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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 21 and 22, November 1983

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9 February 1984

USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS  
COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 21 and 22, November 1983

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## IMPROVING COMPETITION AMONG STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE UNITS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 83 (signed to press 19 Oct 83) pp 31-37

[Article by Maj Gen D. Zhil'nikov, first deputy chief of political directorate of Strategic Missile Forces: "By Improving Competition Organization"]

[Text] In the Strategic Missile Forces, as in all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, socialist competition has become an inalienable part of the training process and an effective means for the personnel's communist indoctrination. It raises servicemen's activeness in a struggle for successful fulfillment of training plans and tasks and develops in them a feeling of personal responsibility for the assigned job, a creative initiative, collectivism, comradely mutual help, and a striving for self-improvement.

The study and implementation of resolutions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum led to a new upswing in competition in units and subunits under the motto "Improve vigilance and reliably assure the Motherland's security!" In fulfilling the directions contained in the speech by party Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at this plenum on matters of improving the organization of competition further, commanders, political entities, staffs, and the party and Komsomol organizations are guiding the main efforts of participants in the patriotic movement to an improvement of quality indicators in performance of operational readiness duty, in practicing operational training tasks and norms, in mastering weapons and equipment and in the teamwork training of combat teams. The troops perceived as a guideline for action the demands of the decree adopted recently by the CPSU Central Committee entitled "On Improving the Organization and Practice of Summarizing Socialist Competition Results and Providing Incentives for Its Winners." Party administrators have begun to show more concern for increasing the effectiveness and creative nature of competition, for beefing up its role in an intensification of the training process, and for developing the personnel's official and public activeness.

The closer link of socialist competition with troop life and missions generates many valuable initiatives contributing to an improvement in combat readiness and an increase in the effectiveness of combat training. For example, there are widespread initiatives such as "A higher level of mastery for new equipment," "From masters in the team to a team of masters," "For an

outstanding result for every training day," "The subunit's honor is my honor" and "Not one laggard next to outstanding persons."

The people's creative initiative and their orientation on specific end results are having a positive influence on the accomplishment of missions assigned by the party, government and USSR minister of defense to the missile forces. The overwhelming majority of military collectives have fulfilled plans of combat and political training and their socialist pledges fully and with increased quality and there has been an augmentation in the ranks of outstanding subunits, persons outstanding in training, masters of military affairs, and specialists with a high rating.

Now at the finale of the training year one can see especially clearly that more ponderable results are being achieved where competition is arranged in conformity with Leninist principles and contemporary party demands, and where competition is directed objectively. The role of one-man commanders, who bear personal responsibility to the Communist Party and Soviet government for the combat and mobilization readiness of their entrusted units and subunits, is exceptionally great in this important work. The Interior Service Regulation obligates commanders and chiefs to arrange socialist competition among the personnel and assure its day-to-day direction.

Many commanders among the missile forces are fulfilling this obligation capably and conscientiously. Together with political workers and the party organizations and relying on staff assistants, they are developing in personnel a spirit of competitiveness in attaining the high goals of military proficiency and are directing the missilemen's enthusiasm at practical fulfillment of the party's increased demands on troop combat readiness.

For example, Lt Col A. Pavlov, commander of an outstanding missile unit, takes a responsible attitude toward the organization of competition. The personnel of this unit, which initiated socialist competition in the Strategic Missile Forces, fulfilled their pledges with honor. Sixty percent of subunits and combat teams became outstanding and every other officer is a master of military affairs. All operational training missions have been accomplished with high quality and operational readiness duty is performed vigilantly. The close-knit, cohesive collective confirmed the title of outstanding unit.

The commander constantly ensures that competition is connected integrally with the training and indoctrination process and contributes to successful accomplishment of combat and political training missions and a strengthening of military discipline. Proceeding from demands of the party and USSR minister of defense, he clearly defines competition goals in each phase, teaches subunit commanders (especially young commanders) the practical work of organizing it, and orients the party and Komsomol aktiv on what has to be done to develop and maintain the personnel's creative initiative and where such initiative should best be directed in a particular period. Supervision over the progress of pledge fulfillment is carried out in the collective at all levels and there is in fact assurance of publicity and comparability of results the personnel achieve, comradesly mutual help, and the propaganda and adoption of foremost experience.

The unit has many officers who are genuine masters in training and indoctrinating the personnel. Their example shows the others how high intensity and effectiveness of competition are achieved. For example, officers were familiarized (not without benefit to themselves) with the experience of Capt N. Kozulin, commander of an outstanding subunit who is able to kindle great ideas in subordinates and a desire for highest results in training and service. Having a good knowledge of the people and their abilities, the commander reveals to each missileman the prospects for combat, political and moral growth. Privates and NCO's gain a picture of what specific indicators must be fought for today, tomorrow and in a month's time in order to make the greatest personal contribution toward improving combat readiness. Therefore specific pledges are made which are within their capabilities. Classes, exercises and operational readiness duty in the subunit are permeated with a spirit of lively, interested competition.

The unit commander, political officer and party organization vigorously support every valuable initiative of the soldiers. For example, the slogan "A master prepares a master" was advanced in one of the subunits and experience immediately proved its effectiveness. As a matter of fact, who if not a master of combat qualification is to help his colleague come up to the very same high level of combat schooling? Lt Col A. Pavlov approved the initiative and recommended that all subunit commanders take advantage of this experience. Party members became active implementers of the good work and one more reserve thus was set in motion. As a result, the plans outlined for preparing masters were accomplished fully by the end of the training year.

The party bureau finds its own forms of influence on the effectiveness of socialist competition. Using words of persuasion and demands, bureau members see to it that the party members set the tone in competition, set the example of efficiency in pledge fulfillment, and help the laggards. Party members' reports on these matters are heard regularly at sessions of the party bureau and at meetings. Broad discussion in the party organization of materials of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums contributed to an increase in the missilemen's sense of responsibility for the unity of word and action. Each time, the party members thoroughly analyzed the state of affairs, sought new reserves and opportunities for improving indoctrinational work with the personnel, boldly uncovered and evaluated with principle the slightest displays of formalism, and acted as the commanders' first assistants in remedying deficiencies. Staff party members set the example in this respect. While working in the subunits they arm officers with the ability to carry out a check of execution and evaluate objectively and exactly what has been achieved. For example, CPSU members A. Ivanov, S. Martynets and others identified in a timely manner that some team commanders were exercising insufficient supervision over the missilemen's independent work and their fulfillment of individual scheduled assignments. The staff officers saw to it that this omission was remedied, which of course contributed to fulfillment of the pledges.

The experience of the foremost missile unit shows that if competition is well arranged it plays an important part in the military collective's life. In the

work of the commander, political officer, and the party and Komsomol organizations competition is a tested and very effective means not only for improving combat proficiency, but also in indoctrinating the personnel.

The military council and political directorate of the missile forces regularly study, generalize and introduce the best methods of organizing competition into the working practice of commanders, political entities and party collectives. Survey materials with specific recommendations are prepared periodically and sent to the troop units. For example, political directorate officers recently studied the experience of the personnel's effective struggle for outstanding performance of operational readiness missions and for stable and exacting preparation of combat teams in the unit where Officer V. Krivomazov serves. What were the primary positive points in the generalized experience that were identified and recommended for adoption by other units?

Above all it was the fact that this collective accomplishes the work of organizing socialist competition and directing it in conformity with requirements of the 26th party congress and guidelines of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums. The unit command element specifically determines the directions of military rivalry which guarantee a high end result. All privates, NCO's, warrant officers [praporshchiki] and officers here are given assignments for the period of operational readiness duty which provide for exemplary performance of functional duties; strict fulfillment of the requirements of combat and operating instructions; maintenance of equipment, missile complexes and the systems and assemblies assigned to the soldiers in the initial combat state; quality performance of periodic technical servicing and other kinds of maintenance; improvement of knowledge in special training, and so on. The missilemen then make pledges with consideration of this. Each time, the commanders and political officers check to see how the personnel have understood their tasks and the operating procedure and whether or not they know the norms which they must practice.

While performing operational readiness duty the leaders strive for unity of word and action by performing a daily analysis of results achieved by combat team members, comparing them publicly and organizing the objective help of experienced missilemen (who are masters of combat qualification and highly rated specialists) for the junior comrades in acquiring firm skills of working on the combat equipment. The atmosphere formed in the teams is one of an attentive attitude toward each other, each one's responsibility for overall success, and intolerance of any deviation from rules of regulation order or the norms of troop comradeship.

All this is producing good results. There are no instances of unconcern or negligence in the collective and for many years the personnel have performed operational readiness duty in an outstanding manner. All missilemen have a class rating, more than 30 percent of the officers are masters and the rest are first or second class specialists.

It must be said that this collective's experience of struggling to assure high quality of operational readiness duty has been adopted by the commanders, political officers and party organizations of the majority of our units.

The missile complex is a new type of collective weapon. Its effective use is achieved not through the autonomous efforts of individual soldiers, but by the strictly successive actions of the entire collective regulated precisely by place and time. This is why competition for successful accomplishment of operational training missions and for bettering the norms has become widespread among the troops. It allows permeating every day of combat training with a spirit of competitiveness, elevating the personnel's interest in the classes and developing their creative initiative.

The arrangement of competition in Unit "X" can serve as a good example in this regard. Back at the beginning of the training year this unit determined the tasks and norms under which subunit personnel would compete and the tentative time. Much also was done to specify the missilemen's pledges for the month, the week and for each day.

The commander, political officer and staff give special attention to the development of competitiveness for high quality in practicing operational training tasks and norms during integrated problems and drills conducted before the personnel go on operational readiness duty. Class instructors are given special cards where they make entries about which tasks and norms have been worked and about the quality of their fulfillment. Chief of staff Capt V. Yakovlev performs a weekly analysis of data received on each combat team and reports conclusions to the commander. Prompt steps are taken to remedy the identified deficiencies and to improve combat proficiency further.

Another positive point is that the unit staff has begun keeping records of the tasks and norms practiced by the combat teams in each integrated problem, and the staff has generalized data by month, for the half-year and for the year. These data are used systematically in summarizing results of socialist pledge fulfillment and in discussing them at party and Komsomol meetings.

The unit makes effective use of contests for the title of best specialist for the purpose of activating the personnel's struggle for quality fulfillment of operational training tasks. A commander's order appoints a commission to conduct the contests. This commission draws up a plan and develops schedules of practical classes, a list of norms and the procedure for fulfilling them, as well as variants of control questions for determining the team members' level of knowledge.

The title of best unit specialist can be won by a private, NCO, warrant officer or officer who is outstanding in training, who is a disciplined soldier and who performs operational readiness duty in exemplary fashion. Every missileman who takes part in these contests has to have a class rating, he must maintain the equipment and weapons assigned to him in a serviceable condition, and he must take an active part in social work. Contest results are announced in a unit order and the experience of the best specialists is propagandized in verbal and visual agitation.

Well organized military-technical propaganda also contributes to an improvement in the missilemen's combat proficiency. There are regular equipment

nights, question-and-answer nights, and technical quizzes. Technical circles have been formed and are in operation, and a technical lecture bureau is functioning.

This approach to organizing competition prompts the people to work to their utmost and contributes to unconditional and quality fulfillment of pledges.

Following the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum the commanders, political entities and party organizations began to devote more attention to taking advantage of the indoctrinational opportunities of competition for the moral improvement of soldiers, for making military collectives cohesive, for strengthening discipline and for maintaining firm regulation order. Many administrators try to ensure that the missilemen's combat schooling and ideological-political conditioning improve in indivisible unity during the competition process. For example, in the unit where Officer A. Miroshnichenko serves, servicemen are constantly given an explanation of the indoctrinational role of competition and a strictly individual approach is used to help them make pledges to observe moral and ethical standards of behavior and to improve political knowledge. The soldier's ideological-political growth, social activeness, attitude toward the collective's affairs and help to comrades are considered along with successes in mastering weapons and equipment and in performing operational readiness duty when competition results are summarized. Commanders attempt to see beyond the objective fact of what was done and achieved, the extent to which a person acted consciously and what motivated him. It is no accident that this collective is distinguished by cohesiveness and has had high indicators in combat and political training and firm military discipline for a number of years.

It must be admitted, however, that a number of units and subunits make insufficient use of great opportunities contained in competition for the ideological and moral improvement of its participants, for increasing their public activeness and for making military collectives cohesive. Some commanders and political officers poorly monitor the progress in fulfilling pledges aimed at expanding the political and cultural horizons of privates, NCO's, warrant officers and officers. In connection with this, the political directorate requires the political entities to make a better study of and adopt more promptly everything new that originates among the troops and be more persistent in striving to reinforce the effect of competition on the soldiers' development of ideological conviction, a communist attitude toward labor and responsibility for performing their duty.

An analysis of the state of affairs indicates that the role of staffs is rising in the organization of socialist competition in units and subunits. For example, the staff party organization headed by Officer A. Gorobchishin engages daily in developing a high sense of responsibility in party members for the effectiveness of competition. When the staff officers work locally they study and compare results of the personnel's work, disseminate foremost experience, uncover deficiencies and help remedy them. They have prepared methods recommendations for subunit commanders on the organization of competition in classes, exercises and in operational readiness duty and when summing up results of competition.

It hardly is necessary to prove that a well-conceived system of summarizing competition results is a necessary condition for its effectiveness. Pledge fulfillment criteria have been drawn up and are applied in our forces. In this work we proceed from the assumption that a leader's competency and principle in assessing each soldier's activity and the true state of affairs in the collective is a very important indicator of his command and party maturity and his ability to accomplish tasks at the level of modern demands.

It now has become the rule in all military collectives that competition results are summed up daily in squads and teams, weekly in subunits, and monthly at a general meeting of servicemen in the units. The winners are honored and given encouragement in a ceremonial atmosphere. Party and Komsomol activists tell about them in talks, and radio newspapers, photo bulletins, special leaflets and operational newsheets are devoted to them. Those who work halfheartedly and who talk idly also do not remain in the shadows.

A definite, strict system has formed for assuring publicity and comparability of results of competition among units and subunits. To this end the staffs maintain competition boards which graphically reflect results in performance of operational duty, preparation of teams, masters and rated specialists, equipment operation, performance of periodic technical servicing, and so on. Each month the units and subunits discuss these results and this contributes to heightened intensity of the struggle for first place.

Close contact among commanders, political officers, staffs and services of competing units; the conduct of joint instructional methods classes and demonstration classes; the mutual familiarization with the practice of organizing competition for outstanding performance of operational readiness missions, for quality performance of periodic technical servicing, and for keeping equipment in constant readiness for tactical employment; and mutual familiarization with internal order and the upkeep of duty spaces, training classrooms and post grounds contribute to a businesslike exchange of experience and to the development of mutual help. Meetings of party and Komsomol activists of competing units and their mutual participation in the work of meetings and in sessions of party committees and party bureaus also are of great benefit.

