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JPRS-SSA-85-105

30 October 1985

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

19980226 143

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30 October 1985

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICAN STANCE ON WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEM EXAMINED

Paris AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE in French Jul-Sep 85 pp 10-37

[Article by Maurice Barbier of the University of Nancy II]

[Text] Until 1975, the issue of Spanish Sahara was not a matter of particular concern to the countries of black Africa: they obviously all agreed in calling for its decolonization. At both the OAU and the United Nations, they several times urged Madrid to organize a referendum in that territory to allow its inhabitants to exercise their right of self-determination. In doing so, they were simply asking that a principle from which they themselves had benefited be applied for the purpose of completing Africa's liberation. But they were not concerned about the Spanish colony's future beyond that point, even though Morocco and Mauritania had conflicting claims to the territory and a nationalist movement--the POLISARIO Front [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro]--had been developing since 1973 and was struggling for independence with support from Libya and Algeria.

Beginning in 1975, the countries of black Africa were to discover the extreme complexity of that decolonization problem, which was causing sharp conflict among the countries of the Maghreb. What is more, they were to be called upon to take a stand on the issue and even to find a solution for it within the framework of the OAU. Very naturally, then, that Maghrebian conflict took on an African dimension to the extent of causing a sharp split among the countries on the continent. It is basically within the OAU that the problem has been discussed and that the African countries have taken a stand or sought a solution. But our purpose is not to study the OAU's action in this connection, because that has already been covered in several detailed studies (1). Our intention is to examine the attitudes of the various countries of black Africa toward the Saharan affair by inquiring into their motivations and indicating as needed how their stands have changed. Since those countries were in a position to play a decisive role in the outcome of the issue, the main protagonists--Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, and POLISARIO--sought their support more or less actively by making use of their political affinities and their diplomatic or economic relations. It is therefore appropriate to begin by presenting the various aspects of that approach and then to study the responses by the countries of black Africa by examining their stands in international bodies and their attitudes toward the Saharan problem.(2)

I. Search for Support in Black Africa

From the start of the Saharan conflict in 1975, the interested parties tried to obtain the support of the other African countries. But in that respect, they were far from being equally situated and their relations with black Africa differed greatly, and this necessarily had an effect on the results of their actions. Morocco maintained political and economic ties with only a small number of African countries, most of them moderates. Algeria, on the other hand, had more diversified trade and, above all, it maintained political relations with almost all the countries. For its part, POLISARIO, being a newcomer at the time, had to make itself known on the African scene and develop its presence there. It did not fail to do so actively.

1. Morocco and Black Africa

Morocco, a pro-Western country, was oriented mainly toward Europe and the Arab world, and its interest in black Africa was still limited, with a preference being shown for a few moderate French-speaking countries.⁽³⁾ It showed little interest in forming ties with the rest of the continent or in developing a genuine African policy. Its relations with Africa had been marked initially by the issue of Mauritania, which had become independent in 1960 despite Morocco's claims. That problem had led Rabat to form an alliance with the progressive leaders (Nasir, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita, and Nkrumah) within the framework of the Casablanca group. That group supported Morocco's claims to Mauritania in 1961, but it disappeared the following year. King Hassan II then had to show realism and accept the existence of Mauritania, which was supported by Senegal, Tunisia, and Ivory Coast. Whereas the Mauritanian issue had at first enabled Morocco to discover progressive Africa, it later constituted a barrier between Rabat and Africa because Mauritania joined the OAU in May 1963, and the latter could not support the Moroccan Kingdom's territorial pretensions.

Moreover, Morocco waited 4 months before signing the OAU Charter (in September 1963) and then did so with the inclusion of reservations concerning its frontiers and its territorial integrity. The "war of the sands" with Algeria, which began in October 1963, and the proclamation at the Cairo Conference in July 1964 concerning respect for colonial frontiers were not of a nature to bring Rabat closer to the rest of the continent. That explains why, beginning in 1962, Morocco showed little interest in black Africa and gave only feeble support to the latter's liberation movements. It was not active in the OAU, whose summit meetings rarely included participation by Hassan II. Following its brief experience with the Casablanca group and the unfortunate war of the sands, Morocco was led by the disturbing proximity of a revolutionary Algeria to turn to certain moderate African countries, notably Senegal and Ivory Coast, where there were sizable Moroccan communities and whose chiefs of state had good personal relations with Hassan II.

Morocco's indifference to black Africa was reflected in the weakness of its diplomatic relations with that region despite the efforts made. In 1973, Morocco had only four embassies in the region (Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Zaire), while five other countries were covered. It later opened four new

embassies (in Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan). In 1976, therefore, it had eight embassies, while seven other countries were covered. All told, it was represented at the time in only 15 black African countries--or about one-third of the total. In the following years, it opened six more embassies (in Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic), but it closed one (in Ethiopia). The result was that by 1984, it had 13 embassies in black Africa, while three other countries were covered. True, Morocco had tripled the number of its embassies in the region in about 10 years. But it was still represented in a total of only 16 countries, and half of those were in West Africa (table 1).

Table 1: Moroccan Embassies in Black Africa

1976		1984	
Embassies (8)	Countries covered (7)	Embassies (13)	Countries covered (3)
Cameroon		Cameroon	
Ivory Coast	Niger	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta
	Upper Volta		
Ethiopia	Kenya	Gabon	
	Uganda	Guinea	
	Tanzania	Kenya	
Gabon		Liberia	Sierra Leone
Nigeria		Mali (2)	
Senegal	Gambia	Niger	
Sudan		Nigeria	
Zaire		Central African Republic (2)	
	Chad (1)	Senegal	Gambia
		Sudan	
		Zaire	

(1) Covered by the embassy in Libya.

(2) Charge d'affaires.

Moreover, Morocco has few economic relations with the other African countries (including Arab countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia). Between 1976 and 1982, its imports from Africa averaged a little less than 2 percent of its total imports, while its exports to Africa averaged a little over 4 percent of its total exports. Its trading partners are few in number--basically six--and most of them are moderate French-speaking countries. Morocco buys primarily from Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon, Guinea, Senegal, and Nigeria. It sells chiefly to Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon, and Congo. The trade balance is usually in Morocco's favor, except in its trade with Ivory Coast and Gabon. Between 1974 and 1981, Morocco also signed economic, technical, and cultural cooperation agreements with about 10 countries, most of them French speaking: Senegal, Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Nigeria, and Gambia. But in general, those agreements were not ratified until several years later, resulting in a long delay in their implementation. So whether we are talking about diplomatic relations, trade, or agreements signed, Morocco's

chief partners in Africa are very few in number, since there are only six: five French speaking (Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Cameroon) and one English speaking (Nigeria). It is among those countries, to which Zaire must be added, that Morocco has found its greatest support on the issue of the Western Sahara.

Its weak presence in black Africa and its small number of trading partners explain why Morocco's theses have gotten little response in that region except in a few French-speaking countries. To tell the truth, its search for support in Africa was belated and not very active. In the summer of 1974, for example, Rabat undertook diplomatic action on the continent. But it entrusted that work to an opposition leader--M'hamed Boucetta, the secretary general of Istiqlal--who visited only four East African countries to meet with their leaders (Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan). After that, Morocco somewhat neglected the African countries until 1980, and its diplomatic action with respect to them was modest compared to its diplomatic efforts with the Asian, socialist, and Scandinavian countries. All it did was send two opposition leaders--M'hamed Boucetta and Abderrahim Bouabid, secretary general of the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces)--to Dakar in April 1976 to meet with President Senghor. Rabat was therefore allowing Mauritania a free hand on the continent, where Mauritania enjoyed sympathy in many quarters. And early in March 1976, Nouakchott undertook a vast diplomatic campaign by sending six ministers to 23 African countries to hand their leaders a message from President Ould Daddah. He himself visited Gabon on 29 and 30 June 1976.

But after the coup d'etat in Mauritania in July 1978 and the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979 (where a cease-fire and referendum in Western Sahara were recommended), Morocco's position on the African scene deteriorated seriously. That was when Rabat undertook a diplomatic campaign directed at the African countries. In January 1980, Hassan II sent five ministers to 32 countries with messages for their leaders in which Morocco's position was explained. Also in late July and early August 1980, following the summit meeting in Freetown (where the question of admitting the SDAR to the OAU was brought up), Moroccan emissaries visited 11 countries--primarily French-speaking ones--in an effort to prevent the SDAR from being admitted. Those countries were Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Zaire, Gabon, and Upper Volta. But it was already too late, and Rabat's theses were losing ground on the continent. It is true that Morocco succeeded in keeping the support of its traditional African allies during the OAU crisis of 1982. But beginning in 1983, their support weakened and their number declined, thus increasing Morocco's isolation in Africa.

2. Algeria and Black Africa

Algeria's relations with black Africa were completely different, because it pursued a very active policy in that region, earning it considerable support on the Saharan issue beginning in 1975.⁽⁴⁾ Since becoming independent, Algeria has always shown a great interest in Africa. It has constantly and actively supported the struggles against colonialism and racism. It has welcomed and helped the various African liberation movements, particularly those in the Portuguese colonies (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde) and in

southern Africa. Several leaders from those movements lived in Algeria for a time and found it to be like a second homeland. As one of them--Amilcar Cabral--expressed it, Algiers had even become "the Mecca of revolutionaries."

In the 1970's, Algeria extended its fight to the economic area by demanding the right of peoples to control their own natural resources and emphasizing economic development. With that in view, the National Charter adopted by referendum in June 1976 stressed the importance assigned to Africa. It said: "Algeria, an African country, places its foreign policy within the framework of African solidarity for the political liberation and economic and social advancement of the continent. The total liberation of Africa is part of the struggle by the Algerian people for their independence and dignity." (5) Algeria was therefore seeking to exercise leadership in Africa so as to complete its political liberation and promote its economic development.

That special interest in the continent was reflected in dynamic diplomacy with respect to the continent. Algeria, which already had 11 embassies in black Africa in 1976, began opening new diplomatic posts after that date: two in 1977 (Cameroon and Zaire), four in 1978 (Angola, Madagascar, Benin, and Ethiopia), and five in 1979 (Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Uganda). (6) Algeria also had a charge d'affaires in Kenya, and it opened still another embassy--in Zimbabwe--after the latter became independent in 1980. Thanks to those new embassies, 11 other countries were also covered. One can certainly note the delayed opening of embassies in certain countries. But the special effort made in 1978 and 1979 must be emphasized, because it concerned about 20 states. Algeria now has embassies in 24 countries of black Africa, and another 20 countries are covered through those embassies. Altogether, therefore, it is represented in 44 black African states, and that means all of them (table 2). In this respect, Algeria's situation is in sharp contrast to that of Morocco, whose presence is much more limited.

Like Morocco, on the other hand, Algeria trades very little with Africa (including the Arab countries). Between 1976 and 1981, its imports from Africa averaged a little more than 2 percent of its total imports, while its exports to Africa averaged less than 1 percent of its total exports. While its imports are similar to those of Morocco in terms of percentages, its exports are proportionately four times less. In absolute value, however, they usually exceed those of Morocco by a rather sizable amount. Above all, Algeria's trading partners in black Africa are more diversified and include both moderate and progressive countries. Its imports come mainly from Ivory Coast, Angola, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda, while its exports go mainly to Senegal, Ivory Coast, Benin, Ghana, Madagascar, and Mozambique.

Between 1976 and 1981, Algeria also signed economic, technical, and cultural cooperation agreements with 25 black African countries (twice as many Morocco did), and its partners are relatively diversified: half are progressive countries and the remainder are moderate countries. But in terms not only of the number of agreements signed but also of their importance, Algeria's chief partners are primarily progressive countries: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Togo (table 3).

Table 2: Algerian Embassies in Black Africa

1976	1984
Embassies (11)	Embassies (24)
Countries Covered (11)	Countries Covered (20)
Congo	Angola
Ivory Coast	Benin
Gabon	Cameroon
Ghana	Congo
Guinea	Ivory Coast
Mali	Ethiopia
Niger	Gabon
Nigeria	Ghana
Senegal	Guinea
Sudan	Guinea-Bissau
Tanzania	Kenya (1)
	Liberia
	Madagascar
	Mali
	Mozambique
	Niger
	Nigeria
	Uganda
	Senegal
	Somalia
	Sudan
	Tanzania
	Zaire (1)
	Zimbabwe
	Sao Tome and Principe
	Togo
	Central African Rep.
	Equatorial Guinea
	Djibouti
	Sierra Leone
	Cape Verde
	Seychelles
	Mauritius
	Comoro Islands
	Lesotho
	Swaziland
	Botswana
	Malawi
	Upper Volta
	Chad
	Gambia
	Zambia
	Rwanda
	Burundi

(1) Charge d'affaires

Table 3: Countries Signing Cooperation Agreements With Algeria (1976-1981)

Angola	Djibouti	Lesotho	Uganda
Benin	Ethiopia	Liberia	Seychelles
Cameroon	Gabon	Madagascar	Sierra Leone
Cape Verde	Gambia	Mali	Tanzania
Comoros	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique	Togo
Congo	Upper Volta	Niger	Zambia
Ivory Coast			

It is plainly evident that Algeria takes a much greater interest in the countries of black Africa than Morocco does and that its interest is constant and growing. Thanks to the number of its embassies, the diversity of its trade, and the multiplicity of its cooperation agreements, it has relations with all those countries, whereas Morocco's relations are limited to about 10 states, most of them French speaking and moderate. Algiers has developed a dynamic African policy, whereas Rabat has largely neglected this area. That difference was to have important consequences when the African countries were induced to take a stand on the Western Sahara issue beginning in 1975.

3. POLISARIO and Black Africa

From the very start of the conflict, POLISARIO benefited from Algeria's network of relations in Africa, using it to step up its contacts with the African countries to explain its position to them and obtain their support for its cause. Its officials sometimes met with their leaders while they were in Algiers. For example, they held talks with ministers from Togo and Mali in March 1976 and with the presidents of Congo and Niger in October 1977. Above all, delegations visited numerous African countries--sometimes on several occasions. There were about 20 such visits between 1976 and 1980, as follows:

Madagascar (March 1976 and April 1977)

Burundi (March 1976)

Upper Volta (March 1976 and March 1977)

Tanzania (June and December 1976)

Guinea (August 1976)

Togo (August 1976; February, August, and December 1977; August 1978; and June 1980)

Mali (August 1976, August 1978, October 1979, and January, August, and October 1980)

Benin (November 1976, August 1977, and August 1980)

Ethiopia (December 1976 and September 1978)

Kenya (December 1976)

Niger (January 1977, September 1978, and November 1979)

Mauritius (January 1977)

Zambia (January 1977)

Congo (January and April 1977; September and November 1978)

Angola (April 1977 and September 1978)

Guinea-Bissau (May 1977)

Sao Tome and Principe (September 1978)

Cape Verde (August 1980)

Gambia (August 1980)

When an OAU summit meeting was being held, POLISARIO would generally send a delegation to the city where the conference was being held, but it did not participate in those conferences. In June 1976, Mauritius turned back one such delegation, then accepted its presence in Port Louis after Algeria intervened. Only Gabon dared to prevent a delegation from entering its territory--in July 1977--leaving the progressive countries displeased. And in March 1982, Senegal turned back a Saharan delegation that had come to Dakar for an OAU ministerial conference, causing the departure of Algeria and 13 other countries and, as a consequence, the cancellation of the meeting.

After the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) was admitted to the OAU in February 1982, Saharan leaders visited black Africa even more frequently. Their usual purpose was to meet the ministers of foreign affairs or even the chiefs of state and present them with messages from the president of the SDAR. In April 1982, for example, Saharan ministers visited 10 countries: Tanzania, Nigeria, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Comoro Islands, Angola, Congo, Chad, and Benin. For his part, Minister of Foreign Affairs Brahim Hakim stepped up the number of his visits abroad, notably as follows:

Liberia, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi (January 1980)

Mali (May 1981 and February, September, and December 1983)

Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Tanzania (January 1983)

Congo (February 1983 and September 1984)

Zimbabwe (April 1983)

Ethiopia and Tanzania (July 1983)

Zimbabwe and Mozambique (January 1984)

Other emissaries, often carrying messages from the president of the SDAR, also visited several countries, sometimes twice: Mali (September 1982), Benin (April 1983 and January 1984), Madagascar (June and December 1983), Mauritius (September 1983), Congo (September 1983 and June 1984), Ghana (September 1983), Upper Volta (September 1983 and August 1984), Botswana (November 1983), and Cape Verde (December 1983).

The Saharan prime minister visited Mali in November 1979 and Ethiopia in January 1983. And the president of the SDAR, Mohamed Abdelaziz, visited Mozambique in June 1980. In particular, he made three important trips to black Africa, where he was welcomed everywhere as a chief of state: the first was in October 1982 (Tanzania, Madagascar, Benin, and Mali), the second was in April 1983 (Benin, Mozambique, Burundi, Congo, and Mali), and the third was in October 1984, when he visited 12 countries: Ethiopia, Burundi, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mozambique, Botswana, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Mali. The basic purpose of those trips was to prepare for OAU summit meetings: the one scheduled for Tripoli in November 1982 and those that were held in Addis Ababa in June 1983 and November 1984. Mohamed Abdelaziz also met with the president of Nigeria, General Buhari, in Lagos on 7 November 1984, a few days before the SDAR was recognized by that country.

In all, the Saharan leaders made official visits to 30 countries in black Africa between 1976 and 1984. The countries visited most often were Mali (15 times), Congo (11), Benin (9), Tanzania (8), Madagascar (7), Togo (7), Ethiopia (5), Upper Volta (5), and Mozambique (5).

The SDAR also had diplomatic relations with certain African countries that had recognized it. For example, it appointed ambassadors to about 10 of them. Besides its missions in Algiers and Tripoli, it had embassies in five countries and was represented in a total of 10 countries (table 4).

Table 4: SDAR Embassies in Black Africa (1984)

Embassies (5)	Countries Covered (5)
Angola	
Benin	Burkina Faso
	Ghana
Ethiopia	Burundi
Madagascar	Seychelles
Mozambique	Zimbabwe

POLISARIO's close relations with most black African countries show the interest it took in them and the support it expected from them. Despite its feeble resources, its diplomatic action with respect to them was much more considerable than that of Morocco. It is not surprising, therefore, that the SDAR reaped considerable rewards.

II. Stands Taken in International Bodies

Being called upon to take a stand on the Saharan problem, the countries of black Africa have stated their positions chiefly at periodic OAU conferences (councils of ministers and summit meetings by chiefs of state) and at the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly. Some of them have also played a special role either by offering to mediate, supporting the Moroccan position, or recognizing the SDAR. Our purpose is not to trace the development of the Saharan conflict or to study actions on that issue by the OAU or the United Nations. Our intention is to examine the attitudes of the various countries

of black Africa on this matter and, where appropriate, the changes in those attitudes since 1975. But since their positions have been expressed primarily at the OAU and the United Nations, it is necessary to recall briefly the content of the decisions reached by those two organizations.

1. Stands Taken by OAU

In most cases, OAU summit meetings led to compromise solutions accepted by consensus, and therefore without a vote, in order to avoid a split or even a breakup of the organization. In several instances, however, the member states were induced to take a clear stand either by voting or in some other way.

Their first opportunity came at the end of February 1976 at the council of ministers meeting in Addis Ababa. The question was whether the OAU recognized POLISARIO as a liberation movement. Besides Algeria and Libya, 15 countries favored recognition: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Comoro Islands, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Tanzania, and Chad. Opposing recognition were 11 countries in addition to Morocco and Mauritania: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Zaire, and Zambia. The remaining countries hesitated to take a stand.

A few months later, at the council of ministers meeting in Port Louis in June 1976, a vigorous resolution presented by Benin was adopted by a vote of 29 to 2 with 10 abstentions. It supported the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence and called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory. The countries voting in favor of POLISARIO were the same as those in February, but they had been joined by 12 others: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta, and Zambia. Only two--Gabon and Senegal--were opposed, but many countries abstained (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Tunisia, and Zaire) or were absent (Morocco, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, the Seychelles, Sudan, and Uganda) (see table 5). Since Morocco and Mauritania considered the resolution unacceptable and threatened to leave the OAU, the chiefs of state did not take up the resolution at their summit meeting early in July. Nigeria suggested a compromise that consisted of holding a special summit meeting with participation by representatives of the people of Western Sahara.

In fact, it was never possible to hold that meeting because the countries that were asked to act as host (Zambia, Ethiopia, and Gabon) found various reasons not to do so. Every year thereafter, except in 1982, a resolution on Western Sahara was adopted at every regular OAU summit meeting. But except in 1979, the resolution in question was always a compromise text adopted by consensus.

At the summit meeting in Khartoum in July 1978, where Presidents Senghor and Boumediene had a sharp confrontation, two draft resolutions were presented. One, presented by Mali with Nigerian support, called for setting up a special commission, while the other, presented by Mozambique, demanded the right of self-determination for the Saharan people. The resolution as adopted combined those two proposals by setting up an ad hoc committee of five chiefs of state

and evoking the Saharan people's right of self-determination. The ad hoc committee was set up in November 1978. It was presided over by Marshal Nimeiri (Sudan) and consisted of five countries: Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania. In fact, Ivory Coast did not participate in the work of that body. The committee appointed a subcommittee consisting of the presidents of Mali and Nigeria. They visited Nouakchott, Algiers, and Fez in May 1979 and met with POLISARIO leaders. The following month, the committee made recommendations clearly favoring POLISARIO: it called for an immediate and general cease-fire and the exercise by the Saharan people of their right of self-determination through a general and free referendum.

Those proposals were taken up at the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979, where they were adopted, but only by the bare two-thirds majority required: out of 44 countries voting, there were 33 votes in favor, 2 opposed (the Comoro Islands and Zaire), and 9 abstentions, while 5 countries (including Morocco, Gabon, and Senegal) showed their opposition by not participating in the vote (table 5). A special committee of six states was also set up at the Monrovia summit meeting to prepare for and oversee the referendum. Its makeup was the same as that of the previous committee, and it was headed by Liberia.

Table 5: Votes by African Countries at the OAU

(Y=Yes; N=No; A=Abstained. A blank indicates that the country did not take part in the vote. A dash indicates that the country was not an OAU member.)

Council of Monrovia			Council of Monrovia		
Ministers		Summit	Ministers		Summit
Country	June 1976	July 1979	Country	June 1976	July 1979
Algeria	Y	Y	Malawi	A	Y
Angola	Y	Y	Mali	Y	Y
Benin	Y	Y	Morocco		
Botswana	Y	Y	Mauritius	A	A
Burundi	Y	Y	Mauritania		Y
Cameroon	A	A	Mozambique	Y	Y
Cape Verde	Y	Y	Niger	Y	Y
Comoros	Y	N	Nigeria	Y	Y
Congo	Y	Y	Uganda		Y
Ivory Coast		A	Central African Rep.	A	A
Djibouti	-	A	Rwanda	Y	Y
Egypt		A	S. Tome and Principe	Y	Y
Ethiopia	Y	Y	Senegal	N	
Gabon	N		Seychelles		Y
Gambia	A	A	Sierra Leone	Y	A
Ghana	Y	Y	Somalia	Y	Y
Guinea	Y	Y	Sudan		Y
Guinea-Bissau	Y	Y	Swaziland	Y	
Equatorial Guinea		Y	Tanzania	Y	Y
Upper Volta	Y	Y	Chad	Y	
Kenya	Y	Y	Togo	Y	Y
Lesotho	A	Y	Tunisia	A	A
Liberia	A	Y	Zaire	A	N
Libya	Y	Y	Zambia	Y	Y
Madagascar	Y	Y	Zimbabwe	-	-

The issue of the SDAR's admission to the OAU came up at the summit meeting in Freetown in July 1980 because the SDAR was already recognized by 26 out of 50 countries. Morocco's strong opposition was supported by several other countries, notably Guinea and Senegal. Nigeria again suggested a compromise solution that was adopted by consensus: it merely asked the committee to continue its action to reconcile the parties to the conflict and find a peaceful and lasting solution. The committee, now headed by Sierra Leone rather than Liberia, again recommended in September 1980 that a referendum be held and a cease-fire observed. Hassan II having accepted the principle of a referendum, the summit meeting in Nairobi in June 1981 resulted in the adoption by consensus of a compromise resolution centered on two points: the cease-fire and the referendum. To implement its decisions, the meeting appointed a committee with the same members as before (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania) and chaired by Kenya. But despite several meetings, that body was unable to achieve any results.

The SDAR's admission to the OAU in February 1982 caused a serious crisis in the organization. Along with Morocco and under its influence, 18 countries walked out of the council of ministers: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Sudan, Zaire, Djibouti, Niger, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Somalia, the Comoro Islands, Gabon, Tunisia, Upper Volta, and Liberia. Seven of those countries also walked out of an OAU ministerial meeting in Salisbury in April 1982 because of the presence of a Saharan delegation: Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Somalia, and Zaire.

The group of countries supporting Morocco prevented the holding of the OAU summit meeting in Tripoli in August 1982 despite a compromise proposed by Nigeria. A resolution inviting Morocco and POLISARIO to begin direct negotiations was adopted by consensus at the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983. Again it was a compromise, drawn up this time by Ethiopia, Senegal, and Mauritania. Finally, at the summit meeting in November 1984, where the SDAR's presence was accepted, only Zaire withdrew from the conference to show its support for Morocco, which then left the OAU. Thus, the split created among the African countries by the Saharan problem manifested itself chiefly on three occasions: in 1976, 1979, and 1982. Since the serious crisis experienced by the OAU and the final admission of the SDAR, very broad consensus has been achieved on the proposed solution, and only a few countries continue to support Morocco.

2. Stands Taken at the United Nations

Like the OAU, the UNO has shown constant concern over the Saharan problem, and every year since 1975, it has adopted a resolution (and sometimes two) on the subject.(7) The votes cast by the African countries in this connection enable us to gain a better knowledge of their positions and to see how their stands have sometimes changed. Their votes at the UNO are therefore a useful complement to the data furnished by the OAU, where votes are seldom taken. But to understand their significance, we must recall the basic content of the resolutions in question. For each resolution, we will indicate the number of votes obtained among the African countries (including the Arab countries).

The UNO adopted two concurrent resolutions in December 1975. The first of them (Resolution A) favored Algeria and POLISARIO, since it called for free exercise of the right of self-determination by all Saharans. There were 29 votes in favor, 0 opposed, and 11 abstentions. The second (Resolution B) supported the stand taken by Morocco and Mauritania, since it took note of the Madrid agreement, signed by those countries with Spain on 14 November 1975, while also affirming the Saharan population's right to self-determination. It was supported by only 14 African votes, while 21 African states voted against it and 8 abstained. In December 1976 and November 1977, the UNO simply adopted by consensus a resolution taking note of the OAU's decision to hold a special summit meeting on Western Sahara.

In December 1978, it again adopted two conflicting resolutions. The first (A) reflected the position of Algeria and POLISARIO and reaffirmed the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence. It was supported by 32 African votes, with 6 votes against and 9 abstentions. The other resolution (B) supported the position of Morocco and Mauritania and entrusted the finding of a solution to the OAU. It was supported by 20 African votes, with 20 votes against and 7 abstentions.

The resolutions adopted in the ensuing years were all favorable to Algeria and POLISARIO. The one adopted in November 1979 reaffirmed the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence, recognized the legitimacy of its struggle, deplored Morocco's occupation of the territory, and called on Morocco to end that occupation. It was supported by 31 African votes, with 4 votes against and 6 abstentions.

The resolution of November 1980 was essentially the same as that of the year before. It also called on the UNO to cooperate with the OAU in enabling the Saharan people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and it asked Morocco and POLISARIO to begin direct negotiations with a view to reaching a final settlement. In committee, it was supported by 34 African votes, with 4 votes against (6 in the plenary session) and 8 abstentions.⁽⁸⁾ A resolution favorable to Morocco was also submitted, but it was rejected in committee, where it received only 14 African votes, with 24 votes against and 9 abstentions.

The resolution of November 1981 took note of the OAU's decision to hold a referendum on self-determination and asked Morocco and POLISARIO to observe a cease-fire and to begin negotiations to that end. It received 28 African votes, with 6 votes against and 14 abstentions. The resolution of November 1982 was practically identical. It again asked Morocco and POLISARIO to begin negotiations with a view to achieving a cease-fire and allowing the holding of a referendum on self-determination. It was supported by 26 African votes, with 9 votes against and 11 abstentions.

The resolution of November 1983 echoed the one adopted at the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983, which also urged Morocco and POLISARIO to undertake direct negotiations aimed at a cease-fire and a referendum on self-determination. It was adopted by consensus despite Morocco's reservations. Lastly, the resolution of December 1984 was like the preceding one, but it was

adopted by vote. It received 38 African votes, with 0 voting against and 5 abstentions, but 7 countries, including Morocco, did not participate in the voting.

With reference only to votes cast by the African countries, we can make the following observations:

1) In 1975 and 1978, the years in which two conflicting resolutions were adopted, the pro-Algerian resolutions received wide African support (29 and 32 votes respectively) and little opposition (0 and 6 votes). On the other hand, the pro-Moroccan resolutions received only modest African support (14 and 20 votes) and encountered pronounced hostility (21 and 20 votes).

2) Beginning in 1979, the UNO adopted only one resolution each year, and in every case that resolution was favorable to POLISARIO, usually receiving wide support (31, 34, 28, and 38 votes) and little opposition (4, 6, 6, 9, and 0 votes).

Table 6 shows in detail how the African countries voted at the UNO from 1975 to 1984, except that no figures are shown for 1976, 1977, and 1983, when the resolution in question was adopted by consensus.

Table 6: UN Votes by the African Countries
(Y=Yes; N=No; A=Abstained; (Y), (N), or (A): the country later informed the secretariat of its intention to vote yes or no or to abstain. A blank indicates that the country did not take part in the vote. A dash indicates that the country was not a member of the UNO.)

Country	Dec 1975 Res.		Dec 1978 Res.		Nov 1979	Nov 1980 4th Comm.	Nov 1981	Nov 1982	Nov 1984
	A	B	A	B					
Algeria	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Angola	-	-	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Benin	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Botswana	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burundi	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cameroon	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
Cape Verde			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoro Islands	Y	N	(N)	(Y)			A	(A)	(1)
Congo	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ivory Coast	A	A	A	A	A	A			A
Djibouti	-	-	Y	A			A	A	
Egypt	A	A	N	Y	A	A	A	A	Y
Ethiopia	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gabon	A	Y	N	Y	N	(2)	N	N	A
Gambia	A	Y	A	Y	(Y)	Y	A	N	Y
Ghana	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea	Y	N	Y	N		N	A	N	
Guinea-Bissau	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Equatorial Guinea	Y	N	Y	N	N	(2)	N	(N)	(3)
Upper Volta	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A		N	Y
Kenya	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y
Lesotho	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Liberia		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
		(N)							
Libya			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Madagascar	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y
								(Y)	
Mali	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco		Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	
Mauritius	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania		Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Niger	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y
Nigeria	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y
Uganda	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Central African Rep.	A	Y	N	Y	N	A	N	A	Y
Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
S. Tome and Principe			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Senegal	A	Y	A	Y	(N)	N	N	N	Y
Seychelles	-	-	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sierra Leone	Y	N	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	A	Y	Y
Somalia	Y	A				A	A	A	A
Sudan	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A
Swaziland	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(4)
Tanzania	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chad	Y	N	A	A	A	Y	Y	N	Y
Togo	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
Tunisia	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
Zaire	A	Y	N	Y	A	N	N	N	A
					(N)				
Zambia	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zimbabwe	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Y	Y	Y

(1) Abstained in fourth committee.

(2) Voted against in the plenary session.

(3) Voted against in fourth committee.

(4) Voted in favor in fourth committee.

III. Attitude of Black African Countries

The various stands taken by the African countries at the OAU and the UNO on the Saharan problem reveal their general attitudes on the issue and make it possible to divide them into four different groups:

1. Those that have generally supported Morocco.

2. Those that have generally supported Algeria and POLISARIO.

3. Those that have changed their attitude considerably--to the point of completely reversing themselves.

4. Those that have avoided taking a clear stand.

But there is nothing rigid about the above grouping, because many countries have wavered or changed their stand at one time or another. Our task, then, is to determine their dominant attitude since 1975 and place them in the appropriate group, while bringing out all the nuances where needed.

1. Countries Supporting Morocco

Four countries can be included in this first group, but they themselves are of two kinds. Gabon and Zaire have consistently supported Morocco, while Guinea and Senegal have changed to some extent: Guinea was favorable to POLISARIO until 1979, and Senegal's position has shifted since 1983.

Gabon adopted a stand in favor of Morocco at a very early stage. During a visit to Rabat in November 1974, President Bongo was already supporting Morocco's claims to the territories occupied by Spain. And Gabon's support remained steady thereafter, as is shown by its voting record at the OAU and the UNO. But it was more discreet in 1984, the reason being that it was presenting a candidate for the post of OAU secretary general. Although trade between the two countries is modest, there are close ties between them. They signed several cooperation agreements between 1976 and 1981, particularly in the fields of vocational training and transportation (air and sea links and railway transportation) and in the cultural and scientific fields. Above all, there are profound political affinities between the two regimes, which are definitely pro-Western and dread any destabilization attempt in Africa. Rabat also provides President Bongo with sizable aid in the field of security.

Zaire is just as loyal in its support of Morocco, although it abstained from voting at the OAU in June 1976 and at the UNO in December 1984. In 1975, while laying claim to Angola's Cabinda Enclave, it presented the court in The Hague with an oral brief in support of Moroccan claims on the Sahara. A trade agreement and a convention on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation were signed in October 1972, but there is practically no trade, and no agreements were signed between 1976 and 1981. In fact, ties between the two countries are chiefly political in nature. On two occasions--in April 1977 and in June 1978--Rabat sent a contingent of 1,500 soldiers to help President Mobutu defend his regime and protect rich Shaba Province from attacks by former Katangan gendarmes. In exchange, Zaire has always provided vigorous support for Morocco's stand on the Sahara. In June 1984, President Mobutu even brought up the idea of a league of black African states to overcome the OAU crisis caused by the Saharan problem. The idea was later brought up several times, but nothing came of it. Lastly, Zaire walked out of the OAU summit meeting in November 1984 and suspended its participation in that organization to protest the presence of the SDAR.

Guinea's attitude toward the Saharan affair was much more complex. Guinea supported Algeria and POLISARIO until 1979, and it expressed itself in their favor in February and June 1976. At the UNO, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan resolution in 1975 and 1978. But a change in its attitude began the following year. In January 1979, Sekou Toure made a 4-day visit to King Hassan II in Marrakesh. In their joint communique, the two chiefs of state declared that they wanted to work "for the establishment of detente with respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states." (9) That was an allusion both to the Saharan problem and to the border dispute between Conakry and Guinea-Bissau. At the same time, they signed three agreements: a convention on trade and tariffs, a cultural and scientific agreement, and an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. It is true that there was little trade between them, but other agreements were concluded between 1977 and 1981. They covered construction of the great mosque in Conakry, the establishment of an airline, and cooperation in the fields of transportation, geology, and mining.

But Guinea, which was a member of the OAU's ad hoc committee, voted for the latter's recommendations at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979, and that amounted to supporting POLISARIO. At the UNO in November, however, it did not participate in the voting, thus abandoning POLISARIO. It vigorously supported Morocco later by voting against the UNO resolutions in 1980 and 1982 and taking Rabat's side during the OAU crisis of 1982. Since the OAU was to hold its summit meeting in Conakry in 1984 and the SDAR intended to take part, Sekou Toure took many steps to ensure that that conference, the material preparations for which were being made with generous help from Morocco and Saudi Arabia, (10) would take place. But he died on 26 March 1984, and a coup d'etat brought the military to power on 3 April. Guinea then decided not to host the summit meeting and adopted a very cautious stance: without breaking its ties with Morocco, it stopped supporting the latter openly, and at the UNO in December 1984, it did not take part in the voting. Absorbed since then in its own internal problems, it has avoided taking a stand on the Saharan affair. In any case, Rabat lost an important ally when Sekou Toure died.

Senegal also supported Morocco at a very early stage. During a visit to Hassan II as far back as February 1974, President Senghor supported Rabat's determination to recover Spanish Sahara. At the court in The Hague in October 1975, Senegalese judge I. Forster stated that he accepted the advisory opinion to the extent that it affirmed the existence of legal ties of allegiance between the Moroccan sultan and certain tribes in Western Sahara and legal ties between the Mauritanian entity and the territory of Western Sahara. But he did not share the court's view when it stated that there was no tie of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara on the one hand and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity on the other because, in his view, that conclusion excessively minimized "the exceptional importance of the local, social, and temporal context of the problem." He therefore felt that the legal ties described in the opinion, notably those relating to allegiance, denoted "the existence of a state power and the exercise of a political administration that are analogous to a tie of sovereignty." What his statement came down to was support for the Moroccan thesis. (11)

Senegal was particularly interested in the Saharan conflict because it was close to the zone of tension and was concerned about the fate of the black inhabitants of southern Mauritania who were being sent to fight POLISARIO. That was why it voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975 and 1978 while abstaining from the vote on the Algerian resolution. Afterward, and until 1982, it always voted against the resolutions favoring POLISARIO, and its attitude was similar at the OAU in June 1976 and at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979.

