

R 191059

JPRS-EER-86-067

30 APRIL 1986

East Europe Report

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30 APRIL 1986

EAST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ECONOMY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- Nuclear Thermal Energy Generation To Meet Long-Term Needs
(Dieter Herrmann, et al.; ENERGIE TECHNIK, No 3, Mar 85) 1

POLAND

- Regulations on Economic Activity of Foundations
(DZIENNIK USTAW, No 57, 23 Dec 85) 10

ROMANIA

- Law on Remuneration of Workers Published
(SCINTEIA, 4 Apr 86) 13

YUGOSLAVIA

- Financial Results of Economy in 1985 Reported
(Zoran Nikodijevic; PRIVREDNI PREGLED, 27 Mar 86) 30
- 'Critical Analysis' Seen as Opposing Economic Program
(Jovan Radovanovic; BORBA, 15-16 Mar 86) 32
- Vojvodina Increases Investments in Thermal Power Plants
(S. Razic; PRIVREDNI PREGLED, 26 Mar 86) 36

MILITARY

POLAND

- Possibilities for Combating Cruise Missiles Outlined
(Marek Suchanecki; PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK
OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU, No 12, Dec 85) 37

POLITICS

HUNGARY

Academician Advocates 'One Party System Tempered by Pluralism' (Katalin Mogyoros; MOZGO VILAG, No 7, 1985)	45
---	----

POLAND

Party Activities Calendar: 23 December-5 January (ZYCIE PARTII, No 2, 15 Jan 86)	55
PZPR CC Commission Examines Local Government Inspection (TRYBUNA LUDU, 21 Jan 86)	58
Completion of State of Law Report Announced (TRYBUNA LUDU, 1-2 Mar 86)	60
Lack of Internal Party Criticism Decried (Mieczyslaw Czerniawski; POLITYKA, No 8, 22 Feb 86)	61
Self-Management Requires More Worker Initiatives (TRYBUNA LUDU, 11 Feb 86)	62
Young People Too Apolitical, Says Loranc (Wladyslaw Loranc; ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 28 Feb 86)	64
PRON Grunwald Committee Goals Designated (ODRODZENIE, 9 Feb 86)	65
PRON, National Councils' Joint Efforts (RZECZPOSPOLITA, 28 Feb 86)	67
Award Recipient Notes 'Rational' Patriotism (RZECZPOSPOLITA, 20 Mar 86)	68
American Church Group Visits To Discuss Agricultural Fund (GOSC NIEDZIELNY, No 51-52, 25 Dec 85)	69
Aspects of 'Catholic Culture' Criticized (PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI, No 49, 8 Dec 85)	70
Pope Names New Warsaw Auxiliary Bishop (Jozef Glemp; PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI, No 2, 12 Jan 86)	72
Polish Muslims Convene, Creating New Muftiyat (Janusz Kamocki; TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, No 2, 12 Jan 86) ...	73
Antonowicz Death Investigation Refutes Murder Charges (Wieslaw Debski; TRYBUNA LUDU, 12 Feb 86)	74

Briefs

Change in Passport Regulations Reported	76
Pope Addresses Polish Academics	76
USSR Religious Affairs Council Visits	76
Europe Backs Agricultural Fund	76

YUGOSLAVIA

Slovenian LC Supports 'Critical Analysis,' Attacks Reformers (BORBA, 2 Apr 86)	77
Discussion of LCY Bylaws Changes Continues (Milivoje Tomasevic; KOMUNIST, 21 Mar 86)	80
Increase of Nationalism in Army Discussed (Simeon Buncic; BORBA, 20 Mar 86)	88
Belgrade Professor Accuses Vatican in Historical Overview (Dragoljub Zivojinovic Interview; INTERVJU, 17 Jan 86)	92

ECONOMY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NUCLEAR THERMAL ENERGY GENERATION TO MEET LONG-TERM NEEDS

Leipzig ENERGIETECHNIK in German Vol 35 No 3 Mar 85 pp 85-89

[Article by Dieter Herrmann, Dieter Ziegenbein, Herbert Munser and Beate Reetz, Dresden¹: "Considerations of the Long-term Development of Heat Supply in the GDR"²]

[Text] 1. Introduction

In industrialized countries central heat supply, specifically the supply of low-temperature heat, plays a major role. In industry the supply of heat is essential for a variety of processes. Efforts to achieve a high level of productivity in heat generation and the advantages of increasing the capacities of heat generating plants have resulted in an increase in the centralization of heat supply in the industrial sector. This impetus will continue to stimulate the increase in the degree of centralization in heat supply in the future.

On a local level, central heat supply means a marked improvement in the comfort of living and extension of leisure time. One may assume that in the future the demand for an apartment or home supplied by district heating will have a major impact on the further centralization of heat supply.

There are other factors favoring the expansion of central heat supply. First and foremost, problems of environmental protection should be mentioned here. In large central heat generation plants measures to retain harmful substances which strain the environment can be much better implemented than in smaller decentralized plants. In addition, one must consider that the efficiency of energy conversion in larger plants is higher than in smaller plants. Last,

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1. Dr rer oec Dieter Herrmann and Prof Dr sc nat Dieter Ziegenbein, GDR Academy of Sciences, Central Nuclear Research Institute, Rossendorf. Prof Dr Ing habil Herbert Munser and Associate Professor sc techn Beate Reetz, Dresden Technical University, Energy Conversion Department.
 2. Lecture P4, presented at the XVIth Power Plant Colloquium of the Energy Conversion Department of the Dresden Technical University on Oct 9/10 1984.

but not least, one must point out that nuclear energy can only be utilized as a heat source if efficient heat supply systems exist.

What is the current status of central heat supply in the GDR?

In 1980 the percentage of heat energy supplied by central plants was 22 percent of the overall user energy, while a total of 60 percent of the user energy were used to satisfy the demand in the low-temperature range. Thus, in 1980 38 percent of user energy was utilized for heat supply in the low-temperature range, but not via heat as an energy transfer medium. The latter percentage is potentially available for further expansion of the district heating system, even if the overall demand remains essentially the same.

Taking a close look at heat energy generation, one finds that approximately one fourth of this volume is generated in the so-called public sector, i.e., under the jurisdiction of the integrated energy plants, while 75 percent are generated in the non-public sector, i.e., under the jurisdiction of the collective energy combines. In the public sector the installed output is approximately 10,000 MW, with approximately 25,000 MW in the non-public sector. These numbers show that in coming up with ideas on the perspective size of district heating systems, it is absolutely necessary to consider public as well as non-public heat supplies.

On the local level, the percentage of apartment units supplied by district heating is approximately 20 percent at present. This percentage will increase within the limited further construction of new units. As is well known, the GDR residential construction program is oriented more towards the reconstruction and modernization of existing units. In order to reduce expenses, the present priority is the retention of existing heating systems. This decision, which was necessary in view of the conditions of the 80s, will have to be reconsidered taking the changed conditions into account, because satisfying the demand for a home supplied by district or central heating will become an increasingly important component in evaluating the level of working and living conditions. We assume that presently only district heating is the solution for maintenance-efficient apartment heating in metropolitan areas. It is doubtful that direct electric heating will be usable beyond the extent it is presently utilized due to poor integral efficiency in energy conversion; it will further necessitate corresponding insulation of the interior space. Gas heating units on the basis of coal gasification require high expenses involved in providing the energy transfer medium. The national supplies of natural gas are limited. Imports require extraordinary expenses. Measures of heat insulation will permit the reduction of the currently higher heat consumption of units supplied by district heating in comparison to furnace-heated units, which is mainly due to the larger number of heated rooms. The expansion of local heat supply, combined with an integration of industrial users, will permit the continuous development of efficient district heating supply systems and thus lay the basis for the use of non-polluting and effective heat sources.

2. Primary Energy Sources

Which primary energy sources are available for expanding the district heat supply system?

The economic strategy adopted by the 10th Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR is based on increased rates of the national income in the range of 4 to 5 percent annually over an extended period without a major increase in the primary energy supply. This places high demands on the efficient utilization of the available energy. As high-quality energy sources are being replaced to a large extent by raw lignite in the course of energy source conversion in the 80s, the latter will become the major primary energy source by 1990. As analyses show, it is economical for the period after 1990 to satisfy the projected growth in primary energy requirements by nuclear energy. Seen from a long-term perspective, nuclear energy will become the GDR's major primary energy source besides raw lignite. One can assume that energetics in the GDR is presently characterized by the beginning of a development process which will show a transition from raw lignite to nuclear energy as the major primary energy source. This process, which involves thorough structural changes of the energy basis, will extend over a period of one century. This process will also necessitate a major expansion of the energy basis, the extent of which will be determined by the interaction of societal requirements characterized by a major automation of production processes, a reduction of working hours and the continued balancing of social discrepancies and a simultaneous increase in the standard of living, with the economic environment.

By the end of the century, nuclear energy will be mainly used for the generation of electrical energy, although today we have the technological potential to utilize nuclear energy to supply low-temperature heat. The wide use of this option will not materialize until after the year 2000, but preparations must be made well in advance by expanding the district heating systems and constructing new facilities to generate nuclear heat. Here utilization of the opportunities of the existing nuclear plants to separate heat takes priority.

When considering the options for the long-term development of heat supply in the GDR, one can assume that this will be based mainly on raw lignite in the decades to come, with a continuous reduction in the raw lignite use in favor of the use of nuclear energy

3. Raw Lignite-Heated Heat Supply Plants

At the present time, heating plants and heating power plants are operated on the basis of raw lignite and lignite briquettes with only few exceptions, with an orientation towards raw lignite replacing lignite briquettes. The construction of new heating plants on the basis of raw lignite within district heating systems under the jurisdiction of collective energy combines remains limited to a few locations. In the industrial sector, the utilization of the advantages of heat-power coupling by using back-pressure turbines in combination with steam generators on the basis of raw lignite should be promoted.

Projects foreseeing heat supply from condensation power plants operated with raw lignite are in a state of implementation and preparation, respectively. They promise to bring about an improvement in the fuel economy in the GDR energy industry.

In the decades to come, the reconstruction and the new construction of heating plants operated with raw lignite and equipped with hot-water generators and

steam generators will dominate. With the available plant types, plant outputs in the range of 3 to 150 MW and even higher outputs can be realized if more than six steam generators of 40 t/h are installed. As a rule, it has not been proven that investment costs will decline when changing to higher unit outputs.

By means of the selection of suitable heating plant types and equipment, this conventional heat supply can, in principle, satisfy the various heat supply requirements with respect to design output and time-independent characteristics. One problem is posed by spatial requirements, 15 to 20 percent of which are a factor of coal storage; an output-dependent minimum size between 1,000 square meters per MW (5 MW heat output) and 500 square meters/MW (150 MW) (1) can pose problems of implementation within centers of major heat supply requirements. Another problem area is the strain on the environment due to harmful substances. Emission problems are countered by high stacks. Emission can be reduced by means of desulphurization plants, which require substantial additional requirements as to investment, space and transportation and turnover processes, however.

The burning of high-fiber raw lignite in the turbulence phase (2) is a potential way of coping with part of the problems.

4. Nuclear Thermal Plants

Nuclear energy can be used for the generation of low-temperature heat in two ways: by separating heat from nuclear power plants, thus improving primary energy utilization, or by the construction of specific nuclear thermal plants.(3)

Basically, heat separation from nuclear power plants does not pose any technical difficulties because decades of experience in conventional energetics benefit this purpose. The problems of nuclear safety have to be specifically dealt with. A first heat separation facility was put into operation in the "Bruno Leuschner" nuclear power plant last winter.

For nuclear power plants of the WWER-1000 type, which will be operated in the GDR in the future, turbines were developed in the USSR and the CSSR permitting heat separation of a maximum of 30 percent of the thermal output, i.e., a maximum of 900 MW (4) per 1,000 MW unit. The flow temperature of the hot water in the heating cycle is between 150 and 180 degrees C. Adhering to the principle of the condensation turbine, these plants can make full electric power available at peak hours through the electrical energy system. The heat separated from the nuclear power plant has substantially lower fuel heat requirements than the requirements applicable to heat supplies by nuclear thermal plants. With regard to its fuel costs it is far below those of conventionally generated heat. Their wide use is, however, limited because of the locations of nuclear power plants. For reasons of nuclear security, minimum distances are required for nuclear power plants in population-dense areas. Therefore heat separation from nuclear power plants will not achieve wider acceptance until the late 90s. The heat will have to be transported over larger distances than before. This means that measures to increase the transportation worthiness of the heat source--of hot water for a limited period--will have to be taken by means of effective technologies of laying and operating district heating routes and a

reduction in the return temperature. If one considers the low fuel heat expenses of the heat separated from nuclear power plants, the question arises as to what extent an increase in the scope of heat utilization could be achieved by locating heat-intensive industrial or agricultural production processes near nuclear power plants.(5) The types of heat by-product utilization already used in conventional power plants should be duplicated and expanded in accordance with the higher parameters of the separated heat. An analysis of low-temperature heat utilization conducted by a Soviet author shows that there are a number of yet undeveloped areas of application for low-temperature heat available at reasonable prices.(6)

Worldwide efforts have been made for approximately one decade to develop specific nuclear thermal plants providing low-temperature heat. In the process, a number of measures were implemented permitting safety level of nuclear thermal plants to be attained that is higher than that of nuclear power plants, thus reducing their comparison to the minimum distance applicable to nuclear power plants.

The AST-500 Soviet nuclear thermal plant is in the most advanced stage of development. It is being built in a two-unit design near the cities of Gorki and Woronesh. Each unit has a thermal output of 500 MW. The first phase is expected to be commissioned next year.

In order to achieve a high level of safety, the following measures will be implemented by the AST-500;

- Natural circulation in the first cycle, resulting in an increase in the reliability of heat dissipation;

- Integral arrangement of the first cycle in a double-wall pressure vessel, also resulting in a further reduction of the probability that the reactor core will dry out;

- Reduction of the parameters in the first cycle as compared to the first cycle of pressurized water reactors; thus, the probability of failures occurring is drastically reduced;

- Realization of three cycles with pressure staggering, excluding any radioactivity spill from the reactor cycle to the load cycle.

In the AST-500 the reactor output temperature of the coolant is 200 degrees C; the flow temperature in the heating cycle is 150 degrees C. Concepts for nuclear thermal plants, whose implementation, however, has not begun, are known to come from France (THERMOS), Sweden (SECURE) and Canada (SLOWPOKE).(7,8) These nuclear thermal plants are designed for flow temperatures in the heating cycle of 90 to 120 degrees C and therefore can only be used for local heat supply. Due to high specific costs these projects have not been commercially viable so far although they contain interesting technical solutions, with the exception of the SLOWPOKE nuclear thermal plant whose output is to be 2 MW per unit and whose construction is to start this year. In addition, there is a number of additional studies and development projects on nuclear thermal plants, specifically on those with organic coolants,(9) which have not matured technologically, however, and whose future large-scale use must be seriously doubted.

5. Incorporation of Nuclear Heat Sources Into District Heating Systems

Nuclear energy conversion plants feature a high level of safety, the implementation of which is quite costly. These costs are dependent on unit size only to a small extent. Therefore, nuclear plants have a strong cost depression, i.e., the specific investment costs relative to the output unit are considerably reduced with increasing unit size. This fact necessitates the construction of nuclear thermal plants in as large a unit as possible. Estimates have shown that the specific investment costs for nuclear thermal plants in relation to the thermal output unit can be compared with that of nuclear power plants only if the minimum unit size is 500 MW.

For smaller unit sizes it is significantly above that of nuclear power plants. When considering this fact it is appropriate to turn towards the use of the AST-500 type in reference to nuclear thermal plants in the GDR, especially since nuclear thermal plants of other unit sizes will not exist in the CEMA area in the foreseeable future.(10) Studies conducted in the Soviet Union on a 300 MW unit nuclear thermal plant (AST-300) revealed that the absolute investment will only be 15 percent below that for the AST-500, i.e., the specific costs are 40 percent higher than those of the AST-500. The flow temperature in the AST-300 heating cycle is to be 120 degrees C only, nearly excluding the utilization of this plant for industrial heating supply.

In going in the direction of using the AST-500, the question arises as to what extent nuclear thermal plants of this size with a 1,000 MW thermal output in a two-unit design and 500 MW in a one-unit design are feasible in the GDR. It is obvious that currently this is possible in only a few centers requiring heat. Studies of heat requirements and their probable development have shown, however, that in integrating local and industrial consumers in territorially limited GDR distribution systems, to be created by the connection and expansion of existing hot water systems, numerous heat requirement areas emerge in which such heat sources can be integrated in the future. In preparing the district heating system of the city of Gorki for the commissioning of the first nuclear thermal plant, a two-unit AST-500, it will be necessary to combine "island" areas by means of connecting routes, create a system of main lines and build coupling stations between transit routes and the main system. The parallel between the measures taken in the Soviet Union and those required in the GDR to increase the centralization of heat supply becomes evident by the fact that, upon commissioning the Gorki plant, 285 thermal plants of outputs ranging from 0.3 to 500 MW within the city can be discontinued. The consequences connected with such a measure with regard to reducing the exposure of harmful substances to the environment should be considerable.(11)

In the GDR the building of nuclear thermal plants will not take on larger proportions until the year 2000. The period up to that date must be utilized to create the necessary requirements by expanding the district heating systems. In doing so, the following problems must be taken into account:

--Over an extended period, nuclear thermal plants will only be used to cover the basic load in the range of 30 to 70 percent of nominal system outputs. Conventional plants will continue to be necessary for requirements during peak hours.

--Industrial consumers are presently supplied with the following:

high-parameter steam. The selection of parameters is frequently not determined by the technological process of heat application, but by the type of heat generation. One can assume that a major portion of the heat requirement can be satisfied with hot water as a heat transfer medium. For those remaining processes which require steam for technological reasons, steam can be generated with hot water as a heat source in the proximity of the users. If high-parameter steam is necessary, then the parameters can be improved by means of thermal compression.(12)

The incorporation of large heat sources into district heating systems can pose problems of reliable supply of the consumers connecting to it, particularly if the heat source accounts for more than one third of the installed output. This problem can be reduced by using heat accumulators. The failure of the heat source can be bridged by heat accumulators for a certain period. Heat accumulators can also be used to cover peak requirements and can thus contribute to an increase in the utilization of the nuclear heat source and thus to an improvement of the economy.(13)

--Some district heating systems in the GDR are designed for flow temperatures of 180 degrees C. If it should prove necessary to maintain such a high flow temperature in the future, conventional after-heating of the heat source will be required when using nuclear thermal heat in these systems, particularly in times of peak consumption.

Considering the characteristics of nuclear thermal sources discussed, it is possible to create the preconditions for a long-term effective use of this heat source.

The results of experiments conducted at the University for Architecture and Construction in Weimar (14) with respect to heat requirements in two areas of the Thuringia area have confirmed this general conclusion. For both areas it made economic sense to use an AST-500 nuclear thermal plant in a single-unit arrangement to cover the increased heating requirements. Experiments further revealed that the industrial steam required represents a relatively small portion of the overall required heat; thus, the preconditions for utilization of secondary steam generation with subsequent steam generation already exist.

The demand voiced from time to time for nuclear thermal plants of smaller output, for example, to supply cities with a population between 20,000 and 50,000, cannot be supported from an economic viewpoint at this time. Nuclear thermal plants of smaller outputs are associated with very high specific costs if they are to have the same heat source parameters as nuclear thermal plants of the AST-500 type. The costs are markedly reduced when reducing the parameters which tends to result in a further reduction of the distance between the nuclear thermal plant and the consumer required for reasons of nuclear safety.

In extreme cases the reduction of parameters results in a pressureless reactor, as was the case with the Canadian SLOWPOKE nuclear thermal plant. The reactor coolant output temperature here is 85 to 90 degrees C, and the flow temperature

in the heating cycle as low as approximately 70 degrees. Low-temperature heat of such parameters is not usable for industrial purposes. It requires specific heating systems. Also, a large number of small-size nuclear thermal plants would have to be built in order to make a marked contribution to taking the load off the required raw lignite volume. Areas of demand of the above-named magnitude will have to be supplied by raw lignite heated sources over an extended period unless they can be incorporated in more comprehensive district heating systems. The use of heat pumps in such areas appears possible if the following requirements are met:

- Reserves in the national electrical energy volume;
- Heating systems on the required temperature levels.
- Availability of a heat reservoir usable for efficient operation.

6. Conclusions

These considerations for a long-term development of the heat supply in the GDR result in requirements whose implementation must be prepared in the current development period.

The future heat supply requires concepts permitting the creation of sophisticated solutions for the public and the non-public sector. The level of centralization of the district heating systems must be increased by coupling the individual heat supply areas within metropolitan areas, with the integration of industrial heat consumers and the increase in the district heat percentage on the local level taking on special importance.

In the industrial sector the trend must be towards increased use of hot water as a heat transfer medium.

By means of the site selection for nuclear power plants on the basis of the maximum possible heat separation and intensive preparation of the use of nuclear thermal plants with AST-500 reactors, the utilization of a continuously increasing number of nuclear heat sources for district heat supply must be ensured.

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Manuscripts received 12-10-84

ENA 9967

9544/12232

CSO: 2300/002

30 April 1986

ECONOMY

POLAND

REGULATIONS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF FOUNDATIONS

Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish No 57, 23 Dec 85 pp 757-758

[Text] Order of the Council of Ministers of 2 December 1985 on the conducting of economic activity by foundations.

On the basis of Art 13 par 3 of the statute of 6 April 1984 on foundations (DZIENNIK USTAW No 21, item 97), it is ordered as follows:

Par 1. A foundation may conduct economic activity in the field of production, service or the sale of goods if its operation is provided for in the approved statutes of the foundation or an individual license granted by the appropriate minister in agreement with the Minister of Finance.

Par 2.1. A foundation's economic activity may be conducted by a separate organizational entity (institution) appointed by the foundation's management or by the foundation itself; a foundation's economic activity may also be participation in a partnership.

2. A foundation's economic activity conducted by a separate organizational entity (institution) is directed by the organ specified in the statutes and if the economic activity is carried out on the basis of a license, the organ specified in the license.

3. The carrying on of economic activity by the foundation itself requires a separate records of the receipts and costs of the activity.

Par 3.1. A license to undertake economic activity by a foundation may be granted after submission of:

1) An application specifying:

a) the subject of the economic activity;

b) the anticipated extent of the economic activity, the expected number of employees and expected income and its allocation;

c) the organizational form of the activity;

- d) the organ directing the economic activity;
- e) the location of the carrying of the activity;
- f) the elements of the foundation's property intended for economic activity;
- 2) the rules for conducting financial management and accounting records of economic activity.

2. A license to conduct economic activity by a foundation can be granted for a limited or unlimited time. However, if a foundation's economic activity is indispensable to achieve the foundation's goal or closely tied to its statutory activity, the license for conducting this activity is granted for an unlimited time.

3. The appropriate minister may refuse to grant a foundation a license to conduct economic activity if the intended activity, because of its nature, extent or location is contrary to the interests of the national economy or other important state interests.

4. The rules of pars 1-3 also have appropriate application in approval of the statutes in the portion concerning the conducting of economic activity by a foundation, except that the appropriate minister may release the foundation from its obligation to provide certain information as indicated in par 1.

Par 4.1. The license may be revoked in whole or in part if a foundation's economic activity is not conducted in accordance with the binding rule of the law or the conditions of the license.

2. If a foundation's economic activity is integrally related to its statutory activity, the license may be revoked only after exhausting the procedure provided in Art 17, par 1 of the statute of 6 April 1984 on foundations (DZIENNIK USTAW No 21, item 97) and after fruitless expiration of the limit for bringing the economic activity into line with the binding rules of the statute or conditions of the license.

