

006022

JPRS-SSA-85-095

4 October 1985

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

ERIC QUALITY INSPECTED

19980226 135

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

12
162
A08

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

4 October 1985

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS

BURKINA

Major Projects for Food, Power, Communications Detailed (B. Hubert Pare; CARREFOUR AFRICAINE, 2 Aug 85).....	1
Proceedings of First National Conference of Students (SIDWAYA, various dates).....	9
Editorial on Importance	9
Details of Opening Session, by Wind-Lananm Ramde	10
Further Report, by Wind-Lananm Ramde	12
Reports, Committee Work, by Wind-Lananm Ramde	13

MADAGASCAR

TSS Takes Revenge on Kung Fu Fighters (THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER, 24 Aug 85).....	15
--	----

MALI

UDPM Delegation Observes Workers Collectives in Moscow (Sissoko; L'ESSOR, 20 Aug 85).....	16
Activities of Delegation to Moscow Youth Festival Reported (P. M. Koite; L'ESSOR, 17-18 Aug 85).....	17
UNJM Delegation Meets With GDR Youth (P. M. Kote; L'ESSOR, 20 Aug 85).....	19
Diallo Meets With Mali Students in Moscow, Poland (Sissoko; L'ESSOR, 20 Aug 85).....	20

MOZAMBIQUE

AIM Commentary Warns Against Internal Enemy (Editorial; NOTICIAS, 23 Aug 85).....	21
--	----

Commentary Urges Greater Efforts To Combat Hunger (NOTICIAS, 22 Aug 85).....	24
---	----

Maputo Cooperatives Union Holds Seminar on Technology Use (NOTICIAS, 23 Aug 85).....	26
---	----

NAMIBIA

SWAPO May Be Forced Into Major Offensive (Keith Abendroth; THE CITIZEN, 10 Sep 85).....	29
--	----

Farmers Ready To Fight Back (THE CITIZEN, 10 Sep 85).....	31
--	----

NIGERIA

Industrialists Await Government's Detailed Programs (Jackson Imafidon; BUSINESS TIMES, 2 Sep 85).....	33
--	----

Experts To Fight Environmental Pollution (Ndu Ughamadu; BUSINESS TIMES, 26 Aug 85).....	35
--	----

Romania Pledges Agricultural Aid (Ted Odogwu; BUSINESS TIMES, 2 Sep 85).....	36
---	----

Labor Congress' Economic Recovery Alternative Analyzed (Ndu Ughamadu; BUSINESS TIMES, 19 Aug 85).....	37
--	----

Funds Earmarked for 5th Development Plan (Ndu Ughamadu; BUSINESS TIMES, 19 Aug 85).....	40
--	----

Food Wastage Hinders Agricultural Drive (Vicky Ngozi Ikeano; BUSINESS TIMES, 19 Aug 85).....	41
---	----

IITA Develops New Farming Technology (BUSINESS TIMES, 19 Aug 85).....	43
--	----

Consumer Goods Import Figures Released (BUSINESS TIMES, 26 Aug 85).....	44
--	----

Feasibility of Continental Oil Cooperation Discussed (Ndu Ughamadu; BUSINESS TIMES, 26 Aug 85).....	45
--	----

Textile Smuggling Increasing (Jackson Imafidon; BUSINESS TIMES, 19 Aug 85).....	48
--	----

Lagos Ports Traffic Drops (BUSINESS TIMES, 26 Aug 85).....	51
---	----

Lack of Spare Parts Keep Vehicles Off Road (Anthony O. Asiadiachi; BUSINESS TIMES, 19 Aug 85).....	52
---	----

Briefs	53
East Bloc Eases Credit	
SENEGAL	
Commentators Focus on Freedom of Press (WAL FADJRI, 8-30 Aug 85).....	54
Discussions Key to Healthy Future, by Sidy Lamine Niass	54
Rights, But Also Duties, by Youssoupha Ndiaye	55
SOUTH AFRICA	
Percy Qoboza Says Time Running Out for Government (Percy Qoboza; CITY PRESS, 1 Sep 85).....	58
Boesak Sees Government 'Imprisoned in Own Political Chains' (Allan Boesak Interview; DER SPIEGEL, 2 Sep 85).....	60
Two Bothas Clash on Pace, Scope of Change (John MacLennan; THE SUNDAY STAR, 8 Sep 85).....	64
Buthelezi: Conflict Among Blacks Hinders Liberation (Mangosuthu Gatscha Buthelezi Interview; DIE ZEIT, 16 Aug 85).....	66
Concern Over Visible Show of Strength Against Blacks (Aggrey Klaaste; SOWETAN, 9 Sep 85).....	71
Black Sash Vice President Views Slabbert's Call for Convention (Joyce Harris; THE STAR, 6 Sep 85).....	73
Author Views Continued Vaal Unrest (Johannes Rantete; CITY PRESS, 8 Sep 85).....	75
Arms Purchases by Private Citizens Rising (THE SUNDAY STAR, 6 Sep 85)	77
Gun Sales Booming, by Susan Fleming	77
Whites Increasingly Gun Happy, by Arlene Getz	78
PFP Criticized by Left, Right for Electing Dinkie Pillay (Gary van Staden; THE SUNDAY STAR, 8 Sep 85).....	79
Struggle for Control of Information Department (Stephan Terblanche; SUNDAY TIMES, 8 Sep 85).....	81
Reporter Attends HNP Congress, Reports Conclusion (THE SUNDAY STAR, 8 Sep 85).....	82

Idea That 'Government Is on Its Knees Is Nonsense'	
(Dawie; DIE BURGER, 31 Aug 85).....	84
Report on Urbanization Strategy for Nation	
(THE CITIZEN, 13 Sep 85).....	87
Moves to Control Migrants Failed	87
Mulder Did Not Sign	88
Legislation To Be Introduced	88
Positive Urbanization Strategy Needed	89
Features of Urbanization	90
Preventing Cycle of Poverty	91
UDF Leadership Driven Underground	
(David Breier; THE SUNDAY STAR, 8 Sep 85).....	92
Stellenbosch Lecturer Fears for Family's Lives	
(Karen Stander; THE SUNDAY STAR, 8 Sep 85).....	94
Official Ideology, Members' Commitment to Inkatha Studied	
(John D. Brewer; POLITIKON, Jun 85).....	95
SADF's Special Committee on Misconduct Criticized	
(Percy Qoboza; CITY PRESS, 8 Sep 85).....	104
National Party's Call for Speeding Up Reform	
(THE CITIZEN, 17 Sep 85).....	105
Most Indians Prefer Botha as National Leader	
(THE CITIZEN, 16 Sep 85).....	106
Minister Says No to Welfare State	
(THE CITIZEN, 17 Sep 85).....	107
Slabbert Motives in Calling for Convention Alliance Questioned	
(Editorial; DIE BURGER, 7 Aug 85).....	108
Upgrading of Homeland Planned	
(DIE BURGER, 29 Aug 85).....	109
Stellenbosch Rector Calls for More Colored Undergraduates	
(DIE BURGER, 17 Aug 85).....	110
General Malan Defends Non-White Troops Against CP	
(DIE BURGER, 23 Aug 85).....	113
Briefs	
Loan for Bophuthatswana	114

TANZANIA

ANC Opens First Educational Institute (Anaclet Rwegayura; THE HERALD, 4 Sep 85).....	115
Italian Aid Discussed (DAILY NEWS, 4 Sep 85).....	117
Canadian Aid for Port (DAILY NEWS, 4 Sep 85).....	118
Australian, Norwegian Oil Agreements (DAILY NEWS, 3 Sep 85).....	119
Development of Small Scale Irrigation Schemes Discussed (Paul Chintowa; DAILY NEWS, 5 Sep 85).....	121
Tarecu Purchases Crops (DAILY NEWS, 3 Sep 85).....	124

TOGO

Briefs New Appointments, Reassignments	126
---	-----

UGANDA

History of Bloodshed, Torture Unlikely To Change (Pierre Haski; LIBERATION, 29 Jul 85).....	127
Political Prospects of Okello Regime Analyzed (Pierre Haski; LIBERATION, 29 Jul 85).....	129
Situation Since Fall of Idi Amin Reviewed (Gerard Prunier; AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE, May-Jun 85)	132
Interview With NRA Field Commander (THE SUNDAY STAR, 1 Sep 85).....	142

ZIMBABWE

Trade With U.S. Drops (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 6 Sep 85).....	144
Non-State Groups Warned of Engaging in Political Activities (THE DAILY NEWS, 23 Aug 85).....	145
White Population Higher Than Expected (THE STAR, 31 Aug 85).....	146

Contacts Reportedly Taking Place Between Mugabe, ZAPU (Robin Drew; THE SUNDAY STAR, 1 Sep 85).....	147
Four White Detainees Freed (THE CITIZEN, 17 Sep 85).....	148
Strengthening of Zimbabwe Dollar Said Unwelcome to Experts (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 6 Sep 85).....	149
Asbestos Production To Improve (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 6 Sep 85).....	150
Mood of Optimism Prevails in Mining Sector (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 6 Sep 85).....	151
Bikita Mine Lithium Deposits 'Unique' (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 6 Sep 85).....	153
Briefs	
China Promises Planes	154

BURKINA

MAJOR PROJECTS FOR FOOD, POWER, COMMUNICATIONS DETAILED

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAINE in French 2 Aug 85 pp 7-12

[Article by B. Hubert Pare: "The Major Projects of the People's Democratic Revolution (RDP)"]

[Text] Solution of the problem of food self-sufficiency is the key to any real development. That is why the National Revolutionary Council (CNR) is currently doing everything to satisfy the needs of the people in this very important field. To achieve it, several major projects have been started, including the Sourou, Kompienga, Tambao, as well as the railway task, roads, and secondary airports.

Most of these projects are very old, some, such as the Sourou and Tambao projects, dating back to before Burkina's political independence.

With the coming of the August Revolution, all have become realities.

On 26 April 1984, the CNR began the Sourou project, then the first ground was turned on 1 February 1985 for the great railway task, which will create new socio-economic conditions for the Sahel. The third major project launched by the CNR, on 8 June, involved construction of the Kompienga hydroelectric dam.

In 2 years of revolution, the profound aspirations of the Burkina masses have moved from the stage of dreams to that of a living reality. All this was not easy in such a short time, that is why there are cries and gnashing of teeth by those who, accustomed to the ease of the past, have found themselves caught up in the revolutionary whirlwind, which draws them inexorably toward a real well-being, stripped of any imperialist tutelage.

A backward agricultural country, Burkina Faso is located in the heart of the Sudano-Sahelian plateau. It long suffered the trials of the colonial and neocolonial history. For a long time, the Upper Volta of that time, like the other African countries, had based its development strategy mainly on the "agricultural revolution." It had thus envisaged developing the Sourou to reduce the imbalance between food requirements and the national production. In sum, a praiseworthy initiative.

In fact, this initiative remained a dead letter because the leaders of the time totally lacked the will to follow up, and demonstrated a congenital

deficiency in regard to a coherent agricultural policy.

Indeed, how can one leave it entirely to foreigners to solve a basic issue such as that of hunger? It is because of refusal to understand that real development is first of all from within, that is, a development approved by all the sons of the country, and thus primarily undertaken by them, that so much remains to be done in Burkina.

Starting with the principle that the people can only be mobilized on the basis of their interests and after being able to instill sufficient energy in everyone, the CNR attacked the problem of food self-sufficiency. To this end, women, men, children, old people, in short, all the socio-professional elements of the country, felt themselves involved by the titanic tasks undertaken by the August Revolution. Since 1973, the grain shortfall has been huge (163,000 tons) following the continuing decline in rainfall and the related problem of rural exodus. This explains the decision to develop the Sourou valley, which will provide to our people 24,000 hectares of irrigated land.

Sourou Active Phase

On 26 April 1985 the Sourou project entered its active phase. The project is part of a broad program that is to ultimately develop 41,300 hectares of land, of which 24,000 will be irrigated. The future objective is to be able, with this beginning, to produce 124,000 tons of grain per year. This represents about 10 percent of the national requirements. The project involves several stages of development. Initially, the task will be to fill the Sourou from the Volta-Noire. This will enable development of the large Sourou plain. Then it will be necessary to build a dam at Samandeni.

In the south of the Volta-Noire (Lanfiera and Di) a sugar plant was built, which produces good-quality sugar but does not process it, for lack of a factory. The harvested cane is thus thrown away, which makes the people unhappy. Since the beginning of the construction, this sugar plant has been shut down. Grain is also grown in this area. Also, it is the main cotton-growing area in our country, with 33,000 tons per year, or half the national production. In this respect, a study has already been prepared by officials of the Ministry of Equipment, to be financed by the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC), for a grant of 225 million CFA francs with a supplementary credit of 40 million for reconstruction of the Bobo-Dedougou road (the cotton road). In view of the wealth of the Sourou, and in view of the objective of food self-sufficiency, the CDR of the region have stood firm: "Since the Burkinabe land was always used to benefit the imperialists (money crops) and their lackeys, the Sourou valley should be used exclusively for food crops."

Participation by All

The Sourou project is the fruit of the spirit of sacrifice shown by our people. The petty bourgeois element, composed mainly of civil servants, made its fulfillment possible by agreeing to give up their allowances. This action falls in the category of those that the Faso president has described as the "socio-economic burdens" that each of us bears.

This project is thus a national project, a priority one, to which each Burkinabe must give ascendancy, because we must break with the policy of the outstretched hand. Achievement of this project, in addition to giving us food self-sufficiency, will at the same time liberate from our status as forever being helped. It is the attitude of the Faso president that we will not associate ourselves with certain African countries in crying our hunger to the world. "We will be stoics," he emphasized.

Also, everyone should take his turn to go there and work, with the work carried out in an organizational framework directed by the CDR's.

Progress Status of Construction

European Development Fund Project (EDF):

- Study of a priority 50-hectare block completed,
- Availability of implementation plans by the end of July 1985.
- Beginning of construction: 15 September 1985,
- Location of the whole project (500 hectares) on site.
- (Beginning of studies in January 1986).

West African Development Bank ADB) Project:

- Location of 200-hectare project on site,
- Beginning of implementation studies in January 1986, at the same time as those for the EDF 500 hectares.

Textile Fiber Company (SOFITEX) project:

- Mechanized food and seed production on 180 hectares (all sown). Food production, cultivated by oxen, with farmers on 30 hectares (sown).

Location of the economic operators:

- Topographic surveys underway for parceling out the land.

Guiedougou (Lanfiera) area:

- Food production on 288 hectares (totally cultivated).

Status of Acquired Financing

- Algeria: agreement to finance 200 hectares at Kounbara.
Total: 1 billion CFA francs.
- Romania: agreement to develop 500 hectares in the Debe sector.
- Beginning of construction: 15 October 1985.

The various types of aid should now "help us get rid of aid," for in future no aid should contribute to keeping Burkina in the backwardness of the former Upper Volta. Yes, in regard to necessary aid (machinery, tractors, etc.). That is why the confidence of all the people in this project reflects the new determination aroused by all protagonists of the national political life. This confidence indicates the good choice of the project that reflects their aspiration. The profound rightness of this initiative also derives from the the revolutionary approach that must in future govern all our actions and behavior, and which bans forever improvisation, resignation and lack of political awareness. The dynamism of the current policy is thus guided by the concern that the agricultural campaigns be based on the logic of directing all our thinking to the great majority of our people, the rural population. Thus,

in regard to production, the one primarily concerned is the farmer. It is he who holds the key to self-sufficiency. In the Sourou irrigated area, the farmers will be given an area of 4,800 hectares for grain cultivation, 700 for rice, and 1,400 for market gardening.

In agro-industry, Sourou also has a significant area devoted to oleaginous crops. The progress of the Sourou construction is generally satisfactory (see boxed summary). The work on building the dam and the canal is completed. These two projects, which enable storage of 6000 million cubic meters of water needed to develop the Sourou plains, are thus available.

This is thus an obvious means of contributing to the food security and agricultural expansion in a Sahelian country such as Burkina, where the people rely on nonirrigated agriculture and thus tend to see in irrigation the greatest hope for agricultural development. In association with the Sourou project, 25 small dams are being built at the same time as collective fields for the various organizations. All these initiatives are aimed at giving the farmer more confidence, and demonstrate that though the Sourou project remains a great hope of the Burkinabe people, it will still meet only 10 percent of the national needs. That is why the Komplenga hydroelectric dam is an essential complement in this struggle for food self-sufficiency.

Komplenga

On 8 June 1985, ground was broken on the Komplenga hydroelectric dam, 300 km southeast of Ouagadougou, by the Faso president. Following up the Sourou project, this action is undoubtedly a very hopeful development for the Burkinabe people.

Like Sourou, the Komplenga is an old project, started in 1976, that had dragged out through the fault of the neocolonial regimes (one after the other) that led our country after the 1960 independence.

The Komplenga dam will enable Burkina to diversify its energy sources and thus reduce its dependence on oil. It is thus the leading development in low cost electrification for all Burkina.

The confidence in this achievement results from two main goals. The certainty that it will help us toward food self-sufficiency, because it will have many beneficial effects. First, there is the opportunity of significant agricultural development due to the irrigation possibilities. It assures development of fish industry, while care must be taken to establish adequate drying installations and construct the road (Ouaga-Fada-Pama) to bring the product out.

To these first benefits must be added the growth of the population living on the banks, who will have infrastructure such as schools, dispensaries and particularly water.

The second aspect of reasons for satisfaction derive from the fact that implementation of this project will greatly decrease our oil bill. It should be noted that in 1983 all our urban centers consumed about 28,720,243 kg of fuel.

The entire Kompienga-Ouagadougou axis will be electrified. This will be a very important step, because the presence of electricity will stimulate social-commercial activity in all the provinces covered. In a general way, the Kompienga project will enable us to achieve a saving of 10,500 tons of fuel, or 2.3 million CFA francs.

In view of the importance of the project, several financial lenders are interested. It will cost a total of about 38 billion, and construction is expected to be completed in 1989.

Technical Aspects

Located 300 km from Ouagadougou, and 25 km from the Benin border and 8 from the Togo border, the site is on the Kompienga, a tributary of the Pendjari.

The dam will have an earth length of 1,475 meters, maximum height of 50 meters, and fill volume of 2.91 billion cubic meters. Its top elevation will be 182.75 meters, and top width 8 meters. The reservoir's minimum level will be 165 meters and the maximum 180 meters. It will hold 2 million cubic meters of water and have a maximum flow of 480 cubic meters per second.

The generating plant will be equipped with two 7.5 megawatt Kaplan turbines, each operating with a water column of 30 meters and flow of 39 cubic meters per second.

Kompienga's annual production will be 45 gigawatt hours, or 3,000 operating hours.

The Kompienga dam will rank third in the country with 15 megawatts, behind Numbiel (60 megawatts) and Bagre (16 megawatts).

It will be able to provide half the power consumption of the city of Ouagadougou, currently estimated at 70 gigawatt hours.

Total coverage of the country will require an installation of 50 megawatts. Two transformer stations will be installed, at Kompienga and Ouagadougou. In view of the distance separating the two stations (270 km), a high-tension line of 132 kilovolts will be used.

On completion of construction, SONABEL will assume responsibility for operation of Kompienga.

Communication Routes: 800 Km of Roads

In the 2 years of the revolution, the CNR has tackled the important sector of road construction over almost the entire territory. Almost 800 km of roads have been constructed or are being improved.

In this key sector, Burkina is fairly well endowed compared to some countries in the region. In fact, Burkina's road map gives cause for satisfaction. The past emphasis on development of secondary roads reflected the obvious desire to bring the commercial crops (cotton, peanuts) out of the producing areas. As soon as those activities stopped, imperialism at the same time stopped financing repair of those roads.

The development of road infrastructure also relates to our country's geographic location. Burkina is a hinge of the subregion, which makes it the transit point for movement from one country to another. The reactionary regimes were able to profit from this geographic advantage, but were not able to give this sector the dynamism that it should have had. Thus, most of the roads exist today only in name.

The road repairs must thus enable us to have roads that measure up to our country's current level of development. To this end, more than 700 million CFA francs in grants has been committed to road construction studies. The most important are the following: Bobo-Dedougou, to be financed by the FAC (265 million CFA francs); the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and Burkina will jointly finance, for a total of 278 million CFA francs, the study of the Yako to Mali border road; the African Development Fund (ADF) will finance the Dori-Tera-Niamey road study for 110 million CFA francs. Most of this financing has already been obtained.

In regard to the active phase, the Ministry of Equipment, in the framework of the PPD, has designated seven projects, for most of which the studies have been completed. First, there is the Piega to Niger border road, 109 km, to complete the Abidjan-Niamey cross highway. Construction will be financed by the Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA), the Kuwaiti Fund, and Burkina. The total is 6.2 billion CFA francs.

The second road, already begun, is Ouaga-Yako (already completed) passing through Ouahigouya on the Mali border. The first segment is 109 km and it has been financed by the EDF, a total of 5.2 billion CFA francs. The road will be extended to camp CRS. It is usually called the "fish road." The 132 km Fada-Pama-Tindangou road, at a cost of 4 billion, will be constructed of very "modernized" earth and later tarred.

The primary concern in this construction is to facilitate the dam work by completely opening up the region.

It may also link Benin to our country, thus increasing our independence in respect to the port of Abidjan.

The Bilanga-Tarpako road, 117 km, will be financed by the ADB, a total of 3 billion. It is an ordinary earth road, intended to open up this whole region.

After these four main achievements come the projects of the fourth road plan. This construction, for a total of 5,115,000,000 CFA francs, will be financed by the World Bank. It is mainly directed at reconstruction and maintenance. For example, there is the Yako-Koudougou-Sabou-Tekourou road, 180 km. The Ouagadougou-Koupela road (137 km) is an important connector and its interruption could be harmful to our commerce. It has suffered deterioration during its 13 years of existence. Its bed is rutted so badly that it can no longer carry heavy traffic. The surface will have to be completely redone. The cost of the maintenance will be 1.9 billion CFA francs.

These all-directional actions by the Minister of Equipment include the streets in the Burkina towns, and particularly in Ouagadougou. The task is to make

them wider, more pleasant for traffic, and less subject to flooding in the rainy season.

Improvement of Ouagadougou's streets has become a necessity, because some of the major thoroughfares have not been finally constructed, and those already tarred have not had periodic maintenance. The sometimes nonexistent drainage means that some thoroughfares are passable only with difficulty after a rain. The deterioration is of all kinds (channeling, corrugation, cracks, water penetration, buckling, pot holes, etc.).

These roads generally have a right of way varying between 20 and 60 meters. The roadbed is 6 to 7 meters wide. Maintenance is carried out by the town, which, because of lack of material, financial and personnel resources, is not able to perform regular followup.

The seriousness of the problem was grasped by the CNR, which immediately following 4 August 1983 put road reconstruction at the top of the many projects carried out in the 2 years.

Thus, Rue Nelson Mandela, 6 km long, was one of the CNR's first tasks. This street, costing 869 million CFA francs, was entirely constructed from the national budget.

Avenue General de Gaulle followed almost immediately. Financed by the FAC, this 1.6 km street cost 662 million CFA francs. There was also the highway Ouidi (sector 11) Tampoui. Along with these highways, bridges will be constructed, such as dam No 2 (Tanghin).

Secondary Airports

In general, thanks to its geographical location, Burkina has benefited from extensive road infrastructure. However, it should be noted that the lenders are only interested in roads of immediate interest to them. They are very reluctant when it is a matter of developing road infrastructure for the sole purpose of opening up "nonprofitable" areas.

Development is a succession of coordinated achievements. The construction of secondary airports follows this logic. Four airports have been constructed during the 2 years. This is a record for a country such as Burkina. Gaoua airport was opened in December 1984, during National Culture Week. Orodara airport, being completed, will demonstrate the fruits of our orchard to the rest of the country. At Fada, the airport will not only serve to open up the Gourma area, but will rapidly transport onions of the region to other areas where growing of this crop has not been developed.

The fourth airport at Po responds to strategic factors. Anyone who is aware of the importance of this town in the carrying out of the revolution needs no explanation of the importance of protecting it.

Finally, with the expansion of the runway at Bobo-Dioulasso airport, one can say that the CNR is in the process of demystifying the airplane, and intends, as it has done for the bus, to make it available to the largest number of Burkinabe. These Burkinabe have understood that no one is going to come and

build their country for them, and so they have thus adopted the language of the CNR.

These 2 years of struggle have taught us that only revolutions bring hope. A people that really has the power of decision, relying solely on its own strength, can surmount all the obstacles to its happiness. Such a people can thus not fail.

These 2 years of struggle show us that we must dare to tackle projects that we believe are beneficial to the interest of the broad people's masses. An aware people will entrust the carrying out of their vital projects only to itself. It must have confidence in its members and design its development plan on the basis of its most profound aspirations.

All these major projects undertaken by the CNR are proving successful because they reflect the expectation of the people.

These projects are succeeding because the people are everywhere associated with their implementation. They are thus adopted by them as their own.

9920

CSO: 3419/526

BURKINA

PROCEEDINGS OF FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STUDENTS

Editorial on Importance

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 19 Aug 85 p 1

[Editorial: "For a Youth More Committed to the Advanced Posts of the Revolutionary Struggle"]

[Text] Since 4 August 1983 a new era has dawned on the Burkinabe people: that of dignity, prosperity and happiness for all. The coming of the People's Democratic Revolution (RDP) laid the concrete foundations for building a new society liberated from tutelage of any kind. As a result, the task is to bring the people to exercise the power themselves and for themselves. This clearly demonstrates that we are no longer in the period of organizing all the country's dynamic forces to oppose the reactionary powers and the local allies of international imperialism. It is a matter of organizing ourselves, of organizing the people to exercise power. To this end, the political orientation speech of 2 October 1983 provided a clear and lucid orientation without ambiguity.

Thus, the Burkinabe student youth, who had always professed their anti-imperialism but who had long suffered from the intellectual terrorism and hollow phraseology of the drawing room revolutionaries, adopted the concerns of the people and responded to the appeal of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR) by establishing, everywhere that youth were located, committees for the defense of the revolution (CDR), and by cleaning out the campuses by forcing the dogmatists swelled by populism and garbed in sectarianism to jump, tied hand and foot and with mouth sewn shut, into the trashcan of history.

This first national conference of Burkinabe students studying on all the continents, under the theme: "The Role of Youth Educated Under the RDP," is the sign of the determination of the student comrades to march boldly with the people in themselves defining the tasks that they must assume before history. This is the occasion for them to see how to share the joys and trials of their people, and to proclaim loud and clear their conscious and farseeing consent to join the people's masses, thus allying revolutionary theory to the resulting revolutionary practice.

There is thus nothing in common between this national conference and the interminable and "historic" congresses of a minority drunk with populism,

4 October 1985

revolutionary in words but reactionary in deeds, that fraudulently passed itself off at a given moment in history as the avant-garde of the people's struggle. And who yesterday, today, tomorrow and always will write: "The situation is troubled and complex," incapable of a correct and scientific analysis of the struggle. This national conference is taking place at a time when the situation is as clear as a full moon. In a clear situation, clear tasks present themselves. That is why our students, to avoid floating in the twilight like our enemies, have come together after 2 years of political, attitudinal, and socio-economic revolution to analyze what has been done, what remains to be done, and what they should do.

The fruits of these activities should be useful support and resulting strengthening of the development strategy that the people chose to define in their first 5-year plan, and from the start they will provide the bases for a unity of action with the student youth, whose ideological unity around the political orientation speech of 2 October 1983 needs no demonstration. That is very important, because as Lenin said: "Unity of action cannot be achieved unless there is genuine unity of conviction on the necessity for an action."

Full success to the work of the first national conference of the students of Burkina Faso.

Details of Opening Session

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 19 Aug 85 pp 1,4

[Article by Wind-Lananm Ramde]

[Text] "The Role of Youth Educated Under the RDP" is the theme of the first national conference of Burkinabe students that opened Saturday 17 August 1985 at 1000 hours at the House of the People in the presence of Capt Blaise Compaore, representing the Faso president; Capt Pierre Ouedraogo, national secretary general of the CDR; Capt Henri Zongo, the Faso coordinator; members of the CNR; directors of ministry offices; the diplomatic corps; and many students from all continents. Also participating in this opening ceremony was a delegation of the national bureau of Burkinabe students and of the Benin National University. We should also point out that the national gendarmerie orchestra played to an enchanted public.

This national conference assembles all the CDR's of students studying in foreign countries as well as those of Ouagadougou.

Speaking on behalf of the committee of the University of Ouagadougou, Comrade Felix Kabre, university delegate, first welcomed all the comrades who had come from all continents. He then stated that this conference "is opening in a world context characterized by a general crisis of the imperialist capitalist system, which, in order to assure its domination, subjects the peoples to the most varied forms of oppression." This creates a revolutionary situation throughout the world and makes all progressive peoples confident of certain victory for all those struggling against imperialism.

He then recalled that since the victorious uprising of 4 August 1983, organized into its assault units, the CDR's, the Burkinabe people have

achieved numerous victories in both the political and socio-economic fields; victories that explain the frenzy of our enemies against our young revolution and that prove the rightness of the political orientation defined in the political orientation speech of 2 October 1983.

In Comrade Kabre's view, we must derive from this national situation "the harmful characteristics typical of the petty bourgeois intellectuals that we are" in order to find solutions, because "winning victories does not mean being immune from errors. That is why we should be constantly challenging ourselves in order to improve. To any rational revolutionary a failure must be an unrivaled source of experience for the future."

After condemning certain types of behavior that must not develop in exercising the revolutionary power, Comrade Felix Kabre concluded by saying that "though initially some students hesitated and others were influenced by national populism, one can today affirm that the general trend is mobilization of the students within the CDR's." That is why this conference must have, among other objectives, the goal of strengthening these gains and defining and discussing conscientiously the tasks of the student youth, because the building of a new society requires total commitment of the youth.

Following him on the rostrum, Comrade Oussené Banaon, president of the national students bureau, congratulated the students on behalf of his colleagues for organizing the conference so as to "express the firm will of our student youth to mobilize all energies in service of the great battles of the hour." He said that the conference should remind all young people that theory should be combined with practice, be transformed into practice, reinvigorate itself, correct itself, and verify itself by practice. Comrade Banaon concluded by undertaking the commitment, in the name of all the students, to make future students into intrepid and indefatigable propagandists of the RDP, which can only be achieved through the action that today's students take toward their young brothers. The latter dare to believe, he said, that "the students will not hesitate to do everything to merit the confidence that the Faso pupils have placed in them."

The next speaker was Comrade Adama B. Ouedraogo, office director in charge of promoting current affairs of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. He suggested to the comrade students some pieces of advice and ideas as a contribution to enriching the debate.

The last speaker was Capt Pierre Ouedraogo, national secretary general of the CDR's, who said: "If year number 1 of the RDP witnessed the birth of the CDR's on campus, year number 2 was without doubt the year of their flourishing." He paid tribute to the struggles waged by the students on campus against the bourgeois ideology rooted in attitudes, and their firm commitment to the advanced positions of the revolutionary struggle to build a new society, while absorbing the problems of the broad people's masses. Their participation in the major battles of the RDP is eloquent witness to this. Capt Pierre Ouedraogo added: "One can note with satisfaction the heroic assaults that have conquered the last citadels of populism and leftism in all the universities, especially Ouagadougou University. And all these actions by the students demonstrate their determination to work to strengthen the alliance of the foundation classes in our country struggling to eliminate all servitude."

However, he also noted, as stated by the Faso president on 4 August 1985, that the exercise of people's power has not been sufficiently correct.

Thus he said: "We recognize our errors. However, what do they amount to in comparison with the monstrosities that the masses endured under the reactionary regimes? What are they in comparison with the consequences of the exploitation and servitude under the capitalist bourgeois system? Let all who are loudly applauding or secretly jubilating over the saving measures and success of the RDP know that they owe these above all to the CDR's, the spearhead of the RDP." He then explained that it is thanks to our ideological unity around the political orientation speech that we have won all these victories, and this conference must be an opportunity to strengthen this unity. Since they have facilities for access to the theoretical accomplishments of the great educators of the proletariat, the student youth should set an example by an ever more concrete commitment. He concluded by expressing his confidence in the students: "We are assured in advance that, inspired by the main theme of International Youth Year and conscious of the great battles that our people are currently waging, you will have constructive debates that will make this national conference a source of definite enrichment for the discussions on the people's first 5-year development plan."

After declaring open the first national conference of Burkina Faso students, he proceeded to installation of the presidium of the conference, composed of six members, with Mamadou Traore of the CDR national general secretariat as chairman.

At 1400 hours the students assembled at the ISP [expansion unknown] to hear the reports of the various delegations, which lasted until 0700 Sunday, and continued on Sunday afternoon. The next task was formation of the committees. By hearing the various reports, the students were mutually enriched by the experiences of others in the various universities and all the continents.

Since 0630 hours this morning, all the conference participants are at the Wayen collective fields to link theory with practice and thus participate in the battle for food self-sufficiency. The conference will probably end next Saturday.

Further Report

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 6 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Wind-Lananm Ramde]

[Text] The national conference of Burkinabe students that began on Saturday continued its work, including yesterday. After hearing and discussing for 2 days the reports of the delegations, yesterday the students put down their pens and notebooks to go to the Wayen collective fields, where they made their contribution to the struggle undertaken by the CNR for food self-sufficiency, thereby demonstrating their firm will to always struggle at the side of the masses to bring down a peg or two all the opportunists who call for compulsory work, but also, and above all, to disprove the theory that students are only talkers, incapable of applying what they say. The students gathered in large numbers and with boundless enthusiasm on Monday morning at 0600 hours outside

the headquarters of the CDR national general secretariat armed with dabas to go out and tackle the collective field at Wayen, the now famous place where the petty bourgeois intellectual is in the process of getting to know the land, now after the beginning of the rainy season.

Having left Ouagadougou slightly late because of the inadequate number of vehicles, they arrived at the field reserved for the CDR national secretariat general at about 1100 hours. Despite the sun beating down, the students went right to work, and continued until 1700 hours. During the 6 hours, they finished working the field where they were to lay the fertilizer. The work was done with joy and gaiety, to the extent that some wanted to go on and work neighboring fields, so great was their enthusiasm at working the earth, which many had not touched for years. By this action, the students proved once again, following their participation in the Sourou projects, the railway battle, reforestation, and other, no less important, tasks, their total commitment to working to build a new, worthy and prosperous Burkina. This also proves, to the displeasure of national and international reaction, that the students will always respond to any appeal by the CNR in the interest of the people's welfare.

On return from Wayen, the conference resumed its work yesterday evening by hearing the reports of CDR's of students in the Arab countries (Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). The work in committees is to begin this morning. Let us hope that all will be able to maintain the tempo of the conference.

