

EAST REGION

JIANGSU DISCIPLINE INSPECTION COMMISSION SETS WORK PRIORITIES

Nanjing XINHUA RIBAO in Chinese 18 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Yang Tingzhi [2799 2185 4249]: "The Whole Party Concentrates on Party Style, Strives for Initial Victories in 'Seven Battles, Seven Wins'; Jiangsu Discipline Inspection Commission Sets Priorities for This Year's Work at Work Conference"]

[Text] The provincial Discipline Inspection Commission held its working conference between 9th and 15th to pass on and implement the spirit of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission work conference. It set forth this year's tasks and discussed how to achieve remarkable improvement in party style, in order to ensure initial victories in the new "seven battles, seven wins" campaign.

At the conference, Comrade Xing Bai [9388 4101], secretary of the provincial Discipline Inspection Commission, passed on the spirit of the working conference of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, delivered the work report entitled "Centering on the New 'Seven Battles, Seven Wins', We Must achieve In Party Consolidation Marked Improvement in Our Style Throughout the Province," and had serious discussions with the comrades attending the conference.

Looking back at the work in 1983, the conference pointed out that party committees, discipline inspection commissions at various levels and the vast numbers of party members throughout Jiangsu have really achieved success in their work to correct party style and to enforce party discipline. Party style has been further improved. Party committees at various levels and party-member cadres have deepened their understanding of the party line, principles and policies since the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee. The level of political consciousness to keep in unison with the central authorities has risen. The level of consciousness among the vast numbers of party members and cadres to resist unhealthy tendencies has been strengthened universally. The unhealthy tendency of using powers to seek one's own interests is disappearing. The unhealthy tendency of building and distributing houses among party-member cadres has basically been checked in those places and departments where the "open letter" was well implemented. Political life within the leading bodies of party organizations at various levels has improved, and democratic centralism has initially been

strengthened. Through discussions, the comrades attending the conference further widened their field of vision, thoroughly understood that they are facing an excellent situation where party style, the general mood of the people and economic construction promote each other. Their confidence has been strengthened. But the conference also pointed out that at present there still exists in the party serious impurity in ideology, work style and organization. The party style has not yet been fundamentally improved. The level of consciousness of some party organizations and party-member cadres in implementing the central authorities' line, principles and policies is not yet high. Disruption from the "Left" or right in implementation and expediting party policies occurs now and then. The unhealthy tendency of using powers to seek one's own interests still exists among some party member cadres. Severe bureaucratism, decentralism and departmental selfishness exist among some party-member cadres and have not been thoroughly exposed. There are still "untouched spots" in the battle against serious criminal activities in economy. Economic criminal activities such as corruption and larceny often occur. While fully recognizing the main trend of an improved party style and various beneficial conditions, we must also see the stubbornness and resilience of some unhealthy trends and the arduous task to achieve fundamental improvement of party style. We must remain clear-minded from beginning to end, work conscientiously to marked a improve party style year after year, and reach the goal to achieve fundamental improvement in 5 years.

The conference concluded that in order to achieve notable improvement in party style this year, we must do work in four key areas: (1) We must further enforce the party's political discipline. Party organizations and discipline inspection commissions at various levels must first upgrade the education of party members and cadres, teach them to consciously maintain ideological and political unanimity with the central authorities. We should take disciplinary action against those who oppose the Central Committee's line, principles and policies from the "Left" or right and after education and criticism still persist in their mistakes. (2) We must vigorously check the tendency to use one's powers to seek selfish interests, particularly those that are very harmful and that the masses are most dissatisfied with, such as using one's authority to demand gifts and take bribes; encroaching upon the interests of the state, the collective and the masses; using public funds to entertain and give presents; helping one's own children, wife, relatives and friends to gain employment, attend better schools, recruit workers, promote cadres, transfer registered permanent residence, etc. We must concentrate our strength, carry through the work to the end, and firmly correct these unhealthy tendencies. We must take effective measures to check and deal with such styles as "electric tyrant," "water yamen," "coal tiger," etc. We should continue to correct the unhealthy trend in building and distribution of houses, keep close inspection and takeover, and strive to finish the work before July 1st. (3) We must firmly fight and overcome severe bureaucratism, departmental selfishness and decentralism. We must seriously deal with bureaucrats whose serious neglect and dereliction of duty, because of their irresponsibility in their work, has caused severe waste and damage in production and construction and other serious mistakes. Activities of decentralism and

departmentalism which seriously violate financial and economic discipline must be strictly dealt with. We should suggest to the judicial organs to bring those who violate criminal law to justice. (4) We must continue to battle against serious criminal activities in the economic sphere and achieve marked results in eliminating "untouched spots" and in making improvements. We must combine enterprise consolidation with careful financial checking, and press the struggle in a planned way in commercial, communications and other systems. We must grasp the focal points of our struggle and concentrate our strength on checking and dealing with serious cases, especially recent large and important cases. Serious economic criminal elements must be punished severely and quickly and the phenomenon of ineffective attacks eliminated.

The conference emphasized that it is an important task of the party to noticeably improve its style of work. We must insist on consolidating party style throughout the party. Upper-level party committees must take the lead in consolidation, making rectification of party style the priority item on their agenda. Members of party committees must take the lead to correct unhealthy trends, adhere to principles, dare to confront difficulties, conquer weakness, fear of difficulty, and inability to maintain strict discipline. Party committees must strengthen their leadership in discipline inspection and consciously accept supervision by discipline inspection commissions at the same level, which is stipulated in the party constitution and system. Discipline inspection organizations at various levels should consider party consolidation as their central task, strengthening themselves to play an effective role. However, discipline inspection must be subordinated to the party's general tasks and objectives; it must ensure smooth economic construction, further implement the guiding principle to focus on rectification of party style, handle correctly the relationship between education and case-handling, and constantly improve style and method of our work. If this way, party style can be remarkably improved throughout Jiangsu this year and our discipline inspection work will take on a new aspect.

Comrade Shen Daren [3088 6671 0086], deputy secretary of the provincial party committee, gave a speech at the conference. A total of 300 or more leading members of municipal and county discipline inspection commissions and offices of economic cases, leading members and cadres in charge of discipline inspection in organizations at the provincial level, and representatives of organizations under provincial jurisdiction and local institutions of higher education attended the conference.

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EAST REGION

COMMENTARY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM

Nanjing XINHUA RIBAO in Chinese 26 Apr 84 p 1

[Commentary: "Personal Responsibility System in Organizations Is Imperative"]

[Text] In the spirit of the national conference on the same subject, the provincial work conference on implementation of post responsibility system in provincial party and government bodies integrated with the province's actual situation, discussed earnestly the issue of establishing the personal responsibility system throughout party and government bodies at all levels, mass organizations and public institutions in the province. It is imperative that this important matter be done now. We must take effective measures to consciously implement and expedite this important and urgent task.

After the new system of city-administered counties was implemented in Jiangsu in March, 1983, the provincial and county-level organs underwent reform and leading bodies were adjusted. The appearance of the organizations at all levels has changed fairly remarkably. However, we now face an extremely acute problem: Does organizational construction end here or does it continue to go forward? If we are satisfied with the first fruits of organizational reform and remain at a standstill, not only these fruits cannot be consolidated and will cease to develop, also we will be found to take the road backward. The fruits gained will be lost. Therefore, after initial organizational reform is completed, we must take the second and the third steps. The pressing matter at the moment is to establish the personal responsibility system throughout the province. This is another revolution in organizational construction. Only with the success of this revolution can we overcome bureaucracy, break free from bad customs and conventions, improve the work style of the organizations, increase work efficiency, and open up a new situation in office work, to suit the great historical mission of our socialist modernization construction. Only with the success of the revolution can we bring the initiative of cadres and employees throughout the organizations into full play, call forth their revolutionary enthusiasm, kindle their enterprising spirit and the spirit to offer new ideas, train large numbers of outstanding qualified people, accelerate greatly the pace of our cadres' "four transformations," and energetically promote the reform of our organizational and personnel systems.

To firmly implement the personal responsibility system in party and government bodies and mass organizations and public agencies does not mean that we should take hasty action. The personal responsibility system is a system of individual responsibility with each person taking his share of work, on the basis of "position classifications" and division of responsibilities. Therefore, it must be done according to the relevant regulations of higher authorities, on the basis of successful readjustment of the leadership, the internal organizational setup and completion of a fixed number of staff, and should be combined with every work task of every period. Forms and methods to be applied should suit the actual situation of each organization. Responsibility and jurisdiction are to be differentiated level by level, from top to bottom; tasks are to be broken down level by level. Duties and jurisdiction of each position and each worker should be clearly defined, in order to achieve the unity of duty, responsibility and rights. In this way, every task will be taken care of by someone, everyone has responsibilities, duties and rights, each attending to his job, each fulfilling his duty. And based on this, we must implement a strict inspection system, a system of reward and penalty, to encourage the progressive and change the backward. In this way, the personal responsibility system can truly be implemented and will not be a mere formality. So we can see that we must not only regard the personal responsibility system as an important matter but must also as a great learning experience. We must carefully study, organize and implement it, and keep improving and exploring actively in practice so as to perfect the system.

Because implementation of the personal responsibility system is a reform, it will inevitably encounter various resistance. The key to smashing the bonds of old ideology and old customs and to successfully implementing the personal responsibility system lies with the leadership. Leading cadres of all units at various levels must first take the lead in implementing the system and must set an example, playing an exemplary role. Only if leading comrades at the top act this way can the system be spread, sustained, and perfected. The tremendous results in the past several years since implementation of the system of contracted responsibility linking remuneration to agricultural output as well as the economic responsibility system in enterprises have concretely demonstrated the significance of the personal responsibility system in organizations. The time is already ripe now to propagate the system in every single party and government body, mass organization and public agency. We want this to be one of the key elements of the overall party consolidation drive, correcting while consolidating and correcting before consolidating, and bring marked results this year. We strongly believe that the day that the personal responsibility system is conscientiously implemented in organizations will be the day when the face of these organizations will be fundamentally changed.

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CENTRAL-SOUTH REGION

HUNAN'S CHANGDE TRIES TO IMPLEMENT INTELLECTUALS POLICY

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 22 May 84 p 3

[Article: "Hunan's Changde Prefectural Party Committee Grants Five Powers to Group Implementing Intellectuals Policy"]

[Text] Reporter Zhang Zaihua [1728 0375 5478] reports the following: The party committee of Changde Prefecture, Hunan, granted five powers to the group implementing the intellectuals policy and hastened the pace of its work.

Last March, the prefecture formed the group to implement the intellectuals policy and its party committee decided at that time to grant powers to it in five areas: examining and acting on the applications to change from rural to nonrural status made by family members of scientific and technical personnel of the middle level and above; adjusting the personnel performing work outside their fields of learning and properly carrying out the talent exchange work of the area; directly handling the major problems left by history; solving the special difficulties of the intellectuals in work and living; and investigating and handling instances of attack and discrimination against the intellectuals.

The group consist of comrades of the organization, labor and personnel, propaganda, united front, public security, education and public health departments. They are familiar with the party's policies in all aspects and possess both duty and power. The various untis are required to implement their recommendations earnestly. Thus, efficiency has been greatly improved and the pace of the fulfillment of the intellectuals policy hastened. In the past 2 months, the prefecture reinvestigated the historical problems of 135 persons, and those of 112 were settled. In addition, the practical working and living difficulties of 1,215 persons were solved.

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CENTRAL-SOUTH REGION

EFFORTS TO FULFILL INTELLECTUALS POLICY UNDERTAKEN IN GUANGDONG

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 16 Apr 84 p 1

[Article: "Seriously Tackle Problems and Implement Policies One By One"]

[Text] The Guangdong provincial party committee's leading group investigating the work on intellectuals recently despatched 13 small investigative groups to examine the fulfillment of the intellectuals policy in units directly under the province.

The old comrades who have withdrawn to the second and third lines and who were serious about and familiar with work on intellectuals served as group leaders. Together with the party organizations (committees) of the units concerned, they will launch investigations in the six aspects proposed in the documents of the Central Organization, Propaganda, and United Front Departments and study the means to solve the existing problems.

Before the small groups started out, Wang Ning [3769 1380], provincial party committee secretary and chief of the leading group investigating the work on intellectuals, called a meeting. He pointed out: The "left-wing" influence is the main obstacle to the complete fulfillment of the intellectuals policy. The small investigative groups must organize the party committees, organizations and personnel branches of the units concerned to study earnestly the relevant speeches and comments of the central leading comrades, rectify their attitude and improve their understanding. The party committees of the various levels must each have a responsible comrade in charge of the work, list the fulfillment of the intellectuals policy in their important daily agenda and focus on it earnestly. The various units must follow the principle of simultaneous investigation and solution and depend on themselves to solve the problems. They must not shift the responsibility back and forth and perform their duties in a perfunctory manner. They must give attention to discovering typical models in the course of their investigation and summarize the positive and negative experiences, commending the good, criticizing the poor and publicizing the outstanding in the papers. Through investigation, they must discover talents and recommend intellectuals of both ability and political integrity for important posts. The provincial party committee's leading group investigating work on intellectuals demands that all city and prefectural party committees send out small investigative groups, earnestly solve the problems and implement the policy provision by provision.

CENTRAL-SOUTH REGION

ILLEGAL STATUS CHANGES IN GUANGDONG'S TUNCHANG COUNTY FOUGHT

Former Status Restored

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 15 Apr 84 p 1

[Article: "Guangdong's Tunchang County Firmly Restores the Status of Those Illegally Changing from 'Farming to Nonfarming'"]

[Text] Reporter Wang Hongru [3769 1347 0320] reports the following: In studying the documents on party consolidation, the party committee and government of Tunchang County, Guangdong, firmly adhered to the practice of simultaneously learning and rectifying. Since last November, they focused on some leading cadres who used their power for private gain, resorted to deception and acted illegally on changing from "farming to nonfarming" and on worker recruitment and decided to cancel the urban residence registrations and grain and oil credentials of 119 individuals in 4 groups and return them to their former units for handling. Meanwhile, the county discipline inspection commission investigated the personnel who seriously violated law and discipline in making the status changes, and the judicial branch will impose criminal responsibilities on those who violated the criminal law.

With the aid of the work group of the Hainan District party committee, the Tunchang County party committee, beginning in the second half of last year, made the shorting out of illegal changes from "farming to nonfarming" an important part of party style rectification. They started with the leading cadres at the county level and launched criticism and self-criticisms. At the meeting, six leading cadres examined their mistakes of illegally changing the statuses of their relatives and friends and corrected their mistakes with a positive attitude. County party committee secretary Li Guangdian [7812 0342 7193] voluntarily restored the former statuses of six relatives and friends.

Since last November, they restored the former statuses of 38 people, the first group, because of illegal changes and worker recruitment by means of false replacements, false policy implementation, false worker recruitment and misrepresentation as urban veterans and young intellectuals. Among them, 27 were the relatives and friends of 7 leading members of the county party committee and government (including the former county leader).

While restoring the statuses, the county discipline inspection commission and judicial branch investigated and handled the illegal and undisciplined

conduct of the main responsible persons of units in charge of status changes. Utilizing his post, Lin Youyi [2651 1429 5030], the former directing cadre of the county labor bureau, changed the statuses of and found jobs for 246 relatives and friends and those having connections with him in the course of 2 years, seriously corrupting the party style and violating the criminal law. Recently he was expelled from the party, dismissed from his post and arrested by authority of the procuratorial organ.

Tunchang's Example Recommended

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 15 Apr 84 p 1

[Commentary: "Taking the Lead in Consolidation and Rectification by the Leaders Is the Key"]

[Text] The leading cadres should serve as the models in implementing party and government discipline and developing the fine traditions. If they have made mistakes, they should also serve as models in making corrections. It is the people's eager hope for the leading cadres in party consolidation. To prevent turning their hope into disappointment, the key is in the practical manifestations of the leaders. In restoring the statuses of those who illegally changed from "farming to nonfarming," the main leaders in Guangdong's Tunchang County served as models. Their action doubtlessly produced a decisive impact on the county's correct handling of the problems of the use of power for private gain.

