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**Toward A New Partnership  
In Responsibility Sharing**

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*An Overview of the 1996 Report on Strategic  
Context of Responsibility Sharing*

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**A Report to the United States Congress by the  
Secretary of Defense**

April 1996

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
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# FOREWORD

I would like to introduce this Overview to the 1996 *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* by emphasizing the continuing importance of Congressional concern and attention to responsibility sharing issues with our allies. This support sends a clear message to our allies that if we are to maintain effective alliance relationships, they must be based on fairly shared roles, risks, responsibilities, and costs.

## ALLIANCE IN EUROPE

NATO provides the single most important vehicle for the coordination of national security policies between the United States and our European allies, and continues to serve as an indispensable mechanism for the exercise of American leadership in support of our regional goals in Europe. As you know, NATO allies have been with us in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, and today we are working closely together in Bosnia. In addition, allied contributions to peacekeeping operations and economic assistance to developing countries around the world, including the emerging democracies in Central Europe and the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, significantly exceed U.S. contributions.

Allied activism in these areas belies the perception of a passive and inwardly-focused Europe. In fact, compared with other allies and friendly nations around the world, our NATO allies have long been more actively engaged in sharing the roles, risks, responsibilities, and costs of protecting U.S. regional and global interests.

## JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Administration completed new cost sharing agreements with Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1995 which we believe are very positive and serve our shared security interests.


In October of last year, we concluded with Japan a new five-year Special Measures Agreement which will provide \$1.7 billion per year in host nation support for the life of the accord. Last November, we signed a three-year cost sharing agreement with the Republic of Korea which will increase the ROK's current direct cost sharing contribution of \$300 million by 10 percent each year to a total value of \$1 billion over the life of the agreement.

## COOPERATION IN THE GULF

This year, for the first time, this Overview reports on the cooperative efforts of our friends in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The United States is expanding its involvement with the GCC countries by entering into formal arrangements for the prepositioning of equipment, access, and participation in combined exercises. In exchange, several GCC countries make major contributions toward offsetting the costs of U.S. activities in the region, either by providing in-kind support or by funding the housing and maintenance of prepositioned materiel. An important example of this support is the \$372 million in direct and in-kind assistance paid or pledged by our Gulf partners in 1995 to offset the majority of U.S. incremental costs for Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

## ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

The Administration's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is being manifest in new cooperative relationships around the globe. At the same time, however, it is clear that a single approach to responsibility sharing is unworkable. Some have suggested, for example, that the cost sharing approach adopted with our partners in the Pacific should be the benchmark for agreements with our NATO allies. Such proposals ignore fundamental regional differences of history, politics, security arrangements, and defense situations. As this Overview demonstrates, flexibility and innovation are the basis of successful cooperative arrangements. We must not confine ourselves to merely one approach to the broad range of security challenges facing us in the post-Cold War era.



Walter B. Slocombe  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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# OVERVIEW

## THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF RESPONSIBILITY SHARING

### INTRODUCTION

The U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement includes three essential elements:

- **National security interests** represent the *ends* or *objectives* of our strategy. Since the United States has national security interests worldwide, our strategy involves commitments, presence, and responsibility sharing arrangements worldwide.
- **U.S. military forces** are among the most important *means* of implementing the strategy, and our forward presence is perhaps its most visible demonstration.
- **Allied contributions to security** represent important *dividends* of engagement--the degree to which our security goals are shared and our efforts reciprocated. This community of shared interests and goals makes our security arrangements strong yet flexible, efficient and effective politically, militarily, and economically.

This last item, allied responsibility sharing, cannot be divorced from the strategic ends and means which it supports, and is one measure of the scope and success of U.S. engagement. Indeed, by this measure, our strategy of engagement continues to be very successful--as documented in this Overview to the 1996 *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*.

Within the framework of our engagement strategy, the central tenets of the Administration's responsibility sharing policy are as follows:

- Responsibility sharing is an important but not paramount objective of our national security strategy. The foremost goals of

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engagement are: to enhance U.S. security by maintaining appropriately sized and postured military forces; to protect U.S. interests, allies, and friends; to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression; to improve regional stability; and to prevent the emergence of regional powers hostile to U.S. interests.

- Allied responsibility sharing efforts cover a very broad range of activities. As detailed later in this Overview, allied efforts to promote and defend shared security objectives include defense and force contributions, cooperation and participation in contingency operations, provision of development assistance, and host nation support for U.S. forces.
- Within this broad range of responsibility sharing activities, our policies can and should be tailored to differences in regional strategic, political, military, and economic needs.

Because none of our regional security situations is directly analogous to another, explicit comparisons of U.S. presence and allied responsibility sharing arrangements among different regions are of limited utility. Unfortunately, this has not prevented some observers from attempting to reduce our engagement strategy and the regional variations in our responsibility sharing policy to one dimension: allied cost sharing.

In effect, this view isolates a single aspect of allied contributions, elevates it to preeminent importance, and mandates its application uniformly across different geographic regions. To make matters worse, some advocate that cost sharing be used as the *sine qua non* of our forward presence posture and of our strategy of engagement itself.

The Administration continues to believe

strongly that disproportionate emphasis on cost sharing is inappropriate, and reflects a flawed and imbalanced view of the strategic, political, military, and economic realities upon which our national security strategy is built.

### REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK

This section turns to the variables and variations in and among our commitments to three regions most important to vital U.S. security interests: Europe, East Asia-Pacific, and Southwest Asia. Consistent with the Department's 1995 series of reports on the *United States Security Strategy*, the following sections describe the security framework, U.S. forward presence, and allied responsibility sharing in each of these critical regions.

#### EUROPE

The greatest concentration of nations that share our commitment to democracy and market economies is in Europe. Moreover, our longest-standing political, economic, military, and cultural ties are with Europe. Through continued U.S. leadership and presence there, we can effectively shape allied views toward consensus on major defense issues, facilitate further cooperation, and acquire leverage in other important forums.

U.S. security concerns in Europe go beyond the immediate region to adjacent areas, including the developing democracies of Central Europe, Russia, and the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. Supporting political and economic reform throughout this region is one of our foremost security objectives in Europe.

The promotion of U.S. interests around the world critically depends on effective American leadership in NATO and concerted action with our allies in support of shared goals and objectives.

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### Security Framework

For more than forty years of the Cold War, and throughout the period since, the North Atlantic Alliance has been the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. Collaboration with our NATO allies has secured the end of the Cold War, ensured security in the Mediterranean, projected Western power into the Middle East and North Africa, and provided a political basis for coordinated policies and actions in Africa, South Asia, and the Far East.

NATO provides an integrated military command structure, a highly developed process of assigning national defense assets to multinational roles and missions, a system of integrated plans and procedures across virtually the entire spectrum of civil/military affairs, and cost sharing arrangements such as common budgets.

While the United States is still called upon to provide leadership and to offer prompt and innovative solutions to urgent defense and security problems, we have come to rely more heavily on coordinating NATO activities in a wide range of political-military arenas. Aside from the myriad bilateral interactions occurring daily among U.S. and European allies, the most critical integrated planning activities undertaken in NATO forums include:

- **Force Planning:** The biennial force planning process recommends national levels of defense effort and produces specific goals to promote modernization, interoperability, readiness, and sustainability. It is through this process that nations commit forces to NATO.
- **Cooperative Logistics:** NATO has adopted new policies to support its changing strategy, force structure, and reinforcement concept. Nations will

have a collective responsibility for logistics support of NATO's multinational operations.

- **Armaments Cooperation:** Through the Council of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), cooperative arms projects are going forward in areas such as the Alliance's ground surveillance system, theater missile defense-related systems, and battlefield identification friend/foe systems.
- **Civil Emergency Planning:** NATO experts in crisis prevention and management coordinate access to national civil transportation resources, telecommunications, medical and civil defense assets, and certain industrial resources and supplies.
- **Cost Sharing:** Multilateral cost sharing in NATO includes commonly funded programs (e.g., NATO Security Investment Program, and Military and Civil Budgets) and jointly funded programs (e.g., NATO AWACS and U.S.-European F-16 consortium).

In sum, as the most elaborate and highly articulated political and military alliance in history, NATO contributes more to our national security and to our ability to exercise leadership and promote political stability and democracy than any other security arrangement in which the United States is involved.

### Role of U.S. Forward Presence

U.S. forward deployed forces in Europe are indispensable to our leadership role in European affairs. The presence of American forces in Europe enhances regional stability (as well as helps extend stability to the developing democracies in Central Europe), deters adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, and underwrites our larger strategy of engagement. The forward stationing of U.S. forces in Europe and the day-to-day training and interaction of our forces with those of our European allies helps to build and maintain the strong bonds of the Alliance.



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Our forward presence in Europe and our access to related NATO infrastructure facilities ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response capability. U.S. presence greatly assisted essential logistics support for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and can be a critical factor in other contingencies by easing the burden on American air- and sealift. U.S. military presence in Europe means that our forces are an ocean closer to areas of potential conflict, and have a substantial logistical base to support out-of-area operations.

U.S. security and humanitarian requirements outside NATO are now a main determinant of the tempo of operations for forces in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The pace of operations in EUCOM has risen sharply as a result of crises in its area of responsibility (including the Middle East littoral and Africa), and has involved over 50 force deployments to over 30 countries since the end of the Gulf War.

While U.S. force deployments in Europe remain essential to our security strategy and global defense posture, the number needed to assure stability and security has diminished significantly since the end of the Cold War. In response to the dramatic and favorable changes in European security since 1989, we have restructured and reduced our force presence in Europe by over 200,000 troops, and have closed two out of three U.S. installations there. By the end of this fiscal year our reductions will be largely complete, and our force levels in Europe should remain at approximately 100,000 for the foreseeable future.

### Sharing Responsibility for Security

The most important contribution allies can make to common security goals remains the commitment of forces in contingencies affecting U.S. and allied interests. The United States

continues to place increasing reliance on our European NATO allies to take greater responsibility for meeting collective regional defense requirements.

This increased European role is exemplified by the January 1994 NATO Summit initiative on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). This concept will allow the use of NATO assets by the Western European Union (WEU) in support of crisis management or contingency operations of priority to Europeans, but of lesser importance to the United States. Other practical examples abound, demonstrating the increased responsibility Europeans are taking for their own regional and collective security affairs.

