


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10 June 1985

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS



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10 June 1985

USSR REPORT

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL

U.S. ACCUSED OF 'INFORMATION IMPERIALISM' IN UNESCO POLICY

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 3, Mar 85 pp 114-118

[Text]

For some time Washington has been pursuing a policy of outright obstructionism with respect to the United Nations and some other international organizations. Among the latter which have become subject to the American blackmail and pressure is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The destructive nature of the US stand manifests itself in America's approach to the establishment of a new international information order. Two basic trends are visible across the board in UNESCO's discussions on the role and tasks of mass media in international relations. The first trend implies the use of information in the interest of peace and understanding among nations, of the struggle against the arms race and for the equal and mutually beneficial cooperation among all states. This is the stand of the socialist and developing countries.

The second trend, whose proponents are the United States and its Western allies, calls for a "free exchange of information", absolute "independence" of the press from governments, "pluralism" of information, and for the use of advertising as an important means of the press' financial independence. The most detailed and consistent picture of these demands was presented in what became known as the Talloires Declaration which was adopted by the meeting of representatives of mass media from mostly capitalist states held in the French town of Talloires in May, 1981.

The Talloires Declaration is based on the rejection of all the initiatives aimed at regulating the content and activities of the mass media, including those of UNESCO and other intergovernmental bodies. The authors of the declaration are in general against any UNESCO role in the struggle for a new international information order (NIIO) and reject the necessity of establishing such an order. Supporting the concept of a "free information flow", representatives of Western news monopolies and transnational corporations turned against any regulation of international information exchanges based on the recognition of the national sovereignty in the field of information and culture.

In lieu of a new international information order the Talloires Declaration calls for the establishment of a "global information order" that would give Western media owners a possibility to misappropriate the right to freely disseminate information of their own across the national borders and without taking into account legitimate interests of other states. The main objective of this concept's proponents is to consolidate and further promote imperialism in the field of information and propaganda, and perpetuate cultural colonialism.

If UNESCO and the socialist and developing countries which support it interfere with the interests and aims of Western news agencies, so much the worse for them, reason the today's "cultural crusaders". In this

case UNESCO can be blamed for "politization", developing nations can be threatened with the prospects of reduced aid, and the socialist states can be labelled the "suppressors of the freedom of the press". Or the question can be raised whether the United States should retain its membership in UNESCO, thus turning the American contribution to this organization into a means of barefaced blackmail. It is precisely along these lines that one should understand Washington's decision to withdraw from this organization.

UNESCO's support for the idea of a new international information order is not the sole reason for US attacks on this organization. Washington charges UNESCO with "ineffective management", "politization" or even "Sovietization". The idea of a new international economic order, for the establishment of which UNESCO spares no effort, is met with unconcealed hostility. UNESCO's measures aimed at educating people in the spirit of peace and cooperation, as well as its concept of linkages between the human rights and the rights of nations constitute a source of constant irritation for American representatives. In short, the American side rejects anything that UNESCO does in these spheres.

UNESCO is not the first among the UN specialized agencies which the White House attempts to place under its diktat. The United States has drastically reduced its contribution to the International Development Association, which is one of the major international bodies granting easy-term loans to developing nations. It was also reported that the United States was considering repressive financial measures against UNCTAD—the UN Conference on Trade and Development. Some zealous Washington leaders even tried to scare the United Nations by threatening to remove it from American soil.

The White House decision to withdraw from UNESCO, which was made public in the end of 1983, was not an unexpected move for those who keep an eye on American policies in the field of international information exchanges. Back in 1981 the House of Representatives of the US Congress called for "discontinuing the financial backing of UNESCO, should any steps be taken to execute the plans related to controlling and administering the dissemination of information and ideas". Washington is exerting outright pressure on its allies. It is forcing them to pursue the same obstructionist course vis-à-vis UNESCO, which, among other things, has been reflected in the declaration of the British government about leaving the organization.

What are the reasons that compel the United States and some other Western countries to zealously defend the concept of a "free information flow" and oppose any regulation and control in this sphere? At first glance it may seem that the US stand is based on a noble desire to ensure everybody's right to "seek, obtain and disseminate" information virtually without any restrictions. However, it is obvious that under the prevailing conditions such a "right" will yield worldwide benefits only for the largest news agencies and transnational corporations of the West, US in the first place.

The extent of Western transnationals' domination in the sphere of information and the media is seen from the fact that today they produce 80 per cent of news reports printed and transmitted over the air in the capitalist world. The production and marketing of communication technology is largely controlled by 15 international corporations, 10 of which are located in the United States. Western information and propaganda centres flood the developing countries with their information: radio and TV programmes, tapes, printed matter, and films. Annually, Western, mainly American, television companies sell or disseminate in other countries their programmes, the combined duration of which amounts to 300,000 hours of air time. Export earnings of US private television net-

works alone constitute some \$100 million per annum, although sometimes their products are sold at token prices in view of the fact that most of the consumers cannot pay much. Some reports indicate that American publishers' profits from the sale of books in Asia and Africa run to the tune of \$300 million per annum. Western mass media satiate other countries, particularly the developing nations, with their versions of facts and events.

Obviously, the developing nations are attempting to somehow counteract the Western communication and ideological expansion by setting up and consolidating to the best of their abilities national and regional information networks and seeking at least minimal control over the content of the avalanche of information and propaganda that reaches them from the West. The people of developing countries which constitute a majority in UNESCO, as a rule, are aware of the harmful nature of the imperialist propaganda; however, their possibilities to combat it are rather limited.

As the President of the International Organization of Journalists Kaarle Nordenstreng has pointed out, the information flow that reaches the developing countries from capitalist states exceeds 100-fold the news transmitted in the opposite direction. According to UNESCO Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, "a few powerful transnational companies dominate the information market to an extent that borders on cultural aggression". One cannot escape the conclusion that Western slogans about a "free information flow" and an "unimpeded exchange of ideas" are a kind of a smokescreen that camouflages the imperialist ideological expansion to the developing countries.

Taking all these factors into account, the developing nations, which seek to consolidate their sovereignty, attach high priority to the task of reducing the dependence of their national mass media on the West. In the solution of this vexing question they can rightly rely on the support of the United Nations, UNESCO and other international organizations. The young states need help in setting up mass media of their own, and training personnel capable of managing communication networks. Therefore, it is only natural that international organizations, UNESCO included, cannot ignore the requirements of the developing nations.

By effecting information expansion to the developing countries, increasing the power of their radio transmitters, increasing the volume of broadcasts to all the regions of the world, and developing means for direct telecasts to other countries via satellite, the United States and its allies give the priority to the praising of the Western way of life and bourgeois values, on the one hand, and to the struggle against the growing influence of socialist ideas and the fanning up of anti-Sovietism, on the other. In fact, they persistently brainwash the international public opinion along anti-Soviet and anticommunist lines. To this end, they employ various indoctrination means and techniques: misinformation, lies, slander, appeals to all kinds of political prejudices and ignorance. The imperialists are waging systematic "ideological warfare" against patriotic and democratic movements in a bid to discredit or, at least, to hinder the progressive development of states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, to isolate the developing nations from the socialist world, and thus to weaken the forces which form the united front in the anti-imperialist struggle against neocolonialism, racism, and for genuine independence.

The mass media of the United States, in particular the United States Information Agency (USIA), which is an official governmental body, play a leading role in subversive propagandistic actions against the world of socialism and progress. The USIA has 206 branches in 126 countries, and gigantic funds are made available to it annually. In 1984, it was given \$700 million, and in 1985 the USIA's budget will

exceed \$800 million. Expenditures on propaganda in the United States are growing at even a greater pace than defence allocations. For example, in 1985 the military appropriations will increase by 13 per cent, while USIA's budget, by 28 per cent.

The Agency has some 9,000 employees on its payroll. Some 1,700 TV films, including newsreels and documentaries, are produced annually on the Agency's orders. The programmes are dubbed into 62 languages and sent to television centres of many countries. The Voice of America, which broadcasts 145 hours a day in 42 languages, carries out intensive propaganda. In 1983 the radio station was allotted more than \$100 million, and in 1984 its budget increased by another 30 per cent.

The USIA's Worldnet television network is growing in scope. This is a propagandistic venture that provides for direct telecasts to different countries via satellite. The African portion of the network, AFNET, became operational last April. It is characteristic that the highlight of the first programme telecasted to Africa was the speech by the Director of the US International Development Cooperation Agency Peter McPherson who slandered the Soviet Union and its policy towards African developing countries. At the same time the UN policy in Africa was presented in the best possible manner.

The AFNET programmes, according to the designs of their authors, must make the African TV viewers believe that the United States is the best friend of developing nations, ever ready to lend a helping hand. With certain strings attached, naturally. One of the strings was mentioned by McPherson in his speech. He said that many African states would have to "change their course" in order to obtain American aid. No more and no less. In other words, obey US diktat, and America will aid you.

Thus, the slogan about a "free information flow" is used by the imperialists in order to cover up their barefaced lies, hypocrisy, demagoguery, and brainwashing of the masses. The US Administration attempts to disrupt the elaboration of just principles of a new international information order, to keep a free hand for ideological subversion and psychological warfare against the forces of peace and progress. These goals largely explain the attempts by the White House to blackmail UNESCO and the attacks on the socialist and developing countries, the non-aligned movement, and democratic organizations of journalists. American delegates invite the "industrially underdeveloped nations" to turn to the United States, rather than to UNESCO.

Nevertheless, there are very few countries willing to follow Washington's advice. It can be seen from the fact that the overwhelming majority of UNESCO's member states are in favour of the establishment of a new international information order and the elimination of the Western monopoly over mass media. At the end of 1983 the Conference of Journalists from the Non-Aligned Countries was held in Delhi, and was followed by a conference of the information ministers from these countries held in Jakarta in January 1984. The conferences mapped out specific ways to oppose Western informational and ideological expansion. The participants pointed out, in particular, to the necessity of establishing direct information links between African, Asian and Latin American states as one of the means to fight this expansion.

There are good prospects for regional cooperation among the developing countries' journalists: they have set up the Pool of Information Agencies of the Non-Aligned Countries, Pan-African News Agency (PANA), Latin American Information Agency and the Organization of Press Agencies of Asian and Pacific States. The participants in the Delhi and Jakarta meetings believe that the expansion of cooperation with the socialist countries, which are reliable allies of the young developing na-

tions, offers considerable opportunities in thwarting the imperialist ideological aggression.

What are the UNESCO's prospects in the light of the USA's and subsequently Britain's walkout from this organization? Addressing this issue UNESCO Deputy Director-General Henri Lopes said: "As far as the decision to withdraw from UNESCO is concerned, it is the right of any of its 161 member states. The General Directorship believes that this decision undermines the principle of universality of the planet's largest international organization. However, UNESCO will continue its activities according to its decision and financial means which will be provided by the remaining 160 member states."

There will be a long and difficult struggle so as to fully translate into life the ideas UNESCO stands for, including that of a new international information order. Efforts to establish it are not limited to UN or UNESCO resolutions and decisions. It is life itself that creates a new order: the alignment of the world's forces shifts in favour of socialism, and the peoples' aspiration towards peace, detente, friendship and cooperation becomes more pronounced. Likewise, a new order is established by the developing countries which enjoy the consistent support of the socialist states. The policy of blackmail and diktat with respect to UNESCO and, consequently, all the sovereign member states of this organization, is unacceptable, and, therefore, is rejected by the world public opinion.

V. SHILOV

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INTERNATIONAL

STRATEGIC, POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SDI VIEWED

Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 11, 9-16 Mar 85 pp 2-3

[Article by Sergey Losev: "The 'Star Sickness' of the White House"]

[Text] By all accounts, the fit of "star sickness" which has struck the American administration has become more severe; it is a recurrence of the mania of "rolling back communism" from which American politicians suffered in the 1950's. If anyone still has any illusions about the nature of the present epidemic in Washington, acquainting oneself with the unremittingly hostile speech by Secretary of State George Shultz, delivered 22 February in San Francisco at the "Commonwealth of Nations Club", is enough to dispel any doubts.

The lofty phrases of the leader of US foreign policy department on the fact that the world situation has "ripened" to the point that the "forces of democracy"--as he describes the forces of imperialism and reaction--should mount a global counteroffensive under the leadership of the USA, conceal the strategic plans of American imperialism to achieve world hegemony. The turbid flow of such speeches by the leaders of the US administration, which preach the export of counterrevolution, unwittingly gives one pause: If even now, in the year of the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Fascist Germany, the proteges and lackeys of the American military-industrial complex are openly and importunately making claims for world domination, then what can one expect from them in the event Ronald Reagan's so-called "strategic initiatives" are put into practice?

The "Star Wars" program, no matter how Washington's masters of psychological manipulation of public opinion serve it up, is in no way a defensive program. The creation of a vast anti-missile defense system with elements based in space is considered by the Pentagon to be part of a plan for creating the potential for dealing a first strike with calculated impunity.

The plan for creating an "antimissile shield", which is aggressive in its very essence, represents in actuality an attempt to achieve decisive military superiority.

Even the Americans themselves do not believe in the official Washington version with respect to the "defensive nature" of the "Star Wars" program. The Bureau of Technical Analyses of the American Congress has prepared an analytic report, from which it follows that the vast antimissile defense

systems with elements based in space is directed toward preparations for nuclear war by the United States against the Soviet Union. The report was hardly prepared by dilettantes; taking part in its preparation were former Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara, and former chief of the American delegation to the SALT-I negotiations, J. Smith. The report makes it clearly understood, the WASHINGTON POST sums up, that "Reagan's goal is to provide a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union without excessive risk". In other words, the paper notes, the report by the Bureau of Technical Analysis assumes that "Reagan wants to perfect a nuclear defense, and then take advantage of it to blackmail the Russians, in order to force them to dance to his tune, or to become reconciled to the possibility of an American nuclear strike which Moscow would be unable to repel".

It is self-evident that the Soviet Union cannot stand by idly in the face of these dangerous plans. In his 1 March speech in Madrid, Comrade A.A. Gromyko warned with all seriousness: "If they want to turn space into a battleground, thereby hoping to subject other states to their will, the answer of the Soviet Union is: They will not succeed in their plans to achieve military superiority, neither on Earth nor in space. The plan to hide behind an antimissile shield to escape retribution for their aggression is an illusion. Would it not be better to seek honest and mutually-acceptable understandings for the purpose of bringing the arms race to a firm halt in all respects? The Soviet Union will be doing just that in the forthcoming Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva".

Many prominent American specialists share our estimate of the danger to world peace posed by the "Star Wars Plan". Speaking the other day before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives on the armed forces, former Presidential Assistant for National Security, P. Scowcroft and former Secretaries of Defense G. Brown and J. Schlesinger, made an urgent appeal to the Administration to abandon the program of militarization of space. All three expressed grave doubts that it would ever be possible to create a truly effective antimissile defense system with space-based elements, and warned that in any case the Soviet Union would take the proper retaliatory measures and would be forced to increase its arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons if the USA attempts to create a powerful antimissile space defense system.

McGeorge Bundy, former presidential assistant for national security, in turn, declared that the plans revealed by the American administration for the militarization of space would lead to undermining the arms control agreements, and are a serious obstacle to achieving an understanding in the course of the Soviet-American talks to be held in Geneva beginning 12 March on a whole range of questions of demilitarization of space, limiting strategic weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons, which the two parties have agreed to examine and solve together.

The USSR is setting out for Geneva ready to achieve concrete results on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security, honestly and strictly observing the premises of the January joint Soviet-American statement to the effect that the goal of the negotiations will be to work out effective understandings aimed at preventing an arms race in space and

stopping it on Earth, on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, and on strengthening strategic stability. Against this background the attempts of the American administration to place outside the framework of the talks in advance the basic problem of preventing the militarization of space cannot be interpreted as anything else than steps which preclude concrete results.

As the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs noted, it cannot but put one on one's guard that on the eve of the Geneva negotiations the American side is resorting to unscrupulous methods, clearly calculated from the very beginning to poison the atmosphere around them, and to make it difficult to examine the problems which must be solved in a businesslike manner. It is obvious that it was just for this purpose that the White House report was published, which brings out the unsubstantiated and groundless accusations of the alleged "violations of their international obligations" committed by the Soviet Union.

For the sake of deceiving the public, official Washington is trying to camouflage its "Star Wars" program with all kinds of "high moral considerations". In actual fact the present administration has promised a new mother lode to the military-industrial complex--an arms race in space, which will cost the United States, in the most conservative estimates, one trillion dollars, and which promises gigantic profits for the military concerns. It is characteristic that the overwhelming majority of contracts connected with the militarization of space are already in the hands of the aerospace corporations whose headquarters are in California. In order to ensure the prosperity of these corporations, which have put the present administration into power, the White House has proposed reductions of almost 50 billion dollars in fiscal year 1986 in allocations for socio-economic needs and in domestic programs vital to the United States. "The country," declares Ronald Reagan, has "more important interests". And what are they? It goes without saying--the arms race, for which the proposed federal budget for fiscal year 1986 is allocating the unprecedented sum of 322 billion dollars.

All of this is needed, not for the defense of the national security of the USA, which no one is threatening, but for conducting a policy of state terrorism and international piracy; for putting down the national liberation movement; for crude imperialistic interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; and for imposing systems suitable to Washington.

A vivid example of this policy of power diplomacy of the USA is the undeclared war against Nicaragua. Having paralyzed the Contradora process and having rejected the latest peaceful proposals of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, the American administration now has openly declared that its goal is to overthrow the Sandanista government. Since the invasion of Nicaraguan territory by a band of Somosist sore-losers did not achieve the desired results, the CIA and the Pentagon are now pursuing the cause of direct US military intervention against revolutionary Nicaragua. In order to cover up their preparations for invasion, they've once again trotted out the lie about the fact that Nicaragua is allegedly being turned into a "Soviet base". In actual fact, in Central America as in other regions as well, there are only American bases. It is not the USSR but the USA that has inundated the world with 1,500 of its military bases.

The USSR respects the right of the nations to independent existence and development. But if one considers the imperialist, piratical logic of the Washington leadership, then one must ask how should the Soviet Union carry on affairs with those nations where there really are American military bases! This question is all the more objective, when one speaks about the American bases established right on the borders of the USSR and other socialist countries for preparing for and waging war against them.

Looking on foreign military bases as a serious threat to the peace and security of the entire world, the USSR will continue to place before the USA the question of the numerous American military bases in the various regions of the world. Sooner or later the widespread network of American military bases abroad must be eliminated.

The interests of international security demands not the establishment of new centers of confrontation, but the liquidation of the existing ones, and a search for ways to improve the health of the world situation. The reckless policy of imperialistic piracy must be brought to an end.

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INTERNATIONAL

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MALAYSIAN OFFICIAL VISITS KAZAKHSTAN

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 1985 carries on page 3 a 100-word KazTAG report entitled "Guests from Malaysia." At the invitation of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Malaysia, Abdul Kadir bin khadzhi sheykh Fadzir, visited Alma-Ata. He was received by M. I. Isinaliyev, the KaSSR minister of foreign affairs, and toured the city. Abdul Kadir bin khadzhi sheykh Fadzir, accompanied by the Malaysian ambassador to the USSR, and department chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A. S. Zaytsev, left for Moscow.

CSO: 1830/595

INTERNATIONAL

HISTORY OF SOVIET NON-USE-OF-FORCE PACT PROPOSALS

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan 85 pp 62-69

[Article by V. Fyodorov, D. Sc. (Law)]

[Text]

Throughout its history the Soviet Union has worked vigorously and persistently towards having the use of force banished from the practice of international relations and putting an end to aggressive wars unleashed by imperialist powers, wars defined by Lenin as a bestial means of settling conflicts in human society.¹ In the present international situation, dangerously aggravated owing to the policies of the US ruling circles, the USSR is doing its utmost to stop humankind's precarious sliding into the abyss of thermonuclear catastrophe and to achieve a radical turn towards the strengthening of peace, limitation of the arms race and development of international cooperation.

It is of paramount importance to curb the nuclear arms race and renounce the use of military force if we are to consolidate peace and security. In this connection, Konstantin Chernenko pointed out: "The world has radically changed. Force cannot resolve its problems. This has been proved more than once, including by the experience of the United States of America itself. It is impossible to strengthen one's security at the expense of the security of others. Just as unrealizable today are the calculations to gain military superiority in the hope of winning a nuclear war."²

The Soviet Union bore the brunt of war against German fascism and Japanese militarism. In 1985 all progressive mankind will mark the 40th anniversary of that Great Victory. The USSR also played a leading role in creating the organizational forms of postwar international cooperation intended to secure a lasting peace on earth and prevent a new world war. As a founding member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union was to a great extent responsible for a whole number of progressive democratic principles and provisions included in the UN Charter, first and foremost the all-important principle of inadmissibility to use force or the threat of force to resolve international disputes that might arise between countries with different social systems.

According to the UN Charter, not only the use of force should be banned but also threats to resort to force both against the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of any state and for any other purpose incompatible with the goals of the United Nations. The ban on the threat or the use of force is formulated comprehensively, unambiguously and unequivocally, and leaves no room for partial interpretations, which is recognized by some bourgeois analysts. Its import is augmented by the fact that certain exceptions from the ban are envisaged, in a clear-

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 567.

² *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1984.

cut form, by the UN Charter, which provides for any state's right to individual and collective self-defence.

In the postwar period, pursuing the Leninist policy of peace, the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, has persistently fought for the strict adherence by all states to the basic goals and principles of the UN Charter, above all the non-use of force or threat of force in international relations and peaceful settlement of all international disputes at the negotiating table, rather than by force of arms. The USSR and other socialist countries have perseveringly sought to have the non-use of force principle enshrined in international treaties and agreements and in UN declarations and resolutions.

But the imperialist states resorted to force to suppress revolutionary and national liberation movements and to grossly interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states, thereby violating the UN Charter, above all the principle of non-use of force or threat of force. They have on many occasions resorted to threats and used force to achieve their expansionist aggressive plans.

The international situation has become especially strained of late, what with the US administration having sharply stepped up its dangerous militaristic policy. Underlying this policy is the concept termed by its authors "peace through strength". The US President, speaking in Michigan in October 1984, declared plainly that thereafter the USA would negotiate from a position of strength.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries counter the military preparations and nuclear arms brandishing with a well-considered, responsible approach to international issues. The USSR calls for setting up reliable guarantees of international security. In a speech at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, the head of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Gromyko, said: "A nuclear age requires that political thinking be consonant with its realities. Where categories such as 'strength', 'deterrence' and 'superiority' still prevail in this thinking they must be replaced by concepts of the non-use of force, confidence, equality and mutual regard for security interests."³ It is towards these ends that the Soviet Union has directed all its efforts.

In evaluating political processes in the world the Soviet Union, in the first place, seeks to pinpoint the main cause of the growing tension, the main factor of destabilization, and, correspondingly, the necessary ways and means to remedy the situation.

The chief source of tension is the policy of the more aggressive forces of imperialism, the USA in the first place. The Washington Administration accelerates, one after another, widescale programmes of production of the latest arms, nuclear arms heading the list, and attempts to dictate, from positions of strength, to other states and nations how they should go about their internal affairs. This policy saps international confidence and directly contradicts the UN Charter.

Besides, this policy, whenever applied, serves to prove that no interstate dispute has ever been, or can be, settled reliably and equitably through the use of force or a threat to resort to it. On the contrary, the use of force for aggressive purposes, for territorial annexations and oppression of other nations, has always generated nothing but animosity, hatred and sprouts of new conflicts, resulting in death and huge material destruction. The nuclear arms stockpiling has radically changed the notions of the outcome military conflicts may have for the nations,

³ *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1984.

and, meanwhile, the probability of a crisis or a conflict growing into a nuclear confrontation has increased many times over.

The CPSU and the Soviet state work persistently to have the renunciation of force and the threat of force in disputes made a law in international relations. This principle is reflected in numerous treaties and agreements the USSR has concluded with other states (for example, with the USA, France, Italy, Britain, and the FRG) and in many of the UN resolutions. The clause concerning the non-use of force in international disputes is contained in such USSR-sponsored important international documents as the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and the Definition of Aggression. At the 27th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1972, the question of the meaning of the principle of non-use of force and the possibility of making it binding was discussed in detail at the initiative of the Soviet Union. Following the discussion, the Assembly passed Resolution 2936/XXVII On the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons for All Time. This resolution marked an important step forward on the way of effectively implementing the principle of non-use and non-threat of force and represented a major contribution to the struggle of all peace-loving people to block the efforts of trigger-happy politicians.

The non-use of force principle was most profoundly elaborated at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. It was included in the Final Act of the Conference as a priority principle. In the Declaration on Principles the participants proclaimed that they would "respect and give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force" and expressed their conviction of the necessity "to make it an effective norm of international life". The Final Act noted that the implementation of non-use of force and other principles would be a major element in detente.

Those who stake on force do not confine themselves to building it up. They use it, claiming dominance in the world and seeking to halt and reverse the objective process of world development. In the Middle East they encourage Israeli aggressive policies and overtly use force in Lebanon; they have committed aggression in Grenada; they resort to force to keep up the puppet junta in El Salvador; exert mounting pressure on Nicaragua and continue their threats and subversion against Cuba. They support and arm the counterrevolutionary gangs waging a war against Afghanistan. In southern Africa they launch aggressive actions against sovereign states, Angola in the first place.

The policy of strength adherents trample upon the basic norms of international law; they show no respect for the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of their borders. Moreover, Washington openly declares its intention to act with brute military force.

Countering the nuclear war threat, the Soviet Union has set forth a package of constructive proposals whose main thrust is towards the formation of effective and lasting guarantees of international security and above all ensuring consistent observance of the principle of non-use of force in international relations, which in today's nuclear age is tantamount to the survival of mankind.

Over a hundred constructive initiatives have been proposed by the Soviet Union from the rostrum of the United Nations. As is known, the USSR was the author of the most radical proposal—one on general and complete disarmament under general and complete international control. Other exceptionally important Soviet initiatives include proposals on an early termination and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, on a ban to

the development and production of new types and systems of mass destruction weapons and on prevention of the militarization of outer space.

Of great moral and political importance is the draft declaration Condemnation of Nuclear War which the Soviet Union tabled at the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1983 and which an overwhelming majority of member-states voted for. The adoption of this declaration, just as of the Soviet-sponsored Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe adopted in 1981, was a major UN act designed to thwart the danger of nuclear force being used.

It will be recalled that in the course of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament in 1982 the USSR undertook a unilateral pledge not to initiate a nuclear exchange. Had the other nuclear powers followed suit this would in practice have been tantamount to a total ban on the use of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union took that important step in a situation where the NATO nuclear powers, above all the USA, make no secret of the fact that their military doctrine not only does not rule out first use of nuclear arms, but is actually based on this dangerous concept. The Soviet Union proceeded from the indisputable fact that a nuclear war, should it flare up, could mean the end of human civilization and, probably, life itself on earth.

The Soviet initiative adds a new dimension to the entire set of problems involved in arms (especially nuclear) limitation and reduction. It generally facilitates disarmament and effective enactment of a ban on the use of force in international relations.

The NATO countries, however, try to cast doubt on the Soviet commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to belittle its importance. They allege that the USSR seeks freedom of action for itself to employ conventional arms and that the above commitment is essentially meaningless if the USSR does not declare its readiness to abstain from the use of conventional armed forces. Yet concrete actions by the Soviet Union and its allies have convincingly refuted these assertions. A case in point is the Political Declaration adopted in Prague in January 1983, in which the socialist countries proposed a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of armed force and on the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries.

The core of this treaty should be a mutual commitment by participants in both alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons, against one another, which means not to be the first to use military force in their relations altogether. This commitment would cover the territory of all countries parties to the treaty, and also their military and civil personnel, sea, air and space craft and other objects and sites in their possession wherever they are located. A significant element in the treaty could be a commitment of the signatories not to threaten the security of the international sea, air and space routes crossing the territories beyond any national jurisdiction.

It would seem reasonable to combine the non-use of force commitment specified in the treaty with a pledge to conduct in good faith talks on effective measures to stop the arms race, to limit and reduce armaments and achieve disarmament, or else to employ other means available to promote the success of the talks so as to gain practical results through them. The treaty could also provide for joint consideration of practical measures to prevent the danger of a sudden attack. It could also incorporate clauses on the strengthening of the United Nations as a world instrument of collective security. In this context, it would seem reasonable to stipulate in the treaty its signatories' readiness to cooperate in making the UN more effective in fulfilling its mission, specified in the Charter, of peacefully settling international disputes and conflict situations, of suppressing aggression and eliminating the threat to interna-

tional peace and security. The treaty, of course, is not expected to restrict its participants' inherent right to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

These and some other proposals were tabled by the Soviet Union at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. However, the USA and other Western countries have taken an obstructionist stand vis-à-vis these initiatives. Meanwhile, it is clear to all that an agreement on the non-use of force between the two groups of countries would facilitate a breakthrough for the better in international affairs, and would signify a step forward of immense political significance.

In the context of these and other measures proposed by the Soviet Union so as to block the possibility of war, above all nuclear, it would be extremely useful to have a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations. This treaty would reiterate and consolidate the non-use of force principle as applied to the conditions and requirements of the present stage in international relations.

It will be recalled that the proposal on a World Treaty, initiated by the Soviet Union, was submitted to the UN in 1976. Since 1978, it has been under consideration in a committee specially set up for the purpose, which sends regular reports to the sessions of the UN General Assembly, the 39th Session being no exception.

The underlying idea of the World Treaty is to banish the use of force from the practice of international relations, to make renunciation of the use of both nuclear and conventional arms an immutable law of international life. The World Treaty could radically solve the problem of banning the use of nuclear arms.

The conclusion of the World Treaty would be a globally important event creating a qualitatively new situation in the world and securing a lasting peace for the future. While in no way diminishing the non-use of force pledges contained in the UN Charter and the many post-war multilateral, regional and bilateral treaties and accords, it would reinforce them, envisaging not only a general ban on the use or threat of force but also inadmissibility of using any types of arms, whether nuclear or conventional.

The conclusion of the World Treaty would serve as a measure to prevent both a nuclear war and military conflicts in general. It would be an underpinning of peace based on an order guaranteeing security for all states. By confirming the "dominance of law" instead of the "dominance of force" in international relations it would create favourable conditions for practical measures to reduce and, in the longer run, eliminate war threat altogether through arms limitation and reduction.

The World Treaty would provide a vivid example of how, in the present situation, international treaties and agreements on important political problems should be worked out within the UN framework. It would considerably enhance the role of the United Nations as a genuine center coordinating international actions and helping develop relations of peace and cooperation among all member-states, implementing, in accordance with its Charter, its tasks of peacefully settling international disputes and conflict situations and eliminating the threat to international peace and security.

The Soviet Union opposes attempts to replace the drawing up of the Treaty with an "examination" of specific cases of the use of force in international relations, a "consideration" of the arguments of those who seek to justify the use of force, and a "study" of the mechanisms and

procedures for peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflicts. Endeavours of this kind serve no useful purpose, only leading astray from the drafting of the World Treaty, the job that is on the order of the day. Insolvent are also the attempts to adopt, short of a World Treaty, a resolution or a declaration on the issue. It is a treaty, legally binding on all signatories, that we should strive for.

The Soviet Union highly appreciates the efforts of the non-aligned countries aimed at speeding up the preparation of the text of the World Treaty—acceptable for all, based on the Soviet draft and taking into account the pertinent proposals by non-aligned and Western countries. In the present sharply aggravated international situation, the speedy preparation of the World Treaty becomes an insistent task brooking no delay.

Recently, the problem of the prevention of an arms race, nuclear one included, in outer space has acquired special urgency. The USA seeks to turn outer space into a bridgehead of war. The Soviet Union stands resolutely for immediate measures ensuring that the principle of non-use of force in outer space and from space against the earth is strictly observed.

The Soviet Union feels that it is absolutely necessary that effective measures are urgently taken to prevent the extension of the arms race into space. With this in mind, it introduced in the UN in 1981 a proposal on a treaty to ban the deployment of any type of weapons in outer space. The proposal was endorsed by the General Assembly. However, because of the US opposition, no concrete talks on the issue have been started at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

At the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1983, the Soviet Union proposed an agreement to prohibit the use of force both in space and from space against the earth, and tabled a corresponding draft. It specified the participants' commitment by envisaging a ban on the threat or use of force in the atmosphere, in outer space and on the earth with the help of striking weapons deployed for this purpose in the earth's orbit, on space bodies or in some other fashion in space. It also envisaged a ban on the use or threat of force with regard to space objects.

An overwhelming majority of countries assess this Soviet proposal as a sound basis for negotiations and for positive practical measures to make the non-use of force principle more effective. The Soviet Union has declared a unilateral moratorium on orbiting anti-satellite weapons as long as the USA and other countries do likewise.

A new important development was the Soviet initiative for Soviet-American talks on preventing the militarization of space. The underlying idea of this Soviet proposal is that the pioneers of space exploration—the USSR and the USA—must do everything to keep peace in space, and, specifically, they should lay the foundation for a multilateral agreement. However, through the fault of the American side the talks never took place.

Finally, at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, the USSR proposed the question of the Use of Outer Space Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes, for the Benefit of Mankind as an urgent point on the agenda. In coming out with this proposal, the Soviet Union proceeded from the fact that now as never before it is important to bar the arms race from outer space, making it a strict standard in international politics, a universally recognized commitment, so as to block all ways for the militarization of space. The idea, therefore, is to ban immediately and forever the use of force in space and from space against the earth.

The Soviet Union proposes achieving a radical solution to the question of preventing space militarization. This includes banning and eliminating space-based weapons and also all ground-, air- and sea-based weapons designed to hit space targets. The United Nations should have its say in support in the immediate achievement of reliably controllable agreements on this score on a bilateral and multilateral basis. No doubt, the implementation of this proposal would considerably help establish non-use of force in international relations and open the way not only towards peaceful cooperation in space but towards the solution of other urgent problems of the day, above all, the key problem of removing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

As distinct from the USA, which sees no way to peace other than a military buildup and war preparations, the Soviet Union considers the prevention of war as a task which, though difficult, yet can be resolved. It requires the efforts of all countries through joint and effective measures to put an end to the arms race, to bar any eventuality of war flaring up and to ensure strict observance by all states without exception of the universally recognized principles of non-use of force or threat of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Guided by this consideration, the Soviet Union submitted to the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, as an important and urgent point of agenda, the question: Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and Any Actions by States Aimed at Undermining the Socio-Political Systems in Other Sovereign States.

In tabling this proposal, the Soviet Union had in mind that the policy of attaining military superiority adopted by certain countries and the implementation of the policy of terrorism in international affairs sap the very possibility of peaceful relations and mutual trust between states, that such policies and actions boost the war threat and constitute a violation of norms of international law. They are especially dangerous in the nuclear age, as threatening not only the freedom of nations but their very existence. The Soviet Union feels that the policy and practices of state-sponsored terrorism should be unambiguously condemned; that an end should be put to any actions intended for forcible change or subversion of the social system in sovereign states, for destabilization and overthrow of their legitimate governments; that no military action should be undertaken for this purpose under any pretext, while those already under way should be stopped.

All states should respect people's inalienable right to decide their own destinies and to independently shape their own political and other development. The Soviet proposal stems from the consistent approach to the historic goal of ruling out the use of force from the international practice. The adoption of this principle would greatly contribute to the creation of political guarantees of peace, to the security of individual countries and greater international security in general.

In its approach to the goal of banishment of the use of force from the life of human society, the Soviet Union shares the view of many states that a special responsibility lies with the nuclear powers, and is fully aware of its own responsibility. As is known, Konstantin Chernenko, in a speech on March 2, 1984, proposed that relations among the nuclear powers be regulated by certain agreed upon and mandatory norms intended to prevent nuclear war. These norms should include renunciation of nuclear war propaganda, commitment not to be the first to use nuclear arms, not to allow their proliferation in whatever form, to promote nuclear-free zones and to pursue the policy of nuclear arms reduction up to their liquidation altogether.

The USSR has made these principles a basis of its policy and has expressed its readiness at any time to agree with other nuclear powers on jointly recognizing these norms and making them binding. Should the other nuclear powers agree to this proposal and strictly observe the enumerated norms, this would create political, moral and legal safeguards against the use of force in its particularly dangerous, nuclear form: in other words, the nuclear war threat would peter out.

An analysis of the Soviet proposals concerned with the establishment of non-use of force in international relations shows that they represent a highly practicable programme which can make the renunciation of force an immutable law of international affairs, can rid mankind of the nuclear catastrophe threat and radically improve the situation in the world. An important feature of these proposals is their comprehensive, universal nature, by which they combine an overall ban on the use of force with the inadmissibility of employing any types of arms, whether nuclear or conventional. This places all states on a par, consolidates the security of each, and gives no one unilateral advantages or military superiority.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries organically combine measures of a material, organisational, political, legal, and moral nature, with the key goal of the day, the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe menace, moved to the foreground. Importantly, these proposals are distinguished for their accord with the vital demands of the peoples concerned about the continual deterioration in the international situation and the spiralling arms race. The implementation of these proposals would benefit all countries irrespective of their social system, the size of the territory or population, of whether or not they possess nuclear arms.

The Soviet Union's policy is aimed at putting an end to the arms race imposed by those who would like to dictate their will from strength. The Soviet Union strives to have the policy of strength excluded from international relations altogether and will continue to work persistently to attain this goal.

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INTERNATIONAL

SOVIET EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSALS IN INF, CDE, MBFR

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[Article by E. Vasilenkov: "European Security--A Major Prerequisite for World Peace"]

[Text]

The modern approach to safeguarding European security calls for combining the realities of a peaceful coexistence of states having different social and political systems with the tasks of eliminating the increased nuclear war threat. The Soviet concept of European security provides for consolidating and promoting the results already gained by the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community in the efforts to realize the age-old dream of nations about a lasting peace in Europe. Simultaneously, this concept envisages a resolute rebuff to nuclear warmongers, to the anticommunist "crusaders" who hope, for the umpteenth time now, to solve the historical argument between capitalism and socialism by force.

The year 1985 will mark a decade since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The outcome of the Conference inspired the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe, with great expectations which no other collective action has brought about since the joint allied decisions at the end of the Second World War. The Conference summed up, on a collective basis, the political results of the Second World War and of the postwar development and signalled the start of a new phase in detente. It was a new major step towards consolidating the principles of peaceful coexistence and establishing equitable cooperation between states with different social systems. The very fact of holding the Conference pointed to the futility of power politics and the cold war and offered new opportunities for accomplishing the main task of our time—to safeguard peace and security not only for the peoples of Europe, but for the whole world.

But the more aggressive and influential forces of world imperialism, those in the USA above all, alarmed by the successes of existing socialism and the advancement of detente in the world, intensified, almost immediately after the Conference, their opposition to developing cooperation among nations and to adopting peace and security measures. These forces identified their interests with the arms race and staked on heightening world tensions. They have come out to upset the military-strategic parity in the hope of achieving superiority over the socialist world.

These tendencies, dangerous for the cause of world peace as they are, have been generated by the military-industrial elite and the US Administration catering to it. The purposeful struggle against the foundations of a lasting peace and security on the European continent—as they were registered in the Helsinki Final Act—is a major element of US policy enjoying the support of the forces of aggression and revanchism in some West European countries.

The way to the European Conference was not an easy one. "It required," Konstantin Chernenko said, "considerable efforts on the part of the Communist Party and the Soviet government and the fraternal Parties of the socialist countries to overcome the resistance of the forces of militarism and reaction. The top political and state leaders of 33 European countries, and also of the USA and Canada, meeting in Helsinki, signed the Final Act which fully accords—in letter and spirit—with the requirements of peaceful coexistence."¹

The solution of the European security problem is a long-term task of the present epoch, and therefore the convocation of the European Conference and its success proved to be a landmark on the path towards this goal. The attempts made today by the more aggressive forces of imperialism to bring to naught the results achieved during the period of detente, including the results of the European Conference, far from diminishing its significance, reveal that a number of the tangible gains of that period are, indeed, irreversible.

The success of the Conference had been prepared for by many years of struggle conducted by the Soviet Union and all socialist countries, by the working masses and democratic public forces for European security, and also by the efforts of sober-minded forces in capitalist countries which realize that in the nuclear age peaceful coexistence is the only reasonable alternative to the arms race.

The participants in the Conference agreed on the principles guiding relations among states and clearly formulated them: sovereign equality, refraining from the use or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for people's equality and for their right to determine their own future, cooperation among states, and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. These principles, determining the policies and conduct of states on the basis of peaceful coexistence, have offered real opportunities to safeguard European security.

They drew up a Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament as part of the Final Act. Registered in it were understandings, which proved very important for the subsequent period, on complementing political detente with military detente. "The participating states", the document says, "recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political detente in Europe and to strengthen their security".² Furthermore, the participants in the Conference recognized that the political and military aspects of security were mutually complementary, that European security was indivisible and inseparable from world security.

They also planned a vast programme of measures on cooperation in the field of economy, science, technology, culture and environmental protection in the whole of Europe.

Thus, the Final Act determined the main components of European security on the basis of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states.

During the years that have passed since the Conference, the USSR and other socialist states exerted a good deal of effort to carry into life the noble goals and principles proclaimed in Helsinki. Today, we have

¹ Konstantin Chernenko, *The CPSU and Human Rights*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1982, p. 278 (in Russian).

² *In the Name of Peace, Security and Cooperation*, Politizdat, 1975, p. 31 (in Russian).

every reason to state that if the Western participants in the European Conference, primarily the USA, showed the same constructive approach to the implementation of the Helsinki accords, then the process of strengthening peace and security in Europe and, therefore, in the rest of the world, would develop steadily and detente would gradually become fuller and deeper in content.

II

However, soon after the European Conference was over, those who from the outset tried to discredit the process that had started in Helsinki and to distort and emasculate its true content, got the upper hand in the political leadership of the USA and in some other countries among its allies in NATO. The USA viewed the collective strengthening of European security as a direct threat to its leading role in the North Atlantic Alliance, a barrier to its hegemonic ambitions. From the unfounded assertions that the only road to peace lay through arms buildup, the US ruling elite went over to the propaganda of the thesis that peace can be preserved only if the USA had indisputable military superiority over all other powers in the world. This thesis was capsulized most crudely by the Republican Administration of the USA, which openly switched over to confrontation with the USSR on a global and regional scale.

In the first place, the US ruling elite began to revise the political and military-strategic approach to East-West relations and to war and peace issues, redirecting it to confrontation with the USSR and its allies and friends actually in every part of the globe, primarily in Europe. To that end, Washington strategists believed it was necessary to provide corresponding political grounds and offer an explanation of why, from their point of view, this strategy must be adopted.

President Gerald Ford, it will be recalled, began to discard the very notion of detente, and his successor James Carter took practical steps towards undermining Soviet-American relations and the all-European process in general. But the present US leadership not only calls the Helsinki accords in questions, but even is trying to reach for the deep historical and political roots of European detente. With their statements about the split in Europe, Washington officials are playing up to the West German revenge-seekers, even though they claim that they are not questioning the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. These documents laid the basis for safeguarding European peace precisely through collective efforts of all the states concerned. The members of the anti-Hitler coalition noted sagaciously at that time that only with continuing and growing cooperation among all peaceloving nations can the supreme striving of man—sound and lasting peace—be realized.^{*}

Today, some leading American (and not only American) politicians are attacking what has been at the basis of European and world peace for forty years now. As they are building up tensions, the imperialist states oppose the truly collective efforts to safeguard European peace and security with pseudo-collective efforts of NATO which, far from ensuring European security, are consolidating the split. In other words, they would like to provide the security of some at the expense of the security of others, while the nuclear age has long since shown that security can only be the same for everyone.

Considering all this, it is hardly a coincidence that there also has been a sudden interest in the Western European Union of seven countries, which in the past adopted a decision, at least formally, barring nuclear

^{*} *The Soviet Union at International Conferences During the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Collected Documents, Vol. IV, Politizdat, 1979, p. 271 (in Russian).*

and other more destructive weapons from the FRG. But in the summer of 1984, the WEU lifted the ban on the manufacture in the FRG of strategic bombers and long-range missiles. In some quarters in the West the revival of the WEU is justified by saying it would, allegedly, make Western Europe less dependent on the USA. No doubt, the WEU invigoration, to some extent, reflects the growth of interimperialist contradictions, the striving somehow to demonstrate the "remoteness" of Western Europe from the USA, and the rivalry flaring up between the military-industrial complexes of the USA and Western Europe. Nonetheless, the very "revival" of the WEU and the way it is being revived show that this military-political alliance is called upon, above all, to rally the West European countries for stepping up military efforts in keeping with the strategic concepts and plans of the USA and NATO.

As a result of the USA's turn towards greater confrontation with the socialist countries, the Soviet-American relations were frozen in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other spheres, while East-West relations as a whole came up against difficulties. In short, Washington's policy was undermining detente.

Exploiting the fabricated "Soviet military threat", the US political leaders were pushing the NATO partners onto the dangerous path of military rivalry with the USSR and its allies in Europe. As early as 1977 the USA imposed on its allies the decision on a 3-per cent annual military spending increase and in 1978 NATO adopted, under pressure from Washington, a 15-year programme, costing \$80,000 million, of building up NATO's might. The subsequent developments followed a certain pattern. In December 1979 the USA got the approval of the infamous NATO "two-track decision", envisaging a sharp escalation of the arms race on the European continent. In this case, though, it was helped readily enough by Britain and the FRG. The purpose of the "two-track decision" was to deploy, beginning in December 1983, 108 Pershing-2s and 464 land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles in some West European countries. Though the advisability of this move was questioned even in NATO, especially in smaller countries like Belgium, Holland and Denmark, the USA still managed to impose its will on the allies and by the start of 1985 it was to dispatch 63 Pershing-2 missiles to the FRG and 112 cruise missiles to Britain and Italy.

All these years the USA has been trying to prove that the Soviet Union, which deployed SS-20 missiles on its territory, was to blame for such a course of events. However, even those who seemed to stand through thick and thin by this myth now admit there was quite a different motive behind the US plan. The West German *Stern* magazine reports that in 1983 General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated in a US Congress committee that most people believe that the USA has undertaken to modernize its weapons because of the SS-20 missiles. We would go through with modernization even if SS-20 missiles did not exist, he declared.⁴ That the General's statement was not accidental is proved by the documents of the Trilateral Commission. "The truth of the matter is", says one of the documents, "that even if there had been no SS-20s, we would need the new missiles in Western Europe".⁵ Rogers returned to this subject again in 1984. The USA always could reach Soviet territory by aircraft, but when the British Vulcan bomber was scrapped, only the American F-111 aircraft could reach Soviet territory. Therefore, the USA decided that it needed modernization, and not because the SS-20 missiles had appeared⁶, he said in an interview to *Stern*.

⁴ See *Stern*, Dec. 21, 1983, p. 115.

