

SOVIET MILITARY-THEORETICIAN

A. A. KOKOSHIN



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INTRODUCTION

In August 1991 a coup attempt in Moscow, directed by elements of the Communist Party, Committee for State Security (KGB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the Armed Forces, failed in its bid to reestablish tight central control over Soviet economic and security mechanisms. The Armed Forces' participation in the coup severely tarnished the prestige of the old forces' High Command. The key roles played by many senior commanders including Minister of Defense Marshal D. T. Yazov and Chief of the General Staff Army General M. A. Moiseyev in the coup's preparation and execution (with the military already under fire for overspending, secretiveness, and misallocating resources) has caused post-coup Soviet authorities to reexamine mechanisms for control over the military.

Civilian control of the military has now become a realistic alternative. Military officers themselves have suggested that civilian control is desired, if not necessary. The newly appointed Minister of Defense, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, has already offered to resign from the military and become a transitional civilian minister of defense. The Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army V. Lobov, has called for "the civilianization of the USSR and republican defense ministries,"¹ while Colonel V. N. Danilov, deputy spokesman for the information section of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, called for both a civilian office and civilian Minister of Defense at a recent conference at Harvard.²

It appears that, with the consensus of the military, an appointment of a civilian to an important Ministry of Defense position is now only a matter of time. Speculation now shifts to whom it might be. The probable short term heir apparent will be Shaposhnikov in civilian clothes. However, waiting in the wings are many well-qualified civilian candidates. One of the most highly competent and well-connected civilians is Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin, deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN). Indeed, in the past many conservatives openly stated that their worst nightmare would be the appointment of Kokoshin as Minister of Defense and Lobov as Chief of the General Staff. So far, half of that "nightmare" has come to pass.

"WHY KOKOSHIN?": A LOOK AT HIS BACKGROUND AND CREDENTIALS

Andrei Kokoshin is a civilian analyst at ISKAN and is one of the most respected military analysts in the USSR and abroad. He traces his interest in military affairs chiefly to his childhood. Kokoshin's father, grandfather, and uncle were all military men, and they often gave him military books to read. By age six he had read a book on Alexander Suvorov, who many identify as the greatest Russian commander of all time (Suvorov was known for his tactical

innovations and ability to inspire the Russian peasant soldier to fight, and, as a soldier, he combined the pen and the sword in his famous "The Art of Victory"); and soon thereafter he read a book on Marshal Kutusov, the formidable foe of Napoleon in the War of 1812. By age 15 he had read Boris M. Shaposhnikov's Brain of the Army, concerning the role of the General Staff in planning for and directing war; and the following year he read Soviet Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's Military Strategy. Unknown to Kokoshin, one of the leading authors of Military Strategy, then Colonel V. V. Larionov, would later serve as his doctoral thesis advisor and become his collaborator on several major works on military doctrine and strategy in the late 1980s.

Kokoshin's childhood reading was not limited to just army commanders. His two heroes were, in fact, naval officers, Admiral Feodor Fedorovich Ushakov (1745-1817) and Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov (1802-1855). Ushakov began his career with the Baltic Fleet and commanded and fought against the Turks throughout the latter half of the 16th century. His most famous campaign was the Mediterranean operation of 1798-1800 when he blockaded and took by storm the fortress at Corfu. Working in a difficult political environment, he proved to be a sailor-diplomat and greatly improved the world standing of the Russian Navy. As a commander, Ushakov was particularly adept at using land and sea forces together as demonstrated during the liberation of Italy from France (where he was commended for his cooperation with Suvorov), and in the Ionian Islands Campaign.

In his early career Nakimov was noted as a prolific voyager, explorer, and battle participant. He was a fine sailing officer and tactician. During the Crimean War he commanded a squadron of the Black Sea Fleet which annihilated the Turks at Sinop (where the first large scale employment of shell firing guns was introduced), a battle heralding the end of the age of sail. During the allied intervention in the Crimean War Nakimov oversaw the scuttling of his own squadron to block Sevastopol harbor, deployed crews to land defenses, and played a heroic and leading role in the defense of the port until his death in 1855. He has been honored by both the Czarist and Soviet navies. Ushakov and Nakimov's tactical battles and their diplomatic work in a difficult political environment motivated Kokoshin profoundly to consider the connection of politics and military affairs even at an early age.

By the time Kokoshin had reached his 20s, his favorite historian was Hans Delbrueck (1848-1920), who has been described as a military historian, an interpreter of military affairs to the German people, and a civilian critic of the general staff.³ Delbrueck was noted for his ability to write about military affairs for the public at large, filling the gap between military professional and civilian understanding. He believed that educated laymen had a responsibility to comment on military issues because of their importance to the modern state. His scholarship enabled

the German public to "comprehend the underlying strategic problems that confronted the general staff", thereby stimulating "a reappraisal of the type of strategical thinking that had ruled the German army since the days of Moltke."⁴ Delbrueck's most important work, History of the Art of War, was a major contribution to military history. For the first time the scientific method was applied to classical sources.⁵ Finally, Delbrueck was noted as an astute critic of military institutions who argued that "the conduct of war and the planning of strategy must be conditioned by the aims of state policy and that once strategical thinking becomes inflexible and self-sufficient even the most brilliant tactical successes may lead to political disaster."⁶ Delbrueck found alternative models of strategy and military art in the styles of Frederick II and Napoleon and recognized the viability of limited means and ends in warfare as a break on the trend towards "absolute" war. Much of Delbrueck's influence can be seen in the writings of Kokoshin today.

Besides Delbrueck, one of the people hailed as a great "teacher" by Kokoshin, just before his career took off in the mid-1980s, was Colonel General (Retired) Nikolai Andreevich Lomov. Lomov was a former military analyst at the USA Institute who introduced Kokoshin to the work of Alexander Svechin, about which Kokoshin has written on several occasions during the past two years.⁷ Lomov continued to cultivate Kokoshin's interest in military-political affairs through discussions on the General Staff, doctrine (especially its military-technical aspect), and forecasting during the early 1980s.

Kokoshin's love of history was supplemented by a strong background in the sciences. By the early 1960s, Kokoshin had begun to work for the construction bureau of the Yakovlev firm and, from 1963-1969, he attended the Moscow Higher Technical School, which he remembers as "an expression of great teamwork among social scientists, scientists, and mathematicians." Instead of Marxism-Leninism he concentrated on physics, mathematics, and systems design. He especially liked systems analysis, operations research, and cybernetics. Kokoshin credits the institute with providing him a first class education, and he looks back on his days in the school with fond memories. A banner from the institute still hangs in his office.

Upon graduation Kokoshin went to work for the Academy of Sciences to do post-graduate work, and not long thereafter for ISKAN. The strong background Kokoshin gained in systems analysis and mathematics greatly assisted his future research projects in forecasting and systems analysis as applied to the social science and modelling field. He soon became engulfed in the study of the factors affecting the stability of the international system and the arms control process, and he soon became and has remained a key consultant to Gorbachev on these issues.