Par 5.1. The foundation is entitled to income tax relief by virtue of directing the income for economic activity toward fulfillment of its statutory objectives.

2. Income tax relief is set at:

- 1) 10 percent of the income tax due if the payment for fulfillment of statutory objectives is less than 15 percent of income,
- 2) 15 percent of the income tax due if the payment for fulfillment of statutory objectives is at least 15 percent of income,
- 3) 20 percent of the income tax due if the payment for fulfillment of statutory objectives is at least 20 percent of income.

3. The Minister of Finance may grant a foundation further relief and releases from income tax if important socio-economic considerations recommend it, particularly if the amount for statutory objectives from the foundation's income is higher than the amounts specified in par 2.

Par 6. A foundation is entitled to tax relief and releases other than those provided in par 5 on the rules and in the manner provided in the rules defining taxation of legitimate persons who are not units of the state economy.

Par 7. This order is valid as of the date of publication.

President of the Council of Ministers, Z. Messner.

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CSO: 2600/241

ECONOMY

ROMANIA

LAW ON REMUNERATION OF WORKERS PUBLISHED

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 4 Apr 86 pp 6-7

[Law on the Overall and Direct Contract System of Remuneration of Working Personnel--date not given]

[Text] Chapter I

General Regulations

Article 1--(1) The remuneration of the entire working personnel is based on the socialist principle of distribution according to the quantity, quality, and social importance of the work, the contribution made to developing the material and cultural production of the entire society, and the results obtained.

(2) Our socialist society ensures the right to work and creates the necessary conditions for each person to perform a function in the area of material production, scientific-technical, and social-cultural activities in accordance to his talents and skills and with the development needs of the society.

Article 2--(1) The remuneration system provides the working people with material incentives to increase production, labor productivity, and economic efficiency, and ensures an equitable distribution of labor revenues and a fair ratio between minimum and maximum individual incomes.

(2) The working people are paid according to the work performed and the results obtained.

(3) When the planned production is exceeded incomes increase accordingly, without a ceiling. When the production or job obligations are not fulfilled, remunerations are cut back accordingly, and no guaranteed income is ensured.

(4) The planned itemized production is considered to be fulfilled only when all the product ranges envisaged in the plan have been produced. Failure to achieve one range cannot be compensated by exceeding the plan production of another.

Article 3--(1) Remunerations are directly correlated to increases in individual and collective labor productivity.

(2) The increase in labor productivity must be higher than the increase in individual and general incomes in all the branches and sectors of the national economy in order to ensure both the funds required to raise the working people's incomes, and resources for covering the general expenditures of the state.

Article 4--The general meeting of each economic unit debates and adopts decisions on the administration of the share of the national wealth entrusted to it by the society; the continuous development of socialist property; the complete utilization of machines, equipment, and installations; the improved utilization of all material resources; strict observance of the norms of consumption of raw and other materials, fuel, and energy; the rational allocation of the labor force; continuous improvement of the professional training of the working personnel; the resolute implementation of the overall and direct contract system of remuneration of the working personnel, and mobilizing the entire technical and productive potential of the unit with a view to attaining increased high-quality productions with the lowest possible expenditures and raising the efficiency of all activities.

Article 5--The overall or direct contract system of labor organization and remuneration is applied to all activities in industry, agriculture, transport, commerce, tourism, and the other economic sectors.

Article 6--Under the overall contract system of remuneration a collective of working people undertakes to achieve certain products or work as required by the single national plan of socioeconomic development, expressed in terms of physical units: tons of coal, oil, pig iron, chemical fertilizer, or cement; number of tractors, waggons, machine-tools, or tires; cubic meters of natural gas or timber; square meters of fabrics or leather; linear meters of tubing or electrical conductors, and so forth, in accordance with the specific activity or job and established for each year, quarter, month, and day.

Article 7--Within the overall contract system of labor organization and remuneration, the direct contract system of remuneration is applied to all jobs where the quantity of products or volume of work that is to be fulfilled by one person or one team per unit of time are established on the basis of time or production norms; this ensures a direct link between the work performed and the results obtained in production.

Article 8--The collective of working people employed under the overall contract system receives an overall sum for the production or work assumed under contract, which is established on the basis of scientifically determined work norms and regulations, the technologies prescribed, the capacity of the machines, equipment, and installations, and in accordance with the strict observance of the task to increase labor productivity and with the planned remuneration fund.

(2) The sums of money established in the overall contract for the work payment

are firm and are paid out in full after the completion of the production or work under contract, if the criteria and conditions specified in the contract have been met.

(3) The entire collective can obtain higher incomes by exceeding the contract itemized production, having ensured a secure market, by shortening the production period, better utilizing raw materials, manufacturing high-quality products, reducing the consumption of raw and other materials, fuel, and energy, and by better organizing activities and cutting back on the number of personnel required to fulfill the work. If the plan tasks are not fulfilled, the production period is exceeded, or the number of personnel is increased, incomes drop accordingly.

(4) Premiums and other incentives are awarded, according to the law, for saving raw and other materials, fuel, and energy.

(5) Raw and other materials, fuel, and energy expended in excess of the norms through the fault of the working personnel are supported by those responsible, in accordance with the law.

(6) Products or work whose quality falls below quality standards or norms through the fault of the collective will be remade by the respective collective without additional pay; the collective will also support the cost of the materials used to remedy the production.

Article 9--Working teams employed under the overall contract system are obligated to ensure the complete fulfillment of the products and services earmarked for export. Aside from the amounts due for the production achieved, premiums and other incentives are awarded, according to the law, for fulfilling the exceeding export productions and exports.

Article 10--The amounts due for the products and work achieved are allocated by the team foreman, with the agreement of the team members, to each person in accordance with his contribution to the production and work, the tariff remuneration, and the actual time put in.

Article 11--In order to increase labor productivity and concentrate the efforts of the entire collective or team on achieving the production and work undertaken under the overall contract system, the number of personnel will be established strictly in accordance with the need to fulfill the plan tasks and to cut back non-productive and administrative personnel to a minimum by simplifying record-keeping and other documents concerning the activities of the work team.

Article 12--Under the overall contract system, foremen, engineers, and subengineers will be directly involved in production, carrying out more complex or technical operations, thus making an effective contribution to completing the contract tasks satisfactorily and speedily.

Chapter II

Organizing the Implementation of the Overall Contract System

Article 13--The overall contract system is implemented from the basic organizational unit of each sector of activity--section, workshop, production sector (in mining or forestry), production team (mining, oil industry), installation (in the chemical, petrochemical, metal, cement, and glass industries), electrical station, energy set, work team, complex team, and so forth, up to the level of plant, factory, enterprise, and other similar units.

Article 14--(1) After consulting the working people, work teams are formed in keeping with production requirements and steps are taken to ensure an optimal structure of skills and a professional level corresponding to the degree of complexity of the work undertaken, to fulfill the task of raising labor productivity, and to observe the maximum number of personnel envisaged in the plan for each category of work. The number of working personnel in each working team, workshop, section, and other production subunits is established in accordance with labor norms and regulations.

(2) The working people's collective in work teams may decide to achieve the products or work under contract with a smaller number of personnel than prescribed by norms, by better organizing the work.

(3) Team foremen are democratically elected by the working people's collectives from among the best workers, skilled workers, subengineers, or engineers, experienced in production and capable of organizing and leading the team's activities so as to fulfill and exceed the contract tasks, thus obtaining higher incomes.

(4) Steps will be taken within sections, workshops, and work teams to ensure polyqualification, so that workers can perform as many operations as possible and utilize the entire working time.

Article 15--(1) The personnel employed in sections, workshops, and work teams is responsible for fulfilling the itemized production and the work undertaken under contract; the raw materials utilization index and the index of material per product unit; manufacturing products according to the planned quality categories; observing the allocated consumption of raw and other materials, fuel, and energy, the approved working technologies, and the labor safety norms.

(2) Sections, workshops, or work teams are given the tools and equipment required to achieve the production or work, and are responsible for their maintenance and repair, and for judiciously using them throughout their prescribed lifespan.

Article 16--The managerial personnel of enterprises, plants, and factories and their compartments are responsible for the completion of all plan tasks, for judiciously managing the material and financial resources made available to them, and for implementing the overall contract system of organization and

remuneration, for which purpose they carry the following obligations:

- a) to allocate quantity, quality, and export tasks and consumption norms for raw and other materials, fuel, and energy from the unit's plan to the various sections, workshops, and work teams, and to secure overall contracts for the entire planned production;
- b) to ensure the establishment and implementation of manufacturing technologies, consumption norms for raw and other materials, fuel, and energy, and the implementation of work norms and regulations;
- c) to ensure technical-material supplies in the structures and at the rates required for production, and to efficiently manage fixed assets;
- d) to daily supervise the achievement of the contract production and the observance of the consumption norms for raw and other materials, and to oversee and take measures to ensure the quality of the production and work, the implementation of utilization indexes, the observance of labor safety regulations, and the fulfillment of the planned technical and economic indexes;
- e) to continuously improve the organizational structure with a view to cutting back non-productive and administrative personnel and continuously increasing labor productivity;
- f) to ensure the qualification and improvement of the manpower in keeping with the complexity of the work;
- g) to monitor the resolute implementation of the socialist principle of distribution according to the quantity and quality of work, so that each person's income should reflect his contribution to fulfilling tasks and the results obtained.

Article 17--(1) The ministries, other central and local bodies, and industrial centrals are responsible for ensuring that the entire planned itemized production is covered by contracts, whereby a close correlation must exist between the itemized production, commodity output, and the other plan indexes, for all the units subordinated to them; they must ensure regular supplies of raw and other materials, supervise the cooperation programs between units, and continuously oversee the complete utilization of the production capacities and manpower of each unit, so that the working personnel can be assured of work and of being paid accordingly.

(2) In cases in which the working personnel of a certain economic unit achieves less than 80 percent of the tariff remuneration for 1 month, the immediately superior bodies--industrial central or ministry--are obligated to examine the factors that led up to that situation and to take the necessary measures to permit the working people to secure the entire remuneration in the immediate future.

Article 18--(1) In cases in which enterprises cannot secure production tasks for all the capacities available, and thus cannot ensure work for their entire personnel, their bodies of collective leadership are obligated to take

measures to reorganize the personnel in keeping with the conditions of fulfillment of the plan tasks, whereby the personnel thus made available should be reallocated to other productive activities within the same enterprise or in other units.

(2) The ministries, other central and local bodies, and industrial centrals are obligated to work, together with economic units, to reallocate personnel that have become available to activities and units where production tasks and capacities permit their employment within the framework of the approved plan indexes. If no openings are found to reallocate all the available personnel among units belonging to the same industrial central or ministry, they will be reallocated, with the help of the Ministry of Labor, to units belonging to other central or local bodies.

Chapter III

Production Or Work Contracts Under the Overall Contract System and the Remuneration of Working Personnel

Article 19—(1) Work teams sign overall contracts with the management of the production subunits to which they belong, while the latter sign contracts with the management of the enterprise. The enterprises sign overall contracts with the management of the central to which they belong.

(2) Overall contracts are concluded on a yearly basis, while the production and the planned levels concerning the criteria and conditions of fulfillment of this production are established on a monthly basis.

(3) The monthly production tasks and specific consumptions of raw and other materials, fuel, and energy are allocated on a daily basis down to the level of work teams or of individual workers, according to case.

(4) The terms of the overall contract are discussed at meetings of working people in work teams, workshops, and sections, and at the general meetings of working people in plants and enterprises, which adopt the measures required to fulfill all the tasks assumed under contract while cutting back on personnel.

Section 1

Production Or Work Contracts Under the Overall Contract System and the Remuneration of Working Personnel in Work Teams, Workshops, and Production Sections

Article 20—(1) The overall contract signed with the section, workshop, or work team must mandatorily stipulate the production or work that is to be achieved, the criteria on which remuneration increases or cuts depend, the conditions in which remunerations may be cut, the size and structure of the work team, and the overall sum of money established for the contract production or work.

(2) Under the overall contract, the section, workshop, or work team obligate themselves to fully achieve the production or work that are the object of the

contract and to observe the planned levels for the criteria and conditions envisaged in the contract, while the enterprise obligates itself to ensure the necessary technical-material supplies, technical assistance, laboratory work, and quality control.

Article 21--The production allocated under overall contract is the itemized production envisaged in the unit's plan, expressed in terms of physical units--tons, units, cubic meters, square meters, and so forth--specific of the respective unit or job, including the production for export and the work expected to be performed. The itemized manufacture of products, product ranges, subassemblies, spare and other parts, or work is derived from the single national plan of socioeconomic development and the itemized production established for each ministry, central, or enterprise.

Article 22--(1) The criteria according to which the amounts earned for the fulfilled itemized production may be increased or cut are the following:

a) the planned index of raw material utilization or the planned index of materials per product unit, the purpose of which is to ensure that the same quantity of raw materials is used to manufacture the production with the highest possible value, or a larger quantity of finished products; specific norms of consumption of raw and other materials, fuel, and energy, in cases in which the above two indexes are not used;

b) the planned percentage of higher-quality production in the case in which the production is divided into quality classes.

(2) The indexes of raw material utilization or of raw materials per product unit and the percentage of higher quality production are established under the single national plan of socioeconomic development. For the itemized production allocated by the ministry, central, or enterprise, the ministries, other central bodies, and the executive committees of country people's councils and of the Bucharest municipality establish indexes for raw material utilization and raw materials per product unit, and the percentage of higher quality production in keeping with the specific production processes.

(3) The criteria are established according to organizational level and category of personnel and in keeping with their responsibilities in the production process.

Article 23--The amount of money due on the basis of the itemized production achieved and the degree of fulfillment of the criteria established is remitted in full if the following conditions are met:

a) the planned indexes of utilization of the machines and installations are fulfilled;

b) the specific norms of consumption of raw and other materials, fuel, and energy are observed, or in the cases in which they do not constitute criteria for increasing or cutting remunerations.

Article 24--The size of work teams is determined by the products or work under

contract; the number of personnel is determined according to skills, function, and level of qualification, on the basis of labor norms and regulations, efforts being made to raise labor productivity and to further reduce the planned number of personnel.

Article 25--The amount of money established for the fulfillment of the contract production is determined as follows:

a) for directly productive workers--on the basis of the quantity of products or work undertaken by contract and of tariffs per unit of product or work. In homogenous production activities the tariff per product unit includes the remunerations of all the personnel employed in the production subunits, including the subunit manager, foremen, engineers, technicians, non-productive workers, and other categories of personnel;

b) for the managers of production subunits, foremen, engineers, technicians, non-productive workers, and other categories of personnel of subunits with diversified production activities--on the basis of the quantity of products or work undertaken under contract and the quota established per 100 lei of labor directly corresponding to these products or work.

Article 26--(1) The labor per unit of product or work is mandatorily determined on the basis of labor norms and regulations, according to the work technologies and plan tasks approved. The tariffs per unit of product or work and the remuneration quotas are established by the enterprise on a yearly basis, so that upon completion of the production and of the volume of work envisaged in the overall contract the personnel can receive full remuneration. The production or work may be allocated per quarters unevenly--within annual tariffs and average quotas--in keeping with the implementation of measures to raise labor productivity and with the dynamics of the plan indexes.

(2) In cases in which production requirements lead to direct labor fluctuations from one period to another, according to changes in the volume or structure of the itemized production, to the addition or elimination of production capacities, to the gradual implementation of measures to raise labor productivity in directly or indirectly productive activities, and to other needs of the national economy, quotas or tariffs can be set for shorter periods of time to reflect changes in labor, provided the quota or tariff for the entire year is not exceeded.

(3) The tariffs and quotas established in accordance with paragraph (1) and (2) must fall within the annually planned remuneration fund and the task to raise labor productivity, and is amended only when the amount of labor required is reduced thanks to the implementation of technical or organizational measures, or when the production or work to be carried out differ from the ones initially envisaged at the time of the signing of the contract.

Article 27--(1) The amount due to the working personnel is established in keeping with the quantity of itemized products or the volume of work achieved, and no limits are set at either the upper or lower end, depending on whether the production was exceeded or not fulfilled.

(2) Directly productive workers as well as the managers of production subunits, foremen, engineers, technicians, non-productive workers, and other categories of personnel in units manufacturing itemized productions for export will receive an additional 1 percent for each percentage point by which they exceed the production. If the production for export is not fulfilled, the respective personnel will be penalized by 0.5 percent for each percentage point of unfulfilled production.

(3) The planned itemized production is considered as fulfilled only when the export production has been entirely completed. Failure to achieve the export production may not be compensated by providing products and services for domestic customers in excess of those envisaged in the plan or overall contract.

(4) If the total planned itemized production is not fulfilled but the export production plan is exceeded, the personnel specified under paragraph (1) will receive 1 percent for each percentage point by which this production was exceeded, on condition that they meet their contract obligations to deliver raw and other materials, parts, subassemblies, and products to domestic customers. The exceeded export production is also taken into calculation for the overall itemized production.

Article 28--The amount of money due for the itemized production and the export production achieved is increased by 1 percent for each percentage point by which the set criteria are exceeded--the planned indexes of raw material utilization or of materials per product unit and the quality of the planned production--as a whole.

(2) If the set criteria are not met, the amount of money due according to article 27 is cut by 1 percent for each percentage point by which they were not met, as a whole.

(3) Increases or reductions determined by the degree of fulfillment of the criteria may not exceed 10 percent.

(4) If the conditions envisaged in the overall contract are not fulfilled, the amount of money determined according to paragraphs (1)-(3) is cut by 1 percent for each percentage point by which the conditions were not fulfilled, as a whole, up to 10 percent. At units producing for export, cuts for failure to fulfill contract conditions are of 0.5 percent for each percentage point by which these conditions were not fulfilled, taken as a whole.

(5) The amount of money determined according to paragraphs (1)-(3) is paid out in full in situations in which although some of the conditions envisaged were not fulfilled during the contract period, they were all met as a whole since the beginning of the year.

Article 29--The amount due to the work team is distributed among its members according to each person's contribution to fulfilling the tasks, the tariff remuneration, and the time put in.

Article 30--In the case of directly productive workers and other categories of personnel who are paid in direct or other contract forms within the framework of the overall contract system, the amounts earned for quantitative achievements will be established on the basis of the work performed by each individual. The resulting amount will be increased or reduced depending on the degree of fulfillment of the criteria established; if conditions were not met, the amount is cut by the corresponding percentage, which is applied to the amount due to the entire team.

Article 31--(1) Foremen, engineers, and subengineers who are directly involved in production and perform complex, highly technical jobs, will be incorporated in overall contract work teams at the work place to which they were allocated and will be paid according to their tariff remuneration and time put in, as well as with the level of fulfillment of the tasks undertaken by the respective team under an overall contract.

(2) Particularly complex work, at the level of at least that envisaged in the tariff guidelines for the higher qualification category, carried out by foremen, engineers, and subengineers under individual direct contract, within the framework of the overall contract system, will be paid according to the legal tariffs for specialists.

Article 32--(1) In the area of capital repairs, individual repairs and check-ups--for machines, installations, equipment, furnace, and other elements--will be contracted under the overall contract system.

(2) The amount of money due to the personnel for performing the work under contract is established according to the object and labor category, on the basis of labor norms and regulations.

(3) Ninety percent of the amount due is paid out during the work period until the completion and reception of the work, and the remaining 10 percent is paid if no break-down occur in the machines, installations, or equipment within 6 months after the repair.

Article 33--The products and work carried out for local use--spare parts, industrial water and steam, and so forth--will be included in the planned itemized production according to the real requirements for fulfilling the commodity output. The overfulfillment of the itemized production for local use may be legally taken into account at the most by the same percentage by which the planned commodity output was exceeded.

Section 2

Production and Work Under the Overall Contract System and Remuneration of Working Personnel at Enterprise Level

Article 34--(1) The overall contract that is signed at enterprise level incorporates the sum of all the production tasks and other plan obligations that must be carried out by the plants, factories, sections, workshops, and work teams of the unit.

(2) Overall contracts signed at enterprise level feature: the itemized production according to ranges and the planned commodity output; the criteria for increasing or reducing remunerations--the planned indexes of raw material utilization or of materials per product unit, and the planned percentage of higher quality production; the conditions for awarding the amounts of money due under the overall contract.

(3) For units where utilization indexes are not established, the criterion for increasing or reducing remunerations will be the level of material expenditures planned for 1,000 lei production or volume of work.

(4) The enterprises are obligated to set and sign contracts with customers for the entire planned itemized production, in relationship to the commodity output plan, to establish consumption norms for raw and other materials, fuel, and energy down to the level of each section, workshop, or work team, and wherever possible, down to the level of each worker, and to implement labor norms and regulations designed to fulfill the task of raising labor productivity and the planned remuneration fund.

Article 35--(1) The overall contract of the enterprise will incorporate its managing personnel, the personnel employed in functional compartments, and the personnel employed in other activities for which there is no plan and which serve the current production activities of the entire unit.

(2) The conditions for releasing the amounts due under the overall contract to the enterprise managing personnel and the personnel employed in functional compartments are: fulfillment of the export plan, fulfillment of the net production plan, fulfillment of the plan for the commodity output sold, fulfillment of the planned indexes of utilization of the machines and installations, planned labor productivity, commodity output per 1,000 lei of fixed assets, planned expenditures per 1,000 lei of production or volume of work--in cases in which the material expenditures do not constitute a criterion--or other indexes envisaged in the plan.

(3) Specific conditions are established for the personnel employed in activities for which there is no plan and which serve the entire enterprise.

(4) The amounts of money due to the personnel incorporated in the enterprise overall contract are determined in relationship to the results obtained by all the plants, factories, sections, workshops, and work teams of the unit concerning the fulfillment of the itemized production, the criteria and conditions established, and all the plan indexes, on the basis of quotas per 1,000 lei commodity output or 1,000 lei volume of work. The quotas are established yearly by the immediately superior body, for each quarter, in the same conditions as those envisaged for the work teams.

(5) Increases or reductions in the amounts of money due in relationship with the production achieved and the degree of fulfillment of criteria, and cuts determined by the fulfillment of the conditions established, occur in the same manner as that envisaged for the work team personnel.

Article 36--The amounts due to the personnel paid under the overall contract system at enterprise level are distributed in keeping with each person's contribution to fulfilling tasks, tariff remuneration, and the time put in.

Article 37--Productive technical personnel employed in factory design work, who draft the blueprints and technologies for the products envisaged in the technical plan, the equipment built for the factory use, tools, devices, testers, and models are paid under the overall contract system according to the specific regulations concerning scientific research, technical engineering, and design. Factory design personnel who carry out other projects, such as adapting technical specifications to production needs, technical assistance, and so forth, are paid under the overall contract system in accordance with the results obtained by the unit as a whole, just as the personnel employed in its functional compartments.

