

**STRATEGY
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**DOMINANT MANEUVER VS PRECISION ENGAGEMENT -
FINDING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN SOLDIERS
AND TECHNOLOGY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Dominant Maneuver vs Precision Engagement — Finding the
Appropriate Balance Between Soldiers and Technology**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the Department of Defense has been under excruciating pressure to reduce military forces and provide the nation a peace dividend in the wake of the Cold War. Significant reductions have been made over the course of the past eight years based on traditional budget share and not on a strategy driven process. Thus, land-based forces are being reduced in favor of precision weapons and expensive platforms to carry them that portend to offer a quick and virtually bloodless solution for the nation's military needs. The structure of our military forces has been driven by political pressure — the Base Force Review, the Bottom Up Review (BUR) the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) and most recently, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) — and not by the strategy driven process that would render the objective balance in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Consequently, our military forces are created and nurtured by institutional desires and the services' crusade to preserve budget share. As is historically the case, today's defense funding priorities ignore the preeminence of land forces in its quest for "silver bullet" solutions to accomplish the nation's conventional warfighting needs.

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DOMINANT MANEUVER VS PRECISION ENGAGEMENT — FINDING

THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN SOLDIERS AND TECHNOLOGY

History shows that the human dimension of conflict cannot be countered with purely technological solutions. America's armed services must be as ready to defeat an enemy armed with machetes and rifles as it is to take on those armed with tanks, planes, and weapons of mass destruction.¹

THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF LANDPOWER

Wars are always significant contributors to strategic culture, but great failures are more likely to result in rapid or substantive change.² The structure and thinking of our military forces today reflects the overwhelming successes they achieved in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. The rapid military victories, both in the air and on the ground, were astonishing to many who feared protracted and bloody affairs. But even more astounding was the revelation of stealth aircraft technology accompanied by its riveting performance in combat followed by the video footage of space-age precision munitions scoring direct hits on chimney-sized bullseyes. This reality has lead many to believe that the age of bloodless warfare has arrived.

The traditional rivalry between the relevance of soldiers on the battlefield and the demand for technological solutions for modern warfare rages on with increased passion today. How do we balance the need for ground forces and precision weapons and

delivery systems? How does the Army compete with the other services to ensure that it has the forces it will need when called upon to serve the nation? A short walk through history shows that the Army traditionally has paid a heavy price in blood during the early stages of wars because the nation neglected it when the threat was ill-defined. But, it doesn't have to be that way.

On Sunday, 25 June 1950, The North Korean People's Army violently and abruptly attacked its Southern neighbor. Grappling for ways to achieve a global balance of power and stability, the United States had turned militarily to nuclear weapons as the ultimate weapon to contain the Soviet communist threat and keep peace in a dangerous and uncertain world. Consequently, the United States Army was ill-prepared to fight this war. The nation rediscovered that even in the middle of the 20th Century, soldiers were needed to fight enemies on the ground. "Guns, boots, and butter might be bought, but not men."³

It wasn't until the nation's leaders accepted the comprehensive assessment of the Soviet Union's motivations and the implications of global communist domination espoused in NSC 68 that the threat to the United States was clearly defined.⁴ This document gave direction to the national security strategy

and would drive the US in designing military forces and using its elements of national power to deal effectively in international affairs with what was to be defined as the Cold War.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in 1989 the US again found itself adrift in a sea of strategic uncertainty and global opportunity. Little fanfare was associated with this massive achievement, however, Congress and the American people could clearly see the opportunity to reap an unprecedented peace dividend. The military had done its job and was no longer needed in great numbers.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was the first real opportunity to see how powerful and effective the America's military force really was. After a massive buildup of forces, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was prosecuted with a massive air campaign and a ground war that defeated the fourth largest army in the world in a matter of 100 hours. More importantly, the accuracy and lethality of our modern weapons again brought into question the necessity for large standing formations of ground forces. If the Air Force and the Navy were capable of putting precision weapons on enemy targets from extreme long distances, why is it necessary to put soldiers on the ground in harms way? Why sacrifice the lives of our young

men and women when the job can be done cleanly from hundreds of miles away?

