on education for a pluralistic society is really acceptable. Issues such as criteria for graduating from high school or exam modalities can be resolved through school rules. There must be agreement on contents, but a society's general awareness regarding education cannot be codified. In the past, we have seen time and again what an important role the law has played in cases of a sudden reorientation. With that in mind, I would like to state once again that I appreciate the hypotheses as a basis for discussion; they can be used as a reference, but they should not be ranked any higher. Even in their formulation, they are too slippery, in my view. I am saying this as a linguist, not so much as a practical politician. I am worried that their formulation is not clear and realistic enough.

[Skulski] Among other things, the education system is expected to address demands that parents have the right to educate their children and that the individuality of children should be respected. What is the position of the education system on these issues?

[Meyer] These demands are fundamental principles which I consider absolutely necessary. Educators must be more child-oriented, and they must not cling to a uniform personality ideal. They must accept a young person the way he is, respect his needs, further his

interests, recognize his life ambitions, and address the needs of the individual student. Still, teaching must keep its grouplike character.

[Skulski] In any discussion on schools, vocational training, and university education, there is always talk of the importance of a thorough all-round education. How would you define this concept in today's world?

[Meyer] We still have to reach a social consensus on this. We have to think about what we should emphasize. In the past, compared with linguistics and the arts/aesthetics subjects, the scientific-mathematical components used to play a dominant role. As a result, other important areas were neglected, not to mention such areas as the classical languages. Together with experts in schools, institutions of continued vocational training and universities, we will have to redefine goals and ensure that there is once again a balanced relationship among the various disciplines. Especially in the area of languages and arts, some things have fallen by the wayside.

[Skulski] How much thought is given in these discussions to the subject of polytechnics?

[Meyer] Polytechnics is an important component of education, although good traditions were lost as a result of its strongly ideological orientation. I believe it is essential and would make sense if we would be able to teach practical skills and aspects of everyday production in that discipline. In that sense, I think that polytechnical training is no doubt an element of a well-rounded education; however, this is no reason why our schools should be called polytechnical universities. We have to find meaningful names. Why is it necessary for first-graders to immediately go to a secondary school? We should avoid such exaggerations, if only because it makes us appear laughable internationally.

[Skulski] For a long time, equal access to education for all children has been viewed as disastrous egalitarianism. How can we ensure optimal conditions for each child and each young person? In this connection, what role does the integration of handicapped children play?

[Meyer] We agree on the desirable goal of integration. But we must also understand that this involves material requirements which at this time are unavailable in our school system. I think setting goals makes sense. However, I do not believe it is useful to set unattainable goals. We can profit from new insights in other West European countries, although their material conditions differ from ours. But even in the FRG and Western Europe, this problem is controversial. In the one or one and a half years we have, we should work to achieve, within the framework of our existing schools, the optimum degree of equal opportunity for everybody to get an education, and we should encourage the gifted, so that we will be prepared to participate sooner or later in the educational debate of the entire Germany. At the moment, it looks as if the comprehensive school model of the Weimar period has been distorted to a degree that it has become unrecognizable. Above all, the school system

must be flexible enough to open up many different ways for our young people to grow and to make corrections possible.

[Skulski] The education network is large and wide, ranging from kindergarten through school, vocational training, to university and continued education. How do you see the way to start a career under these new circumstances?

[Meyer] In the past, the way to [begin] a career was absolutely fixed. Only apparatchiks could design something like that. The questions we must ask are: how much time does a youth realistically need and which career does he want to pursue, should he first complete high school or first learn a trade? We cannot expect a young person to make final decisions at one point in his life which do not leave room for change. Also, we are currently experiencing a rather frightening situation with regard to job training. A large number of companies are shunning their responsibility. We are currently trying to counteract this attitude by way of legal and fiscal measures. In the past, all this was resolved through political will. If we now want to take measures under the rule of law, we first must create the necessary instruments. We are fighting to maintain the work training system and believe it is realistic to expect cooperative and communal forms to take on more importance. Companies would then have to share in the costs.

[Skulski] Indications are that the university system needs to be reformed as well. Which are the major starting points here?

