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USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 5, May 1984

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28 August 1984

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 5, May 1984

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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD USSR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 6-14

[Article by P. T. Podlesnyy]

[Text] The U.S. administration obviously has no interest in alleviating tension in the political sphere of American-Soviet relations. Bilateral relations and some of the most vital international issues were discussed at a number of meetings between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko and U.S. secretaries of state--A. Haig in 1981 and G. Shultz in New York in 1982, Madrid in 1983 and Stockholm in January 1984.

When K. U. Chernenko spoke with U.S. Vice-President G. Bush in February 1984, the fundamentals of the current state of international affairs and of Soviet-American relations were discussed. "Soviet-American relations," K. U. Chernenko said, "should be based on equality and equivalent security, mutual consideration for legitimate interests and non-intervention in one another's internal affairs. A display of actual willingness to adhere to these principle on the American side would make the improvement of relations between the two countries possible."¹

The American leadership has not displayed any real desire, however, to start a serious political dialogue between the USSR and the United States. The very idea of treating the USSR as an equal partner and seeking mutually acceptable solutions to the main problems in Soviet-American relations by means of negotiation is profoundly alien to it. Its policy is based on two main premises: First of all, the USSR is regarded as the "most obvious threat to U.S. vital interests" and the main source of the problems encountered by the United States in international affairs. Ronald Reagan made the well-publicized statement that "the Soviet Union is behind all of the disturbances in the world. If it were not playing this domino game, there would be no trouble spots in the world";² secondly, people in Washington believe that the Soviet Union has been put in a difficult position by the international situation of the 1980's and by the state of the Soviet economy. It is on these premises that the chief aim of Reagan's policy rests: the comprehensive buildup of U.S. and NATO military strength, the maximum restriction of trade and scientific contacts and the more energetic use of ideological leverage to exert stronger pressure on the USSR in order to disrupt plans for Soviet peaceful construction, undermine the

bases of socialism, weaken the Soviet Union's foreign political positions and reduce the sphere of its influence in the world. The administration's approach is devoid of any kind of positive program to correct the abnormal state of affairs in American-Soviet relations and is permeated with the hope that the continued exertion of pressure on the USSR could force it to make some kind of additional concessions of unilateral benefit to the United States and the West in general.

The announcement of plans for the comprehensive rearming of the United States in the 1980's inflicted colossal damages on the positive development of Soviet-American relations and on international stability in general. Washington's military strategy of "direct confrontation" between the USSR and United States on the global and regional levels envisages the achievement of military superiority to the Soviet Union, is of an overtly aggressive nature and is geared to the conduct of policy from a position of strength, including the direct use of U.S. military strength for the purpose of reinforcing American political influence in various parts of the world. The current administration not only inherited the strategy of "limited nuclear war" worked out by the previous administration on the basis of Presidential Directive 59, but even amplified it and made it more adventuristic and dangerous.

Current U.S. nuclear strategy has reclassified nuclear war as a form of war that is possible and even expedient under certain circumstances. According to this strategy, this kind of war can be won, and it has supplemented the list of probable U.S.-USSR military conflicts in which nuclear weapons could be used. The overall import of White House strategy led to the interruption of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and put the entire process of nuclear arms limitation in question. As we know, no date has been set for the resumption of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. The 31st round of the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe was also unproductive.

The Reagan Administration also took an unconstructive stand on the Soviet initiative, which was, incidentally, approved by the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly, on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space to the earth. The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union envisages a total ban on tests of all space-based weapons, the unconditional refusal of states to develop antisatellite systems and the dismantling of existing systems. The Soviet draft treaty lists specific methods of verifying its observance, including national technical means and the appropriate international procedures. The USSR put a unilateral moratorium on the first emplacement of any kind of antisatellite weapons in space as long as other countries, including the United States, refrain from the emplacement of these weapons in space.

A published State Department statement on the Soviet draft alleges that the United States does not know the exact purpose of the Soviet proposals and that one of the principal flaws of the Soviet draft is the "inadequacy of means of verification."³ While making groundless statements like these, the United States has been stepping up the development of various space weapon systems, including those that would be prohibited by the Soviet draft treaty. In January 1984, for example, the United States tested the ASAT antisatellite

system designed to destroy targets orbiting near the earth. On 6 January, Ronald Reagan signed Directive 119, authorizing the development and production of various types of space weapons.

It is important to stress that such actions by the Republican administration as the President's decision to begin the development of a space ABM system, announced in March 1983, are putting the future observance of the USSR-U.S. ABM treaty by the American side in question.

The United States refused to continue participating in the trilateral (with Great Britain) talks on the complete and total nuclear test ban, although the text of the treaty was almost ready. Washington refused to enact such important Soviet-American agreements as the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests, the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the protocol to this treaty, despite the fact that the latter envisages the kind of local inspections the United States had been requesting for so long.

For a long time, the American administration blocked the drafting of an international convention prohibiting chemical weapons by the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (formerly the Committee on Disarmament), again on the pretext of "inadequate means of verification." On 12 February 1984 the USSR demonstrated its willingness to seek mutually acceptable compromises by submitting new proposals on matters of verification and thereby strengthened the prerequisites for this kind of agreement. The Pentagon, on the other hand, is stepping up the production of a new type of chemical weapon (binary).

The Reagan Administration has refused to resume the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean and on the limitation of deliveries and sales of conventional weapons to other countries.

The White House has made no positive response to many other Soviet proposals on methods of curbing the arms race and of strengthening international security in general, submitted in 1981-1984, including the proposal on the quantitative and qualitative freeze on Soviet and U.S. nuclear potential.

Washington's intention to build up U.S. military strength in every way possible was reaffirmed in the draft budget for fiscal year 1985, envisaging a sharp increase in allocations to the Pentagon and other agencies for military purposes: The administration has requested 313.4 billion dollars, or 19 percent more than in 1984.

Washington officials have intensified anti-Soviet behavior in the sphere of international politics in order to undermine the positions of the USSR and its allies in strategically important regions--in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean--primarily through the broader political, military and economic support of pro-Western regimes in developing countries and the simultaneous pressuring of progressive developing countries maintaining a close relationship with the USSR. Furthermore, after launching an anti-Polish and anti-Soviet campaign, the administration tried to make use of the so-called Polish question as a pretext to delay the positive conclusion of the meeting in

Madrid and to exert pressure on the USSR in the sphere of bilateral relations. In particular, the American side tried to raise the question of Poland at the Soviet-American meeting of foreign ministers in Geneva at the end of January 1982.

The Reagan Administration has shown no interest in finding a fair solution to the Middle East problem and has even begun direct military intervention in the affairs of this region, including a struggle against national patriotic forces in Lebanon.

It has also taken every opportunity to oppose the resolution of political problems connected with Afghanistan by giving Afghan counterrevolutionaries broader military assistance. According to State Department data, the United States gave Afghan counterrevolutionary groups over 300 million dollars in 1981-1983.

The political atmosphere in Soviet-American relations is severely poisoned by Washington's regular anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns (about the "Soviet military threat," about "international terrorism," with the USSR as its alleged center, about "the crisis of the communist system," about "violations of human rights" and so forth), accompanied by the most vile anti-Soviet rhetoric on the highest level, the outright slander of the Soviet Union, attempts to portray the USSR as some kind of "center of evil" and more pervasive subversive radio propaganda. The "program of democracy and public diplomacy" announced in February 1983 has obvious anti-Soviet and anticommunist aims. At the beginning of 1984 the White House sent the U.S. Congress a report on the Soviet Union's alleged non-observance of arms limitation agreements, thereby adding a new feature to the latest anti-Soviet campaign it had been conducting on various levels.

Washington is trying to use this continuous round of campaigns to exert political and psychological pressure on the USSR and other socialist countries, undermine the USSR's prestige in the world, describe it to the entire world public as the force preventing the elimination of existing tension in the world and cause people to mistrust and despise the political system of the USSR, its foreign policy and its proposals on methods of curbing the arms race and strengthening international security. Another objective is the maximization of the anti-Soviet feelings of part of the American public. Washington also hopes to weaken the peace movement, turn it against the USSR, prevent the further spread of the discussions begun in the ruling class on matters of American-Soviet relations, and discredit the politicians who criticize Washington's power politics and advocate the restoration of constructive relations with the USSR. Finally, the harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric reflects the rabid, pathological anticommunism of Ronald Reagan and some of his closest advisers. The anti-Soviet campaigns are consistent with their ideological beliefs and political outlook, and they conceal the administration's lack of a more thoroughly considered and balanced policy toward the USSR.

The current administration is trying to reduce American-Soviet trade, economic, scientific and technical contacts to a minimum. After lifting the "grain embargo" imposed by President Carter in April 1981 under pressure from farmers, Reagan announced the institution of anti-Soviet economic sanctions by

December 1981 on the pretext of Soviet involvement in the declaration of martial law in Poland. In particular, permits for the sale of some types of equipment for the oil and gas industry to the Soviet Union were made difficult to obtain. In March 1983 R. Reagan signed Directive 75, authorizing the President to cancel trade and economic transactions negotiated by American firms with Soviet foreign trade organizations. These measures reduced Soviet-U.S. commodity exchange to the 1977-1978 level and hurt the interests of several American firms. For example, whereas the trade volume was 2.8 billion rubles in 1979, it was 1.8 billion in 1981, 2.2 billion in 1982 and around 2 billion in 1983.⁴ It is true that a new 5-year Soviet-American agreement on trade in some agricultural goods was concluded in August 1983. Reagan concluded this agreement in an attempt to strengthen his position in the agricultural states and in business groups striving to maintain trade and economic contacts with the USSR. Washington's positive behavior in American-Soviet relations in the past three and a half years has been virtually confined to this agreement.

The volume of intergovernmental contacts and scientific and technical contacts decreased perceptibly.

Although the Soviet-American agreements on cooperation in world ocean research, environmental protection, medicine and public health, and the development of an artificial heart were extended in December 1981, and agreements on agricultural cooperation were extended later, the scales of cooperation in these spheres are much smaller than they were in the mid-1970's. For example, whereas in 1975 more than 2,000 Soviet and American specialists and workers from government agencies were involved in the implementation of various bilateral agreements on cooperation signed in the first half of the 1970's, in 1982 the figure had fallen to 300. In 1983, according to official data, the volume of scientific and technical contacts was equivalent to only 20 percent of the 1979 volume.⁵ Cooperation in transportation, housing and other construction, and the peaceful use of atomic energy has stopped. The Reagan Administration refused to extend the Soviet-American agreements on science and technology, on the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and on cooperation in power engineering.

Exchanges of Soviet and American scientists have continued in some fields, but even there all types of obstacles have been piled up, such as the refusal to issue visas to Soviet scientists. Besides this, Washington took several steps to limit the access of Soviet scientists to American publications and instituted stricter control over the export of certain technical items to the USSR.⁶

Washington has made a persistent effort to undermine the mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and Western Europe, which is playing an important role in securing the maintenance of Western Europe's interest in normal relations with the USSR, despite Washington's pressure. The U.S. assistant secretary of state for congressional relations frankly admitted that Washington wants to "put an additional burden on the economy of the USSR and other CEMA countries. This alone should have a negative effect on prospects for the development of East-West economic relations."⁷

In June 1982 the U.S. President instituted sanctions against the European branches of American firms and European companies working on American licenses which continued to make contracted shipments of equipment for the construction of the pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe. The American administration's move aroused serious opposition from West Europeans, and as a result of this R. Reagan had to lift the sanctions in November 1982. Washington then refocused its efforts on the consent of its allies to set harsher credit terms on commercial transactions with the USSR and to impose additional restrictions on commercial and other economic contacts. These plans were apparent during the meeting of the leaders of the seven largest capitalist countries in Williamsburg (United States) from 28 to 30 May 1983. There the U.S. Government urged its allies to take an anti-Soviet stand on questions of arms race limitation, and this stand was recorded in a statement approved at the meeting.

In addition to this, in April 1983 the American Government set new, stricter regulations to control the movements of Soviet diplomats in the United States, and in May 1983 it announced stricter visa requirements for citizens of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Since the beginning of the current administration there have been more frequent cases of the flagrant provocation of Soviet citizens by American officials and cases of terrorist actions committed against Soviet diplomats with the direct connivance of the American authorities.

The abovementioned facts about administration policy in the sphere of American-Soviet relations indicate that it is distinguished by a strong anti-Soviet thrust and is intended to undermine and eliminate the positive results of detente, secure the comprehensive buildup of U.S. military strength and promote the constant escalation of international tension. It has intensified the arms race in the world, has set up new obstacles to impede the development of the detente process on the European continent and has severely exacerbated the situation in the Middle East, Central America and other parts of the world.

The results of White House foreign policy activity have become the subject of heated debates in the U.S. political and academic communities, the members of which have expressed concern and anxiety over the tendency of Washington's emphasis on force in relations with the USSR to increase the danger of nuclear war, destabilize international relations, create tension in virtually all spheres of American-Soviet relations and erect a high wall of suspicion in these relations. It is indicative that Washington's anti-Soviet policy line is even being criticized by authoritative members of the American foreign policy establishment who were directly involved in the engineering and conduct of U.S. policy toward the USSR for many years and who learned from their own experience that it is futile to deal with the USSR from a position of strength and diktat.

Summing up the results of Reagan Administration activity in this area, one of the Democratic Party's senior statesmen, A. Harriman, said that Washington's nearsighted line had made "relations with the Soviet Union more tension-ridden than they have been in the last 30 years. This is the dismal result of Reagan Administration diplomacy. If the present trends in the area of nuclear weapons and American-Soviet relations are allowed to continue, we might face the prospect of nuclear war, and not merely the danger of war."⁸

Another authority in this field, former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR G. Kennan, called the state of Soviet-American relations "extremely alarming." In an article in the NEW YORK TIMES on 16 January, on the same day that R. Reagan tried to give everything that was so obviously dirty and unscrupulous a snow-white appearance, G. Kennan quite justifiably stated: "The arms control talks have been broken off, the volume of American-Soviet trade has fallen to an insignificant level, bilateral exchange programs in scientific and cultural fields have virtually ceased to exist, and the statements and actions of the Reagan Administration are deeply disturbing."

The pernicious effects of the White House's anti-Soviet policy line, including its effects on the United States' own interests, were also mentioned in a recent report prepared by Democratic congressmen in conjunction with the Democratic Party National Committee: "The Reagan Administration has severely complicated relations with the Soviet Union and has been unable to improve relations with friendly countries and developing states.... Diplomatic solutions to problems, including the problem of arms control, have been secondary on the administration's list of priorities. As a result, America has made no progress in the creation of a more secure and stable world. The arms race spiral is still climbing. The Middle East is sinking into the morass of conflict. The only response to increased tension in Central America has been the buildup of American troop strength. Under these conditions, neither Americans nor the people of other countries can feel more secure than they did in 1980."⁹

This kind of description reaffirms the absence of constructive aims in Reagan's policy toward the USSR. The White House is using any pretext, any international political problem, for anti-Soviet purposes.

Members of U.S. ruling circles are worried that Washington's primitive and nearsighted line could have negative implications for the United States and could even cause America to suffer more substantial losses and failures over the long range. Prominent businessman T. Watson, who was U.S. ambassador to Moscow in 1979-1981, criticized administration foreign policy activity quite pointedly when he said: "There are clear signs of an impending crisis. We are now deploying cruise missiles and Pershing II's in Western Europe which, according to the Russians, pose a threat to the Soviet Union. Besides this, there is an explosive situation in the Middle East and a potential crisis in the Persian Gulf zone, through which our oil is shipped. In both of these cases matters could lead to a confrontation between the superpowers.... The Geneva talks on intermediate-range missiles have been postponed indefinitely, and there have been no productive consultations on ways of preventing crises in which nuclear weapons might be used. In short, never before has the threat to our existence been so great as it is now."¹⁰

Leading American experts are disturbed by the absence of realism in Reagan Administration policy, which overestimates the U.S. ability to influence world events and ignores the actual sources of the problems and difficulties the United States is encountering in the world. "The reasons for the Reagan Administration's failures--and the time has come to discuss its failures in foreign policy," W. Pfaff said, "can be found in its view of the world.... Reagan's belief that the Soviet Union is behind all of the disturbances and conflicts in the world has played the most fatal role in his general outlook...."

It was precisely this vulgar and invalid oversimplification that resulted in the U.S. intervention in Grenada, Lebanon and El Salvador. The administration's conviction that literally everything stems from a common cause is insupportable, and the result has been a series of awkward statements and official propaganda that have turned the world public against the United States."¹¹

Washington's now obvious reluctance to come to a mutually acceptable agreement with the Soviet Union in the area of nuclear and conventional arms limitation and reduction has become the target of special criticism because it is destabilizing the military-strategic situation in the world, undermining treaties and agreements, increasing the danger of nuclear war and compounding anti-American feelings in the world. "The administration," Senator J. Biden said when he addressed the Congress in fall 1983, "has shown no interest in arms control or in seeking means of peaceful coexistence with the USSR."¹²

Members of the American foreign policy elite are also somewhat disturbed by the fact that now that the United States has begun the deployment of the new American missiles in Western Europe against the wishes of the West European public, it might have to pay a disproportionate political price for this in the future due to the increase in anti-American feelings on the continent as a result of West European worries about the possible subversion of detente and about the new round of the nuclear arms race. As early as summer 1983 this was being discussed by famous American political scientist R. Legvold: White House strategists base their calculations on two groundless illusions, alleging, first of all, that the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles will force the USSR to agree to concessions benefiting only the United States in the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and, secondly, that this will almost completely neutralize antiwar feelings in Western Europe and remove a source of additional friction and disagreements in NATO. Legvold warned that these calculations were unrealistic.¹³ The authoritative American authors of a special issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS also acknowledged the groundlessness of these calculations in an analysis of the situation after the United States had already begun the deployment of its missiles.¹⁴

Deep concern has also been expressed in various U.S. circles in connection with the administration's plans to launch an arms race in outer space and its refusal to negotiate the total demilitarization of space with the USSR. "We," over 100 American congressmen and more than 40 U.S. scientists said in a collective letter to President Reagan, "are seriously disturbed by the threat of an arms race in space and are certain that its avoidance would be in the national interest. This kind of race will endanger our security and undermine international stability and the possibility of future arms control agreements."¹⁵ Equally convincing warnings were voiced by A. Harriman: "It is probable that the most tragic tendency, since it would be so easy to avoid, is the tendency to move the arms race into space.... The administration's 'star wars' plan will lead to the abrogation of three arms control treaties--the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, which have served the purpose of safeguarding our security so well."¹⁶

It should be noted that sometimes the criticism of White House policy is of a halfhearted nature and is accompanied by appeals for the alleviation of tension in some areas of relations with the Soviet Union and an increase of tension in others. The fact that U.S. ruling circles are not opposed in general to the buildup of U.S. military strength and do have an interest in diminishing the influence of socialism and the national liberation movements is also having an indisputable effect. For this reason, the present situation is distinguished largely by criticism of the extremes of the current anti-Soviet line and appeals for the avoidance of actions that might rebound against the United States' own influence and interests, as well as demands for interaction with the USSR in a number of spheres of mutual interest.

This approach has been displayed, in particular, during hearings on Soviet-American relations in the concerned committees of both congressional houses. American politicians, diplomats and experts who have testified in these hearings (A. Harriman, R. Legvold, S. Bialer, T. Watson and others) and several senators and congressmen (A. Cranston and C. Percy) have questioned, although with reservations, many aspects of the Reagan Administration's hard militarist line and have issued warnings about the illusory nature of the expectation of White House strategists that the conditions of future relations with the United States can be dictated to the Soviet Union, that military superiority to the USSR can be achieved and that the foundations of the socialist order can be undermined.¹⁷ "First of all," Director S. Bialer of Columbia University's Institute on International Change, said, "we must take a realistic look at our policy goals. I do not think that the Soviet structure will crumble under U.S. pressure. I do not think that the Soviet economy will be bankrupted by our embargo on trade with the USSR, although I do think that this method could be used effectively in the attainment of certain specific goals of our policy in the sphere of trade. I also cannot believe that the USSR will be incapable of reacting to our commencement of a new round of the arms race."¹⁸

Appeals for more realistic policy in relations with the USSR, for the attenuation of anti-Soviet rhetoric, for interaction by the two countries in the resolution of questions of war and peace and for regular political dialogue on various levels are characteristic of the contenders for the 1984 Democratic Party presidential nomination. All of them have pointedly criticized Reagan's hard anti-Soviet line.

Time will tell if Washington is capable of making a positive response to the mounting worries of millions of Americans about the constant escalation of tension and confrontation in relations with the USSR. A great deal will depend on the balance of power within the United States and on the ability of people with a realistic frame of mind to display enough consistency and persistence to prevent the further deterioration of relations with the USSR and to give them a constructive and stable nature.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 15 February 1984.
2. Quoted in "Eagle Defiant. United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's," edited by K. Oye, Boston, 1983, p 210.

3. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, November 1983, pp 3-5.
4. "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR. Statisticheskiy sbornik" [USSR Foreign Trade. Statistical Handbook], Moscow, 1980, p 14; 1982, p 14; 1983, p 14; VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1983, No 12, p 84.
5. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, September 1983, pp 76-78.
6. In September 1982, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense prohibited the publication of 100 scientific reports by American scientists at a conference on optical instruments which was held in San Diego at the end of August and was attended by Soviet scientists. That same month the head of the U.S. Bureau of Customs, W. von Raab, reported the creation of a group of 300 people for the stricter monitoring of the California electronics industry in order to prevent "leaks" of the latest technology to the USSR. The sum of 22 million dollars was allocated for this operation. Since October 1981 U.S. customs officials have arrested 276 representatives of various firms who have been accused of "violating" restrictions on exports to the USSR (NEWSWEEK, 5 December 1983, p 22).
7. "East-West Commercial Policy: A Congressional Dialogue with the Reagan Administration. A Study Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress," Wash., 16 February 1982, p 70.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 31 December 1983.
9. THE WASHINGTON POST, 9 December 1983.
10. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 November 1983.
11. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 3 November 1983.
12. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 October 1983.
13. Ibid., 5 June 1983.
14. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AMERICA AND THE WORLD, 1983, 1984, No 3, vol 62, pp 503, 588, 589.
15. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 June 1983.
16. Ibid., 31 December 1983.
17. "U.S.-Soviet Relations. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate," pt I, Wash., 1983, pp 32-33.
18. "U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1982. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives," Wash., 1983, pp 5-6.