The development and use of precision guided weapons and munitions will certainly be important in helping to win our future wars, but air and naval forces have not successfully accomplished the job alone. Stealth aircraft, precision munitions and cruise missiles delivered from great distances played a crucial role in the victory over Iraq, but it did not defeat Saddam Hussein's Army. That crucial task was accomplished primarily by ground forces as it always has in the past.

The passion for new technology also overlooks the deterrent value of forward stationed ground forces in shaping a peaceful environment. The constant search for elusive "silver bullet" weaponry ignores the fact that once any military technology is known to exist and its characteristics are understood, it is possible to devise countermeasures that will reduce or completely negate its effectiveness.⁵

As policymakers continue to define the size and types of forces we will need in the future, they must understand that control of events on land in areas of strategic importance to the United States cannot be achieved without a well-prepared American Army. History reminds us that the refusal of the United States

and Great Britain to maintain armies capable of presenting real resistance to German fascism was an important source of encouragement to the aggressors who concluded that they could achieve their aims without American interference even though America possessed enormous sea- and air power.⁶

Why, given America's experience in war is there remarkably little appreciation in contemporary America for the strategic role of landpower? Part of the answer can be traced to America's reluctance to commit ground forces before conflict erupts to achieve important political objectives.⁷ The United States has repeatedly fallen victim to the illusion of having political influence without the commitment of effective land forces. The nation's willingness to commit the decisive strategic influence of landpower in wartime is seldom matched by an understanding of its strategic value in peacetime to prevent conflicts from erupting.⁸

If unpreparedness for war is one pattern in 20th century American politics, another is the swift return to an isolationist military posture immediately after conflict. Americans have rarely understood the relevance of military power to the task of establishing stable political institutions in the aftermath of war that would lead to continued peace. Following WWI, General

Pershing, understood that the Allied victory was not complete and urged a longer and more thorough occupation of Germany.⁹ General Pershing's recommendations were rejected because of domestic political pressure to reduce the Army and return to American normalcy once the Versailles Treaty was in place. Without a actual military threat to the nation, the American people saw little need for a strong, ready army. Instead, the nation provided resources for a strong navy and small land forces. They did not grasp the point that despite their impressive absolute and relative size, America's naval forces held a distinctly defensive posture and could not deter aggression on land. Consequently, President Wilson's proposals for collective security went largely unnoticed. Without a strong, capable Army to apply power and influence in Europe and Asia during the inter-war years, the United States could not devise a serious strategy to prevent aggression and influence the events that ultimately would lead to WWII.¹⁰

This same view of landpower persisted as WWII loomed on the horizon. President Roosevelt's strategy to exert political influence by relying exclusively on seapower and, later airpower did nothing to dissuade Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet Russia from aggressive action between 1938 and 1942.¹¹ Until the fall

expanding air force and an American Army that was not prepared to fight in Korea.¹⁶

While the Korean War provided a temporary increase in the Army's budget, American national security policy turned toward massive retaliation against the nuclear capable Soviet Union. Massive retaliation called into question the future role of land combat. The strategic bombing doctrine of the US Air Force fit well with the Eisenhower Administration's policy of massive retaliation, itself driven more by domestic economic concerns than by conventional military considerations.¹⁷

The United States entered the Vietnam war, again under the premise that strategic airpower alone would be decisive. After the bombing offensive failed to achieve the desired results the President was informed that if the United States wished to save Vietnam it was going to have to commit ground forces to do it. For all the expenditure of treasure, firepower, and lives, American airpower, while occasionally pivotal, was never decisive in the Vietnam War.¹⁸ One of the reasons why so little was purchased at such great cost is that American airpower was not employed as part of a broad offensive strategy that included American landpower.¹⁹ The use of airpower without the coordinated follow-up of decisive land forces permitted the enemy

to rebuild his defenses in the absence of continuous and steady pressure on the ground and the vicious cycle of attrition continued. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara recalled years later: "We failed then--as we have since--to recognize the limits of modern high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine." Empirically, American airpower could not win a war and in the minds of the American public only American landpower could lose one.²⁰

