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POLITICAL

Declaration of 29 June, U.S. Strategy Toward Korea Reviewed

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[Text] The 29 June declaration of No Tae-u starts as follows: "Dear fellow citizens! I have deeply agonized and seriously thought about the true mission of a politician in this epochal situation where deep-rooted conflict and antagonism among the people has led to a national crisis." That opening statement reminds one of the remark by the vicious Russian priest Rasputin who put the Russian state of affairs in disorder at the end of the Russian empire, when he talked to the empress in order to save the life of the Russian crown prince after he prayed. At that time, he promised the empress the crown prince's life would be spared when he whispered, "Daughter, I fought all night long with God for your son's life even as the Prophet Jacob wrestled all night long with God. I fought and I won...." He predicted that: the life of the Russian imperial family, which was tied as one to his life, could survive and prosper as long as he lived and would not prosper when he died. Even though it is not clear whether it was due to Rasputin's prayer, the crown prince came back to life as he said, and the trust that Rasputin received from the Russian imperial family became absolute.

Since 10 June, the destiny of Korea's governing power, which lies as its pinnacle on the United States, has been like that of the Russian crown prince whose malignant tumor could not be surgically treated because of his hemophilia, leaving him unable to do anything but "just look on." The size, intensity and persistence of the demonstrations since 10 June, climaxing on 18 June, greatly surpassed those of the Kwangju Incident of May 1980. However, the United States and the incumbent power shared the same position as the Russian crown prince in that they could not operate using the surgical knife of military mobilization because of the "Kwangju Incident" which could be analogous to the hemophilia of the Russian crown prince.

The 29 June declaration by No Tae-u which appeared under these circumstances was almost like the prescription of Rasputin. The United States and the incumbent power could free themselves from the crisis of survival and search for a safe way to survive once again, by strongly tying their destinities to the 29 June declaration. As the status of Rasputin who promised to bring the crown prince to life began to absolutely soar, the 29 June declaration has disguised Mr. No Tae-u as a "national hero" while his decision been acclaimed as a "resolute step" and show of "determination."

The drama spanning the "3 weeks of June," which ultimately led to the 29 June declaration, confirmed the fact that the Korean people who accomplished a great struggle for democratization were the legitimate main

players of the development of history. It also reflects a stronger U.S. influence than at any other time, in which its most-feared situations such as the occurrence of a revolutionary situation and the control of the situation by revolutionary democratic movement forces could be prevented. The 29 June declaration, which completely accepted the demands of the opposition camp and democratic movement forces such as constitutional reform with direct presidential election, freeing of prisoners of conscience, and amnesty and reinstatement, was not the original wish of the United States. However, the United States could not but make a "decision" in order to hastily control the flame of the explosive democratization struggle of the Korean people. That work was accomplished by formal and informal comments made by the U.S. Government every day throughout the period and behind-the-scenes maneuvering which broke out into an internal power struggle within the incumbent power caused by a series of recent incidents such as the Pak Chong-chol incident.

13 April Measure Corresponded to U.S. Intention

When the 13 April measure was first declared, the U.S. Government withheld its public criticism against the measure and accepted it as a *fait accompli* by demanding partial and gradual improvement measures. Assistant Secretary of State Sigur, who has working level responsibility for Korean affairs in the U.S. Government, said in House hearings on 6 May that "I was disappointed that the meetings did not continue. However, it is a problem that the Koreans themselves should decide. It is necessary to resume a dialogue on issues that can be dealt with, such as changing the election law, the press law, and local autonomy." Secretary of State Shultz said in his speech at Stanford University on 14 May that "We hope that the Korean ruling party and the opposition party will pursue a serious political dialogue through mutual compromise in order to bring about a free and fair election system." The aforementioned speeches by both men, in short, revealed the United States' position which acknowledged the 13 April measure, thus urging South Korea to negotiate for a (presidential) election law.

Such a position was what the United States had originally hoped for, and the 13 April measure provided the occasion to show its true intention.

It is true that the United States initially acknowledged the need to improve the current government in order to secure a stable ruling system in South Korea. However, such acknowledgement was extremely limiting in light of the fact that it was established from the viewpoint of ensuring long-term U.S. interests in South Korea, and also because of the United States' comfortable relationship with the current government which, because of the problems that it had when it came to power, has listened more gently to the United States than any previous government in areas such as economic policy. The U.S. position went only to the extent of urging President

Chon Tu-hwan to keep his promise of a single term, and improvements on restrictions and repression of basic rights such as human rights.

Plan for Large-Scale U.S. Conservative League and Hardline Policy of Ruling Power

However, as the ruling power's oppression became stronger, causing a heightening of Korean political conflicts as the constitutional reform movement strengthened between the period of the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986, criticism in and outside the nation ensued. Therefore, it became necessary for the United States to adjust its policy toward South Korea. The active role taken by the United States enabled it to extract the 30 April meeting, which was a desperate measure of the ruling power; it was a relaxation of the South Korean Government's full-scale repression of the constitutional reform movement, thus permitting the movement to a certain extent, and bringing about mutual agreement by the ruling and the opposition party. The reasons that the United States planned constitutional reform are as follows: to construct unity among conservative forces in the process of discussing constitutional reform; to assure legitimacy by allowing the political system to have the impression of civilian control; to block the growth of revolutionary democratic movement forces; and to ultimately secure the ruling system in South Korea.

Since then, the United States by having made remarks such as "solving problems according to dialogue and compromise"; "the South Korean people should decide their specific political system"; "the United States has no right to interfere in South Korean internal affairs and its influence has limits"; has consistently expressed its position to the South Korean people based on the principle that it supports democratization in South Korea, but cannot interfere in South Korean affairs in any specific way since South Korea is an independent sovereign nation. Meanwhile, the United States showed a seemingly neutral attitude toward both the ruling and the opposition party. However, the United States was recognizing that such a position was simply a gesture toward the Korean people. In effect, it was not only acknowledging the fact that the current authorities had the initiative for the discussion of constitutional reform, but was also secretly supporting a parliamentary system which the current authorities favored for constitutional reform. Such a U.S. position can be clearly seen in its public support for the Yi Min-u plan of democratization first and a parliamentary system later, which had appeared after the discussion of constitutional reform between the ruling and the opposition parties had come to a practical deadlock. Such a U.S. attitude is also indicated in its support for denying Koreans the opportunity to directly express their opinions, as was indicated in the ubiquitous U.S. official comment on South Korean affairs, "absolutely opposing the struggle outside the National Assembly chamber."

At any rate, the United States had been relatively inactive in solving South Korean affairs until the discussion of constitutional reform became deadlocked in effect, as the NKDP announced that it would not attend the special committee for constitutional reform in the fall of 1986. It is because in some aspects, the United States estimated that the NKDP would put up a little resistance to constitutional reform negotiations, which is about the distribution and reorganization of power in principle, but ultimately participate smoothly. However, as the situation did not progress in such an optimistic direction and constitutional reform negotiations failed in effect because of several reasons (the democratic movement forces' holding the NKDP in check and the two Kims' rejection of urgings of compromise with the ruling camp's one-sided position) the United States began from the end of 1986 to actively interfere in solving Korean problems, which was described as "two trains heading for a head-on collision" by the United States itself. Mr Lilley, who has excellent qualifications for intelligence operations with his intelligence agency background, assumed the ambassadorship and began to make contacts with various personalities at various levels. There were also consecutive visits to South Korea by the central working-level officials within the U.S. Government such as Assistant Secretary of State Sigur, Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department Abramowitz, chief of the Korean Desk at the State Department Blakekmore, Deputy Assistant Secretary Clark (2 times), and Secretary of State Shultz.

These people contacted opposition leaders mainly in order to accurately estimate the political situation in South Korea and also to assess the possibility of constitutional reform to adopt a parliamentary system based on a mutual agreement through concessions from the opposition camp. They opposed direct presidential elections and publicly supported the Yi Min-u plan. They urged the opposition camp to concede by agreeing to constitutional reform to adopt a parliamentary system, but they failed to achieve this faced with rejections by the two Kims. The reason behind the United States' support of a parliamentary system is that it has been fearful of direct presidential elections since the 1971 election (direct election between Pak Chong-hui and Kim Tae-chung) and its experience in the Philippines. (The United States let the Philippines hold an early democratic election in order to insure the legitimacy of the Marcos regime and greatly suffered because of the Philippine people's power which exploded through the direct presidential election.)

While the United States was sending working level officials on Korean affairs to South Korea and urging the opposition party to accept a mutually agreed constitutional reform adopting a parliamentary or compromise parliamentary system from the end of last year, the internal political situation in South Korea became worse and worse. After the Asian Games ended, the ruling regime took advantage of the aftermath and began a comprehensive crackdown on all dissident forces. It

cracked down on student and labor movements such as the Federation of Promotion for Labor, the M-L organization, and the Anti-Imperialism League Incident. Its crackdown reached not only opposition groups such as the Democratic Reunification League when it closed their offices in order to paralyze their activities, but also the NKDP by the arrest of Representative Yu Song-hwan. This repression of the opposition forces reached its climax in the Konkuk University incident and the ruling authorities seemed to take advantage of the aftermath to eradicate all opposition forces for the sake of "smooth operation of political affairs." The entire police force had been mobilized to arrest those on the wanted list who had not yet been arrested.

Pak Chong-chol Incident and Check by Hardline Forces

The political situation seemed to be controlled by the ruling authorities who indiscriminately attacked all the opposition forces using physical force. However, in the process of these attacks, the people's discontent increased and its latent explosive power rapidly began to form whenever an opportunity arose. The crackdown on all the opposition forces which started in the second half of last year ultimately brought about an inevitable by-product, the torture death of Mr Pak Chong-chol, which triggered a large-scale anti-government protest by all the anti-government forces.

On 7 February, when a nationwide protest against the torture death of Mr Pak Chong-chol took place, Assistant Secretary of State Sigur, who has working level responsibility for Korean affairs within the U.S. Government, clarified in an unprecedented manner the U.S. policy toward South Korea through his speech on "South Korean politics at a turning point" made during a meeting of the Korean-U.S. Association. There were 2 noteworthy points in that speech. The United States clearly indicated its strong opposition to political interference by the South Korean military in expressions such as "Today's (South Korean) military are living in a new era when they need to regard national security as their main mission and devote themselves to the perfection of various techniques required to achieve their utmost important objective which is the national security of South Korea." Another point is that the United States clearly declared its position of opposing the exercise of influence on government or politics by President Chon after his retirement by saying that "He (President Chon) will join the group of retired politicians which no longer engages in political activities." He then added "I hope that the leaders participating in the process (of constitutional reform discussion) will present much more creative ideas, that is, those which politicians from both the ruling and the opposition camps can consider with an open mind keeping the necessity of compromise in mind." Observers interpreted the meaning of "creative ideas" as either a "democratization" measure by the ruling camp and a corresponding acceptance of constitutional reform favoring a parliamentary system by the

opposition camp (the Yi Min-u plan) or "(giving the appearance of) bold civilian politics in exchange for maintaining the fundamental structure of the current regime."

One can interpret the U.S. position as shown by the speech of Mr Sigur as "either reforming the constitution by adopting a parliamentary system or adopting democratization measures while maintaining the incumbent regime and at the same time ensuring the retirement of President Chon and his presidential group."

The United States had a relatively clear policy toward South Korea in an unprecedented way because of the South Korean political background during the second half of last year: the hardline policy set by President Chon and his followers and the disappearance of the possibility of constitutional reform by mutual agreement. As the possibility for constitutional reform by mutual agreement became unclear, the United States hardened its policy in favor of a constitutional reform adopting a parliamentary system of the Yi Min-u plan style or the maintenance of the current regime with democratization measures in case the first did not work out, and demanded the complete retirement of President Chon and his presidential hardliners, who had damaged the legitimacy of the Chon regime by following one-sided hardline policies which brought about incidents such as the Pak Chong-chol incident.

The keynote for the hardline policies since the second half of last year was sounded by presidential hardline authorities with Chang Se-tong, the head of the Agency for National Security Planning, as their central leader. Their ulterior motive was to prevent the "moderate rationalistic forces" around the DJP President No Tae-u from gaining power. As for the United States, it felt that the South Korean situation would deteriorate if the former group continued to take the leadership position in South Korean politics. It is rumored that a CIA agent leaked the news of Mr Pak Chong-chol, who was tortured to death in the Namyong-tong branch of the Communist Affairs Agency which allows access only to authorized personnel. The United States excluded President Chon and his presidential hardline forces from the future forces in power and consequently, the moderate forces around DJP President No Tae-u began to recover their power around the time of the Pak Chong-chol incident. And later, the U.S. operation proceeded while deeply penetrating the power struggle between these two factions.

13 April Measure and No Tae-u Takes Initiative

The presidential hardline forces around Chang Se-tong, which appeared to have their unfettered freedom of movement placed in check with the Pak Chong-chol incident, seemed to take the initiative again within the ruling authorities when they took a resolute action in the 13 April measure by taking advantage of the internal conflict fostered by them within the NKDP. As was shown in the Mr

Sigur's speech, the United States was able to achieve what it wanted through the 13 April measure. First, the 13 April measure itself means continued maintenance of the current regime and the United States could return to "maintaining the current regime through a partial democratization" which it originally hoped for by suggesting partial democratization measures in order to appease resistance to the 13 April measure. The United States concluded that the 13 April measure would become a *fait accompli* when it saw the tremendous South Korean police force which was shown on 7 February and 3 March, which democratic movement forces could not penetrate. Secondly, the United States was able to eradicate the presidential hardline forces taking advantage of the dissatisfaction of various forces in tough political situations in and around the time of the 13 April measure. In short, the United States took the 13 April measure as an opportunity to acknowledge the existence of the current regime and at the same time to eradicate President Chon and his presidential hardline forces, which was the leading power within the current authorities, through the dissatisfaction of people from various levels of society with the measure. And the then-head of the Agency for National Security Planning Chang Se-tong, the central leader of President Chon's hardline forces which created tough political situations around the time of the 13 April measure, made a flurry of several fatal mistakes. One of those mistakes was the already known torture death incident of Pak Chong-chol. He was already severely damaged with this incident and later was fatally struck by the revelation of cover-up efforts. The other is that the internal conflict within the NKDP and operations of interference in the creation of a new party, whose execution he was fully responsible for, was a complete failure. By interrupting the creation of a new party, the government was even more strongly criticized by the public. It is rumored that Chang Se-tong was severely criticized by President Chon for reporting the number of representatives who would participate in the creation of a new party less accurately than the police. The important thing is that the 13 April measure which was taken resolutely upon the strong insistence of Chang Se-tong turned out to be an immense political miscalculation.

