

094123

JPRS-EPS-85-014

28 January 1985

# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT 1

Approved for public release.  
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980302 131

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

6  
108  
A06

## NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

## PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

28 January 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Briefs

|                                           |   |
|-------------------------------------------|---|
| USSR Expresses Regret                     | 1 |
| Trial Evidence of Popieluszko 'Murderers' | 1 |

BULGARIA

|                                                                                                           |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| Illegal Foreign Currency Operations Described<br>(Lidiya Andreeva; NARODEN STRAZH, 21 Nov 84).....        | 2 |
| Crime Fighting Efforts, Methods Deemed Insufficient<br>(Georgi Panayotov; NARODEN STRAZH, 21 Nov 84)..... | 6 |

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

|                                                                                            |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| Bratislava Mayor Speaks at 12th CPCZ Plenum<br>(Ladislav Martinak; PRAVDA, 10 Dec 84)..... | 8 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|

HUNGARY

|                                                                                                                        |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Miklos Sees Church, State Relations as Model for Bloc States<br>(Imre Miklos Interview; POLITYKA, No 50, 15 Dec 84)... | 11 |
| More on Meeting Between Sarlos, Church Leaders<br>(Peter Vertessy; MAGYAR NEMZET, 15 Dec 84).....                      | 17 |
| Hungarian Academy of Sciences Official Interviewed<br>(Kalman Kulcsar Interview; 3 Jan 85).....                        | 19 |
| New Community Representational Forms<br>(Tibor Balint; PARTELET, No 12, 1984).....                                     | 22 |

## POLAND

|                                                                                                                                      |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Study of Political Leadership Deliberated<br>(Jerzy J. Wiatr; STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNE, No 2,<br>Apr-Jun 84).....                        | 29 |
| Preparations for Parliamentary Elections Launched<br>(RZECZPOSPOLITA, 5-6 Jan 85).....                                               | 45 |
| Constructive Role of Church in Society Defended<br>(Andrzej Micewski; PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI, No 19,<br>28 Oct 84).....                  | 58 |
| Failure To Appreciate Friendship With USSR Criticized<br>(Wladyslaw Misiuna; NOWE DROGI, No 11, Nov 84).....                         | 64 |
| Catholic, State Press Differ on Role of Intelligentsia<br>(TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, No 40, 30 Sep 84; POLITYKA,<br>No 44, 3 Nov 84)..... | 74 |
| Stelmachowski in Catholic Weekly, Andrzej Stelmachowski,<br>Interview<br>Lack of Intellectual Debate, by Daniel Passent              |    |
| Specifications of PZL-130 Orlik Training Plane Provided<br>(Boguslaw Witkowski; SKRZYDLATA POLSKA, No 48,<br>25 Nov 84).....         | 85 |

## ROMANIA

|                                                                              |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Ceausescu Receives Guinean Envoy's Credentials<br>(AGERPRES, 26 Dec 84)..... | 87 |
| Briefs                                                                       |    |
| Trade Protocol With Vietnam                                                  | 88 |
| Socialist Culture Council                                                    | 88 |
| National Women's Council                                                     | 88 |
| Ceausescu Receives PRC Envoy                                                 | 89 |

## YUGOSLAVIA

|                                                                                                                                |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Federation-Confederation Dilemma Challenged<br>(Radoslav Stojanovic; NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE,<br>No 1769, 25 Nov 84)..... | 90 |
| Nationalistic Sentiments in Split Theater Deplored<br>(Zoran Krzelj; POLET, 2 Nov 84).....                                     | 96 |
| Suvar Describes Current Economic Criticism as Step Backward<br>(Stipe Suvar; BORBA, 10-13 Dec 84).....                         | 99 |

|                                                                                          |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Djuranovic, Sukrija Congratulate Castro on Cuban Holiday<br>(TANJUG, 30, 31 Dec 84)..... | 101 |
| Djuranovic Telegram<br>Sukrija Message                                                   |     |
| Los Angeles Court Appoints Commission on Artukovic's Health<br>(TANJUG, 10 Jan 85).....  | 102 |
| Briefs                                                                                   |     |
| Mojsov Receives Children's Group                                                         | 103 |
| Employment Bureau Director Dies                                                          | 103 |

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

USSR EXPRESSES REGRET--The Soviet Union--On 28 December 1984 during target practice by Soviet ships in the Barents Sea, a flying target [Letiaci terc] strayed from the set course, owing to a malfunction, in the direction of the shore and disappeared in a westerly direction. As the Soviet press agency TASS announced today, it cannot be ruled out that the target partially overflowed the territory of Norway, and came down on Finnish territory [dopadol na uzemie finska]. The flying target was not carrying any explosive or toxic substances. The Soviet side has informed the Norwegian and Finnish sides about this unintentional incident caused by an equipment malfunction and also expressed regret at the incident. [Text] [Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1400 GMT 5 Jan 85]

TRIAL EVIDENCE OF POPIELUSZKO 'MURDERERS'--The Warsaw correspondent Rastislav Bayer reports: The trial of the kidnappers, and later murderers, of the Warsaw priest Popieluszko last October is continuing in Torun. The accused Leszek Pekala and Waldemar Chmielewski, former Interior Ministry employees, were giving their evidence. They both described their superior and co-offender Gregor Piotrowski as the main offender. They justified their involvement by saying that he convinced them that this was an action carried out on orders from their superiors. They also said that, at Piotrowski's order, they left traces at the place of action and (?the also) in Warsaw which then helped to uncover the whole affair quickly. Thirty home and foreign journalists are present at the Torun trial. [Text] [Prague Television Service in Czech and Slovak 2100 GMT 3 Jan 85]

CSO: 2400/191

ILLEGAL FOREIGN CURRENCY OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Sofia NARODEN STRAZH in Bulgarian 21 Nov 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Lidiya Andreeva: "A Raid...Against the Inroads of the Black Market"]

[Text] A car stopped in front of one of the foreign exchange bureaus of Balkanturist [State Economic Enterprise for Excursions and Travel]. It was 9 o'clock in the morning with many people already around and for this reason no one noticed that the passengers did not get out of the car. They were closely watching the entrance of the currency exchange bureau. Suddenly they energetically jumped out of the car and rapidly entered the exchange bureau. They went up to a foreign exchange clerk who at that moment was quietly accepting a stack of bank notes from an attractive young man. When he noticed those who had entered, his face twisted into a sour smile but, controlling himself, he calmly said: "They caught me just like in the books and movies!" After a little while an investigation-operations group arrived and it wrote up the apprehension of the impressive young man and the foreign exchange clerk at the moment of making a transaction.

The described case has not been taken from the literature. The characters are economic operations workers and investigators from the OU [?okrug administration] of the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] in Ruse and Mikhaylovgrad and from the Economics Administration of the DNM [State People's Militia] and the Main Investigation Administration. The apprehended young man was Lyubomir Penev, known by his nickname "Chekha" from Ruse, and the woman was Petranka Dimitrova, an exchange clerk at the foreign exchange bureau of Balkanturist in Mikhaylovgrad. Later she would admit that for 2 or 3 years she had illegally been exchanging Penev's foreign exchange. For her "services" she was generously remunerated.

The instituted investigation of this and similar cases have long been concluded, the materials are in the courts and they will measure out precisely the blame and the punishment. The economic operations workers in Ruse are busy with new, difficult tasks. Yet, when they find the free time, they recall the sleepless nights and that they themselves did not know where they found the strength not to lose once and for all the grasped thread. And this led them to a black market in foreign exchange which for years had been carefully concealed and was run by a large group of criminals who had spread their tentacles into various corners of the nation. And if now we turn back in time, it is not

only to show the enthusiasm of the MVR workers who apprehended and unmasked dangerous criminals. One is impressed by the outstanding organization of the work, the high professional and operational skill shown and the close cooperation between the various okrug administrations and the divisions of the MVR in the capital.

Now the operations worker Sr Lt Kamen Nyagolov from the Ruse MVR OU, having analyzed everything profoundly, calmly relates how he together with the chief of the economics section Capt Petko Petkov made a significant effort to dis-close the criminal group. Initially, Sr Lt Nyagolov was given the job by chance and this gradually grew and required the involvement also of other police forces.

The combating of infringements of the provisions of the Law Governing Transactions, Foreign Currency and Foreign Exchange Control concerning the provisions for transactions and other actions involving foreign exchange and property under the foreign exchange control of the Ruse MVR OU began in a more organized manner in 1977. By operational and also overt means, the economic section began receiving information on the sale of Kent cigarettes by railroad workers and sailors from foreign nations and the transfer of convertible capitalist and socialist currencies, predominantly the lei. A group of several operations workers was organized to investigate this and this was active chiefly after the end of the work day or on days off. Experience was gained and the first more important result was achieved several years later. They apprehended Gencho Poshtadzhiev with 12,000 leva. The encouraged police workers constantly attacked. And then they received information that one of the most important figures in this "branch," Lyubomir Penev, was celebrating his joining of the "200,000 Club," that is, from the transferring of foreign exchange he had saved more than 200,000 leva. The economics workers also learned the names of Anton Prodanov, Nedko Stoyanov and others. The leadership of the section felt that attention must be focused chiefly on Penev. He was the largest buyer of foreign exchange, he worked with intermediaries and was very clever and inventive. While the remainder were not employed in socially useful labor, he worked at an enterprise feeling that he would remain outside the view of the police bodies and calmly loosened his belt. The work dealing with him was assigned to Sr Lt Kamen Nyagolov. So on 25 May 1983, a beginning was made to the "Moneychanger" Case. Sr Lt Nyagolov was a young operations worker but he still had certain experience and ably led and aided by the chief of the economics section Capt Petko Petkov he assumed the difficult task. The information received showed that the case would be a "tough nut to crack" and Penev transferred foreign exchange with numerous persons in Ruse and the country. Then the threads led also to Khristo Dobrev, a foreign exchange clerk at the Orbita BMT [?International Tourism Bureau]. They documented criminal activities involving 500,000 leva. They also worked constantly on another criminal group which was headed by Tefik Yusmenov from Ruse. Also under police surveillance were Nedko Stoyanov, Iliya Tsvetkov, Dimitur Dimitrov and Petur Murgenski also from Ruse. It was already known that the suspects in the Moneychanger Case were exchanging currency not only in Ruse but also at the exchange bureaus in Sliven, Shumen, Varna, Mikhaylovgrad and Sofia.

Already things were going beyond the Ruse workers. The case was assumed by the centralized leadership of the Economy Administration of the DNM and specifically

by Col Georgi Parishev. Forces from the Main Investigation Bureau were also called in. Close coordination was organized between the economic sections in the designated cities, the main goal was defined and the further forms and methods of work were clarified. There was a desire to apprehend Penev at the moment of making a deal as this would provide physical evidence and achieve a definite psychological upper hand. And this led to the scene described at the beginning when Sr Lt Kamen Nyagolov from the Economic Section of the Ruse MVR OU and Maj Anani Ananiev from the Economic Section of the Mikhaylovgrad MVR apprehended Penev with physical evidence, some 130,000 leva which were the object of the transaction being carried out at that moment between him and Petranka Dimitrova.

Thus, the major raid was made. The investigation was assumed by a group of investigators. The investigation was skillfully carried out by Maj Feodor Vladimirov, Lt Col Bogdan Karayotov of the GSU [Main Investigation Administration] and others. In the process of the investigation it was established that over the period from 1977 to 1983 by its actions the formed criminal group itself and in cooperation with other individuals, under conditions of continued criminal activity, violated the legal provisions concerning transactions and other actions involving foreign exchange and property under foreign exchange control in Ruse, Varna, Sofia, Mikhaylovgrad, Sliven, Shumen and elsewhere. The total value of the foreign exchange violation amounted to 2,678,204 leva. Some 34 defendants were held criminally liable.

"Of interest from the professional and operational viewpoint are the forms and methods by which the criminals carried out their illegal activities," emphasized Col Georgi Parishev of the Economy Administration of the DNM.

Here are some of the more important ones:

--The criminals purchased large amounts of Kent cigarettes from the stores of the Korekom VTO [Foreign Trade Organization] which were sold for lei to foreign tourists visiting our country. The lei obtained in the sale were exchanged illegally at the various foreign exchange bureaus of the Balkanturist VTO and the Orbita BMT.

--For the purpose of producing a profit, they utilized the foreign exchange differences of the various currencies sold on the black market. For leva they purchased Western currencies, most frequently U.S. dollars and West German marks. The obtained currencies were sold to foreign tourists in exchange for lei. And again for the lei they received leva at the exchange bureaus.

--They were also interested in certain types of goods such as coffee beans and angle polishers and other goods sought by foreigners. The lei obtained for them were again exchanged at the bureaus.

--An illegal profit was also extracted in the exchange of the currencies by officials, the foreign exchange clerks employed in the system of Balkanturist and the Orbita BMT.

The uncovering of this large criminal group has been a significant success in combating the foreign exchange and smuggling crimes and violations in our

nation. At the same time, it is a warning that in the future we must show increased vigilance to even the most insignificant warning of such actions. For our country in the future will continue to be visited by tourists, vacationers and other foreign guests and we must create for them conditions for quiet relaxation and leisure while the violators of the law must be approached with the necessary strictness.

10272

CSO: 2200/55

CRIME FIGHTING EFFORTS, METHODS DEEMED INSUFFICIENT

Sofia NARODEN STRAZH in Bulgarian 21 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Georgi Panayotov, head of Investigation Supervision Under the Main Prosecutor's Office of Bulgaria: "The Effective Combating of Crime"]

[Text] This year the bodies involved in pretrial proceedings have achieved definite successes in improving the quality and effectiveness of investigation work in the combating of crime. In cooperation with the other specialized bodies of the People's Militia, they have increased their contribution to disclosing criminal and economic crimes. For example, during the first half of this year, there was not a single unsolved premeditated murder; under Article 212 (Forgery) and Article 219 (Mismanagement) two-fold more defendants were turned over to the court in comparison with the same period of 1982 and the total of established and recovered losses in economic crimes increased. The rate of solving also increased for organized group crimes.

The results could have been even better if certain problems had been solved more effectively. The growth of concealed crime in the economy continues to be high. A number of economic crimes have been solved late, when the losses caused by them had significantly increased. The reasons have been repeatedly emphasized: shortcomings in control and poor exactingness by economic and other leaders both at the center and on the spot. There are also weaknesses in the operational-investigatory work of the police and in the organizational activities of the prosecutors. A goodly number of felonies have remained unsolved, chiefly thefts, including certain more severe ones. The problem of the full recording of crimes has not been completely solved.

Due to the efforts made and the professional skill of the investigators and prosecutors guilt has been established and punitive responsibility sought from a large portion of the perpetrators of crimes. Many okrugs have almost completely solved the problem of the period and speed of investigations and examinations (Kurdzhali, Lovech, Stara Zagora, Blagoevgrad, Vidin and others). There are few delayed preliminary investigations in the okrugs of Silistra, Vratsa and Pernik. But in the okrugs of Burgas, Varna and Yambol and the city of Sofia, during the first half of this year, many investigations were overdue. The same applies to the pretrial investigations in the okrugs of Gabrovo, Shumen and Sofia City. There are many delayed checks in Sofia and in Tolbukhin and Sofia Okrugs.

Cases returned for additional investigation have declined substantially this year in Blagoevgrad, Vidin and Kurdzhali Okrugs. However, there are investigators and examiners to whom a large number of cases have been returned for additional investigation (Burgas, Shumen, Stara Zagora and Pazardzhik Okrugs). There have been superficially conducted interrogations, inquests with defective notes, incomplete evidence, unverified evidence of the defendants as well as cases and correspondence which were hurried or incorrectly resolved by the prosecutors. Such weaknesses are often encountered in cases dealing with fires, accidents, mismanagement and major embezzlement of private property. Not satisfactory is the rate of solving economic crimes under Articles 219, 228, 225 and 301 of the Criminal Code. The combating of poor-quality products is also still not effective. At times they rely on methods with poor value of proof (for example, organoleptic ones). In a number of instances the prosecutors have not closely followed the investigation, particularly the cases taken under special assignment, and have not shown the required exactingness.

Recently significant efforts have been made to establish and recover the losses caused by crimes. But the results of a number of investigators, and particularly the preliminary investigators, are not satisfactory (Tolbukhin and Shumen Okrugs). At times, the investigatory bodies do not act promptly, they do not show sufficient activity in seeking the more valuable property of the accused and they rarely make inventories and seizures. There are also substantial differences in the calculating of the recovered losses by the MVR, the prosecutor and the courts. Liability is not sought from the investigators and the prosecutors in this area.

Generally speaking, there are few cases which end with an acquittal. More frequent are instances of partially dropped charges or the so-called "management" of the losses (for example, of the 50,000 leva of a verified shortage, there are 20,000 in the investigation and the criminal information and 3,000 in the verdict). But this means the justifying of a larger portion of the indicted crime. There are also numerous cases returned by the court for additional investigation and which afterwards are halted by the prosecutor instead of concluding with an acquittal. There are also cases halted by the prosecutor which should conclude with charges. In this area constant analyses must be made, the causes and guilty parties must be sought out, help provided and greater exactingness shown.

This year the preventive measures carried out in the cases have increased and have become more effective. In the process of the investigation thousands of warnings and proposals have been given. However, we have not completely solved the problem of fully elucidating the causes and conditions of crime. We have underestimated the importance of the preventive role of the investigation and this is more marked in the okrugs of Blagoevgrad, Pernik, Sofia and Stara Zagora.

Obviously we must raise the level of the investigatory and prosecutor work using suitable organizational and scientific means. We must strengthen exactingness and at the same time provide skilled aid, particularly for the younger workers. It is imperative to hold a larger number and more effective qualification exercises. We must be bolder in seeking liability in the committing of more essential weaknesses as well as more widely popularize and encourage positive experience.

## BRATISLAVA MAYOR SPEAKS AT 12TH CPCZ PLENUM

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Dec 84 p 3

/Speech by Ladislav Martinak, CPCZ Central Committee member, mayor of Bratislava/

/Text/ For the realization of the Seventh 5-Year Plan's key tasks it is necessary to utilize fully every hour, every working day of this year and, naturally, the whole year 1985. We are aware of this necessity also in Bratislava, which, as a fast-growing city with developed industry, is an important part of the Czechoslovak economy. In our city more than 12 percent of Slovak industrial output is produced. In the development of the material-production base of the city the orientation of the Seventh 5-Year Plan is toward the machine industry, electronics industry and a gradual realization of structural changes in the chemical industry, in accordance with the need to upgrade the raw materials and to protect the environment.

At present some new production capacities of the Bratislava Automobile Plants, the Juraj Dimitrov Chemical Plants and Slovanat---which are of republicwide or even nationwide importance---have been realized.

In 10 months of this year we have achieved a higher dynamism in all volume indicators than assumed in the annual plan. Contributing factors were the activity of the party organizations, the worker collectives and the management. The accepted target tasks are progressive in that they set a higher formation of adjusted personal achievement and of profits, in reducing the cost of materials as well as in further indicators. In this time our enterprises achieved a production value exceeding the plan by 530 million Kcs. It is particularly gratifying that---compared to last year---the share of technologically and economically high level products increased more than four percent. Even though the overall results are favorable, we do not conceal our problems. One of them is a considerable disparity in securing the fulfillment of the tasks in the individual enterprises.

An important place in the economy and in the life of Bratislava belong to the enterprises managed by the national committees, and to the large area of the tertiary sector. They are primarily composed of the service industries, including care for people. No less than 25 percent of all our employees work in this area. As emphasized by the 16th Party Congress, good work in this area is a weighty political task. We were aware of this when we were detailing the

resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee; from this perspective we are effecting, with the most demanding standards, measures whose aim it is to provide better and faster services and to eliminate the shortcomings which still abound. However, high-quality functioning of services does not always depend on the efforts of the employees. Even though the replacement parts situation was the subject of severe criticism at the 16th Congress as well as at the Sixth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, it is still a problem.

The effectiveness of the measures adopted by some ministries to improve the supply system and to remove the perennial shortcomings in distribution still cannot be felt. This affects the quality and readiness of the service sector in a negative way, especially as concerns repairs on durable consumer goods, such as motor vehicles, refrigerators, washers, and others. Not only is the consumer dissatisfied, but so are employees of the service sector, who do not have anything to do, but immediately afterwards organize replacement jobs, and finally do "shock work." Shortcomings in this sector are not supportive of the nation's work discipline and order.

The further development of Bratislava, its larger contribution to the Czechoslovak economy, and also the securing of good living and working conditions for its inhabitants is to a large degree dependent on the realization of the goals of capital investment.

We are working on very urgent tasks in transportation and in creating and improving the living environment, which also relates to the development of the industrial base and to the building of the tertiary sector, at this time especially health care facilities. In accordance with the measures adopted by the local party bodies after the Sixth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, we are devoting special attention to the preparation and realization of complex residential developments. By raising the standard, our builders since 1982 have fulfilled their annual tasks by 20 December and have removed defects found by inspection in January of the following year. It will be the same this year, and we believe next year as well, during which the building organizations are supposed to build more than 5,300 apartments. The greatest part of the credit for the good results in apartment construction is due to Pozemne Stavby Bratislava. However, the overall situation in investment is not this optimistic. On the one hand, we are pleased by the completion of planned units like the Matador enterprise, the first stage of construction of Palenisko Harbor, and others. The completion of the freeway-railway bridge and the related investments is going on satisfactorily. However, tasks in the construction of the Bratislava Automobile Plants, several multipurpose buildings, facilities for railroad transportation and health care facilities are not being fulfilled. Some enterprises postpone the completion dates not by months but by years. And so we have a large number of so-called "eternal" works-in-progress: the clinic for the third district; Central Public Baths; House of Clothing on Slovak National Uprising Square, and others. Therefore, we do not consider it right, after years of delay, to turn over for use with great fanfare and ostentatious publicity buildings which--according to the original deadline--should have been serving the public long ago.

In our city, we are very much concerned with the healthy physical and emotional development of the human personality. After the 14th Congress there has been positive development in preschool care, development of concern for senior citizens, growth of the retail network, and inability to work due to illness is decreasing. However, the number of hospital beds for 1,000 persons, which decreased in the National Health Institute of the City of Bratislava from 5.11 in 1970 to 4.16 in 1984, is unsatisfactory; this is the lowest figure of all the krajs. In this respect, the task to complete as rapidly as possible the hospital construction in Ruzinov, and the preparation of new hospital construction in Petržalka, has high priority. We are aware that worries over capital construction will not be smaller next year and certainly not in the Eighth 5-Year Plan, all the more so in our conditions because we are beginning to effect further apartment construction in more than 40 localities without a completed infrastructure. However, we want the present inhabitants to feel the difficulties connected with construction in already inhabited areas as little as possible. This requires, on the side of investors and suppliers, higher-quality preparation, more willingness to apply both new and traditional building technologies, to shorten the time of construction, to increase discipline, to improve the quality of the organization of work, and especially to deal with greater respect for the living environment.

The most serious problems for the inhabitants of the residential developments on the right bank of the Danube are caused by municipal mass transportation. We have been searching for years for a more efficient solution of transportation difficulties. We are forced to do this, among other reasons, because of the insufficient capacity of the bridges across which we transport inhabitants from Petržalka, which has a population of 100,000 by now. At the same time, these same bridges are also used for extensive international transit traffic. We have devoted ourselves considerably to the clarification of the concept of a rapid transit system, which, according to Slovak and foreign specialists, could radically change the situation, and in the future might become the carrying system of urban mass transportation. We are meeting with understanding on the part of both party and government agencies and I am certain that, through joint endeavors over almost 15 years, we will soon reach the final decision concerning its construction.

In the Seventh 5-Year Plan we devote a particular attention to creation and protection of the environment. The second joint session of the CPSL City Committee and the National Committee of our city--which took place in September--acknowledged that the worsening of air pollution has stopped. Wide-ranging campaigns, the process of awareness, social pressure and support of the central bodies have all created an atmosphere in which--even though not yet all and everyone--most enterprises and citizens have begun to approach the protection and creation of the environment and the overall cleanliness and order in the city more responsibly.

12634

CSO: 2400/172

## HUNGARY

### MIKLOS SEES CHURCH, STATE RELATIONS AS MODEL FOR BLOC STATES

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 50, 15 Dec 84 p 11

[Interview with Imre Miklos, chairman of the State Office for Church Affairs, Hungarian People's Republic, by Witold Pawlowski and Stanislaw Podemski: "Bread and Wine Are Here Again," under the rubric "The State and the Church in Hungary"]

[Text] [Question] The church-state separation existing in Hungary precludes the possibility of keeping any kind of denominational statistics, and that is obvious. However, the authorities of a certainty have some general idea as to the numerical size of the various denominations, don't they?