A case in point is allied participation in United Nations operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and in support of the Dayton peace agreement. Our NATO allies contributed the vast majority of troops to support UN peacekeeping within the FRY (i.e., UNPROFOR), provided 55 percent of the forces to Operation DENY FLIGHT and 85 percent of the forces to Operation SHARP GUARD (the air and naval cordons around the FRY), and supplied significant support to Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, the humanitarian supply airdrops in FRY. Under the terms of the Dayton peace agreement, every one of our NATO allies has contributed personnel to the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, collectively accounting for roughly 65 percent of the total Alliance contribution. Unlike UN operations, in which money is distributed to troops that participate in peacekeeping, NATO requires each country to fund its own troop deployments.

In other areas, NATO member states have provided significant force contributions to demanding tasks such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the combat air patrol activity over

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northern Iraq. In 1994, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other nations participated in a *de facto* CJTF involving the transport and delivery of humanitarian and medical relief supplies to war-torn Rwanda. European NATO allies also participated with U.S. forces in Haiti, as well as in the deployment to Kuwait in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

In addition, our NATO allies are very active in support of a number of major policy areas, such as those discussed briefly below.

- **European Security and Defense Identity:** Key developments in strengthening the European pillar of the trans-Atlantic relationship include NATO's decision to provide forces to the WEU for allied operations, the creation of CJTFs to respond to out-of-area crises, and expanded membership in the European Corps.
- **Counterproliferation and Theater Missile Defense (TMD):** Our allies are demonstrating increased support for TMD development efforts, ranging from sharing early warning information and R&D to improving current missile defense capabilities and eventually deploying advanced capabilities.
- **Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR):** NATO's ad hoc Group on Nuclear Weapons (GNW) and an informal group dealing specifically with Ukraine are focusing attention on the status and disposition of nuclear weapons.
- **Partnership for Peace (PfP):** Activities include joint military exercises, work with the Partnership Coordination Cell at SHAPE Headquarters, and formal assessments of partner capabilities through the Planning and Review Process (PARP). The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Group on Defense Matters (GDM) are other important forums for NATO-partner interactions.

- **NATO Enlargement:** In September 1995, NATO completed its initial review of the "how" and "why" of enlargement, and is using 1996 to intensify consultations with interested partners to assess what each potential member might contribute to the Alliance, and to convey NATO expectations of potential members.

### EAST ASIA-PACIFIC

The East Asia-Pacific region holds enormous economic and strategic importance for the United States and our allies. In economic terms alone, U.S. trade with this region has surpassed \$400 billion annually, and accounts for more than 3 million American jobs. In addition, East Asia possesses a large concentration of military power, including some of the largest armies in the world.

Our friends and allies in the region are essential to the success of the U.S. security strategy of engagement. Their cooperation is necessary to deter potential threats, counter regional aggression, ensure regional peace, monitor attempts to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, and help protect sea lines of communication both within the region and to the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia.

### **Security Framework**

Our most important security relationships in East Asia are our bilateral arrangements with Japan and the Republic of Korea.

The U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is the linchpin of our security policy in the region. Given Japan's economic and political weight, it is a natural partner in our efforts to fashion a viable post-Cold War regional and international order. Our security arrangement with Japan relies on access to Japanese bases and Japanese support for U.S. operations.



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access to Japanese bases and Japanese support for U.S. operations. As a result of a division of roles and missions, in accordance with Japanese constitutional constraints, Japan concentrates on defense of the home islands and sea lane defense out to 1,000 nautical miles, while the United States assumes responsibility for power projection and nuclear deterrence. This allocation of roles enhances both sides' operational flexibility, and provides far-reaching benefits in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

As it has for over forty years, our security relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to be central to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region. The U.S.-ROK combined defense structure rests on three strong pillars: the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, Combined Forces, and the annual Security Consultative process. Until North and South Korea find a peaceful solution to their differences, we remain committed to the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Our bilateral relationship with the Republic of Korea is a vital component of our broader national objective of supporting and promoting democracy.

### **Role of U.S. Forward Presence**

U.S. forward presence in the East Asia-Pacific region is an important part of our global military posture and is essential to assure and reinforce our shared security goals of peace and stability throughout the entire region. Forward deployed forces in the Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response capability, discourage the emergence of regional hegemons, and enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region. In addition, forward deployed U.S. forces help mitigate the handicaps of time and distance presented by the geography of the vast Pacific region, and demonstrate to our friends, allies, and potential enemies alike a tangible indication of our interest in the security of the region.

After the Cold War, U.S. forces forward deployed in East Asia-Pacific were adjusted to retain the capability required to keep peace throughout the region. Our forces in Japan and the Republic of Korea were reduced from approximately 88,000 in 1990 to around 75,000 in 1995. Extensive cost sharing arrangements with Japan and the Republic of Korea--recently renegotiated on terms more favorable to the United States--provide substantial support to our forward deployed posture in the region.

Our forces in Japan are committed to and prepared for not only the defense of Japan and other nearby U.S. interests, but also for the preservation of peace and security in the Far East. U.S. bases in Japan are well-located for rapid deployment to virtually any trouble spot in the region. Given the great distances associated with the Pacific theater, assured access to bases in Japan plays a critical role in our ability to deter and defeat aggression.

