


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12 February 1986

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INFLUENCE OF WHEAT SOWING PERIOD ON GROWTH AND YIELDS

Bucharest CEREALE SI PLANTE TEHNICE in Romanian No 8, Aug 85 pp 29-38

[Article by Professor Dr. Gheorghe Bilteanu and Engineer Victor Stefan of the N. Balcescu Agronomic Institute, Bucharest: "The Influence of Sowing Period and Density on Wheat Germination and Yields in the Conditions of the Central Romanian Plain, in the Years 1982-84 (the Moara Domneasca Teaching and Experimentetal Station)"]

[Text] Research concerning optimal sowing time for autumn wheat and sowing density (germinable grains per square meter) has been of special interest in Romania ever since 1930 and since the establishment of the Institute of Agronomic Research (ICAR). In the past 15-20 years, as the Fundulea Institute for Grain and Industrial Crops created strains with an increased genetic potential (8,000-9,000 kg per hectare), this type of research was resumed and developed in the most varied climatic and soil conditions in which autumn wheat is cultivated in our country.

In the following paper we will present in short the experimental results, with different dates of sowing and densities, on the brown-reddish soil typical of the Romanian Plain, obtained in 2 very different years from a climatic viewpoint, on unirrigated land. Two biologically different strains were studied, concerning particularly the number of harvestable ears per square meter, namely: the Iulia strain, standardized in 1973, and the Fundulea 29 strain, standardized in 1979. The experiments were cultivated after peas.

Climatic conditions. Graphs 1 and 2 show that the 2 years in which the experiments were carried out were markedly different regarding both temperatures and precipitation.

In 1982-83, the average monthly temperature was clearly higher than in 1983-84, when temperatures were lower (even than normal) especially in the months of October, November, December, February, March, and April (graph 1).

Precipitations, which considerable deviations from the norm, fell in different quantities in the 2 years (558.3 mm in 1982-83; 657.8 mm in 1983-84, 99.5 mm more). At the same time, the precipitation distribution during the wheat vegetation period also differed (graph 2), a fact which had special consequences on the vegetation and yields.

Results Obtained

Table 1 (1982-83) shows that in the fall, on different sowing dates, 58-70 percent of the Iulia seeds sowed sprouted; the highest sprouting percentage was achieved on sowing date 5X. The sprouting percentage of the Fundulea 29 strain was 58-79 percent, the highest percentage having been achieved on sowing date 15X. Although precipitation was low during the entire sowing period (graph 2), the water conserved in the soil from July and August rains ensured satisfactory sprouting for both strains.

Out of the plants sprouted, 66-85 percent of the Iulia strain and 85-90 percent of the Fundulea 29 strains survived until spring. the largest number of plants that died during winter had been sown on 15 September.

The number of ears harvested of the Iulia strain sowed on 15 September was very low, and that of grain sown on the other dates was practically equal to the Fundulea 29.

The prolonged drought that lasted from September to May had a strong impact on the productivity elements of the plants; thus, average yields per hectare were particularly low (table 3); the optimal sowing period for both strains was between 10-15 October. Note that the yield difference between the two strains was insignificant; the Fundulea 29 strain, known for its greater layering capacity and production potential, suffered more than the Iulia strain as a result of the long drought, and the vegetation conditions did not permit its genetic potential to assert itself.

In 1983-84 (table 2) the wheat did not sprout in the fall. During the sowing period the quantity of water in the soil was low (graph 2), dropping below the minimum seed germination limit. The wheat began to sprout (gradually) during January, and altogether in February. Precipitations dropped markedly as of January, and temperatures rose sensibly in March. Thus, the Iulia strain produced 62-73 percent plants (a 27-38 percent loss of germinable grains) with a density of harvested ears of 491-543 per square meter, while the Fundulea 29 strain produced 71-83 percent plans out of the germinable grains, i.e., losses of germinable grains were 17-29 percent, far lower than of the Iulia strain. The number of harvested ears was higher for the Fundulea 29 by 21-29 percent as compared to the Iulia strain (613-669 harvested ears of Fundulea 29 per square meter).

In 1984, the production of both strains (table 3) was more than double that of 1983, whereby the Fundulea 29 strains exceeded the Iulia by almost 1,500 kg per hectare in some versions. That year, the optimal sowing period for both strains was between 5 and 15 October. Note that in the southern part of romania, where the experiments were carried out, because of autumn drought, in many years the wheat sprouts during the winter, particularly in January and February and even at the beginning of March. In the above mentioned conditions, we estimated the winter wheat sprouting phase in those areas as the critical phase in cases in which sprouting irrigation did not take place.

In general, specialized literature shows that winter wheat yields depend on the condition of the plants at the beginning of winter. Thus, on the basis of the data supplied by various USSR experimental stations, Prutskov (F. M. Prutskov, "Ozimaia Pshenitsa," Moskva, 1976) stated the following: when plants enter the winter with a single leaf, yields are of 600-1,000 kg per hectare; with two leaves, 3,000-5,000 kg per hectare; with three leaves, 8,000-9,000 kg per hectare; layered (4-6 layers), 10,000 kg per hectare. Completely in agreement with the view that the average wheat yield per hectare is closely connected with the condition of the plants at the beginning of winter, on the basis of the results discussed above and featured in tables 1, 2, and 3, we believe that in cases in which the wheat sprouts during the winter because it had not been irrigated, too, better yields can be obtained if sufficient rains fall in the winter months (January and February) and spring (March-May) and during the formation of the grain, and if temperatures are lower than normal, as was the case in 1984 in the area of our experiments (graphs 1 and 2). The Fundulea 29 strain produced in those conditions over 5,800 kg per hectare, while the Iulia strain produced over 4,300 kg per hectare, as compared to 2,880 kg and 3,080 kg per hectare respectively in 1983, when the plants sprouted and layered in the fall but continued their vegetation in spring in conditions of drought and without the benefit of irrigation.

The conditions prevailing in 1984 as of the month of January permitted the plants to sprout and go through all the phases characterizing the generative stage practically normally. As a result, the average wheat yield in our country increased to almost 3,200 kg per hectare on large areas in the south and east; in the west, the Banat Plain, where the wheat sprouted and layered in the fall, yields were of 6,000 and over 6,000 kg per hectare.

We studied the second aspect--sowing density (germinable grains per square meter)--in view of the conditions found to prevail in many autumns in the southern and eastern areas of the country, and which were extremely unfavorable to wheat sprouting; in some years, more than 100 days passed before the wheat sprouted. During that time the grains remained unsprouted or just beginning to sprout in the soil, and it is safe to assume that a considerable number of germinable seed would thus be lost. In such conditions, is it possible to assist crop density (harvestable ears) by sowing a larger number of germinable grains?

In the fall of 1982 we counted 63-65 percent of Iulia plants per square meter of all the germinable grains sowed (table 4). The number of plants per square meter was between 193-505, and increased from 300 toward 800 germinable grains sowed per square meter. In the spring of 1983, out of the plants sprouted in the fall only 145-392 (75-82 percent) were left per square meter, and the ears harvested were between 295-433 per square meter. The number of germinable grains sowed per square meter evidently influenced the total number of plants sprouted, the total number of plants that came up in spring, and the total number of harvestable ears. In the conditions of that year (graphs 1 and 2) the best density situation of harvestable ears was obtained with 600-800 germinable grains per square meter (table 6); with 300 germinable grains, yields were significantly lower.

The fall sprouting percentage for the Fundulea 29 strain was practically equal to that produced by the Iulia strain (62-73 percent); on the other hand, out of the total number of plants sprouted in the fall, a higher percentage, between 84-89 percent, survived until spring. As for the ears harvested per square meter, the Fundulea 29 strain performed clearly better than the Iulia with sowing densities of 300-400 germinable grains per square meter; was at the same level with densities of 500-700 germinable grains per square meter; and dropped under the Iulia level with 800 germinable grains sowed. In the conditions of 1982-83, with lower sowing densities, the Fundulea 29 strain demonstrated its layering capacity; in that year, the highest densities of harvestable ears were nevertheless achieved, for both strains, with a sowing density of 800 germinable grains per square meter (table 6).

In the fall of 1983, because of the pronounced drought, the wheat did not sprout (table 5) regardless of the sowing density. The sprouting began in January and in the spring the sprouting percentage ranged between 63-69 percentage for the Iulia strain, and 74-78 percent for the Fundulea 29, out of the total number of grains sown. It would seem that the Fundulea 29 grains show a greater resistance potential in the soil in non-germinated or partially germinated state, than the Iulia. The number of plants sprouted was, according to density, higher by 62 plants of the Fundulea 29 strain than the Iulia. The number of Iulia ears harvested was between 456-555, while that of Fundulea 29 was 22-38 percent higher.

The conditions prevailing in the spring of 1984 (graph 1, 2) favored the layering of the Fundulea 29 strain, and thus the density of the ears harvested. While for the Iulia strain, with a sowing density of 300 germinable grains the number of ears harvested was 52 percent higher, for the Fundulea 29 strain, with the same sowing density, the number of ears harvested was 86 percent higher.

In 1984, the grain yield of the Iulia strain was 4,030-4,380 kg per hectare, while the Fundulea 29 yielded 5,280-5,840 kg per hectare; this considerable difference between the two strains was caused primarily by the evidently higher capacity of the Fundulea 29 strain to form a higher number of harvestable ears per land unit (table 6).

Conclusions

The following major conclusions emerge from the above data:


--In two years with very different climatic conditions, in the brown-reddish soil area of the Romanian Plain, on unirrigated land, the optimal sowing period for the Iulia and Fundulea 29 wheat strains is at the beginning of October. In very dry falls, such as the one of 1983, early sowing causes important yield drops, while late sowing does not have any negative influence on yield as compared to the usual optimal date;

--the sowing density that ensures the largest yields ranges, in years similar to those of the experiments, between 500-600 germinable grains per square meter;

--the Fundulea 29 strain is superior to the Iulia strain from the viewpoint of its capacity to produce a larger number of plants after a lengthy period of conditions unfavorable to germination, and to form a higher density of harvestable ears per square meter;

--the yield capacity of the two strains is practically equal in some conditions (such as those of the year 1982-83); the Fundulea 29 strain is clearly superior in conditions such as the ones of 1983-84. Its superiority is determined primarily by its capacity to form a considerably larger number of harvestable ears per square meter than the Iulia strain.

Graph 1 -- Temperatures taken into calculation for winter wheat vegetation (1982-83; 1983-84)



Graph 2 -- Precipitation taken into calculation for winter wheat vegetation (1982-83; 1983-84)




Table 1

The influence of sowing date (period) for winter wheat on the number of plants sprouted and ears harvested (germinable grains per sq. m.: 550) 1982-1983

Data semănatul Sowing Date	Solul Iulia Variety				[Solul Fundulea 29 Variety				%Harvested Ears of Fundulea 29
	Fall In toamnă		Spring In primăvară		In toamnă		Spring In primăvară		Spice recoltate, %, solul Fundulea 29 comparativ cu solul Iulia Compared to Iulia
	Sprouts Plante răsarite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germina- bile semănate 1%	Plants % of all total Plante la m ² per M ²	% din total plante răsarite la m ²	Sprouts Plante răsarite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germina- bile semănate 1%	Plante la m ²	% din total plante răsarite la m ²	
15.IX	317	58	211	66	321	58	274	85	157
25.IX	368	67	306	83	350	64	307	88	98
5.X	384	70	301	78	357	65	320	90	97
15.X	359	65	274	76	435	79	382	88	108
25.X	326	59	276	85	407	74	356	87	97
5.XI	357	65	297	83	311	56	268	86	103

1* percentage of germinable grains sown

Table 2

The influence of the sowing date (period) for winter wheat on the number of plants sprouted and ears harvested (germinable grains per sq. m.: 550) 1983-1984

Sowing Date Data semănatului	Solul Iulia						Solul Fundulea 29						% of Fundulea 29 Ears Harvested		
	Fall In toamnă			Spring In primăvară			Fall In toamnă			Spring In primăvară				Spice recoltate, %, solul Fundulea 29 comparativ cu solul Iulia compared to Iulia	Ears
	Sprouts Plante răsărite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germina- bile	% din boabele germina- bile	Sprouts Plante răsărite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germina- bile	% din boabele germina- bile	Sprouts Plante răsărite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germina- bile	% din boabele germina- bile						
15.IX	—	—	346	63	491	—	—	—	389	71	613	125			
25.IX	—	—	361	66	504	—	—	—	413	75	615	122			
5.X	—	—	343	62	541	—	—	—	425	77	657	121			
15.X	—	—	363	66	543	—	—	—	426	77	669	123			
25.X	—	—	362	66	531	—	—	—	436	79	653	123			
5.XI	—	—	404	73	516	—	—	—	458	83	667	129			

1* - percentage of germinable grains sown

Table 3

Influence of sowing date on wheat yields (100 kg/hectare) in the years 1983 and 1984 (Moara Domneasca Station)

Period Epoca	Iulia				Fundulea 29			
	1983		1984		1983		1984	
	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha
15. IX	13,5	-13,8 ^{ooo}	41,4	0,2	17,6	-4,2 ^{ooo}	54,5	-1,6
25. IX	18,7	-8,6 ^{ooo}	41,6	0	18,8	-3,0 ^{oo}	55,2	-0,9
5. X	27,3	Mt.	41,6	Mt.	21,1	Mt.	56,1	Mt.
15. X	30,8	3,5 ^{***}	43,7	2,1	28,8	7,0 ^{***}	56,8	0,7
25. X	25,7	-1,6	42,9	1,3	24,2	2,4 [*]	58,1	2,0
5. XI	25,2	-2,1 ^o	43,2	1,6	23,1	1,3	58,1	2,0

DL 5% 1,9 q/ha 2,5 q/ha 1,9 q/ha 9,3 q/ha
 1% 2,5 „ 2,5 „
 0,1% 3,3 „ 3,3 „

1Q=100 KG

Table 4
Influence of sowing density on the number of plants sprouted and ears harvested (1982-83)

Sowing Density	Densitatea de semănat, boabe germinabile la m ² Grain per sq. m	Soul Iulia					Soul Fundulea 29					%Ears Harvested of Fundulea 29	
		Fall In toamnă		Spring In primăvară		Ears	Fall In toamnă		Spring In primăvară		Ears		
		Sprouts		% din boabele germina- bile semănat 1%	Plants		% of total plants la m ² per M ²	Sprouts		% din total plants la m ² per M ²			
		Plants răsarite la m ² per M ²	% plante din total plante răsarite la m ² per M ²		Plants răsarite la m ² per M ²			% plante din total plante răsarite la m ² per M ²					
300		193	64	145	75	295	201	67	170	84	353	120	
400		256	64	202	79	346	293	73	250	88	382	110	
500		320	65	250	78	376	340	68	204	86	390	104	
600		387	64	303	78	392	390	65	334	85	423	108	
700		448	64	368	82	391	463	66	407	88	303	100	
800		505	63	392	78	433	493	62	441	89	420	97	

1* - percentage of germinable grains sown

Table 5

Influence of sowing density on number of plants sprouted and ears harvested (1983-84)

Sowing Density Densitatea de semănat bonbe germinabile Grains per M ²	Solul Iulia						Solul Fundulea 29						%Fundulea 29 Ears Harvested Spice recoltate, % solul Fundulea 29 comparativ cu solul Iulia Compared to Idlia
	Fall In toamnă			Spring In primăvară			Fall In toamnă			Spring In primăvară			
	Sprouts			Sprouts			Sprouts			Sprouts			
	Plante răsărite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germinabile	% din boabele germinabile	Plante răsărite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germinabile	% din boabele germinabile	Plante răsărite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germinabile	% din boabele germinabile	Plante răsărite la m ² per M ²	% din boabele germinabile	% din boabele germinabile	
300	—	—	69	207	—	456	—	—	225	75	558	122	
400	—	—	67	269	—	490	—	—	296	74	606	123	
500	—	—	68	344	—	511	—	—	391	78	627	123	
600	—	—	65	393	—	534	—	—	467	78	659	123	
700	—	—	66	463	—	555	—	—	544	78	706	127	
800	—	—	63	503	—	521	—	—	624	78	719	138	

1* - percentage of the germinable grains sown

Table 6

Influence of sowing density on wheat yields (100 kg/hectare) in the years 1983 and 1984 (Moara Domneasca Station)

Germinable Seed Density b.g./m ² per M ²	Iulia				Fundulea 29			
	1983		1984		1983		1984	
	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha	Prod. q/ha	Dif. q/ha
300	19,6	-5,0 ^{oo}	40,3	-2,8 ^{ooo}	20,8	-2,5	52,8	-5,6 ^{ooo}
400	23,0	-1,6	42,0	-1,1	23,3	0	55,2	-3,2 ^{ooo}
500	24,6	Mt.	43,1	Mt.	23,3	Mt.	58,4	Mt.
600	25,2	0,6	43,8	0,7	23,0	-0,3	58,3	-0,1
700	23,8	-0,8	42,9	0,2	21,9	-1,4	57,1	-1,3
800	24,8	0,2	42,1	-1,0	23,0	-0,3	56,8	-1,6

4Q = 100 KG

DL 5%	3,0 q/ha	1,3 q/ha	3,0 q/ha	1,85 q/ha
1%	4,0 "	1,7 "	4,0 "	2,4 "
0,1%	5,2 "	2,2 "	5,2 "	3,1 "

CSO: 2700/41

FACTORS INFLUENCING RAPE SEED PRODUCTION

Bucharest CEREALE SI PLANTE TEHNICE in Romanian No 8, Aug 85 pp 39-47

[Article by engineer Ioan Pop of the Livada Agricultural Research Station: "The Impact of Certain Technological Factors on the Production and Quality of Fall Rape Seeds"]

[Text] Considerable progress has been recently made in the cultivation of rape, due both to increased areas sown to this plant, and especially to the achievement of strains free of erucic and eicosenoic acids (of the type LEAR-low erucic acid rape seed) and with a high oil content in the seeds. Areas sown to rape throughout the world have increased 1.6 times over, and 3.4 times over in Europe.

Within the range of plants providing edible vegetable oil, rape takes the fifth place, after soybean and sunflower (50 percent).

Increasing demand for vegetable oils have made it necessary to expand the cultivation of additional oil plants (rape), especially in areas where conditions are not favorable for sunflower and do not permit economical and stable crops, such as the north-west area of our country. Similarly, rape cultivation among field plants in cool and humid areas constitutes a good preparation for fall crops.

In our country, research studies on cultivation technologies suitable for the various soil and climatic conditions specific of each area have been relatively few (2,4,5,6,7). This aspect must be more thoroughly studied, particularly in view of the current world economic crisis, because, aside from their nutritive and industrial value, vegetable oils (rape, sunflower) have a caloric coefficient of 40,500 KJ/kg, the richest after Diesel oil (45,000 KJ/kg).

Research Method

In order to establish as correctly as possible the agrobiological requirements of several new and valuable strains of spring rape, as of 1980, the Agricultural Research Station Livada has studied, on brown [luvic] soil (1.41 percent humus, 21.3 percent clay, pH (H₂O)=5.19) aspects concerning: sowing periods for three strains (Ledos, Garant, and Quinta), quantity of seed per


hectare, and sowing spacing (Quinta); as of 1982, studies began on fodder rape of the Ratona variety (Lv-609).

Using the method of subdivided plots, the experiments were distributed in four repetitions, yields being expressed in 100 kg/hectare with 8 percent humidity and calculated according to variance analysis. Sown after fall cereal grains, the agricultural foundation was general, consisting of 90 kg N/hectare + 80 kg. P_2O_5 /hectare, whereby the nitrogen was applied in stages (1/3 in the fall and 2/3 in spring). The qualitative analyses were carried out by the biochemistry and vegetable physiology of the Fundulea Institute of Research for Cereal and Industrial Crops.

Results Obtained

The climatic conditions prevailing during the period under study conditioned rather obviously the yields achieved, with variations from one year to the other. Graph 1 shows that 1982-83 was a dry year throughout the vegetation period, and when the crops were sown after 20 September, precipitation is generally below the multiannual average (1961-83), except for 1981-82, when water was plentiful throughout the vegetation period.

Graph 1 -- Precipitation fallen during the vegetation period of fall rape (Livada 1980-83)



Generally speaking, precipitation during the sowing-sprouting period is sufficient, but shortage and particularly uneven distribution is noted in the first part of the March-June interval, which is the period of intensive growth.

The wintering resistance of the rape crops increases if $\Sigma t^{\circ} \text{C}$ from sprouting to the beginning of winter is of at least 650-700 $^{\circ}\text{C}$ (Table 1).

In the period under study the post 20 September sowing was compromised particularly because of the frost at the beginning of November, compounded by the lack of a layer of snow, with the exception of 1980-81, when the crops passed the winter well, although the sowing was after 10 October, but yields dropped 45 percent compared to those sown at the beginning of September.

Table 1

The influence of the sowing period and $\Sigma t^{\circ} \text{C}$ from sprouting to the beginning of winter on fall rape yields, in the period 1981-83, at the Livada Research Station

(1) Epoca de semănat	(4) $\Sigma t > 0^{\circ}\text{C}$ răsărit-îngheț			1981			1982			1983		
	1980	1981	1982	q/ha	d	s	q/ha	d	s	q/ha	d	s
1.IX	740	805	847	28,0	—	—	28,5	—	—	27,0	—	—
10.IX	835	701	723	25,8	-3,1	000	26,1	-2,4	00	25,7	-2,2	000
20.IX	511	557	558	24,3	-4,6	000	24,8	-4,2	000	21,7	-6,2	000
(2) Media X	628	687	700	D 5% = 1,0 q/ha			1,5 q/ha			1,1 q/ha		
Sept.	300	374	400	1% = 1,4 q/ha			2,0 q/ha			1,5 q/ha		
% din X	40%	54%	56%	0,1% = 1,0 q/ha			2,6 q/ha			2,0 q/ha		
(3) primul îngheț:	1.XI.1980 3.XI.1981 6.XI.1982			Q = 100 kg			(5) ultimul îngheț:			13.III.1981 28.IV.1982 18.IV.1983		


Key:

1. Sowing period
2. Average
3. First frost

4. Sprouting-frost
5. Last frost

The data obtained at the Livada station show that sowing after 20 September increases the risk of uneven sprouting, causes plants to develop weakly and to have a low resistance to conditions in winter and spring, and thus average yields over 3 years were 500 kg/hectare lower compared to 1 September, which means losses of 25 kg/hectare for each day of delay (seed that could be used to sow 50-60 hectares) (graph 2).

Graph 2 -- The influence of the sowing period and the soil on fall rape yields (1981-83 average), Livada



The varieties under study behaved differently: the quinta strain stood out with an average yield of 2,680 kg/hectare, higher than the Garant and Ledos varieties by 200 and 340 kg/hectare respectively; this variety produced a maximum yield of 3,130 kg/hectare when the sowing was done at the beginning of September. Average yields for the three varieties of oil rape dropped when the optimal sowing period was exceeded (in the north-west area of the country the optimal sowing period in the the first 10 days of September).

Harvesting density shows that maximum yields are achieved when there are 140-145 harvestable plants per square meter, sowing 8 kg/hectare. The lower harvesting density noted for the Ledos variety was due to the fact that this strain is more sensitive to wintering conditions.

An analysis of agroproductive traits (table 2) shows that the Quinta variety has a larger diameter, and that the number of capsules per plant and seeds per capsule are higher if the sowing is done at the optimal time.

The data concerning the influence of the interaction between sowing spacing and seed quantity (kg/hectare) on yields highlight the efficiency of sowing in close rows at 12.5 cm. intervals (graph 3) as compared to sowing at larger intervals of 25 and 50 cm. respectively. The average results obtained over 4 years (1980-83) show that by sowing 8 kg/hectare at 12.5 cm. intervals, 3,000 kg per hectare can be achieved with the Quinta variety, 460 kg/hectare more than the norm of 400 kg/hectare and 530 kg/hectare compared to crops sown at 50 cm. intervals.

Table 2

The influence of the variety and sowing period on the agroproductive traits of fall rape (1981-83 average), Livada

Sowing period	Insertion of first ramification (cm)	Average ramification height (cm)	Average plant height (cm)	Average number		
				Ramifications per plant	Capsules per plant	Seeds per capsule
LEDOS						
e ₁ - 1.IX	55,3	67,2	122,5	6,6	79,3	25,9
e ₂ - 10.IX	53,2	64,6	117,8	6,1	63,7	24,9
e ₃ - 20.IX	47,1	59,9	107,0	6,0	62,6	25,1
Average	51,9	63,9	115,8	6,2	68,5	25,3
GARANT						
e ₁ - 1.IX	61,2	66,4	127,6	6,2	76,4	20,5
e ₂ - 10.IX	57,4	65,1	122,5	6,0	65,5	21,9
e ₃ - 20.IX	55,8	61,8	117,6	5,7	56,0	24,5
Average	58,1	64,4	122,5	6,0	66,0	22,3
QUINTA						
e ₁ - 1.IX	63,4	71,5	134,9	6,4	81,2	26,2
e ₂ - 10.IX	59,6	66,0	125,6	5,8	67,3	24,3
e ₃ - 20.IX	57,0	62,3	119,3	5,4	55,2	23,5
Average	60,0	66,6	126,6	5,9	67,9	24,7


Sowing in close rows ensures optimal space for the growth and development of the plants, better soil utilization, elimination of manual hoeing, and the achievement of even fields, a fact that makes harvesting easier and permits the utilization of cereal grain harvesters without any special adaptations.

Qualitative Analyses.


The process of rape amelioration is aimed at achieving qualitative and quantitative improvements in the oil by reducing the contents of erucic, eicosenoic, and linoleic acids, while increasing the percentage of oleic and linoleic acids in the structure of fatty acids, thus making edible oils 90 percent stable, easier to preserve, and digestible. Similarly, it is sought to ensure that rape cakes do not contain glucosinolates (glucoses rich in sulphur), which cause discomfort in animal fodder.

The analysis of the protein and oil contents in seeds of the three varieties of rape in 1981 shows that a delayed sowing leads to an increased percentage of proteins and reduced oil contents. Graph 4 shows that the percentage of protein increases from 20.96 percent to 24.65 percent, and the oil contents drops from 46.55 percent to 44.22 percent.

Graph 3 --The influence of sowing spacing and seed quantity (kg/hectare) on fall rape yields, Livada Research Station



Graph 4--The ratio of oil contents (percentage) and protein (percentage) in relationship to the sowing period of fall rape in 1981, Livada



However, analyzing the quantity of oil and protein resulting per unit of area we see that maximum values are obtained when the sowing is done on 1 September, after which date yields drop. Total losses are approximately 470 kg oil per hectare when sowing is done on 10 October as opposed to 1 September. (graph 5).

Graph 5--The ratio between yields (100kg/hectare) and oil and protein quantity (kg/hectare) for fall rape in 1981




Table 3 -- Main fatty acids composition of the oil, 1981, Livada

Variety/period		Fatty acids percent of total					
		Palmitic	Stearic	Oleic	Linoleic	Linolenic	Erucic
Quinta	e-1	5,0	1,7	60,8	18,1	11,6	2,8
	e-2	5,0	1,8	59,9	18,0	12,0	3,3
	e-3	4,8	1,8	59,3	18,3	12,3	3,5
	e-4	4,8	1,5	58,5	18,3	13,2	3,7
	e-5	4,7	1,6	58,8	18,8	12,9	3,2
Garant	e-1	4,8	1,8	60,4	17,4	12,3	3,3
	e-2	5,0	1,6	60,2	17,9	12,2	3,1
	e-3	4,8	1,6	59,4	17,7	12,9	3,6
	e-4	4,8	1,8	59,3	18,0	13,1	3,0
	e-5	4,6	1,6	57,4	18,8	14,0	3,6
Ledos	e-1	4,2	2,2	63,2	15,5	11,1	3,8
	e-2	4,1	2,3	62,6	15,9	11,4	3,7
	e-3	4,0	2,1	60,4	15,8	12,5	5,2
	e-4	4,0	2,0	60,0	16,2	13,0	4,8
	e-5	4,1	2,0	59,1	18,2	12,5	4,1

Table 4.

The seed protein and oil contents and the composition of main fatty acids for the Gorczanski variety in relationship to sowing distance and quantity of seed per hectare, 1980, Livada

Sowing distance (cm)	Seed quantity (kg/ha)	% protein	Protein kg/ha	% Oil	kg/ha	Fatty acids percent of total			
						oleic	linoleic	linolenic	erucic
12.5 cm	4	23, 16	570	47, 94	1232	12, 7	11, 3	15, 8	54, 0
	6	21, 93	634	48, 60	1405	12, 8	11, 6	15, 6	53, 7
	8	21, 58	632	48, 81	1474	12, 3	11, 4	15, 9	54, 2
25 cm	4	21, 80	464	47, 11	1003	12, 3	11, 2	15, 9	54, 1
	6	23, 04	553	48, 30	1159	12, 2	11, 2	15, 9	53, 9
	8	21, 47	535	48, 79	1215	12, 1	11, 1	15, 6	54, 4
50 cm	4	22, 82	450	48, 71	980	12, 2	11, 0	16, 5	53, 8
	6	21, 57	455	48, 29	1019	12, 4	11, 3	15, 8	54, 3
	8	23, 25	521	47, 50	1064	12, 2	11, 2	15, 4	54, 5

The analyses performed show that for the three varieties the percentage of erucic acid is below the admissible limit (6-8 percent), is very low for the Quinta and Garant (2.8-3.7 percent), and is of 3.7-5.2 percent for the Ledos variety. As for the oleic acid contents, we see that it tends to drop, but not too markedly, in relation to the sowing delay, and that it registered higher values for the Ledos variety (62.6-63.2 percent) in the first two periods, after which the percentage becomes closer to the contents of the Quinta and Garant varieties. The linoleic acid contents showed the highest values for the Quinta variety (18-18.8 percent), and the lowest for the Ledos variety (table 3).

For the Gorczanski variety, cultivated in 1980, we note primarily the very high contents of erucic acid, over 54 percent, and the rather high percentage of linoleic acid (about 16 percent), a fact which makes it suitable for industrial uses (typographical inks, linoleum, etc.); similarly, we note the extremely low contents of oleic acid (12.1-12.8 percent). Analyzing the protein and oil contents in relation to the sowing distance and seed quantity (kg/hectare) we note that they do not cause essential modifications, except for the fact that the version sown in close rows, with 3 kg seed/hectare produced 400 kg oil/hectare more than the same version sown at a distance of 50 cm. between rows (table 4).

Conclusions

1. The optimal period for sowing fall rape on the [luvic] brown soils of the north-west part of our country must not exceed the first 10 days of September, when the plants can benefit from accumulated temperatures of at least 700°C before winter.
2. The Quinta variety proved to be superior to the Ledos and Garant varieties, producing yields of over 3,100 kg/hectare, sown at the beginning of September.
3. Sowing in close rows (12.5 cm.) and using 8-10 kg. of seed per hectare contributes to the achievement of even fields, ensures a harvest of at least 140 plants per square meter, and permits the utilization of cereal grain sowing [as published] machines without any special adaptation.
4. The oil percentage tends to drop in relationship to the sowing delay, regardless of soil, while the percentage of proteins reacts inversely. The quantity of protein and oil per unit of area shows maximum values when sowing is early (e_1), after which it drops steadily.
5. The varieties studied have a very low contents of erucic acid (below 3.7 percent) compared to the Gorczanski variety, which contains about 54 percent erucic acid. The quantitative and qualitative traits of the three varieties, especially the Quinta strain, can produce considerable income if the technological factors established by scientific research are observed.

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12782

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ECONOMY

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOVIET ACADEMICIAN ON INTEGRATION, IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 5 Dec '85 pp 1,2

[Interview with Academician Guriy Marchuk, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and President of the State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR, on the occasion of Soviet Science and Technology Days in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, date and place not specified]

[Text] The Soviet Science and Technology Days in the PRB are an important element in the discovery of new resources and opportunities for cooperation between our country and the USSR in the field of scientific research and in the practice of socialist economics. The leader of the Soviet delegation, Academician Guriy Marchuk, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and President of the State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR, found time in his heavy schedule to visit us and answer the questions of an editorial staff representative, Veliyana Khristova.

[Question] The economic structures in the countries of the socialist community today are mature and need to be integrated in order to facilitate mastering the latest achievements of science and technology. In this respect, Guriy Ivanovich, how would you characterize the present stage of cooperation?

[Answer] The economies of our countries are at a crucial stage, in which the factors of intensive development are fundamental. We are obliged now to be economic in the use of resources and, most of all, to exercise economies of labor. Lenin himself said that productivity of labor is the major criterion for the scientific and technological potential of society.

New technologies allow us to reduce the amount of work invested for a unit of production. When we make a capital investment to create new technology, corresponding to the achievement of contemporary scientific knowledge, and we bring it into production, it has an effect on the national economy, although it takes a few years to realize it. And production with the present technology can only cover the resources invested in it because at the end of the same few years it becomes obsolete and must be discarded.

That's how it is with the present integration between socialist countries. Let's suppose that the eight countries of CEMA make lasers and put them into

production. Instead of spending our resources once in one of the countries and exploiting all the developments that would have an effect in our factories, we are investing eight times more effort for the same thing. The socialist system permits cooperation between us, and we are losing valuable resources needlessly. This fact led our community to the decision to unite our efforts in the creation of a joint program for scientific and technological cooperation with a large common effect. Naturally, all countries must take part in investing resources for the initial development. I think that it is quite clear how important this path of development is. The economy of resources and labor that we shall realize will strengthen our countries' positions on a world scale, initially in science, technology and equipment, and afterward in economics.

The goal of our present stay in Bulgaria is to work together with Bulgarian scientists to determine those areas of cooperation that will allow us, with the minimum common resources, to resolve the most important scientific and technological tasks that will provide the greatest economic effect in the future.

[Question] How do you see the prospects for acceleration of the social and economic development that the scientific and technological revolution is opening up for our countries?

[Answer] Our ultimate goal is not to make machines and equipment but to raise the material prosperity of the people. When we speak of the impressive effect of laser technology, of powder metallurgy or of anticorrosive covers, we are referring to only one side of the issue -- the scientific and technical side. Man benefits from the results: materials, food, medicine and culture. To achieve these results, we need money, and we have to earn the money with the aid of new technology. Then the profit to the state will serve still more to resolve social problems. In this respect, the connection between scientific and technological progress and social development is quite natural. The struggle for new technology is a struggle for a high standard of living, for all the good things that are directly acquired by man.

[Question] In the planned socialist economy, the joint program for scientific and technological progress for the period up to the year 2,000 is very important. What place will there be for multilateral and bilateral ties between the member countries of CEMA?

[Answer] That is an important question. Our countries have both multilateral and bilateral interests. The complex program is conceived in such a way that there is room for all bilateral contacts that support its execution if they are generated by treaties and contracts that run under conditions of mutual interest and compensate for the resources invested for development. In this way, the complex program enables common national and bilateral interests to be consolidated. In addition, when it is advantageous, the results of bilateral cooperation may be used by all.

[Question] Bearing in mind the enormous attention paid in recent years by the CPSS (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the BCP (Bulgarian Communist Party) to the development of science and socialist cooperation in the five

directions of priority, how would you assess the creation of joint Bulgaro-Soviet scientific collectives and unions?

In my opinion, that is a pioneer activity. The Bulgarian government and the CK (Central Committee) of the BCP have repeatedly taken many important initiatives connected with the active development of international socialist cooperation in specialization, cooperation and long-term programs. The new Bulgarian suggestions for joint operation in a common program of cooperative production receive the most serious support from the side of the USSR. I am sure that this is the beginning of a very fruitful path.

We have reached agreement on the creation of joint production of computerized equipment and robots. We are preparing the creation of a specialized international organization "Robot" that will produce electronic cars, etc. That is practical integration of coordinated economic organizations.

This activity requires a very careful approach, but there is no doubt that we are witnessing a new stage in the development of socialist integration which, like every beginning, is difficult and, at the same time, very promising.

12907

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ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION TO YEAR 2000 FORECAST

Prague PLANOVANE HOSPODARSTVI in Czech Nov 8, 1985 pp 57-65

[Article by Eng Ivan Kubec, Candidate for Doctor of Science, State Planning Commission: "Projected Energy Consumption in the CSSR to the Year 2000"]

[Text] One of the foundations of the economic development of every country is the development of its fuel and power base along with reductions in energy intensiveness. At the same time, this ongoing intensification brings with it the increasing application of electricity as one of the critical elements in the overall fuel and power balance. The development of the critical figures in the CSSR over the past 20 years are presented in Table 1 and the corresponding average percentage growth rates of relative data on a per capita basis in Table 2.

For purposes of comparison we present in Table 3 similar indicators for selected countries with a comparable national economic production structure (all data are again per capita annual percentage increases in relative data).

Even though one must be very careful when drawing conclusions, because this is a matter of economies that function in the context of varying social systems (affecting the comparability of net material product and gross national product), and encompass differing standards of living, climatic conditions, primary resource availability, final consumption, and production bases, certain common features are nevertheless evident:

-- in all the monitored countries smaller and smaller increases in primary energy resource consumption will be needed over the long term to increase the net material product (gross national product) on a per capita basis by 1 percent. An elasticity coefficient defined in this way fluctuates from a value close to 1 to negative values. Obviously achieving negative values over the long term is unacceptable.

In the CSSR this elasticity coefficient fluctuated during the Fourth through the Sixth 5-Year Plans from 0.35 to 0.45 and is approaching zero in the current 5-year plan;

-- in a number of monitored countries the average annual increase over the long term in electricity consumption has been just as rapid or more rapid

than the average increase in net material product or gross national product (both measured on a per capita basis). An elasticity coefficient defined in this way fluctuates between 1 and 2. In contrast, this coefficient had values less than 1 in Great Britain and the FRG between 1970 and 1980, and it has been declining gradually in the Soviet Union.

Table 1. Development of Basic Indicators of CSSR Economic Development

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>
Population (millions)	14.159	14.334	14.802	15.311	15.503
National income (billions of Kcs in constant prices) *	178.5	280.8	370.8	453.4	492.8
Net material product (billion of Kcs in constant prices) *	405.6	677.2	895.3	1,175.6	1,285.0
Domestic consumption of primary power resources (million tons of standard fuel equivalent)	71.7	81.2	93.2	103.2	104.4
Domestic electricity consumption (billions of kilowatt hours)	35.0	48.6	63.5	74.6	82.9
Increases in per capita national income (1965=100)	100.0	137.8	176.3	204.1	219.1
Increases in per capita domestic consumption of primary power resources (1965=100)	100.0	111.9	124.3	133.1	133.0
Increases in per capita net material product (1965=100)	100.0	136.8	175.0	203.4	219.6
Increases in per capita electricity consumption (1965=100)	100.0	137.3	173.8	197.3	216.4

Table 2. Average Percentage Increase in Per Capita Ratio Data of Table 1 for CSSR

	<u>1966-70</u>	<u>1971-75</u>	<u>1976-80</u>	<u>1981-1985</u>
National Income	6.6	5.1	3.0	1.6
Net Material Product	6.5	5.0	3.1	1.4
Domestic primary power resource consumption	2.3	2.1	1.4	0.2

Table 3. Percentage Increase in Net Material Product, Domestic Consumption of Primary Power Resources, and Domestic Electricity Consumption on Per capita Basis for Selected Countries

a) Socialist countries

	Net material product			Domestic consumption of fuel/power resources			Domestic electricity consumption		
	1971/75	1976/80	1981	1971/75	1976/80	1981	1971/75	1976/80	1981
USSR	5.1	3.6	2.7	3.9	2.6	1.1	5.9	3.5	1.7
Hungary	5.8	2.7	2.5	3.0	2.5	-1.0	6.2	4.5	3.4
GDR	5.9	4.4	4.1	-	1.8	0.4	4.8	3.8	1.9

b) Capitalist countries

	Gross national product			Domestic consumption of fuel and power resources			Domestic electricity consumption		
	1971/75	1976/80	1981	1971/75	1976/80	1981	1971/75	1976/80	1981
FRG	1.7	3.6	-0.2	0.2	2.4	-4.3	3.9	4.0	0.5
France	3.2	2.9	-0.3	0.9	3.0	-0.6	4.0	6.4	6.7
Great Britain	1.9	1.6	-2.0	-1.0	0.0	-3.3	1.8	1.1	-1.7
USA	1.5	2.5	-0.8	-0.2	0.4	-3.9	3.6	2.6	1.6

In the CSSR this elasticity coefficient fluctuated between the value of 1 and 0.84 during the Fourth through the Sixth 5-year plans, and this year has reached the value of 1.3.

-- in all the monitored countries increases in electricity consumption are faster than increases in consumption of primary fuel and power resources. This fact, along with conclusions on the magnitude of the elasticity coefficient for primary resource consumption may also be interpreted to mean that an increase in the percentage share of total final energy consumption accounted for by electricity has a clearly efficiency enhancing impact. When electricity consumption is increasing faster than production, the overall increase in primary power resource consumption slows down.

From the above it is clear that when evaluating the power intensiveness of gross output the same criteria cannot be applied both to fuel and electricity consumption.

Projections of power consumption, and especially of electricity consumption, that were developed by the World Energy Conference in New Delhi in 1983 as well as by studies of the Power Research Institute [EGU] (and the Research Institute of the Fuel and Power Complex [VUPEK]) can serve as a base for more detailed consideration of the evolution of domestic electricity consumption and its structure.

The projections developed for the use of the World Energy Conference cover worldwide development, and divide the world into 10 regions. It is based on UN projections of population growth and on gross national product projections by international organizations (both studies consist of worst case and best case scenarios).

Population growth play a major role in world energy consumption, accounting for 60 percent of increased consumption in a best case scenario and 90 percent of this increase in a worst case scenario. Because the share of total world population in the third world countries will increase from 72 percent in 1978 to 80 percent in 2020, such worldwide projections have no great significance for Europe as a whole.

Of greater interest from our viewpoint are the regional projections for the socialist countries (including Albania, Bulgaria, CSSR, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR) as well as, for comparison purposes, the regional projection for the member countries of the OECD and those for the USA and Canada. Population increases will slow down both in the socialist countries and in the OECD countries, where almost the entire growth will be only in terms of increased average age. In contrast, economic growth in the socialist countries will be substantially greater than in other areas, both in absolute terms and on a per capita basis.

Through the year 2000 per capita fuel consumption will increase faster than in the OECD countries; after that date it will probably increase at about the same rate.

Absolute consumption is estimated for the socialist countries at 7.3-8.3 tons of standard fuel equivalent per capita, and at 5.2-5.8 tons of standard fuel equivalent in the OECD countries. Projected developments are influenced to some extent by geographical location and the composition of primary power resources. Socialist countries also use a greater percentage of coal, especially brown coal, which has a lower energy conversion efficiency.

At the same time it is expected that per capita increases in electricity consumption in all regions will be substantially greater than increases in the consumption of primary power resources. In the near future this ratio should be 2:1 to 3:1. These figures correspond fairly well with the results of studies by the EGU and VUPEK from 1967 to 1978. It is also, however, clear from the data how, especially after 1973, new views have developed concerning the need for orienting future economic development towards an intensive path. While thought concerning increases in net material product or national income have been adjusted only to a small extent, views concerning the development of domestic consumption of primary fuels and power, and concerning the development of domestic electricity consumption, have changed radically.

Table 4 presents index number data from specific projections related to actual non-adjusted consumption in 1980 (the projection of the world energy conference relates to the entire region of socialist countries).

Table 4. Index Number Projections of Development of Consumption of Primary Energy Resource and Electricity Consumption Based on Actual Non-Adjusted 1980 Consumption

	<u>Total Fuel and Power Resources</u>		<u>Electricity</u>	
	1990	2000	1990	2000
Power Research Institute [EGU] - 1967	140	183	228	365
EGU - 1971	160	233	173	337
EGU - 1978	136	168	170	237
World Power Conference - 1983	-	141-160	-	197-385

Recent thinking assumes that pressures will increase on the intensive development mode. This approach will have the practical outcome of assuring, in addition to increased efforts to increase the efficiency of consumption of all resources and changes in production structure, and any increased value generated in a number of sectors will have to come almost exclusively from increases in use values of products rather than from increased production volumes.

In the next 20 years the percentage of final consumption accounted for by non-production consumption of both the non-production sphere and the general public will increase. At the same time, the percentage of production consumption accounted for by specific branches will change.

All of the projections presented in the remainder of this article assume the easy availability of specific raw materials and fuel and power resources with a minimal impact from currently well known restrictions. It takes into account reductions in energy intensiveness brought about mainly by expected developments in major technologies. In addition it is essential that additional savings be assured through the introduction and gradual implementation of consumption standards for specific products and production processes.

In addition to actual producer consumption, it is necessary to take into consideration in the planning of all innovative projects, modernizations and new capital construction projects the efficiency and operating consumption of the resultant products on the one hand, and the material and power intensiveness of project implementation on the other hand.

In the future, the optimization of the size and composition of product lines must become a primary source of conservation. This assures that given unit volumes of material and power inputs will generate the maximal amount of value that is saleable on domestic and foreign markets.

Under this approach, compliance with which is fully in the hands of individual producers and central agencies, the above mentioned reduction in the energy intensiveness of individual branches represents a minimum acceptable outcome. Meeting targets as well for reducing production consumption is the best case scenario. The best case scenario assumes also the exploitation of significant underutilized capacity.