[Answer] In Hungary belonging to one denomination or another is the private affair of the citizens, and indeed the last known statistics on the numbers of the adherents of various churches date back to 1949. Besides, how is it possible to consider accurately in numerical terms such a fluid and relative phenomenon as attitude to religion, creed, faith? One person may think that he is still a believer, but he is no longer one, while for another the converse is true! Are believers only those who pay the church tax regularly, or do they include those who pay it irregularly? Or can belonging to a religious denomination be judged according to how often or how rarely a person attends mass? That's nonsense! The influence of the individual churches and the numbers of their adherents in Hungary follow the traditional, historical proportions. Two-thirds of the believers are Catholics and the remainder are chiefly Lutherans and Calvinists but also Adventists, Baptists, the [Greek and Russian] Orthodox, Israelites and representatives of many other, smaller religious communities. The total number of religions and denominational associations is not more than 20 and varies often.

[Question] Are the relations between believers and nonbelievers characterized by a spirit of tolerance or rather by one of hostility? Do the clergy and adherents of the various denominations cooperate harmoniously, or do they on the contrary compete for influence and followers?

[Answer] The policy of uniting believers and nonbelievers (or too adherents of different religions) is an important part of the party's policy; it lies in the interest of the wellbeing of the common fatherland. It has had a long and arduous but also fruitful period of development. The demolition, years ago, of the legal barriers to denominational equality and the consistent--since 1956--and steady party policy of promoting social accord (a policy of which religious peace is an essential part) have produced fruits which we are harvesting now.

On 29 March of this year happened something truly unprecedented in our history. And when I say this, please believe that I'm very cautious in my judgments and pronouncements. It was then that the leaders of all religious denominations and a large group of other clergymen gathered in the Parliament Building in order to consider their responsibility for the fate of the fatherland and mankind. Those sitting together in the presidium of that meeting included: Cardinal and Primate of Hungary Dr Laszlo Lekai, Bishop of the Evangelic Church Dr Zoldan Kaldy and the Chief Rabbi Dr Laszlo Salgo. It was not the state authorities that had initiated and organized this constructive meeting but the religious communities, and we were merely a group of invited guests. The published resolution of that conference states, among other things: "We appeal to our brothers and sisters to display sacrificial love and a greater feeling of responsibility for the cause of the national effort intended to not only preserve the existing accomplishments but also promote the further peaceful development of the country. We are doing this in the conviction that only joint action and jointly accepted responsibility can produce results." Such a thing could not have been even dreamed of in the past, let alone seriously considered.

[Question] At the conference of the representatives of all denominations to which you refer, Chief Rabbi Dr Salgo stated eloquently that, "We rejoice because we have again bread and wine in the fatherland."

[Answer] He expressed it beautifully. The road which we traveled together has been long, but the point is that on it everyone has abandoned monologue and conviction in his own infallibility in favor of an open dialogue. In the September issue of the Catholic monthly CHRISTMAS EVE [Hungarian title not given] you will find the latest proof of this: the statement by the Secretary of the Hungarian Episcopate Dr J. Cserhati that the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary does not arrogate to itself the right to the exclusive knowledge of the truth about the country's social and political problems. For years now, the state and party leadership has been holding annual meetings with religious leaders and keeping them informed about the country's situation. Clearly, such meetings include discussion of public affairs.

[Question] In Poland it is considered noteworthy that in Hungary there are no lay Christian organizations such as the PAX, the Christian Social Association and the clubs of Catholic intelligentsia, which have become a prominent component of our social panorama.

[Answer] Both clergymen and laymen in Hungary have, however, many opportunities for social and political meetings and undertakings. The National Peace Council includes a Catholic commission, as well as an interdenominational commission. The clergy and laymen participate in the work of the Patriotic National Front and serve as parliamentary deputies and municipal councilmen, with two clergymen even belonging to the Council of State. Altogether, several hundred such individuals are thus involved in various kinds of public activity. The Catholic press consists of many publications, ranging from the social weekly THE NEW MAN [Hungarian title not given] (circulation 90,000) to the cultural monthly CHRISTMAS EVE (circulation 12,000). These are autonomous publishing houses which decide on their own profile and interests in social and economic questions, including those of the economic reform.

[Question] We know of the Vatican's pressure on clergymen who hold government posts in Nicaragua, and of the attendant demands that these clergymen withdraw from public activity. There is no such thing in Hungary, since a canon is a member of the Council of State, a Catholic priest is a parliamentary deputy and a cardinal is a member of the Patriotic People's Front.

[Answer] We know of no such pressure here. It had been attempted long ago by Pope Pius XII and afterward it took as many as 15 years to abandon mistaken decisions and repair mutual relations. Exactly 20 years ago we concluded an agreement with the Apostolic See that specifies in detail mutual relations and bilateral interests. The conclusion of that agreement was preceded by a long personal talk between J. Kadar and Pope Paul VI. Since then we have been adhering to that agreement, and to its every point at that, and we have the right to expect the same thing of our partner. He must understand and respect our interests, just as we respect his interests, and this is not a question of doing favors. So far as Nicaragua is concerned, it is really difficult to understand certain things. Either this shows a lack of consistency, or it precisely shows consistency--and then the matter becomes much more serious. Because after all, how can it be that it is bad for clergymen to help the poor and oppressed in their own countries, but it is permitted for clergymen in the socialist countries to hold masses and on occasion to attack the government? Or perhaps the former is forbidden but the latter is even recommended? We observe carefully such measures, which have also taken place in other countries, and I do not conceal that they impair our trust and of a certainty are postponing the moment when full diplomatic relations can be established with the Apostolic See. We are saying this loudly and openly. We are trying to view all this dispassionately, to understand various circumstances, factors and interests. In Nicaragua certain occurrences became intensified during the pre-election campaign in the United States. Perhaps here too certain pressures were exerted? This cannot be precluded. Of course, I have no proof of this, but such suppositions are not altogether groundless.

[Question] Will Pope John Paul II come to Hungary? Your pardon is requested if this question were to be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic.

[Answer] This question has more than once been asked in this office by representatives of the Western press. Thus I see no reason why I should not answer it when asked by journalists from a socialist country. On the contrary, I'm authorized to reveal to you more than I had stated in the past. Moreover, this question is neither indelicate nor an interference in our internal affairs. The question of the Pontiff's coming to Hungary is not on the agenda, and it has not even been raised officially, because the Apostolic See has never asked for an invitation; it had not been raised until the sojourn of the Primate J. Glemp in Hungary last summer. During the solemn mass in the Esztergon Basilica, which I had attended, Cardinal Glemp expressed in his sermon the hope that the Pontiff would be soon welcomed in that basilica. This was caught up by the world press, which treated it as a certainty that the cardinal had conveyed the papal wish in this manner. From the outset I believed that there was no such intention, nor such authorization, although of course an attempt at mediation by Cardinal Glemp cannot be precluded. But that was rather an effective oratorical ending of a sermon. That is why in the interview I granted to the Italian IL GIORNO, on answering a similar question, I had declared that, insofar as I'm familiar with Vatican diplomacy (and I've been dealing with it regularly for 20 years), I can't assume that it has chosen such a path of securing an invitation for the Pontiff to come to Hungary. The matter is simply too serious. This interview was read by Cardinal Casaroli, who, during a meeting with me, said that he was in complete agreement with me on this and that I interpreted the matter rightly. That's all I have to say on this subject.

[Question] Foreign publications that are not well-disposed toward Hungary state that part of the believing youth is dissenting from religious leaders and setting up informal groups for religious renewal, and that it resents the clergy for its supposedly submissive attitude toward the apparatus of state and proclaims pacifist slogans.

[Answer] Gentlemen, you should distinguish between two phenomena. First, the formation of intradenominational communities whose exclusive aim is to deepen, refine and renew religious feelings. It is not our affair to assess that movement, particularly considering that the Church's long history abounds in diverse aspirations and tendencies of which some have completely disappeared while others, such as the Reformation, have led to lasting and irreversible changes. But this does not concern such groups. For at the same time there also arise small communities bearing various appellations which raise doubts about church discipline, question the tenets of the hierarchy and even of the Pontiff himself (there exist proofs of this) and appeal for boycotting legal obligations. To these individuals it seems that they are creating an upsurge of changes in the Church, whereas in reality they merely reflect broader currents of a different genesis. These are small groups whose size we estimate at a couple of thousand persons, but they are active, visible and mobile. Their composition is besides diverse, including both those who know well their aims and those unaware of them and instead concentrating on their own religious experiences. Their leaders are persons who sometimes can hardly be considered young. Does the existence of these other groups worry and disturb us? Of course, it does, because it creates problems: it disturbs

social peace and influences state-Church and government-ecclesiastical hierarchy relations as well as internal peace of the Church.

[Question] Is a religious renaissance occurring in Hungary or, on the contrary, do consumerist and bourgeois moods cause the temples to be empty even on holidays?

[Answer] In Hungary we can speak neither of a religious renaissance nor of a decay of faith. The churches are full on Sundays and holidays. Does this mean that the number of believers has increased? I believe that the proportions have remained the same as in the past, except that now more people attend churches because the fear is gone and people have the courage to demonstrate their faith publicly. Let us also add that interest in Christianity, religion and religious denominations has now increased. But is such interest at once tantamount to full acceptance? Curiosity is a splendid trait of youth. Why should people learn about Greek or Roman mythology but not about the Bible? Here there is a kind of gap which is filled by interest in the churches. A large cross hanging on the chest of a young man sometimes seems hard to bear and often is disproportionate to the magnitude of faith. This is simply a fad. But it also is incontestable that the war psychosis prompts people toward faith. In sum, there are many factors accounting for such great interest in faith, but it is difficult to encompass this phenomenon in precise statistics or classifications.

[Question] Legislation specifying in detail the relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church is being drawn up in Poland. Is similar work under way in Hungary? We are aware that the Hungarian laws dealing with these matters derive from various periods (and even from the 19th century) and are of a rather fragmentary nature.

[Answer] I don't see the need for such legislative solutions in this country. We rather prefer resolving matters and problems as they arise, depending on the time and circumstances. A couple of instances: Previously, correspondence courses in theology could not be taught. When the need for them arose, we met with representatives of the Church, discussed the matter, and it is now permitted. Previously also the teaching of religion in rectories had not been possible. We held meetings and discussions, and now this teaching is possible. In 1950 monastic orders were in principle abolished in Hungary. Four such orders, operating schools that made great contributions to education, have survived. We see no need for restoring the other monastic orders, but now social considerations and those of charity are in favor of granting consent to the establishment of a monastic sisterhood whose interests are focused on charitable works. We are granting consent to it, and it is up to the Episcopate to decide when and which sisterhood will commence its activities. In Hungary, as in many other countries besides, there is a shortage of clergymen. Hence, the participation of laymen in ecclesiastical service is understandable. We support it, acknowledge the right of believers to such participation and also engage in negotiations on this subject. In 1950, when the agreement with the Episcopate had been signed, no such need had existed, but it exists now and so we negotiate.

[Question] What is the scale of the social, educational and charitable activities of the churches?

[Answer] It complements the state's activities in these domains. The struggle against the habit of drunkenness as well as family care, care for the sick, and the propagation of work ethics all are activities in which the churches are involved, and the number of the ecclesiastical institutions pursuing these goals reaches 50. In addition, denominational organizations operate 10 secondary and elementary schools with an aggregate enrollment of 3,000. Eight of these schools belong to the Roman Catholic Church, one is operated by the Reformed Church and one by the Jewish community. These schools have exactly the same rights as state schools. The number of their graduates who go on to higher studies does not diverge from the proportions attained in the state school system. Religion is taught not only in the schools operated by the religious denominations but also in the entire remaining school system, though of course on a completely voluntary basis. The number of students attending these courses is small, however, being no higher than 4 percent. We have also said that those who fear to sign up their children for religious instruction in [state] schools have the option of sending them to catechism classes in the church or the rectory. We are not investigating how many pupils attend these classes.

[Question] Are the social services provided by the churches subsidized by the state?

[Answer] This subsidy amounts to 70-80 million forints annually and is distributed in proportion to the needs of the individual denominations. Of course, the largest proportion is received by the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, one-third of the architectural landmarks in Hungary belongs to religious organizations. Thus, we also defray the cost of the preservation and repair of these buildings from the funds earmarked for this purpose in the state budget.

[Question] Do you believe that the model of state-Church relations adopted in Hungary can be of value and significance to other socialist countries as well?

[Answer] Of course, we have no ambition of applying the experience we gained over the years to other countries with their different present, past and traditions. The existing differences do not encourage this. I believe though, speaking very cautiously, that certain aspects of the state-Church relations that we have worked out may also be suitable elsewhere as additional components of a different situation and a different concatenation of circumstances.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

1386

CSO: 2600/456

## HUNGARY

### MORE ON MEETING BETWEEN SARLOS, CHURCH LEADERS

AU172017 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 15 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by Peter Vertessy: "With Common Responsibility"]

[Summary] "It is an old and good tradition of our social life that PPF leaders invite representatives of the Hungarian churches and denominations for a friendly discussion each year. However, it was for the first time that church leaders acquainted themselves with the problems of our country and the world and the tasks facing our country at the invitation of and as guests of a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers at the Parliament on the Thursday [13 December] of the week coming to an end. Deputy Premier Istvan Sarlos' words of invitation stressed that it follows naturally from the good relationship of a partnership that has developed as a result of the joint work of decades between the Hungarian state and the Hungarian churches that, as the year is approaching its end, the state leadership counts on the help and views of the Hungarian churches and denominations in the work of stocktaking, in responsible reviewing the tasks of the coming year, which will be a festive one in the country's life."

The meeting was, indeed, a genuine and informal discussion. "As the deputy premier stressed in his introductory remarks, each person seated in the hall--each one of them in his own position--is a representative of the country's people, both the state leadership and the leadership of the churches share in the problems and joys of the greater community, the fatherland. The fact that relations are good and can stand the test of an international comparison in Hungary can justify everyone hoping--believers and nonbelievers alike--that every citizen will develop for the good of Hungary as a whole in the future as well."

Istvan Sarlos then briefly reviewed the international situation and the country's domestic position and our achievements. "He spoke frankly about problems as well, for instance about the fact that we must notice even in the struggle to preserve the standard of living that certain strata and groups of the population have recently been encountering material problems. He noted that a series of measures are included in the government's plans to alleviate the problems of these strata and also to make the distribution of assets fairer--on the basis of the quantity and quality of the work performed. He noted also that the overwhelming

majority of our people support the policy of the party and the government. Nonetheless, one cannot expect a complete accord in the appraisal of certain issues and one should realistically see that there are people who sometimes adopt a position of complete rejection. In such situations, persuasion and debate are the working method of the state and party leadership; in the same way, Hungarian foreign policy, which is so highly valued and acknowledged in the world, also regards dialogue as the only rational path that can lead to a settlement of conflicts."

The church leaders spoke of the importance of winning respect for Hungarian domestic and foreign policy throughout the world. Cardinal Laszlo Lekai noted that the international conferences held in our country this year provided an outstanding opportunity for this. "Presbyterian Bishop Tibor Bartha spoke about constructive cooperation between our state and the churches, adding that this relationship has an impact on the international atmosphere as well." Lutheran Bishop Zoltan Kaldi noted that believers feel well in society. "Chief Rabbi Laszlo Salgo added: For the Hungarian Jewry, only the liberation and this society could allow us to live in a fraternal relationship, as equals, with the other denominations. The members of the free churches also feel at home in this fatherland, as equal members of the great family of the Hungarian churches, stressed Jozsef Szakacs, president of the Council of Free Churches."

Sincere and responsible words were uttered at this discussion in parliament. "They were spoken in the spirit of the policy of which the stable nature of relations between the state and the churches--sometimes also entailing debates--is an important achievement, in the spirit of an atmosphere that made it natural for the churches to choose 'with responsibility for the fatherland and mankind' for the slogan of their interdominational peace conference in March.

"For the responsibility--that of all citizens--is truly a common one."

CSO: 2500/142

HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED

LD040238 [Editorial Report] Budapest television in Hungarian from 2050 GMT to 2150 GMT on 3 January carries its program "Program 66" during which Kalman Kulcsar, deputy secretary general of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is interviewed. The program's host is Janos Ban.

The program is called "66" because the studio audience comprises 66 persons, each with buttons to press to vote on questions raised by the host. They can also raise issues.

The first question Ban raised regarded the reason behind the modernization taking place in Hungary. Kulcsar discussed modernization endeavours from the last century to the present and said Hungary has no alternative but to modernize in the present world economic situation, thus the new stage of the economic reform.

The audience raised questions concerning the considerably higher performance and rewards of those working in the small economic collectives, as compared to those working in the large enterprises.

Kulcsar said: "Let me say right away that it is not the case that the Hungarian worker or peasant or whoever does not work as well as those workers in Austria or Finland, to mention only countries in some way comparable to ours. Those in the economic working collectives are not only working very hard because they receive more money--so that one might argue we should pay higher wages so that they would then work better during normal working hours as well, whereas others might argue we should work better and then be paid more, thus there might be an egg-chicken argument here. In my opinion, this is not the only decisive factor; what also matters is who the people are working in the small economic collectives. In other words, who are the people allowed to participate. I have a feeling that only those who work well are admitted, who know how to work and are not lazy. Secondly, one must look at the organizational level of the economic working collectives. Could the same be achieved within the framework of a large enterprise? Organizing this and finding the optimal situation is a social problem. The economic working collectives can achieve things on a small scale that would be far more difficult to do on a large scale. Naturally, it is much easier on a small scale.

"Further, there is the question of numbers. The number of those working in economic collectives is not very high on a national scale. I do not want to

give an absolute figure as this changes daily. However, it is below 200,000. Thus, there are still very few people working in the collectives. The smoke is much bigger than the fire.

"Thirdly, is this a temporary phenomenon or one that will exist in the long run? I believe this is a long-term phenomenon. In my opinion the conditions that have brought about the economic working collectives and that keep them alive are not temporary factors. They will not disappear in a year or two."

Kulcsar was then asked about the effect people working during their 'free' time had on their families. He explained that people with more children naturally need even more money and that the Hungarian economy's present performance does not make radical wage rises possible. "This is not a question of whether the political leadership wants to give the money or not; rather, it is whether we can produce the extra to distribute or not. However, I believe the present regulators provide much more scope for enterprise managements to differentiate in the wages sphere and believe if the enterprise managements truly make use of this possibility--and this is something not solely dependent on the will of the management, but on the collective as a whole, because one can envisage a situation where those who cannot provide a very good performance, who do not work as well within a given collective use various channels, trade union and so on, to express views about social considerations and talk about tensions. The enterprise management consequently is afraid to make use of this possibility. This is a realistic danger than must be kept in mind. There can be conflicts arising within the enterprises. But this is a conflict the enterprise managements must accept and which those workers who work better and want to work better, must also accept. False humanitarianism or social considerations should not be permitted to prevent this differentiation."

The next set of questions concerned the proportion of white collar workers in the working population. Kulcsar said that 30 percent of all active wage earners belong to the white collar stratum, roughly the same percentage as in the FRG. Of this 30 percent, 27 percent have a university education. Kulcsar opined that there are indeed too many white collar workers in relation to the country's economic development but not enough professionals with the highest level of qualifications.

Janos Ban then asked the audience to vote on whether Hungary has enough democratic forums and, if so, whether the population makes adequate use of them. Of the 66 members of the audience, 53 voted that there are enough forums but not enough use made of them.

Kulcsar said: "The political and economic spheres cannot be divorced from each other. They have never been separate in Hungary and in this region where we live. For historical reasons politics has always had an extra weight in other spheres, including the economy, as well. It follows from this that if there is some sort of movement in the economy, if the economic reform progresses, then the political system cannot and has not remained untouched. The voting that we have just seen: namely, that we have enough institutions but do not make full use of them is, in my opinion, very close to the truth. We had many democratic institutions granted to us constitutionally and organizationally

even in the worst periods without us making use of them. Recently there have been a number of measures within the political system itself working in this direction. Let me mention just two or three: increasing the significance of self-management, of local self-government, which can provide a counterweight in time to the excess weight of the center, where people who are interested and possess the relevant knowledge can begin making decisions. Secondly, the elections, which will be conducted differently this year. Finally, a factor to which I attribute great importance; namely, the Constitutional Council, which makes the revision of decrees contravening the Constitution possible.

"However, all this will only function if political culture changes. In other words, the elections will be other than formal if people attend the nomination meetings, speak, and make recommendations. If we do not do this, then quite clearly it is difficult to envisage this type of step forward.

"It is not that the economy endangers public life; rather the contrary. The independence being developed in the economy by the regulators and the possibilities, or the increase in independence, increasingly educates people to become more independent politically as well, to think more independently. Thus, it is precisely in this way that public life can be developed."

No further processing planned.

CSO: 2500/102

## NEW COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIONAL FORMS

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 12, 84 pp 50-54

[Article by Tibor Balint, member of Administrative Department of MSZMP Central Committee: "The Borough Council Is the New Representative Form of the Community"]

[Text] As a result of the recent changes, joint councils have become the prevalent form in the network of community councils. More than half of the community population (2.6 million Hungarian citizens) live in communities belonging to joint councils. 1 million of them live in so-called non-residential associated communities of the joint councils, i.e., not in the community where the council resides.

In 1950 when the council system was set up, councils were still elected separately in almost every community. Out of the 2978 community councils there were only 170 managing the populations of several--a grand total of 361--settlements. At that time this solution was necessary, but later the division into small units started to make the work of the community councils more and more difficult.

Establishing joint councils as a new form offered itself as a way out of the difficulties. The process got started in connection with concentrating the collective farms, above all in counties having small villages. When the collective farms were merged mainly for reasons of economy, there arose a situation of large enterprises extending to areas of several communities each having their own independent council. This caused overlapping and agreement difficulties in the council work connected with the collectives. In order to solve this problem, settlements that were close began to be placed under a joint council. Unifications started also with the organizations providing commercial and residential services (as in the case of the state consumer and marketing collectives), which again stimulated the organization of joint councils.

This solution of the problems also had the advantage that setting up joint councils made it possible to concentrate the material means of the investments connected with the basic supply of the needs of the communities. Thus individual establishments (schools, kindergartens,

roads, water works, etc.) could be constructed faster. For similar reasons the managements of the institutions fulfilling the health care, instructional and cultural demands of small settlements were replaced by district managements. A further stimulus for setting up joint councils was the fact that they made possible in each place the operation of a larger and more competent council apparatus. This was an important condition for the greater independence of the local councils: that they should be able to deal with problems where they emerged.

As a result of decentralizing their realm of action, the first instance legal authority of the local councils, including the joint community councils, has become virtually complete. There remained only a few types of problems--those which demand specialized knowledge or, because of their rare occurrence cannot be reasonably dealt with on the community level--that are not under the jurisdiction of the community councils. The latter not only have at their disposal almost all of the legal authority but they also maintain the institutions fulfilling the basic demands concerning health, instruction and culture, they organize commercial supply and services, take care of the harmonious development of the settlements, regulate the local conditions of life and take care of those tasks of state administration which directly concern the population. It is fair to say that the joint community councils are today the high-quality organizers of the public and community life of the villages, the successful executors of the policy of the party.

Higher-paced organization of the joint councils concluded in the second half of the 70's. In 1966 we had 343 joint community councils, and in 1973 already 685. At present, of the 2957 communities 661 have a council of their own and 2296 settlements have been organized into 720 joint councils. Thus there are 720 so-called residential associated communities, and there are 1576 settlements qualified as nonresidential associated communities of the joint councils.

The joint councils have become stabilized. Their population accepts the advantages of this form, it looks upon belonging together as natural, and demands it. However, in connection with the community problems of the villages, especially the smaller settlements, with their reduction in population and with their defective supply with necessities, opinions begin to be heard according to which, as a consequence of establishing the joint council, the council actually moved out of the communities and left the non-council-residence settlements to fend for themselves.

\* \* \*

The organization of joint councils accompanied not only the tightening of the professional management structure following rational considerations, but also the merging of the representative authorities of the settlements.

The representative authorities of the joint councils, the council organizations, are made up of the council members elected in the individual associated communities. Thus, the council is the common organization of the associated communities, having the basic function of integrating the common interests of the associated communities and of securing priority for the common interests. The representational system of the associated communities of the joint councils showed itself able to express the common interests of the associated communities, but experience has shown that it did not leave sufficient margin for clarifying the special interests of the individual settlements, such as may not even be significant from the points of view of the other associated communities or of the joint council. The representational mechanism of the joint councils did not possess a clear organizational framework for the efficient realization of these special interests. Especially in the nonresidential associated communities, there was a gap concerning representation on the independent settlement level and strength of community organization such as could not everywhere be filled completely by the council member groups consisting of the council members of the associated communities.

In the wake of further developing local party and state management, strong voices have again been heard advocating that the management independence, responsibility and involvement of the local councils be increased, the circle of their own revenues be widened, opening up even further the local resources that can be utilized for the development of the settlements. Prime importance was given to the demand that the councils should exploit the possibilities of cooperating with each other and with the councils of the cities (large communities having city rights) acting as a center of attraction. Converting to this system of city-environment-management increased the elbow room of the community councils. Increasing the independence of decision is creating a new situation also in the mutual relationships between the associated communities belonging to the joint councils: it continues to intensify the significance of the fact that the interests of the associated communities can be considered, together with the responsibility of the council bodies and members.

For these reasons it has become necessary to further develop the representation of the associated communities and various suggestions have been presented. According to one, the council member groups should be given greater authority. Another one was that the associated communities should have their own council bodies, and these latter should constitute the joint council together.