Nevertheless, in assessing our work by the yardstick of contemporary party demands, it must be admitted that it still contains many omissions and unused capabilities. The CPSU Central Committee decree about improving the organization and practice of summarizing socialist competition results and providing incentives for its winners notes that collectives and workers who are not working to their utmost and who are satisfied with average results often escape the view of competition organizers, and that when results are summarized proper exactingness is not always shown and insufficient advantage is taken of opportunities for moral and material incentives for the leaders.

All this unfortunately also occurs in the missile forces. The level of competition organization in some units and subunits for now leaves much to be desired. Some commanders and political entities do not direct the personnel's creative initiative at improving quality indicators of combat and political

training and they struggle with insufficient persistence to have servicemen fulfill their pledges. These were the deficiencies which occurred in the subunits commanded by officers V. Rummyantsev, L. Filimonov and I. Golovin. Until recently competition was arranged here in the old way, there was poor indoctrination work to assure the unity of word and action, what was achieved was not always evaluated objectively and results at times were summarized formally. As a result, the personnel of these subunits did not fully carry out the plans outlined in competition and surrendered the previous positions for some indicators. Negative facts in other military collectives also are being uncovered now in the process of summing up results of the training year and at report-election party meetings.

The missile forces political directorate is taking steps to remedy these deficiencies and preclude their repetition in the new training year. During preparations for the new training year refresher courses for command and political personnel also are examining problems of improving competition organization, uncovering foremost experience and analyzing the reasons for formalism and irresponsibility. We see a guarantee of reinforcement of the mobilizing and indoctrinational role of the patriotic movement in quality accomplishment of combat and political training missions and in strengthening military discipline to lie in having the immediate organizers of competition gain a firm knowledge of contemporary party demands, master the foremost methods of working with people and take an imaginative attitude toward the work.

Consideration is given to the circumstance of no small importance that in recent years young commanders and political officers with a good general and professional-theoretical preparation have come to lead units and subunits. Many of them, however, lack practical experience in organizational and indoctrination work, including in the organization of socialist competition. Experience indicates that at such levels as the subunit and combat team, where the fate of pledges is decided above all and where a spirit of healthy rivalry must be developed for best results in mastering equipment and weapons and in practicing the tasks and norms, the young officers who head them have insufficient methods skills. It stands to reason that the situation will not be corrected here merely by refresher courses or by the most persuasive revelation of foremost experience. Daily individual work and the assistance of senior chiefs, political entities and party organizations also is required. They are being directed specifically to this by the military council and political directorate of the missile forces.

Also not to be ignored is the fact that the aktiv will be renewed considerably during reports and elections in party and Komsomol organizations. Comrades who have been elected for the first time to management entities also have to be taught the ability to make maximum use of the mobilizing and indoctrinational force of competition and to assure that party and Komsomol members play a leading role in it.

In short, many tasks and problems arise on the threshold of the new training year and the beginning of a new phase of competition connected with it. By using the experience which has been gained and learning lessons from the

deficiencies which have occurred, the commanders, political entities and party organizations of units unquestionably will resolve them and will do everything to ensure that the scope, efficiency and effectiveness of socialist competition meets the spirit of the times, the party's demands and the interests of a further improvement in combat readiness.

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POLITICAL OFFICERS MONITOR PERFORMANCE OF AIR DEFENSE UNITS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 83 (signed to press 19 Oct 83) pp 57-62

[Article by Col I. Semenov: "Do Not Merely Register the Fact..."]

[Text] The signal sounded just before dawn. A control target was flying, detected by the operators on distant approaches and tracked by them without being lost, as they say, through the entire "zone of responsibility." On receiving the coordinates, a fighter pilot immediately took off for intercept and launch batteries were placed in readiness promptly. Various tasks were performed by operator Pvt Valeriy Beketov, target plotter Pvt Nikolay Lopatochkin, 1st Class fighter pilot Maj Aleksandr Semeryakov, missilemen Maj Trofim Karasev and Capt Vladimir Gorokhov, as well as many other guardians of the sky, representatives of one of the units [soyedineniye] of the Air Defense Forces. Each one performed his part in the common operational training mission, and performed it conscientiously, selflessly and to his utmost as required in genuine combat. A deep understanding of duty to the Motherland and personal responsibility for her security joined officers and men of various military professions.

Acting political department chief Col Fedor Maksimovich Olefir returned to headquarters only toward morning. Tired from a sleepless night, the officer did not conceal his satisfaction: The people did not let them down and performed the mission successfully. This is the chief indicator that political indoctrination work with them is producing the desired results and that the political department is directing it into the necessary channel. As noted at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the work of ideological cadres is measured in the final account by ideological maturity, labor activeness and efficiency of people. Well, the personnel displayed all these qualities to the full extent last night. Honestly speaking, the political department personnel expected nothing else. That conclusion was suggested by a good knowledge of the atmosphere of the military collectives and by the ability to delve deeply into the affairs and concerns of those performing their difficult duty at the "sites" and other facilities.

Studying the people... This is right where the difficult, multifaceted process of political indoctrination activity begins. To perform it successfully, V. I. Lenin taught party members, one must be constantly in the thick of the

masses, have a good knowledge of how they are living and satisfy their wants and needs. Political department officers try to act in just this way. That is probably why it is far from always possible to find them in their offices. The greater part of the time they are where the main job is being done and where missilemen, aviators, specialists from the teams of the radar complexes, communicators, and representatives of other professions are improving combat proficiency and learning to keep the Motherland's sky firmly locked. Events show that this task is one of the most pressing. The foreign hawks are too impatient to probe the impregnability of the Soviet air borders.

The political department workers are well known at the "sites." Commanders, political officers and enlisted men as well have contact with them periodically without long pauses in between, but of course there are different kinds of contact. A passive presence in a military collective and a simple registration of processes occurring in it do little in themselves to change things for the better. Important above all is the political entity's active position and desire to uncover the reasons for a particular negative phenomenon in order to affect the course of events purposefully and therefore more effectively.

...At one time certain problems in the quality of personnel training began to be observed in the unit where Officer N. Solov'yev serves as political officer, and in test classes the personnel demonstrated results below those on which it seemed they could count. This did not go ignored by the political entity. Officers F. Olefir, G. Shevchenko and V. Artyushchenko worked a great deal here, not being hasty with conclusions and trying to delve thoroughly into matters. Of course it was possible to reproach the quality of some training activities, which was immediately done, but the primary reason lay deeper: Elements of formalism were allowed in political indoctrination work with the personnel. In organizing a study of equipment with subordinates, some officers, including even party members, did not deem it necessary to explain the political aspect of this matter to them and they did not reveal the interrelationship of a soldier's high combat schooling with what is because of this his more successful fulfillment of patriotic duty in the present acute international situation. When the struggle for gaining normative seconds becomes a goal in itself and is not combined properly with an explanation of the political essence of combat readiness, there is less initiative, activeness and emotional aim at a high result in the personnel's practical actions.

And it is not only because few indoctrinational activities were conducted in the regiment: They were sufficient, judging from what the plans and other documents registered. Many of them, however, contained the imprint of formalism and the desire to place a mark in a plan as quickly as possible without breathing a living feeling into each of them or catching the interest and enthusiasm of the audience. By the way, the soldiers did not hide their opinion about the quality of indoctrinational work being done in the subunits. Dissatisfaction was expressed in particular over the level of political classes which senior lieutenants G. Sukhorukov and V. Aliluykin conducted in their groups.

It became clear from talking with the soldiers that they were troubled by a number of questions of their everyday support. It is generally known that the personnel's well arranged everyday routine is an important factor for a healthy mood in the collective and for quality accomplishment of indoctrinational tasks. Of course there were objective difficulties and not everything depended on the regimental administrators, but the truth also was that they went into these matters insufficiently and awaited instructions even in those cases when they could have resolved something with their own resources. The party organization also showed no activeness in this matter.

The political department substantially helped the regiment improve the everyday living arrangements of the officers and enlisted men and saw to it at the same time that the appropriate comrades firmly learned that everyday routine is far from a secondary matter and cannot be allowed to go unsupervised. Only by resolving problems of the personnel's training, indoctrination, everyday routine and leisure time comprehensively is it possible to attain stable indicators in combat and political training.

The political department's officers applied much effort to help the quality improvement of the process of indoctrinating unit personnel and to assure that every party member took an active part in it. They generalized the experience of the best non-T/O&E propagandists, talked with different categories of the aktiv about the activists' work with people directly in the subunits, and repeatedly gave lectures and talks to regimental personnel as a whole and to individual categories. They suggested how to activate the party organization's work and direct its cutting edge at improving the effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process and assuring each party member's example in performance of duty. Most important, they tried to reach every person and learn servicemen's opinions about the reasons for certain deficiencies and how best to remedy them. This also was of much benefit to the political department personnel in analyzing the state of affairs, allowing them to generalize the information they had obtained and to rely on the most mature and competent opinions in developing the necessary recommendations. In the final account the result of such purposeful efforts produced an effect and, along with other measures, helped correct affairs in the regiment.

The following picture is seen when a person becomes more familiar with the work of a particular political entity: The comrades have not determined the key element in their work and resemble some kind of fire brigade--everyone rushes to where a fire has broken out. As a result they reproach themselves for not directing events but dragging behind. The fact is, in such instances measures of organizational and indoctrinational influence seemingly are taken after the fact and have no substantial effect. The political department in question arranges its work according to a different principle. Of course it considers the state of affairs in a particular military collective and determines specific methods of influence in this regard, but it sees the primary goal not in "taking steps" on a stand-by basis, but in giving objective assistance to local administrators. If the proper style is established in their work there also will be successes in affairs without fail, only they have to be approached without excessive haste and fuss, not harrasing or urging on organizers of the

training and indoctrination process without need, but consistently helping them rise above the trivial affairs and carefully analyze every step in the planned direction.

...Once in studying the degree of effectiveness of unified political days held in the unit [soyedineniye], the political department personnel learned from soldiers at one of the "sites" that party members A. Rudak and V. Kravchenko had not appeared before them for a rather long while although there were more than enough reasons for them to appear here. The people had accumulated sufficient questions for these officers and some problems in the organization of duty and everyday living arrangements awaited resolution. Meanwhile it was learned that the lengthy absence of these comrades on the small post was not a chance or solitary fact. It had become the habit for these persons to direct their subordinates in units [chast'] located at "sites" from afar. But what can be learned about the state of affairs from there, except for general data? Well, the administrator registers the data, but then what? The fact is, one doesn't feel the collective's emotional atmosphere from a distance and one won't exert real influence on the people. As a result a unit which quite recently was known for excellent indicators began to surrender gradually the positions it had won. Lightning had not yet struck, but the stormclouds already had begun to thicken. Miss this moment in time and a person will have to reap fully the fruits of an incorrect work style.

This prompted the political department personnel to work thoroughly at the remote "site." They proceeded according to a prearranged methodology which, as usual, included a detailed familiarization with the collective's life and a study of public opinion and the personnel's moods and requirements. Most important, they did not merely register deficiencies and omissions, but they identified the genuine, deep-seated reasons for them. The political department's party commission also had its say. Party members Rudak and Kravchenko had to give an account both for the "remote" style of managing subordinates and for the absence of proper principle in evaluating negative facts and the attempt to downplay their number. It must be said to their honor that both of them drew proper conclusions from the criticism addressed to them. In correcting their omissions they shifted the center of gravity of organizational and indoctrinational efforts closer to the people, into the subunits, and they began to visit those located far off enormously more often.

Life confirms that in order to fight deficiencies successfully one must delve deeply into their "primary source" each time and carefully study the nutritive medium which generated them. This is of course no simple task, for a person's surroundings are not something invariable or solidified. They are subject to changes and fluctuations. Today certain trends, sentiments and ideas gain the upper hand here, and tomorrow others may do so. If matters are neglected, the climate which forms in the collective may not at all be the one necessary to achieve firm success. "Publicity, open discussion of successes and failures and the participation of administrators of all ranks in political indoctrination work," it was stated at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "create that public climate in which people work well." And so the climate in a collective does not arise of itself, but is created as a result of purposeful

efforts by indoctrinators and organizers of labor activities. Being oblivious to this truth does not lead to any good.

...The company in which Sr Lt V. Yurchik was serving was situated by itself, as they say, and so required special attention. Political department workers had been here repeatedly and talked with the commander, his political deputy and the party organization secretary. The workers' advice was to engage in more individual indoctrination of servicemen, assure the party members' example in performance of duty, and rely more on the NCO's and the aktiv...

The advice is good and proper and it is seemingly easy to follow. Most important, the commander and political officer should have studied the microclimate of the small military collective more thoroughly and promptly influenced the processes occurring in it. This unfortunately did not happen. Instead of resolving indoctrinational matters young political worker Sr Lt Yurchik set about to clarify his relationship with the company commander. Not feeling a guiding hand, the NCO's let up in their work with subordinates and some NCO's began to violate discipline. With such an example before their eyes, some privates also took the path of infractions. The party organization was called upon to have a ponderable say under such conditions. It has seven CPSU members, which is no small force, but party organization secretary WO [Praporshchik] V. Zabuga showed uncertainty. It seemed to him that he didn't have the right to point out to persons senior in rank how to do their jobs.

That was the tangle that resulted, but it was only a tangle at first glance. An absence of proper exactingness; liberalism and connivance instead of thoughtful, consistent indoctrinational work; and the inability of some party members to influence those around them by personal example all led to serious omissions.

"This is a lesson for us as well, comrades," admitted the political department chief to his colleagues. "We didn't discern the moment when it was necessary to shift from general advice and wishes to business and to sound the alarm. We also should have delved thoroughly into the party organization's work and demanded a strict accounting of every party member for performance of official and party duty. The fact that Party Member Yurchik now has been held accountable by the party is, excuse me for saying so, merely shutting the barn door after the horse is stolen..."

The ability to assess certain mistakes in one's work self-critically, analyze specifically where a mistake has been made and learn a necessary lesson for the future is a feature of the Leninist style in work. The spirit of self-criticism and exacting attitude toward the job has been established firmly here. Political department personnel love their difficult work, each one sees a calling in it and when it comes time for someone to move to a higher position a replacement for the departed person is chosen carefully so that precise teamwork is maintained in the political entity's work and unity of thinking is not disrupted.

The new arrival is brought up to speed gradually. He feels the support of a more experienced senior colleague without fail, especially at first. It was

under such favorable conditions for development that Capt B. Dergachev, assistant chief of the political department for Komsomol work, unfolded his young wings. He was given much active assistance in developing a proper work style by Maj Vitaliy Andreyevich Artyushchenko, senior instructor of the political department for organizational-party work. At first it seemed to the young Komsomol worker that his primary task was to uncover omissions in the indoctrination of the Army youth and point out deficiencies, and someone would be found to remedy them. But in observing the actions of the political department's officers, the captain gradually realized that not much can be achieved merely by stating the deficiencies. It is enormously more important to teach Komsomol activists the correct work style and the ability to influence young people by an intelligible word and personal example. He improved his work methods and began to spend most of the time directly in the subunits, in the midst of soldiers and Komsomol members. By the way, Boris Ivanovich himself is capable of setting a worthy example for the soldiers in many respects, because he has a good knowledge both of combat equipment and a soldier's duty. That is why many of his talks about the example of Komsomol members in performing operational readiness duty and about the need for high vigilance are so instructive.