The central objective of our relationship with the Republic of Korea is to deter aggression from North Korea. U.S. military presence helps achieve this goal by making it unmistakably clear that the United States would automatically and immediately be involved in the event of any such conflict. We now have around 36,000 military personnel in the Republic of Korea, whose missions are to contribute to deterrence, participate in the defense of the Republic of Korea should deterrence fail, and promote the defensive capabilities of allied forces through combined training.

Our forward presence in the Pacific also yields benefits in terms of our bases there, and access to Japanese and ROK facilities. During the Gulf War, for example, U.S. facilities were used extensively in support of the coalition's response to Iraqi aggression. In addition, Japan and the Republic of Korea provided access to ports, airfields, and maintenance facilities for personnel, ships, and aircraft transiting the region enroute to the Gulf.



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### Sharing Responsibility for Security

Military force contributions and self-defense efforts remain an essential element of responsibility sharing in the East Asia-Pacific region.

In December 1995, Japan approved the first five-year mid-term defense program based on its new national defense program outline. While reorganizing some major units to yield a net reduction in personnel strength, the new budget seeks to enhance Japan's self-defense forces, and improve air defense capability and protection of sea lines of communication. In addition, the United States and Japan continue to make progress in several cooperative weapons technology development projects, such as ballistic missile defense and the F-2 support fighter program.

Japan supplies by far the most generous host nation support to our forward stationed forces of any of our allies. In October 1995, the United States and Japan concluded a new five-year Special Measures Agreement in which Japan will continue to assume almost all local national labor and utility costs at U.S. bases, and will assume almost all of the costs of relocating training activities which are moved at Japan's request. Compared to our 1991 Special Measures Agreement with Japan, which returned a total of roughly \$5 billion to the United States in reimbursed labor and utility costs, the 1996-2001 Agreement is expected to return a total of approximately \$8.5 billion. Japan also incurs indirect costs, such as waived land use fees, and foregone taxes, customs, and rents. With the new agreement, total direct and indirect Japanese contributions to U.S. stationing costs are expected to approach \$6 billion per year.

The Republic of Korea continues to modernize its forces at a steady pace, through the addition of more powerful ground, air, and naval weaponry. The warfighting capabilities of its ground forces also continue to improve with

the formation of more mechanized and armored units. The Republic of Korea maintains steady real growth in defense spending and also makes sizeable purchases of U.S. weapons systems and spare parts.

In accordance with long standing U.S. policy objectives, the Republic of Korea is assuming increased responsibility for defense in the area of command and control of military forces. In 1991, a Korean general replaced a U.S. flag officer as Senior Member of the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). In 1992, the Combined (ROK/U.S.) Field Army was deactivated, and a Korean general was assigned, for the first time, as the Combined Ground Component Commander. In 1994, peacetime or "Armistice" operational control of ROK forces was returned to Republic of Korea command.

Since 1989, the Republic of Korea has yearly increased its contributions toward sharing the costs of U.S. forces deployed there. In November 1995, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed, for the first time, a multi-year cost sharing agreement. Over the period of the agreement (1996-1998) ROK contributions will be increased by 10 percent each year, with cash (vice in-kind) assistance making up a gradually increasing share of this support. In addition, the Republic of Korea provides substantial indirect cost sharing (e.g., waived land use fees, foregone taxes, customs, and rents). ROK direct and indirect host nation support to the United States totals over \$1.5 billion per year.

### SOUTHWEST ASIA

Our national security interest in the Gulf remains focused on deterring threats to regional stability and maintaining the unhindered flow of oil to world markets at stable prices. Nearly two-thirds of the world's proven reserves of petroleum lie beneath the Gulf and the countries around it. The United States and its principal



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economic partners are increasingly reliant on imported oil to fuel their interdependent economies.

### Security Framework

The United States is pursuing a three-tiered cooperative approach to Gulf security with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates).

- **Strengthen self-defense capabilities:** To help our partners get the best return on their defense investments, the United States works closely with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in matching defense requirements to financial and personnel constraints. Excess defense articles are provided to Bahrain and Oman to bolster their armed forces at minimal cost. We also promote responsible sales of U.S. weapons systems to all the GCC countries consistent with their legitimate needs and capabilities.
- **Promote GCC and inter-Arab defense cooperation:** The United States is working closely with our GCC partners to overcome impediments to improved inter-Arab cooperation in defending shared interests in the region. We applaud the GCC decision to expand its standing PENINSULA SHIELD force and to hold more multilateral exercises.
- **Enhance ability of Western forces to return and fight effectively alongside local forces in a crisis:** In addition to Oman, where the United States enjoyed significant prepositioning rights prior to the Gulf War, we have signed defense cooperation agreements with four other GCC members establishing a framework for prepositioning, access to facilities,

and combined exercises. Moreover, we now have bilateral exercise programs with each of the GCC states.

### Role of U.S. Forward Presence

Peacetime forward presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf gives us the ability to respond immediately to threats and provocations in the region. The Gulf War and the rapid reinforcement of U.S. military capabilities in the Gulf during Operations VIGILANT WARRIOR and VIGILANT SENTINEL were only the most recent examples of U.S. military presence in this critical region. As we emphasize to friendly regional states the necessity of taking steps to avoid future crises, the United States looks to sustaining and diversifying our military presence in the Gulf.

