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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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18 July 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

HUNGARY

Demographic Situation in Southern Hungary (Istvan Gajdocsi Interview; MAGYAR HIRLAP, 12 Jun 84).....	1
Party, State Apparatus Described (Georg Brunner; SUDOST EUROPA, No 3/4, 1984).....	5
Reservists Mobilized for Exercises Near Danube (Laszlo Szabo; NEPSZABADSAG, 5 Jun 84).....	16

POLAND

Nature of, Prospects for Socialism Debated (PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU, No 3-4, 1983, No 1, 1984)..	20
Long Transitional Period, by Jerzy Muszynski	
Democratic People's Republic, by Artur Bodnar	
Socialist Revolution, Communist Civic Education, by Stanislaw Cieniawa	
National, Historical Characteristics, by Jerzy J. Wiatr	

DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN SOUTHERN HUNGARY

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 12 Jun 84 p 4

[Interview with Dr Istvan Gajdocsi, chairman of the Bacs-Kiskun County Council, by Andras Erdelyi; date and place not specified]

[Text] Ten years ago the government passed a resolution on many measures for bringing about a more even growth of population. Since then the population policy has been one of the most debated questions of our socio-intellectual life. "We must act in such a way as to survive"--this statement by Andras Suto became the motto of the demographic debate. But what are all the things that must be taken into account and fundamentally considered to take proper action? Recently the Bacs-Kiskun County Council prepared a detailed report and a forecast extending to the turn of the century on population development in the county.

This report was our starting point in the interview we conducted with Dr Istvan Gajdocsi, the chairman of the county council.

[Question] According to the forecast the population of the county will decline on the average by 1,000 to 2,500 inhabitants annually in the next two decades. The biggest drop can be expected in the second half of the 1980's when this figure will even rise to 3,000. With this, the unfavorable population trend which started at the beginning of the 1960's will essentially be continued. What are the major causes for this?

[Answer] Population change is affected basically by two factors, the ratio of fertility and mortality, and emigration. In the 1950's and 1960's the latter played an important role in the county. The basic cause was that we were industrially undeveloped, labor was unable to find employment, and the better skilled and capable persons tried getting ahead elsewhere. Thus a productive and extremely valuable age group was lost. Nowadays the situation is somewhat different. There is not unemployment, or at the most--as we used to say--only inside the factory gate! To put it plainly, wage management did not provide adequate incentive for labor to flow where competitive production was being conducted. From this arises the contradiction that modern machines are idle in large factories because those who might operate them are earning their bread somewhere in small plants, and obviously a considerably larger portion than they could have earned in a factory.

Against Their Will?

The asymmetries "inside the factory gate" obviously also have an effect outside the factory, that is, they may increase emigration and weaken the balance of the settlement network. But this is not only a question of wage management. . .

[Answer] Indeed not. If we are to take seriously the often-mentioned population-retention strength of the small villages, we must protect primarily the childbearing age group. But to do this an enormous number of other conditions besides manpower management must be established. For example, it is necessary to close the gap between city and village facilities. I am not saying that we must build a theater in every community, but it is necessary to have cafes with music, libraries, and clubs, all of which are in fact attainable. Equally important is the disposition of the villagers, and whether the intellectuals will stay there and deal with the affairs of the settlement; and the status of democracy, whether the voice of the people living there has credibility and effect; for example, at village meetings the extent to which they identify themselves with the lot of the community.

[Question] In recent decades administrative measures have been taken which--at least in their execution--have not always strengthened the above-enumerated feeling in the residents of small settlements. We need think only of the council amalgamations, various districting measures. . .

[Answer] Of the unjustified amalgamations and districting measures! We also established associate communities in our county, but only in cases where it was perfectly clear that it would also be to the advantage of the smaller partner, and where the residents agreed on the action. It is an old truth that people cannot be made happy against their will. I will give an example. A joint council was discussed in the case of Matetelke with its southern Slav population and the Hungarian Tatahaza. There was a rational basis for such action but the residents did not even want to hear of it. With this attempt we aroused mutual antipathies going back many decades. Finally we said that it would be better to let it be and leave everything unchanged. Then came the gas program! On basis of their own decisions and without any kind of outside initiative, the two villagers established an association, and without a filler of central support and with joint resources, gas was introduced into every household. They now only wait permission to light it. . .

[Question] The light which I believe can also be a sign, among other things, of the vitality latent in small villages. But however significant this strength may be, is it enough for actual independence?