Reports, Committee Work

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 21 Aug 85 pp 1,3

[Article by Wind-Lananm Ramde]

[Text] "It is not enough any more to say revolutionary, one must penetrate further into the profound meaning of the revolution of which one is the fervent defender. That is the best way to better defend against the attacks and distortions that the counterrevolutionaries will not fail to mount against it." It was on the strength of these statements made in the political orientation speech of 2 October 1983 that the Burkinabe students studying in various places established CDR's in order to better publicize the struggle of our people.

On conclusion of the reports of the delegations of Benin, Cameroon, Algeria, Libya, Senegal, France, Ivory Coast, USSR, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc., the main problem that emerged was that of information. All, without exception, criticized the inadequacy of information distribution between the CDR national secretariat general and the CDR bureaus. This is a very important problem, in that the militant comrades abroad, cut off from their countries, have great difficulty countering the reactionary statements and other distorting images of our revolution circulating in these environments.

In addition to these information problems, the students did not fail to denounce the demagogic actions and statements by certain of their administrative authorities; actions and statements that have often had a disorganizing effect and deserve to be combated under the RDP.

Despite all these difficulties, our students have been genuine and worthy ambassadors of our revolution to the foreign peoples who receive them. Even though the governments of some countries have been systematically opposed to the formation of CDR's on their territory, our students have been able, through revolutionary discipline, to develop initiatives on their level to organize, develop and publicize the ideas of the DRP within the Burkinabe communities.

The assembly and presidium of the national conference congratulates certain bureaus for the rigor and seriousness which they had demonstrated in promoting the image of our revolution.

Study of revolutionary theory was one of the major concerns of these members. Evening debates, meetings, establishment of newspapers, study books, organization of exhibitions, revolutionary weeks, etc.; these were various activities carried out on all the campuses. In this respect, special mention was made of the CDR's of Ouagadougou, Dakar and Paris for the regular publication of their struggle organs, RBD, L'EVEIL, L'AUREOLE and COMBAT, which have greatly helped students and nonstudents in mastering ideological and political problems.

Everywhere, the comrades have fought not only against international reaction, but also, and primarily, against national-populism, which has succeeded in sabotaging some of their actions and which has tried to portray our country abroad as the most fascist of our times. These dogmatists, because of their barking, have ended up discrediting themselves in the eyes of their hosts because of the determination and courage of the RDP fighters.

It must be pointed out, however, that in certain countries the lack of self-confidence, coupled with the lack of a spirit of initiative, along with the mentioned problems, has not facilitated the mobilization work. To this must be added the passivity of some ambassadors cited by the comrades, the former having done nothing to help them. For the members in certain Arab countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the basic problem they face is that they are ignored by our authorities in the sense that they are there on their own initiative, not receiving state scholarships.

In face of all these problems, the national conference, which began its committee work yesterday, intends to find the necessary remedies. Three committees have been established: general orientation, pioneer and school movement, and finally student movement. All the comrade students who are members of the committees are currently hard at work so that the conference can achieve concrete results regarding the role of the student youth in the RDP.

9920

CSO:3419/544

MADAGASCAR

TSS TAKES REVENGE ON KUNG FU FIGHTERS

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 24 Aug 85 p 4

[Text]

Following the destruction by the armed forces of the headquarters of Antananarivo's kung fu movement and the killing of its leader, Pierre RAKOTOARIJAONA, alias Pierre BE, last August 1 (see I.O.N. N° 193), the great rivals of the kung fu fighters, the TTS, are again active in the Malagasy capital, committing acts of violence and intimidation. It appears that the TTS, some 100 of whose members were massacred by the kung fu adepts last December, have decided to settle old scores and regain control of the city, where for the past six months their opponents had been in command in many districts.

The TTS, unemployed youths organised by the AREMA party of president Didier RATSIRAKA, are now openly showing themselves and are telling their victims they are from Ambohitsirohitra, the district where AREMA's offices and the presidential palace are located. THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER knows details of at least two examples of their actions: a midwife from the Antananarivo suburbs was tied to a post and killed, and the wife of a political activist, who was alone at home when a TTS group arrived seeking her husband, was tortured then left bound in the middle of a room which was set on fire.

It is evident that a struggle is now underway for the control of the capital, whose inhabitants showed their hostility to the government at the last presidential election. The kung fu fighters may have lost their leaders, but the authorities cannot be sure they will not re-emerge soon.

CSO: 3400/1118

MALI

UDPM DELEGATION OBSERVES WORKERS COLLECTIVES IN MOSCOW

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 20 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Sissoko, correspondent in Moscow]

[Text] A delegation of the Democratic Union of Malian People (UDPM), led by Nangozie Ferdinand Berthe, secretary in charge of relations with the National Union of Mali Workers (UNTM), visited the USSR from 13 to 20 July at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee. During its friendship visit, the Malian side learned about the Soviet experience regarding the party's participation in the country's economic and social development.

The role of the workers collectives was the focal point of the discussions. This innovation, which dates from 1982, has become an essential factor in the society, a special instrument for strengthening socialist ownership of the means of production and for planned development of the economy.

The founding basis of the collectives is the concern to harmoniously ally the interests of the state, society, and the individual. In enterprises, the workers are directly involved in the operation of the unit and contribute with full awareness to its smooth functioning. They are organized into brigades and teams that commit themselves voluntarily to fulfilling a contract. The respect for this commitment is beneficial both for the enterprise (increased productivity) and for the worker himself (resulting material interest).

The method results in greater democratization of the management process. Also, it requires of the workers a spirit of responsibility and above all a sense of discipline. Berthe's delegation was very interested in this practice, which it likened to the observer and civil education cells established in our various services and which represent an effective party presence in the country's economic life.

The UDPM went on to Azerbaijan, where it met the republic's political leaders, and it also laid a bouquet of flowers on the Lenin Tomb in Moscow.

9920

CS0:3419/553

MALI

ACTIVITIES OF DELEGATION TO MOSCOW YOUTH FESTIVAL REPORTED

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 17-18 Aug 85 p 7

[Article by P. M. Koite: "12th Youth and Students Festival: III. Fruitful Contacts by the Malian Delegation"]

[Text] In addition to the program activities of the 12th Festival, the Malian officials had useful contacts with young people of the Komsomol of the USSR.

In this connection, on 2 August a Malian delegation led by Diadie Danioko, office director of the Ministry of Sports, Arts and Culture, paid a visit to Dimitrov, a town some 600 km from Moscow where there is a textile industry that has for 18 years been the USSR's leading producer of children's clothing. The youth of the town gave the Malian delegation a fraternal and warm welcome. To the factory managers, the responsibility that parents have toward their children means that the youth working in the factory (they compose 60 percent of the work force) make great creative efforts to meet the clothing needs of the children.

A visit to view the products followed the fashion parade presented by the personnel, and an artistic evening concluded this meeting. The town of Dimitrov, founded in 1859, has some 800 people and was a strongpoint of resistance to foreign invasion during World War II. Mr Danioko also placed a wreath of flowers on the monument to the dead.

The Malian delegation of 100 members went to Byelorussia on Sunday 4 August and stayed 4 days in Minsk. On its arrival in the Byelorussian capital it was warmly greeted by a Komsomol committee, whose leader, after welcoming our delegation, expressed the great pleasure of Minsk to receive the guests of the 12th Festival.

In reply, Amadou Daouda Diallo said that the struggles of all youth in the world are the result of their aspirations. He concluded by stressing that the National Youth Union of Mali (UNJM), like all youth organizations, has set as its objective the tasks of development in a world of peace, fraternity and mutual understanding.

In the afternoon of the same day, Amadou Daouda Diallo went to the headquarters of the Leninist Komsomol in Minsk, where he had contacts and exchanged opinions with the political and administrative leaders of Minsk, to

whom he explained the structures and operation of his organization.

In the evening, the Malian delegation went to the rest area 30 km from the city on the Minsk Sea, an artificial lake where the city's inhabitants come for recreation. After a 12 km boat trip on the lake, a solidarity meeting was held in the delegates and leaders meeting hall. The slogan of the festival, "Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship," was repeated. An evening of entertainment ended this first day.

On Tuesday, 6 August, a group led by the UNJM secretary general, and including Dadie Danioko and Adama Kansaye, went to the MAZ auto plant, where it learned about the various stages of assembling heavy capacity vehicles. After the visit to the workshops, they went to the factory's museum to gain an understanding of the improvements that have been made in engine construction since 1939.

Concluding its stay in Byelorussia, the Malian delegation on 6 August paid a tourist visit outside the city to see the Katyn memorial. This unique memorial was erected in memory of the people of the village of Katyn and of other neighboring villages who were burned by the fascist occupiers.

9920

CSO: 3419/553

MALI

UNJM DELEGATION MEETS WITH GDR YOUTH

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 20 Aug 85 p 6

[Article by P. M. Kote]

[Text] In the framework of the good relations between the German and Malian youth, a friendly meeting was held on Tuesday 30 July 1985 between 20 representatives of the German Free Youth (FDJ) of the GDR and leaders of the National Youth Union of Mali (UNJM).

The two sides, led by FDJ bureau member Hendrich and by Seydou Coulibaly, secretary for press and information of the national executive bureau of the UNJM, began their meeting with an exchange of speeches. First, Mr Hendrich expressed pleasure at the opportunity given him to convey on behalf of the FDJ central council their support for the noble ideals of independence, peace, solidarity and fraternity that the UNJM upholds.

Mr Hendrich reviewed the various achievements of the German Youth and the resolutions that will be taken during the 12th Congress of German Youth. He concluded by affirming the FJD's desire to guarantee peace and solidarity with the struggling peoples.

In his reply, Seydou Coulibaly recalled the good relations between the UNJM and the FDJ. He said that all youth movements across the world are working for the same objective: to maintain continuing relations and work on the development tasks that are assigned to them.

He said that outside of meetings the youth should be able to communicate between themselves. They should join efforts for progress on the path of justice and freedom.

After this exchange, Mr Hendrich presented to the UNJM on behalf of the FDJ a check for 5,000 DM. A friendly exchange of ideas and experience between the youth of the two countries concluded the evening.

9920

CSO: 3419/553

MALI

DIALLO MEETS WITH MALI STUDENTS IN MOSCOW, POLAND

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 20 Aug 85 p 7

[Article by Moscow Correspondent Sissoko]

[Text] In connection with the 12th World Festival of Youth and Students, Amadou Daouda Diallo, secretary general of the National Youth Union of Mali (UNJM), held an information meeting with representatives of the UNJM committees in the USSR and Poland. The event was held on the premises of the Mali Embassy to the Soviet Union in the presence of Ambassador Abdoulaye Amadou Sy; Messrs Danioko and Kansaye, respectively office director and technical adviser of the Ministry of Sports, Arts, and Culture; and Messrs Abdoul Sy and Kanoute, members of the UNJM national executive bureau.

The first speaker, His Excellency Abdoulaye Amadou Sy, expressed satisfaction at the excellent relationship between students and officials residing in the USSR and Poland. He recalled that they had participated in the legislative and presidential elections of 9 June, thereby demonstrating their commitment and militant attitude.

The students, for their part, emphasized that the arrival of the new Mali ambassador had had a beneficial effect on their conditions of life and study. A frank and open dialogue had been established between the two parties, and no one any longer had the feeling of being rejected.

The final speaker, Amadou Daouda Diallo, warmly congratulated His Excellency Abdoulaye Amadou Sy on his methods of operation, and he went on to give a review of the political, economic and social situation in Mali during the past few months. He stressed in particular the efforts being made by the people to combat the afflictions of drought and desertification.

In this respect, he mentioned the initiatives by the people of the seventh region, who have established rice-growing areas, thus taking up the challenge of food self-sufficiency. Amadou Daouda Diallo called on the audience for ingenuity and self-denial, for, as he said, quoting Gen Moussa Traore, "No one but the Malians will build Mali."

9920

CSO: 3419/553

MOZAMBIQUE

AIM COMMENTARY WARNS AGAINST INTERNAL ENEMY

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Aug 85 p 3

[MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION AGENCY editorial: "Who's Who?"]

[Text] The incidents in Maputo Province and other parts of the country have once again shown the armed bandits' nature as tools.

We think that there is a clear realization throughout the entire national territory of the bandits' leading characteristic. The armed bandits have been tools of external forces which want to see Mozambique incapable of developing itself, or even returning to the status of a colonized country.

But while this is the leading characteristic, it is not the only one. During recent months, President Samora Machel has alerted our society to another factor: There are individuals who are amassing wealth based on the armed bandits: The poverty of the majority and aggression are a source of wealth for a small minority.

Where are those individuals, and who are they?

The Mozambican people's struggle, the battles waged daily by our troops and officers, the efforts for development expended by the party and the government: in short, the current process of confrontation and construction are attesting to who those individuals are.

But at the present time, what any conscious citizen can observe is the following: In the first place, in nearly all aspects of the management of a country, we inherited enormous ignorance, and hence we are to a large extent learners: We are learning to govern by governing. Secondly, there is organized disorganization; there is conscious incompetence; and part of what is wrong lies inside the institutions.

Let's take speculation as an example.

There are people who don't want to see a substantial increase in food production, so that they can continue distributing the little that there is, at exorbitant prices.

But if production rises (and it has risen considerably), then the concern of those persons is shown in acts which prevent food from circulating. The next important thing for them is to facilitate the action of the armed bandits in the area of looting and destroying food. These people play the role of the sorcerer, opening the window to allow the thief to enter.

Conclusion: For such persons the bandits are the tool creating the conditions that enable them to continue amassing wealth.

And this nature of the bandit as a tool is marked by another factor: The individuals on whom we are commenting do not go over to the other side overtly; they do not show up in the brush, or abroad, as bandits; they only want to continue making use of the latter. Hence, this does not involve a social base of banditry, but rather the opportunistic use of the banditry phenomenon.

Hence, let us return to the starting point of this editorial. The armed bandits are not an organization, they are not a cohesive movement; and many of the forces backing them do not even want them to be an organization. They are only tools.

Under these conditions, the solution advocated by the party and reaffirmed at the Fourth Congress (the elimination of banditry on the spot) is a viable solution.

But it has become increasingly evident that it is a solution which also includes the battle against such individuals in our midst who, both objectively and subjectively, are using the bandits as a basis for amassing wealth. To summarize, we are experiencing a phase in which the "internal enemy" mentioned by the party is starting to manifest itself clearly.

At the same time that these incidents are occurring, there is another phenomenon which has attracted our attention.

Last year, we witnessed great praise for President Samora Machel from foreign forces which had been allied with colonialism in the past.

Some of those forces expressed that praise for two reasons. Their interests in southern Africa are protected by a gradual, overall development of the area in peace, and they fear that, without President Samora Machel, the strong sense of sovereignty in FRELIMO and the Mozambican state would be jeopardized. Therefore, they have changed their position, and it is rightful for them to have done so on the basis of their interests.

But there are also other forces which actually want to see Mozambique destroyed and FRELIMO attacked by its own popular rank and file. One of the areas in which they operate is that of the so-called "public opinion." Why are they praising President Samora Machel, their declared enemy?

The answer comes in the second part of their disinformational activity.

After voicing praise for the Mozambican leader, they claim that the rest of the apparat has not accompanied them. And in this way they leave the matter up in the air, so that we, poor unconscious ones, will conclude that he is isolated.

This is an act typical of spreading confusion.

In the first place, the people exist and are fighting against the bandits out of dire necessity, because of the fact that they, the people, are the main target of the bandits. Therefore, the action by the president and the party is echoed quickly and extensively by the entire society.

Secondly, FRELIMO exists and has a political line cultivated by millions of Mozambicans. It cannot be confined to one person.

Thirdly, the government exists and state institutions exist: an apparat exists.

Claiming that only the president is advancing and that the apparat is not operating means trying to create a split between the two, so as later to annihilate both the president and the apparat.

Let's take the example of the Armed Forces. One very often hears it claimed hereabouts that our Army is not fighting. We ask: who substantially reduced the banditry in Inhambane, Gaza and Manica Provinces? Who is combating the bandits every day in Zambezia, Sofala and other areas? It is our troops and officers.

There is an interesting phenomenon in all this: A handful of infiltrated individuals want all the troops and officers to pay the price of being accused by the people. This internal enemy organizes the disorganization and later, hypocritically, foists the blame on the troops. As for us, as informational professionals, we have already seen enough not to succumb to this kind of trap.

Hence, the problem is not the apparat. The problem lies inside the apparat. It is not the members of the party, the government, the Armed Forces and the other state institutions, as a whole, who are not operating. Many of them are finding, every day, obstacles originating among individuals also inside the apparat whose function it is to boycott the operation of others. We are witnessing the exacerbation of that phenomenon known as infiltration. It is against this that we must fight, while at the same time fighting the armed bandits.

Being clearly aware of this means ensuring the first step toward preventing the enemy from using our voices against erroneous targets; this is the first condition for conquering to the greatest extent this difficult phase in our history; because the alternative would mean another 100 years of domination.

2909

CSO: 3442/407

MOZAMBIQUE

COMMENTARY URGES GREATER EFFORTS TO COMBAT HUNGER

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] The food situation has improved considerably of late in much of the country, despite the still devastating effects of the natural disasters, which have not prevented the armed bandits' terrorist, destabilizing activities.

Reports indicate that there has been a relative abundance of food products at rather high prices; nevertheless, the results, while significant and encouraging, are still far removed from measuring up to what is intended from the standpoint of basically meeting individual needs.

Between no food products and food products at very high prices, there is not much to choose. Which is worse? Our experience, which is sad, tells us that the worst thing is the lack of food products, because that means hunger.

What exists at present, from the standpoint of food production, is an optimistic prediction of future prospects opening up new horizons in this herculean national effort to put an end to famine.

And this is a direct result of the implementation of measures introduced by the Council of Ministers 3 months ago to rehabilitate the national production and commerce. It involves building the national economy; it involves putting into effect the ambitious plan to create a society with abundance and happiness.

Stimulating the producer, whoever he may be; promoting the production of consumer goods; giving an incentive to commerce through the most diverse mechanisms; making it possible for the high costs that the producer has to pay for services rendered by enterprises or entities to be conveyors of an overall action that is starting to bring the most fortunate results: and the measures of the Council of Ministers must be upheld and executed throughout the national territory, so that they may bring results.

What is important is that the producer produce, that the marketer market and that the consumer consume. As for prices, they will be in direct ratio to the capacity that the state and cooperative sectors, and the honest private

sector had to assume , through competition, which cannot consider quantity alone, but which must take quality into consideration.

Dynamism, aggressiveness and the entrepreneurial spirit must be alive. There must be an end to the traumatism of apathy, defeatism and the false image of our incapacity and latent bureaucratism; whatever the cost may be.

2909

CSO: 3442/407

MOZAMBIQUE

MAPUTO COOPERATIVES UNION HOLDS SEMINAR ON TECHNOLOGY USE

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] From Monday to Thursday of last week, the General Union of Agricultural-Livestock Cooperatives of Maputo held a seminar on appropriate technology. Sponsored by the Joint Nutritional Support Program (JNSP) of the WHO and UNICEF, the seminar was intended to constitute a first step toward being able, in the future, to introduce technologies which farmers could easily master, through which they could improve their living conditions.

The seminar was comprised of a demonstration on the operation of various methods and applications of certain types of technology, followed by a discussion of the interest and difficulty in implementing these methods and techniques.

The methods and techniques covered in the seminar's program included the general areas of equipment for cooking, soap making, pottery, technology for making use of scrap metal and tin, and technology associated with water, animal hauling and growing garden produce.

This meeting was intended to address several requests from the cooperative members to their leaders in the Maputo General Union to find solutions for a vast range of problems affecting them every day. In conjunction with the WHO and UNICEF, the cooperative heads made an effort to organize an activity that would enable the farmers themselves to create conditions enabling them to solve the problems which they themselves are confronting.

This view stems from the concern for solving the technological problems most common among the farmers in a lasting manner, making them independent of imported technologies and methods requiring large outlays of foreign exchange.

Another prevailing concern is that the technological solutions found should not atrophy the human potential, making the cooperative members mere users of resources; but rather should themselves constitute a source of development for individual capacities, while at the same time serving as a basis for the economic consolidation of the cooperative movement among the farmers.

To respond to these views, there was backing from UNICEF technicians and those from several other agencies, who planned the seminar in a preeminently instructional manner, based on whatever was possible to make during the period in

which the meeting took place, with the participation of the cooperative members themselves in the methods which were to be assessed, so that they could analyze and decide on the possibilities of their use.

Simple, Effective Technologies

For example, one of the technologies which drew the most attention from the farmers was that for making clay stoves operated with coal or wood. In this demonstration, as well as others, the farmers assumed a participatory role, involving themselves in the making of those resources and in the use thereof.

In the case of the "rafiki" type wood-burning stove, the cooperatives found out for themselves that, with clay and wooden forms simple to make, it was possible to build a stove which, to produce the same amount of caloric energy as the usual fires, could reduce the consumption of wood to less than a quarter, in addition to other advantages of particular importance in the vicinity of the urban centers, as in the case of the fire safety problem.

Using scrap, the participants also found out how easy it was to make coal stoves, or wood-burning stoves as well which, in addition to providing similar enormous energy savings, could readily be transported with the pots and pans inside them, providing heat for a considerable period of time. This stove was mentioned by several peasants as a practical means for solving the problem of a hot meal during the period of working in the fields.

The pottery demonstration given by members of the Hulene Pottery Cooperative also galvanized the attention of the participants, who observed how the problems of a tableware shortage could be solved.

The proper way of using the mule as a means for hauling without fuel expenses, and the complex problems of maintenance, solving transportation problems, was considered by many of those present to be the ideal solution for these problems involved in removing their products. In the opinion of some of the participants, the combination of the mule with the already available means of transportation would be the most suitable solution, because it would allow for the concentration of products on certain sites, where the connection would be made with the carts and trucks.

The making of soap, inasmuch as it addressed one of the peasants' most serious problems, was among the demonstrations in which they became most involved. However, despite the ease of its manufacture, they noted that there are difficulties stemming from another major requirement, namely, oil. Some of those present stressed in this connection that the only alternative for having more oil and soap, simultaneously, would be to pay greater heed to the production of oil seeds; expressing assurance that, if the basic techniques were mastered for extracting the oil from those crops and subsequently making the soap, they would have one of the basic problems solved.

Starting Point

Nevertheless, it was not the purpose of this seminar to immediately solve the existing problems, but rather to make an evaluation of the way in which the peasants viewed each of the methods and techniques demonstrated. From this standpoint, it constituted a first step. Based on this evaluation, an attempt will be made later to determine the policies for action to develop the human and material capacities among the cooperative farmers that are necessary to solve their own problems.

In was from that standpoint that the UNICEF representative in Mozambique, Marta Mauras, declared on Monday morning, at the opening of the seminar, that: "The use of these techniques, which are being developed in Mozambique, will depend on the cooperative members themselves. You are the ones who will have to decide which are most appropriate, also bearing in mind that the most important thing is also to find out how to teach others the way of applying them and even improving them."

2909

CSO: 3442/407

NAMIBIA

SWAPO MAY BE FORCED INTO MAJOR OFFENSIVE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 10 Sep 85 p 12

[Article by Keith Abendroth]

[Text]

SECURITY Forces in the South West African war against Swapo believe that they are now winning their biggest battle — for the hearts and minds of the local population.

In military terms, the war is at a low ebb, with the Kako veld, Caprivi and Kavango zones — bordering on Angola — completely clear of Swapo's military wing, Plan (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia).

Intelligence from sources within Angola indicates that Moscow is becoming increasingly impatient with the terrorists' lack of success and it is expected that they will be pressured into making a major effort against the "boere".

So far this year Security Forces — now comprising more than 60 percent of South West African multi-racial units — have killed about 500 terrorists. Armed encounters now total 230.

A low key has been reached and it is believed that sabotage attempts are being planned. This task is made more difficult for Swapo infiltrators as they have to keep on the move.

The local populace report them to the military if they spend more than a day or two in an area.

Latest intelligence information is that only 40 Swapo insurgents are now active in Ovamboland — the focal point of the war.

A massive collection of arms, including some of the most sophisticated yet made in the Eastern Bloc and Russia, have been captured.

Major General George Meiring, Officer Commanding the Security Forces in South West Africa, told The Citizen at the weekend: "The home-grown SWATF security forces have now become one to be reckoned with.

"They are being increasingly accepted as being part and parcel of South West Africa — ready to supply the necessary military presence when independence is achieved."

Ninty percent of the war is being fought in the northern area of South West Africa — and nearly 100 percent of this in Ovamboland.

"Swapo is becoming increasingly jumpy. Poor military results are shipwrecking the Communist political message the organisation is trying to put across, Gen Meiring said.

Swapo is being hampered by the fact that a considerable part of its available fighting resources are to be used to shore up the rapidly collapsing FAPLA military force in Angola — to keep the MPLA government happy so as to allow Swapo to continue operating from Angolan soil.

Nearly 31 000 Cuban personnel in Angola are being used mainly in defensive positions — and not against the increasingly successful anti-Marxist forces of Dr Savimbi — and as a symbolism of Soviet support for "the cause".

Intelligence sources say 41 percent of Swapo

forces in Angola — forces now totalling just under 9 000 — are being used mainly to back up the Angolan army. Of these about half are deployed against Unita.

A bounty system in SWA is contributing much toward the successes of the security forces. A schedule of rewards is paid for information leading to a variety of anti-Swapo situations — ranging from capture of a Russian-made AK 47 rifle (R100) to R5 000 for a RPG rocket launcher, R20 000 for a Swapo detachment commander, R10 000 for a political commissar and R2 000 for a Swapo soldier.

Brigadier Gert Nel, Second in Command of the forces, told The Citizen "Swapo is having serious problems with its military wing and there is no doubt that its military effort is crumbling fast".

Swapo's big problem is inadequate material from which to draw leaders.

Colonel John Vorster, senior staff officer of the SWATF said that an indication of the near desperation of Swapo was an overall increase in intimidation.

This was because Swapo clearly realised that it was not mobilising the population successfully.

Fortunately South Africa had not repeated the mistake made by the French in Algeria — where they won the military component of the revolutionary war but lost the overall war because eventually, they regarded the Algerian population as the "enemy".

In the South West African war it had been realised that the Ovambos were not the enemy — but the target group of a revolutionary organisation.

CSO: 3400/1166

NAMIBIA

FARMERS READY TO FIGHT BACK

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 10 Sep 85 p 12

[Text] SOUTH West African farmers say there's "no way" they will submit to Swapo and Communist domination in South West Africa — and have set up a commando-style organisation to ensure that they can face any survival challenge.

Farmers in the area force make up one of the four wings of the force, with area commando units themselves totalling nearly 30 claim that their best allies are their own farm workers.

A vital feature of the military-style and polished area force set up is that it relieves the pressure on the reaction, or hard military force, in cases of Swapo infiltration behind the lines of the border frontier war.

Workers range from Damaras to Bushmen and Vambos to Namas — but

farmers say that almost all generally, are totally anti-Swapo.

On the farm 'Ondera', bordering on the Etosha pan in military sector 30, tough and successful German descended farmer Mr Klaus Mais-Rische says "our farm has been in my family for three generations. I am not going to give it up now".

Defence methods include the de-bushing of areas immediately surrounding farm homesteads, bunkers and food supply systems for emergencies, comprehensive radio links with each other and the military.

These farmers experienced their biggest infiltration by Swapo terrorists in 1982 — and the aid of workers, who have been trained in the use of automatic weapons — accounted for more than 400 terrorists, killing

many of them in shootouts.

Commandant Okker Brits (Town Clerk of Tsumeb in Currie Street) said SWAPO avoids farms that are defended and has learned that success in activating workers is minimal.

Captain Dave Keyser said "You could say that a farmer always makes a plan....

"And we certainly have made one discovering in the process that our stoutest allies are our own farm workers--proud to be trusted and one of the cogs--in their uniforms and with their automatic Ewee weapons--in an overall machine.

"We have born bushfighters. All they need is training in modern weapons--transition from bows and arrows--and in relating their amazing tracking skills of human as opposed to traditional animal movements.

"They are wonderful fighters--eager and patriotic. The secret is that they have been made to feel part of the whole defensive system."

CSO: 3400/1166

NIGERIA

INDUSTRIALISTS AWAIT GOVERNMENT'S DETAILED PROGRAMS

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 2 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Jackson Imafidon]

[Text]

NIGERIAN business organisations are keeping a studied silence over last week's change of leadership in the country.

A Business Times opinion survey in Lagos revealed that business houses are assuming a "wait and see" posture for the meantime.

A senior official of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria said that MAN, has no detailed information on the policies and programme of the new dispensation and was therefore not in position to make any meaningful comment.

On what MAN's expectation are, he said, that the association has for about four years from the civilian administration to the last Buhari government, being highlighting the same problems affecting the manufacturers in the country.

Dr. O. O. Fafowara, the executive director of MAN, was however not available to either comment on the change of leadership or what MAN expects from the new leadership.

Only recently MAN submitted an interim report on raw materials to the Buhari administration for possible consideration. MAN a body of manufacturers in the organised private sector, has had problems winning concessions for its members as the economy recessed daily.

Manufacturers in the chemical and metal sectors of the economy have a running battle on the issue of sourcing raw materials locally.

Their fate they have argued, was tied to the take-off of the petrochemical and iron and steel projects.

Agro-allied companies have also highlighted problems they encounter as they made efforts towards backward integration. Acquisition of lands and obtaining import licences for bringing into the country agricultural machinery.

Manufacturers have consistently said that they were producing below capacity because according to MAN they

were not being granted enough import licences to import raw materials and spare parts.

At the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, the executive director, Mr. M. A. Oke said that he would not comment on the situation in the country as it affects his members. He would not also talk on the expectations of the chamber from the new administration.

However, when the council of the chamber meets this week, it is expected that its feelings and expectations would be discussed.

However, members are anxious to see if there would be new effective guidelines in the issuance of import licences. The organised private sector has always agitated it be allowed representation on the import licence issuance committee in the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Areas where the business community

would however want more light shed are, the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) loan, the issue of unemployment, the counter trade and the servicing of our foreign debts.

Measures that might ensure that industries have smooth flow of raw materials and spare parts would gladden the hearts of the industrialists.

The labour movement in the country (NLC) while welcoming the change in leadership was quick to point out that the army of the unemployed should be given priority attention.

Policies aimed at resuscitating the economy which in turn would generate a re-absorption of retrenched workers and at the same time creating new employment opportunities are what the leadership of the Nigeria Labour Congress is looking forward to.

CSO: 3400/1136

NIGERIA

EXPERTS TO FIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 26 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Ndu Ughamadu]

[Text] The Nigerian Environmental Society (NES) is evolving a plan geared at ensuring that homes are built on coasts free from oil or other pollution.

At a news conference in Lagos last week, the president of the society, Dr. B. Idoniboye-Obu, said that the NES, made up of mainly environmental scientists and engineers would conduct studies to establish environmental baselines, impact assessment of industries and engineering designs for effecting environmental clean-ups including sewage treatment and industrial effluent control.

The president emphasised the need for clean and well planned community where adequate disposal of domestic wastes were properly managed adding that rivers should carry no oily effluent and hazardous industrial or human wastes.

An investigation carried out recently showed that most oil producing and marketing companies operating in the country are yet to update their oil spill contingency plans for 1985 to ensure adequate stockpile of spill control equipment and other combat measures.

Oil spilled in the country's offshore and on shore areas between 1970 and 1983 amounted to 1,711,354.6 barrels. Of this figure, 32,365.27 barrels were spilled in 1983 compared with 150 barrels recorded in a single spill in 1970.

The net volume loss, after recoveries, was about 284,650 barrels between 1971-75 from 347 oil spill incidents, with 1975 recording 128 spills, the highest number during the five-year period.

Although, 59 spills were recorded in 1973, the net volume loss amounted to 95,580 barrels.

CSO: 3400/1137

NIGERIA

ROMANIA PLEDGES AGRICULTURAL AID

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 2 Sep 85 p 24

[Article by Ted Odogwu]

[Text]

ROMANIAN Government has indicated its preparedness to assist Nigeria in her current campaign to revolutionise the agricultural sector in order to ensure continuous bumper harvests.

This fact was disclosed by the country's charge D' Affairs, Mr. Vasile Stoian while addressing a press conference held at its embassy in Ikoyi recently to mark Romania's 41st Anniversary celebration.

Mr. Stoian stated that what is been awaited now is for the Federal Government to reciprocate its gesture to enable it ship in the necessary machinery and equipment.

He however pointed out that Romania's agriculture has been undergoing continuous process of development and modernization based on priority programmes aimed at increasing soil fertility at any

weather condition.

Furthermore, he remarked that Romania has achieved a tremendous success in its farming operation while ploughing, sowing, and harvesting have been fully mechanized.

All these experiences, and many more in agro related projects will be shared with Nigeria and possibly transfer the technological know how to enable Nigeria achieve that same success, Mr. Stoian declared.

What Romania is asking the Federal Government of Nigeria to provide for now is land and seedlings for experimentation purposes Mr. Stoian further declared.

Already, Mr. Stoian disclosed that Romania is engaged in a small scale agricultural project with Cross River and Kwara states respectively but is now seeking a large scale participation in Nigeria's agricultural development programmes.

CSO: 3400/1136

NIGERIA

LABOR CONGRESS' ECONOMIC RECOVERY ALTERNATIVE ANALYZED

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 19 Aug 85 p 7

[Article by Ndu Ughamadu]

[Text] **THIS** is the final instalment of a four-part analysis of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) 'alternatives' to the nation's recovery. The source of the points analysed was the New Nigerian issue of July 5, 1985. Please read on.

An effective, efficient and all-purposeful defence system for a country, according to a school of thought, is a necessary condition for sustained social, political and economic development consequently, they argue, defence spending will continue to rise.

Through such an increasing expenditure, a country's defence will be ever-ready to protect its natural, material, human and technological resources against external aggression. Their demolition, according to this school, can set a country back in the position they have attained in their path to development.

Accordingly, many countries of the world have always allocated a huge proportion of their annual and development plan budgets, both in real and monetary terms to defence.

Nevertheless, so another school of thought rising defence spending is a burden rather than an engine of development and defence should never be accorded any preference. Rather, emphasis of a country, more importantly developing countries of the world, should be on the basic needs of life: food, shelter and clothing.

However, to the NLC, the country's defence spending had been quite out of proportion with our development needs. In most of the years, even after the civil war, defence spending had been higher than those on education and health combined.

The Congress observed that in 1978/79, after the civil war, the Federal Government's expenditure to the health sector was ₦569.6 million, while defence had ₦1,474.6 million including internal security and that defence spending remained above one billion naira in 1980 while that for the health sector was never much above ₦400 million in the same period.