The use of power for private gain and bureaucratism are the two main problems requiring solution in party consolidation. The masses bitterly abhor the conduct of some cadres who use their power for private gain and know that such conduct is against party and government discipline and even state law. Therefore, all Communist Party members, especially the leading cadres, must guard against it. Whoever doing so severs himself from the masses and incurs their sharp criticisms, either overt or covert. Thus, if a cadre makes the mistake of using power for private gain, the only remedy is conscious correction, the sooner and the more thoroughly the better. Otherwise, he will lose the people's trust. He will not be in a position to lead in party consolidation or succeed in other work.

In terms of Tunchang County, the problem of illegal status changes was serious. In studying party consolidation, the leaders, from the county party committee secretary to others, faced the evil, firmly took the lead to correct the mistakes, won the right to speak in leading the party organizations of the various levels throughout the county to learn and rectify simultaneously, easily solved the "long-standing, big and difficult" problems and satisfied the masses. In the course of party consolidation, the errant cadres criticized bourgeois individualism and improved their awareness. The individual cases which were particularly serious encountered earnest punishment. Thus, an evil matter was turned into a good thing.

We hope that all areas with major problems will act like the comrades of Tunchang. Such an action will enhance the people's confidence in party consolidation, raise the party's prestige and propel the successful progress of all tasks.

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CENTRAL-SOUTH REGION

CONSOLIDATION OF GUANGDONG CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION DISCUSSED

Fight Against Bureaucratism

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 8 Apr 84 p 1

[Article: "Leading Cadres of Provincial Construction Commission Conscientiously Improve Workstyle"]

[Text] The party organization of the Guangdong provincial construction commission earnestly implemented the principle of simultaneous consolidation and rectification in the course of party consolidation and gave attention to all opinions expressed by party members and the masses, thereby enhancing their confidence in party consolidation and unfolding a new scene in the work style of the organs.

Since launching party consolidation more than 4 months ago, the commission's party organization encouraged party members and the masses to express their opinions on party consolidation and held many special meetings to discuss the issue of consolidation and rectification. Bureaucratism was one of their main complaints. It was mainly manifested in numerous general appeals but very little intensive investigation and study, much planning at meetings but few solutions to problems on site, failure to deal promptly with the poor results of key projects and the numerous construction accidents, etc. The party organization felt that wherever possible, all matters which incurred a large number of complaints from party members and the masses should be immediately rectified and that it must start with the leaders and focus on the word "rectify." After the Party Central Committee issued instructions on developing Hainan, the commission party organization failed to study them properly, nor did the leading cadres visit Hainan. In party consolidation, the party organization examined the problem. On 8 April, party organization secretary Yang Guoqing [2799 0948 1987] and vice chairman Lin Xuchu [2651 2485 0443] led the cadres concerned to inspect the Hainan Administrative Zone and study the ways to help its development. After the serious accident of the collapse of a seven story building in Haikang County 2 years ago, the commission failed to give it prompt attention and the masses were very dissatisfied. Conscientiously learning the lesson, the party organization acted earnestly to make corrections. When the two construction accidents occurred in Zhanjiang City and Haikang County this year, the commission promptly dispatched leading cadres and engineers to make on-site investigations, analyze the causes of the accidents and propose ways of

handling, producing a favorable effect on strengthening quality management throughout the province. Attending a meeting in Beijing, a vice chairman of the commission received an assignment of rendering aid to an inland construction project. Upon his return on 29 August, he immediately relayed the information to the party organization, studied the implementation of the assignment, reported to the provincial government leaders, made arrangements speedily and solved the problem in 3 days, changing the style of past procrastination. The masses were pleased with the leaders' simultaneous consolidation and rectification and earnest checking and examining.

In the course of the simultaneous consolidation and rectification, the commission party organization also focused on the unhealthy trends in housing assignments and construction and handled the "five-many" phenomenon in the internal work of the organs. In regard to matters to be rectified by the various offices, they were required to implement them item by item. In party consolidation, the housing and real estate office changed its former practice of discussion without decision and slow action. To start with, the State Council had decided 2 years ago to sell dwellings to private individuals and demanded that the work be launched by the various provinces, but the said office stalled along and took no action. In party consolidation, several of the responsible cadres concerned made investigations and studies in Shantou and Jiangmen and helped formulate the concrete methods of implementation.

Practical Action Urged

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 8 Apr 84 p 1

[Commentary: "Earnestly Implement Consolidation and Rectification"]

[Text] In party consolidation, the Guangdong provincial construction commission displayed results in simultaneous consolidation and rectification. Its main experience was that the leading cadres served as models and earnestly implemented the consolidation and rectification.

The principle of simultaneous consolidation and rectification must be followed in party consolidation from beginning to end. What problems should be focused on for consolidation and rectification? We must activate the broad ranks of party members and the masses to express opinions and seize the problems which have attracted the most attention and which can be solved and solve them promptly. In the process, the leading cadres must take a clear-cut stand, listen to the diverse opinions, focus on the word "rectify" and take prompt action to solve the problems which can be solved, in order to show their determination, thereby increasing the confidence of the masses in party consolidation. Some party members said: "Of thousands of items, setting an example by the leading cadres comes first." These words are the key to the success of consolidation and rectification.

To implement consolidation and rectification earnestly, we must guard against perfunctoriness in our work. We must comprehensively analyze the numerous

opinions expressed by the masses, explain to them the problems which cannot be solved now and solve those which can be solved promptly and earnestly one by one. Only thus will we gain concrete results. Some comrades discuss consolidation and rectification over and over again, holding meetings, discussing without deciding or taking no action after deciding. They talk in fancy words and write careful plans, but fail to implement them. By discussing principles while remaining seated, their words and writings, no matter how good, are merely lip service.

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CENTRAL-SOUTH REGION

YUCHENG COUNTY, HENAN, ENROLLS 10 PEASANT CADRES

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 25 May 84 p 1

[Article by Jiao Yufeng [3542 5940 6912], Qin Yutang [4440 0645 1016], and Li Taixing [2621 1132 5281]: "Ten Peasants Offered Positions in Township and Commune Leadership"]

[Text] Yucheng country, in Henan Province, has taken an encouraging step in reforming its cadre system by engaging ten culture, young peasants with both ability and political integrity for leadership positions in townships and communes. The contracts for the positions set the term of office at one year, effective 1 April. If the peasants work well, their contracts can be renewed at the completion of that period, while those who are not equal to the task will be returned to the peasantry.

The ten peasants are all below the age of 35 and the youngest is 18. Some of them were formerly brigade Party branch secretaries and Youth League branch secretaries, while others were from the ordinary masses. The contracts were signed after the peasants had volunteered, were recommended by the masses and were checked out by the organizing department. During their tenure in office, they receive monthly living expenses of 35 or 40 yuan, depending on their duties. They will not change their registered permanent residence or be responsible for their farmland. They enjoy public health services, allowances for business trips, allowances for non-staple foods, rewards for economizing, and allowances for grain price differences. This group worked very well after they took office. Zhang Renbao [1728 0088 0202], the party branch secretary for the Zhangzhuang brigade of Zhangji Township, was appointed township party committee secretary by the county party committee after he was engaged. After he took office, he conscientiously took charge of wired broadcasting, family planning, afforestation, drought-resistant irrigated wheat, and road-building. These practices received the praise of vast numbers of cadres and the masses.

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CENTRAL-SOUTH REGION

CRACKDOWN IN GUANGZHOU ON CORRUPT SUBURBAN CADRES

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 15 May 84 p 5

[Article by staff reporters Liang Zhaoming [2733 0340 2494] and Zeng Xiangping [2582 4382 1627]: "Behind the Smiles"]

[Text] On 2 October 1983, some judicial officers suddenly appeared at the home of Ye Zhuo [5509 0587], party committee secretary and bureau chief of Guangzhou suburban construction bureau, and told him: "Come with us to the procuratorate." Ye Zhuo, who was taking a nap, smilingly got in the car with them, and was still smiling when he was handcuffed at the Guangzhou procuratorate.

It wasn't that Ye Zhuo was unaware of the gravity of his problems.

In 1973, taking advantage of the chaotic "cultural revolution," Ye Zhuo got a transfer from the suburban people's hospital to become the assistant chief of the suburban construction bureau. In 1979, he was promoted to bureau party committee secretary and chief. With the party and government powers concentrated in his hands, he colluded with the former assistant secretary of the bureau party committee Wang Quanxing [3769 6898 5281] (who committed suicide to escape punishment) and former assistant bureau chief Zhang Zhenjiang [1728 2182 3068] (who was arrested) in one criminal activity after another.

Utilizing the availability of land in the suburbs, they extensively extorted "land money," either exchanging land for houses or operating commodity houses and withholding tax payments to the state by deception. According to the finance and tax departments, the bureau evaded tax payments up to 1 million yuan in recent years, inflicting heavy losses on the state.

They resorted to all despicable means to coax large sums of money and installed a small safe for their private use. In the past several years, they divided up and spent the enormous sum of 150,000 yuan that was in the safe.

They took bribes from a Hong Kong firm, used state funds to loan it more than 4 million yuan for its construction of the "Baiyun Xincun" new village and subsidized the project by considering the negotiated prices of materials as par prices, causing 1.3 million yuan in losses to the state.

Their serious dereliction of duty caused a loss of up to 1 million yuan in building the Yunshan Restaurant and Taihegang residential project.

The facts proved that Ye Zhuo was a "housing tyrant" who utilized his power to do whatever he pleased.

Ye Zhuo remained smiling when being handcuffed, but he was not deliberately showing his calm. He smiled: What can the judicial organ do to me!

It turned out that Ye Zhuo possessed other skills: He was an expert in self-protection by ingratiating himself with certain leading cadres who used their power for private gain. He said: "The central government is so far away. How can we maintain unity? The most practical thing is to maintain unity with one's immediate superiors. Anything else is nonsense." He took these words as his philosophy of life and criterion of conduct.

In April 1981, a Hong Kong firm invited Ye Zhuo, Zhang Zhenjiang and others for an "observation trip" to Hong Kong, led by a vice chairman of the standing committee of the suburban people's congress. When the vice chairman anxiously tried to raise money everywhere for his expenses, Ye Zhuo, in violation of the system of travel subsidies, obtained a large sum of Hong Kong currency and delivered to him several hundred Hong Kong dollars as "pocket money." Ye Zhuo told him: "Whatever you want done, just let me know." Arriving in Hong Kong, Ye Zhuo negotiated with a manager on the Hong Kong side to provide tens of thousands of Hong Kong dollars to the "observation" personnel for shopping. Hearing that the vice chairman wanted to buy a refrigerator, Ye Zhuo obtained for him an additional 3,000 Hong Kong dollars. Returning home with a full load, the vice chairman loudly praised Ye Zhuo as an "able man."

Ye Zhuo understood very clearly the temperaments and preferences of the leading cadres of superior units and catered to them in every way. If some of the responsible persons of the municipal planning, construction, agricultural and district commissions liked to drink, Ye Zhuo became their "drinking partners" and often took them to guest houses and bars to clink glasses. Last July, he invited a certain leader of the municipal construction commission to dinner in the Baitiane Guest House and spent 325 yuan at one throw. Other leaders liked to play mahjong, and Ye Zhuo became their "card friend." frequently renting a room in a guest house and inviting them to play, lasting all night until dawn. In January last year, he invited the leading cadres of the municipal agricultural commission to play cards in the Meihuayuan Guest House and spent 529 yuan for the rent and dinner. When the "higher level" needed money to give dinners, he generously "rendered assistance." In July and August last year, a certain leader of the municipal construction commission gave three dinners for cadres from out of town, but had no way to submit an expense account for the 1,600 yuan for the dinners. Ye Zhuo beat his own chest and said: "Don't worry. I will render complete assistance." Sure enough he got the money from the safe of the suburban construction bureau to settle the account.

When some leading cadres wanted to buy televisions, recorders, washing machines and refrigerators, Ye Zhuo, acting on their behalf, delivered the articles to their doors, either for free or at a reduced price. According to his account, as many as 20 leading cadres of the departmental, commission, office and bureau levels and above, from the district to the city, received favors from him, and more than 10 of them obtained color televisions, recorders and washing machines from Hong Kong firms connected with him, either at half price or for free. When the children or relatives and friends of the leaders wanted houses, Ye Zhuo did his best to accommodate. A total of 106 public dwellings was used by him for "connections" and "favors."

Ye Zhuo's effort was not wasted. Though the masses continuously exposed his conduct to the suburban and city departments concerned, he muddled through safely under the "protection" of certain leaders.

In 1982, the departments concerned had long ago reported Ye Zhuo and his gang's serious problems of using state funds for the Hong Kong firms to build houses and make a profit, but the district leaders paid no heed. In August that year, they even recommended Ye Zhuo's promotion from a district (county) level cadre to the municipal party committee.

In early 1983, under an ingenious pretext Ye Zhuo and his gang obtained 50,000 yuan in planning funds and divided it up privately. The suburban discipline inspection branch intended to use the incident as a breach and thoroughly investigate their economic crimes. Hearing of it, the district party committee leaders quietly advised Ye Zhuo to "return it." Turning around with a smile, he took the full sum from the government safe and paid it back. He then extorted construction funds from the subordinate construction teams to replenish the safe. Not a penny of the money already in his wallet was returned and the matter was settled by leaving it unsettled.

When the unhealthy trend in housing construction and assignment was investigated, a GUANGZHOU RIBAO reporter, based on information from the masses, wrote an article to expose the serious problems of Ye Zhuo and others. When the manuscript was delivered to the suburban party committee for examination, the committee secretary refused to have it published on ground that it was not necessary to criticize "the unavoidable unhealthy trends at the present time." Hearing about it, Ye Zhuo remarked cockily: "What about the party paper? It cannot touch one hair on my head!"

After thorough investigation, the municipal procuratorate obtained a large amount of criminal evidence against Ye Zhuo and his gang and arrested Zhang Zhenjiang was arrested, two responsible persons of the district party committee had dinner with Ye Zhuo in the Dongjiang Restaurant. At the dinner, the two responsible persons toasted him over and over again to "help him get over his shock" and the person in charge of political and legal work felt Ye Zhuo's chest and asked, "Are you alarmed?" He also cheered him by saying: "Nothing to be afraid of. No need to be alarmed!"

However, no matter how big the "protection umbrella," it could not cover the hideous truths of Ye Zhuo and his gang. Ye Zhuo, the once prominent figure in the Guangzhou suburbs, is now a prisoner in jail. No longer "smiling," he often holds his head and wails: "Had I known this, I would not have done what I did!" Then, how should his "drinking partners" and "card friends" be handled? People are waiting to see!

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NORTH REGION

UNIVERSITY PROMOTES INTELLECTUALS ON MERIT

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 15 May 84 p 3

[Article: "Hebei Teachers' University Promotes Middle-level Cadres Without Following Any Set Pattern"]

[Text] Reporters Wang Gengnan [3769 1649 0589] and Yang Zhenwu [2799 2182 2976] report the following: In readjusting and assigning the leading groups of department and office levels, the Hebei Teachers' University boldly promoted well-trained middle-aged intellectuals, thereby vitalizing the middle-level groups and creating conditions for developing teaching and scientific research work.

Last January, the Hebei provincial party committee again readjusted the university's leading group at the school level. While strengthening its own building efforts, the new leading group performed "major surgery" on the middle-level leaders who had fairly serious problems, ascertained and handled those committing serious mistakes during the "Cultural Revolution" and readjusted and assigned 83 leading comrades of the department and office levels. Among them, 47 had the title of lecturer or higher, constituting 58 percent, an increase of 25 percent compared with before, and their average age also dropped from the previous 53.9 years to 46.9.

