


180128

JPRS-CPS-84-033

7 May 1984



China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

19980227 170

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

6
49
A03

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

7 May 1984

CHINA REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOVIET UNION

- PRC Journal on Intensification of Soviet Economy
(Feng Shunhua; SHIJIE JINGJI, No 2, 10 Feb 84)..... 1

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

- Paper on Changes in Honduran Military Leadership
(Yao Chuntao; RENMIN RIBAO, 8 Apr 84)..... 11

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Article Discusses Aspects of Party Consolidation
(Chu Ruigeng; RENMIN RIBAO, 26 Jan 84)..... 14
- Foreign Press Covers Zhao Visit to United States
(RENMIN RIBAO, 19 Jan 84)..... 16
- Demographers Attend International Seminar on Population
(XINHUA, 30 Mar-2 Apr 84)..... 19
- Life Expectancy Statistics
Growth of Minority Groups
Future Stress on Quality
Chinese Families Getting Smaller

Kunming Forum Lauds Performance of Evening Papers (XINHUA, 6 Apr 84).....	23
XINHUA Interview on Publication of Lenin's Works (XINHUA Domestic Service, 5 Apr 84).....	25
Briefs	
Officials at Women's Meeting	28
Civility Month Commendation Meeting	28

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NORTH REGION

Beijing Mayor Addresses Municipal People's Congress (XINHUA, 3 Apr 84).....	29
Lists Social Order Tasks Announces Environmental Program	
Legal System Helps Improve Beijing Social Order (XINHUA, 3 Apr 84).....	31
Beijing To Spend More on Culture, Health (XINHUA, 4 Apr 84).....	32
Beijing Plans To Curb Population in 1984 (XINHUA, 4 Apr 84).....	33

TAIWAN

Reportage on Barry Goldwater's Visit to Taiwan (CNA, 14, 17 Apr 84).....	34
Interview With Reporters Comments on Reagan Trip	
Legislators Upset at ROK Basketball Incident (CHINA POST, 12 Apr 84).....	36
Briefs	
Premier's Health Improves	38
Cooperation With Saudi Arabia	38

HONG KONG MEDIA ON CHINA

Perspective of CPC Party Rectification Discussed (Lin Fan: CHENG MING, No 76, Feb 84).....	39
---	----

SOVIET UNION

PRC JOURNAL ON INTENSIFICATION OF SOVIET ECONOMY

HK110910 Beijing SHIJIE JINGJI in Chinese No 2, 10 Feb 84 pp 63-68

[Article by Feng Shunhua [7458 5293 5478] of Liaoning University: "The Process of Intensification in the Soviet Economy"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the 1970's the Soviet authorities have repeatedly stressed that the adoption of new economic strategies requires "that the entire economy shifts in direction and develops toward intensification, increasing results and quality, and emphasizing the end results of economic activities." The 26th CPSU Congress decided that during the 1980's the economic policies which have been implemented since the 1970's would continue to be implemented so that eventually economic intensification could be completed. In order to assess whether or not the Soviet economy can achieve this strategic turn about from extensive style growth to intensified growth within the next 20 years, it is necessary to first examine the progress of intensification in the Soviet economy during the 1970's and look at the effects of various factors which influenced this process.

1. There Was No Improvement in the Level of Intensification of the Soviet Economy During the 1970's

Social expanded reproduction in real life is always the unified process of the simultaneous roles of both extensive growth factors and intensive growth factors. During the 1920's and the 1930's the Soviet economy was able to grow very fast (during the first 5-year plans) not only because of the enormous increases in investments of manpower, material resources, and finances in production, but also because this growth was the result of constant improvements in technological installations and clear improvements in labor productivity. However, up until the beginning of the 1970's the expansion of Soviet social production still had to mainly rely on extensive growth factors.¹

Chinese scholars vary in their opinions of the developmental course of intensification in the Soviet economy during the 1970's. Some comrades believe that while the Soviet economy did experience serious problems during the 1970's. Some comrades believe that while the Soviet economy did experience serious problems during the 1970's, some progress was gained in the intensification of the Soviet

economy because during this 10-year period there was some improvement in labor productivity and consumption of some raw materials did drop, and so on. Some comrades feel that although the Soviet Union did make great efforts they did in fact achieve no real progress in the strategic move to a transition toward economic intensification. Here then we are looking at the signs for evaluating the process of intensification and the question of the relationship between intensification of the process of reproduction and increases in the social productivity rate. Economic intensification is very closely linked to improvements in the social productivity rate, but they should not be confused. If there are no improvements in the social productivity rate, then of course we cannot even begin to discuss the progress of economic intensification. However, as soon as the social productivity rate grows quickly and constantly to reach a specific level, then changes in the oppositional relations between the extensive and intensive factors in overall economic growth occur, in favor of the latter, and only then can there be any development of the process of economic intensification.

First of all it should be recognized that during 10 years from 1970 to 1980, there were clear improvements in the social labor productivity rate in the Soviet Union and during the first 5 years of the decade (during the Ninth 5-Year Plan), growth averaged 4.6 percent a year, while during the latter half of the decade (the 10th 5-Year Plan), the growth rate was 3.2 percent. Although the growth rate was a little on the slow side, there were still improvements in the efficient use of labor resources. The key to this lay in the changes that occurred in the proportion of overall growth in national revenue that depended on increases in labor productivity. During the two 5-year plans of the 1950's, after the war, this proportion was 83 percent and 62.2 percent respectively. During the first half of the 1960's, the Seventh 5-Year Plan, it was 66.7 percent, while during the latter 1960's, the Eighth 5-Year Plan, it had risen to 87 percent. By the 1970's it had dropped to 80 percent, during the first half of the decade while during the 10th 5-Year Plan from 1976 to 1980, between 85 to 90 percent of the growth in the national revenue depended on increases in labor productivity. Now this proportion has dropped a little to 75 percent and thus as far as use of labor resources is concerned, efficiency is still growing, but it is very difficult to say that there is any improvement in the process of intensification.

Secondly, as far as material consumption is concerned, if we examine the situation from the point of view of each individual product and sector, then we see that consumption of some raw materials and fuels has constantly dropped. For example fuel consumption in Soviet electric power stations is fairly advanced in comparison to that of industrially advanced countries and in 1981 every kilowatt hour of electricity consumed 327 grams of standard fuel, a clear reduction over the 415 grams consumed in 1965. However when one looks at the situation in terms of the entire national economy, it is necessary to use the difference between gross social production value and the national revenue to illustrate transferred value in social production results within a specific period of time, in other words a currency or monetary illustration of the total amount of material resources consumed, including raw materials, fuels, and depreciation costs for fixed

assets. During the 1970's growth in material consumption in the Soviet Union was faster than growth in the national revenue. When one compares 1980 to 1970 it can be seen that the national revenue has grown 67 percent, while material consumption has grown 74 percent. Although during the 10th 5-Year Plan the situation did improve over the previous 5 years, with growth in the national revenue slightly higher than growth in the gross social production value, the general negative trend of the 1970's did not change. In other words between 1970 and 1980 material labor used up or consumed in the production of every ruble of the national revenue, and illustrated in monetary form, actually increased. As far as utilization of material resources is concerned, there was a drop in efficiency and thus, of course, there could be no discussion of any advances in the intensification of the economy. After the war as the scale of investment in the Soviet Union quickly expanded, there were acute increases in total production-type fixed funds used up in the national economy and the position and role of fund utilization efficiency in improving overall social production efficiency became more and more important. Between 1971 and 1980 production-type fixed funds increased by 116 percent, much faster and more than the 67-percent increase in the national revenue. As a result there was a clear drop in the fund output rate and the national revenue produced per ruble of production-type fixed funds dropped from 55 kopek in 1970 to 40 kopek in 1980. Thus as far as fund utilization is concerned, there was an enormous drop in efficiency (28 percent in 10 years) and this became one of the most important factors limiting the process of intensification of the Soviet economy.

Soviet economists, when they examine developmental trends in the Soviet economy during the 1970's, are also forced to admit and recognize that "the drop in growth of labor productivity along with reductions in fixed fund remuneration have provided a negative prospect for labor economization in the process of production development."² According to the calculations of Soviet economists, the proportion that intensive factors represent in the overall growth of social and products did not increase during the 1970's, in fact it actually dropped in comparison with the preceding 10 years. When calculating on the basis of social end products, the proportion of intensive expanded reproduction was 33.8 percent from 1961 to 1965, it then rose to 35.2 percent between 1966 and 1970, while between 1971 and 1975 it dropped to 26.9 percent and although it did rise between 1976 and 1980 it still only made up 30.5 percent.

2. Major Factors and Reasons Hampering the Process of Intensification

There are a great variety of complex reasons for the lack of good progress in intensification of the Soviet economy. Above we cited the drop in growth of social productivity and a slight decrease in the utilization efficiency of material resources, and a large drop in the fund output rate. If we examine the situation on the basis of the mutual relationship between these three factors within social productivity, then the restrictions on social productivity [words indistinct] in the fund output rate play, become even clearer. Let us first of all look at the relationship between the fund output rate and utilization efficiency of material resources, in the industrial sector. Since the 1970's regular costs incurred per ruble of product production value (including animate

labor consumption and inanimate labor consumption), have risen constantly, calculated on the basis of actual prices for each year. Between 1971 and 1975 it increased 2.8 percent and between 1976 and 1980 it increased again by 1.5 percent. As labor productivity rose, so the amount of animate labor consumed dropped, manifesting itself in the make-up of production expenses for industrial products. Percentages deducted for wages and social security funds dropped from 16.1 percent in 1970 to 14.8 percent in 1980; the main problem lies with the consumption of inanimate or mechanical labor. Within the make-up of inanimate labor consumption, the consumption of raw materials and fuels is basically stable and unchanging while there have been clear rises in the percentage of depreciation costs which in 1971 represented 5.1 percent of production expenses for industrial products and which by 1980 made up 7.7 percent. It can be seen that the increase in inanimate consumption in the industrial sector is mainly the result of increases in fixed fund consumption. Hence, it can be said that the drop in the utilization efficiency of material resources is to a very great extent controlled by drops in the fund output rate. For example, during the 10th 5-Year Plan, in all sectors of the national economy, drops in the fund output rate caused increases of 44 percent in depreciation deductions. Although drops in consumption of materials have resulted in consumption savings in raw materials and fuels of around 11.4 billion rubles, because depreciation costs have increased, there has been virtually no decrease in consumption of inanimate labor for each unit of the national revenue.

Let us take a look at the relationship between the fund output rate and labor productivity. In the process of expanded reproduction, improvements in the utilization efficiency of one kind of means of production often requires as a premise, increases in the amounts invested in another kind of means of [word indistinct]. Some Soviet economists believe that during the early stage of transition toward intensification, the premise for improving labor productivity is increasing investments in funds and improving the fund outfitting rate. However, in the Soviet Union during the 1970's, the savings that increased labor productivity were not able to make up for increases in the utilization of resources caused as a result of decreases in the fund output rate. During these 10 years social labor productivity increased by 47 percent while the fund output rate dropped by 28 percent and every 1 percent increase in fund consumption required absolute increases in utilization funds, equivalent to 2.5 times the value savings made for every 1 percent increase in social labor productivity. Thus, in overall terms, the quantity of resources (the combination of the decreasing wage funds and rising production funds) utilized during the 1970's per ruble of national revenue produced constantly increased. According to official Soviet data, the combination of wage funds and production funds utilized per ruble of national revenue produced rose from 3.36 rubles in 1970 to 3.77 rubles in 1978.