The NLC did not state if these expenditures to the sectors listed had been commensurate with the results they have achieved

or not. This is necessary because I have always emphasised the need for measuring achievement of sectors in terms of extent they have gone with the various projects money was voted for (real term achievement) rather than measurement based on volume of expenditure only.

Strength

Nonetheless, I agree with the NLC on the need for caution on defence spending by government which they contended had been rising over and above expenditure on some vital sectors like education and health.

Surely, defence spendings over the years in the country have been on the upward trend because of principally preparing our forces against external aggression, precisely from our neighbouring countries: Benin, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea and Niger.

These preparations take the form of military manpower development, armament purchase, capital development like barracks and so on.

The second reason, is the country's continental responsibilities mainly in form of maintaining peace, waging wars and fighting apartheid in Southern Africa.

However, the most important of these, is readiness against any incursion from our neighbouring countries. But this can be achieved by a small-size army that can match the strength of our neighbours military forces and at a less cost.

For example, statistics published recently, by the London International Institute of strategic studies shows that Nigeria's armed forces number 133,000, Benin 3,000, Equatorial Guinea 1,550, Cameroun 7,300 and Niger 2,000. With

some foreign military personnel supplementing the military strength of almost all these countries.

Even the number of Nigeria's troops surpasses those of all the neighbouring countries combined. Taking cognizance of the fact that a huge proportion of our defence spending goes to the maintenance of these troops, there is the need for more trimming of this number to allow for more resources for the development of other more vital sectors like health.

For example, "World Military and Social Expenditure 1983", reported that public expenditure per capita on the military in Nigeria is N25, Public expenditure per soldier N13,059, and public expenditure per capita on health is N5.80.

Contributions

Writing on defence spending in the country a New Nigerian columnist, Malam Mohammed Haruna in the March 8, 1985 issue of the paper said that the country's average expenditure on defence, "comes to about 2.5 per cent of our GNP which was N66.5 billion in 1980.

Yet the total GNP of our four neighbours for the same year was N7.7 billion" This he added, was hardly capable of sustaining any army that can ever threaten us.

As regards the country's continental defence responsibilities, it does not necessarily require grooming a large army since we can hardly go to these countries to do the fighting ourselves. For example, the probability is less than one that we shall ever go to South Africa and start fighting the minority regime there against apartheid with our military forces.

Rather, what these countries need are food and other relief materials in addition to our making contributions to OAU or other organisations in Africa regularly and punctually as we have been noted for. Through this, some of their problems can be solved. Nigeria can also help these countries through appealing to other African countries to always live to their financial obligations to the OAU and other organisations.

The NLC should stress more on the paramount need for emphasis on internal security in the country, especially police and prison services.

The police sub-sector for instance, needs more

attention in form of increasing their strength and equipping them with more sophisticated weapons to cope with the increasing wave of crimes in our society.

Unfortunately, the men of the underworld our police are "battling" with, have now started using heavy and sophisticated weapons, posing a more challenging task for our police.

Also most of the country's prisons are congested with inmates, most of them criminals. This sub-sector like the police, needs more monetary allocations that can match their expansion and other basic requirements.

"However, to the NLC, the country's defence spending had been quite out of proportion with our development needs. In most of the years, even after the civil war, defence spending had been higher than those on education and health combined.

The Congress observed that in 1978/79, after the civil war, the Federal Government's expenditure to the health sector was ₦569.6 million, while defence had ₦1,474.6 million including internal security and that defence spending remained above one billion naira in 1980 while that for the health sector was never much above ₦400 million in the same period".

CSO: 3400/1138

NIGERIA

FUNDS EARMARKED FOR 5th DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 19 Aug 85 p 16

[Article by Ndu Ughamadu]

[Text]

A TOTAL planned expenditure of N65 billion is to be spent by the Federal Government under the Fifth National Development Plan, 1986-1990, taking off next year.

This figure was released by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Professor Tam David-West, in a gold medal lecture in Lagos last week.

He stressed that oil revenue expectation was the most important element in the country's national development effort.

Professor David-West contended that in the first national development plan, 1962-68, two billion naira was earmarked, in the second plan, 1975-80, N43.3 billion and the fourth plan 1981-85 N82 billion.

Comparing the marketing practices of OPEC member-nations, in another development, the Minister reveal-

ed that in the month of June and July this year, all OPEC countries, with the exception of Algeria, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela produced above their officially assigned ceiling.

Professor David-West identified seven OPEC member-countries that were involved in barter or counter trade deals as Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE).

On spot sales of crudes and condensates, the minister declared that six OPEC member-countries were culprits. He said these countries were Algeria, Gabon, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE.

He stressed that Nigeria would gain more by its continued membership of OPEC then quitting adding: "OPEC has demonstrated since the inception of this administration its readiness to understand Nigeria's current economic problem."

NIGERIA

FOOD WASTAGE HINDERS AGRICULTURAL DRIVE

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 19 Aug 85 p 7

[Article by Vicky Ngozi Ikeano]

[Text]

NIGERIAN textile manufacturers are getting worried over the increase, in recent months, in the smuggling of textile products into the country.

Mr. B. K. V. Murthy, a director of Texton Industries (Nig) Limited told the Business Times that Nigerian textile mills now face a lot of difficulties in selling their finished products in the market. He said that there are a lot of "Chinese silk", Korean textile products that could be found in the Nigerian markets now.

Mr. Murthy recalled that before the recent wave of smuggling, Nigerian fabrics found ready market. That was when the anti-smuggling measures of the Federal Military Government were effective.

The General Manager/Director of Enpee Industries (Nig) Limited, Dr. O. P. Pahuja, said that the smuggled textile goods are in the open markets for every one to see. For the first time in recent months, he said his company had unsold stock in its stores. Nigerian textile industry is presently going through a difficult period

reminiscent of 1980 when smuggled textile products nearly crippled it.

Dr. Pahuja said that the influx of the Nigerian market by "Chinese silk" and Korean products pose a formidable threat to Nigeria's textile industry in spite of the fact that the mills operate at below that their installed capacity.

Mr. Oludotun Ilo, the general manager of Nigerian Textile Mills, Ikeja, showed the Business Times, some smuggled textiles, which he said the company bought in the market. He said that, the goods were smuggled into the country from Niger and Cameroun republics where he said, there are no import restrictions.

Textile merchants in these countries, he said have no foreign exchange problems, since according to him, their currencies were at par with the French franc.

Mr Ilo said that he showed the smuggled textile goods mainly African print, to the Internal Affairs Minister, Major-General M. Magoro when he visited NTM recently.

The production manager of Woollen and Synthetic Textile Manufacturers Limited, Ikeja, Mr. C. V. Ramasivamy, said that the anti-smuggling measures were very effective when they were introduced initially.

He said that his company produces on orders from dealers. Feed backs from the dealers, he said, were that the foreign fabrics were enjoying more patronage.

However, preference for the foreign fabrics was not traceable to superior quality over local ones. Mr.

Ramasivamy said that the situations has become more feverish as the purchasing power of members of the public continue to fall as a result of the economic situation in the country, in which case, buying of clothes was no longer done on frequent basis.

The production manager was optimistic that with the approach of moslem festivals and Christmas, sales might pick up, after which sales would drop again.

Nigerian textile manufacturers, in the face of smuggling, are still optimistic

about the potentials of the Nigerian market. Mr. Murthy, said that the Nigerian market was still dynamic. He noted that textile technology in Nigeria has reached a level it can compete effectively with that of any other country, given the necessary inputs.

Machines used by Nigerian textile mills are just the same if not better than those of the sources of smuggled fabrics he added. He said the industry has highly trained and efficient manpower to produce high quality textile products.

Speaking for his company, Mr. Murthy, said that many of his machines lie idle because there were no sufficient raw materials to keep them running. This year, for instance, he said, the company received import licence sufficient only for 22 per cent of the company's installed capacity.

CSO: 3400/1138

NIGERIA

IITA DEVELOPS NEW FARMING TECHNOLOGY

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 19 Aug 85 p 16

[Text]

SCIENTISTS at the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) Ibadan has come out with a dependable farming method, "alley cropping", which is an alternative to shifting cultivation that allows a farm land to stay several years unutilised.

A communication's associate at the institute, Mr. Taye Babaleye, told newsmen at Ibadan last week that this new technology would make land more productive for farmers in Nigeria and the continent at large.

Alley cropping is simply the planting of food crops in between rows of leguminous trees or shrubs whose leaves are periodically slashed to supply nutrients into the soil.

In addition, it is a low-input soil management technology

that can sustain crop production where farmers cannot afford expensive inputs and where increasing pressure on land does not favour the age-long shifting cultivation. Nonetheless, alley cropping retains the same features of bush fallow.

Three scientists at the institute, Drs. B. T. Kang, G. F. Wilson and T. L. Lawson, said that the trees and shrubs in the alley farming provide green manure or mulch for companion food crops. In this way, plant nutrients are recycled for deeper soil layers.

A major advantage of alley cropping over the traditional shifting cultivation and bush fallow system is that cropping and fallow phases can take place concurrently on the same land, thus allowing the farmer to crop for an extended period without returning the land to bush fallow.

In the Savannah region of Benue State which is noted

for yam production, alley cropping has been introduced. Besides, the root and tuber improvement programme of the institute in an effort to strengthen its yam seedlings distribution system to members of Nigerian Seed Yam Growers Association has ordered for thousands of specially manufactured perforated water resistant fibre board containers from the Ikeja based Original Box Co. Ltd.

These containers will also be used for yam propagation and transport to other yam farmers in Africa. These containers will be given to farmers at the beginning of planting season or earlier, and will be retained by the farmers for evaluation of their produce during harvest.

With this development, the storage problem being encountered by Nigerian farmers, more importantly, during planting and harvesting seasons will be minimised.

CSO: 3400/1139

NIGERIA

CONSUMER GOODS IMPORT FIGURES RELEASED

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 26 Aug 85 p 7

[Text] Some N2,656.7 million worth of consumer goods were imported into the country last year, according to figures released by the Central Bank of Nigeria. This represents a decrease of N1,044 million or 28.21 per cent over the consumer goods imports for 1983 which amounted to N3,700.3 million.

The consumer goods imports for last year was 416 per cent of total imports for the year. Total imports for 1984 stood at N7,178.3 million.

A breakdown of the consumer goods imports for the year showed that durable good took up N632.5 million and non-durable goods N2,024.2 million.

Capital goods and raw materials imports for 1984 totalled N4,500.5 million, representing 58.3 per cent of the aggregate imports for last year and a decrease of 13.36 per cent over the capital goods and raw materials imports for 1983. Specifically, capital goods imports for last year amounted to N2,637.2 million and raw materials N1,863.3 million.

An itemised breakdown of the imports for 1984 show that food and live animals imports took up N1,052.1 million, beverage and tobacco seven million naira, animals and vegetable oils and fats N84.9 million and chemicals N852.3 million.

Others are crude materials N143.5 million, mineral fuels N111.3 million, manufactured goods N1,241.7 million, machinery and transport equipment N3,256.6 million.

According to the Central Bank, imports of "miscellaneous manufactured articles" took up N418.3 million and "miscellaneous transactions unclassified" N10.6 million.

CSO: 3400/1137

NIGERIA

FEASIBILITY OF CONTINENTAL OIL COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 26 Aug 85 p 7

[Article by Ndu Ughamadu]

[Text] The Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Professor Tam David-West, a few days ago, delivered a 55-page gold medal lecture at the Eko Holiday Inn, Lagos, on "Perspectives of the Nigerian Oil Industry."

The lecture which a colleague described as a professorial dissertation was to a large extent very comprehensive that many doubts, unanswered questions and some arguments about the oil industry, were demolished in it.

Since the country's oil industry can hardly be divorced from the global oil scene and other related energy issues, the minister's presentation, therefore, went beyond the Nigerian perspective of the industry.

What caught the eye of this writer and a few others most, in the professor's lecture, was among others, his assertion that preliminary contacts had been made with oil producing countries in Africa with a view to having a continental forum for consultation, dialogue and meaningful co-operation. "It is our hope that this will lead to a continental organisation of African producers," he declared.

This comment deserves some attention for some reasons. First, the gist came from the minister himself who in recent times had undertaken some continental oil assignments. He was voted unanimously to represent the African zone in the newly formed OPEC Ministerial Executive Council. Also voted as a member of the OPEC Committee on Price Differentials. With these, he might have seen how feasible and realistic the coming into force of a continental body is.

Secondly, suggestions for a continental body had been made by some African oil producing countries in the past without effectualising their words into action.

Thirdly, formation of the co-operation, involves two groups in Africa: OPEC African members and non-OPEC producers.

Fourthly, OPEC implicitly recognises the dynamic role of oil bodies or blocks of which some of its members belong as will be seen later.

Ordinally, about nine countries for now are major producers of crude oil in Africa namely: Algeria, Angola, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Tunisia and Zaire. The OPEC members are: Algeria, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.

A striking feature of all these African countries is that they are also exporters of crude oil. The formation of a continental co-operation, no doubt, will enhance their bargaining power in the oil market.

For another reason, most of the crudes of these countries are under the light grade category and contain little sulphur. These qualities, generate high demand for the crudes in the market.

With the formation of OPEC in 1960 it has remained the strongest Third World Organisation. Within OPEC, however, there are four unofficial blocs. The Arab, African, Latin American and Far Eastern.

Members of the Arab bloc for example, are United Arab Emirate, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar with Iran taking sides with them. The African bloc is made up of Algeria, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.

This shows that Algeria and Libya belong to two unofficial blocs. But when it comes to policy matters in OPEC, they always identify themselves with other Arab member-countries because of their membership of an Arab body known as the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting countries (OAPEC) formed in 1968 with the aim of coordinating member-countries' activities in the oil industry.

Though many OAPEC members are in OPEC and some non-members like Egypt, however, OAPEC, for sure, has remained a strong link among the Arab oil producers. Since this has not wrecked OPEC, the possibility of a continental oil body doing so, as some have put forward, is very remote.

This argument is necessary, though OAPEC is not a continental body, because its aims are virtually the same as that of a continental body. It stands, therefore, that a continental body will bring unification to OPEC because issues to be discussed relate to the oil market.

More importantly, through it, non-OPEC African producers can bring their price and production structures in line with those of OPEC. Some of these countries, buyers still dictate to them prices they pay for their crudes. They can always get the cooperation of OPEC in putting a stoppage to this exploitation through a continental body.

Moreover, many African non-OPEC producers had shown interest in the activities of OPEC in the past because they know that the success of the Organisation is indirectly theirs. For instance, Egypt had on few occasions attended OPEC meetings as an observer so are some other oil producing Third World Countries.

Non-co-operation of African oil producers had on a few occasions in the past virtually brought OPEC conference deliberations to an abrupt and inconclusive end because of divergent stance by the various OPEC African light crude producers on price differentials. If a continental forum were to be existing, matters like this would have been resolved before coming to the meeting. This will also save OPEC more time for other burning issues.

There are other benefits to be derived from such a continental co-operation. It would assist other developing countries in Africa in particular in securing development aids with soft interest rates and other favourable terms. This is possible through setting up a special fund for development by the continental body.

Such a co-operation would also bolster Africa's voice and position in international economic co-operation agreements.

Nevertheless, there is an obstacle some energy observers have envisaged to the formation of this continental body. This centres on getting the African OPEC members of need for such a forum. How they are going to share their loyalty is a puzzling question to these observers.

This is only a minor problem since they have always co-operated in some other developing nation's organisations apart from OPEC. Against this background, there is every possibility that they would show positive interest in the continental body. This is a sure hope indeed.

Since preliminary contacts for the continental co-operation are on now, it is my considered opinion that initially its membership should include only African OPEC producers. The essence of this is to lay solid foundation for others to come in, all geared toward achieving a solid and dynamic body.

Crudes are finite resources, therefore, African countries endowed with these should ensure that maximum benefits are derived from them through among others, high bargaining power.

This can be meaningfully achieved through the formation of an African Petroleum Exporting Countries, which existence has been shown to be both feasible and realistic.

It should be emphasised that the limit of any continental bodies or other groups that OPEC member-countries belong to or are trying to form, should include that they would not do any thing that should wreck OPEC, nor discuss issues that are counter-productive to the objectives of the Organisation.

CSO: 3400/1137

NIGERIA

TEXTILE SMUGGLING INCREASING

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 19 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Jackson Imafidon]

[Text]

UNLESS the various governments take drastic measures to arrest the situation immediately (which is impossible in the short-run) much of this year's anticipated abundant food harvest resulting from the current agricultural drive, would be wasted as a result of inadequate storage and preservation methods.

Indeed, the problem of inadequate storage facilities has been the bane of our agricultural planning and this inadequacy further depresses our food supplies.

Investigations show that over three billion naira worth of agricultural produce is lost in the country each year due to post-harvest spoilage. The loss from yams tops the list as between 3.75 million and 5.1 million tonnes of harvested yams is lost every year.

In naira terms, the lost according to experts at the National Root Crops Research Institute (NRCRI) is valued at between N2.4 billion and N3.3 billion. The spoilage in percentage terms, according to the experts is 25 per cent to 30 per cent of harvested yams.

The yam spoilage emanate from rot, pest and disease infestation. Yams are attacked by diseases and pests in the field and in storage. Such pests include 'root knot nematodes,' 'yam nematodes' and beetles.

Cultivation

Nigeria is the world's largest producer of yams as she accounts for 74.3 per cent of the world's total yam production. About 1.33 million hectares of land are under yam cultivation in the country and these produce between 15 million and 17 million tonnes per year, with an average yield of 9.2 tonnes per hectare. The yield is equivalent between N9.75 billion and N11.05 billion yams yearly.

Thus it has been asserted that Nigeria has the potential for exporting yams to other countries. Apart from the African continent, the millions of Africans and blacks in Europe and America provide ready markets for our yams abroad if suitably packaged and processed.

Yams are eaten in cooked form, fried, roasted or pounded. Yam flour, 'elubo' is reconstituted into 'fufu,' 'amala' in some parts of the country.

In these austere times, many people have taken to eating roasted yams. Roadside roasted yam sellers have become a common sight in both residential and industrial areas, with a large slice of yam selling for 50 kobo.

However, in spite of the fact that we are the world's largest producer of yams, national supply, according to statistics falls short of demand by 1.62 million tonnes, equivalent to ₦1.05 billion. Among the factors responsible for this shortfall is the heavy losses in storage due to environmental and physiological issues as well as attacks by pests and diseases.

Experts

With regard to the problem of storage, storing of whole and uninjured tubers in shaded barns made rodent proof to be successful and experts project that storage losses can be cut down by 30 per cent which is equivalent to a saving of ₦750 million annually.

For cassava, the crop is facing menacing threats from the common insect pests: the cassava mealy bug (CMB) and the 'green spider mite' (GSM). These result in the loss of about 60 per cent and 40 per cent of cassava roots and planting materials respectively. Experts put the monetary loss at about ₦700 million per year.

Cassava is an important carbohydrate staple food which supplies 70 per cent of the daily calorie intake of over 50 million Nigerians and of which Nigeria is the fourth largest producer in the world with an average yearly production of ten million tonnes.

Consumption

However, the statistics show an increasing shortage when projected

demand is matched with production. In 1983/84 12 million tonnes of cassava valued at ₦1.2 billion was produced. This was in contrast to the 24 million tonnes projected demand, representing a shortfall of 12 million tonnes for the season. In the 1982/83 season the deficit was 11 million tonnes.

The cassava yield potential according to experts is 50 tonnes per hectare. However cassava yield in most of the farmers' plot is ten tonnes per hectare or 20 per cent of the potential yield, representing a staggering loss of one billion naira. The reduction is attributable to among other factors, pests and diseases.

Cassava can be processed into garri, tapioca, garri flour and cassava flour for consumption as well as cassava starch for industrial use.

With respect to Irish potatoes of which Nigeria's annual production is estimated at 200,000 tonnes valued at ₦200 million, pests and diseases infestation are yet, constraints to production. "Blight" is said to be endemic in most potato growing areas causing up to 60 per cent reduction in yield.

Preservation

Up to 30 per cent of the potato harvest, it is gathered is lost in storage while more than 50 per cent of seed potato stored by farmers under their conditions is said to be lost between the time the crop is harvested and the next planting season. The loss therefrom is put at 100,000 tonnes or one hundred million naira.

In the fisheries sub-sector about 30 per cent to 35 per cent of what is caught is wasted due to poor preservation methods. Fish spoilage in 1983 is put at 501,119 tonnes valued at ₦112.76 million.

On the average, experts projects that Nigeria loses about N70 million yearly as a result of fish spoilage caused by insect infestation and poor preservation.

All in all, experts project that about 30 per cent of the food produced in the country is lost to crop spoilage.

Production

The losses are particularly irksome as they widen the food supply and demand situation, compound shortages thereby making the national goal of self-sufficiency in food production seemingly illusory.

According to one consumer, the government should declare a 'war' on these pests and insects that wreck havoc on agricultural produce, an issue that is of vital importance to the populace.

However, the Research Institutes, are said to be tackling the spoilage problems. It is gathered that research to contain pests and diseases both in the field and in storage would increase yam production by over 20 per cent or N1.87 billion while research to reduce storage losses by selecting yam varieties with long storability would save the country between N1.2 billion and N1.6 billion annually.

According to officials in the Science and Technology Ministry, the development and use of resistant cassava varieties, pesticides and the application of biological control methods are yielding good dividends in the fight against cassava pests.

For fisheries, the Research Institutes have developed smoking kilns for quick drying of fish to prevent spoilage. Also areas noted for high fish production are being provided with cold storage/ice making facilities and smoking kilns by the Federal Department of Fisheries.

Wastage

Another notable research effort aimed at alleviating the problem of crop spoilage is the use of "inert atmosphere in silos" for long term storage of maize, sorghum, cowpeas and groundnuts. Experts say the grains can be stored for up to three years whilst still retaining their quality with the method.

All of the above efforts notwithstanding, there is no gainsaying the fact that the food spoilage and wastage for this year would be enormous. And this is not anything to cheer about especially in this austere times when consumers want to be as economical as ever.

CSO: 3400/1138

NIGERIA

LAGOS PORTS TRAFFIC DROPS

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 26 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

NIGERIA'S busiest ports, Apapa and Tin Can Island, recorded an aggregate drop in cargo traffic during the first half of this year.

A total of 3,622,349 tonnes of traffic was handled from January to June this year as against 4,796,889 tonnes recorded within the same period last year.

Traffic figures, at the Lagos ports, though had the traffic at the container terminal added unto it, still fell below the figure for the corresponding period for last year when figures from the terminal were not included.

The decline was a disappointment because of the

ship-bunch at the Lagos ports during the first four months of this year. At the Apapa and associated areas from January to June this year, a total of 2.5 million tonnes of Cargo were handled as against 3,812,991 tonnes recorded within the same period last year.

Out of this traffic, imports accounted for 2.4 million tonnes while exports within the period were 91,211 tonnes.

The situation was slightly different at the Tin Can Island port where the traffic increased to 1,122,439 tonnes, January to June this year, from 983,898 tonnes recorded within the same period last year.

At the container Terminal, Lagos, 20,222 tonnes of cargo were handled within the same period from 210 ships, including a traffic of 19,430 tonnes of exports.

A total of 516 vessels brought goods to Apapa ports while Tin Can Island Port had 274 ships. Of the 3,812,991 tonnes of cargo handled, as much as 3,735,982 tonnes were imports while exports accounted for a paltry tonnage of 77,009. Such was the pattern at the Tin Can Island port where imports figure stood at 964,129 tonnes and exports 19,769 tonnes.

The situation report at the ports is a testimony to the fact that there has been no significant change in the fiscal policies of the Federal Military Government. This lid on importation, Mr. M. K. Ibrahim, the managing director of the Nigeria Ports Authority, NPA, said, has adversely affected the authority's revenue expectations for the year. NPA, derives the bulk of its earnings from the volume of traffic handled at our ports.

CSO: 3400/1136

NIGERIA

LACK OF SPARE PARTS KEEP VEHICLES OFF ROAD

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 19 Aug 85 p 16

[Article by Anthony O. Asiadiachi]

[Text]

THE scarcity of motor vehicles spare parts has continued to create serious problem to the transportation system in the country despite the fact that about ~~N600~~ million was earmarked in the budget for importation of machinery and spare parts this year.

At present, in the absence of accurate statistical data, the number of vehicles in the country has been put at about one million units, consequently at an average cost of N8,000.00 per unit which represents a net vehicles asset of about N8 billion.

The problem of motor spare parts scarcity was blamed on the government's inability to provide enough import licence, though the amount issued

has been kept a secret to satisfy Nigeria's market needs. Consequent upon this many serviceable cars have been put off the roads, until spare parts are available for repairs.

Investigation, however, revealed that when spare parts were available, the average life span of commercial vehicles was put at between 4-6 years depending on whether it is a light or heavy commercial vehicle while for private cars, the average life span was put at 6 years.

For now, because of inadequate supply of spare parts, coupled with the terrible conditions of our roads, average life span has been seriously reduced.

In addition, in a situation where vehicles or enough spare parts are not being allowed into the country, understandably because of our financial situation, the existing vehicle stand the risk of being swept off the roads, sooner than later.

According to a motor spare parts dealer, ~~N200~~ million import licence will put Nigeria motor industry now on the verge of collapse on the road to fitness and save over 1.5 billion naira worth of assets. He suggested that the government should remove vehicles spare parts from general merchandise list to either a special class of its own or up grade it to raw materials class.

Government will do well by identifying well established reputable motor distributors and spare parts dealers in the country to be earmarked for the issue of import licences as distinct from motor companies existing only on paper.

The chamber of commerce and industries can assist in this and also by issuing licences to those companies identified as stockists of spare parts based on their performance in the last 5 years or more, he said.

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

EAST BLOC EASES CREDIT--Nigeria's difficulties in obtaining credits from Western banks--which will probably continue until an agreement is reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)--are being used by East Bloc countries, filling the ensuing gaps through deliveries for which they offer financing at the same time. According to the Afrika-Verein in Hamburg, Bulgaria recently offered a 120-dollar credit line [sic] for the purchase of Bulgarian agricultural and water supply equipment. In addition, two Bulgarian trade firms will also supply training and educational material in the amount of \$42 million. An agreement on a Hungarian credit line of \$120 [sic] was concluded, and also a total package in the amount of \$45 million offered by Czechoslovakia. The GDR, which in 1983 had offered a credit of \$290 million to finance construction of a machine tool foundry, is negotiating a blanket credit line of \$100 million. A barter deal on the purchase of cocoa and other agricultural "cash crops" may also be concluded. The Afrika-Verein also reports that Nigeria is increasingly effecting oil deliveries as barter deals. It is said that Italian state-owned ENI has concluded a purchasing agreement in the amount of \$400 million for delivery of goods. The French ELF is also mentioned in connection with barter deals. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German 9 Aug 85 p 2] 9917

CSO: 3420/83

SENEGAL

COMMENTATORS FOCUS ON FREEDOM OF PRESS

Discussions Key to Healthy Future

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 8-30 Aug 85 p 2

[Commentary by Sidy Lamine Niass "For a Free Press"]

[Text] People often talk about the nobility of certain professions such as that of teachers or doctors, but never--or at least only rarely--of journalism. But in reality, what is more noble in all of history and in all corners of the world than educating, informing, and entertaining? The press is often the mirror of a society, a generation, within a given environment. We will never tire of stressing its importance. Unfortunately, its defects are as substantial as its virtues, and in a country such as ours the situation conspires generally to encourage the former.

Reality falls far short of the ideal. From what we can see, the press tries not so much to reflect the aspirations of the broadest possible mass, but rather to be the vehicle of personal ideas or those of a tiny coterie. It is a press which tries to transmit and impose anger or personal sentiments.

The work of the journalist ceases to be exclusively personal from the moment when he agrees to make everyone a part of it. From the moment when he agrees to be an observer, to note the facts, report them, and when necessary analyze them with both heart and mind, in a sincere way.

The idea is a grand one. It is a difficult responsibility to shoulder, given the temptations of every kind. However, this is the journalist's duty. Independence, for the journalist, is often a great word because he knows its price. Independence vis-a-vis political authorities, independence vis-a-vis the wealthy, as well as any kind of power that could interfere with the process of discovering and disseminating the news.

Unfortunately, the art of criticism is difficult to exercise in a country where, despite a high percentage of intellectuals, freedom of opinion has not reached the level desired. Must one always apologize for the authorities to avoid being accused of being an opponent? Must the opposition see as a puppet of the regime anyone who acknowledges its good points? Is it no longer possible to criticize with an independent mind?

Certainly not. The future of the press in Senegal lies in its diversity. Diversity of publications, diversity of opinions. It should be protected and treasured, as it is a sign of the existence of democracy in Senegal.

If the government notes that the press publishes unfactual news, it must bear part of the responsibility for this. With a sector so vulnerable, where investments yield little or no profits, the government should not stand idly by; rather it should help people to respect their independence and integrity, give them access so they can find the information they seek, instead of numbing them with communiques and statements of which they have good reason to be suspicious.

Finally, the challenge of a good press is one that should be met by the state as well as journalists. The alternative may be that journalists lose face while the state faces a permanent threat to its stability. The mere formulation of the problem is already a step forward (see our article [below] about the conference on "The Institutional System of the Press in Senegal and the Organs of Censorship"), and now it is time to move ahead, with the goal of seeing truth prevail in every publication.

Rights, But Also Duties

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 8-30 Aug 85 pp 8-10

[Article by Youssoupha Ndiaye]

[Text] "If Senegal has problems--and it does--freedom of opinion does not seem to be one of them." It was with this quotation from President Abdou Diouf, upon his return from the Courts and Tribunals of 1984-1985, that Mr Djibril Samb on 2 August began his introductory remarks at the Hotel Teranga at the conference on "The Institutional System of the Press in Senegal and the Organs of Censorship," a conference organized by the Press Club. However equivocal the subject might seem, investigator Djibril Samb carried it off well. All the way through he was sedate and thoughtful, able to keep the discussions dispassionate, avoid polemics and keep the discussions on a scientific plane.

It is perhaps somewhat disappointing that he focused so exclusively on the legislative language concerning the press, without concerning himself excessively with the way in which freedom of the press and the right of journalists to keep the public informed are actually encountered every day by working professionals. This, one might say, was the only gap in his presentation, which without doubt was a veritable feast of information.

The information was that we have a liberal press system. This system is expressed in the institutionalized freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of opinion, without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, skin color or religion. In addition, it is stipulated in Article 11 of the penal code that all one needs to do to publish a journal is to sign a statement of publication with the public prosecutor's office. But this freedom of the press is subject to certain obligations which amount to restrictions. These limits, however, are legal, according to Mr Samb, for they are tied to public order and to the

protection of the dignity of the individual. This is the case with regard to libel (there have been innumerable libel trials) and civil damages.

Right of Response

In cases of libel or civil injury involving a newspaper, who is criminally responsible? The first responsibility lies with the managing editor. In his absence it lies with the author of the offending article. If he has disappeared, the publishing company or the printer can be charged. This caused Mr Samb to remark that this could be called "trickle-down" responsibility. Such a phenomenon is not found in matters of moral responsibility where the journalist is protected.

In addition to these restrictions, there are two other exceptions to freedom of the press. The first is contained in Article 47 of the constitution, which permits the president to assume full control of the press in case of need. The second exception is found in Article 58, which is applicable in case of state of siege or emergency. These exceptions in no way detract from the liberal press system, adds Mr Samb. They are explained by the fact that, like any liberal system, ours is regulated.

The regulation of freedom of the press includes the right of correction accorded to the guardians of public order if the news is reported incorrectly. As for the right of response, it is a general concept which may be invoked by any individual or corporate entity that has been named or mentioned. Along with the right of response, the legislative authority has also established a right of further reply that is of a preventive character, and is intended to raise the moral standards of the profession. Our ethical training urges us to raise the moral standards of the profession and protect the morality of our youth, said Mr Samb.

In concluding the first portion of his presentation, Mr Samb said he believes that the institutional system of the press in Senegal is a regulated liberal system, and, because it is regulated, it is protected. The organs of censorship, the second part of his presentation, are there for that reason. Of the four organs of censorship, only two are functioning. These are the the commissions for control of press organs aimed at young people and in the national language. The latter has nevertheless an "illiberal" character, he said, and therefore the "decree establishing it should be abrogated."

Before opening the meeting to discussion, Mr Djibril Samb said that "even though we have a liberal system, it is even more liberal in practice. This ultra-liberal character has engendered a certain backsliding by the press. Three measures need to be taken, we think, to prevent an unduly dangerous slippage, and among these is a redefinition of the journalistic profession."

In the discussions which followed, Mr Samb was showered with both praise and criticism. He was reproached for having ignored audiovisual media and confining himself merely to the written press. Mr Samb's response: "I was not trying to sweep anything under the rug. This presentation, as stated in the theme of the conference, was devoted to the press taken in the strict sense of the word, that is the written press. At some other time I might study the audiovisual media in as detailed a fashion as I have the written press." Does the

Senegalese press reflect the various currents of thought existing in our country? Yes, says Mr Samb, "and if you want proof look at the newspaper kiosks." If all these freedoms exist, why are the Islamic journals ignored in the press reviews? "That is not normal," he replied, just as respect for the religious convictions of others does not allow one to make targets of them. As for the right of ORTS [Senegal Radio and television Broadcasting Office] to respond, it is not recognized by the legislature and is a lacuna, one which the director of information will certainly have noted.

The thorniest issue was about Senegal's independent radio stations. They are not contemplated in the law, explains Mr Samb, but all the same "I am for them. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that French law did not authorize the existence of independent television stations until 1981." The growth of audiovisual technology being such as it is, it goes without saying that one day it may force the hand of the nation's authorities, as it did in France.

The debates, like the presentation, were instructive, and the personality of the chairman, his able repartee and his investigative style--though young he is practiced--certainly counted for something. Conferences of this intellectual caliber should be held more often.

9516

CSO : 3419/521

SOUTH AFRICA

PERCY QOBOZA SAYS TIME RUNNING OUT FOR GOVERNMENT

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 1 Sep 85 p 5

[Commentary by Percy Qoboza in column "Percy's Itch"]

[Text]

WE are in a state of chaos.

Of this there is no doubt at all.

For all who have eyes to see and ears to hear, the agony all of us are going through is probably unprecedented in the history of this land.

Yet, over and over again, the Government refuses to recognise, or honestly evaluate, the root causes of our problems.

They stick to their stereotyped guns – namely, that at the root of the endemic unrests stand agitators who are playing havoc with people's lives.

As long as that analysis of our problems remains the pillar of their beliefs – or their cop-out – the crises will linger on.

One is heartened amid all the gloom and despondency by the growing voices of reason coming from leaders in the business sector.