In readjusting and assigning, the school party committee followed the methods described below:

Eliminating misgivings, they freely promoted six persons who had long been suppressed and attacked but who, as proved by facts, had been unjustly accused. Lecturer Zhang Guolin [1728 0948 2651] of the Marxist-Leninist teaching and research section was candid and upright. When serving as assistant branch secretary of an organ directly under the party committee in 1957, he was wrongly classified as a "rightist." He appealed continuously against the injustice. Encountering "dictatorship" during the "Cultural Revolution," he was criticized and struggled against. After rehabilitation, he sincerely supported the party's lines, principles and policies since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, worked assiduously for the party, struggled boldly against the unhealthy trends and won the high opinions of everyone. Upon recommendation by the board masses, the new party committee promoted him as the assistant secretary of the school discipline inspection commission.

They broke down the framework of "old Teachers' University," eliminated "inbreeding" and boldly promoted 12 "outsiders" who had been transferred to the university not long ago. After examining their work in the university and making reference to their consistent performances in their former units, the school party committee became certain and boldly promoted them. Rather keen in politics, geography lecturer Chen Guanyun [7115 0385 0061], who was transferred from the Hunan Teachers' College in 1974, reporter many times the problems of the university to the higher-level party committee and had the courage to struggle against the leaders of the former party committee who persisted in their mistakes. However, he was not very particular about his methods and the masses complained about him. By means of observation, the school party committee found that his intrinsic quality and main aspect should both be affirmed and nominated him as the party general-branch secretary of the geography department.

They stepped out of the circle that limited promotions to the party and appointed 19 nonparty intellectuals as department and office leaders. A person outside the party, assistant professor Li Hongbin [2621 3163 3453] of the physical education department, was capable and dedicated. He was rather strict in teaching, but his method was oversimplified. Some people objected to his promotion on ground that he was conceited and arrogant and liked to show off. While fully affirming his intrinsic quality and main aspect, the school party committee also pointed out his shortcomings and, after convincing everyone by ideological work appointed him vice chairman of the physical education department.

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NORTH REGION

INTELLECTUAL DEMANDS POWER ALONGSIDE DUTY

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 20 May 84 p 5

[Article by reporters Duan Cunzhang [3008 1317 4545] and Wang Aisheng [3769 5337 3932]: "Duty Must Be Accompanied with Power -- Inner Thoughts of Chen Huibo [7115 1920 3134] After Taking Office"]

[Text] "Premier Zhao Ziyang expressed the inner thoughts of our intellectuals in his government work report," said Chen Huibo happily. When receiving reporters at the second meeting of the Sixth NPC, Chen Huibo discussed his feelings after taking a leading post.

Last February, steel rolling expert Chen Huibo, horticulturist Zhong Jixue [0112 3444 1331] and senior engineer Liu Xishan [0491 6932 1472] of the Taiyuan Heavy Machine Plant undertook leadership functions at the Shanxi provincial science commission. Chen Huibo said: "As a bookworm, I have no great interest in becoming a 'bureaucrat,' but the provincial party committee thinks highly of us and gives us heavy burdens to carry. As a Communist Party member, how can I refuse to carry the burden? He promptly took office and prepared to make accomplishments at his new post.

Resistance was encountered right at the start. With duty, one does not necessarily have real power. Not long after joining the science commission, Chen Huibo ran into all kinds of strange happenings. The provincial party committee declared that he was in charge of the work, yet he was only assigned the overall work of planning and achieving results and had no authority over such important departments as personnel, discipline inspection and the organ party committee. Vestiges of the "Cultural Revolution" remained widespread in the science commission. Comments were made behind the back and problems were not laid on the table. In regard to such important work as case investigation and cadre assessment assigned by the central and provincial discipline inspection commissions, Chen Huibo and others had no part. What was even more strange was that after provincial party committee secretary Li Ligong [2621 4539 0501] and Chen Huibo approved the application for transfer of cadres into the building design institute of the provincial Jinguang Talent Development Company, some people resisted and refused to affix the seal, seriously hampering the fulfillment of the intellectuals policy.

Comrade Chen Huibo said: "I went to Beijing for a meeting 3 days after taking office. Less than 1 week after I returned, some comrades proposed behind our backs a list of middle-level cadres to be appointed. I felt that it was very sudden, as if they wanted to force it on others. They wanted me to express my attitude. It is very difficult for me." The middle-level cadres of the science commission averaged 53.5 years of age, with 33 percent of them of the college level, 17 percent of the technical secondary level and 50 percent of the junior middle level or below. Chen Huibo felt that the advanced age and low educational level of the leading cadres made it impossible to adapt to the new situation. Thereupon, he investigated in many ways, argued adjustments of the leading group and forcefully promoted more than 10 comrades of college level. He said: "With some effort, the situation is somewhat better, but it has not basically changed!"

Perhaps some people say that Chen Huibo is "struggling for power." Yes, the power granted by the party to the scientific and technical leaders must be struggled for. Struggle is a manifestation of the party spirit. Without struggle, it will be difficult to fulfill the intellectuals policy. Comrade Chen Huibo said: "If I am asked to do the work, I must have both the duty and the power. I will not be a mere skeleton, a foil. I have no wish to suffer for an empty title. It will be better for me to return to the plant and resume scientific research." Taking the post and handling the work, he had the courage to think, to speak and to act. When some people continued to sow discord, he loudly appealed at the party organization meeting: "If they still refuse to change, let us deal with them!" Some cadres took protracted sick leaves and failed to come to work, but not long after he started rectifying the organ style, they all reported for work.

For the new cadres to have both duty and power, the path remains difficult. Developing the spirit of "climbing the summit of science and technology and dedicating oneself to the four modernizations construction," Comrade Chen Huibo is struggling valiantly.

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NORTH REGION

CRACKDOWN ON 'UNHEALTHY' TRENDS IN SHANXI'S LINFEN REPORTED

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 21 May 84 p 4

[Article: "Shanxi's Linfen Prefecture Learns from Yuncheng's Experience in Party Style Rectification"]

[Text] According to a report in SHANXI RIBAO, Shanxi's Linfen Prefecture recently held a work meeting on party style rectification. It was attended by more than 1,400 main responsible persons of the prefectural and county organs concerned. At the meeting, the speeches of the responsible persons of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission on the problems of the prefecture were relayed, and standing committee member Liu Liying [0491 7787 5391] and inspection group chief Liu Xu [0491 2485] of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission and Shanxi provincial party committee secretary Li Ligong [2621 4539 0501] gave talks.

The meeting was held after a group of major cases was investigated and prosecuted under the guidance of the inspection group of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and an obvious breakthrough was made in party style rectification throughout the prefecture. Extremely dissatisfied with the serious problems of party style in the prefecture, one after another the broad cadres and masses waged struggles in manifold forms. In just the months of August and September 1983 alone, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission received 327 letters from the cadres and masses of the prefecture, including 98 which exposed and accused the prefectural and county leaders. The leading comrades concerned of the Central Commission for Guiding Party Consolidation and Central Discipline Inspection Commission demanded "earnest investigation and handling." The standing committee of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission sent an inspection group headed by Liu Xu to Linfen to help the prefectural party committee investigate and handle the major cases and rectify the party style. Secretary Ma Guorui [7456 0948 3843] and standing committee member Liu Liying of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission went to Linfen to hear reports and render actual guidance.

The serious unhealthy party style in Linfen was mainly manifested as follows: Political discipline was lax, with some people refusing to follow the instructions of the higher level and others showing a strong antagonism. In cadre employment, there was the incorrect practice of making appointments by favoritism, drawing a circle around oneself and attacking and retaliating against those who differed. Some cadres utilized their functions to build private houses illegally,

and the three housing investigations were basically perfunctory. Some leading cadres utilized their functions to enter by the back door and illegally approved "changing from farming to nonfarming," worker recruitment and cadre promotion, and others granted favors in exchange for their private gain. Some leading cadres and political and legal personnel relied on their power and position, substituted their words for the law, violated the law when enforcing it and even resorted to dictatorship to attack the good and innocent people, while bending the law to protect the true criminals, enabling them to go scot-free. Abusing their functions and doing what they pleased, some few leading cadres were immoral and corrupt.

The leaders of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission solemnly pointed out that the reason for Linfen's unhealthy party style was because the leading group of the former prefectural party committee lost its effect as a fighting fortress and became an umbrella protecting the unhealthy trends and law and discipline violations. To rectify the party style, the leaders must serve as the models. In line with the spirit of the documents on party consolidation, they must rectify before consolidation, refer to Yuncheng's experiences, start with case investigations in party style rectification, reorganize the leading group and build a untied and fighting leading group having the courage to uphold principles and maintaining political unity with the Party Central Committee.

Provincial party committee secretary Li Ligong pointed out in his speech: The problems found in Linfen are fairly serious and party style rectification has become an urgent matter. We must give first place to the word "dare," concentrate to the end, "catch up with and learn from Yuncheng and persevere until final victory." We must investigate and handle the cases by seeking the truth from the facts, eliminate all interferences, break through the connections network and protection levels and rely on facts, criticizing, punishing or acting according to law as called for, without favoritism or leniency.

The work meeting on party style rectification produced a strong reverberation throughout the prefecture. Those violating law and discipline were alarmed, the cadres pursuing the unhealthy trends received an education, the comrades upholding principles were encouraged and the people of the prefecture gained hope.

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NORTH REGION

YUNCHENG PREFECTURE MODEL FOR REFORM OF PARTY STYLE

Taiyuan SHANXI RIBAO in Chinese 18 Mar 84 p 1

[Commentator's Article: "Conscientiously Study Yuncheng Prefecture's Experiences in Party Style Reform"]

[Text] The party organization at the Light Industry Department of Shanxi Province conscientiously studied and applied party workstyle rectification experiences of Yuncheng Prefecture, in order to have its own reform of workstyle proceed vividly, dramatically and step by step in great depth. This reiterates that the experiences summed up at Yuncheng by the work team of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, their "arousing awareness of party style through the investigation and disposal of typical major cases and their consolidation of the leading groups through the rectification of party workstyle," are of universal significance as guides. If they are conscientiously studied and creatively applied, they can lead to tangible results.

The key element in the experiences in party style reform at Yungcheng Prefecture is the investigation of major cases. Why should the investigation of major cases be the starting point? Practice at many places proves that the occurrence of a major case is in general not an isolated occurrence, but is directly or indirectly linked with certain people or certain related quarters.

Frequently, a major case is the concrete manifestation of unhealthy tendencies in a certain department's or unit's party workstyle. A firm grasp of the major case will be like taking the bull by the horn's regarding the problems in a department or unit and will allow effecting a breakthrough in the solution of the problem in question. At the start of party style reform at the Light Industry Department of Shanxi Province, the major case of Guo Pengfei [6753 7720 7378] was singled out, a case that had evoked most comment from the masses and has had the broadest implications, as the case in which a breakthrough was to be effected. Through the investigation and punishment of Guo Pengfei's crimes and the analysis of the formation and development of his case, it was possible to expose concretely and in depth the ideological, workstyle and organizational flaws within the party. This action not only convinced everyone of the importance and urgency of rectification of workstyle, for a strengthening of discipline

and purification of the party organization, but also enabled the broad masses of our party members to gain a lesson, which strengthened their confidence in the effectiveness of party reform and their resolve to reform. Party committees at all levels, particularly party organizations at units which are in the process of party reform, must by all means emulate the party organization at the Light Industry Department and, in accordance with the realities of their locality, conscientiously study and apply the experiences of Yuncheng Prefecture, striving to do a good job in party reform work at their specific unit.

Certain comrades lack a comprehensive and substantial understanding of the experiences of Yuncheng Prefecture. They say something like: "There are no offensive cases in our unit and so there is nothing we can learn from the Yuncheng experiences." Is that really so? In the course of the decade of turmoil, our party organization suffered serious disruptions, and certain offensive cases and serious problems have developed in many places and units, problems that have not been solved over long periods of time and which interfere with implementation of our party's political line, principles and policies. Even if the cases are not major, they may be medium or small, or there may be this or that long-standing problem. Selecting among these a representative problem, investigating it and dealing with it can provide the breakthrough in party reform. If we close our eyes to such problems or, being well aware of them, take no action, merely indulging in empty talk of party reform, the whole party reform will then become a merely perfunctory exercise. Viewing the conditions in provincial organ party reform units, why is it that certain units can never effect a breakthrough and stagnate in vague generalizations? There are of course many reasons for that, but one question that cannot be overlooked is that the leading comrades in places like the Light Industry Department did not conscientiously undertake a major case and check the party's workstyle, but bypassed the contradiction or even intentionally covered up the problem. There are also some comrades who place all hopes for the solution of their problems on the shoulders of the work team from the Central Discipline Investigation Commission. They say something like: "Major cases are complex and have broad implications; they cannot be handled without a work team from the Central Discipline Inspection Commission." This is certainly a lopsided view. We have to say that problems are sometimes huge and interferences and obstructions are encountered, which indeed makes it impossible to solve the problems without the help and support of party committees of higher rank. For instance, the problems in Yuncheng Prefecture would have been momentarily impossible to solve without the earnest help of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission work team. However, these work teams cannot be made to "capture the whole world," nor can they be dispatched everywhere. The ultimate solution for a certain locality or a certain unit's problems, and a fundamental turn for the better in their workstyle, will in the main still depend on the local party organization. If all problems were heaped on the work teams from the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, what need would there be to maintain the party organizations at various levels, and would they still constitute any fighting force to speak of? Rectifying the party's workstyle is a task that history has entrusted to our entire party

and to all members of the Communist Party. Party organizations at all levels, our leading cadres and each member of the Communist Party must emulate the work team comrades of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission and with a high sense of responsibility and a strong sense of principle, unselfishly, fearlessly, and indomitably pursue on their own initiative the fight against unhealthy tendencies. In this way alone will it be possible to achieve a fundamental turn for the better in our party's workstyle.

There are also comrades who say: "We have no 'imperial sword of highest authority' in our hands, how could we dare to take on major cases?" This way of thinking is also incorrect. The work team of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission has indeed an "imperial sword of highest authority" in its hands, but this consists of nothing other than the party's statutes, the party's discipline, the party's policies and the country's laws. It was on these items that they relied when they boldly and resolutely rectified the party's workstyle in Yuncheng Prefecture. This type of "imperial sword" is not held by only the work team of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission but is the common property of the party organizations at all levels and the entire body of Communist Party members. The question is whether one dares to use it and whether one is imbued with party consciousness and a fighting spirit. Some of our leading comrades only have selfish motives, and in whatever affair they are involved they will first plan for their own safety. They will be afraid of offending anyone, afraid to hurt feelings, afraid to block their ways of retreat, but they will never be afraid to harm the party's undertakings or the interests of the people. Even wielding the "imperial sword of authority" in their own hands, they will still not dare to use it, and even in affairs that responsible comrades of the central authorities or the provincial party committee have repeatedly approved for action and investigation, they will put off investigating. This so clearly amounts to not executing the directives of their superior authority that how can there still be talk of not having the "imperial sword of authority" in hand? Is this not a monstrous absurdity!

The provincial party committee has already demanded that party organizations at all levels throughout the province study the experiences of Yuncheng Prefecture when rectifying party workstyle. At present, the work of party reform in our province is just in the process of being carried out step by step and in depth. It is our hope that more and more units will, with due consideration for reality, learn perfectly from the experiences at Yuncheng Prefecture and create a new overall situation in party reform work.

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NORTHEAST REGION

COMEBACK OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION 'REBEL' DESCRIBED

Beijing LIAOWANG OUTLOOK in Chinese No 20, 14 May 84 pp 22-23

Article by Li Huimin 2621 1920 3046 and Liu Changhe 0491 7022 3109:
"The Whole Story of the Rise of a 'Rebel'"

Text In Qiqihar City, located on the banks of the Nenjiang River, during the consolidation of the party organization, there was news of a case that caused a stir throughout the city: Liu Peng 0491 7720, secretary of the party committee and director of an agricultural and animal husbandry vehicle general plant, had been removed from the party, had been stripped of his post as party committee secretary and plant director and had had his salary lowered from the 15th grade to the 18th grade. Recently, we visited the unit in which Liu Peng had worked and got the full story on this piece of news.