The June CPSU Central Committee Plenum pointed out the need to improve the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination of Soviet citizens and the effectiveness of all forms of political training. Its specific results must be reflected in a growth in the workers' social-economic activeness and, under Army conditions, in the soldiers' activeness in military work and their diligent performance of duty. A leading role rightly rests with the political entities in accomplishing this task. Who if not the political entities is to monitor the process of selecting and training non-T/O&E propagandists and political study group instructors, or disseminate the foremost experience gained during classes. Political department personnel try to teach group instructors to regard their duties with creative vim. Every visit by a political department worker to group classes usually leaves a good imprint and serves as an object lesson for the young non-T/O&E propagandists. That is just how senior political department instructors majors Valeriy Vasil'yevich Bubnov and Vladimir Viktorovich Pankov try to do their work.

Maj Pankov remembers a conversation with one regimental political worker, who in attending political classes would leave one and the same entry in the logs: "Student activeness poor. Few visual aids."

"Tell me what you did specifically to improve the students' activeness," said a political department worker to the officer.

"My task is to monitor class progress," uttered the other with not much confidence, apparently sensing the shakiness of his position.

"It is of course necessary to monitor," agreed Maj Pankov, "but it is also necessary to teach the techniques of propaganda expertise, or else the result is that you 'enriched' the people only by your presence..."

Soon the political department worker had occasion to back up this advice with a graphic example. He visited classes in Capt D. Andrusiv's group together with the person with whom he had spoken recently. The subject involved friendship of USSR nations and socialist internationalism. The class instructor, whose primary profession was as an equipment specialist, prepared conscientiously but did not present the subject in the best manner. He was too "tied" to the lesson plan, spoke dryly and made no attempt to tie the material in with specific jobs of the students sitting before him.

Seeing that the discussion was not achieving the goal, the political department worker imperceptibly and in a tactful manner took the reins of the class into his own hands. By his narrative he was able to catch the genuine interest and enthusiasm of the audience, which by the way contained soldiers of many nationalities. Later when they were alone Vladimir Viktorovich gave the non-T/O&E propagandist his comments and advice.

Senior political department instructor Maj Bubnov also has a creative approach to the job. When he visits the units Valeriy Vasil'yevich puts much effort into learning public opinion. It is important for him to know how the students themselves evaluate the quality of classes being held with them and how fully their emotional needs are being satisfied.

Here is an example. Not long ago a subject devoted to the Great Patriotic War was being studied in the political study system. This almost coincided in time with the 40th anniversary of the Soviet forces' victory in the Kursk Bulge. Many privates expressed the desire to hear a talk in the political classes by a frontline veteran, a participant of the legendary events which concluded the radical turning point in the course of the war and became heralds of the imminent Victory. The desire seemingly was not one that was satisfied simply, but it did not catch Maj Bubnov unawares. He established work ties long ago with many Great Patriotic War participants living in the city and its environs. They periodically speak in units and subunits at the political department's invitation.

The political department requested Mikhail Semenovich Andryushchenkov, a participant of the battle in the Kursk Bulge, a former combat battalion commander and now a retired colonel and member of the "Znaniye" Society, to hold a political class at one of the "sites." Just the veteran's appearance in the soldier audience in parade uniform with many combat orders and medals riveted general attention on him. The author of these lines was witness to this. When the guest began his story a unique "field" of mutual attraction arose between him and the audience's hearts. The soldiers listened to the frontlinesman in fear of missing a word. He spoke in an outwardly simple, unsophisticated manner, but movingly and fervently as people speak about something of which they are deeply convinced, something not simply learned or read but suffered and experienced. For the political study group instructor and other officers present this was a good lesson of lively contact with people and the ability to affect their thoughts and feelings.

...The political department chief's work calendar abounds in notes, some of which are devoted to an upcoming trip by political entity officers to see the

troops. People already have been appointed, the preliminary information has been studied and a plan of action has been discussed but, most important, each of the political department officers is in the necessary mood for the trip. It is the mood to be an active fighter for improving the indoctrination process, and not an impartial outside observer. This is what generates a feeling of participation in daily affairs of those who in peacetime are performing difficult duty on the forward edge and are vigilantly guarding our Motherland's happy sky.

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## SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF WESTERN SPECIAL SERVICES

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[Article by Maj V. Roshchupkin: "'Crusaders' with an Antenna: Activation of Subversive Activities of Western Special Services"]

[Text] A familiar ditty which has been sung now by several generations of those who love the light genre tells about a certain distinguished person by the name of Malbrouk. He went down in the folklore of song for the fact that back in the era of King Horoch he planned to campaign against enemies on the continent. That is what the simple, playful text says: "Malbrouk's off to the wars..."

Countrymen of the British Duke of Malbrouk hardly will recall even in passing why their militant forebear was planning to go on a campaign. Moreover, like all West Europeans, the British now are concerned enormously more not with their past, but with their present and future, a future threatened by the "splendid" prospect of burning up in a nuclear furnace if the Reagan team succeeds in turning Great Britain and other West European countries into hostages of Washington by stationing new American medium-range nuclear missiles.

By an irony of fate it was a British representative, Sir Winston Churchill, a direct descendant of a real historical figure--the Duke of Marlborough--who spoke in the United States in March 1946 and called for a struggle against "world communism headed by Soviet Russia." The postwar "cold war" period marks its beginning from this militant speech. In the summer of 1982 the world again heard the cry of Malbrouk, which sounded this time in England. The White House proprietor himself, having arrived from across the ocean in the land of his forbears, proclaimed a "crusade" against communism from the banks of the Thames.

But while the notoriety of the Malbrouk of song now is limited for many merely to being praised in couplets, the inflammatory calls of the Washington guest were taken up in an instant and carried throughout the "free world" by the "free" press, and by hoarse "voices" and turbid "waves." Having gathered for a campaign against socialism, against nations struggling for national and social liberation and against forces of peace and progress, the latter-day

"crusaders" are aggravating the international situation in every possible way and artificially whipping up antisoviet and anticommunist hysteria. An arms race unprecedented in scope, military expansion in various regions, kindling and directly participating in conflicts at "hot spots" on the planet, political terror, all-out espionage, and provocations--that is the ominous arsenal of the overseas Malbrouks and their anticommunist host. Describing the U.S. militaristic course, CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov emphasized in the Declaration published on 28 September 1983 that it presents a serious threat to peace. The essence of such a course, noted Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, is an attempt to assure the United States of America dominant world positions without regard for the interests of other states or nations.

Washington has advanced to the forefront of the "crusade" the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's intelligence agencies, the Aerospace Intelligence Office, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, an intelligence division of the Department of Energy, and other American espionage and subversive services. They make up the basis for the organization of the so-called U.S. "intelligence community." At the top of this organization sits the Director of the CIA, who is directly subordinate to the proprietor of the White House.

Washington's "intelligence community" is developed and financed in a close tie with the program outlined by President R. Reagan for "rearming America," which will cost \$1.6 trillion over a five-year period. It is planned to appropriate funds of many billions in fiscal year 1984 for further improvements to Washington's "espionage empire." Billions of dollars annually are appropriated for its needs and it has a staff of hundreds of thousands of persons. American special services attempt to extend their tentacles into literally all regions of the world, but the primary object of their hostile activity consists of the socialist states, and the Soviet Union above all.

The Central Intelligence Agency drew up plans for stepping up subversive actions against the USSR and other socialist countries back before the change of power in the White House. With the arrival of the present American administration and the corresponding subsequent assignment of W. Casey as the new head of the primary U.S. espionage agency, however, the CIA is experiencing a period of genuine boom. The fact is that under Reagan people abroad have ceased to conceal that the United States has been intervening and intends to continue to intervene unceremoniously in the affairs of those countries whose state systems and politics do not suit Washington. The intelligence and subversive services are considered a suitable instrument for this there. As the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE writes, a major build-up of forces and deployment of American intelligence is occurring.

For example, CIA personnel recently were regrouped and increased by 1,500 persons. According to American press data, hundreds of American intelligence agents have been accepted for "work" in the State Department, where they engage in espionage activity under cover of diplomatic passports. On 11 September of this year one such "diplomat" was caught red-handed together

with his wife in the vicinity of Leningrad while carrying out an act of espionage. U.S. General Consulate Vice Consul (now already former Vice Consul) Lon David Augustenborg and his wife Denise Augustenborg were trying to obtain secret information of a military nature, primarily about the Soviet Navy...

Foreign special services have turned the American Embassy in Warsaw into a real nest of espionage and subversive activity. The chief role in plans for subversive acts against socialist Poland is given to the very same U.S. CIA, which is waging a "strategic offensive" against this sovereign state. PNR [Polish People's Republic] state security agencies have uncovered espionage activity by certain American diplomats who in fact were CIA agents. Polish authorities proved irrefutably that radio transmitters installed in American consulates in Krakow and Poznan were being used to conduct antisocialist subversive propaganda.

Financial appropriations for the "knights of the cloak and dagger" from the CIA rose 25 percent and, according to the most modest estimates of the UPI agency, comprise approximately \$17 billion annually. This is at a time when social programs in the country which are curtailed even without this are being cut back in every possible way or even discontinued! With support from the White House, W. Casey got a sharp increase in appropriations for conducting subversive work abroad. All this led to an "expansion of operations abroad." The U.S. president himself, who personally outlined the directions of intelligence work, gave the "green light" to subversive operations by the espionage agency.

American press organs and intelligence specialists emphasize that at the present time more and more espionage information is being obtained by the U.S. special services using radio and radiotechnical means. Electronic intelligence, as this kind of espionage activity is called abroad, provides corresponding U.S. special services with around 80 percent of the information of interest to them, according to an admission of the journal RAMPARTS.

The ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, a Pentagon mouthpiece, recently reported that a so-called deep-strike strategy is being developed actively abroad. Its primary purpose is to wage electronic warfare against socialist countries and set up a broad network of stations for guiding missiles "into the depth of enemy territory" and for radio intercept and jamming. In an attempt to attain these ominous goals, today's Malbrouks, who have gone on a new "crusade," are brandishing standards, one side of which contains an anticommunist cross and the other side, antenna and missile silhouettes.

...Low buildings surrounded by a barbed-wire fence, beyond which are metal towers and facilities of a spherical shape as if transplanted from Hollywood "star wars" films to an earthly landscape. That is the appearance of the American electronic intelligence center at Edsel, not far from the town of Fettercairn in Scotland. According to the British newspaper MORNING STAR, communications are maintained here around the clock with American spy satellites.

It must be said, however, that the U.S. espionage center at Edsel is not the only one in the Northern Hemisphere. The supersecret OL-5 system, which receives intelligence information from American satellites (as became known recently from foreign publications) also is located in Greenland. From there the United States conducts "comprehensive" intelligence activity against the USSR, against the developing countries and even against its own allies in Europe. Nevertheless, first place in the number of American radiotechnical espionage facilities unquestionably belongs to the country from whose territory today's Malbrouks called on the capitalist world for an anticommunist crusade. According to the MORNING STAR, over a thousand American "specialists" are engaged in the espionage trade at the base in Edsel alone. Just in a single year Washington lavished more than three million dollars on the needs of this nest of espionage, and the foreign Malbrouks know what they are paying for. It was to Edsel, as the weekly NEW STATESMAN attests, that varied espionage information came from American intelligence satellites during last year's Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

A major signal intelligence base is located at Menwith Hill, County of Yorkshire. As with the similar facility at Edsel, it belongs to the U.S. National Security Agency, a far-flung espionage agency which has extended its antennas around the world. It also has a number of other facilities on British soil. By the way, it was the "knights of the cloak and dagger" from the National Security Agency who broke the secret codes of the Argentine military command. This espionage agency actually trampled the inter-American treaty for mutual assistance when it passed on codes to the British and thus engaged in open betrayal of Buenos Aires, with which Washington is (or at least was) linked by the aforementioned document.

It is noteworthy that the very location of Washington's nests of espionage indicates their targets. Their antennas are directed above all at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In Turkey, for example, according to the American journal PROGRESSIVE, there are radio intercept centers belonging to U.S. special services at Sinop and Istanbul, there is a base at Darmstadt in the FRG and at Brindizi in Italy. In addition, the American espionage agencies carry on electronic intelligence work from the territories of Norway, Greece, Cyprus, West Berlin and from the Pentagon's very large base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Antennas of the U.S. intelligence stations located in Japan and South Korea are aimed at regions of the Soviet Far East. As indicated by data published in the press, the Americans have deployed a total of many dozens of signal intelligence centers and posts in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. U.S. allies in aggressive military blocs, particularly Great Britain, also established major networks of electronic espionage following World War II.

The imperialist special services attempt to use electronic espionage equipment directly on our country's territory.

...This appears to be an ordinary stump, with bark like any other bark and roots grown into the ground, but one thing is not clear: Where did it come

from in the vicinity of the defense facility? The fact is that just recently there was no such stump here at all and who would have thought it possible for it to grow out of the ground like a mushroom? It is a well-known fact that a stump is not a mushroom and doesn't crawl out of the ground by itself. A close look was taken at the "stump phenomenon," and what do you think? The stump proved to have a listening post, and not just any post, but an electronic one! It was literally crammed with microelectronic stuffing intended for electronic intelligence in an automatic mode with a preset program.

This is only one of the examples of the use of modern equipment by special services of the imperialist states which are conducting subversive espionage activities against the USSR and countries of the socialist community directly on their territories. In the given instance it is a spherical, portable multipurpose radio of the "Electron" type of apparatus and camouflaged as a pine stump. Just what is this radiotechnical device? It is set up several kilometers from a facility in a zone of radio visibility and can intercept radio emissions. It was assumed that the espionage information obtained in this manner would be transmitted both to American satellites and to ground communications and electronic intelligence points.

But despite the failure of this operation (which was reported at one time in our press) American intelligence has not given up the use of electronic intelligence equipment directly on our country's territory. For example, Richard Osborne, first secretary of the U.S. Embassy, was caught red-handed in Moscow on 7 March 1983 while working with a spy radio in the Filevskiy Park. Confiscated from him was a set of special-purpose portable intelligence gear for transmitting espionage reports via the American "Marisat" communications satellites and handwritten notes in a notebook with paper rapidly soluble in water, which exposed Osborne as engaging in espionage. The U.S. espionage agencies also use miniature equipment for radio espionage mounted in a ball-point pen, cigarette lighter, watch, eyeglasses, and so on, so that the pine "stump" merely heads this list.