[Meyer] At the universities, it is primarily a question of setting up an orderly appeals procedure that will ensure competition. The proposals seek to make sure that academic standing and quality are taken into consideration, not the fulfillment of cadre management plans. Decisionmaking and management structures must be designed where groups of people interact in a democratic fashion so that the diverse interests and levels of responsibility can be utilized. After all, a university professor's expectations are different from that of a student. At the same time, we have to work for consensus agreement and also provide in the near future the necessary general requirements for it. As in the school system, a federal education system offers universities room for great flexibility. This is an opportunity we must not miss.

POLAND

Sociologist on Status of National Minorities

90EP0530A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 16,
21 Apr 90 p 7

[Interview with Cezary Zoledowski, sociologist specializing in research on Poland's national minorities at the University of Warsaw, by Piotr Golik; place and date not given: "Account of Conscience"]

[Text] [Golik] Due to a lack of a question regarding nationality on the census forms, we do not know how many non-Poles live in Poland. What else don't we know?

[Zoledowski] We don't know the scope or dynamics of various phenomena. We don't know to what extent we should attribute them to special processes and to what extent to nationality policy. Minorities make up from 2 to 3 percent of the country's population, but no research group has ever been interested in this "fringe" problem, regardless of the prevailing political conditions.

[Golik] Was the doctoral thesis entitled "The PRL Officials' Policy on Nationalities 1944-89" a dissertation about something that never existed?

[Zoledowski] Not at all, although central authorities focused their attention on these issues only during the first few years after the end of the war. At the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's they seem to have felt that all sorts of problems had been solved by the repatriation agreement with the Soviet officials, the "Vistula" drive, and then the emigration of a substantial percentage of the Jews. After all, they had to deal with population migrations related to taking over the Western Territories and industrialization. At that time it was significant that Poland had become a country with a relatively low percentage of national minorities compared to the rest of Europe. So, until the mid-1950's, the policy waged was one of a nationally uniform country. The year 1952 represented a turning point in this policy, when a school system was set up for minorities, and three associations, Russian, Jewish, and Greek, began their activities.

Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Germans had to wait until October [1956] for the right to set up their own organizations. This date was a turning point in terms of publishing, amateur theater and arts, radio broadcasts, and finally the revocation of certain regulations which discriminated against Ukrainians and Germans.

The next censorship came during the first few years of the 1970's, when we went back to the hypothesis that we are a nationally uniform country, which the Third PZPR Central Committee Plenum in 1976 "canonized" in its resolution on moral and political unity. The practical consequences were the internal affairs ministry's stricter control over national minority associations, the cutting of subsidies for their activities, and the famous drive to make geographic names of towns and places more Polish, especially in the Bieszczady Mountains.

The last stage finally began with the period of martial law, which could be described as moderate but still retaliatory advances against official groups representing minorities.

[Golik] So the northeastern parts of the country are ideal territory for a sociologist who wants to do research on the level of awareness or the role of national minorities in sociopolitical life?

[Zoledowski] The eastern parts of Bialystok Voivodship and Sejny Powiat are the only areas in our country

inhabited by Byelorussians and Lithuanians in any cohesive way. They were able to remain faithful to their "little native countries" in the face of the far more rapid emigration pressures after 1944. The Lithuanians are estimated at a total of 12,000. They represent an absolute majority in the gmina (parish) of Punszk. The Byelorussian population is more than a dozen times greater. It predominates in the area of two former powiats [administrative district, dissolved in 1975] (Bielsk Podlaski and Hajnowka), and it makes up a significant share of the population in three other areas (Bialystok, Siemiatycze, and Sokolka).

And this is where we find the first paradox. The Byelorussians are far more inclined to assimilate. Eugeniusz Mironowicz's research shows that, unlike before World War II, nearly 30 percent of the Orthodox declared themselves to be Poles or Polish Orthodox, and more than half of this population defined itself as Byelorussian. The other groups were "Russkies" and "local people," that is, groups which hadn't been here before the war either. So the fact that they belong to a faith distinct from that of the Polish Catholics around them does not seem to be as strong a barrier as is popularly thought. It is worth adding that the erosion of Byelorussian national awareness does not always benefit Polish identity. In the southern part of this region we find the Ukrainian influence. Some 2 percent of the inhabitants of these areas, which have been Byelorussian for centuries, declare themselves to be Ukrainians, and this group is growing slowly but consistently.