When weighing the suggestions, the fundamental criterion has been that organizing the associated community representation situation should not make the council system development more complicated on the one hand, neither should it result in losing the advantages of the institution of community joint councils on the other. A solution had to be found taking

into consideration the fact that only then will the representation of the associated communities be efficient, the leading representative of the council members of the associated communities be accepted by the surroundings as their own leader when behind him there stands an institutionalized organization with appropriate political weight and with well-defined rights. Thus will the consciousness of "our council members" be complemented with the consciousness of "our organization". It was on this basis that the decision to set up borough councils was born.

\* \* \*

The borough councils--which will be formed in the nonresidential associated communities after the general elections in 1985--will function as part of the council system but as the representational organizations of the associated communities. In the individual associated communities people elect, as before, the members of the community joint council, and the council members elected in a nonresidential community constitute together the borough council of the given community. Basically this means that the council members elected in the nonresidential associated communities of the joint council will have a "double" membership: on the one hand, they will be members of the joint council, and on the other, of the borough council of their own community; they will collectively represent the associated community both in the joint council and before other organizations.

Participating in the work of the borough council broadens the contents of council member representation and of council member responsibility. The council member represents his own electoral district in the joint council and in the work of the borough council, while at the same time he represents the interests of the entire associated community before the joint council and its organizations.

The legally binding decree modifying the law on councils has circumscribed the basic tasks and the authority of the borough councils. Since, however, the associated communities are not alike, and their circumstances are different from each other, it is possible to define in a unified manner only the organizational form of the associated-community representation, its place within the council organization and the chief elements of its authority. Those directly involved--the local councils and the borough councils--have the task of filling out the uniformly established framework with contents oriented on local conditions. For doing this, the party organs and organizations responsible for directing the work of the councils must furnish appropriate ideological-political suggestions.

One of the most important tasks of the borough councils is to represent the interests of the population of the associated communities in the joint council and before other organizations. At a first glance it would

seem that stressing the representation of the interests of the associated communities is superfluous, this demand being natural. However, the council law invests the borough council, as a body of the associated communities, with an added authority not given to the council members personally. Thus, for example, upon initiative of the borough council the joint council must be convened. The council, or rather, the executive committee must repeatedly discuss decisions concerning the associated community considered injurious by the borough council. Suggestions of the borough council must be incorporated in the planned schedule of the council and of the executive committee respectively. If any scheduled item concerns the associated community, the representative of the borough council must be invited to the session of the executive committee, with a right to participate in the discussion. The council law also declares that when the council bodies must bring a decision concerning the residential community such that would, in the cases of the other associated communities, belong under the jurisdiction of the borough council, only the council members of the residential community shall participate in the voting.

The representation of the interests of the associated communities in the joint council cannot be restricted to representation before the council bodies. The borough councils' points of view formed while exercising their rights of agreement and critique may also not be neglected in the course of making decisions in questions of professional management.

The other direction of representing the interests of the associated communities has to do with non-council organizations. The borough councils possess, so to speak, their own jurisdiction to conduct business with various organizations; and the authorities and the farming or service organizations are under obligation to properly deal with the requests and suggestions of the borough councils. This authorization creates, also in this respect, a possibility for the efficient representation of interests. To make this possibility a reality, it is necessary for those realistic, well-founded demands of the borough councils, which are within the framework of legal regulations, to receive appropriate political support. For this reason, also the party organizations concerned must pay keen attention to the functioning of the borough councils, promoting the interests of the associated community, noting how such action is being received.

A principle that can be followed is that the direct political management of the borough councils should be done by the party organization active in the associated community. Where there is none, there it is reasonable to commission the party member(s) living or working in the associated community to occupy themselves with the activities of the borough councils.

The other important task of the borough councils is organizing the community life of the associated community. The tasks vary from one settlement to the other and demand cooperation with the social and mass organizations active in the communities. Such tasks are dealing with the everyday problems of the population, starting social work actions, organizing help for the elderly, organizing the various forums of public life, taking care of public places, etc. It must be stressed that the borough councils do not take over the functions of the office holders of the joint council or of its professional management organization, but that, according to the demands of the settlement, they fulfill those organizational tasks of public and community life which demand independent activity.

\* \* \*

The borough councils make their own decisions about how to utilize the material means at their disposal. Within their economic possibilities it is, however, a good idea to distinguish between the financial means assured for the totality of communities belonging to the joint council on the one hand, and, those coming from the local cooperation and special support of the individual associated communities on the other. Dividing the developmental means dealt with by the joint council among the associated communities or the borough councils would not be a good idea, since that way, after all, precisely the advantages of concentrating the financial means would be vitiated. Decisions about investments satisfying the joint demands of several associated communities must still be made by the joint council. On the other hand, in developmental questions concerning only one individual associated community--especially, when the development is to be paid for by the joint effort of the populace or from support given to that particular associated community--the borough councils must play a decisive role. Neither is it unimaginable that the borough councils should, on the basis of a decision by the joint council, have disposition over a certain part of the financial means for development. The sums handed over to them, if complemented, for example, by social work done by the people, can make it possible to solve the most urgent problems of the settlement (building sidewalks, roads, bridges; setting up waiting rooms for people using public conveyances; planting trees; etc.). It is not so much the amount of the independently usable financial means that counts as their significance in community politics.

Another area of management by the borough councils is connected with the small-scale maintenance and repair works. It would not be practical, however, to entrust the borough councils with directing the functioning of the council institutions in the associated community; not only would doing so create an unnecessary burden on these organizations without an apparatus, but it would also complicate, without any good reason, the bookkeeping and accounting mechanism. On the other hand, the borough councils may play an important role in supervising the functions of such institutions and watching their work.

Possibility will be given for the joint council to let the borough council exercise some of its authority. The joint council will determine those groups of cases in which, before deciding them, the borough council's opinion or concurrence must be requested. The legal regulations may also directly give the borough councils the right to make decisions. To press for their greater participation makes sense first of all in cases where a correct decision can only be made with a thorough knowledge of the locale, or where it is desirable that community participation should play a greater role, that society's supervision of administration should become stronger.

\* \* \*

The administrative tasks of the borough councils must be determined with circumspection. It must not be forgotten that they have no separate office organization and, besides, their purpose is not to settle individual affairs. The present forms of management services in the associated communities remain unchanged. For example, in the associated community office hours must be held by the office holders and professional management customers must be received in the same manner as at present. When regulating the rights to decide, agree and critique, one must also consider the fact that, on account of the different sizes of the associated communities, the borough councils may not be given equal burdens. There will be those that--because of the small population--function with only three people, while others will have many times this number. Because of the different circumstances it is easily possible that not even in communities belonging to the same joint council can rights be exercised in an identical fashion.

It would not be practical to prescribe in detail the functioning of the borough councils. As to their sessions, there are no rigid rules; actually, they will only hold sessions when necessary in order for the body to take a stance or to form a common opinion. For being able to decide and to make a decision the well-known majority principle holds. An important obligation of the borough council as a body is to give account of its work and its plans at the village gathering, before the population of the associated community.

The borough councils elect from among their members a borough council president who leads the sessions and represents the borough council. It is very important that the borough council president of the associated community should be a council member well-known at his residence and having great social and moral authority there. The council members divide up among each other the work in the borough council done as a commission by society, taking into account their abilities and how busy they are. It will not be absolutely necessary for them to exercise their authority as borough councilmen always as a body. The practical way of doing things is that for each partial activity that one among them should be responsible who, on the basis of his professional knowledge, expertise and interests is best qualified to deal with the given task.

STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP DELIBERATED

Warsaw STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNE in Polish No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 11-27

[Article by Jerzy J. Wiatr, Warsaw University: "Political Leadership in Poland in the Light of Sociological Studies"]

[Text] Politics cannot be understood without considering the role of leaders, just as besides the role of leaders cannot be understood without analyzing the historical context in which they act, and particularly the alignment of the class forces, the intensity and nature of the coeval political and ideological conflicts and the political culture in which these leaders have grown up and happen to operate. Already elsewhere I have drawn attention to the availability of important and valuable analyses of this problem in the tradition of the Marxist teachings of politics and the sociology of political relations; in particular, I refer here to Marx's "The Eighteenth of Brumaire and Louis Bonaparte," with its incomparable study of the role played by a rather mediocre leader who derived his strength from the legend of his great paternal uncle, as well as to Engels's analysis of the role of Luther and Muenzer in "The Peasant War in Germany."/1/ It was precisely in referring to Engels that Julian Hochfeld provided the following concise and at the same time extraordinarily perceptive characterization of the nature of the approach used by Engels (and at the same time typical to Marxism in general) to the evaluation and characterization of the leader:

Underlying Engels's characterization of Luther as a leader of bourgeois-moderate reform and Muenzer as a leader of the peasant-plebeian party is an analysis of not only the doctrines but also and above all the practical activities of these men. Three themes can be found in Engel's characterization. One: the leader's attitude toward the peculiarly conditioned, vacillating and opportunist awareness predominant in a given class; it is an element of the historical situation which, to be sure, the leader has to take into account, but which he can alter if in addition to realism of outlook he also does not lack greatness and foresight. Two: the extent to which the leader comprehends the objective class interest of which he desires to be the spokesman,

as well as the objective conflict of class interests at a given place and time; if the great and farsighted leader does not lack realism of outlook as well as political talents (on assuming as well that he is not a spokesman of interests that are irretrievably doomed by the development of productive forces or hopelessly utopian owing to the lack of prospects for linking them to that development in some not too distant future), then the determination of an optimal combination of purposes, chances and means as well as the offering and implementation of a program close to a concretely outlined model of objective class interests are possible and attainable. The third theme is the tragedy of the leader who has been turned by his own character and temperament or by external circumstances into the spokesman for an extremely radical political wing of a class which /is not yet/ or /already is/ [emphasized] capable of proposing maximalist program variants but /already/ or /not yet/ [emphasized] (or even in general) lacks any opportunity for implementing such variants./2/

Marx's analysis of Louis Bonaparte considers two additional themes. The first is the relationship between the personal traits of the leader and the attributes of the movement (class, stratum) which brings him to power. Louis Bonaparte, a rather ordinary individual, is named by Marx as a person whose very ordinariness became the trait desired by the nascent coalition of forces of the postrevolutionary Center. Generally speaking, Marx pointed to the relationship between the context in which a leader acts and his personal traits. The nature of this relationship is a kind of selection patterned on natural selection in biology. From among the countless number of potential pretendants, the successful one will be he whose personal traits fit best a particular historical situation. The second leitmotif is the question of the legend. There would have been no Napoleon III without his great uncle. "Napoleonic ideas" are an example of a myth that sometimes surrounds a leader, making of him what the myth's adherents desire to see in him.

A continuation of the themes contained in the aforementioned works by Marx and Engels is of major importance to the development of the Marxist teachings of politics and the Marxist sociology of political relations. However, this continuation is definitely incomplete and inadequate. Present-day Marxists consider problems of this kind too rarely in their works on theory and empirical studies./3/ In Western science, questions of political leadership have long ranked high, owing to the great influence of Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto and Harold Lasswell. In recent years new attempts at an integral approach to the problem have been published, with the especially noteworthy ones being the works of Robert Putnam, Glenn Paige and William Welsh./4/ They are particularly distinguished by their striving to construct a theory of political leadership based on the empirical foundation of comparative studies in political science and sociology. There is in the West no dearth either of studies of the political leadership in the socialist countries./5/ Regardless of the extent to which the inferences formulated in these studies may cause controversies, whether scientific or political, this trend of Western research can in no way be simply ignored. I will not review these interpretations here

in greater detail, as I would merely be repeating what I already have written on the topic./6/ But one thing I wish to stress again here is that it would be desirable for the problem of political leadership to receive more attention in both our works of theory and our empirical studies.

In the literature on the subject so far, three kinds of studies of political leadership may be distinguished. (In addition, studies of the leaders of small groups, including groups of a political nature, are worth noting, but that is a matter outside the scope of the present article.)

The first kind is general works of theory, often focusing on explicit philosophical themes, with the typical author being Thomas Carlyle, Vilfredo Pareto or Max Weber. It appears that more recently such works have been giving way to general-theoretical analyses supported by empirical material, which I would trace to the empirical studies of leadership elites initiated by Lasswell.

The second kind of pertinent literature is the studies of individual great leaders. Sometimes these are attempts to compare two or more leaders belonging to some discernible category. One example of such an analysis is De Wolfe's aforementioned study of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. More often, they are sociologizing biographies of a single leader. The boundary line between studies of this kind and traditional historical biographies is fluid.

The third kind is empirical studies of entire groups of leaders. Their common feature, in addition to their reliance on sociological methods of causal research, sources, is the striving to quantify the attributes of leadership groups. The attributes in question vary. They include: sociological attributes in the strict meaning of the term (such as origin, life history, education, social milieu) and psychological and behavioral attributes (i.e., relating to the particular political actions of leaders). Recently emphasis began to be placed on studies which use the sociological, psychological and behavioral traits of leaders to extrapolate an empirical determination of their influence on politics./7/ I think that this approach is particularly promising.

#### History of Polish Studies

For more than 20 years now Poland has been a subject of systematic empirical studies of political leadership at the local level. The fact that these studies have already been under way so long, that their findings are accumulating and, lastly, that the Polish studies are performed in the context of international comparisons, makes them a significant factor in world science, as reflected in, among others, the aforementioned works by Glenn Paige and William Welsh. What is more, apart from Yugoslavia, Poland is the only socialist country in which studies of this kind have been conducted over a prolonged period of time. This affords a unique opportunity for assessing the problems of the new type of political leadership that has arisen under the conditions of the construction of a socialist system of society.

As noted above, the Polish studies are confined to the local levels of the political system (province, town and gmina [parish], and also, in the 1960's,

the now abolished "powiats" [counties]). This is a major limitation on these studies, which applies not only to Poland (similarly, the Yugoslav studies focus on political leadership in the communes). The principal reason why these studies are confined to the lower levels of political leadership is the restricted access to data. For many years the powiat, the small town and the gmina represented the boundary line that could not be crossed by researchers who wanted to interview leading political activists or study records. It was only in the second half of the 1970's that we had succeeded--and that too to a limited extent--in extending our studies to the leader aktiv of two provinces (Kalisz and Siedlce). Studies of political leadership at the central level have not been feasible so far. In referring here to restrictions on access to data I mean in part the restrictions ensuing from the accepted interpretation of the term "state secret," and in part the limitations due to the time that can be spared [for interviews] by leaders of the state at the supreme level. Still, it is true that so far in this respect we have not availed ourselves completely of even our limited research opportunities and, as a consequence, the existence of this gap is to some extent our own responsibility.

The concentration on the local levels of the political system had also its positive aspects, however. The local level affords particularly great opportunities for comparisons of groups of leaders operating in different yet comparable communities. Inasmuch as the Polish studies have had from the outset explicit theoretical aims, this is an important consideration.

Lastly, the concentration of research at the local level was also due to the fact that the most extensive team studies of the 1960's had been carried out within the framework of comparative cross-national studies of political leadership in Poland, India, Yugoslavia and the United States, and that the topic of these studies was precisely local leadership./8/

The beginnings of the Polish studies of local leaders date back to 1962 when a group of sociologists at Warsaw University headed by Zygmunt Bauman undertook studies of the then so-called "power elite" in selected small communities./9/ These studies, originally conceived very ambitiously, had bogged down, and the sole major result was the valuable monograph on a small town by Winicjusz Narojek./10/ The sociological studies of that period also are linked to the first ever Polish program for studies of the psychosocial attributes of local leaders, formulated by Aleksandra Jasinska, and the implementation of the first analyses of that kind./11/

Following this first and only partially implemented research initiative, the second stage in Polish studies of local leaders was the work of the team of sociologists from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, and Warsaw University, performed under my direction. This team has been handling since 1965 the Polish part of the cross-national study of local leadership in Poland, India, Yugoslavia and the United States. The initiative for that study came from the American political scientist Philip E. Jacob, and the first consultative meeting on the intended study took place during the World Sociological Congress in Washington in 1962. The subsequent 3 years were a period of preparatory, chiefly organizational, work. In the summer of 1965 was held the first of a series of international "roundtable" conferences in

Dubrovnik, and in 1966 all the national teams carried out studies of local leaders with the aid of a jointly agreed-upon questionnaire and collected other data (statistics, documentation, etc.) as well. Several years later, these studies were published in a joint monograph (see n.9).

In Poland the studies comprised 30 powiats and six towns isolated from the powiats: in these towns the studies of leaders were accompanied by comparative community studies. Since the community studies were not conducted in the other countries, the joint monograph includes only the findings of the studies of 888 leaders in 30 powiats. That was the largest and most representative survey of local leaders to be ever conducted in this country. What is more, the comparative interpretation of the findings (against the background of comparable studies in the three other countries) warranted drawing inferences on the common and unique attributes of the Polish local leaders. For many subsequent years the Polish team acted as the initiator and executor of further studies of local leadership, and particularly of political leadership./12/ It is from this period, too, that date certain studies of a theoretical nature, intended to outline the directions of the analysis of political leadership in this country./13/

The cross-national study of local leaders did not end with the publication of the joint monograph. In subsequent years, related international meetings were regularly initiated (among other things, within the framework of the 1978 World Sociological Congress in Uppsala, the 1979 World Congress of Political Sciences in Moscow, and the 1983 Convention of the Society for International Studies in Mexico). Some were held in Poland (in Zaborowo in 1977 and Kalisz in 1979). In 1982, at a conference in Honolulu, the new international scientific organization was finally constituted under the name of the Stein Rokkan International Comparative Archive on Leadership, Participation and Local Government Performance to Meet Social Needs, consisting of scientific teams continuing in one way or another studies based on the assumption and methods of the cross-national comparative study initiated by P. E. Jacob. The Archive collated in computerized form the data collected by studies performed in Finland (1981), France (1979-1981), Holland (since 1979), Hongkong (1980-1982), India (1965-1970), Yugoslavia (1965-1970), South Korea (1980-1982), Poland (since 1965), the Federal Republic of Germany (1980-1981), Singapore (1981-1982), Sweden (1979-1982), Thailand (1979-1980), and the United States (since 1965). The Archive's International Coordination Committee has the task of initiating the exchange of research findings and theoretical analyses and promoting the international comparability of data by extending their scope to additional countries. The establishment of the Stein Rokkan Archive is a new step on the road to the laying of empirical foundations for a consistent theory of political leadership. It is worth noting that the participation of Polish sociologists in this work has from the beginning been particularly notable and fully appreciated by our collaborators in other countries, as reflected in, among other things, the election of the representative of the Polish team to the chairmanship of the International Coordinating Committee. We expect that further work in this field will enable us to carry out a further and more complete theoretical analysis of political leadership at the local level.

The Polish studies, conducted in the 1970's by the joint team of the Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University, and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, and since 1981 by the team of the Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University, were included as topics in the interdisciplinary research problems coordinated by the Institute of Sociology. In the years 1976-1980 they were included in the problem, "Systems of Values and Consumption Patterns in the Polish Society," and in 1981-1985 in the problem, "Economic, Social and Political Mechanisms for Shaping and Meeting Needs"; with the present writer serving as the coordinator of both problems. The inclusion of studies of local government--and, within their framework, of political leadership at the local level--in the comprehensive interdisciplinary research into the meeting of [material and other] needs of the population had, among other things, the advantage of assisting in a more explicit determination of the influence that local leaders can exert on the effectiveness of policies serving to meet the (material and other) needs of the population. Thereby, this shifted the point of gravity from the traditional emphasis on the characteristics and attitudes of activists--which were, however, also surveyed besides--to the aspects of their social roles and the effects of their activities.

The studies during that period comprised:

--in the first stage (1977-1979), six towns that had been studied in 1966: Cieszyn, Tomaszow, Siedlce, Starachowice, Tczew and Zamosc /14/;

--in the second stage (1978-1980), two provinces: Kalisz and Siedlce./15/

Continuation studies have been under way since 1981 in the Kalisz and Siedlce provinces, with the object of determining the extent and direction of the changes in local leadership teams following the 1980-1981 crisis and during the subsequent political changes.

The studies of political leadership have been from the outset an important aspect of the entire program of studies. We proceeded from the assumption that the operating mode of local authorities is markedly determined by the individuals holding the top administrative posts. We have thus devoted a great deal of attention to them. However, our studies were not exclusively centered on studying leaders. They also comprised studies of the local population as well as assessments of the performance of the institutions of local authorities. Hence also, as seems worth stressing to us, the analysis of local leaders has been placed in a context broader than that usually employed in the Western studies.

These studies have led to the publication of numerous works on local leadership in Poland, most of them also presented in English, which made them accessible to the international scientific community./16/ These works contain partial assessments and theoretical hypotheses, and they also document the changes that took place among the aktiv of local leaders over a period of more than 20 years. For these reasons, the Polish studies so far provide the foundation on which it will be possible in the future not only to continue and

add to the gains in empirical knowledge of local leadership but also to formulate a theory of political leadership in a socialism-building society.

This latter consideration requires, however, not only augmenting empirical knowledge. It also requires outlining the perspectives of theory as well as hypotheses without which no theory can arise and there is only mere augmentation of factographic knowledge. The reflections below deal with these issues.

#### "Activists" or "Leaders"?

Let us begin with a terminological problem. The Polish studies dealing with political leadership most often, though not always, employ the term "activist" to denote the individual who holds a particular position that is fairly high in his community or who, owing to other circumstances, exerts a particularly great influence on the course of public affairs. This term is rendered as "leader" by Polish authors when they write in English. A literal translation into the English "leader" would, however, require using the Polish counterpart term, "przywódca," from which we often refrain owing to doubt as to whether the persons in question are indeed leaders.

At one time attempts were made to resolve the matter differently: by using the term "elita władzy" [literal translation of the American "the power elite"]. Włodzimierz Wesolowski offered the following definition of the "elite": "The elite, in the most general meaning of the term, consists of those who, by virtue of their place in the political structure, make state decisions or have a direct influence on these decisions." /17/ I have elsewhere /18/ questioned the preciseness of this definition of the "elite," particularly considering that using it does not show whether and to what extent a particular leadership group is or is not elitist. This because in every society there are individuals who make state decisions or influence them directly, that is, by definition, every society has a political elite or a "power elite." With respect to Polish local activists, Zygmunt Bauman /19/ employed the term "elite" most consistently, but in subsequent years he has clearly discarded this terminology. And justly. For essentially, it is important for an accepted terminological convention to make it possible to pose in an empirically resolvable manner the important question of whether the nature of a leadership group is elitist or not. This question may be resolved, as I propose in my "Sociology of Political Relations," on the basis of two clearly graduated criteria: 1) the extent of the centralization of power and 2) the extent to which the leadership group is closed to those standing outside the milieu of the leaders and their closest kin. /20/ If such an interpretation of the elite is assumed, it is possible to formulate sensibly opinions such as: "The leadership groups in country A are more elitist than the leadership groups in country B," or, "In Poland in the 1970's a marked process of the elitization of leadership groups took place."

In what sense can an activist be considered a leader? What, in other words, are the particular attributes distinguishing leaders from among the broader category of activists?

The most elementary definition of activists would be the statement that the activist is a person who participates in a continuous and organized manner in public life to a much greater extent than the average citizen. This is a relativizing definition. Peter is more of an activist than Paul if Peter devotes definitely more time, energy and attention to public activities than Paul. But both are activists if their commitment to public activity is: a) much greater than that of the average citizen in their own community; b) continuous and organized. One practical problem about this definition, which is often resolved by using the reputational [as published] method, consists in the existence of doubt as to whether certain individuals may be included in the group of activists, or in other words, whether the extent of their participation in public activities is "significantly higher" than average. However, such difficulties attend nearly any definition of social and political phenomena.

Still, not every activist is a leader, although it is difficult to imagine a leader who is not an activist. The leader leads, directs, heads. These attributes pertain to, on the one hand, the formal scope of the powers held within the power structure and, on the other, to the psychosocial relationship between the leader and those who recognize his leadership.

Here, three situations may be distinguished in theory:

- a) informal leadership, based on authority alone as well as on the support provided to the individual by his adherents;
- b) formal leadership, ensuing solely from the institutionally defined powers of the official superior, which those subordinated to the formal leader accept as part of the general (active or passive, more or less willing) acceptance of the existing system for the exercise of power;
- c) full leadership, when personal authority and formal powers are both present.

One of the most important problems in studies of political leadership is finding an answer to the question of what kind of leadership are we actually dealing with, and to what extent is the leader's personal authority coupled with his formal powers.

