


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Near East/South Asia Report



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13 January 1986

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EGYPT

BROAD STUDY SURVEYS LANDLORDS' GRIEVANCES

Struggle Between Landlords, Tenants

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 pp 12-17

[Article by Raja' 'Abdallah, Rabi' Abu al-Khayr, Muhammad al-Shadhili, Ghali Muhammad and Sayyid Zaki]

[Text] In its upcoming session, the People's Assembly will observe the draft of a law presented by the Ministry of Agriculture in the name of the National Party government to realize justice for 16 million landlords and tenants who are the two sides to the struggle regarding this issue. The draft law is to contain a review of land tax value and a discussion on raising per-feddan rents over their current level. It will also address itself to the problem of the bequest of contracts to the heirs of tenants after the death of the latter. The problem is great in magnitude when we realize that 40 percent of Egypt's area is farmed by tenants in various ways. Now that 30 years have elapsed during which the economic and social conditions of the landowners and tenants have changed, it has been necessary to seek a solution to alleviate the intensity of the struggle and tension which have increased in recent years between landlords and tenants in order to maintain the stability of social peace in the society and guarantee that the productivity of the land will not deteriorate.

AL-MUSAWWAR went down into the villages of some governorates in Upper and Lower Egypt and the canal to conduct an investigation on the actual ground and record the real testimony of the parties to the struggle. The landlords' view is that it is necessary to raise rents now that the prices of crops have risen and the revenues they receive from them are paltry. The tenants acknowledge that the landlords are unjustly treated and request that the rents be raised gradually, so that attention may be given to their own circumstances. Agricultural experts said that permanent contracts between landlords and tenants do not provide adequate flexibility for the attainment of the government's goals and that there is no dispute over the landlord's right to obtain an attractive yield, but they are opposed to the expulsion of tenants from their land. Researchers consider that current rental policy embodies a severe injustice to landlords and leads to a deterioration in the productivity of the land. The opposition parties unanimously agreed that it

was necessary to realize justice and issue a law regulating the relationship between the two parties once that is thoroughly studied.

The land reform laws issued in 1952 and 1961 managed to change the map of agricultural ownership in Egypt, realizing social justice for millions of peasants and people working on the land and bringing the inverted pyramid back to its proper condition. Prior to the issuance of the law, the land was in the hands of a small number of landowners, with no more than 2,000 representing 1 percent of the owners and owning more than 1 million feddans of land!

Once ownership was restricted to 100 feddans per person, the number of owners came to 3 million, possessing 3.7 million feddans.

If to that one adds the number of owners of land reclaimed in the period 1952-80, which came to 1,181,000 feddans, we will find that small farmers owning agricultural land now number more than 4 million.

Thirty-three years of time have passed, bringing many social changes in conditions in the Egyptian countryside with them. Concomitantly, the screams of landowners demanding justice and equity have started to grow loud.

The years have brought on a process of migration from rural areas to towns, as children have moved to schools and universities and those who have graduated have proceeded to live in Cairo and the capitals of the regions. Fathers owning land have died, the inheritance has been distributed among children, and they have found it necessary to rent the land out to tenants, who farm it for a material amount determined by contract between them or by the law which sets the per-feddan rent at seven times tax.

The years have also brought with them the forefathers' weakness in persevering in the face of time and the migration of manpower abroad in search of a livelihood, so that the forefathers also turned to the trap of renting and landowners became remote from the land, living out their days in anticipation of what the tenants would pay them.

Then the years also brought further change. Prices have risen increasingly with the passage of time, the requirements of living and life have increased and burned the landlords with their flame, along with the others who have been burned, and they have come to require an additional income, but the land has not been provident to people who live far away from it.

The pyramid was inverted once again. The land is owned by people who do not benefit from it, and the people who benefit from it do not own it. Landowners have sought to get rid of it by selling to people who would devote themselves to it full time, but they have not found anyone to buy land which in reality is in other people's hands, that is, in the hands of tenants; 2.24 million feddans, representing 40 percent of the land of Egypt, have been converted into rented land.

The prices of farmland have increased astonishingly and landowners have come to possess great wealth though dying without acquiring it. It is frozen wealth, lacking an attractive yield for its owners.

The problem has manifested itself clearly -- the problem of the relationship between landlord and tenant, which of them is the real owner of the land, which of them is the oppressor and which is the oppressed.

However, the answer does not come as easily or simply as one might imagine. It has become apparent that the location of the land makes a difference as between one region and another. The Delta governorates are very different from those of the canal, and these in turn are different from the heart of Upper Egypt.

The type of crop also makes a difference. Vegetables and fruit differ from the main crops such as wheat, rice and cotton, and the differences are numerous.

The form of the relationship between landlord and tenant also makes a difference. This assumes three forms: a cash rental contract, a contract between landlord and tenant where the landowner receives seven times the tax as a price for the land, as the law stipulates (a form which accounts for 81 percent of the amount of land rented out), a participation contract between landlord and tenant, where the landlord obtains half the crop though he is remote from the land, and the final form, where the landlord and tenant share in farming the land and dividing up its yield.

Each of these forms has its positive and negative features but ultimately gives the advantage to the tenant.

Therefore, it has been necessary that AL-MUSAWWAR review each of these differences and the effect derived from them on the relationship between the landlord and tenant, so that the truth could be drawn from the ground of reality.

We must mention that we, all the editors, started the excursion with feelings that were totally different from those it ended with. We traveled to the villages and towns bearing a feeling impregnated with sympathy for the tenant in our hearts, a traditional feeling that he was the party that was sinned against, and an increasing enthusiasm to defend him, out of fear that the landlord would predominate or that sympathizing with him would increase his power. However, we came back with a totally different feeling, a feeling which the reader will discern and share with us after reading this article.

The Picture in Asyut

We started the excursion in Asyut, the capital of Upper Egypt. We found that one could offer as a summary of the picture there that the landowners were sitting in armchairs with their land mortgaged, built upon and subleased.

In Asyut they say "If you are in the right, do not turn to the courts!" Seizure is not advantageous to landowners because the tenant makes his payment to the money-changer into the land tax account. The situation reaches the point where crimes are committed in the event total despair grips some landowners or a state of pride over committing crimes prevails among some strong tenants. The result, as Brig Gen Husni al-Daba', director of criminal

intelligence in Asyut, replied when I asked him "Do these severe disputes between landowners and tenants reach you?" is "Corpses, wounded people, enmity and new grounds for revenge reach us!"

The agricultural engineer Fikri Hafiz al-Far, secretary general of the governorate, a landowner who worked for 18 years in the Agrarian Reform [Department], said:

"The damage always falls on the small landowners. The tenants today give the owners crumbs. What does the landowner do, especially if he is a government employee and has children in school and university? A social disruption has occurred, one result of which has been that the tenants get the whole crop and the landowner gets only the crumbs."

He recommended "It is necessary that part of the land belong to the landowner and that he rent it out or dispose of it freely. At least, the landlord should get back 10 feddans, half of what he owns, especially landowners who are transferred to retirement so that they can earn from them. We must face this problem boldly."

"Raising rents is no solution, because the result will be a rise in crop prices. In addition, putting rental contracts on an annual basis is an incorrect solution, because the landowners will expel the tenants as soon as the year ends, and this will guarantee that a revolution will be created in Egypt."

Participation Is Necessary

Counsellor Rif'at al-Sayyid, chief of court and a major landowner, said,

"The participation system of farming between the landowner and tenant is necessary in cases where the landowner is a peasant. The land must provide a suitable rent to landowners who engage in another job as a profession by increasing the value of the tax imposed on the land or having the landlord accept the system of participating in farming with the tenant. People who own less than 3 feddans (small farmers and landowners) must, if they do not have another occupation besides farming, be given the ability to regain their land in full in two cases:

"The first case is that if the original tenant dies the rental contract should not pass on to his heirs. The second case is where the original tenant has another occupation besides farming."

Al-Hajj 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Wahid is a major tenant but in spite of that demanded that the tax on farmland be increased, saying,

"The landowner is treated unfairly because the rental value per feddan is about 60 pounds a year, of which he pays 12 pounds in taxes, and what does he do in this time? The solution is to increase the rent until things are in balance and justice becomes prevalent. I say this though I am a tenant."

Dr Salih Hasan Farraj, deputy minister of agriculture in the Governorate of Asyut, said,

"To me the solution is to raise per-feddan rents in the light of the rise in crop prices. Moreover, the peasants do not just farm the land once a year. Is it the sin of anyone who has 5 feddans as the result of an inheritance or personal labors to sit and watch his land? The optimum solution for agricultural production, and I say this as an official, is for the landowner to have the freedom to rent out to anyone, by temporary sharecropping contract or participation, on the basis of the prevailing prices in the rural areas, and the tenant must get the land for a feasible rent and an annually-renewed contract.

"As an official, I consider that the best types of rental are temporary sharecropping contracts or participation, because both the landlord and the tenant receive a reasonable return. Through the statistics, you find that the productivity of a person who gets a rental contract for a year is high because he is fighting to realize a greater return and pay off the rent."

How Can We Break up the Scuffles?

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin, chairman of the local people's assembly for the Governorate of Asyut, who farms 122 feddans and owns 17, which he rents out, said:

"It is in the interests of any landowner to divide the land or raise the rent. This is normal.

"The scuffles between landlords and tenants can be resolved by reappraising rents every 3 years in accordance with constant price increases. Peasants are committed to paying stipulated amounts of money which increase annually, and according to the cooperative marketing statute they are committed to supplying quantities of wheat, fava beans and lentils at prices below the world markets. These prices do not compensate the peasants for their effort but let the consumer obtain these commodities at reasonable prices. These are recovered one way or another by the people as a whole. If land rents increase in a manner which is not compatible with the prices of the crops they supply to the government, the peasants will turn away from the land and abandon it. If the per-feddan rents rise, it is necessary to raise the prices of the crops. Ultimately all these increases will be recovered through the ordinary citizen in Egypt."

Why Do the Peasants Procrastinate?

Concerning the phenomenon of the evasion of payment of modest rents by most tenants, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin said, "The annual production per feddan in some places yields the peasants only enough to cover the costs of production and their costs of living, and they are left with nothing by which to pay rent. They are compelled to procrastinate sometimes. Any new law issued on behalf of the landlord without considering the tenants will be a major disaster. The peasant will commit suicide on the land. Even if the tenant procrastinates in paying the rent, the court rules that he should be evicted from the land and the police come to carry out the verdict, it is the tenant who goes to the land and farms it, and the landlord is compelled to reach an understanding with him. Not 1 percent of the eviction verdicts are carried

out except in cases of force and landlord's influence. However, the disputes continue and people become victims, to the point where half a feddan has led to the murder of 28 people in our village."

At the Mansi home in the village of Bani Muhammadiyat, the basic property was 800 feddans. The property was broken up and each member of the family now has 40 to 50 feddans. Since most of them became educated and got government jobs, they rented out the land to farmers and entered the vortex of collecting rent from the tenants. Prior to the campaign to collect weapons from villages in Upper Egypt, making a request for rent was dangerous in itself and a weak landowner could not make a request of a strong tenant without being treated contemptibly and dealt with in a bad manner. In 1977, the date of the weapon-collecting campaign, they started to demand rents and have not obtained more than 10 percent of what was owed them. Since they have not obtained rent at all for years, real estate taxes have accumulated against them and they are now demanding 10,000 pounds in arrears. Hilmi Mansi said, "Our relationship with the tenants is disturbing and we obtain rents only as beggars." Riyad Mansi said, "I farmed 18 feddans and they took that from me by pressure and intimidation." The wife of Mr Falubus, who owns 37 feddans, said,

"Isn't it outrageous that the rent should be 50 pounds per feddan and when I ask the tenant I get 25 pounds and pay 25 pounds in taxes? I have a water buffalo for which I rented out 12 qirats for 300 pounds, and I have land. I have 11 qirats which 'Abd-al-Muhaymin took, and he has not given me a single millieme for 11 years. Everytime I ask him for the rent he screams at me and says the land comes to just 9 qirats. Moreover, is it in perpetuity? If his heart is merciful he gives me 5 pounds, and if I want to sell it he asks for half.

"'Amm 'Uthman bought a feddan from my son for 2,000 pounds and sold it the next day for 13,000 in cash. My son got 1,000 pounds, and the other 1,000 he is getting in instalments. 'Amm Hamdan bought some feddans from the family for 6,000 pounds and sold them the same week for 16,000, and has not paid us the rest of the amount yet. Al-Hajj Kamil Husayn rents 3 feddans and a qirat from me, and does not pay me rent."

The Tenant Is Stronger Than the Landlord

In the village of Bani Murr, we met with 'Ali 'Atiyah Husayn, who owns 5 feddans and rents out parts of them. He told us,

"You can say that the tenant is now stronger than the landlord. The tenant is the new feudal tyrant. Therefore, I recommend that a law be passed which will enable the landlord to recover property he owns of less than 5 feddans. It is necessary to amend the agrarian reform law so that justice will be set right."

The agricultural engineer Jamal Iskandar Ibrahim of the agricultural society in Bani Murr said, "The landlord gets 60 piasters a month from renting out a feddan, while the tenant gets 60 pounds. The landlords recommend that the tenant leave the land to them and that they pay him the rent!

"The agricultural society was the body which resolved disputes. The committee to break up disputes has been eliminated and the matter has been submitted to the judiciary."

In Bani Murr, we found the farmer Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-'Ala, a landowner, working with a tenant, though the land was his father's property!

Al-Hajj 'Ali 'Abd-al-Wahhab of the village of Bani Muhammadiyat said:

"Farming is not my occupation. I own 20 feddans along with my brothers and cannot find land to farm. It is all rented out. Therefore, I have been appointed to the Health [Ministry]. The 20 feddans are rented out not to a single tenant but to a number of them, and they are distributed among a number of areas. The tenants of the land do not pay the rent in a friendly manner. The payment of the rent is due on 1 October, and no one has paid yet in spite of the meagerness of the rent.

"We, two brothers and six girls, get only 500 pounds from the 20 feddans we own, and in order to get that I spend a similar amount moving around and on transportation. The tenants' procrastination is unlimited. In collecting the rent, I observe strange methods."

One story we heard in the village of al-Shahabiyah is that a lady went to ask the tenant for the new rent and the overdue rent; she owned 4 feddans. She was sworn and cursed at and to vindicate her honor sold the land to a strongman for a few pounds and handed the deed over to him, along with the indebtedness on it. This strongman managed to evict the tenant.

Hamid Jawdah al-Shaykh, a big landowner, who was "under sequestration," said that the tenants on his land sublet it for 500 pounds per feddan and procrastinate in paying him 50 pounds. [He said] "One cannot prove subleasing cases and no one testifies on my behalf, unfortunately. That is a total crime in the real meaning of the word. There are laws but it is difficult to carry them out."

Brig Gen Husni al-Daba', director of criminal investigation in the Asyut security department, said, "Ninety-nine percent of the incidents in the governorate arise from agricultural problems and disputes between landowners and tenants. The struggle over farmland is the catalyst of the incidents here."

A Surprise in Al-Gharbiyah

When we went down to the village of Tatay in the district of al-Santa in al-Gharbiyah Governorate, the surprise was that the majority of the tenants favored an increase in land rents, albeit a relative, conditional one. They agreed that the landlord was also unfairly treated and that he was at the mercy of inflation. However, landlords have other occupations on which they depend while the tenants have only the land they work, and they ask that that be taken into account in the increase and also that all the changes that have occurred in the Egyptian countryside be taken into account.

The difference in views between landlord and tenant is embodied in the calculation of the cost of agricultural accessories and the yield per feddan. The former raises the cost and the latter lowers it. For example, a tenant quoted the yield from the crop of a feddan of cotton at the equivalent of 104 pounds, 80 pounds of which he paid in rent to the landowner; ultimately, he was left with just 24 pounds.

The landlord differed over the estimate. He stated that a feddan of cotton gave a net yield estimated at 300 pounds, to which one should add 200 pounds as the yield from growing bersim, so that the net yield became 500 pounds, 70 pounds of which he paid to the landlord; thus the net became 430 pounds per feddan.

'Ali Wardah pointed out to us that a feddan of vegetables earned him 500 pounds a year.

If the above figures, overall and on the average, mean that the tenant realizes a great income per feddan of land which is not in keeping with the landowner's income, we must first of all find out the tenant's opinion.

'Abd-al-Mu'ti Yunis al-Shinawi, a landowner and tenant, said:

"Yes, crop prices are better today than before, and I am in favor of an increase in land rents for the landowner, because he has children and expenses."

'Abd-al-'Aziz Abu al-'Azim Sa'd, who owns a feddan and a half and rents 2 feddans, stressed that the income from the land was not enough for him and his six children and that the rent on the land must not be raised in these circumstances of inflation. The landlord has another occupation which he depends on, and an increase in the per-feddan rent to 100 pounds is to be considered a great amount.

'Abd-al-'Azim al-Shinawi, with a feddan owned and 2 feddans rented, said, "I have eight children, including six girls. The landowner is a government employee and the income from the land is not enough. The workforce is unfair with the tenant."

'Abd-al-Qadir Khurshid, an old man, has 6 qirats owned and 10 qirats rented. [He said] "This acreage is not enough for me and my children, and I work as a farmer for this reason. I cannot put up with the landlord's rights. I gave the landlord an increase over the rent specified in a friendly fashion, but he deceived me and complained to me over getting these paltry qirats, but what do the 10 qirats yield us that he should increase their rent?"

Al-Sayyid Mahmud Yunus, who owns 2 feddans, that is, is not a tenant, nonetheless felt solidarity with tenants and said "They are unfairly treated. No one can pay the prices."

Mahmud Ahmad Khalil, with half a feddan rented, said, "A sudden increase would be difficult for tenants, and it is better that there be a gradual increase each year."

Rents in the Black Market

Before addressing ourselves to the landlords' views on this issue, we must mention that we heard about the phenomenon of landlords and land tenants who were not able to farm renting land out to others so that the rental per qirat increased in accordance with supply and demand and the crop cycle. The rent for a qirat of land rose to between 15 and 25 pounds, meaning that the rent per feddan in this black market has ranged from 460 to 640 pounds.

Eng 'Abd-al-Ra'uf, manager of the agricultural society in Tatay, said "If the peasant's land is all farmed with a consolidated crop in accordance with the crop cycle, he has the right to rent land for the period of one season from another farmer to farm crops that are required for his home and his cattle. This is a legal loophole since every season the tenants rent out their land to others on the black market but do not rent it out on a permanent basis to other farmers, lest they be subject to the law.

"This phenomenon has driven the landowners to get their land back. In addition to this, there is the rise in prices of land lying in the built-up zone, which has made some landowners negotiate with the tenants to get their land back."

'Abd-al-'Aziz Turki, head of the village of Mit Ghazal, with 80 feddans rented, said, "The rent was set years in the past. Circumstances have changed, crop prices have increased, inflation is inundating the landowner and he has no income except the income from his land. Of the rent that I obtain, 60 pounds per feddan, I pay 12 pounds in taxes due the government; I am left with 48 pounds per feddan. My total income from the 80 feddans after deductions is 8,340 pounds a year [sic], that is, about 315 pounds a month on the average. The amount has brought the rent per feddan to 150 pounds a year. This does not entail injustice to the tenant, who realizes 1,000 pounds a year in income per feddan.

"I also consider that rentals should not be handed down as an inheritance, because this is something that is unheard of. It should be considered an injustice. If I rent out a feddan, that is unlawful, because if a tenant holds onto the land for a period by farming that will come to eight times a feddan. The ordinary tenant, the peasant, rents out a feddan a number of times in accordance with the number of crops per year and consequently obtains several times the ordinary rent he pays to the landowner. Not every landowner has another job. Even if he does, he has the right to get an increase in rent."

'Abd-al-'Aziz Rajab said "The government's protection of the tenant and response to all his demands have caused him to keep doing what he is doing. It is the tenant who has stripped off the farmland to sell it to brick factories, without the landlord's knowledge.

"In addition, the tenant is supposed to relinquish the land which is turned into land for buildings.

"I recommend that the system of participation prevail between the landlord and tenant so that the two parties will benefit from this land."

Muhammad Ja'far, the owner of a grocery shop, with 10 feddans rented out, said, "My income from this land is no more than 460 pounds a year and there are 10 people in my family. What can I do with 40 pounds a month? My monthly expenditures are more than 400 pounds. My daughter, a student at the university, spends 150 pounds a month, that is, the equivalent of the annual income from 3 feddans.

"I consider that if the rent per feddan comes to 200 pounds, the tenant will gain. An ardebb of corn is now about 25 pounds."

Why Aren't They on Equal Footing with the Owners of Buildings?

Muhammad al-Bandari Hijab, who works as a tailor and has 12 feddans rented out, said, "I do not want land to farm; rather, we want an increase in rent which is in keeping with the landlord's needs. Why isn't land treated like buildings and why doesn't the law let people who own more than 5 rented feddans have a space where they are acknowledged, like someone who has a building and has a share of apartments which he can dispose of?"

Ahmad al-'Uways, who has 5 rented feddans, said, "The government promised us a number of times to review the relationship between landlords and tenants, but that has not happened. Circumstances have changed. The tenant now is dealing in land, not engaging in farming but subleasing the land in an unlawful way. I consider that the per-feddan rent should be raised to 250 pounds, measured by black market prices. I consider that the tenant should stay on the land with an increase in rents."

Muhammad al-Wardani, who has 27 qirats rented out, said, "The feddan I farm is not enough to meet living requirements. I have five children who are studying in school." As a peasant engaged in agriculture, he considered "The tenant gains, and I as a small property owner working in agriculture am more entitled to farm my land, which is small in area." His wife Najat Muhammad Sulayman interrupted, saying "The rent per feddan must come to 300 pounds a year."

Hanim 'Abd-al-'Al, from the village of al-Hamadiyah, Birkat al-Sab', owns 6 qirats rented out and said, "I want this small area for dill-farming, so that I can see my children. My husband married another woman and left me without any income!"

Muhammad Sulayman al-Shabakah, the moneychanger in the village of Qitay, said, "The tenants' power is now greater than that of the landowners, now that the phenomenon of subleasing land, where the tenant gets 500 pounds per feddan as rent and pays just 75 to the landlord, has become widespread. Out of the latter amount the landlord pays the government taxes and insurance ranging from 10 to 12 pounds.

"This year the rent will rise to 30 pounds for land included under the tile drainage project. This will be better than the old system."

Eng Sayyid 'Awadallah of the agricultural society in Qitay said, "Subleasing land to more than one farmer results in the deterioration of the

productivity of the land, because the land tenant is concerned only with his farming and puts a burden on the land to realize the greatest output."

On Canal Land

The land in the Governorate of the Canal is almost owned by the tenants, since it has become a legacy of theirs. Sons inherit land rental contracts from fathers. It is land which is not bound to delivering crops to the government. Fruit and vegetables are farmed on most of it, realizing the highest productivity and quality.

We paused before some of this good land in I'ta'ah, five hundred expansive feddans, green in color, with fine crops. Some peasants there replied that they were farming plots of land in participation with Shaykh al-Yamani. Shaykh al-Yamani is the tenant and has taken over all this land. After hesitating they answered, most bluntly, "The fact is that the landowner is oppressed, oppressed, oppressed."

How so?

The 500 feddans are owned by a large family. Shaykh al-Yamani rented it all more than 30 years ago. He grew fruit and vegetables on it. How much does Shaykh al-Yamani pay the landowners? He pays 60 pounds per feddan a year. He said simply that that was the rent the law had stipulated, which was seven times the tax.

When he saw the amazement on our faces, he smiled and said that he had been paying this rent recently. According to the rental agreement, he had previously been paying 25 pounds.

How much does he earn from a feddan? The situation differs from crop to crop, but the minimum for the tomato crop, for example, is 1,500 pounds, and the price is double in the case of the fruit crop!

The landowner takes 60 pounds, and the tenant's earnings, after deduction of costs, are no less than 1,000 pounds.

The tragedy here is that the landowners live on the land. They are not absent from it. They have homes in the middle of the land.

The peak of the tragedy comes when we realize that because they cannot farm the whole area by themselves, the tenants sublease it to other tenants through participation, and do not vacate the rental contracts. Stranger than all that, the owners of the land itself have also been compelled to rent areas from tenants on the basis of participation, in order to seek the aid of their work on the land to meet living costs.

Ultimately, they own the 500 feddans of land on paper only. Reality states that the real landowners here are the tenants and their sons, during their lives and beyond, and that the law allows the sons to inherit the rental contracts.

Eternal Rental Agreements!

In another of the numerous conditions which are similar in circumstances, the tenant is al-Hajj 'Abd-al-Sattar and the landlord is in the town. The land has been in the tenant's hands for 30 years. He pays rent of 70 pounds per year per feddan for it. The landlord now wants part of the land to be returned to him. His son is a graduate agricultural engineer. However, he cannot go back. The rental contract is almost eternal. The son of the tenant is preparing as of now to inherit it from his father.

These cases repeat themselves the length and breadth of the governorate, especially since the area has been subjected to emigration more than once and the land has been left to tenants. When the owners of the land returned they had no way to get the land back. It remained with the tenants. There is no way to sell, no matter how many small parts the ownership may be broken down into, because the tenants refuse to buy it for more than half the price prevailing in the region.

In Al-Daqahliyah the Situation Is Different

The situation in the Governorate of al-Daqahliyah is different from that in the other governorates. Al-Daqahliyah is bound to farm the main crops, which are wheat, cotton and rice, and to deliver them to the government.

Mrs 'A'idah Mahmud, who inherited a number of feddans here and lives in Cairo, said:

"The land now is a burden on the people who own it, whether the relationship between the landowner and the tenant is a direct rental one or one in the form of partnership." In the latter case, which is the one that connects her to the tenant, her share of the production is determined in accordance with the basic crop, which is wheat, for example, or rice, while the tenant benefits from all the crops he sells for his own private account, for instance beans, whose price is several times greater than that of wheat. The peasant also sells the chaff of the wheat for his own account, and the tenant can make calculations with the landlord on the basis of a quantity less than the real quantity a feddan produces. In addition, there are excesses in the prices of the materials used in farming.

[She said] "There have been times when I, the landlord, have paid the tenant close to 300 pounds per feddan. The fact is that this may be attributed first of all to existing flaws in agricultural policy. The agricultural society and the village bank impose taxes and requirements in which the tenant and the landlord both lose themselves, especially with respect to the prices of crops and the quantities which have to be delivered. Because these are decrees which are issued at a distance from actual circumstances, they lead to many results which harm not just the landlord but also the land and national product.

Deliberately Keeping the Land Fallow!

"For example, some tenants now refuse to farm the main crops and prefer to pay fines. Some others leave the land fallow while they go to regular jobs

which earn them better money. This statement does not arise from a vacuum. I personally left 3 feddans of land unplanted this year, because we did not find anyone to farm it.

"Selling the land is out of the question now, because land where there is a tenant is sold vacant only. The tenant will bargain with the landlord either to get all of half the price to abandon the land or to pay only half the price himself and buy it.

"In any case, the landlord is the loser and the tenant is the beneficiary.

"In my opinion, the payment of rent is not enough. A review of the entire economic policy is what is needed. It is necessary to raise the purchase price of the crop and properly estimate it so that we can encourage peasants to be interested in the land and in farming it, as well as to define what is to be delivered to the government in a realistic manner. The farmers give an example of rice farming, when the societies requested that two and a half daribas of rice be handed over per feddan, which does not produce this much. They had either to buy it from the black market or pay the fine.

"What is strange is that the ministry asked the persons harmed by the bad crop, who sought to complain, to pay the sum of 100 pounds to prove the seriousness of their complaint.

"It is also necessary that the rental contract be confined to the tenant only and that rights not be transferred from him to his children after him, so that the contract becomes a legacy, especially since many of these children do not work the land themselves, but move to the cities and sublease the land on their own behalf."

A Neutral View

Al-Hajj Sayyid 'Ali, a man who is neutral, considers the whole issue facing himself in all its aspects, and is knowledgeable about the minute details of it; he lives on land which he farms and owns, knows its cost and productivity and speaks objectively. He said,

"The optimum situation is for the person who owns the land to farm it, but since this situation is not easy to find, the laws governing the relationship between landlords and tenants, most important of which is the eternal nature of the contract, must be reviewed. The rental agreement must be for a limited period and renewable if both parties are satisfied, with the rent to be determined each time in accordance with actual production and production prices.

"The provision must be that the law give consideration to compelling the landlord to farm the land in the event he gets it back, so that he will not convert it into another situation and the farmland declines."

"Thus, people in all situations are in agreement over the need for a law which will bring about justice between landlord and tenant.

What do the two parties consider is appropriate for solving the rent problem?

The Search for a Solution Which Will Satisfy Both Parties

The village of al-Barajil: "At the same time the government must review amending rents in order to realize a kind of justice for the two parties. We must increase the rent four times above its current level. I believe that 300 pounds are a fair rent for the landowner to get, because no tenant's annual income now is less than 1,000 pounds per feddan on the average if he grows traditional crops such as wheat and corn and no less than 2,000 pounds if he farms non-traditional crops. This situation exists and it is not possible for a person who wants to set out a just solution to the problem to ignore it. It is true that farming costs have increased, but conversely crop prices have increased. It has become necessary to create a just formula governing the relationship between the landowner and the tenant which will reduce the severity of the tension which disturbs it now. I will give an example of pressure and dominance on the tenant's part: a short time ago I wanted to buy a feddan of land and agreed with the landowner over the sum of 20,000 pounds. Since the land had been 'occupied' by other tenants, I went to reach an understanding with them to complete the purchase. He [sic] agreed that I should pay him 25,000 pounds in key money to evacuate the land and of course I refused."

Rawash Jum'ah al-Mughrabi, a tenant, considered "The government should pay attention to the small tenants' circumstances. It is not reasonable that the tenant of a feddan or half a feddan should be the equal of another tenant working on more than 10 feddans, and it is necessary to take into account the circumstances of a person who owns 3 or 4 feddans of which he rents out one or two and another owner of more than 10 feddans who has rented out 2 feddans of that. Thus it is necessary to set out rules governing the relationship between the owner and the tenant to take these differences into account."

'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghaffar has a different opinion. He recommended that the rent be graduated, so that it will be modified every so often to give attention to the landowner's circumstances. It is not reasonable that the landowner should get 90 pounds a year while the tenant's income is greater than 1,000 pounds.

Concerning the system of participation in farming, he said that that was a failure because it created a state of distrust between landowner and tenant. Participation, in his view, is acceptable in form but from the practical standpoint if it is applied its flaws become obvious. The tenants farm the land and view landowners as people who want to share the bounties of the land with them without exerting any effort, while the landowners view the tenants as persons who have plundered their land and been blessed with its bounties.

Another example of an owner of half a feddan is a government employee who inherited half a feddan from his father after he died. Salim 'Atiyah said, "The area I inherited is small and there is a tenant on it. I proposed to

him to sell the land, because my house was in danger of collapsing at any time and it was necessary to destroy it and rebuild it. The tenant refused, although he is a government employee and owns property which brings him a large income, and his children are government employees. I am now bewildered. I was injured in war operations in 1973 during the gap, and left the army with 40 percent disability. I have no other income except my minor salary. I also proposed to the tenant that I sell half the area and he refused. What shall I do? Shall I beg? I wrote complaints about my situation to all the bodies, the office of the president and the Ministry of Agriculture, and I have not yet come up with a solution."

After this broad excursion over the length and breadth of the country, the urgent need to re-establish balance in the relationship between landowner and tenant and raise land rents in a manner which will bring about justice and eliminate tension between them became clearly apparent through consensus everywhere.

However, the views concerning ways to bring such justice about differed, although confined to these recommendations:

The level of rent should rise to no less than 10 times tax, rather than seven times, or the rent should be set according to the real yield of the land; rents should not be unified in the case of all the land; and attention must be paid to the nature of the crops farmed, their differences and the nature and location of the land.

The demand that rental contracts not be passed on to the sons of tenants by inheritance unless the latter are peasants farming the land themselves.

The rental contract should specify a time for review of the rent, after each period, with attention paid to the realization of stability for the peasant and a guarantee of his rights, so that we will not revert to a new feudalism which the landowners will create if the land is returned to them and the peasant comes to have no role except work as a wage-earner.

The demand that the timely collection of rent be guaranteed in sound ways without recourse to the judiciary, by having the village banks collect it and hand it over to the landowners. More accurately, the bank should be the guarantor of rental contracts.

Rents' Effect on Productivity

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 15

[Text] This title was the subject of the thesis for a doctorate the researcher 'Atif Hilmi al-Shimi received in the Faculty of Agriculture at Asyut last year. He carried out a field study on 503 farms in the Governorate of Bani Suwayf, 244 of which were owned and 259 rented out. The researcher's choice of the Governorate of Bani Suwayf was justifiable, since it ranks first among governorates in the republic in terms of the ratio of rented land to the total area farmed throughout the governorate, which comes to 57.5 percent.

The researcher concluded that the average net income per feddan of land owned exceeded equivalent income on rented land. He broke down the categories of landowners and tenants into five tax groups in accordance with area farmed, ranked as follows: less than 5 feddans, 5 feddans, 8 feddans, 9 feddans and 10 feddans and more. The result was that landowners belonging to the first group and farming by themselves get 191 pounds per feddan on the average while what tenants in the same group get is no more than 142 pounds and that this comes to 319 and 252 pounds for landowners and tenants in the second category, 386 and 270 pounds for the third category, 463 and 333 pounds for the fourth category and 591 and 368 pounds for the fifth category.