[Answer] True independence exists if I myself can decide how to spend what I have. I regard it, for example, as an impossible situation if a

ministerial auditor can ask the communities to account for how they spent their own surplus incomes. Of course, if my pocket is empty, there is no use for me to set fine goals. . . For this very reason the communities must receive more of the goods produced by society, and more ample material sources must be available to them. In distributing central money we seek to bear this in mind, and at the same time we also set conditions. For example, we transfer the requested amount only if the community in question agrees to build, let us say, a road with its own resources. In this way, we try to see to it that it contributes to the joint economic efforts at the place.

In Its Interrelationships

[Question] What we have been discussing thus far may be linked primarily to the question of population-retention strength. But as you mentioned, demographic changes are also affected by another factor, fertility. According to the forecast the decline in the county population in the coming decades will be affected primarily by the number of live births. What council tasks will result from this?

[Answer] The most important is the development of the housing supply. In the next 5-year plan we would like to set aside about 20 million forints for the expansion of credits that may be offered for housing construction. The 20 million forints will actually amount to 40 million because, on the basis of the above-mentioned distribution system, only those settlements may share in this money which contribute an equivalent amount from their own resources. With this method, we will be able to contribute about 100,000 to 150,000 forints to housing construction credit for about 4,000 young families. In addition, of course, we might speak of an enormous task: all the way from the modernization of health facilities to consciousness formation. Population development--as shown by sociologists--is not only a function of the material situation. It is a well-known fact that in general the greatest population increase is in the most neglected conditions. At the same time--to mention a nearby example--the one-child family is not solidly in fashion in the prosperous Bacska. This is true to such an extent that even the Csangoes who settled here from Bukovina--where they withstood the storms of history in their closed world by means of the large family form--converted to the one-child family model after a decade. Therefore, the question is complicated and contradictory enough for us to consider thoroughly all the essential areas of socio-political life in order to take the correct action. This statement is also affirmed by the fact that we started to discuss demographics but quickly arrived at a discussion of democratism.

The Recognition of Interests

[Question] For this very reason, perhaps you will not regard this question as inappropriate to our subject: What can we expect from the new electoral law; how much can it contribute to consciousness formation, the better disposition which you yourself have mentioned?

[Answer] The possibility which the new law offers for establishing a democratic public life has never before existed in Hungary. But in order to make it possible for the statutory provision to stand on its feet, we need above everything else to prepare responsibly for the elections in every respect. The voting technique--particularly with the introduction of a national list--promises to be so complicated that even experts may become confused in explaining it. We should start political education work not at the last moment but now, in order to see that the election will not be a formal action but reflect the actual will of the communities. It is, of course, an additional task that anyone who struggled to obtain a mandate should have the appropriate means for carrying out the representation. That is, we must further expand the sphere of authority of the bodies and the democratism of the representational system. Only in this way can we teach people to be political in recognition of their interests. Our discussion has touched on many subjects, the basis of which was provided by several data and an astonishing forecast which by no means gave cause for clarity of vision. The situation in Bacs-Kiskun County--even if it bears marks deriving from the particular features of this area--does not differ essentially from the national situation. Therefore, we regarded it as enlightening to go through the thoughts described above. Of course, this could not provide a complete, comprehensive and detailed summary of those manifold tasks which fact the state and social organizations--including the councils--and which by some kind of thread are linked with population policy. But at least it may have been made clear by the above that we can and must act! And in fact in such a way that in addition to the immediate tasks of the present we must also keep in mind the more distant future. And to repeat the words of the writer: "In order that we may survive!"

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HUNGARY

PARTY, STATE APPARATUS DESCRIBED

Munich SUDOST EUROPA in German Vol 33 No 3/4, 1984 pp 155-168

[Article by Dr Georg Brunner, professor of public law, eastern law and political science, Wuerzburg University: "Party and State in Hungary"]

[Text] I. The Background

The Hungarian government system, reconstructed after the bloody defeat of the popular insurrection in October 1956 under Janos Kadar's leadership, conforms in all essential features to the Soviet type of communist one-party dictatorship. The political system is divided into the three parts of the party, the state and the social organizations. Those parts are related in such a way that the party holds the supremacy, the state and the social organizations existing in juxtaposition. Article 3 in the Constitution of 1949/72 relates the party's political leadership monopoly only to the society, to be sure, and not--as in most communist constitutions--to the state, yet there is no doubt that the party's leadership role extends to the state which may, after all, be conceived as a part of society.

The deeper sense of the somewhat unorthodox formulation of Article 3 does not lie in any structural constraint on the party dictatorship but in the mild reference to the comparatively generous ways and means by which the party exercises its power. This specifically Hungarian practice of party dictatorship, often referred to as the "Kadar Model," which first made its appearance in the early 1960's, was officially introduced by the eighth party congress in November 1962 and forms the basis for the "program announcement" the 11th party congress issued on 21 March 1975 as the mandatory ideological long-term program for the "developed socialist society." The reform measures taken cautiously yet consistently at that time, while not entirely free from situation-conditioned fluctuations, have brought about, generally speaking, a deconcentration of the system of political power relations and an expanded elbow room for individual freedom.