Section 3

The Overall Contract Remuneration of Personnel in Industrial Centrals, Ministries, and Other Central and Local Bodies

Article 38--In order to ensure the complete fulfillment of all the plan indexes, the judicious management of material and financial resources, increased efficiency, the continuous development of public property, and the resolute implementation of the overall and direct contract system of labor remuneration and organization, the industrial centrals, ministries, and other central and local bodies have the following major obligations:

- a) to establish well ahead of time the plan tasks of each unit within the framework of the indexes approved under the single national plan, and to establish and secure contracts for the entire planned itemized production, endeavoring to ensure a close correlation among the itemized production, commodity output, the task to raise labor productivity, the number of personnel, and the remuneration fund;
- b) to take measures to ensure that all the units fully utilize the machines, equipment, installations, and production capacities by appropriately loading all technological lines and equipment, installations and aggregates in each shift;
- c) to ensure regular supplies of raw materials, semifabricated material, and energy, as well as tools, devices and testers, and measuring and control apparatus for all the units and work places;
- d) to ensure the rapid introduction of technical progress into production, with a view to continuously raising the technical-qualitative level of the products and enhancing their competitiveness, promoting and spreading advanced technologies, and reducing consumptions of raw materials and energy;
- e) to establish measures to judiciously organize shift work and allocate technical cadres to each shift, so as to ensure the necessary technical assistance for each work place;

f) to appropriately organize the work places, fully utilize working time, and strengthen production order and discipline, with a view to raising efficiency;

g) to ensure the qualification and advanced professional training of the working people in keeping with the complexity of their work;

h) to supervise on a daily basis the regular fulfillment of the production in the ranges established in the plan and in economic contracts with customers, particularly the production earmarked for export, from the ministry leadership down to the last work team and place; similarly, to daily supervise the implementation of the indexes of raw material utilization and materials per product unit envisaged in the plan, the strict observance of the consumption norms for raw and other materials, fuel, and energy, and efforts to cut consumption below the planned norms;

i) to draft and ensure the resolute implementation of labor norms in close correlation with the level of technical equipment and the technologies employed, by better organizing production and labor, and in accordance with the planned levels and rates of raising labor productivity;

j) to effectively intervene whenever the production process is disrupted in a given unit and to take measures so that the working people in each unit and on each job can enjoy all the necessary conditions for completely fulfilling the plan tasks and their obligations.

Article 39--(1) The entire management and production personnel, technical, economic, and other specialized personnel employed in industrial centrals, ministrsies, other central and local bodies, and the executive committees of county people's councils and of the Bucharest municipality, including ministers and their staff are paid under the overall contract system in relationship to the fulfillment of the planned production and of the other plan indexes which constitute the sum total of the results obtained by all the enterprises, factories, plants, sections, workshops, and work teams belonging to them.

(2) The pay of the personnel envisaged under paragraph (1) is increased or cut without limitation in keeping with the degree of fulfillment of the following indexes:

a) the itemized plan of industrial commodities production;

b) the planned indexes of raw material utilization or of materials per product unit;

c) the percentage of higher quality production envisaged in the plan;

d) the export plan;

e) the planned labor productivity;

f) the commissioning plan for investment projects;

- g) maximum expenditures planned per 1,000 lei of commodity output;
- h) the value of the commodity output planned per 1,000 lei of fixed funds;
- i) observance of consumption norms and regulations for raw and other materials, fuel, and energy;
- j) other specific indexes.

(3) The pay is increased or cut by 1 percent for each percentage point by which the established indexes, as a whole, were exceeded or not fulfilled.

Article 40--(1) The indexes which predicate the remuneration of personnel employed in ministries and other central bodies, and in the leadership and staff of the executive committees of county people's councils and of the Bucharest municipality, and the quotas by which remunerations are increased or cut for each index are established by State Council decree.

(2) For the personnel of industrial centrals and their units the indexes and quotas for increasing or cutting remunerations are established by the ministries, other central bodies, and the executive committees of county people's councils and of the Bucharest municipality, in keeping with the indexes and quotas envisaged for these bodies under paragraph (1).

Section 4

The Overall and Direct Contract System of Labor Organization and Remuneration According to Branches and Sectors of Activity

Article 41-- The overall and direct contract system of labor organization and remuneration will proceed in each unit in accordance with the provisions of the present law and the specific criteria established for the various branches and sectors of activity.

Article 42--The specific criteria concerning the overall and direct contract system of labor organization and remuneration according to branches and sectors of activity are approved by State Council decree.

Article 43--The specific criteria according to branches and sectors are implemented in all the units or subunits of the respective branch, regardless of the body to which they belong.

Chapter IV

Providing Additional Incentives and Enhancing the Personnel's Responsibility for Fulfilling the Export Production and Exports

Article 44--(1) The managing personnel of economic units which manufacture goods for export, of industrial centrals, ministries, other central bodies, and people's councils, the heads of the production, planning, technical-material supply, and foreign trade compartments of the apparatus of those

units, and the personnel in charge of export production and exports will receive a monthly bonus of 1.5 percent of their pay for each percentage point by which the planned export production and exports were exceeded.

(2) The amounts of money required to pay out bonuses will be drawn from the financial accounts of economic units, i.e., from the income and expense budgets of central and local bodies, and they will be awarded above and beyond the planned remuneration fund.

Article 45--In situations in which the planned export production and exports are not fulfilled, the personnel listed under article 44 will be penalized 2 percent of their pay for each percentage point by which the planned export was not fulfilled. If the planned export production is completed but the export plan is not fulfilled, the penalty will be 1 percent of the pay for each percentage point of unfulfilled export plan.

Article 46--(1) The export production and exports plans are considered as fulfilled if all the specific plan tasks were completely fulfilled.

(2) In situations in which a planned export venture is not fully completed, but the export plan is exceeded in terms of convertible currency, a 0.5 percent bonus is awarded for each percentage point by which the plan was exceeded.

Article 47--(1) The bonuses or penalties envisaged under articles 44, 45, and 46 are set on a monthly basis according to the stage of fulfillment of the export production and export plans, computed from the beginning of the year, by applying the total premium or penalty percentage, in keeping with the results obtained, to the amount envisaged in the overall contract for the respective personnel, also computed from the beginning of the year.

(2) Bonuses for the exceeded export production and export plans are awarded on an individual basis in relationship to the tariff remuneration and time put in in the month in which the bonus is awarded. The monthly bonus awarded to a person may amount to up to 20 percent of the tariff remuneration corresponding to the time worked.

(3) Penalties for failure to fulfill the export production and export plans are also calculated in accordance with the tariff remuneration and the time worked in the month in which the penalty is applied. Penalties for failure to fulfill the export production and export plans, together with cuts for failure to meet the criteria and conditions envisaged in the overall contract may amount to up to 30 percent of the amount due in relation to the itemized production achieved.

Article 48--(1) In situations in which previous shortfalls have been partially or fully recouped, penalties are duly refunded at the end of each quarter and at the end of the year.

(2) The amounts of money that are to be refunded are allocated in relation to the penalties actually retained from each person. Amounts of money retained

from persons who left the unit prior to the month in which the shortfall was recouped will not be refunded.

(3) In situations in which, in relation with the achievements computed since the beginning of the year, no further bonuses are due or smaller bonuses than the previously awarded ones are due, the amounts paid out as bonuses will be fully or partially recovered.

Article 49--The personnel listed under article 44, who are awarded bonuses or are penalized in relation to the fulfillment of the export production and export plans, will not have any other remuneration increases or cuts according to those indexes.

Article 50--(1) The provisions of articles 44-49 are applied accordingly to ministers, other top ministry cadres, and leaders of other central bodies and of the county people's councils and of Bucharest municipality--who are responsible for economic units which manufacture goods for exports--as well as to the deputy prime minister in charge of coordinating the activities of those bodies.

(2) Similarly, the provisions of articles 44-49 are applied to ministers, their aides, other managerial cadres, and to the directors, deputy directors, and heads of export production and export compartments of the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Material-Technical Supplies and Control of the Management of Fixed Assets, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, the Ministry of Finance, and the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank, as well as the deputy prime ministers who coordinate their activities. No other remuneration increases or cuts will be applied to the remuneration of this personnel in relation to the fulfillment of the export plan or the plan of incoming foreign currency.

Article 51--Upon establishing bonuses or penalties in accordance with the provisions of articles 44-50, account will be duly taken of the plan tasks incumbent on enterprises in connection with the delivery of raw and other materials, parts, and subassemblies that are to be incorporated in export productions.

Article 52--The executive personnel in charge of the fulfillment of export production and export in enterprises, industrial centrals, and ministries who are subject to bonuses or penalties according to articles 44-49 are uniformly established by the managerial councils of the ministries and other central bodies, and by the executive committees of county people's councils and of the Bucharest municipality, with the approval of the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the Labor Ministry, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation.

Article 53--The economic units that do not fulfill at least 60 percent of the export production plan will be subjected to a special regime of economic-financial supervision, in accordance with the law.

Chapter V

Final Regulations

Article 54--In sectors of activity in which the production is achieved within installations such as those of the chemical, petrochemical, cement, oil, and sugar industries, remunerations will not be increased for exceeding the planned production tasks if the overfulfillment was obtained within the nominal capacity of the respective installation.

Article 55--On the basis of the present law and of the specific criteria approved for branches and sectors of activity, the ministries and other central bodies will draft, with the approval of the Ministry of Labor, technical methodological norms to implement the overall contract system of remuneration of the working personnel, which will stipulate--for each organizational level and down to each work team or job--the manner of establishment of the itemized productions and work to be carried out under an overall contract system, the criteria and conditions in which the production is to be achieved on each work place, the remuneration increase or reduction percentage for each criterion or condition, and the obligations and responsibilities of the collectives of working people, enterprises, and centrals for optimally achieving the products and work subject to the overall contract system.

Article 58--The provisions of the present law come into effect as of 1 May 1986.

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CSO:2700/127

ECONOMY

YUGOSLAVIA

FINANCIAL RESULTS OF ECONOMY IN 1985 REPORTED

Belgrade PRIVREDNI PREGLED in Serbo-Croatian 27 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by Zoran Nikodijevic: "Unearned Money Is Being Spent"]

[Text] The most important problems in the economy's conduct of financial business last year continued to be the high growth rate of business operating costs and the immense increase in what was paid out in interest. After deduction of income from interest last year, the economy set aside for payment of interest the same amount as for savings and reserves, and interest was nearly as great as outlays for net personal incomes. If the economy's business operating costs were reduced by just 1 percent, income would increase by 2.6 percent, and that would amount to 55 percent of the current losses of the economy and more than two-thirds of what is set aside for reserves.

In 1985 the economy earned an income of 6,416 billion dinars, which was 80.3 percent more than in the previous year. But the economy is still spending more than it has earned; it distributed 174 billion dinars more than it took in. This at the same time represents uncovered expenditure, said Demsit Durici, general director of the Social Accounting Service of Yugoslavia, at a press conference.

The economy's gross income last year was 38,058 billion dinars, or 79.4 percent more than in the previous year. Most of it (82.4 percent) was realized through sales on the domestic market. Prices had the dominant influence on the growth of gross income, as indicated by the following figures: the physical volume of production in coal processing increased 0.8 percent over 1984, but gross income 104.7 percent; output in the production of petroleum products even dropped 6.5 percent, but still gross income increased 92.2 percent....

In distribution the drop in the economy's share in distributed income is also continuing; in 1980 it was 64.2 percent, and by last year it had fallen to 53.9 percent.

The economy's losses shown on year-end statements for 1985 reached 317.9 billion dinars and were 2.5-fold larger than in 1984. Losses were shown by 2,369 OOUR's: that is, 1 out of every 12 organizations, with an aggregate labor force of 521,506. This high growth of losses also increased their share in the income of the economy from 3.1 percent in 1984 to 5 percent last year.

The physical volume of industrial output rose 2.7 percent, which is 1.3 percent below the plan and 2.9 percent below the 1984 rate.

[Box, left]

Recordbreakers in Recording Losses

The fertilizer factory in Kutina, which is a subsidiary of INA-"Petrochemical Industry," showed a loss of over 21 billion dinars in 1985 (its average personal income was 51,009 dinars); the OOUR "Ammonia" of the Pancevo Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant showed a loss of over 6 billion (average personal income 58,140 dinars); the "Birac" Alumina Plant, a work organization in Zvornik which is a subsidiary of Energoinvest, showed a loss of about 6 billion (average personal income 38,773 dinars); the OOUR "Production" of the Zagreb Oil Mill, which is part of the "Zvijezda" SOUR in Zagreb, had a loss of 4.7 billion dinars, which is 538.4 percent more than in 1984 (average personal income 42,954)....

Trends in the economy were also unfavorable in the first months of 1986 because of unfavorable developments last year and because of everything that has been carried over for years now, losses above all. Inflation is swelling, there is an ever greater discrepancy between commodity flows and money flows, obligations come due on foreign credits are exerting pressure, and the demand resulting from higher personal income has also been added as a particular pressure of its own kind on the market.

It is obvious on the basis of the economy's results last year and the beginning of this year that the relatively good financial results are mainly the result of the steady rise of prices. Expensive credits are still being used, since--according to the simple formula--interest is passed on to customers, which hikes up prices, which causes a rise of inflation, and as a consequence there is usually a rise in interest as well. So that it goes round and round.

The key point of the Yugoslav economy--raising labor productivity--again showed a negative growth of 0.8 percent last year, and it would seem that this explains a great deal.

And finally, let us also add this: Economic policy continues to be mainly concerned with the administrative restraint of prices and inflation instead of pursuing the key directions of increasing production and financial consolidation, which is the only real answer to Yugoslavia's economic difficulties.

7045

CSO: 2800/210

ECONOMY

YUGOSLAVIA

'CRITICAL ANALYSIS' SEEN AS OPPOSING ECONOMIC PROGRAM

[Editorial Report] According to an article in the 15-16 March 1986 issue of Belgrade BORBA page 3, by Jovan Radovanovic, the increased public criticism filled the press during February and March and has been particularly severe in Serbia and among economists, has now crystallized around two questions: whether the Critical Analysis represents "a deviation from the Economic Stabilization Program, and whether it should have supported the formation of a third chamber (in addition to the Chamber of the Republics and Provinces and the Federal Chamber) in the SFRY Assembly. The article said that the initial criticism of economists, politicians, and scholars pointing out the significant disagreement between the Critical Analysis and the stabilization program has now shifted to political forums and discussions in delegate assemblies. The "clash of diametrically opposed views" on this question "have now been brought out at meetings of the federal councils for economic and legal questions and culminated in a certain way last week when over 30 delegates of the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly disagreed over these questions."

In an effort to reflect more harmony, BORBA headlined its front-page report on the 12 March meeting of the Federal Chamber, "A Return to the Stabilization Program--most delegates believe that the Analysis cannot bypass the basic points of the Long-term Program [of Economic Stabilization]--support for the creation of a Chamber of Associated Labor; only changes possible are those which strengthen the working class."

At the meeting delegates Ela Ulrich Atena, Surija Pupovci, Dusan Alimpic, and Zvonko Spoljar expressed the view that, despite its defects, the Critical Analysis "represents a realization of the stabilization program."

On the other side, Vanco Nikolovski, reflecting views frequently expressed by many economists in the press, said essential differences between the Critical Analysis and the stabilization program exist in regard to the approach to planning, banking, and the law on prices; and he sees the Analysis as a "return to an economy-based-on-agreement."

Zarija Martinovic, delegate from Serbia said at the Chamber meeting that those who oppose the Critical Analysis are being branded as enemies and opponents of self-management and the socialist system. As if in response to

this, an article, "What Are the Limits of Criticism?" in the 22-23 March 1986 issue of BORBA (page 3) by Radovanovic notes that nothing was said about the opposition between the Analysis and the Stabilization program in the report from the last LCY CC meeting. This party report asked that "communists oppose attempts to impose unacceptable ideopolitical views directed against socialist self-management and the bases of the constitutional and political system." But, he said, party members find it difficult to judge what is unacceptable and what is directed against self-management because LCY leaders themselves have differing views on this. This was quite clearly shown at the 24th meeting of the LCY CC in January, he said, and noted in this regard the following statement by Belgrade economist and members of the SAWPY CC Presidium Professor Ljubisav Markovic in debating the Analysis in the Federal Economic Council three days previously: "The Critical Analysis is not the fruit of any dogmatic spitefulness or methodological superficiality [as it has been presented in some of the press criticism]; it is in agreement with the prevailing system and is entirely all right if we agree that we are retaining this system. The laws of the market can operate in it largely as much as they are operating [now]. But if we want true commodity production, economic laws, market criteria--this requires solutions drawn from the Long-Term [Stabilization] Program, that is, very large limitations placed on the political factor as the ruling force, a completely different formation of everything, from the economy to the party.... According to all our (otherwise outstanding) theoretical, political and legal documents, this system is ideal, but it is for some wonderful future. And it cannot resolve the contradictions of economic reality." (BORBA, 20 March 1986 page 3). Markovic said, furthermore, that none of the official documents, including the much proclaimed Law of Associated Labor and even the Long-Term Program, have much practical application in the present system. "In this sense," he said, "I am for a different system."

The fullest discussion of the opposition between the Critical Analysis and the stabilization program to appear in BORBA were statements in the 22-23 March 1986 issue (page 9) by Dr Borisav Jovic, delegate in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the SFRY Assembly. He said: There are many proofs that the Critical Analysis is a step backward in relation to the Long-Term Program. Let us take the question of the use of capital accumulation. In the Program it is a matter economically established. If an enterprise...does not effectively use its funds it will be led into a difficult situation because real interest must be paid for, because its debts must be paid on time, because it will fall into losses so it will have to reduce even personal earnings. It simply and clearly "hits one in the pocket." Thus, it will make every effort to use funds as rationally as possible because this is in its material interest.

"But the Analysis suggests something different: It introduces intervention by society. Someone from outside should monitor how funds are being used, and if they are not used efficiently, a self-management defender should intervene and he can suggest that the funds be given to others through a technical-administrative procedure and not an economic procedure. The enterprise again embarks on legal action in order to defend itself from such interventions and to prove that it needs and uses these funds, etc. I do not think this, in fact, is...a good way to resolve economic problems.

"In the Critical Analysis some solutions in regard to planning, the banking system, expanded reproduction, etc., are suggested which are different from those which have already been put into law based on the Long-Term Program of Economic Stabilization. There is no...sense in bringing confusion into society, to enact today that which we have adopted in the Long-Term Program and tomorrow return to that which we had before but changed because it was poor. If we cannot harmonize this, we will, in fact, have two parallel documents on the same matters with opposite views.

"I am afraid that these differences are not accidental, but that they reflect different political conceptions about the direction of development of our society. In practice, indeed, we are still not liberated from some dogmas which we inherited from the administrative period. For instance, we introduced socialist self-management, we have had it for over 35 years, but until today it has largely remained under the protection of the state. To a much greater degree than should have been the case we have retained a system of social concern and social intervention in expanded reproduction, in re-allocating capital accumulation, and--what is worst of all--we have, as a state, excessively and in detail intervened in the organization and work of the economy. The economy does not have enough freedom of action. Through regulations we have fragmented and motivated it in such a way that it cannot easily apply economic criteria to economic operation. An incentive system has been introduced that prevents integration and supports particular-ism [partikularizam]. An [enterprise] has more to gain by investing its capital at home than by associating to [pooling its resources] with others. Under these circumstances appeals to integrate and associate can be of no help."

Concluding his remarks on the failure to implement fully the stabilization program, Jovic says: "Because of the uncertainties surrounding the full introduction of the stabilization program and surrounding the changes in the political system, it could happen that the status quo will prevail and this would mean that we will be condemned to a longer period of impoverishment."

In an earlier interview in BORBA on 1-2 March 1986 (page 9), Zoran Pjanic, Professor at the Economic Faculty in Belgrade, questioned why the Critical Analysis had dealt with economic questions at all, when this had already been done in the stabilization program and noted that among the 200 staff members who worked on the Critical Analysis that was not one economist who had been involved in drawing up the stabilization program. He said he was struck by the fact that the word "market" had only appeared twice in the Analysis. Acknowledging that the aim of the Analysis is largely the political system and that in the section dealing with the economy it does bring out some good solutions drawn from the Long-Term Program of Economic Stabilization, he said nevertheless the Analysis reflects a fear of renewing the entrepreneurial principle, it still insists on firm agreements between production and trade organizations, and contains "very problematic" points on the banking system--all leading back to an economy-based-on-agreement which is now considered by most economists to represent a mixture of utopianism and the "categorical apparatus of simple goods production."

At an early March meeting of the law, economic, and political science faculties in Zagreb, reported in DANAS (Zagreb, 11 March 1986, pp 15-16), Croatian economist Dr Marijan Korosic expressed much the same views about the Critical Analysis, describing it also as "two steps backward" and saying that it conceals within it the theory that socialism does not have its own laws of reproduction, that without the subject forces [mainly, the LCY], the economy and society cannot automatically take the lead in socialism, and that "we will return to capitalism if these subjective forces do not act every day. Goods production [the theory says] leads to inequality and it [production] should be subject to state regulations because [otherwise] inequality and wealth are created at the expense of the working class." Korosic repeats also the general criticism that the Analysis does not offer a way out of the crisis, but rather defends the existing system.

Dr Zdravko Tomac argued against Korosic and said the Analysis is, in fact, based on the stabilization program, that it does seek radical changes "but within the strategy of the existing system." Tomac is co-author with Ciril Ribicic of a recently-bulished book supporting the Analysis and titled, "The Critical Analysis and the Proposal for Changes in the Political System" which stresses agreement, consensus, and solidarity "more than methods of decision-making" as the essence of socialist self-management; and opposed majority decision, as well as the formation of a third Chamber of Associated Labor in the Assembly. DANAS says the book was quickly written for popular consumption, is not a serious analysis, but is informative and tries to give answers to all the dilemmas which have arisen in the public discussion. Ribicic, a member of the Vrhovec Commission which drew up the Critical Analysis, at the same time has been engaged in a polemic with Rade Aleksic in March issues of BORBA on these, generally political, questions in the Analysis.

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CSO: 2800/221

ECONOMY

YUGOSLAVIA

VOJVODINA INCREASES INVESTMENTS IN THERMAL POWER PLANTS

Belgrade PRIVREDNI PREGLED in Serbo-Croatian 26 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by S. Razic: "More Funds for the 'Drmno'"]

[Excerpt] Amendments and supplements to the Law on Financing Construction of the "Drmno" Thermal Electric Power Plant at Kostolac have been adopted in a session of all three chambers of the Vojvodina Assembly. What this does is to increase the funds for these purposes from 10.78 billion to 22.8 billion dinars. That is, back in 1983 the Vojvodina Assembly adopted the Law Establishing the Obligation To Pay Contributions to the Self-Managing Community of Interest of the Vojvodina Electric Power Industry in order to finance construction of projects for generating and transmitting electric power and projects for coal production to meet the needs of the thermal electric power plant. This law prescribed the obligation to pay contributions to the SIJ for consumers of electric power in the province, except those consumers who pool resources under a special law, for the purpose of building the "Drmno" strip mine and thermal electric power plant. Consumers are required to pay this contribution from 1 January 1984 to the end of 1988 and to furnish 10.78 billion dinars.

Because of large differences in exchange rates on equipment purchased abroad and the rise in prices of domestic equipment and installation and supplemental work items, there have been large overruns of the total estimated cost of the investment projects for the "Drmno" strip mine and thermal electric power plant. In view of the importance of completing construction of the "Drmno" Thermal Electric Power Plant to the province's further economic and social development, the Vojvodina Assembly has amended the provisions of this law pertaining to the amount of resources to be provided for investment in electric power sources. Electric power consumers will pay a contribution to the SIJ of the province's electric power industry for these purposes up to the end of 1988 and will furnish 22.8 billion dinars.

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CSO: 2800/210

MILITARY

POLAND

POSSIBILITIES FOR COMBATING CRUISE MISSILES OUTLINED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU in Polish No 12, Dec 85 pp 22-27

[Article by 1st Lt Marek Suchanecki: "Using the Fighter Force to Combat Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] For the past 20 years or so, we have witnessed the rapid development of various generations of weapons, including land-based, air-based and sea-based cruise missiles.

According to Western publications, these missiles are to be used for a mass, surprise attack on targets having strong antiaircraft defenses, that is, primarily command posts, airports, naval bases and other important targets.

Cruise missiles, equipped with jet engines, can fly at low altitudes of about 60 m at subsonic speeds and carry a nuclear warhead having a power of 30 kt (and even up to 200 kt according to some sources). Because of their small size, these missiles are difficult to counteract during flight, and are difficult to detect because of their small effective reflecting surface (0.02 to 0.2 m²) and weak infrared radiation. In addition, the use of electronic jamming against these missiles is not too effective because of their speeds (620 to 900 km/h) and independent automatic guidance systems.