Seizing the Chance To Rebel

Liu Peng is 51 years old this year. Nineteen years ago he was the party branch secretary in the Design Section of the First Machine Tool Plant in Qiqihar. To begin speaking about him, this person with small shifty eyes was adept at seeing which way the wind was blowing. Once the "great cultural revolution" began, Liu Peng drew its flames down upon the scientists and technicians. For several days big-character posters inscribed "overthrow the bourgeois reactionary authorities" and "sweep away all demons and monsters" were spread all over the place, and more than 60 members of the over 100-man design section were singled out for criticism.

Then there was a sudden change in the situation. Soon afterward Liu Peng himself was "unhorsed" by the "rebel faction." Every day he swept with a broom corridors and lavatories. As he swept the floor, he calculated: "Other people can rebel, so why can't I? Only by rebelling will I be able to put aside this broom and become a leader again." He worked from dawn to dusk, stepped up his activities, established ties with middle-level cadres in the factory and planned a big banner--the "storm" rebel group. After this rebel group was established, it wrote one big-character poster after another, criticizing so-called "capitalist roaders" and pointing the spearhead of struggle at the plant's party committee, and provided the "rebel faction" with a large number of "heavy cannon shells."

In April 1968, the Qiqihar First Machine Tool Plant set up a revolutionary committee, and because Liu Peng "had rendered service to the rebellion," he was made chairman of the revolutionary committee of the design section.

Persecuting the Innocent

After Liu Peng had regained authority in the design section, he took charge of the work "to purify the class ranks" and once again directed his spearhead at the engineer and technical personnel, willfully accusing them of being "traitors," "secret agents" and "active counterrevolutionaries" and ruthlessly persecuting them.

Liu Qi /0491 3823/, who was only 46 years old at that time, was a worker who had suffered extreme difficulties in the old society. After liberation, being educated by the party, he taught himself the Russian, English, German, Japanese and French languages and translated books and technical materials. He also independently studied higher mathematics and physics and designed and drew up the blueprints for nearly 20 machine tools, becoming an outstanding engineer. Even this kind of "both red and expert" engineer was labeled a "reactionary technical authority" by Liu Peng, who criticized and denounced him in an unbridled manner at a public meeting and sent him to a workshop for reform through labor. In a "self-vindication book" Liu Qi, with tears in his eyes, wrote:

"I have been struggled against. How am I to handle the knowledge I have painstakingly dug up and studied for nearly 20 years? I cannot let time slip by in vain. I will put in order the scientific knowledge I have learned."

Liu Qi had no idea at all, while he was writing with great concentration so as to continue to make his contributions to the people, that Liu Peng had put him on the namelist of "secret agents," organized his forces and was waging a more ruthless struggle against him. On the evening of 20 May 1968, just as an interrogation was about to end, a member of the "dictatorship team," seething with rage, entered Liu Qi's "self-examination room" and snatching up a big stick to beat him. Liu Qi screamed in pain incessantly.

Liu Qi could not bear this humiliation. On the evening of that day he shattered a glass of a window by butting his head against it and jumped from the second story of the building. When people discovered him, he was lying in a pool of blood. After being taken to a hospital, he said to the nurses: "I am dying. Quickly find my wife and children and bring them here. I have something to say to them." Liu Peng would not permit Liu Qi and his loved ones to see each other for the last time. Liu Qi said: "Liu Peng, I am not a secret agent. My death is unjust:" After speaking these words, he breathed his last.

Liu Qi's death did not make Liu Peng realize his error and show repentance; on the contrary, he intensified his persecution of the intellectuals. In 1967, technician Cheng Xianben /4453 0341 2609/ designed the C8102 rough-turning axle lathe. At that time he had only drawn a "whiteprint" of it and the design was not yet finalized. On reexamination of the design it was found to contain several technical errors. Unwilling to accept the explanation of other technicians, Liu Peng tried to force Cheng Xianben to admit that it was a case of "sabotage by an active counterrevolutionary." When Cheng Xianben would not admit this, Liu Peng extorted a confession by torture and locked him up in prison for 2 and one-half years.

Because Engineer Zhang Mingxian /1728 2494 6343/, at a technical appraisal meeting on Cheng Xianben's case, spoke the truth that "this was a case of technical errors and not an action by an active counterrevolutionary!" Liu Peng found him guilty of shielding an active counterrevolutionary. Zhang Mingxian was locked up in a "cowshed" for more than 5 months during which time he was repeatedly beaten, leaving many scars on his body.

Woman Eng Shao Suzhen /6370 4790 3791/ and Cheng Xianben were neighbors. Because she told Cheng Xianben's family the news about his being ferreted out and struggled against, she was also implicated. Liu Peng charged Shao Suzhen with the crime of "divulging secret information for a counterrevolutionary." Disregarding the fact that she had not recovered from massive hemorrhaging after an induced abortion, he pulled her out and criticized and denounced her at a public meeting, causing her bodily injury, the sequel of which remains to this day.

From April 1968 to November of the same year, more than 10 engineers and technicians in the design section led by Liu Peng were ferreted out and struggled against had their houses searched and their property confiscated and were locked up, beaten and interrogated in isolation, all of which caused extremely great physical and mental damage to them. Among them two persons lost their lives because of this.

Staging a Comeback

Not only did Liu Peng not receive his deserved punishment for framing and persecuting the engineers and technicians, but, on the contrary, he constantly won promotion--from chairman of the revolutionary committee of the design section, he was promoted to deputy director of the political department of the plant's trade union; afterward, he was promoted to the posts of deputy secretary of the party committee of the Qiqihar Municipal First Machinery Plant and of plant director. Just when he was making a rapid advancement in his career, like a clap of spring thunder the "gang of four," which had brought calamity to the country and the people, fell from power.

However, Liu Peng had a special skill: he was good at observing situations and adapting himself to changing conditions. After the "gang of four" was smashed, Liu Peng changed his strategy by switching from actively "engaging in revolution" to actively "engaging in production."

At that time, the Qiqihar First Machinery Plant had been twisted all out of shape by the 10 years of great calamity: worker discipline was slack, the production sequence was chaotic, tasks were not completed and the plant was also unbearably disordered in appearance. After taking up his posts, Liu Peng started "three fires in succession, which changed the features of this plant.

Liu Peng's "competence" in "boldly getting a grip on things and boldly managing them" was appreciated by certain leaders, and he was transferred from the Qiqihar First Machinery Plant, whose personnel numbered a little over 1,000, to the Qiqihar Municipal Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Vehicle General Plant, whose personnel numbered a little over 2,000, to be the party committee secretary there. Once Liu Peng took up his new post he adopted the pose of a reformer and not long afterward was selected to be the plant's director, so that all the party and governmental authority of the plant was held in the hands of one man--Liu Peng. The Liu Peng of this time also restored his "rebel's temperament;" he won over and combined factions and did not pay any attention at all to the party's organizations. If the directives of the Party Central Committee and the ideas of the higher-level leaders did not suit Liu Peng's purposes, he would defiantly not go along with them.

Huo [7202] so-and-so was the chief of a "rebel faction" during the "cultural revolution" and on many occasions led many people holding clubs, vee belts and other weapons in beating people, searching houses and confiscating property and extorting confessions by torture in the ruthless persecution of the cadres and masses. He incurred the bitter hatred of the people. Liu Peng first appointed this kind of person to be the deputy chief of the propaganda section and later also promoted him to be deputy director of the plant's party consolidation office. After the party consolidation work team of the municipal party committee went to the plant, it stated: "Hou so-and-so should not handle the later stage of party consolidation." Liu Peng paid no heed at all to the opinion of the party consolidation work team but continued to keep Huo so-and-so in the posts of plant director and office deputy director. When the case of Huo so-and-so was brought before the all-province forum on party consolidation, the leading comrades of the organization department of the provincial party committee and of the provincial discipline inspection commission said: During the "cultural revolution," Huo so-and-so engaged in the serious action of beating people, something which lowers the standards for party membership. Administratively, he should be dismissed from his leadership duties; organizationally, his party membership should be suspended for 1 year. Liu Peng still paid no attention. The party consolidation work

team again pointed out: "The question of Huo so-and-so is to be turned over to the party committee in implementing the procedures for organizational handling." Liu Peng not only took no notice of this but also decided to transfer Hu so-and-so to be deputy chief of the general affairs section at the Doqing construction site with a one-grade raise in pay. Under Liu Peng's protection, Huo so-and-so, swollen with arrogance, refused to admit his errors. He said: "The landlords and rich peasants have cast off their labels. What crime did I commit when I rebelled!"

During the "cultural revolution," Deng [6772] so-and-so ferreted out, struggled against and locked up leading cadres and beat the masses. Once, in one night, with all sorts of accusations he ferreted out and struggled against 27 cadres and workers. Liu Peng obviously knew about the problem connected with Deng so-and-so, but he recommended him to be the head of a workshop and concurrently the secretary of its party branch. The higher-level leadership department said that Deng so-and-so should be dismissed from leadership duties, whereupon Liu Peng agreed. Not long afterward through, he appointed Deng so-and-so to be director of the fourth branch plant and concurrently secretary of its party branch. After discovering this, the municipal party committee reiterated: "Deng so-and-so cannot be used!" Liu Peng then had to make Deng so-and-so leave his leadership posts.

Liu Peng's ways of using personnel were as different as the waters on the Jinghe and Weihe Rivers--entirely different! Those who submitted to him prospered, those who resisted him perished--in other words, his ways were brutal and arbitrary. On the eve of the Spring Festival in 1981, Zhou Xuezhi [0719 1331 1807], the head of the plant's armed forces department [militia], went to Li Peng's office to report on work. Liu Peng was eating an apple sent as a gift to sick personnel while playing mahjong and with deputy plant directors. Zhou Xuezhi frowned upon this and said in criticism: "You are leaders, but you play mahjong during worktime, taking the lead in breaking rules. How can you talk about others?" In his heart Liu Peng bore a grudge over this incident. Not long after the festival, on the pretext of strengthening the grassroots, he transferred Zhou Xuezhi to the post of party branch secretary of a workshop a dozen li from the plant. The Armed Force Department of Qiqihar City did not agree with Liu Peng's decision. Not only did Liu Peng pay no attention to this, he also ordered the sealing up of the armed forces department and the turning in of Zhou Xuezhi's guns, effectively putting a stop to Zhou's work. This veteran comrade, who had been in the armed forces for more than 30 years, had to retire early at the age of 53. With regard to the handling of the question of Zhou Xuezhi, a deputy secretary of the plant's party committee who did not agree with Liu Peng's peremptory way of doing things, was also dismissed from his post by Liu Peng and sent away as "investigation and study personnel."

Every day Liu Peng had a car take him to and from work; every time he went on official business, he used public money for food and drink, and the plant's leading group had to go to the railway station to see him off and meet him upon his return. His family consisted of seven persons, who already had two houses, but he used the plant's money to purchase another house for his own residence. In September 1982, Liu Peng said he wanted to buy steel products. Leading several persons, he rode on airplanes and railway sleeping cars to Guangzhou and Shenzhen, where they traveled around and enjoyed the sights of the mountains and rivers for over a month. Not a single steel product did he buy and bring back, and he spent to no good purpose more than 2,000 yuan in renminbi. Nobody dared to concern himself about this situation.

Providing Food for Thought

After Liu Peng's errors were exposed, the Qiqihar City CPC Committee decided to take away his party membership and to dismiss him from all his posts inside and outside the party. After this news spread, all of the people who knew about Liu Peng were elated. However, besides being excited they pondered a problem, namely: Why could a person like Liu Peng be promoted to higher and higher positions?

A responsible comrade of a relevant quarter in Qiqihar City replied: "Some of our leading cadres only look at a cadre for a time and do not look at his whole history: they only look at his current behavior and do not look at his behavior during the 'cultural revolution;' and they only look at his 'competence' and do not look at his ideological character. Therefore, they let some figures like Liu Peng get their own way." This explanation is not without sense, and it is precisely an important reason why some units are not thorough in their checks on people.

Please listen to the answers of a certain responsible person of the Qiqihar First Machine Tool Plant:

Question: Have you examined the question of Liu Peng?

Answer: No, because Liu Peng has already been transferred from here.

Question: In 1978, the family members of the victims strongly demanded an investigation of those who beat people and those who pulled the strings behind the scenes. Did you turn over their accusatory materials of the departments concerned?

Answer: No, that was a time when policy was being implemented, and, as a rule, when policy is being implemented, an individual's responsibility is not looked into. Therefore, the accusatory material was not handed over to the departments concerned.

Question: During the "cultural revolution," six members of your plant died, and two of them were in Liu Peng's design section. Why was this not investigated?

Answer: During the "cultural revolution," Liu Peng only joined a small "rebel" organization, which did not leave its mark on our plant.

The answers given by this responsible person conceal a grim fact: some units and departments are not serious but are very irresponsible about their investigation work. Therefore, some persons who did a lot of bad things during the "cultural revolution" are able to conceal themselves and, through a disguise and pose, come back on stage.

This is the lesson provided to us by the whole story of the rise of this "rebel" figure.

9727

CSO: 4005/650

NORTHEAST REGION

PROPOSALS FOR 'FOUR TRANSFORMATIONS' OF CADRES

Harbin FENDOU [STRUGGLE] in Chinese No 5, May 84 pp 6-7

[Article by Li He [2621 0735]: "Four Transformations' Must Be Comprehensively Implemented"]

[Text] It is a strategic party policy to transform cadres in the new era so that they will be more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated, and more professional. These "four transformations" are at the heart of the implementation of the party's organizational line. Our firmness and comprehensiveness in carrying out the "four transformations will affect the outcome of the "four modernizations" and the long-term interests of both the party and the country. Therefore, we must try to understand this policy thoroughly and work on it seriously.

To meet the requirements of the policy of the "four transformations," we have earnestly readjusted the leading groups at the provincial, municipal, county and local levels in accordance with the work plans and uniform arrangements of the central authorities. Our work has produced some notable results: Leading groups at various levels have been trimmed in size, their average age has dropped and their educational standard and level of professional expertise have been raised. They have become a purer organization with an improved political quality and heightened combat capacity. Simultaneously, we have exchanged a number of cadres, thereby laying the basis for the future regularization and systemization of cadre exchange. However, the "four transformations" are a long-term objective which cannot be achieved overnight. We must remain firm and confident and continue our efforts to bring about the "four transformations" comprehensively. To achieve this, the following problems must be solved:

Clarify Cadre Standards for the New Era. The "four transformations" is only a general guideline indicating the direction for cadre work. It must be substantiated and made more practicable with a set of policies and regulations. Of particular importance is a deeper understanding and a better grasp of cadre standards. It has been our traditional policy to insist on both virtue and ability in the selection of cadres. However, the substance of virtue and ability varies over time. In the new historical era of socialist construction, what do virtue and ability consist of? At a ceremony celebrating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Ye

Jianying for the first time systematically spelled out the cadre standards: 1) A firm resolve to embrace the political and ideological lines of the party; 2) Impartiality and a determination to abide by the law and discipline, uphold the party spirit and stamp out factionalism; and 3) A strong revolutionary commitment and sense of political responsibility. Deng Xiaoping later pointed out: 1) The most important thing about virtue is a firm adherence to the socialist road and party leadership." "Ability means nothing more than professionalization, intellectual development, practical experience and strong physical endurance." He added: "What are the political standards in the selection of personnel? The ability to work for the good of the people and to contribute to socialism. This is the main political standard." With other leading central comrades, he later put forward the strategic policy of selecting cadres in accordance with their revolutionary spirit, age, intellectual standards and professional expertise. Thus we can see that the standards of virtue and ability in the selection of cadres have changed completely. We must now adapt to the new situation and make new demands of cadre work, striving to ensure that we and our ideological associates follow consistent recruitment policies.