Electricity Consumption Projections for Production Sphere

-- In the fuel extraction and processing branch consumption patterns will be characterized by an increase in the share of consumption by the "coal extraction and processing" subsector relative to the "crude oil processing" subsector. This will include an increased share of electricity consumption, estimated as up to 26 percent of total final consumption by this sector by the year 2000.

We must expect an increase in standard consumption per unit of gross production, on the order of 2 percent overall and 6-8 percent for electricity in comparison with 1985. This will occur because not even efficiency enhancing measures have been able to offset the growing demands for energy necessitated by mining operations far below the surface under difficult geological conditions on the one hand on the other hand by surface mining operations that must cope with higher overburden ratios and longer conveyor belt systems.

Overall electricity consumption will, however, increase more slowly as a result of declines in total mining volumes. A new aspect of the operations of this sector is electricity consumption by the compressor stations of the transit natural gas pipelines.

-- Electricity and heat generation will be marked by a growing role for nuclear generation facilities and the transfer of certain steam power stations with 100 and 50 megawatt units to off-peak operations. In addition, most generation facilities will be modified for heating plant operation.

The increasing share of total electricity generation being accounted for by nuclear power plants is an efficiency enhancing measure both in terms of lower fuel extraction requirements and lesser transportation needs. On the other hand, actual electricity consumption at a nuclear plant tends to be higher than at traditional power plants. Moreover, the reduced possibilities for regulating the output of a nuclear plant during the day and on a weekly basis is necessitating the utilization of pumped storage hydroelectric power plants, which are only 70 percent efficient.

At traditional thermal power plants reductions in actual electricity consumption because of efficiency enhancing measures will to a large extent be offset by increased requirements for pulverizing and ventilating work due to worsening coal quality.

Over the next 20 years there will probably be an increase in electricity production at Federal Ministry of Fuel and Power [FMPE] facilities on the order of 53 percent, while the total electricity consumption of the power generation system itself will increase by about 81 percent.

-- The ferrous metallurgy sector predetermines to a large extent the development of other sectors for 2 reasons. On the one hand, as the supplier of metallurgical materials it exerts a decisive influence on production volumes of general engineering sectors, which in turn determines delivery volumes to yet other sectors. On the other hand, as one of the main consumers of electricity in our economy its own usage influences the amount of electricity available to other users. In terms of power intensiveness ferrous metallurgy will continue to play a critical role. Projections call for a decline in the unit volume of production both for pig iron and for steel.

Long term projections confirm that ferrous metallurgy will continue as one of the fundamental elements of the Czechoslovak economy through the 2000. There are, moreover, no plans for fundamental changes in the techniques and equipment available to foundries during this time frame.

In contrast, the power management operations at steel mills will be very much affected between now and the year 2000 by a structural change in the steel making process involving the intensive development of thermal techniques and oxygen processes. At the same time the production of electric steels will increase, but volume projections will have to be adjusted to conform to the potential of the power generation system. Because of the foregoing we may expect that standard electricity consumption per ton of steel will increase. Positive influences on this sector include the application of continuous casting techniques, the introduction of semiconductor equipment in forming processes, and the thorough application of new technologies to material forming operations.

-- Nonferrous metallurgy does not play a significant role in the overall electricity balance, with the exception of aluminum production. By the year 2000 projections call for significant efficiency enhancing innovations in this sector and the installation of new production technologies. For this reason it is expected that there will be no change in overall electricity consumption in this area, even with an absolute increase in aluminum production.

Over the period in question we can expect a decline in the overall energy intensiveness of gross metallurgical production of almost 40 percent. Reductions, however, in the intensity of electricity consumption will be substantially lower. In the Eighth 5-Year Plan, in fact, we will have to assume that they will increase.

In coke production no significant change in electricity consumption should be expected for the next 20 years. Production volume will also remain roughly constant.

-- By the year 2000 the heavy and general engineering sectors will account for, along with the electronics sector, the lion's share of increases in net material product. The structure of the product lines of these sectors, moreover, along with the construction sector, will exert a substantial influence on the evolution of the energy intensiveness of the national economy.

These sectors are characterized by clearly defined products and, in general engineering, by a tendency towards medium or small production runs. Because of this fragmentation it is difficult to establish unambiguously trends in energy intensiveness. It may be expected, however, that given the projected decline in energy intensiveness over the next 20 years of 50 percent, demands for electricity will decline by 40 percent. Because production is expected to double in this time frame, total increases in electricity consumption will be on the order of 20 percent.

In the electronics sector the next 20 years will see roughly a seven-fold increase in gross production, the greatest projected increase in our entire economy. At the same time this highly advanced sector is also achieving the greatest reductions in energy intensiveness. Extrapolations of current trends indicate that total electricity consumption in the Federal Ministry of Electronics will increase by the year 2000 only by a factor of 2.25.

In the chemical and rubber-asbestos industries there is a clear effort under way to shift to intensive development modes. For this reason there will probably be no further increases in the production of large, energy intensive products, with future developments focusing on the production of speciality chemicals, for which the ratio between the value of output and its energy intensiveness is much more favorable.

This policy, along with the elimination or phasing out of certain obsolete and energy intensive products and the gradual introduction of efficiency enhancing measures will make possible a reduction in the energy intensiveness of this sector on the order of 20 percent by the year 2000. Given a projected increase in gross output on the order of 60 percent, electricity consumption should increase during this time by about 26 percent.

-- The wood processing industry along with the paper and cellulose industry, because of its raw materials base, should be among the fastest growing sectors in our economy. They are also among the sectors with the lowest energy intensiveness of production. Because there are no expected innovations that might lower standard energy consumption, projected increases of 50-60 percent in gross output will mean approximate increases in electricity consumption on the order of 35-45 percent.

-- In the glass, ceramics and porcelain industry group the greatest influence on the growth rate is from the glass industry, which provides some 90 percent of the gross output of this sector. Most of the power generation and capital equipment of this sector, however, is well below world standards for energy efficiency, making the standard energy consumption of this sector 50-100 percent higher than in other developed industrial countries. For this reason we can expect a sharp decline, in the future, in the overall energy efficiency of this industry. This, however, will not be true of electricity consumption, which will increase as a result of automation. In particular, the use of electricity to preheat glass kilns will increase. Electricity consumption therefore will bear a roughly linear relationship to increases in production.

-- Because of the need to develop our economy more intensively we do not expect any significant increases in volume of production from the building materials industry. There should also be a decline in energy intensiveness, especially in the production of building units. The overall positive trend in reducing energy intensiveness by producing cement by the dry technique is offset, however, by increased electricity consumption. It is expected that sectoral demands for electricity consumption will decline by 25-30 percent on a unit basis, and that gross production will increase by 10-15 percent.

-- In the construction industry itself, because of the focus on modernizing and rebuilding existing structures, projections do not call for significant increases in the volume of construction work, but rather for an increase in the quality of the work that is performed. In addition, labor requirements at construction sites will decline through the use of small scale and large scale mechanization. The construction industry must reduce its consumption of materials that require large amounts of energy to produce, as well as strive to build more energy efficient structures, in part by using less massive materials, which among other things will reduce transportation costs.

Increased equipment utilization in this sector has led to annual increases in electricity consumption recently on the order of 1.5-2.5 percent. It is essential that this unfavorable trend be arrested no later than the end of the Eighth 5-Year Plan and that reductions in electricity usage be achieved of the same order of magnitude as increases in the volume of construction work. On these assumptions, both ministries of construction can project a leveling off of energy use by 1990 at the latest.

-- The food industry is planning a broad upgrading of obsolete machinery and equipment, accompanied in many instances by the introduction of the most recent findings in the biologization of production.

Gross production volume is keeping pace with increases in the Czechoslovak population and demands for effective nutrition. Because the percentage is increasing of foods that have been processed to some extent for final consumption (prepared dishes and semi-prepared foods) we must anticipate an increase in electricity consumption for their processing and preservation. This increase, however, should be compensated for in some way by increased efficiency in processing techniques and equipment upgrades. It is therefore being projected that production increases of about 40 percent in the next 15-20 years will require increased electricity consumption on the order of 46-51 percent. At the same time it is being projected that the standard consumption of all forms of energy by this sector, which still was on the increase in the Seventh 5-Year Plan, will begin to level off in the Eighth 5-Year Plan.

-- In agriculture, 60 percent of electricity consumption is involved with livestock production, 15 percent in operating facilities, and the remainder in plant production, mainly for irrigation.

In livestock production, plans are being made to replace part of this electricity consumption with renewable and nontraditional forms energy. For operating facilities, increased consumption is being projected, especially where irriga-

tion is necessary. These increases, however, must be adjusted for the possibilities of the power generation system, which are much lower than originally envisioned by employees of the agricultural sector.

Projections for Electricity Consumption in the Non-Production Sphere

In conjunction with the thorough implementation of intensive forms of development for the national economy, steps must be taken in the area of transportation to optimize overall traffic flows in the CSSR in terms of requirements for specific modes of transportation. Specifically, within an overall minimal increase in the amount of transportation, the percentage of railway transport should increase noticeably, and particularly the use of electric locomotives.

The rate of decline of standard fuel consumption will decrease as output of electrically powered trains increases, because of the higher loads (and lower carrying capacity) on the main electrified rail lines and because less desirable rail lines, from an energy viewpoint, will have to be electrified. An increase in the use of electric switching engines will also have an unfavorable influence on electricity consumption.

If we assume that in the period until the year 2000 irregularities in transportation will be eliminated, along with deadheading runs, and that eventually there will be extensive use of regulational and semiconductor-based tractive equipment, then it can be assumed that electricity consumption in transportation will increase by 36-40 percent.

Consumption projections for the actual non-production sphere are based on the development of population, the housing stock, and other factors related mainly to an increase in the quality of services provided both for a fee and for free to the general public.

It is assumed that the population of the CSSR will increase by the end of the century by roughly 4.5 percent and the number of apartments by 20 percent. In view of current changes in the structure of the housing stock in favor of category I apartments it is necessary to project a moderate increase in per apartment energy consumption (by roughly 4 percent) and a change in the composition of specific energy sources. In the rebuilding and modernization of the existing housing stock the heating and hot water preparation operations that have been solid fuel based to date will be replaced in many cases by natural gas or electrically fired systems. The same is true of new detached house construction.

Towards the end of this period heat pumps and in some cases heat pumps with solar collectors will likely emerge as a new source of heat. In the vast majority of cases however these systems will be driven with electric motors which will be reflected in overall consumption of the non-production sphere.

One component of consumption is public lighting, another system that is undergoing modernization and a shift to substantially more efficient light. This will make it possible to obtain the publicly necessary amount of light while increasing electricity consumption only by 50 percent.

A relatively less significant and stable area of consumption is nonthermal electrical appliances in households. Even though the presence of such appliances in our homes continues to increase, increased efficiency and the electrification of these appliances to a large extent compensates for increases in overall electricity demand.

In accordance with the foregoing analysis it may be expected that overall electricity consumption in the nonproduction sphere will almost double by the year 2000.

The Electricity Consumption Balance Through the Year 2000

The analysis presented in the previous sections was used to formulate a preliminary electricity consumption balance through the year 2000. From a comparison of individual groups in this draft balance it is clear that consumption will increase the fastest in the area of consumer goods inventories, i.e. in relation to the consumption of the general public.

In the area of consumption for production and operations the greatest increases will be in the sector administered by the FMEP, and in the area designated in the report as "other". The increase in consumption by the FMEP is a desirable development, because increased electricity consumption indicates a substantially greater increase in the value of gross production.

The situation is different with the "other" sphere. This group includes smaller sectors (education, culture, health care, the Ministry of Forest and Water Management, communications, trade, cooperatives). Moreover, agricultural enterprises and organizations administered by national committees are continually building new facilities which contribute to increased electricity consumption. Consumption may be managed in this area only by adopting specific measures for the approval and implementation of additional facilities and electricity consuming projects.

A basic characteristic of the development of domestic consumption of all forms of energy in the Czechoslovak economy, and especially its production sphere, through the year 2000 must be a significant reduction in energy intensiveness.

While the elasticity coefficient, defined as the required relative increase in domestic consumption of primary fuels for a 1 percent increase in net material product, fluctuated from the Fourth to the Sixth 5-Year Plan from 0.35 to 0.45, in the Seventh 5-Year Plan it has been almost at 0 and in the Eighth through the 10th 5-Year Plans it will fluctuate between 0.15 and 0.26.

A similarly defined elasticity coefficient for electrical energy ranged from 1.0 to 0.84 in the Fourth-Sixth 5-Year Plans, was 1.3 in the Seventh 5-Year Plan, and for the Eighth-10th 5-Year Plan will range from 0.53 to 0.78.

The increase in electricity consumption will be substantially faster than increases in total domestic consumption of primary fuel and power resources (by a factor of 4-5 over the 20 year period). This will make it possible to accelerate the introduction of state of the art techniques, including the

automation and electronization of production. Only in this way will it be possible to assure all the technical and structural changes essential to the maintenance of the current growth rate of national income.

Nevertheless it is necessary throughout the entire period to anticipate significant pressure from consumers to increase established deliveries of fuels and electricity consumption, because the achievement of targets within the proposed constraints will require all managers to adopt a fundamentally new approach to the resolution of problems in the planning and management of operations, and particularly to the formulation of strategic plans for their enterprises.

This analysis must be considered as preliminary, and is based mainly on the work of research teams. As such it will be made more precise during upcoming work on the draft of the Eighth 5-Year Plan and long range projections. One may also expect further improvement in efficiency enhancing measures on the one hand and an increase in the growth rate of national income formation on the other.

9276/13045
CSO: 2400/103

CONSUMER'S COMPLAINT ON REPAIR SERVICE DESCRIBED

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech 4 Dec 85 p 6

[Text] Even today we hold the old fashioned Czech folk festivals with roasts, goose and pies. You tell me who could resist all those goodies and [festive] atmosphere? Even the old song "At a folk festival everything smells so good, just as in a pharmacy..." tantalizes our senses. As for myself, however, I rather not be reminded of this year's festival....

Even as my wife was baking the pies, the stove was giving her trouble; more specifically, the oven door would not open quite right. While roasting the goose it became stuck shut. It refused stubbornly to give up the goose. I, on the other hand, was determined to not give up something that good. As a consequence a lot of prying went on, search for all kinds of tools and levers, until finally success came and the goose was removed from inside the overheated oven. All this in spite of the fact that the same door was replaced just three years ago; already the door was broken again. So, I called the Plzen repair shop on Dukelska Street. Within 14 days we will have a man out there, was the answer.

The technician showed up on time. With an experienced eye he consigned the oven door to oblivion. I am familiar with this; the mechanism is not any good--the problem is the wrong type of material. Our office will file the request for a new door by phone.

He was right. The level of service must be improving, I thought, when on the other end of the line a pleasant female voice was giving me my repair number. Then I asked how long I may have to wait. About 2 years, was the answer. What was that? I am telling you again--about 2 years! It is a case of simple arithmetic. The most recently completed repair was done on 12 December 1984. We receive five or six oven doors a month for the more than 200 we have on the waiting list. If I assume some minor improvements in the delivery rate, your oven should be in service in 2 years. Do not get angry with us. We are doing our best. Unfortunately the manufacturer and shipper of gas stoves MORA 212 in Moravia national enterprise in Moravske Udoli, near Olomouc, is deaf to your pleas.

This makes fools of its customers and users. She did not say that, of course; I said it to myself. When someone is manufacturing defective, low quality merchandise, he is guilty of a serious breach of order and discipline. It

should be in their best interest to put things back in order. This is so even in the case of an expired warranty since the quality of the product reflects on the reputation of the manufacturer. The manufacturer must understand that by his attitude he is putting the customer into an impossible situation. One either has to get along without an oven for 2 full years or one has to buy a new stove. The housing administration will not replace the stove either, as long as the existing one can be repaired.

12876/12859

CSO: 2400/99

ECONOMY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRIEFS

CHINA'S PRIVATE ENTERPRISE NOTED--The Chinese Communist Party daily reported on Saturday that during the next 5 years the Chinese Government would authorize an additional 30,000 market places with free prices, making their total in China 90,000. Prices will be set according to supply and demand, albeit, within a certain range. Such market places are quickly becoming the principal sites for the purchase of vegetables, fowl, eggs and fish. According to the report, the government intends to open one such place for every 30 to 50,000 inhabitants of large cities [Text] /Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 19 Nov 85 p 6/ 9496/13068

CSO: 2400/71

CONSTRUCTION MINISTER RESPONDS TO RADIO AUDIENCE'S QUESTIONS

DW140845 [Editorial Report] In its 1600 GMT "Magazine" program, East Berlin Domestic Service in German on 6 January carries the first hour-long installment of the recorded "Listeners' Forum." Construction Minister Wolfgang Junker is featured, answering questions about achievements and goals in GDR housing and industrial construction. He says that what matters above all is to take qualitative new steps, so as to transfer scientific-technical achievements into production rapidly. In 1986 the most important task will be broader utilization of microelectronics, which is already evident in computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacture.

Answering a number of questions on prospects for housing construction in 1986, the minister points out that "in 1985 more than 200,000 apartments were built or modernized. This was the best result since the Eighth SED Congress. Housing conditions for some 600,000 people in the GDR have "improved considerably." At the same time, the minister says, 25,000 kindergarten places and 13,000 nursery places were created. This "solid balance sheet that can be struck in our housing construction program," the minister adds, forms a sound basis for tackling the new and greater tasks for the next few years.

Asked about the number of apartments to be built in 1986 and about possible new types of construction, Minister Junker says that some 209,200 apartments are to be built or modernized, with the WBS-70 series being the dominant method of construction in all GDR bezirke. "It has stood its test," the minister says, and adds, "it suits our people! One half the apartments built in the GDR in 1985 had three rooms. As always, requirements will conform to the needs of the bezirke and kreise.

Replying to a listener's question on whether remodeling and modernization of apartments is worthwhile, the minister points out that although it takes 10 percent longer to remodel than to build new apartments, "overall costs, including material costs, is substantially lower for modernization than for new apartments." Thus, for instance, costs for steel, cement, and electronic material are respectively 76 percent, 85 percent, and 60 percent below that needed for new apartments.

Asked whether the construction of private homes will be continued that this sector is extremely well developed and that "it constitutes an important sociopolitical factor in our housing construction program." Private homes will be built in the villages. From 1976 to 1980 they numbered 60,000, and 1981-1985 about 70,000, and now account for 11 percent of overall housing construction in the GDR.

The minister answers listeners' questions about housing construction repair work. In 1985 the growth rate in repairs the minister says, "amounted to more than 12 percent, and almost 3 million square meters of repaired roof area were achieved according to plan in our roof program." This result averages M157 more spent in repairing each apartment in the GDR in 1985, compared to 1981, the minister points out. He adds that in 1986 the national economy plan provides an increase of over 10 percent in repair performance compared with 1985.

In connection with the stepped up housing program for Berlin, Junker says that the program was successfully mastered in 1985, with 32,700 newly built or modernized apartments and that such a pace will continue in 1986, so that the number will increase to 33,800 apartments. In addition to the apartments and a number of community buildings belonging to them, much weight in Berlin's construction program will be given to further expansion of the water supply and sewage installations, such as the sewage plants at Wassmannsdorf and Stahnsdorf, as well as the power stations at Friedrichshagen and Stolpe.

Asked whether the number of workers employed in housing construction is higher than that in industrial construction, Junker replies that roughly 150,000 workers are employed at 7 construction and assembly combines, 3 special construction combines for industrial building, and 2 supplier combines, whereas roughly 100,000 construction workers work at housing combines, a fact, the minister says, "that shows the significance we attribute to industrial construction in our republic."

Referring to construction materials, the minister notes that domestic raw materials such as cement, calcium sulphate, and ceramic construction products form the basis.

Asked about building material. Supplies for people's private use, the minister points to the 1986 plan for an investment of 2.2 billion in building material for the people. It amounts to a 6 percent increase compared with 1985, and includes building bricks, limestone, concrete, and insulation. What is noteworthy, the minister says, is that in 1986 1.4 million tons of cement and 260,000 tons of construction lime will be supplied to the people.

In conclusion, the minister expresses the hope that strict management will support the many initiatives by the construction collectives so that an excellent overall balance sheet can be presented in 1986, the year of the 11th SED congress.

/7051

CSO: 2300/158

PUBLIC DRINKING WATER SUPPLY CONSIDERABLY INCREASED

AV011911 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 30 Dec 86 p 2

[Text] East Berlin (ND)--In 1985, too, the working people in water management have made an important contribution to implementing the housing program. They supplied potable water and sewer system for 118,000 newly constructed and 85,000 modernized apartments. The households of 370,000 citizens were newly hooked up to the public water supply, those on 270,000 were hooked up to sewage-disposal plants, or the existing plants were modernized and expanded.

In order to meet the rising demand for potable water the working people in water management, together with construction workers, increased the daily output of the about 6,000 water works to more than 8 million cubic meters. The daily capacity of the communal purification plants was raised to 4.7 million cubic meters, that is by 4.2 percent. In 1985, 1,500 km of water pipes and 600 km of drains have been laid.

The working people in water management achieved particular progress concerning potable water supply and sewage disposal in large cities and conurbations. In Berlin, for example, potable water supply was considerably improved--particularly by putting into service the second stage of the Friedrichshain waterworks. In addition, it was possible to further expand sewage disposal, which created preconditions for the step-by-step elimination of the sewage fields--in 1986 in the north and in 1980 in the south of the capital.

In rural areas the apartments of 88,000 citizens were hooked up to the public potable water supply for the first time. This was above all achieved through the "Join in!" initiative. The number of hook-ups to the public potable water supply has increased by 0.5 percent to 91.2 percent of all GDR citizens.

/7051

CSO: 2300/159

MOVE TO PRODUCE LEAD-FREE GASOLINE DEFENDED

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian No 48, 30 Nov 85 pp 62-63

[Interview with Odon Schler, processing manager of OKGT [National Petroleum and Gas Industry Trust] by Andras Tar: "We Are Not Producing Lead-Free Gasoline on the Basis of the Merkur's Predictions"]

[Text] Even though we cannot expect that the most modern environment protecting passenger cars will quickly become widely popular in this country, and what is even more, for the lack of better things we are continuing to purchase the cars with two-cycle engines considered to be vicious air polluters, the Hungarian petroleum industry ahead of many Western European countries is already producing lead-free gasoline. In addition, in spite of the fact that it cannot be used in the engines of the cars used in this country, designated filling stations are also selling it already as of 1 January. What is the explanation for this hurry, how much did it cost, and what is the profit on this new investment? What is the situation in some other question which affect us much more closely, for example, decreasing the high sulfur content of the fuels? We asked Odon Schler (age 56) engineer-economist, processing manager of the National Petroleum and Gas Industry Trust (OKGT).

[Question] The introduction of lead-free gasoline in Hungary is imminent. By this we are getting ahead of quite a few common market countries, even though in this country for the time being neither transformation of the auto park nor the impatience of the environment's protectors do not hasten this.

[Answer] We are not producing lead-free gasoline on the basis of the Merkur's predictions, and we also did not make the decision to sell it in commercial trade on the basis of this. Unfortunately, knowing the development tendencies of the automobile factories which sell us cars, we will have to wait quite a few more years for the cars with catalytic converters, but our sizeable transient traffic and automobile tourism have already defined developing Hungary's fuel selection in this direction now as a daily need. Automobile clubs from the FRG and Austria first approached the National Petroleum and Gas

Industry Trust two years ago through the Hungarian Auto Club with the request that we sell poison-free gasoline for the so-called "KAT-cars" which conform to the expected new air purity standards. The request was later repeated officially also by the European Economic Community.

At this time the plant development plans were already completed in the Hungarian petroleum processing industry, which provided the opportunity on the one hand to decrease the harmful material content of the domestic motor fuels, and on the other hand to produce gasolines which conform to the newest catalytic standards. The so-called getting the lead out is in essence merely a part of comprehensive product development in the petroleum industry.

[Question] The leaders of OKGT and AFOR Mineral Oils Commercial Enterprise stated at a press conference that in 1984 Hungary was still one of the countries with the most "polluted gasoline." How big was our disadvantage when we started the lead removal action?

[Answer] Prior to the quality improvement executed this year we really had nothing to brag about. With the 0.6 gram per liter lead content of regular and high-test gasolines we were below the environmental protection standards of quite a few countries. For this very reason the Hungarian petroleum processing industry made it its goal to introduce fuels as soon as possible which are friendly to the environment. We wish to implement this as we reconstruct the refineries. It has cost the OKGT approximately 400 million forints to decrease in 1985--as the first step--the lead contents of the regular, high-test and the extra-high test gasolines to 0.4 gram. We have installed new plants and new technologies, primarily at the Danubian Petroleum Industry Enterprises [DKV] but also in other Hungarian refineries. For example, the new isopentane plant, the catalytic craking plant and the reforming plant group have been completed in Szazhalombatta. Among other things these made it possible to also start producing the completely lead-free gasoline besides the very significant domestic quality improvement.

[Question] What is the situation with the fuel for vehicles with diesel engines? The smoke-belching buses and trucks make the lives of those yearning for clean air at least as miserable as the much-berated gasoline users and the two-cycle engines.

[Answer] For cars which use gasoline the harm caused to health by lead emissions can decrease because of the lower lead content since the exhaust gas of the cars became cleaner. Unfortunately with the two-cycle engines the lubricating oil burned together with the fuel continues to poison the air. And as far as the diesels are concerned the many kinds of diesel fuels used in transportation and the household heating oils were also modernized this year. In these we decreased the sulfur content from 1.0 percent before to 0.5 percent. The prime significance of this is that the sulfur dioxide emission which is extremely harmful from the air pollution viewpoint will decrease. By the way, by the end of the decade we want to decrease the sulfur content of 0.15 gram per liter which today--except for the lead-free fuels--is the desired international optimum. Of course this involves further technological development of the industry. No small investment is involved since in this

area the program which runs until 1990 represents an additional investment of 2.5 billion. For example, in Szazhalombatta we will soon begin construction of a new alkylating plant by using a World Bank loan.

[Question] The domestic lead-free gasoline production implemented by means of the investment costing several hundreds of millions which you mentioned, will obviously not be satisfying primarily the domestic needs expected to remain modest. Can we make a deal with this fuel in countries which use cars with catalytic converters?

[Answer] At the present time the DKV is able to produce about 100,000 tons of lead-free gasoline per year using the new-type petrochemical catalysts. This is 91 octane and in every way satisfies the most exacting Western European standards, thus we have the opportunity to export this current product. Of course it was not enough for the exportability to merely ensure that the gasoline is free of lead. We changed the entire recipe and we have checked things during this work with quite a few European and overseas institutions in the trade.

[Question] Returning to the introduction of lead-free gasoline in Hungary, actually how much can the AFOR expect to sell and what kind of a network did they prepare for this change-over?

[Answer] As I have already mentioned we have important international and mainly foreign tourism interests attaching to the introduction of lead-free gasoline, and therefore we also had to absorb the expenses connected with it. As of 1 January ten AFOR and two Shell stations will be selling the new type of fuel. At these stations separate tanks, piping and measuring equipment had to be installed since even minimal quantities of the traditional motor fuels must not mix with the lead-free gasoline. We supply every one of the designated stations with merchandise directly from Szazhalombatta where it is produced, and the lead-free gasoline is transported in tank trucks made suitable exclusively for this purpose. The work of changing them over began at the affected gas stations in early fall. Where it was not necessary to add to the existing tank park, thorough cleaning of the existing systems and removal of the lead from them are taking place until the January premier.

By the way, the pumps selling the new gasoline are structurally identical with the traditional ones, the only difference is at the filling gun. The diameter of this is much smaller than usual. The reason is that the filling opening of the cars running on lead-free gasoline is smaller than that of the other cars so that leaded gasoline cannot be put into them due to forgetfulness. As far as the expected sales are concerned, for the time being we are expecting 5,000 tons per year. This is not much but let's not forget that today in Europe the number of passenger cars with catalytic converters is only in the thousands and at the Common Market they are still discussing the resolution to make them mandatory.

[Question] And how much will the lead-free gasoline cost in this country? Similarly to the surrounding Western countries will we also encourage its use with relatively low prices?

[Answer] So much has already been printed in the domestic press about the entire environmental protection debate and the catalytic program that the intention of the Western European governments to support the prices is a well known fact to the Hungarian readers. Where the manufacturing of cars with catalysis is centrally encouraged and so is the sale of fuel suitable for them, customs discounts and various tax advantages are enjoyed not only by the consumers but also by the petroleum refiners, and thus the lead-free gasoline is also not more expensive than the traditional one. In this country we cannot expect such incentives, thus we are forced to reflect the more costly production also in the price. The OKGT proposed a consumer price about 20 percent higher than the present one. So far the official authorities have not revealed the price, but being familiar with the international ratios, it is certain that for the foreigners even the lead-free gasoline will not appear expensive in Hungary. But for the time being the whole matter will not affect our domestic automotive public because the experts do not recommend the lead-free gasoline for the traditional cars. And it is not even worth it to try it out because it does not exert any kind of "beneficial effect" on the engine, on the contrary, since the lead is absent from it--which in these cars supplies lubrication of the valves--it may even cause damage.

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REFORM DEBATE CONTINUED: NEED FOR DEFINED DIRECTION, VALUES

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 29 Nov 85 pp 3,4

[Article by Istvan Siklaky: "Let's Call a Spade a Spade"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] There are two major trends, one literary and one socioeconomic, to the debate which has been in progress since the summer, a debate which extends from the Dorogi-Mezsei interview via Tamas Ungvari and Gyorgy Asperjan to Mihaly L. Kocsis and Erzsebet Hallama. As an economist, I am examining the questions and answers of the second trend, though I will also briefly state what a reader like me expects from modern Hungarian literature--or perhaps from literature created anywhere, at any time.

I quote Gyorgy Asperjan on the concept which serves as a starting point for the examination: "The socialist social order, which began with historical disadvantages, has not been able to overcome its backwardness by means of the existing economic and political structure. Indeed...the inherited disadvantage is increasing [I interpret this to mean that the backwardness is increasing--I.S.] in the economy, in political culture, in democracy and--as a consequence of everything--in the level of the quality of human life." (ELET ES IRODALOM, 6 September) This process should be reversed by a social reform which "is worthy of the name only if it can bring about a higher degree of freedom and a greater abundance--and a more equitable distribution--of goods." (Laszlo Megay, ELET ES IRODALOM, 20 September) I believe that this is the basis on which all the debaters agree, myself included.

* * *

The next step is the claim made by Mihaly L. Kocsis (ELET ES IRODALOM, 18 October): "I have recently read and heard a lot about reform, and even though I am not an economist, it is easy to agree that at every level there is an urgent need for some sort of renewal, for an explicit and careful examination of our jobs, for a reshaping of our work. But in the spirit of all these concepts I certainly would have liked very much /to hear precise words about more than one outgrowth of this reform, this entrepreneurial socialism."/ (The italics are mine--I.S.) Why only about the outgrowths? Why not about entrepreneurial socialism itself or, even better, just socialism? It is surprising that the other debaters do not consider it necessary to raise the question of "what is becoming of socialism," as if everyone knew the answer to it, and as if everyone would obviously give an identical answer to this

question. I again quote Gyorgy Asperjan: /"How/ should the Hungarian citizen and Hungarian society live--as opposed to the way they do at present--so that they can see a future ahead of them and indeed at the same time a future which /can be called socialist?"/ (The second set of italics is mine--I.S.) Then: "Reform is society's forward motion within the existing social framework. It is self-renewal without transformation of the nucleus--in this case: socialism!--into something else, into self-disownment."

All this means nothing, however, without a standpoint on the interpretation of socialism. Tibor Vamos writes in a volume of "Accelerated Age": "Fortunately, socialism is a social form with an enormously broad spectrum, and today no one any longer finds it sacrilegious if we state that socialism in Hungary differs quite profoundly from what is understood by socialism in North Korea, let us say." ("Hazánk es a muszaki fejlodes" [Our Homeland and Technical Development], page 192.) Let us leave the problems--and the determination of the essence--of North Korean socialism to the North Koreans, and let us examine the socialism which sprouts today in our homeland. Or to be more precise, I will speak about one of the courses of socialist development possible in our country, the one which--and I am certainly not alone--I consider the best of the possible courses in keeping with the times. Following the admonition of Ferenc Tokei, I also think that we must return to Marx's approach to socialism. According to it, socialism is not a house which we construct and then it is finished ("This battle will be the last one!") but rather a course of development. (The metaphor is mine but its spirit, I believe, is Marx's.) By proceeding along such a course, mankind has the opportunity to outstrip capitalism in labor productivity, in freedom, and in other indices of the quality of life. Then, from time to time, it will surpass the level which it has already managed to achieve.

If socialism is a course, then we need signposts and values against which we can measure each politicoeconomic event, phenomenon, arrangement, institution, and by which we can ascertain whether Hungarian society is moving in this direction or in precisely the opposite one: perhaps, on the basis of our current knowledge, it makes no difference from the viewpoint of progress interpreted in this manner. What are these values? The most important are (1) equality of opportunity in economic and public life; (2) the "who was born has a right to live," in other words, the principle of responsibility felt for one another; and (3) freedom based on tolerance.

* * *

The demand for equality of opportunity has already cropped up in this debate. When Tamas Ungvari (ELET ES IRODALOM, 4 October) complains about the "regeneration of social inequalities," it is impossible to know whether he means the inequality in cultural level and material living standards or (maybe alongside them) the unequal opportunity to acquire roles in economic and public life. But Mihaly L. Kocsis (ELET ES IRODALOM, 18 October) writes unambiguously that "it is indecent to announce a competition with unequal conditions." Should we ponder whether our words are precise enough? After all, it is plainly unattainable for all human beings to start out with an equal opportunity in the contest of life. Since there are not and cannot be two human beings identical in every way, it follows that there are not and cannot be two human beings whose opportunities for every role in public and economic life would be identical. (What a sight the opera house would be where Gyorgy Melis and I had an equal opportunity for the title role in "The Barber of Seville.")

In order for us to arrive at "precise words," let us introduce the concept pair "good and bad benefits" (inequalities of opportunity). Society is improved by the good benefits and corrupted by the bad benefits. The good benefits are those which stem directly from the inherited or acquired talents and skills which exist in harmony with humanist values or from a good reputation based on performance, perhaps from wealth based on performance. Benefits of other origin are bad, for example, those which derive from one's connections with authorities, from wealth independent of one's own achievements, or from one's lack of moral inhibitions. We must therefore understand the demand for "equality of opportunity" to mean more precisely the stronger assertion of good benefits and the more expeditious suppression of bad benefits. In accordance with our concept, the signpost of social development (socialist development) examined here is that parents are restricted less and less by the State, by ignorance, and by material factors from giving their children the conditions of "good benefits," and adults from creating these conditions for themselves. Let me return to the standpoint of Mihaly L. Kocsis, because a fundamentally important contradiction is inherent in it. Again I quote: "It is indecent to announce a competition with unequal conditions." According to Kocsis, therefore, as long as conditions are unequal, we choose a noncompetitive method of organizing social work. It is obvious, however, that an entire historical epoch separates us from the fact--now formulated more precisely--that reduced to insignificance are the differences stemming from circumstances of wealth, power, and knowledge by virtue of which a human being and a citizen with various opportunities can obtain the "good benefits" for himself and his child or--seen from another aspect--until the role of "bad benefits" becomes negligible.

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In order to disclose the difficulties hidden here, I must speak about the two fundamental possibilities for social division of labor (organization of labor) which--apart from the most ancient of times--march through history in various combinations for better or for worse. In one of them, the command (plan precept, constraint, subordination, hierarchy) is the basis for organizing social work; in the second case, the comparatively free exchange between economic units (the market, the enterprise, coordination, the contractual and relatively free relations that can be modified or dissolved by either side, i.e., voluntary cooperation). In the first system, a central office specifies who consumes (can consume) what and who produces what. The essence of the second system is the mutually conditioning autonomy of consumers and producers. Consumer autonomy means that in a broad circle the consumers themselves select what they buy within the limits of their purchasing power. In order for this to come about, it is necessary for the producers, in competition with one another, to find out what the consumer wants and to strive to satisfy the disclosed demands on better terms. All this is true of producers/consumers and their suppliers, too. For example, the factories' purchase of raw materials, manpower, energy, etc, is necessary in order for there to be a purpose to the competition among suppliers, who offer their products, their labor, etc.

At a high level of production forces, competition is thus an indispensable element in a social division of labor not based on command. The historical experience of the Hungarian economy and society is that an economy basically organized on commands

is accompanied by shortages, reduced supplies, technical backwardness and, in the long run, social decline. That is why the Hungarian political directors have set out on a course which leads toward an organization (the market economy) based on free exchange. Measures which strengthen the economic reform exert an influence in this direction. Mihaly L. Kocsis thus finds himself in a vicious circle. He does not want there to be "competition as long as there is no equality of opportunity," and yet an economy without competition is incapable of creating the material conditions for equality of opportunity, properly interpreted. There is another aspect to this vicious circle. On the one hand, the condition for developing an adequate level of equality of opportunity is the suppression of state monopolies, i.e., democracy. On the other hand, organization of an economy on the basis of commands is not compatible with democracy, according to both theoretical considerations and historical experiences.

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But all this does not mean that the inequalities which distort current competition necessarily continue to exist. In a consistent entrepreneurial (or market or commodity-producing) socialism, only the inequalities of opportunity which inevitably exist at the given developmental level would assert themselves. The current Hungarian politicoeconomic system is not "entrepreneurial socialism," however, but rather a mixed makeshift economy (social division of labor) with market elements which is still controlled by the commands of a bureaucratic apparatus. Let me give an example. If by various means the political leaders of a small town prevent a third confectioner from setting up shop alongside the two existing ones and if, as a result, the two monopolistic confectioners make money hand over fist, the reason for it is not the market, the enterprise, the competition, or the division of labor based on exchange but rather the restriction of all these things by commands. (The command--in other words, political constraint outside the economy--has a significant role in the market economy; its task there, however, is not to restrict competition but rather to suppress and eliminate monopolies in the interest of a flourishing competition.)

Everything which I have said so far about free exchange and division of labor based on competition is not a specific feature of socialist commodity production but rather a general characteristic of advanced commodity production. All this is also true of advanced commodity production based on private ownership, i.e., capitalist commodity production. The difference is that public ownership is the foundation for socialist commodity production. In all likelihood, socialist commodity production will be the higher (the more efficient, the one which better promotes the development of production forces) level of commodity production, because it will be free of the most fundamental monopoly, the private ownership of production forces.

The reader has undoubtedly noticed that in place of the question about "what is becoming of socialism" (at least in Hungary or in the case of socialism sprouting in Hungary) the question of "what is becoming of public ownership" has cropped up. In my opinion and not just in my opinion, the key to the answer to this question is an arrangement which rests on performance. The more public the ownership of the means of production, the more decisive the actual performance undertaken. So in the second degree the "good" benefits plus the incidental but not "bad"

benefits determine who or which voluntarily associated group has each economic unit, economic opportunity. In this sense, the future seeds are not the small private enterprises (though I do not dispute their usefulness, and I would consider their suppression a serious mistake) but rather the industrial plants under contract, the advanced domestic enterprises (for example, the experimental units at Szentes), and the truly venturesome enterprise business work partnerships (because that is what they are there for). The election of enterprise councils and directors is likewise a forward step along this path.

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The signpost of responsibility felt for one another also turns up in the debate. Mihaly L. Kocsis writes (ELET ES IRODALOM, 18 October): "It must be said that every human being should be able to live decently (not just make a living but a decent living and, later, a good living!) and only from this point can a wholesome inequality begin..." To be sure, this calls for more precision in several places. According to one reading of the text, the "from this point can begin" is to be understood in time, i.e., first we arrive at a point where everyone lives well and afterwards can come the "wholesome inequality," i.e., application of the performance principle, the market economy. I have already pointed out how this is self-contradictory (in a command economy, it is impossible to see to it that everyone lives well). According to a second reading, society must guarantee the well-being of everyone, regardless of his output, and reward greater output with a--let us say--level of luxury above this. On the one hand, this also contains the contradiction of the previous reading and, on the other hand, it is morally unconvincing. From the viewpoint of the solidarity principle, we must distinguish three groups: (a) those who because of their handicaps are unable to yield the output necessary for a livelihood which comes close to the average, (b) those who are not handicapped in the clinical sense but do not want to yield such an output (hippies and vagrants, for example), and (c) the remainder, who can perform and want to. I believe it is possible to reconcile the solidarity principle with the performance principle in a satisfactory manner if society (a) offers the handicapped, regardless of their output, a standard of living which comes close to the average, (b) provides no more than the bare necessities to those who just watch the grass grow, and (c) grants the remainder, i.e., the great majority, material goods in proportion to performance (in accordance with an objective assessment of the market).

My third signpost was freedom based on tolerance. About this it is perhaps sufficient to say by way of explanation that each person and group can select its own lifestyle, with the restriction that this must not interfere with the lifestyle which others have rightfully chosen (taking into account the legitimate interests of these others) and must make allowance for all sorts of minorities (ethnic, religious, philosophical, etc). As far as I know at present, the most suitable form for this is a humanist, decentralized democracy.

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I have laid a foundation, and by standing on it I can judge more securely the debaters' arguments and assertions. Many statements are in harmony with this foundation; some, however, stand in opposition to it, or at least require fine-tuning. Let me comment on the main contradictions and inaccuracies which have caught my eye.

Tamas Ungvari writes (ELET ES IRODALOM, 23 August): "Hungarian goods must hold their own in Europe and on the world market. If this is accompanied by a neglect of the domestic market the way it is nowadays..." My argument: as Janos Kornai has classically proven, an economy based on command (directive, plan precept) is by necessity a shortage economy. The reason for the domestic shortage is not that we must export but rather that our economy today is more a directive than a market economy. If it was a market economy, we would still be poorer than the countries with more efficient economies and more accumulated capital as long as we did not catch up with them in long-term competition, but the supply would practically always satisfy the effective demand.

In the same place, Ungvari writes with reference to the profusion of goods in Vienna: "Will there be such a supply in our country? We cannot know. An open economy does not predict." Let us recall that not only did a directive "closed" economy predict, it also ordered plans, and its plans did not materialize one after the other. On the other hand, if we create a market economy, especially a socialist market economy, we can predict, for example, the supply of merchandise which satisfies the effective demand in accordance with what was just mentioned. The market economy's uncertainty (risk) is not absolute. It cannot be predicted whether an enterprise or an industry will be flourishing or declining 5 years from now. But it can be predicted that a market economy linked to the international division of labor will be more efficient than an autarkic command economy, that greater efficiency means greater national income, and that if the distribution takes place in keeping with the principles of a socialist market economy and if the (centralized) assets taken away from the economic units (entrepreneurs and employees!) do not go down the drain (for example, through military preparations or inadequately weighed central investments), then the general standard of living will increase together with the efficiency.

Gyorgy Asperjan writes (ELET ES IRODALOM, 6 September): "A human being is a creature who...wants to overcome the obstacles which pile up before him and who does overcome them if the nature of the social organization is such that directly or indirectly it promotes this goal. The question of how is always tantamount to: in what manner, here in this country, can and should the indisputably most modern social arrangement, socialism, be made into a society with such a structure and organization?" My comments: it is inherently contradictory to state, on the one hand, that we observe "here in this country the indisputably most modern social arrangement" and, on the other hand, that this social arrangement does not help to overcome "the obstacles which pile up before a human being," since it must still be made into such. Furthermore, as we have seen, it is ambiguous to speak about "socialism": it must always be stated which of the imagined and self-declared socialisms (they differ greatly from one another) it is a question of.

Mihaly L. Kocsis writes (ELET ES IRODALOM, 18 September): "Today in Hungary we recognize skill, not performance." Kocsis is comparing different things here. Skill: a talent for some kind of activity; performance: a result of some kind of activity. In a command economy, Peter's performance is what his hierarchical superior recognizes as performance. In a market economy, Peter performs well if he satisfies some demand of Paul (who is independent of Peter) and if Paul freely recognizes and values it (he compares it with the other ways the demand has been satisfied, i.e., he sets a price on it). Undoubtedly Kocsis was thinking not of

"skill" but of the pejorative "shrewdness," or to be more precise, that today in Hungary the "bad benefits" have a much greater impact than desirable on success in economic and public life and the "good benefits" have a much smaller impact.

Kocsis in the same place: "In a country of 10 million people, not everyone can be self-employed, not everyone can be a small-scale businessman. The reform should begin by restoring the honorability of work." Now my comments. (1) It is incorrect to equate the "self-employed," i.e., private ownership, and the entrepreneur. Whoever does this denies, as do the capitalist "agitator" ideologues and the Stalinist dogmatists, that there can be socialist commodity production, a socialist market economy, i.e., one which rests on public ownership. (2) Socialist commodity production does not mean that everyone is an entrepreneur but rather that anyone--depending on his productive capacity--can be the entrepreneur of a property unit (economic opportunity) which he competed for and that each person can freely decide whether he wants to be an employee or an entrepreneur, or to be more exact, whether he wants to enter the labor market or the entrepreneurial market, and that he not only has a right but also an opportunity to do this.