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CLASS POLARIZATION SAID TO FIT TRADITIONAL MARXIST CATEGORIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 15-27

[Article by Ya. N. Keremetskiy: "The Evolution of Working Class Political Awareness"]

[Text] Just 4 or 5 years ago the American bourgeois ideologists seeking calming myths for ruling circles assured them that class relations in the United States had undergone a fundamental change: Politics no longer reflected differences between social classes in terms of economic interests. Expanding on their own 1950's idea about the inability of class differences in the "affluent society" to become the basis of "political conflicts," these ideologists tended to point out the "decline" of the particular type of class political behavior that was characteristic of the era of F. Roosevelt's "New Deal." At that time the working class supported stronger government regulation for the purpose of securing full employment and reducing social inequality to some degree and therefore voted against conservative bourgeois candidates who objected to strong government.

For example, one of the engineers of the idea of the cessation of "political conflicts" due to opposing economic interests, E. Ladd, believed that the "ideological merging of classes" had been completed in the United States, primarily because "the majority of the population moved out of the category of 'have-nots' into that of the 'haves,' and this eradicated the class conflicts of the New Deal era."¹ According to Ladd, the essence of the most important changes in the political ideology of classes was that the traditional propertied classes accepted the principle of the government regulation of economic and social relations de facto and the traditional have-nots, the workers, became the "new bourgeoisie" and acquired the "instinctive conservatism of the middle class" in their views on government. The "embourgeoised" workers, this political scientist asserted, changed their "political ideology" in the 1960's and 1970's, when their own social experience taught them that government activity was not solving their problems as much as it was undermining their new status as "haves" with the high social spending and the inflationary federal budget deficit that were destroying the economy.

The theory about the merging of the political ideology of classes was engineered by a method F. Engels called ideological in "Anti-Duehring," because

the content of the theoretical constructs was not derived from the development of actual social relations, but from the beliefs of ideologists, who were certainly not devoid of class political biases.

When a high percentage of workers voted for Reagan in 1980 under the influence of the rightist demagogically scathing slogan "Get government off our backs," this not only seemed to corroborate the idea that blue-collar workers had acquired the "instinctive conservatism" characteristic of the "middle class," but also added grist to the mill of Republican Party rightwing ideologists. After all, ever since R. Nixon's first term in the White House they had been hoping to lure the laboring masses away from the Democratic Party and turn the "Grand Old Party" into the party of the majority, including the workers.

The political behavior of the laboring masses in 1980 was influenced by the declining standard of living and mounting social insecurity of the Carter years, and not by the "instinctive conservatism" of the propertied class.

The even more pronounced decline of the material and social status of the laboring masses during the first 2 years of the Reagan presidency affected the results of the midterm congressional elections in 1982. For the workers who had been turned into the "new poor" by Reaganomics, and for the black population, they became what NATION termed "grudge elections."² Blue-collar workers could not forgive the "party of the rich," the Republican Party, for the growth of unemployment in 1981 and 1982, unprecedented since the 1930's, and the growing social gap between haves and have-nots in levels of consumption, which convinced them that Reaganomics made the rich richer and the poor poorer. These voters, especially union members, abandoned the Republican Party.

In the last 30 years the highest "achievement" of American capitalism within the context of its ability to prevent the development of "Marxist class struggle," according to the ruling class, was the "elimination of the class polarization predicted by Marxist theory" by turning the upper strata of blue-collar workers into a "middle class" in terms of comparative income levels. This transformation was viewed as a step toward the creation of a "classless society" in the United States, or, to use a more popular American term, an exclusively "middle-class" society. In the 1980's these illusions were succeeded by the conviction that the "blue-collar middle class" and much of the traditional "white-collar middle class" were disappearing in the country as the social status of most workers and rank-and-file employees continued to decline. "However we might measure them," FORTUNE magazine confirmed this fact, "differences in rich and poor American family incomes are growing. More precisely, the middle class, defined as the total group of families with an income of from 15,000 to 35,000 a year (in 1982 dollars), decreased from 51 percent of all families in 1973 to 44 percent last year."³

Public opinion in the United States has learned the following reasons for the increasing class polarization in terms of income: the elimination of many jobs for industrial workers with a "middle income" by corporations (they close plants in the United States and open them in regions with cheaper labor abroad or automate production); the increasing concentration of low-paying jobs in branches of non-physical production, primarily the service sphere; the growth

of corporate profits and the income of high-salaried categories of administrators and technocrats. The crowning touch in the abrupt change in distribution patterns is the economic and social policy of a state which takes pride in the supra-class nature but is actually encouraging the corporations to intensify the "unilateral class war" they began at the end of the 1970's by lowering the wages of industrial workers and destroying the unions that helped the workers rise to the level of the "middle-income" category in the 1950's and 1960's.

Reaganomics strengthened and illuminated the particular tendencies in the development of political relations between classes that began to grow more pronounced during the period in the development of American capitalism when it started to lose its ability to erase class distinctions in the public mind by stimulating "equal levels of mass consumption." It was then that the U.S. ruling class had to acknowledge the futility of its attempts to set up an "official utopia"--a socially and politically integrated society without "Marxist classes" and "class struggle."⁴ The deceleration and more frequent interruption of economic growth (which relieved American capitalism of the need to intensify inequities in distribution in the 1950's and 1960's) forced the American Government, which pretended to be "above classes," to conduct a more precise and persistent policy of lowering the consumption standards of low- and middle-income families and thereby increasing the social distance between the working class masses and the propertied class.

The most important result (from the standpoint of the development of class relations) of this policy, which took the form of the crude and quite visible augmentation of class distinctions in the society at the start of "Reaganomics," was the change in working class ideas about the "American class structure" and its susceptibility to government influence.

The majority view this "class structure" as a hierarchical system of unequal prosperity. It usually takes the form of an income ladder, on which individuals with equal consumption standards occupy the highest, middle and lowest rungs, corresponding to the upper, middle and lower "classes."

At the beginning of the 1970's a relatively popular idea in American society was the belief that "classes are less important now than ever before," because "the standard of living of the majority is much higher now than before." As a result, the "old dichotomy--haves vs. have-nots--appears to have changed so much that only Americans on the lowest level can still be categorized as 'have-nots.'"⁵ When sociologists R. Coleman and L. Rainwater studied American ideas about the "class structure," they found that physical laborers who were relatively financially secure believed that society essentially consisted of "three classes"--"the rich at the top of the income ladder," "the lowest Americans, people who live on welfare," and "all the rest, representing the middle class in this case."⁶

The ideological formation of this "common" view of the "class structure" as a hierarchy of status groups based on income levels is the most important factor dividing the working class into groups with specific social interests, as the "size of the wallet is a purely quantitative difference that can be used to

turn one person against another, even when they belong to the same class."⁷ At the same time, the common belief in the prestige of belonging to the "middle class" creates the sociopsychological conditions for a political coalition of individuals belonging to different classes but regarding themselves as members of the "American middle class" on the basis of their own assessment--realistic or illusory--of the place they occupy on the income ladder. The "three-class model" of society largely predetermined the political outlook of most blue-collar workers in the 1970's by creating the possibility of their participation in voter coalitions with traditional supporters of the Republican Party--the bourgeois and petty bourgeois strata of society.

In the 1970's the workers of "middle America," who were angry that inflation was lowering their real wages and taxes were lowering their status in the "American class structure," were viewed by the ruling elite and its ideologists as the main factor in the political destabilization of the system.

During this decade they looked for the reasons for their inferior status in the "American class structure," equipped with nothing other than their own experience, viewed through the prism of traditional populist beliefs and illusions engendered by an earlier "age of prosperity" and tenacious racist biases. The propaganda of emerging rightwing and conservative groups also had an impact. Under the influence of these factors, "middle America" arrived at the conclusion that the social-reformist state, headed by rich men "alienated" from the average American--liberals from the Democratic Party leadership--was the main reason for the growing gap between the ideal of the "American dream" about the continuous improvement of the well-being of all classes and the social realities of American capitalism in the 1970's. In the eyes of most workers, the state, which had forced them to shoulder most of the financial burden of programs to combat extreme forms of poverty and which was promoting stagflation, economic crisis combined with inflation, through the growth of the federal budget deficit, had not only stopped their upward social mobility, but had also had even more adverse effects. According to these beliefs, it was lowering the social status of "average" Americans, wrecking the hope of reducing the social distance between them and traditional propertied classes, as well as the hope of increasing the distance between "middle America" and the indigent "lower" class.

In the 1950's and 1960's the optimistic view of the future evolution of the "American class structure" was generally expressed in the abovementioned opinion that "classes are less important now than ever before" in the United States. During these relatively favorable years for American capitalism, the hope of erasing class distinctions based on income levels and consumption standards was the main sociopsychological factor precluding the development of the struggle for the redistribution of national wealth and political power. The workers' new opportunities to buy their own homes and goods previously accessible only to the propertied "middle" class were taken as a sign that the poor had grown richer and were turning into a "middle" class. In the 1950's and 1960's the specifically American "egalitarianism," which existed in the mass mind as faith in the possibility of reducing class distinctions by means of the upward social mobility of increasing numbers of people, was the main factor contributing to the development of the sociopolitical awareness of large segments of the U.S. working class.

The development of class relations in the 1970's and, in particular, under the conditions of Reaganomics demonstrated quite clearly that this faith had begun to disappear. More and more workers rid themselves of illusions about the "American class structure." The 1970's dealt a severe blow to the workers' overestimation of their position in the system of capitalist-regulated social inequalities. Their reaction to the transformation of this system into a rigid, from their vantage point, "closed" structure of class privileges was quite intense; it was affected by the size of the gap between the realities of the 1970's and the optimistic and excessive expectations inherited from the 1950's and 1960's.⁸

The mood of "middle America" was probably summarized and described most completely by economist and sociologist J. Wilson in his work "After Affluence." Making extensive use of personal interviews to elicit typical reactions, he cites remarks like the following: "What happened to our great American dream? Why is it that we cannot have our fair share of what the country should give its citizens? Or 'We are entering an era in which the rigidity of the class structure is suddenly obvious!'"⁹

As a member of the so-called "enlightened" and liberal elite, Wilson does not conceal the fact that he and the other people of his circle are afraid that the "American class structure" is acquiring the features of "Marxist class polarization." He realized that "stagflation is increasing the size of the working class by undermining the security of the middle class."¹⁰

The sense and recognition of downward mobility in the "class structure" aroused frustration, tension, insecurity, despair and depression in the masses of "middle America" in the 1970's when their ambitions and stereotyped beliefs about the possibility of social advancement crumbled.

Marxist theorist G. Green analyzed the political implications of the state of frustration just before the 1980 election: "Our entire national mentality and views were based on the belief that 'our' capitalism was somehow special and better, more progressive and perfect, always capable of guaranteeing higher levels of social well-being.... The national mind has been traumatized by the revelation that the dream is crumbling and that another prospect must be acknowledged. This is a time of extreme difficulty, vulnerability and danger."¹¹ The time was crucial, Green went on to say, because the inability to explain events due to the absence of class or socialist awareness creates the risk of blind, irrational reactions under the influence of false and superficial beliefs.

Political analyst S. Lipset, a ruling class expert in the revival of faith in the "American dream," had this to say about the political behavior of the laboring masses in 1980: "The discussion of evidence and factors pertaining to the low level of class awareness in America is certainly the main element of any analysis of American politics."¹² But it would be even more correct to say that the investigation of premises and factors connected with the elevation of class consciousness in the United States, especially evidence of changing beliefs about the "American class structure," is of the greatest significance in any analysis of the development of American politics.

The major prerequisite for the elevation of class consciousness over a relatively long period of time was the social experience of the laboring masses, acquired at a time when the extreme right wing of the ruling class was in power. It is no secret that rightwing conservative groups gained power on the strength of the gap between the ideal of the "American dream" and the social realities of capitalism regulated by the government according to bourgeois liberal specifications. Polls and studies of the workers' mood just before the 1980 election indicated that the majority did not put much trust in R. Reagan's promises to "put the American dream back within the reach" of average Americans and secure a revival of steady economic growth and a higher standard of living with his economic and social policy. Class instinct told the workers that the "millionaire actor" was more concerned about serving the needs and interests of big business and his own class. But the semiliberal, semiconservative J. Carter did not even promise "reindustrialization" and clearly demonstrated the impotence of his policy. He did not propose any programs and simply asked people to "tighten their belts" and accept the need for a lower standard of living. These requests were tantamount to asking them to give up their hope of a better financial and social status. Carter irritated "middle America."

If Reagan was able to captivate many workers with his demagogy, the main reason was that neither the influential leftist radicals nor certainly the discredited liberal forces in American politics could offer the laboring masses any kind of alternative program for the improvement of their socioeconomic status. They did not offer it for the simply reason that they had no such alternative. The mentality of today's individual, particularly the worker, is such that it is not enough to simply tell him: Things are bad all over, but just wait because tomorrow will be better. The first part of the sentence is easy to believe, but only concrete facts can convince people of the second part. This is why there is now such an urgent need for a constructive alternative, positive program, and it is just as necessary that it be convincing and comprehensible to the masses.

In the absence of a comprehensible, convincing radical-innovative program for the constructive and substantial improvement of the social status of the masses, they begin to suffer from conservative nostalgia for an earlier "golden age," connected with the idealization of past U.S. history, with the idealization of the more enterprising and energetic form of capitalism that was "freer" of bureaucratic government regulations. When people cannot feel secure about the future, they hang on to the past. In the eyes of the average American, Ronald Reagan's simple program for the revival of traditional capitalist levers of economic growth in place of the discredited liberal, Keynesian policy of government regulation had a singular appeal: He proposed the reduction of the social expenditures that were responsible for the inflationary federal budget deficit and a tax cut and promised the curtailment of government regulation in the private sector.

But various strata of the working class gradually grew disillusioned with Reaganomics. The mass unemployment, unprecedented since the 1930's, and the declining standard of living of much of the population proved to many Americans that the hopes connected with the "millionaire actor" were illusory. After

polling workers, the mass media concluded that one of their most typical remarks was: "Just imagine, I voted for Reagan."¹³

In 1981 public opinion polls began to indicate that an increasing number of Americans, especially members of ethnic minorities and white workers, saw the President as a Robin Hood in reverse: He was stealing from the poor and "middle America" and giving to the rich people who constituted his social base. For a high percentage of American workers, Ronald Reagan's most serious fault was his denial of the spirit of "American egalitarianism" through the augmentation of class differences in society. According to the data of the ABC Radio Corporation, 64 percent of the Americans wanted to believe that the President would be concerned "about everyone" in the beginning of 1981. By the middle of 1983 only 32 percent of the respondents, most of them belonging to privileged social groups, believed that he was acting in the interests of "all."¹⁴

The realization of the lopsided class nature of Reaganomics grew so strong in the United States that all public opinion polls conducted just 3 years after the right wing of the ruling class had taken power indicated that over 80 percent of the Americans believed that Washington policy benefited only people with the highest incomes, and over 70 percent felt that it was being conducted only in the interests of big business, and not the "average individual." The polarized class evaluations of the Republican administration's performance gradually divided the voting public. Polls recorded the political polarization of the voting public in terms of class affiliation to a degree unprecedented, in the opinion of experts, since the days of Roosevelt's New Deal. The removal of the right wing from positions of authority is advocated by the majority of unemployed, members of ethnic minorities, many white workers, primarily those belonging to unions, women workers and employees, retired people and young Americans. Unconditional support for the Right is characteristic of bourgeois stockholders and the executive elite, as well as the most privileged segment of the middle strata, primarily technocrats and bureaucrats.

Conservative ideologist K. Phillips criticized Ronald Reagan for enriching business and the "upper class" with his policies and destroying the "new conservative majority" by alienating the blue-collar masses and stated: "Few politicians have shown as little awareness of why and by whom they were elected as Reagan has."¹⁵

Reagan believed that American workers were so eager to stop the recession that they would be willing to "temporarily lower" their consumption standards in order to stimulate capital investments. But the President apparently forgot what the Roman patricians realized so well, according to Titus Livius, in times of crisis for the republic: If you want the masses to be willing to make sacrifices for the "common good," you must set an example by placing at least part of your own wealth on the altar of this "good." Otherwise you will offend the people's sense of social justice if it is something they have already acquired. "Ask them," the workers were already saying during the second year of Reagan's term in office when they heard about the need for "sacrifices," "how many sacrifices the rich have made. Have corporations sacrificed much?"¹⁶ When the WALL STREET JOURNAL declares: "As for the rich, life has apparently never been better for them in American than it is now,"¹⁷ there is no question that we can believe the newspaper.

After the American rich had put "their people" in power, they apparently decided, judging by their consumption patterns, that they could completely disregard T. Veblen's advice to avoid advertising their wealth so that "lower-class envy" would not lead to social upheavals. In the American society of the 1980's, just as in the good old days of the "robber-barons," the primitive ideology that the prosperity of "all" depends on the enrichment of a few is being cultivated. The rich, believing in their grand destiny, are obviously misusing "conspicuous consumption." They are aggressively displaying their love of luxury. And they are following the example of the President, who cannot resist the temptation of acquiring symbols of luxury and showing them off at the dinner parties held in his honor by the rich. And this is all happening at a time when the customary American goods, elementary symbols of relative prosperity, are almost inaccessible to the "middle class."

Is it any wonder that "middle America" tends to believe that Reaganomics was engendered by the greed of the rich and is fueling this greed? The realization of the unfair distribution of national income among social groups is having the greatest effect on the political outlook of the working class in the 1980's. Although workers have a negative opinion of expenditures on various forms of welfare benefits, which are not, according to their current views, in the direct interest of "middle America," since the time of the rise of the working class political struggle during the period of Roosevelt New Deal they have been convinced that the government is obligated to reduce social inequality, and not to serve only the rich and big business.

Openly allying itself with big business and the highest-income strata, the government has embarked on the extremely dangerous road exposing its class essence. From the standpoint of the traditional strategic interests of the dominant class, the most important thing is to keep the class political consciousness of the working class from developing. It is understandable that liberals from the Democratic Party, convinced that the government should strive to maintain a sense of "social harmony" between classes, are accusing the Republican administration of "making the American dream inaccessible to the majority of Americans" and "creating a society of only two economic classes."¹⁸

On the threshold of the 1984 election the relatively common opinion that Republican administration policy is polarizing society is a matter of increasing concern to the President and his closest advisers. They hope that economic growth will help create the impression of the alleviation of social inequality and will "kindle" faith in the "American dream." According to Harris polls, however, low- and middle-income Americans "feel that economic recovery will benefit only the extremely wealthy minority"¹⁹ because the current upswing differs from previous ones in the growth rate of profits and dividends and the negligible increase in wages.

Of course, the economic upswing has revived the "traditional American optimism" of relatively privileged and mobile segments of the working class, particularly the highly skilled workers and technicians engaged in the incorporation and maintenance of new equipment. Rightist forces in American politics expect the workers who regard themselves as "haves" to vote for them in 1984, particularly those who live in small towns and suburbs of large cities in the southern and

southwestern states and who suffered least of all from the last crisis. They also hope to retain the support of members of the conservative unions of the labor aristocracy, who have traditionally supported Republican candidates. Judging by polls, however, the majority of workers feel that they cannot count on any kind of steady improvement of their socioeconomic status, because the President's publicized "restoration of American economic strength" is only "a brief and temporary upswing."²⁰ This majority knows that the present upswing has no foundation, such as the substantial real expansion of the demand for traditional mass consumer goods on the part of the main consumer--"middle America"; on the other hand, the Sword of Damocles, in the form of the colossal federal budget deficit, is hanging over their heads.

American workers in the northeastern and midwestern states cannot forgive the Republican administration for the trauma caused by the mass unemployment of the early 1980's. According to TIME magazine, in contrast to the 1930's, when "many people blamed themselves for losing their jobs (under the influence of the individualist mentality of "equal opportunities"--Ya. K.), now many people feel that the government has artificially increased unemployment to lower the rate of inflation."²¹ In this context, Reaganomics is elevating the socio-political consciousness of the average American worker.

Above all, it is changing ideas about class polarization. In the 1960's and 1970's the white workers who considered themselves to be socially mobile were extremely anxious to maintain and increase the social, status-related distance between them and the "underclass" of people who were living on welfare and who, according to the prevailing opinion of that time, were to blame for their lack of jobs.

In the 1980's the actual reduction of the social distance between the workers of "middle America" and the growing "indigent underclass" was associated less with the false and primitive notion that the "unearned" income of the "idle poor" was being augmented through the goodness of government's heart: After all, the conservative-led government under the Reagan Administration had made sharp cuts in aid to the poor. Illusions about the reduction of the distance between the incomes and consumption standards of workers considering themselves to be members of the middle class and the people with the highest incomes simultaneously began to be dispelled. Under these conditions, workers with low and middle incomes are more likely to contrast themselves to the "wealthy class" and think in terms of "us" and "them." The psychological unification of workers with varying income levels in a single class--and, what is more, a "class for itself" to some degree--reflected the onset of a period of increasingly acute class conflicts in the United States.

At the beginning of the 1970's some American experts on these matters were already warning that the augmentation of the social distance between upper and lower social strata due to the reduction of the "middle" class would inevitably put an end to differences between the "lower" classes and would cause them to set themselves up in opposition to the elite. For example, in a hypothetical analysis of the "curtailment of gradual social changes in the United States" and the "creation of the kind of revolutionary situation described by Marx," sociologist P. Blau wrote: "The great social distance between the elite and

the middle class reduces the social distance between lower strata...because the status-related differences between them pale in comparison to the differences between them and the elite." As a result, Blau concluded, "the lower strata acquire a common interest...and, by the same token, a common basis for the establishment of social associations."²²

In the 1980's there were frequent reports of "active political campaigning from the bottom up," which was being conducted in states by organizations calling themselves progressive. These organizations primarily want to unite low- and middle-income white, black and Hispanic Americans in a "new major liberal force in American politics." The main reason for the appearance and activity of these organizations is "the belief that American political democracy is being threatened by the excessive concentration of economic power in the hands of gigantic corporations,"²³ which are responsible for the government's present redistribution policy.