Dr 'Atif Hilmi al-Shimi said that 92 percent of the landowners covered by the study confirmed that there were flaws and negative features in current rental policy and that the continuation of this policy, with the rules regulating relations between farmland owners and tenants it entails, constitutes an severe injustice to them in one area and leads to a deterioration in per-feddan agricultural productivity in another, as well as the collapse of social relations between the parties to this relationship in a third area.

The researcher recommended two methods for rectifying the relationship, one of which concerns the determination of what is known as "equity rent," which could be defined as a rent which will bring about stability in the ratio of the rent per feddan to the total costs of production per feddan. The second method is to estimate the general trend in per-feddan production costs and determine their average annual increase, and consider that a basis for defining the rent in the future. It is worth pointing out that the estimated equity rent for 1983 came to 367.65 pounds, which is very close to unrestricted rent, known as subleasing, which comes to 350 pounds. It is well known that the legal rent at present comes to 75 pounds per feddan.

The strange thing is that the legal rent per feddan, which is set at seven times the tax assessed on farmland, ranges from 9.8 to 78.4 pounds per year.

Landlords, Tenants Describe Figures

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 17

[Text] In the village of al-Barajil in the Governorate of Giza, we listened to Farahat Mabruk 'Uwaydah, a peasant who owns 3 feddans, 1 feddan of which he has been renting out for 20 years, while he farms two. Farahat 'Uwaydah managed to give us a practical picture of the costs of farming a feddan with various crops and the income per feddan as well. He said:

"For me, as a peasant farming 2 feddans, wheat is a basic crop. The situation has now changed. It is true that wheat production now yields a feasible return for peasants, but there are other more profitable crops such as green onions, cauliflower, lettuce and bersim which have started to predominate in the land."

Farahat 'Uwaydah added, "I get 90 pounds from the tenant, out of which I pay money to the government, and I am left with 70 pounds. What should I do with

this sort of sum, which can scarcely pay for a pack of cigarettes a day for a landowner? By simple arithmetic, if the tenant farms a feddan of wheat which stays in the ground for 3 months, his net income after costs will be 900 pounds!

"If we make calculations in black market prices, the average production of a feddan's yield is from 12 to 15 ardebbs. An ardebb sells for 25 pounds, so the total is 375 pounds, to which one should add straw or chaff, of which about 15 "straw loads" are sold per feddan, each load being sold for 40 pounds; that is, ultimately he will get 600 pounds.

"If we calculate the costs of wheat per feddan in current market prices, we will find that they are as follows: 8 balance-trays of seeds for 16 pounds, two plowings per feddan for 40 pounds, irrigation three times for 30 pounds, one and a half sacks of fertilizer for 20 pounds, harvesting for 80 pounds, a crop threshing for 50 pounds and winnowing for 50 pounds. If we add the rent for this period, at about 30 pounds, we will find that the total costs are 316 pounds. Therefore the tenant gets 650 pounds while the landlord gets only 30 pounds. That is, the wheat crop yields about 20 times the rent. Is this reasonable?"

1,000 Pounds in Revenues per Feddan of Bersim

'Abd-al-'Ati Sabir al-Mughrabi gave us another example of another traditional crop, bersim, which is more profitable than the others.

'Abd-al-'Ati al-Mughrabi, who owns more than 3 feddans, said, "It takes a third of a day to farm a feddan of bersim and it yields a return of 1,000 to 1,400 pounds. The costs of farming this in black market prices are as follows: seeds for 50 pounds, fertilizer for 25 pounds, irrigation 12 times at 120 pounds and plowing and farrowing at 40 pounds; thus the total costs are 235 pounds. If we calculate how the crop is sold, we must realize that all peasants harvest seven 'cuttings' per feddan, and a single cutting sells for 200 pounds; therefore if the landowner or tenant farms a feddan of bersim, his net income will be about 1,000 pounds and sometimes that comes to 2,000 pounds, if its price in the market is high.

'Abd-al-'Ati al-Mughrabi added, "Most peasants now have turned to farming non-traditional crops. Whereas corn and wheat were the two dominant crops in terms of acreage, other crops have now started to take up this space; for example, lettuce, which stays in the ground for 3 months, costs no more than 225 pounds and the yield of the crop is sold for 1,000 pounds.

"If we calculate the costs per feddan of lettuce on the basis of black market prices, we will find that each feddan requires 2 kilograms of seeds for 10 pounds, 5 sacks of super fertilizer for 25 pounds, 10 sacks of chemical fertilizer for 50 pounds, three hoeings at a cost of 25 pounds per hoeing, irrigation five times for 50 pounds and insecticide for 25 pounds; therefore the total cost is 185 pounds. That is, if a peasant is a landowner he will get a net income of about 815 pounds and if he is a tenant he will get 790 pounds, because he will pay 25 pounds in rent.

There No Longer Are Indigent Peasants!

Al-Hajj Mabruk Abu 'Atiyah, a model of a farmer-landowner who at the same time rents land to farm on a single-crop basis, agreed with him and said, "The lives of peasants today are totally different. They sell their crops at reasonable prices and have now become able to buy irrigation machinery and new threshers."

Al-Hajj Mabruk gave an example of the income a peasant gets, stating "In 1973 I rented a feddan from a farmer to plant with tomatoes for 150 pounds. The net income I obtained after costs was about 1,000 pounds. Meanwhile, the price of a feddan of farmland at that time was no more than 1,200 pounds -- that is, the return on farming a feddan of tomatoes was close to the price of buying a feddan of land."

'Ali Abu 'Atiyah, a tenant on 3 feddans since 1956, asserted that he paid 100 pounds in rent per feddan annually.

When we asked him about his income from farming, he pointed out to us that he farmed his land with tomatoes and lost 250 pounds per feddan.

Al-Hajj Sayyid 'Abd-al-Karim, who owns more than 5 feddans and farms the same crop, answered him, "This is not true. The tomato crop in the worst of circumstances covers its costs. A 'clever' peasant can realize 600 pounds per feddan after deducting the costs of the crop."

We asked al-Hajj Sayyid about the crops he farmed that gave him a feasible return.

He replied, "We are receptive to farming the sweet potato crop, which is a non-traditional crop, in order to solve the problem of fodder. The crop stays about 6 months in the ground and its cost is about 300 pounds in black market prices, while the crop sells for about 1,300 pounds. Peasants sell two 'growths' of sweet potato greens, that is, the green leaves; the first growth sells for 800 pounds and the second for 500 pounds. If we deduct the costs of farming from the sales price of the crop, the peasant will be left 1,000 pounds net."

Al-Hajj Sayyid 'Abd-al-Karim added, "There are other crops which provide a feasible yield, for example green onions, which it takes a month and a half to farm. Its actual cost is about 370 pounds in irrigation, plowing, fertilizer, insecticides and labor, while the crop sells for 1,000 pounds. Therefore the peasant's income in a month and a half comes to 630 pounds."

Conclusion

Therefore, by simple arithmetic, we can deduce the following facts:

Crops of tenants who farm a feddan of wheat cost 316 pounds and they sell wheat and straw for 795 pounds. They are left with a net income of 651 pounds over 3 months, while landlords get only 25 pounds of this income, which is the per-feddan rent for this period, and they get it at the end of the year.

If the tenant plants bersim on a single feddan, he will spend 235 pounds on it in 8 months, which is the bersim growing-period, and he will sell the crop for 1,400 pounds. His net income will be 1,156 pounds, sometimes reaching 1,500 or 2,000 pounds. Meanwhile, the landowner gets only 70 pounds of this in rent per feddan over that period.

If he plants lettuce on a single feddan, he will realize a net return of 790 pounds after deduction of the costs, which come to 225 pounds, in the course of just 4 months, while the landowner will get only 25 pounds in rent.

If he farms this feddan with sweet potatoes, he will realize a net yield of 1,000 pounds after setting aside costs, while the landowner will get 45 pounds only.

Meanwhile, if he farms green onions, he will get a net income of 630 pounds in a month and a half, the period for farming the crop; of this, the landowner will get just 15 pounds.

Experts' Views on Relationship

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 pp 18, 19

[Text] During this excursion, it was necessary for us to poll the views of agriculture experts in Egypt.

Dr Mustafa al-Jabali, former minister of agriculture, said that he was against the presence of an eternal relationship between landowner and peasant, on the farmland specifically, because that would deprive the landowner of the rental contract. Also, it is not proper that rent on farmland should have been fixed since the revolution, in spite of the changes which have occurred in production costs and crop costs and the radical social change which has occurred in Egyptian society.

Dr Mustafa al-Jabali added, "I am against eternal contracts since in my view they do not give adequate flexibility for realizing the government's goals in terms of agricultural development strategy, since the small farmers' whole goal now is to realize 'a livelihood,' not 'sufficiency.' The gravity of this situation is apparent when we realize that 65 percent of all the properties are rented out to small tenants, causing Egypt to suffer from what is called the food gap. Even now, with the government's policy relative to the wheat crop specifically, the tenants are now finding it easy to get their wheat and corn requirements through subsidies, in order to farm all their land by bersim. This is confirmed by recent data which has referred to the spread of bersim farming over close to 3 million feddans."

Dr al-Jabali said, "The solution in my opinion is for rents to be for a period of 5 years which can be renewed by having the landowner and tenant agree over the rent and the method for exploiting the land. Moreover, the current rent must be raised to double at the lowest estimate, because it is not proper than it should be less than 150 pounds a year. Indeed, the sum of 300 pounds is not a hardship for a tenant who wants to work and not sleep. The proof of this is that the per-feddan rent during a single growing

season, 6 months, is now much greater than 150 pounds, and the rent figure must not be frozen at the level where it was 5 years ago. Rather, the rent must be contingent not on tax but on the basis of the productive ability of the single basin which contains the farmland under contract, since the productive ability depends on the five levels of land quality. The tenant must commit himself to retaining per-feddan productivity at high levels and raising the level of per-feddan productivity from second class to first class, and so on."

Dr al-Jabali went on to say, "Under the worst of conditions, the landowner must be given the right to rent out his land for cash or participation in the output with the tenant, on condition that the share of each be set in a manner which will guarantee equity in the distribution of income to the two parties. It is absolutely not fair for the tenant to get the equivalent of the value or the area of half the land he rents if the landowner wants to get his land back because that should be considered infringement on ownership rights at a time when there are no feudalists in Egypt. Perhaps this situation was understandable and logical in 1952 but now the situation has changed."

I asked him, "Are there other solutions?"

Dr al-Jabali replied, "The agricultural cooperative societies which encompass all the productive farmers in Egyptian villages can provide planning for ways of exploiting rented lands and supervise execution of the plans they set out, provided that all the farmers, landowners and tenants, participate in setting these plans out, keeping accounts of the various units on the basis of each unit's net revenues, and setting out the bases for dividing this revenue up among landowners and tenants in a manner which ultimately will guarantee equity in income distribution and dominance of the proper productive relationship.

"At the end, I would like to say that whatever the proposed solutions for breaking up the conflict between the landowners and peasants might be, it is necessary to 'move gradually' in creating the requisite change in the direction of a better situation which will bring about justice for both parties, because all the landowners reject the current situation, as it gives them a sense of psychological instability, while the tenants believe that they are incontestably in the right and not to be questioned. This will come about only by creating concessions with both parties and meeting at a point in the middle which will retain the inviolability of property and the tradition of social circumstances."

Changes Which Require Amendments

Fathallah Rif'at, chairman of the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank and chairman of the economic committee in the People's Assembly, said,

"Many changes have occurred over the past 33 years which have made the issue of balance between landowners and tenants a subject of discussion among people. Landowners now get only 70 pounds a year per feddan from tenants in rent, on the basis of the calculation the government has stipulated for

these, at a rate of seven times tax. It is well known that the tax is estimated at 10 pounds per feddan per year.

"Although a number of changes have already been made in the current tax in order to improve landowners' incomes, this benefit has not yet reached a point which will cover the landowner's basic costs of living. While I grant that the revolution came about to support the oppressed peasant classes, I can say that a form of injustice has befallen another class, and that is the landowners, especially since they cannot get their land back today, since rented land is now inherited by the tenant's heirs in the event he dies."

Fathallah Rif'at added, "Therefore, before the government issues a decree concerning this problem, the studies on which this decree is to be based must not just be official ones! Rather, it is necessary to listen to various views, so that the dimensions and angles of the problem will be totally clear to the decision-makers, especially since the masses of tenants are used to a specific income at the same time the landowners are complaining of this situation.

"Therefore I say that it is necessary rapidly to look for an equation which will restabilize the relationship between landowners and tenants to reduce the severity of the numerous disputes between them, whose harshness the economic and social change which has taken place in recent years has helped to aggravate.

"The optimum solution, in my opinion, must be introduced to create a balance so that the tenant's real average income will be weighed and the tenant will get a reasonable, not excessive, surplus from the revenues per feddan. This solution must carefully scrutinize differentials in the per-feddan yield from one crop to another and one area to another, and therefore the rent must not be the same for all types of crop. The rent per feddan must not be the same in the case of all types of crops. Perhaps we will thereby be able to restore some balance, not the desired balance, to the relationship between landowners and tenants.

"In spite of all this, I consider that it is not desirable to deprive tenants of guarantees and that it is not desirable to give the landowner the right to own and act as he wishes. In addition, it is not desirable to keep the situation as it is, because it is necessary to show attention to the interests of the two parties in a manner which will not disrupt the social peace, in the sense that one class or group will not harbor a grudge against another!"

Keeping the Tenant's Presence

Dr Ahmad Hasan, senior expert in the National Planning Institute, said, "We are not opposed to the landowner's right to get a just rent in a manner which is in keeping with the general level of prices, but in the context of the rise and power of labor wages. We must keep the tenant on his land so that he and his children will farm it.

"To keep the tenant's presence and preserve the rights of the society and the landowner at the same time, it is necessary to preserve the rule of

suitability of farmland rent, which is seven times tax, because that guarantees society what it is owed by the landowner, as it guarantees the landowner what he is owed by the tenant. This rule of suitability is not a violation of the land reform laws, but rather an extension of the application of a legislative stipulation which was set out in the thirties and forties in the context of governments of people representing owners of farmland."

Alternatives for Appraising Rents

Dr Ahmad Hasan reviewed a number of alternatives for appraising rents in the study he carried out, and found that the most suitable solution for taking the two parties' interests into consideration was to increase rents every 10 years through general reappraisals stipulated in the tax laws, based on the analysis of absolute net revenues from the land during the reappraisal years. This will lead to the farming system which exists in the land reform law at present, since that is the most suitable, just method for both the landowner and the tenant, if the conditions included in the land reform law are amended and the costs are also split equally between landowners and tenants in the light of considerations related to the tremendous rise in costs of labor, for example, which is one of the sections on costs to which the land reform law binds the tenant.

"This is unfair to the tenant, especially if we go back to the cost of labor relative to rent. In 1960, in the cotton crop, labor costs accounted for 24 percent of total overall costs per feddan, and rent accounted for 46 percent of this total.

"Conversely, rents came to represent 11 percent of the total costs per feddan relative to cotton, and labor costs represented 59.3 percent, in 1984. These figures confirm the unsuitability of the agricultural system at present.

"This rise in labor wages confirms that the tenant is a natural resource supporting the slogan 'the land to those who work it' and is indeed an economic necessity, not just a social necessity."

Dr Ahmad Hasan added "It is necessary to apply the agrarian reform law to tenants who farm vegetables." He stressed the option of choosing rents between landowners and peasants, as is the case with fruit, especially since vegetable cultivation has become profitable.

Liberalization Has Affected Land Prices

Dr Mahmud Ibrahim Badir, professor of rural sociology in the Cairo Agriculture [Faculty], considered "The relationship between landowners and tenants was stable up to 1973, when the political practices of economic liberalization started to constitute a form of speculation in prices of farmland, making their prices increase as a reflection of the value of the crops. When we try to unearth or determine the current problem, we find ourselves faced with new figures in 1984, stating that 70 percent of the landowners own less than a feddan, that what they own constitutes 17 percent of the total farmland, that 95 percent of the landowners own less than 5 feddans, that this

comes to 44 percent of the total cultivated land in Egypt, that 134,000 landowners control 21.3 percent of the farmed area, that each of them owns between 5 and 20 feddans, that 23,000 owners control 12.2 percent of the farmland and that each one of them owns from 20 to 50 feddans.

"As far as rented land goes, that comes to more than 2 million feddans, that is, about 40 percent of the total land farmed; 81.50 percent of that is rented out by the cash system, and the rest through participation.

"This is one aspect of the problem. Another aspect holds that the average farmland rented out is declining. In 1952, the ratio of rented land to the total area farmed in Egypt was 60 percent. This dropped to 51 percent in 1960 and 40 percent in 1984. This can be attributed to the increase in buying power and the conversion of the tenant into a landowner as a result of the agrarian reform laws.

"How many landowners and tenants are affected, negatively or positively?

"Sixteen million citizens, throughout the republic. This figure includes the members of families of landowners and tenants.

"Thus it is possible to identify the problem behind tenants' revenues rising in a manner which is not in keeping with rents and return on landowners' per-feddan investment. The price of a feddan now has become unused capital.

"How to get out of this problem?"

Dr Badir said, "There are a number of aspects to the solution to this problem. First is that it is necessary to define rents on the basis of productivity and profits per feddan in accordance with each region's circumstances, taking into account a number of reservations, the most important of which are abrogating subsidies on some subsidized crops such as cotton and corn and changing the crop pricing policy on grounds that the local price should approximate the international price, especially in the case of export crops, so that the prices will be attractive to farmers. In addition, it is necessary to change the crop structure so that it will reflect the geographic structure in the case of markets adjacent to us, which will lead to the modernization of agriculture in accordance with this structure.

"The second aspect is that rents be determined in accordance with economic and social changes every 5 years, provided that tenants refrain from subleasing land except in specific cases, for instance if they fall ill, and that that be with the knowledge of the landowner, who will then have the right to increase the rent by 20 percent for a specified period of time agreed to by the landowner and connected to the period of the tenant's illness.

"The third aspect is that passing the rental contract on to the tenant's heirs should continue if farming is the profession of one of the heirs, in order to preserve the structure of the family and its performance of its duties toward society and its members, on condition that the land be taken away from the tenant's heirs if it is proved that they have not farmed the land bequeathed to them.

"The fourth aspect is that the government should distribute reclaimed lands free of charge to tenant farmers who want to leave the land to landowners, on condition that the government provide all services on the new lands.

"Finally, agricultural cooperative societies should oversee the land to make sure that it is farmed in a scientific manner which will yield the best output, so tenants will not resort to keeping it fallow or farming it indiscriminately to continue to distress landowners, and that rental contracts are abrogated if the tenant goes abroad to work, especially now that it has been proved that the number of agricultural workers who have gone abroad to work in Gulf countries came to 40 percent of the total number of people working in agriculture, totalling 5 million agricultural workers, and that the people who have remained in Egypt are awaiting an opportunity to go abroad. These are called 'unsettled workers.'

"Recent research indicates that 92 percent of people current farming do not have the desire to have 'their children' continue in agricultural work and that 86 percent of agricultural engineers and supervisors have no desire to continue with agricultural work; if they find an opportunity to work in any other area, they will seize it!"

Opposition Leaders Discuss Subject

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 19

[Article by Sulayman 'Abd-al-'Azim]

[Text] After AL-MUSAWWAR's excursion through the Egyptian countryside and with agricultural experts and specialists on the subject of the relationship between landowners and tenants, it was necessary that we listen to the views of the opposition parties on this subject.

The Wafd: No Opinion at Present!

When AL-MUSAWWAR contacted Mr Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, chairman of the Wafd Party, to ascertain the party's view on the relationship between landowners and tenants, the party chairman said, "I will review this subject in my political speech at the celebration of National Holy War Day on 13 November. Therefore, it is not possible for the party to give any opinion on this subject now."

Labor: Yes to Modifications in Rents

Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, said "The agrarian land reform law managed to spare Egyptian society upheaval, indeed bloody revolution, after the problem was remedied through legislation. An important matter I would like to point out is that the law I submitted to the Chamber of Deputies 2 years before the revolution was compatible with the law issued in September 1952: the two gave compensation to people owning land taken over which was in excess of the stipulated limit on ownership. The law was founded on a basis of appropriation of ownership for the public benefit and did not assume the form of expropriation, although the situation later changed when the issuance of compensation bonds was suspended.

"In any event, the situation which equates the calculation of rent to seven times tax is not a fair one now as far as landowners go, since the tax is normally calculated on the basis of the major crops. How can the rent be at this price when there is a constant increase in the prices of some non-basic crops, when there is a constant rise in the prices of the bersim crop because of the extreme receptivity toward it, although it was farmed as an additional crop before cotton, when there is this instability in the prices of additional yields of certain grains, embodied in straw, whose prices have increased over those of wheat, and when rice greens can get a price whereas they used to be burned as waste!

"The most nearly logical remedy for establishing a balance between landowner's and tenant's shares might be to turn toward the system of participation by temporary sharecropping contracts after studying the practical results arising from the amendments introduced into the temporary sharecropping contract system in 1964, since it is possible to combine the abilities of landowners and tenants by this system to realize the highest production bringing benefits for both of them.

"Of course the relationship between landowner and tenant in the system I advocate must end when one of the two parties dies. This might be desirable in the case of future relations but in the case of relations which exist now it is possible to set out a period of time, let us say 6 years, when the relationship between landowner and tenant will end, with death or the end of the relationship, whichever comes later."

Eng Ibrahim Shukri added, "As regards rents, I recommend that new rules be set out where attention will be paid to changes in crop prices in accordance with a specific rule. In order to remedy current conditions, if the participation system is accepted by the two parties in accordance with the above-mentioned rules, there will be no problem, but if the tenant does not accept this situation in this case it will be possible to abrogate the rental contract after the 6-year period I recommend ends, if the tenant does not want to continue with the participation system."

The Liberals: Raising Rents to 10 Times Tax

Mustafa Kamil Murad, chairman of the Liberal Party, requested a review of relations between landowners and tenants on farmland for the following reasons:

"First, the rise in crop prices to nearly five times their 1952 level. Cotton has risen from 10 to 65 pounds per qintar, wheat has risen from 3 to 15 pounds per ardebb, and so on, specifically in the case of crops where there is a buyer's monopoly.

"Second, the rise in living costs because of inflation, whose annual rate comes to 15 percent, making the burdens of living on landowners increase constantly.

"Third, per-feddan rent on the black market ranges from 200 to 350 pounds a year, while the rent by law, seven times tax, ranges from 50 to 70 pounds a

year. Therefore, we consider that the first step in reform is to raise the tax. Thus the landowners' income will rise to 70 to 100 pounds per feddan a year and thus justice will be realized to some extent."

The Grouping: A Review of the Law Is Necessary -- But

Concerning the Grouping Party's view on the relationship between landowners and tenants, Muhammad Muhammad 'Iraqi, member of the peasants' office in the party and secretary of the Egyptian Peasants' Federation currently being established, said, "Raising the rent by increasing tax must take place after very careful study of the revenues from such basic marketing crops as cotton, rice, wheat, onions, corn and so forth, so that the value of the calculation of the average net income of these crops after deduction of all farming cost categories will be known. After that, the rent will be set at half the net per-feddan rent for these crops. In other words, landlords and tenants should divide average per-feddan net revenues, so that the landowner will have half and the tenant half, and this process will be repeated every number of years so that it will be in keeping with the various changes which have occurred in the agricultural process." Muhammad 'Iraqi warned about the danger of spontaneous tax appraisals aimed at increasing rents without the performance of such accurate studies and he requested that the government not act hastily over any measure in this regard before discussing it at a symposium in which the parties and all political forces will take part.

He said, "We are in favor of having the tenant's stable presence on his land and keeping from threatening him with expulsion from the land, because the anxiety which exists at present is reflected on the productive process, with the result that the tenants are diverted from performing serious service for the land."

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CSO: 4504/90

LIBYA

PEOPLE'S BUREAU ISSUES STATEMENT ON MALAYSIAN FUNDAMENTALIST

HK230554 Hong Kong AFP in English 0529 GMT 23 Nov 85

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 23 (AFP)--Libya has denied any links with a Malaysian Moslem religious teacher whose followers attacked police with choppers, bamboo spears, poison arrows and molotov cocktails in the northern state of Kedah on Tuesday in a clash that left 18 people dead.

The Libyan People's Bureau here said in a statement that it could not ascertain whether politician-turned-teacher Ibrahim Mahmud called "Ibrahim Libya" by his followers had been educated in Libya as claimed by local officials.

"Even if he had, Libya could not be responsible for his way of thinking or his actions," the bureau said.

It added that it regretted that local newspapers had chosen to link Mr Ibrahim with Libya "as if they wanted to tarnish the image and good name of Libya in the eyes of the public."

Mr Ibrahim, a member of the fundamentalist Parti Islam Sa-Malaysia, led some 400 of his supporters, including women and children, into battle with police near Baling town, 432 kilometers (270 miles) north of here, after security officials tried to detain him and some of his followers for possession of weapons, intimidation and resisting arrest.

Local newspapers had said that Mr Ibrahim had been preaching his brand of deviationist Islam to poor rubber tappers in the remote village of Memali for some eight years, during which he had built up a substantial following.

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CSO: 4500/36

TUNISIA

LOANS FOR AGRICULTURAL, INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS REPORTED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 15 Nov 85 p 2

[Article: "Development of South And Central Tunisia: Two Algerian Loans for \$30 Million to Tunisia"]

[Text] The neighborly working visit to Algeria at the end of September by Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and minister of the interior, continued to have beneficial results for relations between the two neighboring countries. Algeria and Tunisia continue, as a matter of fact, to reap the fruit of the meetings which Mzali had with Algerian Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi.

Thus, in accordance with the desire of Presidents Habib Bourguiba and Chadli Bendjedid to strengthen ties of cooperation and solidarity between the two countries, and in order to give concrete form to the agreements worked out by the prime minister and his Algerian counterpart, an official ceremony was held on Wednesday in Algiers in the presence of Moualem Ben Hamouda, minister of finance, during which Nouredine Hached, minister of labor and Mohamed Tarbache, secretary general of the Algerian Ministry of Finance, signed two financial agreements according to which Algeria, through the Maghreb Arab Development Bank, granted Tunisia two loans for the realization of industrial and agricultural projects in Tunisia.

The first loan is for \$10 million repayable over a long period of time on very favorable terms including particularly a reduced interest rate. The loan will be spent on financing industrial projects in Tunisia's central and southern areas, and in the border area between the two countries.

The amount of the second loan, made on the same conditions, totals \$20 million.

It will go to finance agricultural projects in the south of Tunisia.

In a speech made on this occasion, Nouredine Hached emphasized the closeness of the special relations between the two countries, and the exemplary nature of bilateral cooperation which has been constantly strengthened since the signing of the treaty of fraternity and concord by Presidents Bourguiba and Bendjedid in March 1983. Today, this cooperation has been extended to all sectors, he said.

In the name of the president, and the Tunisian government and people, Hached also thanked Algeria for its latest display of active solidarity with Tunisia.

KUWAIT

U.S. POLICY IN GULF CRITICIZED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 23 Oct 85 pp 18-19

[Article by Dr 'Abd-al-Hadi Khalaf: "America Gains Increased 'Rights' of Intervention"]

[Text] In its 5 September 1985 issue, the NEW YORK TIMES newspaper published an article by Gwertzman, its writer specializing in defense affairs, on the agreement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to give the United States the right to use Saudi military bases and installations in case of "Soviet aggression" or a crisis in the Gulf which is "beyond the ability of the kingdom to resolve."

The article was based on a secret report presented by Richard Murphy to members of Congress, summarizing a study undertaken by the American government of its military sales to states of the Middle East.

The article attracted wide attention and long sections of it were published in some Arab newspapers. It also attracted official denials. In spite of their denials, the reality of the agreement-accord can not be denied.

By this agreement-accord, the clock is turned back more than two decades, to the time when the United States enjoyed the right to use Saudi military bases and installations.

With this agreement-accord, the lack of credibility of the calls we have heard repeatedly that "the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of its residents" can be judged anew. In spite of their repetition over more than 15 years, these calls still have not changed the tangible reality. Nothing on the horizon forecasts that.

At any rate, the agreement-accord means stationing American forces on Saudi territory only in the cases of a "Soviet attack" or a crisis in the Gulf. From a formal standpoint, this situation is, certainly, better than that which obtains in other Gulf countries,

such as Oman, Bahrain or the Emirates, where American forces, under various cover, are actually stationed, along with their ships and planes.

But this point is formal only. Experience of cooperation with the United States by many Arab and non-Arab states confirms that the United States is not content merely to obtain a signature giving it "the right to use bases and installations," but it works, directly for practical implementation of the "right."

It works to create suitable means to make implementation of its right an acceptable matter, or, rather, a matter desired by those in power and authority in the country friendly to it.

The United States does not need to go far in its search for justifications of its military presence in the Arab Gulf region. The war in the Gulf is unabated--in all of its ramifications--as a war of attrition. Clearly and importantly, it is marked by all of the characteristics by which it may be described as what the agreement-accord calls "a crisis beyond the abilities of the kingdom to resolve." This means, in other words, that the option to send American forces to use these bases and installations is an option for which all of the conditions and considerations are available. All that is needed is for the officials of the Pentagon to decide that the time has come to exercise it.

This means, also, that an important issue, the introduction of foreign forces in to the territory of an independent state, and the possession of influence and standing at the regional level--by means of the agreement-accord mentioned--has come to be a matter beyond the frame of the power of the officials of the relevant countries, and, from a practical point of view, is confined to the Pentagon.

Naturally, the Gulf has no fear of a Soviet attack, since Kremlin officials have repeated their peaceful intentions toward the Gulf region. Perhaps Soviet initiatives related to preserving a stable security and peace for the nations surrounding the Gulf are greater proof of these peaceful intentions, in spite of the negative attitude these states have taken toward these initiatives. Naturally, American forces will never enter the larger countries of the Gulf as a result of a Soviet attack. There is no possibility of this.

The more likely scenario is for the United States to continue to expand the forms of its military presence in the region by using "the rights belonging to it" for this that are set down in writing in agreements between it and some of the states of the region. However, this expansion can not continue easily unless the guardian United States is able to continue the protusion of security crises in countries of the Gulf, and as long as the long-lived crisis of the Gulf war continues.

Beyond this, since American intervention will never result from a "Soviet attack," the efforts of those concerned with the apparatus of destruction and disorganization in the American Central Intelligence Agency will be intent on introducing a variety of security crises in one or more of the countries on the Gulf region, in view of the fact that these security crises form the cover needed to increase and reinforce the American military concentration in the region.

Since the issue has become, simply, that the majority of the states of the region are not able, for suitable foreign and domestic reasons, to agree to station a larger number of American forces in them, as America would like, unless a crisis which these states can not resolve has occurred, the regional conclusion is for the United States to continue to aggravate the situation in the region to create a state of fear among the local officials, so that it becomes acceptable and desirable to station its forces, equipment and material in the region.

Something like this scenario means creation of a situation characterized by an organic connection between the number and frequency and degree of violence of security crises and the size and type of the American military presence. The more the crises increase and the more violent they become, the more the "demand increases for a larger, more dense and more technically developed American military presence.

In a digression, everything that is needed to bring about an increase in the security problems of the countries of the region and to bring about an inclination for these crises is available, because there is a new type of crisis which the region has not seen before that is, the development of crises without a social or political background, that do not rest on the usual pressure groups or on social alliances among the citizens of the countries of the region who are disadvantaged politically, socially or economically in terms of the course on which the regimes are oriented.

In connection with the preceding is the continued presence of "anonymous" groups carrying out terrorist and sabotage actions that are deceptively attributed to this or that opposition group, and so suitable conditions and circumstances become available for the Americans to provide whatever "assistance" they can.

As for this part of the application of the scenario, we have not seen the "anonymous" groups. They are unable to mobilize the elements needed to create security crises of any magnitude. The Gulf teems, as is well known, with many who are capable and inclined to join the plans of these "anonymous" groups, and the Gulf teems with plenty of people ready to sacrifice themselves.

Having already turned over the keys to the house to someone who has announced, often and repeatedly, his firm desire to occupy it, there is no possibility, after all that has been published by officials of the White House and the Pentagon in terms of threats and claims that "the security of the Gulf region is a strategic part of the security of the United States," that they are concerned with the security and peace of our region. They are concerned, first and last, with the security and peace of the interests of the United States of America in our region. Notwithstanding the political and financial sacrifices that have been imposed on the states of the region, and the abuse that has been imposed on their sovereignty and on the security and comfort of their people for the sake of guaranteeing the security and peace of American interests (economic, political and strategic), and notwithstanding, with all due emphasis, the disastrous results caused by continued growth of the size and power of the American military concentration in our region for the sake of the security of the region and the security and peace of the world, perhaps the most direct and prominent of these results is the confirmation of these states of the region joining in American plans and projects hostile to the real interests of the peoples of the region and the other peoples of the world.

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KUWAIT

INFORMATION MINISTER ON DEMOCRACY, SECURITY, PRESS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 12 Oct 85 p 61

[Interview with Shaykh Nasir Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, minister of information for Kuwait, by Sulayman Nimr: "Democracy and Kuwait Are Inseparable Twins"; date, place not given]

[Text] No one can deny that the democratic experiment which Kuwait has been experiencing since its amir, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, restored the practice of the constitution, and since the last parliamentary elections, which were held 8 months ago, is real. Any visitor to Kuwait can notice it and can see this political interaction between the citizen and his government.

The political interaction between the citizen and the nation is what made all Kuwaitis, in their various groups and their various intellectual and political tendencies, rally around the amir of their country when he was the object of an assassination attempt. The political interaction about which we are speaking is what made all Kuwaitis, in their various views and opinions, stand as one in defense of their country when the security of this country was threatened by the bombing of a popular coffeehouse this past summer.

