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19 November 1985

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RECENT LOOK AT ISRAELI-BLACK AFRICAN RELATIONS

Paris LE MOIS in French Jun-Sep 85 pp 3-25

[Jun-Jul 85 pp 3-25]

[Two-part Article by Leon Cesar Codo; Part I: "Introduction"]

Owing to their scope and to the spectacular aspects of their emergence onto the world scene, the 1972-1973 breaks between Israel and the Black African States marked, for the Jewish State, the collapse of a patient and fruitful policy of cooperation with the African countries, a policy that dates back to the dawning hours of African independence. In fact, aside from eight African countries belonging to the Arab League and siding with the Arab camp from the outset (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia), and Guinea, which severed ties with Israel in the early aftermath of the 6-Day War in 1976, the South-African satellites (Lesotho, Swaziland), and Malawi, all the African States belonging to the OAU at the time had to break off their diplomatic relations with Israel between March 1972 and November 1973. The product of a laborious diplomatic offensive mounted by the Arab countries, begun as early as 1967 and spread through political and financial pressures brought to bear on a number of African countries, those breaches marked the end of African neutrality in the Middle East conflict and the beginning of wandering in the desert for Israeli diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite continuing economic ties with certain African capitals.

As of then, concerned with protecting and consolidating the political and diplomatic victories it had chalked up during the Yom Kippur War, the Middle-East Arab nations, rejoicing as well in the new power thrust upon them by their status in the greatly altered global economic picture(1), made a sensational entrance onto the African political scene with the clearly stated intention of driving Israel out for all time. However, 10 years after the onset of the cascade of Israeli-African ruptures, Zaire renewed its ties with the Jewish State in a communique issued on 14 May 1982 in Kinshasa, followed a few months later by Liberia, which announced its decision in August 1983.

Was this the start of another turnabout of which Africa seemed to know the secret? What happened during that decade in Africa, after Israel's diplomatic eviction? What were the key factors -- economic and financial as well as strategic -- behind what can already be called a new pro-Israeli realism whose flowering, albeit slow, was visible at the start of the Eighties?

The Arab decade in Africa was unquestionably remarkable for the start of Arab-African dialogue that was to take the form of a cooperation whose ideology laid claim to roots in historical or geographical factors (the mixing of the races, plus other ties of a commercial, cultural, or religious nature) and in the colonial factor, but whose terms were not external to the formation of an African clientele that would be pro-Arab and, above all, anti-Israel in the international organizations, and especially the UN, in exchange for financial assistance or transfers of Arab capital to Africa.

Euphoric at the start, the renewal of acquaintanceship and restoration of old ties, along with Arab-African cooperation would very shortly bog down in the basic divergence over the very concept of that cooperation, its machinery, and its goals.

The manifold divisions among the Arab countries, incapable of mounting any common action vis-a-vis Africa, the selectivity and particularly the inadequacy of Arab financial initiatives by comparison with African expectations, despite the impression of a united front against Zionism, colonialism, and apartheid, very speedily eroded the store of credit the Arab countries enjoyed among African countries whose disenchantment would shortly be apparent (and would deepen into resentment).

We shall try to analyze the reasons for this disenchantment in the African countries in the light of the record of Arab-African cooperation, a disenchantment whose role is important in the new African attitude toward Israel. The swift erosion of Arab positions in Sub-Saharan Africa, visible in the steady crumbling of the highly-touted "automatic majority" that fed the fears of Israeli diplomats throughout that decade, cannot be attributed solely to the earlier experiences in Arab-African cooperation.

The truth is that a number of events came along to topple Africa's strategic geopolitical configuration. To begin with, the Camp David process that was to lead to the return of the Sinai to Egypt, and to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel. Given its international, regional, and African implications, the Camp David process emerges as one of the most promising elements favoring Israel's return to the African continent.

In the second place, the threats or rather the fears of destabilization rightly or wrongly perceived in Col Qadhafi's Libya, an Arab country, by a number of "moderate" African countries below or on the fringes of the Sahara, and even by Egypt, like the need for security engendered by this situation, seems to move some of them to turn toward the United States and ... toward Israel, its special ally, which, given the overriding convergence of interests, cannot but involve France, in one way or another, as we shall see.

Actually, what we have here is a new strategic given that has taken root and one which the African countries least fearful of Arab reprisals and capable of doing without Arab aid are learning some lessons.

We shall attempt to single out the factors that encourage this new pro-Israeli realism.

Meanwhile, despite these constructive factors, Israel's return to the African continent is not yet a fait-accompli. Even now, one can go so far as to say that its presence in Africa will not have the same scope as it did before 1972 -- for that matter, this is the way Israel would rather have it -- because one may well wonder whether or not current conditions foreshadow a trend toward the rebirth of the famous Monrovia and Casablanca Groups, and to a split between pro- and anti-Israel sides, which would even further deepen the division of Africa and the crisis besetting the OAU.

I. Harsh Realities of Arab-African Cooperation: From African Disenchantment to African Resentment

Unquestionably, the question of Arab-African cooperation, as a prime example on a large scale of horizontal South-to-South cooperation, has dominated the debate over development aid for the past decade. Even better, and this is what concerns us, Arab-African cooperation is the backdrop for the important diplomatic game, rife with unanticipated developments, that is now being played out on the African continent. The crucial question in this connection is this: can this cooperation, that has languished almost since its birth in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, constitute a strong enough barrier to contain the Israeli diplomatic offensive that has been pushed since 1980 with an eye to the Jewish State's comeback debut on the African political and strategic scene?

The fact is that, designed to seal forever -- or at least that is what people thought -- the new solidarity born of the Israeli-African estrangement, Arab-African cooperation has fallen prey to crisis, a crisis that will make available to Egypt the political and psychological space it needs to achieve its goal of a separate peace with Israel without worrying too much about Arab-African thunderbolts. Should we, though, be astonished at this crisis?

In fact, the ideological assemblage based on a shared struggle against imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, and Zionism disguised for the occasion as racism, could not long conceal first the ambiguities and misunderstandings that prevailed at its emergence, nor serious disagreements over the approach to cooperation among the partners that became apparent as they got down to discussing the details.

Arab-African cooperation was not born of any ideological consensus; how could it be otherwise, given the diversity of the partners and of their ideological preferences, of their respective political concerns and their alliances? Even less was it the outgrowth of long-standing historical ties which, when closely scrutinized, do not flow in the direction of Arab-African rapprochement... It is primarily a situation that emerged from a two-pronged contingency: the 1973 October War, of course, but, more importantly, the trend in economic power

relationships at the global level in the wake of the oil price-hikes. That latter event gave the Arab, African, or Gulf States the wherewithal to enter upon a more activist African policy, and, above all, the means for bringing diplomatic pressure to bear in favor of a reversal of African alliances with them.

It also enabled the African countries to rally in time to the right side in the new economic poker-game, and allowed them to hope for a share of the unprecedented shower of financial manna that had fallen within the space of a few years into Arab hands. To tell the truth, "good feeling played a minor role in this business; the Israelis' standing fast in the occupied territories was of far less import than the tremendous potential flow of financial aid from the oil-producing Arab countries." (2)

To be convinced of this, one need only remember that a few years earlier, in 1967 during the 6-Day War, only Sekou Toure's Guinea had severed relations with Israel, while Nasser's attempts to persuade his "African brethren" to support him in his war with the Jewish State were vain, from the Sixties right up into 1972.

Accordingly, we can say that on the African side, the economic variable was strongly operative in the diplomatic decisions of 1972 and 1973. On the Arab side, in Africa or in the Gulf, there was a startlingly swift awakening to the enormous amount of potential influence and power that would give rise to petroleum surpluses, influence and power which the African scene would make it possible to exercise in the pursuit of a collective strategy for driving Israel out of the continent, or in furtherance of individual aspirations to regional power. This is why the economic and development concerns that shaped Sub-Saharan African diplomacy during this period of Middle-East conflict would be relatively eclipsed in the Arab concept of cooperation. These two approaches inevitably elicited, behind the smiling facades and the anti-imperialist shibboleths, a degree of resentment and, eventually, of bitterness on the African side. These two approaches to the infant notion of cooperation explain the overall crisis in Arab-African cooperation efforts, but also, when looked at closely, the shortcomings and misfortunes and mistakes that plagued economic and financial cooperation, particularly multilateral agreements, to the point where in foreign policy matters multilateral aid was never a valid vector for influence. They also explain the Africans' unspoken political grievances, in the background of the discourse of solidarity, as well as the growing and widespread feeling in some African capitals south of the Sahara over the Arabs' establishment of a channel for dependency every bit as demanding as that of conventional North-South relationships.

Our intent is not to pass judgment on Arab-African cooperation (on that score, see the three very comprehensive articles by Mr Otayek) (3), but to bring into clearer focus just what it was that through this cooperation, created the psychological climate whose development would open the way for Israel's return to the African continent.

A. Shortcomings and Errors in Arab-African Economic and Financial cooperation.

Underlying the difficulties that would arise, in the months ahead, in making a start at Arab-African cooperation was a three-fold disagreement: over the concept of cooperation, over its machinery, and over its objectives. That three-fold lack of understanding was to find expression during the preliminary meetings to the first Arab-African summit meeting in Cairo from 7 to 9 April 1977 (4).

What had happened was this: in Lusaka, while the Committee of the "24" (an institution embracing representatives of African and Arab States as well as such organizations as the Arab League, the PLO, and the OAU) had gathered in January 1977, the Africans (from south of the Sahara) had brought their demands to the fore as part of a plan sponsored by Tanzania, a project that can be summarized as follows:

1. The need to compensate for the loss of Israeli technical aid;
2. Allowing Africa preferential oil prices, with the understanding that the price-hike would be used as a means to bring pressure on the industrial countries friendly to Israel;
3. Use the oil surpluses to support the development efforts of the African countries through financial aid, investments, and divers and sundry transfers.

The Tanzanian plan called, in addition to a change in the mode of distribution of Arab aid, for an increase in that aid and, most important, for assignment of Arab financial resources to be made available to the African countries, after the model of the ADB, one way of asking for African management of Arab funds sheltered against favoritism and politicization.

For the Arab countries expected to provide the funds, there could be no question of taking over the economic development of all Africa, which, as they pointed out, includes 28 of the poorest countries in the world. Better yet: reminding their African partners of their (the Arabs') already heavy commitments to the poor Arab countries, the Islamic countries, and international agencies, the Arab countries made the point that they, too, must look to their future by making their investments as productive as possible and, that's being the case, that they could not be targeted solely on assistance and friendship.

For the Arab providers of funds, the Arab contribution was to be perceived less as a duty than as a voluntary contribution among others. To sum up, and to quote the phrase used by the Kuwaiti Finance Minister, this was a flat refusal "to play Santa Claus." Actually, not only had the Arabs turned down the notion of preferential prices, but they were in no position to take the place of Israeli aid, since it was essentially technical in nature, whereas they themselves sought that kind of help.

As for the institutions through which the flow of financing was to run, it was out of the question for the Arab donors to leave control of the money in African hands. That out-of-hand dismissal of the Lusaka proposals foreshadowed the eventual souring of cooperation. And in fact, ever since then, the grievances have been piling up.

Sluggish Operations of the Special Financing Institutions and Delays in Execution of Economic Decisions.

In this connection, be it remembered, and the Africans did not omit doing so, that the Special Arab Fund for Africa (FASA) set up in January 1974 and made \$200 million available to the African States to finance their oil imports and to develop their own energy resources, did not, in the event, distribute the first portion of those funds until October 1974.

The Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA), founded in 1973, did not begin making loans to African countries until November 1975, 2 years later, underscoring the fact that in June 1976 the list of projects for which assistance had been approved committed only a sliver over 50 percent of its resources: \$143 million out of \$231 million.

As for the Technical Aid Fund for Arab and African Countries (FATAA), ridiculously parsimonious size of its capital (\$15 million) doomed it from the start to inanition.

The Initial inadequacy, Then the Regular Decline in Arab Transfers Since 1973, Apart from Random Spurts, and Desultory Disbursements.

The African countries who had entered the cooperation arrangement on the asking side expected the Arab transfers to offset, at the very least, the ballooning of their oil bills. Though it is hard to come up with any overall figure for the surcharge occasioned by the increase in oil prices, an estimate of \$500 million per year would be plausible, for all the non-oil-producing African countries (5), which is, after all, well above the cumulative aid provided by the Arab countries and the IMF. If you factor in the size of the oil bill in 1974, estimated at \$11 billion for the entire Third World, plus the \$10 billion due to retaliatory price increases in manufactured products, it become clear that at the African level, these additional outlays have brought some countries a major economic shock (6).

Even if you look at the volume of transfers per se, you can say, with Mr Otayek (7) that there is a substantial drop in multilateral transfers, both from the BADEA and from the Arab Development Fund.

As for bilateral aid, while its level may look pretty good by comparison with multilateral assistance, it also displays a marked slowdown. The ADP ratio [Public Assistance to Development to GNP] for Arab aid has declined, falling from 1.48 percent to 1.35 percent, the lowest rate since 1973, as opposed to 2 percent in 1976 and 3 percent in 1975.

Selectivity in Bilateral Aid

This is one of the frequent complaints. And it would seem, in fact, when one looks at the regional distributions, that there is double discrimination at work here, despite efforts at geographic diversification in aid. There is an initial screening that determines the flow of more substantial sums to countries like Pakistan and India than to Africa. A second screening process, whose victims are the African countries with relatively minor Islamic populations, as opposed to those where the Islamic population is larger. The Sub-Saharan States' share of bilateral transfers in 1980 came to less than 4 percent.

Tougher Loan Conditions for Arab Commitments

This is another of the complaints that has heated up the Arab African dispute. While the OECD pointed out that between 1975 and 1977 there was a general softening in what had hitherto been extremely strict conditions surrounding Arab aid, there has been a counter-trend setting in since 1979, along with the clearly paradoxical finding that it is the poorest countries that get the hardest terms.

Among the donor members of OPEC that have toughened their conditions are Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Nigeria. In addition, we note the fact that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abou Dhabi, and Qatar will invest only with guarantees from such international organizations as the IMF, the IBRD, etc.

There is mounting irritation in Sub-Saharan Africa, faced with a brand of cooperation upon which it may have pinned too much faith. Increasingly heated denunciations are voiced not only on the economic aspect of the situation, but also on its political aspect.

B -- The Background-Level of the Arab-African Discourse on Solidarity: African Complaints

The political side of the Arab-African dispute seems to come complete with an economic and financial side. Despite the ritual proclamations repeated in position statements in international debate (UN, OAU, Islamic Conference), or in the joint communiques issued during bilateral visits, on readiness to fight Zionism from one quarter, apartheid from another, it would seem that doubts are surfacing on the African side as to the efficacy of that readiness, particularly when it involves the economic boycott of the racist regime in South Africa.

Whereas, the Africans point out, we have never left off underscoring the legitimacy of the Palestinian claims, the Arab attitude tends toward lukewarm vis-a-vis the liberation movements in Southern Africa, and seems to us ambiguous, to say the least. That assessment would seem to be borne out by the world trade statistics, which show that the isolation of the racist South African regime is far from total.

In fact, while South Africa is beginning to fade out of the list of important clients of suppliers of the North African States, it is still anything but a negligible partner, not to say the main partner in Africa for many Middle East Arab States such as Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Iran. "In 1974, the South African Ambassador to London traveled discreetly to Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon with requests to open airport terminals for South African Airways." (8). Even more spectacular was the announcement from the London Institute for Strategic Studies of Jordan's 1974 sale of 54 "Tigercat" missiles and 41 "Centurion" tanks to South Africa. As for Morocco, in 1980 it bought South African Eland armored vehicles. If we are to credit the SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON, Egypt would be willing to forward French arms shipments to South Africa. And lastly, the Saudi National Commercial Bank is said to be an associate in a Brazilian banking firm, a subsidiary of the South African Anglo American Company in mining Brazilian gold (9).

These intricate ties among some Arab countries and South Africa are hardly astonishing per se. They merely confirm the divergence of interests and the diversity of ideology peculiar to the two groups of partners. In truth, for a country like Saudi Arabia whose pro-Western proclivities are common knowledge, the stability of the Cape route, above and beyond its importance to trade, requires the utmost prudence when it comes to financial aid to the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

It is also worth noting that in general Libyan activism south of the Sahara seems increasingly to crystallize all of the region's anti-Arab resentments. We shall see shortly how these resentments are hardened by pro-Israeli realism, the more so in that we see Libya again in the Chadian conflict as a direct major player. Its support for Goukouni Oueddeinne does not necessarily bode a swift settlement of the conflict. Most unacceptable, however, for some African capitals, is the Libyan army's occupation of the Aouzou Strip, whose value apparently lies in its large uranium reserves. The Aouzou Strip also seems to be of some strategic worth in Libya's plans to secure this portion of the Sahara as a buffer against threats from Egypt and Sudan. "Based on an unequivocal interpretation of the Franco-Italian treaty of 7 June 1935 delineating the border between Chad and Libya," (12) a treaty which, among other things, was never ratified, this decision would inevitably anger some of the African countries for whom the principle of the intangibility of borders, enshrined in the OAU Charter, stands and must continue to stand as a sacrosanct principle.

Aside from such actions, which do not square with the rhetoric in vogue during the glory days of "Arab-African friendship," one can also detect a recrudescence of diplomatic pressures exerted by some Arab countries during votes in the international organizations. These continuing and unrelenting diplomatic pressures clearly express Arab determination to be a permanent and active presence in the major diplomatic choices of African countries south of the Sahara.

Lastly, one more observation made since 1980, most openly by such African countries as Ivory Coast and Tanzania: that of the differentiations in attitude the Arab countries take on the Israeli question when they deal with their various partners. While there are open threats directed at African

countries perceived as leaning toward renewed ties with Israel, we find that all the Near East Arab countries never broke their relations with the European countries or with the United States, even though it is a friend of Israel, but cooperate and trade with it. While Arab aid to the African nations seeking help aimed at hoped-for dependable support in the Near-East conflict, it is clear that aid obtained by countries having diplomatic relations with Israel is anything but negligible. (See Table I)

In fact, this situation in which Arab-African cooperation now finds itself is inconsistent. When you look at Arab initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa, you realize that they respond very often to clearly defined goals which are a far cry from the anti-imperialist solidarity discourse which has lulled many African countries. Not only is the African policy of the Arab countries consistent, but it looks legitimate if you start from the elementary premise that there is no such thing as purely philanthropic cooperation or aid. Actually, the Arabs, like other countries everywhere, East as well as West, always have and always will utilize their economic and financial strength to achieve political and cultural objectives in Africa.

C. Arab-African cooperation as vector for a collective
or individual Arab strategy for influence and power.

International relations are not the privileged pale of great or middling powers. They are also formed by the interplay, concerted or autonomous, of so-called regional powers whose influence can be measured only by their capacity to act on and modify the attitudes of their neighbor countries. With the wealth bestowed upon them by the oil surpluses, the Arab countries that own them find on the African scene their chance at individual or collective assertion of international status. In fact, the Arab objectives in Africa have been evident from the moment of their appearance on the African political scene, once you scrape off the ideological and the purposely misleading cliches.

The prime target was unquestionably the formation of a diplomatic supporting cast, preferably unwavering, for the Arab and Palestinian cause in the Near-East conflict. The sheer numbers of African countries south of the Sahara make them an indispensable ally in decisions made by the international community inside such organizations as the UN, or the OAU. Israel in fact was far ahead of the Arabs to grasp this important aspect of the conflict between it and its Arab neighbors. After all, it is unseemly for a country to whose birth the UN was both midwife and godmother to be put in the dock and routinely denounced, even though it can rely on the veto rescue of allies like the indefectible United States.

This Arab striving for a diplomatic clientele seems to be subtended in the Arab strategy for multilateral cooperation, whose aim is to hold Sub-Saharan Africa in a system of global solidarity. Multilateral transfers must accordingly, without ostentation or philanthropic pretense, aim at establishing a dependence whose corollary would be support. Hence it matters little that the African partners find these funds inadequate: the goal is not to inundate Black Africa with capital, but to make these transfers the disincentive to potential notions about switching alliances. It is therefore not surprising that, once that goal had been achieved, Arab countries have turned deaf ears to the aggrieved chidings of their partners. Clearly, that strategy is effective insofar as, despite the sometimes bitter complaints about the Arab notion of cooperation, some African capitals have confined their discontent to words. The fact of the matter is that, in an economically painful situation for Africa, already struggling with drought and famine, while the recession hanging over the Western countries is drying up the sources of financial aid, or yesterday's generosity is dwindling, Arab transfers at whatever level are still vital to the African economies. That explains, as we shall see, why Israel's return there will be difficult at worst, and selective at best.

The second objective may be as important as, or even more important than the first one: it is Pan-Islamic patronage-building. It is an objective global in its effects but one that may be implemented in a multiplicity of ways -- a goal that is global in its effects: the advancement of Islam involves not only cultural aspects, but political ones as well. The cultural aspect contemplates homogenization of the African religious universe under the banner of Islam. Obviously, this cultural aspect swiftly spills over into ideology and from there into politics. In fact, as J.-C Froelich (13) wrote: "Perhaps this Black Islam will play a political role in shoring up the hopes of certain elites to de-Europeanize Africa?" Furthermore, the growing proportion of converts to Islam in the population of a given State is not inconsequential in the conduct of foreign policy by that State, or even in the domestic political interplay in the government's quest for legitimacy and alliances. We shall come back to this point, because it is one of the current obstacles to Israel's return.

Unlike the first objective, this second one is subtended by bilateral cooperation. Two Arab States have in fact used it as a weapon for penetration. Saudi Arabia and Libya "to all intents and purposes the Riyadh royal family personally subsidizes instruction in the Koran and mosque construction" (14). As for Libya, it has entered into a number of cultural agreements which call for establishment of Arab-slanted education, construction of Medersas, and religious broadcasts over the various national radio networks.

The threat posed by Pan-Islamic patronage to a number of African States south of the Sahara is often perceived hazily, but it is beginning to be seen more clearly in some of them, at least. Item: FRATERNITE-MATIN, an Ivory Coast daily with access to government circles wrote (15) on 3 December 1983: "The handful of mosques built with capital contributions from the oil-producing countries in our countries are designed more to strengthen Islamic influence or worse, Arab-world imperialism among us than to make any real contribution to the development of our countries. They do not nurture the growth of our people."

The third Arab objective is undoubtedly individual assertion of international status. In other words, to deploy diplomatic, political, and even military action in Africa which would enable it to shape the continent according to their own ideological standards.

The example of Saudi Arabia is typical. The same goes for Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and the rest. The considerations that led Saudi Arabia to take an interest in Africa are at once historical and strategic. Certainly the spread of Islam into the Black countries, and the peculiar situation of a country whose access to the sea is controlled by the Straits of Hormuz for the Gulf and by the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb at the exit from the Red Sea. It is these considerations that dictate the Saudi ruler's determination to block Soviet penetration. That is why he moved swiftly to get them ousted from Somalia and to cut off aid to the Eritrean rebellion in response to the possibility of the birth of an Arab State, but one which would in all likelihood turn out to be progressive.

Another country that is the object of Saudi Arabian interest is Sudan. Saudi Arabia's action strikes directly at the heart of Africa. Saudi funds have been used, for example, to finance outside intervention in Shaba or for limited aid to countries more or less threatened by Soviet interference.

This Saudi Arabian African policy is by no means free of economic concerns. Aid to Sudan is one instance. The Saudis, however, are also thinking of the post-petroleum period and of their future need for uranium, of which certain African countries have large reserves, and which today seem to them indispensable to the maintenance of their sphere of influence.

It is also this objective of asserting regional power that Morocco had in its sights when it twice sent troops to intervene in Shaba. It is wise, before leaping to the conclusion that not all these objectives, depending on how they are implemented, are necessarily contrary to the wishes of the African countries because they can reveal some converging objectives that are, to say the least, curious, and which complicate analysis of the interplay among those involved.

In conclusion, one may say that in general Arab-African cooperation is an unstable and destabilizing cooperation, which leaves very little elbow-room for maneuvering on the African side, apart from the threat to switch alliances. Seemingly, it is the idea of support for implementation of a horizontal dependence that the African countries seek to evade by casting about for a counterbalance: Israel might be one. In fact, the crisis in Arab-African cooperation that stems from these considerations will set up, first of all, a psychological state in Sub-Saharan Africa, besides allowing President Sadat, without major risk of condemnation by his African peers, to complete the process of a separate peace with Israel. The crisis in Arab-African cooperation will therefore create the conditions for Camp David which, in turn, would hasten the process of erosion of the Arab positions in Black Africa.

It is under these favorable conditions that Israel plans to stage its comeback on the African stage.

II. THE CRITICAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC FACTORS BEHIND THE NEW PRO-ISRAELI REALISM

With the withdrawal, the peace process initiated by President Sadat with his "journey to Jerusalem," which culminated in the signing of the Camp David accords in 1979 and in the restitution of the Sinai in April 1982, constitute a momentous event that was to entail major political, strategic, and diplomatic readjustments.

What happened was that the Camp David accords, by establishing peace between Egypt and the Jewish State, would heighten the confusion in Arab-African cooperation circles and in Black Africa. From the first timid approach taken at the beginning of the process, we shift to indecision, then, finally, to approving silence. This marked the beginning of the breakaway by the moderate African groups from the Arab maximalist arguments, through a reading of the Camp David accords that seemed to these moderate States to mark the end of the obligation to side with Egypt in the Near-East conflict against Israel.

Nor was that all: Camp David was Black Africa's introduction to regional implications, designed to calm the area's considerable fears of destabilizing threats, ostensibly from Libya, but behind which, it was believed, lurked the Soviet Union. Can Egypt, which now seems safely anchored in the Western camp, insure the security so sorely needed by some Black African countries? Egypt's

means, yesterday under Nasser and today under Hosni Mubarak, are still "hopelessly limited." It is hard to take Egypt's ambitions for a grand policy for Africa too seriously. Well, then, though Egypt cannot be the recourse long awaited in certain African capitals, it will forever be credited with creating the conditions that opened the way to choosing an alternate solution: Israel.

A. Camp David: African Reactions and Interpretations

While the peace process engaged by President Sadat with Israel very quickly evoked hostility from most of the Arab countries generally counted among the progressives, be they African or Near Eastern, as well as guarded opposition from the other Arab countries like Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Black African countries, for their part, were to seize the opportunity to distance themselves from the Arab arguments already deemed "bitter-ended," and also to refuse to get involved in Arab quarrels which would lead to Egypt's diplomatic isolation in the Arab world.

Despite the pro-forma reservations expressed at meetings of the OAU committees or the Arab-African multilateral cooperation circles, Black Africa's attitude was essentially one of "watchful waiting" (16) during the first phase of the negotiations.

That attitude was nothing more than the expression of deep diplomatic embarrassment for the majority of African countries looking at a situation that would ineluctably force them to choose between two mutually exclusive loyalties. Strongly in favor of a negotiated settlement in the Mid-East conflict, which the Organization of African Unity had, however, voiced through its Mediation Commission demarche in 1971 (17), can Africa condemn the Egyptian initiative, which is merely a particularist move, of course, for seeking a negotiated peace?

Furthermore, could it condemn Egypt, an African country and founding member of the OAU, forgetting the solidarity the member countries pledged to one another in that organization? From another angle, though, despite the disappointments of Arab-African cooperation, could Africa so abruptly abjure the solidarity it had freely pledged with the Arabs en bloc? Clearly, in the context of Africa racked by dissensions over the Western Sahara problem, any decision either way could only exacerbate tensions and precipitate the obliteration of the OAU, a consummation no African country desired. At that point, it seemed that there might be some refuge in silence, aside from the practically pro-forma approach taken by ex-president Amin Dada, then acting president of the OAU. In effect, in a letter addressed to the Egyptian Chief of State, the acting president of the OAU asked for clarification in order, he wrote, to dispel the "confusion" prevailing in "the minds of Egypt's friends." (18).

However, though the silence was deafening, it did not prevent expression of "discreet approval, innocent of all ambiguity," on the part of the so-called moderate African countries, including Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Zaire.

An adviser to President Houphouet Boigny visiting in Cairo said in January 1978:

"Ivory Coast supports President Sadat's action designed to achieve a just peace in the Near East."(19)

What emerges as important in this phase of reactions -- or the absence thereof -- in Black Africa is that it would enable Egypt to launch a diplomatic offensive in Black Africa in support of his peace initiative, an offensive whose results, while not extraordinary, would begin the process of dissociation by the African moderate group from the Arabs' hard-line front (20). When you read back over this Egyptian diplomatic operation, you come to realize that it also paved the way to a kind of rehabilitation of Israel, whose intransigent behavior in the Near-East conflict had evoked more than annoyance among many moderate African Chiefs of State. In the event, while Egypt deserves credit for considerable courage by getting involved in the peace process, it was also able to do it thanks to some voluntary softening of its stance on the part of the Jewish State.

The results of the Egyptian diplomatic missions, the visits by Boutros Ghali to many African capitals would be marred by a manifest non-acceptance on the part of most African countries, aside from Kenya, vis-a-vis the Egyptian arguments.

That diplomatic lukewarmness would not stop the Black African States from opposing an outright dismissal of the wishes so insistently pressed by certain Arab countries for Egypt's ouster from certain international and regional organizations.

Meanwhile, despite this diplomatic fuzziness, the African reading of the Camp David accords, which the African States had refrained from condemning outright, began to pop up gradually, at least in moderate African countries and even in others, such as Angola,

Mozambique, and Ethiopia. The 1979 Camp David accords, especially the return of the Sinai to Egypt in April 1982, would, for some African countries, mark the end of Pan-African involvement in the Near-East conflict. For these countries, the reasoning ran like this: Egypt, an African country a portion of whose territory, and hence of African territory, had been occupied, had just had its territorial integrity restored. Better yet, under the terms of the peace treaty that had just been signed, it was no longer at war with Israel; and it had established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level with Israel. Hence there was no longer any reason for the commitment to support Egypt in the Near-East conflict. Placing the Palestinian conflict in its Near-Eastern context, and therefor its non-African context, despite their understanding of the Palestinian claims, the African countries, especially the moderates among them, felt themselves absolved of all pro-Arab commitments, especially since the Arab commitment to the Palestinian problem far outstripped its enthusiasm for the Southern Africa question, which was far from whole-hearted.

This African reading of the Camp David accords, even though it did not carry a majority in Africa, is enough to enable Israel to use those same arguments to persuade the African countries to restore relations with it, African countries most sensitive to the problems of internal security and political stability. Security and stability are two concerns Egypt, as part of the Western strategic alignment, does not look like a good candidate as guarantor in Black Africa.

B -- Camp David: Regional Readings from
Sub-Saharan Africa

Camp David, as its name indicates, is a "Pax Americana." It was accepted by the new Egyptian leadership that believed, from the outset, that only the United States held the cards that could put an end to the conflict by forcing Israel to the negotiating table. This choice of a peace proposed by the United States is not, despite appearances, a tactical choice: it was a strategic choice whose long-term aim is to eliminate any Soviet presence in the Nile Basin area. It thus follows logically that Camp David was to mark the true return and inclusion of Egypt in the American strategy for interdicting any Soviet infiltration into the Nilotic region on the one hand and into Sub-Saharan Africa on the other.

This American strategic objective, adopted as its own by Egypt, inevitably attracted the interest of several capitals in Sub-Saharan Africa. The question is: can Egypt handle this role of "Western sanctuary" that it would like to play, and can it, with its minimal resources, act as the stabilizing power for Black Africa?

The new Rais has the political will to take on such a role. In the United States in April 1977 and in an interview over Antenne 2 on 14 January 1981, he said: "Egypt could stand as a rampart against communism along the confines of Africa..."

He would also sound the alarm over Soviet activities in Africa with his expose of the notorious "three Red belts" theory which, according to him, had been mapped out by Moscow and its allies: from Angola to Mozambique on the south, from Afghanistan to Chad through Libya in the center, and the Moscow-Damascus-Tripoli axis in the north. As Rene Otayek wrote, this Egyptian readiness to stand up and act as an ever-ready haven for the West "is based on the disintegration of the Iranian monarchy before the onslaught of the Islamic Revolution, as well as on Saudi Arabia's reservations about a "Pax Americana" which would leave the Palestinian question unresolved." Under these conditions, Egypt would unfailingly gain political credibility in application of its strategy of anti-Soviet "containment" in Sub-Saharan Africa.

As for credit for its actions since 1977, Egypt's kudos stem from an entirely different assessment. Actually, "it was during the first Shaba war that President Sadat decided, on 1 May 1977, to commit Egypt to the Western cause by ...promising to take over a portion of the Zairian Air Force." (21). However, neither that move nor the second one in June 1978 (22) developed into any real strategic cooperation with Zaire, owing to the total inadequacy of Egyptian assistance. Despite offers of military support to Morocco in the

Western Sahara war which, in the event, proved grudging, and despite attempts to increase its military cooperation with Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Chad, and Somalia, Egypt proved incapable of putting together a structure around itself that would hold as an inter-African alliance against the Soviet Union and its African allies, in whose front ranks stands Libya. It was, however, mainly events in Chad that revealed the weakness of the Egyptian strategy. When the time came, Cairo sent only a few weapons to the Chadian splinter-group hostile to Libya, and even that was a shipment that Cairo hastened to deny ever having sent. (23).

When one knows the intense emotion and fears aroused in Black Africa by the announcement in early January 1981 of the Chad-Libyan Union, one understands why the credibility of the Egyptian rampart against Col Qadhdhafi's destabilizing operations swiftly vanished. Despite a new diplomatic offensive in the form of a proposal for expanded military cooperation, embracing the Horn of Africa, West Africa, plus States like Rwanda and Burundi, mounted after the announcement of that union which, for that matter, bore out the arguments for the Egyptian crusade in Africa, "Egypt's capacity to replace non-African protection protection with its own would prove to be extremely limited." (24)

Meanwhile, these fruitless Egyptian initiatives would leave room for a closer relationship with "moderate" Africa, a coziness that materialized in the official approval from Mr Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal, of any initiative for peace in the Near East, in this instance Egypt's. It was clear, though, in Sub-Saharan Africa especially in the "moderate" African capitals, that, in view of their feeling that the traditional great powers had bowed out of their role, they had to look elsewhere for new help and support if they were to deal with the orchestrated destabilization at the gates to the Sahara that directly threatened their regime.

C -- Sub-Saharan Africa and the specter
of destabilization: the quest for security.

The 1980s were marked in Africa by the importance conferred on security concerns in African countries' foreign policy, whether those countries were labeled "moderate" or "progressive." Of course, such concerns were nothing new, but they had never before reached the level of top-priority or crucial problems. The evidence, should more be needed, is in the bloom of non-aggression pacts between countries that often meet in regional organizations that are predominantly economically-oriented, such as the West African Economic Community (CEAO) and the Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO).

Actually, since 1975 Africa has been a full-fledged participant in East-West rivalries, and deep-running currents of destabilization are flowing through and shaking Africa which, until then, had been lulled into a sense of security by the principles set forth in the OAU Charter: the intangibility of borders, non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, etc. Replacing the conservative rule established after 1963 and lasting through the first decade of independence was a more changeable order, one that worried a lot of people. The OAU was impotent as a result of its internal rifts, and it looked as

though the values and principles enshrined within it would turn out to be available only for use on the most arbitrarily approved occasions.

Latent border disputes exploded into open conflict. Occasionally, only a few shots were actually fired, but they showed that things had changed on the continent. For African leaders in office, while the economic concerns were not hidden, in this period during which their countries were striving to cope with economic crisis of maximum force, destabilization became an obsession and security a major concern.

In the event, President Mobutu and some of his peers believe that "there can be no development without security."

These worries over security would crop up from then on in political discourse, and in the bilateral contacts of many African leaders with friendly powers. As a result, the perceived threat to the majority of leaders seems indeed to emanate from Col Qadhdhafi's Libya. African political grievances do not stop with these Arab backslidings in anti-apartheid and anti-imperialist fervor, especially since, in such matters, a good many African countries are not above all suspicion. They also bear on certain Arab attitudes in conflict situations in Africa, some of which may have been brought about by certain Arab countries. Some African leaders have pointed out, in this connection, that even though the Arab Saharan Democratic Republic (RASD) was not admitted to membership in the Arab League, some Arab countries, Libya in particular, have tried to force the OAU to recognize it, after having thrust it on some African capitals south of the Sahara, a situation that has given rise to the schisms that led to the paralysis and the current crisis of the OAU.

Speaking for his peers, President Senghor declared, in his speech opening the Dakar Conference in 1976: "Let us have the courage to admit that our States often fail to abide by this principle of non-interference, without which there can be no peaceful coexistence, much less dynamic cooperation, unless they cease meddling in the internal affairs of their neighbors and brothers. This occurs most often in the form of support for the opposition by means of advice, of subsidies, and of course arms." (10).

During a plenary session of the Arab-African Conference, allegations leveled at certain Arab countries such as Libya were brought by Ethiopia, which complained of their support for the liberation movements in Eritrea. Ethiopia's exasperation rose to new levels of outrage over the aid lent by these same Arab countries to its adversaries in Somalia. Furthermore, ever since 1978 we have been witness to increasingly virulent tirades against Arab interference and other offenses which may be lumped together as imperialist ambitions which certain Arab countries blatantly display in Sub-Saharan Africa. And in fact, there is no shortage of examples of just such Arab initiatives. In Niger in 1976, an attempted coup d'etat was foiled. President Seyni Kountche forthwith charged a "foreign country" which all present immediately identified as Libya. And in fact, two events concomitant with that putsch tend to corroborate the argument for Libyan culpability: "On the one hand, the arrival at Niamey airport, while the coup d'etat was under way, of a Libyan aircraft laden with weapons, while its cargo manifest said it

was carrying grain, and, on the other, the identity of the leader of the mutineers, Cdr Sani Souda Sidou." (11)

As it turns out, the chief mutineer occupied the offices of Minister of the Interior and of Mines, which enabled him to control the nation's uranium prospecting and mining programs. Well: it would appear that the Libyan nuclear program's need for uranium was such as to push Libya to take over Nigeria's uranium-mining operation, if only to make sure of a steady source of supply! While under Diiori Hamani these plots had some chance of success, Seyni Kountche's patriotic refusal could only have annoyed the hot-tempered Col Qadhdhafi, hence the stage-managed coup de force to overthrow him.