Erzsebet Hallama (ELET ES IRODALOM, 25 October) indignantly quotes a statement by an assistant undersecretary at the Ministry of Finance according to which consideration should be given to whether "it would not be cheaper to replace the 1.2 million tons of domestic coal produced at a tremendous loss with another energy source or to buy the amount in question abroad." She then continues: "We know very well that mineral substances are strategic goods." Erzsebet Hallama must decide whether to recommend an autarkic (self-sufficient) wartime economy, the logic of which is that--no matter what the cost--"strategic goods" must be produced or whether to recommend a peaceful entrance into the world economy and international division of labor. In the latter case, however, only those "treasures" can be produced for which the world-market price aggregate of the resources (labor, machines, materials, etc) to be consumed in the production is at least no larger than the world-market price aggregate of the produced substances. If it does not happen this way, a backer must be sought who will pay the difference. Nature, namely, has by no means "laid up its treasures under our feet free of charge". Nor in the light of this, perhaps, does Erzsebet Hallama recommend that in the given case in the interest of preserving miner morality and miner self-respect we lie to individual mineworkers and tell them that through their work the national income has risen, even if it has actually decreased, though through no fault of theirs.

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Finally, let me say what kind of support for the socioeconomic reform process I, as one reader among many, expect from Hungarian writers. First and foremost I expect them to accept, give expression to, and make people aware of those moral values which, according to the given writer, must be signposts for our social development. Let them reveal the presence or absence of these values in the various layers, groups, and stations of our society, and let them write about the conflicts, hazards, opportunities, and tasks which arise therefrom. Moreover, I do not consider superfluous the "statements of mood" which have often been heard in the debate.

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STATISTICS ON DWINDLING INCOMES, STANDARD OF LIVING

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 19 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Julia M. Venyige: "What We Live On and How"]

[Text] Incomes and Consumers

During the past 6 to 8 years instead of an increase in the standard of living we have had to take into consideration its stagnation, on occasion even its decrease. Compared to prices our income, our earnings have risen at a far more modest rate, as a result of which, for instance, the real wages due one wage-earner in 1984 were 5 percent lower than in 1980.

Reality is however, not so plain. Although it is true that 1,000 forints are barely enough to cover a week's groceries for a family of 3 or 4, and a pair of shoes of acceptable quality is not any cheaper either, nevertheless trade is still great in the stores and markets. People are buying a lot and increasingly more, and not only cheap, but rather expensive goods. The number of cars is increasing and are being used daily, despite the extremely high price of gas. According to statistics the supply of durable goods has recently improved. Moreover: between 1980 and 1985 about 200,000 new apartments were built--up to 70,000-75,000 per annum in recent years--mostly by private sources. Current consumption has not decreased either. According to figures on household statistics, for instance, consumption of more expensive groceries has also recently increased.

It seems that all of this contradicts our present economic situation, the stagnation, i.e. decrease in income and real wages. The question is, what is the cause and explanation for this contradiction?

The Luck of Heirs

As far as income is concerned: nowadays the economic condition of the family or the household is less likely to be characterized by per capita income, or rather its real value, than previously. First of all, accumulated income or wealth plays a significant role in this as well, as does the accumulation of previous generations. True: the old, large family fortunes have disappeared, but for instance if somebody inherits a valuable family home or even a well situated, well equipped apartment--in most instances this, too can be inherited--he can live completely differently from the one who has to create this with his own labor.

However I don't consider this some kind of injustice, even if it might seem so from the viewpoint of the abstract idea of equality. It is natural that the industrious, family-loving man should strive to provide for his descendants as well, which is something that is badly needed these days, especially in the case of our youth.

The economic condition, the supply of goods is of course also dependent on how much work an individual is willing and able to invest in providing for himself, in shaping his direct surroundings apart from his employment and place of work? It is a fact that the much propagated and much discussed "do it yourself" movement is spreading, since the average income is less and less able to pay the price of services.

In realistically evaluating the economic condition and the standard of living we must go beyond the examination of income conditions, because the statistically grasped incomes and consumption are becoming increasingly detached from one another. The discrepancy between the income of the population and its consumption is increasingly noticeable, so to speak at a macro-level as well as among the majority of families and households. This can be traced back to the fact that during the past 6 to 8 years the growing segment of the population has had access to incomes through several channels, and statistics cannot register this as they do "official" incomes and society's allotments. Behind incomes resulting from household and auxiliary plots, earnings from small enterprises, even from moonlighting, generally lies the establishment of new values, that is, the fulfillment of real needs; however in statistics all this is reflected only on the basis of estimates or returns. And these, particularly the returns, do not give reliable results. The situation is similar in other countries too, but here the reliability of returns is also damaged by the fact that it is "not proper" to be well off.

Who Has the Gain?

Tips, gratitude money, and "hush money" are becoming more common and are expressly income-rearranging tactics, behind which there is usually no surplus output. Still, income-rearranging touches a wide stratum, and it can also be regarded as a significant factor in the price increase of high quality goods and hard to find services. Everyone pays somehow, but the "gain" stemming from this source--i.e. the balance resulting from income-rearranging--falls into the pockets of definite social groups, while the incomes of other groups are greatly tapped by this practice.

Finally a delicate theme: not insignificant groups of the population obtain supplemental financial resources through the use of common property for their own gain. Numerous semi-legal forms of this are known. For instance: certain construction workers undertake "self-employed" work with company machinery, materials etc. Several share in the returns gained in this manner. This influences the population's financial situation, because it is qualitatively different than tips or bribes. The fact is, the latter only rearrange the income which was already in the population. However the unauthorized use of common property means a new financial source. In other words it means that a part of the national income--besides wages and other "regular" incomes--seeps through

to certain groups of the population; therefore the total available income is more than the amount that can be shown statistically.

Saving For a Bad Apartment

The contradiction between income and consumption can be explained by the fact that the rather early and comparatively quick increase in incomes influenced the standard of living favorably exactly at the turning point between the seventies and the eighties. The financial security for the apartments built in the past 6 to 8 years was accumulated mostly from the population's earlier income. Growth in the stock of durable goods can probably be attributed to two factors that play a role, money reserves and inflation. Fear of price increases urges us to spend our savings. Therefore we buy a second air conditioner or television even if the old one still works well; that is, even if it were more expedient to reserve our money. Thus inflation leads to irrational economy, waste, and finally to a more acute shortage.

To summarize the aforesaid in one sentence: the population's financial condition, its supply of durable goods and ongoing consumption is, fortunately, somewhat more favorable than shown by income data, i.e. real-wage calculations. However, it is part of the total picture that a comparatively significant stratum--and first of all aged, low pension persons--do not buy much and look for the cheaper items. Because they cannot supplement their income either legally or illegally, they must bear all the consequences of an economic situation rendered more difficult by inflation.


Furthermore: different shades of meaning color the picture we get of most people's consumption. It is true that for instance a significant portion of the population lives in apartments that are no older than 20 years, with all modern conveniences. A great many new apartment, however, are so small--for instance 37 square meters per 1 1/2 rooms with modern conveniences--that it can hardly create a feeling of true comfort even for two people. The apartment houses again are often so faulty that this embitters the lives of the owners or renters for years. It also does not appear in the statistical data that a significant number of old apartments, especially in the cities, is in a run-down condition and in bad repair; in these cases comfort is a formality, and does not mean comfort that is synonymous with good feeling and contentment.

It is also a fact that more than 40 percent of families own cars. Only the construction of their automobiles is in the overwhelming majority of cases obsolete, of simple workmanship, high fuel consumption, and cause unnecessarily great amount of air pollution. In addition, the "average life span" of motor vehicles is nearly 8 years.

In the case of every other consumer item we can complain--with respect for the rare exception--about poor quality, and that not infrequently they can only be obtained with "extra charge." This stands for services as well. The unquestionable exception is the food supply: the choice is good, and the quality is also usually acceptable.

To sum up what has been narrated: without a doubt, looking at the quantitative indicators for apartments, supply of durable goods, and ongoing consumption, significant improvement has been experienced in the past 10-15 years. This process, although stagnant or rather greatly slowed, has still been evident during the past five-six economically rather difficult years, and can be demonstrated by the 1983 closing statistics. Regrettably the same thing cannot be said about the quality of goods around us. Although statistics do not reveal this, our daily experience bears witness to the considerable and continuous deterioration in the quality of the majority of goods and services.


Lakossági jövedelemfelhasználás



Contains total monetary income, credit conditions, and other returns not of the character of incomes.

- Key: (1) Use of income by the population (4) Buying consumption
 (2) Billion forints (current price) (5) Apartment investment expenses
 (3) Total available money (6) Savings

Egy lakosra jutó fogyasztás (1975 = 100)



- Key: (1) Per capita consumption (4) Services
 (2) Food and pleasure items (5) Total consumption
 (3) Industrial products

Configuration of real rates of interest on the population's deposits by groups of items

	A takarékbetét átlag kamatlába	Élvezeti cikkek	Ruházkodási cikkek	Élelmiszerek	Fűtés, háztartási energia	Egyéb iparcikkek	Tartós fogyasztási cikkek	Szolgáltatások
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1975	4.34	0.47	-0.36	3.14	-3.46	-1.66	-0.26	2.14
1976	4.36	3.86	-0.84	-5.84	5.26	-2.34	1.46	1.96
1977	4.39	-0.61	-0.11	-1.11	5.09	2.19	1.99	1.19
1978	4.41	-4.79	-0.59	0.81	4.11	1.11	1.31	0.51
1979	4.40	-8.00	-1.60	-5.80	-4.40	-3.60	-3.90	1.00
1980	4.54	2.84	-0.46	-8.86	-16.86	-4.96	-8.66	-2.46
1981	4.58	1.98	-1.42	1.18	4.78	-4.12	3.48	-1.92
1982	4.61	1.51	-0.89	-0.19	5.39	-1.79	2.51	-2.59
1983	4.72	-1.98	-1.58	-0.38	-0.18	-1.58	-3.08	-3.38
1984	5.04	0.04	-3.96	-7.06	0.14	-2.26	-0.46	-2.96

Source: Tamas Banfi - Sulyok - Marta Pap - Janos Szaz: based on p 350 of the 1985 (handwritten) manuscript

EXPLANATION: The table shows in the cases of different groups of items the difference between the average rate of interest on savings deposits and the price index of the given group. A positive number means that the increase in price of the group of items occurred at a slower tempo than the average rate of interest on savings deposits. The negative numbers in the table indicate the reverse. In its entirety the table evaluates how the savings deposit has kept, or rather lost, its buying power as "measured" in groceries, fuel, and durable consumer goods. The negative numbers show the amount of loss of buying power, that is, it is not worth "saving" for those items or groups of items.

Key: (1) Average rate of interest on savings deposits (5) Heating, household energy
 (2) Pleasure items (6) Other industrial items
 (3) Clothing items (7) Durable consumer goods
 (4) Groceries (8) Services

12932/7051

CSO: 2500/127

VIEWS ABOUT NEW ENTERPRISE LEADERSHIP FORMS VARY WIDELY

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Dec 85 p 7

[Interview with Istvan Csillag, department head of the Finance Ministry and secretary of the interministerial committee coordinating organizational problems, with Csaba Halmos, head of the economic and living standard policy division of the National Council of Trade Unions; Jozsef Gertner, works manager and member of the enterprise council of the Ujpest Wool Weaving Mills; Laszlo Monostori, works managing director and deputy chairman of the enterprise council of the Magnesite Works; Gyula Toth, factory director and chairman of the enterprise council of the Machine Tool Industry Works, and Janos Vad, director of the United Chemical Works by Katalin Bossanyi, no date or place specified]

[Text] On the basis of an agreement between the superior authorities and the economic units, 247 enterprises out of 306 industrial organizations will be transformed to the new leadership forms by the end of 1986. At eight enterprises the directors of the collective bodies were not reaffirmed in their former positions. We asked Istvan Csillag and Csaba Halmos their views on the results of the transformation thus far and on the work distribution between directors and collective bodies, and on the new methods of interest coordination. Also included among our participants in the conversation were Jozsef Gertner, Laszlo Monostori, Gyula Toth, and Janos Vad. Our newspaper was represented by Katalin Bossanyi.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Transformation into the new leadership forms was preceded by a broad-scale organizational study in the entire economy. According to enterprise indications, this process was accompanied by quite a few conflicts in industry. What was the reason for this?

[Csillag Istvan] Organizational decisions on the independence of factory units had to precede the transformation to the collective leadership forms, because in many cases this was the precondition for a more market oriented and flexible management. It would not have been the correct solution to pass the onus of these difficult decisions to the collective bodies which were only then being formed. With our efforts the superior authorities, the area organs and the enterprises would have had sufficient time and information in this process to discover the problems and coordinate interests. Also because of

the tensions that accumulated from before, the process was accompanied, in practice, by considerably more conflict than we had expected, something which caused the industrial ministry to fall behind. All this caused uncertainty and impatience among the enterprises.

[Toth Gyula] At first the specialized ministry placed the Machine Tool Industry Works into the modernized trust or enterprise council form, which meant different management and independence. The collective of 5,000 members voted for the enterprise form, because in our view this would best meet the needs of our endowments. We were helped in this by the fact that we had had a managing director at the enterprise, and thus the factory managers were long ago drawn into the leadership.

There was a dispute, however, over the independence more for the Kecskement factory--led by me--which operates with a higher profit than the enterprise as a whole. Some of my colleagues voted for independence, but were finally persuaded that we could develop more rapidly if we stayed united.

[Halmos Csaba] But the coordination of interests was by no means this harmonious in industry as a whole; the decentralization debates caused many tensions, at times they unjustifiably brought into conflict also the enterprise centers and units. All these things led to a delay in decisionmaking, which even had a damaging effect at times on daily work. I see the causes in the fact that the organizational development process which started in industry had slowed down, and thus there were too many problems that had to be solved all at once. Basically, this was too bad because in this way--understandably--attention was diverted from the true importance of the new leadership forms during the industrial transformation, from the advantages of collective leadership, and from new tasks stemming from the assumption of proprietary rights.

[NEPSZABADSAG] The enterprise trade unions had the most important role in the preparation of the transformation. Won't the trade union outlook be too strong in the work of the enterprise councils?

[Halmos Csaba] It has been maintained in various forums that the trade unions--quote--took over the process of preparation. I protest this. The enterprise party and economic leadership and the KISZ [Hungarian Communist Youth League] representative participated along with the trade union in the committee responsible for the preparatory work. With the help of our steward network the trade unions very quickly and smoothly could find out the opinions of the workers, and they also represented a responsible control for the preparatory committees. It is another matter that the MT [Council of Ministers]-SZOT [National Council of Trade Unions] guideline are of general nature and do not regulate in detail all the phases of the transformation, thus leaving opportunity for enterprise independence. We found, however, that many enterprises turned to the higher authorities even in matters which they should have decided themselves. And still they welcomed having someone--from the outside--nod a head in approval at their ideas. This indicates that the transformation to collective leadership is

also a process of becoming independent and growing up, and that there are many who have to learn this.

[Monostori Laszlo] At our place the committee led by the trade union secretary --in agreement with the other social organizations--came up with recommendations for members to be delegated to the enterprise council. The work place groups debated these recommendations, which were amended everywhere by new ones. In the end, therefore, there was a plurality of candidates and the workers decided on their delegates by secret vote.

[Vad Janos] Our enterprise ran on ahead with the organization of the enterprise council. It appeared to us that the collective would welcome this change and know how to use the new proprietary rights. But the ministerial decision was delayed, and it was feared that because of the long waiting time the workers' enthusiasm would subside. Therefore we pushed for the transformation, but in the "final course" the leaders pulled back. In retrospect, this was right. The trade union carried out an outstanding work of organization, the whole matter was conducted democratically and under the rules of fair play.

[NEPSZABADSAG] There are many trade union stewards among the members of the enterprise councils. Won't this cause a conflict hereafter--in the coordination of interests?

[Vad Janos] For this very reason they have now in trade union elections left out the stewards who are members of the enterprise councils...

[Toth Gyula] A strange thing for us has come about in that one member of the enterprise council--the delegate of our managing director--has now become a member of the steward body, and he himself feels that it will be difficult for him to carry out the dual role. I believe that in the course of time he will see in which body he wishes to work.

[Halmos Csaba] I am personally convinced that the two functions are incompatible. Primarily because the task is different for the steward bodies in the representation and coordination of interests and different for the enterprise council. Also it is not proper to link the two functions, because together they are a very great burden.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Unlike in agriculture there are very few manual workers on the enterprise councils which have been formed thus far. What is the reason for this?

[Gertner Jozsef] At our factory, too, there are only few manual workers. When we discussed this in our shop the opinion was unanimous that to the enterprise councils we should send people who have appropriate knowledge and perception of enterprise matters and thus can reason and debate with the other leaders. For this reason we chose mostly technicians and leaders as worker delegates.

[Toth Gyula] There is also another side to the coin. Let us not beat about the bush: manual workers try to avoid social assignments. Some of it is due

to fear of formalities, but a more important factor appears to be that the young tradesmen who are establishing a family and buying a house must certainly work after hours whether in the enterprise associations or in an outside undertaking.

[Monostori Laszlo] I regard the term manual worker as a bit rigid. Of the nine elected council members at our factory two are workers, and three are technicians who were workers and are still regarded by the working collective as one of their own.

[Halmos Csaba] Fortunately there is no central statistical approach to the composition of the enterprise councils as to how many manual workers they should have, how many women and youth...The essential thing is that those workers should be sent to the collective body who have the confidence of the collective as a whole and are suitable for the function, regardless of what organizational or technological role they fulfill in the work specialization.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In principle there is no statistical "expectation" but in practice one is realized. This is indicated by the fact that many enterprise directors with some prodding--to improve the ratios--delegate workers to the enterprise councils.

[Csillag Istvan] The transfer of some property rights to the collective leadership faced the ministries, too, with a new situation. Accordingly, the organization of the specialized ministries is being reshaped, and the right of intervention and the mode of liaison are being modified. There are still numerous unsettled elements involved here, and accordingly many mistakes. The fact is, it is not only at the factory level that economic democracy must be learned and applied.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Without any differences among the industrial, construction industry or agricultural experiences, it strikes one that most of the chairmen of the enterprise councils come from among the deputy director. This can lead to tensions other than "cross employment."

[Monostori Laszlo] At our factory the manager of the research division is the chairman of the enterprise council. I have now been appointed technical deputy director, but I was an automatic member of the enterprise council also by virtue of my previous assignment. It is really strange: I exercise employment rights over the chairman of the enterprise council, and he over me. Jokingly, we used to refer to this situation among ourselves as "dual power." Actually, it has not caused any tensions up to now.

[Gertner Jozsef] To me it is reassuring that the deputy director is the chairman of our enterprise council. But it may cause a problem if, let us say, the enterprise council assigns a task to the director, but its realization depends on his deputy. How will the responsibility then be divided?

[Halmos Csaba] I do not regard it as a good thing for the deputy director to be the chairman of the enterprise council. We should designate for this position a technician who is held in general esteem and is not directly dependent on the director.

[Toth Gyula] I have been a factory director for 4 years. I have had disputes and obviously will continue to have with the managing director, but from the perspective of the enterprise's interests as a whole these can be kept with safe limits. That is to say, I feel this is a contrived problem.

[Casillag Istvan] Really, as if the person of the enterprise council chairman were being mysticized. A factor in this is that the statutory provisions put too many areas of administrative authority into his hands, for example, the approval of foreign travel and granting leaves for absence. Although in respect to the actual tasks of the chairman it is not a matter of another director, here it is a matter of a corporate decision. The director is also a member of a body. They must make the decision together--this is the essence of collective leadership--in the course of which the enterprise council, by using its proprietary rights, is at one and the same time the helper and controller of the director.

[Vad Janos] But life is a little bit different. In this collective body the management and leadership functions are still mixed. In my view, the enterprise council took over from the ministry the collective management function. But it continues to be the director who must lead the enterprise, and moreover with one-man responsibility. In case of a bad decision, we cannot throw the ball back! Our liberty is merely in the fact that if we do not agree with the decision of the enterprise council, we can return the authority with thanks...but there are other unclarified matters. In our case, for example, they wanted to draw the person of the enterprise council chairman and his deputy into the cadre sphere of authority of the area party organ. We protested for fear that this would evoke a feeling among the workers that they are actually not the ones who may decide. Finally, on the basis of a secret vote the enterprise council chairman became the same person who was also recommended by the party committee--incidentally he may apply with good chances also for the position of director. On the other hand, they elected another person as his deputy. I have related all this because in my view the area and party organizations should also adopt a new style of work and think over their activities and new tasks--increasing in number but of different character--at enterprises which have been brought under collective leadership forms.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Similar conflicts are in evidence also in the case of directors who have been recommended by social and state organs for further employment but have not been affirmed by the leadership body to the collective. Among the enterprises represented at this table, the Magnesite Works is in this situation.

[Monostori Laszlo] Actually, at our factory the former director failed to be affirmed by a ratio of 11 : 7. I must say that this decision surprised no one but the ministry or social organization. The collective had sensed that something was wrong in leadership methods and enterprise atmosphere. It was my feeling that he was not able to win people over to his side and that this was expressed in the vote...There is a split in views regarding the further role of the director who was not affirmed. For example, let me mention that with the vote of rejection the chairman of the enterprise council immediately

asked the director whether he wanted to remain in office until the decision was made on the applications or whether he wanted to hand the post over to the enterprise council, or to the deputy director. He asked for several days to think it over, but the legal division of the ministry immediately indicated that there was no choice, he had to remain in his position. We do not consider this a good solution either from the human or professional point of view. Think about it: his decisions, or failure to make decisions, will be judged subjectively to the extreme, no matter what he does, it will be the object of criticism. Because of this situation it is the view of many that the enterprise will be left without leadership during the transitional period... We succeeded in electing a new director in the record time of 115 days. There were nine applicants and finally the choice of the enterprise council fell on the former deputy. And we respectfully said farewell to the former director, who went into retirement.

[Toth Gyula] It is not a good thing for the ministry or any other body to campaign for directors. The workers will in any event evaluate and decide on the basis of work in the previous years. And we can speak of a true election, therefore, only in coming years.

[Vad Janos] A strange style is spreading nowadays among the directors: Did they elect you with a bone or without a bone? [Did you make a clear basket or did you hit the rim?] they ask one another. I received two negative votes--thus I was elected with a bone--and I am proud of this because there is no director whom everyone would approve.

[NEPSZABADSAG] We still have very little experience with the operation of the enterprise councils, for they are only now being formed. For most of them the first task will be to debate and approve next year's or the Seventh 5-Year Plan. According to your experiences, in such important questions whose interests--enterprise groups or sub-groups--are reflected the most in the collective decisions?

[Toth Gyula] The enterprise council must in any case represent the interests of the entire enterprise, this is what is meant by the development of proprietary consciousness and responsibility. This is not contradicted by the fact that I am a good leader if I also represent in the body the interests of our own factory at Kecskemet. Obviously I cannot be expected to vote in a way that will damage the collective I lead. Therefore, the collective decision will be made following a conflict and coordination of interests and the making of good compromises, and with the weighing of the long term interests of the whole collective.

[Csillag Istvan] It may be objected that the leaders of the factory units who represent differing interests will not pull the enterprise wagon in one direction, and will obstruct the development of a unified concept. In my judgment it would be unfortunate to regulate this problem from above. The surfacing of many interests in the work of the enterprise council will require and make possible the democratization of economic life, the discovery of and grappling with latent problems. that is, continuous interests coordination.

[NEPSZABADSAG] The social enterprise organizations participate in the work of the enterprise councils only when invited to do so. On the other hand, the trade unions have the right of concurrence in questions regarding the long and short term interests of the enterprise. In this case how will the coordination of the differing interests be realized?

[Vad Janos] In the various wage and social questions the director must come to a compromise with the trade union body, even as they sign with me the collective contracts.

[Halmos Csaba] That is not how it goes, for the two bodies must come to an agreement. It is another matter that the director may reach an agreement with the trade union committee, and it is binding to inform the enterprise council of this--before the decision. It is a problem that the various functions become mixed up in minds. It is wrong when the enterprise council wants to carry out trade union--that is, individual, worker--tasks that do not belong to it. But it is also wrong when the trade union arrogates to itself rights to which it is not entitled. I am of the conviction that work specialization functions can be sharply differentiated, and within this we must strengthen the traditional interest representational role of the trade unions. What are we speaking of? Of the fact that the local trade unions have concurrence and decisionmaking rights in certain wage, employment and social questions. In others it can only give its views. In these cases it can either bring the enterprise council to accept its views or it cannot, but in any event the enterprise council makes the decision. This is not the case in matters where it is invested with concurrence rights. Here it is necessary to come to an agreement! And if this is not possible, the representatives of the sub-branch trade union must be drawn into the settlement of the problem, of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce might undertake a role in the coordination of interests.

[Csillag Istvan] We must recognize that in the economy and thus in the life of the enterprises, too, there are very many different kinds of interests. Because a part of the proprietary rights has been moved from the ministerial level to the leadership bodies of the collectives, the sovereignty of the economic units had increased and their dependence on state administrative and sub-branch interests has been moderated. In its place, however, there has stepped a new, collective interest realization whose development for promoting effective, overall social interests will require a long learning process. It is already evident that the coordination of differing interests within an enterprise would also require organizational interest protection both for the enterprise council and for the directory.

[NEPSZABADSAG] We are still at the very beginning of the highly important changes in leadership forms. In the hope that in time we will be able to continue our joint thinking about the experiences of the operation--about the results as well as the debatable questions--I now thank you for our conversation.

6691/12951
CSO: 2500/136

ENTERPRISE REPRESENTATIVES, MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON REFORM

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] Reform consultants deliberate: What system of management? On 18 September, for the third time this year, there was a meeting of enterprise representatives and reform consultants. This time, on their agenda was the evaluation of conclusions arrived at the Poznan National Party-Government Council and of drafts of eight implementing orders to the Act of 31 July which was designed to adjust the economic reform to the real conditions and needs. The meeting was chaired by Minister Wladyslaw Baka, government representative for the economic reform matters. The discussion was primarily devoted to the principles which will determine the level of earnings in the next 5 years. This was of the greatest interest to the participants. Pros and cons of various proposed tax formulas on earnings, exceeding the standards, were also discussed (this tax would replace the notorious PFAZ). The differences of opinions which emerged indicate that there are substantial differences among plants. The flexible formulas of new tax respond to those differences.

In this context, reservations were expressed regarding the possibility that choosing one of the formulas to be implemented by the originators may unduly strengthen the central authorities. Stanislaw Borkowska, vice-minister of labor, compensation and social affairs, responded to questions in this field. She assured that all opinions of enterprise consultants will be carefully reviewed in further efforts to define the compensation policies in the 1986-1990 period. The vice-minister announced that the tax formula will assure a definite compensation for increased cost of living. She also stated that further efforts are in progress--various recalculations and estimates are conducted with the intent to raise the lowest pay.

Many of the participants raised questions regarding renovation of productive capital and counteracting the decapitalization process. In connection with this problem, there were proposals to reallocate the amortization contributions so that a larger share would stay with the enterprises. It was pointed out that maintenance and repair work should have priority and modernization should be made easier. Preferences and privileges for explorers were welcomed, especially the advance notice that ruble decreement accounts will be introduced on an experimental basis. Also, there were many reservations; for instance, regarding investments aimed at increasing export offers. It was brought up in the discussion that economic parameters need to stay stable over a longer period of time such as 5 or at least 2 years. Also discussed were the prices of supply articles

(do not change them many times a year) and the need to improve the supply system of commercial items. Questions were answered by the representatives of pertinent ministries. Minister W. Baka stated in his concluding remarks that the meeting fully fulfilled its purpose. The shortcomings and the missing elements were brought forth and this presented a better picture and permitted to establish how far we have progressed in implementing economic reform. All remarks will be carefully reviewed and, if justified, implemented. The pronouncements indicated that there is the desire that we have a simple, stable, efficient and effective economic system.

8801/12245

CSO: 2600/36

COMMISSION DISCUSSES FOREIGN TRADE INCENTIVE MEASURES

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21-22 Sep 85 pp 1-2

[Text] In the next 5 years we are aiming at increasing exports. An adjunct to the Council of Ministers, the Coordinating Commission for Cooperation with Foreign Countries in the Fields of Economics, Science and Technology held its routine meeting. Vice-Premier Janusz Obodowski chaired the meeting. The subject of discussion were new systemic solutions aiding the expansion of export during the period when the new National Socio-Economic Plan is in force. One of the conditions assumed by the Sejm when accepting Variant II of the Plan, was the accelerated development of export essential for satisfying the import requirements and making payments to foreign creditors. This is connected with the need for accelerated development of those economic sectors which do, or could, help increase export. Discussing the tools which can serve as import incentives during the period 1986-1990, the commission reviewed the conclusions based on the operation of existing system of crediting hard currency. There are many critical comments however, (they were voiced, among other places, at the National Party and Economic Conference in Poznan) which point out weak features of the system; one of which is limited freedom regarding the use of hard currency accumulated in the accounts and another is frequent changes in the level of increments. The Commission decided that the hard currency credit system should be based on the multiyear crediting rate. Also, it was decided that it would be desirable that the enterprises had the freedom of choice between using memo entries or capital accounts. In the case of memo entries, the owner would have to pay the bank only the full equivalent in zlotys; and make the payment in hard currency after the import actually occurs.

Next, the Commission reviewed a draft of the Council of Ministers regulation covering the experimental accounting system for ruble credits. It is assumed that in 1986, i.e., during the first year of the experiment, the system would cover a limited number of enterprises, mostly those participating in direct cooperation with the CEMA countries, those producing items covered by multiyear agreements of cooperation and specialization and those undertaking investments to aid export. In the successive years of the 5-year plan, depending on the results of the experiment, the system would be extended to the remaining exporters to socialist countries. Enterprises will be able to use the amounts collected on their accounts to make purchases needed for production in the Payment Zone I taking advantage of priorities within the limits of trade agreements. A portion of the amounts collected in the accounts will be available to cover the costs of trips abroad by the engineering and technical personnel (hands on training and other professional improvements).

The Commission reviewed information pertinent to the motivational system and the privileges and preferences in the tax liabilities due to the production for export. These materials were submitted by the Ministry of Labor, Compensation and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Finance; the commission made several comments and corrections. The measures included in the drafts are intended to increase the interest of enterprises and their personnel in developing and increasing production for export. Inter alia, it is planned to include the current export rewards in the wage fund which should result in more effective incentives. One of the criticisms of the current system was that the rewards were often paid many months after the export order was shipped. In conclusion, the Vice-Premier J. Obodowski emphasized the importance of systemic solutions. They should be made well known to the personnel to provide tangible proof of benefits resulting from production for export. The aim is to mobilize fully for our foreign trade--export and import.

8801/12245

CSO: 2600/36

ECONOMY

POLAND

BRIEFS

COAL MINE INCREASES OUTPUT--More coal from Bogdanka. Since 16 September of this year, the miners of the experimental/extracting coal mine in Bogdanka increased daily output by 200 tons. This was possible by using technological solutions which increased the throughput of the shaft serving to transport the extracted coal and to bring down materials. Since December 1982, when the exploitation of the first coal face started, the Lublin-Chelm coal company delivered almost 800,000 tons of coal. [Text] [Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Sep 85 p 1] 8801/12245

COAL TRANSPORT FROM NORTH PORT--In the North Port, a jamboree of ships awaiting their load of coal. In the last few days, in the North Port and in the anchorage, there is a true jamboree of ships that came to pick up their load of coal. In the coal dock over there, the Baja de Cris has been loaded with 62,000 tons of coal. Its place was taken by the Docebruma which will take 57,000 tons of coal. In the anchorage, there are five more ships which came to obtain almost 300,000 tons of coal. The next few days will be characterized by a procession of ships which will take away over 200,000 tons of coal. This large number of ships coming to pick up coal permits to make up the arrears which were caused by the decreased shipments due to the severe winter last year. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Sep 85 p 1] 8801/12245

NEW EXCAVATOR IN OPERATION--In the Konin lignite mine, at the Lubustow open-pit mine, a new excavator started working; it is a Polish excavator, designated KWK 1500S, built by specialists at Famago in Zgorzelec. Domestic production of the gigantic machines for strip mining will permit elimination of expensive imports from the FRG and GDR. [Text] [Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21-22 Sep 85 p 1] 8801/12245

COAL TRANSSHIPMENT TO EXCEED PLAN--Record high transshipments of coal in the North Port. Record breaking transshipments of coal are predicted for September in the Gdansk North Port. During the past 22 days sea shipments of coal amounted to 763,000 tons. This means that the September plans were exceeded by 20 percent. Contrary to the past months, in the period of approaching winter, it is not the port which awaits the arrival of ships but it is the ships which drop anchor at the anchorage and await their turn. On the 22nd day of this month, 48,000 tons of coking coal was loaded aboard the Austrian flag Tirol and its place at the coal pier of North Port was taken by a large British ship Farland, over 200 meters long, which will take an impressive amount of 90,000 tons of coking coal. At the anchorage, two more ships are waiting including another

large British ship, Ravenscraig, which will take a similar quantity of coal. There is advance notice that before the end of the month more large ships will arrive including Romanian and Panamanian flag ships. [Text] [Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Sep 85 p 1] 8801/12245

OPZZ, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MEET--Another routine meeting of the government-union subcommittee for the national economy operational systems took place. The meeting was co-chaired by the deputy government representative for economic reform, Prof Zdzislaw Sadowski, and the vice-chairman of OPZZ, Stefan Koziaczy. Views were exchanged on the subject of employment problems and the inter-occupational pay relationship. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 15 Sep 85 p 8] 8801/12245

CSO: 2600/36

DISCUSSION OF PUBLIC LOANS TO REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT

[Editorial Report] The 21-23 December 1985 issue of Belgrade PRIVREDNI PREGLED on page 7 publishes articles on the question of floating public loans to reduce unemployment, noting at the same time that "one of the dilemmas is whether this action is premature and whether many other possibilities [for solving the problem] have been utilized."

It said that the loan subscription campaign initiated on 1 December 1985 in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been encouraging, with 7 billion dinars subscribed in the first 10 days of the campaign by over 230,000 people throughout the republic, including even pensioners and students; special efforts were being made to include the 7,000 workers employed in republic enterprises which are building projects abroad.

Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA of 30 December 1985 on page 18 says that this republic expects to collect about 167 billion dinars in this way, as well as through local assessments and by increasing the rate of tax taken for employment out of our income, in order to employ an additional 100,000 in the next 5 years.

PRIVREDNI PREGLED says that the draft law which is expected to be adopted on this in Kosovo calls for the payment of 1 month's average 1985 salary by all workers (private and socialized), pensioners, and farmers in 18 installments at 10 percent interest, resulting in a total of 13 billion dinars. It reports that enterprises would be expected to allocate 1.5 percent of their income to open new jobs and that a total of 10,000 persons were expected to be employed. At the same time Ibis Krasnici, president of the Kosovo Committee for Labor, is quoted as saying, "We are aware that this will affect the standard of living of working people and citizens so consideration is being given to those with lowest income; because the problem of unemployment in Kosovo cannot be resolved by additional funds collected in this way but rather through the better use of capacities, the introduction of multishift work, the shortening of work hours where working conditions are difficult, and the retiring of all those who meet the conditions for this."

Montenegro will issue a law on obligatory loan subscription for all categories of the population with regular incomes which, together with other measures, is expected to open up 1,100 additional jobs, according to the above-cited issue of EKONOMSKA POLITIKA.

In regard to Macedonia, which PRIVREDNI PREGLED noted has the highest unemployment rate in Yugoslavia with 134,000, mainly young educated people, waiting for work, such a loan for employment is being discussed with terms similar to those above and a repayment period of 5 years; "19 billion dinars would be expected to be collected and exclusively applied to developing labor-intensive sectors and enterprises which plan to introduce two or more shifts on the basis of investment projects corresponding to the criteria contained in the regulations." A spokesman for the Macedonian Committee for Labor said that "As of now one cannot say anything concretely about the outcome of this social action, there is a certain fear as to whether the unemployment problem can be alleviated in this way and whether these funds will be used as earmarked.... Despite the possibilities for solving the problem of unemployment in Macedonia, there is not much room for optimism, since the number of unemployed is expected to be 120,000 by 1990."

/9365

CSO: 2800/145

ECONOMIST REFUTES SLOVENIAN CRITICISM OF LCY STANDS ON INCOME

[Editorial Report] In six installments, 6-12 January 1986, page 4 respectively, Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian publishes excerpts from a work by Slovenian economist Zvonimir Tanko, refuting the "severe and very polemical" arguments expressed in Slovenia against the LCY CC's Draft Stands on Income Distribution published last year.

Tanko quotes France Popit from the 4 October 1985 issue of Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene as saying that the Draft Stands present a danger "that we will receive only some kind of state pay, as was the case right after the war when conditions were different." He cites the following statement made at the Slovenian LC Presidium meeting from Ljubljana DELO in Slovene on 10 October 1985: "The most criticism is directed at that part of the Draft Stands which proposes that workers' income be formed on the--certainly state--basis of uniformly specified conditions, and separated according to the principle of equal work and equal results of work regardless of...the income earned on the market." Ljubljana TELEKS in Slovene on 26 September 1985 said, "The LCY...represents the idea that work must be paid for uniformly everywhere and that the price of labor is equal throughout the state." Trade union official and economist Francka Herga in several press statements last fall strongly deplored such "state regulating of pay."

Tanko says: "I do not know where these writers get these ideas since they do not exist in the Draft Stands," which, on the contrary, he continues, speak not of the state but of social agreements and self-management compacts and assert that the basic part of personal income depends on the level of economic development and average labor productivity in each republic and province. "Thus, already in basic personal income, differences exist among the republics and provinces. Nowhere does it say that the results expressed in the income of individual enterprises would be ignored and that personal earnings would be linked only on the basis of labor productivity of society as a whole, as Francka Herga said in KOMMUNIST of 18 October 1985.

"The Draft Stands say that the 'general level' of the [basic] part of personal income would depend on 'labor productivity of society.' The other part of workers' income would be based on the economic results of the enterprise."

Tanko quotes another typical criticism from NASI RAZGLEDI of Ljubljana: "The unchangeable [basic] part of personal income can only mean that labor does not get its social recognition through income on the market, but must seek it from the state."

He counters that "the Draft says, in fact, the opposite, i.e., that the basic part of workers' income is an integral part of his earnings and must be paid out of earned income and if enterprises cannot do this, then they must liquidate or rehabilitate [their business]. This is the way it is even now!"

Tanko also denies that the Draft Stands are not in line with self-management, and that they "pull us backward" (Dusan Sinigoj in DELO of 12 October 1985).

Refuting the Slovenian trade union statement made in DELO of 27 September 1985 that the Draft has caused confusion and concern, political damage, and internationality tension, Tanko says it is rather the misinterpreters of the Draft at political forums and public discussions who have caused confusion.

He notes that there are economists who say the new income plan will also increase the differences in earnings, who assert that the plan cannot be carried out "either technically or politically" and that if it is attempted, it would "produce yet another 'mad dog' in our inter-republic relations, since the undeveloped and inefficient parts of our economy would come out at the short end!"

But Tanko believes that the "pessimistic assumptions about the consequences of the new plan are exaggerated. Every radical change requires also certain transitional solutions." The technical problems in implementing the plan do not worry him; but he acknowledges that the political problem arising from "possible reduction...of personal income which would affect a minority can be controversial, but not to the degree that would make application of the new system impossible."

He notes wryly that "if we have 'succeeded' politically in bringing 60 percent of all employees who have below-average personal incomes to a (sub-) minimum [i.e., even lower] level, I see no reason why we could not do this [i.e., reduce the income] for perhaps 20 percent of those who would be found (on the basis of clear social bases and measurements) to have too high personal incomes based on results achieved."

At the same time he denies that inflation can--"either hamper application of the new method of income distribution because the level of the...basic part of income can be increased by agreement, even several times a year if necessary, although at lower-than-inflation rates"--or that the new method would stimulate inflation to a greater degree than is presently the case.

Tanko expresses particular astonishment at economist Aleksandar Bajt's criticism printed in DELO and other publications. Bajt warns that, among other things, the Draft introduces "a principle of remuneration which prevails in capitalist

enterprises; namely, that consumption and personal earnings are the only stimulus for workers." Such a view morally discredits associated labor, according to Bajt, who says that the proposed system of income distribution would be considerably less stimulating than the present one since "it would transform capital accumulation into a quantity which is opposed to the interests of the workers, and again introduce into our system the concept of the labor force being a commodity" on which a value is placed.

In response to Bajt and other economists who, he says, believe that "regulating by force the standards of work will not contribute to a more efficient use of social funds," Tanko asks whether "it is more rational to distribute income on the basis of strictly linking it to the social results of economic operation or on a basis which makes it possible for personal earnings to be formed independently of the results of economic operation."

Tanko, furthermore, discusses how the new plan's division of personal earnings into two parts (a constant base pay, and a variable pay depending on the performance of the enterprise) is based on Marx' teaching and on Kardelj's ideas which, in turn, are "built into the Constitution." He cites "simple peasant logic" which says that under socialism the worker, in addition to his pay, can also get part of the profit; and concludes that, far from following capitalism, the new system of income distribution simply adapts to universal economic laws and is, in fact, the "only possible form of social 'leap' from capitalism to socialism."

One of the criticisms of economists Herga and Bajt, Tanko says, is that the Draft neglects economic solutions, and gives priority to administrative decisions, "similar to the way labor value is determined in capitalist economies which have to stimulate the market." But Tanko says labor-management wage negotiations "as carried on in Western countries are seen by everyone to be objectively necessary. Is it not wiser and better to 'hash out' questions of pay every 3 or 4 years as is done in Western capitalist economies and then have at least some period of peace...than, as we do, to quarrel about pay every day in OURs; and to increase pay...regardless of the results of economic operation just to have peace in the house?"

"It is high time that we recognize that in capitalism the allocation of income into workers' pay and into owners' profit is carried out by social agreements and the allocation of capitalists' profits is carried out under socioeconomic pressures (competition between enterprise owners, taxes on owners' profits...)"

Tanko concludes by citing a comment from Bajt that "although the idea on which the proposed system...is based...has its rational core, its application has been proposed in a way that is foreign to our type of self-management commodity production." Tanko replies that, although he agrees that the Draft Stands should be critically examined, he believes "they are ripe for further development."

/8309

CSO: 2800/147

BRIEFS

WHEAT PLANTING--This spring 12,000 hectares are to be planted in wheat which will bring the total wheat area to 1,272,000 hectares, since 1.26 million hectares were planted in wheat last fall, or about 14 percent less than planned. [Private] farmers reduced their wheat area by one-fifth, planting 857,000 instead of the planned 1.08 million hectares, while socialized farms planted 403,000 hectares, or 5.5 percent over the plan. Measures to provide the necessary fertilizing and care of crops are needed if wheat production is to reach the planned 5 million tons this year. The wheat planted in the Province of Vojvodina looks good, on the whole..., [although] more snow cover would be especially good for wheat now. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jan 86 p 1] /9365

ESTIMATED WHEAT HARVEST--In Yugoslavia 1.22 million [as published] hectares of wheat have been planted, or about 200,000 hectares less than planned. As a result, the planned production of 6 million tons will be reduced to 5.6 million or 5 million tons. Production will be lower largely because of reduced area, but also because a good part of the planting was done after the best period (in October). If one adds to this also the fact that low-quality seed was planted on about 30,000 hectares, we will certainly not have high yields. According to quality specialist Prof Dr Todor Misic, because a considerable part of the planting was done after the best planting period, yields will be 10 to 15 percent lower. Initial estimates call for average per-hectare yields of about 3.5 tons, resulting in a total harvest that would be as much as 700,000 to 1 million tons below the plan, and most probably requiring wheat imports. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 86 p 12] /9365

SUGAR BEET HARVEST--In one of the shortest [sugar beet harvesting and processing] campaigns up to now a total of 6.67 million tons of beets have been processed in the 23 Yugoslav sugar mills, resulting in a total sugar production of 921,000 tons, 883,000 tons of which are to be allocated to the domestic market and the remainder to Hungary. Despite the drought, yields last year were average, 42.6 tons per hectare, with a sugar content above average. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jan 86 p 1] /9365

PKJ TRADE OFFICES--The PKJ [Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia], in accord with the new law on economic activity abroad, will have its representative offices abroad, which will replace the joint economic representative offices in

existence up to now. It is not only a question of changing the name but of aiming toward a more organized and effective operation of the Yugoslav economy on foreign markets, said Radojko Filipovic, secretary of the PKJ coordinating council for foreign economic relations. The number of offices will not be changed initially; which means that of the total of 55 economic "embassies," 8 will be East European countries and China, 18 in the West, and the others in developing countries. At present 105 Yugoslavs and 110 foreign citizens work in these representative offices. If it is found that some work organizations are ignoring business ethics and damaging the reputation and economic force of Yugoslavia, the office will report this to the PKJ Court of Honor and on the basis of the court's decision the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Trade can deny permission for foreign trade. The expenses of the PKJ representative offices are expected to amount to 3,122,000,000 dinars in 1986, including the hard currency amount of \$3.8 million. In 1985 expenses amounted to 1,734,000,000 dinars, including \$3.5 million. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4-5 Jan 86 p 8] /9365

CSO: 2800/145

TESTS WITH BOTULIN TOXINS, DETOXIFICATION AGENTS DESCRIBED

Warsaw WOJSKOWY PRZEGLAD TECHNICZNY in Polish No 11, Nov 85 pp 474-475

[Article by Captain Jerzy Rzytki and Sergeant Artur Slowik: "Botulin Toxins"]

[Text] Botulin toxins (botulisms) are defined as third-generation toxic agents and are the most lethal of all currently known substances. For example, they are 25,000 times more lethal than hydrocyanic acid and 500 times more lethal than sarin. They exceed the toxicity of soman by almost 400 times, and that of mustard gas by 7,500. These toxins, known by the name botulin toxins, are produced by bacteria called the botulinum bacillus (*Clostridium botulinum*). Currently, seven types of the botulin toxin have been identified: A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Variants of A and E can be utilized for military purposes.