As soon as the 13 April measure was announced, the relatively conservative Korean Bar Association made an opposing statement on the same day, heading a nationwide opposition movement from various levels of society. This movement made various opposition statements, a signature pledge drive against the government's protection of the current constitution, and protested by fasting, and in various prayer meetings. In spite of forceful repression, these protest movements spread on a much wider range than the constitutional reform movement of last year and the resistance of the people was on the verge of explosion like an active volcano once given an outlet. That outlet was given by the cover-up operation on the torture death incident of Pak Chong-chol and the subsequent formation of the "National Headquarters of the Movement for Securing the Democratic Constitution."

There is no clear information about the U.S. maneuvering during this flurry of events. We can only think about several circumstances.

The United States had already declared its position of opposing the exercise of influence of President Chon after his retirement. That meant that it opposed the transfer of power to the people close to the president. At the same time, since the United States hoped for a continued strong pro-U.S. regime, it was necessary for the United States to choose someone who could exercise strong leadership and would be supported by the military. In this context, it was inevitable for the United States to support DJP President No Tae-u who became tied to the moderates within the DJP because of the power dynamics within the ruling authorities. When he met with Representative Yi Chol-song in mid-April, U.S. Ambassador Lilley had already told him that "I think Mr No Tae-u will become a candidate."

According to a confirmed source, when there was a cabinet reshuffle because of the Pak Chong-chol incident, the then-Minister of Home Affairs Chong Ho-yong, a U.S. hand who enjoyed widespread trust within the military, strongly insisted on a large-scale cabinet reshuffle and en masse resignations of the authorities concerned. He is said to have forced down President Chon's right-hand man, Prime Minister No Sin-yong and the Head of the Agency for National Security Planning Chang Se-tong with his "drowning man tactic" when he stepped down. Also, Mr Chong Ho-yong along with Mr Kim Pok-tong is said to have exercised a decisive role in drawing military support to DJP President No Tae-u and in controlling the military after 10 June.

On 28 May, 2 days after Mr Chang stepped down, the Seoul stock market plunged at the rumor of a coup d'etat by the hardline military. Japanese newspapers reported the coup attempt by two people at the level of deputy chief of the Agency for National Security Planning who were angry at the dismissal of Chang and two division commanders from the 17th class of the Korean Military Academy, who are the central force in the hardline military. However, they reported that the coup was revealed in advance and thus aborted. Even though it was a groundless rumor, it was an exquisite piece of demagoguery timed so that such movements by Chang and his support group could be predicted. According to one theory, the rumor was originated from the U.S. side and its intention was said to be to forestall movements of Chang and his support group in advance. As the coup theory ended as a rumor and No Tae-u gained the initiative, the possibility of military intervention in politics, which the United States feared most because of the nightmare of the Kwangju Incident, became remote. Since then, the U.S. control on the South Korean military is said to have become firm.

U.S. Activity Since 10 June

On 10 June, nationwide protests were held by all anti-government forces, sponsored by the National Headquarters of the Movement for Securing a Democratic

Constitution, to criticize the cover-up operation of the torture death incident and measure of the government for protection of the current constitution aiming at the national convention of the DJP. There was unprecedentedly active support and participation in these protests by the general public. Later, a group of demonstrators entered the Myongdong Cathedral and a violent demonstration and sit-in ensued. The next day, State Department Deputy Spokesman Oakley commented that the United States "decried" violent acts causing injuries which took place among South Korean police and demonstrators. By using expression like "decry," the United States expressed a stronger concern regarding the South Korean situation because it had customarily used such expressions as "regrets" for such situations on previous occasions. On this day, Mr Sigur said in a satellite press conference with journalists from 6 Asian countries that the United States hoped that democracy in South Korea would grow and that the voice of the people would be even more greatly reflected in politics. Thus, he mentioned the will of the South Korean people for the first time, which differed when compared to his previous references to compromise by political factions, excluding the people with such statements as "dialogue and compromise between the ruling and the opposition parties" and "absolutely opposing the struggle outside the National Assembly chamber." The United States seemed to have begun to make some important policy changes, having realized after seeing the exploding democratic struggle of the Korean people that it was impossible to cope with the situation by maintaining the current regime through the 13 April measure or a temporary measure added to the 13 April measure. The U.S. Congress and the media took a position advocating economic sanctions against South Korea while demanding withdrawal of the 13 April measure and epochal democratization measures. Democratic presidential candidate Jesse Jackson announced that he would support a boycott movement for the Seoul Olympic Games if South Korea did not take democratization measures.

As the Myongdong Cathedral sit-in and violent protests in downtown Seoul continued on 12 June, the government confirmed its stiff measures against the Myongdong Cathedral sit-in and began to consider emergency measures upon the insistence of the hardliners within the government such as Minister of the National Unification Board Ho Mun-to and Chang Se-tong. The Washington Post in its 17 June edition reported that U.S. Ambassador Lilley had hastily arranged a meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Kwang-su the next day, 13 June, and had urged that the government should not forcefully suppress student demonstrators in Myongdong Cathedral, thus temporarily dampening an explosive situation. As was indicated through Ambassador Lilley's behind-the-scenes contacts, the United States did not put any clear and public diplomatic pressure on South Korea since the situation had developed since 10 June. The reasons are expressed in the 16 June edition of The New York Times. That article quoted a well-informed U.S. Government source as saying that the U.S. Government

was abstaining from putting any diplomatic pressure on South Korea in fear of the fact that it might contribute to increasing violence. In other words, the United States was concerned that exerting diplomatic pressure such as by publicly criticizing the current government and the series of measures taken by it might trigger an overthrow of the government by the South Korean public and democratization forces who might acquire more strength from such pressure. In consequence, the way that the United States handled the South Korean situation amounted to "maneuvering" and such maneuvering itself possesses the characteristic of being intrinsically clandestine; therefore, there is nothing specifically known about this "maneuvering."

However, we can observe the basis of the U.S. maneuvering on South Korea through the development of a series of incidents. It was fundamentally the same as that which took place around the dismissal of Chang Se-tong and can be regarded as an extension of it. The elements are: strong control over the military through maneuvering within the South Korean military and preventing the military from intervening in the situation; eradication of President Chon and his presidential hardline forces and the resulting rise of the "moderate rationalistic power" around DJP President No Tae-u.

On 15 June, the Myongdong Cathedral sit-in was dispersed in a defeat for the government. However, contrary to expectations, the dispersal of the sit-in gave the public and democratization movement forces a sense of victory and confidence for the first time and further sparked nationwide demonstrations. In provincial areas, demonstrations began in full swing. The seemingly invincible South Korean police force began to crumble slowly in front of continuous demonstrations nationwide, day after day. In small and medium sized provincial cities, police forces only kept guard over major facilities. The government stated that it would resume discussion of constitutional reform, however, such a temporary measure only gave the public confidence. The demonstration to protest the use of tear gas on 18 June appeared to have reached the climax. A total of approximately 1 million people were mobilized and packed downtown Pusan where demonstrations had continued since 10 June. The police force of Pusan was incapable of deciding on an action in the situation, not to mention suppressing the demonstration itself. Therefore, the police were only able to conduct helicopter reconnaissance. The time came for a decision to either mobilize the military or to accept all the democratization measures demanded by the public.

Appropriate Timely Advice?

The United States which has been suffering from the nightmare of the Kwangju incident has consistently opposed a military mobilization. And even if the military were mobilized, the situation could not be handled like that of May 1980 since people had acquired confidence and fighting experience. However, a serious rumor

of an emergency decree began to prevail within the South Korean Government. The United States could not spare any more time merely by engaging in indirect maneuvering as it had done until that time.

Let us take a look at the article "Timely Advice of the United States on South Korean Situation" in The Washington Post on 5 July, which was published after the South Korean situation calmed down with the 29 June declaration.

As the unrest continued to increase, the military police wearing masks and bullet-proof vests reached the limit of their capacity. There was increasing pressure in Seoul to use the military to suppress demonstrations. U.S. officials say now that it was reported that President Chon "is very seriously considering" tough suppression of demonstrations on 18 and 19 June. On 19 June, new Prime Minister Yi Han-ki announced that the nation was experiencing deep social unrest, which might make an "extraordinary measure" necessary. On the same day, Ambassador Lilley delivered President Reagan's letter to President Chon. That letter demanded that he restrain himself in coping with demonstrations, free political prisoners, stop oppression of the opposition party, and resume dialogue with opposition forces. Through secret messages and public messages, the United States has warned that the use of the military force under any form of martial law would create a more serious crisis.

U.S. officials say that a message which had more importance than that delivered to President Chon from Washington came from the high command of the South Korean military, which was opposed to use of the military in order to suppress demonstrations. On 22 June, when Mr Sigur departed from the entourage of Secretary Shultz and flew to Seoul, Washington was aware that military leaders refused to intervene. In spite of that, the State Department made an unprecedented direct statement that South Korean military commanding officers should not interfere. U.S. officials say that the statement was not aimed at top-level military leaders but rather at mid-level military officers who might have been tempted to take control of the situation and the government through a coup d'etat.

The military opposed not only an emergency decree which might mobilize the military but also made its opposition position clear directly to President Chon. At any rate, it was disobedience. President Chon and his presidential hardline forces lost their last card of military mobilization and the initiative for controlling the situation returned to No Tae-u and the moderate forces. It was known that Mr Chong Ho-yong played a great role in mustering support for DJP President No among the current top military officers who are between the 12th and 14th classes of the Korean Military Academy. Mr Chong Ho-yong is a definite U.S. hand within the military. According to one theory, Mr Pak Se-chik was

said to have relayed a summary of the 29 June declaration from Mr Sigur to Mr Chong Ho-yong during Mr Sigur's visit to South Korea.

When he returned to the United States, Mr Sigur made an unprecedented comment in the press conference, saying "the United States wants what the South Korean people want." On the morning of 28 June by U.S. time, several hours before the 29 June declaration was announced, Secretary Shultz said on an NBC TV program that "The (South Korean) Government is going to make a promise to change its attitude on several important issues. This effort was part of the United States's long-term efforts, furthermore, it was part of the South Korean people's long-term efforts." He therefore predicted the 29 June declaration while emphasizing the U.S. "efforts" along with making gestures toward the Korean people.

In South Korea several hours later, DJP President No Tae-u was reading the "historic declaration" while President Chon was partially aware of its contents.

Another U.S. Card

According to Japanese media, it has been said that there was a large-scale personnel reshuffle of approximately one-third of the army generals on 21 June when the political initiative was completely turned over to the moderate forces as attempts to take emergency measures had failed twice. The situation at the time bred speculation that the personnel reshuffle was a punitive measure against the younger group of hardliners consisting of the 17th class of the Korean Military Academy, who had connections with Chang Se-tong. However, the result was the contrary. According to Japanese media, it is said that the commander of the Armed Forces Security Command, who holds the most important position in the military and was appointed with a strong recommendation by Chang Se-tong who came from the same hometown, remained in his post and key staff posts within the Army Headquarters such as personnel, information, and operation staffs went to those from the 17th class of the Korean Military Academy.

What significance is there in the fact that the younger group of hardline forces within the military, which are the real power of the presidential hardline forces, have taken more key posts than others at a time when the political leadership within the ruling forces was turned over from the hardliners to the moderates? In order to hastily end the Korean people's democratization struggle which exploded like an active volcano and improved the status of the democratic movement forces, the United States turned over political leadership to the moderate forces and enabled the announcement of the 29 June declaration. However, it remains to be seen whether the 29 June declaration will turn out as it was originally meant or rather initiate a new phase of growth for the

Korean people's democratization struggle and democratic movement. The contradictory structure of Korean society is not one in which the ruling forces concede greatly and improve democratic movement forces.

If the Korean people's democratic struggle rises even higher as the grass roots democratic movements such as the labor movement do not concede on questions of responsibility for the Kwangju incident, which is their Achilles heel, the United States is likely to use the younger group of hardliners in the military as its last card. That would mean the end of the leadership of Mr No Tae-u and the 29 June declaration and would temporarily silence the people's movement, however, it would ultimately signify an end of all of the current ruling forces and the United States in South Korea.

These situations remind one of yet another mysterious prediction by Rasputin when expecting his death, that is, if he died at the hands of the Russian people, the Russian royal family would continue; on the other hand, if he died at the hands of the aristocracy or the emperor's in-laws, then the Russian royal family and aristocracy would disappear forever without a trace.

Rasputin was killed at the hand of the aristocracy and the Russian ruling class including the royal family soon disappeared in the revolution as he had predicted. Will the United States let the younger group of hard-liners in the military again take control of political leadership, thus resulting in the total collapse of U.S. interests in Korea, or let the present ruling forces remain as a political group by letting the Korean people fill the 29 June declaration with substantial instead of merely formal content?

13269

U.S. Influence on Political Transition Viewed
4107005 Seoul WOLGAN CHOSUN in Korean
Sep 87 pp 124-129

[Article by Political Columnist Cho Se-hyong: "Presidential Election and the U.S. Influence"]

[Text]

Election War Among Mr No and the Three Kims

For now, it seems clear that we have four candidates for the presidential election—namely, No Tae-u, Kim Tae-chung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Chong-pil. Since it is still possible that the two Kims and the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) could agree on the single-candidacy issue and since Mr Kim Chong-pil, who is planning to create a new party, has not clearly indicated his will to run for the office, a number of unknown variables still exist. Nevertheless, it is becoming more and more unlikely that any one will give in.