The colonel he remembered was the man who had declared: "We believe that the Arab Nation is not only entitled to take over leadership of the Third World, of the non-aligned and socialist movements but that it is its bounden duty to do so.

It would appear, in the light of many events, that the expansionist ambitions, territorial and non-territorial, of the Libyan leader are more than mere flights of fancy in the minds of some African Chiefs of State. If you look at Niger, for example, the failure of the March 1976 coup d'etat, behind which the shadow of the Libyan colonel looms unmistakably, marked the start of a kind of guerrilla warfare of the airwaves against the Niamey regime, followed shortly thereafter by territorial demands on Northern Niger (the Air Region). This was a ploy to force the Nigerien government to renege on its reluctance to comply with Tripoli's desire for supplies of Nigerien uranium.

This pattern of behavior, typical of a country desirous of imposing its will as a regional power, inevitably alarmed countries with little means to deal with that. Furthermore, for certain African countries endowed with some degree of influence south of Sahara -- countries like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Zaire -- the advent of a third party in the diplomatic game they were trying to force as embryonic regional powers, it inevitably fuelled mistrust, not to say hostility.

Awareness of these threats of Libyan destabilization seems to be remarkably acute. The almost universal summons to arms which followed, for instance, the announcement of Libya's imminent annexation of Chad is evidence of that. On 12 January 1981, urgently summoned to Lome at the instance of the acting president of the OAU, Sika Stevens of Sierra Leone, the 12 chiefs of State empowered to find a settlement for the Chadian conflict firmly and unequivocally condemned the intended annexation. It was clear that Chad was a serious advance in Libya's influence over West Africa and Central Africa. Its establishment in N'Djamena would assuredly have set off major political up throughout these regions.

African apprehensions did not center solely on such spectacular Libyan action: they extended as well to what appeared to be Libyan-inspired activism on the part of opponents of certain Sub-Saharan governments. Gen Kolingba of the Central African Republic had just recently complained about the asylum and support lent by Libya to his most obstreperous opponents. Another recent instance came in May 1983, when the Ivory Coast press (25) reported these

anxieties: boxing and bold-facing the declaration in Cotonou (Benin) by Col Qadhdhafi underscoring "Libya's need to strengthen its alliance with every revolutionary country in Africa," and his admiration for the leaders of Ghana and Upper Volta, "countries whose revolution and progress" he intends to favor with resolute support," the Ivorian daily, which has close ties to government circles, denounced what it called "the highest common divisor of Africa" and a man pursuing his "idee fixe of destabilizing Africa." (26)

Addressing the National Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI) African Democratic Rally Council, President Houphouet Boigny in May 1983 bore down on the Libyan leader's statement at Cotonou, particularly on the passage in which Qadhdhafi had asserted that it was his duty "to stir the African peoples into revolution and the revolutionary forces in the African armies to join with the masses of the African people," repeatedly referring in his speech to the secondary-school teachers' strike.

In April 1983, on a visit to Washington, the Ivory Coast President "appealed to the United States and to the Western powers to oppose the attempts at destabilization mounted by the leader of the Libyan Revolution" (27). In this interview with THE WASHINGTON POST, the Ivory Coast Chief of State added:

"The African countries have done everything in their power to keep Col Qadhdhafi from becoming president of the OAU. Qadhdhafi supports radical movements all over the world, and it is up to the great powers to act with whatever means they have available." (28)

There is no doubt but that the Libyan menace is occasionally invoked for domestic political ends, but the concerns are real and sometimes well-founded. The question then arises for the African States south of the Sahara: how are they to guarantee their security, and to what major power to turn for help? To France, of course, except that France's waffling in African policy in its "pro-Third-World" advocacy (29) on the one hand plus its intensive trade relations with Libya cast doubt on Paris' will to take any meaningful stand against the Libyan threats. Well, then, what about the United States? Despite the Reagan administration's firmness toward the Soviet Union, the American commitment in Africa is still tentative, partly out of a willingness to avoid annoying Paris, whose private preserve Africa apparently is.

At this point, eyes turn to Israel, which shows all the signs of needing the benevolent neutrality of the African countries in the Near East conflict at the diplomatic level and, as well as "knowing its way around in security and military assistance matters," which is precisely what the worried African countries need. Some doors in Africa, which for that matter had always stood slightly ajar, would now be flung wide to Israel, and Israel would take advantage simultaneously of African defections from Arab-African cooperation and of the political and strategic dividends of the Camp David peace process.

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ANNEX: TABLE I

Chronology of Severance of Diplomatic Relations Between the African Countries and Israel

COUNTRY	Date of diplomatic break with Israel
Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Somali, Tunisia	Eight member countries of the Arab League have never had any diplomatic ties with Israel.
GUINEA	6 June 1967
UGANDA	30 March 1972
CHAD	28 November 1972
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CONGO	5 December 1972
NIGER	5 January 1973
MALI	5 January 1973
BURUNDI	16 May 1973
TOGO	21 September 1973
ZAIRE	4 October 1973
DAHOMY	6 October 1973
RWANDA	9 October 1973
UPPER VOLTA	10 October 1973
CAMEROON	13 October 1973
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	15 October 1973
TANZANIA	18 October 1973
MADAGASCAR	20 October 1973
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	21 October 1973
ETHIOPIA	25 October 1973
NIGERIA	25 October 1973
ZAMBIA	26 October 1973
GHANA	28 October 1973
SENEGAL	28 October 1973
GABON	29 October 1973
SIERRA LEONE	29 October 1973
KENYA	1 November 1973
LIBERIA	2 November 1973
IVORY COAST	8 November 1973
BOTSWANA	16 November 1973

FOOTNOTES

1. Immediately after the Tehran Accords were signed (15 February 1971) crude-oil prices would begin a steady and spectacular climb that would precipitate a world-wide round of new deals of the economic cards.
2. Postel Vinay, O.: "From Bitterness to Realism," LE MONDE, 12 July 1975

3. Otayek, Rene: "Arab-African relations tested by the peace between Israel and Africa," ANNEE AFRICAINE, 1981; "Arab- African cooperation: A Trial Balance," ANNEE AFRICAINE, 1979.
4. Arab-African Conference convened in Cairo from 7 to 9 March 1977, attended by representatives from 60 Arab and African nations: 30 Chiefs of State (14 Arab, 16 African), 6 vice-presidents, 8 heads of government, and 16 foreign ministers.
5. P. Pean, art. cit.
6. OECD estimate cited by P. Pean (art. cit.)
7. Otayek, R. : "Arab-African relations tested by the peace between Israel and Egypt." ANNEE AFRICAINE, 1981.
8. Constantin, Fr. Coulon, Ch., "Islam, Oil, and Independence:. new stakes in Africa." RFEPA, March, 1975.
9. News reports by Klich, I.: "Annexation of the Golan compromises early efforts to renew ties with Israel," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, February 1982.
10. Documents from ACTUALITE INTERNATIONALE (Paris), No 26, 30 Jun 1976, p 525.
11. Otayek, R.: "Revolutionary Libya south of Sahara," MAGHREB MASHREK, October-November-December 1981, pp 25-26.
12. Otayek, R.: "Revolutionary Libya south of Sahara," MAGHREB MASHREK October-November-December 1981, p 27.
13. Jean-Claude Froelich: "Muslims in Black Africa," Oronote Editions, 1962.
14. P. Rondot: "Facts and opinions on the influence of Arab countries in Africa," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE No 1, 1979.
15. BQA No 11171, 4/9/83.
16. The term is R. Otayek's. in Arab-African relations tested by the peace between Israel and Egypt," ANNEE AFRICAINE, 1981, p 214.
17. The OAU sets up a mediating commission which in August 1971 composed of the Heads of State of Senegal, Cameroon, Zaire, and Nigeria, for a mission of conciliation in the Near East whose failure would lead to the severance of Israeli-African diplomatic relations in 1972 and 1973.
18. BQA (Daily Bulletin from Africa) No 9454, 3 January 1978.
20. The hard-line front consisted of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and the PLO.

21. P. Mirel: "Egypt and Africa: the pitfalls of adventure,, LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, 184-185, April-May 1981.
22. On 12 June 1978, Boutros Ghali went to Kinshasa to offer military aid to Zaire during the second Shaba war. Egyptian aid, however, amounted to no more than a few field howitzers and some light equipment, according to P. Mirel (art. cit.).
25. FRATERNITE MATIN, 3 May 1983
26. BQA No 11069, 4/5/1983.
27. BQA No 11100, 11/6/1983
28. BQA No 11100, 11/6/1983
29. We are referring to the time immediately following May 1981 and up to the departure of J.-P. Cot, Cooperation Minister.

[Aug-Sept 85 pp 36-51; Part II]

[Text] III -- Manifestations of the new pro-Israeli realism: a new turn, one that may prove a crystalization-point for latent inter-African divisions.

The Jewish state's return to the African political and strategic scene after the 1972-1973 breaches began in 1980 with intensified Israeli diplomatic efforts toward Africa, as a prelude to the return of the Sinai to Egypt, from which Israel was counting on deriving some diplomatic profit.

What must be noted, though, is that in fact the Camp David accords did not set the process in motion, but served to shed some light on a subtle trend that dated back to the years of alienation. Turning to advantage the political turbidity prevailing in some African states during that period, Israel had in fact quit the continent except diplomatically, and even that withdrawal was carefully shaded. One could point out that during this Arab decade in Africa, Israeli-African economic and cultural relations held firm and deepened; diplomatic contacts were possible via the Western embassies in the African capitals; it was possible to establish more or less secret contacts. In fact, what Israel lacked during this period and what constitutes one of the reasons for its return, was the diplomatic support of African countries left vulnerable by the dejure Arab-African solidarity in what was called the "automatic majority."

In this process of reconquering Africa diplomatically, Israel seemed to enjoy the backing of two powers whose interests do not always converge: France and the United States, which tossed their political weight onto the scales, but found it just a trifle short of sufficient to tilt the scales clearly in Israel's favor. The truth is that there were braking factors at work against Israel, both among the African countries that might have been eager to renew ties with it, and in connection with the Jewish state's foreign policy decisions, of which its annexation of the Golan is an enlightening example.

However, above and beyond the ebullience of the Israeli diplomatic comeback in Africa, an important issue arose for the OAU's future: while it was already clear that this return would not mean a turning-point for the picture of severed alliances in 1972 and 1973, it would bring with it new rifts on a continent already deeply divided within one organization, the OAU, which had been widely described as on its deathbed.

As R. Otayek put it (30), "Less than 6 months after Israel's all but total eviction from south of Sahara," its return constitutes "a replay of the tightrope-act whose consequences are unforeseeable."

A -- The Incubation Process of Israel's Return

It has been said that the severance of Israeli-African ties did not result from any solid ideological consensus. There is no lack of indicators as to the soundness of that assertion: some date back to the years of alienation, to the memory of Senegal declaring its break with Israel was merely "a temporary breach pending establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East" (31), or of Zaire's president tacking onto his declaration of severance of relations with Israel: "Israel exists and has the right to live," or again, a commentary by an African editor, writing that "It is for the people and the government of Israel to prove to Africa in particular and to the Third World in general that there has been a tragic misunderstanding, and that therefore all is not lost."

Furthermore, there have been visible limits to African diplomatic support for the Arabs: in November 1975, at the time of the vote on the United Nations resolution that equated Zionism with racism and racial discrimination, five African states voted against it and ten abstained. Similarly, at the Dakar Conference of African and Arab foreign ministers, and at the express request of Ivory Coast, the clause equating Zionism with racism was omitted from what was to become the Cairo Charter. On the same record, but regarding the Palestinian problem, we find that UN votes by Africans and Arabs are not always unanimous. In 1975, Ivory Coast, the Central African Empire, Kenya, Gabon, and Malawi voted against resolutions introduced by the Arab states.

Even so, beyond these factors that confirm the basically off-again, on-again aspect of Arab-African togetherness, two different indices can be taken into consideration to demonstrate a quasi-presence of Israel in Africa.

1. The permanence of economic and cultural relations between Israel and Black Africa.

Israeli-African economic and cultural relations stood up remarkably well under the gales of 1972-1973 alienation. Israel's exports to Africa south of Sahara tripled from 1973 to 1980, settling at nearly \$100 million that latter year, as compared with \$19 million in 1973, \$25 million in 1975, and \$34 million in 1976 (32).

In 1977, there were nearly 100 major Israeli construction firms building infrastructural projects in a score of African countries, among them Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Zaire, and Zambia, even though President Kaunda stated

again in 1983 that "Israel was the South Africa of the Near East" (33). Several import-export firms joined together in a holding company with headquarters in Amsterdam, specializing in irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and construction equipment, operating first in the nine countries where it had offices (Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia) and then branching out to serve neighboring countries as well: Togo, Upper Volta, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and Mozambique (34).

Cultural cooperation was by no means sidelined: despite severed relations, and according to the director of the Afro-Asiatic Institute, of 460 trainees who went to Israel in 1976 to learn the fine points of organizing cooperatives and labor unions, 435 were African.

2) Broken political relations and secret contacts

When the tide of alienation set in, the Jewish state at once set about establishing communications channels with the states that had broken with it. This was how it came to pass that Israeli diplomats were welcomed in a score of African capitals into embassies representing Israeli interests, western embassies, mainly Belgian and Canadian, in countries like Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast (35).

It was the activities of these "unofficial ambassadors" that made possible the political contacts that marked the alienation period: In 1976, President Senghor met with the Israeli prime minister in Geneva, followed in 1977 by his opposite number in Ivory Coast, President Houphouet-Boigny. Israeli-African contacts were not confined to summit meetings, which for that matter ran up against Israel's stubborn refusal to comply with the United Nations' Resolution 242. Contacts and visits by Israeli leaders to Africa took place as part of the Israeli diplomatic offensive in Black Africa during the final phases of the Camp David process.

In March 1981, Rahamin Timor, director of international cooperation at the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry, went to Ivory Coast as part of a secret mission which had taken him earlier to Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and Nigeria.

November 1981 General Sharon, defense minister at the time, also did a tour of Africa. He reportedly visited, among other countries, Zaire, Gabon, and the Central African Republic. Ivory Coast and Sudan were also reportedly on the Israeli minister's itinerary. Ivory Coast and Sudan were also reported to be stops on the Israeli minister's tour, but these two countries denied the reports. While these contacts were not exhaustive, they are evidence of the major underground diplomatic activity put in play since 1973, with a sharp acceleration beginning in 1980, the year in which Israel moved into the mainstream of the Camp David Accords.

In this diplomatic game the Jewish state was playing in Africa, a game that had only just begun, it could count on some potent hole-cards in the form of support from two powerful allies: the United States and France, but also they had to counter the awkward impact of the decision to annex the Golan, a move that would cause some African countries to re-think their decision to renew

relations, mindful of the attempts to get Arab-African cooperation going again since 1982.

a) Support from France and the United States

Actually, insofar as France was concerned, French support for the Israeli diplomatic penetration in Black Africa was more the result of a desire to avoid even the appearance of a connection between French strategy in Africa and action that the Israelis might take that would bring divergences and conflicts of interest such as had occurred in the past.

It goes without saying that France, whose strategic, economic, and political interests in Africa are considerable, cannot but have a keen interest in its stability and to that end, the Israeli action which apparently gave indications of working toward that same end, could not be neglected. There could be no question of France's allowing Israel to expand its relations with the African countries on behalf of the United States, given Paris' determination to extricate Africa insofar as possible from the battlefield of East-West rivalries.

The Israeli government even referred to these French reservations publicly, at the time of M Cheysson's visit to Israel. He reportedly offered France "a degree of coordination" (36).

It was during that same visit to Israel by the French Foreign Affairs Minister in late December 1981, that he, according to Israeli political circles, reportedly "promised his Israeli opposite number, Yitzhak Shamir, French assistance in restoring diplomatic ties with the countries of the African continent" (37). And so it was in the name of an "association" to maintain stability in Africa that France and the Jewish state found themselves partners in Israel's diplomatic game.

One high official also expressed his delight at the same time at the contribution of French President Francois Mitterrand to "the recent improvement in ties between Israel and Africa." (38).

However, the procedures and forms taken by the French initiative or initiatives on Israel's behalf are not known. One can see, though, that Franco-Israeli coordination on the African file is still continuing. Accordingly, when President Mitterrand went to Israel in March 1982, accompanied by Guy Penne, the Elysee's adviser on African Affairs, questions relating to resumption of Israeli-African relations were discussed by Guy Penne and David Kinche, Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

In addition, the Vittel Franco-African summit in 1983 provided an occasion Israeli diplomacy seized to make contact with certain African Chiefs of state.

The Israeli delegation, under Avi Primor, head of the African Department, reportedly met the leaders of Togo, Liberia, and Zaire. On the fringes of these unofficial contacts, it is said that the conversation touched on relations between Israel and Africa in small committees, outside the plenary sessions; that was the cue for President Mitterrand to repeat what he had

already said in 1981 at the Paris summit to his African partners: "The political approach to the Near East problem and its solution assumes balanced relations with the two partners, with the understanding that each government remain free to decide its own position" (39).

As for American support, it dates back to the Carter Administration: at the time, the eloquent appeal addressed by Andrew Young, former US Ambassador to the UN, to the African leaders to whom he was called upon to explain the scope and meaning of the Camp David peace accords, urging them to "open up a dialogue with Israel to further the chances of reconciliation in the Near East"(40) evoked no visible reactions. It was under the Reagan Administration and in the strategic extensions of the Camp David accords that the American support would be clearly underscored. That support is part of an American plan to establish a geopolitical and defensive sphere of influence stretching from Pakistan to the heart of Central Africa, via the Arab World; a project in which Israel seems to play a major role on its own, but also in furtherance of American interests.

The assistance, economic and especially military, and the defense agreement first broached during General Sharon's tour of Africa seems to have as its guarantee American financing as called for in Article 3 of the memorandum on strategic Israeli-American cooperation. As Dean Fisher, state Department spokesman, spelled it out, strategic cooperation between the two countries should allow for "possible use by third countries of American credits for military sales abroad, in such a way as to finance the purchase of Israeli defense equipment and services" (41).

Israel's annexation of the Golan, whose consequences will be further analyzed later on, by provoking anger on the American side, led to an indefinite postponement of application of this strategic cooperation agreement which was absolutely indispensable to the deployment of Israeli diplomatic activity in Africa.

Without that American financing, military contracts involving several million dollars could not be undertaken. Right now, though, there are indications that the United States will have some second thoughts about that decision after the november presidential elections in 1984.

Aside from the consequences of the Golan annexation in mid-December 1981 to Israeli-American relations, that decisions also seems to have had some extremely harmful and discouraging effects on the process of Israel's diplomatic comeback.

b) Golan Annexation Decision Blighted

Prospects for Israel's African Comeback.

Announced in mid-December 1981, Israel's decision to annex the Golan would cancel out a portion of Israel's diplomatic efforts in Africa over the past months. For instance, preparation of a Joint African Declaration (by some Chiefs of state) announcing resumption of their relations with Israel had to be scrapped. In truth, the annexation of the Golan had placed some African

capitals in an untenable situation: how can you resume ties with a country that has just annexed a territory by force, even if it were for reasons of border security, a territory belonging to an Arab country, on top of that, even as Arab-African cooperation, difficult as it might be, is still one of the factors in the Near East policies of the majority of African states?

It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find that the mission David Kinche was preaching to certain African governments after the annexation decision was announced, in hope of salvaging what could be saved from the wreckage, was a dismal failure.

In the event, the ranking Israeli official was heard by his African counterparts to say that "Annexation of the Golan was an act inadmissible in international relations"(42). The negative African reactions to news of the Israeli annexation decision were not confined to rhetoric. Some African countries cancelled contracts already signed with Israeli companies (43). Better yet, some African countries such as Zaire, Uganda, and Togo, which had been very amicably disposed toward the Jewish state, joined in the UN Security Council in the resolution condemning the Israeli move.

Even so, while the Golan annexation had put a tight brake on the Israeli comeback process and caused a number of African countries to pull back from their decision to resume ties, it did not deter two African countries, Zaire and Liberia, from renewing their ties with Israel: Zaire did it in May 1982 and Liberia in August 1983.

B -- Zaire... Liberia, the first signs of a turnaround

When Zaire on 14 May 1982 announced its decision to resume relations with Israel, and did so in the international context established by Israel's annexation of the Golan, the least that can be said is that it came as a surprise, despite recent assignations between Kinshasa and Tel Aviv.

It was indeed hard to imagine Zaire's taking such a step in complete isolation from the rest of the African continent, especially since President Mobutu had declared in December 1981:.

Zaire is not alone in Africa. There must be consultations with other African states. For the time being, I am waiting to see what the others are going to do."

In the event, Mobutu did not wait. It would seem that domestic political considerations played a crucial role in the Zairian government's decision.

After all, Zaire's economic and financial difficulties are a matter of public record, not to say notoriety. It would appear that Mobutu ran the risk of standing all alone in his decision, so as to "look like the most loyally of the Western camp," and, in the end, to get the American Congress to give him the aid it had thus far refused him. Furthermore one may surmise, given the persistence of his economic problems, that Zaire's leader opted to reinforce that impression through increased Israeli aid in the area of domestic security.

Meanwhile, the pressures brought to bear by Israel through promises of american Jewish investments in the Zaire economy are not to be overlooked. For Israel, it was mandatory, after the halt in the return process as a result of the annexation decision, to stage a "great coup" that could shatter the psychological block in some African capitals and pull them along in Zaire's wake. Mr Shamir, Israel's Foreign Minister, had after all said, the day after Zaire's decision:

"We have good reason to believe that Zaire's example will have a positive influence on the governments of other African countries and persuade them to renew relations with Israel" (44)

African reactions to Zaire's decision underscore its prematurity.: "Zaire has gone too soon and too far to be followed en masse, even were it 'only' to Tel-Aviv" (45).

As it turned out, most of the countries reacting to the decision, while refraining from comment in the name of non-interference in Zaire's domestic affairs, were assiduous in affirming, this time, their determination not to resume relations with the Jewish State so long as it refused to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories.

That was the case for Gambia, for Gabon, for Togo, for Cameroon, for Senegal, for Ivory Coast, for Benin, etc. The attitude in the Arab African countries was even stiffer: Algeria, while it sought to minimize the Zaire decision, which it called isolated, nevertheless viewed it as a source "of grave concern." (46) In Algeria's view, "should it prove that pressures have been brought to bear on other African countries to restore relations with Israel, it would set a dangerous precedent designed to crush African unity." Tunisia summoned its ambassador home from Kinshasa. Libya broke off its relations with Zaire.

Despite the detailed exegesis provided by the Zairian representative at the UN concerning the second part of his country's decision on the matter of "full and complete recognition of the PLO and unwavering support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people" (47), Arab reactions were keen: while the PLO called for a boycott of Zaire whose decision is "perceived as a stab in the back," Saudi Arabia broke its ties with Zaire, as did Kuwait and other Arab countries, while the Arab League was taking reprisal measures, mainly suspension of all economic and financial activities of Arab national and multinational banks with Zaire.

Liberia's August 1983 decision would be the target for the same thunderbolts and the same coventry treatment from the other African countries south of Sahara. In Liberia's case, it would appear that there was some outside incitement, American, involved in the decision. And in fact, despite the wind advent of President Doe, the centuries-old relations between Liberia and the United States are still very close.

Even though it is still too soon for a judgment-call on the new brand of cooperation Israel is trying to establish officially with the two African countries that have taken the step across the line, it is possible to discern, in the light of the Zaire case, the broad outlines of this cooperation and the areas in which it appears to be working.

The new approach adopted by the Israeli leaders in the aftermath of the "painful" trial by alienation of 1972 and 1973, reflects extreme prudence in dealing with the grievances felt by Zaire and Liberia. The multifarious, active, "good-guys" cooperation of the sixties and seventies seemed to be yielding to cooperation in which military and security concerns take priority over real cultural and technical assistance projects, not to mention economic or financial aid.

That approach can be read quite clearly in the cues for action that Israel plans to conduct in Africa with its new partners. Of course, the draft agreement signed in December 1982 during the Kinshasa visit by Yitzhak Shamir, then Foreign Minister, "covers areas as diverse as agriculture, technology, industry, and science"(48). Projects now in execution as part of that cooperation center on training, in Israel, of Zairian cadres and technicians, establishment in Zaire of farm cooperatives along with creation of an agricultural extension center, scientific research, etc. The emphasis, though, is reserved for the military area. As early as Gen Sharon's november 1981 trip there, a secret military agreement had been signed in connection with training by Israeli instructors for units of the special presidential brigade and for the notorious "Kamanyola" division, based in Shaba, which distinguished itself in both Shaba invasions in 1977 and 1979(49). The Israelis may have wanted to go further in this military cooperation. Shamir reportedly proposed a 5-year reorganization plan for Zaire's armed forces: beefing up the air force and airborne troop levels through creation of new elite units, reinforcing anti-guerrilla commando units, reorganizing the general staff and command in the various regions, and, lastly, a 5-year program for equipping some Zaire units with Israeli weapons bought with Israeli loans.

It was a huge program, but failed to win Zaire's support: Zaire was concerned with relations with other military cooperation partners, including the Chinese who were training infantry cadres in Kisangani, and Belgians who were training commandos at Katakola, the best of whom would then be passed on to the French at their Airborne Troop Training Center (CETA) in Ndjili, near Kinshasa airport.

This Israeli fixation on the "military" bothered some of its partners in Zaire who were expecting Israel to come up with some agricultural rescue operations that would cost close to \$359 million in investments spread over 1982-1984 (50).

In Israel's view, Zaire was primarily a good base for organizing the diplomatic campaign it had been pressing on Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Kenya, on one side, and on the other a demonstration site for the inherent superiority of Israeli military technical capabilities, for consumption by other African countries sensitive to the potential for destabilization, a fear on which Israel apparently planned to play.

The scenario looks much the same with Liberia, albeit with a few variants. Liberian President Samuel Doe's visit to Israel about the end of August 1983 was occasion for the signing of a cooperation agreement. Among other matters, that agreement called for dispatch of agronomics experts, construction specialists, and civil aviation advisers from Israel to Liberia. Despite the emphasis put on the "civilian" aspects of cooperation, despite the Liberian denial of its intention to purchase Israeli weaponry, the fact that during Doe's stay in Israel he had been taken on a tour of Israeli arms plants by the Israeli defense minister, Moshe Arens, and the Israeli Chief of General Staff, Gen Moshe Levy, would indicate that the military aspect is anything but invisible in Israeli-Liberian relations.

It seems that in Tel-Aviv there had been a decision, since the experiences in Zaire, to be less ostentatious and unnecessarily aggressive, by emphasizing the civilian side over the military. Apparently, such declarations as "Israel will make available to you the experience it has acquired in battling to defend its independence, so that you will be able to defend your country against the new imperialism that threatens it" (51), although normal and, for that matter, legitimate as well, had somehow ceased to serve the ends of Israel's African penetration, though admittedly it was enough to avoid the trap of an anti-Soviet crusade.

In conclusion, it may be said that the new Israeli African policy can claim to be prudent, selective, more focused on the interests of the Jewish State than in the past, but one that does not resist the temptation to surround Israel's return with clouds of public relations flack, an approach that is not always desirable in an Africa that is still highly susceptible to and more likely to listen "to whispers rather than to bellicose shouts or noisy vows to get even," especially since the game has not even begun. It is still true that one swallow, or even two, cannot make a summer.

Even so, the chances for things to go well for Israel are there. Other African countries, admittedly in no great hurry, seem to be getting ready to take the step. When? One hardly dare venture further, but the objective factors for assessment exist to confirm the slippage that is going on in Black Africa.

C -- Whose turn now? or: "Israel's Eternal Return" to Africa.

The euphoria that pervaded Israeli diplomatic circles toward the end of 1981 prior to the annexation of the Golan has dissipated since. The likelihood of concerted moves by African countries to renew relations with Israel are remote. African countries' decisions to renew relations with Israel have come in "by the eyedropperful," and since the Liberian episode, despite intensive Israeli underground diplomatic activity, nothing seems to be moving in that direction south of Sahara. Does this mean that the Israeli dream of a

comeback in strength has gone glimmering? It seems that it has not! There are, however, several serious obstacles to be dealt with that will make the process still longer than anticipated.

Among the countries likeliest to cross the line in coming months Ivory Coast is routinely cited. And in fact it would seem that the situation had turned favorable for Israel in Ivory Coast, right up to the decision to annex the Golan in mid-December 1981. At that point, Ivory Coast had reaffirmed its determination not to resume relations. Since then, however, the process has got under way again. Encouraging noises from Washington, where President Houphouet Boigny recently visited, have something to do with this fresh start. Despite denials from the Israeli Foreign Minister, careful that there be no repetition of the 1977 "coup" (52), the Ivorian president would indeed meet with Shamir in Geneva in mid July 1983, as well as with politicians and businessmen belonging to the World Jewish Congress or to the Committee Representing Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF) between June and September 1983. Amid that same crush, and at his own request, he received one Palestinian leader, as well as Chedli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League. These apparently conflicting meetings evidence a conscientious preparation for the decision to resume relations with Israel.

The Ivorian president's standing grudge against the Arabs will certainly be a factor in this move. Ivory Coast is among the countries that have profited least by Arab subsidies since 1973: total credits of \$58 million in 8 years, only a shade more than went to a country like Cameroon (\$55.8 million in 1981).

On top of that, out of this total, 89 percent of the credit was extended at market rates. So obviously, when the Saudis threatened not to help finance the Soubre dam if Ivory Coast refused to promise not to award contracts to Israeli companies, the Ivorian president was deeply humiliated.

Even so, as these lines are written, Ivory Coast has yet to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. And yet, unlike some other countries, Ivory Coast has no large Muslim populations to cosset, nor is it excessively dependent on the Arab capitals. Ivory Coast's current economic difficulties, introducing an additional factor of social entropy in a political context dominated by backstage squabbles over the succession may explain why President Houphouet Boigny has put off making any decision for a while, which is one way to avoid having to fight on more than one front at a time.

The Central African Republic, too, seems to be on the verge of signing, strongly urged to do just that since Gen Sharon's november 1981 visit. However, the Iraqi aid General Kolingba's government is getting is factor that might offset Bangui's felt need, lacking more intensive cooperation with Paris, to find some alternative that might be either American or Israeli. It should be noted, though, that the Central African government has good relations with Zaire, which has already restored relations.

This same air of hesitancy prevails in Togo as well. Even while President Eyadema was congratulating his Liberian counterpart on his decision during the latter's visit to Lome on 4 September 1983, he was denying reports of an

imminent resumption of relations with Israel for his country, and doing so despite the presence in Lome, along with President Doe, of Avi Primot, who heads the African department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

Kenya's position is both peculiar and interesting. Actually, Kenya's break with Israel was, so to speak, never consummated. In this connection, one may recall that in 1976, it was Nairobi that offered the Israeli commandos en route for Entebbe a rear base during the operation to free the Israeli hostages held in Uganda.

In March 1981, two Israeli diplomats reportedly paid secret calls at the Kenyan capital: Rahamin Timor, director for international cooperation, and David Kinche, Director of the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry. Israel's interest in Kenya seems to be primarily strategic: for strategic reasons, the region of Eastern and Central Africa constitute, for many Near-East countries, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, is a key region to which Kenya is the eastern gate.

In December 1982, Israeli Foreign Minister Yitshak Shamir reportedly stopped in secretly at Nairobi, in the middle of the night, to meet with President Arap Moi. However, Arap Moi's then position as president of the OAU apparently moved him to delay a decision to renew ties with Israel.

As for the oil-producing countries: Nigeria and Gabon, the first currently at grips with economic problems stemming from the collapse of oil prices in 1980, did not appear to be in any condition to consider renewing its ties with Israel, particularly when it could sell its oil on the world market only because the Arabs kept up the pressure on western buyers. As for Gabon, despite its president's conversion to Islam, there were major structural factors that stood in the way of any serious leaning toward Israel. For one thing, the considerable cumulative weight of the number and influence of the Arab countries in the OAU constituted a massive obstacle which was not likely to be removed any time soon. Some countries, like Algeria, enjoyed some influence in Black Africa, in connection with the Third-Worldist strategy Algiers was then developing. Libya, despite persistent and growing distrust it evokes, holds some solid positions, not to mention the deterrent role King Hassan II could play, even though he failed to halt Zaire's decision.

Next, there is one factor stemming from the Pan-Islamic cultural and religious drive in Black Africa. Some African leaders must reckon with the growing size of their Muslim populations and handle that fraction of public opinion with kid gloves. Indeed, as Messers Couton and Constantin write:

"Rapprochement with the Islamicized or oil-producing Arab countries is not without its advantages. They can help enhance the legitimacy of rulers in the view of national Muslim communities which sometime constitute total, all-encompassing societies with leaders of their own. More broadly, establishment of direct ties with the Arab capitals makes it possible to channel and control the modernist or reformist Islamic fringes in Africa."(53).

Occasionally, relations some African capitals maintain with the Arab countries have enabled them to fend off socio-political crises or to guarantee some

degree of steadiness for the sitting government. Senegal's case is enlightening on this count. There, a Catholic president, President Senghor, proved able to govern

with the support of the Mourides and Tidjani communities. It seems clear that a country like Senegal must look twice before taking a decision that could shatter these socio-political balances, not to mention the subversive potential of some Islamized social groups once they join "the opposition."

TABLE 3

Percentage Muslim Share of Population - 1975 Estimate

90% - 100%	Mauritania	- 10%	Burundi
	Niger		Gabon
	Senegal		
	Somalia		
		.05%	Congo
60% - 90%	Gambia	or less:	Liberia
	Guinea		Madagascar
	Mali		Malawi
	Sudan		Uganda
			C.A.R.
45%	Nigeria		Rwanda
			Togo
			Zaire
			Zambia
30%-45%	Ethiopia		
	Upper Volta		
	Sierra Leone		
	Tanzania		
	Chad		

SOURCE: Article by P. Rondot: "Actuality and Outlook for Arab Country Influence in Africa," POLITIQUE ETRANGER, No 1, 1979.

This table lends credence to the capability for blocking the Israeli return process latent in the religious factor. Even so, it is wise to refrain from exaggerating the real impact of these social groups on the government's elaboration of foreign policy.

The third factor, which was underscored earlier, is the financial dependence of many African countries on Arab financial largesse. These countries have not the same skill as Zaire or Ivory Coast in dangling possible shifts in alliances before the great powers so as to free themselves of Arab aid. Since this group does not have much leeway for maneuvering, it cannot even consider a break with the Arabs, particularly inasmuch as its capacities for seeking loans on the international market are limited.

In the event, stripped of American financial support, the Israeli projects could not come to fruition: if they did, Israel would risk being lumped together with Egypt. The two situations are not truly comparable, however, since Israel had other trumps in its hand, which Egypt did not. To cite just one example: the political and financial power of the Jewish lobby in the United States.

CONCLUSION

The process of Israel's return will not run swiftly. It may even prove very long indeed, and Israel's diplomatic successes may come only step by step. One may also wonder whether Israel really wants to make a massive comeback in Africa. The costs of any such operation are high. It seems more likely that the Jewish state would rather "control" a certain number of countries important to the Israeli-American strategic arrangement, countries in which it would not hesitate to commit large sums of money.

However, a development like that could be perceived only as a halfway success, since we must not forget that Israel's other goal is to win the benevolent neutrality of Sub-Saharan diplomacy, since flareups in the Near-East conflict are always a possibility.

As for Black Africa, it is more than ever a pawn on the diplomatic, political, economic, and strategic chess-board. Israel's return would inevitably accentuate the cleavages and tensions, and were it to be massive, "the consequence would be a breach in Arab-African solidarity and, in the long run, the division of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa into pro-Arab and pro-Israeli factions"(54).

A kind of rerun of the situation in the sixties when the Casablanca and Monrovia groups clashed violently over the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The problem is that in the sixties, the cleavages, the divisions, and the tensions were not legion, whereas today the battlegrounds simply multiply with a more or less moribund Organization of African Unity.

There is no predicting future developments, but they do not look very rosy, at all.

FOOTNOTES

30. R. Otayek: "Arab-African relations under stress from the peace between Israel and Africa." ANNEE AFRICAINE, 1981, p. 235.

31. NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, No 476, 24-30 nov 1973.

32. BQA No 9200, 13-14 Feb 1977, LE MONDE, 8 Dec 1981, Article by F. Cornu, cit.

33. BQA No 11110, 24Jun 84

34. BQA No 11110, 24 Jun 84

35. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1186, 28 September 1983, p 30
36. I. Klich: "The annexation of the Golan..." LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, February 1982, p 19
37. BQA No 10647, 11 Dec 81
39. BQA No 11196, 4 Oct 83.
40. R. Otayek: "Arab-African relations under stress from the peace between Israel and Egypt," ANNEE AFRICAINE, 1981, p 231.
41. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (Paris), 18-20 Dec 1981, cit. by I Klich.
42. BQA No 10662, 30 Dec 81
43. For example: the Solel BonchCorp., whose construction contract with East Cameroon was cancelled (BQA No 10664, 2 Jan 1982).
44. BQA No 10776, 16-17 May 1982
45. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1117, 2 Jun 1982
46. BQA No 10777, 18 May 1982
47. BQA No 10779, 21 May 1982.
48. BQA No 11286, 19 Jan 1984
49. BQA No 11286, 19 Jan 1984, and JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1145, 15 December 1982.
50. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1145, 15 December 1982
51. BQA No 11160, 23 aug 1983
52. In 1977, after the meeting secretly requested by Houphouet, the Israelis published the content of his conversations with Israel's then Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin.
53. Constatin, F., and Coulon, Ch.: "Islam, Oil, and Dependence: New States in Africa." RFEPA, May 1975, No 113.
54. Otayek, R.: "Arab-African relations under stress from the peace between Egypt and Israel," ANNEE AFRICAINE, 1982, p. 235

ANNEX

TABLE 2

Distribution of Arab aid to 41 Non-Arab African countries between
1974 and 1982 (in millions of dollars)

Multilateral Aid

COUNTRIES (descending order)	AMOUNT	COUNTRIES (descending order)	Amount
1. Guinea	743	23. Burundi	94
2. Senegal	583	24. Botswana	83
3. Zaire (1)	576	25. Sierra Leone	79
4. Mali	530	26. Cape Verde	76
5. Kenya	400	27. Mauritius	70
6. Zambia	386	28. Togo	59
7. Uganda	372	29. Ivory Coast (2)	58
8. Tanzania	320	30. Liberia (3)	58
9. Ghana	319	31. Benin	58
10. Niger	300	32. Angola	52
11. Cameroon	298	33. Seychelles	41
12. Upper Volta	251	34. Lesotho	35
13. Madagascar	184	35. Central Africa	30
14. Congo	163	36. Ethiopia	29
15. Zimbabwe	154	37. Equatorial Guinea	19
16. Comoro Islands	133	38. Sao Tome	13
17. Chad	127	39. Malawi	7
18. Rwanda	121	40. Swaziland (4)	4
19. Guinea Bissau	116	41. Nigeria	2
20. Gabon	115	-- Regional orgs.	350
21. Mozambique	110	-- Not specified	365
22. Gambia	105		
TOTAL			7.988

Source: BADEA March 1983, round numbers.