Kokoshin's strong historical, military-theoretical, and scientific credentials should prove handy to the new government in the coming months. Exploiting Kokoshin's skills should be simple since, politically and militarily, he is well-connected with those making key decisions today, especially in the coup's aftermath. Before 1987 he wrote extensively with other colleagues at the USA Institute, the Academy of Sciences, and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. The stature and voice of these independent "think tanks" which grew under glasnost and perestroika is expected to expand in value as a source of information and guidance for the new government. In the past three years he has co-authored several articles and books with the prominent military theoretician Major General V. Larionov and with the new Chief of the General Staff, Army General V. Lobov.⁸ Larionov, a military theoretician noted for his writings on the offense and military strategy, served as Kokoshin's doctoral advisor on his dissertation on "Prognosis and Politics."

These ties link Kokoshin directly with new thinking and the new General Staff, an organization with which he has had close relations over the past few years. And, perhaps most important for his post-coup popularity, Kokoshin was in the Russian "White House" with Yeltsin defending the RSFSR building against the security forces of the coup planners during the crucial days of 19-21 August.⁹

KOKOSHIN'S WORK AT THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA

Andrei Kokoshin occupies room 21 at the USA and Canada Institute, a few doors away from Director Georgii Arbatov. At first glance through the brown-padded double doors, his office appears more like that of a college professor. A television set constantly tuned to CNN sits near the door. His bookshelves are filled, with many volumes in English. The normal piles of paper are scattered on his table, windowsills, and desk, the latter dominated by an antique ink well. Rugby banners hang on one of the bookcases (as well as two certificates won from rugby competition); and a "New Zealand World Cup" rugby ball sits on another, barbells lie on the floor, and a ball to squeeze to strengthen his wrists lies on his desk. He likes the idea of competition but is also a team-player. He also likes the strategic element of sports and its structured violence. His manner is informal, very much like a U.S. academic, and his language in either Russian or English is easy, well-tuned, and acute when it needs to be.

Staring down at Kokoshin from one of the bookcases is a photo of his favorite ship, the Slava, and a xeroxed photo of Alexander Svechin. The Svechin photo serves as a reminder that, behind the outward athletic interest and appearance (he looks like an American football interior lineman or linebacker), stands the intellectual who has authored several important documents over the past five years on Soviet forecasting, doctrine and security, arms control,

and military-political affairs. Kokoshin has authored twelve books on contemporary history, as well as numerous articles. On a personal note, Kokoshin is married and has two daughters.

Kokoshin's articles have appeared in a number of publications both at home and abroad.¹⁰ These include, but are not limited to, the Soviet publications International Affairs, World Economics and International Relations, New Times and USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, and the U.S. publications Mediterranean Quarterly and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He has also succeeded in publishing in journals where few Soviet civilian opinions are sought. In January 1989, for example, he published an article on surprise for Military Thought, the formerly restricted Soviet military's General Staff publication. This again demonstrates Kokoshin's ties with the military. He also has published articles in Red Star and Trud, military and trade union newspapers, respectively.

Kokoshin has concentrated his writing efforts on forecasts on national security and international issues, and on factors affecting the stability of the international system. His Trud article is a good example of his foresight and analytical capabilities. He was interviewed in this article on the military threat to the USSR. Kokoshin identified five threats. First, there was the threat of nuclear war or a big conventional war. He dismissed this threat as unlikely. Second, he noted that a close watch must be maintained on the nature and scale of the activity of various extremist forces and groupings in countries whose foreign policy could affect Soviet security. Third, he stated that possession of super computers today has the same symbol and prestige (and threat implication) as did possession of ships in the first half of the 20th century. Fourth, he noted that the role of the military remains a threat in the developing countries where the use of armed force is not decreasing in both interstate and domestic conflicts (ie, Iraq). Finally, he pointed out that the threat of nuclear or chemical proliferation will not diminish in the coming years.¹¹

Kokoshin also used this article to point out the futuristic program of military construction being pursued by the U.S. (precision guided munitions, third generation nuclear weapons, etc.). But he took an intentional slap at the Soviet military as well (and the threat they represent to other nations) by noting that Soviet authorities are still not publishing information on either their arms programs overall cost or the cost of each unit of armament. Without this information, domestic experts cannot evaluate the threat the USSR represents to the outside world; and they cannot plan for a force equipped with the most modern combat and support hardware that Kokoshin believes is necessary for the future Soviet armed forces.¹²

Because of his interest in forecasting, Kokoshin became involved with the Star Wars controversy in the early '80s. He edited a book on Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security with the Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Yevgeni Velikhov, and others (which discussed potential uses of space-based weapons against air and ground targets, and technical issues of defense among other items). A consultant on the book was, interestingly enough, N. A. Lomov. The book generated great controversy due to its detailed account (to include the mathematics to support conclusions) of space and security matters. In those days of secrecy many blamed Kokoshin for selling top secrets for a mere one ruble thirty, although the accusations went no further. Kokoshin also provided a military assessment of SDI's cybernetic and decision-making processes; U.S. defense spending and research and development processes for an SDI investment type study; and the political vulnerability of SDI and its unfeasibility as a universal shield. He consequently helped bring on the U.S. split over a "maxi" or "mini" system.

Throughout the 1980s, Kokoshin has been involved in security studies with influential members of the military and scientific communities. In 1987, together with R. Sagdeev, Kokoshin conducted research on "Strategic Stability under Conditions of Radical Reductions of Nuclear Weapons", a work closely monitored by the General Staff. His research was based on mathematical model "AC", which developed excellent graphics and helped the military command and political leadership deal with complex problems of stability. His work on stability issues continued in 1988 with the publication of the short article "Three Elements of Stability" in Red Star. These elements included the lack of an incentive for first use of nuclear weapons; the absence of an ability to carry out a disabling preemptive (first) strike; and the necessity to prevent unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons.¹³ But these elements addressed only the nuclear weapons issue. Kokoshin further foresaw other "destabilizing" systems that would have to be addressed in the near future as: strategic antisubmarine warfare forces and systems; intentions to do away with the 1972 ABM Treaty; various NATO proposals that did not match with the principles of reciprocal security and strategic stability; and long-range high-accuracy weapons and electronic warfare systems, two concerns recently exposed during Desert Storm that produced particular alarm within the Soviet military.¹⁴

Kokoshin developed a criteria called the "dynamic margin of the strategic balance" during his study of stability issues. Initially this concept was based on parity measured by the ability of the USSR and the U.S. to retaliate in different forms. These forms created room for maneuver in the arms control arena. The "dynamic margin" was based on both the reliability and dependability of the systems involved on both sides. Due to the improvement in our relations today and to improvements in the quality of nuclear weapons, this margin now, Kokoshin feels, must

be measured in terms of safety, since both sides have plenty of reliable and dependable systems to dissuade or destroy one another. The danger lies in accidental launch or in a peacetime accident on one's home soil. For these reasons the safety aspect has taken on new imperatives.