Scientifically Understand and Comprehensively Grasp Cadre Standards of Virtue and Ability. The "four transformations" make up one organic whole; every component is indispensable. But the pre-eminent part is still revolutionization. Comrade Deng Xiaoping has repeatedly emphasized that youth, intellectual development and professionalization must take revolutionization as the major premise, pointing out that this is an overriding issue which will help determine who will run the nation. In examining and selecting cadres, we must place virtue ahead of ability. Ability must be considered in the context of virtue. On the one hand, we must guard against the tendency to neglect political qualifications. On the other hand, we must steer clear of the tendency to ignore ability. It is dangerous to entrust a high position to someone who is capable but not virtuous, while a virtuous but incompetent person cannot live up to the demands of the job. In fact, there is a dialectical unity between virtue and ability; through hard work, a cadre can achieve both qualities. We must grasp the dialectical unity between the two and firmly and correctly enforce the principle of dualism. Moreover, we must try to understand thoroughly each of the "four transformations." Concerning revolutionization, we must not dismiss liberated thinking, innovativeness and the courage to make suggestions as immaturity, instability, arrogance or complacency. Concerning the age of cadres, we must not look at age in isolation from other factors. As for intellectual development, we must work out the proper relationship between diplomas and standards and between intellectual knowledge and practical experience. While it helps for someone to have a diploma, we must not make it the sole criterion. We must also give weight to a cadre's real ability and practical experience. As for professionalization, we should ask different things of people in different positions, making the most of their strengths and avoiding their weaknesses. Particularly important are a cadre's organizational and managerial abilities. We must carefully measure the cadres' professional standards, but it is not simply a question of counting how many professionals there are in a group. Instead, we must ensure that the intellectual composition of the entire group is rational. Only by comprehensively and scientifically understanding and

grasping the new era's cadre standards can we accomplish the "four transformations."

Resolutely and Boldly Select and Recruit Cadres from Among Intellectuals. Comrade Deng Xiaoping has repeatedly stressed; "Empty talk cannot bring about modernization. Only knowledge and expertise can do so." "We must create in the party an atmosphere which respects knowledge and expertise. The erroneous idea of putting intellectuals down must be resisted." Comrade Hu Yaobang has pointed out: "It takes knowledge and intellectuals to overthrow the old world, and it certainly takes knowledge and intellectuals to construct the new world." It may be said that the intellectual development and professionalization of leading groups and cadres are processes of slowly transforming all cadres into intellectuals and turning all leading members into intellectuals. With the development of socialist modernization, the main object of our cadre work in the future will also be intellectuals. Even now, however, some comrades have not yet liberated themselves from "leftist" thinking and continue to look down upon intellectuals. Denying that intellectuals are part of the proletariat, they resist the idea of selecting intellectuals and admitting them into a leading group. These and other mistaken actions and thoughts must be clarified and corrected. We must realize that without knowledge and intellectuals, there would be no leading group, no "four transformations" and no "four modernizations." As a result, we must raise our understanding of the importance of intellectuals, mobilize their initiative to the fullest, courageously bring into the leading groups whoever can be a leading cadre and encourage those who cannot take up leadership positions to make professional contributions.

Continue To Liberate Our Thinking, and Break New Ground in Cadre Work. To carry out the policy of the "four transformations," we also need the guarantees provided by relevant rules and regulations. However, we are still being hindered by some old conventions, old formulas and old ways of doing things. As a result, we must continue to liberate our thinking, carry out thorough reforms and develop the courage to innovate. In reforming the cadre management system, we should try to make it less restrictive, more efficient and more flexible. In reforming the cadre management staffing system, we should focus on the three key areas of "entry, management and exit." Serious efforts must be made to solve the leadership-for-life problem and to enforce the resignation and retirement systems. The system whereby elderly comrades retire to become consultants and inspectors must be followed. If they perform well, newly-appointed young comrades should be allowed to keep their jobs. Otherwise, they should resign voluntarily and take up other work. The composition of cadres must be gradually reformed to accommodate the needs of the "four transformations." An election system should be instituted for cadres at the grassroots level; experience gained in such elections can be used in future elections at higher levels. A reasonable degree of mobility among technical experts can be promoted through recruitment, self-recommendation and the practice of allowing a cadre to rejoin his unit. The exchange of cadres must be carried out in a planned way. We must gradually build up and perfect a personal responsibility system in party and government organs. The reform of the cadre system must be carried out in a steadfast, orderly and organized way under proper leadership. Cadre reforms must be

coordinated with reforms in the economic system and the personnel, labor, education and wage systems. Moreover, in any reform situation, we should take as our starting point the special circumstances of the case at hand. In situations covered by clear central regulations, the regulations must be followed. In situations where the central government has prescribed only the proper spirit, bold experimentation must be made. In situations where reforms are needed but where central authorities have given no explicit directives, exploration also must be actively pursued. We must take care to strengthen political and ideological work amidst all these reforms.

We must continue to strengthen leading groups at various levels in accordance with the policy of the "four transformations" and bring about the normalization of the cooperation and replacement of old and young organized groups as soon as possible. Our present organizational reform is being carried out in the context of the existing economic management system and constitutes only the first step. New cadre ranks that come into existence after the organizational reform will have basically a ladder-shaped age structure, a rational intellectual composition and a coordinated work system. But this will still fall short of what the party's "four transformations" require of its cadres. Reform can be drastic or moderate, and changes in the age structure, intellectual standard and professional composition can vary. New cadres have yet to be put through the trial of experience. Under these circumstances, we must persist with our reform policy to make it more scientific and rational. Under no circumstances should we retreat to the old ways. On the one hand, we must pay attention to relative stability, strengthen regular constructions, solve such problems as "too much paperwork, too many meetings" and "government remaining as complex as ever despite a reduction in personnel: and use the strengths of the new cadres to bring about a breakthrough. On the other hand, building on the basis of this organizational reform, we must develop a good grasp of the reform of the composition of leading groups at various levels in accordance with the policy of the "four transformations" and the need to build up the third-echelon leadership. We plan to complete by the end of 1985 the basic normalization of the replacement of old and new cadres and, by the end of 1990, the four transformations of leading cadres at various levels in all departments. Furthermore, through the establishment of a more complete system, we hope to keep the composition of the leading groups constantly rational.

12581

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NORTHWEST REGION

SHAANXI GOVERNOR PROMOTES GROWTH, REFORM

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 25 May 84 p 3

[Article: "Liberate Thinking, Boldy Reform, Administer the Province and Enrich the People"]

[Text] Reporter Ai Feng [5337 0023] reports: by advancing ideological liberation and stressing reform and the relaxation of restrictions, the invigoration of Shaanxi's economy could be well in view. This was stated confidently by the secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and Governor of Shaanxi Province, Li Qingwei [2621 1987 0251], who is now attending the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress.

There were a number of breakthroughs in the economy of Shaanxi last year: in a year of natural disasters, bumper harvests were obtained, and for the first time in 25 years, the province was more than self-sufficient in grain. Industrial production value increase 14.3 percent over the year before, with an increase in net production value of 1.5 billion yuan for the year. In addition, the rate and benefits of production increased apace. Financial conditions took a big turn for the better, while income exceeded the original plan by 120 million yuan.

Comrade Li Qingwei said: "Nevertheless, compared with the demands of creating a new situation, and compared to the advanced cities of this province, we still have quite a long way to go in our work." He listed several existing problems with leading ideology:

1) "Leftist" influences in economics have not been eliminated, people have not liberated their thinking, there are too many conventional ideas, and the pace of reform is too slow. For example, in terms of ownership, "large in size and collective in nature" is still influential. People only want to manage large enterprises or enterprises owned by the whole people, so that inadequate attention is paid to the economy of the collective and the individual. In terms of economic management, there is too much systemization and limitations are too strict. Enterprises have no authority to expand on their own and the burdens of the enterprises are too heavy. 2) Some comrades have conservative ideas, stick to old ways, refuse to make progress, are content with "fair to middling," and lack creative spirit. Several locales in northern and southern Shaanxi even now have no concept of commodity production and no

country fair trade. Some counties have a longstanding habit of living off financial subsidies. 3) Some locales have still not completely changed over to emphasizing economic construction, nor have they made raising economic benefits their main course. 4) The habitual influence of small-scale production maintains a serious presence and there has been no basic change in "one thing at a time" management thinking. 5) There has not been enough courage in importing things from elsewhere (including importing things from outside the country or from the seacoast). Fields of vision have not been broad, there is too much apprehension, and basically the situation has not opened up. 6) The neglect of technical progress is still very serious, and the relatively superior strength of science and technology has not been brought into full play. 7) Styles of work are not sound; there is too much talk and too little done. There are some situations where resolutions are made and documents issued, but still no one pays attention to putting them into effect. The masses criticize this as "waking up early, getting up slowly, and going out late."

It should be said that the economic invigoration of Shaanxi enjoys several exceptionally advantageous conditions. One of the nation's largest coalfields is in northern Shaanxi, with reserves of 230 billion tons; the province as a whole currently produces over 700,000 kilowatts of electricity; and the Qinling mountain range has rich mineral resources of nonferrous metal such as molybdenum, gold, silver and copper. In addition, Shaanxi has excellent natural resources for tourism and a considerable number of talented people in science and technology.

After enumerating these advantages, Comrade Li Qingwei said: "The key lies in our doing good work. These days, we representatives of Shaanxi Province must, on the one hand, discuss government work reports and, on the other, consider how to implement the spirit of the meetings afterward." He told this reporter that from now on a great deal of effort will be expended for reform at all levels in the cities, with priority given to Xian. As the countryside "surrounds" the cities, if reform can be promoted satisfactorily in the cities, it could bring along development in the countryside. Enterprises under provincial administration should be transferred down to the city level, where the organization of the economy would be unified. Enterprises with the right to expand should attend to a system of economic responsibility. At the same time, they should study the Chongqing experience and set up trade centers. Supply and marketing cooperatives in the countryside should break through restrictions by drawing the peasantry in as shareholders. Cadres should expand their sphere of management and service by truly achieving elective production. Steps to relax restrictions should be somewhat bigger. Li Qingwei said that Xian could be established as an experimental site for the lifting of restrictions in an inland city, with special policies carried out in certain areas, to develop a foundation in the northwest.

"To free ourselves from old ideas, to relax restrictions of policy, to courageously reform, and to govern Shaanxi so as to enrich the people. With these standards we should not fear taking on risks, and if we concentrate to the last, in three to five years there will be a great transformation." In his capacity as one of the principal leaders of the province, he ended with this demonstration of his own resolve.

12534
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

ZHANG'S U.S. VISIT DOES NOT MEAN U.S.-CHINA ACCOMMODATION

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Jun 84 p 4

/Article by Karl Kraenzle, datelined Peking 12 June: "Making a Virtue Out of Lack of Modern Weapons" /

/Text / Whenever U.S. politicians indicated sporadically in recent years that Washington was willing to sell certain armaments to Peking, the Chinese reacted each time noncommittally and with polite restraint. Official commentaries stated regularly that China could not make modernization of its armed forces dependent on purchases of highly-sophisticated weapons systems in the West. In recent days, this truism could be read and heard especially frequently. This time it is in connection with Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping's visit to the United States. Of course, if China had no interest whatsoever in U.S. weapons, then Zhang could have saved himself the trip.

A potential aggressor would have to fear the striking power of the Chinese Army far less than the problems connected with an occupation of China. The Chinese themselves like to illustrate these circumstances graphically. They would let the enemy come very close, and then they would "swallow" him up and drown him in a sea of guerrillas. During U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's visit last year, the Chinese leadership demonstrated just how much validity this concept of a traditional people's war still possesses. The Chinese showed him a troop of rural infantrymen who are trained in hand-to-hand combat and whose self-control and physical abilities are probably unexcelled by any other armed forces in the world.

The demonstration was also of symbolic significance. Weinberger was shown, indirectly, that China has only a limited interest in the type of military cooperation which the U.S. secretary of defense wants. Although the Chinese are aware that the armaments sector must be included in the current modernization process, the emphasis continues to be on training foot soldiers who grow their own rice, make their own noodles, raise chickens and pigs, and also produce bicycles, in addition to many other goods. Because of this high degree of self-sufficiency, for example, it is impossible to compare Chinese defense spending with corresponding expenditures of other countries.

The frequent extolling of a concept which proved successful decades ago, first in the fight against the Japanese and then in the victory over Chiang Kai-shek's

troops, cannot obscure the fact that the Chinese hereby make a virtue of necessity. The People's Liberation Army consists of about 160 divisions. More than 120 divisions are "old-fashioned" infantry units; then there are some artillery and a dozen tank divisions. The air and naval forces constitute less than one-fifth of all troops on active military duty. To transform these troop units into a creditable deterrent force, such as smaller countries like France and Great Britain possess today, would swallow such enormous amounts of money that the country's economic development would suffer great damage. Peking wants to avoid that, and this is also one of the reasons why the concept of a people's war is being propagandized time and again.

Supposing China were attacked militarily, the country would first need a certain amount of time to organize such a people's war in which the aggressor is "swallowed" and drowned in a sea of guerrillas. In turn, this would presuppose a modernization of the air force, air and tank defense, and the navy. There are Western military experts who claim, for example, that China could make effective use of its air force "only during good weather," which in case of war would deprive the ground troops of the necessary air support during bad weather. Antitank defense is also totally antiquated. Antitank weapons are still widespread which would be largely suicidal for the soldiers using them.

There are many indications that the Chinese are trying, first of all, to establish an industrial base on which they can finally progress to a modernization of weapons for the People's Liberation Army. Until that point is reached, it may well come to isolated weapons purchases in the West. The present visit by Chinese Defense Minister Zhang is probably an indicator of such a possibility

At present, however, modernization of arms does not have priority. If one studies statements by prominent Chinese military men, then "streamlining" is put in the foreground of army reform. The number of soldiers on active duty--more than 4 million--is to be reduced in favor of a reserve force that can be quickly mobilized. Another urgent task is seen in building up a younger officer corps. And then there is the problem of the so-called troop morale which has dropped--because the People's Liberation Army has suffered a certain loss of power and prestige in recent years--and which is to be lifted with the aid of the recently decided reintroduction of insignias of rank, dashing new uniforms, and the formation of a well-paid volunteer elite corps.

9917

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

BUREAUCRATISM IN KUNMING MILITARY REGION UNIT COMBATED

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 15 May 84 p 5

[Article: "Logistics Department of Kunming Military Region Combats Bureaucratism"]

[Text] In the course of party consolidation, the logistics department party committee of the Kunming Military Region thoroughly analyzed the concrete manifestations of bureaucratism in the unit, recognized its perniciousness and formulated countermeasures. This practice of simultaneous consolidation and rectification in connection with real situations should be promoted.

When studying party consolidation documents, the party committee of the logistics department of the Kunming Military Region linked them with the reality of the unit and thoroughly analyzed the numerous manifestations of bureaucratism:

1. Abusing Power and Issuing Arbitrary Orders. Some cadres replace policies and systems with power and make the words of those in high positions count. They make plans on the important issues of the troops without careful consideration, arbitrarily veto the decisions of the lower level without clarifying the circumstances and meddle and interfere in matters beyond their jurisdiction. When a warehouse started to build an underground storehouse, for instance, some individual leaders, ignorant of the geological conditions, arbitrarily designated a location. After excavation was started, it was discovered that the spot was on a fault, and the work had to be relocated.
2. Overbearing and Sounding off in Official Jargon. Some cadres play the "big shot." When people from the basic units come on business, they are cold and indifferent, instead of receiving them warmly.
3. Making Irresponsible Remarks. Picking up rumors and hearing the words of one side, some cadres give arbitrary lectures. Especially in regard to criticizing the backward and evaluating the advanced, some leaders rely on subjective impressions and one-sided understanding and make arbitrary decisions, resulting in unfair rewards and punishments.