In general then, as far as the factors comprising social productivity are concerned, a slowing down in the growth of labor productivity and a lack of any drops in material consumption are undoubtedly negative factors affecting the progress of intensification of the Soviet economy during the 1970's. However, large drops in fund utilization efficiency represent a particularly important problem. If it is not possible to overcome this bad tendency of drops in the fund output rate, then it is very hard to achieve constant improvements in overall social production efficiency, and the progress of economic intensification will continue to be seriously hampered.

What are the main reasons which hamper improvements in the fund output rate and smooth growth of social production efficiency? In view of modern socialized large scale production, there are mainly two ways of improving social production efficiency, one is scientific and technological progress and the other is improvements in production management and administration. Over the last 20 years the Soviet authorities have constantly stressed the decisive importance of speedy scientific and technological advances in improving economic results and in addition they have adopted certain measures to increase scientific research and educational expenditure and furthermore there have also been very fast increases in the numbers of scientific personnel and engineering and technical personnel. From 1960 to 1970 expenditure on scientific research increased 2-fold and from 1970 to 1980 it increased by 82 percent. This increase in expenditure for scientific research has been far greater than increases in the national revenue and as a result the proportion that such expenditure represents in the national revenue has greatly increased. Take 1975 as an example. During that year the amount that developmental expenditure for science and technology represented in the overall national economy was 3.9 percent in the GDR, 3.6 percent in Czechoslovakia, 1.9 percent in Poland, 1.8 percent in Bulgaria, and 4.67 percent in the Soviet Union. In 1980 the Soviet Union had 1.4 million scientific workers, making up about one-fourth of all scientific workers throughout the world. The problem then is that the manpower and material resources that the Soviet Union has invested in scientific and technological progress have not achieved the necessary economic results.

For many years now the Soviet Union has been unable to solve the problem of quickly disseminating scientific and technological achievements through the national economy and the key to the problem lies in obstacles within the management system. Enterprises lack internal motivation for adopting new technological methods and devices and manufacturing new products and thus science is unable to quickly transform itself into a direct social productive force. More recently, Soviet discussion of the problems involved in economic management has touched on this. For example, one member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Te La Bi Ci Ni Ke Fu [3676 2139 1764 5417 1441 4430 1133], believes "monopoly hindering of technological advances may eventually wipe out scientific and technological innovation." When consumers have no margin for choice, monopoly enterprises gradually refuse to seek new approaches and ideas, and thus sluggishness and laziness sets in and this slows down and drags out technological progress.³ Soviet State Planning Committee [Gosplan] leaders point out that "integrated production companies [enterprises lack initiative in solving common management problems and this has a negative effect on their achievements."⁴ Another economist feels that the scale of Soviet industrial enterprises is too large and that the majority of them are "multicapability factories." These "large and complete" enterprises are like "enormously inert ships which are difficult to navigate" and thus it takes a very long time to alter their course and this is no good for speedy implementation of new technology nor is it good for timely application of test manufacture of new products and the commencement of production of new marketable goods. According to disclosures from the leaders of Gosplan, for many years now planning targets for implementing new technology in the Soviet Union have not been fulfilled and it has not been possible to quickly stop using technologically out-dated equipment and machinery.

Judging from 11 machine and equipment manufacturing sectors of industry, not only has there been no drop in the percentage of old products manufactured 10 years ago or more within overall production value, there has in fact been a constant increase in this percentage. In 1967 this percentage was 16.2 percent, in 1976 it had risen to 26 percent and by 1981 it had gone up to 30.6 percent. These various opinions illustrate from different angles that the backwardness of the economic management system has become a "bottleneck" in improving social production efficiency in the Soviet Union and achieving a move toward economic intensification.

If we analyze the reasons for the drop in the fund output rate, then the obstacles posed by the "bottleneck" of backwardness in the economic system and the imperfections in economic management become even clearer. A functional analysis shows that the drop in the fixed production fund output rate, calculated on the basis of constant prices, can be traced back to three factors: A reduction in the utilization time for existing fixed assets; lengthening of the period involved in planning, constructing and putting into production new fixed funds; and drops in the technological standards of fixed assets. During this present period of technological advancements there cannot, of course, by any absolute drops in the technological standards of fixed assets actually being utilized and hence the third of the reasons cited above does not have any direct effect on the drops in the fund output rate. However, the extent of utilization of existing fixed assets is not very great and the length of time required for putting into production new fixed assets is too long and thus the first and second reasons are important factors which have contributed to the drop in the fund output rate in the Soviet Union during the 1970's.

According to official Soviet data, existing equipment utilization coefficients in processing industries and many raw material development sectors dropped during the 1970's. The results of investigations into more than 1,600 enterprises which went into operation during the 1970's, carried out by Gosplan, showed that these enterprises were on average only making use of around 81 percent of their production capacity. Of these enterprises which belonged to a total of 38 different sectors, equipment utilization rates in the oil industry, the nonferrous metallurgy industry, the chemicals industry, and electrical and industrial machinery sectors were between 50 to 80 percent. In 12 sectors production capacity load rate was less than 50 percent. The reasons for this irregularity are in some cases dislocations in the sectors concerned, or insufficient supplies of raw materials or components, and thus enterprises which have gone into production are unable to work at full pace. In other instances the reasons are problems in management within the enterprises and serious shortcomings in production and labor organization.

The most important factors affecting drops in the fund output rate are still over-extension of the capital construction front, decentralized investments, constant delays in work dates, frequent increases in costs, and enormous numbers of unfinished projects which exceed construction dates and this results in an inability to make full use of large amounts of funds over long periods of time. During the 1970's the fact that funds were decentralized meant that unfinished projects in state-run and cooperative enterprises (not

including collective farms) increased from 52.5 billion rubles worth in 1970 (representing 73 percent of investments for that year) to 76.6 billion rubles worth in 1975 (75 percent). In 1980 this figure increased further to 105.1 billion rubles (87 percent). According to calculations by the Soviet Construction Bank, the fact that fixed funds cannot be put into production in time means that today the Soviet Union cannot but produce between 6 billion rubles and 6.5 billion rubles less per year of national revenue. Under the present Soviet investment and capital construction management system, there are problems within investment planning itself and with the pressure created by each sector, each region, and each enterprise in their desire to invest, what often happens is that too many projects are included in planning at the same time. On the other hand building and design sectors also have many shortcomings in implementing planning.

In conclusion then, there are many reasons for the unfavorable trends in the process toward economic intensification in the Soviet Union during the 1970's, and in addition to objective factors such as the eastward shift of the exploitation of natural resources and the effects on agricultural harvests of unusual weather conditions, there are still many problems linked with technological development, but the backwardness of the economic management system is now one of the weakest links restricting improvements in social production efficiency.

3. The Extreme Difficulty in Completing the Shift Toward Comprehensive Economic Intensification During the 1980's

The strategic shift toward completing comprehensive economic intensification in the Soviet Union during the 1980's as proposed by the Soviet authorities implies the two following inter-related things: First, that there is a comprehensive improvement in the quality and utilization efficiency of all important production factors so that by the end of the 1980's there will be a transition from today's "unitary and partial intensification" which only manifests itself in increases in labor productivity to a "comprehensive or synthetic intensification." And second, that production efficiency be maintained and speedily increased in all sectors of the national economy so that a fundamental change takes place in the opposing relations between extensive and intensive factors within national economic growth, and so that by the end of the 1980's expanded reproduction throughout the entire society can shift towards growing in an intensive style. These two things are different and yet at the same time they are linked. The former of the two necessitates a turnabout in the drop in the fund output rate while the latter specifies that improvements in social production efficiency reaches specific quantitative limits so that in the end results the intensive factors in the growth of social product exceeds extensive factors and thus this latter thing is a sign of the "depth" of intensification.

Can the Soviet Union achieve this strategic target by the end of the 1980's? First of all, it should be noted that there are very obvious special traits concerning improvements to economic efficiency and strengthening the extent of economic intensification included within the 11th 5-Year Plan (1981-1985) and these reflect the attempts of the leading authorities to carry out strategic readjustments to the economy. First, the planning targets for the

speed of economic growth are lower than the actual results of the implementation of the 10th 5-Year Plan. Between 1976 and 1980 national revenue saw a real increase of 21 percent and in the new 5-year plan there is a stipulation for growth of only 18 percent between 1981 and 1985 and at the same time it demands that improvements in economic efficiency reach speeds higher than during the previous 5 years. The readjustments being made in the relations between speed and efficiency will help improve the process of economic intensification. Second, the new 5-year plan stipulates that the speed of growth in social labor productivity be slightly higher than the actual results in the previous 5 years. The actual growth rate during the 10th 5-Year Plan was 17 percent while the targets for social labor productivity growth in the new readjusted 5-year plan is 17.8 percent. Improvements in the speed of growth of labor productivity on the premise of a decreased growth rate in the national revenue will mean that the proportion of total increase in social and products which depends on improvements in social productivity will increase from 75 percent during the period of the 10th 5-Year Plan to between 85 and 90 percent during the first half of the 1980's. Third, the outstanding characteristic of the new 5-year plan is the stipulation to slow down the growth rate of national revenue investments with a demand that within 5 years the speed of growth in the national revenue (18 percent) clearly exceeds the growth rate of production-type investments (13 percent). In other words, during the first half of the 1980's, not only is there a demand for labor productivity to increase fairly considerably, in addition, it is necessary to bring about a change in the constant decreases in investment efficiency and thereby make decisive steps toward "comprehensive intensification." Fourth, the 11th 5-Year Plan lists enormous savings in energy as "a major target" and as far as economizing on raw materials and fuels is concerned, it specifies very high planning targets. It requires that within 5 years the country save between 160 and 170 million tons of standard fuel and this quantity of savings is equal to four times the increases in oil exploitation during this 5-year plan. In machine manufacturing and metal processing industries the plans demand a decrease in metal consumption and according to the plans, steel material consumption economies average around 18 to 20 percent. Because of these special characteristics in the 11th 5-Year Plan, if the tasks in the plans can be achieved, then the proportion of intensive factors within economic growth in the Soviet Union will greatly increase, and, according to economists' calculations, this proportion could reach 50 percent by 1985.

The 11th 5-Year Plan is more than half over, so what is the situation actually like? During the first 2 years, targets for improving economic efficiency were far from complete. The growth rate for the national economy was lower than planning targets for 2 consecutive years. In 1981 and 1982 growth was 3.2 percent and 2.7 percent respectively, while average annual growth specified in the plans was 3.4 percent. The speed of growth in labor productivity was actually a long way off the planning targets, and in 1981 and 1982, industrial labor productivity growth rates were 2.7 percent and 2.1 percent respectively, while the plans specified an annual average increase of between 3.4 percent and 3.7 percent. The weakest link in improving economic results, namely the drops in the fund output rate, continued. In 1981 the output rate for fixed funds in industry dropped 3.6 percent over the preceding year. During 1982 and 1983 the number of unfinished projects also exceeded the permissible limits.

During the first half of 1983 there was a turn for the better in the Soviet economy and industrial production value plans were achieved by 102 percent while industrial labor productivity increased 3.3 percent over the same period during the preceding year and approached the annual average growth rate specified in the plan. However, this rise in the speed of economic growth, while it was related to the readjustment measures adopted by the Soviet Union, was mainly the result of Andropov, who, after taking control of the country, came to grips with labor discipline and non-attendance at work. Hence the question of whether or not this upward trend in the economy can be maintained, still requires consideration of some more important, long-term factors.