⁵ *Trilateral Security. A Report to the Trilateral Commission*: 26, New York, 1983, p. 95.

⁶ See: *Stern*, Aug. 9, 1984, p. 132.

Thus, from the outset the USA contemplated not a response to an imaginary danger allegedly arising from the modernization of Soviet missiles (whose number and yield was even decreased in the process), but the deployment in Europe of first-strike weapons targeted on the USSR.

But if at the dawn of the nuclear era the USA could expect to be in the lead in nuclear arms and could, therefore, think that it could do anything it wanted, then in the early 1970s, when approximate parity was achieved between the USA and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, the situation was much different. It was then that the idea of a "limited" nuclear war, including in Europe, was conceived. This scenario of US political strategists was embodied in President Carter's Directive 59, and it was first mentioned by the US Secretary of Defense speaking in New Port on August 20, 1980.

A "limited" nuclear war required medium-range nuclear weapons. And precisely these weapons were to ensure NATO's "two-track decision". The Republican Administration which succeeded Carter went still farther. It adopted a new document on national security, which replaced Directive 59, and openly proclaimed that the goal of US policy was to "win" a protracted nuclear war as well.⁷

All the reasoning about a possibility of winning a nuclear war and its admissibility in general set off an angry outcry, also in the West. Evidently Washington and NATO leaders must have taken all this into account when they set out to devise a "new" strategy which would not sound so horrible.

There are quite a few facts to prove this. Thus, on November 9, 1984, the NATO Defence Planning Committee approved a doctrine of delivering non-nuclear strikes at the enemy's "second line". The public is told that this "new" development is an attempt to raise the nuclear threshold or, in other words, to make the use of nuclear weapons more remote in time or perhaps to rule it out altogether. But a closer look at the new doctrine will make it clear that now NATO intends to threaten the Warsaw Treaty countries also with conventional weapons, though it keeps nuclear systems with brief flight time, "invulnerable" weapons, and even "impregnable" ABM systems in reserve. To accomplish this task in practice a division of labour of sorts is being effected in NATO: the USA sees to the nuclear "defence" of Western Europe, while Western Europe handles defence with conventional weapons. The idea is far from being new. When in 1982 General Rogers offered it to West Europeans in a more comprehensible way for them, the NATO allies argued with one another over the share each was to contribute in escalating the arms race on the so-called near-nuclear level, on the level of "thinking" weapons. Now it looks like the Americans have persuaded the allies.

Thus, yet another step has been taken in implementing the dangerous US plans on preparations for an armed conflict in Europe involving the more aggressive forces of Western Europe. It is not for nothing that the FRG showed great zeal in backing the Rogers Plan and declared the "strengthening of conventional defence" to be "a European task, first and foremost". But what is really meant here is not defence but the same old strategy of the first strike, both nuclear and, now, conventional.

It is worth recalling that it is in Western Europe that the USA stores a large portion of its powerful arsenal of chemical weapons (over 3 million shells, tens of thousands of aerobombs, and hundreds of thousands of mines and demolition bombs). Of late, the number and capacity of storage facilities for toxic agents have been increasing on the territory of the USA's European allies.

⁷ See R. Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War*, New York, 1982, p. 12.

All these actions by the more aggressive circles in the USA and their minions in Western Europe have really imperilled peace and security not only on the European continent but elsewhere in the world.

III

Recent developments have reaffirmed that the principle of equality and equal security is of vital importance for stable peace in Europe. The Soviet Union has insisted on implementing this principle at every stage of postwar development and at all talks related to the elimination of the threat of war and to the limitation and reduction of arms.

Ever since the European Conference, the USSR and its allies have worked hard to promote European detente along all lines in keeping with this basic principle, the chief aim being to rid the peoples of the continent of the war danger. A departure from this principle would only encourage the more aggressive forces of imperialism.

In 1976, the Warsaw Treaty countries proposed that all participants in the European Conference sign a treaty repudiating the first use of nuclear weapons and presented to them the draft of the treaty. The NATO countries turned down the proposal, alluding to the "indisputable superiority" of the USSR and its allies in conventional weapons. But the facts show this assertion to be totally unfounded. Objective assessments have revealed that NATO exceeds the Warsaw Treaty in the total numerical strength of the personnel (4.9 million against 4.8 million people). And in the land troops in Europe NATO's superiority is greater—2.1 million against 1.7 million. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty have roughly equal amounts of artillery and armoured hardware (counting the tanks concentrated in West European depots). NATO has a superiority in fighter-bombers, which is balanced by the Warsaw Treaty by means of a somewhat larger number of interceptor-fighters. On the whole, there is an approximate parity between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in conventional arms, which is actually confirmed by a recent issue of the journal *Military Balance 1984-1985* issued by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies.⁸

However, considering the West European concern over the conventional forces of the Warsaw Treaty, in March 1979 the USSR proposed that NATO should renounce the use of not only nuclear but also conventional weapons and sign a kind of a non-aggression pact. NATO ignored the proposal.

In 1982, the Soviet Union displayed goodwill by assuming a unilateral obligation to refrain from being the first to use nuclear weapons and called upon the USA and other nuclear powers to follow suit. They refused, however.

In January 1983, the Warsaw Treaty countries addressed the NATO countries with a proposal to sign a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of armed force and on the maintenance of relations of peace. That move was motivated by the wish to restore detente and, considering the increased mutual apprehensions, to find a way out of the present situation. There was no response to that either.

At the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms in Europe, the USSR again suggested that Europe be cleared of nuclear weapons, medium-range and tactical, and formulated a number of proposals taking into consideration the interests of the parties concerned. It declared its preparedness to conclude a comprehen-

⁸ See *Nouvelles atlantiques*, O.L. 12, 1984, p. 4.

sive agreement covering all types of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, that is, all nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles. At the same time, the Soviet Union, wishing to take due account of the considerations expressed in the West, made relevant correction in its proposals. For instance, it agreed to halt the deployment of its medium-range missiles not only on the territory of Europe but in those regions of the USSR from which these missiles could reach West European countries. It also expressed a readiness to take into account not only delivery vehicles but also the warheads and to destroy its missiles which would be reduced if a relevant treaty were signed, and not to deploy them in other regions of the USSR.

But the American side made only proposals which would give NATO an advantage in medium-range weapons, and ultimately deadlocked the talks by starting the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe. As a result, the Soviet Union was compelled to take counter-measures to maintain the nuclear parity and to ensure its own security and the security of its allies.

Some people in the West (even in the antiwar movement) doubt whether it was necessary to continue military preparations at all, since the sides possessed overkill potentials: let the USA alone go along this road of no return. But the point is that the existing parity, which is at the basis of talks on equal terms, should be maintained, and the US Administration seeks to upset it in order to deal with the USSR "from the position of strength", and it does not even conceal this fact. And since the addition of new medium-range missiles to the mass-destruction weapons already stockpiled by the USA means only that the United States seeks ways and means of delivering the first and disarming strike at the USSR, to leave these plans without response would be to open the way for any US venture in the world arena. This is what the USSR and its allies cannot allow to happen, all the more so since their concession may be interpreted by the United States as confirmation of the correctness of its position: pressure supposedly yields results.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union believes that parity can and must be preserved, preferably on a lower level, so that disarmament could be gradually achieved, for which honest and constructive talks are needed.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, an important way of decreasing nuclear confrontation in Europe would be to create zones free of nuclear weapons in various parts of the continent: in the north, in the centre, and in the south. The USSR backs up any concrete initiatives facilitating the solution of this problem.

At the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the USSR and other socialist countries have long been working to achieve practical results. To that end, the USSR proposed that the sides reduce the armed forces in Central Europe down to agreed levels: 900,000 effectives, including 700,000 in land forces. This would put an end to the protracted and futile dispute over the number of troops to be reduced by this or that country. The USSR and the USA would be reducing their armed forces on the basis of mutual example, not limited by treaties: by 20,000 and 13,000 effectives respectively. And, finally, the participants in the talks would freeze their armed forces and armaments in Central Europe before reaching an ultimate agreement.

At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the USSR and its allies proposed a constructive way of combining large-scale political and international legal measures with military-technical ones. These are, above all, renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, signing of a treaty on the non-use of force and the maintenance of relations of peace, ridding Europe of chemical weapons and cutting back military spending. As before,

the USSR and its allies are prepared to elaborate additional confidence-building measures in the military sphere—more significant and comprehensive ones—on the basis of what was proposed in Helsinki and has proved its worth.

IV

It is in Europe that the borderline runs between two opposite socio-political systems, and, therefore, Europe is the main zone of military confrontation between the two largest military-political alliances, while the struggle for more reliable European security still remains a major condition for safeguarding world peace.

At the same time, it is precisely in Europe that during the 40 years after the defeat of fascism new principles of international relations are being established, principles which reject security only through force or the threat of force. Europe was the venue of the Conference on Security and Cooperation whose results meet the long-cherished aspirations of the peoples. *Therefore, no matter how difficult the present international situation may be due to the actions of the certain imperialist circles, those in the USA above all, the Soviet Union is convinced that peace in Europe and in the rest of the world can be preserved.* "To achieve this," Andrei Gromyko said, "joint actions of all countries adhering to the positions of peace and of all social strata are required, whatever the social system and size of the states".⁹

At the same time, the favourable opportunities offered to Europe by the results of the European Conference have never been looked upon by the USSR as a godsend. One should always remember what regularities and what combination of the chief motive forces gave rise to a particular system of international relations.

The way towards ridding humanity of imperialist wars, towards establishing democratic peace and solving European security problem was paved by the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory over the Nazi aggressors in the Great Patriotic War. With the emergence of socialism on the world scene new regularities and motive forces were brought into play and the entire system of international relations began to be reshaped on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Now the masses have come to the fore in the world arena and are increasingly joining the struggle for restructuring international relations, for ensuring stable peace and security. Herein lies the earnest of stable peace. It is not without reason, one supposes, that a French paper pointed out that the present leaders of Britain, France, the FRG and Italy "cannot infinitely agree with the position [US position—E. V.] of constant resistance to Soviet proposals, if they want public opinion in their countries to support them".¹⁰

Socialism, which is conducting a historical offensive, compels capitalism to agree to a peaceful competition between the two world systems. As to Europe, the Warsaw Treaty is an invincible force safeguarding the gains of socialism. It serves reliably the cause of strengthening international security.

The working class and the Communist and Workers' Parties in capitalist countries are a powerful force fighting in the world arena for peace and against the threat of war. No mean role in the struggle for peace is played by the non-aligned states, which greatly contribute to curbing the arms race and strengthening world peace and security.

⁹ *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1984.

¹⁰ *Le Monde*, May 26, 1984.

The antiwar movement, which has been growing especially in Europe, is having an increasing impact on the course of events in the world. The movement comprises people of various segments of the population espousing different political, social and religious convictions. Every sensible person cannot fail to understand that today, when huge amounts of lethal weapons have been piled up in the world, while the arms race is going on, mankind is faced with the choice between life and death, between the arms race and a nuclear catastrophe on the one hand, and peaceful coexistence on the other. The participants in the antiwar movement have made their choice. Meanwhile, the course of the NATO countries towards whipping up the arms race and preparing for war is evoking growing alarm among people on every continent. They demand that the governments of these countries display a sober approach to war and peace issues and curb and ultimately end the arms race.

Today it should be abundantly clear to every serious politician or statesman who is aware of his responsibility for the development of the world situation that a realistic policy cannot be based on force and confrontation. It is not merely dangerous today—it may be suicidal. There are ever more signs of growing opposition in Western Europe to the deployment of nuclear and chemical weapons there, and to the doctrines envisaging the use of these weapons. This opposition is rising in the quarters which really influence political decision-making. In this context it is symptomatic that realistic-minded figures in all countries, whatever their ideology or political and other convictions, are pooling their efforts in search for ways of safeguarding security in the nuclear-missile era. Among such efforts mention should be made, for instance, of the joint actions within the framework of the Palme Commission which presented in 1982 at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament a report on concrete measures to strengthen security in Europe and the world at large and in 1984 elaborated a number of specific proposals to curb the arms race. There are, among other things, the joint action by the heads of state or government of the six countries—Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden—which proposed, in May 1984, a programme of measures leading to general and complete disarmament; proposals by individual countries, as, for instance, by Greece, which suggested in August 1983 the idea of postponing the deployment of US medium-range missiles to give the Soviet-American talks a chance to continue with a view to reaching mutually acceptable understanding, to name but a few.

The struggle carried on by the USSR and its allies for safeguarding peace and security in Europe is concrete and purposeful. They suggest that the most pressing problems related to world and European security, primarily problems concerning the prevention of nuclear war, should be solved immediately through negotiations on the principle of equality and equal security. Precisely their struggle has made it so that the USA agreed to hold new talks with the USSR to achieve mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of issues related to nuclear and space weapons.

It was noted at a session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held last December in Berlin that the ongoing deployment of American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries has further worsened the situation in Europe—a fact which is evoking growing concern everywhere. The vital interests of all European nations today, the session communique reads, require efforts towards halting the stockpiling of new nuclear devices on the European continent and towards a radical reduction thereof, up to and

including the ridding of Europe of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. Calling to mind the proposals advanced by the socialist countries to resolve this fundamental issue of our time, the Ministers' Committee definitively reiterated the fact that "the Warsaw Treaty Member States have been and remain devoted to the continuation and deepening of the European process of detente, the strengthening of security and the promotion of cooperation in Europe on the basis determined by the Helsinki Final Act".

All the peace forces are convinced that sooner or later the idea of strengthening security by joint efforts of all countries will strike root and make peace in Europe and the rest of the world more stable and reliable.

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INTERNATIONAL

MAJOR ISSUES IN 1984 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

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[Article by V. Petrovsky: "For Peaceful Solutions to International Problems"]

[Text]

For three months, from September 18 to December 18, 1984, New York hosted the regular 39th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, an international forum today encompassing 159 states. The Session's agenda incorporated 141 items, including the crucial issues of limiting the arms race, preventing its spread to outer space, eliminating dangerous seats of international tensions, strengthening universal security, educating the youth in the spirit of peace, and restructuring international economic relations on a democratic basis. Over 300 resolutions representing recommendations to states with respect to certain aspects of international life, were approved.

The proceedings and results of the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly were determined by the acute political struggle between the forces seeking to ensure that the least possible quantities of explosive materials remain on our planet, and those which, contrary to realism and common sense, continue piling up armaments and persist in pursuing an adventuristic course for military supremacy and diktat with respect to other states and peoples. Consequently, two opposite approaches to the conduct of international affairs and two styles of diplomacy were also mirrored at the UN forum.

The Soviet Union, together with the other socialist community countries and with a majority of the peaceloving UN member states, maintained that the threat of nuclear war could and should be removed and that the attainment of this goal required an honest and sincere desire to look for mutually acceptable solutions to the existing problems, with due regard for realities, equality and equal security.

An important instrument of exerting positive influence on the Session was constituted by the new major Soviet initiatives put forward in the United Nations aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space and ensuring its use exclusively for the benefit of mankind, as well as at defending the right of the peoples to determine their own future and directed against the policy of state terrorism. As was noted at a Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, substantial work was performed by the head of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Gromyko,

Professor Petrovsky, D. Sc. (Hist.), has also authored a number of books on international relations and foreign policies of the USSR, the USA and Britain, including "The National Security Doctrine in the US Global Strategy", "Disarmament: Concept, Problems and Mechanism", and "The Diplomacy of Downing Street".

during his meetings with foreign statesmen in the course of his stay in the USA in connection with the UN General Assembly Session.

A most powerful factor which steered the work of the Session in a constructive direction was provided by the concerted action by the socialist community countries. The delegations of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania did much to secure approval of important decisions on a whole range of issues related to the limitation of armaments and promotion of disarmament. The Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace approved by the Session at the proposal of the Mongolian People's Republic, was still another useful decision of the United Nations. The document stresses that this right is sacred and that it is incumbent on all states to help preserve and maintain it.

The socialist countries' approach to international affairs was consonant with the sentiments of a majority of UN member states, above all the countries participating in the non-aligned movement. Although some countries within that group, particularly those experiencing economic hardships and dependent on Western imperialist powers, displayed some traces of confusion and, in certain cases, gave in to the imperialist pressure, on the whole a main body of non-aligned states held actively anti-militarist, anticolonialist positions.

Elements of realism in assessing the nuclear missile realities also graphically manifested themselves in the positions of several industrialized capitalist states, primarily neutral countries, and in certain cases states members of the NATO bloc such as Denmark, Greece and Spain. On some issues, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, too, dissociated themselves from the extremely obstructionist course of the United States. It should be borne in mind, however, that Western states by and large continued to maintain positions of class and bloc solidarity.

The United States and its closest allies, for their turn, acted at the Session contrary to the desire of a majority of countries to see the United Nations facilitating a turn for the better in international relations. In a bid to introduce in the United Nations imperialist techniques and methods of secret diplomacy, they tried to employ the entire arsenal of means, ranging from political pressure and economic blackmail, especially with regard to smaller states, to blatant demagoguery. Practical actions by the delegations of the USA and some of its NATO allies at the Session turned out to be aimed at emasculating the political content of issues under discussion and draft decisions proposed thereon rather than at searching for substantive solutions.

A distinctive feature of the NATO representatives' behaviour at the Session was the trend on their part to imitate activity, primarily on procedural matters, without propping it, however, by preparedness for practical deeds.

The Soviet Union's proposal on the inclusion in the Session's agenda of an important and urgent item concerning use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind helped focus the attention and efforts of the participants in the Assembly on achieving specific results which would contribute to averting nuclear war, curbing the arms race and preventing its spreading to new spheres. Its consideration spurred on the discussion of issues related to the cessation of the space arms race and prompted states to intensify efforts in this field.

The Soviet Union's opinion that it is now of overriding significance to resolve the problem of space weapons in order to prevent a further increase in the risk of nuclear war, elicited virtually unanimous support at the Session. It was noted in many statements that spreading the arms

race to outer space, unless a reliable barrier be placed in its way, would cancel all the accomplishments in the arms limitation sphere and whip up the arms buildup in other areas. In this context, the US-declared plans for creating a large-scale ABM system with elements of space basing and other militarist programmes regarding outer space were strongly criticized, although many speakers did not explicitly name the United States. The delegations of not only socialist and many non-aligned countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Nigeria, Argentina but also some Western states, France included, specifically emphasized that plans for deploying antimissile and antisatellite systems were fraught with the threat of upsetting strategic stability and heightening the risk of nuclear clash.

Statements by the representatives of developing countries echoed the Soviet Union's thesis that the militarization of outer space would consume enormous human, material and intellectual resources and erect insurmountable barriers to international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space and the use of the accomplishments in this field in the interests of economic progress of states.

Highly assessed within the United Nations was the initiative of the USSR which suggested that states possessing major space potentials be the first to reach agreement on banning and eliminating attack space weapons of all types of basing, designed to hit objects in outer space, and that the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth as well as from Earth against objects in outer space be promptly prohibited for all time. The Soviet Union's inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly of an important and urgent item concerning use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind made it possible to concentrate the attention of states on the task of preventing the militarization of outer space.

The major thrust of the Soviet Union's proposal found its approval in a resolution jointly elaborated by socialist and nonaligned countries. It was supported by virtually all states but the USA (the American delegation was the only one to abstain during the voting), i. e., 150 members of the United Nations, including American allies which openly demonstrated thereby their disapproval of Washington's militarist course towards the "Sixth Ocean". The Assembly called for early and effective agreements on preventing the arms race in outer space on a bilateral and multilateral basis. It was the first time that a UN document contained provisions on the obligations by all states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities. Thus the idea of banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against Earth put forward by the Soviet Union, has been formalized in the official UN document which is unanimously supported by all UN member states.

A resolution on peaceful uses of outer space, unanimously approved by the United Nations, was also of considerable significance. This document specifically stresses that all states should actively contribute to preventing an arms race in outer space, this being an important condition for international cooperation in its peaceful uses. The statement of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar about the urgent need to prohibit the deployment of weapons in outer space before it is too late was a reflection of the sentiments predominating in this organization.

Conclusive proof of the Soviet Union's support for United Nations efforts to cement peace was provided by another *major initiative of the USSR, which submitted to the Session for its consideration an important and urgent item entitled "Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and Any Actions by States Aimed at Undermining the Socio-Political Systems in Other Sovereign States"*.

Noting the timely and urgent nature of that issue, the representatives of many states, primarily smaller and developing countries, shared the

Soviet Union's opinion that such a policy and actions constituting a violation of the elementary norms of conduct and morals were particularly dangerous in the nuclear era when they could have pernicious consequences not only for the freedom of the peoples but also for their very survival. They led to the destruction of the very possibility of ensuring a peaceful nature of interstate relations and mutual confidence, a sharp aggravation of tensions and a growing peril of war throughout the world and in some of its regions.

As was shown by the debate at the Session, a majority of UN member states reject attempts to inject ideological disagreements into international relations, which, as is the consensus, should be structured on the basis of strict observance of the United Nations Charter, and the generally accepted principles and norms of international intercourse.

The results of the consideration of the Soviet proposal speak for themselves. The General Assembly approved the Draft Resolution on the Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and Any Actions by States Aimed at Undermining the Socio-Political Systems in Other Sovereign States submitted by the Soviet Union and drawn up with due regard for the wishes and considerations voiced at the Session by a good many non-aligned and other countries. The document resolutely condemns the policy and practice of state-sponsored terrorism in interstate relations as a method of dealing with other countries and peoples and categorically rejects any concepts, doctrines and ideologies intended to justify actions of states aimed at undermining the socio-political systems of other states. The Assembly has strongly demanded to cease any such action, including the use of military force. The UN confirmed the obligation of all states unswervingly to respect the rights of peoples freely to choose their own socio-political system, and to determine their future without outside interference.

That UN decision backed by 117 states proclaims, for the first time in the UN record, the principle of inadmissibility of the policy of state terrorism. The refusal by the USA and its closest allies to support that major decision of the United Nations graphically demonstrated the origins of the policy of state terrorism and who really sought to have a free hand in order to take outside actions to undermine the socio-political systems of other states. Thus, the Assembly gave an unambiguous reply to attempts by the imperialist forces to pin the label of terrorism on national liberation movements and states pursuing an independent course in international affairs.

The consideration of the Soviet initiatives at the Session and the adoption of responsible decisions thereon permitted to focus, from a new perspective, the attention of the United Nations, governments and the public of the UN member states upon the most important problems, inherently common for all, such as how to avert a nuclear war, how to stop the arms race and move over to disarmament; and how to settle the existing conflicts and crises and prevent new ones and to create in the world an environment that would allow every country to concentrate resources on accomplishing economic and social tasks facing it.

As the head of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Gromyko, noted in his speech at the Session, it is of fundamental importance to compare the two approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons. Most participants in the Session shared the Soviet Union's opinion that the removal of the nuclear threat was a paramount issue of present-day world politics whose solution would also determine the possibility of overcoming other difficulties facing mankind. Resolutions of the Session once again empha-

sized that "removing the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation".

The proposal formulated by Konstantin Chernenko on March 2, 1984, to the effect that the need to prevent a nuclear disaster should be the aim of nuclear-weapon states' policies and that they be guided by appropriate norms of their mutual relations, was perceived at the Session as a condensed expression of realism and responsibility for the future of the world in conditions of the nuclear missile face-off. This idea struck the most responsive chord among the representatives of developing states. The representatives of India, Mexico, Tanzania, Uganda, Indonesia, Syria, Rwanda, Mali and other countries came right out and said that what with the nuclear confrontation, concern for the preservation of peace should be made the priority. The same theme was stressed in the statements by representatives of a number of developed capitalist states. In his speech at the Session Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen of Finland noted that the "world has the right to expect that the nuclear-weapon states, which have the primary responsibility for disarmament, act decisively to halt and reverse the course of the arms buildup".¹

The idea of concerting specific measures among nuclear-weapon states to lower the war threat also found its reflection in a good many resolutions adopted by the Session. The Assembly stressed that such states bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for taking measures designed to prevent the unleashing of a nuclear war, in particular by establishing appropriate norms guiding relations among them.

A special resolution adopted by the 39th Session demands that the other nuclear-weapon states follow the example of the USSR and assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Support was also given to a new idea advanced by the Soviet Union, i. e., to work out an international legally binding document containing a no-first-use commitment. The Assembly explicitly requested that the Conference on Disarmament take practical steps to this end.

In recommendations on specific matters the Assembly accentuated the need "to refrain from war propaganda, in particular a nuclear war—global or limited—and from the elaboration and dissemination of any doctrines and concepts endangering international peace and justifying the unleashing of nuclear war". A number of the Session's decisions, *inter alia* those adopted on the initiative of developing countries, point out the extremely grave danger inherent in the strategy of deterrence officially accepted by the NATO bloc, which is based on the concept of a salutary nature of the alleged "deterrent force of nuclear weapons" and the advisability of being the first to use them.

Two resolutions adopted by the 39th Session contain a call for concluding a convention banning altogether the use of nuclear weapons, which would involve the participation of the five nuclear-weapon powers. Opposing all those decisions adopted by an overwhelming majority of the participants in the Session, the representatives of the USA and its closest NATO allies seemed to openly display the inconsistency between the political thinking of the bloc's chieftains and the level of responsibility which a majority of UN member states were entitled to demand, and demanded, from them in the face of the nuclear peril.

Conducive to stronger law and order in the world was the General Assembly's decision to continue efforts with a view to working out and concluding a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations which was initially endorsed by the United Nations, at the propo-

¹ UN Doc. A/39/PV.6.

sal of the Soviet Union, in 1976. In this matter as well, the United States and its closest allies, which sought to obstruct the elaboration of a World Treaty, found themselves in a political isolation. Parenthetically speaking, Washington's opposition to the commitment that would ban the use of any weapons, both nuclear and conventional, shows better than anything else the true value of the utterances by US spokesmen to the effect that they cannot agree to renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons and relevant doctrines because that would allegedly legalize the use of conventional weapons.

On the initiative of socialist and major non-aligned countries the General Assembly adopted a decision containing recommendations regarding specific steps towards erecting not only political and legal but also physical barriers to the threat of war in the shape of specific accords on freezing the nuclear armaments and prohibiting nuclear weapon tests.

Decisions at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly commended the joint declaration adopted by the heads of state or government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania on May 22, 1984, concerning the need to put an end to the nuclear arms race. In practical terms, the General Assembly appealed to all nuclear-weapon states to freeze their nuclear armaments on a global scale starting from a definite date and subject to appropriate verification, and called upon the USSR and the USA to be the first concurrently to freeze their nuclear arsenals on a bilateral basis and as an example for the other nuclear powers.

In several resolutions the General Assembly demanded that the issue of ceasing nuclear weapon tests be resolved without delay. American representatives who addressed the Session with proposals the gist of which was in fact to exchange observers to monitor the carrying out rather than the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, failed in diverting the attention of the delegates from top-priority tasks in that field. The Assembly approved decisions calling for the earliest drafting and conclusion of a treaty in general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and spoke in favour of a prompt beginning of talks to that effect within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

It is worth noting that the consideration by the Session of these two major issues, which, as its decisions emphasized, are of paramount importance, further isolated the opponents of the cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is quite typical that only a small group of the USA's closest allies joined it in voting against the resolutions on a freeze. That extremely negative position was not supported even by several NATO countries such as Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain, or Australia and New Zealand which are allied to the USA in the ANZUS bloc. Washington found itself in greater isolation in the matter of ending nuclear weapon tests where votes against relevant UN documents were cast only by the USA, Britain and in one case—France.

The Session adopted decisions charting ways of removing the nuclear menace in other areas, too. For instance, the Assembly strongly advocated the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world, primarily the Middle East and Africa, taking into account the craving of the Tel Aviv's aggressive regime and South African racists for nuclear weapons. The Session spoke in favour of strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapon states and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Session can also take credit for adopting, by an impressive majority of votes, a demand to outlaw chemical weapons, to limit and reduce naval armaments, and to finalize preparations for an International Conference on the Indian Ocean with a view to convening it early in 1986.

All in all, the Assembly approved 61 decisions calling upon states, first and foremost nuclear-weapon states, to contribute by concrete deeds to halting the arms race, primarily space and nuclear armaments. Those

decisions were backed by an overwhelming majority of countries. Twenty-six of the decisions received negative votes of the USA and a group of its allies, with the USA being the only one to vote against on ten occasions. The voting results vividly showed which policy was in keeping with the interests of a majority of the UN member states and which one ran counter to their demands.

An acute political struggle marked the Session's discussion of both arms limitation and other political problems of the today's world related to strengthening the security and sovereignty of states and defending the rights of the peoples.

The General Assembly devoted much of its time to matters relating to the elimination of the pockets of conflict and war danger in various regions of the world, above all in Central America, the Middle East and southern Africa. In the course of the Session's discussion of the situations prevailing in specific regions, progressive countries denounced such manifestations of the policy and practice of state-sponsored terrorism as the US undeclared war against Nicaragua, the occupation of Grenada by the USA, and its interference in the affairs of other countries of Central America with a view to imposing an order to its own liking upon the peoples of the region. Such US "strategic partners" as Israel and South Africa were mentioned at the Session as vehicles of the policy and practice of terrorism in interstate relations. The Session endorsed seven resolutions condemning various facets of Israel's policies and actions, with regard to the population of Arab territories occupied by it. Such actions were explicitly described as acts of terror and their repressive and unlawful nature was accentuated. A resolution adopted by a majority of votes unambiguously stressed that the US-Israeli strategic cooperation helps Tel Aviv continue its aggressive expansionist policy. A paragraph to that effect was incorporated in the UN document though in a bid to get the paragraph deleted, Washington launched a most vigorous campaign of pressure and blackmail against non-aligned countries.

Some ten resolutions of the Session concerning the Middle East reflected the basic provisions and ideas put forward by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1984 in its proposals on the Middle East settlement. In particular, the United Nations reiterated an urgent need for Israel's full and unconditional withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967 as a sine qua non for establishing a comprehensive and equitable peace in the Middle East. The resolutions reaffirmed the call for an International Conference with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the PLO, with a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement in that tinderbox area. They plainly pointed out that only the positions of two states, the USA and Israel, hindered the convening of such a Conference. Only the USA and Israel voted against some of those decisions of the General Assembly while an absolute majority of other UN member states, including some of the US allies in the NATO bloc, cast their votes for the above resolutions or abstained.

The Session also strongly rebuffed crude attempts by the USA delegation to secure that resolutions contain no mention of the USA and Israel as the major accomplices of the South African racists who are exercising terror in Namibia occupied by them and perpetrating terrorist aggressive acts against independent African countries.

The Assembly approved some 30 decisions in which it firmly and unequivocally advocated the termination of the criminal policy and practice by the apartheid regime and economic, military and political cooperation with it on the part of Western powers. Specifically condemned was

the policy of "constructive cooperation" with South African racists, proclaimed by Washington.

Positions of principle were maintained by the Assembly on matters related to the Namibian settlement as well. The Assembly urged that UN decisions on the immediate liberation of Namibia be translated into life, and reiterated its support for the national liberation movement of the people of that country under the leadership of SWAPO. The General Assembly also advocated granting the right to independence and self-determination to all the peoples who are still languishing in colonial servitude, this fully applying to the people of Micronesia as well.

The USA delegation did not second any of the dozen-odd decisions of the Session on the matter of putting a stop to the criminal terrorist practices of Tel Aviv and Pretoria against the Arab and African peoples. The General Assembly's recommendations call upon states and peoples to do away with the seeds of war danger. Countering the USA's claims to rule the roost in Central America and to impose its will thereon by force, the United Nations associated itself with the search for peaceful solutions within the framework of the Contadora initiative. Indicative were the negative votes cast by American representatives during the voting on resolutions condemning the crimes committed by the military in Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala. Even many of Washington's allies dissociated themselves from the US attempts at the United Nations to take the above-mentioned antipopular regimes under its protections. Suffice it to say, for example, that a draft resolution on Guatemala was prepared by the delegations of Western states, including France, Spain and Scandinavian countries. The USA voted against the draft jointly with dictatorships of Latin America. The same thing happened during the voting on a draft resolution on the crimes of the Salvadorean junta, co-sponsored by France, Greece, Spain and Sweden. On the whole, USA "champions of human rights" refused to support 10 out of 11 resolutions on matters pertaining to that field.

Important decisions (about one-third of all resolutions) were taken by the General Assembly on economic problems. The documents approved reflected many ideas regarding the invigoration of international economic and political relations, advanced at the Moscow Economic Summit Conference of the CMEA Countries in June 1984. The thesis backed by socialist countries concerning a direct interrelationship between the problems of averting a nuclear war and curbing the arms race and the tasks of economic development, evoked a broad response in the statements made by representatives of many developing countries.

On the whole, the economic discussion at the 39th Session was clearly marked by strong sentiments of protest against the neocolonialist policies of imperialist powers. A resolution on confidence-building measures in the economic field, proposed by Poland, was approved by the votes of over 100 UN member states. The document strongly denounces any measures of pressure and sanctions used in international economic relations with a view to bringing pressure to bear upon states.

The struggle against neocolonialism not only in the economic field but also in the spiritual sphere has become a major area of UN activities in recent years. In a special decision, the General Assembly called upon the mass media to make a contribution to strengthening peace and international understanding and to combatting racism, apartheid and incitement to war. The document stressed the need for establishing a new international information order, an order that would be aimed at strengthening peace, enable all people actively to participate in political, economic, social and cultural life, and promote mutual understanding and friendship among all states and respect for human rights.

As a counterbalance to the attempts by the USA and some of its allies to blackmail the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the General Assembly adopted, on the initiative of a group of developing countries, a resolution supporting UNESCO, its noble objectives and its substantial contribution to the struggle for developing moral and psychological guarantees of a universal peace.

It is quite symbolic that the voting at the UN forum is done by pushing buttons: a green one for an affirmative vote, a red one for a negative vote and an amber one for an abstention. This lights up lamps of a corresponding colour beside the name of a given UN member state on a large electronic panel located on a wall of the Assembly Hall. It is noteworthy, indeed, that in taking decisions on major issues related both to the problems of war and peace and to other aspects of international relations, the green light invariably prevailed on the voting panel, symbolizing, as it were, the desire of an overwhelming majority of the UN members to open up the roads leading to a stable peace and constructive international cooperation. As to the red and amber lights, they kept lighting up all but constantly beside the names of the USA, the FRG and some other NATO countries. It is not fortuitous that within the United Nations any voting is called the "moment of truth", i. e., a moment when all masks are cast off revealing the true nature of a country's policies.

"For a number of years," Andrei Gromyko said in his interview to Soviet political analysts on January 13 of this year, "most states of the world, even those states which do not have so cordial state relations with us, have, one can say, instinctively tended to support proposals that promote the cause of preventing war and strengthening peace." This state of affairs is apparently distasteful to the USA and some of the Western states which, together with Washington, pursue a course towards building up international tensions. The voting on the crucial issues in the 39th Session of the General Assembly has shown that the bulk of the world's population represented at this authoritative body expects the US Administration and its closest allies to heed the imperative of time and respect and honour the Session's decisions. Today, these decisions are backed by a broad cross-section of the people on all continents who are coming to realise that the threats and perils facing humanity are indeed formidable, and that no effort must be spared if this peril is to be removed, and a nuclear cataclysm, whose shadow has been hanging over the world throughout the postwar years, be averted.

Although not all decisions taken by the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, for example, the stereotyped resolutions on the so-called questions of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, live up to the requirement of political realism, the overall balance of the forum's work is positive. It testifies that the forces of human self-preservation are more powerful than the forces of nuclear adventurism. The Session gave an unambiguous reply to the paramount question of today namely whether it is possible to do away with the threat of a global nuclear conflagration. Yes, it is possible.

Those decisions of the Session which have been adopted due to the interaction between socialist and most non-aligned countries are in keeping with the vital interests and requirements of all the peoples of our planet without exception and rest on the authority of collective reasoning. They reflect the interests of the broadest possible range of UN member states. Worked out and approved under the auspices of the UN, the largest political organization of states, those decisions provide a powerful impetus to the efforts by all forces standing on the positions of

realism and responsibility, against a growing danger of war. The Session's useful resolutions contribute to creating moral and psychological barriers to the implementation of the militarist plans hatched by the most aggressive quarters. Those recommendations, which are in line with a new political way of thinking in the nuclear era, cannot be disregarded by any state or government since the latter exist in a certain international environment and have, in one way or another, to take account of the sentiments of social forces.

No wonder the positive decisions of the General Assembly have been greeted with satisfaction by international public opinion and welcomed by the governments of peaceloving states. The Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries regard those decisions as vivid proof of the effectiveness of their foreign policy course towards peaceful coexistence and stronger foundations of universal peace and security. At the same time, those decisions have provoked undisguised irritation in the West, above all in the United States.

The idea of concerted efforts for the sake of a more durable peace was the prevailing subject in the statements by a great many countries at the Session. It is only natural that the idea was advanced in close connection with the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the victory won by the peoples over fascism and of the foundation of the United Nations, to be observed this year. As was stressed by Andrei Gromyko in his speech before the General Assembly, "it is the main lesson of the Second World War that states must stand together in the fight against war". Many statesmen emphasized in the speeches at the Session the need to revive and translate into life the noble idea of united actions of the nations in the interests of peace.

In a decision unanimously adopted by its 39th Session, the General Assembly once again stressed the respect felt by the present generation to the victims of Nazism and fascism and to the struggle of the peoples against Nazism and fascism during the Second World War, as well as to the establishment of the United Nations called upon to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm the faith in fundamental human rights, the dignity and value of human life. The United Nations solemnly declared May 8 and 9, 1985, the days of observing the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism in the Second World War.

Thus, the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly has most graphically demonstrated that on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the great victory of the peoples over fascism and of the foundation of the United Nations a majority of countries are aware of the need to pool efforts in order jointly to overcome the threat of nuclear war facing all the peoples and have outlined top-priority steps which should be taken to that end.

An analysis and objective assessment of the regular UN General Assembly Session allow the Soviet people to assert, with considerable satisfaction, that the USSR, which was instrumental in securing a victory in the Second World War, is at present pursuing a policy supported by the bulk of the UN member states, all those who campaign against nuclear annihilation and for the noble objective proclaimed by the UN Charter: "To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

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INTERNATIONAL

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 3, Mar 85 pp 15-20

[Article by M. Shelepin: "Nuclear-Free Zones: A Means of Reducing the War Threat"]

[Text] Since the outset of the nuclear age the Soviet Union has been consistently advocating non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was largely owing to the USSR's efforts that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was prepared and put into effect and an international nuclear non-proliferation regime set up on its basis, which has since proved its viability and effectiveness. At the same time, the Soviet Union has advocated other means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

In 1956, when there was no precise concept of nuclear non-proliferation, and the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons became tangible, the USSR put forward the general idea of regional, geographic limitation of the possible spread of nuclear weapons by means of setting up nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world.¹ Thus a new concept was added to the international political lexicon, which implied a package of measures to prevent access for nuclear weapons to any part of the world.

The nuclear-free zones idea promptly gained in popularity. The peoples of the world saw in it not only a reliable means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also a way to reduce tensions, promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, strengthen regional and international security, and curb the arms race.

Starting in 1957, concrete proposals to set up nuclear-free zones followed one another, to include Central Europe, the Balkans, the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, Northern Europe, Africa and Latin America. Later proposals envisaged the setting up of denuclearized zones in the Middle East, South Asia, South Pacific and other regions of the world.

The evolution of the nuclear-free zones concept and its implementation in the 1960s was largely affected by the discussion and elaboration of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For its parts, the denuclearized zones concept played a positive role in the elaboration and ultimate conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A comparison of the "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" and the "nuclear-free zone" concepts shows that the latter presupposes broader commitments by states in comparison with those assumed by signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, states participating in a nuclear-free zone commit themselves not only to refrain from acquiring or developing their own nuclear weapons but also not to allow deployment of nuclear weapons belonging to a nuclear power on their territories. By contrast, participation in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not automatically demand the withdrawal of foreign nuclear weapons from the territory of a state signatory to the treaty.

It follows that the setting up of nuclear-free zones serves the aims of nuclear non-proliferation. On the other hand, struggle to extend the membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to reinforce the international non-proliferation regime objectively contributes to the establishment of nuclear-free zones, creating material prerequisites for the

¹ See UN Doc. DC/SC 1/41, March 27, 1956.

process. "The establishment of nuclear-free zones is an important aspect of the struggle to strengthen security," noted Konstantin Chernenko. "Such zones are not a utopia. Efforts in this direction have already yielded some results. These efforts ought to be redoubled in every respect ridding earth step by step of the nuclear plague."²

Naturally, it is the non-nuclear states that should primarily have a vested interest in the creation of nuclear-free zones. However, it is equally obvious that whether the zones can actually be set up and whether they are going to be viable and effective largely depends on the nuclear powers' stand.

The Soviet Union has been consistently supporting the idea of setting up nuclear-free zones, and it went on record as being prepared to commit itself to observing the status of all nuclear-free zones that may be set up, should other nuclear powers assume similar commitments. The Soviet Union's thinking was that commitments to set up nuclear-free zones could be made not only by groups of states covering entire continents or vast geographical areas, but also smaller groups of states or even individual countries. The Soviet Union especially stressed the importance of setting up nuclear-free zones as a means of effectively limiting the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in the regions of the world where there exist large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and there is a greater risk of a nuclear conflict. The USSR has always regarded setting up of nuclear-free zones as a significant norm of relations between nuclear powers.

What are the pledges that could be made by states signing agreements on the setting up of nuclear-free zones? In order to close all loopholes for possible breaches of the denuclearized status of these zones, such agreements must include commitments by member-states not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, not to seek direct or indirect control over them; not to allow deployment and stockpiling of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the zone's territory; not to allow transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and their transit through the nuclear zone's territory, including the calling of ships with nuclear weapons on board at ports situated in the zone. As for the legal status and boundaries of nuclear-free zones, they are to be defined in accordance with the universally recognized norms of international law, including the principle of the freedom of shipping in the high seas and international straits.

At the same time the Soviet Union has always held that there can be no automatic recognition of any nuclear-free zone. In line with this approach, the USSR abstained from voting at the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly (1975) on the draft resolution on "the general principles for the creation of nuclear-free zones" introduced by Mexico, Argentina, Zaire and some other countries. The draft would have the General Assembly, contrary to the UN Charter, empowered to recognize the establishment of nuclear-free zones by any group of states with consequent commitments by nuclear states. Without defining specific obligations of non-nuclear states-members of the zone agreement, the draft simultaneously contained specific obligations for nuclear powers to observe the status of any nuclear-free zone which could be set up by a group of states and approved by the General Assembly irrespective of the specific content of the agreement on its creation and of the fact whether the Soviet Union had taken part in its preparation or not.

² *Pravda*, Aug. 26, 1984.

Proceeding from its principled stand, the Soviet Union was the initiator or vigorously supported the drafts of the formation of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe, the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas, the Balkans, Northern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

From the outset of the nuclear age the Soviet Union has accorded particular importance to reducing nuclear confrontation, above all where it is especially dangerous. This applies to those continents and regions where the interests of states threateningly conflict with one another, where only a narrow strip of land divides opposing military-political groupings, and where there is a great concentration of armaments and armed forces. Europe undoubtedly was and remains such a region. The Soviet Union views the creation of nuclear-free zones as an important aspect of the effort to strengthen peace and reduce the military danger on the European continent, and as one of the ways to rid Europe of both tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons.

It is a known fact that debate on the issue of forming a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe has intensified of late. Unlike other regions of the European continent there is still no nuclear weapons here, and it is important that there not be any in the future as well. The nuclear-free status of this region should be formalized appropriately. This would be useful both for the Scandinavian countries and for neighbouring peoples.

The USSR has declared its willingness to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North European countries which become participants in the nuclear-free zone, i. e., which do not produce, acquire or deploy nuclear weapons on their territories. This Soviet guarantee could be formalized either through a multilateral agreement with its participation, or a bilateral agreement with each of the zone's member countries. The Soviet Union is prepared for this at any time and does not make this pledge conditional on the positive attitude of other nuclear powers to the zone, although the importance of such a zone would be greater for its participants if such guarantees were to be given to them by the NATO powers, too. The Soviet Union also stated that it did not exclude the possibility of discussing in the context of nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe certain other measures on Soviet territory contiguous to the zone, adding that the extent of these measures could be considerable. In 1983 the USSR made this proposal more specific, expressing its preparedness to discuss the denuclearization of the Baltic Sea. In doing so the Soviet Union stated that in certain cases it was prepared to guarantee the status of the nuclear-free zone without the participation of all other nuclear powers and to consider making certain commitments in respect of its own territory contiguous to the nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union also stated that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans would also be of no small significance in terms of strengthening security in Europe. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its positive attitude to the formation of such a zone in this region.

The Soviet Union was the first to speak out in favour of the draft proposal advanced by Sweden on the creation of a zone free of all battlefield nuclear weapons. The practical implementation of such a zone would help to boost confidence and stability not only in the centre of Europe but throughout the continent as well, and would further the process of reducing armed forces and armaments.

However, considering the tactical and technical characteristics of nuclear weapons which are at issue in the Swedish proposal, the creation of a zone whose depth would stretch just 150 km on either side of the Warsaw Treaty-NATO borderline would not lead to any substantial reduction of the nuclear danger. For this reason the Soviet Union has stated that the zone being proposed can be truly effective only provided its width is not 300 km, but between 500 and 600 km, i. e., 250 to 300 km.

westward and eastward of the Warsaw Treaty-NATO borderline. The creation of such a zone could be begun with Central Europe in the context of the efforts which are being taken at the Vienna talks on armed forces and armament reductions in this region.

The USSR's 1978 proposal to the UN not to deploy nuclear weapons on territories of states which are presently free from them also contributed greatly to the implementation of the nuclear-free zones idea. The proposal calls for agreement not to emplace in future nuclear weapons, whether in the form of the deployment of combat-ready nuclear systems, stockpiles of nuclear warheads, bombs, shells and mines, on the territories of states presently free of such weapons. Such an agreement would not only have a stabilizing effect on the existing strategic parity but would also provide the basis for the effective recognition of the denuclearized status of countries in a discussion of the status of nuclear-free zones under international law. If all nuclear powers pledged not to deploy nuclear weapons and reached an agreement to this effect in accordance with the international law, this would bring out into a sharp relief those territories on the map of the world which militarily and strategically could qualify for inclusion in nuclear-free zones.

The implementation of the Soviet initiative would also considerably strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime without detriment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Having a direct bearing on the setting up of nuclear-free zones, this Soviet proposal creates broader possibilities for attaining this objective through collective or individual efforts of the international community.

Unfortunately, its implementation was blocked by the West led by the USA.

It is symptomatic that the USA and its NATO allies in fact adopted a negative stand towards the nuclear-free zones concept since its inception. In justification of their position they said that the setting up of nuclear-free zones would be feasible only if "it did not result in unilateral advantages for a state or group of states."³ When applied to the nuclear-free zones concept, this demand, perfectly legitimate in itself, was regarded by the Western powers as violating "the balance of forces" and creating additional military advantages for the Soviet Union. These far-fetched "arguments" were most frequently used in the discussion of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe and particularly in its central part.