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 served to remind the American people of the economic impact that can be created by external threats to America's vital interests. While the US military response was swift, it was accomplished as our military forces that had been designed to fight a conventional war with the Soviet Union on the plains of Europe were also being drawn down in the wake of the Cold War. Again, the primacy of airpower was touted and the relevancy of landpower called into question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General McPeak, opined that the planned 30-day bombing campaign would destroy at least 50 percent of Iraqi's armored and mechanized forces.²¹ In a Congressional hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on December 3, 1990, General Powell criticized the "airpower alone" option as unrealistic. An air-only strategy

could not guarantee success because it would leave the initiative to Saddam Hussein. He said, "One can hunker down, one can dig in, one can disperse to try to ride out such a single-dimension attack....Such strategies are designed to hope to win, they are not designed to win."²²

The lesson of history and especially of Desert Storm is that airpower and seapower are not strategically decisive by themselves. Precision weapons are essential to achieve air and sea dominance, to protect ground forces, and to enable landpower to defeat the enemy where he lives and thus occupy his territory. Decisive land operations set the strategic conditions to enable the political settlement of a crisis that is acceptable to the United States and benefits the former adversary.

TODAY'S GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS CHALLENGES

The essential characteristics of the current strategic environment are uncertainty and change. "The new strategic order has three dominant characteristics: international disorder, a revolution in military affairs, and a crisis of demotic culture."²³ Today, the geopolitical problems are more diffuse and the remedies less obvious. There is, and can be, no global scheme for American foreign policy, save for the vague objectives of promoting an environment conducive to international trade and

open communications.²⁴ But this pessimistic view is not shared by America's political leadership.

The national security strategy provides an ambitious plan for remaining globally engaged with all elements of national power. The military's role is to respond to challenges short of war, and in concert with regional friends and allies, to win two overlapping major theater wars. The strategy is based on three tenets; to "shape" the international environment to prevent or deter threats, to "respond" across the full spectrum of potential crises, and to "prepare" now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.²⁵

The Army has always played a central role in advancing the security interests of the nation. It's unique capabilities for conducting sustained land combat and controlling land, resources and populations make it the force of choice in today's environment of international engagement. By their very presence, soldiers on the ground are America's most visible sign of deterrence and reassurance.

American interests can only be inferred from visible ties that the nation has with other countries. The presence of American soldiers on allied territory is an unambiguous sign of US interests and a visible fact that an adversary cannot ignore.

WHAT THE ARMY HAS DONE

The United States Army has changed physically and culturally over the past eight years to embrace this new era of uncertainty and promise. Physically, the active Army has reduced force structure from 776,000 to 495,000 soldiers. Its resources have declined by 39 percent and the Army's infrastructure has been reduced by about 36 percent. In General Reimer's words, "for the United States Army, the 21st Century began in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down and our world turned upside down."²⁶

Culturally, the Army has changed from a forward deployed containment force to a power projection force. Today, primarily stationed in the United States, the Army has changed from a threat-based force to a capabilities-based force. The threat-based force was designed to fight and defeat the Soviet Union on the plains of central Europe. Today's capabilities-based force is a power-projection army that provides the nation a full spectrum of essential capabilities for the world we live in -- it is a force of global deterrence, a force with the ability to compel any adversary, a force that can reassure friends and allies, and a force that is ready and able to provide support to civilian authorities during natural disasters or civil emergencies. Today's Army is not just a smaller version of the

Cold War force; it is a force that has changed to meet the nation's strategy and is changing to meet the demands of the future.

BUILDING MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR THE FUTURE

The fact that the United States was not seriously challenged [by North Korean military forces] in the air or at sea, where it was strong, indicates that had the nation been equally prepared on the ground, the war would not have occurred, or having begun, could have been quickly contained.²⁷

Today's geo-strategic environment suggests that the world in the foreseeable future will be faced with struggles between ethnic groups, competition for economic resources and general instability rather than a protracted high or mid-intensity war. These realities contribute to the difficulty of creating a military force structure of the right size and composition to achieve the nation's security goals. The situation is further complicated by the military's recent successes that seem to make change even more difficult to imagine. Arguably, the military's fixation on delivering overwhelming force to defeat an enemy has left the military unprepared to support the nation's most pressing needs like domestic support, peacekeeping and enforcement, and humanitarian assistance efforts. For the foreseeable future, the priorities of the navy and the air force must change from its Cold War focus. Strategic airlift must

become a priority for the air force, not just in terms of support, but also in resources for new lift aircraft. Similarly, the navy should focus its budget priorities on attack transports, pre-positioning cargo carriers and other support vessels.²⁸

The capability to rapidly move land forces from the continental United States to a crisis area will be the priority for the foreseeable future. This reality is recognized in the National Defense Panel's report on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). "Regular deployments to far-flung areas of the globe, from open deserts to confining urban terrain"²⁹ will be central elements of our foreseeable military responsibilities.