There do exist possible factors which could help the Soviet Union improve social production efficiency during the latter half of the 1980's. First of all, by making use of the advantages of the highly centralized planning mechanism and, on the basis of assessing the experiences and lessons of the earlier period, a great deal of hard work is now being done to speed up scientific and technological progress. On the one hand, scientific research expenditure is being increased much faster than increases in the national revenue, for example in 1983 expenditure for science and technology increased 6.2 percent over the preceding year, according to planning. On the other hand, positive measures are being adopted to promote integration between science and production, and targeted and comprehensive regulations are being implemented to handle questions relating to the development of science and technology which are extremely significant for the national economy, and questions relating to their application and propagation. At present, 170 such regulations are being implemented, of which 40 will be finished by 1985 while the majority will be completed during the latter 1980's. These regulations demand that special attention be paid to improving the extent of mechanization of supplementary production, which at present only reaches 29 percent and an enormous potential for economizing on animate labor lies within such measures. Thus a great deal of effort is now being put into developing mechanization and automation of transportation and shipping, loading and unloading, and storage work. The implementation of these regulations will result in an employment savings of 14 percent in these supplementary production sectors during the 11th 5-Year Plan. The completion of these specialized and comprehensive regulations will promote improvements in social production efficiency.

What is even more important to take note of and pay attention to is that very recently the Soviet Union has been involved in a new round of discussions concerning improvements in economic management. Economists and economic workers have very frankly exposed shortcomings and failings in the existing management system which do not correspond with further development in the productive forces and which in particular do not correspond with the demands of economic intensification. And thus they have proposed some breakthrough measures for improving the situation.

On the basis of theoretical discussion, the Soviet authorities are now implementing new measures to improve planning management and the economic mechanism. In March 1983 the CPSU's Central Political Conference proposed the comprehensive implementation of the collective contract system in agriculture. In June the full session of the CPSU Central Committee demanded improvements in

planning management and the economic mechanism so as to improve the slow application of scientific and technological results. In July the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Ministers' Conference decided to adopt additional and supplementary measures in relation to expanding the rights of industrial production integrated companies and enterprises and thereby strengthening their responsibilities and duties towards the results of their work. The decisions stated that from 1 January 1984 pilot schemes for expanding enterprise rights and powers would be launched, first of all, in the Soviet heavy-duty and transport machine manufacturing sector, electrical machinery sector, Ukrainian food industries, Belorussian light industrial sectors, and regional industries in Lithuania.

There are some initial signs that suggest that present Soviet trends are in some sense similar to those of the first half of the 1960's: Namely, discussion of theoretical problems in economic management and consequent pilot schemes designed to improve economic management. If the Soviet authorities are able to grasp this "bottleneck" which is hampering speedy improvements in economic efficiency and are able to carry out reforms to the economic management system, then the latter 1980's may be similar to the latter 1960's and a slight upward turn in the growth of social production efficiency may be seen.

However, there are still some important factors hampering a shift toward economic intensification in the Soviet Union which will continue to be felt during the middle and later 1980's. First of all, there exists within the country a force which opposes reforms and this means that reforms are very difficult to properly implement. Second, the process of intensification of the Soviet economy is still restrained by the extent to readjustments to the structure of the national economy. Since the beginning of the 1980's Soviet leaders have believed that the international situation will become more tense and that Soviet-American relations will shift from "detente" to the adoption of power politics and thus the two countries are at the moment entering a new round of the arms race involving the investment of even more funds. Hence, it is impossible to reduce military expenditure and make major readjustments to the proportions between light and heavy industry so as to improve economic efficiency. Third, in order to overcome the long-term backwardness of agriculture in the Soviet Union, the 11th 5-Year Plan has specified that investments in agriculture will make up 27 percent of all economic investments. Investment efficiency in agriculture in the Soviet Union is usually much lower than in industry, the former is only between one-third and two-thirds of the second. During the latter 1980's, agriculture will need large investments and this may check the speed of improvements in social production efficiency.

In conclusion, when we consider the beneficial and the unbeneficial factors, if effective measures can be implemented in reforms of the economic system during the mid- and latter 1980's, then there can be an upward turn in the growth of social production efficiency, but because various obstacles still exist, it will be extremely difficult to achieve the turn toward comprehensive economic intensification before the end of the 1980's.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

PAPER ON CHANGES IN HONDURAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

HK120837 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 8 Apr 84 p 6

["Roundup" column by reporter Yao Chuntao [1202 2504 3447]: "A Contingency in the Honduran Army"]

[Text] Mexico City, 5 April--A contingency occurring in Tegucigalpa, capital of Honduras, has shaken Central American as well as Latin American countries.

On 31 March, the Honduran supreme military headquarters announced in a communique that four high-ranking military officers, including Gustavo Alavez, commander of the Armed Forces and national defense minister, had resigned and that President Roberto Suazo Cordova would temporarily take up the post of commander in chief of the armed services. On 4 April, the Honduran National Congress unanimously passed a decision on appointing Air Force Commander Wo'erte Luoepesi [3087 1422 3676 3157 0160 2448] as Honduras' new commander of the Armed Forces. Afterward, the tanks and armored troops which had been gathered near the presidential palace, the National Congress building, and the armed forces headquarters since 31 March returned to their camps in succession.

There are two interesting points in this Honduran high-ranking military leadership change. First, the change is on a large scale. Except for the Air Force, all of the principal leaders of the army, Navy, the security forces, and the headquarters of the general staff left office. Second, the matter occurred suddenly. It happened just before the United States and Honduras started their joint military exercise. Therefore, this incident has caused a great shock both within and outside Honduras. Mexican newspapers believed that this incident was a "military coup plot" "successfully" crushed by the "civilian government."

With the background of the United States intensifying its intervention in the tense Central American as well as whole regional situation, the Tegucigalpa incident is a reflection of the internal contradiction of the Honduran junta becoming more acute. In January 1982, President-elect Suazo of the Liberal Party assumed office and ended some 17 years of military rule. But the military influence has always been strong. In particular, the geographical situation of Honduras is very important as it is located between El Salvador, in which an endless civil war is being fought, and

Nicaragua, which has overthrown the Somoza dictatorship. In order to deal with the Salvadorean guerrilla forces more effectively and to put pressure on the Nicaraguan Sandinist Revolutionary Front regime, the United States has greatly strengthened its military aid to Honduras in the past 2 years. In the meantime, the United States also supports the remnants of Somoza supporters in Honduran territory in waging the so-called "hidden war" in Nicaragua. Beginning from the second half of last year, the United States has constantly taken part in large-scale military exercises with the Honduran forces. Furthermore, the numbers of U.S. military personnel and military facilities in Honduras are also on the increase. Such action taken by the United States has caused Honduras to drift deeper and deeper into Central America's regional conflicts. The continuous armed border conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua has also strengthened the influence of the Honduran Armed Forces.

Public opinion both within and outside Honduras has held that former Armed Forces Commander Alvarez had become the man who held "real power" and who had placed himself above the government. He was not only "tough" in his stand on the Central American issue, but also actively intervened in internal political and government affairs. According to reports in Mexican newspapers, there was widespread talk in Honduras that Alvarez had plotted a coup to overthrow the civilian government. As a result, the Honduran civilian government, headed by President Suazo, felt dissatisfied and kept a wary eye on him. Meanwhile, there were also contradictions within the armed forces, as Alvarez was imperious, despotic, and ambitious, and was building up his influence. In particular, some middle and lower ranking military officers opposed him. This caused the occurrence of the incident on 31 March.

According to reports from Tegucigalpa, Alvarez was caught by a group of military officers headed by Air Force Commander Wo'erte Loupeisi at San Pedro Sula air base in northwestern Honduras. The former Armed Forces commander was at that time presiding over a meeting. The meeting place was suddenly encircled, and soldiers pointed their guns at Alvarez, forcing him to sign a letter of resignation. After that, they took him onto a military plane which flew him to Costa Rica. In the meantime, Hese Bu'aisuo [0149 1049 1580 1002 4792], chief of the general staff; Ruben Montoya, admiral commander; and Daniel Bali [1572 0448], security forces commander, were placed under house arrest. After that, several high-ranking military officers, including the attorney-general, the director of the military intelligence department, the army commander, and the personal secretary to Alvarez, also lost their freedom of action. According to Central Americans living in Mexico, only the Air Force commander among the top officers on the active list of the Honduran Armed Forces remains loyal to the president of the Republic. Such a large-scale struggle in the Armed Forces is unprecedented.

Since Alvarez was renowned for his tough right-wing stand, his dismissal from office has caused repercussions among Central American and other Latin American countries. The Nicaraguan Government leader Daniel Ortega Saaveda said through a broadcast message that he would like, with the Honduran Government, to find a way to improve the relations between them and to solve

the present crisis. Public opinion in Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, and other countries also holds that the changes in the leadership of the Honduras Armed Forces is a welcome and positive one, and that it will help Central America to achieve peace.

What provokes our thought is the United States' attitude toward the incident. The U.S. ambassador to Honduras told the press: Everything that happened in Honduras was normal and conformed to "democracy and the constitution." He also reaffirmed U.S. support for Honduras. The reason the United States has taken this stand, just as the Mexican newspapers have pointed out, is because Washington has always presented Honduras as the model for a "democratic regime" in Central America. If Suazo's civilian government is overthrown in a military coup, the United States will find no way to continue its present policy in Honduras under the flag of supporting Central American democratic politics. Therefore, what Washington is concerned with most at present is that Honduras had better not face any unfavorable change in its future internal and external policies.

Of course, it is still too early to reach a conclusion on what influence the change of Honduran military leadership will have on its internal political situation and on the Central American situation. But we have to watch out for further development from the incident.

CSO: 4005/536

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

ARTICLE DISCUSSES ASPECTS OF PARTY CONSOLIDATION

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 26 Jan 84 p 8

[Article by Chu Ruigeng [0328 3843 5087]: " Our 'New Road'"]

[Text] When I read that the Third Plenum CPC Central Commission for Guiding Party Consolidation had stipulated that party consolidation should be completely open to the views of non-party friends and the non-party masses, I could not help but remember a conversation between Comrade Mao Zedong and Mr Huang Yanpei [7806 3508 1014] in July of 1945. At that time, Huang was in Chongjing as a member of the Nationalist government and received an invitation from the CPCCC to go to Yanan to discuss national affairs.

Mr Huang said, I am over 60 years old and need not rely on hearsay can tell you that what I have seen truly is the so-called "sudden rise and equally rapid fall." Very few, whether an individual, a family, a group, a locale or even a country, are able to escape the control of such a cycle...and in history one finds that "governments may fail while the officials prosper," the people perish, and the government fails, and "the pursuit of glory yields ignominy." None are able to escape this cycle. I have known many communists both in the past and in the present and have a degree of understanding. It is my hope that you will find a new road and escape the control of this cycle.

Comrade Mao Zedong replied, We have already found a new road and are able to escape this cycle; this new road is democracy. If the people are permitted to supervise the government it then will not dare to be lax. If the people are given responsibility then they will not be lost and the government will not fail.

The words of Huang Yanpei expressed his concern for the country and the people and place hope in the Communist Party. His feelings are obvious. The words of Comrade Mao Zedong express the truth and show all confidence in attaining victory.