The possible influence of the Day of Solidarity, organized in Washington in September 1981, on the balance of political power in the 1980's was assessed by A. Raskin, famous expert on the labor movement, who quite justifiably stated that all of the participants in the protest march against Reaganomics were united by the common opinion that "hired labor and the disadvantaged are being robbed for the enrichment of those who already have too much wealth."²⁴ It is hardly likely that any of the American non-Marxist ideologists who strive for any degree of objectivity would dare to say in the 1980's that the current division of society into leftist and rightist forces in politics does not reflect opposing class interests. There is sufficient evidence of this in statements by the rightist leaders of the AFL-CIO, the traditional opponents of class political polarization and defenders of the practice of "social harmony" between classes: Now they never tire of saying that big business and the government have launched a "class war" against the working class and under-privileged social groups. This also indicates that the United States is experiencing the beginning of a transformation of class relations.

In the 1970's ideologists with differing political outlooks were all talking about the "decline" of the labor movement, stating that the main causes of this decline were "incurable economism," the loss of the ideals of the 1930's and the transformation of unionized workers into a mere "special interest group" concerned only with the satisfaction of the egotistical demands of union members. The farsighted conservative ideologist S. Huntington predicted, on the basis of the past experience of the working class, that as soon as the unions realized what growing political weakness threatens them with, their leaders would cease to regard the American workers' low level of class awareness as a special "virtue" and would have to elevate their political trade-unionist consciousness.²⁵

This prediction is coming true in the 1980's. Many union leaders are already calling the Reagan Administration a factor in the development of the trade-unionist consciousness and are saying that the unions have no function more important than the elevation of the political consciousness of rank-and-file members by informing them that the government has become the main arena of "class conflict" now that the "wealthy class" is making more extensive use of

the government to erode the social and financial status of virtually all segments of the working class without exception. These leaders are now indignantly saying that "the organized labor movement will not tolerate its categorization as a special interest group in politics"²⁶ because it intends to act as a social movement representing the interests of 25 million organized workers and 60 million unorganized ones.

The increasing social importance and influence of unions of white-collar workers, especially government employees, whose financial and social status depends completely on relations with the government--the toughest and most merciless employer--is one of the factors making the labor movement increasingly political. The rapid rise of the percentage of members of ethnic minorities, women and young Americans in the working class is one of the factors radicalizing the labor movement and strengthening its tendency to become a class political movement. The unionized members of these groups have a higher level of class awareness than middle-income white workers. The social experience of groups which have suffered from discrimination has guarded them to some degree against the influence of the traditional ideology of "equal opportunities." Ethnic minorities, especially black workers who learned from their participation in the movement for the civil and social equality of black Americans, are more resolute and uncompromising in their rejection of Reaganomics and are more interested in stronger government intervention in the economy for the guarantee of full employment and the reduction of social inequality.

As the consciousness of rank-and-file members of the labor movement is gradually radicalized and as more and more new leaders who support the ideology of class struggle come to the fore, signs of interest in socialist ideals of guaranteed full employment, as well as the transformation of private property into public property by means of nationalization, also make their appearance. As early as the end of the 1970's, BUSINESS WEEK directed the attention of its readers to these signs of heightened class awareness, but it also hastened to reassure the business community that "there is no broad movement for socialism in the labor unions."²⁷ In the 1980's the interest in socialist ideals increased to such an extent that even some ideologists of official trade-unionism began to express essentially socialist views, although usually in an indirect form, stating, for example, that they "reject the view that there can be no industry without the profit motive."²⁸ In G. Meany's time, this opinion was viewed as unforgivable socialist sedition.

The right wing's "class war" against the unions for the sake of the "revival of the free market"--that is, the freedom to exploit--and its efforts to eliminate the labor movement's influence on government economic and social policy are helping greatly to intensify the historical process by which the center of gravity in the class struggle is transferred from the economic sphere to the political one. The unions' realization that big capital's political domination of the Democratic Party is so strong that it has ceased to be the party it was during the days of Roosevelt's New Deal has led to a situation in which the AFL-CIO is striving to increase its political influence by taking a step, unprecedented in its history, in the direction of greater political independence for the labor movement: It decided to nominate and support its own

candidate for the presidency before the Democratic Party convention had made its choice.

As far as the comprehension of the complex and contradictory nature of the political development of the American working class is concerned, it would certainly be wrong to overestimate its degree of class awareness at the present time. The U.S. ruling class has the ability and machinery to slow down the development of the workers' class consciousness. Although the faith in the "exceptional nature" of American capitalism has been undermined, it is far from obsolete, just as the "economism" of union members and their disuniting "status" and racist mentality still exist. In the multiracial and multi-ethnic American working class, programs of "affirmative action," envisaging certain hiring privileges for women and members of ethnic minorities, became an acute problem in intraclass relations under the conditions of fierce competition for jobs.

"Many white workers still believe," Chairman H. Winston of the Communist Party said when he analyzed the significance of these programs in the creation of a "strong and united working class," "that affirmative action takes jobs away from them and gives them to Afro-Americans. These ideas are spread by corporations trying to drive a wedge between black and white workers."²⁹ The Republican administration is taking advantage of these views in the hope of keeping part of the white workers in the hypothetical "conservative majority."

The laboring masses have not completely lost the hope, fueled by rightwing propaganda, that Reagan's program could raise the standard of living over the long range. There is no question that the retention of this hope is promoted by the absence of any kind of effective Democratic Party alternative to Reaganomics for the resolution of socioeconomic problems.

New leaders have not taken charge of the labor movement as yet, and the old union bureaucracy would not object to directing it toward "neocorporate" development for the sake of "social harmony" by negotiating (if the liberal-reformist wing of the ruling class should take power) an opportunistic "social contract" with the government and the corporations. And this would be done in the name of the "fair" distribution of the sacrifices needed for the "reindustrialization of America," and the "fair" distribution of benefits. The rightwing union bureaucracy consented to be the junior partner in the "trilateral accord" in the hope of gaining even the slightest influence in economic policymaking.

But there is no question that the political position of the labor movement will suffer the gravest injury from the anticommunist and anti-Soviet ideology of the top AFL-CIO leadership, which validates its support of the militarization of the economy. It is impossible to be in close partnership with the militarist government and simultaneously attempt the effective protection of the labor movement against injury by the government. The AFL-CIO support for the Reagan Administration's line of military superiority is helping the right wing in American politics, which is relying most heavily (following the example of the English Conservatives) in the 1984 campaign on the fueling of anticommunist hysteria, trite patriotism and nationalistic chauvinism.

The actions of the Republican administration, which bases its foreign policy on the idea of a "crusade" against communism, testify that belligerence in international relations is its method of correcting acute class conflicts and the political polarization of society. The creation of a consensus among social groups by means of the escalation of the fear of the "foreign threat" is one of the main elements of Reagan Administration political strategy. This has also been acknowledged by his political opponents from the Democratic Party, who assert that the Republican administration is trying to frighten its own people.

The obviously repellent nature of the very idea of a possible confrontation with the USSR under the conditions of the mounting danger of thermonuclear war is interfering with the attainment of rightist goals in American politics. The working class, with its common sense, advocates the curtailment of the nuclear arms race and the conclusion of agreements that will improve Soviet-American relations. Questions of war and peace are becoming the key political issues for the progressive segment of the working class.

Judging by public opinion polls, the appeals for sacrifices on the Pentagon's altar no longer have the desired impact; the masses are growing increasingly aware of the direct connection between reduced social spending, a larger budget deficit, a lower standard of living and higher expenditures on the needs of the military-industrial complex. The connection between reactionary domestic policy and aggressive foreign policy is becoming increasingly apparent.

When the founders of Marxism-Leninism analyzed the complexity and contradictory nature of the development of political awareness, they constantly pointed out the fact that the working class of each country is bound to its past and depends on this past. But the dynamics of class struggle have the deciding effect on the development of the class over the long range. The 1980's changed the political conditions of the development of social relations in the United States and engendered the most acute set of class conflicts since the 1930's. This intensified the process Western sociologists call the "Europeanization of the American class structure." This term signifies the increasing polarization of the two main classes on the grounds of the recognition of their conflicting interests, a polarization promoting a higher level of class struggle. The rulers of the country can still take advantage of the limitations and contradictions of the mass consciousness, but they no longer have the kind of ideological hegemony they had in the past, when they were able to convince the masses that the United States is moving in the direction of a "classless society."

FOOTNOTES

1. PUBLIC OPINION, October-November 1980, p 13.
2. NATION, 1-8 January 1983, p 12.
3. FORTUNE, 28 November 1983, p 77. The range of incomes used by FORTUNE magazine as a criterion for membership in the "middle class" is arbitrary

and ideologically biased. It does not reflect the actual distributive processes among the main classes. The actual family incomes of the majority of laborers, office workers and trade employees are concentrated at the bottom of the income range used by the magazine.

4. For a discussion of the development of the American "official utopia," see E. Ya. Batalov, "Sotsial'naya utopiya i utopicheskoye soznaniye v SShA" [Social Utopia and Utopian Thinking in the United States], Moscow, 1982.
5. R. Coleman and L. Rainwater, "Social Standing in America," N.Y., 1978, pp 294-296.
6. Ibid., p 121.
7. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 4, p 310.
8. For a discussion of these excessive expectations, see Yu. A. Zamoshkin, "Lichnost' v sovremennoy Amerike" [The Individual in Present-Day America], Moscow, 1980, p 207.
9. J. Wilson, "After Affluence," N.Y., 1980, p 65.
10. WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY, November-December 1981, p 41.
11. POLITICAL AFFAIRS, October 1980, p 29.
12. DISSENT, Winter 1982, p 109.
13. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 March 1982.
14. ABC NEWS-WASHINGTON POST POLL, 15-19 June 1983.
15. THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 13 May 1982, p 29.
16. DAILY WORLD, 17 June 1982, p 6.
17. WALL STREET JOURNAL, 28 April 1983.
18. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8 February 1982, p 76.
19. THE HARRIS SURVEY, 1 December 1983.
20. WALL STREET JOURNAL, 19 December 1983.
21. TIME, 17 May 1982, p 47.
22. "Approaches to the Study of Social Structure," N.Y., 1975, p 237.
23. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 14 March 1983.

24. ACROSS THE BOARD, December 1981, p 30.
25. COMPARATIVE POLITICS, January 1974, p 180.
26. AFL-CIO NEWS, 11 June 1983, p 6.
27. BUSINESS WEEK, 24 September 1979, p 130.
28. AFL-CIO NEWS, 17 April 1982, p 5.
29. DAILY WORLD, 27 October 1983, p 8M.

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CATHOLIC CHURCH OPPOSING REAGAN FOREIGN POLICIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 40-50

[Article by S. B. Filatov: "The Catholic Church and U.S. Foreign Policy"]

[Text] In the very first months of its existence the Reagan Administration encountered strong opposition to its foreign policy from the Catholic Church. Washington is quite concerned about the influence this church has on national public opinion and on voter behavior. Ronald Reagan has met several times with representatives of the church bishops and has addressed various Catholic organizations to attenuate church criticism and to gain a "better understanding" of his position. Some prominent members of the administration have openly criticized the "irresponsibility" of the Catholic bishops, but all attempts to win their "loyalty" have been futile thus far.

What is the current foreign policy position of the Catholic Church in the United States?

Since the beginning of the 1970's this church has been on the extreme "left," liberal flank of American society in matters of foreign policy.

Above all, this applies to the church's views on the arms race and the use of military force for foreign policy purposes.

As soon as reports on the development of the neutron bomb appeared in the press, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) officially opposed these plans. The church supported SALT-I and actively promoted its adoption, and it vehemently protested Carter's draft registration plan. It has consistently advocated cuts in government military spending in recent years. When John Paul II visited the United States in 1979, he made an appeal for detente and the conclusion of SALT-II; Cardinal John Krol,¹ the church spokesman on matters of disarmament since the 1970's, personally telephoned senators to urge them to vote for the treaty. In the 1980 election the bishops urged churchgoers to vote for candidates whose platforms corresponded to the church position; the second item on the church list of priorities was the struggle to curb the arms race.

When Ronald Reagan was elected the struggle for detente and the cessation of the arms race became the main element of church political activity. The

struggle for disarmament was joined by top members of the hierarchy--Cardinals J. Krol, H. Medeiros, T. Manning and J. Bernardin and NCCB President J. Roach, acting head of the episcopate.

A draft of the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," published by the NCCB at the end of 1982, had the most widespread public repercussions. The text of this letter, which was supposed to serve as a moral guide for Catholics in their views on war and peace, was fully approved, with only a few changes, in May 1983.

The document contains appeals for sharp cuts in military spending and a nuclear freeze and condemns the "offensive nature" of U.S. military strategy. The bishops advocate the intensification of talks with the USSR on all levels for the purpose of the relaxation of tension, placing special emphasis on the need for summit-level talks. The fundamental significance of this document consists in the denial of the traditional Catholic belief in "just" wars and the acknowledgement that any war is "amoral" in the nuclear age. Incidentally, it describes nuclear intimidation as "morally acceptable," but only as a temporary measure, during the stage of negotiations leading to disarmament.

As soon as the letter had been approved, the NCCB launched an unprecedented campaign to bring the document to the attention of Catholics. More than 1.5 million copies of the text were distributed in 1983. Catholic parishes, higher academic institutions, schools and social organizations organized special programs for the study of the document. Many Protestant churches supported the letter and also began to publicize it among their parishioners.

The bishops, just as theologians "specializing in war and peace," are indeed approaching these matters from a "moral" philosophical standpoint. The military experts who criticize the bishops often point out the contradictions and incompetence of church officials in this field. But the position of the latter is not a strategic doctrine of their own, but merely a moralistic attempt to change American views on the arms race, an attempt to create a more peaceful atmosphere; furthermore, the bishops' specific proposals with regard to disarmament are only of secondary or auxiliary importance to them. The moral and intellectual "intolerability" of the prospect of nuclear war for Catholics (and this is the basis of their pacifism) was clearly expressed by Bishop T. Hambleton, who told the critics of Catholic pacifism who accused Catholics of "irresponsibility": "Christ taught us how to die, not how to kill."²

When the bishops were discussing the text of the letter, characteristic differences of opinion regarding the church struggle for peace came to light. Most of the criticism concerned the need to strengthen the antiwar thrust of the text. Unilateral disarmament was advocated by the radical pacifist faction, which has grown in recent years and has rallied round the Pax Christi organization (57 bishops belonged to it in 1983). Catholic antiwar radicals represent an influential faction in the church and in the mass peace movement, and their initiatives have widespread public repercussions. For example, Bishop R. Hunthausen of Seattle advised the refusal to pay taxes used for military purposes; Bishop L. Matthiesen of Amarillo (where nuclear warheads are produced) and Bishop E. Herrmann of Columbus (where B-1 bombers are built)

recommended that Catholics refuse to work in military installations and called them "amoral." The last two established financial funds in their diocese to assist people who quit jobs in the military industry. Catholic antiwar radicals organize demonstrations and rallies, attended by thousands, and promote campaigns of "non-violent action."

The church position has been condemned in principle, however, by 12 (of 280) bishops, headed by Archbishop P. Hannan (New Orleans) and O. Lipscomb (Mobile), who believe that Reagan is conducting the right policy and that the church has no business interfering in it. Lipscomb declared, in particular, that "the existence of the planet and the human race is not the absolute value," essentially rephrasing the remark by former Secretary of State A. Haig (who is, incidentally, considered to be a devout Catholic) that "some things are more important than peace." Finally, many top members of the hierarchy, including Cardinal J. Krol and the late T. Cooke, who died in October 1983, suggested that the critical tone of the letter and the condemnation of the Reagan Administration be retained but also proposed that the text contain "harsh and uncompromising condemnation of communism."³

What lies behind all of these reservations and objections is the need to decide whether the prevention of a nuclear cataclysm is the highest value, in comparison to which any other ideological or political value loses all meaning. For the church this is a particularly agonizing question: The preaching of the Gospels and adherence to Christian ideals (among which peace was far from the main one) have always come first in this church, but now peace has become its highest value.

The pastoral letter and the debates over it have aroused considerable interest in political circles and the media and have made the general public aware of the Catholic Church's antiwar position. The pastoral letter itself, however, is only one of many signs of the church's new antiwar position. Although the authority of this letter is now being questioned by the Vatican,⁴ what is important is the almost unanimous opposition of the American Catholic Church to militarism and its resolute support for disarmament and the struggle to relax international tension. The peaceful position of the Catholic Church has become a permanent factor in American politics. Top members of the hierarchy have recently stated that the political impact of their decisions will be revealed within the coming decade, as Catholics assimilate the new political values.

This position has been widely supported by parishioners. In spring 1981, for example, only 44 percent of the Catholics supported Reagan's policy toward the USSR while the figure for Protestants was 76 percent; in fall 1982 it was supported by only 37 percent of the Catholics and 39 percent of the Protestants. The 1982 election results provide more proof of the significance of the Catholic opposition to Reagan's policy line in the sphere of the arms race. In the majority of states where referendums demonstrated public support for a U.S.-USSR nuclear freeze, the percentage of Catholics among voters was higher than the national average, and 150 Catholic bishops actively promoted the freeze.

The church's new position has also had a direct effect on the armed forces, where Catholics have traditionally represented a high percentage of personnel. Cardinal T. Cooke, the church's chaplain-general in the U.S. Armed Forces, announced a program for the cultivation of pacifist feelings in Catholic servicemen. Some top-level Catholic officers have said that they are disturbed by the church position: Even before the final draft of the pastoral letter had been approved, they stated that if the draft should become an official document, they would be unable to ignore it and would therefore be prone to "difficulties of a moral nature."

The administration and the opponents of detente in general are seriously disturbed by the position of this church. Conservatives have launched a loud campaign against the pacifist position of the bishops. Particularly vigorous steps have been taken by Catholic members of the administration--Director W. Casey of the CIA, National Security Adviser W. Clark and his predecessor in the NSC R. Allen, Director F. Shakespeare of Radio Free Europe, Secretary of the Navy J. Lehman and others. A group of Catholic conservatives formed an American Catholic Committee (ACC), which is trying to oppose the church leadership on the political level and is arguing that the bishops are "wrong" from a purely religious standpoint, falling just short of calling them heretics.⁵

The founder of the ACC, conservative journalist and public spokesman M. Novak, constantly accuses the bishops of anti-Americanism, of a departure from "true Christian doctrine" and even of "stupidity" in his many articles, books and speeches.⁶ To date, however, the attempts of the right wing to change the position of the church have not produced any significant results.

It is true that the pacifist line of the Catholic Church has not won the general, almost unconditional support of its U.S. parishioners as its previous political campaigns did. The bishops have been openly attacked, but only by government officials who do not depend on voter support, and not by congressmen or senators. As for the average Catholic, internal divisions in the Catholic community and in the church are becoming apparent.

The Catholic community is now severely divided in the social respect, and this affects the political outlook of Catholics. In terms of income and education, Catholics have now reached the North American average. They are widely represented on all rungs of the social ladder. Internal divisions are also strengthened by the ethnic variety of the Catholic community, whose members come from almost all of the European countries and many Latin American countries. Liberalism in matters of foreign policy is more widespread among the more highly educated strata. Leftist, anti-imperialist feelings and sympathy for liberation movements in the developing countries are characteristic of several mass Catholic organizations uniting Latin American workers and farm laborers. The main ones are the Catholic Worker, a pacifist movement, and the United Farm Workers of America. On the other hand, the Catholic servicemen who represent around half of the personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces have expressed dissatisfaction with the church's foreign policy position.

It is therefore understandable that large segments of the Catholic voting public ignore the appeals of the church, and this weakens the impact of its

campaign for peace. Furthermore, the church itself now regards its pastoral instructions more as "food for thought" than as a strict order.

It is also significant that the Catholic Church in the United States is still a consistent opponent of Marxism and the socialist order. One of the fundamental documents approved by the bishops in 1980 says that "the church condemns Marxism, but it advises cooperation with Marxist regimes in the struggle for peace." On the practical level, the policy toward the socialist community presupposes maximum pressure on the domestic policy of these countries for the purpose of gaining more influence for the church there. Attitudes toward specific socialist states differ, and they also differ from Washington's official position, depending largely on the status of the Catholic Church in these countries (and also, to a lesser degree, on that of other Christian churches). For this reason, the American Catholic bishops are less unfriendly than the administration to the governments of Cuba, Yugoslavia, the GDR and Hungary, and are much more intolerant of the CSSR, Romania (where activity by the Romanian Uniate Church has been banned) and the PRC (the bishops still favor the restoration of diplomatic relations with Taiwan). The political pressure the church exerts on the public and the administration in matters pertaining to relations with the USSR (and--with a few reservations--with other socialist countries) now depends primarily on its struggle for disarmament. But we should recall that the Catholic bishops supported the "human rights" campaign during the first years of the Carter Administration, placing special emphasis on the position of the Catholic Church and "religious dissidents" in the socialist countries.

The church's position on the "Polish question" clearly illustrates the distinctive features of its attitude toward socialist countries. The church launched a campaign to collect contributions for the Catholic Church in Poland, primarily for "charitable purposes," but it did not support the more extremist actions of the Reagan Administration and Polish immigrant circles. Statements made by American bishops (generally of Polish descent -- Cardinal Krol, Archbishops Szoka and Pilarczyk and Bishop Abramowicz) at various meetings and rallies were in sharp contrast to the appeals of representatives of the AFL-CIO, the administration and secular emigre organizations for sanctions, boycotts and the support of extremists. When Cardinal Krol returned from Poland in June 1983, where he had accompanied John Paul II on his second trip to his homeland, he met with Reagan and informed the President that the Polish Government "wants to work for the good of the people"; he made disparaging remarks about "some extremist elements in the 'Solidarity' underground." Although the bishops did not officially oppose Washington's actions, they did not participate in the creation of the hysterical atmosphere over the "Polish question."⁸

The American Catholic bishops have taken a different stand on internal conflicts in Latin America. Through its charitable and missionary organizations and through lobbies in Congress and the White House, the church is striving to support the peaceful bourgeois-democratic evolution of this part of the world and is quite resolutely opposed to dictatorships and to their support by Washington.

Although the American Catholic Church has always had a special interest in the Latin American countries, it became much more active in this region in the

1970's, and the reformist thrust of its activity is a fundamentally new development. The reasons for this reorientation can be found in the general transformation of its social doctrine, in the more important role played in Spanish-speaking immigrants in church affairs, in the particular interest of Catholic liberals in this region (it could be said that the hierarchy has "turned over" Latin America to them) and in the changing political views of churches in Latin America.