The nation's military response to the overthrow of Haitian president Jean Bertrand Aristide's democratically elected government in 1991 provides some insights into the missions and types of forces required in today's environment. It was clearly a Joint operation, but it was dominated by planning considerations that called for the employment of two Army divisions to execute.³⁰ Traditional employment of advanced fighter aircraft and aircraft carriers are ill-suited for the majority of missions America's armed forces are performing today. Separating warring parties, restoring democratically elected governments and providing humanitarian assistance are missions that require

adequate airlift and sealift and in the majority of cases, soldiers on the ground.

How do the military services determine what forces and weapons are needed for the nation? Is the motivation behind a service's strategy less about national security than about the services' institutional interests? One view is that the qualities of the US military forces are determined more by cultural and institutional preferences. People, not threats argue for and against the acquisition and maintenance of specific military forces.³¹ This would portend that the Services buy what they want to further their image which may not necessarily support the nation's security strategy. Particularly troubling, if true, is that "institutional self-interests are most evident in peacetime and among the senior officers of the services."³² Given the current environment of relative peace and enormous uncertainty in global affairs this is troubling, but probably true.

This leads to the most recent national effort to right-size the military forces for the foreseeable future, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The hallmark of the QDR is that it was praised as a strategy driven assessment of military capabilities to support the National Security Strategy. It was an analysis

that carefully examined the geo-strategic environment to design the forces and acquisition requirements for the future. While it may be viewed by the Department of Defense and the Army as a successful analysis in terms of not losing substantial active force structure, it did nothing to correct the imbalance of funding between the three services. The troubling issue is that the Army is allocated less than 25 percent of the Department's annual budget of about \$250 billion and it is the force that accomplishes 60 or 70 percent of the operational requirements.³³ The Army is rightfully proud of its accomplishments and service to the nation, but its very fabric is being stretched to the limit without additional top line funding. A good example of the problem is the Army's modernization account. While it's equipment is being run ragged, there is little hope of recapitalizing modern equipment to replace the tattered and worn equipment the Army has today. In fact, only four of the top twenty defense investment programs to be funded between 1997 and 2013 are Army programs, and not one of them is among the top ten in terms of funding.³⁴

Perhaps the QDR got it about two-thirds right. It recognizes the new geo-strategic environment of asymmetrical threats and the absence of a peer competitor for the foreseeable future. It also

acknowledges that the defense department must be capable of projecting forces rapidly from the continental United States to problem areas around the world. But, while the strategy and requirements have changed, the funding paradigm has not. The passion for current systems prevents the military from preparing now for future challenges. The NDP report describes the situation quite accurately, "...the procurement budgets of the services are focused primarily on current systems and do not adequately support the central thrust of their visions."³⁵

CHALLENGES FOR BALANCED MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The absence of strategic plans in the post-Cold War era has precluded the identification and establishment of priorities for specific strategic objectives, inhibited planning for future military capabilities, and has not allowed for the integration of the operation planning and theater strategies of the combatant commands.³⁶

The current geo-strategic environment holds challenges for military and civilian leaders alike in creating balanced military forces to serve the nation. The challenge for democratic leaders in our strategic culture is to create and sustain public support for policies that are in the long term national interests, especially when such policy aims are not apparent on their face value.³⁷ The challenge for military leaders is to create full

spectrum military capabilities that are responsive across the conflict continuum.

Even in today's environment of "Global Engagement" military leaders view conflict and peace as totally separate entities. There is a reluctance to use the military for purposes other than to engage with and defeat an enemy. The military is considered a tool of last resort and not a fully engaged instrument of national power. Retired Army Colonel, Harry Summers made the following observation concerning the Pacification effort during the Vietnam War. "Armed forces are designed, trained and equipped for a specific task, to fight and win on the battlefield. They are a battle-ax, not a force for providing for nation-building activities."³⁸ This inability to match force to mission was expressed by General Trainor, a former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations for the Marine Corps in a statement he made on the Army's role in Operation Just Cause. "The Army did what it knows how to do...it went in with heavy firepower and troops trained for large scale war on the plains of Europe, not the expeditionary wars of the Third World."