Despite the clear need to maintain forward presence in this part of the globe, the Gulf is distinguished by the absence of permanent U.S. military bases. Instead, our presence in this region consists of a varying mix of rotating, temporarily deployed forces and capabilities, which we have enhanced since the October 1994 VIGILANT WARRIOR operation.

U.S. naval presence in the Gulf has long included a surface force (two to six surface combatants plus support vessels), and now also includes an aircraft carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group either in the Gulf or close enough to respond quickly in a crisis.

Since the Gulf War, the United States also maintains a land force presence in the region, through rotation of Army and Marine Corps combat units in an expanded program of combined exercises with the GCC states and other coalition partners. Significant newly established exercises involve deployment of battalion-sized U.S. units for extended training with Kuwait. In addition, the U.S. Army maintains a PATRIOT air defense capability in Saudi Arabia.

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The United States is also increasing its presence in the Gulf through prepositioned stocks and equipment, both ashore and afloat. Since well before the Gulf War, the United States has stored equipment afloat for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade in the Indian Ocean, and we now also have an Army brigade set and additional support equipment afloat in the region. U.S. prepositioning ashore is discussed in the following section.

### Sharing Responsibility for Security

Although the United States has no formal allies in Southwest Asia, we cooperate closely with partners within and outside the region in sharing the responsibilities of cooperative security. The member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council contributed forces to the defense of Saudi Arabia and the liberation of Kuwait in 1990-91. Both Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dispatched forces to Kuwait in October 1994 to forestall renewed Iraqi aggression. In 1995, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar paid or pledged over \$370 million in direct and in-kind offsets to U.S. incremental costs incurred during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

Not only do the GCC countries participate fully in our programs of prepositioning and combined exercises, but several of them make major contributions toward offsetting the costs of United States operations, either by providing in-kind support or by funding part of the expense of housing and maintaining prepositioned materiel.

Our principal security partners in the Gulf carry a substantial proportion of the defense load. Defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP range from four to five percent in the case of Bahrain and the UAE, to 10 percent or more for Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

Although the GCC countries are generally perceived as being fabulously wealthy, collectively they have a per capita GDP less than one-third that of the United States, and barely 45 percent of the level of our European allies combined. Thus, while we look to the GCC countries to meet a substantial share of the costs of U.S. force deployments, their resources simply do not permit this approach to be continued indefinitely--without potentially dangerous domestic fiscal and political consequences. One of our principal challenges, therefore, is finding a way to share the responsibility of regional defense more equitably among the beneficiaries of a secure and stable Gulf.

Our partners in the Gulf also contribute to regional security by providing our forces the use of facilities, transit rights, and other forms of access. Bahrain, for example, has provided port facilities for U.S. naval forces since 1948. It also hosts the headquarters for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, furnishes facilities for prepositioning equipment, and has granted rapid access for U.S. military aircraft when necessary. Oman has permitted the United States to preposition equipment and to have emergency access to Omani bases since 1980, an arrangement whose value has been proven repeatedly over the years. Both countries stood by these commitments during periods when cooperation with the United States carried serious political risks, a fact that attests to the courage of Bahraini and Omani leaders, and to the strength of the relationship.

Under a Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in 1991, Kuwait allows U.S. prepositioning of a heavy brigade equipment set, and pays for storage facilities, equipment maintenance, and operating costs of U.S. units dispatched to exercise with Kuwaiti and other friendly forces. In 1992, the United States and Qatar signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement allowing U.S. prepositioning of a second heavy brigade set and division base (minus), for which Congress has recently provided phase one construction funding.



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To help defray U.S. costs, Qatar provides free land, maintenance, and other support services to meet U.S. requirements. A defense cooperation agreement has also been signed to permit access and prepositioning in the UAE. Finally, Saudi Arabia has allowed U.S. forces to use its military and commercial infrastructure in times of crisis and continues to provide substantial in-kind contributions to offset the costs of ongoing U.S. military operations in Southwest Asia, such as Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.


Finally, in assessing the scope of Gulf countries' contributions to international security, it is important to include their involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In 1995, each of the GCC nations provided funding support to many UN peace operations, ranging from Mozambique to the former Soviet Union. For example, Saudi Arabia provided nearly \$6 million in support of operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), while Kuwait provided nearly \$1 million to those peacekeeping missions.

### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Our allies and partners contribute to shared security objectives politically, economically, and militarily. These contributions in turn depend on historical circumstances and the capabilities and limitations of individual nations. In line with our national security strategy, this Overview has approached the question of responsibility sharing from a *regional* perspective, and has highlighted far-reaching differences in contributions, parallel to the differences in U.S. security objectives, the framework of our security relationship, and the role of our forward presence in each region.

The following chart focuses on the two regions, Europe and East Asia-Pacific, with which the United States has been most deeply involved in responsibility sharing. (Complete

and comparable data are not available for our GCC partners.) By comparing each region's portion of aggregate allied GDP and defense, peacekeeping, and cost sharing efforts, the chart reflects regional responsibility sharing relative to ability to contribute.