The political interaction between the citizen and the nation, and between the citizen and the state, can only be caused by the existence of real democratic political life, which makes the government accept other opinion and take it into consideration, no matter how strident or critical it becomes. There are many examples of this. Perhaps the best known of them is the case of the interpellation of the former minister of justice, Shaykh Sulayman al-Du'ayj al-Sabah, which resulted in the resignation of the minister but not dismissal of the deputies.

When we met with the Kuwaiti minister of information, Shaykh Nasir Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, we presented all of these fears to him in this conversation:

[Question] In a well-known statement, the amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, said: "We believe in democracy and freedom, in

principle and program. We must practice them in all of their senses." Does this mean the continuation of your democratic experiment without limit? Or that the Kuwait government thinks that there are definite limits that may not be crossed in democratic life?

[Answer] We all believe in democracy as a means and way of life. Therefore, the words of our revered amir, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, that you mentioned in your question are a true expression and realistic reflection of what the amir, the government and the people of Kuwait believe. It is a belief that we always translate into action, not just today, but since the establishment of the bases of democracy in our country by his highness the late amir Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Salam al-Sabah. Even before independence, consultation, freedom of opinion and expression and supremacy of the public interest were frameworks that ruled our lives. History and the events that Kuwait has experienced in the past and the present are the best witness to this.

As for the limits about which you asked, which may not be crossed in the practice of democracy, I believe that the true practice of democracy, raising the level of awareness and putting the public interest above all considerations are all guarantees changing, without overstepping, democracy. Our people have proved, praise be to God, that they are responsible and are exercising their natural right to democracy.

[Question] The events that have happened recently in Kuwait, which have threatened its security, beginning with the attempted assassination of the amir of the country and ending with the explosion in the popular coffeehouse--what affect have they had on democratic life in Kuwait?

[Answer] The great rallying around his highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad after the treacherous attempt this past 25 May confirms the soundness of the path on which Kuwait is moving. Kuwait, its old men, youth, women and young men rushed to stand as one person behind the amir of the country. This certainly proved something. Much more, it proves that the Kuwaiti experiment is a strong and lasting experiment. Likewise for the cowardly actions of the explosion in the popular coffeehouse which struck peaceful, innocent people, included women, children and old men, which was aimed, inasmuch as it was aimed at something, at damaging our democratic experiment and the system of institutions that we and the Kuwaiti people have chosen as a way and program of life. I want to go back and emphasize that our Kuwaiti experiment is a strong and lasting experiment. It will continue.

[Question] This means that you think that the democratic path in Kuwait has become a reality, requiring that all of its

responsibilities and consequences be borne. Are you among those who fear for the democratic experiment that Kuwait is experiencing?

[Answer] The practical experiment has demonstrated, praise be to God, that our people have become responsible, and, furthermore, that the government, under the directives of his highness the amir of the country and his excellency the crown prince, is stongly desirous of deepening democratic practice in Kuwait and working to anchor its bases. Therefore, there is no room for fear for the future of democracy and continuation of its course in Kuwait, no matter what its result. In truth, the duration of the democratic experiment always makes us confident that the course of democracy will continue and that the cooperation between the legislative and executive authorities will continue, to the good of the country.

[Question] Do you believe that the Kuwaiti democratic experiment will have a specific influence on the Gulf region, and has the experiment caused some complications with some Arab states?

[Answer] We practice democratic life in Kuwait according to our own satisfaction, in harmony with the way of life that satisfies us. Each Arab state has the right to practice the same right and to choose for itself what it considers the appropriate form of government. I do not believe that our experiment in Kuwait might cause difficulty for us or stir up resentment by any state. To my knowledge, there has been no agitation of this problem from any direction. Moreover, it has had no effect on our relations with any state, praise be to God. We have relations of friendship, affection and common understanding with all the Arab states, whether the Gulf states or other states. This is the biggest proof that the the fears and complications that some have discussed from time to time have no basis in reality.

[Question] Many have observed that the Kuwaiti media, particularly the Kuwaiti press, is experiencing a real and healthy florescence, and is able, under this florescence, to reflect in action the democratic atmosphere that Kuwait is experiencing. Is this a result of your strong belief in freedom of the press, or is this a reflection of the situation through which Kuwait is passing? What is the extent of the freedom available to the Kuwaiti press?

[Answer] Whatever freedom the Kuwaiti press enjoys, and whatever broad florescence it has achieved and whatever success it has realized are matters of which we are proud. We are strongly intent on preserving them. The Kuwaiti press has not achieved this by chance or accident. Rather, it has done so by virtue of a natural development. It is an inevitable result of the system of government that has satisfied us since Kuwait obtained independence. We have from the beginning sought to give complete

freedom to the press and to provide the facilities necessary to it. We have allocated coupons at nominal cost to newspapers, and we have given them interest-free loans to make it possible for them to build presses and purchase modern equipment, so they have achieved a high degree of technology and development. The press has stood as one in condemnation and criticism of the terrorist actions that have afflicted us. This position indicates a great degree of vigilance, awareness and sensitivity to responsibility.

[Question] The previous Kuwait government prepared a draft bill for a new law on printed materials for submission to the national assembly. What is the prospect of this law?

[Answer] The draft bill is still a proposal on the agenda of the national assembly. It was decided to debate and decide on it under the previous national assembly. But the number of topics submitted to the assembly have delayed issuance of this law so far. The ministry received, some time before this past May, the brother chairman and members of the committee on education, culture and guidance affairs in the national assembly to discuss some of the matters pertaining to this law preparatory to presenting it to a session of the next assembly. The agreement between the government and the assembly guarantees arrival together at an appropriate form for this law, so that it becomes harmonious with the desire of all and achieves the public interest.

[Question] Reports are mentioned frequently about the government's intentions to reorganize the newspapers. This reorganization includes incorporation of the papers and their transformation into joint organizations. How true are these reports?

[Answer] I find your purveying these reports very strange, since you know that the newspapers in Kuwait are owned by individuals, organizations or companies. So those who have the right to incorporate or change or any thing else of this sort are the owners of the papers themselves, not the government. To my knowledge, no owner of a newspaper has thought of something like this. Everything progresses in a natural way. There is no truth at all to these rumors.

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QATAR

NORTH FIELD GAS PROJECT DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Nov 85 p 14

[Article signed P.B.: "The North Field Project: To Develop the Largest Gas Deposit in the World"]

[Tex[] The economy of Qatar is based on oil and gas, and will still be based on them in the 21st century: oil, extracted since 1949, which led to the country's spectacular development after independence, in 1971; and gas, the fuel of the future, which has begun to relay oil. Indeed, the decline in world oil consumption and the fact that Qatar will never be a large producer have encouraged its rulers to accelerate the development of the huge North Field gas deposit, also called North Dome, which is 100 km long and 50 km wide, and lies at the limit of Iranian territorial waters; considered to be the largest on earth, it enables the emirate to rank third worldwide for gas reserves, after the Soviet Union and Iran.

Oil reserves represent only 454 million tons--less than the annual production of Saudi Arabia--and will therefore last only about 30 years, compared with 150-200 years for the North Field reserves. In addition, Qatar must comply with the quotas imposed by OPEC to cope with the crisis, so that it produces less associated gas from oil to operate its factories (87 million cubic feet in 1983, compared with 101 million in 1982). It must also expect prices to fall again, which may further reduce its revenues compared with the affluent period 1973-1980. Finally, the land gas deposit of Khouf--114 million cubic feet in 1984--will start to decline in 1988 and will be unable to meet the country's increasing needs.

\$10 Billion

The very ambitious North Field project will require an investment of the order of \$10 billion. It should start by mid-1986 or 1987 at the latest, and be completed around 1995. The State holds 70 percent of the capital--\$6 billion--and has reserved the rest for foreign interests, as follows: Total-CFP [French Petroleum Company] (France), 7.5 percent; British Petroleum (Great-Britain), 7.5 percent; Marubini (Japan), 7.5 percent. The remaining 7.5 percent could be attributed to a German company or to another Japanese company, depending on their marketing capacities.

Studies concerning the installation of oil-drilling platforms, pumping stations and the separation unit were made by the U.S. firm Bechtel. Construction will be entrusted to one of the six firms whose bids are under consideration; they include Bechtel and Technip (France) which intend to form a partnership and thus hope to obtain the contract. The minister of finance and petroleum, sheikh Abd al-'Aziz bin Khalifa, told us that the choice would be made public before the end of the year.

The Gulf Gas Pipeline

The first 3-4 year stage will require an investment of \$2 billion. Its goal will be to meet local demand, i.e. 600-800 million cubic meters by 1988. Should production momentarily exceed the demand, the surplus would be reinjected pending the implementation of the second stage. The latter will require an investment of the order of \$5 billion for the construction of a natural-gas liquefaction plant, with gas being extracted at the rate of 1.6 million cubic meters per year. Liquefied natural gas would be exported mainly to Japan, Australia and other Asian countries.

The third stage will see the construction of a gas pipeline specific to the Gulf region. Kuwait is said to be especially interested in Qatari gas, and a gas pipeline connecting the two countries would cost about \$450 million. It could be extended to Turkey, which also needs fuel for its industry. Ankara has already started negotiations with the emirate. The Turks are also considering an extension of the lines toward Greece and Italy, from where the gas could be distributed to the rest of Europe by the end of the century. The United States, which are concerned by Europe's gas dependence on the USSR, would view such a project favorably; however, the project may come up against competition from Algerian and North-Sea gas.

Qatar's industrialization focusses on petrochemistry and fertilizers in order to recover the associated gas that used to be burnt off and therefore lost. Since its cost price was attractive, it was to be used both as a raw material and as a fuel and, therefore, was to make Qatari products competitive. Results, however, have been uneven.

Thus, QAPCO (Qatar Petrochemical Company), whose shareholders are QGPC (Qatar General Petroleum Company) with 84 percent of the capital and the French company CDF-Chemistry [French Coal Mines/Chemistry] (16 percent) shows a deficit: there is not enough of the associated gas used to make ethane so that, in this sector, the plant operates at 60 percent of its capacity. To remedy the problem, an ethane recovery unit (500 of the 1,100 tons required per day) should be completed in the next few months. QAPCO will then be able to produce, as scheduled, 280,000 tons of ethane, 160,000 tons of low-density polyethylene used to make plastic films, and 4,600 tons of sulfur. But even with an output rate of over 100 percent, will it make a profit when polyethylene prices have dropped from \$700 to \$450 per ton?

A Chemical Industry

QAFCD (Qatar Fertilizer Company), 24 percent of whose capital is held by Norsk Hydro from Norway, has achieved production records. With 632,000 tons of

ammonia and 734,000 tons of urea in 1984, it made a net profit of 172 million rials. But its management fears that the results may not be as good this year, due to lower prices. QUASCO (Qatar Steel Company), which has two Japanese shareholders (Kobe Steel, 20 percent; Tokyo Boeki, 10 percent), is experiencing similar problems: during the first half of 1985, it beat its own records with a production of 263,000 tons of steels, exported mainly to Gulf countries, but it has suffered indirectly from the dumping practices of Brazil and South Korea, which caused prices to drop to around \$230 per ton.

The results achieved in the private sector and in the banking sector are controversial. Merchants and bankers imply that they will show a deficit this year. The government points out that they expressed the same concern during the past 3 years but that both still made profits, albeit smaller, in a country where subsidies are many and taxes unknown.

Under these conditions, the crisis forces the State and the private sector to exert rigor and increase productivity at a time when the national budget shows a deficit and some companies are complaining that they are paid several months late. Finance officials, however, point out that the situation is sound and that the country's reserves amount to \$8 billion, bringing in some \$700 million per year.

Priority projects have been temporarily shelved. For instance, the giant electric power and seawater desalination plant of Al-Wousail; this project, however, cannot be delayed for long as industrial and social needs are increasing. Similarly, the construction of a military airfield, the need for which is felt, may have to wait for better days. Imports have also been reduced by about 20 percent in 1984, amounting to 4.17 billion rials, compared with 7 billion in 1982 and 5.29 billion in 1983.

Simultaneously, planners are studying ways of reducing expenditures and increasing revenues. Indeed, most services, including education and health care, are free for all. Also, the Qatari do not pay for water or for electricity. Electricity is provided to non-Qatari and to manufacturers at one fifth of its actual cost, which places a burden of 1.3 billion rials on the State. As for gasoline, it costs only 60 cents per gallon, i.e. FF 4.80 for 4.5 liters. Abolishing or reducing these benefits may be unpopular, but it is quite possible that the Gulf Cooperation Council will make the governments' task easier by formulating recommendations and recalling that the time of the providence-State and cheap energy is over.

9294

CSO: 4419/5

QATAR

STRONG POLITICAL, CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Nov 85 p 13

[Article signed P.B.: " Paris-Doha: From A Marriage of Convenience to Falling in Love"]

[Text] Relations between France and Qatar began with a marriage of convenience and continued with romance, so that this State has become the most francophile in the region; a region that, for two centuries and until independence in 1971, had remained a British preserve. The splendor of the emir's, sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani's official visit, starting on 20 November, and its exceptional character--it is one of four official visits to France this year--illustrate the importance that Paris attaches to its ties with Qatar. It also underlines the strength and regularity of bilateral relations: the emir came to France on an official visit for the first time on 27-28 October 1975, and Mr Giscard d'Estaing in turn went to Qatar on 4-5 March 1980.

Another symbol: on 31 October, the ground was broken for the construction of the French embassy seat in the new residential district of Doha. When it is completed, in 15 months and at a cost of FF 50 million, the building will house the ambassador's residence and the chancellery. "The construction of this embassy is proof that France has confidence in the future of Qatar, which is a well-run state," we were told by the French ambassador, Mr Fernand Brejon de Lavergnee.

Diplomatic relations between Paris and Doha were established only a few days before sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad, then crown prince and prime minister, acceded to power, on 22 February 1972. At the time, he wanted to keep his distance from Great-Britain which, as a result of colonization, was still very much in control. For its part, France wanted to achieve a "breakthrough" in the Gulf. However, it was Qatar that took the initiative of a rapprochement and, already in July, it was the first of the emirates in the region to appoint an ambassador to reside in Paris.

The emir had appreciated the Arab policy practiced by General de Gaulle after the Algerian war and especially after 1967. He thought that Paris would be a good "locomotive" in bringing Europe along this road, to counterbalance the two superpowers. France was also to contribute to the development of the young State and advise it in matters of armament and defense. For its part,

Paris could not ignore that, despite its small size, Qatar possessed huge gas deposits and had the highest per-capita income in the world. This was a solid basis on which to cultivate a policy of reciprocal and mutually profitable interests.

How can we account, however, for the fact that feelings were added to convenience? We can mention various causes, having to do with men and circumstances. It is probably significant that the emir's political advisor, Mr Hassan Kamel, a highly educated Egyptian, studied in France and is very much attached to our language. He also used French to deliver Qatar's candidacy speech at the United Nations. The emir then liked his first stay in Paris and, since then, has been taking his vacations in France with his family every year. He has acquired an estate in the South of France and hired a private tutor to teach French to his family.

Ranking 5th

In turn, several ministers and high officials started learning French, and French instruction was introduced in Qatari schools.

This climate of friendship helped the French economic breakthrough in the peninsula; it would have been still far more vigorous if French manufacturers and businessmen were more dynamic and more visible, like their main competitors.

Indeed, France dropped from the third to the fifth rank of Qatar's suppliers, with 5.4 percent of Qatari imports, following Japan (19.2 percent), Great-Britain (14.6 percent), the United States (9.1 percent) and the FRG (7.2 percent). In 1984, French exports amounted to FF 800 million (vs. only FF 45 million in 1973), but its imports, especially its oil imports, amounted to FF 4.5 billion. Until now, it appears, the deficit was made up for to an extent that is not known by arms sales.

However, declining revenues have led Qatar to cut down on this budget item. True, the government appointed a French company to study the construction of a military base and aircraft runway, but the construction of the project itself is no longer a priority item.

From Technip to "Poison"

Until now, the French as a whole had been awarded large contracts: electrical installations, salt-water desalination, port facilities, telephone, etc. Technip built the large Oum-Said refinery, and this highpoint of bilateral cooperation in the field of petrochemistry was the first industrial cross-investment made with an Arab country. The Dunkirk petrochemical complex, COPENOR (Petrochemical Company of the North) was financed 60 percent by CED-Chemistry [French Coal Mines/Chemistry] and 40 percent by the QGPC (Qatar General Petroleum Company), and in Qatar both firms own the QAPCO [expansion unknown] complex.

A major future project is the development of the North Field gas deposit, in which Technip, which has already proved itself, hopes to participate; because

of its scope and duration, the project will have numerous spinoffs in various industrial sectors. Other major projects, however, may well be fewer than in the past; for the time being, the largest are the water and electric power plant of Al-Wousail and the military base.

But there are also a number of projects, ranging from 50 to 300 million rials, which are not insignificant. The agricultural field, although limited, could be promising and could interest the French in two respects: development of new land and reconstitution of the ground water table. We should also mention the improvement of the sewer system, the modernization of the towns of Madinat-al-Chamal and Wakra, the construction of new headquarters for the Consultative Council, and other buildings.

If France wants to improve its balance of payments with Qatar, it must not rely solely on large contracts, but persuade small and medium-size firms to show some imagination and dynamism, even if that means banding together to export. It is surprising that France should have sold only 300 of the 15,000 cars imported by Qatar in 1984, especially from Japan and Germany. On the other hand, sales of perfumes and cosmetics totalled more than car sales; when it ventured to go on location to introduce its latest perfume, "Poison," the Christian Dior team "made a great hit"! Similarly, the success of Arques Crystal, whose products are found throughout the peninsula, should serve as an example to other companies of a similar size in fields as varied as paints, ink, paper, household appliances, small supplies, etc. Actually, the main problem of many French companies is that they do not know how to take advantage of circumstances* and of the favorable ground maintained by the political and cultural dialogue that goes on between the two States.

9294

CSO: 4419/5

* Thus, a symposium to present Qatar and its potential was organized in September by the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce with the aid of the Qatar and French embassies.

QATAR

BRIEFS

HOUSING PLANS--Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Dirham, director of the public housing department in the Qatari Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, said that the construction boom in Qatar has begun to make progress especially in the area of providing suitable dwellings for the Qatari family. Mr al-Dirham added in an interview with the newspaper AL-RAYAH that he had begun to fulfill the desires of the Qatari family for a high quality dwelling having finished drafting plans to construct a dwelling composed of four bedrooms, a living room, a dining room, a family room, a kitchen, a storeroom, and four bathrooms. The floor space will be no less than that allocated for senior Qatari officials. The foundation on which the dwelling for fixed income families is to be built is expandable for the future. These dwellings are currently under construction. Mr al-Dirham explained that the conditions for receiving public housing are that the beneficiary be a Qatari national from a fixed income group between the ages of 20 and 50, married, willing to submit to a medical examination, unable to build a suitable dwelling for himself and not benefiting from any other housing program. The director of the public housing department in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs said that there are no difficulties or problems facing the work, but housing projects depend on a number of governmental agencies and this makes it necessary for those who undertake the projects to take their time and study the matter. Concerning Gulf cooperation in the field of housing, Mr Dirham said that in the light of the meetings which have taken place regarding the housing sector a number of results and recommendations have come forth including the standardization of specifications for building materials, giving priority to construction products manufactured in the Gulf Cooperation Council States, as well as the standardization and classification of contractors in the Council States. [Text] [Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 5 Oct 85 p 17] /9274

CSO: 4404/143

SAUDI ARABIA

MINISTER OF PILGRIMAGES, ENDOWMENTS INTERVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 10 Sep 85 p 3

[Report on interview with 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi', minister of pilgrimage affairs and religious trusts: "Kingdom Spares No Effort in Establishing Service Projects, Paving Roads, Digging Tunnels and Building Hospitals To Serve Pilgrims"; Jiddah, date not given]

[Text] Jiddah (Saudi News Agency)--His Excellency 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi', minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts, stated that the kingdom, under the leadership of His Majesty King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, keeper of the Holy Places, and his highness, the crown prince, is sparing no effort and withholding no resources in establishing numerous public service projects, completing many walkways, digging tunnels, building bridges, paving roads, constructing hospitals and clinics, and providing health care in order to offer optimal services to pilgrims to the holy House of God.

In a statement to the Saudi News Agency, his excellency said that all state agencies involved with the pilgrimage are mobilizing all forces and capacities to organize the pilgrimage activities and to offer all services on a regular, planned and organized basis. He indicated that he foresees the provision of more conveniences and facilities for pilgrims at the sites of religious ceremonies.

The minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts made it clear that the ministry has special development programs for a continued increase in services to the pilgrims. These programs are in keeping with the aspirations of the kingdom and in agreement with its goals. No limit has been set; new projects to serve pilgrims, he emphasized, will be completed at each new pilgrimage season.

He said that the ministry devotes great attention to all suggestions submitted to it for the development of pilgrim-related services, and that it does not hesitate to implement any sound ones.

His Excellency 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi' added that the kingdom has generously and liberally supported pilgrimage-related services and the care of pilgrims; it has withheld no resource to improve all utilities and to install the most modern equipment.

His excellency mentioned that he is very hopeful now that the pilgrim guide service has been developed and organized into agencies through which many matters will be regulated in the future. The idea of creating these agencies is one in which the ministry takes pride. It will serve to provide optimal services for the pilgrims.

His excellency indicated that projects to enlarge the mosques used for pilgrimage rites and the mosques at Namirah and al-Khayf are among the activities of which the ministry is proud and which it considers important and outstanding. He stated that credit for all of this is due first to God and then to his majesty the king, who offers support in every field to the service of Islam.

His excellency 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-Wasi' stated that the government of the kingdom, guided by Islamic law, is working to organize the pilgrimage and to implement measures that will improve and facilitate services to the pilgrims. It is not trying to limit the number of people who wish to make the pilgrimage, but it is spurring any efforts to organize the pilgrimage and the pilgrims.

Reviewing the most important accomplishments and developments of the last 10 years in the organization of the pilgrimage, his excellency said that the Ministry of Pilgrimages and Religious Trusts has worked constantly since its creation; every minister charged with responsibility for the activities of the ministry has done his utmost to raise their level. Everything is proceeding in the light of policy set by the government. Everything is being supervised by his majesty the king, keeper of the Holy Places, who personally directs and follows all activities with the goal of raising them to the highest levels of execution and development.

His excellency added that the ministry has paid much attention to mosques, especially in pilgrimage areas. In the last 5 years, no fewer than 2,500 mosques have been added to the mosques in the kingdom, raising the total number of mosques in the kingdom to 25,000. The ministry has given particular attention to mosques at pilgrimage assembly points. These have been constructed according to the most modern methods and specifications, in a fully Islamic style, and they have been provided with public services and utilities and parking lots for automobiles and buses. He indicated that the mosque at the assembly point of Wadi Muharram has been provided with all public services and enlarged to an area of 1,200 square meters, with a capacity of 1,600 worshipers, at a cost of 24 million riyals.

His excellency the minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts said that the mosque of al-Miqat has been completed and that it has been built on the plan of the mosque at the Wadi Muharram assembly point. A 10-million-riyal contract has recently been signed for the rebuilding of the assembly-point mosque at al-Juhfah and for the construction at Yalamlam of an assembly point and temporary mosque of prefabricated buildings, until the new projects for expansion are completed in the near future. Expansion of the al-Khayf mosque at Muna has been completed; its area has been increased several fold, at a cost of 60 million riyals.

As a convenience to pilgrims, the ministry has installed 2,000 toilets and 4,000 ablution basins at Mina, at a cost of 6 million riyals. The mosque at Muzdalifah has been torn down and rebuilt at a cost of 4 million riyals. The mosque at Namirah has been enlarged to an area of about 118,500 square meters; huge air-conditioning units, 1,000 toilets and 2,000 ablution taps have been installed. Adjoining the mosque are halls for the distribution of alms in the name of the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al-Sa'ud (may God bless him). The facilities of this mosque extend to world-wide satellite transmission of the ceremonies at 'Arafah. Costs of the mosque amounted to 323 million riyals.

His excellency added that mosques in Medinah have been enlarged and rebuilt following the pattern of those at Mecca, at places of pilgrimage rites, and in various other parts of the kingdom. The mosque at Qaba' has been enlarged. [His majesty the king,] keeper of the Holy Places, laid the cornerstone for this enlargement during the last visit to Medinah. Studies and plans have been completed for the enlargement and rebuilding in Islamic style of the Mosque of the Two Qiblahs.

During this year's pilgrimage season, the King Fahd Academy for Printing the Koran began to produce the Medinah edition of the Koran. With a production capacity of 8 million Korans in various sizes, the academy is one of the largest printing projects in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Each pilgrim has received a copy of the Medinah edition of the Koran as a gift from [his majesty the king,] keeper of the Holy Places. The cost of building and equipping this establishment, with its equipment, machines and fully-furnished living quarters, came to 1 billion riyals. Costs for its management, operation, maintenance and the training of its Saudi personnel have reached approximately 1.5 billion riyals over a period of 3 years.

His excellency the minister of pilgrimages and religious trusts, said that the factory producing the Kiswah [the embroidered covering for the Kaaba] has been renovated. Everything needed has been provided, enabling the factory to produce two coverings for the Kaaba every year. Other improvements connected with the pilgrimage include the following: The activity of the traditional pilgrims' guides has been handed over to organizations. The document on pilgrimage traffic has been put into effect, which has already contributed to the saving of time and effort by the pilgrims. For pilgrims who travel overland, stations have been provided in Mecca and Medinah and rest stops on the pilgrimage highway. In the ports of entry, the offices of the consolidated bureau of agents have been improved to insure the pilgrims' comfort. Attention has been paid to directing pilgrims who become lost at the Holy Places and at pilgrimage ceremonies, and a number of centers and improved services have been provided. Care has been given to housing pilgrims. Work is being done on building state-supervised pilgrim cities in Mecca and Medinah.

Pilgrim transport operations have been developed, with opportunities for each new company to participate in transport operations. This has led to competition between the operators of these companies in introducing new fleets of cars and buses equipped to carry pilgrims over long distances in comfort, with air conditioning and toilets. Stations and lockers have been built at the various sites where ceremonies take place, at a cost of 65 million riyals. There is

a program to build canopies for shade at various ceremony sites, at a cost of 8 million riyals.

His excellency said that centers to direct pilgrims have been constructed at a cost of 18 million riyals. The ministry publishes the magazine AL-TADAMUN AL-ISLAMI [Islamic Solidarity], formerly called AL-HAJJ [The Pilgrimage] magazine, to provide information to the pilgrims. A special department of information has been established within the ministry. The distribution of books and publications is being expanded. A large Islamic symposium will be held to discuss contemporary Islamic problems. Cassette tapes will be produced containing questions and answers about the pilgrimage rites in nine languages and in accordance with the four legal schools [of Sunni Islam].

Thousands of books and publications in the various languages of the Islamic world have been distributed to pilgrims. A group of educational programs has been produced for radio and television for the information of pilgrims during the pilgrimage season. The ministry has paid special attention to pilgrims in delegations, to deepening the relationship between them and the ministry, and to defining a clear range of services to be provided to the pilgrims in these delegations during their presence at the pilgrimage.

12937/12947

CSO: 4404/95

SAUDI ARABIA

VISA FORGERY UNCOVERED

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 13 Oct 85 p 5

[Article: "Saudi Visa Forgery Racket Uncovered"]

[Text]

COLOMBO, Oct. 12 (KUNA): Police in Sri Lanka have uncovered a forgery racket involving air tickets and visas for Saudi Arabia.

Police said today that 15 people had been arrested after a raid on a house in Galle, about 70 miles south of Colombo. Police recovered more than 80 books of forged Saudi airline tickets and passports with forged Saudi Arabian entry visas from the house.

According to the police the airline tickets had been printed in a press in Colombo. More arrests were likely to be made over the weekend, police said.

Stranded

Preliminary investigations revealed the fake airtickets and visas had been given to those seeking jobs in Saudi Arabia for a sum of about \$1,500.

But the clients either got stranded at Colombo airport or at airports in India.

Police said the forged airtickets and visas could never have

been used to board Saudi Arabian Airline flights as they were too crude. "We believe the forgeries enabled the racketeers to fleece their unsuspecting victims, most of whom had never seen an airline ticket before," a senior police official said.

Samples

A spokesman for Saudi Arabian Airlines in Colombo said they were expecting police to give them samples of the forged air tickets and visas together with a full report on the racket for security reasons.

Saudi Arabian Airlines operates from Colombo on a "temporary operating permit" as there is no bilateral air agreement between Colombo and Riyadh.

A team of Saudi government officials is expected to visit Sri Lanka next month to negotiate a bilateral air agreement between the two countries, airline sources said.

/12851
CSO: 4400/67

SAUDI ARABIA

LARGE TIN DEPOSIT FOUND

Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 3 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Patrick Werr: "At Silsilah Exploration: One Million Tons of Ore Found"]

[Text]

JEDDAH, Oct. 2 — Work at the Silsilah tin deposits over the last two and a half years has uncovered a deposit of one million tons of ore at a grade of 0.18 percent tin, according to exploration geologists with the Deputy Ministry for Mineral Resources (DMMR).

However, although these findings and others are "good pointers along the way" toward uncovering economic deposits, the geologists stressed that the ore was not of a sufficient grade or quality to be economic. "They are a good incentive to continue exploring," they said.

DMMR geologists have only been looking seriously for tin — along with tungsten, which is often closely associated with the mineral — in Saudi Arabia for five years. Before then there had been little evidence to suggest that there were important deposits, according to the geologists.

Since then, three main ore bodies have been found. The first was at Baid Al-Jimalah, 150 kms southwest of Buraidah. In 1982 another was found in Bir Al-Tawilah, 50 kms east of Zalim, and in 1983 a third at Jabal Al-Silsilah, 100 kms west of Buraidah.

The mineralization at Silsilah is scattered about a four-square-kilometer area, although the most important is located in several discrete areas. The tin occurs dispersed in highly altered granites. The exploration work done at Silsilah was undertaken mainly in 1984 and early 1985, and included geochemical and geophysical testing, detailed geological mapping, trenching and drilling. The geologists drilled 80 shallow percussion drill holes up to 50 meters deep, concentrating on two main areas.

According to preliminary results, the best area evaluated contained about one million tons of tin-bearing rock at a grade of 0.18 percent, with a small amount of silver and other minerals. In the other areas there were indications of much material, though of a lower grade.

The geologists noted that although there was a lot of surface tin at Silsilah, there was no evidence of any ancient mining, common with gold and copper occurrences throughout the Kingdom.

At Baid Al-Jimalah, drilling has indicated the presence of quartz veins containing mainly tungsten with minor tin. But the mineralization uncovered so far is too widely dispersed to be of economic interest.

At Bir Tawilah, similar quartz veins contain tin, together with tungsten, silver, copper and zinc. Two other prospects in the area contain mainly tungsten. All are small and in themselves would not be economic, although further exploration work is justified, said the geologists, as it is at Baid Al-Jimalah.

During the last year they have identified many areas associated with the mineral. But due partly to world commodity prices and partly to a need for more testing of the occurrences, none as of yet represent economic deposits. Drilling is needed to determine tonnage and grade.

Near Abha and Khamis Mushayt down to the Yemeni border, widespread tungsten mineralization, often associated with tin, has been discovered, but only in minor occurrences.

There is evidence of alluvial tin on the Red Sea coastal plain, especially near

Rabigh. The presence of tin in the sand may indicate undiscovered tin-associated granites either on the surface or below ground, said the geologists.

Studies carried out by the DMMR have led to an understanding of the relationship of tin and tungsten with certain types of granite formed late in the history of the Arabian shield, they added.

The DMMR had stepped up its exploration for tin and tungsten deposits, which is still in a relatively early stage. However, in the last six months there have been severe cutbacks in regional exploration and in the ministry's ability to drill in areas where there have been encouraging results.

Like gold, tin would be relatively easy to mine if economic deposits were found, because it can be concentrated on site. The valuable, concentrated ore is easily transported.

/12851

CSO: 4400/67

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

NGPF ASSISTANT SECRETARY INTERVIEWED

Cairo AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 15 Oct 85 pp 8-10

[Interview with Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, assistant secretary general of the NGPF:
"Violence Is a Barbaric Tool, We Are Not Crusaders Against Communism, We Do
Not Reject Dialogue With the Aden Regime, They Aim To Liberate the Peninsula,
600,000 Yemenis in the Open Air--Why?; time and place not given]

[Text] This newspaper interview was conducted by a journalist colleague who works for the Egyptian newspaper AL-AHALI, one of the opposition newspapers. However, the newspaper's editorial management did not approve its publication. AL-WAHDAH is publishing it in its pages as a careful political interview conducted by a journalist colleague with whom we differ in opinion. He belongs to a particular political operation, and we have an outlook that sometimes does not agree with his.

We are therefore publishing the interview, thanking him for it, without retouching or interfering with it. As our colleague says, "It is a conversation of complete sincerity and patriotism."--the editorial staff of AL-WAHDAH magazine.

"We are striving to open a channel for dialogue between us and Aden, but without begging."

"Because dialogue is the only language of civilization, and because bullets are a logic opposed to words and discourse, thus the future is always the victory of dialogue and the retreat from violence and hope lies in man as a creature of reason, not in man as shooter of bullets. There is where one begins from."

Entering into a long discussion with one of the makers of the revolution, one who at the same time is one of the rebels against the government, is perhaps an operation surrounded with dangers: the clash is violent, the enmity is bloody, and the search for meeting places is like the search for a needle in an endless desert.