In Poland this issue has become acutely topical in recent years. The crisis of the state is to a large extent the crisis of the leadership groups, whose authority melted rapidly during the collapse of the policies of the 1970's and the hopes linked to them. The dynamics of this process, as well as the emergence of new leaders—including those who operated within the framework of structures independent of the authorities or even oppositionist structures—has not been conclusively investigated and described in detail, although we do have fragmentary data on that process. The studies of local leaders conducted directly before the crisis of 1980 [the emergence of Solidarity], and even during the first few weeks of that crisis, served to establish that the regard in which they were held by their communities varied markedly, and the differences in this regard strongly correlated with the feeling of possibility

and effectiveness of participation in politics and the opinion on the extent of the satisfaction of [material and other] needs./21/ Thus these studies account somewhat for the acute mass phenomenon of the decline in the authority of those in power. This was linked to the special circumstances of the political crisis at the beginning of the 1980's, although the roots of this phenomenon date back to the previous years, and especially to the then arisen tendency toward a relatively easy acceptance, and a relatively easy rejection as well, of successive leadership teams [e.g., Gomulka's]. The beginning of the 1980's differed from the previous crises in that, among other things, the drastic decline in the authority of the official political leaders--at the national but also at the local levels--was not accompanied by the immediate transference of trust and authority to their successors. The new leaders thus faced the need to gradually build up their authority or, to use the terminology I am adopting, they had to transform their formal leadership into full leadership. To the future studies of political leadership it will be highly important to observe how far is this process progressing in practice and to what extent are the new local leaders becoming "full" leaders, that is, leaders endowed not only with the strength of formal powers but also with the force of authority among the society.

There is yet another aspect to this problem. In our sociological studies conducted during the 1960's and 1970's we considered the activists who operated within the framework of a broadly conceived local political system, that is, those who had to one degree or another participated in the exercise of power by the authorities and supported them with their influence. In those days that was justified, because no other leadership groups on a mass scale had been present. The situation changed following the strikes in the summer of 1980 when a large army of activists and leaders, chiefly the activists and leaders of Solidarity, had ridden the crest of that wave of strikes to enter the political arena. The brief operating period of that alternative leadership group and the considerable lability of the political situation during those 16 months were not conducive to the rise of a complete and integral sociological picture of that group. There exist, however, pertinent data, studies, records and even provisional analyses./22/ It would be worthwhile to consider very thoroughly that sociological-political phenomenon in order to determine, among other things, in what respects and to what extent were these new activists and leaders similar to the activists and leaders of the former power structures, and to what extent did they differ from them. Although the matter already belongs to history, it is of diagnostic significance, because it would be worthwhile to know what kind of leadership emerges in the presence of a mass crisis of the traditional authorities, total questioning of the previous policies and undermining of the institutional structures of the power system.

Of particularly great significance, though, would be further studies of the political leadership in the presence of a progressive stabilization [of life in Poland]. This is the new leadership that has to a large extent emerged from the tempestuous events of the beginning of the 1980's. Do these new men at the same time represent a new psychosocial profile of leadership groups? To what extent and in what respects are they the continuators of those whose functions they took over, and to what extent are they actually the "product" of the new

times, qualitatively different from the leaders and activists of the earlier periods? Which of their attributes will endure in the presence of stabilization, and which will prove transitional? Publicistic answers are sometimes given to these questions. Sometimes also these answers are colored by an emotional approach to the matter. Both the extremely optimistic hopes and the highly negative predictions as to the future countenance of these new groups of local leaders at present chiefly reflect the emotions associated with the recent political experiences. The reality requires studies that are conducted calmly, without preconceptions, and in clear awareness that their findings may be of considerable importance to identifying the changes occurring within the circles of local political leaders as well as determining the permanence of particular related trends.

### Political Leadership and the Autonomy of Local Government

The leaders in our studies operate within the framework of a highly centralized system in which the local authorities are closely subordinated to and controlled by the central authorities so far as the fundamental questions, including financial ones, are concerned. This situation has always--throughout the 20-year period of the studies--been causing discontent among local activists along with desire for greater autonomy, as I mentioned already long ago (in 1967) on assessing the initial findings of studies in 30 powiats and 6 discrete towns./23/ This situation changed somewhat in the 1980's, now that the new decree on local authorities somewhat augments their autonomy, and considering that the more democratic electoral procedures (of the PZPR and the allied parties, as well as in elections to people's councils) cause local activists to be somewhat more dependent on the constituencies in which they operate, which logically weakens the consequences of the centralization of power. These changes are partial only, however, and moreover they are still too recent to warrant any more definite assessments. Hypothetically, though, I foresee a long and rather slow process of growth in the autonomy of local government and, what goes with it, certain transformations in the profile of the local activist.

The evolution in that direction would be consonant with the views and inclinations of local activists. All our studies, whether conducted in the 1960's, the 1970's or after 1980, clearly indicate that local activists desire an expansion of the powers of the rung in the ladder of power at which they operate. They do not champion an unlimited "independence" of local authorities, which is anyway not feasible owing to practical considerations, but they support a genuine increase in their autonomy. This entails major consequences as regards defining the role of the local leader and also as regards the factors influencing the typical road taken by his career.

In the centralized system of local authorities the local leader fulfills simultaneously three functions. First, he is an organizer of local efforts, a local administrator acting on issues that are of importance and specific to his community. Second, he is an executor of the government's policy on the territory entrusted to him. Third, he is a relayer of local influences, opinions and pressures upward to the centers that shape national policies.

These functions are often interrelated. For example, the national policy of building schools in the Millennium [i.e., on the millennial anniversary of the introduction of Christianity in Poland], had to be implemented by mobilizing and organizing local efforts as well as by influencing the allocation of the material resources at the disposal of the central authorities among the discrete units of the local administration. Regardless of the intermeshing of the abovementioned functions, each of them requires different measures, and hence also different predispositions of the persons exercising them. Most often, a local activist cannot perform with uniform excellence in all three functions. Which ones are foremost and become the cardinal conditions for the activist's success?

It is a paradox of the centralized system that, although it engenders among local leaders a strong desire for greater autonomy, at the same time it results in that the most important factor in their success is their ability to perform effectively their second function--that of the executor of government policies. For it is the effectiveness with which a local leader implements these policies that is crucial to not only his eventual advancement (both within the local power structure and above that) but also the possibility of retaining his post, and hence also the possibility of implementing the first and third functions. Even the greatest "local patriotism" of a leader cannot dictate to him measures inconsonant with his function as an executor of government policies, since such measures are a straight path to political disaster and hence also to the nullification of any plans he might have concerning "his" territory. In practice, this has given birth to both a tendency to maneuver and search for a compromise and the alienation of local leaders from their constituencies. This alienation was not in the least a result of pursuing bad policies--although it is not difficult to find examples of bad policies of local activists--but and above all it stemmed from the local public's largely justified perception of these activists as "outsiders" implementing policies on which that public itself had no major influence.

The consequences of this trend manifested themselves with special intensity during the 1980/1981 period. The attacks directed against local activists were in many cases due to their own mistakes or even to the corruption they had tolerated. But there also existed another plane of conflict. On that other plane, local activists were attacked no longer because of their own imaginary or real faults but as representatives of the state authorities, and in general as the local plenipotentiaries of the political center. At the same time, local activists experienced painfully the consequences of the past limitations in their influence on the direction of central policies, although it was now precisely they who had to pay for the consequences of that policy.

This engendered a very strong tendency toward opposing the local rungs of the power system to the central rung. This was reflected most clearly in the elections campaign prior to the 9th Extraordinary Congress in 1981 as well as at that congress itself. The province [party] conferences then showed unusual reluctance in admitting [to the electoral slates] the activists nominated by the central authorities, and were even more reluctant to elect them. At the congress an overwhelming majority of the incumbent members of the party authorities were not reelected. Of the 1955 delegates to the congress 91

percent were first-time participants. Of the 142 members of the Central Committee whose term of office was over, only 43 were delegates (and only 28 of the 94 candidate members of the Central Committee). Only 21 incumbent members and candidate members, elected 17 months previously at the 8th Congress, were reelected to the new membership of the Central Committee. Only four incumbent members of the Politburo--and not a single candidate member--were elected to the Central Committee and subsequently reelected to the Politburo. The candidates who failed to get elected to the supreme party echelon included representatives of the central state authorities such as the chairman of the Council of State, the chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control, deputy premiers (except one) and ministers. The other side of the coin was the mass influx of local activists into the highest party authorities. Never before had local activists dominated quantitatively so much the membership of the Central Committee as following the 9th Congress. Never before either had so many local activists been advanced by the congress to the leading party bodies (the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat). The 9th PZPR Congress represented, in addition to its many other distinguishing features, the victory of the "province" over the traditional "center." It is largely the influence of this congress that has been shaping the current political situation in which local leaders exert a greater influence on the shaping of central policies, and thereby also can be perceived by their fellow citizens as not chiefly (or even exclusively) executors of central policies but representatives of their own communities, lobbyists for community interests vis a vis the higher levels of the power system. This is a highly important tendency, and its preservation and strengthening in the future may result in the formation of the model of a local leader who has deeper roots in his own territory and is perceived as an authentic representative of that territory vis a vis the authorities. The coherence of the national political system requires, however, that this process should not go too far, that is, in other words, that the local leader should not at the same time cease to be an executor of state policies. At present, however, the sprouting buds of this innovation are still so tender that it appears most important to protect and ensure their growth. This does not mean that the growth of the local functions of territorial activists will be free of new perils and contradictions other than the traditional ones.

The definition of the political leader is also linked to the pattern of his political career. Generally speaking, it can be said that political leaders in People's Poland emerged by following four principal paths.

The first path was revolutionary activity within the worker movement or within a radical popular movement before the war, along with participation in a leftist resistance movement during the era of Hitlerite occupation. The political leaders of this type were the core of the central authorities during the first years of people's rule and occupied the principal political posts at the local level. They had been young people, and as a result they remained long at the helm of the government. Properly speaking, it was only after 1968, and the more so after 1970, that leaders of this type had relinquished--not without exceptions either--their leading posts. However, at the local levels they had been supplanted even earlier.

The second path toward a political career is advancement within the framework of the local levels of rule. This is a mass channel for advancement and, as regards the staffing of executive positions at the local level, the most typical one. It is accessed through one's active participation in the local elements of the PZPR or its allied parties, as well as in a people's council or a social organization. This path also may lead to some extent to the central level of power. We could readily name members of the central authorities of the PZPR, the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and the SD [Democratic Party], as well as members of the supreme authorities of the state, who started on the road of political advancement at local levels and advanced to the central level. As I wrote earlier, this kind of advancement became pronounced after 1980, but it was also known earlier. To a political sociologist, tracing not only the intensity but the direction of that political advancement from local toward central levels of the political system is an interesting task. Certain provinces appear to offer easier paths toward advancement than others, which may be linked to a particular geography of political influences and connections which so far remains relatively uninvestigated. But when speaking of this channel of political advancement it should be borne in mind that in Poland, unlike in, e.g., France, success in local politics was not and is not an indispensable prerequisite for advancing to political power at the center./24/

The third path toward a political career is working for the central administration or within the central party apparatus from its lower to higher levels. At a certain stage during such a career, the activist may be transferred to work in the provinces, but such a local chapter in his vita will not make a leader of him. He has been essentially shaped by his activities within the framework of the central elements of the political system.

Lastly, the fourth path toward gaining political leadership is represented by individuals who already are of a mature age and who had previously held professional posts outside the state administration and have now been coopted or elected to political posts owing to the authority they had previously gained in their professional work. This path of political advancement may be exemplified by the appointment of academics, newspaper editors or professional military men to high state or party posts. This type of political advancement played only a marginal role prior to 1980, but in recent years its importance has grown markedly.

Knowledge of the existence of different paths of typical political advancement in Poland--as well as of the varied ways in which these paths crisscross and intersect--leads to the conclusion that the local political scene is not and of a certainty will not become the dominant avenue toward high political power at the center. But still it is important, and it may become more important than in the past, particularly if the new mechanisms of local influence on central policies which appeared in the 1980's become further consolidated.

From this ensues a conclusion applying to sociological studies of political leadership. When trying to expand the research opportunities in this respect above the local level, it should be borne in mind that it is, however, at the

local level of the political system that we sometimes encounter individuals who in the future may become part of the national political leadership. Knowledge about local activists, when accumulated painstakingly over the years, may thus also be useful to understanding the political processes occurring among political leaders at the national level.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. J. Wiatr, "Types of Political Leadership," *MIESIECZNIK LITERACKI*, No 9, 1982.
2. J. Hochfeld, "Studia o marksowskiej teorii społeczeństwa" [Studies of the Marxist Theory of Society], Warsaw, 1983, p 200.
3. Not all, of course. Mention in particular should be made of the typology of revolutionary leadership introduced by Hochfeld (*Ibid.*, pp 202-203) as well as of the typology of bourgeois leadership proposed by F. M. Burlatskiy and A. A. Galkin ("Socjologia. Polityka. Stosunki Miedzynarodowe" [Sociology, Politics. International Relations] [translated from the Russian], Warsaw, 1978, pp 151-161), or lastly of my conceptual analysis of this problem ("Political Elites and Political Leadership: Conceptual Problems and Selected Hypotheses for Comparative Research," in [English-language] book: "Essays in Political Sociology," Wroclaw, 1978, pp 91-109). Among detailed studies, noteworthy is the extremely interesting work by Fyodor Burlatskiy, "Mao Dze-Dong" (Moscow, 1976).
4. R. D. Putnam, "The Comparative Study of Political Elites," Englewood Cliffs, 1976; G. D. Paige, "The Scientific Study of Political Leadership," New York, 1977; and W. A. Welsh, "Leaders and Elites," New York, 1979.
5. In particular, B. De Wolf[e], "Three Who Made a Revolution," New York, 1948; I. Deutscher, "Stalin. [A] Political Biography," Oxford, 1949; "Leaders of the Communist World," ed. by R. Swearingen, New York, 1970; "Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," ed. by R. B. Farell, Chicago, 1970; "Comparative Communist Political Leadership," ed. by C. Beck, New York, 1973.
6. For a fuller discussion of this problem and the literature, see my "Socjologia stosunkow politycznych" [Sociology of Political Relations], 3rd edition, Warsaw, 1980, pp 223-240.
7. The premises for this research approach are more precisely defined in my "Political Leadership and Public Policies," in [English-language] book: "Comparing Public Policies," ed. by J. J. Wiatr and R. Rose, Wroclaw, 1977, pp 79-93.
8. "Values and the Active Community. A Cross-National Study of the Influence of Local Leadership," ed. by P. E. Jacob et al., New York, 1971.
9. The initiation of these studies was linked to discussions of the concept

- and techniques of investigating the "power elite." Cf. Z. Bauman, "Power Structure and the Local Community. Conceptualization of Research," *STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNO-POLITYCZNE*, No 12, 1962, pp 7-30; W. Narojek, "Premises for a Study of Power-Holders in a Small Town," *STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNO-POLITYCZNE*, No 12, 1962, pp 31-40.
10. W. Narojek, "System władzy w mieście" [The Power System in a Town], Wrocław, 1967.
  11. A. Jasinska, "Psychosocial Attributes of Local Activists," *STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNO-POLITYCZNE*, No 24, 1967, pp 45-66
  12. In the Polish team a particularly significant role was played by Aleksandra Jasinska, Antonina Ostrowska, Krzysztof Ostrowski, Adam Przeworski (until 1967, i.e., until permanent emigration from Poland) and Jacek Tarkowski. Professor Stanislaw Ehrlich, as a member of a four-person advisory group established by the International Council for Social Sciences, under whose aegis the studies were conducted, provided the Polish team with valuable counsel and broad assistance. The coauthors for the international volume were, in addition to myself, Aleksandra Jasinska and Krzysztof Ostrowski.
  13. J. J. Wiatr and K. Ostrowski, "Political Leadership: What Kind of Professionalism?" in [English-language] book: "Studies in Polish Political System," ed. J. J. Wiatr, Wrocław, 1967, pp 140-155. This paper was first presented at the 6th World Congress of Political Sciences in Geneva in 1964.
  14. "Władza lokalna a zaspokajanie potrzeb" [Local Government and the Satisfaction of Needs], ed. J. J. Wiatr, Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, and Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University, 1981 (limited edition); particularly Part 2, authored by Aleksandra Jasinska, Anna Potocka-Hoser and Renata Siemienska, dealing with local activists.
  15. "Władza lokalna u progu kryzysu" [Local Government on the Eve of the Crisis], ed. J. J. Wiatr, Warsaw: Warsaw University (limited edition); see especially Chapter 6, "Who Are the Activists?" (Aleksandra Jasinska, Renata Siemienska, Joanna Sobolewska), Chapter 7, "The Administrators Comment on Local Community Problems and Own Activities" (Aleksandra Jasinska and Renata Siemienska) and Chapter 9, "Activists and the Community--Relations" (Barbara Fratzczak).
  16. Cf. in particular: K. Ostrowski and A. Przeworski, "Local Leadership in Poland," *THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN*, No 2(16), 1967, pp 53-71; J. Tarkowski, "Local Influences in a Centralized System: Resources, Local Leadership, and Horizontal Integration in Poland," in book: "Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations," ed. S. Tarrow, P. J. Katzenstein and L. Graziano, New York, 1978, pp 213-244; R. Siemienska, J. Tarkowski, "Polish Local Leaders and Fulfilling Community Needs: Politicians or Administrators?" *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, Vol 1, No 2,

- pp 245-264; J. Tarkowski, "Determinants of Local Influence," in: "1981 Yearbook of Polish Political Science," pp 135-155; A. Jasinska and R. Siemieniska, "Attitudes of Local Authorities Prior to the Crisis of 1980," SISYPHUS--SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES, Vol 2, 1982, pp 161-171; R. Siemieniska, "Local Party Leaders in Poland," INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol 4, No 1, 1983, pp 127-136.
17. W. Wesolowski, "Klasy, warstwy i wladza" [Classes, Strata and Power], Warsaw, 1966, p 86.
  18. Wiatr, "Socjologia stosunkow politycznych...", op. cit., p 227.
  19. Z. Bauman, "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation: The Case of Poland," INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, Vol 16, 1964, pp 203-216; reprint in: R. Bendix and S. Lipset, "Class, Status and Power. Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective," New York, 1966, pp 534-540.
  20. Wiatr, "Socjologia...", op. cit., p 228.
  21. Frateczak, op. cit., pp 437-450.
  22. P. Sztompka formulates in his "Dynamics of the Renewal Movement in the Light of the Theory of Collective Behavior" (STUDIA SOCJOLOGICZNE, No 3-4, 1982, pp 69-93) a couple of interesting hypotheses concerning the leadership of that movement. I provided a partial analysis, based on very fragmentary data and observations, in a paper presented at the 12th World Congress of Political Sciences (Rio de Janeiro, 1982) under the title "Mobilization of Non-Participants During the Political Crisis in Poland, 1980-1981" (INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol 5, 1984, No 2--in print).
  23. J. J. Wiatr, "Masters of Their Own Territory (From Sociological Studies of the Powiat Aktiv)," NOWE DROGI, No 1, 1967, pp 55-65.
  24. With the exception of President de Gaulle, who represents the type of the leader-liberator, all French politicians have always had and have their own local base [of support], e.g., they are mayors of cities. Without that local base their career would simply have been impossible. This property of the French system is brilliantly analyzed by Jacques Lagroye in "Societe et politique. J. Chaban-Delmas a Bordeaux" (Paris, 1973).

1386

CSO: 2600/380

PREPARATIONS FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS LAUNCHED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5-6 Jan 85 p 3

[Unsigned article: "Regulations Governing Elections to the Parliament of the Polish People's Republic: Assumptions of the Draft Decree"]

[Text] On 31 August 1985 the current session of the PRL Parliament will have expired. In this connection, elections to the Parliament will be held this year.

A worthy place in the general process of the democratization and renewal of sociopolitical life in this country belongs to problems of the electoral law and system. The need to develop new solutions in this respect was pointed out in the resolutions of the 9th PZPR Congress, the 8th ZSL [United Peasant Party] Congress and the 12th SD [Democratic Party] Congress as well as of the 1st Congress of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth].

The course and results of the elections to people's councils point to the progressing normalization of social and political life, as well as to a growth in constructive civic activities.

The experience gained during the electoral campaign for people's councils has served to a large extent as a foundation for the proposals contained in the assumptions for the draft Statute of the Elections to the PRL Parliament.

These assumptions were also worked out on the basis of premises ensuing from the unique legal-institutional status of the Parliament and the special political significance of elections to that supreme body of power within the state.

Continuing the already established practice of consulting the society about proposals for decisions of such importance

to this country and its citizens, the Council of State is presenting these assumptions below for broad public discussion and expecting an active participation of the society in this discussion.

Comments and suggestions on the assumptions presented below should be addressed to: Chancellery of the Council of State, 6 Wiejska Street, Warsaw 00-902.

## I. General Principles

1. The elections to the Parliament represent the act of creating the supreme representative body of state power in the country. Citizens elect to the Parliament their best representatives who offer guarantees of properly exercising the mandate entrusted to them for the good of the society and in accordance with the institutional principles of socialist Poland.

2. The elections to the Parliament are to be held on the basis of the Electoral Declaration of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, which provides the basis for a nationwide discussion of the principal problems of the future wellbeing of the state.

3. The basis for the right to vote for the Parliament is the principles contained in the PRL Constitution, namely:

1) Universality of voting: the right to vote (active voting right) belongs to every Polish citizen who has reached the age of at least 18 on Election Day, regardless of sex, nationality, race, creed, education, period of residence in electoral district, social origin, occupation and property status.

### Proposals:

Variant 1: A candidate for a seat in the Parliament (passive voting right) may be any citizen who has the right to vote and who is at least 21 years old on Election Day (Article 96 of the Constitution).

Variant 2: A candidate for a seat in the Parliament (passive voting right) may be any citizen who has the right to vote and is at least 18 years old on Election Day. Adopting this variant would require amending Article 96 of the Constitution. (In the socialist countries the passive voting right applies to a minimum age of 18 in Bulgaria, the GDR and Hungary; 21 in Czechoslovakia and the USSR; and 23 in Romania.)

2) Equality of voting: voters participate on equal principles in the elections: each can cast one ballot for any slate.

3) Directness of voting: voters elect deputies directly and must cast the ballots personally.

4) Secrecy of balloting: all poll stations must provide a screened booth enabling the voters to prepare themselves for casting their votes and exercising their right to secrecy of balloting; the ballots are placed in a sealed urn.

4. The right to vote does not apply to persons who are declared entirely incapacitated or partially competent by a judicial decree owing to mental illness while that incapacitation lasts, as well as to persons deprived of their civic rights by a valid judicial decree, for the period for which that decree applies. This also applies to persons deprived of active and passive voting rights by a valid decree of the Tribunal of State. The following persons cannot participate in voting regardless of the place of their residence: those subject to the penalty of deprivation of freedom or to detention, those placed in social adjustment centers, and those temporarily detained.

5. Elections to the Parliament are to be ordered by the Council of State, not later than one month prior to the expiration of the Parliamentary session.

Variant 1: The resolution ordering the elections will designate their date on a day legally considered as not a workday, within 2 months following the expiration of the Parliamentary session.

Variant 2: The resolution ordering the elections may designate the dates of their conduct on two successive days within 2 months following the expiration of the Parliamentary session; one of these days must be legally considered as not a work day (Article 28, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution: "Elections to the Parliament are designated by the Council of State... on specifying election day as a day free from work....").

6. The resolution ordering elections to the Parliament is to be published in DZIENNIK USTAW POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ not later than 90 days prior to Election Day.

7. Variant 1: The elections will be held only on the territory of the state (Polish seagoing vessels regardless of their locus are part of that territory).

Variant 2: The elections may also be held abroad, at Polish diplomatic and consular missions as well as within major groupings of voters employed abroad (e.g., construction crews, factory crews, etc.).

8. Variant 1: The new session of the Parliament begins as of Election Day.

Variant 2: The new session of the Parliament begins on the day the first meeting is convoked.

9. Variant 1: 460 deputies are to be elected to the Parliament.

Variant 2: 500 deputies are to be elected to the Parliament. The adoption of this variant would require amending Article 21, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution.

10. Deputies will be elected in electoral districts and regions from corresponding district and region slates. An electoral district comprises a province or part of a province, while an electoral region comprises electoral districts located in one or several adjacent provinces.

11. Deputies will be elected according to the following distribution:

In the event that variant 1 of Thesis 9 is adopted:

Variant 1: 391 deputies in electoral districts plus 69 deputies (that is, 15 percent of the total membership of the Parliament) in electoral regions.

Variant 2: 368 deputies in electoral districts, plus 92 deputies (that is, 20 percent of the total membership of the Parliament) in electoral regions.

In the event that variant 2 of Thesis 9 is adopted:

Variant 1: 425 deputies in electoral districts plus 75 deputies (15 percent of the Parliament's membership) in electoral regions.

Variant 2: 400 deputies in electoral districts plus 100 deputies (that is, 20 percent of the Parliament's membership) in electoral regions.

12. The elections will be conducted by the following social bodies: electoral caucuses and commissions. The elections will be held on the basis of voters' registers in the electoral wards into which the electoral districts are divided. The cost of the elections will be defrayed from the state budget.

## II. Electoral Districts and Regions

13. The number, boundaries and numbering of the electoral districts and regions as well as the number of deputies to be elected from each are to be determined by the Council of State.

The number of deputies to be elected in individual electoral districts and regions will be determined by the Council of State in proportion to the population of a given district or region.

In principle, three to eight deputies are to be elected from each electoral district or region.