It's different with the Lithuanians. They've maintained a strong sense of separateness and are afraid of being absorbed by the Poles. This is demonstrated in the answer to the classic question: Would you accept a mixed marriage in the family? A whole 43 percent of the Sejny Powiat residents I asked rejected such a union (one out of every four people living there is a Pole), although at the same time only 8 percent of the Lithuanians say that they feel a dislike for their Polish neighbors or fellow workers.

There is a far smaller number of the population which seems more attached to their ethnic group or is more organized. As many as 30 percent of adult Lithuanians in those areas belongs to the Lithuanian Social and Cultural Society, while the Byelorussian Social and Cultural Society is still a relatively small organization.

[Golik] There is a theory promoted largely in the United States that says there is a limit above which conflicts are bound to occur. In the literature this is usually given as 10 percent. Would you be inclined to agree with this hypothesis?

[Zoledowski] With certain reservations. We mustn't treat such a threshold in a mechanical way. This leads to oversimplification. The racial conflicts in the U.S. South are one thing. The problems with the influx of immigrants to the Common Market countries, for example, are another. And finally the situation of having two or

more age groups or social groups living side by side are still another. No one's going to deny, however, that in postwar Poland various conflicts came about which, if not actually based on, definitely had nationalistic undertones.

[Golik] The conflicts between the Uniates (that is, Ukrainians) and the Catholics over churches, the Polish-Lithuanian conflicts over language used at liturgies, and the Catholic-Orthodox disputes over the course of religious processions have colored certain areas, surely not for the better, but now we are dealing with deliberately heating up people's attitudes. The pamphlets of Polish chauvinists, unusually anti-Semitic ones signed by anonymous groups, converge in time at least with the statement of an activist of the German minority who said that his native town in the Opole Region was "not Polish," and a statement by another who doubted the size of Polish losses during World War II.

[Zoledowski] I recognize everyone's right to define his own nationality and a change in it, but there's no getting around the reflection that Poland should be written off on the balance sheet of the 45 years of communist governments as having lost the fight for the hearts and minds of the Silesians, Mazurians, Warmians, and the Slowins [of Pomerania, closely related to the Kaszubs]. This was the unavoidable result of competition, in which one side proved incompetent and at times brutal, while the other side offered good organization, prosperity, and liberalism.

As for the conflicts, sometimes various activists saw them as a technique in social engineering, a means serving to spur a group's self-definition by evoking dislike among people around them. This was very easy to do in the case of the heavy-laden history of relations between the Poles and the Germans.

Things may come to a similar pass in relations with other minorities, although the situation will of course be different in that the past history with the others is different. I myself read a Byelorussian underground newspaper which, for example, praised the attempt on the Pope's life. The attempt to start a conflict was so obvious that I took it all as the false propaganda of the SB [security forces]. I am no longer so sure about this, although the number of people striving for conflict is completely negligible.

[Golik] In the situation where just about all of the "other" Europe is going through a wave of nationalism, though, we have to ask about the chances the various propagandists have of winning. To what extent do you think they are appealing to the real attitudes which the minorities and Poles have?

[Zoledowski] CBOS [the Public Opinion Research Center] has already done research on Poles' relations, for example, to Americans and Japanese, but somehow they never asked about other nationals. One can only draw conclusions indirectly. Last year children of people settled here from beyond the Bug River voting in the

Gorzow area immediately chose Dr. Wlodzimierz Mokry to the parliament of the Ukraine, but socialist Jan Jozef Lipski had to stand election for a second time around in what was once "red" Radom.

As for the sense of injustice among the minorities, leaving historical issues aside, some of the people in the Byelorussian and Ukrainian groups bring up the question of teaching their language. They consider the parents' declaration envisioned in the regulations to be proof of discrimination.

[Golik] Did 1989 begin a new stage in the history of national minorities in Poland? How do they react to the changes taking place?