However, if we agree on the need for dialogue and for overcoming the dichotomy of bullets and words, there is no avoiding the search for "the needle." It is absolutely necessary.

Hence comes the conversation with Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, assistant secretary general of the National Grouping of Popular Forces [NGPF] in South Yemen, former prime minister, and one of the "sons of Dathinah" who embarked on the epoch-making battle with British imperialism and who took hope as their companion at the dawn of their youth. He is still giving, in spite of having moved from the seats of power to those of opposition, from being a man whom the state protected and whose life it saved, to being a man pursued by the cars of murderers and death squads out to bring back his head at any price.

What did Muhammad 'Ali Haytham say? What are the real points of difference between him and the government in his country? To what extent has the opposition shown sincere intentions toward a national democratic dialogue to save the country and stop the continuous whirlpools of violence?

Here are Muhammad 'Ali Haytham's answers:

[Question] Mr Assistant Secretary General, is it possible for us to define the issues on which dialogue between you and the Aden regime can concentrate? Or is the possibility of dialogue nonexistent, so that disagreement has turned into a breach?

[Answer] The most important of the issues about which we disagreed is the method of operations. When we disagree, it is necessary that we rise to the level of debate, which means rejecting violence as a means of solution and of conflict settlement. The first of these issues was the use of violence against the elements that fought and participated in making the revolution, comrades in arms and builders of independence. I would mention that when I was interior minister, I was surprised to find 3,500 prisoners. I immediately stipulated the formation of a committee to investigate the matter with a view to their release within 3 months. And it was so.

Nevertheless, violence remained the authorized means of conducting the struggle, until the dominant mentality came to operate only through such violence. I objected.

A scientific method is one thing; what it does is something else. I do not condemn violence; I condemn indiscriminateness in its use. The principal conflict at a particular stage in history was with imperialism. Violence was called for.

I confess that we were extreme in violence against imperialism. We showed it no mercy, and it in turn showed us no mercy. Imperialism put us into a closed circle: killer or killed. So there was no escape from violence.

However, things have to be different when we are sitting in the seat of authority. Violence should not be the language among us. Bullets should not be aimed at the hearts of our brothers and countrymen.

So as not to exaggerate, let me ask:

What is the result today?

-- An endless chain of violence, terrorism and murder.

There are more than 600,000 Yemeni citizens unable to return to their country. You would cry if you saw them in North Yemen or in the canyons of Saudi Arabia, out in the open air. They are no longer even able to buy tents!

These are men who used to own their houses, lands and animals. They lost everything and went off to wait for aid from the United Nations and the Catholics, aid that stopped 5 years ago!

-- To say nothing of the hundreds of thousands who were killed inside the country.

(Sadly) What if it had happened in Egypt or in any other Arab country? Would we disagree about condemning or opposing it?

We are not incapable of using violence. Any man can be as violent as the next. We are seeking dialogue, another language--civilized men and not savages!

[Question] But what has the NGPF done to oppose all this violence?

[Answer] I can say that since we began to participate in the opposition to the regime, we have "muzzled" this style of violence. This has been done through the possibility of creating political and national conditions that can help us complete the dialogue and express ourselves in a higher language--and not losing this [possibility].

The NGPF and the Conditions of Rule

[Question] What is the nature of these conditions that the NGPF can create?

[Answer] We do not create conditions. We call for dialogue. It is absurd for this bloody current to continue relying on violence as the only instrument. We say clearly that enough of our countrymen have been lost. We say that violence is not our goal.

[Question] Has the NGPF set any conditions for participation in the present government as a basis for dialogue or meeting?

[Answer] It is difficult for a person to propose conditions before meeting with the other side. When I propose conditions, that does not reflect a sincere intention. It means that I am intent on obstructing, not on dialogue, and that would prove to the other side that we do not desire relations and discussion.

Hence, we have no conditions at all. Rather, we come forward with sincere intent to overcome all the problems that stand between us and the meeting.

[Question] What have you offered to prove good intentions?

[Answer] We have said frankly that all of us are ready to return as citizens, not as sharers in the government. But what guarantee does the other side offer? The wall of trust between us and them has collapsed. If you asked any of the citizens who have been chased out of the country, he would reply to you in the negative.

Patriotism and the Experience of Power

[Question] Does your lack of trust come from your personal knowledge of the elements of the regime? Or does this evaluation come in the light of "the experience of power"?

[Answer] There is no dispute about the patriotism of the present elements and about their love of their country. That, however, was in the past.

Power strips a man and makes him insolent, if he does not examine his conscience and hold to his principles and morals.

We differ with the regime as a "ruling establishment," not as individuals. No one can deprive them of their patriotism. We do not condemn individuals; we condemn particular practices.

[Question] What, then, are the steps that you in the NGPF have taken toward the expected dialogue?

[Answer] In October 1980, we issued a communique in which we expressed our readiness for dialogue. We requested it from the regime in order to spare our people further bloodshed. What we are concerned about fundamentally is the individual Yemeni inside the country. In 1983, we sent out another call. In spite of this, the violent actions continued.

[Question] Mr Assistant Secretary General, are you hostile to socialism?

[Answer] I am against mistaken actions, not against human ideas in general. Marxism is a great human idea. There are more than 1.2 billion people on earth who embrace Marxism and are applying it in their countries. How can we condemn ideas?

[Question] What, then, is the point of difference in regard to the actions of the regime?

[Answer] For example, there is the theory of class struggle. I have studied and know that this theory was only created by various circumstances and conditions in the history of Europe. In Yemen, however, we are a tribal society. We have different circumstances and other conditions. We do not have class contradictions in the scientific sense of the word, nor has a class conflict developed in the European social and political sense of the term. How can we jump over reality and ignore it to such an extent? How can we subject our society to propositions and ideas that do not spring from its history and conditions? Our dispute is with application, not with theory.

Criticism and Frank Answers

[Question] Let me be completely candid with you: What we hold against the opposition is that it has become the protege of the anticommunist front. It has become part of the world propaganda campaign to combat communism, and it no longer distinguishes between communism and the regime it opposes.

[Answer] When we attack the Marxist regime in Aden, that does not mean that we are attacking Marxism or communism in general.

We condemn the application of Marxism in our country. We condemn the Marxists, not Marxism. We are not crusaders against communism!

[Question] What is the real role of the opposition grouping now?

[Answer] That is a very embarrassing question.

[Question] We agreed to be frank.

[Answer] (Smiling) The real role is to restore hope in the souls of those who have been forced out of their homeland--to restore it after their dreams of return have been scattered and they have been overcome by a deadly despair.

The second role is to help these people with food, clothing and tents. The third role is to care for students and provide scholarships for them. But the important role that we strive to perform is to open a channel of dialogue between us and the regime--without begging.

[Question] What moved you to disagree with your comrades in arms, especially on the subject of "exporting revolution"? What did they mean by that?

[Answer] (Smiling) They were aiming to liberate the peninsula!

[Question] Was that the only point of difference?

[Answer] No, there were other causes, such as violence directed at comrades in arms and lack of respect for the law or violation of it.

[Question] Are these reasons sufficient to drive them to try several times to assassinate you?

[Answer] (Laughing) Ask them, my friend!

[Question] Mr Assistant Secretary General, thank you for your frankness.

[Answer] Thank you.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

ACTIVITIES, RESULTS OF PARTY CONGRESS SESSIONS DISCUSSED

Aden AL-RAYAH in Arabic 17 Oct 85 pp 3-4

[Article: "Minutes of Third Yemeni Socialist Party Congress"]

[Text] The Third Congress, which convened last Friday, held five working sessions during which a number of important charters were ratified, including the political report that the party's secretary general submitted on party activity in the various activities undertaken between the Second and Third Congresses. The congress also ratified the major directions of the Third (1986-90) 5-year Plan for economic and social development and the report of the party's Central Audit Committee. The minutes included several discussions of the political report and the major directions of the plan, in addition to the party's Central Audit Committee. The congress also received a torrent of congratulatory telegrams and greetings from the various Arab and international revolutionary movement groups and from popular and creative organizations.

Opening Session

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, amid warm applause by 426 conferees who came from the various governorates, the armed forces, and the party's organizations abroad, announced in a resolute and firm voice the opening of the congress in the name of the revolution and the party under the great motto "let us struggle for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, for the implementation of the 5-year plan, and for the achievement of Yemeni unity."

There was warm applause when Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad took the main podium where the Preparatory Committee was seated to deliver a speech warmly welcoming the party's representatives who came from the governorates, the armed forces, and the party organizations abroad as well as friendly and brotherly delegations which participated in the congress. He also welcomed the participation of Dr George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad asked the conferees to stand for a minute of silence in honor of the martyrs of the Yemeni revolution who shed their pure blood on every hill and mountain and sacrificed their lives at the alter of freedom for the triumph of the revolution's goals and for the cause of the leading Yemeni Socialist Party.

In his important speech, Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad spelled out the allegations and losing bets of the revolution's enemies, emphasizing that "the enemy bet on the failure of this experience and used to bet on many other things, but we have foiled all their bets, one after the other. Here we are, convening our congress at the scheduled time, proving once again that our party and our people are stronger than all conspiracies."

The secretary general expressed his warm and highly appreciative greetings to all the comrades who, through their creative work and various activities and abilities, contributed to the success of the intellectual, political, and organizational preparation for the party's Third Congress.

The secretary general expressed special thanks and appreciation to the families of the revolution's martyrs and party fighters who gave their lives for the triumph of the party's cause and the cause of the Yemeni revolution. He also singled out the laborers, the farm workers, the cooperative farmers, and all the country's toiling masses who met the congress with magnificent work in the production field for warm greetings and great appreciation.

He expressed deep-felt thanks to the educated class of journalists, mass media personnel, and employees of the cultural, fine arts, and literary fields as well as to the ideological front fighters, who devoted all their creativity to meet the congress in a fashion, the secretary general said, befitting the party's status as a leader, an inspirer, and a guiding force for the people in the revolutionary process.

Furthermore, Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad expressed warm greetings and great appreciation to the officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the armed forces, the state security forces, the popular police, and the popular militia who protect the country, defend its sovereignty with courage and honor, and safeguard the people's security and stability.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad expressed similar greetings to students and to our mothers and our homemakers who provide the right atmosphere for their husbands, brothers, and sons to carry on their revolutionary tasks and national duties in the various fields of work. He also included our strategic allies and class brothers in the Arab and international revolutionary movement, in the forefront of which is the Soviet Communist Party.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad described the party's Third Congress as an outstanding historic event in the lives of the people and a true demonstration that our party is continually changing into a real political force for all the people.

He reiterated his confidence that the people will continue to support and rally around the party, saying: "The masses cannot relinquish the gains they have realized and will defend with all their might their accomplishments and financial gains as well as their security and national aspirations."

He explained that since the convocation of the Second Emergency Congress 5 years ago, our country has witnessed significant progressive changes which no one can ignore.

He added: "Our great aspirations can become a reality when, through practical action, we direct all our activities and devote all our efforts to their realization based on the party's platform, charters, and resolutions and the activities of its leading organizations without skipping any phases or overstepping the rules and regulations of historical development."

In an awe-inspiring procession, the representatives of the Yemeni Vanguard Organization entered the conference hall carrying roses, banners, and important slogans. They spread out in an orderly manner and one group offered the roses to the secretary general and members of the Preparatory Committee and then sang some meaningful vanguard songs.

Following the opening address, the conferees unanimously approved the agenda and then elected the conference's chairmanship, which was composed of the members of the conference's Preparatory Committee. The following comrades were also elected as members of the conference's Secretariat:

1. 'Ali Sa'id Muthanna
2. Riyad al-'Akbari
3. Salim Bikayr
4. Faruq 'Ali Ahmad

The following were elected to the Information Committee:

1. Salim Salih Muhammad
2. Zaki Barakat
3. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qawi
4. 'Abd-al-Razzaq Sha'if
5. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman Bishir

The Appeals Committee was elected as follows:

1. Mutallaq 'Abdallah
2. 'Abdallah Ahmad Ghanim
3. Muhammad Salim al-Tawi
4. Sayf Munsir
5. Ahmad 'Awad al-Mahruq
6. Muhammad 'Ali Bamuslim
7. Sa'd Salim Faraj
8. Muhammad Sa'id 'Abd-al-Karim
9. Salih 'Ubayd

The conference voted on the Secretariat and the Information and Appeals Committees originating from the conference and the opening session was adjourned. The conference reconvened Saturday morning.

Second Session

At the beginning of the session which Comrade Staff Col 'Ali Ahmad Nasir Antar, politburo member and deputy chairman of the Supreme People's Council, opened in the name of the revolution and the Yemeni Socialist Party under the

great motto of our party's Third Conference--"Let us struggle for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, for the implementation of the 5-year plan, and for the achievement of Yemeni unity"--'Ali Nasir Muhammad read the political report of the Central Committee, which included the party's activities between the two conferences in various economic, political, social, and cultural fields and our party's activities on the level of the Yemeni national cause and its relations on the Arab and international levels.

The secretary general presented in this session the first chapter of the report dealing with the consolidation of the party's unity and the strengthening of its leadership role as the central link for the development of the revolutionary process in our country and the second chapter dealing with the intensification of ideological action as one of the party's principal tasks.

In its political report the Central Committee described the conference as a new step and a qualitative addition to the revolutionary struggle of our party and our people that will become the staging ground for the broader development of the revolutionary process in our country on its way to accomplishing the national revolutionary tasks with their socialist horizons.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad affirmed in the Central Committee report that the conference was convening after 5 years of fruitful and creative efforts which have enabled us to continue our struggle with determination in defense of our national sovereignty and progressive accomplishments based on our ideological and political choices under the banner of scientific socialism and the proletarian international. These choices have been actively embodied in the party's program and bylaws and in the resolutions of its leading bodies as well as in the revolutionary pursuits of the party's members, the cadres, and various bodies in our revolutionary course around which the toiling masses have rallied and which enjoys the support of our people and the backing and appreciation of the international revolutionary movement detachments.

He emphasized that the past years were full of giving and sacrifices and witnessed the establishment and intensification of democratic Yemen's socialist orientation through the regeneration of political, economic, social, and cultural changes. He pointed out that society's social and class structure has witnessed important developments which have allowed the influence of the working class and its allies to grow and expand while the spiritual life has been marked by a measure of revival owing to the expansion and intensification of the influence of the working class' scientific ideology coupled with the growth of the country's defense capabilities and the consolidation of the citizens' security and stability.

The political report touched on cooperation and coordination with the northern region of the homeland, emphasizing its positive effect in resisting the imperialist and reactionary forces which are constantly trying to bring about tension and fighting between the two regions of the country. --

He stressed the necessity for more caution and vigilance toward the machinations of the forces opposed to our people's unity and progress.

Concerning the policy of peaceful coexistence under our regional circumstances, he mentioned that we have been able to practice it in a way that ensures our country's security and ability to provide the proper conditions for building a new peaceful life for us, saying that this policy cannot be separated from the pursuit of solidarity with the struggle of our Arab peoples for the sake of liberation, democracy, and social progress, side by side with the forces of progress, peace and socialism in the world.

Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad presented a comprehensive analytical review based on the conclusions drawn from and the experiences of revolutionary construction. He identified the weak points and suggested ways to overcome them.

Third Session

The conference convened its third session yesterday evening at 7 pm to resume reading the Central Committee's report submitted by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. The conferees heard Chapters 3-7 which talked about the party's efforts to improve the standard of living of the toiling masses as the principal objective of the party's economic policy and to modernize the social structure in order to consolidate democratic relations and protect constitutional legitimacy in an effort to reinforce the government's democratic content and relations between the two parts of the country as well as the party's struggle for the sake of unity on sound democratic grounds. The report also talked about measures to defend peace and realize international relaxation and to foil the imperialist and Zionist attack on our Arab people as principal party tasks.

During this session, the secretary general finished reading the Central Committee's report and a number of good-will cables and messages sent to the conference by a number of friendly and fraternal parties were read. The conferees listened to good-will telegrams and messages from the Bulgarian CP, the German Socialist Unity Party, the Cuban CP, the Czechoslovakian CP, the Polish United Workers Party, and the Vietnamese CP as well as a message of good wishes from the Central Committee of the Sudanese CP.

Comrade Abu Bakr Badib, politburo member, secretary of the Central Committee, and member of the conference's chairmanship, who directed the third session of the conference, announced the arrival of a number of good-will messages from the Lebanese Action Organization, the Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, and the General Federation of Palestinian Journalists and Writers.

The conference also received greetings from the General Federation of Labor Unions, the National Command of the Popular Defense Committees Organization, the Yemeni Writers Federation, the Yemeni Democratic Journalists Organization, Yemeni Socialist Party organizations abroad, the Yemeni Democratic Engineers Association, the Yemeni Democratic Bar Association, the Petroleum Exploration Department, the Yemeni Doctors and Pharmacists Federation, the Yemeni Farmers Union, and the Yemeni Women's Federation.

The Third Congress of the Yemeni Socialist Party began its second session yesterday morning at 10 am under the chairmanship of Comrade 'Ali Nasir

Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, president of the Supreme People's Council, and conference chairman.

Moreover, a number of good-will messages were read in the conference, including a telegram the conference received from the Central Committee of the Soviet CP praising the great accomplishments that our Yemeni people have realized in consolidating national independence and in building the country, in setting up an economy which can grow on the basis of planning, and in dealing with important social issues. It also praised the party's growing role in the country's economic, social, and political life.

Fourth Session

The Third Session of the Yemeni Socialist Party reconvened yesterday morning by holding its fourth session under the chairmanship of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party's Central Committee, president of the Supreme People's Council, and conference chairman. At the beginning of the session, Engr Abu Bakr al-'Attas, Politburo member and prime minister, announced in the name of the revolution and of the Yemeni Socialist Party, under the great motto "let us struggle for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, for the implementation of the 5-year plan, and for the achievement of Yemeni unity," the opening of the fourth session during which the conferees heard discussions and presentations about the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee's report to the Third Congress.

Presentation About the Party's Leading Role and Struggle for the Sake of Its Unity:

Comrade 'Abdallah Nasir Rashid, party secretary in Shabwah Governorate, delivered a presentation on the party's leading role and the struggle for its unity.

Presentation About the Party's Social and Economic Policy:

Comrade Dr Yasin Sa'id Na'man, Central Committee member, deputy prime minister, and minister of fish resources, delivered a presentation on the Central Committee's report entitled "The Party's Social and Economic Policy."

Presentation on Reinforcing the Country's Defense Capabilities:

Comrade Col 'Abdallah 'Ali 'Ulaywah, deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff, delivered a presentation on the political report entitled "On Reinforcing the Country's Defense Capabilities."

Presentation on the National Cause:

This presentation about our national cause and the struggle for Yemeni unity, which was delivered by Comrade Mahmud 'Abdallah 'Ashish, minister of state for unity affairs, dealt with the importance of reunifying the Yemeni homeland.

Ratification of Political Report

Following the presentation, the speeches, and the general report, Comrade Engr Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas made a motion to end discussion about the general report. The motion was seconded unanimously and the conferees thereafter listened to the concluding speech about the report delivered by Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in which he praised the presentations presented by the conference representatives from party organizations in the governorates and the armed forces during which they debated the highlights of the political report. He explained that the presentations underscored the political line and the practical activity of our party's Central Committee during the past 5 years. Moreover, the future horizons outlined in the report were unanimously approved and this gives us a feeling of pride and deep satisfaction.

The secretary general affirmed that the presentations were marked by a spirit of criticism of some aspects of our activity during the past period, explaining that this had a deep significance not only in our party life but also in the courage to identify and uncover shortcomings and propose solutions and safe remedies for them.

He pointed out that the accomplishments in the past phase could not have been realized without collective action by party agencies and without the united efforts of the party organizations in the governorates and the armed forces coupled with party unity with the toiling masses and their democratic organizations. He added that the results of our action were the fruit of collective efforts by both our party and our people.

He alluded to the role played by the international support our party and our people received from our allies and friends in the international revolutionary movement and specifically in the socialist countries led by the USSR.

The secretary general concluded his speech, saying: "Creative action awaits us and we must unite our forces and prove, as we have always done, so that we are worthy of our party's confidence, of the wide support our party has received from the people, and of the vanguard role we have taken upon ourselves in leading progressive change and building the new Yemeni society."

Upon listening to the concluding speech, the conferees ratified the political report unanimously and Comrade Haydar al-'Attas read the conference's resolution of ratification.

Discussion and Ratification of 1986-90 5-year Plan

In the fourth session, the conferees listened to the main orientation of the Third 5-year Plan for economic and social development for 1986-90 by Comrade Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, politburo member and prime minister. They also listened to a presentation about the main orientation of the Third 5-year Plan presented by Comrade Sayf Munsir.

Following the presentation, Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad made a motion to approve this orientation and they were ratified unanimously.

Concluding Speech About Main Orientation of Third 5-year Plan

Comrade Engr Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas delivered the concluding speech in which he saluted the presentations on the plan's main orientation, explaining that it reflected our party's concern with economic and social issues as well as support and development of the successes achieved in the course of implementing the last 5-year plan.

He expressed satisfaction with the enlightened support for the main orientation of the Third 5-year Development Plan, emphasizing that the next stage will witness creative action and widespread solidarity among all party members and party leading agencies in all party organizations in the governorates and the work place for the sake of implementing the Third 5-year Plan for economic and social development as the second program of our Yemeni Socialist Party during the next 5 years.

Engr Haydar al-'Attas said that we will all take firm and confident steps in a collective spirit to employ all energies and capabilities in order to reach the plan's goals and to accomplish its missions represented primarily in the achievement of new growth rates in the various economic sectors, raising the productive efficiency of economic structures and existing production units and achieving more overall planned improvements in the toiling masses' standard of material and spiritual living.

He expressed confidence in achieving more successes owing to the deep-rooted unity between the party and the people, guided by our party's charters outlining our initial choices on the road to completing the tasks of the national revolution's democratic phase.

Moreover, the conference unanimously ratified the draft of the main orientation of the Third 5-year Plan for economic and social development for 1986-90. The resolution stated the following:

The Third General Conference of the Yemeni Socialist Party ratified the draft of the main orientation of the Third 1986-90 5-year Plan. The elected Central Committee is charged with examining and reviewing the indicators when discussing the draft of the Third 1986-90 5-year Plan in the December 1985 session for final approval.

Good-will Messages

The conference listened during the fourth session to a number of good-will messages sent it by the Supreme Committee for Popular Oversight, the Federation of International Democratic Youth, the Norwegian CP, the Spanish CP, the Yemeni Democratic Artists Union, Yemeni Communists in India, Kuwait, and Britain, the Progressive Arab Student Organizations in Czechoslovakia, the Council of Arab Teachers Organizations in Democratic Yemen, the Yemeni Pilots Society, the Egyptian CP, and the soldiers, NCO's, and officers of the popular police. The American CP also sent a good-will telegram.

The conference also received a cable of congratulations from the Central Committee of the Chinese CP. It also received similar cables from the Laotian Revolutionary Popular Party, the British CP, and the foreign students organizations. A cable from the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Labor Party was read to the conference. It affirmed the Hungarian Communists' supreme appreciation of the long-term economic, social, and political changes which have occurred in our country under the leadership of the Yemeni Socialist Party.

The cable from the Hungarian Communists wished the conference success.

The conference also heard the cable from the National Command of the Syrian Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, confirming that the Ba'th Party fighters are satisfied with every success achieved by the party and the people in democratic Yemen under the leadership of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad.

It indicated that the Syrian and Yemeni revolutions are the fulcrum of an Arab liberational struggle which brings us together in the whole Arab world.

Fifth Session

In the session which convened at 8 pm, the conference considered and approved the report of the Audit Committee. The report was read by Comrade Sa'id Salim al-Khaybah, chairman of the Yemeni Socialist Party's Central Audit Committee.

According to the conference report, the conference will resume its work tomorrow morning, Tuesday, to complete its agenda to allow party and government leaders and conference representatives to celebrate with our people the 22d anniversary of the glories of the 14 October revolution.

Sixth Session

In a climate of party enthusiasm and popular thrust, and under the motto "let us fight for the defense of the Yemeni revolution, the implementation of the 5-year plan, and the realization of Yemeni unity," the conference will conclude its work this morning by holding a final opening session under the chairmanship of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, president of the Supreme People's Council, and conference chairman.

The conference will issue its final communique on its work, resolutions, recommendations, and the outcome of the party's Central Committee and Central Audit Committee elections.

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AFGHANISTAN

RESISTANCE COMMANDER ANALYZES 'STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS' OF WAR

Kuala Lumpur ASIAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Oct 85 pp 104-110

[Article by Abdul Rashid]

[Text]

The peoples of the Free World have the gratitude of the Afghan people for their support of our cause of national liberation. I hope that, by explaining the situation in Afghanistan as many thoughtful mujahideen commanders see it today, I will be able to help them strengthen this support and, through us, to help the rest of humanity in our common struggle against the most barbaric of modern imperialist forces.

It is not our battle alone. Indeed, it is that rare event: a war of virtue against evil, of the defence of natural liberties. Therefore, it is the battle of the entire Free World.

By explaining our situation, I hope to clarify the basis of our belief that the Soviet Union, with all its military might, can still be beaten — as all other evil empires have been defeated by freedom-loving peoples. It is our fundamental belief that the Soviet Union has reached a climax in its policies — a zenith whence it must descend.

THE INVASION AS A STRATEGIC SOVIET MISTAKE

The ultimate weapon in the defeat of the Soviet Union will be religion. Military force can halt Soviet expansion, but it is the impact of religion that will bring about the dissolution of the Soviet empire. In this great conflict, the adherents of Christianity and Islam — and, indeed, of all of the world's great religions — can work together.

The process of unravelling the Soviet empire can begin in Afghanistan. The Russians committed a fundamental mistake in invading Afghanistan. The invasion undermined the Soviet strategy of attacking the Free World through proxies and through the cultivation of hatred toward the West. Their strategy for many years has featured the indirect approach, but that strategy has been — and continues to be — negated by the invasion of Afghanistan and by the ongoing war against the Afghan people.


The military intervention in Afghanistan has damaged the image and interests of the Soviet Union throughout the Third World. In Afghanistan the Soviets have exposed their uniformed troops in a war against a poor Third World country which had had no imperialist infrastructure to speak of — which, indeed,

was noted for its independence throughout the era of colonial imperialism. And there was no apparent danger to the Soviet Union from these poorly clad, illfed, uneducated and otherwise deprived masses.¹ Afghanistan was a friendly neighbour. Thus, by invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has earned the potential enmity of most of the Third World nations, and has created apprehension among them which in every way acts against Moscow's policies and objectives.²

I can speak from personal experience of the lost Soviet opportunity to exploit the anti-American feelings that exist among many Muslim youths. The Soviet Union has exploited anti-Americanism effectively for many years and in many parts of the world. But since December 1979 it has forfeited this opportunity by presenting an anti-Muslim and anti-humanitarian — in fact, a barbarian — posture to the world in the Muslim nation of Afghanistan.³

The policy mistake that was thus committed by Moscow is a grave one. The Islamic nations are strategically important to the Soviet Union and, in some respects, are ripe for exploitation by Moscow. After what has transpired in the past five years, however, the Soviets cannot take full advantage of the opportunities in the Muslim world. On the contrary, they have exposed a vulnerability in themselves that the Free World can exploit in bringing about a fatal weakening of the very foundations of the Soviet power base.

The Free World clearly has the resources to defeat the Soviet Union in this indirect way, if it will but use them. What is needed is the will to win and a strategy for victory. Even before that, the Free World must regain its understanding of the fact



▲ Following their invasion of Afghanistan at 2300 hrs on December 24, 1979 the Soviets established garrisons in all the major Afghan cities in an attempt to prop up the regime of the much-reviled Babrak Karmal.

that the Soviet Union is its mortal enemy. I am afraid that the democracies sometimes lose sight of this fact, and come to believe that they can preserve their security through persuasive diplomacy.

By invading Afghanistan, the Soviets forfeited — at least temporarily — opportunities elsewhere in this and other regions. As just one example, take the Iran-Iraq conflict. Had it not been for the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets could have easily and quickly won over Iran following the fall of the Shah — and Iran is more important to Soviet strategy than is Afghanistan. True, the Soviets now have bases in Afghanistan that are 500 miles closer to the Persian Gulf than those in the USSR. Yet, when it undertook the invasion, Moscow already commanded bases in Ethiopia and the two Yemens. In any case, moreover, if they want to cut off oil supplies through the Gulf, the Soviets can accomplish this more easily, and at lesser risk, by creating instability in the Gulf and other Arab nations through exploiting the antagonism of the intelligentsia against the ruling families instead of taking military actions. In short, their gain in Afghanistan was not essential to their long-range strategy for expansion in the region.

SOVIET CALCULATIONS

If it was such a large mistake for the Soviet Union to involve Afghanistan, why did they do it? I believe that the Russians knew, when they decided on the invasion, that it would be a costly move. They expected resistance, which is why they used such a massive number of their own troops in a surprise attack. But they were taking a calculated risk, not a reckless gamble. For they were certain to lose in Afghanistan if they did nothing,⁴ and they weighed that certain loss against possible setbacks in the Third World that might result from their invasion. In these calculations, I believe, they wagered that the political damage to their policy for the Third World would be only temporary, and that the costs would be great and lasting only if the Free World chose fully to exploit the invasion. Thus far, the Free World has not done so: while, as I have noted, Soviet political losses have been substantial, from Moscow's vantagepoint they have not necessarily been inordinate, nor have the economic and military costs been excessive.

The communist regime that had been installed in Kabul in April 1978 came under threat at a bad time for the Soviets, because they had not prepared the Afghan population for a direct Soviet involvement. At the same time, they obviously felt that they had little choice but to invade, for the following reasons:

- The Brezhnev Doctrine might have been shown to be invalid if they had waited even a short time longer, because the communist regime in Kabul was about to be overthrown.
- Had this overthrow occurred, the Soviet Union — and communism as an ideology — would have lost prestige and been weakened politically throughout the Muslim world.⁵
- The overthrow of the communist regime in Afghanistan could have given new inspiration to the Muslim population

in Central Asia, which has not yet been fully subdued under the Russian yoke.

- A newly free Afghanistan, previously a neutral buffer-state, could have become — thanks to its experience with communism in 1978-1979 — a frontline state against the Soviet Union, possibly to be exploited by the United States and other powers.
- The overthrow of the communist regime in Afghanistan could have encouraged dissident populations in Poland and other countries under communist control to rebel against the Soviet Union.

For these reasons, the overthrow of the Afghan communist regime would have meant not just a regional loss for Moscow; but one of larger dimensions. The Soviet stakes in Afghanistan were much higher than American stakes had been in Vietnam. Afghanistan shares a border with the Soviet Union, whereas Vietnam was far from the United States. Afghanistan shares a cultural and religious identity with Soviet Central Asia, which Vietnam did not with the United States. And finally, the loss of Afghanistan would have represented a direct defeat to communism and could have increased instability in adjacent Soviet Central Asia — which both Brezhnev and Gromyko subsequently referred to as the “soft underbelly” of the USSR.

Moreover, against the costs of invading Afghanistan, the Soviets have gained certain benefits:

- The Soviet rescue of a communist regime increased the confidence of other communist and socialist regimes, particularly those of Libya, Nicaragua and Ethiopia, in the Soviet Union as an ally.
- To some degree, the Soviets have been able to hold off the rising wave of Islam inside the USSR by demonstrating to Central Asians that the government can react, and that religious insurgency has no future in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan had always been a buffer state hedging the Russian empire's border; now Moscow hopes to use it also as a barrier keeping the surge of Islam away from Soviet Central Asia.
- Through their intervention, the Soviets have succeeded — at least temporarily — in preserving the Brezhnev Doctrine.

SOVIET PROSPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN

If, in the next year or two, the Soviet Union should be successful in overcoming the Afghan Resistance and maintaining a pro-Soviet communist regime of one sort or another, it will be helped strategically in every sense. If, on the other hand, it cannot crush the Resistance, the war in Afghanistan will increasingly turn ideological, becoming a war of religion against anti-religious communism. Because communism is losing its appeal, the Soviets will lose this ideological war. Therefore, Afghanistan may become a turning point in history, leading to the ultimate defeat of communism.

The logic behind this projection is as follows. The Soviet form of communism is more suitable for a traditional proletariat. Yet, in modern, technological societies, the proletariat is giving way to middle-class, white-collar workers. The middle class demands from the nation's resources a higher standard of

living. Communist governments cannot meet these demands; this is evidenced even in the Soviet Union itself, where Western culture is making inroads and leading to expectations that cannot be met. The long lines before Soviet shops that carry Western goods are proof of those inroads.

Partly for those reasons, the international Soviet appeal now is pitched more and more to nationalism, which they can subsequently exploit, rather than to communist ideology, in order to attract intellectuals who are predominantly in the middle class. In effect, the Soviets are endeavoring to create a nationalist-communist proletariat.

Ultimately, the appeal to nationalism carries with it dangers for the Soviet Union itself, for no amount of propaganda can make the Soviet Union itself into a unified nation. So, Moscow must try to insulate the various nationalities within the borders of the USSR from the potentially divisive effects of nationalism while it exploits nationalist sentiment in other countries: Andropov was explicit about this.

Thus, the Soviet Union faces a sharp dilemma. As the conflict in Afghanistan turns toward ideology, the Soviets become losers, because communism is a loser. On the other hand, if the Soviets try to avoid defeat in the ideological contest by appealing to Afghan nationalism, they risk a spillover into Soviet Central Asia which could loosen the central bond holding the Soviet Union together — communism. As this bond is loosened, nationalist forces within the Soviet Union will begin to compete with the military for resources. As such internal demands increase, the Soviet Union will be less able to invest resources in its military machine and in external military adventures.