To date, most plans for the setting up of nuclear-free zones have not been implemented, primarily as a result of the negative attitude of the USA, Britain and France and differences between prospective participants. The only exception is the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, enshrined in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, better known in international practice as the Treaty of Tlatelolco which was opened for signing on February 14, 1967.

The Treaty as a whole might be described as a good foundation for the creation of a solid and durable status of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. So far this is the first and only example of a nuclear-free zone in a populated area of the world. The signing of the Treaty has thus provided convincing proof of the feasibility of denuclearized zones as an effective means of blocking the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the effectiveness of the Tlatelolco Treaty is limited by a number of its provisions which might be interpreted as enabling

³ *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965*, New York, 1967, p. 209.

both the participating countries and certain nuclear powers to violate the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America. This is largely a result of the reluctance of the Western powers, primarily the USA, to abandon their positions of military and strategic predominance in this part of the world. Some of the Treaty's shortcomings stem from differences in the approaches of Latin American states themselves to the key issues of limiting the arms race and of disarmament, primarily to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

Presently, 23 Latin American states have acceded to the Treaty. For some reasons Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other states have not yet done so.

Additional Protocols No. I and II to the Treaty, which call on non-Latin-American states to pledge to observe the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America, have played an important role in asserting the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Protocol I commits states to extend the status of the nuclear-free zone to territories for which they bear international responsibility *de jure* or *de facto* and which are situated within the boundaries of a geographical area defined in the Treaty. Protocol II calls on all nuclear powers, that is the USA, the USSR, Britain, France and China, to commit themselves to observe the status of nuclear-free zone in Latin America. All five nuclear powers are signatories to Protocol II of the Treaty. In signing and ratifying the Protocol they went on record about their attitude to the treaty's individual provisions.

The Soviet Union signed Protocol II on May 18, 1978, "although" as USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said at the time "we had some doubts on that score because of some well-known weak points in that Treaty".⁴ The statement made at the signing ceremony formulated the USSR's principled stand regarding several provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and pointed to the practical ways following which the participating countries as well as countries signatories to additional Protocols I and II can ensure the genuinely denuclearized status of the zone set up in Latin America.

The record of the Tlatelolco Treaty has shown that the participating states have not developed their own nor acquired foreign-made nuclear weapons. This means that the status of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America has been observed so far. This is an important positive result.

At the same time it must be pointed out that a number of the Treaty's provisions have not been fully implemented. This primarily concerns the imperfect functioning of the system monitoring its fulfilment, as a result of which there remains a possibility of its violations in the absence of a built-in mechanism designed to block such violations.

Latin America's hopes that the Treaty will help them accelerate the process of the peaceful use of nuclear energy have largely remained unfulfilled. Atomic energy for peaceful uses has developed with greatest strides in Argentina and Brazil, two countries which did not accede either to the Tlatelolco Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

One of the stated purposes of the Tlatelolco Treaty was facilitating progress in curbing the arms race in Latin America. However, even the modest efforts towards this objective which were made by Mexico and other states in the 1970s (the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho) failed.

A set of measures is called for in order to guarantee henceforth the genuinely denuclearized status of Latin America. The Tlatelolco Treaty must become a truly universal agreement in Latin America, which primarily means that it must be joined by Argentina and Brazil which have

⁴ Andrei Gromyko, *Lenin and the Soviet Peace Policy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 366.

advanced nuclear energy programmes and the potential for developing their own nuclear weapons.

Accession to Protocol I of all countries concerned without exception is an important element of reinforcing the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Meanwhile France has not ratified it and, by all indications, is not going to do so in the near future. It is also imperative that the USA, Britain and France sign an agreement with the IAEA on the application of its safeguards system to territories covered by Protocol I.

All Latin American states must accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons because, among other things, this would enable these countries to more fully use the IAEA potential in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Since the Tlatelolco Treaty does not prohibit transit of nuclear weapons through territories of participating countries, this built-in deficiency could be rectified by unilateral declarations of all participating countries about prohibition of transit. (Mexico has already made such a declaration, providing a good example and precedent for other Latin American countries). The problem has acquired a special topicality in the light of the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Malvinas (Falkland Islands).

All parts of the Tlatelolco Treaty mechanism must be set in motion. This primarily concerns unimpeded functioning of its control system. From this point of view it is especially important for all Latin American states to sign agreements with the IAEA on the extension of the Agency's safeguards system to all nuclear activities.

Today, when Washington openly seeks to upset the existing military-strategic parity to the detriment of not only the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation but also that of many other countries, the peoples of the world view nuclear-free zones as an effective means of curbing the nuclear arms race and reinforcing security.

It is highly significant that lately the UN has been engaged in animated discussion of plans of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. One of the permanent items on the agendas of government-level meetings in Europe has been the creation of nuclear-free zones in the continent's north and the Balkans, as well as the establishment of a zone free of all battlefield nuclear weapons. In 1982, on Finland's initiative, the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly unanimously approved preparations for a study of all aspects of nuclear-free zones⁵.

In late August 1984 the Tuvalu Conference of countries of the South Pacific reached an agreement of principle on the main provisions of a treaty which is to proclaim the area a nuclear-free zone. Even before that New Zealand and Vanuatu barred access to their territories to ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons on board.

The international public at large is increasingly pressing for the creation of nuclear-free zones. The first international conference on nuclear-free zones which was held in Britain in 1984 and was attended by representatives of local governments from many countries is sufficient proof of this. This stand of the public is quite natural, for the setting up of nuclear-free zones is an important step towards the elimination of the nuclear threat looming over mankind and towards the complete banning and ultimate elimination of the most terrible of mass destruction weapons.

⁵ See UN Doc. A/RES/37/99F, Dec. 13, 1982.

INTERNATIONAL

ASSIGNMENTS OF SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS ABROAD ANNOUNCED

November 1984 Assignments

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 11, Nov 84 pp 60-61

/Text/ Igor' Dmitriyevich Bereznikovskiy has been confirmed as TASS correspondent in Tunis.

Born in 1925. Completed Moscow State University's Institute of Asian and African countries. Has been working at TASS since 1952: was a correspondent in Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, led the TASS section in the United Arab Republic. Worked as an editor of the Near East department of Foreign Information Editorial Board, the chief publisher of the Foreign Information Main Editorial Board, and the head of Eastern countries editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board. Since 1979 had led the Arab editorial board of TASS's Information for Foreign Countries Main Editorial Board.

Viktor Mikhaylovich Borodin has been confirmed as a correspondent of the TASS section in Great Britain.

Born in 1947. Completed the Moscow Institute of International Relations. Worked at TASS since 1970. Was a correspondent in the TASS section in the USA, an editor, and since 1980 the senior editor of the American countries editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board.

Georgiv Vladimirovich Voytsekhovskiy has been confirmed as the head of the correspondent center of Soviet television and radio in Greece.

Born in 1930. Completed the Moscow Institute of International Relations. Worked at Gosteleradio USSR since 1957. Was an editor, reviewer, commentator, deputy chief editor of the foreign political information department of the Information Main Editorial Board of Central radiobroadcasting to foreign countries. Worked as a correspondent of Soviet television and radio in Tanzania. Since 1982 was chief publisher of the publishing section of the Information Main Editorial Board of Central radiobroadcasting to foreign countries.

Igor' Vladimirovich Ignat'yev has been confirmed as correspondent of the TASS section in the USA.

Born in 1957. Completed the Moscow Institute of International Relations. Worked at TASS since 1977. Was an editor, chief editor of the American countries' editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board. Since 1983 has been editor of the TASS section in the USA.

Grigoriy Valentinovicy Kamenskiy has been confirmed as a correspondent of the TASS section in Egypt.

Born in 1953. Completed the Moscow Institute of International Relations. Has worked at TASS since 1976. Was an editor, then senior editor of the Eastern countries editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board.

Evgeniy Ivanovich Popov has been confirmed a correspondent for the newspaper IZVESTIYA in the GDR.

Born in 1937. Completed the Journalism Faculty of Moscow University. Has worked in publishing since 1959: was a literary contributor of the Chita oblast newspaper ZABAYKAL'SKIY RABOCHIY. From 1965 to 1980 worked at the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: as correspondent, editor of the industry construction and transportation section. Since 1980 has been with the newspaper IZVESTIYA: as an editor in the socialist competition and introduction of advanced methods section, and as chief secretary of the editorial board, since 1983 as a correspondent of the newspaper in Yugoslavia.

Nikolav Nikolayevich Stepanov has been confirmed as head of the bureau of the Novosti Press Agency in Algiers.

Born in 1939. Completed Moscow University. Has worked in the Novosti Press Agency since 1965. Was an editor, reviewer, editor-consultant of the African Countries Main Editorial Board, headed the bureau of the Novosti Press Agency in Senegal and in Mali. Since 1981 has been chief editor of the Tropical Africa combined editorial board of the Near and Middle East and Africa Main Editorial Board of the Novosti Press Agency.

Vladimir Fedorovich Stefanov has been confirmed as a correspondent of Soviet television and radio in Hungary.

Born in 1954. Completed the Moscow Institute of International Relations. Worked as a correspondent-organizer of radiobroadcasting in the editorial office of the regional newspaper SOVETSKOYE PRIAZOV'YE. Was a translator of the radiobroadcasting to Yugoslavia department, an editor of the radiobroadcasting to Hungary department and since 1984 was an announced of the radiobroadcasting to Hungary department of the Main Editorial Board for radiobroadcasting to socialist countries of the Gosteleradio USSR.

Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich Chernyshev has been confirmed head of the TASS section at the United Nations (New York).

Born in 1945. Completed the Journalism Faculty of Moscow University. In publishing since 1967. Was a literary contributor for the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM, senior editor of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board, a TASS correspondent in Canada, chief publisher of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board and a TASS correspondent in the USA. Since 1982 has been a deputy chief editor of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board.

Nikita Vsevolodovich Shevtsov has been confirmed a correspondent of the newspaper TRUD in Czechoslovakia.

Born in 1951. Completed the Moscow Institute of International Relations. In publishing since 1972. Worked as a scientific editor of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' and since 1979 has been a correspondent, then deputy editor of the socialist countries department of the editorial board of the newspaper TRUD.

Yergeniyy Petrovich Shirokov has been confirmed as head of the Soviet television and radio section in Hungary.

Born in 1931. Completed Moscow University. Has worked in Gosteleradio USSR since 1960. Was a correspondent, reviewer, chief editor of the socio-political programs section of the main editorial board of radiobroadcasting for Moscow, the chief editor for programs of the main editorial board for programs, chief editor of the main editorial board of radiobroadcasting for youth of Central Intraunion Radiobroadcasting. Since 1975 has been chief editor of the main editorial office of programs for youth of Central Television of Gosteleradio USSR.

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December 1984 Assignments

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 12, Dec 84 p 68

/Text/ Vladislovas Yulevich Burbulis has been confirmed as head of the TASS section in Vietnam.

Born in 1932. Completed Vilnius University and the CPSU CC Higher Party School. Has worked at TASS since 1973. Was a correspondent head of the TASS section in Vietnam, deputy chief editor of the Information Main Editorial Board for Foreign Countries, head of the TASS section in Finland, correspondent of the agency in Morocco. Since 1982 has been deputy director of the Telegraph Agency under the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

Vasiliy Trofimovic Zakhar'ko has been confirmed correspondent of the newspaper IZVESTIYA in Bulgaria.

Born in 1939. Completed the Journalism Faculty of Leningrad University. Has worked in publishing since 1963. Was literary contributor for the newspapers VECHERNIY LENINGRAD and LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA. From 1972 to 1976 was senior correspondent, and since 1976, deputy editor of the newspaper IZVESTIYA for the internal information department.

Leonid Sergeyevich Kilosov has been confirmed correspondent of the newspaper IZVESTIYA in Yugoslavia.

Born in 1926. Completed the Moscow Foreign Trade Institute. Has worked in publishing since 1960. Was senior editor of the journal VNESHNAYA TORGOVLYA; correspondent for the newspaper IZVESTIYA in Italy, deputy editor of IZVESTIYA for the foreign department. Since 1980 has been deputy chief editor of the illustrated supplement NEDELYA to the newspaper IZVESTIYA. Candidate of economic sciences.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich Kuz'min has been confirmed head of the TASS section in Hungary.

Born in 1948. Completed Budapest University (Hungarian Peoples' Republic). Has worked at TASS since 1974. Was editor-translator, correspondent of the TASS section in Hungary. Since 1982 has been senior editor of the socialist countries main editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board.

Eduard Fazilovich Murtazin has been confirmed chief editor of the Main Editorial Board for radio broadcasting to countries of the Near and Middle East of Gosteleradio USSR.

Born in 1933. Completed Sredneaziatskiy University and the CPSU CC's Academy of Social Sciences. Began working in newspapers in 1954: was chief secretary of a high circulation newspaper, correspondent of the newspaper SOVETSKIY SPORT, head of a department of the newspaper KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA. Since 1961 has worked at Gosteleradio USSR. Was a correspondent, editor, deputy head of a department, deputy chief editor, chief editor of programs, chief publisher of the Chief Management for programs of Central Television. Candidate of historical sciences.

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January 1985 Assignments

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 1, Jan 85 p 51

/Text/ Vladimir Pavlovich Abrosimov has been confirmed as head of the TASS section in Bulgaria.

Born in 1944. Completed the Journalism Faculty of Sofia University (Bulgaria). Has worked at TASS since 1973. Was editor, senior editor of the socialist countries main editorial board of the Foreign Information Main Editorial Board, correspondent of the TASS section in the German Democratic Republic.

Spartak Petrovich Alekseyev has been confirmed as chief director of programming of Central radiobroadcasting to foreign countries.

Born in 1925. Completed the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University. Has worked at Gosteleradio USSR since 1955. Was editor, reviewer, deputy head of the section, commentator, chief editor, and then chief director for programs of Central radiobroadcasting to foreign countries. Has worked as head of the correspondent center of Soviet television and radio in Great Britain. Since 1982 was head of the section of Soviet television and radio at the United Nations.

Igor' Aleksandrovich Belyatskiy has been confirmed as head of the information center of the Novosti Press Agency in Lebanon.

Born in 1935. Completed the Journalism Faculty of Moscow University.

Has worked at the Novosti Press Agency since 1964. Was editor of the Main editorial board for Near Eastern Countries, editor of the Novosti Press Agency bureau in the United Arab Republic, deputy head of the Novosti Press Agency bureau in Lebanon, head of the Novosti Press Agency bureau in Iraq. Since 1980 has worked as deputy chief editor of the Main editorial board for the Near and Middle East and Africa of the Novosti Press Agency.

Aleksandr Semenovich Vorapayev has been confirmed as deputy head of the TASS section in the Republic of Cuba.

Born in 1941. Completed the M. Thorez Moscow Pedagogical Institute for Foreign Languages. Has worked at TASS since 1971. Was editor of the Foreign Information Main Editorial Board, senior editor of the American countries editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board. Worked as a TASS correspondent in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, correspondent of the TASS section in the Republic of Nicaragua. Since 1983 has been a TASS correspondent in Cuba.

Yuriy Valentinovich Rodionov has been confirmed head of the TASS section in Nigeria.

Born in 1948. Completed the Moscow Institute of International Relations. Has worked at TASS since 1972. Was an editor, senior editor of the Asian countries editorial board of the Foreign Information Main Editorial Board, TASS correspondent in Nepal. Since 1982 has been chief publisher of the foreign information combined editorial board of TASS's Information for Foreign Countries Main Editorial Board.

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February 1985 Assignments

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 2, Feb 85 p 69

/Text/ Kim Borisovich Boldokhonov has been confirmed as head of the TASS section in Mongolia.

Born in 1935. Completed Irkutsk University and the CPSU CC's Higher Party School. Has worked in publishing since 1957. Was deputy editor of the Irkutsk newspaper ZNAMYA LENINA. Has worked at TASS since 1968. Was editor of the socialist countries of Asia and Southeast Asia editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board. Since 1979 has been head of the editorial foreign photoinformation editorial board of TASS's Photoinformation Main Editorial Board.

Aleksey Alekseyevich Golyayev has been confirmed as correspondent of the TASS section in Italy.

Born in 1954. Completed the M. Thorez Moscow Pedagogical Institute for Foreign Languages. Has worked at TASS since 1977. Was editor of the European countries editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board. Since 1983 has been senior editor of the TASS section in Italy.

Yuriy Mikhaylovich Ilyakhin has been confirmed as correspondent of the TASS section in China.

Born in 1955. Completed the Institute of Asian and African Countries of Moscow University. Has worked at TASS since 1979. Was editor of the socialist countries main editorial board of TASS's Foreign Information Main Editorial Board. Since 1984 has been a senior editor of the TASS section in China.

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INTERNATIONAL

ZHURNALIST BLASTS EMIGRE ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLICATIONS

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 4, Apr 85 (signed to press 12 Mar 85) pp 68-70

[Article by Igor' Gapochka: "People without a Homeland"]

[Excerpts] A Page from History Has Been Turned

The small white emigre journal VOZROZHDENIYE [Resurrection] printed the following melancholy complaint: "For a long time Soviet regime has hidden the fact that emigration exists. Nothing either positive or negative is said about us. We have been covered by the 'tombstone of the past'..."

This article is not an attempt to look under the "tombstone of the past." It is a story about those who live in dreams of the past, with quartz watches on their wrists, without even noticing that their entire life has turned into a cheap farce.

This is also a story about the tragedy of human fate, about lost dignity, broken dreams, and the helplessness and futility of people who have lost their homeland. Many of them are still enemies of their homeland and harbor hatred toward Russia, hoping for "changes" of some kind. The majority of them lead wretched lives.

There forced optimism lives right alongside total confusion, tinsel and guilt can be found right next to dirty laundry and grinding poverty. There in "fashionable bug-ridden dwellings" bitter struggles for power and crumbs from the table are waged. There mediocre extras try for the role of "sophisticated lions." There...

A farcical stir and commotion.

The Association of Cadets of Russian Military Schools in France. The Association of the Guards. The Association of Poltava Cadets. The Association of Veterans of the Drozdov Division...Associations...associations...

And why? There is nothing uniting them. Each member lives for himself. No one needs them. They live alone, they die alone. Crying and melancholy, they have been driven into the cells of a "society of prosperity."

They want time to stop because they did not manage to turn back the hands of time. A single fate has befallen these bankrupt political schemers, jaded petty merchants and officials of various ranks, the generals who have not given up and the frenzied officers of the defeated white armies, the bourgeois intellectuals, who are still arguing about the role of the Constituent Assembly and the mistakes made by the Provisional Government, the cadets and the members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the philistines, traitors, and renegades who were frightened by the revolution...

The betrayed and the betrayers. The deceived and the deceivers. They betrayed themselves, their children, and their grandchildren.

The white hangover. Illusions are burst. Life without a homeland, death in a foreign land.

And the announcements in the newspapers read: "Give a donation, in the name of Christ!..."

Before they asked for rubles, now they are asking for dollars, pounds, francs.

A Meeting of Shadows and Ghosts

Claims about some sort of "rights" to Russia and the "Russian soul" play a major role in reactionary emigre publications, a great number of which are published in the West. Claims are also made that these publications are a "unifying center of the Russian community abroad," and that they "speak for the community and serve as its ideological center."*

On Eighth Avenue in New York, where the newspaper's editorial offices are located, one hears: "It is impossible to overestimate how important NOVOYE RUSSKOYE SLOVO is to each of us." One also hears: "The newspaper meets the demand that the emigre community has always had to speak the truth and write the truth about the most important issues in political and social life. Practically speaking, the newspaper has become the center of cultural life among the emigres." It would be more accurate to say that it has become the mouthpiece for lost people, renegades who are ready to join the "crusade against the Soviets."

An analysis of the activities of anti-Soviets of all stripes and of their publications deserves a separate investigation. We are going to take a look at the shadows and ghosts that are still trying to take a place under the sun and to appear not as apparitions, but as real people with real needs.

"We install wall-to-wall carpeting. Free delivery within a 50-mile radius"... "Renaissance, the fashionable Russian restaurant and bar, has the only piano bar in San Francisco, with Yara Gornyy and Nick Umanets at the piano"... "Why make your own when you can buy them for so little! At Porkov's frozen food shop you can buy top-quality dumplings"... Yevgeniy Krasovskiy on Clement Street

*Progressive emigre publications are also published in the West. For information on one of these, cf. ZHURNALIST No 12, 1984.

does all kinds of hair styling, at moderate prices"...Petr Yarema's Funeral Service: Air-conditioned chapel. The best funeral service for the lowest price!"...

Is advertising the motor that drives commerce? Yes, of course. This is an ancient truth. And the harder it is to unload a product, the more aggressive the advertising.

It seems that the people who place advertisements in RUSSKAYA ZHIZN', RUSSKAYA MYSL', NOVOYE RUSSKOYE SLOVO, and other white emigre publications printed in the West do not put much stock in advertising. They count instead on sympathy. On "solidarity" with their countrymen, who do not prefer the traditional supermarket to a "Russian" shop.

The word "Russian" when applied to a trademark, or the name of a firm or shop, is like a calling card. Like a thread that ties the business to fellow countrymen.

And still none of them have enough of the homeland: traitors have no homeland.

"Russian," "for the Russian taste," "We speak Russian,"...And everything at a discount: "Our prices are lower than other stores." The discounts are only for "their own people," for former Russians.

The little streams of their businesses, as a rule, have not flowed into the river of free enterprise, where the current is governed by tough competition.

They are ready for everything, for any work, for any conditions. Today they might be earning the minimum wage. And what about tomorrow? It's better not to think about that. Or, just the opposite, as the announcements persistently advise, think ahead. The past, present, and future--everything is here...

"A memorial prayer service has been organized by the Board of the Alliance of Russian Military Schools in honor of the Sovereign and Most August Patrons, Grand Prince Konstantin Konstantinovich, Grand Princess Kseniya Aleksandrovna, directors, teachers, other staff of the cadet academies, and Russian cadets who gave their lives for the Faith of the Tsar and for the Fatherland, will be held in the Church of the Assumption; after the service the members of the alliance will have a traditional breakfast. Phone or write if you plan to attend."

The same thing is advised in the case of free lunches for members of the Alliance of Holders of the St. George Cross, St. Serafim's Fund, the Alliance of Officials of the Russian Academy...Otherwise they can throw you out. It doesn't matter if you are a former officer and graduate, say, of the Kuban Alekseyev Military Academy: there are a lot of "former" whatevers, who also want to get a free meal.

But free meals are not given out that often:

"The Cossack Alliance, the Alliance of Cossack Combat Soldiers, the Association of Life-Guards of the Cossack Regiment, and the Association of the Life-Guards of the Ataman Regiment announce that the military holiday of the Don, Kuban,

and Tersk Cossack Armies will be celebrated as follows: on Saturday, a memorial service will be held at the Cossack monument in the Sainte Genevieve de Bois Cemetery, prayers will be said at the graves of the Cossacks, and finally, a service will be held in the church at the cemetery. On Sunday, there will be a special prayer service after the liturgy in the Cathedral of St. Alexander Nevskiy on rue Darue.

"The traditional Cossack banquet in the "Lus" Restaurant is not planned."

These same ceremonies are held in cemeteries in New York, New Jersey, and San Francisco...And they are attended by the sympathetic fellow countrymen.

The majority of announcements are like this. There will be no meal, not at the "Lus," not at "Maxim's," not anywhere. And there aren't many "Cossacks" left. Hypertrophied hatred for the Soviets, multiplied by years of waiting for the end of the Soviet regime, led many to an early grave. They simply couldn't wait it out. None of the people acting in the white emigre farce will be able to wait it out either.

"Ready for Anything!"

Another announcement appeared in the papers:

"Free spinal examination for people suffering from back problems. Your chiropractor will find the pinched nerve and quickly relieve you of your pain. You will be able to rid yourself of pain without drugs, and you will receive competent consultation. Dr. Allan Pollok, 21st Street, Brooklyn, New York."

Many emigres arrived in the West with no professional skills that would help them find decent jobs and make ends meet. There are some people who claim to have a higher education, but they say they lost their documents or they were "not allowed" to take them out of the country. Others cheat their neighbors and openly become charlatans. They publish announcements in the papers in which they shamelessly tell naive clients (if they can find any) that they can:

Take away misfortune and the evil eye; give advice about all problems; teach you "how to earn big money mounting diamonds"; make introductions; help you "in all matters involving business and health"; make you "younger and more attractive"; treat "internal illnesses and hemorrhoids without surgical intervention"; "quickly repair dentures and deliver children" ("same-day service")...

Other emigres, who have not discovered special talents like these, are willing to do all kinds of extra jobs, such as:

Giving driving lessons; providing "quality rug and furniture cleaning"; translating and notarizing documents; photographing weddings; selling used cars; repairing used air conditioners; auto towing, complete overhauls, and technical service; English language classes; room, house, and trailer rentals; selling nuts, dried fruit, and ice cream; providing assistance in "the purchase and sale of businesses..."

And finally, someone is offering his services in organizing circus performances. But there is no demand. Just as there is no demand for cockroach races. Even without this their lives are a farce.

Help in the Name of Christ!

The majority of announcements in the "Russian" press can be divided into several basic groups: what to eat where, what to buy where, offers of various services, and advertisements for the sale of everything under the sun. In the final analysis this reflects the range of interests of the readers and their actual situation. But how do these people feel, these people whom fate has driven to live such a farce? Do the newspaper announcements say anything about this?

"...Former Muscovite, 55 years old, intelligent, suffering from loneliness in West Germany, would like to receive some letters."

"...Russian refugees in England are in need of help...They are not receiving any assistance from the British government and are entirely dependent on voluntary contributions. Many have been in England since 1917 and are now elderly...Send contributions."

Not many of these letters are published. They are a cry of despair.

Russians are used to helping each other. This, if you will, is a national character trait. In a foreign land, this selflessness is not accepted. Independence and extreme individualism are the norm. The paths of those who have managed to get acclimatized and those who have ended up on the bottom diverge quickly.

The white emigre press does not raise these issues. For the majority of readers the answer to these questions is well known.

The proprietor of the "Russian" antique store "Saint Petersburg" on an ordinary street in Paris is ready to buy from his countrymen who have hit rock bottom and are reduced to begging, any remnants of their former luxury and distinction: "pictures, porcelain, silver, orders, medals, coins, jewelry, autographs, documents..." He also buys "entire libraries."

You can hardly call this type of service help. It is really robbery. These robbers buy everything from their impoverished countrymen that is valued by foreign patrons and collectors of Russian antiquities. There are no moral considerations here. Russian culture is for sale, both wholesale and retail. They are buying up and pawning things that they did not acquire through their own labor and did not bring out illegally themselves.

In the "Russian" press you will not find one word of criticism toward those who "have not provided assistance." They know that they shouldn't count on sympathy from the powers that be. Only charity. They don't like foreigners

here. They are "extras." The people who supported them in their country through charity have enough problems of their own.

These announcements reflect the fate of people without a homeland.

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NATIONAL

ROLE OF CENTRAL JOURNALS IN PARTY BUILDING

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 1 Jan 85 (signed to press
27 Dec 84) pp 154-156

[Article by Ye. N. Tarasov, deputy director of the party building department of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate in philosophical sciences, assistant professor: "Improving the Elucidation of Current Problems of Party Building"]

[Text] The successful accomplishment of the difficult and diverse tasks of improving developed socialist society is inconceivable without strengthening the leading and directing influence of the Communist Party upon all aspects of social life. The practice of building socialism and communism has constantly confirmed the unshakableness of the Marxist-Leninist principle: the party's political, organizational, and ideological work are a powerful accelerator of social progress.

This acceleration depends to a substantial degree upon the extent to which the party cadres and the entire party aktiv understand the content of the tasks being accomplished, and are aware of the principles, forms, and methods, that is, the means of their accomplishment, the degree to which they are equipped with organizational abilities and skills, and with the ability and skills of making use of various levers. In other words, the effectiveness of party work is to a large extent determined by the understanding of cadres and of the party apparatus of the demands which follow from the laws of the development and functioning of the CPSU.

For this reason with the growing role of the party in social life ever increasing importance is acquired by the study of the theory and practice of party building. Analyzing the level of the development of the social sciences, Comrade K. U. Chernenko observed that "political, economic, and educational work show a growing dependency upon the results of scientific research," with demands being made on "a detailed analysis of the mechanisms of the action of objective laws, the ability to see phenomena in their interconnections and contradictory development, and to provide practice with substantiated recommendations and reliable prognoses..."*

*Chernenko, K. U., "Selected Speeches and Articles," Second Edition
Moscow, 1984, pp 621, 622.

The party press and our scientific journals play a large role in elucidating the problems of party building and disclosing the mechanism of the leading activities of the CPSU--its principles, style, forms, methods, and devices. The way they respond to the burning issues of the day, the kind of political, organizational, and ideological CPSU activities which are placed on their pages, the extent of the depth of their disclosure and the extent to which the publications help to strengthen the theoretical, political, and professional training of party, government, and ideological cadres--this was the range of the issues discussed at the "round table" in the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee in October 1984. The discussion was participated in by party building teachers of the country's higher party schools and Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. Addresses were delivered by V. V. Sukhodayev, the deputy chief editor of the journal PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN', by the deputy editor for the department of party life of the newspaper PRAVDA, candidate in historical sciences A. V. Chernyak, and by the candidate in historical sciences G. F. Khatsenkov, a consultant of the journal VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS. The conference was opened by the head of the party building department of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee Professor S. I. Surnichenko.

The speakers noted that the newspaper PRAVDA and the journals KOMMUNIST, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN', VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, and other publications about the style and methods of party leadership, about the realization of the Leninist principles of cadre policy, the improvement of the party's ideological work, the development of criticism and self-criticism, and an increase in the fighting spirit of the primary party organizations help cadres to master the Leninist style of leadership, and to strengthen the scientific foundations of party work.

It was unanimously emphasized that the reader shows a substantial interest in the materials which reveal the experience of insuring the unity of political, organizational, ideological, and economic work, of the demarkation of the functions of political leadership and economic management, the coordination of the work of party committees, the development of their activeness and increased discipline and a rise in the responsibility of communists.

In the preparation for classes, the candidate in economic sciences V. V. Tuchin, a senior teacher at the Novosibirsk Higher Party School (VPSH) wide use is made of articles, consultations, and questions and answers which are published in party journals. Using them as a basis, situational tasks are worked out, and control problems are resolved. The students fulfill theoretical and practical assignments: they prepare scholarly papers on the basis of the publications, compare the forms and methods of the work of various party committees, and prepare reviews of materials on specific topics. The party journals provide nourishment for deep thought, help unite in the scholarly process theory with life and with the practice

of party committees and organizations, and are an important support in the work of teachers and students of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee and of the higher party schools. Journal publications are an important source for studying party building, enriching life's experience, and improving the art of party leadership.

The participants in the discussion devoted considerable attention to an illumination of the problems of party building by the journal VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS. It was noted that the journal had made an essential contribution to the disclosure of the subject and special characteristics of party building as a science and of its categorical series. Interesting articles about the style of leadership and about its basic features have been published. Recently publications written by party workers have appeared on the issues of improving the party organizational and ideological activities of party committees, on the practice of directing economic and cultural construction, and on the economic and social development of labor collectives, rayons, and cities. Great interest has been shown for the appearance of materials of the "round table" on the problems of the party leadership of the economy under the conditions of the experiment which is being carried out in the Ukraine. Such publications have a positive influence upon the actualization of the content of journal publications, and help to overcome the excessive theorizing which occurs in our journals.

While taking note of the creative successes of our editorial collectives, the participants in the discussion at the same time expressed a number of wishes. For example, the head of the Department of Party Building of the Tashkent VPSH, doctor of historical sciences, Professor L. A. Ivanov, the deputy head of the Department of Party Building of the Khabarovsk VPSH, and the candidate in historical sciences, N. I. Kostyukov took note of the importance of a deeper disclosure of the mechanism of party work, of that totality of form, methods and devices which assure a high final result. For example, in illuminating the questions of the party leadership of economic building the accent was shifted from the questions the issues of party organizational and ideological support to a characterization of economic indicators which, of course, are important but extremely insufficient for achieving the essence of party work.

In this connection the senior teacher at the Tashkent VPSH, the candidate in historical sciences L. V. Gorbunova, raised the question of having the party journals help equip party workers, researchers, and teachers of the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee and at our higher party schools with a methodology and methods for analyzing and generalizing experience which has been gained, and the approaches and devices for singling out its positive aspects. Without this it would be impossible "to turn the experience which has already been learned by the masses into ideological baggage for new historical action."*

* Lenin, V. I., "Complete Works," Volume 19, p 81.

Attention is also merited by raising the question of the disclosure of the contradictory moments in party practice, by a characterization of those types of contradictions in the process of overcoming which party work was perfected, as was the leadership of all of the spheres of life. Attention to this problem would fully accord with the party's principles on the necessity for studying the contradictions of developed socialist society, which is of enormous theoretical and practical importance. "The social scientist," K. U. Chernenko notes, "must not shun sharp questions and pass over real collisions and contradictions. It is not a matter, of course, of collecting difficulties and shortcomings and seeing in this a 'radicalness of thought' and a 'critically-based approach,' but of studying their concrete sources and reasons and determining the most effective ways of overcoming them."*

Wishes of the following kind were expressed: that there be a more frequent publication on the pages of journals of statistical data on the growth, composition, and structure of the party, of the system of Marxist-Leninist education, the selected party aktiv, the results of individual sociological studies, a series of articles about the basic categories of party construction, about the laws of the increasingly leading role of the CPSU, and also about the work experience of party committees and party organizations in all of the spheres of party organization and ideological work.

After expressing a feeling of deep satisfaction with the discussion which had taken place, its participants expressed a desire to make such meetings traditional ones.

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*Chernenko, K. U., "Selected Speeches and Articles," pp 624-625.

NATIONAL

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF PARTY CADRE TRAINING EXAMINED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 2 Feb 85 (signed to press 30 Jan 85)
pp 23-36

[Article by L.S. Leonova, doctor of historical sciences and professor: "On the Study of the Historical Experience of the CPSU in Training Party Cadres"; words enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The further increase in the leading role of the CPSU in the process of the systematic and comprehensive improvement of developed socialism depends to a decisive degree upon party cadres. In the contemporary stage of social development, new and higher demands are being placed upon them, as evidenced by the recent decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the April and October (1984) CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the speeches, addresses and articles of Comrade K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.¹

Party educational institutions are an effective form of training leading cadres. In its decree "On the Participation of the Leading Cadres of the Estonian SSR in Political and Educational Work Among the Working People" (1914), the CPSU Central Committee recommended to party committees that they make better use of the possibilities of higher party educational institutions in improving the ideological and theoretical training of leading cadres and in giving them a high political culture and a new type of economic thinking.²

The CPSU has accumulated a great deal of experience in training cadres in party educational institutions. The improvement of this work is inseparably linked with the generalization and interpretation of all of the experience as well as with the working out of contemporary problems in cadre policy.

Party documents pay special attention to the most important aspects of the historical experience of the CPSU in the training and education of cadres, to the new demands on the cadres, and to the tasks in training them and raising their skills.³

More and more, these problems are attracting the attention of researchers. There is a growing inclination on the part of researchers and operating employees to view contemporary questions in the training of cadres in close connection with historical experience. A number of works have reflected and evaluated various aspects of the historical experience of the CPSU in training and educating cadres as well as urgent problems in raising the skills of party cadres under the conditions of the improvement of developed socialism.⁴

The continued fruitful study and generalization of this experience is directly dependent upon the degree to which the methodological problems of its investigation have been worked out and upon the mastery of specific methods of historical analysis.

In the article, an attempt has been made to draw the attention of researchers to precisely these aspects of the study of the problem of training party cadres.⁵ In the opinion of the author, the correct resolution of the problems in research methodology will help to extend and deepen scientific notions about the experience of the party in training cadres and to make creative use of it under today's conditions. There is no doubt that the scientific illumination of this experience is possible only on the basis of the overall methodological principles of Communist Party commitment and historicism. At the same time, the specific nature of the subject also determines some special features in its study; there is a direct relationship between methodological aspects of the investigation of the problem and specific processes occurring in the area of the training of party cadres.

The scientific illumination of the history of the formation and development of the system of training party cadres is inseparable from the study of the /role of V.I. Lenin/ in working out the bases of the theory and practice of building party educational institutions. In creatively developing the idea of Marxism, Lenin under the new historical conditions scientifically founded the position on the necessity of a party core of professional revolutionaries providing for the creative development of the theory of scientific communism and capable of heading the struggle of the working people for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as for the construction of socialism and communism. The works of V.I. Lenin outline the ways, methods and basic content of the training of party cadres.

Leninist positions on the role of party cadres in the resolution of the program tasks of the Communist Party and in the principles for their selection and training are the basis of the knowledge of the work of the CPSU in this area and of the historical experience accumulated here. The addressing of the Leninist ideological legacy as the methodological basis of the research allows one to find the key to isolating and resolving the problem's main questions. Leninist instructions orient researchers toward the study of problems whose solution determines the character and meaning of the activity of the system of party educational institutions, its organizational structure, the composition of students, their ideological-theoretical and practical training, the selection and training of pedagogical cadres, the ideological-educational and organizational work of party organizations among students,⁶ and their participation in the social and political life of the country.

One of the important methodological questions is linked to the /conceptual scheme/ of the research. It is above all essential to specify the content of the concept "party cadres." These are communists for whom party work is a profession. Lenin considered that the party must be composed of professional revolutionaries, that is, people who have chosen revolutionary activity as their profession and who have a certain theoretical knowledge, political experience and organizational skills, and of the large mass of party members. Contemporary workers are the successors of the Leninist guard of professional

revolutionaries. They are communists who have dedicated themselves to professional work in the party. Their characteristic features include devotion to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, profound knowledge of their own work, organizational abilities, high culture, and the ability to think on a large scale and to sense what is new.

Very important is the substantiation of the /urgency/ of the subject. As is known, the successful implementation of the tasks in the improvement of developed socialism depends largely upon party cadres at the extreme forefront of the struggle of the party to construct a new society. "How precisely, orderly and intensely the labor collectives and all links of the country's national economic complex work depends upon the cadres, above all the party cadres," stressed Comrade K.U. Chernenko. The solicitous education of party cadres possessing profound knowledge of revolutionary theory and advanced political and practical qualities and capable of working at the level of today's requirements always was and still remains an object of the permanent attention of the Communist Party. And therefore the problem of the study and skillful union of the experience previously accumulated by the party in working with cadres with new and present-day forms of training highly skilled cadres is becoming especially urgent. The rich and multifaceted historical experience of the CPSU in training party cadres is widely utilized by fraternal communist and worker parties.

The intensifying ideological struggle in regard to the problem of the training, education and utilization of party cadres also demands that greater attention be paid to the scientific elaboration of cadre questions. Under the conditions when the doctrine of the leading role of the party has become the object of a very intense struggle between Marxist-Leninists and representatives of various forms of revisionism, the scientific illumination of the problem and the scientific-political criticism of bourgeois and revisionist falsifications about the formation and activity of party cadres are acquiring special significance and require serious ideological armament.

In this connection, G.I. Perova, in revealing the class orientation of bourgeois falsifications of the cadre policy of the CPSU, justifiably notes that "anti-communists are showing particular interest in cadre party workers.... This is no accident, for precisely the leading party workers are engaged in the scientific elaboration of party policy, organize its realization in practice, and provide for the party's ties with all of the institutes of the Soviet political system and with the broad masses of the working people." Contemporary bourgeois "Sovietologists" frequently "openly acknowledge that party workers are an important link in the party leadership and the Soviet political system as a whole."⁸ The comprehensive illumination of the history of the training of party cadres in the USSR helps to unmask the fictions of the enemies of socialism, who are trying to discredit the experience and traditions of the CPSU in the training of cadres, traditions that have become the property of the international communist movement.

And it is important to keep in mind the methodological orientation of specific research themes in the scope of this important scientific problem. At various stages in the development of the society and the party, some or other aspects of the problem can become particularly urgent.

Of course, urgency cannot be equated with contemporaneousness, although they are related. N.N. Maslov rightfully notes that the "urgency of historical labor in no way depends upon the temporal remoteness of the object of historical research. Urgent can be a work on the activity of the party during our time or on its origin or its fight for the concerns of the working class in any historical stage. What matters is how it meets the requirements of today and the tasks of the contemporary ideological struggle."^{8a}

In revealing the Leninist approach to the selection of themes, N.K. Krupskaya wrote: "One thing that strikes the eye about Lenin the theoretician is his selection of themes. He chose some theme or other not simply because it was interesting and needed elaboration but because the given theme was especially urgent for the working class movement during a given interval of time.... And all of the articles and scientific works were written on the most urgent themes of that time."⁹ As applied to the given problem, this means that the study of the work of the entire system of party educational institutions can be urgent, as can individual elements and aspects of the work during various periods of their development.

/Historiography/ fulfills an important methodological function. The methodological aspect of historiography is expressed in the revelation of the principles that guide the work of scientists in the determination of the main directions of research and the degree to which a theme is studied, in the establishment of the tasks in its further development, etc.

The present-day level of research in the theme under review is characterized by the increasing attention of scientists and operating employees to the fundamental principles of the work with cadres as worked out by V.I. Lenin. The literature stresses the permanent significance of the Leninist ideas and traditions about the formation of party workers and reveals the meaning of the Leninist legacy for the organization of their training in the contemporary stage.

The researchers indicate the role of the CPSU Central Committee and the local party organizations in cadre training. The work of the party educational institutions is seen in connection with the economic, political and ideological tasks facing the party. Certain successes have been achieved in the specific historical development of such aspects of the subject as the formation of the student body, the selection of the teaching cadres, the organization of the academic work, and the participation of the communists of the schools in the social and political life of the country. Considerable work has been done in the interpretation of questions in the training of national cadres.

The literature of the 1970's and 1980's pays increased attention to questions of improving the training of ideological cadres. It stresses the role of party educational institutions in strengthening party authorities and ideological institutions with cadres.

One should note the importance of the contribution of Soviet sociologists in the unmasking of our ideological adversaries who are falsifying the activity of the CPSU in the area of the selection and training of party cadres.

The chronological-problem approach to the description of the available literature shows that the work of the party educational institutions in the years 1921 through 1925 is the best studied in their history. Apparently, the interest in this period is related to the fact that these were the years of the formation of the system of party educational institutions, whereby the principles for the training of cadres there were developed under the direct participation of V.I. Lenin.

Until now, the experience in the training of party cadres during the years of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy has not been adequately studied. Little research has been done on the activity of party educational institutions in the second half of the 1930's, early 1940's and postwar period. The analysis of the work of higher party educational institutions under the conditions of developed socialism demands considerably more attention.

One of the most urgent tasks is that of the further assimilation of the Leninist theoretical-methodological legacy and the disclosure of the contribution of V.I. Lenin to the theory and practice of the training of party cadres.

Still inadequately disclosed is the party's creative development of the Leninist principles of cadre training with consideration of the specific historical conditions and tasks to be resolved.

In the light of contemporary problems of cadre policy, new aspects are being revealed in the work with cadres and in the training of party cadres, aspects that researchers formerly did not pay enough attention to. For example, in working out a complex of demands on the contemporary party worker and in carrying out research directed toward the study of the conformity of cadres to those demands that are being put on them in connection with the resolution of the tasks in the improvement of developed socialism, it is expedient to make use of the experience accumulated in the 1920's.

The methodological questions in the /study of historical sources/ for the given problem are closely linked with the theory and methodology of historical knowledge. The present-day level of historical science, being characterized by increased attention to the overall and more profound representation of historical phenomena, also increases the demands on the source base of research. The classification of sources and the formation of a source base for research are of fundamental importance.

The scientific-methodological approach to the revelation of a given theme requires that it be studied /in a continuous linkage/ with the processes taking place in all areas of public life, since the training of party cadres is a theme where there is an intermingling and a tying together of problems in economics, policy, culture, ideology, the social structure of society, party construction, pedagogics, etc. Only such an approach makes it possible to explain the changes in the organizational structure of the system of party educational institutions, in the body of students and teachers, in the content of the processes of cadre training, and in the forms of the communications with the masses and other areas in the work of party educational institutions.

In the original version of his article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," V.I. Lenin, in revealing the tasks facing the Bolsheviks in the area of the economy, administration and education of the masses, directly related their resolution with the selection and disposition of the cadres. "An economic transition of the indicated nature," he wrote, "also requires that the representatives of Soviet authority make the corresponding changes in the functions of the leaders." And he further explained that under the conditions when the party faces "above all the task of convincing the majority of the people or of gaining authority and crushing the resistance of the exploiters, the main place among the leaders as well is primarily taken by agitators of the masses." This was completely natural, because to convince the majority of the population and "to interest it in the laborious and difficult military struggle against the exploiters, the abilities of the agitator were especially needed." Under the new conditions, however, "those tasks,...that involve accounting for and controlling production and the distribution of products now mainly promote practical managers and organizers. Accordingly, there must be a certain reevaluation of leaders and a certain relocation of them...."¹⁰

The Accounting Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress included a comprehensive analysis of the organizational, political and ideological work of the party during the past 5 years, summarized the development of the entire Soviet society during the years of the 10th Five-Year Plan, revealed the immediate tasks of the party in domestic and foreign policy, gave a profound description of the Leninist style of party work, specified the demands on contemporary leaders and on this basis concluded that the further improvement of the training of leading party cadres is essential, and established the task of creating a dependable reserve of cadres.¹¹

The June (1983) and April and October (1984) CPSU Central Committee plenums reviewed the questions in the training and retraining of cadres in an inseparable relationship with the tasks being resolved by the party in the process of improving developed socialism.¹²

The many-sidedness of the problem and its social importance determine the significance of the /theoretical equipping/ of researchers for the fruitful elaboration of the theme, and they require that they have knowledge of a broad range of inherent laws of social development. The broader and the more profound the knowledge of the inherent laws revealed by the social sciences and considered in the study of the historical experience of the CPSU in training party cadres, the more possibilities there are for improving the investigation of the given problem, for in this instance the theoretical positions acquire a methodological character.

Thus, for example, the conclusion about the increase in the leading role of the Communist Party as Soviet society gradually develops represents a theoretical generalization of the historical experience in the work of the CPSU. This conclusion orients researchers toward the revelation of the special features in the training of party cadres at various stages of socialist construction and toward the disclosure of the complex of knowledge and qualities that party cadres possessed and that allowed them to carry out successfully the tasks of the political leadership of the society in a definite specific historical situation.

The conclusion formulated and substantiated in CPSU documents on the leading role of the working class in socialist and communist construction and on the growing convergence of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and intelligentsia on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology expressing the communist ideals of the working class makes it easier for researchers to understand the party line in the area of the formation of the student body of party educational institutions.