In 1989, Kokoshin authored a collective research work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a "Concept of the National Security of the USSR", which was heavily criticized by conservatives. The report's basic materials and conclusions eventually were accepted by the "Ryzhov Commission", created by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. From 1989-1991, together with Major General I. Danilenko of the military-political cadre of the General Staff Academy, Kokoshin helped conduct seminars that included politicians, economists, historians, and military theoreticians and equipment specialists. The theme of their discussion was "Politics and Global Security". And, in the 1990-1991 timeframe, he has helped make corrections in the criteria for stability based on, first, the changes between the USSR and the USA and, second, the developing disintegration of the USSR.

Kokoshin has been a primary consultant/participant in major international negotiating sessions, having participated in the SDI talks at Reykyavik, the Malta summit, and the London meeting between Gorbachev and leaders of the seven industrial nations (G-7). He has also appeared before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee together with other prominent Soviet civilian experts on military affairs, and is a council member for the European Center for International Security, which has main offices in Germany and Denmark and consists of prominent western thinkers (Robert McNamara and Jonathan Dean among others). Most recently Gorbachev consulted Kokoshin on the Bush initiative to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal.

By virtue of his interests, abilities, and connections, Andrei Kokoshin is worthy of serious consideration as a potential candidate to occupy a high staff position in the Ministry of Defense, and perhaps eventually to become a civilian Minister of Defense. First, however, he must acquire a formal position as the head of an institute or agency (he currently is an assistant to the director at ISKAN), or at a minimum a highly visible MOD position, in order to be considered for the position of Minister of Defense. Regardless, his articles to date have been so important to the Soviet internal and external military and resource debate that an examination of his writings and thoughts is in order. Kokoshin possesses an uncanny ability to isolate problems and develop political and military approaches suited to solving them. He often accomplishes this by adroitly developing issues of historical interest with a modern day context. He utilizes his forecasting skills in his works and, especially in the past three years, he has mastered the intricacies of and relationships between the political

and military-technical aspects of military doctrine, emphasizing a newly found meaning and dominance of the former on the latter.

Kokoshin on Svechin, Bismarck, and a new Europe

During the past three years, Kokoshin has authored several articles of special note. In the journal International Affairs he published a troika of articles between October 1988 and November 1990 that dealt with the military-political situation in the USSR. These articles, which justified the switch to a defensive doctrine, explained the need for cooperation between politics and strategy, and outlined the types of security scenarios forecast for the near future, are explained in more detail below.

Nearly a year and a half after the Warsaw Pact declared that it accepted a "defensive doctrine" the issue continued to be debated heatedly at home and abroad. Several burning questions were asked: Was the declaration merely a ruse? Could the offensive character of the Soviet armed forces be restructured? Did a defensive doctrine conform to the realities of the time?

Kokoshin provided a rationale, by way of historical example, for viewing the new defensive doctrine as a means of unifying politics, the economy, and strategy based on the new international situation. In an article entitled "Alexander Svechin: On War and Politics" (probably meant for both domestic and foreign consumption) Kokoshin described the writings of the key military theorist of the 1920s and '30s who believed in the value of a strategy of attrition (defense) over a strategy of annihilation (offense). Since the authorities branded Svechin anti-Marxist, his writings received little attention outside of higher military schools over the ensuing decades. Kokoshin perceptively noted that "certain forecasts, analogies, parallels and conclusions are most unexpected yet relevant" in Svechin's thoughts today. Kokoshin believed that the past Soviet focus primarily on offensive operations led to a considerable weakening of the real defensive capabilities of the country and its army. Military leaders of the past believed that all future wars would be revolutionary ones, and would utilize an uncompromisingly offensive strategy. This in turn led to the severe strategic defeat suffered by the Red Army on 22 June 1941 at the hands of Nazi Germany.¹⁵

Svechin, in sharp contrast to other past military theorists, attempted to explain how a country's economic and military potential, mobilization potential, and political situation could influence the type of military strategy to be adopted as part of a country's military doctrine. His major work was Strategiya (Strategy), which examined "every problem of strategy in close connection with politics and the economic aspect of war and with due regard to the social and cultural development of society."¹⁶ He believed that "political decisions should be made with due regard to strategy and military potential, and that a politician should

pay the most careful heed to the opinions of professional military men and know how the war machine works, what the state's military mobilization mechanism is like, and so on."¹⁷ He also underscored Clausewitz's judgement that defense was the strongest form of warfare "to which the materially weaker side must resort"¹⁸ and saw strategic defense as the "totality of appropriate operations comprising counterstrikes, major operations and battles on positions prepared beforehand."¹⁹ Perestroika and glasnost' had uncovered much to convince many in the USSR that they indeed were the "materially weaker side" and that the reason was an ill-conceived offensive military policy that had robbed the nation of a multitude of economic assets. This relationship between military strategy and politics required immediate adjustment.

Kokoshin highlighted Svechin's stress on the need to study the problem of strategic defense for purely military purposes as well. "Defense can use the lines and depth of the theatre, which makes the attacker waste his forces on tightening his hold on territory and on forces passing through it; and every gain in time is a new advantage."²⁰ Kokoshin concluded by noting that a study of Svechin can help answer many military-political problems concerning the relationship between war and politics (for which some have viewed Svechin as the "Soviet Clausewitz"), disarmament, and the development of strategic stability.

The future development of Soviet military thought, especially related to its defensive doctrine, may be strongly influenced by Svechin's writings. It is particularly noteworthy that the new Chief of the General Staff Lobov, together with Kokoshin, later co-authored another article on Svechin, further illustrating the current interest in defense issues (see section on Kokoshin and Lobov below). Kokoshin is now being heralded as the person who reinstated Svechin to his rightful position as one of the USSR's and the worlds' leading military theorists. Kokoshin, in turn, would point to his teacher General Lomov as the main reason for his interest in Svechin.

Kokoshin eventually went on record favoring a position in which the military objective of each country in a future conflict should be "simply the restoration of the situation antebellum, i.e., before the outbreak of hostilities-status quo ante bellum-without crossing the border of the other side and without trying to retaliate by responding to a strike with a 'double strike' (see the section on Kokoshin and Larionov for a complete articulation of the range of enduring paradigms describing the degrees of defensiveness in national military postures)."²¹ He also viewed the 1987 shift to a defensive doctrine as "the most important change in Soviet strategic and operational thinking, not only since the 1960s but since the late 1920s when the advocates of a reasonable combination of defense and offense, with emphasis on defense, suffered defeat in the Red Army Supreme Command."²²

Nine months after publishing his piece on Svechin, Kokoshin addressed another sensitive issue, this time concerning civil-military conflict in the USSR. The historical model he proposed in an article entitled simply "Bismarck and Moltke" was the relationship between Chancellor of Prussia Otto von Bismarck and Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke during the 19th century. Kokoshin asked "how far can and must politics, which holds a dominant position with regard to military strategy and military operations, interfere in them?" In it he hoped to demonstrate how to manage and understand civil-military conflict.²³ The actual debate was over military secrecy in budgetary and operational areas and its effect on the disarmament process. In addition, he surveyed the development of relationships within a Germany which was about to be reunited. The issue of military secrecy was discussed in several heated exchanges on the pages of Ogonek magazine between Marshal (retired, now deceased) Akhromeyev and Georgi Arbatov, Kokoshin's superior at ISKAN.