The Soviets already are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the West in technology and economic vigour. Should they, in addition, lose their ability to withhold wealth from their population, they face certain defeat in their battle against the Free World in the long term.

STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET UNION

In Clausewitz's theory of war, the first offensive should be launched at the enemy's weakest link. As has been emphasized, in the case of the Soviet Union this weakest link is ideology. If the Soviet Government can be forced to appeal to nationalism, with its inherent middle-class values and demands, it will be unable, for the reasons that have been outlined, to compete with Western technology and economic resources.

One means to force the Soviets to lean harder on nationalism is to heighten their concern that the forces of religion are growing stronger, threatening the bonds of communism. This process can be begun in Soviet Central Asia by mujahideen who can cross into the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, stimulating the forces of Islam within the Soviet population.

It should be noted in this context that the invasion of Afghanistan was completely counter to the Soviet strategy of indirect involvement, for the following reasons:

1. Instead of proxies, Soviet troops were used.
2. Instead of attempting to win the hearts of the population through indirectly aiding the intelligentsia, uniformed troops

were used in direct suppression — an act of enmity that fans nationalism.⁶

3. Conditions in Afghanistan were unsuitable for Soviet-style communism. There is no substantial working class in the country, and most of the population is peasantry. The Chinese model of communism was more suitable to Afghanistan — as the Russians knew only too well. In fact, one of the spurs for the invasion was the knowledge by the Soviets that, if the Free World did not exploit the situation of an overthrow of a Soviet backed regime in Kabul, the Afghan political group most likely to take advantage of it would be oriented to China.


Having acted contrary to their established precepts, the Soviets are vulnerable to a strategy consisting of three basic phases:

- Phase One: Hold the line against communist attempts at success anywhere in the world, achieving at least a stalemate. This will remove from communism and crypto-communist movements their image as the “wave of the future” — particularly among the youth of the world. Nobody wants to be with a loser.
- Phase Two: A stalemate will gain time and lead to demoralization in the communist camp. Time is required for the development of the preparatory phase of the ideological offensive. In this phase, religious and other ideological forces should be given a chance to take their toll of communist ideology. That means that the educated classes everywhere should be helped — acknowledged, given status and brought into the political process. Financially, this calls for only a limited investment, but it will create a stable anti-communist base. Intellectuals need only modest economic help, but their psychological needs for prestige and influence are enormous. If thwarted in this by Free World forces, they will turn to those who woo them — the communists.
- Phase Three: Having achieved a stalemate and an ideological base, the Free World should encourage religious values and fervour among the intellectual classes in areas around the entire periphery of the Soviet Union (and around its satellites, wherever they may be). The involvement of a genuine intellectual class (as differentiated by the half-educated and ambitious) will moderate extremist religious tendencies. The potential of such developments can be seen in events in Poland and Afghanistan in recent years. This process needs to be consciously supported and aided on a global scale.

STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN

The Soviets have taken a methodical approach in Afghanistan, but time is becoming a heavy burden for them. The Soviet political and Sovietization programmes are proving ineffective in the face of the mujahideen counter-campaign, with its religious and ideological content. The stalemate in Afghanistan, as I have noted, is preventing the Soviets from exploiting the forces of Muslim youth, especially in the Middle East. The Russians are growing increasingly frustrated and impatient for immediate results, as their announcements indicate. Thus, in

January and February 1984 statements were made by the Soviets to the effect that the insurgency would be defeated by the end of the year. Babrak Karmal, head of the puppet government in Kabul, has issued similar assertions.



Soviet efforts to entice India, their air incursions into Pakistan, the warnings to Pakistan by the Soviets and the Afghan regime — all these indicate Moscow's desire to conclude the war soon. This is understandable, since all demographic, statistical and ideological analyses indicate that the war — in its broad geopolitical implications — is going against them.

The Soviets, however, will not pull back and lose face. Instead, they will use India in order to pressure Pakistan into accepting a negotiated settlement. This would provide the Soviets with a face-saving solution while preserving their military position. The Soviets can win through purely military means only at the high cost of incurring the complete hatred of all Muslims — which is against all Soviet strategic interests. Therefore, they must win instead through a combination of diplomatic and military measures.

The nations of the Free World should not give the Soviet Union an opening for the face-saving solution they seek.⁷ Instead, they should play for time, in line with the basic phases suggested above. When the Soviet Union has been sufficiently weakened, a coordinated counter-effort should be launched. Such a strategy requires the following:

- Increasing the effectiveness of the Afghan mujahideen.
- Decreasing the immediate dependence of the mujahideen on outside sources for supplies by developing small ammunition producing units inside Afghanistan. This will also shorten logistic lines.
- Increasing Western support for Pakistan, to help it resist Soviet pressures (to be discussed below).
- Organizing the mujahideen so as to increase their combat and political effectiveness, creating a form of unity by reducing

economic disparities and diversity of logistic lines among different parties. At present, economic aid from a variety of sources is distributed via a number of separate channels, encouraging disunity and competition among the mujahideen forces for the limited resources.

- Countering the enormous Soviet efforts to bribe the Afghan population — with cash, food, weapons or other incentives — into support of a Soviet puppet regime or at least neutrality between the regime and the Resistance.
- Organizing the vehicles for a propaganda offensive based on religious, ethnic, cultural and nationalistic appeals to the Soviet population and launched from Europe as well as Afghanistan.

Parts of the above strategy are already being executed, but the execution is piecemeal and uncoordinated. Moreover, on the psychological warfare front, there seems to be uncertainty as to whether the emphasis should be on nationalism or on religion. It seems fair to say that those who are executing the strategy, not being directly involved in the Afghan war and not having faced Russians in battle or commanded mujahideen troops, do not understand the intricacies of the Afghan battlefield. Thus, for example, regular army training for mujahideen is beneficial in some circumstances, but it becomes a hindrance for executing a type of combat which the conventional military mind cannot really comprehend.

SOVIET PRESSURES ON PAKISTAN

At the present juncture, several basic options are available to the Soviets in resolving their predicament in Afghanistan. The first and obvious option is to apply political-military pressure on Pakistan in order to halt that country's support for the Afghan Resistance. If the Pakistani sanctuary and assistance were denied to the mujahideen, the Afghan Resistance would be destroyed within a short time (10 to 15 days) because of the present lack of alternative logistic sources and lines into Afghanistan.

To stand up to such pressure, President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan will have to rely on support from the United States and China. He will rely on Chinese promises but not on American ones⁸ — even though he will accept American economic and military support. If he has assurances from both China and the United States that they will support Pakistan in the event of all-out war with both India and the USSR, President Zia will not cave in to the Soviets.

Yet, in order for Zia to stand firm in the face of such pressure, Pakistan needs a military posture of her own to defend against an attack by India alone — an attack waged with Soviet complicity but without the active involvement of Soviet troops. For this, Pakistan requires more mobile weapons, so that its borders can be defended at less expense than with the present arsenal of immobile weapons, which increase the defence burden and manpower requirements for Pakistan without increasing the combat effectiveness of Pakistan's forces.

A second and related alternative for the Soviets is to undermine the Zia regime by creating an insurgency in Pakistan. In-

deed, the Soviets may try this course during the election period in Pakistan in the next several months. They have the elements available in the form of Pakistani dissidents (some of them based in Afghanistan) and of weapons already smuggled into and stockpiled in Pakistan.⁹

MOSCOW'S OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

In Afghanistan itself, a Soviet option is to set up a "coalition" puppet government with mujahideen members. The successful enticement of recognized mujahideen leaders into such a government could cause the collapse of the Resistance. The Russians have already sent letters to leaders of many groups, proposing that they join a "nationalist coalition" government.¹⁰

Our greatest fear now is that some individual or group will agree to negotiate with the Soviets on behalf of the Afghan people. The world has seen many times — in Vietnam and Central America, and Yalta and Helsinki, for example — how the communists can and do make temporary, tactical concessions in order to gain a strategic victory. Many mujahideen commanders are politically unsophisticated, and some of the Afghan party leaders living in Pakistan are either naive or self-seeking. Either of these categories could produce individuals willing to negotiate with the Soviets in order to gain leadership of a "nationalist" government.¹¹

One way to defeat this option is to guard against excessive popularity for individual Resistance figures. The glorification of individuals is especially dangerous because Afghans are unsophisticated and, in pursuit of nationalism, are susceptible to manipulation by the Soviets. This is where religion comes in: efforts must be made to build a national platform upon a religious emphasis in order to guard against the Soviet manipulation of nationalism as a purely secular and thus divisive element.

PROSPECTS IN IRAN

There is another option open to the Soviets, which relates indirectly to the situation in Afghanistan but is strongly tied to developments there: namely, the option of effecting a communist takeover in Iran. The military stalemate in the war between Iran and Iraq is sapping the spirit of Iranians. Today the Iranian youth by and large is still with Khomeini because of nationalist and religious fervour. Yet, religious fervour is cooling, and the loss of the war with Iraq will both weaken the drive of nationalism and turn it against Khomeini. The appeal of the left is growing stronger, especially among the youth. Bahais, Kurds, Baluchis and the Mujahideen-I-Khalq movement already are opposing Khomeini — and only the left can provide leadership to the anti-Khomeini forces.

Under these conditions, in a year or two the Soviet Union could bring communists to power in Iran, uniting dissident forces under the banner of "nationalism." The Soviets would avoid direct involvement, but could use covert action to promote their interests. Indeed, the effect on Iran of a stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war is the main reason why the Soviets have been providing abundant arms to Iraq.

PAKISTAN'S MILITARY PREDICAMENT

The first Soviet option that has been noted above — to place political and military pressure on Pakistan — is already in motion. Pakistan today faces the buildup of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and allied Indian military deployments along Pakistan's eastern border. The combination of these forces now make it possible to defeat Pakistan militarily within hours. Even if this option is never exercised, its existence serves to reduce Zia's political and military options and to push him toward accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Pakistani forces total only 20 divisions. On Pakistan's northern border alone, 11 or more Soviet divisions are available in Afghanistan for attack, including one tank division and more than one airborne division. In addition, the Afghan army has 18 divisions (under Soviet command), even though at depleted strength. On its eastern border, India commands 42 divisions, 25 of which can be deployed against Pakistan. Of Pakistan's 20 divisions, 12 must be designated for the defence of the border with India. This leaves only 8 for defending the border with Afghanistan — with no reserve forces available. If those 8 divisions are deployed along threatened axes (Peshawar, Parachinar, Wana, Khost and almost all of Baluchistan), Pakistani forces along a frontier extending 1,200 — 1,400 rugged miles will be so thinly deployed that any motorized attack at any point will be successful. No warning of the exact point of penetration of a Soviet/Afghan mechanized attack is possible for Pakistan; the only suitable defence would be the rapid redeployment of mechanized reserves — which Pakistan does not have.

Therefore, the Soviets are capable of penetrating Pakistan at many different points. The Soviets face some potential bottlenecks at Chaman, Wana and Landi Kotal, but these could be overcome quickly by Russian helicopter forces, which can act as advance columns to occupy them while the mechanized divisions, in two-to-three division strength, can assault Quetta, Peshawar or Dera Ismail Khan in less than 12 hours. With these locations in Russian hands, the further development of the attack on the plains can be a sweeping move conducted by Afghan forces — always under Soviet command — or by remaining Russian divisions. They can strike at Islamabad along the Indus River: following the plain, they will have a free run and can neutralize the Government of Pakistan before it can react.

The mobilization of ground divisions specifically based on foot mobility takes at least one day. Shifting such a division-strength column of foot soldiers in order to ward off a very rapidly moving Russian mechanized column presents a very difficult task, due to the inherent flexibility of mechanized/track forces.

In the eventuality that Pakistan is partially overrun, the chances of resistance there will be virtually nil, as will the hope for outside help. Even the American Rapid Deployment Force would require seven days' warning in order to deploy in division strength. But the Soviets need only three days to capture Islamabad, Quetta, Peshawar and other cities and regions. No country would be likely to come to the aid of Pakistani forces once its government has fallen.

The Soviets have already amassed enough military manpower in Afghanistan to mount the optimal forces for attack. No more

than six divisions would be required for the initial assault; the follow-up operations can be conducted by Afghan forces and a few Soviet divisions. The present deployment sectors of the forces suggest that, if the Soviets should want to, they could launch an attack on Pakistan in a very short time without an additional buildup. Such an attack, with all the elements of surprise, speed and firepower available to the Soviets, has every chance of success.

On the other hand, if the Soviets could not hope to achieve surprise or the rapid neutralization of Pakistan, they would face the risk that such a move could escalate into global war — a risk which they will avoid. But, to create this situation — in which the Soviets cannot be sure of quick success and will therefore hesitate to move — requires the preparation of Pakistan's defence in advance and the predeployment of Pakistani forces along expected points of entry.

Pakistan cannot take these required steps, however, for several reasons. A major one is that redevelopment carries political risk: it would antagonize the Soviets and might provide them with an excuse to attack. An even bigger risk, as far as the Afghan mujahideen are concerned, is that it would place the preponderance of Pakistani forces along the routes that serve as logistic lines for the mujahideen, leaving the Government of Pakistan no excuse for not blocking those routes. The Soviets are already demanding that they do so.

The only option, then, is for the Government of Pakistan to place more *mobile* forces on its western (Afghan) border. This requires more and more armoured carriers, tanks and helicopters, including Cobras. However, that would entail a huge defence expenditure which Pakistan cannot afford. Pakistan, as a front-line state, should be further helped to meet its defence needs.

THE INDIAN VARIABLE

If the Soviets calculate a substantial risk that a war may escalate, they will go for a second option: to threaten Pakistan through Afghan forces, thereby pinning down at least one-third of the Pakistani forces in the northwest, while thus enabling India to attack the Kashmir, Lahore and Badin Umar-kot sectors, gaining territory near Lahore and in Kashmir. An Indian attack may not result in reaching Lahore and overthrowing the Government of Pakistan directly, but even a small loss of territory would humiliate Zia's government and cause it to fall.

This second option is a relatively safe one for the Russians — and a dangerous one for Zia and the mujahideen. The optimal time for such an attack would probably be before the March 1985 elections in Pakistan (although it could come later).

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi needed — and her son and successor still urgently needs — a means to divert the attention of the Indian public from internal problems and to defuse the enormous communal conflict in India. This conflict has been intensified, not relieved, by Rajiv Gandhi's sweeping election victory, which has further sharpened the divisions between Hindus and non-Hindus. The most expedient way to deal with the strife is by rekindling Indian nationalism — and Pakistan

provides the only pretext for doing so. This also coincides with the Soviet desire to dislodge Zia's government without the direct involvement of Soviet forces.

Mrs. Gandhi's secret visit to Tashkent, the regional planning centre for Soviet political-military measures — a visit that came shortly after her military attack on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar last summer — and her subsequent buildup of forces in Kashmir and the Punjab (which is closed to journalists), suggested an intention to carry out such an attack. Her death may have delayed it, but not necessarily foreclosed it.

DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES

This, then, is a summary of the situation at present, as we see it. The war in Afghanistan continues — much to the frustration of the Soviets, who looked for a quick resolution. Its full implications, for both the Soviet Union and the Free World — not to mention the Afghans and others in the region — have not yet even begun to be assessed or understood.

For all the reasons that I have outlined, Afghanistan is not merely an instance of Soviet suppression in an isolated region remote from "vital" Western interests. Rather, Afghanistan represents a strategic battleground — a pivotal one in terms of the longer-term struggle for the future of the globe.

In their brutal assault on a hapless but fiercely proud people, the Soviets have exposed not only — and once again — their readiness to use military force in pursuit of their political and ideological objectives, but also a fundamental vulnerability of their system and of their power base. The situation is thus fraught not only with danger but, as I have tried to indicate, with opportunities as well — if, and only, if, the Free World will recognize and seize them. ■

/9274

CSO: 4600/143

AFGHANISTAN

HUNDREDS REPORTEDLY DEFECT TO MUJAHIDIN

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 24 Oct 85 p 4

[Text]

NEW DELHI,
(Dispatches) — Several hundred Afghan government troops defected to guerrillas in the strategic Panjsher Valley, where Soviet forces appear set for a major new offensive, diplomats said Tuesday.

The diplomats said large numbers of dead and wounded Afghan government troops were brought back to Kabul last week from the valley, which serves as a base for guerrilla attacks on the capital's main supply route from the Soviet Union.

"Reports reaching here suggest the Soviets may again be massing for an assault on the Panjsher before the onset of winter," said one of two western diplomats who held separate briefings for reporters on condition they not be named.

She added that little equipment could be seen at military bases in Kabul and fewer

military aircraft were using the airport, suggesting troops already had moved into assault positions.

The report could not be independently confirmed.

Afghan Mujahideen fighting to oust an estimated 115,000 Soviet troops and the government of Babrak Karmal installed after Moscow's 1979 invasion have stubbornly resisted several major Soviet offensives in the Panjsher.

The last thrust came in June and July and was reported to have left hundreds of Soviet and Afghan government troops dead. There were also reports of widespread defections by government troops to the guerrilla side.

"Several hundred more (Afghan government) soldiers are said to have defected in the Panjsher in the last week or so," said one diplomat. She said a new

division of Afghan troops, numbering some 1,000 men, was formed in Kabul "to meet critical manpower needs."

In an apparent effort to stop Mujahideen ambushes on the main Salang Highway between Kabul and the Panjsher, 40 miles (65 km) to the north, Soviet helicopters bombed villages near the road believed to be guerrilla hideouts, the diplomats said.

The bombings on Oct. 17 and 18 in the Guldara region

caused "a large number of civilian casualties," one diplomat said.

A Soviet-built helicopter which may have been shuttling troops to the Panjsher crashed into a house in north Kabul on Oct. 19, the diplomats said.

The pilot was killed. Two crewmen, as well as several Afghan civilians, were injured, diplomatic sources reported.

/9312

CSO: 4600/138

13 January 1986

AFGHANISTAN

REDUCED MILITARY ACTIVITY MARKS APPROACH OF WINTER

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Oct 85 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 16 (Dispatches) — Heavy fighting has died down in recent days as Soviet and Afghan government forces pull back in part due to the approach of winter, western diplomatic sources said, who spoke on condition that they not be identified.

The diplomat further said fighting in the Paghman area to the north of the Afghan capital of Kabul, and in Wardak and Loghar Provinces to the south and west, and tapered off.

Soviet armored groups backed by helicopter gunships and jet fighter-bombers launched a series of attacks earlier this month, trying to clear Islamic freedom fighters from the areas.

Mujahideen had reported heavy fighting earlier, with their forces battling to stave off ground attacks as their positions and some villages came under air attack. One official, asking not to be named, estimated that up to 5,000 Soviet and Afghan troops had been involved in the fighting in Loghar Province.

The Soviet and Afghan forces apparently had started to pull back amid signs of reduced military activity.

Aircraft movement at the main Soviet military air base at Kabul airport had dropped noticeably and the numbers of Soviet and Afghan helicopters at the installation also had dropped, they said.

The first snow of the winter had fallen on the mountains around Kabul during the past week, earlier than usual and indicating a hard winter, the sources said. Fighting slows considerably during the winter in Afghanistan as snow and bad weather make travel in the mountainous nation difficult.

Fighting was going on in the south and west of Afghanistan, the sources said, with daily clashes reported from Kandahar.

The Afghan government had lost control of parts of the city to the Mujahideen and rocket and grenade attacks were reported daily, they said.

About 1,000 fresh Soviet troops had arrived in Kandahar in September to

replace the garrison, the sources said. The Soviet troops were concentrated at the city airport or in surrounding garrisons, they said.

Conditions in Kabul were quiet with only minor fighting apparent, the sources said.

The diplomats reported an attempted breakout from Kabul's Pol-e-Charki prison by a group of prisoners who had been sentenced to death,

the sources said. Some 13 prisoners started the attempt and were joined by others before guards opened fire, killing several inmates, they said. The prison reportedly

holds thousands of political prisoners.

Wireless Station Destroyed

In related news the Afghan Mujahideen destroyed a wireless station in Kandahar cantonment, killing seven Karmal troops including Colonel Abdul Latif and injuring several others, according to the London-based Afghan Press Agency.

The report added that a group of Mujahideen launched a missile attack on the wireless station on October 4 during which three Karmal soldiers defected to the Mujahideen.

A couple of days ago, the Mujahideen had wiped out the wireless station near the headquarters of Arghustan.

/9312

CSO: 4600/138

AFGHANISTAN

SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KILL OFFICERS, DEFECT TO MUJAHIDIN

Tehran KEYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 30 Oct 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 29 (Dispatches) — About 100 Soviet-backed Afghan troops killed four officers and defected to Mujahideen in Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, where Muslim guerrillas have tightened their control, Western diplomats said Tuesday.

In other developments, Afghan Mujahideen killed or wounded more than 60 Soviet troops in the strategic Panjsher Valley as Soviets attempted to strengthen their forces before the onset of winter, two diplomats told reporters in separate briefings.

On Oct. 22, about 100 Afghan government troops killed four officers and defected to Afghan Mujahideen in Kandahar, about 290 miles (460 km) southwest of the capital of Kabul, the diplomats said. No further details were given.

"The resistance's grip on Kandahar is tightening," said one diplomat. Afghan government troops have abandoned their posts in the city's main Herat Bazaar area

which is now controlled by guerrillas, the diplomats said.

"Fighting in the city continues and the Mujahideen (Muslim guerrillas) are in a stronger position now than one year ago," one diplomat said. The other diplomat said food supplies to the city were adequate, "but electricity is a thing of the past."

"The overland trip (from Kandahar) to Kabul remains hazardous," the diplomat said. He said Afghan government troops man between four and six checkpoints along the road, while guerrillas control 10 checkpoints.

In the Panjsher Valley, about 40 miles (65 km) north of Kabul, guerrillas killed or wounded between 60 and 70 Soviet troops in battles near the towns of Anawa and Rokha in the lower part of the valley about two weeks ago, the diplomats said.

The Panjsher Valley has been the scene of the nearly 6-year-old war's fiercest battles between Afghan Mujahideen and Soviet troops as it provides an ideal staging area for guerrilla attacks on the Salang Road, Kabul's only

land link with the Soviet Union.

"As in the past, the fighting was preceded by massive bombings," by Soviet "high performance jets," said one diplomat. He quoted "an Afghan source" as saying guerrillas shot down 15 Soviet aircraft in an unspecified two-day period.

The diplomats said Soviet and Afghan government forces used bulldozers to flatten trees, crops and houses along a 10-mile (16 km) stretch of the Salang highway near the mouth of the Panjsher to deny cover to the guerrillas.

"It appears the Soviets are intent in tightening their positions lower down the valley and along the Salang Road," one diplomat said. He said fighting in the upper valley had tapered off as winter set in with early snowfalls.

Afghan Mujahideen are fighting to expel and estimated 115,000 Soviet troops and to oust the government of President Babrak Karmal installed by the Soviets after they invaded the country in December 1979.

/9274

CSO: 4600/145

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTANI CORRESPONDENT REPORTS ON OBSERVATIONS

Jeddah SAUDI GAZETTE in English 18-21 Dec 85

[Report by Mazhar Hasan Siddiq: "Cannon Against Catapult"]

[Text] Each of the 29 provinces of Afghanistan is resisting the forces of Soviet Russia and the Babrak Karmal regime, in a Jihad (Holy War) that has gone on for over five years. Some of the fiercest fighting can be seen in the provinces of Paktia, Herrat, Kabul, Qandhar, Takhar, Panjsher, Qundus, Logar, Perwan Kunhar and Nangarhar.

Ten of these provinces share the 1,200 km border with Pakistan.

Paktia, the province through which Salahuddin passed is important to Russia both politically and strategically. Two significant supply routes for the Mujahideen branch out from here.

The city of Khost, where the enemy army is under siege, is a priority area for Russia, which has been making efforts to take the city in order to evacuate its army and personnel.

It is from this city and Paktia province that Russia can extend the war into the whole region.

The province's population is intact with minimal emigration to Pakistan and its residents vehemently support the Mujahideen's struggle.

Russia has been terrifying the people with its relentless attacks and guerrilla activities but its indoctrination campaigns have failed in their goal to compel the population to migrate to Pakistan, which would reduce the strength of the Mujahideen and allow the Soviet and Afghan armies to mount effective attacks against their forces and lift the siege.

In Paktia, the handful of workers of the Parcham and Khalq communist parties are not co-operating with each other, nor are they extending any support to Babrak Karmal's administrative machinery and the Soviet forces. They support the Mujahideen wholeheartedly but stealthily.

Pakistan's defence is firmly linked with the province of Paktia. Khost has long been a centre for most of the Soviet operations against Pakistan and the

Mujahideen's refugee camps are located there. From here, North Waziristan, Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar can be attacked.

Today, as ever, it is a living symbol of Afghan resistance against Soviet hegemony and Babrak Karmal's rule.

Khost was the first city to demonstrate the Afghan nation's determination to reject the emergence of communism. It was here that a formal proclamation of Jihad was issued. Processions and demonstrations were organised. Protest marches were held. Strikes, civil disobedience and violence against the ruling junta marked the beginnings of resistance to a communist rule.

The terrain and topography of each of the country's provinces has its own advantages and disadvantages for the two righting forces. But, by and large, it is all more favourable to the Mujahideen, though lightly armed and defenceless compared to their Superpower adversary.

The deserts, valleys, streams, swamps, rocky mountains, forests, extreme temperatures, and the absence of roads, electricity, water and communications all aid the Mujahideen forces facing the well-equipped Russian army. As one fighter said, "all these provide us an indestructible defence."

The intensity of enemy attacks varies from province to province. A few months ago it was the Panjsher which braved a spate of severe attacks and humbled the combined forces of the Afghan government and Soviet Russia.

But Paktia has always been a target for massive operations against the Mujahideen.

In Khost a brigade of Soviet army and a very large number of Karmal troops have been besieged for the last five years.

The Soviet forces in their first attack had captured the city and all its 21 posts. But the Mujahideen not only retook 19 of them but also effectively cut off all air and ground links to the enemy forces. The Siege by the lightly armed Mujahideen is so strong that so far all the combined efforts of the Soviet and Afghan forces have failed to dislodge it.

On August 12, in one of the severest attacks, aimed at breaking the siege, the two forces deployed some 20,000 troops, mostly Russians. The attack failed.

The Soviet and Babrak Karmal armies themselves can only supply their besieged troops in Khost by air drops. For fear of Mujahideen offensives the Soviet army has not been able to improve its makeshift runway there. The aircraft, mostly Antonov transporters, keep moving escorted by heavy trucks on both sides. The aircraft hurriedly load and unload and take off: A brief stop on the runway may invite fire from the Mujahideen. Khost is thus virtually under Mujahideen's control.

The siege is tight and the besieged troops can find no escape. All conceivable outlets have been plugged and the road held by the Mujahideen cuts off Khost from the nearby town of Dargai.

The besieged personnel include not only Afghan government officials but also a good number of Russian military officers and troops, advisers, experts and engineers.

Khost is a very important cantonment for Russia, which knows it as "little Moscow."

Some time ago the Russians in Paktia province and elsewhere distributed large quantities of arms and ammunition to the local people urging them to use them against the Mujahideen. Not only did the Afghans not use these weapons against the fighters, they themselves joined the Mujahideen along with all the arms supplied by the Russians.

An Afghan Mujahid who came to Karachi to meet pressmen, bemoaned the Islamic world's apathy, particularly that of journalists based in nearby Pakistan. In his view they were showing an unprofessional attitude and failing in their Islamic duty by not covering the Jihad nor participating in it. The Mujahid impressed upon them that a full-fledged war was going unreported.

The Mujahid then compared this unpardonable unconcern with the deep interest shown by journalists from far-off countries whose survival and security are not directly affected by the war.

Instead of covering the war at first hand, the Mujahid complained the Islamic world's media had been carrying news datelined Paris or London and reproducing comments and analysis without investigating the real spirit of the struggle.

They had been running stories that served the interests of the "enemy," promoting a viewpoint little at variance with that of Kabul or Moscow.

He felt that the indifference demonstrated by Muslim journalists confirmed to some extent the indirect but very effective influence of Soviet propaganda on the struggle.

Such piercing remarks moved Salahuddin to see for himself the war Mujahideen were waging against the Superpower.

Salahuddin stayed in Paktia province from July 1 to August 7, 1985, not travelling incognito but not introduced as a journalist either. He was simply a Haji, a title that commands respect with the Afghans.

He covered some 120 kms on foot. Once he travelled almost non-stop for about 12 hours over difficult terrain. He was provided with a mule, but could not manage it. He braved foul weather, rain, storms and heat and even faced bombing and heavy artillery fire, salvoes of rockets, aircraft strafing and machinegun bullets.

At many places there was no proper shelter. The only chance of safety was the natural cover of rocks or hills but there were not always enough to conceal everyone.

The Mujahideen's short-range anti-aircraft guns could keep enemy aircraft at a considerable height, but Salahuddin saw constant random fire taking its toll many times.

Once, he and his party were spotted and were just within range of a barrage of artillery fire. But all escaped the sharpnel and flying rocks.

At some places he saw in rows corpses of Afghan and Russian troops but was unable to photograph them amid the intermittent firing and bombardment. In one place countless corpses were strewn over a wide area, many of them being Russian soldiers. He was told that these were the enemy's casualties of the 27th of July offensive.

Salahuddin's first stop was Zavar, the Mujahideen's first well-equipped and fortified operations centre. It is also a provincial communications centre, and has a small but beautiful mosque and a hospital run by Mujahideen for their own sick and wounded.

The journey to Zavar by foot and jeep was arduous and nerve shattering. The party was overtaken by a severe storm and rain, and the whole area was completely submerged in water. Human bodies, cattles, vehicles, trees and shrubs were all floating. They were cautioned that the onward journey would be impossible because of heavy flooding of streams and rivers. As they saw for themselves, the whole valley became a raging torrent in a matter of minutes. The heavy winds and rains kept the valley overflowing without any chance of stopping.

Salahuddin recalled an incident in which a message was intercepted in Zavar, indicating a heavy attack on Lagori.

Lagori and its surrounding areas were promptly attacked by repeated sorties of 10 aircraft for several hours. The ear-splitting explosions were audible as far as Zavar, but no heavy damage was caused to the Mujahideen.

The next day, August 3, 1985, Salahuddin was himself in Lagori. Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, the commander of Paktia province, provided some interesting details about the attack, including the defection of a group of Babrak Karmal's soldiers and officers. At Farm Bagh, an outpost of the enemy, near Khost airport, a group of five officers and 31 soldiers mutined and defected under the leadership of their commander, Hayat Ullah, and joined the Mujahideen along with many Kalashnikovs and wireless sets and a large quantity of ammunition.

Zabita Umar Khan, 28, is the commander in-charge of Zavar centre, which he himself established. Son of a retired brigadier who is now a refugee in Pakistan, this highly educated Mujahid was himself a lieutenant in the Afghan army. But he was charmed by Maulana Haqqani's personality, and so exchanged his mundane arms career for the spiritual force of the Mujahideen.

Before joining the fighters he and his companions finished off a good number of communists and destroyed a large quantity of enemy arms and ammunition.

Khan has trained hundreds of Mujahideen and in the Zawar centre has set up a fully-fledged maintenance and repair workshop, which can repair Kalashnikovs, tanks, anti-aircrafts guns and other weapons.

Zawar centre has always been a target for the Afghan and Russian armies. It was some time in 1983 that some 26 Russian bombers rained hell for more than two hours, dropping some 90 bombs of various sizes as well as many rockets. "But it inflicted no damage on the centre," a Mujahid told Salahuddin. "In the nearby valleys and hills you can see the tell-tale signs of the attack," he added.

Zawar centre has a Russian-built 72 mm four-ton mortar, seized intact in an encounter. Some 16 Mujahideen brought it in on their shoulders. It also has an armoured troop carrier, T44 and T45 tanks, a 101 mm mortar, and a number of machine-guns and wireless sets.

Recently the centre was bombarded intermittently for more than two weeks. Russian SU 25 and TU 28 aircraft, together dropped a record number of 2,000 bombs.

The Mujahideen downed only one SU25 along with its crew of both Soviet and Afghan airmen. Zabita Khan said, "our aim has always been to maximise losses of the enemy." And that is what Salahuddin could see in the scattered parts of the aircraft.

The journey from Zawar to Lagori was no less tortuous and dangerous. Before departure, Salahuddin was given instructions to carry only essential luggage. He was also asked to have a bath and a shave. He was provided with a mule. "The instructions suggested the need for caution in going to the war front," he said. He felt the Mujahideen did not approve of his onward journey and thought it would be dangerous.

Salahuddin and his party crossed steep mountains and high passes and forded seasonal streams in the valleys. On the way they met caravans of sick and weary children, women and old folk, on foot or occasionally on mules. Their faces told stories of exploitation and destitution, agony and apathy, hunger and haplessness.

The party passed bombed houses and settlements. In many places they saw carcasses of cattle, unexploded bombs and wreckage of tanks and aircraft.

Sometimes they felt the vibrations of hovering helicopter gunships and saw strafing by aircraft. At times they were within range of the shelling, and felt the shock waves from the exploding bombs and rockets. Salahuddin told the GAZETTE: "We were in the midst of attacks from all sides. I wonder even today how all of us escaped the raining hell. It was no less than a miracle that the heavy firing and shelling missed us."