Botulisms are the protein of a type of globulin and contain in their particles approximately 18-20 amino acids. It seems that the botulisms do not have branched chains of polypeptide. The formation of the botulinum particles is not yet totally known, even though a great deal of research has been dedicated to this. The majority of the scientific research conducted was aimed at establishing the formation of the toxin's radioactive nucleus which is responsible for the agent's toxic properties. Some researchers believe that the makeup of the toxin's radioactive nucleus contains a particle of tryptofan; others believe that it contains a particle of saccule. The newest theories assert that the radioactive nucleus forms a certain defined peptone made up of several amino acids.

Presently, it is believed that botulisms are a stable substance made up of two particles: a typically unspecific neurotoxin with a molecular weight of 150,000 and a typically unspecific hemagglutinin with a molecular weight of from 290,000 to 900,000. Research has shown that the neurotoxin is an elongated twofold fibre or tube, about 9 mm long, made up of particles 4.5 mm long. The toxin fills space within the hemagglutinin spirals. The hemagglutinin then occurs in the form of a spiral made up of twists averaging 19-20 mm.

Botulisms have a stable body, are colorless, and occur in a crystalline or amorphous structure (3.6); they are tasteless and odorless. They dissolve well in water, being subject to a slow hydrolysis. Botulinum crystals are

hygoscopic. At a temperature of around 375K (100°C), the particles of the toxin break down quickly. The toxins of the other types behave similarly under the same conditions.

Research was also conducted on the influence of ionizing and ultrasonic radiation on the stability of the botulinum toxin. Large dosages of ionizing radiation cause a loss of the toxic properties in a relatively short time. This method of detoxification, however, cannot be considered under battlefield conditions. The effect of ultrasonics on the toxin also causes a decline in the toxin's toxicity and this method of detoxification can be used in the future to decontaminate clothing.

A relatively large amount of research was concerned with the effects of an alkaline environment on the stability of botulin toxins. Among other things, it was proved that at a pH of 3.5, the toxicity of various toxins was not changed over a lengthy period of time. At a pH of 7, the toxicity of type A botulin toxins decreased to 5 percent of the initial toxicity after 24 hours, and type B toxins lost up to 50 percent of their toxicity. Type C and D toxins maintained their toxic properties at a pH of 7 for up to 10 days. An increase of the pH to approximately 8 results in a considerable decline in the toxicity of all types of the toxin in 24 hours. The most resistant toxin was type E, the stability of which survived a temperature of 277K (4°C) for 3 months, while at room temperature and at a pH of 9, its toxicity diminished to 50 percent of its initial toxicity after 24 hours.

Also research were the effects of chemical combinations containing active chlorine on botulin toxins. This problem is very important, inasmuch as all current solutions of sulphate hypochlorine are alkaline solutions used in decontamination. The utility of this group of combinations in the detoxification of botulin toxins in water solutions was also proved.

The water solution of sulphate hypochlorine currently utilized to decontaminate combat equipment contains approximately 1.8 percent of a two-thirds based sulphate hypochlorine solution in water (on the model: $3\text{Ca}(\text{OCl})_2 \cdot 2\text{Ca}(\text{OH})_2 \cdot 2\text{H}_2\text{O}$) and 1 percent of a P-710 concentrate in relation to the water. The active chlorine content amounts to about 1 percent. In the utility of this solution to decontaminate botulin toxins, we have to consider the active chlorine content, the concentration of hydroxide ions in the solution, and the presence of P-710 concentrate. Considering the relatively small amount of active chlorine, this solution may turn out to be little effective, inasmuch as recent research has seen considerably greater concentrations of active chlorine being used. The concentration of hydroxide ions in the solution is large ($\text{pH} > 12.6$) and in this environment, all known types of this toxin will quickly lose their toxic properties. Adding to the alkaline solution more P-710 decontamination concentrate permits an easier wetting down of contaminated surfaces, and also facilitates the washing off of the toxic particles from these surfaces, the particles' dissolution and solubility in micelles of an active surface agent (this active surface agent is one of the elements of the P-710 concentrate).

The content of active chlorine, a large concentration of hydroxide ions, and the corresponding wetting-washing properties allow the solution of sulphate hypochlorine to be useful in decontaminating botulin toxins. Research testing should answer the question: When do the individual toxin types lose their toxic properties altogether?

An organic decontaminating solution (ORO) is a solution of chemical combinations with strong nucleophilic properties. The solution is spread on the contaminated surface to a thickness of about $0.1 \div 0.2 \text{ dm}^3/\text{m}^2$, with the help of the CzPO and 20d-1 decontaminant. This solution can contain about 5 percent sodium ethanol, 25 percent of monoethanol and up to 45 percent of diethynol acid or some other multi-acidic substances in ethanol. Monoethynal acids and diethynol acids are powerful alkaline combinations, while an ethanol ion is a strong nucleophilic element, the strongest of the hydroxides. An organic decontaminating solution can also be very useful in dealing with botulin toxins.

Decontaminating solution No 1 is used in artillery and ship decontaminating assemblies by spreading it on the contaminated surface to a thickness of $0.3 \div 0.5 \text{ dm}^3/\text{m}^2$. The solution contains 10 percent of dichloride acid in dichloride ethane or 5 percent 6-chloromelamine in dichloride ethane.

Decontaminating solution nr 2aZ contains 2 percent sodium hydroxide and 5 percent monoethanol acid dissolved in 20 percent of animoalkaline water. This solution is also spread in decontaminating assemblies to the same thickness as is solution nr 1. This solution is very alkaline.

In analyzing the makeup of solutions No 1 and No 2aZ, we discover that they can also be effective against botulin toxins.

The water solution with the SF powder with a concentration of $0.15 \div 0.3$ percent can be important when it is spread on a surface as a deactivating solution. SF contains superficially active agents which reduce the surface tension of the water; this facilitates washing off the decontaminated particles. The residue of this solution is sodium ($\text{pH} = 10 \div 1$); it can also be used to decontaminate equipment contaminated by the toxin during washing.

The decontamination of combat equipment contaminated by the toxin can be affected with the aid of the WUS thermal assembly. Decontamination consists of heating the outer surface of the equipment with a stream of hot gases for several minutes until the temperature reaches 400K (130°C). Under these conditions, the toxic substance is not thermally resistant and will quickly dissolve.

Currently, decontaminants are used to clean uniforms and equipment; they are prepared in the BU assembly with sodium carbonate added, and used to decontaminate through the steam-air-ammonia method in the AGW-3 assembly. The decontaminants can also be useful in decontaminating uniforms contaminated with the toxin.

From a theoretical analysis of the usefulness of decontaminating solutions used to detoxify botulin toxins, we find that all the decontaminants mentioned here can be used to cope with all botulin toxins. The decontamination technology discussed here should be used practically in laboratory and field research.

AIR FORCE COMMANDER DISCUSSES PERSONNEL, ACTIVITIES

Warsaw ZA WOLNOSCI LUD in Polish No 34, 24 Aug 85 p 4

[Interview with Tytus Krawczyc, Commander of the Polish Air Force, by Edmund Orkiszewski; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] There will be nothing in this conversation on war. I suggest that we restrict our talk to the present. As one of the armed services of the Polish People's Army, what is the air force all about?

[Answer] "World War II proved by itself that there can be no talk of success on the part of the ground forces unless there is air superiority. Other local wars, waged since 1945, confirm this idea. For this reason also, the air force is an integral part of the armed forces and serves to win air superiority and to inflict blows against enemy targets located beyond the range of the rocket forces and artillery. Additionally, the air force conducts reconnaissance for the benefit of all the armed forces. The air force is also a means to wage radioelectronic combat and to transport personnel and equipment rapidly. Even now, in peacetime, the fighter air force continually performs combat patrols over the airfields and airports, keeping an eye on the inviolability of our borders. Often enough, the fighter air force intercepts enemy aircraft conducting reconnaissance near our borders. One can find in many units photographs clearly showing aircraft with black crosses. These pictures were taken by modern Polish pilots.

[Question] What qualifications must a young candidate possess in order to become a pilot of a modern combat aircraft?

[Answer] Pilots have always had to meet high ideological, moral and physical requirements. These requirements have grown with the development of aeronautical technology. Today, a pilot of a combat aircraft has to be ready to fly under extreme conditions, at high altitudes and at great speeds. For example, at a speed of 900 kilometers an hour, he will fly 15 kilometers in a single minute. At the same time, the pilot is also a navigator and gunner, inasmuch as he navigates along the designated route and controls the onboard weapons systems. He therefore needs to be proficient in many respects, have a healthy heart, good vision, physical endurance and great psychological stamina.

The average Pole possesses many traits which come in handy for piloting; traits like courage, bravado, decisiveness, and the capacity to make even risky

decisions rapidly. These traits were the reasons for the successes of our combat pilots during World War II. We have trained many excellent pilots in our air force; these pilots all have the necessary traits for expert piloting and are recognized throughout the Warsaw Pact for such. This fact confirms the idea that Poles have good qualifications for flying.

[Question] The fame of Polish Wings was created by engineers, aircraft pilots, glider pilots and balloonists. Several generations were well acquainted with the names and accomplishments of Rogalski, Wigura, Drzewiecki, Zwirka, Skarzynski, Burzynski, and Hyniek. During the war, famous fighter pilots covered themselves with glory. Does any of this from our recent past line on in the younger generation? Do young people desire to be a part of the Polish Air Force?

[Answer] A considerable number of young people know about our air force traditions. There are many flying enthusiasts among them. However, the requirements facing pilot candidates are so high that not all of them can qualify. We are doing much to ensure the selection of the best candidates. Aero clubs, flying scout troops, flying schools, and pilot training courses are turning out new glider pilots and aircraft, the most recent was the "Orlik" aircraft. More are anticipated. All of this is supposed to increase the number of young people familiar with flying. The profession of piloting is actually an attractive and heroic profession. Additionally, this profession provides the fatherland with a necessary service, inasmuch as it guards our borders even in peacetime. I believe that every courageous and proficient young man should try flying. I have said that young people are attracted to the air force, but I must add that good health alone does not allow a young man to realize his ambitions. We have many candidates, but our needs are even greater and we must select the best young men in all regards.

[Question] Aeronautical technology is undergoing very rapid changes. These changes determine the equipment and the pilot....

[Answer] Very true. Modern aircraft are complicated machines; additionally, they are equipped with the newest radio, navigational, and targeting devices, and automatic instruments. Every country is not capable of building all types of aircraft. We in the Warsaw Pact fly Soviet-built aircraft. Very well trained soldier pilots, who are dedicated to socialism, sit behind the aircraft's controls. They are capable of performing any difficult mission day and night. They fly aircraft which meet the requirements of the modern battlefield. The newest aircraft have been produced with super technology. But let us keep our heads clear: even the most famous aircraft means nothing without an excellent pilot.

[Question] We are conducting this conversation at one of the airfields during a training seminar for journalist members of the Air Force Publicists Club of the Society of Polish Journalists. This club was organized by the Political Office of the Polish Air Force. The seminar is dedicated to the role and missions of the Ground Forces' air force on the modern battlefield. How do you, as Commander of the Polish Air Force, see this role and these missions?

[Answer] The massive employment of helicopters in local wars confirm their overall usefulness, not only as a transportation, reconnaissance, and command asset, but primarily as an effective means of supporting the ground forces with fire. All of this created an interest in the helicopter as the future combat asset. It simultaneously resulted in the emergence of a new branch of the armed forces: The air forces of the Ground Forces. True, helicopters will not revolutionize modern combat operations, even if they are a modern weapon for armed combat. Nor will they become an answer to all the problems on a modern battlefield. However, it is well to note that their role in armed struggle is growing systematically. This growth is the result of the ever-increasing combat opportunities offered by helicopters and their positive influence on their ability to hit combat targets, especially while performing a number of missions for the benefit of the ground forces. Considering the unique nature of helicopter operations and the types of equipment utilized, we can distinguish three basic groups of helicopters, i.e., combat attack, transport-assault, and special. As a rule, combat attack, transport and multi-purpose helicopters like the Mi-2, Mi-4, Mi-8, and Mi-24 are utilized to accomplish the above-mentioned missions. These missions are performed by helicopters for the benefit of ground forces during offensive and defensive operations. Helicopters are primarily employed for the effects of their firepower; they are used to combat enemy tanks and anti-tank assets. This greatly enhances the conventional firepower of the ground forces and ensures the high tempo of the offense, particularly in maneuver operations and in the rear of the enemy's grouping.

[Question] As each of the armed forces, the air force not only trains and educates a young man, but also benefits the civilian economy.

[Answer] Yes, it does. Soldiers of the Polish Air Force have many opportunities to perform missions, while they train, for the benefit of the economy. Military aircraft transport cargoes require rapid transport and good protection, both inside the country and beyond its borders. We also move groups of passengers on the basis of an agreement with the Polish airline, "Lot." This agreement will be expanded in 1986. There was a time when helicopters performed building-assembly work. Afterwards, a special enterprise was set up, but it proved incapable of handling the requirements of the economic reform and went bankrupt. Once again, the military will begin performing this service and for only minimal compensation. Another service is performed by the air force in the event of a natural calamity. Remember the flooding around Plock and the part played by helicopters in saving people from "the winter of the century?" Today, a group of helicopters is performing missions in providing help to the starving people in Ethiopia; the helicopters carry food and medical assistance to the most inaccessible mountainous regions in that country and thus bring great honor to Poland. Finally, the pilots we train fly the aircraft of the Lot airline and other civilian aerial institutions. We also accord free technical and material assistance to aero clubs. As you can see from the brief description, we are trying to be as helpful as we can in servicing the economy and public.

[Question] How is the cooperation between our pilots and the combatants who participated in the air battles on the fronts of World War II?

[Answer] The Polish Air Force has been working together with veteran organizations for years now. We are working closely together with the Association of Fighters for Liberty and Democracy, the Senior Air Force Pilots Club, and circles of the Union of Former Professional Soldiers. We assist these associations in setting up performances and shows. In June of this year, thanks to our help, an outing of the Poznan chapter of the Senior Air Force Pilots Club was set up for a trip to Krakow and Auschwitz. We organize meetings between the veterans and soldiers in our units, and meetings on state and military holidays. Last year, in Lawice in Poznan, we held a meeting on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the air force. Two hundred fifty veterans participated in this meeting and many other veterans attended the main ceremonies in Poznan. The columns of the weekly periodicals, WIRAZE and PRZEGLAD WL. WOPK. are open for reminiscences. Additionally, we offer our veterans various kinds of assistance. Many officers are members of veteran institutions. I personally am a member of the Senior Air Force Pilots Club and participate in its activities. A joint effort was made to set up in Poznan an obelisk commemorating the acquisition of an air force in Lawice in 1919 during the All-Polish Uprising. Have we done everything here we can? Of course, we can do more. We have, however, this principle: Our veterans can inspire a great deal of initiative and new ideas, and we will help implement them.

Taking advantage of the fact that this interview will be printed in a veteran's periodical, I want to extend to all veterans my congratulations and a request to remain in contact with the leadership of the Polish Air Force during difficult times.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the interview.

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CSO: 2600/150

POLITICS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROMANIANS CRITICIZE HUNGARIAN 'REVISIONISTS', CHAUVINISTS'

Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA in Romanian 5 Dec/85 pp 12-13

[Article by Prof Stefan Stefanescu, Nicolae Petreanu: "Hungarian Revisionists and Chauvinists Are at it Again"]
[Text] History is the science of truth. Truth always forces its way through, and any attempt to hide, evade, or distort it is always futile to the person making the attempt, because reality emerges triumphant in the end. History is also a science exerting a powerful influence, a delicate cultural instrument. It must be handled with care and great discernment, and the consequences which writing in one direction or another must always be kept in mind. Every people naturally recalls its own history, the stages in its development, moments of prosperity and decline, as suggestive lessons for future generations, but the way in which this is done can be harmful and contrary to the interests of coexistence, neighborliness, and friendship between nations and contrary to its own real interests if these lessons fail to conform to reality and historical truth.

An example of this is the article "Independent Transylvania" published under the signature of Peter Ruffy, in issue 3 (1985) of the publication HUNGRIA (Spanish edition). The article deals with the period of Transylvanian history extending from 1541 to 1687, when Transylvania was a principality. Its title suggests an historical situation which in fact never existed. When the Kingdom of Hungary fell as a result of the Battle of Mohacs and the subsequent fall of Buda and installation in it of an Ottoman Turkish pashalik (in 1541), Transylvania, which during the centuries of domination by the kingdom of Hungary had been preserved as a separate entity, was transformed into a principality. Under the particular historical conditions prevailing at the time, it was subject to Ottoman suzerainty along with the other two Romanian lands, Moldavia and Muntenia. At the end of the 17th Century, Ottoman domination was replaced by that of the Habsburgs. At this time there could accordingly be no question of an independent Transylvania except for brief periods, the most illustrious being that of the reign of Michael the Brave, the prince who united the Romanian lands. But we are entirely justified in asking what the use is today of conferring a title such as this on a person.

However, the author refers in the introductory section of his article to subjugation of regions of Transylvania by Hungarian kings around the year 896, when in reality the conquest took place in successive stages of a long subsequent period extending into the 13th Century. After presenting the

opinions of Romanian historians, which we admit represents homage paid to objectivity, the author then discusses the thesis of Hungarian historians regarding the population of Transylvania at the time of its conquest by "groups of Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Slavs." How could the author have omitted from this list the Romanians, whose ancestors, the Getodacians, had inhabited these lands from time immemorial?

The studies made of the pregovernmental and governmental organizations in existence in the Transylvanian region before the conquest by the Hungarian kings, the archeological research conducted over a period of decades, and the testimony of the Anonymous Notary of King Bela III confirm not only the continuity of population by Romanians and their permanence, but their governmental organization in the Transylvanian territories before the Hungarian conquest. Moreover, the institution of voivodship itself was taken over from the indigenous population and adapted to the needs of actual Hungarian conditions. At any rate, no vacuum existed in Transylvania, and the Romanians and their voivods (governors) at the time of the conquest of their homeland represented the indigenous ethnic element and the predominant ethnic element. Even the author indirectly acknowledges this situation when he later states that the Hungarian kings did not complete their conquests until 1002 ("occupation of our country's land by Hungarians in this region was completed in 1002, when King Stefan I the Saint annexed it to Hungary"), that is, after 106 years, although the process of conquest proper of Transylvania, which did not begin until the 11th Century, was completed only during the centuries that followed.

In addition, Peter Ruffy is neither the first nor the only one who has attempted to demonstrate that there was a vacuum in these regions which was filled by migratory peoples such as Slavs, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and others, with the Romanians apparently not returning to ancient Dacia until the 13th and 14th Centuries. "The vacuum," points out Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, "was not in these regions but perhaps in the consciousness of historians, who, serving interests alien to those of nations and their peoples, and working in the interests of the imperialistic policy of domination, continue now as in the past to poison the minds of workers of different nationalities and to sow discord among these workers."

After the conquest, the voivodship of Transylvania was made by the royal power into an institution, a reality which could not be removed. The land was subjected to the domination of Hungarian kings, but precisely because of its specific features it kept its institutions, so that it was not assimilated into the kingdom and retained its organizational characteristics until the time that Hungary fell under the onslaughts of the Ottoman Empire. The institution of a general assembly of nobles (*universitates nobilium*) or of general congregations (*congregationes*), convened and presided over by the voivod, as the king of Hungary convened and presided over the parliament of the kingdom, reflected the specific political and administrative situation in Transylvania relative to the Hungarian kingdom itself. Because of this situation it became possible to establish the principality of Transylvania when the kingdom fell. For a period of a century and a half the historical destiny of this principality paralleled and was closely bound up with that of the Romanian principalities South and East of the Carpathians. But Peter

Ruffy, who is quick to compare the area of present-day Hungary (93,000 square kilometers) with that of the Principality of Transylvania (102,000 square kilometers), has made no effort whatever to present realistically the social, political, and ethnic circumstances in Transylvania during the period in question. While applying the term "national assembly" to a parliament which, as he himself states, was made up exclusively of "the major nobles of the three 'incorporated' nations," and asserting that "'Transylvanian' Hungarians (that is, Szeklers) and Saxons (Germans)" were members of these nations, the author forgets on the other hand to describe or even to mention the marginalized situation at that time of the politically and religiously "tolerated" Romanians, who nevertheless represented the oldest and numerically largest ethnic component of Transylvania. And yet, in the next paragraph Ruffy, citing a source of the time, admits that toward the end of the era of the Principality of Transylvania, that is, in the last decades of the 17th Century, the number of Romanians was 250,000, as against 150,000 Hungarians and Szeklers and 100,000 Saxons. We still ask why the testimony of the historian Benedek Jancso concerning the first mention of Romanians in 1210 is obsolete, when both archeological excavations and Anonymus, and especially the specific demographic situation in the 13th and 14th Centuries, indicate that more than 60 percent of the Transylvanian population was made up of Romanians, as has been demonstrated by Academician Stefan Pascu in the first volume of his work VOIEVODATUL TRANSILVANIEI [The Voivodship of Transylvania] (Vol I, p 232)?

Peter Ruffy repeatedly refers to the "Hungarian" Principality of Transylvania; this is an altogether forced interpretation of the actual situation, because, according to the demographic data which the author reproduces, the Magyars (including Szeklers) only represented less than one-third of the total population of Transylvania in the last decades of the 17th Century. In view of the fact that representatives of the three "nations" were summoned to the parliament (the Hungarian nobles representing in this respect an entity differentiated from the "nation" of Szeklers, and the latter from the Saxons), in contrast to the demographic realities this qualification does not in the least reflect an actual state of political affairs. Similarly, Ruffy's assertion to the effect that the Transylvania subsequently occupied by the Habsburgs was ruled by governors "belonging to the Hungarian aristocracy" is only partly true, for in the 18th Century Austrian and Bohemian governors were in office for more than half a century, while representatives of the Hungarian nobility filled the position for less than half a century.

The author has launched into a "slalom" through the history of Transylvania, with errors at every turn. He nonchalantly avoids everything that does not please him (and other things), believing that profoundly dramatic times such as those experienced by the Romanians in Transylvania during the period in which they were under the domination of the Hungarian state can be erased from the memory and the history of a people. By proceeding in this manner, Ruffy avoids historical events the content and significance of which highlight precisely that which the author wants to pass over in silence, the permanent attraction of the Transylvanian lands to Hungarian potentates, sometimes open, sometimes concealed, but always present in their minds, their striving to round out their territory by conquering and subjugating

these lands, with all that this involved, their desire to weaken, and even cause to disappear, if possible, the national sentiment of the Romanians, their unity and dignity, the awareness that they always belong to the Romanian nation and people with every fiber of their being, material and spiritual. But the truth cannot be conjured away. The history of Transylvania and of the struggle of Romanians to preserve their national identity cannot be fitted into a Procustean bed and interpreted from the viewpoint of a single author, a viewpoint of preconceived ideas and dogmas, whereby the truth and the sources which support it are ignored in an attempt to "construct" the past in accordance with the author's own needs and models. However, this "method," by no means a new one, has a boomerang effect, not only proving his information to be dubious but above all demonstrating his unannounced advocacy, his endeavor to assert what others have long tried to advance, the pre-eminence of the Hungarian element in the Transylvanian lands.

Once having set out on this course, the author proves himself to be a mere dilettante. We are not, of course, interested in how learned Ruffy is or how deeply he becomes entangled in the untruths or preconceived notions of others. What concerns us is that an obscure article of no scientific value once again gives currency to erroneous theses relating to the history of Transylvania and the struggle of the Romanians there to preserve their ethnic existence.

It appears to say the least surprising that the author does not analyze the national, sociopolitical, and demographic situation in Transylvania at the time of the 1848-1849 revolution caused by this situation. He states that the "national assembly" of "Kolozsvár" (he does not even mention or use the Romanian name of the town, just as, somewhat later on, he fails to mention Alba Iulia) decided to "reincorporate" Transylvania into Hungary. This assertion does not match reality, because in fact a decision was made at the time to incorporate, with the "unification" resulting in a political and administrative situation which had ceased to exist. For the first time, the existence of Transylvania was no longer accepted as a separate entity, it being absorbed into the Kingdom of Hungary. Although he does note the fact that this decision had been made without consultation of the "large Romanian population" (in reality the absolute majority of Transylvania's population), Ruffy does so only to be able to make a far-fetched comparison of the parliament of the privileged elements, which ethnically were made up exclusively of Hungarians, Szeklers, and Saxons, the consent of the latter to the "unification" being in any event obtained under pressure, with the grand national assembly of the Romanians in 1918, and also to establish the least suitable equation imaginable, that of the "large Romanian population" of 1848 with the "large Magyar population" of 1918. To the Spanish-speaking readers of the publication for whom the article is intended and who are poorly acquainted or entirely unfamiliar with the historical realities of the Lower Danube and the Carpathians, this mode of expression conceals an intent to distort the truth and prevents the reader from seeing Transylvanian ethnic realities in their true light. I would have preferred for the author to have replaced the vague "large population" with a statement of the figures revealing the ethnic make-up of Transylvania, both in 1848 and in 1918, in the latter case even after the disputed census of 1910. I will note that the Hungarian historian Kovari Laszlo stated that before 1848 the counties of Transylvania

numbered 1 million Romanians and only 213,000 Magyars. "You can travel for days on end in Transylvania," noted Kovari, "without hearing a single Hungarian word spoken" (ERDELYORSZAG TÖRTÉNETE, p 176). The statistical study of Soellner dating from 1844 indicated that Romanians made up 60 percent of the population of Transylvania. Was this the case with the Transylvanian Magyars in 1918?

As regards the 1848-1849 revolution, the author without realizing it reveals the way in which the decision was made artificially to integrate Transylvania into Hungary. We can easily understand why those who held seats in the Cluj parliament in 1848 acted as they did--a parliament far from being ethnically representative of Transylvania, as is understood by Ruffy--and why they did not consult the "large Romanian population," as the author himself characterizes it. If they had done so, the result would unquestionably have been different. The author entirely forgets the circumstances under which this "reincorporation" was decided upon, as he does also the reasons for it.

What the Hungarian counts failed to accomplish in 1848-1849 they succeeded in doing 2 decades later, when the desired "reincorporation" took place following conclusion of a pact with the ruling classes of the Austria of the Habsburgs. This "reincorporation" was in reality an annexation, because it was only during this period extending from 1867 to 1918 that Transylvania was improperly incorporated into the state of Hungary and lost its political and administrative identity. The dual monarchy unquestionably served the obvious purpose of strengthening the Habsburg empire, and at the same time of satisfying the unslakable thirst of the Hungarian nobility for extending its domination over a territory that had long been coveted. Under these conditions Transylvania was for a half a century under the direct domination of Hungary, into which it was administratively integrated by force.

The author believes this period during which this territory was under direct Hungarian domination to have been a "state of Constitutional law," deliberately ignoring the grave consequences to the majority Romanian population of the Austro-Hungarian compromise constructed step by step between 1865 and 1867. In keeping with the new status of Transylvania, the Parliament of Budapest in 1868 enacted the law of nationalities, which recognized the existence in Hungary of a single nation, "one and indivisible," the Magyar nation, in which Romanians and other nationalities were forcibly included. By assuring a minority in Transylvania, the landowners and upper bourgeoisie, of unlimited possibilities for oppressing the majority of the population, the dualistic system doubled the suffering of the Romanian people from both the social and the national viewpoints.

Resistant to any forms of sociopolitical progress, the leading circles in Hungary conducted a policy of oppression and forcible nationalization, of Magyarization of the Romanians, one of the most open and brutal policies ever. But it was a policy with no hope of succeeding, considering that the Romanians had retained their individuality for centuries, the fact that they made up the majority contributing to this result. Thus, even according to the data of the "official" census of 1880, 2,294,421 Romanians lived in Transylvania and were the largest population group. This numerical superiority of the Romanians, which persisted throughout the existence of the Austro-Hungarian dual system (1867-1918), represented one of the factors

lending support to the struggle for national unity waged by the Romanians inhabiting these lands. A similar struggle was waged by the other nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. As a matter of fact, even at the end of the last century, Friedrich Engels stated, in an article entitled "The Beginning of the End of Austria," that "the Austrian monarchy, this motley complex resulting from heritage and theft, this organized hodge-podge in which dozens of languages and dozens of nations are haphazardly mixed together, this random mixture of some of the most contradictory customs and laws, is finally beginning to fall apart" (Marx-Engels, WORKS, Vol 4, p 511). Referring to the same phenomenon in 1916, V. I. Lenin characterized the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as "a ramshackle union of several cliques of social parasites," emphasizing that "the liquidation of Austro-Hungary represents from the historical viewpoint nothing more than a continuation of the disintegration of Turkey, being like it a necessity of the historical process of development" (V. I. Lenin, OPERE COMPLETE [Complete Works], Vol 30, Editura politica, Bucharest, 1964, p 8).

The author remains far from the historical truth even when he refers to events of decisive importance not only for the fate of the Romanians in Transylvania but also for that of the Romanians to the South and East of the Carpathians, achievement of the national unity of Romania by carrying out what the Romanians rightly termed the Great Unification of 1918. The author appears to be unaware of the events which took place at that time and which were of such overwhelming importance in the history of the Romanian people. He drily notes that the "national assembly" of the Romanians in Transylvania, held at Alba Iulia in December 1918, "declared that Transylvania was to be reincorporated into Romania." This poverty of the author's vocabulary at first glance appears to be strange, inasmuch as he uses the same word, reincorporation, to apply to events differing so much from each other. To Peter Ruffy, the forcible annexation of Transylvania to Hungarian territory negotiated by the uppermost ruling classes of Austria and Hungary from 1865 to 1867 was reincorporation. To him the unification of Transylvania with Romania in 1918 was also reincorporation. Two events in history which were not and could not have been alike were in this way placed on the same level.

The unfolding of the events which had unification as their corollary demonstrate in the most categorical terms the fact that this unique moment in the history of the Romanian people was not the result of an accident, the consequence of a favorable turn of events or of understandings in the mass of negotiations, but was rather the natural result of the struggle of the broadest masses of people, an act of profound historical justice that allowed law-governed harmonization of objective reality with the inalienable rights of the people, on the one hand, and with the national context rigorously demanded by this reality, on the other.

The author complains that the Alba Iulia resolution was adopted "without the holding of a plebiscite." It is clear, however, that he intended to ignore the demographic realities of Transylvania at that moment in history. Even though they were subjected to intolerable conditions during the period of the dual monarchy, which aimed not just at denationalization but even at

destruction of their biological stock, Romanians continued without interruption to represent the majority of the Transylvanian population, a circumstance confirmed, moreover, even by the "official" statistics of 1910. It is obvious that their choice, that of the majority, was decisive.

As regards the fact that the unification of Transylvania was effected, as Ruffy notes, "without the holding of a plebiscite," we are forced once again to point out this want of information on the part of the author, who thus attempts to insinuate to persons less familiar with the course of events in question that the unification of Transylvania with Romania in 1918 was carried out without the unanimous consent of the masses. In this context it appears to us to be not uninteresting to note that the act of unification in 1918 was preceded by far-ranging activity on the part of the local national councils, which at open meetings elected the 1228 delegates who at Alba Iulia represented the electoral districts of all the judete [districts] of Transylvania, as well as political, economic, cultural, and religious organizations. Similarly, 150 delegates representing more than 70,000 organized workers, Romanians, Magyars, Hungarians, and other ethnic groups, were present at the Assembly. The Unification Museum in Alba Iulia preserves for posterity, as eloquent incontrovertible testimony, the mandates and authorizations granted to the 1228 delegates to vote for unconditional and perpetual unification of Transylvania with the motherland, Romania.

More than 100,000 people were present at Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918, workers, peasants, intellectuals, and craftsmen who had come to sanction the objective and progressive lawful act of completing the process of forming the unified national state of Romania. This enormous gathering was broadly democratic and of the nature of a plebiscite; it embodied and expressed the will of the vast majority of the Transylvanian population. As is known, this act of national will of the Romanian people was also supported, on the basis of the resolution passed at Alba Iulia, by representatives of the Suabians, Saxons, and Jews at representative meetings held at Timisoara, Medias, and Bucharest at the beginning of 1919. Also significant in this context is the manifesto published in Budapest by prominent Magyar figures such as Ady Endre, Bela Bartok, Gyorgy Bolony, Zoltan Kodaly, Jeno Varga, and others, in which it is stated that "we have no claims on sister nations. We also consider ourselves to be a nation brought to life again, like those brothers who are arising happy to a fresh life on the ruins of the monarchy. We have awakened with our conscience relieved by the fact that we are no longer forced to be pillars of oppression. Let us live side by side in peace as free nation with free nation."

The peace treaty concluded at Trianon in 1920 merely confirmed and gave international legal sanction to a state of affairs brought about by the Romanian people through its centuries-old struggle.

Following the thread of history, the author also notes the fact that the Northwestern part (Northern, according to the author) of Transylvania "belonged to Hungary" between 1940 and 1944 and that later, through the Paris Peace Treaty (1947), this province "in which a significant portion of the population spoke the Hungarian language," was to be returned to Romania.

We do not understand why the author has insisted on drawing the reader's attention to the fact that a large part of the population spoke Hungarian in this part of Transylvania. If Ruffy is an enthusiastic supporter of historical truth, to set his mind at ease we can inform him that even today some inhabitants of these areas speak both Hungarian and Romanian. There is nothing new in this. It would have been useful for the author to have noted the fact, even if only by devoting a few lines to it, that annexation of the Northwestern part of Romania by Hungary under Horthy took place in 1940, as a result of a dictate brutally imposed by Hitler and Mussolini and desired by Hungary. Were it to have been rejected, Romania would have been invaded by the revisionist powers and wiped off the map of Europe. This seizure of territory represented the reward which Hitler and Mussolini bestowed on the Horthy government for the loyalty and support which it had generously lent to the revanchist policy of Germany and Italy, and at the same time "punishment" meted out to Romania for its efforts undertaken toward firm establishment of an anti-revisionist collective security system in Europe. The author should have known that Hitler himself, who sponsored this dictate, was convinced of the groundlessness of the Horthy claims, admitting in an interview with the Italian minister of foreign affairs on 28 August 1940 that "solution of the problem is particularly complicated, because a territorial claim, which enjoys very high popularity among the Hungarian people, is counterbalanced by a definitely incontestable ethnographic claim" and that "the population structure in the disputed region, giving the Hungarian position the most favorable possible consideration, is as follows: while there are 1.5 million Hungarians, there are 3 million Romanians and 600,000 to 700,000 Germans" (DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, Series D, Vol. X, doc 40).

In sponsoring this dictate, which gave satisfaction to the reactionary and revisionist circles of the Hungarian bourgeoisie and land-owning class, Hitler wanted to intensify the suspicions and misunderstandings existing between the two neighboring countries, in order to subordinate them to the interests of the Third Reich.

The fascist Vienna dictate of 30 August 1940, as a result of which the Hungary of Horthy annexed a territory of 42,243 square kilometers, with a population of more than 2.6 million inhabitants the majority of whom were Romanians, had extremely tragic consequences. In an attempt to alter the existing demographic ratio, the Horthy administration pursued a policy of expulsion of Romanian inhabitants from their homes and deportation abroad, sponsored the perpetration of massacres in Romanian villages, to which children, women, and the aged fell victim, ordered the internment of Romanians and Jews in forced labor camps, etc. It is significant that in a relatively short period, up to the end of 1940, more than 86,000 Romanians were forced to cross the line of demarcation into Romania, while other thousands upon thousands were mistreated, arrested, interned in camps, or deported to Germany. More than 100,000 of the 148,288 Jews deported to camps in the summer of 1944 were exterminated.

The memorable act of 23 August 1944 and the commitment of Romania to the war against Hitler alongside the United Nations, whereby the odious Vienna dictate was denounced in public as an imperialist act and was declared null and void, created prospects for establishment of new friendly and neighborly

relations with Hungary, in addition to placing the seized territory again within the natural borders of the country. In reference to the provision of the peace treaty which recognized the legitimate rights of Romania, the Romanian delegation which signed this international document stated that it "puts an end to the centuries of prolonged and repeated oppression of which the Romanian people has been victim." "Pronounced in the name of justice, and at the same time, we are convinced, in the name of the countless sacrifices suffered by the entire Romanian nation," the delegation goes on to say, "this decision opens up serious prospects for fruitful cooperation between the Romanian and Hungarian peoples and allows us to stamp out the last hotbeds of agitation, the legacy of a painful past that has thus far prevented the establishment of friendly relations between these two peoples."

We understand that "historical, cultural, and spiritual" affinities, as Peter Ruffy writes, can bind together the Hungarian ethnic group of Transylvania, but at the same time, as was pointed out by Teleki Laszlo during the 1848-1849 revolution, even at that time the Hungary of St Stephen was dead. The modern national development of the peoples of Central and Southeastern European put an end once for all time to deeds of conquest, restoring rights to the oppressed peoples, and what is more ended by providing the Hungarian nation itself with a national framework for self-assertion, removing the burden of populations in a continual ferment of revolt, and giving Hungary identity as a truly individual nation in Europe.

But we do not understand why articles such as that by Peter Ruffy (who, by the way, was born in Transylvania and for many years worked as a journalist at Brasov and Cluj) are written at all, nor why calendars such as that entitled OLD MAPS OF HUNGARY are published at all. This calendar, edited by K. Bende Ildiko, recently appeared in Budapest. It reproduces period maps many of which reflect the nostalgic borders of "historical" Hungary. We are also at a loss to explain why L. Nagy Szusza published an article entitled "Old Maps" in HISTORIA, No 4, 1985. From this article we quote a significant assessment which unfortunately seems to be the motive behind publication of materials of this kind even today. "By its visual effect," writes L. Nagy Szusza, "a simple map can exert a more powerful effect than a detailed description; it is easy to understand and requires no prior knowledge. It not only appeals to rational arguments, but reaches in particular into the domain of sentiment." In the article in question in HISTORIA, concrete expression is given to certain propaganda efforts undertaken by Hungarian chauvinist and revisionist circles after the Peace of Trianon, in the hope of revising the latter. There also appear in the article maps compiled at the time by Prof Szadeczky reflecting an effort to show some of the countries which emerged victorious from the First World War (United States, Italy, France, England, and Belgium) what changes would have been made on their own maps if they had suffered territorial "losses" proportional to those of "historical" Hungary. Do this republication and reproduction not represent an indirect repetition of a sterile chauvinist revisionist propaganda campaign to generate ill will between peoples? Even if such materials must be published, would it not be dealing more honestly with the reader to reveal to him the multinational character of "historical" Hungary, as well as the fact that the new frontiers were determined by the will and action of

the incontestable majority of the population before being ratified by the peace treaties? Whose interests are served by such articles?

We do not understand what purpose can be served by perpetuation of a nostalgia for that which no longer exists and can no longer exist, now that the wheel of history can no longer turn in the direction opposite that in which the waters move it, now that both a peace treaty (1947) and the entire system of international security recognizes the immutable nature of frontiers, including those of Romania and Hungary, and again now that the historic act of 1 December 1918 was reconfirmed by the armistice of 1944. We do not understand this also because, from the demographic viewpoint, the absolute Romanian majority of Transylvania represents an incontestable and irreversible fact. Feeding nostalgia in the mind of one's own people and sterile propaganda, because of their possible effects abroad, can lead only to needless and harmful maintenance of a state of tension between two peoples who have been neighbors for more than a millennium and who should find in friendship and trust the basis needed for their historical existence together through history.

After reading these materials, every honest-minded person and public opinion in Romania can rightly ask what is the sense of and who benefits from circulation of old chauvinist, revisionist, and revanchist theses taken from the arsenal of Horthy propaganda dating from the period between the wars. These materials obviously advance once again pernicious anti-Romanian theses, in flagrant conflict not only with historical truth but with the principles of normal relations between states and peoples. Also in view of the common course of socialism which our peoples are pursuing and which is bringing them closer together, perpetuation of nostalgia among one's own citizens or dissemination abroad of propaganda, no matter how subtle, designed to demonstrate a false historical injustice is not something that can preserve good neighborly relations and friendship. This can be accomplished only by mutual respect and presentation of historical truth in all its aspects, with no ostentatious and pointless emphasis on what cannot be split asunder, but with emphasis rather on the factors that unite us, those of active and positive collaboration, with unhesitating acceptance of what has been nothing more than inevitable historical justice.

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ROMANIANS CHARGE HUNGARIAN ATLAS FALSIFIES HISTORY

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[Article by Vasile Cristian, Augustin Deac, Nicolae Edroiu: "The Dangerous Game of Falsifying History"]

[Text] A HISTORICAL ATLAS for intermediate schools compiled by 19 research workers, including six doctors of science, was published in Budapest in 1984. The atlas claims to present the evolution of peoples over the entire planet in all eras of history. We have not examined the atlas in its entirety in this context. We have naturally directed our attention to the way in which the history of the Romanians has been dealt with.

A person going over this HISTORICAL ATLAS is surprised to note an inexplicable fact, that the authors are familiar with and respect historical truth when it concerns areas, peoples, and countries remote from the Carpathian-Danubian-Black Sea region, but as soon as they come to deal with the past of this area, from the most ancient times to our days, they are afflicted with amnesia and are unaware of events and processes of decisive importance in the respective eras. What is more, they resort directly and unscrupulously to falsification of the most elementary truths, ones which have long long been known and attested and authenticated by the scientific world.

The inadmissible omissions and the obvious distortions are not accidental, of course. They pursue goals having nothing in common with historical truth and the ethics of scientific research; to put it bluntly, they seek to accredit falsehoods which, we are sorry to say, we have also encountered of late in other works of an historical nature published in the Hungarian People's Republic.

The first and most striking falsehood contained in the atlas is due to the intent of the authors to ignore the age-old Carpathian-Danubian-Black Sea home of the Romanian people and thus their origin and continuity. Consequently, the Romanians do not appear in this HISTORICAL ATLAS until the 9th Century, in the guise of Wallachians (whom the authors do not, however, identify as Romanians at the outset) and are placed far to the South of the Danube. At the same time, the Hungarians are mentioned as being in Muntenia, the Buzau Bend, and Vrancea.

Is it really possible that not one of the 19 historians who compiled the atlas was aware of the elementary truth that the Romanian people are descendents of the vigorous Geto-Dacian branches of the ancient Thracians, that they are one of the oldest peoples in Europe and were spread over a vast territory in the Carpathian-Danubian-Black Sea region? The ancestors of the Romanian people, the Dacians, the builders of a brilliant civilization, organized a state which always inhabited the same homeland, Dacia, which reached its culmination during the reign of Burebista in the 1st Century BC. "Lord of all the lands on this side of and beyond the Danube," as he is called in the Dionysopolis inscription, Burebista accomplished unification of all the Dacian governmental organizations in a single centralized and independent state, Dacia, on the basis of the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and economic unity of the Geto-Dacian world.

The historian Julius Jung states that "Burebista ruled over a powerful kingdom that stretched out on both sides of the Danube, reaching as far as Thracia, Illyria, and Noricum" (ROEMER UND ROMANEN IN DEN DONAULAENDERN [Romans and Romanians in the Lands around the Danube], Innsbruck, 1977, p 11).

Can it be possible that the authors of the HISTORICAL ATLAS have not read and seen the hundreds of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary works and maps which show the Geto-Dacian people as being the indigenous inhabitants of the Carpathian-Danubian-Black Sea area, an area which reached from Moravia and Pannonia far into the lands north of the Black Sea and into the Balkan Peninsula? Are they really unaware of the map of Dacia compiled in the 2d Century AD by Ptolemy, who, stressing the great prosperity of Dacian society, lists dozens of towns and cities throughout the region inhabited by the Dacians? But even if in haste or deliberately they passed with reprehensible carelessness over the maps and writings of antiquity, they could have spent at least a little time examining contemporary ones. Had they done so they would have found that in the work UNIVERSAL HISTORY, Vol II, Moscow, 1956, whose editor-in-chief was Academician E. M. Zhukov, the map on page 192, which shows the ancient world in the middle of the first millennium BC, represents the territories to the East in the Tisa basin, including all of present-day Moldavia, as belonging to the Dacians and Muntenia as being inhabited by Getae. In another map in the same work, the Dacians and Getae are mentioned as living in the large Carpathian-Danubian-Black Sea region, from the Tisa basin far into the areas North of the Black Sea. The Soviet historian N. S. Derzhavin, in turn, pointed out that "for decades the Dacians who occupied the territory of Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia as far as the Black Sea and the Dniester offered especially fierce resistance to the Roman conquerors (HISTORY OF BULGARIA, Moscow, Leningrad, Publishing Office of the Academy of Science of the USSR, 1945, p 22).

If the authors, for reasons known only to themselves, did not want to consult foreign works or take them into account, they were obliged at the least to dip into Hungarian writings. A Hungarian school book printed by Istvan Losontzi and entitled SHORT HISTORY OF THE TRINITY was published in several editions in the 18th Century. It is couched in the form of questions and answers, and the answer to the question "What were the names formerly given to the territories of Hungary" acknowledged that "the part beyond the Danube (in the West--authors' note) was called Pannonia, that between the Danube

and the Tisa was called Iazigia, and the part beyond the Tisa (to the East-- authors' note) was called Dacia" (1781 edition, pp 73-74). Similarly, the REVAI NAGY LEXIKON (Great Revai Lexicon), Vol 5, Budapest, 1912, pp 234-235, clearly states that "Dacia is the name of the territories inhabited in antiquity by the tribes of the Dacians. The Dacians belonged to the Thracian family of peoples, and their closest kinsmen were the Getae. Their country as a whole included present-day Transylvania and Romania. At one time it (Dacia) also extended into the regions between the Danube and the Tisa."