To a large extent, combating missiles depends on effective detection and identification, which must be done beforehand. Early detection increases the possibility of combating missiles effectively before they arrive at the protected target. OPL (Antiaircraft Defense) resources and the air force, primarily the fighter force, will be used to combat missiles in the air. This requires that aircraft be in such a state of readiness as to be able to destroy the missiles at the distant approaches to the protected targets. The last line of defense for destroying the missiles should consider the safety of our own forces in case of an accidental nuclear warhead explosion. Thus, early detection is a basic condition for combating Cruise missiles by the fighter force.

Collaboration among the fighter force, the radio engineering troops and OPL ground forces is linked with the detection and identification problem. It is very important that command and control posts be properly located along the missiles flight paths. Thus it is essential for these posts to be highly automated regarding transmitting data concerning weather, and control and mission assignments.

In analyzing the possibility of combating Cruise, the following must be considered:

- possible missile flight path variants;
- possibility of ensuring information to the air force via radio concerning identification;
- possibility of detecting (visually or via the aircraft's radar) from the aircraft missiles in flight at low altitudes;
- possibility of homing aircraft to missiles;
- the effectiveness of aircraft armament systems and the possibility of using them.

Detecting and combating a cruise missile are impeded by its:

- very small reflecting surface;
- ability to operate in all kinds of weather;
- large range of flying altitudes;
- ability to fly at very low altitudes for very long time periods;
- the weak infrared radiation emitted from its engine;
- ability to change flying altitude and use ground contours to mask it.

Elements facilitating combating Cruise are its:

- long stretches of rectilinear flight at constant speeds;
- inability to change its programmed flight parameters after it is launched;
- need to use a radar altimeter in correction regions;
- long flying time to the target.

The following Cruise launch and flight-to-target variants are assumed (see fig. 1):

1. For the SLCM (sea-launched cruise missile) and GLCM (ground-launched cruise missile):

a) launch and flight at an altitude to 30 to 200 m at a constant speed of about 850 km/h (0.7 Ma);

b) increasing the altitude to 7,000 m and flight to the target is at 620 km/h (0.5 Ma). After arriving in the radar detection zone, flying altitude is decreased to 80 to 200 m.

2. For the ALCM (air-launched cruise missile):

a) launch at 11,000 to 12,000 m followed by a track flight at a constant speed of 620 km/h (0.5 Ma) calculated in such a way that the missile will be at an altitude of 30 to 200 m and a speed of 850 km/h (0.7 Ma) when it is 80 to 90 km from the target;

b) launch at low or medium altitude, then to an altitude of 7,000 m and a flight according to variant 1b.




Figure 1. Cruise missile launch and flight variants

Key:

1. free fall after launch
2. low flight path
3. up to 7,000 m
4. up to 30 m
5. up to 700 km
6. launched from air-compression torpedo tube
7. first correction region, initial correction and flight control

Missile flights can be masked by electronic jamming at distances up to 40 km from the line of combat contact.

In analyzing the possible Cruise flight variants, it appears that the most effective way the air force can combat Cruise missiles is via interception inside duty zones located within our own territory and within the operating field of control point radio engineering facilities. This requires the creation of a continuous radar field permitting a complete homing cycle at altitudes up to 200 m. The possibility of detecting and tracking a cruise missile at these altitudes by radar stations is limited. The missile can be observed on an indirect observation display in the 30 to 50 km segment, that is, for 2 to 3 min. Considering the need to confirm identification during this period, the ongoing 0.5 to 1 min missile flight will be monitored for 1 to 2 min. Further flight will take place in a zone not under radar surveillance because of strong interference from so-called local terrain barriers. In association with this, monitoring of a flight can be resumed after a lapse of 2 to 2.5 min. For the case of a missile flying alongside a strong jamming zone, the observation time can be 4 min. Since the homing cycle is 3 to 6 min in a duty zone, homing an aircraft toward a missile cannot be realized.

The required detection line (S_{wykr}) to execute homing with the help of a single PN (control point) can be calculated from the formula

$$S_{wykr} = V_{ext} \{$$

where

$$t\{ = t_{pas} + t_r + t_{180} + t^s$$

$$t^s =$$

$$t_{pas} = \text{time to detect target and make a decision to attack}$$

$$t_r = \text{pilot, navigator and radar operator reaction time}$$

$$t_{90}, t_{180} = \text{time required to maneuver the aircraft into a good firing position}$$

The calculations show that S_{wykr} must equal 60 to 70 km to complete the cycle to home in and destroy a Cruise missile. From a technical point of view, very often this condition is not possible to achieve.

In this situation it seems that it is necessary to organize an automated notification system and to transfer command over controlling aircraft from one PN to another. When detection of missiles by radio identification is limited and perhaps even impossible, or when it is impossible to generate a continuous radar field at very low altitudes, then fighter planes alone can seek out and destroy missiles.





Figure 2. Cruise combat operation characteristics

Key:

1. Jamming zone masking missile flight
2. Correction region
3. Target
4. Threatened object
5. Firing zone

However, serious difficulties occur during visual detection because of the missile's small size, its low flight altitude and masking capabilities. Experience indicates that, as a rule, the visual detection range does not exceed 2 to 4 km (see fig. 4). Because the design of the aircraft, it is difficult to detect a missile flying in a straight path. Seeking out a missile in a patrol zone can be accomplished best by using the "rectangle," "eight," "viper" or "screen" maneuver or the combing maneuver in zones measuring 30 to 50 km x 20 to 30 km with $V_m = 900$ to 950 km/h and $H_m > H_c$ at $\Delta H = 300$ to 500 m. In view of the small visual detection distance when maneuvering, to initiate an attack from the missile's rear hemisphere, visual contact with the missile can be lost momentarily when the missile's flight path tranverses under the aircraft's fuselage or wing or when the missile recedes beyond the range of visibility (2 to 4 km). Then the search must begin anew. In association with this, the search and maneuver zones should be configured for the greatest probability of attack approach when the turn angle during maneuvering will be less than 180 deg.


Figure 3. Possible depiction of missile flight path on a radar display screen



Key:

1. Missile flight path
2. Strong jamming zone

Figure 4. Possible observation from a fighter aircraft cockpit



Key:

1. Possible observation zone within a 2 km radius
2. Nonobservation zone

Detecting missiles flying at low altitudes against an earth background is much more probable using Doppler-type target radars. When using a target radar, search conditions are most advantageous when the aircraft flight altitude is higher relative to the missile altitude. But flight altitude should not exceed 500 m. The search aircraft should fly in zones located in the path of the expected missile flights. The "eight," "rectangular" and similar maneuvers, parallel to the expected flight, ensure the greatest probability of detection, short aircraft homing time and safety. These maneuvers should be executed alone or in pairs, with the time interval between aircraft equal to one-half the maneuvering time in the zone. The observation angle of the trailing aircraft in the direction of the leading aircraft should be 20 deg, and the altitude of the trailing aircraft should be 150 to 200 m higher than the altitude of the leading aircraft (see fig. 5). The most effective way to attack a Cruise missile is from the rear and from above. During an attack, aircraft tactical groupings should ensure:

- independence of fighter aircraft maneuvering during search time;
- maximum search zone width;
- the execution of immediate attack




Figure 5. Pair of aircraft searching for a cruise missile

Key:

1. RLS search zone for leading and trailing aircraft
2. visible detection zones for leading and trailing aircrafts
 1. detection responsibility sector
 2. periodically examined detection sector
3. $1/2$ maneuvering time

To attack a missile effectively, a fighter aircraft should be to the rear of the target, at a 0/8-2/8 silhouette, and at a distance ensuring the rational

use of its onboard weapons. An analysis shows that short range homing rockets, automatic cannons and unguided rocket missiles are the most effective way to combat cruise missiles, assuring the safety of the attacker. To increase the probability of executing the mission, these weapons should be used in an integrated manner depending on the situation.

In examining the possibilities for combating Cruise missiles by the fighter force, special attention must be paid to protecting combat operations. This especially concerns communications, and radio and navigation security because the present rules for their use do not fully meet the requirements and conditions for such operations. The execution of the LM (Fighter Force) mission will depend on the characteristics of the radar field within which the aircraft will combat winged missiles. According to the assumed variants of Cruise missile operations, radar data concerning cruise flights will be nil and, in addition, haphazard. Thus, the homing process will take place in a discontinuous radar field. Therefore, it is necessary to assign flying and navigation personnel having the most experience and training to combat cruise missiles. This is based on the need to minimize the homing cycle, which has an enormous effect on executing a mission. The possibility of transferring data and control between PNs, the proper placement of duty zones and independent search operations will be decisive in determining success. In association with this, the following conclusions are drawn:

--Primary effort should be focused on aircraft searching for and combating missiles independently. These aircraft should be located in zones of the probable missile flight paths and in regions in which the missiles decrease their flight altitudes to 200 to 600 m, that is, about 80 to 90 km from the expected target of attack. This also permits our own SDs (control posts) to be notified and the transmittal of data concerning the number of missiles, their directions and parameters.

--Two to four jet aircraft should be kept in the zones at appropriate altitudes and distances. Each one will search an air space, and the moment a target is detected, the most advantageously located aircraft will attack it.

--Safe distances must be observed during an attack to avoid damage from fragments of an exploding missile charge.

The potential enemy is conducting systematic research and developing new cruise missile and guidance system designs. These activities require the continuous study of the possibility of its SNP [not further identified] and monitoring their development. The problem of combating Cruise missiles requires a quick resolution. Thus, with this article I hope to induce our readers to discuss the possibilities and ways of combating cruise missiles.

11899
CSO:2600/206

POLITICS

HUNGARY

ACADEMICIAN ADVOCATES 'ONE PARTY SYSTEM TEMPERED BY PLURALISM'

Budapest MOZGO VILAG in Hungarian No 7, 1985 pp 103-109

[Katalin Mogyoros' interview with Professor Jozsef Bayer: "About Pluralism; A Conversation with the Philosopher Jozsef Bayer." Date and place not indicated.]

[Question] Pluralism became a fashionable expression since it found its way from the sphere of philosophy into that of political debates. It takes considerable courage for a philosopher to undertake becoming an expert on the subject.

[Answer] The truth is that, until recently, I have only examined the international aspects of pluralism; lately, for example, I have studied the topic in the United States.

[Question] Still, as the penultimate conversation within our series entitled "Intra Hungariam," I would like to ask you to discuss pluralism within Hungarian society. Rather than calling for scientific statements, I would like to hear your educated opinion concerning the multifaceted nature of Hungarian society, and also about its still surviving one-dimensional aspects.

[Answer] Today's Hungarian society, the socio-political structure of which is not pluralistic, is characterized by a multitude of views, opinions, values and interests, the last of which have their roots in the existence of various economic forms. This multitude is reflected in the differing ways of life as well. All of the above are attributable to a hegemonistic practice of authority that does not strive to achieve total uniformity of opinions, but rather figures on a variability of interests in a differentiated society. As a consequence, our political culture is also changing; of course, it is debatable how much and whether for better or worse. One thing is certain: the former "terror of taste" has loosened up somewhat, people tolerate deviant behavior patterns and lifestyles, and even differences in political views do not cause as much excitement as they used to. Of course, increasing differences in material opportunities, in the midst of an economically far from happy period, create new passions, but nevertheless, it is a fact that public atmosphere is much more liberal and tolerant today than it has ever been.

[Question] This reasoning also implies that Hungarian society was always pluralistic, in the various meanings of the word, yet there were periods when this was not a desirable phenomenon. And now I am not thinking exclusively of the 1950s, but also of the decades preceding the liberation.

[Answer] In a certain, very broad interpretation of the term, every society is pluralistic, because after all, it has never been possible to realize complete uniformity anywhere. Such a state belongs among the Utopian nightmares. A completely different question is, however, what kind of socio-economic bases tie this divergence into a unit, and how such unity is politically expressed. There is a form of divergence, wherein people live in caste-like or class-based separate social groups, which is even more condemnable than one-dimensionality. But pluralism in the modern sense can exist only in places where a certain basic equality has already been established, be it in the form of the abstract equality of commodity-owners existing in capitalist societies, or based upon the social equality hypothesized by socialism.

[Question] Pluralism must have numerous different definitions...

[Answer] So many, in fact, that we have to refer to the pluralism of pluralism-theories. In general, and using a certain degree of retroactive wisdom, any tendency of politics or political theory which attempts to establish balance, the division of authority, and the autonomy of various social groups as values created out of variety. Bourgeois pluralism is connected with additional attributes, such as the traditional bourgeois freedoms and political values, including tolerance, the readiness to compromise, etc. These lend it such emphasis of values that it is hardly possible to oppose it, . . . albeit in given historical circumstances and under given political conditions unity and monism may have equal emphases of values. The term pluralism is relatively new; it first appeared as a political theory around the turn of this century, used by the English political scientist Harold Laski, who borrowed it from pragmatist philosophy. However, his term contained a political challenge, as the critique of monopolistic, overly centralized state authority. In its early manifestations, it used to be a socialist idea with liberal roots, and only later became part of a rather conservative political philosophy. However, to this day it has retained its "inciting" characteristics. In spite of this, it is no longer opposed to the state; what is more, according to an American political scientist, every new pluralism is merely a new covert monism. Still, pluralism contains the risk that it could turn against the established institutions.

[Question] In our country too--as you pointed this out in on of your articles-- pluralism is one of the touchy topics.

[Answer] Yes, because the term implies a conscious ideological challenge as to the interpretation of democracy. In bourgeois ideology, pluralism became a synonym for the Western bourgeois democracies, the so-called "Free World," and at times it is openly promoted as the antidote to Marxist socialism. During the difficult periods of socialism's development, reformers of various intents

often recommended pluralism to alleviate our problems. In addition to all of this, some of the Western communist parties subscribe to a version of pluralism that is more meaningful and democratic than the bourgeois version, and under the influence of this conviction they frequently criticize the practice of socialist countries.

In spite of its propagandistic excesses, bourgeois pluralism is not merely a product of manipulation. True, pluralism would have scarcely become so successful if it had not been proven so eminently suitable for the purposes of ideological mobilization against systems labeled as "totalitarian." At the same time, however, the theories of pluralism themselves represent the changes that have taken place within bourgeois societies which, even though they do not touch the substance of the capitalist socio-economic order, nonetheless influence its political manifestation.

[Question] What social circumstances justify the use of pluralism as one of the key phrases of politics and political life in the bourgeois systems?

[Answer] One of the political contradictions of developed capitalist societies is that, even though capitalist private property and the basic class structure of society--with its division between capitalist property owners and those without property--remain unchanged, there also exists the appearance of a struggle between various group interests in the center of political life. Marx was justified in considering the capitalist state as simply the political executive organ of capitalist interests. Today's interventionist capitalist state is connected to society in a much more complex manner, however, through an entire network of organized interest groups, such as parties, associations of employees and employers, and other professional and social bodies. This, of course, does not make the state less capitalist; however, today's circumstances make it impossible to implement the will of the ruling capitalist circles with the complete sidestepping of organized social groups. The theory of pluralism attempted to justify this situation, using a number of ideological elements. For example, the proponents of pluralism often deny the existence of class-based social division, or refer to it as secondary compared to other divisions and conflicts. But even today's reality is the result of social and class conflicts, and pluralism is frequently promoted as a method of avoiding revolution, moderating conflicts and taming the class struggle. In the theory of pluralist democracy, the numerous different interests of society, enjoying freedom of expression and organization, compete fairly against each other in their attempt to exercise a determining influence over the policy of the state which expresses the will of the people. Thus, the state itself is neutral, a sort of confederation of various autonomous social and political organizations. I do not have to add that this is a highly idealized picture of bourgeois society. What makes it illusory, first of all, is the preponderance of capitalists in the system of interest-representation; after all, when it comes to material and organizational power, they enjoy absolute advantages. In addition, the neutrality of the state should also be classified as a myth. As a result of debates on this issue, the recent past witnessed the rise of self-criticism on the part of the followers of pluralism, and the birth of much more realistic concepts. Thus we must be advised that pluralism has different meanings in the different theories. Of course, in our country, too, not everyone thinks of the same thing when

talking about pluralism. There is a great deal of difference between tying pluralist democracy to the free movement of capitalist property on the one hand, and the promotion of de-centralization within a socialist planned economy on the other.

[Question] Is it conceivable that pluralism means something else under our circumstances than in the West?

[Answer] It must, of necessity, be so, by which I do not mean to make light of the question. Certain professional expressions from the social sciences have become fashionable--think of identity-crisis, legitimacy, and their likes--not simply because they were imported; rather, our own social problems seek expressions in them. Of course, there are examples for uncritically adopting terminology that is utilized by short-lived scientific fads. If we use one term without discernment for defining phenomena in divergent societies, we end up saying nothing meaningful.

The paradox of pluralism is that while bourgeois political scientists consider it a method for insuring social stability, and for solving or moderating conflicts, in our country the opposite is true: pluralism has a meaning associated with incitement. The reason for this, as pointed out by the well-known Polish political scientist Jerzy Wiatr lies in the differing structure of social integration. In capitalism, this integration is still accomplished basically through the medium of the marketplace, while in our society politics fulfills this role. In other words, everything depends on the quality of political transmission. In theory, this is conceivable under pluralistic as well as monistic conditions; the council republics, or even the original concept of socialist self-government were based on this theory, providing more pluralism than any bourgeois constitution or system. Of course, in this situation it would be more correct to emphasize the content (democracy) as opposed to the form (pluralism). But theory and reality differ from each other. Of course, this is true in the case of bourgeois pluralism, too: One of its most readily acknowledged contradictions is that freedom of private property, which forms its foundations, is also the greatest obstacle in the way of democratically implementing pluralistic values. After all, material limitations influence the organization, let alone the implementation of interests. As they used to say, freedom of the press belongs to the owners of the presses, and this is true for every means of mass communication. Business interests will conquer pluralistic politics: As the American political scientist Charles E. Lindblom used to say, money not only talks in politics, it also whispers conspiratorily or screams so loudly that no one else's voice can be heard. Pluralist democracy is tied to the marketplace, not because the latter is democratic, but because it is not.

As for socialism, the circumstances of its birth, thus far, have not been favorable for the alternative of pluralistic political organization. Revolutionary change and the tasks of mobilization for the elimination of economic backwardness and for self-defense, implied demands for unity at all costs, and this led to the development of a strongly monistic political system. Pluralistic elements have only been tolerated if subordinated to the above requirements. This was particularly evident during the period of economic activity based on plan instructions. But even the egalitarian social

ideal of socialism conflicted with the unhindered organization of particular interests. After all, such freedom implied that those groups that have a more favorable negotiating position could make their influence felt at the expense of others. No communal society was able to free itself of this dilemma, which manifested itself most severely during the early years of shortages.

With the reform of the economic mechanism, the weight of market elements is increasing, and the pluralism of values in society is achieving a degree of legalization. At the same time, the question will arise, how does all this influence, or how will it influence, the entire political system of socialism?

[Question] No matter how we interpret the term pluralism, it could hardly be used to characterize pre-war Hungarian society. We must state this categorically if we wish to discuss how divergent our society is today.

[Answer] I agree completely. The society which, in the words of [Istvan] Bibó, wore the stigma of "distorted Hungarian character, and a history rife with blind alleys" was not exactly a haven for pluralism. The multitude of particularisms and socio-cultural enclosures, in themselves, do not represent pluralism, unless they rest on a basic sense of equality. In the development of political circumstances in our country, such historical precedents naturally played a decisive role. The feudal fragmentation of political spirit was eliminated by the revolutionary changes, creating a unified base for a new differentiation which was to rest on a basic equality. Of course, the process was not free of contradictions. It is a fact that the transformation injured a number of traditional values, even while it liberated new energies. The severe political consequences of monopolizing political authority are well known. Meanwhile, the "ideological state apparatus" was from time to time operated along the same lines as the "repressive state apparatus." Ideological issues were settled as questions of authority. The overcentralization of intellectual life took place in accordance with the same logic that prescribed the exaggerated nationalization of property. As a consequence, few people tolerated pluralism during the early years of our political system's development. Of course, the feeling was widely held that the only alternatives available in this region were a right-wing dictatorship or a sharp turn to the left, with no middle ground. There were, to be sure, efforts made in other directions as well: The period of the people's democracy is frequently mentioned nowadays, with justification, as the time when other choices were available to us. In any event, these choices were not utilized,

[Question] We like to wonder about "What if...?" issues. For example, we wonder: Would the domestic political situation have developed differently if the multi-party system had been preserved? But, I believe, we must remain in the area of reality: The existence of a single party is a historical fact. Nowadays, the only thing worth meditating about is how we can make Hungarian society more divergent within the framework of a one-party system.

[Answer] I would express myself even more sharply: The existence of a single party is, in my opinion, more than a simple historical fact. Rather, it is connected with the changing role of the party as an institution within a society based on community ownership. After all, one could theoretically

outline a kind of socialism which operates on the basis of communal ownership and still tolerates the existence of several parties, but we have no precedent for this. Thus we must look elsewhere for the most suitable method of democratization. The strategy of Eurocommunism, with its emphasis on pluralism, is still awaiting historical justification, and its least clarified aspect is the one dealing with the transitional period toward socialism.

[Question] Are you trying to say with this, that there is no multi-party system even in those socialist countries where more than one party is allowed to exist?

[Answer] Certainly not in the sense of the bourgeois party systems, which are based on the principle of alternating rule by government and opposition forces. For this reason, Wiatr referred to these as "hegemoneous party systems." By the same token, if the Eurocommunist parties, in alliance with a strong leftist bloc, were to come to power and attempt to change property relations, such solution would be lasting only if a similarly hegemoneous party system were to develop from it, just as every coalition government contains elements of such a system. These are very spontaneous ideas; please consider them as hypotheses. However, I believe that those who, based merely on some "conspiracy theory," make the claim that societies based on community property have only one dominant party, or a party of hegemoneous power, tend to simplify the issue.

Efforts to implement various social interests can be integrated into a one-party system, too, if the opportunities for expressing those interests exist in society. The opposite is claimed only by adherents of the totalitarian myth, for whom there are no subtle distinctions. At the same time, a more pluralistic transmission of interests calls for stable social and political conditions, a tranquil public mood, and well-developed political culture. Even within one-party systems there are opportunities for development in the direction of politics that is based on consensus and is able to integrate a variety of interests. Great variants are possible, depending on what kind of alliance policy is practiced by the ruling party, how developed internal democracy is, and what the practice of authority is: monopolistic or hegemonistic? The party is not necessarily facing an unorganized crowd consisting of isolated individuals, and it is not the only active mobilizing force on the scene. There are opportunities for the development of broad public discussion concerning a great variety of questions, and also for the creation of such social representative and participatory organizations that fulfill the role of partners for the party in the process of selecting and discussing the issues. Thus individuals organized into representative bodies can voice their wishes and aspirations, presenting them in their own particular manner, and the ruling party, considering these forces as potent political factors, may decide on the methods, degree and schedule for satisfying these calls. Naturally, this calls for a new-style politics, in which issues are no longer decided by the voice of authority. Professional competence and the readiness to compromise and coordinate are given increasing emphases.

[Question] I believe that Hungarian society has taken many steps in this direction during the recent past. However, the frequent hesitance in this regard demonstrates that the outcome of these initiatives does not always depend on the goodwill evidenced by either the party or the masses. Various institutions, authorities and offices are not always predisposed to consider the people's interests.