"My mission was to participate in the Mihad and that's why I didn't ask my hosts to get me a safe shelter and postpone the journey to some other hour of the day or night. I was going ahead with the full determination of a Momin (a pious Muslim) without fear of death," said Salahuddin. "I don't recall my legs ever trembling or my feet faltering. There was some hidden energy in me that made me walk as confidently as the others."

From Tani onward the journey was equally difficult. Here, too, there was no shelter when it was needed. "The only cover was our belief that the end for all of us will be the hour appointed by the Creator. So if there was no shelter available, so be it." That is how Salahuddin comforted himself during his travels.

The party crossed Dasht-i-Khost in three hours. From here they could see Antonov aircraft landing and taking off.

"Thank God, during this crossing that we were out spotted," said Salahuddin. "But," as he continued, "a great relief to all of us was the proximity of the Lagori centre, and maybe the Afghan and Soviet forces deliberately avoided the risk of overtaking us near the Mujahideen's strongest post."

"As we neared the Lagori centre, we felt we were safe," he continued. "But our hosts looked happier at my safe journey than at their own."

He could see the mosque and was told by his escort that there were caves dug into the hillside. "The mosque is an inspiration for them. It is a symbol of their determination to brave all the odds that stand in the way of Muslims," Salahuddin stated.

Around here, too, tell-tale signs of Soviet barbarism were visible.

While approaching the Lagori centre they divided into two parties for safety's sake.

Haji Ibrahim, commander of the Ismail Khail centre, was their leader: he is the younger brother of Maulana Haqqani.

As soon as they had separated, the enemy spotted them and opened fire. Hiding behind the rocks they continued moving until they reached a muddy area.

The continuous fire confused not only the party but also the accompanying mule. At one place, it stopped and would not move an inch. It was pushed and dragged, but it remained stationary.

Salahuddin took shelter nearby, but before long it dawned on the party that the mule was taking them along the right track and it was the escort who had missed the turning under the heavy helling.

The expanse of mud and shallow water provided them with a timely shelter. The intensity of the attack subsided a little as soon as they became invisible to the enemy.

They were just trying to get out of the mud when a man with a Kalashnikov appeared from behind a mound and was about to shoot Salahuddin. But the guide yelled, "He is our man."

"We had just come out of the mud with great difficulty when the aircraft appeared on the scene to do their job," said Salahuddin. "The mud that we had cursed now became a safe shelter for all of us," Salahuddin said. "We remained in that muddy swamp for more than 45 minutes."

Salahuddin met some legendary figures in the vanguard of the fight to rout the Superpower and talked to many fighters determined to free their country from the clutches of the mercenary and imperialist forces.

Maulana Haqqani and Ahmad Shah Massaod, the commander of the Panjsher province, strike terror into the hearts of both the Afghan and Soviet armies. Both command respect and virtually rule the hearts and minds of the Afghan nation.

Maulana Haqqani belongs to the resistance organisation called Itte-had-i-Islami. His younger brothers are Haji Ibrahim, commander of the Ismail Khel centre, Muhammad Ismail, commander of the Siran centre, and Muhammad Khalil.

Haqqani had always opposed the growth of relations with Soviet Russia. But one incident that particularly incited him to take up arms against the secular and anti-Islamic regime was the sending of innocent Afghan students to Russia. He strongly opposed the idea and organized demonstrations throughout the province of Paktia. The reverberations of the protest spread far and wide, and within a matter of a few days it engulfed the whole of the country.

He was arrested three times along with other leaders. The deposed Zahir Shah was against religious leaders and it was during his rule that some 100 Ulema and Huffaz (who memorise the Quran) were killed.

The group of leaders who first proclaimed Jihad and declared guerrilla war against Zahir Shah's rule include Maulvi Habibur Rahman, Dr Muhammad Omar, Engineer Habibur Rahman, Engineer Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Abdul Rahim Niazi and Ustad Mansur. Maulana Haqqani was then an active member of the movement against anti-Islamic rule in the country.

This group, with no thought for their own lives and those of their children and families, organised nationwide protest marches against the influx of Russians.

The group was arrested and put in jail, where they dug a tunnel to a bakery in a busy market across the road. As luck would have it, the tunnel was detected by the authorities. Only Gulabdin Hikmatyar and the owner of the bakery, named Mujahid, managed to escape. The rest were hanged.

Salahuddin met Haqqani at his small cave at Uch Khara, in Lagori. When he reached there Maulana Haqqani was hearing a case--he was then a Qadi or Shariah court judge.

A worn out mat, maps of various sizes, a lantern, copies of the Holy Quran and some other books, Kalashnikovs, a few clothes, blankets, sheets and shoes were also he could find in the dimly lit cave. [as published]

It was for the leader an operations room, a shelter, a court, an office, a living room and a mosque.

Salahuddin raised a pertinent question about the justification of continuing a war against a Superpower. Maulana Haqqani replied that history has always been full of incidents in which a worldly Superpower of its time was confronted with a comparatively insignificant opponent. He recounted some cases in point namely Namrud against Abraham; Pharaoh against Moses; the Quraish against 313 of the Companions of the Prophet at Badr; the Mujahideen of the Caliphate against the Kings of Persia, the British empire against the Indian sub-continent and so on.

"And, who was the winner?" Haqqani asked. In his view, history would repeat itself in the case of Afghanistan also.

When he was asked about the result of his own struggle over some 13 years, Haqqani's spontaneous reply was: "The struggle for the independence of the subcontinent started in 1857 and culminated in freedom in 1947, a period of 90 years. Let us have result in nine more years, not 90."

Salahuddin told the GAZETTE that Maulana Haqqani had in his possession a document exposing the role of the Soviet media in counteracting the Mujahideen's struggle. It was a four-point propaganda plan to be carried out by its own media men and also others in its paid service or influence all over the world.

The first point in the document required that in no case should the struggle be called a war between Russia and the Afghan Mujahideen, or be mentioned in any way as a "people's war." It should be noted that with the Soviet Russia the use of prefix "people" is something unjuxtaposeable. But in the case of Afghanistan it is expedient to drop the prefix. It should be labelled as only a confrontation between Russia and America.

The second point stressed that refugees should be portrayed as disloyal, unpatriotic criminals and as drug traffickers. Here the purpose was complete character assassination not only of the refugees in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere but also of the whole Afghan nation.

The United Nations team's observation, as Haqqani pointed out was that the Afghan refugees were the most disciplined and had the highest morals of any refugee community anywhere in the world.

The aim behind such propaganda was to divert the world's attention from the pitiable lot of the refugees and to block moral and material assistance to them. If such an attempt, was successful Haqqani stressed, the refugees would suffer greatly and it would have a great impact on the efficiency of the Mujahideen fighting machinery.

The third point insisted that the whole world should be made to believe that Russia has taken over full control of the country, that there is no war beyond cases of sporadic firing from the Mujahideen, which should be labelled as no more than suicidal attempts arising from sheer desperation.

Elaborating on this point, Haqqani asked Salahuddin, "Have you noticed a single hour without an offensive and counter-offensive of some kind, or a moment without jet strafing, bombing or mortar shelling?"

As for control by the Babrak Karmal or Russian forces, Haqqani said: "With all their combined strength and joint strategies they do not have even a tight grip on Kabul."

He offered a challenge: "If the combined imperialist and mercenary forces were made to evacuate the land mass reported to be in their control, and asked to go over to the other side of the River Amu (the natural boundary between Afghanistan and Russia), the Mujahideen would expose the myth of their control within an hour."

It has been reported and confirmed that the capital, Kabul, is under constant attack. At night it is under curfew.

The areas where the Russian residences or bases are located are surrounded by multiple circles of mines for safety.

Entry into or exit from Kabul entails checking at some eight posts, where everyone undergoes thorough search and heavy interrogation.

In July this year, the Mujahideen attacked Kabul with rockets. The main targets were the Russian embassy, strategic installations, the airport and some of the government offices.

It was also disclosed to Salahuddin that Mujahideen had retaken 80 percent of the land that had fallen under the control of the Afghan and Soviet forces.

The fourth point was no less ingenious in its strategy. Through intensive propaganda efforts the whole world should be urged to recognise the Babrak Karmal regime. As Haqqani forecast, once the regime was recognised as lawful and legitimate, all its past and future actions would find international endorsement.

* * *

The victories of the Mujahideen confused both Soviet and Afghan government forces. The two are so nervous that they consume in two days what should be enough ammunition for two months.

But Haqqani admitted the Mujahideen's lack of a country-wide communications system. So far they have been operating with a provincial or regional wireless network. In his view, the Mujahideen would have performed much more effectively had they been in possession of a unified, modern communications system.

Haqqani charged that, this year, the Afghan government did not bother to arrange for the air transport of pilgrims. Afghan's Ariana airline had no planes for this purpose! "It was not true to say that there were no planes available for pilgrims. It was a reprisal against the Mujahideen for their attack last year of Afghan Ariana's plane at Qandhar Airport," said Haqqani.

He realised, as did other leaders, that if Mujahideen had modern weaponry the whole situation would have been much better for them today.

* * *

Other leaders and fighters showed their mettle and their dedication to that mission. They clearly distinguish themselves from a mercenary force: they are fighters more interested in upholding the banner of their faith than fighting merely for comforts, bread or land.

Salahuddin met a wireless operator named Allahdad who is warned dead or alive by the mercenary and imperialist forces.

A graduate and a trained teacher he was forcibly recruited and trained when young, by the Russians and posted to Paktia. As soon as he found a chance he fled along with a good quantity of wireless sets and ammunition.

Today he operates one of the captured wireless sets, intercepting messages.

Once he intercepted a communication ordering the airforce to bomb a Mujahideen concentration. After a brief pause he replied that the concentration had moved to another location where the bombing should be carried immediately. When the enemy forces did so, they hit a concentration of Soviet and Babrak Karmal troops.

Maulvi Ahmad Gul, who has since been martyred at Lizan on September 7, was the second in command in the province of Paktia. He was 43.

Maulvi Gul was succeeded by Maulvi Fatahullah. He was also martyred, on September 13, on the same front in heavy fighting.

Maulvi Ahmad Gul was a member of the Markazi Majlis-i-Shura. He organised demonstrations against the growth in Afghanistan of Russian relations and communist activities in the country.

In his interview with Salahuddin, he said that during Daoud's regime the total strength of the communists in the country was not more than 44,000, the majority being those who were registered as such under duress. He put the true figure at no more than 5,000.

The Soviet forces have always been suspicious about the integrity of the Afghan communists. The repercussions of the fall of the Tudeh party in Iran could be found in the demoralisation of the Afghan army, and the performance of the Soviet machinery in Afghanistan. "They don't trust Afghan troops. They even kill Afghan soldiers when they are about to be surrounded or trapped or are going to surrender," he said. "The survival of Parchamis and Khalaqis (the two communist parties) has been made difficult by the Russians. They use them as cannon-fodder in offensives against the Mujahideen, and they

treat them as no better than servants."

Maulvi Gul disclosed to Salahuddin that the Russian troops in the early days were drawn from Samarkand and Bukhara. Before coming they were told that their duties in Afghanistan would be of a civil nature, mainly construction of roads and bridges. Many were addicted to drugs.

"But when they came into contact with Mujahideen, and discovered their actual duties, they gave up drugs and asked for copies of the Quran. Not only that, they also assured us of their full cooperation with the Mujahideen," Maulvi Gul said. But they were soon replaced by troops from Russia's western regions.

Maulvi Gul added that in the Russian-held Turkestani region the beginnings of a struggle for autonomy and independence were taking shape. The impact of the Mujahideen's struggle has been felt beyond the Afghan frontiers, in the Muslim communities of Russia.

The Russian government has taken extra care in dealing with the new awakening. There is now an elaborate system of satellite and radar, security checks and control on movements in the Muslim-populated areas. There is censorship on communication and the people are under constant watch.

Maulvi Ahmad Gul said that on August 4 a Tashkent-bound train was heavily fired upon for half an hour by Soviet Russia's Turkestani soldiers, who also destroyed some radar stations.

There have been confirmed reports that a good number of Mujahideen have been secretly crossing the Russian borders for Tabligh (the propagation of Islam).

Maulvi Fatahullah Haqqani was 45 at the time of his martyrdom. Before his death he had captured three very important enemy posts. He was about to take the fourth post when death overtook him.

Maulvi Haqqani, a strategist in his own right, was commander of the forces that had captured the famous Bari Qila in December 1982.

He was also among those who had strongly protested against Afghan-Russian relations, and always opposed Russian activities in his country.

It was during Nur Muhammad Taraki's regime that he proclaimed

Jihad and took over a number of police stations.

He had just returned on September 6 from the Hajj. He attended the burial of Maulvi Ahmad Gul, and went straight from the graveyard to the front. He returned to the graveyard as a martyr on September 13, and was buried by the side of his predecessor and commander.

Haji Ibrahim, 35, commander-in-chief of all posts in the Ismail Khel region, is the younger brother of Maulana Haqqani. He established the Ismail Khel centre and has been engaged in Jihad since the premiership of Sardar Daod Khan, participating in many operations against the enemy.

He told of an offensive on July 26, when the Mujahideen successfully attacked a convoy of enemy troops. They captured four tanks and a large quantity of arms and ammunition and killed some 60 of the enemy.

The fighting continued for several days. At one stage the Mujahideen purposely vacated their outposts and retreated secretly to dig up new trenches. The enemy came out of its hideouts and took over the vacated posts. The Mujahideen opened fire, killing 35 troops and capturing a number of Kalashnikovs, hand grenades, wireless sets and ammunition.

"The cowardice of the Soviet soldiers can be seen in the way they hide in underground shelters in cities with multiple circles of mines all around," Haji Ibrahim said.

In his view, Afghanistan was not the last stop for Russia; from Afghanistan it would reach out to the warm waters, oil-rich regions and international sea lanes of the Mid-east. He said the unity of the Islamic nations, the resistance movement of the Afghan Mujahideen, their Jihad against the infidels and their faith in God would all work together to throw the Russians out of their country.

"In Afghanistan, Russia is using all its most modern weaponry, which it has not used elsewhere," he added.

* * *

Kamil Shah, 35, is a trained teacher. He has been involved in the Jihad ever since its very beginning holding important commands and taking part in many missions. He has successfully destroyed a number of tanks, armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers and trucks laden with arms, ammunition and fuel as well as

capturing arms and ammunitions depots.

Mulla Sadim Khan, 33, has a similar record. Like many others Hukum Khan, 26, was forcibly recruited by the Russians. He joined the Mujahideen's struggle and now commands a group of some 500 fighters. He has many feathers in his cap, but the one that distinguishes him is the gift of mastering the workings of all kinds of caputred machinery and weapons. He can maintain and repair such items and can train others to use them.

Gulab Khan, 27, took refuge in Pakistan, and did odd jobs to make a living. But that life did not excite him much, and he came back to join the struggle. He has only one brother, who is a Khalaqi (a member of the communist party of that name). Gulab Khan's only ambition is to shoot his own communist brother.

The Mujahideen are united and so are their parties. Recently the seven leaders, Maulvi Muhammad Nabi (Mahaz-i-Milli), Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamaat-i-Islami), Engineer Gulbadin Hikmatyar (Hizb-i-Islami), Professor Abdur Rasool Sayyaf (Ittehad-i-Islami), Maulvi Yonus Khalis (Younus Khalis group of Hizb-i-Islami), Pir Syed Ahmad Jilani (Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami), and Professor Sabghat Ullah Mujaddadi (Nejat-i-Milli), have entered into an effective arrangement for joint cooperation and planning at strategic and political levels. These parties are internationally recognised parties, and the head of the alliance is chosen by rotation.

They have a 60-member Majlis-i-Shora, under which work several committees.

Salahuddin concluded after meeting a number of leaders that differences between the parties were limited to matters of distribution of provisions, money or relief supplies. Logically, every tribe or tribal chief would like to have as much as possible for his tribe as quickly as possible. That sometimes caused conflict, but they were absolutely united in the efforts to oust Babrak Karmal and the Soviet forces.

In the past there have been conflicts in matters of command over forces consisting of several tribes. These conflicts too have been resolved. Now the commander will be chosen from the tribe with the greatest influence in the province of the fighting. The groups or parties with relatively less

influence will be under the unified command of the provincial commander. Those representing other provinces will also fight under the commander.

Such differences, in situations like the one the Afghans face today, are only natural. Many problems arise from the scarcity of resources at their disposal. "But there is no conflict whatsoever in fighting the 'twin enemy', Babrak Karmal and the Soviet forces, and there is complete unanimity and consensus on the continuation of the struggle," said a leader.

* * *

The Soviet propaganda offensive against the Mujahideen and their struggle is so effective that the whole world seems to have ignored the true mettle, morale and the spirit of the poorly-equipped fighters.

The fighting is continuous in almost every province but the intensity varies. The world media highlight the progress of fighting in only a couple of provinces. Such ignorance serves the interests of the Kremlin which goes unchecked and unchallenged on what it says through its own media and through others under its influence. The net result is that the situation in Afghanistan is known as a very localised war and not as one involving the whole nation.

The world media and particularly that of the Islamic world, has never troubled to cover the war to show the world that a hapless people is at war with a superpower. It has not carried stories that could have shown the mettle and the morale of the Afghan

people.

They are a unique people. A few scenes testify to this fact. While approaching a village, Salahuddin and his party saw a child aged about five or six. He hurriedly turned and in a few seconds, a pitcher of water in his hands he rushed towards the strangers. Fire opened and the whole surrounding area became covered by thick black smoke. Falling rockets and shells created a din that drowned all warnings to the child to stop and lie down. Houses were on fire and the party was in utter confusion as to how to stop the approaching child.

All lay prostrate, hushing their accompanying mule. The guide frantically beckoned to the child to lie down with the rest. But he would not. He continued running until he reached the party of strangers to his village and handed them the pitcher. After that he obediently lay prostrate with the others.

Later the guide angrily asked the child why he had not lain down as soon as he was told to do so. "Bombs and rockets are common place," the boy quipped. The guide was not at all satisfied with the reply. But the child added, "Every one has to die at a fixed hour, not a moment earlier or later, that is what my mother taught me." And the Mujahid guide was more than satisfied. Afghan tradition demands the offering of a meal or water to anybody passing through the village. The war could not deter the child from fulfilling the tradition.

Salahuddin and his party met caravans, on foot and on mules, that had survived aerial and ground attacks. The caravans were organised with

children and women riding the mules and old folk on foot, holding the reins. Each group was accompanied by a young man. Asked about the ordeals they had suffered on the way, they thanked God profusely that they were safe until that moment, without mentioning any incidents, and continued their march.

"It is our 31st day," said one caravan. "It is the 27th day of our journey," said another, without asking for sympathy from the enquirer.

The majority of the able survivors of such caravans join the struggle. The disabled and the aged, along with women and children trek into Pakistan and add to the number of refugees there.

Only a few such caravans enter Iran: There are now restrictions on their entry.

Salahuddin came across a graveyard, where a martyr was being buried. He had stepped on a mine and had lost half of his lower body. Salahuddin wanted to console the grieving relatives and friends, but someone stopped him: "The deceased won the martyrdom he wanted and it is a matter to be happy about not to grieve over."

Salahuddin called on Maulana Haqqani's mother. This graceful elderly lady was sitting with children aged between three and six. She introduced each one to him: They were all orphans as well as her real nephews and nieces.

Morale is exemplary among the Afghan refugees.

[19 Dec 85 p 5]

['We Don't Join Blocs']

[Text]

The Soviet forces have made the whole expanse of Afghanistan a testing ground for its sophisticated armaments and deadly chemical weapons.

They have poisoned water used by humans and cattle, and thus killed hundreds of Mujahideen and their innocent families. They have laid mines in civilian areas, used "toy"

bombs and dropped napalm bombs on civilian areas. They have harassed the whole nation by all conceivable means. But it has not submitted.

The Mujahideen fighters say prayers even when bombs and rockets and missiles fall in the vicinity and aircraft and helicopter gunships are hovering around.

The commander will lead the prayers, hold courts and pass verdicts based on the Sharia. He ensures equality of treatment, and takes food only after making sure that everyone also has already eaten. He will not go to bed until he has personally checked that every one has received a blanket, or a bandage.

When one of the Mujahideen's leader was asked about the availability of American weaponry, the curt reply was: "You have been to every post in the province. You have seen our depots. Did you ever find an American knife in our arsenals? We are Muslims; we are fighting for Islam, and we don't join blocs."

At meal times, which were fitted into brief lulls in the fighting, the Mujahideen are at a loss over how to treat the guests in a proper manner. They take out dry bread and pieces of dry raw sugar. They put the latter on one side of the mouth and go on chewing and gulping the dry bread. They then drink rain water from a nearby pond. The same water is used for ablutions.

At some posts nothing is available for breakfast, lunch or dinner, so they eat only leaves and drink only rain water for 25 days.

Unheard of barbarism, torture and atrocities towards civilians are an everyday scene. A whole village was raided by the Soviet forces. They killed all the inhabitants except a few who escaped and a few more left alive

intentionally. They also captured alive young girls, loaded on them onto helicopters and started throwing out their dresses in front of those who were kept alive or had missed death by chance.

The targets of government troops and Soviet forces is the sparse civilian population, water mills, granaries, cattle and mules. The two forces seem allergic to the sight of camels, or at least they appear to be afraid. Everywhere there can be found burnt carcasses of this animal, and also those of mules.

For the Mujahideen the camel is the only major means of transportation. But camels today are rather safer, thanks to the availability of rocket launchers, which also scare away the helicopter gunships.

The main purpose behind such destruction is to shatter the rural economy. "If they are successful in doing this, our fighting machinery will be severely affected," one Mujahideen said.

Whatever crops they produce are burnt.

Orchards and vineyards are dying of thirst. Production of cotton and rice has declined considerably. Tractors and other farming implements are destroyed on sight. Water courses are bombarded. Underground conduits, surface canals, river channels and mountain streams are irreparably disrupted. Farmhouses are razed to the ground, ponds with rain water are poisoned. Roads, bridges and transmission lines are erased.

Sources of food supplies are cut off.

The regions once known as breadbaskets are growing nothing.

Against this barbarism are deployed ingenuity and valour. Mujahideen have been capturing tanks intact with the help of a long, coarse, cloth sheet slung over their shoulders. They soak the sheet in water and roll it over and over again to make a heavy ball. They ambush tanks by throwing the ball between the toothed chain and wheel. The tank stops with a jerk and ultimately jams. The man astride the tank with a kalashnikov in his hand ducks inside the tank and seals it from inside. Immediately the Mujahideen will soil and blacken the viewing glass used for viewing.

The confusion thus created makes the occupants surrender. A good number of tanks have been captured with this technique.

The coarse cloth sheet has unique significance with Mujahideen. It is a part of their body; they keep it slung throughout the day and night. It is what they lift sick and wounded with; they make bandages and dressings of it; it is used as a stretcher; they lift arms and ammunitions with its help; it covers and wraps the dead bodies; it is a prayer mat; and it can be used as a table cloth, towel, bedsheet, blanket and overall.

So is kalashnikov important for Mujahideen. It is a currency and a means of barter. Once richness is measured in number of kalashnikovs one has. One can enter deals of any tune with.

[20 Dec 85 p 5]

[Failure to Get Desired Results]

[Text]

Young students are sent to Russia for education, where they are given training under a very special curriculum. The Mujahideen were asked about the impact of this indoctrination on the young generation. They said that according to some rough estimates 40,000 students were sent to Russia for education during the last five years, but this year a significant drop in numbers was noted. The conclusion they drew was that attempts to brainwash them, have failed to provide the desired results. They have failed also in their massive conscription schemes at home and

programmes for military training in Russia. One fighter said, "So will end their indoctrination programmes against innocent children." Another added: "We are genuinely hopeful that both our soldiers and students will return undamaged and undefeated."

The highly anti-Islamic education that was openly imparted during Hafeezullah Amin's regime is now diluted. But there are schemes and programmes under the cover of which efforts are still being made to indoctrinate the youth against the Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen said that the traditional Islamic mosque or *madrasah* education in the Holy Quran and Hadith could now be found only in Mujahideen-controlled areas. In Kabul or in the few cities under government control, the curriculum designed for moral uplifting were only nominal.

Cases of human rights violations were also reported. "Third degree" treatment of innocent prisoners was a routine practice. Khad, the KGB of Afghanistan, has Russian advisors, who are said to be involved in torture and murder.

The Karmal government is not in a position to overcrowd its jails and detention centres, or the Khad offices, with every suspect Mujahid or anti-regime individual, so the short cut for the regime or Khad is to mete out the harshest possible treatment or to kill the suspect.

Amnesty International has a record of human rights violations by the regime, and the whole world knows that repression is now at its ugliest and the infringement of fundamental

rights is at its most extreme, the Mujahid added.

With regard to the possibility the return of Zahir Shah after the exit of Babrak Karmal and the Soviet forces, the Mujahideen are unanimous in their view that it was the deposed king who not only accepted the influence of Russia but welcomed it wholeheartedly. They have no liking for him. But the name of his son-in-law, a major general, was heard in some circles as one of the possible candidates to take over the reins of the country.

A very small minority of secularists supports the return of the king, but the Mujahideen will give him no support.

Some interesting facts and figures were collected. More than 80 percent of weapons used by the Mujahideen are that were captured intact or repaired by them for use. The balance they produce locally.

Out of a total population of some 16 million, some more than three

million have taken refuge in Pakistan, about one million in Iran and a similar number in various other countries of the world. Over one million of the population has been killed in the war. More than one million are engaged actively in the struggle. Of the remaining 10 million people, a very large majority lives in the Mujahideen-controlled areas and supports the struggle, and only a very small minority lives in the areas under the control or influence of the Karmal government. More and more areas are coming under the control of the Mujahideen.

Some 3,000 persons go over to Pakistan daily and add to the refugee population. The Mujahideen put the figure of Pakistan's refugees at more than 3.3 million, and the total number of refugees at more than five million.

The strength of the Soviet and Afghan government troops is reported to be about 150,000 and between 30,000 and 40,000 respectively.

Annually some 10,000 soldiers are trained by the Afghan government, and about the same number promptly defect to the Mujahideen.

[21 Dec 85 p 5]

[A War Without Reference To Land]

[Text]

The Afghan Mujahideen do not care about casualties on the battlefield. They only care about the toll of innocent family members back home.

The ratio of casualties in engagements is always in the Mujahideen's favour. But the elimination of villages and massacre of the civilians disturb the ratio.

The Mujahideen's war is altogether different from other contemporary struggles fought by Muslims in or outside of their own countries. As Salahuddin found himself and as their leaders put it, the difference is faith. Islam versus atheism, infidelity, heresy and, of course, imperialism. It is a struggle without reference to land.

It is a struggle in which the Ulema are commanders in all 29 provinces. In every action and thought they draw heavily on Islamic traditions and practices. A Mujahid said, "We are fighting for the supremacy of Islam. Even if the Russian troops pack up and

evacuate the country, we will not give up the struggle until Islam rules in Afghanistan."

The Mujahideen have among them neither the socialists nor communists nor secularists. They are just Muslims, with Islam as their creed and Islam as their way of life. Their whole struggle is for the cause of Islam. It is only an added dimension that the Mujahideen want to save their country from the clutches of socialism and communism and prepare a bulwark for defence of other countries in the region.

It is also unique because the Mujahideen have no one behind them, no moral or material support. They are fighting a super power, with which no Islamic nation has ever had a direct showdown. No wars have been fought in a landlocked country like Afghanistan. It is virtually cut off from the outside world. It is a war where the peoples are fighting on two fronts: against an alien super power and against an un-Islamic government at home.

But the Afghan Ulema have inexhaustible resources in Islamic history from which they receive inspiration and guidance. Before them are the battles, victories and heroes of hundreds of years of Islam in various continents. As one leader put it: "The continuation of our war is in no way dependent on the mundane resources of the supply of provisions, arms and ammunitions. We believe more in the proper realisation of our inspiration with education and training in the true Islamic way." As the leader said confidently, "Anyone with a modern, secular, scientific education steeped in alien culture would not have the puritanical inspiration needed to rule a people. An empire on land could be set up but one could never rule hearts and minds without the help of a faith."

With Mujahideen the ideals are Bilal, the slave of the Abyssinian origin and the first Mua'adhin of Islam, Salman Al-Farsi, a companion of the Prophet and Khubaib Bin Adi Al-Ansari, one of the first martyrs of Islam, as well as many other legendary figures of Islamic history.

It is this inspiration that supports the Mujahideen as they take up arms against a heretic government backed and installed by communists.

An Afghan leader drew a parallel: "It is like erecting a solid wall or building strong barriers contain water in a dam. If the wall or barrier it will be a disaster for the whole area. We have been facing a super power for years, and we have been resisting it with our own modest resources. But others would not be able to fight for even a few days."

* * *

When the leaders were asked about the reaction of the Afghan masses to the presence of the Soviet forces and the imposition of a puppet leadership in the person of Babrak Karmal, the unanimous reply was: "Barring partial control on Kabul and some other provincial capitals the whole country is under the control of Mujahideen. Not only large scale defections but also constant support for us and assistance to our families in the cities, towns and villages is living proof of our control and influence."

The leaders said that ever since the presence of the Soviet forces and the installation of Babrak Karmal not even a single day or night in Kabul passes without an offensive of some kind by the Mujahideen. Such as bomb and rocket attacks on the Radio Kabul building and government installations.

One fighter questioned, "Could we wage a war in 29 provinces against a super power without the support or blessings of the local masses?"

The leaders said that Karmal's own administrative machinery and defence organisation was affected by serious conflicts. There was a deepening crisis of leadership among the Parcham and Khalaf parties.

About the legitimacy, competence and role of the Loyah Jirgah (grand assembly) and the government by council, the leaders said: "It did not have any roots in the masses nor did it reflect their mood or aspirations. It was a hand-picked team including only the people under the control of the ruling junta. It failed the same way as did the erstwhile National Fatherland Front."

/9274

CSO: 4600/142

AFGHANISTAN

EXPORT BANK EXPANDING ACTIVITIES

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 25 Sep 85 p 8

[Text] The Export Development Bank was founded in the first half of 1355 [21 March 1976 - 20 March 1977] with an initial capital of 100 million afghanis in order to help provide the necessary financing for exporters. After the victory of the glorious Sawr revolution, the banking activities of this institution expanded and became ever more intensive. A source from the Export Development Bank told DEHQAN correspondent:

From the time all the banks were nationalized, they have been separated in various sectors of specialized activities. For instance, the Industrial Development Bank is active in the industrial sector, the Agricultural Development Bank is active in the sector of agriculture and the commercial banks all have a special role in providing services in the area of foreign trade. The Export Development Bank, which is one of the commercial banks, provides credit financing in the area of private industry and commerce, it also provides similar services to various other institutions, corporations and cooperatives according to the provisions of the loan bill and other pertinent regulations.

The extension of loans of this bank to the above-stated sectors as of 1355 until the end of 1363 [21 March 1984 - 20 March 1985] have been divided into two export and import categories. In the year 1355 there were no import credit loans while in the same period there were 218.5 million afghanis of export credit loans. Similarly, in 1363 the import loans amounted to 646.08 million afghanis and the export credit loans came to 1.515 billion afghanis. The balance of import loans of the bank from 1355 until the end of 1363 was 2.974 billion afghanis and that of the export loans for the same period amounted to 9.072 billion afghanis. The total figure stood at 12.047 billion afghanis which showed a year to year increase in the amount of loan credit activities.

The abovementioned source also added: The distribution of loans for exportable products of the country such as raisins, almonds, sesames, linseed, cotton, the skin of Karakul lamb, carpets, cereals and medicinal herbs are provided to the merchants of the country according to the provisions of the loan bills and other pertinent regulations. Furthermore, for the purpose of facilitating the process of permissible import merchandise the amount of pertinent loans have had a year to year increase.

In answer to a question the source stated: Although in the articles of association of the bank the issue of marketing as regards the exportable goods of merchants

and various other companies has been discussed and to this end, the Export Development Bank has been able up to a certain extent to provide pertinent services for the interested exporters, however it should be mentioned that this bank does not have a branch in any other country. Therefore, based on the pertinent foreign reports this bank provides the necessary marketing consultation for its customers. As a result of this activity the transaction relations of the Export Development Bank with reputable banks of the world have been expanded.

The aforementioned source also said: The proper plan for export and import loans has already been projected and we hope that with the ever-increasing assistance from the Bank of Afghanistan we will be able to provide more help to individual/private merchants and various other import and export institutions.

12719

CSO: 4665/15

AFGHANISTAN

SECOND PHASE OF LAND REFORM UNDERWAY IN PROVINCES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 85 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Land Reform Goes on in Provinces"]

[Text]

PROVINCES, (BIA)—

Thirty-three landless and small-scale land holding peasant families in Ali Khel village related to the centre of Laghman recently received forty land ownership documents in continuation of the process of the implementation of the second phase of the just and democratic land and water reforms.

At the function which was also attended by a large number of the peasants and workers of the village, Shair Aqa, one of the peasants who received land ownership document in an interview said, "On behalf of the peasants of my village I assure the party and the revolutionary state that since the party and the revolutionary state make indefatigable efforts day and night for the prosperity and improvement of the living conditions of the toilers of the country, we consider it our moral responsibility to support and safeguard the gains of the April Revolution till the last moments of our lives.

Likewise, thirty-four landless and small-scale land holding peasantry families of Madad Khel and Eshqabad villages of Jabul Saraj district of Parwan province in a recent function received land ownership documents.

According to a spokesman for the Democratic Land Reform Directorate of Parwan province, an area covering 25 hectares of land was cleared in afore-mentioned villages and forty one surplus land was given to the landowners.