(1) Suspended in May 1982

(2) Not including financing pledged for the Soubre dam (\$8 million)
Nothing since 1978.

(3) Suspended in August 1983

(4) Nothing since 1975.

6182

CSO: 3419/4

IVORY COAST

AFP DETAILS FRENCH AID

AB311435 Paris AFP in French 1149 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Text] Abidjan, 31 Oct (AFP)--According to a document published by the French Cooperation Mission in Abidjan on Thursday, French bilateral public aid to Ivory Coast in 1984 amounted to 45.9 billion CFA francs against 57.5 billion for the preceding year. The subventions amounted to 16.9 billion CFA francs and loans by the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation [CCCE] amounted to 28.9 billion (against 15.1 and 42.3 billion CFA francs, respectively).

This aid does not include other important French aid to Ivory Coast through participation in several multilateral aid organizations (EEC, European Development Fund, World Bank, UN Development Program, African Development Bank, and so on...), through active French military cooperation (the cost of personnel and operations of technical military assistance amounted to 2.4 billion CFA francs in 1984), through promotion of French private investments with the help of Coface [French Foreign Trade Insurance Company], and through support for Ivory Coast in the field of international trade and the monetary field within the framework of the franc zone.

Thus, French-Ivorian cooperation was maintained at a high level in 1984 and even increased in certain sectors, a French source indicated. French aid endeavored to promote the progressive replacement of the French technical assistance personnel by national cadres and undertook a redeployment which adapts it to the new needs of project-by-project cooperation. Thus, the ivorization of cadres has resulted in the departure of 512 French technical assistance personnel in 1984 but at the same time, French assistance in this field increased from 8.15 billion CFA francs to 9 billion, representing an increase of 4 percent. At the end of 1984, there were 2,719 French technical assistance personnel against 3,231 in 1983.

Secondly, France applied itself to the task of reorganizing and diversifying the programs of its assistance in the field of scientific and technical research. The expenditure for research amounts to more than 5 billion CFA francs representing mainly French contribution to the functioning of French-Ivorian institutes such as the Overseas Scientific and Technical Research Office.

Finally, France effectively took part in the financing of public investments in Ivory Coast through the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) whose instigating role--thanks to its methods of operation (nonrefundable grants, flexibility of operation, and absence of reciprocal contributions) remains a favored instrument for the promotion of small-scale development projects, notably in the rural sector...

Moreover, Ivory Coast is the world's first beneficiary of the loans of the CCCE. During the past 10 years (1975-1984), this organization's commitments in Ivory Coast amounted to an average of Fr400 million annually, half of which was within the first category of loans incurring the medium interest rate of 5 percent while the other half was within the second category of loans which bears the interest rate existing in the market.

Rural development was the first sector of intervention of the fund in Ivory Coast followed by energy, transportation, and collective equipments. The main loans granted by the fund to various sectors in 1984 were for the following purposes:

- Installation of four gas turbines for electricity production,
- Supply of buses and the financing of the purchase of equipment for Abidjan Urban Transport Company (Sotra),
- Continuation of the lagoon fish-farming project and of the project of development of mechanized cassava farming,
- Loan of Fr370 million to the state for the reorganization of public enterprises.

/9599

CSO: 3400/322

IVORY COAST

IACO HEAD INTERVIEWED ON WORLD COFFEE MARKET

AB302222 Abidjan FRATERNITE MATIN in French 30 Oct 85 p 5

[Interview with Avi Adroh, director of studies at the Ivorian Stabilization Fund and chairman of the Inter-African Coffee Organization [IACO], by correspondent Ladji Sidibe]

[Text] [Sidibe] Mr Director, the debates this afternoon were centered on the problems of coffee sales on the international market, with special reference to unfair competition and the quality of coffee. In a nutshell, what can one gather from all this.

[Adroh] The sales committee of the Inter-African Coffee Organization, IACO, member states has held a meeting. The central issue at the meeting, one should gather, was the problem of insufficient shipments (nonrespect of the imposed quotas) to the member countries while sales to nonmember countries are increasing considerably. This year a record figure of 12 million bags have been sold to nonmember countries as against 6 million last year. Similarly, countries assigned quotas are facing insufficient shipments.

Precisely, on the question of quotas, a solution to such an anomaly--called for by the United States as a prerequisite for an agreement--was adopted last September. All the delegates showed keen interest in the need to solve such a problem. This is because this very issue will come up again on the agenda of the 1986-87 negotiations.

Already last September, we received a warning from the United States. And if we take no notice of it, the situation may degenerate at the expense of everyone. This is why some countries have called for both political and economic contacts to be initiated by the IACO's current chairman, the president of the People's Republic of Angola, with the Latin American and Asian countries. It is known that it is these countries which are the most concerned by the issue of great quantities sold to nonmember countries.

Concerning the second point, it is the current big differential of 30 American cents between the prices of other coffees and those of African robusta. This is even more preoccupying because only on the eve of the 1984-85 harvest was this differential nil. I would even say that it was slightly in favor of the robusta by 0.50 cent. Today we are experiencing a deficit of 30 cents as

compared with other coffees produced by countries of Central America (Guatemala, Mexico, and others).

[Sidibe] What brought about this sudden gap between the robusta and the other coffees?

[Adroh] Let's take the case of robusta. You know that robusta is also produced by Brazil. This Brazilian coffee is called conillon. And this year, because of the bad quality of Brazil's arabica, it had to do some sales promotion of its conillon on the European market, where African countries sell most of their robusta. And since Brazil has an aggressive sales policy, which means a guarantee for fall in prices of coffee on purchase (dumping), it has easily occupied the traditional markets won by Africans. What does this mean? It simply means Brazil agrees to make repayments to the buyer if between the time the coffee ordered is loaded and the time it is delivered to the buyer there has been a fall in price.

This practice, which goes against the laws of the market, has enabled Brazil, whose coffee is \$1 cheaper than the Ivorian robusta, to present a product which is practically beyond competition.

The immediate consequence of this policy of Guarantee for Fall [Garantie de Baisse] is that countries producing primary robusta--like Ivory Coast--have had their coffee stockpiled in European ports, because industrialists preferred the Brazilian coffee which is very cheap. The result is that today, there are more than 2 million bags of robusta coffee from the African countries lying at the European ports. These statistics are for last September. With its new aggressive trade policy, Brazil has tried and succeeded in taking away our share of the market.

[Sidibe] However, is this Brazilian robusta not of a better quality to be able to impose itself so easily on the market?

[Adroh] Of course not! The conillon quality is generally inferior to Ivory Coast's robusta, for example. But the only explanation for the high demand for this Brazilian coffee lies in the service of the Guarantee for Fall, through the payment of bonuses to the buyers. There is also the fact that the tendencies for the production of coffee have changed in Europe. Industrialists now go in for ground coffee whose cost of production is far below that of the instant coffee which is the most expensive, or the roasted granulated coffee. Therefore, the manufacturers who certainly take into account the drop in the purchasing power of the consumers, because of the economic crisis, tend to look for low-quality brands of coffee. There are brands which are clearly inferior to those we produce here, for example. These are coffee brands which could conform with mixtures cleverly done with a Colombian coffee of better quality. We must add that even Colombia is presently granting important bonuses.

By the way, we have been made to understand that this policy has displeased not only the African coffee producers. The IMF is reported to have demanded

and obtained the suspension of this policy of Guarantee for Fall and this has not at all favored the Brazilian finances. If it is proved to be true, there is every chance that the robusta price will go up again this year.

[Sidibe] In reality, besides this problem of insufficient shipments which was denounced at length this morning, does this policy of Guarantee for Fall not disorganize the international market?

[Adroh] Of course! Take a look at the prices today. With a gap of 30 cents, if we want our robusta brand to sell on the market, we must lower our prices in order to make them below an already too low a price. The proof is that there is African coffee lying at the European and American ports because the Brazilians are more active. Therefore, there is a real disorganization of the coffee market.

/9599

CSO: 3400/322

LESOTHO

FINANCE MINISTER DELIVERS BUDGET SPEECH

MB291548 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1448 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Text] Maseru, Oct 29, SAPA--Lesotho's estimated customs revenue from the Southern African Customs Union with South Africa, Botswana and Swaziland for the financial year 1985/1985 [as received] totalled R161 million representing 67 percent of the country's total revenue.

This was stated by the Lesotho minister of finance, Mr Peete Peete, in his budget speech in the National Assembly today.

The minister presented a budget of R403,184,130--an increase of R75 million or 23 percent over the 1984/85 budget.

Mr Peete said the Lesotho Government hoped to collect the balance of R78 million from a wide range of domestic revenue sources.

He said Lesotho derived its revenue mainly from the customs pool, income tax and sales tax. He announced that sales tax will be increased from the present six percent to eight percent with effect from December 1 and that for certain luxury items sales tax would be increased to 10 percent.

Referring to the giant Highland water project to supply water to South Africa, the minister said draft legislation of the creation of institutions to implement the water project was almost completed and should be tabled in parliament soon.

Negotiations with South Africa on a water treaty were ready to commence with the target date of March 1 next year for conclusion of the treaty.

/9599

CSO: 3400/322

MOZAMBIQUE

PROCEDURES FOR IMPORTING GOODS THROUGH CUSTOMS EXPLAINED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] Because "Dossier-MLL" showed that a considerable number of individuals detected by "Operation Stop" had vehicles with an irregular status and were ignorant of the legal customs procedures for clearing goods brought in from abroad, we are publishing some explanatory information today. Viewed from an educational standpoint, this was based on explanations given by customs officials and technicians, and covers the entire customs procedure.

As is the case anywhere in the world, in our country also there are customs regulations for clearing goods brought in from abroad, either by foreigners or by native citizens.

In the concrete instance of automotive vehicles, motorcycles and motor scooters, up to [illegible] cubic centimeters, their entry into the country may be through temporary import (on the part of foreigners) during a tourist or service trip, with up to a year's stay in Mozambique, and through final import, on the part of native citizens.

In each of the instances cited, there are specific documents to activate the process of their import.

Temporary Import

The temporary importing of vehicles is usually done by foreigners on a tourist trip to our country, or by cooperants rendering services here. This holds true, for example, of the vehicles circulating with "MLT" (temporary driving) registration.

Manuel Comiche Alage, deputy director of customs in Maputo, explained: "To process this type of import, the party concerned must submit the ownership title in the name of the legitimate owner, the temporary export clearance issued by the customs authorities of the country of origin, the vehicle's insurance document issued by customs at the border of entry and the temporary import permit on form 10-C issued by customs on the border of entry, for 3 days, to be presented in the first section or in the customs agency of the province through which the party concerned has entered, where he will be allowed the number of days' stay necessary or any extensions that he may request."

If he is not the legitimate driver or owner of the vehicle, he must submit the authorization conveyed by the legitimate owner.

In the case of tourist or service trips to remain in the country as long as a year, or for a period exceeding a year, the very same documentation is required, with the exception of the temporary import permit which, instead of being form 10-C, will be form 23-C; and it is required with the payment of a fee amounting to 100.00 meticals per month.

And the granting of this permit (for temporary import, on form 23-C,) is required from the minister of foreign trade.

Vehicles with a temporary import status ("MLT" registration) are exempted from payment of customs duties.

Final Import

The final importing of vehicles is meant for Mozambican and foreign citizens residing in the country who are not beneficiaries of the extension of tax exemption. There are two categories in this instance, namely, that of Mozambican workers who are emigrants in neighboring countries and that of non-emigrant Mozambicans.

The former (native emigrants) are included in tax benefits, that is, they are exempted from the payment of customs duties and all fiscal levies, in exchange for the payment of a symbolic tax of 60.00 meticals. The non-emigrant Mozambicans who purchase vehicles abroad are subject to the normal clearance formalities; that is, to the payment of customs duties.

Both groups require, for the process of the final import of their vehicles, submission of the title of ownership in the name of the legitimate owner; final export clearance issued by the customs authorities of the country of origin; a "memorandum" issued by customs on the border of entry; an insurance document cleared by customs on the border of entry, in the event that the vehicle is arriving through its own means; and an invoice or declaration of the vehicle's value.

Procedures to Be Carried Out for Final Import

Manuel Alage adds: "The customs procedures in the country for final import of vehicles, in the case of native emigrants with tax benefits, involves a cycle that includes the appearance of the party concerned in the customs first section or in the customs agency, provided with the documents already noted. In either of these locations, the final import clearance will be processed, exempt from the usual formalities. It is then followed by customs' transmittal of the import notation to the transit services. Here, based on the notation sent by customs, the inspection of the vehicle is carried out and the national registration is issued. Finally, customs will turn over to the party concerned the import clearance, in triplicate, already settled, through which it will require registration of ownership in the Automobile Registration Bureau, which will give him the title of ownership."

In the case of non-emigrant nationals subject to the usual clearance formalities, the procedural cycle also begins with the appearance of the party concerned in the customs first section or the customs agency of the province through which he has entered, provided with the aforementioned documents.

In either of these locations, the party concerned will be issued a temporary import permit on form 10-C for a few days, during the course of the usual required formalities.

The latter consist of a request to the minister of foreign trade for the final import permit, for clearance purposes only, and a request for clearance to ADENA, submitting all the aforementioned documents, including the permit granted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

When ADENA has these documents, it will handle the entire import process with customs and the traffic services, without the intervention of the party concerned; receiving from the latter the amount of taxes owed to customs. The process is completed with the delivery to the party concerned of the customs clearance, in triplicate, with which the latter will undertake the registration of ownership of the vehicle at the Automobile Registration Bureau.

Tax Exemption

Jaime Levi, national director of customs, remarked: "Therefore, in the case of exemption from customs duties, the only ones included are emigrant Mozambicans, vehicles with temporary import ("MLT") status and those owned by diplomats and international agencies, as well as certain vehicles used for state development projects. In all the other instances of final import of vehicles, either by Mozambicans or by nationals [sic], the customs duties and other fiscal levies are owed to the state."

Payment of duties by Mozambican citizens is made in national currency. Only the payment for final import of vehicles by foreigners is made in convertible currency.

But none of the vehicles covered by tax exemption, whether they belong to diplomats, cooperants or Mozambican emigrants, can be transferred (sold) without prior authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. And even in this case, in order to sell them the respective owners must pay in advance the pertinent duties in freely convertible currency, exempt from government control. Any violation of this ruling entails seizure of the vehicle and its reversion in the state's favor, based on the terms of Ministerial Legal Documents 47/83 and 52/84.

Customs Clearance of Other Goods

Up to certain limits, previously set, in addition to those which may be subject to the usual formalities, Mozambican emigrants are also exempt from payment of duties for the importing of other merchandise, such as agricultural goods, housing construction materials and others, for example.

But duties are required of Mozambican citizens who are not emigrants. The documentation necessary for their final import includes the invoice, in the event that the goods have been acquired through purchase, or an authenticated statement of gift, if that be the case.

If the value of the goods does not exceed 20,000.00 meticals, their clearance is handled at the entry site itself. But if the value of the goods exceeds that sum, the customs authorities on the entry site will issue a "memorandum" so that, with it, the party concerned may appear in the first section or the customs agency, from which the goods will be sent to ADENA, so that the respective import clearance may be completed.

200 Vehicles With Forged Registration

A study prepared by the customs services, in cooperation with the traffic authorities, concerning "Operation Stop," shows that nearly 200 vehicles with the national registration plate "MLL" were given their registration with forged documents, causing serious damage to the state budget. These documents were forged by a ring, organized for this purpose, involving both native citizens and foreigners.

This ring included a group of individuals engaged in bringing vehicles into the country, another group of persons who had been purchasing the aforementioned vehicles with cash, at prices ranging between 2 and 9 million meticals, on the average, either for their own use or for resale, and also a third group of persons who were forging the documents at the request of the aforementioned sellers and purchasers. For their "services," the forgers were receiving large amounts of money.

According to the authorities associated with this activity, although "Operation Stop" has embarked on a "closed season," a large number of that group of vehicles have not been found.

Goods Subject to Customs Duties

Virtually all items of value brought in from abroad by native, non-emigrant citizens are subject to the usual formalities and hence payment of taxes or customs duties; because they are goods brought into the country's market, the consumption of which will entail the sale of other imported goods. These goods are the ones technically termed "separate from baggage," and for their clearance all that is required is submission of the invoice, if they have been acquired through purchase, or a statement of gift, if that is the case.

Baggage is understood to be the entire group of items that any traveler normally brings from another country, such as checked luggage and hand luggage, containing items of clothing with signs of wear or new, in amounts that are obviously individual; small items of a "souvenir" type; trinkets, and other similar items; and even a small portable radio, a wrist watch, and others.

In principle, these normal baggage items are not subject to the customs formalities; and hence there is no need to pay duties.

'Separate From Baggage'

But when a citizen purchases in another country, for example, a loud-speaker system, 20 or 30 pairs of pants, or a television set, an electric stove, an automobile or other such items, the corresponding customs duties must be paid for them, because they are in the "separate from baggage" category.

In this regard, the deputy director of customs in Maputo, Manuel Comiche Alage, commented: "By 'separate from baggage' we mean all the goods which, although accompanying the passenger or tourist, by their very nature and status cannot be included in the normal category of baggage."

As the general director of customs, Jaime Levi, better stated it, the goods brought in by individuals arriving from abroad included in the "separate from baggage" category are items of value that must be declared to customs for obvious reasons. And these include some which have the duties owed paid on the site itself, and others which require an import permit.

Jaime Levi remarked: "A radio does not require an import permit when it comes with its owner; all that he must pay are the duties, when they are owed (for radios of larger size). But a television set, equipment, a motorcycle or a motor scooter, up to an automobile, require an import permit, in addition to the pertinent taxes."

In instances wherein the value of the goods "separate from baggage" does not exceed 20,000.00 meticals, the clearance is done on the entry site itself. But when the value exceeds that amount, the customs authorities on the entry site will issue a memorandum which the party concerned will submit in the first section of customs or at the customs agency, from which it will be transmitted to ADENA, so that the respective import clearance may be completed.

Why Payment of Duties to Customs?

On constant occasions doubts have arisen as to whether or not these or those goods brought in from abroad should be subject to payment of customs duties. Arguing about the difficulties confronting the country, known to everyone, many persons claim that it would be more advantageous for the country itself to give an incentive for the entry of goods such as automobiles, farm machinery, trucks and others, by means of exemptions for all citizens from customs duties; inasmuch as such goods are not being imported through the state system for sale on the market.

At first glance, this concern might ostensibly appear rightful, because it is based on the objective reality of the great scarcity of countless essential goods on the native market and the almost non-existence of imports thereof for the supply market.

But, in reality, this viewpoint only reflects ignorance of the real situation, for two reasons. First, that exemption from duties aimed at encouraging the entry of goods brought in from abroad does, in fact, exist. It is contained

in the regulatory provisions included in Ministerial Legal Documents 47/83 and 52/84, of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which establish the principle of exemption from payment of customs duties for Mozambican emigrants. Through the force of this principle, they can bring or send all their possessions to themselves and their families.

Benefits for the Emigrant

Thus, based upon those provisions, any Mozambican emigrant worker is allowed to bring to the country, with total exemption from duties or taxes, foodstuffs and items of clothing for himself and his immediate family, with items such as radios, record players, sound equipment, a light vehicle, a pickup truck type vehicle, a truck or a tractor considered to be superfluous items. All this is for his individual use or that of his immediate family. The emigrant is also allowed, with exemption from duties, to bring in agricultural goods (tools, tractors and others) and construction materials (cement, zinc plating or roof tiles, or lusalite; and everything necessary to build his dwelling).

As has been proven, this permission aimed at encouraging the entry of goods exists, but only in a disciplined manner, precisely to allow for the control which would not be possible if the exemption were applied generally to "everyone," provided someone had access to foreign currency.

Why the Duties?

The other reason is that there is also a relative incentive including any Mozambican citizen, allowing him to import vehicles or any other goods by paying the pertinent taxes in native currency.

In addition to the fact that it would run counter to all international customs standards, the elimination, pure and simple, of customs duties for all citizens would not be practicable, because, in the case of a vehicle, for example, its circulation in the country entails higher costs for the General State Budget and the Foreign Exchange Fund because, owing to the wear and tear caused by its use, it will require larger amounts of components and spare parts (which are not imported by the state) or because, not receiving the proper care, it would increase the rate of fuel consumption (this also being imported by the state).

In addition, also in the case of automotive vehicles, when the state imports fuel and accessories, it intends to serve a certain group of vehicles circulating in the country. An uncontrolled increase in the number of these vehicles would increase the demand for fuel and accessories, in addition to the planning, creating burdens which only the revenue coming from customs duties would make it possible to minimize.

Similarly, if a citizen coming from abroad, instead of bringing four or five pairs of pants for his personal use, carries 20 or 30 pairs, it is obvious that his intention is that of doing business. Now, this being the case,

it would not be rightful for him to accumulate profits from that business when, on the other hand, the items brought in by him for consumption will require soap and water to be washed. The water contains chemical treatment products which have been imported, the soap was also manufactured with certain imported raw materials, and so on.

2909

CSO: 3442/31

MOZAMBIQUE

OTM SECRETARIAT URGES WORKERS TO BUILD SOCIALISM

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Oct 85 p 8

[Text] Yesterday, the Secretariat of the Central Council of the Mozambican Workers Organization [OTM] issued an appeal to all the workers of our country, on the occasion of National Workers Day, which will be marked next Sunday. Following is the text of the appeal:

Mozambican workers:

On 13 October 1985, we commemorate Mozambique's National Workers Day. On this occasion, the Secretariat of the OTM Central Council fraternally greets the workers who, from Rovuma to Maputo, are engaged in the difficult task of combating hunger, nakedness, illiteracy and underdevelopment. A special greeting is directed toward the workers who, bearing arms, are participating in productive activities while at the same time contributing actively to the defense of the fatherland and the revolution's conquests.

They constitute an example of patriotism, and they are galvanizing the entire Mozambican people during the current phase of building socialism.

In marking 13 October, Mozambique's National Workers Day, we should also reflect deeply on the path traversed throughout recent years.

Nine years have elapsed since the convening of the historic meeting between Comrade President Samora Machel and the representatives of the Mozambican working class, at which he directed the organization of the workers in Production Councils. The progress of the Production Councils gave rise to the holding of the Trade Union Constituent Conference and the creation of the OTM, whose second anniversary we commemorate on 13 October.

On this festive date, we should also make an assessment of the work accomplished, evaluate the progress made and the difficulties experienced, and determine action that will lead us to the consolidation of the success and the surmounting of the difficulties.

In his speech at the opening of the Trade Union Constituent Conference, the Comrade President of the FRELIMO Party and President of the People's Republic

of Mozambique instructed that the trade unions must be the army to battle against hunger, nakedness and underdevelopment; the army whose weapons are the hammer and sickle, and the machete; the army which has constructed the wealth, prosperity and happiness of the Mozambican people; and which is an example of discipline, timeliness and efficiency.

This watchword should live in every union member; it should constitute a source of inspiration for every worker. In this context, the Central Council Secretariat urges all workers:

To participate actively in socialist emulation, aimed primarily at fulfillment and over-fulfillment of the goals set by the PEC [Central Economic Plan]. In this connection, it is necessary:

To continue the signing of collective agreements and supplementary plans, with priority for those aimed at combating hunger;

To schedule and hold voluntary work drives, devoting special attention to the rebuilding or repair of infrastructures damaged by the armed bandits;

To implement the movement of inventors, innovators and streamliners in all work centers;

To promote better work organization, which will afford greater efficiency in production units, with better use of the existing potential;

To participate resolutely in the defense of the fatherland, responding affirmatively and massively to the fatherland's summons. In this respect, the priority is to reinforce the ranks of the People's Militias and intensify the vigilance in all work centers.

At the present time, our country is experiencing a difficult economic situation, resulting from the criminal acts of the armed bandits in the pay of imperialism, who are destroying our economic and social infrastructures, assassinating defenseless citizens and fostering terror and instability. This situation is also a result of the international economic situation which is unfavorable for us. At this difficult time, all workers are called upon to defend the threatened fatherland, to raise production and productivity, particularly in the area of the battle against hunger and nakedness, releasing the workers' immense creative initiative, and implementing the principle of counting on our own resources, which assume vital importance at present.

Mozambican workers:

Let us proceed ahead with our battle for the building of socialism!

Let us intransigently defend every part of our fatherland from the armed bandits' criminal action!

Let us be the living example of militancy, discipline and dedication in the performance of our tasks!

With the FRELIMO Party as vanguard and with Comrade President Samora Moises Machel as a guide, we are certain of victory.

The struggle continues!

2909

CSO: 3442/33

MOZAMBIQUE

SEBASTIAO REVIEWS ACCOMPLISHMENTS, GOALS ON OTM ANNIVERSARY

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] "The 2 years of OTM's [Mozambican Workers Organization] existence have been highly significant for us, because they were years of struggle to entrench our organization.; they were 2 years of struggle to create conditions for the improvement of the lives of Mozambican workers. The program to improve the workers' lives affected the construction of social infrastructures, such as social centers, eating establishments and day care centers for the workers' children." This statement was made on Saturday by the secretary of the Mozambican Workers Organization in the city of Maputo, Alberto Sebastiao, at a meeting with the press organs on the occasion of the marking of 13 October, the date when the Mozambican unions were created.

Alberto Sebastiao said that, during its first 2 years of existence, the OTM in the city of Maputo had devoted very special attention to the effort for organizing and recruiting the workers for the battle to eliminate hunger and nakedness from our country.

That union leader remarked: "Our organization has an active role in solving the problems affecting our workers' daily lives. The solution to this or that problem affecting each of our workers should not and cannot come from outside. It must come from us. But, for this to be possible, it is essential that our organization, which is responsible for improving the living conditions of Mozambican workers, operate in an effective manner."

The OTM secretary for the city of Maputo gave a reminder that the meeting held on 13 October 1976, directed by President Samora Machel, with workers from this city, created objective conditions for the advent of the commission to implement the Production Councils; which, a year later, was converted into the national commission for implementation of Production Councils.

Alberto Sebastiao claimed that OTM, in the city of Maputo, has been especially concerned with the process of recruiting the workers. As a result of the effort expended by the OTM in the area of recruiting workers, in 1983 138,515 members were included, 3,626 of whom have membership cards for this socio-professional organization.

In the economic area, Alberto Sebastiao explained that there exists among the workers of this city a great strength for surmounting the difficulties with which we are struggling.

He added that this strength and determination have been shown in various ways, underscoring, for example, the phase of preparation for the Fourth Congress of the FRELIMO Party, in which the workers from the nation's capital, organized by the OTM, engaged in countless activities to raise production both quantitatively and qualitatively. As he noted, the same spirit was shown again during the preparations for the Constituent Conference of the Mozambican Workers Organization.

Moreover, Alberto Sebastiao explained that those many activities were marked essentially by innovations and the reproduction of various components and equipment. The workers from the city of Maputo devoted special attention, throughout OTM's 2 years, to the creation of social centers, eating establishments, day care centers and farms for production.

In the social and cultural area, the OTM secretary in the city of Maputo said that 26,600 workers participated in the adult literacy and education campaigns, and more than 5,000 took part in the schooling campaigns as well.

Also in this connection, Alberto Sebastiao claimed that nearly 260 enterprises in the city of Maputo are implementing the programs to retire their workers, although each one of them uses independent judgment. The practice of retirement currently covers an average of 1,390 workers.

According to Alberto Sebastiao, the Mozambican Workers Organization in the city of Maputo has been concerned with establishing this socio-professional organization's rank and file structures, so as to ensure an efficient recruitment of workers from various branches of activity existing in this city.

He explained that many union committees have been formed in various enterprises in the nation's capital, and this process is still under way in certain production units.

2909

CSO: 3442/33

MOZAMBIQUE

FIRST CHEMISTS TO GRADUATE FROM UEM

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 10 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] The first Mozambicans with degrees in chemistry since independence will be leaving Eduardo Mondlane University [UEM] this year, after completing specific training in this field. The director of the School of Sciences of that institution of advanced learning told our reporter that, this year, the return of other cadres from our country, totaling three, who have been specializing in that same field in the GDR, is planned.

The four higher-level technicians who are completing their training this year had finished the work on their bachelor's degree in 1982. They returned to UEM in 1984, and since then have come under a special training plan.

Maria Manuela Faria, Felisberto Pedro Paguta, Adelaide Agostinho and Pedro Magala are the cadres who, when the training is finished, will continue working: the first two as assistants in the School of Sciences and the Ministry of Health, and the latter two in the health laboratory and the water and food agency.

Furthermore, both the former and the latter have engaged in their activities in those sectors, even during the course of the training process.

According to reports released by the director of the School of Sciences, a total of six are candidates for a degree, and the four who will be leaving the university have completed the work on that level.

The director of UEM's School of Sciences, Leonid Kapreliants, explained: "To be a candidate for the degree, they had to take a group of subjects and laboratory apprenticeships, after which they entered the final phase of studies, doing work which constitutes the thesis for their degrees."

Years Spent in the Field

As our newspaper learned, all the students have for several years engaged in activities relating to the field of chemistry, although in different sectors. This fact is considered to have contributed to the specialization per se.

Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that the topics for the degree were directly associated with scientific research and aimed at solving the problems confronting the country.

The subject of our interview added, during the meeting with our reporter, that the students in that course were involved throughout the training process in activities relating to scientific development, based on a measure aimed at enhancing the scientific knowledge of future cadres.

Our subject also noted: "The topics for the degree theses selected were as follows: "chemical analysis of rare earths in geological materials in the RPM," "alkaloids of medicinal plants in Mozambique," "quality control of medicines and study of the main causes of deterioration of medicines in Mozambique," and "nutritional value of certain wild plants used by the populations of communal villages in the country."

As our subject remarked, the selection of these topics is associated with the need for intensifying the research on everyday phenomena in the country, particularly with regard to the economic development programs.

The work for earning degrees was directed by Profs Leonid Kapreliants, Anatoliy Dityatyev and Anatoliy Alekseev, on duty at EUM.

An Important Science

Chemistry is one of the sciences often used, not only in large industries, but also in the everyday life of the average citizen per se. Commenting on this point, Dr Leonid Kapreliants cited as a first example the fact that Mozambique has a large number of plants with chemical compounds often used to make certain remedies. "In most instances, the population uses that type of medicine," he commented.

Our subject explained: "Chemistry is not an abstract science. It is linked with people's lives: from the production of food, items of clothing, footwear and the building of infrastructures to the industrial level, it is chemistry that helps humans to maintain a quality control over raw materials as well as finished products. It is also used in the plastics industry."

Among other sectors in which chemistry has applications, Leonid Kapreliants cited the pharmaceutical industry, referring particularly to the research being done in connection with the use of certain plants considered to be medicinal.

On a level considered more ordinary, chemistry is used widely (although many may not realize it) in the everyday life of every citizen: in food preparation, and in the local production of beverages and other mixtures that we make every day.

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CSO: 3442/31

MOZAMBIQUE

MARKETING CAMPAIGN UNDER WAY IN NIASA, CABO DELGADO

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 5 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] Various activities associated with agricultural marketing are continuing to be carried out all over the country, including primarily the family sectors, whose output in grain production has been quite sizable in Niassa and Cabo Delgado Provinces. At the same time, the preparations for the 1985-86 agricultural campaign are already under way in other sections of the country.

During the 1984-85 agricultural campaign, in Niassa Province, the district of Mavago marketed 30 tons of corn and 12 of rice, despite the delay caused by the rainfall which seriously upset the communications routes connecting the stations located on the sites where the production was taking place.

According to reports provided to our reporter by the director of that enterprise, although the amount of rice was not very large, it is encouraging for that region's production capacity, because this is the first time that rice has been marketed in that district.

Plans call for the creation, within a short time, of four pilot cooperatives in the localities of Chilolo, N'Kalapa, M'Saise and Mavago-headquarters, for the production of rice, corn and beans. Concurrently small handwork cooperatives will be formed to make clay pots and bee-keeping units.

To assist in the agricultural production, at the present time two agronomical technicians have joined in the district activities, one in the district headquarters and another rendering services in the various sections of Mavago.

In Tete, the private and family farmers are starting the planning, in cooperation with the provincial directorate of agriculture, for the cultivation areas in the 1985-86 campaign, the plowing for which is due to begin shortly.

According to reports coming from that province, some difficulties are occurring, associated with the preparations for the campaign. The producers do not yet have necessary materials, namely, farming equipment and other work tools.

Although the MECANAGRO [Agricultural Mechanization] enterprise is currently facing serious material problems in meeting all the agricultural requirements for Tete Province, particularly insofar as plowing is concerned, this has been

the place to which both private and family farmers have come to solve the campaign problems.

There are reports claiming that in that province the number of family and private farmers has increased during the current campaign; which leads to the prediction that it might be possible to accrue good results, better than those of previous campaigns.

Another important aspect relating to the cooperative sector is the training of cattle for animal hauling, an experiment also backed by the party, which has been bringing good results, for the improvement of agricultural production in various sections of Tete Province.

In Cabo Delgado Province, although no figures have been provided on the amounts of grain marketed as yet, the provincial director of AGRICOM [Agricultural Marketing], in reports supplied to our reporter, claimed that the results attained in the family sector will be splendid, particularly in Montepuez and Mueda.

According to that official, the family sector in Cabo Delgado Province contributed the largest amount of products for agricultural marketing, and this has been increasing more during recent campaigns, with the bartering of tons of rice, sorghum, dry cassava, peanuts and corn.

Officials and administrators from the districts of Mueda, Macomia and Mocimboa da Praia told our reporter in that northern part of Cabo Delgado Province that the greatest "sore spot" in the agricultural marketing for them is the lack of products to encourage the peasants' participation.

The same officials disclosed that they have reports from various localities stating that a considerable part of the family production considered to be surplus is still in the hands of the peasants, who are waiting for barter products.

The administrator of Mocimboa da Praia commented: "There have been instances wherein certain family sector products have been marketed two campaigns after their production; owing, on the one hand, to the lack of planning of the respective consumption requirements, but primarily, to the lack of products for barter."

Cabo Delgado Province, particularly the areas in which the largest grain production is concentrated, has serious difficulties in purchasing items such as "capulana" [a type of cloth], the main product for barter. There are areas in which good results can only be accrued with "capulana" and other textiles, owing to the acute problem of lack of clothing.

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MOZAMBIQUE

OFFICIALS MARK END OF RICE HARVEST IN CHOKWE

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 85 p 1

[Text] A ceremony led by the party's first secretary and governor of Gaza, Col Aurelio Manave, on 1 October, marked the close of the 1984-85 rice harvest campaign in the district of Chokwe. At the function, at which all the enterprises and services which had contributed directly or indirectly to the success of this effort were represented, the best workers from the private, family, cooperative and state sectors received emulation awards.

During the 1984-85 agricultural campaign, 28,000 tons of rice were produced in the district of Chokwe by the private, family, cooperative and state sectors, on an area of nearly 23,000 hectares.

A report submitted during the course of the ceremony by Joao Mosca, director of the agrarian enterprises coordination office in Chokwe, commented on the work done during the campaign, with emphasis on the private and family sectors, which distinguished themselves during this harvest, from organization to rational use of available resources.

On the other hand, Joao Mosca said that rice is being grown on only 35 percent of the irrigated area, with the distribution of 11,000 hectares to the state sector, 9,000 hectares to the family sector, 1,500 hectares to the cooperative sector and 2,500 hectares to the private sector.

As for the irrigated area with a rice growing potential, the UDA director cited the achievement noted during the latest campaign, claiming that not all of the 49 percent, the total area, was cultivated owing to difficulties of various types and the meager equipment existing in all sectors. He added that, if there had been production on the entire planned area, with the yields obtained by the state enterprises and the considerable improvements in the others, the largest production rates ever would have been attained.

At the present, time, a mobilization effort is under way, with a view toward the preparations for the next campaign, and the peasants are being made aware of the advantages of producing this grain, and also of the introduction of larger cultivation capacities into the land. Regarding the use of the capacities that the district has, director Joao Mosca announced on this occasion the

arrival in Chokwe of a fleet consisting of 39 tractors, to be used to motivate the production of the private and cooperative sectors.

In submitting his report, director Joao Mosca emphasized: "The rise in the price of the grain has brought benefits to the producer; it is remunerative, and encourages those working on the land." Also with respect to the forthcoming campaign, that official added that efforts aimed at improving the soil preparation are being made and, consequently, the sale of nearly 1,500 animal-hauled plows was undertaken, from 1984 until August of this year.

In this connection, a planned effort, ranging from the provision of fuel to the Siremo enterprise, the restructuring of its involvement in irrigation and the importing of parts to guarantee irrigation and drainage conditions, is taking place in that district. Director Joao Mosca later remarked that, although there are possibilities for improved use of this production potential, "during the 1985-86 campaign we shall still be far removed from attaining the goals sought, because the capacity for preparing the soil is still far short of the requirements; since on the mechanized sectors' nearly 14,000 hectares there is only a capacity to cultivate 9,000 hectares."