International intra-church relations and the obligations of the American Catholic Church have made it the advocate of the interests of Latin American Catholic churches in many cases, and these now support bourgeois-democratic development (naturally, if the churches there are granted maximum authority and opportunity). In the middle of the 1970's the American Catholic Church actively lobbied its government to exert pressure on military juntas in the hope of bringing about democratic changes in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and other countries in South America, as well as in the Philippines and South Korea,⁹ where the American hierarchy has close relations with the Catholic churches.

At the height of the rebel movement in Nicaragua, the American Catholic Church was quite active in the efforts to cut off aid to Dictator Somoza. The activities of the American Catholic Church were constantly coordinated with the head of the Nicaraguan church, Obando y Bravo; in essence, the administration had to deal with the united position of the American and Nicaraguan Catholic churches. From the time of Somoza's defeat to the middle of 1982 the American Catholic Church constantly advocated the normalization of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.

The murder of four American nuns in 1980 by rightwing terrorists in El Salvador and then of Archbishop O. Romero of San Salvador aroused an unprecedented outburst of indignation in the American church. It energetically organized a campaign against military aid to the Salvadoran and Guatemalan juntas. When A. Haig tried to convince the bishops that the nuns were "leftist radicals" and asked the church to take a "more sober" look at things, the bishops angrily denied the charge. Emotions again became high-pitched when some more American missionaries were killed by rightwing terrorists in Guatemala in 1981 and 1982. The American Catholic press and the top members of the church hierarchy were lavish with scathing remarks about the Central American dictators and the State Department. O. Romero and the American missionaries killed by rightwing terrorists are already being called saints. The present head of the Salvadoran church, Archbishop A. Rivera y Damas, an energetic supporter of the bourgeois-democratic evolution of Salvadoran society, is one of the most popular figures in U.S. church circles.

Guatemala is the main target of American Catholic Church criticism. Church documents stress the fact that more than 100 Catholic priests (American and local) had to leave the country when their lives were threatened, that the Jesuit order is illegal in Guatemala,¹⁰ and that the number of murders of Catholic priests and lay persons is constantly rising.¹¹

The Reagan Administration was obviously disturbed by church activity in this area. The State Department sent frequent explanations of its actions to the bishops and organized meetings for them with the successive leaders of the Salvadoran regime. The success of administration pressure was limited: Only a small group of conservative bishops, headed by Archbishop of New Orleans P. Hannan, supported Washington's line.

Despite all of the church leaders' sharp words, they, in contrast to some more positive-minded missionaries, stay within clearly defined limits and support only the bourgeois-democratic development of the South American countries. For example, as the revolutionary process in Nicaragua developed, the American church refused to support the Sandinist leadership after a conflict arose in 1982 between the revolutionary government in this country and the Catholic hierarchy, and it then began to promote anti-Sandinist opposition.¹² As for the Vatican, its position was clearly expressed by John Paul II during his tour of this region in March 1983. The pope was lavish with his praise of the bourgeois-democratic regime in Costa Rica but he deliberately engaged in heated polemics against the tyrannical regimes in Guatemala and Haiti (in El Salvador the authorities were able to see that his visit went relatively smoothly) and the revolutionary government in Nicaragua. The pope's trip to Central America had widespread repercussions in the United States and intensified the participation of the American Catholic Church in Latin American affairs.

It must be said that the American Catholic Church's energetic involvement in internal Latin American conflicts is part of the general liberal-reformist attitude toward the problems of developing countries. The American Catholic bishops constantly urge the U.S. Government to take a more constructive position in the North-South dialogue on the establishment of a new economic order and to exert pressure on South Africa for the purpose of granting independence to Namibia and eradicating apartheid. Within the framework of this general position on the developing countries, the Catholic bishops advocate measures that are currently unpopular in the United States, such as the unrestricted admittance of refugees from developing countries to the United States and the legalization of illegal aliens.

The present position of the American Catholic Church on international relations is a fundamentally new development representing the final result of the lengthy and agonizing evolution of Catholic social doctrine, an evolution constituting a reaction to cardinal changes in the conditions under which the church exists. For this reason, when we examine the nature of the American Catholic Church's foreign policy activity in our day, we should take a closer look at the reasons for radical changes in the political views of Catholicism, which was closely allied with reactionary forces just three decades ago.

The Vatican and European Catholicism invariably took the side of extreme reactionary political forces from the middle of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th. This position was grounded in church doctrine and in the actual balance of political and ideological power in Europe. As far as dogma was concerned, Catholicism, just as any other strictly dogmatic ideology, had great difficulty acquiring tolerance for dissenting views. During this period church intolerance on the ideological level took the form of widespread

(but unofficial) "Catholic romanticism"--the idealization of absolute monarchy, which was supposed to be a sacred institution. This kind of "truly Christian" absolutist state was committed by its authority to support the dominance of the Catholic Church and its spiritual monopoly. The social duty of the church in a "Christian monarchy" was the ideological sanctification of the status quo, and its duty in a society where the monarchy had been overthrown was struggle for its restoration. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, Catholicism was still dividing people into "good Catholics" who could expect to go to Heaven and those who could not be saved. Although these beliefs were not reinforced by dogma or doctrine, this was the actual ideological outlook of the Vatican and the European church.

In the sphere of actual policy, the rabid anticlericalism that arose in the majority of Catholic countries of Europe as a reaction to the spiritual monopoly of the church in the Middle Ages also complicated its ideological and political evolution toward the acceptance of bourgeois-democratic values by pushing it into an alliance with political reaction: The refusal to do this could have meant the loss of political allies or serious restrictions in the event of a victory by anticlerical opponents. The equitable coexistence of the church with other ideological forces in society did not appear to be a real possibility. The church wanted only a dominant, privileged position, seeing this as a step toward the future destruction of its opponents.

International relations were regarded as one aspect of the general church struggle for its survival and for its dominance. The political alliance with the most reactionary, nationalist forces in the European countries and the ideology of the "crusade" made the pope's sporadic appeals for peace ambiguous even in the first half of the 20th century.

The position of the Catholic Church in the United States was quite different from its position in the European countries. After coming into being as the church of a negligible minority in a Protestant country, Catholicism in the United States did not have the kind of "glorious past" it was striving to revive in Europe, it did not have traditional feudal allies and it did not have irreconcilable anticlerical opponents. From the very beginning, bourgeois-democratic practices, including the separation of church and state and religious pluralism, which were so alien to the Vatican, were the norm for American Catholicism and later evolved into an ideal worthy of emulation. By the time of the historic statement of the synod of Catholic bishops in 1884, the U.S. Government's legal standards were described not only as the height of human wisdom, but also as the supreme sacred ideal: "The founding fathers built something beyond their comprehension because they were guided by the hand of Almighty God."¹³

During World War II Cardinal F. Spellman declared on behalf of the American Catholic bishops that "the American Armed Forces are a weapon in the holy struggle to establish a Christian civilization." As historian G. Flynn remarked, however, Catholic bishops who were carried away by "crusading euphoria" often "forgot" that the USSR was the United States' ally and spoke of the impending ruin of all "anti-Christian forces" in Europe, including the USSR.¹⁴ The realities of postwar Europe, particularly the establishment of a socialist order in countries where the majority of churchgoers were Catholic

(Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) and in Yugoslavia, put the American Catholic Church in a state of shock.¹⁵

The most well-known American theologian of those years, J. Murray, wrote that in the struggle against communism the United States should take the maximum risk of military conflict, display maximum "initiative" and concern itself with "hurling back" communism rather than with "security."¹⁶ He, just as the majority of Catholic bishops, criticized D. Eisenhower for "yielding too much" in Korea.

In the 20th century this sociopolitical position led Catholicism into a blind alley. By the end of the 1890's even the Vatican gradually grew aware of this fact. The pontificate of Leo XIII (1878-1903) began the agonizing reassessment of church social doctrine, and the church began to depart from "Catholic romanticism" and started a circuitous process of adaptation to bourgeois-democratic values. It must be said that this was not so much a "revision" of traditional Catholic social doctrine as a return to its ancient roots. The social doctrine of Catholicism, which was formulated by Thomas Aquinas and was then worked out in detail and logically developed by the later Scholastics F. Suarez, R. Bellarmino and others, presupposed the fairly strict division of spiritual and secular power, and the social ideal envisaged the weakness of the latter with the widespread development of social structures not dependent on government institutions and of political and cultural pluralism (to use a modern term) in the society. Suarez and Bellarmino wrote that political power was "delegated" by society and the people and that the ruler was responsible only to the society (in contrast to the church authorities, who were "appointed by God" and were responsible to Him). The Thomist tradition acknowledged the people's right to overthrow tyrants.¹⁷ But one "supreme principle"--the unconditional spiritual monopoly of the Catholic Church in the society--lay behind all of these seemingly "liberal" premises. Later events threatened precisely this principle, and it was in the struggle for its retention that the church resorted to an alliance with absolutist monarchs; all other aspects of social doctrine were relegated to a position of secondary importance, were "shelved," lost their political significance and were even denied (but only unofficially).

During the years preceding World War II and at the height of the war the Vatican allied itself primarily with authoritarian regimes of the clerical-fascist type, such as the regimes of Tiso in Slovakia, Pavelic in Croatia, Franco in Spain and others guaranteeing the ideological dominance of the church. Although the Vatican opposed Hitler's "Third Reich" with its antichurch policy, this opposition was largely silent, turned into a kind of cooperation in some cases and contrasted sharply with the unconditionally hostile and aggressive attitude toward the USSR.

Nevertheless, in 1942 apostolic delegate A. Cicognani toured the United States on special instructions from Pius XII to urge American Catholics to support F. D. Roosevelt's war effort.¹⁸ This was motivated by political considerations. The Vatican saw the United States as a defender of its interests against anti-clericalism, which was associated at that time primarily with socialism and the international communist movement.

At the Vatican II Council (October 1962-December 1965) and soon afterward, a resolute step was finally taken in the direction of religious tolerance, the recognition of bourgeois democracy and a break with the feudal heritage in social doctrine. An analysis of the multitude of "schema," "constitutions," and pastoral messages recording this change indicates several guidelines and key ideological reforms: 1) the recognition of the existence of elements of the "supreme truth," which could lead to salvation, in other Christian and non-Christian religions; 2) official recognition of the state-legal principle of freedom of religion; 3) recognition of the church's obligation to serve all mankind, and not only its own parishioners, and to serve not only by preaching the Gospels but also by fighting for "social justice" for all people; 4) recognition (although within strictly limited bounds) of the historical progress of mankind; 5) the condemnation of "unjust social structures" leading to the perpetuation of poverty, tyranny and inferiority; 6) the condemnation of war as a means of settling international disputes, of the arms race and of colonialism, and the recognition of the church's obligation to promote international cooperation.

An entire group of ideological reforms concerned beliefs about the church's role in the world, about social justice and about the rights of the lay person in the church and the individual in society (taken individually, these reforms did not seem to indicate a break with tradition and, furthermore, they were accompanied by a multitude of stipulations). Taken together, these reforms led to cardinal changes in Catholic social thinking, in the Vatican's political aims and, in the final analysis, in the social psychology of the devout Catholic. Human rights in the bourgeois-democratic sense of the term became a "Catholic value," the struggle for religious tolerance for non-Catholics became natural, submission to political authority became a sin instead of a virtue in some cases, and the church itself became a moral and spiritual opponent of the government instead of its constant spiritual servant.

Although these reforms legitimized most of the standards of American bourgeois-democratic society, they could not put the church in the position of a supporter of the U.S. Government and American militarism (the very need to consider the interests of Catholics from the most diverse countries, including developing states, precluded this). The social doctrine of the church, which has associated itself largely with the interests of the "Third World" countries, where the majority of Catholics now live, took on a natural anticolonial hue and began to support relatively broad programs of reform in the developing countries.

After American bourgeois-democratic standards had been accepted, the American Catholic Church associated itself closely with "American patriotism." For example, the American hierarchy spoke with pride of the disproportionately high number of Catholics in the U.S. Armed Forces. This was the reason for the American bishops' resolute objections to Vatican II's attempted adoption of documents containing unconditional condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons, acknowledging the right of Catholics not to serve in the army on religious and moral grounds and declaring the anticolonial purpose of church social doctrine.

In general, what happened was paradoxical: The gradual acceptance of bourgeois-democratic values in the United States was accompanied by the refusal to take Washington's side in all political matters.

The reforms of the 1960's intensified internal unrest and led to ideological polarization and acute conflicts within the church. A distinctive feature of the struggle within the church in the United States was the resistance (although it was passive in most cases) of reforms by the bishops and the general dissatisfaction of the religious public with the bishops' position. The meaning of "American patriotism" and the position of the church in matters of foreign policy constituted one of the main issues in this struggle. The messianic aggressiveness of the American bishops of that time in matters of foreign policy (these were the years of the war in Vietnam) contrasted sharply with the spirit of the decisions of Vatican II and the papal encyclicals of those years.

The dissatisfaction of Catholic liberals and leftist radicals with several aspects of church life and the indignation aroused in many previously apolitical ordinary believers by the bishops' inability to find a way out of this crisis were concentrated at that time in the strong Catholic peace movement, which was directed equally against church leaders and against the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The years of 1966-1971 became a unique period of heated disagreements between the bishops, with their amicable approval of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, and the majority of lay persons, and especially the priests and monks condemning the war. A passionate pacifist movement came into being within the Catholic community, and many of its heroes (the Jesuit brothers D. and P. Berrigan and others) pointedly criticized top members of the church hierarchy, such as F. Spellman and R. Cushing, for supporting the war and accused them of unchristian behavior in general.¹⁹

The chaos and confusion in the church in the 1960's and early 1970's sharply reduced its ability to influence the policy (including foreign policy) of the U.S. Government because the prestige of the hierarchy fell to its lowest level ever and because there was no particular "Catholic position" at that time.

The gradual elimination of the confusion in the American Catholic Church began in the early 1970's. The position of the church began to be influenced by pressure from below, from monks, priests and parishioners. The most conservative cardinals died (F. Spellman in 1967 and R. Cushing in 1970) or retired, and they were succeeded by younger men who were more flexible and who had been trained during the period of reforms. All of this had a strong impact on the political views of the bishops. In 1971 they officially condemned the war against Vietnam. This was the turning-point. From that time on, the Catholic Church in the United States took a peaceful foreign policy position and asked the government to show restraint in foreign policy. The earlier emotional zeal with which the church had supported the American "hawks" can now be heard in appeals for disarmament and for a change in Washington's policy in the developing countries.

Catholics represent 25 percent of the U.S. population. In general, American Catholics have strong ties to the church: More than 50 percent attend church weekly. There are hundreds of Catholic periodicals (with a total circulation of around 27 million) and there are many Catholic social organizations and academic institutions.

The church also has considerable lobbying potential in the Congress. More than 23 percent of the congressmen in 1983 were Catholic. Surveys of legislators and church officials conducted by M. Hanna indicated that Catholic senators and congressmen have not only been lobbied more frequently by the bishops in recent years, but have also been more inclined to comply with their requests.²⁰

It is quite understandable that the Catholic Church's antimilitarist position is a matter of increasing concern to U.S. ruling circles.

FOOTNOTES

1. It is interesting that during the years of the war in Vietnam, when F. Spellman and other members of the older generation in the hierarchy were advocating the expansion of military operations, J. Krol maintained an ostentatious silence and did not express a single opinion--INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 11 June 1982.
2. HUMAN EVENTS, 16 October 1982, p 10.
3. AMERICA, 18 December 1982, pp 387-389.
4. In January 1983, the Vatican, disturbed by the widespread tendency of national Catholic conferences to approve "instructive documents" (such as the Pastoral Letter) undermining the unity of world Catholicism and the authority of the papacy, issued a statement through Cardinal J. Ratzinger, prefect of the sacred congregation for the doctrine of the faith, that Catholic doctrine did not give episcopal conferences a "mandatum docendi," or "right to teach." With this statement, the Vatican questioned the authority of the Pastoral Letter and Catholics officially acquired the right to ignore it. In the same statement, however, Ratzinger confirmed the "mandatum docendi" of bishops within their diocese and thereby provided the American bishops with moral reinforcement for their antiwar activity on the local level.
5. AMERICA, 18 September 1982, p 127.
6. Ibid., 3 July 1982, pp 5-10.
7. PILOT, 21 November 1980, p 1.
8. The position of the American Catholic Church was actually identical to the position of the Polish bishops. For more detail, see L. F. Shevtsova, "Sotsializm i katolitsizm" [Socialism and Catholicism], Moscow, 1982.
9. The NCCB repeatedly asked the American Government to stop giving military aid to the South Korean dictatorship, and dozens of American Catholic missionaries were deported from South Korea for antigovernment activity. In this country the Catholic Church is one of the few legal social institutions openly advocating democratic reforms.

10. The Jesuit journal AMERICA indignantly cited the following remark by a member of the Guatemalan junta: "The church in Guatemala is helping to destroy Christian civilization and replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat" (AMERICA, June 1981, pp 478-480).
11. PILOT, 12 November 1982, p 2.
12. Ibid., 3 September 1982, p 12.
13. Quoted in: J. Murray, "We Hold These Truths. Catholic Reflections on the American Propositions," N.Y., 1961, p 30.
14. G. Flynn, "Roosevelt and Romanism. Catholic and American Diplomacy. 1937-1945," Westport (Conn.), 1976, p 193.
15. Ibid., p 217.
16. J. Murray, Op. cit., p 239.
17. For a detailed analysis of the "liberal" trends in later Scholasticism, see H. Rommen, "The State in Catholic Thought. A Treatise in Political Philosophy," St. Louis-London, 1947.
18. G. Flynn, Op. cit., p 187; S. Madzhister, "Politika Vatikana i Italiya, 1943-1978" [Vatican Policy and Italy, 1943-1978], Moscow, 1982, pp 16-39.
19. N. A. Koval'skiy, "Katolitsizm i mirovoye sotsial'noye razvitiye" [Catholicism and World Social Development], Moscow, 1974, pp 73-79.
20. M. Hanna, "Catholic and American Politics," Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1979, pp 75-80.

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1984 REAGAN STATE OF UNION, BUDGET, ECONOMIC MESSAGES TO CONGRESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 63-69

[Article by Yu. I. Bobrakov: "The Presidential Messages of 1984"]

[Text] In accordance with a long-standing tradition in the United States, President R. Reagan sent three documents to the Congress in January and February 1984: messages on the state of the union and on the budget and an economic report.

For the first time in the last 3 years of the Republican administration, the President addressed his annual messages to the Congress under the conditions of a definite improvement in overall economic conditions in the country. In the state of the union message he expressed his satisfaction that "the situation in America has improved considerably" and that "America has recovered" from "the lengthy recession which weakened our nation's spirit and undermined its wealth."

Of course, he did not fail to give the credit for this to his own administration, its economic policy and the reforms it had instituted in line with the program for a "New Beginning for America," announced by President Reagan on 18 February 1981. "Although it will take time," Reagan wrote in the economic report, "for the beneficial effects of these reforms to have their full impact on rates of economic growth in our country, some positive results of our economic policy are already apparent in the gradual revival of economic activity." As proof of this, he cited the indicators of real GNP growth in 1983 (6.1 percent), the increase in employment (4 million) and the decrease in unemployment (from 10.7 percent in December 1982 to 8.2 percent in December 1983). The President made special mention of the fact that retail prices had risen "only" 3.2 percent, "reflecting the lowest rate of inflation since 1967."

Employing statistics like these, Reagan even said in his address to his party's political committee in the Senate at the end of January that "the world witnessed an American miracle" during the first 36 months of his stay in the White House and that his administration had "changed American history" within this "short space of time." What does he view as this "miracle" and why does he believe that it was engendered by the 3 years of his presidential term?

In the state of the union message, Reagan described the situation in the country prior to the beginning of the current administration and said that "we (the United States--Yu. B.) encountered the most serious crisis in our postwar history. The 1970's were a decade of mounting problems and diminishing confidence." It is true that the economic upheavals of the 1970's caused the overall deterioration of conditions in capitalist reproduction and the decline of the main indicators of U.S. economic development, intensified disparities in the economy and contributed to the development of stagflation. It was in this atmosphere that Reagan's so-called economic program was born and was given the appealing title of "A New Beginning for America: A Program of Economic Recovery." Its appearance, aims and content bore the imprint of the severe exacerbation of U.S. economic problems. Reagan's economic doctrine was born at a time when business circles and the national population were deeply disillusioned with the traditional government economic policy and of strong nostalgia for the "good old days" of minimal government intervention in the economy, on the wave of general expectations of changes. It reflected the rightwing conservative reaction to mounting U.S. problems. Referring to his program, the President described it as something just short of a cure for all economic ills and promised that it would pave the way for stable prosperity.

Although Reagan did not stipulate the temporal bounds of the program as a whole, the time limits recorded in it were quite definite and were clearly geared to the 1981-1984 period--that is, to the years of his presidency. Obviously, this was designed for a future demonstration of the effectiveness of administration economic policy, providing it with a reliable platform in the race for a second presidential term. Now that Reagan is approaching the "finish line" of the current campaign, he is making every effort to convince the Americans that his economic policy has been successful and that he actually brought about a "miracle" and put the nation on the road to stable "prosperity."

But the present state of the U.S. economy does not display any signs of "stable prosperity"; in fact, it reflects only the emergence of the economy from the cyclical crisis and its subsequent recovery. Furthermore, these were brought about by the objective laws of capitalist production with its inherent cyclical nature, in which the cycle and its phases--crisis, depression, recovery and growth--are repeated regularly. Despite all of the distinctive features the cycle has acquired under the conditions of the contemporary state-monopoly economy in the United States, recovery does not cease to be cyclical even when it is portrayed to the public as the success of the Republican administration's economic strategy.

If, on the other hand, we compare the "economic recovery" program's recorded objectives for the first 3 years with actual achievements, we can conduct our analysis in quite precise, quantitative terms.

In the program, the nation was promised steady economic growth at a constantly rising rate. Instead of this, the nation received the most severe economic crisis since the 1930's, with all of its attributes--the decline of production levels, the colossal underloading of production capacities, a new rise in unemployment and a new wave of bankruptcies. Industrial production was set

back several years. It was not until September 1983 that its index rose above the 1979 level.

The program promised the steady decline of the rate of unemployment in the nation--from 7.8 percent in 1981 to 6.4 percent in 1984. Instead of this, the crisis caused the colossal growth of the army of unemployed: In 1982 the official rate began to be measured in double-digit figures for the first time since the "Great Depression." The present cyclical reduction of unemployment will not reach the promised parameters soon (if at all).