The Army has always embraced the national security strategy as the essence of its very being. Its history and traditions are grounded in over two centuries of values, but its capabilities

are realized by its innate ability to change its culture and structure. Over the past eight years, the Army has experienced enormous physical and cultural change to permit it to perform its role in the nation's security strategy of Shape, Respond and Prepare Now. Always the selfless servant of the nation; the Army's traditions and culture compel it to serve the nation's needs, not its own. The Army may be unique among the Services in its acceptance in peacetime of national strategies it is both utterly committed to execute and unlikely to be able successfully to prosecute in wartime.³⁹

Why, if the Army is inevitably the nation's force of choice, has it historically not been given resources on balance with the other services? One view is that the collision of service doctrine can be associated with the appearances of air forces and theories about air power.⁴⁰ If airpower alone is a decisive element of military power it begs the question of the need for significant naval and ground forces. So long as the significant missions were related to the command of the sea, the conquest of territory, and the control of the air, distinct service doctrines were meaningful in policy terms.⁴¹ But, in the wake of WWII, distinct service doctrines tended to disappear. The functional requirements of deterrence during the Cold War and global

engagement in today's environment have blurred the lines between the elemental service doctrines as decisive elements of military force in and of themselves. If doctrine serves to relate forces to purpose then an examination of airpower and seapower shows that as independent entities, they serve no distinctive ends of policy. A look at cultural differences and perceptions may provide some insights into the relative imbalance between the services and why they do the things they do.

The US Army has a long and honorable tradition of service to the nation. In fact, the Army is older than the nation itself and takes great pride in doing whatever the nation asks it to do with the resources its given. Why hasn't the Army crafted an independent groundpower service strategy? Why does it simply accept the fact that the nation's strategy is its own? In essence, the Army is the nation's full spectrum workhorse. Its wide-ranging capabilities — compelling enemies, deterring aggression, reassuring allies and providing support to communities within the country — provide a menu of powerful tools at its disposal, but does not address a distinct service strategy that is landcentric. Perhaps a more important issue is the medium in which the Army is employed — land itself. The Army must operate on the terrain that is allocated to it by

circumstances of the nation's needs and interests.⁴² In essence, the Army's job is to take the battle to the enemy wherever he is located on land. Unlike the mediums of the air and the sea, the earth's terrain presents a variety of geographical features that challenge both man and machine. In the end, terrain, terms of engagement and supporting resources deny the Army the freedom to define war on its own terms.⁴³

The Air Force and the Navy use their air and maritime strategies not just to make their internal planning coherent, but principally as devices for justifying the independence of their institutions, missions, forces and therefore their budgets within the national security forum.⁴⁴ The Navy has always professed that the United States is a maritime nation and therefore naval forces are its predominant protectorate. The size and composition of the Navy's required fleet has remained remarkably constant in spite of changes in technology and orientation of national strategy. The Navy's peacetime demand for capital ships has remained essentially unchanged since before WWI, even though the kind of capital ship has changed from dreadnought to battleship to carrier to super carrier.⁴⁵

The US Air Force was conceived around a strategic theory of dominant air power and midwived by strategists that predicted its

the emerging challenges, exploit opportunities and terminate programs and approaches that are not high payoff.

The military services should be planning forces, capabilities and modernization priorities to enable seamless joint operations. That is the premise espoused by "Joint Vision 2010," the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of its people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.⁵⁰ The analytical tool to enable this process is the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).⁵¹ While JSPS has been in existence since 1952, it has not achieved primacy as a planning tool to size military forces and it has not been effective in developing joint capabilities that subordinate service desires to the needs of the nation's security strategy. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies essentially faced a single predominant threat — the containment of communism and Soviet aggression. It was a comfortable, stable planning environment and each of the military services focused on designing forces that could defeat the Soviet Union in its medium of operation — land, air and sea.

The strategic planning system worked because it was not stressed by multiple threats and global uncertainties. The

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, demise of the Soviet Union, and end of the Cold War unsuspectingly cut away the anchor that provided continuity in strategic planning for the US Armed Forces.⁵² The dominant threat had evaporated and the military services found themselves trying to define their roles in a geo-strategic environment that was vastly different and more complicated than the past fifty years.