[Answer] Are you referring to the bureaucracy? No doubt, there are some representative organs that have become empty and formal in nature. There are a number of forums in our society that lack liveliness; for this reason, we should strive not only to increase their number, but also to make sure that they perform substantially. This also requires that they should have real power. In this respect, we are not very courageous. The new laws concerning the factory councils, the election of plant managers, etc. have finally brought to most of our production facilities those elements of self-governance that have proven themselves in the cooperatives. However, even the latest educational reforms fail to propose that communities of teachers be allowed to elect their principals, not even with the proviso that higher authorities must approve the results of such elections. In fact, the reverse is true: teachers can express their opinions only during the selection process, when they should have the right of veto. The same situation exists in many areas of life, even where the stakes are much smaller than in production facilities.

It is difficult to escape bureaucracy in the modern world, where large organizations operate within a hierarchical distribution of activities. As someone said: If democracy is our fate, so is bureaucracy. However, we can limit its influence. One of the many functions of the party is to supervise the bureaucracy. In order to do this well, it cannot become bureaucratic itself. Even though the distribution of authority existing between the state and party organs is seldom mentioned, it is very important. The party, given its political and mobilizing character, is only able to renew itself and formulate realistic programs (which become binding for state activities as well) in accordance with the success of this distribution.

Today, it is becoming even more necessary to reconsider the qualitative substance and perspectives of socialism, and in the course of this a great variety of concepts are formulated. I would define our socialism as state socialism. This is not the same thing as calling it statism, which would imply moral condemnation based on ideological grounds. My term simply means that in the process of modernization the state plays a great social organizing role in the structure as well as in intellectual life, with all of the consequences that such a role implies. At the same time, I do not follow the approach proclaiming the complete duality of state and society, claiming that in opposition to the official society, there develops another, "civilian" one which operates on different principles. In my view there is no such duality. After all, in socialism the "civilian" organizations are not free of politics either. Their political weight and responsibility is not equal to that of expressly political or state organizations. However, our entire existence is interwoven with state institutions, from the nursery to retirement, so I fail to understand how anyone could claim that we can step outside this. If this state is not ours, then we are lost. We should insist that it is our and continue our political activities accordingly. I

do not believe that we must divide our society in order to struggle for democratization, and I also oppose breaking down society into a non-political, and thus not-responsible segment and a political one that has all the responsibility. In any event, such efforts only further nurture the surviving distrust and fear we have of all self-organized and participatory bodies. I find it shocking, for example, that the creation of a private work association for the purpose of building sidewalks had to be approved at the county level, because as a television program revealed, local authorities were afraid to make a decision concerning the matter. Some people could certainly come up with better examples, and the topic has already attracted the attention of documentary film-makers. It is my opinion that in the future there will be a greatly increased demand for locally organized associations for various purposes. If we do not develop a practice to integrate these successfully, the number of conflicts is certain to grow.

[Question] True. However, this contrasts with the old practice, when we used to "receive" everything from above, and even the local actions only came about as the reflections of central will.

[Answer] I hope that such a stupid compulsion to legitimize everything will soon disappear. No one should wish for the survival of this; it is better if particular interests surface as such and not take on the ideological significance of universal issues. Only this way can we evaluate their real significance and the degree of their justification. But we must also take into consideration the fact that every striving toward autonomy has its material aspects. For example, one of the conditions for the successful operation of local councils is that they should have money, and that they should be allowed to manage their own resources.

[Question] The new concept for the development of communities will probably bring changes in this, too.

[Answer] Yes, and I hope that in the long run this will have positive effects. For example, the local council elections will be viewed seriously by people, only if there will be matters that can be solved from local resources; in that case, it will no longer be irrelevant who brings up the questions and what kinds of decisions are made. Suddenly people will be very interested in elections, and this is one of the preconditions of democracy. Through such changes, the community efforts of people will more effectively be utilized, since there will be direct results to show. Of course, central redistribution is still necessary in certain important areas; after all, a number of decisive social functions can no longer be accomplished rationally through local means. Let us think of public health, education, etc. In addition, there are regions whose unfavorable natural circumstances make the continued receipt of state support necessary. In a socialist system that strives toward equality we cannot and should not eliminate central redistribution, only use it in accordance with the requirements.

[Question] I think that by mobilizing local resources, even those problems could be taken care of that have previously frustrated the efforts of the state. Perhaps it would not even be a matter of embarrassment to learn from the examples of certain Western countries, too. There are cities, for

example, where the problems of care for the elderly have been solved largely through community efforts.

[Question] Naturally we should learn from any example that may teach us how better to organize and conduct self-governance, although I would caution against the mechanical copying of methods. This process was slow and troublesome in the West too. In the United States, for example, part of the reason for the development of local self-government was the fact that there were no authorities that took care of matters. People were compelled to manage their own affairs. I read in a study dealing with the early history of Boston that there were a number of penalties prescribed for people who refused to accept public office. Some of these people came from Europe, and most of them were used to absolutist and oligarchic social structures, where they had no opportunity to function as public officials. Later they learned to function in their new environment so well that, to take care of their spiritual needs, they even organized their own religious institutions in many of the newly settled areas of the West. This is one of the sources for the sectarian particularism, one might say pluralism, prevailing in the United States. The same traditions explain why even the sheriff is elected by local residents. Which European village would even think of electing its own law enforcement officers? Of course, autonomy has its negative aspects as well, such as when extreme particularism is not welded into a national unity. Socio-cultural enclosures may be created, which do not liberate but rather imprison the individual.

In any event, the state is unable to accomplish every function in the complex process of modernization. At the same time, if people expect the state to do everything, it will experience a severe legitimizing pressure, resulting in chronic political dissatisfaction or even crisis. In his own time, Lenin envisioned a system of socialism in which a multitude of social and political participatory organizations would operate. Due to well-known reasons, however, this was never realized. If our social reforms today propose a greater degree for democratization, this would require more than the introduction of new practices; their result would also depend on how well we are able to take advantage of the impotence of the circumstances.

There is resistance to every social innovation, and the overcoming of such resistance often requires great inventiveness. Social transformations are much too complex to fit into scientific models or recipes. Efforts for self-organization and self-governance will only become truly successful when it will be more costly to prevent their victory than to accept and integrate them.

[Question] In your opinion, have we reached this point yet?

[Answer] No, we are still far from it. We must acknowledge that problems resulting from the underdeveloped state of the infrastructure, the uneven status of development, etc., often severely limit our choice of feasible alternatives. For example, there cannot be a serious debate concerning the distribution of resources available for development, if the community does not have healthy drinking water, or if a hospital must be built. The entire issue of self-governance depends greatly on the quality of community development policies. Compromise, or the synchronization of differing interests make real sense only if there are more open alternatives.

[Question] Another precondition for political compromise is the existence of appropriate forums and the availability and satisfactory distribution of information.

[Answer] I have already quoted the ominous saying that freedom of the press belongs to those who own the press. For example, in the United States there are without doubt alternative sources of information, but most of these are owned by people who have the requisite amount of money. I like it in the American press that everything, even the most delicate of topics, is discussed in detail. At the same time, quite aside from the difference in ideological perspective which determines how the news is presented, I have also noticed that certain issues that are likely to go against business or political interests will be systematically avoided. What is more, it has been my impression that the pluralism of information prevailing in the United States more effectively indoctrinates public opinion than does our unified mass media. Our system of information and communication is colorful enough, but I could imagine bolder distinctions between the various publications and intellectual workshops; some of these are too cautious in presenting conflicts of social interests or debates.

Under our present circumstances, I favor a greater, though controlled pluralism, or to use a different expression, a monism moderated by pluralistic elements. Of course, this predisposition could be interpreted in a number of ways. More important is the question: Beyond the evaluative concept of pluralism, can we provide a theoretically coherent explanation for the problems that arise from the new situation?

12588

CSO: 2500/187

POLITICS

POLAND

PARTY ACTIVITIES CALENDAR: 23 DECEMBER - 5 JANUARY

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 2, 15 Jan 86 p 23

[Unattributed report: "Party Chronicle: 23 December 1985--5 January 1986]

[Text] Sessions of the Central Committee Politburo

3 Jan

The Politburo:

-- evaluated, on the basis of findings of the CKR [Central Party Audit Commission], the cooperation of party echelons with plant and basic party organizations;

-- considered the course and results of the 41st Extraordinary Session of CEMA and the conference of the secretaries for international and ideological affairs under the central committees of the communist and worker parties of the socialist countries, and approved the activities of the Polish delegations.

Conferences and Meetings:

23 Dec

-- Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Marian Wozniak met with press, radio and television correspondents from socialist countries and press attaches of the embassies of these countries. The subject of the meeting was the main socioeconomic problems of the 23rd Central Committee Plenum.

27 Dec

-- Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla met with the heads of the Ministry of Justice. Problems of the functioning of the administration of justice, and especially activities intended to strengthen the moral and professional values of judiciary personnel, were discussed.

31 Dec

-- First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski visited, together with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Zbigniew Messner, the employees of the Rolling Mill of the Warsaw Iron and Steel Plant in Zoliborz and subsequently the inmates of the State Home for Annuitant Chemists and the State Child Home No 3.

-- Servicemen of the Warsaw OPK [National Air Defense] First Fighter Plane Regiment were visited by Candidate Member of the Politburo and Minister of National Defense Army General Florian Siwicki.

-- On the last day of 1985 Candidate Member of the Politburo and Minister of Internal Affairs General of Arms Czeslaw Kiszczak met with functionaries of a MO [Citizens' Militia] station in the Praga South borough of Warsaw.

-- Candidate Member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Gdansk Province PZPR Committee Stanislaw Bejger, together with representatives of the province party and administrative authorities, met with the personnel of the Gdansk Lenin Shipyard and the Gdynia Parisian Commune Shipyard.

3 Jan

-- First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski received Aleksey Antonov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Minister, co-chairman of the Polish-Soviet Bilateral Commission for Economic and Scientific Cooperation and permanent representative of the USSR to CEMA, during the latter's sojourn in Poland.

4 Jan

First Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski received the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic to the USSR Wlodzimierz Natorf in connection with his nomination to that post.

At Party Echelons and Organizations:

23 Dec

-- Politburo Member Albin Siwak met with representatives of the Praga North borough party organization in Warsaw. He discussed the principal problems ensuing from the deliberations of the 23rd Central Committee Plenum.

-- Politburo Member Albin Siwak took part in a meeting with the party-managerial aktiv of the BUDIMEX CHZ [Foreign Trade Agency]. The organization's export-service tasks in 1986 were discussed.

27 Dec

-- The Lodz Province PZPR Committee discussed the assumptions of the 1986 province socioeconomic plan. Its deliberations were chaired by Politburo

Member and First Secretary of the Lodz Province PZPR Committee Tadeusz Czechowicz.

-- On the 87th anniversary of the outbreak of the Wielkopolska Uprising wreaths were placed at the Monument to the Wielkopolska Insurgents in Poznan. The ceremony was attended by heads of the province party committee and Politburo Member Stanislaw Kalkus.

-- A joint session of the Secretariat of the Warsaw Province PZPR Committee and the Presidium of the Warsaw Province PZPR Audit Commission [WKR] was held. The performance of the WKR in 1985 and the tasks of audit elements in 1986 were discussed. The deliberations were attended by CKR Chairman Kazimierz Morawski.

28 Dec

-- The Pila Province PZPR Committee evaluated the implementation of resolutions of the Ninth Congress in the province and outlined tasks for party echelons and organizations relating to preparations for the 10th party congress.

30 Dec

-- The Bialystok Province PZPR Committee discussed the performance of the health and social welfare service in the province. The deliberations were attended by Director of the Agriculture Department under the Central Committee Stefan Zawodzinski.

-- Politburo Member Stanislaw Kalkus toured the Iron Casting Department of the HCP [H. Cegielski, Poznan] Works in Srem, where he talked with employees at work stations. On the same day, St. Kalkus met with foundry personnel of the POMET Metal Works in Poznan.

3 Jan

-- The Krakow Province PZPR Committee outlined tasks for party members and organizations relative to combatting abuses, perversions and shortcomings as well as violations of people's rule and principles of social coexistence.

Interparty Cooperation:

-- A delegation of the PZPR Committee to the centenary celebration of the Indian National Congress, headed by Politburo Member Hieronim Kubiak, met in Delhi with representatives of political, scientific and cultural circles.

1386

CSO: 2600/243

POLITICS

POLAND

PZPR CC COMMISSION EXAMINES LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSPECTION

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 21 Jan 86 pp 1,2

["Activities of the PZPR Central Committee Commission: Cooperation Among Inspectors, Implementation of Recommendations Ensuing from the Sejm Election Campaign" -- PAP Report; passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] /At its session on 20 [Jan 86] the Commission for Representative Bodies and Self-Government under the PZPR Central Committee, deliberating under the chairmanship of Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak, considered cooperation between the NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] and province people's councils./

The principles of cooperation intended to streamline the solution of local problems are defined by the resolutions of December 1980 of the Council of State. Corresponding provisions are contained in the decree on the system of people's councils and local self-government.

The NIK material presented at the session referred to /forms of cooperation/ tried and tested in recent years, such as /consultation on audit plans/ (which, among other things, makes possible the consideration of topics of special importance to people's councils) and /systematic presentation of audit findings to people's councils/.

/During the first three quarters of last year NIK audit findings were presented at 213 sessions of council presidiums and 89 sessions of province people's councils. They also were utilized at 562 sessions of commissions of people's councils, and councilmen admit that the information thus provided helps them evaluate the performance of the administration, offices and economic organizations and take appropriate decisions./

/Joint audits/ (by the NIK and councilmen) also are being organized. /A new plane of cooperation was provided by the formation of the Worker-Peasant Inspection Teams [IRCh]./ Among other things, branches of the NIK promote the development of cooperation between the IRCh and the councils and self-government. By the end of the third quarter of last year, province people's councils appointed more than 20,000 IRCh inspectors (by year end their number was to reach 30,000). During the same period the IRCh conducted

approximately 4,600 inspections. Their findings are being transmitted to province people's councils.

Six comrades -- commission members and invited guests - took the floor in the discussion. /It was said, among other things, that NIK audit findings are not being completely utilized by people's councils and this reduces the possibility of streamlining their performance. Attention was drawn to the excessively tardy dates of the sessions evaluating the implementation of last year's plans and budgets, which curtails the possibility of utilizing the principal recommendations presented at these sessions by, among others, the NIK./

The insufficient utilization of NIK materials in the conception stage of local plans was criticized. Causes of the weak exercise of control by people's councils also were mentioned. /NIK branches should assist people's councils in developing methods of inspection/ which at present are often of an amateur nature and thus detract from its effectiveness.

Concluding this item on the agenda, Włodzimierz Mokrzyszczak discussed, among other things, /the need to coordinate control, to help the new control institution represented by the IRCh and to pay special attention to the quality of control/.

/The second item on the agenda dealt with the recommendations ensuing from the Sejm election campaign as presented to the central authorities./ It was found that of the 40,000 recommendations submitted during that period more than 3,300 merit consideration and settlement at the central level.

Often these recommendations are difficult and not always feasible at present. /The society should be given a detailed explanation on these matters. These recommendations should be considered by the Council of Ministers and subsequently by the Sejm. People's councils and self-governments should hold sessions to adopt plans for the implementation of these recommendations. In addition, the implementation of the recommendations ensuing from the campaign for elections to people's councils should be successively evaluated./

It was mentioned during the discussion that /a conscientious treatment of the recommendations is an important factor in strengthening the society's trust in the authorities/. Recommendations of an economic nature should be considered from the standpoint of their possible inclusion in the 1986-1990 NPSG [National Socioeconomic Plan]. Recommendations of a general social nature should be included in the discussions prior to the 10th PZPR Congress. Another subject to be discussed at the commission's session was /improving the system/ for the reception and implementation of recommendations offered by citizens. Further, the commission accepted the report on its activities during the period from the Ninth Congress until 31 December 1985.

1386
CSO: 2600/249

POLITICS

POLAND

COMPLETION OF STATE OF LAW REPORT ANNOUNCED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 1-2 Mar 86 p 2

[Passages in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /A member of the State Council-- Prof. Sylwester Zawadzki, spoke about some issues of the report on the state of law in Poland at a meeting with journalists at the Journalists Association of the PRL [Polish People's Republic]. The organizer of the meeting was the Socio-Legal Publicists' Club of the SD [Democratic Party] of the PRL./

Work has just been completed on the report which the Legislative Council had undertaken in the middle of 1984 with the president of the Council of Ministers. As the chief of the council, Prof. S. Zawadzki, stated, the report will appear in the next few days. This document, which was assembled by scholars and legal practitioners, is 1600 pages long together with enclosures. Six scholarly groups wrote syntheses of the individual law divisions: constitutional, administrative, civil and agricultural, economic and financial, labor and social insurance, criminal. Then they introduced their overall conclusions concerning the evaluation of the state of law and the needs and outlooks for the future in this area.

The authors of the report defined the criteria they used, part of which was derived from social conditions. Examples of these criteria are the needs for codification, amendments or organization of individual law divisions, also defined was the state of each law division, as well as its position in the social consciousness. The goal of the report is to create conditions under which there can be assurance of maximal efficiency for the rules of law and of respect for that law in society.

12972/13068
CSO: 2600/334

LACK OF INTERNAL PARTY CRITICISM DECRIED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 8, 22 Feb 86 p 2

[Statement by Mieczyslaw Czerniawski, first secretary of the Provincial Committee of the PZPR in Lomza, in an interview with W. Tocki and St. Zagorski from KONTAKTY NO 6, 1986]

[Text] "--Even basic qualifications are not required for many important or less important positions! No one expects new ideas, bold concepts, solutions...from directors, chiefs or presidents.

--Reducing the whole problem to nepotism and favoritism would be a serious over-simplification. Many inappropriate causes for personnel decisions are inherent in traditions reaching back to the beginnings of the socialist revolution in our country, when the necessity for maintaining the power held by the workers pushed political qualifications into the foreground.

You should treat the declaration of war on conformism, opportunism and procrastination not just as my personal affair, but also as the affair of the chief of the provincial level of the party. We will fight it in the economy and in our provincial organization. We want to get to a point where the most important thing is not the number of meetings taking place, the number of programs decided upon, of guiding principles, of directions, but rather that which brings these things to life, which causes them to bear results, and not that which is merely discussed.

--Yet, unfortunately, it is the latter which continues to dominate our consciousness. Furthermore, many meetings, which bring little results, lack arguments and lively discussions, and one can only hear more spontaneous responses in the corridor. Has the party again withdrawn into its "coatsleeves?"

--I would say this even more emphatically: the uncritical, unthinking following of orders "from above" is a lamentable parody. We must distinguish between organizational discipline and the grotesque. The party demands democratic centralism. And all organizations must adapt many solutions, which have been worked out on the basis of the experience of the majority, to their own individual cases. But a total lack of criticism within the party is statutorily forbidden..."

12972/13068
CSO: 2600/334

POLITICS

POLAND

SELF-MANAGEMENT REQUIRES MORE WORKER INITIATIVES

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by [MS]: "Self-Management in Businesses--More Initiative and Responsibility"]

[Text] (Own Information) Those people actively engaged in worker self-management have often expressed the opinion that their contacts with founding organizations are infrequent and merely a formality. The Ministry of Chemistry and Light Industry therefore decided to organize periodic meetings between the chairmen of the workers' councils and the ministry authorities. The meeting was held on Monday, 10 February, and was devoted to the tasks arising as a result of the 1986 National Annual Plan and the conditions to improve the work of self-management.

In the Ministry of Chemistry and Light Industry, in 98 percent of those firms who are entitled to self-management there are functioning self-management councils. There are more than 14,000 workers who actively participate in workers' councils. In the ministry's opinion, the majority of self-management councils use their authority properly and inspire both factory management and personnel to partake in various activities. There are, however, other self-governments that tolerate poor quality, overstatement of production costs, and pay increases that are not tied to economic conditions. The question of particularism that reveals itself chiefly in the acceptance of unjustified price increases is also common. The leader of the meeting, Minister Edward Grzywa, emphasized that this behavior cannot be permitted because it is restrictive on self-management. Some self-management activists abuse the law concerning the supervision of business activities in an unsatisfactory manner, and do not provide often enough initiatives that serve to improve effectiveness.

The chairmen of workers' councils from about 150 factories pointed to the barriers that make their everyday work difficult. Among the most commonly mentioned were gaps in the education system of self-government members; poor circulation of information; and external conditions such as frequent changes in the regulations of reform, difficulties with raw-materials and supplies, and difficulties in cooperation. In addition, attention was paid to the problem of dividing profits between the development fund and the workers'

fund. This point has been frequently raised in worker claim demands. As it turns out, the profits of the firms, as well as the profits of both funds, can be higher (in suitable proportions) if a number of factors are fulfilled. These include using resources and supplies wisely, care for high product quality, work organizations, and setting standards and employee awards at a proper level.

There are many tasks this year before the enterprises in the chemical and light industry fields. The amount of products sold is to increase by 4.1 percent, and supply of goods for market consumption is to increase by 5.7 percent. This must be accomplished mainly through an increase in work productivity because new personnel cannot be counted on. One can conclude from the comments of self-government activists that they will be able to meet the challenge of their responsibilities.

A meeting of chairmen of factory workers' councils from the Lubelski voivodship was held on 10 February in Lublin. The meeting came about as a result of the initiative of the Voivodship People's Council. Participants in the meeting included delegates to the Sejm, members of the Voivodship People's Council, and representatives of the voivodship authorities. Problems that self-management activists encounter in their work were discussed.

13073/9738
CSO: 2600/299

POLITICS

POLAND

YOUNG PEOPLE TOO APOLITICAL, SAYS LORANC

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 28 Feb 86 p 3

[Statement by Wladyslaw Loranc, director of the Ideological Division of the Central Committee of the PZPR in an interview with Krzysztof Pogorzelec of the Lodz GLOS ROBOTNICZY (22--23) Feb]

[Text] "We have achieved a very valuable success in tearing the overwhelming majority of the young generation away from the direct influences of the antisocialist opposition. We have also achieved some progress in overcoming the devastation which the enemy has caused in the consciousness of this generation. But looking at things soberly, we must realize that e.g. the schools are very slowly becoming accustomed to their educational tasks, to their educational responsibilities. I guess that I would be exaggerating a bit if I were to say that the institutes of higher learning do not want to undertake these educational responsibilities.

In consequence we faced with a situation in which the young are no longer being educated on the street at the beck and call of the underground. The underground is no longer an alternative for them. But the young are also turning aside from politics, from the political life. Among other things, this leads to a situation in which a part of the young generation do not understand the gravity of the situation when it comes to the international arena, the problems of war, peace, and armament. And so we must realize that the statistical stance is often an apolitical one. The young seem to be burnt out, disillusioned. They would rather look on, make demands, and not get involved. Despite our efforts, among others at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee, and other steps, the situation among the young generation today must disturb us."

12972/13068

CSO: 2600/334

POLITICS

POLAND

PRON GRUNWALD COMMITTEE GOALS DESIGNATED

Warsaw ODRODZENIE in Polish 9 Feb 86 p 2

[Text] Grunwald is one of the greatest victories in the history of the Polish nation, an example of the unity of the Slavic nations in the battle against the German onrush. It is the symbol of wise political thought and of a strong state--an idea uniting many generations of Poles.

This historical event is exceptionally close to all Poles despite differences of convictions. It has stuck forever in our historically consciousness. In the years when we had lost our freedom and independence it sustained our faith in our national survival, it served to fortify our hearts like few other facts in the thousand-year history of the Polish nation. We clung to the Grunwald tradition in the years of our struggle with the Nazi invasion. The Polish People's Army adopted the idea and symbolism of Grunwald. The memorable oath of the soldiers of the First Division named for Tadeusz Kosciuszko was taken on the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald. The victory at Berlin was a reenactment of Grunwald for the contemporary generation.