But now spyplanes are the chief trump of the foreign special services in radiotechnical espionage against the USSR, as also confirmed by the story of the South Korean spyplane which violated USSR air space on the night of 1 September 1983. So there are spyplanes. Why are they needed?

Following the end of World War II a special aerial reconnaissance division was set up within the CIA. Back under President Eisenhower a program was adopted, a component of which was "broad surveillance from the air by penetration" of Soviet territory. For many years, states the book about the U.S. National Security Agency [NSA] published abroad in May 1983, the agency has been "probing" Soviet borders with the help of aircraft crammed with the latest electronic intercept systems. "Flying parallel to the Russian border," states the book's author J. Bamford, "the aircraft records even weak signals of air defense radars, ground communications and microwave transmissions. Recordings are sent to the NSA for analysis. Today pilots violate Soviet air space intentionally or not."

As attested by American specialists, in many instances the radiotechnical equipment as well as photographic and movie equipment installed aboard the aircraft provide more accurate information than can be obtained from satellites. "Spyplanes are unique 'ears,' a supplement to satellites, operating at an altitude of 50 miles," wrote the British newspaper DAILY STAR on 4 September 1983. The newspaper emphasizes that the United States "uses gigantic Boeing jet aircraft as spyplanes."

It now has been proved irrefutably that the violation of Soviet air space by the South Korean airline's Boeing was a deliberate, carefully planned intelligence operation in which an entire network of capabilities--reconnaissance aircraft, warships and space systems--was activated. It was controlled from certain centers on U.S. and Japanese territory. The civilian aircraft was selected consciously for the operation without regard for, or possibly even figuring on, human sacrifices. Hence all the serious consequences of this extraordinary "incident," as it is called in the western press. Naturally all responsibility for what occurred rests wholly and fully on its organizers.

But by hypocritically distorting the actual events, the U.S. government is using the story of the South Korean aircraft to activate psychological warfare sharply against the Soviet Union. Washington now has brought in all the might of the subversive propaganda apparatus to arrange the brainwashing of hundreds of millions of people around the world. The White House is attempting with the help of continuous insults and monstrous lies to conceal the espionage nature of the Boeing's mission from the public and to blacken our country, our system and the Soviet Armed Forces. The facts not only are being manipulated dishonestly; they are being hushed up. It was clearly not without design, for example, that the American side still has not made public recordings it unquestionably has of reports from aboard the Boeing-747 and of conversations with the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft located in the vicinity of Kamchatka at the very same time, and other materials relating to the matter.

The tone in this dirty antisoviet campaign is being set by none other than President Reagan himself. His fierce hatred for socialism which has predominated in the president's latest speeches would suffice for several London speeches where the "free world" was called upon for a "crusade." In his September speeches Mister President first quotes the Bible, then grandiloquently reflects on truth and morality, and later curses communism and the Soviet Union almost in a foul language, becoming heated from his own malice. Here is a sample of the expressions of this "morality": "Plague take them!"

But what "morality" and what God and Bible can Reagan talk about (by the way, he considers himself a believer) when, as reported in the press, agents of his subordinate CIA went to the point of installing radiotechnical espionage equipment in the room where elections of the present Pope took place! Judging from everything, those in Washington immediately easily forget about the all-seeing and all-knowing God when the highest administration representatives wish to be all-seeing and all-knowing.

As emphasized at a 9 September press conference held in Moscow for Soviet and foreign journalists by the USSR Ministry of Defense and USSR MID [Ministry of

Foreign Affairs], the moment for antisoviet provocation was not chosen at random. The world public now is awaiting radical solutions to major problems of importance to all humankind. Above all, these are problems of stopping the arms race and of making a substantial reduction in strategic and nuclear weapons in Europe. This requires the presence of trust and detente, but the U.S. administration's plans are different. They reduce to aggravating the international situation even more and striving for a build-up in existing mass destruction weapons and the creation of new kinds.

This is why the provocational act was undertaken with the South Korean spy-plane, about which a noisy antisoviet campaign unfolded. It stands to reason that it is hardly convenient for its organizers to admit that Washington's special services have made it a practice for a long while to collect intelligence with the help of spyplanes.

...One March day in 1981 a report about an air disaster arrived at the U.S. Air Force command post. More than 20 persons had died and several were missing. That was the number of sacrifices of this incident which occurred with an American aircraft. The American AP agency passed on the announcement of the crash with a reference to a Pentagon representative. That is how it appeared in the press. Well, air crashes do occur and no particular significance might have been attached to the AP report. Might have been, had it not been for two circumstances. First of all, it was not just some aircraft, but an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. Secondly, the crash occurred in the vicinity of the Aleutian Islands, not far from the USSR's far-eastern borders. And so the report transmitted by AP about the crash of the American reconnaissance aircraft in far-eastern waters two years ago confirmed that the Pentagon makes it a practice to fly spyplanes along the borders of the Soviet Union, and not only in the Far East.

...It was an ordinary flying day at the American Air Force base at Mildenhall, located on British soil. The customary order was disrupted somewhat only by television cameramen and journalists who arrived at the base for filming. Everything was going according to a previously agreed plan, but suddenly staff officers began to fidget and become nervous. Finally U.S. Air Force representatives became fully disconcerted when the not-unknown U-2 spyplane which came in for a landing appeared right in the focus of the television cameras. This was not at all included in the scenario, for hitherto the Yankees officially denied that the spyplanes were stationed at the base. Attempting to conceal with its left hand the fact of the U-2's basing at Mildenhall from the indignant British public, the American command obviously did not know what the right hand was doing. The fact is that AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, journal of the American Air Force, admitted the following without beating about the bush: Specialists of a signal intelligence squadron were performing duty at Mildenhall. The equipment they operated was intended for collecting intelligence during spyplane flights to the borders of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member nations.

Special aircraft with radiotechnical reconnaissance gear aboard have been used more and more widely of late in the interests of Washington's espionage

agencies. They are based at American air bases in England, the FRG, Turkey, Cyprus, Japan and South Korea and are employed for electronic espionage against the USSR and other socialist countries. In addition to the RC-135, the not-unknown U-2 aircraft continues to be sent out for aerial electronic reconnaissance. At one time one of them was shot down by Soviet missilemen as it attempted to fly over USSR territory. As the American press reported, a decision was made not long ago to modernize the U-2. The first models of the new spyplane, which was designated the TR-1, already have been made operational. It was announced that they would be making spy flights from British airfields. As with similar U-2 and SR-71 aircraft, the new spyplanes will be produced by the Lockheed aviation construction corporation, which has become skilled at manufacturing such products.

The specialists of aerial electronic espionage now rest great hopes on AWACS--airborne radar warning and control--aircraft. The Pentagon allocated \$2.5 billion for this superspy undertaking. A civilian aircraft, the Boeing-707 passenger liner, was taken as the basis for designing the airborne superspy. In one of the first advertised flights on the European continent the Boeing flew along the borders of the GDR with highly placed Bundeswehr representatives aboard. The West German generals thus were able to see the spyplane's capabilities "in action." A majority of North Atlantic Alliance member nations decided to purchase AWACS aircraft. As reported in the foreign press, AWACS aircraft based at West German airfields will carry out communications and electronic intelligence espionage against the GDR, CSSR and PNR. By the way, they already are making reconnaissance flights both in Europe and the Far East.

The following fact cannot be ignored. AWACS aircraft also are intended for guiding to targets the American medium-range missiles which the United States and NATO intend to station in countries of Western Europe. These aircraft also can be used for control in combat as airborne command posts. The press has reported that their onboard EVM's [electronic computers] can coordinate and direct the course of several battles simultaneously and jam "enemy" radar centers and communications. Reviewers note that deployment of the AWACS aircraft, which is planned to be completed prior to 1987, is an unprecedented step in NATO's preparation for "limited" nuclear war in Europe.

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Those are the facts which Washington's "crusaders," armed with radio espionage gear, now prefer not to mention. On the other hand, mountains of lies about the incident with the South Korean spyplane are piling up there in front of the microphones and television cameras and in the press. Antennas of subversive radio stations send this unpardonable lie over the air in dozens of languages night and day. By the way, one shouldn't be surprised at this. "Our leaders," writes the American journal NATION, "are well-known masters of brainwashing. They lied to us about Vietnam, about the Bay of Pigs, about Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua, they lied about reconnaissance flights by the U-2 and RC-135 aircraft, and they lied concerning Watergate..."

It is not the notorious "hand of Moscow," about which our class and ideological enemies now lament desperately in all "voices," but the quite specific, dirty hand of the "crusaders" from the U.S. espionage agencies that is apparent in many subversive acts aimed against peace and mutual understanding of nations. Deception of world public opinion as well as of its own people obviously now has become one of the tools of Washington's rash, adventuristic foreign policy.

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## EDITORIAL ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 83 (signed to press 3 Nov 83) pp 3-8

[Editorial: "Persistently Increase Combat Readiness"]

[Text] A matter of days separate the Soviet Armed Forces from the beginning of a new training year. Extensive preparatory work has been conducted among the troops and in the fleets, with everything being done to assure that personnel enter this new training year in an organized manner and that they work conscientiously and productively to accomplish the difficult, responsible missions assigned the Motherland's defenders by the Communist Party, Soviet state and USSR minister of defense.

The patriotic enthusiasm generated by resolutions of the June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum and the filial pride in the Soviet people's heroic labor achievements are fused indivisibly in soldiers with the feeling of high responsibility for the country's security. The new year has to be begun under conditions of a sharp aggravation of the international situation and heightened military danger on the part of imperialism. An assessment of the adventuristic militaristic course of the present U.S. administration which presents a serious threat to peace was provided with exhausting completeness and substantiation in the Statement by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov.

With no consideration for the interests of other states and nations and in an attempt to assure for itself a dominant position in the world, the United States of America is carrying out an unprecedented build-up of military potential and widescale programs for the production of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons, and it is planning to extend the unchecked arms race even to space. Under all kinds of far-fetched, false pretexts, Washington is expanding the network of military bases--springboards for aggression--located thousands of kilometers from the United States but in the immediate vicinity of countries of the socialist community. More and more it is drawing other NATO countries into the implementation of its dangerous plans and it is bending furious efforts at regenerating Japanese militarism.

For the sake of achieving their imperial goals and egotistical interests, American leaders are capable of any adventure and are not above any means.

This also is confirmed by the "crusade" against socialism as a social system openly declared by President Reagan, by the cynical concepts of Pentagon strategists about the possibility of "limited" nuclear war and delivery of a preemptive first nuclear strike, and the refined provocation arranged by U.S. special services using the South Korean aircraft.

As the Statement emphasizes, we will be able to ensure our country's security and that of our friends and allies under all conditions. The Soviet Union's peaceloving policy, good will and desire to come to an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis should not be taken as a sign of weakness by anyone. The Soviet Union is able to offer an appropriate response to any attempt to break the existing military-strategic balance, and its word will not deviate from its actions. "Soviet citizens can be sure," said Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, "that our country's defenses are at such a level that I wouldn't advise anyone to arrange a test of strength."

Army and Navy personnel undividedly support the Leninist party's domestic policy aimed at the people's welfare and happiness and its firm, peaceloving foreign policy course. They show their monolithic solidarity about the CPSU and their dedication to its ideals by zealous fulfillment of the sacred duty defined by the USSR Constitution of reliably defending the socialist homeland and being in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

The past training year was lived by personnel of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms under the sign of an increase in vigilance and combat readiness and a steadfast struggle for implementing resolutions of the 26th party congress and the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU CC plenums. The overwhelming majority of units [soyedineniye and chast'] and ships fulfilled training plans and programs and their socialist pledges completely and with higher quality, and they took a perceptible step forward in improving the level of field, air and naval schooling and the personnel's tactical-weapons training, in mastering equipment and weapons, and in strengthening discipline and efficiency. In final problems and exercises, in inspections, and in performing missile launches and field firings personnel demonstrated their actual readiness to defend socialism's achievements reliably, their military proficiency, and their ability to wage modern combat competently and resolutely on the land, in the air and at sea against a strong enemy in the most difficult situation.

High results in combat and political training and in fulfilling socialist pledges were achieved in particular by personnel of the missile unit [chast'] headed by Lt Col A. Pavlov, of the Irkutsk-Pinsk Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet, of the Proskurov-Berlin Guards Tank Regiment imeni G. I. Kotovskiy, of the guards bomber regiment headed by Gds Lt Col V. Tatarchenko, of the guards surface-to-air missile unit [chast'] commanded by Gds Lt Col V. Nechayev, of the nuclear-powered strategic submarine commanded by Capt 1st Rank A. Samokhvalov, and of many other military collectives.

The experience of foremost units and ships indicates once again with all persuasiveness that stable successes in improving combat readiness are achieved

where the party's modern demands and complexity of the international situation are taken most fully into account in political and organizational work and where people have a deep realization of the presence of the real danger of war; where the training and indoctrination process is arranged precisely, firm regulation order is maintained and combat training is conducted intensively, without indulgences or oversimplifications; and where the leading role of party and Komsomol members is in fact assured in training, competition and discipline and where a moral atmosphere of concerted work, mutual exactingness and irreconcilability toward any manifestation of unconcern, conceit or self-complacency has been formed.

Take for example the missile unit where Gds Maj G. Murav'yev is the party organization secretary and which confirmed the title of outstanding for several years in a row. Why are the results in performance of operational readiness duty, accomplishment of operational training missions and mastery of equipment and weapons invariably high here from year to year? It is above all because the commander, political officer and party organization use joint efforts to bring the party's demands to the personnel's hearts and minds and they instil a feeling of personal participation in the unit's combat readiness and an acute sense of responsibility as sentries of the homeland's forward edge in literally every missileman. The people clearly realize that keeping the powerful weapons in constant readiness for tactical employment depends on all of them without exception and so they learn and work to their utmost. A climate of comradely mutual help, intolerance toward deficiencies and a healthy dissatisfaction with what already has been achieved reigns in the collective.

Comprehensive readiness of command-political personnel and all personnel for combat and for accomplishing missions which arise suddenly is the chief index of the quality status of troops and naval forces. As pointed out by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, combat readiness cannot bear a temporary, seasonal nature or freeze at some level; it must be elevated and improved constantly. The main efforts of commanders, political entities, staffs, the party and Komsomol organizations and all servicemen must be directed at this so that no surprises catch them unawares.

Military affairs do not mark time. Weapons and equipment and the methods of their tactical employment are being perfected, the scope of missions being accomplished by the Armed Forces is growing and the nature of the missions is becoming more complicated. In addition, each year the personnel of units and ships experience a considerable turnover. Consequently, the level of tactical schooling and tactical teamwork which was achieved yesterday cannot remain unchanged today, let alone become obsolete tomorrow. An increase in combat readiness is a vital necessity demanding constant progress both in operational-tactical and combat training and in the ideological, political, moral-psychological and physical conditioning of personnel and in the strengthening of discipline and efficiency.