The program promised that government finances would be put in order within the next few years and that the federal budget would be balanced by fiscal year 1984 (positive balances of 7 billion dollars in 1985 and 30 billion in 1986 were projected). Instead of this, budget deficits displayed an unprecedented steep rise and turned into a serious problem with a potential severe effect on the economy. Furthermore, a deficit of 180 billion dollars--that is, the 1983 figure--has been officially projected for fiscal year 1985.

These and all the other regrettable "records" set in the American economy in the last 3 years are connected largely with the administration's economic policy.

The Reagan Administration adopted and implemented a line of sharp cuts in allocations for social programs, in which millions of underprivileged Americans have a vital interest, and a simultaneous unprecedented increase in military spending, the uncontested leader on the White House list of priorities. Furthermore, instead of "reviving" the economy, this is contributing to its more pervasive and prolonged attachment to the requirements of the arms race; in coming years, according to administration budget calculations, the Pentagon will absorb the lion's share of federal budget increases, and this will tighten the knot of U.S. financial and economic difficulties.

In his state of the union message, Reagan called the significant reduction in the rate of inflation in 1982-1983 a "grand victory for our people," obviously regarding it as a result of "Reaganomics." But the deceleration of the inflationary process occurred primarily in connection with the severe economic crisis and the related decline of consumer demand and a number of other factors. This applies, in particular, to the stabilization of prices in the world oil market, which had a restraining effect on domestic price dynamics. The policy of the Federal Reserve System also played a role. By fall 1979--that is, long before Reagan's inauguration--it instituted strict long-term restrictions on the growth rate of the total amount of money in circulation for the purpose of gradually alleviating inflation. At the same time, the FRS policy, which was adopted by the Reagan Administration as one of the elements of its economic program, promoted the abrupt rise of interest rates and thereby strengthened crisis-related tendencies in the economy. It is no secret that the unprecedented rise of U.S. interest rates created serious economic difficulties in Western Europe. It was not until summer 1982 that the FRS attempted to help the economy climb up out of the abyss of crisis by relaxing monetary restrictions, as a result of which interest rates decreased, but nevertheless remained high. "The price of this victory over inflation," BUSINESS WEEK magazine

remarked, "was the most severe recession since World War II. Although the President's basic political principles have actually remained intact, the recession delayed his plan for an era of long-term vigorous economic growth. The specter of large budget deficits for many years in the future poses a serious threat to the attainment of his economic goals."

Furthermore, the danger of a new spurt of inflation has not been eliminated, and it could result from the growth of military expenditures and the compounding of budget deficits and the public debt.

With a view to all of these inexorable economic realities, it is obviously no coincidence that the President's messages contained no mention of the inaccurate initial quantitative parameters of his economic program.

Reagan did refer to his administration's "success" in the area of "deregulation"--that is, the relaxation and reduction of various government regulations concerning directions and other bureaucratic instructions in economic affairs. In his economic report he stressed: "In the last 3 years we have made considerable progress in this area. New instructions have been reduced by more than a third. The work of compiling reports required by the government in the private sector has been reduced by several hundreds of millions of hours a year." He also mentioned several measures to relax standards regulating the activity of financial markets, interurban buslines, civil aviation and communication networks, etc. The administration's policy line is fully in the interest of the business community and has won its approval. The organ of the business community, BUSINESS WEEK magazine, reported with satisfaction that "American business is undergoing its first reorganization in 50 years. The policy of deregulation, which was first outlined just 10 years ago, is now gaining strength, and the results are amazing. The reduction of government regulations is not only reviving three important spheres--finance, telecommunications and transportation--but is also stimulating the economy in general."

"Deregulation" is being conducted not only and not so much for the purpose of reducing the bureaucracy hampering entrepreneurial initiative. Measures benefiting big capital are being taken under this slogan. It is indicative that the administration has already taken several measures which have essentially weakened antitrust legislation in precisely the points that have bothered the monopolies the most. The Congress made laws with Reagan's support in 1982 and 1983, for example, which undermined the provisions of antitrust legislation regulating the activities of American companies in the sphere of export operations and freight shipments. In a report on the 1983 act on maritime shipments, the NEW YORK TIMES remarked that "it grants American shipping companies immunity from antitrust legislation." The Department of Justice rejected a number of government antitrust suits brought by previous administrations. The antitrust subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was even abolished with Reagan's approval.

In his messages to Congress, Reagan supported, just as he had in the past, the maximum buildup of U.S. military strength and the expansion of new expensive "defense" programs. "When I arrived in Washington," he stressed, "one of my chief aims was to stop the rapid growth of federal expenditures on domestic

programs and transfer a large part of the resources for the reinforcement of our country's defense. Although many people doubted that this could be done, we are now solving both of these problems." The President takes credit for the fact that the proportion accounted for by military spending in the GNP rose from 5.2 percent in fiscal year 1980 to 6.7 percent in 1984 and that "real defense expenditures have risen 39 percent since 1980."

This line is also apparent in the draft federal budget for fiscal year 1985, submitted to the Congress on 1 February 1984. Budget income has been projected at 745.1 billion dollars, which is 75.1 billion in excess of the anticipated budget revenues for the current fiscal year of 1984. Expenditures are projected at the unprecedented sum of 925.5 billion dollars. This is around one and a half times as great as the 1980 figure of 576 billion dollars, and it is 71.7 billion higher than the projected figure for fiscal year 1984. In this way, a deficit of 180.4 billion dollars has been "built into" the draft federal budget for FY 1985. We should recall that Reagan's economic program promised a balanced budget by 1984.

Almost half of the projected increase in federal spending for FY 1985--33.4 billion dollars--is earmarked for military purposes. Defense Department authorizations have been projected at 313.3 billion dollars, and its total expenditures have been set at 272 billion.

The massive buildup of the military budget--over several years--has been planned for the long range. Military authorizations are to rise to 380 billion dollars by FY 1987 (245.8 billion in 1983), and expenditures should reach 348.5 billion (210.4 billion in 1983).

The draft budget for FY 1985 envisages authorizations for the entire "range" of strategic and conventional weapons, particularly further research on the Stealth bomber, a "total" ABM system (the plans for its development were announced by Reagan in his speech of 22 March 1983) and antisatellite weapons.

In a commentary on the draft, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT remarked: "President Reagan challenged the Congress by demanding the largest peacetime increase in military spending." American press organs have suggested that the Congress is too concerned about the colossal and growing federal budget deficit to agree to the proposed 13-percent increase in military authorizations and will block the Pentagon's attempts to obtain a record military budget from the Congress in an election year. The projected military expenditures have been pointedly criticized by the Democratic opposition in the Congress and by many Republican members of the Congress. They stress that Reagan has actually shelved his campaign promise to balance the budget.

It is clear that the increase in military spending is one of the main reasons for the growth of budget deficits, but the growth of deficits under the present administration is connected with its military budget policy and with the basic aims of its economic program. Although these deficits became chronic long before the start of the Reagan Administration, Reaganomics can be given the credit for the "explosive" growth of the federal budget deficit and its tendency to become one of the most acute problems in the U.S. economy.

The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act, based on the premises and calculations of the "New Beginning for America" program, was supposed to stimulate capital investments and augment economic growth rates by means of tax cuts and tax and depreciation privileges for the business community. According to the administration, this was supposed to promote the growth of profits and various types of income, and therefore the growth of treasury revenues, and thereby reduce the federal budget deficit. But things went smoothly only on paper; in reality, an economic crisis took the place of the promised economic recovery, and this crisis "worked" to the same end as the tax cuts envisaged in the 1981 law by reducing federal budget revenues. The law itself, which reflected the aims of the administration's recipe of "supply-side economics," essentially included the prerequisites for the exacerbation of the deficit problem in the 1980's. According to the estimates of government experts, the cumulative federal budget deficit between fiscal years 1982 and 1986 will amount to 785 billion dollars, 627 billion of which will consist of the revenue losses resulting from the tax cuts in the 1981 act.

The implementation of Reagan's economic program has reduced the proportion accounted for by federal budget income in the GNP from 20.1 percent in 1980 to 18.6 percent in 1983, while the figure for expenditures rose from 22.4 percent to 24.7 percent. Therefore, the attainment of administration goals slowed down the growth of income on the one hand and--in connection with the policy of sharply increased military spending--contributed to the abrupt growth of federal budget expenditures on the other. As a result, the administration's economic program and its actual policies led to the sharp augmentation of the "scissors" between budget income and expenditures and created a situation in which colossal and long-term budget deficits are "built into" the U.S. financial system. According to official predictions, the total federal budget deficit for fiscal years 1984-1989 could exceed 1.1 trillion dollars. Therefore, colossal budget deficits have already been "programmed" for the entire decade.

Furthermore, this official forecast is based on optimistic assumptions about fairly high rates of economic growth in coming years, lower interest rates and a low rate of inflation. The forecast of the Congressional Budget Office, on the other hand, is based on more realistic assessments of U.S. economic prospects and it predicts a much larger federal budget deficit and an upward deficit dynamic rather than a decline. According to this forecast, the deficit could total 216 billion dollars in FY 1986 and 248 billion in 1987. Even some members of the administration believe that budget deficits will far exceed officially stipulated levels. For example, Director D. Stockman of the Office of Management and Budget feels that the deficit could exceed 200 billion dollars in FY 1985.

The continuous growth of budget deficits has brought about an unprecedented increase in the public debt. In FY 1983 it amounted to 1,381,000,000 dollars, or more than one and a half times the 1980 figure. Consequently, whereas the federal debt represented around 35 percent of the total GNP in 1980, the figure was already 43 percent in 1983. According to the forecast of the Office of Management and Budget, the public debt could rise to 2 trillion dollars by 1986 and represent around half of the GNP.

The growth of the federal debt raised interest payments on it, turning them into one of the main federal budget expenditure items in recent years. In FY 1984 interest payments on the government debt will already total 108 billion dollars, or almost five times as great as the figure a decade ago. According to the predictions of government experts, these payments could exceed 150 billion dollars by 1988. If interest rates should rise, the payments will be even higher. According to American estimates, a rise of only 1 point in interest rates will increase federal expenditures on public debt interest payments by 162 billion dollars; as a result, total payments could be triple the present figure.

The Reagan Administration has been borrowing more in the money market to somehow patch up the holes in the budget. According to the estimates of experts from the Manufacturers Hanover Trust, in 1983 the government borrowed a total of 324 billion dollars in this market--that is, twice as much as in 1981. The administration's tendency to pump increasing sums out of the money market is limiting private crediting potential, including credit for production purposes, and could thereby, according to many American economists, "block" economic growth, cause another steep rise in interest rates and contribute to the development of a new recession. The American press has reported that the needs of the economy and consumers are coming into conflict with the government's "voracious appetite" for loans to cover budget deficits. "The current process," Director R. Penner of the Congressional Budget Office stressed, "could be described as the gradual erosion of the nation's economic health."

In his messages, President Reagan listed "constant economic growth" as his primary "grand objective" for the 1980's and said that this represented "the key to a decade of dynamism." In the state of the union message he asked the Congress and the entire nation "not to listen to alarmists and skeptics" and to support his economic and budget policies.

At the same time, the dangerous implications of the continuous compounding of budget deficits, which have alarmed even Reagan's closest advisers, particularly Chairman M. Feldstein of the Council of Economic Advisers, have forced Reagan to resort to intricate maneuvers. He proposed that the problem of deficits be solved on a bipartisan basis, suggesting the creation of a congressional task force, made up of Republicans and Democrats, to work with the administration on the engineering of "a group of measures, which could be approved by the Congress in spring, to reduce the deficit by around 100 billion dollars within the next 3 fiscal years." This is an obvious attempt to make his Democratic rivals share the blame for the deficits with the administration. As for solutions to the deficit problem, the President did not propose any in his messages and confined his discussion, and not for the first time, to the mere declaration of his "firm intention to put the budget back on the road to balanced revenues and expenditures" and promised that the draft budget submitted in 1985 would "make the attainment of this goal possible." The campaign thrust of this promise is obvious, just as it is obvious that the nation's economic and financial problems will be tangled in an even tighter knot if the pursuit of the Republican Administration's present policy should continue.

The years of Reagan's economic program have shown that it has not produced the anticrisis recipes it promised. "Stable prosperity" has also remained just a

promise. The program itself and the President's new messages testify, however, that American capitalism is continuing the search for a new strategy of state-monopoly regulation. American ruling circles are engaging in maneuvers and trying different ways and means of mobilizing capitalism's resources in order to reinforce its foundations and lead it out of the maze of mounting difficulties and problems.

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U.S. THREAT TO WITHDRAW FROM UNESCO HIT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 69-73

[Article by V. L. Roshchin: "Outright Blackmail (An Inquiry into the U.S. Decision to Withdraw from UNESCO)"]

[Text] On the very eve of this year Washington officials committed another irresponsible act which was intended to undermine international cooperation and which demonstrated a total disregard for the wishes of the world community of states and for public opinion on the planet. This was President Reagan's decision to cancel the United States' membership in the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on 31 December 1984. Two copies of the official notification of this decision, signed by Secretary of State G. Shultz, were sent out: one to UNESCO Director General A. M. M'Bow and the other to UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar.

The U.S. secretary of state was not ashamed of resorting to outright blackmail by remarking that UNESCO would be offered a "chance to improve" and that the United States would be willing to reconsider its decision if this improvement should take place. The fact that Washington's decision was intended to exert pressure on UNESCO was even admitted in editorials in major bourgeois newspapers. "The American withdrawal or threat of withdrawal," the NEW YORK TIMES commented, "could convince UNESCO to reconsider its goals. There is no need for the withdrawal to be irrevocable." The United States "has left the door open for continued membership in UNESCO after 1984, but only if it undergoes changes," the WASHINGTON POST noted.

Therefore, it is obvious that the Reagan Administration's action is another link in the American policy of attacks and threats against the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

"The U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO," India's NATIONAL HERALD pointed out, "fits in with Washington's general strategy of denigrating the United Nations' role in international affairs." The PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER suggested that groups which condemned the United Nations long ago will "take the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO as a signal of the possibility of withdrawal from the United Nations in general."

We should recall that in 1977 the United States withdrew from the International Labor Organization when it adopted a number of documents condemning imperialism and colonialism. Washington accused the ILO of excessive "politicization" and urged the disaffirmation of certain resolutions. But since the blackmail did not work, the United States returned to this specialized UN agency in 1980.

In October 1982 the U.S. delegation walked out on the 26th Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to signal dissatisfaction with the agency's sanctions against Israel for its bombing of the Iraqi nuclear research center. Washington stopped paying dues and announced its intention to withdraw from the IAEA. But by spring 1983 it had already "reconsidered" the matter. Anti-UN actions continued throughout 1983. For example, in August the United States boycotted the UN-sponsored second world conference in Geneva on the struggle against racism and racial discrimination.

In fall 1983 the United Nations itself became the target of unprecedented threats. During the 38th session of its General Assembly, when many states demanded the guarantee of normal conditions for the work of their delegations and representatives in New York, the location of the UN headquarters, American representatives, supported by the President, told them to "get out of New York." Demands for the reduction of American contributions to the UN budget were heard in the Congress. According to a statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State G. Newell, for the past year and a half the State Department has been reviewing the question of further U.S. participation in 96 international organizations and programs of the United Nations. The administration, in his words, has doubts about 6 of them: UNESCO, the IAEA, the ILO, the International Telecommunication Union, the World Food Council and the UN Environment Program.

The Reagan Administration has been greatly dissatisfied with UNESCO activity, particularly since the time when the 21st session of its General Conference in fall 1980 decided to draft a declaration on the basic principles of the new international order in the sphere of information and communication. It was then that the U.S. representative in UNESCO threatened the organization. A special resolution, condemning UNESCO decisions aimed against the domination of the information sphere by the leading agencies of imperialist nations, was also adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1981.

Explaining the American decision to leave UNESCO, State Department spokesman A. Romberg mentioned three main reasons: the "excessive politicization" of organization activity (this, as we know, is not a new argument), "hostility toward the main institutions of the free society, particularly the free market and free press" and, finally, "indiscretion in budget expenditures."

For many years the United States completely denied the acceptability of political discussions in UNESCO. Today American spokesmen acknowledge that the intergovernment nature of the organization makes this kind of discussion both acceptable and inevitable. At the last session of the UNESCO General Conference, for example, the head of the U.S. delegation, prominent businessman and chairman of Mobil Oil E. Hennelly, stated: "UNESCO is an organization of governments, and it should, almost by definition, be a political organization." However, he

went on to say, political disagreements must be avoided, and for this purpose the members must acknowledge that UNESCO can concern itself only with a limited group of issues. It is particularly important to avoid "tyranny by the majority." Director C. Wick of the USIA, one of President Reagan's most trusted associates, stated his views even more frankly: "If UNESCO does not act in accordance with the U.S. definition of its functions, the United States will take repressive action and could withdraw from the organization altogether."

It is precisely the general progressive aims of UNESCO activity, the United States' loss of its once dominant position in this organization, and the increasingly obvious isolation of the American delegation during discussions of cardinal issues of the present day that are irritating Washington. The real reason for its dissatisfaction was unequivocally stated in a Heritage Foundation report reflecting the views of the conservative right wing of U.S. ruling circles. In this report, as a NEW YORK TIMES article by foundation spokesman O. Harris indicates, UNESCO is described as a "wholly politicized organization which attacks the fundamental values, interests and institutions of the West, believes that the 'imperialist' Western culture poses a threat to the cultural uniqueness of other nations and criticizes the free market economy and trans-national corporations. UNESCO decisions on complex and delicate matters of peace and disarmament, fields in which it is incompetent, are hostile to the West and full of prejudice against it. It constantly attacks Israel and helps the Palestine Liberation Organization."

This opinion of UNESCO activity, according to many commentators, had the main influence on the administration's decision to withdraw from this organization.

UNESCO, to which 161 states now belong, is adopting increasingly important resolutions with the aim of expanding and strengthening its contribution to the struggle for peace, disarmament, detente and mutually beneficial international cooperation, and against colonialism, racism and apartheid, and is pursuing a generally constructive policy in the area of education, science, culture and information. It has been successful in its international campaigns for the eradication of illiteracy and the preservation of the cultural heritage, it is studying the resources of the land and world ocean, new sources of energy and the environment, and it is actively aiding in the efficient regulation of international informational exchanges.

This consistent UNESCO line was continued and secured at the 22d session of its general conference in Paris in October and November 1983. The session adopted a number of important decisions and resolutions recording the results of general political discussion and pointing up the invariably progressive aims of UNESCO activity. Above all, these include such documents as the resolutions on UNESCO's role in molding public opinion in favor of the cessation of the arms race and a move toward disarmament, on the organization's contribution to the cause of peace, on its participation in the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, on the improvement of the status of youth, on regional cooperation, particularly in Europe, and on UNESCO's role in the development of equitable and mutual beneficial scientific and cultural cooperation as an important factor in the consolidation of peace, friendship and mutual understanding among nations.

It is important to underscore the anticolonial and anti-imperialist aims of UNESCO's broad and diversified activity, and of the the resolutions of its General Conference, concerning the new international order in the sphere of information and communication, the democratization of education and culture, the preservation of people's cultural uniqueness, etc. The ultimate purpose of all this is to guard the national sovereignty (economic, political and informational) of all countries, including the most disadvantaged, against imperialist and neocolonial intervention, and to protect the rights of people.

But it is precisely this UNESCO aim that displeases the United States, which views it as politicization.

Just before the 22d Session of the UNESCO General Conference, the U.S. representatives in this organization practically issued an ultimatum, demanding that it comply with American requests regarding budget matters and problems connected with the establishment of the new international order in the sphere of information and communication. During the vote on the 2-year UNESCO budget for 1984 and 1985, the United States was the only country to vote against it. Its displeasure was aroused not only by the growth of the budget (although the increase was only 3.5 percent instead of the proposed 10 percent), but also by the distribution of budget expenditures among programs. The United States insisted on the revision of budget priorities in an attempt to cancel programs not to its liking, primarily those connected with "the Eastern bloc's initiatives in the sphere of disarmament."

Director General A. M. M'Bow of the organization described the American delegation's position as the following: "UNESCO is facing deliberate attempts to counteract any increase in its activity, even if this increase can be accomplished within the framework of a smaller budget. This is obviously a case of the definite political aim of stopping multilateral cooperation and limiting the scales of UNESCO undertakings in the world."

As for the new international order in the sphere of information, Washington officials have resolutely objected to the organization's decisions in this field and have even questioned its right to concern itself with this subject matter, although UNESCO's activity in this sphere stems from a mandate approved by the United States. The organization's central role in the resolution of these problems is acknowledged by the United Nations. This is specifically mentioned in the resolution on informational issues, adopted by the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly. It was supported by non-aligned countries, many heads of state and government, and intergovernmental and public organizations. In essence, only the United States and its closest allies are questioning the validity of UNESCO activity in this sphere, and they are doing this for the simple reason that the majority of its members objected to the imperialist domination of the information sphere, to the ideological expansion of Western countries, especially the United States, in the developing countries and to the use of the mass media to kindle mistrust, hostility and hatred among nations, conduct psychological warfare, interfere in the internal affairs of other states and rationalize imperialist and colonial policy.

The 1978 UNESCO declaration on the basic principles of the mass media's contribution to the consolidation of peace and international mutual understanding,

the development of human rights and the struggle against racism, apartheid and war-mongering (the document was approved by a consensus, and was even applauded enthusiastically) caused the United States to react in the same way as a bull seeing red; it has made every effort to prevent the discussion of ways of implementing this document.

The imperialist countries would like to perpetuate the kind of situation in the information sphere in which, for example, the African continent accounts for only around 1 percent of all the television stations in the world and 1 percent of the newspapers, while many African countries have no telegraph agencies at all and do not publish any daily papers. The United States, on the other hand, controls around 75 percent of all international television programs and the publishing trade. The American AP and UPI agencies transmit 8 million words a day (the seven largest agencies in the developing countries transmit only 50,000). At the 22d Session of the UNESCO General Conference, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State G. Newell declared that the United States believes in "the freest and broadest flow of information possible" and opposes the new order in the sphere of information and communication. In fact, however, the "free flow of information" is free only for those who control the financial and technical resources, and it allows the United States and other developed capitalist countries to conduct ideological expansion in the newly liberated countries.