4. Tackling All Major and Minor Matters. Some leaders have no plans for their work, make no distinction of primary and secondary and seek no efficiency. Others give no attention to coordination between departments, making it difficult for their subordinates to know what to do.

5. Removing Themselves from the Masses and Reality. Some cadres hear reports in their offices and hold meetings and issue documents on all major and minor matters, creating "mountains of documents and oceans of meetings." According to statistics, the logistics organ of the Kunming Military Region held 86 meetings of all kinds and issued 2,892 documents last year. Some leaders do not go to the basic level and have no idea of the feelings of the masses.

6. Evading Contradictions and Passing the Buck. Some cadres like to appear in the limelight on matters which are easily handled and advantageous to them. But when it comes to contradictions and problems, they shift the responsibility back and forth, stall along without decision and leave them unsettled for the future. A certain department ordered in 1966 a batch of lumber from the Xiping forestry bureau with an allocation of 27,000 yuan. To date, the lumber has not been delivered, nor has the money been refunded. In 18 years, no one has shown any interest.

7. Making Superficial Observations and Following Formalism. Skimming the surface of the water like a dragonfly, some people are unwilling to stay in the basic-level units. When the basic-level units submit requests, some of them make promises on the spot but ignore them completely afterward. Others claim that they go down to the basic level, but actually visit the mountains and waters.

8. Being Superficial and Irresponsible. They either utter hollow and false words, reporting only the good but not the bad, or listen to whatever is reported by the lower level and believe whatever they hear. Others are irresponsible, doing their work in a perfunctory manner, marking the incoming documents with a circle and putting them aside after glancing at the titles.

By means of analysis, the comrades of the logistics department of the military region recognized the tremendous harm of bureaucratism to the party, military and social styles. In the discussions, they proposed three remedies: firmly establishing the idea of serving the people heart and soul, continuously purging the feudal vestiges, and establishing and strengthening the responsibility system in organ work and changing the "soft, scattered and lazy" state of the leading groups of the various levels.

6080

CSO: 4005/606

MAJOR PRC POLITICAL ISSUES ANALYZED

Hong Kong MING PAO YUEH KAN [MING PAO MONTHLY] in Chinese Vol 19, No 6,
Jun 84 pp 20-26

[Article by Li Hong [2621 7703]: "Four Major Political Issues in the
PRC Today"]

[Text] I. Differences over Ideology and Theory Among Cadres

Political, economic and social life in Mainland China underwent a drastic change between the Great Cultural Revolution and the recent modernization drive. If anyone claims that this change could not lead, or has not led, to any acrimonious controversy among the broad masses of cadres, such a claim can hardly gain any credence. Policies can be changed overnight, but the theoretical basis for such policies cannot be changed readily. The present power holders have stressed the need for economic construction and declared that there will be no large-scale political movement or class struggle in the future. We, after all, do not know if the serious consequences of stressing class struggle over a long period have awakened them to the realities. However, if they are aware that they cannot adopt the method of removing political obstacles before talking about economic construction without the advantages afforded by the "gang of four" or the indisputable authority of Mao Zedong, they have to place their hopes on achievements in economic construction as a means to win popular support and to establish their prestige. In any case, one thing is certain: many policies and decrees from the new power holders have led to a series of acrimonious controversies among the cadres at various party and governmental levels.

According to the logic of Deng Xiaoping and the other leaders, the concentration of resources on economic construction will naturally preclude the continuation of political revolution and class struggle. To convince people that it is correct to refrain from stressing class struggle once again, it is undoubtedly necessary that people should first be convinced that the class contradiction is no longer the principal contradiction in the country. This is certainly a serious theoretical test for those Communist Party members who confine themselves within the scope of Marxism.

Although they have made the utmost effort to include the words "the exploiting classes as such have been eliminated in our country" in the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" and later in the new state constitution, it does not mean that they have emerged victorious in the theoretical controversy on this issue. The "elimination of exploiting classes as such" as a final conclusion is not only contrary to basic Marxist tenets but also incompatible with the "four firm adherences" which, they stressed, could not be abandoned. This issue can be analyzed from two different angles. First, since the exploiting classes as such have been eliminated, the exploited classes on the opposite side would no longer exist for the reason that without the bourgeoisie, there cannot possibly be any proletariat. Under such conditions, any division of the society into "classes," if such a division must be carried out, can only be based on trades and professions, and so there would be the worker class, peasant class, teacher class, government servant class and so forth. Only such "classes" can be obviously nonantagonistic, since everyone will be classified as the "people." The contradictions among them should be considered as contradictions among people, and nobody can exercise dictatorship over others. Such an analysis will negate not only the continuation of the proletarian dictatorship but also "class dictatorship" by any name.

Although the so-called exploiting classes as such have been eliminated, the elements of the exploiting classes will continue to exist as individuals for a fairly long time to come, and that is why class dictatorship is still necessary. This line of argument cannot stand refutation. No matter whether the so-called elements of the exploiting classes refer to those who have previously, but not now, exploited others or those new exploiters emerging under the new economic policies, their number should be very small (and, indeed, those of the former type have mostly died off.) Therefore, it is entirely possible for the state to deal with them according to common law without actually exercising a class dictatorship. Furthermore, according to Marxism, "class dictatorship" should be a means for one class (the ruling class) to control another. It means one class dealing with another class, but not with individuals.

At the same time, according to Marxist theories, the state, as a political instrument, will exist until the elimination of antagonist classes, and as soon as the antagonistic classes disappear, the "state" itself will also disappear. Since there are now no exploiting classes as opponents in China, class antagonism has practically disappeared. What deserves to be reiterated is that the various types of the "people's public enemy" appearing as individuals do not constitute a class. In fact, Marxists have never denied that even in the age of communism, there will still be a small number of "troublemakers." However, since it will not be necessary to exercise a class dictatorship over them or even to preserve the "state" as a political instrument in dealing with them, does it mean that China can enter, or has already entered, the age of communism?

To prove the correctness of the theory of continued proletarian dictatorship on the grounds that although exploiting classes as such have been eliminated,

class struggle has to continue for some time to come, the reformist theorists have often pointed to the existence of class enemies abroad and of certain influences from the ideology of the exploiting classes in the society at home. Unfortunately, they seem to have forgotten two factors in advancing this line of reasoning. First, as long as aggression is not committed, the political power of any country cannot extend beyond its national boundaries, and China can neither deal with foreign "class enemies" nor use the preservation of a class dictatorship as a pretext to prevent Chinese people from being corroded by the foreign enemy's ideology. As long as antagonistic classes do not exist, there should be no class dictatorship in the country.

Second, it is obviously inconsistent with Marxist principles to regard an ideological struggle -- waged to eradicate the ideological influence of the exploiting classes -- as class struggle. Class ideology cannot be equated to a class. It is quite common that the ideology of the exploiting classes exists among the exploited classes. Can a Marxist actually regard the elimination of the ideology of the exploiting classes among the exploited classes as class struggle?

Obviously, the reformists may not gain the upper hand in such theoretical controversies mainly because while approving something that is contrary to Marxism-Leninism, they are also compelled to disguise themselves with Marxist-Leninist theories. As a result, the more they explain, the more confused are the people. There are many similar instances as shown in the controversies over the political essence of concrete policies, over the concrete methods of setting right the relationship between the party and the government in order to accomplish "political democracy," over the relationships between politics and economy and between consciousness and matter, over the role of individual leaders and over the pros and cons of cadre policies. In almost all these controversies, the reformists have always found it difficult to defend their own theories and, as a result, have failed to convince the people. This is certainly unfavorable to their reform program.

II. Improving the Relationship Between the Party and the Government To Achieve Political Democracy

In the past several years, the reformists have all along advocated collective leadership and separation between the party and the government. Collective leadership, in some people's opinion, is inevitable after the demise of a big dictator in a dictatorial regime. Under normal circumstances, a dictator, while still alive, would not willingly groom his own successor (except perhaps his immediate relative.) He would not establish the prestige of the successor in advance for a smooth takeover upon his death. Thus as soon as the dictator is gone, the regime will be without a leader, and before the final outcome of a power struggle, collective leadership for the division of power would be the usual phenomenon. The duration of this phenomenon mainly depends on how balanced can be the potential of the contestants in the power struggle. The more unbalanced the potential, the

shorter will be the life of the collective leadership. At present, there is still no sign that the balance at the top level in the CPC will end. Therefore, the collective leadership will continue.

However, if analyzed from the theoretical standpoint, the so-called collective leadership in purely administrative work is obviously inconsistent with the many complex and interrelated administrative jobs in a modern society. The society is now continuing its democratic trend, but methods embodying democracy do not come from a multi-leader administrative system. In fact, collective leadership does not mean democracy in a broad sense. The so-called collective leadership means only a division of work among several people, while genuine democracy means the "people's participation in state administration." Can it be reasonably claimed that the concentration of power on one Mao Zedong means dictatorship and that the division of power among 10 Mao Zedongs (of course, not all of them are named Mao Zedong) means democracy? People desiring to participate in state administration usually try to gain decision-making power and supervisory power. In actual administration, they generally agree to let the administrators possess due authority, since this is a matter of administrative efficiency. If we want to restrict dictatorial power and to reduce the chance of error by advocating collective leadership instead of any fundamental and realistic democratic reform, we could only produce multilateral restrictions with adverse effects on efficiency and gain no real benefit. The passion for possession and power is a human instinct. This was true in the past, is true now and will continue to be true at least in the foreseeable future. The division of power among many leaders without external supervision can only create even more acute power struggles.

On the issue of separation between the party and the government, some people are actually inclined to the view that rather than any political reform in the interests of the party and the state, this division should be considered as a means used by Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues to weaken the power holders, large and small, in various localities and units.

Everyone knows that if the separation between the party and the government is smoothly carried out at all levels, the result could only be as follows: either the party's leadership over administration will be weakened or nullified, or the secretaries and even members of party committees at all levels will become mere figureheads. Real power will be in the hands of those having the title of administrative officers but not of those having the title of secretaries. In this event, the party's leadership over state administration will be exercised not through those with the titles of secretaries but those administrative officers who are party members and are directly appointed at the higher leadership levels. In the latter case, the chairman of state must be a loyal party member instead of someone chosen by the people in a democratic election. Under such circumstances, the chairman of the Party Central Committee will become a figurehead if he possesses no real power in the appointment or election of the chairman of state. The reason is quite simple. If the party is separated from the government (in a genuine and thoroughgoing way from the central down to the basic levels), the administrative officers at each level will theoretically be responsible to

the administrative officers at the next higher level or to their own electors (if they have been elected by the people.) Then the party committee secretary at the same level or the next higher level will be powerless over them. Under such conditions, if the state really practices democratic election, the party can hardly find any way to ensure its leading position in the state apparatus aside from befriending the electors in the hope that more party members could be elected.

From this, we can see that the separation between party and government and the strengthening of party leadership are in a certain sense mutually contradictory. Despite the great efforts of the reformists to conceal this contradiction in theory, their argument can hardly be convincing.

The reformists may, for example, insist that party leadership over state affairs is mainly manifested in the assurance that all party principles and policies are properly implemented and that ideological education is properly carried out among the party members and the broad masses of people, and not in the party's involvement in routine administrative affairs. From this argument, they draw the conclusion that the separation between party and government will not interfere with the party's leadership over the state. Unfortunately, while offering this explanation, they totally forget, or deliberately evade, some most essential questions, such as to what extent will the position of the party committee secretaries be reduced after the separation between party and government? As soon as the party is separated from the government, on what can the party committee secretaries rely to ensure the necessary implementation of party principles and policies? For example, if the party committee secretary at a certain level discovers that the administrative officer at the same level, or the next lower level, fails to act in accordance with the spirit of party policies, should he or can he have the power of direct intervention? If he actually has such power, who can prevent him from abusing this power and violating the principle behind the separation? If the secretary does not have this power, what can he do? Should he report to the administrative officer at a higher level and request action? If the administrative officers at both levels feel the same way, what can the secretary do? If he reports the matter to the party committee at the next higher level, this party committee would likewise be powerless to intervene in administration.

As to ideological work among the party members and the broad masses of people, one of the most essential problems is that once the party loses its real power of control over administration, it has also forfeited its qualification to act in the capacity of tutors.

In fact, the most serious mistake made by Communist Party members is that they regard themselves forever as other people's tutors, as the personification of truth and as the sole representative of the people's interests. In their opinion, the people not believing in the correctiveness of their faith or behavior today will certainly believe it tomorrow, the day after tomorrow or eventually. Furthermore, if the people's way of thinking or action is different from theirs, it is always the people, not the Communists

themselves, who should be educated and remolded. It is precisely on such a ground that Communist Party members establish themselves as the proletarian vanguard and the saviors of mankind and find a theoretical basis for their claim to permanent leadership over others. Unfortunately, this Communist style has been subjected to the inexorable test of age.

III. The Unfinished Power Struggle

Of the present 39 million members of the CPC, the overwhelming majority joined the party during or after the Cultural Revolution. They are rather radical in political ideology and can never be reconciled with the reformists. On the other hand, a large number of people were admitted into the party on a "crash basis" in recent years, and many of these people are intellectuals with more conservative or basically anticommunist ideas. This is the method used by the new powerholders to equalize the left and right wings in the party. The so-called party rectification is in fact another step to eliminate the leftist forces so that the rightist forces can gradually gain preponderance in the party.

However, while all-out efforts are being made in party rectification, the development in various regions and units cannot deviate from either one of these two patterns: first, perfunctory action taken amid a hue and cry but yielding no tangible result; and, second, the purge of alien elements and the appointment of trusted persons in the name of party rectification by local ruffians in certain localities. The rectification has thus become a public scandal and the ultimate result be on an out-and-out power struggle. Instead of doing the party any good, this rectification will increase the element of unrest and bring even more serious destruction.

In fact, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues should be able to understand that the CPC no longer has a unified will. With actual deeds and concrete principles and policies, the new power holders, as the mainstays of the party rectification movement, have already negated the political theories with which the party members used to strengthen their solidarity. Under such conditions, the party's solidarity has lost the theoretical foundation commonly accepted. Aside from the leaders' personal prestige and the party members' craving for power, nothing else can serve as a bond for their solidarity. Party rectification under such conditions can hardly accomplish anything aside from intensifying the intraparty power struggle.

Judging from China's present conditions, we can see at least four major factors in the continued intensification of the power struggle:

First, the dictatorial nature of the political system. Under this system, power has a particularly strong lure for people, and the people joining the power struggle are particularly numerous. Since the system itself does not permit them to attain their goals through "peaceful competition," a resort to violence is the only alternative. This method has greatly increased the element of brutality in the power struggle. The defeated party has to make every preparation for a comeback, while the victorious party has to

consolidate his gains, lest he may be toppled and pulverized. Therefore, he must continue to apply pressure against his opponent even to the point of extermination. This determines the protracted nature of the power struggle.

Furthermore, because of the particularly strong lure of power and the brutality used in the power struggle under the dictatorial system, those who have been drawn into the whirlpool of struggle must protect their positions by recruiting people from both the upper and lower levels and form alliances with those around them. As a result, the number of cliques and factions increased, while uncalled for or unexpected clashes can take place at any time and in any place. Whatever may have been their original intention, people will finally be pushed into the quagmire of the power struggle.

Second, the existence of what Dr Sun Yat-sen called "people of foresight" in any society and any age. These people would try to find some way to give play to their own abilities and wisdom. If they live in an enlightened society, they may not always look for their opportunities on the political stage, because they can become capitalists, musicians, artists or even movie stars. The attraction of these professions would be greater than that of a political career. As long as these born leaders do not flock to the political stage, the power struggle will be less severe.