In conclusion, Joao Mosca discussed the need for reinforcing the management situation of the family and private sectors, as well as backing them with technicians to ensure the planned production during the current campaign.

Workers Receive Awards

During the ceremony, the governor of Gaza, Col Aurelio Manave, undertook the distribution of emulation awards to workers from certain agricultural enterprises, both private and family, in that district, for having distinguished themselves throughout the campaign that is ending. The prizes consisted of electric stoves, yokes of oxen, plows, bicycles, "Xirico" radios, blankets and clothing.

On that occasion, the party's first secretary and governor of Gaza commented on the work accomplished by those cultivating the soil, urging them to redouble their efforts for the purpose of ensuring better yields in the current 1985-86 campaign.

At one point, Governor Aurelio Manave remarked: "Let us forcefully combat hunger and armed banditry," later adding that it is the duty of every Mozambican to defend our independence by increasing production and productivity. "Making maximum use of the potential that the district of Chokwe has will mean a considerable reduction in the hunger problems affecting our country, and Gaza Province in particular," declared Aurelio Manave, expressing thanks to the producers of Chokwe for the production achieved during the last campaign.

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MOZAMBIQUE

MAPUTO ROAD NETWORK TO BE REHABILITATED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 10 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] Some of the main avenues of the city of Maputo will benefit from a rehabilitation program, inasmuch as it is aimed, on the one hand, at allowing them to be used in safety and, on the other, at ensuring the conservation of the vehicles themselves. The plan was devised by the Transportation Commission recently created as a result of the decisions made at the meeting on the reorganization of the capital city, held in July of this year.

The recovery of the various routes used to enter and leave the city of Maputo is part of the activity being planned with a view toward reactivating transportation in this city.

As we have been publishing, the general program for the sector calls for the reorganization of Urban Public Transportation, and the rehabilitation of the River Transport Enterprise, including the renovation of the Maputo and Catembe bridges and the repair of the lighting system on the two floating bridges.

Also in connection with the River Transport Enterprise, the plan calls for the recovery of vessels immobilized for some time, as well as the restoration of the connections between Maputo and Inhaca, Maputo and Matola Rio and Maputo and Matutuine.

As for the TPU [Urban Public Transportation], the work to be done will involve primarily the reorganization of the entire operating system of the enterprise, in a plan aimed at allowing for greater operativeness in the sector, taking into account the important role played by it in the city's politico-economic and social context.

It should also be recalled that the aforementioned Transportation Commission devised another program, to rehabilitate the Maputo Driving School. On the basis of the established plan, that training establishment needs, immediately, a total of 16 vehicles, eight light and the same number heavy, as well as two motorcycles.

The Roads to Be Repaired

According to information obtained by our reporter from members of the City of Maputo Executive Council, 14 arteries considered to be a priority have been targeted to receive special attention from the agencies responsible for the work to be done.

They are Julius Nyerere, Eduardo Mondlane, OAU, Vladimir Lenin, Angola, Labor, Karl Marx, Paulo Samuel Kankhomba, Albert Lithuli, Anchleta, Agostinho Neto, People's War and Filipe Samuel Magaia Avenues, as well as Mozambique Avenue.

Based on the plan that has been prepared, also included are some of the arteries regarded as important and located in the suburbs. In this instance, materials such as tamped earth and coal may be used.

The responsibility for the execution of the work to repair the streets in the suburbs will be incumbent on the Urban Services Earth Fill Brigade. In the case of those considered to be main avenues in the city, the work will be done by enterprises under the direction of the Ministry of Construction and Water.

Generally speaking, it is thought that, although the maintenance of the capital's highways is the responsibility of the Urban Services of the City of Maputo Executive Council, with conditions as they are, a complete job will be possible only through the contracting of specialized enterprises.

Based on the notion governing the accomplishment of the work, this means that, once the preparations have been completed, it will be necessary to make contracts with enterprises which have the human and material requirements for carrying out this type of work.

On Time, Too

As we were told a few days ago by individuals associated with the transportation sectors, for good preservation and technical maintenance of a vehicle, it is necessary for the roads used by it to have the minimal conditions; because, otherwise, the very life of the vehicle will be endangered.

At present, most of the city's arteries show a rather pathetic state of preservation. Because of defective preservation, some roads are contributing to the deterioration of buses, trucks, light vehicles, etc.

The suburban areas are the ones with the largest number of streets that are virtually impassible. Because there is no other place on which he can drive, the automobile driver has no alternative other than to subject his vehicle to a genuine "sacrifice."

Sources associated with the city of Maputo's transportation sectors are of the opinion that the program to rehabilitate Maputo's highways is proceeding on time, too, particularly considering the (possible) approach of the rainy season.

The same sources also pointed to the fact that some arteries in our city constitute a genuine danger, not only to vehicles, but to pedestrians as well.

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MOZAMBIQUE

DUTCH HYDRAULICS EXPERTS DISCUSS COOPERATION

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Oct 85 p 8

[Text] Upon the recent conclusion of a round of talks between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, new prospects are opening up for the intensification of the cooperation between the two countries in several areas. At the end of the meetings, a protocol was signed in which the two parties expressed their interest in continuing the programs currently under way.

At a meeting with our reporter, Dutch technicians assigned to various projects in the agricultural hydraulics field voiced optimism regarding the future of relations between Mozambique and the Netherlands which, during recent years, have met with some obstacles for various reasons, prominent among which is the military situation in certain regions associated with various projects.

Jan Van Hoom, a civil engineer assigned to the Maputo Hydraulics Enterprise's Works Department, commented: "I am sure that the visit helped to break the stalemate which typified our cooperation at one time."

During its stay in our country, the Dutch delegation, headed by the Ministry of Cooperation and Development Southern Africa Division director, Dr R. Harkema, in addition to holding talks with Mozambican authorities, also visited some projects financed by that European country.

According to Jan Van Hoom, the cooperation between the RPM and the Kingdom of the Netherlands dates back to 1976, when the first Dutch technicians arrived in Mozambique through the solidarity organizations.

On the governmental level, the cooperation did not begin until 1980, with the arrival of 10 cooperants specializing in the fields of hydraulics, civil engineering, mechanics and business management.

Two years later, specifically, in 1982, the first monetary backing from the Dutch Government arrived in Mozambique, to be used for the purchase of agricultural equipment to be applied essentially to the formation of the Maputo Hydraulics enterprise.

Also for the agricultural hydraulics area, the Kingdom of the Netherlands granted 1.9 million Dutch florins in 1983. The following year, over 1.2 million florins were provided for the purchase of equipment and spare parts for the recovery of various types of farm machinery and vehicles.

Van Hoom added: "At the present time, the Mozambican-Dutch cooperation in the agricultural hydraulics area covers the provinces of Maputo, Inhambane, Gaza and Zambezia, and it will soon start in Sofala, with the creation of another provincial agricultural hydraulics enterprise."

Cooperation Concentrated in Maputo

Although the cooperation covers the various parts of the country, it is in Maputo Province that it has had the greatest effect.

In the Umbeluzi Valley, in the district of Boane, work is under way to prepare 270 hectares for growing corn and elephant grass, to make feed and forage, as well as pasturage for dairy cattle.

This project, budgeted at 20 million meticals, will be used to raise dairy cattle which will supply milk and by-products to the city of Maputo. The work, which is currently in progress and due to be completed by the end of this month, consists of the digging of canals for irrigation through gravity, the installation of sprinkler irrigation and the preparation of land for the production of corn, elephant grass and forage to feed the cattle.

The subject of our interview declared: "Other projects are due to be carried out in the area of agricultural hydraulics in the same valley, namely, the construction of a new pumping station and the recovery of the irrigation system"; adding that, also in Maputo Province, Dutch technicians have aided in the recovery of 18 small dams destroyed by tropical depression "Domoína," in Moamba and Catuane.

In Moamba, irrigation for 200 hectares was also recovered. In the district of Marracuene, during the past 4 years, a drainage project has also been under way, with Dutch backing in the form of technology and money, covering an area of 800 hectares belonging to the state, cooperative and family sectors.

The agricultural hydraulics engineer Pieter Jan Zilstra, from the Maputo Hydraulics Enterprise Technical Assistance Department, emphasized: "The experience in Marracuene was quite fruitful in terms of leafy vegetable production, because on land that had previously been unproductive, there was success in producing leafy vegetables all year long, with a production rate equivalent to 10 times higher than the previous one."

In Gaza Windmills Are Gaining a Tradition.

Andre Vonk is a Dutch mechanical engineer in charge of the windmill project for irrigation that is under way in Gaza Province, specifically, in Limpopo

Valley. The project, started last year, has technical backing from the Netherlands which made 50,000 Dutch florins available for this purpose, as well as technicians for the execution of the program.

According to Andre Vonk, the windmill system, which is being applied at first only in the family and cooperative sectors, is gaining a tradition, not only on the provincial level but also in other parts of the country, such as Inhambane, Cabo Delgado and even the city of Maputo itself, where producers from the Green Zones have already made orders for those systems.

In conclusion, Jan Van Hoom discussed the future prospects in the area of cooperation between the two countries. He claimed that, next year, a drainage project will be started in Infulene Valley, in cooperation with the Green Zones Office, the land of which will later be distributed to the family sector.

Over the longer term, it is planned to construct irrigation systems in Pequenos Libombos.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

NEW DIRECTORS FOR MAPUTO PROVINCE--Yesterday afternoon, new directors were sworn in for industry and energy, agriculture, health; registration, notarial work and identification; chief of medicine and secretary of public relations for Maputo Province, at a ceremony held in the nation's capital. Presiding over the swearing-in ceremony was the first secretary and governor of Maputo Province, Lt Gen Jose Moiane, who on this occasion called upon those taking office to expend the greatest effort in their work, aimed at surmounting the various difficulties confronting the sectors. The new directors now sworn in are Joao Chichuto, Alberto Tembe, Salvador Panguene, Ernesto Matsinhe, Francisina Vieira and Luis Govene, for the offices of provincial director of industry and energy, agriculture, health; registration, notarial work and identification; provincial chief of medicine, and secretary of public relations, respectively. The photo shows a view of the ceremony for the swearing-in of some of the provincial directors. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 85 p 2] 2909

LAM INCREASES FLIGHTS--Mozambique Airlines' (LAM) DC-10 airplane will begin landing at European airports three times a week starting next Monday; which also means an increase in the sector's cooperation among the five African countries whose official language is Portuguese. Mozambique Airlines and Angola Air Transport (TAAG) agreed that, starting next Monday, the Mozambican enterprise's DC-10 plane would begin regular flights to Lisbon, in an operation carried out jointly, by the two enterprises, on the Maputo-Luanda route, and TAAG would begin flights between Luanda and Lisbon. The scheduled timetable calls for the plane to leave Maputo at 1100 hours on Monday, and then stop in Luanda, leaving the Angolan capital, now as a TAAG flight, at 1500 hours local time, landing in Lisbon at 2200 hours. Two hours later, the plane will return to Luanda, from which it will finish the flight in Maputo, at 1500 hours on Tuesday. This flight substantially increases the regular runs which could connect the countries of Southern Africa, particularly those of the SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference], with Europe, also affording TAAG greater contact with the "old continent." Furthermore, this cooperation with other African countries, particularly the "five," has been a policy of LAM. In fact, since last April, the DC-10 has been flying for Cape Verde Air Transport (TACV), connecting Lisbon with Sal, on Fridays, on the extension of the weekly connection between Maputo and Lisbon. The DC-10 also makes a weekly trip to Paris, Copenhagen and Berlin. In addition to

these flights, LAM, which has regular runs to the neighboring countries, members of SADCC, began last May a mutually advantageous cooperation with TAAG, to whom it assigned a Boeing-737 plane which has been operating in that country. The leasing of this airplane is planned to be stopped at the end of this month, and is due to resume at the end of November. Also, recently, LAM's IL-62M plane started service for TAAG, with charter flights between Luanda and Havana. Previously, during last August and September, this plane made regular TAAG flights between Luanda and Moscow, with stops in Rome and Paris. The introduction of this operation with the DC-10 makes it possible for passengers from the SADCC countries to benefit from another regular connection with Europe, being able to use the first-class and tourist services offered by the Mozambique Airlines plane. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 5 Oct 85 p 3] 2909

CSO: 3442/33

NIGERIA

NEGLECT OF ECONOMICS IN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

Lagos NIGERIAN FORUM in English May/Jun 85 pp 106-115

[Article by C.I. Igweonwu]

[Excerpts]

Most contemporary writers and observers of the foreign policy process and indeed astute statesmen would undoubtedly agree that economic issues and resolutions to them are now one of the central concerns of both governments and domestic economic interests. Economic considerations increasingly dictate the pace and focus of a nation's foreign policy. External events, once the outcome of international power play, increasingly determine the fate of our domestic economy. Slack demands for global oil, depressed prices, inflation in industrialized countries - all automatically translate into domestic and foreign policy woes and worries of nations and their policy-makers.

In Nigeria, we (especially the foreign-policy makers) are 'bugged' down with the traditional values and goals of foreign policy: the pursuit of 'national interest' and security. One point at this juncture should be made clear: the concept of national interest as many use it, is ambiguous and ill-defined. For one to make appropriate use of it, 'national interest' must be subjected to vigorous conceptual clarity. When necessary, this concept should be disaggregated into component parts such as economic issues, diplomatic issues etc, so that sharper focus on these issues is achieved.

Yet in several foreign policy pronouncements our policy-makers pretend to be doing just that and confusing national interest with foreign policy. For 'national interest' to have meaning, it must be disaggregated and thoroughly focused on issue areas. Each Administration (whether civilian or military led) since independence willy - nilly ignored this elementary foreign policy fact. The genesis of this debacle could be traced to the quality of those making decisions and most importantly perhaps to the formative factors upon which our foreign policy has been historically based.

Among these formative factors which helped shape our traditional goals of foreign policy are: the nature of our political system or what I refer to as the British connection. Excessive moderation and caution has over the years characterized our foreign policy stance. This feature of course, was the product of the 'graceful British departure' from Nigeria and concomitant agreement that this nation should tow the British line in major foreign policy issues. Second, the question of geography and demographic pattern. In terms of size and relative to her neighbours, Nigeria is a giant with vast human and material resources. The effect of this impression is that we tend to treat these 'smaller' countries as delicate entities never to be offended whilst simultaneously playing the role of 'big brother'. In the process, we either ignore our true feelings and ambitions or simply get confused in the political rhetoric of good neighbourliness and 'love' among our ECOWAS 'Brothers'. Third, of course, is the economic consideration or component. Although our economic growth and potential was rated 'very high' immediately after independence, it was clear nevertheless that then Nigeria ranks among the poorest. This fact helped shape the nature of our foreign policy. The need for new sources of capital and new markets for Nigeria's product and the invitation of the multinational corporations into our economy - are crucial determinants of our foreign economic policy. This policy, except for occasional zest for particular programmes, remains incoherent, inconsistent and on the whole inarticulated. Fourth is the character of the Nigeria population, and fifth, the perennial question of our religious orientation.

In contrast to these formative factors are new or complementary elements to our foreign policy which are products of our unique or peculiar circumstances and the interdependent world we live in. These new elements include our vast oil resources, OPEC membership, our desire for rapid industrial transformation. In addition, they include our new awareness in the community of nations and our place in the global order of things. A new consciousness makes us understand we are living in an interdependent world where mutual vulnerability and sensitivities are the norm. A good understanding of approaches and methods of study of foreign policy will, we hope, illuminate foreign policy process and clarify the issues.

Shifting Interests

Undeniably, foreign policy formulation process is in most cases characterized by inherent attributes of contingency, fallability and subjectivity. Yet the basic reasons why nations engage in foreign policy remains fundamentally this: Self preservation in an increasingly 'Hobbesian' world.

Foreign policy goals and objectives shift over time. They tend to respond to the demands of a given situation within a given system. Although certain goals remain constant such as defending the nation, others shift over time such as economic issues.

Successive administrations of this great nation have knowingly or not neglected, ignored or de-emphasized the economic components of our foreign policy. We argue that this type of policy in an interdependent world where external events to a large extent determine domestic policy, where economic issues are increasingly assuming central concerns to governments, is to put it slightly, ill-advised, detrimental and dangerous to our national security. On the hierarchy of national interests, we must give economic consideration a prime and deserving position. The days when politics and diplomatic engagements determined the course of international politics and thus of foreign policy are gone. We must re-examine our concept of foreign policy and what we hope to achieve from it. Economic problems are the dramatic crisis of our time and appropriate economic policies must be formulated in order to meet future challenges.

Much has been said on the need for continental and regional integration in Africa. The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) offered us a shaky platform on which African Heads of States pledged solemnly to work toward the economic integration of the continent, the Lagos Agreement was a prelude to that. In the Western part of the continent, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was another fledgling institution with hopes of forging closer economic ties among the countries of the subregion. Have these platforms and Institutions succeeded in their goals and objectives? Many think not. What has Nigeria done apart from prompt payment of dues and serving as conference host to the objectives and goals of regional and continental integration. We have not done much. As a nation, we have not formulated nor have we articulated coherently our foreign economic policies. As the Head of State observed recently, no country can conduct a successful foreign policy without first putting its home in order.

That observation is indeed sweeping and all - encompassing. However, we take it to mean selectively that our economic house must be put in order. Nigeria presently lacks the economic status necessary for leadership and effective diplomacy on a continental basis. In pursuit of economic status, we must re-examine our structural economic linkage to the global economy and how this affects our foreign economic policy formulation and execution. A closer look must be taken on issues of foreign direct investment and their main agents - the multinational corporation. We must hasten our industrial development through the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral aid agreements and make these an integral part of our foreign economic policy. More contextually, specific policy instruments are required - at the domestic level, instruments that recognize our persistent balance of payments problems and how to check these, the increasing inequity in the terms of trade and investment and on the international level, debt issues, the question of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the burden of domestic and international adjustment. They do not guarantee agreement but provide condition for a meaningful and useful dialogue.

A New Style of Thinking

The demands and dictates of the present international relations behoove nations to take a closer and serious look at those instruments which ensure, and guarantee national interests, security and self-preservation in an increasingly grim global environment.

Nigeria has not seriously and carefully examined those domestic as well as international economic instruments which will in the future guarantee her interests and survival. Infact, it is pertinent to state categorically that this great nation has no discernable foreign economic policy. Foreign economic policy is the means by which governments influence and control certain productive arms of the government in concert with the private sector interact with the economies of other countries. Areas which concern foreign economic policy include: investments, trade, banking and finance acquisition and 'transfer' of technology, transportation, questions of debt, certain areas concerning the 'common heritage of mankind' - the resources of the sea and so on.

The manner with which Nigeria's foreign policy was conducted over the years betray the serious allegation that more attention is paid to the political and diplomatic aspect of foreign policy process, ignoring or de-emphasizing the economic component. We think such policy is ill-advised, uncreative and dangerous. In a zero - sum international political environment, characterized by brutal and most competitive struggle, a policy for survival should be paramount. In this case, international economic policy provides the two principal objectives of the modern nation state: national security

and economic prosperity. Substantially, and as a vehicle to achieving the goals, international economic policy involves the core issues of economics - production and consumption - and the core issues of politics - the distribution of wealth and influence. Our policy - makers have over the years emphasized on the later. The core issues of politics and economics as they affect foreign policy are intertwined and complimentary, and can not be separated. Our contemporary national values, aspirations and goals are at the heart and form the core of foreign economic policy. One could argue thus that international economic policy, when properly formulated, articulated and executed offers an increasingly important determinant of national prosperity. It becomes as well, a means to the end of both foreign and domestic political and economic success.

Unfortunately, the core issues of economics and politics as they affect the international system cannot be pursued successfully simultaneously. One must be given priority over the other. Considering the central and dominant role played by economic issues in our time, we are convinced that politics and political issues be given a lower place in our hierarchy of interests.

'Discarded Precedents'

A new style of policy-making must govern the formulation and articulation of our foreign policy. Nigeria's foreign policy needs new direction, renewed vigour and creativity. If we are to meet successfully future challenges on the international arena then a complete re-examination of the philosophy and substance of our foreign policy processes is inevitable.

Since independence in 1960 and right from the time of Balewa Administration, 'Africa was given the pride of place as the centre - piece of Nigeria's foreign policy'. Moreover since then, three major areas have received special treatment. These are The West African Sub-region, Africa and the 'super powers'. It has been preached also that the first two areas form the 'centredness' and 'cornerstone' of our nation's foreign policy. What actually does this foreign policy posture mean? Frankly, it does not tell us much about the seriousness of a policy designed to ensure national survival. Infact, one shouldn't be overly blamed when he claimed he was tired of hearing foreign policy-makers characteristically bellowing that Africa is the 'cornerstone' of our foreign policy.

The plain fact is that the trust of that policy is misguided, anachronistic and woefully unresponsive to immediate and future global challenges.

Quite alright, we owe a moral as well as financial obligations perhaps to our African brothers who are still waging a war of national liberation against modern day colonizers. We owe them still our unflinching support in their noble cause against apartheid in racist South Africa. These obligations

should indeed be peripheral and not a moral imperative, should economic prosperity and national security be our primary aim and goal in foreign policy. Equally important and urgent is the need for a careful cost - benefit analysis of our 'Afro-centric' foreign policy posture. The much celebrated utopian visions and romantic sentiments about love between us and our neighbours must be subjected to sober re-examination. The incidents with Cameroun, the Republic of Benin and others should awaken us to that reality.

'We are realists' declared Dr. Gambari, the Foreign Affairs Minister. Let us be so. Our foreign policy could be said to be realistic only when it sees global issues and challenges in an unsentimental manner. Nigeria will not gain anything in the grim world of international politics by deluding ourselves that foreign policy can be safely conducted without much resistance and struggle from other nations.

We must stay ahead of this struggle. One way of doing this is to re-shape our foreign policy posture. This can be done by recognizing the vital role that foreign economic policy plays in the achievement of national security and economic prosperity. Thus as central concern to our foreign policy, policy-makers must emphasize economic determinism and fundamentalism through the acquisition of relevant economic instruments. These policy instruments include the attraction of new sources of capital, new markets for our exports (when domestic demand is satisfied), the acquisition and adaptation of technology. More funds should be devoted to research and development. Enough has not been done in this area which holds the key to sustaining rapid industrial take-off. In the areas of sectoral as well as industrial development, we must encourage bona-fide multinational Corporations who are the main agents of development. Policies to control their activities should be implemented also.

In a complex international environment, our pattern of interests have definitely changed and so should our foreign policy. Nigeria is a member of a zero - sum global society where the gain of one nation or a group of nations is automatically translated into a loss for the others. Our foreign policy must be designed to maximize gains and minimize losses. Living in a most profligate age and the characteristic depravity of such times as we live in, a carefully thought out elements of foreign policies free from timidity, romanticism and sentimentality would restore this country to its former lustre and would ensure the survival of our civilization.

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NIGERIA

ECOWAS: WHAT PRICE MEMBERSHIP

Lagos NIGERIAN FORUM in English May/Jun 85 pp 125-135

[Article by Femi Aribisala]

[Text]

ECOWAS is a regional economic community encompassing 16 West African states - Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauretania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta. It is unique, to the extent that it is the first ever attempt to integrate such a large number of countries. In effect, the Community unites such unlikely partners as Nigeria, with its huge oil resources and estimated 90 million population, with the tiny Gambia, where peanuts and tourism provide the only sources of income for its 500,000 people.

The aim of ECOWAS is to promote economic co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity within its membership, including industry, transport, tele-communications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, monetary and financial questions, and in social and cultural matters. Its objective is also the creation of a customs union in which all barriers to trade would be eliminated, and within which there would be unified customs and tariffs.

The ECOWAS sub-region produces a wide range of commercial crops, including the world's largest supply of tropical oils, peanuts and coffee. The region also produces over 60% of the world's cocoa, as well as substantial quantities of rubber and livestock. In addition, it is rich in mineral resources, including the world's largest known reserve of bauxite in Guinea; iron ore, also in Guinea; uranium in Niger; manganese in Upper Volta; and petroleum, principally in Nigeria, but almost everywhere along the coast.

The Community has a population of almost 150 million. Of these, about 60 live in Nigeria. The Nigerian GNP at \$26 billion is almost double that of all the other member-states put together. The formula for contribution to the ECOWAS budget is based on a co-efficient calculated as half of the ratio of the GDP of all member-states, plus half of the ratio of the per capita income of each member-

state. Nigeria alone provides more than 31% of the annual ECOWAS budget, with the Ivory Coast coming as the second highest contributor, but with only 12.6%. In addition, Nigeria contributes 32% of the ECOWAS Fund for Development, with Ivory Coast providing 13%. All this ensures that the future of ECOWAS is inalienably linked with the attitude of Nigeria and its policies.

The support of Nigerians for the ECOWAS venture has tended to be ambivalent. Many regional integration schemes have been established in Africa in order to attain a market no more than half the size of Nigeria. These include the abortive East African Community. Moreover, Nigeria's domestic industrial production is not sufficient to bridge the vast demands of its internal market, how much more to provide for exports to the ECOWAS sub-region. This has prompted many Nigerians to argue that Nigeria does not need ECOWAS, at least in the short-term. The general feeling is that, in the meantime, what the country basically derives from ECOWAS is the headache of massive illegal aliens, rampant smuggling and large financial obligations.

However, the Nigerian government is fully aware that it is in the country's enlightened self-interest to be supportive of the ECOWAS venture. It is recognised that sooner, rather than later, Nigeria will need a regional market for its burgeoning economy, and that, therefore, it is prudent to establish the foundation for that enhanced future economic interaction in the present, whatever its immediate costs. In this regard, ECOWAS is perceived as a veritable economic investment for Nigeria.

Nigeria's official support of ECOWAS is also rooted in the experience of the civil war, when France, Ivory Coast and Gabon actively supported Biafra. This created the feeling in the post-civil war years that Nigeria's security would be greatly enhanced within the framework of sub-regional economic co-operation.

The Community is also intended to increase Nigerian influence throughout the West African sub-region and to allow the country, surrounded by francophone states, to escape entrenched political and cultural isolation. By working quietly through ECOWAS, it is also felt, although not officially stated, that Nigeria would reduce or dispel fears about its potentially hegemonic role in West Africa, while, at the same time, providing a base for its leadership of the sub-region.

Facing Nigeria within ECOWAS, and to a large extent, balancing its influence, stands a close knit group of nine French-speaking countries - Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. What these countries lack in wealth, they make up in a stable and

freely convertible currency, inherited from and backed by France. And the fear within this grouping, a fear stoked up by France, is that ECOWAS might be intended as a vehicle for the domination of francophone West Africa by anglophone Nigeria.

In this regard, one of ECOWAS' greatest challenges is the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), another regional grouping comprising Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, all of which are also members of ECOWAS. Indeed, CEAO was established in 1973 while ECOWAS was still being negotiated, and as an insurance policy against its potential for Nigerian domination. Like ECOWAS, CEAO is also designed to establish a customs union, but at a much earlier date.

Inevitably, there has been conflicts of loyalty in those countries belonging to both CEAO and ECOWAS. ECOWAS does not allow for discrimination among member-states, but CEAO is clearly a preferential trading arrangement. Which means that CEAO members may be inclined to discriminate against non-CEAO ECOWAS members.

Indeed, at the Ministerial Council meeting of the ECOWAS in Freetown in 1981, CEAO members called for the suspension of article 20 of the ECOWAS Treaty, which states that when a member-country extends privileges to one country, it must extend the same privileges to a third country (the most-favoured-nation clause). CEAO members argued that the provisions of the article should not apply to them on the grounds that they are less developed than the other ECOWAS states. There can be no gainsaying that the suspension of the said article would, for all intents and purposes, mean the beginning of the end of ECOWAS.

The ECOWAS Treaty was signed by the Heads and representatives of 15 West African states (Guinea Bissau was still a colony and, therefore, absent) in Lagos, in May 1975. The treaty came into effect in June 1975, when the mandatory 7 states ratified the agreement, namely Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo and Upper Volta. Although legally in force thereafter, the treaty only comes into effect after the ratification of its essential protocols, which define the detailed objectives of the organisation, and the modalities of their implementation. Some of these protocols have since been signed, but the overwhelming majority are still under consideration.

Trade

The foreign trade of the ECOWAS countries is carried out preeminently with non-ECOWAS countries, mainly European. 1981 figures show that only 2% of the total ECOWAS exports, and 3% of total imports are within the region. This

marginal inter-ECOWAS trade itself is largely zonal, that is the anglophone countries trade with each other and the francophones with each other. Moreover, a substantial proportion of this very low level inter-ECOWAS trade is actually no more than the trans-shipment of non-ECOWAS goods. And the picture becomes even more depressing when it is pointed out that over 60% of inter-ECOWAS exports is represented by Nigerian oil alone.

This low level of trade is a hang-over of the colonial era, whereby francophone Africa was hermetically sealed off from the anglophone state. It also derives from the non-complimentarity of the ECOWAS economies. In the main, the countries of the Community export the same primary products, such as livestock on hoofs, meat, fish, nuts and cereals. The industries also duplicate each other exactly, concentrating on canning, food processing, pharmaceuticals, textiles, footwear, and brewing and bottling.

However, there is a relatively high degree of unofficial inter-ECOWAS trade, otherwise known as smuggling. This more than trebles the level of official trade and, according to UNCTAD estimates, exceeds \$1.5 billion dollars. Smuggling has been encouraged by the free movement of people within the ECOWAS community, without the harmonisation of customs tariffs and regulations. It is mostly concentrated in Nigeria, with Cotonou providing a key access point for goods including cars, cigarettes, champagne, lace and apples. According to Chief Akin George, President of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, the annual loss of tax revenue to the Nigerian government through smuggling exceeds over 500 million naira.

The complete elimination of all tariff barriers on unprocessed products was attained in the ECOWAS community in May 1981, at which time the elimination of tariff barriers on industrial products began, with a view to completion by May 1989. Likewise, the elimination of non-tariff barriers commenced in May 1981, to be completed four years later in 1985. At the Conakry Summit of May 1983, the so-called "relatively industrialised countries" of Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Senegal, were given only 4 years to abolish tariffs on a list of priority manufactured products, and 6 years on non-priority items.

The Community recognises that liberal trade would represent a steep loss of revenue to many of the ECOWAS countries, given their heavy dependence taxes levied on foreign trade. Thus, compensation procedures were adopted for member-states suffering loss of revenue as a result of the implementation of the trade liberalisation programme. Member-states contribute to the compensation budget in relation

to their share of the inter-community export trade. The decision was also made to deduct 20% of the compensation due to the more industrialised member-states, to be allocated to the less-industrialised members over a period of 5 years. (Thereafter, 20% would be allocated to all member-states for another period of 5 years).

Industrial Co-operation

In order to enhance the objective of industrial harmonisation, ECOWAS members are enjoined to furnish each other with major feasibility and other reports on current projects within their countries. They exchange information about technical partners and other foreign groups, and furnish each other with reports on experience acquired in industrial projects and the results of industrial research. They also undertake joint industrial studies and projects, and finance research into transfer of technology and the development of new products based on raw materials found inside member-countries.

An example of joint ventures within the ECOWAS community is CIMAO (West African Cement Company). The company is a project jointly undertaken by Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo, to construct a major cement plant at Tabligbo, near the Ska Kondji limestone deposits in Togo. The objective is to produce 1.2 million tons of clinker annually at the Tabligbo factory. This would then be transported to Ghana and Ivory Coast, there to be crushed into cement.

When fully operational, it is envisaged that the CIMAO plant will greatly ease the balance-of-payments burden of its three beneficiaries, who are traditionally dependent on France, Spain, United Kingdom and West Germany for clinker supplies. The clinker factory itself will be powered by the Benin Electricity Company (CEB), a regional body set up in 1968 by Benin and Togo. The CEB receives its power supplies from the Akosombo Dam in Ghana, but eventually will be powered by the Kpong Dam, also under construction in Ghana.

Other joint ventures exist, including those aimed at developing all sources of energy in the sub-region, including coal, and the use of ground-nut and ground-nut husk. Nigeria, for example, is currently investing in a project to supply high-quality iron ore from Guinea for its Ajaokuta blast furnace.

To underwrite such ventures, ECOWAS has set up an industrial fund with an initial capital of 50 million dollars, projected to reach 500 million eventually. This is to be used to finance all kinds of industrial projects, compensate losses due to trade liberalisation, guarantee foreign investments, and help to mobilise internal and external finance for industrial investment.

The Fund has two main sources of income - contributions from member-states to the capital and the budget; and income received from the investment of the Fund's capital resources. In this regard, ECOWAS has attained full recognition as a credit-worthy organisation in its own right, with lines of credit from Britain, Sweden, the European Development Fund, and the European Investment Bank. However, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) have yet to reach agreement on the legal status of the Fund as a multilateral financial institution.

Transport and Tele-communications

ECOWAS states are poor in infrastructural development. Apart from Nigeria, and perhaps Ivory Coast, there is only the most rudimentary transport system between and within the sub-region. Tele-communication links are also still inadequate. The Community recognises that the harmonisation of industrial incentives can scarcely produce the desired results without prior substantial and co-ordinated public investment in infrastructure. As such, the Community has embarked on the construction of a Trans-West African Highway network from Lagos (Nigeria) to Dakar (Senegal); and from Nouakchott (Mauretania) to Niamey (Niger).

In addition, the ECOWAS Telecommunications Project has been embarked upon. This is intended to provide direct automatic links between all the ECOWAS capitals, without the need for transmission through Europe as of old. The project also includes a micro-wave link between Sokoto (Nigeria) and Birni N'koni (Niger), at a cost of 8.6 million naira. The project has received promises of financing from the Italian government; the Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken; Bayerische Vereinsbank; the European Investment Bank, as well as the European Development Fund. The EEC has also given technical assistance worth \$400,000, and the UNCTAD is providing logistical support.

Monetary and Financial Matters

The ECOWAS monetary programme is two-fold. In the short-term, the idea is to build up clearing houses to facilitate payments; and in the long-term, the organisation hopes to create a monetary union with either a single ECOWAS currency, or, at least, a co-ordinated exchange rate system that would permit intra-ECOWAS convertibility.

The first programme is underway. The West African Clearing House (WACH), based in Freetown, serves ECOWAS' various central banks and facilitates exchanges between the governments of member-states. If the Ghanaian government wants, for example, to purchase tractors from Nigeria, the WACH will credit the Nigerian account with the appropriate

foreign exchange and debit Ghana's account. These are just paper accounts, and no foreign exchange is actually held by WACH. If the Nigerian government then buys some Ghanaian cocoa, Ghana's account is credited and Nigeria's is debited. Then at the end of the quarter, the accounts are tabulated and outstanding debts are settled in hard currency.

With regard to the long-term question of monetary union, there are a number of immediate obstacles. Of the region's 10 different currencies, only 4 are freely convertible. These are the African Community Franc (CFA), backed by the Banque de France; the Gambian dollar, supported by the Bank of England; the Sierra Leonean leone, also backed by the Bank of England; and the Liberian dollar, backed up by the United States' Treasury.

CFA countries, including Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta, all members of the Union Monétaire de l'Ouest Africaine (UMOA), are reluctant to abandon the security of the franc zone, in favour of a new ECOWAS zone. Since the CFA is directly convertible into hard currency, many of the weak currencies within the ECOWAS would almost certainly cause a community currency to be less robust. The same goes for Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, who are also loathe to give up their links to the British and American currencies. In all likelihood, Nigeria, too, might be ill-disposed for its oil-backed naira to be diluted by weak currencies.

Nevertheless, the creation of an ECOWAS currency, or the establishment of a West African Unit of Account (WAUA) which guarantees full convertibility is imperative, if the community is ultimately to survive and grow. Because of the small size of many ECOWAS country markets, a project often only becomes feasible if it can supply neighbouring markets. But, as long as currencies cannot easily be exchanged, such industrial development will remain largely pipe-dreams. And, of course, the reduction of tariffs will do little to promote trade, as long as present payment difficulties remain unresolved.

Free Movement

The ECOWAS objective is for all barriers to free circulation of people, services and capital between member-states to be dismantled. Citizens of member-states are ultimately to be regarded as community citizens, and thus, would not require visas and resident permits when travelling to other member-countries. And they would be able to work and conduct business in all community member-states. These are the long-term objectives.

In the meantime, ECOWAS citizens are allowed by community protocol to stay in another member-country without a visa for a maximum period of 90 days, after which they are required to regularise their stay. This protocol has provided

the framework for a large settlement of illegal aliens in Nigeria and Ivory Coast in particular, with the issue coming to a head with Nigeria's dramatic expulsion of over 2 million illegal aliens in January 1983.

The Nigerian expulsion order did not contravene the letter of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of people, but it clearly contravened the spirit of ECOWAS. The granting of a meagre two-week period of grace for roughly 2 million people to leave the country was nearly catastrophic, especially given the fact that the Ghana/Togo border post at Aflao had been shut earlier, at the behest of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana in order to foil smugglers. With the result that many of the deportees were stranded at the border for 12 days, during which it remained closed.

Perhaps no governmental directive in recent times has aroused so much passions and earned such widespread international opprobrium for Nigeria as the expulsion order. The humanity of Nigerians was widely called into question. And we were lampooned as a heartless people, eager to exploit the services of illegal aliens in boom periods, but quick to expel them unceremoniously in lean times. Others pointed out the incongruity of having the biggest black nation in the world, and the self-proclaimed spokes-country of African unity, expel fellow black West Africans, while the white and Asian communities within its borders were unaffected.

The expulsion order certainly had a negative effect on the treatment of Nigerians living in the affected ECOWAS states. Reports from Ghana, for example, indicated that there ensued the molestation of Nigerian market women. A 900,000 naira grant made to Ghana by the Nigerian government for the re-settlement of the returnees was emphatically turned down. Worse still, the evidence indicates that, in spite of its considerable costs (social, political, as well as economic), the expulsion has not succeeded in achieving its basic, minimum objective - that of denuding Nigeria of its constituency of illegal aliens. The aliens did leave, but only at the first instance. They are now back in force in the country, with many more creeping in through the ever-porous borders.