In an interview in France's MATIN at the end of 1983, J. P. Cot, member of the UNESCO Executive Board from France (and formerly a minister of France), said that Washington, which had accused the organization of ideologization, was conducting this kind of activity itself "without considering the economic and social rights of nations."

"Quantitative disparities give rise to qualitative distortions of the information disseminated in the world," M'Bow said at the 22d Session of the UNESCO General Conference. "These are distortions which could give people the wrong ideas about the world...and injure the dignity and even the independence of peoples. The new order is now regarded by the overwhelming majority of UNESCO members as a central concept. This is a process which will be simultaneously progressive and irrevocable: The new order will arrive regardless of our wishes or the objections of our opponents."

Ronald Reagan's decision to withdraw from UNESCO has not met with unanimous approval in political circles, the academic community or, in particular, the general public. The result of the U.S. withdrawal could be "a UNESCO even more unacceptable to the United States," the WASHINGTON POST remarked. The overwhelming majority of members of the U.S. Public Commission on UNESCO Affairs voted against withdrawal from the organization. The opinion of academic circles disagreeing with the administration's decision was expressed in an article entitled "UNESCO: American Science Needs It" and published in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE on 6 January. The article said specifically that "withdrawal from UNESCO will deal a severe blow to the scientific community in the United States."

Only organizations and individuals on the extreme right applaud the administration's decision.

Washington's arbitrary action, which is obviously designed to blackmail the international community, is not even supported by many of the United States' own allies. The majority of developing countries view it as a new sign of the "big-stick" policy, intended to force them to obey Washington's orders.

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BOOK ON U.S. STRATEGIC STUDIES REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 102-104

[Review by G. I. Svyatov of book "Strategic Studies and Public Policy. The American Experience" by C. Gray, Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1982, 230 pages]

[Text] The author of this book is comparatively young but he is already well known in the United States. He purports to express independent opinions but is actually an energetic apologist of the Reagan Administration's current military and political strategy and military policy.

"The issues of the 1980's demand relevant strategic studies," C. Gray begins his book. "Strategic matters represent a moving target and demand the constant attention of intellectuals" (p 1).

Analyzing the development of research in this field after World War II, Gray distinguishes among three periods: 1945-1946, 1955-1965, and from 1969 to the present. In a discussion of the reasons for the effective development of military-political thinking, he notes the strategist's disagreement with the official line of government circles--that is, the opinion that nuclear war can be averted by means of the guaranteed destruction of an aggressor's military and industrial potential with a second strike on the condition that both sides are equally vulnerable to the first strike--and lists the names of Donald Brennan, Albert Wohlstetter and Edward Luttwak (pp 8-9). This is also the view of the author of this review.

Gray also points out the fact that there was a great demand for ambitious strategic concepts during the cold war era and regrets the decline of this demand in the 1970's, during the era of international detente. Since the beginning of the 1980's, with the disappearance, in his opinion, of the "detente era" and the onset of the U.S. "military lag," "a favorable political climate was established for the first time in 20 years for the innovative strategist" (p 10), a category to which the author naturally relegates himself.

Examining Western views of the late 1940's on the possible nature of a war with the Soviet Union, Gray singles out two points of view.

The first--adhered to by the U.S. and British military establishments and by such experts as P. Blackett and V. Bush--was the view that the next war could resemble World War II with the addition of atomic bombs. According to Blackett, "a war between the Soviet Union and United States will be protracted and will not lead to the attainment of any specific goals" (p 31).

The second is the viewpoint of B. Brodie, who essentially concluded that the prevention of nuclear war is the chief function of military establishments during the nuclear age.

Gray prefers the first point of view (p 32).

The author cites some passages from the once classified document NSC-162/2, dated 30 October 1953, which said that "in the event of a conflict, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be just as useful as any other type" (p 36) and that "until the end of 1953 at least, American administrations assumed that they would win a third world war" (p 38).

The author then goes on to cite what he calls the "central argument"--between 1955 and 1965 "excellent foundations were laid for strategic theory, but the job was never completed and strategic theory therefore requires substantial additions and fundamental adjustments" (p 45).

There is the opinion, Gray remarks, that the interrelated theories of deterrence, limited war and arms limitation are the indestructible theoretical monuments of the "golden age." He then makes the groundless statement, however, that this is not true because they are based on many incorrect or obsolete assumptions.

Analyzing the U.S. military policy of 1961-1965, Gray accuses influential specialists of that time, A. Wohlstetter, M. Hoag, H. Rowen and A. Enthoven, of misunderstanding the strategic concepts of the Soviet Union (p 93), of propounding the incorrect theory that nuclear war could be averted by means of the threat of "mutually assured destruction with a second strike" and of involving the United States in the war it lost in Vietnam, since the strategy for waging it was incorrect, with their theories about "counterinsurgency." The author draws a conclusion which is shared by the U.S. circles now in power:

"First of all, foreign policy strategy is not synonymous with military strategy. It is the duty of the armed forces, supported by their societies, to fight and win (or at least not lose) wars. It is the duty of civilian politicians to ensure that these wars have the correct political aims, that methods of warfare do not fundamentally compromise these aims and that the overall political situation provide their generals with a real chance of military victory. Secondly, although there is no substitute for good military strategy, its existence does not preclude the need to display the necessary degree of firmness in relations with adversaries. The war the United States fought against North Vietnam did not surpass that country's pain threshold, and this could have led to the conclusion of the war on the basis of fair compromises. Thirdly, lengthy diplomatic talks on arms limitation do not mean that the participating sides must arrive at the same strategic conclusions."

Gray also analyzes U.S. and Soviet arms buildups and limitations during this period and says that the most important unilateral U.S. decisions in the development of strategic forces were the decision to deploy the Sentinel limited ABM system in 1967 and the MIRV'ed missile in 1970 (p 128). He also notes that the total number of strategic means of delivery decreased from 2,265 to 1,944 between 1967 and 1981 in connection with the use of MIRV'ed systems and the more than twofold increase in the number of strategic nuclear warheads with guaranteed means of delivery (p 129). With this statement he denies the important results of the past decade in the sphere of U.S. and Soviet arms limitation.

Examining the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements signed in the 1970's, Gray seems to regret the Soviet Union's consent to the fundamental limitation of ABM systems and implies that the Soviet Union has aggressive intentions and plans to win an unlimited nuclear world war (p 131). The author's political outlook is so rigid that he unceremoniously accuses U.S. President Carter of pursuing an incorrect strategic policy and of concluding a treaty allegedly disadvantageous to the United States--SALT II--and praises Reagan's strategic arms buildup policy to the skies (p 133).

In a discussion of the containment and conduct of war in Europe, Gray analyzes two views on the nature of potential wars. The first is the idea that NATO strategy should place more emphasis on the buildup of non-nuclear potential and that the possibility of "the non-nuclear defense of Western Europe for at least a month" should be secured. The second view emphasizes the buildup of U.S. operational and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the use of tactical Lance missiles and heavy artillery with neutron warheads and the deployment of 108 Pershing-II ballistic missiles and 464 intermediate-range cruise missiles in Western Europe. Gray is inclined to support the second point of view, although he believes that the military expediency of the deployment of the Pershing II's precludes the expediency of the cruise missiles (p 146).

In a discussion of arms limitation, Gray asserts that this theory is undergoing a general crisis (p 165), that old approaches to strategic arms limitation have serious defects and new ones have not been perfected, and that too much energy in the 1970's was given to the details of arms limitation and reduction and too little was given to the resolution of fundamental problems connected with the aims of limitation and reduction (p 166). The views of an opponent of military detente and of the limitation and reduction of the arms race, especially the nuclear race, and a supporter of the Reagan Administration's current practice of "international terrorism" can be seen clearly behind the entire pseudo-scientific program of this "strategic theorist."

The author concludes his book with another attack on the idea of the assured destruction of the aggressor with a retaliatory strategic nuclear strike and repeats his praises of the scientific services of D. Brennan and M. Bailey, who always opposed this concept, calling it "irrational and extremely dangerous," and demanded the guarantee of the "assured survival" of the United States. All of these opinions are fully in accord with President Reagan's recent decision to begin the development of new types of space-based ABM systems.

Summing up the results of the postwar development of American strategic theory, Gray commends the strategy of "massive retaliation" of the second half of the 1950's and the "flexible response" strategy of the 1960's and takes a negative view of the "realistic deterrence" strategy of the 1970's, particularly after the signing of the U.S.-Soviet treaty on the limitation of ABM systems.

Gray believes that the concept of political neorealism should serve as the analytical base of U.S. strategic theory. This concept, which essentially implies that war is an inevitable element of international relations and a method of resolving conflicts in today's world, is based on the ideological constructs of political analysts such as E. Carr, N. Spikeman and H. Morgenthau.

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BOOK ON MILITARY POLICY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 104-106

[Review by S. A. Karaganov of book "Keeping America Safe: Studies in Strategic Military Policy" by P. Warnke and J. Woolsey, Washington, Center for National Policy, 1982, 40 pages]

[Text] The heated battles in the United States over matters of military policy are growing more fierce with each day and are leaving their imprint on the inter-party struggle on the threshold of a national election. The Democrats have recovered from their defeat of 1980, largely with the aid of a series of Republican Administration failures in domestic and foreign policy, and are preparing for the campaign battles of 1984. The Democratic Party platform, an alternative to Republican policy, is being drafted.

The recently founded Center for National Policy, with virtually the entire Democratic Party elite represented on its advisory board, and with its leadership including such prominent Democrats as Michael Blumenthal, Warren Christopher, Stuart Eizenstat, Cyrus Vance, Terry Sanford, Felix Rogatin, Edmund Muskie and others, is supposed to play an extremely active part in this process. The book under review was published under the auspices of this center.

P. Warnke pointedly criticizes the military policy of the current administration. He is one of the most famous American experts on strategic weapons and has served at different times as assistant secretary of defense, head of the U.S. SALT delegation and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

P. Warnke states correctly that Reagan's strategic program, with its emphasis on the steep buildup of the counterforce potential of American strategic systems, particularly the development of the MX and Trident II missiles, is weakening strategic stability and making the security of all countries, including the United States, more fragile. "Forces with increasing counterforce potential, ready to be launched instantaneously, could provoke a nuclear war, which no one wants and which our contemporary world would not survive," Warnke writes (p 19).

The administration's deployment of more and more thousands of cruise missiles, including sea-based ones, is undermining stability, increasing the danger of war and ruining the general prospects for arms limitation and reduction. The author correctly notes that cruise missiles, particularly sea-based ones, will not guarantee the security of the United States. As witnessed by the entire history of the arms race, and its initiator has always been the United States, Warnke stresses, the Soviet Union has always nullified U.S. attempts to gain military superiority.

Washington's constant attempts to disrupt the strategic balance and to attain the kind of superiority that would allow the United States to count on the use of nuclear weapons with impunity or at least to use the threat of their use for political pressure, according to the authors, pose a special threat to international security. This is the essential purpose of the concept of "limited nuclear war" adopted by the Carter Administration and developed further by the Reagan Administration. The current administration does not even feel the need to conceal its desire to acquire the potential to use nuclear weapons. For example, former Director of the ACDA E. Rostow once stated that the United States should be "capable of using nuclear weapons if its vital interests are jeopardized by nuclear or conventional forces." The present director of this agency, K. Adelman, also does not conceal the United States' willingness to resort to nuclear blackmail and to use nuclear weapons first.

The dream of resurrecting the past, however radiant it might appear to the cold war knights that are once again at the helm of power, is certainly unattainable, although it is also extremely dangerous. The Soviet Union, as its top political and military leaders have repeatedly declared, will never allow the disruption of parity. P. Warnke also acknowledges the unattainability of U.S. nuclear superiority: "Nothing we do now or in the future will restore it" (p 12).

An understanding of the dialectics of international relations in the nuclear age and elementary political responsibility lead P. Warnke to the conclusion that "our policy in the area of strategic weapons, both official and actual, should be a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Our military should be clearly ordered to give up any plans for the preparation and delivery of preemptive strikes against military and industrial targets in the Soviet Union or against its cities" (p 13).

Warnke advises the quickest possible conclusion of strategic arms limitation and reduction agreements based on those negotiated during the SALT II process.

The other author of the book, J. Woolsey, now a Washington lawyer and previously a member of the U.S. SALT-I delegation, under secretary of the Navy in the Carter Administration, expresses almost the opposite point of view. He openly advocates the continuation of the arms race.

Two American propaganda theses--the "window of vulnerability" and the "military spending lag"--are merely a repetition of the ill-reputed theses of the "bomber lag" and "missile lag," with the aid of which Washington officials rationalized the strategic arms race in the 1950's and early 1960's. At that

time it was relatively easy to deceive the American public: Information about the strategic forces of both sides was unavailable. Now this kind of outright deception is impossible. The strategic balance has become the subject of negotiations, and information about it has been published and is available to experts and any other interested parties. The approximate parity between the USSR and the United States in the strategic sphere is also obvious. It is under these conditions that data on military spending are being manipulated and that the other side is being ascribed the most fantastic figures, depending only on the urgency of the need for propaganda underpinnings for the arms race. In some cases a single element--the vulnerability of the ground component of strategic forces, for instance--is isolated from the rest of the complicated strategic equation and is exaggerated beyond measure on the assumption that part of the public will not understand all of the subtleties of the equation and will believe this argument.

In addition to containing appeals for the continuation of the arms race, Woolsey's article also displays elements of the sensible approach. First of all, he questions the expediency of highly accurate first-strike counterforce systems. Secondly, he believes that arms limitation and reduction talks should be an integral part of U.S. efforts to safeguard security and should be conducted as vigorously as possible. In this respect, his point of view differs from that of many influential members of the Reagan Administration, who regard these talks only as a propaganda screen for the "modernization program."

This book by P. Warnke and R. Woolsey was published in the United States at the end of 1982, but the debates on administration military and foreign policy strategy are still going on. What is more, they are becoming increasingly heated as a result of the growing awareness that the Reagan Administration is pushing the nation onto an extremely dangerous road, leading to huge expenditures and to a less stable and secure future. The voices of those who believe that national security should be safeguarded primarily with the aid of mutually acceptable agreements with the USSR are being heard more clearly in the United States. But although the momentum of the militarist approach has been undermined to some degree, it is still strong, particularly in view of the fact that this approach is based on firmly entrenched anticommunism, on the interest of extremely influential segments of the U.S. ruling class in it, and on the tradition of power politics in foreign relations.

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BOOK ON U.S.-USSR WAR ALLIANCE REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 107-109

[Review by Yu. P. Davydov of book "SSSR i SShA: soyuzniki v gody voyny. 1941-1945" [The USSR and the United States: Allies in the War Years. 1941-1945] by A. Yu. Borisov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983, 286 pages]

[Text] It is clear that history has much to teach us. It is just as clear that it has gifted students and "F-students." This thought occurs to the reader of A. Yu. Borisov's work on the Soviet Union's military and political cooperation with the United States during World War II.

The author makes use of abundant factual material and many Soviet and American documents (including some from the Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR), many of which are being brought to the attention of the scientific community for the first time. The work deals with an extremely important period of history. "The Soviet people," the author stresses, "will never forget that they were not alone in the struggle against fascism. Other people, including Americans, fought side by side with them" (p 5). A. Yu. Borisov examines the period marked by close cooperation between the United States and the USSR, states belonging to different social systems.

Despite the historical nature of the work, it is pertinent today. Parallels with the present day can be found on almost each page, whether the discussion deals with the pre-history of the alliance, its actual functioning or its subsequent fate. Analyzing Soviet-American relations after the recognition of the USSR by the United States (16 November 1933), the author stresses that many politicians in Washington at that time believed that pressure tactics were the best way of dealing with the world's first socialist country. Soviet diplomacy consistently clarified this matter. The author cites a remark (which could be addressed to the current Washington administration) made by then People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov in a conversation (on 10 October 1934) with American Ambassador W. Bullitt. "I know," the commissar said, "that there are people in America who believe that concessions from us require only a firm tone and threats. These people do not understand anything... about our mentality. Other countries have resorted to intimidation more than once, but it has not produced any results" (p 13).

Hitler once called the USSR's military alliance with the United States "an unnatural union." We should recall that Americans on the extreme right have always considered U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union to be "unnatural." In fact, however, the fighting alliance was completely natural, because the two states had to deal with a lethal threat to the vital interests of both countries, just as to those of other states and peoples. The author cites a remark by American labor leader T. Mooney: "In the present world conflict, Russia is the natural and logical ally of the United States.... They have common enemies" (p 46). But after all, even today the Soviet and American people must deal with a common threat--the threat of nuclear war, which persistently dictates the need to unite the efforts of the two countries for the elimination of this danger.

The author discusses not only the importance of the alliance of the two great powers, but also the atmosphere of constant disagreements and conflicts in which it existed and functioned; this stemmed quite naturally from their differing sociopolitical systems. These conflicts were sometimes so acute that the threat of a split arose several times (the issue of the "second front," the "Polish question," etc.). But perhaps the most important and educative aspect of the matter was not that these conflicts constantly arose, but that the two sides were able to find ways of resolving them. "The common interests of the two states in combatting fascism did not lead automatically to the elimination of disagreements engendered by their differing class interests and ideologies," the author stresses. "Displaying the necessary flexibility and persistence, Soviet diplomats did much to strengthen the military cooperation with the United States" (p 77). Obviously, this did not depend only on the Soviet side. In spite of the inconsistency and egotism stemming from the United States' desire to shift the entire burden of the war onto its partner's shoulders, and from other considerations of a class nature, common sense was also characteristic of the majority of American leaders of that time, especially President F. Roosevelt and his closest advisers. "As a bourgeois politician on a grand scale," the author remarked, "President Roosevelt was able to assess facts soberly. Each time relations with the USSR approached the verge of danger, he found the strength to display prudence and rely on the time-tested method of negotiation.... He was quite aware that the security of the postwar world and the well-being of the American people depended largely on the state of Soviet-American relations" (p 225).

Unfortunately, many subsequent American presidents and their advisers did not have enough of this common sense and understanding. By 1945 H. Truman declared (and his words were repeated almost word for word by Ronald Reagan 35 years later) that "agreements with the Soviet Union thus far have been a one-way street" (p 235). The cold war machine Washington had started began to pick up speed. But no matter how much Washington tried to ignore historical realities, "no matter what unfavorable tendencies prevailed at times in Soviet-American relations and no matter how complicated they sometimes became, the fighting alliance of the people of our countries in the struggle against fascism is still a valid point of reference," the author says (p 267). It is not surprising that the memory of the Soviet-U.S. military alliance in the minds of our two populations managed to survive the dismal years of the cold war.

History does not like to dwell in dusty archives. It prefers to affect the present day. This fully applies to the Soviet-American cooperation of the war years, particularly since it provides quite definite answers to many of today's questions. A. Yu. Borisov's thoroughly historical and thoroughly contemporary book is permeated with this realization.

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BOOK ON CAPITALIST 'POWER CENTERS' REVIEWED

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[Review by V. F. Davydov of book "'Tsentry sily': kontseptsii i real'nosti" ["Power Centers": Ideas and Reality] by V. P. Lukin, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983, 256 pages]

[Text] Bourgeois analysts have recently paid much more attention to prevailing trends in world development. The many theories about the "global world order" objectively reflect the crisis in the policy of leading capitalist states, especially the United States, and represent an attempt to adapt to the new balance of power in the international arena. The conclusions and recommendations of bourgeois experts on international affairs often lie at the basis of the foreign policy line of American administrations, and their authors occupy important government positions. For example, Professor H. Kissinger, who worked on the theory of the "multipolar" world for a long time, was the secretary of state of Presidents Nixon and Ford, and Professor Z. Brzezinski, who popularized the theory of "interdependence," was President Carter's national security adviser. These examples testify to the value of a timely and discerning analysis of the prevailing ideas in the ruling circles of the United States and other capitalist states about the future development of international relations.

After revealing the class limitations of bourgeois theories of international relations, the author correctly notes that these theories, regardless of their differences, all distort reality and are designed to secure the interests of ruling circles in the capitalist countries at the expense of the interests of other states. The "multipolar" theory singles out a few elements of the complex and contradictory realities of today's world and ignores or deliberately downplays other equally important, and sometimes even more important, elements. This results in a distorted view of the world, which is employed in recommendations of ways of implementing a modified global (or national) strategy in the interests of ruling circles in the leading capitalist countries (p 14). In the same way, the theory of "interdependence," representing the "multipolar" theory's competitor, was essentially an appeal for the merging of the three main capitalist centers to such a degree that they could become the dominant factor in the "new world order" (p 13).

But the world did not want to "fit into" American theories that ignored the interests of other states. Competition between the "three centers" of

capitalist rivalry--the United States, Western Europe and Japan--has continued into the 1980's and has been marked by the United States' inability to control the policy of large states in the developing world and, in particular, by its futile attempts to force socialist countries to accept the American "rules of behavior" in the international arena.

American ruling circles now believe that they can resolve the distinct crisis in their foreign policy practices and world view by "replaying" the results of the historical development of a previous era, by returning the world to the era of the so-called Pax Americana. The present American administration, the author writes, is distinguished by the refusal to adapt its view of the world and its foreign policy theories to changing reality, and by its inclination to do the opposite--to adapt reality to its view of the world, which took shape in the first years after the war. "A policy motivated by yesterday's ideological and psychological reactions leads to a dangerous gap between wishes and possibilities, and to actions with unpredictable implications" (p 235).

In the nuclear age the tendency to deal "from a position of strength" and to disregard the interests of other states, the author stresses, is hopeless and it is suicidal; only a policy of detente, aimed at preventing nuclear war, can solve present and future problems in international relations.

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MILITARIZATION OF SPACE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 112-119

[Article by A. A. Vasil'yev and S. K. Oznobishchev]

[Text] The President's State of the Union message of 25 January 1984 called space a "new frontier" for the American people. The facts show, however, that military, and not civilian, space programs will play the leading role in these plans.

By the start of the Reagan Administration the Pentagon had spent 100 billion dollars on military space programs. The Washington administration raised expenditures for these purposes to an unprecedented height. Annual federal budget appropriations for Department of Defense space projects, which were once surpassed by the appropriations of the civilian NASA, now far exceed them. Appropriations for military space programs have increased at a rate of 20 percent a year for the last 3 years, surpassing even the unprecedented rate of increase in the total Defense Department budget.