If all four individuals ultimately decide to fight for the one and only presidential post, their characteristics and moral justifications before and after the election will change as follows, regardless of who wins or who loses. First of all, it will be difficult for both Mr Kim Tae-chung and Mr Kim Young-sam to justify their cry of "Down with military dictatorship and support your democratic forces." This is because they should have remained a united force if "democratization" had been truly their guidepost of highest priority.

If the four people, including the two Kims running separately for the office, end up fighting against one another, the fight will result in a weakened system and will create a strong image of personal struggle or factionalism.

Needless to say, the person who will benefit most from such a situation is Mr No Tae-u, who carries the burden of our system. The two Kims will be even more troubled by the fact that they have never advocated a separate election campaign in the first place, and they have even stressed numerous times their comradeship and homogeneity, saying, "We shall never betray the remaining hope of our history and our people."

Therefore, in order to justify their positions in a separate election campaign, each of them must clearly represent "something" quite different. It should be something that is so different that the two Kims cannot help running separately for the office. What could it be? If this is only the difference between Cholla Province and Kyongsang Province, such a difference is insufficient to justify their positions. If so, they will have to present differences in policy matters, which are not yet clear. But Mr Kim Chong-pil, too, must show "something" that he wishes to represent.

Need To Establish a Clear Image for the Election

In order to show that he is not running for the office for nothing, Mr Kim Chong-pil, who, unlike the two Kims of RDP, has not fought against the dictatorship of the past 7 years, and has never been a leader in the democratization struggle, must explain exactly what he wishes to represent. He will be asked why justice for the people which has not troubled him for the past 18 years of the Republican government is so important today. He will be asked over and over whether he is in a position where he can truly represent the politics of the Republican Party. However, among the four people, it is Mr No Tae-u, who must present the most earnest explanation for what he wishes to represent.

What does he represent today?

Is he candidly representing the past 7 years of the Chon Tu-hwan government? Is this precisely what he represents as public justice? Or, is he representing something

different from the existing system of the Democratic Justice Party (DJP)? If so, could he really represent something new without separating himself from the existing system?

He is obviously the "presidential candidate of the DJP," who has roots in the existing party's system. Then, how can he show that he has separated, or will separate, himself from the existing system? This issue of the [new or old] system has become the most difficult problem for Mr No Tae-u. In view of this, it can be said that Mr No Tae-u's recent visit to the United States carries a significant meaning.

In particular, his political meeting with the U.S. President Reagan was an unprecedented event. First of all, the President of the United States, Reagan, held a political meeting with an independent politician of another country who is neither the country's current president nor a presidential personal envoy.

Does this mean the United States has now established two windows for Korea? Although this meeting might have been prearranged with President Chon Tu-hwan's consent, it can be said that the meeting could present a really delicate problem if it involved a special political topic.

Next, the issue is the relationship between the opposition party and the United States. Although the officials of the White House and the State Department have alternately issued explanatory statements that the meeting was not intended to generate a sentiment of favoritism or intervention in Korean politics, the White House's invitation to a presidential candidate of a particular party, whose election time is within 100 days, is not only unprecedented but also unconventional.

For example, in 1969 when President Nixon visited Manila to meet with then-President and the presidential candidate Marcos on diplomatic issues, in order to avoid generating a one-sided influence in the imminent presidential election period in Philippines, he also met with a presidential candidate of the opposition circles to balance the quality of and amount of time spent with Mr Marcos.

Unconventional Conference Between No Tae-u and Reagan

The Philippine case is not an exception. The United States is a country that exercises extreme caution even when a conference is held between the secretary of state or the like and foreign politicians. In view of this, it is highly probable that the No-Reagan conference was Mr Reagan's independent decision rather than anything suggested by his administration, including the State Department, the U.S. Embassy and even the CIA. Whether or not this was Mr Reagan's independent decision, we cannot help regarding it as American policy insofar as the decision was made at the highest level of

the United States. But we can see that Mr Reagan, who is a right-wing conservative, uses his own [political] style, in which he frequently ignores his administration officials' opinions and carries out an independent action, even in the policies involving Nicaragua and the Philippines.

In any case, Mr Reagan's action [of meeting with Mr No] seems to have ultimately brought about chances for disputes over the U.S. intervention and its favoritism in Korean politics. This has also left a damaging consequence for the opposition candidates. Although candidate No Tae-u might have to take into account partial damage resulting from the disputes for a while, it can be said that he has actually benefited from the meeting in that internationally he has improved his image, while internally generating a sense of stability among the voters of the middle class and above, who are mostly conservative.

It is possible to conclude inductively that the United States would not have committed such an act if it did not believe in the birth of the No Tae-u government. In other words, we could possibly ask a hypothetical question: how could the United States defend itself against all the criticisms that might arise from this meeting if either Kim Tae-chung or Kim Young-sam won the election?

We do not know how the United States thinks it can influence the rise of a particular government. But assuming that the present atmosphere of the presidential election campaign is well-balanced, the United States might have judged that just a little help could easily break the balance.

Of course, the DJP Chairman No Tae-u's visit to the United States is not all that negative. One positive effect is that this meeting serves as a confirmation of the timetable for democratization. Amid all kinds of dark clouds, such as the rumors of the September crisis or the October crisis, the purpose of this meeting is seen also as a planned measure to control the military intervention in politics or violence by the radical circles.

The United States Should Restrain Its High-Pressure Tactics

When the U.S. Government strongly opposed mobilization of the military force during the climax of the Myong-dong incident on 19 June, it at least demonstrated its basic policy that the Korean politics must now take the form of a civilized democracy. Toward this goal of a civilized democracy, the United States might be planning to establish the so-called American stability in Korea through Mr No Tae-u, who is a former general and the mastermind of the declaration of 29 June.

Anyway, we cannot help asking questions as to whether Mr No or the Reagan administration wanted to effect a quick solution to the problems of Korean politics by separating Mr No's image from the Chon Tu-hwan

government and by promising a U.S. guardianship in a semipublic manner. Further development in this situation could be extremely interesting.

More than anything, however, this incident has stimulated the anti-American sentiment that had already been worsening.

Some thousand religious workers of the Christian community have already issued statements criticizing the incident. In addition, it is possible that other movement circles or the opposition circles could criticize U.S. "meddling in Korean politics" which is done in a semipublic manner.

It seems that the United States either does not yet fully understand the social atmosphere in Korea, or it completely misunderstands something. If not, maybe the United States calculated that a high-pressure method, while ignoring all the facts, could be more effective for a quick solution. But this could be a mistake. The United States must understand that direct U.S. influence is limited only to the government and other systems which maintain a direct relationship with the United States and that the United States is gradually losing its persuasive and influential power on the general public and society. It is not due to somebody's fault or responsibility but is, in reality, the current trend.

Although the general public does not support any violent anti-American movements because of the fear of domestic unrest, it is difficult, historically or realistically, to deny the fact that a large number of Koreans are becoming increasingly critical and skeptical of the American role. The American high-pressure method is well-reflected in the speech and action of the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense Armitage, who has recently visited Korea.

He said, "The U.S. military forces can be withdrawn if Koreans do not want them." It was the first time ever such a speech was given by a high-ranking U.S. official. Such a speech even makes us regard it rather as an expression of nervous temperament than a high-pressure tactic. Furthermore, Mr Armitage's speech is not persuasive at all, since the United States is not considering withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea at this time.

He is in a position where he knows better than anyone that the United States has no intention to withdraw its armed forces in Korea and that it would not be easy to withdraw the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea and shut down the vast number of military bases in Korea. He is also well aware that the majority of the Korean people are not yet demanding withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces from Korea. Under such circumstances, when such a speech is given to the general public of the entire country in order to suppress the anti-American sentiment in Korea, it only worsens the whole situation by stimulating the national sentiment and pride.

The United States Must Show Its Ability To Accommodate the Reality

Mr Armitage's recent speech indicates that "the U.S. military forces remain in Korea for the benefit of Korean people." It would be awkward if Mr Armitage, as well as American policy makers, and a large number of conservative Americans, had not awakened from such an outdated way of thinking. The United States should read the nationalistic Korean sentiment. The Korean nationalism does not coincide with the fundamental benefits that America seeks.

Nobody in a country would feel proud of the situation where a foreign military force is stationed in his country for 40 years. It is just that the Korean people are willing to tolerate such a long duration of the current relationship because it is beneficial to both Korea and America. It is not a relationship of giving or taking by one country. If it was believed or advocated in such a manner, then it must have been a fabrication, not a truth.

If the United States is really concerned about the anti-American movement in Korea, the solution should not come from a high-pressure attitude but should start from an honest and accurate understanding of the nature of such a Korean-American relationship. In view of this, if the United States intended to plant the "American stability" on Korean soil through such an unconventional No-Reagan conference, the United States could be risking another mistake.

No matter what, at a time when the Korean politics is heading for a historic transition with a tightly balanced power, the United States, as expected, has begun to function as a significant variable. The tight situation in Korean politics is not limited only to the balanced power among the four individuals fighting for the presidential post. Such a tight political situation rather reflects a limited movement within the framework of a given system.

On the right side of the political system is the heavy, silent military circles that stress "national order," while on the left side of the system is a stiff challenge ranging from revolutionary methods to progressive forces that advocate reform of the system.

The First Priority for Korean Politics in Transition

The reason why the present political situation in Korea has become more complex is that Korean politics is suffering from systematic conflicts that cannot be resolved simply by a conventional power struggle. Such systematic conflicts include labor-management disputes, students' movements, and various demands for reform by all sorts of special interest groups.

Such systematic problems, which come and go like tornadoes, cannot be cured by a temporary suppression of the public power. The fundamental problems of distribution and pluralism are not so easily solved. It is because these problems are the cumulative products of a long oppression by the authoritarian politics of the past 10 to 20 years.

However, it is extremely frustrating that the systematic politics centered around the four individuals have not shown a special interest and ability to resolve this vast problem. Frankly speaking, we have no idea what these political leaders have done since the declaration of 29 June. In other words, we have no way of knowing whether those politicians have presented any measure toward solving these systematic problems, except that they have been busy working for themselves.

The Philippine experience teaches us that a political democratization done only for form's sake gives rise to another explosion of the problem. Logically or realistically, it is inevitable that a political system could run the risk of destruction if the systematic politics cannot absorb the structural conflicts.

In order to prevent the presidential election war among the four people from sinking to a simple power struggle among individuals and factions, what should we expect from them?

If Mr No or the three Kims could not effectively deal with the vast problems of our economic and social systems that have not changed over the past 20 years, how could they face the challenge from a fifth power? And what kind of variable is the United States trying to present?

Everyone involved in this process should recognize the fact that true democratization in Korea cannot take a fixed form, and that the process must be flexible enough to allow a systematic reform at the same time.

We cannot help being concerned about the fact that the shape of today's political situation in Korea only looks good on paper, and that the real foundation of the situation is in danger of falling apart. Is our system itself strong enough to contain such a danger?

Certainly, the election result is important, no matter who wins. But this is precisely the first phase of the tasks to be carried out by Korean politics which are in transition.

13095/7310

Seoul Paper on U.S. Observation Team for ROK Elections

*SK271216 Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean
27 Nov 87 p 2*

[Editorial: "The Sovereign People's Pride Is Hurt—the Visit of a U.S. Observation Team to Korea for the Election Is Clear Outside Force's Intervention"]

[Text] Our people refer the act of presumptuously interfering in another's affairs to "the wide front of one's outer garment." When the act of interference exceeds the

degree, we say that "he tries to order this and that at the memorial service held by his neighbors for their forefathers."

These proverbs are expressions of criticism of the acts of presumptuously interfering in another's affairs. We also have another proverb saying "one attempts to draw another's attention by showing one's ugly spot," which refers to the act of attempting to make others sense one's mind by revealing one's own weak points.

People may regard these proverbs simply as an inheritance of traditional culture. However, if we analyze these sayings based on the theory of the so-called neo-leftist trend, we come to realize that a sort of class discord [kyekupchok kaldung] is hidden in them.

The "wide front of one's outer garment" indicates the social position of Yangban [aristocrats in the old Korean society—fbis] who liked to interfere in personal affairs of Sangmin [the lower class people—fbis]. Thus, we note that this proverb symbolizes a certain class complaint. On the other hand, the saying on "drawing another's attention by showing one's ugly point" stresses that "even if one has weak points, one should not offer an excuse for others to interfere." Thus, we can hardly imagine the act of asking for another's interference despite the fact that we have nothing to hide and furthermore, there is no proverb describing such an act. Hearing the news report that an observation team consisting of 21 assistants of U.S. congressmen and specialists on the Korean issue and the elections will visit Seoul on 12 December to observe the processes of voting and counting votes in the presidential elections in Korea, we cannot but say that our pride is being greatly hurt.

In other words, an election guard team [songo kamsidan] will come to Korea from the United States. Nothing has convinced us of why the people of another country have come to have the idea of watching the process of the election of our nation's president. We cannot but think that because the people of even a sovereign state are foolish and dull, they should watch the elections on our behalf. We also feel that such an idea was prompted by the concept of being the great power. Indeed, their view toward Korea is biased and erroneous. We cannot but think that they still have the judgment that there is no great change from the time when the United Nations dispatched its observation team to Korea 40 years ago. We wonder how they could look down on us in such a way.

However, we believe that rather than the disgrace we feel from the "presumptuous" act of dispatching a U.S. observation team for the elections, the evaluation of the people of a sovereign state by domestic political forces who are attempting to drag in such a team is more deplorable. We would like to stress that the pain we suffer as the result of our hurt pride caused by them is great.

If one considers dragging in such a team as a psychological tactic designed to support a certain candidate, it is indeed an anachronistic idea. We can say so because the members of the team have collaborative relations with certain forces, as pointed out by The New York Times.