The development of the scientific /periodization/ of the history of party educational institutions in the USSR is methodological in nature.

It was noted at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum that "for the correct understanding of the prospects in the economy as well as in policy and ideology, it is necessary above all to visualize clearly the nature of the stage of social development in which we now find ourselves."¹³ This position has direct importance for the formulation of the question of the periodization of the activity of party educational institutions.

The formation and development of the system of party educational institutions occurred in definite stages. Their historical path was from short-term agitation and propaganda courses in the first months of Soviet authority to the ramified scientifically founded system of training party cadres in the contemporary stage of social development. The resolution of the problem of periodization is possible only as a result of the revelation of a complex of factors that are the basis of the change of periods in the evolution of the system of party educational institutions. The key to its solution is given in the works of V.I. Lenin and in the documents of the higher party authorities.¹⁴

The organizational structure of the system of party educational institutions and the content of the training of party cadres were formed in the process of the organic interaction of economic, social-political and ideological factors and internal laws for the development of the party itself. The party educational institutions are an extremely important social establishment inseparably linked with the development of the party and society as a whole. The periodization of their activity therefore coincides with the general periodization of the history of the CPSU.

In the activity of party educational institutions, three main periods are distinguished that correspond to the stages of the construction, consolidation and development of socialism in the USSR. In the scope of the important stages in the development of party educational institutions, periods are manifested whose boundaries are determined by changes in the historical circumstances of the work of the party and in the tasks in the political leadership of the society. Thus, for example, in training party cadre in the stage of the construction of the bases of socialism, periods are clearly manifested that are determined by the tasks and work of the party in the first years of Soviet authority, in the reconstruction period, and in the years of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy.

The tasks of the political leadership of the Communist Party, which expanded immensely after the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution, required

the formation of skilled cadre workers. The urgency of the resolution of the cadre problem necessitated specific and prompt measures. Immediately after the establishment of Soviet authority, schools and courses were organized whose goal was to train mass party and soviet worker cadres in a very short time to solve the most immediate practical tasks, which was also reflected in the content of cadre training. It is essential to note, however, that even in those years (1917-1921), these educational institutions gave the students an idea of the bases of scientific communism and of the history of the Communist Party.¹⁵ The forms of their ties with life were determined by the peculiarities of the historical circumstances, above all the military intervention and the civil war.

With the transition to peaceful construction, the possibilities were established for the organization of the systematic and differentiated training of cadres for the party and state system and public organizations. In the reconstruction period, the types of party schools were determined, their special aims were made specific, the principles for the selection of students were specified, and the bases were laid down for the systematic training on a national scale of party cadres whose composition was international. The main tasks involved the creative work of the party and of primary importance for party workers was the understanding of the essence of socioeconomic processes and the ability to manage economic construction practically and to understand and explain to the masses the special features of the struggle between socialism and capitalism under the new conditions. In this connection in cadre training, there was an increase in the role of theoretical and historical disciplines and the practice of party and soviet construction. Questions relating to the implementation of the new economic policy occupied a large place.

Some characteristics of the development of party educational institutions in the years of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy of the USSR were expansion of their network, significant growth in the numbers of students, structural changes reflecting the party line on the intensification of specialization in cadre training, the rational geographic distribution of party educational institutions, review of the forms of cadre training in the direction of its higher elements, and increased planning in the dynamics of party schools and students. More attention was paid to theoretical, methodological and political aspects of teaching as well as to the provision of students with special knowledge so that they can better implement the party line in a specific sector of socialist construction.

In the ideological and political training of cadres, consideration was given to the problems facing the party in connection with the necessity of raising the country's defense capability. With a view to strengthening this capability, questions of the reconstruction of the national economy were reviewed and it was concluded that it was necessary to make maximum use of the peaceful respite to increase the pace of economic construction and to raise the country's economic potential. Habits of party management of socialist construction were more purposefully inculcated in communists and the link between academic and extracurricular work began to be implemented more organically.

The periodization of the development of party educational institutions helps to deepen the knowledge of the inherent laws in the training of cadres and of

the specific nature of this process in various stages of socialist construction. The knowledge of the special features of each period in the process of cadre training will help in using the experience accumulated by the CPSU more purposefully and effectively.

The determination of /the general and the particular/ in cadre training and the correct relationship in the investigation of the national and local material have a methodological orientation. This makes it possible to reveal laws for cadre training that are general for all regions of the country and to disclose the special features of their training in the large multinational country.

The study of the problem shows that the system of party educational institutions was formed on the basis of the principles of internationalism, is a unified system for training cadres of all nationalities, and is incompatible with any manifestations of national limitedness and isolation. At the same time, in resolving cadre questions, the party attentively considered the peculiarities in the development of the various nationalities of our country. The Communist Party granted advantages to the peoples of the formerly backward national regions for enrollment in party educational institutions. The party educational institutions became a universal means for the accelerated training of cadres of the intelligentsia. According to data of the late 1920's and early 1930's, in the overall system for the training of the national intelligentsia, the Soviet party schools and communist VUZ's occupied a leading place in the involvement of a whole series of peoples of the native nationality in training. The relative share of representatives of a number of nationalities in the student body of Soviet party schools was higher than their relative share in the population of the USSR.¹⁶

In the years of the postwar five-year plans as well, the party consistently continued its line on the training of national cadres.

In the contemporary stage under the conditions of the intensive economic, social and cultural development of each republic, of the "objective process of the internationalization of public life," and of the "gradual but steady convergence" of nations¹⁷, the area of the operation of the principle of internationalism in the cadre policy of the CPSU is expanding. In conforming to Leninist principles for the selection, training and education of cadres, the CPSU is making them specific in accordance with the new conditions and new tasks facing the party. The 26th CPSU Congress called attention to the necessity of the proper representation of all nations in the party and state authorities of the Soviet republics.¹⁸

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" stresses that "the party is vigilantly seeing to it that the new processes and problems in the sphere of national relations, which are continually arising in the development of such a large multinational state as ours, receive a timely and full reflection in the work of party, soviet, trade-union and Komsomol organizations and economic authorities. A reliable means of implementing this task is the strict observance of the scientific management principles, the Leninist work style, and the Leninist cadre policy."¹⁹

Of methodological significance is the problem of the /relationship of history and contemporaneity/, in other words, the problem of the utilization of the historical experience in cadre training in contemporary activity of the CPSU. Scientific knowledge of the past helps one to understand present-day processes and to forecast the future correctly, and turning to the present helps one to see the past better and to take its experience into account.

V.I. Lenin repeatedly formulated the question of the relationship of history and the present day and the question of the significance of the theoretical generalization of historical facts for the scientific perception of the present day, for the resolution of new problems presented by life, and for the determination of the nature and direction of contemporary development.

At the same time, V.I. Lenin called attention to the impossibility of the mechanical transfer of previous experience to contemporary phenomena. In one of his early works, he wrote: "The history of socialism and democracy in Western Europe, the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, and the experience of our working class movement are that /material/ that we must master to develop the expedient organization and tactics of our party. The processing of this material must, however, be independent, for there is no place for us to find finished models. On the one hand, the Russian working class movement was placed in completely different circumstances than the West European movement. But on the other hand, Russian social democracy differs in the most fundamental way from the previous revolutionary parties in Russia..."²⁰

As applied to the theme under review, the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the link between history and the present day presupposes the revelation, based upon the study of the experience of the past and present, of the main inherent laws and tendencies in cadre training and in the work of party educational institutions.

The historical experience of the CPSU has thus shown that of decisive importance for the training of cadres at the level of the tasks of socialist construction was the direct party management of cadre training, the concentration in leading party authorities of all principal means of influencing the work of party educational institutions, an implacable campaign against all attempts of opportunists to distort the Leninist principles of the cadre policy of the Communist Party, and the struggle against voluntarism and subjectivism in the training of party cadres.

The historical experience of the CPSU has confirmed the viability of party educational institutions as a form of training leading cadres. The characteristic features of the organizational structure of this system include flexibility and mobility, the capability of including representatives of all basic groups of party workers in training simultaneously, and the possibility of ensuring a differentiated approach to the selection and training of cadres. Historical experience teaches that it is essential to improve continually the organizational structure of the system of party educational institutions for the purpose of having it correspond to the urgent tasks in the construction of a new society.

The experience in cadre training gives evidence of the decisive contribution of the working class to the formation of party cadres. At the present time as well, the consistent course in the training and promotion of representatives of the working class and kolkhoz peasantry to leadership positions is one of the main directions of the cadre policy of the CPSU.

Of permanent importance in the training of cadres is their provision with the theory of Marxism-Leninism and with Marxist-Leninist methodology, on the basis of which the party has solved and is solving urgent contemporary problems.

The historical experience of the CPSU has shown the effectiveness of comprehensive cadre training and the necessity of implementing it on the basis of a broad range of scientific knowledge and the close ties of training with life.

The further specification and enrichment of the content of Leninist principles for the training and education of cadres are reflected in the work of party educational institutions under the conditions of the improvement of developed socialism. Thus the growing scale of economic development, the scientific-technical revolution, the tasks in the improvement of production relations, the expansion of the foreign economic ties of the USSR, and the aggravation of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the area of the economic and scientific-technical competition of the two systems have immeasurably increased the responsibility of party cadres for the organization of the national economy. The tasks of the consistent implementation of the economic strategy of the CPSU require a deepening of the economic education of cadres. To a greater and greater extent, their training reflects questions related to the development of the political system of Soviet society--the consolidation of the unity of classes and social groups, the provision of the continued prosperity of the nations on a socialist and internationalist basis, and the extension of socialist democracy. Characteristic of the contemporary stage of developed socialism is the increasing activation of party work on the ideological front. Contributing to the teaching of the scientific approach to ideological work is the study in party educational institutions of questions of the current and long-term planning of ideological and political work and the comprehensive approach to the resolution of ideological-educational tasks, theory and methods of communist education and counterpropaganda as well as the participation of students in sociological research related to the study of public opinion, the effectiveness of ideological work, etc. Significantly greater attention was paid to problems of social psychology and pedagogics in party work. In connection with the increased demands on party cadres, their training included a greater role for party construction as a scientific and academic discipline--an effective factor in the education of cadre, improvement of the style of party work and the extension of its scientific bases.

In the training of cadres called upon to resolve the tasks of improving developed socialism, particular importance is being attached to mastering the Leninist style of work, in which the ability of cadres to implement successfully the political management of the society is expressed in a concentrated manner. "Previously as well, in the preceding stages of our development," notes E.Z. Razumov in his book, "the party presented the cadres with the task of mastering the Leninist style. Now, however, when the intensification of the

economy and higher efficiency and quality of work in every sector have become the universal motto, when measures are being implemented on a national scale to improve the economic mechanism, this task is acquiring a universal and urgent character."²¹

Historical experience shows that depending upon the tasks facing the party in specific historical periods of its development, particular features of style have acquired primary importance. Under present-day conditions, of particular importance are such characteristics of style as unity of words and action, realism, scientific nature, competence, a new type of economic thinking, mastery of the administrative mechanism, knowledge in the area of pedagogics and psychology, and consideration of the interests of people.

The experience of party schools confirms the Leninist position on the vital role of teachers in the ideological and political training of cadres. Characteristic features of pedagogical collectives of party schools were always the high percentage of communists in them, active participation in the life of party organizations, experience in party political work, and the creative scientific potential of cadres.

In developing the best traditions of party educational institutions, teachers tirelessly improved the forms and methods of teaching. Along with traditional forms and methods of instruction, at the present time in party schools, differentiated instruction, the reading of lectures on problems, specific situational tasks, etc. have become widespread.

In the contemporary stage of social development characterized by unprecedented dynamism, more and more importance in the structure of education is being acquired by its orientation to the future based upon consideration of the entire complex of tasks that must be solved by the party in the coming period. In increasing the effectiveness of cadre training, it is important to forecast the number of students with consideration given to the nature and content of their future work according to the level of their general and special education, experience in managerial work, and the length of service in the party.

The study of the historical experience of the CPSU in training party cadres helps to reveal the leading tendencies in this process: the increase in the role of the higher links in the system of cadre training, the increased importance of the theoretical, methodological and fundamental scientific training of cadres, the more rapid renewal of knowledge essential for the political management of the society, the enrichment of the very content of cadre training, the broadening of the social base of the formation of leading party workers while maintaining the leading role of the working class in this process, the steadily growing educational level of students of party educational institutions, etc.

The question of the /criteria and indicators of the effectiveness/ of the existing system of cadre training has methodological importance. The main objective indicator of the efficacy of the cadre policy of the CPSU, of course, is the construction of the society of developed socialism in the USSR. However, the more accurate and specific is the formulation of the increasingly complex

demands on contemporary leading workers and the better is the elaboration of the system of criteria for evaluating their work, the more effective will be the actions of cadres. It is no accident that during the last decade in party schools there were repeatedly questions raised about the carrying out of research directed toward the study of the relationship of cadres to vital requirements and about the elaboration of a complex of demands on party and soviet workers with consideration of the forecast for the development of the science and practice of managing the economy and social processes.

The elaboration and clear concept of the demands on party cadres is an essential condition for the objective evaluation of the work of party educational institutions called upon to train cadres and capable of carrying out the steadily growing tasks in the management of the society.

Our literature has already raised the question of the necessity of working out scientifically founded criteria for the evaluation of the labor of party cadres. Thus S.A. Nazarov pointed out that "the revelation of the criteria for evaluating the practical suitability, political maturity, pedagogical culture and level of social activeness of leading workers is becoming especially urgent. This also applies to the evaluation of the cadres of the system of party and state authorities and public organizations and institutions." It was emphasized that the practical resolution of this task opens up additional possibilities for increasing the responsibility of cadres, for improving the quality of their training, and also for "identifying talented people for promotion and inclusion in the reserve."²²

Party workers and scientists make assumptions concerning the structure and content of the criteria for the effectiveness of the practical work of leading cadres. In the complex of requirements essential for every leader, especially for the party worker, more and more attention is being paid--in addition to political and practical qualities--to moral qualities, a very important factor in the socioeconomic and spiritual development of the society.

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Work of the Moldavian CP Central Committee to Improve the Style and Methods of the Activity of Party Organizations in the Light of the Decisions of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum" stresses: "Party organizations are called upon to see to it that each leader is on top of the situation, conscientiously does his duty, and serves as a moral example for the working people."²³

Under present-day conditions, there is a growing responsibility of leading cadres for the educational consequences of the work. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Educational Work" indicates that "in evaluating the work of leaders and economic cadres, it is essential to consider not only the indicators of the fulfillment of production plans but also the level of discipline, the moral and political climate in the collective, and the working and living conditions."²⁴

It is natural that in determining the criteria for the effectiveness of cadre work it is essential to foresee moral indicators as well as the ability of party workers to provide for the unity of ideological, organizational and economic activity.

The formulation of the question orienting one toward the dialectical approach to the content of the criteria for the effectiveness of cadre training is methodological in nature. Thus the authors of the team monograph on the questions of internal party life and the leading work of the CPSU in the contemporary stage, emphasizing the fundamental importance of the Leninist approach to the evaluation of cadres, draw the following conclusion: "At each new stage of development and with the increase in the overall maturity of cadres as well as in the complicacy of the tasks that they are called upon to resolve, the criteria of the evaluations of workers are filled with new content and the meaning that is given to them is increasingly being expanded and deepened."²⁵

There is no doubt that the study of the social and political work of party cadres as a subject of historical action is a very complex matter. This is primarily related to the fact that the results of the work of party cadres cannot always be separated from the overall results of the socioeconomic, political and spiritual development of the society.

In the establishment of the criteria for evaluating the work of graduates of party educational institutions, Marxist-Leninist methodology is a reliable point of reference. V.I. Lenin wrote: "By what characteristics are we to judge /real/ 'thoughts and feelings' of /real/ persons? It is clear that there can be only one such characteristic: the /action/ of these persons. And since we are only talking about public 'thoughts and feelings', one should add: /public actions/ of persons, that is, /social facts/. The sociologist-materialist, in making certain social relations of people the subject of his study, is thus already studying real /persons/ whose actions constitute these relations."²⁶

The further study of the problem of training party cadres presupposes the improvement of the research methods, an important component of the system of the methodology. In the given article, the author does not set the task of characterizing all of the methods whose application is possible in the study of the given problem, but calls attention to the current necessity of utilizing quantitative research methods. There exists a whole series of sets of sources characterizing various aspects of the process of training party cadres. These are such mass sources as autobiographical compositions written at the time of enrollment in the communist VUZ, materials in the granting of certificates to graduates, materials of business correspondence and personal records, statistical data, information on correspondence, data of specific social research, etc. Great possibilities for the study of the role of party educational institutions are presented, for example, by the party correspondence of 1922 and 1927 containing information on party schools and communist VUZ's. The questionnaires of students of party educational institutions can provide interesting material.

The Soviet literature and the literature of socialist countries on party and state construction reflects the experience in carrying out sociological research directed toward the study of some categories of leading cadres.²⁷ There is no doubt that many elements of the structure of this research can also be used in carrying out sociological research directed toward obtaining a better idea of the effectiveness of the functioning of the system of training party cadres.

Questions of raising the level of party leadership in all areas of public life and of improving the style of the work of cadres occupied an important place in the work of the All-Union practical scientific conference "Improvement of Developed Socialism and Party Ideological Work in the Light of the Decisions of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum."

In greeting the participants in the practical scientific conference, Comrade K.U. Chernenko stressed that our society faces qualitatively new tasks requiring the mobilization of the nation's entire creative potential and a certain reorientation of public consciousness. The concept of developed socialism available to the party provides a strictly scientific notion of the immediate and long-term goals of the CPSU and of the ways to achieve them and is the basis of the new edition of the CPSU Program in preparation. Comrade K.U. Chernenko called attention to the necessity of the universal and skillful utilization of the forms, procedures and methods accumulated by party committees for organizing and educating the masses--one of the most important requirements of the Leninist style of work.²⁸

In conclusion, I would like to note that the further development of methodological problems in close connection with research practice will doubtless aid in the more profound illumination of the urgent problems in the training of party cadres in the light of the tasks set by the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums and of the positions included in the article of Comrade K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the Level of Demands of Developed Socialism." In the final analysis, all of this is aimed at raising the level of the training of party cadres capable of ensuring the successful resolution of the tasks outlined by the party for improvement of developed socialism, a fuller utilization of its possibilities and advantages, further strengthening of the economic and defensive might of our country, and development of its spiritual potential.

FOOTNOTES

1. K.U. Chernenko, "Narod i partiya yediny. Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [People and Party United. Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1984; Chernenko, "Living, Working and Struggling As Lenin Did," speech at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations on 28 May 1984, Moscow, 1984; Chernenko, "High Civic Duty of the National Controller," speech at the All-Union Conference of National Controllers on 5 October 1984, Moscow, 1984; Chernenko, "On the Level of Demands of Developed Socialism," KOMMUNIST, No 18, 1984; in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, PRAVDA, 19 October 1984; and elsewhere.
2. KOMMUNIST, No 12, 1984, p 5.
3. Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, Moscow, 1981; Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14th and 15th of June 1983, Moscow, 1983; Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 26th and 27th of December 1983, Moscow, 1983; Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 10 April 1984, Moscow, 1984; "Report on the Work of the Saratov CPSU Obkom. CPSU Central Committee Decree," PRAVDA, 7 July 1983; "On the Work of the

Moldavian CP Central Committee to Improve the Style and Methods of the Activity of Party Organizations in the Light of the Decisions of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. CPSU Central Committee Decree, PRAVDA, 15 December 1983; "On the Participation of the Leading Cadres of the Estonian SSR in Political and Educational Work Among the Working People. CPSU Central Committee Decree," KOMMUNIST, No 12, 1984; "In the CPSU Central Committee Politburo," PRAVDA, 19 October 1984.

4. "Voprosy raboty KPSS s kadrami na sovremennom etape" [Questions in the Work of the CPSU With Cadres in the Contemporary Stage], Moscow, 1976; F.F. Petrenko and V.M. Shapko, "Partiynoye stroitel'stvo na sovremennom etape" [Party Construction in the Contemporary Stage], Moscow, 1977; "Voprosy vnutripartiynoy zhizni i rukovodyashchey deyatel'nosti KPSS na sovremennom etape" [Questions of Internal Party Life and the Leading Work of the CPSU in the Contemporary Stage], second edition, Moscow, 1979; L.S. Leonova, "Istoricheskiy opyt KPSS po podgotovke partiynykh kadrov v partiynykh uchebnykh zavedeniyakh 1917-1975" [Historical Experience of the CPSU in the Training of Party Cadres in Party Educational Institutions 1917-1975], Moscow, 1979; L.S. Gaponenko, "Historical Succession and Development of Leninist Traditions in the Training of Cadres in Party Educational Institutions," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 1, 1981; I.I. Pronin, "Rukovodyashchiye kadry: podbor, rasstanovka i vospitaniye" [Leading Cadres: Selection, Distribution and Training], second edition, Moscow, 1981; E.Z. Razumov, "Problemy kadrovoy politiki KPSS" [Problems in the Cadre Policy of the CPSU], Moscow, 1983; N.I. Nikolayev, "V.I. Lenin, CPSU, On the Selection and Promotion of Leading Cadres," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 6, 1984; "Leninist Principles in the Work With Cadres," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 12, 1984; and elsewhere.
5. The experience in working out the methodological questions of historical party science and party construction was used in writing the article. See "Voprosy metodologii istoriko-partiynoy nauki" [Questions in the Methodology of Historical Party Science], Kiev, 1980; L.M. Spirin, "Teoriya, metodologiya i metodika issledovaniy po istorii KPSS" [Theory, Methodology and Methods in Research on the History of the CPSU], Moscow, 1982; N.N. Maslov, "Marksistsko-leninskiye metody istoriko-partiynogo issledovaniya" [Marxist-Leninist Methods of Historical Party Research], Moscow, 1983; "Methodological Problems in the Research on the Party Management of the Society of Developed Socialism in the Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" ("round table" materials), VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 9, 1982; and elsewhere.
6. See, for example, V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collection of Works], Vol 47, p 186.
7. K.U. Chernenko, "On the Level of the Demands of Developed Socialism," KOMMUNIST, No 18, 1984, p 19.
8. G.I. Perova, "Criticism of Bourgeois Falsifications of the Cadre Policy of the CPSU," in the book "Kadrovaya politika Kommunisticheskoy partii i yeye osushchestvleniye v sovremennykh usloviyakh" [Cadre Policy of the Communist Party and Its Implementation Under Contemporary Conditions], Moscow, 1982, p 175.

- 8a. N.N. Maslov, "Marksistsko-leninskiye metody istoriko-partiynogo issledovaniya" [Marxist-Leninist Methods of Historical Party Research], Moscow, 1982, p 175.
9. N.K. Krupskaya, "Leader, Revolutionary, Scientist" (from unpublished materials on Lenin), VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 2, 1960, p 187.
10. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 36, p 142.
11. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 71-72.
12. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iyunya 1983 goda" [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14th and 15th of June 1983], p 6; "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 10 aprelya 1984 goda" [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 10 April 1984], p 20.
13. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iyunya 1983 goda" [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14th and 15th of June 1983], p 8.
14. See, for example, V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 36, pp 142-144; "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TSK" [CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of the Central Committee Congresses, Conferences and Plenums] Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 337; "Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress, Moscow, 1971, pp 96-101; "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, pp 70-71.
15. "X let Komuniversiteta imeni Ya. M. Sverdlova. 1918-1928" [10 Years of the Communist University imeni Ya. M. Sverdlov. 1918-1928], Moscow, 1928, p 16; PRAVDA, 9 May and 10 October 1918.
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17. K.U. Chernenko, "Bystupleniye na zasedanii Komissii TsK KPSS po podgotovke novoy redaktsii Programmy KPSS 25 aprelya 1984 goda" [Address at the Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Commission for the Preparation of a New Edition of the CPSU Program 25 April 1984], Moscow, 1984, p 10.
18. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 56.
19. SPRAVOCHNIK PARTIYNOGO RABOTNIKA, Moscow, No 23, 1983, p 120.
20. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 4, pp 189-190.
21. E.Z. Razumov, op. cit., p 33.
22. S.A. Nazarov, "Some Urgent Problems in the Cadre Policy of the CPSU Under Contemporary Conditions," in the book "Kadrovaya politika Kommunisticheskoy partii i yeye osushchestvleniye v sovremennykh usloviyakh" [Cadre

Policy of the Communist Party and Its Implementation Under Contemporary Conditions], p 17.

23. PRAVDA, 15 December 1983.

24. SPRAVOCHNIK PARTIYNOGO RABOTNIKA, Moscow, No 20, 1980, p 322.

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26. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 1, pp 423-424.

27. B.D. Lebin and M.N. Perfil'yev, "Kadry apparata upravleniya v SSSR. Sotsiologicheskiye problemy podbora i rasstanovki" [Cadres of the Administrative System in the USSR. Sociological Problems in Their Selection and Distribution], Leningrad, 1970; R. Gerber and G. Jung, "Kadry v sisteme sotsialisticheskogo upravleniya" [Cadres in the System of Socialist Administration], Moscow, 1970; G. Byrdarov, "Sotsiologiya i partiynaya rabota" [Sociology and Party Work], Moscow, 1977; and elsewhere.

28. K.U. Chernenko, "To the Participants in the All-Union Practical Scientific Conference 'Improvement of Developed Socialism and Party Ideological Work in the Light of the Decisions of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum'," PRAVDA, 11 December 1984.

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NATIONAL

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF NEP YEARS EXPLORED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 2 Feb 85 (signed to press 30 Jan 85)
pp 68-80

[Article by N.N. Saburov, doctor of historical sciences and professor (Leningrad): "Party Campaign for the Economic Unity of Socialist Industry With the Peasant Economy (1924-1925)"]

[Text] After the end of the civil war and the foreign military intervention, the party faced the very acute task of consolidating on a new economic basis the union of the working class with the working peasantry, a union that constituted the social foundation of Soviet authority. V.I. Lenin viewed the task of supporting such a union while preserving the leading role of the working class as the "highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and as an inalienable condition for the construction of socialism.¹ It was possible to achieve the further consolidation of the union of these two classes by giving it a solid economic foundation. As is known, such a foundation was to be provided by the New Economic Policy [NEP] worked out by Lenin and adopted by the 10th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. As Lenin repeatedly emphasized, the task of the NEP was to establish the union of the socialist economy with the peasant economy.² The NEP became a very important factor in carrying out the socialist industrialization and reconstruction of the national economy as a whole and to a significant degree it predetermined the resolution of the question: "Who will win?"

The historical experience of the CPSU in establishing and developing the economic interrelationships between the working class and the peasantry under the conditions of the NEP is of great scientific and practical interest. It teaches how to interpret from class positions the social policy of the party in the contemporary stage, a policy that is helping to develop proper economic relations between two forms of socialist ownership. Today this, in particular, is the aim of the decree of the October (1984) CPSU Central Committee Plenum "On the Long-Term Program of Land Improvement and of Greater Efficiency in the Use of Improved Lands for the Purpose of Steadily Increasing the Country's Food Supply."³

The study of the indicated experience is also essential for the exposure of the falsifications of "Sovietologists" who are attempting to represent the policy of our party in the countryside in the 1920's as a policy that supposedly expressed the interests of the working class only, found no support among the working peasantry and was even contrary to its interests.

Despite the fact that quite a vast literature is dedicated to the work of the party in strengthening the union of the working class with the peasantry in the reconstruction period, the question of the establishment of the economic union of socialist industry and the peasant economy at that time and especially in the years 1924 and 1925 remains inadequately studied.⁴

The present article attempts to show in operation the process of the establishment of the economic union of socialist industry and the peasant economy in 1924-1925 on the basis of the consistent resolution of political, economic and social tasks by the party.

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Of all of the economic ties between the city and the countryside that the proletariat was to establish after the gaining of power, Lenin singled out in particular the exchange of industrial output for agricultural output. Both before the October Revolution and after its triumph, he spoke of the importance of resolving this task.⁵ The civil war, however, having destroyed normal economic ties between the city and the countryside, hindered the establishment of new economic relations between the working class and the peasantry. Although it had a certain economic basis ("The peasant received from us all of the land and support against large-scale land ownership and we, in exchange, were to receive food"⁶), the military and political union that developed between these classes in those years was inadequate for peaceful conditions, as the relations between the classes in the wartime period were built, in the words of Lenin, "not on the usual interrelationships between goods producers and consumers,"⁷ that is, not on an exchange basis.

The NEP created a solid basis for long-term and mutually advantageous cooperation of two classes and, in the final analysis, for the building of socialism. As before, Lenin considered the establishment of exchange to be the core of this cooperation.⁸ For its implementation, it was essential above all to restore the peasant economy and those sectors of industry that would ensure the satisfaction of its needs.

Initially after the transition to the NEP, Lenin and the party proceeded from the possibility of the organization of the direct (nonmonetary) exchange of the products of state industry for the surplus agricultural output that began to remain with the peasants after the replacement of distribution with a tax. Direct exchange did not come about, however, and beginning in the fall of 1921 the Soviet state had to go to exchange in monetary form, that is, in the form of the customary buying and selling. Recognizing the inevitability of private commerce, the party consciously proceeded to allow it so as to achieve economic revival in the country. However, the development of commodity turnover based on private commerce still did not mean the establishment of that economic union of socialist industry with the peasant economy that corresponded to the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat. By economic union, Lenin had in mind the establishment of close ties of socialist industry with the peasant economy not through capitalist elements, which sought to separate the working peasantry from the working class and consequently to undermine the foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but through socialist forms of commerce, above all through cooperation. He repeatedly stressed that the

resolution of the question "who will win" depends on who is able to lead the peasantry--the workers or the capitalist elements.⁹ One should not forget Lenin's statements to the effect that capitalist elements also sought to establish their own type of union with the peasant economy so as to separate it from the working class.¹⁰ As early as the end of 1921, therefore, Vladimir Il'ich put forth the task of "taking control of the market" on the basis of the development of cooperative trade so as to establish the link between socialist industry and the peasant economy without the intermediary services of the private owner or speculator.¹¹

Despite successes in reviving the national economy by the end of the first year of the NEP and the normalization of the interrelationships between the working class and the working peasantry, the union between the socialist economy and the peasant economy remained unorganized, as Lenin noted at the 11th Congress of the RKP (b).¹² He therefore considered its organization to be an integral part of the aim of the 11th Congress of the RKP(b) for the regrouping of forces for preparing the offensive against capitalist elements.¹³ It is rather interesting to note that at this congress Lenin spoke not of the strengthening or consolidation of the union but of the task that still had to be resolved: "finding the union," "creating this union," "if we defeat capitalism...and create this union..."¹⁴ All of this is evidence of the fact that the party linked the establishment of an economic union intended for the victory of socialism not with the development of private commerce, which grew intensively without any instructions at all, but through socialist forms.¹⁵ This is also in full agreement with the task put forward at the end of 1921 of taking control of the market and expelling the private owner, with the instructions adopted by the 11th RKP(b) Congress for the regrouping of forces, and with the subsequent decisions. Here is what was said, for example, in the resolution of the 13th RKP(b) Conference: "Under the New Economic Policy, the organization of commerce has extraordinary importance, because through the system of commerce there is to be a direct union of the nationalized industry and the peasant market. Any strengthening of cooperation and state commerce and expansion of their field of activity represents an extension of the realm of the socialist economy. Any weakening of the positions of cooperation and state commerce and strengthening of the positions of the private middleman, speculative buyer and trader represents an expansion of the area of the rule of bourgeois capitalist relations."¹⁶

Thus the implementation of the Leninist idea of the establishment of a union of state industry with the peasant economy was to take place through socialist forms of commerce. In no way is this affirmation contrary to the Leninist requirement that it is initially essential to utilize private commerce and private capital to stimulate and develop the country's economic life.¹⁷

By the end of the second year of the NEP, certain successes had been achieved in restoring the national economy. However, a number of difficulties arose in the interrelationships between state industry and the peasant economy, difficulties that were exploited by capitalist elements, which held 75.3 percent of the retail commodity turnover in their hands in 1922-1923.¹⁸

Measures adopted in 1922 and the beginning of 1923 to restore and improve the peasant economy and to provide various sorts of aid to the working peasantry

strengthened the confidence of the peasants in the Communist Party and Soviet state and to a certain degree helped to consolidate the union of workers and peasants. Nevertheless, the formation of the so-called "scissors" [widening gap] in prices in the fall of 1923 and the difficulties thereby evoked in the sale of industrial output are evidence of the fact that the task set by Lenin of establishing an economic union of socialist industry with the peasant economy was still not fulfilled.¹⁹ In addition, the high prices for industrial goods and the low prices for agricultural output evoked the dissatisfaction of small-scale agricultural commodity producers and vacillations in their milieu. As a result, in the fall of 1923 there arose the threat of a split in the union of the working class with the peasantry.²⁰

The lowering of prices was carried out at the expense of the state budget and to support low prices for industrial goods in this way would be too burdensome for the state. Therefore, recognizing the necessity of continuing to lower prices, the 13th RKP(b) Conference (16th through the 18th of January 1924) stressed that the measures taken needed to follow the line of lowering the cost of production, improving and expanding production, making a maximum reduction in overhead expenditures, and also improving and lowering the cost of the commercial system. At the same time, the conference pointed out the inadmissibility of economic and political "deviations in the direction of underestimating (by some workers--N.S.) the importance of the peasant economy in the overall economic structure of the country."²¹ The decisions made after the conference on the development of agricultural credit and on the transition to a stable ruble exchange rate had important consequences.

After having again and thoroughly reviewed the question of the interaction between the working class and the peasantry, the 13th RKP(b) Congress (23rd through the 31st of May 1924) wrote in its resolution: "The strengthening and consolidation of the confidence of the peasantry in the proletarian state by means of the carrying out of a number of real measures toward the economic union of the city and countryside remains an immutable task of the party...."²²

A very important achievement of the party and the Soviet state in the establishment of an economic union in 1924-1925 was the sharp improvement in the work of state industry, which received state subsidies right up through 1923 (175 million rubles in 1923).²³ Of great importance in this connection was the strengthening of the influence of the party on the resolution of economic questions directly at the enterprises. On 24 February 1924, the RKP(b) Central Committee sent to all local party organizations the letter "On Attracting Branches and Factory and Plant Committees to Participate in the Production Work of Enterprises." The letter directed the attention of party branches to the resolution of such tasks as the increase in labor productivity, the reduction of the cost of production, and consequently, to the reduction in the cost of goods.²⁴

The production and trade commissions under the factory committees were forms of attracting workers to practical economic construction according to the line of the trade unions and state authorities. The scope of their tasks was determined by the circular letter of the AUCCTU and NK [People's Commissariat] of the RKI [Workers' and Peasants' Inspection] of the USSR (May 1924).²⁵

Questions of raising labor productivity occupied an important place in the work of the August (1924) RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum. Particular attention there was paid to expanding production and lowering the cost of industrial goods. In this connection, the plenum proposed to all party organizations the carrying out of an explanatory campaign among the workers, at the same time emphasizing that the attention of the VSNKH [All-Russian Economic Council], trade unions, RKI and TsKK [Central Control Commission] must be directed to the resolution of this task.²⁶

In conforming to the directives of the RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, the Moscow Party Committee and the communist faction of the Moscow Guberniya Trades Council sent a circular letter 7 September 1924 to the raykoms, ukoms [uyezd party committees] and branches of the RKP(b), bureaus of the factions of the guberniya sections, uyezd trade union bureaus, rayon control commissions and authorized representatives of the International Red Cross, in which measures were outlined to get the working masses to participate actively in improving the economic production work of state enterprises.²⁷

The TsKK and RKI authorities did much work to improve industrial activity as a whole and in particular in those sectors producing products for the peasant market (enterprises in the metalworking industry, agricultural machine building, and light industry, especially the cotton textile industry). During 1924 and 1925, their attention was directed primarily to the establishment of accurate calculations at enterprises (organization of the correct calculation of the cost of production). Thus, the NK RKI studied the state of calculating at 52 industrial enterprises in 1923-1924 and at 132 enterprises in 1924-1925.²⁸

In characterizing the tasks of the RKI, V.V. Kuybyshev stressed that the plan for its work in the immediate period includes the elaboration of questions involving the maximum cost reduction for consumer articles issued to the peasant market.²⁹

The April (1925) RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum pointed out that in the economic policy of the Soviet state the interests of state industry must be linked to and coordinated with the interests of the development of agriculture and that "this must be expressed above all in a proper economic union of industry with agriculture...."³⁰

To consolidate this union, it was essential to improve the provision of the countryside with plows, pitchforks, scythes and other metal products, the demand for which had increased significantly. For this purpose, the 14th Party Conference (27th through the 29th of April 1925) made the decision to increase the production of metal.³¹ At the same time, the April (1925) RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum demanded that "provision be made for the rapid implementation of all measures related to the restoration and organization of new plants for the processing of flax, butter products, potatoes and other items."³²

As a result of the measures adopted by the party and the enthusiasm shown by the working class, the volume of industrial production increased by 62 percent 1924-1925. In individual regions of the country, the increase in production was more significant. In the Urals, for example, it increased by 72 percent.³³

Numerous data characterizing the growth of the industrial sectors linked with agriculture and the volume of the importation of agricultural machinery and implements³⁴ give evidence of the fact that the party and the Soviet Government, as F.E. Dzerzhinskiy stressed in his report at the 14th Moscow Guberniya Conference of the RKP(b) in December 1925, unswervingly put into effect the Leninist idea of the union of the socialist and peasant economies.³⁵

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The establishment of the economic union presupposed not only an increase in the volume of the production of industrial goods for the peasant market and a lowering of their production cost but also a further rise in the peasant economy and an increase in its marketability. In 1922, after 2 years of extremely severe drought, a good harvest was brought in. The grain harvest amounted to 56.3 million tons (73.55 percent of the 1913 level). The 1923 harvest of 57.4 million tons (75 percent of the prewar level) was also rather good.³⁶

Having noted that agriculture "is doubtless on the rise," the 13th RKP(b) Congress pointed out the necessity of continuing to strive for a maximum increase in its output.³⁷ This will be possible, the congress stressed, only "on the basis of the further development of the union of the working class with the peasantry, the economic union of state industry with agriculture."³⁸

On 2 June 1924, to study the socioeconomic processes in rural areas and to work out recommendations in questions concerning credit, cooperation, land use, and aid to rural party committees, the RKP(b) Central Committee formed a commission on work in the countryside. It was soon reorganized into the Standing Conference under the RKP(b) Central Committee.³⁹

In conforming to the directives of the 13th RKP(b) Congress, local party organizations worked to put into effect the decisions of the congress directed toward advancing agriculture, developing cooperation, increasing the party stratum in it, etc. Thus, at the meetings of the Leningrad Provincial Committee, its bureau and organizational staff in the summer and fall of 1924, specific measures were outlined in these questions and instructions for their realization were given to uyezd and volost party committees.⁴⁰

The year 1924, however, turned out to be unfavorable for agriculture and 24 districts were hit by drought.⁴¹ At the same time, in a number of regions of the country where weather conditions were favorable, there was a further increase in agricultural production. The country's total grain harvest in 1924 was considerably smaller than in the previous year, amounting to about 51.4 million tons, or 67.2 percent of the 1913 level.⁴²

The party and Soviet Government adopted a number of measures to aid the working and especially the powerless peasantry of the suffering regions. In total, about 110 million rubles were expended for this aid covering a territory with a population of 7 million people. In addition, a 77-million ruble fund was established to fight against a possible repetition of the drought.⁴³

It should be noted that the forms of assistance of the Soviet state to the peasants of the regions of the crop failures in 1924 differed from those that

were practiced in 1921, when the main thing was to save the people from starving to death. Under the conditions of 1924-1925, the primary task was that of preserving the economic strength of the regions suffering poor harvests. Therefore, most of the resources were used to provide the peasants with seed material and to maintain livestock. The remainder was used as a wage fund for public works. Thus, in Penza Guberniya, public works were organized at 293 places (construction of 366 new bridges and repair of 296 existing bridges).⁴⁴

For the regions where drought was frequent, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government worked out a three-year plan to carry out a series of measures to mitigate its consequences. It provided for the organization of reclamation work, the improvement of livestock and other inventory, the establishment of seed stocks, the cultivation of drought-resistant crops, and the like.⁴⁵

The experience of the first 4 years of the NEP showed that grain production increased more slowly than did the sown areas. This was even observed in the regions with favorable climatic conditions. The low yield was caused by the worsening of the quality of land cultivation in view of its depleted state and the shortage of implements, the lack of incentive on the part of peasants to put resources into farming in connection with systematic repartitions of land, and other factors.

The measures⁴⁶ worked out by the 14th Party Conference and the April (1925) RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum included the cessation of frequent repartitions and the reduction of the unified agricultural tax to 280 million rubles for the purpose of facilitating the acquisition of agricultural inventory, machinery and pedigree livestock, and the fuller and better utilization of land resources (in some cases, through an expansion in leasing and, in other cases, through the transfer of land parcels of the state fund to the peasants of thickly populated regions and assistance to settlers).⁴⁷ At the same time, the conference pointed out the necessity of eradicating all visible relics of the policies of military communism in the sphere of interrelationships between the city and the countryside--commanding, bureaucratic administration, excessive appointing, and also abuses and violations of revolutionary legality in the work of the Soviet agencies of authority.

An important condition for the development of farming was the overcoming of such a legacy of past times as poor land use on peasant farms, including the dispersion of arable lands and multiple cultivated strips, which lead to the inefficient expenditure of time and energy by peasants. The quantity of arable parcels with good land management was still small. Thus, in the Kiev area, as noted by P.P. Postyshev at the Third All-Union Congress of Soviets, of 2,800,000 desyatinas [1 desyatina = 2.7 acres], only 500,000 had land management.⁴⁸ One of the reasons for this situation was that the peasants did not have adequate resources for land management. In this connection, the April (1925) RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum indicated the necessity of the preferential extension of credit for the carrying out of land management work.⁴⁹

Of particular importance for economic development was the allotment of 100 million rubles from the receipts of the unified agricultural tax to the volost budget, the curtailment of all types of local taxation, and other measures.⁵⁰

The plenum and conference adopted a number of resolutions on satisfying the interests of the poor strata of the peasantry.⁵¹ An important place in the decisions of the party and state for the advancement of agriculture was allotted to the strengthening of agronomic aid to the peasantry. This aid went in the following directions: expansion of the network of agronomic parcels to the number of volosts, establishment of an aktiv among the peasantry itself and elevation of its agricultural level through the organization of various kinds of agricultural courses (in the 40 guberniyas in 1924 alone, 1,538 agricultural courses were organized covering 18,000 students), development of mass measures in agriculture not in the form of campaigns but by carrying out profound systematic work with the purpose of involving the majority of peasants in the introduction of advanced procedures and methods of the management of agriculture, and organization of guberniya and uyezd agricultural exhibitions (there were 753 of them in 1924 and already more than 1,000 in 1925). The efforts of the working peasantry itself, aid provided to it by the party and the Soviet state, and favorable weather conditions in 1925 contributed to the fact that by the end of 1925 the volume of agricultural production had almost reached the prewar level.⁵²

The increase in the gross production of agricultural output in 1925 was accompanied by a certain increase in its marketability. This permitted the Soviet Government to increase significantly the volume of procurements of agricultural output in 1925 and thus to improve the provision of the urban population with food and of industry with raw materials. Nevertheless, to ensure a fuller loading of the enterprises of light industry and an increase in commodity production, the Soviet state was forced to continue the importation of some sorts of agricultural raw materials (cotton, wool, and woolen and cotton yarn).⁵³

Of primary importance in the establishment of an economic union between socialist industry and the peasant economy was the question of the correlation of the prices for industrial and agricultural output, which, in the final analysis, determined the relations between the working class and the peasantry.⁵⁴ Under the conditions of the grain requisition and the prohibition of private commerce, the price question lost its practical significance. And its role was not great in the first months of the NEP right up through the fall of 1921. Only with the admission of the freedom of commerce on a national scale did it become paramount.

The Soviet state, however, having begun the restoration of the national economy under extremely difficult economic and political conditions, could not immediately and fully take control of the development of the economic interrelationships between the city and the countryside. To a considerable degree, this circumstance contributed to the formation of the "scissors" in the prices for industrial and agricultural output in 1923. From that time on, the question of prices and their regulation was at the center of the party's attention.