The Grunwald Cross, as the battle order established by the State National Council, became the utmost symbol of bravery and daring for many heroes of partisan battles and soldiers of the Polish Army, as well as for numerous townships and organizations which served in the struggle with the Nazi invader.

The Grunwald traditions open new possibilities in the historical and civil education of contemporary society. They can be the basis for the development of an essentially profound and attractive program for the education of the young generation. This has particularly great meaning in the present situation of the growing threat to peace.

For years the idea of Grunwald has inspired social activity. It has been embraced by the social Grunwald Committees in Olsztyn and Cracow and by the communities decorated with the Grunwald Cross. They have stipulated the creation of an All-Poland Grunwald Committee.

In response to social expectation the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the State Council of PRON [Patriotic Movement for the National Rebirth] has

created an Organizational Group for conducting preparatory work for the creation of the All-Poland Grunwald Committee.

The State Council of PRON, which has accepted the activities of the Organizational Group done so far at its session on 24 January 1986, has brought the All-Poland Grunwald Committee into being and charged KAZIMIERZ BARCIKOWSKI, the deputy chief of the State Council of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] as its president. The State Council of PRON has authorized the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the State Council of PRON to appoint the personnel of the committee and to inaugurate its activities on the 41st anniversary of the victory over fascism.

The State Council of PRON has designated the following as the most important tasks of the Grunwald Committee:

- Promulgating the idea of Grunwald in Polish society, especially among the young;
- Patronizing the social movements centered on the idea of Grunwald, with the participation of the concerned circles and communities decorated with the Grunwald Cross;
- Inspiring scholarly research and publications;
- Making the battle field into a permanent symbol of the Glory of Polish Arms;
- Collecting the means for a Grunwald fund.

The State Council of PRON issued an appeal to the communities decorated with the Grunwald Cross, to all concerned organizations and institutions, to PRON activists and workers--for active participation in the work of the All-Poland Grunwald Committee.

12972/13068

CSO: 2600/334

POLITICS

POLAND

PRON, NATIONAL COUNCILS' JOINT EFFORTS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Feb 86 p 5

[Article by PAP; passages in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] /The tasks of PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] in its joint efforts with the national councils was the subject of discussion at the session of the Commission of Representative Organs and Self-Government of the movement on the 27th of this month.

The documents of PRON's program--we were reminded--emphasize the significance of developing citizen's self-government. They also assert that PRON should be a forum through which all organs and forms of self-government will present their arguments. In most provinces the directions and forms of PRON's joint efforts with the national councils has been defined in the appropriate agreements signed by the presidia of the WRN [Provincial National Councils] and the provincial councils of PRON. The essence of such joint activity--it was said--depends upon this. An important field of joint activity is the joining of PRON in strengthening the position of the national councils. This gives rise to further needs for activities to spread knowledge about the goals and significance of the newly situated, in accordance with the laws, national councils. A further matter is arranging for ties between the councils and councilors and the local communities. At present meetings are taking place throughout the country between voters and the councilors. To this end meetings of village and town activists for resident self-government have also arranged. PRON workers have proven their great activism in organization and management.

Another expression of the joint efforts of PRON and the national council is the is the efficient implementation of the regional election plans and of the proposals and postulates expressed by the citizens in the pre-election campaign.

As was stressed in the discussion--the organs of resident self-government of socio-political organizations, workplaces and townspeople should all be integrated into the PRON sphere for the development of self-government.

Also demonstrated was the importance and need for organizational activity to awaken social activism. The national councils and PRON have worked jointly, e.g. within the framework of the national action for the aid to schools, and they have produced results. The joint efforts of the movement and the national councils should also find expression in arranging for social consultation for projected legal actions.

POLITICS

POLAND

AWARD RECIPIENT NOTES 'RATIONAL' PATRIOTISM

[Editorial Report] Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Mar 86 carries on page 2 an article attributed to "Lut" on the second annual W. Katrzynski awards. These awards are journalistic prizes granted by the Christian socio-cultural publication Tygodnik Polski in honor of the publication's founder and first editor-in-chief, Wojciech Ketrzynski, historian and journalist. The award ceremonies were attended by PRON Secretary General Jerzy Jaskiernia and the Christian Social Association President, Kazimierz Morawski. This year's recipients are Jan Meystowicz and Olgierd Terlecki. Meystowicz has written extensively on the French Third Republic, with a recent monograph on Louis XVI, and Terlecki is an essayist noted for his biographies of politician Jozef Beck and Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski and his interest in the prewar Polish Third Republic. Both authors have, in addition, traced the history of Polish combat units in the West [during World War II].

In his acceptance speech Meystowicz referred to the many articles which have recently appeared in the press devoted to the Polish national character. "One of its [national character] traits is patriotism." Meystowicz stated that "'Polish patriotism of the latter party of the 20th century should be directed by rationalism, which by no means discredits spiritual values. This means rationalism in relation to issues in the arena of public affairs and an understanding of what is desirable and workable in terms of the most important relationship in our public life, that of the authorities and society.'"

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CSO: 2600/366

POLITICS

POLAND

AMERICAN CHURCH GROUP VISITS TO DISCUSS AGRICULTURAL FUND

Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish No 51-52, 25 Dec 85 p 15

[Text] Wilfrid Caron and Deirdre Dessinque, delegates from the American Conference of Bishops, visited Poland from 3 to 8 December. The purpose of the visit was to discuss legal issues in connection with the institution being formed in the USA to assist the work of the Agricultural Fund. This institution, acting on behalf of the Conference of Bishops, will have as its goal the organization of funds and the flows of goods purchased for them to Poland. Participating in discussions with members of the organizational committee, which took place at the seat of the secretariat of the Polish Episcopate in Warsaw, was the plenipotentiary of the Polish Episcopate for the Agricultural Fund, Rev Alojzy Orszulik. the guests also spent time with a pilgrimage to Jasna Gora and visited farms whose managers expressed their approval of participation in the fund's programs. During the discussions, promotion of the work in North America was affirmed, enabling the initiation of concrete activity on behalf of Polish farmers as soon as information that the Agricultural Fund has been registered in Poland has been received.

12776

CSO: 2600/241

POLITICS

POLAND

ASPECTS OF 'CATHOLIC CULTURE' CRITICIZED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 49, 8 Dec 85 p 4

[Text] Professor Witold Nawrocki, director of the PZPR Central Committee's Cultural Division, published in ZYCIE LITERACKIE (No 47) a broad statement, "On Culture and Politics," including remarks on the church.

"The cultural initiatives of the Polish villages, I would say cautiously, are divisive. Some want first to build what is most necessary for that part of village culture that is connected with the operation of the parish and when they have a beautiful church, they want us to build them a clubhouse, for example. . . . It has happened that when there are 600 to 700 residents, a church for 2000 people is built. We support cultural initiatives wherever they already exist. But the custom of building structures regardless of whether or not they are necessary or in the hope that they can someday be socially useful must end.

"In the Catholic Church we have something like two forms of culture, one that can and does emerge in the church, e.g., growing out of the church's philosophy and cultural program, being something of a part of that institution's existence. This is authenticated by documents produced by numerous Polish writers and Catholic publicists and certain dramatists. And this is normal. But we also have a different form of church culture, growing out of completely different aspirations and programs. This is the attempt to politicize the church to the utmost. . . . We are dealing here with a clear attempt to create an anti-socialist church culture. The church wants to improve culture, it wants to have its own cultural influence and I think we can fight this only by creating our own better cultural offering. But we cannot agree that the church will be a site for anti-socialist activity as we have in the case of the church theater. . . . There is also no consent to creating the impression that state patronage does not offer a full opportunity for the free creation of theatrical or literary works. One can hardly consent to the presentation of Norwid, for example, only in the church.

"According to indicative data from various sources, clustered around the church are about 50 actors (including Nehrebecka, Holoubek and Hanka Skarzanka) and there are writers of various flights and heights who previously did not exhibit a desire to appear in Catholic circles. The most Catholic writers today are Woroszyński and Miedzyrzecki and there is also a certain

number of politician-"converts" and as is known, neophytes are particularly active. What are the consequences? Mediocre. Moreover, there is no increase of new names or new works in addition to such classical Catholic writers as Golubiew or Malewska. Attempts at inclusion in their ranks are unsuccessful, often even tragicomic, for the religious education of these people is deficient. In addition, traces of other religious systems are often visible, which is rather curious, because from under this Catholic culture there appears some other religious skin. . . . However, the most important thing is that the paths are not crossing.

12776

CSO: 2600/241

POLITICS

POLAND

POPE NAMES NEW WARSAW AUXILIARY BISHOP

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 2, 12 Jan 86 p 1

[Communique by Cardinal Jozef Glemp, Primate of Poland]

[Text] Beloved Brothers and Sisters of the Warsaw Archdiocese!

I am sharing with you the good news that Holy Father John Paul II has named a priest of our Warsaw archdiocese, Rev Marian Dus, my auxiliary bishop. The bishop designate, currently a pastor in Pyry, a professor of Catholic social science at the seminary and dean of the Piaseczynski deaconate, will enter the College of Bishops and assume his bishop's spiritual duties alongside the worthy auxiliary bishops of the Warsaw archdiocese, Archbishop Dabrowski and Bishops Modzelewski, Miziolek, Kraszewski and Romaniuk. Our archdiocese is the largest in Poland and thus the constantly increasing problems in it require new powers in the service of education and sanctification.

The bishop designate is prepared for this responsible task. He was born in the Tarnow region in 1938. After high school he did technical work. After completing studies in philosophy at the Wloclwek Seminary, he studied social sciences at Lublin Catholic University. Then he took up theology at the Warsaw Metropolitan Seminary, concluding with his ordination in 1968.

Since then he has devoted himself completely to priestly work in the archdiocese, first as a vicar in Grojciec, then as a teacher and professor in our seminary. In taking over the parish of Warsaw-Pyry in 1977 and two years later the deanery of the Piaseczynski deaconate, he did not relinquish his teaching work among the alumni. At every turn he was distinguished by his zeal, discernment, heartfelt devotion and love for the people.

The Second Vatican Council gives these instructions to bishops: "Let bishops proclaim the Gospel of Christ to the people... exhorting them by the power of the Spirit to faith or fortifying them in faith. Let them acquaint them with the whole of the mystery of Christ" (DB 12).

We thank Christ who through the Holy Father grants the Warsaw church a new auxiliary bishop. I commend the prayers of all the priests and faithful to the bishop designate. Let our prayers especially go with Bishop Marian on the day of his consecration, which will take place at Warsaw cathedral on the Feast of the Three Kings, 6 January 1986 at 5 p.m., so that in his work as a bishop he would bring in love the hope that is in the Cross of Christ.

POLITICS

POLAND

POLISH MUSLIMS CONVENE, CREATING NEW MUFTIYAT

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 2, 12 Jan 86 p 6

[Article by Janusz Kamocki: "60 Years of Muslim Religious Union in Poland"]

[Excerpts] On 28 December 1925 a conference of delegates of all Polish Muslim communities was held in Wilno. This conference created a Polish muftiyat, the highest national religious authority, thereby breaking all ties with the Taurydz muftiyat, which since the partitions had been the superior authority over Polish Muslims.

After the war many Polish Muslims left the Wilno area and the role of Muslim center, after Wilno, was assumed by Bialystok, where a significant part of the present community of 3,000 lives. Thus it was to Bialystok that the clergy and active members of the Union of Polish Muslims and representatives of embassies of certain Islamic countries came from 27 to 29 December 1985 to celebrate the 60th anniversary of that event.

On the first day of the conference, solemn services were held under the leadership of Aleksander Chalecki, the Bialystok imam and chairman of the Liturgical Committee of the Muslim Religious Union. On 28 December there was a celebration opened by the chairman of the Supreme Muslim College, Stefan Mucharski. After commemorating deceased and killed Muslims who served Islam as well as Poland, Ali Miskiewicz, historian; Janusz Kamocki, ethnographer (the only non-Muslim in the group) and Selim Chazbijewicz, poet and student of the Islamic ethos, gave lectures that elucidated comprehensively the situation of Muslims in Polish society and their connections to Oriental and Polish culture. Finally a representative of the Moroccan embassy and Polish-Moroccan Friendship Association, Muhammed Lebiry, spoke, thanking his Polish co-religionists for keeping the faith, then presenting certain social issues in Islam from his own viewpoint.

Following the official portion, those attending saw the model and plan for a future mosque in Bialystok. It will be an imposing place of worship, capable of accomodating 1,000 worshipers.

12776
CSO: 2600/241

POLITICS

POLAND

ANTONOWICZ DEATH INVESTIGATION REFUTES MURDER CHARGES

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 12 Feb 86 p 5

[Article by Wieslaw Debski: "Press Conference in the Olsztyn Voivodship Public Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] (Own Information) Last year on 19 October, Marcin Antonowicz, a student at the University of Gdansk, jumped from a militia automobile into the street. He died a few days later as a result of the injuries he sustained. The young man's unfortunate death was immediately exploited by enemies of socialism both in Poland and in Western European countries. Without waiting for the public prosecutor's assessment, the militia functionaries were blamed for the accident.

As in the past, these enemies created their own particular version of events, which were aimed at disrupting the normalization of the country's political situation.

Our completed investigation was refuted yet another lie. The results of the inquiry were made public at a press conference held on 11 February at the Olsztyn Voivodship Public Prosecutor's Office.

Dr. Stanislaw Jagodzinski, spokesman of the Voivodship Public Prosecutor's office, said that "individuals with power of attorney representing the family of the wronged person took part in the inquiry and in the inquiry tests. They also had full access to the records of the case. Close to 50 witnesses were interviewed, of which 6 were brought forward by the lawyers representing the Antonowicz family. Nineteen experts were also questioned for their opinion."

The inquiry results presented at the conference clearly showed that Marcin Antonowicz was the victim of an unfortunate accident. After a party in which alcohol was consumed (research undertaken 3 hours after the accident showed the presence of 1.3 promilles of alcohol in the blood of the victim, which according to experts means that at the moment of the accident the rate was between 1.7 and 2.0 promilles of alcohol) Antonowicz went with two friends to the bus stop on Kalingradzka Street and acted rowdy. This was confirmed later by 4 witnesses who were also present when the boisterous trio's identity papers were checked. Due to Antonowicz's aggressiveness, and his

under the influence of alcohol, it was decided to take him to a detoxification station. While escorting him to the automobile, the Citizens' Militia functionaries exercised every possible means of caution such as putting him in the back seat and locking the doors. During the ride, Antonowicz assaulted the Citizens' Militia functionaries and jumped from the automobile which was then traveling at a speed of 40 kilometers per hour. As a result of the fall to the street, he sustained serious injuries, which caused his death on 2 November.

Two expert teams of doctors summed at the request of both the Prosecutor's office and the attorneys representing the victim's family ascertained that the injuries sustained resulted from a fall to a flat surface. They ruled out the possibility that the injuries were caused by a truncheon blow. This opinion was also confirmed by a filmed inquiry experiment, which was shown to reporters yesterday.

After taking these statements into consideration, Czeslaw Reut, the regional prosecutor, decided to close the inquiry on 10 February.

Dr. Teresa Dziedzic-Witkowska of the Gdansk Institute of Court Medicine and Colonel Krystyna Kaczmarek of the Institute of Crime Detection of the National Headquarters of the Citizens' Militia presented the methods used by the experts in their work and how the inquiry conclusions were reached.

The incident described above illustrates the need for a precise definition of the patrol duty regulations for the Citizens' Militia functionaries and regulations dealing with individuals under the influence of alcohol. The Olsztyn viovodship prosecutor passed on the results in this matter to the National Headquarters of the Citizens' Militia.

13073/9738
CSO: 2600/299

POLITICS

POLAND

BRIEFS

CHANGE IN PASSPORT REGULATIONS REPORTED--A change in passport regulations: A foreigner staying in Poland may invite only his immediate family to his own country. He can invite persons not related to him only with the intervention of a Polish diplomatic or consular representative in his own country. [Text] [Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 50, 15 Dec 85 p 4] 12776

POPE ADDRESSES POLISH ACADEMICS--The Holy Father, during breaks in synod proceedings, met in private audiences with bishops participating in the conference. On 3 December John Paul II received the Polish primate, Cardinal Jozef Glemp, at a private audience. The Holy Father's tribute to representatives of Polish science and the academic environment: On 4 December, during a Wednesday general audience, the Holy Father, after summarizing his instructions on the Triune God in his native tongue, said, "I want to give my regards to all the pilgrims present here and all my countrymen in our homeland. In a special way, my thoughts turn to academic circles, to the universities. I have in mind those distinguished representatives of science who act according to their conscience. This is a great, great distinction, a great honor, although it may not have encountered the acceptance of outside authorities. Certainly the good of the nation demands that we build on the human conscience. And I wish this for my homeland, for this I pray constantly, that a tested conscience be built on the people in Poland." [Text] [Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 50, 15 Dec 85 p 4] 12776

USSR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS COUNCIL VISITS--A delegation from the Religious Affairs Council of the USSR's Council of Ministers, with council chairman Konstanty Charczew, is in Poland at the invitation of minister Adam Lopatki, director of the Office for Religious Affairs. The delegation met with the management of the Office for Religious Affairs, the management of the Socio-Legal Division of the PZPR's Central Committee and academic employees of the Institute for Religious Studies of the Academy of Social Sciences. There was also a meeting with members of the board of directors of the Society for the Promotion of Secular Culture. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 14-15 Dec 85 p 2] 12776

EUROPE BACKS AGRICULTURAL FUND--Press agent's communique by Slawomir Siwek. As we have been informed by the European Conference of Episcopates of the Catholic Church, the European Parliament, at a meeting on 14 November 1985, supported the sum of 2 million EQ (about \$1.7 million) allocated for fiscal 1985 for the needs of the Agricultural Fund being formed in Poland and for its intervention for the needs of family farming. 25 November 1985. [Text] [Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 49, 8 Dec 85 p 4] 12776

POLITICS

YUGOSLAVIA

SLOVENIAN LC SUPPORTS 'CRITICAL ANALYSIS,' ATTACKS REFORMERS

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Apr 86 p 3

[Excerpts] The summarized statement of the Slovenian LC CC Presidium on implementing the LCY CC views in connection with the Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System says that the public discussion in Slovenia as a whole supported the basic assessments contained in this document and, for the most part, also the suggestions for further developing the political system. Executive Secretary Valerija Skerbec said that differing views, especially in regard to the proposed solutions but not the basic course of the analysis, were largely expressed by individuals outside the LC ranks.

In the public discussion in Slovenia the prevailing judgment was that the foundation of the social order should not be changed and that the key problems are in the practical application of the system and not in its legislated solutions. In connection with this, Andrej Marinc and Ciril Ribicic said at the meeting of the Presidium that the work on eliminating the deformations and "short circuits" in the practical functioning of certain parts of the system should be accelerated and this is the best answer to all those who support a basic revision of the system and [the best answer] to working people who stubbornly demand a reduction in the harmful regulation-ism and administration and [demand] the enabling of all subjects and institutions of the system to solve more effectively the accumulating problems in the economy and throughout society. Action in this direction has already been underway in Slovenia for a long time, above all in regard to rationalizing various administrative procedures and decision-making, but no one is satisfied with the concrete results.

The other important conclusion of the public discussion was that there is no reason to change the constitutional conception of the Federation and the structure of its organs, but of course their effectiveness should be increased. In this connection it was stressed that the conditions of economic operation are those which assure unity of the Yugoslav market and that the so-called polycentrist etatism and the existence of republics and provinces are not a brake on the integration of associated labor in the Yugoslav economic area which [integration] should be stimulated also by measures of economic policy and especially by pooling labor and resources based on economic criteria. This is considered also the key condition for overcoming autarky in the circulation of social capital.

From the report prepared by a working group and from the discussion at the meeting of the Presidium, the assessment was made that in the public discussion throughout the country, especially outside Slovenia, there were great deviations from the conclusions of the LCY CC in connection with the Critical Analysis. It was said, for instance, that extremely critical and negative discussions rather than constructive and critically-creative discussions have had a large response throughout the Yugoslav public. Failure to respect the clear directions of the LCY CC in reporting on the course of the public discussion creates the impression that most working people and professional organizations have an opinion about the functioning and perfecting of the political system which is different from those of the organized subjective forces which prepared the Critical Analysis and [the discussions] are thereby undermining the foundation without which it is not possible to harmonize the views of the broadest Yugoslav public about the questions on the functioning of and agreement in the political system.

The repeating of criticism from the period before the Critical Analysis and, especially, the deepening of differences was assessed as unacceptable and damaging. Also damaging are the attempts to create the impression that demands for radically changing the system have supporters in all republics and that, in fact, only the most responsible [top] political forums of the republics and provinces which are alienated from the opinion of the working people and citizens are "defending the system." These actions attempt to deepen, differentiate, and encourage the forces which, also in Slovenia, are not for the strategic commitment to our system. Despite the clear stands of the LCY CC, deep differences in views on the bases and future of the development of the political system still exist also within the LCY. This is reflected also in the fact that not only individual communists but even LC organs are engaged in discussions which deny that the Critical Analysis has any value. The strategic commitment to the political system is most often attacked on the basis of the Critical Analysis being in opposition to the Long-Term Program of Economic Stabilization.

Also judged unacceptable and contrary to the views of the LCY CC are the abstract demands for organizing a Chamber of Associated Labor in the SFRY Assembly without a clear formulation and argumentation of what this would mean for the present structure of the Assembly, for the parity [paritetni] structure of the Assembly's two chambers, decision-making by consensus, etc. This question is even more complicated by the fact that such a proposal, although not accepted in the Critical Analysis or insisted on by any of the participants in the work of the social councils, received support from forums in some parts of Yugoslavia. In addition, now some are adding to this proposal also a proposal to form a Sociopolitical Chamber or Chamber of Citizens in the SFRY Assembly. One is hereby losing sight of the entire contradiction of such proposals, i.e., the fact that one [issue] is our strategic commitment to the decisive role of associated labor in society, another is the return to forming general political chambers on the territorial principle, and a third is support for changing relations in the federation.

At the Slovenian LC Presidium meeting it was stressed that in connection with discussions on the political system, responsibility should be sharpened in regard to the failure to respect adopted directives and conclusions, especially in areas which frequently emphasize the importance of applying the principles of democratic centralism, which dramatize the question of LCY "federalization," and act in an organized way against the LCY conclusions unanimously adopted.... Parallel with rejecting the frontal attacks on the Critical Analysis and LCY Stances, one should intensify work on eliminating weakness and deformations in the political system..., fight for more effective action of all the system's institutions and organs, and stop unproductive debates on an abstract level for or against changing the political system.

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CSO: 2800/225

POLITICS

YUGOSLAVIA

DISCUSSION OF LCY BYLAWS CHANGES CONTINUES

Belgrade KOMUNIST in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 86 pp 12-14

[Article by Milivoje Tomasevic: "Against Federalization and the Philosophy of Issuing Bureaucratic Directives"; first paragraph is KOMUNIST introduction]

[Text] The draft of the new LCY Bylaws is aimed at eliminating from that document everything that might be the basis for further federalization of the LCY or pull in the direction of the philosophy of issuing bureaucratic directives. The party rank and file will be evaluating how successful it has been in that during the coming months of public discussion, and the LCY Congress will have the final say.

Additional work has been done on the bylaws at every LCY Congress since the fifth. Sometimes there were fewer changes made in that text, sometimes more, but every reconstruction aroused great interest, since this job profoundly affects the work and relations of the entire LCY and has an extremely strong influence on its ideological unity and ability to act. The provisions of the bylaws, as has been demonstrated more than once, may also represent a bunker from which various negative tendencies can be successfully nurtured.