The path to win in the presidential election should be a fair and open process and should not mobilize political strategy to drag in even outside forces. Needless to say, such an act will not help win votes. A foreign observation team on the spot watching a presidential election in a sovereign state cannot but hurt national pride.

Daily Opposes Dispatch of Foreign Election Supervisory Team

*SK271200 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
27 Nov 87 p 2*

[Editorial: "Unacceptable Involvement of Outside Forces in the Election"]

[Text] It is understandable that the United States is interested in democratic development in Korea. This may be because for one of its allies in Asia, which has attained economic development, to enjoy stability and prosperity at the same time coincides with the interests of the United States. In this sense, we have carefully listened to, as sincere advice, concern and expectations that those in and out of the U.S. Government have extended over the past several months of a politically difficult period.

We also know well that as Korea has been turned into a more democratic and open society since the 29 June declaration, an atmosphere of praising a political miracle in Korea has prevailed in Washington.

However, we recently heard news that some quarters of the U.S. Congress and other circles decided to send to Seoul, "supervisory teams to monitor election rigging." We cannot but be dumbfounded and genuinely displeased at this news. They are trying to oversee us, while using such words as "rigging" and "supervisory teams." We want to know how they rate the level of Korea and its people. We again cannot but be exasperated—far exceeding the state of being displeased—at this.

We strongly criticize the attempt of some quarters of the United States to send election supervisory teams [to Korea-fbis] not because we are exclusive or narrow-minded nor because we are afraid of being the victim of fault-finding.

We do so, above all, because our people's political consciousness is not so low as to invite some foreigners' supervision of our election and because our society is not so less civilized as to invite their supervision. People at home and abroad know well that even though we have a short history of democratic politics, our people firmly believe in democratic politics, that our people recently formulated a democratic constitution, and that in this

respect, our people have a high degree of political consciousness so that we can hold a democratic election in name and in reality. The Korean people now have truly firm resolve to establish a democratic government after holding a fair presidential election by giving everyone an equal opportunity. No one is entitled to make light of such resolve.

The Korea of 1987 is neither that of the 1950's, when we "invited" the UN Election Supervision Team, nor an underdeveloped country in Latin or South America or a newly emergent country in Africa that receives grants—a country where U.S. supervisory teams carry out their activities. We are capable of managing our own election and our's is a country where public opinion does not tolerate rigged elections and where positive law is applied in dealing with rigged elections.

We do so, secondly, because of the characteristics of the organizations and their members that have decided to send "supervisory teams" [to Korea—fbis]. As was pointed out by The New York Times, which reported on their activities, they are people who "have close relations with an opposition party in Korea." Let us note those in Congress, among other people. They consist of aides to Democratic congressmen, aides who have directly supported an opposition candidate. Therefore, it is clear that they decided to carry out their activities in Korea to assist and encourage a specific candidate. Moreover, this constitutes sufficient reason for being criticized as assistance in the election by outside forces.

We do so, lastly, because overseeing elections by foreigners is prohibited by law. If election supervisory teams even try to tour local areas to observe voting and vote counting as was reported, the election management authorities will have no choice but to prevent it. In this case, they will not be able to carry out their activities effectively. Their attempt, notwithstanding, to oversee our election in the name of "supervisory teams" seems to be part of a psychological war designed to support a specific candidate based upon a stand of a big nation, a stand that despises the Korean people.

We fear their anachronistic act may serve as a cause that may spread the anti-u.s. sentiment that prevails in some quarters by hurting national dignity. We also arouse their attention so that they do not to violate the sovereignty of their ally or hurt our people's sentiment.

New Democratic Republican Party Founding Declared

*16011021 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
30 Oct 87 p 3*

[Gist] of declaration adopted at the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) convention held in Seoul on 30 October]

[Text] Today we are at the important time of marking the dawn of the era of democracy, when the demand of the times and the people's desire for democratization will be achieved.

In the historic course of the 40 years since the nation's founding, we realized that laying the substantive foundation for democracy is much more important than merely shouting the word democratization. We had consolidated the substantive foundation for democracy by eliminating poverty through the nation's modernization and economic construction and by strengthening the industrial foundation in the 1970's and 1980's.

However, with the emergence of the non-democratic "17 May" forces in the early 1980's, we have been mercilessly infringed upon and have wasted time amid difficulties and pains.

The 29 June measure means that "17 May" itself is invalid and that the revival of the forces of modernization of the fatherland, which were destroyed by the "17 May" forces, and their re-unity are a natural historic consequence. Thus, we now declare the founding of the party that seeks the leading role in the era of democratization by inheriting the brilliant ideas and tradition of the past Democratic Republic Party [DRP], which had been the leading force in carrying out the tasks of modernization.

The basic ideas of the NDRP are the same as those of the DRP; however, they are not designed to return to the past.

We will advance in such a way as to assign the principal mission and key role of the party to those in their thirties and forties, who are the main force of society; to have the old generation support them; and to rear the youths in their twenties to be their successors.

We will strive to be the party that advances with policies and the party of service by constantly holding dialogue with the people and striving to realize their wishes and desire.

Thus, based on democratization and harmony with the people, we will build a welfare society, pursuing the great reunified country. In conformity with the development of history and with the trend of the times, we will seek to attain the nation's prosperity and will strive to realize happiness and joy that all the people can share equally.

Platform of New Democratic Republican Party

16911233 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
30 Oct 87 p 3

[Major platform and basic policy of the New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP] adopted at the party's founding convention held at the Hungsadan Building at Tong-sun-dong, Seoul, on 30 October]

[Text] Platform:

—the party shall maintain liberal democracy which ensures human rights, freedom, and equality as its basic ideal.

—based on the trust and harmony of the people, the party shall concentrate all the political force of democratic forces.

—the party shall achieve an advanced economy by fostering the creativity and vitality of individual citizens based on a free economic system.

—the party shall place emphasis on the establishment of business ethics and the fair distribution of income and shall ensure a balanced development of the national economy.

—the party shall realize the conversion of farmers, fishermen, and workers into the middle class.

—the party shall build a society where common sense prevails, where there are no grievances, and where everyone trusts one another and lives an affluent life befitting a human being with equality ensured.

—the party shall ensure the autonomy of education, provide assistance so that creativity can be exerted, and ensure the balanced development of spiritual culture and science and technology.

—the party shall ensure freedom of the press and speech so that everyone can freely express their thoughts.

—the party shall endeavor to restore trust between fellow countrymen and take the initiative in the effort to reunify the fatherland based on the spirit of reconciliation on the principle of peace, democracy, and independence.

—the party shall contribute to world peace and prosperity, maintaining national spirit and independence as a member of the international community.

Basic Policy:

—realization of Democratic Politics: The party fosters fresh and excellent force to succeed to the political heritage, thereby achieving advanced political development. The party shall totally institute the provincial autonomic system to bring forth an administration closely connected with the people. The party shall strengthen the function of the National Assembly and accommodate the people's unattended aspirations. The dignity and independence of the judicial branch should not be infringed upon under any circumstances. The party shall establish a career public servant system and ensure the rigorous neutrality of all public servants, including the military and the police. The party shall effect major reforms in administration and finance and realize small government, clean government, and an administration that serves the people.

—leap Forward to an Advanced Economy: The party shall ensure free economic activities of individuals and shall eliminate government restrictions and interference

in order to promote fair competition. The party shall modernize agriculture and fisheries, increase the income of farmers and fishermen, and ensure the production cost and reasonable profit of the farm produce and fishery goods. The party shall reduce the tax burden on the personal income of wage earners and innovate tax administration. The party shall defend the unique domain of medium and small industries and reinforce the assistance in their technological development and finance.

—realization of a Welfare Society: The party shall institute a national pension system to eliminate elderly people's worries. The party shall institute an expanded medical insurance system so that all people can benefit from medical care. The party shall ensure the three labor rights and women's rights.

—development of Education and Culture: The party shall assist the pursuit of learning, protect the independence of education, and protect and foster culture and art that is unique to the nation.

—strengthening Foreign Policy and National Security: The party shall expand cooperative relations with all countries irrespective of their ideology and system, on the basis of mutual benefit and equality. The party shall improve the international trade environment and promote national interests.

—taking the Initiative for Peaceful Reunification: The party shall consistently pursue the issue of national reunification, transcending the interests of all political factions, with the people's agreement, and establishing a firm, reliable principle.

Kim Yong-sam Accepts Presidential Nomination, Talks With Journalists

Acceptance Speech

16100215 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 9 Nov 87 p 2

[Acceptance speech by Kim Yong-sam, president of the RDP, at the party convention to nominate its presidential candidate held at the annex building of Sejong Cultural Center in Seoul on 9 November]

[Text] I accept the nomination as presidential candidate as a demand of history and the times and to devote my life to revolution through election for the democratization of this country, to national reconciliation, and reunification. The presidency cannot be taken by force or by one man's greed, but should be assumed in accordance with the call of the times and the natural order of history and particularly on the basis of the people's support.

If a democratic revolution is a demand of history, the assumption of power by the RDP, the united body of legitimate democratic forces, is a natural order of history. I am convinced that the people's aspirations for putting an end to military dictatorship are being focused on the RDP and me.

The democratic government to be established in the future will realize the restoration of the people's homogeneity and national integration. This society, in which distrust and division between the rich and the poor, between those in power and those without power, between different regions, and between different industries have expanded due to the protracted dictatorial oppression and the discriminatory and economic operational policy of splitting society, should be newly integrated, and the homogeneity of the people who are the same should be restored.

The RDP government will serve as a cornerstone to revive democracy, which has been faded in the course of the protracted military dictatorship. We should dispel rigidity in the legislative, judiciary, political party, press, labor, educational, cultural, and other fields which have been tamed amid coerciveness and oppression. Also, we should achieve democratic self-reforms.

In addition, we will forsake fruitless and nominal growth and "the rich-get-richer-and-the poor-get-poorer" growth and construct a welfare society through equivalent distribution and substantial growth. We will not seek "growth first and distribution next," but achieve "growth through distribution."

I define the traits and attitude of a civilian democratic government and president as follows:

First, I and the RDP government will seek an "intimate presidency" and an "amicable government" and guarantee the revitalization of diverse functions in society.

Second, for a clean government, I will never pardon my close aides, family, or whoever has contributed to democratization, if they are involved in corruption and irregularities.

Third, I will seek an "honest presidency" and an "honest government" and keep all the promises to the people under whatever circumstances.

Fourth, I will pursue a "reconciliatory presidency" and a "reconciliatory government" and achieve the harmony and integration of the people on the basis of love and justice. In particular, sacrifice in the course of the Kwangju civil resistance should be brought to light, and amid this, it should be ultimately developed into sacrifice for democratization. As well, reconciliation should be sought among the people.

The military dictatorial regime, which took power through a coup d'état, has craftily mocked the June civil resistance and has framed a scheme for permanent power through rigged elections. Just as the struggle to revise the Constitution providing for the direct presidential election was a combined struggle of the people—workers, students, democratic figures, farmers, and urban poor people—with the RDP at the center, the struggle for the forthcoming election should be a struggle to watch, indict, and denounce rigged elections and furthermore, defend ballots in the course of ballot counting by forming an all-people combined front.

Fielding the single candidate of the democratic camp is a demand of the times and a natural order of history to surely put an end to military rule. I appeal to the democratic forces to unite themselves and continuously exercise their warm, amicable, and moral influence for a single candidacy. Also, I hope that the great people will decide the direction of single candidacy with their strength, and I am convinced that this they will do.

Believing that today has been greeted thanks to the ordeal-filled struggle of democratic fighters in prison and the death of democratic martyrs, I once again confirm my resolve to revive democracy, the good news for the liberation of the oppressed, by leading the struggle to put an end to the military rule to success.

Talks With Journalists

16100215 Seoul Television Service in Korean
1200 GMT 6 Nov 87

[Report on 6 November panel discussion with Kim Yong-sam, RDP president, by *Tong-a Ilbo* deputy editor in chief Hong In-kun, *Hanguk Ilbo* editorial writer An Pyong-chan, *Chungang Ilbo* acting editor in chief Kum Chang-tae, and Munhwa Broadcasting Company News Department director Kang Song-ku; under the sponsorship of the Kwanhun Club; with introduction by Kwanhun Club Secretary General Kang In-sop at the Korea Press Center; questioners identified by captions—videotaped]

[Text] [Anchorman Pak Song-pom] Kim Yong-sam, RDP president, participated in a panel discussion under the sponsorship of the Kwanhun Club this evening. Due to the decision of the Kwanhun Club, four new panelists sat in tonight's discussion replacing the four panelists who put the questions to Kim Chong-pil and Kim Tae-chung. Here are the highlights of the discussion:

[Begin recording] [Kang In-sop] When we began these panel discussions, we thought that the same persons' asking questions to four presidential hopefuls would be burdensome for them and would fail to maintain a fresh atmosphere. We, therefore, had a policy from the outset that we would change the panelists after two rounds. However, in the two previous rounds of discussions, the four panelists made such serious, sincere, and sharp questions that they boosted the quality of our discussions

substantially. We, therefore, received the opinion from many people who maintained that we ought not change the panelists but let them continue to ask questions in the succeeding rounds of discussions to ensure consistency and fairness. We pondered about this, but have finally decided to change the panelists as we had originally planned, for the aforementioned reason, that all of the panelists felt it very burdensome and that by changing the panelists we will be able to have a fresh atmosphere.

[Hong In-kun] I remember an interview you gave last November in West Germany. In that interview, you, President Kim, said that since candidate Kim Tae-chung is your senior by 5 years he should, therefore, run for president before you do. You also said that your idea on this has not changed a bit even today. On another occasion, you also said: If a direct presidential election system is instituted and if his civil rights are restored and amnesty is given to him, I would suggest that he run for president.

[Kim Yong-sam] Not only is he older than I am by 5 years, but he also appeared to be in poor health. I thought I would support him as a presidential candidate in the future. I thought it would be all right if there was no such chance for me in the future. I have never dreamt about it. I thought I would do whatever I could do for democratization in our fatherland.