While the military services continued to use the JSPS, it was not responsive in terms of defining a military strategy to reshape the forces that the nation desired for the future. In its attempts to redesign the strategic planning strategy, the JSPS was revised in 1992 which produced for the first time, an unclassified National Military Strategy (NMS). It was again revised in March 1993 and today, in its current version, the JSPS was published on 1 September 1997 as CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01. It's designed to provide annual guidance and strategic direction for the services and requires the preparation of strategic plans. It also assists the Secretary of Defense in developing Defense Planning Guidance, and perhaps most significantly, includes for the first time, Joint Vision 20XX, the Chairman's vision for the future.

dividend that certainly should have accrued since the United States won the Cold War.

Why is the analysis effort to restructure the armed forces being accomplished outside the system by so-called defense authorities? Perhaps these strategic reviews are contracted out for independent evaluation because no-one in the defense department or in the Congress is willing to take responsibility for making the hard calls on structure, modernization and strategic priorities.

Strategic planning is a challenging, but necessary, endeavor for any organization, small or large.⁵⁵ The defense department understands the need to plan, therefore, "Planning" is the first "P" in the defense department's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Planning therefore should be the bedrock foundation for examining the nation's strategic direction and logically lead to programming and budgeting balanced military forces to protect the nation and its global interests.

If the joint planning system works, why is it necessary to conduct independent strategic planning analyses? One view is that joint level strategic planning does not adequately establish and specify strategic objectives nor does it integrate and establish priorities for them.⁵⁶ The system is further flawed

because "it does not provide sufficient underlying rationale for the review of service functions nor does it provide unequivocal and compelling bases for the development and implementation of joint doctrine."⁵⁷

Perhaps national strategy doesn't drive the types of forces and the subsequent resource allocation to support them. Conceivably, what drives the acquisition and planning of military capabilities is a perceived threat or the services' preferences, or both. Unfortunately then, strategy is the intellectual rationale that follows after and attempts to explain the forces sought or in being for other unspoken or unimaginable reasons.⁵⁸

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

The debate on size and types of forces the nation will likely need in the 21st Century is far from over. In fact the QDR professes that continuous reassessments are an inherent requirement. "Indeed, the rapid rate of change in the world since the end of the Cold War underscores the importance of undertaking such a reexamination on a regular basis."⁵⁹

For all practical purposes, the QDR and its review by the National Defense Panel (NDP) reconfirmed a future geo-strategic environment of unpredictable and asymmetrical threats, and a force sizing requirement to confront two near simultaneous major

theater wars. While the Army was permitted to retain its ten active divisions, it endured a reduction of an additional 15,000 active duty personnel and was encouraged to accelerate its Force XXI modernization plan.⁶⁰

The Air Force and the Navy also were directed to reduce force structure and some current platforms along with fewer projected buys for some future aircraft including the Navy's F/A-18E/F, the Joint Strike Fighter and the Air Force's F-22. In essence, the QDR trimmed each of the services, but eliminated no current or new programs even though the defense department assumes that the security environment between now and 2015 will likely be marked by the absence of a global peer competitor.⁶¹ It seems that the military is still challenged by its Cold War spending habits even though it has embraced a new strategy of "shaping" the international environment, "responding" to the full spectrum of crises and "preparing" now by discovering and harnessing the elements of the revolution in military affairs for an uncertain future.

For the Army, the QDR's most notable feature was the fact that it didn't lose significant force structure or people, its most important asset. Unfortunately, it did nothing to balance the service's share of the budget. In the fiscal year 1999

budget, the Army continues to receive about a quarter, the Navy and the Air Force roughly a third each, with the remainder going to defense department-wide functions.⁶² Defense Secretary Cohen defended the service budget allocations, arguing that despite the end of the Cold War, "We still have roughly the same missions," with Army troops deployed to Europe and Korea, Air Force planes in the Gulf region patrolling Iraqi airspace, and Navy ships representing the US around the world.⁶³ The world has changed, but thinking in the defense department remains lodged in its Cold War rut.