Despite its open support for Morocco, Senegal tried on two occasions to offer its mediation. In March 1976, President Senghor suggested "overall negotiations" between the three countries concerned (Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania) to settle the issues in dispute and organize economic cooperation for the joint exploitation of Western Sahara's resources.(12) In fact, Senegal was clearly favoring Morocco and Mauritania and ignoring the Saharan people. Algeria therefore rejected its proposal. The following year--in September 1977--Dakar again tried mediation by presenting a settlement plan that provided in particular for consulting the inhabitants of Western Sahara under the aegis of the OAU, the UNO, and the Arab League. Saharans would be asked to choose between three solutions: integration, autonomy, and independence within the framework of a confederation of the region's states. The plan also envisaged the joint exploitation of Saharan resources by the neighboring countries. POLISARIO rejected those proposals because they did not satisfy its demands and ignored the refugees in the Tindouf camps. Algeria also judged them unacceptable. Morocco and Mauritania were also hesitant about the plan. Under those conditions, nothing came of it, and Senegal could not present itself as a mediator because it had clearly chosen its camp.

Beginning in November 1977, it accepted French forces, and especially Jaguar aircraft, on its soil--at Ouakam Airbase near Dakar. They were to defend Mauritania from attacks by POLISARIO, and they intervened against the latter on several occasions, inflicting serious losses on it. President Senghor saw POLISARIO simply as "a tool in the hands of Algiers." He regarded it as a subversive movement seeking to overthrow the Mauritanian Government and replace it with a radical regime. He accused it, with no convincing proof, of being a racist movement and of killing black Mauritanian prisoners.(13) He also accused Algeria of carrying on "an imperialist and racist undertaking" in the region. And if there was a change of regime in Mauritania, he was even thinking of asking that that country's black inhabitants be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination and join Senegal.(14) The charge of racism was still being expressed and enlarged upon by Senegal's representative at the UNO in November 1980. He denounced POLISARIO's "iniquitous treatment" of its black prisoners.(15) The opposition parties, on the other hand, and particularly the Democratic Party, criticized French military intervention in Mauritania from their country and supported POLISARIO as well as the Saharan people's right of self-determination.(16)

After the peace agreement was signed by Mauritania and POLISARIO in Algiers on 5 August 1979, Senegal continued to support Morocco. Its prime minister, Abdou Diouf, delivered a message from President Senghor to Hassan II, stating at the time that Morocco could "count on Senegal's resolute support."(17)

After President Senghor's departure at the end of 1980, Senegal remained one of Rabat's best supporters, as it showed by its votes at the UNO in 1981 and 1982 and its attitude during the OAU crisis of 1982 (it refused to accept a Saharan delegation in Dakar in March 1982 and refused to participate in the scheduled summit meeting in Tripoli in August 1982 due to the presence of the SDAR).

But its position then began to change, probably to prevent the paralysis or even the breakup of the OAU. At the Addis Ababa summit meeting in June 1983, President Abdou Diouf met with the president of the SDAR, Mohamed Abdelaziz, and played an active part in drawing up a compromise--adopted by consensus--that called on Morocco and POLISARIO to undertake direct negotiations with a view to establishing a cease-fire and organizing a referendum. The following year, Senegal accepted the SDAR's presence at the Addis Ababa summit meeting in November 1984, and in December it voted for the UNO resolution that again called for direct negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO. That change in attitude was made possible by the coming to power of a man whose personal ties with Hassan II were weaker. He wanted to bring the OAU out of a deadly crisis and accepted the Saharan people's right to self-determination, as he stated on 3 December 1984.(18) That defection by such a longstanding and prestigious supporter as Senegal was obviously a considerable loss for Rabat.

2. Countries Supporting Algeria and POLISARIO

There are two chief criteria for determining which countries these are: votes cast at the OAU and the UNO and recognition of the SDAR. The fact is that a great number of African states have generally declared themselves in favor of the Saharan cause at the OAU and the UNO by voting consistently, or almost consistently, for resolutions favoring Algeria and POLISARIO. They number 26 in all, and all except Kenya and Malawi have recognized the SDAR. Here is a list of them, with explanatory remarks where needed:

Angola

Benin (19)

Botswana

Burundi

Cape Verde

Congo

Ethiopia

Ghana (but Ghana voted for both UN resolutions in 1978)

Guinea-Bissau

Kenya (but Kenya abstained at the UNO in 1981 and 1982 because it held the chairmanship of the OAU at the time)

Lesotho (but Lesotho abstained at the OAU in June 1976)

Madagascar

Malawi (but Malawi abstained at the OAU in June 1976 and at the UNO in 1981)

Mali (but Mali voted for both UN resolutions in 1978)

Mozambique

Nigeria (but Nigeria voted for both UN resolutions in 1978 and abstained in 1981 and 1982 out of a concern for neutrality)

Uganda (but Uganda did not participate in the voting at the OAU in June 1976, and it voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1978. (20)

Rwanda (but Rwanda voted for both UN resolutions in 1975)

Sao Tome and Principe

Seychelles

Sierra Leone (but Sierra Leone abstained at the OAU in July 1979; it voted for both UN resolutions in 1978 and abstained in 1981, although it had recognized the SDAR in 1980)

Swaziland (but Swaziland voted for both UN resolutions in 1978 and did not participate in the voting at the OAU in July 1979)

Tanzania

Togo (but Togo voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975 and for both resolutions in 1978, although it had recognized the SDAR as far back as March 1976)

Zambia (but Zambia abstained on the issue of the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1978)

Zimbabwe

Moreover, the SDAR was recognized by a growing number of African countries following its proclamation of 17 February 1976--a step of great political importance because it affirmed the Saharan Republic's status as a state and gave it international existence. Recognition was gradual and sometimes quite slow (table 7). At the very start (in February and March 1976), the SDAR was recognized by eight countries besides Algeria: Madagascar, Burundi, Benin, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Rwanda. Their recognition was the result of an active diplomatic campaign. The movement then lost momentum, with recognition by only one country (Seychelles) in 1977 and four in 1978 (Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Tanzania). But following the coup d'etat in August 1979, Equatorial Guinea withdrew its

recognition on 5 May 1980. The movement then picked up speed again after Mauritania withdrew from the conflict. Recognition came from six countries

in 1979 (Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Ghana, Uganda, Lesotho, and Zambia) and from six more in 1980, not counting Libya (Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Mali). But there was none in 1981 or 1983, and only one in 1982 (by Mauritius, following the change of government resulting from the elections in June). Lastly, two countries in addition to Mauritania recognized the SDAR in 1984: Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) after Captain Sankara came to power in August 1983 and Nigeria on the eve of the OAU summit meeting in November 1984. In all, and allowing for Equatorial Guinea's change of mind, 27 countries of black Africa--more than half--now recognize the SDAR. If we include the three countries in the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania), we come up with 30 out of 50 African states, or three-fifths.

Table 7: African Countries Recognizing the SDAR

Year	Country	Date
1976	Madagascar	28 February
(9 countries)	Burundi	29 February
	Algeria	6 March
	Benin	9 March
	Angola	9 March
	Mozambique	11 March
	Guinea-Bissau	13 March
	Togo	15 March
	Rwanda	30 March
1977	Seychelles	25 October
(1 country)		
1978	Congo	3 June
(4 countries)	Sao Tome and Principe	20 June
	Equatorial Guinea	3 November (rescinded)
	Tanzania	9 November
1979	Ethiopia	24 February
(6 countries)	Cape Verde	4 July
	Ghana	24 August
	Uganda	6 September
	Lesotho	9 October
	Zambia	12 October
1980	Sierra Leone	27 March
(7 countries)	Libya	15 April
	Swaziland	28 April
	Botswana	14 May
	Zimbabwe	3 July
	Chad	4 July
	Mali	4 July
1982	Mauritius	16 July
(1 country)		
1984	Mauritania	27 February

(3 countries) Upper Volta
Nigeria

4 March
11 November

As noted earlier, the SDAR has appointed ambassadors to about 10 African countries, but only three of those countries have ambassadors accredited to the SDAR: Burundi and Congo (22 May 1983) and Benin (27 February 1984). Their gesture was largely symbolic, since it concerned ambassadors posted to Algiers. Some African leaders--although not many, to tell the truth--have also visited the Saharan refugee camps in the vicinity of Tindouf, examples being the minister of foreign affairs of Sao Tome and Principe in March 1982 and especially the president of Upper Volta, Captain Sankara, in April 1984.

In retaliation, Morocco threatened to break off its diplomatic relations with countries recognizing the SDAR. But since it had practically none with those countries, its threat had almost no effect. It is true that Morocco broke off its relations with Algeria on 7 March 1976, with Ethiopia on 9 March 1979, and with Libya on 18 April 1980, but it did not do so in the case of other African countries, such as Mali and Nigeria, where it had embassies.(21) After the summit meeting in Freetown in July 1980, it decided to stop selling phosphates to countries recognizing the SDAR. But that measure had few consequences owing to the ease with which phosphates can be bought on the world market.

Because of its proximity, Mali tried from the start to help resolve the conflict both by promoting meetings and making proposals. At the end of April 1976, President Moussa Traore brought Ould Daddah and Sekou Toure (who favored POLISARIO at the time) together in Bamako to discuss the problem. Shortly after that, the Algerian minister of foreign affairs, A. Bouteflika, also visited the Malian capital. At the OAU in June 1976, Mali expressed its support for self-determination by the Saharan people. In November, it even proposed a federal solution that would have given POLISARIO the Mauritanian area of Western Sahara on condition that it federate with Mauritania. But Mauritania rejected that proposal, which was also unacceptable to POLISARIO. After the coup d'etat in Mauritania in July 1978, it again tried to bring the sides closer together, and early in September, its minister of foreign affairs visited Algiers, Skhirat (where Hassan II was), and Nouakchott to discuss the Saharan problem. Then, in October 1978, President Moussa Traore organized a meeting in Bamako between a representative of POLISARIO (Mahmoud Abdelfattah), a sizable Moroccan delegation that included Colonel Dlimi and Reda Guedira, both close advisers to the king, and Ahmed Bensouda, governor of Sahara. But those talks, which were the first, did not produce any results.

Among the states supporting the Saharan cause are those usually described as progressive, but there are also many moderate countries. The former are the most determined, and they belong to two special categories. The first group consists of those that conducted a long struggle for national liberation, notably the former Portuguese colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe) and Zimbabwe. Making up the second group are those which either have a socialist orientation or are centered on the USSR (Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Zambia). In addition, two West African countries have played a special role in the Saharan affair: Mali and Nigeria.

Soon afterward, Mali became a member of the ad hoc committee established at the summit meeting in Khartoum in July 1978. To facilitate its mediation

efforts, it voted for both of the resolutions presented at the UNO in December 1978. But at the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979, it supported the resolution calling for a cease-fire and a referendum for self-determination. It also voted for the UN resolution of November 1979, and it recognized the SDAR on 4 July 1980 at the summit meeting in Freetown. It subsequently supported all the OAU and UN resolutions on Sahara. It was also part of the OAU committee in charge of implementing the resolution adopted at the summit meeting in Nairobi in June 1981. In that role, it engaged in intensive diplomatic activity aimed at finding a solution to the Saharan problem, and it became one of the best supporters of the Saharan cause in West Africa.

Nigeria, although far removed from the Maghreb, also played an important role in the Saharan affair. While remaining discreet, it supported POLISARIO almost constantly. For example, it voted for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in December 1975. And at the OAU, it supported POLISARIO in February 1976 and the right of self-determination for Saharans in June. Like Mali, it was part of the ad hoc committee established at the summit meeting in Khartoum, and it voted for both of the UN resolutions in December 1978. But also like Mali, it supported the resolution at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979, and it also supported the UN resolutions in 1979 and 1980. It became a member of the implementing committee established at the Nairobi summit meeting in June 1981. Probably to facilitate that body's work, it adopted a neutral attitude by abstaining at the UNO in 1981 and 1982. On several occasions, it played a crucial role at the OAU in coming up with a compromise acceptable to everyone--notably at the summit meetings in Port Louis (July 1976), Freetown (July 1980), and Nairobi (June 1981) and during the serious OAU crisis of 1982. At the Addis Ababa summit meeting in June 1983, it supported the request that Morocco and POLISARIO engage in direct negotiations. After the military coup d'etat on 31 December 1983, Nigeria continued to support the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence, as was stated by its president, General Buhari, and its minister of foreign affairs in March 1984. But faced with Rabat's lack of cooperation and its refusal to negotiate with POLISARIO, Nigeria withdrew from the implementing committee in September 1984, feeling that the committee could no longer fulfill its mission. Finally, following a visit to Lagos by Mohamed Abdelaziz, it recognized the SDAR on 11 November 1984. That decision was especially important because of Nigeria's importance in Africa. It facilitated the SDAR's permanent admission to the OAU at the summit meeting in Addis Ababa, which was held the next day. Naturally, Nigeria voted for the UN resolution of December 1984, thus confirming its permanent and active solidarity with the Saharan cause.

3. Countries Whose Attitude Has Changed

Several countries have changed their attitude toward the Saharan problem, generally by transferring their support from Morocco to POLISARIO--rarely the other way around. In fact, only two countries have abandoned POLISARIO to line up with Morocco: Guinea, which changed its stand in 1980, as we saw above, and Equatorial Guinea.

A former Spanish colony, Equatorial Guinea spontaneously supported the Saharan cause in the early years. At the UNO, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan resolution in 1975 and 1978. It even recognized the SDAR on 3 November 1978. It also voted for the OAU resolution at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. But after the coup d'etat on 3 August 1979, which brought Col Obiang Nguema to power, it reversed itself completely and systematically supported Morocco. It announced on 5 May 1980 that it no longer recognized the SDAR. Beginning in November 1979, it voted consistently against UN resolutions favorable to POLISARIO (in December 1984, it voted against the resolution in committee and, following Morocco's example, did not take part in the voting at the plenary session). The explanation for the rather odd change on the part of this small country, which borders on Gabon and has a fragile regime, seems to be the aid in the field of security that it has been receiving from Rabat since the political change in 1979.

Conversely, other countries that were originally hesitant or favorable to Morocco have come around to supporting Algeria and POLISARIO. Some have gone so far as to recognize the SDAR. We can mention five in particular: Liberia, Mauritius, Gambia, Upper Volta, and Chad. Liberia has shifted several times: hesitant at first, it voted for both UN resolutions in 1978. Then it decided in favor of POLISARIO at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979 and at the UNO from 1979 to 1981. But it opposed the SDAR's presence in the OAU in 1982 and voted against the UN resolution that same year. On the other hand, it voted for the 1984 resolution, thus returning to its previous attitude.

Mauritius also hesitated during the early years. It abstained at the OAU in June 1976 and July 1979. At the UNO, it voted for both resolutions in 1975, but in 1978 it voted only for the Moroccan text. Beginning in 1980, however, it voted consistently for the UN resolutions in 1979 and 1980 [sentence as published]. But after the federation with Senegal was established in August 1981, it went along almost entirely with the latter. It abstained at the UNO in 1981, but it voted the same way as Senegal in 1982 and 1984--that is, against the 1982 resolution and for the one in 1984.

Upper Volta, too, has frequently changed its stand on the Saharan problem. It began by voting for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in December 1975. At the OAU in June 1976, after brief hesitation, it supported self-determination for the Saharan people. It then leaned toward Rabat, and at the UNO in 1978, it voted for the Moroccan resolution. But at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979, it approved the resolution calling for a cease-fire and referendum. It adopted the same attitude at the UNO in November 1979 but then stood aloof, abstaining in 1980 and not voting in 1981. During the OAU crisis in 1982, it aligned itself completely with Morocco and voted against the UN resolution in November. But after the coup d'etat on 4 August 1983, which brought Captain Sankara to power, it reversed itself completely: it recognized the SDAR on 4 March 1984 and voted, naturally, for the UN resolution in December. Captain Sankara even visited the Saharan camps near Tindouf on 3 April 1984. He was the only African chief of state to do so, and his country has become one of POLISARIO's best supporters.

Chad's attitude toward the Saharan problem has fluctuated depending on its own particularly troubled internal situation. In the beginning, it was clearly

favorable to POLISARIO: at the UNO in December 1975, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan text. And at the OAU, it expressed its support for POLISARIO in February and June 1976. But then, paralyzed by its internal difficulties in 1978 and 1979, it avoided taking a stand on the issue, abstaining at the UNO on the two resolutions of 1978 and on that of 1979, and it was not represented at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. Following the formation of GUNT (National Union Transition Government), which was headed by Goukouni Oueddei and supported by Libya, in November 1979, Chad changed its stand considerably: it recognized the SDAR on 4 July 1980 and supported POLISARIO at the UNO in 1980 and 1981. But there was another change when Hissein Habre came to power in June 1982. Since Libya, an ally of the Saharans, strongly opposed his regime, he decided against POLISARIO and gave his support to Morocco. That was why Chad voted against the UN resolution in 1982, without, however, canceling its recognition of the SDAR. But when Morocco drew closer to Libya, going so far as to support its claim to the Aouzou Strip and signing a treaty of union with it in Oujda in 1984, Chad reversed itself again. It pointed out that its recognition of the SDAR remained valid, and it voted for the UN resolution in December 1984, thus drawing closer to Algeria, which by then was not on good terms with Tripoli.

4. Hesitant or Neutral Countries

For various reasons, some countries in black Africa have avoided taking a clear stand on the Saharan issue. Primarily moderate countries, they tend to favor Morocco but do not support it openly and like to take refuge in abstention at the OAU and the UNO. That is the dominant attitude of eight countries, most of them French speaking: Ivory Coast, Cameroon, the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Niger, the Central African Republic, Somalia, and Sudan.

Ivory Coast adopted a consistently reserved attitude toward the Saharan problem. Its political affinities led it to favor the Moroccan position. But it has not really supported Rabat and has usually refused to choose between the two camps. Several reasons explain that extreme caution. First of all, Ivory Coast was rather far from the region of conflict and was not in danger of being affected by it. Second, it had relatively important economic ties with Morocco and Algeria, and its trade balance with both those countries was definitely favorable. Its desire to retain those advantages may have induced it to show a degree of neutrality.

Moreover, Ivory Coast was one of the African countries best acquainted with the Saharan problem and had been since 1975--that is, before the conflict started. For one thing, it was the Ivorian representative at the UNO, Simeon Ake, who headed the UN mission that visited Spanish Sahara and the neighboring countries in May and June 1975. He was able to note that the population as a whole was in favor of independence and opposed to the claims of Morocco and Mauritania and that POLISARIO seemed to be "the dominant political force in the territory." The mission felt that the solution to the problem would require an agreement by all parties involved, including Sahara's inhabitants, and that the latter's wishes should be respected. It therefore recommended that the entire Saharan population be consulted under UN control. When he later became his country's minister of foreign affairs, Simeon Ake found it difficult to forget that mission's conclusions and recommendations.

For another thing, Morocco had obtained the right in May 1975 to appoint an ad hoc judge to the court in The Hague, and its choice fell on the presiding judge of Ivory Coast's Supreme Court, Alphonse Boni. Boni took part in all the debates at the court in The Hague and voted in favor of the advisory opinion handed down on 16 October 1975. In his separate opinion, Judge Boni defended the Moroccan thesis. He stressed the religious ties linking the sultan to certain tribes in Saguia el Hamra, and he felt that the legal ties existing between them were both religious and political and had "the character of territorial sovereignty." Although the court had explicitly repudiated that last point, Judge Boni voted for its opinion because it asked the UNO to "consult the inhabitants of those regions concerning their future." Rather oddly, he added that by acknowledging ties having the character of territorial sovereignty, one reached the same conclusion--that is, that of a "compulsory consultation with the inhabitants of Western Sahara concerning their future." As a result, the ad hoc judge and the chairman of the UN mission, both of whom were Ivorians, reached the same conclusion, although by differing and independent paths. Through them, therefore, Ivory Coast was able to acquaint itself thoroughly with the political and legal aspects of the Saharan problem. Although sympathizing with Morocco's theses, it knew full well where justice and right lay in the matter, and that may explain its subsequent attitude of caution and neutrality.

Both at the OAU and at the UNO, in fact, Ivory Coast has generally abstained or not taken part in the voting, thus avoiding support for either camp. At the UNO in 1975 and 1978 in particular, it abstained when both of the opposing resolutions were put to a vote. In 1981 and 1982, it did not take part in the voting. Before and after the Mauritanian coup d'etat on 10 July 1978, President Houphouet-Boigny was received several times by President Giscard d'Estaing (on 1 June, 5 July, 2 August, and 8 September), and his intention was to help solve the Saharan problem. But while he had many contacts, he was never able to play a mediating role, as President Senghor hoped.

It is true that Ivory Coast was part of the ad hoc committee established at the Khartoum summit meeting in July 1978 to investigate the Saharan issue. But it never participated in the committee's work and soon withdrew, probably to avoid taking sides and to protect its chances for playing a mediating role. It also abstained on the proposals submitted at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. It did not really take a stand until 1982, when the SDAR was admitted to the OAU: in Addis Ababa in February, it walked out of the council of ministers that had accepted a Saharan delegation, and in April, for the same reason, it left a ministerial meeting in Salisbury and refused to take part in the summit meeting scheduled for Tripoli in August. But in all three cases, it was more a question of rejecting the SDAR's presence than of supporting Morocco. On the other hand, Ivory Coast resigned itself to the SDAR's presence at the Addis Ababa summit meeting in November 1984. The following month, it again abstained on the issue of the UN resolution, thus confirming its desire not to choose so as to avoid displeasing either Morocco or Algeria. At any rate, while it has avoided supporting Rabat openly, it has also done nothing to help the Saharan population exercise its right of self-determination, which was the hope expressed in 1975 by two eminent Ivorian personalities, Simeon Ake and Alphonse Boni.

Following Ivory Coast's example, seven other countries, including five French-speaking ones, have generally avoided taking a stand on the Saharan problem, choosing abstention in most cases but sometimes expressing their preference. Cameroon, for example, supported Rabat's claims at first. During a visit to Morocco as far back as July 1974, President Ahidjo supported the latter's action to liberate Spanish Sahara, and his country voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in December 1975. After that, it consistently abstained at both the UNO and the OAU, although favoring Morocco's theses. But after President Ahidjo's replacement by Paul Biya in November 1982 and the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983, Cameroon changed its stand considerably. For example, President Biya told an Ivorian newspaper in January 1984 that the solution of the conflict required implementation of the resolution passed at the Addis Ababa summit meeting--that is, direct negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO.(24) Following the abortive coup d'etat on 6 April 1984, in which Morocco appeared to be involved, Cameroon maintained its position, expressing the hope, through a statement by its minister of foreign affairs in August 1984, (25) that the principle of self-determination and the organization of a referendum would be implemented. Lastly, in November 1984, it voted for the first time in favor of the UN resolution asking Morocco and POLISARIO to begin direct negotiations aimed at a cease-fire and a referendum.

The Comoro Islands supported Algeria and POLISARIO at first by voting in their favor at the UNO in December 1975 (and against the Moroccan resolution) and at the OAU in June 1976. Then, following the coup d'etat on 13 May 1978 and the installation of Ahmed Abdullah's regime, the country lined up with Morocco by supporting the latter's resolution at the UNO in 1978 and rejecting Algeria's resolution. It also voted against the proposals at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. But subsequently, it abstained at the UNO or did not participate in the voting, although it did support the Moroccan draft in October 1980. So after leaning first toward POLISARIO and then toward Rabat, this state, which is demanding the return of Mayotte Island, has been uncertain as to the course it should pursue.

Djibouti has almost always taken a neutral stand. It is true that that small country, scarcely more densely populated than Western Sahara and much less wealthy, voted for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in 1978. But since then it has consistently abstained at the OAU (the Monrovia summit meeting) and the UNO or has not taken part in the voting--a sign that it is somewhat uncertain.

Niger showed support for Algeria and POLISARIO in the early years. It supported the Saharan cause at the OAU in June 1976 and at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. At the UNO, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan text in 1975, but it supported both of those conflicting resolutions in 1978. In November 1979, it again supported the resolution favoring POLISARIO. But in the 3 following years, it took refuge in abstention, probably to indicate its hostility to Libya's ventures in the Sahel region. On the other hand, following the rapprochement between Morocco and Libya and the signing of the Oujda treaty in August 1984, it again supported the UN resolution in December, thus returning to its original position.

The attitude of the Central African Republic is much more complex because of internal developments in that troubled country. It voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975 and again in 1978, when it also voted against the Algerian text. It simply abstained at the OAU in June 1976 and at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. After Emperor Bokassa was overthrown in September 1979, it again voted against the UN resolutions favoring POLISARIO in 1979 and 1981, but abstained in 1980 and 1982. That attitude may be explained by a certain political affinity with Morocco and great distrust concerning Libya. But after the rapprochement between Rabat and Tripoli, the Central African Republic voted for the UN resolution in December 1984 for the first time. So after following Morocco for a long time, it eventually came to support the Saharan cause.

Conversely, Somalia began by supporting POLISARIO. It voted for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in 1975 and cast a favorable vote at the OAU in June 1976 and July 1979. But beginning in 1978, it either did not take part in the voting at the UNO or abstained, although it did vote for the Moroccan draft in October 1980. Its reserved attitude may be explained by the turnabout in that country's alliances, since it broke with the USSR and drew closer to the United States in 1977.

Lastly, Sudan began by wavering between the two camps. It voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975, then for both resolutions in 1978. Presiding over the OAU's ad hoc committee, it supported POLISARIO at the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979. It also voted for the UN resolutions in 1979 and 1980. But then it abstained in 1981, 1982, and 1984, probably because it was a member of the committee responsible for implementing the resolution from the summit meeting in Nairobi (June 1981) and wanted to remain a member.

Conclusion

The issue of Western Sahara, which brought three Maghreb countries into conflict with each other, became an African problem as early as 1975 because it involved a problem of decolonization on which the states on the continent were being called upon to take a stand. Paradoxically, that issue, which was of concern only to the Maghreb, had to be resolved by the countries of black Africa. But the latter became divided on the subject, with some supporting Morocco and Mauritania, others supporting Algeria and POLISARIO, and still others wavering between the two or avoiding the taking of sides. The split was both complex and unsettled. The African countries did not divide into two well-defined camps, but rather into four groups of unequal size. Morocco's real supporters were actually only four in number: Gabon, Zaire, Guinea, and Senegal. The countries generally favorable to the Saharan cause were much more numerous--26 in all--and in 1985, the SDAR is recognized by 27 black African states. For various reasons (internal situation, change of regime, and foreign pressures and relations), some countries have shifted positions, either to line up with Morocco (Equatorial Guinea) or to support POLISARIO (Liberia and Gambia), or even to recognize the SDAR (Mauritius, Upper Volta, and Chad). Lastly, several countries, especially French-speaking ones, have generally avoided taking a stand and have remained more or less neutral (Ivory

Coast, Cameroon, the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Niger, the Central African Republic, Somalia, and Sudan).

Morocco received little support at the OAU whenever a vote was taken. For example, only two countries (Gabon and Senegal) defended it at the council of ministers meeting in June 1976, and four (Gabon, Senegal, the Comoro Islands, and Zaire) defended it at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. At the UNO, African votes favorable to Rabat were a little more numerous: 10 in 1975 and 18 in 1978, but only 5 in 1979, 4 in 1980, (26) 5 in 1981, 8 in 1982, and none in 1984. Already in a weak position, Morocco suffered two setbacks: one in 1979 following Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict and the Monrovia summit meeting, and another in 1984 following Morocco's refusal to negotiate with POLISARIO and the signing of the treaty of union with Libya. Conversely, the Saharan cause benefited from sizable and growing support among the black African countries, both at the OAU (27 countries in June 1976 and 30 in July 1979) and at the UNO (28 countries in 1975, 30 in 1978 and 1979, 31 in 1980, 25 in 1981, 24 in 1982, and 34 in 1984). It is clear that the Saharan problem has cut Morocco off from Africa, just as the Mauritanian question did in the 1960's. Rabat was forced to see that its theses were receiving scarcely any support there, especially after 1979, when Mauritania defected, whereas support for POLISARIO was growing thanks to the various political changes occurring on the continent (independence for the Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe, coups d'etat, the coming to power of new leaders, and so on). Since 1975, those changes have consistently occurred to the benefit of the Saharan cause and the detriment of the Moroccan position.

As a result of the SDAR's permanent admission to the OAU and its recognition by 30 African countries, it can be said that POLISARIO has now won the diplomatic battle that has been underway in Africa for the past 10 years. For their part, by accepting the Saharan Republic's presence at the Addis Ababa summit meeting in November 1984, the African countries overcame the Saharan problem without really solving it. They prevented a new crisis in the OAU at the cost of Morocco's departure, that country's position having become unacceptable to almost all the members. Black Africa has now been delivered from the thorny issue of Western Sahara, which divided and paralyzed it for many years. At the same time, Western Sahara has become--or become again--an essentially Maghrebian problem. But it is now being posed in different terms, because Morocco has drawn closer to Libya and can, as a result, stand up to Algeria and POLISARIO. The battle of Africa may be over, but the battle of the Maghreb has already started, and it could easily last for a long time to come.

FOOTNOTES

1. Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental" [The Western Sahara Conflict], Paris, L'Harmattan, 1982, pp 238-242 and 325-343, and "The Western Sahara Conflict and the OAU Crisis," LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, Nos 207-208, April-May 1983, pp 31-51. See also Hodges, Tony, "Western Sahara, the Roots of Desert War," Westport, Connecticut, Lawrence Hill and Co., 1983, pp 307-316, also Bontems, Claude, "La guerre du Sahara occidental" [The Western Sahara War], Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1984,

pp 191-203, and Jouve, Edmond, "L'Organisation de l'unité africaine" [The Organization of African Unity], Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1984, pp 141-152.

2. Mouddour, Badroum, "The African States and the Western Sahara Affair," thesis for M.A. in international development law, University of Nice, 95 pp. Actually, the contents of this paper do not correspond to its title. It is devoted essentially to the Western Sahara problem and only incidentally to the attitude of the African countries toward that problem.
3. Mohammed Bouzidi, "Morocco and Sub-Saharan Africa," ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD, No 17, 1978, pp 87-111, Lekbir Kherrati, "Morocco's African Policy," master's thesis, ETUDES POLITIQUES, University of Paris-II, 1981, 97 pp, and Jalil Tadlaoui, "Morocco and Black Africa: Evolution of Relations, 1956-1978," third-cycle thesis, ETUDES AFRICAINES, University of Bordeaux-I, No IV, 1981, 362 pp. These papers uncritically adopt the official Moroccan theses concerning the Saharan problem. But they do underscore the weakness of Moroccan diplomacy in Africa.
4. Paul Balta, "Algeria's African Policy," REVUE FRANCAISE D'ETUDES POLITIQUES AFRICAINES, No 132, December 1976, pp 54-73, and Slimane Chikh, "Algeria's African Policy," ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD, No 17, 1978, pp 1-54.
5. Quoted by Paul Balta, article cited, p 54.
6. See Slimane Chikh, article cited, p 9.
7. Concerning UN action, see Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental," op. cit., pp 182-183, 236-238, and 343-351.
8. Because of equipment failure, the votes at the plenary session were not recorded. But the votes in committee were.
9. LE MONDE, 20 January 1979, p 4.
10. Laurent Zecchini, "Guinea, 57 Billionaires' Homes," LE MONDE, 1-2 January 1984, p 4.
11. "Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion," ICJ Reports 1975, Forster's separate opinion, p 103. Concerning this advisory opinion, see Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental," op. cit., pp 132-154.
12. Statement of 18 March 1976. See LE MONDE, 20 March 1976, p 7.
13. Interview with JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 885, 23 December 1977, pp 32-34. Basing his remarks on statements by only one witness, but one "considered reliable," he said: "Mauritanians falling into the hands of POLISARIO were divided into two groups: Moors were spared, but the blacks had their throats cut" (p 32). But he did not specify the date, place, or

circumstances of that incident or the nature and identity of the witness. If he had, it would have been possible to verify those allegations, which have often been repeated since.

14. President Senghor said: "If there were a bid for power in Mauritania, we would demand that the 500,000 Mauriticians who are ethnically and culturally Senegalese exercise their right to self-determination." Ibid., p 34.
15. "According to reliable information in my government's possession," he said, "those black prisoners are often systematically massacred, whereas they should be receiving the treatment accorded prisoners of war. Proof of this is the small number of black prisoners of war released by POLISARIO in comparison with prisoners of a different race, whereas the situation should be the reverse, seeing that fighters of the black race have always constituted the largest group in this conflict." "Official Documents, General Assembly," 35th Session, 56th Meeting, 11 November 1980, Vol II, p 1,067, 128. It can be seen that the argument has been developed and modified without being made more convincing. On the contrary, its exaggerated character tends instead to weaken it.
16. LE MONDE, 9 December 1977, p 6.
17. LE MONDE, 10 August 1979, p 6.
18. L.S. Senghor, who has become chairman of the League of African Socialist Parties, now says that he also supports the Saharan people's right to self-determination.
19. In October 1975, the Dahomean judge on the court in The Hague, Ignacio-Pinto, accepted the advisory opinion only because it recognized no tie of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara on the one hand and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity on the other and because it advocated application of the principle of self-determination. He therefore rejected that section of the opinion which affirmed legal ties of allegiance between the Moroccan sultan and certain tribes in the territory as well as legal ties between the Mauritanian entity and Western Sahara. ICJ Reports, 1975, p 78.
20. In October 1977, it also proposed a special joint summit meeting between the member states of the OAU and the Arab League, a proposal supported by Hassan II.
21. Mauritania broke off relations with Morocco on 18 March 1981 following an abortive coup d'etat in Nouakchott.
22. "Official Documents of the United Nations," A/10023/Rev. 1, Vol III, ch XIII, pp 12-131. See Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental," op. cit., pp 117-131.

23. Boni's separate opinion, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp 173-174.
24. FRATERNITE-MATIN, 13 January 1984.
25. CAMEROON TRIBUNE, 28 August 1984.
26. But in committee, 12 black African countries voted for the Moroccan draft in October 1980.

11798

CSO: 3419/581

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SEA EROSION CONFERENCE

Bight of Benin Countries Meet

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 17 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Abdul Aziz]

[Text]

THREE member states of ECOWAS along the Bight of Benin are meeting in Accra to pool their resources to fight sea erosion along their coastlines.

The countries are Ghana, Togo and Benin.

The four-day conference known as International Consultative Conference will dilate on reasons for the current serious and devastating sea erosion and possible means of reversing the trend.

Mr Steve Akuffo, Under Secretary for Works and Housing who opened the conference said the time has come for a concerted effort to deal with the problems of sea erosion which knows no defined territorial boundaries.

Mr Akuffo lamented over the damage sea erosion is causing to life and property, economic activities like fishing and tourism which he said should not be allowed to continue any longer.

He said since the problem could not be satisfactorily tackled individually the government of Ghana is advocating a sub-regional approach to deal with the problem.

Professor Mawuse Dake, leader of Ghana's team saw the conference as a challenge to engineers in the sub-region but noted that they are capable of overcoming it if they are given adequate inputs.

He said as civil engineers, the proposals they would put forward will take into consideration the economic resources of the nations involved.

Mr Agbekodo Anani, leader of the Togolese delegation said no effort should be spared in exchanging views to find a lasting solution to the problem which has washed away villages and roads along the coastlines.

Mr Gnonlonfin Lazar of Benin said the problem on the Bight of Benin is a common one and praised Ghana for hosting the meeting to find solution to the problem.

Conference Recommends Coastline Monitoring Body

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 19 Sep 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Abdul Aziz]

[Text]

DELEGATES to the International Consultative Conference on Coastal Erosion along the Bight of Benin at their last session yesterday recommended to their various Governments to set up a body to monitor the coastline against wilful destruction.

This body, the conference suggested, should be empowered to check the activities of sand winniers along the coastline which has adversely affected it.

As the various governments are seeking for help to solve the sea erosion, the conference was of the view that adequate measures should be taken to safeguard structures already installed to avoid the dumping of large sums of money into the sea.

The conference expressed the need for a co-ordinated effort by members to tackle the problem since any ad-hoc measures by one country could lead to the recurrence of the same problem elsewhere along the Bight.

In this regard, the conference unanimously agreed to admit Ghana and Nigeria into an already-established Commission of Togo-Benin which is being funded by the French Aid and Co-operation Fund (FAC).

Other sources the conference

identified and recommended to their governments to seek their help are the European Economic Community (EEC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Environmental Programme.

Mr Steve Akuffo, Under-Secretary for Works and Housing, in a brief speech to the conference, regarded sea erosion as an enemy which is capturing the already insufficient land surface and called on the international community "to stand up to retrieve our scarce land."

He said it is in this light that the developing countries are seeking the goodwill of international bodies to solve this international crisis.

Ghana chaired the conference, with Togo as the vice-chairman and Benin as the secretary.

Addressing the delegates on Tuesday, the Secretary for Works and Housing, Dr Kofi Sam, appealed to African scientists to direct their energies towards the scientific advancement of the continent, reports the GNA.

He remarked that if they do not involve themselves in the affairs of the continent but watched how Africa would develop from

the international organisations in which they work, they would be doing a great disservice to the continent.

He said one task facing Africa is how to tackle technological problems associated with hunger, sea defence and desertification.

He noted that those to deal with the problem might not even understand the environment in which they worked and this could compound the problem.

Dr Sam hoped the conference would not only deal with problems of the coastal erosion "but develop tentacles that will defend food, clothing and environment".

He said "if we defend the sea and die of hunger we achieve nothing".

He, therefore, urged delegates to continue to fight the kind of technical battle which would go a long way to free the continent from economic slavery.

Prof. Mawuse Dake who chaired the conference, thanked the Secretary for inspiring scientists to take up the challenge of helping Africa advance in the field of technology.

He hoped African scientists would live up to expectations adding that, recommendations from the conference would be considered seriously.

CSO: 3400/92

BENIN

CONTRACT OF NORWEGIAN OIL COMPANY REPORTED REVOKED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Aug 85 p 32

[Article by Flemming Dahl and Morten Wang]

[Text] Yesterday the Norwegian oil company, Saga Petroleum, received written cancellation of its contract with the West African state of Benin concerning the development and operation of the Seme oil field off the coast of Benin. Saga had expected the contract to remain in effect until sometime in the 1990's and was taken by surprise by the cancellation, which did not offer any explanation.