The combat and political training plans themselves envisage such progress. The task is for the commanders, political entities and staffs, with reliance on the assistance of party and Komsomol organizations, to assure from the first

days the strict fulfillment of missions assigned to the units and ships exactly at the designated times and with high quality, and to mobilize the personnel for intensive and effective training. Combat readiness is forged by the personnel's daily conscientious, military labor on operational readiness duty, in problems and in exercises. It is therefore very important that every training day and hour be used with maximum return. Much depends here above all on commanders, staffs and logistical workers who are called upon to plan precisely, organize rationally and provide logistical support to every field and naval exercise, every flying day and every class at training centers, ranges, tank training areas and unit firing ranges.

We cannot permit a repetition of such negative phenomena as where last year personnel in some places wasted valuable training time due to lack of coordination in planning in the unit headquarters and subunits and omissions in preparation of the training facility. For example, the organization of tactical and weapons training classes left much to be desired in the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Gds Maj N. Chentsov. They often were conducted in violation of planning schedules, or would be disrupted entirely due to lack of preparedness of the instructors or the training facility. Such deficiencies also occurred in the tank battalion headed by Gds Maj V. Tkachev, where once even before firings the equipment was not checked thoroughly and weapons were not zeroed. Any lack of coordination and any display of disorganization dampen the people's ardor. The surest path to their prevention and complete eradication is an intensification of indoctrinational work and an increase in exactingness through official and party lines toward officers of the headquarters entities.

Officer personnel have a deciding role to play in arranging an effective training and indoctrination process. Competency, efficiency, a keen sense of new things, a high sense of responsibility, exactingness toward themselves and subordinates, and an ability to note and support initiatives promptly and mobilize the personnel's will and energy to accomplish the difficult missions are those qualities which now are most needed by the military leader and which allow him to control his entrusted military collective firmly. Commanders, political entities and party organizations are called upon to work constantly on shaping and establishing such qualities in the officers, to be concerned with broadening their ideological-theoretical horizons and improving the quality of command training, and to arm them with foremost methodology and a knowledge of military science, pedagogics and psychology. It is important to see to it that a commander of any rank above all grows as an organizer and indoctrinator and as the creator of combat, and that he is able to think and act under conditions of an extremely rigid time limit and under enormous moral-psychological and physical stresses. Proper actions are taken in those units where wide use is made of military-science conferences, instructional methods classes, demonstration classes, an exchange of experience, and practical assistance to young commanders by experienced commanders in the training and indoctrination of officers.

Expert mastery of weapons and combat equipment is an important element of combat readiness. The movement which unfolded in the last training year in the

Armed Forces under the motto "A higher level of mastery for new equipment!" produced good results and facilitated an increase in the number of masters of combat qualification and highly rated specialists. It is advisable to reinforce and develop comprehensively the experience which was gained. The task is for all soldiers without exception to have a thorough knowledge of their entrusted weapons and equipment and to be able to use them in different kinds of combat with maximum effect. Along with scheduled classes and practices in technical and special training, a significant role in accomplishing this task also is played by well-arranged military-technical propaganda, socialist competition for a higher class rating, and contests for the title of best subunit, unit or ship specialist. In short, there are places here where efforts can be applied and where concern and creative initiative can be displayed both by command-political personnel as well as the party and Komsomol organizations and all soldiers.

It is generally known that modern weapons and combat equipment can produce the proper effect only if they are in capable and reliable hands and if their study and the mastery of tactical methods of their employment is combined with a further improvement in the personnel's field, air and naval schooling, with the development of tactics and operational art, and with tactical teamwork training of the subunits, units and ships. In other words, we must not simply acquire the knowledge and ability to drive combat vehicles and fire accurately, but learn to fight a strong, crafty, technically well outfitted enemy and master the science of defeating him in any situation, including an unfavorable one.

The interests of combat readiness insistently demand strict observance of the immutable principle of training of Army and Navy forces--teach them what will be required in war; teach them the art of conducting modern offensive and defensive combat day and night on the plains and on mountainous, desert, wooded and marshy terrain. It is exceptionally important to have the training approximate to the maximum the conditions of combat reality, prevent indulgences and oversimplifications, attune the personnel to overcome difficulties, hardships and deprivations steadfastly by all forms and methods of ideological influence and party-political work, and explain to the personnel that should a modern war with use of mass destruction weapons be unleashed by the imperialists it will place unprecedentedly high demands on their tactical schooling, emotional strength, psychological stability and physical conditioning.

In understanding the nature and features of modern combined-arms, air and naval combat and in acquiring skills in its competent organization and precise control, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of troop, fleet, command and staff, and tactical field fire exercises. They permit integration of different kinds of combat training with tactics and with the personnel's moral-political and psychological conditioning, and they place participants in such a situation, such circumstances and such a development of events which requires them to have boldness of thought and action, valor, courage, military cunning, daring, an ability to surpass the enemy in tactics and impose one's will on him, and the ability to execute an order at all costs.

The effectiveness and quality of combat training and successful accomplishment of the new training year's tasks will be predetermined to a considerable extent by the ideological-political maturity and conscientious attitude of officers and all personnel toward fulfilling official obligations and military duty. Hence the need for further intensification of ideological, political indoctrination and all party-political work in light of contemporary party demands and the need for elevating the role and influence of political entities and party organizations on all aspects of military life. The key element in party-political work remains the mobilization of personnel to fulfill resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU CC plenums, rallying Soviet military personnel even closer about the Communist Party and its Central Committee, and instilling in them a spirit of utter dedication to the Motherland and the cause of communism, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism; unremitting vigilance; and class hatred for imperialism.

The work of explaining the Statement by the CPSU CC general secretary and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium which has begun in the Army and Navy must be expanded and deepened comprehensively. Reaching the personnel's hearts and minds with the ideas, provisions and conclusions of this document of enormous historical importance, a true manifesto of peace and of the Leninist peaceloving foreign policy of the Land of Soviets, and defining precisely the tasks stemming from it for strengthening ideological-political indoctrination and improving vigilance and combat readiness is a matter of prime importance for commanders, political officers, propagandists, all party members and the military press.

Reports and elections of party entities now taking place permit a search for reserves and capabilities and the outlining of ways for a further improvement in the party organizations' spirit; the party members' public activeness and their influence on the quality of personnel training and indoctrination, on the strengthening of discipline and on ensuring a tie with life; and improvement in the offensive nature of ideological work, agitation and propaganda. Report-election meetings almost everywhere are taking place in an atmosphere of efficiency, principle, criticism and self-criticism. The question is being raised quite correctly at these meetings to the effect that the role of political nucleus of the military collective and center of daily ideological indoctrination activity is best accomplished by a party organization when every party member is an example in training, service and discipline and when he carries party ideas and demands daily into the soldier masses. It is important that action follow the word everywhere.

The majority of personnel in units, aboard ships and in subunits are Komsomol members or young people. Komsomol organizations can do much to mobilize them for conscientious military work and for developing in them high moral-political and ethical qualities and an active position in life. To this end it is necessary to give Komsomol work high ideological direction, plunge more boldly into the pressing problems which genuinely trouble young people, get rid of bureaucratic overregulation and sham hullabaloo, and wage a decisive fight against deviations from the standards of communist morality. The spirit of Army and Navy Komsomol organizations is directly related to the level of

party management of their activity, but managing the work of a young people's collective does not at all mean coddling it or accustoming the activists to parasitism, which still happens in places. The best method of indoctrinating Komsomol members and young people is not to lecture them, but assign them responsible work, support their undertakings and develop their own initiative.

Socialist competition is a tested means for mobilizing personnel for strenuous training, developing their communist attitude toward military labor, and developing their creative initiative. Now, when pledges are being made for the new training year, we must be guided steadfastly by lines of the November and June CPSU CC plenums and the decree recently adopted by the Party Central Committee about improving the organization and practice of summarizing socialist competition results and providing incentives for its winners. We must direct the personnel's patriotic aspirations, enthusiasm and energy above all at improving quality indicators in accomplishing combat and political training missions, at improving combat readiness and at developing economy and thrift; we must make fuller use of competition's indoctrinational opportunities.

Successes in training and competition and high combat readiness are inconceivable without strong discipline and firm regulation order. The party teaches that the strengthening of discipline is not a campaign, but painstaking work with people, and that the essence of socialist discipline lies in its conscious nature and each person's all-out effort at his or her work station. Based on this, the commanders, political entities, staffs and party organizations must use joint efforts to develop the personnel's high degree of execution. Experience shows that only by developing people's attitude toward orders and the demands of regulations and the oath as toward an inviolable law and only with precise organization of troop duty and the personnel's life and everyday routine can we achieve unconditional and quality fulfillment of training plans and programs, class schedules and the order of the day, and assure effective combat training.

It also must be remembered that the personnel's attitude toward work also depends on the concern shown for satisfying their needs, good arrangement of meals and of everyday-cultural and medical services, and housing and everyday services support to servicemen and members of their families. Attention to people and concern for a person must permeate each administrator's work style. Senior chiefs and party organizations must demand strict accounting of those who permit a heartless, formally bureaucratic attitude toward soldiers' life and everyday routine.

At the present troubled time Soviet military personnel realize their responsibility for the Motherland's security and for reliable defense of socialism's achievements with special clarity. They are sparing no effort or energy for a further improvement in combat readiness in the new training year. They always are on guard, always ready to perform their patriotic and international duty with honor and provide a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

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## RELATIONSHIP OF DEFENSE EFFORT, ECONOMY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 83 (signed to press 3 Nov 83) pp 25-30

[Article by Col B. Korniyenko, candidate of economic sciences: "Structural Improvements in the USSR Economy: Features and Prospects"]

[Text] The USSR's economy is developing as a unified national economic complex. In the past years of the 11th Five-Year Plan there has been an improvement in planning and management, an increase in the effectiveness of public production, a significant growth in economic and scientific-technical potentials and a rise in the people's standard of living.

Here are just a few figures. In 1982 the volume of industrial production rose by six percent compared with 1980 and gross agricultural production increased from 122 to 125.8 billion rubles. Labor productivity in industry increased five percent over two years. The national income used for consumption and accumulation exceeded 500 billion rubles last year. The present year of 1983 is even more characteristic in the increased rates of development of public production and labor productivity. These achievements serve as a reliable base for a further growth in the Soviet economy.

"In our social development," said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in a speech at the June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum, "we now have approached that historic milestone where profound qualitative changes in productive forces and the corresponding improvement in production relations not only have matured, but have become inevitable. This is not just our wish, comrades; this is an objective necessity and we can't drive around it or go around it, as they say."

The party advanced the understanding of the mechanisms of developed socialism, especially economic mechanisms, as a primary task. It is only on a firm theoretical foundation that we can improve the forms of organization of economic life, better the economic mechanism, and choose reliable paths for increasing production efficiency. The experience of building communism in our country convinces us of this.

The rational structure of the economy is a component of the economic mechanism and a very important factor in accelerating the development of productive forces. It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that it is in the eighties and nineties that the national economic structure with which the USSR will enter the twenty-first century is laid down and created.

The structure of public production is varied and reflects sectorial, intersectorial, territorial and other proportions in the economy. Proportions of development of the production sphere are of decisive importance here. The national economy's structure is not fixed; it changes continuously under the effect of the economy itself and the influence of the scientific-technical revolution, socialist integration, defense interests and other factors. But this does not occur automatically; it does so on the basis of economic policy, which is called upon to reflect faithfully the objective needs of social development.

A steady process of further improvement of production structure now is under way in the country. Sectors which provide for progressive changes in the national economy and a stable, balanced, expanded reproduction are developing at outstripping rates in the 11th Five-Year Plan. This relates to industry as a whole and to many of its sectors. There is a rise in industry's proportion in creation of gross national product and national income.

Special attention is given to sectors which support scientific-technical progress: power engineering, chemistry, petrochemistry, precision machinebuilding, instrument making, and production of computer technology, means of automation, and equipment. Machinebuilding is the heart of heavy industry and its rates of development continue to be high. Its production volume will rise 40 percent during the five-year plan. The USSR holds a leading place in the world in production of machine tools, power and metallurgical equipment, tractors, grain harvesters, diesel engines, electric locomotives, bulldozers, self-propelled and construction cranes, bearings, diamond tools and other products.

As noted at the June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum, enormous work to create vehicles, machinery and technologies both of today and tomorrow lies in store for us. We must automate production and assure widest application of computers and robots and the introduction of flexible technology permitting rapid and effective reorganization of production for the manufacture of new products.

Scientific-technical progress under socialism also supports social progress. The proportion of manual labor will be reduced on the basis of comprehensive mechanization and automation of production. Hundreds of thousands of people will have an opportunity to work under other more favorable conditions. They will experience greater satisfaction from their work and its results.

Technology is called upon to assume the heavy, monotonous operations and form conditions for people's creativeness. Introduction of the latest machines will allow preserving the workers' health and making the best conditions for professional training of each toiler. Such an approach to matters meets the humane objective of socialism where the fruits of the scientific-technical revolution are used for the people's welfare and for the individual's improvement.

Preferential development of sectors manufacturing final products is an important structural improvement in the national economy. This means that growth rates of the effectiveness of the processing industry will become higher to the extent that raw materials are utilized better. Meanwhile, as noted by the

26th CPSU Congress, there now has to be a new approach to the extractive sectors as well. Today they are accounting for the primary share of capital investments. The demand for raw materials and energy carriers is growing constantly. Further successes of the entire national economy naturally depend largely on an improvement in the efficiency of the extractive industry.

Scientific-technical progress being adopted in all production phases including the extraction of raw materials is reflected to the greatest extent in the output of products. It is a question of a more rational use of natural wealth. The economy's turn to thorough processing of raw materials helps reduce the materials consumption of articles and helps preserve resources. Let us refer to the following example. Raw materials and goods make up only half of the gross national product. A reduction in the materials consumption of manufactured articles only by one percent is equivalent to the manufacture of additional products worth more than six billion rubles. Among the practical problems arising also are those such as obtaining materials with preset properties, development of biotechnology, and use of waste-free and energy-saving technologies in industry.

The structure of the country's fuel budget continues to improve. An increase in production of electrical energy in the European USSR will be obtained basically from new atomic power stations and better use of hydroelectric power stations and, in eastern regions, thanks to construction of major GES [hydroelectric power stations] and extensive use of cheap coals of the Ekibastuz and the Kansk-Achinsk basins and the natural and petroleum-associated gas from fields of Western Siberia. The future of Soviet power engineering above all lies in use of the latest atomic reactors and over the long range in practical resolution of the problem of controllable thermonuclear fusion.

There are obvious progressive improvements in the economy's structure as a result of a comprehensive development of the agro-industrial complex. The proportionality and balance of its sectors on the basis of unified management is being improved. Much attention is turning to an increase in the production of grain, meat and fodders and the preservation of agricultural products. Ties between agriculture and various sectors of the economy are improving. Proportions are changing within the agrarian sector between the volume of products from crop raising and animal husbandry in favor of the latter.