Since 1990, the Army has increased its operational pace by a factor of 16 while subsisting on the same "short rations" it received during the Cold War.⁶⁴ At the same time, the other services continue to doggedly defend their roles, missions and modernization priorities as critical to national defense. The Navy contends that it plays a major "presence" role by showing the flag around the globe and providing aircraft carriers that enable US warplanes to operate around the world without seeking permission from other nations. While that may be true, the Navy's presence in the Adriatic Sea had little effect on stopping the killing or influencing the cessation of hostilities that raged in Bosnia. A carrier battle group is an impressive armada,

but its capabilities are marginally useful in accomplishing today's missions. The Air Force contends that its modern high-tech combat aircraft can strike anywhere in the world from bases in the continental US, so it is worth the investment.⁶⁵ While that too is true, the logic above applies here as well.

Strategic airlift, to move forces rapidly to trouble spots, should have at least equal priority with the development and production of advanced strike and fighter aircraft.

The Army contends that the world has changed, the strategy has changed, the requirements have changed, and the Army has changed, but the funding paradigm has not changed.⁶⁶ Today, as throughout history, the presence of Army combat troops is the hallmark of the US commitment to use military force in defense of its national interests.⁶⁷ In fiscal year 1996, the Army had more than 100,000 soldiers stationed around the world and more than 35,000 soldiers were deployed from their home stations to conduct operations or participate in exercises in more than 70 countries.⁶⁸ American Soldiers on the ground working side by side with their contemporaries shape the international environment in a meaningful way. And only soldiers on the ground show the nation's true resolve and commitment when responding to an emergency where military forces are required. The forward

stationing of Army forces is an unambiguous sign of the nation's determination to use military force to support its national interests and the sovereignty or territorial integrity of an ally or friend.⁶⁹

Firepower alone cannot defeat the will of an enemy and may even increase his resolve to fight back. The issue boils down to how the nation wishes to confront its potential foes and court its allies and friends. The trend continues to be an enormous appetite for advanced jet fighters, improved aircraft carriers and submarines that portend to be capable of accomplishing the mission quickly and without putting America's sons and daughters in harms way. Media opinions on the United Nation's, or more appropriately the United States' continuing confrontation with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on UN access to Iraqi facilities suspected of producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) provides some observations on proposed allied measure to force his compliance with United Nations (UN) mandates. The threatened coalition military response will contain a variety of precision weapons and other munitions delivered primarily by naval and Air Force aircraft and by cruise missiles. It will undoubtedly be an impressive display of modern weaponry, but Lawrence Freedman, in an article published in the London Times wrote that, "Saddam

can't be coerced by air power alone....He cannot stop his country from being attacked, but he can hope to deny his enemies their objective."⁷⁰ He points out that Iraq's apparatus for producing weapons of mass destruction remains substantial and will be difficult to destroy by air raids because it is portable and easily concealed. Buildings and structures connected with the WMD program will be targeted and destroyed, but it will not make any difference. "Knocking down buildings is not the same as eliminating a repressive political apparatus....the allies are in an awkward position because they are forced to rely solely on air power."⁷¹ In his final analysis, Freedman contends that the air option is "excessively punitive — and produces no obvious results."⁷² His solution is to send in ground forces. Air strikes will destroy property and kill people, but it is not decisive. "The problems in Iraq demonstrate one of the main issues in defense planning for the future, the gap between what advocates say air power can do and what it actually can do....Bombing will be revenge, not something that compels."⁷³ In an age of rapid technological change, we can be confident that the human dimension of battle will retain its traditional and compelling importance. Technology is supremely important in war,

but an emphasis on technology that neglects the role of human factors is fundamentally misplaced.⁷⁴

CONCLUSION

Korea was an infantry war, essentially no different from any infantry war of the twentieth century. This was one of the factors, along with the political, that made the fighting so distasteful to a people who had subconsciously come to regard infantry warfare as obsolete.⁷⁵

The United States truly has the best military forces in the world today, but the continuing challenge is to achieve a balance of capabilities that are relevant to the nation's security needs. The end of the Cold War turned fifty years of relatively stable military planning upside down overnight. Without a clearly defined threat, the military is faced with change, and it must change to meet the nation's needs in an uncertain future.