Defence

The ECOWAS Defence Committee, comprising Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo, has been deliberating on the establishment of an ECOWAS defence force. The Committee has come up with a defence protocol which prescribes, not the creation of a standing force, but for each member-state to ear-mark part of its forces for use in an ECOWAS force, if needed for defence against external aggres-

sion. The big question here is against whom is the defence force meant? The more left-wing governments, including Benin,

Guinea Bissau, and Mali seem to have some cause for concern. The existence of French garrisons in several of the francophone ECOWAS states obviously creates some difficulty. But other problems abound, including the fact that troops from Niger and Liberia, for example, have no common language, and differences in military tradition, armaments, and methods of operation between the anglophone and the francophone states.

Conclusion

The future of ECOWAS is contingent upon how successfully it deals with 5 major challenges before it:

- (1) Co-ordination of national economic policies in order, for example, to effect a new system of rationalised crop production;
- (2) Organisation and re-organisation of industrial production to serve regional, rather than national, markets;
- (3) Expansion of inter-community trade in spite of competitive nature of exports;
- (4) Creation of a monetary union with either a single currency, or a co-ordinated exchange rate system permissive of currency convertibility; and
- (5) Downplaying of competing sub-regional economic groupings, such as CEAO. These objectives, though difficult, are attainable.

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NIGERIA

BORDER CLOSURE STEMS SMUGGLING, MANUFACTURERS PROSPER

Ikeja NEWSWATCH in English 7 Oct 85 p 46

[Article by George Oliono, Sam Bryson]

[Text]

Nigerian borders were closed seventeen months ago to ensure a smooth change of the colours of naira notes. After the change was over, the borders have remained closed to stem the activities of smugglers which have had a disastrous effect on industrial expansion and commercial establishments in Nigeria. Nigeria has resisted pressures from ECOWAS member-nations to reopen the borders.

Manufacturers are reaping a rich harvest from keeping the borders closed. Sales turnover and profit for the 1984 operating year showed abundant evidence. Goods mostly affected by smuggling in the past were textiles, cigarettes, beverages and shoes. The affected companies' sales levels in the past five years had been dismal.

Since 1980, Nigerian Textile Mills Ltd, NTM, had consistently recorded a loss. In 1980, on a turnover of N7.5 million, a loss of N0.81 was recorded. In 1982 and 1983, on turnovers of N14.43 million and N13.69 million operating losses of N4.99 million and N3.21 million respectively, were reported. But in 1984, on a turnover of N13.85 million, an operating profit of N4.19 million was recorded. In his report to NTM shareholders, company chairman, Saburi Biobaku, said that the 1984 result was the best by the company in many years. He attributed this partly to the effective control of smuggling.

Philip Morris Nigeria, the Ilorin-based cigarette company, had cause to be grateful for the 1984 border closure. In 1980, 1981 and 1982, the company recorded operating losses. In 1983, on a turnover of 14.84 million, it made a meagre profit of N0.33 million; a net margin of about 2 percent. In 1984, it made a profit harvest.

On a turnover of N28.91 million, a net profit of N4.72 million was recorded; a net margin of 17 percent. Company chairman, Godfrey Amachree, told shareholders that, "government action to eliminate smuggling by keeping Nigeria's borders closed had greatly contributed to encourage a return by consumers to cigarettes of domestic manufacture."

Even the cigarette giant, Nigerian Tobacco Company Limited, NTC, also benefitted from the 1984 border closure. Both its turnover and net profit performance showed a healthy development. Between 1981 and 1982, its turnover decreased by 9 percent and net profit tumbled by 67 percent. But from 1983 to 1984, the turnover shot up by 12 percent and profit leaped by 59 percent.

As industries and manufacturers gloat over the closure, there are indications that smuggling is alive and well. Sethu Madhavan, manager of Arcee Textile Industries, Isolo, Lagos, said that about four months ago, smuggled textile fabrics resurfaced in Nigeria's markets. He claimed that these already have a telling effect on the local textile industry. In fact, NTM officials reported to the former minister of internal affairs, Mohammed Magoro, a major-general, about the renewed problem of smuggling.

Last August, Customs and Excise officials raided a market at Owode-Egbado near Idi-Iroko border in Ogun State, and seized goods worth N250,000. In July, markets raids in Maiduguri led to the confiscation of goods, mainly textiles, worth N18,000. And more recently, at the Port Harcourt international airport, smuggled clothing

materials valued at N300,000 were impounded.

In March, three men were charged and sentenced for dealing in contrabands worth N2.1 million. Another group was also jailed for smuggling foreign cigarettes worth N312,500 into the country.

Aig Imoukhuede, deputy managing director of NTC, estimated that smuggled cigarettes in the market as at last March was 35 percent of total sales in Nigeria. Solomon Ani, chairman of Delegate Niger Cafe and Foods West African Limited, said that Nigeria loses over N2 million annually through the smuggling of locally produced raw coffee to neighbouring countries. Oluwole Ayorinde, assistant general manager of NTM expects smuggling to increase if the borders are reopened. Said he: "If the borders are reopened, it will be like giving smugglers a blank cheque."

Manufacturers and industrialists held their breath, when on August 27, President Ibrahim Babangida said that "the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS must be reborn with a view to achieving the objectives of regional integration." The statement was interpreted to mean that Nigeria's borders would be opened soon to appease ECOWAS member-states.

Those fears were allayed, a fortnight ago. John Shagaya, a lieutenant colonel, the new minister of Internal Affairs, told journalists that the borders were not likely to be reopened yet because the reason for their closure still remain unresolved. Only last week, Bolaji Akinyemi, a professor who is Minister of External Affairs, told a BBC correspondent that "the action on the closure of Nigeria's borders had been taken to protect the nation's economic interest which was threatened by smugglers."

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NIGERIA

NEW INCENTIVES TO BOOST EXPORTS

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 14 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Arize Nwobu]

[Text]

THE gateway to the exportation of Nigeria's non-oil products may soon open up. New export incentives that would interest genuine exporters of exportable products have been put together, according to a very reliable personnel of the Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC).

The incentives are yet to be endorsed by the Federal Military Government.

"It was lack of adequate incentives and bureaucratic constraints that have been inhibiting the exportation of non-oil products," our source further said.

Besides our source strongly remarked that there was the need for a thorough ground work to be done first and foremost in the area of export development which required a lot of funding.

He said that delegates of the trade mission to the United States last year saw a lot of lapses on our export strategies but however gathered very useful experiences.

The NEPC seems to have known better. In collaboration with the Commonwealth Secretariat, the council is embarking on four export-oriented projects.

A team of experts it was learnt have already left for Brazil to carry out a market survey for Nigerian products in that country.

While the team is expected back by the end of this month, another team is expected to leave for Saudi Arabia while yet another team would precisely carry out a market survey for a cocoa-based products in Australia. And more, contact promotion programme would also be embarked upon to Gabon and Cameroun by the council.

Back home, the council was said to be intensifying efforts to identify more genuine and potential exporters of exportable goods.

A Nigerian-brewed beer it was learnt, has caught the fancy of some American businessmen and according to our source, its exportation would soon commence. But it would be the liquid content only since the interested American party would design and procure bottles from their country which would be flown down here under a special custom arrangement.

The reason for this arrangement was that the cost of bottle production in Nigeria was higher, a situation capable of skyrocketing the total cost of production thus

making the product less competitive.

Exporters have been reacting to the numerous trade inquiries received by the NEPC and being published by one of the weekly financial papers. "Those inquiries are received in their multiples daily by the council but are not considered serious," our source hinted.

There are more serious ways to identify genuine interested importers of our products, he added.

For instance our commercial attachées in foreign countries, he continued were expected to get to know the good buyers and give a feed back to the NEPC. This remark however, left one to ask if the NEPC had ever made attempts to liaise with such commercial attachées, or must it be the attachées who have to initiate such moves?

In any case, a wide range of observers believe that Nigeria was standing at crossroads and that failure to develop and intensify the exportation of non-oil products might spell her doom maybe in the next two decades.

NIGERIA

FOREIGN AGENCIES AGREE ON CREDIT COVER

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 14 Oct 85 pp 1, 24

[Article by Nduka Nwosu]

[Text]

THREE export credit agencies have agreed to provide cover for large projects in Nigeria.

They decided to burst an earlier agreement between themselves that they would not provide medium- or long term cover for any new projects until Nigeria came to an accord with the IMF and if Nigeria finalised its priority list of projects and came to a satisfactory conclusion on short term debts.

The above projections were based on the assumption that no bank would provide finance without insurance making the agreement to rule out the possibility of fresh export credits to Nigeria.

In a recent publication of the AED Economic Digest Special Report on Nigeria, IMPRESIT, a contracting firm (subsidiary of Italy's Fiat), is reported to have agreed to go ahead without a cover from the SACE, of Italy.

Impresit officials believe that their two deals have sufficient priority to ensure that foreign exchange was set aside like the Sokoto water supply project and the land reclamation scheme.

The US Export Import Bank (EXIMBANK) was said to have first pulled through the agreement in May, insisting that it had a commitment in 1983 to cover the deal.

This was a contract involving a 93.5 million dollars credit to supply gas turbine generators to the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) in the Delta station.

However EXIMBANK was said to be lying low by being inconsistent. In June for example, EXIMBANK reversed its decision to cover a 60 million dollars (about N49.8 million) water pump supply contract for the agriculture ministry despite a Federal Government guarantee awarded to M & W Pump Corporation, arguing that no guarantee could be issued until outstanding transfer risk claims were settled.

Then came July and August when surprisingly again COFACE and Japan's Export Insurance Division (EID) broke through the agreement pressing like EXIMBANK, that it was forced to do so on a 500 million dollars (about N415 million) refinery contract at Port

Harcourt to prevent the Japanese who were said to be willing to provide cover, from taking all the work.

This is a deal whose original joint venture was between France's Spie-Batignolles and Marubeni and JGC Corporation of Japan. "The trickle of projects getting through could turn into a stream as countries fight to retain their market shares" was the comment of a London banker who added that "there is so little major project business around that Nigerians will be able to get around their problem."

Surprisingly for Nigerians the AED digest reports also that these agencies anticipating prospects of an IMF agreement are perhaps expecting a further incentive to break ranks and pick up business.

These export credit agencies claim they paid out huge amounts of money to Nigeria in the past few years for which reasons they now want to go tough.

NIGERIA

EXTERNAL FOREIGN RESERVES DECLINE

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 14 Oct 85 p 24

[Article by Roseline Umesì]

[Text]

THE level of the external reserve for the month of August 1985 declined further to N741.2 million. This showed a further reduction of N46 million when compared with the level in July when it was N787.9 million.

The reserve was made up of N19 million in gold; N716 million foreign government securities and balances with foreign banks; N3.8 million in I.M.F. gold tranche; N6.9 million in special drawing — right (SDR).

The August foreign reserve level also showed a decline of N19.8 million when compared with the same period of 1984 at N761 million.

When studying the pattern of the external reserve, it showed that the decline has been consistent since the month of July. It is difficult to say the reason why the reserve has been declining, more especially

when it has been reported that the level of oil production has been maintained at the standard level.

However, this development may not be unconnected with the increased level of foreign exchange outflow recorded for the month of May and July as contained in the Central Bank monthly report for the month of June 1985.

It is also difficult to reconcile the rapid decline of foreign reserve in terms of imports, more especially when according to report a lot of goods were imported under counter-trade.

However, contradictorily in the home front, the level of currency in circulation increased to N4.9 billion in the month of August from the level of N4.8 billion in the month of July 1985.

On the other hand, the level of currency in circulation for the month of August 1985 corresponded with that of August 1984 at N4.9 billion.

Such observers hold it that it was essential that we borrow a leaf from some other countries with successful export incentives.

One of such countries is Singapore. According to available information, inputs used in export promotion in Singapore were admitted duty free without any limitations and such exports receive additional incentives in the form of tax allowances on marketing expenditure in addition to tax concessions on profits, royalties and interest in foreign loans being granted to exporters.

In Argentina, in addition to exporters receiving subsidies theoretically representing draw back for tariffs paid on import inputs, they also had access to preferential credits.

In Brazil, it was learnt that

a generalised indirect tax exemption was given on processed exports and their inputs used in export production. Also generous export subsidies were granted in the form of tax credits, reduction in income taxes and preferential export financing.

But how easy is it to implement related export policies in Nigeria?

According to the former Managing Director of ICON (Merchant Bankers), Chief Ime-Ebong now the Managing Associate of Ime-Ebong Associates at a recent seminar in Lagos, "export promotion policy is neither easy to implement nor capable of yielding the

required results overnight."

For one thing, he said that such policies required considerable financial outlay "which in the present day Nigeria may not be easy bearing in mind difficult financial circumstances and also the fact that financial assistance to this sector must necessarily be at the expense of other sectors of the economy."

Moreover, Chief Ebong continued, "Nigeria is suffering from internal inflation and maintains an over-valued currency leading to prices of exportable products which are above world levels." To this he advocated for the devaluation of the naira

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

BRAZIL SEEKS COOPERATION--The persistent call for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) can only be achieved when leading countries in the Third World come together to act with one purpose. This fact was revealed by Mr. Joseph M. Tutundjian, Executive Director of COTIA Brazil, during a cocktail party at the Brazilian Embassy in Lagos, held in honour of members of the Brazilian Capital Goods Industry Association (ABDIB) who were in the country recently to hold consultations with their Nigerian counterparts. Mr. Tutundjian observed that Nigeria and Brazil have similar problems and interest which typify those of other Third World countries. According to Mr. Tutundjian, co-operation between both countries, which was further strengthened in their last countertrade agreement would help in moulding the Southern Hemisphere into a force to be reckoned with. Within the past one year, said Mr Tutunajian Brazil has supplied over 200 Nigerian companies with a wide range of products from raw materials to manufactured goods, equipment and food commodities. He further said that geographical proximity between Nigeria and Brazil has resulted in a reduction of lead time and transportation costs, thus lowering the price paid by the final buyer of the products. [Text] [Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 14 Oct 85 p 2]

DUTCH TRADE INQUIRIES---The Netherlands Embassy in Lagos has announced the establishment of the Holland Trade System (HTS) a body to promote trade between Nigeria and Holland. According to the Commercial Attache, Mr. Hans J. Van Nieunkerk, the HTS is a computerised data bank founded by the Netherlands Export Promotion Agency and the Netherlands Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. It contains the profiles of a great number of companies in the Netherlands and aims to bring the demand of both countries more efficiently together. All trade enquiries received by the Netherlands embassies and the bilateral chambers of commerce all over the world are channelled through the Holland Trade System. The information of a trade enquiry is fed into the computer which scans all available profiles and selects companies which can supply or manufacture the required products or services. When a number of relevant firms are selected, they are instantly, either by telex or by telephone informed about the particular trade inquiry. The companies concerned can then respond directly to the enquiring firm. [Text] [Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 14 Oct 85 p 3]

ECONOMIC PROMOTION TOUR--A Nigerian economic mission is now on export promotion tour of five nations for four weeks starting from Saturday, October 12, 1985. The economic mission which included industrialists, bankers and exporters, was led by the President of the Association of Nigerian Exporters, Chief (Mrs) Grace Ogunnusi. Others in the mission are Alhaji A.M. Bulkachuwa, chairman, Bravo Nigeria Limited, Chief S.J. Udoh, chairman and managing director of Jackson Devos Limited; Mr. A.A. Onafuwa, marketing manager, Cocoa Industries Limited, Mr A. Akinola, managing director International Breweries Limited, Jos, Plateau State. The rest are Dr C.A. Onwugbolu, Technical Manager, Tower Aluminium Nigeria Limited, Lagos; Mr A.F. Olasebikan, Marketing Manager, A.C. Christlieb Nigeria Limited, Lagos; Mr R.R. Umoette, assistant General Manager (Marketing) Cross River Breweries Limited, Uyo; Mr K. Adeniyi-Williams, Export Manager, Nigerian Breweries Limited, Lagos. The secretary of the Association of Nigerian Exporters, Mr Henry Ogwah and the Publicity Secretary of the association, Mr A.W. Oyegun will also be in the economic delegation. The mission will visit West Germany, India, South Korea, Kenya and Hong Kong. [Text] [Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 14 Oct 85 p 3]

MORE BANKS IN VILLAGES--Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has directed Nigeria's 28 commercial banks to open a total of 300 new branches under the third phase of the rural banking programme. The branches are to be opened between August 1, 1985 and July 12, 1989. The rural banking programme was instituted in 1977. Under the first phase, 17 commercial banks were directed to open 200 branches between July 1977 and June 1980. The second phase of the scheme, originally scheduled to be between July 1980 and December 1983, was extended by one year to December 1984 to enable the 20 commercial banks comply fully with the directive to open more than 266 rural branches. Even then by August 1, 1985, about 30 of the rural branches were yet to be opened for business. Banks complain that most of the rural branches are unviable. They also say that the scheme is straining available resources and preventing improvement in urban banking services. [Text] [Ikeja NEWSWATCH in English 21 Oct 85 p 33]

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SOUTH AFRICA

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ANALYZED FROM AFRIKANER VIEWPOINT

Johannesburg LEADERSHIP in English Vol. 4 1985 No 3, pp 34, 36, 39

[Article by Harald Pakendorf]

[Text] Ah, for the good old days of Eric Louw.

Then we claimed that article 2(7) of the UN Charter forbade interference in a country's internal affairs. Our first full-time Minister of Foreign Affairs regularly thundered against the world for sticking its nose into the way we handled racial problems in South Africa.

The world would admonish us, shrug its shoulders and go back to its own affairs. Over the years a series of condemnations and resolutions were stacked up against us but we, too, shrugged them off and carried on as before. All that has changed

Our internal policies, gradually over the years but specifically over the past year, have become part of the internal policies of the major countries. And thus positions have to be taken on us, positions which are no longer of academic interest but could impact on a politician or a government's influence, role and sometimes even possibility of gaining power.

This is so fundamental a shift that it has changed the parameters within which South Africa can decide its own future and also foreshortened the timespan within which those decisions can be taken.

There is another, new element which has the same effect, and that is the politicisation of the voteless masses inside the country.

The effects of the year-long violence, rioting, intimidation and upheaval will not just go away once it has been brought under control as happened to a large extent after Sharpeville and Soweto. The masses feel that real change is just around the corner, that if they hang in there a little longer the inevitable will happen: apartheid will disappear and blacks will sit in Parliament.

How does the government react to these undeniably new elements in the political process?

Views differ widely. From the Right outside the National Party it is a simplistic one, namely that a harsh clampdown now followed by more, not less, apartheid will see us through. There are those on the Right within the National Party whose instinct also lies in that direction, though there is a realisation that a return to the period before September 1984 is no longer possible.

On the white Left there is a feeling of: "We told you so. The chickens have come home to roost." Plus fear for the future and a resurgence of activity to try to blow some life into what is perceived to be a lifeless, decisionless leader-group, those Afrikaners on whom you could always rely to keep the country on an even keel while you made a good profit and kept your conscience clean.

Among non-whites--how strange that word feels now!--there is also division. Coloureds and Indians are divided between those who want to work within the present arrangements for change and those who don't want to. The same, broadly, holds for blacks.

With one significant difference. Here the division can more properly be described to be between those who want reform and those who are out for revolution, the overthrow of the State and the installing of a black government.

How, then, does the government react?

It is fairly united in the need to break down racial segregation in all spheres of life, except that of housing and schooling, but divided on the fundamentals of how a new constitutional dispensation should look.

If it had not been for the riots and the strong foreign reaction, the year 1985 would have gone down in history anyway as a revolutionary one, for the government has moved rapidly compared to past performances.

The State President in three significant speeches in the first half of the year, made statements which previously might have sounded implausible even as future speculative possibilities. In January, April and June P.W. Botha--in the convoluted manner which politicians use to announce changes that they don't want potential white electors to understand clearly--stated that in power-sharing lies our future, that forced resettlement is out, that freehold rights in white areas will be granted to blacks and that the citizenship issue will be resolved.

That this was not grasped is partly due to the manner and the words which were employed, but also to an abysmal failure to understand the rudiments of public relations. The message simply did not come through. It left whites comfortable in the feeling that change is in the air but not too much, thank God, and blacks frustrated because nothing seemed to be happening.

Piecemeal Change

True, there has been change. But it has been piecemeal. In the political vacuum the government seems to have created deliberately, trains have become partially desegregated, central cities have been opened up, theatres may become available to all races and the liquor and hotel legislation will be cleansed of apartheid connotations. And more of the same.

Clearly then the government has moved, and quite rapidly, too. It is a major mistake to think that Botha and his men sat on their hands while the country was going up in flames and the rand was falling rapidly.

They have moved. There is no denying this. And on the need for these kinds of change there is unity, broadly speaking, as there is on the need to change the political system in such a manner that blacks will be accommodated at the centre of decision-taking.

In the present hullabaloo this is too easily overlooked. It shouldn't be because it is the clearest indicator that drastic change in the country is coming, even if it is in fits and starts.

Sadly though, this is no longer enough because of the twin new inputs--foreign interest and the politicisation of the masses. These have changed the situation fundamentally and the question is whether the government also has this perception. There is no clear indication that it has--a deduction made from public statements and private acts.

Thus the government, quite correctly, says that it will talk to anyone about the political future of the country and that its only pre-condition is a no for one-man-one-vote in a unitary state. But the talks simply do not get off the ground and, despite vague assurances that the Special Cabinet Committee is seeing black leaders as do some cabinet ministers in their private capacity, there has been almost nothing of this of late.

Certainly, the government is talking to homeland leaders and others who are prepared to work within the present structures--as it should, for these, too, are real leaders--men with clout, men with a considerable following. Nobody can deny that Buthelezi, Mangope, Matanzima and Phatudi are men to be reckoned with.

Adroit Handling Needed

But they are not the ones who are behind the violence or at least sympathetic to it, or who are looked on as leaders by those who are rioting.

For that, one has to look at the UDF and of course the ANC. The UDF is amorphous and it is only really the ANC which at the end of the day can be said to have a truly national following--if not for its methods at least for its ideals. The UDF leadership finds itself largely behind bars and the ANC out of the country--both factors which militate against talks which could lead to meaningful and long-term solutions of the political problems in the country.

There is, of course, a third category of leadership--not part of the "system" and not openly and actively UDF. They are the trade union leaders, the up-and-coming businessmen, the teachers, the community leaders. But even they do not want to talk to government--partly because they fear for their safety but also partly because they fear a loss of credibility in their ranks.

The talks about the future of the country simply have not taken off and there is no indication that they can get started.

It would be difficult if not impossible, for example, to talk simultaneously to Buthelezi and Tutu. Separately one could, but the State President has not seen either of them of late, though they both are visible and important symbols of black power.

One is reminded of the tale told by Barbara Tuchman in "The March of Folly." She relates how John Kennedy came back from Vietnam when he was still a Senator and said that it was obvious why there could not be elections--the communists would win. The same reason, incidentally, why we do not hold elections in South West--SWAPO would win. And we don't talk to the ANC precisely because it is the most important black political grouping--not the only one, but certainly the most important.

Ironically, the only way we can circumvent the ANC is by doing swiftly what it wants done--devise a system in which blacks and whites sit in the same parliament, the same government and realise that the next State President could be black.

Of course, the ANC is going for a unitary state whilst the State President has explicitly shut that possibility out--which does not mean the twain shall never meet. The future constitutional form is surely what the talks will be about because the issue of power sharing has been granted ahead of time--Botha did so in January, April and June and very clearly in the statement made to the EEC delegation.

The ANC may want to go for an all-black government but talks around a table would soon convince it that the present South Africa is not about to collapse, despite the impression which exists. It is alive, not all that well but certainly kicking--and do not underestimate its power, ability and will to hit back.

Having said that, though, one has to admit that freeing Mandela and unbanning the ANC--pre-conditions for open talks inside South Africa--may not necessarily bring that organisation to the table. It may not be able to do so, partly because it overestimates the nearness of the revolution and partly because of its fears that it may lose credibility with the really wild young men--both reasons we should try to talk to the ANC.

But having taken the first and vast step, adroit handling can improve our international standing and thus the value of our currency--and buy us time. Internally, it may not bring an end to the unrest although the violence could be contained.

It would mean that we again have the initiative, again have morality on our side. If attempts at the talks with the ANC are accompanied by a clear statement that negotiations are in fact to be about the dismantling of apartheid and power-sharing, we may even get somewhere around the table. If the ANC is not there, moderate internal leaders may yet come if the intent of the government is explicitly stated and not in the convoluted manner these things have been said so far.

What are the chances of this coming about?

In the near future, small, because on the fundamentals with which government wants to go to the negotiating table it is divided. Certainly, there is clarity in Cabinet and caucus that power sharing and a common citizenship for all are a must and that all else follows from there. But these terms are so broad that a sham unity can be kept up behind them.

But to assume that there is unanimity on the specifics of all issues at cabinet level would be foolish. Thus the definition of what common citizenship entails--announced in January by the State President--was held up because of these differences. And even though we now finally have had a statement on what is meant, this has not yet cleared up one other point of difference, namely, the future place of the homelands and independent states in a possible new constitutional system.

Equally, there is clear reluctance on the part of some cabinet ministers that the key words "power sharing" should be used. Thus one sees vague references to common decision making, co-responsibility and so on. There is a strong push by other ministers though, that the key words should be used so that there can be no doubt as to what is meant.

Also, there is a line of thinking which says that a central cabinet but not a central parliament for all races represents the limit of what is acceptable. Yet there are men in Cabinet who accept that a central legislative authority is inevitable.

Differences like these--to talk of a split now would be a strong exaggeration--are what hold back clearer pronouncements and rapid movement.

Added to this is one other development: the succession race. Not that there is any doubt about P.W. Botha being in control and above all not about the strong input from him which has brought about the reforms we have had in South Africa. In fact, he has already more than earned a name for himself in future history books. In seven years he has broken down more prejudices than the previous years have built. He has prepared the way for what has now become inevitable; sharing of political power between white and black.

Jostling for Position

Yet there is a distinct feeling that rivals for the future presidency are already out of the starting blocks. There are small indications--the President saying that he is a healthy man and not considering resigning when neither has been suggested, ministers Pik Botha and F. W. de Klerk proclaiming their loyalty to P.W. Botha. De Klerk again, saying that the President should be supported.

Elsewhere there are other signals: officials and MPs increasingly beginning to speculate about which of the main runners has the strength and stamina to make it--F.W. de Klerk, darling of the party's right wing, or the three verligtes Pik Botha, Gerrit Viljoen and Chris Heunis. It may be a long-distance event, though, because P.W. Botha is not about to resign.

But runners tend to jostle for position, militating against clarity of position.

Thus, despite rapid movement on several fronts--the new factors of international pressure which won't go away and the heightened political expectations of the masses which, too, will not go away--we find ourselves in a frozen moment.

It is that frozen moment which is causing the rand to fall and political initiative to slip away--both of which we can ill afford. But the end is not nigh. The economy is strong, so is the will for survival and the capacity for strong action.

We will break out of that moment when we grasp the nettle of the ANC, full well knowing that it may be dangerous, but not as dangerous as not doing it.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BOESAK DETENTION JUSTIFIED

Pretoria DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 29 Aug 85 p 12

[Editorial: "No Other Alternative"]

[Text] It was one of those unfortunate and unpopular actions. But, if all the facts surrounding the Boesak affair are taken into account, there was hardly any other alternative.

The fact that the radical elements here and the outside world are now giving vent to curses and venom over the detention is the last thing that had to be considered when weighed against all the potential evil that may have broken out this week, and later, as a result of Dr Boesak's campaigns of agitation. Because he had for a long time not merely been busy defying the authority of the state: His planned march to the Pollsmoor prison and his rabble-rousing speeches to radical groups clearly foreshadowed unrest, damage to business and bloodshed. For the simple reason that the police would have had no other choice but to move in. In any case, Dr Boesak himself said he intended to "turn the country upside down." This was thus not a question of peaceful protest.

Boesak's methods followed the recipe of the traditional revolutionary. To turn around his own comparison of the rulers of this country to Hitler, it can be said that he carried on like the spiritual child of Fidel Castro.

He no longer concerned himself with the religious task for which he was qualified: He preached civil disobedience and let loose unrest and violence wherever he found himself. And there were more than just passing indications that his campaign fitted in neatly with the anti-South African actions overseas. In short, Dr Boesak was clearly part of the larger assault on the South African system.

With the preponderance of anti-South African mud-slinging now let loose overseas, the true facts surrounding the Boesak affair will scarcely make a dent in the torrent of criticism in store for the country. We therefore have to accept that the detention will lead to a new low in foreign mistrust. The only consolation is that things could scarcely go worse than they have recently.

What lies ahead on the Boesak road?

The man is dynamite. It may be hoped that the detention will not have to last too long. And in the present climate even this kind of length is a relative matter of too little or too much.

In such awkward circumstances a judicial decision will be far and away the most acceptable expedient.

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CSO: 3401/288

SOUTH AFRICA

ATTITUDES OF BLACK, WHITE YOUTH

Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 30 Aug 85 p 8

["Political Picture" by Willie Kuhn: "White and Black Youth Call For Quick Solutions"]

[Text] White and Black in South Africa have one thing in common: an increasing movement away--to the point of rejection--from what older generations did, or did not do.

The methods differ. Some throw stones, burn and try to break down institutions their fathers helped create, and within which they perhaps have to live in humiliation. Older people are even intimidated when the young ones try to "reeducate" them as in certain authoritarian states.

That is a significant part of the reaction of black youth. They are perhaps lawless, often defiant, calmly self-assured and convinced that the black power revolution has given them a starting point in a sense of human dignity and that real political power is now in the offing.

Other Revolution

Like Kwame Nkrumah they are mainly seeking to triumph in the realm of politics--otherwise they would not have struggled so hard to devastate the economy, and thus prosperity in South Africa, by means of boycotts and disinvestment.

On the white side--and also among part of the young blacks community--another revolution is underway, but not with rocks and firebombs. Intellectually, religiously and emotionally the legacy of decades of apartheid is being ever more sharply questioned, and the criticism that is already being expressed indicates that history will one day judge what happened even more severely. Even the plea that actions must be seen in their historical context does not necessarily evoke sympathy.

Young Whites no longer want to permit the "sins" of their ancestors be visited on their political future.

Delaying So Long

That is also why there is a total rejection of discrimination on grounds of color among most of them. Racial superiority apparently lives on only in the hearts of those on the far right--and even in that circle one has heard stories of young people who could no longer accept the political opinions of their fathers and mothers.

Among the politically aware youth there is frequently dissatisfaction with the fact that political leaders are delaying so long with solutions. Partly that can be attributed to naivete about political realities; on the other hand the older generation may too easily dismiss youth's striving for greater justice and fairness as naive idealism.

Precisely because young people are busy with such a far-reaching reevaluation of the South African political situation, the older generations of politicians must guard against offering guidelines for all eternity with too much certainty.

Choosing Adaptation

In the sixties many Whites said: "There will be a Maori member of an All Black rugby team touring South Africa over my dead body." Then there was the question of mixed hotels, power sharing, colored people in Parliament . . .

In the final analysis most people choose adaptation over a dead body. Even Ian Smith's "never in a thousand years" did not last more than a decade.

For that reason no one can be too certain about current political options and principles: Younger generations may have other insights.

The generation that grew up politically as the NP [National Party] began to move away from hide-bound apartheid over the past two decades is already represented in Parliament, and a new generation is now maturing that lives in an era of far more critical and analytical thinking. Also in an era of much greater contact.

The latter is perhaps the key word for the young. Intellectual contact. Social contact. Or simply curiosity about who and what lives on the other side of the fences erected in the era of apartheid.

Informal Ties

That was evident at the Youth Congress of the Transvaal NP. Also at the congress of the Inkatha youth movement at Ulundi. For example, the ASB [Afrikaans Student Association], the Maties [Stellenbosch University students], the Raukies [Rand Afrikaans University students] and the Pukke [Potchefstroom University students] were represented at the latter, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi especially welcomed them because they had come to talk to his young people.

There were also informal ties on the side of the UDF [United Democratic Front]. Mr Terror Lekota was, for example, to have addressed the ASB congress earlier this year--if he had not been detained.

There is even no longer any fear of talking to radical elements. And that is the fruit of the philosophy of political negotiation. If one believes in that, one must also, for example, be prepared to listen to the ANC. Only then will one be able to decide that no further debate is possible with a violent partner.

Fortunately a large part of the black community--particularly the black youth--is increasingly willing to make contact on an equal footing with a white community that reacts similarly. The white youth especially connect so much more naturally because they aren't perpetually burdened with all the prejudices, suspicion and bitterness of the older generation.

Land of Hope

Who still says that South Africa isn't a land of hope? Renewal also means that young new participants come to the fore. As an observer at the NP youth congress said: "The feet are apparently ready to walk more quickly than the NP body wants to move."

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SOUTH AFRICA

STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS URGE TALKS WITH ANC

Cape Town THE WEEKEND ARGUS in English 19 Oct 85 p 13

[Article by Dale Lautenbach]

[Text] Students Buzz Over ANC Affair

Four petitions were circulating the Matie campus by the end of the week--two calling students to sign in favour of the proposed ANC talks, one in opposition and one calling students to express a show of no confidence in State President Mr P.W. Botha as chancellor of the university.

The Student's Council offices at the top of the Langehoven Centre measured the pace of political comings and goings.

"Never before has this campus been so pulled in different directions," said Andrew Day, member of Student Parliament and history masters student writing a thesis on the history of the PFP.

Student council member Frans Volschenk broke in with a bit of baiting. "Andrew's our campus ANC activist..." and there was banter about that for a while before Frans voiced his serious reservations about the ANC talks. He was concerned about alienating the Inkatha Youth Brigade, a connection of which a number of Stellenbosch students seem extremely proud.

"But I'm a student representative and what they decide to support I will accept," he said. (The proposed ANC talks were supported in the Student Parliament on Thursday night with a clear majority and a standing ovation for the would-be Matie/ANC dialogue.)

Andrew warned that much of the political action on the Matie campus was confined to small hard-working groups of individuals.

"The student apathy is appalling," he said and this was borne out downstairs in the Neelsie, the student canteen, where, earlier this week, slap chips and chatter were still the main focus and the new Dire Straits hit, Brothers in Arms, boomed out of the campus radio station and way over the relaxing heads.

A number of voices though located a subtle shift when, later in the week, the reality of how one's personal freedom might be affected was made crystal clear to them by the passport confiscation saga.

All of a sudden students were more directly involved, it seemed, roused to talk.

Canvassing opinion is usually a matter of stopping people and asking them for a view--and often they drift off remaining non-committal.

I was doing just that on Thursday (passport cancelling day) when I was approached, opinion offered....

"It's the most laughable thing that's ever happened. And yes, quote me on that. The name's Jan de Waal."

Jan left, passionately.

There were other quotables too and they all hit out unquestionably at "P W" as the man responsible for Passport Day. There was language, too, not often seen in print.

Some of the quotables:

--It's the sort of dictatorship move that proves we're living in a police state. As chancellor, he's imposing his political vision on this university and classifying it as a Nationalist institution. (Johan Theron, SC member.)

--We don't want him as chancellor. I'm disgusted. (Robbie Roberts, SC member.)

--It was a bona fide effort by students to create dialogue and we've already shown we're all for open dialogue by a vote taken in Student Parliament earlier this year. (Hein Brand, vice-chairman Student Parliament.)

--An utterly ruthless move--but to be expected. The talks were important because the initiative showed an establishment Afrikaner group breaking out of the system. (Charl du Plessis, Nusas.)

--The Government is like an ostrich with its head in the sand. But I also think the ANC has let down blacks by agreeing to talk to Stellenbosch students. The campus is not even open to all races. How can there be talks with the ANC if there are no talks at grassroots level? (Helet Herholdt, ex-president Current Affairs Society.)

--That the invitation came from the ANC gives the lie to PW's assertion that the ANC is not interested in dialogue. It's important that a holy cow like Stellenbosch has been seen to make this move. (Craig Watt-Pringle, ex-president Current Affairs Society.)

--If we had any doubts that we were living in a police state, today has erased those. (Andrew Breitenbach, student.)

Special Report

Bzzzt...the doorbell. A student flat in Stellenbosch. "Department of Internal Affairs. Your passports please." There's a flurry and eight students, seven young men and a woman search bags and pockets.

The officials wait: One wears dark mirrored sunglasses to catch the glare off his white shirt, white trousers and white shoes. A toasted cigarette dangles from his fingers.

His colleague wears a bright purple shirt, and they dish out official papers.

"It's not every day one gets a personal letter from the Director of Internal Affairs," says Hennie Bester, leader of the Matie student group whose bid to talk to the ANC Youth League was crushed this week, students believe, directly or indirectly by the Stellenbosch University chancellor, State President Mr P W Botha.

The students hand over their personal documents politely. They bear no malice towards purple shirt and mirror shades--they even say "totsiens" and "dankie" when the gentlemen leave.

But the disappointment is evident too. How do they feel, days of pressure having culminated in this strong-arm move?

Committed

Their voices sound all at once, but the common gist is: "We are still totally committed to dialogue with the ANC. More so than ever now, in fact."

One voice summarises: "You don't know how we can get hold of some passports do you?"

The eight students who have been at the centre of a Matie-land storm this week are not radical fringers. They are, broadly, a politically moderate group--by their own description and that of observers.

Serious

They seem older than their average 22 or 23 years; a serious bunch with serious convictions about the statement that has outgrown them.

Annami Oosthuysen is a 23-year-old law student. She is from Port Elizabeth and was vice president of the Matie Students' Council for '84/'85.

"We didn't actively seek publicity," she says.

"We wanted to keep it all as quiet as possible, although we decided we would notify the government and the university authorities," says Hennie, who is 22, who smiles easily and is also a law student, chairman of the Stellenbosch Debating Society and the Christian Fellowship ("From Wellington, a ware boereuseun," he quips.)

"But now there are a number of students who mistrust us, who have accused us of ego-tripping," says Annami. "The whole thing is out of our hands. We can't take positive action. We've made our statement."

The group's attention is split by telephone calls, the doorbell again. Someone has made them lunch--a cottage pie and a chicken dish--and the young men wolf down mouthfulls between policy-making, ideas, and debate on events of the day. Annami takes notes at a table.

"Typical." She laughs. "One women, and who gets to be secretary?"