The 13th RKP(b) Congress noted that the policy of reducing prices undertaken to eliminate the marketing crisis had completely justified itself, and it emphasized that in its further implementation it is essential "to consider attentively and as accurately as possible the requirements of the market and to prepare systematically for meeting these requirements."⁵⁵ Having sharply

criticized Trotsky's position on the peasant question, the January (1925) Central Committee Plenum demanded the unswerving realization of the party's course for the continued reduction of prices for articles of urban production.⁵⁶

In his report to the Third All-Union Congress of Soviets (13th through the 20th of May 1925), in characterizing the party's policy of reducing prices, F.E. Dzerzhinskiy called it the lever and the basic method "through the help of which we are realizing our union with agriculture and the peasantry...."⁵⁷

During the period from 1 October 1923 through 1 April 1925, the prices for industrial output were reduced quite substantially. For example, they were reduced by 23 percent in the metals industry, by 31 percent in the chemical industry, by 40 percent in the leather industry, and by 35 percent in the textiles industry. After 1 May, prices for cotton fabrics were reduced by another 10 percent.⁵⁸ The April (1925) Plenum of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] issued a decree to establish the prices for agricultural machinery according to the prewar price list.⁵⁹

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Since the establishment of the economic union of socialist industry with the peasant economy could take place only as a result of the exclusion of private capital from commerce, questions linked with the development and regulation of the commodity turnover were at the center of attention of the party and the Soviet state in 1924-1925. An important place was allotted to them by the RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum at the end of March and beginning of April 1924, which issued a special decree "On Internal Commerce and Cooperation."⁶⁰

In its resolution "On Internal Commerce," the 13th RKP(b) Congress stressed that "the basic task of trade policy at this time must be the organization of the proper supplying of the broad masses of consumers and in particular of the peasantry by means of the development and consolidation of the positions of state commerce and cooperation in the marketplace."⁶¹

A no less important task in the party's trade policy was the organization of purchases of agricultural output in connection with the transition to the unified tax and, in view of this, with the abolition of the People's Food Commissariat, which carried out the basic procurements of food and agricultural raw materials. Therefore, the 13th Party Congress recognized the need to reorganize the STO [Council of Labor and Defense] Commission on Internal Commerce into an independent people's commissariat, which was granted the right to regulate all internal commerce.⁶²

The development of state trade authorities was directed mainly toward gaining control of wholesale trade and procurements of some types of food and raw materials. To gain control of retail trade, especially between the city and the countryside, the main attention was paid to the development of consumer cooperation, which was supposed to become the main link in the economic union, a two-way bridge linking socialist industry with the peasant economy, that is, taking upon itself the task of providing the peasant economy with industrial products and organizing procurements of agriculture output. But

the economic difficulties that arose in the fall of 1923 showed that cooperation had not coped with the tasks given it. At the meeting of the Audit Commission of the Central Union of Consumer Societies at the beginning of November 1923, it was noted that the "Central Union indirectly participated in the price 'rise' for goods through the high organizational and trading expenditures."⁶³

The new approach to cooperation set forth by Lenin in the article "On Cooperation" and the lessons of the marketing crisis required that the party and state authorities pay more attention to it. The 10 April 1924 decree of the RKP(b) Central Committee emphasized: "The struggle with private capital for the purpose of the genuine realization of the union of state industry with the peasant market through the satisfaction of the interests of the peasant market is the fundamental task of consumer cooperation."⁶⁴ This line of the RKP(b) Central Committee was also affirmed in the orientation of the 13th Party Congress toward the establishment "of a solid bond between the peasant economy and socialist industry."⁶⁵

Of great importance for the improvement of the work of cooperation was the transition to voluntary membership and measures to improve the structure of the cooperative system as well as to extend credit to it and to provide it with industrial products. The local party organizations showed interest in various aspects of the work of cooperation. Thus, the resolution of the Samarskiy Party Gubkom "On Consumer Cooperation" reflected such questions as the magnitude of expenditures for maintaining the system, the selection of leaders for the reelection of low-level cooperative authorities in January 1925, the bringing of new strata of peasants into cooperation, and others.⁶⁶

The measures adopted by the party in 1924-1925 to develop cooperation led to a turning point in the cooperative movement. Especially intensive was the growth in the consumer cooperative system, the number of members of which increased from 5,265,000 on 1 October 1923 to 9,436,000 on 1 October 1925. In regard to agricultural cooperation, through which the peasants were supplied with agricultural implements and machinery, the number of cooperating farms in the country as a whole (without the Ukraine) was only about 4.5 million on 1 October 1925, despite the broad development of this cooperation in several sectors of agricultural production.⁶⁷

As a result of the efforts of the party to widen its influence on cooperation, the party core in cooperative authorities increased significantly. Thus, during the period between the 13th and 14th party congresses, the party core increased from 67.2 percent to 79.5 percent of the administrative staff of the Central Union and the increase was from 45.2 to 57.3 percent in the case of Sel'skoyuz [Agricultural Union].⁶⁸

The development of cooperative and also state turnover led to a reduction of the relative share of private capital (despite a certain amount of absolute growth) of from 21.8 percent in 1923-1924 to 9.4 percent in 1925-1926 in wholesale trade and from 58.6 percent to 38.8 percent in retail trade.⁶⁹

By the end of 1925, then, clear successes were observed both in the country's economic life as a whole as well as in the development and consolidation of

the socialist sector in the economy. State industry, having been transformed from an unprofitable to a profitable industry, was already in a position to meet the basic needs of the working peasantry for industrial products at acceptable prices. There was a significant increase in procurements of food and raw materials. The coverage of the working peasantry with various forms of cooperation expanded. As was noted in the plenums of a number of RKP(b) gubkoms, the predominant positions in the commodity turnover between socialist industry and the peasant economy were occupied by state and cooperative authorities; their relative share in the country as a whole was 61.2 percent.⁷⁰ The influence of the socialist economy on the peasantry became predominant. The 15th VKP(b) Congress made special note of this.⁷¹ At the 22nd Leningrad Guberniya Party Conference in December 1925, the worker Korenev, in saluting the fact of the consolidation of the union, declared: "If our union with the countryside is strong, then we will have nothing to fear from the Chamberlains or the MacDonalds or anyone else."⁷² And it was as if the words of the peasant Filippov at the 14th VKP(b) Congress were in response to the address of the representative of the working class. In the name of the 28,000 nonparty peasants of Kurdyumovskaya Volost of Samarskaya Guberniya, he expressed thanks to the party and the Soviet authority for the help in restoring agriculture and declared the readiness of the working peasantry to exert even more effort for the further advancement of farming on the basis of the mutual assistance of workers and peasants. "In this way," said Filippov in his greeting, "we will strengthen the union of the city with the countryside and we will fortify the granite cliff of Soviet authority, upon which the entire world counterrevolution will break apart."⁷³

The union of socialist industry with the peasant economy that was established at that time was in accordance with the line of mainly satisfying the personal needs of peasants for industrial goods.⁷⁴ On the basis of the economic union of socialist industry with the peasant economy, the union of the two classes became even stronger. This allowed the party to turn to the socialist reconstruction of the national economy.

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The question of the qualitative changes in the economic union in the course of the reconstruction of the national economy is beyond the scope of this article and is a subject for special consideration. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these changes, in our view, basically involved the fact that as collectivization was being carried out economic ties were established between socialist industry and the collectivized peasantry, that is, between two forms of socialist ownership. The primary task became that of satisfying the production needs of the kolkhozes, although the meeting of the personal needs of the peasants had not lost its importance. Therefore, the union became a production union. Despite the diversity of economic ties between the state and the kolkhozes, the core of these ties continued to be the exchange of industrial output for agricultural output, in which its commodity and noncommodity forms were combined.

It seems that proceeding from Leninist propositions, the economic union in the NEP years could be determined as the establishment of the close ties of the

socialist economy with the peasant economy, the basis of which was the exchange of the output of state industry for the output of peasant farms (private family or collective farms).

With the triumph of socialism in our country in the mid-1930's, the economic foundation of the Soviet state began to be composed of socialist property expressed in two forms, on the basis of which there was an even greater strengthening of the union of two friendly classes that withstood the trials of the austere years of the Great Patriotic War.

The task of strengthening and developing the ties between the two forms of socialist ownership at the level of their integration has not lost its urgency under the conditions of developed socialism either from an economic or a political point of view.

The party line on specialization and concentration based upon the organization of interfarm cooperation and agroindustrial associations is now the main direction for the convergence of the two forms of socialist ownership. This line was approved by the 25th Party Congress⁷⁵ and was further developed in the CPSU Central Committee decree of 28 May 1976. It was noted therein that the specialization and concentration of agricultural production based upon broad cooperation as well as its transition to a contemporary industrial basis are a "new stage in the practical implementation of the ideas of the Leninist cooperative plan under the conditions of developed socialism."⁷⁶

The July (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed that the May (1976) CPSU Central Committee decree on this question "armed party organizations with a clear program for raising the productive forces of agriculture on the basis of the further socialization of socialist production and labor."⁷⁷

In indicating the necessity of the further development of the specialization and concentration of agricultural production on the basis of interfarm cooperation and agroindustrial integration, the 26th CPSU Congress noted that an important task of the agroindustrial complex is the "dependable supplying of the country with food and agricultural raw materials."⁷⁸ This is the purpose of the Food Program of the USSR.

The party is paying special attention to the development and improvement of the interrelationships between the two forms of socialist ownership not only from the point of view of the increase in the production of agricultural output but also from the point of view of the resolution of a number of questions concerning the social development of Soviet society. Thus, the measures for further specialization and interfarm cooperation on the basis of agroindustrial integration as a whole will contribute to the acceleration of the convergence of these forms of ownership and to their merging into a single national form. And this will not take place by means of the mechanical transformation of kolkhozes into sovkhoses. As is shown in practice, for this "there are other ways--agroindustrial integration and the development of interkolkhoz and kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations, for example."⁷⁹ On the other hand, the convergence of the two forms of socialist ownership and their subsequent merging leads to the elimination of class differences, which takes place, as the 26th Party Congress noted, under the conditions of developed socialism.⁸⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collection of Works], Vol 44, p 47; Vol 45, p 370.
2. Ibid., Vol 45, pp 75-76.
3. PRAVDA, 24 October 1984.
4. V.I. Pogudin pointed this out in his work "Put' sovetskogo krest'yanstva k sotsializmu. Istoriograficheskiy ocherk" [Path of the Soviet Peasantry to Socialism. A Historiographic Essay] (Moscow, 1975, p 270). Among the studies on this subject that have come out in recent years, one that is worthy of attention is the monography "Ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu. Osnovnyye problemy istorii perekhodnogo perioda v SSSR. 1917-1937 gg." [From Capitalism to Socialism. Basic Problems in the History of the Transition Period in the USSR 1917-1937], Vol 1, Moscow, 1981.
5. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 7, p 182; Vol 35, p 63.
6. Ibid., Vol 44, p 44.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., Vol 43, pp 61, 148.
9. Ibid., Vol 44, pp 160-161, 164.
10. Ibid., Vol 45, pp 81, 92.
11. Ibid., Vol 44, pp 227, 311.
12. Ibid., Vol 45, pp 75-76, 78.
13. The lack of organization of the union was pointed out by the authors of the one-volume "Istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (see Vol 1, book 1, Moscow, 1970, p 154); E.N. Gorodetskiy ("Lenin--osnovopolozhnik sovetskoy istoricheskoy nauki" [Lenin--Founder of Soviet Historical Science], Moscow, 1970, p 369); Yu.N. Klimov ("V surovyye gody dvadtsatyie. Bol'sheviki Severo-Zapad v bor'be za provedeniye nepa v 1921-1925 gg." [In the Harsh 1920's. Bolsheviks of the Northwest in the Struggle to Carry Out the NEP in the Years 1921-1925], Murmansk, 1968, p 83); V.I. Kuz'min ("Implementation of the Leninist Ideas on the NEP in the USSR," VOPROSY ISTORII, 1970, No 4, p 74).
14. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 45, pp 75-76, 92.
15. A similar opinion is held by Yu. N. Klimov, V.I. Kuz'min, and M.Ye. Shklyar (see Yu.N. Klimov, op. cit., p 149; V.I. Kuz'min, the indicated article, p 74; and M.Ye. Shklyar, "Bor'ba Kompartii Belorussii za ukrepleniye soyuza rabocheho klassa i trudyashchegocya krest'yanstva v vosstanovitel'nyy period (1921-1925 gg)" [Campaign of the Belorussian Communist Party to

- Strengthen the Union of the Working Class and the Working Peasantry in the Reconstruction Period (1921-1925)], Minsk, 1960, p 250). The question of cooperation as a basic link in the economic union is reviewed rather thoroughly in the work of V.P. Dmitrenko, L.F. Morozov and V.I. Pogudin, "Partiya i kooperatsiya" [Party and Cooperation], Moscow, 1978.
16. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of the Central Committee Congresses, Conferences and Plenums], Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 523 (here and below, references are to the eighth edition).
 17. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 43, pp 61-64, 68-70.
 18. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. Statisticheskiy spravochnik" [National Economy of the USSR. Statistical Manual], Moscow-Leningrad, 1932, p 315.
 19. I.V. Stalin, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 6, p 244; F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya. V 2-kh t" [Selected Works in Two Volumes], Vol 2, Moscow, 1977, p 5.
 20. M.N. Bakhtin, "Soyuz rabochikh i krest'yan v gody vosstanovleniya narodnogo khozyaystva (1921-1925 gg.)" [Union of Workers and Peasants in the Years of the Restoration of the National Economy (1921-1925)], Moscow, 1961, p 190; "Leninskoye ucheniye o soyuze rabocheho klassa s krest'yanstvom" [Leninist Doctrine of the Union of the Working Class With the Peasantry], Moscow, 1969, p 271.
 21. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 2, p 516.
 22. Ibid., Vol 3, pp 39-40.
 23. F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, op. cit., Vol 2, p 5.
 24. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 20.
 25. "Profsoyuzy SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy v 4-kh t" [USSR Trade Unions. Documents and Materials in Four Volumes], Vol 2, Moscow, 1963, p 350.
 26. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 132.
 27. "Profsoyuzy SSSR..." op. cit., Vol 2, pp 350-352.
 28. S.N. Ikonnikov, "Sozdaniye i deyatel'nost' ob'yedinennykh organov TsKK-RKI v 1923-1934 gg." [Establishment and Activity of the United Authorities TsKK-RKI in 1923-1934], Moscow, 1971, p 320.
 29. V.V. Kuybyshev, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1958, p 95.
 30. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 163.

31. Ibid., p 205.
32. Ibid., p 165.
33. Dzerzhinskiy, op. cit., Vol 2, p 309; "Rezolyutsii VII Ural'skoy oblastnoy konferentsii RKP(b)" [Resolutions of the Seventh Ural Oblast Conference of the RKP(b)], Sverdlovsk, 1925, p 10.
34. "SSSR za 15 let. Statisticheskiye materialy po narodnomy khozyaystvu" [USSR During 15 Years. Statistical Materials on the National Economy], Moscow, 1932, pp 82-87, 279, 284-287; "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1924-25 g." [National Economy of the USSR in 1924-1925], Moscow, 1926, p 14.
35. Dzerzhinskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" op. cit., Vol 2, p 310.
36. The absolute figures were taken from the book "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. Statisticheskiy spravochnik" [National Economy of the USSR. Statistical Manual], 1932, p 121. In determining the percent, the total grain harvest in 1913 (76.5 million tons) is taken in the boundaries through 17 September 1939 in accordance with the book "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. 1922-1972" [National Economy of the USSR 1922-1972], "Yubileynyy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik" [Anniversary Statistical Yearbook], Moscow, 1972, p 216.
37. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, pp 39, 77.
38. Ibid., p 76.
39. "Istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 4, book 1, p 334.
40. Party archives of the party institute of history of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom (LPA), f. 16; op. 1, d. 116, l. 39; d. 117, l. 3, 4, 12, 13; d. 118, l. 16-20.
41. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 4, book 1, p 336.
42. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. Statisticheskiy spravochnik" op. cit., 1932, p 121.
43. "14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party(b), 18th through the 31st of December 1925," stenographic report, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, p 40.
44. Report of the Penza Gubispolkom on the work during the time from 10 October 1924 until 1 March 1926, Penza, 1926, p 10.
45. "Third Congress of the Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," stenographic report, Moscow, 1925, p 59.
46. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, pp 163-169, 202-205.

47. Ibid., pp 163, 168-169, 203.
48. "Third Congress of the Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," stenographic report, p 398.
49. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 164.
50. Ibid., pp 168-169.
51. Ibid., pp 160-164.
52. "Agropomoshch' i agropropaganda. Sbor statey i materialov" [Agrocultural Assistance and Agricultural Propaganda. A Collection of Articles and Materials], Moscow, 1926, p 9; "15th VKP(b) Congress December 1927," stenographic report, Vol 1, Moscow, 1961, p 56.
53. "USSR During 15 Years..." op. cit., pp 267, 269, 273, 284-285.
54. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 433.
55. Ibid., p 65.
56. Ibid., p 146.
57. Dzerzhinskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" op. cit., Vol 2, p 196.
58. Ibid., p 220.
59. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, pp 166-168.
60. Ibid., pp 29-36.
61. Ibid., p 65.
62. Ibid.
63. USSR TsGANKH [Central State Archives for the National Economy], f. 484, op. 2, d. 16, l. 26-27.
64. "Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitel'stva po khozyaystvennym voprosam, 1917-1957 gody" [Directives of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on Economic Questions, 1917-1957], Vol 1, Moscow, 1957, p 454.
65. "KPSS v rezolyutiyaakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 68.
66. "Ob ocherednykh zadachakh raboty v derevne (Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya)" [On the Immediate Tasks of the Work in the Countryside (Resolutions and Decrees], Samara, 1925, pp 28-31.
67. "40 let sovetskoy potrebitel'skoy kooperatsii. 1917-1957" [40 Years of Soviet Consumer Cooperation 1917-1957], Moscow, 1957, p 55; "Kontrol'nyye

tsifry narodnogo khozyaystva na 1926/27 g." [Control Figures for the National Economy for 1926-1927], Moscow, 1927, p 188.

68. "K XIV s"yezdy RKP(b)" [On the 14th RKP(b) Congress], Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, p 64.
69. "Kontrol'nyye tsifry..." op. cit., p 374.
70. See, for example: "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniye XIV Moscovskoy gubkonferentsii VKP(b)" [Resolutions and Decrees of the 14th Moscow Guberniya Conference of the VKP(b)], Moscow, 1926, p 81; "Obzor ekonomicheskogo i politicheskogo polozheniya gubernii (K otchetu Gubkoma na XV-oy Gubernskoy Partiyonoy Konferentsii)" [Review of the Economic and Political Position of the Guberniya (On the Report of the Gubkom at the 15th Guberniya Party Conference)], Tula, 1925, p 38; "Kontrol'nyye tsifry..." op. cit., p 374.
71. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 4, p 32.
72. LPA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 143, l. 7.
73. "14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b), 18th Through the 31st of December 1925" op. cit., p 806.
74. "Kontrol'nyye tsifry narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1927-1928 god" [Control Figures for the National Economy of the USSR for 1927-1928], Moscow, 1928, p 242.
75. "25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 24 February Through 5 March 1976," stenographic report, Vol 1, Moscow, 1976, p 76.
76. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh..." op. cit., Vol 12, p 278.
77. Ibid., Vol 13, Moscow, 1981, p 182.
78. "26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 23 February Through 3 March 1981," stenographic report, Vol 2, Moscow, p 187.
79. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iyunya 1983 goda" [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14th and 15th of June 1983], Moscow, 1983, p 11.
80. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 53.

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NATIONAL

PROGRESS IN INTRODUCING NEW SOVIET HOLIDAYS VIEWED

Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 85 (signed to press 13 Mar 85)
pp 20-22

[Interview with Vladimir Timofeevich Gubarev, deputy minister of justice of the RSFSR, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the passing of a resolution by the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR on the introduction of new civil ceremonies into the daily life of Soviet people by a correspondent of the magazine NAUKA I RELIGIYA; date and place not specified: "Connecting the Individual and Society"]

[Excerpts] In 1964 the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR passed a resolution "On the introduction of new civil ceremonies into the daily life of Soviet people". Analogous resolutions were passed also in the other united republics. What have the past twenty years given us? The deputy minister of justice of the RSFSR, V. T. Gubarev, answers the questions of a correspondent of the magazine "Science and Religion".

[Question] Vladimir Timofeevich, my very first question: What gave rise to the resolution?

[Answer] The most important events in human life - birth, coming of legal age, marriage - both in the past and now are accompanied by festive ceremonies. Their role is great: they interrupt the smooth flow of the weekdays, they reveal the importance of the event which has special meaning both for the individual and for society as a whole, they strengthen the bond between the individual and society. Here there accumulates the social experience, the common sense of the people, all that is necessary to pass on to the new generations. The particular form of a ceremony, its singularity, brilliance and festiveness allow the influencing not only of the mind but also of the emotions of a person, awakening a feeling of oneness with the society in which a person lives, a feeling of duty and personal responsibility before that society.

Over the course of many centuries, festive ceremonies in our country have carried on the whole a religious character. The church invariably attached very great importance to them; with the help of impressive, carefully worked out rituals it strengthened its power - both spiritual and material - over man.

Immediately after the October Revolution, the process of supplanting the old church ceremonies with new non-religious ones acquired a more and more active character. By the '60's we had on the whole a system that had taken shape, and now continues to develop. In all the republics, krais and oblasts, including in the Russian Federation, there entered securely into daily life the ceremonial registration of marriages and births, the presentation of the passport of a USSR citizen, send-offs into the Soviet Army, the entrance of a young person into working life, etc. In Moscow and Leningrad wedding palaces were opened.

Along with this, the introduction of new ceremonies met with no small difficulty. In many places, the registration of marriages and births took place at public expense. In such a light the rituals were not meeting with support; they gave rise to dissatisfaction and the just criticism of the workers. It became necessary to place the matter on a solid state-run basis. In 1964 the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR passed a special resolution which recommended to the local organs of power - The Councils of Ministers of the autonomous republics, the krayispolkoms, the oblispolkoms - to use more widely the positive experience of introducing new civil ceremonies and rituals.

[Question] Who was made responsible for the realization of the resolution on the introduction of Soviet ceremonies and rituals?

[Answer] It was recommended to the Councils of Ministers of the autonomous republics and to the executive committees of the kray and oblast councils of people's deputies to create for the organs of the Civil Registrar's Office the proper conditions for working on the introduction of new civil ceremonies; to allocate for them well-built premises and equipment; to grant for these goals palaces and houses of culture, meeting halls, theaters etc. Under the guidance of city, regional, rural and village councils of people's deputies, social commissions were formed on civil ceremonies. These commissions were faced in the first with deciding a complex of problems: the working out, perfection and propagation of new civil ceremonies, the coordination of the activities of the state organs and social organizations.

In connection with the fact that the general leadership of the Civil Registrar's Office in the Russian Federation was entrusted to the Ministry of Justice, as in the other united republics, the Ministry of Justice was charged with rendering to the Civil Registrar's Office comprehensive assistance with the introduction of new Soviet ceremonies.

[Question] Twenty years is no short period. Now one probably could sum up some results.

[Answer] The councils of people's deputies, the organs of the Civil Registrar's Office have done much and continue to do a lot for the development and perfection of civil ceremonies. Work is continuously being carried out in maintaining the necessary means for the ceremonial registration of marriages and births in the organs of the Civil Registrar's Office.

The efforts have brought forth appreciable results: in 1983, for example, 66.5 percent of new births and 88.7 percent of marriages were registered according to the New Soviet ceremony.

[Question] One probably could say where, in which oblasts and krays of the Russian Federation, the introduction of Soviet ceremonies is proceeding successfully?

[Answer] Work of such type is well implemented in Moscow and Leningrad, in Komi ASSR, Tatar ASSR, Chuvash ASSR; in Stavropol and Khabarovsk krays; in Volgograd, Gor'kiy, Kuybyshev, Irkutsk, Moscow, Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Tambov oblasts.

It is probably worth noting specially Krasnodar kray. The Soviet organs and social organizations of the kray skillfully use the socialist civil ceremonies in the ideological-political, work-related, moral and atheistic training of the laborers for the strengthening of the Soviet family and the overcoming of harmful vestiges and customs.

The organizers of the ceremony of registration of newborns take special care that the ceremony corresponds to the significance of the event - the entrance into life of a new person.

[Question] It probably will be useful in our interview to dwell also on the unresolved problems.

[Answer] Such problems aren't few. Until now the question of the material-technical maintenance of the new ceremonies has not been fully resolved. Many Civil Registrars' offices in the Russian Federation still do not have the appropriate premises for carrying out ceremonial activities; far from all the workers of the organs of the Civil Registrars' offices are equipped with appropriate uniforms. Unfortunately, it is necessary to clash with formalism and uninspired attitudes. Although we are trying to overcome red tape, it is impossible not to consider the fact that formalism and bureaucracy seriously interfere with the introduction of new ceremonies into the daily life of Soviet people.

Success usually comes in places where the Civil Registrars' offices together with the commissions on Soviet holidays and ceremonies rely upon society - party, trade union and komsomol organizations - and they enlist the services of the deputies of local councils, economic leaders, the local intelligentsia, heroes of labor and war, and pace-setting workers.

[Question] How skillfully are good national traditions used in the Soviet ceremonies?

[Answer] It would be improvident to overlook those riches which our ancestors left us. Ancient ceremonies are now finding new life in many parts of the Soviet land. The ceremony is conceived as an intelligent, unobtrusive lesson in proper family relations, in considerate and respectful regard for one another.

[Question] How is the training organized and how are the qualifications raised for those who work in the field of introducing the new ceremonies?

[Answer] The training of personnel is an important and difficult question. Unfortunately, up to now not a single institution is preparing specialists who could sufficiently perform the ceremonies on a professional level. It is necessary to enlist in these activities people from "related fields" - pedagogues, graduating students from the institutes of culture, jurists, etc. In this connection, a system of raising the qualifications of the workers in the departments of the Civil Registrar's Office gains special significance. Together with the secretaries of village and rural councils, they study at annual republic (autonomous republic), kray and oblast courses and seminars; they participate in contests for the best performance of a ritual, undergo productive practice, etc.

In Gorkiy oblast, the department heads of the Civil Registrar's office study regularly, every two or three years, at two-week courses. The program is meant to last for 92 hours, in which lectures are included on ethics, aesthetics, the basics of theatrical art, standards of speech and practical work on the performance of the rituals of ceremonial registration of marriages and births.

[Question] We would like to learn your opinion about the role of the press in the formation of Soviet ceremonies.

[Answer] One can say that the press, radio and television pay no small amount of attention to the problem of new Soviet ceremonies. However, many such publications are superficial. Their authors do not go much farther than a favorable word. One could rather expect a deeper, more analytical approach from the press. This, in particular, relates to the urgent matter of the participation of composers, artists and poets in the creation of new ceremonies. The press in the meantime limits itself to an appeal to the creative unions. It's time to pay closer attention - why hasn't this call received a proper response? - there's a reason for that.

[Question] Some of the blame probably should rest even with our magazine. We'll take account of that. Thank you for the interview.

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12882

CSO: 1830/562

NATIONAL

NEW MOSFIL'M DIRECTOR

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 April 1985 carries on page 3 a 200-word article by G. Alumov announcing the appointment of Vladimir Il'ich Desyaterik as general director of Mosfil'm [Moscow Motion Picture Studio]. V. E. Desyaterik, candidate of historical sciences, is the author of several books and articles and formerly served as the publishing director of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. He will take charge of a film studio which has made more than 2,000 films in the last 60 years, employs more than 5,000 people, and includes 6 artistic associations and an experimental young artists' association called Debut. Mosfil'm produces 42 films per year for the motion picture industry, and 12-13 films for television (Gosteleradio). This represents about one-third of the total film industry output. Mosfil'm's major future films will include "The Battle for Moscow" [Bitva za Moskvu], "Through All the Years" [Cherez vse gody], "Legacy" [Nasledstvo], and "Why Do Men Need Wings?" [Zachem cheloveku kryl'ya]--all dedicated to World War II. The most famous film in this group, "Victory" [Pobeda], based on A. Chakovsky's book of the same title, had an all-union premier on 19 April.

CSO: 1830/585

NATIONAL

COMMENTARY ON NARCOTICS USAGE IN SOVIET GEORGIA

Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian 9 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by Medical Sciences Candidate A. Gagua, senior scientific associate in the GSSR Health Ministry's Experimental and Clinical Surgery Institute: "Narcotics Addiction Is a Great Tragedy. A Doctor's Advice"]

[Text] Narcotics addiction is a very dangerous disease and is considered one of mankind's greatest tragedies. It is very harmful to man. Until the end of the 19th century, narcotics addiction was not an international problem. It is classified with the group of diseases characterized by an abnormal habituation to neurotropic compounds (those that act upon the nervous system).

Scientific advances made it possible to produce alkaloids, and the development of transportation made it easy to ship narcotics to distant lands. Thus the trade in narcotics became especially widespread in the early 20th century. It was at that time that people began to be concerned about narcotics addiction as it became clear how harmful narcotics are to individuals, society, and the state. The growing traffic in narcotics was followed by a rise in crime.

Narcotics are of various types, but all of them basically act upon the central nervous system. Small doses bring about a slight rise in psychosomatic tone, a general calming effect, and relief from pain. Large doses bring on inebriation, deep narcotic sleep, stupor, and other clinical symptoms characteristic of a toxic state.

There are various causes of the development of narcotics addiction. Frequently it comes about after long-term use for medical purposes--so-called "medical narcotics addiction." It happens when the physician prescribes narcotics to relieve pain.

There are cases, however, when narcotics addiction involves coercive pressure, when a confirmed addict of degraded and perverse character coerces an acquaintance or loved one to take narcotics.

Sometimes, addiction begins as a result of "self-treatment," when a person suffering from sleeplessness or general listlessness starts to take sleeping medicine or stimulants on his own, without the advice of a doctor. There are frequent cases in which children and young people, especially, turn to narcotics out of curiosity or imitation.

Taking narcotics induces a number of abnormal changes in the organism. The nervous system is especially affected. Long-term use results in the following characteristic symptoms: the addict's unsuppressable need to take more narcotics and efforts to obtain them; a withdrawal syndrome, in which the victim, if he does not get his accustomed narcotics within a certain time, begins to suffer from a state of withdrawal (abstinence), accompanied by a number of characteristic physical and psychical symptoms; the organism acquires a "tolerance" to narcotics, making it necessary to gradually increase the dosage (rise in tolerance).

It should be pointed out that most narcotics addicts exhibit certain physical and psychological weaknesses from childhood on. Many of them from an early age exhibit an unstable autonomous nervous system and nervous disruptions of the cardiovascular and gastrointestinal systems such as loss of appetite, dizziness, collapse, sleeplessness, disruption of menstruation and so on. Such persons are characterized by psychological irritability, unstable moods, affective lability, impulsiveness, timidity, and excessive ambition.

In short, most such persons are infantile, hysterical psychopaths devoid of strong moral principles. Persons afflicted by a sense of exaggerated ambition do not have the minimal personal ability to do systematic work. To disguise their weakness they do not hesitate to lie and brag. Because of their exaggerated ambition they are gravely troubled by job and family difficulties, especially premature sexual debility.

The taking of narcotics is accompanied by strange behavior which is often inappropriate to the particular situation and puzzling to persons in the vicinity. At the same time, a particular dose can at some stage bring on an opposite reaction--general listlessness, moodiness, depression, and so on.

Long-term narcotics use brings about a number of somatic and psychological changes. The rate and character of these changes, which ultimately lead to degradation of the personality, depend on the kind of narcotic, how long it is taken, the strength of the person prior to becoming addicted, and other individual characteristics. In the end, chronic narcotics addiction brings about the person's physical and psychological destruction.

Somatically, we observe a breakdown in the water and carbohydrate balance. The skin becomes dry and yellowish, teeth are easily damaged and caries begin, the pupils become narrow and the face puffy; blood pressure and pulse are lowered, symptoms of asthma appear, sexual potency drops sharply, menstruation ceases, severe insomnia sets in, and the bladder and rectal areas become painful. Speech is impaired because of articulatory breakdown. Motor coordination is disrupted, and trembling in the extremities sets in.

In terms of psychology, the following changes are observed: addicts lack initiative, they lose their will power, their thinking is superficial and narrow, their only goal in life is to get narcotics in order to alleviate the extreme suffering of withdrawal. This latter, the abstinence syndrome, occurs any time the addict does not get his accustomed dose. About 6 to 18 hours later, severe somatic phenomena begin: general weakness, accelerated pulse, rapid breathing, widening of the pupils, nausea, diarrhea, occasionally subfebrile temperature, salivation, weeping, sneezing, and insomnia. The

following subjective sensations are notable: pains throughout the body, painful joints, acute depression, irritability, and angry and aggressive outbursts. This abstinence syndrome generally lasts several days; after 10 to 12 days it passes. This condition gives rise to a craving for the abandoned narcotics.

The prime object of preventive efforts against addiction should be those persons in the population who have not yet experienced the grave effects of narcotics--that is, the most important stage of addiction prevention is the correct indoctrination of the younger generation. Health education among young people should pursue two goals: to acquaint them with the destructive effects of narcotics and instill in them the idea that addiction is immoral. These ideas about addiction should not only be inculcated in children by means of instruction but also reinforced by life experience. Young people should see social measures as confirmation of what they are taught.

Appropriate agencies in our republic have been implementing systematic organizational measures against narcotics addiction. In 1965, for example, the GSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issued a ukase "On Compulsory Treatment and Labor Indoctrination for Incurable Alcoholics and Narcotics Addicts." Later, in 1966, the republic closed all narcotics stations [punkty] and provided all addicts with inpatient treatment. A treatment and labor prophylactorium for compulsory treatment of narcotics addicts and alcoholics was opened in Tskhinvali in 1967 and one in Sagaredzho in 1970.

Since 1966, moreover, the GSSR Health Ministry has conducted regular inspections to check on the storage, logging, and issuing of narcotics in the republic's medical establishments. Narcotics have been removed from the general pharmacy network, and each rayon now has only one pharmacy each that issues them. Improvements have been made in the storing, logging, and issuing of narcotics and special prescription blanks. Prescribing of narcotics to patients on medical evidence for especially long periods has been drastically restricted. Maximum one-time doses of narcotics have also been reduced.

A USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase in 1969 stipulates the assessment of responsibility for narcotics use and stepped-up efforts against the sale of narcotics. The ukase calls for severe punishment against anyone who makes and distributes narcotics illegally. The ukase spells out coercive measures for improper treatment of addicts.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the governments of various countries have been making efforts against narcotics addiction for 50 years now, regulations have been drawn up and implemented with regard to the international trade in narcotics, and strict controls have been instituted on licensing the exporting of narcotics, it has still not been possible to liquidate illegal trafficking in narcotics. This situation is facilitated by the fact that there are regions where it is as yet impossible to effectively control the raising of opium poppies. Everyone needs to be aware that a narcotics addict is an accomplice in the crime of smuggling narcotics. Trafficking in narcotics is a form of organized crime.

The state has mapped out collective measures designed to protect mankind from the destructive effects of narcotics addiction.

NATIONAL

TICKET SCALPING DRAWS JAIL SENTENCE

[Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA KUL'TURA in Russian 6 April 1985, on page 8 carries a 1,200-word article entitled "By-pass the Box Office." Author K. Raspevin reports that the public court of Sverdlovsk Rayon sentenced two people for ticket scalping and the Moscow review court for criminal affairs upheld the sentences. A Bolshoy Theater cashier in Moscow, Raisa P. Kirilenko, was sentenced to 3 years in jail and "confiscation of personal property," and a former Mostorg [Moscow Oblast Trust for Wholesale and Retail Trade] cashier, S.I. Chistova, received a 6-year jail sentence and "confiscation of personal property." Chistova systematically purchased theater tickets from various city theater cashiers at R5-6 above the official price and sold them privately to "a cultural circle" of theater lovers, adding her own "travel expenses" to the price of each ticket. The court revealed that Chistova's "travel expenses" were deposited in three bank accounts and amounted to a "considerable sum of money." She had also accumulated other "valuables worth R10,000." At the trial, witnesses testified that Chistova in a 10-day period in January 1985 sold 586 tickets to her clients for the performance of the ballet Spartacus. She bought these tickets from Raisa Kirilenko, the Bolshoy Theater ticket cashier, out of a total of 1,209. One of Chistova's regular clients, B. Kolbashnikov, translator for NATI [State All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Tractors], testified that "I bought theater tickets from Chistova at R25 per pair. During the 6 years of our acquaintance, I overpaid about R6-7,000." A colleague of Kolbasnikov at NATI testified that Kolbasnikov, in addition to this established route of obtaining tickets outside the official ticket booth, "regularly came with me to ticket booths in the city, where he was known, and I received good tickets at higher than official prices." His testimony confirmed the court's suspicion that speculation in theater tickets was widespread.

CSO: 1830/553

KaSSR COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER ON EFFORTS TO ECONOMIZE

Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 85 p 3

[Excerpts from article by S. Bayzhanov, KaSSR Communications minister, in the column "A Personal Account of Economizing": "At Each Work Station"]

[Text] The communications workers of the Republic have stringent obligations to economize on material resources. They have decided to work not two but three days on economized raw materials, supplies and fuel in the concluding year of the Five-Year plan.

Owing to the saved resources 3.3 million rubles' worth of communication services will be rendered. And this means: without additional expenditure 546,000 long-distance telephone calls will take place, 153,000 telegrams will be processed, 14,787,000 copies of newspapers, 59,000 parcels and 131,000 remittances will be delivered, and 600 telephones and 600 wired-radio outlets will be installed. 85,000 kilometers of trips will be completed by Departmental Motor Transport on economized gasoline, and a thousand tons of freight will be transported. Construction and installation organizations under the jurisdiction of the Communications Ministry will accomplish 420,000 rubles' worth of work and will construct 82 kilometers of aerial lines.

At the present time specific measures have been worked out and are being implemented for increasing the efficiency of the utilization of material resources and for intensifying the economization of stocks, fuel and electric power at all production stages of the economic process--from the work station and crew to the shop, enterprise and industry as a whole. The tasks of economizing on material resources has been brought home to all industrial subdivisions as a valuational assessment and, according to a number of indices, as the natural thing to do. Many workers, engineers and technicians have opened personal economization accounts.

Planning, financial, engineering and supply services that have raised the level of their activity in this direction will help greatly by bringing to light and redistributing above-norm commodity stocks and by recycling resources.

The initiators of this patriotic undertaking among the communications workers of the Republic were collectives of the Tselinograd Telegraph and Telephone Exchange, the specialized construction and installation trust "Kazsvyazstroy" No. 1 and Ural Reinforced Concrete Products Yard. They intend to achieve sufficient economization to permit the work front to be supplied for three days.

The initiative of the initiators has been taken up by all communications enterprises. Thus the Republic Long-Distance Telephone Exchange will be able to work not 3 but 10 days on 100,000 economized kilowatt-hours of electric power. In this plan a great deal of attention is being given to technical and economic measures directed primarily toward preventing irrational expenditure of energy resources. Thus the replacement of vacuum-tube equipment by semiconductor devices and of obsolete equipment by new equipment with a higher efficiency will make it possible to save more than 40,000 kilowatt-hours of electric power. And the replacement of automatic voltage adjustment racks by semiconductor devices will reduce voltage on the load of electric power supply installations and will save 25,000 kilowatt hours. Intensifying economization in the expenditure of electric power at all work stations and in every operation will save additional tens of thousands of kilowatt-hours of power.

It is not just the collectives of subdivisions but all the workers of an enterprise that take part in Socialist competition for economization and thrift. The attitude of communications workers toward the problems of economizing on material resources is especially important: it is of course precisely the work station, this base of production, where zealous management begins.

Hundreds of front-rank workers and industrial innovators are in the vanguard of Socialist competition and are setting standards in labor. Their mastery and their creative attitude toward the cause serve as an example to their fellow workers.

1985 is the special, concluding year of the Five-Year Plan and the year of preparation for the 27th Party Congress. This places a special responsibility on each of us.

The communications workers of the Republic will direct all of their strength and energy to fulfilling obligations to economize on stocks, raw materials and resources of fuel and energy, and to increasing the volume of communications services to the population and to the national economy, and will suitably greet the 27th CPSU Congress with their labor successes.

12731
CSO: 1830/364

REGIONAL

KASSR ENTERPRISES URGED TO SHARE INFORMATION ON IMPROVEMENTS

Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Experience Is Next Door"]

[Excerpts] Party organizations of the republic are giving more and more attention to activation of socialist competition, propaganda and the introduction into industry of progressive methods in the solution of tasks connected with the conversion of the economy to intensification.

The Kaskelenskiy Party Raykom in Alma-Ata Oblast began persistently popularizing and introducing on the farms of the rayon the experience of leading farms in organization of commercial cross-breeding of cattle. This led to positive results immediately. The milk yield per fodder cow rose by 143 kilograms in 1984. The productivity of cattle rose on 11 farms.

The policy of intensification of production demands the selection of advanced methods of labor organization, the introduction of which would allow us to not only raise labor productivity, but also resolve in a new way a number of problems which time has brought to the fore concerning reorganization of all production. The example of the Tselinogradsel'mash Association demonstrates how this is accomplished in practice. The party committee and economic and engineering services studied the organization of labor of the [harvesting] combine builders of Dnepropetrovsk and came to the conclusion that it was a necessity to introduce certification of work places there. They provided for a complex of measures directed towards: better utilization of internal resources of production, the acceleration of scientific-technical progress, an increase in labor productivity and the quality of output, and the constant improvement of technology. In the final analysis, this produced remarkable results. For the year, the volume of production increased 8.5 percent and labor productivity went up 10.6 percent. Profits were 1.8 million rubles over plan. In all, 102 work stations and 166 square meters of production area were freed.

The majority of press organs in our republic are single-mindedly and urgently engaged in production propaganda. Unfortunately, the Ural Oblast newspaper PRIURAL'Ye and the Aktykubinsk PUT' K KOMMUNISMU, as well as certain others, write about progressive methods spasmodically, superficially and dryly. It should be constantly borne in mind that our party, in accomplishing a switchover of the economy to the rails of intensification, is firmly relying on the initiative and creativity of the masses and on the introduction of progressive experience.

The substitution of agitational exclamations for effective propaganda and a concrete solution of organizational-economic problems cannot produce positive results.

The struggle for improvement of the management of labor collectives and assertion of order, organization and discipline and increased accountability of cadres at all levels of production, which has been promoted by the party, has received universal approval. Experience of such work has already accumulated. But if it could only spread and become generalized everywhere, right away! Here is an example from Turgay Oblast. Years of searching were required by the oblast agricultural experiment station in order to find the path to stabilizing harvests and the productivity of livestock at a high level. In accordance with the example of the leading farms of Russia, the Ukraine and our republic, the management of production was changed here. Ties between subdivisions were improved. An optimal load was placed on the workers of the central staff and the leaders of production sectors. The accountability of labor collectives for the end results of their labor was increased. To accomplish this, a shop structure of management was introduced. Councils were established in 32 sectors of the shops and operation on a self-supporting [profitable] basis was put into effect. The productivity of labor grew 62 percent in comparison with its planned level and the yield on invested agricultural capital grew by 40 kopecks per ruble. The experience of the agricultural station, however, is not being applied by its neighbors.

A passive attitude towards the introduction of advanced methods not only limits the growth of production, but unavoidably leads to its decline. That is what occurred, for example, at the Chimkentskiy cardan shaft plant of the AvtoUaz Production Association. Here they took a formal approach to the development of measures pertaining to the introduction of equipment which was new, but already proven. They did not determine who would be responsible for this work and the time frames in which each stage would be completed. They did nothing to precisely determine the economic effect of each innovation and they made hash of the statistical accounts. And how! The volume of actual production fell 4.3 percent in 1984 and labor productivity declined 3.7 percent. In connection with this, the position of the party committee is incomprehensible. It did not organize socialist competition in the collective. It substituted general talks about the necessity of dissemination of the innovators' experience for lively, creative work with the innovators of production.

12784
CSO: 1830/490

REGIONAL

MSSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FORMED

Supreme Soviet Presidium Named

Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 30 Mar 85 p 1

[Decree entitled: "Decree of the MSSR Supreme Soviet concerning the Election of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium" signed by I. Kalin, Chairman of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and A. Mel'nik, Secretary of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Kishinev, 29 March 1985]

[Text] The MSSR Supreme Soviet decrees the election of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium thus:

Chairman of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: Kalin, Ivan Petrovich -- deputy from the Kalarash-Yuzhen election district of Kalarashskiy Rayon.

Deputy Chairmen of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: Sidorenko, Sergey Stepanovich -- deputy from the election district Gur Galbene of Chimishliyskiy Rayon; Cheban, Ivan Konstantinovich -- deputy from the Bolduresht election district of Nisporenskiy Rayon.

Secretary of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: Mel'nik, Anna Vasil'yevna -- deputy from the Komrat-Komsomol election district of the Komratskiy Rayon

Members of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium:

Buzhenitsa, Il'ya Ivanovich -- deputy from the Lipkan election district of Brichanskiy Rayon;

Vinebryacha, Valentina Andreyevna -- deputy from the Hertsen election district of Leninskiy Rayon, city of Kishinev;

Georgioglo, Nikolay Nikolayevich -- deputy from the Komrat-Lenin election district of Komratskiy Rayon;

Grossu, Semen Kuz'mich -- deputy from the Leningrad election district of the city of Belets

Gural', Lidiya Ivanovna -- deputy from the Chokyltyan election district of Orgeyerskiy Rayon;

Iovv, Vasilii Matveyevich -- deputy from the Volodar election district city of Belets;

Kara, Anatolii Petrovich -- deputy from the Abakliy election district, Bessarabskiy Rayon;

Morar', Ivan Profirovich -- deputy from the Chernyshevskiy election district of Frunzenskiy Rayon, city of Kishinev;

Nidelku, Dmitriy Ivanovich -- deputy from the Gradishen election district of Chimishliyskiy Rayon;

Pavlova, Zhanna Vladimirovna -- deputy from the Solnech election district city of Bendera;

Paliy, Ivan Aleksandrovich -- deputy from the Korkmaz election district of Suvorovskiy Rayon;

Ryabchich, Viktor Andreyevich -- deputy from the Rasponen election district Sholdaneshtskiy Rayon;

Semenov, Vladislav Fedorovich -- deputy from the Timoshenkov election district of Sovetskiy Rayon, city of Kishinev;

Shripnik, Valentina Sergeyevna -- deputy from the Yedinets election district, Yedinitskiy Rayon;

Yashai, Aleksey Vasil'yevich -- deputy from the Korzheuts election district, Brichanskiy Rayon.

Council of Ministers Named

Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 31 Mar 85 p 1

[Decree entitled: "Decree of the MSSR Supreme Soviet concerning the formation of the MSSR Council of Ministers" signed by I. Kalin, Chairman of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and A. Mel'nik, Secretary of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Kishinev, 29 March 1985]

[Text] The MSSR Supreme Soviet decrees the formation of the MSSR Council of Ministers thus:

Chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Ustiyan, Ivan Grigor'yevich.

First Deputy Chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Kalenik, Yevgeniy Petrovich.

Deputy Chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Vyshku, Vasiliy Konstantinovich.

Deputy Chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Kiriyak, Nellya Pavlovna.

Deputy Chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Chairman of the MSSR State Planning Committee: Kutyrkin, Vladislav Georgiyevich.

Deputy Chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Polyakov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich.

Deputy Chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Shapa, Petr Ivanovich.

Administrator of Affairs of the MSSR Council of Ministers: Dobynda, Vasiliy Ivanovich.

Minister of Viniculture and Winemaking of the MSSR: Luk'yanov, Nikolay Nikolayevich.

MSSR Minister of Internal Affairs: Bradulov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich.

MSSR Minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education: Kerdivarenko, Vasiliy Aleksandrovich.

MSSR Minister of Procurement: Tuzlov, Mikhail Ivanovich.

MSSR Minister of Health: Draganyuk, Kirill Alekseyevich.

MSSR Minister of Foreign Affairs: Komendant, Petr Vasil'yevich.

MSSR Minister of Culture: Konstantinov, Anton Sidorovich.

MSSR Minister of Light Industry: Zhitnyuk, Galina Mikhaylovna.

MSSR Minister of the Forest Industry: Vasalatiy, Grigoriy Ivanovich.

MSSR Minister of Furniture and the Wood Processing Industry: Terekhov, Boris Pavlovich.

MSSR Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Resources: Kishlar', Aleksandr Stepanovich.

MSSR Minister of the Meat and Dairy Industry: Chokoy, Georgiy Stepanovich.

MSSR Minister of the Food Industry: Chekoy, Arkhip Il'ich.

MSSR Minister of the Fruit and Vegetable Industry: Protsenko, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich.

MSSR Minister of the Construction Materials Industry: Demchenko, Ivan Ivanovich.

MSSR Minister of Education: Zidu, Dmitriy Georgiyevich.

MSSR Minister of Communications: Russu, Vasiliy Petrovich.

MSSR Minister of Rural Construction: Yarutin, Vladimir Kuz'mich.

MSSR Minister of Agriculture: Stepanov, Georgiy Afanas'yevich.