The number of the deputies elected in an electoral district or region will reflect the number of the Parliamentary mandates apportioned to that district or region.

## III. Electoral Commissions

14. The elections to the Parliament will be conducted by state, district and ward electoral commissions. The State Electoral Commission will be appointed by the Council of State, while the district electoral commissions will be

appointed by the presidiums of province people's councils. Electoral ward commissions will be appointed by the presidiums of local-level people's councils. Electoral ward commissions within military units will be appointed by the presidiums of province people's councils.

15. State, district and ward electoral commissions will be appointed from among the voters nominated by, correspondingly, central, province and local authorities of the organizations which are signatories to the Declaration of 20 July 1982 Concerning the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.

16. The State Electoral Commission, in particular, will:

- 1) supervise close adherence to the electoral law;
- 2) register regional slates of candidates to deputies and publicize data on these candidates;
- 3) consider appeals against the resolutions of district electoral commissions and complaints about the activities of these commissions;
- 4) determine and announce the results of the elections to the Parliament and submit a corresponding report to the Parliament together with the requisite documentation.

As part of its supervision of close adherence to the electoral law and to the related implementing regulations, the State Electoral Commission will provide directives and explanations as the need arises to the [lower-level] electoral commissions.

17. The electoral district commissions will, in particular:

- 1) supervise close adherence to the provisions of the electoral law on the territory of the electoral district;
- 2) register district slates of candidates for deputies and publicize data on these candidates;
- 3) consider complaints about the activities of electoral ward commissions;
- 4) determine election results within the electoral districts and inform accordingly the State Electoral Commission.

18. The electoral ward commission will, in addition to their tasks of presenting voters' registers for public inspection, conducting the elections within their wards and determining their results, supervise the adherence to the provisions of the Electoral Law at the place and time of elections on Election Day.

19. Variant 1: Any member of a state or district electoral commission whose name is placed on the slate of candidates for deputies registered with that commission immediately forfeits his mandate as a member of that commission.

Variant 2: Any member of an electoral commission whose name is placed on the slate of candidates for deputies submitted for registration forfeits his mandate as a commission member.

#### IV. Electoral Caucuses

20. The All-Polish Electoral Caucus and province electoral caucuses are to be created with the object of identifying and nominating candidates. The All-Polish Electoral Caucus is for candidates elected from the regional slates while the province electoral caucuses are for candidates elected from the district slates.

21. The All-Polish Electoral Caucus is to consist of:

- 1) representatives of the main authorities of the organizations which are signatories to the Declaration of 20 July 1982 Concerning the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), to account for two-thirds of the membership of the Caucus;

- 2) delegates (representatives) of the main authorities (or national coordinating councils) of: trade unions, socio-occupational organizations of farmers, war-veteran organizations, socialist youth unions and women's organizations, to account for one-third of the membership of the Caucus.

22. The province electoral caucuses are formed on analogous principles from representatives of the province bodies of the signatories and the PRON province councils, as well as from the delegates (or representatives) of the province bodies or province coordinating councils of the authorized organizations.

The All-Polish and province electoral caucuses are to commence their activities upon informing the Council of State of their formation. The caucuses are to be disbanded on the day when the Council of State disbands the electoral commissions.

23. The tasks of the electoral caucuses are as follows:

- 1) the acceptance of the candidates for deputies proposed by the authorized organizations, from regional slates for the electoral regions, by the All-Polish Electoral Caucus, and from district slates for the electoral districts, by the province electoral caucuses;

- 2) the determination, on the basis of proposals by the authorized organizations, of the slates of the proposed candidates for deputies; the All-Polish Electoral Caucus will determine the slates of proposed candidates for deputies separately for each electoral region, while the province electoral caucuses will determine the slates separately for each electoral district;

- 3) the consideration of the opinions and suggestions of voters gathered during the presentation of the proposed candidates, and the determination by:

--the All-Polish Electoral Caucus, of the slates of candidates for deputies separately for each electoral region and the submission of these slates for registration to the State Polling Commission;

--the province electoral caucuses, of the slates of candidates for deputies separately for each electoral district and the submission of these slates for registration to electoral district commissions;

4) the designation of accredited representatives to electoral commissions by the All-Polish Electoral Caucus to the State Electoral Commission, and by the province electoral caucuses to the electoral district and ward commissions;

5. The tasks of the All-Polish Electoral Caucus include moreover:

a) Issuance of directives concerning:

--the procedure for nominating candidates for deputies;

--detailed principles for convening and conducting pre-election meetings of voters at which candidates for deputies are presented and discussion of the principal problems ensuing from the Electoral Declaration of the PRON is held;

b) Consideration of complaints about the activities of province electoral caucuses.

## V. Candidates for Deputies

24. The right to nominate the proposed candidates for deputies to be elected from district slates belongs to the province authorities of the Polish United Worker Party, the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, the PAX Association, the Christian Social Association and the Polish Catholic-Social Union. This right also belongs to the province authorities or province coordinating councils of the PRON, the trade unions, socio-occupational organizations of farmers, war-veteran organizations, socialist youth unions, women's organizations and other mass social organizations.

25. The right to nominate candidates for deputies to be elected from regional slates belongs to the main authorities of the Polish United Workers Party, the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, the PAX Association, the Christian Social Association and the Polish Catholic-Social Union. This right also belongs to the Executive Committee for the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.

26. The proposed candidates for deputies are presented to the society in order to gather the voters' opinions and comments on them.

1) The presentation is conducted in the following forms:

a) pre-election meetings of voters organized at workplaces, in socio-occupational communities, at places of residence and within military units. At these meetings discussion will also be held on the principal problems ensuing from the Electoral Declaration of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.

b) broad publicity about the background of the candidates in the mass media;

2) the pre-election meetings of citizens are to be organized by the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth with the participation of electoral caucuses and the organizations nominating the candidates.

The voters have the right to both present their opinions and comments on the candidates at meetings and convey them directly for consideration to the electoral caucuses.

27. The electoral caucuses determine the slates of candidates for deputies and submit them for registration to the proper electoral commissions. Only the persons presented to the voters may be named on the slates.

28. Candidacy is restricted to any one electoral slate (either district or regional slate).

29. Composition of the slates of candidates for deputies:

1) Variant 1: The number of candidates named on a regional slate should be greater than the number of the mandates apportioned to a given electoral region, but not greater than half that number.

Variant 2: The number of candidates named on a regional slate should be greater than the number of the mandates apportioned to a given region, but not greater than twice that number.

2) On the district slates the mandates are to be enumerated, with two candidates to be named per mandate.

The All-Polish Electoral Caucus will decide on the naming sequence of the candidates on regional slates, while the province electoral caucuses will decide on the naming sequence of candidates on district slates with respect to each mandate.

30. The determination of the slate of candidates for deputies to be presented to the voters as well as of the slate of candidates to be presented for registration belongs within the competence of the concerned electoral caucus alone.

31. When registering the slate, the (state, district) electoral commission will investigate whether the slate has been prepared in accordance with the decree requirements.

32. The electoral caucus has the right to:

1) advise the proper commission (by the prescribed procedure) of revisions in the registered slate, but not later than on the 10th day prior to the elections;

2) ask the proper commission to delete a candidate from the slate at any time; a substitute candidate cannot, however, be named later than on the 10th day prior to the elections.

The (state, district) electoral commission has the right to delete from the slate, within the last 10 days prior to the elections, a candidate who is deceased, forfeits the right to be elected or withdraws his consent to candidacy upon informing the caucus accordingly.

#### VI. Electoral Wards and Voters' Registers

33. Electoral wards are to be set up with the object of conducting the elections. An electoral ward should, as a rule, comprise 1,000 to 3,000 inhabitants. In particularly justified cases wards comprising smaller groups of voters may be established.

Electoral wards may also be established in hospitals, sanatoriums and other health-service institutions as well as in social care institutions and institutions for the handicapped in which voters exist.

34. Electoral wards in gminas, cities and city boroughs are established by the concerned presidiums of local people's councils; within military units, by commanders of military districts; on Polish seagoing vessels that happen to be cruising on Election Day, by the minister or head of the Office of the Maritime Economy; and in the event that ballots are cast abroad, by the minister of foreign affairs. The electoral wards set up by the minister of foreign affairs are to be part of the electoral region comprising the Capital City of Warsaw. Within these wards voters would vote only on the regional slate.

35. Voters' registers will be prepared, separately for every electoral ward, by the local agencies of the state administration. The registers will name both the voters reporting as permanent residents and those who are temporary residents in the ward area during a period that includes Election Day.

36. A voter who changes his place of residence after the voters' register is prepared may be upon his request included in the voters' register for the electoral ward encompassing his new place of residence and permitted to vote at the ward's poll station.

This right belongs to the voter on the basis of an attestation of his right to vote issued upon his request by the body which had prepared the voters' register.

37. The electoral ward commissions will post the voters' registers for public inspection on the premises of the commissions for at least 14 days, 5 hours daily at times accessible to working people.

38. After the voters' register is posted, claims concerning inaccuracies in the register, and in particular the omission or naming of particular individuals, may be submitted to the body which had prepared the register. Decisions rejecting these claims or resulting in deletions from the voters' register may be appealed to the concerned rayon court by the claimant or by the person deleted from the register. The court's verdict is final.

## VII. Balloting

39. Variant 1: Votes will be cast on the premises of the electoral district commission from 0600 till 2200 hours.

Variant 2: In the event that elections are held for 2 days, the polls will be open from 0600 till 2000 hours.

40. Upon checking the identity of the voter, the electoral ward commission will hand the ballots to him. To avoid multiple voting, the commission ticks off the voter's name on the voters' register.

41. The voter has the right to enter a screened voting booth in order to prepare himself for the act of voting.

### 42.1. Voting for the regional list:

1) the voter will vote for as many candidates as there are mandates in a given electoral region;

2) the voter will not cross out on the ballot the names of the candidates for whom he votes;

3) In the event that the number of candidates is greater than the number of mandates, a voter who crosses out on the ballot fewer names of candidates than there are mandates is considered to have voted for the candidates named first on the ballot.

### 2. Voting for the district list:

1) the voter will vote for as many candidates as there are mandates in the electoral district, according to the division of mandates specified on the ballot;

2) the voter will not cross out on the ballot the names of the candidates for whom he votes;

3) the voter who fails to cross out the names of both candidates for a mandate on the ballot is considered to have voted for the candidate named first.

## VIII. Counting the Votes and Determining the Election Returns

43. Following the elections of deputies from the district and regional slates, the electoral ward commissions count the votes separately for each slate within

the ward. After the ballots are counted, the commission transmits appropriate data to the proper electoral district commission.

44. The votes cast on ballots other than the officially determined ones, or on officially determined ballots that lack the seal of the proper electoral commission, or on ballots entirely torn into two or more parts are to be considered as invalid votes.

The votes cast on ballots on which the names of all the candidates are crossed out or deleted are considered to be valid votes: they are considered to be votes cast against all the candidates named on the ballot. Write-ins of additional candidates or the addition of any comments on the ballots will not influence the validity of the vote and will be disregarded.

45. On the basis of the records of votes cast for the district and regional slates, as received from the electoral ward commissions, the electoral district commission will:

- 1) determine the results of the voting for deputies on the district list in the electoral district;
- 2) sum up the results of the voting for deputies on the regional list within the area of the electoral district.

46. On the basis of the reports received from the electoral district commissions, the State Electoral Commission will:

- 1) determine the results of the voting for deputies on the regional list separately for each electoral region and, on this basis, the election returns for the individual regions;
- 2) verify the accuracy of the findings of the electoral district commissions on the election returns for the electoral wards and, on this basis, on the election returns for the individual districts;
- 3) determine and announce the results of elections to the Parliament.

47. 1. The candidates acknowledged as having been elected as deputies on the district lists are those for whom, within the confines of the mandate for which they were nominated, a majority of valid ballots has been cast in an election in which at least one-half of the voters registered in the electoral district have voted. In the event that both candidates for the same mandate receive an equal number of votes, the candidate elected is the one who is named first on the ballot.

2. The candidates acknowledged as having been elected as deputies on the regional list are those for whom, within the confines of the electoral region, a majority of valid ballots has been cast in an election in which at least one-half of the voters registered in the electoral region have voted. In the event that two candidates receive an equal number of votes, the candidate considered as elected is the one named first on the ballot.

48. Immediately after the results of elections to the Parliament are determined, the State Electoral Commission will make them public in the form of an announcement. Said announcement is subject to publication in DZIENNIK URZEDOWY POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ "MONITOR POLSKI."

#### IX. New Elections

49. The need to repeat the elections in an entire electoral district or region arises in the event that fewer than one-half of the registered voters attend the polls in the district or region.

50. In view of the duty of convoking the first meeting of the newly elected Parliament within one month from Election Day, the new elections should be held on a day free from work within not later than 3 weeks from the initial elections.

51. An election is repeated only once. The candidates considered as elected are to be those who receive in succession the largest number of ballots. The requirement of 50 percent voter turnout does not then apply.

52. New elections are conducted by the same electoral caucuses and commissions, on the basis of the same voters' registers.

#### X. Validity of Elections

53. Pursuant to Article 21, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution, the validity of the election of a deputy is ratified by the Parliament on the basis of the report submitted by the State Election Commission and voting records.

54. Variant 1: Proceedings to invalidate an election are commenced once a protest is submitted by a voter (voters). Any voter has the right to submit the protest.

Variant 2: Proceedings to invalidate an election are commenced once a protest is submitted by a voter (voters). Any voter who on Election Day was authorized to vote in the district to which the protest refers has the right to submit the protest.

55. The protest may be submitted within 7 days following the public announcement of election returns, on grounds of an electoral crime or a violation of the provisions of the Electoral Statute governing the procedure for voting, ballot counting and the determination of election returns.

56. The voter will submit his protest in writing to the State Electoral Commission. The voter should present evidence of his accusations. If he does not do so, the Electoral Commission will specify the deadline for presenting the evidence. If the protest specifies the perpetration of a crime, the State Electoral Commission will notify the concerned agencies of the procurature. Following the expiration of the specified deadline for the submission of evidence, the State Electoral Commission will transmit the protest together with the documentation to the Supreme Court for an opinion.

57. After the proceedings referred to in Thesis 56 are completed, the State Electoral Commission will transmit the protest to the Parliament, together with the documentation, the opinion of the Supreme Court and its own position.

58. In the event that the Parliament resolves to invalidate the elections in an electoral district or region, it will recommend ordering new elections to the Council of State.

#### XI. Forfeiture of the Mandate of a Deputy

59. A deputy's mandate may be forfeited owing to: refusal to take the Oath of the Deputy, relinquishment of mandate, forfeiture of the right to be elected, invalidation of election, lawful sentencing by a court for a crime perpetrated with the object of personal gain, or recall by voters.

60. Voters may recall a deputy whose conduct is detrimental to the dignity of his status or who shuns working in the Parliament or who otherwise betrays the trust of his voters. The proposal for asking voters to recall the deputy may be submitted to the Parliament by the organization which had originally nominated that deputy or by the National Council of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth. Such a proposal may be made by the voters themselves, if it is supported by at least 10 percent of the voters in the concerned electoral district or region. Upon considering the proposal, the Parliament will resolve (by a majority of two-thirds in the presence of at least one-half of the total number of the deputies) either to ask the voters to recall the deputy or to quash the proceedings. The recall of the deputy will be decided upon by a simple majority of votes by the voters in the electoral district or region concerned.

The voting will be conducted by commissions appointed by a procedure to be determined by the Council of State.

61. Once the Parliament resolves to ask the voters to recall the deputy, his mandate becomes suspended.

62. In the event that a deputy forfeits his mandate, his replacement during the term of the session of the Parliament can be accomplished only through by-elections. By-elections should be ordered whenever 5.0 percent of the total number of Parliamentary mandates is vacant, or whenever more than one-half of the mandates in a given electoral district or region is vacant. No by-elections may be ordered if fewer than 6 months remain until the expiration of the current session of the Parliament.

Warsaw, 20 December 1984.

1386

CSO: 2600/444

CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF CHURCH IN SOCIETY DEFENDED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 19, 28 Oct 84 pp 1,3

/Article by Andrzej Micewski: "That You Might Never Despair"

/Text/ The Holy Father John Paul II, at the conclusion of his first pilgrimage through Poland, appealed to the people in Krakow's town square.

"...before I leave here, I ask you to accept once again the whole spiritual legacy whose name is Poland with faith and love of the kind Christ instilled in us at holy baptism,

"--that you might never despair, nor grow weary nor become discouraged,

"--that you might never spurn that love that is the greatest, that was expressed through the cross and without which human life has neither roots nor purpose."

Without trust in the cross, trust in the church would also be weak and despair easy. The Holy Father, during his pilgrimage to Poland, did everything to instill hope in our people and thereby strengthen them spiritually and morally in this difficult period of our social life.

The pope ordered us to have confidence. It seems to me that confidence in the church, symbolizing the love that was expressed through the cross, is very important.

But one should answer this question--what hopes and expectations can one associate with the church? The answer depends to a great extent on full awareness of what the church is and what it is not and can never become.

As we know, the church is a community. It is thus all the faithful. The church also makes up the mystical Body of Christ. At the same time, the church is hierarchical and the popes are successors of St Peter. I mention these catechismal truths in order to better understand the fact that the main functions of the church, fulfilled by its hierarchy, are education and salvation through dispensation of the sacraments.

But it would be hypocritical not to acknowledge that public opinion is bound to the church, specifically to its hierarchy and hopes and expectations in the realm of natural, earthly life. Thus the critical and prophetic function of the church in relation to the world, its structures and prevailing doctrines, is currently being emphasized most readily. The church wants to serve the people and society in the natural order as well, being aware of its responsibility for the social conditions of a human being's development and his natural environment, which is the family and the nation. Thus the church, having above all a supernatural purpose, is very interested in earthly reality, which to a significant extent determines the conditions of a human being's development. Thus in the whole postwar period the church also fulfilled a critical and prophetic function, summoning secular representatives to create proper living conditions, pointing out the error, shortcomings and defects of social structures and calling for their improvement.

Was the church not one of the most important postwar institutions that for such a long time strove for the improvement of public life with such consistency and at the same time such caution? Is it not thanks to its good fulfillment of its critical function that the church enjoys such great influence? Was it not Cardinal Wyszynski who, in creating the school of union between church and national history, reached most deeply into the essence of the social defects of our lives? The way in which the nation, the world, the church and the Apostolic See, as well as John Paul II personally, commemorated the late primate gives an affirmative answer to these questions. For we know that in his lifetime he was unjustly criticized under the influence of powerful political feeling.

The reader will undoubtedly say: fine, but what came next? The second half of 1981 and all of 1982 constituted a critical period in our most recent history. In this period the church played a very active role, first by summoning the conflicting parties to restraint and moderation and later, after 13 December 1981, to understanding and social accord on the basis of the revival of suspended union structures, which were to operate according to law. The church's efforts did not bring results, having been frustrated by opposing ideological concepts and above all by the passionate feelings of the potential partners in accord and understanding. The proposals of the primate's social council were known to part of the public. And this was only an external expression of the church's efforts. The writings and memorials of the conference of the episcopate constitute documentation of the church's complex endeavors toward social accord and the defense of various people and groups. The negotiations of the primate of Poland, the secretary of the episcopate and other representatives of the hierarchy, conducted with authorities at every possible level, dealt to a decidedly lesser degree with the direct needs of the church than with nationwide issues. Let us not forget

too about the church's concrete and effective efforts on behalf of many imprisoned people, the rapid release of internees and assistance for them and their families. Let us add to this the action for distribution of overseas packages, which simply surpassed the church's strength in its proportions, and we will see an image approaching the truth, although not free of faults stemming from a lack of familiarity with the situations of particular families. There is also no reason not to mention the mistakes or indiscretions in announcements, especially in heated moments of social tension, when quick discernment of the situation is so important but is not always possible. The errors resulting from insufficient information or manipulation were most often explained and rectified at the first opportunity. The church does not claim infallibility in that difficult period, but historians will objectively be able to assess favorably the outcome of its actions for society.

On the other hand, the episcopate tried to assess objectively the failures it experienced. At a dinner meeting with physicians on 3 January 1983 Primate Glemp said, "Last year at this time we formed our notions of understanding and national accord. I personally stood by them very firmly...." But later the primate had to place the issue on a different plane and said "...we must see the unity of the people, our brotherhood, which must stand above hatred and above the mediocrity of people small in spirit. We must be in the mold of our national aspirations, the mold of the church, the mold of the children of God, who see light on the path of their lives.

"...Do not be afraid, let no one in Poland fear that the church will not go together. The church will go together, just as a doctor will not abandon the sick because he cannot. It is the same with the church. Otherwise, if it did not go together, it would cease to be itself. Politics are not the point here. The point is the great humanism, the brotherhood that must be instilled in our nature. It must be a very human feeling that God comes to a human being through another human being."

In his sermon on the feast of the Three Kings on 6 January 1983, the primate added in reference to the Holy Father's message on peace, "We enter into the spirit of the pope's reflections on dialog, we grieve over our failures in this field, ...we accept from the papal words at least the dialog is a 'challenge'...This is not a dialog of top leadership, but this dialog is above all necessary at the lower levels of society. For there it is easiest to use retaliation. There it is easiest to deprecate what is new and what is true and return to the former, already obsolete, order."

An interpretation of these excerpts from Primate Glemp's statement is not difficult. Already after the suspension of martial law and after the passage of new union legislation the primate conceded that the

church had not been able to convince the interested parties of its notions of accord and understanding. But in the primate's opinion, this did not rule out Christian hope. On the eve of the Holy Father's second pilgrimage to Poland, the primate spoke of the need for dialog and Christian brotherhood on the lowest levels of society. He was concerned with maximum moral integration of society, which in any case was accomplished to a great extent during the Holy Father's pilgrimage and under the influence of his instruction and charismatic effect on millions of Poles. This kind of spiritual fortification of society also constitutes a significant element of the social situation. The church, in not achieving its desired results in mediation among the various factions of society, looked for a road that was more far-reaching and appropriate to its nature as a religious institution with supernatural goals. Even people who think in political rather than religious terms agree that John Paul II's second pilgrimage to Poland had a fundamental moral significance in integrating society. But let us not forget that before the pope's visit took place it was criticized, and that later the pope, standing face to face with the political realities of the country, was not spared. But what meaning did all this have in relation to the spiritual harvest that John Paul II left in his native country?

No one can deny that the church, in its proper religious and moral jurisdiction, serves the timely needs of society. We defined above what the church is and what its main functions are; we can therefore point to the dissimilarity between the church's presence in social life and the participation of institutions operating only in the natural, secular order. The church criticizes bad social elements because of their moral consequences often and in various systems; it defends freedom and human rights not only in relation to religion, but also in relation to the all of the social conditions influencing the development of a human being.

However, the church does not work politically, not in the sense of participation in the struggle for authority, nor by identifying with one sociopolitical group against another. For the church's struggle is against evil, not against people. And this is not a platitude but an evangelical principle. The church does not treat anyone as an enemy, even its philosophical and ideological opponents. It is therefore not a party in political conflicts, although it can have enemies. This is perhaps most difficult to understand for nonbelievers or those indifferent to religion. They say the church cannot be merely a go-between or mediator, that it must be on the side of society. But the church is always on society's side in the sense of defending its valid rights and opposing limitation of its subjectively and freedom. The church views the defense of truth, goodness and freedom as fulfillment of the principles of the Gospels, not as political activity. Thus in the period in question establishment of a Catholic party or religious trade unions was not called for, although the church was accused of this beforehand. The

accusations turned out to be groundless. Today too the church does not consent to be exploited for political purposes, regardless of whether someone from the structures of authority or other political circles and elements holds such intentions.

There is evidence, however, that the church defended not only abstract social rights and freedoms, but also specific institutions. It defended them as long as was possible and practical. But when the conflicts reached their peak, it did everything so that blood would not be shed in vain in Poland. And to some extent the church contributed to saving the country from that tragedy. History will note this to the good of the church and Polish Catholicism.

One nonbeliever wrote sharply that one cannot demand separation of church and state and participation by the church in current politics at the same time. It seems right to agree with this attitude. But we must add that keeping a distance from politics does not mean absence from national affairs. The church today serves many levels of society, if only in organizing a specialized ministry. The hierarchy was very intensively involved in including all political prisoners in the amnesty. There is no true freedom or real human right for which the church will deny its moral support. But it will not permit itself to be exploited for politics. Not by anyone. The church's power and influence are spoken of often. But one must remember that this influence is above religious, moral and social, not political. And it would be an illusion to presume that the church can dictate political decisions to anyone. That is simply not the case. The church is a powerful support for its followers, but in the area of social affairs it has no power besides its moral authority. It can only resort to rational arguments, to its own understanding of the good of the nation and man, and refer to its own circumspection, of which it has given much evidence.