(view full-size chart)


### Regional Shares of Allied GDP and Selected Responsibility Sharing Contributions 1995

The chart demonstrates that on balance our European NATO allies bear a substantially larger share of security responsibilities than do Japan and the Republic of Korea. Although our European allies collectively account for around 60 percent of combined allied GDP, Europe provides disproportionately larger defense budgets, combat forces, and peacekeeping funding than do our Pacific allies.

In comparison, Japan and the Republic of Korea collectively have made much smaller contributions relative to GDP in every category shown except for cost sharing, in which their efforts dominate the allied total. In particular, with regard to Japan, substantial cost sharing support of U.S. troops is provided precisely *because* Japan is unable to take on the security roles, risks, and responsibilities that our NATO allies have increasingly assumed since World War II.

Although this Overview has summarized the strong efforts of our allies and friends in sharing responsibility for collective security, we recognize, with the Congress, that further improvements are necessary. As we continue to seek additional contributions, however, we must

# Regional Shares of Allied GDP and Selected Responsibility Sharing Contributions 1995



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## Overview: The Strategic Context of Responsibility Sharing

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ensure that higher strategic objectives, such as our ability to protect vital U.S. interests and to maintain our leadership position in international affairs, are not sacrificed in the process.

In particular, as we have stated in previous Reports, the Department of Defense and the Department of State take strong exception to proposals that U.S. forward presence be determined by allied cost sharing, or that we adopt a "one-size-fits-all" policy in seeking responsibility sharing contributions. As demonstrated herein, U.S. forward presence posture, as well as our responsibility sharing policy, reflect the very real regional differences we face in the pursuit of U.S. strategic goals around the world.

# OVERVIEW ANNEX

## RESPONSIBILITY SHARING FACTORS AND ANALYSIS

Following a brief description of responsibility sharing factors used in our assessment and relevant data notes, this Annex provides country summary tables--i.e., statistical sketches portraying contributions and rankings of NATO nations, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

NOTE: Due to noncomparable and incomplete data for the GCC countries, and in keeping with previous Reports, this Annex provides only limited quantitative detail regarding responsibility sharing efforts of our Gulf partners.

### RESPONSIBILITY SHARING FACTORS

The broad array of countries' responsibility sharing efforts and contributions addressed in this Overview are subdivided into five major categories. These are: (1) aggregate resources for defense; (2) military forces for defense; (3) crisis management and peace operations; (4) economic and financial assistance; and (5) host nation support.

- *Aggregate Resources for Defense:* The financial and personnel resources nations commit to defense remain their most important contributions to collective security. Financial contributions are measured by comparing the most comprehensive indicator of defense effort (defense spending) against the most comprehensive indicator of ability to contribute (GDP), and receive the greatest weight in country assessments. Personnel contributions are measured by comparing active duty and civilian defense personnel against the total labor force.
- *Military Forces for Defense:* The standing military forces that nations raise and maintain represent their most basic defense capabilities, and thus comprise an

## Overview Annex: Responsibility Sharing Factors and Analysis


integral component of responsibility sharing. Conventional force contributions are measured according to each nation's inventory of major weapons systems as a share of the aggregate for all nations assessed. Relative performance is evaluated by comparing these contributions with each nation's ability to contribute (its share of aggregate GDP).

- **Crisis Management and Peace Operations:** Post-Cold War security risks and challenges cover a wide range of political, economic, and ethnic instabilities that may affect areas of strategic interest--the prevention and management of which is increasingly important to protecting fundamental Western values and enhancing our security. Efforts in this area are measured by countries' financial and personnel contributions to UN peace operations worldwide.
- **Economic and Financial Assistance:** Each of the NATO and East Asia-Pacific nations addressed in this Report provides economic assistance to developing countries, or has pledged aid to Central European nations and the NIS. These contributions and pledges are an important boost to post-Cold War stability, and represent notable economic commitments by donor nations.
- **Host Nation Support:** Our European and Pacific allies provide a broad range of host nation support to U.S. forces, including direct cost sharing, land for U.S. bases and/or material storage facilities, logistics support such as ammunition storage and equipment maintenance, and pledges of wartime host nation support (WHNS).

The following chart summarizes our assessment of nations' efforts in these areas, drawing heavily on the foregoing measures, combined with each country's relative standing

in economic development and standard of living. Among all of these factors, the most important is the ratio of defense spending share to GDP share.

### Aggregate Resources for Defense



[\(view full-size chart\)](#)


### COUNTRY SUMMARIES

The remaining tables presented in this Annex provide a brief portrayal of selected responsibility sharing indicators on a country-by-country basis. In addition to presenting a nation's performance in each indicator, the portrayals show relative standings of the 17 nations assessed (i.e., the 15 NATO nations, Japan, and the Republic of Korea). Information in the portrayals includes:

- **GDP and Defense Spending** data are depicted for 1995, using 1995 exchange rates. Defense spending figures for the NATO nations (including the United States) reflect an agreed definition of total defense spending adopted by NATO.
- **Active Duty Military and Civilian Defense Personnel** data are shown for 1995. Labor force numbers used to compute personnel as a percentage of labor force are mid-1995 totals.
- **Defense Capability Measures** are ratios based on 1995 force levels and GDPs. A ratio of around 1.0 in a given category indicates that a nation's contribution and its ability to contribute are roughly in balance--that is, its contribution to the aggregate capability of all 17 nations is in line with its share of the aggregate wealth (GDP). A ratio above 1.0 suggests that a



# Aggregate Resources for Defense



country is contributing beyond its "fair share," and a ratio below 1.0 suggests that a country is contributing less than its "fair share."