It has been nearly 40 years since this exchange took place and the times show fundamental changes. The 30-some years that the communist party has ruled this huge nation are but the twinkling of an eye. The road that we have taken not only is uneven, it has had great risks and turnings. To sum things up, general adherence to the principles of this "new road" has meant that things go properly, while their neglect results in errors.

As for the "cycle," certain characteristics frequently were given this name during the developmental processes of movements and transformations. The 60 years that Mr Huang Yanpei personally witnessed were 60 years from the past. The "sudden rise and rapid fall" that he summed up as a cycle was a period that actually existed. Will the historical period of communist party control over the whole country ever repeat the "sudden rise and rapid decline"? Of course not!

However, this does not mean there is a complete guarantee or that the "cycle" can be escaped without conscious struggle. Some party organizations and some party members in their ideology, work style and in their work have turned their backs on the people, have neglected the party precept to "wholeheartedly serve the people" and in a certain manner of speaking are faced with the danger of entering a "cycle." The CPCCC resolution concerning party consolidation says: "It is because of changes in party status that each and every action and movement of the party are concerned with the interests of the people and the faith of the nation, so that if the party becomes separated from the masses and does not undertake resolute reforms it definitely will fail because of a loss of mass trust and mass support. These are the dangers referred to. What does "fail" mean? It is the references made by Mr Huang Yanpei to "governments failing while officials prosper," "people are lost and the government fails" and "their decline was equally rapid." This is the basis of the urgency and necessity of party consolidation.

The "cycle" seen by Mr Huang is a law of history which is by no means inescapable by the new political party of the new age. Our party and the political power of our people will never have a "sudden rise and an equally rapid decline." The reasoning for this is that the communist party represents the people, and its basic interests are completely at one with those of the people. The communist party is able to use self criticism to overcome shortcomings. This ability also makes use of mass criticism and mass supervision. Furthermore, the communist party has not forgotten the "new road" that it discovered.

To say that democracy is the new road that we have discovered refers to all old eras, old governments, old political parties and old laws, and by no means indicates that the "new" in this "road" will suddenly become "old." Consequently, we must provide eternal, full support for this "new road," and in the party consolidation none of our work must be permitted to be separated from the masses nor can it lose mass criticism and mass supervision.

11582

CSO: 4005/356

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOREIGN PRESS COVERS ZHAO VISIT TO UNITED STATES

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 19 Jan 84 p 6

[Article: "Third World Nations, Western Europe and Japan Comment on US Visit of Premier Zhao: Stable Development of US-China Relations will Benefit World Peace"]

[Text] In recent days, newspapers in Third World Nations, Western Europe and Japan have reported and commented on the US visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang, saying that this is a visit of extreme importance and that the stable development of US-China relations will benefit the strengthening of peace in the Pacific region and throughout the world.

The Pakistan DAILY JANG printed an article saying, "The Taiwan issue is the basic problem obstructing the normalization of US-China relations, even though there has been a considerable easing of tensions regarding this problem. Nonetheless, China is still firmly committed to the position that Taiwan is a part of China and must be reunited with the Chinese mainland."

An editorial in the Thailand DAILY NEWS pointed out that the Chinese people are convinced that US-China relations will permit them to maintain national independence and autonomy and that there is no need for any other nations to interfere in China's affairs. During the visit, Zhao Ziyang expressed the hope that the United States would uphold the US-China Joint Communiqué and would revert to the previous normal conditions.

An editorial in the Thailand NEW CHINESE DAILY NEWS said that this visit has already caused US-China economic and scientific cooperation to reach a new level. At the same time, this will also help China to accelerate completion of the plans to construct the four modernizations and moreover symbolizes China's great victories in foreign relations this year. It must be said that Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit was not in vain.

An editorial in the Thailand SIRINAKORN DAILY NEWS pointed out that the improvement in the US-China relations will considerably benefit the maintenance of the present peace and stability of the Asian region.

A commentary in the Singapore LIANHE WANBAO pointed out, "The visit of Zhao Ziyang to the United States can be seen as the return to the path of stable progress after going through stormy conditions."

An editorial in the Singapore LIANHE ZAOBAO reflected the belief that if Hu Yaobang characterized his visit to Japan as "a search for friendship and a search for knowledge" then the Zhao Ziyang visit to the United States can be described as "a search for peace and a search for science and technology."

An editorial in the KUWAIT TIMES said, "The Chinese leaders very candidly expressed their disapproval of the policies and the actions of the United States toward the Third World, the Mideast and Central America. This is well-spoken. At the same time, we can also say that Zhao also candidly expressed his dislike of the Soviet actions and 'hegemonism' toward Afghanistan and Cambodia. The juxtaposition of these two is not without significance."

The Liberian JAMAHIRIYAH REVIEW in an editorial titled "US-China Relations: A New Age," said, "The friendly relations between China and the United States have already entered a period of relative stability, even though Washington and Beijing do not have consistent views on several issues."

An editorial in the Chilean EL MERCURIO said that the US-China understanding is of extreme significance in maintaining world peace. A signed article in the Argentine LA NACION says that the Zhao Ziyang visit to the United States "indicates that a peak has been reached in the process of adjusting the direction of Beijing foreign policy."

An editorial in the Mexican EL HERALDO says: "Three years after the freeze of US-China relations because of United States support for Taiwan, the United States visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang shows that there has been a thaw in the relations between these two countries which wish to strengthen their foreign trade relationship."

The Japan NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN says that in this meeting between the United States and Chinese heads of state, "both sides focus on mutual economic benefits and agree that an expansion of economic cooperation would promote the relations between these two countries, which for a time had stagnated." An editorial in the TOKYO SHIMBUN pointed out, "Washington must realize that Beijing is very sensitive about careless words which depart from established policies," "The United States must maintain a consistent policy and Taiwan should not become an insurmountable obstacle to stable relations." The NIHON KOMEI SHIMBUN, the organ of the Japan (Gongming) Party, believes that, "Because of the close relationship between Japan and Western Europe and the United States, stabilization of the US-China relations will also help to promote cooperative relations between Japan and West European nations."

An editorial in the Cologne STADT-ANZEIGER of the Federal Republic of Germany pointed out that Beijing "when evaluating its relationship with the United States used the basis of a global strategy." "They clearly emphasized their foreign policy of 'independence' and the 'basic role' of the Third World." "It cannot be said that Beijing has adopted the 'equidistant policy' toward Moscow and Washington."

An editorial in the French LES ECHOS said that the formal visit of the Chinese premier demonstrates a tendency toward stable relations between the two countries and is of major significance. In the "PARIS DAILY" [sic] editorials and articles pointed out that everyone is aware of the deep and lasting differences over the problems regarding Korea, Latin America, the Mideast and the Third World.

A commentary in the Spanish ABC pointed out that the Zhao visit is of historical significance and was satisfyingly successful.

The Swiss LA LIBERTE believes that the Washington visit of Premier Zhao has unquestionably opened a new era in US-China relations.

A commentary in the Finland UVSI SUOMI pointed out that the US visit of Premier Zhao is a major turning point in relations between the two countries.

The British press regarded the US visit of Premier Zhao as important and generally believes that although it is not possible to completely eliminate the differences between the two countries, nonetheless, improvement of relations is in the interest of both countries and also benefits maintenance of world peace.

An article in the Greece KATHIMERINA pointed out that there is overall development in US-China economic cooperation.

A few Swiss newspapers pointed out that the strong restrictions the White House placed on Chinese textile imports and the policy of prohibiting export of advanced technology "completely or more or less covered future developments of relations between the two countries with dark clouds."

11582

CSO: 4005/356

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

DEMOGRAPHERS ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON POPULATION

Life Expectancy Statistics

OW301219 Beijing XINHUA in English 1155 GMT 30 Mar 84

[Text] Beijing, March 30 (XINHUA)--Life expectancy in China is 67.88 years of age, higher than the world's average of around 60. It is better than some countries with the same economic conditions or higher per capita income than China. This was pointed out by Chinese demographers Jiang Zhenghua, Zhang Weimin and Zhu Liwei in a paper read here today at the international seminar on China's 1982 population census.

Reviewing Chinese history with its wars and famines, the paper noted that life expectancy in old China was only 25 to 30 years. Even in the first half of the 20th century people could only expect to live to the age of 35. In a list of the life expectancy age in 28 countries in the Asia and Pacific region compiled by the United Nations, China ranked at the bottom at the time of the founding of the People's Republic. Following the improvement of economic conditions and the public health system under the socialist system, epidemics were brought under control and life expectancy speedily rose to the age of 60 in the late 1950's. In the 1960's the average life expectancy went up 30 to 40 percent of a year per annum and in the 1970's this rate increased to between 40 and 50 percent of a year. In 1975 life expectancy reached 66 years and in 1978, it was 67.

Geographically speaking, life expectancy in China is higher in the east than it is in the west. Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces have the lowest life expectancy with the average age of 59. This is over 10 years lower than that of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Liaoning where the age is about 72. The difference in life expectancy between urban and rural areas is not as great as that between regions. Statistics gathered in the 1970's show that life expectancy for a Chinese urban male was two to 2.5 years more than his counterpart in the rural areas. The average life expectancy of a female in China is about 3 years longer than that of a male.

The paper pointed out that more old people in China die of cardiovascular and cerebral vascular diseases and that better treatment of these diseases could bring life expectancy at 70 up 16.83 years for males and 15.45 years for females. Cancer is the main cause of death in the group around 55 years of age and infectious diseases mainly affect younger people.

Growth of Minority Groups

OW310813 Beijing XINHUA in English 0728 GMT 31 Mar 84

[Text] Beijing, March 31 (XINHUA)--The population of minority nationalities in China has almost doubled since the founding of New China as a result of the government policy of equality and prosperity for the minorities, according to Chinese demographer Zhang Tianlu. Addressing today's session of the international seminar on China's 1982 population census, he noted that the population increase from 35.32 million in 1953 to 67.23 million in 1982, or an annual growth of 2.24 percent, far surpassed the growth rate of the Hans.

A case in point was the Tujia nationality, who increased from 545,000 in 1964 to 2.83 million in 1982. Explaining the phenomenon, Zhang said that in old China the minority nationalities had had a low birth rate and high mortality, hence a negative growth rate. Some nationalities similar to the Hans use to claim that they were Hans to avoid discrimination. However, with the founding of New China, and especially after the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee in 1978, the policy of helping minority nationalities to become prosperous has been further implemented and many people who before hid their nationality identify now report the truth. The number of Tujias is still rising. But all those who claim to be minorities will have to be verified by the government before they are recognized as such. Now, after much investigation, the number of minority nationalities has risen from 41 in 1953 to the present 55.

What was more, he said, the offspring of marriages between minorities and Hans often declared themselves to be of minority nationalities. For example, all 33 descendents of Hui-Han intermarriages living in one neighborhood in Haidian District in Beijing declared themselves to be Huis. They made this choice, Zhang said, because the minority nationalities enjoy certain privileges. The government gives priority to the minorities in work assignment and promotion. By 1982, 107 autonomous regions, prefectures, and counties for minority nationalities had been established and a greater number of minority deputies had been elected to these bodies.

Economically, the government has been developing the areas inhabited by the minorities. In the 30 years between 1950 and 1981, the government allocated 72.9 billion yuan (about 36.5 billion U.S. dollars) for capital construction in minority areas. Besides this, the State Nationalities Affairs Commission has appropriations for special projects. Zhang Tianlu pointed out that development of culture and education was a prerequisite to prosperity. The government sets lower standards for minority students in entrance examination and gives them special allowances. Some small minorities, like the Henzhens and Oroqens, have all their education expenses from primary school all the way through college covered by the state.

