Rear Battle Defense and Artillery Fires
Abstract
This monograph examines rear battle doctrine and artillery fires to determine the adequacy of doctrine as it relates to the use of artillery fires in the rear. It analyzes rear battle doctrine as a whole and as it pertains to the effective and or ineffective use of artillery to defeat rear area threats. Specifically, the focus will seek to extract and critique past techniques as well as propose a solution to aid in combating threats to the rear with artillery fires. The doctrine for the rear battle operations as described in doctrinal manuals depicts a discrete approach to combating threats to the rear area. Additionally, the ad hoc nature of the employment of fires in the rear further impedes the efficient and effective defense of the rear area. This approach to rear battle operations while not self defeating, certainly hampers efficiency. While fires in support of rear threats are provided on a contingency basis, the structure to use these fires, when they become available, must already be in place and thus a doctrinal change regarding the structure of the fires system in the rear is needed. Fires in support of the rear, just as elsewhere, must be planned and coordinated to maximize its effectiveness. The rear area as the sustaining base for the close and deep operations is critical to overall success and suggests a need for a permanent fire support organization in the rear.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 18, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA340205
Entities
People
- Clarence Neason
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College