No More Bad Force Myths: A Tactical Study of Regimental Combat in Korea, July 1950
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph is to inquire whether or not the traditional explanation of poor peacetime training and unit readiness is adequate to account for U.S. Army defeats during the first month of the Korean War. General histories of the war, such as those written by Roy Appleman, Clay Blair, and T.R. Fehrenbach, identify poor physical conditioning, lack of combat training, low strength and weak small unit leadership as prevalent in all U.S. Army units. The post-1945 drawdown is identified as the root cause of these shortcomings. The Army's equipment was "old and worn" and its soldiers were "undertrained, understrength, ill- equipped." This paper will focus on what happened to the regiments in two of the Eighth Army's three divisions. It will consider the performance of all three of the 24th Infantry Division's regiments between 5-20 July, or from Task Force Smith's first encounter north of Osan to the brutal stand at Taejon. It is this period in particular that historians have identified the materiel, personnel and training weaknesses as being critical, and have, by extrapolation, extended their importance to other units.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 18, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA340611
Entities
People
- Richard E. Wiersema
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College