Furthermore the state has helped ten minorities, Zhuang, Yi Bouyei, Miao, Dong, Hani, Lisu, Li, Wa and Naxi, work out their scripts based on the

Latin alphabet. Efforts have also been made to design two schemes to standardize the Dai language based on its two major dialects. Attention has also been paid to public health work in the minority areas. Besides building medical installations in these areas, mobile medical teams are sent every year from major cities. Several acute epidemics and endemic diseases have been effectively brought under control.

Future Stress on Quality

OW010836 Beijing XINHUA in English 0638 GMT 1 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 1 (XINHUA)--With population growth in the world's most populated country under control, future efforts will be dedicated to raising quality while still consciously controlling growth, say Chinese statistician Ma An and demographer Zha Ruichuan in a paper distributed at the international seminar on China's 1982 census here. From 1970 to 1982, China's population growth rate dropped from 2.88 percent to 1.47 percent.

Analyzing the characteristics of China's population, the paper points out that there is high population density. According to the 1982 census, the population density of China averages 107 per square kilometer, or three times the world average of 34. Owing to the vast area and the great disparity in natural and social conditions in different regions of China, the distribution of population is extremely uneven. The coastal area averages 312 per square kilometer, close to a number of West European countries; Jiangsu Province reaches 593. At the other end of the spectrum, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang average only eight. This disparity is rooted in history and in geographical and economic conditions. The authors are of the view that in the future people should be encouraged to migrate to developing, sparsely populated areas.

On the other hand, the proportion of population in cities and towns has all along been quite low. According to the 1982 census, the total population residing in cities and towns is 20.6 percent of the total, lower than the 1982 world urban population average of 37 percent. In the future, they say, steps should be taken to help small and medium cities and towns to develop in a systematic and planned way to bring the proportion of the urban population in keeping with other developments.

As for age composition, they point out that the population figures in low age groups have decreased, and that China's age composition has changed from its original constant growth pattern to a gradually lower reproduction pattern. In 1982, the numbers in the 5-19 age group were the biggest, or 36.64 percent of the total population. From the late 1990's, both the working population and the population as a whole will be older. To prevent the population from excessive aging, China must pay close attention to the change of age structure and take appropriate measures at the right moment to attain the goal of both controlling population and preventing the age composition from harming social development and improvement of living standards.

The census figures show that though China's educational standard has risen greatly in the past two decades, it still lags far behind the needs of modernization. In 1982, the number of college students increased by 2.6 times as compared with 1964, while senior middle school graduates increased 7.3 times, junior middle school graduates 5.5 times and those with primary education 2.3 times.

However, when compared with the needs of building a modern socialist power, or with culturally developed countries, China is still far behind. The proportion of senior middle school graduates or above rose from 1.74 percent in 1964 to 7.22 percent in 1982 as against 86.93 in Norway, 55.11 in Canada, 54.13 in the U.S., 38.26 in the Soviet Union and 29.14 in Japan. Illiteracy and semi-illiteracy dropped from 33.75 percent in 1964 to 23.5 percent in 1982, while that of scientifically and culturally developed countries is below one percent. The authors believe that the raising of cultural and education standards is an important factor in raising China's population quality.

Chinese Families Getting Smaller

OW021313 Beijing XINHUA in English 1226 GMT 2 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 2 (XINHUA)--Chinese families are getting smaller and will continue to shrink for the foreseeable future, according to Ma Xia, vice-director of the Population Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The size of the average household has shrunk from 5.35 persons in 1947 to 4.43 two years ago, Ma told an international seminar on China's 1982 national census which closed here last weekend. The changes were signalled by a marked rise in the number of nuclear families and a corresponding drop in the number of multi-generation stem families. An earlier report quoting State Council statistics released late last year indicated that nuclear families made up 70 percent of the country's population. The census showed that one- or two-generation families accounted for 82 percent of China's households in 1982, up from 51 percent in the 1930's.

The trend toward smaller families was stronger in cities than in the countryside, Ma noted. Changes in social psychology played a part in this, but the most important reason was the greater economic independence of urban residents. There were still a number of multi-generation families, especially in rural areas where they were still viable under current economic conditions and traditional concepts, he added.

The number of economically self-sufficient older people living apart from their children will continue to increase in the future, Ma said. Childless widows and widowers living alone will also contribute to further reducing the size of Chinese families, the demographer said. He also called for greater attention from society at large to the material and cultural well-being of these people.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

KUNMING FORUM LAUDS PERFORMANCE OF EVENING PAPERS

OW060359 Beijing XINHUA in English 0241 GMT 6 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 6 (XINHUA)--China's 17 evening newspapers with an estimated circulation of five million cover all aspects of daily life and appeal to the imagination of the ordinary citizen.

At a forum on evening newspapers held recently in Kunming, capital city of Yunnan Province, the participants agreed these tabloids fill a real need in local life. They go in for vignettes on daily life that strike a resonant chord in the neighborhood reader.

One helpful thing the evening papers do is to expose wrongdoings that are not serious enough to merit official attention but are important to a family, a neighborhood or a certain segment of the population.

Nearly all the evening newspapers have a column in which anyone can get a complaint published. Some of them can even start a letter writing campaign in which people air their opinions.

BEIJING WANBAO (BEIJING EVENING NEWS), one of the leading evening papers in the country with a circulation of more than one million, receives about 100 such letters a day, Ning Yuantao, the editor in charge of the column told XINHUA.

Among the most widely circulated evening papers are also Shanghai's XINMING WANBAO (NEW PEOPLE'S EVENING NEWS) and YANGCHENG WANBAO (GUANGZHOU EVENING NEWS).

Most evening papers have an "ask for help" column, where people write about their problems like how not to spoil a child, where to find a reference book or how to cure an illness.

Another attractive feature of evening papers is their discussions on family affairs. One of the things causing family quarrels at the moment is whether the young couple's only child should take the surname of the mother or the father.

Perhaps the best aspect of the evening news is the willingness of the staff to project themselves into anything of interest to the people.

Some of the papers have special columns on growing flowers, cooking, fashions and home decoration.

A magazine on journalism recently published the opinion that "the evening papers do better than the daily papers in terms of news coverage and readability."

CSO: 4000/314

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

XINHUA INTERVIEW ON PUBLICATION OF LENIN'S WORKS

OW060831 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0802 GMT 5 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, 5 Apr (XINHUA)--A responsible comrade of the Bureau for Translation of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin's works of the CPC Central Committee recently granted an interview to XINHUA reporters concerning the publication of a new edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin," compiled and published in China.

Question: Why is it necessary to compile and translate a second edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin"?

Answer: As you know, it has been more than 20 years since the publication of the present Chinese edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin" (totalling 39 volumes). It has played an important role in the dissemination and study of Leninism in China. However, from a current viewpoint, it has several shortcomings: First, it omits a fairly large portion of Lenin's articles, especially those written after the October Revolution. Second, the quality of translation is inadequate, and inconsistent with other versions because, since its publication, changes have been made in the translation of some offprints, collections, and special collections of Lenin's works, and in the "Selected Works of Lenin," leaving readers at a loss as to which version of the translation they should follow. Third, it contains only a few reference materials, and its contents are oversimplified and, in some cases, unscientific and inaccurate. For these reasons, the present edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin" can no longer meet the current needs. That is why the party Central Committee decided, in May 1982, to compile and translate a new edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin."

Question: How many volumes are there in the new edition, and what features does it have?

Answer: There are a total of 60 volumes in the second edition. They are divided into three parts: From the first to the 43d are volumes of articles, from the 44th to 53d volumes of letters, and from the 54th to 60th volumes of notes. Compared with the present edition, the new edition has the following features:

First, the second edition is compiled and translated by Chinese, while the first edition is a translation from the fourth Russian edition, published in the Soviet Union in the 1940's and 50's. Aside from a very few translator's notes, the prefaces, notes, chronological tables and other references are taken, word for word, from the Russian edition, and cannot meet the needs of Chinese readers. It is precisely because of the textual translation that the first Chinese edition retains the good points of the fourth Russian edition, while reflecting its shortcomings in collation, editorial handling, and selection of reference materials. The new edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin" has been compiled and translated on the basis of the fifth Russian edition, supplemented by some documents from the Russian edition of the "Collected Works of Lenin." The principle of seeking truth from facts has been followed in editorial handling, including selection of reference materials.

Second, enriched with documents, the second edition reflects, in a fuller way, the legacy of Lenin's thinking. The edition includes over 9,000 articles, is 20 more in number of volumes, 6,000 more in number of articles, one third more in wordage of articles alone, and 60 percent more in the total wordage, including the reference materials, of 25 million, than the first edition. A fairly large portion of these articles were written after the October Revolution, and are of immediate significance for us today.

Third, the translation of the new edition has been checked against authoritative texts, and is more accurate than the previous translation. While trying to read smoothly, the translation, throughout the 60 volumes, has been carefully checked against the latest edition of the original version, with omissions and errors in the first edition made up and corrected. Moreover, it has corrected and unified terminology, translation of terms, and quotes from the works. For example, in Volume 1, there are between 80 and 90 places involving changes in meaning. The changes (including meaning, literal and translation) range from a few to about a dozen per page.

Fourth, the second edition has fuller, and more accurate, content, with complete reference materials. In the first edition, the content is oversimplified, and reference materials are limited to the prefaces, notes and chronological tables. In the second edition, we have written a preface, notes and a more detailed chronological table for each volume, in addition to a biographical and a bibliographical index, which the first edition does not have. The preface to each volume mainly explains the background of the writing and major content of the volume. Notes are divided into two kinds: Those given at the bottom of each page, and those listed at the end of a volume. Reference notes listed at the end of each volume are more than double those in the first edition, and many of them are invaluable reference materials.

Included in the biographical index are over 5,000 entries, with a brief sketch of each person. The bibliographical index, totalling some 16,000 entries, contains materials of various documents quoted, or mentioned, by Lenin. The two indexes are useful, not only in scientific research, but also for readers to understand the original works. The chronological table

in each volume lists Lenin's major theoretical and practical activities, and the contents are more than double those in the first edition.

Besides, under the joint efforts of the publishing and printing departments, the quality of binding, layout, design and printing of the second edition will be better than the first.

Question: What is the significance of publishing the second edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin"?

Answer: Our party has always attached great importance to the translation and publication of Marxist-Leninist classics, because Marxism-Leninism is the guide for party action. In the past, our party combined the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete situation in China, and won great victories in revolution and construction. To build socialism with distinctive Chinese characteristics, and accomplish the gigantic program put forward by the 12th CPC National Congress in the new historical period, it is necessary to persist in such a combination. The Leninist theory has greatly developed the three components of Marxism--philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism. It has made new theoretical contributions, originally not contained in Marxism, especially in building party and state power, economic construction, science and culture, foreign relations, and the international communist movement. Lenin's theory on socialism is, in particular, closely related to the present situation in our country. To study and disseminate the basic theory of Marxism-Leninism is of great significance in raising the consciousness of the members of the whole party in maintaining political and ideological unity with the central authorities, rectifying the party's style and consolidating its organization, building socialist spiritual civilization, inspiring revolutionary enthusiasm, promoting the modernization drive, resisting various types of decadent ideology from the exploiting class, and overcoming various erroneous ideological tendencies departing from Marxism and socialism. The central authorities' decision to compile and translate a new edition of the "Complete Works of Lenin" is a great event in our party's political, ideological, and theoretical building. The publication of the "Complete Works of Lenin," with enriched documents and materials, and accurate translation, will create a more favorable condition for the Chinese people to systematically study Marxism-Leninism, and provide more reliable ground for the dissemination and teaching of its theory.