In fiscal year 1983 the sum of 8.5 billion dollars was allocated for the use of space for military purposes. During the current fiscal year the difference between "military" space appropriations (9.4 billion dollars) and civilian NASA appropriations (7 billion) continued to grow. But even these figures do not provide the complete picture: After all, in fiscal year 1983 alone, 28.3 percent (or 1.5 billion dollars) of NASA appropriations for R & D actually financed work included in military programs. There is also evidence of secret Pentagon expenditures of several billion dollars. Therefore, total expenditures on the militarization of space far exceed the officially admitted figure.

Over more than a quarter-century of space flights, the use of space has taken on extraordinary dimensions. Space technology is being used in many spheres of human endeavor, has given powerful momentum to the development of radio and telephone communications, is being used as the basis for long-range television broadcasting, mineral prospecting, weather forecasts and crop predictions, etc. In addition to developing civilian space programs, however, the United States has begun the unilateral militarization of space.¹

Military communication and reconnaissance systems have appeared, and military meteorology and navigational devices have been developed. Around 40 percent of

the approximately 200 satellites launched into permanent orbit by the United States are military satellites. Washington's official government documents state that "the United States' ability to use its military strength is increasingly dependent on the efficient and reliable functioning of various satellite systems." Statements by various Washington administration officials testify that the potential space support of military operations on earth is being developed to give American armed forces a chance to conduct combat operations more effectively in a protracted conventional or nuclear war.

The satellites belonging to the control, communication and reconnaissance system occupy one of the key positions in the attainment of these objectives. As President Johnson once noted, reconnaissance satellites alone had recouped all U.S. space expenditures tenfold. He was referring primarily to the acquisition of espionage information about the Soviet armed forces (particularly strategic weapons). These space vehicles include photoreconnaissance satellites, radiotechnical, radar and radiation reconnaissance devices, and early-warning satellites. The scales of U.S. activity in this field are attested to by the fact that the United States has launched around 400 satellites of this type just since 1959.

Space systems are becoming the technical foundation of the military communication system on which the Department of Defense plans to rely in peacetime and in times of armed conflict. Space communication systems were officially assigned special priority in 1983. This means that all of the security, invulnerability and other specifications of the weapons served by these systems will also extend to them. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute noted in one of its publications that 70 percent of all long-range military communications are now accomplished with the aid of satellites.² In all, around 120 satellites of this type were launched between 1958 and 1981.

Space navigation systems can now be used for the precise location of military targets. The Navsat system (which can determine the location of naval ships, for example, within a range of around 180 meters) is being replaced by the new Navstar system, consisting of 18 satellites. According to published data, it can determine the location of stationary targets within a range of no more than 8.15 meters (68 percent probability) and of moving targets within a range of 11.1 meters (50 percent probability). American specialists have suggested that the Navstar system "will cause a revolution in navigation" and will secure more effective operations by the military establishment in such fields as reconnaissance, surveillance, troop and materiel transfers, etc. The main thing, however, is that these systems will heighten the accuracy of the operations of the naval and airborne components of the strategic triad.

These and other military space systems will play an important auxiliary role in Pentagon military programs. Their military significance is camouflaged slightly by the fact that they do not carry weapons suitable for direct attacks on enemy space vehicles and ground targets. Nevertheless, the exceptional importance of satellite systems designed for the performance of military functions has been acknowledged by the Pentagon leadership in the statement that enemy space systems of this type are "primary" targets. "We must acquire the potential to interfere with the functioning of enemy space

systems and to put them out of commission," Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger declared.³

The creation of this potential, including the ability to attack enemy ground targets from space, is the purpose of many Defense Department programs. The scales of these programs and the sums invested in them attest directly to the fact that the administration hopes to put this relatively young field of science and technology on the same level as major military programs of strategic significance, such as the MX, Trident, Pershing-II and cruise missiles and others.

We cannot say that the United States is just taking its first steps toward the militarization of outer space. Even when D. Eisenhower was President, Director S. Raimo of the Space Technology Laboratory said that the use of space "will give us more room for our strategic forces."

American publications written by politicians and by members of the scientific community often suggest that the United States had no plans for the military use of outer space, much less the launching of vehicles designed for combat in space, during the initial stage of its space program. In connection with this, Deputy Secretary of Defense R. Gilpatric said in 1963 that "the United States does not have any plans to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit." By 1964, however, the United States had already armed itself with the Thor missile, equipped with nuclear warheads, as an antisatellite weapon. The existence of an active antisatellite system was confirmed by President L. Johnson in a speech in September 1964.

The President's statement was preceded by several undertakings directly in conjunction with the U.S. military establishment. In 1958 the work of developing an antisatellite weapon was begun within the framework of several programs, one of which was the famous "Spacetrek" program. By 1961, four full-scale models of the Saint antisatellite weapon were already being built. All publications about military satellites were prohibited in February of the next year in connection with the intensification of work in this field. Although the Saint project was abandoned for a number of reasons, the development of more promising models continued. In particular, various methods of destroying enemy satellites were investigated, including such "exotic" methods as "blinding" the other side's space vehicles by spraying paint on their optical sights, scattering metal balls in their orbits, etc. Preference, however, was given to systems utilizing available components. An Air Force program proposed the use of a modified Polaris missile, while the Army insisted on the deployment of the Nike-Zeus land-based antisatellite system, which had been tested in 1963, on the atoll of Kwajalein. It was assumed that this system was retired in 1968, but Air Force Thor missiles were kept in a state of 5-minute readiness on Johnston Island in the Pacific until 1975 and they can still be put back in action within 6 months if the need for this should arise. The work on space-based antisatellite weapons also began in the early 1960's.⁴

The new steps toward the militarization of space in the late 1970's and early 1980's were certainly not taken in a vacuum. In terms of the size of its appropriations, the technical equipment and general state of its industrial

base, and its supply of highly skilled manpower, the U.S. space industry is surpassed only by the arms industry. More than half a million scientists, engineering and technical personnel and workers in the aerospace industry are engaged in its projects. Space program guidelines are a matter of primary concern to U.S. political leaders, the military establishment and large monopolies. Presidential candidates are expressing their views on the future use of space.

The entire process of the militarization of space was given perceptible additional momentum after the American side unilaterally broke off the Soviet-American talks on antisatellite systems in 1979. Nevertheless, the new administration felt the need to take a number of additional steps in this direction. The most significant were the following:

On 2 October 1981 President Reagan announced a strategic arms modernization program, underscoring the important role of space equipment as an element of the control, communication and reconnaissance system and an element of strategic defense, including space-based ABM and antisatellite systems;

On 21 June 1982 the Air Force announced the creation of a space command on 1 September. "It is clear that the use of satellites in warfare is of vital importance to all of us," General L. Allen, then Air Force chief of staff, said in connection with this event;⁵

On 4 July 1982 the White House published a presidential directive on national space policy. It said that "the United States will continue developing potential antisatellite systems";

On 23 March 1983 the President made a statement on matters of military policy and a "new defensive concept." Subsequent White House explanations indicated that this also meant the further intensification of the use of space for the deployment of weapons there;

On 1 October 1983 the Navy formed its own space command, similar to the Air Force command.

In light of these measures, the statements by official Pentagon spokesmen about the inevitability of war in space and about the need to attain superiority in this field, statements made in April 1983 at the annual NASA convention in Florida, did not come as a surprise. "Space is already a sphere of military actions," Rear-Admiral W. Ramsey, director of the naval space systems agency, said. "Operations in space will necessitate the attainment of superiority in this area," agreed Colonel S. McElroy, assistant chief of the Air Force space agency. "Space wars are inevitable," Colonel E. Walnwegan, representing the space command, remarked as his contribution to the "discussion." These allegations are not new either. For example, H. Mark, formerly the secretary of the Air Force and now NASA assistant director, said in an address to the Senate back in 1980 that the development of the potential of space-based weapons is one of the most important elements of the development of U.S. strategic forces, because this would lead to the quicker attainment of superiority. A year later, the WASHINGTON STAR printed an article with the

intriguing title "The Move to Space-Age War" by General D. Graham, who, as the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, must be regarded as an informed source. The general also believes that military efforts in space "will help the United States regain its strategic superiority to the Soviet Union."

In August 1981, President R. Reagan ordered a review of space policy so that future programs could have a "Reagan" structure. It is indicative that the job was assigned to the National Security Council.

The analysis resulted in the abovementioned directive on national space policy, in accordance with which an interdepartmental group was formed to study proposed changes in space policy and brief the President on major problems in space exploration. The head of the group was the President's national security adviser. The composition of the group is indicative. It includes the deputy secretary of defense, the director of the CIA, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

A committee in charge of space operations was created under the jurisdiction of the Defense Department. The Air Force formed a special committee for the planning and analysis of space operations, a new space directorate under the jurisdiction of the Air Force deputy chief of staff, etc.

The Air Force space command began operating as part of the Department of Defense on 1 September 1982. The functions of this specialized organization include the following:

The centralized management of the planning and performance of military operations in space;

The creation of an organizational link coordinating R & D with Pentagon requirements;

The management of communications between the Pentagon and industry and of purchasing policy in this field.

The space command was made responsible for putting military payloads in space on board the space shuttle and launching antisatellites and other military satellites (reconnaissance, communication, meteorological, etc.).

Last November the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the four branches of the armed services create a unified space command. The appearance of this new organizational unit in the Pentagon system raised the hopes of many supporters of space weapons. The views of this group were quite unequivocally expressed by Congressman K. Kramer (Republican, Colorado). The formation of this command, he said, would be "an important step in the direction of the frontier the President spoke of--the creation of a space ABM system."

A new Air Force space equipment center, combining a geophysical laboratory, jet propulsion laboratory and arms laboratory, was formed at the same time as the space command.

As a pretext to justify the militarization of space, the United States is using the notorious slogan of the "Soviet military threat," transforming it in this case to the "USSR threat from space" and the "Soviet military superiority in space." Sometimes these arguments are so groundless that they have to be refuted even by members of the U.S. administration. This was the case in 1975, when the American press spread the rumor that "an American satellite was blinded by laser beams from Siberia" and when then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld acknowledged soon afterwards that there had been a "misunderstanding." The NBC and ABC television networks' lies about "the Soviet Union's preparations for space warfare" are a newer example (March 1982). They declared that "a Soviet military station, from which small missiles can be launched to destroy American satellites," was already in space. This "news" led to an outburst of lobbying activity and, in particular, allowed General D. Graham, former director of the Pentagon's intelligence agency, to demand the development and deployment of 432 American combat satellites in space.

It is quite indicative that Pentagon spokesmen are shamelessly misrepresenting the content and goals of the Soviet space program, taking advantage of the fact that average Americans, and even the majority of congressmen, have little knowledge of a field as diverse and complex as space travel. The hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the arms race and the militarization of space serve as one example of this. When Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering R. DeLauer discussed the Soviet program in his testimony, he made up for the lack of other data by including the "Salyut-7" space station and communication satellites of the "Molniya" class among the Soviet military systems.

The most dangerous aspects of the militarization of outer space are connected with potential direct hostilities in space. Above all, the potential broad spectrum of these actions--from the disruption of normal operations to all kinds of "inspections" of foreign space vehicles to their destruction--must be taken into account. The United States regards the prospect of potential antisatellite systems (PAS) as the most realistic and readily attainable goal. By threatening the destruction of enemy satellites serving to maintain the strategic balance, antisatellite systems will destabilize the international situation and stimulate the arms race.

The United States has begun working on "space defense" programs. Directives which were signed in March 1983 and which outlined U.S. strategic policy up to the end of 1989 propose the creation of potential capable of "depriving an adversary of the possibility of using space systems." The development of anti-satellite weapons, tests of which are now on the American Air Force agenda, is regarded as one way of attaining this goal. The Vought Corporation's two-stage MELS homing missile, launched from an F-15 plane (the ASAT system), has been assigned the highest priority.⁶ Standard elements are being used widely in the project to speed up the work: The first stage of the missile was taken from the SRAM guided missile projectile, and the second is the solid-propellant engine designed for the Scout booster-rocket. Two squadrons of fighter planes on the Langley (Virginia) and McCord (Washington) Air Force bases are to be equipped with antisatellite weapons.

"Conventional" antisatellite weapons, involving less technical risk but having only "limited potential," are to be developed. Three heavy antisatellite models of the guided projectile type for direct interception will be built.

American military and political leaders are pretending to be unaware of the fact that the creation of these systems will erect an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of their reliable prohibition: The small size of a missile launched from a fighter plane will certainly complicate the verification of any agreement. The dismantling of these systems at some time in the future does not appear to enter into the plans of the American military community, hypnotized by the mirage that "successfully operating systems could paralyze the strategic defense of any country without even touching a single missile."

Another reason for the high priority of antisatellite weapons is that they essentially represent a finished element capable of becoming a component of the ABM system constituting the basis of the new defensive concept announced by R. Reagan on 23 March 1983. In particular, the "High Frontier" program suggests that a few hundred satellites, which will supposedly constitute a reliable U.S. defense, should each carry 50 MELS projectiles.

The plans and actual prospects of the development of energy beams in the United States constitute a separate topic, demanding separate investigation. People in the Pentagon associate plans for the development of these weapons, especially laser weapons, with the resolution of a broad range of problems, including the creation of first-nuclear-strike potential under the cover of space defense. Some experts believe that space-based laser weapons could bring about a genuine revolution in the strategic balance. This is why this field of research is the object of so much attention. Citing a "classified government report," the WASHINGTON POST said that these weapons could be ready for testing by 1993.

The Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working on three major projects: "Alpha"--the creation of a chemical laser with a force of up to 5 megawatts and with ground tests planned for the middle of the 1980's; "Lode"--the experimental demonstration of the laser beam focusing system, with tests scheduled for the same dates; "Talon Gold"--the perfecting of the laser beam guidance and tracking operations. In 1987 a laser weapon is to be tested with the use of the space shuttle, envisaging the tracking of targets at a distance of around 1,500 kilometers.

A method of destroying space targets and strategic targets with the aid of installations on earth is also being considered. The Air Force has already spent several years considering the establishment of an experimental base in the Kirtland Arms Laboratory (New Mexico), equipped with two powerful laser installations with a range of up to 740 kilometers for the destruction of enemy space equipment. When the President's assistant for science and technology policy, G. Keyworth, was interviewed by the WASHINGTON POST in connection with Ronald Reagan's speech of 23 March, he said that one "extremely promising" ABM concept presupposes the use of a gigantic laser on earth with huge orbiting mirrors guiding its beams to enemy missiles.⁷

It is significant that space-based laser weapons, just as antisatellites, could be used in missile defense and in satellite defense.⁸ In this context, some specialists regard the laser as a "superweapon," capable of radically changing the world correlation of forces. In their opinion, an effective space ABM system or even an antisatellite system could nullify many achievements in the sphere of intercontinental nuclear weapon delivery systems, the satellite-aided collection of information and space communications.

This idea is quite popular among some U.S. legislators. Senator M. Wallop (Republican, Wyoming), an active supporter of the stepped-up development of laser weapons and the head of a bipartisan group of at least 100 members of Congress who advocate a dramatic increase in funds for these weapons, said quite frankly that with their help, the United States could make "the modern strategic arsenal of a potential adversary useless."⁹

The significance attached to this weapon is attested to by large and constantly increasing appropriations. By the end of fiscal year 1982 total appropriations for the laser weapon reached 2 billion dollars. The request for FY 1983 was 433.3 million.

The Pentagon has firmly attached the militarization of space to the space shuttle project. The need to put military payloads of various types in orbit has been arising more frequently. A fleet of several space shuttles is an important part of Pentagon plans. Almost half of the 70 flights scheduled up to September 1987 will be made in line with Defense Department programs. The flight schedule testifies that the Pentagon is striving to "militarize" the flights of this new space vehicle as much as possible. The significance attached to this program is attested to by Ronald Reagan's order not to make any changes in it without his personal approval. The space shuttle is the largest project in the U.S. space program since the Apollo project. The cost of the project, within the framework of which four or five spaceships are to be built, has been estimated at over 18 billion dollars. Two ships ("Columbia" and "Challenger") have now made 10 flights. Although NASA was responsible for the development of the shuttle, Defense Department interests were always taken into account. For example, military requirements dictated the larger cargo bay and the heightened maneuverability of the vehicle upon entry into the atmosphere. In turn, the Defense Department "supported" NASA when the agency budget was being discussed in the Congress, as a result of which the program was not cut when the total agency budget was reduced.

The directive on national space policy signed by R. Reagan frankly states that flights connected with national security will be given priority in shuttle launchings.

The U.S. Department of Defense is building its own launching site for the shuttle on Vandenberg Air Force Base and is taking a number of additional steps to secure the secrecy of its own flights from the NASA launching site on Cape Canaveral, because the shuttle carries payloads only to low orbits but many Defense Department satellites are designed for deployment in permanent orbits (at an altitude of 36,000 kilometers). The Pentagon is financing the development and production of an interorbital towing vehicle for the subsequent transfer of space vehicles from a low orbit to a permanent one.

The next step, according to American forecasts, in the U.S. military establishment's modernization of the space shuttle family will be the use of vehicles of the "Cruiser" type (single-seater manned space vehicles designed to be launched into orbit from the shuttle cargo bay), which could be used in a global ABM system. Plans to build a special military "mini-shuttle" have also been reported. The possible functions of this vehicle would include the inspection of satellites, their destruction and the surveillance of enemy territory from altitudes "too high for planes and too low for satellites." Research is already being conducted in this field, and these space vehicles will be used close to the end of the 20th century or even in the 21st. Certain requirements have already been made. The military spaceships must have qualities the shuttle lacks: low cost, survivability, heightened maneuverability, emergency launch potential, security, etc.

The prospect of emplacing weapons of various types, including nuclear ones, in outer space is associated with the possibility of a network of permanent orbital stations. The military has displayed an interest in projects of this type for a long time. The recently created Air Force space directorate considers one of its primary jobs to be the search for new fields for the military use of the inhabited orbital stations designed by the Johnson and Marshall centers (NASA subdivisions). Judging by the past relationship between military and civilian sectors of American space travel, we can assume that the Defense Department will give NASA limited financial support in its R & D in this field so that it will be able to use these stations for military purposes in the future.

The continuation of the militarization of outer space will require new gigantic non-productive expenditures and will intensify signs of crisis in the U.S. economy--this is the conclusion of many American economists. The cost of building one of the most ambitious military-space systems--the space-based laser weapon, whose functions will be confined to antisatellite activity--will be around 50 billion dollars. It will take approximately the same amount to build a laser weapon for ABM needs. A system of this type for antimissile defense could cost taxpayers up to a trillion dollars. According to the data of the so-called "inter-agency report," representing the combined conclusions of two commissions, one of which was headed by former NASA Director J. Fletcher, the most "modest" space-based antimissile system will cost around 94 billion dollars in its initial form. Apparently, the Republican senator from South Dakota, L. Pressler, was justified in expressing his fear that within 10 years the United States will be spending as much on the arms race in space as it is spending now on the conventional arms race.

It is obvious that the development of new types of space weapons will usher in a qualitatively new stage of the arms race, based on the extensive use of the most advanced technology. By embarking on this road, the U.S. administration is trying to create another sphere of military competition in addition to attaining its military policy goals.

The continuation of this game of using scientific and technical achievements to militarize outer space poses a direct threat to peace. In connection with this, Yu. V. Andropov advised "every possible effort to ensure that the

achievements of the human intellect which have accelerated scientific and technical progress will not be used to hurt people" and that space exploration be conducted "only for peaceful purposes, only for the good of mankind."¹⁰

High-level political and military officials of the current Washington administration are trying to pacify public opinion with the allegation that a war in space, even one involving nuclear weapons, will exclude the possibility of hostilities on earth and will not injure anyone's territory. In this way, the groundless military-political theories about the possibility of "limited" wars are being transferred to a new sphere. Many serious experts in the United States have called these views extremely dangerous.

The genuine guarantee of the security of any country is not "space defense" or antisatellite systems, but a consistent policy of disarmament and, as its logical continuation, the refusal to deploy weapons where there are none thus far--in outer space. A solid foundation for this can be found in the Soviet proposals recorded in the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space or from space against the earth, reinforced by the announcement of a unilateral moratorium on the launching of all types of antisatellite weapons. The United States' reaction to this is well known: It isolated itself from everyone, even its NATO allies, by casting the only vote against a corresponding draft resolution at the latest session of the UN General Assembly. In this way, the U.S. administration unequivocally informed the world that its plans to prepare for "star wars" are unchanged.

FOOTNOTES

1. Also see V. Avduyevskiy, "Space Should Be Peaceful," KOMMUNIST, 1983, No 15.
2. "Antisatellites," Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, Wash., 10 May 1981, p 7.
3. PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 3 July 1982.
4. THE NATION, 25 March 1978, p 334.
5. SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 22 June 1982.
6. The ASAT system, designed to destroy targets in orbit close to the earth, was tested this January. "During the tests a missile was launched into outer space from an F-15 fighter plane flying at a high altitude. According to a U.S. Air Force spokesman, the missile was not aimed at any specific target. However, he remarked that special 'satellite-targets' will be used in subsequent tests.

"The U.S. Air Force plans to spend 1.4 billion dollars on the development and construction of the ASAT system. The deployment of the system, scheduled for 1987, will cost tens of billions of dollars" (PRAVDA, 24 January 1984).

7. THE WASHINGTON POST, 25 March 1983.
8. A. A. Kokoshin, "The U.S. Debates on the Plans for the Space ABM System,"
SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 11.
9. LOS ANGELES TIMES, 21 June 1982.
10. PRAVDA, 29 April 1983.

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SOCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. MILITARIZATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 12 Apr 84) pp 120-127

[Conclusion of discussion organized by Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences; first half of article printed in issue No 4, 1984; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Yu. N. RIGIN. THE GROWTH LIMITS OF MILITARY SPENDING. The federal budget deficit almost reached 200 billion dollars in fiscal year 1983. But the administration feels that the deficit in, for example, 1988 could amount to around 300 billion dollars if present trends in government spending should continue.