Kokoshin identified two significant reasons for studying the Bismarckian age. First, the world is now changing from a bi-polar to a multi-polar system, similar to the diplomatic experience of the second half of the 19th century;²⁴ and second, central to the Arbatov-Akhromeyev debate, Bismarck's and Moltke's legacy of reflections on how relations between politics and strategy should shape up was worthy of reexamination.²⁵ As Kokoshin notes:

Moltke held that 'politics must not interfere in operations.' He stressed that 'as far as the course of war is concerned, the chief guideline is military considerations, political ones being important only in so far as they necessitate nothing inadmissible from the military point of view.'

Bismarck took a different stand. He stated his attitude to the role of politics and diplomacy in wartime as follows: 'The task of the military command is to destroy enemy armed forces; the aim of war is to achieve peace on terms consonant with the policy which the state concerned is pursuing. Defining and limiting the ends to be attained by war and corresponding advice to the monarch are a political task both during and after war, a task whose fulfillment in one way or another cannot but influence warfare.'²⁶

Bismarck's name is most often associated with the unification of Germany under the patronage of the Prussian Empire. This was accomplished through Bismarck's comprehensive understanding and manipulation of the interactive roles played by politicians and the military. Bismarck was also one of the few men of his time who realized the growing influence of the press and public opinion, and here Kokoshin could exploit the glasnost! campaign in his own era.²⁷ Moltke's name is associated with the development of the General Staff, and innovative changes in strategy and tactics. He

also disagreed with Bismarck on several key doctrinal issues of the time.

Kokoshin analyzed the motives and decisions of Bismarck (especially his insistence on a just peace with Austria) as proceeding from a forecast or vision of the next phase of international relations, thereby eliminating future allies for France. Central to Bismarck's decisions were socio-psychological considerations (not insulting an injured country) and his desire to keep the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy intact and thus prevent new revolutionary powers from gaining influence in this area of Europe.²⁸

The loss of Eastern Europe from the Soviet stranglehold and the reemergence of a united Germany has prompted the need for a reassessment of future power relationships in Europe. Forecasting the development of international relations remains as important today as it was during the time of Bismarck. In forecasting future developments and force structures, the relationship between politics and military strategy takes on added importance, since military strategy must coincide with the economic, military, and political potentials of each country.

Hand in glove with the process of forecasting new security arrangements went the civil-military debate within the USSR. The creation of new security arrangements required an "open look" at the military's budget and military thinking to insure that the military was serving the interests of the switch to a new domestic and international order. This was an extremely difficult step, for the military had never before permitted its budget to be examined closely (writing about the budget would eventually get Kokoshin in trouble with Soviet officials. See the section on Kokoshin and Larionov below). In addition, military authorities noted that civilians were simply not competent enough to comprehend military requirements. Consequently, civil-military relations became a realm of confrontation since the military had something to hide--overspending and misuse of resources for over two decades. This battle continued right up to the coup and revolution of August 1991.

In December 1990 Kokoshin published the final article of his troika in International Affairs. It addressed new conditions in Europe. Entitled "What Kind of Europe Do We Need?" the article attempted "to provide a general outline of these interests [security interests with regard to Central and Southeast Europe, and Germany] and to invite experts and the public to a broad discussion rather than to offer any consummate definition."²⁹ It was published at a time when General Staff concern over military doctrine was undergoing close scrutiny, and when the military-political situation in the country had deteriorated severely, as witnessed by the sharp comments directed at General Secretary

Gorbachev by People's Deputy Colonel Victor Alksnis that Gorbachev "had 30 days to turn the country around or be replaced."³⁰

Kokoshin noted that interdependent security arrangements had always caused problems, yet he opposed the development of a single security system in favor of a multi-layered system. A long adjustment period to a new system will result, he felt, due to the difficulties which the USSR faced.

Kokoshin noted that the "level of constructive interaction precisely in this substructure [the leading states of the European system, including the USA and Canada] will largely determine the degree of the stability of the entire system."³¹ He pointed out that these structures differ from the past in that supranational bodies of political and economic integration [EC, WEU, etc.] were becoming stronger. This increased reliance on interdependence as a stabilizing force. Yet interdependence could also cause the appearance of new conflicts.³² The ability of future security substructures to deal with these problems, argued Kokoshin, will be the most important factor in shaping European security today.

According to Kokoshin, Soviet interests in Europe include: a desire to prevent war and forestall the formation of coalitions hostile to the USSR, which would interfere with sovereign Soviet security interests; the development of just and nondiscriminatory conditions for a bigger share for Russia and the entire USSR in world economic relations; and the definition of Soviet interests regarding Central and Southeast European countries bordering on the USSR and Germany.³³

So defined, Soviet security interests now include the fostering of stable friendly relations based on mutual interests; the establishment of stable and dynamic socio-economic development of Eastern Europe (with democratic political systems with genuine political pluralism); the development of each East European country outside the sphere's influence of other states; the observance by the governments of these countries of human rights in keeping with the international legal norms of the UN and the 1975 Helsinki Accords; and respect for the legitimate interests of Soviet security in a given region on the part of all other states engaged in foreign policy activities there.

Regarding relations with Germany, Kokoshin noted that policy should include the extensive development of economic relations with a united Germany, respect for the inviolability of postwar borders in Europe, the absence of conditions under which a threat of war could again arise from the German territory, and the maintenance of parity or a decrease in the Western aggregate political and military potential confronting the USSR.³⁴

To accomplish these goals Kokoshin argued that the USSR needed to work within the framework of a four-level system: first,

on a truly Pan-European level involving the USA and Canada as parties to the 1975 Helsinki Accords; second, on a block to block level (NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which has already been overtaken by events); third, on a regional and functional cooperative level between relatively small groups of states; and fourth, through the establishment of bilateral relations with individual European states.³⁵

To accomplish these goals Soviet and Russian diplomacy must evolve, especially since the rights and scope of activities of individual republics are broadening. The republic's independence process "is capable of changing significantly the mechanism of Soviet defense and foreign policies and diplomacy."³⁶ These changes come at a time when a military stalemate has arisen in Europe and in Soviet-U.S. relations, and militarism appears to be on the upswing outside and inside Europe (ie, Yugoslavia). The fact that a "European superpower" [EC?] is evolving causes special concern for Kokoshin, yet he believes that the USSR will have a determining voice in the development of whatever system emerges.

Kokoshin's third article, then, attempted to link the ongoing processes in the USSR with parallel developments in Europe. It was designed to outline the interests and roles to be played by the USSR within new conditions in the international arena. Kokoshin also highlighted Soviet concerns and misgivings about the manner in which Europe was evolving, and the challenges this presented for Soviet diplomacy. Indirectly, perhaps, it also expressed General Staff concerns and interests in the new Europe, and the viewpoint from which the General Staff looked upon its own evolution, to include the impact on military doctrine, over the coming years.