- **Peace Operations** figures for personnel are as of December 31, 1995. Labor force numbers used to compute personnel as a percentage of labor force are mid-year 1995 totals. Funding data reflect contributions paid toward UN peacekeeping assessments during 1995, as well as *voluntary* contributions by countries in support of Security Council resolutions (1994 estimates).
- **Grant Aid** statistics include net disbursements to developing countries (ODA), as well as aid pledged to Central Europe and the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. Due to differing reporting periods for the different aid types, figures shown are cumulative over the multi-year period 1990-1994. Cumulative 1990-1994 GDPs are used to compute aid as a percentage of GDP. All figures are expressed in constant 1995 dollars and exchange rates.
- **Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing** assessments are based on estimates for 1994 collected last year. Updated and revised figures for 1995 will be compiled later this spring and provided to the Congress separately.

Since no set of selected indicators can fully convey the entire range of a nation's contributions, readers are urged to review the material in this Annex in conjunction with the more detailed information presented in the 1996 *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, which will be forwarded separately.

# BELGIUM

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$269	..... 11 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$26,793	..... 07 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$4.6	.... 13 .....
Percentage of GDP	1.7%	.... 13 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	52	... 14 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	1.2%	... 14 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.97	..... 08 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.83	..... 05 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.19	. 16 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.7	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0159%	..... 02 .
Funding (Millions)	\$37	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0138%	..... 11 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$5,727	..... 12 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.44%	..... 08 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....	Moderate	

**Other Country Summaries:**

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# CANADA

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$571	..... 07 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$19,431	..... 10 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$9.0	..... 08 .....
Percentage of GDP	1.6%	... 14 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	100	..... 11 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	0.7%	. 16 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.33	.. 15 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	0.91	.... 13 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.83	..... 10 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	1.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0064%	..... 04 ...
Funding (Millions)	\$183	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0321%	..... 05 ....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$12,859	..... 08 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.48%	..... 06 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....	Not Applicable	

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# DENMARK

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$175	..... 12 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$33,606	..... 04 ...
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$3.1	.. 15 .....
Percentage of GDP	1.8%	..... 11 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	38	. 16 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	1.3%	..... 11 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	.92	..... 09 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.06	..... 11 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.75	..... 12 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.3	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0096%	..... 03 ..
Funding (Millions)	\$25	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0142%	..... 10 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$8,985	..... 09 .....
Percentage of GDP	1.11%	..... 01
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....Modest		

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# FRANCE

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$1,552	..... 04 ...
Per Capita GDP	\$26,654	..... 08 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$48.1	..... 03 ...
Percentage of GDP	3.1%	..... 05 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	606	..... 04 ...
Percentage of Labor Force	2.4%	..... 04 ...
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.49	... 14 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.31	..... 08 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.79	..... 11 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.5	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0019%	..... 07 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$1,112	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0716%	..... 02 .
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$48,934	..... 04 ...
Percentage of GDP	0.66%	..... 04 ...
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....	Not Applicable	

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# GERMANY

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$2,422	..... 03 ..
Per Capita GDP	\$29,423	..... 05 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$41.8	..... 04 ....
Percentage of GDP	1.7%	..... 12 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	509	..... 05 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	1.3%	..... 12 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.91	..... 10 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	0.57	.. 15 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.22	.. 15 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0001%	.. 15 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$382	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0158%	..... 09 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$65,904	..... 03 ..
Percentage of GDP	0.58%	..... 05 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution .....	Substantial	

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# GREECE

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$112	.. 15 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$10,671	... 14 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$5.1	..... 12 .....
Percentage of GDP	4.5%	..... 01
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	238	..... 10 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	5.6%	..... 01
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	8.60	..... 01
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	11.40	..... 01
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	3.88	..... 02 .
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0003%	..... 12 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$10	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0087%	... 14 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$516	.. 15 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.10%	.. 15 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....Modest		

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# ITALY

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$1,092	..... 06.....
Per Capita GDP	\$18,987	..... 12.....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$20.0	..... 06.....
Percentage of GDP	1.8%	..... 10.....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	485	..... 06.....
Percentage of Labor Force	2.1%	..... 05.....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.83	..... 12.....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.33	..... 07.....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.54	..... 13.....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.1	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0003%	..... 11.....
Funding (Millions)	\$644	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0590%	..... 03..
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$17,788	..... 05.....
Percentage of GDP	0.34%	..... 09.....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....	Moderate	

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# LUXEMBOURG

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$13	17 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$34,597	..... 02 .
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$0.1	17 .....
Percentage of GDP	1.1%	. 16 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	2	17 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	0.9%	.. 15 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.00	17 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	0.00	17 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.00	17 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0000%	17 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$2	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0179%	..... 08 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$300	17 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.48%	..... 07 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....Moderate		

Country Summary Notes

**Other Country Summaries:**

Belgium | Canada | Denmark | France | Germany | Greece | Italy | Netherlands | Norway | Portugal | Spain  
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# NETHERLANDS