This time the draft of the LCY Bylaws had to arouse still more attention, since there were two reasons above all else that led to its truly serious changes: This is one of the tasks set at the 12th LCY Congress, and in the general party discussion after the 13th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee a great number of proposals and suggestions were made as to the method of organization and activity and the relations between the bodies and organizations of the LC which are based on the current LCY Bylaws.

More in Less Space

The draft of the new LCY Bylaws has 35 more articles than the one now in effect; almost half of the text has been rewritten, and yet this document is still more than one-fourth shorter than the present one. This is what one notes on first glance. It is evident from the draft, which at about this time is supposed to reach every basic organization and member of the LC, that the key principles have not been touched--the character of relations in the LCY, the way in which it is organized, its position in society, and performance of its role in the system remain as they have been. But the way in which those

principles are to be implemented has been modified quite a bit, and there are completely new features. It is obvious that a large number of proposals and demands presented in the partywide debate following the 13th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee have been incorporated into the text of the bylaws.

The principles of democratic centralism and the manner of organization and of internal relations in the LCY have been elaborated more precisely. Emphasis has been put on the responsibility of organizations and bodies of the LC for failure to make decisions in good time and for carrying out positions that are taken. Quite a bit of space is given to responsibility, the manner of establishing personal and collective responsibility and the related pronouncement of appropriate political ideological measures have been elaborated. The procedure for electing the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium has been changed. Emphasis is put on the role and responsibility of the member and basic organization of the LC in personnel policy, in formulation of the positions to be taken by the supreme bodies of the LC, and also in carrying out that policy. Provision has been made for conferences to be created in OUR's, work organizations, higher educational institutions, local communities, and work communities, and they would be able to adopt binding positions. Quite a bit of attention has also been paid to relations among the bodies of the LC.

The broadest party membership now has to judge whether everything has been done in the right way, whether the present conditions and troubles in society and in the League of Communists in demand some different solutions, would it be possible to do more and better given the present balance of power, in short--the extent to which the proposed changes meet the needs of continuation of the revolution. That is why the LCY Central Committee in fact decided that the public discussion should last until 30 April, and then the proposed version of the bylaws is to be drawn up and sent to the LCY Congress, but suggestions and proposals will be accepted until the last days of June, when the 13th LCY Congress begins (25-28 June).

These innovations were made in the bylaws by introducing a large number of new phrasings and completely new articles and then by rigorous "cleaning up" of the text, and at times the meaning of an entire article or its key paragraph has been altered and clarified with the insertion of just two or three words. We will attempt in this article to call attention to the new solutions for those problems which have in the past drawn the greatest attention and over which there have been the most widely differing opinions and disputes.

Independence Within Unity

Much attention of the public has been directed over the last 4 years to relations between the bodies of the republic and provincial LC's and the bodies of the LCY. It has often been warned that the League of Communists has been caught up in a process of federalization (another name for factions) and that its unity has been seriously disrupted. Particular unrest was aroused by the lengthy meetings of the bodies of the LC in SR Serbia, both the republic and provincial bodies. For that reason the provisions of the bylaws regulating that subject matter will certainly be weighed with particular delicacy. And here is what is new in that regard: "...the leagues of communists of the

republics and leagues of communists of the provinces, as parts of the unified LCY, shall organize themselves and operate as /independent/ and /unified/ (emphasis [represented by slantlines] supplied by M.T.) organizations of members and of their organizations within the territory of a republic or province."

Those words "independent" and "unified," and especially the apparent equating of the position of the republics and provinces, could arouse new confusion and disputes. But here is the explanation which is supposed to reduce everything to its true measure. Article 6 states what "independence" means in these relations. "The independence of the Leagues of Communists of the republics and provinces within the framework of the unified LCY is expressed in their equal position and equal right and responsibility for actively and creatively participating in building and carrying out the unified policy of the LCY, to elaborate and concretize that policy on the basis of the program, bylaws, positions and decisions of the forums and bodies of the LCY, and their own experience in development of socialist self-management, and within that framework to independently set forth policy, positions, and decisions for whose content and execution they bear direct and full responsibility to their own membership and to the LCY and to its forums and bodies." The end of that article states precisely the relation between the organizations of the republics and provinces: "...the leagues of communists of the provinces, as integral parts of the Serbian LC, are required in the independent building of their policy, positions, and decisions to take as their points of departure the policy, positions, and decisions of the forums and bodies of the Serbian LC and shall bear responsibility for so doing before their own membership and the membership of the Serbian LC and its forums and bodies."

Relations among bodies of LC's (not only in Serbia) are further spelled out, especially in Article 48, where a completely new formulation has also been proposed: "When the Central Committee of the League of Communists of a republic or the provincial committee of the LC of a province and the Committee of the LCY Organization in the YPA does not carry out the Program and policy of the LCY, the positions and decisions of its forums and bodies, or when it acts contrary to them, the LCY Central Committee is required to issue it a warning.

"If the situation that has arisen is not resolved even after the warning, the LCY Central Committee shall adopt appropriate positions and take the necessary steps. If it deems it to be necessary, the LCY Central Committee may call for an extraordinary congress to be held of the LC of the republic, an extraordinary conference of the LC of the province, and an extraordinary conference of the LCY Organization in the YPA. If even then the problems which have arisen are not resolved, the LCY Central Committee shall call an extraordinary congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

"The same procedure shall also apply at other levels of organization of the LC in the exercise of responsibility and the taking of initiative for calling extraordinary meetings of the forums and bodies of the LC."

The Principles of Democratic Centralism

A topic which throughout the entire period between the congresses has been at the center of attention of the entire public and especially the party community--democratic centralism--has been elaborated in 12 subparagraphs, among which only numbers 6, 11, and 12 have been left intact. According to the new text, abiding by democratic centralism means:

"(1) that the member of the League of Communists is the principal in building and carrying out the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia;

"(2) the right and obligation of basic organizations and bodies to participate in the preparation, enactment, and implementation of the Program, Bylaws, positions, and decisions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia;

"(3) democratic dialogue and contest of opinions as a permanent method in the building and establishment of political positions and decisions of the League of Communists and in evaluating the results of their implementation in social practice;

"(4) application of the principle of the majority in decisionmaking at all levels of organization of the League of Communists;

"(5) the duty of the basic organizations and bodies of the League of Communists to guarantee consistent execution of both their positions and decisions and also the positions and decisions of higher bodies of the League of Communists, and also to regularly inform the membership and bodies of the League of Communists and the public concerning the results and problems related to their implementation;

"(6) the obligation of members of the League of Communists who during decisionmaking in the basic organization or body have remained in the minority, while freely retaining their own opinion, to consistently and creatively carry out the decisions of the majority, which is incompatible with any sort of activity that would hinder or hamper the unified action of communists to carry out decisions made in that way, an action that would constitute a form of cliquism and factional activity;

"(7) the obligation and right of the members, basic organizations, and bodies of the League of Communists to verify the soundness and performance of the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and to make proposals to amend or supplement it;

"(8) the duty of higher bodies and forums of the League of Communists to help lower bodies and basic organizations of the League of Communists in carrying out their decisions and to contest and vacate positions and decisions which the latter adopt when the former find that they are not in conformity with the goals contained in the program, the standards contained in the bylaws, and the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia;

"(9) adoption of positions and decisions in the bodies of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the basis of democratic debates and their responsibility for the policy which they adopt, for its unambiguous interpretation and its consistent implementation throughout the entire League of Communists of Yugoslavia and society;

"(10) the right of the Leagues of Communists of the republics, the Leagues of Communists of the provinces, and the LCY Organization in the YPA to independently set forth policy, adopt their own positions and decisions on the basis of the Program and the established policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and their direct and full responsibility to the forms and bodies of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for their content and methods of implementing them in society;

"(11) collective and individual responsibility of the members, basic organizations, and bodies of the League of Communists for the results of their work and for the state of social relations and the political situation in the communities where they are active;

"(12) uninterrupted mutual flow of information with respect to policy and public scrutiny of the political-ideological activity of basic organizations and bodies of the League of Communists."

Standing and Ad Hoc Conferences of the LC

Surely many people still remember the speech which Rade Koncar made at the 12th LCY Congress, when he demanded a fundamental revision of the way in which the LC is organized in associated labor, above all the formation of conferences whose decisions would be binding on all basic organizations. As is well known, Koncar ended up in isolation at the congress and for that reason resigned from all party and work duties. His speech has aroused many disputes, and in a large number of work collectives they have asserted even after the congress that in those workplaces the LC would operate more successfully if "factory committees" did exist, and they would, of course, have to be tailored to the new conditions and needs of society and the League of Communists. But the decision made at the congress was different, that is what went into the bylaws, and in the period since that time the LC has been operating without standing action conferences.

Four years of experience have shown that those who demanded a firmer organizational tie between basic organizations in work collectives were right, and it is now being proposed that in OOUR's, a work organization not divided into OOUR's, higher educational institutions, local communities and work communities containing more than a single basic organization of the LC a "conference of basic organizations" be formed "to coordinate and unify their work and, following democratic discussion in the basic organizations of the LC, adopt decisions and take positions binding on the membership and the basic organizations."

The conference of the LC in the work organization divided into OOUR's "would adopt positions and make decisions in the manner done by bodies of the LC on

the basis of prior discussions in basic organizations of the LC and their proposals, and those positions and decisions would be binding on all members and basic organizations of the LC."

The draft envisages that even in a complex organization of associated labor action conferences of the LC would be formed and "following discussion in the basic organizations of the LC and in conferences of the LC in the SOUR could adopt positions to guide and coordinate the action of the members and the basic organizations of the LC within the SOUR which become binding when they are accepted by all the basic organizations or when they are verified by the appropriate body of the LC."

In large integrated systems, SIZ's, trade associations, and other associations ad hoc political-ideological linkage and organization of the members for action are being proposed. "Those forms might be special-topic and action conferences, regular conferences, caucuses, and the like.... The positions and recommendations adopted by these forms become binding when confirmed by the bodies of the LC which organize them."

Role of the LCY Central Committee

Many polemical blows have also been exchanged concerning the role of the LCY Central Committee. In the public partywide debate this body was criticized to the greatest extent because it has not prevented the strengthening of disintegrative processes in society and the party. Emphasis has been put on the need to strengthen the center of the country's party and the like, and at the 25th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee Dusan Dragosavac proposed that this body elect its own chairman and executive committee. Dragosavac proposed that the chairman be elected for a term of 1 year (he would be allowed to succeed himself), that the election be done by secret ballot with at least two nominees, and that the rotation of the office (by republics and provinces) ought not to be strictly respected. Even earlier there were quite a few differing views and proposals made in meetings of the Central Committee as well as in the broader public concerning the way in which the Central Committee operates.

The Central Committee decided that the draft, in addition to the well-known text which stresses that the LCY Central Committee is the supreme body of the LCY, would take under consideration and guarantee consistent implementation of political guidelines, positions, decisions, and conclusions adopted in the LCY Congress and the like, and would also record new formulations.

"The LCY Central Committee evaluates the activity of the central committees of the LC's of the republics and the provincial committees of the LC's of the provinces and the committee of the LCY Organization in the YPA in implementing the positions and decisions it sets forth and the goals and policy of the LCY as a whole. It issues a direct and timely warning when there is a departure from the LCY Program and policy and takes the necessary steps to establish responsibility of those who have not been consistent in implementing them." In addition, the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee is to give timely notice to the Central Committee on the situation throughout the LCY, "to see to consistent execution of the conclusions of the LCY Central Committee...to propose

institution of proceedings to establish responsibility...of bodies and organizations and of their members who have not been carrying out the conclusions of the LCY Central Committee...." How much help this will be in strengthening the power of the LCY Central Committee will be seen over the next 4 years.

Obligations of LC Members

Attention will certainly be drawn as well to the new provisions concerning the image and obligations of the ICY member. The draft states that "basic organizations and bodies of the IC are required to give preference in enrollment in the LC to workers, young people, and other active and creative people."

New obligations have been added to the obligations which the member of the LC has had up to now. He has a duty to wage a fight for the following:

- "1) the development of the relations of socialist self-management, exercise of the rights and discharge of the obligations of the working people and citizens, application and development of socialist ethical standards, solidarity, and compassion among people, work collectives, and sociopolitical communities;
- "2) the decisive role of the working class and of associated labor in the creation and distribution of the entirety of income and throughout all social decisionmaking;
- "3) achievement of equality and development of brotherhood and unity of the nationalities and ethnic minorities of Yugoslavia and of their common interests;
- "4) consistent application of constitutional, legal, and self-management norms and self-management accords and social compacts;
- "5) distribution according to the results of work;
- "6) development and protection of social property;
- "7) strengthening of nationwide defense and social self-protection, defense of the freedom, independence, and international position of the SFRY and the achievements of the National Liberation Struggle and the socialist revolution;
- "8) a rise of labor productivity and development of creativity in the domains of production, education, science, and culture, and
- "9) enhancement of the prestige of the League of Communists and a strengthening of its unity with respect to political ideology and action."

We have called attention only to the new statements of certain basic issues which have dominated the public discussions in the period between congresses. It would be logical for the rank and file to also take positions in large numbers on the present proposals, to say whether their positions have been respected or not, to state what is good and what is not acceptable in the new text, since they will be working under the new bylaws for at least the next 4

years, and it is well known that in addition to the programmatic commitments, the pattern of organization is one of the most important issues to the work of any political organization. There is enough time, since, according to the decision that has been made, members of the LC and their organizations may submit their suggestions, proposals, and criticisms to the commissions for affairs of the bylaws of the LC's of the republics and provinces and the LCY Organization in the YPA or directly to the LCY Commission for Affairs of the Bylaws. Proposals arriving after 30 April will be submitted to the Commission for the Bylaws of the 13th LCY Congress.

[Box, p 14]

Even Something New for the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee

The draft of the bylaws (Article 41) states: "The bodies of the LC shall elect executive-political bodies made up of their own members by secret ballot." Then, "...the electorate shall also decide on the number of candidates for election to the bodies, and as a rule that number shall be greater than the number to be elected." Article 106 reads: "The Central Committee shall elect from its own members a Presidium as its own executive-political body on the basis of prior consultations with the central and provincial committees and the Committee of the LCY Organization in the YPA, which the Presidium shall conduct through a specially elected commission made up of the chairman and secretary of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee and the chairmen of the presidiums of the central and provincial committees of the LC's and the Committee of the LCY Organization in the YPA."

The LCY Central Committee, then, shall elect rather than verify the members of its Presidium. This means that if this formulation remains intact, that the manner of election of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee would also be different at the next congress.

7045

CSO: 2800/209

30 April 1986

POLITICS

YUGOSLAVIA

INCREASE OF NATIONALISM IN ARMY DISCUSSED

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 86 p 8

[Article by Simeon Buncic: "Nationalism Will Aim for Any Target"; first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The increasingly frequent and bold assaults on the armed forces are not only the fruit of a nationalistically colored and distorted mind, but also a manifestation, the visible side, of deeper rifts and relations which have in certain places been created spontaneously even within the organized forces of socialist consciousness.

There is nothing essential in the life of society that can escape being reflected on the armed forces, on the development of relations, and on ideological and political developments within them. The influences are not only in one direction, nor are they merely mechanical. They are more compact and stronger in intensity at the critical moments and turning points in development, when the ideological fronts are crisscrossed, cloudy, and unclear. As a rule, we are referring to a social situation in which a polarization is taking place on two fronts within the organized forces of socialist consciousness.

On the one hand people begin to live in a false conviction that the situation is good. People suggest taking it easy and waiting for the future that will arise out of the inevitable and natural spontaneous course of development. On the other hand changes are being demanded at any cost, a radical showdown with everything that has been created, even though this might ultimately lead to bureaucratic centralism, statism, and unitarianism, or to a society of the bourgeois type. A multitude of ideas, controversies, attitudes, commitments, and political struggles precipitate out between those two opposing poles. Criticism of the entire status quo has been growing to dimensions which are unjustified in terms of the social situation. Nor has the army been spared in this. The motives and occasions for attacks on the armed forces have varied. The perpetrators have also been diverse. But the consequences are the same or quite similar.

Nationalists on the Scene

The nationalistic forces, which in a tie-up with other opponents of socialist self-management, are trying by every means to discredit and play down the

armed forces with the public or in some other way to weaken its prestige in society, are the most visibly recognizable on the scene. In the form it takes this may appear, and often does, as if these were innocent and isolated behavioral acts by individuals. However, if one attempts to penetrate more deeply into the essence, goals, and methods of these actions toward the armed forces, a pattern emerges in which one first sees that the armed forces have never been chosen accidentally as a target of attack.

The nationalists of all shades, whose most salient detachment is usually made up of manipulated young people living in an illusion that they will weaken the unity of the armed forces and shake the confidence of the broader strata of the population and its strength, its working class, and nationwide character--direct the brunt of their propaganda machinery and ideological influences above all toward proving that the armed forces are a supranational, unitaristic-centralistic, and bureaucratic-dogmatic creation which is unresponsive to ethnic identity and interethnic relations. The arguments to that effect are rather old ones. More recently they have merely been brought up-to-date with more numerous, perfidious, more vociferous, and more aggressive assault, even, to mention one place, in a portion of the youth press and popular magazines, but in the other news media as well.

This type of nationalistic expression against the armed forces has a short range, the space in which it can exert influence is very restricted, and its political-psychological effects on public opinion are short-lived. Influences on the armed forces are slight and almost negligible. The political and ideological unity of the armed forces has its permanent sources and deep foundations, and it has never been so feeble and brittle that nationalistic propaganda and very naive fabrications could shake the consciousness of members of the armed forces concerning themselves and their role in society.

Even Military Personnel Under Attack

Yet it has turned out, especially in recent years, that attempts to contest the essential values and foundations on which the ethnic and social identity of the army and its role in society are based, and the related deprecation and negation of the capability of the subjective factor in it to be a decisive factor for ideological orientation and political action of members of the armed forces, are not an innocent, sporadic, and isolated phenomenon. There has been a growing number of facts in social reality that lead to an awareness that these activities are not only the fruit of a nationalistically colored and distorted mind, but also a manifestation, the visible side, of deeper rifts and relations which have in certain places been created spontaneously even within the organized forces of socialist consciousness.

Empirical surveys in the armed forces show that nothing has been isolated or unconnected in the challenge of its essential values. Quite recently the propaganda has been combined with provocations and physical attacks on individual members of the armed forces. Sometimes conflicts are provoked in public places, at sporting events, on the street. Bullying and fascistoid behavior is combined with the most diverse methods of insult and attack on the integrity of members of the armed forces. Members of the armed forces have been

exposed to the attacks of irredentists, separatists, and unitarists at the same time. Military personnel are being attacked not only because they belong to this or that nationality, but because of the very fact that they belong to those forces of society which are there to protect the constitutional order, independence, and totality of the SFRY. And this unambiguously shows that nationalism is not manifested merely as a distortion of relations among the nationalities, but that this is a broader social evil which offers as a replacement for the system of socialist self-management different class values, enslavement, bloodshed, and genocide. An effort is being made to instill unrest among members of the armed forces and their families. On the other hand there is a desire to show our own public and the world public that the forces of nationalistic extremism are well organized.

The statistics kept in the armed forces indicate that the share of propaganda from nationalistic positions toward the armed forces has been declining in terms of the number of physical manifestations and other types of irresponsibility. For example, hostile activity from positions of nationalism toward the armed forces has grown several times over in the last 4 years, while the share of propaganda here has dropped 38 percent in spite of its absolute growth. The attacks are rougher, more bold, and more frequent. Curses and insults have recently been replaced by dangerous physical attacks on people. Nationalistic outbursts of individuals have gradually come to be combined with the organized activity of groups. The space for the activity of these groups has been widened. What in 1981 was located almost exclusively in SAP Kosovo has more recently been carried over in somewhat altered form to certain other areas, cities, and regions of Yugoslavia. Nationalistic outbreaks have been recorded even in communities which up until now have hardly encountered this type of social evil. Efforts to establish contacts with military personnel of similar mind have also become more frequent. However, so far these attempts have been quickly detected and interdicted. The linkage between the hostile forces within the country and those outside is quite obvious. The fascistoid rightwing organizations of the West serve as the model.

Disagreements Which Can Serve as a Warning

An awareness of the possibility of dealing a decisive blow to nationalism and of emerging more quickly out of the state of crisis becomes unclear and cloudy as disagreements become more frequent in evaluation of the character, dimensions, and danger of nationalism. The dangers of each person's own nationalism are underestimated. Bureaucratic power tampers with the criteria and adapts them to its own needs. The disrupted relations in the political system and in the normal functioning of its agencies and bodies are a lasting source of subjective evaluations of current political, security, and other events taking place in the respective communities. The rule is that in such a situation the picture of reality is selected according to bureaucratic-subjectivist criteria and the kind of content that is considered desirable. People begin to live in the mistaken illusion that the negative phenomena, and indeed even the major nationalistic outbursts in their own respective community are an extremely sporadic, isolated, unconnected, and passing detail which has nothing in common with what is being maliciously pointed to from outside.

The minds of army personnel, just like other people, are most destructively affected by those facts in social reality which arouse the feeling that the common destiny of our nationalities and ethnic minorities is being neglected and forgotten and that sometimes even many of the social values forged in the revolution are in jeopardy.

The anticipated ideological purity and severity in the showdown with opponents of the revolution often give way to compromises and the efforts of the polity to create the conviction in the broadest strata of the population that the ideas, views, and opinions which it professes have their roots in the sources of our revolution and in authentic Marxism. Those to blame for all the troubles are those others in the neighboring nationality, republic, and the Federation. When such conceptions and practice gain legitimacy, then unconnected, isolated, and selfish interests in which broad room is opened up for nationalistic euphoria and national totalitarianism gain sway. Here unity is only apparent. It is confined by the boundaries of commitments in principle and abstract declarations. The blockade arises as soon as an attempt is made to make them operational.

The personnel of the armed forces are exposed to the strong influence of that kind of spiritual sphere. This is a relatively new situation whose political and broader social consequences need to be studied and learned so that we can better understand the dangers that arise out of that.

7045

CSO: 2800/215

POLITICS

YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE PROFESSOR ACCUSES VATICAN IN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jan 86 pp 8-12

[Interview with Dr Dragoljub Zivojinovic, professor and dean of the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University, by Dejan Lucic: "The Fingers of the Vatican on the Soil of Yugoslavia"; date and place not given; first paragraph is INTERVJU introduction]

[Text] How did the pope behave toward everything that happened in the Independent State of Croatia? The response shows a pragmatism typical of the Vatican: "It was ugly, but worthwhile! Amen!" Pope Pius XII gave moral support to Alojz Stepinac, archbishop of Zagreb, who was the gray eminence of Pavlic's experimental Catholic Church.

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The book "Vatikan, Srbija i stvaranje Jugoslovenske drzave 1914-1920. godine" [The Vatican, Serbia, and Creation of the Yugoslav State 1914-1920] is the first full-scale study of the policy of the Vatican toward our country.

Along with Dr Dragoljub Zivojinovic, eminent specialist in the secrets of Vatican policy, we will attempt to shed light on at least a portion of what Yugoslavia and socialism have experienced in relations with the Curia.

[Question] How might we define the current Vatican policy toward the socialist countries?

[Answer] Everything depends on what country you are talking about.... In the Polish Sejm the Catholic Party operates quite legally as one of the members of

the ruling coalition. Of course, that multiparty system is more a matter of formality, but still the Vatican can stand behind its own party and aid it. As we see, that aid is not negligible.... In the Hungary the situation is similar with respect to the formal existence of several parties, it is just that the Catholic Church is less important on the political scene. In Czechoslovakia the situation is more difficult in the political area for the Catholic Church, since there is no room even as a formality for advocating Catholic political interest.