The foregoing remarks are by no means an attempt at "washing hands" or relativizing the church's temporal responsibility. But it must be established on firm doctrinal ground. Therefore I would like to refer to Pope Paul VI's apostolic appeal, "Evangelii nuntiandi," devoted to spreading the gospel in the modern world. Paul VI wrote:

We cannot deny that many noble-minded Christians devoted to matters of the greatest significance comprising the question of liberation, when they desire to draw the church into the liberation movement itself, often expect and attempt to reduce its task to the limits of some mere temporal venture; its obligations to an anthropological program; the salvation of which it is the champion to material success; its activity to political or social actions, deprecating any spiritual or religious care. If this were how things stand, the church would lose its entire main purpose. The propagation of the liberation it brings would lose its proper nature and could easily become distorted and slanted by other doctrinal systems and political parties. The church would be stripped of its authority to preach in God's name....

"The church associates, but does not identify, human freedom with salvation in Jesus Christ because it knows from divine revelation, from the experience of history and from considerations of faith, that not every conception of liberation necessarily agrees with or suits the evangelical vision of man, objects and events and that it is not enough to achieve freedom and establish prosperity and progress for the kingdom of God to come.

"Moreover, the church has a strong belief that every liberation regarding earthly matters or every political liberation--although it may try to find justification on this or that page of the Old or New Testament, although it may believe that its ideological requirements and standards of conduct draw their authority from theological principles and conclusions, although it may see itself as a new, modern theology--contains the seeds of its own destruction and deviates from the noble goal it planned for itself, since its true motives in no way deal with a position of justice in love, since the thrilling enthusiasm and zeal they bring do not have the quality of spiritual power, nor do they take into account salvation and eternal happiness in God as their ultimate goal."

I am well aware that the quoted words of Paul VI do not deal with our circumstances or our region. But they have universal implications in understanding the church's relationship to reform and political activities. Paul VI, whose legacy the present Pope John Paul II treats with great reverence, did not remove himself from aspirations for liberation in general. On the contrary, it is evident from the arguments in the appeal that he was sympathetic toward them. But he did point to the difference between a purely secular and political approach to social issues and a Christian, evangelical approach, and this particular direction is instructive for our circumstances as well.

The church in Poland, within the limits of its objective capabilities and its evangelical mission, wants to serve society and will not frustrate its hopes. We must remember, however, the tasks for which Christ established His church. And we must see its obligations in the service of mankind and society in the perspective of its main supernatural mission. The church will never stop accompanying society steadfastly through thick and thin. For otherwise it would cease to be itself.

12776

CSO: 2600/284

FAILURE TO APPRECIATE FRIENDSHIP WITH USSR CRITICIZED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 11, Nov 84 pp 57-65

[Article by Wladyslaw Misiuna: "Polish-Soviet Friendship as a Crucial Problem of National Accord"]

[Text]

1

We must achieve a consensus on many issues, and primarily on issues decisive to the security of Poland, the permanence of its present frontiers and its sovereignty and proper place in the world. And also on issues relating to emergence from the present economic difficulties and entrance upon the path of a steady elevation of material and cultural standards and living conditions as well as of improvements in the quality of life corresponding to the potential possibilities and consonant with the needs felt by the contemporary Polish society. And also on issues of safeguarding public order and social justice in our country in a shape reflecting the aspirations of the principal progressive social forces and laboring people, a shape that is most fully and realistically defined by scientific socialism. The ideals and principles of social coexistence of that socialism, as followed and implemented by the main and leading political force in our state, namely, the PZPR, are also accepted and materialized by the allied parties, the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and the SD [Democratic Party]; these ideals also are acknowledged by the social currents flowing outside the scope of influence of other ideologies.

The need for a consensus on these issues is with difficulty gaining access to the social awareness of present-day Poles. There already exist specific proofs that this is happening, and they awaken hope and provide motivation for more rational actions. The foundations for consolidating this consensus and utilizing it effectively in Poland's interest are being laid. Many problems of crucial importance to our country and its future, problems which we must resolve on our own, are prompting reflections. To resolve them, the tremendous resource of our experience, including the most recent experience as well, should be exploited, rationally and without preconceptions. And all sowers of discord who distort the assessments of that experience in a manner injuring

our basic interests and perturbing our national consensus should be opposed more resolutely.

Prominent among these problems is Polish-Soviet friendship, which supremely affects our consensus on the issues most vital to us. It invariably is the subject of particularly perfidious attacks by the enemies of our accord. This must be stated explicitly, because all the grounds for it exist. Whoever rejects this friendship, essentially also rejects national accord on issues that are fundamental and supreme to Poland. Whoever does not understand the need for this friendship will not find a place for himself in that accord and will stray. The awareness of the need for Polish-Soviet friendship as a prerequisite for resolving our principal contemporary issues is objectively one of the fundamental premises for a lasting national accord and its effective utilization in Poland's interest.

The position on a consensus regarding the indispensability of adhering to and strengthening Polish-Soviet friendship is clearly and unambiguously defined in the document of October 1982 of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, "Basic Assumptions and Tasks of Consolidating Polish-Soviet Friendship in Social Awareness." This document restates the ideological rationale and currently most important context, purposes, orientations and tasks for a mass social movement in favor of Polish-Soviet friendship headed by the PZPR.

The significance of the above document to shaping the foundations and conditions for the development of that movement has a historic dimension, and its content will influence the nature of the movement in favor of Polish-Soviet friendship, the expansion of its scope and lasting changes in social awareness. This document introduces into socialist social thought in our Polish area weighty formulations ensuing from deeply pondered experience in mutual ties between Poland and its largest neighbor, the USSR, which confirm the rationale for that movement. It makes evident the historical truth, which no one can rationally question, that a socialist Poland that strengthens its friendship with the Soviet Union and broadens its omnilateral cooperation with that country provides the safeguard for the existence of Poland within its present frontiers as well as for its security, sovereignty and a peaceful economic and social development meeting material needs and national aspirations. There is simply no other alternative.

As based on a critical analysis of the previous development of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship, its accomplishments and shortcomings, this document outlines new directions and content of both longrange and current tasks dictated by the complicated domestic and external situation of our country. In particular, it points to the vast field for its development and operation within the system of social education assuring the consolidation of Polish-Soviet friendship in social awareness. This is linked by the document to the indispensability of radical changes in the nature and methods of activity and the broadening of the scope of influence of that movement. At the same time, it defines the place in that movement of all the patriotic social forces in our country and their parties and organizations comprising all the social milieux. As part of this, the document also defines the role and place

of the TPPR (Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship) as well as its particular obligations toward that movement.

This is the first document of its kind with a rich sociopolitical content that enriches socialist social thought on the basis of our country's experience in in evolving mutual relations between socialist countries and societies in the presence of ideological confrontation and perturbations in the peaceful coexistence of countries with differing systems of society.

The ideas and recommendations contained in this document have already prompted individual participants in the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship to undertake actions consonant with their positions in that movement and to assess critically their own experience. It is to be expected that they will also stimulate those who have not yet done so. It will undoubtedly provide the basis for revising the nature and operating methods of the TPPR and critically reappraising the experience gained so far by that social organization. The publicization of that document is the behest of the times and should serve to effectively bar the road to social awareness for the forces and centers opposed to the movement for Soviet-Polish friendship.

Acting out of this conviction, and being inspired by the content of that document, I should like to share with the reader my reflections on issues important to the further growth of that movement. These reflections are based on my 40 years of experience as a participant in this movement, including the years of World War II and the postwar reconstruction of Poland as well as the dramatic events of October 1956 [worker protests in Poznan] and the dangers of the post-August 1980 period, which strengthened my conviction in the necessity of placing the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship on a more permanent foundation. It is my belief that to this end it is necessary to develop the social thought of that movement and its conceptual basis and activities so as to assure genuine and permanent changes in social awareness that would avert tendencies toward seeming and make-believe activities.

2

The idea of Polish-Soviet friendship appeared and blazed a trail for itself in the awareness of the Polish and Soviet societies as a result of historical experience. No one except our own and often painful experience has imposed this idea on us. This idea evolved owing to the experiences of the common struggle of the progressive and revolutionary forces of both our nations which demonstrated its importance to the destiny of our own nation. Its ideological, class and national rationales and the convergence of the goals and aspirations of both our nations were perceived and accepted by the forces of the social left. Their validity was confirmed by the struggle for Poland's independence during World War I, the struggle for the shape of independent Poland in the interbellum period, and, to a supreme degree, by the joint struggle against German fascism for Poland's liberation. They found their full confirmation in the entire postwar period of development of our country.

Penetrating the social awareness, the idea of Polish-Soviet friendship prompted the formation of a movement for that friendship. On the eve of its

birth, it was a spontaneous social movement. It manifested itself most strongly within the circles of the social left, particularly in worker communities, in the bosom and domains of activity of the KKP [prewar Polish Communist Party] and the PPS [former Polish Socialist Party] as well as of youth associations and organizations and the class trade unions, whose activities were influenced by this idea. It also demonstrated its presence in the rural community, in progressive organizations of the peasant movement. It penetrated other milieux and progressive organizations of the intelligentsia. It was not at once that this movement became an organized one. That was not favored by the conditions in which it operated. All the means at the disposal of the capitalist state had been directed against it. And it was precisely in that struggle that the awareness of the need for an autonomous organized movement for Polish-Soviet friendship had ripened. Aspirations of this kind manifested themselves in the activities of leftist groups in various milieux. I can here cite my personal observations of this trend among the Red Scouts of the TUR [Worker University Association] in the 1930's, which could be translated into reality in a not distant future.

The influence of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship grew during World War II. The September 1939 defeat of Poland and, as a result, the loss of its independence barely 20 years after it had been regained owing to the conditions afforded by the October Revolution in 1917, signified the defeat of the concept of a state rejecting friendly relations with the USSR. The awareness of this fact spread among a growing part of the society, despite the use of every means to inoculate it with enmity toward and mistrust of the USSR, along with enmity toward the social left, and particularly toward communism. The activities of the Hitlerite occupier also magnified that awareness. Under these conditions, the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship began to spread to those patriotic social circles which linked the struggle for Poland's independence and destiny to the victory of the USSR over German fascism. It was in these circles also, and initially in the milieux of the resistance movement, that the first autonomous organizations of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship began to arise under the name of "Circles of Friends of the USSR," and under other names, in various regions of the country. These organizations associated persons who were as resolute in their struggle for a Poland with its sovereignty based on the permanent safeguard of Polish-Soviet friendship as in their uncompromising struggle against the occupier, convinced that a genuine liberation of the country and salvation of the nation from destruction could be brought only by the victory of the USSR over the Third Reich.

The movement for Polish-Soviet friendship manifested its existence and dynamic growth immediately after the country's liberation. The liberation of our country by the Soviet Army, with the participation of the Polish Army organized with the aid of the USSR, created a favorable climate for the growth of that movement, because the identity of its rationale with that of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) was confirmed. Once people's rule constituted itself under the ideological guidance of the PZPR, this provided a new impetus for the growth of the movement. The consolidation of people's rule and its revolutionary undertakings, implemented side by side with the creation of a state of a new type and economic reconstruction within new and more favorable

frontiers, required a resolute struggle against its enemies, against the reactionary underground, as well as an accord with the progressive patriotic forces of the society on the question of such a shape of independent Poland as would permanently safeguard its independence and new boundaries as well as a rapid economic reconstruction and the strengthening of the state on the principles of people's democracy. Under these conditions, the issue of a national consensus on the indispensability of Polish-Soviet friendship moved to the forefront.

The awareness of this need prompted the formation of a coherent and mass organization of that movement. As early as in the fall of 1944, in the liberated eastern areas of Poland, organizations of the Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship began to arise. Soon the TPPR occupied a permanent place in the structure of the social organizations of People's Poland which actively supported the democratic forces of the nation united as a result of the policy of the PPR, in the Bloc of Democratic Parties comprising the PPR [Polish Worker Party], the PPS, the SL [Peasant Party] and the SD. This social organization associated the most active members of these parties, of the youth organizations and of the numerous new social organizations--individuals who were fully aware of the linkage between the struggle to perpetuate people's rule and democratic socioeconomic transformations, on the one hand, and the national accord and the progressive patriotic social forces, on the other, as well as of their place in that struggle. The movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and its organization scored, under the guidance of the PPR, successes in promoting national accord and its basic purposes and aspirations.

Following the merger of the worker parties PPR and PPS and the resultant formation of the PZPR, along with the achievements of people's rule under the guidance of the PZPR, which confirmed the rationale of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship, the organization of the Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship reached a mass scale. This resulted in extending the movement to all social milieux, and hence also, in addition to the political parties and youth associations, to the aktiv of trade unions and many social organizations. Following the establishment of the National Front in 1952 on the initiative of the PZPR, the TPPR became a mass social organization within its structure. Under these conditions, certain signs of a weakening of initiative occurred in the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship owing to the ossification of the activities of its organization, the TPPR, along with the negative consequences this produced. This reflected a more general tendency, also occurring within the democratic parties, the youth associations, the trade unions and the social organizations, due to the loosening of the bonds with the masses, which had led to the worker protests in June 1956 and as a consequence to the further unfolding of events, to the political crisis which manifested itself with special intensity in October 1956.

Thanks to bold self-criticism and the line of national accord consonant with the feelings of the basic patriotic social forces, the PZPR overcame the political crisis of October 1956. The implementation of that line revealed the strength and determination of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship. This was reflected in, among other things, that movement's defense of its organization, the Society for Polish-Soviet friendship, which had become the object of merciless attacks by

the enemies of that friendship. This influenced the growth of social initiative in the activities of the TPPR and the rebuilding of the authority of the social aktiv of that organization, which found its place in actively participating in the Front of National Unity formed in 1956, winning over to its activity all the participants in that Front. I am entitled to make this appraisal, since I was a participant in these events.

The successes in building socialism and the prominent activities of the TPPR reduced the interest of the leading echelons of the PZPR in the development of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship, thus promoting the ossification of the activities of that organization and weakening social initiatives. During the economic difficulties that appeared in the 1960's and the attempts at resolving them in a bureaucratic manner, the bonds with the masses again weakened and a style and methods of activity causing social tensions had evolved. Under these circumstances, the bonds between movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and its organization [the TPPR] had loosened. This contributed to weakening its influence on the society. The manner in which the worker conflict in December 1970 was resolved had negatively affected the development of that movement and its bonds with the TPPR. The activities of the TPPR again became ossified, as did its proneness toward make-believe for-the-effect activities under the general influence of the propaganda of success.

The exacerbation of negative phenomena in the style of directing the state and the society, along with the economic difficulties in the second half of the 1970's and the weakening of bonds with the masses, markedly influenced the situation in the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and in its organization, the TPPR. The decline in the interest shown by the PZPR and other participants of the FJN [Front of National Unity] in the development of this movement and the activities of its organization weakened these activities and intensified the tendencies toward make-believe action and propaganda of success. This was exploited by opponents of Polish-Soviet friendship, who had clearly been preparing themselves since 1976 for the struggle to overthrow the evolved structures of the socialist state and take over power at a favorable moment, and who had been creating to this end appropriate organizations and structures of their own. Such an occasion was provided by the conflict with the working class in August 1980 on the Coast, which these organizations spread to other communities in the presence of marked intervention from abroad, which was helped by the previous weakening of the PZPR and its bonds with the masses.

It is characteristic that this time the main attack of the enemies of Polish-Soviet friendship was directed directly against the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship rather than against its organization. By means of massed attacks against the ideological rationale and premises of that movement, attempts were made to discredit it in the eyes of the society and, if not to destroy it immediately, then at least to neutralize it. Apparently the "strategists" of anti-Sovietism, rich in the experience of 1956 and 1970, realized that only thus could they paralyze the activities of the TPPR. At the same time, though, the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship then manifested its indomitable

strength, represented by the progressive patriotic elements participating in it, and particularly by the social aktiv, ready to make any sacrifice for the country's sake. This time, too, although the conditions were in many respects more difficult than during the period of the consolidation of people's rule following the liberation of the country, this movement again assured the continuation of the principal activities of the TPPR and the launching of struggle against manifestations of anti-Sovietism increased its influence on the milieu that had been temporarily dominated by the influence of the opponents of Polish-Soviet friendship.

Following the 9th PZPR Congress we observe a growth in the interest shown by the leadership of the PZPR, as well as by the allied parties, the ZSL and the SD, in the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship. The confirmation of the leading role of the PZPR in this movement was expressed in the document of October 1982 of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, which provided a new impetus and outlined the directions and tasks of development of that movement for all of its participants. In the present socioeconomic situation of the country, the need to broaden and deepen the influence of this movement is becoming tremendous. It can play an important role in a national accord on the indispensability of Polish-Soviet friendship to the successful development of independent Poland and peaceful conditions of its development, as in the past. Hence also it is vital in this connection to integrate the forces and activities of that movement with the patriotic movement for national rebirth and its organization, the PRON, just as in the past the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship used to integrate its activities with those of the other progressive movements of patriotic social forces. Here a major role is to be played by the TPPR, the organization of our movement, and by its aktiv participating in the PRON's activities.

As I view it on the basis of personal experience as a participant in the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship, the experience of this movement indicate that it has been successful whenever interest in its development was shown by the party and the social associations and organizations, whenever the PZPR (and earlier the PPR) exercised ideological guidance over it, and whenever its organization, the TPPR, acted in close coordination with the movement's participants. In the past, this movement played an important role in the attainment of national accord at most critical junctures in the destiny of Poland and its socialist development. It has demonstrated in practice that it is a patriotic movement that reconciles patriotism with internationalism and impartially associates party and non-party members, believers and atheists, all who, for the sake of Poland's good and needs, comprehend the indispensability of Polish-Soviet friendship and desire to consolidate its ideological rationale in the social awareness. These truths should in no way obscure the periodically appearing weaknesses and tendencies within this movement, which besides it itself has surmounted. Anyone who has participated in it will find plenty of proofs supporting these necessarily generalized experiences without exhausting their richness.

The idea of Polish-Soviet friendship has not been nullified, despite the dramatic shock experienced by our society and the vast devastations in social awareness. For the rationale behind this friendship has been confirmed by both past and present experience, including the experience following August 1980 which demonstrated that socialist Poland can rely on the USSR in any need. This experience provides a strong motivation for the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and its organization the TPPR. They themselves also exert considerable influence, which is inspiring the idea of national accord and comprises those patriotic social forces which, guiding themselves by the idea of the accord, have accepted the line of socialist renewal and national accord fixed by the 9th PZPR Congress as the sole reasonable and responsible solution serving to genuinely surmount all the difficulties revealed.

The movement for Polish-Soviet friendship could not be restrained despite the brutal attempts of the opponents of that friendship to distort and bespatter with mud its premises and goals. From these attempts the movement emerges toughened and more mature, with new experiences that confirm its rationale. In particular, it has an emerging conviction of the urgent need for a national accord, in the indispensability of strengthening Polish-Soviet friendship in the social awareness, which preconditions a national accord on all the fundamental issues. This conviction accounts for the convergence between the aims of this movement and those of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] as well as for the tasks relating to the participation of the TPPR in the activities of the PRON. Cooperation between both these social movements is the behest of the times and is needed for a rational and lasting accord.

For essentially the same reasons as those that made the patriotic progressive social forces in our country aware of the need to achieve a lasting national accord and prompted conceiving the idea of that accord--which gave birth to the social movement for national accord and to the formation of its organization the PRON--these forces have also become aware of the need for an accord on strengthening Polish-Soviet friendship. The convergence of the tasks of both these contemporary social movements is, while not encompassing all the aims declared by the PRON, indisputable so far as the purposes pursued by the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and its organization the TPPR are concerned. It is the obligation of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and the TPPR to publicize their rationales and demonstrate the linkages between the national accord on basic issues and the accord on the indispensability of Polish-Soviet friendship.

It is the ideological chaos and devastation accomplished in the social awareness, particularly in that of the rising generations of Poles, by the opponents of Polish-Soviet friendship that raise to prominence the problem of Polish-Soviet friendship and define its place among the crucial problems of national accord. The importance and fundamental significance of this problem to the solution of others are confirmed by the historical experience of the periods when the fate of our country and the shape of its independence hung in the balance. This experience provides weighty arguments in favor of cooperation and mutual action between the patriotic movement for national

rebirth and the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship. The utilization of this experience in the light of the latest dramatic history lesson provided to us following August 1980 is in the interest of both movements. The ensuing conclusions unambiguously speak in favor of encompassing the problem of Polish-Soviet friendship by the national accord. The consideration of these conclusions in the activities of the PRON enhances the chances for the success of that organized movement and at the same time can tangibly expand the scope of influence of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and the effectiveness of activities of the TPPR. Reflecting on these conclusions and translating them into reality is in the interest of this country and its society, of all those social forces which understand that only through a national accord can we resolve our own present-day problems.

The patriotic movement for national accord [rebirth] has rich traditions in this country. It has always appeared whenever the country was in need and its complex problems required solution by means of a national accord or consensus. Its aims and tasks were determined by the realities of the times in which it appeared as well as by the problems round whose solution it rallied patriotic social forces. It is they too that determined the framework and appellations of its organizations. In the course of the 40 years of existence of People's Poland this movement has been present and scored successes, though not always commensurate with the efforts and expectations of its participants in the organizations which it formed.

Participating in this patriotic movement throughout that entire period has been the organization of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship, namely, the TPPR, which made its own weighty contributions to the purposes accomplished by this movement. This entitles and obligates the TPPR to participate in this movement and in its forms and organizations as shaped by the country's needs following August 1980. The TPPR was one of the first mass social organizations to support the aims of the patriotic movement for national rebirth and declare its participation in the organization of that movement, the PRON, regarding this as its obligation. Its actual contribution will be decided by both its activism and the PRON's understanding of the importance of the problem of Polish-Soviet friendship. Experience warrants the belief that the importance, significance and place of this problem in the national accord will be appreciated and properly considered in the PRON's activities.

The traditions of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship are very strongly intertwined with the traditions of the patriotic movement for national accord, being part of them. By its very nature, premises, goals and tasks, the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship is a movement for national accord on Polish-Soviet friendship. The scope of activities of its organization, the TPPR, encompasses all the participants in national accord and the progressive patriotic social forces of our country rallied in that movement and determined to act within its organization, the PRON. The cooperation of both these organizations, the TPPR and the PRON, and their utilization of each other's experience, represents a continuation of the traditions of both these social movement and will magnify their strength and social authority. Awareness of

this is imposed by the social realities of the operating conditions of the PRON and the TPPR.

The TPPR is the organization of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and hence ensue its particular obligations as a mass social organization. But neither this movement nor its organization are exclusive or can bear exclusive responsibility for strengthening Polish-Soviet friendship in social awareness, for a national accord on this issue, whose urgency is not perceived only by the opponents of Polish-Soviet friendship. This is a problem of national accord, and its resolution is the duty of all the patriotic social forces participating in the movement for national accord and acting in its organization, the PRON. The duties of the TPPR as the organization of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship assign to this organization the role of the inspirer and organizer of activities in behalf of Soviet-Polish friendship within the patriotic movement for national accord and with the active participation of all the participants in that movement and its organization, the PRON. Leaving these activities solely to the TPPR conflicts with the purposes of both these social movements and their organizations.

The importance and significance of strengthening Polish-Soviet friendship as one of the crucial problems of national accord in the current social reality of our country, and in the presence of the new conditions for its solution created by the formation of the PRON, require profound changes in the nature and modes of operation of the TPPR, as pointed out by the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee in its document of October 1982. The necessity of these changes is also indicated by the experience gained in the activities of the TPPR so far, which was critically reappraised by our 9th Congress and used to infer general conclusions. These changes must above all consider the actual state of the social awareness and the tried and tested positive experience gained in introducing the idea of Polish-Soviet friendship into that awareness. These changes should also be based on a critical assessment of the situation of the movement for Polish-Soviet friendship and its organization the TPPR as well as of the new possibilities for broadening its scope that are provided by the growth of the patriotic movement for national accord and the real needs for cooperation between the TPPR and the PRON.

1386

CSO: 2600/378

CATHOLIC, STATE PRESS DIFFER ON ROLE OF INTELLIGENTSIA

Stelmachowski in Catholic Weekly

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 40, 30 Sep 84 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Prof Dr Andrzej Stelmachowski, jurist at Warsaw University, by Magdalena Bajer: "Change"]

[Text] Prof Andrzej Stelmachowski was born in 1925 in Poznan. He commenced his studies at the clandestine Warsaw University [during World War II] and completed them in Poznan after the war. Initially he engaged in civil law, but for many years his specialty has been agricultural law. Recently he was appointed by the Primate of Poland to the post of chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Agricultural Foundation.

[Question] Recently the dispute on the attitudes of intellectuals has been revived by the article by Prof Jozef Kozielski in ODRA. There is no way this fact can be overlooked in our interview.

[Answer] All the comments contain one statement which I consider incontestable, namely, that an extremely profound change is taking place in the attitudes of the Polish intelligentsia and not just the intellectuals themselves. I view this with sincere amazement.

As far back as in the interbellum period a considerable part of the intelligentsia displayed leftist or left-leaning tendencies. I would hardly err if I were to say that the /consciously/ [emphasized] Catholic intelligentsia proclaiming its Catholicism was in the minority and a small one at that.

[Question] Among persons in the so-called free professions--physicians, engineers, university faculty and some lawyers, indifference to politics was viewed as a virtue, while at the same time these people often were personally

extensively involved in civic work in behalf of education, public health, sophisticated farming, etc.