Saga expects to emerge from its Benin involvement without suffering big economic losses but it is less clear whether the same thing can be said of Norway, which has guarantee commitments for close to 700 million kroner in connection with the Saga involvement.

Although the Marxist-Leninist inspired regime in Benin has not given any reason for the cancellation Saga placed it in context with news reports from Geneva that a company called Pan Ocean Oil Company had entered into an agreement that included taking over Saga's activity.

"It seems probable that the announcement we have received has some connection with an offer from Pan Ocean," Saga's administrative director, Asbjorn Larsen told AFTENPOSTEN in a telephone conversation from Benin's largest city, Cotonou.

Larsen said that in a talk with Benin's President Mathieu Kerekou on Tuesday he had been given no hint that a cancellation was forthcoming but the Saga office in Cotonou received the written revocation the next day.

Even before Larsen's meeting with Kerekou on Tuesday--which Larsen said was part of a routine visit to Benin--news reports from the Reuters news agency's Geneva office concerning Pan Ocean's alleged Benin agreement had appeared in Norway and Larsen had been informed of them by Saga's main office in Hovik, outside Oslo.

When Larsen was asked about his reaction to the fact that the Pan Ocean news reached Saga via news reports instead of coming from Beninese authorities, he replied: "It was unusual, that is the only comment I can make."

Negotiations

Larsen said that following a request from authorities in Benin Saga will start negotiations to clarify the situation and that they will be conducted in Benin. According to Larsen Saga is not interested in trying to meet the terms Pan Ocean reportedly offered Benin.

But Larsen said that Saga is prepared to help maintain the normal course of oil activities in Benin until such time as they can be turned over to a new operating company. Larsen expects to be back in Norway by the weekend.

Larsen said that the Norwegian colony in Cotonou of around 100 people--primarily Saga personnel and their families--was surprised by the news but that things were otherwise calm.

Saga expects to get out of the Benin involvement without big losses because the company has been paid as it went along. This was based on a service contract concerning development and operation of the oil field on behalf of the state of Benin which owns the field.

Ever since Saga became involved in Benin in the late 1970's the company has said repeatedly that it took on the commitment as much to acquire experience in the development and operation of an ocean oil field as to earn large amounts of money.

Estimates of the amount of oil that could be extracted from the Seme field are substantial. But it has been clear all along that the field is quite small compared to the oil fields in the North Sea.

State Guarantees

Saga's involvement has been based all along on a Norwegian state guarantee--through the Guarantee Institute for Export Credit (GIEK)--covering most of the costs of the first field development phase, which amount to around 900 million kroner. After some payments were made the Norwegian guarantee commitment now lies at 600-700 million kroner.

The basis for the Norwegian state's involvement was that most of the products and services would come from Norway and this has been the case. The state saw this as an opportunity to help out an industry in great need of contracts.

The Saga agreement with Benin included training Beninese personnel in Norway as well as in Benin.

Oil production following the first phase of development started up in 1982. Oil from the field--whose installations can be seen with the naked eye from the palm-lined coast of Benin--is brought ashore through pipelines.

Expansion

After the first phase of development Saga has gone to work on an expansion, but the Norwegian state is not involved in that. Saga has also conducted explorations in other parts of Benin's continental shelf and these suggest that other oil finds might be made.

According to the reports from Geneva Pan Ocean has signed a contract with Benin worth 2 billion kroner. The contract is said to include the construction of an air base, an oil refinery, irrigation facilities and other things--in addition to taking over the Seme operations.

Benin--formerly a French colony called Dahomey--is one of the poorest countries in the world and has around 4 million inhabitants.

Norwegian investigations indicate that Pan Ocean was established in Geneva this March and that the aim is to run it as an oil company--including exploration, production and refining. If the reports of the company's extensive offer to Benin are true and if Pan Ocean proves able to live up to such a bid Benin is almost certain to reap benefits far in excess of those it would have received under the Saga agreement.

Headaches

It is a well-known fact that Saga has run into business methods and practical difficulties in Benin that have given the company more than one headache. After a period several years ago when the Norwegian state feared it would lose large sums of money on the project--because the Seme reserves seemed to be smaller than originally estimated--the project later developed in such a way as to revive hopes of coming reasonably well out of the Benin involvement.

Because Saga gained experience from both the development and operation of the Seme field, the company has achieved much of what it originally hoped for. In view of the many headaches there is reason to believe that neither Saga nor the Norwegian state will have unmixed feelings of regret that the Benin involvement appears to be coming to an end--as long as the Norwegians come out of it in good financial shape.

6578

CSO: 3639/12

BURKINA

POLITICAL VISIT TO DAKOLA REPORTED

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 10 Sep 85 p 4

[Text] An informational and consciousness-raising meeting on the establishment of the businessmen's CDR [Committee for the Defense of the Revolution] in Dakola was held on the afternoon of Sunday 25 August 1985, under the chairmanship of Comrade Natama Jean-Baptiste, political leader of the province of Nahouri. In attendance were the president of the bureau of departmental coordination of the CDR's, numerous militants of both sexes, and friends from nearby in Ghana.

Dakola is a Burkinabe border town opposite Paga, a village situated on the Ghanaian side of the border. During the meeting, the political leader laid out the procedures for conducting elections, particularly with regard to the choice of candidates, who ought to be dedicated RDP [People's Democratic Revolution] militants, public-spirited, and workers. He strongly criticized the inaction of the CDR bureau of Dakola, whose representative has in fact been relieved of his duties. The latter, Dramane Atio, who held the positions of both village chief (as they call him out there) and CDR representative, had a tendency to confuse the two roles. The individual concerned was frequently to be found attending to his business on the other side of the border, and he took no interest in the CDR activities of his village, even though he was responsible for organizing them. Elections were held on Thursday 29 August to choose a new and more responsible representative. The same day the businessmen of the village of Dakola elected their CDR bureau. In that connection, Comrade Natama, the political leader, called on them to establish a capable bureau, because given Dakola's geographic position--a border town on the major highway linking Ouagadougou, Po and the Ghanaian border--the CDR of honest businessmen has an obligation to fight fraud and trafficking in contraband, all the more since the customs office is not on the border but 18 km toward the interior, in the town of Po.

The president of the bureau of departmental coordination of the CDR's, Comrade Abdou Wogohire, took the floor during the meeting to denounce the insufficiency--or, to be more precise, the total absence--of participation by the militants of Dakola in the PPD's [People's Development Projects] being carried out in Po, the chief town of the province. He called on them to engage in self-criticism so that in the future their participation in these projects will contribute to the general construction effort in the province.

BURKINA

REVOLUTION DEFENDED AGAINST REACTIONARIES' CHARGES

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 13 Sep 85 p 7

[Editorial]

[Text] We are not trying to teach anyone lessons.

We do not engage in "subversion."

We are seeking to understand and explain why the reactionaries always attack from the rear and then prove to be the first to ascribe intentions to the revolution and then attack it because of them.

Listen to what the reactionaries say whenever, anywhere in the world, the revolution triumphs over their cause. They maintain that the political change which has come about is the result of foreign interference, and they point to Moscow, Cuba, Qadhdhafi...or the closest revolutionary country, which in any case is a pawn of Moscow, Cuba or Qadhdhafi.

And what do these reactionaries say when a revolutionary regime somewhere in the world unravels an intrigue plotted by the reactionaries? "A story created out of whole cloth to get rid of so-and-so, well-known for his pragmatism and level-headedness."

And it is thus that the reactionaries, the antipopular regimes, the personal regimes and those which persecute the people, the pseudodemocracies and the money powers live and act.

Our people could cite themselves as an example illustrating this old tactic of the international reactionaries. Earlier, under the CSP [People's Salvation Council], the president, who was then prime minister, was labeled an agent of Qadhdhafi, and then when the revolution triumphed on 4 August 1983, everything possible was said, written and done to represent the new revolutionary regime as a tool supposedly adopted by the Libyan leader to cut short the reign of the regimes of many decades in the subregion.

The goal of this campaign was to provoke unjustified and baseless hostility in the neighboring peoples, to serve as a cover for behind-the-scenes actions undertaken by the enemies of the revolution to destroy stability.

But it was a waste of time, for the campaign of disparagement did not bear fruit. Two years afterward, the revolution is still as solid as ever. The similar campaign orchestrated against the revolution in Ghana met with the same frustration. Both revolutions are still in place and are an increasing source of worry, because other peoples watching and seeing them may one day reach the conclusions which are already evident.

And so mercenaries and those who are simply stateless are recruited and financed, and insane maneuvers are regularly tried. The explosions here and there in Burkina never reach the ears, very sensitive, however, of those concerned about the security of the members of the Council of the Entente.

How then are we to understand the sudden awakening from a long, seemingly deep sleep following the explosions which occurred a little farther away?

In fact, the concept of the Yamoussokro summit meeting conceals a reality and represents an effort to gain support for a pretext. The reality is that the reactionaries are afraid of the revolution, because it is contagious and has nothing to do with a plot.

The peoples who aspire to a more just social order want the revolution. And the experience of the progressive countries can only serve as a reference, a model for what can be achieved by the peoples still being dominated.

The TPR [People's Revolutionary Tribunals] trials are being heard both inside and outside Burkina.

The free allocation of housing is the envy of others in the subregion. The clarity of language and the courage of our ideas arouse admiration elsewhere.

And all of this is little by little weaving a web in the minds of the people, who, one day or another, will say to themselves "we need the revolution too," and they will find for themselves the means of satisfying their just demands.

It is this which explains the real fear the nonrevolutionary regimes have of the need to deal with revolutionary countries. This also explains the fierce and ill-concealed desire to put an end to the revolutionary experiments which reveal to the people the incompetence and the shortcomings of the nonrevolutionary regimes.

But one must give the appearance of justifying the attacks against the revolutionary regimes. And this is the reason for the gratuitous accusations and charges made. Our people, after 2 years of revolution, have gained experience and become vigilant enough to enable them to see through various intrigues and machinations. And because they can also recognize evasive maneuvers, they will work wherever they are represented to ensure clear answers to simple questions. And the Yamoussokro summit meeting cannot be credited with having given the peoples of the subregion a clear response on the basic question of security.

5157

CSO: 3419/1

BURKINA

ANNIVERSARY OF COMMITTEES FOR DEFENSE OF REVOLUTION CELEBRATED

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 16 Sep 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Already a Year of Harsh Battle for the CDR Offices"]

[Text] Today, the geographic offices of the CDR [Committees for the Defense of the Revolution] are celebrating their first anniversary. It was in the middle of September 1984 that they were established, in accordance with the bylaws of the national secretariat general of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, published in May of 1984. The geographic offices have been in operation for 1 year, and it is thus time for an assessment of their work.

But prior to any review, this particular characteristic of the geographic offices should be stressed. Unlike the CDR service branches, the geographic offices represent almost all of the social strata found in Burkina (peasants, workers, government employees, the military, etc.). As a result, one can say at the outset that the CDR offices in the sectors, communes, departments, etc. are daily faced with the solution of many more socioeconomic and security problems than the service offices. There can be no doubt about this. But the question which arises today is whether the geographic offices of the CDR, after a year of popular administration, have in fact succeeded in resolving these various problems. Generally speaking, the answer to this question is in the affirmative, with regard to the various achievements of the CDR militants since September 1984 throughout Burkina as a whole.

Relying on the popular development program, the geographic offices, faithful to the slogan which requires that they "rely first of all on their own forces," have under the leadership of their respective bureau undertaken the construction of schools, medical and pharmaceutical dispensaries, athletic fields, etc. In the large cities such as Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, the CDR members in the sectors which have not been allocated have made a substantial effort to establish markers. This made it possible to begin large-scale lot allocation operations in these sectors. Fountains have been established, thanks to the determination of the CDR militants, to deal with the crucial water problem. At the present time, there is hardly a sector in the large urban centers which does not have at least two fountains installed since the September 1984 elections.

The housing problem, which just yesterday was a nightmare, has begun to become more democratic, with the advent of the RDP in general, and the geographic offices of the CDR in particular. In fact, the dubious owners of homes were quickly brought to account thanks to the intervention of the sectorial offices. One could not possibly list in full detail all of the achievements of the geographic offices in only one year of operation. In the military, athletic and cultural sectors, numerous comrades were instructed in the handling of weapons, mass sports have gained impetus thanks to cross-country races, land has been developed and good use has been made of the cultural heritage, since a number of companies (theater, ballet, etc.) have been established.

Politically, the geographic offices have not been idle. In fact, a number of members at the base whose previous political level was not high are able today to understand the exact sociopolitical situation of our country, and those of other peoples as well. This is the result of lecture-debates, evening meetings of political discussion circles, etc.

To speak the truth, the geographic offices are taking giant steps forward and winning victories in the multiple battles undertaken by our people since August 1983.

However, along with these victories, the shortcomings which characterized and still characterize some of the offices following the September 1984 elections should be stressed. Lack of discipline has been seen on the part of certain members of the offices in this or that sector, commune or village, which has led to some confusion therein (swindles, laxity, a tendency toward feudal relations, despotism, etc.). These comrades have seen fit to trample the principles of democratic centralism underfoot after having been given the confidence of the people. But they have had to learn to their sorrow that opportunism would not pay when it came to the RDP. Thus throughout this first year, new elections have not infrequently been held to replace this or that comrade involved in security, the mobilization of women, etc. In all cases, these have been remedies essential to the radiant and continuing advance of the popular and democratic revolution.

5157

CSO: 3419/2

BURKINA

CDR STUDENT ACTIVISTS CLAIM VICTORY OVER NATIONAL-POPULISM

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAINE in French 30 Aug 85 pp 19-20

[Article by Francois Campaore and Wind Lanam Ramde]

[Text] After 2 years of revolution, CDR activists in the universities felt a need to gather from 17 to 24 August 1985 to assess the situation and work out new tactics for the struggle. The first national student conference set itself radically apart from the "historic conferences" mounted by the sectaro-dogmato-populists. For one thing, democracy was the order of the day at the national conference. Each participant had free access to the floor to express his point of view freely. Basically, the national conference took as its starting-point the stark reality of the lives of the masses of the people and the students, to examine them from the revolutionary point of view and to propose efficacious and viable solutions.

The Situation among School-Age Youth

The conference successfully displayed the situation of young people against the background of the current international context. Our time is marked by the unprecedented worsening of crises in the global imperialist capitalist system, whose fallout on the people's lives includes chronic unemployment, inflation, and social deprivation. Imperialism has launched an all-out offensive against the working class and the embattled peoples: wars over how the world is to be parcelled out, repression of workers' and people's struggles, the soaring dollar, mass layoffs of workers, and the like. Working-class youths and the young people in countries struggling for their existence bear an enormous share of the burden of this crisis and are moving to the side of their peoples to struggle against imperialist exploitation and domination.

Evil Influences

Burkinabe school- and college-students do not stand aside from the struggle. In the high schools, dawning awareness of their living

conditions, coupled with faith in the possibility of breaking out of them, led students to set up union organizations as early as 1974, with the Ouagadougou Scholars' Association (ASO), the Bobo Scholars' Association (ASB), the Koudougou Scholars' Association (ASK), and the like. These organizations were the real cadres in the struggle. They allowed scholars to fight against living and studying conditions made difficult by the bourgeoisie's abandonment of education for the children of the poor. They gave many young people a chance at basic training in the struggle and at developing a revolutionary, anti-imperialist consciousness.

Their growing-pains, however, were not long in coming. What happened was that the scholars' unions fell under the salutary influence of the General Union of Voltan Students (UGEV): in 1978, compulsory card-carrying and intellectual terrorism strode onto the stage, and infiltrated the ASO by means of the "Big Brothers" in the AEVO [expansion unknown]. This situation was the prelude to the crisis in the ASO, for which the Upper Voltan Revolutionary Communist Party (PCRv) was entirely responsible. As a matter of fact, at a seminar held in December 1978, the "PCRv" engineered a split by setting up -- out of whole cloth -- a "provisional committee," thereby undermining the legitimacy of the executive committee set up 2 months earlier. That crisis weakened the association so severely that it did not recover its strength until after the imperialist slap at our people on 17 May 1983. After the victory of the August Revolution, the ASO, under the influence of the Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD) and the African Independence Party (PAI), shifted its support to the RDP [People's Democratic Revolution]. Very swiftly, though, it got involved in the anarchist activities of LIPAD-PAI and broke away after the light dawned to start plotting with AEVO as part of the PAI-P"CR"V at the expense of the masses. Today, little is left of the scholars' unions but splinter-groups that surface at carefully timed intervals in vain attempts to mislead the activist RDP students.

Away from National Populism

At the university, the UGEV, founded in 1960, somehow lost the nationalist orientation impressed upon it by the National Liberation Movement (MLN) and adopted a more responsible anti-imperialist position. UGEV deserves credit for spreading progressive ideas in our country, for making a theoretical contribution to the Burkinabe revolutionary movement, and for being a political education cadre for many revolutionaries, while its many struggles successfully snatched away privileges the reactionaries had usurped. However, avant-gardism, national-populist deviations, contempt for organizational principles, bureaucracy, and intellectual terrorism led the movement into an impotent position in which the lack of democratic debate made it impossible to speak out against it. This led to the 1979 split and to the birth of UGEV-M21. Thanks to that split, a third organization, the General Association of Ouagadougou Students (AGEO) came to birth. That PAI-controlled organization, though, expired before it could make any helpful contribution.

To UGEV-M21 goes credit for revealing the role and the true limitations of the student movement, and for defining the RDP as a new phase in the Voltan people's struggle. This M 21 movement was influenced at the theoretical level by the United Labor Congress (ULC).

Demobilization had already begun, however, and the weakened movement suffered through some heavy repression in 1979 and 1981. The demobilized student movement would not make its rightful contribution to the advent of the RDP from 17 May to 4 August 1983.

At the fringes of the labor movement, mass organizations of a religious or social nature (JTC, JEC, JAD) [expansions unknown], (Scouts, Red Cross, etc.). sprung up and organized activities of a religious and social nature. These movements raised some practical social issues but they lacked the anti-imperialist orientation that could have channeled their actions more productively.

After the emergence of the RDP, revolutionary defense committees were set up in the secondary and vocational schools and universities where there were Burkinabe students. These CDRs did a good job of defending the revolutionary government and as insurrectional bodies for the exercise of the people's power at the local level.

The many conferences, all-night debates, movie-screenings, publication of documents, solving the problems of pupils and students, participation in the battle for the railroad, in Project Sourou, at the experimental farm of the Tapoa, revolutionary weeks, rallies, cultural activities, sporting events, and socio-economic activities show that. They vied with each other in their commitment to the struggle against reaction, putchism, and populism. Against the distorted image of the Burkinabe revolution projected by the bourgeoisie and its defenders at home as well as outside of Burkina, they found a way to counterpose the revolutionary truth, the true image of our people's revolutionary struggle. Outside Burkina, some of the CDRs made contacts with some ONGs [expansion unknown] and with progressive organizations which supported our struggle politically and helped finance some of our projects.

Even so, there were some shortcomings. Among them were: the fairly low level of political training, the lack of liaison among the individual CDRs, the hostile attitude of the administration, especially in privately-licensed establishments, and the inexperience and hostility of some countries.

The latest organization to emerge in the school milieu is unquestionably the National Pioneers Movement, whose objective is to make a major contribution to the training of a new kind of men free of the petit-bourgeois taint we all carry: men with a sense of their responsibilities, with pride in a job well done, and distinguished for their revolutionary consciousness. From this angle, the Pioneer Movement is the hatchery for Revolutionary Defense Committees.

The salvation of our youth, as the conference showed, lies in its intimate union with its people and in its responsible participation in the struggle for a new society innocent of all patterns of injustice. Thanks to that struggle, the people will ensure a glorious future for their children. The portion of youth that is an integral part of the people must therefore be educated in a revolutionary direction, hence the need for a new kind of education dedicated to inculcating in young people love of country, anti-imperialist awareness, knowledge of the truth about their people's lives, and the possibility of earning their living and building a country through apprenticeship in a trade.

Full participation by school-age youth must perforce come about through a reorganization of the scholar and student organizations. At the union level, the goal will be to continue the struggle against splinter-groups and their replacement with genuine unions that will adopt an anti-imperialist position and will thereby participate in our people's struggle against imperialism.

The structures of the people's government will be made stronger by better coordination of activities and a campaign against rash enthusiasms, hidebound bureaucratism, and all such petit-bourgeois taints. Educated youth has a major role to play in changing mind-sets. It must take part in political education and in the war on illiteracy. On that count, the students are on alert for a "commando" operation to wipe out illiteracy. They are equally ready to teach courses in revolutionary theory in the high-schools.

It was with a deep feeling of relief that the participants in the conference learned of the dissolution of the National Scholarship Grant and Control Commission, of the decree regulating the conditions for scholarship grants, and of the full representation given the university CDRs on the Provisional Revolutionary Scholarship Discipline Commission. . . A great many motions, recommendations, and resolutions were adopted in relation to revival of the historic date of 5 August 1960, the appointment of political extension-workers in the provinces, the anti-CDR attitude of some principals of licenced private establishments, on discipline in the university CDRs, etc...

6182

CSO: 3419/609

BURKINA

ANNIVERSARY OF KAYA ARMORED DETACHMENT CELEBRATED

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 10 Sep 85 p 4

[Text] The second anniversary of the creation of the Kaya armored detachment was celebrated from 1-3 September. The program for the day included projects of general interest, cultural activities and other events open to the public that made it possible for Kaya's RDP [People's Democratic Revolution] militants to get better acquainted with the armored group.

Presiding over the opening of the ceremonies marking the second anniversary of the armored detachment was the secretary general of the province, Comrade Minadofini Coulibaly, representative of the high commissioner, who said that "the establishment of a military detachment at Kaya resulted from the decision of the CNR [National Revolutionary Council] to decentralize military structures and take military defense back to the people." He urged the militant citizens of Kaya and Sanmatenga always to collaborate with the military detachment to insure the future and permanence of the RDP in the province. The armored group has several socio-economic projects to its credit. Among others could be cited creation and expansion of a rabbit-raising center and the tending of some truck-gardening acreage. Elements of the Kaya armored group have also been working to disseminate and increase their understanding of CNR slogans.

For example, through debate evenings and general assemblies, the CDR of the Kaya armored detachment has always shown its readiness and determination to work with the popular masses of the province of Sanmatenga. But the record would be incomplete without mention of the contribution made by the Kaya armored detachment to the military training of CDR militants in the province. To date more than 675 militants throughout the province have received their first exposure to military life.

9516
CSO: 3419/598

BURKINA

CHINESE AUDIOVISUAL AID APPLAUDED

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 10 Sep 85 p 6

[Text] "The People's Republic of China and Burkina cannot escape their solidarity as developing countries." This statement was made by the president of Faso while the latter was in Changqing, during his November 1984 visit to China. Following that visit, the Chinese people have proven that no obstacles can keep us apart, as shown by the new economic accords and the provision of various goods to the Burkinabe people, including grain for those suffering in the Sahel, medicines for the Chinese medical team in Koudougou and film projectors for the provinces.

The official ceremony to mark the delivery of these projectors took place on 9 September 1985 in the courtyard of Radio House. Those in attendance included the Chinese ambassador, His Excellency Feng-Zhishan; Comrade Watamou Lamien, the minister of information and culture; the secretary general of the aforementioned ministry and the office directors and agency heads of the ministry. First to speak was the secretary general of FESPACO [Ouagadougou Pan-African Cinema Festival], Comrade Philippe Sawadogo, who on behalf of the CDR [Committee for the Defense of the Revolution] expressed his appreciation of the good cooperation existing between China and Burkina. The only delays in delivery of this equipment were due to distance. The Chinese ambassador said that the success of the cordial visit to China by the president of Faso shows the solid ties of cooperation between the two countries. He described the 50 projectors as a modest gesture of the Chinese people, which expresses their regard for the Burkinabe people. It will help the latter consolidate and enrich their culture.

The minister of information and culture expressed Burkina's thanks to China and urged those who will be using this equipment to take good care of it, for the Chinese people have made sacrifices for the Burkinabe people in order to assist with the intensification of revolutionary propaganda. We must remain mindful of this symbol of sincere friendship and maintain the equipment in good condition.

9516
CSO : 3419/600

BURKINA

DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN KOSSI PROVINCE DESCRIBED

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 10 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Samuel Kiendrebeogo "When the People Organize their Aspirations"]

[Text] "Anyone who proposes that we fly to the moon should also show us the means of doing so." This was the advice given to the militant citizens of Kossi by Comrade Issouf Ouedraogo, minister of planning and development, while passing through Nouna on 28 March on business connected with the elaboration of the upcoming 5-year plan, which is not to be pulled off course by the sirens of populism, anarcho-syndicalism or petty bourgeois voluntarism. On 27 May High Commissioner Jean-Baptiste Lansdome launched the process of preparing the 5-year provincial plan at the Nouna people's recreation center. The first draft of the plan was completed by 7 July, the date of the most recent meeting of the provincial synthesis committee.

This document is comprised of 39 projects of various kinds on 748 worksites, with an overall cost of Fr CFA 1,019,980,000. The province must provide 62 percent of the resources (human resources included) or about Fr CFA 928,691,750. The province must look to the national budget for the remaining Fr CFA 555,400,000. The investment capability of the province was determined to be equal to a contribution of Fr CFA 730 per person per year, over the 5 years of the plan, for all persons between the ages of 15 and 53. Contributions of human resources are estimated at Fr CFA 350,275,160, or 3 percent of liquid assets of worth estimated at between 6,666,978,000 and 24,000,000,000.

Realism and Concern for Balance

This mode of calculation of course has a purely indicative value. Obviously, in terms of geographic distribution, there is absolutely no intention of penalizing those already disadvantaged zones which are least densely populated. Among the factors duly considered were the dynamism which the militants in various departments have shown in execution of the People's Development Plan, as well as a concern to promote balanced development that takes into account the needs that have been expressed.

This 5-year provincial plan is thus realistic and responsible, and is based on the guiding principle that above all we must count on our own strength. Water, agriculture and stock-raising are receiving especially great emphasis (30 percent), followed by education (28.9 percent) and housing (17 percent).

Transport and communications are receiving 7.1 percent, health 7.3 percent, commerce 4 percent, sports and recreation 3.6 percent, information and culture 1.9 percent, the environment 0.2 percent. Now with regard to the physical aspect of the plan, the department of Balave (6 villages) is receiving 4 percent of the investments, the department of Barani (62 villages) 11 percent, Djibasso (45 villages) 7 percent, Doumbala (31 villages) 9 percent, Kouka (14 villages) 5 percent, Nouna (144 villages) 33 percent, Sanaba (29 villages) 6 percent, Solenzo (24 villages) 10 percent, Tansila (29 villages) 8 percent, Madouba (11 villages) 3 percent and the commune of Nouna (7 sectors) 7 percent.

The first draft of the Kossi 5-year plan represents a judicious synthesis of regional analysis and a coordinated set of village and sectoral programs. However, it could not take into account all of the sectoral programs, for which the central executive retains primary responsibility. Now that we are engaged in the RDP [People's Democratic Revolution], it would be a good thing if the province of Kossi could be one of the very first beneficiaries of the policy of economic decentralization which the CNR [National Revolutionary Council] is proposing to encourage, with the support of the popular masses.

9516
CSO : 3419/598

30 October 1985

BURKINA

FUEL STORAGE FACILITY SEEN AS ENERGY SAFETY-VALVE

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAINE in French 30 Aug 85 pp 21-24

[Article by Bogna Yama Bamba and Justin Coulibaly]

[Text] Burkina Faso burns a lot of hydrocarbons. You could guess that at a casual glance at the number of motor-scooters and cars on the streets every day. Industry, too, depends entirely on fuel derived from petroleum products. Most of our factories use it as well because other energy sources (hydro-electric, solar, etc.) are either non-existent or go unused because of their high cost or the perceived lack of market potential for them here.

Petroleum products, for the time being, are the most convenient for running our economy. With economic and social development, the nation's thirst for hydrocarbon products increases steadily. Inasmuch as Burkina produces no oil, petroleum products must be imported. Hydrocarbon imports account for 16 percent of our country's total imports. Therefore Burkina must cope with enormous difficulties in getting supplies, owing to its isolation and distance from seaports.

Aware of these problems, the authorities have made it clear to the local oil companies that the country must have storage facilities. Creation of the Bobo-Dioulasso Storage Company (SEB) met that need. SEB did not have all the requisite technical and financial capability to meet all the nation's needs. Some areas of the country were liable to delivery delays and, consequently, empty tanks.

That was why, back in 1980, we undertook the job of putting together, out of government spin-offs, the Burkinabe Hydrocarbon Storage Depot in the Ouagadougou region [SEBHY]. After several years of ups and downs, SEBHY was officially opened for business on 13 August 1985. Even now, though, many comrades don't know what SEBHY is. To help spread the word about this new company, we met with its CEO, Comrade Jean Sidibe, who told us all about it.

In his remarks at the opening of the Burkinabe Hydrocarbons Storage Depot, SEBHY CEO Comrade Jean Sidibe underscored the fact that the hydrocarbons sector is a very delicate one, a highly strategic one, and one too important to be left in the hands of the multinational corporations alone. Comrade Henri Zongo, Faso coordinator, who presided over the inauguration ceremony,

had also taken that occasion to point out that SEBHY is a company of particular importance to the National Council of the Revolution. Its importance stems as well from all the tribulations encountered in actually setting up the infrastructures for the company.

SEBHY's Background

SEBHY's genesis involved enormous problems. It was officially created on 7 November 1980, and it was fully constituted under the law on 31 December of that same year. A mixed-economy corporation, it brought together the following godparents: the Burkinabe government spun off several of its holdings -- BUMIGEB, CBC, and CEP, which accounted for 70 percent of its activities; the oil companies (BP, Burkina Shell, Mobil Oil, Total, and Texaco), retaining 30 percent of the shares. Capitalization is 750 million CFA francs. Unlike the Bobo Storage Company (SEB), which was entirely owned by the oil companies, SEBHY is almost totally under the financial control of the State.

It took close to 5 years to put together the infrastructures required if the company was to perform its mission. Those 5 years were rife with tremendous difficulties, the most demanding of which was rounding up the necessary financing. After some very harrowing and very frustrating wanderings among the haunts of the international financial mafia, loans were obtained from the French Foreign Trade Bank (BFCE) and from the West African Development Bank (WADZ). Those two loans were granted under very harsh conditions. The interest rates were very high, as were the installment payments. Already SEBHY is faced with twice-yearly payments of 180 million CFA francs, not to mention repayment of the advance on the BFCE loan for establishment of purchaser's credit. Special mention should be made of the loans granted by the BFCE. Under the terms of that loan, the bank demanded that SEBHY buy all equipment in France and that transport be handled by French shipping companies. This very complex routing predictably gave rise to enormous difficulties in getting the work done. SEBHY management had to fight court battles to get the project completed. SEBHY's experience demonstrates that the international financiers are greedy predators, ready to lend money with one hand and snatch back most of it with the other.

SEBHY's Structures

Thanks to a demonstrated readiness to solve the problem of supplying the country with fuel, all the major difficulties have been overcome, for the most part, and the Burkinabe Hydrocarbons Storage Depot is in full operation today. It has an office in sector 17 at Ouagadougou. That office houses top management along with the administration and finance offices.

All told, 58 people work there full-time for the company. It also has a 7-kilometer blacktop road for overland access to the depot, a 5.3-kilometer railroad spur for access by rail to the depot, cottages for lodgings, and an infirmary. The depot consists of two 6,200-cubic meter tanks for gasoline, one 4,130 m³ tank for gas-oil, a 3,250-m³ tank for super, a 1,830-m³ tank for DDO, a 1830-m³ tank for petrol, which add up to a total capacity of 23,440 cubic meters of liquid hydrocarbons. For liquified fuels, the depot is

equipped with two cylinders (cigaros), each with a capacity of 100 m3, plus a water storage tank that holds 500 m3. For each product, our installations allow discharge and loading of three tankers simultaneously. SEBHY's installations are keyed to our present stage of economic development, to our needs for consumption and storage space.

The Company's Immediate Tasks

Officially opened for business on 13 August last, SEBHY must take several steps so that the depot will be completely operational very shortly. It must complete the job of identifying prospective sources of supply, so as to make doubly sure that the nation will have permanent reserves of the petroleum products it needs. The rules say that this type of depot must maintain a minimum of 90 days' reserve stock and 30 days' operating stock. SEBHY's installations can top that security barrier. With a calling to serve the nation SEBHY has the heavy responsibility for placing orders for products on the international market, and assuring their shipment here from ports in neighboring countries. Domestically, it is responsible for supplying, storing, and supervising the management of stocks on behalf of the local oil companies which pay it for this service.

Pending full-scale operation of this new circuit, the Burkina/Shell depot will continue to supply the Ouagadougou zone. This depot, which is at some risk by reason of its location, will have to shut down. Meanwhile, we are in a transitional phase between the Burkina-Shell depot and SEBHY. In meeting these goals of providing proper service to the entire country, more depots will be built. We are worried about too abrupt a transfer of supply to Bingo because of the distance to the new depot. It has been decided, however, pending the advent of the necessary conditions for total transfer of pickup operations to Bingo, that the SEBHY depot will retain its monopoly over the management of fuel stocks at the national level. The newly opened depot is only the first of many operated by the SEBHY Company. In its ongoing campaign to supply fuel to the entire country, other depots will be built. In order to achieve overall control of its area of action, the company will have to conduct statistical studies to determine the country's actual requirements, allowing for all the parameters affecting fuel management (such as leakage losses). All these are factors that are beyond our control for the present.

SEBHY Helping in Coordinated Development of the National Economy

SEBHY's importance in economic growth cannot be denied. It is a key element in the underpinnings of our industrial infrastructures. As a company far stronger than most, SEBHY has the means to survey the petroleum market so as to buy what the nation needs at far lower prices. When you consider that fuel supplies account for 16 percent of our total imports, this policy will contribute to major hard-currency savings. The lack of adequate storage-space here forced oil-tankers to offload their orders into tanks at the port. That not only constituted a risk, because offloading could be delayed and affect stock management, but this procedure was very costly because of the fees for port storage. SEBHY's goal is to lower import costs still further. Once all these factors have been brought under control, the national economy will enjoy a major and very practical booster shot.

SEBHY's Ancillary Operations

SEBHY has some more far-reaching goals. As part of the Green Burkina campaign, SEBHY is sponsoring the national committee to popularize gas. The company will be awarded a monopoly on imports of bottled gas. From now on, all imports and exports of bottled gas will be subject to regulation by the company, which plans to use that oversight authority to assess the current status of the nation's supply of gas containers. SEBHY, through BUMIGEB, will contribute more toward expanding the petroleum-products action fund, earmarked for petroleum research. The quest for alternative energy sources stands to benefit by the technical or financial contribution of this new company. SEBHY CEO, Comrade Jean Sidibe, who talked about all these points with convincing assurance of success, believes that in the area of research the much-talked of plant known as "phougere," which thrives so abundantly here in Burkina, and whose fruit contains an oil which, when processed, yields a satisfactory diesel fuel, could prove a promising source for a new kind of energy. In its own research, SEBHY will work closely with other more specialized government agencies, such as the Burkinabe Energy Institute (IBE).

Aware of all the hope that rides on their efforts, SEBHY executives are buckling down to the tough assignment thrust upon them. They will have to learn some lessons from the failure of SEB if SEBHY is to develop properly, manage payments on loans contracted with the banks, and play the role assigned it as part of the nation's economic development. In consideration of the hard work involved in managing the depot, Comrade Jean Sidibe makes the point that SEBHY is the State's special tool for solving the problems of buying and stockpiling fuels so as to contribute solely to the well-being of the people, even should that goal conflict with certain interests. Inspired by that determination, the company offers its partners open and above-board collaboration, with the interests of the Burkinabe people always uppermost.

6182

CSO: 3419/608

BURKINA

BRIEFS

RDP ANNIVERSARY--The second anniversary of the launching of the RDP [People's Democratic Revolution] provided an opportunity for the people of Muhun to test their mobilization. A total of 7,000 souls attended the gathering on this great anniversary day in front of the offices of the high commissariat. The ceremony, at which Comrade Mathurin Kambou, provincial high commissioner, assisted by his closest colleagues, presided, began with the hoisting of the colors, followed by the presentation of awards. The RDP medals of merit and the torch of the revolution were presented to six recipients. At this juncture, the province, which has about 12 classified forests, is also making a tremendous collective, individual and pre-urban planting effort. As a result, in the collective planting sector, 208 hectares have been reforested by 108 villages. Thanks to individual plantings, more than 31,250 fruit trees have been set out on an area of 50 hectares. As of 4 August 1985, the provincial territory had registered more than 70,000 trees planted by the provincial militants. [Excerpts] [Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAINE in French 13 Sep 85 p 6] 5157

CSO: 3419/1

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

ROAD PROJECT BENEFITS CONSIDERED

Paris AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE in French Jul-Aug-Sep 85 pp 62-64

[Text] Linking Lagos and Mombasa by road is a long-cherished dream of all who are interested in the development of the African States on a continental scale. The United Nations General Assembly, for instance, in December 1977 passed a resolution proclaiming 1978 to 1988 the Decade of Transportation and Communications in Africa (hereinafter referred to as "The Decade"), with a view to coordinating mobilization of resources, both technical and financial, requisite for implementation of an overall transportation policy for the continent.

In 1979, the United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa (CEA) could report the provision of \$158,000 from the United States, a sum far from adequate in view of the estimated \$9 billion (in 1979 dollars) assessed for the approved Trans-African projects, all modes included. In addition, this sum represented, for the most part, only the contributions of the African States, keenly aware of the need to increase their trade, which, in all, accounted for only 3.5 percent of the trade between the continent and the rest of the world in 1982. Other sources of funding had to be sought if we were to achieve, even partially, the objectives set for 1988.