It reaffirms strongly the things we have been saying to this government for at least three decades.

The latest to enter the debate is none other than Dr Anton Rupert, who owns the giant Rembrandt group.

Speaking to the Press in Cape Town this week, he said: "Time has run out".

"This is the Government's final opportunity to correct past wrongs and introduce the sort of reforms the country is strongly signalling it needs so urgently."

Dr Rupert pointed out the Government had ignored the warnings of Sharpeville and the Soweto riots in 1976.

He warned they could not afford to do the same with the current unrest.

Anglo American chief Gavin Relly was quick to point out that the present poor state of the economy was caused by political and not economic factors.

"Any economic measures the authorities may introduce will have no more than a short to medium term effect unless they are also accompanied by a new political dispensation," he said.

Adding to their voices, comes the collective statement by organised commerce and industry urging the Government to reverse the present political crisis "by negotiating with all *acceptable* black leaders *including* those in jail".

The emphasis on both "acceptable" and "including" are my own – because I am particularly impressed that at last this message has gone through the heads of people.

I have been knocking my head on a wall trying to convince the Government and many of their supporters that negotiation with the appointed leaders of Pretoria is futile and endangers the security of us all.

These leaders do not represent the genuine interests of their communities and they enjoy nothing but scorn from the people they represent – or allege to represent.

That businessmen have by their own free will – based of course on self-interest and admittedly a late awakening – have set in motion a possible face-to-face discussion with the African National Congress, is cause for hope.

The meetings, which I hope for and genuinely encourage, are due to be held in Lusaka in the next few weeks.

We sincerely hope that they will convey what they hear there to State President PW Botha, with all the

forcefulness and urgency they can muster.

The state is too busy gambling away the lives and future of our people – for no prize but the paltry payment of five by-elections.

They must proceed to meet the appeal of organised commerce and industry to negotiate with *acceptable* leaders of the community – *including* those in jail.

I must add, lifting the bans on black political movements and deregulating black politics will go a hell of a long way to create a climate conducive to all men and women to tackle our crisis in a purposeful way.

Time, unfortunately, is a critical element.

CSO: 3400/1143

SOUTH AFRICA

BOESAK SEES GOVERNMENT 'IMPRISONED IN OWN POLITICAL CHAINS'

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 2 Sep 85 pp 120-121

[Interview with Rev Allan Boesak conducted by SPIEGEL staffer Paul M. Schumacher at Boesak's residence in Capetown, Jul 85: "'The Whites Will Find the Country Collapsing Around Them'"]

[Text] Allan Boesak, 39, president of the Reformed World Federation, to which 55 million people in 143 churches belong, is a patron of the United Democratic Front (UDF) civil rights movement, as is Bishop Tutu of Johannesburg. Three days after his interview with DER SPIEGEL, Boesak was arrested at a roadblock near Capetown. Emergency law permits him to be held in custody "for an indeterminate period of time."

[Question] Pastor Boesak, you've faced students and made the promise to turn South Africa upside down. How do you imagine this happening?

[Answer] We are turning South Africa upside down in a symbolic sense by holding mass demonstrations involving many thousands of people. According to the law as it currently exists, two people who meet each other already constitute a seditious gathering. Those of us from the United Democratic Front (UDF) have decided to break such laws intentionally.

[Question] Is this an aspect of the civil disobedience also being propagated by other church representatives?

[Answer] Yes, quite definitely.

[Question] How, in your view, will the South African government react to this?

[Answer] If it reacts in the customary way, then the police and the army will appear on the scene before we are able to assemble peacefully. They act as if we wanted to set fire to all of South Africa and murder the Cabinet.

[Question] What do you want then?

[Answer] I want to have the government out of the way.

[Question] Does it seem proper, considering the way you view your official position, for a reverend to use such revolutionary talk?

[Answer] I am not speaking about revolution. I am merely repeating what this country's churches have been saying for years: We need radical social, political, and economic changes. If the church does not concern itself with these things because of continuing oppression, then we might as well close our doors. The government will have to learn how to put up with nonviolent demonstrations.

[Question] Is the black consumer boycott a method of breaking the power of the white minority?

[Answer] The consumer boycott is a useful, direct, and nonviolent action, here the Blacks are able to demonstrate their power. The pressure exerted on the economy will be transferred to the field of politics. Here we have everything under our control.

[Question] As a co-founder of the UDF you are a radical to the government. Aren't you afraid of being neutralized by those in power?

[Answer] I do have some protection. I am not unknown abroad. If the government attempts to neutralize me, it will have to pay the price internationally as well as within South Africa.

[Question] Have you taken precautions in case you're arrested?

[Answer] Yes, to be honest. Somehow, of course, the continued existence of my family needs to be guaranteed--I have four children.

[Question] There are repeated rumors about atrocities said to have been committed by the police and the military in rebellious areas since the imposition of the state of emergency. Do you possess evidence of the charge that government opponents were intentionally murdered?

[Answer] We have piles of statements from witnesses, the most terrible stories. It is extremely difficult to compile such statements because of the state of emergency. People are exceedingly afraid. The police are beyond legal recourse and they can do what they want. But for the sake of the future, we want to have a record in print of the things being done to our people during these days.

In Steytlerville, for instance, a small place in the eastern Cape, they arrested a 12-year old boy. A doctor made the determination that he died of head injuries. He had been beaten to death. His uncle was likewise picked up by the police. He was shot and killed with a pistol at a range of 15 centimeters. These are murders in cold blood.

[Question] The government claims that the unrest is being instigated by a small minority; the silent black majority, on the other hand, is supposedly glad at the protection offered by the police and the military.

[Answer] Mr Botha should try his theory out at the polls sometime. Then he'll be able to prove how much my people love him and support his policies. I

challenge Mr Botha to hold a plebiscite immediately. This will then show what we think about his police and his army. For me there is no doubt whatsoever as to what the response would be if the people could vote without fear.

[Question] Mr Boesak, what was your own initial experience of apartheid?

[Answer] I was a little boy about 5 years old. We lived at that time in a small village located in northwestern Cape Province. We hardly dared to breathe the same air as the Whites.

My father was a teacher at the local missionary school. We went into a store through the entrance for non-Whites, which was still separate at that time. It was hot, perhaps about 40 degrees. My father ordered a soda pop and the white lady handed him a bottle from the shelf. To this my father said, "But this one is warm, my son will get sick." He asked for a bottle from the refrigerator. Then the woman proprietor said, "Cold drinks are only for Whites." I often asked myself when I was older what my father must have felt at that moment in terms of anger and humiliation.

[Question] All the same, a few things have changed in South Africa since then. As you see it, what has been achieved by the reforms instituted since Pieter Willem Botha came to office?

[Answer] Well, yes, we are now able to live in certain international hotels. We are able to take our wives out, if we have enough money, to a number of wonderful restaurants.

[Question] But that really isn't all. Black trade unions were permitted...

[Answer] That came about differently. Mr Botha said: We have to make certain concessions, for example the creation of trade unions for Blacks. But the government's will was that the trade unions should only concern themselves with practical day-to-day matters. The people, however, wanted to determine themselves what kind of unions they wanted. This is why today's trade unions also see themselves as a political instrument.

[Question] Botha held out his little finger, and the people reached out for his hand?

[Answer] That was bad luck for Mr Botha.

[Question] The government has threatened to break the resistance movement aggressively. Where is this confrontation taking South Africa?

[Answer] The government is holding firmly to apartheid. It wants to assure the continuance of white power at any price. The Whites view themselves as a ruling class which wishes to decide what's best for the rest of the population. Because Mr Botha feels himself to be answerable only to the white community, and because he forgets that the majority is Black, he is a failure. The government is imprisoned in its own political chains. That makes it weak.

[Question] Have the Blacks recognized this weakness?

[Answer] The black majority possesses a will to be free, a will which can no longer be suppressed. This will cannot be broken by any form of power. I believe and I hope that now the Whites are slowly realizing that even the unrestrained force of the police and the military will no longer do any good. The state of emergency is an admission of their defeat, it is a political and moral declaration of bankruptcy.

[Question] All the same, however, most white South Africans still perceive themselves as being unaffected by the crisis.

[Answer] That shows the effectiveness of the government's propaganda on radio and television. Many newspapers are restraining themselves in making their reports, either because they are afraid of being punished or because they're afraid of alarming their white readers.

[Question] Is there still hope for saving the Whites?

[Answer] Many Whites come to me, quite astonished, and wanting to know why I'm raising such a fuss. They don't understand our dissatisfaction and they say that, after all, everything is under control. Someday, the Whites will find the entire country collapsing around them. Then they still will not have understood why things had to happen thus.

[Question] How long will there continue to be a South Africa in its present form?

[Answer] Not much longer, I think, only a few years yet. Our struggle is entering into a decisive phase, and our people have realized that they must force a decision now so that they won't have to continue living with apartheid in the next century as well.

12412

CSO: 3420/90

SOUTH AFRICA

TWO BOTHAS CLASH ON PACE, SCOPE OF CHANGE

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Sep 85 p 18

[Article by John MacLennan]

[Text] **THE** pressure for change this week had the two Bothas at apparent loggerheads as Foreign Minister Pik contradicted President Piet directly on where the blame should lie for the evils of apartheid.

In what amounts to a complete backflip on the maligned policy, the Foreign Minister confessed in an interview that the Government had seen the light and admitted it had made mistakes in legislating the rigid separation of the races.

Yet recently, in a response to an HSRC report on apartheid, President Botha pronounced himself sick and tired "of hearing how guilty the Afrikaner and the National Party are." The time had come, he said, for "this myth to be crushed once and for all."

And in his much ballyhooed speech at the Natal Congress of the National Party, President Botha came up only with vague prospects for change and the baleful warning to the outside world: "Don't push us too far."

Political academics interviewed this week would not be quoted by name and confessed they were in the dark.

But they conceded the clash in attitudes could provide credence to persistent speculation that the Cabinet is anything but unanimous on the pace and scope of change, that President Botha in fact cut the guts out of the Durban speech under pressure from conservative colleagues, and that Mr Pik Botha was mortified to discover the message had been watered down from the one he had been authorised to give foreign governments at a meeting in Vienna a few days before.

Some feel the Foreign Minister's latest statement on the subject indicates the more verligte members of the Cabinet may well be gaining the muscle they need for real change as the Government reels under the onslaught of terrific pressure for reform.

At this stage it is not just calls for change.

The Sunday Star broke the exclusive news three weeks ago that some of the country's financial giants had initiated talks with the ANC in Lusaka.

The Foreign Minister's statement is a thumbs-down to official NP policy of the last 36 years. He said: "I admit in years gone by we went too far with legislative measures and concentrated too much on fragmentation and compartmentalisation of our communities.

"We have changed our attitude in this respect. We now see clearly that we have a lot in common and instead of concentrating solely on the differences we are concentrating on what we have in common.

"And that is why we are prepared to remove measures which impair the human dignity of people based on colour, to remove racial discrimina-

tion to include communities in the decision making processes."

This could be so much pie in the pious sky, but hopeful pundits are optimistic he is reflecting some of the Government's behind-the-scenes talks and decisions towards arriving at a workable solution to the country's political and economic plight.

Also blurring the issue is the President's most recent statement to the EEC Ministers in which he said the Government is proceeding with its reform programme which will provide a political say for "all communities at all levels in matters of national or common concern." He was willing, he said, to talk to anybody on an open agenda as long as they renounced violence.

More particularly, the Government is reaping even criticism from such a traditional ally and economic luminary as Dr Anton Rupert, chairman of the massive Rembrandt Group.

At his company's annual meeting he said practices of the past may readily be weighed and found wanting by leaders engaging in negotiation in virtually every field.

Now some are even predicting that Dr Rupert may be so concerned with the economic situation that he might be persuaded to do a Tielman Roos. Political scholars will recall Britain was forced off the gold standard in 1931 and South Africa faced severe financial difficulties when the Hertzog Government refused to follow suit. Mr Roos descended from the Appeal Court bench and initiated a personal campaign which forced the Government to abandon the gold standard as well.

Other strong words from the economic sector have come in a statement by Assocom, FCI and Nafcoc.

They say unequivocally: "No real negotiation is possible without normalising the security situation through lifting the partial State of Emergency as soon as circumstances permit...equally essential is a commitment by Government

that it will deal even-handedly with the accepted leaders of the black community, even if some of these are currently in detention."

They also want the Government to provide a clear assurance that it is to move away from racial discrimination — which is exactly what Mr Pik Botha said this week.

So what's going on? Said one political academic: "It looks as if the Government is a juggler with a bunch of variables. They (Cabinet members) say what they have to when they have to. The Government is becoming increasingly aware that it has to take opinions into account... but at the same time no Government can bow to pressure."

And another: "PW has to worry about the voters. Pik has to speak to his colleagues all over the world. No wonder there are two messages."

And yet another highly reliable source this week said: "Essentially the hand at the tiller (PW Botha's) is getting progressively weaker. It is only in the last week that he has realised how seriously he has miscalculated with the Durban speech. He has had everything explode in his face. His aura is irrevocably destroyed and his own ambitions have narrowed. "As a result you now have a political vacuum at the centre. He has neither given his Cabinet colleagues more freedom, nor has he stopped them. In essence they are running around trying to stake out a bit of the turf."

He likened the situation to the last days of the Vorster regime, when Dr Connie Mulder — as Crown Prince — acted as if he were running the country.

The source predicted the President would work towards an election in two years time which the National Party would fight on his reformist policies. He would hope for a massive majority and bow out to his successor as a successful elder statesman.

SOUTH AFRICA

BUTHELEZI: CONFLICT AMONG BLACKS HINDERS LIBERATION

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 16 Aug 85 pp 5,6

[Interview with Chief Mangosuthu Gatscha Buthelezi conducted by Andreas Kohlschuetter, date and place not given: "We Must Not Destroy Ourselves"]

[Text] Chief Mangosuthu Gatscha Buthelezi is the proud leader of 6 million Zulus, the largest black tribal unit in South Africa. In the Natal Province, as chief minister of Kwazulu, he rules over the largest of those ten homelands that the apartheid regime has established for black settlement. As president of the "Inkatha" organization (1 million members) he has command of a militarily strictly organized mass movement and his own combat force armed with the traditional short spears of the legendary Zulu warriors.

The 56-year-old Buthelezi is struggling against the white apartheid system, which he is attempting to dismantle politically from within, through compromise and negotiations. Black antiapartheid activists reproach him for lacking militancy, label him "traitor" and "puppet". The predominance of the Zulus causes historical anxiety in the members of the other black tribes.

Buthelezi is a loner. Nevertheless, without the agreement of the Zulu chief, a political solution to the racial crisis in South Africa is inconceivable. In the interview Buthelezi conducts himself coolly, precisely and as convinced of himself as convincing in his argumentation. He only reluctantly allows interruptions in the flow of his speech: the Zulu ruler loves the monologue.

ZEIT: What triggered the current unrest in South Africa?

Buthelezi: The blacks are bitter because in the new constitution which went into effect last September they were quite simply shut out of the decision process in Parliament. This is a degrading situation since blacks make up 72 percent of the population. They are treated as if they did not exist. Those white South Africans who do not see the connection between the new constitution--with its tricameral parliament reserved for whites, Coloreds and Indians--and the increasing black embitterment are blind to the realities from which this latest violence stems. It is wrong when blacks express their rage

in murderous and destructive violence. It is a greater error when whites cling to a political system which excludes blacks from power, hardens their hearts and drives them to despair.

ZEIT: Was the economic recession not also a contributing factor?

Buthlezi: It is an fundamental factor. Thousands, tens of thousands of blacks have lost their jobs; many companies have been forced to close. All of that takes place against the backdrop of a 3-percent growth in black population. Half of this population is 15 years old and younger. We are not only politically, but also economically the most disadvantaged sector of the South African population.

ZEIT: What is the difference between the black uprisings of 1960 in Sharpeville, of 1976 in Soweto and today's unrest?

Buthlezi: There are in fact great differences. In the case of Sharpeville there was a peaceful mass demonstration against the racist pass laws which prohibit blacks from moving freely, settling or seeking work in South Africa. The police were quite clearly responsible for the bloodbath and the violence at that time.

In Soweto, the police fired on peacefully demonstrating black children protesting the introduction of Afrikaans as a required language of instruction. Hundreds of blacks lost their lives there. In Sharpeville and Soweto, it was a question of violence by the police and the army against black Africans.

But today we are witnesses to a confrontation which is more frightful and uglier, and precisely because blacks are killing, maiming and burning each other. Because blacks are pursuing and stoning other blacks whose businesses and houses are in ruins as "collaborators." We are witnesses to the burning alive of a young black woman by blacks, witnesses to dreadful acts of vandalism and barbaric atrocities of black South Africans. It is tragic that in the UDF (United Democratic Front, the opposition movement: editor) there are people who use the term struggle for liberation when black Africans are engaging in murder and violence against other black Africans with brutal force.

ZEIT: Do these blacks not become sacrifices to the black popular rage since they serve the white system?

Buthlezi: Still, it is a struggle of blacks against blacks. One must not kill people simply because they have different opinions. That is the essence of democracy and freedom--that people with varied opinions mutually agree to accept and respect each other. For this reason, intimidation, violence and force as they are now being used by blacks against blacks here seem to me to be unadulterated barbarism.

ZEIT: Then how should a black react to the apartheid regime which oppresses him inhumanely?

Buthlezi: He should concentrate on his education and training. There is absolutely no doubt that the blacks of South Africa will gain their freedom. Apartheid will disappear. The young black must prepare himself for this freedom. That was already the case in many African countries where it was assumed that after independence was achieved the land would automatically flow with milk and honey. Black South Africans must not ruin the foundations of their future with their own hands. If we fight, it should only be in such a way that we do not destroy ourselves and the freedom which awaits us.

ZEIT: What is the way out of the present crisis? "A dramatic gesture" is expected from President P.W. Botha this week. What should it be?

Buthlezi: The first thing he must do is issue a declaration of intent which clearly contains a commitment to distribution of power between whites and blacks in South Africa. Secondly, the black ANC (the outlawed African National Council) leaders like Nelson Mandela and Albert Sislu, who have been sitting in prison for over 20 years, must be set free. Thirdly, the state of emergency must be lifted, otherwise no black leader can participate in any negotiations for a solution of the crisis without losing his credibility. Whatever President Botha offers this week will be meaningless as long as the state of emergency continues and the two other demands are not met.

ZEIT: Hasn't President Botha always spoken out resolutely against any such distribution of power in the framework of a union or a federation?

Buthlezi: Yes, he declared that unequivocally in an interview before an English television camera at the end of May. He announced that he was not ready for a change in South Africa's existing power structure, whether it be based on a united state or a federation. What in the world can you negotiate and talk about with a man who says such things?

ZEIT: How can white South Africans' deep seated fear of the oppressed black majority and superior strength be removed?

Buthlezi: That only comes through compromises which blacks and whites must be willing to make. Our "Inkatha" movement has prescribed a policy of compromise for the well-being of South Africa. We recognize the unique nature of the South African situation, the fact that we here, in contrast to Zimbabwe or any other African country, are dealing with a large indigenous white population. We want to begin where a beginning is possible. The universal right to vote, one man one vote, of course remains our ultimate ideal, but we must not destroy South Africa for its sake. We are prepared to exercise patience and to undertake a long journey.

ZEIT: What should be the first steps of this long march?

Buthlezi: The plan proposed by the Buthelezi commission for a mixed race administration for the Natal/Kwazulu region would be such a first stage. It is based on the one-man-one-vote principle, which however would be mitigated by strict proportional representation, and especially by a veto right for the white minority. Three years ago the government rejected this proposal; today it is being seriously discussed. The population of Natal/Kwazulu, which

consists of a majority of black Zulus in addition to whites, Coloreds and Indians, is pressing for implementation of this plan. If the experiment with a mixed regional government succeeds, it could also serve as a school for other regions, as part of an overall South African federative solution. Then the anxiety of the whites about distribution of power would gradually disappear.

ZEIT: In the West, hope has recently arisen that President Botha has set a genuine reform process in motion: through the new constitution, which gives Coloreds and Indians parliamentary access; through lifting the ban on mixed racial marriages; through more movement and property rights for urban blacks; through the authorization of black labor unions and multiracial political parties. What is your opinion of these measures?

Buthlezi: The new constitution with its tricameral parliament excluding blacks is totally unacceptable. With it, for the first time, racism and apartheid are established constitutionally. As for the remaining innovations, it would be inaccurate to characterize them as purely cosmetic. From a psychological point of view, the authorization of mixed marriages is a very important step for the Africans and their apartheid dogmas. And the other measures you mentioned are significant for millions of blacks.

But the basic questions which South Africa can no longer evade remain unanswered. Millions of blacks still can settle and work in 87 percent of South African territory only with permission from the white government. The pass laws, the internal South African Influx Control Laws and the racist Group Areas Act must be eliminated.

ZEIT: And what do you think of the chances for this?

Buthlezi: Nothing is being done; nothing is being promised; there is no prospect for movement in the short term nor in the intermediate term. Mr Botha talks about reforms; he has mastered the rhetoric, but he is not really moving. He is excessively afraid of the right wing of his party, which really cannot pose a danger to him. He is misjudging the situation, for a majority of whites today support basic reforms as well as a resolute movement away from apartheid. Even blacks like myself would stand behind him completely. He ought to lead, but he is not doing even that.

ZEIT: You are leading the struggle against the apartheid system from within, through compromises, negotiations and with nonviolent methods. Haven't the possibilities for this renunciation of violence almost run out?

Buthlezi: I am sticking to nonviolence, for moral as well as for purely pragmatic reasons. The use of violence does not pay. The ANC has tried it for 25 years now and taken up the cause of armed struggle. However, success has not been achieved, and there will be no change in that in the foreseeable future. This regime is not going to be brought down simply with a few bombs exploding here and there. I have certainly never said that blacks will not perhaps one day be forced to take up weapons. If my Zulu people decided in favor of armed struggle, I would not disregard their wish.

ZEIT: What do you think of nonviolent combat methods such as the current boycott of white businesses in various parts of the country directed by blacks?

Buthelezi: I am an advocate of consumer boycotts. Only I do not believe that a recession in which massive numbers of blacks are losing their jobs is the appropriate time for such an action. I am also of the opinion that a boycott can only have the desired effect when all blacks support it as determinedly as possible.

ZEIT: That is not the case?

Buthelezi: The greatest obstacle on the road to our liberation is the divisiveness among blacks. UDF and black AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization] fundamentalists fight each other, clashes are occurring between our "Inkatha" and the UDF. We are the largest and the most powerful organization and we have always been open to reconciliation. Our black brothers do not however wish to take us up on it.

ZEIT: Why are Western sanctions against South Africa not appropriate?

Buthelezi: Sanctions and investment embargoes are ineffective. That was already demonstrated in the case of Rhodesia. And the South African economy is considerably stronger, more autarkic than that of Rhodesia. Furthermore, blacks would suffer more than whites under sanctions. Volkswagen, Mercedes and Siemens employ thousands of blacks, give them opportunities for earning money and for training, and increase their economic power. The more this power grows, the more the South African economy is dependent on blacks, the stronger our negotiating position with the whites is. Economic integration is thus the flip side of the liberation for which we blacks are striving.

ZEIT: What will happen in South Africa if basic reforms are not forthcoming?

Buthelezi: The vicious circle of black desperation and white intransigence will close even tighter. Restraint, reconciliation, even genuine reforms will no longer have any chance. Self destruction, chaos, civil war and ruin will be the result. South Africa has reached a turning point. The whites must choose between constructive or destructive anger from the blacks. One way or another, they must tackle the problem of our embitterment.

12666

CSO: 3420/89

SOUTH AFRICA

CONCERN OVER VISIBLE SHOW OF STRENGTH AGAINST BLACKS

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 9 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by Aggrey Klaaste]

[Text]

When your country is at war and you look through the bedroom window to behold the sight of fit-looking military young men, seemingly well-equipped to die for you and your country, you must feel pretty good.

You must feel a sense of security, that your taxes are being used properly by the Government.

When you are NOT at war and you look through the same window to be chilled by a similar sight of strapping young men, athletic in their military outfits, menace carefully cradled on the arm, and the various war paraphernalia hanging loosely from sturdy waists, with one slightly more grim-looking young chappie raising his hand like in the movies, you get a creepy feeling this is a show of some dramatic sort.

So it was with me last Sunday. I opened the curtains rather with silly haste when the kids woke me.

And came face to face with the barrel of a gun. I don't exactly mean that, may I hasten to assure the officers.

But my windows are somewhat low and near street level. I also plead a certain amount of poetic licence.

I still get this wet feeling in the small of my back. For one thing, what if the soldier boy thought I was about to zap him, and had opened fire?

Right into that ridiculous house in Diepkloof Extension, which is still unfurnished and hardly has an axe to speak of.

What if somebody in that convoy thought I was up to some devilry and blasted the hell out of me?

Then my family, other families, went onto the stoeps to check this extraordinary thing out.

People curious as they always are with babies on their arms, stare with some trepidation at these young men.

Am I mistaken to think that some of them look distinctly uncomfortable, even unhappy? Or am I extrapolating my feelings onto them?

What the dickens is going on? Tongues babble with excitement.

Children peep from behind backs. One more unruly boy gets on his bike and wishes to ride along with the army, is stopped, and rather sullenly gets back on the stoep.

The young man majestically lifts his arm (just like in the movies, I repeat) and the convoy moves on.

Moves on with silent menace, not doing anything, not saying anything. Quiet as hell.

The message, if anything, sinks in. This is showing the black bastards what we mean when we say they must not push us too far.

To me this is an exact replication of the arrogant military stance I have observed from people like the president and various police chiefs I have met. To you it might be the exact reflection of white South Africa's view of blacks.

They were not born with that view, mind. It is a re-inforced response; laid on by history, by politics, by privilege and prejudice, by hate and chiefly by fear.

It is a most unfortunate view, but is there as vividly as that convoy of troops in the streets of Soweto.

Which brings me rather logically to my next point. A reader of this newspaper sent a cutting to us. In some disgust most probably.

The note, which was presumably distributed to blacks by some rascal of a white man or woman in Johannesburg's Motortown, clinches my case. My case about these attitudes.

It is most revealing. It must have infuriated my black friends who sent it for us to publish. It is the height of racial incitement and thus unpublishable.

Just to give you a hint I will repeat the less scurrilous parts of this scum.

It is said to be an "Application of Em-

ployment" — which is an ungrammatical construction and gives the game away from the word go.

Then follows another Freudian slip. It says this application is for: Indigenous Black Person.

The writer is a fool and blunders. If they thought "indigenous" was a derogatory word they are sadly mistaken. My friend, it only means you and I, blacks, own this country, not the writer of the letter.

We are indigenous folk here. So it is ours.

It goes on in this sad, sick, though revealing, way asking if the applicant has mated through tribal law, through common law, through any old how, or just shacking up.

It asks if the applicant's income is derived through theft and other skulduggery.

I would treat this tripe with the contempt of silence, but some black out there is obviously reacting from the gut; is very angry.

Don't you ever worry my friend. Such notices are very helpful. Makes us understand their minds.

To understand the hate and the prejudice. Makes you able to deal with this inhumanity.

I will go further. It makes me understand

why it is necessary to have those troops in the townships.

Most white people (and I don't care if this hurts the PFP) think we are unruly, we are inefficient, we are savage, we are all the wrong things that their upbringing and so-called culture says of us.

Even the most gentle among them have these unfortunate conceptions.

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK SASH VICE-PRESIDENT VIEWS SLABBERT'S CALL FOR CONVENTION

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 6 Sep 85 p 12

[Article by Joyce Harris]

[Text]

What exactly did Dr Van Zyl Slabbert mean by his call for a national Convention to thrash out the country's problems? It should not be confused with what the Government calls "negotiation", writes JOYCE HARRIS (right), national vice-president of the Black Sash, who in the accompanying article takes a look at the full implications of Dr Slabbert's call.

Reaction to the call by Dr Van Zyl Slabbert for a National Convention Alliance convey the impression that the Government has succeeded so well with its "Natspeak" that communication has broken down completely. It has so abused and misused language with its semantic games played over the years that words have lost their original meanings and become loaded with political and/or emotional bias, words such as humanism, liberalism, communism.

One of the latest words to have its meaning altered is "negotiation", which the Government uses interchangeably with "consultation", although they have entirely different implications.

Consultation implies talking together between parties not necessarily of equal standing, instigated usually by the more powerful party, and with no obligation whatsoever on it to do more than

listen. It is not in any way committed to act upon the results of the consultation. Consultation, Government style, has brought little joy. It is entirely different from negotiation, not a substitute for it, though the Government has succeeded in fudging the difference.

Negotiation implies discussion between parties all of which have some clout, all bringing to the conference table their particular views, opinions and aspirations and all prepared to bargain with each other in order to reach some kind of acceptable consensus which is then acted upon. The readiness to negotiate implies a commitment to put into practice the fruits of negotiation, and is therefore a commitment to listen, to influence and be influenced, and to arrive at conclusions which will resolve the problems under discussion.

The less non-negotiables brought to the conference table the more successful negotiation is likely to be, for non-negotiables could scuttle the process before it is even begun. Negotiation provides an arena for the hardest possible verbal bargaining and, provided all the participants are motivated to reach solutions acceptable to all even though they are unlikely to fulfil every need, it should be possible to hammer out a modus vivendi for South Africa.

A National Convention is about negotiation and not consultation. Those who call for a national convention are presumably committing themselves to a process of negotiation with ALL concerned and interested parties in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution of our country's manifold problems.

The constituent assembly must represent ALL peoples and constituencies within the country through their chosen and recognised leaders, which in turn implies that all such leaders must be released from detention if that is where they are. If such a convention were intentionally to exclude certain constituencies that, too, could scuttle it before it is begun. There should be no non-negotiables and no exclusions.

It would seem that when the call to join a Convention Alliance is rejected because the Government has ruled out some of the conditions some of the potential participants would like to see met, or because at the present time a leader has not been released, then the meaning of the call has been misunderstood.

In his call Dr Slabbert made it clear that his party is committed to one country, one citizenship and one constitution, despite the fact that "the Government has shown its true colours", which are certainly not the same as his. Presumably he wants to provide a vehicle through which all those who would rather negotiate than fight can come together, irrespective of their political and ideological differences, in order hopefully to exert sufficient pressure on the Government to force it to call a national convention and participate in it itself, with the same commitment to negotiate and compromise and find solutions.

He is offering potential impetus to the Convention movement, the arguing and hard bargaining to take place once a Convention has been achieved.

A National Convention Alliance is a beginning, a means to an end, not an end in itself. The end is the calling of a truly representative National Convention which will be the place where differences can be argued out and hopefully settled. What other alternative is there to violent confrontation?

SOUTH AFRICA

AUTHOR VIEWS CONTINUED VAAL UNREST

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 8 Sep 85 p 7

[Article by Johannes Rantete]

[Text]

JOHANNES RANTETE, 21, came into international prominence last year when the Vaal unrest erupted. He published a book, "The Third Day of September", which was banned, and he was detained.

The banning of his book and his detention unleashed an international outcry until he was released and the ban on his book lifted. Today the Sharpeville-born author is a law student at the University of the Witwatersrand.

THE blanket ban imposed by the SA Government on all services commemorating the Vaal unrest is very disappointing.

The blanket ban on meetings indicates nothing more than the monstrous blunderings made by the Government.

Its response to a situation which required negotiation and conciliation has set it further upon a course of violence.

I emphatically argued in my publication "The Third Day of September" that the rebellion in Sebokeng and the rest of the Vaal in particular, resulted from the implementation of the unwelcomed Black Community Council system — and I still stress that such a system is counterproductive and unprofessional.

Regardless of its form, in all its expressions it is devoid of legitimacy. It would be unwise for me to advise the Government how to solve the intricacies of this system.

Rather I call for its annulment.

Thus far it has achieved nothing more than bloodshed and country-wide turmoil.

It is undoubtedly at the root of the 1984 uprisings that have swept through SA up to today.

The Vaal suffered the evils of one of these councils — but remained tolerant until the rent issue arose.

The Lekoa Community Council increased rentals in the face of the present economic environment governed by retrenchment, increasing general sales tax and already high unemployment.

The Vaal communities have risen fiercely against this action, and have broken the shackles of oppression. They have added past experience to the present and found the answer of violence. They have become the forerunners of black passion. Their anger not only reached the boundaries of their suburbs, but became an irritant in the hearts of the concerned and negligent white community. Furthermore it brought a sense of concern to the international communities.

It would be wrong to explain urban unrest only on the basis of the black community council system, without mentioning another element that soon scattered the seeds of the Sebokeng rebellion to other parts of the country, leading to continued rioting and resistance.

What I mean here is the immediate transformation of the township unrests into a gigantic political issue — which emanated from black suffer-

ings and the immediate need for a political Messiah.

For the first time in the history of black resistance against Government policies, the name of Nelson Mandela was chanted in every corner of the townships. It has swept not only throughout SA, but throughout the world.

It has automatically altered the thinking of younger black South Africans, and has shown all South Africans and outside observers that black liberation in SA will be incomplete without the release of Nelson Mandela.

This assertion is not tactically aimed to influence the Government to release him, but to advise it that there will be no solution to township rebellion as long as such issues are ignored.

I say the Vaal has made its own history — but it didn't make it just as it pleased, it didn't make it under circum-

stances chosen by itself. Rather under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

The root of township unrest lies in the consequences of apartheid. Mass mobilisation in black urban areas is only a result of black people's consciousness of common interests and their appetite for political recognition.

If enough attention is not paid to the issues that saw the Vaal in flames last September, it would be premature to talk of peace and stability in SA.

Continued confrontation between black people and the police and their Parliament across the barrel of the gun will be an everyday event - until a large bath is filled with the blood of innocent black South Africans.

I say this because I find it hard to withstand the pains afflicted by the obstinacy of a Government consisting of intellectuals who, not only in the moral but also in the religious domain, fail to use better calculations to avoid Hitler's trends.

Its recent action of declaring the state of emergency and the banning of organisations such as Cosas has clearly shown its failure as a government. It has failed to use modern methods of bending with the changing environment - instead it has depended on the old notebooks of Verwoerd and other Afrikaner elitists of the past.

It has misunderstood the meaning of history - "the study of the past to explain the present, so that the foibles of yesterday and today cannot be repeated tomorrow".

It declared the state of emergency with the hope of gaining momentum as did the past declaration - but it committed the mistake of comparing today with yesterday without considering the changing atmosphere.

To avoid any further catastrophic consequences of apart-

heid, it would be wise for the Government to dismantle it immediately and divorce itself from the idea of a tortoise-paced reform which could take a millenium to achieve.

But besides the Government's reluctance, black South Africans still call for a non-racial, just and egalitarian South Africa in which colour, creed and race will form no point of reference.