However, such is not the situation in China now. In Chinese society, a person without political power may be entirely helpless. If he wants to be an author or an artist, the politicians will first set up all sorts of rules and conventions to tie his hands. If he fails to meet the required standards, he can never hope to see his work published and may even lose his life. If he wants to become a factory manager or a business magnate, he may be arrested, repudiated or attacked before his ideas could be put to good use. It is true that there is a tendency of the new policies of the reformists to reverse this situation, but it is doubtful whether the implementation of these policies can continue smoothly. (This point will be dealt with at greater length when the economic issue is discussed later.) In any case, the reform is still far short of its goal of materially reversing the situation. Under such circumstances, all talented people in the society have nowhere else to go except the political stage. This naturally leads to more conflicts and struggles.

Third, the Chinese people's innate fraternal feelings. Chinese people always say: "Scholars are not afraid of dying for their good friends" and this kind of traditional "loyalty" is precisely what careerists of all types want. At any time and in any place, they would show you some warm "friendship" for which you will unavoidably feel indebted to them and follow them. Thus a visible or invisible faction is formed, and, wittingly or unwittingly, you will become a tool of others in the power struggle. Chinese society will witness more overt or covert tragedies.

Fourth, the political realities in Chinese society which have tragically created many large and small political groups. Regardless of their motives,

such as the defense of their political convictions (which is the most legitimate one,) the greed for individual power or the struggle for survival under the shadow of the opponent's sword, all members of these groups will be drawn into the whirlpool of political power struggle.

Among these groups or factions, leaving out the minor ones, people cannot possibly forget the military men of Lin Biao's faction; the Cultural Revolution warriors of Jiang Qing's clique; the "whatever" faction which professed loyalty to Mao Zedong's line without allegiance to Jiang Qing; the military and political figures with traits of localism, old fraternal ties and no clearcut political stands, now around Ye Jianying [5509 0494 5381]; and those marshals like Xu Shiyu [6079 0013 0645] and Wei Guoqing [7297 0948 3237] who have lost their power and influence and are now only "serving the interests of others." All these major groups are factions which everyone knows constitute a very serious threat to the reformists now in power, and trouble may occur at any time. Furthermore, among the reformists themselves, the division of power and disputes over the scope and tempo of the reform have also created many contradictions resulting in many open or secret factions.

The situation may be best described in the CPC's own words: "At present, factionism is not shown openly as it was before. There are now 'mountain strongholds in the open and submerged shoals in the dark.' There are also factions consisting of the remnants of the 'gang of four' as well as people who have grouped together out of personal favors or grudges. These factions normally cannot be seen, but they will appear whenever there is any sign of trouble."

"Do not believe that since the 'gang of four' has been overthrown for many years, all problems should have been automatically solved and that it is now time to talk about stability and unity and to look forward." In fact, "even now, there is serious impurity in organization and ideology" in many units and departments.

Although the Party Central Committee has repeatedly stressed the need to purify the leading bodies at all levels, many units have not only failed to remove the three types of persons (namely, those who rose to eminence by following Lin Biao and the "gang of four," those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas and those who resist the reformist line) from their leading posts but are also retaining them for even heavier responsibilities. "The reason is that in these units, these 'three types of persons' are still holding real power and are extremely unhappy with the Central Committee's decision to remove the 'three types of persons' from office. In order that they may continue to hold their leading positions, they have formed cliques and factions and have installed their cohorts around them."

"These people still retain their rebellious temper. They neither follow the organizational line of the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee nor comply with the directives of the State Council. Swaggering and throwing their weight around, they are ordering people about and

performing various misdeeds in the way they did before." Some people have written articles of exposure. "As soon as these articles were published in the newspapers, the writers would receive threatening phone calls. From this, we can see that some of the 'comrades of the good old days' are still around and not reconciled to defeat. Although hiding in the dark, they are still very arrogant. How could such things have happened? Simply because they have back-stage supporters and therefore need not fear anything."

IV. Political Pressure from People at Home and Abroad

Because of the dramatic change of policies and the serious weakening of its controlling power, the CPC and its political power are now laboring under serious tribulation and are being subjected to a severe political test. The internal troubles have already been discussed. (These troubles should have included the serious factionalism among the military men in various regions and their disunity with the leadership which has almost reached the point of rebellion. I do not intend to deal with the details of this problem here and have simply treated them as part of the power struggle and factional feud.) It is also under pressure from domestic and foreign sources. Judging from the development of the overall situation, it is difficult to see how Communist China could reverse the present trend.

To reverse this trend, the first requirement is to remove the sources of pressure. From what has been analyzed, people can easily understand why Communist China cannot even hope to end its internal troubles. Furthermore, "since the party has committed errors, particularly the prolonged errors affecting the overall situation during the Cultural Revolution, the people have no more faith in the party's ability to lead the people in building a strong and prosperous state." Under such conditions, on what ground can we believe that the CPC can easily eliminate the various types of pressure coming from both domestic and foreign sources at the same time?

Which type of pressure now faced by Communist China is more serious after all? Let us take a look.

First, we will discuss the pressure created on Communist China by the upsurge of democratic and liberal ideas among the people.

We may say that the political pressure in Mainland China now is mainly attributed to the unprecedented upsurge of democratic and liberal ideas among the people, especially the younger generation. This upsurge may be explained as the result of the quest for freedom -- which is a human instinct -- and the effects of politics on people's economic and cultural lives in a modern society. The stronger these effects, the more eager will the people be for participation in political affairs, and this trend will continue along with the formation of a more widespread democratic ideology. According to an analysis of the realities inside China, the cause of the upsurge may be briefly described as follows:

(1) This is a type of reaction to the prolonged despotic rule which has prevailed since the founding of Communist China.

(2) The weakening of the ruling clique's controlling power has revitalized democratic and liberal ideas.

(3) The "extensive democracy" and "extreme freedom" experienced during the Cultural Revolution have their aftereffects on the society.

(4) As a result of the open-door policy, democratic and liberal ideas from abroad have a more direct and sweeping impact on China.

(5) Before seizing power from the "whatever" clique, Deng Xiaoping took the lead in advocating "democracy" in order to win over the people and to deal with the clique at the same time. This "democracy" has provocative effects on people's minds.

Now let us see which type of democracy and freedom are the people in China hoping for and what means will they use to obtain them.

First, let us read a passage from a speech by Bai Hua [4101 2901], the novelist. In his speech entitled "Without a Breakthrough, There Will Be No Literature," he said: "Recently, some people have seriously criticized the conditions of literacy creation in the 3 years following the smashing of the 'gang of four.' They often asked: 'What do you want?' This question requires an unequivocal answer. What do we want? We want to restore the pragmatic tradition in the sphere of literature and art in China! We also want to recover the most elemental function of literature and art in reflecting social life.... The missions of authors and artists have been given them by history, and anyone violating the law of historic progress by applying pressure on literature and art in serving his own political interests will ultimately fail. We must not overlook the phenomena rarely seen in history. We must study how they have occurred and developed as well as the instances of astounding success and tragic and ignominious failure."

In literature and art, people like Bai Hua have committed the error of having a "bourgeois liberalization tendency." Politically, they are charged as deviating from the principles of party spirit and the party's policies and stand. "They regarded the four principles as symbols of forbidden zones and declared their intention to break through these zones. The appropriate requirement that 'social effects' must be noted in literature and art was considered as restrictions on creative work. According to them, the party should not control literature and art, lest there will be no future in this field. They also propagated the theories of bourgeois humanity and human rights and advocated the so-called human value, human dignity and human liberty, while socialism was described as a system designed to suppress human nature."

There are also "people infatuated with anarchism. They give no thought at all to the destiny of the state and the people.... They were, and still are, rebels. After all, they only rebel against the party leadership."

"A small number of people are seeking after ultra-democracy and using the bourgeois standpoint, viewpoint and methods to handle elections. Some of them have even used a bourgeois democratic platform as an electioneering stunt; others have indulged in anarchism by boycotting and opposing the orderly

and well-led democratic elections which they branded as undemocratic. Still others have formed factions and cliques during the elections."

Some people want to have the multi-party system, parliamentary system and electoral system of the bourgeoisie "mechanically transplanted to socialist China." Others regard China's present socialism as feudal socialism and declare that there should be another "democratic revolution." "What is the purpose of another democratic revolution after all...? To overthrow the Communist Party?"

From these remarks, we can clearly see that the democratic movement in the country now, with regard to its goals as well as actions, has already developed to a certain extent and intensity. It has (as viewed by Communist China, at least) gone far beyond the limits of a reform movement and has assumed the dimensions of revolutionary action. This is certainly intolerable to the ruling authorities. They have responded to it with strong measures as shown by the arrests of some (such as Wei Jingsheng [7614 0079 3932] and Fu Yuehua [0265 2588 5478]) and the execution of others (mostly those who have carried out both revolutionary and criminal activities including some who have apparently committed social crimes under the camouflage of democratic revolution.) The authorities have also solved some social problems in a way advantageous to the democratic reformists (such as the redressing some longstanding unjust, wrong and false cases.) The state's economic improvement under the new policies means a certain setback for the democratic movement. However, it still cannot be defeated or destroyed, and its pressure on Communist China remains unabated.

Another hidden danger, not so threatening as a democratic revolution right now, is that some people with a strong resentment against the Chinese Communist regime have learned from personal experiences that unless the existing regime is overthrown by revolutionary means, nothing can be gained. Taking advantage of the flexible policies, the social unrest and the weakening of the ruling authorities' controlling power, they are now engaging in liaison and organizational work everywhere. These people consist of the sons and brothers of high-ranking cadres who have lost their power and influence and the offspring of the so-called "five-category elements" (namely, landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements and rightists.) People of the former type have a better knowledge of the internal structure of the Communist regime and its political weaknesses, and their call for action is more effective because of their family connections. Therefore, they are also in the leading positions in various types of movement. People of the latter type are more numerous. They hate Communist China more bitterly and have a stronger will. They are widely spread out at the basic levels in society and constitute a serious potential threat to Communist China.

Through the past 30 years and more, China has never stopped talking about class struggle at home even for a single day. The persistence and brutality of such struggle have been the cause of humanly intolerable hardship for the family members and relatives of the "five-category elements" (and, needless to say, these elements themselves.) Thus, subconsciously or unconsciously, they find it difficult to coexist with such a regime, even though the new

power holders have proclaimed that there will be no more large-scale class struggle and have even removed 90 percent (and 99 percent in some areas) of the "five-category element" labels in the past several years along with the announcement that these people and their family members will not be politically persecuted in future.

However, the feeling of being discriminated against, the inferior complex and personal rancor, accumulated and deepened over several decades, cannot be wiped out with only an announcement. In fact, the new policies can produce only two aftereffects: In some places where the power holders' controlling power is strong and the social order is fairly stable, the environments of "class enemies" and their dependents cannot be much improved. In other places where the political control is weak, it is true that the "class enemies" have been completely liberated. Most of these "liberated persons" have lingering fears and doubts which they have managed to conceal for the time being. However, we are sure that some strong, active or "farsighted" ones among them will take this opportunity to do various types of liaison and organizational work. In the beginning, of course, these activities will be sporadic isolated and without distinct goals. (Some of these activities may be purely for the purpose of revenge against certain individuals.) However, when these people become more experienced and have wider contacts, their ideological level and skill for action will be gradually raised. As long as these activities continue, there will certainly be capable leaders emerging out of somewhere to combine these sporadic and isolated organizations to form larger groups which will be better organized and have more distinct and loftier goals. In fact, society in China now is providing favorable conditions for the existence and activities of these groups. The weakening of political control makes it easier for them to preserve their vitality by spreading over wider areas, while the present economic policies enable them not only to raise operating funds but also to undertake illegal political activities behind the shield of legitimate economic activities. Furthermore, social unrest will give them the opportunity to win over the broad masses and to create incidents.

Some of these people have already mingled with the high-ranking cadres' sons and brothers engaged in revolutionary activities or with those overseas anti-Communist revolutionaries (mostly the "class enemies'" sons and brothers or those pathbreakers of the Cultural Revolution who have escaped to foreign lands.) They will gain strong spiritual, economical and even organizational support.

The "revolutionary" sons and brothers of high-ranking cadres will always be in leading positions, at least in the initial stage of the "revolution." To win over the masses and to swell their ranks, they will form alliances with the "revolutionary groups" and the democratic reform groups. If we look at the situation more closely, we will see that the threat to Communist China is more serious from these sons and brothers of high-ranking cadres and the offspring of class enemies than from the pure democratic reformists.

Communist China seems to have tasted the bitter fruit of class struggle. Now, it is in a dilemma: If it relaxes its control, these people will make trouble and wreck vengeance; if it tightens its control (which, however, is almost

impossible under the present conditions), it will stir up more incidents which will be more serious and more sudden.

A third cause of political pressure on Communist China is that in recent years, Communist China has sent a large number of government-financed or self-supported students and scholars for study or advanced studies in various foreign countries, mostly capitalist countries, and the vast majority of students have gone to the United States. We can be sure that none of them can be immune from the political, economic and cultural influences of their host countries and that some of them may have even been brought over by foreign governments or the Kuomintang and are serving as their informants or special agents (though their number may be small.)

Furthermore, their background is quite special: Some of them are the sons and brothers, relatives or friends of high-ranking cadres; others are top-notch intellectuals. Although most of them have left their country for experience and intellectual pursuit, it cannot be denied that some of them have come out for investigations and liaisons with political goals in mind. Upon their return to China (of course, it will have wide political repercussions at home if they become turncoats abroad), they will certainly give rise to the following problems:

First, they will bring back to China whatever influences they have received, and these influences will continue to be felt by them in work and daily life as well as by others around them. Ideologically, the majority of these people are half-inclined or sympathetic to democratic reform and may become the supporters or the leaders of reform movements. Second, these people who originally bore a special social stamp will feel more superior after their advanced studies abroad. Whatever they say or do consciously or unconsciously may be offensive to others. Above all, there will be some difference in the way of thinking, and this difference may easily lead to conflicts or even antagonism among colleagues and friends resulting in mutual exclusion. Eventually, those who have been overseas will be the losers, since they are in the minority and less powerful.

These conflicts, resembling a power struggle, will increase political instability and at the same time force the returned students to create an ideology that is antagonistic to the regime. When the situation develops to such an extent, the strength of these returned students will soon be revealed. Under such circumstances, they will form unions across unit and departmental boundaries (since they will most probably be in the minority in their own units.) Their total number by that time may be only 10,000-20,000; however, since they will be concentrated in the large cities, they can make quite a show of strength.

Aside from the students sent abroad by Communist China, the young students of Hong Kong and Macao may also exert pressure on Communist China in a certain way. Hong Kong and Macao are geographically close to Mainland China. Now that China has opened its door, many energetic youths, tired of being cooped up in a small island, have visited their motherland. Their ideas and actions will certainly produce great influence among youth in China. (Because

of the striking difference in their material lives, most Chinese youths may tend to worship foreign things.) Furthermore, in visiting China, the youths of Hong Kong and Macao may be motivated first by their patriotism and second by their worry over their future after 1997. Like those deploring the failure to turn iron into steel, most of them are anxiously hoping for early improvement in the political situation and may, wittingly or unwittingly, become supporters of political reform. Many of them have even joined the ranks of the democratic reformists in China.

The fourth cause of political pressure is the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

The so-called aftermath of the Cultural Revolution includes the following three aspects:

1. Many factions and cliques formed during the Cultural Revolution have not yet been disbanded or completely disbanded. As soon as there is any change in the political climate, these factions and cliques will be itching for action.
2. A large number of rebel leaders were trained during the Cultural Revolution. These people have tasted the sweetness of rebellion and mastered the required techniques. Now they are certainly unhappy with their suppression by the new power holders, and their desire to see another "Cultural Revolution" at the opportune moment is not hard to understand.
3. Many weapons were left in the hands of civilians during the Cultural Revolution. Although the authorities have made every effort to deal with these privately hidden weapons and issued special directive to that effect, many weapons in civilian hands have not yet been turned over to the authorities. As soon as there is any change in the situation, these weapons will obviously be the source of a serious threat.