[Zoledowski] Certainly. These groups reacted to turning points in our country's postwar history. I have already talked about 1956. In 1981 things got to the point where the authorities sabotaged the registration of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian students' organizations. NZS and Solidarity in the colleges supported these efforts, but Solidarity has generally given minorities a wide berth, considering them to be a nationalistic group.

Quite a number of new national minority organizations are now coming into being. Two Byelorussian groups are the Ukrainian Youth Union and the Greek Catholic Red Brotherhood, or "Foundation of St. Vladimir." This is at least in part a reaction to the many years of monopoly which the social and cultural societies have enjoyed, along with their leadership, usually imposed by the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and limited to PZPR members. Now that this syndicate has come to an end, an account of conscience is going on outside the societies just as it is within many Polish groups. Considering both the reflection on history and pluralism to be a natural idea, I think that they don't lead to basic divisions, because only by acting together will small national minorities be able to achieve anything, even if it's just in the upcoming self-government elections.

[Golik] Thank you for the interview.

Mortality Causes, Rates Viewed

90EP0547A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE
in Polish No 13, 1 Apr 90 p 8

[Article by Zofia Zubczewska: "Health in a State of Crisis"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In 1951, the mortality rate in Poland was on an average 40 percent higher than in the FRG, the GDR or in England. It declined between 1951 and 1965, attaining among young people the same level that occurred at the time in the aforementioned countries. Therefore, it may be said that more or less similar kinds of phenomena were occurring everywhere which raised living standards.

In 1965, the ways of the Europeans and the Poles parted. In our country, the mortality rate began to rise whereas

it declined continually in the West. The year 1985 was critical for at that time a rapid increase in the number of deaths occurred reaching 88.4 percent of the mortality rate in 1951. Since 1987, an improvement has been noted. However, the mortality rate continues to be higher than in previous decade, i.e., during the 1970's.

Boys born in 1988 have a life expectancy of 67.1 years, i.e., 0.3 of a year more than those born a year earlier. Girls can expect to live an average of 75.7 years or a half-year longer than those a year older. What is the reason for this improvement? After all, living standards between 1985 and 1988 did not change.

Perhaps we have become accustomed to the crisis. It is less stressful for us than it used to be. However, the authors of the report entitled "The State of Health of the Polish Population in 1988" published by the State Institute of Hygiene, the source for my above presented data, warn against the drawing of hasty conclusions. We do not know whether the declining mortality rate, which attests to an improvement in the population's health, is a trend that will last. In recent years, people have found themselves under pressure of unprecedented threats, rapidly rising prices and unemployment. The average European male born in 1988 will live 4 years longer than the average Pole whereas a European female will live 2.5 years longer than a Polish female.

A gauge used worldwide for measuring living standards is body weight of newborns. British medical sociologists have shown that the average weight of newborns depends on the economic situation in a given country. They give Germany as a classic example. Children born there between 1945 and 1949, were much lighter (by as much as 25 percent) than those born 10 years later. A decline in parents' living standards is accompanied by an increase in the number of newborns with a so-called low birth weight (weighing less than 2,500 gm at the time of birth) and in the number of deaths among newborns.

Meanwhile, in our country the situation is different. Parents' living conditions are worsening; however, this does not have an effect on the physical condition of newborns. What is more, increasingly less children are born with a low birth weight and less newborns die. The only direct effect of the crisis, above all, the long wait for an apartment, is the mounting problem called the "age element" in medical jargon. Namely, the number of women in the 35 to 40 age group, who decide to have their first child, is growing. Such late life pregnancies are more risky than in young women. Frequently, complications arise as do congenital defects among the newborns. Therefore, this constitutes a specific social and health problem.

In 1988, for every 100,000 infants born alive, 1,624 died, i.e., 124 less than in the previous year. A particularly optimistic sign is that fewer infants are dying during the first 27 days of life as well as newborns with a low birth weight. A drop in the mortality rate has been achieved due to improved neonatal care. This is the only factor

that can be indicated because care for pregnant women is the same as it has been. Admittedly, it is being noted in the report of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare that in 1988, 0.8 percent more pregnant women were included in early prenatal care whereas only 53 percent of the women in the country take advantage of it (only 34.9 percent in rural areas).