Question: When will the new edition be published, and when will the publication of the entire edition be completed?

Answer: Four volumes, one through four, will be published this year. In order to enable readers to view Lenin's works, written after the October Revolution, as early as possible, we plan to publish next year ahead of schedule, the volumes of articles written after the February Revolution and the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, that is, volumes 29 through 36. The publication of the entire 60 volumes is expected to be completed in 1990. This is the first time we have tried to compile and translate Marxist-Leninist classics, and shortcomings are unavoidable. We earnestly hope that, after publication, readers from various circles will offer criticism and correction, so that we will be able to improve our work in future.

CSO: 4005/535

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

OFFICIALS AT WOMEN'S MEETING--Beijing, 31 Mar (XINHUA)--The All-China Women's Federation-sponsored practical housekeeping meeting ended in Beijing today. Speaking at the meeting, Zhang Guoying, vice chairman of the sponsoring federation, and first secretary of its and medium-sized cities throughout the country to learn from, and popularize, Beijing Municipal Women's Federation's experience in housekeeping. The meeting began in Beijing on 29 March. Representatives from the women's federations of Guangzhou, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Nanjing spoke, giving their introductory accounts of how to help women workers do housekeeping chores. Present at the meeting were Kang Keqing, chairman of the All-China Women's Federation; Hu Dehua, Wang Shuxian, Wang Dehui, Yu Shuqin, and Wang Liwei, members of the Secretariat of the All-China Women's Federation; Duan Junyi, first secretary of the Beijing Municipal CPC Committee; and responsible persons of the women's federations of a number of provinces and municipalities. [Excerpts] [OW021205 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1507 GMT 31 Mar 84]

CIVILITY MONTH COMMENDATION MEETING--Beijing, 6 Apr (XINHUA)--A meeting to sum up and commend the 1984 civility and courtesy month activities in the organs directly under the CPC Central Committee was held at the CPPCC auditorium on the afternoon of 6 April. Five advanced units, 39 advanced collectives and 293 activists from the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, CYL Central Committee, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, XINHUA News Agency and Guards Bureau of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee were commended at the meeting. Hao Jianxiu, alternate member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, and responsible persons of departments concerned Feng Wenbin, Liao Jingdan, Bai Jiefu and Feng Ligan presented banners, certificates and prizes to the advanced units, collectives and individuals. Feng Wenbin and Feng Ligan spoke at the meeting, calling on leaders at various levels in the organs directly under the CPC Central Committee to regard "five stresses, four beauties and three loves" activities as an important task. All organs must further enhance ideological understanding, rectify workstyle, strengthen discipline, improve administrative work and system and raise work efficiency in order to become civilized units. [Text] [OW070046 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1433 GMT 6 Apr 84]

CSO: 4005/535

NORTH REGION

BEIJING MAYOR ADDRESSES MUNICIPAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

Lists Social Order Tasks

OW030717 Beijing XINHUA in English 0635 GMT 3 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 3 (XINHUA)--Greater developments in education and culture and higher standards of social conduct were among the tasks of Beijing's government in 1984 listed by Mayor Chen Xitong here today.

In his report made on behalf of the municipal government at the second session of the Eighth Municipal People's Congress, which opened here this morning, the mayor said that since Beijing was to be built up as China's cultural as well as its political center, more importance should be attached to education, culture, public health and sports.

He said that Beijing's institutions of higher learning this year would increase student intake to 29,200, up 5.8 percent over 1983. Teaching standards in primary and secondary schools should be raised and knowledge about computers should be spread in such schools. Adult education should be improved in various ways, including television universities, workers' colleges, correspondence courses and evening colleges.

Beijing will repair a number of ancient buildings and open some historical sites to the public, thus further combining protection and use of cultural relics, the mayor said.

Other tasks he listed included:

- dealing a firm blow to criminals so as to improve public order;
- trying harder to control pollution and beautify the city;
- improving water, electricity and gas supplies, and traffic and telecommunications;
- promoting technical progress;
- accelerating industrial readjustment and technical transformation;

- developing a diversified economy and commodity production on the outskirts;
- strictly controlling capital construction; and
- speeding up the development of commerce and the service trades so as to meet the needs of the rapid growth of industrial and agricultural production and the steady rise in living standards.

Announces Environmental Program

OW030723 Beijing XINHUA in English 0709 GMT 3 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 3 (XINHUA)--Beijing planted 1.95 million trees, added 740,000 square meters of lawns and 24 street-corner gardens in the city proper as part of its environmental program last year, Mayor of Beijing Chen Xitong said today.

Reporting to the current municipal people's congress, he said that the city had added flower beds on either side of Tiananmen Square in the heart of the city. Local people planted more trees and built a number of landscaped enterprises, government offices and schools and in residential areas in and around Beijing.

Beijing had also planted some 27.9 million trees by roadsides, riverbanks, houses and villages on its outskirts, and covered 33,000 hectares of barren hills with trees last year, 17.1 percent more than in 1982, he said.

Among other measures to improve the city's environment, Mayor Chen said that Beijing last year used containers to dispose of over 90 percent of its garbage, and built or renovated 205 comfort stations along main streets in the city proper.

The city had also tackled more than 200 sources of pollution, removed 100 electroplating workshops and converted some 400 boilers.

Pollution had been basically controlled in the city moat and two rivers in northern and eastern Beijing.

In addition, low-noise horns had been fitted to approximately 120,000 motor vehicles and use of car horns prohibited in 15 main streets. Traffic noise had dropped by 3.5 decibels in the city proper, Mayor Chen said.

CSO: 4000/315

NORTH REGION

LEGAL SYSTEM HELPS IMPROVE BEIJING SOCIAL ORDER

OW030653 Beijing XINHUA in English 0630 GMT 3 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 3 (XINHUA)--Education in democracy and the legal system helped reduce the occurrence of criminal offenses in Beijing last year and the residents now had a stronger sense of security, Mayor of Beijing Chen Xitong said today.

Addressing the second session of the Eighth Municipal People's Congress, which opened here today, he said his government had severely punished grave criminal offenses against the law since last August. Most bad elements perpetrating outrages against the people had been rounded up, crushing blows dealt to criminal gangs and criminal offenses undermining public order greatly reduced, he added.

The 54-year-old mayor noted that the average monthly occurrence of criminal cases from August to December last year had dropped 58.7 percent from those in the preceding seven months, and that 93 percent of the 1,450 economic offenses registered had been handled.

In the citywide endeavor to promote socialist ethics and civilized behavior, he said, more than 1,150 advanced units with high moral standards had emerged last year. They had been built up jointly by the People's Liberation Army and local residents, as had a large number of outstanding neighborhood communities, rural villages, shops, schools, factories, residents' compounds and households.

Moreover, some 18,000 units in and around the city, such as government offices, factories, schools, and homes, had contracted with neighborhood authorities to plant trees and grass around their sites and improve hygiene and public order, the mayor said.

CSO: 4000/315

NORTH REGION

BEIJING TO SPEND MORE ON CULTURE, HEALTH

OW041231 Beijing XINHUA in English 1158 GMT 4 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 4 (XINHUA)--A municipal financial official said today that Beijing planned to spend 542.96 million yuan (about 271.5 million U.S. dollars) in 1984 on culture, education, science and public health, a 17.4 percent rise over last year.

In his budget report to the municipal people's congress, director of the municipal bureau of finance Chang Zichao said this was the fifth consecutive year that the city had increased its budget for such undertakings, and that this year's increase rate would hit an all-time high.

Chairman of the municipal planning commission Wang Jun noted that 127 million yuan (about 63.5 million U.S. dollars) or 23 percent of the appropriation, would be spent on construction or extension of hospitals, colleges, primary and middle schools, radio and T.V. stations, opera schools, nurseries, kindergartens, and other cultural and sports facilities.

In addition, he added, special funds would be allocated for building some 100,000 square meters of housing for primary and middle school teachers in both urban and suburban areas.

The municipal government would give as much financial support as possible to cultural and educational development as part of its effort to make the capital a cultural center, finance bureau director Chang Zichao said.

CSO: 4000/315

NORTH REGION

BEIJING PLANS TO CURB POPULATION IN 1984

OW040801 Beijing XINHUA in English 0743 GMT 4 Apr 84

[Text] Beijing, April 4 (XINHUA)--Beijing will put a ceiling of 9.5 million this year on its urban and outskirts rural population, a municipal planning official said today.

Addressing the second session of the Eighth Municipal People's Congress, Wang Jun, chairman of the city's Planning Commission, said that Beijing would set its natural growth rate at 12 per thousand this year, 11.5 per thousand for its urban areas and 12.5 per thousand for its rural outskirts.

The city would continue to prevent people from other parts of China from flowing in and strive to keep its mechanical population growth below 40,000 this year.

Speaking of the city's achievements in birth control last year, he said that the rate of first births had reached 99.1 percent in its urban areas and 80.8 percent in its rural outskirts, adding that the birth rate in Beijing had dropped from 20.04 per thousand in 1982 to 15.63 per thousand, and natural growth rate from 14.36 to 10.14 per thousand.

He noted that the population of Beijing Municipality had numbered 9.332 million at the end of 1983, 154,000 people more than a year before, representing a relatively low population growth in the past few years.

The city had registered a mechanical population growth of 59,000 people last year, Wang Jun said.

CSO: 4000/315

REPORTAGE ON BARRY GOLDWATER'S VISIT TO TAIWAN

Interview With Reporters

OW150447 Taipei CNA in English 1512 GMT 14 Apr 84

[Text] Taipei, April 14 (CNA)--"President Reagan won't accomplish anything with mainland China. In fact, no one will ever accomplish anything with mainland China," U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater said upon his arrival in this nation Saturday.

Senator Goldwater, who is visiting this country with his wife, declared: "I like this country very much. It's just like coming home again."

In an interview with reporters at the Sungshan military airport, Goldwater said that he doesn't quite understand the details of President Reagan's visit to mainland China, but he believes Reagan won't accomplish anything there.

With regard to the Chinese communist military threat to Taiwan, Goldwater said he believes communist China will not constitute a military threat to Taiwan in the next 25 to 50 years in the face of strong pressure from the Soviet Union.

The senator said he strongly opposes any U.S. arms sales or technology transfers to mainland China, but as just one U.S. senator, he cannot stop the Reagan administration from doing so.

On the other [words indistinct] Goldwater said his consistent stand has been that the U.S. Government should sell advanced weapons to the Republic of China on Taiwan.

The U.S. senator also pointed out that most Americans don't like the communist China. He said he hopes that those Americans who are going to the China mainland can visit Taiwan first so they won't be cheated by the Chinese communists.

Aboard a U.S. Air Force plane, Senator Goldwater was warmly welcomed by Shen Chang-huan, secretary general of the National Security Council, Ting Mou-shih, vice foreign minister, and John H. Chang, director of the North American Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, upon his arrival at the airport.