Kokoshin on military-political aspects of international security

In the midst of the Svechin and Bismarck articles published in International Affairs, Kokoshin authored a book in 1989 entitled In Search of a Way Out, which discussed military-political aspects of international security. The book served as a capstone attempt to warn Soviet policy-makers of the growing dangers confronting them and urged them to recognize the interrelationship of these dangers. In it he discussed the interdependence of the strategic balance, strategic stability, nuclear and conventional arms reductions, the reduction of the arms race in space, and the size of the armed forces with the promotion of international security. It was one of the first attempts to raise the question about the necessity for deep military reforms and roughly outlined their contours.³⁷

The book also served as a public relations vehicle for surfacing a new concept--the field of military-political research. This field of study had only recently evolved, in Kokoshin's words, "following a clearly indicated trend of modern science, at the juncture of the field of international political relations (between states) and that of military science and military affairs-

including, as an integral part of it, matters pertaining to engineering technology and the natural sciences."³⁸ Kokoshin hoped that such research would provide a more integrated approach to problem solving and prompt closer cooperation between those working in the foreign policy and defense fields.

In Kokoshin's view, there were many issues that would benefit from military-political research. These included prevention of war; use of armed force; limitation and reduction of weaponry, in particular medical and biological, chemical, ecological and climatic, conventional and nuclear; factors promoting strategic stability; laws governing the evolution of military affairs, build-up of the armed forces, and growth of defense industry; developmental principles underlying military technology; and the historical roots of military-political problems.

Methodologically, Kokoshin remained bound to historical and dialectical materialism, and he emphasized, in his own analysis of military-political affairs, Engels scientific approach to economics, politics, social studies, national psychologies, and military affairs. He underscored the importance of this analysis after the October Revolution of 1917 when an accurate military-political assessment was a matter of life and death to the state. A new assessment was now needed due to the changing international situation, the changed nature of bourgeois-democratic regimes, and the unsatisfactory conclusions, which the Soviet government reached at the end of World War II, conclusions based almost solely on military achievements and unwilling to admit to defects in the Communist system. A new assessment was particularly relevant now in light of the changing character and content of local wars caused by the rapid development of conventional weapons; and by the need for forecasting to prevent the outbreak of war through miscalculation.³⁹

A final goal of Kokoshin's book was to emphasize major changes taking place in the political arena, which had the ability to radically alter the manner in which the military-strategic balance is weighed (that is, force structure, weapons quantities, doctrine, and operational plans). Understanding political change was vital to Kokoshin because it underscored movement from an era of confrontation to an era of cooperation.⁴⁰ Moreover, it was now essential to study the impact of these changes on the military-technical aspect of doctrine.

In a review of Kokoshin's work, Soviet Lieutenant General V. Starodubov noted that the book was a search to find the optimal way for making the Armed Force's missions and structure consistent with the stipulations of the new military doctrine (which Starodubov identified as based on the need to maintain a balance between military forces on a lower level; the reduction of military potentials to a level of sufficiency needed for defense; and the inadmissibility of using under present circumstances military means

in solving any international dispute). Starodubov stated that Kokoshin drew the conclusion that national security should be achieved, in terms of its strictly military part, by abandoning the outlay (spending to maintain parity?) approach. He believed Kokoshin favored an armed forces actively imbuing anything new in military-political, military thought, or technological development.⁴¹

S. Blagovolin of IMEMO also critiqued Kokoshin's book, and his analysis differed somewhat from Starodubov's. He wrote that Kokoshin achieved his goal of demonstrating the urgency of problems and the possibility of solving them through either persuasion or agreement. Blagovolin also noted that Kokoshin correctly identified the need for the total correspondence of the two aspects of military doctrine, and the need to view surprise not only in a military but also a military-political sense. It is necessary not to create a threat to stability, Blagovolin stated, from a military nor a socio-political viewpoint, and to make our actions somewhat predictable to the other side.⁴²

Clearly these works, written by Kokoshin over a three year period, represent the political-military aspect of doctrine. However, during this same period he also co-authored several other works of importance which addressed the military-technical aspect of doctrine. Of major importance were those which he co-authored with Major General Larionov and Chief of the General Staff Lobov. They are most relevant and important for the Soviet military's future and for understanding the context within which military-technical decisions will be made.

Kokoshin and Larionov

Kokoshin's writings in the fields of doctrine and strategy did not achieve full notoriety until he had teamed up with Major General V. Larionov. Kokoshin and Larionov, over a period of four years, have offered both domestic and international audiences an open source discussion of strategic posturing, restructuring, and force development (the conscript or professional soldier debate) as those subjects related to the creation of a new defensive doctrine. Their joint work was initiated with the publication of an article on the Battle of Kursk.

The Kursk article was published in the August 1987 issue of Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya (MEMO), and was signed to press in July 1987, shortly after the Warsaw Pact announcement of a doctrinal change. In the study of the Kursk Battle, they offered a variant of a strategic posture that was "most directly related to the problem of the prevention of war both under current conditions and, possibly, in a post-nuclear era; and to the question of a reduction in conventional arms, in the course of which, as the Warsaw Pact states suggest, there would be a diminished possibility of surprise attack and the

launching of offensive operations."⁴³ The variant highlighted the historical fact that a counteroffensive, launched after an initial defensive operation, was a successful way to plan for and cope with future war. The Kursk Battle has been labeled "the birth of the idea of premeditated defense."

Almost a year later, in the June 1988 issue of MEMO, Kokoshin and Larionov expanded on the Kursk concept and authored an article which soon became the centerpiece of Western analysis of Soviet restructuring and strategic variants. Their article, entitled "Confrontation of General-Purpose Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability," expanded the Kursk example beyond the counteroffensive option to include three additional examples toward which "defensive doctrine" might evolve.⁴⁴ The authors postulated the existence of four enduring stages of de-escalation from offensively-oriented conventional forces to counteroffensive-oriented, through counterstroke and finally to non-offensive defense. This process of change, they argued, would be a "protracted one of mutual adjustments and unilateral actions undertaken in a benign political environment conducive to the creation of a new and vastly different security system for Europe...taking no fewer than ten years."⁴⁵

Subsequently, in April 1989, Kokoshin collaborated with Larionov and two other authors, A.A. Konovalov and B.A. Mazing, on yet another article entitled "Problems in Guaranteeing Stability with Radical Reductions of Armed Forces and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe." This article (which later was published as a brochure) combined Kokoshin's former predilection for advocating arms control with his new-found interest in doctrine and strategy. It focused on Phase Three of the Vienna negotiations, and suggested "elements of an approach to guaranteeing a military-strategic stability at reduced armed forces and arms levels of NATO and the WTO in Europe and possible versions on their future military structure and principles of military construction..."⁴⁶ This article allowed Kokoshin to enter the discussion of force restructuring and was based on his earlier joint works with Larionov. It underscored methods by which radical reductions in weaponry under varying models of confrontation could lead to increased strategic stability in the international arena.