CSO: 3400/1165

SOUTH AFRICA

ARMS PURCHASES BY PRIVATE CITIZENS RISING

Gun Sales Booming

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Sep 85 p 6

[Article by Susan Fleming]

[Text] **THERE** has been a considerable increase in the sale of arms and ammunition as a result of the current unrest sweeping South Africa.

A survey of Reef arms dealers revealed that in some cases sales had increased by more than 30 percent.

The chairman of the Arms and Ammunition Dealers' Association, Mr Nicholas Yale, agreed there had been a marked upswing in sales.

Mr Yale said that during the past few weeks he had sold a lot of arms and ammunition to people living in the Eastern and the Western Cape.

Mr Raymond Manas of FN Guns and Ammunition in Florida said sales were up 30 percent. "This is as a direct result of the unrest," he said.

More women were buying arms and ammunition, according to Mr Johan Liebenberg of Hot Power Arms in Krugersdorp.

"People are getting frightened and many women are buying. We are selling a lot of pistols, revolvers and riot guns," he said.

Mr L Potgieter of The Powder Keg in Melville, Johannesburg, said the publicity given to "stone-throwing and other acts" had boosted sales.

"We have found that far more blacks are buying guns than ever before. People feel they are in danger and so they want protection," he said.

Whites Increasingly Gun Happy

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Sep 85 p 6

[Article by Arlene Getz]

[Text] **WHITE South Africans are getting increasingly gunhappy.**

Increasing numbers of homeowners are hiring armed guards to keep a round-the-clock watch on their houses and security firms are among the few businesses to benefit from the countrywide unrest.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the lobby of a Johannesburg hotel this week.

In a setting that would have gladdened the heart of any aspiring Rambo, about 200 delegates gathered for the 21st anniversary conference of the Security Association of South Africa (SASA).

One of the more popular exhibits was a space-age semi-automatic known as "The Striker".

Manufactured by a Natal company and relatively cheap at R650, delegates were keen to heft the gun praised for its short, compact design.

An added advantage was that, by loading the weapon with huge cartridges and "winding it up like a clock", the gun could spit 12 rounds in a few seconds.

Although this weapon could only be sold to approved security companies, other goods were available for the security-conscious individual.

Bullet-proof vests, a metal-detector, aluminium batons to replace the traditional wooden ones enjoyed pride of place in front of the lethal range of guns.

Said arms dealer Graham Whiteing: "There definitely has been an increased interest in these products."

Mr Whiteing was reluctant to say whether any of these weapons were sold to the Gov-

ernment, but admitted to a possibility of their being exported to Europe, America and Asia.

Interest was "very strong" and the poor exchange rate would make prices competitive, he said.

Another exhibition winner was the "instant laager" designed by the Johannesburg steel-manufacturing firm which supplied the fence now electrified and guarding South Africa's northern border.

The new "riot-barrier", made of 1,6 m high razor wire, can be erected within 20 seconds to separate or cordon off a crowd. Packed tightly into a towed trailer, the barrier is released when the driver pulls a lever.

Mr Bruce Cochrane, a director of the manufacturing firm, said the attraction of this new design was the fact that it could save lives by controlling crowds.

"It's painful to get caught in it, but it stops people without killing them," he said.

He was hoping the Government would buy some of the units, which sold for R10 000 to R12 000.

Other congress exhibits included the latest in locks and security devices, with the representative of one firm reporting a definite increase in the number of homeowners hiring full-time guards.

SOUTH AFRICA

PFP CRITICIZED BY LEFT, RIGHT FOR ELECTING DINKIE PILLAY

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Sep 85 p 10

[Article by Gary van Staden]

[Text] THE Progressive Federal Party found itself under attack this week from both the Left and the Right after the election of controversial Lenasia politician Mr Dinkie Pillay to its federal executive.

The decision has been criticised by both the Government Press and extra-parliamentary spokesmen. The Afrikaans afternoon newspaper Die Vaderland and the black morning daily The Sowetan carried articles highly critical of the move.

At the eye of the storm is Mr Pillay's long association with organisations, political parties and management committees regarded as part of "system" politics. Mr Pillay, however, believes he is doing the right thing.

"Just who are these 'credible' black leaders everyone is always talking about?" he asked. "I have never claimed to be a spokesman for my people. I am just a member of the PFP."

Die Vaderland carried leader page comment under the headline "Dinkie wie?" (Dinkie who?).

The article criticised the

PFP for urging the Government to negotiate with "legitimate" black leaders and then voting someone such as Mr Pillay on to its federal executive.

"If you have never heard of him, that is hardly surprising," the article commented, adding: "He lost in Lenasia-East against Faiz Khan in one of the lowest percentage polls in the country during the first House of Delegates elections last year."

According to Die Vaderland's article, coming second in a 6 percent poll did not say much for Mr Pillay's influence in his community, and it questioned whether he would be of any value to the PFP.

"Is this one of the PFP 'legitimate' leaders?" it said.

The Sowetan carried as its main leader page story an article which said that the PFP had harmed what little credibility it had left in the Indian community by associating itself with Mr Pillay.

The article added that the PFP was told in advance that Mr Pillay was the least popular of a group of unpopular "system" politicians in Lenasia.

"Now, I get on well with Dinkie Pillay," the writer of the article, Mr Ameen Akhalwaya, said. "But who is he?"

According to the article, some anti-election leaders

were outraged over the space Mr Pillay was given in a Sunday newspaper at the time of last year's tricameral elections.

"Then they reasoned that if this was the type of politician the pro-election forces wanted to project, perhaps it would be wiser to keep quiet; that it might even do the boycott cause some good."

The Sowetan article also made the point that by all accounts Mr Pillay had been roundly rejected by the people of Lenasia at last year's elections, and pointed out that he had received only 100 votes.

The article made the same point that Die Vaderland had: "The Progs keep accusing the Government — with justification — that it regards as black leaders those 'system' politicians who have been soundly rejected by their communities.

"So, here we have a case of what looks like tokenism by the Progs, reinforcing suspicions about white liberals."

The Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) issued a statement this week condemning the PFP's decision to participate in tricameral elections in general and for its association with Mr Pillay in particular.

"Mr Dinkie Pillay's political history is a joke," the TIC statement added.

The statement added that Mr Pillay had no credibility in his community, a fact which they said was borne out by election results.

The TIC said that the achievement of the tricameral Parliament was the current political and economic deterioration in which South Africa now found itself.

But the supreme irony of the situation has escaped most observers.

That irony is that during the election campaign for last year's tricameral Parliament, Mr Pillay said that the new system would end the role of the PFP as Official Opposition — the same PFP of which he is now a member.

SOUTH AFRICA

STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 8 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Stephan Terblanche]

[Text] **EFFORTS** in Government circles to revive the former Department of Information to repair South Africa's badly tarnished image abroad, has led to considerable behind-the-scenes jostling for control of the new department.

Two groups are said to be lobbying for the job of information boss to go to either Deputy Minister Louis Nel or Deputy Minister Adriaan Vlok and that it be attached to the office of the State President.

Unfair

It is understood that powerful people in Government are opposed to the allocation of the portfolio to a senior Cabinet Minister who alone would have full control over it.

They believe that it would lend an unfair propaganda advantage to such a Minister who could use the position to promote his own chances as a successor to President P W Botha.

When the former Information Department was disbanded its functions were incorporated into the Department of Foreign Affairs under Minister Pik Botha.

According to the sources the strongest opposition to the revival of the old department has come from Mr Botha who fears a repetition of covert operations.

It is also understood that Mr Botha believes splitting

the functions of his department could harm its work overseas.

"But Mr Botha accepts and supports the need for a co-ordinated information drive to present a more accurate picture of the country to the outside world. To him it is more a question of control," says one official closely involved in reviving the department.

It is understood that the question was first raised with the Government by the State Security Council and that strong support has since come from members of the Cabinet.

But, the sources say, because it is widely believed that President Botha will retire in a few years' time, senior Cabinet Ministers do not want to allow any single Minister to control such a department.

"They fear that if a senior Cabinet Minister controls the department, he could use it to further his own chances of succeeding President Botha," says one source.

Subsequently a strong group is pushing for the job to be given to a junior Minister under the control of the State President's office.

"Two groups have emerged, one promoting Mr Nel for the job and the other Mr Vlok," says a source.

SOUTH AFRICA

REPORTER ATTENDS HNP CONGRESS, REPORTS CONCLUSION

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Sep 85 p 10

[Text]

THE banner on the wall of the Pretoria City Hall carried a quotation by Dr H F Verwoerd in big black letters on a white background: "Create your own future."

If only the good doctor had been here today to see just what kind of a future his policies did create for South Africa...

The Herstigte National Party (HNP) had gathered in the hall for its annual congress during which members discussed their role in the political development of the country.

It was one of the rare times when Dr Voerwoerd is mentioned these days — at HNP meetings. In the words of leader Mr Jaap Marais, who was re-elected unopposed for the eighth year in a row, the HNP sees no need to change its thinking.

"We haven't changed our policies, we haven't revised our position, there has been no need to," Mr Marais told the cheering congress delegates.

The township conflict which is tearing the country apart is all the fault of the National Party Government, according to Mr Marais.

He lays the blame on the Nats because they are reforming, not because they are doing too little 20 years too late.

It was agreed by the congress that the HNP reference to a "white South Africa" would include all those areas which were unoccupied by black people when the white man arrived at Africa's southern tip.

The congress also agreed that those areas which were occupied by "natives" included only the Transkei, Ciskei, Botswana, Swaziland and portions of Venda. All the rest, congress decreed, belonged to the whites — and that included Namibia/South West Africa.

The congress adopted a resolution condemning "those organisations who wanted to establish 'Boerestate' in South Africa". The white man's claim, they said, was far wider than that.

There was bad news, too, for the coloured population of South Africa. It has long been HNP policy that a coloured "homeland" must be created to accommodate the political aspirations of those people.

Now the HNP is to review this policy in line with a congress decision that the coloureds of South

Africa don't really belong here anyway.

"I suggest that we give the coloureds (bruinmense) limited representation at local level only, and exclusively in those group areas they now occupy," one delegate said.

So the HNP leaders may decide to take away the coloured homeland before they even get to move in.

There is always the chance that this could be reinstated later, however, because the HNP apparently also has ambitions to add extra land to "white" southern Africa and there may be some space available there.

A resolution was put forward in support of the idea that the Zambesi River (Zimbabwe's northern border) be restored as the "border of white southern Africa".

That resolution too, however, was referred back to the party executive for further discussion.

One congress delegate felt that if the resolution was suggesting an invasion of Zimbabwe to restore white rule under Pretoria, then the issue should be discussed in a little more detail before a decision was taken.

Then came the usual string of resolutions condemning the Government for "dismantling apartheid" and leading the white man to the brink of disaster.

Not even the Conservative Party of Dr Andries Treurnicht escaped the sharp tongues of congress delegates.

"The CP is trying to wipe us out," one delegate said. Another said the CP leaders were not men who could be trusted but that there were many potential HNP supporters among the party's rank-and-file.

"We must just be patient, they will come to us," he added.

The whole issue ended in total confusion when the congress adopted resolutions instructing the HNP leadership to continue negotiations with the CP but not to concede basic principles.

The congress also adopted a resolution calling on the party to consider whether there was any point in further talks with Dr Treurnicht.

All the while a bronze bust of Dr Verwoerd stood on the stage, a slight smile on its metallic face while delegates reminded the congress of how things were in South Africa when he was around...

CSO: 3400/1144

SOUTH AFRICA

IDEA THAT 'GOVERNMENT IS ON ITS KNEES IS NONSENSE'

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 31 Aug 85 p 10

[Column "From My Political Pen" by "Dawie": "Daydreams Perish in This Time of Testing: Now It's Time to Build"]

[Text] It's almost September, spring is here--and the most recent outbreak of violence, the painful scenes on the Cape Flats, make one realize almost with shock that it has already been a year since the cycle of rioting began in South Africa.

Now here, now there it broke out, and it still drags on, from Sebokeng to the [Cape] Peninsula. Enough to make you wonder: can the chronic state of unrest be halted?

Perceptions

The next few weeks will be critical in calming the riots, which began in September 1984 at Sebokeng in the Vaal Triangle and raged on elsewhere in the country.

Great determination to build a new, better South Africa will have to arise from the ruins and misery, or sufferings worse than the calamities of Lebanon, Algeria and other nations lie in wait for this country. If South Africa is once dragged into the African swamp, it will find it just as difficult to struggle out again as do so many black states.

Precisely for that reason it is necessary that certain perceptions of South Africa be analyzed.

One of the most dangerous perceptions is found among radicals who think that the Whites are done for, that the government is on its knees and can simply be toppled, so that a revolutionary clique can take over.

That is sheer nonsense.

It is a fact, and it is there for those who wish to see, that the state has not even begun to bring to bear the forces available to it.

Even if it is part of the revolutionary struggle to make the state look more "oppressive," to provoke it so as to stimulate resistance, radicals would be making a terrible mistake to think that the government lacks the necessary will to look out for people and their interests.

There must be no misunderstanding about this. The Whites are here to stay, and they are a formidable force. Only a fool would ignore that.

Trusting Faith

Black leaders of whatever political persuasion will have to learn to live with that--just as white leaders have to live with the fact that black people have rightful aspirations that cannot be ignored, but must be satisfied.

Along with this goes another perception that the riots have put an end to: the trusting faith of some white people that the status quo can be perpetuated, that it is possible to continue happily down South Africa's old roads.

The time for that is well and truly past.

Such illusions exist among those on the far right, those whose escapist ideas lead them to such absurdities as a Boer state, colored homelands and a white heartland in the Transvaal PWV [Pretoria-Wit waters rand-Vereeniging] region.

These ideas are too silly for words. They are just as unattainable as the leftists' dream of a thousand-year reign of peace under a black majority government.

Businessmen

With such daydreams the far left and far right illustrate the danger in politics of utopianism, defined by the dictionary as "impassioned but unrealistic plans for reform."

A better South Africa able to achieve its great potential to the full cannot be built on daydreams, but only by leaders who take the harsh realities of the country as a starting point.

There are factors that can make a contribution.

The recovery of the economy, in connection with which important new developments are coming over the weekend, is an outstanding prerequisite. The recession has in part contributed to the unrest, and economic recovery will help improve matters.

The road ahead is a difficult one, and the punches that are casually being dealt out in business circles will not exactly help to make it easier.

A further contributing factor will be the restoration of order. The riots have set back reform initiatives; they will be able to be carried out more effectively in greater peace and quiet. But even without it there can be no waiting.

True Leaders

The country is going through an epoch-making time of testing, a situation that somewhat reminds one of A. N. Whitehead's profound observation: "The great advances in civilization were processes that practically destroyed the societies in which they took place."

That means that the attention of far-sighted leaders must now be focused more sharply than ever on finding lasting peaceful solutions.

Good sense will have to triumph among leaders who must reach out to one another across color lines and other differences, who want to see an end to violence and to practice the politics of negotiations in a meaningful sense.

12906

CSO: 3401/313

SOUTH AFRICA

REPORT ON URBANIZATION STRATEGY FOR NATION

Moves to Control Migrants Failed

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Sep 85 p 13

[Text] CAPE TOWN. — Rapid urbanisation is a world phenomenon which will continue for a long time and increase, according to the report of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of the President's Council.

Under the heading "urbanisation as a world phenomenon, with special reference to Africa", the committee found that although some successes had been achieved with urbanisation, coercive measures to keep migrants out or to remove them have in most cases not achieved the desired end.

Removal measures had often given rise to greater problems than they attempted to solve.

The same applies to measures aimed at merely destroying informal squatters' houses without providing immediately for alternative housing.

Incentive measures, coupled with the creation of new towns, could however, make a major contribution.

French experience with the creation of satellite cities was "illuminating", the report said.

"This should be accompanied by a well-considered and practical national urbanisation policy, correct siting, strong infrastructural support by the central government, a solid labour foundation, a bold regional planning programme, flexible planning, adequate social and welfare facilities, a vital city centre and civic centres, aesthetic environment planning and effective co-ordination between all interested parties.

"Upgrading of the rural standard of living does not as yet have a good record, especially in Africa, but could nevertheless to some extent have a positive effect.

"Measures to absorb migrants could succeed if undertaken in a positive spirit of goodwill, avoiding past mistakes and taking examples of success into account. Urbanisation should not be regarded as an evil. It should be used as an opportunity to utilise one of a country's greatest assets, namely its people, in such a way that the end result for all will be an improvement in the quality of life.

"To sum up, the literature indicates that no single set of measures can prevent people from becoming urbanised. All measures can make a contribution towards reducing or slowing down the flow, but their cost-effectiveness should always be weighed against . . . the advantages of utilising the flow of migration." — Sapa.

Mulder Did Not Sign

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Sep 85 p 13

[Text]

ONLY Dr Connie Mulder, the Conservative Party representative on the 18-man Committee for Constitutional Affairs, did not sign the report on the urbanisation strategy for South Africa, tabled in the President's Council yesterday.

Headed by Rand Afrikaans University's former director of the Institute of Urban Studies, Dr A J G Oosthuizen, the committee consisted of 10 National Party councillors, two Labour Party councillors and one each from the Progressive Federal Party, National Republic Party, People's Congress Party, National People's Party, Solidarity Party and Conservative Party.

The 427-page report makes broad recommendations — including the

scrapping of influx control, the reference book for Blacks in favour of one identity document for all South Africans, and major urbanisation policy changes. — Sapa.

Legislation to be Introduced

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Sep 85 p 13

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — It was probable that some legislation would be introduced before Parliament in the coming session as a result of his report on influx control and urbanisation, the committee chairman, Dr A J G Oosthuizen, said yesterday.

Speaking at a Press conference in Cape Town called to clarify the President's Council Committee for Constitutional Affairs report on urbanisation strategy, he said that although it was not in the council's hands, he ex-

pected some aspects of the report's recommendations to be implemented soon — especially in the light of President P W Botha's statements in Bloemfontein this week.

Asked what he estimated the flow of Blacks to urban areas to be, Dr Oosthuizen said estimates ranged between one million and three million or between 17 and 32 per cent increase in Black urban populations.

Dr Piet Koornhof, chairman of the President's Council, who presided at the conference said it was his experience that past estimates of in-

flux resulting from the release of restrictions were always "vastly exaggerated".

"After the Rhikhotso decision predictions made than turned out to be vastly exaggerated," he said.

Dr Oosthuizen stressed that even though Section 10 Influx Control legislation was removed, the committee had recommended residential qualifications.

These, he said, were to prevent situations such as had occurred in Durban where a site for residential use had been planned, but before the services could be installed, they

had found squatters had already taken it over.

"This had necessitated finding alternative accommodation for the squatters so that the development could be completed.

"This is a total waste of time and money and a considerable inconvenience to everyone concerned."

This was at the source of the residential avail-

ability qualifications in their report.

He said also that fears of mass migration to urban areas and the lack of employment available causing other problems were contradicted by experiences elsewhere.

"Urban areas are always better equipped to provide employment opportunities, especially in the informal sector than

rural areas. For this reason I do not think that the removal of influx control would create excessive additional problems."

He said only one committee member did not sign the report although he had taken part in the discussion "right up till the last moment."

The only member not to sign was Dr Connie Mulder of the Conservative Party. — Sapa.

Positive Urbanization Strategy Needed

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Sep 85 p 13

[Text] CAPE TOWN. — South Africa needs a "positive urbanisation strategy" aimed at economic growth and the creation of employment, according to the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of the President's Council.

In its report on an urbanisation strategy for the Republic, released here yesterday, the committee says this strategy should also aim at the enhancement of the quality of life of those who are already urbanised, and the accommodation of future urbanisation.

"This urbanisation strategy should be an integral component of a comprehensive development plan in terms of which market forces are taken into account and which is aimed at a more even distribution of economic activity and population in South Africa."

The committee would like to point out that:

- The cost of such planning intervention should constantly be monitored and evaluated;

- Urbanisation should be stimulated in those areas in which it is economically viable, which means that far fewer growth points should be the focus of concentration and that these should be vigorously promoted to the point where self-generated and sustained economic growth is possible; and

- Added incentives should be considered in deserving cases, so as to direct the spatial pattern of urbanisation, to stimulate comprehensive development instead of just industrial development, and to enhance the possibilities of making a living in rural towns.

Such incentives should also apply at the intra-urban level, for example, in and around Soweto.

Urbanisation should, "where desirable", take place by using the infrastructure of existing towns.

The committee says it is convinced that, because of the operation of the South African economy across national boundaries and the resultant ef-

fect on urbanisation, there will have to be co-operation with neighbouring states in developing an orderly and effective urbanisation strategy.

The committee also recommends that a plan for job creation in urban areas should be developed as part of an urbanisation strategy.

"It should be aimed at utilising the potential of metropolitan centres to provide employment in both the formal and informal sectors, preventing 'over-urbanisation' and unwholesome conditions in urban areas and especially in large urban centres, while promoting employment creation in and around peripheral low-income residential towns." — Sapa.

Features of Urbanization

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Sep 85 p 13

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — The level of urbanisation among Blacks is "far higher" than official statistics indicate, the report by the President's Council's Committee for Constitutional Affairs says.

The committee is undecided on whether there is under-urbanisation of Blacks or not because of obscurities arising from the changing bases of official statistics.

Broadly speaking, however, the general level of urbanisation in South Africa correlates with the level of economic development, it says.

A striking feature of urbanisation in South Africa was the tendency for concentration of the population to take place in a few urban complexes.

The report says that the lowest level of concentration in metropolitan areas is among Blacks and the highest among Asians and Whites.

Preventing Cycle of Poverty

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Sep 85 p 13

[Text] AN effective social infrastructure to help new migrants in towns was essential to prevent a cycle of poverty, the committee investigating urbanisation has found.

On the social considerations in urbanisation, the report finds that "residential stability" for new migrants is important for the creation of social ties and social responsibility "which is the foundation of social order."

"The danger that a cycle of poverty among newcomers to the city will be perpetuated can be effectively reduced by the establishment of a satisfactory social infrastructure and the promotion of economic activities in the formal and informal sectors."

This would also help to promote a tertiary sector and offer employment opportunities for women.

Health services capable of dealing with changing illness patterns found in the urban environment could improve the quality of life in urban areas.

The report finds that security of residential rights, transport, clean water, personal safety, schools and markets are among the highest priorities for new migrants.

"Community development programmes have the potential to make decisive contribution in determining the success achieved in meeting the challenges posed by high rates of urbanisation, but only if adequate scope is provided for the realisation of reasonable aspirations identified by the programme.

"If this is not done, the potential for frustration and conflict will be increased," the report found.

CSO: 3400/1149

SOUTH AFRICA

UDF LEADERSHIP DRIVEN UNDERGROUND

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by David Breier]

[Text] POLICE have started to detain the United Democratic Front's second-level leadership which took over the organisation when police immobilised its top leaders.

Within hours of granting an interview to The Sunday Star, the UDF's temporary organiser in the troubled Western Cape went into hiding as his fellow second-level leaders were detained.

The new interim UDF leadership has helped to sustain the protest movement, especially in the Western Cape where mass action has reached new levels in the past two weeks.

The UDF has achieved this even though its top leadership has been detained, arrested and put on trial for treason, or gone into hiding.

"Every time the State takes away one leader, two more take his place. There are enough people in the community to assume the leadership," said Mr Naseekh Jaffer, organiser of the UDF's interim leadership in the Western Cape in an interview with The Sunday Star.

Hours later, police cracked down on the interim leadership. Mr Jaffer has gone underground after escaping a police dragnet that picked up several other interim leaders. He telephoned The Sunday Star from hiding to condemn the detention of his fellow interim leaders and to say "the liberation struggle will continue".

Effective changes

"To end this mood of resistance there needs to be effective changes in the political and economic system. No number of arrests, detentions and police brutality in our townships can stop the defiance," he said.

Mr Jaffer condemned the Government for banning a UDF rally in Cape Town today.

He said the "Botha Government" was now preventing all forms of peaceful protest.

"The UDF cannot be held responsible for any actions that result from these high-handed measures," he added.

In the interview before he went into hiding, Mr Jaffer said the security crackdown had temporarily crippled the UDF's structures. The state of emergency had immobilised the leadership in the Transvaal, Eastern Cape and Border regions. In Natal and the Western Cape, detentions had the same effect and executive members who escaped the police dragnet had gone into hiding.

The UDF's re-organisation after its leadership was immobilised was illustrated in the Western Cape which, this week became the country's major trouble spot.

The strength of the UDF lies in its affiliates. The organisation is, in effect, a loose alliance of more than 600 affiliates including civic, student, youth, women's, sport and trade union organisations.

So, with the disappearance of its top leadership, it was merely a matter of general council meeting to choose an interim committee.

Enough activists

Mr Jaffer said that, even if the second-tier leadership were arrested, there were enough activists to give direction to the "people's anger".

Even if the leadership were to be immobilised, the direction of the people's anger had been set and could sustain its direction for a considerable period.

The "brutality" of the police in suppressing protest had played a major role in fuelling the anger of the people and in spreading the action, he said.

Mr Jaffer said white people had nothing to fear from the protest action.

"The anger of the people is not aimed at whites, it is aimed at apartheid," he said.

It was possible that the consumer boycott might be redirected in the near future. At present, it was a boycott of white-owned businesses — but this might change to a boycott of major white-owned shopping centres occupied by big conglomerates.

Small white-owned "corner cafe-type" shops might not be strongly targeted.

The boycott was aimed at big capital in an attempt to pressure it to push for structural changes in the Government.

CSO: 3400/1151

STELLENBOSCH LECTURER FEARS FOR FAMILY'S LIVES

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Karen Stander]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN — A Stellenbosch University lecturer who is a member of the area committee of the United Democratic Front has become the victim of attacks which have led him to fear for the safety of his family.

In three separate incidents, grass on Mr Rob Gaylard's front lawn was doused in petrol and set alight, his car was sabotaged and a rock was thrown through the window of his lounge.

He has also become the subject of a vicious pamphlet campaign.

Mr Gaylard, a lecturer in the university's English department, said there had been a sustained campaign on campus to expose, identify and intimidate members of the UDF.

Mr Gaylard's wife, Ms Miki Flockemann, is a lecturer in the English department at the University of the Western Cape.

They have a seven-month-old son, Joshua. Mr Gaylard has three other children by his ex-wife in Cape Town.

He said of the terror campaign: "It's not only myself that I have to take responsibility for. I have to think of the safety of my wife and children."

Ms Flockemann said she was particularly concerned about the other three children, Mathew (16) Anna (13) and Joseph (11) who were old enough to feel something of the effect the actions were having on them.

Fears for baby

"Obviously I am afraid for the safety of my baby as well but he is too young to be frightened of noises in the night."

Smear-pamphlets had been published and distributed, alleging links between the UDF, the African National Congress and the Communist Party.

Mr Gaylard said the first smear pamphlet mentioning his name had been distributed at the end of the second term.

This pamphlet said: "The UDF has decided that a new phase in mass protest action must be introduced.

"The planned All Black tour in South Africa will be the first target of such an action. Protest will be held in the streets, at airports and rugby stadiums."

In the first week that the students were back after the June vacation the rugby tour was cancelled, Mr Gaylard said.

A link had been created in the minds of the "average unthinking student".

Another pamphlet mentioned Mr Gaylard and other academic staff by name and questioned whether they had "thrown their ethical and professional duties overboard".

Mr Gaylard's car was sabotaged in his garage one night with a series of holes drilled in the radiator. This resulted in damage of R2 400.

Two weeks ago, the night after a meeting addressed by Dr Allan Boesak was held to launch a consumer boycott, Mr Gaylard woke to the sound of a bang. He found his sitting room covered in glass. A stone had been thrown through the window.

A new smear pamphlet appeared yesterday which questioned the integrity of Mr Gaylard and several other academics.

SOUTH AFRICA

OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY, MEMBERS' COMMITMENT TO INKATHA STUDIED

Johannesburg POLITIKON in English Jun 85 pp 57-63

[Article by John D. Brewer, member of the Department of Social Studies at the Queen's University of Belfast]

[Text] Abstract

The size, loyalty and commitment of Inkatha's members is seen as a vital element to Inkatha's importance in current South African politics. It is claimed to strengthen Buthelezi's bargaining position with the state and to differentiate Inkatha's support from the much less committed support of affiliate-based organizations like the United Democratic Front. Yet this assumption about Inkatha's lay members cannot be taken for granted, given the paucity of the empirical data on Inkatha membership. One measure of this commitment is the extent to which lay members have internalized the movement's official ideology. It is thus evident in the degree of coherence between official ideology and the beliefs of lay members. This paper reports on empirical research amongst a sample of Inkatha's members in KwaMashu in order to assess this coherence.

Introduction

Inkatha and its leader Chief Buthelezi arouse strong emotions, but it cannot be denied that they play a prominent role in South African politics. With a paid-up membership of 700,000 (Kane-Berman in IRISH TIMES 21 June 1985) Inkatha is confirmed as the largest political organization in South Africa's history. The United Democratic Front challenges this assessment and points to an affiliated membership of over two million. However, one of the criticisms made of the United Democratic Front is that, as a popular front, its affiliated members may lack a commitment to the umbrella organization and its policies (Welsh, 1984: 147-162). This criticism is based on the common observation in the literature on social and political movements that it is not total numbers of supporters that is important but the extent to which they have internalized the movement's official ideological goals and policies. There is an assumption behind this criticism, which is that the United Democratic Front cannot be guaranteed of this among its affiliated members, while Inkatha can from its paid-up members. Unfortunately, we know very little about Inkatha's membership and this assumption cannot be taken for granted.

It is easy to understand why we have so little data on Inkatha's members. Political interest in Inkatha has grown along with its rising political prominence, although academic analyses of the organization lag some way behind.¹ Understandably, what academic focus there has been, has taken its cue from this political importance, for it has concentrated on what role Inkatha currently plans in South African politics and what role it is likely to play in the future.

These sorts of analyses are important and necessary, but one of the elements which is lost sight of in all of this, is the membership of Inkatha. It is the membership, after all, which is claimed to provide the organization with some of its strength. The membership is seen as vital to Inkatha's overall strategy, for the size, unity and strength of Inkatha's membership is crucial to Buthelezi's bargaining position with the government, making it a force which cannot be by-passed in any future negotiations. It is also the commitment of Inkatha's members to the movement's official ideology that is said to distinguish it from its main political rivals. Yet, previous studies have eschewed any detailed consideration of membership in favour of analysing Inkatha's political role.²

Notes on Methodology

The present state of our knowledge on Inkatha membership is unsatisfactory and does not reflect the prominence of the organization in the current political scene in South Africa. To correct this void the author undertook a sample survey of Inkatha membership in the township of KwaMashu in 1980. Samples are only representative of the wider universe from which they are drawn. The wider universe from which the sample is drawn is Zulu males with legal residence rights in KwaMashu. Multi-stage sampling by area was used to achieve randomization. Inkatha members were identified by a filter question in the midst of a standardized interview schedule relating to political attitudes. The filter question asked which organizations respondents were members of. Additional questions were asked of those respondents who mentioned Inkatha. Thus, a sub-sample of Inkatha members was obtained which could be directly compared to a wider parent sample of non-members which acted as a control group. One of the major problems with such research is that, even with randomization, it is only possible to make generalizations from a sample to the wider universe from which it is drawn and of which it is taken to be representative. Therefore, the data do not furnish insights into the nature of support among non-Zulu, women, migrant workers or rural dwellers. Nonetheless, urban areas are important in current politics for a variety of reasons, and the urban areas will have to be won over if Inkatha is to extend its power base beyond rural Kwa-Zulu. Therefore, the attitudes and motivations of Inkatha's urban members do warrant investigation.

Of the 255 respondents, 105 were prepared to admit to Inkatha membership, a proportion of 41.2 percent. This figure would support Kane-Berman's estimate (IRISH TIMES, 21 June 1983), that Inkatha membership will top one million during 1985. The data from the sample have been analysed in detail elsewhere³ and further details about the research design and the problems involved in research like this can be found there. In this paper, analysis of the Inkatha respondents will be restricted to one issue which bears upon the membership of social and political movements: the extent to which lay members have internalized the beliefs, policies and goals contained in the movement's official ideology.

Internalization of Ideology

There is an on-going debate in the literature on social and political movements about the coherence between official ideology and the beliefs of ordinary members, and the casual connection between them. There are those who argue that the ideology of the movement reflects the grievances and attitudes of its members, while others stress that the ideology often defines the members' opinions for them.⁴ In the former case, the movement's policies reflect the views of the members, while in the latter instance, the members assimilate the ideological categories of the movement. In this account of conversions to the Jehovah's Witnesses, Beckford (1978) notes how the subject's self-reported accounts of religious conversion could not be taken as unproblematic. They were typically constructed according to the ideas and guidelines of the movement itself; the subject's view of the world were defined for him by the movement.

Only when there is a coherence between the opinions of members and official ideology does the movement have that unity, and strength and loyalty of support which is vital for success. In political science the theory of political immunization discusses how this coherence functions to provide the mechanism through which members interpret political stimuli to produce strong and loyal support to the movement.⁵ It argues that identification with the movement (or political party) strengthens, and support to it deepens, the longer the movement's ideological categories are used by members to interpret and make sense of political stimuli.

Findings on the Political Beliefs of Inkatha Members

The data on Inkatha membership cannot be used to decide whether the movement's ideology or the opinions of members are the independent variable. This is as much a philosophical issue as an empirical one. Nonetheless, it is possible to establish whether there was a coherence in the views of members and those of Chief Buthelezi at the time when the research was undertaken. Although this is a crude measure of official ideology, the focus will concentrate on three particular issues: their views on the role of political violence; the role of ethnicity in politics; and what future political dispensations aspire to. One special point of interest opens up here, for it is possible to establish whether the views of the Inkatha members on these issues are as moderate and conservatives as those of their leader. Previous analyses (Southall, 1981; Brewer, 1981) have suggested that, even by 1980, Inkatha's policy had taken a move to the right.⁶ Therefore, one is able to see whether this move towards conservatism is in accord with the views of ordinary members of Inkatha.

Chief Buthelezi's commitment to non-violence is well known (Southall, 1981: 464). Although he has warned of the pressures pushing Blacks towards violence, Buthelezi's career shows a remarkable degree of consistency in advocating non-violence; all the more remarkable given his oscillation on other issues. Southall (1981: 464) sees this commitment as a key part of Inkatha's petty bourgeois platform, while Schlemmer (1980) sees it as an essential part of Inkatha's commitment to consociationalism.