Similarly, during the same period, the Democratic Land Reform Directorate distributed a quantity of 11,932 tons of chemical fertilizers and 5 tons of improved agricultural seeds to the peasants who had received land ownership documents.

Another report from Kunduz province states that the peasantry council in Ghondi Kalai relates to Chardara district of Kunduz province, was set up in order to attract the peasants for further participation in the imp-

lementation of the second phase of the democratic land and water reforms.

The function was attended by a large number of the peasants among whom Rahman Jan, was elected chairman and six others as members of the council in a free and democratic atmosphere.

The session of the Commission for the Democratic Land and Water Reforms of Paktia Province on the results of the work of that commission during the current year was recently opened in Gardiz city.

The report on the work and activity of the commission during the first six months of the current Afghan year (begun March 21, 1985) was presented by Shair Ahmad Fazli, head of the General Directorate of the Land Reforms of Paktia province which in part says:

"During the first six months of the current year the land-ownership area of 310 peasantry families, equivalent to 500 hectares of land was clarified and documented and more than 260 hectares of surplus land were distributed to 251 deserving

peasantry families, free of charge.

Likewise, during this period 500 ownership documents were given to the landless and small-scale landholding peasants of the province, seven peasantry councils and three peasantry committees were lately established through which the water quotas of 310 peasantry families have been defined and 72 cases have been settled."

The report adds that during this period 141 cubic meters of irrigation canals have been repaired and re-activated and as a result of the voluntary and collective work of the peasants 5,400 square meters of canals have been cleaned with the help of the facilities provided by the Irrigation Department of Paktia Province.

Similarly, material and technical aid of the Department to the peasants amounted to 128 tons of chemical fertilisers, 14 tons of agricultural seeds totally amounting to more than 389,500 Afs.

The report adds, that right now, the implementation of the second phase of the democratic land reform is going on successfully in eleven villages of Mangal district.

/12851

CSO: 4600/130

AFGHANISTAN

FARMERS ASSISTED IN SOWING

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 85 p 1

[Article: "State Aid in Autumn Sowing Campaign"]

[Text] "The autumn sowing campaign will be launched in the country on an area of 1,600,000 hectares of agricultural lands. The Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms has decided to seriously undertake extensive and coordinated programmes for its successful implementation. Peasant's higher standard of living and their prosperity as well as higher agricultural outputs are the main objectives of the party and the revolutionary government. The peasants make majority of our population and they are to play a crucial role the advancement and reconstruction of the homeland."

This was said by a spokesman for the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms to a KNT correspondent.

The spokesman added: "For higher yields of wheat which is a staple food in Afghanistan, 880,000 hectares of irrigated land and 605,000 hectares of dry land have be-

en allocated for cultivation of this crop all over the country. For the same purpose, 90,000 hectares have been set aside for barley, 17,000 for growing clover and alfalfa and 8000 hectares of better land for growing vegetables.

Use of Fertilizers have an unprecedented effect on raising agricultural yields. This is why their distribution is being accelerated in the sowing campaigns. For the autumn sowing campaign it has been decided to distribute 66,000 tons of fertilizers, 39,038 tons of urea and the remaining is phosphorus bearing fertilizers. This figure indicates an increase of 9,000 tons comparing with the previous year.

"Improved seeds have also great impact on crop capacity. The farmers, therefore, will be getting additional quantity of improved seeds for the present autumn campaign. They will also receive pesticides worth of more than 25 million Afs. to save their crops

from noxious diseases and pests. Meanwhile, the Agricultural Development Bank provides the farmers with a sum of 216,373 Afghanis as credits on an easy term for purchasing improved seeds, pesticides and others. The credit distributed is 63 per cent more than the previous year.

"The area under mechanized agriculture was only five thousand hectares last year. This area was expanded to 23,000 hectares for the present campaign. Likewise, land of the state farms under cultivation was doubled.

"In addition to the programmes described, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms is determined to popularize mechanization of agriculture both on state farms, experimental farms, farms of the Improved Seed Company and on private land or the land belonging to agricultural cooperatives, which all in all comprise

22,880 hectares. Mechanized agriculture will also be applied on a wider scale in Nangarhar Valley Project to raise the efficiency of agriculture in this province.

"The credit provided by the Agricultural Development Bank to individuals and members of cooperatives are aimed at serving them.

For this purpose, the bank facilitates granting credits to the farmers.

The credits will be used for purchasing improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other.

"The General Department of the Extension and Agricultural Products accelerates the process of the implementation of the campaign through special programmes.

The employees of the department guide the peasants in utilising necessary facilities and teach them how to apply new methods.

/12851

CSO: 4600/130

AFGHANISTAN

HUNDREDS MOBILIZED AROUND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 p 6

[Text] With regard to the continual care and agricultural policy of the PDPA and the government of the DRA, in contemplation of improving the living condition and increasing the farm products and in order to be able to give timely assistance in the matter of the cultivation and the harvest of farmers' crop with each and every passing with the active and voluntary participation of the farmers throughout various provinces, districts and rural areas of the country new agricultural services cooperatives are created.

By being mobilized around agricultural cooperatives, the farmers can easily and on time obtain their various bare necessities such as chemical fertilizers, improved wheat seeds, pesticides, herbicides, farm machinery and equipment. Regarding the above-stated subject, DEHQAN's reporter has prepared a report on the activities of the branch cooperative of the Land and Agriculture Department of Deh Sabz district which will appear below.

A source from the Land and Agriculture Reform branch of Deh Sabz district stated: For the purpose of mobilizing the farmers into a unified force, with the voluntary participation of 681 farmers, with a capital share of 182,200 afghanis, involving 300 acres of land, eight agricultural services cooperatives were formed in the villages of Deh Yahya, Pay Minar, Bakhtiaran, Khajah Chasht, Dod Khey1, Yakah Tut, Tarah Khey1 and Qabel Pay.

In the spring campaign of the current year, the members of the agricultural cooperatives have obtained 491,825 afghanis through grants and loans from their revolutionary government. On the other hand, they've also received 58.3 tons of white fertilizer, 24 tons of black fertilizer, 29 tons of improved wheat seeds and 79 bags of soil-enriching sulphur. In the same period, 177,000 afghanis of previous loans were paid back and after proper familiarization with the goals of the cooperatives 34 farmers have voluntarily become members of these cooperatives. Furthermore, the members of the agricultural cooperatives of Deh Yahya village decided to export 1,708 tons of grapes and 431 tons of raisins through the medium of abovementioned cooperatives after correctly realizing that these cooperatives are protecting their interests.

The source went on to add: The members of the agricultural cooperatives of Hod Khey1, Tarah Khey1, Deh Yahya, Khajeh Chasht, Yakah Tut, Bakhtiaran and Pay Minar have played an active role in realizing the second phase of the democratic Land

and Water Reform and also in fulfilling the progressive objectives of the party and the revolutionary government. To this end, 457 members of the cooperatives of the aforementioned villages have received land deeds and have settled their pertinent disputes. Moreover, during the same time period an illiteracy course in which 20 farmers have taken part was established in the village of Deh Yahya. Similarly, in order to facilitate the process of cultivation and harvest of agricultural products of the members of the cooperatives of this district, an area of 280 hectares has been properly prepared by mechanized farm machinery.

The source also added: In addition to their sacrifice, sweat and utmost efforts for increasing farm products and securing the necessary foodstuff for themselves and their countrymen, the members of the cooperatives also have taken up arms and some 67 members of these cooperatives through creation of security centers are valiantly defending the achievements of the revolution shoulder to shoulder with other defenders.

12719

CSO: 4665/14

AFGHANISTAN

ANIMAL FARMERS RECEIVE ASSISTANCE

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 p 8

[Text] The improvement of stockbreeding affairs and the provision of assistance to stockbreeders is one of the main concerns of our revolutionary government. It is for this reason that the Department of Animal Husbandry of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform through proper treatment and vaccination of animals carries out effective and practical programs.

In order to enhance the growth of animal products, proper efforts are put in force to improve animal and poultry breeding throughout the country. To be able to realize this objective, pertinent animal and poultry farms and artificial insemination projects have been created, to, on the one hand insure the improvement of poultry and animals and their proliferation, and on the other to make certain that this sector plays its fundamental role in buttressing the national economy of the country.

Based on the plan of 1364 [21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986] with an eye to improving and proliferating a better breed of animals, the stockbreeding department in the first quarter of the current year has carried out the following measures: During the first quarter of the year in the animal farm of Bini Hesar a total of 292 milk cows and calves were properly bred which realized 98 percent of the projected plan. Annual plan for production of milk in this farm is 175,000 liters and in the first quarter it produced 55,000 liters of milk. The production of milk for the current quarter was 42,495 liters.

During the first quarter of the year in the Qarah Qol farm of Balkh Province 43 rams, 182 ewes and 120 male and female lambs were properly bred. Furthermore, more than 377 tons of dairy products were processed. Similarly, through the Dairy Product of Afghanistan Project which will have an annual projected plan of 265,650 tons of milk, more than 8,935 liters of milk were produced during the first quarter of the year. Moreover, during the same period 53,874 kilograms of curdled milk, 855 kg of butter and 1,223 kg of cheese were produced through the same project.

A projected plan for the incubation and breeding of 5,000 stock chickens in the annual program of the poultry project of Bagrami and Jangalak have been included and during the first quarter of the year this number reached 4,135. Likewise, in the same period 48,605 eggs, 13,267 chickens and 514,700 kg of fowl were sold and 104,675 eggs and 28,239 chickens were produced.

In the artificial insemination project, the projected annual plan called for keeping 12 buffaloes, however in the first quarter of the year 14 buffaloes which were bred through artificial insemination were kept. Further, the annual artificial insemination of 20,000 cows was projected in the relevant plan, and in the first quarter of the year 6,680 cows were artificially inseminated.

In the bee culture project, during the first quarter of the year over 1,000 kg of honey and nine kilograms of beeswax were produced. Furthermore, in the same project 30 eggs of honeybees which had been laid in large cells were fed on royal jelly to produce 30 young queens and after copulation of the queens 30 complete colonies each consisting of a queen, workers and drones were produced.

According to the report of a source from the Animal Husbandry Department, the Stockbreeding and Propagation Department of Balkh Province has carried out the following operations during the first quarter of the year for the purpose of improving the breeding of animals:

- Providing guidance and technical consultation to 1,285 stockbreeders.
- Preparing or organizing simple and more complex building plans for the construction of special quarters for 765 stockbreeders.
- Preparing and organizing feeding charts with due consideration to environmental conditions and preservation of fodder for the animals together with providing necessary consultation to 905 stockbreeders.
- Continuous technical cooperation with government and private farms and co-operatives, and cooperation with 12 small cow-breeding farms.
- Cooperating with the Jan and Pars Department for the purpose of establishing a poultry farm.
- Providing guidance and cooperation with Silo Department for the purpose of creating a cow-breeding farm.
- Encouraging 1,358 farmers and stockbreeders to set up or form poultry, sheep-breeding or Karakul lam-breeding farms.

12719

CSO: 4665/14

AFGHANISTAN

NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT ASSISTING MARTYRS FAMILIES

Kabul ANIS in Dari 1 Oct 85 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Provincial National Fatherland Front of Samangan has one city council, one district council, one subdistrict, five village and 41 residential councils. From the aforementioned total number of councils, one district council, three village and 20 residential councils were created during the current year. Likewise, 714 persons from the total number of the provincial council members which comprise 1,498 have newly joined the various councils of the NFF of Samangan.

Also 18 peace councils with 130 members have been created in the Provincial NFF of Samangan. Furthermore, 18 literacy courses with 270 students have been created in the central district councils of Samangan Province. Recently, 27 individuals were graduated from the above-stated literacy courses.

The director of the Provincial NFF Council of Samangan added: Moreover, 25 mobile and stationary propaganda groups have been formed in the NFF of Samangan. According to previously prepared plans these groups are charged with the extensive task of informing the inhabitants of the villages and hamlets of their relevant region about the goals of the party, the government of the DRA, the land and water reform, the importance of literacy, rules and laws of the local organs and government departments, the decisions and decrees of the grand tribal assemblies, the crimes of the mercenaries and exposing their true and filthy nature, securing national peace and putting an end to fratricide throughout the country.

In addition to the aforementioned activities the representative of the provincial council has been able to create seven farmers councils and two consumer co-operatives with the cooperation of other relevant institutions. Beside, he also has been able to select and appoint eight water-distributors with their assistants in order to help distribute water among farmers on a fair basis.

During the current year, the Provincial NFF Council of Samangan has also provided 115,000 afghanis from the gratis/gift money fund as aid to the families of the martyrs of the revolution, the invalids and the disabled. In a like manner, it has distributed an equal share of wheat from the relief assistance of friendly countries among 318 individuals who are members of the defenders of the revolution working in various parts of the said province. Additionally, 676 patients including children and adults from the district of Hazrat-e Soltan have received medical aid and treatment from the mobile doctors.

12719
CSO: 4665/15

AFGHANISTAN

NEW HEALTH CENTER PROVIDES GRATIS SERVICE TO ALL

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Oct 85 p 4

/Text/ KABUL (BIA) -- Health insurance and medical care form one of the basic and crucial objectives of the PDPA and the state of the DRA. Therefore, the revolutionary party and state pay great attention to the health and well-being of the people and the health services are being extended day by day on countrywide scale.

In line with the philanthropic policy of our revolutionary party and state, generalisation of medical care by the Ministry of Public Health of DRA has achieved great successes. Despite the plots and subversive activities of the counter-revolutionary elements, the Ministry with the moral and material aid of the friendly countries, headed by the Soviet Union and with the technical assistance of international organisations has built hospitals, clinics and other medical service centers throughout the country.

The State Central Polyclinic of the Ministry of Public Health of the DRA which is well-equipped with advanced and modern facilities is one of the brilliant examples of internationalist co-operation of the great country of Soviets with the DRA. The polyclinic which was inaugurated last week provides all medical services to our compatriots free of charge.

Dr Ahmad Wali Babak, the General President of the State Central Polyclinic in an interview said, "Despite the fact that daily norm of the Polyclinic is planned for 600 patients, a week after the inauguration more than 14,000 patients have visited the polyclinic and made use of its services.

The State Central Polyclinic has sections as Internal surgery, ear and throat, psychiatric, neuro-surgery, urology, obstetrics and gynaecology, Ophthalmology, dermatology, pediatrics and other auxiliaries such as operation room, laboratory, X-rays, infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, emergency section, family planning, gastric juice, vaccination and pharmacy, each of these sections are equipped with the most up-to-date medical facilities.

Right now, forty local doctors and 3 specialists from the friendly country, the Soviet Union, are engaged in various sections of the polyclinic to provide medical care to our compatriots.

The president of the State Central Polyclinic said, general medical check-ups are being carried out in various sections of the polyclinic and the required medicines and drugs are dispensed to the patients free of charge.

The pharmacology section of the polyclinic is equipped with modern facilities to make synthetic drugs. Here the drugs are synthesized and dispensed to the patients free of charge. The physical therapy section of the polyclinic is equipped with the most advanced facilities, being unique in the country. This, in itself is a new manifestation in the field of medicine in Afghanistan. The stomatology section of the polyclinic possesses four well-equipped apparatuses for dental treatments, x-rays, tooth orthopedy and various complex treatments.

Concerning the other sections of the polyclinic, the President said: "Medical check-ups are carried out and the prescribed medicines are being distributed to the patients free of charge by the pharmacy. He went on to say that in case the patients need continued treatment, they are being introduced to other hospitals.

The foundation stone of the Polyclinic was laid in 1981 at a total cost of 131,000,000 Afs. from the state development budget and 9 million rubles, aid of the friendly country, the Soviet Union, was spent on the construction of the polyclinic. The polyclinic was completed in 3.5 years by Banai Construction Unit in three blocks of three-storeyed buildings with about 300 rooms. Local engineers and specialists from the friendly country the Soviet Union Co-operated in its construction. The State Polyclinic of the Ministry of Public Health of the DRA is open from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. to render service to the patients. Besides, the polyclinic is open from 4:30 to 6 p.m. for the state employees who cannot come to the polyclinic during the official working hours.

/12851

CSO: 4600/129

AFGHANISTAN

HEALTH SERVICES EXTENDED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Oct 85 p 1

[Article: "Free of Charge Medical Services for People"]

[Text] KABUL (BIA) -- Since giving medical services free of charge and ensuring equal rights for our countrymen in making use of health services, make up part of the popular policy of the PDPA and the state of the DRA, the government has taken effective and extensive steps towards the popularization of medicine and improving free medical services, in the light of the Programme of Action of the PDPA.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Public Health reported that based on the proposal of the Ministry, the Council of Ministers of the DRA has approved gratuitousness of another part of medical services which has still been paid for.

The spokesman added that on the basis of this decision of the Council of Ministers, laboratory tests, except those of the water supply projects and complete tests of the materials having commercial aspect the paid beds in the hospitals, X-Ray treatment, including that of cancer diseases, dental treatment, the paid operations in the Avicina Hospital, electrocardiogram, audiometry, physiotherapy, electroencephalography and other technical and orthopedic services have become free of charge all over the country.

The government had already declared the gratuitousness of a main part of medical services in the country as well. Among them one can name gynecology service at home deliveries, giving blood free of charge and giving free medical services in the NOOR hospital and the Institute of Child Health named after Indira Gandhi.

The state accepts annual subsidy of millions of Afghanis for rendering free medical services to people.

/12851
CSO: 4600/129

AFGHANISTAN

VILLAGE COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP GROWING

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 pp 6-7

[Text] Members of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of Faryab Province: The Provincial Council of the Farmers' Cooperative Union of Faryab Province, which was formed for the purpose of attracting farmers and other toiling individuals in joining the consumers and handicrafts cooperatives, was created in 1361 [21 March 1982 - 20 March 1983] and now has 3,204 members. The social composition of its membership roster comprise 1,064 farmers, 387 workers, 630 intellectuals and 465 craftsmen who are mobilized in 20 consumer and handicraft cooperatives with a capital share of 2,565,500 afghanis.

Regarding the activities in the first quarter of the current year the director of the Provincial Council of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of Faryab Province told DEHQAN's reporter: In the first quarter of the current year two consumer cooperatives, one called Kuhi-Khaneh located in the provincial capital and another called Hambastegi situated in the Pole-Cheragh district with a total of 228 members, were created. Furthermore, in the same period 191 individuals joined other consumer cooperatives of the province and a new butcher shop with a capital share of 100,000 afghanis was opened in Andkhui city. Moreover, in the same period 941,572 afghanis worth of consumer goods, an equivalent amount of 888,420 afghanis of chemical fertilizers, improved wheat seeds, pesticides and herbicides and an equivalent amount of 571,121 afghanis worth of farmers surplus products were made available for sale to the farmers and other toiling workers of Faryab Province through consumer and agricultural product stores at lower than the regular market prices.

Likewise, with a view to forming the farmers and other toiling workers into a unified force and keeping them in close touch with the party and the revolutionary government, particularly the realization of the important decisions of the grand tribal assembly, two meetings were held for farmers during the first quarter of the current year through the efforts of this union. In order to fulfill the decrees and decisions of the grand tribal assembly and secure the peace and security and protect the great achievements of the revolution the majority of the members of consumer and handicraft cooperatives carry arms in one hand and farm tools in the other. With an eye to completely eliminating illiteracy among farmers, during the same period four literacy courses were recently established with the participation of some farmers.

As regards the deficiencies and inadequacies of the said union, the director of the provincial council stated: There are four inactive handicraft cooperatives

within the framework of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of Faryab Province, although for the purpose of reactivating these cooperatives which have an important role in the economy of the country, we've asked on several occasions for financial help from the Farmers' Union Central Council of the DRA, and have dispatched a representative of the union to the capital, but unfortunately each time our representative has come back to Faryab Province empty-handed. Likewise, we are facing some problems in transferring consumer goods from Mazar-e Sharif to Faryab Province. The transfer of consumer goods only takes place twice a year which can by no means answer the needs of all the members of consumer cooperatives. Furthermore, since Faryab Province is one of the agricultural provinces of the country a sum of two million afghanis has been allocated for the purchase of surplus products of the farmers through the Farmers Union Central Council of the DRA, however because of the short supply of cash, unfortunately we are not in a position to buy the surplus products of many farmers. We hope that the Central Council of the Farmers' Cooperatives Union of the DRA will help us toward the growth of our cooperative movement so that we will be able to reactivate the handicraft cooperatives and to make it possible for us to purchase the surplus products of the farmers and provide us with the capability to more frequently transfer consumer goods.

12719

CSO: 4665/14

AFGHANISTAN

WATER PUMP INSTALLATION INTENDED TO REMEDY WATER SHORTAGE

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 2 Oct 85 p 8

[Text] In the same way that the national democratic Sawr revolution unshackled the hands and feet of the farmers from the oppressive chains of the feudalists, it has also continued and still continues to expand its various agricultural services through the medium of government departments in order to enhance their living condition. In line with the humanitarian goals of the revolution and according to the provisions of the law regarding utilization of water and its relevant regulations pertaining to the users, two sets of mobile water pumps, type 50-80 manufactured in the Soviet Union, were installed and became operational in the village of Qarah Kutarmah, in the district of Hazrat-e Imam in Qonduz Province. During the start of the operation, which was initiated by the governor of Qonduz, hundreds of farmers, responsible officials of the branch office of Agriculture and Land Reform of the provincial party committee and heads of the Irrigation and Agriculture Departments of Qonduz Province were present. These water pumps went into operation in order to insure the happiness or prosperity of the country's farmers and boost their yields.

Thereafter, Abdol Rashid, one of the village farmers, on behalf of others while expressing his appreciation for the government and party's care and consideration, stated: With the installation of these water pumps, the land of us, the farmers, which had been left unused during recent years as a result of the ravages and devastation of the dams and water-ways by the godless insurgents, will once again spring back to life and become green and blooming through the care and interest of the party and government organs. We will protect these water pumps like our own lives and property and make proper and sagacious use of them in increasing our cultivation and productivity.

Quoting the head of the Irrigation Department of Qonduz, DEHQAN's correspondent reported that the capacity of both water pumps is 165 liters of water per second and they are capable of irrigating an area of over 2,000 acres of land.

12719
CSO: 4665/14

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

FORCES REPORTEDLY KILLED--Mashhad, Khorassan Prov., 17 Dec (IRNA)--Over 100 joint Afghan-Soviet forces were killed and 80 other captured in a Mujahidin ambush attack on a large military convoy of the joint forces two weeks ago. The convoy was on its way from Herat to Badghis Province. During the attack 12 enemy tanks were destroyed and 116 truck-loads of munitions were seized by the Afghan Muslim Mujahideen. Meanwhile, in retaliation for the Mujahidin's attack, the joint forces bombed and missile attacked villages in the region, massacring more than 100 Muslim women and children. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 0850 GMT 17 Dec 85 LD] /9738

FORCES SAID RETREATING--London, 17 Dec (IRNA)--Afghan Mujahidin have killed 20 joint government and Soviet soldiers and captured two trucks loaded with ammunition, cutting off all access roads to the besieged sub-divisional headquarters of Maruf, in Qandahar Province. The town has been under siege since 24 November, according to agency Afghan press here. Meanwhile, a group of Mujahidin led by Captain Hadi have beaten back an attack launched on the Hazarhjat area, Bamiyan Province, say reports. It was the first time during six years of occupation that Soviet troops have attacked Hazarhjat, but the Mujahidin foiled their attempts and forced them to retreat with heavy losses. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1840 GMT 17 Dec 85 LD] /9738

CASUALTIES REPORTED--Tehran, 14 Dec (IRNA)--Afghan Mujahideen have smashed a joint Soviet-Karmal offensive in Khakriz [IRNA spelling], Qandahhar Province, killing or wounding more than 600 troops, besides destroying 90 enemy tanks and personnel carriers, as well as 11 helicopters. According to Mujahideen sources Saturday [14 December], the joint offensive launched last week was badly beaten and forced to retreat. Kabul Radio has confirmed the attack in its daily program, but has since blacked out any information about its progress or the number of casualties suffered by either side. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1835 GMT 14 Dec 85 LD] /9738

SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PREDICTED--Islamabad, 14 Dec (IRNA)--The leader of the Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society) of Afghanistan, Burhaneddin Rabbani, speaking in Peshawar Friday said that according to reliable sources, the Soviet Government will pull out its forces from Afghanistan next year. Rabbani, quoting informed sources said that the Soviet Defence Ministry has

sent a letter to Afghan Government noting that Soviet forces are no longer able to fight against the Afghan Muslim Mujahideen. The Soviet officials have also informed Babrak Karmal that in 1986 they would not continue to maintain security of Karmal's Government and, therefore, will leave the responsibility for the Afghan Government, he added. Rabbani warned Muslim Mujahideen against any schism and said that the enemies were after such vicious plans. He further condemned the Geneva talks on Afghanistan, a new round of which is to start next week under the supervision of the United Nations. He said that such talks, held between representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan would fail again. He stressed that no one had the right to negotiate on behalf of people of Afghanistan and make any decision for them. The fate of Afghanistan, he concluded, must be determined by Afghans. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1210 GMT 14 Dec 85 LD] /9738

FORCES SAID SUSTAINING LOSSES--London, 13 Dec (IRNA)--AGENCY AFGHAN PRESS here said that Karmal mass media in Afghanistan has confirmed that the Mujahideen carried out operations in the provinces of Baghlan, Balkh, Herat, Farah, Uruzgan, Ghanzi, Nangarhar, Kabul and Laghman, in which 850 persons were claimed to have been killed and over 300 captured. Kabul Radio stated that worst hit were the provinces of Herat and Balkh where Soviet-Karmal forces sustained heavy losses. In Balkh Province, the Mujahideen with the collaboration of Soviet troops of the Muslim occupied state of Tajikistan blew up an ammunition depot, inflicting over 100 casualties on the Soviet troops. In addition, Balkh, the western province of Herat was the main target of Mujahideen's operations, which according to Kabul Radio were the scene of fierce clashes between the Mujahideen and Soviet-Karmal troops in Herat City. The AAP report said also that the main Jamia Mosque of Herat City was severely damaged by joint forces' shelling which martyred 80 Afghan civilians. The Kabul Radio, however, did not mention the losses of Soviet-Karmal troops. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1450 GMT 13 Dec 85 LD] /9738

CSO: 4600/136

BANGLADESH

BRIEFS

JAPANESE FOOD AID--Japan will provide Bangladesh with a grant of Taka 20 crore under notes the two governments exchanged in Dhaka yesterday. External Resources Division Secretary M K Anwar and Japanese ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka signed the notes on behalf of their government. Japan will provide the grant assistance under the food aid convention of the international wheat agreement, 1971, known as Kennedy Round Programme, meant for food support to the developing countries. Of the total amount Taka 10 crore would be utilized by Bangladesh government to import wheat from the United States and taka 6 crore to import rice from Pakistan. The remaining amount of Taka 4 crore will be used for transportation of the foodgrains to Bangladesh ports. Since 1971 Bangladesh has received an amount of Taka 237 crore 26 lakh as grant for rice from Japan under the K R Programme. It is only this year that Japan agreed to provide wheat to Bangladesh for the first time. Total food grant received from Japan, including the present one will stand at Taka 256 crore 43 lakh. With the signing of the exchange of notes yesterday total grant assistance to Bangladesh will amount to Taka 963 crore 47 lakh. Japan also extended loan to Bangladesh amounting to Taka 2640 crore since 1974. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 13 Nov 85 pp 1, 8] /9274

COMMUNIST LEADER ARRESTED--Mr Tipu Biswas, a leader of the Communist League of Bangladesh and the Seven-party alliance was arrested at 11:30 a.m. yesterday from the GPO crossing along with six others. The other arrested persons are Zahiruddin Swapan, general secretary of Biplobi Chhatra Moitree and a leader of the Kendriyo Chhatra Sangram Paad, Syed rish Mohsin Al-Mamun, Mohammad Shahjahan, Rafiqul Islam, Aminul Islam and Sohrab Ali Sheikh. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Nov 85 pp 1, 8] /9274

NEW THAI ENVOY--Thailand has appointed Niran Panupong as its new Ambassador to Bangladesh, report BSS. Born August 24, 1929 Mr Panupong entered the foreign service in 1950 after obtaining his Lib and M. A. (Diplomacy) from the Thammasat University. He was Minister Counsellor at the Thai Embassy in Vientiane prior to his present assignment. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 5 Nov 85 p 3] /9274

AMBASSADOR TO POLAND--The government has decided to appoint Mr K. M. Shehab uddin, at present Charge D'Affaires in Warsaw, as Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Polish People's Republic, according to an official source. A career

diplomat, Mr K. M. Shehabuddin did his B.A. (Hons) and M.A. in History from the University of Dhaka. He joined Foreign Service in 1966 and served in various capacities in India, Nepal, France, Lebanon and Great Britain. He was the Deputy High Commissioner of Bangladesh in London from 1979 to 1982. He also worked as Director and Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Joint Secretary-in Charge of Relief and rehabilitation Division, Ministry of Food in 1982-83. He was appointed Charge D'Affaires of Bangladesh to Poland in July 1983. Mr. Shehabuddin has travelled widely as member of Bangladesh delegations to many countries in South and South East Asia, Middle East, Europe and America. He also attended the United Nations General Assembly Sessions several times. He is married and has children. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 3 Nov 85 p 3] /9274

PRC ENVOY'S CREDENTIALS--The Ambassador-designate of China to Bangladesh, Mr Zheng Jianying, presented his credentials to President M. H. Ershad at Bangabhaban on Sunday morning, reports BSS. Presenting his letter of credence, the new Ambassador expressed the hope that during his tenure of office the existing friendly ties and cooperation between Bangladesh and China would be further strengthened. Reciprocating the sentiments President Ershad assured Mr Zheng Jianying of all possible assistance and cooperation in the smooth discharge of his duties. Earlier, on arrival at Bangabhatan the Chinese Ambassador was given a Guard of Honour by President's Guard Regiment. He took the salute and inspected the guard. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 4 Nov 85 p 1] /9274

CANADIAN RAILROAD AID--Canada will provide ten main line metre gauge diesel electric locomotives of Tk 39 crore as grant to Bangladesh to support the development of railway transport and communication system in Bangladesh, says PID handout. A memorandum of understanding to this effect was signed in Dhaka on Wednesday by Mr M. K. Anwar, Secretary External Resources Division and Mr Anthony G. Vincent, Canadian High Commissioner to Bangladesh on behalf of their respective government. The expenditures for procurement shipment and all other related matters for this will be covered from this grant. The Railway Division of the Ministry of Communication will implement this project. With the procurement of ten locomotives, the total Canadian grant will rise to 22 locomotives and 12 broad gauge locomoties. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 31 Oct 85 p 8] /9274

CLASH IN CHITTAGONG--Chittagong, Oct 28--At least 30 people were injured when two rival groups clashed with guns and other lethal weapons at Charkhagari Union under Satkania upazila of the district this afternoon, reports BSS. According to Chittagong Medical College Hospital sources 20 people with bullet injuries were brought to the hospital to night. Of them 14 were released after first air while six others were admitted in serious condition. The admitted persons are Tajul Islam Kabir Ahmed Fauz Ahmed Aftabuddin Badan Ali and Jebar Ahmed. Ten injured persons were treated at different medicare centres of the upazila. According to police two rival groups clashed for two and a half hours from 1.00 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. today with fire arms. The violent clash originated from a land dispute police sources said. When contacted over telephone Satkania police said that a police team was sent to the spot and the situation was now under control. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 29 Oct 85 p 1] /9274

CSO: 4600/1210

IRAN

SOVIET TRADE WITH MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES EXAMINED

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 30 Nov-6 Dec 85
pp 14-16

[Article by A. Olshany, International Institute of Economic Problems of World Socialist System, CMEA: "Soviet Trade and Economic Co-operation with the Middle East Countries"]

[Text]

The Middle East countries have always played and today continue to play an important part in the foreign economic affairs of the Soviet state. Some 60 years back, the Soviet government repudiated, on Lenin's initiative, the agreements on the division of Iran and Turkey. About the same time, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey were the first among the developing countries to conclude in 1921 inter-governmental agreements with the Soviet state. And today, Lenin's principles of foreign economic policy based on the ideas of friendship, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual interest of the parties concerned, have made the groundwork for the agreements between the USSR and the Middle East countries, for hundreds of industrial projects completed and nearing completion in the key sectors of their economies with Soviet assistance, and for ever-growing mutual trade.

USSR — Middle East trade and economic relations continue to develop further on firm legal-contractual grounds underlain with inter-governmental treaties and agreements on economic and technical co-operation.

In the years 1960 through 1984, goods turnover between the USSR and the countries of the Middle East grew from 344.6 million to 5,982.7 million roubles. In 1984, the share which the Middle East states occupied in the total Soviet trade with all the developing countries constituted 32 per cent in goods turnover, 23 per cent in exports, and almost 47 per cent in imports.

Soviet exports to the Middle East countries include essentially the articles of means of production, such as machines, equipment and materials so important for the development of their national economies. In total Soviet exports of machines and equipment, 50 per cent are complete-set deliveries for the industrial projects constructed with Soviet aid. Other Soviet exports to these countries include various building materials, fuel, raw materials and foodstuffs.

The Soviet market is open to the traffic of traditional export goods of the Middle East countries, such as gas (Afghanistan), oil (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia), cotton (Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, the Sudan), wool (Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey), raw hide (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Syria). The tendency in recent years has been to increase purchases by Soviet trade organisations of processed materials, semifabricated and finished articles. These include superphosphates (Morocco), granulated urea (Afghanistan), cotton yarn (Egypt, Pakistan, Syria), textiles (Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey), knitted goods (Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria), carpets (Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria), fish products (Iran, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Morocco), wine (Algeria).