The correlation of certain kinds of transportation in passenger and cargo movements is changing. Air and vehicular routes are seeing further development, with special significance being attached to the construction of new roads and an improvement of existing ones. In the near future, however, railroads will continue to occupy a dominant position in freight shipments. Through traffic on the BAM [Baikal-Amur Mainline] will open up in the 11th Five-Year Plan, which will allow development of a vast zone and put the natural resources of this area to use. The Far East will receive one more line of communications with Western Siberia, the Urals and the country's European center through an area to the north of Baikal. Creation of a unified transportation network at the USSR level, the interchangeability of individual kinds of transportation and an increase in their mobility, speed and efficiency are of national economic importance and at the very same time help strengthen our Motherland's economic and defense potentials.

Science, education and health are developing successfully, which also facilitates the growth in scientific potential and in quality of labor resources. Thirty-one million specialists now are employed in various sectors of the national economy. The rates of their training will accelerate and training quality will improve in the 11th Five-Year Plan, especially along new lines of science and technology and for the rapidly developing sectors of production and the sphere of services.

The territorial structure of production is being perfected and the relationship in manufacture of products is improving between the union republics and economic regions and between oblasts and other administrative units. Each union republic provides for comprehensive economic and social development with consideration of the accumulated national wealth, production capacities, natural conditions, and the number and qualification of labor resources. Such development has nothing in common with autarchy (the isolation of national sectors). Diverse inter-republic ties are assumed. The distribution of productive forces in union republics on a scientific basis was reflected in resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized in the report "Shest'desyat let SSSR" [USSR's 60th Anniversary] that today's productive forces demand integration even when it is a matter of different countries. They require a close and skilled combination of efforts of different regions and republics all the more in one and the same country. What will be of greatest benefit to each region, each nation and nationality as well as the entire state is the most intelligent use of natural and labor resources and climatic features of each republic and the most rational inclusion of this potential into the unionwide potential... It will be necessary to improve even further the distribution of productive forces, regional specialization and cooperation, and the patterns of economic ties and shipments. It is of course no simple task, but it is urgent and its resolution promises considerable gain.

A shortage of labor resources has become a serious limiting factor in the distribution of production for a number of regions. In the past the increase in able-bodied population was distributed more or less proportionally to the size of the regions' populations, but substantial changes are beginning in the 1980's. For example, over the next 20 years approximately two-thirds of the increase in labor resources is expected from republics of Central Asia and the southern parts of Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the industrial-production capacities basically are in the European part of the country and fuel-energy resources in Siberia and the Far East. When we consider that the RSFSR concentrates approximately 60 percent of the unionwide economic potential, the shift in the increase in labor resources complicates the problem of using that potential. The Baikal-Amur Mainline] is being built on the republic's territory, primary areas for production of petroleum, natural gas, coal and other minerals are being developed, the Nonchernozem is being developed and the majority of territorial-production complexes is being set up in the republic. This presumes an augmentation of labor resources in a number of regions, especially Siberia and the Far East, from the youth of the southern republics. Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress envisage the development of industry in the European part of the country and in the Urals basically through the renovation

and retooling of existing enterprises without an increase in the number of people employed here, and new construction to be carried out in Siberia, the Far East and in regions with a surplus labor force.

The general direction in the territorial distribution of the country's productive forces is a shift to the eastern regions, whose relative share in the overall volume of production in the USSR is continually increasing. The economic potential of the eastern part of the country will build up in the 11th Five-Year Plan and in the distant future. Siberia is characterized by an accelerated growth in the fuel industry, electric power engineering, nonferrous metallurgy, the chemical, petrochemical, timber, pulp and paper, wood processing and microbiological industries, and the construction industry. The food base is strengthening here and the housing and municipal services and cultural and personal services sector is expanding. The importance of eastern regions is rising especially in the supply of fuel, energy and mineral resources to the country. For example, on the whole Siberia's share in the increase of fuel in the past five-year plan was 90 percent and it will rise in the future right up until the end of the 20th century.

The northern regions, with 45 percent of the Soviet Union's area, also hold an important place in the territorial distribution of productive forces. This territory has major deposits of many kinds of valuable minerals as well as enormous reserves of hydraulic power and extensive timber resources. In particular, large reserves of coal, petroleum, natural gas, iron and copper-nickel ores, tin, titanium, gold, platinum, wolfram and aluminum resources have been discovered here. The mineral wealth of the Arctic Ocean's continental shelf is significant.

Development of productive forces in the North bears a nodal character. Placing the Tyumen-Tobolsk-Surgut railroad in operation and developing air, motor vehicle and other kinds of transportation in these areas is of inestimable importance for the region's development.

Accomplishment of tasks outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress will mean a new step toward development of productive forces, a further improvement in the nation's life and the solution of other social problems, which emphasizes the creative nature and peaceful direction of our plans.

We are not supporters of competition in the military area which imperialism is imposing on us. At the same time, we cannot help but reckon with the unprecedented aggravation of the international situation and attempts by imperialist forces to break the existing military-strategic balance between the two world systems in their favor. "Attainment of this balance," stated Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "is one of the most important results of recent decades. It required a great deal of effort and means of our people and peoples of other countries of the socialist community, and we will not permit the balance to be broken. We will continue to do everything necessary to assure the security of our own country and of our friends and allies, and we will increase the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are a powerful factor for deterring the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist reaction."

Strengthening the physical base of defense places an imprint on the economy's structure and the level of its technical outfitting. The extent of the economy's influence on defense now is determined largely not so much by the quantity of a particular manufactured product as on the presence of modern sectors and a rational sectorial and territorial structure of the national economy.

Today there must be that set of sectors which supports the production of nuclear missile weapons, new kinds of aircraft, tanks, ships, artillery weapons, electronic instruments, telemechanics capabilities and so on. The development of military affairs is not standing still. Technical progress leads to the appearance of new weapons, and it is not just any economy that is capable of doing this, but only an economy with a rational structure.

Let us refer to the example of the Great Patriotic War. From 1938 through 1940 the USSR introduced up to 2,000 giants of Soviet industry at the cost of enormous efforts, with a growth in output of machinebuilding having special defense significance. Despite the difficulties of relocating hundreds of plants and despite the smaller economic base, our country produced approximately twice the combat equipment of Hitler Germany during the war. The decisive advantages of socialism--its capability of redistributing resources on a planned basis and using them better--were a telling factor.

An improvement in the national economic structure continued after the war. Aggressive intrigues by imperialists, especially the Americans, forced our country to strengthen its defenses. Under these conditions it was necessary to create qualitatively new means of warfare, which accelerated the development of previously unknown sectors: atomic machinebuilding, missile building, electronics and others.

Machinebuilding and metal working are developing at the highest rates of all sectors of industrial production. In 1981 the output volume of machinebuilding exceeded the prewar level by 109 times. The proportion of machinebuilding and metal working in industrial products comprised almost 30 percent. Relying on its own material-technical base and having a contemporary production organization, skilled workers, technicians, engineers and scientists, the USSR will not permit a lag in the military-technical field. Today's level of development of the Soviet economy, science and technology fully permits our country to accomplish the most difficult tasks in the military-technical area successfully. The USSR is capable of creating any kind of weapon on which the enemies of peace would like to rely, whether it be the MX missiles, cruise missiles or some other kind of weapon. With a powerful economic potential and scientific-technical base, our country provides the Armed Forces with the latest means of warfare permitting missions to be accomplished under the most difficult tactical conditions.

The territorial shifts of production also have a defense significance. As shown by historical experience, the party's work on the eve of the Great Patriotic War to distribute productive forces rationally, to set up new industrial centers, especially in the eastern part of the country, and to construct duplicate plants played an exceptional role in the Soviet Union's economic and military victory. In mid-1943 eastern regions were manufacturing 76 percent

of all war products. The Urals alone were producing more tanks and artillery than all of Germany together with the occupied countries of Europe.

A comprehensive development of particular regions, development of territorial-production complexes, and a certain shift to the North and East in developing industrial production acquires particular importance under present-day conditions.

High mobility and flexibility in case of necessity allow a reduction in the time for reorganizing the economy on a wartime footing. There is an increase in the importance of economic readiness and comprehensive development of the economy of union republics and economic regions. As USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov remarked, we are forced to speak about our readiness for defense and about the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces in order to cool off certain hotheads overseas as well as in Europe itself who conceitedly think of themselves as rulers of the destiny of humankind and who by their rash actions are placing the world at the brink of a general nuclear catastrophe.

It also must be noted that formation of a regional structure of production in our country is occurring with consideration of foreign economic ties, and economic and scientific-technical cooperation with socialist states above all. A process of optimization is occurring in the structure of the economy at the level of CEMA member nations. A qualitatively new level of socialist integration lies in the future and this will reliably strengthen both the national economies and the overall economic potential of the entire socialist community. Herein lies a guarantee of high defensive capability of world socialism.

And so perfection of the structure of public production and improvement in the distribution of productive forces act as an important factor for increasing the effectiveness of the national economy and strengthening the defense might of the Soviet Union and socialist community as a whole.

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## SEA DUTY PROVIDES BEST TRAINING BASE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 83 (signed to press 3 Nov 83) pp 34-39

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Moskalev: "The Sea Teaches and Tests"]

[Text] Preparations were under way aboard the patrol ship "Bezukoriznenny" for a tactical antisubmarine exercise. Classes and practices were being conducted intensively and the most experienced specialists were carefully adjusting parameters of the search sonars and the antisubmarine weapons. The commander, political officer, and party and Komsomol activists focused their primary efforts on indoctrinational work with personnel of the ship's ASW team.

Suddenly came a radio message from the flagship. The planned exercise was being postponed and the ship was to proceed to another part of the Mediterranean to perform a completely different training mission.

It was necessary to proceed to the designated area of operations (where, according to preliminary intelligence, a detachment of "enemy" ships was located) at emergency speed for several tens of hours. During this time of course the "enemy" also would not be standing still, but it was not known what direction he would be heading. Under these conditions the problems of accident-free, undetected operation, long-range radar surveillance, and a thorough analysis and precise estimate of the surface and air situation became especially acute. And so now the role of first fiddle rested with the engineering department, the electronics division, and teams of the primary control station and combat information center. Consequently, the navymen of these very subunits above all had to be mobilized for strenuous work and helped to realize their responsibility.

Ship's commanding officer Capt 3d Rank A. Rimashevskiy issued precise instructions to subunit officers about making changes in training plans and in the procedure for organizing the underway watch, then together with his political deputy Capt 3d Rank A. Kostenich he did everything to orient the personnel on successful performance of the new mission.

The commander explained the substance and complexity of the mission to the navymen in a brief address to the crew over the general announcing system. His political deputy promptly briefed the party and Komsomol aktiv about unfolding

party-political work in the watch sections. A meeting of the personnel was held and then the political officer, party organization secretary and Komsomol committee secretary went around the battle stations to chat with the personnel and remind them about vigilance and about each person's role and place in maintaining the ship's battle readiness.

One could judge how effective the party members' party influence and call were from how the crew burned with desire to pass the difficult test with honor. Concerned with overall success, the most experienced specialists of the engineering, electronics and navigation subunits volunteered to stand a double watch, and everyone on whom the outcome of the difficult tactical encounter with the detachment of "enemy" ships depended worked with a total output of energy and knowledge. Personnel of the "Bezukoriznenny" performed the mission assigned to them suddenly in the best manner.

Accomplishment of opportunity missions is a rather frequent phenomenon on lengthy sea and ocean deployments, which have become the basic form of the Navy's operational training activity. These deployments rightly are called the best school of combat and naval schooling. Here is where navymen receive firm knowledge, develop skills and acquire the moral-combat qualities needed for victory in modern combat. It is here, in the immediate proximity of the planet's "hotspots," where imperialism intentionally whips up tension and provokes military conflicts and where the "neighborhood" of naval and air forces of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and fleets of other NATO countries is persistently imposed on our ships that the crews' vigilance and combat readiness is tested by the highest measure and simultaneously honed, and their spiritual potential is tested.

For this reason every long deployment also is an irreplaceable school of party-political work. Commanders, political workers and party activists master the ability to conduct it in a specific, purposeful manner, in a close tie with the difficult and responsible missions being accomplished by the personnel. When there is a sudden situation change in deployment areas it is necessary not only to make corrections to training plans and shift on an urgent basis from accomplishing one task to performing another, but also to reorganize party-political work promptly. Its organizers have to have a constant feel for the pulse of crew life and determine faultlessly the chief element in a particular situation, for without this the efforts of commanders, political workers, and the party and Komsomol organizations do not produce the proper return or are even expended for nothing. In order not to be without proof, I will cite what are in my view two rather instructive examples.

A group of ships was to conduct a tactical exercise in hunting and "killing" a submarine during a long deployment. Very thorough preparations to accomplish this difficult mission were made aboard each of them, including aboard the patrol ship commanded by Capt 3d Rank G. Antsifirov. Different versions of the hunt were drawn up, coordination and control problems were resolved and the proficiency of shipboard ASW teams was sharpened in numerous practices. Officers of the force [soyedineniye] staff who were on the deployment moved over to these ships to give practical help on the spot, and they gave it daily while working in real earnest to prepare the specialists, equipment and weapons for the exercise.

Party-political work also was directed wholly toward successful conduct of the exercise. Party and Komsomol meetings were held aboard the ships after which the party and Komsomol members came out as pioneers of competition under the motto "An excellent result for the upcoming ASW exercise!" The activists' group and individual talks with specialists who were part of the ASW team, and the daily radio newspapers and operational newsheets devoted to those same persons all were used to ensure that they had a deep realization of their leading role and responsibility in this phase of the deployment. In the meantime, other elements of the crews' combat readiness were ignored. The surface-to-air missilemen and gunners seemed to be in the shadows for some time, and proper attention was not given to the question of the ships' combat stability either along official or party-political lines.

The hunter-killer group in fact performed the ASW exercise effectively and demonstrated proficiency worthy of the highest praise, but in its final phase the senior officer present gave a narrative about an "enemy" air raid. Here is where the problems began: Here an air defense station operator received target designations late, there a gun crew was slow in opening fire... In short, the sudden mission was not executed in the best manner and the grade for the exercise as a whole was justifiably reduced.

Here is an example of a different sort. All factors of battle readiness were covered by party-political work equally at the beginning of a long deployment aboard the ship where Capt-Lt A. Galantsev was the party organization secretary until recently. Lectures and briefings were given regularly and talks were held about the difficult military-political situation in the deployment area and about the need for high vigilance. Working on an individual basis with party members, the party bureau persistently tried to ensure that each of them set the example in standing underway watches, in assuring navigation safety and all kinds of ship defense, and in the productive use of every deployment mile for perfecting combat and naval schooling. The upcoming torpedo firing was not singled out from the overall cycle of daily important tasks. To put it more accurately, it was discussed on a general plane. It is true that the head of the mine-torpedo department oriented his subordinates on the fact that preparations for performing the combat exercise were the primary element for them at the given period, but senior comrades, including the ship's political deputy, did not orient the navymen on the unusual or complicated nature of conditions nor did they give proper attention to the people's psychological reorientation. As a result, not all torpedomen functioned in a self-disciplined, responsible manner in accomplishing the fire mission.