MSSR Minister of Construction: Uzun, Nikolay Ivanovich.

MSSR Minister of Trade: Cholak, Mikhail Isayevich.

MSSR Minister of Finance: Savvin, Ivan Alekseyevich.

MSSR Minister of Justice: Volosyuk, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich.

MSSR Minister of Motor Transport: Fomin, Vasiliy Mikheyevich.

MSSR Minister of Consumer Services: Yukin, Vladimir Maksimovich.

MSSR Minister of Housing and Municipal Services: Moku, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich.

MSSR Minister of Local Industry: Kudryavtseva, Natella Danilovna.

MSSR Minister of Social Security: Bykova, Ol'ga Vasil'yevna.

MSSR Minister of Highway Construction and Maintenance: Bolbat, Ivan Semenovich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for Construction Affairs: Grafov, Sergey Sergeyevich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply: Parfenov, Vitaliy Georgiyevich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for Labor: Yakubovskiy, Petr Ivanovich

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee on Prices: Chekati, Grigoriy Yakovlevich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education: Kushnir, Grigoriy Ivanovich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for Television and Radio: Lozan, Stepan Ivanovich.

Chairman of the State Committee for Cinematography: Iordanov, Ivan Yefremovich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade: Khropotinskiy, Vasiliy Petrovich.

Chairman of the MSSR Committee for State Security: Volkov, Gavriil Moiseyevich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture: Bondarenko, Mikhail Vasil'yevich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for the Supply of Petroleum Products: Popov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and for Mine Supervision: Solomko, Frants Mikhaylovich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature: Kotyatsy, Ivan Aleksandrovich.

Chairman of the MSSR Agrarian Industrial Association for Tobacco: Verbitskiy, Nikolay Filippovich.

Chairman of the MSSR Agrarian Industrial Association for the Production of Oil Essences and Perfume Cosmetics: Khynku, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

Chairman of the MSSR State Cooperative Scientific-Production Association for Agrochemical Service of Agriculture: Atanovskiy, Leonid Nikolayevich.

Chief of the MSSR Central Statistical Administration: Kozub, Konstantin Ivanovich.

In accordance with Article 21 of the MSSR Law concerning the MSSR Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the MSSR Committee of People's Control is included in the staff of the MSSR Council of Ministers.

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NABIYEV PLENUM SPEECH

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 2 Apr 85 pp 1-2

[Speech by R. N. Nabyev, CP of Tajikistan Central Committee first secretary, at the 20th CP of Tajikistan Central Committee Plenum: "Work With Cadres Must Be on the Level of Contemporary Requirements"; abridged]

[Text] Comrades:

The CP of Tajikistan Central Committee Plenum is considering a problem of great importance. Cadre policy has always been and remains a key link in the comprehensive organizing and guiding activities of our Leninist party. Now, when the problems of perfecting developed socialism stand in their full magnitude, such work becomes particularly important. The novelty and difficulty of the problems which face us, and the higher level of education and standards of the Soviet people dictate stricter requirements concerning cadres and their practical and ideological-moral aspect.

As they prepare for their 27th congress, the party and its Central Committee direct the party organizations to the need for a thorough study and summation of positive experience acquired in cadre work and to profoundly exposing existing shortcomings and their causes.

After considering some problems of contemporary cadre policy in the light of the tasks of further perfecting developed socialism, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo made it incumbent upon the party committees persistently to see to it that all sectors of economic and cultural construction are headed by politically mature and knowledgeable managers possessing high moral qualities, enjoying a high reputation among the masses and able successfully to implement party policy.

The central committees of communist parties of union republics and the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms were asked to formulate and implement specific steps aimed at upgrading the standard of their work with cadres.

The Extraordinary March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum was a most important recent event in the life of the party and the country and the world public. It developed into a vivid demonstration of the monolithic unity of the CPSU Central Committee and our entire party, their inflexible loyalty to

V. I. Lenin's cause and to the undeviating overall political course formulated at the 26th Party Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums.

Together with the entire party and Soviet people, the Tajik party members and working people welcomed with warm approval the results of the March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the unanimous election of Comrade M. S. Gorbachev to the position of CPSU Central Committee general secretary, and his plenum speech in which he emphasized the continuity of the party's course and formulated the main party problems at the present stage and the way to resolve them.

The republic's party organization and all working people, who are rallying their ranks even more closely around the communist party and its political headquarters--the Leninist Central Committee--are brimming with resolve to continue selflessly to work for the implementation of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums.

The materials of the Extraordinary March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum were made public and everyone is properly familiar with them. In its 20 March regular session, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo discussed the tasks stemming from its stipulations. As we know, they are aimed at mobilizing the party, the state bodies and public organizations with a view to achieving a decisive conversion of the economy to intensification and accelerating the socioeconomic development of Soviet society.

The need to strengthen labor, state and party discipline and to wage a decisive struggle against all manifestations of ostentatiousness and irresponsibility and against anything conflicting with socialist life standards was particularly emphasized.

All of this, naturally, must be taken into consideration by the party organizations in their daily work with cadres, which must be conducted in the spirit of the requirements of our time and the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee. Essentially, what are they?

Above all, we must emphasize that, by strictly following the Leninist principles in cadre policy, under the Soviet system the party trained a body of politically mature and skilled leading cadres, loyal to the cause of communism. They have honorably justified the trust of the party and the people.

The party, which considers this its greatest accomplishment, also draws attention to existing weak spots and errors allowed in work with cadres. The result of such weaknesses is that occasionally managers who are unable to deal with their work, fall behind the requirements of reality and fail to display a creative approach, initiative and enterprise in their work, find themselves heading responsible sectors. Such painful problems, which hold back progress, require practical solutions.

In this connection, the CPSU Central Committee calls for a more specific concern for the selection, placement and upbringing of cadres of different categories and for taking more fully into consideration their political and

practical qualities, the specific nature of their activities, their place and role in production and sociopolitical life and the enhancement of their responsibility for assignments. It is important in this case for the Leninist principles of work with cadres to be observed comprehensively, in their essence rather than form.

Professional training and knowledge of the work are important criteria in assessing cadres, particularly in the period of the scientific and technical revolution.

"...In order to manage," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "one must be competent. One must be fully and precisely familiar with all production conditions. One must know production technology at its contemporary level. One must have a certain scientific training." This Leninist instruction is particularly important today.

The party sets strict requirements concerning the moral qualities of managers. The absolute majority of our cadres, the CPSU Central Committee points out, are impeccably moral. However, there also are those who swindle the party and the state, engage in all sorts of account padding, use their official position to extract personal benefits, allow stockpiling, fail to be self-critical in their work, behave immodestly and violate the discipline.

The party reminds us of the inadmissibility of liberalism in the struggle against these and similar actions, a liberalism which results not in correcting the errors but in the degeneration of cadres. The CPSU Central Committee sets for us a model of Leninist principle-minded exigency in this respect.

In this connection, most serious attention must be paid to the need for permanent and effective party control over cadre activities, improving work with the reserve, adopting a more daring and thoughtful approach to the promotion of women and young cadres and ensuring collective decision-making and continuity in resolving cadre problems.

We have a very rich arsenal of means and methods of party work with cadres. However, it is important to bear in mind that their skillful utilization is a prerequisite for all of our successes and a guarantee against possible errors and blunders.

It should be pointed out that, in implementing the resolutions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequently CPSU Central Committee plenums, the republic party organization is always keeping cadre problems in its sight. They are discussed regularly at CP of Tajikistan Central Committee plenums, by the bureau and secretariat and the local party committees, and at sessions of collegiums of ministries and departments and local soviets.

The party organizations have developed a specific work system for the selection, placement and training of cadres on all levels. A great deal is being done to strengthen discipline and organization and to upgrade managerial responsibility. The system of reports submitted by nomenclature personnel, individual talks and cadre training and certification are practiced

extensively. The role of the primary party organizations has noticeably increased in assessing cadre activities. The importance of character references issued to leading personnel is increasing.

Such activities enable us steadily to improve the qualitative structure of party, soviet and economic cadres. Today more than 81 percent of them have higher or incomplete higher training. Sixty-two percent are specialists in industrial and agricultural production. Every second nomenclature worker is under 40 years of age.

All party obkom, gorkom and raykom secretaries and chairmen and deputy chairmen of oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies have higher school training. Sixty-eight percent of them are specialists in various economic sectors. One-third of all party gorkom and raykom secretaries have undergone primary party work training and more than 43 percent of chairmen of city or rayon executive committees have headed production collectives. The structure of department heads and party committee instructors has been strengthened. The number of nomenclature personnel with higher party-political training has increased.

The quality of the structure of primary party organization secretaries is improving systematically. The trade union and Komsomol organizations and people's control bodies have been strengthened with cadres. Substantial positive changes have taken place in recent years in the structure of economic cadres as well. The absolute majority of them are economic specialists.

Steps were taken to strengthen cadres in law enforcement, trade, planning and financial bodies and in material and technical supplies, public education, science and culture.

Today we can justifiably say that our leading cadres are, as a whole, well-trained, politically mature and loyal people, with a profound understanding of their role and responsibility for the situation in their assigned sectors. We should also point out that we have the possibility steadily to add new fresh forces to managerial cadres.

Currently the national economy has nearly 300,000 specialists. One-half of them are graduates of higher schools and nearly 20 percent are party members. A thousands-strong elective aktiv is working in the soviets of people's deputies, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and people's control bodies.

The results of the republic's socioeconomic development for the first 4 years of the five-year plan confirm the standard reached by our cadres and their ability successfully to resolve problems. We are on the level of state assignments in most sectors. Last year--the year of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tajik republic and communist party--was particularly fruitful. You are familiar with these data. We mention them frequently and they have been published in the press.

Naturally, such successes in the development of the national economy did not come by themselves. They are the result of the intensive constructive efforts

of our working class, kolkhoz peasantry and people's intelligentsia and the continuing and ever-growing assistance provided by the communist party and Soviet state, for which the grateful Tajik people and all working people in the republic offer their sincere thanks.

The work carried out by the party organization among the masses and, above all, its purposeful cadre work, unquestionably played an important role in this respect.

Undoubtedly, our results could have been significantly better had all cadres and units in the party and economic mechanism worked on the level of contemporary requirements. Unfortunately, so far we have been unable to achieve this.

We must point out most bluntly that despite their extensive efforts, party committees, soviet bodies, ministries, departments, trade unions and the Komsomol in the republic are still not always strictly and systematically implementing the principle-minded fundamental party stipulations relative to cadre problems. They tolerate existing shortcomings, frequently use obsolete methods, fail to show strict exigency toward cadres and, here and there, have clearly weakened control over their work.

The consequence of this is that occasionally immature and untrained workers, who fail in their assignments, or some managers who ride on the reputation of their former services, who have lost the ability critically to assess their activities, who are undisciplined and who allow lack of discipline and an irresponsible attitude toward assignments, find themselves heading some responsible and important sectors.

It would be proper today, as we formulate stricter requirements toward cadres, to approach self-critically and above all the activities of central republic bodies.

Let us consider a few specific cases.

In recent years the Central Committee has repeatedly issued instructions to the respective republic bodies on problems of the further economic development of Komsomolabadskiy Rayon. However, some of them have remained unresolved to this day, although with proper efficiency, the Central Committee departments, the Council of Ministers and agricultural managers and a show of interest on the part of the Gosplan, ministries and departments, they could have been resolved long ago and removed from the agenda.

Similar examples can be cited in resolving problems related to the long-term development of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. During the same period of time many oblasts, Gosplan and ministry officials, who were in charge of resolving such problems, have been replaced. Cadre changes are being made but the problems remain.

Here is another case. Under the republic's conditions, with a skillful organization of the work, a significant amount of a valuable highly nutritive and medicinal product such as mountain honey could be produced. The Central

Committee has issued instructions on this matter as well to the respective republic organs. Apiculture, however, has failed to develop properly.

A great deal of unfinished problems remain in organizing verification of execution. This, however, is one of the main instruments in cadre training. In the past, the question of the work of the party committee of the republic's Ministry of Agriculture on upgrading performing discipline among the apparatus personnel in the light of the requirements of the May and November 1982 CPSU Central Committee plenums, was considered. Many omissions and shortcomings were exposed in the course of the investigation. Nearly 2 years have passed yet today we must discuss the same problems all over again. In particular, to this day the ministry has not formulated an efficient system for the use of young agricultural specialists and VUZ and technicum graduates. Every year the republic's educational institutions graduate about 2,500 such specialists. However, a high percentage of them do not go to work in their field, while the ministry's leadership remains unconcerned.

These and many other blunders in the implementation of cadre policy--the selection, placement and education of cadres, and the organization of supervision of execution--which are taking place in the work of the central apparatus, naturally affect the situation in national economic sectors as well.

In discussing problems related to the development of industry, we must constantly draw attention to the fact that many enterprises are failing to fulfill their state plans. The task now is to find out the reasons for such straggling and to take steps to correct the situation. The number of such enterprises, however, is not diminishing. Study of the problem indicates that unsatisfactory work and chronic straggling are frequently related to the fact that some collectives have been headed for long periods of time by non-initiative-minded and, occasionally simply managers who are out of step with reality. In some cases, ministries, departments, party committees and local soviet bodies adopt a tolerant attitude toward such cases and fail to make full use of cadres in this respect.

The case of the nonmineral ore materials plant in Leniniskiy Rayon is an example of the results of underestimating cadre work and adopting a superficial approach to this matter. Thirteen directors have been replaced since the plant was commissioned in 1970. During all this time the enterprise worked unevenly and failed to fulfill its plans. It was only after repeated criticism that the Ministry of Industrial Construction Materials and the Leninskiy party raykom took steps to strengthen the party's management. Results were not late in coming. A good practical mood has developed in the collective and a foundation has been laid for successful year-round work.

There have been frequent cases of unnecessary haste and lack of planning in cadre work. In October 1984 Comrade D. M. Murtazayev was appointed chief of the trolley bus administration. Only 3 months later he was reprimanded for a weakening in educational work among the drivers and other shortcomings which had piled up over the years. In the face of this situation, he resigned 10 days later. Meanwhile, Comrade A. Z. Mukhamedzhanov, the former administration manager, who had worked in that position for 3 years and was

mainly responsible for everything, was made chief of the specialized motor vehicle base of the communal economy administration, thus avoiding liability. This triggered the entirely understandable indignation of the collective and the Central Committee had to deal with this matter.

There are many unresolved cadre problems in the agroindustrial complex as well, which is working on one of the main national problems--the implementation of the Food Program. Today most of our cadres are successfully dealing with their difficult assignments. This is confirmed by the results of both last year and the first 4 years of the five-year plan. These results are known. The task is to consolidate achievements and to increase the volume of output.

Here farm managers play a special role. Many of them are outstanding masters of their work, achieving excellent results. The names and experience of many among them are widely known. Young cadres, who are worthily continuing the work of the veterans, are developing as well.

However, there also are farms which have either done average work or have been falling behind for many years. The reasons for this should be sought in the weakness of the cadres which head them.

We know the difficult situation in capital construction. This five-year plan the construction workers have failed to deliver more than 280,000 square meters of housing and facilities for about 2,000 children in kindergartens. The completion of many production capacities, schools and sociocultural projects is being delayed. Construction quality deserves serious criticism.

Let us consider the way cadre problems are resolved here. Twenty-five percent of managers in the ministries of construction and construction materials industry and the Tajik Tadzhikgidroenergostroy Trust have no higher school training; 1,175 specialist positions are being held by practical workers. Meanwhile, some 2,000 construction workers with specialized training are employed as ordinary workers. What kind of competence is this?

Let us add to this the unjustifiably frequent replacement of managers of construction subdivisions. In a 4-year period, 12 trusts under the Ministry of Construction have had 17 different managers and chief engineers, and triple that number have been replaced at the Tadzhikkhimstroy Trust. Obviously, it is no accident that construction at the Yavan Electrochemical Plant is going extremely slowly, with low quality and unfinished projects.

Almost 70 percent of the nomenclature personnel of the Ministry of Industrial Construction Materials have been replaced over the past 4 years. This includes the appointment of three or four different directors at the Proletarskiy Bricks Plant, the Dushanbe Industrial Construction Materials Association, Specialized Industrial Construction Materials Column No 8 of Ordzhonikidzeabadskiy Rayon and other enterprises.

Similar cases exist in other sectors. They are frequently encountered in transportation and trade organizations and communal services. Frankly speaking, here and there the harmful practice of endless transfers of

personnel who have failed or compromised themselves and their avoidance of responsibility have taken roots. Meanwhile, the party committees by no means always provide a principle-minded assessment of such actions and sometimes even encourage them.

For example, we find totally puzzling and unquestionably censurable the position taken by many party raykoms and their secretaries, who, having dismissed kolkhoz and sovkhoz managers for major negative reasons, immediately promote them to other leading positions on the rayon level. They are usually made chairmen of the trade union raykom, managers of rayon sel'khoztekhnika, chairmen of rayon sel'khozkhimiya, chief state inspectors in charge of agricultural commodity purchasing and quality, chief specialist of rayon agroindustrial associations, and so on.

It is assumed that such cases and, I would say, strange flirtatiousness with cadres by some party committees are known to party obkoms which fail to react promptly and principle-mindedly to such violations, and, furthermore, in some cases, knowingly allow such occurrences.

Frequently, the Ministry of Internal Affairs appoints personnel, who have been released for negative reasons, to positions in the ministry's central apparatus or finds jobs for such personnel in oblast administrations. Many similar cases may be found in other departments as well.

Such faulty practices must be ended once and for all, for they conflict with the party line for the need for comprehensively upgrading exigency toward managers. They greatly harm the prestige of superior authorities and the proper upbringing of cadres.

Today the moral features of the manager are a major political problem, a problem of the strength of ties between the party and the masses and the party's reputation among the people.

The party and soviet bodies have done and are doing a great deal in this connection. Of late cases of account padding, theft, bribery and abuse of official position have been significantly reduced in the republic. Nevertheless, so far we have failed to put all of this in proper order.

Strange though it may seem, such cases are not always firmly stopped by the respective local authorities. We are justified in addressing this reprimand today to executive committees of soviets of people's deputies. Some of them are clearly paying insufficient attention to the proper way of spending state funds and materials and ensuring the protection of the socialist property of enterprises, organizations and establishments.

We cannot fail to be concerned by the increased number of officials indicted by people's control committees.

A great deal of theft, waste and customer swindling may be noted within the systems of the Ministry of Trade and Tajik Consumer Union. Once again, the reasons for such occurrences rest in neglect of cadre work. This has been repeatedly pointed out by the CP of Tajikistan Central Committee. However, no

proper conclusions have been drawn so far and the situation is not improving. As in the past, the trade system frequently hires former felons or individuals who have compromised themselves as a result of dishonest actions or abuses. We find it hard to understand, for example, what motivated the Ministry of Trade and the Yavanskiy Rayon Executive Committee by appointing G. Fayzov director of the city trade administration. In less than 1 year as deputy and, subsequently, director of the State Trade Administration, he managed to hire five previously sentenced individuals. In all likelihood, he would have continued had he not been criminally indicted for machinations committed while he was deputy manager of the rayon Goskomsel'khoztekhnika department.

Here is another scandalous case. One Kh. Nusratov, a republic Ministry of Trade auditor, was appointed director of the Tadzhikyuvelirtorg office, with a view to strengthening it. He immediately began to violate grossly the principles of cadre selection and hire unsuitable people as sales clerks, who immediately began to steal and commit forgeries. We assume that they will receive the punishment they deserve. The question, however, is will those job it was to prevent such outrages be punished? Unfortunately, in the majority of cases they are not touched.

Work with cadres must be live and conducted on many levels. It does not tolerate stagnation, formalism or stereotype. It demands a comprehensive approach and a consideration of the growing tasks, a certain system and planning and the profound and comprehensive study of the practical, political and moral qualities of the personnel and a subjective assessment of their activities in their jobs. Such work must be headed by the party committees--the Central Committee and the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms.

Today the republic has four party obkoms, the major political headquarters of oblast party organizations. There are an equal number of oblast executive committees of soviets of people's deputies. They too have extensive staffs. We must point out that they are doing a great deal. Relying on leading cadres and the broad network of party and public organizations, as a whole they are confidently resolving important economic and political problems.

Today, however, we should like to draw attention to their unfinished work in the area of cadre problems. As a whole, here as well we face the same problems which exist on the republic level.

Last February, the Central Committee bureau heard a report submitted by the Kulyab Oblast Executive Committee on ensuring the organized wintering of the cattle and increasing the production and purchasing of animal husbandry products during the 1984/1985 winter season. It was pointed out that as a result of the steps which were taken, the wintering of the cattle on most farms was better organized, the production and sales to the state of meat, milk and wool and cattle productivity had increased. At the same time, the Central Committee drew the attention of the oblast organizations to major shortcomings in the management of this most important sector, the lack of adequate exigency toward economic managers and specialists and weakened control over the implementation of decisions and planned measures. The Central Committee decree, which was carried by the press, stipulated measures to eliminate such shortcomings and correct the situation in the oblast's

animal husbandry. These steps are being implemented and it is hoped that party, soviet and agricultural cadres in the oblast will achieve an upturn in the work. The CP of Tajikistan Leninabad Obkom held its plenum recently. Here as well problems of further improving work with cadres in the light of party requirements were discussed. We must point out that the plenum noted the significant work being done with cadres and pointed out sharply and on a principle-minded basis major shortcomings in this important matter. Comrade R. Kh. Khodzhiyev and other participants in the plenum criticized particularly sharply in their speeches the Nauskiy, Matninskiy and Zafarobodskiy party raykoms and the Kanibadam and Ura-Tyube gorkoms.

The following was brought out in the criticism of shortcomings in the selection, placement and upbringing of cadres, weakening control and exigency and underestimating the promotion of women and young people to leading positions: at the beginning of this year, 271 nomenclature workers in the oblast had not been approved by the party committees, although several of them had been at work for a few years. It became clear from many of their statements that the party gorkoms and raykoms themselves had abstained from doing so. This fact was known to the obkom as well. The question is, who needs this kind of work with cadre nomenclature?

Other cases were cited at the obkom plenum as well, some of them involving the Zafarobodskiy Rayon. In 1983, one V. D. Yugay, nonparty member, not even a secondary school graduate, who, furthermore, had already committed a number of serious crimes, was appointed director of the vegetable-growing Shirin Sovkhoz. Strange though it might seem, character references for that person, made available to the party raykom and obkom, were positive and were signed by the chairman of the rayon agroindustrial association. Incidentally, this is a nomenclature position on the obkom level. Yet data on his violations of the law at the Pobeda Sovkhoz, in that same rayon, where he was department manager, were already in the hands of the investigative authorities. The question is, how could such a serious cadre problem be resolved so indiscriminately.

Let us consider Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. We are simply puzzled by the fact that the oblast party committee has allowed an important sector such as animal husbandry, which plays a most important role in the solution of the Food Program, to experience a sharp decline of late. In 1984, the oblast kolkhozes and sovkhozes lowered their milk and wool production and reduced the size of their cow, hog, sheep and poultry herd. Quality indicators worsened. Milk production per cow dropped by 27 kilograms and the delivery weight dropped by 9 kilograms per head of cattle and 1 kilogram per sheep. Last year, 16 percent of the oblast kolkhozes failed to fulfill their plans for cattle and poultry purchases and about 40 percent of them did not meet their milk, egg and wool plans. Milk shortfalls amounted to 1,777 tons.

Here as well, the reason lies above all in lowering the exigency of oblast party and soviet bodies toward farm managers and specialists and agroindustrial associations. We have looked at a single sector in the oblast's national economy. Many shortcomings may be found in other areas of economic and cultural construction as well, headed by personnel who are

members of the party obkom nomenclature. Why are they not being taken to task?

Although during the past 4 years a number of nomenclature workers have been replaced in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, their qualitative composition has remained virtually the same. Furthermore, the number of specialists and people with party political training has been declining. The city and rayon party committees play an important role in implementing the party's cadre policy. They work directly within the masses and are, one may say, in the front line of economic and cultural construction, where the implementation of the plans is decided in practical terms. They are most closely and directly connected with the broadest possible network of primary party organizations, which are the party's support, and the command cadres which head labor collectives. Therefore, bearing in mind the specific nature of their work, let us especially consider some problems of specific cadre work, with its main trends: cadre selection, placement and upbringing.

What are the main problems worthy of attention in cadre selection? First, special control must be assumed with work with leading cadres. Their selection, placement, ratification and study in the course of practical work should be conducted promptly, systematically and most responsibly.

Most party committees act precisely in this spirit. However, there also are cases in which case work is being done formalistically. There have been numerous violations of principles governing cadre selection and placement in Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube and Kayrakkum gorkoms and Oktyabr'skiy, Garmskiy, Voseyskiy, Yavanskiy and many other party raykoms.

Poor work by party committees is the only explanation for the fact that at the beginning of 1985 many nomenclature positions in these party committees were vacant.

In order to be able to renovate cadres on a planned and systematic basis, to strengthen the management of various sectors and to prevent haste and errors in such matters, a good and efficient reserve is necessary. Today we have a firm cadre potential at our disposal.

However, many party committees and soviet and economic organs and public organizations have still not formulated an efficient and systematic approach to developing a cadre reserve. Frequently, lists of candidates for promotion are drawn up and the files of the candidates are considered. However, the necessary concern for their education and growth is not always displayed. The result is that on paper everything looks as good as can be, but the difficulties begin whenever it becomes necessary to find an able person to fill a responsible position. The Kulyab, Kurgan-Tyube, Dushanbe, Ordzhonikidzeabad, Gissar, Murgab and Matchinskiy and Nauskiy party gorkoms and raykoms are improving their work with the reserves sluggishly.

In order to prevent errors in cadre selection and promotion, naturally, one must know the people well through their practical work; the practical, political and moral qualities of any manager are manifested best of all

through his actions, his ability to work with the collective, to lead the people and to implement assignments.

As we study cadres at work, we must see both their positive qualities and weak sides and shown concern for protecting them from making errors. All of this must be reflected in character references, at which point the latter will not be simple and impersonal bits of paper, as is frequently the case if a formal approach is adopted. Cadre certification must be practiced extensively, for it is a reliable and tried method.

The party pays particular attention to the further development of democratic principles in work with cadres. We must point out that of late a great deal of interesting developments have appeared in the work of the party organizations in this respect. The opinion of primary party and public organizations and collectives where such people work and where they are best known is being taken more frequently into consideration. It has become the rule in many enterprises to listen to the opinion of the shop party organizations, party groups, brigade councils, the public, frontranking workers and labor veterans in selecting and nominating people to the positions of heads of shops, sectors and brigades or foremen and chief specialists. The party committees must make more extensive use of this experience. Practical experience proves that wherever this is observed there are fewer errors and blunders, cadre shifting or the other shortcomings we mentioned. Conversely, whenever cadre problems are resolved within the four walls of an office, by a narrow circle of people, a favorable atmosphere develops for errors and improper decisions.

Work with cadres is a very responsible matter requiring a collective approach. In this case not only the leaders but the bureau members, the entire party committee membership, bear the responsibility. Most party gorkoms and raykoms act precisely in this manner. This enables them to make, as a rule, accurate and efficient decisions. However, occasionally some problems are left uncontrolled. In this connection, we would like to draw attention, in particular, to the promotion of young people and women.

Let us frankly say that some city and rayon party organizations show little concern for the promotion of promising young specialists to party, soviet, trade union and economic positions. The reason is that they frequently limit themselves to a circle of people among whom they look for and select able organizers. Furthermore, here and there excessive caution and even a certain prejudice against young people is displayed whenever it becomes a question of promoting them to responsible work sectors. This is erroneous. Youth is our future and young cadres must be carefully nurtured for great accomplishments.

The same applies to work with women. We see from the practical experience in the republic that our women are coping as successfully as the men with major and complex problems in all realms of life--state, public and production. Women fruitfully work in responsible positions in party committees and soviet bodies on all levels and as ministers and heads of enterprises and establishments. We are proud of the labor accomplishments of our great women in all economic and cultural sectors.

However, some party committees occasionally display a totally unjustified inertia in such matters and fail to show the necessary concern for the more extensive promotion of female cadres. We have few women heads of industrial enterprises, even in sectors mainly staffed with female collectives, as well as among kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhoz directors, department heads, brigade leaders or heads of livestock farms. The party's instruction on having more women work in trade and public catering enterprises is not being satisfactorily implemented. Women account for only 28 percent of the Tajik Consumer Union, 51 percent of the Ministry of Trade and no more than 9 percent of the public catering personnel, although, as is the case with the rest of the country, women workers in them account for 83 to 87 percent. This is our common unfinished project which must be corrected.

No less important are problems of cadre training and upbringing. What should be the main point of attention of party committees in this area?

The republic has a number of managers who have received good practical training within the party apparatus on various levels. Over the past 4 years, more than 2,500 people have attended the higher party schools, the Academy of Social Sciences and party and soviet cadre retraining courses. However, a more responsible approach must be adopted in the selection of candidates for enrollment in higher party training institutions. This must be pointed out once again, for some party committees do not always pay serious attention to the people they select for training.

Here is another problem. Currently, 10 higher and 30 secondary specialized schools are training cadres for the republic's national economy, attended at any given time by nearly 100,000 people. Over the past 4 years alone they have graduated almost 85,000 specialists, 38,000 of them with higher training. However, a considerable percentage of such personnel are still not working in their fields. Yet all schools have party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, the activities of which should be properly directed. They must show concern not only for the quality of training young specialists but also for developing in them a high feeling of civic duty, and must think about their ideological training.

How could party committees remain indifferent to cases such as the following: nearly one-third of the 1,000 students who graduated from the Tajik Agricultural Institute between 1981 and 1983 did not show up to assume their assigned jobs? The main reason was the poor study of the actual requirements of oblasts, rayons and farms for specialists. What about the many shortcomings we have in our training and education process? Is it normal that in the past 4 years 13,000 people have dropped out of higher educational institutions?

Generally speaking, we must have a clear idea of the type of specialist cadres we have at our disposal, the areas in which they are in short supply and where and in what numbers are they being trained or else where to find them. We must bear in mind that the further development of the national economy, particularly in connection with the organization of the South Tajik Territorial-Production Complex, there is a growing need for various specialists. This particularly applies to the electric power and fuel

industries, automation, telemechanics, automation of chemical-technological processes, technology of inorganic matter, grain processing, baking, production of spaghetti and confectionery goods, metallurgy, welding technology, and others. By 1986 we shall be able to fill only about 27 percent of vacancies for such cadres, which will amount to more than 1,400 people.

For quite some time the republic has been acutely short of highly skilled personnel for the institutions of the Ministry of Culture and Goskino. Currently, one-half of the personnel in the cultural area lacks specialized training.

The republic's Gosplan, ministries and departments must comprehensively study such problems, determine the need for such cadres promptly and substantiatedly and find ways for the practical solution of this important problem.

In general, we must restore the former prestige enjoyed by specialists in all sectors, when their opinion was law. There are two ways to achieve this: first, to enhance the role of the specialists and their responsibility; second, to improve the quality of their training and retraining. Today the CPSU Central Committee ascribes particular importance to such work. An all-union and republic higher schools for the management of agroindustrial complexes are being set up on the basis of the reorganization of existing cadre retraining units; measures are contemplated to organize the training time and ensure material support for the students.

This new manifestation of concern shown by the party and the government for cadres in the agroindustrial complex and for improving labor organization and incentive is another major step in the successful implementation of the Food Program. Extensive work lies ahead in this area. We must ensure the practical and creative approach of all units in the reorganization of the system for retraining leading cadres and specialists for the republic's agroindustrial complex.

The problems of the ideological and political education of cadres require tireless attention. The republic has a widespread system of different courses, seminars for leading workers and Marxism-Leninism universities.

All in all, more than 200,000 leading workers and specialists are involved in political training. I am not referring to the overall party and Komsomol political education network attended by a substantially higher number of people. Single-policy days, open-letter days, question-and-answer evenings and round-table encounters are being held. A considerable percentage of our cadres are actively participating in propaganda work.

This major and necessary project must hold the permanent attention of party committees. The tasks in this area were clearly defined at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and considered at the plenum of the CP of Tajikistan Central Committee. All of us must energetically implement the party line in this area.

We must point out that as a rule, the party committees pay great attention to the qualitative aspect of the work and to the scope of political training and ideological influence. Naturally, this is important. The main thing, however, is the quality of the training, the ideological tempering of cadres. We must work in such a way that theoretical knowledge turns into convictions, determining the moral aspect of the people and their attitude toward the work, and for practical work to be actively helped by Marxist-Leninist theory.

Unquestionably, the work done in the republic in this area is contributing to the ideological growth of our cadres and to the combination of their managerial functions with personal participation in the education of the people. However, the effectiveness of steps taken in this direction remains low. Some courses for the party-economic aktiv work irregularly. In some of them the level of training is low and poorly related to practical work. Many managers do not study at all. Such shortcomings were detected in Oktyabr'skiy Rayon in Dushanbe and in Fayzabadskiy, Garmskiy, Kumsangirskiy, Rushanskiy and Ganchinskiy rayons. Eighty percent of the senior workers of the republic's ministries and departments have no party-political training and only a few individuals are attending Marxism-Leninism universities.

Party committees and primary party organizations must pay greater attention to the ideological training of managers. They must develop more persistently in them the need and habits of political work among the working people.

In improving cadre work in all areas, the party committees must make skillful use of the entire extremely rich arsenal of means and methods acquired by the party. In this case a special role must be assigned to the organization of permanent and effective control and supervision of execution and the development of criticism and self-criticism, which are powerful and efficient cadre education methods.

Guided by the resolutions of the 26th Party Congress and the CPSU Central Committee instructions, the republic's party organizations have done and are doing a great deal in such areas and have acquired certain positive experience. However, here as well not everything has been properly organized. Superficially, it appears as though a great deal is being done: problems of economic and cultural construction are being discussed, proper resolutions are passed, reports are submitted by party organizations and economic managers and seminars and conferences are held. However, due to poor control such work frequently fails to yield necessary results and does not contribute to upgrading the personal responsibility of cadres for their assignments. We could cite examples borrowed from the work of many party committees in which good decisions are not carried out but remain on paper only, and in which the state of affairs in one sector or another is discussed repeatedly, without anything changing as a result. Therefore, the organization and implementation of efficient control should be the constant daily concern of the party apparatus. If we succeed in achieving this, matters will substantially and unquestionably improve in all areas.

The comprehensive development of criticism and self-criticism must be used more extensively and daringly. The mass information media must play a particularly important role in this respect. However, by no means do they

take such positions in the republic. In its article "Report From the Plenum," the 19 February PRAVDA issue drew our attention to this quite properly. The question of promptly reacting to press materials was especially considered recently. Here again we must put things in order.

Last year comprehensive plenums were held in the republic on improving the style and methods of work on all levels. They were held in a sharp and principle-minded atmosphere. The speakers named specific managers who displayed lack of modesty, arrogance and lack of self-control, whereas some party committees tried to protect them from assuming responsibility.

Unfortunately, no such specific criticism was sounded in the reports submitted at the plenums and published in oblast, city and rayon newspapers. In this case, the party committees in charge of these printed organs are directly responsible. We must make major improvements in this work within the party organizations, the primary organizations in particular, and in the labor collectives. Efficient and constructive criticism must be organically combined with high exigency and strictness toward cadres.

Let us particularly emphasize the importance of the close interaction in resolving common economic and political problems of party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol bodies and the people's control. Cadre work in all of them have their specific features. However, it must be based on the inviolable Leninist principles. The party bodies must always see to it most closely. Here as well, however, many of the shortcomings we are discussing today, exist.

The republic's Supreme Soviet First Convocation had its initial session at which a practical and exigent discussion was held of a number of very important problems, including that of upgrading the role and responsibility of soviets of people's deputies and their broad aktiv in resolving economic and political problems. Not so long ago, the question of improving the party's leadership of the Komsomol was considered extensively and comprehensively and cadre work was analyzed. Such problems were sharply raised at one of the expanded plenums of the Tajik Trade Unions Council. Here as well the tasks are clear, the shortcomings are known and we must actively undertake to resolve them.

Comrades! We have entered the final and exceptionally important stage in the struggle for the implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The outcome of our current plans and future successes will depend on our work today and tomorrow, and during every single day until the end of the year. In a word, the question is the following: in what condition shall we go to the next 27th Party Congress and what foundations shall we lay for the solution of even more difficult and extensive problems?

The only possible answer for us, party members, could be the following: we must do everything possible so that, in the words of Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, we may successfully complete the implementation of the plans for this year's economic and social development and thus ensure a confident start for the next five-year plan.

Recently, we held a detailed discussion on a broad range of problems related to the further development of agricultural production and the implementation of the Food Program and the Long-Term Land Reclamation Program at a republic conference of workers of the agroindustrial complex. We believe that there is no need to repeat what was already said.

All I would like to say is that the time has now come for a specific verification of the work. The republic is engaged in widespread sowing of the cotton crop. The campaign for bringing up young livestock and cattle wintering is nearing its end; grass mowing and the feeding of silkworms will begin soon. All such work is a most important test for every rural worker, specialist and managers and the entire rural party and soviet aktiv.

We have also frequently spoken of the difficulties which arose in connection with the implementation of the 5-year assignment on the growth rates of industrial output. In order to reach the planned levels, industry workers must accomplish considerably more this year than in 1984. It is on this basis that socialist obligations were assumed. Let us point out that they began well. The quarterly program for the production and marketing of industrial output was fulfilled ahead of schedule. We are anticipating more than 10 million rubles' worth of above-plan output for the past 3 months as a result of the assumed obligations. However, in no case should this make us relax. As you know, the CP of Tajikistan Central Committee bureau, which considered the results of the first 2 months of the year, drew the attention of ministries and departments to a number of major shortcomings and omissions in their activities. The situation, however is being corrected too slowly. We have an inadmissibly large number of straggling enterprises and associations, even in sectors which, as a whole, are working successfully. We are particularly concerned by a worsening of contractual deliveries and a faster growth of wages compared with the growth of labor productivity, and the nonfulfillment of obligations for the above-plan lowering of production costs.

Despite the measures we have taken, the situation in capital construction is not improving. The Ministry of Trade, the Tajik Consumer Union and the Ministry of Consumer Services are not fulfilling their plans. Breakdowns in the work of the transportation system, the communal economy, the organization of material and technical procurements and many other sectors and services occur.

Comrades, that is not the way to work. We simply have no right to do this. Those who are present in this hall must know that the CP of Tajikistan Central Committee and the republic's Council of Ministers have frequently drawn the attention of and made it incumbent upon party oblast, city and rayon committees, local soviet executive committees and managers of ministries and departments to take decisive steps to eliminate shortcomings, to study the situation of straggling enterprises and sectors and to give them practical assistance.

Apparently, in our republic executive discipline is poorly organized. The time has come to demand most strictly of the managers to assume personal responsibility for the situation in their assigned sectors and to consider carefully how to ensure the implementation of their assignments.

Today the organization of the successful completion of the first half of the year is of primary, I would say of essential significance. At all cost, we must tighten up all sectors, catch up with the lag and eliminate straggling wherever it has occurred. We would find it difficult to advance should we fail to do this.

The inspiring words of Comrade M. S. Gorbachev in his speech at the March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum should be the guideline of every party member today. "Now," he emphasized, "we must collect ourselves, harness reserves and stress all efforts to catch up and reach planned levels by the end of the year."

Unquestionably, the cadre problems discussed at this plenum will play a major role in resolving this problem. Improving work with cadres will enable us to perfect the party's leadership of the economy, strengthen its influence among the masses and discipline and organization in all production and management sectors. A new impetus will be given to the development of initiative and creative activeness and to enhancing the responsibility of specialists, managers and all our cadres.

Allow me to assure the Leninist CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo that the party members and all working people of Tajikistan will multiply their contribution to strengthening the economy and defense power of our fatherland and welcome the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th Party Congress with new labor successes and successfully fulfill their plans for the year and the 5-year period as a whole (applause).

5003

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REGIONAL

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LETTERS FROM KASSR WORKERS AID LOCAL PARTY PLANNERS

Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 85 p 1

[Editorial: "A Letter to the Party Committee"]

[Text] Besides business correspondence, the daily mail of party raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms contains a large amount of letters from workers. In addressing themselves to a party committee, the people are certain that their interesting suggestions, just demands or well-founded requests will be heard and implemented. According to V. I. Lenin, workers' letters are an active method for monitoring the course of national economic construction, and one of the effective forms of aiding party and state organs in the business of the timely elimination of existing errors and omissions. Therefore, the CPSU Central Committee is giving constant attention to the improvement of work with workers' letters and suggestions, since they consider them to be the most important channel for active communication between the party and the masses. Every party official and every leader is obliged to consider a sympathetic and attentive attitude towards the letters, requests and complaints of citizens as his duty before the people and before the party.

Working with letters is an important part of the daily activity of party committees. The ability to study public opinion, to rely on the power of collective thought, and to respond sympathetically to people's questions and wishes on the basis of workers' messages is a true sign of the maturity and the decisiveness of the apparatuses of the majority of the republic's party committees. Analytical ability, consistency and exactitude are characteristic of the style used by the Pavlodar, Kustanay and Dzhezkazgan party obkoms in their work with the letters and declarations of workers. The Aktyubinsk, Kzyl-Orda and Ural obkoms and 58 gorkoms and raykoms of the Kazakh CP discussed methods for improving this work in their planums during the last two years. Recently the Alma-Ata party gorkom held a scientific-practical conference on working with letters which left a noticeable mark in the life of the capital's party organization.

During the years following the 26th Congress, the Central Committee has addressed itself many times in its documents to the tasks for the further improvement of working with letters and of the receiving of citizens. They have all become a program of activities for party committees in the republic. Approaching the business creatively, many of them have found good experience in this course of party work. Great attention is being given to its generalization and extension. In particular, the Kazakh CP Central Committee has endorsed the experience of the work of the Semipalatinsk Oblast party organization in conducting open letter days. Similar days are now being conducted practically everywhere in the republic and are popular among members of labor collectives and inhabitants of micro-rayons and villages. In the course of meetings with the leaders of the party, soviet and economic organs, they receive competent answers to their questions, so to speak, first hand. An important result of the open letter days is that they curtail the flow of written declarations.

A knowledge of the daily mail somehow opens up the walls of official offices, helps one to sense more clearly people's frame of mind, to discover shortcomings and omissions, and to uncover abuses and cases of indifference towards people's inquiries and needs. In a considerable share of the letters, questions concerning the improvement of living conditions and the expansion of the network of children's pre-school institutions are raised. In showing a maximum amount of attention to these urgent problems, one must find an answer in each specific case which satisfies the person who makes the request and decisively stop cases of red tape and violations of the basic principle of social justice.

Those party committees which constantly carry out work with letters under their control, and regularly listen at buro meetings to reports from the heads of soviet and economic organs on the practice of considering workers' written and oral declarations, are conducting themselves correctly. In particular, the Shchuchinskiy party raykom is approaching the matter in this manner. It was recently noted here that the number of letters has grown including repeated letters, from the Shchorsovskiy sovkhoz. An examination established that the reason for this is the formal approach on the part of farm managers to the consideration of the sovkhoz workers' declarations. The activity of the Sovkhoz party committee's work with letters and declarations was thoroughly analyzed at a meeting of the raykom buro, and shortcomings were pointed out. This was helpful: at the farm they began to respond more attentively to the workers' written appeals.

The number of letters written to party committees has grown each year, and their authors pose questions which have social importance and are full of solicitous concern for the well-being of society. Such letters contain valuable information and provide a stimulus for solving large-scale national economic problems.

A year ago a letter from the communist V. Babchenko, a workman of the styrene shop of the Shevchenko Plastics Factory, arrived at the Mangyshlak party obkom. He wrote about the reasons for the serious shortcomings in the organization of labor and production at the plant, about constant interruptions in the supply of raw materials, and about the disruption of deadlines for the construction of a tank for ethane which is needed to create ethane stocks. The enterprise had not fulfilled the plans. Taking into account the importance of the questions raised in the letter, the party obkom buro discussed them at their meeting. A commission was created consisting of specialists and workers from party organs. It planned specific measures for eliminating the existing shortcomings. In a word, a worker's letter and the reaction to it resulted in a number of measures which made it possible to secure a turning point at the plant. The staff of the enterprise coped with the plans of the past year for all the indicators and became a winner of the republican competition.

In improving the style of working with workers' letters and declarations, much depends on the managers of enterprises, farms and institutions. In conducting the selection, placement and education of cadres, party committees should take into consideration how capable the management is and how desirous and sincere he is about working with letters. If he considers the scrutiny of written and oral appeals to be a burden and a secondary affair, then such a workers should not be the head of the collective.

The work of auditing commissions is an object of special concern to party committees. Competent and principled communists who are able to monitor the work with letters, and to help in its organization, should become members of these inspection commissions. As comrade Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has emphasized, "All our experience confirms the fact that the party's most important source of power has always been, is, and always will be its bond with the masses, the civic work (aktivnost') of millions of workers and their solicitous approach to affairs in production and to the problems of public life." It is the duty of party committees to skillfully use and to increase this power in every possible way by improving the style and the methods of working with workers' letters.

12810

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REGIONAL

PRAVDA REPORTS BELORUSSIAN CP CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

PM081349 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 85 p 2

[Report by correspondents I. Novikov and A. Simurov: "Augmenting the Contribution. Communists Discuss Measures to Fulfill the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum Decisions"]

[Text] Minsk--Belorussia's working people have achieved substantial successes, it was stated yesterday at a Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee plenum which examined the results of the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the tasks of the republic's party organizations in fulfilling its decisions and worthily greeting the 27th CPSU Congress. The report was delivered by N. N. Slyun'kov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee.

"However," he pointed out, "if we evaluate what has been achieved from the positions of the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum demands, then there are no grounds for complacency. On the contrary, far from everything has been done to secure a decisive shift toward intensive management methods."

The role and activities of party organizations and committees were examined from this aspect. Attention was drawn, above all, to the need to ensure that they do not overlook questions of improving their work style. It is important to enhance professional efficiency, reduce the creation of paperwork, and overcome armchair methods of leadership.

The criticism at the plenum was sharp and specific. Last year alone, for example, more than 10,000 directive letters and telegrams were sent from the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Fruits and Vegetable Farming to the provinces. Rayon agro-industrial association workers continue to address rebukes to the republic Ministry of Agriculture and its oblast subdivisions for the flood of paper, the diversion of specialists from their own work, their use for writing various papers, and the gathering of information bypassing statistical organs. Last year the Lioznenskiy Rayon Agro-industrial Association received more than 1,000 documents from the Ministry of Agriculture, the oblast agricultural administration, and other organs demanding the elaboration of 63 measures and the preparation of 89 reports, statements and information reports.

The plenum participants said that the preparations for the party congress and the holding of report and election meetings and conferences must be aimed at activating party life and stepping up organizational and political work with people. During the reports and elections every communist must be firmly confident that his voice will be heard and his opinion definitely taken into account.