In fact, the rejection of political violence was manifested throughout the sample as a whole and transcended all social variables, with 91.8 percent being opposed to its use. The opposition to the use of political violence was even greater among Inkatha members. Even if there was a tendency to under-represent the support for political violence because of the fear of expressing such views, this figure does confirm the wealth of previous research which shows there is a considerable constituency within the Black communities which desires a peaceful solution, at least as an immediate goal.⁷ Inkatha's commitment to non-violence distinguishes it from many other Black opposition forces and this allows Inkatha to successfully tap this constituency. As far as the data go, it is shown that on this issue there is a large degree of coherence between Buthelezi and his ordinary members in the sample.

One of the other distinguishing features of Inkatha is its views on the role of ethnicity in politics. Southall (1981: 446-447; 1983: 110-112) describes it as an ethnic movement, while Schlemmer (1980: 115) feels that broader political goals are the source of Inkatha's main attraction to members. Inkatha's position is not simple or clear cut. Its role as the governing party of Kwa-Zulu forces Inkatha to manipulate a Zulu ethnic base, while its social movement role in wider South African politics requires it to shed itself of ethnicity. Inkatha has shown a shift from a cultural to a political liberation movement and, in this way, many of the earlier references in its constitution and policy statements to Zulu ethnicity have been deleted. But while it remains the governing party of an ethnic territory, it cannot successfully purge the traces of ethnicity. So its overall position is ambiguous (Brewer, 1981: 104; forthcoming: chapter 6): The cathetic symbols which Inkatha utilizes are one example of this ambiguity. The symbols, values and standards of a movement are important in developing support to it and some of the cathetic symbols of Inkatha are Zulu--its flag, tribal dancing, impis and so on. As if to emphasise its ambiguity, however, its uniform is in the old colours of the ANC, an organization which epitomizes modernity in Black politics.

The ambiguity does not reflect in the attitude of Inkatha members in the sample. They are less conservative than Buthelezi in this regard, for they are ahead of their leadership in rejecting Zulu ethnicity as having a political role. Tables 1 and 2 show that the overwhelming majority of Inkatha respondents saw the encouragement and forging of Black unity as the main issue facing Inkatha. Their motivations to join reflected an interest in wider political goals and showed no traditional, tribal or charismatic following for Buthelezi.

In response to the question of which group they saw it as Inkatha's role to help, nearly three-quarters of the Inkatha respondents said 'all races,' rather than 'all Blacks' or 'only Zulu.' This support for an ethnically neutral role for Inkatha among its supporters in the sample held true across all social variables, although it was even more pronounced among the young and better educated.

Table 1. Motivations for Joining Inkatha

Reason	Percent	Number
Improve my standard of living	6.7	7
Safeguard my career/job	9.5	10
Improve wise decision-making	31.4	33
Obtain one-man-one-vote	8.6	9
End discrimination against Blacks generally	43.8	46
Other	--	--
No response	--	--
	100	105

Table 2. The Major Issue Facing Inkatha

Issue	Percent	Number
Reducing unemployment	18.1	19
Raising the standard of living	4.8	5
Universal franchise	5.7	6
Abolishing discrimination	11.4	12
Forging Black unity	60.0	63
Other	--	--
	100	105

This degree of ethnic neutrality may be over-representative of Inkatha membership as a whole due to the urban nature of the sample and the bias in Inkatha membership towards the rural dwellers. Meer and Mlaba's study (1982: 212) of women in Nqutu showed them to be more ethnocentric than the KwaMashu respondents with only 1 percent supporting the view that it was Inkatha's role to help 'all races,' 1.5 percent feeling it should be 'all Zulu' and 14 percent 'all Blacks.' There was a non-response rate of 85.5 percent, so it is impossible to know what significance this finding has, although this tendency toward ethnocentrism among rural Africans is to be found in other research on the ethnic attitudes of rural Africans in South Africa.⁸

In this sense, the ambiguity there is in Inkatha policy may well reflect the different constituencies within it and represent Buthelezi's attempt to reconcile the different interests of these constituencies. This suggests, as Kane-Berman (1980: 154) has argued previously, that Inkatha is a coalition of radical and

moderate elements. If the sample reflects the radical element, it further suggests that there is a rural-urban split within the movement. Conflicts in the past between Buthelezi and the Soweto branches of Inkatha over strategy in Soweto are evidence that this split has proved difficult to contain.

The final area to be considered is that of the political aspirations of the Inkatha respondents. The absence of any ethnocentrism in the majority of Inkatha respondents influences their views on future political dispensations, pushing them towards a power sharing option. Buthelezi has rejected universal franchise and, while 83.4 percent of the Inkatha respondents felt getting one-man-one-vote would be a "good thing for Blacks," it was not very prominent in their motivations for joining or in their views of the major issues and problems of the time when set against other things. Over three-quarters of the Inkatha respondents felt ending discrimination was 'most important to them,' while only 7.6 percent mentioned getting one-man-one-vote. Only 2.9 percent mentioned this as the major problem facing Blacks. The absence of any ethnocentrism among the respondents made them unwilling to countenance a political solution where one ethnic group would dominate, even if it were their own. Their political aspirations were predominantly for power sharing with all races. Those seeking such a solution comprised 89.5 percent of all Inkatha respondents, with only 8.6 percent aspiring to an all-African government and 1.9 percent for a government with Indians only. Thus, for example, 60 percent said they would give their greatest support to a 'South Africa under a shared race government.' Only 18.1 percent supported the idea of ethnic homelands for Africans.

One of the problems in the data for those who have in the past advanced the idea of universal franchise, and the present author is one, is that this does not receive much greater support among non-members of Inkatha in the sample. While there was a slightly greater tendency for them to mention universal franchise as an issue important to them personally or to Black people generally, and to be in favour of more narrowly African or Black nationalist solutions, the level of support for power sharing in an all race government is not far behind that amongst Inkatha respondents--a mere 6.8 percent difference. Even for these respondents, power sharing between all races was the favoured solution of 82.7 percent of the sample. If, like Southall (1981: 464), we take the support for universal franchise as one measure of a politically radical stance, then members of Inkatha in KwaMashu do not seem to be significantly more conservative than their neighbours who are not members of the organization. Thus, while there is a coherence between the views on power sharing of Buthelezi and the Inkatha respondents, this coherence also exists for non-members. This suggests that the latter could constitute a pool of potential converts to be tapped as the future political drama unfolds. There is also a lesson for those who reject the idea of power sharing, for the urban residents of KwaMashu strongly supported this idea.

Conclusion

Quite clearly, there is a considerable degree of coherence, on these three issues, between the official ideology, as espoused by Buthelezi, and the beliefs of ordinary Inkatha members. This would give Inkatha an advantage over the United Democratic Front if this coherence is not true of the UDF. But there are

other points which need highlighting. The Inkatha members here were urban and if there is a dichotomy between the rural and urban members, it does force upon us the necessity to distinguish between the different kinds of Inkatha membership.

While the data here do illustrate a coherence between official ideology and the beliefs of urban lay members, it also demonstrates the potential for division between Inkatha's urban and rural members. This opens up the organization to a range of possible internal policy conflicts. The leadership of Inkatha not only has to create a strategy which gives the organization a role in wider South African politics, it simultaneously has to tend to the bureaucratic task of forging a united membership.⁹ There is already evidence of internal conflicts over policy and strategy. The resignation of Bengu, the former General Secretary, expulsions from the Youth Brigade and open quarrels between Buthelezi and the Soweto branches are examples of such conflicts. Because the size, unity and strength of Inkatha membership is so vital to Buthelezi's bargaining position with the state and in distinguishing him from rivals, Inkatha's importance to the current political situation will depend on its ability to contain these conflicts and straddle the different types of membership it attracts. More so than any political role, this bureaucratic task will be the test of Buthelezi's leadership qualities.

FOOTNOTES

1. From varying viewpoints see, 'Inkatha: Centrepiece of the Gathering Storm,' Frontline (Johannesburg), December 1979; 'Will Zulu Party Change the Shape of Apartheid Politics,' New African (March 1978); South African Communist Party, 'The Compromising Role of Inkatha,' African Communist, 74 (1978); Counter Information Service, Buying Time in South Africa (London, 1979); Schlemmer (1980); Kane-Berman (1982); Southall (1981); Brewer (1981).
2. All we have at the moment are vague and unsubstantiated inferences about membership. For a summary of the contrasting views of Inkatha's political role, see Brewer (1985). This article is an attempt to give some empirical foundation to our knowledge of Inkatha membership.
3. See Brewer (1985) and Brewer (forthcoming, chapter 6).
4. See G. Lewis, 'The Structure of Support in Social Movements,' British Journal of Sociology, 27 (1976); P. Kiven Tunteng, 'Ideology, Racism and Black Political Culture,' *ibid.*; H. Blumer, 'Outline of Collective Behaviour,' R. Evans, Readings in Collective Behaviour (Chicago 1975); N. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour, (New York, 1962); R. Heberle, 'Forward,' R. Roberts and R. Kloss, Social Movements between the balcony and the barricade, (London 1979); J. Banks, The Sociology of Social Movements (London, 1972); R. Levitas, 'Some Problems of Aim-Centred Models of Social Movements,' Sociology, 11 (1977).

5. For an outline of this see A. Campbell, Converse, Miller Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960); McPhee and Ferguson, 'Political Immunization,' McPhee and Glaser, *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (Glencoe, 1962), pp 155-79. For an application to Britain see Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (London, 1969). For an application to British fascist movements see J. Brewer, *Mosley's Men: the BUF in the West Midlands* (London, 1984), pp 22-26.
6. The reasons for this shift differ. Southall sees it as part of Buthelezi's policy to present Inkatha as the moderate Black heir to a consociational solution, while Brewer sees it as the consequence of Inkatha's entrapment between the twin pressures of state control and ostracism by the left.
7. This emerged as a strong theme from the longitudinal study of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Hanf (1981). The different degree of legitimacy which political violence has in Northern Ireland compared to South Africa, is one of the reasons why political violence is much higher in Northern Ireland despite the level of oppression for Catholics being far less severe than it is for Blacks in South Africa. See J. Brewer and J. Smyth, 'Political Violence and Conflict Management in Northern Ireland and South Africa,' T. Hanf, *Deeply Divided Societies* (Munich, forthcoming).
8. The pioneering work of Mayer is a good example. He has recently up-dated and extended his work on ethnic and class perceptions among Africans in a paper called 'Good and Bad Whites,' delivered at Queen's University of Belfast, January 1983. Also see Hanf (1981: 339-44); Lever (1978); De Crespigny and Schrire (1978); Schlemmer and Moller (1982).
9. In this way Inkatha tends to conform to what we already know about some nationalist movements in other parts of Africa, who were extremely fissile.

Bibliography

- Brewer, J., 1981: "The Modern Janus: Inkatha's Role in Black Liberation." *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Vol 12, Institute of Commonwealth Studies.
- Brewer, J., 1985: "Inkatha Membership in KwaMashu." *African Affairs*. Vol 84.
- Brewer, J. (forthcoming): *After Soweto: an Unfinished Journey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DeCrespigny, A. and R. Schrire, 1978: *The Government and Politics of South Africa*. Cape Town: Juta.
- Hanf, T., 1981: *South Africa, the Prospects of Peaceful Change*. London: Rex Collings.
- Kane-Berman, J., 1982: "Inkatha: The Paradox of South African Politics" *Optima*. Vol 30.

- Lever, H., 1978: "Attitudes and Opinions of Africans." In South African Society. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
- Lewis G., 1976: "The Structure of Support in Social Movements." British Journal of Sociology. Vol 27.
- Meer, F.S. and M. Mlaba, 1982: Apartheid--Our Picture. Durban: Butterworths.
- Schlemmer, L., 1980: "The Stirring Giant." In Price and Rosberg, The Apartheid Regime, Cape Town: David Philip.
- Schlemmer, L. and V. Moller, 1982: Migrant Labour in South Africa, Centre for Applied Social Sciences. University of Natal.
- Southall, R., 1981: "Buthelezi, Inkatha and the politics of compromise," African Affairs. Vol 80.

CSO: 3400/1164

SOUTH AFRICA

SADF'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MISCONDUCT CRITICIZED

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 8 Sep 85 p 6

[Commentary by Percy Qoboza in Percy's Itch Column]

[Text] THE appointment by the South African Defence Force of a special committee to investigate the allegations of misconduct by members of the security forces in black townships, has fallen flat on its face.

The announcement came just after police commissioner General Johan Coetzee's announcement that members of the public should lodge complaints with the police was greeted with widespread scepticism by members of the public.

Both the SADF and the South African Police must understand that many people are terrified of the police.

And you do not reasonably expect a man who has a complaint against a member of the police to go to the same police to lodge that complaint.

What many people would have liked to see, is the establishment of an independent body, preferably headed by a group of lawyers, who will record the complaints, initiate an independent inquiry, and cross-examine witnesses. They will then forward affidavits to a senior police officer.

Only when this is done can people feel secure enough to come forward with complaints against members of the army and police.

People are not suggesting that the entire defence force

and police force are guilty of misconduct.

Like any other organisation, one expects there are rotten eggs which damage the image of the police and defence force. But we must seek out these culprits so that they can be censured by the courts.

Having listened to many people's views on the subject, I am not sure the security forces can still salvage their reputation. But it would help to see them to try.

The Government, for its part, must lift the state of emergency as soon as possible, and at the same time remove the curfew in places like Soweto. The damage they inflict is immense.

Last Saturday night, I was supposed to join other editors at a dinner arranged to meet the three visiting EEC foreign ministers.

The dinner was scheduled to indulge in the most amazing form of verbal acrobatics. I calculated that the dinner would be fully operational by the time I got into Soweto.

Okay, all reporters here have been given a special dispensation to drive around at odd hours.

But still, my kids were most uncomfortable and they would not let me drive around Soweto at the dead of night exposing myself to the most fearsome dangers.

People have been killed under the most suspicious circumstances. So there you are. I never made it to the dinner.

They can blame it on the curfew.

And as long as it persists, all those Americans and Europeans who have descended on this country like a swarm of bees can forget seeing any of us at the dinners.

SOUTH AFRICA

NATIONAL PARTY'S CALL FOR SPEEDING UP REFORM

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Sep 85 p 2

[Text]

A RESOLUTION to be put before the National Party's Transvaal congress in Pretoria at the end of this week calls on the Government to speed up its reform programme so that its practical implications are known and understood before the next general election.

This is necessary because of the "uncertainty that accompanies reform," according to the resolution in the congress agenda.

Another resolution, referring particularly to Black constitutional accommodation, asks the Government to continue "incessantly, firmly and speedily" on its chosen path despite the possibility of increased resistance from "both extremities of the political spectrum".

The congress begins on Thursday.

Another resolution will request that influx control be replaced with a programme of orderly urbanisation.

The Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr Chris Heunis, will be asked to express an opinion on "the possibility and desirability of Black city states and territorial expansion of the powers of self-governing and independent states as part of the future constitutional development in the Republic".

Among other resolutions to be discussed, one on law and order will request stronger action against agitators and "inciters", in spite of the sensitivity surrounding the combating of unrest. — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/1164

SOUTH AFRICA

MOST INDIANS PREFER BOTHA AS NATIONAL LEADER

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 16 Sep 85 p 8

[Text] DURBAN. — Most Indians — and to a lesser extent — Coloureds prefer the State President, Mr P W Botha to lead South Africa, but a large majority of Africans want jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela as national leader.

These are some of the findings of a survey into the recent Natal unrest by the Institute of Black Research, released in Durban at the weekend by the Institute's director, Professor Fatima Meer of the University of Natal.

A total of 488 people in African, Indian and Coloured townships in the greater Durban metropolitan area were sampled after the unrest and riots early in August.

While more Coloureds (25 percent) preferred the PFP leader Dr F van Zyl Slabbert for the number two choice of national leader, Africans chose UDF pat-

ron Dr Allan Boesak as the second choice.

While Coloureds (11 percent) and Indians (3,7 percent) picked Mandela as third choice, Africans picked the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, Bishop Desmond Tutu.

KwaZulu leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was preferred as number four choice by 4,8 percent of Africans and by 0,6 percent of Indians sampled in the survey.

Not one of the 100 Coloured respondents picked Chief Buthelezi for any one of the six choices of South African leader and only three percent of Coloureds chose Dr Boesak, himself a member of the Coloured community.

Indians (11,2 percent) chose Dr Slabbert as second choice against a massive 53,4 percent for Mr Botha for number one choice. — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/1165

4 October 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

MINISTER SAYS NO TO WELFARE STATE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Sep 85 p 9

[Text]

SOUTH Africa was not and had no intention of becoming a welfare state, the Minister of Health Services and Welfare, Dr G de V Morrison, said yesterday.

But, he said, there were indications that the country might be moving in this direction — despite declared and firm Government policy not to become a welfare state.

Opening the new Jona Vaughan House for handicapped children at Amanzimtoti, on the Natal South Coast, he said that, there was cause for concern in the fact that the State was increasingly financing the rocketing costs of Social Welfare and Health Services.

The same thing applied to requests from the private welfare sector that more programmes be subsidised, or existing programmes receive bigger subsidies.

"The increasing support by the State for such services is resulting in South Africa's welfare services becoming more State involved," said Dr Morrison.

Now was the time for the volunteer to come into his own — for more use to be made of him in providing welfare services.

"As the worldwide economic recession increases, funds diminish for social and public services."

CSO: 3400/1165

SOUTH AFRICA

SLABBERT MOTIVES IN CALLING FOR CONVENTION ALLIANCE QUESTIONED

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 7 Aug 85 p 10

[Editorial: "The Alliance?"]

[Text] The first question that arises in connection with Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert's "broad alliance" to do the preparatory work for a national convention is whether he intends to resort to extra-parliamentary action with this.

What especially calls the motives behind the new plan into question is the fact that the PFP [Progressive Federal Party] leader previously declared himself willing to take part in the constitutional forum called into being by the government, with which progress has already been made. Dr Slabbert has himself already been present at meetings about the discussion body and there have been signs that it is seriously intended to get the forum going as soon as possible.

In government circles it has recently been emphatically stated that the agenda for a constitutional debate with Blacks is open, with the sole proviso that the arrangement that is worked out must not make the domination of one group over another possible. This is a prerequisite that Dr Slabbert agreed to and that he himself still requested over the weekend.

So why doesn't the opposition leader try to persuade the people he wants to involve in the alliance to take part in the forum? Perhaps precisely because he wants the forum to fail?

If that is the case, Dr Slabbert and his party have reverted to the old boycott mentality that found expression inter alia in the PFP's refusal to take part in the first president's council. If so the PFP has not yet escaped from the grudging spirit that characterized its eventual contribution to the new constitutional arrangement.

If the motive behind the alliance is not to derail the forum, the new plan is an attempt to back both sides, a political move that only too clearly cannot work.

12906

CSO: 3401/313

SOUTH AFRICA

UPGRADING OF HOMELAND PLANNED

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 29 Aug 85 p 6

[Article: "By Our Political Editorship": "Development in kwaZulu Planned"]

[Text] Improvement projects for urban Blacks in the kwaZulu-Natal region that will amount to roughly 107 million rand are among the recommendations contained in an interim report submitted to Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi yesterday by a joint planning committee.

Mr Louis Rive, former postmaster-general and chairman of the joint planning committee said yesterday that the committee has 40 physical improvement and development projects he regards as "extremely urgent."

But the final report, on which six working groups are still busy, will only be ready in 10 months.

The committee was assembled in July last year with instructions to make recommendations and to plan for the upgrading of the standard of living of Blacks in the urban areas of kwaZulu and Natal.

Areas that the committee has identified as having priority are: greater Inanda (outside Durban), greater Umlazi and the Edendale complex outside Pietermaritzburg.

At the same time, the committee's six working groups looked into certain areas where it has been decided by the government that no more relocations will be carried out, but where upgrading and maintenance are urgently needed.

These 12 areas are: Matatiële, Kokstad, Chesterville (Durban), Stanger, Greytown, Mooirivier, Glencoe, Colenso, Dundee, Vryheid and Ladysmith.

12906
CSO: 3401/313

SOUTH AFRICA

STELLENBOSCH RECTOR CALLS FOR MORE COLORED UNDERGRADUATES

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 17 Aug 85 p 11

[Article "By Our Political Editorship": "US Rector Requests New Approach to Coloreds"]

[Text] The University of Stellenbosch [US] has never taken the path of retreat or isolation. A further broadening of the basis of the university in these changing times is necessary, but with the preservation of its essential character.

So said the rector of the US. Professor Mike de Vries, yesterday evening in an address to student leaders, in which he asked for wider admission of colored undergraduate students to the US.

Speaking on the topic of "The Formation of Young Leaders at Our Universities: Educational Requirements," he said that he wished to refer to another function of a university, beyond the educational requirements it has to meet. It also has the task of nurturing, a task Professor De Vries believes should be highlighted more sharply than in the past.

The task of nurturing can be seen in the broad context of culture, socio-political requirements and civilization's needs.

"The US, especially as the oldest Afrikaans-language university and as the dynamo of Afrikaner thought, continues to have the task of projecting a glimpse of the future, a vision--you can even call it a dream--of the tomorrow we would like to see for the Afrikaner. The umbilical cord that binds Stellenbosch to the Afrikaner cannot be untied, and Stellenbosch has taken upon itself the enormous task of nurturing and building on the best in Afrikaner culture and traditions."

Mistakes

Professor De Vries said that he saw it as one of the educational requirements that must be brought home to youth leaders as students of the university that they should recognize and respect the human worth of people on all levels in their actions. As far as this is concerned, as also in some other areas, the past must be forgotten and a new beginning made.

He referred to the recent HSRC [Human Sciences Research Council] enquiry into intergroup relations in which obstacles in relations in the country were evident. According to the findings people are becoming isolated from one another. If this situation develops further, the HSRC warns that it will be increasingly difficult to defuse conflict. In the report the transmittal of communal values, especially through the educational system, is stressed.

Freedom of association with other individuals and groups--which includes the freedom of non-association--is regarded as an important prerequisite for future development. Furthermore, equal opportunities and the realization of individual potential and recognition of the human worth of all members of society are seen as essential.

"We must have the courage to admit that we have made mistakes in the past--not only the Afrikaner is to blame--and we must accept that these mistakes (will) be laid bare on the dissection tables of the Western world. Do we have the physical and moral strength not to be humiliated and broken? As a bred-in-the-bone Afrikaner I refuse to be humiliated and broken, but at the same time I am ready to leave behind the past and its faults, including my selective conscience, and to take the present as a starting point."

Professor De Vries said that the US's responsibility outside the purely academic field, and as an institution with a social vocation, lies, among other things in showing South Africa and the community it preeminently serves, the Afrikaner, that diversity in the makeup of a student body can be a strength. In itself it is an education for a future of understanding, and teaches that it is possible to retain your own character therein.

Confidence

The US's educational requirement also incorporates a vision of the future, an ideal, something to strive for--not fear-ridden oppression, strife and mutual conflict, but a positive and realistic view of the future of South Africa and the Afrikaner. Narrow exclusivity and a denial of the ideals of fellow South Africans are simply out of the question.

In the midst of pessimism about the future of the country, the duty of the university lies in articulating a message of hope that speaks to all the youth of South Africa, that is not limiting and exclusive, but nonetheless creatively reconciles Afrikaner identity and South African patriotism. In addition, contact and communication with all the people and all the different cultures and with the international community must be created and maintained. People must be convinced that there is little to be gained from isolation.

Basic Christian norms of civilization must not merely be preached, but lived out. All actions must reveal sincere humanity.

"We cannot be unapproachable and haughty, but should rather keep an open ear and an open eye for people's needs.

"It is hard not to notice the needs of the colored, indian and black communities in the area of education. These needs extend to the tertiary level. If we lay claim to being a university that upholds internationally accepted and recognized standards, we must not regard it as the exclusive right of only some of our country's inhabitants to receive such an education and upbringing."

Professor De Vries said that fortunately the US was no longer following such a course. The experience of admitting Coloreds over 8 years was fortunate, and Stellenbosch was not weaker in its nature, its mystical character, for it--rather even stronger.

The policy of admitting any student to courses on the post-graduate level (including B. Th., LL.B. and B. Ed.) simply on the basis of merit, he believes, is more or less generally accepted today. On the undergraduate level students are only admitted if the courses they are following or their combined majors are not offered at that population group's "own" universities.

"I am, however, aware that there are for many reasons also students that need to study at Stellenbosch who don't fit in with this policy. I am convinced that we ought to broaden this policy to accommodate the students who respect the values of Stellenbosch and wish to be exposed to them."

Character

The rector said that after a modest beginning in 1866 the basis of the US had been considerably broadened over the years. It had never been ashamed of what it was, or is or wanted to be. It had kept its individual character, and it had known its way forward. That had never been a path of retreat or isolation.

Different lines cannot be drawn for students who are accepted at the US. He is therefore also campaigning for the Group Areas Act to be differently applied on university campuses so that the treatment of students, especially also where accommodation is concerned, can entirely be regulated by the university council. The highest governing body at the university could thus make its own rules. A university's autonomy on its own campus could thereby be fully realized.

Professor De Vries said there was hard work in store for everyone. The present difficult situation must be a departure point for hard work on relations in the country.

"My vision, my dream for the future is a society where we acknowledge our diversity, trust and accept one another, nurture the things that unite us and do not live in isolation whether out of free will or by regulation.

"I look to a US that will hold out the message of a stable future, of faith, of hope, supported by level-headed thinking and action, and that is ready to pioneer the uncharted paths of the future.

"As student leaders there is work waiting for you. As the administration we can help open doors, but you must go through them," he said.

4 October 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

GENERAL MALAN DEFENDS NON-WHITE TROOPS AGAINST CP

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 23 Aug 85 p 14

[Report "From Our Political Editorship": "CP's Decision Is Ingratitude"]

[Text] Pretoria--The CP [Conservative Party] congress's resolution that non-Whites should no longer do border duty in the Army and that only white soldiers should be employed for this is the worst kind of ingratitude and it is so laughable and inconsequent that it must be repudiated, General Magnus Malan, the minister of defense, said yesterday.

General Malan was approached for comment after the CP's Transvaal congress adopted such a draft resolution. According to the draft resolution, non-Whites should rather perform police duties in their own residential areas in separate police units.

"For years colored, black and Indian members of the Army have made an exceptional contribution to keeping this country free from the Marxist terror onslaught. Many of them paid the supreme price, and on behalf of the government I once again thank these people for their voluntary service in this respect."

General Malan said that it was strange that the CP had accepted such a congress resolution a few months after the party's spokesman on defense, Mr Koos van der Merwe (MP [member of parliament] for Jeppe) "advocated compulsory military service for Coloreds and Indians in a torrent of words."

Now Mr van der Merwe's party did not even want non-Whites to fight in the front line of the country's defense. "It is beyond comprehension that such absurd and radical congress resolutions are accepted in these times."

"Luckily the Coloreds, Blacks and Indians know that the majority of Whites accept the colored, black and Indian soldiers as their partners in the struggle against a common enemy," General Malan said.

12906

CSO: 3401/316

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

LOAN FOR BOPHUTHATSWANA--Mafikeng--The Development Bank of Southern Africa has signed a R23-million loan agreement with the Bophuthatswana Government. The loan, signed in Mmabatho yesterday, is to be used for the further development of the Odi Manpower Centre. Speaking after the signing ceremony, the Manpower Minister, Mr S.L.L. Rathebe, said developing countries had to approach manpower development in a new way so that it could contribute meaningfully to industry. The chairman of the DBSA, Dr S. S. Brand, said the signing of the loan agreement was an indication of the bank's contribution to the improvement of education and training.--SAPA. [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Sep 85 p 15]

CSO: 3400/1143

TANZANIA

ANC OPENS FIRST EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE

Harare THE HERALD in English 4 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Anaclet Rwagayura]

[Text]

MAZIMBU (Tanzania).

OLIVER TAMBO, leader of the South African National Congress (ANC), describes the ANC college here as "a window on the future of a liberated motherland".

With mixed emotions of grief and joy as they recalled the 1976 Soweto student uprising, ANC members gathered here late last month for the official opening of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (Somas Co), the ANC's first educational institution.

After the Soweto uprising, during which police shot dead more than 300 students and wounded hundreds more, thousands of young black South Africans fled the country. Most joined the ANC, which has referred many for further education to Somas Co.

Somas Co, named after a young ANC guerilla who was executed in 1979, was established that year to cater for the educational needs of youths exiled from South Africa.

"This is a glorious day," Cde Tambo told an international gathering of guests at the opening ceremony. "We are gathered here to bear witness to the fruition of an independent education institution that rejects Bantu education."

The quality of education blacks receive under "Bantu education" is inferior to white education, and government spending per capita on white pupils far outweighs its outlay for black pupils.

Somas Co has grown impressively into a sizeable complex consisting of a vocational training unit, an adult education centre, various production units, a hospital, and nursery and primary schools.

Realisation of the entire project was a result of multi-national support and donations from government and non-governmental organisations. Among these were the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

Amid cheers, ululations and drumbeats, Cde Tambo told guests: "We have laid foundations for the new educational system that liberated South Africa will require. At Somas Co we are demonstrating our ability and capacity to govern

ourselves in a democratic and non-racial system."

ENDURE

Cde Tambo reminded his compatriots that they come from a country where the majority have had to endure a racist education system — Bantu education — which he said constitutes an extreme expression of colonial ideology.

Rejecting the view that the South African government is moving away from apartheid, Cde Tambo declared: "Apartheid cannot be reformed by its own perpetrators."

However, he added that "it will not be long before we create conditions in our country derived from experiences we have learnt here".

In response, the secretary of organisation in Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party, Cde Moses Nnauye, said the politics of "oppression" would always entail the "radicalisation of the oppressed".

Somas Co was established on a plot granted

to the ANC by the Tanzania government.

Mohamed Tikly, the college director, said that in South Africa opportunities for African students to follow mathematical or scientific studies are extremely limited. Minimal attention is paid to English language studies and Afrikaans is stressed as the principal medium of instruction.

Cde Tikly said that through Somaf Co programmes the ANC has opened the doors of learning which were closed in Soweto. The movement is providing South Africans of all ages access to their own history and culture while endeavouring to bridge the gap between mental and manual labour.

Thami Gqweta, a Somaf Co student, said that the college has managed to establish stable school life and conducive learning conditions.

Cde Gqweta said most of the youths who fled South Africa after 1976 did so with little knowledge of the nationalist struggle and ANC objectives. But, "while here, I realised that the ANC was internationally recognised and was able to accommodate and assist its members in achieving their needs".

A Somaf Co librarian, Chris Ngwenya (26), said the uprising against apartheid and spirit of revolt would persist until apartheid has been defeated.

He said he was fortunate to be accommodated in the ANC after the 1976 student revolt.

Anxious to get education, Cde Ngwenya was brought to Somaf Co where he completed Form

V in 1980. He is to go for further training in civil engineering abroad.

WAGE

Mpho Gwangwa, a 22-year-old Form V student, said women should come out of their kitchens and wage the liberation struggle alongside males.

For many years, she told IPS, she grew up alone with her mother in South Africa as her father, an active member of the ANC, was always outside the country on missions for the movement.

Between 1978 and 1982 Cde Gwangwa went to school in Botswana. Then she joined Somaf Co two years ago. Since learning what the ANC stands for and having made her own analysis of her father's long absences from home, she expresses a profound determination to defend the ANC and its aims.

Dumisani Nkosi has just celebrated his 24th birthday but he is only in Form III. He left his parents in South Africa in 1977 and fled to Swaziland where he joined the ANC.

"Sometimes I feel like crying when I remember my parents, but I hope we will meet in a free and democratic South Africa one day," he said.

Since coming to Somaf Co last year, he admits: "I have learnt that we are a community with all racial groups of South Africa. Our school aims at brotherhood."

Attempts to pursue the struggle against apartheid by peaceful means won't yield results, according to Barney Mogane (22), a Form V student. He participated in many ANC activities in South Africa before leaving for exile. — IPS.

TANZANIA

ITALIAN AID DISCUSSED

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 4 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] ITALY intends to explore possibilities of helping Tanzania in fishing industry, road communications from north to south, schools for the handicapped and training centres for artisans. This was revealed in Dodoma on Monday night by the Italian Ambassador to Tanzania, Marquiz Fabrizio Longhi, in an interview with newsmen at the Dodoma Regional Commissioner's residence, *Shihata* reported.

He said Tanzania must first identify projects which required immediate action. He gave an example of road communications which, he said, could speed up development especially in the agricultural sector and other industries.

Commenting on road construction and improvement within Dodoma, he said priority would be given to major roads or those with heavy traffic.

When asked about Dodoma/Arusha Road, surveyed by an Italian firm about a year ago, he promised to contact the company to find out what steps had been taken.

Longhi said that his country and other European countries would see to it that construction of railway line from Arusha to the shores of Lake Victoria became a reality.

On training of artisans, he

revealed that it was necessary for Italy to look into the possibility of establishing two training centres on the Isles and the mainland.

Italy would also extend its commitment to the social services by establishing schools for the handicapped. He also said that the Italian medical team in the country would be expanded by providing experts to identify dumb children at an age of three months, he said.

During his four-day visit to Dodoma, the envoy will meet the Italian medical team working at the Dodoma, Regional Government hospital, Roman Catholic fathers and sisters engaged in the rearing of vineyards.

He will also tour Sadelmi, an Italian firm constructing power lines from Iringa to Dodoma via Mtera.

TANZANIA

CANADIAN AID FOR PORT

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 4 Sep 85 p 3

[Text]

THE Canadian High Commissioner to Tanzania, Derek Arnould, has pledged that Tanga Port would get spares from Port Equipment Rehabilitation Unit in Dar es Salaam, *Shihata* reported.

The envoy made the pledge after he was told by the Tanga Assistant Port Manager, Ndugu F. X. Mungure, that most of the equipment supplied by his country at the port was in poor condition.

Ndugu Mungure told the envoy that most of the equipment was unserviceable because of lack of spares.

The envoy showed sympathy over the problems facing the port and promised that he would see that things returned "to shape once again."

Later he inspected some of the equipment, including cranes, fork lifts and forklift tractors. He also toured the harbour by boat to the Tanzania Fertilizer Company Jetty at Raskazone.

He also visited the site for a proposed port at Mwambani. Money for the project is yet to be sought.

Earlier, he called on the Tanga Regional Commissioner, Colonel Ayubu Simba, and visited the Regional Party Headquarters.

He also visited a sisal estate at Gofu, Livestock Training Institute at Buhuri and the Tanga plant of the Tanzania Diaries Limited on the outskirts of the town.

The plant was built by the New Zealand Government.

CSO: 3400/1127

TANZANIA

AUSTRALIAN, NORWEGIAN OIL AGREEMENTS

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 3 Sep 86 p 1

[Text]

THE Norwegian state-owned oil company (STATOIL) yesterday opened a Dar es Salaam office to be jointly used by the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) for oil exploration in Tanzania.