In practice, continuing care did not increase; scarcely 6.6 percent of urban pregnant women take advantage of it and 4.0 percent of women from rural areas. This is a very small number even if we are to take into account the fact that a percentage of the women are patients of medical cooperatives and private practice physicians. Moreover, for many years now the number of employment positions kept secure for pregnant women is decreasing from year to year. According to MZiOs [Ministry of Health and Social Welfare] estimates, there are only enough of them for every other woman. Will the decline in the infant mortality rate persist if only the obstetrics departments continue to care about it? Especially in the newly developing situation on the job market. A pregnant woman will lose out in the competition with every other candidate for her position.

How We Become Ill

The types of illnesses suffered by various populations change along with their civilizational development. We become ill like, for example, the Swedes following World War II. Our backwardness is attested to by frequent illnesses caused by microorganisms which have been virtually eradicated in the West and by the growing number of diseases of the circulatory system and neoplasms—disorders from which an increasingly smaller number of people are suffering in the West.

Food poisonings are raging wild caused by salmonella. They began in 1982. Prior to that date, 6,000 to 10,000 people annually would suffer from this; currently as many as 40,000. And these are only poisonings recorded by physicians. How many people have suffered in the privacy and quiet of their own homes we do not know. More can be said about the various causes of this plague. We have started to hoard food and store it for long periods of time under improper conditions. We stock up on things because we don't know when something will be "thrown" on the market or because it will be more expensive tomorrow and we buy meat from street vendors. In addition, as is the habit, we do not pay too much attention to hygiene. In homes, 65 percent of collective food poisonings reported during the last 2 years occurred during family gatherings.

A second raging disease is viral hepatitis. It has been included among the occupational diseases of the health service and, strictly speaking, should also become an "occupational" disease of hospital patients. Contagious and infectious diseases constitute 19 percent of the total number of occupational diseases. (More frequently occurring than these are only occupational hearing injuries—26.6 percent of the total number of diseases).

Among these diseases, more than 80 percent are cases of contact with the hepatitis virus. In 1986, for every 100,000 persons, 57.7 became ill and these were almost exclusively hospital patients, most frequently children, women giving birth and older persons.

This year, the obligation has been introduced of control testing for pregnant women for the so-called virus carrier factor. Infants born of carrier-mothers are vaccinated. This will limit the virus' impact but will not eliminate the cause of the disease. The virus will remain a threat for as long as unsanitary conditions are present in hospitals and there is a lack of disposable medical implements.

Infectious diseases do not belong to the group of powerful killers, although, the hepatitis virus helps one of them. It weakens the liver which in the future could be conducive to the development of malignant tumors of that organ and of the gall bladder.

For years, the primary cause of deaths among Poland's residents have been diseases of the circulatory system followed by neoplasms. In 1988, 48 percent of men and 57 percent of women died of the former disease whereas 17.6 percent of men and 20.5 percent of women died of the latter disease. In the West, these diseases are gradually becoming more and more infrequent. Improvement has been achieved owing to an equal degree to advancement in medicine and preventive treatment as well as changes in people's attitude toward their own health.

We do not have money for advancement and prophylaxis nor the will to make changes in our attitudes. In any case, this is not a quick process and one that requires favorable conditions. In the West, people are giving up smoking, taking up jogging and submitting themselves to physical checkups. However, they also have the conditions to do all this. What are things like here at home? Sixty percent of men and 34 percent of women are chain smokers. At the sight of joggers, people point to their heads with disbelief not unlike when they hear someone's refusal to "join me for a drink?"

It is necessary to have an internist's recommendation confirmed by the district surgeon followed by registering for one's place in line in order to have USG tests performed. In 1988, only 20 percent of women had prophylactic cytological tests done. I did not find any data as to breast exams—breast malignancies being the primary cause of death among women suffering from neoplastic diseases. I also do not know anyone who goes in for such tests.

In the Institute of Cardiology, tests were conducted on the residents of Warsaw's right bank district from the aspect of the threat of diseases of the circulatory system. We are in sixth place in Europe with respect to the incidence of hypertension among women. Half of those suffering from this disease knew that they had hypertension and half of those who were aware of this received treatment with half of those receiving treatment being treated properly.