The dialogue initiative was really started by two junior students who took note of the standing invitation from the ANC, says Hennie.

The Idea

"They approached Hendrick, Hans, Anton, Eric and myself and we worked on making the idea concrete. Once the ANC had been contacted we received confirmation from them immediately."

Hendrik du Toit is an ex-student council member. He's 23, from Cape Town and studying economics honours. Hans Muller is a forcibly Christian presence in the group. From Sabie, at 23, he is the chairman of the Church Youth Action Committee and, with Ned Geref clergyman the Rev Carel Anthonissen motivated by his belief that the church should be represented at talks with the ANC.

Anton Steenkamp, 23-year-old law student, is a previous editor of DIE MATIE and he and fellow law student Eric le Grange, 22, present editor, look just a fraction more like the student stereotype than their colleagues. Anton in his hand-made sandals and Springbok boy Eric wearing a decidedly contemporary shirt.

This initial group expanded to become the Matie 8 with Annami, present student council president Phillip Verster, and his SC member colleague, Johan Olivier. Phillip, 22, is a final-year electrical engineering student and son of a Worcester dentist. Johan is 23, another law student, and from Bellville.

Each group member stresses that they came together with different political convictions and persuasions (a member of the Student Parliament described them as a gathering of right-ish and left-ish students, the "ish" emphasised).

Concerned

"The thinking that unites us though is that we're all deeply concerned about the future and all committed to peaceful change for which dialogue is the only non-violent way," says Eric.

"And we have had tremendous support--from unknown people too," says Annami.

"From students known to be National Party supporters..." says Anton.

So what is it like for them now to walk through the Neelsie (the student canteen in the Langenhoven building).

A chorus: "Wonderful!" Any negative reaction has been more than counter-balanced which was borne out in the Student Parliament on Thursday night.

Support

Parliament member and history masters' student Andrew Day said most of the audience came just for the ANC talks motion. Support for the talks was carried resoundingly with 38 votes to 16 and three abstentions.

"And as hands shot up the students stood up to applaud the group," he said. "That done, they left parliament to carry on its business."

Back in the student flat, obviously a neat and orderly abode under normal circumstances, but cluttered now with bodies and papers and talk and lunch and more talk, the Matie 8 knock about ideas but stand still, undivided.

What They Say

Criticism on campus for Matie 8 actions has focused on the university's already established links with Inkatha, concluding that ANC dialogue would alienate what is considered the more valuable Inkatha connection...

Phillip: I received a call this morning from the Inkatha Youth Brigade. Full support. Total support for us from Ntwe Mafole.

--The group has been accused of disloyalty to fellow young men fighting on the country's borders.

Hendrick: Anton was an officer in the navy, Johan a corporal in the army and I was an officer in the army. Johan and I have both done more than six months operational duty.

--There have been reports in the local Afrikaans Press quoting vociferous opposition to the proposed talks.

Phillip: A number of small groups have jumped on the bandwagon to get publicity without proof of how much student support they really have.

Hendrik: The student's council is now supporting us unanimously.

Annami: When the storm started to brew we received a lot of support and criticism. Isn't that a reflection of the turbulent society we live in now?

--How did they feel about relinquishing their passports, even though they did it so politely?

Anton: We expected pressure but we didn't expect such a drastic move. They realised it was the only way they could prevent us going.

Eric: I want to know what their motivation was for stopping us. They've shown no grounds, given no reason...that upsets me.

--Finally, how do they think and feel, these young people? What drove them to make a move which, in Matieland, must have guaranteed a certain controversy?

Hendrik: I'm an economics student and I've looked at disinvestment and its potential catastrophic impact on South Africa. If foreign investors have to justify their interests here we have to give them reasons to use in that justification, proof that something is being done in a practical way. Our dialogue with the ANC would be one small, humble step towards this; a step which might open the way.

Hennie: This was not a self-righteous act and not ill-considered. We all want to be part of Stellenbosch University. It means so much to us. All of us have had contact with black youth and every time I've made some contact it's been so meaningful. Black youth expect, I think, to meet arrogant children of the ruling class and they have gone away encouraged in the past. And we have been encouraged.

Anton: We've all been fed second-hand preconceptions.

Hendrik: I accept that a certain degree of idealism is inherent in this. But without idealism and mutual trust in the citizens of South Africa this effort is not worth it.

Annami: We would have illustrated to the ANC that we're thinking about our future. We acknowledge the fact that they claim a certain interest in the future but so do we. That is our common ground.

Anton: The ANC has great influence, even if it is symbolic. And we have to take account of that.

Phillip: I have my ideals and my personal view of the future and I'm worried about things like the State of Emergency. For me that was motivation enough for anyone to seriously consider any opportunity that might have a role to play in improving our situation.

Hendrik: We wanted to show them that the Afrikaner can and does think....

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CSO: 3400/335

SOUTH AFRICA

PUBLISHER REFLECTS ON MEETING IN ZAMBIA BETWEEN BUSINESSMEN, ANC

Johannesburg LEADERSHIP in English Vol 4 1985, No 3, pp 25, 28, 30

[Text] Now that the fuss appears to have died down over businessmen's historic meeting with the ANC in Zambia on September 13, it may be useful to reflect briefly on what the initiative is all about--and look at possible implications.

The ANC is a reality that South Africans will have to come to grips with--sooner or later. As VADERLAND editor Harald Pakendorf postulates in concluding his contribution to this issue of LEADERSHIP (see page 34) it may be dangerous grasping the nettle of the ANC, but it is far more dangerous not to.

But that is only part of the reason.

Some 18 of South Africa's biggest names in business and the media have visited State House, Lusaka in recent months for talks on the region's future.

The central figures in the initiative are unquestionably the President of Zambia, Dr Kenneth Kaunda and the chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, Mr Gavin Relly.

Dr Kaunda has made it clear, in his capacity as chairman of the so-called Frontline States and as the Zambian President, that he is to dedicate what remains of his career to working for peace in the region. The cynics may sneer that there is nothing wide-minded about this. After all his country will be in serious trouble if South Africa really erupts. This would be to misjudge the man.

They would find it an eye-opener talking to Kaunda. There is no pretence, no arrogant posturing. Indeed the refreshing thing about him is a frankness in relation to his own problems--potential and existing. A deeply committed Christian, he makes no bones about what is troubling him. But it is the spectre of regional violence and all that entails which, by his own admission, causes him to weep in the night.

Those who have been fortunate enough to get to know him--and there are a number of businessmen in this category--may question his economic policies. But that is another matter. They do not, however, doubt his political acumen or his disturbing ability as a political forecaster. He has something of a track record in this regard.

Kaunda may have an agenda of his own. But is that so important? The hand offered by the Zambian President is not one to be slapped aside. As those who have attended his State House sessions will confirm, he is looking--in business parlance--at the big picture. And today, "KK" is Africa's elder statesman.

Regarding South Africa, he has no preconceived idea of how the system should be reformed. Rather, Kaunda believes in getting people across the spectrum together to talk about the things dividing them--to establish any common ground, and then to build.

There is only one prerequisite in his book--apartheid must be abolished. But here he would have on his side the vast majority of South Africans, and the Western World.

At the third meeting with South Africans at State House in July, the President handed out what he called a "Statement of Direction."

If South Africans could subscribe to its fundamental tenets then there was nothing that could not be achieved in the region, he maintained.

The document reads:

"There is an overwhelming consensus in South Africa today that all people of South Africa regardless of race, colour, creed and social circumstances are South Africans, and it is the bounden duty of all South Africans and this administration to work for common conditions for South Africans. In doing this of course we all recognise that the efforts of all of us face a divided past out of which we must emerge and are emerging as one strong people and undivided South African nation. We must transform our complex situation in a systematic and responsible manner as we reduce the divides that separate us and build equal opportunity in South Africa."

All in all, a quite unexceptionable proposition and part of the reason those who met him recently believe it is essential that President Kaunda's bona fides as a peacemaker should be accepted. Is there another honest broker capable of bringing together clashing ideologies and, where possible, helping establish common bonds? I doubt it.

All of those present felt the ice thaw in the hot sun of President Kaunda's "Camp David" in Mfuwe. Sure, there were differences between the parties. Nevertheless, one principle was established: There is considerable justification for further talks.

The ANC made it clear that they regarded the contact as well worthwhile, but they may not be quoted directly. So how can it be summed up?

Tony Bloom, chairman of the Premier Group, who was one of the main participants in a very lively discussion, is perhaps the right person to assess the meeting. He has, very kindly, given LEADERSHIP permission to quote from some of his extensive notes.

Reports Bloom on his impressions:

--I gained the distinct impression that the ANC is going through a "schizophrenic period" at the moment. On the one hand its tail is clearly up as a result of the recent developments internally in South Africa, because of international pressure against South Africa, economic problems, the drop of the rand and so on. On the other hand they realise that the whole system is not about to disintegrate and that their struggle is likely to continue for many years into the future and involve considerable loss of life and deprivation. They face the prospect of exile for many years to come.

--I have no doubt whatsoever that the people we met have an overwhelming desire to come back to South Africa. This was said to me on several occasions. They love to talk about South Africa in detail, about parts of South Africa, to remember people in South Africa, places and events. Take Thabo Mbeki. The life of someone who has been in exile for twenty-three years cannot be attractive, particularly as most of the ANC live in fairly abject circumstances.

--I was surprised (almost overwhelmed) by the cordiality of the meeting. A more attractive and congenial group would be hard to imagine. There was a total lack of aggression, animosity or hostility towards us. In fact, I sometimes worry that we got on a little bit too well! Clearly we differed fundamentally on several important points, but the differences of opinion were always argued rationally and without invective.

--I was struck by the absence of traditional Marxist-Leninist jargon and dogma. Even in the discussion on nationalisation of industry, the concepts could quite easily have fitted into a socialist rather than Marxist framework. I found it curious that they used the example of Sweden as an ideal, rather than the USSR or Eastern Bloc states.

--All of the ANC delegates were clearly highly intelligent, intellectual and very articulate. In fact, the calibre of the leadership is streets ahead of much of the black leadership one finds in South Africa.

--It was difficult to view the group as hardline Marxists or bloodthirsty terrorists who were interested in reducing South Africa to anarchy and seizing power, with a hatred of whites. While it is difficult to draw deep conclusions from a superficial meeting, the latter stereotype (which is probably the impression that most white South Africans have of the ANC) certainly did not come through at all. Without in any way wishing to be seduced or hypnotised by the occasion, I believe that they are people with whom serious negotiation can be undertaken and with whom a certain amount of common ground could be found.

Clearly there are fixed positions on either side that are diametrically opposed to each other, but this is the situation in many negotiations. I believe there could well be room for compromise and I would unhesitatingly support any initiative to get the South African Government and the ANC into contact with each other.

--The link with the South African Communist Party was part of the story that I found the least convincing. We did not really probe into this very deeply or cross-examine them on the link, but I would require to be convinced that that link is not stronger than the impression given, particularly as over half the members of the National Executive are members of the SACP. Neither were we able to resolve the question of how influential the hardline Slovo element was.

--Were we taken in or deliberately used as stooges in any way? Was this merely a propaganda exercise designed to obtain worldwide publicity and legitimise the ANC? I have thought back carefully on the discussions and honestly believe not. The air of spontaneity would have been hard, if not impossible, to fake unless they are actors of the calibre of Lord Olivier!

Moreover, their subsequent media behaviour was restrained and could not be faulted for accuracy. I continue to believe the meeting was an important breakthrough, constructive, and I would certainly be prepared to attend a follow up.

I doubt if anyone who was there would disagree with Bloom's conclusions.

And in the wake of recent admissions of government contact with Renamo in Mozambique it's hard to disagree with the ANC proposition that precedents of the authorities talking to "terrorists" do exist.

They point out that the government talked to the Angolans and to SWAPO at the peak of hostilities. It talked to Frelimo, and now it talks to another (if right-wing) liberation movement in Renamo. They also remind one that South Africa insisted the Smith Government talk to its enemies while the bush war in Rhodesia was at its hottest.

There are some in the ANC who would talk to the South African Government--but not after disbanding their military cadres. They want to keep them intact, not lose any bargaining power.

Perhaps the thesis that talking could ease, if not stop, hostilities carries a great deal more weight than has thus far been conceded. Clearly the converse is not the only route.

At any rate, since the ANC seems at this stage unlikely to give up violence to begin official talks (though a pause or moratorium is something that might be further explored), informal contact of the kind that took South Africans to the Luangwa River in September may be a small start in the process of national conciliation.

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CSO: 3400/333

SOUTH AFRICA

NEW PAN-AFRICANIST LEADERSHIP

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 16 Oct 85 pp 6, 7

[Text] The PAC has been quietly congratulating itself on the smooth appointment of a new leader after the sudden death in Harare on 13 July of John Nyati Pokela. The new chairman, Johnson Mlambo, who at 45 is young in comparison to his three predecessors (Pokela, Potlako Leballo and Robert Sobukwe), was unanimously elected only two days later. He appears to enjoy the full support of his 16-person central committee.

His main task is to prevent the rival ANC from establishing itself as a sole voice of nationalism outside South Africa. The OAU's "ad hoc" unit committee, formed in 1978 under the aegis of the OAU Liberation Committee's Tanzanian chairman, Hashim Mbita, still exists, but has made no headway. Oliver Tambo, the ANC leader-in-exile, has made polite noises to the PAC recently, but reckons that if the PAC were to join a formal common front, it would be on his terms. There is little chance of this happening at present.

The PAC's representation in Africa is still almost as wide as that of the ANC. The PAC is still taken seriously in Nigeria, where Theophilus Bidi remains "ambassador." In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe appears to retain his old loyalty, though both main South African groupings have low-profile offices in Harare: the entire PAC central committee attended Pokela's burial there. It is in Europe--East and West--and the USA that the ANC is increasingly gaining better access. Several Scandinavian governments give preferential treatment to the ANC. The PAC complains that several influential London groups, such as the British branch of the Anti Apartheid movement (AA) and the International Defence and Aid Fund, which provides definitive documentation about political prisoners in South Africa, are biased in favour of the ANC. The PAC is bitter that the British Trade Union Congress now recognises the ANC, the just-legal United Democratic Front (UDF) and the ANC-affiliated South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) as the authentic representatives of the South African people--but omits to mention the PAC.

The ANC, through its tight link with the strongly pro-Moscow South African Communist Party, is handsomely cultivated east of the Iron Curtain, while the PAC is virtually ignored. The PAC blames white Marxists, such as Mike Terry, the secretary of the British wing of the AA and a veteran member of the British Communist Party, for the TUC decision.

What this means is a shortage of funds for the PAC. So it was with relief that Mlambo received his first invitation, as chairman, to visit China, the PAC's oldest major ally. We understand he is currently in Pekin. Another possible fund-raiser is Libya: it is notable that the PAC's experienced London representative, Hamilton Keke, is off to run the Tripoli office, while Vusumzi Nomadolo, who is only 28 (though a central committee member since 1980), takes over the London Branch. Earlier this year, the central committee confirmed the appointment of a new finance secretary, Joe Mwabi, to improve the PAC treasury.

Mlambo has not yet made a drastic reshuffle of top executives. Other key figures are Templeton Ntantala, who led a revolt within the PAC in 1969: he is probably lying low (but influential) in Zimbabwe: Jow Mkwanzazi heads the administration in Dar; Edwin Makoti, no longer secretary of defence, still runs information; Ngila Michael Muendane is secretary of labour; Elliot Mfaza, secretary for education. Ike Mafole has been recalled to PAC headquarters in Dar es Salaam from America, leaving Ahmed Gora Ebrahim as the chief representative in the USA. Dr Vus Make, once co-chairman of the PAC, is now a central committee member with no specific portfolio. Henry Isaacs, formerly foreign affairs spokesman, remains in the wilderness.

An interesting little-noticed fact about Mlambo, who earned a B.Sc. by correspondence from London University during his 20 years in prison (1963-1983), is that he hails from the fairly small Tsonga group from northern Transvaal. That is an unusual ethnic departure, because most of the leaders of the ANC and PAC have been Xhosa-speakers, like Nelson Mandela, Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Sobukwe and Leballo, not to mention the black consciousness leader, Steve Biko. While Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Zulu-dominated Inkatha movement complains that the ANC is Xhosa-dominated, it is equally notable that Mkwanzazi, now the PAC's chief organiser, is a Zulu-speaker. But the PAC, like the ANC, insists that it is tribe-blind.

The chief ideological difference between the PAC and the ANC remains the racial exclusivity of the former, and its belief that blacks must set themselves free, psychologically as well as materially, without too much help from whites. Though less doctrinally Marxist-tinged, the PAC posture is also more militant. It has roundly condemned the ABC meeting with white South African businessmen in Zambia, and continues to place its hope in Poqo (We alone), the PAC's military wing. Though it has many fewer guerrillas in the field than the ANC, the Poqo still operates underground. The trial of six alleged Poqo saboteurs is soon to begin in Pochefstroom, Transvaal.

Not surprisingly, the PAC is rude about the ANC, echoing UDF, arguing that, far from prodding the township activists into action, it is confusing the people. In contrast, it is polite about the more PAC-oriented Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), under the leadership of Ishmael Mkabela, and about any trade union organisation that has not yet affiliated to the UDF. That includes the multi-racial Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu) and the Confederation of Unions of South Africa (Cusa), which follows the black consciousness creed.

PAC reflects a minority strand of black thinking within South Africa, but one that has by no means, faded away. Mlambo is not a well-known figure there, especially compared with Nelson Mandela, but he stands for an important nationalist tradition. Neither the ANC nor the UDF can ignore it completely--nor can the South African Government.

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CS0: 3400/335

SOUTH AFRICA

HUNDREDS OF BLACK FAMILIES FACE CONSEQUENCES OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Individuals Recount Experiences

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 13 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Sandile Memela]

[Text] Hundreds of black families are reeling under the impact of unemployment and the continuing downturn in the economy.

Inflation has also pushed some families to the borderline of starvation, forcing them to take in lodgers to supplement their income.

Many families have been reduced to beggars and are now totally dependent on handouts from charity organisations.

Most families interviewed by City Press have admitted that they had their backs to the wall.

In a bid to beat poverty and hunger, parents have been forced to beg and live on handouts to survive.

Many are now prepared to take any job in a bid to beat the unemployment crisis.

According to Central Statistics Service records in Pretoria--which are believed to be conservative estimates of unemployment--the number of unemployed black South Africans now tops the 520,000 mark.

And the figure is increasing daily--more than 60,000 jobs have been lost since the beginning of the year, and there is no drop in the 8,000 retrenchments each month.

Not all unemployed are included in CSS records. Independent sources estimate the number of unemployed black people at well over three million.

As the recession continues to bite, families are confronted with going to bed on empty stomachs--and facing the possibility of not having any breakfast the next morning.

As a result, more and more parents have turned to charity organisations and piecemeal jobs--which are also rare--to make ends meet.

Social workers have expressed concern at the social consequences of unemployment.

Amelia Padi, a nursing sister and committee member of the Santa Relief Fund in Tsakane, said more families were finding it difficult to cope with the recession and unemployment.

"An increasing number of people in the area are destitute as a result of being out of jobs. There was therefore a need to establish the Santa Relief Fund to help them make ends meet," she said.

Ms Padi said the Santa Relief Fund--which operates under the auspices of World Vision, a Christian aid organisation--was desperately trying to get some of the unemployed on their feet again.

She said they were supplied with free seeds to cultivate vegetable gardens to eat and sell.

Ms Padi said they also subsidised some people to pay rent and applied for disability grants for those who were no longer in a position to work.

"We have supplemented their rental and have urged them to take in lodgers to help them meet the battle of paying rent," said Ms Padi.

The Relief Fund has been launched only recently in the area and also supplies destitute families with maize meal, dried vegetables, powder milk, and soup.

Meanwhile, World Vision has reported that it has exhausted the R100,000 provided by its overseas partners in aid to unemployed families in SA.

Chairman David Cuthbert said: "Although this is a short-term program, we were overwhelmed by calls for help during September."

The organisation sent out an urgent call for help to its partners in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Europe in August, when it was faced with stories of children fainting in class and families being evicted from their homes.

"We have spent the R100,000 in just six weeks helping 20,000 men, women and children of all races through 27 projects in the Transvaal, Western and Eastern Cape," said Mr Cuthbert.

He said most of the money went to feeding schemes for children and unemployed families.

Jobs were created in several urban areas, and rents were subsidised to prevent families being evicted.

The government has hinted of a major new multi-million rand campaign to create job opportunities and upgrade the training of unskilled workers.

About R500-m would be made available by the Treasury for relief measures. A further R400-m will be made available later.

Although the emphasis would be on constructive aid--such as the creation of jobs--large-scale immediate relief in the form of food and clothing for the hardest hit areas would be an essential part of the package.

'I Have Nothing But My Dignity'

MEETING Stephen Mongale of "Silver-town" - a tiny shack location in Tsakane - brings home forcefully the stark reality of unemployment.

Mr Mongale, 53, has been without a job for the past seven years. He is a man who has been defeated, a man who has lost all hope.

He has only his dignity left.

He worked for Brakpan Scrap Metal for 15 years, but had to quit because of illness. He was in hospital for seven months as a TB patient.

But, since he was discharged, he has not been able to find a job again.

"It is a long time since I last had a good, solid meal. Eating meat and rice has become a luxury at my home.

"We survive on porridge and vegetables," said Mr Mongale. He is living with his common-law wife, Elina, and a sub-tenant who helps him to pay rent.

He says his sub-tenant has become the pillar of his home with the little he earns as a labourer.

Mr Mongale said it had been a struggle for him to meet his monthly rent bill of R12,90 before his sub-tenant moved in with him.

"Although I am looking for employment, job-hunting has become expensive as it would fritter away whatever little money I have.

"And whatever little money I do have, I beg from people," said Mr Mongale.

He said that he occasionally visited his former employers - who would give him a R20 note or so - to get money.

He said looking for a job these days was a money-wasting exercise.

Mr Mongale has also applied for a disability grant to help him make ends meet.

Mr Mongale is prepared to accept any temporary job - as long as it will help him to survive.

"However, I only take gardening jobs as hard labour would finish me off," he said.

'I Don't Know When I'll Have My Next Meal'

"EVERY day is a battle to put together a decent meal. We now survive on pap and spinach to stay alive. These are tough times for me. I've had to struggle like this for the past two years."

These desperate words were spoken by Elizabeth Mashinini, 52, of 8852 Tswaku Street, Tsakane, who has resigned herself to her plight of being unemployed.

"My feet are now sore and tired from walking. I now rely on other domestics to inform me of any 'madam' who seeks a temporary maid. And that is rare nowadays," said Mrs Mashinini.

It is now two years since she lost her job and her main concern is paying her monthly rent. Her two children, Portia, 11, and Bheki, 4, live with their grandmother as maintaining them has become impossible for Mrs Mashinini.

Her husband walked out on her two years ago, leaving her with the two children to feed and clothe. Her children have lived with their granny since her husband left her.

Mrs Mashinini now depends on her sub-tenant to survive. She supplements the money she receives from the rent with the income from her temporary jobs as a domestic worker.

"I had no choice but to get someone who would help me out with my R36 monthly rental. Meeting the bill became a battle as I had no source of income," said Mrs Mashinini.

At one stage she worked as a vegetable vendor, but had to abandon the enterprise after losing customers when her vegetables became stale without refrigeration facilities.

But other families have found themselves in the same desperate situation as the economic situation worsens.

"We won't be able to have the traditional family meal this Christmas - times are too hard. Decent meals on any Sunday have become a luxury," said a member of one Tsakane family.

Other families interviewed said the festive season would be "bleak" because of unemployment.

Long Lines at Employment Offices

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 13 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Sandile Memele]

[Text]

ANOTHER week-day ... and Johannesburg's 60 Albert Street - better known as the "pass offices" to many black people - is crowded again.

A throng of black men - and an ever-increasing number of women - again gather at the labour bureau in a desperate bid to find jobs. One long queue snakes back and forth, through the building, spilling over into the city's pavements.

It is made up of young and old - their faces lined with hope, despondency, desperation ... and exhaustion.

Albert Street means waiting up to nine hours in a queue - hoping, sometimes praying, that you will be given a job; that you will be able to feed your wife, children, or grandchildren who are waiting at home.

Albert Street also means returning home at the end of the day after standing for nine hours in a queue and then being told by an official: "There are no jobs."

While the country's economic experts and academics squabble and bicker over the correct statistics of the unemployed, there is a heavy - and almost tangible - mood of despair in the townships and rural areas.

According to the Central Statistical Services in Pretoria - whose estimates are considered conservative - the rate of unemployment among blacks stands at more than 500 000.

And the toll worsens daily as workers are retrenched, dismissed and the economic situation deteriorates.

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CSO: 3400/341

SOUTH AFRICA

MODERATOR SAYS NGK SHOULD BE POLITICALLY INVOLVED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 22 Oct 85 p 17

[Article by Hannes de Wet]

[Text] The Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) should not think it would dirty its hands by getting involved in politics; the Moderator of the NGK in the Northern Transvaal, Professor Johan Heyns, told *The Star* in an interview.

"No church which is not involved in politics can really be true to its calling. In these times the church should be an agent for reconciliation in the world of politics."

Professor Heyns said he was not referring to party politics but to politics in its broader sense.

Professor Heyns was one of a few NGK leaders who took part in the recent National Day of Prayer, against the wishes of the NGK authorities. He is also an outspoken supporter of initiatives with a view to better communication and understanding among different church groups.

Because he had conducted a service in an Anglican congregation on the National Day of Prayer he had been sharply criticised by some NGK members.

"Some said I was being disloyal to my own church's authorities. Others accused me of being a traitor, of collaborating with the 'enemy'."

"But my conscience is clear. The NGK has a reputation of withdrawing itself from ecumenical relations. My decision

to take part in the National Day of Prayer was a symbol of reconciliation."

Professor Heyns said the church could not detach itself from politics in the present political situation.

"That doesn't mean the church should become a pressure group. It should refrain from involvement in party politics."

"The church concerns itself with man in his totality and politics have to do with the concrete situation in which man is living."

Professor Heyns believes that several NGK ministers, especially of the older generation, were "not in contact with the problems of the day".

CROSSROADS

"Some ministers don't even recognise the fact that the NGK is at the crossroads. The NGK will have to choose whether it's going to help build a new South Africa, or whether it is going to continue on its present path and eventually become irrelevant."

It was ironic, Professor Heyns said, that the NGK had played "an enormous role in bringing about the policy of apartheid."

"In that sense the NGK actually had an active political role in the years after the National Party was voted into power. Today it's just the other way round," he said.

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CSO: 3400/342

SOUTH AFRICA

UDF PUBLICITY SECRETARY EXPLAINS FRONT'S STANCE TOWARD ALLIANCE

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 22 Oct 85 p 16

[Article by Murphy Morobe, publicity secretary]

[Text] The idea of negotiating a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems is being advocated by a broad range of individuals and organisations here and abroad. We are unable to agree on the form, content and outcome of such negotiations. Often we cannot even accept the bonafides of those who claim to be committed to this idea.

We are explaining our position at a time when there is an all-out effort by the Government to destroy or at least cripple the United Democratic Front. The loss of life in the townships in the last year is already higher than in 1976. Talk of peace has become increasingly abstract but the UDF hopes it is still possible to negotiate a just peace in our land.

The National Party says it is prepared to negotiate only with those leaders who reject violence and the concept of one person, one vote in a unitary state. Parties to negotiation must accept the broad parameters of apartheid, it says.

The Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, for example, remain non-negotiable. So

The myth is that a think-tank of leaders meeting under the shadow of the SADF or the SAP, and over the heads of the people, will be able to arrive at an acceptable deal.

when Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis talks about an "open agenda" for negotiations, he is

trying to mislead us that the Nationalists are really prepared to listen to people whose views differ fundamentally from their views.

The stated objective of the Inkatha-Progressive Federal Party-sponsored Convention Alliance is to bring about by non-violent means and in the shortest time possible complete dismantling of apartheid and the negotiation — through a national convention — of a constitution based on one citizenship in one country.

The end product of such a convention would be some form of "power sharing" between various groups — a solution that implies that all participants will have to agree to some form of compromise.

For the UDF negotiation does not mean South Africa's "leaders" can sit around a table and work out a solution while the people sit outside the conference room waiting to hear the outcome.

The myth is that a think-tank of leaders meeting in effect under the shadow of the South African Defence Force or the South African Police and over the heads of the people will be able to arrive at an acceptable deal. This is a fundamentally undemocratic and elitist view.

The UDF believes that any negotiation must be the product of a democratic process which involves the masses. After all, the outcome of negotiation requires mass acceptance if peace is to be attained.

A climate favourable to mass participation needs to be created. This means that the African National Congress and other political organisations must be unbanned. All detainees and political prisoners must be released unconditionally. Apartheid must have been totally dismantled and there must be free political activity.

These are not bargaining chips — they are conditions which must prevail for democratic participation in free negotiations.

When we call for the release of Nelson Mandela it is not so that he can be whisked off to some top level negotiations behind closed doors (assuming that he would allow this). We demand that Mandela and all other political prisoners and detainees be released to play their full role in the development of a mass-based democratic participation.

It is meaningless to push for a national convention while the basic preconditions have not been met.

It is unfortunate therefore that the Progressive Federal Party leader, Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, chose a time when no semblance of democracy exists to call for the formation of a convention alliance.

Those who genuinely want to see peace and justice brought to our country and believe this can come about through negotiations must struggle side-by-side with the oppressed people to create the atmosphere for negotiation.

To assert the need for a convention alliance now undermines the very concept of negotiations. Indeed we must conclude that the Convention Alliance is no more than a front intended to act as a buffer between apartheid and the genuine

Indeed, we must conclude that the Convention Alliance is no more than a front intended to act as a buffer between apartheid and the genuine aspirations of our people.

aspirations of our people. It is an attempt to find a solution above the heads of the people.

Both the Government and the Convention Alliance appear to accept concepts such as "a united South Africa with one citizenship" and "universal franchise". The Government appears to see the outcome of negotiations as some form of "power sharing" — but through structures which are racially defined. This is in fact only apartheid being restructured and the UDF will have no truck with it.

Leading proponents of the Convention Alliance would also like to see full adult suffrage based on "power sharing" without any domination. Where those who presently control the instruments of power and privilege agree to share power with the powerless and under-privileged this must inevitably perpetuate the subject condition of the latter.

Unless we begin to address ourselves to redistribution of wealth and the creation of conditions of equality in all spheres of life, power sharing will remain hollow and will continue to be rejected by the UDF.

The front believes that political negotiations must be directed toward achieving a non-racial democratic South Africa and a unitary state. While the process of achieving this is negotiable the creation of democratic rule is not. This is the demand of the majority of the people and the international community.

We reject the notion that this is an extremist view, regarding it as the only reasonable alternative to white domination. Only when the vote becomes the embodiment of true people's power in a united South Africa can we realistically address the other problems of this land.

SOUTH AFRICA

SUPPORT FOR SOYCO TO FIGHT THUGS IN TOWNSHIPS

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 24 Oct 85 pp 1, 2

[Text] Several black political organisations and members of the community have backed moves by the Soweto Youth Congress to root out thugs molesting people in the townships in the name of the struggle.

As reported in the SOWETAN yesterday, Soyco has declared war on thugs, adding that members of the community have been subjected to unnecessary harassment by gangs of youths masquerading as representatives of student organisations.

Organisations like the Azanian Students Movement (Azasm), Soweto Civic Association and the Azanian People's Organisation yesterday backed Soyco, while members of the community called on all organisations to join hands and come out clearly on this issue.

Since last year scores of residents have suffered in silence while gangs of youths posing as liberation fighters trampled on their dignity whereas all they were interested in was robbing people of their money and possessions, molesting residents and at times destroying their property.

Unrest

These thugs have taken advantage of the unrest in the township, going to the extent of raping women and causing general mayhem while calling themselves "comrades".

This week they went on a house-to-house raid in Central Western Jabavu, asking either donations or "protection fee" from residents, after claiming to be members of the outlawed Congress of South African Students (Cosas).

This has caused serious concern among the residents, who said while they hoped to get "guidance" from the youths, they were instead being molested.

They also said this was going to have a detrimental effect towards the struggle, as in future they would not readily agree to participate or heed calls made by these students' movements.

Political organisations have backed Soyco on this move, describing it as a "step in the right direction", but made it clear that it should not only involve Soyco but all other organisations in Soweto and other black townships.

National treasurer of Azasm, Ms Sesi Baloyi, said: "As much as we support this move by Soyco, we felt that it might increase the dreaded black on black violence if it does not include all other political and student organisations in Soweto.

"All organisations should come together and guard against these irregularities that are making a mockery out of our struggle for liberation."

The president of Azapo, Mr Ishmael Mkhabela, said: "One would like to express to all elements which continue to torment the black community that they are playing a dangerous game which cannot be tolerated by the community.

"Our people's tolerance cannot be dragged too far. We call upon the black people to close their ranks and identify their common enemy and struggle jointly for their enemy immediate defeat."

People interviewed have also called on the authorities not to interfere in this move, bringing into mind the 1977 incident where all members of the Committee of Ten, formed to normalise Soweto, were detained.

Ms Nombulelo Zikalala of Dlamini said that black people were capable of solving their problems without the interference of the security forces or any other authority for that matter.

Meanwhile, Soyco has called on an urgent meeting to be held on Sunday to discuss the issue with members of the community, taxi-owners, shop-owners, parents, church leaders and other political organisations.

Soyco has asked the security forces to keep away from the meeting, because their presence might be provocative.

The meeting will be held at the Methodist Church in CWJ from 1.30pm.

/8309

CSO: 3400/342

SOUTH AFRICA

NMC RELEASES STATISTICS FOR 1983, 1984

Johannesburg IIR INFORMATION SHEET in English Aug 85 pp 20-22

[Text]

NMC'S 1984 REPORT - SELECTED STATISTICS

1. TRADE UNIONS

1.1 General Statistics

	1983	1984
Number of registered trade unions	194	193
Total membership of registered trade unions	1 288 748	1 406 302
Membership of registered trade unions as % of total workforce <i>including</i> workers in agriculture, forestry, fishing, central Government, provincial administration, domestic servants, self-employed and unspecified	14,4%	14,9%
Membership of registered trade unions as % of total workforce <i>excluding</i> above categories	24,2% ²	±25,1%
Number of unregistered trade unions	59	58
Estimated paid up membership of unregistered trade unions	150 000	230 000

1.2 Comparative Statistics for Degree of Unionisation of Workforce:

	1983
Sweden	: 88%
UK	: 50%
Japan	: 24%
West Germany	: 33%
USA	: 18%

2. EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS

2.1 General Statistics

	1983	1984
Total number of registered employer associations	265	267

3. INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS

3.1 General Statistics

	1983	1984
Number of Industrial Councils	104	102
Number of agreements with statutory force at the end of the year	87	94
Total number of employees involved	1 171 724	1 183 400
Total number of employers involved	46 075	51 000
Total number of trade union members	528 462	511 600

4. CONCILIATION BOARDS

4.1 General Statistics

	1983	1984
Number in operation at end of the year	1	—
Total number of applications	118	279
Number of disputes settled by Conciliation Boards	8	16
Number of disputes settled by arbitration	6	7
Number of disputes settled by agreement outside a Conciliation Board	3	3
Number of disputes withdrawn	24	56
Number of applications refused	27	80
Number of disputes which ended in deadlock	2	15
Number of disputes still being considered at the end of the year	48	81
Number of disputes not yet completed at the end of the year	—	28

5. RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS

5.1 General Statistics

	1983	1984
Estimated number of recognition agreements concluded by the end of the year	More than 300	More than 500

6. STRIKES

6.1 General Statistics

	1983	1984
Total number of strikes	336	469
Total number of workers involved	64 469	182 000
Total number of man-days lost	124 596	380 000
Estimated wages lost (in R's)	1 697 610	5 174 798
Average loss man-days per worker	1,9	2,1

6.2 Duration of Strikes – 1984

Duration	Number	%
1 day or less	228	48,6
2 days	97	20,7
3 days	48	10,2
4 days	34	7,3
5 days	15	3,2
Longer than 5 days	47	10,0
TOTAL	469	100

(1 day = 8 hours work)

6.3 Reasons for strikes and work stoppages, 1984

Reason	Number	Workers concerned		Man-days lost	
		Black	Other	Black	Other
Wages	164	81 384	1 902	165 805	4 099
Wages and another reason	17	13 604	125	19 890	921
Union matters	47	32 418	586	72 260	323
Disciplinary measures	97	17 087	1 367	49 945	4 691
Working conditions and benefits	44	8 334	880	15 012	1 073
Other or unknown	100	22 070	2 185	42 183	3 510
TOTAL	469	174 897	7 045	365 096	14 616

7. UNEMPLOYMENT

7.1 Current Population Survey Data

	NOV 1983	SEP 1984
Blacks*	456 000	506 000
Coloureds	66 000	60 000
Asians	18 621	17 300

* The NMC acknowledge the inaccuracy of these figures.

No current Population Survey figures are available for Whites, but the number of registered workseekers is as follows:

1983	1984
187 850	200 400

7.2 Absolute and percentage change in employment in the different sectors, RSA, 1982/83 to 1983/84

SECTORS	Absolute increase (a)		Percentage increase (a)	
	1983/84	1982/83	1983/84	1982/83
Mining	10 610	- 619	1,5	-0,1
Manufacturing	7 400	-81 700	0,5	-5,5
Electricity	3 600	5 300	6,0	9,7
Construction	-5 700	-20 900	-1,4	-4,7
Commerce	-6 512	-18 945	0,9	-2,4
Transport and communication	-1 090	-19 096	-0,3	-4,3
Finance and insurance	7 488	8 773	5,0	6,2
Government and services	31 789	41 079	3,0	4,1
TOTAL	60 610	-86 108	1,2	-1,7

Source: Central Statistical Services

(a) The absolute and percentage increase in employment in June of each year (decreases are indicated by a minus)

(Report of the NMC for the period 1/1/83 - 31/12/83 and Report of the NMC for the period 1/1/84 - 31/12/84)

/9274

CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

ROLE OF LABOR MOVEMENT IN REFORM DEFENDED

Johannesburg IIR INFORMATION SHEET in English Aug 85 pp 2-6

[Editorial: "The Union Movement as an Agent of Change--International Influence and Pressure"]

[Text] "With all their faults, trade unions have done more for humanity than any other organisation of men that ever existed. They have done more for decency, for honesty, for education, for the betterment of the race, for the developing of character in man, than any other association of men", so said American lawyer Clarence Darrow in 1909.