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$398	..... 10 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$25,622	..... 09 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$8.2	..... 10 .....
Percentage of GDP	2.1%	..... 09 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	94	..... 12 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	1.5%	..... 10 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	1.41	..... 05 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.13	..... 10 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.86	..... 09 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.2	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0036%	..... 06 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$109	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0274%	..... 07 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$17,250	..... 07 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.93%	..... 03 ..
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution .....	Moderate	

**Other Country Summaries:**

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# NORWAY

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$148	... 14 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$33,987	..... 03 ..
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$3.8	... 14 .....
Percentage of GDP	2.5%	..... 08 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	43	.. 15 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	2.0%	..... 06 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	1.23	..... 06 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.25	..... 09 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	1.05	..... 07 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	1.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0457%	..... 01
Funding (Millions)	\$116	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0784%	..... 01
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$6,617	..... 11 .....
Percentage of GDP	1.01%	..... 02 ..
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution ..... Moderate		

**Other Country Summaries:**

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# PORTUGAL

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$103	. 16 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$10,457	.. 15 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$2.8	. 16 .....
Percentage of GDP	2.7%	..... 07 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	82	.... 13 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	1.8%	..... 08 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	1.10	..... 07 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	3.63	..... 03 ..
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	1.35	..... 05 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.3	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0061%	..... 05 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$2	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0020%	.. 15 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$1,598	.... 13 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.32%	..... 11 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution .....	Modest	

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# SPAIN

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$558	..... 08 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$14,238	.... 13 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$8.5	..... 09 .....
Percentage of GDP	1.5%	.. 15 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	254	..... 09 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	1.6%	..... 09 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.90	..... 11 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	0.83	... 14 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.98	..... 08 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0001%	.... 13 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$71	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0128%	..... 12 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$7,271	..... 10 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.27%	.... 13 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution .....	Moderate	

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# TURKEY

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$166	... 13 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$2,682	17 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$6.1	..... 11 .....
Percentage of GDP	3.7%	..... 03 ..
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	871	..... 02 .
Percentage of Labor Force	4.2%	..... 02 .
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	8.18	..... 02 .
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	7.11	..... 02 .
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	3.88	..... 01
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0001%	... 14 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$1	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0007%	17 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$659	... 14 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.09%	. 16 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution .....	Moderate	

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# UNITED KINGDOM

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$1,107	..... 05 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$19,028	..... 11 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$34.2	..... 05 .....
Percentage of GDP	3.1%	..... 06 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	367	..... 07 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	1.3%	.... 13 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.63	.... 13 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.64	..... 06 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	2.04	..... 03 ..
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.4	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0016%	..... 09 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$585	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0529%	..... 04 ...
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$17,368	..... 06 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.33%	..... 10 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution .....	Moderate	

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# JAPAN

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$4,954	..... 02 .
Per Capita GDP	\$39,571	..... 01
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$50.1	..... 02 .
Percentage of GDP	1.0%	17 .....
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	265	..... 08 .....
Percentage of Labor Force	0.4%	17 .....
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.13	. 16 .....
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	0.19	. 16 .....
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.31	... 14 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.0	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0000%	17 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$543	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0110%	.... 13 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$75,511	..... 01
Percentage of GDP	0.31%	..... 12 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution.....	Substantial	

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# REPUBLIC OF KOREA

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$447	..... 09 .....
Per Capita GDP	\$9,966	. 16 .....
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$14.1	..... 07 .....
Percentage of GDP	3.2%	..... 04 ...
<b>Active Duty Military &amp; Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	682	..... 03 ..
Percentage of Labor Force	3.2%	..... 03 ..
<b>Defense Capability Measures (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	3.67	..... 03 ..
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	2.88	..... 04 ...
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	1.07	..... 06 .....
<b>Peace Operations (1995)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.3	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.001%	..... 10 .....
Funding (Millions)	\$5	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0012%	. 16 .....
<b>Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)</b>		
		Low _____ High
Total (Millions)	\$494	. 16 .....
Percentage of GDP	0.03%	17 .....
<b>Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)</b>		
Contribution .....	Substantial	

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# GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

## Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	
		<b>BAHRAIN</b>
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
Total (Billions)	\$5	
Per Capita GDP	\$8,806	
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
Total (Billions)	\$0.2	
Percentage of GDP	5.4%	
		<b>KUWAIT</b>
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
Total (Billions)	\$24	
Per Capita GDP	\$14,994	
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
Total (Billions)	\$3.5	
Percentage of GDP	14.2%	
		<b>OMAN</b>
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
Total (Billions)	\$11	
Per Capita GDP	\$5,584	
<b>Defense Spending (1995)</b>		
Total (Billions)	\$2.0	
Percentage of GDP	18.1%	
		<b>QATAR</b>
<b>Gross Domestic Product (1995)</b>		
Total (Billions)	\$7	
Per Capita GDP	\$13,345	

**Defense Spending (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$0.9
Percentage of GDP	12.0%

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**SAUDI ARABIA****Gross Domestic Product (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$129
Per Capita GDP	\$7,317

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**Defense Spending (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$13.3
Percentage of GDP	10.3%

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**UNITED ARAB  
EMIRATES****Gross Domestic Product (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$39
Per Capita GDP	\$18,550

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**Defense Spending (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$1.8
Percentage of GDP	4.6%

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