Professor Stefan Rywik from this institute points out that the state could have an impact on improving the health situation even during this time of [economic] crisis not only through the activity of the health service but also by means of promoting appropriate foods through lower prices, e.g., low-sugar jams (only highly sweetened ones are available), unsalted bread (which no one wants to bake), whole-meal baked goods (cheaper than white but only in production not in stores), and skim milk and cheese (these products happen to be available).

In Poland, illnesses are not recorded, with the exception of certain diseases, e.g., tuberculosis and venereal diseases. However, a hospital morbidity index is used, i.e., the number of persons treated in a hospital for every 10,000 people. In this way, the statistical health picture leaves out illnesses not requiring a hospital stay. Nevertheless, the overall picture of the population's state of health would not be particularly distorted if everyone requiring hospital treatment would be able to find himself there in time. How it really is we all know.

Professor Stanislaw Mlekodaj and Assistant Professor Zenon Piasecki, the authors of a report entitled "Studies on the Effectiveness of the Functioning of the Health Service," conducted comparisons of the number of deaths in hospitals and outside of them. They estimated that slightly less than half (46.9 percent) of the overall number of deaths occur in hospitals. Unfortunately, the authors do not answer a truly interesting question as to how many of those deceased could have been saved if they had found themselves in the hospital at the right time? They only state that "a high percentage of nonhospital deaths, particularly among children, youths and adults up to age 65, indicates a significant disproportion between the public needs arising from current health threats and the ability to meet these needs with the country's health protection system."

A Diet From the 1950's

One's state of health is, above all, associated with diet. The crisis imposes diet changes on us but they are more an indication of a drop in the standard of living than the state of our health. In economically developing countries, a rise in people's prosperity is accompanied by characteristic changes in eating habits. The consumption of grain products and potatoes drops whereas there is an increase in the consumption of meat, fish, eggs, milk (i.e., animal protein), fats, sugar, fruit and vegetables.

In Poland, between 1950 and 1980 the consumption of butter, meat, organ meats, eggs and sugar rose twofold and that of vegetables and vegetable products—one and a half times while fat, milk and milk product consumption rose 30 percent. On the other hand, grain product consumption decreased 25 percent and that of potatoes by 40 percent. The crisis has disturbed this process. We

began to eat increasingly more potatoes and flour products; increasingly less meat, vegetables and fruit. The current diet of the average Pole resembles more and more that of the 1950's.

However, doctors are not worried about this because along with the drop in meat and fat consumption, the number of incidences of cardiovascular disease is decreasing including also the number of heart attacks. The correlation is obvious. Between 1978 and 1982, meat consumption fell and so did the number of heart attacks. Following 1983, meat supplies improved somewhat; butter and pork roast cuts returned to the table and lard was always available. The number of heart attacks increased.

In 1988, meat consumption fell again—something to be happy about if not for a certain concern. Thus, along with all of the unhealthy aspects of excessive fat in the diet, the lack of protein is just as harmful and meat happens to be the primary source of this ingredient in the traditional diet of Poles. We have not adapted ourselves to the advice of dieticians and started replacing protein from pork roasts with that derived from beans. However, nutritionists do not note protein deficiencies for the time

being but only call attention to certain habits which can make it difficult to reconcile the content of our wallets with reasonably well-balanced diets.

The World Health Organization [WHO] is promoting the slogan "Your Health Is in Your Hands." In this way, it is trying to change people's attitudes toward their own health; get them accustomed to thinking that they themselves have the greatest influence on their own health. "It is up to you," they say at WHO, "how you become ill and how your family becomes ill. Avoid stress, do not overeat, be active and content. You choose your life-style and, therefore, the way in which you become ill. In applying this advice to our own circumstances, it ought to be stated that it is more healthy to go for a walk and make some "silly beans" for dinner than to wait in line for some less expensive pork roast, worry whether it will arrive at the butcher's, then eat it (if it does arrive) fried in lard. And yet, there is no evidence and WHO specialists have not yet studied how the constant stress caused by the necessity of eating beans would affect the health of Poles. Admittedly, along with the drop in the consumption of fatty meat, the number of heart attacks is decreasing but the feeling of the good life is not increasing.

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