While here, Senator and Mrs Goldwater will call on Foreign Minister Chu Fu-sung, Defense Minister Sung Chang-chih, Economics Minister Chao Yao-tung and Taiwan Governor Lee Teng-hui.

The senator is scheduled to depart for the U.S. on April 17.

Comments on Reagan Trip

OW170350 Taipei CNA in English 0238 GMT 17 Apr 84

[Text] Taipei, April 17 (CNA)--U.S. Senator Barry M. Goldwater said Monday he expects nothing will be accomplished during President Ronald Reagan's visit to the Chinese mainland.

Goldwater Monday met the press of the nation at the Grand Hotel. He will depart Tuesday to visit South Korea.

The U.S. Government will not sell sophisticated weapons and top technology to the Chinese Communists, he said.

After President Reagan tours the mainland, Goldwater opined that the U.S. President will realize the Republic of China's need for latest defensive weaponry.

In fact, the senator revealed, the American authorities are scheduled to sell some such items to the Republic of China in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

He highly lauded the powerful armed forces of this nation. He also pointed out that the Chinese Communists are unable to launch any attack on Taiwan while facing a threat on the northern border with the Soviet Union.

Although he will not run again in the Senate, yet he said he will still raise his voice in support to the Republic of China.

He said he has told President Reagan and former U.S. presidents that they should visit Taipei because the Republic of China is a land of freedom and democracy.

During his stay Goldwater was received by President Chiang Ching-kuo. Goldwater highly praised President Chiang as an able, successful politician.

As the United States and the Pacific region are sharing the common interests, Goldwater pointed out, the American Government must value its relations with the countries in the region. And the position of the Republic of China on Taiwan is particularly important to the safety of the region, he added.

He was accompanied by Chang Hsiao-yen, director of the Department of North America under the Foreign Minister, during the press conference.

Goldwater arrived in Taipei with his wife April 14 for a four-day visit. In the past days, the senator called on ranking Chinese Government officials including Foreign Minister Chu Fu-sung, Defense Minister Sung Chang-chih and Economic Minister Chao Yao-tung.

CSO: 4000/316

LEGISLATORS UPSET AT ROK BASKETBALL INCIDENT

OW160810 Taipei CHINA POST in English 12 Apr 84 p 12

[Text] Recriminations were the order of the day at a joint meeting of the foreign affairs and education committees of the Legislative Yuan, held yesterday to question Minister of Foreign Affairs Chu Fu-sung and Minister of Education Chu Hui-sen on their handling of the flag raising incident. The furore has angered the people of the Republic of China and put a crimp in ROC-South Korean relations.

Speaking at the emergency session, Foreign Minister Chu Fu-sung said diplomatic relations between the ROC and South Korea have suffered because of the dispute over the display of the Red Chinese "national" flag at an international basketball tournament being played in Seoul.

The Foreign Minister urged the government of the ROC continue its efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea in spite of the incident for the sake of the traditional friendship between the two nations and the security of the Asian-Pacific region.

Legislators seemed little pacified by Chu's diplomatic approach to the incident, however, and condemnation of both the South Korean Government and what was perceived as a "soft stance" toward South Korea on the part of the government here was voiced by the lawmakers.

Legislator Hung Chao-nan, himself having served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disallowed any arguments based on traditional friendship with South Korea, saying the Seoul government would sever diplomatic relations with the ROC with no reservations whatsoever if the Chinese Communist regime offered to extend recognition to South Korea.

Legislator Chou Shu-fu disagreed with a statement by the foreign minister that the basketball flap is only a temporary setback in ROC-South Korean relations. Instead, he said, the incident is just one more example of South Korea's ongoing campaign to win the goodwill of the Chinese Communist regime.

The current incident was sparked Saturday when South Korean officials reversed a decision not to allow any of the guest nations attending a basketball championships in Seoul to fly national flags during the opening ceremony.

At the request of the Chinese Communist regime, all delegations including the one from mainland China, were permitted to display their "national flags," with the single exception of the Republic of China, which was told it could show only the flag of its basketball association.

Following the return of the ROC delegation from Seoul after withdrawing from the games in protest, the ministers of foreign affairs and education were called to report to the emergency meeting on the incident.

At the meeting, more calls were made for strong action against South Korea, including the recall of the ROC's ambassador to Seoul, a boycott of South Korean products, and the severing of air routes between Taipei and Seoul.

There was also a call for the resignation of Foreign Minister Chu, should he be unable to solve the flap "in a satisfactory manner.

One legislator told Chu he had a letter from an irate citizen, but he said he would not show it for fear that the foreign minister's blood pressure would rise to an unsafe level.

The foreign minister was told by legislators that the incident was indicative of a failure on the part of the ROC's foreign policy toward South Korea. Several of the lawmakers said that the Republic of China had been mollicodding Seoul to no avail and called for a hardline approach to South Korea in the future.

Legislator Chung Lin-chin demanded an apology from the South Korean Government. He suggested that one way the Seoul government could show its sincerity would be by apologizing and releasing the six freedom fighters it jailed for hijacking a Red Chinese domestic airliner to South Korea, and by allowing them to come to Taiwan before the second inauguration of President Chiang Ching-kuo on May 20.

CSO: 4000/316

BRIEFS

PREMIER'S HEALTH IMPROVES--In Taipei, ROC's premier, Sun Yun-hsuan, who is recuperating from an operation on February 26th following a cerebral hemorrhage, is now able to walk a short distance unaided, according to a newspaper, the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS. The paper, quoting informed sources, said the premier can take 10 steps at a time without any assistance. The paper also said, except for minor damage to the nerves on his left limbs, the stroke had not affected Sun's speaking and thinking faculties. The same sources said the premier hoped to attend the inauguration of the newly reelected President Chiang Ching-kuo on May 20. The cabinet is to resign en masse before the presidential inauguration, paving the way for the reelected president to appoint a new premier after his inauguration. [Text] [OW141209 Taipei International Service in English 0100 GMT 14 Apr 84]

COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA--Taipei, 16 Apr (CNA)--The Republic of China Monday pledged to step up cultural, science and technology cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The pledge was made by Education Minister Chu Hui-sen when he addressed the opening ceremony of the 6th session of the Sino-Saudi Permanent Joint Committee on cultural cooperation. The three-day meeting opened at the Grand Hotel Monday morning with Dr Muhammad M. Safar, vice minister for technical affairs of the Ministry of Higher Education, as leader of the seven-member Saudi delegation, and Vice Education Minister Li Mo as the Chinese chief delegates. Minister Chu said the prospect for mutual cultural cooperation between the two countries is bright. To step up the cooperation, he suggested that exchanges of visits by professors and students and education officials of the two countries should be increased in the coming years so that they can better understand of each other's culture, science and technology. Since the two countries set up the permanent committee in 1978, Chu said cultural cooperation between the two countries has been solidly founded. During the three-day meeting delegates of the two countries will review past cooperation and set new programs for future cooperation. [Text] [OW161303 Taipei CNA in English 0938 GMT 16 Apr 84]

CSO: 4000/316

PERSPECTIVE OF CPC PARTY RECTIFICATION DISCUSSED

Hong Kong CHENG MING [CONTENDING] in Chinese No 76, Feb 84 pp 18-20

[Article by Lin Fan [2651 2753]: "What Is the Perspective of CPC Party Rectification"]

[Text] Party Rectification Enters "Substance" Stage at Beginning of New Year

Since the first day of 1984 and after accomplishing a series of necessary tasks, the Party Rectification Guidance Committee of the CPC Central Committee has sent out the first group of liaison units to be stationed in key units in various regions of the country and to assume the authority of the party committees on major issues. They have assumed leadership in the movement to eliminate "spiritual pollution" in connection with the party rectification and style rectification effort. Just as the name implies, the function of a liaison unit should be to coordinate between the top and the bottom and only to reflect conditions. In substance, however, it is very similar to the "work group" sent out by Liu and Deng during the initial period of the cultural revolution.

Regardless, the start of activities by the liaison units reminds us that the party rectification work of the CPC has moved to the "substance" stage.

It may be said that the present party rectification by Deng and Hu is being done with full and necessary preparation work. Before pursuing related arrangements, this paper must talk about some related reactions.

In the various units where the liaison units have been stationed, the reaction is really not very strong. Most of the general masses and party members are keeping closemouthed and looking at the move with indifference. However, among the angry and dissatisfied young generation, there is no lack of quick words. They say with ridicule: "We welcome the propaganda units of Mao Zedong ideology to be stationed in our unit and lead us to engage in the second cultural revolution" and "we welcome the arrival of the working group at our unit to lead us in struggle, criticism and reform." Indeed, we could neither cry nor laugh! And those who have been targeted for investigation are laden with anxieties. As reflected by the units where the liaison units are stationed, the masses do not have much confidence in these commonly occurring party rectification movements. Added to this the fact that, in coordination with the

party rectification movement, the first thing is to engage in a movement to "eliminate spiritual pollution," most people have lost their confidence and changed to a feeling of detestation.

Of course, there are also people who immediately go into action in response to the call. These are the high and low leftwing kingpins and soldiers who previously held Mao Zedong's doctrine as their motto. Some of them are scouting the "enemy situation." Others are secretly collecting information on others. Still others are exploring the likes and dislikes of the liaison units. They are prepared to "establish new meritorious service" during the party rectification and style rectification movement. There are even those who use the call for "eliminating spiritual pollution" to viciously engage in revenge against those not to their liking.

From these signs, it is not really impossible to arrive at a perspective on the CPC party rectification.

However, we cannot reach a conclusion too early. We should know that in deciding to rectify the party Deng Xiaoping's idea was that there is only room for success and no room for failure. Before the liaison units were sent out to lead party rectification into the "substance stage," there had actually been some very careful work done with some deep thinking and long-term considerations. I will try to select the pertinent points for discussion below.

Rectification of the Military War the Prelude to Party Rectification

The first work that was simply indispensable in Deng Xiaoping's party rectification effort was the rectification of the military.

Mao Zedong said: "Political power comes from the barrel of a gun". Not only are these words a portrayal of China today but they are also the key to the success or failure of the party rectification and style rectification movement which has as its principal element the "cleaning out the three types of persons."

As long ago as the beginning of 1975, Deng Xiaoping already issued the call for "party rectification, rectification of the military, and rectification in all areas." However, before he had time to put it into practice, it was counterattacked by Mao Zedong and the gang of four and, as a result, Deng had to step down.

In June 1981, Deng Xiaoping assumed the post of chairman of the Military Commission and the work of the rectification of the military was able to move forward. Deng deeply understood that the military was bound by the doctrine of Mao Zedong most deeply and was the most serious empire of leftist poisoning. Most cadres in the military, from bottom to top, belonged to the "whatever" faction. For this, Deng Xiaoping criticized the military for the existence of the problems of "being swollen, dispersed, conceited, extravagant and lazy" and, in his rectification effort, he dealt particularly with the word "swollen." This was to streamline the cadres and make them younger in average age.

The "Service Regulations for Officers" formulated according to the wishes of Deng Xiaoping establish age limits for commanding personnel at army, division, regiment, battalion, company and platoon levels. These age limits are: 49 to 55 for the army level, 41 to 45 for division level, 31 to 35 for regiment level, 26 to 30 for battalion level, about 25 for company level and about 22 for platoon level.

Under the above regulations, there are floating areas for the upper and lower age limits for army, division and regiment level cadres. This was a shrewd and tough design of Deng Xiaoping. The effect is that those who do not closely follow the line established in the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Congress would be eliminated by the lower age limit standards and those who conform with the reforms of Deng Xiaoping or really have talents would be retained by using the upper age limits.