Since that time I have been observing the course of development from various angles while asking myself: What is the best way to bring an end to military rule? Will the military rule be brought to an end, effectively and without fail, if I support Mr Kim Tae-chung's bid for the presidency? I realized that it is a very difficult task for him.

So, I have reached a conclusion that I will have to bear the cross of the times, that I have no choice but to shoulder this heavy burden in order to make sure that the military rule will be brought to an end. Thus, I have changed my mind.

[Hong In-kun] What is the basis of your conviction that you alone can put an end to military rule?

[Kim Yong-sam] It is my political sense which I have acquired in the course of my long political career.

[An Pyong-chan] I know that you would not admit that you have a morbid longing to be a president. Which job, for example, do you think carries more weight, party president—the combination of the party president, the house speaker, and the right to nominate candidates for the National Assembly—or the presidency?

[Kim Yong-sam] Which carries more weight? They all do. The house speaker's job and party boss are equally important. Nevertheless, serving the country as president carries more weight than any other job, I would say.

Ambition alone is not enough energy to become a president. What I mean is that nobody can become a president simply because he aspires to be one.

[Kum Chang-tae] In view of what you have said and done so far, you seem to have a stronger and more persistent desire for the presidency than anyone else. Exactly what do you mean by your stating that you emptied your mind?

[Kim Yong-sam] Interpreting my word that I emptied my mind as stating that I would not run for the presidency is wrong. They mean two different things. When I said that I emptied my mind, I meant to say that I was ready to sincerely serve the people, casting aside my private interest and my private ambitions. This means that even if I become president, I will never let my private interest or ambitions interfere in my presidential duty.

[Kang Song-ku] What actually does veto group mean? And are you still firmly convinced that Chairman Kim Tae-chung should never run for the presidency because of the veto group?

[Kim Yong-sam] As for the word veto group, I have never used it. Indeed, Adviser Kim Tae-chung and I have talked privately on many occasions. We have discussed many things—things we have not made public. I have told him that it is not he but I who is more suited for the task of ending military rule. I said: When it comes to the task of terminating military rule effectively, I can do better than you could.

[Kum Chang-tae] A certain "C" who was a very popular actress in the past, a certain "L," and a certain "P," daughter of a former opposition party boss, have all been mentioned and are well-known. None of those who are involved has denied the fact. [as heard] One more thing. The house in which you, President Kim, live is known to have once been owned by an actress and was used as a kisaeng-entertained restaurant operated without license. Many people remember it. It is also rumored that after you purchased the house you are currently living in from an actress who is now residing in the United States, you had words with the former owner over the money involved. Explain to us how you bought the house, and what relationship you had with the actress in question.

[Kim Yong-sam] [Chuckling] What kind of question is this? All right. You can ask me whatever you please. Is it not common knowledge that houses can be sold and bought given an adequate bargain? It does not matter who owned it before. It does not matter if it was owned by an actress. I bought it because I liked it and I was able to afford it.

I am clean when it comes to money. A few days ago, my wife said in an interview with a newspaper that I am handsome. I have never thought that I am handsome. Is it not good to be popular with women? More than half of the voters are women. [end recording]

Kim Tae-chung's Party Officially Inaugurated

'Party for Peace and Democracy'

16120244 Seoul YONHAP in English
0220 GMT 12 Nov 87

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 12 (YONHAP)—Kim Tae-chung, one of South Korea's leading opposition leaders, and his supporters Thursday officially inaugurated a new political party named the Party for Peace and Democracy in a ceremony here with more than 3,300 representatives of the party from across the country attending.

The party members elected Kim as the party's president and presidential candidate for next month's presidential election. Kim recently broke away from the leading opposition Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) after the failure to reach a compromise in talks with RDP President Kim Yong-sam over a single presidential candidate.

In an address accepting the nomination, Kim said that he was solemnly accepting the nomination in accordance with the aspirations of democratic people and fellow party members wishing to open a new era for freedom, justice, peace and reunification in this nation.

Kim went on to say that the upcoming presidential election would have historic importance because it would mean a complete end to military rule and a return to genuine civilian rule in the country. He claimed he was the only presidential candidate who does not seek any form of compromise with the politically oriented military.

The opposition leader also said his party would make efforts to guarantee that the working class and middle class have the right to live well.

Commenting on the political situation on the Korean peninsula, he said he would implement a three-stage policy for easing tension between the two Koreas. The policy's first phase would involve establishing a basis for maintaining peace by bringing about a complete end to the 34-year-long armistice the second phase would focus on the recovery of national homogeneity through expanded political, economic, social and cultural exchanges the third phase would feature an open-door policy conducive to peaceful reunification.

Participants at the inauguration ceremony adopted a five-point resolution calling for an end to military rule, the pursuit of reunification, national reconciliation, safeguarding the rights and interests of the working-class population and a struggle against possible elections rigging.

Meanwhile, Kim Tae-chung told a group of journalists shortly before the opening of the ceremony that he would take up the so-called Dec. 12 incident and Kwangju incident as major issues of the election campaign. Both incidents, which took place in 1979 and 1980, respectively, were closely connected with the inauguration of the incumbent ruling camp.

Kim Announces Party Policy

16120244 Seoul YONHAP in English
0848 GMT 11 Nov 87

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 11 (YONHAP)—Kim Tae-chung, chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP), Wednesday announced a set of policy guidelines his party will pursue, including the establishment of regular meetings between leaders of South and North Korea.

Kim, who is a candidate for the December presidential election, said in a news conference that his party will reject any type of dictatorship.

The PDP will pursue the establishment of a genuine democratic government, the realization of economic justice, a welfare society and will be devoted to the realization of peaceful national reunification, he said.

The PDP is scheduled to be formally inaugurated in a convention Thursday.

As policy guidelines, Kim cited national reconciliation, a just economy, neutrality of the armed forces, independent diplomacy and the promotion of reunification.

In order to help facilitate reunification, the PDP will seek regular meetings between leaders of the two Koreas and regular ministerial-level consultative talks.

Kim said his party will pursue a moderate reformist line and speak for the middle class, workers, farmers and small- and medium-sized businesses.

Kim pledged that he will organize watchdog bodies in the country's smallest administrative levels to ensure fair elections and establish private human rights committees to oversee cases of human rights violations.

He also said that if he is elected president he will release all prisoners of conscience except for Communists and restore their civil rights.

In order to realize a just economy, the PDP will promote the economy by masses in which the fruits of economic growth are distributed fairly to all the people.

He also pledged the establishment of a government agency in charge of small- and medium-sized industries, the privatization of state and public enterprises, the establishment of autonomy in the financial industry, and the liberalization of capital markets.

Government Accused of Meddling in Election

SK250722 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
25 Nov 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Discriminate Between Right And Wrong—is the 'Vote-winning Strategy' True or False?"]

[Text] Does the government document entitled "Basic Strategy for Winning Votes" alleged by the opposition really exist or not? We believe that the determination of the answer to this question will be an important factor in settling current arguments about irregular electioneering, offensives, and defenses.

One side accuses the other of irregularities, so the other side flatly denies them, declaring that evidence must be produced. This is quite natural and right because denouncing someone without material evidence is rather tantamount to malicious black propaganda.

Yesterday, the opposition made public copies of that "material evidence," cornering the government, and asking, "Despite this, do you deny it?" If this is the case, the answer to the question is simple. What remains now is for the judicial authorities to determine the truth of the "material evidence" in question.

If the evidence is genuine, the government offices, officials, and supervisors concerned should be punished without delay; if it is fake, those who fabricated it should be called to account. At this point we have no way of judging whether it is genuine or not. We only request that it be accurately distinguished as genuine or fake by public officials in appropriate positions.

The important point is that such a matter should not be passed ambiguously as an exchange of words or verbal battle. Now that a document, supposedly "material evidence," has been presented, the government and its party need to assume a more active posture and prove unequivocally that it is fake.

Meanwhile, the opposition should take a posture to prove more objectively why it cannot be anything genuine.

In addition, the government and opposition are "exposing" various examples of irregularities and black propaganda conducted by the other side. Since the two sides claim that what they say is true and that what the other side says is false, the people are thrown into considerable confusion.

To distinguish as a demonstration case whose words are true and whose are not, we wish to have the truth and falsehood of the "Basic Strategy for Winning Votes" case thoroughly brought to light and the right and wrong of the matter clearly distinguished through the use of all possible means.

What is more, the neutrality of public officials during the election period is an area to which the people are most sensitive. This is quite natural for our people who, since the 15 March [1960] rigged election, have bitterly loathed government officials' meddling in elections under successive administrations. This is why even the government and ruling party have repeatedly emphasized that in the current election, government intervention is absolutely impossible in light of our present level of development.

At this very point, the opposition presented documentary evidence, entitled "Basic Strategy for Winning Votes."

The government and opposition are to assume responsibility according to the two alternatives—truth or falsehood. If true, the government and ruling party cannot be relieved of responsibility for intervention by government authority; if false, the opposition cannot escape responsibility for black propaganda and misrepresentation.

The people have the right to ask which of the two is correct. We call for strict discrimination by the proper authorities.

TONG-A ILBO Views Importance of Televised Campaign Speeches

*SK200730 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
19 Nov 87 p 2*

[Editorial: "TV Campaign Speeches and Discussions"]

[Text] It appears that televised campaign speeches and discussions by presidential candidates will materialize at long last. The TV debates, sponsored by the Kwanhun Club last week, were shown for more than 10 long hours, enjoying an unprecedentedly high audience rating. This must have made all the presidential candidates, political parties, general viewers, and broadcasting media acutely feel the functional relationship between television and elections. According to an estimate by broadcasting corporations, the TV sets turned on for 2 days—Saturday and Sunday—for viewing those discussions totaled 6 million. This reportedly accounts for as much as 60 percent of the 10 million TV sets across the country.

Putting together fragmentary remarks made by the candidates so far and the positions of their parties, although there may be a difference in the degree of preference, it is expected that the candidates in the current election will, in principle, make active use of television.

With the exception of only unfairness, artificially created by the broadcasting media concerned, and biased ulterior motives, TV campaign speeches and debates are a means of conducting election campaigns that must inevitably be tried in this zge.

According to an agreement reached between the Election Management Committee and the two broadcasting networks—kbs [Korean Broadcasting System] and MBC [Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation]—political speeches by candidates, which will begin on 24 November, are scheduled to be aired five times for 20 minutes each, followed by five supporting speeches. The radio-wave rent is set at 50 million won each time.

As for the format of TV discussions, beginning 12 December when TV speeches will be finished, American-style TV debates managed by the broadcasting network or interviews with broadcasting media under an agreement among candidates seem to be under consideration. The format will highly likely be interviews with questioners on whom the candidates agree as in the case of the recent Kwanhun Club interviews, rather than direct debates among the candidates.

One of the merits of the televised campaign method is that, compared with the announcement of political views through stumping tours, it can reach a greater audience simultaneously and help the audience observe candidates in a calm and cool atmosphere. But it is of greater significance in that it is a method which can prevent regional feelings, something which can be touched off in future mass rallies, as shown in the recent RDP Kwangju meeting or the Party for Peace and Democracy Taegu rally.

It is high time now to prevent by all means the symptoms of a political catastrophe, which can be produced by explosions of such regional sentiments, which are highly likely to be touched off in the remaining campaign period.

However, despite the propriety of TV speeches and debates, there are some preconditions. First comes the selection of the airing time frame. How to deal with the difference in audience rating on a fair basis, depending on the variance in time frames, is also an important issue.

In the case of televised discussions, no matter how they are determined in accordance with prior agreements with candidates, control by broadcasting media in the selection of questioners and other minor details cannot be completely ruled out. In addition, we believe that there are many technical ways to induce biased conclusions favoring or harming specific candidates, if the broadcasting media simply have a mind to do so.

We reemphasize that, in order to insure the fairest televised speeches or debates, the management and producers at the broadcast media, who can influence the

production of these programs, are urged to recast themselves into a fair posture worthy of "journalists." We mean to say that those in the broadcast media are urged to become new men and show a dauntless posture, awakening to the fact that the current election is a stepping-stone to open the future of Korean democracy in the 2000's. Together we must believe that this is the only way to lead the current election to fairness and show the true face of the journalists living in this age.

Polls Conducted on Presidential Election

16071213 Seoul CHOSON ILBO
in Korean 5 Nov 87 p 1

[Text] It has turned out that the great majority of the eligible voters of our country think that the next president should be someone who has a strong sense of responsibility and leadership and who is capable of dealing with economic problems well.

According to the poll taken jointly by *Choson Ilbo* and the Korea Gallup Poll for 8 days from 16-23 October through individual interviews with a random sample of 1,200 persons age 20 or older across the country (606 men and 594 women), those who responded to the question "Please choose three of the qualifications of the president which you think are the most important," the greatest portion, 48.1%, chose a "sense of responsibility," followed by 46.6% and 40.1% that chose "leadership" and "honesty" respectively. In other words, the poll showed that the three most important qualifications of the president turned out to be a sense of responsibility, leadership, and honesty.

This was followed by 36% that chose "respect for public opinion," 25.0% "decision making ability," 23.5% "common people-mindedness," 18.0% "ability to put things into practice," and 15% "integrity."

To the question "Please note the three major tasks to be solved by the next president," the greatest segment, 38.5%, chose economic problems, followed by agricultural and fishery problems 28.5%, eliminating the gap between the rich and the poor 28.2%, improving basic rights 25.9%, and eliminating corruption and irregularities 24.8%.

As for the major items chosen as qualifications required of the president, in the case of "the president should be a man with a strong sense of responsibility," 56.8% of the women respondents chose this item, while 39.7% of the men did.

Also, the lower the education of the respondents, the more they chose the response stressing responsibility, namely, 55.5% of those who finished only elementary school, 52.2% of those who finished middle school, 43.5% of high school graduates, and 40.1% of those in college chose this item. As for "leadership," more men (48.3%) than women (44.9%) chose this item.