The mystification regarding the incontestable existence of Dacia is evident not on just one map, but on many. Thus, the authors of the HISTORICAL ATLAS misleadingly present a map reflecting the image of the Earth at the beginning of our era (p 10). No mention is made of Dacia of the time of Decebal, at that time a powerful kingdom which maintained relations with the Empire made up of several parts, which is shown on the map, but Dacia is not. The largest part of the Dacia of our ancestors is included in the Roman Empire, and that simply was not the case.

Consistent in closing their eyes to truths which do not suit them, since they contradict their theses devoid of historical substance, the authors of the atlas blithely ignore the fact that only a third of the territory of Dacia fell under Roman domination, while the remaining two-thirds remained under the control of free Dacians, who were known by different names, Greater Dacians or Carpii. The latter had political and governmental organizations of their own and had at their disposal powerful military forces which continually waged war on the armies of the Roman Empire. The free Dacians and the political and governmental organizations are nevertheless not mentioned in the HISTORICAL ATLAS, their territories being shown as being uninhabited (the map on p 8).

The compilers of the atlas, "doctors, yet unlearned," are not content with ignoring the ancient Dacians, but rather, applying the same procedures alien to the scientific spirit and the ethics of research, they continue to draw up maps from which they omit the presence of the Romanians in what was their land for almost the entire first millennium AD. And all this is done to lend credit to the false idea, devoid of any foundation and downright bizarre, that on the arrival of the Hungarian tribes in Pannonia from Asia in the 9th Century AD they had not heard of Dacia at all, which had a history extending over several millennia, or if it existed had no connection whatever with the homeland of the Romanians, as if no relationship whatever existed between the Romanians and their Geto-Dacian and Daco-Roman ancestors. Following the same line, they resort to another historical falsehood, presenting the situation as if Northwestern Dacia had been a void waiting to be filled by migrating Hungarian tribes. Taking as their basis the fact that only now are intermediate school students studying history, the authors of the atlas without batting an eyelash present their theses and wishes as authentic facts. So it is that on the maps relating to the time of the migrations the Carpathian-Danubian-Black Sea area is shown as being inhabited in the 3rd and 4th Centuries by Gepids, a Gepid Empire (?) even being created, migratory Slavs, and Western Goths, in the 7th and 8th Centuries by Avars and Slavs, and in the 10th Century the entire ancestral Daco-Roman homeland is shown as being inhabited by Danubian Bulgars (map 10b). In another map (11b), which is

supposed to reflect the situation before the coming of the Hungarians to the Pannonian Plain in the 9th Century, Avars are shown as being present in the Northern half of Dacia, while the Southern part is represented as "territory subject to the Bulgarian Empire," with the exception of Vrancea, in which Hungarians are recorded. The latter are shown then to pass through Predeal and Orsova into Transylvania and Banat, while the other body of Hungarians comes down through the Northern Carpathians into the Pannonian Plain. What does it matter to the authors that archeological research has brought to light more than 1500 Daco-Roman settlements, fortresses, and cemeteries? Students at intermediate schools in Hungary for the time being have no other means of becoming acquainted with this definite evidence which weakens the opinions of historians at odds with truth and objectivity.

The authors of the pseudo-atlas seem to give no thought to what these students will say when by chance they come across the textbook of Istvan Losontzi, who speaks in realistic terms about the wanderings of the Huns from the Dnieper basin in the 4th Century, noting that in this century they came "into Dacia, and the Avars came there after them." Or what they will say when they come across the work by Andras Huszti dating from 1791 and significantly entitled *VECHEA SI NOUA DACIE* [Old and New Dacia]. In it the author, acknowledging the indigenous status and continuity of the Romanians as being the same people as the Geto-Dacians of antiquity, wrote that "the descendants of the Getae live and reside even today where their forefathers did and speak the language in which their ancestors formerly expressed themselves."

These assertions are fully in keeping with the reality attested by a whole series of ancient sources. Rufus Festus Avienus in the year 366 stated in his work *DESCRIPTION OF THE EARTH* that "Sarmatians, Germans, ..., tribes of Dacians hold sway along the Istru." The fact is also alluded to during the same period by Marcianus of Herakleia in his work *PERIPLUS ON DACIA* (*SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF ROMANIA*, Vol II, p 171). The chronicler Priscus Panites wrote in 448 that he had taken part in the mission sent by the Byzantine emperor Theodoric II to the court of king Attila, which was situated somewhere in Banat. He mentions the presence of Getae and the use of their language (*CALATORI STRAINI* [Foreign Travelers], Vol II, pp 79-80).

Important information on the administrative and political organization in Dacia in the 4th to 6th Centuries AD is given by the geographer of Ravenna, *Ravennatis Anonymus*, who in his 7th Century work *COSMOGRAPHIA*, compiled, as he states, on the basis of historical data and knowledge left by Castonius Orosius, Sardonius, Iordanes, Isidor of Seville, and others, mentions two administrative divisions bearing the name of Dacia, *Dacia Prima* and *Dacia Secunda*, in what is now Banat.

The provinces of the Dacians are mentioned in the *CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS* [Body of Civil Law] drawn up in the time of the Emperor Justinian (527-562). Stephen of Byzantium, who lived in the first half of the 6th Century AD, in his accounts of his travels mentions Getae and Dacians as being of the Thracian race.

The existence of a Land of Wallachians is recorded in one of the oldest Turkish chronicles, entitled *OGUZNAME*. In the view of the chronicler, while the

Hungarians, as is clearly shown by the atlas on the map on page 11c, were in migration, being quartered between the Dnieper and the Volga, the Romanians of the Eastern Carpathians had a country of their own called in the chronicles the Land of the Wallachians. Their governmental organization had been firmly consolidated and had a fairly strong army capable of organizing resistance to dreaded enemies such as were at that time the Turkic peoples, in this case the Cumani led by Kipciak (Mehmet Ali Ekrem, "A Previously Unpublished Reference to 9th Century Romanians in the 'Oguzname'" (the OGUZNAME is the oldest Turkish chronicle) in REVISTA ARHIVELOR, No 3, 1980, pp 287-294).

The authors display surprising and downright inexplicable nonchalance in persistently denying the presence of Romanians in Transylvania in the 9th Century, at a time when Hungarian tribes were passing through the Northern Carpathians in search of a homeland. Not only do they challenge all the authentic sources of the time, but they even disregard highly respected documents of their own such as the comments of the chronicler of King Bela III or the RUSSIAN CHRONICLE of Nestor.

Thus, as is known, the Hungarian tribes directed expansion toward the West after settling in Pannonia. When these attempts had been checked, they aimed their expansion in the direction of Transylvania, where it encountered strong resistance on the part of the Romanian voivodships.

Commenting on the penetration of Magyar tribes into Transylvania, the anonymous chronicler of King Bela III wrote that at first, after many battles, they conquered the territory of a political formation situated geographically to the west as far as the Tisa, North of Satu Mare, East as far as Piatra Craiului, and South to Mures. The ruler of this country was named Menumorut and had his capital at Cetatea Bihariei. Hungarian tribes also penetrated the territory of other Romanian political formations headed by a Duke Glad, whose royal fortress residence was at Cuvin. And Anonymus states that on the arrival of the Hungarians, one of their commanders, Tuhutum, found "in connection with the bounty of the land of Ultrasylvania," that Gelu, the Romanian leader, who "held dominion over the entire Ultrasylvanian kingdom," opposed Hungarian expansion. "His country being very large and very rich, its soil is watered by the greatest number of rivers..., gold is collected from their sands; the gold of that country is the best gold; and salt and salty materials are taken from this country..."

Upon being attacked by Tuhutum, after "stubbornly" resisting, Gelu was obliged to retreat and was killed at the Capus River, a tributary of the Somes.

But if the authors of the atlas decided to ignore any historical source which treated of Dacia, as supporters of dialectical and historical materialism it would have been appropriate for them to take into account at least the assessment of Marx, who pointed out that "the Hungarians had in the 10th Century settled in the mountains in the vicinity of Moldavia, at the headwaters of the Olt, thus occupying a corner of ancient Dacia" (K. Marx, NOTES ON THE ROMANIANS. UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS, Manuscript B-85, p 144).

With a consistency worthy of a nobler cause, the authors of the atlas continue the method of omissions, distortions, and falsifications even when they

come to compile the maps relating to the 2d millennium AD. Their main concern is naturally to continue to deny stable, uninterrupted habitation of Transylvania by the Romanians from ancient times.

Thus, in the maps devoted to the first centuries of the 2d millennium AD the Wallachians are still placed South of the Danube, but closer to this river. In another stage, the Wallachians are also placed North of the Danube, in the territory of Oltenia, but only in the map representing Hungary in the second half of the 13th Century are the Wallachians (now at last identified as Romanians) placed in Northern Oltenia, while nomads are shown to be present in the Vrancea region, and Southern Moldavia is labeled the Land of the Cumani. Wallachians (Romanians) are now recorded in three isolated areas in Transylvania (in the far Eastern part of Banat, in the Fagaras Lowland, and in the Northwestern part of the Apuseni Mountains). So much for the presence of Romanians in Transylvania until the time of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (at the end of the 19th Century the nationalities of Hungary, including Romanians, are mentioned on a medallion). Despite the historical documents and maps, the authors of the atlas continue in effect to popularize the false theses of the ideologies of the exploiting classes from the reactionary and fascist past of Hungary, according to which the Romanians were not sons of the soil in Transylvania, Muntenia, and Moldavia but first appeared in the Balkan Peninsula, whence they penetrated the territories north of the Danube, reaching Transylvania in the 13th Century and, in the view of the editors, in conflict with the historical sources, being present there in entirely negligible numbers.

On the other hand, applying all possible forms of graphic presentation, the authors of the atlas try to present the Hungarians as a numerous people, holding dominion not only over the Pannonian Plain, which they had conquered, but over temporarily occupied territories, including Daco-Romanian Transylvania. At the same time, they omit, distort, or even falsify the history of the Romanians to the greatest extent possible.

The attempt simply to omit for centuries on end from the maps of Europe the existence of a people in an atlas preeminently educational in nature and with scientific pretensions can only cause stupefaction and indignation. In a map dealing with establishment of the Russian national state (1300-1533), only the Principality of Moldavia is mentioned, while Muntenia is left blank. It is astonishing that the authors can represent Muntenia as being empty, for at this time there had been formed in it a strong, independent feudal state capable of defending its integrity and liberty heroically and with dignity, achieving among other things, under the leadership of Basarab I, a crushing victory over Carol Robert of Anjou, then king of Hungary, who ventured to cross the Carpathians to enter Muntenia. The authors of the Atlas cannot fail to know that they have blanked out the greater part of the army of Carol Robert; in any event, but Muntenia remained whole and independent.

Being dominated by sentiments characteristic of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, the authors fail to record on the maps the centralization of the feudal Romanian states of Wallachia and Moldavia, which had governments and laws of their own. Ignoring contemporary documents and deliberately falsifying historical realities, they show the centralized Romanian feudal states

as being incorporated into the Ottoman Empire (the maps on pages 23-29 inclusive). Now, the instrument issued by Sultan Balazid to Mircea the Aged in 1393 expressly states that the Romanian land of Muntenia continued "to be governed by its own laws," having "full authority to wage war against its neighbors or to establish friendly relations with them whenever it so desired." Another document, dating from 1511, records the fact that "the Porte recognizes Moldavia as a land free and unsubjugated. The Christian law which is observed in Moldavia will never be violated or suspended. The Porte obliges itself to defend Moldavia against all who might attack it, restoring it to the state in which it previously found itself, without committing any unlawful act against it or suffering even the least partition to be made of it. Moldavia will be ruled and administered in accordance with its own laws, secular and canonical, without the least interference on the part of the Porte. Its princes will be elected by the people and confirmed by the Porte to rule as long as they live, the princes to be governors of all the land of Moldavia." These fundamental rights were reconfirmed by the treaty of 1634 between the prince of Moldavia, Vasile Lupu, and Sultan Murad IV. The treaty also proclaimed that "Moldavia will retain its status as an independent country" (Gh. Petrescu, D. A. Sturdza, D. C. Sturdza, ACTE SI DOCUMENTE [Acts and Documents], Vol 1, Bucharest, 1896, p 68). Transylvania enjoyed similar treatment after the defeat of the armies of the Hungarian feudal kingdom at Mohacs in 1526 and the division of feudal Hungary between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Becoming in 1541 an autonomous principality, Transylvania established with the Porte the same relations as the latter maintained with the other two Romanian feudal states.

Along the same line of malicious disregard for historical reality, on the map showing Europe at the end of the 15th Century, the territory of the Eastern Carpathians is identified as Moldavia, and that of the Southern Carpathians as the Muntenian Plain, without identification of the two areas as principalities, Romanian feudal states.

The authors of the atlas even refuse to take into consideration the assessment of Karl Marx, who analyzed the international legal situation of the Romanian lands of this period, writing that "the Danubian principalities were two sovereign states under the suzerainty of the Porte, to which they paid tribute, but on the condition that the Porte defend them against all foreign enemies, whoever they might be, and at the same time that it not in any way interfere in their internal affairs" (Marx-Engels, OPERE [Works], Bucharest, Editura politica, 1961, Vol 10, pp 328-329).

An obvious distortion is also contained in the map showing the various religions existing in Europe around the year 1570 (p 22). Broad stripes representing the Catholic and Protestant religions run through Transylvania, while the Orthodox religion, to which the vast majority of the inhabitants belonged, is hardly to be observed.

The situation in Hungary following the defeat at Mohacs in 1526 is presented confusedly at best in the atlas. It is not made clear that the Northwestern part of Hungary became a province within the Habsburg Empire, that this portion of Hungarian territory lost its independence and its attributes as a sovereign nation, and that even after 1687, when the Habsburgs also annexed

the part of Hungary that the Ottomans had transformed into a pashalik after 1526, the international legal situation of Hungary did not change, Hungary continuing to be a simple Habsburg province just like the other subjugated lands and disappearing from the map of Europe as an independent state.

Despite these regrettable realities, the borders of the old royal, feudal Hungary continue to be entered in many maps of the historical atlas under review, "Kingdom of Hungary" being written in boldface letters over Hungarian territory. Not once are the words "Habsburg Empire" entered in this territory; they appear only outside the Hungarian territories, on the peaks of the Northern Carpathians and beyond, including, of course, Bucovina.

It is, of course, at the discretion of the Hungarian historians to present national history as they see fit. But it is not and cannot be a matter of indifference how the history of the Romanian people is presented, or more precisely how it is falsified by the presentation of falsehoods. We cannot help but ask ourselves whose interests are served by the persistent omission of great moments in the history of the Romanians, and for what purpose they are omitted. Why have the authors of the atlas allowed themselves to be enticed into ignoring, among other things, the first political reunion of the Romanian lands, Muntenia, Transylvania, and Moldavia, under Michael the Brave in 1600, a union which was also supported by szeklers? Is it not perhaps because the current authors of the atlas adopt the same positions as those of the Hungarian minor nobility who wanted to tear Transylvania from its ancestral Romanian homeland and took steps to bring about cowardly assassination of the great prince in order to bring to an end the most brilliant era in Romanian medieval history?

Although the authors consistently pay attention to social, political, and religious movements recorded over the globe, they forget entirely to register the 1784 revolution of the Romanians of Transylvania for national and social liberation, led by Horia, Closca, and Crisan, the Romanian revolution of 1821 led by Tudor Vladimirescu, and, what is just as conclusive as regards their historical integrity, they give no indication whatever of the Romanian revolution in Transylvania in 1848-1849, in which the Romanians demanded their rights to national and social life on a par with the other nationalities in Transylvania and union with their homeland. K. Marx correctly notes that "when the revolution broke out in February 1848, the Magyars believed that the time had come to found on the ruins of the other nationalities a great Hungarian fatherland, a powerful and vigorous Magyar nation" (K. Marx, *DESPRE ROMANI* [On the Romanians], p 146).

The national liberation movements of the peoples oppressed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire are very well known. Attention was attracted by the memorandumist movement of the Romanians and the process which followed it, with wide response in Europe during the last decade of the 19th Century, the Congress of Nationalities at Budapest on 10 August 1895, when a Romanian-Serbian-Slovak political alliance was concluded which gave impetus to the mass protest of the oppressed nationalities against the dominant Hungarian classes of the Dual Monarchy, the imposing demonstrations in Moravia in December 1905 against the brutal actions of the Austrian governmental apparatus, the street fights waged in Prague in November 1905, the general strike of the laboring

masses in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1906, the actions of the proletariat in Vienna in 1907 to assert its claims, the activity of numerous cultural and political associations of oppressed peoples such as the Astra in Transylvania, the Narodna Oborova in Bohemia, the Arboroasa in Bucovina, the Matica Slovenska in Slovakia, and the great number of trials for "agitation" held by the civilian and military authorities of Austro-Hungary, soldiers by the thousands sentenced to years of imprisonment at hard labor, and tens to hundreds of patriots from the ranks of all oppressed nationalities sentenced to death.

Distortions of historical reality are also found in this HISTORICAL ATLAS on maps relating to the period of the Second World War. The land amputated from Romania on 30 August 1940 is shown as being merely "territory annexed to Hungary following the second Vienna resolution"; no indication is given that this land was in fact annexed as a result of a fascist dictate. No mention is made of the revolution of August 1944 for national and social liberation of Romania, which began with an armed national insurrection. On the map depicting the "Liberation of our Country (that is, Hungary), 23 September 1944 to 4 April 1945," no mention is made of the large Romanian Army units. It is impossible that not one of the 19 authors has heard that more than 210,000 members of the Romanian Army participated in the liberation of Hungary, heroically and with supreme selflessness shedding their blood so that the sun of liberty might shine over the towns and villages of Hungary, a friendly neighboring country. The losses of the Romanian Army in the battles fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soviet Army on Hungarian territory amounted to 42,700 dead, wounded, and missing. Even if the authors of the atlas failed to consult the documents of the time and the extensive historiography of these battles, they could at least have taken into account the existence of the graves of tens of thousands of Romanians scattered throughout the Hungarian People's Republic. It is also a mystery why the authors of the atlas show on the respective maps only the German troops which opposed the liberating Soviet and Romanian armies and why they neglect to indicate the army of Horthy-led Hungary, which, as is known, continued to fight fiercely beside the armies of National Socialist Germany even into Czechoslovakia. Surely they know that the younger generation cannot be educated in the spirit of peace and understanding among peoples without open acknowledgment and condemnation of the errors of the past.

Distortions of the truth, falsifications, and attempts to mislead are particularly dangerous no matter in what sphere they are perpetrated and at whom they are addressed. The gravity of the distortions and falsifications of the atlas with which we are concerned is intensified by the fact that it is a question of history, the most valuable storehouse of any people, and by the circumstance that it is aimed in a large-scale printing at intermediate-school students, that is, the younger generation, whom scientists, above all historians, and all teachers have the sacred duty to educate in the spirit of honor and truth and in that of respect for neighboring countries and for all countries and peoples loving peace and progress.

Because of the way in which it has been compiled, the HISTORICAL ATLAS without question makes no contribution to correct education of young people in

the spirit of socialist patriotism and fraternal cooperation with neighboring peoples and with all socialist countries. Unfortunately, we must state quite frankly and unequivocally that the authors have not proceeded on such principles, have ignored the requirements of the present day, and have been guided by outdated nationalist, chauvinist, and revisionist concepts.

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INTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTRY TROOPS GIVE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

Ceremony Described

Sofia NARODEN STRAZH in Bulgarian 6 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Violeta Angelova]

[Text] The young soldiers with the blue epaulettes of Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov's division from 'N' garrison, will for ever treasure in their memory the sunny day of November 3. On that day, they gave oath to serve the party, the people and the motherland honorably and courageously. And the oath is something that one gives once and fulfils for the rest of one's life.

Honored guests at the ceremony were Candidate Member of the Politbureau of the CK of the BCP (Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party) and Minister of Internal Affairs, Colonel General Dimitur Stoyanov, generals and officers of the MIA, representatives of social and mass organizations, and many parents and relatives of the young men. Colonel General Dimitur Stoyanov inspected the serried ranks of soldiers and congratulated them on taking their soldiers's oath. His words were followed by a powerful "Hurrah".

Then, one by one with concise steps, they filed past the flag, kissed the sacred silk and with trepidation pronounced the moving words "I swear!".

The Minister of Internal Affairs addressed the soldiers in blue epaulettes with a heart-felt speech. (The slightly abridged speech is printed separately.)

The young soldiers were also congratulated by other party, state and consomol leaders.

On behalf of the mothers, Comrade Dimitrova spoke in moving terms of the pride of the parents who raised such worthy sons who, as of today, become men, and of the sacred oaths which the young soldiers must never break. She bid all the young men serve honorably and courageously and be true and worthy sons of the people and the homeland.

On behalf of the young soldiers, Private Stoyanov responded to the

congratulations. He emphasized that from today he and his friends would become real men, strong in the faith of thousands of good sons nurtured by our homeland. That in their future service, they would be inspired by the decisions of the glorious Bulgarian Communist Party and the example of hundreds of known and unknown heroes who had given their lives for the realization of the communist ideal. Private Stoyanov assured the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that the young men would devote all their knowledge and efforts to the well-being and happiness of our people and that, if it were necessary, they would not spare their lives but would remain loyal to the oath.

Photographs: 1. Official guests on the tribune. The speech was given by Candidate Member of the Politbureau of the CK of the BCP and Minister of Internal Affairs, Colonel General Dimitur Stoyanov. 2. I swear!

Speech by Internal Affairs Minister Stoyanov

Sofia NARODEN STRAZH 6 November 85 pp1,3

[Speech "Worthy of the trust of the party and the homeland"]

[Text] Comrade soldiers, sergeants and officers, honored guests, parents and relatives of the men, comrades, Allow me first of all, on this moving day, to give to you -- soldiers, workers and the entire public here -- the greetings and wishes of the Central Committee, the Politbureau and the General Secretary of the CK of the BCP and President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria himself, Comrade Todor Zhivkov.

It is with joy that I fulfil the pleasant commission on behalf of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to give a most warm greeting to the soldiers of the 1967 recruitment on the occasion of their taking the soldier's oath of loyal and devoted service to the people, the party and our socialist homeland.

Young men, under the unfurled battle flag, you swore to be honest, brave, disciplined and vigilant soldiers. To defend to your last breath our socialist fatherland and the impressive achievements of our working people.

From now on, dear young men, arms in hand, you will in practice be fulfilling the sacred obligation, written in the constitution, that "the defense of the fatherland is a supreme duty and a question of honor for every citizen".

The history of our ancient and eternally young Bulgaria is made up of noble examples of lofty patriotism and self denial in the name of mankind and the homeland. Diligence and willingness to sacrifice for the homeland are distinctive features of the national character of the Bulgarian.

Bulgarian soldiers are worthy receivers and continuers of the revolutionary traditions of our people, defenders of the freedom-loving Bulgarian spirit. In our battle flags, covered in everlasting glory, rustle legends and military exploits that will never be hushed: those of Asparukh's warriors, Simeon the Great's horsemen, of Krum the Terrible and Tsar Ivan Shishman, and of the

legendary hayduts. In them live on the exploit of the people of Shipka, the revolutionary aspiration of the vladaets and the participants in the September uprising, the heroism of the glorious partisans and brave soldiers who crushed the enemy at Stratsin, Drava and Mur and made their contribution to the routing of fascism.

The 1300-year history of the Bulgarian state is full of a multitude of examples of heroism, displayed by ordinary working people who repelled enemy raids and led the struggle against foreign invaders, writing the glorious pages in the battles for freedom, national independence and social progress.

Every word of the oath is a legacy of those who have fallen for the homeland. From it sparkles the sacred love for the fatherland and untamable hatred for its enemies.

Dear soldiers, You are sons of a diligent and brave people. You have come to the Interior Forces from different ends of the country, united by one feeling and one thought: selflessly to serve the people, the homeland and the great work of the Bulgarian Communist Party, for the happiness and prosperity of the people, for the triumph of socialism and communism.

To you -- the young generation of Bulgaria - the party, the government and the people entrust the defense of liberty, independence and socialist achievements. We believe that you will live up to this great trust and will worthily continue the glorious revolutionary traditions of our people, increasing the successes of generations of those who have served the MIA, who fulfilled and are fulfilling their duty of defending security and public order in the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Dear young men, You have taken an oath and are setting out along the road of your military obligation on the eve of the year in which our people will celebrate the 30 year anniversary of the historic April plenum and with unprecedented political and labor enthusiasm prepare for the 13th congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Under the leadership of the party, with the invaluable brotherly help of the Soviet Union and in cooperation with other countries of the socialist community, in just 41 years Bulgaria has made the strides of an entire epoch and is emerging at the forefront of social progress in the modern world. Today's generations may proudly say: "We are giving a new century to our fatherland:.. This new century embodies the victory of socialist production relations, important achievements in the economic, cultural and social development of the country and the celebration of the April strategic Marxist-Leninist line of the Bulgarian Communist Party. These are years of bold creative scope and of the far-sighted application and further development of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Modern-day Bulgaria has at its disposal a powerful economic, scientific, technological and cultural potential and is extremely rich in moral and social values. Everything created by the hands, mind and daring of our working people is a rich and bountiful fruit of the creative and vitally consolidating party line. It is a result of the stubborn struggle of the party and the people for

political, economic, social and spiritual progress.

The enormous successes that our motherland has gained would have been unthinkable without the close cooperation of member countries of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, particularly the Soviet Union. The People's Republic of Bulgaria is an inseparable component of the world socialist system; it has done, is doing and will continue to do everything possible for its further consolidation and unification.

Recent party developments and the decisions of the CK of the BCP are powerful factors and accelerators of the creative energy, responsibility and self-sacrifice in the struggle to instil the achievements of scientific and technological progress and to rationalize the use of raw materials and energy.

The Bulgarian communist party and the people have every reason to believe that the working people will give their worthy contribution in the struggle to further consolidate the spiritual and political unity of our heroic and diligent people and to build a mature socialist society.

Comrades, the varied and constructive tasks that our people are resolving today under the leadership of the party are extremely important. These are tasks that concern the most essential aspects of construction of a mature socialist society. They must be accomplished by overcoming real social contradictions in terms of a complex, explosively dangerous international situation.

The fullest and most accurate characterization of international political relations was provided in the declaration adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Pact which took place recently in Sofia. In this, as in the speeches of Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Mihail Gorbachev during the visit of the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSS, it was emphasized that the world situation continues to be tense, and that the danger of war has not been averted. History charges the socialist countries with a special responsibility. There is no powerful force, other than the forces of the world socialist community, capable of halting the aggressive circles of imperialism and of preventing them from pushing humanity into the abyss of nuclear war.

The chief goal of our foreign policy has been and remains the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, a reduction in the level of military opposition and development of international relations in the spirit of peaceful coexistence. The broad set of proposals of the member states of the Warsaw Pact are directed to this end. Millions and millions of the inhabitants of our planet are unifying around this policy. The peace-loving, honest, sincere and offensive policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is a guarantee of the creation of new and still more vital premises for the beginning of a real peace offensive against war. This historically necessary course of the countries of practical socialism demands that constant political and military vigilance be shown in everything, that peace-loving forces be organized, that unity and solidarity among peoples be developed and consolidated, that the struggle for peace, social progress and the celebration of socialism be intensified.

In these conditions, important tasks in the line of duty demand that the men and commanding officers of the Internal Forces be constantly ready for action and maintain vigilance, ceaselessly improve their military and political training, and consolidate military discipline in every way possible. They must always be prepared to fulfil their patriotic and international duty.

All along the line, and in every way possible, we must consolidate discipline and strictly preserve socialist law. As an inseparable part of the agencies of the MIA, the men of the Internal Forces have a special responsibility to secure strong public order and guarantee the security of the socialist worker and his peaceful and constructive labor.

Comrade soldiers and commanding officers, the homeland has entrusted you with weapons and the great confidence that you will complete your military service, shoulder to shoulder with the employees of the MIA, and guarantee security and internal order in the country. Be worthy of that trust and, with your irreproachable service, guarantee tranquility for our people who are building the advanced socialist society.

In fulfilling this extremely responsible military duty, you will learn every day from the rich and inexhaustible experience of your Soviet comrades.

The okrug and local committees of the BCP and the DCYU (Dimitrov Communist Youth Union), the okrug and people's municipal councils and the entire local population will render us invaluable assistance in the line of duty. Allow me on your behalf to express to all of them our heart-felt gratitude.

Dear young men, The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the State Council, the government, the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, your commanding officers, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters, comrades and friends, our entire nation are deeply convinced that you will fulfil the oath that you took today worthily and with honor.

Inspired by the noble communist ideals, under the constant care of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and her General Secretary, Comrade Todor Zhivkov, men of the Internal Forces will stand selflessly and fearlessly at their battle post!

Be loyal to the end to the oath you took!

I wish you health, good cheer and strength that you may successfully master your military work and complete your service cautiously and vigilantly!

For our glorious Bulgarian Communist Party, for our dear fatherland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, for the heroic and diligent Bulgarian people, for the happiness of your mothers and relations, Hurrah, Comrades!

Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Awarded

Sofia NARODEN STRAZH in Bulgarian 6 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Director of the People's Militia, Lieutenant General Ivan Dimitrov, has been awarded the Order of Georgi Dimitrov.

The State Council awarded Lieutenant General Ivan Georgiev Dimitrov with the Order of Georgi Dimitrov for active participation in the struggle against fascism and capitalism, for long service in the agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in connection with his 60th birthday.

Congratulations!

12907

CSO: 2200/48

INNOVATIVE CUSTOMER SERVICE APPLAUDED

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech 11 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] The November Metro Line "B" opening in Prague was not only a major event in transportation, but also in the area of securing certain services that do not have anything to do with transportation, for example, the food business. During the construction of the "B" line, and practically immediately following the start of operation of the line, a number of outlets opened up in the vestibules [of the line], or areas immediately adjacent to the entrances of individual stations. One of these food operations has to this date no counterpart in Czechoslovakia. All this did not happen easily. The food outlets were transferred to Prague Foods at the last moment, and it was only thanks to an extraordinary spiritedness of people--naturally--who else--above all, women--that the individual stores opened on time...

Prague Foods has been perhaps the most frequently criticized business in the capital area of the CSSR. The management has kept on explaining patiently to the "critics" what measures have been taken to improve selection and service. Eventually, here, as in transportation, a lot has changed for the better. Take for example, the extended opening hours. Already in November a second outlet opened in the heart of the city under the name "Tempo," though with rather unusual business hours--from Tuesday to Friday, from 6 a.m. (Sat. and Sun. from 2 p.m.) to 11 p.m. Unfortunately good intentions of one person are not always reciprocated by others. And so it happened, for example, that the Health Service forbade sale of drugstore type goods in "Tempo" located in the underpass of the Jungman Street. This had clearly been a decision that was not fully thought out, since everywhere else in our country (including in Prague), not to mention abroad, properly located drugstore goods (that is to say away from food-stuffs) are sold routinely.

Similar lack of understanding is demonstrated by our food producing industry that pays little attention to the production of dietary foods. A Prague based enterprise called "Potraviny" [foodstuffs] opened its specialized sale section, and in addition it also opened a snackbar where diabetics can find things to satisfy their taste. Yes, that is the kind of business that in terms of the variety of offerings has no counterpart in our country. It is located on the corner of Palackeho and Jungmanova streets. The store itself is a constant motivation for its employees to think of new kinds

of dietary delicatessen products. Production of foodstuffs of interest not only for sick people but also for those concerned with their looks is constantly overlooked. The problem simply is, that, as they say, there are some who mean well and others who could not care less. And yet, it is so little to ask. Just a little bit of understanding, and the problem would disappear. What is needed is that all those with authority to decide whether drug store items will be sold in "Tempo," or those who can influence production of dietary foods by our food producing industry had the same objective as the businesses themselves. Namely, a satisfied customer.

Look out, however, that is not asking as little as it may seem...

12876/12899

CSO: 2400/108

REFUGEE FLOW HALT PROMISED TO SWEDEN, DENMARK

Swedish Agreement Reported

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Dec 85 p 20

[Article by Ingemar Lofgren: "GDR Promises to Halt Stream of Refugees"]

[Text] The uncontrolled stream of refugees through East Germany to Sweden is now to be halted. At least that is what the Swedish government believes.

After talks with Olof Palme's special envoy Anders Thunborg, GDR head of state Erich Honecker promised once and for all to deal with the transit traffic.

"As soon as the issue was raised to a very high political level, there was understanding for the Swedish points of view," says Jonas Widgren, undersecretary at the Labor Market Ministry.

The GDR's manner of dealing with transit visas for refugees to Sweden has long been an irritating element in the relations between the two nations, at least as regarded by the Swedish government.

According to the Swedish criticism, the GDR has served as a transit country for primarily Iranian and Iraqi refugees, who want to cross to Trelleborg. The East German authorities have, the Swedish authorities claim, issued large numbers of transit visas to refugees during last year--despite the fact that they lack entry visas for Sweden. Furthermore, the East Germans have demanded payment for their services.

Many Attempts

The attempts to make the GDR authorities see reason have been numerous. There have been threats of suspended ferry traffic and diplomatic notes at various political levels.

On each occasion the East Germans promised to reform, according to the Swedes. Nothing happened, however, and the traffic continued as before.

Today the Swedish criticism is all but gone. According to the Swedish government the GDR is now approaching international practice regarding the

issuing of transit visas, and yesterday Foreign Minister Sten Andersson came forward and said that Sweden takes a very positive view of this development.

The background for the government's optimism is that on 14 November Olof Palme sent his special envoy, former Defense Minister Anders Thunborg, to Berlin.

In talks with GDR head of state Erich Honecker and Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer Anders Thunborg repeated the old Swedish wishes that the GDR should not issue transit visas to foreigners who do not have entry visas for Sweden.

According to the Foreign Ministry, the East Germans suddenly showed great sympathy for the Swedish viewpoints. The negotiations were therefore rapidly followed by additional talks, but now at a lower level and of purely technical character. The latest talks took place a few days ago.

The question of why the GDR never reacted to earlier Swedish promptings this year was never discussed during the talks.

Waiting

The effect of the most recent talks and negotiations are likely to take a little time. First, the altered attitude must become widespread among the GDR authorities, it is said at the Foreign Ministry.

Meanwhile, the so-called refugee stream to Trelleborg continues as before, that is to say about 100 refugees a week seeking asylum.

Danish Agreement Reported

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Dec 85 p 6

[Article by Christian Palme datelined Copenhagen: "Danish Refugee Halt-- According to an Agreement With East Germany"]

[Text] Denmark as well has now obtained an agreement with the GDR which effectively halts the transit traffic of spontaneous refugees from Iran and the Middle East.

Sweden got an equivalent agreement with the GDR a few days ago.

Denmark, which a short time ago had Europe's most liberal refugee policy, has now lowered the boom and closed the border to spontaneous refugees. This is a result of the agreement with the GDR in combination with the new refugee legislation which Parliament recently adopted.

The agreement means that the GDR will only grant transit visas to Lebanese, Palestinians, Iranians and Tamils from Sri Lanka who are able to show an entry visa for Denmark or Sweden.

For several years the GDR earned millions from selling airline tickets to Berlin combined with transit visas to refugees from the Middle East and South Asia.

Visa papers in hand, the refugees boarded ferries from the GDR to Trelleborg or Gedser in Denmark. The pressure has been particularly great on Denmark which has had, and to some extent still has, a very liberal refugee policy.

Difference

After the law was recently made stricter, Denmark as well has the possibility of turning back refugees directly at the border, if their requests for asylum are obviously unreasonable. One important difference over the Swedish system is, however, that the police cannot determine refugee matters on their own.

The investigation at the border is made by the Danish immigration agency (Directorate for Foreigners) together with the independent organization Dansk Flygtningehjaelp [Danish Refugee Aid]. Immediate rejection at the border is only possible if the immigration agency and Refugee Aid agree on their evaluation of an individual case.

In Denmark one is now tensely waiting to see whether the anticipated Christmas surge of refugees will fail to materialize on the basis of the new agreement with the GDR.

11949

CSO: 3650/93

PLAN TO TAKE NEW APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 18 Dec 85 p 3

[Interview Dr Laszlo Udvari, group leader at the National Bureau of Plans by E. J. with: "Unity of the Systems of Goals and Means; New Approach to Environmental Protection"]

[Text] The Seventh 5-Year Plan proposal contains an independent, complex chapter on environmental protection that was recently also discussed by the committee on residential developments and environmental protection of the National Assembly. We asked Dr Laszlo Udvari, group leader at the National Bureau of Plans to give us an overview of the main issues of the economic aspects of environmental protection.

[Question] The adjective 'complex' refers to new features of the economic planning for environmental protection. What are these?

[Answer] Adapting to the demands of the changing world, we are continually modernizing our system of economic planning. As a part of this process of rejuvenation a new chapter on environmental and nature protection was developed for the current Seventh 5-Year Plan period. It is complex in its approach, is built on the goal system of environmental protection, and contains the tasks of inter-branch economic direction and system of means for implementing the plans as well.

We have laid the foundation for planning with extensive economic organizational work among branches. As it is known, environmental and nature protection is an inter-branch task. There are things to be done in every area of the economy, in industry, in agriculture, in transportation, in each branch of the national economy and in the councils. Its complexity and its openness lie in the fact that planning and direction have to organize and direct the environmental protection activities of all branches. It is sufficient to point out that a part of investments to this end require central decisions at government level, and a significant part is realized through companies and cooperatives. Council decisions on developments play an important role in investments as well.

The efficacy of our environmental and nature protection depends largely on how capable the designated directing organs will be in fulfilling their

multifaceted functions of coordination. Our planning involves not only the protection of the environment and nature, but is "invisibly" present through its realted demands in the modernization of the structures of production and energy comsumption.

[Question] Previous plans aimed at stopping environmental deterioration. We know that they were not successful. Why?

[Answer] This goal was not devoid of illusions. In the past years we have not been able to stop environmental deterioration. This has several reasons. One factor was the discrepancies in the specific tasks and means aimed at reaching our goals for the previous plan period that were defined in global, comprehensive terms. Meanwhile more unpredictable problems of environmental protection surfaced. The switch to active and preventive environmental protection was delayed, financial resources were limited, and at times direction was inconsistent.

But experiences were favorable in lessening solid matter air pollution and in some respects water pollution. We also made advances in areas where the interests of companies, a change in the economic structure, a lessening of material usage, technological developments and programs for utilizing waste and secondary materials had together contributed--along the realization of other goals--to diminishing the burdens on the environment.

[Question] What is defined as the chief goal of environmental protection for the Seventh 5-Year Plan, what are its main tasks, and how much money will be allocated to environmental protection?

[Answer] The plan proposal's main objective is to slow down the process of environmental deterioration, and here, it aims at improving the environment that influences the living conditions of the general public. According to this, tasks of special importance will be protecting the quality of water reserves, neutralizing dangerous waste, and moderating air pollution. In total, we are allocating about 45-47 billion forints for environmental protection in this plan period, and this is twice the amount we spent in the previous plan period. One-third of this amount is state subsidy from the budget, another third comes from the council budget, and the last third depends on the environmental protection efforts of companies and their capacity to generate income that is necessary to finance developments. Although we expect substantial improvements over present conditions, we have to count on not being able to make up a decade's delay in five years.

We are spending 28-30 billion on protecting the quality of surface and underground water reserves. As a consequence, the number of people living in areas with public sewage system will increase to 5.7 million, by 16 percent, and the capacity of public swage treatment plants will increase by 40 percent. We are continuing the work of improving the water quality of Lakes Balaton and Velence. In spite of this, the gap in the public works is apparently water not improving. What we have in reality is that while the expansion of the public sewage system affects the residence of 800,000 people, this is the number by which those grow who will have running water. By the end of the

decade 9.6 million people will have running water, and 5.7 million will live in areas with public sewage system. Although in this way the public works gap will not become narrower, we will find "behind it" a higher level of service both by providing sewage system and supplying drinking water. The situation is less favorable with sewage treatment. Despite significant development we will be able to treat only a third of the water used.

We are allocating about 6 billion forints to combat air pollution. The solid matter waste dumped by industry will diminish by 35 percent through implementing an action program under completion aimed at lessening serious local air pollution. The propagation of modern heating methods and other measures aimed at easing the traffic burden of residential areas are servicing the protection of clean air. It is expected that the living conditions of 20 percent of residents living in seriously polluted cities are going to improve substantially.

Very important developments are going to take place in the area of dangerous wastes. Among others, two combustion plants and at least three permanent dump sites are going to be built. We are allocating about 11 billion forints for the next 5 year for the environmentally approved and safe handling of both dangerous and residential wastes.

[Question] How do the measures for environmental protection in the case of the Bos-Nagymaros water barrage system fit into the plan proposal?

[Answer] For the first time in the history of domestic investments, but even in international terms, a pioneering and complex environmental study was conducted for the water barrage system. The plan proposal takes its recommendations into consideration. So among others, at the time of the completion of the water barrage system the most substantial sewage treatment plants are going to be built in the affected region; in Győr, Komárom, Esztergom, Tatabánya and Óroszlány. Because of the construction of the water works, these otherwise also necessary plants will be completed sooner, so as to significantly lessen the present waste water burden of the Danube above Nagymaros before fully opening the water barrage system.

It is worthwhile mentioning that already at the technical planning phase of the dam system measures to counterbalance assumed environmental damages are being implemented. One measure, for instance, is the building of a ground water regulating system in Szigetköz. In addition to the above, there are several other investments for environmental protection considering regional characteristics. We are continuing scientific research work as well primarily studying--parallel with the construction of the dam--the effects of the operations of technical plants. The plan will have to consider the results of the studies and possible future developments. Finally, I find it important that in the case of the construction of the dam system the State Planning Committee demands a harmony among technology, ecology and economy.

[Question] What kind of system of means will be used to achieve the goals?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to remind you that the Council of Ministers has significantly widened the jurisdiction of the National Bureau of

Environmental and Nature Protection this year. Among other things, this makes it possible and necessary to coordinate tasks and organize their execution, and it gave jurisdiction to the bureau to develop and implement standards and science and technology norms to express the interests of environmental protection. The objectives of the plan are served by the action programs developed for tasks of special importance. The modernization of the economic regulation of environmental protection is also under work. Its goal is to make those who damage the environment more interested in environmental protection. Subsidies will slowly be replaced by a modern financial system based on refunds and encouraging active protection. So it will become possible to spend central financial resources primarily on the improvement of the situation in overburdened regions.

[Question] Could you please summarize the tasks related to implementation?

[Answer] Compared to the past, a stronger, more differentiated move is desired. This can be achieved by accelerating the process of the switch to a new economic structure, also satisfying demands of environmental protection, and by a more consistent, more flexible management of environmental protection that adapts faster to changing conditions. We have to take a stronger stand against those who cause damage and instead of subsequent interventions we have to exercise active protection. Economic efficiency--just like in production and the service industries-- is demanded in environmental protection as well, but here it has to work together with social efficiency. Education as well as information provided to the general and professional audience play an important role in the shaping and strengthening of a protective behavior toward the environment and in developing society's willingness to take action. I believe we are facing the second half of the decade with a plan that not only inspires hope, but may mark a decisively new phase in our country's environmental protection.

12366/12951

CSO: 2500/131

BERECZ SAYS 1956 UPRISING IN PART COMMUNIST REFORM ACTION

Budapest MOZGO VILAG in Hungarian No 10, 1985 pp 4-19

[Interview with Janos Berecz, a secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee, by Gyorgy Balo: "Posterity Sees the Facts"]

[Text] [Question] The 1950's have become fashionable. To some members of the first generation born after World War II, the 1950's are the Heroic or Golden Age. But somehow we very rarely talk about the subsequent period. I wonder why?

[Answer] Today, in my opinion, we are talking more about this subsequent period than we were, say, 10 to 15 years ago, and even the process of writing its historiography has begun. But the reason as to why relatively little is being said about that period is, I believe, the following: The impressions the generation living at that time gained, and the experiences it still retains, have been so varied and mixed that the aforementioned generation finds it extremely difficult to distinguish, or to evaluate jointly in their dialectic unity, all the uplifting, inspiring, revolutionary momentum-providing experiences and facts on the one hand, and all the unpleasantness and evil, the vilifications and emotional crises that accompanied this uplift, on the other. Therefore people are more cautious when recalling such a period. And a certain historical perspective is indeed necessary--for the emotions to calm down, we might say--to be able to take the actual facts into account.

[Question] Well then, let us consider the facts. Janos Berecz, in October and November 1956. How old were you, where were you, what were you doing and thinking?