In 1990, Kokoshin and Larionov collaborated on two more works. The first was a book entitled The Prevention of War: Doctrines, Concepts, Perspectives, which was an elaboration on their previous works authored either together or separately. The book contained chapters on politics and military doctrine, the consequences of nuclear war as a factor in the formation of military doctrine, problems of preventing conventional war in Europe, the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and its relation to strategic stability, the correlation of the offense and defense, the four models of confrontation between NATO and the WTO, surprise as a factor in upsetting strategic stability, and

perspectives on stability in a non-nuclear world. As the title suggests, the work offered viewpoints from the authors previous works to help prevent war.

During the cold war Kokoshin and Larionov would argue that both sides prepared to deter a total war but found themselves drawn into limited wars which ran the risk of escalation and in which neither power dared risk the employment of his full and lethal arsenal because such a course had, in fact, become an act of suicide. Larionov and Kokoshin have sought to find a way to keep the military within bounds without recourse to the threat of strategic escalation under the assumption that such risks were simply too great over time.

In October 1990 they published together their second article of the year, this time in Kommunist, entitled "Military Doctrine in the Service of Peace." This article was fundamental to understanding the summation of their arguments to restructure and reposture forces in the interests of war prevention. Published shortly before the Ministry of Defense issued its draft proposal on defensive doctrine (which appeared in a special issue of Military Thought in December 1990), Kokoshin and Larionov noted that past political statements on defensive doctrine "were not reinforced by corresponding provisions in its military-technical aspect."⁴⁷ They noted that missions "this side of D-Day" now need added attention, in particular those supporting strategic parity on a gradually decreasing level of minimal deterrence; maintaining forces and means of early attack warning in a state of technical reliability and combat readiness; and the sophistication and timely use of means and methods to provide warning and prevention of dangerous incidents on land, in the air, and at sea.⁴⁸ Methods for averting war, the authors stated, must be included in the program of instruction of such institutions as the General Staff Academy.

They also discussed how much of the budget must be allocated to ensure reasonable sufficiency, casting the argument in terms of the conservative approach and the radical approach. The conservatives, they argued, contended that economizing while rejecting superiority represented a contradiction of effort, since victory has no price. The radicals, according to the authors, felt that sufficiency must be combined with superiority in the correlation of forces in the name of victory. Kokoshin and Larionov stated that one must both measure sufficiency and ensure it in order to make superiority useless on the pre-war side of D-Day; and suggested that the Soviet Defense Budget should be broken down into line items on the model of the US Defense Budget in order to increase accountability.⁴⁹

Touching on the budgetary process at a time of contention over the secrecy of military data led to trouble for Kokoshin and Larionov. G. Khromov accused the "authors" of "heights of incompetence." In a personal attack on the author's credentials

only Kokoshin and his institute were named specifically, most likely due to intense debate at the time between Kokoshin's boss, Georgii Arbatov, and the military advisor to Gorbachev, former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev. Khromov made no mention of the name of the second author. Kokoshin was eventually "rescued" by an article by a Ministry of Defense official a month later. Many felt this short personnel attack on Kokoshin was caused by the Arbatov-Akhromeyev and an overreaction by the military-industrial complex.

In addition to their argument concerning the budget, Kokoshin and Larionov contended that strategic defense and the counteroffensive had moved to a prominent position and had become the essence of restructuring in Soviet military art.⁵⁰ To accomplish this, they advocated, as most important of all, the dismantling of the offensive in the minds of people responsible for formulating doctrinal principles. In the modern era, they claimed, the act of unleashing war is devoid of any principle of victory as was the case in the past when it included not only defeat of the enemy's forces but the destruction of his political and economic system as well.⁵¹

KOKOSHIN AND LOBOV

Kokoshin holds Lobov in high esteem as a military theoretician, has maintained close relations with him over the past few years, and has direct access to Lobov's military aide. He has described Lobov as an outstanding military thinker and avid reader who possesses an extensive military library. Lobov also earned a Doctorate Degree in Military Science.

The exact circumstances leading to the Kokoshin-Lobov partnership are unknown, although meetings under the joint sponsorship of Larionov cannot be discounted. Kokoshin's first work (there have been other, although unpublished, documents prepared by the two) with Lobov was in Znamya No. 2 in 1990, entitled "Foresight (General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War)." In this article they compared and contrasted the period of stormy social development, including military-political and military-strategic thought, in the 1920s and early 1930s with today's events. They noted that the ability to exchange freely opinions and participate in debates at this time was similar to the present.⁵²

Svechin believed it was incorrect to confine politics and military strategy in any ideological straightjacket, and advocated the informed interplay of politics and military strategy devoid of ideological constraints. Politics, as Clausewitz asserted, would direct and inform strategy. Kokoshin and Lobov declared that an understanding of this relationship is essential today since:

...it is all the more important that the top state and political leadership know the theory and practice of military

strategy and the implementation by the military mechanism of decisions made by policy...The general public should also understand the basic military-strategic issues, so glasnost is necessary here too. Otherwise policy will not be able to exercise real, but only declarative control over military strategy, and there will be no correspondence between the political and military-technical components of a state's military doctrine.⁵³

Svechin believed that offensive capabilities should not be overestimated. "Equally decisive military and political goals can be pursued with a 'strategy of attrition' as with a 'strategy of destruction.'"⁵⁴ Svechin further called for political leaders and military leaders to consider carefully economic factors and the industrial resources of all sides⁵⁵; and advocated maintaining a Navy whose scale was strictly regulated by the USSR's geographic location. Most important, in cases where the might of adversaries could not be duplicated, Svechin believed that a defensive posture, combined with a reasonable allocation to the defense sector, would help offset enemy advantages.⁵⁶ He believed that the dialectical unity of defense and offense offered a means of ensuring conditions for the mounting of an effective counteroffensive, resulting in the defeat of the enemy. The defense was seen as a totality of operations which included "counterstrikes and counterattacks at various prepared lines."⁵⁷

Kokoshin and Lobov drew upon Svechin's discussion of strategic paradigms to assess indirectly the Kokoshin-Larionov variants, pointing out the apparent dichotomies within various scenarios. War on another's territory is not justified either by theory, by operational calculations, or by a specific military-political situation, they noted.⁵⁸ They also pointed out a need for literature on the political and military aspects of local wars and the use of system analysis methods.⁵⁹ War on one's territory in defense of one's own people and state is both just and popular.

More and more conflicts are taking place among developing countries themselves who are in the stage of forming their own national and multinational (multitribe) statehood. The scale of the use of military force in this zone is not decreasing, and is increasing for a number of parameters. The process of devaluating the role of military force here has not yet begun, so the question of just and unjust wars must be largely resolved anew.⁶⁰

Through the logic of Svechin, Kokoshin and Lobov "forecast" the future shape of military affairs in the world and asked questions around which they must shape the military reforms of the country. Indicators are that the future will be shaped by a reevaluation of the role of the traditional TVD concept and the increased role of local wars. Their central message is that the conflict will be frequent but also limited in means and ends. A

century of total war will give way to a century of limited war not only in terms of the conduct of war but also in preparing for them.