The debate concerning the types of forces the nation needs will continue, but it must be based on strategy and not institutional interests and desires of the individual services. Service doctrines must be about producing effects and not systems. It must be about using mediums and not simply owning them. It must be about creating the right force, not just equal shares.

The problem lies not so much with the processes and analysis tools like the JSPS and PPBS, but more with cultural and

institutional desires. Legislative attempts to reform the military have not achieved a great deal of success because they attack the perceived problem by changing procedures and organization, but do nothing to change the incentives and visions that motivate the services.⁷⁶ The Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff and the Commanders in Chief of the regional commands are the logical institutions to match national commitments to the use of force because their unique roles encompass the employment of all the services. They are unlikely to accept that challenge because the tradeoffs among the Services' vital institutional interests are simply too hot to touch.⁷⁷

An example of the friction between the services is their disagreement on language in Joint Publication 3.09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," concerning the control of joint fires in the land component commander's area of operation. The publication currently enjoys its tenth year as a draft document because of this single, emotional issue.⁷⁸

The Army's history is that of subordinating institutional interests to those of the nation. The Army proudly continues to sacrifice its blood, comfort and popularity for the needs of the nation.⁷⁹ In the end though, it's not about popularity, it's about capabilities that the nation needs to provide for its

security and accomplish the tenets of the national security strategy. But resources and priorities in the fiscal year 1999 defense budget request are confusing at best. There is no funding slated for ongoing operations in Bosnia even though the Army has approximately 8,500 soldiers deployed there maintaining an uneasy peace. On the other hand, the Administration's request includes \$48.7 billion to purchase new weapons, primarily advanced fighter aircraft.⁸⁰

Today's relatively stable security environment rests on two fundamental assumptions. First, that the United States will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world over the next 15 to 20 years and second, that it will maintain military superiority over current and potential threats.⁸¹ Those are noble and powerful goals for a nation that stands for peace and freedom, and they are attainable with a balanced military force that is capable of fulfilling the nation's warfighting demands.

In spite of all the problems we face today, peace prevails and that is a powerful force for stability in the world. Balanced military forces provide the nation the capability to engage friends and allies and influence global events. Well-equipped ground forces, armed with the most modern weapons the nation can produce supported by equally capable naval and air

forces will enable the assumptions of the national security strategy to become realities.

If soldiers are the nation's warfighting credentials, then people will continue to be the military's crown jewels. In the end, young Americans in military uniform, our sons and daughters, will be the nation's premier weapons. They will be the ones we entrust to determine the fate of our country's continued freedom and guarantee its role as a global leader. Today's geo-strategic environment offers myriad challenges and opportunities, but the national security strategy offers the roadmap to tame rogue tigers and thus enable peace and prosperity to prevail. American soldiers will continue to be the ultimate arbitrators on the battlefield; they will be the ones expected to tame unruly tigers. It is the nation's duty to ensure that America's warriors are properly armed and plentiful enough to do the nation's bidding; it is the sacred obligation of our military and civilian leaders to guarantee no less.

...guns are hardware, and man, not hardware, is the ultimate weapon....What happened to them might have happened to any American in the summer of 1950....They had been raised to believe the world was without tigers, then sent to face those tigers with a stick. On their society must fall the blame."⁸²

Word count: 7,480.

ENDNOTES

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³ T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, A Study in Unpreparedness (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 165.

⁴ NSC-68, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950 (Naval War College Review, May-Jun 1975), 51-108.

⁵ Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1997), 3.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid, 10.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid, 12.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid, 13.

¹² Allen R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 395-396.

¹³ Ibid, 407.

¹⁴ Macgregor, 14.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid, 15.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, 17.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York, NY, Simon & Schuster, 1991), 341.

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²³ Williamson Murray, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Christopher K. Ives, Brassey's Merston American Defense Annual, The United States and the Emerging Strategic Environment, 1995-1996 (Ohio State University, Ohio, Brassey's, 1995), 53.

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⁷⁶ Builder, 152.

⁷⁷ Builder, 153.

⁷⁸ The idea for this paragraph was raised during an advance course study of the Army' partners.

⁷⁹ Builder, 191.

⁸⁰ Greg Schneider, "Procurement Gets Boost in 1999 Budget." Baltimore Sun, February 3, 1998, 1/1C.

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⁸² Fehrenbach, 123.

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