In addition, there was urgent need for a full-scale review of our working procedures. As a result, under the aegis of the CEA, during the first phase of the Decade (1978-1983), a number of technical advisory meetings were held, but they dealt with only one or two modes of transport and only one or two sub-regions. The result was worth the effort: close to a billion dollars in financing was mobilized. Meanwhile, a look at the bottom line led those responsible to make certain adjustments.

Accordingly, construction of the Kisangani-Kasindi route (826 km) in Zaire, planned for the first phase (estimated cost about \$200 million, of which only 5 percent had actually been collected), was transmogrified in the second phase (1984-1988) to a mere ... study costing \$6 million. In its 16 November 1984 issue, MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS ran an article titled "Where Does the Decade of Transport in Africa 1978-1988 Stand Today?" Hugues Viel pointed

out that, aside from the Algiers-Lagos Trans-Saharan route, then almost completed (it will be 4,850 km long when completed) most of the major continental routes planned had advanced very slowly indeed. According to MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, we shall have to wait another decade before we shall see 8-meter-wide blacktop surfaces on seasonal roads.

Genesis of National Building Program

In the Central African Republic, the question of transportation was approached from a practical angle: how to export the only cash crops of the nation, which are cotton, coffee, and tobacco? To provide, among other things, a better system for warehousing and moving cotton, the prime resource, a program to upgrade 4,000 kilometers of country dirt roads was undertaken with help from several quarters: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the European Development Fund (EDF)... Actually, insofar as coffee and tobacco were concerned, the steady decline of production found on both family and industrial plantations was attributed to the same cause: the country's difficulties in moving its products to market. On the other hand, according to most observers, the main wealth of the Central African Republic may well turn out to be its Southwest forest. Experts have identified a high concentration of rare and much sought-after species. The problem then arises as to how to get the felled timber out and to get supplies to the logging crews and the on-site crews distilling kerosene, a resource the country is much in need of. This is doubtless why the government of the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) headed by General Kolingba since 1 September 1981 (see AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE No 117, September-October 1981, p 20), gave top priority to building a system of roads capable of handling and furthering the desired economic development.

On 25 October 1982, all the agreements signed on access to independence, deemed "unsuitable to the realities of the moment," were renegotiated at the time of establishment of a joint Franco-African Commission (see AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE, No 124, November-December 1982, p 25). Among the goals of the Commission was gradual provision of a modern highway system. Two and a half years later, it became feasible to attempt an estimate of the cost of that goal.

First of all, on 1 October 1984, President Kolongba and Christian Nucci, the French minister for cooperation and development, were present at Yamando (600 km southwest of Bangui) at the opening of the Berberati-Nola-Salo arterial highway (about 250 km) and at the formal start of construction of the "Fourth Parallel" road, construction of the first 16 km. portion of which, financed by France, had just been completed. Mr Nucci, taking the floor before President Kolingba and delegations from Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon, reiterated France's readiness to continue and pursue its contribution to development in the Central African Republic, in the form of building such roads.

"Today we celebrate the opening of a project that will make reality of a long-cherished Central African dream, the hope that it will no longer be so isolated as in the past," said the minister for transport and urban planning, General Abel Nado.

That done, it should be noted that the project just completed involves, in addition to these 16 km and that highway about 250 km in length, a system covering 482 km, whose construction and improvement cost 3.2 billion CFA francs or 64 million French francs. That system serves three prefectures in the West and Southwest: economic Sangha, Upper Sangha, and Nana-Mambere.

Finally, as of now, the highway, running from North to South, links the towns of Baoro near Bouar, Carnot, Berberati, Nola, and Salo heading for Congo, while providing an interconnection to the Longo-Mombasa Trans-African highway. It is completed to the West by the Berberati-Gamboula road, which makes the link to Cameroon.

Anticipated Fallout

Naturally, the financing necessary to completion of the 4th Parallel Route is hard to come by. Construction of the second stretch, the 170-kilometer run from Yamando to Boda, accounts for 14 percent of the total length of the plan, and will, by itself, cost 2.8 billion CFA francs, or 56 million French francs. The total amount needed to link Bangui with the Atlantic coast is estimated at 20 billion CFA francs, or 400 million French francs.

It is difficult, though, to assess the benign fallout from construction of that highway, which more or less follows the 4th parallel -- hence the name. Its main allure is that it will very markedly shrink the distance for access to the sea. When it is complete, the distance from Bangui to the Cameroon port of Kribi via Berberati will be about 1,200 km instead of the 1,800 km of the route through Douala.

This spectacular shrinkage of distances will make paying propositions of a lot of projects that have been in limbo for years as a result of the isolation that afflicts the country.

Furthermore, the Central African achievement is regional in nature. What it means is that the transportation systems of Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon can now be given serious consideration. The map for the 4th Parallel route is a close overlay of the one approved in 1983 in Bangui at the conference of heads of State of UDEAC, which includes Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. Thanks to the trade which it will open up among those countries and all the region, this achievement is also a fine African example of potential South-to-South cooperation, and unquestionably marks the beginning of a project of commanding scope.

6182

CSO: 3419/585

CHAD

UNIR SOCIAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS REPORTED

Ndjamena INFO-TCHAD in French 7 Sep 85 pp 3-6

[Text] The second session of the Central Committee of UNIR [National Union for Independence and Revolution] has given Chadian politicians and public authorities a fresh opportunity to focus their concerns on the problem of social security and the health of our compatriots. The session demonstrated, as expected, the determination of the authorities of the young Third Republic to establish a policy aimed at eliminating poverty, sickness and ignorance from our territory, starting with a harmonious development policy. And this despite the fact that we are at the same time being undermined by drought and the victims of foreign aggression.

In this familiar context, it is undeniable that education and the establishment of a more complete and effective social security system involves increased protection for vulnerable groups and the improvement of our social infrastructure. It is also important to note that the participation of women in any collective development effort is a factor that should not be ignored. The effort as a whole must be carried out in a juridical and administrative context modified to reflect the realities we face.

To do so, it is today more than ever necessary to adapt, improve, revitalize and reactivate the organs of the Chadian administrative system. These administrative structures should reflect our traditions, and the latter need serious study so they can be adapted to modern law.

If we succeed in reaching these objectives, we will be close to winning our political gamble, which will give us greater credibility on the international scene. This is all the more important since we have been working, ever since the beginning of the Third Republic, for the welfare of our people and the establishment of social peace, despite the undeniable aggression perpetuated by a neighboring country notwithstanding the efforts of all peace-loving people.

We publish below the latest recommendations of the second regular session of the UNIR Central Committee, which so eloquently express the concerns of our people.

Recommendations on Social and Health Questions

The Central Committee recommends that the government:

1. continue and intensify its efforts for the reintegration into society of displaced and disaster-stricken people wherever they are;
2. take urgent and specific action to assist the people coming from the occupied zone;
3. insure equitable distribution of basic foodstuffs in the context of the emergency assistance to the needy;
4. develop protection and assistance measures for the handicapped, abandoned children, widows, orphans, and the families of martyrs;
5. continue with the efforts being made to accord Chadian women the social position that is rightfully theirs;
6. establish a juridical framework, by drawing up a realistic code of family law that takes account of national diversity but will assure the protection of children and guarantee women's rights;
7. investigate ways and means of upgrading the wages and benefits of workers, given the high cost of living;
8. establish an effective system of social security for government employees, in the first place, and in the second do everything possible to insure full collection of the social contributions owed to the CNPS [National Social Welfare Fund];
9. insure strict application of the regulations in force in order to put an end to the chaotic conditions in pharmaceutical supply depots, hospital wards and clinics;
10. assure better coverage of the country, especially through:
 - the creation of PHARMAT [expansion unknown] branches to keep rural people regularly supplied with pharmaceutical productions;
 - a) requiring the presence of doctors, nurses, midwives and other qualified personnel in every health unit;
 - b) the equitable distribution of pharmaceutical products and medico-technical equipment among the various health units;
 - c) deployment and intensification of efforts to prevent epidemics and the spread of endemic diseases by the expansion of vaccination programs throughout the country;

d) creating and regulating medical and pharmaceutical professional associations;

e) systematically monitoring the activities of international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental;

The Central Committee calls on the nation's communities:

13. to continue with the efforts already undertaken in the field of sanitation, to intensify them and to work closely with the populations affected;

14. to collaborate in these activities with the technical sanitation services of the Ministry of Public Health;

15. to move ahead with systematic planning of sanitation projects and to complete projects already under way;

16. to investigate ways and means of augmenting the resources of the nation's communities;

17. to participate in sanitation and public health activities in urban and rural areas;

18. to train and sensitize the people more thoroughly on this issue of such consequence to them in their daily lives.

Recommendation on Administrative and Juridical Questions

The Central Committee:

1. urges the government to continue its policy of administrative and judicial reform, at both the central and regional levels;

2. recommends that the government do everything possible to launch studies and more intense investigations of our traditions and customs, in order to adapt them to modern law;

3. calls on the government to combat by every appropriate means manifestations of sloth, particularism and nepotism, in order to reinvigorate the civil service and achieve greater efficiency.

Recommendations on General Policy and External Relations

The Central Committee recommends:

1. that the government continue with the initiatives already undertaken in the pursuit of a durable peace in our country;

2. that all possible steps be taken to obtain the withdrawal of Libyan troops from the national territory and to find ways and means of peaceful coexistence with Libya;

3. continuation of the dialogue with all opposition formations, both internal and external, in order to restore national concord;

4. maintaining the political alignment that has been followed since 7 June 1982.

9516
CSO : 3419/598

CONGO

REASONS FOR COCOA PRODUCTION DECLINE IN SANGHA EXAMINED

Brazzaville MWETI in French 20 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Clotaire-Moniangue-Oniangue: "Cocoa, Declining Production"; all figures as published]

[Text] Cocoa production in Sangha region for the 1984-1985 cocoa season is estimated at 1,110 t 516 worth 321,716,386 CFA francs, according to the results published by the regional office of the OCC [expansion unknown] at Ouessou.

This production was a slight decline compared to the previous year, when it was 1,278 t 220.

Sembe district remained in first place with production of 845 t 129, followed by Souanke with 135 t 425, Pikounda 90 t 838, and Mokeko 39 t 624.

The drop this year is attributable to several factors, according to OCC sources in Sangha.

Among these is the abandonment of some plantations due to their age and due to the very large area to be maintained.

The death and aging of planters, as well as the failure of other family members to take over, are also regarded as significant factors.

To these must be added rotting and attacks on the pods by mirids (cacao tree bugs), the reorganization of villages in the region, and the progressive liberation of the pygmies in relation to the Bantu (problem of labor).

The emigration of young people to the centers and their involvement in the various economic projects in the region are also factors in this production decline.

The most striking example is Mokeko district, where most of the forest production units are located.

The movement of part of the production across the border is also a regrettable matter.

This is particularly true in Sounake district, motivated by the naivete of the planters who hope to get more profit on the other bank, while in fact they are there subjected to several assessments (packing, transport) and do not have the right to be present at the cocoa weighing.

To this must be added the plant health treatments and provision of young cacao trees that are free in the Congo.

Thus, what is needed in this respect is a campaign to educate and mobilize the planters, so they will understand the economic policy of the party and state toward the farmer planters.

Despite this drop, there is room for hope. The first conference of party committee chairmen of districts and communes of Sangha region, held in Ouesso 26-27 March, decided on opening up and maintenance of new agricultural roads, and this may enable purchase of cocoa from isolated areas.

9920

CSO: 3419/577

CONGO

BRIEFS

UAIC PAPER MILL PROJECT--The director of the Congo Industrial Forestation Unit (UAIC), Yves Laplace, said recently in Pointe-Noire that "the company to carry out the major paper paste project could be formed at the end of the first quarter of 1986 if nothing occurs to interrupt progress. This was reported by the Congolese News Agency (ACI). This project, estimated to cost about 60 billion CFA francs, compared to the 300 billion initially planned, has been adapted to the national and international situation, he added. This new strategy by the National Cellulose Committee, presided over by Comrade Sassou-Nguesso, provides for a study on constructing a modular factory whose capacity could be progressively increased up to the limit of 300,000 tons of chemical paste per year. Mr Laplace said that this paper paste factory of more modest dimensions would have several advantages, in particular causing less pollution and also needing less foreign technical assistance; 20 to 25 foreigners could be employed, compared to the 120 under the initial technical configuration. Mr Laplace stressed, however, that this phase of the project remains entirely secondary to the industrial marketing aspect, which is essential in development of this large project, the very first south of the Sahara. Referring to the eucalyptus trees, Mr Laplace said that the forested area involved is 23,000 hectares, and that the UAIC, which has been in existence since 1978, remains determined to continue its efforts at an industrial pace. Mr Laplace concluded that the project will undoubtedly end in success, and that there are many favorable conditions for it. [Text] [Brazzaville MWETI in French 20 Aug 85 p 3] 9920

CUBAN 5 FEBRUARY SCHOOL--The young Congolese studying at the 5 February School in Havana, which has been open to them for the last 5 years, achieved good results in 1985, thanks to the success of the 190 baccalaureat candidates and the promotion to higher class of all the other pioneers. These results were announced on Monday evening in Brazzaville at the meeting between the wife of the president of the Republic, Comrade Antoinette Sassou-Nguesso, and some of these young people who returned on Tuesday to the island of freedom. The first class of the students, now completing their education, is preparing to join the Congolese labor market. According to a spokesman of these pioneers, the 5 February School ranks first for productive work among the 22 international schools in Cuba. In the final year and the fourth year it holds the prize for the best students in physics, chemistry and library. This school, which is outstanding for the cultural qualities of its students and the discipline that they show, received one of the most important Cuban honors: the Moncada flag. Comrade Antoinette Sassou-Nguesso said she was very honored by the results and called on the pioneers to help in the adjustment of the 183 others who left Brazzaville on Thursday to study in the same school. The school is an example of internationalist solidarity. [Text] [Brazzaville MWETI in French 22 Aug 85 p 2] 9920

CSO: 3419/577

IVORY COAST

GOVERNMENT PUSHES PRIVATE SECTOR IN FARM DEVELOPMENT

Harare THE HERALD in English 25 Sep 85 p 8

[Text] ABIDJAN. The West African state of Ivory Coast, having achieved its objective of becoming the world's biggest cocoa producer, is making rapid strides towards reaching its latest agricultural goal of food self-sufficiency.

Rural Development Minister Gilles Laubhouet says Ivory Coast, which last year imported some 300 000 tonnes of rice, could become a net exporter of the cereal after 1986.

Good rains this year are expected to result in better crops of rice and maize, which already reached record levels in 1984, and assure good harvests of other Ivorian staples such as millet, sorghum, yams, manioc, plantain and taro, he said.

Ivory Coast produced 490 000 tonnes of rice and 468 000 tonnes of maize last year, according to the country's 1985 economic and financial report.

"We want to create a new race of producer--the modern producer," he told Reuters in an interview, pointing to government aid of over 20 billion CFA francs (US\$44 million) this year to Ivorian farmers to boost food output.

The aid is used to train farmers when to sow and reap, grant them seeds, provide fertilisers to producers of irrigated rice and to clear bush for cultivation.

Ivory Coast's food self-sufficiency drive was launched in 1981 and a rural development ministry headed by Mr Laubhouet set up in 1983 with the specific task of boosting output of staple crops and cutting the country's large rice import bill.

Rice imports are unlikely to total more than 150 000 tonnes this year compared with 450 000 tonnes in 1983, Mr Laubhouet said.

The bumper 1984 maize crop enabled the country to export grain to West African Sahel states suffering from drought and famine such as Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.

"Ivory Coast is in fact already self-sufficient (in food crops)," said Mr Laubhouet, pointing out that Ivory Coast's nine million people have never gone hungry.

Many of some two million foreigners living in this wealthy former French colony are not used to traditional local staples and this has pushed up the food import bill, he said.

However, he conceded that Ivory Coast was some way from producing enough beef and fish and needed to improve grain storage facilities.

To reduce fish imports, which currently total around 100 000 tonnes a year, Ivory Coast will invest money in promoting fish breeding in the country's coastal lagoons and inland lakes, Mr Laubhouet said.

The food self-sufficiency drive follows Ivory Coast's success in becoming a major exporter of cash crops, notably cocoa and coffee.

Trade sources put the current season cocoa crop at around 545 000 tonnes, Ivory Coast's best ever, and some 145 000 tonnes above the world's second largest producer, Brazil.

It also had a good coffee crop of around 270 000 tonnes and is the world's third largest exporter of this commodity.

At independence in 1960, the country produced only around 80 000 tonnes of cocoa and 60 000 tonnes of coffee a year.

Last June it announced a record cotton crop of 212 000 tonnes, making it Africa's third largest producer.

The food drive is also aimed at persuading young people to stay on the land rather than migrate to overcrowded cities suffering from unemployment and at developing regions outside the country's coastal economic capital of Abidjan.

Mr Laubhouet says government policy is to utilise existing water resources to boost output rather than construct new and costly dams.

A major project to clear land to plant rice and other crops has been launched in the area around the capital, Yamoussoukro, in the centre of the country, which has several natural lakes.

Rivers

"Bafons", or small valleys containing rivers, in the centre-west will be used to grow rice, while food crops will also be encouraged in the northern area of Korhago.

Mr Laubhouet gives much of the credit for Ivory Coast's agricultural success to President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who has ruled the country since independence.

"Agriculture works in Ivory Coast because our president is a farmer who understands the farmers' world," he said.

Aid officials agree that Ivory Coast, unlike many other African states, has not made the mistake of neglecting farming.

"Ivory Coast is encouraging the private sector in farming and can grow virtually anything," said one official.

"Houphouet-Boigny has supported farming more than any other West African leader."--Ziana-Reuter.

CSO: 3400/158

LESOTHO

WATER PROJECT WITH RSA

Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 20 Sep 85 p 858

[Text] Lesotho and South Africa are on the verge of negotiating the final draft of an international treaty which will play an important role in the implementation of the giant R2 200-million Lesotho Highlands Water Project.

It is envisaged that the project will ensure a continuous flow of water from the Maluti mountains to satisfy the needs the two countries.

Speaking in Maseru, the South African representative of the project in Lesotho, Mr Hans Pettenburger, said the engineering work on the feasibility study into it was progressing satisfactorily.

The draft report on the study is expected to be completed by the end of December.

The final signing of the water treaty is expected to take place by the end of January or the beginning of February next year.

South African Press Association, September 9.

CSO: 3400/158

MADAGASCAR

GOVERNMENT'S REPRESSION OF KUNG FU DISILLUSIONS PEOPLE

Paris AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 28 Aug-10 Sep 85 pp 14-15

[Article by Aristide Ratsimbazafy: "Kung Fu, Politics and Repression"]

[Text] In the night of 31 July, the Malagasy armed forces, equipped with heavy weapons and supported by armored vehicles, attacked and destroyed the training building of the Kung Fu students of Tananarive and the residence of their grand master, some 15 kilometers from the capital. The official count: 24 killed, some 30 wounded and hundreds of arrests.

The event produced an emotional response by the public, who discovered from this incident that the Tananarive government, which it had credited with a democratic and popular character, had proved to be a terrible competitor in practice of repressive violence. Recalling that the last time the people were attacked was in 1947 under full colonialism, when the escort boat "Ajacienne" fired its guns at the forested cliffs of the eastern shore, which the high command thought was sheltering rebel camps, national opinion is wondering whether the alliance it concluded with the regime, under the slogan of socialism and democracy, is not in danger of coming apart under the shock of the event.

Disturbed at the terrible reality of the facts, the people, who still want to believe in the popular nature of the regime and its government, are trying to grasp at hope by saying that this terrible event was perhaps a big gaff by which provocators intended to harm the regime. Thus, they hope that a judicial action will ultimately be instituted to reveal the truth about the cause of this tragic event, which risks blemishing permanently the socialist regime of President Ratsiraka.. It is in this hope that, despite the indignation at this use of the national armed forces against an element of the population without a state of emergency having been proclaimed, the population has remained calm.

If one can believe certain reports circulating in the Malagasy emigre community in France, the Kung Fu affair had been brewing for at least 18 months; that is, since the time when the government was trying to prevent the expansion across the country of the Kung Fu clubs, whose activities--though not posing political or social problems--did not please the government. In fact, unlike the club for "motivated unemployed" youth (TTS) that the government operates in an enclosed camp in the heart of the capital to "break

up" popular demonstrations and whose members have engaged, with impunity, in numerous acts of violence (robbery, receiving stolen goods, rape, abduction, seizing of public vehicles, psychological terrorism, etc), those attending the Kung Fu clubs had no intention of relying on government generosity in order to be able to develop health of body and spirit. And it is no exaggeration to say that it was after losing hope of winning over the Kung Fu followers that the government decided in August 1984 to simply prohibit the practice of this physical and mental sport, after which some of the members paraded in the streets of the capital to protest the suspect death of one of their members interrogated by the police in June of the same year.

Compared to the toleration shown toward the TTS, whose misdeeds the people wanted ended, this prohibition represented the worst kind of provocation, which people knew would have a sequel. At the beginning of September, some Kung Fu members protested against the prohibition by holding a demonstration during which some uncontrolled groups succeeded, it is not really known how, in setting afire the old buildings of the Ministry of Youth and Sports and even entering the Police Headquarters. Then, last December, prompted by public opinion, which had had enough of the delinquent, even criminal, activities of the TTS, some Kung Fu members launched an attack on the enclosed camp of the TTS. With the active assistance of the population, they succeeded in totally destroying the camp after having massacred, in fighting without quarters, almost all the residents of the camp, where some unexpected discoveries were made.

However, what were these members of Kung Fu, who already numbered 1,500 in the capital alone and had begun to spread to some provincial towns?

Kung Fu, as everyone knows, is a Far Eastern product, and thus an import to the island. According to some information, the master in charge of training the members, and who was among the victims of the assault on his residence, had spent a number of years in Japan to learn the practice of this martial art. The crisis led to search for a protective shelter against the dangers of all kinds to daily security. And the situation, marked by the failure of the authorized political parties, the disturbing decline of the humane tradition of the nation, and the almost irreversible drift in the sport and cultural movements, offered a starting point for Kung Fu, whose physical and moral disciplines impressed the people. Hence the astounding success of its establishment, first in the capital, where the notable emptiness that marked the daily life in all fields prompted a search for an active compensation that could give a meaning to life. Students, teachers, civil servants, craftsmen and professionals, etc, composed a major part of the participants in this martial art, which succeeded in replacing karate, introduced into the country much earlier.

Different Horizons

On the political level, the Kung Fu did not constitute a group seeking to align itself, in the field of sport and cultural organization, either with the regime or with those in the unauthorized opposition. Since they came from different, not to say opposing, horizons, including individuals from the governing parties and others from the nonparliamentary opposition, the sport and cultural organization of the Kung Fu was naturally unable to take

political action. Perhaps this was why no one was heard to claim support of the Kung Fu club during the Madagascar elections in 1983, although its members were present and active during the electoral campaign. In a word, apoliticism was the rule in the Kung Fu sport and cultural organization.

Despite the apoliticism imposed by the different political allegiances of its members, and although a large segment of the population recognized it as a factor for order and security, the Kung Fu organization did not seem to enjoy the government's understanding. Some very serious individuals affirm that after the great success of its establishment the refusal of the Kung Fu members to join to share the roof and board of the TTS, maintained by the regime, caused concern to him who feared that it might one day become a refuge for the criticism that was increasing among a public dissatisfied with the disastrous effects of the crisis. Thus, it is believed that when the slightest pretext providentially came to hand the government did not hesitate to prohibit the practice of Kung Fu in August 1984 and to apply last month the virtual "final solution" with heavy weapons and armored vehicles. However, there are rumors indicating that following the confrontations it is quite possible that the survivors may be collected and "processed" to replace the TTS, whose disappearance as of last December threatens to significantly affect the government's strength in the daily confrontation with the public on the subject of the crisis and its ravages. After the recent very critical government debates on the government policy, it would be no surprise for the TTS to be restored with remnants of the Kung Fu to establish a supplementary secular arm essential to the government to control the public demands for explanations outside the parliamentary forum.

Succession Problem

Was this bloodbath of 31 July the end of the history of the Kung Fu? Or did the repression only give it a martyr dimension that would enable it to assume a place in the pantheon of the anticolonial popular images?

It is difficult to answer these two questions that the Malagasy public is nevertheless asking itself. However, one can even suggest that this Kung Fu affair, or more specifically the 31 July affair, derived from a reality that is part of the government succession issue in Madagascar. This prompted the government to state in the communique issued following the assault on the Kung Fu master's residence that the practitioners of this martial art as a group constituted a "state within the state." We do not know, after what we said a little earlier about the Kung Fu, to what degree this accusation is true, for the Kung Fu members have never, as a cultural organization, wanted to get involved in any political movement whatsoever. However, what we do know and which is indisputable is that since 1986, when Madagascar was annexed by France, the succession issue of the Malagasy state has never found a stable solution in which all the nation's dynamic forces could reach a democratic and vital consensus to lead the country to progress and development.

From the time of General Gallieni's direct military administration (1896-1905) until the current regime, from the decentralization of the French imperial system, through the laicized civil administration of Governor Augagneur and the administrative autonomy of the postwar period, Madagascar has always suffered from the absence of a stable state with its roots in the multisecular

depth of Malagasy history. The transfer of responsibilities carried out in 1960 to eliminate the archaic colonialism did not settle the problem because it was carried out under conditions that did not at all take into account the way in which the Malagasy people had mastered the annexation and its consequences and prepared the future that was to emerge from it. The state vacuum, which was created by the annexation and aggravated by a decolonization that did not have the awareness or foresight of the inevitable failure of a solution that did not respect the demands of the anticolonialist process of Malagasy history, did not facilitate the search for a path toward development of a national state that would be proof against the crises of growth. Accusing this or that organization of citizens of being a state within a state will not heal the illness that the country is suffering because of the lack of a state of stability founded on a popular consensus, without the conservative legacies of colonialism. It would be better to fill the state void with a national democracy.

9920

CSO: 3419/613

MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

RUSSIAN LANGUAGE STUDY--The 1985 supplement modifying the terms of the cultural agreement on teaching of Russian language in Madagascar was signed yesterday at the Ministry of Secondary and Primary Education by Voantio Tsifany, the secretary general of that ministry, and M. E. Leonov, the economic counsellor of the USSR Embassy. The main feature of the new supplement is to increase the number of Soviet teachers teaching Russian in Madagascar (to the nine who taught during the 1984-1985 school year will be added six more for the next school year) and expand (geographically) the teaching of Russian (Mabajanga will have Russian teachers beginning with the 1985-1986 school year). Also the supplement provides that the Soviet side will cover the costs of travel of the teachers from the USSR to Madagascar, and their salaries and rents, while the Malagasy side will assume responsibility for their travel from Antananarivo to their places of assignment. As emphasized in the speeches exchanged by the signatories, we should note that teaching of Russian has made significant progress in the last few years, with 2,625 general education and technical education students now studying, and 130 baccalaureat candidates having chosen it as their foreign language. Indeed, the Russian language as a "means of learning Marxist-Leninist policy," as Mr Leonov emphasized, is indeed a means "of promoting development of our own language," as Mr Voantio put it. [Text] [Antananarivo MADAGASCAR MATIN in French 28 Aug-10 Sep 85 p 3] 9920

CSO: 3419/613

MALI

DIO-GARE FARM CO-OP PROJECT DETAILED

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 19 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Mohamed Soumbounou: "Nearly 5.5 million CFA francs for the Dio-Gare Agricultural Cooperative"]

[Text] It is gratifying to note that the ONG AETA [expansion unknown] is not merely satisfied here with popularizing refurbished homes, building dams, small dikes, and other constructions.

When possible, it also is discovering sources of financing so that rural communities are able to construct projects they hope will be profitable.

In fact it succeeded in putting the Italian Association of Villettri in touch with the village of Dio-gare in the central district of Kati. The Villettri Association handed over the sum of 5,447,474 CFA francs in order to help the people of Dio-gare better combat the drought. Leaders of the board of directors of the Dio agricultural cooperative accepted this contribution, which was expressly intended to assist the village in its efforts to master the water situation. Thus, pursuant to studies, this amount will serve to finance the digging of a wide-diameter artesian well with pulley, will make possible the use of a revolving fund, and will facilitate studies for constructing a dam.

During the presentation ceremony, a large number of leaders left their work in order to witness personally this large donation. Everyone, such as deputy Lassana Keleta, the Kati district chief, the chairman of the cooperative, and the representatives of AETA, [expansion unknown] and Diely Moussa Kouyate, delegate from Velletri, stressed the importance of Velletri's gesture of association.

9772
CSO: 3419/554

MALI

TOMBOUCTOU GOVERNOR VISITS REGION

Bamako L'ESSOR in French 19 Aug 85 p 6

[Article by Assoura Albadia, regional press correspondent, "The Governor at the Bedside of Agriculture"]

[Text] Battalion chief Abdourahmane Diallo, governor of the Tombouctou region, has just concluded a journey which brought him to all the areas of his region. This is in connection with periodic inspections of agricultural work, and of the plains and ponds which could be developed. He was accompanied by Bakary Boire, development advisor, Sine Konate, director of agriculture, and Kamate Dupuy, deputy director of planning in Tombouctou.

From Gourma-Rharous to Niafunke, by way of Dire and Goundam, the regional executive head noted the people's effort everywhere for construction of dikes and canals. He gave special recognition to the efforts of the women of Gourma Rharous, particularly to the militant women of the districts of Mandiakoye and Central. Unfortunately, the diligence of many people will not be appropriately rewarded because proper technical supervision was not provided.

The governor had made this statement in many places. Actually, people have not abandoned traditional techniques; as a result, the seeded areas were clearly above the levels reached by the water during these last 5 years. Another problem arose in the improved areas which have been provided irrigation by motor pumps. There was a failure in following through in production (the planting of two alternate crops) which alone could have made the improvements profitable and reduce development costs for the people. Only Dire was able to deal with this difficulty.

There is a third deficiency which it would be desirable to remedy: the absence of an agricultural plan which takes into account the peasants' needs for sources of agricultural income, and their supply situation (a shortage of seeds was noted in several places.) On the basis of the regional delegation's general inspection, it appears urgent for the development committees to seriously work on the task of required planning, without which the good will and the people's mobilization will remain vain gestures.

Governor Diallo hammered on this central theme in all the areas he visited, stressing the fact that the economic well-being of the 6th region depends on the good health of its farmer. Consequently, priority should be given to projects which would feed the people.

MOZAMBIQUE

INTERNATIONAL AID FOR TETE EASES HUNGER

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Sep 85 p 10

[Text] The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has approved the granting of considerable amounts of fuel, worth \$150,000, to aid in the programs to assist populations critically stricken by famine in Tete Province. At present, the local authorities are expending efforts to carry out agricultural projects to overcome the serious food crisis. The number of persons badly stricken by hunger throughout the country has now declined to 2.5 million, also thanks to the considerable aid given by international humanitarian organizations. A famine situation considered to be serious has also occurred in Sofala.

In Tete Province, the shortage of fuel and production equipment is still disturbing the local authorities, who are currently striving to develop programs for agricultural rehabilitation to surmount the difficulties created by 4 consecutive years of prolonged drought.

The Danish Agency for International Development (DANIDA), for example, has granted our country assistance amounting to 21.6 million Danish kroner (equivalent to \$2 million) for supplies of goods and production tools to be used to spur agricultural development in Tete, particularly for the family sector.

At present, several international humanitarian organizations, in cooperation with the provincial government, are involved in programs to aid the populations severely stricken by famine, for example, the United Nations Children's Fund and Oxfam-America.

Yet famine continues in some parts of Tete Province, owing to the criminal activity of the armed bandits, something that has prevented the peasants from doing their planting at a normal pace, as was to be expected.

According to a report from the Department to Prevent and Combat Natural Disasters, for the months of June and July, the levels of malnutrition in Tete Province rose, and the health authorities estimate that 3.3 percent of the population is suffering from acute malnutrition, and 30 percent from moderate malnutrition.

Tete Province is among the parts of Mozambique where the effects of the prolonged drought have been felt very severely. Thousands of people fled to Zimbabwe,

desiring to procure food and shelter; because the acts committed by the armed bandits constituted another major problem.

The famine situation occurring in Sofala Province is also serious and, according to the Department to Prevent and Combat Natural Disasters, many people died during June. At a clinic in Nhamatanda, it was observed that 43 percent of the children suffer from between two and three degree malnutrition.

The situation being experienced in the districts of Chemba, Caia, Maringue and Marromeu, in the northern part of the province, a region seriously hit by the armed bandits' activity, is difficult, causing a large amount of population movement.

In Gaza and Inhambane Provinces, where there were noteworthy instances of people dying from hunger in 1983, the food situation is tending to improve. For some time, in Vilanculo, a rehabilitation center for displaced persons has been in operation, located in Pambarra, where at least 11,000 persons were sheltered at the beginning of this year. Many of them are now rebuilding their lives in communal villages.

In fact, as the Mozambican authorities have assured, the number of people critically stricken by very serious hunger is showing a real decline, and it is thought that, this year, 2.5 million people will be seriously affected.

According to the Mozambican Government, the needs for food, fuel, production equipment and even clothing are still a priority for overcoming this difficult situation. The armed bandits' activities are also an extremely serious problem, because regardless of how much the population strives to resume production, the bandits either threaten to destroy the crops or they simply steal everything.

At the last evaluation meeting held by the Department to Prevent and Combat Natural Disasters, the director, Amos Mahanjane, issued an appeal to the international humanitarian organizations for greater understanding of the difficult situation besetting many populations who were previously held captive by the armed bandits and later released by the Mozambican Armed Forces.

On that occasion, Amos Mahanjane commented: "The main targets of the armed bandits are the population and the financial assets. Many people have been abducted and the bandits steal as much as they can from the defenseless people, from clothing to food. As a result of our forces' operations, the people have been freed from the clutches of the bandits, but without anything at all. This situation is quite regrettable."

2909

CSO: 3442/1

30 October 1985

MOZAMBIQUE

ENTERPRISES, GROUPS CONTRIBUTE TO DISASTER RELIEF

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] During the past few days, over 200 contos have been received by the "Khanimambo Solidarity" Office in the city of Maputo, to aid the victims of natural disasters in the country.

According to a report from a source in that office, a total of 222,746.00 meticals has arrived, resulting from contributions made by enterprises, institutions and individuals in the nation's capital. This sum is added to the 296,150.00 meticals, an amount recently donated in response to the campaign of solidarity with the victims of natural disasters in our country.

For example, in response to this movement, Mabor of Mozambique donated 50,000 meticals; and the contribution from Central Furnishings was in the same amount. The Eduardo Silva business firm, in turn, joined the campaign with 30,000 meticals. Boror Commercial Magic and Somorel (Famol) contributed 10,000, 15,000 and 13,500 meticals, respectively.

The management unit of the Food and Tobacco Branch contributed 7,393.50 meticals, as well as 7.5 kilograms of miscellaneous clothing. TRADIMEX and Magoanine Grocery contributed 4,600 and 400 meticals, respectively.

INLD, Mozambique Lumber, ELECTROMOC, MAGMA, Mozambique Trucking, Maria de Lurdes Graca and Mukueche Music contributed a substantial amount of money, totaling 2,000, 3,000, 3,298.50, 2,670, 5,000, 3,610 and 3,000 meticals, respectively. Manuel Costa Sousa, Samuel Joaquim and Miguel Macuacua donated 3,000, 2,618.50 and 1,000 meticals, respectively.

The Shipping and Buoy Service, DNPP and the Swiss Mission Church contributed 1,100, 350 and 200 meticals, respectively; while SOCIMO and Benigna Paulo gave 1,000 and 50 meticals, respectively.

It is noteworthy that the "Khanimambo Solidarity" Office has opened two bank accounts, one at the BPD [People's Development Bank] and another at the BM [World Bank], in which all monetary contributions in meticals and foreign exchange, respectively, may be deposited.

2909

CSO: 3442/2

MOZAMBIQUE

POLITICAL INSTABILITY, MIGRATION HINDER RELIEF EFFORTS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] The famine situation in the Mozambican province of Tete appears to be worsening, as disclosed by a document made public by the Office to Prevent and Combat Natural Disasters last Friday. The study is concerned with the status of food in the six Mozambican provinces in the southern and central parts of the country, where the effects of the drought have been quite severe during the past 3 years.

The document observes that the situation is tragic, and notes that "all the emergency efforts aimed at assisting the victims have been thwarted because of the unstable state of security." In fact, the activity of the armed bandits has prevented the grain stored on the Angonia plateau, the most fertile part of that province, from arriving where it is needed.

The document discloses that, certain districts of Tete, especially the Zumbo border zone and the northern sections of Macanga and Maravia, have recently had abundant harvests, which might well provide for the needs of other districts with food shortages.

The study cites the district of Mutarara as the one where the famine situation "is most acute," where some of the residents may be seen resorting to anything that they find in the jungle in an attempt to suppress the hunger.

The report mentions as an example the case of certain persons seen consuming "nunufario," the local name for a type of aquatic plant.

As for the provincial capital, the city of Tete, the document quotes the local authorities as having said that the food situation is "probably even worse than the 1983 food crisis." In December of that year, people were dying in the middle of the city streets, because of hunger.

Owing to the shortage of transportation facilities and the armed bandits' activity, food has not reached the city. The document claims that the city of Tete has not been supplied since last June. Aggravating this situation is the fact that many peasants are coming to the provincial capital to escape from the armed bandits.