[Answer] I was 26, working as a staff member of the Budapest DISZ Committee. I had graduated from the Lenin Institute in 1955. On the Budapest DISZ Committee's staff after graduation, I was concerned with the four higher educational institutions for the arts: the Academy of Dramatic Art, the Academy of Music, the Fine Arts College, and the Industrial Arts College. To me those 18 months were exceptionally rewarding. As a peasant boy fresh from the provinces, I was able to come into direct contact with the arts; moreover, with members of my own age group who were full of good intentions, helpful, and keenly interested in what we were doing. This interest meant that my circle responded very quickly to the social and political issues, and to the unfolding new processes. Thus I perceived not only from the rural environment from which I had come, but

also from this environment, that the country's situation had become more complex. Indeed, that waves of dissatisfaction were sweeping over our youth. On 21 and 22 October, we attempted to create the new aspect of DISZ policy on higher education. We were instructed to form a National Students' Parliament, respectively to prepare the formation of a National Council of Universities. We drafted a program, rules of organization and procedure, and the main program points on the basis of which this DISZ-sponsored organization was to have functioned. I remember that on 21 and 22 October we were meeting at the University of Economic Sciences, drafting the program. All at once we received word that we had been outstated, because the collectives of Budapest Technical University and Building Industry University had decided to demonstrate the next day. We then began to discuss these developments. On the evening of 22 October, I ran a temperature of 39°C (probably from the great excitement, because I did not run such a temperature again). On 23 October, I nevertheless went to see the demonstration. I stood on the sideline and watched.

[Question] When you say that you began to discuss the developments, do you mean the question of whether or not to join?

[Answer] No, we were discussing what we ought to do in the given situation. For at that time there was also the idea that we ought to lead this action. Which was not such a bad idea initially.

[Question] Do you mean that the DISZ ought to have assumed the lead?

[Answer] Not only the DISZ. The party, the DISZ, and the other organizations as well. And this was not a bad idea. In retrospect--for I failed to see it then--this is essentially what happened in Poland. Gomulka and his followers gained control of the action and, after a right-wing detour, led it back into struggle on two fronts, thereby avoiding an explosion. Thus the idea itself of gaining control was, in my opinion, a sound one. However, the leadership lacked a conception of how to accomplish this and in which direction to lead. But these questions never arose. Thus we were left out and swept aside. And when I saw on Bem Square that the demonstrators were cutting out the coat of arms on the flag, and heard them booing the red flag (the Lenin Institute had marched under a red flag), I withdrew. I spent the night of 23-24 October in the national DISZ headquarters. There, under Janos Gosztonyi, we begged for, demanded and expected the weapons we never received.

[Question] From whom?

[Answer] Gosztonyi phoned the national party headquarters every half hour. At dawn we were finally told to go home, respectively to go out into the streets and agitate. So we closed shop and went home.

[Question] To agitate against what or in support of what?

[Answer] Well, we were supposed to agitate on the basis of Gero's speech, to explain to the masses that this was a counterrevolution, that they must keep calm, observe the curfew, and so on. But we did not receive any instructions more detailed than this. Thus I went daily to my original place of work, the headquarters of the Budapest DISZ Committee, which was in the same building as

the headquarters of the Budapest Party Committee, on Koztarsasag Square. On 30 October, a delay of 15 minutes kept me from being stranded inside the building. By the time I got there, the building was already sealed off. I spent that day at the Academy of Dramatic Art, among friends. We talked, and from time to time somebody would go to check on what was happening on Koztarsag Square. By the afternoon we were in deep despair when the latest messenger reported that the comrades were being exterminated, hanged by their ankles, and their hearts cut out. We at the Academy of Dramatic Art were deeply shocked and debating what to do next. We more or less came to the conclusion that we probably would have to go underground and work in cover organizations.

[Question] Join the Communist underground?

[Answer] Yes, and work in some democratic cover organization that we would find acceptable. But we were fairly well known, which would have made this future course of action unlikely. On 3 November, I stopped once again at party headquarters on Akademia Street. We were told the same thing: go home and wait. We awoke at dawn to the sound of the radio and began playing with the dial. Between 4 and 5 am on 4 November, we heard the announcement, repeated several times over the Szolnok transmitter, that the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government had been formed, and a counterattack launched.

[Question] In other words, you learned about this over the radio?

[Answer] Yes, over the radio. My brother-in-law and I immediately acquired a rifle each, to defend our apartment if we were attacked. It was common knowledge in the neighborhood that the occupants were Communists.

[Question] Where did you get the rifles.

[Answer] They were being handed out on the corner.

[Question] On the street corner?

[Answer] In the vicinity of Ulloi Road and Angyal Street.

[Question] And you stood in line and were given rifles?

[Answer] Of course. We each got a rifle.

[Question] What kind of rifles were these?

[Answer] Regulation military rifles.

[Question] And you knew how to use them?

[Answer] Certainly. By then I was already a second lieutenant in the reserve. As a university student, I had been trained in summer camps. Four days later, we had to get rid of the rifles. We took out the firing mechanism to render the rifles useless, and hid them somewhere. In the 9th District where we lived, the district party committee was formed sometime between 10 and 16 November. Gyorgy Marosan came to address us. You could still hear occasional

shooting in the streets as we sat there listening to his reasoning regarding the events, the situation, and the way out. After his speech, the entire family transferred there and then to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

[Question] What happened after that?

[Answer] I received a telephone call from Eva Boros, a staff member of the Budapest DISZ Committee. She informed me that I was expected at party headquarters on the 16th. I went in and was asked whether I wanted to work in the MEFESZ. I replied that I could hardly wait to start working again.

[Question] I am not familiar with the MEFESZ. What was it?

[Answer] The Federation of Hungarian University and College Associations. It had been set up originally in 1945, but was disbanded when the DISZ was formed, and reorganized in October 1956. Its reorganization began in Szeged on 16 October, and it became the right-wing, reactionary MEFESZ, as we called it. After 16 November, when I and several like-minded university students joined, the MEFESZ did not immediately announce its support of the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, but neither did it oppose the government. There was an ongoing big debate within the MEFESZ on whether to support or oppose the government. This lasted until mid-January, when the MEFESZ adopted a resolution to support the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. We held two big meetings of the MEFESZ National Council, on 6 and 12 January. On 6 January it still appeared that we would become an organization opposed to the government. We were then able to obtain an adjournment, to think things over. A week later the MEFESZ became a university center that was not a government agency, but accepted the government's policy with understanding. And that is where I worked.

[Question] How long did the MEFESZ last?

[Answer] Regrettably, its existence was shorter than the political need for it. Namely, the Provisional Central Committee of the MSZMP discussed the youth question on 26 February and decided to start reorganizing the Communist youth organization. But it felt that the stratum organizations--in other words, the organizations of university students, secondary-school students, and peasant youths--would still be able to coexist with the KISZ for a long time. We supported this view. Perhaps the MEFESZ could have existed even today, with its particular area of activity, as an organization concerned with professional and corporative matters. But in the upsurge that unfolded in May and June, the KISZ suddenly began to grow very rapidly, and politically active youths preferred to go over and work in the KISZ because it was clear and unambiguous. Not mixed up like the MEFESZ, which now supported the government and again questioned some of its measures. In other words, the politically active youths did not know into what the MEFESZ might develop. Thus by September 1957 we became a center actually without any members. We still existed, but our member organizations either had been dissolved, or they had gone over collectively into the KISZ. That is what happened at Budapest Technical University, in Godollo, and at other universities. In late September, therefore, we simply declared our activity ended. Not the dissolution of our organization, but the end of its activity. For by then there was no organization left.

[Question] And what did you do thereafter?

[Answer] Then I worked for the KISZ Central Committee, in the Department of Higher and Secondary Education. I attended the Moscow World Youth Rally, which was not only an incredibly great experience, but very exciting as well. The Hungarian delegation consisted of about 1,100 members. But we, the politically more conscious and active members of the delegation, awaited with some trepidation what kind of reception we would be accorded. For let us not forget that Soviet blood had again been shed in Hungary. It was an unforgettable experience to march into the Luzhniki Stadium. A hundred thousand people stood up and greeted us as victors. We were amazed that actually they had won us our victory, and yet they were celebrating us as victors. They were so glad that peace and order had been restored in Hungary, and the country would be continuing along the road to socialism.

[Question] In other words, the Janos Berecz who marched into the stadium had some kind of inferiority complex and felt some qualms of conscience.

[Answer] He did. There was the question of how we would be able to face this large crowd, and what kind of reception we would get. It turned out in the end that the crowd celebrated us as victors, handing us this entire experience. This gave the whole delegation a large measure of self-confidence in the various debates. The performance of our delegates was outstanding. In short, the slight reservation or trepidation turned into self-confidence, and we had overwhelming success in the debates. I might add that we differed slightly from the others in that we had already become accustomed at home to debating with arguments, and not with adjectives or in anger. And these arguments surprised the others very much, the delegates from the West in particular. There were forums for open debate. Anyone could request the floor and say what he wanted. Naturally, the events in Tibet and Hungary were in the center of attention. Friends who came to our defense in the debates had harsh words for the reactionaries and imperialism. We Hungarian delegates presented arguments and analyses, admitting our own mistakes, i.e., the political system's mistakes. This was a complete surprise, to both the left and the right. And the Hungarian delegation was indeed popular in these discussions and debates. But our reception had contributed to this to a large extent. "Go ahead, fellows," we said to ourselves, "they like us here."

[Question] And at home? What did you do after the World Youth Rally?

[Answer] I became the head of the Department of Higher and Secondary Education under the KISZ Central Committee. Until 1963, I endeavored to make the activities of the KISZ organizations at universities, colleges and secondary schools more lively and varied. Then I went to Moscow, for postgraduate studies. From 1966 on, I became the secretary of the party committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But for me this meant an end to my participation in the youth movement.

[Question] I would like to run through the dates with you nevertheless. How long did you remain at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Answer] Until September 1972. For a year and a half thereafter I was deputy director and, until 25 July 1982, director of the MSZMP Central Committee's Department of International Relations. Then I became editor in chief of NEPSZABADSAG. And at the 13th party congress I was elected a secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee.

[Question] Then you have several professions. How do they rank in order of preference, or which of them do you like the most? In other words, how did they fit together?

[Answer] Throughout my years as a university student, I had to cope with a duality of interests. I could not refrain from helping to shape life at the university. In short, I was the type who engaged in politics. I was a DISZ secretary, secretary of the party local, and even an agitator and propagandist of the party executive committee. On the other hand, there was not a single scientific contest that I failed to enter. I was a very active member of the student science circle, and the student rapporteur at the first national conference of student science circles. This duality attracted me constantly: the action, the social life on the one hand; and complete absorption in the study of some scientific question on the other. I also won prizes in some of the contests I entered. After considerable length of service in the DISZ or KISZ, I felt that I ought to devote some time also to science. Therefore I applied for admission to postgraduate study. I chose 1956 as the subject of my science candidate's dissertation because that was my most immediate experience. I wanted to check on the basis of documents and my research whether what I knew was correct. Whether the emphasis was different, and whether it would be possible to summarize the whole thing so as to gain a better understanding of it. Many people tried to dissuade me, asking why I wanted to choose such a subject, it was not a timely one, and who needed it anyhow? They were surprised when I replied that I felt a need to review the events and clarify them once again in my own mind; and if they tallied with my basic experience, then it would not be necessary to correct my system of activity and my ambitions. Fortunately, I was able to gain access to very important internal documents, and thus to publish some facts that had not been made public before.

[Question] What kind of documents were these?

[Answer] The documents? Party resolutions that had not been published previously. For example, the June 1953 resolution, which I read through. Court sentences passed from 1953 through 1959. These were very important court sentences, and I studied them at length. One was able to uncover interrelations in them. The files of the Ministry of the Interior. The files of the Ministry of Defense. I scanned 11,000 pages at the Ministry of Defense, to write approximately 9, 10 or 12 pages about them. But I was able to write 11 or 15 pages with confidence, because I had gained a much broader overview. I studied the data that pertained in part to the pre-1953 vilifications and court abuses, and also the sentences imposed by the courts martial after 4 November 1956. An extremely interesting world unfolded before me: there was a process visible on the streets and in the statements and standpoints; and behind the scenes there was action that very few people noticed.

[Question] How were you able to gain access to these documents?

[Question] Access was granted, I believe, because I was pursuing my postgraduate studies on a party scholarship, and also because I was trusted. For which I am grateful even now. I might add that I had a large collection of newspapers from 1956. When something is happening, the historian surfaces in me: I gather, collect and file away, hoping to have the time someday to study the material. And in the 1960's I had the time to go back to 1956. Thus all the published material was at my disposal, and the unpublished material was made available to me from classified documents and archives. It was very exciting work to compare the published and the unpublished material.

[Question] In October 1956 you were 26 years old and were not close to the leadership of that time. Therefore many of the things you came across in your research had to be news to you. You simply had not known about them and had no experience of them. Therefore I would be interested to know what feelings the facts evoked in you when you as a historian were studying what had been happening in Hungary between, say, 1948 and 1953. In other words, how much did the facts shock you or drive you to despair?

[Answer] The data that came to light about the 1948-1953 period did not particularly shock me, for the following reasons. I come from a peasant family. My father saw to it that I worked hard every summer, doing everything from hoeing to harvesting. "So that you will always remember, son, where you started out from." This also meant that there were numerous evenings when eight or ten of my father's friends--in their forties and fifties then, but I considered them old--met at our house to talk. Such visiting was a regular feature of peasant life at that time. The friends usually came to our house. Sometimes they met in other homes; for example, when somebody's wine was ready and he invited the others. I caught much flack on such evenings.

[Question] Where was this?

[Answer] In Ibrany, Szabolcs Megye. It should be noted that this has always been a tough, rebellious village. It even had an underground party local in 1944; because they ran out of red cloth, the party members welcomed the Soviet troops with a reddish beadsread. In the 1930's the village had a religious sect, strong enough to form a cooperative. Thus the residents of Ibrany have always been headstrong and opinionated, and they often gave me a piece of their mind: "Is this your political system?" "What kind of system is this?" "Were there such severe compulsory deliveries during the war?" "Well, son, if this is really our system, then why can't I do with my pig what I want?" And then in late 1952 and early 1953 they even had to sweep up the scattered kernels of grain in their lofts. By then their eyes were really flashing in anger, and I was asked occasionally: "You surely do not want to become our enemy, do you?" There was still a last hope to which they were clinging: "Does Comrade Rakosi know about this? Write all this to Comrade Rakosi. He cannot possibly know what is happening here. If he knew, he would not tolerate it." In short, when their small incomes were looted--for the land was left, but most of what it yielded was seized--I kept clinging to the political system. I felt these intellectual and emotional shocks and attempted to analyze them. It so happened that I was at home in late June and early July of 1953. The people responded to the June party resolution with a big sigh of relief. But there were immediately also the question mark: Why was the

government telling us all this, and not the party? Those simple people in the village were asking this question. They sat at the radio listening to the government program, and their first question was: Why not the party? What would this lead to? Would there be two centers? Thus I was being hardened constantly, and therefore the facts came as no surprise when I began to research them. But the depth of the facts, the realization that the leadership had known about many things and had done many things intentionally, came as a shock.

[Question] But obviously the people in Ibrany did not yet know how many persons had been imprisoned or executed?

[Answer] No, they had no knowledge of that at all. However, they did know that if a middle peasant wealthier than they, but whom they did not consider a kulak, drove out into the street, he would be fined because the wheels of his cart rutted the road. And if he smoothed the ruts with a rake, he would be fined for having loosened the soil. And this caused indignation. Thus the facts were perceptible; but not their depth.

[Question] What was your reaction when you read these court sentences? You said that you studied them, and obviously also the court records.

[Answer] My reaction was not bitterness, because it was after 4 November 1956, in the 1960's, when conditions were back to normal. When what I found was already palatable. But I said to myself that it helped to explain why the Kadar government was distancing itself so clearly from the "Rakosi gang," and why it was using that expression. Actually I regarded all this as confirmation of why we had to do what we did after 4 November.

[Question] You never had any doubts?

[Answer] Of course I had. But the question is: What kind of doubt? Doubt that would have shattered my convictions never arose. Due, I believe, to the background from which I came. I could not imagine an alternative. Somehow the belief became firmly rooted in me that there was no alternative. Yes, I felt that the political system could have been better, more honest, cleaner and more open. But not another political system.

[Question] You never happened to question the entire ideology? Say, on the basis of what you yourself saw or came across?

[Answer] No.

[Question] No?

[Answer] I may honestly say, No. But I did feel anger. For example, we were filled with immense enthusiasm when we studied Rakosi's trial under the Horthy regime. Just imagine: there he stood in the shadow of the gallows, confronting the class court and flinging harsh historical truths in its face. Yet in the end he betrayed us who had still been celebrating his 60th birthday so eagerly. I was furious with Rakosi. But I never had any doubt in the political system or the ideology.

[Question] What do you miss most at present? Let us assume that there are 48 hours in a day, instead of only 24. How would you use the extra time?

[Answer] I have long been planning to research and write the factual history of the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government's formation. I lack the time to do this.

[Question] Then let us return to the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. Many people feel that the consolidation in Hungary after 1956 has been specific and strikingly successful in terms of its rate, methods and results, especially if we compare it with the crises in central and eastern Europe. To what do you attribute this?

[Answer] The first reason, in my opinion, is that the crisis here was the most obvious, and here it also led to an explosion. In our country the Communists went through a catharsis also individually. Here it was not enough to reply that "the enemy attacked the people's power." I have debated many foreign comrades who claimed that an imperialist attack triggered the counterrevolution in Hungary. My final argument has always been the following: What kind of a political system was the one that let in, say, 3,000 imperialists who were then able to create such a crisis that considerable Soviet assistance was needed to suppress it? The foreign comrades have been unable to respond with a counter-argument. They realized that there must have been some basic flaw in the political system's operation after all, a flaw that the enemy was then able to exploit. But the question for us was: How did we get into this situation, and how can we extricate ourselves from it? In other words, every Communist had to give a specific answer to a specific situation. And by so doing, he had to identify with something. Furthermore, sometimes luck also plays a role in history. Our good luck was that in Hungary there evolved a revolutionary center that did not want simply a socialist consolidation. For there could have evolved also a relatively sectarian consolidation. The main issue was not what kind of consolidation there should be--aside from its being socialist--but that a counterattack had to be launched to suppress a counterrevolution. The important thing is that a revolutionary center did evolve--replacing those who clung to some extent to the old methods--and it immediately began a struggle on two fronts. In other words, it announced that we would assume responsibility for everything that was an achievement and socialist, but would categorically draw a line between ourselves and the crimes and mistakes, and would refer to the group that "deviated from Marxism-Leninism" as the "Rakosi gang." Just imagine, we grew up hearing and reading "under the leadership of Comrade Rakosi," and so on. And all at once the party leadership breaks with this practice. Well, many people did not like this. In the first period, the MSZMP typically consisted mostly of people who were "deaf in one ear." Some had a sense of hearing in one ear, and others in the other ear. Fortunately, the core consisted on people with a sense of hearing in both ears, and many party members closed ranks behind them.

Another reason was that this revolutionary center consciously distinguished the action by the masses, from the enemies who attacked with arms the power of the people. I consider this distinction very important, even though very little is being said about it. For there was indeed popular action in Hungary. The 6 November appeal to organize the party recognized this, and the party

resolution of 5 December 1956 clearly states that there was action by the popular masses. They wanted "pure" socialism. If this distinction were obscured, the popular masses would have to be punished. Instead, let us punish the guilty, and reprimand those who made serious mistakes in key situations or key positions. And let us tell the popular masses that their intentions were pure and honorable. When they marched into the streets under the red, white and green flag, singing the national anthem, the overwhelming majority of the people did not want a counterrevolution. Indeed, they wanted something purer and better! Their demands had to be taken seriously. And the government, from 11 November 1956 through March 1957, gradually met the demands, most demands. The government recognized that these were popular demands stemming from the objective situation, and that meeting them was essential to the continuation of building socialism, and to consolidation. It is customary to say in the West that the government expropriated the objectives of the counterrevolution (or revolution, as they claim). The government recognized as justified such demands of the masses as, for example, the abolition of compulsory deliveries. It met the demands of the masses for the same reason that it fought with arms against the counterrevolution: in the interest of enabling socialist evolution to unfold. And the fact that this struggle on two fronts has been typical of policy ever since, is one of the main sources of our results.

[Question] You say that, according to the December 1956 party resolution, there was initially action by the popular masses. And the masses, in the final analysis, wanted something positive.

[Answer] The resolution calls it a democratic mass movement.

[Question] Yes. My question is: What was there in 1956 in Hungary? Not in one word, for then your reply would have to be: a counterrevolution. But if you would have to give a more nuanced answer, in a compound sentence. Then, accordingly, you would not reply merely that there was a counterrevolution, but perhaps that there was, let us say, a well-meaning popular mass action that deteriorated into a counterrevolution?

[Answer] No. No, I have already formulated the answer to this question at a scientific session and have not encountered any views to the contrary since then. Although, I believe, a debate on this question would be worthwhile. The answer boils down to this: From 23 October 1956 on, there was a counterrevolution in Hungary from the viewpoint of power and society's objectives, because it wanted to reverse the process that ensured the building of socialism, and to transfer power into the hands of the old forces. But at the same time there evolved--gradually from 1953 on, and distinctly in 1956, after the 20th CPSU Congress in the second half of February--a democratic movement within the party and also among the masses, for the purification and cleansing of socialism, and to make its construction in Hungary more effective. Those Communists who opposed sectarian and dogmatic policy within the party, and later distanced themselves from Imre Nagy's line and conduct--which became treasonable as of 30 October--remained essentially untainted.

It was not the fault of the masses that--behind their backs, penetrating their ranks, or planted in the action--it was possible to organize an armed uprising

against the power structure. Therefore the masses shouting slogans are not to blame when they are used to further inimical aspirations, instead of pure intentions. When this happens, it is due to the party leadership's helplessness or--as in our case--downfall, respectively to a well organized opposition.

[Question] I am harping on this question because one still finds that in Hungary, even among party members, the terminology used to describe 1956 rarely includes the word "counterrevolution." Instead they use . . .

[Answer] . . . the events . . .

[Question] . . . the events of 1956, the tragedy of 1956, or simply 1956. Therefore I wonder whether the formulation that 1956 was simply a "counter-revolution" is not too sketchy. Perhaps more nuance could be introduced into everyday usage, exactly the way you have just explained?

[Answer] My formulation was that 1956 was a counterrevolution from the viewpoint power and social policy; but if we consider the action by the masses, by the large masses, it also had a revolutionary content. And this, the revolutionary nature, was what the Kadar government relied on. To which I have already received from the West the response that this is a patent absurdity. However, the events are not so simple as to enable us to draw a sharp dividing line, and to determine who has been a revolutionary up to this point, and a counterrevolutionary from that point on. From the viewpoint of socialism, the demands of the large masses essentially aided purification, and therefore they were revolutionary in their nature. That the counterrevolution expropriated these demands is something for which the masses are not--I repeat--to blame.

The masses have to be won over. To illustrate how the new revolutionary center began to do this, I will cite an example that I came across in the course of my research. On 4 November, Comrade Kadar met with 30 to 35 comrades in Szolnok. The meeting had to be a public one, because he had been recognized, and word had spread of his presence in Szolnok. After a brief review of the situation, he answered questions. Most of the question concerned his person. When had he been arrested? How had he been treated in prison? And so on. This, too, shows that the people are very keenly interested also in the personal, humane aspects.

[Question] My next question ties in also with what you have just said, but it already reverts to 1956 and consolidation. I do not know what kind of scientific research is going on behind the scenes. But one would think that it ought to be the responsibility of the newspapers, the radio, and predominantly of television, to interview in depth the grand old boys of this period. Otherwise what will we be bequeathing the future generation about this period? A few people are still here among us--very many have already departed--who are key witnesses to the events that took place from 1945 through 1956. Why are these people not being interviewed at length by the print and electronic media? What I have in mind are not necessarily reports and interviews that ought to be broadcast immediately, but the fact that what these people have lived through is a part of our history, and hence a national treasure that ought to

be preserved. After all, the future will need this material. The future historians, readers, viewers, and listeners.

[Answer] I am able to respond to your comment from the viewpoint of both practice and theory. The practical approach is that actually this criticism is in part true because such programs are being prepared, but not enough of them as yet. The theoretical approach is that documentaries are very valuable to every generation. Within this, reading is important, and the reader accepts or disputes what he reads. But if somebody narrates or tells us in person that "this was my experience, how I experienced it, and that was my decision at the given moment, and why I made it," the viewer or listener is left with an indelible impression. In addition to the factual documents, then, all this enables each generation to gain a firsthand knowledge of history. Therefore I wish to repeat from this viewpoint as well that what you have said is a criticism which is also a proposal.

[Question] The December 1956 party resolution lists imperialist designs as fourth among the factors that led to the outbreak of the counterrevolution. But this is the only place where the adjective "decisive" occurs. Among other things, also your research confirms that in the end the United States chose not to intervene militarily in Hungary. Hence my question: On this basis, can we continue to maintain that imperialism played a decisive role in 1956?

[Answer] Appropriate weights must be assigned to the causes in the course of their evaluation. That is why the Provisional Central Committee listed the Rakosi-Gero gang's anti-Marxist policy, its deviation from Marxism-Leninism, as the first factor. Without this, the counterrevolution would not have found a suitable culture medium in which to breed. However, there still could be enemy activity, as there was indeed. And there also could be dissident activity, as there was that too. But neither our enemies nor the dissidents had an opportunity to significantly--or, at the given moment, decisively--influence our country's politics by their activity. This is why we say that what the Rakosi-Gero policies had wrought in this country provided a suitable culture medium in which enemy and dissident activity could breed. Without international support, however, the two combined would not have been a force strong enough to break through the front. The party resolution regards imperialism's role as a decisive and determining factor because the domestic enemies drew hope from abroad. To suitably exploit the dissident activity, the domestic enemies needed tactics and strategy, which they received from abroad.

The action by the masses in the autumn of 1956 basically demanded socialism's purification and renewal. However, the momentary mood of the masses after 23 October was such that they were no longer able to distinguish their basic interests from the superficial phenomena. In other words: the national colors, the national anthem, revolution, they are shooting, we are advancing, the skirmishing, and some of our children in the streets. The masses must have felt that this great action served, in effect, the realization of their basic demands. But Janos Kadar and his followers had recognized what was actually taking place: what was happening over the heads of the people was already counterrevolutionary and thus made realization of the essence impossible. Marx and Engels said in 1848 that a counterrevolutionary situation, too, was revolutionary. Thus there is suddenly no distinction between the phenomenon and the

essence. Everything that is happening in the streets and around political power, and the demands of the masses, appear to be heading in the same direction. The masses are no longer able to distinguish quickly. And this is where the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, the new revolutionary center, ought to have drawn a line, to enable us to preserve the essence but to exclude everything that happened here. For the people, however, this meant a momentary conflict of experiences: I too was there at the demonstration. Then why are they saying that it was a counterrevolution? It never crossed my mind to wage a counterrevolution. I spoke up specifically in support of the power of the working class, in favor of purification.

In short, this is where a gap forms--not yet perceptible to anyone within the masses--between the upper part of the process and the essence. Therefore the existence of this product must be proven continuously. But this requires first of all the realization of the masses' interests and the granting of their demands. So that the masses may see that now their interests are being realized absolutely.

[Question] Determination of the extent to which the long-range interests differ from the momentary interests or moods still remains a rather delicate and extremely difficult task.

[Answer] I had opportunity to discuss these questions with Comrade Kadar. That is when I discovered--and you will not find this in any document--how fundamental was his experience of the need to switch to a new track, and how much he agonized over having to break with the circle with which he had attempted to go along in the past. The moment when the new center was formed represents a crisis in his life. Because he was plagued by doubts: "Am I doing the right thing? Am I certain that my move is the right one?"

[Question] Consequently, am I certain that I know the long-range interests exactly?

[Answer] And he did know them exactly. Later, at the Trade Union Council's session in January, he spoke very clearly, because by then he had gained more experience. But on 31 October and on 1 and 2 November, he had to make up his mind on the basis of his experience during three days, break with the old center, and form a new one. He said repeatedly that for him it had been a profound and great personal agony.

[Question] After all, he had to break with the people with whom he had sided up to then.

[Answer] Later he attempted to persuade them to join the new center, but persuasion was no longer possible.

[Question] Sentences. Here are some statistics that you published in the May 1982 issue of BEKE ES SZOCIALIZMUS: "The total number of persons sentenced was 28,601, including 6,321 (or barely a fourth) for political crimes; 70 persons were sentenced to death; 5,913 were sentenced to prison (2,332 of these received prison sentences longer than 1 year); three-fourths of the defendants were sentenced to corrective and educative labor, received suspended

sentences or were fined." In view of these statistics, why is it that so few people have been punished for crimes committed under the Rakosi era?

[Answer] Quite a few have been punished, but there is a difference in the severity of their sentences.

[Question] Then why have their sentences been so light?

[Answer] This is a very difficult question of the post-1956 period. If we review the actions of the persons concerned one after the other, then both Rakosi and his immediate circle deserved more than what they got. Rakosi after all was not punished, aside from being expelled from the party and banned from the country. As strange as this may sound, the key to this is a specific moral principle. Namely, that Rakosi had already been tried twice under the Horthy regime, and had been sentenced twice on charges of Communist activity. To try him a third time, therefore, could not be risked. In short, we had to identify with everything that had been good, revolutionary and socially progressive in the Rakosi period, and to break with what had been bad.

[Question] What is the situation with the people who were not in top posts, but who directly participated in torture and unlawful acts?

[Answer] But for the fact that a significant proportion of the new leadership had been imprisoned and tortured, these people--in my opinion--would have received very stiff sentences. However, personal revenge was very far from these new leaders. At the mentioned meeting in Szolnok on 4 November, when Janos Kadar was asked how he had been treated, and was it true that he had been severely tortured, he replied: "Let us put personal misfortunes aside. The social system is in danger. Let us save and rebuild it humanely, and then also these personal wrongs will be solved." In other words, there was no intention of punishing individually those who committed such wrongs. The main effort was to make it impossible for these people to occupy once again positions in which they could commit crimes. But they were not persecuted individually. Thus they did get sentences of varying severity, but the main thing was that they were excluded from the system of institutions in which they might have risen again to power.

[Question] On the basis of all this, anyone in my shoes would now ask you: And what about Imre Nagy?

[Answer] One must take into consideration the following: The first fact is that several attempts were made after 4 November to persuade Imre Nagy to approach with understanding, or to understand, the new situation. There were talks with him, and his advice and help were sought. However, the people around him were so obsessed--"There can be no solution other than that you be the leader," they said--that he rejected any dialogue and collaboration. Later, in 1957 when the process of evolution had already started along its course, there were also talks with party leaders of the coalition period who since then had joined the PPF and were collaborating. They received an offer to form one or two parties, and to join the government.

[Question] Has this fact ever been made public?

[Answer] Yes. At a meeting held in the Lang Machine Factory during the election campaign in the early 1960's, Comrade Kadar disclosed that prominent persons had been contacted and asked to form political parties or a coalition for the purpose of aiding the process of evolution, but they had declined. When later they did come forward, there was no longer any need for them. By then it was enough to revive the PPF.

[Question] Which parties were these?

[Answer] They were not identified. But I think that most probably a party like the Smallholders Party, and another one similar to the Peasant Party, could have come into consideration. But not the Social Democrats by any means. Since the merger of the two worker parties, the working class in Hungary has only one political party.

[Question] What reasons did they give for declining to cooperate?

[Answer] They felt that "our turn will come when this experiment fails." Well, the experiment did not fail. And when they changed their minds and would have been willing to form political parties after all, they came in vain. By then they could be only PPF members or collaborators.

In short, the new revolutionary center requested help--but without compromising its principles--from both Imre Nagy and the former party leaders, to find a way out and to gain the widest possible mass support. But Imre Nagy, like the others, declined. From 29 October 1956 on, Imre Nagy committed serious errors, crimes, historical mistakes or--we might say--unlawful acts. Especially serious were his withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, his declaration overthrowing Hungary's system of alliances, his restoration of a coalition government, and finally his request for help from the United Nations. Thereby he would have exposed the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic to an international conflict. Namely, the fact that the head of what had been up to then Hungary's lawful government called in United Nations troops meant that he was laying our territory open to an international conflict. The court thoroughly examined Imre Nagy's crimes and passed its sentence.

[Question] Regarding the foreign-policy background of consolidation, allow me to quote from a lecture discussing the socialist countries' summit diplomacy at the end of October 1956: "A Chinese delegation, headed by Liu Shao-chi, visited Moscow at the end of October and discussed with the Soviet leaders also the situation in Hungary. On 1 November, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov exchanged views with the Polish leaders on the situation in Hungary, its international implications, and what had to be done; the next day Khrushchev and Malenkov exchanged views with the Romanian, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian leaders, and then with Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic the night from 2 to 3 November, on the Yugoslav island of Brioni." This quote is from your lecture at the scientific session commemorating the 25th anniversary of the MSZMP meeting in June 1957. Could you expand on this?

[Answer] On 30 October, the Soviet government issued a statement on the socialist countries' mutual relations, their evaluation, and the events in Hungary. This was a two-front statement. It admitted and exposed the past

mistakes and one-sidedness of relations between socialist countries, and it established that such relations must be based on Leninist principles. It admitted that the action by the Hungarian masses included proven and justified demands. But the Soviet government's 30 October statement also warned that counterrevolutionary forces had taken up these demands, and a counterrevolution had broken out in Hungary. To be able to meet the justifiable demands of the masses, the Soviet statement said, it was necessary to defend the power of the working class and to break with the counterrevolution. To my knowledge, the Chinese leadership was not entirely satisfied with this statement. It felt that the statement was making concessions to certain forces. Therefore the Chinese urged the Soviet leadership to take firmer action, to prevent the counterrevolution from engulfing Hungary. The Chinese leaders were of the opinion that international imperialism was attacking the socialist countries on several fronts. The Soviet leadership then consulted the leaders of the other socialist countries, to obtain their assessment of the situation, and their views on how to resolve it.

[Question] And what was the opinion of the other communist parties?

[Answer] The Soviet leaders met first with the Poles. Due in part to the similarity of their own events at home, the Polish leaders viewed the situation in Hungary with a degree of empathy, but they admitted that the armed struggle in Hungary was not serving the interests of the working class. They declined to evaluate the entire situation. But they pointed out that, after the Polish plenum on 21 October, Gomulka and his followers had been able to resolve the situation, with mass support, thereby strengthening the party's influence. The Polish leaders, in my opinion, did not quite understand how the events in Hungary were allowed to deteriorate so badly. The Czechoslovak, Romanian and Bulgarian leaders were in complete agreement: there was a counterrevolution in Hungary and it had to be suppressed, because it could lead to two things. On the one hand, there was the danger that a country which is under the influence of international imperialism might become a wedge in the body of the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, there was great fear of Hungarian nationalism and irredentism, some signs of which existed at that time. The Romanian and Czechoslovak leaderships' main concern was that if a nationalist-irredentist process started in Hungary, their Hungarian minorities would respond to it somehow and might destabilize their countries.

The most thorough discussions were held the night of 2 to 3 November on the Yugoslav island of Brioni, between Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic for Yugoslavia, and Khrushchev and Malenkov for the Soviet Union. This was an all-night analysis that actually ended in agreement on everything. This agreement on everything meant that both sides regarded the events which had unfolded in Hungary as a counterrevolution. The Yugoslavs added that initially it had not started out as a counterrevolution, but had now become one. Indeed, they had already placed their armed forces on alert earlier, and had occupied the fortifications they had built along the Hungarian border after 1949. The Yugoslavs, too, were concerned that the developments in Hungary might exert irredentist-fascist pressure on Yugoslavia. They also agreed that--in Tito's words--"Janos Kadar represents everything that is now honest in Hungary." Thus they went farther in their endorsement than just saying that Janos Kadar was the one to support. For Kadar had been a member of the Hungarian party and government delegation

which, under Erno Gero, visited Yugoslavia on 15-23 October. The Yugoslavs had had long talks with Kadar and had been able to learn his views on the situation in Hungary. They knew the story of his life, his imprisonment, and behavior after prison. And they felt that he had the strongest support within the party. The Yugoslavs had expected him to become general secretary already in July--July 1956--although they had been leaning primarily toward Imre Nagy before October. But then, the night of 2 to 3 November, the Yugoslavs were already backing Kadar. The Yugoslav standpoint was categorical on one question: if outside help became necessary, it would have to be provided by the Soviet Union and nobody else. For offers of help had been made in the other talks as well. Tito and his team said that in Hungary, since 1919, only the Soviet Union could provide armed help to a revolutionary center; a new conflict might erupt in Hungary if any other country attempted to provide such help.

[Question] I am quoting you once again: "The Hungarian leadership took great care to keep the fraternal countries and parties continuously informed. It was able to secure the steadfast solidarity and comprehensive support of the socialist countries, although there were also differences of opinion regarding the assessment of the course of events in Hungary and their causes. For example, the hesitancy of the Polish standpoint and the slow emergence of a consensus were disturbing initially, but during 1957 the Polish attitude took a positive turn." I would like to hear about this in greater detail.

[Answer] From 10 November 1956 through April 1958, there were more bilateral and multilateral meetings between socialist countries and within the international communist movement than ever before, except in the Comintern period. The lively diplomatic activity, the talks, the exchanges of experiences and views were unprecedented. Everyone was assessing the Hungarian situation from his own point of view and through his own glasses. Neighboring Czechoslovakia and Romania, and in part also Yugoslavia, started out from the threat that a counterrevolutionary Hungary might pose. To them the inimical features, imperialism's intervention, seemed the dominant factor. Not so much to the Yugoslavs, because they viewed the Hungarian situation more comprehensively. But the Romanian and Czechoslovak leaderships feared primarily this counterrevolutionary aspect. The Poles felt that the social action in Poland and the one in Hungary were similar and related in some ways. Poznan and the Petofi Circle, and the events on 16, 18, 20, 21 and 23 October were practically parallel in the two countries. The Poles believed that the action by the masses in Hungary was similar to the one in Poland. They were less able to perceive and understand what a counterrevolution gathering momentum meant. For they were concerned with their own consolidation, which succeeded without an explosion and a major crisis. Therefore they invariably sympathized with the Hungarian masses whose slogans were similar to the ones that provided the consolidation in Poland. They did not fully perceive and understand that in our country a counterrevolution had superimposed itself on these slogans, and that the counterrevolution had to be suppressed by force so that the action by the masses could again evolve in accordance with the interests of socialism. That ability to function had to be restored to the institutions of the power of the working class, so that this action by the masses could develop to socialism's advantage. With time these reservations ceased. By 1958 there was complete agreement; moreover, the Poles watched with great empathy what was happening in our country.

[Question] Regarding the lessons of the counterrevolution, in 1982 you said in part: "The counterrevolution provided arguments for the dogmatic, pseudo-leftist forces who, citing the events in Hungary, attempted to obstruct the regulation of the socialist countries' mutual relations and the international communist movement's renewal. They believed that renewal would pave the way for counterrevolution. And they argued that the whole chain of events had been triggered by the 20th CPSU Congress that had revealed the past mistakes, thereby offering the enemy an opportunity that it had not missed. The revisionist groups on their part attempted to present the Hungarian crisis as the bankruptcy of the basic values of Marxism-Leninism; and the working masses' dissatisfaction and their action against the mistakes, as directed against socialism's entire practice." Could you explain this?

[Answer: For all those who had committed crimes by misusing their authority but had been unable to exercise their authority in defense of the power of the working class, and for all those who had been removed from power because of their sectarianism and dogmatic mistakes, it was convenient to say: "See where it will lead when we start to speak freely and to reveal our own mistakes. By frankly disclosing them, we trigger a landslide. The masses will not believe us, and power will be in extreme jeopardy." In their opinion, then, not the ones who committed the crimes and mistakes are to blame, but the ones who talk about the crimes and mistakes openly, who want to reverse the course of events and to restore Lenin's norms of party life. In other words, they identified their own defense with defending the power of the working class. As if the social system were being undermined not by the mistakes, but by those who are speaking openly of the mistakes and are seeking a way out.

[Question] This has been a familiar phenomenon in Hungary ever since.

[Answer] This is why we need profound and prudent debate that tolerates opinions to the contrary. In our country I still see signs of intolerance in debate. Debate in most cases is still directed mainly against the person rather than his views; or not only against views, but also against the person or group of persons or institution. Instead of presenting arguments, we tend to pass judgments: this institution is dogmatic, that one is reformist, and so on. We still need a few years to become accustomed to, and to tolerate, the methods of democratic debate. It is no drawback if we disagree on some specific or theoretical question; it is another opportunity to discover something by letting our views clash; and it is not directed against the livelihood of X or the office of Y.

[Question] What do you consider the most important lesson to be drawn from the process of consolidation?

[Answer] That there is no justification for the existence of a Communist Party and its work that cannot make themselves understood to the working people, become united with them, and mobilize the people for the practical application of the laws governing society's development and for the realization of society's objectives. When a Communist Party comes into conflict with reality and the masses, it will certainly be punished; but, unfortunately, the masses too will pay a penalty. In a society that is purposefully building socialism,

therefore, it is in the common interest of the Communists and the working masses to understand each other, and to find a way of cooperating so as to avoid such conflicts. I profess that man is not born to suffer. If he does suffer, it is because he fails to recognize the objective requirements or does not know how to apply them consciously, or because he comes unnecessarily into conflict with other groups. There is a need for Communists so that people, society and also the Hungarian nation may avoid such suffering that stems from objective conditions, and instead may continue building socialism peacefully, in a dialogue, and with the means of their own choice.

1014

CSO: 2500/124

PZPR'S 'SOCIALIST ROAD' STATED, DEFENDED

warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Sep 85 p 3

Article by Anna Pawlowska, "How Broad is our Road?"

[Text] The question stated in the title is very important in practice and has the same value in theory. Two months ago at the August session of the party's Central Committee, Wojciech Jaruzelski reflected on the realization of national understanding by stating, "The road for building socialism is very broad." It is no accident that the First Secretary made similar comments at the Seventh Plenum. At that time, the fate of socialist renewal in Poland was at stake.

For sure, the last 5 years of Polish history will be written and maybe they will be cited in the historical process of socialist development. Much has taken place and new experiences are yet to unfold. As is usually the case, we participants in this process do not always see the importance of it, so maybe we shall have to have a long period of time to reflect upon it. And at that time, there will be greater objectivity without the emotions that dominate the situation today.

Leaving this to the future, to which only it has a right, we return to the question as to how broad is the road opened by the party's principles for society, from which the renewal cannot be withdrawn and the path can lead to many directions.

For The First Time In History

One of the bases of the socialist renewal is the fact that Poland belongs to all Poles and not to just a privileged elite. This is a first in the history of socialist Poland. Despite what historians may say for political reasons, up to 1944 Poland always had been fought over by different classes for themselves. The workers' class is not doing this in accordance with their historical mission. This law is written in the party's declaration "We are measured by what we fight after." This is the ideological basis of the national understanding. This is why the party has opted for a transitional, not immediate, character of building understanding. The forgetting of this truth has acted like a shadow on all of our crises. This cannot be allowed again. If there are still people in Poland who feel that the party wants to have a "monopoly on Poland," then they are not only mistaken but also harming the situation. There is also no Catholic monopoly of Poland. Simply put, there is no monopoly.

The Legal Framework of Protection

The legislative work of the eighth session of the Sejm is the legal framework for the implementation, consolidation and inviolability of the socialist renewal and socialist democracy. There is no need to begin another discussion of all the important acts. It is known that often more important than the law is the practice. In practice during the last few years -- nothing to idealize nor to hide -- the law of often was abused. An example of this could be the recent law on higher education.

Does this legal framework put anyone or any social group beyond the possibility of participating in the arrangement and improvement of Poland? Does it limit anyone or any group? Of course, yes. These are, after all, a class or socialist framework. Antigovernment activities do not have a place here and cannot have a place. This is the framework and only this.

A Fragment of Common Fate

Foreigners -- both friendly and not so friendly -- often pose the question (as has Wojciech Jaruzelski at the XXI Plenum) as to what became of Solidarity. It is difficult to be surprised, as this question does not always have a political meaning. Not long ago there was a large organization with thousands of people and workers. Those people are still in Poland in the new unions, self-governments, the Party and other political parties. They are there working and active socially. They have written themselves into an important, bitter and informative experience; they are richer and smarter as a result of this experience. The organization does not exist now because it was unable to free itself from false prophets who did not want to revitalize socialism, as Jaruzelski has stated, but rather wanted the disintegration of socialism. Richer and smarter are also those who did not belong to Solidarity, who fought against it or feared it. Everyone. This is a nationwide experience and a fragment of common national fate.

The time of the big storm, which we all have survived, was not burn in nor transported by another galaxy to divide us politically and lead to contradictions in interests or value systems. The storm only disclosed, sharpened, inflamed and revealed all complicated things. It gave us a priceless chance of awareness. This is why we are building today painfully for national understanding.

The idea of comprehending national understanding -- understanding the differences and contradictions -- is the essence of the concept of the broadest social agreement from the August 1980 agreements and beyond them. This includes the entire national life and every concern that is difficult, but we must do this together to become a modern, organized society that can improve its fate. Only within this agreement can we work out problems associated with apartment construction, the main focus of youth, and resolve Church-State relations.

Without Self-Appeasement

The undisputed fact is that normalization is proceeding in the country and the political battle is shrinking. Does this give us a basis for self-appeasement?

Still, the economic situation is difficult and bereft of social conflict. Despite being deprived of wide political support, the political opponent has not stopped his activity. This is always the reality, as stated at the XXI Plenum of the Central Committee, so as to avoid a relapse to the old mistakes that have prevented the authorities from listening to social criticism.