A TPDC statement issued in the city yesterday said the office, situated along Upanga Road, was equipped with computer facilities for seismic data processing, interpretation and evaluation.

The statement said the office had the largest computing capacity presently available in Tanzania.

It said that STATOIL intended to prospect for oil in Tanzania and possibly conclude a production sharing agreement.

STATOIL had already carried out several evaluations and technical studies related to petroleum exploration in Tanzania, the statement said, adding that the firm had also assisted TPDC in following up and carrying out various drilling and other exploration operations.

A five-year petroleum sector programme was launched through the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) in 1983 with a total budget of 88m/-.

The programme included financial and technical assistance in seismic and gravity surveys,

geological surveys, evaluation and interpretation studies and institutional support for TPDC and the Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals.

It also covered support to the biostratigraphic unit at the University of Dar es Salaam, technical support from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate for Studies, supervision analysis and training of TDPC personnel at Norwegian universities and other foreign institutions, it said.

Meanwhile, an Australian company starts oil exploration in Coast Region today following an agreement signed in Dar es Salaam yesterday between the company and the Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals.

A press statement issued by the Ministry said that the agreement was aimed at enabling the Australian company to participate in the petroleum exploration activities currently being undertaken in the licence area held by the International Energy Development Corporation (IEDC), the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Corporation (KUFPEC) and the Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA).

It said that according to the agreement, IEDC and KUFPEC would jointly hold 40 per cent of the exploration interests while SNEA and the Australian com-

pany — a subsidiary of Broken Hill Proprietary Company (BHP) which is a large Australian enterprise with activities in oil and gas development, mining, manufacturing and commerce — would each hold 30 per cent.

The statement said the farm-in was designed to enhance exploration activities in the licence

area by making additional technical and financial resources available from BHP.

A ministry official said the drilling of the well located between Bagamoyo and Chalinze in the Coast Region was expected to start this morning and the company was expecting to spend some 180m/- on it.

CSO: 3400/1127

4 October 1985

TANZANIA

DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL SCALE IRRIGATION SCHEMES DISCUSSED

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 5 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Paul Chintowa, Shihata Staff Writer]

[Text] Faced with the problem of recurrent droughts most African countries are realising the folly of relying on rains for their agricultural production. The majority of them including Tanzania are now turning to small-scale irrigation schemes especially for food-crop production. The Usangu Village Irrigation Development Project in southern Tanzania is one such scheme.

Development of small scale irrigation projects could be an answer to the persisting food shortage in developing countries especially Africa, where millions are starving because of overdependence on erratic rains.

Like many other developing countries, Tanzania has spared no efforts in developing small-scale irrigation projects intended to raise food production as well as reduce dependence on unpredictable rainfall.

For the last three or so years, the country has been experiencing food shortages brought about by drought and has had to spend precious foreign exchange to import food.

Implementation of the 78.8 million Usangu village irrigation development project in Mbeya region jointly financed by the government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is one of the projects intended to make the country self-sufficient in food.

With an area of 15,000 hectares currently under irrigation 12,000 under peasant farms and 3,000 hectares owned by the National Food and Agriculture Corporation -- NAFCO, the Usangu Valley has all the qualities and potential for successful irrigation farming.

The development of the Usangu plains has been the subject of several surveys beginning in 1961 when FAO carried out an assessment of the area's irrigation potential as part of the Rufiji Basin study.

The Mbeya-based Zonal irrigation Officer, R. J. M. Temu, says a study carried out recently by the Commonwealth Secretariat estimates that some 68,500 hectares could be irrigated at the area if finance is secured.

Temu says when the project is completed by 1986/87 year, the 15,000 hectares to be under irrigation are expected to increase paddy yields in the Usangu Area from the present 40,000 tonnes to 150,000 annually.

The four-year project, whose implementation began in July 1984, is expected to benefit nine villages around the Usangu plains in Mbeya Rural District under small scale irrigation projects.

The project, according to Temu, entails the upgrading and the rehabilitation of the Mejengo Village irrigation scheme covering 600 hectares within the Usangu plains famous for paddy growing.

The project is also aimed at improving small scale irrigation schemes at Ipatagwa, Mlowo, Motombaya, Meta, Kilombero, Majengo, Mbuyuni and Utengule areas.

A recent report says the immediate aim of the traditionally but the crudely practised by peasants with little success project is to rehabilitate the irrigation infrastructure, servicing irrigated rice cultivation in several villages in the area thereby increasing crop yields especially paddy.

Modern irrigation, adds the report, will go along with optimum water management, improved seed varieties, simple but practical crop husbandry and post harvest crop management.

Rice and other crop varieties will also be improved to suit local conditions and the establishment of standardized crop husbandry practices through trial and evaluation on demonstration plots as well as strengthening of extension services will be emphasized.

In-service and on-the-job training will also be provided by experts in addition to group training sessions to be conducted on the demonstration plots.

Under the project, UNDP will also provide, through the FAO, experts, and fellowship training while the government will provide houses, workshops, stores and will meet other local expenses.

By December in 1984, the report says, the government had completed construction of office building, workshop, store and eight staff houses at Igurusi around the Usangu plains in Mbeya Rural District.

Following arrival of machinery and equipment worth more than 7 million/,-, implementation of the project has now gained momentum, according to the report.

Between now and 1987, main canals will be constructed, access roads will be provided and a comprehensive work programme complete with designs, manpower and budgetary requirements for full upgrading of Majengo Irrigation Scheme under the Usangu Valley will be implemented.

The project also incorporates the training of people in irrigation planning, construction and management, as well as the collection of climatic and river discharge data.

It will also include expansion of demonstration plots in order to provide enough land for trials on rice varieties, application of fertilizer and manure, crop density, land preparation techniques, crop husbandry practices and techniques to reduce post-harvest losses.

The project carry out inservice and on-the-job training, group training, fellowships and study tours for the Mbeya zonal irrigation unit staff and the preparation of work programmes for up to the year 1990.

The UNDP had sent two missions in 1980 and 1983 to assess the project's viability. Under the project, the government has provided 16,561,040/- and the UN body has approved 62,375,400/-.

Temu says the Government intends to request for more funds from the UNDP to finance the project's phase two.

The Usangu plains irrigation project is only one of integrated irrigation schemes which the government is undertaking and intends to undertake to ensure that the country's agriculture will no longer be victim to the whims of the weather.

CSO: 3400/1127

TANZANIA

TARECU PURCHASES CROPS

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 3 Sep 85 p 3

[Text]

THE Tabora Region Co-operative Union (TARECU) has purchased 4,492,273.5 kilogrammes of various crops worth 43,949,296/45, Shihata has reported.

A report issued by TARECU General Manager Mwelukiwa J. Sizya to the Regional Crop Purchasing Committee at the weekend said 2,236,542.5 kilogrammes worth 18,350,824/30 had been transported from primary co-operative societies to National Milling Corporation (NMC) godowns.

He told the committee that the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) had authorised 3.1m/- for the purchase of an assortment of crops, and that the money had all been spent.

He said the crops had already been paid for by the NMC and the General Agricultural Products Export Corporation (GAPEX). Returns by both institutions are 7,452,885/25 and 2m/-, respectively.

Ndugu Sizya explained that since the money had all been spent, the Union had applied for another overdraft from NBC. He said 94,787,170/- had been asked for against the earlier 40m/-.

He said the NBC had authorised 33.5m/- for cotton purchases and that until August 25, some 32,523,368/- had been

spent on buying the crop, gunny bags and insurance cover.

He said cotton ginning was going on well and that to date 1,375 bales had been ginned. Some 627 bales out of these had been sent to Bukene and 200 to Dar es Salaam.

The General Manager told the committee that the former Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA) was owed 11,412,557/- by the Union and that the money was yet to be paid. He said if the money was paid, it would assist in the exercise of crop buying and, therefore, hasten the exercise.

Ndugu Sizya said the Union was facing shortage of gunny bags with which to pack general crops and that though 64,000 bags were required only 25,659 had been obtained. All had been distributed to the villages. Some 100 bales of bags were expected to arrive in the Region soon, he added.

On credits for tobacco inputs, cotton and other crops for the 1985/86 season, Ndugu Sizya said the Co-operative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB) had authorised an overdraft of 190m/-. He added, however, that negotiations between CRDB and Tanzania Fertiliser Company (TFC) were still on regarding mode of payment.

He further said that CRDB had authorised the Union to purchase inputs up to 50 per

cent of the overdraft, and that distribution of the inputs would start after getting further information from TFC.

●Meanwhile, the Ruvuma Region Co-operative Union (RCU) has been directed to start immediately paying the peasants in cash for crops purchased from them and stop forthwith setting payment centres far from where peasants live.

The directive was issued over the weekend by the Regional Development Directorate during a meeting of the committee to monitor transportation of crops in the region.

The committee was told that the Directorate had received

complaints from the people about non-payment for their crops, warning that the habit created room for businessmen to cheat the peasants and earn quick money.

Such habits of non-payment disheartened the people and created enmity between them and the Union which had been established in order to give them better services, the committee was told.

The Directorate also directed that all village lorries in the region should be enlisted so that they helped in the haulage of 6.138 tonnes of crops which were stranded in the villages due to shortage of trucks.

CSO: 3400/1127

TOGO

BRIEFS

NEW APPOINTMENTS, REASSIGNMENTS--Yesterday morning, the president and founder of the Togolese People's Assembly, President of the Republic Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema, named several persons to the presidential staff and to head the information services assigned to the presidency by the appropriate ministry. The appointments are as follows: Solitoke Eso has been named press attache to the presidency of the republic, replacing Kegbagnou Nabede. Koffi Panou was named director of television, and Combiete Combey, director of Radio Lome. In addition, by another decree signed by the chief of state, Amah Abayi Manguiwekim, prefect of Yoto, was relieved of his duties, as was Assiongbon Foly, aide to the prefect of Yoto. The last-mentioned individuals have been placed at the disposal of the minister of national education and scientific research. [Text] [Lome LA NOUVELLE MARCHE in French 27 Jul 85 p 1] 8735

CSO: 3419/520

UGANDA

HISTORY OF BLOODSHED, TORTURE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE

Paris LIBERATION in French 29 Jul 85 p 18

[Article by Pierre Haski: "'Pearl of Africa,' Years of Blood"]

[Text] Winston Churchill called Uganda "the pearl of Africa." Since then the pearl has been somewhat spattered with blood. From Milton Obote to Idi Amin Dada, then to Obote second time round, a man's skin has not been worth very much in that African country, though blessed by God with a fertile soil and abundant rain.

Though at the outset Obote seemed to belong to the race of the Nyereres or Kaundas among the nationalist heads of state on the continent, he very rapidly plunged his country into tribal conflicts. In particular, he took it out on the Bagandas, the country's main tribe, taking away their king Sir Edward Mutesa, and suspending the constitution.

1971: Exit Obote, replaced by his chief of staff, Idi Amin. The escapades of this general-boxer-buffoon, in power for 8 years, tended to make the Western public forget the mounds of bodies accumulated during his reign. The tens of thousands of victims whose bodies were found, one early morning, in a forest near the exit from Kampala.

1979: The victorious Tanzanian troops enter the "liberated" Kampala, bringing in their wake a newly formed Ugandan "liberation army." Tanzanian President Nyerere had been the only one in Africa to condemn the violations of human rights under Amin, described as the "black Hitler"...a new era seemed to be dawning for Uganda.

The first gritting of teeth was already occurring during the transition period: Milton Obote's election victory, far from stabilizing the country, plunged it into a new blood bath. The opposition all agreed on one point: Obote had outdone (or done worse than) Amin. Last year, former president Yusuf Lule, who has since died, accused Obote of being responsible for the death of 200,000 to 250,000 people in 3 years, or as many as Amin in 8 years. More recently, the leader of the legal opposition put the death figure between 300,000 and 500,000.

The Americans came up with their own morbid evaluation, and the assistant secretary of state for human rights estimated last year that there had been 100,000 to 200,000 victims in Uganda in 3 years. Milton Obote's government strongly protested, and itself admitted some...15,000 deaths.

Very recently, Amnesty International published a damning report, accusing the Ugandan army of systematically torturing its prisoners, and practicing arbitrary action and terror. The incontestable evidence provided by the humanitarian organization gives an idea of the fate of prisoners in Uganda. Among the tortures practiced is hanging a burning car tire over a tied-up prisoner. The drops of melted rubber fall on the prisoner, a treatment repeated for hours, even days.

In its campaign against the opposition guerrillas, the Ugandan army has not used gloves. The "Luwero triangle" north and west of the capital, the stronghold of the rebellion, has for 3 years been the scene of fighting and massacres. More than 750,000 people have been forcibly moved, and at one time more than 120,000 of them were being kept in detention centers disguised as refugee camps.

Guerrilla attacks, reprisals, political and tribal rivalries, arbitrary action and repression... Uganda has not stopped its journey to the end of hell. There is nothing to make one believe that General Okello will do better than his predecessors.

9920

CSO: 3419/500

UGANDA

POLITICAL PROSPECTS OF OKELLO REGIME ANALYZED

Paris LIBERATION in French 29 Jul 85 pp 18-19

[Article by Pierre Haski]

[Text] Not a single store undamaged in Kampala: the soldiers of General Okello, the new master of Uganda, celebrated their victory in their own fashion. The Ugandan capital suffered 2 days of systematic pillaging following the fall on Saturday of Milton Obote's regime. AP reports that finally yesterday afternoon officers intervened, ordering the soldiers to return the stolen objects and to stop firing in the air. A number of drunk soldiers who refused to obey were reprimanded. In the "euphoria," the Ugandan AFP correspondent left his watch...

Taking power was not difficult for the rebel troops led by Brig Gen Bazilio Olara Okello, previously commander of the northern brigade of the regular army. In 48 hours, the mutiny that had broken out in the north, initially over tribal rivalries, had reached the capital, caught in a pincer movement by two columns of rebel troops. At 1100 hours Saturday morning the first trucks and buses loaded with rebels and weapons made their entry into Kampala, while Milton Obote--overthrown for the second time in 15 years--fled with some of his colleagues toward Kenya, where they arrived safe and sound. The few gestures of resistance by loyal troops, who tried to take hostages in a barracks, were quickly ended. The number of victims in Kampala appears to have been small.

In his first radio speech on Sunday, General Okello promised, as every coup leader starts out by doing, to restore democracy and hold free elections. He said he had assumed power to restore national unity, adding that the Ugandans had suffered too much. In their first proclamation the new leaders promised to "all the tribes of Uganda that we will not persecute them, and will not launch any reprisals against innocent Ugandans because of their ethnic, religious or political ties. We will not engage in reprisals and we will not persecute the innocent civil servants or the members of the security forces, civilians or members of the overthrown government."

The first measures of the new regime were also classic: suspension of the constitution, closure of the borders, curfew, assembling in the mess the officers of all the former ministers, police prefects and officers, and prison

officials, no doubt to offer them a drink. Twenty ministers were arrested right away on Saturday, including the formidable chief of secret police (NASA), minister of state for internal security, Cris Rwakasisi, captured while he was trying to flee to Kenya. This was a man whose fate few Ugandans will mourn.

Little is known about the personality of the new head of state. Brazilio Olara Okello was not a top-rank officer. All we know about him is that he lived in exile in Tanzania during the Amin Dada period, and that he fought during the "war of liberation" of 1979. His main attribute, in fact, is being an Acholi, a tribal minority allied to the Langi of President Obote until their victorious uprising. This is an important rivalry in a country where the "tribal issue" remains an essential element in holding power.

The Acholi-Langi alliance, which in 1979 had made it possible to seize power from the Lugbara of Idi Amin Dada, had been in a bad way for a long time. The Acholi, who made up half the strength of the army and were often assigned the "dirty work," were less and less happy with the monopolization of power by the Langi. The issue was posed sharply on the occasion of replacement, 18 months ago, of the army chief of staff, who died in a helicopter accident. Claimed by the Acholi, the post was given, after a long period of uncertainty, to the Langi. Recently, incidents between the two tribes broke out over dividing a batch of arms delivered by North Korea. Also, Okello was reportedly the target of an attempted assassination, which precipitated events.

Having gained power as a result of tribal frustration, General Okello is extending his hand to the other tribes in order to insure his survival. He has need to do so, because the country is in a stage of advanced decomposition. The new head of state particularly needs Yoweri Museveni, who leads the all-powerful National Resistance Army (NRA), a guerrilla group that relies on the Ankole tribe of western Uganda and in part on the Baganda, the country's main group. Museveni, who has several thousand armed men, has benefited from the confusion in the army to extend his zone of influence to Fort Portal, near the Zaire border, and thus has an additional card in the expected bargaining. From Goteborg, Sweden, where he is now, Museveni, a former "Marxist" minister of defense, has stated that he is ready "to participate in the country's new direction on condition that the ruling power guarantees peace and democracy." He added that he did not intend to return immediately to Uganda, as the country's new authorities had invited him to do.

In fact, in December, Museveni and the Acholi officers of the army met secretly to plan a joint overthrow of Obote. According to our information, the negotiation broke down over the NRA leader's insistence on getting the defense portfolio and having his guerrillas integrated into the army. Without an end to the civil war, there is a strong risk of the new regime falling into the same difficulties as those of the regime it brought down. Especially since it also has to deal with two other guerrilla forces: the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMO), Baganda-based, and the Uganda National Salvation Front (UNFR), active in the northeast province of West Nile and led by Moses Ali, a former colleague of Idi Amin.

In the Ugandan political-tribal puzzle, one should not forget the main, legal opposition party (until Saturday), the Democratic Party (DP) of Paul Ssemogerere, a Baganda Catholic who has a lot of electoral influence. Uganda is supposed to have legislative elections soon, and the strongest pressure is being exerted on the DP supporters, to the extent that its leader is calling for protection of the former colonial power, Britain.

After one of the most troubled histories--two coups d'etat, a war with Tanzania, and an interminable and bloody civil war, Uganda is entering a new period of uncertainty. Without any guarantee of recovering a long-forgotten stability and coherence.

9920

CSO: 3419/500

UGANDA

SITUATION SINCE FALL OF IDI AMIN REVIEWED

Paris AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE in French Apr-May-Jun 85 pp 26-34

[Article by Gerard Prunier: "Economic Management and Society in Crisis: Uganda Since the Fall of Marshal Idi Amin Dada"]

[Text] When the president of the Uganda provisional government, Yusufu Lule, took the oath on 10 april 1979, it did not mark the beginning of a real new era for that country exhausted by the dictatorship of Marshal Idi Amin Dada.

This is explained in part by a particularly heavy burden of the past, particularly in the economic field; in regard to agriculture--the main sector--production had fallen precipitously between 1973-1974 and the elimination of Amin Dada in 1979. Cotton had declined from 65,000 to 15,000 tons; coffee, the basic resource of the Uganda economy, from 192,000 to 121,000 tons; tea from 22,000 to 10,000 tons; sugar from 44,000 to 8,000 tons. The situation was hardly more auspicious in industry, which before the military took power had been about 12 percent of the GNP. During the same period, cement production had declined from 143,800 tons to 80,000 tons, phosphate fertilizer from 4,100 tons to 2,000 tons, beer from 456,000 hectoliters to 221,000, and copper from 9,600 tons to 600 tons. As for soap, it had dropped from 6,300 tons to practically zero. The commercial vehicle stock had decreased by two-thirds between 1971 and 1978 (Source: THE ECONOMIST "Area Report on Uganda," London, 1980). This economic debacle was paralleled by extreme political confusion.

The provisional government, of which Prof Yusufu Lule--an academic who had been an unknown a few months previously--found himself president, was the outcome of the meeting at Moshi, Tanzania, in March 1979 of 24 movements opposing the dictatorship. This group, named the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), had the paradoxical characteristic of not including in its ranks any official representative of the two major parties prior to the dictatorship, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) of former president Obote, and the Democratic Party (DP), a democratic-Christian organization very well established not only in Buganda, but also in all the partly or majority Catholic populations (Bayankole, Madi and Lugbara of West Nile, Acholi). The respective friends of these two major movements were in the UNLF only as more or less unobtrusive behind-the-scenes envoys. The Moshe spirit called for new men, in order to avoid falling into the errors of the past. These new men

existed: Lule himself, Dan Nabudere, Omwony Ojok, Yoweri Museveni, and others. However, among the intellectuals as a whole they were more or less marginal politically and without a genuine popular base.

I. The Historical Heritage

In order to try to understand the confusion and violence of Ugandan politics, a word must be said about the ethno-religious basis that determines it to a large degree. The country is divided, ethnically and historically, into two large zones, bordered by the course of the Nile and Lake Kyoga. To the north the Nilotics, to the south the Bantu. This cleavage was strengthened during the colonial period (1900-1962) by the British collaboration with the Bantus of the south, and particularly with the Baganda, while the Nilotics were more or less left to their fate or recruited into the army, which called for no other abilities than physical, because all the officers were white. Also, during the British administration the situation was complicated by internal antagonisms in each of the major groups: thus, among the Bantus the Baganda, who were virtual auxiliaries of the British, were the black colonizers of Uganda, admired and hated by the other tribes, while the other kingdoms (Toro, Bunyoro and Ankole) achieved an enviable position, though a little lower than that of the Buganda. The nonmonarchic Bantu groups, on the other hand, experienced various fates: the Basoga (Jinja region), near the Baganda, were almost associated in their fortune, while the small groups in the east (Bagisu, Bakedi) or the tribes in the west (Banyarwanda, Bachiga) found themselves semi-excluded.

In the north, the same thing: while the Nilotic population was in a socio-economic situation much inferior to that of the Bantus, colonization had developed great differences among them: thus, the Langi and Acholi, who had gradually become involved in cotton growing, had achieved some progress, while to the northeast the Karamajong continued to live exactly to the ancestral rhythm of the nomadic herder. Between the two, the West Nile groups (Madi, Alur, Kakwa, Lugbara) had their military enlistment as a special means to open up to the modern world. Idi Amin, a young Kakwa, enlisted in 1946 in the King's African Rifles, which made him a cook.

The final cleavage is that of religion, and it is not the least important. Defeated in Buganda in the outcome of the religious civil wars of the years 1888-1890, the Catholic party has always obstinately represented citizens "a little less equal" than the others. Thus, until the fall of the monarchy in 1966, there had never been a single Catholic katikiro (prime minister), and less-qualified Protestants had several times been given preference over them. The Uganda elite at the time of independence was Baganda and Protestant. The democratic-Christian DP thus assembled those who had been excluded, both in the center (Catholic Baganda) and on the periphery (Catholic Nilotics, thus doubly excluded). Mr Obote, by founding the UPC, assembled against the Baganda Protestant and Catholic elites a new elite, also Protestant, that one would be tempted to call "petty bourgeois," including the most advanced of the Nilotics (Acholi and Langi, Mr Obote's own tribe) and the least well-off of the Bantus (the small tribes of the east). The Nilotics of West Nile, without great influence, divided broadly between the DP and the UPC depending on their religious affiliation; their hour was really to come with the military

dictatorship, the political expression of their socio-cultural marginal status. As for the Karamajong, they remained on the sidelines of the major political movements.

Obote's coming to power in 1962 was carried out against the DP. In order to continue to outwit it, he later, with some loss of momentum, allied with the main enemy, the old "establishment" Protestant Baganda, whose political expression was the monarchist Kabaka Yekka party (KY: the king alone). This unnatural coalition of the UPC and the KY lasted a little less than 4 years and ended in 1966 with an internal coup d'etat in which Mr Obote, the prime minister, got rid of his weakened ally, the king-president. He thereby earned the lasting hatred of the Baganda, who were victims in the wake of the overthrow of the monarchy, and gained a new, more unwieldy ally than the one he had disposed of, Gen. Idi Amin Dada, chief of staff, who had obligingly shelled the royal palace.

The general, exploiting his popularity among the troops and the discredit that Prime Minister Obote had acquired, having become president by force, succeeded in getting literally landslide support for the coup d'etat that he organized on 25 January 1971. Unfortunately, these two successive triumphs--by the northerners as a whole over the Bantus in 1966, then the Nilotics of West Nile over their Langi and Acholi brothers in Idi Amin's coup 5 years later--only led to greater and greater splitting up of the Ugandan social body, and a growing divorce between the government structures and those of the civil society(ies).

To this program of tribal atomization begun under Obote, the dictatorship of "Marshal" Amin added the economic disorder born of an almost complete absence of management coupled with abusive taxes to the benefit of the armed forces, as well as routine use of violence as a means of governing.

II. From Idi Amin to Obote

It was this difficult heritage that the provisional government installed in Kampala in April 1979 had to face. It found itself very poorly equipped for this. The exclusion, in accordance with the "Moshi spirit," of the structured parties of the pre-Amin era (the DP and UPC, the KY having disappeared in 1966 with the king), condemned the new rulers to a paradoxical type of operation, outside government, while there were accusations against some members of the provisional executive either of colluding with the Obote supporters (Muwanga) or of wanting to establish the DP (G. Binaisa). Also, President Lule, very quickly suspected of underhandedly promoting a Baganda revenge, was forced to withdraw on 20 June 1979. His successor at the head of the provisional government, Godfrey Binaisa, a former Obote minister who had resigned in 1967 to protest the authoritarianism of the president, saw his margin for maneuver considerably reduced by the influence of two of his most aggressive ministers. On the one hand, Paulo Muwanga, a veritable Talleyrand of Uganda politics, who had served in all the country's regimes for 20 years and had only broken with Amin in 1975. Minister of interior, he was regarded as very close to former President Obote, still in Dar-es-Salaam, and although a Muganda he was soundly hated by his tribal brothers for having betrayed the kabaka in 1966. On the other hand, there was Museveni, a young and fiery leftist, a Munyankole,

secret resister under Amin who returned weapon in hand to Kampala, and defense minister. While advancing with the Tanzanian army, each had recruited troops during the 1978-1979 campaign, and each had taken care to choose men directly loyal to them, and this made the UNLA (Ugandan National Liberation Army) a profoundly divided body, on tribal and personal bases.

The provisional president, poorly obeyed by his ministers, incapable of controlling an army that only obeyed (when it did obey) the chiefs of factions, also had to face a disastrous and stalemated economic situation. The state's coffers were almost empty, and the shortfall in paying the foreign debt was about \$100 million. Since 1970, prices had increased an average of 4,500 percent, while wages had only risen 54 percent. The result was a flight from the currency that led to a return to the subsistence economy and barter, thus preventing the establishment of any tax source. The Commonwealth experts estimated that short-term financial need to achieve a modest economic recovery would be about \$800 million.

Finally, there was the issue of the ethno-political heritage of Idi Amin. Assembled at Kitgum, an Acholi militia of 12,000 men (or, as many men as the UNLA) insistently demanded to be allowed to cross into West Nile to take revenge for the excesses of the dictatorship on the peoples of the northeast, whom they regarded as collectively guilty. When in January 1980, President Binaisa talked about dissolving the militia, it threatened to march on Kampala, and the head of state had to yield.

It was in this climate of economic catastrophe and political tension that preparations were made for the December 1980 elections. President Binaisa, resolved to try his luck, had demoted Yoweri Museveni from the defense post to that of regional cooperation in 1979, which prompted the latter to approach the Obote people out of spite. Binaisa, who paid a visit to Nairobi on 10 March 1980, sought in Kenya a counterweight to the Tanzanian influence, which he feared might be exerted in favor of Mr Obote, who was still in Dar es Salaam and very close to President Nyerere. There was still an expeditionary corps of 12,000 Tanzanian soldiers in Uganda. President Binaisa's attitude was doubtless the factor that precipitated the events of May 1980. In fact, either through endorsement by the DP, or as an independent candidate, the president of the provisional executive had a good chance of winning the elections to which the UNLF committed itself after the fall of Amin. To very large elements of Uganda society (the Baganda and in a general way all Bantus of the south, but also the people of West Nile who feared revenge, and quite a few Catholics everywhere who wanted to avoid a return of the Protestant UPC), Obote was a figure of a past not of good memories. It was he who had put his foot in the stirrup of General Amin. Binaisa took the chance of winning as an anti-Obote candidate, more than by his personal merit, which he had hardly had the opportunity to show. On 7 May 1980, former president Obote suddenly announced his decision to return to Uganda to take part in the elections. Three days later, President Binaisa took the decision to dismiss Col. David Oyite-Ojok, chief of staff and minister of defense. The latter, a Langi, was an all-out supporter of Mr Obote and suspected of being able to use, in concert with Paulo Muwanga, the armed forces to influence or even take over the electoral process. All the more easily since Yoweri Museveni, frustrated, had established a tactical alliance with the pro-UPC forces. Col. Oyite-Ojok

rejected his dismissal and, in cooperation with Museveni and Muwanga, overthrew President Binaisa on 12 May. No blood was shed because the provisional chief executive had no troops that were personally loyal to him. In Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian Government recognized the coup. On 27 May, Mr Obote returned to Kampala, where the ruling military committee received him cordially.

III. Elections of 10 December 1980

Museveni found himself very isolated within this body. The only non-Obotist and the only civilian along with Paulo Muwanga, he appeared as the pluralist guarantee by the military and the UPC.

The summer of 1980 was particularly hard. The famine in Karamoja, caused partly by drought and even more by the use of modern weapons (12,000 weapons, including mortars and rocket-launchers stolen from the arsenals at Soroti and Moroto in April 1979), had transformed the livestock raids into murderous civil war in the northeast. Simultaneously, in the northwest, Amin's former soldiers who had taken refuge in southern Sudan exploited a partial withdrawal of the Tanzanian troops to invade West Nile in October 1980. The remedy was almost worse than the illness, because in order to push them back it ended up giving the green light to the Kitgum Acholi militia, alongside an already very little disciplined UNLA, seeking vengeance for the murders and disappearances of the years 1971-1979. The result was a very violent tribal repression.

Even in Kampala, the clashes between supporters and opponents of Obote, the flagrant crimes, and the revenges produced victims daily (600 deaths counted officially for October 1980 alone).

It was against this backdrop that the elections of 10 December 1980 were held, and they were smirched with serious irregularities. From the outset, the UPC claimed 17 seats out of 126 by refusing to register opposition candidates in those districts. Ballot box stuffing, violence, intimidation, and the result announced after a mysterious delay in the counting--74 seats for the UPC, 51 for the DP, and 1 for the UPM, the small movement improvised by Yoweri Museveni--doubtless did not amount to much more than an exercise to put on a good face to the financial lenders as the elected Uganda government. On 7 January 1981, Mr Obote was for the second time named president of the Uganda Republic. On 9 February, the first guerrilla operations began. From the beginning, following a scenario that was to become classical, the forces opposing the new president scored successes in the field, were unable to exploit them politically, and withdrew, leaving the peasants exposed to an extremely violent repression. Also from the beginning, the guerrillas showed themselves divided between a Protestant branch (MOSPOR, renamed National Resistance Movement or NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, and a Catholic branch (UFM) [Uganda Freedom Movement] led by Balaki Kirya. A difference in style, with the leftist guerrilla leader staying in the field while former minister Kirya tried to direct operations from Nairobi. During this period, Amin's former soldiers fighting in West Nile broke (officially) all ties with their former chief and renamed themselves Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), under the leadership of an old acolyte of the ex-marshal, Moses Ali.

IV. Permanent Civil Disorders

From 1981 on, a group of military advisers of the Commonwealth countries tried to instill a minimum of discipline in the UNLA, which continued its depredations, particularly in West Nile, where more than 50,000 refugees were added to the 100,000 already assembled in Sudan. President Obote explained that the low pay of the army and the violence of the guerrilla movement combined to create a situation of insecurity, which, however, he was trying to reduce. On 22 October 1982, a special 8-page supplement of the FINANCIAL TIMES emphasizing the economic successes and minimizing the violence of the repression served as a kind of good report by the business world, at least as far as the British were concerned.

However, the brutal decision in November 1982 to expel 50,000 Rwandan refugees started the polemic again. Many of these refugees had in fact been born in Uganda, where they had been settled for almost 20 years. Along with them were deported thousands of Banyankole and even Baciga of the southwest, suspected of sympathy toward Yoweri Museveni. The Kigali government refused to accept this human mass, who thus found themselves hemmed into camps where they remain to this day (January 1985), often prey to the extortions of the soldiers, despite the increasing involvement of various international charitable organizations (Doctors without Frontiers, International Committee of the Red Cross, to be readmitted in 1983).

At the beginning of 1983, the situation remained critical. In Buganda, the UFM underground were in decline after the leader of the organization, Balaki Kirya, had been abducted in Nairobi in July 1982. Leadership of the guerrillas, now under Lutakome Kayiira, was showing itself militarily ineffective and financially corrupt. The same was not true of the NUM, which was actively keeping up the fight, despite the absence of any outside aid, after the Tripoli government finally perceived that Idi Amin's return and the promotion of Islam were certainly not among their war aims. In London, the former president Lule, who had rejoined Yoweri Museveni in a rather surprising tactical alliance, was handling public relations for the Protestant guerrilla movement. In face of this relentlessness, the Kampala government was resorting to major measures: camps opened in the districts of Mpigi, Luwero and Mubende to eventually accommodate up to 120,000 people. Almost 300,000 others to be forced to move to make room for UNLA units, which no one was any longer really able to control, either the on-duty strength or behavior. Kampala admitted 20,000 or 25,000 men, while experts estimated at least 35,000, perhaps 45,000 or 50,000, including the militia. All these receiving ridiculously low pay (1,200 shillings a month for a regular soldier, when beer was 300 shillings a bottle) and virtually condemned to pillage in order to live. Between April and June, several mass graves were discovered.

In the north, in Karamoja and West Nile, brigands, guerrillas, and stock thieves, sometimes from Sudan, Ethiopia or Kenya, created a constant insecurity that further increased the number of refugees.

On 20 February 1984, the NRM briefly captured the town of Masindi, where it seized a large military haul. Within the army, serious tensions developed between the Acholi and the Langi, particularly following the death on 2

December 1983 of the chief of staff, David Oyite-Ojok, in a helicopter accident. In April 1984, the team of Commonwealth military advisers, having failed in its mission, yielded the job to a group of British instructors. However, beginning in the spring of 1982, it was increasingly North Korean instructors who were training the UNLA units facing the guerrillas, which prompted growing concern in Washington, whose support, at least financial, is essential for President Obote's regime.

In May 1984, after a failed attack on the Mpoma telecommunications station, the army reacted with violence, killing more than 100 people in the neighboring village of Namugongo, the torture site of the Catholic martyrs of the 19th century, visited by Pope Paul VI. There was a great emotional response, particularly since a religious minister and a Muslim *cadi* were among the victims, and religious places were deliberately profaned.