The study stresses that, "Despite the fact that the local conditions are limited and critical per se, the populations are leaving the areas where they live to seek refuge in the cities or close to them, without regard for the distances to be traversed."

In Sofala Province, at present, air transport is carrying products to the areas most stricken by the drought.

As of mid-August of this year, 35 tons of emergency food had been taken to the districts of Chemba and Cheringoma, in the north.

During the second half of the same month, the number of flights was multiplied to four per day, in an attempt to carry 290 tons of products to their destination.

The document claims that, "Conditions are completely alarming in the entire region along the Zambeze River, and the population's need for food and other types of consumer goods is considerable."

The districts hardest hit are Chemba, Caja and Maringue, with a total of 98,000 persons in real danger.

In the neighboring province of Manica, the document from the Office to Prevent and Combat Natural Disasters maintains that there are currently 19 trucks assigned to transport products to the distant northern and southern parts of the province.

Last August, an airplane was made available for supplying from the capital, Chimicio, the district of Machaze, farther to the south. A similar operation was carried out last year.

The province is currently undergoing a major migratory movement. Populations from the provinces of Gaza and Inhambane have gone to Manica Province, while those living in the northern section of the latter, more specifically, in the Tambara district, are in turn going to Tete Province.

Movement by populations from Manica to Zimbabwe are also cited by the document. Much of this movement is due to the armed bandits' activity. The security situation has discouraged many thousands of former residents of this province from returning to their homes from Zimbabwe.

Situation Is Better in Gaza

As for the southern part of Gaza Province, the situation is considerably improved; however, certain localities of the vast and meagerly populated district of Chicualacuja are still a source of concern, and the same thing holds true for certain parts of the districts of Chibuto, Guija and Manjacaze.

The status of security in this province has, nevertheless, continued to improve, and many of its roads are now fit for traffic. The document notes that there

is, however, a need for corn and bean seed to be used for the forthcoming planting.

In Inhambane, the province hardest hit by the drought in 1983, there are two regions which still require serious assistance.

These regions include the district of Panda, in the center of Inhambane, which is currently undergoing an acute water shortage. The situation is also serious for the town of Mapote, in the north.

The problem has worsened here lately, because there have been no supplies of food products during the past 2 months.

The report comments that, in the other parts of the province, there is a considerable abundance of vegetables, but a certain amount of danger from the standpoint of grains, the stocks of which appear to be depleting.

During recent months, heavy rain has fallen in the southern part of Inhambane, which will make it possible to plant peanuts as a preventive measure for worse seasons.

To ensure the arrival of products intended for Inhambane Province, the World Food Program (WFP) renewed until November the leasing of the ship that has been stopping at its small coastal stations.

In addition to this, negotiations are under way between the ship's owners and the WFP for a possible extension of the time period, or the acquisition of new vessels to carry out the same work.

Finally, in Maputo Province, the report says that the armed bandits' activity has also caused the rural population to migrate toward the urban centers.

The document remarks: "The organization of the aid to the victimized populations is still impressive, but the warehouses are rapidly becoming emptied."

An encouraging note in this report is that there is no mention of any instance of a fatality occurring from hunger, at least during August of this year.

However, the central and southern sections of Mozambique are living between life and death, because of famine. According to the document, only a constant emergency assistance will be able to prevent these people from having the same disastrous fate that occurred in the country during 1983.

2909

CSO: 3442/1

MOZAMBIQUE

PORTUGUESE REHABILITATION SPECIALISTS STUDY COOPERATION

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Sep 85 p 10

[Text] Yesterday, in Maputo, Joao Gomes, superintendent of the Lisbon Charitable Institution, remarked: "Two Portuguese physicians specializing in rehabilitation are coming to our country in October and, for 3 weeks, will analyze the possibilities of cooperation in this field."

Joao Gomez, who ended a 5-day visit to Maputo yesterday, also noted that the national director of social action, Joana Manguera, will travel to Lisbon to study methods for cooperation in this area, and that Portugal is due to receive within a short time Mozambican interns and students in the field of special education for the retarded.

The two specialists are Jose Alberto Faria, former director of the Alcoholism Center, and Manuel Serra e Costa, director of the Santana (Pareda) Orthopedic Center, who are scheduled to visit the hospitals in Maputo, Beira and Nampula.

During his stay in Maputo, at the invitation of the organization for the international music festival named Kanimambo, Joao Gomes was received by President Samora Machel, and held meetings with the ministers of education, health and home trade.

He disclosed that the nearly 30,000 contos in cash obtained from the "Reach Out to Mozambique" campaign will be used, at the request of Mozambique, for the purchase, in Portugal, of medicines and white clothing for Health Services personnel, to be sent to Mozambique subsequently.

Meanwhile, between 20 and 30 containers carrying products from the same campaign will arrive by ship in Mozambique at a suitable date.

Joao Gomes also informed the Mozambican authorities of the Lisbon government's intention of sending thousands of tons of potatoes, a surplus product in Portugal, to Mozambique.

Also in connection with "Reach Out to Mozambique," the superintendent of the Lisbon Charitable Institution gave a reminder of the difficulties that were

encountered when the campaign was started, claiming that, "The enemies of solidarity and friendship among peoples sometimes use hypocrisy, slander and attacks. It is true that there are also difficulties in Portugal, but this doesn't prevent the people of Mozambique and Portugal from extending their hands, as brothers, at the most difficult times."

2909

CSO: 3442/1

MOZAMBIQUE

EXPERT DISCUSSES NATION'S URBAN GROWTH PROBLEM

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Sep 85 p 5

[Text] Estimates from the National Physical Planning Institute claim that between 1970 and 1980, Mozambique's leading cities witnessed an annual growth in their populations amounting to between 6 and 8.8 percent. Specialists in urban development and demographics maintain that these figures were substantially increased starting in 1980; hence, it is feared that the urban growth rate has become even more acute during the past 5 years.

Concealed behind these numbers which, in themselves, say but little to the citizen who is not an expert on demographic problems, is one of the most serious problems of our country's development. In essence, there is a problem that has created really tragic situations, both economic and human, in most of the underdeveloped countries, Mozambique being no exception.

At present, the tragic nature of this problem which affects underdeveloped countries has assumed a particularly serious feature in Africa, because it fundamentally reflects the nature of underdevelopment and, at the same time, has an effect on it, exacerbating it. For it is not merely a problem involving the worsening of living conditions in the urban centers. It is a reduction in the possibilities of breaking the cycle of underdevelopment.

In fact, when we wonder how the enormous population mass lives, a mass which, in the case of Mozambique, within 10 years more than doubled the urban conglomerates, and the impact that this way of life has on the worsening of the underdevelopment problems, we have to agree with Prof Manuel Araujo, from Eduardo Mondlane University [UEM], when he tells us that, "Although there are no quick solutions to the problem, I think that there is a very urgent need to reflect on the many implications of this phenomenon and, right now, decide on some solutions."

Recently, the issue has received special attention from international agencies, both governmental and non-governmental. Both at the conferences on world population, held in Bucharest during 1974 and in Mexico during 1984, where the urban development issue, not the main topic on the agenda, ended up assuming major importance, and at specific meetings to deal concretely with this problem and, specifically, with Africa, as occurred a few weeks ago in Zimbabwe, the

experts have concluded that the progress made is insignificant in view of the exacerbation of the situation.

Taking as a starting point the UN reports, and the warning about the urgent nature of the problem given by Manuel Araujo (one of our few experts on the subject), we conversed with him. Based upon this, we shall offer our readers today a brief consideration of the significance and impact of the arrival in the city of another family member or an entire family from among the 80,000-100,000 persons who have accumulated in our urban centers every year in a parasitical manner.

What has been happening in Mozambique's leading urban centers is almost a reproduction of what has been going on in the rest of the African continent: a growth in the cities that is completely disproportionate to the economic growth. The situation is worsening to an intolerable extent.

A recent study made by the National Physical Planning Institute and quoted by Manuel Araujo, a specialist in demographics and professor at Eduardo Mondlane University, estimates that, between 1970 and 1980, the urban growth in Maputo was approximately 6.7 percent per year; for Nampula, it is estimated at 7.1 percent; and in Chimoio, nearly 8.8 percent. This means that, in the country's leading cities, the population more than doubled within 10 years.

This growth rate has brought problems which assumed particular seriousness in the concrete instance of Mozambique, where there are structural problems inherent in the legacy of colonial underdevelopment, compounded by current situations, causing an enormous reduction in the capacity to create new infrastructures.

Thus, from one year to the next, the rate of urban population growth becomes increasingly higher, imposing additional requirements in terms of health, education, employment and other areas. However, such capacities are non-existent and, moreover, they have been substantially reduced. For this reason, the deterioration that we are witnessing in the living and working conditions in the urban centers is inevitable.

It has often been said that the solution to the cities' problems lies in the rural areas. What does this mean?

"In my view and that of many other specialists in this field, the solution to the problem is not unilateral. It involves a very great complex of issues. The major question lies in the capacity to create socioeconomic conditions in the rural areas that will encourage people to remain there. I am not saying that they should return, but rather that they should stay. But, so that they can be encouraged, there must also be social conditions, not merely economic ones."

This is the view that Manuel Araujo has regarding the essential solution to our cities' problems.

The rural development problems have caused the rural population to see in the cities, with their ostensible grandeur, a mirage to improve its living conditions,

seeking easier access to education, health, recreation, information and various employment opportunities. This is particularly true and critical among the younger groups, whose need for adventure is increasingly less tolerant of the routine existence in a future that would be the same as that of their parents and grandparents.

The cities are crowded, the employment opportunities are increasingly fewer, but the city mirage still remains, because it has a material basis quite substantially implanted in the rural area stagnation.

For this reason, Manuel Araujo considers policies that do not take this material basis into account and that act unilaterally to be completely unrealistic.

"Furthermore, this is partly what happened in Kampuchea during Pol-Pot's time, and the disaster was evident. In the case of our country, we could maintain the growth rates that have been occurring for a much longer time. In addition to the socioeconomic structural situations from our legacy, there are current factors worsening the problems, which cannot be avoided. But we must take action on these structural conditions, in order to start curbing the influx."

It is only through action on these structural conditions, bringing about the creation of socioeconomic centers in the rural areas, that the mirage reflected by the cities, resulting from the existing imbalance, will be reduced.

As in the other underdeveloped countries, it is a matter of finding the most suitable means for harmonious development that will result from the correct combination of a group of socioeconomic components, so as to achieve a balance. It is not a matter of changing the growth rate of the urban population, because this is only a symptom, not the disease. The disease lies in the imbalance in the conditions for development between the rural and urban systems.

It is from this standpoint that Manuel Araujo considers the problem of the cities filled with people and increasingly unproductive people to be "a global problem, which must have a global solution, starting with a change in the demographic behavior in the rural areas; something that demands economic and social programs that will change the situation of the city's domination of the rural areas created by mechanisms of a colonial type."

It follows from this that there are no quick solutions to the problem, but there is an urgent need to begin taking action on those solutions. It is in this respect that Mozambique has the benefit of having determined development strategies that will lead to solutions for the problem but it also has the great disadvantage of current situations, particularly the war that has been fostered against the country, worsening the problem and delaying the process of recovery, to the point where we could become one of the countries with the most serious problems of urban imbalances and maladjustments.

2909

CSO: 3442/2

MOZAMBIQUE

SECOND CONDUIT IMPROVES WATER SUPPLY TO BEIRA

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 12 Sep 85 p 4

[Text] This month, in Sofala, the second water main conduit, the repair work on which in the Mezimbite (Dondo) area is virtually completed, will go into operation, as DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE was told by Julio Jose Descanso, director of the Water Enterprise.

The project, the work on which started in 1983, has been divided into two phases, the second being in the process of implementation, through contacts between our government and foreign countries. It will be carried out between Dondo and Beira, and will occupy a 14-kilometer section; whereas the one between Mezimbite and Dondo measured 7 kilometers.

According to Julio Jose Descanso, during the first phase the work was assigned to CIS, and the project had financing totaling nearly 15 million pesetas, donated by the government of Spain. The sum was used for the purchase of materials, such as pipes and the respective fittings.

When the second water main conduit goes into operation, it will not improve the pressure of the water outlet, but the amount will be increased.

Explaining, Julio Descanso remarked that this is due to the inadequate number of reservoirs for storage. At present, the Beira Water enterprise has 11 reservoirs, two in Manga and the others in Munhava, each containing 20,000 and 9,000 cubic meters, respectively.

Water Consumption Increased From 1974 to 1985

The water consumption in Beira increased sharply since 1974, owing to the installation of new branches of piping. For example, the increase which occurred in the latter made it possible for the consumption to rise 50 percent over the 13,000 existing consumers and the capacity to be maintained.

Julio Jose Descanso noted that this is associated with the failure to build new reservoirs for this purpose. He commented: "Because of this problem, an erroneous notion has occurred among people, who don't know why the water doesn't go up to the first or second floor."

When asked to comment on the possible solution to the situation, he said that, at the present time, there are no intentions of taking this action, but that the problem might be corrected in the future.

Our reporter also learned that the Beira Water enterprise plans in the near future to rehabilitate the water pumping system, and to construct a new treatment station in areas where they are located, also installing new pumps where they have been damaged.

Damaged Fountains Will Be Repaired

An effort aimed at repairing the 75 damaged fountains, only 25 of which are operating, as well as faucets in the same condition, is under way, and steps will be taken to replace the broken meters.

When this activity has been completed, the Executive Council will undertake to collect payment for the water consumed in the fountains and gardens.

That official added: "The improper use of fountains and faucets located in gardens, by the population, is one of the irregularities that we are attempting to combat."

With regard to the districts which have no piped water, as Julio Jose Descanso remarked, there are no possibilities of installing more faucets or fountains. Concurrently, plans call for GEOMOC, an enterprise engaged in digging wells, to create an agency in Beira, the task of which will be to supervise the digging and conservation of wells in the districts.

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30 October 1985

MOZAMBIQUE

MEETING TO ANALYZE MINING SECTOR PROGRESS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] On Monday in Maputo, the Ministry of Mineral Resources opened a meeting of national scope aimed at assessing the sector's activities, including information on the current status of each production unit and the programming of activities to be carried out next year. Issues relating to exports, the new system for exchange management and other points also constituted topics for analysis.

The meeting, which was due to end yesterday, according to plan, was directed by the minister of mineral resources, Abdul Magid Osman, and directors of production units and other officials from that ministry and from enterprises under its aegis participated therein.

A source from the Ministry of Mineral Resources disclosed to NOTICIAS that at this meeting an analysis is being made of the discussions and conclusions of the task forces regarding the fulfillment of the programs established for each production unit in the sector, among other matters; which will make it possible to devise an entire guideline for the programs to be carried out next year.

One of the topics which received particular attention, at least during the discussions yesterday afternoon, was the need to grant material incentives to workers who have distinguished themselves in the process of implementing the established programs, either individually or collectively. In view of the different suggestions for the proper execution of the program, Minister Abdul Magid Osman decided to form a task force, including directors of production units, to make a more suitable study of how to determine the methods for granting incentives.

Although the exploration of mineral resources is not yet very developed in the country, owing to several factors, since national independence more geological research has been done than during the entire colonial period, and over 400 Mozambican workers specializing in various fields have been trained.

Minister Abdul Magid Osman recently disclosed that there are large amounts of coal in Mozambique, estimating its reserves at between 7 and 14 billion tons. As he pointed out, in Moatize, it would be possible to produce over a million tons of coal; something that is not happening, as a result of various problems.

This national meeting to evaluate the activity of the Ministry of Mineral Resources also devoted attention to matters associated with exports and the new system for exchange management benefiting enterprises which generate foreign exchange.

Mineral resources are considerable in our country, as a source of exports, in particular, insofar as coal is concerned. Mozambique could become one of the leading world exporters of tantalite, fluorite and graphite.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

JAPAN OFFERS TUNA--The government of Japan, through UNICEF, has donated a gift of 260 tons of canned tuna fish to our country, intended to aid the victims of natural disasters. The delivery was made by Marta Mauras, UNICEF's permanent representative, in the RPM and Swaziland, during a ceremony held yesterday afternoon in the port of Maputo, the nation's capital. Also included in the donation from the government of Japan are six vehicles to assist the distribution of products to the population of regions stricken by natural disasters in our country. Speaking during the ceremony for delivery of the gift, the UNICEF representative said that this donation would help to address the immediate requirements of the needy families, and that it would be distributed through the DPCCN's [Provincial Department to Prevent and Combat Natural Disasters] provincial directorates and the Health Directorate. On this occasion, Marta Mauras remarked that 124 tons of products would be distributed in the country's southern provinces, and the remaining 136 tons to Manica, Tete and Sofala. The director of the Department to Prevent and Combat Natural Disasters, Amos Mahanjane, who received the gift, in turn expressed appreciation for the act by the government of Japan, noting that this is not the first time that it has aided our country. Amos Mahanjane said that the donation of vehicles has occurred at an appropriate time, because "at present we are planning a program to rehabilitate the areas stricken by natural disasters in the country. Hence, we think that these vehicles will minimize the lack of transportation for the distribution of medicines and food to the people who have been victimized." [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Sep 85 p 10] 2909

TALKS WITH USSR--On Monday, in the Soviet capital of Moscow, talks were held between Mozambique and the Soviet Union. The delegation from our country, headed by the minister of industry and energy, Antonio Branco, met with the vice chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, Pyotr Kochelev, at that committee's headquarters. During the meeting, an analysis was made of the prospects for cooperation on a group of projects, particularly the joint construction of a farming implements factory in the city of Beira, in the central part of the country. The factory will make it possible not only to supply the country with agricultural machinery, but also to save considerable amounts of foreign exchange, which Mozambique spends on imports of that kind of equipment. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Sep 85 p 1] 2909

JUSTICE MINISTER ENDS GDR VISIT--On Sunday, the Mozambican minister of justice, Ossumane Aly Dauto, concluded a week-long visit to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), according to a report carried by ADN tonight. According to the same source, at the end of his visit to that European socialist country, Dauto signed with his counterpart, Hans Joachim Heusinger, an annual protocol on cooperation between the two countries' Ministries of Justice. Heusinger is also vice prime minister of the GDR. The head of the Mozambican Justice Ministry also held talks with the state secretary of the GDR's Ministry of Justice, Dr Herbert Kern. The topic of the discussions between Dauto and Kern was concentrated on how to develop justice between the two ministries. Both sides exchanged views concerning the implementation of the mutual assistance agreement signed between the two countries in 1981, in this area. At the meeting, there was also a discussion of issues such as the GDR's judicial system, the training of jurists on all levels, and legislation, among other matters. The Mozambican minister visited the GDR after arriving from Rome, where, as head of a delegation from his country, he took part in the activity at the international meeting on crime prevention and combat. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Sep 85 p 3] 2909

CSO: 3442/1

NIGERIA

BABANGIDA DISCUSSES NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 27 Sep 85 pp 2, 5

[Interview with Major General Ibrahim Babangida, president and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, by Malam Bukar Zarma; date, place not given]

[Text]

PRESIDENT Babangida breaks silence ... and speaks to the New Nigerian — the first time he would grant a media interview since he assumed office. He talks on a number of burning national and international issues. Read on:

N.N.: First, the appointment of ministers. We noticed that you have increased the number of ministers from 18 to 22. But more importantly you said when you were swearing them in that their appointments were based purely on their personal merit and that they were not representing either group, geographical or sectional interest. We notice, that the 1979 constitution which has not yet been suspended stipulates that the composition of the government should reflect federal character. Since you have not yet suspended the constitution, we wonder whether you have something to say about this.

PRESIDENT: Okay, I think the constitution provides that such appointments should have the geographical spread. Actually, I think the operative word there is "geographical spread". If you see the composition, the spread as far as geographical position of the country is concerned, I think, has adequately been taken care of.

N.N.: Sir, which geography are you talking about: the natural geography or the state?

PRESIDENT: Well, the state geography. In other words, if you have somebody from Kano, Kano and Katsina may fall within the same ethnic or geographical environment. I think that is the basis of what it means.

N.N.: So, if a lawyer comes tomorrow and say this does not comply with the 1979 constitution, what would be your reaction?

PRESIDENT: No, I think the constitution is clear. It didn't say there should be representation from each state. But one should take cognisance of the fact that such thing is very desirable as much as possible but personally I think that the geographical environment is something that people should take cognisance of. In the past, you had the entire North, the West, the East, and Mid-West. So in the past, you had one man representing the East. He did not himself represent Imo or Anambra; neither did somebody from Western part of the country represent Oyo, Ondo, etc. He was the representative of geographical environment called the West. But we further have broken down the country into 12 states, subsequently 19 states and as much as possible, the geography is still applicable.

N.N.: And then the question of one of the ministers not yet sworn in. Would you like to say something about that?

PRESIDENT: Yes, we did not swear in the minister of industry. At the last minute what actually happened was that we had a hitch. But I think very soon, we are going to swear in, maybe this week before Friday. I hope we should be able to swear in the minister.

N.N.: The same minister?

PRESIDENT: Ah, No.

N.N.: Would you like to say why he has been dropped?

PRESIDENT: Well, I think this thing is not new. We had had similar situation in the past where we appointed I think, a governor and as a result of the development within the state, we had to postpone the swearing-in ceremony until we found somebody who was much more suitable. What actually happened was that from Borno State itself, we had a very strong representation about the candidate and we have to respect the yearnings and opinions of the people.

N.N.: Thank you, Sir. We then move on to the question of the IMF. We wanted to ask you how you are going to assess the debate that you said was welcome on the IMF, since you have already pre-

empted us by appointing a committee on IMF. May we ask you the second part of the question. Some of the ministers and some officials of the government are making statements on IMF. Now, some of the statements clearly indicate the position on whether or not Nigeria is going to take the IMF. Can we ask two questions, Sir. First are they speaking for government or for themselves and if it is government, does the government have a position for now on the IMF?

PRESIDENT: Well, at the initial stage, in my maiden address, I did emphasise that we wanted to break the deadlock as far as the negotiation was concerned because we went into it as far back as 1983, we talked on and on. And I think you are very much aware that most of the time, the then finance minister would always come out to say we would continue to talk. And so there had been a deadlock and we had to break it; so I said we had to break the deadlock but in doing so all our decisions must be governed by the yearnings and aspirations of the Nigerian people and we threw it out for debate. And the government is still holding on. It is the decision of the people that we will carry along to the negotiation table.

N.N.: What about the ministers' utterances?

PRESIDENT: First of all, you must see them as Nigerians. Some of them should hold views as individuals. They have the right to contribute to the development of their country in whatever form. And I think from what I have seen of the Minister of

Finance, he is not trying to take a position. Because, even yesterday, he said the whole thing would depend on the people. He only tried, maybe, to explain it because he is the minister who would eventually go for negotiation. He is trying to get the people to understand the issue involved so that they could contribute much more meaningfully. That will assist the government in coming to a decision.

N.N.: Sir, I don't know whether I am being unfair. But the consequence of that is that people think that because they are ministers in government, they are speaking for government and that is why some people feel that after all, the government has already made up its mind on this matter and therefore, they are wasting their time.

PRESIDENT: No. Like, he said yesterday on the Television interview, I think, it is unfair to say that the government has already taken a position. If it had, it would not have thrown it open for debate anyway. We will take decision based on the people's aspiration.

N.N.: One last question, Sir, on IMF. The current report we have is that the foreign banks — 'our friends' — are already reacting to the development here by cancelling or withdrawing lines of credit and they are refusing also to confirm letters of credit locally. Which is their own way of saying Nigeria is about to give up now, let us do them in harder so that they can give up finally. Don't you think, Sir, that their reaction is an indication that they really don't want us to take an independent decision?

PRESIDENT: Well, I think I would look at this issue from two perspectives. The first will be to take IMF or not take it. Whichever decision this country makes whether we decide to take it or we don't decide to take it — there is bound to be a turning point in the development of this country. There are the advantage of taking it and there are also consequences of not taking it. But I think it is eventually the Nigerian who will prepare to accept these consequences and forge ahead. I see it both ways: Take it, it will matter a lot to the development of this country. Don't take it, it still matters a lot to the development of this country. May be that is one of the reasons why we have to belt up and face the hard realities of the international trading.

N.N.: At 25 years of sovereignty, that is our political independence, we are unable to feed ourselves. We import rice and other things. We don't manufacture anything. We assemble cars; and they are so costly. We have about a week to celebrate our 25th anniversary. Do you think there is cause for cheer?

PRESIDENT: Yes, we are 25 years old as you rightly said. In the last 25 years, we have enjoyed sovereignty over our territory. We have authority over our instrument to manage our own affairs, be it politically, economically. We are able to con-

'I did emphasise that we wanted to break the deadlock as far as the negotiation on IMF was concerned because we went into it as far back as 1983 ... but in doing so, all our decisions must be governed by the yearnings and aspirations of the Nigerian people and we threw it out for debate ... It is the decision of the people that we will carry along to the negotiation table'.

trol our security within own environment and so on. We are able to provide all things that make up what you may call a nation. We were able to achieve this within the last 25 years. We enjoy every sovereignty, authority over our territory; and institutions and so on.

N.N.: So this calls for celebration?

PRESIDENT: I think there is (laughter). Well, in the process of our 25 years of independence, we have gone through so many, turbulent periods. We went through some kind of internal security problems. We went through a civil war and all that and we have been able to come out of these perhaps more united as a country. The civil war, for instance confirmed that we should be able to live together as one country and we should also be able to defend our territorial integrity within the sub-region which we found ourselves. I think those are remarkable achievements we are able to make as a nation. We have problems, like, you rightly said. That is why we say there is a need now to restructure the economy so that we should be able to do away with most of these problems we have just talked about. These are the problems of developing nations. As long as we don't have, for instance, a fully established industrial base, most of these problems of assembling and manufacturing and so on we have to contend with until such time when we are able to make our based well established technologically.

N.N.: You talked of restructuring and industrial base and so on. I don't know whether you have identified the key elements of this

restructuring about to be embarked upon and which you said we must have to achieve before we can go further. Do you have any suggestion on what we have to do?

PRESIDENT: What government is doing now is try to have a look at the entire economic structure of the country and try to have a good look at it. Of course there were a lot of policies that were pursued in the past some of which may need to be studied very very closely. In the field of agriculture, we should be able to be self-sufficient given the abundant natural and human resources that this country has. We have not been able to do this. So, there is probably something basically wrong in our policy towards development and self-sufficiency in agriculture. The same thing goes for industries. We probably have to look at that very closely too. What I observed as an ordinary man is that in Nigeria today, if any one comes out with an industry for producing, say, cap, the other person is going to come out with similar project. There is proliferation of industries within the country. These are very common. In Kaduna for instance, we have not less than nine or eight textile factories and so on and so forth. We have proliferation of these industries and government has to take a look at this and other issues so we get the whole thing sorted out.

N.N.: Sir, when finally you arrive at this, will it be equivalent of what you once termed "military industrial complex"?

PRESIDENT: What I was trying to advocate at that time was all part of development. Given our position within the African

region, there are so many things we will be able to do, which are defence-oriented. For an example, right now in the country, we don't buy rifles from outside this country. We put them up all together in Kaduna. We are increasing the local value added content now. From say about 10 per cent, we are getting to about 50 per cent. Within a short time, locally, we should be able to produce all these. We are saying we should be able to find market for them outside Nigeria. If we are able to do that, we will provide a sort of foreign exchange for the country.

N.N.: Sir, you talked about agricultural strategy and development. Probably, there is something basically wrong. Now, we have hopefully a good harvest from all parts of the country, this year, and in fact, yesterday, reports said prices of food in some of the markets around Kaduna and Kano were one quarter of what they were before the harvest and that some of the farmers were being forced to sell their products at very low prices and so on. Do you have anything to say to farmers?

PRESIDENT: We have observed that there are problems. A lot of food, yet there are no adequate storage facilities. On realising that, we were going to have a good harvest, we issued out instructions to the state governments to put a lot of emphasis on providing storage facilities. I am happy that some state governments have already taken care of this problem and that every state is going to provide for adequate preservation and storage of these food items. This

'Yes, we did not swear in the minister of Industry ... we had a hitch at the last minute ... what actually happened was that from Borno State itself, we had a very strong representation about the candidate and we have to respect the yearnings and opinions of the people'

time around, we also want to make sure that the farmer is given good price for what he has produced to discourage him from taking the crops out of the country where he would probably be offered a better price.

N.N.: The difference between the price the government offers and the market price is usually very high. For an example, for maize the government is offering 450 Naira, whereas last year, prices were as high as 1,200 Naira per ton of maize. The government gives the price but you would notice that it is much lower this year. Would you like to be specific about the prices and also what the Federal Government is doing about storage because you said the states had been given instruction?

PRESIDENT: The Strategic Grains Reserve of the 70s is being revived. We are doing something along that line. The farmers did not have a good price for most of their crops. This time around, we will try to give them a real good price so that they don't get discouraged.

N.N.: One of the good tidings you had for the people of this country in your maiden broadcast was that retrenchment, mass retrenchment of workers would stop. Despite your welcome pronouncement, a number of states have continued to retrench workers. What really is the policy of government on this issue?

PRESIDENT: Well, the history or the circumstances that led to retrenchment in the country is well known. The country found itself in such a situation that it had no alternative but to carry out the exercise at that time. But this administration is trying to create an environment which will offer employment opportunities to people. When I spoke to the ministers, I said there would be less government involvement in the everyday affairs of the Nigerian life. The government has a duty to provide an environment for that so that

people will be employed in the other sectors of the economy not necessarily by government. What government policy will be is to provide the environment for employment and to ensure that security and tenure of those already employed are absolutely protected.

N.N.: Does this include civil servants?

PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. They are all workers.

N.N.: How do you intend to do this, sir especially in the private sector which had, to some extent taken undue advantage and considering that the government has responsibility to all Nigerians?

PRESIDENT: There are rules and regulations governing the worker-employer relationship. If these are followed strictly most of the problems would have been reduced to a greater extent.

N.N.: Shall we then take it that the purge and rationalisation planned in the National Television Authority (NTA) will no longer take place?

PRESIDENT: I am going to be briefed fortunately sometime this week.

N.N.: Do you have a position on the issue of retrenchment as a policy?

PRESIDENT: As much as possible. The government will try to alleviate the sufferings of the people. As I have said, we will continue to create environment conducive to generating employment.

N.N.: Drift from urban to rural cities is one chief reason for declining agricultural productivity. Does the government intent to address itself to this problem?

PRESIDENT: The movement from rural areas to urban centres could be attributed to the oil boom period. A lot of people left, their local environment in search of quick money and neglect the rural environment. The situation is different now. People are going back to the land now that the economy is not as buoyant as in the 60s and early

70s. What the government would do is to try as much as possible to provide the basic infrastructures in these rural areas, water, good food and electricity and so on. Some of these infrastructures are vital to us for development especially in the field of agriculture. Once these are there, people will on their own like to settle there.

N.N.: As a follow-up sir, the problem of the oil boom days wasn't just that people ran after white collar jobs. It was just that farmers suddenly woke up to find that their much respected farm produce were no longer good enough. They suddenly found that rice was smelling, their cotton was bad. Only imported ones were good enough. And to date, importation of commodities like rice has continued. What is government doing about this?

PRESIDENT: I want to assure you that there is going to be a turning point and it is going to be very soon and the importation of food items will stop. Something more positive will be done by government especially on the importation of food more especially rice. Very soon we will make a pronouncement in the interest of the nation and the local farmers.

N.N.: During your earlier broadcast, you talked about abuses on the issue of counter-trade and import licence. I don't know whether you will tell us more about this?

PRESIDENT: I will look at it from the conceptual point of view. Most of the things we went for in the counter-trade were consumer items like milk, sugar, rice.

Counter-trade will still be on but only on projects that are vital to the economy of this country. Not on consumer goods, but on things like petro-chemicals, or even development of power and so on.

N.N.: What about the issue of import licence? There is certainly a degree of opposition right now sir about the import licences that were issued against the counter-trade agreement that we have with some countries,

The history or the circumstances that led to retrenchment in the country is well known. The country found itself in such a situation that it had no alternative but to carry out the exercise at that time. But this administration is trying to create an environment which will offer opportunities to people...

France, Austria, Brazil etc. They are saying that import licences issued in respect of those agreements have been recalled. We don't know what the government intends to do about this?

PRESIDENT: You are aware that we have set up a panel. One of its terms is to look into those that we have gone into agreement with. It is more or less like what happened in the past. Contracts were signed and we now call on the contractors to re-negotiate some of these contracts with us. So the whole purpose is to determine whether at this time, our economy can sustain such agreements.

N.N.: There is an opinion that all such industries which import all their machinery, skilled manpower, raw materials etc., don't contribute anything to the health of this country and its citizens. Do you share the views that such industries should be retrenched?

PRESIDENT: I do understand. The points you are making are very valid. One can't understand, for example, why we should have more breweries than universities and yet they keep on springing up. They tell you that malt has to be imported. Must we drink? If we have to drink, why don't we drink what could be obtainable in the country. So there is a lot of sense in what you said. But if you retrench the industries you are also retrenching the workers.

N.N.: Faced with the problem of a recessed economy, what is the government attitude towards the use of direct labour in government contracts since this can create employment while saving money?

PRESIDENT: Already due to the stark realities of our economic situation, some state governments are looking at this concept of direct labour which I think is one of the ways to save

and make money. But then you must also realise the fact that most of the contractors you talk about are Nigerians and they have to provide employment to Nigerians. We will try at least to strike a balance as much as possible. There are so many things probably the government might not be able to take on. But those that we can cope with, we certainly will.

N.N.: Now, a question on AFRC, sir. The membership has increased from 18 to 28 and some designations have changed. They also include the designations of key government officials. Why these changes?

PRESIDENT: Well, the AFRC like you rightly observed has been significantly increased. The purpose is to provide a broad-base government. You will observe that we have taken care of almost virtually all the ranks and various organisations of the armed forces. I think that this is important because in the past, one of the areas we have had problems was trying to carry the government down to the grass-roots of our constituencies. And I think by broadening the base, the ordinary officer will get to appreciate the problem and the government will get down to the soldiers. Then there will be full participation of all ranks so that it is no longer the exclusive preserve of generals only. But, you would also observe the change of name from SMC to AFRC. We worked on that name supreme. Some of us thought very strongly that only God is supreme. There is nothing supreme about the government because they come and go. Again this is a general concept. So we tried to find something which relates to the everyday affairs of

government. Some of us said, ok, why don't we give it the Armed Forces Ruling Council?

N.N.: So apart from the name and also the composition, is there other differences. I remember some members of the AFRC said it was not a rubber stamp?

PRESIDENT: I mentioned that the body was not a rubber stamp. We want everybody to be fully involved in the day-to-day affairs of government as it relates to the AFRC. Any decision that is of national interest should be taken by that council and we try also to have every member realise that he has a lot at stake governing. And because they are easily accessible to the people, members should be able to marshal a lot of ideas based on the open-door policy. We therefore expect a very significant input coming from members and I think this is very serious. I have been at the SMC for many years from 1975. And from my experience, it is important that everybody participates. When a decision is eventually taken, it becomes a collective decision, and then everybody will have to go along with it.

TO BE CONTINUED

Something more positive will be done by government especially on the importation of food more especially rice. Very soon we will make a pronouncement in the interest of the nation and the local farmers.

NIGERIA

DEFENSE SPENDING QUESTIONED DURING DEPRESSED ECONOMIC TIMES

Enugu DAILY STAR in English 11 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by Dr Okenwa Nwosu]

[Text]

THE National Concord of Thursday, March 28, 1985 carried an article by Dr Femi Aribisala which delved into the cost of financing our national defence. He was able to convince most readers that both the size of our Armed Forces and the defence budget are out of proportion to our present strategic needs. He legitimately wondered why the defence budget should not be curtailed in the light of the depressed state of our economy. After reading the widely publicised speech of Major-General Babangida on "Defence Policy within the Framework of National Planning", it is only natural to [word indistinct] that many Nigerians will have their chance to respond to this important national issues.

The military, as an institution, has played a major role in our national development. Since independence, the Armed Forces have ruled this country for a long period of time than the two democratically elected governments. At the termination of both civilian regimes, the soldiers presented genuine reasons for their intervention, namely to safeguard our strategic national interests. This military regime came to power primarily to arrest the deterioration of our economy and flagrant abuse of public office and violation of human rights by its predecessor. The success or failure of this administration will depend mainly on its ability to accomplish the major task of streamlining our national economy. Our depressed economy can be revived sooner if all sections of the society demonstrate prudence and frugality in these hard times.

National security

The greatest threat to our national security interest is from within since all our neighbours are much weaker and smaller in population than our country. The millions of hungry and jobless Nigerians constitute a potential time-bomb which must be defused before it is too late. The problem with defence expenditure is that it rarely creates new job opportunities.

Since the bulk of our military hardware is imported, the huge sum of money allotted to that aspect of the defence budget will be siphoned off to provide employment opportunities for industrialized countries where our weapons come from. Continued expenditure of our scarce foreign exchange for importation of military hardware, which we may not need now in peacetime, appears to be a misplacement of our national priorities.

Large defence expenditure is justified by the leaders of industrialized nations because major defence contracts are awarded to their industries which, [words indistinct] provide employment to their citizens. Sizeable portions of the defence budget in those countries are committed to university research projects thereby [words indistinct] academic institutions with operational funds. It was interesting to read about our plans to develop nuclear weapons in order to meet our projected future needs. If that is a realistic dream, [word indistinct] pay greater attention to the development of our industrial base instead of diverting huge

sums of money for the upkeep of our uniformed men. The Defence Industries Corporation, Kaduna, must be supported by many other smaller industrial outfits before we can meet most of our defence needs internally. It may be a wiser policy to invest heavily in technical education and research now than to commit 9 per cent of our annual budget in sustaining a large foreign-equipped Armed Forces.