Quite a lot of people from different environments are not saying "no", but they are not yet entirely ready to say "yes" to what is happening in Poland. In accordance with this, there has arisen lately the propaganda of the "virtue of the center". If the people who declare themselves to be "people of the center", meaning those who are opposed to extremism, be it opposition to socialist renewal from antisocialist or sectarian-dogmatic views, then we have to agree with them. But sometimes one can have the feeling that it is some "center" inside the "center" of socialist revival, which could be "accepted" by those to whom the entire socialist "width" is not suitable. If so, then this cannot be acceptable.

This road opened by the Ninth Party Congress is indeed very broad. It is broad enough for those of our countrymen who imagine that happiness for society is far from the Marxist doctrine of scientific socialism. But the idea of socialist renewal cannot be cut out to the "center" in the name of deceptive hope to win over those who do not want to enter the road of understanding.

9807

CSO: 2600/65

CULTURE, LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS MEET

National Council of Culture

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28-29 Sep 85 p 2

[Text] As the first term of the National Council of Culture comes to a close (January 1986), the more concrete becomes the outline of the document which is the product of their own creation and the result of nearly 3 years of deliberations and suggestions discussed during council meetings. The "Report Assignment", as this document is called, was initially evaluated on the 27th of this month by the National Council of Culture executive committee, under the chairmanship of Prof Bogdan Suchodolski.

The responsibility for publishing fictitious information at least once a year on the standing of Polish culture is covered in paragraph 3, item 12 dated 4 May 1982 of the statute regulating the National Council of Culture and the Foundation for Cultural Development. This deals with suggestions and evaluations of proposals concerning the standing of Polish culture.

Initially, concepts of special joint project groups were favored. Influence of this was quite evident in the "Report on The Condition of Culture in the Field of Conservation and Museum Management" issued 1½ years ago. Time was short, so several months ago, a critic and journalist, Prof Jerzy Adamski, a member of the council, took upon himself the difficult task of preparing a report based on available documentation. Recently he submitted a report, "neither the first nor only summary of information relating to opinions and evaluations regarding the cultural status", which expressed doubts from the very beginning: "Should this report deal with the total scope or solely with matters of culture? Should it sound an alarm or pragmatically enumerate responsibilities? Finally, which should come first, the report or a program for cultural development?"

These doubts were equally shared by the evaluating Executive Committee, as well as the National Council of Culture branch directors. Additional objections were presented. Henryk Kluba did not agree that phrases like: "intensification of class struggle" or, "political adversary" should be used in the report, because this is a "document of another sort". Zbigniew Safjan wondered how the author arrived at the figure of 4400 writers, since the

Polish Writers Association [ZLP] at the present time has only 727 members. Janusz Ciegella was uncertain if the report should deal with finances and material matters of the creative centers.

Leszek Lesniak professed that: "within the context of the public's perspective and concerns associated with the council's activities", only a truthful report can enhance the council with greater authority. He appealed for the earliest possible public discussions on these matters, disregarding the many shortcomings of the project. Kazimierz Dejmek decidedly rejected the idea of annual reports, which to his way of thinking, should represent the total substance as well as the culmination of the council's three year term in office. He criticized the structure of the project for its technical errors and methods of approach, objecting to the relegation of total authority to one person for issuing the report on the council's achievements. A report should be the compilation of the joint expertise of the various departments reduced to a "distillation" of their findings by an editorial group. In concluding, K. Dejmek suggested stopping any further work being conducted in the present manner and starting anew from the beginning. This brought about heated controversy. Prof Jerzy argued, "theoretically it sounds good, but in practice....?"

Prof Suchodolski, in summing up both positive appraisals and the controversies, brought attention to the importance of the report which is essential as well as ethical in a situation where the prerogatives of culture are set aside for future planning. One of the causes given is the continuation of the economic crisis and the multitude of public demands in its wake. There is growing concern as to the future of the Cultural Development Appropriation which has been threatened by the exemption of numerous institutions from payroll taxes. All of this has an effect on the opinions and evaluations which are to be a part of the report. This also intensifies the responsibilities of the National Council of Culture, not only to the public, but also to the Council of Ministers to which it should present realistic and well advised suggestions.

Briefly, the report project was returned to committee for further correction and modification. With the conclusion of the meeting at hand, two final remarks. How could it happen that at the end of nearly three years of work, not only do we not have an agreement as to what the concept of the report should be, but practically no one from among the 200 members of the council, with the exception of the volunteer worker Adamski, had a hand in writing the report? The second remark: The under-secretary of arts and culture, Edward Golebiowski attended the deliberations. He did not participate actively although a departmental appraisal of the project was anxiously awaited.

Reports on Proposed Rulings

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Sep 85 pp 1-2

[Text] During the plenary session of 25 September 1985, the legislative body of the Council of Ministers was briefed on the progress of the report relating to the status of the law and at the same time it evaluated the

activities of its first term in office. The report which is being formulated will consist of eight volumes (approx 1800 pages) containing appraisals of individual areas of law as well as proposals addressed to legislative policies. At this time, according to Prof Sylwester Zawadzki, chairman of the council, the last phase of the assignment has been resolved and the preliminary version of the report is completed.

The report will be submitted to the president of the Council of Ministers.

The second segment of the deliberations was devoted to discussions of proposals stemming from the legal advisory activities of the council.

In the first year of the term in office (to June 1985), a collective body of prominent lawyers prepared 40 opinions on projects involving the most significant legislation. These opinions were weighed in the degree of their importance to the substance and format of the proposed regulations. Dr Bogdan Zdziennicki, secretary of the council, in presenting the results of these suggestions enumerated a number of inadequacies in the procedures for instituting new laws. The precise intentions of the enacted laws are not always attained, nor are the proper procedures chose. There is a lack of consideration or justification given to expenditures which are required to enforce the law, the anticipated results, or the much to be desired understandability and clarity of the legal language. These are some of the shortcomings pointed out by the council.

These however, show how sensitive and complicated the process of formulating new laws is and how difficult it can be to anticipate their ultimate effectiveness, especially in these times of intensified legislative action prompted by prevailing economic and social changes.

Undersecretary of the Council of Ministers Prof Zygmunt Rybicki, brought attention to the contingencies of the legislative system. He had high praise for the Council of Ministers' renderings of legal opinions and their assurances of accessibility to all legislation including executive orders which are in the course of being enacted by the council and that all of its opinions have been and will continue to be thoroughly studied.

In discussions for further improvement of the legal interpretation process, the council members and invited administrators of individual ministerial and central offices indicated the necessity for attending to the principal questions of the total legal system, among others, to have the proposed regulations compatible with the constitution of the PRL and the prevailing codes and laws in effect. The importance of executive orders was emphasized since they are a governing factor in law enforcement and their passage often takes a considerable length of time. The submitted proposals of these orders should be considered at the same time the laws are being drafted.

The council members took under consideration the most timely question, namely, the upgrading of the legislative process, which would result in an improvement of the legislators' status, since they are the ones who establish laws.

12306/12951
CSO: 2600/50

PRESS ROLE HIGHLIGHTED

Sociologist On Press Role, Work Ethic

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 31 Oct-3 Nov 85 p 3

[Interview with Prof Jolanta Kulpinska, Lodz University sociologist, by Janina Paradowska]

[Text] [Question] The 5-year period of work on centrally directed research issues is coming to an end. You directed studies on the interministerial problem entitled, "Man and Work. The Humanization of Work." I must admit that I was surprised to learn that this program is so new and that research on it was only begun during the recent 5-year period. It seemed to me that the analysis of various aspects of the humanization of work in our political system ought to be one of the fundamental issues.

[Answer] Indeed, this program had its start quite late. In 1978, prior to the PZPR Central Committee plenum, which was devoted to the science of learning, our Institute of Sociology noticed that it is strange that in our country, among centrally directed issues, there is nothing devoted to work. We conveyed this observation to the party organization for matters of higher education and from there, by way of the PZPR Lodz Committee, it made its way to the Central Committee Plenum...

[Question] And it made its way onto receptive soil.

[Answer] Yes. Already in 1979, we were commissioned to work on and prepare research assumptions. That is when things started moving. It turned out that there is a very large group of scholars who are involved in studying these issues and were willing to join efforts. As a result, a team composed of nearly 150 persons mainly from the university community was formed.

[Question] A team which launched its work in 1981 during a period of great changes and conflict in our country. It would seem that this is ideal ground for a research scholar.

[Answer] This turned out to be, above all, very difficult ground for research. Our initial general assumptions were geared toward researching work processes in their various aspects: employment, the utilizing of qualifications, wage

systems, the legal situation, etc. However, in all these instances, we wanted functionalism and efficiency not to be an alternative to humanization but to have our studies serve the seeking of possibilities for harmonizing these goals. Unfortunately, we began our work during a period of mounting crisis and a labor crisis, as well. And that is when we realized that it is difficult to talk whatsoever about functionalism or humanization under conditions of the then existing conflicts.

[Question] Therefore, it was necessary to change everything; to adapt to a new situation?

[Answer] After long discussions, we came to the conclusion that the problem does not lie in changing anything but in studying the functionalism of the entire labor system, to also analyze those symptoms which signal crisis and conflict situations in order to try to find out how functionalism and humanization may prevent these situations and what kinds of mechanisms lie at the source of inefficiency, dehumanization and conflicts.

[Question] This means that the field of research was expanded?

[Answer] Essentially, yes. However, in practice the introduction of martial law at that time limited our plans greatly. In reality, we did not have access to work establishments up until the end of 1982. Therefore, the subject of our research was closed to us.

[Question] By whom?

[Answer] Above all, by plant management but also by the workers themselves who quite frequently, simply did not want to talk to us. This situation, though not in such drastic form, still exists today. However, today it is the management and not the workers, for example, that is causing us greater problems.

[Question] Thinking in logical terms, it would seem that currently it should be plant management that ought to bow low to every sociologist and social psychologist so that during this time of greater enterprise independence, they could promptly analyze to some degree the various arising situations.

[Answer] However, things have turned out completely differently. Practically all sociologists who were employed by enterprises, lost their jobs.

[Question] It is frequently said that this is the result of the reform; a necessary economizing move.

[Answer] If someone says this, it means that he is not looking any further than the tip of his own nose because it is the independent enterprise that needs to have its situation, including its social situation, constantly analyzed in order to be able to solve the problems properly that a changing reality brings. In my opinion, the reasons for declining assistance from the social sciences run deeper. It seems to me that, first of all, the management and the work forces lost their faith to a certain extent in some social analyses

because they [analyses] did not prepare them for the great conflict; did not indicate where it was coming from. Secondly, during the period of the strong polarization of stands, sociologists and social psychologists also committed themselves to one of the sides and later suffered for this because either the management refused to trust them or considerable parts of the work force.

[Question] As a result, both scholarly work and practice suffered.

[Answer] Unfortunately, many plant managers felt that the only way to solve social problems in enterprises was through the simple method of raising wages. The so-called straight piecework, at which specialists flinch believing that it can be effective only for a very brief period of time, began to rule. On a long-range basis, it cannot motivate the raising of qualifications, improving quality, etc. Moreover, there were cases where political criteria began to dominate in the assessment of a worker's professional usefulness. The evaluations of sociologists, their suggestions on how to work with people, and how to advance and evaluate them became of little use in such a situation. However, I feel that all of these phenomena have a temporary character because the overcoming of the work crisis must be based on a better understanding of the people with whom one works in an institution.

[Question] Therefore, you were studying the situation during a unique period. Cognitively, this is obviously very interesting but does it have any practical significance?

[Answer] Our studies, indeed, do show a period of the greatest instability of the work system with all of its negative, crisis symptoms. That is why I am happy that this research problem will be continued, although under a somewhat different title, during the upcoming 5-year period because alongside the mechanisms which govern work processes during a time of progressive stability. And the practical significance? The effect of our studies on nearly 50 different subjects will be approximately 100 different articles and, I believe, 10 books. Many of these studies have already found and most certainly will find a practical application in the future. For example, studies on wage systems are already being used by the labor and wage ministry. This also pertains to such matters as work valuation and the verification of such valuation. Studies on the system of labor laws will undoubtedly be used for amending the labor code.

[Question] For you, as the director of the interministerial problem, it is now time to sum up that which has been done. At such a time, the question that comes to everyone's mind is whether owing to this research our knowledge has been deepened; does the research reveal any new phenomena?

[Answer] I have been giving thought to this myself because, in reality, I am preparing to make such an account and I will say this: because recently the life of our society has in general become very open, I will not inundate you with any kind of new deductions or problems about which we would not as yet have knowledge. That which we are finding in our social research is the possible intensification of certain phenomena and the manifestation of mechanisms which govern them. Thus, if I say that our research on the

problems of employment reveal the general opinion among more highly educated cadres that their qualifications are not being utilized fully, then you will answer me that this is common knowledge. However, in our research, we see this extremely clearly as a dangerous phenomenon. Moreover, we see that for many people, e.g., engineers this is a personal drama. What they are concerned with is no longer that they are poorly paid but also that they cannot use practically anything of that which they learned; that this is of no use to anyone and that the most shallow reserves are constantly being sought. This, of course, is only an example of the findings which appear from our studies. However, if we were to look for a more general synthesis of that which we have found scientifically, I would formulate it as follows: our research has revealed a completely destabilized labor system, in a deep crisis but which at the same time is ready for reform.

[Question] What indicates this readiness?

[Answer] It is, above all, in the people, in man's natural desire to work independently and well; to demonstrate initiative and industriousness, and to perform one's responsibilities within the framework of well-organized work.

[Question] And yet, we so often hear that people do not want to work.

[Answer] The problem does not lie in whether people want to work or not. They, indeed, do not want to work when they do not see a sense in it or personal or overall benefits. And if we see a certain crisis in this desire to work, then it lies in this lack of a feeling of sense. Finding it is not so easy because the determinants of the current situation lie in organizational shortcomings, in improper steering and in a constant lack of funds. These are macroeconomic and macrosocial determining factors. I would like to return to the matter of the utilization of qualifications because as it appears from our studies, it is the key issue in terms of looking for these deeper reserves. Today, it is a rather common feeling that in order to improve an enterprise's work performance, more people swinging their shovels are needed and less of those using their heads. Perhaps these shovels are needed today but this cannot be the plan for tomorrow or the day after, and especially not for the day after.

[Question] From what you are saying, it follows that the "involvement" of human desire in becoming convinced of the purposefulness of what they are doing is also a problem.

[Answer] Yes, and this concerns not only people with a higher education but all skilled workers and those with basic schooling. Speaking about qualifications, in general, I treat them very broadly. What I understand by them is not only acquired knowledge but also all of man's creative talents; his actual performance potential. And in addition to this, organizational capabilities. Our managerial cadre, which still continues to show preference for the method of operation described sometime ago by Prof Kiezun as collegiate authoritarianism, has a great open field on which to act here. After all, the interdependence between the subjective treatment of a worker and seeing by him of a purposefulness to his work is obvious and despite this, so difficult to implement in reality.

[Question] You spoke about the work crisis and at the same time about the readiness for reform. Is it possible to somehow project from your team's studies how extensive the crisis of the work ethos was in general and how long we will continue to "make up" for it?

[Answer] This is an unusually difficult problem because it is not just a matter of rebuilding that which was and that which collapsed; of returning to the state of things before the crisis. I will make use of an example here: the past 3 or 4 years were a period during which a paradoxical cult of simple work and the particular devaluation of the most highly skilled work occurred. At the same time, general and world trends indicate that the most highly skilled work will be particularly socially necessary. This will be work related to the development of the newest and most modern technology, automation, robotics, etc. Therefore, we must not so much reconstruct as change our attitude to the valuation of work. Next to, so to say, traditional qualities, new work values must be sought and people must be presented with goals that will release their entire dormant intellectual and performance potential.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the interview.

Bloc Journalists Meet, Peace Promoted

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 4 Nov 85 pp 1,7

[Text] On the 3rd of this month, an annual consultation conference of the management of journalists organizations from Bulgaria, the CSSR, Cuba, Mongolia, the GDR, Romania, Hungary, Vietnam, the USSR and Poland opened in Warsaw.

Its participants will discuss issues concerning the development of cooperation between journalists and editorial staffs from fellow socialist countries, particularly with regard to undertaking and promoting peace initiatives. Representatives of the International Journalists Organization along with its secretary general, Jirzi Kubka, are taking part in the deliberations.

"Such meetings have an already 18-year old tradition," remarked Klemens Krzyzagorski, chairman of the PRL Journalists Association Main Administration [ZG SD PRL], upon opening the conference. "They were born of an important and urgent political need which surpasses only the field of the journalism workshop. This is a need for the participation of all progressive journalists in the strengthening of world peace in a broadly understood upbringing of society in the spirit of peace."

This subject matter was referred to in the papers presented during the course of the conference concerning the tasks of journalists in the fight against the threat of war, journalists' cooperation on the forum of international organizations and the exchange of experiences of journalists from various nations of the world. It was pointed out that the concepts of peace preservation and stopping the arms race, reach the collective imagination and awareness of world societies also by way of the journalist.

Quite a lot of the discussion was devoted to the need of finding new forms of contact between journalists. Besides the working cooperation of journalists organizations and unions, the significance of international seminars, conferences, study visits, panel meetings, etc., should increase. The conference participants expressed a definite opposition to those forces which try to use the opportunities of shaping public opinion, afforded by the journalism profession, for poisoning the international atmosphere and intensifying tension.

It was stressed that 1986, declared by the UN as the Year of Peace, will also be the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the International Journalists Organization. Today, this organization has 200,000 members from 120 countries. It is the most important representation of democratic journalism. It was recalled that this organization adopted as its most important goal, the preservation of peace and the strengthening of friendship and understanding among nations, the fight against war propaganda in all of its aspects and counteracting mounting tension resulting from lies and slander.

The deliberations will end on the 4th of this month. On the following day, a meeting of the International Journalists Organization Secretariat with the participation of the consultation conference participants will be held.

Journalists Association Chair on Obligations

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Nov 85 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Klemens Krzyzagorski, PRL Democratic Party [SD] chairman, by Aleksander Checko]

[Excerpts] [Question] Since Sunday, representatives of journalists organizations from 10 socialist countries belonging to the International Journalists Organization [MOD] have been deliberating in Warsaw. What is the purpose of this meeting?

[Answer] The conference is made up of two parts. The first one, which will last until the 4th of this month, is an annual consultation meeting of the management of the country's [Poland] journalists' associations. Following this, on Tuesday, a meeting of the MOD secretariat will be held. I will remind you that MOD is not the only but the most numerous representation of democratic journalism. It numbers 200,000 members from 120 countries, 86 domestic federations and 9 associated organizations.

[Question] The Warsaw conference is, therefore, a routine meeting?

[Answer] In part, yes. There will be an occasion to sign bilateral agreements on journalistic cooperation between individual countries. Among other things, we will define the principles of next year's exchange of journalists groups.

However, the conference will be, above all, an occasion for discussion prior to next year's already 10th MOD congress in Sofia. Therefore, this will be an anniversary congress and particularly important within the context of the UN's recent decisions.

[Question] Decisions regarding the declaration of 1986 as the year of peace?

[Answer] Yes. Our task is to look for answers to the question: What are the responsibilities and possibilities of journalists in this regard; how can we promote the antiwar and disarmament theme; how is the participation of the mass media in that which we call the upbringing of societies in the spirit of peace supposed to look in specific terms?

[Question] Don't you think that perhaps you are overestimating the role of journalists in creating international relations?

[Answer] Journalists are specifically called to actively promote the concept of peace and to create an atmosphere conducive to preserving it. Such was, among other things, the main conclusion following the meeting of journalists in Jablonna. I believe that today journalists have several tasks to assume. The first one is tied to the fact that the currently maturing generations do not know war from personal experience. Therefore, the journalist and not only the historian is obligated to give testimony to truth. Briefly speaking, during World War I, more soldiers died than civilians whereas during World War II, more civilians died than soldiers; in a nuclear war--everyone would die.

[Question] In promoting peace, there cannot be a shortage of Polish journalists, if only by reason of our history. Would you kindly tell me what our position is in MOD? How alive are the reverberations of the division among Polish journalists which occurred several years ago?

[Answer] The International Journalists Organization observed the mounting of discord in our community with uneasiness. The most emphatic example of this discord was the arrival of as many as three different groups from Poland for the Ninth Congress which took place in the fall of 1981. The effect was, among other things, that one of the MOD vicechairmanship posts to which we are entitled by, so to say, right of the member-founder status acquired by Poland at the first congress in Copenhagen in June of 1946, went unfilled. Nevertheless, it was upheld that "Poland's mandate exists and that the journalistic community itself should nominate and propose its candidate for vice-chairman to MOD."

[Question] The end of 1981 brought the suspension of SDP [Polish Journalists Association] activity and that of the Journalists Trade Union. In March of 1982, following the dissolution of the SDP, SD PRL [PRL Journalists Association] was created.

[Answer] And with it problems of a procedural nature whether the new association should be formally accepted into MOD by the congress of this organization or whether it should be considered as the continuator of SDP. The second variant was chosen, although not immediately. The decision was preceded by observations made by MOD as to how PRL SD is developing and to what degree it is becoming a representative organization for the Polish journalistic community.

[Question] Were numbers taken into account?

[Answer] Yes. When delegations from countries all over the world were coming to our congress in June of 1983 headed by the MOD secretary general, we were able to give them the actual number of members in association; i.e., 5,375. In 1980, SDP numbered 7,800 members and candidates.

[Question] How many journalists belong to SD PRL currently?

[Answer] We number 7,575 members and candidates. By comparison with the state of matters in 1983, this constitutes an increase of 2,200 persons; i.e., nearly one-third. The most numerous group, 34.4 percent, are 30- to 40-year olds. There are 2,044 50- to 60-year olds. The group of the oldest SD PRL members (over 60 years old) numbers 901 persons. The association has 2,326 women and 5,249 men. Of the total number of SD PRL members, 4,567 (70.8 percent) belong to the PZPR, 160 are in the ZSL [United Peasant Party], 111 in the SD [Democratic Party] and 2,737 have no party affiliation. In Warsaw, which is the largest center for journalists [in Poland], 4,138 persons belong to our organization; i.e., 55.8 percent of all the journalists-members of the SD PRL.

[Question] Much attention is devoted in the International Journalists Organization to training activity. What is it based on specifically?

[Answer] In Berlin, Budapest, Havana, Prague and Sofia, there are training centers intended, above all, for young journalists from developing countries. Training groups are also sent to us, although, for the time being, this instruction is not taking on as organized a form as in the aforementioned centers. Another form of cooperation among countries within the MOD framework is assistance in the setting up of broadcasting stations, editorial offices and printing plants. Sometimes, this assistance does not require great technology and capital outlays; I recall the shipment of ball-point pens and bicycles--working tools sent for journalists to one of the countries.

[Question] What are MOD's financial resources?

[Answer] There is an international journalists solidarity fund which is provided for by, among other things, an international lottery. We have named this the "Blue" lottery.

[Question] To what extent do Polish journalists take advantage of the MOD training activity? How often do they go abroad?

[Answer] Last year, 196 journalists went abroad whereas this year, 171 for the time being, and 555 since 1982. I am talking only about trips sponsored by the PRL SD and tied, above all, to activity in 34 creative clubs of the association. Besides these trips, there are also so-called sponsored trips, business trips organized in cooperation with the employer (there have been 5,533 [illegible] of them since 1982) or, for example, in cooperation with social [spolecane] organizations. Altogether, there is quite a number of them and each one, regardless of its form, should serve as an opportunity for getting to know the world and improving the journalists trade.

PZPR CC Secretary Meets Bloc Journalists

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Nov 85 p 2

[Text] On the 4th of this month, Jan Glowczyk, PZPR Central Committee secretary and deputy Politburo member, met with the leaders of journalists organizations delegations from socialist countries who were in Warsaw for the consultation conference.

The Central Committee secretary informed the guests about the socioeconomic situation in our country and discussed some of the problems of propaganda activity.

Bogdan Jachacz, director of the Central Committee Press, Radio and Television Department, participated in the meeting.

Bloc Journalists Write Gorbachev

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6 Nov 85 p 1, 2

[Text] A definite commitment to the all-inclusive propagation of peace initiatives by the socialist bloc and its increasing contribution to solving general human problems related to our modern times was expressed by the participants of the consultation conference of journalists organizations management from 10 socialist countries which concluded in Warsaw.

At the same time, concern was expressed over the fact that the advocates of the uncontrolled arms race and of a policy of balancing on the brink of nuclear war, continue to show strength and are not resigning from their aggressive intentions.

The participants of the conference also acknowledged the necessity for the broad-scale presentation, in the mass media of their respective countries, of the celebrations connected with the 40th anniversary of the International Journalists Organization which will take place next year.

The participants at the Warsaw meeting of journalists from socialist countries addressed a letter to the secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, in which they express their support for the peace initiatives undertaken by the Soviet Union for the preservation of world peace and for the prevention of a nuclear disaster. In the name of journalists from socialist countries, they also assure that they will fight actively for putting these initiatives into effect.

9853/13045

CSO: 2600/124

PRESS FOCUSES ON KOZAKIEWICZ

System Needs Changes

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Nov 85 p 3

[Interview with Professor Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, chairman of the Polish Pedagogical Association, by Anna Borkowska, published in KURIER LUBELSKA; date and place not specified]

[Text] M. Kozakiewicz: I would like for the government to change its conduct in order to effectively meet our system's political goals. The public's role in government should be expanded through constitutional guarantees. The party should take a leading role in political life.

[Question] Sir, how do you see this in practice?

[Answer] Exactly as it is stated in declarations; that is, that the party should be an inspiration working through its members. The party should act as the guarantor of social order because we do in fact belong to a defined political alliance and for this reason, such a party role is undeniable. But we also can't deny the fact that the party should not relieve or replace the decision making process of either the Sejm, government or even the director of a factory.

Social demands for reforms in the government and administration are, to a certain degree, appearing; but I am still not clear as to whether we are approaching some general overhaul or becoming content with just cosmetic repairs. If reforms are not carried out to the end, we will again find ourselves at a turning point because the old system will no longer be able to keep pace with increased levels of consciousness, education, or in some portion of society, even an increased level of political awareness. Therefore, in relation to social progress, the party will not be able to realize the goals it has set. For instance, how do we reconcile computers with the control of information? Besides, it is just not our problem but also the world's.

[Question] Steps are being taken in our country to improve the situation.

[Answer] Yes, but small ones. We avoid questions of the utmost urgency. For example, the existence of an opposition group in our country which will understandably not be hostile to the government but will represent different view-

points and be capable of settling economic and social problems. The existence of an opposition group remains a fact of life in politics. When speaking of an opposition, I mean one recognizing the constitutional basis of his country and unconditionally subscribing to the ideological principles of the regime but holding a different viewpoint on what methods should be employed and by what means these principles should effectively be put into practice. There are people who disagree on methods being employed even at the factory level. Even they should be allowed to participate.

[Question] These concern reforms in government and administration. But what about social attitude?

[Answer] I have cause for concern regarding certain mental characteristics of my countrymen. An unjustifiable feeling of megalomania is inherent in every Pole, causing him to look up to other nations even if they do have a more advanced technology and culture. Furthermore, a Pole is convinced that the whole world admires him and welcomes him as a hero. The world, on the other hand, looks down at him with scorn because what is highly regarded everywhere is economic power, good organization, efficiency and social discipline. But what is happening in our country? Very few want to work hard but it seems that everyone wants to have a better life. We envy the rich countries of the West, but seldom do we take into account that the people of those countries work long and hard to achieve what they have. We, therefore, must make a choice between either comfort with much leisure time, even in the work place, or to working hard. If we choose comfort then we have to accept the fact that we cannot have, collectively or individually, that which has been attained by those societies where people work hard.

Censorship, PRON, Government Credibility

Warsaw TYGODNIK KULTURALNY in Polish 22 Sep 85 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Professor Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, chairman of the Polish Pedagogical Association, by Janina Kozbiel; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Sir, you continue to represent and proclaim a certain model lying between capitalism and communism, between western and eastern culture. Do you not feel any solitude in your situation?

[Answer] Philosophically, yes, but I am certain that every person has experienced this. There is psychological solitude, however, my family shields me from this. And there is political solitude, but I am not especially worried about this type. The opinions I voice are not exclusively my own even if they are expressed through my own words and in keeping with my beliefs. They are rather resultant from observing events and from talking with people. My views are not entirely unique or revelatory. I speak what many think. Those of the Establishment and of the Opposition will admit to this in private conversations. My views towards the ideal political system results rather from my intolerance for extremes. I recognize the verity of every proposition, yet towards each I am sceptical. Fanaticism is foreign to me. I concede to every person's right to voice that which he feels irrespective of whether he represents a

secular or religious outlook. Perhaps this is the result of my own form of social pragmatism. After all, theoretical justifications for certain human behavior which some have recently tried to have us believe are of no great importance in practice. A variety of stimuli, motives and philosophical premises may explain similar behavior. The organization of shelters for vagrants and homeless can be overseen by either monk Albert and the Union of Socialist Polish Youth [ZSMP] or the Church and police, for in all practicality, the reasons for doing so will remain the same - humanism and social well-being.

[Question] There was a time, however, when you attempted to convince teachers of the dangers of religion. In looking at your past publications, for instance at "Tolerance and Freedom of Conscience" published in 1963, I cannot help but assume that your views have gradually developed.

[Answer] You will not find in my works any reference made to the dangers of religion, to the superiority of a scientific view of the world or in the harmfulness in combining the Church and State in politics. Furthermore, you are committing a grave mistake in trying to depict me in 1985 with conclusions drawn in 1963.

[Question] A mistake?

[Answer] Yes, an ahistorical mistake. You completely fail to take into account the different socio-political environment existing at the time those words were written. You should compare my more recent books, "Religion and the Teacher", "Philosophical Outlook for 1000 Teachers", "The Effects of Upbringing on Philosophical Outlook", "Tolerance...", with those written in 1963 by other secular writers. This will be a more accurate point of reference and of criticism. I provoked much criticism with statements such as the one asserting that a teacher with religious convictions can equally realize a school's educational curriculum based on a scholarly outlook provided that the school will not be aggressively anti-religious. I can assure you that my statements concerning official policy towards religion and pedagogy, prevalent at that time, were very liberal and made in good judgement. They, however, seem archaic in light of my present views and present day attitudes. That is to say, favourable changes in politics have indeed followed, releasing pedagogy from schematization. What had once been considered heresy by Polish marxists has attained acceptance in public life. Each period has its own restrictions.

[Question] Sir, do you usually consent to restrictions?

[Answer] In public life, we are all faced with some form of restriction. We have to come to terms with this, for such is reality. In concrete socio-political situations, unlike in a record-seeking sport, it is not possible to traverse the imaginary cross-bar that has been hung in place in fact by someone else. If I had to assess myself, I would have to say that I had jumped just below, a millimeter below, at a time when the majority were jumping three meters below the cross-bar. This is then unfortunate. But similarly, knocking down the cross-bar will not move events any faster. I am personally convinced that such cross-bars exist in every country. Let us just hope that they

are not lowered in our country but gradually raised higher and higher as a measure of improved culture, education and social responsibility.

[Question] Sir, it sounds as if you are changing?

[Answer] Of course I am changing, just like every other person. It would be a mistake, however, to reach such a conclusion by merely looking at what I have published. When I plan for something to be put into practice, I have to take into consideration the speed of it being realized.

[Question] Sir, does self-censorship ever trouble you? After all, this is a kind of tactical maneuver.

[Answer] There are two forms of self-censorship. One is the result of common sense used in achieving a goal. The second has to do with fear, conscience and ambition. I employ the first rationalization, believing it to be a means to function effectively. The second I reject without hesitation. For years I have been subject to censorship, both by the State and more often by a worse type, internal. I renounce all forms of censorship when it concerns purely scientific papers. That is why many appeared only for internal use; others I had published. They generated much resentment and reservation by persons holding various positions of authority. However, political stages pass and governments change but that which has been produced remains.

[Question] Sir, what makes you believe that your aim for autonomy is legitimate? Were you not ever afraid of committing an error, becoming a target of ridicule or coming under suspicion as being somewhat perverse? Even within the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON] itself, opinions of you vary.

[Answer] A person who decides to write and become a public figure is prone to such danger. As a rule, I do not comment on criticisms and attacks launched at me. At the most, but very seldom, I will rectify any misstatements. With regard to PRON, I believe that its existence is well-founded as long as it continues to be a place where one can meet and exchange a variety of ideas and opinions. PRON should be a reflection of society which is divergent and where contrasting views, different beliefs exist side by side. But is PRON such an entity? In my opinion it is not. A debate on the language of politics published in ODRÓDZENIA (Rebirth) showed that PRON in reality holds the opinion that it should become a special government agency, reflecting the principles set by those in authority and thinking only on how to transmit them to the lower strata. In my opinion, however, such principles concerning the entire country should arise from discussions by groups, circles and organizations. But PRON is not the only one to blame for this. It is also the fault of those who could effectively represent differentiating views, different social factions, but instead, choose not to join PRON.

[Question] Sir, you have achieved much popularity, and even though you persist in your independent stance within PRON, you have been recommended by the United Peasants' Party [ZSL] to be placed on the central voting list. This would suggest that your autonomy, not to mention controversy, has had some effect.

[Answer] It is difficult for me to explain the exact intent of those who backed my candidacy. I hope that it was the result of changes in the system and a forecast of further such changes. I assume it to mean that people holding similar views and having more notable counterparts in society, are to realize in the Sejm their own program, revealing their views, solutions and performance.

[Question] And you consent to such an experiment?

[Answer] One can interpret intentions by various means. What is more important, is that in practice, this type of autonomous group may display a more judicious form of government and represent no threat to the political order or even the country. Such experience may even encourage other individuals, holding similar attitudes, to enter the Sejm. We must remember that current elections will be held after the occurrence of some very remarkable events and in accordance with amendments to the law on elections, cautious as they were, which finally attests to a willingness to bring about change.

[Question] Hasn't the experience of Sejm delegates trying to speak out independently up to now given you reason to be pessimistic?

[Answer] The thought of even holding any official position is abhorrent to me. Besides, I have never held any official post.

[Question] I had something else in mind. I suspect that there is some sort of psychological mechanism which causes a person, voicing his views publicly, yet belonging to a minority group, to lose his voice in time and slowly be thrust aside or thought of simply as an antagonist.

[Answer] There are some persons belonging to the government apparatus who already think of me as an antagonist.

[Question] Even if what he speaks is in fact in the best interest of the government?

[Answer] In the best interest of the country!

[Question] But also the government itself because its acceptance may lead to a more effective system of rule.

[Answer] This marriage after all does not have to last to eternity; it can always be dissolved.

[Question] In reading your books (even if the most recent one was published by the People's Publishing House [LSW]: "Youth in Times of Crisis"), I gather that you find it essential for a person to participate through institutions. When you write on the shortcomings in the school system and pose the question as to its liquidation or reformation, you always answer in favor of reforms and whenever you analyse the cause for educational failures, you always mention youth organizations. Does this mean that a person trying to live outside of organizations and institutions has within him some sort of deficiency?

[Answer] It is entirely normal for a youth at a certain age to have a need for affiliation which causes him to be drawn to peers because he feels that more can be accomplished collectively than as an individual.

[Question] But what if one is not pulled towards such groups, what if he prefers to read alone or chooses, as you refer, an alternate way of life? Does this mean that he has some inherent flaw?

[Answer] Not in himself but rather in society. If people are looking for alternatives and escaping from reality and official organizations, then it is necessary to correct any flaws within reality and these organizations in order to adapt them to the aspirations of future members in such a way that they shouldn't have to seek their success in movements breeding negative traits and discontent and becoming subject to a row of events that may prove harmful to their safety.

[Question] Professor, have you not given any thought to the most frequent cause for degeneration in present organizations and institutions. Maybe they contain some inherent weaknesses.

[Answer] I do not believe that the cause concerns inherent weaknesses, but rather, inherent dangers which plague all organizations and institutions in their effort to defend and propagate particular ideals which in time become institutionalized (this has happened within the Church for instance). From this arises the belief that only a given organization holds a monopoly on interpreting given mores and making it necessary to stigmatize everything opposed to this interpretation and to force everyone to complete loyalty towards a sole opinion, administration and executive power. What results lacks any genuine authenticity and creates an attitude not on self-achievement and creativity but total compliance in realizing a program issued by superiors "for us" but "without us".

[Question] You, however, took great satisfaction in participating in various organizations. How was this possible?

[Answer] I took great pains in not forfeiting my own voice or allowing myself to be thrust into a role where I would become just a wheel in a machine, a passive member.

[Question] Did you succeed?

[Answer] Once I did have to resign from a post. This happened in the Society for the Promotion of Secular Culture [TKKS] which was formed by superior authority, in defiance of the wishes of many of its members, through combining two energetic, authentic organizations; the Association of Atheists and Freethinkers and the Society for Secular Schools. I did not belong to the organizations, even though I did serve one term of office as its vice-chairman. The only reason for my being connected with TKKS was due to the fascinating personality of its first chairman, Jerzy Sztachelski. When he left the organization, I departed without making any unnecessary gestures. How was it that I was able to find satisfaction in other cases? I always assumed that the strength of an

organization is in the sum of what can be contributed by its individual members. Therefore, I never became a passive member, I always tried to clearly define an individual program, individual hopes and desires. It so happened, that I always found a common language with some group where we attempted to put our plans into practice. Also, I never did anything against my conscience, and when there was an attempt made to force me into doing something against my will, I withdrew.

[Question] Sir, you possess an extraordinary amount of energy. Organizations usually complain about member passivity and try to stimulate their activity using a number of techniques.

[Answer] I agree. It is unfortunate, however, in wrongly believing it possible to artificially instill a common goal inside each of its members. This the member should already possess. The organization, instead, should be a place where people are given the opportunity to carry out individual goals and not be impeded by barriers placed by "officers" and "more knowledgeable" people (besserwisser). It should be a place expressing the means for one's active participation. Orders do not produce enthusiasm and participation, while every suggestion, no matter how "strange", "insignificant", "third rate", or "dubious" it may seem to the central program, fulfills a stimulative role destroying a climate of complete hopelessness.

[Question] This all sounds like a fairy tale. Professor, do you seriously believe that this can happen in our country?

[Answer] This must happen in our country! Our present state is unacceptable. There is too much that needs to be accomplished; there are too many impediments for one to accept present conditions. Though, I am certain that this will not happen immediately or without some resistance.

[Question] Sir, I admire your faith. How certain must you be on the validity of a proposal before attempting to put it into practice?

[Answer] If I had to wait till I was 100 percent certain I would never have started anything. I gain confidence gradually, subjecting my ideas to public scrutiny, to various interpretations. I am a person who reveres honest attacks made against me. What does PRON lack most? A practical approach towards conflicting proposals. During debates on electoral law, our comments were indeed recorded and in some sense taken into account by the government, but they never lead to a confrontation between two opposing but essential variants. The same occurred during discussions concerning rulings on higher education. Many of those opposed to reforms admitted, after all, that some form of it is necessary. Therefore, it would have been appropriate to allow the public to formulate their own amendments to the law and confronting ministers with them in a meaningful discussion. However, this did not happen. I don't know whether it was because there was no time or an absence of trust in people. My main goal in connection with my candidacy as member of the Sejm is to bring about a situation whereby it will be possible to choose between two, maybe even several, meaningful and commendable proposals.

[Question] I would still like to ask you for a self-evaluation. What did you at last achieve during your stormy public life, which plans have you put into practice? I suspect that you still cling to the belief that they are worthwhile.

[Answer] Firstly, my views concerning guidance in family planning. Secondly, what I would term as youth sexology. If up to 1956 the Ministry of Education did not even want to deal with the issue of sex and today has introduced such a subject as part of a school's curriculum, mandatory as of 1986, then maybe this could have been a result of my activity. The third matter would have to concern our present policy towards religion; even if it does continue to remain a topic of controversy, subject to political phases. After 1956, an attempt was made to suggest that a school should indeed be secular and non-religious, yet non-atheistic and anti-religious but this was met with firm opposition. Today this attitude and even the designation "non-religious schools" has once again become a political topic.

[Question] Murmurs of dissatisfaction were heard this past season over the course of action to be followed. Is this then to mean that a mistake has been made?

[Answer] Yes, the steps to be taken are a kind of remedy which will not result in recovery. After all, there was much opposition to them by many workers and peasants and I suspect that the reason for instituting them had to do with maintaining one's dignity. If I continue to express my support for these measures, it is only because they act as a pang of conscience, a symbol of shame, a reminder that socialism in Poland has not succeeded in doing away with flagrant social inequalities.

[Question] And socialism, in your mind, is to correct this?

[Answer] Socialism certainly doesn't end with egalitarianism, yet, without egalitarianism, socialism does not exist. For instance, even with the present economic crisis, which is also plaguing the West, gains made by some western countries in social welfare far exceeded our own. Another case in point is that whenever steps, mostly out of sheer necessity, are taken in Poland to get us out of a crisis, these inequalities deepen. In planning for the future, however, we must look at our present situation as deviating from the rule rather than in observance of it.

13090/13045
CSO: 2600/137

PZPR ACTIVITIES NOTED

Katowice Provincial Committee Plenum

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] The members of the PZPR KW plenum in Katowice held a meeting to assess the living conditions of Katowice Province residents and the results of the social policy conducted by plants. Guidelines were given for the directions of the work of party organizations and their members in this field.

Party, Planning-Statistics School Meeting

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] Janusz Kubasiewicz, first secretary of the PZPR Warsaw Committee, took part in a joint meeting of the rector's council and the PZPR school committee secretariat at SGPiS. The discussion addressed the scholarly, teaching and upbringing work of this institution, stressing the important role of the school party organization in the effective operation of SGPiS. The need was indicated for the increased participation of the school's academic cadre in resolving the critical economic and social problems of the capital and the Warsaw Province. J. Kubasiewicz also took part in the celebration organized at this institution commemorating the 75th anniversary of the birth of Prof Kazimierz Secomski.

CC PZPR Propaganda Meeting

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by: (x)]

[Text] An all-Poland conference of PZPR KW secretaries and editors-in-chief of press, radio and television agencies was held at the PZPR CC. The deliberations were held to assess the participation of the mass media in the propaganda campaign related to PRL Sejm elections and to draw recommendations from this campaign for raising the quality and effectiveness of journalistic work in performing acts of public service.

The discussion was introduced by Bogdan Jachacz, director of the CC Press, Radio and Television Department.

PZPR CC Secretary Jan Glowczyk, Politburo candidate member, summarized the discussion that focused on improving the forms and methods of propaganda activities emanating from the achievements of the Second National Ideological-Theoretical Conference.

Family, Women's Issues at CC Meeting

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6 Dec 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by: (za-ga); first paragraph is TRYBUNA LUDU introduction]

[Text] (Own Information) The efficient and comprehensive work of such centers as "Practical Woman" and "Modern Housewife" is important for approximately 11 million households and hundreds of thousands of young couples seeking advice and concrete assistance in the daily problems of the newly organized family.

Reports of a decline in the number of "Practical Woman" and "Modern Housewife" centers in recent years motivated the PZPR CC Women's Commission to examine the problems, the operational forecasts, the former status and the methods of operation of these centers at yesterday's (5 December) meeting.

At present there are 579 "Practical Woman" centers in operation under the sponsorship of CZSS "Spolem" in various cities. Only half of them are found there where they are most needed--in apartment complexes. The programs of operation of the centers vary, since they are adapted to the needs of the communities in which they function, but as a rule the center combines household services with advice and educational-upbringing activity.

The "Peasants' Self Aid" Central Union of Cooperatives organizes the work of 1,253 "Modern Housewife" centers. Between 1980 and 1983, 300 such centers closed. It was argued that they were unprofitable. In a total of 681 gmina cooperatives in Poland, there are no "Modern Housewife" centers. Many existing centers struggle with problems related to their being equipped insufficiently with model household equipment.

The committee members, joined by the directors of "Practical Woman" and "Modern Housewife" centers from various parts of the country, discussed the positive phenomena (the halt in the decline in the number of centers), everyday problems and operations indispensable for an increase in the number of centers, as well as making them better equipped and expanding services to include those that would mold the consciousness of young families and would spread standards for the wise and planned management of household budgets.

Reports on the participation of the Polish delegation to the International Women's Conference in Nairobi and on female deputies to the PRL Sejm for the 10th term likewise were heard.

The deliberations were chaired by Comrade Zofia Grzyb, Politburo member.

Provincial Committee Meetings

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6 Dec 85 p 1

[Article prepared by: (Tad)]

[Excerpts] (Own Information) On 5 December, party provincial committees deliberated at plenary meetings held in Bielsko-Biala, Czestochowa, Ostroleka, Piotrkow Trybunalski and Torun.

The deliberations covered the following topics:

- in Bielsko-Biala: the implementation of the tasks of agriculture emanating from the resolutions of the 2 April 1982 joint PZPR KW and ZSL WK plenary meeting and the directions of its future development until 1990;
- in Ostroleka: the assessment of the implementation of the 11th PZPR CC and ZSL NK resolution, with special consideration given to rural social conditions;
- in Piotrkow Trybunalski: the problems of the development of culture in the province through the end of the 1980's;
- in Torun: the problems of the molding of socialist awareness in the process of the cultural education of society and the tasks of echelons and party organizations in this field.