The plenum particularly raised the question of strengthening order and discipline and combating losses of work time. The greatest losses have occurred in the systems of the Belorussian SSR Ministries of the Meat and Dairy Industry, Fruits and Vegetable Farming, Forestry and Industrial Construction.

The chief question now, it was stated at the plenum, is how and by what means to secure the acceleration of socioeconomic development. Scientific and technical progress has been defined as the chief lever. Much work has to be done here, because the proportion of manual labor is still great. In industry it now stands at 28 percent, and it is even higher in certain enterprises.

There is a lot of obsolete technological equipment in the republic. In machine building, for example, approximately one-third of metal-cutting machine tools and forging and pressing machines have been in use for 15 years or more. Frequently, this is not because the necessary equipment does not exist, but because of mismanagement and sluggishness on the part of engineering services.

The following fact was cited. A hydraulic press worth almost R800,000 lay for 6 years at the Belorussian SSR Industrial Construction Ministry's Dzerzhinsk Experimental Machine Plant. Now no one, including Minister I. Mozolyako and plant director D. Sklem, can explain whether the plant needed it at all and why such a free and easy attitude to public property was permitted.

The machine tool building industry is one of the leading sectors in Belorussia. Its products are known and highly valued not only in our country but also abroad. There are in this system many truly creative workers creating fundamentally new equipment. Nevertheless, the plenum also made increased demands on machine tool builders. It set the task of going over to new technological systems, reequipping the sector on the basis of modern scientific and technical achievements, and more actively introducing flexible automated production facilities, robotized complexes, microprocessor equipment, and automated planning equipment.

In order to make most rapid progress, it is necessary to further strengthen plan discipline. A definite improvement has become apparent here. The number of enterprises failing to fulfill their contract commitments has been reduced threefold in 4 years. However, there are still many of them. Last year one enterprise in every five and, in the first quarter of this year, one in every six violated delivery discipline.

The value of fixed production capital in the republic's industry increased 31 percent over 4 years. At the same time the capital-output ratio fell by more than 2 percent annually. Capacities at a number of enterprises are not started up on schedule or fully utilized. For these reasons alone output

worth almost R1 billion was not obtained last year. Low-waste and resource-saving technologies are being introduced only slowly.

It is necessary, it was pointed out at the plenum, to tackle more concretely the further improvement of the economic machinery. This work is still being conducted in the republic in an unsystematic and uncomprehensive way. The managerial apparatus remains cumbersome and is continuing to grow. It has increased by 44,000 people in 4 years. This happens because the organizational structure of management is being improved only slowly in many ministries and departments. The apparatus is split up into small subdivisions, which complicates production leadership and gives rise to parallelism, publication and a paper style in work.

During the first years of the 5-year plan, as is known, the republic owed the state a considerable quantity of agricultural produce. In the past 2 years we have managed to substantially reduce the lag in deliveries of potatoes and milk and to eliminate the delays in deliveries of vegetables. It was with this in mind that this year's socialist pledges were adopted. How are they being fulfilled?

In the first quarter deliveries of livestock and poultry increased 10 percent, and milk production increased 9 percent. Animal productivity improved. The plenum analyzed in detail the positive and negative changes in the development of communal livestock raising on farms in all the republic's oblasts and concluded that the causes of lags on a number of farms are the low standard of leadership, poor technological and labor discipline, and minimal demands on cadres at all levels.

Valid criticism was leveled at many economic leaders for losses of agricultural products already grown in the process of transporting, storing and processing them. There was a particularly large number of complaints about the quality of the dairy products of the Minsk City and Mogilev Dairy Industry Production Associations.

Approaching the 27th CPSU Congress, the task has been set of not only consolidating the results achieved but also significantly augmenting them, fulfilling the targets for the year and the 5-year plan as a whole, and creating a good basis for successful work in the next 5-year period. Targets have been defined that we must seek to achieve: In industry the 5-year plan as regards the growth rates for production volume and labor productivity is to be fulfilled in October, consumer goods worth R200 million are to be produced in addition to the adopted pledges, in agriculture the annual plans for sales of milk and meat to the state are to be completed by 1 December, and there are to be additional sales of at least 100,000 metric tons of livestock and poultry and 350,000 metric tons of milk. Specific pledges have been adopted in the capital construction and transport sectors and the consumer services sphere.

A decision was adopted to convene the next, 30th Belorussian Communist Party Congress on 30 January 1986.

The plenum adopted a resolution expressing firm confidence that the republic's communists, leading cadres, and all working people will worthily greet the next party congress.

CSO: 1800/296

REGIONAL

AZERBAIJAN PARTY SECRETARIES ATTEND SEMINAR

Opening Day Reports Read

GF281228 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0105 GMT 26 Apr 85

/Text/ A republic-level conference-seminar opened in the Baku Higher Party School yesterday for the first secretaries of oblast, city and rayon party committees. The seminar will discuss the current problems of perfecting the organizational, political and ideological work of the party committees and--regarding the party plans--the question of consolidating their role in the realization of the CPSU Central Committee recommendations.

Comrade Kyamran Bagirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, opened the convocation. Vasiliy Konovalov, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; Gasan Seidov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium; Svetlana Kasumova, Ramiz Mekhtiyev, and Isay Mamedov, secretaries of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; and Ibragim Muslimov, chief editor of AZERBAIJAN KOMMUNISTI, read reports.

The conference-seminar will continue its work today.

Seminar Concludes

GF281726 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0105 GMT 28 Apr 85

/Text/ The 3-day conference-seminar organized in the Baku Higher Party School for the first secretaries of oblast, city and party committees ended yesterday. The conference arrived at the conclusion that a deeply thoughtful approach to work has become an inseparable part of the work being carried out by the party committees.

Taking into consideration the decisions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee April 1985 Plenum, the participants of the conference-seminar reviewed in detail the experience gained in the republic's party organizations, studied in depth the existing shortcomings, and consolidated a number of /work indistinct/ that lie ahead. The last day of the conference-seminar heard reports from Euad Musayev and Gasan Gasanov, secretaries of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; Ayaz Mutalibov, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of

Minsiters Presidium and chairman of the State Planning Committee; and Ilgar Salayev, president of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences.

Comrade Kyamran Bagirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a speech summing up the conference-seminar.

CSO: 1831/417

REGIONAL

PUGO SPEAKS AT LATVIAN PLENUM*

Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 Mar 85 pp 1-2

[Report by B. K. Pugo, first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee:
"Improving Work With Personnel"]

[Text] Comrades! Our plenum is taking place under the influence of the results of the special March CPSU Central Committee Plenum. As you well know, that Plenum considered the matter of electing a general secretary for the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum unanimously selected Comrade M. S. Gorbachev as general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The communists and all workers of Soviet Latvia, like every Soviet person, said B. K. Pugo, greeted this exceptionally important decision of the CPSU Central Committee with tremendous satisfaction and unanimous approval. They are rallying even more closely around the Leninist CPSU Central Committee and its proven fighting staff -- the Central Committee Politburo; they affirm their enthusiastic support for Party policy and their efforts to implement it unswervingly.

The plenum clearly and precisely outlined the practical steps that must now be taken to greet fittingly the 27th CPSU Congress, successfully complete work on fulfilling plans for the current year and thereby ensure a confident start in the next five-year plan. It was noted in particular that the Party regards the achievement of a decisive turnaround in putting the national economy on the track of intensive development as its primary task; in a short period of time the economy must advance to leading scientific and technical positions and attain the highest level of public labor productivity in the world.

Strict observance of Leninist principles in the selection, placement and training of personnel is an absolutely vital precondition for the resolution of these tasks. A correct personnel policy was and remains a very important instrument. Utilizing it, the Party has an active influence on all processes occurring in society. V. I. Lenin regarded the selection of people and verification of their execution of their duties as "the key to all our work," one of the Party's most important tasks.

* This report is published in abridged form.

Following Leninist precepts, the CPSU has cultivated an army of millions of competent and energetic workers and promoted them to leadership positions; these workers are implementing Party policy on a revolutionary scale and in a business-like Bolshevik manner. At the present stage, when our Party and people face qualitatively new tasks, demands on personnel have increased significantly, demands on their political and vocational training. Now more than at any time before it is essential that leadership personnel have a complete mastery of modern methods of administration and production organization and a feel for innovation, see the long-range perspective and be able to find the most effective ways of resolving practical tasks. Therefore, when drawing up the socio-economic program for the further development of our society the 26th CPSU Congress and the November (1982) and subsequent CPSU Central Committees Plenums defined the most important directions for work with personnel. Many fundamental issues of present-day personnel policy were reviewed recently in a CPSU Central Committee Politburo session.

Carrying out the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee, the republic Party organization, as was further noted in the report, is conducting a great deal of work relating to the selection and placement of personnel and their training in the spirit of a high level of discipline and exactingness and personal responsibility for their assigned tasks. These matters are reviewed regularly at the plenums and meeting of the bureau and secretariat of the Latvian CP Central Committee, in Party gorkoms and raykoms and in primary Party organizations.

In the process of selecting personnel we now study and more profoundly evaluate their political, business and moral qualities; we take into consideration better the opinion of primary Party organizations, labor collectives and the public. Work to create a personnel reserve has become more effective. Under the guidance of Party committees and the bureaus of Party organizations, candidates for promotion include, as a rule, those who have been schooled in a labor collective, possess the requisite political, business and moral qualities and organizational skills and have some experience in working with people.

The establishment of quite an orderly system for the training and retraining of workers in leadership positions represents a significant step toward improving work with personnel. Each year more than 27,000 persons from the staff of the Party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol, ideological and economic aktiv study in higher Party educational institutions, in schools for the Party economic aktiv set up in the Central Committee, gorkoms and raykoms of the Party, in continuously offered advanced training courses and at the university of Marxism-Leninism. The practice of personnel internships in the Latvian CP Central Committee, the republic Council of Ministers, the Riga CP Gorkom and other Party, soviet and economic organs has been established. All of this has permitted improvement in the qualitative makeup of personnel in the Party and state apparatus and in economic and cultural construction; the system for their training has been improved.

We have quite a few good examples of personnel policy being conducted at the proper level and yielding the corresponding returns. The Riga CP Gorkom is conducting purposeful work in this respect. It continually improves the selection, placement and training of leadership personnel, utilizes the

personnel reserve and certification and recertification on a broad scale, ensures the creative participation of engineering and technical workers in the production process and shores up lagging units with capable organizers. Positive results have come out of annually conducted seminars and conferences on work with personnel and out of regular accounting by Party, soviet and economic leaders and secretaries of primary Party organizations at meeting of the Party bureaus of gorkoms and raykoms and before labor collectives, as well as specific local assistance to primary Party organizations. All of this creates a business-like, creative atmosphere and allows communists and all workers to demonstrate more fully their abilities and achieve high final results.

The Valmierskiy Raykom of the Party is actively trying to resolve the task of strengthening personnel and personnel training. Rayon Party organizations are doing a great deal in the training of personnel in the agro-industrial complex and the development of their creative activism. They are making efforts to see the practice of combining respect for and trust in people with a principled stance and demands upon them become established everywhere.

Matters of working with personnel occupy their proper place in the work of the Party's Daugavpils Gorkom, Kuldigskiy Raykom and other committees and many soviet and economic organs.

Speaking further of the general improvement in the qualitative makeup of personnel, their selection, training and retraining, the speaker specifically noted that at the present time all secretaries of Party gorkoms and raykoms have higher education. More than half of all secretaries and many workers in the Party apparatus have Party political education. The qualitative makeup of workers in soviet and economic leadership positions has improved.

The process of strengthening personnel in the lower branches of the agro-industrial complex is continuing. In the past two years 144 specialists from the administrative apparatuses of RAPO's and the Ministry of Agriculture have moved to managerial economic work in kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Significant work has also been done to improve the qualitative makeup of leaders of ideological personnel, workers in the realm of science, culture and education and workers in people's control and public organizations.

Quite a lot has been done to improve the representation of all nationalities living in the republic in the select Party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol aktiv, in state organs and in economic management work.

Positive changes were noted in work connected with the selection and nomination of women for leadership in Party, soviet and economic work. Women have been elected first secretaries of the Party's Leninskiy, Valmiyerskiy, Valkskiy and Ogrskiy raykoms. At present one gorkom or raykom secretary in three and almost half of the secretaries of primary Party organizations are women. In five rayons women have been selected as chairpersons of rayispolkoms. Overall, the number of women among deputy chairpersons of (gor- and rayispolkoms) has reached 23 percent; among chairpersons of the ispolkoms of city (in cities under rayon jurisdiction), settlement and village soviet this figure is equal to 52 percent.

Summing up what has been done, one can state with confidence that work conducted on improving the training and education of personnel on the whole is ensuring a rise in the level of leadership and administration in all areas of sociopolitical life and successful resolution of tasks connected with social and cultural development. The results of work to fulfill quotas in the 11th Five-Year Plan are also evidence of this. Good results were obtained in the republic economy. For the achievement of high indices in the All-Union Socialist Competition and for successful fulfillment of the USSR State Plan for Economic and Social Development the past two years our republic has been awarded the challenge Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee.

But if one proceeds from the fact that much remains to be done for complete fulfillment of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and for stable operation in the coming five-year plan, then it becomes evident that some important questions in the development of the economy are still being resolved too slowly. The results of our work in two months of the final year of the five-year plan, which were recently analyzed in a meeting of the Central Committee bureau, clearly indicated this. According to a number of important indices our socialist obligations and plans remained unfulfilled, particularly in industry and construction.

This situation is explained primarily by the fact that the level of the leaders of individual enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozes and sovkhozes still does not meet growing demands. Part of our personnel proved to be insufficiently prepared for work under difficult, extreme conditions, such as those which have arisen, for example, during the present severe winter. Some economic managers are still working with outdated methods, not taking into account the fact that modern conditions, especially the need to speed up scientific and technical progress, require a profound and more experienced approach to the job, skill in working with people and everyday efficiency.

This concerns above all the ministries of light industry, the food industry, the wood processing industry and the forestry and timber industry, the Latbumprom, Latrybprom and Radiotekhnika associations, the administration of Daugavpils, the Latsantekhmontazh Trust, plants for diesel motor, rail car and lacquer and varnish manufacturing, Reinforced Concrete Structures Plant #3, Rigakhimmash, mechanization devices plants and Kuprava; these did not ensure fulfillment of some important tasks of the five-year plan and its fourth year.

Such an attitude toward the job cannot be tolerated any longer. Party committees must call managers who do not fulfill obligations to account, help everyone mobilize reserves and make every possible effort to complete that which remains undone and to reach more quickly the limits projected.

Today we have a right to reproach seriously the managers of our building complex: the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry and the State Committee for Construction Affairs [Gosstroy]. They have systematically lagged behind in the fulfillment of plan goals and done poor work toward eliminating manual labor and introducing new materials and structures and advanced technologies.

The administrators of the republic Gosstroy devote extremely little attention to these matters. Two years ago the Central Committee bureau subjected Ya. F. Rubins, former chairman of Gosstroy, to severe criticism because Gosstroy, in charge of carrying out guidance of a unified technical policy in construction, did little in this important direction. It would seem that sufficient time has passed to correct shortcomings and improve operations. But fundamental changes have by and large not occurred in the work of either Ya. F. Rubins, who became first deputy chairman, or of E. K. Peterson, who was named chairman, or of their state committee. Gosstroy, which has been designated the organizer and architect of technical progress in construction, is working as before on a low level and in large part ineffectually.

The Central Committee construction division and the Council of Ministers must examine in detail the situation which has arisen here and take exhaustive measures to improve it.

The CPSU Central Committee orients Party, soviet and economic organs, as was stated further by B. K. Pugo, toward a more objective handling of the selection and training of all categories of personnel, more complete consideration of the specific nature of their activity, place and role in production and sociopolitical life and an increase in their responsibility for their assigned task. It is extremely important that Leninist principles should be observed everywhere, not only pro forma but rather according to their spirit, in all branches of Party life and state and economic administration.

When improving present-day personnel policy Party gorkoms and raykoms and primary Party organizations must above all raise their standards in evaluating the political qualities of leadership personnel and workers promoted to leadership positions. A leader's readiness for active, selfless and highly professional labor and persistent implementation of Party decisions and his firm adherence to the rule that "actions must always follow words" can serve as evidence of political maturity.

In the course of a general increase in the demands made on personnel it is essential that Party gorkoms and raykoms, primary Party organizations, soviet and economic organs, public organizations and all leadership personnel continue in the most active manner possible the struggle for an all-round strengthening of labor and state discipline, organization and order. This should be the immutable law of our life and an inner need of each worker.

There was a time in Riga and in other cities when there existed the practice of accepting a worker only through the employment commission. Evidently Party committees, ispolkoms of local soviets and the State Committee for Labor should ponder how to utilize better existing experience to intensify the struggle against shirkers, bad workers and persons frequently changing their place of employment.

The political maturity of each leader should be demonstrated by the way in which he fulfills his most important duty to the Party: to inspire the working masses with his own ideological conviction, to create in each labor collective the sort of atmosphere that is conducive to working better, more efficiently

and more productively and to instill in people intolerance toward shirkers, idlers and any instances of negligence, wastefulness, falsification of records or overlooking of wrongdoing. This thought was expressed with new force in the CPSU Central Committee resolution concerning the participation of leadership personnel of the Estonian SSR in political education work.

Actively participating in the ideological and political education work of Party organizations are: administrative workers of the Central Committee, gorkoms and raykoms of the Latvian CP, the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers, ministers E. E. Slede, A. P. Bril' and V. V. Kanep, state committee chairmen V. N. Chevachin and L. L. Bartkevich, Ya. E. Dzenitis, republic procurator, A. P. Rubiks, chairman of the Riga Gorispolkom, V. I. Dyrchenko, director of the Latvian Maritime Steamship Line, O. K. Lenev, general director of the VEF Association [Riga Order of Lenin State Electrotechnical Plant imeni V. I. Lenin], V. G. Bizyukov, chief of the Latvian Administration of Civil Aviation, V. P. Moskovskiy, director of the Aurora Factory, R. V. Kavinskiy and I. A. Bumbur, chairmen of the Krasniy Oktyabr' [Red October] and Uzvara kolkhozes, and many other economic leaders. They are helping to conduct single political activism days, open letter days, meetings with the populace at home, press conferences, lectures, interviews and studies in the system of Party and economic education.

This expands publicity for the work of Party, state and public organizations and increases workers' knowledgeability. As was noted at the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the better informed people are, the more substantial are their actions and the more active their support of the Party, its plans and program goals.

However, we have at our disposal data concerning cases where a number of leaders have lost their sense of responsibility for personally taking part in political education work. Today one could include in this category the following: Z. V. Girgenson and O. K. Stungrevits, ministers, E. N. Laskin, chairman of a State Committee, A. N. Gromov, director of the Riga Stankonormal' Plant, E. V. Begen, head of the construction administration of Rigapromstroy Trust #55, and some others.

Party committees are obligated to increase the responsibility of administrative workers of all ranks for people's education and for the ensuring of the close unity of organizational, ideological educational and economic work. All leaders, whatever post they occupy, should regard participation in ideological work as their direct obligation. They are urged to untiringly deepen the ties between the Party and the people and teach not only with words but also through deeds: by precise organization of labor, specific concern for individuals, personal example and one's own moral image.

The decisions of the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum make particularly great demands upon Party workers, who are the political leaders of communists and all workers. A person dedicated to professional Party work must be the embodiment of the best intellectual and moral qualities particular to communists and the personification of crystalline purity, a great sense of order and adherence to principles in all of his deeds and actions and in relations with people.

The role of the secretaries of gorkoms and raykoms is extremely great in this matter, especially the role of first secretaries. They are called upon to be first not only according to the measure of their authority and rights, but also according to their competence, skill in organizing people for joint, amicable work, for their adherence to principles and businesslike character, modesty and accessibility and the ability to self-critically evaluate the situation and honestly and openly admit failures and mistakes if they occur.

Where nonobservance of Party requirements in this important matter lead is demonstrated by the situation which arose several years ago in Ogrskiy Rayon. There, with the connivance of E. Ya. Resne, former first secretary of the Party raykom, abuse of authority, accumulation and other unseemly actions by administrative workers flourished. The Latvian CP Central Committee, after a thorough evaluation of the facts uncovered, relieved E. Ya. Resne from his duties as minister of social security on the basis of the shortcomings permitted in his previous position.

Our task consists of excluding even the slightest element of chance in the selection of personnel for Party organs and mercilessly combatting any attempt to utilize an official position for personal purposes, combatting a passive, indifferent attitude toward the job. The divisions of the Latvian CP Central Committee, and above all the divisions for Party organizational work, must make sure that all secretaries, division chiefs and other workers on Party committees fully meet the Party's high standards and constantly improve the style, forms and methods of their work. We must state directly that as yet not all secretaries, specifically the first secretaries of the Tukumskiy, Tsesisskiy and Talsinskiy Communist Party gorkoms A. A. Voyka, E. P. Rode and K. K. Rutenberg, are devoting proper attention to improving the functioning of the Party apparatus, organs of state and economic administration and public organizations.

We must exclude irrevocably from practical Party work, the same as from soviet, economic and public work, any useless meetings, unnecessary paperwork, an armchair style of leadership; we must resolutely make time for checks on and supervision of the state of affairs in labor collectives and for direct organization of the carrying out of Party and government decisions and CPSU Central Committee guidelines.

Pursuing the topic of the selection, placement and training of Party personnel, the speaker emphasized that we, unfortunately, have a portion of workers in the apparatus who work for a long time in the same position and who, so to speak, "go sour" and begin to lose their perspective on and interest in their assigned task. This is clearly not normal. This bespeaks the fact that some leaders of Party committees are taking little thought for people and their future.

The secretaries of Communist Party gorkoms and raykoms, creating conditions for revealing all the creative possibilities of their subordinates, are obligated to concern themselves at the proper time with their further growth. One should always remember that the absolute majority of persons who have done five to six years of Party work are capable of heading up quite responsible sections in both soviet and economic work.

One must also not forget about increasing the role, authority and responsibility of the secretaries of primary Party organizations, who are the political leaders of labor collectives. Communist Party gorkoms and raykoms and Central Committee divisions should render them assistance in resolving all questions of Party leadership of economic and cultural construction and of the communist education of workers.

Professional competence is an important criterion in the Party's evaluation of personnel. This characteristic of a leader has acquired exceptionally great significance today, after the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum posed a task of tremendous political importance: to carry the economy to a qualitatively new scientific and technical level, ensure decisive progress in the intensification of public production and the increasing of its efficiency.

Of course, all this makes qualitatively new, increased demands on personnel, their vocational preparedness, the level of their economic knowledge and their ability to react sensitively to scientific advances. This also obligates all of our personnel to be involved consistently, truly seriously and effectively in the speeding up of scientific and technical progress. Evaluation of this work is one of the best means of specifically and graphically defining the true competence of administrative workers and their ability to successfully resolve today's tasks and carry out the instructions of the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Communist Party gorkoms and raykoms and Central Committee divisions must call enterprise managers strictly to account, not only for failure to meet production plans, but equally as much for a careless attitude toward the introduction of new technology and for sluggishness and inflexibility in resolving matters of scientific and technical progress.

Party committees and primary Party organizations should persistently strive to ensure that leadership personnel constantly expand their vocational experience and are always up to date on the latest advances in theory and practice.

The analysis we conducted, particularly examination of the report of the Daugavpilsskiy Communist Party Raykom in a Central Committee bureau meeting, showed that in certain Party committees insufficient attention is being devoted to offering economic education in accordance with present-day requirements. Here is something for Communist Party gorkoms and raykoms and primary Party organizations to work on. It is important to remember that without profound knowledge of the economy and without the ability to think in an economically literate fashion, these days there is not and cannot be a leader who fulfills his potential. It is essential to bring economic education closer to the resolution of practical tasks and make it an effective instrument of personnel training everywhere.

Emphasizing further that the moral image of a leader is of particular significance, the speaker noted: the Party proceeds on the assumption that the only person who deserves the right to lead people is a person who is notable for his irreproachable moral image, discipline, honesty, conscientiousness, modesty and simplicity, who tenaciously tries to master a Leninist style of leadership. An absolute majority of our leadership personnel possesses these characteristics.

But one also encounters those who, in the name of creating the appearance that

everything is all right, forego our principles, begin to falsify results and overlook wrongdoing. Some utilize the position entrusted to them for personal gain, permit financial accumulation and do not evaluate their own work self-critically.

Among these are: Ya. M. Aboltin', former deputy chairman of the Riga Gorispolkom, B. A. Naukin, chairman of the Oktyabr'skiy Rayispolkom, V. N. Shchepetil'nikov, director of the Riga Industrial Equipment Trust, P. S. Gerashchenkov, director of the Spetsdetal' Plant, and other workers who permitted abuse of authority in the trading of apartments, construction of garden houses, individual houses etc. Party committees gave a thorough evaluation of these cases. All guilty persons were severely punished within the Party and removed from their jobs.

We should note that the struggle against similar manifestations of amoral conduct on the part of managers has intensified in the republic. Over the past four years 352 administrative workers have been punished by organs of people's control alone. Last year over 200 communist managers were called to account by Party committees and approximately 50 persons were relieved of their duties. Criminal charges were pressed against persons who had permitted theft, embezzlement and large-scale abuses.

The ever-present and uncompromising struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism occupies a special place in the formation of a leader's moral image. Recently we have approved a whole series of measures in support of this struggle. Meanwhile there occur cases where administrative workers themselves misuse alcohol. Party committees and primary Party organizations should regard such instances as a most serious violation of standards of morality and labor discipline and call the organizers of and participants in collective drinking bouts very strictly to account before the administration and the Party. The organization of various arrangements connected with these drinking bouts must be decisively interdicted, and administrative workers who abuse alcohol fired without mercy. This applies equally to everyone -- from ministers on down to brigade leaders.

In a word, Party organizations and soviet and economic organs must even more resolutely combat all types of abuse of authority and violations of moral and ethical standards, with the goal of completely eradicating them. This is a political matter, but it concerns Party authority and trust in the Party among the masses.

The practice -- which has long been condemned by the Party -- of transferring weak or morally impure workers from one administrative post to another does great harm in this matter. Only a lack of Party adherence to principles on the part of Ya. D. Tumovs-Bekis, minister of consumer services, can explain the fact that E. A. Vol'dman, head of the Baltic Special Repair and Construction Administration of the All-Union Soyuz elektromontazhremstroy Association, who had been let go on account of his systematic violation of Party and state discipline and abuse of his position, was named -- on the minister's order -- first deputy chief and then acting chief of the Special Repair and Construction Administration under the Ministry of Consumer Services.

As chief of administration of the Soyuz elektromontazhremstroy Association, E. A. Vol'dman permitted falsification of records to fulfill plan goals, allowed

individuals to illegally hold more than one position and demonstrated personal immodesty. He managed to exchange a two-room apartment with 35 square meters of living space for one with three rooms and 65 square meters of living space and acquired three automobiles over a 10-year period. Under the minister's patronage E. A. Vol'dman continued to violate staff and financial discipline and misuse his position for mercenary purposes.

Only after repeated requests by the Kirovsky Raykom of the Party was this manager, a failure on all counts, finally relieved of his position at the beginning of the current year. Relieved, but...transferred to the Repair and Construction Administration under the Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry. The Secretariat of the Latvian CP Central Committee strictly informed Ya. D. Tumovs-Bekis of the inadmissibility of this sort of attitude toward the selection and training of personnel.

Such cases, unfortunately, are not isolated ones here. With the knowledge of the Rizhskiy and Tukumskiy raykoms of the Party, which were evidently lacking in adherence to principles, I. K. Osis, the compromised former chairman of the Ezertsiems Kolkhoz in Rizhskiy Rayon, was transferred to another management position. This time he served as chairman of the Nakotne Kolkhoz in Tukumskiy Rayon, where within a short period of time he had again permitted serious violations in financial and administrative operations.

Latvian CP Central Committee divisions, Party gorkoms and raykoms and primary Party organizations must constantly ensure that each manager is on top of his job, fulfills his duty and serves as a moral example to workers.

In the Leninist tradition trust in personnel must be indissolubly linked with fundamental demands on them and with increased control over their work. It is precisely such an approach which ensures leaders' proper training and fruitful work, emphasized B. K. Pugo. In recent years various forms and methods of Party control have been further developed in the work of the republic Party organization. The work of Party commissions under the Party's Central Committee, gorkoms and raykoms and in primary Party organizations has become more active. The practice of accounting by managers at meeting of Party commissions and the bureaus of Party committees and at Party assemblies has become more widespread, as have individual interviews with managers on the most important matters of collectives' productive and social life. The number of matters connected with increased Party control and reviewed in the bureau and secretariat of the Latvian CP Central Committee has more than doubled recently.

But by no means everything has been done which could and should be done. The role of Party commissions in reinforcing Party control over the work of personnel and the execution of Party decisions must be more active and systematic. In everyday practice they are obligated to be guided strictly by the CPSU Central Committee demand concerning the necessity of concentrating the attention of Party control on the fulfillment by leaders of Party and state directives on crucial matters of economic and cultural construction. Party gorkoms and raykoms should profoundly examine the work of Party commissions and make the appropriate demands of them in connection with the implementation of the tasks proposed by the CPSU Central Committee for the further improvement of control over and checks on execution in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

It is important to arrange things in such a way that each leader is under constant supervision both from above and below and feels his accountability and responsibility not only to those who lead him, but also to those whom he leads, to his comrades in the Party organization and to the labor collective. Party committees and primary Party organizations must develop criticism and self-criticism on a broader scale, make a more frequent practice of reviewing accounts by leadership personnel and thereby analyze more deeply the situation in the sections for which they are responsible, completely revealing shortcomings and indicating ways to eliminate them.

Particular attention should be devoted to increasing the role of primary Party organizations and their secretaries in the training of personnel. We cannot regard as normal a situation in which two-thirds of the personnel matters of communist managers are reviewed by Party committees, circumventing primary Party organizations. This practice has long been condemned, but it is carried on in the work of Valkskiy and Madonskiy raykoms, the Ventspils Gorkom and some other Party committees.

We know from experience that by revealing and eliminating at the proper time irregularities in the work of individual leaders and by subjecting the mistakes which they have made to thorough criticism it is easier to save them from serious failures and keep them on the job. And vice versa, the lack of the proper exactingness on the part of the Party and unjustified tolerance toward those who behave incorrectly and commit unseemly acts can lead to the degeneration of individual workers, as occurred here with Ya. Ya. Zosin, former director of the Livany Glass Plant, V. G. Silakov, director of the Riga Etalon Experimental Plant, V. R. Ozols, deputy chief doctor in the Ventspils City and Rayon Hospital, On. N. Ivanov, senior assistant to the captain of the steamship "Elgava," and others. Of course, all of them were severely punished within the Party and relieved of the positions they held.

We must reinforce the democratic basis of personnel work, increase publicity and, in cases where this serves a purpose, expand the selectivity of administrative workers and the competitive system of delegating duties and of certification; this is fully in accordance with the spirit of the requirements of the Law Concerning Labor Collectives. It is obvious that the work experience accumulated in the Kommunator Association should be more widely disseminated throughout the republic. There the competitive system of selecting economic managers has been successfully applied for several years already.

In order to evaluate the qualities of a worker more objectively and increase his level of responsibility we must increase the significance of work records and ensure that one can really use them to judge a person's strong and weak points. This matter was specially considered in a meeting of the bureau of the Latvian CP Central Committee. The problem is that, unfortunately, at present the recording and approval of work records in many Party committees, soviet and economic organs and public organizations is conducted on a pro forma basis. At the same time, if a work record is compiled responsibly and approved after thorough discussion, if it reflects not only a worker's good qualities but his characteristic failings as well, then it truly becomes an authoritative evaluation of an individual and an effective means of training. Work records should reflect the results of regularly conducted individual interviews with

leadership personnel in Party committees and critical observations directed toward the leaders at Party assemblies and meetings of the Party bureaus and committees. This will aid in training personnel and will arm Party committees with the most complete knowledge of their qualities.

The report noted further the necessity for Party committees and primary Party organizations to use more widely the tremendous opportunities for constant replenishment of personnel staff with the best representatives of the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry.

Party committees and the leaders of soviet and economic organs should do more to ensure that in all sectors young workers with long-range potential work shoulder to shoulder with experienced personnel of the older generation, gaining the experience and tempering required.

It is necessary, as the CPSU Central Committee requires, for each leader, whatever post he occupies, to carefully cultivate from among the circle of his closest assistants persons who are prepared, if the need arises, to replace him and conduct work at the proper level. It is precisely by this criterion that one should judge the Party maturity of a leader and his fulfillment of his duty to society. In this regard Party gorkoms and raykoms and primary Party organizations should devote particular attention to improving work in the selection, placement and training of Komsomol personnel. Komsomol workers who have done well and been tested in practical actions should be assigned more boldly to leadership positions in Party, soviet, economic and ideological work.

There exists the necessity of particularly noting that as yet not all Party committees and soviet and economic organs are working properly on the promotion of women to leadership positions. There is a total of approximately 400 industrial enterprises in our republic, and only 43 of them are headed by women. Among the 577 heads of sovkhozes and kolkhozes there are only 19 women, although the proportion of women among specialists with higher education employed in the republic economy is 59 percent. Party committees must ensure fulfillment of the task posed by the CPSU Central Committee: to promote women more boldly and more resolutely to leadership positions at all levels and to devote the greatest possible attention to improving their working, everyday and recreational conditions.

The Party teaches: in order to have the opportunity to conduct work on replacing personnel and strengthening leadership in various areas one must have at one's disposal a reliable and effective reserve. But in practice it often turns out that instead of painstaking and thoughtful work in the training of the reserve what results is the compilation of a formalistic list of proposed candidates for positions to be filled.

This leads to a great number of positions remaining vacant for a long time and to untrained persons being promoted to administrative posts. In the replacement of ispolkom chairmen in local soviets in Elgavskiy and Ekabpilsskiy rayons not a single candidate from the reserve list was promoted. A similar situation was the case in Kraslavskiy, Tukumskiy and Rezeknenskiy rayons as well. For eight months Rezeknenskiy Rayon was unable to select a candidate for the post of deputy chairman of its ispolkom. No such reserve exists at all in the

ministries of trade and consumer services and in the Latvian Consumer Union in a number of important leadership positions. We encounter great difficulties in the process of promotion to vacant positions at the Stankonormal' and Gidrometpribor plants and the Straume Automation Equipment Plants, in the Ministry of the Forest and Timber Industry and the Ministry of the Wood Processing Industry and in other departments. Only one conclusion presents itself from this: Party committees are obligated to improve markedly work with the personnel reserve.

In ensuring improvement of the reserve, it is essential to train people in good time, taking into consideration their specific level and type of administrative work. One must optimally utilize all ways and means to teach workers the art of leadership while they are in the reserve and in the process of practical activity test and simultaneously teach them, inculcate in them essential political qualities and organizational skills. To these ends one must more actively utilize internships by Party, soviet and economic workers making up the promotion reserve in the Party organizations of leading enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and in the apparatus of Party, soviet and ideological organs. In a word, the cultivation of a reserve for promotion is the duty of each Party committee, each primary Party organization and each leader.

In the report the particular attention of plenum participants was directed to the necessity of improving work with the personnel reserve of the agro-industrial complex. A great deal of work has been done in this area in recent years. And the overwhelming majority of agricultural administrative cadres is capable of ensuring fulfillment of tasks posed in the Food Program. However, there are still poor workers among kolkhoz chairmen, sovkhoz directors and administrators of agricultural organs. It is precisely for this reason that the farms which they head up are standing still and are not fulfilling their obligations to the state. Thus, last year, which was generally not bad in terms of weather conditions, the total production of agricultural products decreased on 45 farms as compared to 1983 totals. We must more persistently reinforce the weak sectors of agricultural production with energetic and knowledgeable administrators and more resolutely increase the efficiency of their work.

We have real opportunities for all kolkhozes and sovkhozes to be headed by professionally and politically literate agricultural specialists who think creatively and take businesslike actions. This is dictated above all by the urgent necessity of increasing our efforts to fulfill our country's Food Program and guarantee food supply to the populace without interruption.

Speaking of the realization of tasks in the Food Program, B. K. Pugo once again mentioned the whole importance of activating work to create subsidiary farm plots as part of industrial enterprises and organizations, and the fact that the Central Committee will strictly see to the fulfillment of this task.

One of the indispensable preconditions for successful work is personnel job stability.

On the whole this stability is ensured throughout the republic. In certain sectors, cities and rayons there occurs an unjustifiably frequent turnover of managers. This is particularly noticeable in the agricultural complex. For

example, four different directors have served at Eglayne Sovkhoz over the course of the past seven years. Such a personnel policy has had an extremely negative effect on the productive and financial operation of the farm. In those seven years milk production has declined by 10 percent and yield per cow has fallen to 385 kilograms; meat production has declined by 30 percent.

Party organizations must persistently implement the line on ensuring personnel stability and reinforcement, particularly of economic personnel.

It is important that Central Committee divisions and Party gorkoms and raykoms rationally regulate the process of personnel replacement, proceeding upon specific situations and taking into account personal qualities and the individual traits of each worker.

It seems reasonable also to practice more actively such forms of personnel work as "horizontal" transfers -- i.e. transfers to similar section within the republic, city or rayon. This will not only inject fresh vitality into the work, but will also benefit the workers themselves and help them demonstrate their abilities in a new job and be enriched through new experience.

We must also utilize more fully opportunities to give city and rayon personnel work experience in republic organizations and send workers from republic offices to local administrative work. This will help to enrich experience at both the local and republic levels.

It is essential that we adopt serious measures to strengthen the personnel of scientific institutions, higher and secondary specialized educational institutions and the system of vocational and technical education.

Improvement of the selection, placement and training of personnel at the intermediate level -- heads of shops, sections, farms and brigades -- is of great importance to the state.

In general, the Central Committee bureau feels that Party committees must significantly increase the effectiveness of personnel work in all areas of economic and cultural construction and in all branches of the Party and state apparatus. Particular responsibility for this falls upon the division for Party organizational work in the Latvian CP Central Committee, organizational divisions of Party gorkoms and raykoms. They are obligated to see the whole picture and profoundly analyze, work out from all angles and unswervingly implement measures for the resolution of all problems connected with present-day personnel policy.

We must in every possible way increase the responsibility of Party committees and Party bureaus in ministries and departments for improvement in personnel work. Practice shows that many failures in economic activity are the fault of ministries and departments. Mistakes permitted here cost the state dearly. It is no secret that there are quite a few poor workers in the apparatus of a number of ministries and departments today. This refers primarily to the ministries of the food industry, the meat industry, light industry, agriculture, municipal services and others. Party committees and bureaus in ministries and departments must improve personnel work in a radical manner, sharply increase

demands on communists working in the apparatus, increase their responsibility for assigned tasks and eliminate bureaucracy and routine.

In order to implement the recommendations and guidelines of the CPSU Central Committee and decisions of the March Central Committee Plenum we must carefully analyze the present situation in Party gorkom and raykom plenums and primary Party organization assemblies, outline additional measures to improve the whole course of the selection, placement and training of personnel and to improve personnel policy as a whole.

Our country has come to the most responsible boundary of the five-year plan, B. K. Pugo stated further. In its final year we face great and ambitious work to fulfill and overfulfill plan goal, strengthen the intensification of production and raise its technical level, speed up scientific and technical progress and more fully utilize production potential.

Party gorkoms and raykoms, Party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and soviet and economic organs must develop on a broader scale organizational and mass political work to mobilize communists and all workers for successful completion of the five-year plan and a fitting welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress and the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory.

We must everywhere increase socialist competition to attain above-plan increases in labor productivity, increase the production of goods, reduce production overhead and improve quality. Particular attention should be devoted to the efficient utilization of labor, an increase in its level of organization and more complete utilization of capacities. A prominent place must be occupied by work to guarantee lowering of outlays of raw materials, supplies and fuel and energy resources. We must publicize widely the initiative to operate not less than two days this year on materials and fuel saved through conservation.

Workers in the agro-industrial complex have a great deal of work ahead of them. They must guarantee further growth in the production of all types of agricultural products and food goods.

As was noted at the special CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the times demand ambitious, creative work by all Party organizations, from the highest levels to the lowest. In all areas and everywhere communists must be an example of the fulfillment of civic duty and conscientious labor for the good of society and at all times evince a Leninist style in their work. This relates primarily to Party cadres and to Party, soviet and economic managers.

Proceeding upon the guidelines of the March Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, we are obligated to resolutely intensify the struggle against any and all manifestations of showiness and idle talk, self-conceit and irresponsibility, against everything which is in opposition to the standards of socialist life. This is a direct obligation and a matter of honor for Party and soviet workers. Party committees must everywhere unyieldingly implement the line on increasing demands on all personnel and on increasing their responsibility for their assigned part of the job; they should encourage and promote those who demonstrate an honest and conscientious attitude toward fulfilling their social duty not

only with words, but rather with actions and practical results.

In conclusion the speaker expressed confidence that the republic Party organization, under the guidance of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo, will markedly improve work with personnel, will increase to the fullest their creative initiative, businesslike approach to and responsibility for assigned tasks and will achieve new success in all areas of communist construction.

12825

CSO: 1800/221

REGIONAL

SHCHERBITSKIY ATTENDS MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS IN KIEV

AU061212 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 2 May 85 pp 1-2

[Report by Ye Guzhva, V. Luk'yanenko, and Ye Solodovnikova on the May Day demonstration at the October Revolution Square in Kiev]

[Excerpts] Red banners and slogans decorated the streets and squares of the ancient city on the Dnepr. The greenery of squares and parks embellished the Soviet Ukraine's capital city. The faces of the inhabitants of Kiev and of their guests who gathered for the demonstration were happy. Many of them displayed orders and medals.

The solemn moment was nearing. Comrade V. V. Shcherbitskiy, Yu N. Yel'chenko, Ye V. Kachalovskiy, B. V. Kachura, A. P. Lyashko, I. A. Mozgovoy, V. A. Sologub, A. A. Titarenko, V. S. Shevchenko, Yu A. Kolomiyets, V. D. Kryuchekov, S. N. Mukha, and Ya P. Pogrebnyak mounted the CENTRAL TRIBUNE. Those present at the October Revolution Square warmly welcomed the Ukraine's Communist Party and government leaders.

At 1000 hours, the chimes of Kiev bells heralded the beginning of the ceremony.

The march of solidarity, peace and labor manifested once again the utter devotion of the working people of the hero city of Kiev to Lenin's legacy, to the cause of communism.

CSO: 1800/297

REGIONAL

MOSCOW TV SHOWS DESTRUCTIVE MUD FLOW IN TURKMENISTAN

LD072017 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 7 May 85

[From the Vremya newscast--video report]

[Text] A large mud flow has come down upon the fields of Chardzhou Oblast in Turkmenia.

[Correspondent] Constant heavy rain has been falling in the last few days in the Kugitangtau mountains. This is what happened to inhabitants of the virginland Yulangyz Tract and a number of other populated areas in east Turkmenia. Mud flows, troubled waters flooding along the mountain crevices and reaching the peak of their destructive force below in the valley, swept many buildings away in its path, destroyed electric communications lines and flooded cotton fields.

But the virginlanders are not lacking in character. In a few hours people and machinery were already working on the most strained areas. All subdivisions of the Chardzhouremvodstroy trust were put into action. The mud flows were diverted into safe, artificial channels. The headquarters for eliminating the consequences of the elements have been brought up to strength by large detachments of rural mechanics for double-shift work. As soon as the hot May sun dries out the soil they will take out their sowing units into the fields once again. [Video shows mud flow, destroyed building, fallen pylon, trucks tipping their load onto ground, mud removal work, fields under water.]

CSO: 1830/580

REGIONAL

REPUBLIC AKTIV ON OIL INDUSTRY

Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 5 Mar 85 pp 1-2

[Article: "Fighting Challenges of Republic Petroleum Workers -- Meeting of the Party-Economic Aktiv of Azerbaijan"]

[Text] Great wealth is concealed beneath the soil of Azerbaijan. The principal type is petroleum. The republic has substantial reserves of petroleum, but it is becoming more difficult every year to extract this valuable raw material. Petroleum workers are increasingly using the latest technology and progressive recovery methods and a broad campaign has developed for high technological and labor discipline and organization at every work position. Working people of the sector are filled with resolve to mark the final year of the five-year plan, the year of active preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress and the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory, with shock labor and to meet the challenge posed by Comrade K. U. Chernenko of increasing petroleum extraction.

The tasks of insuring stable work by the petroleum and gas extraction industry in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the instructions of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade K. U. Chernenko were discussed at a meeting of the republic party-economic aktiv held on 2 March.

K. M. Bagirov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, opened the meeting with an introductory talk.

V. N. Konovalov, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, presented a report.

Participating in discussion of the report were Hero of Socialist Labor K. A. Abasov, chief of the Kasporneftegasprom [Caspain Sea Petroleum Gas Industry] Association; Hero of Socialist Labor A. A. Dzhaferov, general director of the Azneft' [Azerbaijan Petroleum] Association; N. N. Nadzhafov, first secretary of the Azizbekovskiy party raykom; A. Ya. Bolotin, first secretary of the Karadagskiy party raykom; Hero of Socialist Labor A. M. Amanov, foreman at the Ali-Bayramli Drilling Administration; Hero of Socialist Labor I. S. Guseynov, chairman of the republic Committee of the Trade Union of Petroleum and Gas Industry Workers; V. I. Mamedov, chief of the Shirvanneft' [Shirvan Petroleum] Petroleum-Gas Extraction Administration; G. G. Gumbatov, chief of the Petroleum-

Gas Extraction Administration imeni N. Narimanov; corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. T. Abasov, director of the Institute of Problems of Deep Petroleum-Gas Deposits of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences; Academician of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences I. A. Ibragimov, rector of the Azerbaijan Institute of Petroleum and Chemistry imeni M. Azizbekov; Sh. G. Mekhtiyev, head of the Peschaninskiy MURB [possibly local drilling administration]; N. M. Zaidov, secretary of the party committee at the Petroleum and Gas Extraction Production Association imeni XXII S'yezda KPSS; corresponding member of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences M. K. Seid-Rza, director of the Azerbaijan Scientific Research and Planning Institute of the Petroleum Industry; I. A. Golovina, operator at the Artemneftegaz [Artem Petroleum-Gas] Extraction Administration; T. S. Shiraliyev, underground well repair foreman at the Ordzhonikidzeneft' [Ordzhonikidze Petroleum] Extraction Administration; and A. Sh. Shikhlinitskiy, chief geologist of the Dzheyranchel'skoye Exploratory Drilling Administration.

Comrade K. M. Bagirov summarized the results of the meeting.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government, it was pointed out at the meeting, are consistently following a policy of accelerated development of the fuel-energy complex, viewing this as a crucial condition for successful performance of all national economic tasks.