Defence budget

At the end of the civil war, the numerical strength of our Armed Forces was substantially reduced. It is difficult to argue that our country does not need the services of 120,000 persons in the Armed Forces based on our estimated population of 94 million. The crucial issue is not sheer numerical strength but efficient deployment and preparedness of our Armed Forces. Only a small proportion of our uniformed men are presently actively engaged in the running of this administration. The bulk of our troops are quartered in barracks all over the country. At this difficult stage of our national development, our country should not let its disciplined and well-trained hands lie idle while we grope around for the means to provide access to the potential breadbasket of Mambilla Plateau.

A sizeable number of our military personnel are currently deployed along our borders in order to effect their closure and to support the customs with the control of illegal cross-border trade. Since it may be difficult to make our long international borders leak-proof with our present troop strength, our

soldiers could better be deployed to run our many River Basin Authorities and crucial construction projects like highways, bridges and railroads. If the Armed Forces play a major role in leading our country toward renewed economic growth through self-reliance by example, no citizen will begrudge any expenses to better equip and prepare them.

Because of the nature of our Armed Forces, a large portion of the defence budget goes to recurrent expenditure. The former Head of State, General Buhari, lamented publicly on the size of families of our troops which constitutes an extra load on the national treasury. With comfortable accommodation, provision of adequate infrastructure and educational opportunities for our barracks, the soldiers tend to engage in rearing large families at the expense of the nation. To reduce the recurrent expenditure in the military budget, members of our Armed Forces should be limited to three dependents while on active service. Those who have extra commitments will have to foot their bills by themselves.

This administration should be credited for inculcating the spirit of self-reliance into the generality of our people. It is only appropriate that we shall continue to expect purposeful leadership by example from the military in the difficult years ahead. Since self-reliance in food production is our immediate national goal, the Armed Forces should lead the way by utilizing its personnel in food production to feed themselves. The millions of naira, which should have been used to import the food for them, could be channelled to the procurement of modern military hardware and advanced training.

Most citizens would agree that adequate funding for our national defence is essential. The billion-naira defence budget for 1985 is, however, quite generous when most sections of our society are asked to tighten their belts. Until the economy improves, our defence budget should be curtailed, especially the recurrent expenditure. Since our Armed Forces play the dual role of defending and ruling our country at this point in time, a generous budget allotment for the military may create the impression of undue favouritism for some Nigerians while the rest make do with less. In answer to Dr Aribisala's question, our defence policy should not be a matter of choice between guns and butter. In these lean times, our country can do with a little bit of both.

SENEGAL

COMMENTARY ON SUPPRESSION OF OPPOSITION

Paris AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 28 Aug-10 Sep 85 p 5

[Editorial]

[Text] The Senegalese political opposition -- to put it bluntly, Abdoulaye Wade, Esq., head of the major opposition party, has just struck a mighty blow. Against whom? Aye, there's the question.

The trial of the "22 August Demonstrators" (see p. 8) has drawn the attention of international opinion and aroused indignation among some Senegalese. In the end, the judicial system has asserted its independence by disavowing the police action: the nolle prosequi ruling assumes that the arrest and detention of leading lights of the opposition and of a handful of ordinary citizens was illegal.

It remains to be seen, of course, if the police, out of pure concern with public safety, could have dared go so far without a nod from high levels of government. That is why one may well wonder just what dragon the Senegalese political opposition slew: only a couple of police higher-ups? Did it triumph over the State? Over the dominant party? Over the government?

Despite the speculations to which that string of questions may give rise, we can find, paradoxically, that the Senegalese political system emerges the stronger from these days of passion. We did not, in fact, witness ill-timed intervention by the executive or from the dominant party in the halls of justice, unfortunately common though that has become in most African countries.

It is likely that, in Dakar, the government was caught off-guard by the opposition parties' maneuver to boost their alliance with a massive demonstration. One could even say that it was hoist with its own petard by banning and then suppressing a demonstration over the currently highly emotional and timely issue of apartheid, at the very moment when the acting president of the OAS arrived as Senegal's guest.

However, these signs of nervousness in the Senegalese State apparatus -- dependent perforce on the party in power -- are evidence of

the dangerous efficacy of maneuvers designed to harrass the head of the Senegalese Democratic Party, that attorney who has apparently opted for political guerrilla warfare, right up to the very limit of what the law allows.. No doubt he felt it incumbent upon himself to do it, given the current non-existence of any real possibility of democratic alternation in power.

In short, the recent Dakar trial demonstrates the vitality of a democratic system that is all but unique in our Sub-region. Even so, the events that led up to that trial clearly tell us that there are limits to that system.

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CSO: 3419/609

SOUTH AFRICA

U.S. URGED TO BE MORE AWARE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN REGION

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Sep 85 p 6

[Text]

WE are surprised that the United States has only now become aware of the Soviet threat in Angola.

"Intensified Soviet involvement in combat operations in Angola is a matter of concern to the United States," a State Department spokesman told reporters.

"It is important that the Soviet Union understands that such action could have an effect on our relationship."

Dr Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, says the Soviets have delivered massive quantities of arms to their Angolan allies and have become involved in the current campaign against Unita.

The Soviets, he adds, are actively fuelling the civil war "and I don't believe the scenario leads anywhere except to bloodshed and killing."

South Africa has warned that the Russians are playing a leadership role in the present campaign against Unita.

And Dr Jonas Savimbi, the Unita leader, has emphasised that Soviet soldiers and airmen are actively involved in frontline fighting against his forces.

Soviet military personnel, he said, were directing ground fighting and leading air attacks in the all-out MPLA offensive to crush him.

"Angola and South Africa are not such low priorities as we thought."

Calling for help from the United States, he said the Soviet involvement introduced a new element in the civil war.

"We have had offensives before, but never have we had Russians planning and directing artillery, tanks and armoured cars and flying helicopters and jets against us."

General Magnus Malan, South Africa's Defence Minister, said Moscow was exercising its new "muscle aggressiveness" in Angola and pouring in its most sophisticated weapons to crush Unita.

Conventional military equipment worth about R20 000-million was sent to Angola between 1977 and 1982.

The build-up was much more than Angola required to deal with the Unita threat or South Africa's limited series of actions against Swapo.

He believed the Russians wanted to develop a stable base in Angola and then use the men and equipment stationed there whenever necessary in Southern Africa.

"Is this prepositioning of military equipment to be used ultimately against South Africa?" he asked.

With 25 000 Cubans and hundreds of Soviet-bloc advisers stationed in Angola, there is nothing to induce the MPLA regime to negotiate peace.

Furthermore, their presence hampers the chances of achieving a settlement of the South West African issue.

And the Russian involvement in Angola threatens the peace and stability of the whole

Southern African region. For if the Russians are actively involved in the Angolan civil war, it will not be long before they take a hand in other disputes in this region.

However, although the Americans are perturbed about Angola, they have not perceived the danger of Russian penetration in the Southern African situation as a whole.

The African National Congress is manipulated by Russia and, besides its terrorist activities, is also organising the campaign to make the Black townships ungovernable.

The more the United States and other Western countries punish South Africa, the more the ANC and its associates believe they need only continue their campaign of unrest and the South African "system" will collapse.

The more the United States and the West weaken South Africa, the greater the danger of Soviet success.

Doesn't the United States realise that Soviet involvement, not only in Angola but the whole Southern African region, is a danger to the West and could affect relations between the superpowers?

Or does the United States think that Soviet penetration stops in Angola?

CSO: 3400/97

30 October 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

RAJBANSI SAYS BOTHA GREATEST ALLY FOR REFORM IN COUNTRY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 30 Sep 85 p 8

[Article by Stephane Bothma]

[Text]

THE State President, Mr P W Botha, is the greatest ally for reform in the country, says Mr Amichand Rajbansi, leader of the House of Delegates.

Speaking at the Transvaal conference of the National Peoples Party (NPP), in Johannesburg yesterday afternoon, Mr Rajbansi, Cabinet Minister and leader of the majority NPP in the House of Representatives, said that Mr Botha was "the real reformist in South Africa".

He said that his party was fighting for all the race groups in the country, and not just for the Indians, who have "suffered most under the country's apartheid policy".

According to Mr Rajbansi, the only way to achieve permanent peace,

stability and prosperity in South Africa, was to give every race group in the country a share in the decision-making on the highest level, and by having all the race groups sharing in the prosperity of the country.

He said he had "tremendous hope" for the path of peaceful change in the country, and said that they would continue on the road of reform, and would achieve their goals through discussions.

"The NPP is prepared to co-operate with any political organisation, as long as we share the same objectives," Mr Rajbansi told the delegates at the conference.

He stressed that his party reserved the right to choose in which political structure it wanted to serve, and that it would continue to influence events in the country, despite the shortcomings of

the new constitution.

Mr Rajbansi said that his party had achieved more in the past few months for all race groups, than anyone else could have done in years, and said that it would continue on "its confrontation course".

"We will always be on a collision course with apartheid," he said.

According to Mr Rajbansi, the Indian community had suffered most under the restrictive race laws, as it had only been Indians who could not settle in the Free State, only Indian women who could not bring their husbands to South Africa, and only Indians who could not obtain work permits in this country.

"We have worked hard to have these laws changed, and it was definitely not easy", he said.

News by Stephane Bothma, 28 Height Street, Doornfontein.

SOUTH AFRICA

NPP TRANSVAAL LEADER EBRAHIM APPEALS FOR SPEEDING UP REFORM

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 30 Sep 85 p 8

[Article by Brian Stuart]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — The restructuring of the President's Council to include Blacks would make it the main negotiating body between the Government and Black leaders in South Africa.

Although the State President, Mr P W Botha, left the details open to negotiation when he spoke on Monday, The Citizen learned that the new council would be the major channel for reform affecting Black South Africans.

Black representatives on the new council would then have the same role in negotiating their own interests as Coloured and Indian members had in the old President's Council.

In the process, the present council would shed its role of deciding on legislation blocked by one or more of the three Houses of Parliament.

It is proposed that this function should be taken over by a "constitutional court."

This would require amendments to the constitution and Mr Botha has invited Black leaders to negotiate on the form of the new President's Council before making these legislative changes.

Political leads

The first President's Council, set up four years ago, included Coloured and Indian members and recommended the present Tricameral Parliament meet the political needs of Whites, Coloureds and Indians.

However, the Government does not propose a fourth Chamber of Parliament for Blacks — as suggested in New Republic Party policy.

It sees the existence of the four independent TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) and the self-governing states as basic to the political rights of residents in those areas.

Seeking political structures for Blacks permanently resident within

South Africa, Mr Botha has proposed that the self-governing areas and Black municipal bodies exercise full control over Black "Own Affairs."

At the central level, Black municipalities will be represented on the new regional services councils within the same status and rights as other municipalities, regardless of colour.

The contentious issue of Black rights within a "power-sharing" structure on "General Affairs" issues has been the subject of other negotiations.

However, at the National Party congresses, Mr Botha has made it clear that Blacks permanently within South Africa must have their citizenship restored and their political rights accommodated within "a united South Africa."

The Citizen was told that within this context the proposed new President's Council would negotiate the future of Blacks in power-sharing.

SOUTH AFRICA

CONDITIONS TO BE MET IF CONVENTION ALLIANCE IS TO SUCCEED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 25 Sep 85 p 12

[Article by David Braun]

[Text]

The National Convention Alliance which was launched in principle last weekend will have to tread warily on South Africa's political minefield if it is to succeed in becoming a mass movement.

For the moment it has claimed a foothold on the truly middle ground of the country's political landscape and it will have to work hard to broaden its position.

If it is to succeed in bridging the deepening divide between what Dr van Zyl Slabbert has called repression and revolution, it will have to draw in more groups to both the Left and the Right.

To this end a dilemma for the alliance is the extent to which it should voice opinions on such controversial issues as the release of political prisoners and the plight of people in black townships.

If the alliance is to succeed then it will have to try to avoid major confrontations between its members. It will have to encourage more people who detest each other politically to join. The more it broadens itself over the middle ground, bridging the gap between the two extremes, the more difficult this is going to be.

Opening Saturday's meeting, Dr Slabbert set out for the 150 or so people present what a convention

alliance was not and what it did not do.

- It was not a national convention.

- It was not a political party.

- It did not prescribe any single political policy; set of constitutional principles or any one particular strategy.

- It did not compromise any organisation, movement or individual in terms of their respective goals, functions or leaders, except insofar as they were committed to the objectives of the alliance.

These objectives were to bring about by non-violent means and in the shortest time possible the complete dismantling of apartheid and the negotiation through a national convention of one constitution based on one citizenship in one country.

- It did not exclude any organisation, movement or individual who wished to subscribe to the above commitment.

- It was not a ganging up or protest movement against the Government, but it demonstrated a positive alternative to violence and confrontation.

Dr Slabbert said that the alliance could achieve its objectives by facilitating communication between its members on a nation-wide basis. In this way misunderstandings could be cleared up and collective attitudes and joint strategies on current issues and future events could be established.

It could also structure constitutional debate and allow its member organisations to discuss the differences that existed between them in order to establish common ground.

Other actions of the alliance, Dr Slabbert envisaged, were:

- The organisation of rallies and nationwide petitions either to encourage or discourage Government on a particular course of action.

- The splitting into regions of its activities.

- The setting up of a "Convention Hall" in Cape Town that would sit when Parliament did, and discuss the same agenda as Parliament.

- Providing the country and the outside world with systematic, well thought-out agendas on how apartheid could be dismantled as quickly as possible.

In his opening remarks, Chief

Its objectives are to bring about in the shortest time possible the complete dismantling of apartheid. — Dr van Zyl Slabbert.

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who with Dr Slabbert made the original call for the convention alliance, said that a convention would fail if people such as Nelson Mandela, P W Botha and Andries Treurnicht were excluded from it.

A national convention would not be a national convention unless it was a convention of national reconciliation, he said.

While accepting Dr Slabbert's minimal points of agreement (the commitment to one constitution, based on one citizenship in one country), Chief Buthelezi said that if the alliance was to get off the ground politically, and if it was going to be more than just something that the National Party joked about, then the basis of the agreement in its ranks needed to be broadened.

To this end, he tabled Inkatha's Statement of Belief and Declaration of Intent, principles which he said were not prescriptive but which he believed could make a contribution to reconciliation.

In his prepared speech, Chief Buthelezi said he did not see the alliance as a committee of leaders.

"I see this alliance as possibly heralding a movement of constituencies towards each other, and I see it as a forum in which we can demonstrate to supporters of the National Party just how possible it is to work for deepening agreement through negotiation," he said.

A national convention which excludes the likes of Nelson Mandela, P W Botha and Andries Treurnicht, will fail — Chief Buthelezi.

The ensuing debate was behind closed doors to allow people to speak freely. It soon became apparent, however, that a substantial percentage of those present were hesitant to be part of an alliance until they knew where it would stand politically.

As a compromise, the meeting eventually opted to form the alliance in principle and it appointed a steering committee to investigate and report back on this as soon as possible.

Some made the point that the Government should be the primary instrument in calling for a national convention.

For that reason the alliance had to be careful not to insist on those things that would be interpreted as totally unrealistic by the Government. The release of all political prisoners, for example, would antagonise the Government and would therefore be asking for too much.

The opposing view was that a national convention could be viable only if everyone was in a position to take part. The alliance therefore had to do all it could to persuade the Government to release all political prisoners and to unban political organisations.

Another viewpoint was that if the Government was not going to take notice of the alliance, because the alliance had not stamped hard and firmly on its toes, then there was no point in having an alliance.

Said another delegate: "The best thing we can do is support the principle of getting off the ground. Then we must persuade people that this is a middle-ground opportunity worthy of support. We must get something tangible going so that we can hold a rally at Ellis Park and aim at drawing some 17 000 people together to call for a national convention," he said.

He added that the alliance was no hijacking operation, nor was it just another front. It was the active middle ground trying to give the real alternative to the Government, reflecting the concern and the need to do something felt these days by the vast majority of South Africans.

Allister Sparks' regular monthly column, "My View", will appear tomorrow.

SOUTH AFRICA

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS FOR KWAZULU MISFIRING

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 25 Sep 85 p 15

[Text]

DURBAN — The consolidation proposals for kwaZulu revealed this week have now become part of the sorry saga of trying to create a separate country that hardly anyone really wants.

Consolidation has been an issue in elections and also sparked international rows, as happened when the Government tried to cede part of the territory to Swaziland.

Then there has been the controversy over removals. (It was the inhuman treatment of people being resettled at Limehill in Natal, and its exposure by Father Cosmos Desmond, that drew world attention to removals for the first time.)

Within hours of their publication, the latest proposals were showing signs of being just as contentious as earlier schemes.

DETERMINATION

The fact that hardly anyone, and particularly the Zulu nation, wants consolidation has seemingly not altered the Government's determination to press ahead with the plans.

Increasingly, the Government has attempted to confuse the Zulu need for extra land — in addition to that awarded in 1936 — with consolidation.

The latest attempt is the most blatant attempt to sweeten the pill of political consolidation with the addition of some 381 000 ha of land.

The problem has not only been the need to give kwaZulu extra land, but also, for political purposes, to pull together a fragmented, multitude of bits and pieces that have made up the so-called Zulu homeland.

The Zulus were spread far and wide by the British to break their power. Nobody really knows how many bits there are, but at the present count there are 42 pieces defined as tribal areas and 189 black spots.

Not even the National Party could start to pretend that the so-called Zulu homeland would ever constitute a state so, in 1955, the first attempts were made to draw parts together.

The Tomlinson Commission appointed in 1955 was the first to propose "consolidation" based on areas called heartlands, without drawing boundaries.

SEVEN REGIONS

Tomlinson's recommendations had shortcomings. He wanted to give the seven black regions he proposed far too much land as far as the Government was concerned.

Interestingly, he included Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in these proposals, suggesting that Ingwavuma should be given to Swaziland.

The then Prime Minister, Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, took the basis of the Tomlinson recommendation, rejecting most of those which were of benefit to blacks, for his homeland policy of self-governing black areas.

From 1960, the Government toyed with various suggestions for consolidation of kwaZulu. But it never really came up with anything definite, changing many of its plans in mid-stream.

A notorious example was a move by the Government to develop the Makatini flats in northern Zululand, which had always been occupied by blacks, as irrigated farm lands for whites.

However, after the completion of the multimillion-rand Josini Dam, the area was found to be unsuitable for irrigation and so the idea was dropped.

The territorial authority of kwaZulu, established in 1970, was one of the last homeland authorities to come into being and the next year the Government announced that it intended to consolidate the homeland.

In 1972, the first set of definitive proposals to reduce kwaZulu to six pieces were announced and met with immediate resistance, mainly from farmers and kwaZulu.

In June 1973, revised and final plans were approved by Parliament which would convert kwaZulu into 10 parts. Again the plan came under heavy fire, mainly from white farmers.

Another revision, this time for all the homelands, was put through Parliament in 1975. The areas were changed, but kwaZulu was still to be in 10 parts and still there was no support.

As a result of the general dissatisfaction throughout the country with consolidation, the then Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, appointed Mr Hennie van der Walt to investigate anew.

It did not take long for him to discover that the country could not afford the 1975 proposals. He said there would have to be major departures from traditional consolidation.

SUGAR INDUSTRY

He formed various sub-committees with the MP for Klip River, Mr Tino Volker, heading the eastern committee charged with looking at kwaZulu. The evidence he received was overwhelmingly opposed to consolidation for political purposes.

The sugar industry was the main motivator of a report supported by commerce and industry which stingingly rejected any further consolidation.

The Van der Walt Commission evolved into the standing Commission for Co-operation and Development that has presented the latest proposals.

The Chief Minister of kwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, put a further spoke in the wheels of consolidation when he appointed a commission in 1981 to consider the often-mulled-over suggestion that kwaZulu and Natal be treated as one region.

The commission on which most interest groups were represented almost unanimously agreed that kwaZulu and Natal should be one political region, already being inextricably interwoven economically.

The commission gave impetus to calls for a separate deal for Natal, which would obviate the need for political consolidation.

The Government has agreed to separate regional arrangements, but what it means by this has yet to be defined.

SOUTH AFRICA

FLAWS IN ARGUMENTS LINKING ANC, UDF POINTED OUT

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 25 Sep 85 p 15

[Article by Hannes de Wet]

[Text]

The arguments advanced by the Government and others to claim that the United Democratic Front (UDF) is a front for the African National Congress (ANC) are not always valid, a University of Potchefstroom publication says.

"It should instead be said that the ANC, the UDF and all the other black organisations are promoting the aims of a broad social movement," writes Mr Douw Cronje, a post-graduate student in political science, in the latest edition of *Oenskou*.

Oenskou is the magazine of UP's Institute for Political and Africa Studies.

Mr Cronje says there are undoubtedly ties between the ANC and the UDF. But these links can be seen from another perspective — that the different black political groups form part of a broad social movement.

This movement is trying to bring about funda-

mental change in the existing Government and social system through a variety of actions.

It embraces formal associations as well as informal participation. As such, the movement is not an organised group, although organised groups such as the UDF and the ANC are an important part of it.

Mr Cronje says a system of generalised convictions is one of the most notable characteristics of the movement.

Mr Cronje offers "different perspectives" to the four main arguments generally used to demonstrate a link between the UDF and the ANC.

● First argument: Many former ANC leaders are playing a leadership role

in the UDF. It is also significant that about a third of the UDF's patrons are serving life sentences for having been involved with ANC activities.

Mr Cronje: The former ANC members who are existing UDF leaders probably still subscribe to the ANC's viewpoints.

"The linking of individuals (in this context) to a specific organisation is, in a certain sense, narrow-minded. Once this is done, it becomes difficult to explain or to understand cross-cutting loyalties.

"There are individuals who are promoting UDF aims without belonging to the ANC. Then there are UDF members who are harbouring ANC terrorists.

"In these circumstances it is not a question of double loyalties but a matter of subscribing to the generalised convictions of the social movement."

● Second argument: The UDF and the ANC are ideologically closely linked. Both belong to the "Charterist family" (subscribing to the ideals of the Freedom Charter).

Mr Cronje: An ideological connection between the UDF and the ANC would be simply logical within the context of the broad social movement.

"A study of the different organisations' viewpoints would show that there are more agreements than disagreements. Even though they might argue among themselves, they all have a common enemy.

"All of them find the Government, the homelands system, the Group Areas Act, influx control and many aspects of the present system unacceptable.

"All the black political groups — even those within the present political structures — are working for change."

● Third argument: There cannot be much doubt that virtually all UDF followers are sympathisers or supporters of the ANC. ANC slogans and ANC songs are heard at UDF meetings.

Mr Cronje: The fact that all black political groupings are part of the broad social movement explains why supporters of the UDF are also loyal to the ANC.

"It has become difficult to differentiate between loyalty to the broad movement and loyalty to a specific organisation.

"Terms such as 'comrade' and 'struggle' have become symbols of the movement and can no longer be seen as necessarily belonging to a specific organisation."

● Fourth argument: The UDF is promoting the aims of the ANC through its activities. The ANC has often voiced its satisfaction with UDF activities.

Mr Cronje: It is not in all cases correct to say that the UDF is promoting the aims of the ANC. It should rather be said that the ANC, the UDF and all the other black organisations are promoting the aims of the broad social movement.

It should be noted that the UDF consists of hundreds of smaller groups. Each of these has members taking part in protest actions over a wide spectrum.

SOUTH AFRICA

NO VIABLE DEAL SEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT ANC

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 26 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Allister Sparks]

[Text]

For a year the townships burned, died, but the sound and fury of it failed to penetrate the tranquility of white suburbia.

We have learnt a few home truths about our country over the past month.

The argument we have been using for years that sanctions would be ineffective against South Africa, because our economy was so strong we would not feel them, has been blown away by a whiff of bankers' ire.

A simple decision by a few American banks not to renew this country's short-term loans triggered a financial crisis that has changed the whole political outlook. Now we know that in fact South Africa's economy is extremely vulnerable to sanctions.

The other argument we have used against sanctions, that they would hit the blacks hardest while hardly hurting the whites at all, has likewise been revealed as fallacious.

One didn't hear many cries of distress coming from Soweto or the other day when the rand crashed to 34 US cents and the Government froze foreign debt repayments and reimposed exchange controls. But the reaction from the other side of the apartheid track suggests that for all its vaunted resilience, white South Africa, spoiled by years of affluence and privilege, has a very low threshold of tolerance of economic pain.

Blacks knew this all along, which is why so few of them used the argument. They may not know as much as their white bosses about economics, but they have known with the instinct of every underdog that when you are at the bottom of the heap you don't have as far to fall as the guys at the top.

The discovery of these truths may be uncomfortable, but they have awakened white South Africa to a new awareness of reality. For a year the townships burned, died, but the sound and fury of it failed to penetrate to the tranquility of white suburbia.

Aided by our truncated television coverage, the people who hold exclusive political power in this country had no sense of proximity to a crisis that was traumatising the lives of millions of their black countrymen. Their awareness of it was remote, like something happening in another country, and so they failed to respond as people holding power must if the country is to deal with its crisis.

I caught the spirit of this white insularity standing in a queue at Kennedy airport the other day. A South African was taking his leave of some American friends who were expressing their concern about what he would find when he got home.

"Come and see for yourselves," the traveller reassured them. "If you see any violence, I'll refund you your money."

Of course they won't see any violence. The violence is out of sight in New Brighton, Zwile, Kwasekele, Kwanobohle, Umlazi, Lamontville, Mdantsane, Soweto, Guguletu, Daveyton, Tsakane, Duduza, Atteridgeville and Mamelodi. And because it is out of sight it is also out of mind to the man in that airport queue.

The insularity has operated at more serious levels, too. Six weeks ago the editor of the *Sunday Times* wrote a scornful article suggesting that foreign correspondents were sending out exaggerated reports, creating a mistaken perception abroad of a country in crisis.

"Do foreign newspapers and TV stations, and one's friends who are informed by them, know something about your country that you don't," he asked.

The answer was, yes. But since then the economic crisis seems to have concentrated the perceptions of this particular editor, as it has of other white South Africans, sending him off the other day to talk to the ANC.

Now that a more direct sense of the crisis has got through to the whites, one must hope they will begin to respond with clarity and vigour.

The Convention Alliance launched by Dr van Zyl Slabbert last weekend was an encouraging start. A civil war has begun, and although there may be lulls in the action it will not end until a peace settlement is negotiated between the accepted leaders of the major race groups.

But let us not fool ourselves, as the Rhodesians did with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, that we can do a deal with some chosen "moderates".

We may like what such people say, but they don't have influence over the angry blacks who are the driving force behind the township rebellion. Therefore they cannot end it, just as Muzorewa couldn't end Rhodesia's guerilla war.

Like it or not, the organisation which has that influence is the ANC. It may not have much of an internal organisation, and I suspect it has little control over what actually happens in the townships, but there can be no doubt it has the hearts and minds of the politically awakened masses there. There can be no viable deal that excludes it.

SOUTH AFRICA

NEW PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL TO BE MAIN CHANNEL OF REFORM FOR BLACKS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Stephane Bothma]

[Text]

BLACKS must be incorporated in a political constitution as a matter of urgency, said Mr Ebrahim (Boetie) Abramjee, Transvaal leader of the National People's Party of South Africa (NPP), the weekend.

Mr Abramjee was one of the speakers at the first Transvaal Provincial Congress of the NPP in Johannesburg this weekend.

Mr Abramjee, who is also Minister of Budget and Auxiliary Services in the House of Delegates, said reform had taken place in the country, but the pace should be speeded up.

He said that in spite of the reforms announced by the Government — which were welcomed by the NPP, — petty apartheid

still existed and he called for a directive by the Government to all local authorities concerning the scrapping of petty apartheid.

"One by one the National Party is shedding manifestations of what has long been a preoccupation with colour. Let this process of scrapping discrimination be speeded up".

Mr Abramjee said much of the credit for the proposed changes in discriminatory laws should go to the House of Delegates.

"The Government should, without prodding, throw out all hurtful legislation which has no place in the country's future".

He said that it was their task to search for a political solution which would satisfy not only the Black

community, but one which would result in South Africa being given once again its rightful place in the international community.

Mr Abramjee stressed that disinvestment and economic sanctions would in no way help to develop South Africa.

"I want to repeat that none of the protagonists of sanctions has indicated what responsibility they will assume for those who would suffer as a result".

He called for South Africa's wholehearted support in the Government's plan to privatise Government and parastatal functions.

Mr Abramjee said privatisation would create a smaller but more effective and better-paid public service.

(Report by Stephane Bothma, 28 Height Street, Doornfontein, Johannesburg).

CSO: 3400/96

SOUTH AFRICA

LATEST IN STEADY TRICKLE OF CASES OF ABUSE HEARD IN NATAL

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 26 Sep 85 p 13

[Article by Jo-Anne Collinge]

[Text] Human rights organisations have long claimed that South Africa's detention laws offer scant protection to detainees and that they provide potential cover for the assault and torture of those held incommunicado.

Recently the courts have considered assault claims concerning detainees and, more often than not, they have judged these allegations to be credible enough to order magistrates and doctors to investigate them.

Police have also been subjected to interim orders restraining them.

While yesterday's Port Elizabeth hearing has commanded wide attention, because of the large number of alleged victims and the forthright evidence of district surgeon Dr Wendy Orr, a steady trickle of cases has come before the Natal courts in the last month.

Detainees' support groups point out that the number of cases being heard is significant in view of the fact that it is all but impossible for detainees to convey their plight to the outside world — including their lawyers.

The first of the recent Durban cases concerned Mr Yunus Shaik and Mr Riaz Shaik, brothers held in terms of section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

Their father, Mr Lambie Rasool, was detained for a period and saw his sons briefly in the cells. This sighting and a letter from Yunus formed the basis of his application.

Yunus's letter alleged that an unknown officer had inserted a finger in his anus, curling it from time to time. "The result was almost excruciating pain — and while this was in progress I was asked questions."

Sleep deprivation was alleged in both cases and Riaz was allegedly admitted for psychiatric care after trying to obtain a razor blade.

The reports of a district surgeon

and a magistrate, conducted by court order, have been returned to the court and the applicant's lawyers and it is understood they been forwarded to the Attorney-General for a decision on whether to press charges of assault.

In the first week of September a similar order was issued in respect of a section 29 detainee of kwaMashu who is 16 years old.

Three days later another Durban judge issued a temporary interdict restraining police from assaulting Si-benelo Ngubane (20), also a section 29 detainee. His father, who brought the application, claimed he saw his son under guard in Shifa Hospital with a swollen head and mouth and a protective cradle over his body.

After another three-day gap, a Durban court was asked to protect leading Natal Indian Congress detainee Mr Billy Nair. A doctor's certificate was produced confirming that Mr Nair had a ruptured eardrum. An interim interdict restraining the police was issued and magistrate's and district surgeon's investigations were ordered.

The most recent of the Durban cases is that of Mr Shurish Soni, an International Youth Year worker, who was described in court by psychiatrist Dr Ashwin Valjee as a "totally broken man".

A single application brought on behalf of a detainee in the Western Cape last week was dismissed. Three further applications, due to have been brought in Cape Town yesterday, were pre-empted when the detainees became awaiting-trial prisoners.

Yesterday's Port Elizabeth case arose from detentions in terms of the state of emergency. The Durban

claims are made where "normal" security laws are used to detain people.

The rules and regulations for emergency detention are in some respects very similar to section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

- Firstly, both sections can be used for interrogation and both enable indefinite detention.

- While section 29 invariably means solitary confinement, there is ambiguity as to whether this can be enforced under emergency regulations.

- The minimum rank for an officer ordering a section 29 detention is lieutenant-colonel. Any member of the police, Railways Police, Defence Force or prison services may order detention in emergency areas.

- In both instances no person, except the Minister of Law and Order or a State official, may have access to a detainee nor shall any other person be entitled to any official information relating to the detainee or obtained from him.

- Neither section 29 nor emergency detainees have any right to see a lawyer.

- Visits by family in both situations are subject to the discretion of top-ranking officials.

- Under section 29 it is mandatory that detainees be seen in private by a district surgeon at least once a fortnight and similarly by a magistrate. An Inspector of Detainees can and should also visit section 29 detainees at unspecified intervals. The provisions are laxer for emergency detainees, who are to be visited "regularly" by a prison doctor and who may be seen by judges on their inspections of prisons.

- Approved ministers of religion may visit security and emergency detainees.

Courts are prohibited from considering the validity of section 29 detentions and they are excluded in many respects from protecting those deprived of liberty by the emergency measures. But members of the Natal Bench have made it clear they will act where they believe criminal abuse of detainees may be occurring.

CSO: 3400/131

SOUTH AFRICA

UNREST, TROOP DEPLOYMENT INCREASES DRIVE AGAINST CONSCRIPTION

Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English 23 Sep 85 p 8

[Article by Laurie Nathan]

[Text]

IN JULY, Rifleman Alan Dodson, serving a one-month camp in the No 1 Reconnaissance Unit in Durban, refused an order from his superior officer to go on vehicle patrol. At his court martial two weeks later, Alan was fined R600.

As SADF troops are used more extensively in the townships and given greater powers under the state of emergency, the crisis of conscience experienced by national servicemen like Rifleman Dodson is becoming more acute.

In consequence, the debate around the system of compulsory conscription and the presence of troops in the townships has intensified.

On the one side of this debate are those who argue that conscription and the troops are necessary to maintain law and order and to deal with criminal elements in the townships.

According to the military tribunal that court-martialled Dodson, "the SADF is trying to protect the lives and property of other citizens who have not the wherewithal to do this".

Columnist Ken Owen believes the SADF is one of President P W Botha's instruments to suppress revolution (Sunday Times 18/8/85). Campaigns against conscription and militarization, like the murder of black policemen and

councillors, are intended to deny President Botha this instrument.

On this side of the debate there are also many soldiers who, never having been into a township in peace and friendship, now go in with a gun and a sense of absolute power. Trained to kill the enemy, they are confronted by ordinary people whose lives are completely foreign to them and whose suffering and anger they do not understand.

On the other side of the debate is Rifleman Dodson.

Pro Patria Medal

Alan went into the army after school and did 14 months' border duty for which he received the Pro Patria Medal. He then studied law at Maritzburg University and graduated B Comm LLB cum laude in 1983.

He was extremely perturbed when he reported for a camp this year and was briefed, in racist language, that his unit might have to assist the police in nearby townships. Alan immediately informed the unit's welfare officer that he was not prepared to do this and was told his views would be accommodated as far as possible.

This arrangement applied until the end of July when he was given an order that conflicted in a fundamental way with his conscience. Alan disobeyed the order.

At the court martial, his lawyer argued that his views were not exceptional. Like Alan, there are many conscripts who find it intolerable to have to take up arms against fellow South Africans.

They feel the primary role of the SADF, which occupies Namibia as well as SA's townships and is involved in forced removals and arrests of African people on pass-law and influx-control offences, is to defend apartheid.

They know the army, which can fire teargas at funeral mourners and assault and kill township residents, has not brought peace to the townships but fear and further conflict.

Many conscripts know the use of troops is no solution to the growing cycle of violence and that it is futile to apportion blame for this violence either to individual troops or residents. A just and enduring peace will only prevail when the troops are withdrawn and the root causes of conflict — minority rule and the system of apartheid — are eradicated.

They know the political problem of apartheid requires political, not military, solutions. They understand that the violence of apartheid is the real reason for black resistance, even if they do not agree with all the forms the resistance takes. And they therefore find it morally repugnant to have to participate in attempts to crush it.

Ethical grounds

Yet, under current legislation, there are no adequate alternatives to national service. Community service can only be granted by the Board for Religious Objection to Christian pacifists. Those who object on moral or ethical grounds are sent to jail for six years or have to leave South Africa forever.

The call for an end to conscription and for the provision of acceptable alternatives has therefore been made by a wide range of organizations and institutions: the Black Sash, all of the main churches, the PFP, the UDF and the groups that make up the End Conscription Campaign (ECC).

The ECC was formed at the end of 1983 as a broad front of organizations united around the calls for an end to conscription and for a just peace in our land. The campaign has experienced dramatic growth and now has six regional branches and 46 member organizations.

The ECC's opposition to conscription is based on the fundamental belief that individuals should be free to choose whether or not to serve in the SADF.

This belief is solidly founded in international principles, contained in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Nuremberg Principles, which recognize the right of freedom of choice with regard to the taking up of arms and the taking of life.

The ECC is saying quite simply to the government: give young men the right to choose. And until this happens at least allow soldiers the right to refuse to go into the townships.

In the next three weeks — from the United Nations International Day of Peace on September 17 to the anniversary of the troops' entry into the townships on October 7 — young men in four centres who face conscription will fast in support of the ECC's call for the withdrawal of troops from the townships and for a just peace in South Africa.

Protest is impossible

Conscientious objector Richard Steele, who was to have fasted in Durban, has been detained under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, along with three other prominent ECC members.

Yet he believes we cannot allow state intimidation to make peaceful protest impossible. He has said he will fast in detention and others in Durban will fast in his support.

Richard and national servicemen like Rifleman Dodson opposed to conscription are not cowards or unpatriotic. Their love for their country and its people lies at the heart of their stand.

They are prepared to serve South Africa in constructive ways that bring black and white people closer together, and our country closer to a just peace.

They should not be punished for this.

SOUTH AFRICA

BUSINESS HAS ROLE TO PLAY IN REFORM

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 26 Sep 85 p 13

[Article by Sheryl Raine]

[Text]

Prompted by enlightened self interest and a broader social responsibility, South African businessmen have set themselves the awesome task of preparing the way for reform talks between black and white leaders.

And if any white power base is able to get the talk show on the road to peaceful change, it is perhaps big business, which has been in contact with representative black leaders for the past five years.

Their contact with black trade union leaders in on-going collective bargaining has given them credentials to which few white politicians can lay claim.