KOKOSHIN IN 1991

Kokoshin has spent 1991 working on issues of concern to the nation (borders, strategy, and the economy) and the RSFSR. In a February issue of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), he addressed security issues on both the international and national levels, stressing the move away from past security stereotypes and the requirement for new security models. He described the new elements affecting security to be the growth of the interdependence between governments, societies, and nations; the widening role of economic, scientific-technical and social-cultural factors; and the growth in the importance of non-traditional subjects in different international organizations and transnational corporations. He also noted the importance of the growing German economic giant, citing the fact that even the U.S. was forced to seek German support for its war effort in the Persian Gulf.⁶¹

Kokoshin's article placed blame for many of the present Soviet troubles on the "command-administrative" system that, over time, had militarized society and forced the near permanent preparation of the nation for war and the confrontation of aggression. This has resulted in the emergence of the economic threat as the greatest threat to the nation. Of greater concern to Kokoshin, however, is his belief that "the danger of the use of nuclear weapons in crises situations in the 1990s is more significant than it was in the 1980s, although Chernobyl will play a definite deterrent role which was not present before this tragedy."⁶² A second and equally dangerous moment may be the disintegration of the USSR, especially since some republics are capable of laying claim to one or another type of nuclear weapon based on their territory.⁶³ Kokoshin and the world are in agreement that this type of nuclear proliferation is very risky, indeed.

As concerns other projects in which Kokoshin has participated this year, he was part of an apparatus that recently concluded a study on the "History of the Formation of the Borders of the Russian Empire", most likely in anticipation of the eventual crises over borders between the RSFSR and the republics. The document was written in old Russian style to underscore its historical roots. Kokoshin has also noted with concern the increasing complexity of the republic issues as the year has progressed, especially in the Ukraine where authorities are attempting to obtain their own nuclear force. He notes that "it's easier to achieve status that way (control of nuclear weapons) than through technological or economic achievement."⁶⁴ He believes this issue could split the army and initiate new fighting in the republics.⁶⁵ Kokoshin sees major problems of a less dangerous nature concerning Baltic

security. His solution involves a recognition of human rights for the Russian speaking population, a reasonable time schedule for withdrawing Soviet troops, and a plan to take out the most threatening forces (especially air assault) first. He foresees some degree of cooperation in the areas of radar and air defense sites, and perhaps over ports or air force bases.

In addition to his work on republican issues, he has spent time finishing a book entitled The Evolution of Soviet Political, Military, and Strategic Thinking: 1917-1991. The book will discuss the cooperation between politics and strategy in Soviet military doctrine; historical evaluations of security concerns to the USSR, the character and probability of future war from the 1920s to the present, and the means for conducting it; and the historical role of offensive and defense in Soviet military strategy and operational art.

Kokoshin has also addressed the issue of national interests of the new state. In a recent Izvestiya article he called for the immediate integration of the Soviet economy into the world economy, citing the requirements to renew industry and agriculture through the creation of the appropriate infrastructures (transport, communications, energy nets), while raising the standard of living of the people as "national interests". Kokoshin foresaw of fundamental interest to the economy and national security an understanding of the demands of gradually obtaining a position on the world market, especially in terms of industrial production, and including the USSR in the formation of regional and global systems of telecommunications and transport. Finally, he noted that the defense industry was the major burden on the economy while its vast reserve, particularly its competent cadre, was being improperly utilized.⁶⁶

In short, Kokoshin has spent the past year addressing issues of mobilization, conversion, disarmament, and strategy simultaneously. The events of 19-21 August did little to slow the pace of his work load.

KOKOSHIN AND THE COUP

Andrei Kokoshin was present in the Russian Parliament building on the night of 20 August, along with others preparing to defend the building from a military or KGB assault. Fortunately, the attack did not materialize. But Kokoshin's experience gave him a renewed vision of the future of Russia and the Union. He witnessed people who risked their political careers to challenge entrenched authority during those unforgettable days. He saw students, the intelligentsia, and members of the emerging business community standing shoulder to shoulder to confront the old regime. The commitment he witnessed to democracy and freedom deeply touched him. At about 2 A.M. on the 21st, Kokoshin decided to go outside

the Parliament and join the crowd that was protecting the building.⁶⁷

Kokoshin recognized a similar confrontation to the old regime through the important role played by the mass media, who energized morale, sustained the people's will, and kept people informed. The journalists who did so were motivated not just by glasnost and perestroika but also by the struggle to keep alive a free press, according to Kokoshin.⁶⁸

Kokoshin blamed the coup on a mixture of interests that were afraid of losing power. He noted that this fear found expression in such weird scenarios as the military-industrial complex supporting Prime Minister Pavlov's move to a market economy, since the latter was privately scheming to ensure that when property was privatized it would be maintained by military-industry. He further added that to prevent a repetition of actions aimed at the destruction of democracy certain lessons from the coup must be drawn. These were:

- emerging new dangers must be taken into account after structures are transformed and people removed.
- authorities must act decisively to correct the economic situation.
- declining industrial production and unemployment threaten social stability.
- unemployment will be higher due to cuts in the military and programs are needed to absorb such shocks.
- military cuts must be made in accordance with a comprehensive military reform program blocked by the previous leadership that includes a new reality about relations between republics and a new approach to the conversion of defense industries in the USSR.⁶⁹

Shortly after the coup failure, Kokoshin became part of a group of analysts created by a Yeltsin decree to conduct military-strategic analysis. This group was headed by Vice-President Rutskoi. The need for such a group is obvious in light of the new military-political developments in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and other republics after the coup. Discussions are now required over borders, nuclear weapons and armed forces personnel and equipment.

The most important effect of the coup for Kokoshin personally, however, is one he may not yet recognize. It will be the long-lasting impact of his presence in the Russian Parliament. He is now forever identified with the "cult of identity" that can positively answer the question "what were you doing during the coup?" His participation in protecting the Parliament, in addition to the other qualities noted above, will only elevate his chances to become the Minister of Defense.

CONCLUSION

Before the coup attempt of August 1991, it would have been difficult to foresee a civilian Minister of Defense in the USSR. Now, such a possibility is not only plausible, but also being advocated by the military itself.

Andrei Kokoshin should be among the top future contenders for the post. He possesses a solid academic background in military thinking that encompasses both theoretical and practical work; is well-connected with the current High Command; understands the domestic and international threats to his country; has participated in the major events of the Gorbachev era (Reykjavik, G-7, Malta, etc.); and has a conceptualization of the future. Concerning the latter point, his forecasting skills will be particularly helpful, since the defense priorities of the independence-minded republics must be subsumed by the military reform package under development at MoD. Wise decisions now will prevent the system from undergoing more renewal in just a few short years.

It is also noteworthy that Kokoshin's primary interests are the stability of the Soviet and international systems, and military-political and arms control issues. These coincide with many of President Bush's concerns as he and his staff continue to wrestle with the idea of a "New World Order"; and with the interests of Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Kokoshin's presence at the Russian Parliament also must be highlighted. It indicates a link with Yeltsin, who has gained great influence in the appointment process since the coup, politically. All indicators point to the fact that Kokoshin is a man to watch closely in the near future. Given Kokoshin's intellectual linkages to the General Staff, his presence at the Parliament was also an indication that the putchists had neither the heart nor the brain of the Armed Forces or the nation.