South Africa's credibility with the rest of the western world is at an all time low and pressure on the Government to speed up its stated policies of reform is intensifying from overseas, to say nothing of the failing economy and the plight of the Rand. Have trade unions in South Africa the potential to act as a powerful tool in process of change and, if so, what is the reaction of the international labour movement to this potential?

Initially, however, it is important to draw a distinction between industrial justice and the wider implications of justice in society at large. The purpose of a trade union (indeed the reason for its existence) is to strive, through collective power, for justice in the place of work and regulate the inherent conflict which exists between capital and labour. However, its influence is not confined to the industrial context. Unionism cannot be separated from its environment. Therefore, it could be argued that it is through the securing of industrial justice that labour movements ultimately affect the broader scenario of social injustice.

This premise poses a number of questions when related to international reaction. What type of pressure is exerted by national and international labour bodies in support of worker organisation in South Africa? What assistance is given to the emergent unions? What pressure is placed on multinationals to ensure their subsidiaries in this country operate sound and fair labour practices in the workplace? What are the conclusions drawn by the International Labour Organisation with regard to the wider question of freedom of association and human rights? Finally, how can employers and unions be persuaded that sound industrial relations practice within the enterprise which results in a degree of co-operation between capital and labour indirectly exercises a positive influence on the wider society in general, and the economy in particular? It is the objective of this editorial to examine these questions within the context of the part the labour movement can play in

helping to bring about the changes and reforms so vital to the future stability of the country.

INTERNATIONAL LINKS AND THE PRESSURE FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

There can be no doubt that, during the past few years of their legitimate existence, South African emergent unions have created much interest in their overseas counterparts, and numbers of strong links between individual unions and their federations have been forged. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the co-ordinating body of union federations in the free world, which CUSA joined in 1982, has 132 affiliated federations from 98 countries, representing a combined membership of 85 million. The federation has a South African co-ordinating committee and offers continued support and funding for the newer unions and their federations, the funding primarily used in the field of worker education.

In addition, a number of unions are affiliated to ITS's, but at present only the IMF, FIET and IUF have South or Southern African co-ordinating or regional councils. These ITS's are the international federations of unions in a specific sector, and have exerted considerable pressure on a number of overseas parent companies in terms of their labour policies. They have also lodged strong protests with the Government over the detention of trade unionists. The AFL-CIO, although viewed with suspicion in some quarters, due to concern that it was under the influence of the US Government, has established links, particularly with the unaffiliated unions and CUSA also has links with this organisation through its affiliation to the ICFTU. AFL-CIO has been responsible for arranging a number of exchange programmes for unionists, and earlier this year representatives from NAAWU and EIWUSA visited Pittsburg on a study tour of the steel industry.

The IMF, which now includes 10 South African unions, believes in the power of solidarity to help effect change and strong links exist between these local metal unions and their counterparts in West Germany, Britain and the United States. The federation has a total of 14 million members, 200 000 of whom belong to South African unions and an established fund provides assistance to third world countries which is distributed on the basis of need. South African IMF unions receive about 30% of this fund and the main focus is for education which is perceived as a major requirement.

While the IMF does not consider disinvestment as having any benefit to workers it does not advocate new investment and directs its main thrust at putting pressure on employers to put pressure on government. It firmly believes that employers should be considering their credibility in the process of reform by reinforcing their rhetoric on the need for change with constructive, positive action. In the light of this belief strong pressure was put on SEIFSA by the local IMF co-ordinating body to review the bargaining structures in the industry following this year's wage negotiations. The IMF co-ordinating council warned that, unless these structures are altered, it will have to consider seriously its participation in the industrial council. The IMF also adopts the policy of put-

ting strong pressure on the multinationals with the view that these companies can act as leverage on South African organisations in terms of union involvement which should result in sound practices in the workplace.

NUM, the largest single union in South Africa with an approximate membership of 200 000, is affiliated to the MIF and, according to general secretary, Cyril Ramaphosa, the main reason for affiliation was the cause of international solidarity, with issues of education, health and safety matters, conditions of employment and the apartheid system as key areas of concern. Furthermore, a federation of Southern African mineworkers is in the pipeline which is to include NUM and FMU from South Africa as well as unions from Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. NUM has also received continued support from the British NUM with fact finding visits made to South Africa by British union members.

These examples offer support to the view that international labour bodies see unions as a significant influence in workplace practice. Therefore, logically this could lead to a more just social process in society. Indeed, an ICFTU conference in Germany at the beginning of 1984 endorsed this by concluding that "the growth and strengthening of this movement was the most effective means "for the repressed majority to gain freedom and justice and to abolish apartheid without undue violence and bloodshed."

However, if this is the case, the question arises of how these international bodies perceive their role and what measures are considered effective to both influence the practice of workplace industrial relations and press for the removal of apartheid policies? Over the past year considerable attention has been given to the latter. Another ICFTU conference in Washington in April of this year condemned all collaboration which served in any way to strengthen or maintain apartheid and called on all governments to embark on a 'vigorous' programme of constructive disengagement. Following this conference AFL-CIO issued a statement endorsing the outcome and rejecting the official Reagan administration's policy. The statement called for the American Government and other industrial democracies to take the following steps:

- Ban new investment in South Africa;
- end all investment guarantees, export credits and trade promotion with South Africa;
- stop new IMF loans as well as other bank loans to the South African state and publicly-owned companies;
- halt the sales of Kruggerrands and the purchase of South African coal;
- punish violators of the UN oil embargo against South Africa;
- embargo the sale of arms to South Africa, especially those used by its military, security and police forces;
- compel disinvestment by multinational companies in the energy and high technology sectors;
- force disinvestment by all multinational companies that have been identified by the independent black trade union movement as being in violation of internationally accepted labour standards.

In addition to this statement the AFL-CIO endorsed its proposal that the ILO should consider establishing documentation and research machinery to monitor the conduct of all corporations operating in South Africa and, in consultation with the black trade union movement and the ICFTU, pledged to review additional measures which might be effective in bringing about democratic change.

International labour bodies are strongly in favour of economic sanctions and disinvestment and the ILO, at its annual conference in June, adopted a resolution calling for complete economic isolation of South Africa. The Governments represented, although adopting the resolution as a whole rejected demands which included the ICFTU proposals and added others including:

- Ending all contracts for the expansion of South Africa's nuclear energy programme;
- closure of all official and unofficial South African recruitment and tourist promotion offices;
- establishment of a compulsory programme of disinvestment by transnational corporations, especially those in the armaments, energy and high technology sectors;
- prohibition of all sports and cultural contacts;
- "stringent divestment and disinvestment measures" by the EEC community to replace the EEC Code of Conduct.

However, given the potential domestic legal risks and the practical aspect of possible job loss, South African unions which agree with disinvestment have been reluctant to openly support a call for economic sanctions and this may have restricted more overt action by overseas unions in support of societal justice. Nevertheless, there has been recent evidence that some overseas unions are prepared to take a more positive stance. Unionists and workers at the Dunnes supermarket chain in Ireland have been on a prolonged strike for over a year in an effort to prevent the sale of South African goods. Swedish stevedores have decided to impose an embargo on all South African goods entering their ports during the month of September. The British merchant navy union has called on other unions to help impose oil sanctions and the Australian Amalgamated Metal Workers' union has called for a ban on all South African imports again from September.

There can be no doubt that a need exists for concerted action against social injustice and rhetorical lobbying plays a significant role. Nevertheless, there is a paradox. On the one hand, without basic human rights and civil liberties, unions are obviously inhibited from effectively performing their function in terms of working for industrial justice. On the other hand, by concentrating on an industrial power base and using the collective bargaining process to establish new norms in the workplace, unions will inevitably have impact on the norms in the broader spectrum of society. Therefore, it could be argued that more direct pressure from overseas affiliates with regard to industrial justice in the workplace could prove more effective, at least in the short-term and signs point to growing momentum for this approach.

PRACTICAL DIRECT INFLUENCE

The British TUC in the opening paragraph of a report for 1983-1984 affirmed its commitment to more direct action stating that "The General Council of the TUC have continued to take a leading part in international trade union efforts to break down apartheid in employment in South Africa. They have continued to provide assistance, principally with training and education, to independent trade union organisations representing black working people, and they have initiated and co-ordinated trade union pressures on British-based companies with South African interests to recognise and to negotiate in good faith with independent trade unions in South Africa represented in their establishments." The report also states that the council analysed British company reports under the EEC Code of Conduct and met representatives of the CBI to act to encourage full observance of the reporting, minimum wages and other provisions of the code.

Observance of the EEC and Sullivan Codes of Conduct has certainly had a positive effect in many cases and, of late, considerable pressure backed by union federations has been placed on governments to exercise stricter control of foreign subsidiaries operating in South Africa. In the US, pending legislation is very likely to make the Sullivan Code mandatory and there is a strong possibility that imminent legislation in the Netherlands will enforce the EEC Code in Dutch companies.

The German government, on approving the 5th summary of reports of German companies noted "with satisfaction that the subsidiaries of German companies in South Africa have again to a large extent applied the recommendation of the EEC Code of Conduct. This has particularly been shown in the field of the companies' relations with the emerging trade unions. Wherever co-operation between companies and unions had been established in previous years this has been broadened and become more intensive. Additionally a large number of companies have shown growing readiness to accept the emerging unions as representatives of black African workers."

Nevertheless, apart from this, as yet, voluntary adherence to codes of conduct, the question remains of how effective is support of overseas federations and their member unions in practice. Has the influence of unionists on parent companies had any effect in improving labour relations and industrial justice within their subsidiaries operating in this country? To a certain extent, the answer must be yes. South African unions have not been hesitant to enlist the aid of their overseas counterparts at times of dispute and this has met with some success as evidenced in recent cases.

MAWU created a precedent in South African labour history last year when it approached both the IMF and the ILO to intervene in a long-standing dispute with Transvaal Alloys, a subsidiary of Norddeutsche Allgemeine in Hamburg, which had resulted in Industrial Court action the union lost. The dispute had centred round workers dismissed for striking in support of a wage demand and, dissatisfied with the Court's decision, MAWU approached the IMF with several accusations of unfair labour practice. The ramifications of this move resulted

in the question being raised in the German Parliament with a subsequent rebuke to the company; a visit by the German union, IG Chemie (the union represented in the parent company) to Transvaal Alloys; and, possibly, more importantly, the company making positive efforts to improve its industrial relations practice by instituting procedures and training its personnel in sound labour practice.

Indeed, there can be no doubt that a number of West German companies have influenced the labour policy of their subsidiaries in South Africa and worth noting is the fact that neither Volkswagen or BMW have ever fired workers following strike action.

However, there are overseas parent companies which are not prepared to succumb to union pressure as evidenced in the BTR Sarmcol dispute which resulted in the dismissal of nearly 1 000 black workers belonging to MAWU. BTR in Britain firmly refused to intervene in the dispute stating that their foreign subsidiaries operated autonomously. When TUC general secretary, Norman Willis, appealed for government intervention Trade and Industry Minister, Norman Tebbit's reply was that he "did not think it would be helpful or appropriate for the British government to seek to intervene in the dispute, especially since it is taking place in another country. Mr. Tebbit said he believed it was better for the company and the union to "resolve their difficulty directly." While the principles of collective bargaining do not point to the desirability of direct government intervention in labour disputes, it is disquieting to note that some multinationals are approaching industrial relations issues in a manner that would not be acceptable at home – for example, dismissal of striking workers. Despite the different context in which such behaviour occurs, it is questionable whether such divergent action is advisable. Such companies' behaviour could well prove to be a very important contribution to the process towards peaceful change in South Africa.

However, the degree to which societal inequities affect relationships in the workplace cannot be ignored. Whether measures to ensure adequate human rights and civil liberties are a prerequisite for the trade union movement in South Africa to achieve industrial justice and, hence, make a contribution to the reform process remains a significant question.

ILO PERCEPTIONS

In two recent publications, The Special Report of the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration concerning the Policy of Apartheid in South Africa, and a working paper on Restrictions on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise in South Africa, the ILO concluded that apartheid policies have had serious implications for the growth of a free trade union movement. The working paper published in May of this year states that "the effects of apartheid policy have been to create a South African society which negates the fundamental principles of human rights and therefore is incompatible with the principle of freedom of association. In such circumstances, in particular the absence of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, a genuinely free and indepen-

dent trade union movement cannot develop." It goes on to say that, because of the exclusion of large numbers of workers in agriculture, domestic service, state or local authority and educational service employment from the official labour relations structures and the effect of certain "homeland" legislation, freedom of association has not been universally introduced. With regard to freedom of association in practice, it concludes that other laws and regulations also impinge on this question such as:

- The Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945
- The Group Areas Act, 1966
- The Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act, 1984 which control the movement of Blacks between "homelands" and White urban areas and have the effect of regulating Black employment and opportunities.

Other Acts which have direct significance for trade unions are:

- The Internal Security Act, 1982
- The Intimidation Act, 1982
- The Trespass Act, 1984

all of which can be used to curtail union activity. In recent years, numbers of trade unionists have been detained under sections 28 and 29 of the Internal Security Act as was the case after last year's November stayaway when 18 trade unionists were detained, an action which was universally condemned. In addition the controversial Section 53, which covers acts of subversion, was also invoked for unionists charged with treason as a result of this stayaway.

As far as the Intimidation Act is concerned, according to the paper, the Act has been used on trade unionists taking part in industrial action, particularly trade union pickets who seem particularly vulnerable due to the loose interpretation of the definition. The Trespass Act has also been used against unionists who have occupied or refused to leave employers' premises during disputes or following dismissal for striking. The paper is extremely critical of the use of this alternative legislation which it says "is clearly an infringement of normally acceptable industrial relations practices, and as such is a further incursion on the principle of freedom of association."

Although a founder member of the ILO, since it withdrew its membership from the organisation in 1964, South Africa has not provided a full undertaking to accept and apply the principles of freedom of association in the manner intended and accepted by the international community. Nonetheless, given its decision six years ago to open the doors of trade unionism to blacks, together with the current volume of criticism levelled against its policies, perhaps the Government should look more closely at changes in laws and practice which, in the view of the ILO, are restrictive, thus offering the international community more assurances that it will endeavour to adhere to basic principles of freedom of association, without interference. Surely this would be perceived as a positive effort towards reform and, in addition, would provide a vastly improved climate for unions and management to move away from polarised positions which result in escalatory confrontation.

Indeed, a number of considerations must be borne in mind if the labour movement is acknowledged to be a potential agent for change, which arguably could have been in the mind of Government when accepting the Wiehahn proposals back in 1979. Nevertheless, the question remains as to the extent restricted civil liberties and human rights inhibit the legitimate role of trade unions. Western labour movements are not hampered by such restrictions and have, subsequently, been more politically aware. In many cases, union federations have affiliated with specific political parties to advance their cause, thereby directly influencing social change. A notable example is the National Health and Social Security system in the United Kingdom, introduced in the late 1940's by a Labour Government which has been traditionally supported by the union movement. This kind of influence is not possible for unions in the South African context as they are precluded from forming any political affiliations. The Labour Relations Act clearly states that union activities must be restricted to the industry or undertaking in which it operates. Hence, the the current lobby by international bodies for the removal of barriers which constrict the union movement's potential to speed up the process of reform.

However, if the government is not prepared to respond to pressure and take positive steps to remove the restrictions on human rights, it must be aware that a rapidly growing trade union movement is coming under increasing pressure from its members to take a proactive stance in the socio-political arena. The implications are already demonstrated in the current unrest which has increased polarisation and, consequently, placed an increasing strain on a collective bargaining system that is rapidly losing credibility.

Furthermore, there is frequent criticism of unions by managements with regard to their "political" aims encroaching into the workplace. However, do these employers dispute the fact that it is industrial justice in terms of demands for improved wages and general working conditions which form the basis for discussion at the negotiating table? In other words, there are two sides of the coin in terms of influence. Obviously, the socio-economic environment influences the demands of trade unions, but on the other hand, the development of mutually satisfactory relationships built on trust will ultimately extend its influence out into that same socio-economic environment.

The West German industrial relations model of co-determination aptly illustrates that co-operation between managements, unions and the workforce reduces conflict and leads to greater economic stability, which, in turn, has a positive effect on the wider norms of society. Thus, any influence by nationally affiliated unions on multinationals aimed at promoting sound practices and participation between the parties in the workplace over matters of mutual concern could prove extremely valuable by having a ripple effect.

There are, of course, South African employers and unions that have succeeded in building sound relationships and many others are trying, as shown by the the recent agree-

concluded by Rowen (SA), a motor components firm in Jan, and NAAWU. In this agreement, Rowen undertakes not to dismiss strikers for four weeks, provided they adhere to agreed dispute procedures. According to the company, the philosophy behind this agreement is to create an onus on both sides to prevent strikes and form a relationship built on trust. Employer federations should take note and translate their rhetoric advocating the need for reform into more positive action to encourage their members to build co-operative relationships with representative unions. Likewise, unions could show their willingness to move beyond rhetoric into pragmatic bargaining stances geared to the needs of South Africa as a whole. Employer organisations, such as FCI, ASSOCOM and AHI, by putting pressure on their members to create a climate which provides for managements and unions to work together and jointly control frontiers of change in the field of industrial justice, would provide both the basis for more stability in the economy and a significant step forward in reducing the divisions in society as a whole.

As stated by Loet Douwes Dekker, senior lecturer in industrial relations at Wits Business School in a recent article for the South African Labour Bulletin:

"The ability of the industrial relations parties to jointly control the frontiers of change in the workplace as well as on the level of the economic sector will imply social change of a fundamental character."

Faith McDonald
Senior Professional Officer

REFERENCES

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SOUTH AFRICA

LABOR RETRENCHMENTS, UNION RECOGNITION, REGISTRATION DATA

Johannesburg IIR INFORMATION SHEET in English Aug 85 pp 16, 23

[Excerpts]

TABLES AND STATISTICS

PLEASE NOTE: All facts and figures which appear in the following tables are based on newspaper sources as well as contact with the organisations involved. In some cases it is impossible to obtain further details.

RETRENCHMENTS - AUGUST 1985

COMPANY	SECTOR	REASON/S FOR RETRENCHMENT	T.U. INVOLVED	NO. RE- TRENCHED	SEVERANCE PAY	WILLINGNESS TO RE-EMPLOY	SOURCE
Mc Cann Erikson	Commerce	Merger	-	24	Unknown	Unknown	Business Day 1/8/85
Toncoro Building Materials	Manufacturing	Recession	-	350	Unknown	Unknown	Fosatu Press Digest 2/7/85
Veldspun International	Manufacturing	Recession	TWIU	400	Unknown	Will be first to be re-employed when economy improves.	Daily Dispatch 22/8/85
Jack and Jill	Manufacturing	Recession	-	70	Unknown	Will be first to be re-employed when economy improves.	Daily Dispatch 22/8/85
General Motors	Manufacturing	Recession	NAAWU	340	Unknown	60 salaried employees will take early retirement. 280 hourly paid workers released.	Star 30/8/85

RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS – AUGUST 1985

PARTIES	SECTOR	MONTH	CONTENTS OF AGREEMENT	SOURCE
Durban City Council – DMWA	Services	July	Preliminary recognition granted pending conclusion of a formal agreement.	Fosatu Press Digest 21/7/85
Consolidated Frame Cotton – NUTW and TWIU	Manufacturing	August	Both TWIU and NUTW are recognised as the collective bargaining representatives of the workforce. Both unions will represent the workforce in regard to the negotiation of wages and other issues. Recognition at factory level, including access and shop steward's recognition has been accorded to both unions at various factories except Pinetex where the employer will regulate labour relations as neither union will be recognised there. The agreement provides for periodical revision for the representativeness of the respective unions.	Business Day 16/8/85, 19/8/85
Pretoria Coal Company – GWUSA*	Manufacturing	August	Agreement includes retrenchment procedures and other conditions of employment.	Sowetan 28/8/85
Central Plumbing Workers – GWUSA*	Services	August	Agreement includes retrenchment procedures and other conditions of employment.	Sowetan 28/8/85

APPLICATION FOR CANCELLATION/REGISTRATION OF TRADE UNIONS/EMPLOYER ORGANISATIONS/INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS

LABOUR RELATIONS ACT, 1956

INDUSTRY/TRADE	COMMENTS	G.G. NO.	DATE
Catering Restaurant and Tea Room Association.	Application for variation of scope.	9885	9/8/85
Locksmiths' Association of South Africa.	Application for variation of scope.	9885	9/8/85
Employers' Association of the Cineomatograph and Theatre Industry of S.A.	Application for variation of scope.	9885	9/8/85
Transport and General Workers' Union	Application for variation of scope.	9891	16/8/85
SA Spoorwegpolisiepersoneelvereniging.	Application for variation of scope.	9891	16/8/85
Confectionary Craft Association.	Application for registration.	9891	16/8/85
Brushes and Cleaners Workers' Union of SA.	Registration as a Trade Union.	9898	23/8/85

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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

DETAILS ON STRIKES, LABOR DISPUTES PUBLISHED

Johannesburg IRR INFORMATION SHEET in English Aug 85 p 17

[Text]

**STRIKES, DISPUTES, WORKSTOPPAGES, LOCKOUTS
AUGUST 1985**

PLEASE NOTE: The tables must be viewed with the following considerations: Accurate information for tables is difficult to obtain because:

- (a) The figures only represent an analysis of strikes reported in the press; and
- (b) They are, at best, superficial indicators of trends rather than an in-depth representation of actual causes and reasons (i.e. not only are strikes reported on subject to the vigilance of the press, but also overt public reasons may differ considerably from "underlying causes").

COMPANY/ TRADE UNION	ISSUE	NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED	DURATION	AREA AND SECTOR	EVENT AND OUTCOME	SOURCE
Mercedes Benz -- NAAWU	Refund of pension contributions	3 000	1 day	East London	Workers returned to work. Negotiations taking place between management and union representatives.	Citizen 6/8/85, 7/8/85; Business Day 6/8/85
Murray and Roberts -- SAAWU	Recognition	1 500	3 days	Western Cape	Workers dismissed. Union not representative.	Citizen 30/8/85; Star 30/8/85
Woolworths -- CCAWUSA	Working conditions	Unknown	Unknown	Johannesburg	Workers downed tools to protest against death of colleague working in freezing room. Management state worker died from natural causes.	Sowetan 12/8/85
Argus Group (Cape Herald)	-- Retrenchment -- Removal of editor	Unknown	Unknown	Cape Town	Workers returned to work. Negotiations continuing. Management investigating complaints.	Citizen 13/8/85 Daily Dispatch 15/8/85
Irvin & Johnson -- SFAWU	-- Wages -- Improved benefits -- Working hours	600	Unknown	Springs	Strike decision taken after wage dispute unsuccessfully referred for mediation and Minister refused to appoint Conciliation Board.	Cape Times 16/8/85
Dairybelle -- RAWU	-- Wages -- Recognition	400	Unknown	Epping	Workers dismissed following an ultimatum to return to work. Negotiations continuing.	Cape Times 16/8/85
Natal Die Castings -- MAWU	Wages	125	3 months	Pinetown	Workers dismissed on 2nd day of strike. Union has declared a dispute and threatened industrial action.	Fosatu Worker News August 1985
Fry Metals -- MAWU	-- Wages (plant level) -- Working conditions	150	Unknown	Wadeville	Workers returned to work. Union has declared dispute with company.	Business Day 23/8/85, 27/8/85 Sowetan 28/8/85
Iscor Hlobane Colliery -- NUM	Pay increases	1 800	3 days	Vryheid	Workers returned to work after management agreed to try to secure the release of two workers arrested on charges of intimidation. No concession on wages.	Star 27/8/85; Sowetan 27/8/85 Business Day 29/8/85
Mondi Saw Mill	-- Production Bonuses -- Service Conditions	600	Unknown	Sabie	Workers returned to work. Negotiations continuing.	Business Day 29/8/85
Nampak -- PWAUWU	Unknown	58	Unknown	Eastleigh	Workers dismissed and subsequently reinstated following successful negotiations.	Star 31/8/85
Panmure Chicken Factory	-- Wages -- Working conditions	1 000	Unknown	East London	Two stoppages occurred after attempts to negotiate with management failed.	Daily Dispatch 29/8/85

COMPARATIVE STRIKE FIGURES It is reported that an average of 528 of every 1 000 Italian workers participated in strike action each year between 1972 and 1981. Comparative figures for other countries are:

- United Kingdom - 64
- United States - 35
- South Africa - 9 (excluding agricultural, government and domestic employees)
- Netherlands - 4

Financial Mail 16/8/85

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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

DECLINE OF PORT ELIZABETH'S ECONOMY EXAMINED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 8

[Text]

THE BOYCOTT by black consumers of non-black retailers in Port Elizabeth's CBD is now three months old. The impact has been devastating, with turnovers slashed by 80% and more, and scores of business — notably fast food outlets — now facing bankruptcy.

The boycott committee came out of hiding after eight weeks to announce that it proposed extending the September 15 deadline until its demands had been met. Among them: the withdrawal of the SADF from the townships, an end to "mysterious disappearances" of township residents, that a ban on meetings be lifted and that the Black Local Authorities Act be scrapped.

Thus for those PE businesses catering principally for black consumers there is no immediate relief in sight, whereas business will continue booming for black retailers in the townships.

The boycott will undoubtedly further depress indicators measuring economic activities in the PE/Uitenhage complex.

In its latest *Trends* bulletin the University of Stellenbosch's Bureau for Economic Research shows that, for the period January 1984 to April this year, economic activity in PE/Uitenhage plunged by a job-sapping 26%.

By contrast the countrywide decline (in an indexed level of activity derived from consolidating seven major economic indicators) was 14,6%.

Massive neglect

Such stark contrasts underlining the poor performance of the PE/Uitenhage economy are plentiful — despite the best efforts of National Party apologists during a November by-election last year to deny a massive neglect of the country's fifth metropolitan complex.

Gross taxable incomes earned by individuals in PE rose from R333,6m in 1976 to

R529,6m in 1981 — an increase in the area's wage economy of 9,7% per annum over the five-year period.

By contrast, countrywide aggregate taxable incomes rose 10% per year over the same period, from R10 615m to R17 098m. Compared to PE's wage economy (boosted to R663,2m in 1981 if Uitenhage is also taken into account), the wage economies generated in each of the country's remaining metropolitan areas in 1981 was: Johannesburg — R2 528,6m; Cape Town — R1 409,3m; and Bloemfontein R292,5m.

Of deeper underlying significance, however, is the declining relative share of the cake enjoyed by wage earners in PE. Despite its categorisation as a metropolitan area, PE's wage structure is losing ground not only against that of the Reef but in relation to the entire country (See Table 1).

Another perspective of the PE/Uitenhage economy is provided by contrasting the value of retail sales generated in the area with countrywide sales. Once again — "metropolitan" magnet notwithstanding — less than 4% of the country's retail bills were rung up to PE/Uitenhage shopkeepers' accounts.

This performance must be gauged against the magnitude of the population of the hinterland served by the complex. In the broader "Region D" (roughly synonymous with the Eastern Cape, Border, southern Transkei and Ciskei), the population was measured in the 1980 census at four-million, or 16% of the total RSA population. PE/Uitenhage's 727 580 urban dwellers represented 3% of the population.

An analysis by Central Statistical Services in Pretoria of SA's manufacturing sector showed the number of establishments throughout SA rose from 12 761 in 1972 to 17 126 in 1979. Asset growth averaged around 15,5% per annum, raising gross value of asset from R3 232,7m to R8 638,6m.

Once again PE's performance lagged that of the country by a wide margin. The number of establishments in PE/Uitenhage rose from 451 in 1972 to 541 in 1979 (annual average increase of 2,6%), raising the gross investments in assets by 9,7% per annum, from R167,6m to R320,5m (See Table 2).

Profits generated by the manufacturing sector in the PE/Uitenhage complex rose from an estimated R69,5m in 1972 to R208,7m in 1979.

A perspective of the contribution made by the motor industry in the area to the government's tax revenues (prior to the phased exit currently underway by Ford, which has now merged with MMI, previously Amcar, in Anglo-controlled Samcor), is provided by the graph.

Perhaps the most sobering economic indicators from the area are those contained in Table 4, which shows the comparative contribution by the PE magisterial district to GDP. This shows overall share of GDP declining from 4% in 1970 to 3,9% in 1972, and 3,6% in 1975.

Stark picture

Since these somewhat dated figures were produced by Central Statistical Services, a summary of the 1978 results was issued (in February this year), which showed that PE's overall share of the country's economic cake had declined further, to 3,4%.

Add to this the findings of University of PE economist Dr Charles Wait on building industry activities during the Seventies and a stark picture of a stagnating — perhaps even

regressing — economy emerges.

Commissioned by building trade bodies in the area to report on the industry's performance and prospects, Wait painted a depressing picture of the PE/Uitenhage economy:

□ Reflecting this downturn, employment of skilled tradesmen in the area nosedived. Total employment in the building industry in 1981 was down to 74% of the 1971 figure, while job levels among journeymen had declined to 73,1% of 1971 levels, among general employees to 72,4% and among apprentices and learners to 54,3%.

□ Real earnings earned by employees in the building industry in 1981 was down to 74% of their earnings in 1973.

□ The sale of building materials over the decade declined by 27%, with demand for bricks in 1980 at a poor 63,4% of that experienced in 1973, though concrete and quarry products and cement sales were marginally ahead.

Wait forecast that the area would attract only 1,4% of industrial property investment in the country between 1982 and 1987, and was highly critical of government's regional development strategy. "The manufacturing industry in PE/Uitenhage is more likely to suffer than to gain from the regional economic development scheme," commented Wait at the time of the report's release. That was in September 1983, and subsequent events have done little to alter his views, he says.

The decline in the local economy, argue industrialists and city councillors in PE, may be directly attributed to deliberate government policy.




TABLE 1				TABLE 2				
AVERAGE TAXABLE			INCOMES	PE/Uit MANUFACTURING				
(R/m)				SECTOR				
Year	PE	Uit	PE as a % of		'72	'76	'79	
			Jhb	RSA				
1977.....	423	396	76,8	83,3	Establishments.....	451	544	541
1978.....	432	417	62,9	82,4	Employment.....	68 441	75 524	69 574
1979.....	468	457	64,6	83,0	Salaries (R000's).....	114 381	206 729	265 204
1980.....	516	503	63,9	82,2	Output/gross (do).....	643 943	1 278 398	1 675 204
1981.....	595	599	63,6	80,2	Output/net (do).....	234 184	446 994	570 036
					Value (do).....	167 620	238 591	320 547

TABLE 3 PE/Uit % SHARE OF RSA				TABLE 4 CONTRIBUTION TO NAT GDP PE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT	
	'72	'76	'79		
Establishments.....	3,6	3,5	3,2	1970.....	4,0%
Employment.....	6,1	5,6	5,2	1972.....	3,9%
Salaries/wages.....	6,5	5,7	5,4	1975.....	3,6%
Output value/gross.....	7,0	6,3	5,6	1978.....	3,4%
Output value/net.....	6,2	5,7	5,1		
Value of assets.....	5,2	3,8	3,7		

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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

VALUE OF OUTPUT BEATS INFLATION

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 3

[Text]

THE value of sales of manufactured goods has shown a steady upward trend, from a total of R21,339bn in 1976 to R68,333bn in 1984, according to Central Statistical Services.

The monthly values shown on the graph represent net sales (gross sales less returns, discounts and other deductions) of manufactured goods and net charges for work done.


The annual figures more than trebled during that period but the consumer price index has also almost trebled, from 100,0 in 1977 to 290,4 in 1984, indicating that the figures largely reflect the fall in the value of the rand rather than an increase in volumes of manufactured goods.

The level of productive capacity utilised continues to fall.

Utilisation between 1982 and 1984 averaged 86,3% and in May this year it stood at 84,2%.

At this point more than 13% of total productive capacity was unutilised due to lack of demand.

The figures show a downtrend with 86,8% utilisation in May 1984, 86,4% in August 1984, 85,7% in November 1984, 84,5% in February 1985 and 84,2% in May 1985.



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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

NO IMPROVEMENT FORESEEN FOR RAND

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 17 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by David deKock]

[Text]

SOMEBODY has boobed! After all the talk and all the measures, the rand has sunk back to the levels that necessitated the market closure at the end of August.

Last night the rand closed at \$0,3635 — 50 points lower than the close on August 27 when Minister Barend du Plessis announced that the forex and stock markets were to be closed for three days.

We need some explanations. Logic dictates that there are obviously some factors present which are not being made public or, alternatively, a mismanagement of the currency in the grossest proportions.

Firmed

Let's look at the rand and the various measures that have impacted on it over the last few months.

Firstly, we had the partial state of emergency in the latter part of July. The rand firmed for a few days before the first major plunge.

A question — did we not learn from Sharpeville that a political state of emergency needs to be accompanied by emergency financial regulations, or were the powers that be now too taken up with so-called free market forces?

Oh yes, the emergency financial

regulations did come — a month later, after withdrawals had already taken place in substantial amounts.

Secondly, the world was waiting for some positive statement on political reform from P W Botha in Durban in August. They had been led to expect something and were left deflated.

For some overseas banks it was the last straw and they started reining in on credit lines advanced to SA. The downward pressure on the rand became momentous and it hit a low of \$0,3480 on August 27.

As a result, the markets were closed, a standstill on loan repayments was instituted and the financial rand was reintroduced.

It was widely anticipated that the loopholes had been closed and the rand could stabilise and perhaps move even higher once the markets reopened on September 2. But with a lack of

direction from the Reserve Bank on that day the rand resumed its downward course.

Then it appeared that some loopholes still existed — and we subsequently found out that several hundred million dollars had escaped the standstill net, apparently due to a misunderstanding between government and banks on mismatched loan maturities.

Random

By the way, is anyone going to give us some answers on that one soon?

Other stop-gap measures have also been introduced on an apparently random basis — remittances of earnings prior to January 1, 1984, were prohibited; we once even saw some reasonably aggressive support from the Reserve Bank.


Other areas are still hazy: do the gold mines still receive half their gold earnings in dollars,

do oil companies still enter the market in large amounts from time to time, is the repatriation of export proceeds still taking place on a timely basis, and is it right for multinationals to be covering forward their South African equity?

Notwithstanding all the measures introduced, the rand is back to the level that caused their introduction in the first place even despite the fact that the commercial rand should not be subject to so-called political forces. That is why the financial rand was introduced. What is going on?

Are we dealing with incompetence or ignorance? Or are the roots of the problem much deeper than it appears at first glance? The public has a right to know; companies around the country are staring bankruptcy in the face and many have already folded.

It is now 45 days since the market reopened on September 2. We



have got nowhere and the country had to suffer much to get there. Let's get some answers or, preferably, some solutions before the position becomes totally irretrievable.

I have suggested some possible ways out of this mess through this column in past weeks.

To reiterate, a managed float, a fixed exchange rate, a scaling down of the potential to speculate against the rand, and tighter exchange controls. But the warnings and suggestions have gone unheeded.

Please, gentlemen in power, don't you realise that the rand is no longer controlled by economic forces but by psychological

panic which is perhaps not warranted and only you can change this? Do you have a plan to meet this situation or will you continue to fiddle while the rand burns?

Who in the private sector is prepared to join me in a televised public debate with the authorities on this matter? It may well be the only way we will get some answers and then at last we will get some answers.

At least we will know where we stand and can get on with the business of running our companies.

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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

ASSOCOM LAMENTS GOVERNMENT'S APATHY

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 18 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Chris Cairncross in Cape Town]

[Text]

GOVERNMENT ministers — or even deputies — were noticeably absent from this week's Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom) annual congress, the best-attended in more than a decade.

Clearly, the tenuous accord between business and the Botha government that followed on from the Carlton and Good Hope Conferences has been well and truly severed.

As one delegate said this week: "We gave government the benefit of the doubt, but it has not delivered the goods. We have become impatient and time has run out."

The direction the economic debate took reflected dramatically the battering business confidence and morale has been subjected to, particularly in recent weeks with the rand falling to previously unplumbed depths and the wounding blow to SA's creditworthiness by the refusal of overseas banks to roll over loans — leading to the debt moratorium.

Virtually no sector of the economy has escaped the "suffering" caused by the effects of the string of austerity measures imposed last year.

There was broad agreement, however, that the measures were essential in order to bring domestic spending under control; and that that goal has been achieved.

Congress was overwhelmingly critical at the same time that government has failed to keep its own spending in check.

"It would be extremely unfortunate if once again the public sector has escaped the sacrifices imposed on the private sector," said one delegate, expressing the feelings of most of those around him.

Essentially, organised commerce concurred that recent government economic policy has been soundly based, and had become more business-like.

But delegates were unequivocal that blame for the present strains facing the economy must be placed squarely on government's inability to get to grips with political realities and the fundamental problems that have to be tackled expeditiously.

The country's problems, congress asserted, lay in:

□ The failure to accommodate the political, social and economic aspirations of all South Africans;

□ An overseas perception of political instability in the country, allied to an almost universal rejection of policies of enforced segregation;

□ Deep-rooted black concern over the sincerity of government's intentions to initiate major reforms and to accommodate blacks in political decision-making at all levels;

□ The threat, and reality, of internal boycotts and stay-aways and international sanctions — to a large extent imposed because of doubts over the sincerity of the reform process and of government's willingness to accommodate blacks politically.

Dragged

Though delegates accepted that some token reforms have been introduced by government, it was stressed the situation is logjammed.

Little meaningful progress has or is actually taking place — even the opening up of the CBDs has dragged interminably.

Leading debate in congress, Denis Creighton, representing the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce, declared that there were two main stumbling blocks to reform in SA currently:

□ The nature of reform. "Government's position is that reform must take place within the sys-

tem of separateness," he asserted.

□ The insistence on pre-conditions and posturing by various groups. "On the side of government — violence must be rejected before negotiation. In respect of black groups, we have a reluctance (or refusal?) to deal with the system."