Focus on Ideological, Patriotic Training

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] The Fifth PZPR KW Plenum in Czestochowa was devoted to assessing the implementation of the resolutions of the PZPR KW concerning ideological-upbringing work, the patriotic upbringing of youth and the dissemination of culture.

Under organizational business, Wladyslaw Jonkisz, the first secretary of the PZPR KW in Czestochowa, in conjunction with his election as member of the Council of State, submitted his resignation and requested that the plenum release him from his current duties.

Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak, candidate member of the CC Politburo, PZPR CC secretary, in attendance at the plenum, extended thanks to Wladyslaw Jonkisz on behalf of PZPR CC First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski for his productive work thus far. On behalf of the CC Politburo, he recommended Jerzy Sypka, currently PZPR KW economic secretary, for the vacant position. By secret ballot the plenum elected Jerzy Sypka first secretary of the PZPR KW in Czestochowa.

Director of the PZPR CC Cadre Policy Department Wladyslaw Honkisz participated in the deliberations.

CC Hosts Ethiopian Party Delegation

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7-8 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] A delegation from the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia under the chairmanship of CC Secretary Wubesheta Dessie visited Poland.

The subject of talks held with PZPR CC Secretary Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak, Politburo candidate member, was the current situation in both countries and the exchange of experiences in party work.

The delegation visited Radom Province. Bogdan Prus, PZPR KW first secretary in Radom, presented a report on the socioeconomic situation of the province and the major tasks of party work. Politburo member Zofia Grzyb took part in the meeting.

Provincial Committee Meetings

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7-8 Dec 85 p 1

[Article by: (jak); first paragraph TRYBUNA LUDU introduction]

[Text] On 6 December, PZPR provincial committees in Skierniewicz, Slupsk, Tarnobrzeg and Warsaw deliberated at plenary meetings.

In Skierniewice and Tarnobrzeg (at a field meeting held at the Agricultural Schools Group in Sichow) and at joint meetings of the provincial PZPR and ZSL echelons, the subject of deliberations was the implementation of the resolutions of the joint PZPR CC and ZSL NK plenum.

In Slupsk, a preliminary assessment was made of the regional implementation of the tasks of the 3-year socioeconomic plan for 1983-1985.

In Warsaw, discussion was held on the directions for future work on the internal strengthening of the Warsaw party organization.

Warsaw Party Stronger

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7-8 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Andrzej Lawniczak; first paragraph is TRYBUNA LUDU introduction]

[Text] The subject of yesterday's (6 December) plenary deliberations of the Warsaw party echelon was the directions of future party work on the internal strengthening of the Warsaw party organization. In other words, the discussion focused on the tasks facing the Warsaw organization during the period preceding the 10th PZPR Congress.

Participants in the deliberations, that were conducted by KW First Secretary Janusz Kubasiewicz, included: CC Politburo member Albin Siwak and Politburo candidate member, CC Secretary Włodzimierz Mokrzyszczak. Likewise the first secretaries of the party from the largest Warsaw plants and the cities and gminas of the province were invited.

I shall note some data on the state of the Warsaw organization taken from the KW Executive Board report that was presented by KW Secretary Jerzy Boleslawski. At the end of September 1985, it had over 127,000 members: 21.2 percent of these were workers and 3.7 percent were youth under 29 years of age. During the recent period, the process of "departures" from the party was nearly halted and the number of acceptances of new candidates grows each month. From January to October 1985, 2,242 candidates were accepted. This data, however, is not satisfactory.

"The number of party members is based primarily on the working class and youth," said Julian Kedzierski, first secretary of the Ochota KD. "Meanwhile, we manage to forget this in our everyday work. Often we stop only with training as the basic form of reaching these communities. We devote too little time to conversation, discussion and polemics...."

"We still have not won over young people," said Ludwik Hernik from UNITRA-POLKOLOR, "and we should focus particularly on them. That is why we must give more attention to work in the school. Influence on the political attitudes of the young person in the plant is frequently delayed."

The preceding quotes are typical of the issue of the acceptance of young people into the party. Those that speak out on this issue are critical and full of alarm. They also say that not all party echelons work actively toward the development of youth organizations as a major party "base." However, positive examples likewise were cited at the plenum, from such quarters as "Swierczewski," "Warynski," "Kasprzak" and ZWAR. It was stated that the acceptance of candidates into POP's was and is a measure of the effectiveness of influence exerted upon nonparty members. At the same time, it is evidence of the party's general activism.

The rebuilding, the strengthening and the development of party ranks was recognized during the plenum as one of the most important political-organizational tasks of the Warsaw party organization before the 10th Congress. At the same time, it was pointed out that some organizations break with people too readily and strike them from the lists for their so-called passivity, while they too infrequently talk with them and try to make them active.

During the assessment of the most recent period of operation of the Warsaw party organization, it was stressed that the democratic work style of party committees has been strengthened and that the share of party members in conducting important political campaigns is active and extensive. At the same time, weaknesses and shortcomings occur, the pretense of work and stagnation are apparent and attitudes of criticism and continual impotence prevail in some communities.

There are likewise organizations that focus on generating new resolutions and forget about the implementation of resolutions that already have been passed. These factors also weaken the authority and strength of the party's influence. "In everyday party work we pay too little attention to the style of our activity," said Feliks Nasalski, first secretary of the Gmina Committee in Lomianki. "We must demand honest work from ourselves and all our comrades every day, not only during the campaign period. The party organization is militant when it works in this way, when its members present a monolithic ideological attitude."

Zbigniew Nowakowski, POP secretary at UNITRA-CEMI, noted the very important role of primary party organizations: "Unfortunately, there are also those comrades in such organizations that manifest political immaturity and little awareness, that evade the performance of their basic statutory duties."

It was stated during the discussion that every POP, even the smallest one, must have its proper status and role restored. The POP should be a place where in-depth analyses of the sociopolitical situation within the local community ought to take place on a continual basis, not only during political campaigns.

It likewise was stated during the deliberations that there is still too much impulsiveness in party work and too little systematization in activities that are embarked upon. A bureaucratic style is dominant too frequently in direct work with people.

Work with leadership cadres, their training and their proper placement were recognized as vital tasks for the near future.

Wloclawek Party Officials Meet

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 9 Dec 85 pp 1, 5

[Article by Marek Badtke]

[Excerpts] (Own Information) Saturday's meeting of the Wloclawek Province party aktiv was constructive in nature. The 1,300 participants in the deliberations were joined by Politburo candidate member, PZPR CC Secretary Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak.

During this forum, conducted by KW First Secretary Krystian Luczak, the status of the work of primary party organizations was assessed, the means for improving the effectiveness of operation of these elements were outlined and the major directions of the political campaign preceding the 10th PZPR Congress were defined.

Our party must be everywhere that the problems of the present day and the future of all communities are being determined. By leading society, we take upon ourselves the work of collective organizer of the efforts of working people. The party organization that evades these issues cannot expect to have authority within the community of its operation.

The order of the day is the need to increase the effectiveness of the party's political-organizational function, especially within its primary elements.

The demand for an offensive style of work is being confirmed more and more often in the work of the provincial party organization. The number of persons accepted into the party is growing. While in 1982, 72 candidates were recommended, over 11 months in 1985, 836 candidates were recommended. The majority of these were young workers and farmers. Leszek Szperkowski, the young POP secretary from PBK in Aleksandrow Kujawski, said that social, youth and women's organizations are a natural party base.

Cooperation with nonparty members is also an opportunity for exerting more effective political influence in the community. This is fostered by the open nature of most party meetings.

Many discussants also noted the need to activate party work in schools and educational-upbringing institutions.

CC Secretary Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak, who participated in the discussion, rated highly the work of the provincial party organization in Wloclawek. This progress obliges that more effective work be done to eliminate still evident deficiencies and shortcomings. The role of those making recommendations for party ranks and their responsibility for the attitudes of PZPR candidates must grow.

Comrade Wl. Mokrzyszczak also characterized the tasks awaiting the party in 1986, the year of the 10th PZPR Congress. Foremost among these are work to increase the ability of the KZ and the POP to perform the role of political leader, great efficiency and the search for new forms in organizing the collective effort of working people and the continual development and preservation of the class continuity of our party.

8536

CSO: 2600/192

PRESS, PERSONNEL CHANGES, MEETINGS

Press, Media Notices Oct 85

Warsaw PRASA POLSKA in Polish Dec 85 pp 55-59

[Excerpts] On 1 October, Jerzy Golebiowski was appointed correspondent for TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA in Czechoslovakia.

On 1 October, Edward Mikolajczyk was dismissed from his position as editor-in-chief of the PA INTERPRESS Chief Film-Television Editorship.

On 1 October, Barbara Sokolowska was appointed deputy editor-in-chief of PRASA POLSKA.

On 15 October, Leokadia Tempska was appointed editor-in-chief of SWIAT MLODY.

On 15 October, Krzysztof Zglejszewski was appointed deputy editor-in-chief of POLITECHNIKA.

On 25 October in Warsaw, the deliberations of the 26th session of the radio program commission of the OIRT International Radio and Television Organization were held. Participants in the session included representatives of the broadcasting systems of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Cuba, the GDR, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Soviet Union, as well as OIRT Secretary General Genadij Codr. A representative of the Yugoslavian broadcasting system sat in as an observer. The program of radio organization cooperation since the previous meeting held in Sofia in 1984 was discussed and programs for activities for the coming years were adopted. Editor Jan Grzelak was elected chairman of the OIRT radio program commission.

On 26 October at the Warsaw Journalists' Home, an agreement was signed regarding cooperation between the Union of Finnish Journalists and the PRL Journalists' Association for 1986-1987. The document refers to the program of cooperation in culture, science and related fields for 1985-1987 that is contained in a Finnish-Polish intergovernmental document signed in 1984 in Warsaw. Both unions, acting jointly in the spirit of the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, will keep each other informed of the work of their respective organizations, will exchange experiences and materials and will extend direct assistance in the implementation of specific understandings on cooperation

between the particular mass media centers in Finland and Poland. The agreement was signed by the chairmen of both organizations: Antero Laine and Klemens Krzyzagorski.

On 30 October, the 10,000th issue of CZERWONY SZTANDAR appeared. The newspaper, published in the Polish language in Lithuania, has a large readership not only in the Soviet Union, but in Poland as well.

On 31 October, Tomasz Sas was dismissed from his position as deputy editor-in-chief of ODGLOSY.

Warsaw Journalist Society Meeting

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] The reports meeting of the Warsaw press branch of the PRL SD, the largest branch in Poland, numbering more than 3,500 members and candidate members, was held. The discussion addressed the major problems of journalistic work. The need for the journalists' organization to give equal treatment to issues related to building the authority of the profession, to raising qualifications and to social-essential issues was indicated. Chairman of the PRL SD Main Board, Editor Klemens Krzyzagorski, took part in the meeting.

SZTANDAR MLODYCH New Editor

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Dec 85 p 5

[Text] In conjunction with the Sejm's appointment of the former editor-in-chief of SZTANDAR MLODYCH, Aleksander Kwasniewski, as minister of youth affairs, Jerzy Domanski became the new editor-in-chief of this newspaper.

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2600/192

RYSZARD WOJNA ON NATIONAL INTEREST, WESTERN AID TO OPPOSITION

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ POLSKI in Polish No 31, 4 Aug 85 pp 5, 14

[Interview with Sejm delegate Ryszard Wojna, chairman of the Sejm Commission for Foreign Affairs, by Lech Lewandowski]

[Text] [Question] The year 1985 is a time of significant anniversaries and events which had far-reaching effects on our country and on Europe and the world. In my opinion, this is how the anniversary of the victory of the anti-Nazi coalition over the Third Reich, the 40th anniversary of the return of the Western and Northern Territories to Poland and the 30th anniversary of the political and defense alliance of socialist nations--the Warsaw Pact, should be perceived. These dates and the events which they represent prompt not only toward historical reflections.

[Answer] Yes. That is true. The need to return to the source, to our roots does exist and particularly, today. The reasons for this are many. Attempts are being made at undermining the outcome of World War II and, therefore, among other things the permanence of Poland's western border. Efforts are being exerted to tear apart the Polish-Soviet alliance or at least to significantly weaken it by giving it dimensions determined solely by geopolitical factors. Finally, attempts are being made at undermining the principles of our form of government. For example, it is being said that socialism has not proven itself in Poland; after all, our many great past accomplishments are being questioned in this case. All of this gives rise to the necessity and even the obligation of reaching out toward the source of our security and of our peaceful growth. This also gives rise to the constant need for concern over making sure that the Polish national interest is strongly instilled in the social awareness and that it be constantly implemented and strengthened through political practice.

[Question] National interest is made up of, among other things, the conscious choice of a direction of development and also of a system of political-military alliances which protect this development. At the same time, this is never an incidental choice.

[Answer] Of course! In forming the national interests, every form of authority and every political power takes into consideration all the "pros" and "cons" and on this basis adopts the kind of optimal solution which

secures a given nation's most vital interests. Herein also lies the historical contribution of the Polish Left, which turned out to be the only force capable of outlining a realistic vision of creating a new Poland--People's Poland, at a time when pre-war Poland had been toppled by the Nazi Third Reich since our security system at that time failed. This was a vision of a nation spread out over ethnically Polish soil, possessing an infallible system of political and military alliance and implementing the concept of social justice. This is how the national interest of People's Poland was created. The 40-year period of peace, the unthreatened borders of which each is a border of peace and friendship with our neighbors and the ability to decide all Polish matters by Poles in an independent and sovereign manner--these are facts which confirm unequivocally--as evidenced by life itself--the validity of the road which we have chosen.

[Question] The foundation of the Polish national interest is the alliance with the Soviet Union...

[Answer] Let us say outright that the Polish national interest is based on a comprehensive alliance with the Soviet Union. I would strongly like to emphasize the word "comprehensive". After all, it is not a question here of so-called geopolitics. Such a comprehension of our ties with the USSR is either a misconception or rather simply the hostile work of our political adversaries. The Polish national interest created by the Polish Left always had an international and class character. Moreover, it was always based on these values. In turn, this means that the sphere of our ideological identity extends beyond economic, military, political, cultural and every other form of cooperation and this also constitutes the essence of relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

[Question] That which you are saying has its very perceptible application in reality. We are cooperating with the USSR in every domain--something which has tremendous significance for our comprehensive development.

[Answer] I would like to remark on the significance of this cooperation with a substantial, in my opinion, statement with regard to our future. Thus, the future is in technology, electronics, in the computerization of production, etc. These are the determinants of the approaching 21st century. We must have the awareness that our place in Europe and in the world will depend on whether we will be able to catch the train which is speeding very rapidly toward modernity. Will we be capable of stepping into the next century together with developed countries?

Let us admit to ourselves frankly that we cannot accomplish this by ourselves; make up for delays. We need modern technology, raw and other materials. We can obtain all this only through the cooperation which is being developed within the framework of CEMA and particularly with the Soviet Union. This is yet another argument for the fact that the national interest formulated by Polish communists was and is the only one that is valid. Through friendly, allied relations with the Soviet Union and by strengthening cooperation with countries of the socialist camp, we shall find the solution to our problems and the securing of our most vital needs.

[Question] In recent years, the Polish national interest was placed in jeopardy. Thereby, our fundamental interests were threatened. It suffices to mention if only the numerous anti-Soviet incidents which took place during that period. It was also during this period that the forces which always strove toward the revision of postwar European borders became particularly active in the FRG. The progressive destabilization in Poland whetted the appetites of revisionists. Besides, the leading representatives of the opposition also participated in this anti-Polish activity by cooperating with union head offices in the West belonging to the extreme Rights, with antisocialist political forces and finally, with the secret service of the capitalist world.

[Answer] Indeed. However, I perceive this issue in a twofold manner. Thus, the opposition forces strove consciously toward economic chaos and toward antagonizing public mood. There was a great deal of anti-Sovietism in this and the undermining of our alliance, and the role and place of the PZPR in our country. This gives rise to the following question: Were these gentlemen, who took this type of activity upon themselves, not aware that they were threatening the foundation of our state and national existence? The opposition wanted to come to power over the dead body of the Polish economy and through the constant weakening of the state, the authorities and by agitating the public.

On the other hand, the aims of the opposition are naturally convergent with the policies of developed countries in the West toward socialist countries. The so-called game with "Polish cards" was based on using the opposition forces against socialism. That is why, the West was not interested in having Solidarity work for strengthening the Polish economy, for national accord and for coming out of the crisis. The West wanted to see provocation, strikes and weakening of the party and of the bonds between Poland and the Soviet Union. And unfortunately, the leaders of Solidarity went along with these demands which were supported by appropriate dollar donations and by promises of new ones if such or another antigovernment action would be carried out successfully. It came to the point that in the name of their own ambitions, they began to compete in maligning their own country and harming the Polish national interest,

[Question] This cooperation between the opposition and antisocialist, anti-Polish centers in the West is continuing.

[Answer] Owing to the introduction of martial law, the situation in our country was placed under control. Since that time, we have been making up the losses and successfully rebuilding the Polish national interest. Of course, this is not to the liking of anti-Polish centers in the West--those policies and governments which sought out the chance for destabilization within the alliance of socialist states through Poland which was economically weakened and torn apart by unrest.

Attempts are still being made at carrying out this policy based on these positions. Western politicians who come to our country meant, for example, to conduct parallel discussions with both the government and with the

representatives of the opposition, coercing us in this way to recognize the representative character of these people. Contacts between the representatives of various Western centers and the leadership of the so-called Solidarity Bureau in Brussels are well-known. The outlay for propaganda diversionist activity has been increased. To this, we should add incidents which are unequivocal in their character and political provocations inspired by the U.S. administration in order to hamper the process of the normalization of relations with Poland. A downright curious antic is the fact that American diplomats participated together with the underground forces in street brawls on May Day.

[Question] We are, as you have said, rebuilding our national interest. Owing to this, we are overcoming economic difficulties and regaining the trust of our allies and our rightful place both among the socialist countries of our camp and in Europe. In your opinion, what should we do in order to accelerate and intensify this process of the comprehensive regaining of strength?

[Answer] The crux of the matter lies in that the Polish national interest be strengthened by the widest public spheres. The situation looks as if a decided majority of the Polish public understands our governmental principles and identifies with the Polish national interest. At the same time, however, in practice not everyone is working for the constant strengthening of the national interest.

It has been generally taken for granted that the implementation of the national interest and, therefore, concern for the constant protection of our fundamental interests belongs to the authorities. Meanwhile, this is not the case. This matter concerns everyone of us. If we allow political and economic anarchy to take place, then this will be felt by every family. If we weaken our alliance, our adversary will immediately take advantage of this and we will feel it. This is how it looks and we must be aware of it.

[Question] The securing of the Polish national interest is at the same time, activity on behalf of socialist renewal.

[Answer] These are not only convergent but also mutually determining matters. It is owing to the Polish national interest that we can put our house in order ourselves; that we can create mechanisms that will enable to eliminate forever the possibility of the return of socialist deviations. The more earnestly that we strive to secure our national interest, the greater our changes for the implementation of the program of socialist renewal.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the discussion.

9853/12951
CSO: 2600/84

ARMY FIRES ON PEASANTS ATTACKING GRAIN SILOS

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 8/9 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Dusan Polic]

[Text] Belgrade -- Reports confirming the gravity of the situation in neighboring Romania continue to flood into Belgrade in increasing numbers, as Romanian refugees continue to slip across the border illegally, also in increasing numbers. Last month, this was one of the most ominous and earliest signs of the deteriorating situation there. Both these immigrants and the Yugoslav tourists who enjoy visiting the Romanian towns along their border report that the situation has become increasingly tense in the wake of a series of incidents in that country's farming towns, where peasants, angered at the food shortage, have reportedly taken to attacking grain silos.

On several occasions, there has been armed conflict between peasants and detachments of troops assigned to guard the silos. According to these reports, there have been fatalities on both sides. In the Romanian capital itself, there were reports of incidents involving protests and bloodshed, to which the government has responded by "blanketing" Bucharest with troops in battle-fatigues accompanied by attack dogs. The food situation is steadily deteriorating as a consequence of the "scientific nutrition" policy imposed by the Romanian president some months ago as a means for coping with the very grave economic crisis that is tragically reflected in the food situation.

As tension mounts steadily, a battle has been joined within the ranks of Ceausescu's "presidential family" over the succession. It is widely known that the president's health is precarious. The seriousness of his illness is clearly visible, even in official photographs.

According to insiders familiar with relations among the "courtiers" around Ceausescu, the prime contender for the role is the president's consort, Jelena Ceausescu, who already plays a stellar role. It would seem, though, that a considerable majority

within the party's higher echelons is opposed to Mrs Ceausescu's ambitions, citing the general situation in Romania , where the very name of Ceausescu is increasingly the target for criticism and denunciation.

All these factors, which, of course, have seriously threatened the regime, reportedly drove Ceausescu to pay court to Moscow in order to get assurances of Russian support, but nobody seems to know whether or not he got any such assurances.

Concern in Belgrade and Bucharest

Observers generally believe, though, that any possible worsening of the situation could create considerable difficulties for Romania's closest neighbors, beginning with Yugoslavia and Hungary. The Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania has long been in ferment, protesting and demonstrating against the discrimination that is the constant lot of foreign-born citizens of that country.

The situation in Romania, as confirmed by very well-informed sources, is "extremely serious" and "very touchy indeed," given the "critical straits through which Romania is passing today." This is why the Yugoslav government's announcement that the Romanian president would come to Yugoslavia for a brief (2-day) visit less than a month after the talks Yugoslavia's Prime Minister Milka Planinc had with Ceausescu in Bucharest, initially evoked surprise, which was swiftly supplanted by understanding.

Belgrade has for some time had fairly good relations with Bucharest. Long-standing sympathies, based on a foreign policy adopted by both countries and sharing many common features, date back to the days of Marshal Tito, and have steadily drawn closer over the years since his death. Accordingly, it is altogether natural for Ceausescu, casting about for support for his regime, to turn first of all to Yugoslavia, which is itself keenly interested in getting the Romanian situation peacefully back in order, without dangerous counter-shocks.

Ceausescu will arrive in Yugoslavia on 12 December, and will leave the following day. It is not known whether he will go to Belgrade or whether his meeting with Yugoslavia's top leaders, especially Party President Vidoje Zarkovic, will take place somewhere close to the border, which would seem to be more practical.

Yet another visit, that of Hungary's Prime Minister Gyourgy Lazar, which is scheduled only 24 hours before Ceausescu's, takes on particular significance in this situation. Hungary's concern over the state of affairs in Romania is not one whit less acute than Yugoslavia's. It may be that Gyourgy Lazar's visit had been scheduled before this deterioration in the Romanian situation, but there can be little doubt that the situation and its potential

impact on the entire region will be subject to scrutiny during the Yugoslav-Hungarian talks.

Once the talks with Lazar and then with Ceausescu are over, another important personage will be arriving in the Yugoslav capital: United States Secretary of State George Shultz.

6182

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AMENDED DECREE ON ISSUANCE OF PASSPORTS PUBLISHED

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 75, 25 Dec 85 pp 1-4

[Republication of Council of State Decree No 150/1970 on the Issuance of Passports]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

SECTION I

General Provisions

Article 1

A passport is a document issued by an authorized government organ and entitling Romanian citizens to cross the borders of Romania to travel or reside in foreign countries.

A passport provides proof of the identity of its holder.

Holders of valid passports in foreign countries have the right to protection by the diplomatic missions and consular officers of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Republication on the basis of Article II, of Decree No 381 of 5 December 1985, published in BULETINUL OFICIAL, Part I, No 66 of 7 December 1985.

Decree No 156/1970 was published in BULETINUL OFICIAL, Part I, No 32 of 12 April 1970.

Documents issued by authorized Romanian organs which give the right to cross Romanian borders are: diplomatic passports, official passports, ordinary passports, passports for Romanian citizens residing abroad, travel certificates, and passports for non-citizens.

The categories of persons that may receive the various types of passports named in the preceding paragraph will be stipulated by decision of the Council of Ministers.

Passports shall be individual or collective.

Romanian citizens can cross Romanian borders on the basis of other documents issued for this purpose by authorized organs of the Romanian Government in keeping with international agreements participated in by Romania.

Article 2

Passports and documents issued by authorized organs of another government give the right to cross Romanian borders if they are recognized and accepted by the Romanian Government.

Article 3

Within the meaning of this decree the documents provided for in the last paragraph of Article 1 and in Article 2 take the place of passports.

Article 4

A passport gives the right to cross Romanian borders at border crossing points opened for this purpose as well as at other points determined on the basis of international agreements participated in by Romania.

Article 5

Passports for Romanian citizens residing abroad give their holders the right to come to Romania temporarily or permanently when such passports are valid.

Article 6

The provisions of this decree shall be applicable to persons without citizenship living in Romania to whom passports for non-citizens have been issued on request.

Article 7

The government organs having authority in passport and visa matters are the Commission on Passport and Visa Problems under the Council of Ministers and organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 8

The Commission on Passport and Visa Problems under the Council of Ministers is responsible for all the activity of issuing passports and granting visas, having the following powers and duties:

- a. Coordinates, controls, and guides the activities of the organs having powers and duties in this field.

- b. Settles appeals of the decisions of other organs empowered to issue passports and grant visas.
- c. Settles requests by Romanian citizens to reside abroad.
- d. Prepares material for the resolution of requests of foreigners to reside in Romania and requests for the authorization of repatriation.
- e. Exercises all other powers provided for by law.

Article 9

The Commission on Passport and Visa Problems under the Council of Ministers shall consist of a chairman, vice chairmen, and members. One of the members of the commission shall serve as secretary. The membership of the commission will be decided by decision of the Council of Ministers.

Article 10

The powers and duties of the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs respecting passports and visas shall be determined by decision of the Council of Ministers.

SECTION II

Issuing and Holding Passports

Article 11

Passports shall be issued to persons who have reached the age of 14 as well as persons under this age when they are traveling unaccompanied.

Children under 14, who are traveling accompanied, are included in the passport of the person accompanying them.

Article 12

Issuance of a passport may be denied or a passport already issued may be recalled or voided for a Romanian citizen:

- a. Against whom criminal proceedings have been initiated or who has been brought to trial.
- b. Who is indebted to a socialist organization or to an individual and who attempts to avoid payment of debts by going abroad.
- c. Who on going abroad could adversely affect or endanger the interests of the Romanian state or its good relations with other states.

Organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are obliged to take the necessary measures to determine whether persons who have applied for or received a passport fit into any of the situations specified in the present article.

Article 13

The ministries and other central organs that send representatives abroad for official purposes shall address passport applications to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Directorate for Passports, Registration of Foreigners and Control of Border Crossing.

Socialist organizations and all other organizations that send representatives abroad will address passport applications to the same directorate as in the preceding paragraph by way of the central organ whose authority they are under or which coordinates their activities.

The head of the central organ that submits the application shall be responsible for employees' fulfillment of the conditions provided for by law dealing with travel abroad and for the usefulness of such travel.

Article 14

Individuals who wish to travel abroad for private reasons shall submit passport and visa applications to their County Police Inspectorate or to the Bucharest Municipality Police Inspectorate as the case may be.

Those persons stipulated in the preceding paragraph who travel abroad on organized tours shall submit their applications through authorized units of the Ministry of Tourism, through the bureau for youth of the Union of Communist Youth.

Article 15

Applications for travel abroad for private reasons will be granted within the limits of the provisions for foreign exchange funds allocated for this purpose in the annual state plan and in keeping with the criteria and order of preferences laid down by decision of the Council of Ministers.

Article 16

Romanian citizens who are employees or members of a socialist organization and who request approval for travel abroad for private reasons shall submit their applications for passport and visas accompanied by the approval of the head of the organization to which they belong. The head of the socialist organization is responsible for the approval given.

Article 17

Romanian citizens who seek to establish residence abroad and foreigners residing in the Socialist Republic of Romania who wish to travel abroad shall submit their applications for Romanian passports and visas to the police inspectorate of the county in which they reside or, if they reside in Bucharest, to the Bucharest Municipality Police Inspectorate.

Persons stipulated in the preceding paragraph who seek to establish residence abroad are obliged before leaving Romania to settle all their debts and claims that they may have against the Romanian state or any socialist organizations in Romania; together with their application they shall submit documents issued by the responsible organ showing they no longer have any obligations to the state and an authenticated declaration wherein it states that all debts and claims against the Romanian state and against Romanian socialist organizations have been liquidated.

Article 18

Settlement of passport applications provided for in Article 13 will be carried out in 30 days and of those provided for in Article 14 within 60 days from the date of submission of the applications.

Article 19

Romanian citizens living or residing abroad shall address their applications for a passport or for a visa to enter Romania for the purpose of staying to the diplomatic missions or consular offices of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Article 20

On returning to Romania passports shall be delivered within 48 hours to the organs that issued them to the holder.

Article 21

Loss of a passport must be reported, as soon as its holder becomes aware of the fact, to the nearest police station in Romania or to the diplomatic missions or consular offices of the Socialist Republic of Romania, when abroad.

Article 22

Passports are kept by organs of the Ministry of the Interior, except for diplomatic passports, official passports, and the ordinary passports used by travelers in the performance of their duties which are kept by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

SECTION III

Validity of Passports

Article 23

Diplomatic passports, official passports, and ordinary passports are issued for a period of 5 years; they can be extended for an additional period not to exceed a total of 10 years from the date of issue. Documents issued for crossing the border by responsible Romanian Government organs on the basis of

international agreements participated in by Romania shall be valid for the same periods unless such agencies decide otherwise.

Passports for Romanian citizens living abroad shall be issued for a period of 1 to 2 years; they can subsequently be extended successively for an additional 1 to 2-year period without going beyond 10 years from the date of issue.

Those who possess passports for Romanian citizens living abroad are obliged to present themselves to the diplomatic mission or consular office of the Socialist Republic of Romania in the country in which they live and to register with such office, requesting a visa each year and, on expiration of the validity of the passport, applying for an extension of its validity. Those living in states where no Romanian diplomatic mission or consular office exists shall apply to the Romanian diplomatic mission or consular office in the nearest country for this purpose.

A passport for non-citizens will be issued for a period of 6 months and can be extended until such a person takes the trip such a passport entitles him to take.

Article 24

The travel certificate is issued for a period of 6 months and can be extended for an additional 12 months by the issuing organs. Passports and documents issued by responsible organs of another state and recognized as valid and accepted by the Romanian state entitle the bearer to cross the Romanian border if, in keeping with international practice, in addition to fulfilling all the other conditions for validity, the document has been stamped and signed by the agency that issued it and a stamp or dry seal or impressed stamp has been applied to the photograph of the passport bearer.

In cases in which group border-crossing documents are issued by foreign governments and are not provided with the photographs of the persons included in these documents, those involved must possess personal identity cards carrying a photograph with the exception of minors who do not have the right to carry an identity card according to the laws of the state to which they belong.

SECTION IV

Romanian Visas

Article 25

Passports must be provided with a Romanian visa in order to cross the borders of the Romanian state.

Passports issued by the authorized organs of another state and documents issued on the basis of international agreements participated in by Romania are absolved from the necessity of carrying a Romanian visa in conformity with such agreements.

Article 26

A Romanian visa is granted for a single trip or for a number of trips for a definite period of time.

It will be determined by decision of the Council of Ministers which categories of persons on going abroad on official business can obtain visas for a number of trips for a definite period.

A Romanian visa may be a diplomatic visa, an official visa, an ordinary visa or a tourist visa, depending on the nature of the border crossing and the purpose of the trip.

A transit visa gives the right to transit the territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania and is valid for 72 hours from the time of crossing the Romanian border.

Article 27

The validity of a Romanian visa cannot exceed 6 months from the date on which it is granted, excepting certain categories of persons sent on missions abroad to be determined by decision of the Council of Ministers and in those cases wherein international agreements participated in by Romania specify otherwise.

Article 28

Tourist visas shall be granted to foreigners belonging to states with which the Socialist Republic of Romania has not concluded any bilateral agreement on the abolishing of visas and to Romanian citizens living abroad who wish to visit Romania as tourists. Such a visa shall be granted, on request, by diplomatic missions and consular offices of the Socialist Republic of Romania and by border control points for crossing state borders.

A tourist visa gives the right to stay in the Socialist Republic of Romania for up to 60 days and can be extended, at request, up to 120 days.

SECTION V

Violations of Passport Regulations

Article 29

The following constitute violations of passport regulations:

- a. Loss, deterioration or destruction of a passport issued by Romanian authorities.
- b. Failure by the bearer to report the loss, theft or destruction of a passport within 48 hours of discovery of such loss to the nearest police station in Romania or to the diplomatic mission or consular office of the Socialist Republic of Romania abroad.

- c. Failure to turn over one's passport within 48 hours after returning to Romania to the agency that issued it to the bearer.
- d. Failure to return the passport to the agency that issued it to the bearer within 48 hours of the expiration of the visa when the bearer has not carried out his trip.
- e. Allowing a person not authorized by law to keep the bearer's passport for him.
- f. To give or accept for retention, excepting cases expressly provided for by law, or to give or accept against some guarantee or to abandon or throw away one's passport.
- g. To make any changes, additions or written or printed notes in one's passport, excepting such notes as are expressly provided for by law and to allow changes, additions or notes to be made in one's passport, when such an act has not been committed under such conditions as to constitute a violation of the law.
- h. Violation by heads of socialist organizations of the obligations provided for in Article 13, third paragraph and in Article 16.

The violations in paragraph 1 above shall be punishable as follows:

- a. Under point a, by a fine of 200 to 500 lei.
- b. Under points b through h, by a fine of 300 to 1,000 lei.

Violations shall be established by personnel having powers and duties in connection with implementation of passport regulations. The fine shall be assessed by the agent making the finding.

An appeal can be made within 15 days of the communication of an official statement to the effect that a violation has been committed. The appeal shall be decided on by the head of the agency to which the agent belongs or by an employee of the agency who is superior in rank to the agent making the finding and who has been given power by the head of said agency to represent him.

The violations provided for in paragraph 1 will be subject to application of the provisions of Law No 32/1968 on the setting of fines and the assessment of fines for violations except as otherwise provided in this article.

SECTION VI

Concluding Provisions

Article 30

Romanian passports and documents issued by the responsible organs of another state, recognized as valid and accepted by the Romanian state give the right

to their holders to cross the state borders of the Socialist Republic of Romania with sports or hunting firearms and with suitable ammunition only when such have been written into the documents for crossing the state border by the organ that issued the passport or granted the Romanian visa or by the border control station as the case may be.

Article 31

Foreigners who lose their documents for crossing the Romanian borders while in Romania shall apply to the diplomatic mission or consular office of the state to which they belong to obtain a new document. This document gives the right to cross the Romanian border after a Romanian visa has been applied to it.

Article 32

Orders, instructions and any other such legal provisions on the issuance of passports will be given by the responsible organs with the approval of the Ministry of the Interior.

Article 33

Decree No 973/1968 on the issuance of passports and all other provisions contrary to the contents of this decree, are hereby repealed.

/9365

CSO: 2700/66

JAKES VISITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 19 Nov 85 p 2

[Text] Member of the CPCZ Politburo and Central Committee Secretary Milos Jakes, accompanied by the chairman of the Czechoslovak Commission for Nuclear Energy, Stanislav Havel, visited last Monday one of the largest centrally-managed organizations of the Czechoslovak research and development system, the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez near Prague.

He became acquainted with the work of this collective numbering more than 1000, aimed primarily at applied research in nuclear energy. He was especially interested in the results of CSSR-Soviet cooperation in the safety of nuclear energy equipment, in the acquisition of new findings on the physical parameters of the active zone of reactors VVER, in materials used for the manufacture of reactor pressure containers, and in the resolution of problems in the anticipated fast neutron reactors.

Milos Jakes also inspected some of the work sites, for example, the laboratories handling the production of "radiofarmak" the sites of an experimental research reactor, the "hot" chambers, and the metallurgical line for the processing and evaluation of the so-called testimonial samples of materials from operating nuclear power plants.

In conversation with the Institute's managers and party officials, Milos Jakes emphasized the need for better practical application of the higher forms of international S&T cooperation, notably on a contractual basis. He also noted that, due to the increasing importance of nuclear energy, there will be mounting pressure to accelerate research in this sphere. Consequently, it is necessary to focus all creative forces on the resolution of these tasks which create conditions for the implementation of appropriate structural changes in our national economy.

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CSO: 2400/71

CONFERENCE ON PROSPECTS OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY

Budapest OTLET in Hungarian No 47, 21 Nov p 4

[Article by Peter Szakonyi: "Computer Technology in Future Tense"]

[Text] Only a few days after the debate of the State Planning Commission, the Hungarian experts of information and computer technology--the manufacturers, sellers and users--set down for a roundtable discussion. The reason for the conference and the self-examination was that in the near future the central Electronization Development Program, one of the most important central development activities of the 7th Five Year Plan will be submitted to the Council of Ministers.

Two years ago in May 1983, several hundred guests heard for the first time the decision of the government to initiate preparation of a wide-ranging social and economic program which would have as its main concern the development and the application of computer technology and the coordination of the diverse goals and plans of this field. The time that has elapsed since then has confirmed the correctness of the notion that only within such a coordinated system, and with the concentration of resources can our triple goal be realized, namely that:

1. our lag behind the general level of information technology not increase further;
2. in some areas we reduce our lag;
3. the development of computer technology influence favorably the life and standard of living of our whole society.

These were the thoughts of Mrs, Dr Ferenc Nyitrai, State Secretary and Director of the Central Statistical Bureau, as she opened the one-day meeting of computer technology application groups on 11 November. She then added: "Even with extreme optimism we cannot expect large-scale purchases of hardware in the next five years, and we must reach our goals on the basis of currently available technology, with medium and small machines."

Nine minilectures tried to answer the questions regarding the possibilities presented by the development of information technology and the means by which some goals might be reached.

"The trouble is that the system is too good," stated Istvan Martos, the chief director of the Medicor Company. He said this because in his plant the MAS-M microcomputer-based system, developed for the preparation and support of the decision process, is already working successfully. Using it the directors can access not only the consequences of a decision but in minutes can choose between the possibilities. What then is the problem? That little money is available for machine purchases, and that because of the unusability of the postal communication lines even in the capital teleprocessing of data is almost impossible. The interest and enthusiasm generated among the workers is therefore as yet unexploited.

Gyorgy Paris, the director of the Science Management and Informatics Institute also spoke of intellectual assets that are or aren't utilized, even though his organization has done work that is significant even by international standards. The integration of computer technology into the educational activities of schools has, however, revealed dimensions that are far beyond the lower and intermediate levels of education.

Automated technical design will be the next stage of development and this will change radically the educational system of universities and other technical institutes. In some Hungarian companies such as the Hungarian Ship and Crane Factory there is experimentation with the adoption of automated technical design. According to experts, this technology will revolutionize the work of the engineer by doing away with its "slave labor" aspects and by providing opportunity and releasing energy for creative work.

The Comporgan Company has received a significant credit fund for the purchase of foreign technology, but because the procedure for obtaining the necessary permits took 3 years, the purchase was finally not made. Karoly Pogany, its director, mentioned the less than humorous event before he started to analyze the problems and worries of software commerce. Hungarian software development has been present on the international scene for a decade and a half, and our yearly exports are more than 4 million dollars. This export of brainpower is an essential part of keeping up, but there are numerous trends in this area to give one pause. Those larger companies engaged in significant export of intellectual assets cannot develop their machine inventory and technology from a part of their dollar earnings while the small enterprises that export can buy back every fourth dollar. These same small, flexible organizations have appeared as rivals on the international markets and have more than once caused a drop in the prices for the products of the larger companies.

Few know that our country was among the first in the world to develop and utilize some technical achievements in the computer field. It is enough to mention digital control alone among others--a technology that like several others could not be exploited and introduced in force at home. The reasons for the missed commercial profit are the loose links of the research and development chain and the poor cooperation between Hungarian companies, organizations, and research laboratories--said Tibor Vamos, the president of the Janos Neumann Computer Society. If we add the well-known sluggishness of Hungarian companies, the differences in interest, the lack of investment funds and the Western embargo policy, our lagging behind the computer technology of the most developed nations becomes understandable.

"The best prescription is a correct assessment of goals," said Mihaly Sandory, the director of the Microelectronic Company; and his words were supported by the results achieved by his organization. They have developed a plan which will be valid 4-5 years from now. Whatever they could buy abroad was bought there, the rest developed in Hungary. They spent a quarter of their investment of 200 million forints--which is modest by international standards--on research and development, three-fourths on hardware and software purchases. They could show an income of 200 million forints, equal to the company's expenses during the 6th 5-Year Plan, distributed almost exactly like the company's outlays. In his opinion, computer technology must be accompanied by carefully designed production conditions.

Understandably, the report of Ferenc Valter, the technical director of the Hungarian Postal Service, was awaited with great anticipation. Data teleprocessing and access to international data banks are equally obstructed by the underdeveloped state of the postal communication system. The technical director, in the crossfire of the users, could recount significant achievements but could not give much encouragement to those present. Although this year the data bases of 20 countries can be reached from Hungary, this is only for a few users. The companies and institutions waiting for batch connections number more than 600, and even with the expansion in 1986 only 400 requests can be honored. The situation is the same with line-connected data stations; alongside the 1500 stations in operation, there are 1800 on the waiting list.

In the 7th 5-Year Plan the complex postal data transfer operations will develop vigorously. Simple data-transfer apparatus will be acquired from local manufacturers, and the switching stations from abroad.

Lajos Faluvegi, deputy president of the Council of Ministers, pointed out in his concluding remarks to the conference that intentionally greater emphasis will be given to the tasks of expanding and applying computer technology in the program which has been approved by the State Planning Commission and which will be submitted to the Council of Ministers. He also indicated that the social environment, public organizations and scientific bodies play a decisive role in the success of the program. Besides exploiting internal resources, one must rely increasingly on the advantages derived from international cooperation and the scientific and technical interchanges between KGST countries.

Five Years in Numbers

As a result of a 6-billion-forint development program, the number of computers in Hungary has increased ten-fold and has reached 5000 by 1985. Eighty percent of companies have their own computer while 20 percent rent or have data processed by service organizations.

The companies that have computers use their computing capacity for the following purposes:

- 70 percent for materials and stock inventory control
- 41 percent for sales information processing

44 percent for personnel and work-related tasks
40 percent for budget calculations
60 percent for accounting.

During the 6th 5-Year Plan the supply problems for the ESZR machines have been solved, as has the import of computer peripherals from the socialist countries. With the wide-spread appearance of microcomputers the computer-based direction of production was also begun.

According to preliminary calculations, in the 7th 5-Year Plan the companies will expand their computer capacity by a 10 million forint increment. A part of this will be used to replace outdated technical tools, the larger portion, however, will be used to acquire new machines and software.

(Excerpt from the speech by Laszlo Rieb, chief section head of the Ministry of Industry).

12846

CSO: 2500/129

PROGRAM FOR PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS, PLANT PROTECTIVE AGENTS

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Dec 85 p 3

[Text] The manufacture of pharmaceuticals, plant protecting agents and chemical intermediates necessary for the production of the former is among the most successful branches of industry in Hungary. In this area we have significant traditions, have accumulated great intellectual reserves, and the technical level of the branch is in line with its status as one of the rapidly growing, leading branches of industry. Based on this, in 1980 the government has approved the central development program for pharmaceuticals, plant protecting agents and chemical intermediates which authorizes the development of these manufacturing branches at a faster rate than the average for all industry, and orients them more towards exporting. Although the changed conditions of the world economy and the changes in external and internal economic conditions have modified the original purposes somewhat, the program can be said to be successful: the production and export of pharmaceuticals, plant protecting agents and chemical intermediates has increased in significantly greater measure than for industry in general. The weight of these three manufacturing branches within the chemical industry has increased, and they represent an ever growing part of those exports which earn foreign exchange in convertible currency.

The projections of the program for the next five years were approved by the Council of Ministers at its most recent meeting. They indicate a need for a significant increase in the production and the export of pharmaceuticals, plant protecting agents and chemical intermediates.

The three manufacturing branches had a gross production value of some 45 billion forints in 1985. According to the program, the figure will be 1.64 times larger by 1990, based on current prices. The value of the exports in 1985 was 184 million dollars and 530 million rubels. According to the program the value of the non-rubel exports will be increased by a factor of 1.9, that of the rubel-account exports by a factor of 1.4. Sales in Hungary are also expected to increase greatly.

These projections are possible if the structure of production is modernized and the proportion of easily marketed original preparations among pharmaceuticals and plant protecting agents increases. The conditions in the pharmaceutical industry are particularly favorable. The program projects that

in the output of the pharmaceutical industry the proportion of original preparations will rise from the current 15 percent to 18 percent, and that more such drugs will be shipped abroad by the manufacturers. The proportion of packaged pharmaceuticals in the export, which in the past few years--chiefly due to market forces--has declined to 12 percent, should reach 20 percent by 1990.

To turn all of these projections into reality, an investment of 25 billion forints is necessary. With this sum the manufacture of drugs will be modernized and the production of new materials for pharmaceuticals and plant protective agents can be started. Significant sums will also be devoted to the protection of the environment. It is noteworthy that the central nature of the program does not signify a contribution by the state to the development--as in previous years, the investments will be from credits or from the companies' own development funds. At the same time the tax concession for production will remain, increasing the investment capabilities of the companies.

One of the key questions of the program is the improvement of the standards of research and development. The program projects a budget of 16 billion forints for research and development until 1990. The major part of this will be financed by the companies, the rest will come from the budget of national research and development programs.

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