ENDNOTES

1. "Lobov on Military Reform," by Stephen Foye, taken from the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) Bulletin, 9 September, 1991.
2. "Harvard helps Soviets restructure military," The Kansas City Star, 10 September 1991, p A-6.
3. Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), p 326.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, p 327.

7. Lomov has written or edited works on "Scientific-Technical Progress and the Development of Military Affairs", "On the Organization and Methods of General Staff Work", "The Development of the Theory of Soviet Military Art in the Interwar Period", "Questions about Soviet Military Doctrine", and on Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov (not the current Minister of Defense) and M. N. Tukashevski. Information provided by a FMSO printout on N. A. Lomov, as supplied by Dr. Timothy L. Sanz, FMSO librarian.

8. It has been postulated that Kokoshin and Lobov were "sponsored" by Larionov, and their close association over the years would clearly suggest this.

9. Kokoshin's presence at the "White House" raises some interesting questions. How did someone who had been favorably covered in Red Star end up in the White House? Where had he parted company with the leadership of MoD? Did he side with Arbatov in the fight with Akhromeyev? Was it when Lobov was put on the slow track and excluded from military reform discussions? The answer may have to do with Kokoshin's reading of the domestic Soviet situation.

10. In addition to the articles and books discussed in some detail, Kokoshin published the following documents, among others, during the period under consideration (1987-1991):

1987

1. "Asymmetrical Response: Possible Countermeasures to SDI," USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, February, pp 26-35 [Russian version].
2. "Stability and Change in International Relations," USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, July, pp 3-12 [Russian version].

Kokoshin also served on the editorial staff for the IMEMO yearbook in 1987.

1988

1. "The Development of Military Affairs and the Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," IMEMO, January, pp 20-32 [Russian].
2. "Nuclear Arms Reduction and Strategic Stability," USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, February, pp 3-12 [Russian].
3. "Strategic and Operational Contexts: A Soviet Approach," speech at the AAAS Annual Symposium, February.
4. "A Soviet View on Radical Weapons Cuts," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March, pp 14-17.
5. "Three Criteria of Stability," Red Star, 16 September, p 3.
6. "Restructure Forces, Enhance Security," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September, pp 35-38.
7. "Questions of Change in International Negotiations," IMEMO, October, pp 23-33 [Russian] with Kremenof and Sergeev.

8. "Contradiction in the Pentagon," USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, November, pp 60-66 [Russian].
9. "Rethinking Victory," Detente No. 13, December, pp 17-18.

1989

1. "Shifting the Emphasis to Defense," New Times, March, No. 10, pp 19-21 [English].
2. Statement on "The New Soviet Military Doctrine and Unilateral Cuts," testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, March.

1990

1. "Is There a Threat to the Security of the USSR?", Trud, 2 Oct, p 3.

1991

1. "Security in the 1990s: Refuting Stereotypes?", IMEMO No. 2, pp 123-130 [Russian] with Chugov.
2. "National Interests and their Integration in the World Economy," Izvestiya, No 164, 11 July 1991, p 6.
3. The Evolution of Military-Political and Strategic Thinking: 1917-1991, Stanford University Press, 1991, forthcoming.

11. "Is there a threat to the security of the USSR?", Trud, 2 October 1991, p 3.

12. Ibid.

13. Red Star, 16 September, 1988, p 3.

14. Ibid.

15. A.A. Kokoshin, "The New Soviet Military Doctrine: Political, Strategic, and Economic Dimensions," Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 1 Number 1, Duke University Press, Winter 1990, pp 38, 39.

16. Andrei Kokoshin, "Alexander Svechin: On War and Politics," International Affairs, October 1988, pp 133-142.

17. Ibid., p 136.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p 140.

20. Ibid., p 139.

21. Kokoshin, Mediterranean Quarterly, p 42.

22. Ibid., pp 42, 43.

23. Andrei Kokoshin, "Bismarck and Moltke," International Affairs [English version], August 1990, pp 113-121. A motivation to examine the current necessity for the cooperation of politics and military strategy was General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration that the political aspect of military doctrine now prevailed over the military-technical aspect, a departure from the policy of former General Secretary Brezhnev.
24. Ibid., p 115.
25. Ibid., p 116.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p 114.
28. Ibid., p 118.
29. Andrei Kokoshin, "What Kind of Europe Do We Need," International Affairs, November 1990, pp 18-29.
30. Quote from Colonel Victor Alksnis as broadcast on the Discovery Channel's series on "The Second Russian Revolution" on 26 September 1991.
31. Ibid., p 20.
32. Ibid., pp 20-21.
33. Ibid., p 23.
34. Ibid., pp 23-24.
35. Ibid., pp 25-27.
36. Ibid., p 20.
37. A. A. Kokoshin, In Search of a Way Out, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1989, pp 268-269.
38. Ibid., p 4.
39. Ibid., pp 5-10.
40. Ibid., p 264.
41. Kommunist No. 12 August 1989, pp 123-124 as translated in JPRS-UKO-89-018, pp 89-90.
42. Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No 12, December 1989 pp 128-131, as translated in JPRS-UWE-90-004, pp 42-44.

43. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The Battle of Kursk in Light of Contemporary Defensive Doctrine," Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya No 8, Aug 1987 pp 32-40.
44. A. A. Kokoshin and V. V. Larionov, "Confrontation of General-Purpose Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, No. 6, 1988, pp 23-31.
45. Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, "A Gde Zhe Ugroza," Military Review (December 1990), p 9.
46. A.A. Kokoshin, et. al. "Problems in Guaranteeing Stability with Radical Reductions of Armed Forces and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe", Moscow, April 1989, forward.
47. A.A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "Military Doctrine in the Service of Peace," Kommunist No. 15, Oct 1990, p 103.
48. Ibid., p 104.
49. Ibid., p 106.
50. Ibid., p 107.
51. Ibid., p 108.
52. A.A. Kokoshin and V.N. Lobov, "Foresight (General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War)", Znamya No. 2 February 1990, p 170.
53. Ibid., p 173.
54. Ibid., p 175.
55. Ibid., p 175.
56. Ibid., p 177.
57. Ibid., p 179.
58. Ibid., p 180.
59. Ibid., p 181.
60. Ibid., p 182.
61. "Security in the 1990s: Refuting Stereotypes?", MEMO No. 2, pp 123-125 coedited with C. Chugrov.

62. Ibid., pp 127, 128.

63. Ibid., p 129.

64. "Who controls Soviet arsenal?", The Kansas City Star 27 October 1991, pp J-1, J-5.

65. Ibid.

66. "National interests and integration into the world economy," Izvestiya No 164, 11 July 1991, p 6.

67. Andrei Kokoshin, "Inside Moscow's 'White House'," The Washington Post, 1 September, 1991, p C-3.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.