[Answer] I'm not quite in accord with this. It is true that before the war a large part of the Polish intelligentsia was not directly involved in the life of the political parties, but this does not mean that these people lacked definite views and made no definite choices (something similar is happening these days in the Western world--after all, active members of political parties there are in a definite minority). I remember hearing ardent discussions at home, in which, being then a little boy, I took no part; the discussants showed great passion. Well, since then the options have changed.

For some time after the war the situation was unclear. The segment of the intelligentsia that was linked to the Home Army movement or bound by ties of loyalty to the London government had for a long time remained aloof. But there was a considerable number of, in particular, young people who were authentically fascinated by the idea of the country's reconstruction and industrialization under the new conditions of social justice. There was the domain of causes common to all, e.g., the rebuilding of Warsaw. We cleared the ruins enthusiastically, and later took so many Sunday promenades to Mariensztat. This tradition besides survived: when the Lazienki Bridge was being built, thousands of Varsovians came to look on at the construction of the thoroughfare. These causes were definitely common to all.

[Question] When did begin that change in attitudes which you termed very profound.

[Answer] In my opinion, only after 1956 [the year of worker protests]. Then a strange thing happened. Properly speaking two groups of the intelligentsia emerged and began to matter in public life: one, in favor of socialism and seeking reforms within the framework of socialism, and the other, choosing Catholicism--a conscious Catholicism; consider the success of the Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia, which at the time still did not mean at all an oppositionist attitude but rather the acceptance of a certain world outlook. This probably continued until the year 1968, when a turning point arrived [-----] [These bracketed dashes appear to denote "Censored" and probably refer to the events in Czechoslovakia--translator's note] [Decree of 31 July 1981, "On the Censorship of Publications and Artistic Entertainment," Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, Item 99; revised in DZIENNIK USTAW, No 44, Item 204)]. This was a gradual process, but it continued uninterruptedly for many years until 1980 when the aspirations of workers and the intelligentsia merged, probably for the first time on such a significant scale.

[Question] I think that we still underestimate this in our opinions and judgments on the consequences of August [1980, the rise of Solidarity--translator's note]. I had observed the August strike in Wroclaw where people who remembered the pioneer era universally shared the feeling of a spontaneous and at the same time surprisingly easy return to precisely these bonds between the academic community and the workers, a return to shared goals resembling in spirit the broad commonalty of goals felt in ordering life anew 40 years ago.

[Answer] For 7 years (1963-1969) I used to be a professor in Wroclaw. My observations there were similar. The denizens of Wroclaw, and not just the university community, are young and flexible. People there make rapid decisions. The Warsaw community, by contrast, is burdened by a large number of elderly or old people who set the tone there.

[Question] And probably Warsaw also contains what is characteristic of any national capital: all sorts of alliances with power centers and representatives, often deriving from former friendship, and no less often from ambition, calculation or outright opportunism.

[Answer] What struck me in August (I had then been at the [Gdansk] shipyard--that was one of my most intense experiences) was how a large part of the intelligentsia, and regardless of origin at that, bound itself at the time to the worker movement. At the same time, another phenomenon arose: the gradual diminution of the group of the so-called independents, mostly those with leftist convictions, which after all used to be a significant group, if not in numbers then in the names of those belonging to it.

[Question] In all sorts of discussions one can hear voices pleading for this group, for a space for independent attitudes in our present intellectual landscape. I believe that, though it has shrunk, this space still survives in the intellectual landscape.

[Answer] It seems to me that, in the course of the polarization that has occurred, this space has properly speaking disappeared from the intellectual landscape. I would rather not assess precisely this phenomenon at present.

[Question] An additional factor is the false situation of those individuals who, say, championed materialism without necessarily being Marxists or being linked to the Establishment. They have ineluctably been suspected of opportunism.

[Answer] I claim that this group has completely disappeared in our social life. What is more, centrist [moderate, neutral] communities also have disappeared, since moderation is now a political rather than intellectual quality. This became crystal-clear during, e.g., the elections at Warsaw University in 1981. The neutrals were very rapidly eliminated--one had to declare himself either for or against. This resulted in a political clash which, of course, reflects a much broader situation.

[Question] Professor, how do you visualize the further evolution of attitudes?

[Answer] It is difficult to visualize it in detail. I'm nowadays struck by the existence of a certain lethargy with respect to concepts of social solutions following the martial law era. It is as if it were tacitly assumed that the status quo has to be preserved.

[Question] The declarations state otherwise....

[Answer] Of course, but this lethargy creates a situation pregnant with dangers, because the society is dominated by a universal unwillingness to return to the past.

[-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981, "On the Censorship of Publications and Artistic Entertainment," Article 2, Points 1 and 2 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW, No 44, Item 204)] [I.e., another censored comment deleted here--translator].

[Question] In 1980 and for a while afterward tentative and, to be sure, a limited recognition was accorded to differences in world outlook and political views, while at the same time glossing over these differences. This was superseded by their condemnation.

[Answer] And by something even worse--the creation of myths and all sorts of artificial structures, which resembles the missionary attitude: "Inasmuch as so far a large part of heathens has not so far attended my church, I must build more churches." But that is not the point, after all. If we agree that it is time for a kind of political ecumenism, this should mean dialogue rather than building more churches. I fear that we will have to wait for it, for it turns out that certain ideas are extremely slow in penetrating the collective consciousness.

[Question] Are you thinking of the intelligentsia's attitude toward the "churches"?

[Answer] That too. The decisive factor in that attitude should be one's own conscience. My conscience points to a straight road, and let me also quote the Gospel: "Let your speech be simple. Say yes when you mean yes, say no when you mean no." This perhaps is the most fruitful counsel.

[Question] For those who are familiar with the meaning of words. They often ask whether all who would like to follow the straight road see that road clearly.

[Answer] I do think so. Of course, there is also the following attitude: "I shall proclaim my views regardless of from what pulpit." This is not at all unimportant, for it represents a far-reaching inward compromise, with all the dangers ensuing from compromises of this kind. Moreover, by changing pulpits I cut myself off from access to a large number of people, and it is far from certain whether those who provide the pulpit would listen to my views.

[Question] This attitude is not too frequent.

[Answer] Fortunately. I also observed another attitude: that of individuals who want to be /officially/ [emphasized] active in any system of social relations. Some do so out of plain opportunism, while others need an outlet for their activism and find it in fairly dubious forms.

[Question] Sometimes this attitude is interpreted in terms of virtual sacrifice: "I'm risking my good name (in my community) for the sake of higher aims."

[Answer] In a somewhat simplified form this question is worded as follows: "Can I use the evil spirit to proclaim the Gospel?" Hardly, I think. I rather believe in the proverb of going among the crows.\*

[Question] Here we are essentially speaking of the Wallenrod\*\* attitude which, if it lasts long enough, is bound to result in either personal tragedy or finding our own identity.

[Answer] In my opinion, this attitude should be recommended neither on the mass scale nor for individuals.

[Question] I'm in complete accord with your judgments, Professor. In reality, however, we observe many compromises, a large part of which, I believe, occurs because people do not perceive clearly that straight road which they should and surely would want to follow.

[Answer] It rather seems to me that such people simply do not strain hard enough to see. It is natural for groups of weaker or vacillating individuals to always make compromises. But these people do not set the tone nowadays. And that is important. Those who do something improper out of opportunism usually do not raise their voices. An exception from this rule is represented by a small but significant group of people who are generally older in years. This phenomenon is variously interpreted. I incline toward the rather simple explanation that extremely active individuals experience a profound frustration when reaching retirement age. A summons to public activity, regardless of what kind, then provides to them such a strong temptation that they cannot resist it. The operation of an additional factor is then also not excluded, namely, fears typical of advanced age, which prompt the need to offer public exhortations. I'm trying to understand this phenomenon.

---

\*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: "When you go among the crows, caw like they do"--the Polish equivalent of "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." Pun intended, because "wrona," Polish for "crow," also refers to WRON, the acronym for the martial-law junta, the Military Council for National Salvation.

\*\*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A reference to Konrad Wallenrod, the protagonist of Adam Mickiewicz's "Dziady" [Forefathers' Eve], "a sacral drama of Poland's sacrificial destiny as embodied in the poet-hero Gustav reborn as the rebel Konrad. The play's climax comes in a long monologue... in which the poet revolts against a God indifferent to human suffering. But Konrad shrinks from committing blasphemy, thus vindicating the ancestral code, and in Father Peter's messianic prophecy he is cast as a national savior. In its vision of Poland as a 'Christ of nations,' 'Forefathers' Eve' became a major source of the potent doctrine of Polish Messianism" (Czeslaw Milosz, "The Land of Ulro," New York: Farrar--Strauss--Giroux, 1984, p 283).

[Question] The exhortations often acquire the form of defending the idea of the state as the supreme value against alleged or eventual perils.

[Answer] I consider it incontestable that in this part of Europe, and given the existing conditions, the state is crucially needed for the life of the nation and the society, that it is the common good of the entire society.

[-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981, "On the Censorship of Publications and Artistic Entertainment," Article 2, Points 1 and 2 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, Item 99, revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW, No 44, Item 204)].

[Question] Professor, you mentioned the straight road which, in my opinion, is not clearly perceptible to everyone. Please show me that road.

[Answer] To the intellectual this road is fidelity to his basic mission as largely determined by his professional status and place in society. Generally speaking, this road is the defense of the fundamental values--truth, justice, adherence to ideals which cannot depend on the changing situation.

[Question] A prerequisite for fulfilling that mission is having ideals at all.

[Answer] Of course. It is to the great credit of the movement of 1980 that it "brought into prominence" our fundamental ideals. That is why, in my opinion, nowadays it is an unacceptable excuse for anyone to say that he does not perceive that straight road. I believe that the unusual popularity of the Church, and precisely among the intelligentsia at that, as well as the numerous baptisms of adults and totally sincere conversions probably express the desire to declare oneself on the side of the eternal ideals, of precisely these fundamental exemplars of life and conduct.

[Question] The rapprochement between the Church and the persons who had for various reasons stood aloof from it is usually considered as a guise for political choices.

[Answer] Certainly this too happens, but most often this is a road of extremely profound meditations and reappraisals of values. This is a new situation and its effects will become apparent only after years.

[Question] In your opinion, will this new situation be perpetuated by the rising generations of the intelligentsia, which are entering upon public life in the presence of a marked polarization of attitudes?

[Answer] I believe that the current young generation is much more interesting than our own already quite middle-aged one. I look on at these people with a tremendous hope and find them to be incomparably more sympathetic than many of my age peers, who I hope will forgive my saying so. I see in young people proneness to idealism and the disappearance of that shallow materialism which had infected us so strongly in the 1970's. Perhaps this is also due to the present situation of duress, which is not conducive to that shallow materialism, but at any rate I observe that the views of the young are much more profound than ours. There are of course many breakdowns and disappointments, but historical experience teaches that great social

movements, great ideas, as a rule have to blaze trails for themselves through a thicket of resistance.

[Question] We are speaking of the intelligentsia as a whole. In conclusion, I should like to ask about the academic community, which represents such a considerable part of the intelligentsia. Are the views expatiated by you uniformly shared by that community?

[Answer] Yes and no. Of a certainty we--I'm speaking of Warsaw University--have widely diverging views. However, a new phenomenon has appeared, namely, a certain range of "[university] corporation" issues concerning which there exists a considerable solidarity irrespective of the divergent views on other issues. This refers, e.g., to the desire to preserve the rights of university autonomy. We are dealing here with a uniformity of views shared by not only persons who had been linked to the August movement but also those linked to the Establishment and even certain former dignitaries. They all display an evident loyalty to the idea of the corporational university community. This is also seen in daily life, which is highly important, because it assures normal and undisturbed work, and primarily teaching, and it also assures free scientific discussion. In my department (Law and Administration) we held a series of very interesting colloquiums on crisis-causing phenomena in law doctrine as well as in law. The point was to examine our own activities in order to find in them causes of the crisis. Persons of widely differing views engaged in mutual debates in the awareness of being able to exchange their views freely and safely.

[Question] This is of great educational importance.

[Answer] Of course, and it must be said that this is truly and to a large extent a new phenomenon. When I recall the former times of sharp personal rivalries, I consider the situation at present to be different, although, naturally, these rivalries have not completely disappeared. The collective awareness of our community has accepted the value represented by intellectual or spiritual independence, which gives one the feeling of belonging to the academic community and, more broadly, to the community of like-minded persons.

[Question] This is highly encouraging. Thank you for the interview.

#### Lack of Intellectual Debate

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 44, 3 Nov 84 p 16

[Article by Daniel Passent: "A Moiety of Honor"]

[Text] Reading a massive dose of the Polish press over the last month warrants the conclusion that the more the newspapers and periodicals attempt to be interesting, and the more they contain sensational stories, news items on curiosities of customs and history, and narratives of criminal trials, murders and perversions, the more tedious they become to a person who, like myself, is interested in politics and in what is really happening in this country. To be sure, the range of information provided on certain matters has become much

broader, but it is provided in unequal doses. I have the impression that the struggle against speculation has also spread to intellectual and political speculation. And yet, numerous representatives of our society, which formerly used to regard trade as an unseemly occupation reserved for Armenians and Jews, are now speculating from Budapest to Rio de Janeiro, both literally and figuratively.

I found some political speculation in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY (of 30 September), and I inspected that merchandise like a speculator, trying to figure out whether a profit could be made from it. It turns out that it could, for which God will pay! The situation is, however, equivocal and highly unbusinesslike. In business, as known, the rights--though this does not mean also the opportunities--of all goods on the market are equal and anyone who has the money can buy them without being discriminated against. Such is the principle of the free-market economy which, I believe, has its adherents among (and not only, not only) the editors of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY. But with us the TYGODNIK wants neither to trade nor even bargain, as if we were paying in counterfeit coin. In the 1970's, when [Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw] Rakowski and [government spokesman Jerzy] Urban had been working for POLITYKA, it was the periodical most often cited by the TYGODNIK. The fact that nowadays Editor Turowicz takes no notice of us represents an indirect homage which he pays every week to the regretfully missed editors of our periodical who have now joined the government. If anyone from Wislana Street (as the Varsovians say) takes notice of anyone from Dibuas Street, that can be only our former colleague Skalski, who digs out from POLITYKA some extremely critical articles about the postwar economy or environmental pollution in order to exploit them as ammunition in the fight against the godless system of society.

I state this fact not out of vanity and wounded ambition, because, as known, the standing of a periodical depends not on whether X or Y takes notice of us or wants to cut us dead but on unequal rights. I try to read and discuss with anyone who has anything to say, regardless of his origin, religion, etc., whereas the TYGODNIK assumes that, by definition, we have nothing to say. This seems contrary to the principle of dialogue and to realism, but God be with them; they are not alone--on the other side also there exist some or other periodicals which are not anxious for dialogue and thunder like an empty drum.

Thus, in analyzing the interviews with Prof Andrzej Stelmachowski and Krzysztof Zanussi published in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY I feel somewhat like that oldster who addresses a painting (a holy one, of course) without ever getting a word in return. "Pust' budet!" [Let it be so], as the adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church say, it is better to be a voice crying in the wilderness than to hide one's head in the sand. Ultimately, the fellows at the TYGODNIK also pretend that they engage in dialogue. Proof? Surely: Prof Stelmachowski, who poses high moral requirements to citizens of the Polish People's Republic, declared: "...I encounter an attitude expressed as follows: 'I shall proclaim my views regardless of from what pulpit. But this is not at all unimportant, for it represents a far-reaching inward compromise, with all the dangers ensuing from compromises of this kind. Moreover, by changing pulpits I cut myself off from access to a large number of people, and it is

far from certain whether those who provide the pulpit would even listen to my views.'"

So whom is the professor drinking to? Perhaps to his interviewer from TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, Magdalena Bajer, our former colleague from POLITYKA, who herself changed her pulpit and reached the conclusion that it was not worthwhile working here and abandoned the motto "Proletarians of all countries, unite!", quit POLITYKA, moved to another altar and now interviews Stelmachowski. Surely, she had the right to make this decision and anyone (whom they admitted, and surely love of one's neighbor commands admitting every sinner) has that right, except that Magdalena Bajer [did not] answer like a militant journalist the professor's accusation of the "far-reaching inward compromise" represented by the change of pulpits. She used to be our associate, and as a journalist used to be very militant, but now she talks politely, genuflecting, and she has not only failed to make an impolite answer but even declared somewhat later: "I'm in complete accord with your judgments, Professor." That is as it should be: he throws stones at her and she kisses him on the cheek. This is how the principle of engaging in dialogue only with like-minded people, that is, in a monologue, avenges itself. Both the abovementioned interviews, the one with Stelmachowski by Bajer and the one with Zanussi by Szyma, display not even a trace of disagreement or debate between the interviewer and the interviewee; they were gooey-gushy love-thy-neighbor feasts.

And yet there is something to these monologues made to sound like dialogues, namely, they deal with authentic political and moral issues, which have their own adherents, among whom I count myself. Prof Stelmachowski points to a generally known and, in my opinion, deplorable phenomenon, namely, the disappearance of the center [moderates] in our political life, the far-reaching quarrel between both sides, for which the learned term is polarization. (I immediately become aware that the term "center" has many meanings, and that, compared with certain press publications, everyone else is a "centrist," but that is not what I mean. These publications provide besides a convenient alibi to anyone who wants to appear a so-called moderate.)

Let us give the floor to Stelmachowski: "...a gradual diminution of the group of the so-called independents, with leftist convictions, which had after all been significant, if not in numbers then in names... in the course of the polarization that has occurred, this space has disappeared from the intellectual landscape." The professor further commented, "I would rather not assess precisely this phenomenon." That is a pity, a great pity. I would be interested in that assessment, which in my opinion would be a sad one, a very sad one, because there cannot be any reconciliation or dialogue when a gulf instead of a center exists between both high parties. People who attempt not so much to fill in that gulf, as this is impossible, as to throw a plank across it, do not enjoy any special applause, as evidenced by the fact that TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, which is very sensitive about patriotic traditions and national uprisings, has made no mention at all of our discussion of the Warsaw Uprising with the participation of Ciechanowski and Micewski, but when we published an article by another Catholic, Prof Grzegorzcyk, he was at once

abused. It is no easy life for those who attempt to throw a plank across the gulf.

The professor said, "Centrist milieux have disappeared, since moderation is now a political rather than intellectual quality. This became crystal-clear during, e.g., the elections at Warsaw University in 1981. The neutrals were very rapidly eliminated; one had to declare himself either for or against. This resulted in a political clash that, of course, reflects a much broader situation."

What is the advice of Bajer and Stelmachowski in this situation? It turns out that it should continue and there should be no compromise whatever! Magdalena Bajer said: "In reality, however, we observe many compromises, a large part of which, I believe, occurs because people don't perceive clearly that straight road which they should and surely would want to perceive." Professor Stelmachowski: "It rather seems to me that such people don't strain hard enough to see. It is natural for groups of weaker or vacillating individuals to always make compromises. But these people don't set the tone nowadays. And that is important. Those who do something improper out of opportunism usually do not raise their voices. An exception from this rule is a small but significant group of people who generally are older in years."

If compromise is so bad, this raises the question of why the professor is committed to the formation of an agricultural foundation which is a classic example of a rotten compromise: Western, clerical, Bonn and Washington pieces of silver are to be dispatched to socialist Poland where the communist regime under the sign of the kolkhozes consents to allotting them to Polish farms. If both sides agree, this initiative (if only the money were available...) would be useful, but what good would come of it to farmers if they themselves, the government and the Episcopate were to be as uncompromising as Magdalena Bajer, who perceives clearly the straight road, and the professor, who is straining his eyesight so hard? It appears that some people already have the courage to opt for a compromise, but lack the courage to admit it.

However, TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY is not always opposed to compromise, provided that it is the right people who opt for compromises. Thus, on the adjacent side the floor is taken by a typical man of compromise, Krzysztof Zanussi, who describes how a compromise helped save the Association of Filmmakers. Upon resigning--and it must be admitted that he did so after prolonged reflections and not without resistance--Andrzej Wajda and the previous governing board of the association helped their organization, cleared the road to free elections in the association, and now we behold the same virgins who barely a year or two ago felt insulted, emigrated and virginal, now come forward--no, what am I saying, trot forward in their eagerness to reach a compromise. The filmmaker [Zanussi] declared: "We believe that in this way at least 'a moiety of honor' has been saved.... Many people are trying to continue their cultural activities." He further declared: "Many of us believe that this can be done, or at any rate it should be tried. And hence we bet on it." But when discussing the relations between filmmakers and their maecenases in the East and in the West, with which he is thoroughly familiar, Zanussi commented: "In one way or another, some compromise is needed."

I look on and cannot believe it: compromise? With whom? Why does not the editor counter Szyma? What about the boycott? What about the apologia of the internal emigres and turning one's back to anything that comes from the state or is official? What about branding those who displayed their prohibited mugs on television? Where is the praise for those who, unlike Wajda and the filmmakers, stuck immovably to their posts until they were removed to their own satisfaction because then they could point to the cruelty of the removers? I am not asking Krzysztof Zanussi about it; I am asking only Prof Stelmachowski, M. Bajer, T. Szyma and other uncompromising people. It remains to me as, unfortunately, one of the last Mohicans of the moderate center, which has been washed out and does not exist, to quote, after Zanussi, Kieslowski's motto: "We don't accept what has happened, but we will live with it." For it is clear that it is not in every case and with everyone that a compromise is possible; we don't accept just anything, but if we consider things for a while from the other side's viewpoint, a compromise may prove in many cases to be a better solution than an uncompromising resignation of one's post. A real journalist would, for example, never reconcile himself inwardly to restrictions on freedom of speech, but he would understand that we will have to live with them for the sake of a higher good. He will not make a virtue out of necessity, and the readers will watch him to make sure that that moiety of honor would not shrink to one-fourth or even one-sixteenth, turning into a midget bursting with fat.

1386

CSO: 2600/414

SPECIFICATIONS OF PZL-130 ORLIK TRAINING PLANE PROVIDED

Warsaw SKRZYDLATA POLSKA in Polish No 48, 25 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Boguslaw Witkowski: "New Polish Design: the PZL-130 Orlik"]

[Text] On this past 12 October at the PZL Transportation Equipment Factory in Warsaw-Okecie the first test flight took place on the prototype of the new Polish PZL-130 Orlik airplane. The main designer is Mgr engr Andrzej Frydrychewicz, and the operating designer is Mgr engr Tomasz Wolf. The first test flight was made by test pilot Witold Lukomski.

As we have already mentioned, the PZL-130 Orlik is a light training aircraft with a piston engine making it possible for the student pilot to acquire the habits and skills of flying a jet aircraft. After appropriate equipment has been built in, it will be possible to perform many tasks and exercises which have been done previously in jet trainers, thus saving on the fuel and use of jet aircraft.

The new aircraft is equipped like this:

- short wing with expanded utility range of the angle of pitch, with characteristic features accustoming the student to power-on approaches,
- strong landing gear permitting take-offs and landings at higher speeds,
- high-RPM metal propeller creating small gyroscopic moment,
- cockpit design and ergonomics similar to military aircraft,
- modular instrument panel making it possible to build in various sorts of equipment lay-outs, in different configurations,
- set-up allowing instructor to simulate emergencies,
- possibility of building into the student cockpit a flight simulator with mock-ups of instruments and controls characteristic of combat aircraft.

The Orlik is designated for an initial selection of students, for basic pilot instruction and aerobatics, for flights in adverse weather, group flights, air reconnaissance, and towing targets.


The Orlik is a fully aerobatic cantilever monoplane. The construction is all metal. The flight crew consists of two persons, in tandem. The instructor is seated behind, and his seat is higher than the student's, insuring good visibility. The seats adjust electrically, and there is provision for parachutes, both chair-type and canopy-back. The landing gear has a nosewheel and is retractable in flight. Low-pressure tires. Constant 400 cubic decimeter fuel tanks. Piston-driven 220 kW (300 horse-power) engine. Three-bladed constant-speed metal propeller.

#### Specifications

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| Wing-span                   | 8 meters      |
| Length                      | 8.45 meters   |
| Height                      | 4.00 meters   |
| Wing area                   | 12.2 square m |
| Empty weight                | 950 kilograms |
| Max gross weight (standard) | 1,300 kg      |
| Max gross weight (utility)  | 1,500 kg      |

#### Flight Data

|                  |                     |
|------------------|---------------------|
| Max speed        | 380 kilometers/hour |
| Cruise speed     | 330 kilometers/hour |
| Rate of climb    | 7.4 meters/second   |
| Service ceiling  | 7,000 meters        |
| Range            | 1,400 kilometers    |
| Take-off roll    | 300 meters          |
| Landing distance | 240 meters          |



10790  
CSO: 2600/384

CEAUSESCU RECEIVES GUINEAN ENVOY'S CREDENTIALS

AU262047 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1833 GMT 26 Dec 84

[Text] Bucharest, 26 Dec (AGERPRES)--Romania's President Nicolae Ceausescu received on Wednesday, 26 December, Cisse Fode [spelling as received] who presented his letters of credence as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Guinea to Romania. The credentials presentation ceremony occasioned an exchange of salutes between the presidents of Romania and the Republic of Guinea.