In principle the Vatican attempts in the countries of the camp to win more or less of a position of partnership with the communists, since it counts on its great moral influence on believers, and this is especially manifested in periods when socialism is in crisis.

As for the USSR, the Vatican tries to parry it wherever it can. It usually does this on the basis of the Helsinki Agreement and the "human rights basket" which even the Soviets signed and which, in the opinions of certain countries, they have been violating, which the Vatican has been using to the fullest in order to make itself appear to be some moral arbiter and defender of humanistic attitudes.

As far as ideology is concerned, the relations are clear! With its ideology the Vatican is an enemy of socialism. However, it is not trying to aggravate relations with the USSR, but travels on a double track so as not to make its situation more difficult in the countries of the camp where the population is predominantly Catholic. But the Curia has never forgotten to stress in public all the shortcomings of socialism and differences between what the ideology proclaims and what is actually achieved....

[Question] Up to now there have been several cases of unrest in the socialist countries, we might mention Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.... In the fifties there were also revolts in Albania. Aside from socialism, the other common tie these countries have is that they once fell in the Vatican sphere of influence. Is that merely a coincidence?

[Answer] It is difficult to state precisely to what extent the Vatican is involved here, but it is rather a striking coincidence that has been noted. It is even true in Albania that only the Catholic tribes revolted, not those which were Muslim. Of course, the Vatican could have brought all that about indirectly, taking advantage of political, economic, and indeed even religious conflicts. Let us recall Hungary and the involvement of the Catholic primus Mindszenty, to look no further, since the methodology of the Vatican's work is always similar....

[Question] What sort of policy has the Curia pursued toward the Balkans, toward our own nationalities?

[Answer] That policy has been undergoing change. In the past the Vatican, as toward eastern Europe, has shown proselytic ambitions (conversion to Catholicism). It relied in that on certain secular forces as well as on groups of Catholics whom it had under its spiritual authority. It should be remembered

that Vatican missionaries circulated through the Balkans. This was especially emphasized in the 18th century, since the power of the Serbian Orthodox Church was at its lowest level in that period. It had been virtually abolished and passed under supervision of the patriarch of Constantinople. The Vatican had noted that well and judged that the moment had come to spread Catholicism among the Serbs.

With the 19th century and creation of the national states, and above all with the rise of Serbia, the situation began to change. Even by the 1880's the Vatican had shown a lively interest in concluding a concordat with the Serbian state. Bishop Strossmayer also did quite a bit in that regard, but it did not come about, since what the Vatican was asking was simply not acceptable to Serbia. The aim of Vatican policy was to create room for activity. Montenegro signed the first concordat in the Balkans in 1886 for political reasons; this was a good move, since at that time the Catholic elements annexed to Montenegro had become quiet....

[Question] Following the Catholic Congress in Zagreb in 1900 Catholicism began to be deliberately equated with being a Croat. Those aims came from Vienna, but also from the Vatican. The first phase was to "purge" the foreign element from Catholic Croatia. Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies came under attack.... Was that Catholic Congress in 1900 the cornerstone of a policy of genocide?

[Answer] It could have been the beginning of an articulate enmity toward members of the Orthodox Church. The aim of the congress was to turn Croats in this area into warriors of Catholicism, as had happened with the Poles in eastern Europe. I like the Latin name given to this function--ante murale hristianita--the suburbs of Christianity. Fanaticized Catholicism which also contained Croat nationalism was the result of a lengthy and skillful indoctrination.

[Question] Can it be said that the privileged position the Serbs once had in the Military District tended to develop an anti-Serb disposition?

[Answer] It should be said that even before 1690 the Serbs were in a privileged position as border guards, since they were free, and they had also been exempted from many taxes, which created envy. However, as the Military District was demilitarized in the eighties of the last century, the privilege based on services in the military also vanished. But the Serbian border guards had already won for themselves a position not only economic, but also social, in certain circles of the Hapsburg monarchy so that they were not easy to deal with. They held commerce in their hands in cities such as Zagreb, Rijeka, and Trieste.... This, of course, was not to the liking of the more numerous Croats. The difference in religion made them a foreign body that was unwelcome on the territory of Croatia.

Fascism took advantage of this on Croatian soil; it treated the Serbs as the Germans treated the Jews. The anti-Serb disposition of the Croat nationalists, built up over centuries, was one of the cohesive elements of the Independent State of Croatia, along with Catholicism, which had taken even Muslim nationalists into its ranks. In other words, enmity toward the Orthodox Serbs

had diverse roots: first of all historical, later economic and social, so that this aroused first envy, intolerance, and later even enmity.

[Question] The Vatican and Vienna, according to many documents, were also involved in conflicts between Albanians and Serbs in Montenegro, Kosovo, Metohija, Macedonia....

[Answer] What began in the north was continually extended in the south as well. The aim was to halt a "spilling" of the Orthodox to the Adriatic. The Curia's fear of Russian influence lay behind that. The principal figure operating on behalf of the Vatican in the region of Kosovo and Metohija was the influential Archbishop of Skadar Seređji, who had exceptional relations with Austro-Hungary, Italy, and the Vatican. What bound them together was anti-Serb, anti-Orthodox, and anti-Slav sentiments! Since Orthodoxy was not ideologically aggressive, the Curia felt that it was worthwhile to take advantage of this for an offensive in the domain of proselytic activity. The Albanians, of course, as a people who had begun to undergo national awakening, found a military and material advantage for themselves in that policy.

Serbia's prestige began to rise very rapidly in the eyes of the population in Bosnia and Hercegovina after it won its national independence in the late 19th century and the modern state was created under Petar Karadjordjevic. This was not in the interest of Austro-Hungary and the Vatican, especially since the majority population in those regions during that period was Serb.

[Question] According to the census taken by the Hapsburg Monarchy in 1910, the population of Bosnia and Hercegovina at that time was 47 percent Serb and Orthodox, 31 percent Muslim, and 17 percent Croats and other Catholics who had moved in from the monarchy. There were, of course, Jews as well. How did the Vatican wish to alter that proportion?

[Answer] Serbia's position was bothersome to Austro-Hungary. It was in fact a direct threat to it, since it created a strong desire for secession of the part of all the Slavs in the south of the monarchy. Bosnia and Hercegovina was the "shakiest" and inclined to revolt against it. That is why a firm and aggressive Catholic hierarchy centered in Sarajevo was created there very soon after the occupation; it was headed by a Jesuit, Archbishop Stadler, who was a direct exponent of the Viennese court. He conducted a pronounced anti-Serb policy, a markedly anti-Orthodox policy with which he sowed the seeds of enmity toward that nationality with thoroughness. That kind of bigoted religious policy had not been carried out even during the time of Turkey, and it became evident only with the arrival of Catholic Austro-Hungarian political and military domination.

The high point of Vatican and Viennese indisposition was in 1912 and 1913 during the Balkan Wars, when Pious XII [sic] called Serbia "a savage and barbarian country which should be punished and forced to give back what it had conquered." The pope openly took the side of the Bulgarians and demanded that Macedonia be annexed to Bulgaria. A fierce anti-Serb campaign began at that time throughout Austro-Hungary, conducted through the press, but also through the church, which attacked the minds of believers, Catholics, but also Muslims,

in an effort to persuade them that the Orthodox, the Serbs, were their sworn enemies which they would have to crush under the sponsorship of the Hapsburgs.

At that moment the Vatican and Vienna took completely identical political positions. They wanted to destroy Serbia for political and military reasons, but also religious reasons! After the Balkan Wars the Vatican had to undertake a campaign. Serbia and Montenegro had become important factors. Bulgaria had been defeated. Serbia's prestige had grown incredibly and was influencing the ethnic morale of Serbs in neighboring regions. In that situation the Vatican judged that it would be useful for it to sign a concordat with Serbia. It managed to do that following negotiations. That concordat is considered the most liberal one which the Vatican ever obtained in the 20th century. Yet this was a better stroke on the part of Serbian diplomacy than that of the Vatican, since it met with an extremely favorable response among Catholics in the monarchy, who tended toward South Slav unification. Four days later there was the assassination in Sarajevo, and the Vatican took advantage of that not to ratify the concordat, but the Serbian Assembly did do so and was ready to enforce it.

[Question] One of the slogans of Catholic propaganda in connection with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918, one which was taken up by bourgeois circles, was this: "...unification with Serbia means slavery and death for Catholics" and that "there is a primitivism in Serbian imperialism" which would "wrench our beautiful Croatia out of Europe and drive it toward Asian despotism." Those slogans are being launched once again!

[Answer] Yes, that is one of the perpetual Catholic theses. Immediately following World War I, which ended catastrophically for the Vatican, the Curia had to enter into a counter offensive in order to offset the losses. That thesis that "unification with Serbia meant slavery and death for Catholics" was actually a mask to disguise the earlier bad policy. However, church prelates reacted in diverse ways to that thesis. Bishop Jeglic of Ljubljana, who had previously been a pronounced clericalist and nationalist, grasped the fact that there was no salvation for Slovenes outside Yugoslavia when the war ended, since they would have been Germanized in the name of "European culture." That was also the thinking of many Dalmatian bishops who had felt Vatican policy on their own skin and that policy's inclination toward Italy to the detriment of Catholics in Dalmatia. Unfortunately, that was not the thinking of the archbishop of Upper Bosnia, who was taken in by the tactics of "divide and conquer," as indeed were certain priests from Croatia proper.

[Question] Before creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the Vatican opposed the strengthening of the Slavic state in the Balkans. When that had already occurred, the Curia attempted to dissolve that state from within. How did it do that?

[Answer] For example, on 15 April 1919, Cardinal Gaspari, Vatican secretary of state, openly insisted "in the name of the people" that Yugoslavs wanted a republic system in the new state. That coincided with the program of the Croatian Republican Party and the newly formed Communist Party, which were also demanding liquidation of the dynasty.

How unpleasant the creation of Yugoslavia was for the Vatican is also shown by the fact that it was the last to recognize the new state. The plotting of this religious state against Yugoslavia, which it carried out through the Catholic clergy, intensified suddenly in 1928 and was no longer concealed, as has in fact been stated by the American historian Kent. Then came the pope's message to the clergy to undertake an offensive against the institutions of the state. This was manifested through the creation of various organizations on a clerical basis and then through the provocation of irresponsible acts which were supposed to aggravate relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the state. In order to bring that about a privileged position was demanded for the Catholic Church just in order to make a fuss about the refusal!

[Question] How was Great Serb hegemonism manifested in the creation of Yugoslavia?

[Answer] If we are talking about the rule of the Great Serb bourgeoisie, this is inaccurate at the very least. The Great Croat bourgeoisie and the Great Slovenian capitalists, as well as the Great Muslim bourgeoisie shared power in this country with the Great Serb bourgeoisie. Which means all those who could get at it. Since Yugoslavia came about through a compromise among the wishes of the national bourgeoisies, it was not even possible for anyone to impose his political will on another and exploit it. That is not the way things were at all! Between the two wars capitalism was much more highly developed in Croatia and Slovenia, since they were already in that stage when they entered Yugoslavia, and Serbia had been devastated by war, so that even at a human level it was not capable of hegemony. Aside from that, it was an agricultural region with a few sources of raw materials which became available to the north, which was more industrially developed. The thesis that in that division of economic power Serbia was able to exploit the richer north is not realistic even today. The statistics on the investment of capital, on where industrial plants were built and what they were between the two wars show very obviously that the trend of Serbia's lagging behind was noticeable even then, as it has been in recent years.

[Question] Those who do not agree with you say that the Serb hegemony was carried out through the police and military factors. The Serbs were the backbone of state authority!

[Answer] Yes, those were the facts immediately after the war. However, in the very next decade, in the last decade of the old Yugoslavia, matters were different. The ethnic composition of the military and police authorities was no longer dominantly Serb.

To get an answer of who threw that rational stone of suspicion, we should ask ourselves who stood behind the idea of destroying "Versailles Yugoslavia" and whose intentions were upset by this country's existence? For those familiar with history the answer is clear: the Comintern and the Vatican, each, of course, out of its own motives, as in fact has been shown through history. There was collaboration of their exponents on our soil, since their tasks coincided. The idea of Great Serb hegemony was acceptable to both, and its

purpose was to set our nationalities at odds so that foreigners could control them more easily.

[Question] What was the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina?

[Answer] As far as the Muslims go, they were treated differently. Ante Trumbic, for example, took the simple view that Muslims were Croats.... He even insisted on that in the Corfu Declaration. He felt that in time they would come back to their "true" faith. It was his judgment that a different attitude should be taken toward them and a different policy conducted than toward the members of the Orthodox Church. Being on good terms with the Muslims was beneficial to the Catholic Church. That relationship was also retained by the Ustashi in the Independent State of Croatia, since they considered them a natural ally in the fight against the Serbs.

The Vatican's policy during World War II again became markedly anti-Orthodox and again anti-Serb! Yet not everywhere. Archbishop Ujčić of Belgrade protested fiercely at the beginning of the war and warned the Vatican about what was happening in the Independent State of Croatia. Protests also came in through the papal legate in the Independent State of Croatia, the priest Ramir Markone. Letters reached Rome with horrifying first-hand observations by Italian officers who did not concur in barbarism in the name of religion. Even certain German officers wrote to the papal nuncio in Berlin. Karlo Falkone has in fact written quite a bit about this. This opens up a difficult and ugly question: How did the pope behave toward everything that happened in the Independent State of Croatia? The response shows a pragmatism typical of the Vatican: "It was ugly, but worthwhile! Amen!" Pope Pius XII gave moral support to Alojz Stepinac, archbishop of Zagreb, who was the gray eminence of Pavelić's experimental Catholic Church.

[Question] What did the Vatican gain and what did it lose through the policy of conversion?

[Answer] The Vatican lost a great deal of prestige through the forced conversion. All the Serbs converted to Catholicism under threat of the dagger immediately became Orthodox again after the Liberation or they became atheists. The scale on which the conversion was carried out is indicated by the figure of 100,000 Serbs who went back to Orthodoxy after the war. At present there are manipulative efforts being made in Catholic ranks to persuade people that the act of conversion was well-intentioned and humanistic, since in that way the Serbs got an opportunity to survive; however, those are speculations after the fact in order to remove the stain.

When the end of the war came the Catholic elite was in a panic out of fear of revenge for genocide. But when it became clear to them that the new government would not permit bloodshed, they went a step further.... There was a conference of Catholic bishops who all but identified themselves with the Independent State of Croatia. Bishop Aksamović called upon the Government of the Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia not to conduct any trials whatsoever and to exempt the Catholic Church from criticism for its acts during the war.

A demand was issued for everything to be forgotten. Of course, there were honorable men among the pro-Ustasha Catholic clergy, and we must not forget them; we have mentioned Bishop Ujcic, but this also applies to Alojzije Misic, archbishop of Mostar, and also Bishop Garic of Banja Luka. They prevented the atrocities insofar as they were able, and that should be respected.

World War II is one of the darkest periods of recent Vatican history. That is why just before his death Pope Pius XII burned all the important documents which compromised Vatican policy during the period of his pontificate, hoping that in that way history would be deceived more easily and that the atrocities would be concealed.

[Question] Did anything change in the policy of the Vatican when diplomatic relations were renewed with Yugoslavia following the war?

[Answer] The Curia felt that it could continue its work, even though its policy had suffered defeat. Believing that the new Yugoslavia was a temporary creation, the Vatican also continued to behave aggressively. It showed that in the case of Stepinac. And also the "pastoral letter" of the Bishops Conference of Catholic Bishops of Yugoslavia on 20 September 1945, which condemned the new social system. In that letter the "cherished believers in Christ" were called upon to carry out a counterrevolution, and the Western countries were called upon to intervene in the internal affairs of the Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia....

[Question] Why did the new Yugoslavia act so tolerantly toward this proven enemy?

[Answer] You are probably asking why Stepinac received such a mild sentence as compared to Draza Mihailovic!? The answer is clear today. Draza Mihailovic was at that time already politically dead, his patrons were abandoning him, while a powerful international organization stood behind Stepinac, one which could embitter the life of the new system with a vengeance. That is why care was taken not to go too far in blaming the Catholic Church so that through secular public opinion it would not worsen our international position, which at that time was not splendid. However, even the mild treatment of Stepinac, who was the ideological patron of the Ustasha movement, made the Vatican angry.

We have to admit that thought was also given here to the internal factor, there was a desire to calm the situation down and not to get into a conflict with the Catholic masses. Even today the Yugoslav Government avoids conflicts wherever possible, it accepts compromises, although the Catholic Church knows very well how to take advantage.

A change in relations between the Vatican and Yugoslavia occurred only after the death of the militant Pope Pius XII, and an improvement came only after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), which resulted in the signing of the protocol between the two states. The official Vatican, in the words of its spokesman Casaroli, accepted the judgment that there had been serious errors toward Yugoslavia.... Today the Vatican officially respects that protocol,

but one must ask why it is often violated by the Catholic primus in Yugoslavia, Cardinal Kuharic? Is this done with Vatican approval or on his own? One must realize that the church hierarchy in Yugoslavia has had an ever stronger influence on Vatican policy in recent decades. On the basis of all that it is difficult to believe that the actions of Cardinal Kuharic are not approved in Rome. Cardinal Kuharic is aggressive, and he has received an impetus for such behavior from the country's political and economic condition.

The situation was similar at the time of the mass movement, some of whose most important actions were carried out by the cathedral in Zagreb. It is well known that those actions, which went through Cicak to the university, were actually on the Catholic line. Nothing happens by accident, Catholicism in our country has always used division as its trump card regardless of who the players were. If necessary, even with the communists!

[Question] Jekov Blazevic, who was the prosecutor of Stepinac and a politician who has long been "at war" with the clerical nationalists, says that there has been a core at the heart of the Catholic Church which for centuries has been waging a fight against the Croat people on behalf of those outside the country, pushing it into conflicts with the Serbs, and portraying itself as a supposed protector of Croatism.... How is their work manifested today?

[Answer] I would not refer to it as a "core," for me a more acceptable term would be "wing" or "line." However, that is not really essential. That wing has its greatest number of adherents in mixed ethnic communities, which means predominantly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are carrying on the work of their conservative predecessors, the Archbishops Stadler and Saric, who spread enmity toward other faiths "to do what is pleasing to God...."

The supporters or followers of this hard line are mostly people from the poorest strata of Croat society, often uneducated. For those naive people clerical nationalism is a kind of sociological valve through which age-old dissatisfaction is vented. Under such conditions the Orthodox people in their community easily become the scapegoats for everything. They have been the perpetual scapegoats down through the centuries! We can assure ourselves that this religious manipulation of the Catholics and their countrymen of Orthodox faith yields "successful" results over the long run, although there have been official expressions of distress, from the datum that before World War II there were 1.7 million Orthodox people in Croatia, while today there are only 700,000 of them. This is a consequence of "endehazija," Jasenovac, Nova Gradiška.... Since history is not measured in years, but in centuries, we can conclude that the plan to rid Catholic territory of the foreign body of Orthodoxy has been fairly successful in the 20th century.

At present the Catholic Church in Croatia is trying to be a destabilizing factor in the new Yugoslavia, just as it was in the old. The church's aim in Croatia is to win a position of partnership for itself, first at least advisory, and then later it would also operate as a political party. Its aim would be to take power, and ideally it would form a theological state, which would probably be similar to Islamized Iran. Of course, nothing is said about that radical plan, but that is the logical development of things, the one that arises out of the equation CATHOLIC = CROAT!!!

[Question] In Muhamed Kesetovic's book "Kontrarevolucija na Kosovu" [Counter-revolution in Kosovo] there is mention of the excellent ties between the nationalists of the "mass movement" and the irredentists in Kosovo, and this at a very high political level. How did that tie-up come about?

[Answer] The political spirit of such coalitions always comes from the Vatican. That is the way it has been down through the centuries.... The purpose is similar, either expulsion or conversion, and if necessary, the third alternative is also well known. The purpose of this action is to achieve the Vatican's old goal, to surround Orthodoxy with a Catholic cordon sanitaire, and this actually does contain elements of a useful proximity with the Muslims. The *raison d'être* of this kind of nationalistic linkage is the common hatred of the Serbs. The religious factor in our nationalists has been suppressed over the last 40 years or so, and we have forgotten that in many political events we are looking at the influence of the Vatican, which has never weakened. Perhaps we have intentionally stuck our heads in the sand, since we have been unable to skillfully parry it.

[Question] The Munich daily SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG has said that "the Macedonian church probably lives financially off the atheistic Yugoslav state, and perhaps also off the Vatican, which probably expects information in exchange for its generosity, not only concerning Macedonian, but also concerning Serbian Orthodoxy. The good relations between Skopje and the Vatican are also confirmed by the delegations which Macedonian Orthodoxy sends to Rome every year on 24 May for the commemoration of Cyril and Methodius...."

The conflicts over the autocephaly of the Macedonian church occurred when the statehood of the republics became stronger. An autocephalous church was necessary to Macedonian republic statism as one of the proofs of statehood. The separation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church from its parent church in Serbia reduced it to more narrow political and religious limits. As such it was eliminated from the political scene as a factor. That same action was also aimed at weakening the Serbian Orthodox Church. It is difficult to say how much all this has to do with the Bulgarians and with the pro-Bulgarian orientation among some people here, but it is a fact that those currents have not left the scene. The action to extort the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, though not perhaps intentionally, provided grist for the mill of a pro-Bulgarian policy and certainly it also satisfied the Vatican's thirst to shatter and weaken Orthodoxy.... However, since the church councils in the Orthodox Church meet once every 1,000 years, recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church is now practically impossible, since only that universal gathering could officially recognize the church's autocephaly. The Serbian Orthodox Church is against that, immense pressure is being put on the patriarch, although neither he nor the Serbian Orthodox Church can do anything by themselves. Even if they did this under government or republic pressure, this would signify nothing in creation of *de jure* Macedonian autocephaly. The failure to understand these facts is causing unpleasantness. As for the financial aid of the Vatican, I do not much believe in it, it rather provides moral support....

[Question] Is it true that there are dissidents in the ranks of the Catholic clergy in Croatia who are against the aggressive line of Cardinal Kuharic and who have been put "on ice" as punishment?

[Answer] It is a fact that monolithism does not exist in the ranks of the Croat clergy. Dissidents, progressive young and very-well-educated intellectuals who oppose the conservative policy and who are in favor of a more independent Croat church, one that would be more modern and acceptable to future generations, have been emerging more and more frequently. However, their ideas are smothered by repressive measures, and their human rights are stifled. The church, like any conservative and totalitarian organization, persecutes them, sends them to isolated monasteries, to villages back of beyond. There are entire Catholic gulags for dissenting intellectuals in habits all over the world, including Croatia. The inquisitorial spirit in the treatment of progressive ideas in the Catholic Church has not disappeared. It is a fact that the young generation is less dogmatic and more flexible and capable than the old generation. Incidentally, that is not characteristic of the church alone....

[Question] The visit to Yugoslavia by Pope John Paul II is being constantly postponed. Vladimir Dedijer publicly asked the head of the Roman Catholic Church on behalf of the Russell Court why he was refusing to come and pay homage to the victims of fascism of the Independent State of Croatia? Is it because the Vatican was involved in that dirty work?

[Answer] In the opinion of many people the pope does not want to visit Jasenovac, so that he would not indirectly cast a blemish on the church, although people know about that. The Slavic pope, who is a traditionalist, knows that this visit would have a response in the world and would be counterproductive for the prestige of the Catholic Church. For the Vatican Jasenovac is a taboo topic which they want to forget, just like St Bartholomew's Eve in France, when the Catholics behaved likewise on the instructions of Rome, and did so to the glory of Christ! Yet there is a difference. Jasenovac lasted almost 1,500 nights.... A long time even for the Balkans!

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