Petroleum and gas extraction occupied and continues to occupy an important place in the economy of Azerbaijan. Since the first years of Soviet power, in all phases of socialist building, during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War, and also during the postwar rebirth, petroleum workers of the republic have performed their patriotic duty with honor and multiplied the country's energy might by every means. In this way they have earned a well-deserved reputation and great fame. The speakers noted with gratitude that petroleum workers have made a significant contribution to the republic's achievements, to those successes which it attained in the 9th, 10th, and 11th five-year plans -- marked by victories in all-Union socialist competition.

The role and significance of the fuel-energy complex is particularly growing in the current phase. The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that the development of heavy industry, and above all its foundational sectors such as fuel-energy, is one of the unconditional prerequisites for solving all national economic problems. As Comrade K. U. Chernenko pointed out, the party views faster than average development of the fuel industry, which is a component part of the Energy Program, as one of the key goals both for the current period and in the long run.

The CPSU Central Committee has given republic petroleum workers an important and, at the same time, honorable task -- to stabilize and insure growth in the volume of petroleum extraction.

The speakers emphasized that in recent years, thanks to the daily concern and attention of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government and to the specific measures adopted by the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and the republic Council of Ministers, there have been qualitative changes in the development of this very old sector. The volume of capital investment

is growing steadily. In the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan alone it has exceeded 2 billion rubles. In addition to working the deposits of Apsheron and the offshore areas of the Caspian, petroleum workers are moving forward on a broad front in the central and western rayons of the republic and have moved to considerable depths out to sea. Progressive technology for well operations has begun to be introduced more broadly; a large majority of the petroleum fields are automated. Petroleum workers have adopted contemporary self-hoisting and semisubmerged floating drilling rigs equipped with the latest machinery.

All this has made it possible to secure growth in reserves of hydrocarbon raw material and significantly lower the rate of decline in petroleum extraction. More and more collectives are working steadily and fulfilling production plans.

At the same time, as the results of the last year showed, by no means have good indicators been achieved everywhere. The republic fulfilled its plan for petroleum extraction by 98.8 percent. The collectives of the Azneft' Association worked below their capacities, fulfilling only 94.9 percent of the plan. And what is especially alarming is that extraction of petroleum and gas in the republic was lower in 1984 than in 1983.

The final year of the five-year plan began somewhat better: more organization and order was seen at the fields and management work by the heads of our petroleum and gas associations became more operational. As a result the plan for petroleum extraction in January and February was 100.3 percent fulfilled. The increase in petroleum extraction compared to the corresponding period of the preceding year was 5.6 percent. Assignments for extraction of gas were also fulfilled.

Good work was done by the collectives of the Petroleum and Gas Extraction Association imeni XXII S'yezda KPSS, the Karadagneft', Sal'yanyneft', and Kirovneft' petroleum and gas extraction administrations, the Bukhta Il'icha, Neftyanyye Kamni, Peschaninskoye, and Dzharlinskoye drilling administrations, the underground and capital well repair brigades of Kaspar Miraliyev, Adil' Mamedov, Migdat Tairbekov, and many others.

The situation with drilling improved somewhat. The drilling brigades of Salman Nagiyev, Akif Amanov, Sarkhosh Mamedov, Mamedagi Aliyev, and Eduard Aslanov are working heroically, with a deep understanding of the tasks facing them.

It is very important now to increase the current pace of drilling and extraction in order to finish the year 1985 and create a good backlog with which to start the first and subsequent years of the 12th Five-Year Plan. The plan calls for extraction of eight percent more petroleum in the current year than in 1984, and to increase the volume of drilling work by almost 20 percent.

Viewing the state of affairs in the sector from this standpoint, participants in the meeting focused their attention on shortcomings, breakdowns, and elements of mismanagement and poor economic-organization and political work in the collectives. In this connection the failure of the associations to fulfill the plan for the first four years of the five-year plan was brought up. Twelve of the 16 petroleum and gas extraction administrations did not perform their set assignments.

Failure to fulfill plans for drilling and petroleum extraction result above all from the low level of economic, technical, and labor leadership and poor labor, production, and performance discipline in many elements of the sector. These things lead to many problems -- slow rates of construction and development of promising deposits, unsatisfactory work on the stock of wells, and a high rate of accidents and improper work in drilling.

The unstable work of the Azneft' Association arouses serious concern. We know that most of the land deposits and pools they are working have a high degree of depletion of petroleum reserves and low layer energy. The stock of wells there is to a significant degree depleted and low-yielding. Under such conditions each well demands painstaking engineering work and effective organizational-technical concepts and measures. But this kind of approach to the work is often not taken. Many specialists and managers work in the old way and are not doing a good job of mobilizing collectives to hunt for production reserves and make rational use of the scientific and production potential that has been created and available financial, material, and labor resources. Unfortunately, these matters are frequently overlooked even by the party organizations of the association.

The condition of petroleum and gas extraction in the republic is to a significant extent determined by the work of the Kaspornftegazprom All-Union Production Association. The association extracts about 70 percent of the petroleum and more than 90 percent of the gas. In this connection it was noted that the offshore petroleum workers have improved their work markedly in recent times and are not only fulfilling their plans for petroleum extraction but also securing a rise in its level.

But the offshore workers have not yet been able to made up the shortfall that has occurred since the start of the five-year plan. The Petroleum-Gas Extraction Administrations imeni N. Narimanov and imeni 50-Letiya SSSR have allowed themselves to fall far behind.

The improvement in the association's work that has been observed should in no way lead to complacency. The management of the Kaspornftegazprom Association, the collectives of the extraction administrations, the association's enterprises, and their party organizations still have a great deal of work to do to eliminate existing shortcomings and insure stable work. And in this it cannot be forgotten that the Caspian is really the primary testing ground for offshore petroleum and gas extraction technology and equipment.

The meeting devoted special attention to questions of raising the use efficiency of the existing stock of wells and keeping them in action. For a number of reasons, but mainly because of the low level of engineering work, numerous violations of technology, and the low efficiency of engineering geology measures and studies, hundreds of wells go down each year. The shortfall of petroleum that results exceeds tens of thousands of tons by the most modest calculations.

It is also alarming that the effectiveness of steps taken to maintain the yield of the wells is dropping and does not exceed 80 percent on the average for the association, while a number of extraction administrations are well below this figure.

Experience shows that engineering geology measures are often taken without proper substantiation, and sometimes a formalistic approach is manifested. As a result material and financial resources are not always used sensibly, with the proper return. There are still numerous shortcomings in the conduct of capital and underground well repair. Numerous accidents and cases of defective work and repeated repair jobs occur because of the low quality of work. The length of a single repair job is rising year after year in many of the extraction administrations of Azneft', and the shift coefficient of repair brigade work is declining. As a result, each day more than 15 percent of the wells are down in need of repair.

At Kasporneftegazprom wells must often wait a considerable time for brigades to arrive, especially at certain offshore platforms and pier-type rigs, and this leads to losses of thousands of tons of petroleum.

While speaking of the use of progressive methods of intensifying petroleum extraction, participants at the meeting observed that work to maintain layer pressure in pools by pumping water into them is being done at more than 100 sites in the republic and covers 5,400 producing wells. It is done at 68 percent of the operating wells at the Kasporneftegazprom Association and 34 percent at Azneft'.

Experience has dramatically raised the question of the need to further intensify and make broad use of secondary and tertiary petroleum recovery techniques. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and the republic Council of Ministers adopted a decree on this as long ago as 1981. Implementation of the planned measures is producing fairly good and promising results. For example, the use of in-situ combustion at the Artem Island deposit made it possible to increase the production rate of numerous wells and even to convert them to the flow and compressor production methods. The production rate of wells at the Siyan Short site of the Kirovneft' Administration and the Umbaki site of the Karadagneft' Extraction Administration has been more than doubled by the use of tertiary methods. Pumping surface-active agents into the layers has been equally effective. This technique produces about 10,00 tons of additional petroleum a month at the Sangachaly-Duvanny deposit (Bull Island).

In actuality, however, this work is in the initial stage of dissemination. Economic managers, specialists and scientists, and party organizations should show greater initiative and persistence in introducing secondary and tertiary methods of raising petroleum recovery. All of this work needs to be done on a higher engineering-technical level, taking the latest advances of domestic and foreign practice into account.

It is common knowledge, speakers at the meeting emphasized, that drilling is the key to maintaining and further increasing the volume of petroleum and gas extracted. But unfortunately, it is precisely in drilling work more than anywhere else that serious shortcomings and omissions occur. The drilling plan is consistently not fulfilled, and they have fallen far behind the plan based on results of the first four years of the five-year plan. Virtually all drilling enterprises are working below their capacities.

The main factors that explain this are shortcomings in drilling work and poor labor and performance discipline in the collectives. The accident rate remains high because of flagrant violations of technology in well wiring. Seventy percent of the accidents are the fault of the immediate workers. One out of 10 drilling brigades is constantly engaged in work to eliminate accidents and defective work. A considerable number of the wells where accidents occur are shut down and abandoned.

The plan indicators for rate of drilling are not being met. As a result, each year drilling is more than 100,000 meters short of the planned figure. Productive time in drilling remains slightly above 75 percent, which means that almost one worker out of four is wasting his time.

In April of last year the Buro of the Central Committee reviewed a memorandum from the USSR People's Control Committee about serious shortcomings in the work of the Kaspornftegazprom Association to increase the extraction of petroleum and gas condensate. A serious appraisal was made of all the facts uncovered. Certain managers received strict party punishment for shortcomings in organizing and carrying out drilling work.

The struggle to achieve highly efficient drilling, reduce the accident rate, cut well construction time, increase the rate of drilling work, and improve other technical-economic indicators should be a subject of constant concern and unflagging attention for economic managers, party committees in the local areas, and primary party organizations. The collectives of drilling organizations and every engineering-technical worker should be directed to solving these problems.

Another thing that cannot be tolerated is that prospecting and geological exploration work is done on a low organizational level, which drags out the time required to study and evaluate petroleum-gas sites and bring promising deposits into production.

The Tarsdallyar deposit in Shamkhorskiy Rayon was discovered in September 1983. The well drilled there is flowing steadily with a good petroleum production rate. And although almost 18 months have passed, only one new well has been brought into production at this deposit. It is certainly not possible to solve the problems facing the association at that rate. In this connection it was pointed out that the party and Soviet organs of Imishlinskiy, Shamkhorskiy, and various other rayons should show greater interest in solving the problems of developing new petroleum-gas areas.

The questions of stepping up surface construction at deposits are equally timely for the Kaspornftegazprom All-Union Association. For example, the Site imeni 28 Aprelya overall has achieved good results and done a great deal of work. At the same time they also have unresolved problems; in particular, the time has come to lay additional pipeline.

The lag in surface construction at new and operating deposits can be explained in large part by the poor work of the petroleum-gas extraction industry's construction subdivisions. The organization and rate of capital construction in the associations do not meet production demands. Many construction enterprises

regularly fail to fulfill plans for incorporation of capital investment and putting fixed capital into operation.

A clearly abnormal situation has developed -- the construction of oilfield facilities, utility lines, and roads and the establishment of service bases and other objects lags behind the incorporation of new deposits. This is one of the main reasons for the delay in bringing a number of promising areas into active operation. Frequently no work at all is done at them because of the lack of construction.

For a long time now the Azneft' Association has not taken any steps to increase the volume and improve the quality of construction work and to supply subdivisions with the necessary equipment, machinery, and vehicles. Construction of some important projects is dragging on for many years. Road construction is done in an extremely unsatisfactory way. The quality of site and approach roads, especially to exploratory wells, continues to be poor.

The construction organizations of Kasporneftegazprom regularly fail to fulfill plans for construction of offshore platforms. The question of organizing repair or piers, platforms, and other hydroengineering structures continues to be critical. We must also give some thought to additional steps to raise the reliability of operation of offshore petroleum-gas extraction sites and to keep unnecessary structures out of the sea.

It was also noted at the meeting that a large number of means of transportation are still used inefficiently and often stand idle. As a result supply breaks down and this leads to major stoppages and losses of work time at wells, especially exploratory wells. Cases of failure to deliver workers to the job site on time and take them back for rest are frequent, which also has a negative effect on normal work and draws justified complaints from the field workers.

The heads of the associations, their deputies in charge of transportation, and the chiefs of the transportation enterprises must organize matters better, minimize losses and production downtime because of transportation workers, and work more solidly on questions of updating and repairing the fleet of motor vehicles, special equipment, and water-borne vessels.

The speeches devoted special attention to the work of scientists, of all those who are employed at scientific research and planning design organizations.

The Azerbaijan State Scientific Research and Planning Institute of the Petroleum Industry, Gipromorneftegaz [possibly State Institute of Offshore Petroleum and Gas Extraction], and VNIPIgaz [possibly All-Union Scientific Research and Planning Institute of the Gas Industry] are still not sufficiently involved in the introduction of progressive methods of intensification of petroleum and gas extraction and mechanization of labor-intensive processes. Questions of designing drilling facilities and general construction of surface structures at deposits are not being resolved on the proper level. Plans often are very late in being completed and include outdated technical concepts.

The sectorial institutes must insure a comprehensive approach to difficult problems. They should focus efforts on working out practical proposals aimed

at improving the development of deposits, increasing the petroleum production of layers, improving the technical-economic indicators of drilling and -- above all -- well excavation, and reducing accidents and defective work in drilling.

The institutes YuzhVNIIGEOfizika [possibly All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Geophysics for the Southern Region], AzINmash [Azerbaijan Scientific Research Institute of Petroleum Machine Building], OKB Neftemash [possibly Special Petroleum Machine Building Design Bureau], NIPI "Neftekhimavtomat [Scientific Research and Design Institute for Comprehensive Automation in the Petroleum and Chemical Industries], and others should make a more substantial contribution to development of the sector.

The work of the republic Academy of Sciences' subdivisions that study problems of the petroleum and gas extraction industry is inefficient. Certain areas of pure and applied science in the fields of petroleum and gas extraction and exploration are developing too slowly, often divorced from the prospects for development of the sector.

Scientists must make a firm turn toward timely practical problems of petroleum and gas extraction industry. We need technology that surpasses the current needs of the sector, and the comprehensiveness of technical concepts is fundamentally important. We must work more persistently to reduce manual labor at the oil-fields.

The development of the republic's petroleum and gas extraction industry, especially in the Caspian Sea, is linked to accelerating solutions to many problems of technically re-equipping for petroleum extraction and drilling. A number of these problems require appropriate review at USSR organs. At the same time, there are also many matters that can and must be taken care of in the local area, through republic efforts.

There are still serious complaints against enterprises of machine building, metallurgy, petrochemistry, and other sectors linked to the work of petroleum workers. At many of them the managers do not work adequately on problems of the petroleum industry and take too long on problems of development and production of equipment and various kinds of tools and materials for oilfields and drilling.

The question of the quality of pipe, subsurface and electrocentrifugal pumps, hose, and a number of other types of equipment continues to be critical. The problem of supplying the sector with highly efficient equipment and tools for ongoing and capital repair of wells and for well operation is not being handled satisfactorily. The equipment used for these purposes requires the use of a large share of heavy manual labor.

Serious complaints were made against the work of the deep-water offshore platform plant. They have not fulfilled their set plan for production of platforms either last year or this year. As a result production is being held up at a number of promising offshore deposits. The management, the plant party organization, the Baku party gorkom, and the Karadagskiy Rayon party committee must get to the bottom of this situation and take decisive steps to see that these hydroengineering structures are built and delivered to petroleum workers on time.

Carrying out the tasks put before republic petroleum workers requires resolute actions at all levels of economic and party work and coordinated efforts by all the ministries, departments, enterprises, and organizations involved with the work of the petroleum and gas extraction industry. The managers of these ministries, departments, and enterprises must be permeated with a sense of personal responsibility for the state of affairs in petroleum extraction and take exhaustive steps to more fully satisfy the wants and needs of the petroleum workers quickly.

The collectives of industrial enterprises and scientific and design organizations, their primary party organizations, and the corresponding party raykoms are expected to develop a broad movement of working people for rapid development of up-to-date, highly productive petroleum and gas extraction equipment and its incorporation by production. This would be a real contribution by them to stepping up the development of the petroleum and gas extraction industry in the republic, and in the whole country as well.

Speakers at the meeting dwelt in detail on social-domestic problems. The republic party organization has also considered them important. A great deal has been done in recent years, but even more remains to be done.

We cannot accept the fact the the Azneft' Association is permitting a decline in the volume of housing construction. Last year the volume of housing introduced by the association through its own efforts dropped almost 10,000 square meters compared to the level attained earlier. And no increase in the volume of housing construction is envisioned this year either. But after all, it is the association first of all who should solve the problem of providing housing to the working people on the apartment waiting list, and there are more than 3,000 of them. At the same time, it was pointed out at the meeting, the construction organizations of Baku should help the petroleum workers build housing.

We know that people work better and more productively when they can feel that there is constant concern for improving the working and living conditions. This is exactly the situation with services to the petroleum workers at the Production Association imeni XXII S"yezda KPSS and the petroleum and gas extraction administrations imeni 26 Bakinskikh Komissarov, Ordzhonikidzeneft', Kirovneft', and Karadagneft', where the workers have good dining halls, clubs, libraries, red corners, television sets, and current newspapers. Medical service for people working in the sector has also improved somewhat.

At the same time, there are still many shortcomings in cultural-domestic services for petroleum workers. Comfortable special clothing and footwear, as well as other individual protective gear, are not always available in the necessary quantities. It is still not unusual to lack showers, drying rooms, and rooms to store work clothing; many oilfield communities have no laundry and dry cleaning or garment and shoe repair service.

Public catering leaves much to be desired; its facilities often do not meet sanitary requirements. By no means all of the dining halls have appropriate furniture, and service is poor. Dormitories for petroleum workers demand

serious attention; there are many criticisms and complaints about the condition of the dormitories.

And yet every dormitory has deputies in charge of domestic and household matters, and worker supply departments whose service duty and party obligation is to resolve problems promptly when they arise and to look after the working people all the time.

In this connection, speakers at the meeting criticized the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions, the Republic Committee of the Trade Union of Petroleum and Gas Industry Workers, and local soviet organs. These matters should be a matter of constant attention and concern for them.

In the program of measures to further the development of the petroleum and gas extraction industry, questions of the selection, placement, and indoctrination of personnel are decisive, it was stressed at the meeting. The republic's petroleum and gas industry as a whole has highly qualified, experienced specialists who are capable of solving large and important problems.

At the same time, the level of work with personnel, by the associations as well as the party raykoms and the Baku gorkom, does not meet contemporary requirements. They are not demanding enough of personnel with respect to assigned work. As a result, certain managers of extraction and drilling administrations and other subdivisions of the sector have gotten used to failure to fulfill plans. Instead of a critical approach to their activity they look for excuses to justify their inertia and lack of initiative. Shortcomings of this kind were characteristic of the managers of the Siazanneft', Leninneft', and Muradkhanlyneft' extraction administrations; therefore, organizational measures had to be taken and the management of certain administrations strengthened.

Sometimes people are promoted to a position without a thorough study of their practical, political, and moral qualities and a real test in practical work. This often results in their replacement.

Party raykoms and the economic managers of associations are not working properly with the personnel reserve. While we have a sufficient number of specialists with higher and secondary specialized education, many engineering-technical positions are occupied by people with practical experience only. The reserve has not yet become an effective arsenal for replenishment of personnel. We cannot consider it normal where only 40 of the 200 people appointed to Azneft' management positions in the current five-year plan came from the reserve. There are serious shortcomings in work with young specialists. The rate of personnel turnover is still high. Each year about one-third of the personnel of collectives turns over, and in some sectors such as drilling and underground and capital well repair it is up to 35-40 percent. It is disturbing that young workers are not staying in production. Almost one-third of the graduates of higher and secondary specialized schools assigned to extraction and drilling and ministrations since the start of the five-year plan have left the sector, and for vocational-technical schools the figure is even higher.

Economic managers, enterprise party organizations, and party gorkoms and raykoms in the local areas should look into this matter thoroughly and create conditions that help keep personnel in production.

We must also work harder to raise the prestige of the occupation of petroleum worker even higher. Everyone knows the names of the legendary petroleum workers Mikhail Kaverochkin, Bab Pirmamed, Aga Neymatulla, and Garash Amirov and their worthy contemporary successors Musa Bayramov, Salman Nagiyev, Mamed Gambarov, Akif Amanov, Agadadash Kerbalay-ogly, and Vekil' Abbasov.

It is the duty of party organizations, propagandists, and all ideological activists to indoctrinate our contemporaries with the example of our glorious labor traditions. This is also an enormous field of activity for trade union and Komsomol organizations and the mass information media. This work must be begun while students are still in general and vocational-technical school; in the latter young people should be taught pride in the occupation of petroleum worker.

The creative unions -- the writers, artists, journalists, composers, and movie makers -- are greatly in debt to the petroleum workers. In recent years there have been no large works of literature, musical pieces, or movies praising the noble and honorable labor of the petroleum worker. Creative workers must fill this gap.

Work to strengthen labor and production discipline must also be activated and carried on more purposefully. The associations still permit numerous violations of various types and losses of work time run into tens of thousands of worker-days. The results of the slackening of labor discipline in a number of sectors are the high accident rate and defective work, including in underground and capital repair, and rise in downtime for organizational reasons.

The party gorkoms and raykoms of the petroleum regions and the primary party organizations, it was said at the meeting, must raise the level of all organizational and political work in labor collectives. We must intensify party monitoring and raise the accountability of managers and engineering-technical personnel for the work situation. In connection with the expansion of work in the central and western regions of the republic, rural party raykoms must now work more energetically to attract personnel, especially the younger generation, to the petroleum and gas extraction industry. The party committees are expected to give the party organizations of petroleum workers practical help, attempting to make each one of them the political nucleus of the labor collective.

The party gorkoms and raykoms must intensify their guidance of the activity of the extraction and drilling administrations, work more thoroughly and solidly on finding practical solutions to the pressing problems of petroleum and gas extraction, carefully and comprehensively analyze the reasons for the lagging of each enterprise, and take realistic steps to eliminate them.

The employees of the party committees must be well aware of the situation in the fields and in the brigades and give help to economic managers and primary party organizations to insure unconditional fulfillment of established assignments for extraction of petroleum and gas and for drilling. And employees of

the appropriate departments in the Central Committee and republic Council of Ministers should visit the local areas more often and look more thoroughly into the concerns of the petroleum workers.

The Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions, the republic Committee of the Trade Union of Petroleum and Gas Industry Workers, and economic managers of the sector must systematically improve the organization of socialist competition and more broadly disseminate and introduce the know-how of leading collectives and progressive forms of labor organization and stimulation.

People in the local areas often take a formalistic approach to organizing competition. The efforts of the competitors are dispersed over numerous initiatives, not focused on the main thing --achieving good final results. The know-how of leading workers does not always receive due publicity and dissemination.

The patriotic initiatives "Above-plan extraction every day" and "Maximum recovery from every well" began at the Baku oilfields at the start of last year. They were enthusiastically supported in the brigades. Last year showed that this made it possible to eliminate many shortcomings in the organization of socialist competition and to eliminate, to some degree, the leveling approach in totaling the results of competition.

And Comrade Ibragimov, operator at the Karadagneft' extraction administration, is right, the meeting emphasized. In an article entitled "From Tradition and Conscience" in PRAVDA on 21 February 1985 Ibragimov raised the question of wider dissemination of these initiatives. He should also be supported in the idea that the organizers of competition must do everything possible to increase the interest of the collectives themselves in improving the work and give them practical help in surmounting difficulties, bringing up the lagging ones, and moving the "middle-level" ones to the level of the leaders.

The conversion to brigade forms of labor organization and stimulation demand more thorough economic training and organizational work. Where this is ignored they do not get the desired results. This is what happened, among others, at the underground well repair brigades of the Azizbekovneft' extraction administration and the Leninneft' extraction administration, where 67 underground repair brigades were switched to the unregulated system of labor payment and only three are now working under this progressive system.

Broad development of socialistic competition among petroleum workers and dissemination of the know-how of leading collectives is one of the main tasks of party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and economic managers of the sector.

The Azneft' and Kasporneftegazprom associations face large and important challenges this year. They are difficult challenges, but feasible. All necessary engineering-technical and organizational conditions for this have been created. It is the duty of republic petroleum workers to put all reserves into action to realize them.

The meeting adopted a resolution which assures the CPSU Central Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee, and Comrade K. U. Chernenko that republic

petroleum workers, loyal to their labor traditions, will apply all their efforts, knowledge, and experience to improve the situation in the sector, will make a worthy contribution to development of the country's fuel-energy complex, and will greet the upcoming 27th congress of our native Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the 31st Congress of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in a worthy manner.

Participating in the work of the meeting were comrades O. A. Bagirov, A. S. Denisov, S. Ch. Kasumova, I. A. Mamedov, G. N. Seidov, S. B. Tatliyev, K. A. Khalilov, Z. M. Yusif-zade, L. Kh. Rasulova, and G. Sh. Efendiyev.

11,176

CSO: 1830/399

REGIONAL

GAPUROV AT MEETING ON PARTY AND STATE DISCIPLINE

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 7 Mar 85 p 1

[Turkmeninform Article: "Seminar Meeting of the Turkmen CPCC"]

[Text] TURKMENINFORM --On 6 March a seminar-meeting of representatives of party commissions attached to the republic's party committees was held in the Turkmen CP Central Committee. Secretaries of the party's raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms, executives of the Turkmen CP Central Committee apparatus, the Presidium of the Tu SSR Supreme Soviet and the TuSSR Council of Ministers, the republic's Committee of People's Control, law enforcement organs, and representatives of the public and the press were invited to the meeting. Ya. Berdyev, chairman of a party commission under the Turkmen CP Central Committee, gave a report "On the Work Practice and the Tasks of Party Commissions Under Party Committees for the Further Strengthening of Party and State Discipline and for Improving Monitoring Activity". The reader of the report and other speakers noted that party commissions under party committees are conducting specific work for strengthening party and state discipline. Along with this, present shortcomings and omissions in the work of party commissions and their monitoring activity were pointed out, and specific measures for eliminating them determined. The participants of the seminar meeting compared work experience and made their suggestions directed towards the further improvement of the work of party commissions. N.S. Konovalov, a member of the CPSU Central Committee and of the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee, spoke at the seminar-meeting. M.G. Gapurov, first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, gave a speech at the seminar-meeting. He dwelled in detail on the tasks of the party commissions under the republic's party committees for the further strengthening of party and state discipline and of their monitoring activity. The following members and candidate members of the Buro of the Turkmen CP Central Committee participated in the work of the seminar meeting: P. Annaobrazov, A.S. Boyko, V.F. Zhulenev, N.V. Makarkin, G.S. Mishenko, M. Mollayeva, A.I. Rachkov, M.A. Charyyev, M.G. Schmidt and V.A. Kar'kov.

12810

CSO: 1830/427

REGIONAL

UZBEK CP CC BURO ON LAW AND ORDER, DISCIPLINE

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 11 Apr 85 p 1

/Unsigned article: "In the Buro of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party"/

/Text/ At its regular meeting, the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro reviewed the proposals, requests and criticisms made by the participants of the 19th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee. The party committees, Gosplan, ministries and departments were given appropriate assignments, and stipulations were made for monitoring their implementation.

There was a discussion regarding the work of the party organizations of the republic's agricultural machine-building enterprises to better utilize machine-tool stock. It was proposed that the ~~obkoms~~, gorkoms, raykoms and primary party organizations be more demanding of industrial managers regarding unconditional fulfillment of planned tasks for increasing the coefficient of shift work and involvement of all equipment in the production process. It was also proposed that they take under their control the certification and rationalization of employment positions, and the moral and material stimulation of workers who have more than one profession and are transferred to multiple-machine maintenance, and those working in soldering shops.

The attention of trade union and Komsomol organizations and managers was directed toward the necessity of increasing work and production discipline, of consolidating personnel and reducing their turnover, introducing new technology, mechanizing labor-intensive processes and creating the proper social-domestic conditions for the workers of the enterprises to make possible productive work in the evening shifts.

The Central Committee Buro reviewed the question of the progress of the fight against misappropriation of socialist property, bribery and speculation in the Karakalpak ASSR. The oblast party committee, soviet and law enforcement organs, ministries and departments of the autonomous republic were requested to intensify activity aimed at

eradicating negative phenomena and more closely tie this activity with measures to fulfill the decisions of the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee; strengthen party, state and work discipline; improve selection, placing and indoctrination of personnel; and increase their responsibility for preserving national property.

It was proposed that the Council of Ministers, ministries and departments of the Karakalpak ASSR ensure strict organization of state bookkeeping, especially in the lower levels of the national economy, eradicate misrepresentations and eyewash, tighten control of the observance of legislation on land use and of consumption of raw materials and materials, and unremittingly eliminate the reasons and conditions fostering mismanagement, wastefulness and mercenary crimes. The party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations should create a social opinion based on principle around violators of the norms of communist morals and Soviet law. In the fight against negative phenomena, the role of workers' collectives should be increased and work monitoring, people's patrols, operative Komsomol detachments and comrades' courts should be more actively employed.

A report was heard from the party buro of the Ministry of Consumer Services for the people of the Uzbek SSR on the increase of responsibility of the Communists of the apparatus for intensifying the fight against misrepresentations and deceit in light of the demands of the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee. The Central Committee Buro pronounced the work of the party buro of the Ministry of Consumer Services unsatisfactory. The party buro is ineffective at influencing the activity of the collegium for resolving urgent issues regarding the development of the branch, and at creating a businesslike environment in the ministry's collective. The party buro is biding its time in evaluating the results of the work of the apparatus and reviewing the personal affairs of the Communists. The party organization has not established proper monitoring of the fulfillment of party and government directives regarding questions of consumer services for the population and their own decisions. The ministry is not showing decisiveness in bringing to account those guilty of defrauding the state, misrepresentations and eyewash.

On the basis of this critical analysis, the party buro of the Ministry of Personal Services was charged with radically reorganizing their work so that the decisions of the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee would become the basis of the activity of the Communists and all workers of the ministry. It is necessary to demand more active participation by the Communists in implementing the decisions of the party, to make fuller use of the mobilizing and indoctrinating role of party meetings and to ensure an aggressive position in carrying out the adopted decisions. The commission for monitoring the work of the apparatus, the people's control group and the trade union and Komsomol organizations should work efficiently.

It was proposed that the leaders of the ministry concentrate their efforts on eradicating negative phenomena in the branch and mobilize all workers to unconditionally fulfill the national economic plan, comprehensively increase the total amount and quality of consumer services, strengthen discipline and bring proper order to the enterprises and apparatus. Those not wishing to work honestly, who defraud the state and engage in bribery should be decisively gotten rid of.

In order to increase the efficient use of land, water and labor resources, the Uzbek CP Central Committee and Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR adopted a decree on the enlargement and organization of new sovkhozes and other agricultural enterprises.

Measures were endorsed for increasing the total output of footwear, for improving its quality and variety in the enterprises of the Uzbek SSR and for improving its trade in 1985-1990. Due to the construction of new enterprises and the expansion of existing ones, production of footwear will increase to 51.1 million pairs by 1990.

At the meeting of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro a number of other questions regarding the implementation of the economic and social policies of the CPSU and the organizational and political work of the party organizations were discussed.

12793

CSO: 1830/500

REGIONAL

LITHUANIANS COMPLAIN OF INEFFICIENT POSTAL SERVICE

Readers Denounce Postal Inefficiency

Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 24 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by L. Kreshchenskaya, SOVETSKAYA LITVA correspondent: "What Has Happened to the Mail?"]

[Text] It is no accident that we have presented this question as the title. Recently many of our readers have asked it.

Specifically, Veniamin Stepanovich Popov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, begins his letter to the editors of SOVETSKAYA LITVA with this very same question.

"...I have been living in Vilnius for a little over 40 years," he says. "All these years have been corresponding extensively and regularly with my comrades from the front. Yet never before have I experienced that which happened on the eve of 1985...It is enough that letters from various cities took up to 2 or more weeks to reach me. However, the following example is the most indicative of the work of our postal service. A letter sent from Novo-Vilni took 12 days to reach Antakalnye Street. It is characteristic that for some reason the envelopes are not stamped lately with the mailing date."

Here is a letter from N. Ye. Mironov, a veteran of war and labor from the city of Taurage:

"...I earnestly ask you to help bring order to the Taurage Communications Center. Here is the problem. Every month my pension is sent to my home. Often it happens that the money order is sent to a different address. Recently, however, there was a totally out-of-place occurrence. For a long time I did not receive my money order. I began looking for it. And imagine my surprise when they gave me a notice at the post office stating that the 'Addressee no longer resides at this address.' I had to show my passport with registration to prove to the postal service workers that I had never changed my place of residence. It would seem that the error would be rectified. But the next month the same thing happened again. I was again 'written out' of my usual place of residence. And yet this communications section has a banner proclaiming that a communist labor collective works here."

Unfortunately, our readers are ever more frequently expressing reproach to the communications workers for various misunderstandings in receiving correspondence.

We cannot help but share the concern of some of our subscribers for late receipt of periodical publications.

"...I subscribed at the El'fa Association to the newspapers KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (central and republic editions), to journals and to the newspaper IZVESTIYA... My troubles began with the latter," writes I. Udalov, a fitter in the assembly shop. "On 12 January I did not receive a single issue of IZVESTIYA. The problem was that the receipt had been improperly filled out. I inquired repeatedly at the delivery section and at the "Soyuzpechat" agency. But I never was able to get the newspaper. In my desperation, I even tried (funny, isn't it?) to telephone the business office, from which I received only a busy signal. Then I wrote a letter to the editor. I hope that you will sooner help me get the newspaper to which I subscribed..."

Judging by the editorial mail, such facts are far from being the exception. The organization of prompt and continued delivery of periodical publications to the subscribers leaves much to be desired.

Also, there are quite frequently complaints (particularly from Kaunass residents) on the late delivery of central publications to the "Soyuzpechat" kiosks.

"...Why is it, for example, that last year we were able to buy newspapers and journals on the way to work?" asks A. Korshun from Kaunass. "Yet today they often appear in the kiosks only by 11 o'clock. This is very inconvenient."

What can we say. Certain difficulties and problems may arise in any endeavor. But the shame of the matter is that certain services are in no hurry to remedy them. Yet all such confusion should be demedied skillfully and efficiently, in a businesslike manner, without forcing people to engage in tiring correspondence, to sound the alarm to superior departments, or to ask for help from the newspaper.

Communications Minister Answers Complaints

Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 7 Mar 85 p 2

[Article: "What Has Happened to the Mail?"]

[Text] This was the title of an article published in our newspaper on 24 January 1985. It dealt with a discussion of certain shortcomings in the organization of delivery of newspapers and journals to subscribers. This problem interested our readers. This was indicated by the letters which our editorial office received. Their authors not only expressed various pretensions, but also presented a number of proposals aimed at improving the work of the communications sections.

Specifically, L. Taras'yeva, who lives on Vingryu Street in Vilnius, complained that she does not always receive PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA. Often she had to return other people's letters to the post office which had been mistakenly delivered to her. N. Narbekov, resident of the city of Kedaynyay, also had a number of complaints about the work of the communications section in this city. Kaunass resident N. Svintsov told of cases of late delivery of newspapers to subscribers. V. Andreyev from Shyaulayay wrote of late delivery of newspapers and journals. Ye. Romanenko told of delays in delivery of a money order sent from the city of Ionishkis to Shyaulayay.

The editorial staff has asked R. Monkyavichyus, Lithuanian SSR deputy minister of communication, to look into the complaints contained in the readers' letters. Here are his responses to the questions raised in the letters from the readers.

The Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Communications has carefully examined the article entitled "What Has Happened to the Mail?" and has taken appropriate specific measures to improve postal communications service to the population.

On 28 January 1985, a conference was held with the managers of the republic's communications enterprises. This conference analyzed the shortcomings in the work of postal communications enterprises and "Soyuzpechat" and stressed the need for improving the quality and culture of service to the population.

A two-day seminar was held for postal communications zonal dispatchers on working out a precise schedule for shipment of printed matter and correspondence and on increasing control over the quality of delivery service work.

In checking out the facts contained in the article, it was determined that the letter of V. S. Popov, which had been sent from N. Vil'ni to Antakal'ne Street was delayed in delivery due to the fault of the Republic Railside Post Office, which had not prepared properly for processing New Year's correspondence. The shortcomings in the work of this post office were discussed and measures were outlined for improving letter sorting during peak load days.

The money orders are delivered to pensioner I. Ye. Mironov by postmen from the Taurage Communications Center D. Valantenene and A. Griblite. Postman D. Valantenene has been deprived of his monthly bonus for inattention to his duties, and N. Ye. Mironov has received an apology. The communications center has taken the necessary measures to see that such infractions do not recur.

The subscription for the newspaper IZVESTIYA was taken from I. Udalo by public press distributor L. Turauskene. It was her fault that the second part of the card for newspaper delivery was incorrectly filled out. It was written out to P. Kisel', who lives at 20 Karolinishkyu Street, Apartment 60. Agency instructor I. Kachkan, who did not take urgent measures to correct the error, received a bonus reduction, and I. Udalo received an apology for the trouble caused him.

In accordance with the schedule for newspaper shipment, the central and republic publications are delivered to Kaunas at 5:20. After sorting, the newspapers

the newspapers are delivered to the "Soyuzpechat'" kiosks at 7:00. However, there are cases of late publication of the republic newspapers, as well as of the city newspaper KAUNO TIESA. In these cases, the newspapers are delivered late to the kiosks.

The ministry of Communications is planning to organize a target investigation of the work of its enterprises on shipment and delivery of printed matter and mail and to discuss the results of this investigation at the collegium meeting in the second quarter of 1985.

The editorial staff's investigations of the letters revealed the following.

ON THE CLAIM BY L. TARAS'YEVA

The sector in which L. Taras'yeva lives is served by D. Martsinkevich, who has worked as a mail carrier for 6 years. She knows her sector well and fulfills her duties conscientiously. However, she made an error in compiling her list of newspaper subscribers for November and December, and delivered the newspaper to the apartment next door.

The mail carrier has been strictly reprimanded for her error in mail delivery. The 24th communications section has increased control over the work of D. Martsinkevich.

ON THE CLAIM BY N. NARBKOV

The first communications section of the city of Kedaynyay accepts parcels, printed matter, money orders, mail correspondence and telegrams from the population and provides for inter-city telephone communications.

For the purpose of speeding up delivery of publications to the residents of Kedaynyay, the delivery service has been transferred from the first communications section to the rayon communications center. This measure has made it possible to deliver publications to subscribers 1.5 hours sooner, to more reliably ensure the operation of the delivery service, and to more effectively utilize the transport means and the work force.

Mail carriers deliver valuable and registered letters, printed matter and money orders to the home. The residents must pick up only parcels at the communications center.

We believe that it would be inexpedient to change the established order of operation.

ON THE CLAIM BY N. SVINTSOV

The time for delivery of publications to N. Svintsov changed due to a restructuring of transport traffic along the streets adjoining Laysves Lane. In connection with this, the postal routes and delivery sections were restructured.

House No 118, in which N. Svintsov resides, is currently at the end of the mailman's route. According to the schedule, publications are delivered to him by 10:00.

On 25 January of this year, KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA was not published, and on the 26th this newspaper was received late in the city of Kaunas.

There is delivery of central newspapers in the city of Kaunas on Mondays.

ON THE CLAIM BY N. ANDREYEV

In January of this year there were cases of late delivery of publications to the city of Shyaulyay.

As of 1 February 1985, the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Communications in conjunction with the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House have reviewed the schedules for expediting and shipping publications to the central communications enterprises.

At the present time, new schedules have been worked out for the work of mail carriers, and publications will be delivered to citizen Andreyev between 12:00 and 12:30.

ON THE CLAIM BY Ye. ROMANENKO

Money orders addressed to Ye. P. Romanenko were not sent from Ionishkis in August of 1984.

On 10 August 1984 he was sent the sum of 15 rubles 28 kopeks by postal money order No 4/616. It was sent by the Ionavskiy Chemical Construction Trust and was paid out on 14 August 1984. The money order in the sum of 23 rubles 80 kopeks addressed to the claimant in August of 1984 was not recorded.

On 17 January 1985, the above mentioned trust issued a postal money order No 9/986 in the sum of 27 rubles 15 kopeks to Ye. A. Romanenko. The money was paid out on 23 January 1985.

The communications workers do not make any deductions from money sent by postal money orders.

The Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Communications thanks the readers of SOVETSKAYA LITVA for their critical comments regarding the work of the communications workers.

12322

CSO: 1800/264

REGIONAL

AzSSR MINISTRY WORKERS PRINT RELIGIOUS BOOKS IN ARABIC

Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 3 Feb 85 p 4

[Article, under the rubric "From the Courtroom": "When There Is No Control"]

[Text] It was a cold winter evening. But the two young men bending from the weight of their hefty suitcases and bags were hot. They were hurrying to catch a train, and sweat was pouring down their reddened faces.

"What are you carrying?" the militia associates on the platform asked them.

The young men exchanged embarrassed glances. "Well, we ourselves don't know. These aren't our things."

The suitcases were opened in the office. Out of them poured sheets of paper covered with small ornamental Arabic script. Specialists established that the suitcases and bags contained still-unbound religious books which, as it was discovered, had been unofficially published in Baku.

The clues led from there, on the platform of the Baku train station, to an underground printing house which had undertaken legally prohibited private enterprise activities.

One thread led to the Community imeni Razin, to A. Glukhov's apartment in Building No 126 on Molodezhnaya Street. If a person entering this apartment did not know that it was occupied by a fitter working in the gas utility system, he might think that he had come upon a bookstore, or at least a binding shop. Stacks of thick folios rose along the walls. Unglued and unbound books, paper, cardboard, "liderin" [translation unknown], and cans of glue were everywhere. The binding business which Glukhov had set up in his apartment was virtually on an industrial basis. His workshop had a cutting machine built by a craftsman, an electric motor, and other devices.

All the books, both the finished ones and the semifinished articles, were written in Arabic, a language which Glukhov did not understand at all, of course. He was not interested in the content of the books, although he knew that they were religious. What interested the "self-made" bookbinder was something else -- the money which he could receive for these publications. And he worked his hardest.

But a binding shop alone is not enough for a book to be published, of course; it also has to be printed. And this is where L. Belyayeva appears on the scene. She was head of the printing office of the machine accounting station for the republic Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, and Glukhov had once worked there as a repairman. His proposal to use the equipment of the state printing office for personal profit was attractive to Belyayeva. In the evenings, when the employees of the office had gone home, the manager would put on an apron and turn into a printing worker. Using a Romayor offset machine she copied the pages of books that were given to her in the original.

Having once taken up the slippery path of crime, a person often wanders even further down it. That is how it was with Belyayeva, who did not even hesitate to steal state property. The underground printing shop she set up worked with materials intended for entirely different purposes. Belyayeva used tons of state paper and dozens of kilograms of foil for her own personal profit.

The criminal group put together by Glukhov marketed its products with the help of M. Mutsol'gov, an inhabitant of Nazran' in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. He ordered the literature, delivered the originals which were copied at the printing office, and distributed its output in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, profiting from the religious feelings of believers.

We should note that this literature also went from Baku to Dagestan, but this was by another channel, through A. Galkin's criminal group. His position as electrical installer for Baktonnel'sstroy was only a cover he set up for his underground publishing enterprise. This adventurer, who had already been convicted for illegal possession of a weapon and for forging permanent passes for urban transportation, decided to make his money on religion this time. Galkin entered a criminal conspiracy, as the lawyers say, with a certain G. Suleymanov, a 76-year-old inhabitant of Khasavyurt, where Galkin had once worked as a photographer. Suleimanov enlisted several of his people in the group, and the work started rolling.

One of the volumes of the criminal file contains a green student's diary, filled with many dates, names, and figures written in a very adult hand. Suleimanov, in whose home this "ledger" was found, said that he entered all his expenses (to whom, how much, and for what) and income also (from whom and for what) in it. Suleimanov's scrupulousness helped put his accomplices in speculation in religious calendars and similar publications in Dagestan on trial. Between just 1981 and 1984 they sold 63,930 rubles worth of underground literature.

The criminal groups of Glukhov and Galkin operated independently, not knowing of one another. Only L. Belyayeva participated in both, offering the equipment entrusted to her to the money-grubbing scoundrels. The crime committed by the underground publishers involves more than the material loss incurred by the state, the tons and kilograms of paper, foil, cardboard, and "liderin" stolen from the state and the illegal use of printing and binding equipment. By printing and distributing books known to contain harmful material, the criminals also inflicted purely ideological losses and had a negative influence on the young people who found themselves in the sphere of their unlawful activity.

The 73-year-old A. Murtuzaliyev even operated a small "medressah" in his apartment in Khasavyurt, and tried to impose his religious dogmas on the children.

Law enforcement organs stopped the criminal activity of the underground publishers. Their guilt was irrefutably demonstrated through witness testimony, physical evidence taken from their apartments, and technical and handwriting expert witnesses. Moreover, the criminals in court admitted they had committed the acts and exposed one another.

The court collegium of the Baku City Court under the chairmanship of E. G. Nabiyeu sentenced A. Galkin to seven years loss of freedom with assignment to a strict-regime corrective labor colony, while A. Glukhov and L. Belyayeva were given four years imprisonment and the other defendants received various types and periods of punishment.

The court issued a special order addressed to the republic Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, calling the ministry's attention to the lack of proper control over subordinate organizations, in particular the Computing Center to which the printing office was attached. The order points out the need to eliminate as quickly as possible the factors and conditions that made it possible for criminal elements to engage in unlawful activity for a long time under the protection of a state enterprise.

11,176

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REGIONAL

UZBEK CPCC DISCUSSES SHORTCOMINGS IN BOOK PUBLISHING

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 19 Feb 85 p 1

[UzTag Article: "To Improve the Work of Publishing Houses"]

[Text] (Uz TAG)--Tasks for improving the work of the republic's publishing houses were examined in the Uzbek CP Central Committee. Managers and staff members of the editorial offices of publishing houses, representatives of creative unions, prominent writers, literary critics and printing trades workers participated in the discussion of this problem. It was noted that work directed towards improving publishing activity and raising the ideological-artistic level and the quality of book production is being conducted in the republic in light of the demands of the 26th Party Congress, the June (1983) Plenum of CPSU Central Committee and the directives and recommendations presented in comrade K.U. Chernenko's speeches. It was stated that there are serious shortcomings in the work of a number of publishing houses. Books which do not answer the the growing spiritual needs of the Soviet people are still being published. The task is to establish an atmosphere of high exactingness and of the responsibility of each worker for the content and quality of book production in every collective of publishers and printing trades workers, as demanded by the decisions of the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee.

12810

CSO: 1830/427

END