In the full knowledge of their limitations, business leaders say that while they cannot fulfil the role of Government, they can contribute to making the country governable and have the experience to prepare the way for negotiations.

ACTIVITIES

Assocom, the FCI and the Afrikaanse Handel-sinstituut representatives recently told a United Nations hearing on the activities of transnational corporations in South Africa that they had stressed to the South African Government, the "vital importance of negotiation with all accepted black leaders, even if some of these are in detention".

Since the declaration of the state of emergency, they had held a number of meetings with senior Cabinet members and the State President to exchange views and to discuss alternative courses of action.

They said they had offered to Government their negotiating experience and expertise gained in the formative years since 1980 during which the new labour dispensation had to be established.

They had also indicated their willingness to

mediate between and among various leaders and groups, in order to get the negotiation process going which would involve a new constitutional dispensation for all South Africans.

PRECEDED

"Serious direct negotiation between black leaders and the South African Government needs to be preceded by an important pre-negotiation phase during which the emphasis should fall on confidence building through mediation and conciliation," the business leaders said.

"Rushing through this pre-negotiation phase could seriously jeopardise the effectiveness of subsequent round table bargaining.

"This is where organised business could play a crucial role in behind-the-scenes mediation aimed essentially at promoting greater realisation in order to bring the various parties closer together."

SOUTH AFRICA

EFFECTS OF CONSUMER BOYCOTTS ON BUSINESSES VIEWED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 27 Sep 85 p 15

[Article by Gary Van Staden]

[Text]

MARITZBURG — With its dozens of little lanes and first world charm, this city of some 312 000 people could easily pass for an average country town in England.

But it is not in England, it is part of apartheid South Africa and that message was put across in no uncertain terms just a month ago.

The city they call "Sleepy Hollow" woke on August 21 to find itself facing a consumer boycott by the 200 000 residents of the dusty townships on the city's borders.

No one is ready to deny that the boycott was effective, least of all the hard-hit traders in the CBD.

But now the boycott has been called off after the Metal and Allied Workers' Union issued a statement this week saying it had become ineffective.

"It had almost disappeared by natural process," Dr Keith Wimble, president of the Chamber of Commerce here said this week.

A significant part of that "natural process" has been continuing negotiations between a committee of business leaders from the city and black community leaders in the townships.

The structures for such negotiations were set up almost two months ago following a work stayaway.

Other Areas

Maritzburg is not the only Natal city struggling to come to terms with a consumer boycott.

Official boycotts are continuing in Howick, Pinetown, Mooi River and Durban. A Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu) spokesman said this week that while the boycott action in Maritzburg, Pinetown, Howick and Mooi River had been successful, the boycott response had been "disappointing" in Durban.

According to the Fosatu spokesman, the major reasons for failure of the Durban boycott were the sheer size of the Durban area and the failure to get the message across.

The spokesman claimed that the white-owned media in Durban had "stifled" news of the boycott.

He added that evidence of this was to be found in the fact that coverage of the Durban boycott campaign had been "minimal" in the major daily Press.

The spokesman said, however, that the boycott would go on.

Further inland there was little difference of opinion over the fact that the Maritzburg boycott had eased considerably before Wednesday's announcement that it was officially off.

Earlier this week the major chain stores and supermarkets in the city were doing solid if not brisk business. Consumers were apparently quite happy to go home carrying packets and parcels bearing the names of white-owned stores.

"You would not have seen that three weeks ago," one businessman said.

There also appears to be little evidence to support claims that intimidation of black consumers is widespread. This week claims of boycott breakers being forced to eat soap and swallow cooking oil were dismissed by most observers.

Dr Wimble believes that business leaders in Maritzburg were able to negotiate a way out of the boycott because they were able to prove to community leaders that they could "deliver the goods".

He said the business committee had helped to open avenues for black business advancement and training in the area. Another major socio-economic problem identified by black community leaders, that of a lack of recreation facilities for the townships, was also being addressed by Maritzburg business and the city council, Dr Wimble said.

He added that some R1,5 million had been earmarked to improve recreation facilities.

"But there is little doubt that the major problem

is education. They see it as a tremendous problem in the area because it is identified as a community's major responsibility."

Another major factor in the settlement of the boycott issue in Maritzburg was business resistance to "strongarm" tactics to break the boycott.

"We saw little reason to employ such tactics. All that happens is that you get people's backs up," said Mr John Fisser of the Chamber of Commerce.

While the negotiations and concrete evidence of goodwill on both sides of the Maritzburg issue have led to a lifting of the boycott in Maritzburg there appears to be little chance of settling the issue in neighbouring Howick.

And according to informed business opinion here the Howick dispute looks set to stay for a while. "It's a stalemate," one businessman said here.

Labour Dispute

BTR Sarmcol and the Metal and Allied Workers' Union are involved in a labour dispute in which the union is demanding the reinstatement of 1 000 dismissed workers. Not only are BTR refusing to do so — they have already replaced about 80 percent of the fired workers.

White businesses in Howick have been hard hit by the boycott there and a drive through the town — 27 km from Maritzburg — showed little evidence of the boycott slowing. There were very few black consumers to be seen in the CBD.

There is also little doubt that white businesses in Maritzburg did not escape scot free.

While Dr Wimble says that no business in Maritzburg closed down because of the boycott he said that in some cases it was the last straw to break the camel's back.

Many businesses were suffering under the recession and for some the boycott proved to be the knockout punch. "But the inevitability was there already," Dr Wimble said.

For Maritzburg anyway the boycott threat may be over for the moment, but that is no guarantee it won't be back tomorrow, or the next day. A consumer boycott has shown itself to be an effective weapon against both capitalism and apartheid: it is probably only a matter of time before it is used again.

CSO: 3400/131

SOUTH AFRICA

TOWN DIES BY INCHES AS BOYCOTT TAKES HOLD

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Gary van Staden]

[Text]

EAST LONDON — The small north-eastern Cape town of Queenstown is being slowly strangled by a black consumer boycott which is now entering its seventh week with no sign of a let-up.

And to make the town's already serious economic situation even worse, Queenstown was hit last week by a two-day worker stayaway which left pupils manning tills and filling up vehicles at petrol stations.

According to informed sources here at least 100 workers were fired when they failed to turn up for work on Wednesday, the first day of the stayaway.

The work stoppage, the first in Queenstown since the boycott began, was almost 100 percent effective. The two largest supermarkets in the town reported a total stayaway.

"The boycott has been very effective and very well organised," Mr A S du Plessis, local Chamber of Commerce spokesman and town businessman said.

REALLY STRUGGLING

"Some businesses here are really struggling, especially takeaway food outlets and bottle stores," Mr du Plessis added.

According to Mr du Plessis, the greater a business's dependence on black trade the harder it has been hit.

"There have been quite a few businesses which have had to close down here."

Mr du Plessis added that while some had suffered more than others under the consumer boycott, it would affect everybody in the end.

He saw no end in sight but said: "We keep on hoping. It has hit Queenstown business a lot."

Attempts at negotiation between the town's business and commercial leaders and the boycott committee had broken down.

"We have attempted to negotiate with them. We held a meeting with the boycott committee and discussed a list of their grievances," Mr du Plessis added.

He said he believed local issues raised by the committee, such as the lack of basic services and recreation facilities, had been dealt with by the town's business community as best it could.

CONCRETE OFFER

"But it is not really about local issues. The boycott is political and that is out of our hands."

According to Mr du Plessis the one concrete offer they were able to get underway, a renovation of a sports stadium in the township, could not proceed any further as the construction company could not enter the township at the moment.

"It's too dangerous."

He added that while some of the boycott leaders involved in negotiations had been detained by the police, he did not believe that this had adversely affected the talks. However, the last round of discussions due to be held between business representatives and the committee had not materialised.

A major contributing factor to Queenstown's present situation, according to Mr du Plessis, was the fact that the town is situated in the "white corridor" between Transkei and Ciskei and is very dependent on black trade for survival — trade that has now dried up.

In Mr du Plessis's opinion the boycott has put a severe strain on race relations in the town. "I think a lot of goodwill has disappeared and we know that the alienation is great because there are many people who want to do irrational things, militant things, but, of course, the chamber (of commerce) cannot approve."

Mr du Plessis said that Constitutional Affairs Minister Mr Chris Heunis had recently approved R15 million for the uplifting of services in the black townships around Queenstown. For many local businessmen it is already too late.

SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGE VISITS DETAINEES, ONLY ONE REPORT OF COMPLAINT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Sep 85 p 5

[Text]

PORT ELIZABETH.

— The Judge-President of the Eastern Cape, Mr Justice Cloete, said yesterday judges of his division had seen hundreds of detainees under the emergency regulations and he personally had received only one complaint of an assault.

The other judges reported confidentially to the Minister of Justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, and he could not speak on their findings, he said.

Mr Justice Cloete said he was responding to a statement by Professor John Dugard, of the University of the Witwatersrand, who said it was unclear whether judges were entitled to visit detainees held under the Internal Security Act and that most would take the view that they were "not State officials".

The Judge-President said he also wished to state that all judges had taken an oath which had the effect of making them officers of the State.

Mr Justice Cloete said that for decades it had been the practice for judges in his division to make frequent, unannounced visits to all jails within the circuits in the Eastern Cape every time they went on circuit.

In the current state of emergency, judges had been making special visits to detainees as such.

Mr Justice Kannemeyer and Mr Justice Zietsman had since August 16 visited St Albans and North End Prisons in Port Elizabeth and he had himself visited St Albans Prison and, on Saturday, Middelburg Prison.

Mr Justice Cloete said he saw 62 prisoners at St Albans and more than 70 at Middelburg.

Mr Justice Zietsman had seen 303 detainees being kept at St Albans on August 21 and Mr Justice Kannemeyer had seen 124 there on August 16.

He said that in making visits, judges usually notified the prison concerned only 30 minutes before their arrival.

On his arrival, the

judge would ask the officer commanding to parade all prisoners. Judges would then either visit individual cells or inform the paraded prisoners that they were available for private interviews.

No complaints

At Middelburg, six prisoners had asked to see him. All had had good reason to do so, but none had complained of assaults.

Only once was he approached by a prisoner who complained of an assault. The man, who had been in prison for two days, told him he had been whipped. He said he had invited the man to show him his injuries in private, but the man said he had no injuries to show.

Mr Justice Cloete said his statement was not intended to have any bearing on an application concerning treatment of detainees brought before the Supreme Court in Port Elizabeth this week.

It would be improper to comment on a pending case, he said. — Sapa.

SOUTH AFRICA

FORCED REMOVAL: COURT UPHOLDS MOGOPA APPEAL

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Sep 85 p 12

[Article by Jo-Anne Collinge]

[Text] Can They Get Their Land Back?

By Jo-Anne Collinge

The question in many minds after the historic Appeal Court judgment on population removals is: Will the people of Mogopa be able to return to their ancestral land near Ventersdorp?

Pessimists would point out that the farm land has already been expropriated, but, says the Black Sash's Transvaal Rural Action Committee (Trac), the Bakwena ba Mogopa are not pessimists. They fought their legal battle to the last.

A Trac spokesman highlighted the fact that the Government had proceeded with both the removal and the expropriation before the legal process had been exhausted.

The judgment had vindicated the residents' approach.

Mr Fink Haysom, attorney for the Mogopa community, said his clients would not easily accept that expropriation stood in the way of their return to their old farm.

"We believe this judgment may have opened the way for negotiations with the Government for redress for wrongful dispossession of land. Failing this, legal action to challenge the expropriation will be taken," he said.

The implications for the Mogopa people may seem uncertain, but the meaning for scores of others on the removal list is clear. They may not be removed by a simple executive order — it has to be confirmed by Parliament.

BLOEMFONTEIN — It was clearly not the intention of the legislature that Parliament act merely as a rubber stamp when population removals were ordered by the State President, the Appeal Court has found.

The court yesterday upheld an appeal by Mr Shadrack More, a leading member of the Mogopa people, forcibly moved on February 14 1984.

Mr Justice Trengove ruled that Pretoria Supreme Court judge Mr Justice H P van Dyk had

erred in November 1983 when he refused to grant interim relief to restrain the Minister of Co-operation and Development from carrying out a State President's order and removing the Bakwena ba Mogopa from their ancestral land.

The Appeal Court overruled the lower court's decision that a 1975 parliamentary resolution constituted compliance with section 5 of the Black Administration Act

of 1927, in terms of which the President's removal order had been made.

The section states that where a tribe refuses or neglects to withdraw from one area and move to another in compliance with an order by the State President, such order shall be of no force and effect unless or until

Parliament approves the withdrawal.

Mr More had argued that the 1975 parliamentary resolution did not constitute compliance with the terms of the proviso as it was adopted eight years before the issue of the removal order at a time when the destination of the tribe, as specified in the order, was not known.

Mr Justice Trengrove said an essential requirement of the Act was that the place from which a tribe was to withdraw and the place to which it was directed to move should be clearly specified.

The necessity for Parliament to review the State President's decision only arose once the tribe had refused or neglected to withdraw.

Parliament needed to weigh up the tribe's interests against the general public interest.

It followed that Parliament could not possibly fulfil its role meaningfully unless it was apprised of the terms of the order and the tribe's reasons for refusing to move.

It would be pointless to offer a tribe an opportunity to consider withdrawal if its fate was already sealed by prior resolution of Parliament.

Mr Justice Trengrove, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, Mr Justice Rabie, Mr Justice Kotze, Mr Justice Botha and Mr Justice Grosskopf, upheld the appeal with costs.

He also reversed the Transvaal Supreme Court ruling on costs of earlier proceedings and ordered that they be borne by the Minister. — Sapa.

SOUTH AFRICA

NATAL: 241,000 FACE REMOVAL

Cape Town THE ARGUS in English 24 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

DURBAN. — More than 240 000 people face removal in terms of the latest Kwazulu consolidation proposals — not 42 000 as estimated by the Commission for Co-operation and Development.

But senior members of the Government moved quickly yesterday to dissociate themselves from the proposed resettlement plan while commission chairman, Mr Hendrik Tempel, emphasised that the consolidation proposals could be radically changed and were only a basis "for discussion and negotiation".

It is also understood that Cabinet members are unhappy with the proposals although they allowed them to go through "so people could see they were not feasible".

"IT'S OUT"

At a Press conference Mr Tempel said the Government policy of no forced removals remained intact.

"Resettlement without consent is out," he said.

Removals would only take place on the basis of negotia-

tion. He claimed many blacks had requested resettlement within Kwazulu.

He emphasised that resettlement would have to take place "if you want meaningful consolidation".

Ms Patti Henderson of the Association for Rural Advancement, which undertook the Natal-Kwazulu part of the huge Surplus People's Project on removals, disputed the commission's removal figure of 42 000.

Ms Henderson said a conservative estimate of the number of people to be moved was 241 000.

Mr Tempel later conceded that the figure he had given excluded "black spot" removals as well as the removal of tenants on white farm land.

His figures — based on the 1980 census — covered only removals from large tracts of land.

Even then, Ms Henderson said, the figures were low. Surplus People's Project had a figure of more than 80 000 for the same areas.

MAJOR ROW

There were at least 160 000 blacks living in 181 black spots due for clearance in both the old and the new proposals. The number of tenants living on farms was impossible to estimate.

Mr Tempel had no figures for black spots.


According to senior National Party sources, the proposals are likely to be altered radically before they are presented to Parliament.

● A major row has blown up over proposals to excise Reserve Four north of Richards Bay from Kwazulu and to resettle the 20 000 people living there.

Natal Progressive Federal Party leader Mr Ray Swart described the move as "criminal white piracy".

Mr Tempel rejected the criticism, saying people in Reserve Four were living in overcrowded conditions on land with poor farming potential.

But Mr Swart said: "I have been to the area. I know what it is like. It is one of the best agricultural areas in Kwazulu."



This patchwork of black and white shows Natal in terms of the latest proposals for the consolidation of Kwazulu, with Kwazulu areas in black.

CSO: 3400/98

SOUTH AFRICA

HOPES, DOUBTS ON GROUP AREAS ACT

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 3 Oct 85 p 9

[Text]

While hopes grow that the Group Areas Act will be scrapped, blacks living in white urban areas are still being threatened with eviction.

"Indians are not buying property in Fordsburg as expectations are high that the Act will be scrapped," said the managing director of the Corporate Group of Companies in Fordsburg, Mr Ebrahim Kharsany.

"Sales have dropped by about half."

He said the property market in Fordsburg, a group area west of Johannesburg's central business district, was down as people were holding back hoping that other areas would be open to them.

THREATENED

Mr Kharsany said the Indian property market situation was artificial and prices were inflated because there was too little supply in relation to the demand.

He also blamed the recession, high interest rates and the general shortage of money.

The vice-chairman of the Action Committee to

Stop Evictions, (Actstop), Mr Mohamed Dangor, said that, as blacks living in white urban areas were still being threatened with eviction, the Group Areas Act was not about to be abolished.

Mr Dangor said several blacks living in three Hillbrow flats were served with eviction notices recently.

He said the landlords had received letters from a senior public prosecutor from the Johannesburg Magistrates Court, Mr A Lambrecht, threatening prosecution unless they told their black tenants to leave.

"This is another way of circumventing the earlier Supreme Court ruling which stipulated that 'il-legals' who had no alternative accommodation had to remain where they were," he said.

The black tenants had declared that they would not move from the flats and had called for the scrapping of the Group Areas Act.

He said that people were also resisting any move to the new flats in Newclare put up by the Government to house "il-legals".

SOUTH AFRICA

LUTHERAN CHURCH SAYS REPRESSIVE LAWS HAVE LED TO VIOLENCE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 1 Oct 85 p 12

[Text]

APARTHEID produces many injustices which lead to popular opposition and this system can only be maintained by repressive laws and violent methods, the church council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa said in a policy statement yesterday.

Because the South African Government is not representative of the majority of people in the country, they "lack the mandate to rule in a way which promotes common good," the ELCSA statement, released in Johannesburg, said.

"The policies of apartheid produce many injustices which lead to popu-

lar opposition from the discriminated and oppressed majority. As such, the political system can only be maintained by means of repressive laws and violent methods which in turn have led to counter-violence of the part of the oppressed, either in self-defence or in an attempt to gain their freedom."

The ELCSA expressed concern at continued detentions without trial.

"It can only lead to an increase in the political frustrations of the people and can never contribute towards the end of violence which has been raging throughout the country."

The ELCSA also called for the immediate scrapping of all apartheid structures.

"We do not believe the so-called reforms already announced and those still in incubation are the real answer to the people's call for genuine and meaningful change. We believe the abolition of apartheid will never be complete unless accompanied by the creation of an economic system and structure which would facilitate the fair distribution of the wealth and resources of the country.

"We hereby call upon the leaders of the oppressed to provide strong and unselfish leadership in this time of crisis in our country." — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/97

SOUTH AFRICA

PFP GIVE EVIDENCE OF COMMUNITY'S OUTRAGE OF POLICE BEHAVIOR

Cape Town THE ARGUS in English 20 Sep 85 p 7

[Text]

PFP representatives monitoring unrest and police action in Valhalla Park and Elsies River, Cape Town, this week, said they found a community "outraged" at the "savage" behaviour of the police.

Mr Jan van Eck, MPC for Groote Schuur, spoke yesterday on behalf of the group — which included Mr Roger Hulley, MP for Constantia, Mr Tian van der Merwe, MP for Green Point, and Mr Paul Vorwerk, PFP regional director — after visiting the area.

"We heard detailed accounts of ordinary people, men, women and children, sjambokked viciously for no other reason than being outside their homes; of a young woman seriously wounded by buckshot while trying to get into her own yard; of a boy shot dead at point-blank range, and of a schoolgirl whipped by uniformed men for chatting to her boyfriend in her front garden.

Sjambok marks

"We have seen sjambok marks, pockmarks of buckshot, bloodstains on the ground —

all evidence of a jackboot mentality at its worst," Mr van Eck said.

"We found whole communities brutalized, and alienated from police and virtually all authority.

"We will compile a comprehensive report of the evidence. Those in authority who are ultimately responsible will be confronted with what is being done to ordinary, decent people."

The PFP group — accompanied by the Rev Abel Hendricks of the Methodist Church — visited Valhalla Park and Elsies River to investigate charges from residents about police actions earlier in the week.

Many outraged residents told of squads of uniformed men — whites in blue police riot gear and blacks in khaki uniforms — allegedly sjambokking people inside their homes.

Mr Francois Bennett, the father of Valhalla Park resident Mrs Emily January, 28 — who is in Conradie Hospital with shotgun wounds — said his daughter had been shot and left lying on the pavement for an hour before an ambulance arrived.

SOUTH AFRICA

QUESTION OF WHO CONTROLS POLICE RAISED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Bruce Cameron]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN — The question is increasingly being asked whether the Government is in control of the police force or whether individual members are acting according to their own dictates.

Police action in controlling the unrest is being highlighted overseas, with television footage being shown almost every night of measures taken by the police, including charges against demonstrators. Added to the television coverage are claims of police brutality and torture of detainees.

Overseas commentators and politicians are increasingly saying that police actions are nullifying all Government moves towards reform — and unless the police act with greater restraint there will be further punitive steps against South Africa.

Repeatedly there have been stories about the Conservative Party holding sway in the police and undermining discipline. Whether the CP is playing any covert role is almost impossible to establish but overtly, in public statements, it has clearly attempted to sow dissension by criticising the Government for placing too many restraints on the police.

The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, always reticent to publicly criticise members of the force, maintains he has control and that the police are loyal. He admits there are exceptions, but when they occur action is taken. In a force of 52 000 people, exceptions could be expected.

AFFILIATION UNQUESTIONED

He rejects claims that more than 40 percent of the police force support the Conservative Party. But at the same time he says he does not question a policeman's political affiliation so long as he remains loyal to the force and the government of the day.

However, there is known to be concern among senior Government members about the affiliations of some policemen. It is also known that some middle-ranking policemen have recently been reprimanded for their political activities.

It is probably these concerns that contributed to reports circulating overseas about a possible coup led by colonels of the police force and army. These are dismissed in South Africa as being wild reports.

Mr Koos van der Merwe MP, a CP security forces

spokesman, makes no bones about the issue, claiming more policemen support the CP than the National Party. But, he says, "from a discipline point of view they obey orders".

Mr van der Merwe says a reason for CP support in the police force is that the Government places too much restraint on the police force.

"The average policeman is dissatisfied with the restraint. They are frustrated because they cannot deal firmly with hooligans who put fire to innocent black people and their property.

"I am not saying the police should be unleashed like murderers but they should be allowed to do a job in the ordinary way."

This attitude has infuriated Mr le Grange who has publicly denounced the CP, asking whether the party wants more people killed.

Whether the ordinary policeman is obeying orders is impossible to say — the orders are not known. Only occasionally do they become known.

For example, the Uitenhage shootings revealed that policemen were to use "sharp" ammunition when dealing with people throwing petrol bombs.

But the hearing into the shootings also revealed policemen had been instructed to carry birdshot and teargas to be used first in clearing demonstrators.

The order was never obeyed. Who was responsible and whether anyone was punished was never revealed.

And the use of quirts, a controversial subject, is a police instruction which was publicly endorsed last week by Mr le Grange.

Mrs Helen Suzman MP, Progressive Federal Party Law and Order spokesman, says Mr le Grange has a misplaced loyalty in the police force. Combined with the indemnity granted to the security forces under the emergency regulations, this is "very dangerous".

DRUNK OR SOBER

She warns policemen could easily misinterpret "this loyal backing".

His attitude seems to be: "My mother drunk or sober. My country right or wrong."

Mrs Suzman is convinced there are areas where the Government has lost control of the police force, such as in the Eastern Cape.

"It is not clear whether some police actions however have tacit approval or whether the Government just cannot do anything about it.

"Mr le Grange says he will and does take action but there is no evidence of it. There are very few dismissals and then only on very serious charges."

Mrs Suzman feels with the eyes of the world on South Africa, the police force has to be doubly sure that proper discipline and restraint is exercised.

"None of this condones the black violence in the townships and it must be brought under control with the perpetrators punished," she says.

She was concerned that the impression had been created that the police were quick to punish blacks but slow to take action against themselves.

She totally disagreed with Mr le Grange's recent statement that police used a minimum of violence.

"Almost 500 people have died as a result of police action in South Africa compared with two who died in the year-long miners strike in Britain. Those two did not die as a result of police action."

There is little doubt increased pressure will be put on Mr le Grange to exercise stronger restraint on the police and to reveal what orders they are under.

And senior policemen acknowledge the concern of ordinary people about police action is growing.

CSO: 3400/132

SOUTH AFRICA

FIRST SADF SUPPORTIVE PROJECT BEGINS IN TEMBISA

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Janine Stein]

[Text]

THE South African Defence Force's first supportive project in Black townships around the country began in Tembisa on the East Rand yesterday.

This follows a visit by the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan to Tembisa Town Council recently where SADF assistance in the planning and execution of certain projects was offered.

The project in Tembisa will be under the control of the 15 Field Regiment of the SAL Engineering Corps, headed by Captain Hennie Groenewald.

The two-pronged project includes the improvement and maintenance of dirt roads in Emmangweni, Ecaleni, Umthambeka, Esiquongweni, Entshonalanga, Esangweni and Endayeni — and the development of five soccer fields, 10 netball fields and 10 volleyball

fields in Igqagga, Lifateng, Esiqongweni, Isekelo and Isipiwe school.

The development of the sport facilities will be done in four phases, the first two — the planning and excavations — directly involving the SADF.

The Tembisa Town Council will erect permanent buildings and establish the sports grounds, and the residents of the township on the outskirts of Kempton Park will plant trees, shrubs and grass in the areas.

No 5 Engineering Squadron will supervise the completion of the project.

Part of the planning has already been done by the SADF. Excavations for the sports facilities began yesterday at a ceremony attended by Tembisa Town Council officials and members of the SADF. These should be

completed in three weeks.

Capt Groenewald yesterday said the SADF had stepped in to assist the TTC in the completion of necessary projects as it did not have the funds and the equipment to solve the problems in the township.

The chairman of the TTC management committee, Mrs Rose Thulare said that yesterday was a "historic day" and symbolised harmonious action between the Government and the Army with the people of Tembisa.

Grateful

"We are very grateful that the SADF has undertaken to assist the local authority in improving the face of our town," Mrs Thulare said, adding that the SADF had be-

haved in a "healthy and sound" way and had made the residents aware that the Army was interested in their well-being.

Mr Thulare also said the TTC was functioning normally even though six of its 16 members had resigned because of various pressures.

Asked whether the people of Tembisa would accept SADF involvement, Mrs Thulare said: "The council is interested in the welfare of the people. Anything which makes Tembisa more habitable will be accepted by the community."

She also said the state of emergency had helped the council resume functioning in a normal manner and continue delivering vital services which had come to a virtual halt before emergency measures were imposed.

CSO: 3400/97

SOUTH AFRICA

SADF RECOMMENDS DISCIPLINARY ACTION FOR AWOL SERVICEMEN

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Sep 85 p 3

[Text]

A DEFENCE Force board of inquiry which investigated the incident at the beginning of this month when 45 National Servicemen left their Bloemfontein unit without leave has recommended disciplinary steps to be taken against them.

The most important complaint from the soldiers concerned the frequency of guard duties but this had been found to be exaggerated, the Chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, said in a statement in Pretoria yesterday.

The board did, however, find that the company commander had withdrawn passes against instructions, which led to dissatisfaction.

The board had recommended that disciplinary action be taken against

the officer, Gen Viljoen said.

The 45 soldiers were employed in a support role at the headquarters of No 1 Parachute Battalion in Bloemfontein, went Awol on September 4, and the board of inquiry was immediately convened to investigate the matter.

"The most important complaint from the soldiers concerned the frequency of guard duties. This was investigated and found to be exaggerated.

Overwork

"As a result of the complaints about overwork, the board found that the work was within reason and within the framework of the battalion's operational commitments," Gen Viljoen said.

He pointed out it remained the duty of any headquarters to support

its fighting troops at all times, be it an operation or exercise.

"Allegations about the alleged blockages in the channels of communication up to the officer commanding were thoroughly investigated and it was found sufficient channels are available.

"The soldiers did not, however, make use of these channels," he said.

Illegal

"In the light of these and other findings, the board came to the conclusion that the actions of the soldiers involved were illegal and recommended that disciplinary action be taken against them".

The board had also recommended that further investigation be launched to determine why the soldiers did not make proper use of the existing channels of communication.
— Sapa.

CSO: 3400/97

SOUTH AFRICA

ADMINISTRATOR OUTLINES PLAN FOR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 4 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by Brian Stuart]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — The provincial system in South Africa will end between April 29 and June 30 next year, Mr Gene Louw, Administrator of the Cape, said in Grahamstown last night.

Provincial councils would then be abolished and the new provincial administrations would be appointed by the State President and would hold office for a period linked to that of the central government.

These provincial bodies would handle only "general affairs" and would be directly responsible to Parliament for their handling of second-tier political, financial and administrative matters.

Powers

The administrators and executive committees would have "strengthened executive authority" in dealing with general affairs, acting on powers delegated by the central government.

Opening the annual congress of the South Eastern Areas Development Association, Mr Louw said the functions

of the provincial administrations were still being investigated.

However, regional services councils would fall under the jurisdiction of these provincial bodies because the services they would render were of a general character.

The main objective of RSCs would be to promote co-operation and co-ordination in providing essential services and make the best use of scarce resources.

In most cases White, Coloured, Indian and Black communities adjacent to each other were dependent on the same water resource, received their electricity from the same body and purified their sewage in one sewerage works.

Reasons

Mr Louw listed four major reasons for the joint provision of services:

- Because of the economies of scale, some essential services could be supplied cheaper and more effectively on a joint basis.

- There would be potentially a better use of resources, including manpower and finance;

- Some services which required large areas of land, such as cemeteries, refuse dumps and sewerage works, could be used jointly, and

- Because of increasing urbanisation, co-operation between neighbouring local authorities had become essential.

A regional services council would have full policy-making, control and executive powers over those services it provided.

Once a service was transferred to an RSC, the constituent member councils would be compelled to make use of that RSC service. However, an RSC could permit a local authority to deviate from this rule.

Contributions

The voting power of member councils would be based on their relative financial contributions to the RSC. But to avoid

one council dominating an RSC, no member would be allowed more than 50 percent of the votes.

If a local authority qualified for more than 50 percent, the remaining votes would be distributed among the other local authority members.

At the same time, all decisions would require a two-thirds majority. Appeals against decisions could be made to the provincial administration.

An RSC would be financed by charges for its services, by a regional services levy based on the salary bill of employers, and by an "establishment levy" based on the sale of goods which were subject to GST.

Mr Louw said in other respects, existing local authorities would retain their autonomy.

SOUTH AFRICA

VOICES DEMANDING REFORM INCREASING IN VOLUME

Top Churchmen

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 22 Sep 85 p 18

[Article by Melanie Gosling]

[Text]

CHURCHMEN in South Africa have opposed the country's political system for decades, so launching a manifesto calling for political change after a meeting of 400 Christian leaders in Pietermaritzburg was no surprise.

Until you see who the delegates were.

Most religious opposition to the Government has come from Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian churches.

But at the meeting of 400 people organised by Africa Enterprise, an urban mission group, 47 different denominations were represented, including the traditionally Government-supporting Dutch Reformed Church.

The National Initiative for Reconciliation drawn up at the meeting aims to:

- Create opportunities for worship between different cultural and race groups and
- Plan regional gatherings of Christian leaders to initiate concrete change.

The manifesto also called for a "pray-away" on October 9 — a day when all Christians should stay away from work to pray for the country.

They stressed, however, that the day was not to be seen as a political event but a religious one.

A delegation is still to be chosen from those who attended the meeting to meet President Botha and call for:

- An end to the State of Emergency;
- Removal of SADF from townships;
- Release of all detainees and political prisoners;
- Talks to begin with authentic leaders of all race groups with a view to power sharing;
- Introduction of a common education system; and
- Elimination of all forms of legislated discrimination.

But Afrikaans theologians do not set too much store by the presence of the Dutch Reformed Church at the meeting.

Professor Andrio König of the Department of Theology at Unisa, a signatory to the manifesto, said Dutch Reformed Church delegates attended the meeting unofficially.

"Because of that, it would be too much to say the Dutch Reformed Church was moving towards calling for political change.

"But the fact that some of them were there is nevertheless significant because it shows meaningful change is beginning to happen in the Afrikaans church."

Professor Ben Marais, a theologian and former dominee, said 40 years ago he and a few others opposed the political system but "were voices in the wilderness".

"Now that is changing. I understand the Dutch Reformed Synod actually asked some of their members to attend the meeting in Pietermaritzburg, which is significant even if they were there only as observers."

He said a growing number of young dominees realised there was no scriptural basis for apartheid.

Academics

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 22 Sep 85 p 18

[Article by Melanie Gosling]

[Text] THIS year has seen South African businessmen take on the role of politician as never before.

They have called for radical political change; they have negotiated with ANC leaders; they have formed political pressure groups and this week addressed the United Nations on their role in the process of political reform.

The reason for the surge of political involvement is simple, say academics: big business is scared and, as one economist put it, "they are being hurt where it rubs most — their pockets".

Businessmen have admitted they feel threatened by the current crisis and while they have committed themselves to the role of positive agent of change, they concede that by international standards it is an unusual position for business to take.

In a joint statement by six major employer bodies (the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Association of Chambers of Commerce, the National African Federation of Chambers of Commerce, the Federated Chamber of Industries and the Urban Foundation) which was delivered to the United Nations this week, businessmen say the private enterprise system is at stake.

"If South Africa's people lose control over the process of change, either black- or white-dominated authoritarianism will be the result and there will be little room for a market-orientated system."

They said, too, that if effective channels of political expression for blacks up to the highest level were not developed, blacks would increasingly be forced to resort to boycotts and strikes as ways to voice their grievances.

Dr Tom Lodge, of the Department of Political Studies at Wits University, says big business has realised there is no way it can improve the economic situation until the Government convinces

the world that it will undertake basic political reforms.

"The heat is really on for the businessman. The current crisis is effecting their own economic prospects more sharply and more alarmingly than any other crisis has ever before," Dr Lodge said.

He said the businessman's response to the current violence was different from their response to the 1976 riots.

"After 1976, business founded the Urban Foundation which really took on social and economic reform. Their response now is openly to tackle political reform because they realise it is a vital necessity for their survival."

Mr Peter Brews of the Wits School of Business believes the extreme international pressure on the South African business community is unprecedented in economic history.

"To some extent South African business is calling for reform because they're concerned about morality but there is also a large group who have an insular mentality and know nothing about what's happening politically and socially until it effects them — as boycotts, strikes and the deterioration of the economy have.

"It is a shame business has only started putting pressure on the Government now when the international world has almost come to the end of its patience," Mr Brews said.

He said business was desperately trying to dissociate itself from the Government.

"Capitalism is not at the root of the problems but unfortunately we are all tarred with the same brush."

Will big business have any effect on political reform?

"Well influx control and citizenship for all races are being reviewed, which could be attributed to pressure from business but it has come at enormous cost to the country," Mr Brews said.

SABC Changes

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 22 Sep 85 p 18

[Text]

A white man getting a tongue-lashing from a black woman One of the programmes you'll soon be seeing on TV — and part of the changing face of the SABC. IAN GRAY, who has covered the broadcasting scene in South Africa for the past 20 years, looks at the change of attitude at Auckland Park towards political coverage and racial attitudes and how, in a reversal of roles, the SABC is in the forefront of the campaign to condition whites for a mixed society.

CONTROLLED by the Broederbond, the propaganda arm of the National Party, the "Voice of Poison", Big Brother — those and many other epithets have been levelled at the SABC.

At one time or another, all (or certainly most) were justified.

Certainly, when Dr Piet Meyer was chairman of the board and chairman of the Broederbond it was no secret that he ran the outfit, now headquartered in a building that bears his name, as his private fiefdom. And he was surrounded by faithful followers, if not of the Bond certainly of the National Party as it was under Dr Hendrik Verwoerd and Mr John Vorster.

But then, at the start of this decade, just a few years after the introduction of television — delayed for years by the opposition of HNP founder-member Dr Albert Hertzog while he was Minister of Posts and Telegraphs — came new Prime Minister P W Botha's own winds of change.

He ordered a re-shuffle of top executives, reportedly in an effort to get rid of the Meyer old-guard, only to be angered by the fact that what happened was simply that they had been further entrenched.

Nevertheless, Director-General Jan Swanepoel, known affectionately at Auckland Park as Oom Swanee and reputedly a Broeder-

bonder, was quietly instituting his own low-key revolution. He moved slowly, knowing that in the wings the conservatives waited for an opportunity to jump.

He was succeeded, for a two-year tenure, by veteran broadcaster Steve de Villiers who continued to allow the breezes of change to waft through the corridors of SABC power under new chairman Professor Wynand Mouton.

Then came Pik Botha appointee Riaan Eksteen, a career diplomat who had been South Africa's Ambassador to the United Nations. And in view of what has happened since, his background has stood him in good stead.

The SABC, in the face of vociferous criticism, finally gave opposition parties a fair crack of the TV whip during election coverage (disputed perhaps by both the left and right but generally fair in air time if not in all political aspects) and in the run-up to the "Yes/No" referendum, the real revolution began even more recently.

And it did not come politically, in the accepted sense of the word.

In the "old days", blacks made token appearances in entertainment programmes — and then only just. One Afrikaans drama series actually had a "poor white relative" as the domestic servant in order to avoid any confrontation.

Even in commercials, blacks and whites could not be seen mixing "unnaturally".

Now all that has changed.

It started in a small way and did not pass unnoticed, but despite rumbles in conservative quarters formerly taboo subjects, like mixed blood, were aired in John Cundill's award-winning local drama "The Outcast" and TV2 and TV3 happily screened mixed-cast dramas and musicals.