V. Effective Effort for Economic Recovery

The Christian Democratic Party (DP), led by Mr Ssemogerere, convinced that it had in fact won the election, yet chose to limit itself to legality. However, a minority of youth, responding to the call for armed struggle launched by the party's assistant secretary general, Francis Bwengye, took refuge in Nairobi. They were disavowed by Mr Ssemogerere, who on 18 May met with the new prime minister appointed by President Obote, Otema Alimadi. Attacks and raids multiplied, particularly in Buganda, where both the NRM and the UFM recruited most of their troops. Their combined forces were estimated at less than 3,000, because of lack of weapons. In the north, the Karamajong stock thieves were better equipped than the guerrilla movement. On 1 June 1981, President Obote took the hard but salutary decision to let the Ugandan shilling float. The result was an immediate devaluation of almost 1,000 percent in relation to foreign currencies and a soaring of prices: beer increased from 25 to 90 shillings a bottle, a Kampala to Jinja trip by shared taxi from 250 to 1,000 shillings, and an Entebbe to Nairobi air ticket from 1,600 to 6,000 shillings. Incidentally, the average salary of a government employee was then 2,000 to 3,000 shillings a month. However, the price of coffee (robusta) went up to 20 shillings per kilogram and reached 50 in June 1982. Merchandise was gradually reappearing in the markets, attracting the farmers, who would resume production of export crops (especially coffee, and to a lesser degree cotton) to be able to again buy some manufactured products. Taxes would begin to come in again. The economic machine was underway again.

Also, foreign aid was coming in strongly. The IMF announced (June 1981) \$197 million in short-term credit and \$95 million in more long-term loans for reconstruction. On 24 June 1981, two Libyan diplomats were arrested in Kampala, thereby making public what everyone knew, that Tripoli was giving military aid to the guerrillas by delivering arms to it through Rwanda. That helped to rally behind President Obote the bloc of Western aid donors. Nevertheless, despite the fighting continuing in West Nile (Ombacci massacre in June, 1981), despite the constant attacks in Buganda, and despite the exodus of refugees (100,000 in Sudan, 40,000 in Zaire, 40,000 in Kenya), Uganda succeeded in filling the annual quota of coffee allocated to it for the year 1981 (2.9 million bags).

In February 1982, President Obote announced measures for compensation of the Indians robbed by Idi Amin at the time of their expulsion in 1972. This helped to strengthen his support by the United Kingdom, where about 30,000 of them had found refuge. However, that did not prevent the attack on Lubri barracks, near Kampala, by the UFM on 23 February, an operation in which the guerrillas captured large quantities of arms. The reaction was extremely violent. From February to April 1982, vast sweep operations were carried out, during which checks of identity were accompanied by pillage and violence. On 25 April, Amnesty International launched an appeal "for an end to the massacres and torture committed by the Ugandan army."

On 18 and 19 May a Ugandan government delegation presented to the Club of Paris President Obote's new economic recovery program, for which he requested \$600 million in financing over 5 years. He obtained straightaway a commitment of \$135 million from the World Bank, \$220 million from the EEC, and \$18 million in bilateral British aid, without including the investment promises of about \$180 million from private groups, in particular the large Indian consortiums Mehta and Madhvani, which got back their sugar production facilities at Lugazi and Kakira. The 1982-1983 budget, presented on 24 June 1982, confirmed the economic improvement because the deficit in the balance of payments had decreased by 33 percent and because it was possible to count on a 21-percent increase in the value of exports (coffee, tea, and cotton, in that order); producer prices would be increased by 42 percent on average, and the government introduced the original system of the dual exchange market; importers would be able to buy exchange on a free market in which the rate would be set independently of the official rate of exchange. This contributed to weakening of the shilling, which fell from 78 to 90.5 per dollar, but facilitated imports.

Yet, the economy continued its improvement, though with difficulty. The recovery plan presented in Paris in May 1982 was revised upward for financing of \$736 million. In October 1983, Minister of Economy Sam Odaka reported that \$622.7 million had already been found, but that the results had not really measured up to expectations. The floating shilling was sinking in a growing inflation: it was 105 to the dollar in April 1983, but 285 in October and 330 in November. That fed a vicious spiral of prices and earnings. Wages rose 50 percent at the beginning of 1984, but a bunch of Matoke bananas, the staple food of Baganda, then cost 800 shillings in Kampala while the monthly civil service salary was 1,700 to 14,000 shillings. The parallel economy, or "magendo," was developing to face the shortages in the official system.

The economic situation is completely paradoxical. Industry has not really succeeded in taking off again: the use rate of fixed installations increased from 12 percent to 23 percent between 1979 and 1983, however it stagnated at that level. In 1983, the debt service represented in value 51.6 percent of export revenue, while military expenditure alone consumed 28 percent by official claim, and 43 percent of the imports went to the army. In June 1984, the minimum salary in the public service went up to 6,000 shillings, or a 20-percent increase, yet without catching up with the surge in prices. Despite this, the trade balance continued to improve, going from a deficit of only \$92 million in 1982-1983 to a surplus of \$34 million 1983-1984.

This was the miracle of foreign aid and coffee. Between April 1979 and the beginning of 1984, about \$1.5 billion flowed toward Uganda, while, helped in part by the producer price increase (120 shillings per kg for robusta, 220 shillings per kg for robusta) and in part by the armed violence, the government succeeded in "persuading" the Baganda farmers, who had been reluctant to deliver their coffee to it. Coffee represents 95 percent of the public revenue, and until his death David Oyite-Ojok combined in a very symbolic way the functions of chief of staff and chairman of the Coffee Marketing Board.

This way of making the Baganda farmers, and to a lesser extent the Banyoro and Basoga, forthcoming, facilitated the operation of the NRM guerrillas, who occupied Hoima without opposition on 2 June 1984. Two days later, it was the UNLA "liberators" who looted the town abandoned by Museveni's men. The violence of the repression, and no doubt also the growing importance of the North Korean instructors, prompted Elliot Abrams, the American secretary of state for human rights, to openly criticize President Obote's regime in August 1984. An investigating commission was even set up by Congress, and on 4 September, Chester Crocker, in charge of African affairs at the State Department, went to Kampala for conversations with the Ugandan president.

VI. Urgency of Regaining Control

Mr Obote understands that if he wants to be able to continue to rely on the good will of the Western financial lenders, he has to urgently put an end to the action of the armed wing of the opposition represented by the guerrillas. Even more so because the Catholic-based underground is slowly reorganizing, and, trying to draw the lessons of the UFM fiasco, is creating a new movement. the FEDEMU, younger and more "internal." The legal opposition of Mr Ssemogerere's DP continues to observe the British parliamentary rules of fair play and is wasting away progressively. Four DP deputies were persuaded to defect to the UPC, four others were removed from office, and two were assassinated by unknown persons. There remain only 41 Democratic-Christian representatives facing the 78 UPC members, and the Baganda youth has great difficulty identifying with the worthy prudence of the DP. The main obstacle to effective control of the country by President Obote's regime thus continues to be the presence of the armed movements, and correspondingly the large role of the UNLA, which causes as much destruction and as many civilian deaths as the guerrillas.

The end of 1984 thus marks a dual effort on the part of the Ugandan government: on the one hand, regaining of control of the UNLA by its reliable leadership; and on the other, a large-scale offensive against the underground. There is a growing appeal for military aid from the Eastern countries, less concerned about legalism and human rights in their military training activities. On 21 September 1984, Colonel Terentiev of the Soviet military mission was wounded by NRM gunmen as he was leaving his residence. The Soviet action that followed was carried out in coordination with that of the Koreans, who landed numerous reinforcements from Ethiopia at Entebbe at the beginning

of November, bringing their number to about a thousand. At the same time, trucks and 122 mm artillery arrived through Dar es Salaam port and a number of Tanzanian soldiers returned to the scene (the Tanzanian expeditionary force had been almost totally withdrawn between April 1981 and the beginning of 1982).

These troops provided the leadership for the best-trained UNLA units for the major offensive launched at the end of November.

This was successful from the outset. Under heavy pressure, the NRM guerrillas retreated toward Hoima, then in the direction of Fort Portal-Kasese, cutting the railway line between there and Kampala on 1 January 1985.

However, it seems that at the same time movements have developed either in other parts of Buganda (Mbarara) or in West Nile, where the UNRF, long inactive, is showing some slight regain of activity. The situation of the refugees is also still agonizing and is accompanied by a war of communiques that would be comical if it did not concern the fate of thousands of human beings: in November 1984, Uganda appealed for \$17.1 million to "come to the aid of the 300,000 repatriates in West Nile," while Sudan asked for \$26.4 million and Zaire \$13.9 million to help 265,000 Ugandan refugees--the same ones!--who had sought refuge there.

In conclusion, the regime of President Obote must be credited with some quite real economic successes, even if these have owed a great deal to foreign aid and the use of some more-than-questionable methods.

On the political level, however, the doubts about the legitimacy resulting from the election of 10 December 1980, as well as the weight of a past not yet forgotten, doom it to face the latent hostility of the Bantu peoples of the south and west, even though the latter have tended to confine themselves to a wait and see attitude. In view of the impotence of the legal opposition, which is a democratic show window for foreign benefit, a number of Baganda and a minority of Ugandans of other tribes have chosen armed struggle. However, this effort, lacking any outside support, does not seem capable of overthrowing the regime. No more than the regime, thus far (we must await the results of the November 1984 to January 1985 offensive), seems capable of crushing it. Caught between two fires, the civilian population is tired. In the five and a half years of "liberation," certainly several tens of thousands of civilians have been killed. The worsening of the situation has prompted the government to depend increasingly on military aid from the East. Legislative elections are planned for 1985. Judging by the recent indictment of Mr Ssemogerere (November 1984), their conduct does not promise a much more democratic character than those of 1980, unless the internal dissensions in the ruling team (there is a lot of talk about increasing sidelining of the vice president, Paulo Muwanga) changes the features of the political game and leads either to their cancellation or to their conduct in a different atmosphere.

9920

CS0:3419/500

UGANDA

INTERVIEW WITH NRA FIELD COMMANDER

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 1 Sep 85 p 19

[Text]

UGANDA is in stalemate. The peace initiative that began with last month's coup has stalled halfway between settlement and a second, bloodier eruption of civil war.

In the short time since President Milton Obote was overthrown, the junta of General Tito Okello has made significant political gains. But it is the rebel National Resistance Army of Yoweri Museveni that has made the military gains.

The NRA has disarmed the regular soldiers in the large towns of south-western Uganda and has all but admitted infiltrating its guerrillas into Kampala.

Should it carry out its threat to continue the 4½-year war, it may still not triumph but could paralyse the southwest and launch a bloody street battle for the capital itself.

General Okello, for his part, has managed to coax into the cabinet the leaders of all four political parties, absorb the troops of two minor rebel factions, and enter into amicable negotiations with a third rebel group.

But he has failed to get the co-operation of the one faction that really matters — the NRA and its political wing, the National Resistance Movement.

Uganda's new Foreign Minister, Mr Olara Otunnu, has met Mr Museveni privately in Nairobi.

The problem is that Museveni's precondition for talks is so weighty it makes the negotiations relatively meaningless: he wants an equal share in the control of the defence force and civil service.

"Even at this late hour," said Museveni in a Press statement issued after the abortive meeting with Mr Otunnu, "we are willing to negotiate an equal formula."

"(But) if this is not done, the NRM will continue the armed struggle ever more vigorously and, I can assure you, countrymen and women, total victory is close at hand."

It was fiery stuff, and so is Museveni. But there is speculation here that the former defence minister in the post-Amin government of 1979 is actually worried that Okello has been doing his job too well and that the general's success in forming a

government of "national reconciliation and unity" has put him on the crest of a wave.

If this theory is true, then Uganda is now in a waiting game where each side waits for the other to make mistakes before committing itself to the negotiating table.

Both sides have potential trump cards. The junta hopes to create a government whose image is so favourable that popular support for rebellion will wither.

The NRM knows that the support the junta enjoys from the political parties and the public is conditional on its ending the war. If the NRA recommences firing, and can sustain its war, then Okello will increasingly appear no different from Obote and the goodwill towards the junta will evaporate.

How long Museveni can hold out for his present demand depends much on the capacity and motivation of the NRA. Last week I interviewed the top NRA field commander, Salim Saleh Rufu, in a war-wrecked school at a village called Kassaga 50 km northwest of Kampala.

Asked if the ousting of Obote had not stolen the NRA's thunder, making Uganda's 14 million people less inclined to support him, he said:

"We are not against Obote as an individual. We are against a dictatorial, corrupt system."

If the junta did not change the system, the NRA would fight on and "time will tell" where the people's inclination lay, he said.

The NRA had welcomed the coup as a "positive move" and had stopped firing to "observe the Ugandan army and see what they do". But if the peace negotiations failed, it would "definitely" resume fighting. Similarly if the general elections the junta has promised in 12 months' time are not fair, the NRA will fight "because that is what we fought for to begin with".

Commander Salim, who used a nom de guerre as he is believed to be Museveni's younger brother (a relationship he will neither confirm nor deny), stressed the NRA wanted the peace talks to succeed.

"We shall always try our best to remove the obstacles that might make the talks fail." But he made it plain that he was utterly loyal to the position of Mr Museveni and the NRM executive.

He produced the correspondence exchanged between him and Major Eric Odwar of the Military Council as to the arranging of a ceasefire meeting which took place on August 12 in Luwero district. The letters showed he was anxious to avoid any overtures that might drive a wedge between him and the NRM in Nairobi.

He declined to give the size of the NRA, but from conversations with civilians in the area and with Western diplomats I estimate its total forces number about 10 000.

The Uganda Army numbers about 40 000. According to the rule that one needs 10 conventional soldiers for every guerilla, the Uganda National Liberation Army is, therefore, undermanned.

The NRA had two sources of weapons, the commander said: "Those it captured and those given secretly by sympathisers in the army. There is definitely a fifth column in the UNLA".

As to its source of funds: "We hit UNLA salary convoys, we hit banks, and we get from the people".

The impression the NRA made was one of discipline and a low-profile organisation. The interview under the schoolyard tree was repeatedly interrupted by a guerilla who, saluting smartly, passed Commander Salim the latest radio signals.

How far Commander Salim would get if he ordered his troops on to the offensive tomorrow, I could not tell. But I left the NRA quietly impressed. It is not to be underestimated, least of all by the junta.

CSO: 3400/1088

ZIMBABWE

TRADE WITH U.S. DROPS

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 6 Sep 85 p 2

[Text]

LATEST figures from the US Bureau of Census indicate that trade between the USA and countries in Africa fell by US\$1,7 billion, or 20%, in the first half of 1985.

Zimbabwe's contribution to the drop was a reduction of US\$13,9 million (19%) in bilateral trade with the USA. Other significant reductions were South Africa, the USA's most important African trading partner (US\$1 billion or 39%) and Nigeria (US\$245,7 million or 10%).

The figures relate to the period January to June, 1985 and comparison is made with the same period in 1984.

Between January and June last year, total USA/Africa trade amounted to US\$8,4 billion. This year, the figure was US\$6,7 billion. US exports to Africa fell from US\$2,3 billion to US\$2 billion, and Africa's to the USA from US\$6 billion to US\$4,6 billion.

IMPORTS DOWN

Zimbabwe's imports from the USA dropped from US\$31,1 million to US\$27,8 million. Exports to the USA also fell, from US\$42,6 million to US\$32 million. Total Zimbabwe/USA trade fell there-

fore, from US\$73,7 million to US\$59,8 million.

South Africa and the USA did business amounting to US\$1,7 billion. This is 39% less than the corresponding figure for 1984, which was US\$2,8 billion. The main reduction was in South African imports. They fell from US\$1,3 billion to US\$675,2 million.

Nigeria, overtaken by South Africa as the US' largest African trading partner in recent times, experienced a 10% fall in bilateral trade with the US. In 1984 the figure was US\$1,9 billion and this year it was US\$1,7 billion.

CSO: 3400/1148

ZIMBABWE

NON-STATE GROUPS WARNED OF ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English 23 Aug 85 p 6

[Text]

HARARE: Non-government organisations, including aid agencies and religious groups, have been warned that they faced expulsion from Zimbabwe if they engaged in political activities or adopted anti-government stances.

The stern warning came from the Governor of the Matabeleland South Province, Senator Mark Dube, when he called on the various non-government organisations operating in his province to resolve their differences with government officials.

Senator Dube claimed that during the recent general elections, a number of non-government organisations in Matabeleland were seen to be involving themselves in politics. Although the province was "security sensitive" and government workers needed military escorts when travelling, some non-government organisations claimed they did not need such protection. He asked why this was.

Damage had been caused by the dissidents in the province, and a number of government vehicles and government property had been damaged by rebel attacks.

However, no non-government organisation had its vehicles or personnel attacked. This was surprising to the authorities, he added.

The Governor of Matabeleland North, Mr Jacob Mudenda, added that people came into the province under the guise of doing research or as reporters interested in development news. In some cases, checks had shown their backgrounds to be dubious, he said.

ZIMBABWE

WHITE POPULATION HIGHER THAN EXPECTED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 31 Aug 85 p 7

[Text]

HARARE — The white population in Zimbabwe today is probably not much below 140 000, says Finance Minister Dr Bernard Chidzero.

Many consider this to be much higher than expected.

He gave the estimate at a news conference yesterday at which the results of the 1982 census were outlined.

The white population then was 146 880. The previous census in 1969 showed a white population of just under 230 000.

The total population of Zimbabwe today — based on the 1982 figures and a growth rate of 3 percent a year — is 8.4 million. Blacks outnumber whites about 60-1.

Dr Chidzero said the growth rate was down, but still too high. An effective family planning programme was progressing quietly.

The racial breakdown of the 1982 census showed Zimbabwe's black population to be 7.5 million, and whites just under 147 000. There were 20 700 coloured people and 10 800 Asians.

The population is expected to reach 15 million by the year 2000.

CSO: 3400/1090

ZIMBABWE

CONTACTS REPORTEDLY TAKING PLACE BETWEEN MUGABE, ZAPU

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 1 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Robin Drew]

[Text]

HARARE — Secret contacts have been taking place between the Zapu leadership and the Government of Mr Mugabe aimed at restoring peace to Zimbabwe.

A "package deal" was how the indiscreet Home Affairs Minister Mr Enos Nkala referred to the negotiations when yesterday he launched another broadside against Mr Joshua Nkomo and his party.

Mr Nkomo refused to comment on the claim that he had suggested to the Government that he be allowed to leave Zimbabwe to settle in another country.

Mr Nkala said Mr Nkomo, whose passport was seized several weeks ago, would not be allowed to leave until a deal had been worked out to end the dissident menace.

The outspoken Home Affairs Minister said this might include the release of Zapu detainees who include top men such as Mr Dumiso Dabengwa and Lieutenant-General Look-out Masuku who have been in detention for more than three years following the discovery of arms caches on Zapu property.

Their release has been demanded on various occasions in dissident notes.

This month, three Zapu members of parliament were detained as a crackdown on Zapu promised by the Minister was put into gear.

Mr Nkomo said in a telephone interview from his Bulawayo home that he preferred to say nothing at this stage.

"Wait a few days," he said, "And there will be something

to be said. You will hear from me."

The Prime Minister, Mr Robert Mugabe, is due back from a Far Eastern tour this weekend and it is expected that once he returns efforts will continue to reduce the rapidly rising tension between the two parties.

Mr Nkomo would only say that Mr Nkala was being "naughty" by making reference to package deals.

Mr Nkala, whose vitriolic comments have caused concern in some circles anxious to avoid an escalation of bad feeling, has promised to wage a relentless war against the Zapu leadership.

There is the fear, too, that the brutal murder of ranchhands in the Mwenézi area on Thursday night when at least 18 people were killed by a gang of dissidents could jeopardise the settlement moves.

Speaking before news of the massacre had broken, Mr Nkala said the security authorities were preparing for a last ditch fight against the dissidents.

"If they cross any border, we shall follow them," said the Minister.

ZIMBABWE

FOUR WHITE DETAINEES FREED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Sep 85 p 16

[Text] HARARE. — Four Zimbabwe Whites arrested last week on suspicion of plotting the secession of opposition leader Mr Joshua Nkomo's Matabeleland province have been released, lawyers confirmed yesterday.

Mr Trevor Hemans (56), Mr Michael Jacobs (64), Mr Patrick Higgins (49) and Mr Anthony Hunt (48) were held last week in a crackdown against supporters of Mr Nkomo. Scores of others have been arrested in the last two months.

Lawyers said the Whites were detained under emergency powers regulations accusing them of plotting with Mr Nkomo's minority Zimbabwe African People's Union Party to secede southern Matabeleland province from Zimbabwe, and of supporting armed anti-government rebels who profess loyalty to Mr Nkomo.

All four were released on Monday and only one, Mr Hunt, was told that he might face charges later, lawyers said.

Among Blacks arrested and still in detention are four MPS and six Bulawayo city councillors who are all top officials of Mr Nkomo's party.

The Prime Minister, Mr Robert Mugabe, and his Ministers accuse Mr Nkomo of giving orders to armed rebels and say the arrests are a result of routine police investigations into activities against the State.

Mr Nkomo has denied any association with rebels who have murdered and maimed scores of Mugabe Party officials and supporters. The Opposition leader has countered that the crackdown is an attempt to frame his party so that it can be banned, leaving the way open for Mr Mugabe to achieve his avowed aim of creating a one-party state.
— Sapa-AP.

ZIMBABWE

STRENGTHENING OF ZIMBABWE DOLLAR SAID UNWELCOME TO EXPERTS

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 6 Sep 85 p 5

[Text]

THE Zimbabwe dollar strengthened appreciably (by something like three cents) this week against the basket of major currencies quoted, so throwing exporters into disarray.

However, a Harare economist said on Wednesday that the strengthening of the local currency was probably only a temporary result of the instability caused by the recent collapse of the South African rand and various currency readjustments being made abroad. The Zimbabwe dollar was expected soon to "float gently" down again.

"A weak Zimbabwe dollar is in our country's favour. A stronger Zimbabwe dollar causes worry, because in that case our exports cannot earn the greater income expressed in Zimbabwe dollars which we badly need at present due to rising costs," he said.

NOT NEW

"But the devaluation, or floating downwards of our dollar, has been with us for some time previously and I think it will continue when these temporary short-term currency adjustments settle down again."

The economist stressed that as Zimbabwe had drastically increased its domestic costs such as wages and other items recently, at a time when exports were unable and unlikely to earn sufficient increased revenue, the country's only other avenue for the needed increased earnings in Zimbabwe dollars lay in the local currency being weaker against that of its major trading outlets.

"We were all very worried (in the financial world) when the rand fell below 40 cents last week. So it is a relief that it is now being stabilised."

He said the rand was a major factor in Zimbabwe's economy, as South Africa was a major export market (taking some 20% of our total exports) and he added that "instability in some currency usually leads to instability elsewhere".

"For some time now Zimbabwe's currency has been weakening progressively against all other major currencies except for a brief temporary recent change. I think this floating-down trend will continue soon," he said.

"It is in our favour. We must earn more in Zimbabwe dollar terms for our exports. It is the only way we can pay for the greater costs within our country now — and we can at present only earn more for those exports if we have a weaker currency than that ruling in our major trading markets abroad."

As a "layman's guide", he said that costs in Zimbabwe's copper industry, for instance, had risen high this year. But the price of exported copper abroad was only some \$2 000 a tonne, as against the \$2 300 needed to meet the increased costs.

"So, as the world price for copper has not increased to that necessary level, the only other way this country can earn the extra revenue needed in Zimbabwe dollars is for our currency to be weaker than currencies in the copper-buying markets."

Confirming this view, another economist said that it was only the relatively weak Zimbabwe dollar, as against other major trading cur-

rencies, which has enabled the mining industries in Zimbabwe to survive during the past year or two.

He believed that the Reserve Bank's policy of allowing the Zimbabwe dollar to "float" downwards and find a realistic level against other major currencies was a wise and flexible method of devaluing the local currency.

"Call it what you like, it is all in the name," he said. "It is devaluation, whether it is called floating down, revaluing or adjusting one currency against another."

ZIMBABWE

ASBESTOS PRODUCTION TO IMPROVE

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 6 Sep 85 p 22

[Text]

LAST year asbestos worth \$69m was produced in Zimbabwe, making it the country's second most valuable mineral, the deputy Minister of Mines Mr Chimbidzayi Sanyangare, said recently.

"Asbestos is the principal base mineral in both volume of output and value", Mr Sanyangare said. "In terms of value, it ranks second only to gold".

Zimbabwe exported its asbestos to over 52 countries, the Minister said, with the main customers being in the Middle East and Asia. Most exports were in fibre form at present, but government was hoping that capital would be available eventually to establish a spinning plant.

Referring to the downturn in asbestos exports, Mr Sanyangare said because the mines were unable to sell all they produced, a 100 000-tonne stockpile was built up in 1982.

Production had subsequently been reduced — in 1983 it fell to 152 000 tonnes from 200 000 in 1982. In 1983 the industry sold 165 000 tonnes against a target of 180 000.

The present stockpile of asbestos is about 82 602 tonnes and the Mineral Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe expects it to rise to about 83 728 tonnes at the end of the year.

Although the asbestos market and prices remain depressed, both new mills at Zvishavane and Mashava are running at full capacity and sales are at a slightly higher rate than last year, Mr A W Rackham, chairman and managing director of Shabanie and Mashaba Mines, told *The Gazette*.

"One of our main problems," he said, "is that inflation is running at a higher rate than our main compe-

titors (Canada) and although in the past few years the devaluation of our dollar and the strengthening of the US dollar has helped considerably to offset the effect of this, we must nevertheless do all we can to control inflation now and in the future. Thanks to the efforts of our employees, we have had some measure of success in holding cost escalation at the mines below the general rate of inflation and we will continue to work to this end and to improve productivity and efficiencies."

He stated another problem as being the continuing shortage of skilled and experienced people although the company's comprehensive training programmes are showing some encouraging results.

The asbestos industry, as a whole, has been concerned for a long time about the health and environmental problems associated with asbestos and much has been achieved throughout the world in improving upon conditions existing in the past.

"In this regard," said Mr Rackham, "there have been some encouraging developments and there is increasing evidence to suggest that non-occupational health risks to the public are minimal and under properly controlled conditions the occupational risk can be reduced to acceptable levels."

He continued, "In a report published in April 1985, the world renowned epidemiologists Professors Sir Richard Doll and Julian Peto conclude that the risk to the general public from casual or occasional exposure to asbestos fibres in the course of their ordinary business or domestic life is comparable to the

risk of a non-smoker contracting cancer from other peoples' cigarette smoking.

"We have had very little asbestos related disease on the mines which have been worked for over 50 years," he said, "and with our two new mills and improved environmental controls, we expect there to be even less."

NOT THE ANSWER

"Substitutes for asbestos have been tried over a fairly long period and, whilst they are undoubtedly being used, there is no single substitute for asbestos and, in most cases, the substitute is more expensive or less effective. Furthermore, in many instances there could be health and environmental risks associated with substitutes," he suggested.

"We are therefore confident that the demand for asbestos will continue for the foreseeable future, and provided inflation can be curbed and we can control costs and continue improving efficiencies and productivity, we will be in a better position than most of our competitors to meet this demand for a long time to come," said Mr Rackham.

ZIMBABWE

MOOD OF OPTIMISM PREVAILS IN MINING SECTOR

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 6 Sep 85 p 11

[Text] THERE has been a marked improvement in the overall mining picture in this country over the past year as the industry appears to be emerging from the lengthy slump. Prices for most metals have slightly advanced and there is every hope this can be sustained.

This improved climate that is emerging is reflected by the overall increase in production volume by the mining industry of 4% in 1984 over 1983, and a forecast of a further improvement for 1985. You will recall that sales by the Minerals Marketing Corporation for the year ended June 30, 1985, were \$540 million. This does not include gold, where production value was \$214 million for the period January to December, 1984, and \$112 million dollars for the first six months of 1985.

On this strong base it is imperative that both my ministry and the industry work together to plan future developments of both new mines and mineral beneficiation projects.

Government's objectives in the mining sector encompass the following —

(a) Increase foreign-currency allocations through the Mining Continuation Reserve for the importation of essential spares and equipment, thereby enabling the mining industry to maintain viability, expand production and earn more foreign exchange. This is important as the industry is a major earner of the country's foreign currency.

(b) Control of electricity tariffs as most mining, and the downstream operations resulting from mining, are based on low-cost availability of electricity.

(c) The implementation of the mechanised test mining of thin chrome seams in the North Dyke. This is aimed at reducing mining costs which are high because they are labour-intensive. These seams constitute the bulk of the Great Dyke ores which have a higher chrome content. In addition government will also encourage and assist in the mechanisation of other mining operations to increase production and maintain viability.

(d) Development of the technical manpower needed for the industry particularly artisan, journeyman and supervisory skills, by industry and government.

(e) To foster a high degree of discipline in the work force so as to maintain productivity at high levels.

(f) To maintain favourable mining taxation and allowances that have the effect of allowing investors a normal return on their capital and its repatriation, and of stimulating new mining investment.

My ministry is currently concentrating on the following —

(a) Consolidation of the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation which is currently engaged in the production of gold, gold-dump recycling at Penhalonga, exploration in

Mberengwa, Kyanite mining and its further processing and marketing, development of a copper, lead and zinc mine in the Sanyati area.

(b) The establishment of a gold refinery, the feasibility study of which has reached an advanced stage.

(c) Increasing the capacity of the gold roasting plant to cope with the increased production of complex gold ores and concentrates.

(d) Rehabilitation of the Hwange coke ovens in order to maintain profitable export earnings.

(e) Planning for the development of production of low sulphur coal at Sengwa to save foreign currency.

(f) Comprehensive study on the possible large-scale production and beneficiation of tungsten.

(g) Research into the possible production of refractory bricks for use by the metallurgical industry, to replace costly importation.

(h) Promoting exploration by government and private sector in order to expand the industry. In this respect it means more exploration funds and involvement by government, through the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation.

(i) Government to continue to provide technical and financial support to small-scale mining activities and cooperatives by utilizing and expanding the Mining Industry Loan Fund.

(j) Amendments to the Mines and Minerals Act to promote more local participation and to discourage wasteful mining methods.

(k) The promotion of joint ventures between the private sector and government with the aim of further developing new mines and processing minerals to an even higher degree than we are doing at present.

CSO: 3400/1148

ZIMBABWE

BIKITA MINE LITHIUM DEPOSITS 'UNIQUE'

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 6 Sep 85 p 25

[Text] THE opencast Bikita Mine, 70km east of Masvingo, brings over \$5 million in foreign currency into Zimbabwe every year. Although there are other known lithium deposits in the country, the Bikita deposit is unique. It is the highest quality mine of its type in the world. The only other comparable mine is in Canada.

Lithium is the third lightest element. As hydrogen and helium are gases, it is the lightest element capable of being made into a metal, although it is unstable in that state and requires careful handling to prevent spontaneous combustion on contact with oxygen.

Technological developments have made it possible to combine lithium with other metals. It is now being used in the aircraft industry and it is estimated that a jumbo jet made from an aluminium lithium alloy weighs 25 000kg less than a conventional jumbo, which would increase the aircraft's pay load by the same amount.

Lithium is not a rare mineral. It is found all over the world in varying degrees and is most often used as a chemical mainly in the aluminium smelting industry. It causes the aluminium to melt at a lower temperature, thus saving energy, improving flow and inhibiting oxidation.

The element is also an ingredient in pills to treat manic depression. It is widely used in the manufacture of greases, artificial rubber, swimming pool chemicals and, the aerospace industry where it is a vital ingredient in the nose cones of space re-entry vehicles.

Speciality glass and ceramic manufacturers purchase the product from Bikita. It is also used in television tubes and enamels, and forms an important constituent in the manufacture of a flux to help in the continuous pouring of steel. Zimbabwean lithium thus finds its way into a remarkable variety of products.

The major use of Bikita's minerals however, is found in kitchens worldwide. Twenty-five million pieces of Corningware are produced annually in the US and each piece contains a large percentage of Bikita petalite.

At the Bikita Mine the ore is quarried either from the Bikita quarry, opened in the early 1950s, or the adjoining Al Hayat quarry, purchased in 1959.

Since 1960 the company has supplied many thousands of tonnes of high grade petalite and lepidolite ore to customers all over the world. Bikita's products are renowned for their consistent chemical qualities, high lithia oxide and low iron content. Large proven reserves of high grade lithium ores will enable the company to meet customers' demands well into the twenty first century.

The ore is generally sold as ground material as fine as face powder. It is packed in 25kg or 50 kg kraft paper sacks, or 1 tonne woven polypropylene sacks, the latter being known as "bulk bags". A lesser amount is sold as lump. Bikita's entire production is exported, apart from a small amount of feldspar sold to the glass works in Gweru.

In the last financial year, \$1,1 million was spent on capital projects and expansion. Mr John Graylin, managing director, reports that expenditure will exceed this figure in the current year. "Next year we an-

ticipate the installation of a heavy media separation plant, which will revolutionise the method of production," he said. "The three year capital expenditure programme will run into several million dollars. We will have to improve certain items, but most of the plant will be fabricated in Zimbabwe."

The majority shareholders of Bikita Minerals (Pvt) Limited, founded in 1952, is BP Minerals International Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of British Petroleum. "We receive tremendous support," said Mr Graylin, "and enjoy the advantages of top international consultancy services and advice on the latest technological developments. Two experts flew in recently and solved a grinding plant problem which could have caused serious downtime."

The total profits from Bikita, with the exception of a small dividend paid out in 1962, have been reinvested in the mine and have directly contributed to development in the area. Mr Graylin reports that a large number of employees have worked on the mine since it was opened.

Training programmes have offered employees the opportunity to benefit from the company's traditional policy of promotion on merit. Bikita is the only substantial employer of labour in the area. Recently the labour force was increased by 70 to 292.

Schools and clinics are open to the whole community and grounds for a secondary school have recently been donated.

Bikita Mine provides a most interesting example of how technology is increasingly developing the use of resources in new fields. Although Zimbabwe's mineral deposits are not extraordinarily rich, on the whole, they cover an impressive range and, given the dramatic innovations in both exploration techniques and product development, future exploitation of additional mineral deposits is a very real possibility.

ZIMBABWE

BRIEFS

CHINA PROMISES PLANES--Harare--Communist China is to supply Zimbabwe with military aircraft under a deal negotiated by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe on his visit to Peking this week. More than 100 pilots and technicians are to be trained by the Chinese in a programme which Mr Mugabe said would transform the air force. Mr Mugabe did not disclose how many aircraft or what type would be supplied or what they would cost. But Mr Mugabe said China had agreed to give Zimbabwe an interest free loan of \$37 million to help finance the new five years development plan to be launched next year. Mr Mugabe said, "Our old markets were never our friends. We must promote more trade with our friends than with those people who take us merely as business partners and make profits from our raw materials." [Text] [By Robin Drew] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 1 Sep 85 p 3]

END