Under these conditions, American economists are asking a valid question: Is the Reagan Administration capable of finding financing for its military programs without having an extremely negative effect on U.S. rates of economic growth in the 1980's? There are sufficient grounds for these doubts. After all, this is a matter of military expenditures measured in hundreds of billions of dollars, and the tendency toward their growth is becoming stronger. In order to finance these expenditures and to fulfill existing financial obligations, the administration, working through the Department of the Treasury, would have had to increase its indebtedness to banks and other creditors by no more and no less than 326 billion dollars, according to estimates, in 1983 alone. As a result, the government's share of the total loans and credits obtained in the United States would have risen to 71.5 percent, as compared to 35 percent just 3 years ago. Just the interest payments on the public debt should have exceeded 127.7 billion dollars in 1983, representing around 15.8 percent of all federal expenditures and 4 percent of the GNP.

Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration, reluctant to give up its militarist policy line, sees no other solution but the even more active penetration of the domestic money market for the acquisition of the extra financing it needs, even though it realizes that this creates the fiercest competition for private companies needing loans to finance their enterprises.

Under these conditions, it is not likely that private corporations will accept the federal government's massive invasion of the credit market for long. The days when American firms could use their own funds to finance their production

are long gone. Now they have to use outside sources for up to 40 percent (or even more) of the financing they need. They either borrow it from commercial banks, insurance companies and credit establishments or they issue stocks and bonds on the U.S. money market. In 1981, for example, American firms invested 377.1 billion dollars in the economy. Outside sources (loans and securities) accounted for more than 147.2 billion, or 39 percent of all private investments.¹

Many private companies face the actual prospect of not having enough funds to finance their production in the future, particularly since the high demand for bank credit on the part of the government (but actually the Pentagon) will cause interest rates to rise, according to experts, and will seriously limit the loan opportunities of private companies. Insufficient funds for capital investments will impede economic development by lowering growth rates, and this will certainly have negative implications for the laboring public. "The main concern of observers on Wall Street, bankers and leaders of the business community is that," U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT commented, "deficits and huge loans...will jeopardize our tenuous upswing."

This is the reason for American economists' serious worries about the economically sound growth limits of military spending. At what level will these expenditures have an essentially devastating and disorganizing effect on even a peacetime economy? In this connection, the criteria and economic indicators to be used for calculations of this kind are being debated.

To date, American specialists have usually tried to use the general indicator of the GNP for this purpose. "The main factor limiting consumption, investments and appropriations for military needs and other undertakings on the government level," C. Hitch and R. McKean, the authors of "The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age," state, "is the factor of government production potential, measured in terms of the GNP, based on the full use of all resources." In connection with this, American experts have pointed out the fact that the United States spent almost half of the entire GNP on military needs during World War II (46 percent in 1944), the figure was around 15 percent of the GNP during the local war in Korea (1953), but during the years of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam (1965-1972) the figure--DUE TO AN OVERALL INCREASE IN THE GROSS PRODUCT--fell to 9 percent, although in absolute terms Pentagon average annual expenditures were almost 1.5 times as high as during the Korean War.

American economists are putting forth new arguments in favor of the use of a broader group of economic indicators to calculate the scales of economic militarization and the economic impact of military spending. This approach warrants our investigation.

Yu. I. BOBRAKOV. IRRETRIEVABLE ECONOMIC LOSSES. A scientific analysis of the effects of militarization on the U.S. economy is exceptionally important as an element of the struggle against the danger of war and for the consolidation of peace, arms reduction and disarmament.

The problems engendered for the United States by the arms race in past years might appear to be only a prelude to the even more serious difficulties

connected with the current administration's military programs. These programs are attaching the economy to the arms race more closely than ever before by absorbing production, scientific, technical and other resources on an incomparably greater scale than ever before. Suffice it to say that the Reagan Administration plans to spend almost 2 trillion dollars on military purposes in 1983-1987.

It is extremely important to study the quantitative aspects of the country's economic losses due to the arms race. This kind of analysis, based on a number of indicators, can be found in a recently published book by a group of economists from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, "SShA: voyennoye proizvodstvo i ekonomika" [The United States: Military Production and the Economy]. They estimate postwar losses resulting from the arms race--for example, estimates of the increasing underproduction of end product. In 1979, for example the value of this underproduced product was in the range of 295-469 billion dollars, and total irretrievable economic losses incurred by the American society as a result of militarization, calculated as underproduced end product, amounted to 3.4-3.5 trillion dollars (in 1972 prices) over the postwar period (up to the end of 1979). In other words, the U.S. economy lost products equivalent to several times the 1979 GNP in just 33 years. If there had been no arms race, average annual rates of rise in labor productivity in the United States (according to calculations for 1947-1979) could be 1.3-1.5 times as high as the actual rates, and the public standard of living in 1979 could have been 24-36 percent higher than the actual standard.²

More and more American economists are expressing serious worries about the possible consequences of a long-term policy of militarization. For example, doubts about Washington's ability to simultaneously increase military spending, lower taxes and balance the budget are expressed in the book "The Reagan Experiment." The authors stress that "if the Congress does not take action to correct this situation, the country will enter a period of protracted and growing deficits of unprecedented dimensions."³ As early as the beginning of 1981, L. Thurow said that the administration could not act on its plans without jeopardizing economic development. This will unavoidably create more problems with resources and will complicate the "reindustrialization" that is the subject of so much discussion in the United States.

According to the estimates of Professor S. Melman, the administration's projected military expenditures for just 1981-1986 will be equivalent to over a third of the value of all reproduced national wealth by the end of 1975. Analyzing the possible effects of military programs on the national production base, C. Schultze concluded that around 30 percent of the "goods" portion of the GNP would be absorbed by the military sphere over the next 4 years.

The militarization of the economy is being financed to a considerable extent by other capitalist countries. For instance, the growing U.S. public debt, which has already gone far beyond the trillion-dollar mark, has necessitated the more frequent issuance of government bonds on the capital market by the Department of the Treasury. Since government possibilities for the use of the domestic credit market are diminishing, more loans are being requested in the international market. In this way, the resources of other countries are being

used to finance the U.S. public debt, the growth of which is largely connected with the increase in military spending.

V. M. KUDROV. THE MILITARY SECTOR AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION. The statement about the ABSOLUTE economic uselessness of military spending and military production seems debatable to me. If this were the case, the products of the military sector should not be included in calculations of the GNP, labor productivity and other indicators. We cannot say that the military sector does not participate in social reproduction. It uses production resources and creates a demand for specific products, but it does not create any wealth for subsequent participation in social reproduction. These are its distinguishing features.

As an instrument for the redistribution of national income, the military expenditures of the bourgeois state are not completely worthless. To some degree, they are responsible for scientific and technical progress, they help business to compensate for the tendency toward a decline in profit norms and, consequently, they sustain the investment process. Besides this, we must consider the export of weapons, which has a direct commercial purpose in addition to everything else.

Therefore, the indirect effect of military expenditures on social reproduction is obvious. It is quite a different matter that these expenditures would have a much greater economic impact if they were to be channeled in another direction, but the absolute denial of their impact would be an oversimplification.

At the same time, it is quite clear that Ronald Reagan's military program, aimed at the buildup of U.S. military strength rather than the economy, effectively contradicts his economic program, aimed at economic "recovery," the modernization of the production system and the development of a new production structure, which will be more in line with changing national requirements and, of course, with the interests of scientific and technical progress. The military program is not only diverting resources from more productive and effective use, but is also "working" directly against such central aims of "Reaganomics" as, for example, the elimination of budget deficits. It is no coincidence that Japan is now ahead of the United States in terms of several important economic, scientific and technical indicators and has become the world's most successful competitor in the production of several important manufactured goods. Whereas many technical innovations are classified and are used on a limited scale in military production in the United States, Japan has emphasized their mass production and rapid commercialization. This has a strong impact on the entire reproduction process and on the prices and competitive potential of products.

According to Japanese experts, expenditures on R & D in Japan are only a third as high as in the United States. Japan's expenditures on military research, however, are only equivalent to a hundredth of U.S. expenditures and its expenditures on space research are only one-twentieth of the U.S. figure. The proportion accounted for by military spending in the GNP is one-sixth that in the United States. In America the excessive concentration of the most capable scientists and engineers in military research has depleted several civilian

industries and has become an important factor in their technical underdevelopment. For example, in the steel industry in 1980, there were 3,800 researchers in the United States and 4,400 in Japan; R & D expenditures in this industry were three times as high in Japan as in the United States. It is not surprising that the technical level of steel production is higher in Japan. If Japan agrees to a rapid increase in military spending, this will certainly have a negative effect on its economy and on the competitive potential of its industry and its goods in the world market. And whenever the United States urges Japan to do this, it is probably taking this possibility into account.

Nevertheless, I feel that there is no DIRECT connection between the level of military spending and the state of the national economy. The 1970's in the United States were extremely indicative in this respect. For example, when the proportion accounted for by military expenditures in the GNP decreased slightly, the state of the economy grew worse under the influence of many factors. The growth of the GNP and of labor productivity slowed down and the level of real wages declined. At the beginning of the 1980's the abrupt rise in military expenditures was accompanied by the continued deterioration of major economic indicators, particularly in connection with the latest cyclical economic crisis (1980-1982). Now the crisis has been overcome, an economic upswing has begun, but the level of military spending is still rising.

G. S. Khozin. "SPIN-OFF": ORGANIZATION AND EFFECTIVENESS. The "spin-off" process, as the transmission of the findings of military and space research to civilian industries is sometimes called, is developing quite rapidly in the United States and seems to have given some industries perceptible economic advantages far exceeding the cost of transmitting achievements from one sector to another. Obviously, we should remember that this process was engendered and developed within the capitalist economy, with its inherent tendency toward the one-sided use of the results of scientific and technical progress for military purposes. A direct result of this tendency is the chronic shortage of many types of material and financial resources in several civilian industries. It is precisely the inability of these industries to organize their own scientific research that compels them to seek ways and means of incorporating the secondary results of military R & D.

The term "spin-off" is used in two senses. According to the annual NASA report, which summarizes the results of this agency's work in the transmission of achievements from the space program to other sectors: "Specifically, the spin-off represents thousands of products and (technological) processes which came into being as a result of the secondary use of aerospace equipment and technology. In the broader sense, the spin-off includes both indirect, secondary forms of use and the direct transmission of equipment and technology (to other sectors)." Therefore, this is a matter of analyzing existing scientific and technical achievements, administrative methods and other elements of the experience of the aerospace industry and other military industries for the purpose of determining their "symmetry" with the needs of other sectors of the economy. In this case, "symmetry" signifies the correspondence of the function, structure, dimensions and other characteristics of certain parts, components or complete systems used in military or space programs to the characteristics of

products that can be produced by other industries and used as components of items or systems for civilian use. The firm purchasing the innovation simply analyzes the sale possibilities of the new product, which came into being in military production but in a slightly different form can, in combination with other products, be used widely for civilian purposes.

The analysis of military products from this standpoint is also stimulated by the desire of military-industrial corporations with numerous innovations to obtain additional profits by means of the secondary, and often the repeated use of their technical, technological and administrative achievements in other sectors of the economy. This helps to accelerate and expand the sphere of the turnover of part of the capital invested in the military industry. The analysis of the correspondence of specific innovations of the military industry to the requirements of potential civilian clients is relatively cheap for military-industrial corporations. The profits, on the other hand, are quite substantial. As for the client firms, or the recipients of innovations from the military and space industries, they have an interest in acquiring technical designs and other innovations that are ready or almost ready for incorporation, because this costs them less than the organization of their own research, which often requires considerable time as well as resources.

The "spin-off" is accomplished in two ways in the United States--under government control or by military-industrial corporations working independently. The organizational structure of government control over the transmission of innovations from the aerospace industry, which works on space projects and on numerous projects involving weapon systems, particularly nuclear missiles, has been most highly developed and perfected in NASA, where the department in charge of the applied use of space technology includes a technological transmission office. NASA has a special subdivision or official in charge of the "spin-off" process in each of its research centers. Besides this, special centers have been opened in all parts of the United States to oversee this process.

In the 1970's several major U.S. research projects were conducted to analyze the economic aspects of the diffusion of innovations from the aerospace industry and the stimulating effect of investments in the space program. These were the projects of Midwestern Institute and the Mitre and Chase Econometrics corporations. They concluded that the transmission of achievements from the space program had a perceptible economic impact. I will remind you of one of these conclusions: Although the Apollo project cost 25 billion dollars, its stimulating effect on the economy (in connection with the diffusion of innovations, the general expansion of production, the mastery of new types of science-intensive products, etc.), which should take effect over no less than a 20-year period, was estimated at 175 billion dollars.

V. A. NAZAROV. THE BALANCE OF NEGATIVE AND "POSITIVE" EFFECTS. The opinion that militarization accelerates production growth and development and consequently promotes, all other conditions being equal, the reduction of unemployment and a resulting rise in the standard of living of the laboring public, is quite popular in bourgeois science and social thought in the West, particularly among part of the working class in the capitalist countries. These views do much to restrict working class participation in the peace movement.

This is largely due to the fact that the militarization of the economy is a contradictory process. Furthermore, the aspects of this process which promote production growth are apparent on the surface, while the decelerating machinery is concealed from the average citizen. Each person in the bourgeois world can see that capitalist firms which receive military contracts from the government begin to expand production and hire new workers. This is the reason for the conclusion that militarization has a beneficial effect on production and employment. Each person can see that the government hires many talented engineers and scientists for military research, often providing them with much better conditions for scientific work and better living conditions than they would have in the civilian research sphere. This is the reason for the conclusion that militarization has a "beneficial effect" on scientific and technical development.

What specific arguments can contradict this interpretation of the role of militarization?

First of all, there are the facts. They testify that the highest rates of economic development of the postwar period have been recorded in capitalist countries with the lowest military expenditures (Japan and the FRG in the 1950's prior to the increase in military spending), while states with the highest percentage of military expenditures in the GNP (the United States and Great Britain) head the list of large capitalist countries with declining production growth rates.

Data on the production dynamics of all developed capitalist countries also testify to the decelerating effect of a high level of militarization. Militarization has the greatest impact on the manufacturing industry. If the developed capitalist countries are divided into two groups, with the first consisting of states with a high percentage of military expenditures in the GNP (the United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden and South Africa), and the second consisting of states with a lower percentage (Canada, Italy, Spain, Japan, Austria, Australia, Denmark, Switzerland and Finland), the total increase in the output of the manufacturing industry over 1970-1978 is 26.2 percent for the first group and 30.6 percent for the second.⁴

The following basic features of the decelerating effect of militarization on the development of the productive forces of the capitalist society can be distinguished.

1. The products of labor produced in this society generally contribute to the development of production: Manufactured means of production are used for the preservation, expansion and improvement of the material and technical base of production, and manufactured consumer goods secure the reproduction of manpower. Exceptions to this rule are weapons and luxuries, which are of essentially no benefit to production. Consequently, all other conditions being equal, a higher percentage of productive forces used in arms manufacture means worse material conditions for production development.

2. Obviously, the uselessness of weapons for physical production means that the labor of the scientists and engineers employed in arms production represents

a substantial direct deduction from labor used in the improvement of physical production. A higher percentage of scientists and engineers engaged in the development and improvement of weapons implies worse conditions for production. A person would have to be very naive to believe that the secondary results of military research have almost a greater effect on production development than if the personnel of military research laboratories worked on the resolution of scientific and technical problems in modern production instead of developing new types of weapons.

3. The expansion of the capitalist market in connection with military contracts is accomplished in the overwhelming majority of cases at the expense of the market for other products (for example, the government expands the market by placing military orders, but it simultaneously collects the necessary funds in the form of taxes and thereby reduces effective demand). The problem consists in determining the balance of the positive and negative effects of militarization on the size of the capitalist market taking into account the multiplier effect of the transfer of demand from civilian production to military goods, the time variances between the effects of various aspects of militarization on production, the inflationary consequences of militarization, etc. This balance would probably be negative.

4. The transfer of effective demand from civilian sectors of production to military sectors has a particularly adverse effect on the manpower market. This is connected with the higher organic composition of capital in military sectors. According to estimates, manpower accounts for a much smaller part of each thousand dollars spent on military production than the same amount spent on civilian production.

B. M. MAKLYARSKIY. ECOLOGICAL LOSSES. The adverse effects of the military sector of the economy on overall economic development and the extremely dangerous ecological implications of imperialism's arms race have become particularly apparent in recent years.

The very process of stockpiling modern weapons has a destructive effect on the environment. It is depleting many non-renewable natural resources. Military exercises, the construction of military installations and the testing of new weapons, especially nuclear tests, have a ruinous effect on the environment. As early as 1972, a UN conference on environmental protection in Stockholm proposed the condemnation of the arms race and the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. But since they continued and were even accelerated, the scales of the ecological damage resulting from the arms race have grown. According to UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) data, around 1,200 nuclear tests have been conducted since 1945.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) conducted a special study of the effect of nuclear tests on various ecological structures and concluded that the vegetation and sources of water on some islands have a heightened radiation content even 20 years after American atomic bomb tests. The heightened radioactivity that would result from the explosion of a large thermonuclear bomb could cause the deaths of millions of people from cancer and genetic defects in subsequent decades. Furthermore, radiation is known to have

no national boundaries. For example, a radioactive cloud reached North America a few days after some nuclear tests in China in October 1980. Ocean currents can carry radioactive pollution for 3 months. Many cases of the spread of nuclear waste have been recorded in the United States: 16 such cases were recorded just in Hansford (Texas) between 1958 and 1973.

The development and improvement of chemical weapons also pose a threat to nature. Let me remind you that U.S. troops in Vietnam used herbicides to destroy crops and the leaf cover of forests. Dioxin, the most toxic component of the herbicides and defoliants sprayed over the territory of South Vietnam, has been discovered in the organism of American soldiers and officers who were in Vietnam during the war. Herbicide-related diseases have been discovered in 5,000 servicemen.⁵

The arms race requires expenditures of huge quantities of various minerals. According to SIPRI estimates, around 3.5 percent of the annual world consumption of the 10 main metals is used for military purposes in the United States.

The militarization of the U.S. economy is interfering with the resolution of the global energy crisis. In 1973, when the acute shortage of fuel and energy resources in the capitalist world began, the U.S. military establishment was using 36.8 million tons of oil a year--that is, more than twice as much as the amount produced in Western Europe.⁶ Furthermore, due to the huge quantities of fuel and raw materials required by the "god of war," important spheres of the civilian economy must pay extremely high prices for energy resources. In the 1970's this was one of the reasons for the general deterioration of economic conditions, the deceleration of economic growth and the development of inflation in the United States.

In spite of all this, under the conditions of the rapid increase in military spending and the federal budget deficit, the American Government is reducing allocations for environmental protection, although ecological expenditures, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THEIR EFFECT ON ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND EMPLOYMENT, represent an extremely advantageous alternative to higher military spending. According to the estimates of American economists, expenditures on conservation just in 1975--15.7 billion dollars--resulted in the creation or total use of 1 million jobs. Since the start of the Reagan Administration, the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency has been cut by 48 percent (in real terms). This agency is experiencing a shortage of funds for research and a shortage of specialists. Nevertheless, it has to monitor the observance of ecological standards by 60,000 industrial firms and 15,000 transportation firms whose activity could have the most dangerous effect on the environment.

A. M. SHARKOV. THE UNITED STATES--THE PRINCIPAL DESTROYER OF THE ENVIRONMENT. Militarism, particularly the American brand, is the major factor in the destruction and degradation of the environment and is undermining the very conditions of the reproduction of life on earth. The 1970's and early 1980's provided new and stronger evidence that the arms race and the rapacious treatment of world natural resources by U.S. imperialism were related directly to the intensive degradation of the environment. This relationship is no longer apparent only in isolated countries or regions, but on the planetary scale and even in space.

The ruinous effect of the military factor on man's environment is quite varied. It begins with military production, which is much more difficult than civilian production to coordinate with the requirements of environmental protection and restoration, with the reasonable and economical use of natural resources and with the guarantee of normal, healthy conditions for the survival of the human race.

I will cite a few statistics to prove that colossal material and intellectual resources are used in military production. More than 2.1 million people work in U.S. military production--that is, more people than in the other NATO countries combined. The U.S. military industry, which produces three-fourths of all the air missile equipment and half of the small arms of all the NATO countries, absorbs huge quantities of natural resources (this is connected with the fact that the U.S. economy processes a third of all the natural resources produced in the world). The American military industry has also become one of the main polluters of the environment, annually filling the atmosphere with over 140 million tons of particles containing toxic elements.

The peacetime presence of huge U.S. military contingents abroad (545,000 people), the American military bases scattered throughout the capitalist world (1,500 of them), the U.S. nuclear fleet which constantly cruises the world ocean, the essentially continuous maneuvers and exercises conducted by NATO countries under the supervision of American generals and admirals, the military operations of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force, which sometimes involve weapons of mass destruction, and the pollution of the world ocean with radioactive and toxic waste are all inflicting irreparable injuries on nature.

Summing up the results of the discussion, G. Ye. SKOROV said that it had been meaningful and productive. Interesting opinions were expressed on many matters. Perhaps not all of them are sufficiently substantiated, but they will stimulate the further investigation of such matters as the meaning of militarization and its criteria, the quantitative assessment of the degree of economic militarization, the impact of the use of military innovations in the civilian sector, the possible growth limits of resources and the use of resources in the military sphere, and many others.

In addition, it seems that the statements made by some speakers about the relative stimulating effect of military expenditures on economic growth will not diminish the validity of the main conclusion recorded in our literature and reaffirmed in Ye. V. Bugrov's report--the conclusion that military expenditures tend to restrict, and not stimulate, economic development. We have convincing evidence, spanning a fairly lengthy period of time, which indicates that countries with lower levels and growth rates of military spending develop more quickly than countries with high military expenditures, and that expenditures on weapons are far from the most effective method or quickest way of accelerating scientific and technical progress. Apparently, even in the United States this progress would be much quicker if it were not for the militarization of the economy and the careless expenditure of colossal quantities of resources on arms production.

Our discussion will help to promote a fuller understanding of militarization and its socioeconomic consequences. At the same time, it proves that there

are still many gaps in our knowledge in this field, and these gaps must be filled during the course of our future studies.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1982-1983," p 544.
2. "SShA: voyennoye proizvodstvo i ekonomika" [U.S. Military Production and the Economy], Moscow, 1983, pp 48, 49.
3. "The Reagan Experiment," edited by J. Palmer and I. Jawhill, Wash., 1982, p 23.
4. Calculated according to: "1979/80 Statistical Yearbook," N.Y., 1981; "Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1981."
5. ENVIRONMENT, 1980, No 1, pp 21-24.
6. "Warfare in a Fragile World," SIPRI, London, 1980, p 198.

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