Then came TV4 and the likes of "Benson", a black man allowed to boss white staff and, believe it or not, show gentle affection toward white women. Racial jokes are the stock-in-trade of programmes such as "Gimme a Break" and "The Jeffersons", the latter even featuring a mixed marriage.

There has been reaction but, according to sources, it's been milder than expected and "mixing" is acceptable to the majority of whites, perhaps, because it is *entertainment* — a fantasy world.

Now we have "Network/Network" — and a whole new ball game being orchestrated by the powerful public affairs department of the SABC.

Suddenly ostrich-like whites are having thrust at them, in their own living rooms, the nasty truth. Nightly.

And more than just the views, forcefully stated, of opponents no longer of apartheid but of South Africa generally, comes the *positive* side of integration. Like the interview with the Namibian Afrikaner this week who said she had feared for the worst nine years ago but now found living in an integrated society perfectly acceptable.

She was not a character in a TV series. She was real Afrikaner stock.

Of course the PFP and other parties on the left will complain bitterly that the SABC is being misused; the Conservative Party and the HNP on the right will agree, but for reasons of their own.

And the SABC will maintain that it is only reflecting life as it is and that it's up to viewers to make up their own minds. Now, however, there is more reason to believe the SABC.

Top Sportsmen

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 22 Sep 85 p 19

[Article by Melanie Gosling and Caroline Hurry]

[Text] SOUTH African sportsmen are beginning to stand up and be counted.

Attitudes of "keep politics out of sport" and "we should be allowed to play whoever we want despite our political system" are changing.

Keen to be welcomed back into the fold of international sport, they are calling for political change.

Dr Ali Bacher, former Springbok cricket captain and director of the South African Cricket Union, believes the future of South Africans playing world sport again lies in the hands of President P W Botha.

"You can never separate cricket and politics in South Africa.

"You can't play normal sport in an abnormal society. When all discriminatory laws are abolished, when there are just and equal opportunities and joint decision-making for all, we will have international sport again."

Graeme Pollock, Springbok cricketer, said it was time for South African sportsmen to stand up and be counted.

"Players should be chosen on merit, not on the colour of their skin."

He said there was little hope of South Africa taking part in

international sport until the country's political situation improved.

"Politics and sport are interwoven and until South Africa's political situation improves, we will never have international sport," he said.

Bob Hewitt, former Springbok tennis player, agreed there would be no world sport for South Africa until it solved its political problems.

"Sportsmen should be allowed to play their sport wherever they like but unfortunately our Government and other governments have dragged politics in. Our sportsmen are great ambassadors but politics have messed it up."

Morne du Plessis, former Springbok rugby captain pleaded for an end to discrimination.

If Springboks were going to be able to hold up their heads proudly on the sportsfields of the world again, they would have to plead for and work towards an end to all discrimination and injustice, he said.

Top Businessmen

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 22 Sep 85 p 19

[Article by Melanie Gosling]

[Text]

BIG business in South Africa is no longer reacting to the Government — they're acting.

The business sector has told the Government there will be no possibility of the situation returning to normal unless there is immediate and meaningful political reform.

Nearly every top South African businessman has spoken out on the need for reform — most are calling for change which amounts to the abolition of apartheid.

Dr Louis Luyt, multi-millionaire, says the Government must do away with a system "which has been wrong for 40 years". He called for a referendum to find out exactly who blacks want as their leaders.

"The Government must move ahead and dismantle apartheid. The black vote must come and power must be shared between all people," Dr Luyt said.

Mr Raymond Ackerman, Pick 'n Pay chief, has urged South African businessmen to take over from politicians as roving ambassadors to restore international relations damaged by Government policies. He is setting up a task force of 10 top businessmen to put pressure on the Government to reform — a decision which arose out of "a feeling of hopelessness" after President P W Botha's Rubicon speech.

Mr Gavin Relly, Anglo-American chairman, led a delegation of top businessmen to Zambia to talk with ANC leaders. He has repeatedly called on the Government to take measures to create a politically stable climate.

"We find ourselves, internally and externally, under unprecedented political pressure which takes a heavy toll on the economy. The causes for the run on the currency are not economic but political.

"Any economic measures the Government may introduce will have no more than a short-term effect unless they are accompanied by a new political dispensation," Mr Relly said.

Mr Peter Wrighton, vice-chairman of the Premier Group, believes there is a groundswell of disillusionment in the "middle-rung" business community.

He has launched a petition which calls on businessmen to agree on a declaration of intent and inform the State President of their views.

It includes the "total dismantling of apartheid" and the redistribution of political and economic power.

Mr Johan van Zyl, executive director of the South African Federated Chamber of Industries, says it is up to the business community to defend the system of free enterprise.

"For that you need political stability," Mr van Zyl said. "But the way things are we are heading for violent change and free enterprise will not survive after that."

The FCI has urged Government to talk with real black leaders on an open agenda and has said there is a pressing need for blacks to be part of the political system.

Mr Pierre Steyn, Sanlam MD, says the only way to achieve political stability is for blacks to be included in the decision-making process, for improved living standards in the townships, and changes to the system of influx control.

Mr Stanley Kubheka, Nafcoc director, has called for a lifting of the state of emergency, demilitarisation of the townships and a declaration by Government to dismantle apartheid.

Mr Tony Bloom of the Premier Group says the Government must declare its intention to remove discrimination from all walks of South African life.

The Government must declare its willingness to negotiate a new dispensation between leaders of all race groups in South Africa, he said.

Mr Ronnie Lubner, Sloglas chairman and this week named as South Africa's Marketing Man of the Year, said South Africa had missed "a golden opportunity" to start cementing relations with all race groups when it failed to join in the rest of the world in giving Bishop Desmond Tutu recognition after he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

"Had he been recognised as a man of peace then, would it not have been easier to sit around the table now. We are culpable — to my knowledge commerce and industry were silent," Mr Lubner said.

He said South Africa could become the leader of the most exciting continent in the world.

"But we must change our mission. Let us concentrate on putting our house in order."

Dr Anton Rupert, of Rembrandt and one of Afrikanerdom's most respected and influential businessmen, has called for "a man of vision" to lead the country out of the crisis.

He believes the Government

has ignored the warnings of Sharpeville and the 1976 Soweto riots, but says they cannot afford to ignore the current unrest.

"Time has run out. This is the Government's final opportunity to correct past wrongs and introduce the sort of reforms the country is strongly signalling it needs so urgently.

"Don't embalm the corpse of apartheid. Bury it. Let us show the world that the miracle can be a reality."

Mr Raymond Parsons, the Associated Chamber of Commerce executive director, has stressed the pressing need to formulate guidelines to include blacks in the political system.

He has also called on the Government to have meaningful dialogue with effective black leaders.

Any future political system, he says, needs to give blacks a bigger stake in the private enterprise system.

Mr Mike Rosholt, Chairman of Barlow Rand and a member of the delegation to Lusaka this

month to talk with ANC leaders, has said the country's economic problems will only partially be solved by better economic conditions.

"The complete solution can only come when the Government removes certain basic political obstacles."

Mr Rosholt has called for Government negotiation with a wide range of black leaders.

Other measures he suggests are formulation of a "sensible" urbanisation policy and the re-examination of the administration of the security laws.

Dr Chris van Wyk, managing director of Trust Bank and a member of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut has publicly stated that the Government's policies are outmoded and should be scrapped.

"A new approach must be developed if the country is to have any hope of long-term stable economic growth.

"South Africa is at a political and economic watershed and new Government policies must be formulated," he said.

CSO: 3400/136

SOUTH AFRICA

TUTU CRITICIZES EDUCATION SYSTEM

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Sep 85 p 12

[Article by Susan Fleming]

[Text] South Africa was in a sad state of affairs because of its "appalling" education system, the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, Bishop Desmond Tutu, said last night.

He told a packed Great Hall at the Richard Feetham Memorial lecture at Witwatersrand University the system taught people "what" to think rather than "how" to think.

"It is designed to produce docile, unquestioning creatures who could not say 'boo' to a goose. They are taught the best way to survive is by toeing the line, not rocking the boat. It is not designed to develop that embarrassing thing, a questioning mind that will be ready to pose the awkward question: 'But why?'," he said.

White South Africans were unaware of the daily problems facing people living in the townships. "What do whites know about teargas, police dogs and Casspirs rumbling through the streets of their suburbs. About rubber bullets which kill three-year-olds," Bishop Tutu said.

South Africa also seemed obsessed with law and order, while the real causes of the unrest were ignored. "We are too prone to think we have dealt with the problem of unrest by blaming it all on the universal scapegoat, the agitator, and thinking we have done all that

really needs to be done through the might of the State," he said.

Discussing citizenship, Bishop Tutu described himself as being "as South African as bil-tong".

"But, until recently I have had to use a travel document which describes my nationality as indeterminable at present.

"And now we hear that the Government will restore our birthright, our South African citizenship. They have found out that we are South Africans, as if it were a major scientific discovery," he said.

Many people were overawed when someone in authority stood up to speak and Bishop Tutu questioned why the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, had not been asked to resign after the "Cabinda affair".

"He tells us that South Africa has not been assisting the MNR in Mozambique and then irrefutable evidence shows that this has been taking place. The same Minister, without one word of apology for misleading the public, stands up to say the opposite of what he had declared so solemnly to be the case. Again there was no uproar," he said.

Bishop Tutu said it was bizarre that his son, Trevor, had been detained under the emergency regulations because he swore at a policeman.

"I ask you how does swearing at the police constitute a threat to the security of the State? After 14 days in Diepkloof jail, Trevor has not changed his views. Does he still remain a threat to the security of the State?"

SOUTH AFRICA

COLORED RECTORS DEMAND EQUALITY IN EDUCATION

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Oct 85 p 4

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — The establishment of a single non-racial system of education in a truly democratic country was the only just solution to the problems facing South Africa, the Committee of Rectors said in a statement issued in Cape Town yesterday.

They also said the threat to the safety of pupils and students emanated "largely from the presence of police and military personnel".

The committee is made up of 10 heads of Coloured colleges of education in the Cape, Transvaal and Natal.

Five of the colleges were affected by the Government's recent closure of schools and colleges in the Western Cape.

The rectors said they wished to record their "deep dissatisfaction with, and condemnation of, the general state of education in this country.

"To our members it has always been clear that the ideology of apartheid, which is also the basis of our education system, is aimed at making possible the maximum exploitation of the oppressed people in this country.

"The low standards, the unreasonably high teacher-pupil ratio, the high drop-out rate, the poorly qualified teaching force, the biased syllabuses and curricula, the inadequate and usually non-existent sport and cultural facilities all have their roots in the policy of educational separation based on race".

The rectors said they deprecated the recent summary closing of schools and colleges in the Western Cape and the manner in which this decision was made known and implemented.

"We wish to place on record that college heads were not consulted before the announcement and that we gave no assurances of a return to 'normality' or any guarantee of the safety of students as recently made public by the Minister of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives. — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/114

SOUTH AFRICA

BURSARIES BOOST FOR STUDENTS AT WITS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Sep 85 p 11

[Text]

THE Coca-Cola Export Corporation in SA yesterday announced the establishment of a large education fund to provide 16 bursaries for Black, Coloured and Indian students at the University of the Witwatersrand.

Worth R5 000 each, the bursaries will be awarded to students for undergraduate study in the fields of engineering, chemistry, finance, business economics and marketing.

The number of bursaries awarded will be increased to 32 in 1987 and to 48 in 1988. From then on, 48 bursaries will be awarded every year which will represent an ongoing financial commitment by Coca-Cola of R240 000 a year.

Other universities — Cape Town, Natal and Rhodes — will also benefit from this scheme. By 1988, Coca-Cola will be spending R750 000 a year in funding 150 bursaries in SA.

Each university will administer its own bursary scheme and will identify suitable candidates.

The Deputy Vice-Chancellor of Wits University, Professor Mervyn Shear, said that in deciding to support Black students in South African universities, Coca-Cola was making it easier for the university to support needy students who would otherwise not be able to come to university or would have to struggle financially.

CSO: 3400/97

SOUTH AFRICA

EDUCATION MINISTER SAYS 'MARXISTS MUST BE UNMASKED'

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Sep 85 p 3

[Text]

THE ideology of Marxists and other radicals, wherever they were found in the political spectrum, had to be unmasked by objectivity and a critical attitude for the "unscientific, wishful thinking" it was, the Minister of National Education, Mr F W de Klerk, said last night.

Speaking at the University of South Africa's graduation ceremony in Pretoria, he said 'young people in South Africa were talked into forfeiting their education on the altar of ideas that could not stand up to scientific investigation.

"The idea that a Utopia will come about as soon as the existing order is overthrown is being accepted without question in some circles," he said.

"This is not only false, but also dangerous because the supporters of this Utopia believe the goal justifies the means.

"They believe people's lives can be sacrificed with a clean conscience to achieve this supposed attitude," Mr De Klerk said. — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/97

SOUTH AFRICA

TRANSCAAL TEACHERS SEEK ALL-RACE ALIGNMENT

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Sep 85 p 11

[Text] The Transvaal Teachers' Association (TTA) plans to cross the colour bar and make contact with teachers' associations from various racial groups.

At the TTA's annual congress in Johannesburg this weekend, the newly elected president, Mr Hugo Ackermann, told *The Star* that he wished to seek an "alignment" with all teachers' associations that shared common ground with the TTA.

"It is important that we seek contact and that we gain a better understanding of each others' problems," he said.

Mr Ackermann, headmaster of Potchefstroom Boys' High School, said the TTA condemned any social, political or religious policy that interfered with education, adding that the TTA wanted a society based on human dignity and civil liberty.

Mr Ackermann, who was present at last week's Alliance meeting in Johannesburg attended by 150 South African leaders, said the system of working under several different education Ministries was against TTA policy.

MINISTRIES

"We accept a single Ministry and the concept of Own Affairs obviously implies that we do not have one Ministry," he said.

Mr Ackermann said that, although he was unhappy about there being more than one Ministry of Education, the TTA had to work within the system.

"Our aim is to represent the

teachers within the existing system and, at the same time, work towards the creation of a single Ministry."

Mr Ackermann said there was some dissatisfaction among teachers concerning the proposed alliance between the South African Teachers' Council and the Federal Council for Teachers' Associations.

"We will have to reconsider seriously where we stand in relation to the proposed new Federal Teachers' Council which is again an entrenched 'whites only' council."

Mr Ackermann said the English-speaking teachers' associations countrywide would soon meet to discuss this issue.

He declined to discuss last week's announcements by the Minister of National Education, Mr F W de Klerk, on changes in the education structure because he had not yet studied the full text.

But, he said, parents should have the choice of deciding where they sent their children to school.

"I am not for forced integration but I believe parents should have the right to choose if they want to send their children to an open school."

Discussing compulsory tuition fees, Mr Ackermann said this was not the best system to raise additional revenue.

"Additional funds must be raised through existing structures. The general public should be taxed more," he said.

He added that the collection of fees should not be the responsibility of the school.

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMISSION PROPOSES SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO MARITAL LAWS

Better Deal for Black Women

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 2 Oct 85 p 17

[Article by San Vivier]

[Text] The legal position of black women in South Africa will be substantially improved if proposals by the Law Commission are accepted.

In a "working paper" on marriages and customary unions, the commission has sought to bring these institutions "in line with modern needs and realities."

The commission recommended that:

--Customary marriages be recognised as a marriage--this will mean that partners will enjoy the status of husband and wife and their children will be legitimate.

--Customary law consequences of marriage be changed to enable a wife to acquire and dispose of property in her own name.

--A widow of a customary marriage should have the same rights as a widow of a common-law marriage.

--"Guardianship" of a woman who has attained the age of majority be abolished.

--A woman should not need consent to marry, unless she is a minor.

In this regard the commission says: "It is felt that the time is ripe for the abolition of the customary law rule that a woman is always under the guardianship of a male person, and that such guardian's consent must be obtained before the woman can conclude a valid customary marriage even where the woman has reached the age of majority."

In regard to civil marriages, the commission said the advantages of the recent reform of marriage laws for other race groups had to be extended to blacks.

In the case of common-law marriages, it recommended that:

--Marital power be abolished.

--The accrual system be applicable unless excluded by antenuptial contract.

--Couples already married be given a chance to change their property system.

--Courts be given power to overrule an unfair property division on divorce in the case of marriages out of community of property.

Contrary to some other African countries it was decided not to ban black traditions such as polygamy and lobola.

"The prohibition of polygamy would change the nature of the customary marriage materially and such a step would be regarded by blacks as undue interference with an institution which is part of their cultural heritage.

"In line with the committee's approach of changing customary law only in so far as it appears absolutely necessary, it is suggested that the customary marriage should be recognised as a marriage despite its polygamous nature," the report said.

But the commission has suggested a customary marriage should be properly dissolved before a spouse of such a marriage may marry by common law.

The customary agreement that lobola be delivered has been embodied in the proposed bill. The relevant clause is phrased in such a way that "it will not prejudice anyone's right to claim lobola in respect of a customary marriage."

The commission has called for comment on the proposals. The working paper is available free of charge. Correspondence should be addressed to The Secretary, South African Law Commission, Private Bag X668, Pretoria. Telephone (012)26-1121.

Recommendations Accepted

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 2 Oct 85 p 17

[Text] In spite of urbanisation and a Western lifestyle, many blacks still prefer the traditional marriage system, various studies have found.

A Human Sciences Research Council survey shows that more than half of black marriages are customary unions--and thus not recognised by law.

In another study, 95 percent of blacks indicated that they had given lobola. And it is estimated that 31 percent of blacks still practice polygamy.

In answering a question on polygamy, 65 percent felt that it should be abolished--but the objection to polygamy was based on the present socioeconomic climate rather than morally founded.

The main reason given by those who favoured the abolition of polygamy was that a man was unable to maintain and educate a large family. The housing shortage also prevented a man from establishing a home for more than one wife.

Those who favoured the retention of polygamy felt that it was an old tradition among blacks. It was also argued that it reduced the number of unmarried women and fatherless children.

Some felt that, as long as the women were legally protected, a second wife was preferable to an extra-marital relationship.

They also felt that a customary marriage was necessary to maintain the respect of their community. The system also ensured the respect of the in-laws and acceptance by them.

The main reasons for entering into a common-law marriage were to ensure legal certainty and recognition of their marital status.

The HSRC survey found that young, urban and educated blacks still favoured traditional marriage.

From the kinds of occupation, such as doctors, teachers, clerks, bookkeepers, salesmen and builders, it would appear that blacks are living very much in contact with the Western culture; yet they refuse to relinquish the traditional customary marriage system," it says.

"The fact that the majority of respondents preferred to conclude a customary marriage indicates that customary marriages ought to be legally recognised since the information obtained from the survey does not support the view that customary marriages have fallen into (disuse) in urban areas."

Recommendations Accepted

Black women leaders from three provinces who met in Pretoria at the weekend unanimously accepted in principle the Law Commission's working paper recommendations on black marriages.

In a statement issued after their meeting at the Women's Bureau headquarters, they stressed the need for speedy reform and for urgency in disseminating and explaining the proposals to the black community.

"We would like to ensure that our own views on the proposals are put forward to the Law Commission and that the views of non-black individuals and institutions should not be put forward as being representative of the black community unless this is in fact the position," they said.--SAPA.

CSO: 3400/132

SOUTH AFRICA

PRIVATIZATION SEEN LIKELY TO EASE ECONOMIC WOES

Johannesburg WEEKEND ARGUS in English 7 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Michael Chester]

[Text]

A United States think-tank has advised President P W Botha to follow Mrs Margaret Thatcher of Britain in a programme of handing over more State corporations and services to the private sector.

Dr Stuart Butler, director of the influential Heritage Foundation in Washington, argued this week that fewer Government controls and regulations were crucial in finding solutions to South Africa's economic as well as political problems.

He was addressing a national conference called by the SA think-tank Syncom and sponsored by the Federated Chamber of Industries in Johannesburg to discuss the merits of privatisation and the stripping away of red-tape regulations that hinder entrepreneurs.

He argued that many of South Africa's internal and external problems could be eliminated by finding ways to alter the way in which public and private economic sectors were entwined.

BASIC SERVICES

Dr Butler asked:

- "How can the Government cater for the growing need for basic human services and increasing demands on government corporations without straining State finances?"
- "How can the Government help provide essential business infrastructure — such as transportation and telecommunications — without also provoking serious Budget difficulties?"
- "Is there some way to reduce the political tensions and disputes that arise inevitably when publicly-provided goods and services act to charge the political environment?"

POWERFUL INCENTIVES

While no simple answers existed, he said, international experience suggested that problems could be eased considerably by a strategy of moving certain functions of government into the private sector — especially important in the South African context.

Privatisation did not mean that the Government gave up its responsibilities to the nation. What it entailed was clearing the path for the pow-

erful incentives within a competitive market economy and giving a green light to innovation, reducing the financial demands on the Government and often bringing a stronger inflow of funds to the Treasury.

COMMERCIAL DECISIONS

Politically, privatisation could also have a critical effect by replacing political or bureaucratic decisions with routine commercial decisions and so helping to depoliticise important segments of everyday life — "and thus help to defuse the current crisis".

Many countries had explored the privatisation approach. Dozens of American cities now had municipal services even fire brigades — run by private firms. Many cities in the Third World, such as Calcutta, had remarkably efficient mass transit systems run by the private sector.

But the lead had been taken by Britain — where South Africa could find most relevance.

PUBLIC HOUSING

In the last six years, under Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the public sector had been transformed. The equivalent of about R60 000 million in government assets had been sold

to the private sector — including major stakes in North Sea oil, road haulage, motor production, public housing and now the entire telephone system.

Still to come on the privatisation list were British Airways, the gas distribution network — even the Post Office.

WORKER OPPOSITION

There had been sensational successes in selling shares to the public.

"The British experience shows just what can be done, both economically and politically, through privatisation", said Dr Butler.

"Some claim in this country that the privatisation of major state industries is impossible because of ideological as well as bureaucratic and worker opposition. It is hard to imagine such resistance would be any less than Margaret Thatcher faced."

Partial employee ownership, investment incentives and the benefits of competition would work just as well in South Africa's telephone system, in the transport system, in SA Airways or in Escom, said Dr Butler.

KEY PARTS

"Some say that South Africa's tense political situation means that the Government cannot afford to take the risk of withdrawing from key parts of the economy. But the reverse is true.

"Privatisation means depoliticisation. Competition and the need to satisfy the customer motivates the private supplier to accommodate consumer demands, to act dispassionately and to use resources most efficiently. If he does not do so, his competitors will.

LESS TENSION

"Nobody," said Dr Butler, "would suggest that privatisation is anything more than a small part in the solution for South Africa's future. But it is a key element that is easy for all to accept.

"For the Government it means revenues and a reduction in tension. For the private sector it means new commercial opportunities.

"And for businesses and citizens of all races, it means the prospect of better services free of bureaucratic control."

SOUTH AFRICA

FISCAL POLICY NEEDED SAYS NEDBANK

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 27 Sep 85 p 28

[Article by Daan de Kock]

[Text] THE relaxation of monetary policy may not be sufficient to promote economic recovery in South Africa and a certain amount of fiscal policy has to be applied.

How much scope there is for the relaxation of fiscal policy will depend on the success still to be achieved in reining in government expenditure in the second half of the current fiscal year, Nedbank says in its latest Economic Roundup.

Nedbank estimates at this stage a spending overrun of just more than R1-billion. This will have no serious effects on the budget deficit because of the large expected revenue overrun.

"But it does create a spending bulge which, together with even mild increases in civil service remuneration, would put spending at levels that could make for a deficit of around R5-billion in the fiscal 1986/87.

"While this will not be unduly large by either domestic or international standards, it would limit

the potential for major tax reductions in the next budget."

The Economic Roundup says this is why the package announced by the Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis on September 20, 1985 did not include tax cuts, but rather tax on imports with the proceeds to be used to create employment opportunities.

Analysing South Africa's foreign debt situation Economic Roundup comes to the conclusion that South Africa's short-term debt obligations are too high.

The country's short-term foreign liabilities to BIS reporting banks are nearly 67 percent of its total debt. This amounted to about 64 percent of the total value of exports in 1984.

"Thus when the country's short-term debt of \$12,7-billion is included in the calculation, the total debt servicing ratio jumps to nearly 76 percent — a very high ratio by international standards. This is why the country was so vulnerable to external financial pressure," says the bank.

Nedbank says the auth-

orities' deliberations on policies regarding foreign borrowing and repayment strategy in the months to come are likely to focus on two matters:

● The country's foreign obligations are not excessive according to conventional criteria.

● The short-term debt obligations made up too large a proportion of outstanding obligations.

"Rescheduling short-term foreign debt to achieve a better maturity distribution is a solution. But this will only be possible if political developments restore international confidence in the economy.

"Achieving an orderly reduction in debt obligations will not in itself be sufficient."

"The projected current account surplus of some R450-million (\$180-million) a month between now and December will do little more than enable a reduction of \$720-million in foreign debt without depleting reserves.

"Even if the entire gold reserves were swapped, this would raise only about \$1,6-billion in additional dollars," the Economic Roundup says.

SOUTH AFRICA

MOZAMBIQUE BAN WOULD AFFECT NATAL'S FISHING

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 10 Oct 85 p 13

[Text]

DURBAN.— The Natal line-fishing industry could be in for a tough time if the Mozambique government carries out a threat to ban all line-fishing boats from its territorial waters.

The Mozambique Fisheries Department has indicated that it will clamp a ban on all line fishing boats from Natal if fishing dues to enter Mozambique territorial waters are not met.

A spokesman for the Mozambique fishing division said from Maputo yesterday that the situation was being discussed with the Department of Fishing, Marine Division in Cape Town.

He claimed that there were a number of Natal line-fishing companies who had not met their dues but were still operating in the country's territorial waters. He said the situation could not continue for much longer.

But a spokesman for the Natal Line Fishing Association disputed claims that many companies were in arrears with their dues. He said as far as he knew there was only one company that had not met its financial payment.

He said it would be "a serious blow" to the fishing industry in Natal if the Mozambique government carried out its threat. He pointed out that it was vital for line fishing boats to enter Mozambique's territorial waters. If Natal trawlers were banned it would affect hundreds of people who are employed in the fishing industry in Natal.

The proposed ban does not affect those boats which trawl for prawns.

CSO: 3400/96

SOUTH AFRICA

ALTECH POWER UP, POWTECH DOWN AT HALF-YEAR

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 26 Sep 85 p 24

[Article by Don Wilkinson]

[Text]

BEARING in mind the sad state of the South African economy, the half-yearly results from the companies in the Ventron group — Altron, Fintec, Altech, Powertech and Asea — can be considered satisfactory.

For Altech, with its massive emphasis on the electronics sector, conditions were somewhat more stable, assisted as that company is with the ongoing Post Office modernisation programme.

For Powertech, with much of its managerial energy going into the rationalisation of the cable industry, a key factor was the 23 percent decline in the electrical industry's official manufacturing production index.

At Altech, more than half of whose business is linked to the telecommunications industry, parastatal and private, the end-result was a 14 percent rise in earnings a share to 219,2c (192,8c).

Chief executive Bill Venter indicates that the results have been conservatively arrived at, and his equally conservative

forecast for the rest of the year — which is scarcely surprising in current circumstances — is that with a healthy order book, the company should manage to come close to, or equal the first-half growth in earnings.

For 1984-85, Altech earned 401,5c a share, to cover the 125c paid 3,2 times. Conservatively, therefore, it should be able to produce around 460c to 470c this time, given no disasters.

In recent years Altech has gone for three times-plus cover, but a repeat of 3,2 would allow something like 145c a share.

Altech shares traded 100c lower on Monday, and yesterday buyers were offering 5 400c, another 100c down. At this level, the historic return is 2,3 percent, improving to 2,7 percent on a 145c payment.

Powertech presents a different picture, with its 15 percent fall in earnings to 4,3c a share from 5,1c. One factor here was the 28 percent fall in earnings at Asea, the spearhead of the group's cable industry

rationalisation programme through its 41 percent stake in Aberdene.

And part of the trouble at Asea reflected the decline of its transformer divisions, hit by Escom and other deferrals after the big boom in business in 1982-83.

The cable interests inevitably suffered the pangs of reorganisation, a process which will take another year and more to complete, while actual manufacturing suffered from the high prices of local copper which are based on the London Metal Exchange, together with the effects of inflation.

Powertech also suffered from losses at African Electric-Litemaster, following the downturn in domestic house building.

Hopefully, actions taken to redress the position will restore profitability, though much will depend on revival of demand for new housing.

Lascon Lighting and Willard Batteries, the latter affected by the high price of lead, have increased their capacities and now also await the revival of demand.

Prospects boil down to the expectation that current profitability levels will be held for the rest of the financial year provided, for example, that lack of finance does not force further deferrals on Escom, a vital Powertech customer.

For 1984-85, Powertech paid 3,7c a share from earnings of 9,9c, for an historic yield at last night's 115c, down 5c on the day, of 3,2 percent.

A repeated payment, and lower cover, look the best that shareholders can expect this time.

In a very guarded statement — necessitated by the highly sensitive nature of a deal overseas in current international political relations — Mr Venter revealed that Altron has at long last made an ac-

quisition abroad since the end of May.

The deal was described as self-financing and will not impact negatively on earnings, nor did it involve the issue of any shares by the group's companies.

The group's other acquisition-minded member is Fintec, the cash shell which has been investigating potential deals virtually since it joined, but has been unsuccessful.

The JSE has limited the time that is available to cash shells to remain unchanged, and its directors "are mindful of these requirements".

Investors in the group's companies, perfectly aware of the fact that these are at the leading edge of much of South Africa's technology potential and that they have been welded into a well-run organisation, are likely to continue ignoring the fact that yields on the shares are small.

SOUTH AFRICA

MSAULI ASBESTOS MINE READY TO EXPAND

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 26 Sep 85 p 25

[Text]

WORK on the major capital expenditure programme at the Msauli asbestos mine is proceeding according to plan, with the centrepiece of the project — a new sub-vertical shaft scheduled for completion in November.

The 200-metre shaft runs from the mine's main haulage level to its deepest level, and has been designed to provide future access to ore currently locked up in pillars as well as to deep-level ore bodies.

It will also eliminate the four sub-vertical incline shafts currently used to hoist ore to the haulage level, and their related handling stages.

It will therefore ensure the mine's long-term ore supply while at the same time containing ore handling costs.

Flooded

In February 1984 cyclone Domoina flooded

the mine and halted all production for 23 days.

Mining operations continued to be hampered intermittently thereafter by such side-effects of the flood as a shortage of working faces and the overloading of shafts, and total production for 1984 fell substantially short of potential market demand.

The mine suffered a further set back when it became apparent that one of the sub-incline shafts had become unstable and would have to be replaced urgently.

Canals

At this point, Msauli expanded its existing capital expenditure programme considerably. The shaft sinking and development rate was accelerated.

Canals were dug and additional underground pumping capacity was installed to reduce the risk of a recurrence of flood damage.

The new ore hoisting system was initiated.

Work started on the filling in of the old open-cast pits — a move which will enhance underground stability as well as the environment.

Mill improvements and additions were continued, with particular attention to occupational safety and to air quality in the mill.

The fibre count is already down to an average of about 0.9 f/ml — less than half the statutory limit.

Msauli fibre is highly prized for its consistent quality and indications are that demand will be high for many years to come.

Sales volumes are expected to increase as the mine continues to supply its traditional markets in Japan, Korea and Taiwan while developing new markets.

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

ASSISTANCE FOR JOBLESS COLOREDS--Cape Town--Steps to help Coloured people who are unemployed and without income because of the recession were announced yesterday by Mr Chris April, Minister of Health Services and Welfare in the House of Representatives. Mr April said the plan was similar to that initiated earlier this year for people in drought-stricken areas. In determining the extent of social relief to be granted, the joint income of the family would be taken into account. Unemployment Insurance Act benefits would also have to be considered. Mr April said the special scheme to help the unemployed had been initiated because existing social emergency plans were not geared to extend effective assistance to the unemployed over a long period. Those who wished to apply for assistance should do so at their nearest regional office of the Department of Health Services and Welfare of the House of Representatives. In centres where there were no departmental offices, applications should be made at the office of a local magistrate. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Sep 85 p 5]

INDIANS WANT TO LIVE IN NORTH NATAL--Durban--The House of Delegates MP for Natal Midlands, Mr Soomaroo Pachai, said yesterday Government moves to open to Indians northern Natal towns which had been traditionally closed to them would be meaningless until Indians were allowed to live there. All that the Government was proposing to do was permit Indians free movement in the northern Natal towns as it was going to do in the Orange Free State. "That is no big deal and until Indians are provided residential areas and allowed free settlement, there can be no cause for rejoicing." "We will not rest until the Group Areas Act is scrapped and residential and business areas are made open to all races," Mr Pachai said.--Sapa [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 1 Oct 85 p 12]

RECORD AUSTRALIAN EXPORTS--Melbourne--Australian exports to South Africa have hit record levels in the past two years. They topped R380 million in 1983-84 although they dropped quite sharply in 1984-85 to R275 million. A Foreign Affairs spokesman said the figures for both years involved a number of "one-off" deals (which were not named) which pushed the trade level well above the normal figure of R193 million. Meanwhile, the standing of Australian coal producers in the international market has improved as a result of the political problems in South Africa. Australian coal producers, long the subject of criticism because of a poor industrial relations record, are now being viewed in a new light in terms of political and supply stability. However, there is as yet no indication of South African producers being unable to meet their contractual commitments as a result of the internal problems. [Text] [Johannesburg WEEKEND ARGUS (Supplement) in English 7 Sep 85 p 3]

JOBLESS IN NATAL DOUBLE--Durban--Unemployment in Natal continues to increase, according to figures released by the Department of Manpower in Durban yesterday. In August, about 37 000 unemployed people from all race groups had registered with the department. In comparison, in August last year the figure was 19 000 unemployed. According to the figures released by the department, about 5 200 Whites, 2 800 Coloured, 11 000 Indians and about 10 600 Blacks were unemployed in the Province in August. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 1 Oct 85 p 13]

CSO: 3400/96

SWAZILAND

MINISTER WARNS ON 'BACK-DOOR' TRADING

Johannesburg ENGINEERING WEEK in English 29 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] Swaziland should not be considered as a "back door" for South Africans exporting goods to the rest of Africa.

The tiny kingdom on South Africa's borders has no intention of being used as a transit camp to providing South African produce with the passport of convenience to reach markets in the north.

Instead, investors wishing to establish trading links with these countries should consider establishing manufacturing facilities in Swaziland.

This stern warning came from Swaziland's Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Derek von Wissell.

Speaking to Engineering Week during a function in Johannesburg to announce Interboard's plans to establish a particle board (chipboard) factory in Swaziland at a cost of R16-million, he said Swaziland is particularly keen to attract resource-based industries to the country.

"Our intention is to create employment for our people. This policy has been crystalising for about 12 months now, and we hope to move soon from a position of static growth to a state of positive growth," he said.

Explaining his reluctance at seeing Swaziland being turned into a transit camp for goods being exported from the Republic to markets not normally open to it, Von Wissell said: "We don't require certificates of origin, but some of our customers do.

"The local content requirements vary according to the receiving countries. Some insist on certificates guaranteeing a minimum 25% local content while others push it up to 55% before the produce can carry the 'Made in Swaziland' stamp. We are not prepared to compromise on these requirements."

He went on to explain how, on the other hand, investors can benefit from Swaziland's natural resources if they establish manufacturing facilities in the kingdom.

The resources available include sugar, coal, asbestos, and wood and pulp products. Interboard's decision is an example of how the resources can be utilised to the investor's and the country's mutual benefit, he said.

He pointed out that Swaziland's economy has been buffeted about by several factors, including the severe drought, the destruction caused by Cyclone Damoina (which was costing the country R100 per capita) and low world commodity prices--particularly sugar, with a price of about one third production cost. Added to this is the poor state of the South African economy, which, as the region's major economic force, also has a profound effect on Swaziland.

"The steps we are taking to try to attract industry to this country and create employment are simply our way of trying to get back on to an even keel in the same way as South Africa had taken steps to put its own economy in order."

He added: "We don't see ourselves competing directly with the Republic's homeland policy. "That is why we are concentrating our marketing strategy on the resources we can offer rather than tax incentives. However, we do have such incentives, including a five-year tax 'holiday' for companies; various tax allowances; training housing and accelerated depreciation allowances; and a 10% preference on government tenders."

CSO: 3400/158

SWAZILAND

SECURITY REINFORCED AFTER COUNCIL SACKINGS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 5 Oct 85 p 13

[Text] MBABANE.--Although all is reported quiet and calm in Swaziland after the sudden sackings on Wednesday of two prominent members of the Supreme Council of State (Liqoqo) and the country's Commissioner of Police, there are definite signs that security has been strongly reinforced.

Throughout Thursday and yesterday police roadblocks, manned by both traffic police and heavily-armed para-military police, have been set up at various points along the Mbabane-Manzini-Lomashasha highway.

Queues of vehicles are forming at the roadblocks as the police inspect the passengers and contents of each vehicle.

At Elusaneni Royal Kraal the remaining 10 members of the Liqoqo met on Thursday and yesterday as usual.

Residents living near the official house of the sacked Commissioner of Police, Mr Majaji Simelane, reported that as he moved his belongings from the house on Thursday passers-by jeered and called "Ekayi" meaning "Go home".

A police spokesman said that police were searching for illegal arms and illegal immigrants, as well as for a group of armed men responsible for a number of armed robberies on various small businesses both in Manzini and in rural areas recently.

The spokesman confirmed that at least four Mozambicans were arrested in one of the townships on Thursday.--Sapa.

CSO: 3400/158

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