The Deng and Hu reformists are also transferring a large group of college graduates or military cadres of the young and robust group with at least a high school education to military institutes for half a year to 2 years of advanced training and then they are rapidly promoted to various level of cadre rank. For example, most of those receiving half a year of training at the Changsha National Defense College return to their units as company- and battalion-level cadres. Military officers of the young group who have received 1 to 2 years of training at the Central Military Academy or higher military institutes in the various military regions return to their units as regiment, division or army level cadres. These military officers of the young group who have learned a specialization have a strong sense of achievement and most of them support the Deng and Hu reformist line.

As a result of this drastic measure of the changing of the guards by Deng Xiaoping, the old generals and officers who opposed the line of the Third Plenary Session have quickly lost their command power base and their trump card to stand up to the Deng and Hu reformists.

Rectification of the Military Starts With Air Force Rectification

The strategy of Deng and Hu in party rectification is the rectification of the military first. And rectification of the military is to first rectify the air force.

The Deng and Hu reformists decided that the air force was the "heavy disaster areas" of the cultural revolution in the military. There were two reasons that it was called the "heavy disaster areas." First, the air force had the strongest remnants of Lin Biao's force and had the most "three types of persons" which were to be eliminated. After the founding of the People's Republic, Lin Biao concentrated on the study of "coup d'etat classics" and decided that the air force had the strongest mobility and quickest ability to react and it was the section of the military that must be relied upon for a coup. For this reason, he sent his son, Lin Liguang [2651 4539 5470], to assume the post of deputy director of the Operations Department and to control the nerve center. The big traitors formerly responsible for the air force, Wu Faxian [0702 3127 2009] and Wang Weiguang [3769 4850 0948], were his sworn

followers and they had many cohorts. Although Mao Zedong did some cleaning up of the Air Force after Lin Biao was eliminated, especially the priority cleaning of the 4th Army of the Air Force, he was afraid of creating a major incident and did not dare to perform major surgery on the Air Force. Consequently, cadres of the "4th Field Army" faction, loyal to Lin Biao, were still in the majority and persons who opposed the Third Plenary Session or who only showed support in the open but were really disloyal were most numerous. Although a current leader of the Air Force was a subordinate of Deng, his ideology was once that of the "whatever" faction and not only did he express loyalty to Hua Guofeng but he also openly opposed the assumption of Hu Yaobang as the party chief.

Secondly, the level of educational level of the Air Force officers of the young group is higher, there is a greater concentration of free thinking among them and there is also a greater number of the offspring of cadres. This was another reason that the Deng and Hu reformists did not dare to take the Air Force lightly before embarking on their party rectification and style rectification effort. Generally, it is not easy to enter the Air Force. Besides being possessed with a high school education, a candidate must go through a rigid physical examination and political evaluation. Thus, the qualified were mostly the children of cadres, especially those of the senior ranks. During the Mao Zedong era, the military was the shortcut to success for young people and the Air Force was the shortcut of shortcuts. Thus, those in the Air Force had the reputation of being "God's favored ones." However, the Air Force has great mobility, young intellectuals are numerous among the enrolled, the children of cadres get information quickly and remnant forces of Lin Biao are also strong. For these reasons, if there was any sign of disturbance or trouble as a result of the party rectification and style rectification effort, the occurrence of unpredicted incidents was very possible and there was even a greater possibility for the type of defection carried out by Wu Ronggen [0702 2837 2704] and Wang Xuecheng [3769 1331 2052].

Recognizing this, prior to the party rectification effort, the reformists of Deng and Hu had sent out "investigators" or nearly 106,000 cadres to the more than 20,000 basic units of the military. Among them were more than 35,000 cadres of the regiment level and above. Of this number, more than 7,000 were sent to the air force and represented a superior force compared to the number of air force cadres in the current 45 divisions.

These investigating groups conducted investigations and studies while solving problems at the same time. They made it clear beforehand that they would not leave before the problems were solved. In substance, they were saying that if the forces of Lin Biao and the forces which opposed the line established by the Third Plenary Session were not eliminated and leadership groups loyal to the reformists of Deng and Hu were not established, they would not leave. At the same time, the newly formed State Ministry of Security was also establishing political ideology guidance units among the various flying groups of the air force to supervise the ideological movement of air force personnel. The ministry also established rigid rules to prevent pilot defection.

In addition, the Deng and Hu reformists also appointed Qin Jiwei [4440 1015 0251], who is loyal to the line of the Third Plenary Session and who enthusiastically promotes the modernization of the military, as the commander of the Beijing armed forces. The objective of all this careful arrangement was to greatly reduce the danger of any designs to use military force against the party rectification and style rectification effort and to suddenly launch a coup d'etat to overthrow the Deng and Hu system.

"Eliminating the three types of persons" is the key to the "organizational purification" in the party rectification of Deng and Hu and rectification of Hua Guofeng is again the key of the key. There are three reasons for this statement.

The Commanding Banner of Hua Guofeng Must Be Eliminated

First, Hua Guofeng is a person who is all right in small matters but who is treacherous and lacks political integrity. To rely on Hua Guofeng for China to move toward modernization by his chanting the "whatever scripture" is undoubtedly more difficult than climbing the blue sky. It is of course, difficult for the petroleum faction to shed its guilt for the big failure of the "foreign leap forward." However, the failure has also fully exposed the stupidity and ignorance of Hua Guofeng's rule of power. Yet, it is exactly the lack of creativity of Hua Guofeng and his sticking to the "whatever scripture" which has hit the bull's-eye in the minds of the forces of internal decay of the CPC. As early as 1977, not long after Deng Xiaoping had reemerged, some cadres in the army and division levels of the military and ministry and department levels of the government already were saying that now that Hua Guofeng had caught the gang of four and had stood firmly on his feet, there was really no need for Deng Xiaoping to reemerge and he could remain a consultant, and now that he had emerged, "the world will become turbulent again." Now that Deng and Hu are engaged in party rectification and style rectification, it is just the move that causes concern for those worried about a "turbulent world." Consequently, the internal decaying forces in the CPC will naturally long for the "whatever" rule of Hua Guofeng.

Second, the remnant forces of the cultural revolution are exactly the "three types of persons" that the party rectification wants to eliminate. After the fall of the gang of four, these people had viewed the skyrocketing Hua Guofeng as their only protection. In order to get by under false pretences and wait for opportunities to rise again, they are naturally gathering around the "whatever" banner of Hua Guofeng.

Next, not only does Hua Guofeng have a certain influence in the socialist countries but even many politicians, scholars and people in such democratic countries as Japan and the United States also express considerable sympathy for Hua Guofeng and their feeling is "not that he was betrayed by Deng but they have sympathy for Hua's simple honesty."

In addition, it is worth mentioning that half a year ago there was a widely circulated rumor on the China mainland that a famous fortune teller in Shanxi prophesied that: "once the shield falls (Deng Xiaoping falls), the sword

will come out of its sheath (the cutting edge of Hua Guofeng will come out) and Hua Guofeng will again sit on the dragon throne." All of these reveal the banner of Hua Guofeng against the reformist forces of Deng and Hu.

Based on the lessons of historic experience of the struggle for power in the CPC without a doubt, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, who have gone through bitter pains, must be determined to totally eliminate this evil Hua Guofeng, who is fighting with his back against the wall, and holds this banner of the opposition faction.

Skirmishes To Coordinate with Party Rectification

Before starting the party rectification and style rectification battle, the reformists of Deng and Hu also engaged in two coordinating skirmishes. These were the blows dealt to activities of economic crimes and criminal offenders.

According to Hu Yaobang, a strong typhoon will blow throughout the country before the Chinese New Year and the number of criminals to be apprehended is going to be in the range of 1 million. Among this gigantic number of economic criminals and criminal offenders, many are cadres and the children of cadres. In accordance with the implicative nature of Chinese Communist control, the implicated ones will be reduced to criminals and the families of criminals and all will be grouped in the "cannot-be-trusted" type of persons. Thus, during the party rectification and style rectification, those found to have committed misdeeds or to hold different views from the line of the Third Plenary Session will naturally be more easily and undoubtedly rationally rectified and eliminated. Moreover, having seen with their own eyes these two cracking-down movements of enforcing monastic discipline and using severe standards, the iron hand style of Deng and Hu has also produced a definite terrorizing effect on the opposition faction and "three types of persons," thereby reducing their resistance to the party rectification and style rectification movement.

We can see from this that the planning for the party rectification and style rectification movement by the Deng and Hu reformists was really given much thought and is extremely thorough. The movement to crack down on economic crimes and criminal offenders has, in reality, produced the effect of killing the chicken to warn the monkey and of killing two birds with one stone within the party rectification and style rectification movement.

"Elimination of Pollution" Brings Chaos to the Big Picture

However, "despite a hundred careful thoughts, there was one careless one." Among the various important political measures to sweep away the obstructions to party rectification, there was one measure that got "burned." This was the movement to "eliminate spiritual pollution."

According to the analysis of observers, the thought behind this "eliminating pollution" move was to restrain the undisciplined ideology of the intellectuals and to stop them from chattering away on a variety of things and, thus, interfering with the main party rectification movement. At the same time, it was also to show that the movement was to "oppose the left while guard against the right."

However, the development of events exceeded the anticipation of the authorities.

The so-called "eliminating pollution" was directed entirely at the views and theories of the cultural ideology sector. Thus, the people immediately remembered the "famous words" of Mao Zedong that "historical experiences are worth paying attention to." In examining the Chinese Communist "style rectification" history, the important ones were the "Yan'an style rectification" movement, the "rectifying style and opposing the right" movement of 1957 and the current party rectification and style rectification movement. The people immediately looked back at the commonalities in the last two rectifications of style.

For example, in the collection on the "Yan'an Style Rectification", the expressions criticized were "the class system of cadres" (Ding Ling), "special hierarchic cadre authority system, (Wang Shiwei), "respect for human love" (Xiao Jun), etc. During the "rectifying style of opposing the right" movement of 1957, the principal expressions of the "rightist faction" criticized were "The world of the party is the root of three evils" (Chu Anping), "The evil of bureaucracy and socialism together is greater than that of capitalism" (Zhang Naiqi), "no freedom of expression, election, gathering and publication" (Zhang Baisheng), "without a legal system, the law is a mere formality (Lin Xiling)....All of these are what the Communist Party considers to be unfavorable expressions.

What about the latest "eliminating pollution" movement? It was also connected with some "unfavorable" theories, such as the "Theory of Alienation," "Humanitarianism," "Theory of Human Nature," etc. Thus, the people immediately discovered that the theses and writings directed by the spearheads of the CPC movement to "eliminate spiritual pollution" were exactly the intensification and carrying forward of the "spirit of Wang Shiwei" and the spirit of the "rightist faction." It could be said that every word in them is a pearl and every sentence is truth. Where have they erred! And now they were actually brought out for criticism prior to party rectification. Was it not history reporting itself? As a result, the hearts of those who were not too enthusiastic about party rectification have immediately turned cold.

In addition, there are also those "political movement persons" who see rain when the wind comes. They cannot wait to expand "eliminating pollution" to other levels and areas and they have quickly brought chaos to the big picture of Deng and Hu.

These, I am afraid, were not anticipated by Deng and Hu at the beginning.

5974
CSO: 4005/449

END