In his speech on the occasion, the ambassador pointed to the good Romanian-Guinean relations, and expressed willingness to further develop them. He also showed high appreciation for the foreign policy successfully promoted by Romania and its President Nicolae Ceausescu in the struggle for the settlement of the major problems facing mankind, for the building of an international economic order apt to ensure all peoples' free and independent development.

In his turn, President Nicolae Ceausescu emphasized the positive course of Romanian-Guinean relations underlain by the principles of equality of rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual esteem and regard. [Sentence as received] He also showed that the economic potential of Romania and the Republic of Guinea provided favorable prerequisites for the expansion of the Romanian-Guinean collaboration, in the interests of both peoples, of the cause of international peace and understanding. The Romanian head of state also assessed that Romania and Guinea could intensify their cooperation in the international arena, for a policy of peace, independence and cooperation throughout the world.

After the ceremony, President Nicolae Ceausescu conversed with Ambassador Cisse Fode in a cordial atmosphere.

CSO: 2020/41

## BRIEFS

TRADE PROTOCOL WITH VIETNAM--Bucharest, 21 Dec (AGERPRES)--Vasile Pungan, Romanian minister of foreign trade and international economic cooperation, and Nguyen Manh Cam, deputy minister of foreign trade of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, who is visiting Romania as head of an economic delegation, had an interview during which they approached possibilities to further develop the Romanian-Vietnamese economic collaboration and production cooperation, to expand and diversify bilateral economic exchanges. The Vietnamese guest and Constantin Stanca, Romanian deputy minister of foreign trade and international economic cooperation, signed, on 21 December, a protocol on goods and payments exchanges between the governments of Romania and Vietnam in 1985. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1655 GMT 21 Dec 84]

SOCIALIST CULTURE COUNCIL--Bucharest, 21 Dec (AGERPRES)--A plenary meeting of the Council of Socialist Culture and Education examined, on 21 December, the activity carried out in 1984 and the tasks incumbent on this body and on cultural-educational institutions deriving from the documents adopted by the 13th RCP Congress. The agenda of the proceedings included a report on the mass stage of the fifth national festival "Song to Romania," conclusions drawn from the unfolding of previous editions, and proposals for the improvement of the master rules as well as the draft plan of the council's activity in 1985. At the close of the proceedings of the plenary meeting a telegram addressed to Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP general secretary, was adopted. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1653 GMT 21 Dec 84]

NATIONAL WOMEN'S COUNCIL--Bucharest, 21 Dec (AGERPRES)--A plenary meeting of the National Women's Council debated, on 21 December, the tasks incumbent on the National Council, on women's committees and commissions, on all women for the implementation of the resolutions of the 13th RCP Congress and of the single national plan of Romania's socioeconomic development in 1985. A programme of measures was adopted to this end. It was decided to convene the national women's conference between 7 and 8 March 1985. At the close of the proceedings, a telegram addressed to Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP general secretary, president of Romania, was adopted. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1652 GMT 21 Dec 84]

CEAUSESCU RECEIVES PRC ENVOY--Bucharest, 26 Dec (AGERPRES)--Romania's President Nicolae Ceausescu received on Wednesday, 26 December, Li Zewang, ambassador of the People's Republic of China in Bucharest, on a farewell call at the end of his mission in Romania. A talk was conducted on the occasion which passed in a warm comradely atmosphere. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1826 GMT 26 Dec 84]

CSO: 2020/41

## FEDERATION-CONFEDERATION DILEMMA CHALLENGED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1769,  
25 Nov 84 pp 16-17

[Article by Prof Radoslav Stojanovic: "Federation or Confederation"]

[Text] In one of his speeches, Stipe Suvar said that in our country "...first-class lawyers, academics, writers, and analysts of the law and the constitution...reason disproportionately about the nature of the Yugoslav federation. There is no such federation elsewhere in the world, and these people are very disturbed by legal-formalistic comparisons: whether it is more of a federation, or even a confederation. These are categories of old bourgeois law that are secondary for us. The fundamental thing for us is whether certain social processes are in existence, and whether these result in certain ties among people and among the nationalities that these people belong to."

Since I am not a "first-class lawyer," I do not feel eliminated by this label, and so I will occupy myself precisely with the essence of the relationships that give a true picture of our federation. By the way, why is the label "bourgeois law" used in this case? Federalization, as a form of unification of human societies, also existed under slave-ownership and feudal law, and mostly in a confederative form or lower than that. Bourgeois political thought rejected this dilemma as early as the 18th century, and with the growth of the American confederation into a federation in 1789, bourgeois law definitively rejected it for the cases of the federalization (unification) of industrial societies. The American example was followed somewhat later by the Swiss and German confederations. Thus, with the emergence of bourgeois law, the federation-confederation dilemma disappeared.

Federalization is the process of the unification of human societies, and is opposed to the process of territorialization that divides these societies.

It is undeniable that a federation is a state and a confederation is not. A confederation is an alliance of states based on an international treaty. A federation is a state based on a constitution that is an internal legal document.

What is even more significant is that a federation is a society, or as Montesquieu put it in the 18th century, a federation is a "society of societies." A confederation is not a society. It is an alliance of several society-states with precisely defined goals that can usually be reduced to joint defense against a common danger.

What does this mean--a society? A society is an autarchic community and as such is capable of economic, biological, and spiritual existence. This means that a federation, as a state-society, is autarchic, and that its elements are not. A confederation is not a state-society precisely because its elements are autarchic societies.

### Social Processes in the Yugoslav Federation

At competent meetings in our country, the position is expressed that on some issues, the EEC is integrated to a higher degree than Yugoslav society. It was surely as a consequence of this that a situation emerged in which it is not impossible to institute customs barriers between republics and provinces.

We have the autarchic nature and balances of payments of the republics and provinces; the division of the Yugoslav market; the disintegration of the energy and transportation systems; the lack of awareness of the real situation with debts, etc., etc. Finally, there are migrations of populations toward national centers in self-managing socialism! The last is even declared to be normal! The artificial demographic spreading, however, at least in Serbia, is one of the reasons why that republic has the highest number of people unemployed. It is not normal because it creates serious problems, and not just economic ones.

Have all of these processes occurred because of deviations in the political system, or because of its contradictions? My familiarity or unfamiliarity with the situation does not allow me to think that it is only a question of deviations here.

In our political life, the attitude has been consolidated that the federation is what the republics and provinces agree on. This attitude pulls one toward voluntarism, unless "agreement" is taken to mean that the federation is a system subject to its own laws. If these laws are bypassed, ignored, or changed by agreement, then the system "agreed upon" cannot be considered a federation.

A federation is a system that unifies (integrates) societies. That is the first imperative for a federation. A federation is a society of societies, and not an alliance or collection of societies. A federation is a state.

The examples of disintegration processes in Yugoslav society cited above (which are by no means all of the examples) show that there is a discrepancy between these imperatives of a federation and our practice.

A federation is a society. This means that self-sufficiency is ensured at the level of the federation. This presupposes the unity of the socioeconomic system and the economic system, and the unity of the market.

The first demand has been met: the same socioeconomic system has been implemented in all the republics and provinces--admittedly, not at the same level of organization and operation. A couple of things have not been implemented.

It is not necessary now to present the arguments proving the existence of strong autarchic tendencies in our republics and provinces. In spite of everyone's knowledge that today autarchy is leading to economic backwardness, this process is still continuing. In my opinion, this has occurred mostly because of contradictions in the system. They have originated in the relationship between the unity of the market (an imperative), and the independence of the republics and provinces in international economic relations, which is also reflected in the independence of their payments balances. (There are also other causes, which will be discussed later on).

It is impossible to have a unified domestic market, and independent international economic relations between the federal units and foreign countries. In fact, the interdependence of the federal units is not of the same kind as the dependence of each of them with respect to foreign countries. In their internal interdependence, the surplus products of one unit are needed on the domestic market, while another creates surpluses primarily for export. This is normal for every society in the world. If the first one is independent in international payments, however, it will be able to export its surpluses regardless of whether they are needed on the domestic market. That is what is happening. Some export while others import the same thing. They say that this costs the country about \$700 million a year! It is quite clear that under such conditions, it is not possible for the federation to achieve unified interdependence with respect to foreign countries. This destroys the unity of the internal market, while a system of trade necessarily develops among the federal units as in international economic relations: payment in foreign exchange, clearing accounts, etc., which in our country is already an "old" practice (admittedly, one recently prohibited by law, but it still persists). It really is only one step from this to instituting tariffs in trade among the federal units.

Autarchic development leads to the creation of national economies (or viceversa), since it is not possible to be self-sufficient unless production is "well-rounded." The creation of national economies is the final act in separating societies into separate communities, while their links with other communities become more international-economic ones than federal ones, i.e. increasingly weaker and rarer. If one keeps in mind that the national economies are not equal in strength, the transfer of income (exploitation) is a legitimate phenomenon. This also reduced the number of links among republics and provinces, among people and nationalities...

The absence of a hierarchical principle among the federation, republics, and opstinas has created an essential condition for the etatization of the republics and provinces, and for the dismantlement of the federation's statehood.

I am basing this assertion on the fact that the federation has been deprived of the possibility of directly carrying out the decisions made at the level of the federation. The republics, however, can carry out their decisions even without this principle. How? The process of federalization in the LC has reached a point where the republic parties, by means of democratic centralism, can obligate the opstinas, while the federal leadership of the LC can hardly do this with respect to the republics. This leads to a symbiosis between the party and the government that is not desired by anyone and that is contrary to the LC program. It appears that this process has not been concluded: this symbiosis with the government will make the opstina government more and more independent through the emergence of the same symbiosis at the opstina level.

#### Statehood and Self-Management

The problem thus occurs in two forms: first, the adoption of decisions by consensus or veto at the level of the federation, and second, the execution of decisions, which is uncertain because it again depends on the republics and provinces, since the federation does not have a direct capability of doing this. It is sufficient to say that the Long-Term Economic Stabilization Program was adopted by consensus, but the ones who do not want it are not carrying it out! There are many such examples.

Many people consider the adoption of the consensus in decisionmaking at the level of the Yugoslav federation to be proof that Yugoslavia is a confederation. No confederation in history, however (except the Polish one) was familiar with this method of decisionmaking. In all of them, decisions were adopted by majority vote. This is not as essential if something new is being sought that is thus far unknown in history. Naturally, this new thing can lead to higher degrees of unification, which is the goal of all of us because it is inherent in socialism.

Does this method of decisionmaking lead to higher degrees of unity?

The right of veto territorializes political power. Political power strives for supremacy, i.e. not recognizing another power above itself. The right of veto makes this supremacy possible. It is from this circle that republic and provincial etatism grows in all areas of social life. Territorialized power, in turn, leads to the disintegration of society, since unity is the opposite of this supremacy of power. The extension of the consensus as a method of decisionmaking to areas not foreseen by the constitution proves the speed of this merry-go-round.

The existence of this territorialized power and the contradictions within the social system cause countless phenomena involving disunity, disintegration, and the incapacitation of the federation.

All of these contradictions should have been resolved in a new way: by self-managing agreement among social entities. Accords and agreements are the essence of the system, and they mean the elimination of power and the introduction of self-management in a large area of social life. Consultation and agreement presuppose the consent of all the participants in decisionmaking. It is therefore the most democratic form of linking society together "from above." If it were the only means of linking society together, then linking society together "from above" would be uncertain or very difficult to carry out. Such uncertainty cannot be permitted in the political system of the state.

An agreement implies disagreement, i.e., failure to reach an agreement. This is not only logically clear; it is confirmed empirically by practical social relations. But if there is no agreement, society cannot function. Since this cannot be permitted, then the linkage has to be carried out "from above." This linkage "from above" in our system is carried out by means of temporary measures that are adopted by majority vote and not by consensus. Why is it that in our system, vital decisions can only be adopted by a majority in the form of temporary measures? The linkage of society has to be done "from above" as well, and on a continuing basis, if we are to avoid provisionality in operation.

What Is the Issue?

At this stage of development, the self-management system of social organization does not eliminate the division of labor, the market, or the production of goods. Thus, it also does not eliminate inequality among individuals, groups, and nations. Self-management is certainly a system that eliminates power and ruling as separate social functions. It is quite clear, however, that Yugoslavia, as a social community, has not surmounted the stage of development in which the state is unnecessary as a system for linking society together "from above." Since no reasonable person can challenge this assertion, is it possible to expect the dismantled statehood of the federation to be able to perform this function in self-managing society?

In my opinion, the problem is that in our political system there has not been a good distinction between what the state (the federation or the federal units) should do, and what should be done by the self-management system. Because of this, we are entering a paradoxical situation: millions of self-management agreements do not eliminate the absence of state linkage "from above," and in order for society to function, the state adopts more and more administrative measures, thus pushing self-management aside, and so on in a circle. If one considers that these measures are often not derived from the state jurisdictions established by the system but are rather putting out fires on an ad hoc basis, they are not interconnected and as such, do not create a system, which means that they are outside a system.

If the functioning takes place outside the system because the system is not functioning, then the system should be changed, since the practice cannot be wrong.

What should be changed? Everything that hinders the integration of Yugoslav society. Everything that we think is new has to be in accordance with the fact, noticed even by Marx, that with industrial production society overcomes its divisions and becomes functional.

These changes have to be such that they free us from the danger of centralization, since it conceals unitarism. And we are a multinational community in which unitarism is not acceptable. It is also necessary to avoid decentralization, if it conceals disintegration, since it leads to separatism. We have to distinguish the concepts: centralization from integration, and decentralization from disintegration. These concepts are frequently substituted for each other, mixed, and sometimes not even mentioned in our country.

9909

CSO: 2800/141

NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENTS IN SPLIT THEATER DEPLORED

Zagreb POLET in Serbo-Croatian 2 Nov 84 p 5

[Commentary by Zoran Krzelj: "Checked Suits at the Opera"]

[Text] This was the fifth or sixth performance, following the premiere, of the opera "Nikola Subic Zrinski" by Zajc, and the first performance for which tickets were freely available. Regular subscribers of the Croatian National Theater in Split had been attending the previous performances.

Thanks to my obligations as a delegate (and--I have to confess--the free tickets), I have been spending quite a bit of time in the theater lately. To be specific, I was viewing and hearing "Zrinski" in my capacity as delegate from the Split youth federation to the advisory board of the Croatian National Theater. In the same capacity, I saw and heard other works from the opera schedule of the Split theater, so I had no trouble in reaching a conclusion: The number of living beings present in the theater for the performance of the opera "Nikola Subic Zrinski" does not correlate with the actual interest of Split residents (and residents of the theaterless hinterlands) in operatic art! Something else brought them into the theater!

A good deal of time has passed since the events in question. Why, then, write about it today?

For me, there is a constant dilemma as to whether to write at all or not about various instances of nationalist outbursts and outpourings.

Does writing on this subject do more harm or good?

Nationalist Mill

The recent polemical columns published in the local daily, NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, as inspired by "Zrinski," might have been an excuse (justification) for this text. However, such is not the case. The only reason is that it is unforgivable to avoid describing (in writing) such a "marvellous textbook case" of primitivism, of the essence of nationalism!

To make things clear right away: Everything is all right so far as the opera itself, as a work of art, is concerned. I have no intention of

urging its removal from the repertoire just because it served a portion of the audience as an excuse for a political provocation, as demanded by my better-known fellow-citizen from NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA. Can you imagine banning soccer matches because someone in the stands abuses them for non-athletic purposes?

Later on, that same fellow-citizen provides grist for the nationalistic mill by his statement that he would justify the performance of "Zrinski" in Split only after it is performed in Belgrade and Sarajevo.

Poor Zajc, what they are doing to him!

Accordingly, I will not refer to the work of the musical stage but to what a segment of the audience was doing. To be more precise, to poor educational background, stupidity, and primitivism as the foundations of nationalism in general.

Nuns

During the performance which I attended, I saw a great deal that did not occur during "Aida" or [Yugoslav opera] "Ero From the Other World." For example, several full rows in the orchestra would have come out in black and white even if photographed in color film. The rows were filled with nuns. No, they did not applaud frantically at the appearance of the [Croatian] flag with its black-and-white checkerboard, nor did they sing "Into battle! Into battle!" with the performers on the stage. Moreover, they were sitting calmly, humbly in their comfortable, plush seats (for which they pay no assessment like other Split residents, to be sure, because the church is separate from the state, right?).

So why do I mention them?

Because they do not appear in the same formation for either "Aida" or "Ero From the Other World."

Checked Suits

Because love of art did not bring them to the opera!

During the performance of "Zrinski," which is our subject, I also saw young men with long sideburns, in checked suits that irresistibly reminded me of those worn by Baresic and the other murderers of Ambassador Rolovic [in Sweden].

In contrast to the nuns, they jumped up, with their hands over their heads! Just like on the north side of the Hajduk [soccer] stadium!

They were not applauding the opera, I swear by my mother!

(One of the polemicists in NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA states that what is involved is a romantic, entirely normal expression of national enthusiasm. I would

forgive him if he were to persuade me that he is not talking about the audience at the same performance of "Zrinski.")

For the majority of the "checked ones," I could swear, this "Zrinski" was the first opera of their lives, and probably their first encounter with the theater in general! The audience applauds at "Ero From the Other World," too, and even sings, but differently! The applause is different, the audience is dressed differently!

Therefore, to repeat, the "checked ones" did not come to the theater for art! The misery of primitivism, subdivision nationalism, exploded on this occasion in all its "luxuriousness" (this is what won the day when the "checked ones" had to decide whether to buy tickets for the first rows of orchestra seats or wet their whistles in some saloon for the same cost).

#### The Hungarians' National Hero

Imagine, let us say, an Englishman singing the "Marseillaise" and thinking that he is celebrating the queen. Or a Frenchman singing "God Save the Queen" and thinking that he is singing a hymn in honor of the republic. Imagine a white South African going wild over black gospel singing on the assumption that this is his racist minority's cultural heritage.

Now imagine the "checked ones" (I saw them), in the name of "limitless, inviolable, holy Croatdom," to which they swear allegiance in front of a dagger and a portrait of Ante Pavelic, as they glorify Nikola Subic Zrinski, a Hungarian janissary, a magnate who on Hungarian soil, in the fortress of Sziget, defended Pest--centuries-old oppressor of the Croats--against the Ottomans. Imagine the "greatest Croats of all" chanting in honor of the "national hero" whose monument--along with several other Hungarian magnates'--stands in front of the colonnade on Heroes' Square in Budapest. Is there any more elementary example of crude, the most primitive stupidity, ignorance, backwardness in the service of hatred toward man? In the service of anti-humanism?

CSO: 2800/142

## SUVAR DESCRIBES CURRENT ECONOMIC CRITICISM AS STEP BACKWARD

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA on 10-13 December 1984, on page 5 of each issue publishes a four-part article by Stipe Suvar under the title "One Step Forward or Two Steps Backward," arguing with frequent quotes from Kardelj and Bakaric the need to return the fruits of economic production to the workers.

"The goal has been and remains for the organizations of associated labor to... dispose of all income, and this means that in the longer run we should eliminate also banking capital as capital and liquidate the dominance in society of those who dispose of these funds.... Some people--and they are in the majority in our economic science and in the other social sciences and perhaps also in practical policy within the 'structure' which still makes the decisions instead of the workers, be they state, banking, or business people in the OURs themselves...see the way out of our present developmental difficulties more or less in a reform of the monetary system and in adaptation of the dinar. But 'this is only patching up the old system,' through social planning or planning by banks which was offered also earlier,...and has led to the present difficulties and not to self-management by the associated workers....

"Today in Yugoslavia," Suvar concludes, "a struggle is being waged centered around two roads of social development: that which has already started and is indicated legislatively in the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor; and that which would develop techno-bureaucratically and not through workers self-management but rather, citing freedom of action of economic laws and the market, advocates a kind of socialist laissez-faire with the further reproduction of independent parts of the surplus value administered by factors 'outside' and 'above' self-managed associated labor. ...Whenever self-management of the workers has been in the defensive or even lagging, techno-bureaucratic and liberalist concepts of development have been offered which then provide a place for nationalism in the function [form] of capital which allegedly wants to be constituted as a nationality but in fact as a techno-bureaucratic monopoly which seeks to proclaim itself the servant of the nation (while in fact trying to rule it).

"In our country today from many sides and also from the pens of some of the best known economists and other critics of society, one finds support for such a bourgeois, neoclassic understanding of self-management as a collective

undertaking within the existing division of labor and goods production, as a form of economic democracy and an alternative system to bourgeois etatism. Inasmuch as it is an entire critical path which is indicated in the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor but in the form of criticism of the so-called economy-based-on-agreement, it is in essence reactionary and pleads for a turn backward in socialist development. There is not even a shred of Marxist political economy in it.... It proceeds not from a Marxist analysis of the law of value nor does it aim toward investigations as to how this law operates today. It is not even interested in the Marxist criticism of society which was expressed in its theory of revolution...."

CSO: 2800/145

YUGOSLAVIA

DJURANOVIC, SUKRIJA CONGRATULATE CASTRO ON CUBAN HOLIDAY

Djuranovic Telegram

LD311029 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0627 GMT 31 Dec 84

[Text] Belgrade, 31 Dec (TANJUG)--On the occasion of the Cuban National Day Veselin Djuranovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, has sent, on behalf of the SFRY Presidency, a telegram of cordial congratulations and best wishes for the prosperity of the friendly people of Cuba to Fidel Castro, president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba.

Sukrija Message

LD301318 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1049 GMT 30 Dec 84

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Dec (TANJUG)--On the occasion of the anniversary of the victory of the revolution and the national holiday of the Republic of Cuba, Ali Sukrija, president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, has sent a telegram to Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba. The telegram expresses best wishes for the new successes in the country's socialist development and for the further prosperity of the friendly people of nonaligned Cuba. The telegram also expresses a support for and solidarity with the Cuban people in their struggle for the protection and consolidation of their country's independence. The conviction is also expressed that relations and cooperation between the LCY and the Communist Party of Cuba as well as between the two countries will continue to develop successfully to the benefit of both peoples, the strengthening of the movement of nonaligned countries, peace, social progress and socialism in the world.

CSO: 2800/161

LOS ANGELES COURT APPOINTS COMMISSION ON ARTUKOVIC'S HEALTH

LD101118 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1050 GMT 10 Jan 85

["Trial of War Criminal Artukovic Held Up by Health Issue"--TANJUG headline]

[Text] Washington, 10 Jan (TANJUG)--The Los Angeles federal court has ruled to appoint an "independent" medical commission to establish whether war criminal Andrija Artukovic is medically fit to stand trial.

The Los Angeles court took the decision yesterday, Wednesday, after Artukovic's lawyer had again submitted a medical report stating that his client is not fit to appear at the trial, set to open on February 12.

War criminal Andrija Artukovic--responsible for the death of several hundreds of thousands in World War II as minister of the interior of the quisling Ustasha "independent state of Croatia (NDH)"--was arrested 2 months ago.

The "Yugoslav Himmler" and "Balkan butcher," as Artukovic is termed in the United States, where he settled in 1948 under the assumed name Alojz Anic, is to stand trial on charges raised by the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Washington department raised this procedure following Yugoslavia's request for the extradition of war criminal Artukovic.

Meantime, a counsel for the prosecution denied the defence's allegations about poor health condition of Artukovic, and submitted to the Los Angeles court a medical report saying that Artukovic's conditions allows a trial.

So far the Los Angeles court has twice rejected Artukovic's lawyer's allegations.

A panel of physicians, to be named by the Los Angeles court, should report to this court on Artukovic's health condition by 18 January. The court did not change the date of opening the trial, 12 February.

Besides the extradition proceedings, proceedings for Artukovic's deportation from the country have also been instituted.

Over the past 36 years, U.S. judicial and immigration authorities had, on several occasions, taken steps for Artukovic's extradition to Yugoslavia or deportation from the United States but without any concrete results. The current action could have a different outcome, in view of a marked change a few years back in the U.S. Government's attitude toward Nazi war criminals in the country.

## BRIEFS

MOJSOV RECEIVES CHILDREN'S GROUP--Belgrade, 5 Jan (TANJUG)--Yugoslavia's international activity, especially within the movement of Nonalignment, aims at strengthening world peace and international cooperation. The above was said by member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia Lazar Mojsov in a talk here today with a group of children who call upon statesmen and public figures carrying messages of peace. The group is called "Children as Teachers of Peace" and is led by the founder and prominent public figure of San Francisco, Mrs Pat Montadon. The group carries out its activity within a non-governmental round table foundation from San Francisco. [Text] [Belgrade TANJUG in English 1227 GMT 5 Jan 85 LD]

EMPLOYMENT BUREAU DIRECTOR DIES--Belgrade, 7 Jan (TANJUG)--Branko Djordjevic, director of the Federal Bureau for Employment Matters, died in Belgrade yesterday after a brief illness. He was 60. [Summary] [Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1238 GMT 7 Jan 85 LD]

CSO: 2800/161

- END -