As for "honesty," more women (43.1%) than men (37.0%), and the less educated more than the more educated (49.5% of elementary school graduates, 45.6% of middle school graduates, and 30.5% of high school graduates) chose this item.

As for the "economic problems" as the most important task which the next president should carry out, more women (42.4%) than men (34.7%) chose this item, and those living in larger towns chose this item in greater numbers (41.9% in large cities, 37.8% in small and medium cities, and 34.4% in small towns). Also, many of those in higher income brackets (41.2% of the higher income group, 41.2% of the middle income group, and 33.1% of the lower income group) chose economic problems.

Paper Views Criticism of Election Campaign Coverage

SK300016 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
29 Nov 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Criticism of the Press Is a Dictatorial Concept"]

[Text] With the presidential election campaign reaching its peak, its appearance is, it seems, gradually becoming far from the ideal of democratization that we seek. This causes us deep concern. Eligible voters are buoyed by the heated atmosphere of a direct presidential election, which is to be conducted for the first time in 16 years. However, through their election campaign speeches and pledges, presidential candidates have revealed a sort of authoritarian concept and dictatorial way of thinking that runs counter to democratization.

As to press coverage, certain presidential candidates have expressed strong complaints during their campaign speeches, saying "they [the press—fbis] always shoots me making a wry face," "they focus the camera on places where no audience is seen," or a certain political party and quasi-journalists are concocting a plot to make one No and three Kims into one No and two Kims. These days, they have gone so far as to fabricate false propaganda and openly use character assassination.

We wonder if a presidential candidate would believe that reporting on him favorably while downgrading others is precisely freedom of the press. However, democratization cannot be measured based on individual interests. Nevertheless, certain candidates tend to express their complaints in their campaign speeches when they find any news coverage of the press that is unfavorable to them.

Democracy is like a house of cards when there is no freedom of expression or freedom to present different opinions. "I cannot agree with your view, but I will defend with my life your right to express it" is precisely the beginning of democracy. Such a system under which any expression that is favorable to oneself becomes

freedom of expression and under which only acceptable views are permitted is precisely a dictatorial system or an autocratic system, not a democratic system.

The press is like a mirror. Therefore, the press cannot reflect that which does not exist. To attribute one's ugly face to the mirror is foolish. It is impossible to reflect a wry face that does not look wry in a mirror. At the same time, as long as the recent tendency in which the competition among No Tae-u and the three Kims has gradually changed into a competition among No Tae-u and the two Kims continues, the press cannot but reflect in a mirror as it is.

We have seen many times that a certain presidential candidate has corrected the contents of his campaign speeches through statements after admitting their mistakes. Such events could happen because the presidential candidates have to make speeches in many different districts even in 1 day.

Nevertheless, why have certain candidates expressed complaints about press coverage? Does this mean that if they take office they would impose controls on the press? Or, does it mean that they would force their views on the press?

The course of democratization we face today is precisely the property of our joint ownership. There are many people who assume a negative attitude toward the allegation that today's democratization is the result of the struggle of the three Kims. While the three Kims created their factions or stayed in a foreign country, our people, male and female, young and old, worked hard, shedding sweat, while aspiring for mature politics. This finally brought about the 29 June declaration.

In his campaign pledge, a certain candidate promised that if elected president he would take a step against a certain religion, about which the president under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic could not think. We cannot understand how the president alone under the new constitution, in which the parliamentary power has been made stronger, can take such a step. In a nutshell, we cannot but think that he must have learned such an authoritarian way of thinking and such a dictatorial concept under the authoritarian political system in the past, even though he was an opposition figure at the time.

Today's overheated atmosphere may be inevitable because our people are to face a direct presidential election for the first time in 16 years. However, when we witness a campaign rally site where a massive crowd has gathered and hear a candidate promise them that he would do everything if elected president, we can hardly find the common sense of democracy there.

Paper Cautions Military Against Sensitivity To Criticism

*SK292346 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
28 Nov 87 p 2*

[Editorial: "Minister of National Defense Chong's Concern"]

[Text] The remarks by Minister of National Defense Chong Ho-yong at a meeting of key military commanders on 27 November make us think of many things. The key point of his remarks—that the military should neither support a specific presidential candidate nor engage in any activity to support a particular political party, that it should stay neutral in the presidential election, and that the military should set up absentee ballot boxes in a way that guarantees secrecy in full—sounded good to the listeners, although they may be merely declarations.

What particularly attracted our attention in his remarks was the part that called on politicians to exercise self-restraint. Hearing him refer to such things as "people taking a negative view of the military establishment," a "deliberate attempt to estrange the military from the citizens," and "irresponsible words and deeds that are likely to lower the morale of armed forces personnel," we have become aware what military leaders, including Minister Chong, are now thinking.

During a transitional period when a regime changes hands, national enthusiasm and efforts tend to flow toward politics. In particular, in countries like ours, where the North and the South are at a military standoff, such a national tendency can result in weakening national security. Viewed in this light, the open complaint made by a military leader about politicians, which can be said to be a little excessive, makes our people feel more than a little uneasy.

At this juncture, we would like to stress that it is desirable for politicians to make no irresponsible words and deeds that might lower the morale of military personnel. Whatever course our political history has traversed, we find it necessary to treat the military establishment, the group that is primarily in charge of our national security, with a forward-looking attitude. Simply put, we should understand that we can be critical of its past undertakings, but we should also understand it so that it can be faithful to its primary mission. In other words, we can be critical of its intervention in political affairs in the past, but at the same time we should appreciate its patriotic efforts concerning national security.

Despite all this, we would like to ask the military leaders to consider the following: What matters is national defense, the duty the military bears before the people, not how the politicians view it. Instead of becoming angry about hearing someone speak ill of it, the military establishment should feel happy at the thought of the public trust in its essential duty.

Also, military leaders can find solace in the notion that the reference to the military in today's political development is the painful process of bringing an end to the legacy of relationship between the military and politics which has plagued us in the past. If it was inevitable for our politicians to reckon with the military under political circumstances, it must be admitted that the military has had great impact on politics in our country over the past 20 years. Without recognizing this, it is impossible to be independent and critical of references made concerning the military establishment in today's political developments.

This being the case, it is necessary for us to understand that the advance of the times has opened a crack in the dam that has made a direct presidential election possible. In other words, references to the military can be interpreted as being a process of bringing the role of the military, which has been inflated, back to its normal self, therefore, it is necessary for the military leaders and the military establishment in general not to be hostile to every comment about it.

Once again we urge the politicians to abstain from uttering words that can be interpreted as being aimed at estranging the military from the civilian population. At the same time, we hope that the military leaders do not dwell so seriously on references to the military establishment that are pouring out these days. The yardstick we need in understanding the relationship between the military and politics is a point of view called historical fulfillment. The practical attitude we should adopt is to view today as reading history.

SOCIAL

Self Restraint Called For Following 29 June Declaration

41070242 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
18 Aug 87 p 9

[Article by Chung Ku-chong]

[Text] Since the so-called "29 June declaration" was issued, it is as if a dam has broken. Irrational and absurd demands for normalization, democratization, and profit sharing are erupting uncontrollably from people of all segments of society who have suffered for years under undemocratic oppression. At the government offices, courts, political party headquarters, and religious organizations, hardly a day passes without seeing demonstrations by victimized people who either appeal their grievances or protest against the wrongdoings they have suffered through. At every work place throughout the country the dispute between labor and management which may be regarded as a crystallization of grievances, is going on with every appearance of seriousness.

Even as storms, typhoons, and floods continuously played havoc with our entire land during this past summer, our society is now running a high fever comparable to a case of measles due to the explosive demands from the "great march for democracy." Although some are nervous about such an overheated development, many hold a positive view about the demand for democracy, saying it is a demand for the restoration of the basic rights of citizens in a developing country where such rights have been denied under the government's growth-first policy and is the process of modernizing, industrializing and urbanizing our society. The view is that it should be considered a process in search of balance through conflict and building a new order through such balance in a time of political and social changes. It is true that lately people are invariably taking a radical approach in making points and demands. In the case of labor-management disputes, from the very initial stage, labor has resorted to strikes or sit-in strikes. In extreme cases, labor repeatedly has resorted to violent acts such as destruction of machinery or take-over of railroads. Such violent behavior makes people nervous.

But, on the one hand, labor relations specialists point out that such a radical approach to the solution is not a "lawful" labor dispute and departs from the regular process, and, on the other hand, they recognize the legitimate points in the demands of the workers who have suffered from oppression under the shadow of lawfulness. The workers have raised a doubt about the legitimacy of the three labor laws which they have called "bad laws." Also from the standpoint that recent labor disputes have initiated a structural reorganization of the "growth oriented economy," which had been achieved through low wages, government-controlled labor unions, and in an unhealthy environment like a warm nursery, that is government protection, the recent labor disputes cannot be viewed entirely negatively. In a place where there was no healthy business milieu on the basis of equal relationship between the labor and management, the feeling of insecurity is something new to management and to some people in the society, but if such basic questions are dealt with at this time, the expectations for building a strong foundation for self-reliance are so much greater.

At a time of social transformation, renewing the debate on the various absurdities and irrationalities of the past, and loudly demanding their rectifications are not just limited to the area of the labor-management problems.

While the lack of fairness in distributing the fruits of the economic growth, which was made possible by the hard work of all the people, resulted in an uneven spread of wealth in our society, and produced a newly emerged small class of wealthy people, it also produced many low income people. Further, the unjustifiable gap between the classes has resulted in erecting a "wall of spirit" which does not appear to crumble easily.

The schools which have suffered no less than the society—particularly the college community—are also appearing to gear up to demand democratization with the opening of the second semester. The students, who view "29 June" as "the first fruit" of their movement since "19 April," are expected to show more eagerness in organizing and running democratic student associations both in name and reality in the new semester, and in bringing democratization to academia. The "great unity long march of 1 million students," which began on the 16th with the participation of the college student representatives throughout the nation, is about to become the focus of the student movement in the new semester through the establishment of intercollegiate liaison by creating the "National Council for College Students" at Chungnam University on the 19th. It is indicated that in the new semester the college community will demand first of all campus autonomy, and call for the end to the absurdities of every sort in academia including the freedom from government interference in the administration of academia and the dismissal of pro-government or incompetent professors.

It is expected that professors, too, will be able to participate directly in school administration by organizing the faculty council or the conference of professors whose functions will include choosing the college president.

As to the question of recognizing the progressive forces, raised by some people in our society, it should be settled in relation to the question of participation by opposition leaders and religious leaders and by giving recognition to the progressive parties as advocated by some people.

It is difficult to predict what other kinds of ideas, assertions, and demands will come forth from this society during the transition period.

Without new ideas in a time of transition, ideas ranging from demands for the right to a good life by the workers, to the demands of college students for liberalization of their ideological debates, there would be great difficulty in solving these problems. Even though the reality is such that it should be resolved and reordered through unavoidable conflicts, this is the time when the sound judgement of democratic citizens, who are capable of harmonizing procedures with order, is needed. We remember vividly through experiences in previous transition periods that we could quickly lose everything we have gained if we attempt further gains by means of violence. This is not an imaginary fear.

At present, the public power that has been so menacing is silent. Although it is difficult to know whether such a silence is a result of reexamination of their unreasonable way of exercising public power in the past out of political necessity or an act of dereliction of their duties after having sensed the pulse of the time, a power vacuum certainly arouses people's attention to firm autonomy. Moreover, now might be the right time to nurture the abilities of the democratic citizenry.

Measles creates a fear of a fever assaulting the entire body, but what follows complete recovery from the illness is a promise of a bright future of good health. Even though measles is painful, the human body becomes healthier following recovery. But there are some cases of disfigurement from scabs caused by the rash. In a few instances patients have even died from measles. This is the time that we must overcome the fever through self-restraint.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADE

Domestic Automobile Industry Growth Reported

Increased Multinational Production Agreements
41070251 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN
in Korean 1 Aug 87 p 7

[Article by Kim Song-won]

[Text] Recently in the domestic automobile industry, there has been an increase in three-nation joint corporations.

While our nation's automobile industry is growing at a comparatively rapid pace, a new pattern is emerging of Korean-American-Japanese and Korean-West German-Japanese trilateral collaboration in technology and marketing. Foreign corporations are making further advances, both in taking aim at the domestic market and in being supplied through the OEM [original equipment manufacturing] method (having goods produced under the brand names of the orderer).

Including the recent example of Hyundai Motors deciding to establish Kepico Inc. jointly with West Germany's Porsche and Japan's Mitsubishi Electronics, in the last 3 years four companies have adopted a collaborative system of this type.

Kia is a typical example of three-nation collaboration in the finished-product stage of the automobile industry. In the production of automobile parts, Three Star Inc., which produces radiators and condensers, and Korea Diesel Industry, which manufactures diesel engine fuel injection equipment, can be mentioned.

It has been decided that in Kepico, a joint enterprise established for the collaboration of an affiliate of Hyundai Motors, Hyundai Electric, with West Germany's Porsche and Japan's Mitsubishi Electronics, both the West German and the Japanese companies will each have 25.5 percent of the shares. In order to develop electronically regulated gasoline fuel injection equipment, for which demand will grow rapidly, Hyundai is promoting collaboration with these companies which possess that technology. Hyundai arranged for the participation

of Porsche, which holds the patent rights, and, at the same time, of Mitsubishi Electronics, which is Porsche's technology agent for the Asian region.

Korea Diesel Industry, established with 60 percent domestic capital, 20 percent from West Germany's Porsche, and 20 percent from Japan Diesel Machinery, is producing diesel injection equipment. Korea Diesel Industry is a Korea-West Germany-Japan three-nation joint enterprise, with joint investment by Porsche, which has developed the basic technology, and Japan, which manages that company's technology in Asia. The collaboration of those two companies is regarded as an example of those companies, which hold the patent of that technology, promoting a new strategy to protect their own interests.