It stands to reason that those aboard the ships and on the force staff learned lessons from the mistakes made both in the first and second instance. For example, these cases became a subject of a fundamental discussion at a party meeting in the staff party organization. Flag specialists Capt 3d Rank S. Bondar', Capt 3d Rank B. Karmanov and other officer-party members who were aboard the ships and took no steps to prevent the mistakes had to hear just criticism from their comrades. Most important, staff party members arrived at a unanimous opinion that the accomplishment of every specific training mission on a long deployment has to be approached with consideration of the actual situation and of the nature and essence of modern naval warfare, which is

fraught with the most unexpected development of events, and from a position of maintaining battle readiness of all shipboard subunits without exception at a high level.

There was a detailed discussion with ship commanders and political officers about this very thing at the first opportunity that presented itself. The force commander and senior political officers focused their attention once again on the need to accomplish altogether the tasks of tactical, weapons and special training, and of assuring the ship's ability to survive and her combat stability. Emphasis in party-political work must be placed on the personnel's moral-political and psychological conditioning so that nothing unexpected will catch them unawares or will shake their readiness to enter action and execute any order in the best manner. The experience gained in this regard aboard the patrol ship "Bezukoriznenny" was examined in detail at the seminar with benefit for its participants.

What is instructive in this experience? A very great deal, and above all the coordination in actions of the commander, political officer and party organization secretary and their common conviction that a crew has to be prepared for modern naval action comprehensively both in the military-technical and the moral-political and psychological sense. It is also their identical conviction that combat readiness begins with people's awareness, with each navyman's detailed understanding of the great state significance of difficult military work on deployment, and with a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective.

Hence the actual unity of political and organizational work, and of training and indoctrination. Hence the personnel's stable successes in improving the ship's battle readiness. The ships spent a large part of this training year, as well as of the past training year, on lengthy deployments in the Mediterranean. During the last deployment which ended recently the crew received an outstanding grade after having worked all their assigned missions with high quality and they confirmed the title of outstanding ship.

The sources of the collective's success lie in its cohesiveness and in the ability of the ship's command element and party organization to combine the struggle for the end goal of high battle readiness with objective organizational and indoctrinational work to mobilize the personnel for performing each training mission. As already demonstrated at the beginning of the article, based on missions and the situation they concentrate work in the subunits on which quality of mission accomplishment depends above all, but in so doing they do not bypass the other departments or divisions with their attention and influence. The crew conducts combat and all seamen, petty officers, warrant officers [michmany] and officers without exception are involved in the ship's battle readiness--this idea is persistently instilled in the navymen's awareness.

At first glance the party and Komsomol meetings discuss the very same issues and conduct the very same agitprop activities as aboard other ships, but their effectiveness is higher. Why? It is because they are tied in more closely with the people's life and specific work. Whether it be a party meeting discussion about increasing the party members' influence on the personnel's

development of political vigilance or on improving the quality of ASW training, both the report and the presentations during the discussion period always show a fundamental analysis of what each person's contribution is here. Those who are performing incomplete work, who are not showing proper activeness and who ignore deficiencies are mentioned by name. The party bureau monitors what follows a party member's word or his admission of mistakes and omissions and how he executes a decision. Individual talks by the secretary, hearing of accounts and reports at party bureau sessions, and an information briefing at the next party meeting are used for this purpose.

Let's take for example such a widespread form of training and indoctrination as specialist days. The very same sonarman's day aboard the "Bezukoriznenny" is filled with great meaning. The personnel not only deepen their knowledge and master the most effective, foremost techniques of detecting and classifying targets and maintaining stable contact, but also come to have a deeper understanding of their role and responsibility. As a rule, the commander, political officer and unit staff officers speak to them, explain the aggressive substance of the U.S. nuclear missile submarine strategy, and show with special estimates and calculations how much disaster can be wreaked by a single nuclear-powered submarine with strategic missiles aboard aimed at targets in our country and countries of the socialist community.

Or let's say a personnel meeting entitled "We are strong in fleet friendship" and a theme night entitled "The crew is a single combat family" were held aboard ship, and no one had to be made to say anything either at the meeting or at the theme night: There were many who desired to express their opinions. What was especially valuable, the people expressed their thoughts and views frankly and examined relationships in the collective and each other's actions and misdeeds from the position of the readiness of one and all for combat. People did not stint their good words addressed to the seamen who perform their duties in exemplary fashion and generously assist comrades in mastering tactical proficiency. There was criticism of those who through negligence, lack of diligence or incomplete training at times threatened to disrupt performance of the training mission and who at times displayed excess nervousness or crudeness. Party members from among first-term seamen and petty officers gave the discussion that direction.

I would like to note that the ship's commander, political officer, and party and Komsomol organizations show constant concern for maintaining a healthy moral-political climate in the collective, and this is understandable. Long separation from those near and dear, the irregular receipt of mail, high stress of underway watches and exercises and the stormy weather have a negative effect both on the people's mood and minds. It happens where someone loses control.

The commander requires officers (and the party organization requires party members) to know everything, to establish collectivist relationships in the crew and to fight negative phenomena.

Nothing goes unnoticed aboard ship: the chief boatswain's mate's angry shout laced with "salty" language at a young seaman who was slow in launching a

boat; the loud rattle of dice of those playing dominoes in the crew's accommodation where seamen are resting before going on night watch; or an unpalatable dinner the cook prepares. All such specific facts become a subject of critique, discussion and public condemnation. A real war was waged in the crew against those who love to clutter their speech with uncensored expressions. They fought this in the correct belief that it is a very minimum distance from the thoughtless disrespect of one's own human dignity and that of his comrades to nonregulation relationships.

What this produces is shown persuasively by the truly monolithic solidarity of the collective, the outstanding result of the long deployment, and the following frank statement by Smm N. Novikov: "We have the most friendly relations in our department," he said in a conversation. "When comrades ask how I feel during a storm, how I stood watch, how practices or an exercise went for me, and whether or not I am satisfied with my work, this is more than just pleasant. I realize the importance of my modest work for the collective and for the ship's battle readiness and I want to work even better."

No, the sea does not just give a strict test of the ship's battlereadiness or the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination work and all party-political work, but also teaches a great deal. This includes an attentive, thrifty attitude toward accumulated foremost experience. Much that is positive from the work practice of the commander, political officer and party organization of the "Bezukoriznenny" found practical application aboard other ships. For example, personal active participation in the personnel's ideological conditioning and a constant, lively contact with the people became a requirement for the overwhelming majority of our force's ship commanders. They meet the seamen, have heart-to-heart talks with them and speak to them on political and military topics considerably more often on long deployments than in base.

The immediate organizers of party-political work--deputy ship commanders for political affairs and subunit political officers--who have been on more than one long deployment usually perform this work objectively, purposefully and in a differentiated manner. Their assimilation of contemporary party demands and the increased desire to augment military-technical knowledge contributes to this. It is not only the experienced political workers such as captains 3d rank A. Kostenich and Yu. Sokolov and Capt-Lt Yu. Nuzhdin in particular, but also many young ones who have a firm knowledge of the theaters of operation, the content of operational training missions, tactical capabilities of equipment and weapons, and the probable enemy's capabilities and operating tactics.

For example, Sr Lt V. Peregudov, political deputy of the missile-artillery department, learned missile affairs so well that if necessary he can assume leadership of the collective and fire control. Subunit political worker Sr Lt P. Korobkin passed the tests for a class rating in the specialty of sonarman. It is understandable that this was not to substitute for one of his subordinates but in order to gain a deeper knowledge of the psychological features of sonarmen's work and the factors affecting results of their actions. He is well informed about which hour of watch it is when greatest fatigue sets in and hearing and perception are dulled and consequently when his heartening word is required. He knows which of the seamen and petty officers it is best to assign

to a joint watch with whom, who is capable of a four-hour target search in a storm and who should best be relieved after two hours. The subunit officer always heeds his advice. In general, military training permits the political workers to perform party-political work more concretely and productively by tasks and combat exercises.

And one more thing. Mistakes are corrected and deficiencies remedied rather quickly on a long deployment. The more acute political assessment of them by the measure of combat readiness and the situation itself do not permit standing still here for long. In any case, corrections were made in the shortest possible time in the organization of combat training and party-political work aboard the ships where Capt 3d Rank Antsifirov is commander and aboard which Capt-Lt Galantsev served. Subsequently the crews of these ships were placed under even more difficult conditions and their weapons, tactical and naval schooling and readiness for combat as a whole were tested exactly with surprise narrative problems. Each time they passed the test for military maturity with honor and received high grades.

Everything said above in no way means that there are no omissions or unused reserves or capabilities in party-political work performed on long deployments. Party members now are talking about this at the top of their voices at report-election meetings. This unquestionably will be discussed at the force party conference. Commanders, political workers and party organizations are taking steps to ensure that the people's indoctrination meets party demands and that each long deployment of ships is a real school of ideological-political, combat and moral-psychological conditioning of the navymen and a step up to new levels of battle readiness.

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## DECLINE IN UNIT EFFECTIVENESS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 83 (signed to press 3 Nov 83) pp 40-43

[Article by Lt Col V. Emirov: "Why Did the Company Surrender Its Position?"]

[Text] The past training year was another step in combat improvement for the personnel of this unit [chast']. Many subunits concluded training with outstanding indicators in combat and political training, but unfortunately there also was no escaping disappointment here: One of the companies lost the title of best company.

Of course it is not so simple to answer in one word the question as to why this happened, but certain conclusions suggest themselves automatically based on seemingly scattered facts.

Gds Capt A. Khromov's company had been in good repute for more than the first year now. It had held the title of outstanding over a number of years, many certificates and cups recognized successes of the motorized riflemen in socialist competition, and they took prize places at the regimental, division and military district levels. People came here to adopt experience in organizing the training and indoctrination process and reinforcing military discipline, and to borrow from the work style of the commander and party organization. The stable successes apparently generated a certain self-complacency in the collective.

The company received only a good grade for the winter training period. Personnel of the platoon which at that time was commanded by Officer V. Il'in showed poor tactical-weapons schooling in the final inspection and many NCO's did not fulfill socialist pledges in check firing. In short, the outstanding company clearly had begun to surrender its position.

For some reason none of this caused alarm in the regiment. The company continued to be described in superlatives. No one even attempted to delve into the reasons for the deterioration in the state of affairs.

The drop in training indicators was not accidental, however, and the collective already was living in two dimensions, as it were. Junior commanders were satisfied with very modest successes in socialist competition and some

officers did not stand out in their personal discipline. For example, Gds Lt S. Okunev might permit himself to be late or even not come to work. Everyone knew that the young officer had a fondness for alcohol, but they took a condescending attitude toward their colleague, as if to say: He knows his job and in addition has organizing abilities. Should dirty linen be aired? "No" was the decision in the subunit.

Gds Lt S. Prokhorov reports for duty punctually, but serious claims also can be laid against him. At times he may reassign the conduct of classes to an NCO while he himself operates according to a "personal plan." Once a meal had to be taken to personnel in the field urgently and Prokhorov was assigned as vehicle commander. The officer deemed it possible to arrange his own affairs first, seeing no trouble in the fact that the soldiers' mealtime would be put back through his fault. Although he is a good athlete, Prokhorov is in no hurry to help improve his subordinates' physical conditioning... In short, the person often places personal interests above public interests.

Are all these really facts which merit no attention? No, these probably are those very features which indicate that negative changes have occurred in the collective and attention to indoctrinational work has weakened; hence the slump in combat training.

It is in fact the truth that the collective's successes cannot be stable without the appropriate moral atmosphere, without the commanders' example and authority and without the party organizations' active influence on the people's opinions.

It is a special art to create a mood for work and for high end results in military labor. This requires a great sense of responsibility and the cohesive, coordinated efforts of all indoctrinators. Did it happen this way in fact?

Yes, the party members themselves set the example in training and service, as eloquently shown by the outstanding grades they have received in almost all kinds of training. The fact is, however, that officers Prokhorov and Okunev are next to the party members, working so-so, as they say, at odds with discipline. Just what hindered working seriously with these comrades and helping them take the correct path and rise to their level of combat schooling?

Or here is another question concerning party influence on the Komsomol organization's work. Did those in the company try to include Komsomol Member Prokhorov in social work? They did, but very timidly, and then hastened to put him down as passive. The Komsomol activists worked poorly to accept foremost privates into Komsomol ranks, and so many of them remained among the non-league youth. Unfortunately, the party organization gave attention to these facts only at the report-election meeting.

It would have been worthwhile for the party members to turn to the neighbors for experience as well in the matter of organizing socialist competition and strengthening military discipline, but they "refrained." Of course, it is a

delicate matter to recommend someone's experience. If a particular officer is advised to adopt what is best in a comrade he may take offense and see it as mistrust of himself. In short, the party members did not take this step and did not enrich their own experience with anything. It turns out that they had become complacent.

Let's reflect. The first half of the training year was not as successful for the motorized riflemen as had been the case previously. Perhaps in the summer period they decided to try to make up for lost time? Nothing of the sort: Now the company already is being satisfied by little things and accordingly is making lower pledges. It is difficult to assume that company officers, party members and Komsomol activists have been deprived entirely of a feeling of healthy ambition. Possibly they reasoned: "Is it really worthy of leaders to plan high goals again and not fulfill what is promised?" In fact, it is bad to give one's word a second time and not keep it. But to fill a past slogan with new content, use available reserves together in concert and persistently seek ways to improve training quality unquestionably is a task within the capability of a close-knit collective. Just what guided the officers, and the company commander above all?

"In the given instance Gds Capt Khromov obviously evaluated his own abilities and the state of affairs in the company realistically," said acting battalion commander Gds Maj N. Bardakov in explaining what happened.

"The company commander simply became confused and the very first failure discouraged him. Being accustomed to special attention and constant help on the part of senior officers apparently had an effect," is the opinion of battalion political deputy Gds Sr Lt Yu. Gaydar.

Of course, the decision made by the motorized riflemen might be the result of various reasons, including those above. Something else is important. What is seen here, in our view, is that psychological shift in the collective's general mood when it seemed that the old store of knowledge would fully provide a quiet life for the (in the past) best subunit, and that it was not bad to receive good grades instead of outstanding ones in the final inspection for the summer training period and allegedly would not require any special work.