Finally (and this is the fifth to be discussed here,) a cause of political pressure on Communist China is the activities of special agents belonging to Kuomintang and certain foreign countries. In fact, Communist China has never denied the existence of special agents despite its high vigilance. Now that the controlling power of the authorities has been greatly weakened, the political, economic and social lives in various places are in disorder and the national door is wide open to permit the entry and exit of any person, these special agents can directly work on the cadres, corrupt them or buy them over by offering material benefits. Sometimes, these cadres may not be aware that they have already been used by the enemy. Certainly, there are many who are willing to be used or are aware of being used. At the same time, the special agents may also look for suitable personages to work on. Their activities may be for no other purpose than to collect information, to organize various anti-Communist cliques, to carry out anti-Communist propaganda and to engage in subversive activities in various ways. All these activities will certainly have considerable effects on a political situation which is already very unstable.

CURRENT CPC RECTIFICATION DISCUSSED

Hong Kong CHENG MING [CONTENDING] in Chinese No 80, Jun 84 pp 62-64

[Article by Lu Jiren [7627 4949 0086]: "Current Party Rectification Viewed in Context of Past Rectifications"]

[Text] One of Deng Xiaoping's Major Political Achievements

Some people have called the current party rectification movement in Communist China "Deng Xiaoping's last battle." There is nothing wrong with this statement, although it should be added that this rectification is also "Deng Xiaoping's most glorious battle." The so-called glory here has two implications: first, it implies positional glory and, second, political glory. Positional glory refers to Deng Xiaoping's supreme position, since throughout CPC's history, only two leaders have been able to launch party rectification movements in accordance with their personal will. The first was Mao Zedong and the second, Deng Xiaoping. Such positional glory can be shared only by those two men. "Political glory" refers to the profound and great glory for Deng Xiaoping who, with the courage and stamina of an enlightened politician, has unequivocally declared war on and broken away politically, ideologically and organizationally from the ultraleftist line pushed by Mao and the CPC over a long period and then shifted the CPC's political line on to a firm, stable and permanently healthy road. If this rectification is successful, history will prove it to be a great event in Deng Xiaoping's political life.

However, the present is different from the past. This time, Deng Xiaoping's party rectification is far more difficult than Mao's in the past, and there is even the danger that it may come to a halt half way. The causes are many and complex, but one of the important ones is that the political legacy from Mao in party rectifications of the past has become a tremendous obstacle to Deng Xiaoping's undertaking. The specter of a dead man has set up a "spooky maze" in which a "living person" may lose his bearing. This is an important feature of a real Chinese society and the CPC. Therefore, it is quite necessary to study Deng Xiaoping's party rectification at present in conjunction with Mao's in the past.

Basic Conditions in Past Party Rectifications

Since the CPC's party principles were directly inherited from the CPSU and are therefore different from those of the political parties with loose ideological and political bonds in the European and American democratic countries, its article of faith and elaborate setup have a strong dictatorial overtone. This accounts for the extensive and frequent intraparty struggles. Broadly speaking, there are struggles arising out of differences on ideological and policy issues, struggles over political leadership, struggles between different organizational systems, factional disputes over personnel matters, personal feuds from human selfishness and so forth. Such internal struggles have constantly occurred in the CPC, although, normally, they would not take such an important form as party rectification. Such rectification can take place only under given conditions: first, the impending arrival of some critical historic moment, and, second, the reshuffle of leadership at the top level and a drastic change in ideology and policies, leaving not enough time for the organizations at the lower levels to make corresponding adjustments or changes. If the prevailing atmosphere created by the daily intraparty struggles is also taken into account, then party rectification will be inevitable.

The CPC under Mao, strictly speaking, underwent two rectifications. The first was the "Yanan rectification movement" in the early 1940's, and the second was the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" which lasted from the 1960's to the 1970's. There were several significant internal struggles at the top level in the CPC before the Zunyi Conference in 1935. However, because of the extremely adverse environments of fighting and the frequent disruptions of the CPC's organizational structure as well as the direct and effective control over the CPC by the Communist International headed by Moscow, the CPC was unable to solve its problems through party rectification. Mao rose to an eminent position after the Zunyi Conference, but his power was only limited to military affairs. The party power was mostly in the hands of the Wang Ming [2769 2494] clique, and even Mao's military power was seriously challenged by Zhang Guotao [1728 0949 3714] and some others. Above all, the CPC was on the Long March, and the first concern of the Mao and the party was to break through the encirclement. Therefore, Mao had no time to attend to intraparty struggles and could not act as he pleased.

In the Yanan period, Zhang Guotao, Mao's archrival for military power, had already gone over to the Kuomintang's side, leaving Mao as the undisputed holder of military power. His position was stronger than ever. Conditions were then favorable for him to win party power and later to launch the first party rectification in accordance with his personal will. This was how the "Yanan rectification movement" occurred.

From the founding of Communist China to the "Cultural Revolution," two major power struggles occurred at the top level in the CPC. The first was the so-called "smashing of the Gao-Rao antiparty clique," and the second, the so-called "smashing of Peng Dehuai's antiparty clique." Why were these struggles not closely followed by party rectification movements? The reason

is that the so-called "Gao-Rao antiparty clique" only represented certain local forces which challenged the central authorities. Mao was then at the zenith of his power and enjoyed the strong support of many senior party members. There was no marked difference over the political line or ideological and policy issues; therefore, party rectification was unnecessary. The case of "Peng Dehuai's antiparty clique," however, involved a serious struggle over the political line as well as ideological and policy issues. Peng Dehuai was then holding an important post at the top level and many people in the party were sympathetic to his views. Since Mao's ultraleftist line had practically torn the state apart and aroused widespread discontent, the party was beset with difficulties at home and abroad. Therefore, Mao had to take great risks in a political gamble to oust Peng Dehuai. Since then, Mao's vitality had been sapped, and he had to retire to the second-line action. For a while, he dared not act as he pleased and had to join Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others in tackling the chaotic national economy. Much against his own will, he had to witness the correction of his erroneous line by others. Under such circumstances, Mao did not launch any party rectification not because he did not want to but because he simply was powerless to do it.

From this, we can see that party rectification is by no means a simple matter. In the era of Mao, it must proceed in accordance with the aspiration of Mao and his faction for power and depend on the result of the implementation of his line. At the same time, it would be subjected to the strong restraining forces of other factions in the party and the overall situation.

Now, let us concretely analyze Mao's two party rectification movements.

Mao's first Party Rectification -- the Yanan Rectification

The Yanan rectification was Mao's first party rectification and the first of its kind in CPC history. Its purpose was twofold: first, to confirm Mao's leading position in the party and the army along with the elimination of the organizational power of Wang Ming's clique, and, second, to establish the supremacy of Mao's political and ideological lines.

At first, the CPC was entirely controlled by Moscow's "Third International" and functioned as one of its branches. Despite the several changes in the CPC leadership during this period (such as the replacement of Chen Duxiu [7115 3747 4423] by Qu Qiubai [4234 4428 4101] and then by Li Lisan [2621 4539 0005], Wang Ming and others in that order), all the leaders had to take orders directly from the Third International, while Wang Ming, Bo Gu [0590 0657] and several others were intricately linked to it. The directions given by the Third International were based mostly on the global strategy and self-interest of the CPSU which had little knowledge of the realities of the Chinese revolution. This was the cause of the repeated setbacks to the CPC's revolution.

Mao's faction in the CPC rose to power against a different background. His revolution had all the typical Chinese characteristics and his faction had

no tie whatsoever with the Third International. His revolutionary strategem was the same as those used in peasants' uprisings in Chinese history and his military art was learned from Sun Zi. Facts have proved the effectiveness of the revolutionary strategem and military art rooted in Chinese soil. That was why when Wang Ming's Third International faction was leading the CPC to the brink of disaster, Mao was able to save the CPC with his effective revolutionary strategem and military art. This was how he won his prestige and took over Wang Ming's power.

However, the issue became more complicated when there was a power struggle and prolonged differences over the political and ideological lines throughout the party. Mao was well aware that although his revolutionary strategem and military art could bring brilliant victories when Jingjiangshan in Jiangxi was used as the revolutionary base, he would still be defeated in the power struggle and that his political and ideological lines would not be accepted by the whole party. To change this situation, therefore, it was necessary to purge the party and to conduct intensive propaganda and educational activities. In other words, he must carry out party rectification, and history would provide the opportunity and required conditions at the precise moment.

At that time, the CPC set up its new base at Yanan and enjoyed a relatively stable environment. The War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression led to the second period of cooperation between Kuomintang and the CPC, and the military pressure on the CPC was greatly reduced. The whole world situation also underwent a profound change, and the Third International's control over the communist parties in various countries had virtually ended. Wang Ming's faction in the CPC thus lost its strongest political support, and Mao was able to act boldly.

Mao used two trump cards: first, the rectification of ideological style, and, second, the rectification of organizational style.

In the rectification of ideological style, Mao strongly repudiated such tendencies as subjectivism, book worship, divorce of theory from practice, indiscriminate "quoting from Greek classics" and stereotyped party writing. This repudiation was directly aimed at the political and ideological lines of leftist putschism pushed by the Wang Ming clique. In the course of this repudiation, Mao also conducted an extensive propaganda and education program throughout the party for the whole set of his strategic principles, military art and political analysis of the Chinese society and imposed on the party what he considered to be the only correct and complete orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological line. By this means, the foundation was laid and the obstacles removed for the dominant position of "Mao Zedong Thought" to be set up in the subsequent "Seventh Congress." This move had extremely profound historical repercussions. Facts have shown that it established the supremacy of Mao Zedong Thought in such a way that the CPC had to pay a tremendous price for its subsequent development.

In the rectification of organizational style, Mao strongly repudiated the so-called sectionalism and mountain stronghold mentality and launched a grim political inquest, in which a huge number of cadres who belonged to the Wang Ming clique and had differences with Mao were purged. This purge quickly expanded. The writer [of this article] once had a talk with a cadre of the older generation and asked about his fear and suffering during the "Cultural Revolution." He said: "I had already witnessed the Yanan rectification, so the suffering in the Cultural Revolution did not amount to much." From this, we can see how ruthless and wanton the Yanan rectification was.

It was through such a wanton organizational rectification that Mao succeeded in eliminating his opponents in the party. His personal power then rose to an unprecedented height.

Mao's Second Party Rectification -- the Cultural Revolution

Mao launched the second party rectification in CPC history during the unprecedented "Cultural Revolution." Compared with the first one, this rectification was carried out against a different background and in a different form. In the background, the CPC had already become the party in power, while Mao was gradually losing his power and degenerating from a revolutionary leader to a feudal monarch. The form of rectification was also different. Turning his back on the vast majority of political bureau members and resorting to intrigues, he relied on an unruly mass movement, whipped "from below upward," to smash the entire party apparatus and then reorganized it in accordance with his own will. The illegality of this rectification has been fully revealed.

Despite the vast difference in background and form, these two rectifications had one common objective -- the unique eminence of Mao and his political and ideological line to be won with an iron fist.

The CPC won its nationwide political power in 1949 and set up a gigantic and elaborate bureaucratic structure in the form of centralized power. This structure gradually became the ruling power over all sections of the society. Thus the party meant an integral state apparatus, and the so-called "party leadership" meant the function of the state apparatus. The party then played an all-inclusive role, and all political, economic, scientific and technological, cultural, educational, military and foreign affairs were controlled by the party. In the course of exercising this "overall leadership," many power groups of different backgrounds and specialities would naturally emerge, resulting in the redistribution of power and changes in personal relationships. It was under such conditions that Mao's power was gradually weakened. In fact, Mao was only proficient in the political and military fields but totally incompetent in the economy, science and technology, culture, education and diplomacy. His arrogance, voluntarism, fantasies in agrarian socialism and fanaticism in human-wave warfare were fully exposed in the "Great Leap Forward" which was both unscientific and against economic laws. Mao's ineptitude for national construction was

exposed, and he began to lose his popularity. In 1959-1965, his decline was a foregone conclusion.

However, Mao was blinded by his own mental state as a feudal monarch, his fanatical craze for power and his leftist ideological line and could not remain inactive. To help regain his lost power, what he needed was intrigue, political trickery and an opportunity.

A historic opportunity finally arrived. The chaotic national economy took a complete turn for the better in 1965 after several years of readjustment and recovery, and the pressure on Mao was much reduced. Politically, his idea of class struggle was played up by the propaganda of his so-called repudiation of Soviet "revisionism" and the campaign to learn from Lei Feng [7191 0023], and blind loyalty to Mao, bordering on religious fanaticism, was prevalent throughout the country. These were precisely the favorable historic conditions and opportunity for Mao to purge his political opponents. However, he had to face strong opponents who could not be compared to Wang Ming and the others of the past. Therefore, in an effort to regain his lost power and to push his line, Mao had to resort to intrigues in the name of a "mass movement" for the so-called "prevention of capitalist restoration" instead of a party rectification.

Since the illegality of the "Cultural Revolution" is familiar to everyone, let us now turn our attention to party rectification in the "Cultural Revolution" and see how the "party" was "rectified" out of existence by Mao.

The entire organizational system of the CPC crashed under the blows of the "Red Guard movement" and the various mass organizations at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. The leading cadres of the party organs at various levels were attacked for their crime of being "power holders taking the capitalist road," while the broad masses of party members temporarily lost their political status as such and had to join the mass organizations in the capacity of "rebels." From 1967 to the convention of the "Ninth Congress" in 1969, thanks to the careful planning of the "Central Cultural Revolution Group" with Mao's backing, a nationwide struggle for the "seizure of power" took place and numerous large and small "revolutionary committees" were formed. It was through such a process that the CPC began its party rectification with very queer methods. The action taken on leading cadres was called "liberation of the revolutionary leading cadres"; for ordinary party members, it was called "recovery of party life"; and using the so-called "mass line" for party rectification was called "rectification with open door." Whether a leading party cadre could be "liberated" and whether an ordinary party member could "recover his party life" would be determined through assessment by the nonparty people, and the most important political criterion for the assessment was whether the persons concerned could "closely follow Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and relentlessly criticize Liu Shaoqi's revisionist line." This was called "lining up once again." In such a

highly oppressive and horrible political atmosphere, most party cadres consciously or unconsciously "choose Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line." Thus Mao's ultraleftist line, with its unparalleled authority, played a dominant role beyond all doubts, and Mao's personal power also reached a point which was both unprecedented and unrepeatable.

The Most Difficult Problem in Party Rectification -- Political Alienation

We have so far briefly reviewed the two party rectifications under Mao's rule. From these rectifications, we can see what kind of political legacy has been left behind by this "venerable gentleman." This legacy is in fact a heap of trash and a negation of Mao in the political sense. This is quite true, and the desperate resistance from the ultraleftist forces in the current party rectification is only a logical conclusion!

However, this is still not the most difficult problem in this party rectification. If the CPC and the Chinese people still possess the same vigorous revolutionary spirit and revolutionary fervor as they did before, they can certainly succeed in wiping out the pernicious leftist influence. Unfortunately, this revolutionary spirit and fervor has been greatly diminished and is fast disappearing. Therefore, the most difficult problem now faced by the CPC is the political laxity and centrifugal political forces in and outside the party. This is the most dreadful thing. Chinese society is no longer like a volcano or an avalanche; it has become a stagnant pool or a patch of loose sand. Any splendid program of action will be quietly buried here....

One of the important causes of this deplorable, sickening and heartrending situation is the political "alienation" brought about by the incessant political movements (including the party rectifications) launched by Mao over the years. Having been deceived and fooled with the ruin of their families and the deaths of their beloved ones as the result, people are now tired of politics, intraparty struggles and line struggles and are antipathetic to party rectifications.

However, if the current party rectification becomes abortive, the ultraleftist forces may quite possibly make their comeback at the opportune moment with grave consequences to China once again. By that time, those who are now passive and antipathetic will eat their bitter fruit!

Now where can we find the panacea? This is a serious challenge to the CPC and the Chinese people.

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