Three Star Inc., which Samsung Radiator established and of which American Prestone and Japan Radiator each provide 33 percent of the capital investment, is an example of American and Japanese companies each investing while specially providing parts and technology for aluminum and car cooling systems. However, it is the foundation for a collaborative effort to supply the quantities needed not only for domestic markets but for American markets as well.

Furthermore, in 1983 Kia Industries permitted Japan's Mazda Motors to hold an 8 percent share and Ito Tadashi Trading Company 2 percent. Last year a Korean-American-Japanese three-nation division-of-labor system was established, with America's Ford given 10 percent of the shares. While beginning to produce passenger cars, Kia is transforming itself into a joint enterprise, introducing technology from Japan and making America its market.

With this trilateral collaboration system, it appears possible that starting from a relationship which links technology and markets, if it continues as it is, an equal international division of labor may be realized. However, there is concern that the slightest mistake might lead to an increased dependency on the technology of foreign companies, the paying of licensing fees, and the loss of managerial autonomy.

Domestic Original Model Cars

41070251 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN in Korean 16 Jul 87 p 7

[Text] In accordance with the policy of the government to make passenger cars the major export product of the nineties, the automobile industry is developing original models and has decided to begin full-scale production of new passenger cars next year.

The three automotive companies, Hyundai Motors, Daewoo Motors, and Kia Industries, see that it is urgent that they have their own models in order to be able to

compete internationally in quality and in price. They have decided to go forward and foster the ability to design their own engines and automobile bodies.

As the advanced technology which has been provided by America and Japan, who have been the primary technological partners, will no longer be supplied when the market share for Korean-made automobiles rises in foreign markets, they are in a particular hurry to develop technology in their own research centers. Furthermore, they are in a hurry to cultivate a design capability, utilizing overseas specialty sub-contractors, and develop their own passenger cars.

Hyundai Motors has committed itself to producing a mid-sized passenger car, called the Y2, from the first half of next year. They have embarked upon the joint development with Austria's AVL engine research center of 1,800, 2,000, and 2,400 cc class engines. They are almost in the final stages. Hyundai plans to have their own model of a passenger car, really sharply reducing their dependency on the design technology of Mitsubishi Motors and associating instead with an auto body engine that relies on Italy's Ital Design Company.

The engines in all the cars that Hyundai has produced up to now have utilized the design in the cars from Japan's Mitsubishi. Furthermore, Hyundai has been paying royalties. However, from the Y2 model on, they will no longer have to pay fees for the use of someone else's technology. It has been learned that all Hyundai will have to import is general engineering technology. In conjunction with this, Hyundai will be jointly developing a 1,500 cc engine with England's Ricardo Company.

Daewoo Motors, promoting its J car project, is terminating discussions with General Motors and plans next year to develop original model passenger cars.

There are plans for two cars in the J series, one 1,600 cc and the other 2,000 cc. The 1,600 cc car will use the current LeMans engine. The 2,000 cc engine will be jointly developed with AVL Corporation of Austria. Furthermore, Daewoo is preparing a strategy for further expansion in domestic and export markets by relying on Italian subcontractors for the automobile body, abandoning the GM model, and developing a unique model.

Up to now, Daewoo has been importing from GM to produce buses and passenger cars and from Japan's Isuzu to produce trucks. However, they report that in order to win in international competition in the future, they must produce automobiles that match the real conditions in our nation. They have decided to expand the number of unique models, starting with the J car next year.

Although Kia Industries has yet to announce any concrete plans for original model passenger cars, they have already asked Austria's AVL for designs for small-scale engines, of 550 cc and 1,000 cc.

Prospects are that they will certainly have a top-class passenger car, if the development of those engines goes smoothly.

The industry foresees that dependence on overseas research organizations is unavoidable, given the current level of technology, but by the mid-nineties they will all be able to develop products with their own technology lines.

Out of 25 brands of engine oil for use in motor vehicles, five have received the right to use the seal of approval of

the API (American Petroleum Institute). This time the engine oils which have been accepted by the API are Uni-pro, Extra Motor Oil, Pro's Motor Oil, XD-3, and D-3.

Taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the Petroleum Institute's granting to three of those approved this time, Uni-pro, XK-3, and D-3, the highest rating of SF and CD, it has been decided to concentrate on the production of top quality lubricating oil.

09953/7310

ECONOMIC

Party Stresses Consumer Goods Production

41100001 *Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean*
17 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Kim Myong-ch'i: "Stupendous Vitality of the '3 August Mass Consumption Goods' Production Movement"]

[Text] Epoch makingly improving people's livelihood during the new prospective plan period is one of the most important tasks we must carry out. Immensely increasing the production of mass consumption goods is the major import of this task.

Our party sees to it that central light industry and local industry will be developed speedily to satisfactorily meet the demand for mass consumer goods and, simultaneously, that a mass struggle will be launched to produce mass consumption goods.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and secretary of the Central Committee, pointed out as follows:

"It is imperative that the production of miscellaneous goods for daily use be launched as a mass movement." ("Regarding Further Improving Popular Livelihood," monograph, p 21.)

"The 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement is the most widely spread and most vigorous movement in the mass struggle for mass consumption goods production. This movement in our country has ushered in a broader road for increasing consumer goods and added a great benefit to the popular livelihood.

"The 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement is a mass innovation movement designed to mobilize inner reserves with the force of the masses and to unceasingly increase mass consumption goods production by means of creativity from the masses.

"The 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement, which is being vigorously launched nationwide amid the concern and interest of the entire people, was initiated by our party and is displaying an immense vitality under the leadership of the party.

The vitality of "The 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement is being displayed, above all, in the fact that the broad masses are actively taking part in it with high revolutionary enthusiasm.

Results of and vitality in a mass movement are determined by the degree of self-consciousness and activeness on the part of the masses who are taking part in it.

As soon as it got started, "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement echoed among the masses; and it became an innovative movement covering broad masses. Thus, during the first year, it already came to have over 19,000 home work teams and home side job teams throughout the country; and in all plants, business enterprises, cooperative farms, street people's neighborhood units, and everywhere else, the rank and file of producers are increasing with each passing day.

Today, "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement has become a new field of mass consumption goods production along with the central industry and local industry. It is now playing a big role in producing consumer goods nationwide; and its role is growing bigger with each passing day.

This fact is proof that the "3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement is a mass movement that has a tractive force.

The basic factor in the movement of masses with this big tractive force on the part of the "3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement is our people's single-hearted ideological feeling toward the party and the leader.

During his inspection tour of an exhibition of Pyongyang City light industry goods held on 3 August 1984, the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il set out [a plan of] producing through a mass movement various necessities of life which conform to a timely sense of beauty and the people's taste by means of mobilizing inner reserves and potential. This became the beginning of a new mass movement in our country which was called "3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement.

Being endlessly loyal to the party and following it with that same loyalty represent our people's single-hearted will and firm belief. The burning loyalty of our people, who single heartedly uphold the party and follow it, builds up the ideological foundation of "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement. It unites with the creative wisdom of the masses and produces stupendous material benefits.

Our party's sublime desire to make our people's life happy and affluent met with people's responses and became deeply instilled in their minds. Thus, not only housewives but also those older people who have retired from work are now able to devote their wisdom and ability to the cause of people's [livelihood.]

Vitality of the mass movement can be greatly displayed only through the judicious leadership of the party. Our party saw to it that "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement would be launched by cities and counties. It is judiciously leading the movement so that the movement may be launched more and more forcefully without deviation. This decision became an important factor in effecting the success of "the

3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production. With cities and counties leading the movement the work of organization and guidance can be strengthened. Establishing direct sales stores in city and county regions enable functionaries to see and feel them for themselves so that they may launch the mass consumption goods production struggle competitively. Cooperative production can now be organized widely among plants, business enterprises, home work teams, and home service workers. Exhibitions and meetings for sharing experience and discussion can now be organized frequently so that the wisdom and creativity of the masses may be displayed. Raw materials, resources, and labor reserves can now be mobilized and utilized more and more.

In this way, "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement is becoming more and more active and displaying enormous vitality through the burning loyalty of our people who are set to successfully establish the judicious leadership of our party and the will of the party.

Vitality of "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement is also being displayed in an unceasing increase of consumption goods and meeting the material demands of the people more satisfactorily.

In order for men to live, it is imperative that they need various consumer goods. The demand for consumer goods will increase quantitatively and qualitatively, as men's livelihood becomes affluent. One of the characteristics of the growth of demands on the part of workers today is the diversity of structure of demands as well as the qualitative demands. In order to satisfactorily meet the demands for consumer goods, which vary according to sex, age, individual characteristics of workers whose taste and fancy vary, and locality-oriented characteristics, including climate and natural features, it is imperative, needless to say, that great efforts be made continuously to develop central industry and local industry, and that the power of the masses be organized and mobilized for consumer goods production.

"The 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement which was initiated and guided by our party is the most effective means of satisfactorily meeting such complicated and diverse demands for consumer goods.

This is above all directly related to the fact that the movement makes workers buyers and producers of consumer goods.

The wisdom and creative power of the masses are inexhaustible. When they are displayed, nothing becomes impossible. Based on the idea that enormous production reserves are effected when the wisdom and creative power of the masses are mobilized, our party decided to launch a mass movement for mass consumption goods production. Thus many people who were only consumers in the past became producers. The masses themselves become capable of producing what they

need. Accordingly, the mass consumption goods production came closer to the needs of the people. This has made them capable of producing whatever they think is necessary for their living. Therefore, "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" movement meets even the complicated and diverse demands for consumer goods. In this way, the ideas of our party which seek to meet more satisfactorily the demands for people's consumer goods and to eliminate even small inconveniences in livelihood are blooming into realities.

The fact that "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement becomes an effective method of satisfactorily meeting demands for people's consumer goods is related with the fact that the movement mobilizes and utilizes in the production of consumer goods.

"The 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement may also be called a movement for mobilization of inner reserves. The great significance of this movement is in the fact that the production of people's consumer goods can be greatly increased without the state-oriented investments.

By-products and waste materials are the result of the process of production. In the process of being used in daily living, many things lose their value. "The 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement makes it possible for such reserves, natural raw materials, and cultivation raw materials to be mobilized and utilized thoroughly. Since the time when our party launched "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement, the consciousness of the people has been heightened. Thus the people came to handle by-products and wastes, which they used to disregard, with a view toward production, and to find ways to use them wisely and in an effective way. Thus, in many units, they do not discard by-products and wastes, and they become important raw materials and resources for mass consumption goods. Such a practice has ushered in a way in which raw materials and resources themselves may be diversified and in which the variety of consumer goods may be increased to any extent in accordance with diverse tastes of the people. Accordingly, the production of mass consumption goods increases continuously.

In the long run, "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement makes it possible that those things which used to be discarded in the past become useful for people's livelihood, and by so doing more consumer goods can be produced at less cost, workers income can be increased, and material demands can be more met.

Our party's decision on launching "the 3 August Mass Consumption Goods" production movement represents another meritorious service rendered by our party to our people along with numerous achievements made during the era of the workers party. It is imperative for our functionaries and workers to make "the 3 August Mass

Consumption Goods" occupy greater percentage in the overall output of people's consumer goods. They must see to it that this work will display greater vitality.

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SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

S&T Innovations, Achievements Reported

Increased Production of Robots

41100231 *Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean*
12 Aug 87 p 1

[Text] Factory and Industrial robots are increasing.

Following party policy, during a very short period of time this year, dozens of robots were produced by workers, scientists, and engineers. They have completed more than 60 robots and are working ever harder to produce more.

The glorious leader, Kim Il-song gave instructions to us all that in the new plan for the future, modern robot manufacturing plants will be constructed, and the increased robot production project will be carried out at a plant in the vicinity of Pyongyang in order to fulfill the production plan for manufacture and modification. During September of last year, while commenting on the excellence of the special precision machines which are the fruit of the June 1985 machine production project, the glorious leader stated that a new target was instituted for the production of robots.

The party showed the way for production of robots at full speed, and the party led us wisely to bring the robot production campaign into the peoples' domain.

To pursue both the party directive and the instruction of the glorious leader, many plants have set as their goal the production of hundreds of robots while, at the same time, a robotics education campaign has been started in order to define specifically which robots are suitable to the respective plants. Since the inception, the results have been excellent.

The workers and engineers of the 3-25 plant, who are involved with the robot step-up campaign, and the 3 major revolutionary agencies have been working together. In a very short time, their creativity has borne fruit resulting in the production of pressing material feeders and cleaning robots, and their work will continue.

The 8-1 railroad yard also became involved in increased production of robots. The workers and the 3 major revolutionary agencies were aided by the Pyongyang Railroad College instructors and technicians in manufacturing robots to be used in the manufacture of box cars. In addition to that, they are producing various robots for modernizing the plant facility.

Hoechun Machinery, 4-3 plant, 10-5 automation plant, Pyongyang Textile Machinery, and many other plants have produced robots for use in their plants and the quality and quantity of their products have increased enormously.

The research scientists under the Academy of Science, along with the instructors and research scientists from Kim Il-song University and Kimchaek Engineering College, assisted by workers, have produced robots dedicated to machines, x-y coordinate robots, multijointed robots, and welding robots.

Technological Achievements

41100231 *Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean*
12 Aug 87 p 3

[Article by Ahn Yung-sup]

[Text] More than 4,800 new technological innovations were achieved by the workers in the Hamkyong Pukdo and the 4-15 technological shock brigade members, and these innovations were initiated after a speech given by the glorious leader Kim Il-song and to comply with party policy. This project was the Third 7-Year Plan and it has been carried out vigorously since its inception.

According to the report presented by the Hamkyong Pukdo Scientists and Engineers Committee, in Hamkyong Pukdo, the technological innovations included more than 4,800 items, which resulted from the labor of the workers and the members of the 4-15 technological shock brigade. These items contributed enormously to the production and manufacturing at various plants. These innovations brought about conservation as follows: about 21,837,900 won capital; 1,154,900 workers hands; 13,637,000 kW electric power; 21,380 tons of steel; 47,700 tons of coal; 7,740 tons of fuel oil; 10 tons of nonferrous metals; 2,860 tons of cement; and 2,660 cubic meters of lumber.