Delegates welcomed government's acknowledgement of a common destiny of all South Africans in a unified SA under a common citizenship.

But they declared this week that this must be taken further: systematically remove from the statutes all laws which make the implementation of this principle impossible. This includes the Group Areas Act, influx control, and all other legislation discriminating on the grounds of race.

"Reform must not be aimed at improving discriminatory laws — it must remove them. No longer can we tinker with apartheid — we must dismantle it now," echoed Creighton.

It was resolved that Assocom, and business in general, could help materially in facilitating change and true negotiation with all leaders.

Business has so far been the one area where statutory discrimination on the grounds of race has largely been removed. It does, therefore, have a favourable experience of working together equally.

In recent years it has developed important negotiating skills in the arena of labour relations. Experience gained at the negotiating table, it was proposed, could be extended to assist around the political negotiating table.

The private sector was warned, however, that if it was to play its part constructively, it should take care not to partake in "intemperate rhetoric".

Imperatives

"That does not facilitate solution," observed Harold Groom, chairman of Assocom's executive committee.

"What it does do is aid the polarisation of thinking. This we cannot afford and plays into the hands of those who do not want peaceful solutions."

Concern was voiced that sights should not only be focused inwards. One of the imperatives for change is to get SA's international situation changed.

Assocom past president Bill Yeowart commented that government's intractable attitude towards outside criticism and pressure was predictable, but out of place. "There is an agenda of external requirements that must be faced up to," he said.

The speed of external action against SA has been remarkable. It is essential that government recognises this and gets ahead of the game.

The only contribution to the debate from public sector represen-

tatives came from manpower director general Piet van der Merwe. It served to cap the strong message sent out by organised commerce.

He outlined seven developments that have occurred in the manpower arena which he believed could serve as "pillars", giving out hope for meaningful reforms which could — and should — occur elsewhere within the SA environment:

□ The emergence of autonomous structures based on freedom of association and choice — the trade union movement.

□ The emergence of a new band of leaders — which have credibility and support from their members.

□ There has been real and meaningful communication with these leaders that have recently emerged.

□ There has been the acquisition of real bargaining power.

□ There has been an absolute minimum amount of interference in the negotiating process.

□ Mediation structures have begun to emerge and prove effective in both the private and public sectors.

□ Considerable effort has and is being devoted to training and, re-training in industrial relations and in the negotiation processes.

The Assocom congress — representing about 22 000 businesses — had one real message to formulate and it spelt it out clearly and unambiguously. The only issue now is: has government been listening and, if so, has it heard?

SOUTH AFRICA

METBOARD, INVESTEC MERGER. PLANNED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by Brian Zlotnick]


[Text]

RAPIDLY-GROWING Investec Bank and Metboard, an established trust company, are merging to establish an independent specialist investment banking group with R700m under administration.

They also have their eyes at the up-market financial services sector.

The emergent group, which could well have a market capitalisation of about R100m, will seek a Johannesburg Stock Exchange listing early next year through a public shares offer.

For some years the two companies, which were associated, have been discussing the possible benefits of an enlarged group offering a wide spectrum of financial services. Metboard has long wanted a banking licence and Investec should benefit from the assets and addi-



tional skills that the merger would bring.

Both chief executives — Errol Grolman of Investec and John Perkins of Metboard — maintain that in the short-term each company will run independently while moving towards longer-term combined operations.

The deal has been structured so that what they provisionally call Bank Controlling Company (BCC) will hold 100% of the equity of both Investec and Metboard (see diagram on page 2).

The two companies, whose shareholders' funds are about in line with each other at R11,5m (balance sheet), were valued equally.

Once the various legs of the transaction are completed, Unisec, which previously owned 85% of Metboard's equity, and Metboard, which held 9% of Investec, will land up holding 30% of BCC. Under the Banks Act special permission is required for one financial institution to own more than 30% of another.

Hosken Consolidated Investments' 30% stake in Investec translates into a 10% holding in BCC, with management, directors and staff owning about 20% of BCC and the public and institutions are expected to own about 40%.

The enlarged group will in a sense be competing with Stanbic, which controls Unisec. Unisec MD Peter Thomas points out, however, that competition between Stanbic and Metboard existed before the deal.

The merged group is to offer specialist services, says Thomas. Furthermore, Investec's European offshore fee-earning subsidiary could become a more important source of profits.

Perkins says the merger will extend the product range and flexibility and he believes "the group will be ideally positioned to participate in the financial services revolution taking place in SA".

Certainly, when it comes to money market operations, the enlarged group will have more muscle and greater credibility. Operations are likely to extend further to all major centres.

Grolman says: "We have no intention of becoming a money centre bank, the emphasis will be on fee income, very much along the lines of the US investment banking groups."


Metboard and Investec earned aggregate taxed profits of R5m in the 1985 financial year, after transfers to inner reserves in Investec. Despite both enjoying five years of rapid growth, Grolman is confident the new whole will prove in this respect to be greater than the sum of the two parts.

After the cash injection from the share offer to the public, the executive committee, of Thomas, Grolman, Perkins and Ian Kantor, who heads the offshore operation, believes that BCC could have a market capitalisation of about R100m.

Their valuation is based on a PE ratio of 10 and slightly more than twice covered dividends.

The deal is still subject to the approval of the Registrar of Financial Institutions.

PROPOSED SHAREHOLDING STRUCTURE (APPROX)



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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

LEVETT CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 17 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by Chris Cairncross]

[Text]

LAST year's austerity measures have combined to create conditions in which the authorities can cautiously relax economic policy, according to Old Mutual MD Mike Levett.

In a review of economic prospects, presented at the annual congress of the Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom) in Cape Town yesterday, Levett warned of the perils of attempting to reflate while allowing government spending to go unchecked.

He criticised the way government expenditure had remained above Budget projections when spending in all other sectors of the economy had been significantly dampened.

"It would be extremely unfortunate if once again the public sector has escaped the sacrifices imposed on the private sector," he said.

Levett predicted that, should the authorities relax economic policy without maintaining discipline on government spending, and without adequate monetary restraints, the country could soon be grappling with an inflation rate of 20% and rising.

The need to curb growth in government spending was not a once-off anti-cyclical requirement.

"The real need is to restrain government claims in the longer term, to levels that will allow enough scope for the private sector to expand and create desperately-needed employment opportunities for a fast-growing population."

Levett said that, although the austerity measures had succeeded in re-

versing overspending in the economy as a whole, the other objectives of this policy — building up foreign reserves and strengthening the currency — had been derailed by politics leading to the moratorium on foreign debt repayment.

Politics had also undercut the chances of reducing the level of inflation, which he forecast was unlikely to drop below 12% in 1986.

Levett said that, although recent measures had improved the savings ratio, probably enabling it to average about 6.5% in 1985, it was still at too low a level to ensure enough domestic finance to fund the high growth rates the country required.

Nevertheless, he said, SA could look forward to a positive economic growth rate of about 3% in 1986.

Levett believed the upswing would be different from past recoveries, mainly because the monetary and financial environment had changed fundamentally.

With monetary policy based more on free-market principles, it was expected that the level of interest rates would reflect the relative scarcity of capital more closely in the future than they have in the past.

The changes likely to occur in the tax structure as a result of the Margo Commission's findings was expected to have a profound impact on the spread of economic activity.

Fringe benefits tax, for example, was certain to impact on industries that benefited from this form of remuneration.

A further factor likely to impact on the forthcoming upswing in the economy was the low level of the rand.

The depreciation had been far in excess of SA's international inflation differential, which means there had been a major shift in relative prices.

SOUTH AFRICA

BER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ECONOMY IN 1986

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Alan Sendzul]

[Text]

THE economy can expect better growth prospects in 1986, says the Bureau for Economic Research.

It adds that this should reflect an improvement in domestic demand, in the second half of next year, but reversing the gloomy business mood remains an obstacle in shifting economic activity into gear.

In *Prospects for 1986*, authors Attie de Vries, Rudolf Gouws and Ian Macfarlane sketch a mildly optimistic picture of the business cycle moving out of the doldrums in the second half of 1986.

They see the inflation rate down to 11% and the exchange rate up at \$0,50 by the end of the year.

Before the signs start to point upwards, however, consumer confidence will have to be restored. This will be a major problem with falling disposable incomes hit by slower after-inflation salary growth.

Political circumstances have prompted the BER again to qualify its underlying assumptions.

The forecast, prepared by the Nedbank group economic unit in conjunction with the BER, gives a pivotal role to the current account of the balance of payments because it affects the key net reserve position after taking into consideration long- and short-term capital flows.

The BER sees a second-quarter peak of R9,62bn in the current account sur-

plus next year, from an annualised R5,4bn for the second quarter this year, but 90% of the surplus will be eaten into by foreign debt commitments.

Choosing M2 as its proxy money aggregate, the forecasters expect the money supply to grow at 15% in 1986. Since private sector borrowing is unlikely to expand by more than the inflation rate, monetary growth should stay within the authorities' envisaged target range.

As a result of lower money supply growth, CPI-inflation could be slowed to an average of 14% and possibly as low as 11% by the end of the year.

The forecast paints a more optimistic picture of the commercial rand exchange rate from \$0,40 at the start of 1986 to \$0,50 at the end. The average for the year is put at \$0,4370.

BER supports this view by the authorities' greater ability to carry out an active intervention policy from an estimated net reserve base of R900m-R1bn. If debt rescheduling is less successful, then the rand's rise will reflect this.

With the demand for private-sector credit remaining flat, coupled with improved liquidity from envisaged reserves, short-term interest rates could fall to about 14,5% for the 90-day BA at the beginning of 1985 and 10% by the end of the year.

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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

HIGH PRICE OF RAW MATERIALS 'COSTS JOBS'

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Linda Ensor]

[Text]

ARTIFICIALLY inflated raw material prices were inhibiting economic growth and causing unemployment, said National Clothing Federation president Mike Getz.

He told a Press conference in Johannesburg yesterday: "Manufacturing has no future if our domestic raw material suppliers and processors do not understand how critical their pricing strategies are in the struggle to achieve and maintain growth.

"Both the wool and cotton boards chose to link domestic prices to currencies ruling in international mar-

kets. Thus we saw, overnight, prices of wool and cotton to local producers rise by 53% and 23% respectively."

Getz said the windfalls for those industries had immediate and serious consequences downstream. Implications for fabrics were horrendous with heavy cutbacks in demand for finished products.

"It seems we have not yet learned that rising prices put people out of work. To do this unthinkingly in South Africa at this time indicates an

alarming insensitivity to the implications. Jobs in spinning, weaving and garment production are a heavy price to keep the Wool Board sleek," said Getz.

He said government should ensure domestic inputs to manufacturing were rationally priced.

He added that job-creation was also restricted by the tax structure.

Depreciation, investment allowances and other forms of relief were only available for capital-intensive industries, while labour-intensive industries had to pay higher tax rates, said Getz.

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CSO: 3400/267

SOUTH AFRICA

STATE SEEKS WAYS TO CONTROL PETROL COSTS

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 18 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Peter Wallington and Gerald Reilly]

[Text]

IF the current R/\$ exchange rate persisted, government would need to increase the petrol price by 15c/l, but was likely to stagger the increase, a well-placed source within the oil industry said yesterday.

And should the petrol price exceed R1/l, which is likely, then older pumps — which can only register sales at a maximum price of 99,9c/l — will have to charge petrol by the half litre.

According to motor industry sources, oil companies were sacrificing about R130m a month through under-recovery.

The Director General of Mineral and Energy Affairs, Louw Alberts, told *Business Day* earlier this week that an urgent day would be taken at the price "within the next week or so".

He praised the oil companies for carrying a price-over burden, but added this could not continue indefinitely.

However, it is believed government is looking at alternative ways to balance the petrol slate, which will keep any increase to the motorist down to a minimum.


The oil industry source said one such measure would be to drop the customs and excise duty, currently 4c/l. This was one of the recommendations made by the

AA to government recently, and is apparently being considered.

The AA's Robin Scholtz said yesterday that the AA had recommended "an adjustment to the price structure so that there would be no increase to the end user".

It would mean the motorist would pay the same for petrol but an extra 4c/l would accrue to the state.

The director of the Motor Industries Federation, Jannie van Huyssteen, said: "Under current conditions of a chronically weak rand we are paying excessive amounts for oil imports and adjustments will have to be made."



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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

BRITISH TRADE DELEGATIONS--British trade delegations to SA are being affected by anti-SA feeling. Only 10 delegates of the Coventry Chamber of Commerce came to SA on Monday. The delegates said nightly TV news bulleting showing police whipping black children had turned most Britons against SA. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 3]

INTERNAL CASH FREEZE--Industry would not tolerate further deterioration in the economy owing to political hesitancy of leaders, said Transvaal Chamber of Industries president Joe Annegarn. He added that a freeze on internal investment was a more serious threat to development than was overseas disinvestment. "Because of the political situation, members of the chamber are so disillusioned about this country's economic future. They are not investing in their own factories," said Annegarn. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 6]

SATS ESTIMATES LOSSES--South African Transport Services (Sats) has raised its loss estimate for the current financial year by R50m to R450m. Last month Transport Affairs Minister Hendrik Schoeman told the Natal National Party congress that Sats was heading for a R400m deficit because of a "collapse" of rail, air and sea traffic. Railway staff, he said, had been "cut to the bone" in the economy effort and could not be reduced further without grave risk of disrupting services. April to July figures showed a combined loss in all three services of R92m. Losses are likely to escalate, especially in the last three months of the financial year. Figures for August and September are still being computed, but the revenue slide is expected to continue. In an effort to increase revenue, Sats has embarked on a campaign to win back some of the traffic lost to road hauliers over the past decade. According to a Sats spokesman, Sats at one time had a 65% share of all transport. This

figure had plunged to 35% and extraordinary efforts would be made through intensive marketing to close the gap. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 6]

SAF-NATIONAL CONVENTION--London--The notion that the SA Foundation (SAF) should assume a pivotal role in preparing the ground for a national convention has created a flurry of interest here. The idea was floated in the latest issue of Leadership SA by former Cape Town mayor and leading businessman David Bloomberg. Sources said yesterday that the role of SA businessmen in resolving the political impasse had won acceptance at the "highest levels of the British government". Bloomberg said in a letter that the SAF, a non-political business umbrella body focusing on promoting SA abroad, was ideally placed to "play a dynamic and far-reaching role in the future of SA." "Were a national convention to be called by a non-political organization, it is distinctly possible that blacks would participate and, further, that the intransigence of the African National Congress would be overcome." Bloomberg said: "Now is the time for the SAF to rally its overwhelming human resources, redefine its objectives and commence an initiative that will save SA." [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 6]

URBAN FOUNDATION ON INFLUX CONTROL--The abolition of influx control would not necessarily lead to unemployed people swamping the cities, the Urban Foundation's D Mabiletsa said in Johannesburg yesterday. She told the Kempton Park Rotary Club: "Urbanisation is crucial to economic development and overall prosperity. And it offers a vital means of promoting the advance not only of the black community, but of South Africa." [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 6 Oct 85 p 3]

NKOMATI MONITORING SUSPENDED--Operations of the joint security commission monitoring violations of the Nkomati Accord have been suspended by Mozambique's President Sambra Machel pending further high-level talks with SA at ministerial level, the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed in Pretoria last night. The SA government is optimistic the suspension will be lifted soon, a spokesman said. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 18 Oct 85 p 1]

METAL CONTENT REDUCED--The replacement of metals by other materials is an important trend in engineering, says University of the Witwatersrand professor Geoff Garrett. Garrett, head of the metallurgy department, is organising a symposium on materials engineering at the university on November 18 and 19. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Oct 85 p 3]

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CSO: 3400/267

SWAZILAND

BRIEFS

ROK OFFICIAL ARRIVES--The ROK official who will be in residence in Mbabane to run the daily affairs of the ROK Embassy in Swaziland, Mr Pak Kwan-un, arrived in Swaziland today to make arrangements for opening an office to house the ROK Embassy. Speaking at Matsapa Airport this afternoon, Mr Pak said the official commissioning of the ROK Embassy in Swaziland shows beyond doubt the good and friendly relations that exist between the ROK and the Kingdom of Swaziland. He added that his presence here in Swaziland will help further strengthen the bilateral relations between the two countries. Mr Pak said the embassy will be inaugurated at the beginning of December by the ROK ambassador resident in Nairobi, Kenya, who will also be the ROK's ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland. Before coming to Swaziland, Mr Pak served in Athens, Greece, and before that in Indonesia and Jamaica. [Text] [Mbabane Domestic Service in Siswati 1600 GMT 30 Oct 85]

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ZIMBABWE

SENIOR OFFICIALS AMONG 427 ZAPU DEFECTORS

Harare THE HERALD in English 21 Oct 85 p 5

[Text] Scores of Zanu (PF) Jongwe district supporters yesterday converged on Kwayedza High School grounds in Highfield to welcome two senior Zapu officials who have defected to join the ruling party.

Zapu's chief adviser in the central committee, Cde Nicholas Dheva, and the party's candidate for Harare constituency in the last general election, Cde Kenneth Nyashanu, were among 427 minority party district supporters who denounced their parties to join Zanu (PF) Jongwe district during the past few weeks.

Cde Nyashanu told the rally that he had come to join the masses and work for the unity of all Zimbabweans under the Zanu (PF) umbrella.

His words were also echoed by Cde Dheva who stressed the need for unity among Zimbabweans, adding that it was vital for the development of the country.

Welcoming the two into the ruling party the deputy chairman for Harare Province, Cde Smit Marara, said both Zapu and Zanu (PF) fought the liberation with one aim--to liberate Zimbabwe.

He said, however, following the last two general elections, it was clear that Zanu (PF) was the only party that represented the people.

"Zanu (PF) is the people and the people are the party. This is the light that most minority party supporters are beginning to see and are now coming to join the right side of action in the development of the country."

Cde Marara warned against dividing the membership of the party. He said Zanu (PF) would "defend jealously" its membership if there were such elements in the party.

"The present membership of Zanu (PF) is not enough. We still need more and in fact every Zimbabwean, for us to build a strong nation based on a one-party state.

He appealed to all UANC supporters to join the ruling party because they were "political orphans" since their leader, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, had gone to the United States.

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CSO: 3400/340

ZIMBABWE

8,100 DUALS OPT FOR CITIZENSHIP

Harare THE HERALD in English 23 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] With the deadline approaching fast for renouncing foreign citizenship by dual citizenship holders, queues are growing longer and already more than 8,000 people have regularised their status with the Registrar-General's office.

A spokesman for the Registrar-General's office said yesterday that the exercise was going "smoothly" and that his staff was coping with the steady stream of affected persons.

The spokesman hoped that the exercise would be completed before November 30, the date when dual citizenship in Zimbabwe would be abolished.

The spokesman said that 8,102 people had regularised their status by last Friday.

The Zimbabwe Citizenship Act of 1984, which came into effect last December, states that those who hold dual citizenship but wish to be Zimbabwean citizens only must sign the prescribed declaration renouncing other citizenships to which they are entitled.

Failure to do this would result in them losing their Zimbabwean citizenship.

More than 15,000 people in the country could be affected by the Act.--ZIANA.

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CSO: 3400/340

ZIMBABWE

SEMINAR HELD ON KOREA'S CHUCHE AS MODEL FOR NATION'S SOCIALISM

Harare THE HERALD in English 21 Oct 85 p 5

[Text] Just what is the "Juche" idea?

Definitions are many and varied but all inevitably speak of work and development.

In fact to the majority of Zimbabweans Juche (pronounced shooshay) is a relatively vocabulary, having been popularised by returning cadres from the liberation war.

To the layman it might conjure images of the pictorial landscapes and facades of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cities--an excusable notion considering it is that country's leader, Kim Il Sung, who propounded the idea.

Some 150 delegates to an all-day seminar on the Juche idea as it relates to national development in Zimbabwe at the University on Saturday came out convinced that the idea is not divorced from the brand of socialism being introduced by the Government.

Both ideologies zero on man as the means of production--the basis of all production and economic well-being: hence the Zimbabwean Government labels its socialist approach "gutsaruzhinji" (literally satisfy all).

"We in Zimbabwe under the leadership of the President of Zanu (PF), Cde Mugabe, are being taught to think in a new manner befitting our new situation which means we are on the same lines of thinking with our friends in the DPRK," says the party's deputy secretary for the commissariat and culture, Cde Nelson Mawema.

By embracing the Juche idea in its scientific socialism, the Government here has declared that it will accept aid only if it has no strings and that it will do all possible to preserve the country's independence and sovereignty.

By so doing recognition has to be taken of the role that the masses play. "It is the masses who determine the path that the country must take... in our situation Zanu (PF) is a mass party," he says.

Responsible

"A government that plays according to outside pressures cannot be said to be a government responsible for the destiny of its people and it cannot be regarded as a government of a true sovereign state," said the veteran politician and former Deputy Minister of Transport arguing for the growth of Juche in Zimbabwe.

Academics had different approaches to the meaning and significance of the idea. Because it has its basis on man, the Deputy Secretary for Health, Dr J.C. Muvuti, drew the definition to mean a viable health policy was the cornerstone of all development.

He says man's good health is the first basic prerequisite for him to apply all his creative abilities.

This had led to the Government expanding the health services soon after coming into power five years ago.

"Our policy of planning for equity seeks to redress the imbalances which existed between the urban and rural people and demands that the rural population be cared for first with emphasis on appropriateness, accessibility, affordability and acceptability of the care provided," he said.

The stance, he says, explains why 200 rural health centres have been built since 1980 to complement the existing 450 primary care clinics which in turn are being upgraded to function as health centres.

Related to that has been the training and deployment of over 5,000 village health workers and increased intakes at nursing and the medical school.

And because self-reliance is a salient aspect of the Juche idea, the ministry's national drugs and therapeutic policy committee has ensured that more than 60 percent of the drugs needed in Zimbabwe are manufactured locally. Linked to that has been the decentralisation of medical stores so that drugs and equipment can be readily available from provincial hospital to district and rural health centre level, he said.

University of Zimbabwe law lecturers, Cde Gutto and Cde Makumure, tackled the Juche definition from a cultural viewpoint urging policy makers to emulate the DPRK example for it was only in a society without class distinctions that meaningful development could take place.

Unfortunately, they argue, the ground has not yet been set for that development to take place because of the continued existence of the "wasteful and consumptuous culture of the bourgeois classes."

Manifest

The two-culture pattern remains manifest in education as well as the administration of justice with members of the judiciary essentially representing moribund elite interests and by nature being antagonistic to the progressive policies of the government.

In the field of information the lecturers charge as false claims by capitalists that Western television programmes shown are a medium for spreading progressive culture.

"Dallas and such like programmes do not advance universal values but decadent capitalist ones," they say suggesting that their place be taken by materials expressing the struggle against exploitation and colonialism.--ZIANA.

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CSO: 3400/340

ZIMBABWE

HUNDREDS OF SQUATTERS ROUNDED UP

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 20 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Ray Mawerera]

[Text] Police in Harare yesterday launched surprise pre-dawn raids on several squatter camps around the city.

More than 1,000 people were rounded up and taken in trucks to Chikurubi maximum security prison for screening before being sent to resettlement areas.

The Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Police Support Unit, the Special Constabulary and the Harare Municipal Police jointly swooped on the camps, catching the squatters unawares.

Areas affected included Mbare Musika, the area behind Chaminuka Grounds in Mbare and the railway station.

Also caught up in the blitz were numerous commuters who had slept at the Mbare Musika awaiting early morning buses. They would be released after screening, it was understood.

At the Chaminuka Grounds camp the 100-odd squatters there had their plastic and metal shacks brought down, they were rounded up and police kept vigil while trucks waited to take them to the prison complex.

The Chaminuka squatters had vowed not to budge until alternative accommodation had been found for them.

When The Sunday Mail arrived at the camp soon after the raid, scores of squatters had already been taken to Chikurubi.

Of those left behind, several families, including children as young as four years old, were packing their meagre belongings together against a background of burning shacks and pallid smoke.

Some of the squatters said they were puzzled at the raid and did not know where they were being taken to.

One said the raid was launched around 2 am. By 11 am trucks were still bringing people into Chikurubi, including blind beggars.

The screening was reportedly to determine genuine squatters, non-squatters and those who should not have been taken away.

This is the first time in two years that a blitz on squatters has been launched on such a massive scale. The exercise is expected to continue in other parts of the country from tomorrow.

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CSO: 3400/343

ZIMBABWE

STEPPED UP MARXIST READING IN SCHOOLS ENCOURAGED

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 20 Oct 85 p 9

[Article by E.W.M. Dembedza]

[Text] Mass education in Zimbabwe is a necessary condition towards socialist change. An illiterate society is difficult to conscientise. Inculcation and conceptualisation of scientific ideas--let alone the Marxist-Leninist ideas--certainly becomes an uphill problem.

Over 2.5 million pupils are enrolled in primary school and around 422,584 are in secondary schools. Hundreds are at teachers' and technical colleges throughout the country. As many as 15,000 Zintec primary school teachers have recently graduated.

The question to be asked is what sort of teachers and O level and technical college graduates would these be? The question is not about whether, say, the 15,000 Zintec primary teachers would be hardworking and able to produce good results. The issue is that of ideological qualities of our colleges and secondary schools' products.

Programme

In his book, Towards Colonial Freedom, Kwame Mkromah quotes [name indistinct] as saying: "Every true revolution is a programme; and derived from a new general positive and organic principle. The first thing necessary is to accept that principle. Its development must then be confined to men who are believers in it, and emancipated from every tie or connection with any principle of an opposite nature." When the revolution has been successful, the ideology comes to characterise the society. It is ideology which gives a countenance to the ensuing social milieu.

The nation's leaders have declared that Marxism-Leninism shall be the ideology of the Zanu (PF) Government. At this point maybe it is necessary to show the difference between scientific socialism (Marxism) and reformist socialism. Scientific socialism is grounded on the materialist view of history (Marx's theory of historical materialism) which recognises that man's social development follows a certain path according to recognisable scientific laws. And according to Marxist teaching capitalism, which is an economic system grounded in private ownership and control of the means of production and distribution and the alienation and exploitation of the working class, is only a stage that

precedes socialism. Capitalism contains the seeds of its own self-destruction and when it goes socialism takes its place. The question of coexistence between capitalism and true socialism is not there.

Reform

Reformist socialism (at times called mixed economy by bourgeois economists) seeks to reform, accommodate and thereby postpone the death of capitalism. It is not socialism and should therefore not be confused with scientific socialism. This brand of socialism is vulgarised Marxism and subtly employed by bourgeois economists to confuse the issue.

If then a principle of change has been adopted its development must be "confined to men who are believers in it, and emancipated from every tie or connection with any principle of opposite nature." It is a qualitatively changed agent of change which can effect a qualitative change in its products. A substantive Marxist could be expected to produce men of his mould. Are the students and teachers turned out in those large numbers from the country's institutions of education ideologically conscientised or initiated? How deeply, how widely and how lengthily have they been exposed to the healthy and liberating ideas of Marxism-Leninism? Is not Zimbabwe's struggle also a battle of ideas?

The deforming and enslaving bourgeois ideology and the paraphernalia of its superstructure of social views, values, ideas, theories and its judicial, moral and cultural propaganda must be counteracted. The weapon? The inculcation of Marxist-Leninist ideas into the country's young generations while they are still at school or college. To Lenin the school was the most important link in carrying out the cultural revolution in the Soviet Union. In his speech at the first all-Russia congress on education (August 1918) Lenin said: "Our work in the sphere of education is part of the struggle for overthrowing the bourgeoisie." Education divorced from life and politics was lies and hypocrisy, he declared. It is necessary that the country's agents and would-be agents of change should be exposed to the essence of the theories of Marx and Lenin. Theories of historical materialism, the class struggle, the alienation and exploitation of the working class, capitalism, imperialism, neocolonialism, communism and internationalism should be made familiar to them. The provision of such literature in school and college libraries should be made a policy. This way bourgeois lies and distortion of the truth would be contraposed against scientific truth.

Delayed

The Minister of Education, Cde Dzingai Mutumbuka, was reported as saying that the Government was seriously thinking of introducing political economy as a subject in secondary schools. But earlier he was reported to have said that the Government has delayed the introduction of the subject because of a lack of competent teachers.

According to Marxist teaching, practice without thought is blind and thought without practice is empty. And the same question keeps on coming back--if tomorrow's agents of socialist transformation are not initiated into the liberating ideas of Marxism-Leninism, how then can they be expected to set as qualitatively qualified agents of socialist change? Yet if Marxist literature is injected on a large scale into the country's school libraries, Marxist-Leninist reader groups are formed at schools and colleges and both teachers and lecturers interest themselves in Marxist literature, the seeds of correct change would have been sown. The clay would be there for the moulding.

Not many secondary schools, especially the new ones that mushroomed in the countryside, have libraries worth the name. But the provision of libraries with such literature is an absolute must if Zimbabwe is to become a socialist society.

Self-Help

One way of doing it is for individual schools or colleges to introduce self-help library projects where students themselves agree to contribute a few cents, as they can manage, towards the project, each month. At the end of the month they would buy four or so books of Marxism. The project must, of course, be managed by students themselves through their elected committee, which will be accountable to the whole student board. But a member of the teaching staff with proved interest in the kind of literature should be asked to supervise and advise the committee on how to run the project.

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CSO: 3400/343

ZIMBABWE

BRITISH WATER BOWSERS TO HELP SPEARHEAD RURAL DRIVE

Harare THE HERALD in English 15 Oct 85 p 5

[Text] The District Development Fund yesterday received 24 Leyland water bowsters worth \$1.3 million under a British aid programme for rural road development projects.

Receiving the trucks on behalf of the DDF, the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, Cde Enos Chikowore, said the trucks would form the nucleus of a rural road development and maintenance unit that would benefit 75 percent of Zimbabwe's population.

"Owing to the last good rainy season, considerable damage was done to our roads. With these water bowsters, the DDF will be able to develop better roads by watering and proper compaction which has not been easy in the past," he said.

It was not the first time the DDF had received help from the British Government, he said.

"Funds were provided for the reconstruction programme, the building of technical skills training centres, the supply of machinery and training literature for these centres which enhanced and improved the DDF's image and performance throughout the country."

By December 31 last year, 3,117 trainees had attended courses in mechanics and building. Of these 49 had already attained full journeyman status.

Handing over the water tankers, British High Commissioner, Mr Ramsey Melhuish, said Zimbabwe's achievements in the first five years of independence were impressive and substantial.

The DDF had a most impressive track record in the field of rural development.

"It is because of this effective role played by DDF that I am so pleased that my government has been able to cooperate with them every since independence.

"Immediately after independence we allocated \$4 million of our reconstruction money to provide equipment and training facilities for DDF. More recently we have provided staffing assistance, and now we have these water bowsters."

The director of the DDF, Cde Edward Ndoro, said the new fleet of water bowsters would be joined by another fleet of road compaction machines acquired from France.

The water bowzers would be distributed to the 24 rural and district council construction units around the country. The trucks were brought in kit form and were assembled at the Mutare Leyland assembly plant.

A Harare firm, Zimitra, fitted the tankers on the trucks.

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CSO: 3400/343

ZIMBABWE

PALM PROJECT TO CREATE 10,000 JOBS

Harare THE HERALD in English 19 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Lynda Loxton]

[Text] The Government has given the go-ahead to a project which could lead to the creation of 10,000 new jobs over the next four years on a \$188 million oil palm plantation in the Mwenezi district of Masvingo.

GMHL Investments (Pvt) Ltd said yesterday that the Government had agreed to allow it to develop up to 12,000 hectares of land in the Lowveld as an irrigated oil palm plantation, with 4,000 hectares being developed as a smallholder scheme.

GMHL is 30 percent owned by Masimba Investments (1985) (Pvt) Ltd and 70 percent by UK investment companies. The development will be undertaken by a GMHL subsidiary, the Mwenezi Development Corporation, in which the Government has been offered a 25 percent stake.

Initial trials with palm oil plants are already under way and GMHL expects to start in Mwenezi after the rainy season.

Priority

The first priority will be to build the Manyuchi Dam for irrigation for which 300 people will be employed. But total employment on the scheme is expected to reach 10,000 [words indistinct] when the first plants are expected to bear fruit.

To provide "the financial muscle" needed to launch the project, GMHL had agreed to take over the Zimbabwe interests of UK-based Electra Investments in return for the issue of shares to Globe and Electra Investment Trusts in its UK holding company, Westar Investments Ltd.

Westar will then be 15 percent owned by Globe, 13 percent by Electra and 72 percent by GMHL's existing UK investment company shareholders.

This arrangement if approved, will give GMHL a stake in 41 out of the 52 listed companies on the stock exchange and in each case it will be one of the top 10 largest shareholders. GMHL's tangible assets would then be worth \$30 million.

The chairman of GMHL, Mr Simplisius Chihambakwe, described the oil palm project as "the biggest development project to take place since independence..." and a reflection of the company's confidence in agriculture and the management of the economy in Zimbabwe.

"It will have an export potential or an import substitution potential of around \$35 million a year at current price levels once the plants mature and will make a significant contribution to the country's balance of payments," he said.

It will create tremendous job opportunities and we envisage that a population of 60,000 or 70,000 will be established in the area. To give some idea of the scale, the entire sugar acreage in the Lowveld in a good year is in the region of 23,000 hectares--this project is based on a planned 12,000 hectares of oil palms.

"But perhaps more important than any of this is the fact that such a major development by an internationally-respected consortium--of overseas investors will act as a catalyst to create the confidence in Zimbabwe which we must have if we are fully to develop the potential of this country."

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ZIMBABWE

NATION WORLD LEADER IN ACTIVATED SEWAGE TREATMENT

Harare THE HERALD in English 25 Oct 85 p 9

[Article by Gareth Willard]

[Text] Zimbabwe is the world leader in applying the modified activated sludge sewage treatment system, a system that processes sewage into a high quality effluent that can be discharged into rivers without polluting them.

The technology is just 11 years old, the first papers on the technical aspects having been published as recently as 1974. But already 29 percent of the sewage from Zimbabwe's five largest towns is being processed by the method and the figure will rise to 40 percent by 1990.

Already the system has proved suitable in a country where water was probably the most critical limit on development. Last year, during the tight water rationing, Harare was able to return to McIlwaine a quarter of the raw water extracted from the lake. Without the two plants the ration would have been just three-quarters of what it was.

Last night the Zimbabwe Institution of Engineers gave its award for the most outstanding engineering achievement of the year to Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare, Kwekwe and Stewart Scott and Partners for the plants in the four council areas.

The four councils have spent more than \$11.1 million on their new plants since work started at Gimboki near Mutare in 1978 and Stewart Scott have modified, adapted and sometimes developed the technology to suit Zimbabwean conditions.

Before 1971 almost all major sewage works in Zimbabwe were of the biological filter or pond type and discharge their effluent into the nearest water course. The effluent was high in nitrates and phosphates and dams were in danger from an explosion of algae followed by deoxygenation.

The problem was especially threatening in the Harare area where the sewage works were upstream of McIlwaine.

The government started taking action, laying down standards which culminated in the very tight controls introduced in 1977 after the passing of the new Water Act in 1976.

By the middle 1970s Mutare and Kwekwe had to invest in new sewage works. Kwekwe could not use the farming method to dispose of sewage as the town was hemmed in by hills and Mutare found, after detailed discussions with the consultants, Stewart Scott, that the very new modified activated sludge process would be cheaper.

Mr Ronald Marks of the consultants told THE HERALD yesterday that Mutare and Kwekwe had decided to take the plunge and pioneer the system for Zimbabwe, spending too much money for two small municipalities removing pollutants.

But meanwhile the councils had also been taking action, buying land for farming operations to dispose of treated effluent by old systems.

As the two plants were being commissioned Harare decided to go ahead with the biggest such plant in the country, at Firle and a year later Bulawayo followed suit with a slightly smaller unit.

In 1981 Harare ordered its second unit, Kwekwe extended its unit in 1982 and Bulawayo ordered a second smaller unit in the same year.

Kwekwe and Mutare now process all their sewage in that way although Mutare passed some through conventional plants first.

While the system was the most economical for large urban areas there could be a special bonus, as Harare proved. If the treated effluent flowed into a large enough dam and kept there for long enough it could be recycled.

In time Harare could recycle half its raw water abstraction and the effect was cumulative as that half was re-extracted, and half again sent back. In that way effective use of a river system could be doubled.

Therefore, as Harare commissions the new plants to meet expansion and to replace aging equipment it would gain the equivalent of a new McIlwaine and a new Darwendale and would be able to postpone for a long time the building of the third great dam, 80 km away to the northeast which would drive water charges up a great deal, said Mr Marks.

It was because of the value of water that such plants were appropriate for large cities and towns in Zimbabwe, said Mr Marks. Smaller towns were likely to find ponds and irrigation the better system.

But a large town needed vast amounts of land if it used the irrigation system, about 35 ha for every million litres of sewage processed each day. The problem of Zimbabwe's climate, with the rain falling in a few months each year, made disposal a problem in the rains.

The modified activated sludge plants also produced surplus sludge which needed to be disposed of which irrigation but this was less than a tenth of the conventional plants and if land became very scarce the sludge could be dried and be used for landfill or fertiliser. [sentence as printed]

Mutare was looking at another answer for the planned extensions of the Gimboki works. The sludge would be pumped about 1 km to a 40 ha Forestry Commission woodlot.

The Zimbabwean engineers had developed a few wrinkles in the technology. By building the ponds with sloping sides they had cut considerably the cost of the works: vertical walls 4 m high were very expensive as they had to be strong to withstand high stress.

The first tank had, for civil engineering reasons, been made bigger than recommended and this improved the system. And the method of operation of the holding tanks in Bulawayo had been found to produce more of the volatile fatty acids so essential for the process.

Mr Marks said he and his team had also dispensed with bubble aeration, relying purely on surface aeration, to simplify the problems that could occur and so make maintenance easier.

The new plants consumed more energy than the conventional plants but the amount for each person whose sewage was processed was the equivalent of running two 40-watt bulbs continuously and the total cost of building and running the plants came to just 15c a cubic metre of treated sewage a day over the 25-year life of the plant.

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