It is generally known that a major difficult goal adds energy and a sense of responsibility to people and an easy goal dampens their ardor. According to the motorized riflemen themselves, their practices at times would be held at a low methods level and disruptions in training became customary. It would happen where classes would be planned but not carried out, especially in the so-called secondary subjects. Many privates and NCO's with whom I had occasion to chat did not know their personal socialist pledges and were poorly informed about the company's best achievements in the past. The personnel worked less than prescribed under the program in the summer period on driving combat vehicles and on technical training. In addition, it became the rule to stay longer and longer at the training center to perform fatigue duties and to build up and improve the training facility. All these are important concerns, but for this reason there was no time left at times to conduct party-political activities in the evening.

There is direct evidence of shortcomings in the organization of combat training and indoctrination of the personnel which also have a negative effect on the state of military discipline. The fact is, if the class schedule and order of the day are disrupted and if the personnel engage in bricklaying, trench digging or other fatigue duties instead of driving, weapons training or weapon cleaning, it is not precluded that a reassessment of values occurs which at times is not outwardly perceptible, and little by little some may get the idea: "Is strict fulfillment of combat and political training plans really mandatory?"

Somehow it was not customary to speak about all this in the company or even in the battalion in a loud voice and so-called minor infractions of discipline did not receive a fundamental appraisal. It is generally known that big things grow out of small ones and so before the end of the training year two crude infractions were committed one after the other by Gds Pvt V. Cherenkov (absence without leave from the unit). This incident disheartened the collective and was an unpleasant surprise for the senior officers. It was difficult for the commander, political worker and company party members to assume that none other than Pvt Cherenkov, a quiet, modest soldier, was a potential violator of military order. Well, they had seen minor mistakes in him, but who could think that he was capable of such a step? It turns out they simply didn't know the person. And it is not only a matter of Cherenkov, for one can't imagine that a soldier who is constantly in view of comrades left the company and regimental area unnoticed by anyone with a good arrangement of interior service. The person guilty of the incident was punished very severely and properly. His infraction became the straw that broke the camel's back and dragged the collective downward. But here is what is strange: There was not even a question raised about which of Cherenkov's comrades or which Komsomol members could have prevented a crude infraction of discipline and who could have influenced him after the first absence without leave but did not. What is this if not a serious omission in indoctrinational work?

For the sake of justice it must be noted that the past summer period was difficult for a number of reasons for the company and battalion as a whole. Many officers left for a new duty station and new arrivals came to replace them. Gds Maj N. Bardakov, left for a long while in the battalion commander's place, was performing a number of other duties at the same time. The deputy commander for political affairs, Gds Sr Lt Yu. Gaydar, also arrived in the battalion recently. To some extent it can be understood why these unquestionably energetic and industrious officers were not able to assist the company commander in a short period of time.

Nevertheless, the situation in which party member Officer Khromov found himself is not that exceptional. Just take his countryman Gds Sr Lt A. Chotbayev, who took over a company in a neighboring battalion this summer. It so happened that the young company commander was the only officer in the subunit for some time, but he still managed to come out of the situation honorably. Under the difficult conditions the commander found reliable support in the form of the NCO's and Komsomol organization and with his energy he caught the collective's enthusiasm for a high goal of struggling for the right to be called an outstanding subunit. He did this above all by personal example, diligence and

persistence. There is a profound conformity to principle in the fact that the company is confidently collecting points in socialist competition.

A close-knit, genuinely spirited collective took shape here. Chotbayev's company also had soldiers who are called "tough nuts." Gds Pvt A. Shalimov, who was frightened by difficulties and great physical stresses, became a frequent visitor to the medical unit. Shalimov was "cured" by the exactingness and patient, painstaking work of the commander, NCO's and Komsomol organization to instil in him a sense of personal responsibility for success of the common cause.

"A person is convinced once again," agreed Gds Maj N. Bardakov, "that the effectiveness and results of competition depend largely on a subunit's moral atmosphere. Our mistakes also contributed to its deterioration in Khromov's company. For a number of years this collective really was the best; later it was considered such through inertia and indulgences were made. In each training period the subunit would be manned primarily by soldiers with a higher or secondary education and so it deliberately received an advantage over others in competition."

It must be said that people in the company and battalion now have begun to realize that it was a relaxation of responsibility and exactingness, and not at all a chance confluence of circumstances, that preceded the deterioration of discipline, the drop of training indicators and the motorized riflemen's loss of former glory.

During my stay in the regiment the undignified conduct of one of the officers was brought before the court of public opinion. It was obvious that in this instance principle did not hinder the reputation of foremost unit and a feeling of disappointment did not overshadow the interests of the matter or strike out everything that had been achieved by much difficult work. No one thought about the "undermining of authority."

"If we will not fear saying even a bitter and difficult truth straight out, we will learn, and we will learn absolutely and without fail, to overcome any and all difficulties," said V. I. Lenin. Genuine party principle assumes a real view of life and a critical assessment of one's own work. This is the surest path to success.

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## LAWS DETAIL CIVIL RIGHTS OF CONSCRIPTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 83 (signed to press 3 Nov 83 ) pp 87-89

[Article by Col Justice V. Vandyshev: "Privileges for First-Term Servicemen"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Servicemen in our country enjoy the full scope of social-economic, political and personal rights and freedoms and bear all responsibilities of citizens as prescribed by the USSR Constitution. A number of privileges and advantages have been established for servicemen and their families with consideration of the specific nature of military duty. Col Justice V. Vandyshev tells about the basic privileges for first-term servicemen.

**LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVILEGES.** Under Article 32 of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation," executive committees of soviets of people's deputies must show concern for families of citizens called up for active military duty. No later than one month from the day of application, the executive committees must find work for wives whose husbands have been called up for military duty, and in this same period of time place their children in existing kindergartens and nurseries regardless of their departmental subordination.

A grant in the established amount is designated and paid for children of first-term privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers according to the place of residence of the serviceman's family. A declaration about designation of the grant is sent to the rayon or city military commissar.

If the mean gross income per family member does not exceed 50 rubles per month, families of first-term servicemen also are paid a grant for children in the amount of 12 rubles per month for each child up to the age of eight.

Article 43 of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" provides that executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies and the heads of enterprises, establishments, organizations, kolkhozes and educational institutions must find jobs for first-term servicemen released to the reserve with consideration of their specialties and work experience no later than one month

from the date of application. Under the very same conditions persons who were working in enterprises, establishments or organizations before call-up retain the right to go back to work there.

Servicemen released from military duty and accepted at the previous place of employment have the right to obtain material assistance for initial acquisitions.

The time a serviceman spends in the USSR Armed Forces is counted in his overall length of work regardless of whether he worked before Army service or not. Military duty also counts toward continuous length of work on condition that the person goes to work or begins studies within three months from the day released to the reserve without counting time of travel to the place of residence.

First-term privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers additionally have the time of their active military duty counted toward length of work in a specialty on the condition that they begin work in the specialty received before call-up no later than three months after release to the reserve.

The period of military duty for young specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education who were called up to the USSR Armed Forces is included in the term of mandatory work according to allocation after completing an educational institution.

The time spent on military duty is counted toward length of time in a trade union if the worker or employee was a trade union member before being called into the Armed Forces. Kolkhoz members called up for active military duty retain membership in the kolkhoz.

Privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers released from military duty in rayons of the Far North and equivalent areas have their time of duty counted (beginning with 1968) in the length of work which gives the right to obtain privileges established in these places if they begin work in those rayons and areas no later than three months after being released.

Sovkhoz, other state enterprises of agriculture, water resources and forestry, and agricultural equipment associations are authorized to assign a grant to persons released to the reserve from the USSR Armed Forces and who go to work as machine operators for household acquisitions in an amount up to six monthly third category time wage rates established for tractor and machine operators. A similar procedure for issuing a grant for household acquisitions is established in kolkhozes as well.

**HOUSING BENEFITS.** In accordance with Article 75 of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation," servicemen on first-term active military duty retain living space and they cannot be excluded from the waiting lists for receiving living space. If members of the family did not remain in the living space which such a serviceman occupied, then it is not filled for the first three months after call-up into the Army, and then the housing agency can lease it to other citizens for the time spent on first-term military duty by the

conscript. On returning from duty these servicemen have the right to occupy the living space which they had before call-up for duty. Persons living in this space in the absence of its permanent tenants must vacate it in no less than a two-week period.

If an excess of living space has occurred for a serviceman's family as a result of call-up for military duty, the excess is paid for in a single amount.

First-term servicemen released to the reserve who go to work in sovkhoses or kolkhozes are given considerable privileges in paying the cost of individual homes they acquire.

Families of servicemen on active first-term military duty cannot be evicted by a court from the rooms they occupy without other living space being granted.

**EDUCATION BENEFITS.** According to Article 43 of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation," persons called up for active military duty while studying in educational institutions retain the right, on being released to the reserve, to be enrolled for continuing study in that educational institution and in that course where they were studying before call-up for active military duty, with designation of a grant from the day they are reinstated in the educational institution until results of the next exam session. It is authorized to reinstate in universities soldiers released to the reserve at the end of the year throughout the entire first academic half-year without any additional tests.

First-term servicemen released to the reserve who have a secondary education and are sent to higher educational institutions on recommendations of military units to specialties determined by the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, as well as to secondary specialized educational institutions, are enrolled in these educational institutions without competition on condition that they receive positive grades on entrance exams. If a soldier released to the reserve has such a recommendation and did not pass entrance exams to a university, this recommendation can serve as a basis for entering a preparatory department of the university.

Persons who have served at least two years in the Armed Forces have a preferential right for enrollment in day (on-campus) higher educational institutions on the basis of competitive selection on an equal basis with those having a length of practical work of at least two years.

For the first three years after release to the reserve servicemen are accepted for study in universities without separation from production on a priority basis and on an equal basis with persons having the necessary length of work in a specialty corresponding to that chosen in a higher educational institution. The command elements of military units can send worthy privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers with a completed secondary education who are released to the reserve and wish to enter higher educational institutions to university preparatory departments. First-term servicemen released to the

reserve ahead of schedule because of illness or family status and who have served at least one year in the Armed Forces also can be sent to these university departments.

For two years after release first-term servicemen released to the reserve are accepted for day training in secondary specialized educational institutions without competition on receiving positive grades on entrance exams. They are enrolled here for evening and correspondence-course training without competition on the very same condition if the specialty they acquired during military duty corresponds to that chosen at the educational institution.

Regardless of the specialty they acquired during military duty, servicemen released to the reserve are accepted on a priority basis by competition and with all other conditions being equal for evening and correspondence-course training in secondary specialized educational institutions.

**TAX AND DUES PRIVILEGES.** Privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers who are on first-term active military duty are relieved of paying income tax on all kinds of monetary allowances, bonuses and awards.

First-term servicemen and their wives are relieved of paying the tax on single persons, citizens living alone and citizens with small families. In case of release from military duty because of illness this privilege is retained for no more than one year from the date of release.

The USSR Law "On Agricultural Tax" dated 8 August 1953 fully relieves of this tax payment farms in which there is a family member on active military duty if no other able-bodied persons remain in the family except for the wife or mother with children in age up to eight years.

First-term privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers and members of their families are relieved of the tax levy on owners of buildings and of the land tax.

Military construction workers, cadets of military educational institutions and their families enjoy benefits and advantages established for first-term servicemen and their families.

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BOOK REVIEW: RESPONSIBILITY OF AN OFFICER

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 22, Nov 83 (signed to press 3 Nov 83) p 92

[Review by Col V. Obukhov of book "Otvetstvennost' ofitsera" (The Officer's Responsibility) by I. Ya. Ivanov, Voenizdat, 1983, 118 pages: "An Officer's Most Important Quality"]

[Text] A book by Candidate of Pedagogic Sciences I. Ya. Ivanov entitled "Otvetstvennost' ofitsera" was published by Voenizdat. In numerous examples from Army and Navy life it reveals the forms and methods of developing in officers a feeling of military duty and of responsibility for improving the combat readiness of units, ships and subunits in light of demands of the 26th CPSU Congress, and it examines the ideological-political, moral and psychological-pedagogic principles of this most important quality of military cadres.

The pivotal idea running through the entire book is the thesis that every officer's responsibility now acquires particular urgency, determined by the need to defend socialism against the constantly growing aggressiveness of imperialism, by the specific nature of troop life and activities, and by the conditions under which they accomplish the operational training missions assigned them. This urgency also is caused by an increase in the scope and complexity of combat and political training missions, by the further development of the Soviet Armed Forces, and complexity of the process of studying and employing modern combat equipment and weapons.

The book states that the Soviet officer's responsibility is a complex moral-political quality reflecting deep awareness of the need for precise fulfillment of the assigned job, concern for accomplishing it in the best manner and for results of one's own and subordinates' work, and a constant striving to fulfill one's military duties conscientiously, in conformity with Soviet laws, regulations and superiors' orders, and in the interests of maintaining constant readiness of the Armed Forces to defend the Motherland and fraternal countries of socialism.

The author emphasizes that in today's situation Soviet officers must be ready constantly to accomplish the missions facing them with a great sense of responsibility, with high quality, precisely and on time. The fact is that

today's military unit and ship represent complicated military bodies. Their high combat readiness and combat effectiveness depend on the actions of each member of the collective performing a specific range of duties. The book states that the Soviet officer not only is a good specialist and an expert in combat weapons and equipment; he is a political figure, the bearer and conductor of foremost Marxist-Leninist ideology and culture. His responsibility is a responsibility not only for serviceability of combat equipment and subordinates' actions, but also for the personnel's political-moral condition.

In showing the paths of officers' development the author notes that any commander or supervisor has to combine within himself a unity of all components of responsibility. Of great importance here is professional training, which includes the mastery of Marxist-Leninist methodology, operational-tactical schooling, a knowledge of documents regulating troop life and combat activity, the ability to make most effective use of the capabilities of weapons and combat equipment, application of foremost methods of managing, training and indoctrinating subordinates, and much more. "An officer well prepared in the professional sense and who knows his duties, equipment, weapons, their tactical capabilities and methods of employing them in modern combat," writes the author, "acts confidently, skillfully and with a full sense of responsibility."

The reader's attention is drawn to the section entitled "Ideological Training is the Basis of an Officer's Responsibility," which presents the idea that the better a commander is prepared theoretically and tempered ideologically, then the more correctly and successfully he accomplishes the tasks facing him.

In discussing the commander's role in developing high moral-combat qualities in the personnel, the author correctly emphasizes that today questions of strengthening military discipline, the foundation of troop combat readiness, is advanced to the foreground.

The range of an officer's duties is broad. He is responsible for subordinates' field schooling and indoctrination, for providing the personnel with various kinds of allowances, and much more. Of course all this requires much effort and energy. And so, states the book's conclusion, Soviet officers have earned authority and the people's love because they fulfill their duties and their obligation to the Motherland selflessly and courageously, with a high sense of responsibility and sparing no effort.

The book "Otvetstvennost' ofitsera" unquestionably will be of great assistance to commanders and political officers in their practical work of training and indoctrinating subordinates.

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