Particular attention in the co-operation with the Middle East countries is given to developing sectors of material production, in particular heavy industry and agriculture, and to training national cadres. Appreciable assistance is ren-

dered in the spheres of health care, housing and public utility construction. In most cases, the Soviet economic and technical aid is given to develop multi-purpose engineering projects rather than to construct individual enterprises. Thus, the USSR has assisted Afghanistan in prospecting and developing natural gas deposits, constructing gas pipelines, building a factory for nitrogen fertilizer production and a large gas-burning power plant.

With Soviet aid, large-scale hydraulic power development have been accomplished in Syria and Egypt. Beside the dams, water storage reservoirs and huge water-power plants on the Euphrates and the Nile, these developments also include irrigation systems, a developed network of power transmission lines and enterprises of power-intensive industries.

The Aswan High Dam development has the largest Middle East hydraulic power plant of 2 100MW generating capacity. This electric power station makes the groundwork for the single grid of the country. Egypt has become the sixth country in the world (after the USSR, the USA, Canada, Finland and Sweden) that has built a unique 500kV overhead power line. The overall length of power transmission lines built with Soviet assistance totals 3 500 km. Putting into effect the Aswan High Dam project has provided conditions for reclaiming 840,000 hectares of new lands. The storage capacity of the water reservoir is sufficiently high to provide the assured 55-56 billion cu. m. of irrigation water annually, independently of the Nile seasonal freshet waters, to meet the needs of Egyptian agriculture.

The yields of crops such as rice, corn and sugar cane increased by a factor of 1.5-2. With Soviet aid Egypt has built power intensive enterprises such as the Helwan metallurgical combine and an aluminium plant in Naga-Hammadi. The Aswan High Dam is a highly profitable development which by mid-1985 had repaid the cost of its construction seven times.

In like manner, the Euphrates development in Syria produces a many-sided effect on the country's economy. Built with Soviet assistance, it includes the 800 MW hydraulic power plant, and a 12 billion cu. m. capacity water storage. The water can be used to irrigate 640,000 hectares of dry land which will double the irrigated land area in Syria. The company town built for the construction workers of the project has turned into a beautiful

settlement amidst the desert and was symbolically called As-Saurā (the Arabic for revolution).

The industrial enterprises built with the help of the Soviet Union play an important part in the economy of the Middle East countries. The share which the power stations built with Soviet aid contribute to the country's total electric power generation constitute more than 60 per cent in Syria, Iraq and in Afghanistan; 45 per cent in Egypt, and more than 20 per cent in Morocco and Pakistan.

As much as Soviet assistance is important in building up the electric power generating capacities to overcome the consequences of the energy crisis, so it is valuable in the prospecting and developing of the fuel and raw material deposits. The Soviet Union has helped to develop the national oil industry in Syria and gas industry in Afghanistan. Large-scale assistance continues in prospecting and developing oil and gas deposits in Iraq, Algeria, Libya and in a number of other countries of this region. Iran has extended coal production in the mines that are covered by the co-operation programs.

With Soviet aid, the Middle East countries have been able to explore and put into commercial use the natural deposits of the various fossil minerals. Most important developments now in commercial use are the iron ore mines in Egypt and Iran, polymetallic ore mines and ore-dressing factories in Algeria. Work is under way for the developing by Soviet organizations of the Mescale phosphorite deposits in Morocco, the project implying a mining enterprise of an annual rated capacity of 10,000,000 ton of ore plus the necessary features of infrastructure.

Ferrous metallurgy plays an important part in the development of the national economy in the countries of this region.

The USSR has assisted in the construction of metallurgical combines with a production capacity up to 2,000,000 tons of steel in Iskanderun (Turkey), up to 2,000,000 tons in Al-Khadjar (Algeria), up to 1,900,000 tons in Isfahan (Iran); 1,500,000 tons in Helwan (Egypt) and 1,100,000 tons of steel per year in Karachi (Pakistan).

Co-operation programs carried out in petrochemical industry resulted in a number of oil refineries up to 10,000,000 tons per year each in Aliaga (Turkey) and some petrochemical enterprises in Egypt. Another sphere of co-operation of the

USSR with the Middle East countries has been the mechanical engineering industry, machine-making in particular. Dozens of factories and mechanical plants have been built among which are the machine-making plants in Iraq and Iran, machine-tool factory in Egypt, automobile repair plant in Afghanistan. Soviet organizations give the Middle East countries the assistance necessary in the development of various sectors of the economy including construction materials, light and food industries, agriculture and fisheries.

The transfer of scientific-technical and design documentation, the accompanying licences and know-how has been one of the major components of co-operation in the area of capital construction. Soviet assistance in establishing the national design organization has been a specific form of technology transfer and co-

operation. Thus, a project-design bureau was set up in Syria in connection with the developing petrochemistry.

Considerable aid comes from the USSR to the Middle East countries into the spheres of training national specialists during the course of construction and operation of the co-operative projects, in the training establishments organized locally with Soviet technical aid, and in the plants, factories and training centers in the USSR.

The experience gained in the course of co-operation provides evidence that trade and economic co-operation between the USSR and the Middle East countries is mutually beneficial and shows good prospects for further development. Imparting a stable, long-term and large-scale character to this co-operation comes in agreement with the capacities and interests of both sides.

Dynamic Growth of Trade Between the USSR and the Middle East Countries, million roubles

		1960	1970	1980	1984
<i>All countries of the Middle East -total</i>					
	turnover	344.6	1473.	3899.2	5982.7
	exports	169.0	898.3	2297.3	2462.2
	imports	175.6	575.3	1601.9	3520.5
<i>Including:</i>					
Afghanistan					
	turnover	44.0	66.9	504.7	898.7
	exports	28.8	36.0	247.7	594.7
	imports	15.2	30.9	257.7	304.0
Algeria					
	turnover	2.1	118.3	155.1	287.8
	exports	2.1	62.5	92.6	142.3
	imports	—	55.8	62.5	145.5
Arab Republic of Yemen					
	turnover	4.4	11.0	48.1	10.9
	exports	3.2	10.0	47.9	10.8
	imports	1.2	1.0	0.2	0.1
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen					
	turnover	—	4.5	61.2	116.0
	exports	—	4.3	55.9	110.2
	imports	—	0.2	5.3	5.8
Egypt					
	turnover	172.0	606.4	383.7	546.7
	exports	62.8	326.9	172.7	276.7
	imports	109.2	279.5	211.0	270.0
Iraq					
	turnover	21.3	63.5	731.7	941.7
	exports	18.2	59.4	473.2	272.9
	imports	3.1	4.1	258.5	668.8
Iran					
	turnover	33.3	231.2	334.6	484.1
	exports	16.2	169.0	259.2	241.7
	imports	17.1	62.2	75.4	242.4

		1960	1970	1980	1984
Lebanon	turnover	7.4	17.5	17.2	43.1
	exports	3.9	13.7	19.1	35.1
	imports	3.5	3.8	4.1	8.0
Libya	turnover	1.3	12.9	450.9	1273.3
	exports	0.9	12.9	163.4	139.9
	imports	0.4	—	287.5	1133.4
Morocco	turnover	8.8	50.1	198.0	159.7
	exports	5.2	32.5	92.6	118.3
	imports	3.6	17.6	105.4	41.4
Pakistan	turnover	6.2	60.4	176.6	123.5
	exports	2.2	32.1	126.2	77.3
	imports	4.0	28.3	50.4	46.2
Saudi Arabia	turnover	0.4	5.4	30.8	317.1
	exports	0.4	5.4	30.8	25.1
	imports	—	—	—	292.0
The Sudan	turnover	10.1	77.4	17.5	16.6
	exports	4.9	32.5	5.6	0.2
	imports	5.2	44.9	11.9	16.4
Syria	turnover	16.9	59.1	321.0	468.8
	exports	9.9	41.8	167.6	249.3
	imports	7.0	17.3	153.4	219.5
Tunisia	turnover	4.3	5.7	25.0	36.3
	exports	2.9	3.1	19.5	31.5
	imports	1.4	2.6	5.5	4.8
Turkey	turnover	12.1	83.3	443.1	258.4
	exports	7.4	56.2	329.3	136.2
	imports	4.7	27.1	113.8	122.2

/12851
CSO: 4600/127

IRAN

PREPARATION UNDERWAY TO PROVIDE ALTERNATE EXPORT ROUTE

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Vahe Petrossian: "Iraq's Kharg Strikes: Treason or Technology?"]

[Text]

WHEN Iraqi aircraft made their first successful attack on the Kharg island export terminal on 15 August, they found the island's formidable defences unmanned. This was according to plan; the commander of the island's anti-aircraft units had assured the Iraqis that his men would be taking a break at that precise moment.

The Iraqi air force managed to inflict considerable damage on the installations before the anti-aircraft units could go into action. In particular, they hit a very large crude carrier (VLCC) moored at the Sea Island jetty, on the western side of the island, starting a blaze which damaged parts of the terminal structure. The Iranian commander who tipped off the Iraqis is now in jail, facing the ultimate penalty for treason.

The Iraqis have carried out a series of air raids on the island since their mid-August success. However, these have been high-altitude attacks, lacking the precision of the earlier low-level raid.

This is one account of how the Iraqis managed to penetrate Kharg's defences, put forward by some highly placed Tehranis. It is contradicted by a more complex — and more deeply worrying — account advanced by officials close to the oil industry.

According to this version, most of the attacks since 15 August have involved low-level raids, supplemented by high-altitude bombing. Iraq's successes are attributed to better training by French instructors and the use of sophisticated, laser-guided missiles supplied by France.

Many of the attacks appear to be complex operations involving several dozen aircraft. The raiders are reported to approach Kharg at varying altitudes, making defence difficult. The use of laser-guided missiles also allows precision targeting from a distance.

Whichever account of the Iraqi successes is the more accurate, there is every sign that the Iranian authorities are taking the attacks seriously, making preparations to counter

them and provide alternative arrangements for oil exports. Defences are being upgraded and other export terminals are being set up at safer sites (see above).

There are certainly no plans to abandon Kharg, although only essential repairs are being carried out on the damaged installations. The Sea Island jetty is still being used for some liftings, but it is not being repaired. Damaged pipelines and other equipment are being replaced.

Kharg, which was designed to handle up to 7 million barrels a day (b/d) of crude, has so much spare capacity that it can sustain heavy damage without affecting the present low export requirement of about 1.6 million b/d, local observers point out.

Loading operations are primitive: no pumps are required to load the crude on to tankers. The main pumping station is at an underground site at Gurreh, on the mainland; previous Iraqi attacks against Gurreh have failed. Repairs to pipelines can be done in a matter of days.

The Iraqis are now concentrating their raids on the huge tank farm on Kharg island. Dozens of reservoir tanks — some the size of two football pitches — present relatively easy targets, and at least one has been hit in recent weeks. However, even the complete destruction of the tank farm would not halt oil exports: "It would just give us more technical headaches," officials say.

Exports through Kharg, terminals at Lavan and Sirri islands in the east, and a floating terminal off Sirri serviced by a shuttle from Kharg, are averaging 1.5 million-2 million b/d, according to an official who sees daily export figures. This level would provide enough foreign exchange for planned imports of \$16,500 million for the Iranian year ending 20 March 1986.

For the moment, the government seems assured of adequate revenues from oil. But it is bound to be nervous until it has all the alternatives to Kharg safely in place — some time in 1986.

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CSO: 4600/126

IRAN

BUDGET ITEMS, CONSTRUCTION OF NEW PIPELINE, OIL SALE DISCUSSED

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 7-13 Dec 85 pp 18-20

[Text] New Budget Cuts Spending

A \$42,630 million deflationary budget has been proposed for the Iranian year starting 21 March 1986. Expenditure is down by about \$890 million on the current year; when increased defence spending and inflation are taken into account, overall economic activity will be cut by about 10 percent in real terms.

The government of Prime Minister Hossain Moussavi presented the budget to the majlis (parliament) on 1 December; it has to be approved by 20 March 1986. The majlis has in the past slashed proposed government spending; this time, it would seem to have little room for manoeuvre.

Iran: budget 1985/86-1986/87*		
(IR '000 million)		
	1986/87	1985/86
General revenues	3,574.7	3,780.4
Taxes	1,169.8	1,138.2
Oil	1,600.0	1,867.0
Foreign exchange sales	111.0	119.0
Other	424.2	396.3
Special income	269.7	259.9
Deficit finance		
Domestic loans	390.0	200.0
Balance from previous year	85.0	154.4
Total revenues	4,049.7	4,134.8
Expenditure	3,780.0	3,874.9
Fixed investment	949.2	1,085.8
War reconstruction	35.0	50.0
Current expenditure	2,341.3	2,305.3
Repayment of foreign loans	24.5	33.8
War expenditure	430.0	400.0
From special income	269.7	259.9
Total expenditure	4,049.7	4,134.8
*Solar Hijra years 1364-65		
Exchange rate: \$ 1 = IR 95		
Source: Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA)		

Projected oil revenues are set at \$16,800 million, about \$2,800 million below the current budget figure. However, defence spending has been increased by roughly \$300 million, to \$4,530 million. Deficit financing is expected to amount to \$5,000 million--\$1,270 million above the projected deficit for the current year.

The government also plans to spend nearly \$10,000 million on development programmes. This is about \$1,500 million less than this year and nearly \$5,000 million down on two years ago.

IGAT-2 Link Line Award Imminent

A \$188 million contract to lay an oil pipeline to connect the Ahwaz fields with the IGAT-2 pipeline running to Taheri, on the Gulf, is expected to be awarded by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in the next few months, contractors say. The only companies known to be bidding for parts of the contract are Italy's Saipem and South Korea's Daelim Industrial Company; details of the project are a closely guarded secret.

The 140-kilometre line is designed to reduce the vulnerability of Iran's oil exports, following damaging Iraqi air attacks on the Kharg island export terminal in August and September. The exact route the pipeline will take is not known, but contractors say it will link up with IGAT-2, which has just been completed by Saipem. IGAT-2 was originally designed to carry gas exports to the Soviet Union; but if the Kharg terminal is damaged again, the link line will pump oil to IGAT-2, which will take it down to Taheri.

The scheme is the second pipeline project to emerge since the late-summer Iraqi attacks. The other comprises a \$500 million twin line to run 380 kilometres from the Kharg island pumping station at Gurreh to a terminal at Asaluyeh, near Taheri. Bids for this scheme will be opened in Tehran on 5 December; three companies are vying for the pipe supply order and five groups are competing for the contract to assemble the line (MEED 30:11:85).

On completion, the two projects will enable Iran to export well above its OPEC quota of 1.6 million barrels a day (b/d) without using Kharg island. President Khamenei and recently appointed Oil Minister Gholamreza Aqazadeh say that, within a few months, Iran will have raised its export capacity to 13 million b/d. The latter emphasised that the government will not ask OPEC for a quota increase--implying that the two lines will be used for oil exports only if Kharg island is severely damaged.

When the two lines are not being used to export oil, they will carry gas in the opposite direction, from the Kangan gas field near Taheri and Asaluyeh. The IGAT-2 pipeline will have the double function of supplying gas to cities and pumping it up to the Ahwaz oil fields, where it will be used for secondary recovery. The line between Asaluyeh and Gurreh will also be used to pump gas up to the southern oil fields--again, for secondary recovery.

NIOC is understood to have approached only Saipem and Daelim for the link line to IGAT-2. Both companies have declined to release project details.

Other contractors believe the former is discussing a \$100 million financing package for about 100 kilometres of pipeline; Daelim is understood to have quoted \$88 million for 40 kilometres of pipeline, plus pumping stations.

ANZ Moves Into Oil Market

The Australia & New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ Bank) and its subsidiary Grindlays Bank have recently been authorised to open letters of credit (LCs) for oil exports with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

The market is lucrative for banks--crude exports in 1984 were worth \$17,500 million--although the margins are small. Banks not on the list have to get LCs for their clients confirmed by one of the banks acceptable to NIOC.

The 21 banks already on the list are: The Fuji Bank, The Bank of Tokyo, The Mitsubishi Bank, The Sumitomo Bank, The Tokai Bank, Lloyds Bank, Union Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse, Bank Melli Iran, Bank Saderat Iran, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Dresdner Bank, Deutsche-Iranische Handelsbank, Banco di Roma, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, State Bank of India, Banco Hispano Americano and Banque Bruxelles Lambert.

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IRAN

PROJECT INVITES BID ON PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 pp 4-6

[Article by Iain Jenkins: "Iran Acts in Pipeline War"]

[Text]

IRAN is moving ahead quickly with plans to build a \$500 million, 380-kilometre twin pipeline, which will allow it to export its full OPEC quota without using the Kharg island export terminal. The decision follows the damaging Iraqi air strikes, which for one week in late September reduced oil exports from Kharg to a reported trickle and threatened to cripple Iran's war effort.

The speed with which the project is being put together has surprised international contractors. The first news of the project was a mid-October telex to 11 Far East and European companies, inviting them to bid for the contract to install the pipeline in one year (see box). They were given only until 20 November to submit offers. The telex said letters of intent would be issued between 3-6 December.

At the same time, three pipe manufacturers that have been involved for more than a year in bidding for a contract to supply gas pipes were asked for a final re-bid by 2 November. They were told that the pipeline — which was to have pumped gas from the offshore Pars field to the Ahwaz oil fields for secondary recovery — had been modified to a reversible oil/gas line. It was still to be used to pump gas to Ahwaz but, when needed, it would also be able to pump oil to a floating terminal south of Kharg.

"The scheme is a government project, not a National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) project, which is why it is moving so fast," says one contractor. "It is also a stroke of genius, as it is both a strategic and capital project. During the war it will be a back-up to Kharg island and when the war ends it will still have a useful role."

Taking no chances

The urgency on Iran's part reflects the success of the low-level Iraqi air strikes on Kharg island in August and September. Most of the berths at Kharg — which handles 85 per cent of oil exports — were reported to have been put out of action. Since then, quick repair work has restored exports to the normal level of 1.5 million barrels a day (b/d), but Iran has signalled that it is going to take no more chances.

The planned pipeline will have a capacity of up to 1.5 million b/d and will run from Gurreh, the pumping station for Kharg, along the coast to Asaluyeh, near the Pars gas field and halfway between Kharg and Bandar Abbas. It will connect with floating terminals or ultra-large crude carriers (ULCCs), moored at Bushehr and Asaluyeh, which will load the oil on to tankers.

The pipeline itself will only take about 24 hours to repair if bombed; the buoys will be difficult to hit from the air and easy to replace if damaged. This leaves the pumping stations as the only vulnerable part of Iran's latest plans to protect its oil exports — and they can be shielded in bomb-resistant concrete bunkers.

NIOC's invitation telex lists the main features of the construction contract — estimated to be worth \$200 million — as: laying the pipeline, erecting storage facilities for 8 million barrels of oil, and installing booster stations, telecommunications systems and infrastructure.

Contractors have been given seven months to complete the first 350 kilometres of the pipeline, or 172 kilometres of the twin line. This would be enough to reach Bushehr, where some floating terminals will be moored, and would

mean that Iran could have an alternative to Kharg for a large part of its oil exports by mid-1986. The rest of the line is to be commissioned within 12 months, with the booster stations and infrastructure to be completed within 15 months.

Unrealistic deadlines

"The Iranians are determined to rush the project through, but most of the deadlines look slightly unrealistic," says one contractor involved in the project. "I don't know how companies will be capable of making a meaningful offer after only one month. And laying the pipe in one year only looks unrealistic," he adds.

Of the companies invited to bid for the pipeline, none of the European concerns is expected to submit offers, apart from Saipem, which is finishing the IGAT-2 gas line (see map). The South Koreans will almost certainly bid, and Japan's involvement in the pipe supply contract may persuade the two Japanese contractors to put in offers.

The three groups bidding for the pipe supply contract, valued at about \$300 million, are West Germany's Mannesmann, Italy's Italsider, and a Japanese consortium of Nippon Steel Company, Nippon Kokan, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Kawasaki Steel Corporation. The tender calls for the supply of up to 980 kilometres of 42-inch-diameter pipe — suitable for sour gas — and about 12 kilometres of 42-inch submarine pipe. In total, about 470,000 tons of steel pipes are involved.

NIOC is already evaluating these bids but, because of the tight timescale, is unlikely to award the contract to one supplier. This is because the pipe manufacturers do not have sufficient capacity to make such large quantities of pipe in the time allowed. The most likely outcome is that the order will be split between two or all of the bidders.

Oil barter payment

A vital element of both the supply and contracting packages will be the means of payment. The invitation telex says payment will be entirely or partially


through crude oil barter, and asks for various financing proposals. "Oil barter is fine. The crucial factor is when the oil is lifted. If it is lifted before the work starts it is as good as cash, but if it is lifted after the work has been completed we will need financing," says one contractor involved in the bidding.

An additional option being considered by Iran is a 92-kilometre line from Gachsaran oil fields to the IGAT-2 gas line. Crude could then be pumped down the 56-inch-diameter gas line to floating terminals at Taheri.

The plan to build a pipeline to Asaluyeh is the latest phase in the war in which Iran's oil exports have become a main target. Iran hopes to receive about \$17,500 million of oil income in 1985 — roughly 90 per cent of its total foreign currency earnings for the year. Any sustained interruption of oil exports would seriously damage the government's ability to pay for military hardware. Some analysts have suggested that this would provoke Iran to take radical action, including further disruption of Gulf shipping and even attacks on Iraq's Gulf allies.

Iraq has tried attacking tankers plying to Kharg island and loading at the terminal in an attempt to strangle the Iranian war effort. But at least 500 successful hits on shipping in the Gulf have failed to slow down oil exports, which for the past year have averaged close to Iran's OPEC quota of 1.6 million b/d. The Iraqi bombers have also kept up their attacks on Iranian oil installations, renewing the raids in September and October.

Until September it had been Iraq that was on the defensive in the "oil war." Its oil exporting capacity had shrunk to 800,000 b/d, from a pre-war level of about 3 million b/d, because of damage to Iraq's Gulf export terminals and Syria's closure of the pipeline from the Kirkuk field to the Mediterranean coast. But heavy investment in pipelines across Turkey and Saudi Arabia has increased Iraq's export capacity to 1.5 million b/d. Further work in Turkey and Saudi Arabia is projected to raise it further to 3.1 million b/d by mid-1988. Iran's new pipeline appears to be an attempt to regain the initiative in the oil war.



Out of range: the 380-kilometre proposed pipeline will follow a route skirting the Gulf coast to Asaluyeh. The starting point will be Gurreh, site of the pumping station serving Kharg island. The line will connect with Bushehr where single-buoy moorings (SBMs) will be installed to serve tankers. A further pipeline proposal calls for a 92-kilometre crude oil link between Gachsaran and the IGAT-2 gas pipeline. This will give Iran the option of pumping crude oil to Taheri through the gas line.

THE POTENTIAL BIDDERS

The 11 companies invited to bid for the pipeline construction are:

- ☐ South Korea – Daewoo Corporation, Daelim Industrial Company, Samsung, Ssangyong Construction Company
- ☐ UK – Costain Process Engineering & Construction Company; Davy McKee
- ☐ West Germany – Mannesmann Anlagenbau; Philipp Holzmann
- ☐ Japan – Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction Company; JGC Corporation
- ☐ Italy – Saipem.

Two leading French pipeline contractors – Spie-Capag and Entrepouse – have not been invited to bid, reflecting France's continuing support for Iraq in the Gulf war.

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IRAN

TALBOT OPTS FOR OIL BARTER

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 p 18

[Text]

The UK's *Peugeot Talbot* has decided to accept an oil barter deal, using a Turkish company as intermediary, to enable it to complete its 1985 contract to supply car kits. The \$ 100 million-a-year order ran into difficulties in early November, when letter of credit (LC) cover expired — leaving Talbot with 7,824 Hillman Hunter car kits for which no payment had been received (MEED 16:11:85).

The barter deal, through Turkey's *Cukurova Holding*, was signed in mid-November, and will ensure that Talbot is paid for this year's final shipments. The arrangement may be extended to cover the 1986 contract, which calls for the supply of a further 50,000 car kits, but Talbot is prepared to consider any other method of payment, a company representative says. A team is to visit Tehran in December to discuss the 1986

contract.

Talbot has refused to release details of the barter deal, but it is understood to be similar to an arrangement Iran has agreed with France's *Renault*, which also supplies car kits. Both agreements are believed to be covered by Turkey's \$ 3,000 million barter deal with Iran, which calls for the former to import \$ 1,500 million worth of crude oil in return for exports of manufactured goods; if Turkey is unable to fill its quota, it makes up the shortfall by supplying goods made in other countries.

Talbot's contract with Iran has been plagued by payments difficulties since 1982. Several UK oil companies visited Tehran in mid-1984 to discuss a possible role in a barter deal, seen at the time as the most promising way of resolving the payments delays, but nothing was agreed.

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IRAN

REGIME'S LEADERS BLASTED BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER

London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 p 6

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The secretary general of the "Freedom Movement of Iran," Mehdi Bazargan whose open purpose in travelling to Belgium and Federal Republic of Germany was only a declaration in which he invited all Iranians who live abroad to unify, and contrary to his usual manner he did not make any comments against the ruling regime; however, after his return to Iran he has started his strife and squabble with the functionaries of the Islamic government.

Before his trip to Europe, in the month of Tir 1364 [22 June - 22 July 1985] in a letter he answered the charges which had been made against him by the two newspapers KEYHAN [printed in Tehran] and JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI and demanded that the abovementioned newspapers print his letter; however, neither of these two papers did so. Consequently, in the month of Mehr 1364 [23 September - 22 October 1985] after his return from Europe, Engineer Bazargan circulated the said letter in the form of a leaflet in Iran.

The two newspapers accused Bazargan of being of the same ilk as Saddam, since like Saddam and Mojahedin-e Khalq he promoted peace. Bazargan retorted that it was an erroneous comparison since Saddam closes his eyes at night when he falls asleep as does Khamenei, thus Saddam and Khamenei are of the same ilk too!

Bazargan asks: "Is it a sin to ask for peace?" and answers himself and says: It really is strange, it seems like we've come very close to the due date for the reappearance of the last Imam! It is considered dangerous and even treason to mention peace, security and safety, however it would be adjudged glorious and prideful to seek war and promote its continuity, even though it might cause the complete destruction of the two Muslim countries!

Bazargan, who had written this letter in the middle of the period when Tehran was being bombarded by Iraqi planes and thereafter when the ruling regime had staged a large demonstration on the "Day of Qods," in support of the war says: "Suppose one million people took part in your march, so what! Of course throughout the world it is accepted factual propaganda for the stability and continuity of the intended policies to mobilize forces which helps the success of a ruling regime. Notwithstanding, according to the Tehran police traffic report during

the same 24 hours about 500,000 cars left Tehran for various destinations. Now, if we say that each car carried four passengers... or let's even say three... then we have 1.5 million people who left Tehran and we all know on that day how quiet and serene Tehran was!"

Bazargan goes on to add: "When the Freedom Movement decides to take part in the elections and proposes that we should have freedom and law for the elections, they say that the only thing this movement has in mind is the reign of power and thus they decide to nip it in the bud; however, when the Republic Party and your fellow-clerics set up seminars and go about promoting propaganda... or when a mere custodian of a pious foundation becomes chief and holds on to the helm of power with all his might, then that is called service to Islam."

Thereafter, Bazargan stressed the dual policy of the Islamic Republic which is a reference to the famous Persian proverb which says: Good heavens! How can there be two kinds of weather on the same roof? and states: "The ruling class has several newspapers, it has mosques and pulpits, it can give Friday sermons, it has the Voice and Vision [Radio and TV Network], it has a Majlis, it has special rules for employment and enrollment in the university, it has cooperatives and rations, it has courts, committees and corps, it has the Hajj pilgrimage organization, it has the Ministry of Guidance, it has foreign exchange... it has the freedom to say or do what it wants, while at the same time on the other side of the roof-top, for the Freedom Movement... it is only enough to have had a few representatives in the Majlis who within a period of three or four months had to bear so much abuse, beatings and quarreling... even that is too much for them and they should be thankful for that! You are right! Two kinds of weather over the same roof, two different sets of laws in one country for two class of people... yes, we are being too meddlesome and are busybodies and we ought to pay divine honor to them since they've given us the chance to breath! That goes for the rest of other groups or factions, whether it be national, Islamic or else...and some even enjoy less freedom that we do."

Furthermore, Bazargan asks the ruling officials: "Whether at a time when the late Dr Mossadeq... mentioned that in a constitutional government the shah acted as a monarch and not a ruler... which one of you and those individuals who call themselves the heroes of the revolution... had the guts and the gumption to express such a view? Was it not our sources of religious emulation, among them the leader of the revolution... who pinned their hope and reliance on the constitution of 1906 and asked for its execution...?"

Thereafter, Bazargan who has also been accused by the ruling officials of being "westernized," goes on to say: "They're accusing us of being westernized since we've studied in Europe or the United States." Then he asks: "Is it not true that the majority of the present ministers and top-ranking responsible officials of the ministries and those officials of the Voice and Vision have had more or less a few years of education either in Europe or the United States?"

Bazargan goes on to conclude the declaration of the Freedom Movement in this way:

From among the incriminating allegations which have been directed at us is that we do not use the motto "Down with the United States." I would like to say that we never used such a motto for any other country either. This kind of motto which was invented by the communists of the Tudeh Party from the time of Mossadeq has never been used in our religion or policy. Is it not true that the Qoran prohibits the use of abusive and foul language, even for the very infidels or the enemies of God. Is it not true that Imam Ali in one of his sermons stated that I do not like to see my followers use offensive or abusive language?... We believe that through the use of such mottos, you cannot impede the influence of foreigners... As long as we have to sell our oil--in any possible shape or form at any price we can get--to the industrial countries and as long as we have to import our most basic economic-military essentials, even our bread and meat, from the United States or one of its allies, then no matter how many times a day we say "down with the United States," yet our country cannot become independent... To tell you the truth, a true gentleman never uses abusive or insulting words!"

Observers of the political arena of Iran hint of the probability of a new phase of domestic struggle between various wings and the exertion of more pressure on Bazargan from two sides--on the one hand, from the left, the make-believe Muslims and on the other, the religious extremists. Furthermore, they predict that there is a probability of closer relations between Bazargan and the wing of the ruling body which is called the "pragmatists."

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IRAN

BRIEFS

PIPELINE BIDDERS NAMED--Five groups of bidders plan to compete for the \$200 million-plus contract to build a strategic oil pipeline skirting the Gulf coast (MEED 16:11:85, page 4). The tender closing date has been put back to 5 December from the original 20 November, to give bidders time to draw up their offers. The 380-kilometre twin pipeline will run from Gurreh -- the pumping station for Kharg -- to Asaluyeh, and will have a capacity of about 1.5 million barrels a day (b/d). It will connect with single-buoy moorings (SBMs) at Bushehr and Asaluyeh. The aim is to provide a backup to Kharg -- which was reported to have been severely damaged in Iraqi attacks in August and September -- and allow Iran to route all its exports through the pipeline if Kharg is badly hit again. When Kharg is operating normally, the line will be used to pump natural gas from Asaluyeh to the Ahwaz oil fields, where it will be used for secondary recovery. The five groups of bidders are: South Korea's Daewoo Corporation and Japan's JGC Corporation, both of which were invited to bid separately; South Korea's Daelim Industrial Company, with the UK's Stone & Webster Engineering, an affiliate of the US' Stone & Webster, as subcontractor; South Korea's Samsung, which intends to form a consortium with affiliate companies and sublet some work to Far East or European contractors; Saipem and Snamprogetti, both of Italy, and West Germany's Philipp Holzmann; both Saipem and Holzmann were on the original invitation list; South Korea's Ssangyong Construction Company, with the UK affiliate of the US' Bechtel as subcontractor for technical and bidding services. Four companies invited to bid have indicated that they do not intend to do so. They are: West Germany's Mannesmann; Costain Process Engineering & Construction Company and Davy McKee, both of the UK, and Japan's Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction Company. The pipeline is considered a priority by the government, which has set a tight schedule for tendering and completion of the work. The invitation telex sent out by National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) said letters of intent would be issued in early December; contractors would then be given seven months to complete the first 172 kilometres of twin line, with the rest of the line to be commissioned in 12 months. Contractors say the deadlines are slightly unrealistic, and they are not surprised by the two-week extension to the bid deadline. However, they stress that NIOC will stick to the timetable as far as possible. "They are serious about this project and intend to rush it through," says one bidder. "One indication that we got was when it took us only a few days to get our visas approved, compared with the usual two months." The Saipem/Holzmann

consortium is tipped as front-runner because of the Italian firm's recent success at winning Middle East pipeline orders. But contractors say Ssangyong has also emerged as a favourite because of the 6,000-b/d refinery it owns jointly with Iran. Iran has a term contract to supply crude for the refinery, in Onson, South Korea; according to contractors, this might give Ssangyong an edge in arranging the oil barter NIOC has proposed as a method of paying for the line. Bids for the supply of 980 kilometres of pipe for the project were submitted on 2 November. The contract, for 42-inch-diameter pipe, was originally scheduled to be awarded in early December, but the letter of intent is now expected to be issued at the same time as the construction contract is let. Three companies or groups submitted offers for the pipe supply. They are: West Germany's Mannesmann, Italy's Italsider, and a Japanese consortium of Nippon Steel Company, Nippon Kokan, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Kawasaki Steel Corporation. Because of the tight schedule and the lack of spare capacity among the three bidders, pipe manufacturers say the contract is likely to be split between the companies. /Text/ /London MEED/ THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 16-22 Nov 85 p 18 /12851

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