The glorious leader Kim Il-song explained that it is imperative to define our goals in the realm of the socialistic revolution and these goals must be realistic. The goals set for the development of science and technology must be within the framework of the trends and status of science and technological development of other nations. A suitable example would be the complete mobilization of the creativity of the scientists, engineers, and workers.

Various plants and production facilities in Hamkyong Pukdo have commenced the new long range plan under the guidance of the party structure and, from this, a detailed technology development plan has been charted. By doing so, the campaign message was instilled in the masses, the workers, the engineers, and the 4-15 technological shock brigade members.

In the Kimchaek Steelmaking complex, the 4-15 technological shock brigade was reorganized after the inception of the new long range plan so as to adapt to the new goals and demands, and this fulfilled the technological capability, and the chuche of the metal industry was reinforced. At the same time, technical innovation tasks were defined.

As a result of the reorganization and the new long range plan, the workers and the members of the 4-15 technological shock brigade in the steelmaking complex achieved 770 items of technological innovations.

In the Sungjin Steelmaking complex, this year, a hot mending machine was introduced and corrosion resistant steel plate technology was completed. In addition to these, 40 new technical innovations were utilized in the production lines and, by doing so, workers, materials, and capital were conserved, and also production steadily increased.

In the Chungjin Synthetic Fiber Manufacturing Complex, the workers and the members of the 4-15 technological shock brigade concentrated on the modernization of the plant together with the expansion of its production capabilities. Their cooperation has led to the production of a new boring machine for porous plates, and the plant capacity has increased 1.4-times after the introduction of 3 new porous plate press bonding machines.

In the Kilju Pulp plant, the workers and the members of the 4-15 technical shock brigade decided to improve the quality of the paper and, as part of this goal, a new concentrated sulfuric acid plant was completed and it is in the testing stage. In addition to that, 2 large classifiers were constructed and their capacity was increased 12 and 1/2 times. This has certainly created an innovation in paper manufacture.

The workers and the members of the 4-15 technological shock brigade in the Hoeryung Mining Equipment plant and the Saengkiryung Mine, as well as in many other plants, demonstrated the existence of a spirit of self-sufficiency and revolution. Also, they were able to achieve high production goals by the realization of technological innovation.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADE

Solidarity With China Reaffirmed

41100032 *Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean*
1 Oct 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Congratulations on Chinese People's National Holiday"]

[Text] Thirty-eight years have elapsed since our brotherly Chinese people attained victory in their people's revolution and proclaimed the founding of the People's

Republic of China after a protracted struggle launched against imperialists and domestic reactionaries under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Korean people are sending enthusiastic congratulations and greetings to their brotherly Chinese people who are observing that significant national holiday.

The founding of the PRC on 1 October 1949 was a precious fruition of the bloody struggle of the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people. It was a great transformation that ushered in a new era in the history of China.

Discarding the old foundation of government, China moved onto the road of socialism. The Chinese people became a great and dignified people when they became perfect masters of their destiny. And the imperialist aggressive forces were dealt serious blow.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song taught as follows:

"After founding the PRC and ushering in a new era in the long history of China, the Chinese people forcefully pushed socialist revolution and socialist construction by displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and ardent struggle under the refined leadership of the CCP. They transformed China which was very backward into a new China of socialism."

After founding the PRC, the Chinese people displayed the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and ardent struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party. In this way they built a strong new China, a giant of socialism which is prospering and flourishing on the same land where exploitation and oppression prevailed and where the people suffered dire poverty and hunger in the past.

The Chinese people who from the Long March to the occasion of the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee scored stupendous success in their struggle to achieve nationwide security and unity, and to build a socialism that has the characteristics of China.

China is being transformed into a strong socialist nation while the construction of socialist spiritual civilization and of socialist material civilization is being forcefully pushed forward.

In China, the Seventh 5-Year Plan is being implemented successfully and the people's livelihood is improving.

Today brotherly Chinese people are launching an intense struggle to open the 13th Congress of the CPC with high political enthusiasm and successful labor achievements in all fields.

The Chinese people are making efforts to unify the whole country by means of reclaiming Taiwan, which is an inseparable territory of China, [to the China mainland].

The PRC's international status is rising and its influence on the development of the international situation is growing.

The historical innovation attained by the Chinese people and the growth of the PRC's power are strengthening the anti-imperialist independent forces of the world, and thereby making great contributions to safeguarding the peace and security of Asia and the world.

Our people are wholeheartedly joyful to watch the success being scored in our brotherly Chinese people's struggle for revolution and construction.

[Our] two countries, Korea and China, are brotherly socialist countries located in the eastern part of Asia. Peoples of our two countries are carrying out a common militant task to attain victory for the cause of peace, socialism, and communism.

Today our people, firmly united around the central committee of the party headed by the respected and beloved Comrade Kim Il-song, are upholding the Red Flag of the Three Revolutions of ideology, technology, and culture which was set forth by the Sixth Congress of the party. We are launching an all-out march for implementation of the Third 7-Year Plan with the prospect of the complete victory of socialism.

The government of the republic is doing everything in its power in order to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula and to peacefully solve the national unification problem in conformity with the desire and intention of our people and the people of Asia, who seek peace, and of the peace-loving peoples of the world. The government of the republic brought forward a large-scale step-by-step disarmament proposal last July; and recently, proposed that a North-South Foreign Ministers Conference, with the United States also taking part, be held to discuss overall problems related to that proposal.

The government and the people of China always render positive support to our peace proposals set forth to achieve the historical cause of the unification of the fatherland and the just struggle of our people being launched for the complete victory of socialism.

The peoples of our two countries, Korea and China, are long-sworn comrades-in-arms and class-oriented brothers and sisters who established militant friendship with the blood shed in the long ardent struggle against common enemies in early days.

The relationship between peoples of our two countries is a special friendly relationship that can exist only between true revolutionary comrades. It is a solid friendly relationship with a long historical tradition.

The Sino-Korean friendship is displaying a great and solid vitality in that the friendship is based on the true comradely friendship, deep trust, and firm revolutionary sense of duty between the leaders of the two countries.

In recent years, the relationship between the two countries has been developing into a new stage recording a majestic chapter in the history of the glorious Sino-Korean friendship; and a solid foundation has been laid so that that friendship will bloom on and on forever, generation after generation.

The brotherly friendship and militant relationship between our two countries and two nations represent an important factor in successfully implementing the cause of socialism and communism in Korea and China. They are a firm guarantee for maintaining peace and security in Asia and the world.

Our people who treasure the traditional Sino-Korean friendship will do everything in their power, from now on, even as in the past, to expand and develop in all fields the relationship of brotherly friendship between the peoples of two countries.

Our people, on the occasion of the Chinese people's happy national holiday, pray that greater success be achieved in the struggle of the people of that country to launch and build a modernized socialist power.

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Seoul Paper Details Pyongyang's Overseas Military Activism

*41100034 Seoul NAEWŎE TONGSIN in Korean
9 Oct 87 pp 1J-6J*

[Article: "Realities in Military Assistance to Pro-North Korean Countries in Africa and Middle East"]

[Text] (Seoul—Naewoe) It is estimated that the approximate number of North Korean puppet troops dispatched to the African Continent, on the pretext of "strengthening friendship" etc., is at present over 5,000.

North Korean puppet troops dispatched to the African Continent are mainly engaged in military training and equipment maintenance, including [activities of] a military advisory group. It is reported that their distribution by countries where they are stationed are: 4,000 in Angola, 250 in Mozambique, 150 in Zimbabwe, and 100 in Seychelles. They are not only playing the role of personal guards but also engaged as pilots of fighter planes, tank operators, and guerrilla training officers. Some of them are also agitating terror or actively taking part in terror in alliance with antistate organizations.

North Korea's export of the Bolshevik Revolution to the African Continent which was launched on the pretext of alliance in the so-called "antiimperialist national liberation struggle" began on a full-fledged scale in 1973. It has tended to increase since the 1980's.

North Korea launched its export of the Bolshevik Revolution to the African Continent on a full-fledged scale with the following events as momentum: it established diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe (April 1980) when it became an independent nation; the diplomatic relations came through North Korea's military assistance, including weapons, rendered in 1978 to the left-wing patriotic front (ZAPV) which had been struggling for independence against the former Rhodesian white regime. Thus North Korea began giving active military assistance to establish its influence in this region after scoring diplomatic successes there.

Thereafter, North Korea greatly stepped up military assistance activities in Zimbabwe. It dispatched a military advisory group to Zimbabwe with the following event as the starting point: the visit of Mugabe, then prime minister of Zimbabwe, to North Korea in October 1980 and placed approximately \$24 million worth of tanks, field guns, and heavy weapons at the disposal of Zimbabwe.

Furthermore, from August 1981 on, the North Korean advisory group (150 men) directly played a role of personal guards, including the training, secretly conducted, of the Fifth Brigade which was directly under the command of Mugabe. Moreover, North Korea rendered assistance in organizing a militia corps of 20,000 men in Zimbabwe, and establishing a secret intelligence service there.

Major military assistance activities launched so far by North Korea on the African Continent are as follows, by country: Madagascar, established through a coup d'etat (President Ratsiraka; 1976); Ghana (President Jerry Rawlings; 1979); Benin (President Kerekou; 1980); Seychelles (President Albert Rene; 1981); and Burkina Faso (President Sankara; 1983). North Korea rendered assistance to these countries in establishing military forces and secret intelligence services. As for Ethiopia, in 1983 when Mengistu, chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, visited North Korea assistance began to be given to build a factory of small weapons (\$37.7 million worth).

North Korea began exporting to Libya multiple rocket launchers and field guns in 1978 ([it] dispatched over 80 air force pilots and a military advisory group in January 1979). In 1982, a friendship treaty of the nature of a military alliance was concluded and, since then, the relationship of close military cooperation has been maintained. Toward Mozambique, North Korea began rendering assistance to the liberation front of Mozambique (Frelimo) in 1971. After it became independent, too,

[North Korea] rendered assistance, including rifles and anti-aircraft guns, and dispatched 30 armored [unit] personnel and 50 officer personnel (1982-83).

Toward Uganda, North Korea dispatched assistance in weapons, including AK rifles and T-62 tanks, and personnel required for military training in September 1984. To Angola, too, 3,000 North Korean puppet troops and an advisory group of 1,000 men were dispatched in 1983. This dispatch acted as a sort of relief of the Cuban troops there.

Furthermore, North Korea rendered assistance (1975 and 1978) in supplying hand grenades and 700 cases of private fire extinguishers and live ammunition to the African National Congress (ANC), which is an antigovernment armed guerrilla organization, and the South-Western People's Organization (SWAPO), which is an organization seeking independence of Namibia, within the Republic of South Africa.

In this way, North Korea is not only stepping up, with each passing day, military assistance activities to governments of the nations or antigovernment organizations on the African Continent but also rendering assistance in bringing up guerrilla specialists, including inviting guerrilla personnel of this region to North Korea and training them there.

It is reported that the total number of guerrilla specialists North Korea has so far invited and trained has reached over 2,000. Countries involved are: Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Libya, Congo, Chad, Uganda, Central African Republic, Guinea, and Angola.

North Korea began bringing up and training guerrillas and terrorist elements in 1968, when the Overseas Operations Team was established under the Liaison Department of "the Labor Party." International guerrillas were invited to come and get training there: the purpose of training is to overthrow governments of the countries concerned.

Areas in which such training is launched are: 15 special invitation centers, including Samsong-ri area, in Pyongyang City; and 15 areas, including Wonhung-ri, Kangdong County, South Pyongan Province. There are 30 such areas in all. Thirty to 40 trainees are being accommodated in each of those centers.

North Korea's overseas guerrilla training courses include a short course of 3 to 6 months and a long course of 18 months. Contents of the training are: teaching the so-called tactics of urban and rural guerrilla combats; practical training on bitter fighting at close quarters, how to use various weapons and explosives, how to blow up facilities and equipment, sabotage, espionage, and reconnaissance, how to draw maps, secret communications, how to secure secret outposts, how to deal with the people of villages nearby, and how to defend outposts against the government authorities.

Training expenses and stipends required in such guerrilla training are being borne by North Korea in entirety.

The scheme of North Korea's expansion of such military assistance activities on the African Continent is the materialization of its policy of "exporting revolution." It is a scheme designed to create forces supporting North Korea on the international stage, in particular, within the sphere of non-aligned nations by means of making the country concerned a nation supporting and friendly to North Korea. And in the aspect of policies toward South Korea, such a scheme represents North Korea's making all possible efforts to save itself from diplomatic isolation.

Meanwhile, the African region countries with which North Korea entered into the so-called "friendship and cooperation" treaty that takes on the character of "political and military alliance" are the following 12 countries: Cameroon (October 1977); Central African Republic (May 1978); Mozambique (May 1978); Madagascar (September 1978); Guinea-Bissau (November 1979);

Guinea (October 1980); Zimbabwe (October 1980); Togo (October 1981); Angola (October 1981); Libya (November 1982); Ethiopia (October 1983); and South Yemen (October 1984).

Major contents of the friendship and cooperation treaty concluded with these countries are as follows: noting that "firm desire shall be expressed to strengthen militant solidarity with all revolutionary and progressive forces"; and, between the two parties, "multilateral exchanges, including political, diplomatic, economic, scientific and technological, and cultural exchanges, shall be made and joint struggle shall be launched for the causes of anti-imperialist struggle, supporting the national liberation struggle, withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the ROK, and elimination of military blocs." As for the term of validity, the treaty is a long-term entity which is valid for 10 to 20 years. Furthermore, validity of the treaty may be automatically extended for 5 years provided that both parties voice no objection. Thus the treaty has an underlying motive for maintaining a permanent alliance relationship with those countries.

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