Among the structural particulars of the Hungarian government system is the relatively modest position taken in it by the organs of external and internal security. These government security apparatuses enjoy also in Hungary some existence of their own, to be sure, are directly accountable to the central party apparatus and only loosely tied in with the state, yet these particulars

show a fairly weak profile when compared with the normal standards in the Soviet hegemonial sphere. In particular, the state security service that was disbanded during the 1956 insurrection has not been reestablished. In the ministry of the interior there are, to be sure, civil authorities exercising functions in the protection of the political system and in espionage, yet they were incorporated in the official organization at large and have no armed units of their own.

The general division of functions among the three parts of the political system is such that the party makes all essential and basic political decisions that are implemented by the state apparatus and the social organizations, the supervision over politically suitable implementation again being a party responsibility. This general division of functions, however, differs from case to case. While the party leadership determines policy guidelines in all areas, in foreign and security policy it also decides on all important individual questions. That setting down the mandatory ideology of the system and its conversion into agitprop practice is a party task, goes without saying. In other fields, notably in economic, social and law policy, the state leadership has gained noteworthy leeway for action in the course of time. The far-reaching economic reforms of 1968 even led to a decentralization of the economic system, through which concrete production and distribution decisions have largely been shifted to the enterprise level and the party and state leadership confines itself to global economic policy decisions. In the part of the system that is made up of the social organizations, the importance of the trade unions has notably grown, which no longer merely serve as the party's transmission belt but to some extent are also meant to represent the workers' interests.

For properly appreciating this functional outline one has to take into account that the party, the state and the social organizations are not juxtaposed in isolation but are in many respects intertwined. That is mainly true of the personnel sphere. Party and state executives are so much tied into wearing different hats that this is in fact an oligarchic leadership group with certain roles distributed among its members. In the outcome of Kadar's personnel policy, that activated the exchange of personnel among the parts of the political system, the distribution of roles has become increasingly more flexible. Along with the classical types of party, state and organizational functionaries there has developed the type of the all-round politician, equally at home in executive positions of the party, the state and the social organizations. Even so, the party executive reserves the right of appointing for leadership positions.

The factual interlinkage among the three parts of the political system is found primarily in that specialists of the state apparatus and of the social organizations are increasingly being drawn into preparing party resolutions, on the implementation of which they then have to report regularly. So the political decision-making process has some feedback effectively integrating the government system. These interlinking relations apply also to the subordinate management levels, where the party organs assume the directional and coordinating tasks. Here the party's personnel competency plays a crucial role. The party sets down the authoritative cadre policy criteria and supervises the appointments for important executive functions in the state, the society and the economy. It is worth noting here that the classical triad of the selection criteria,

"political suitability--expertise--personal leadership qualities," is applied in a position-related and differentiated manner. In line with the Kadar motto, "not being against us means being for us," it is perfectly possible for expertise to rank more highly than political reliability in a given case. In the outcome of such a personnel policy, where even nonparty specialists enjoy good advancement opportunities, the whole governmental and administrative style has assumed strongly pragmatic-technocratic features.

II. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party

The Communist Party, called Party of the Hungarian Working People after incorporating the Social Democratic Party in June 1948, virtually collapsed in October 1956. On 25 October, still during the episode of freedom, Janos Kadar, who had been incarcerated under the Stalinist dictator M. Rakosi, became the party chief. He was supposed to erect a more livable party structure from the heap of ruins renamed Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) on 1 November. And this he did do, under entirely altered political circumstances. During the night following the renaming Kadar vanished in an eastern direction and resurfaced not until 4 November under the protection of Soviet tanks as party and government boss by the grace of Moscow, charged with first liquidating the revolutionary accomplishments and then with reconstructing the communist party dictatorship under Soviet hegemony. By the end of June in 1957 the party reconstruction had been advanced to the point at which a party conference could be convened though it still took more than 2 years to gather enough strength for a party congress. On 29 June 1957, the party conference passed a statute which underwent a total revision at the five subsequent party congresses (1959, 1962, 1966, 1970 and 1975) and was but slightly amended at the 12th party congress in 1980.

1. Party Membership

(a) According to the preamble in its statute, the MSZMP sees itself as the "revolutionary vanguard of the workers class" while it proclaims that it is encompassing the "most progressive segment of the Hungarian people," of which all it asks is that it "appropriate the socialist ideals and goals of the workers class." Such formulations express the relation of fundamental tension between the conceptions of an elite or mass party and a workers or people's party, and which conditions the membership policy fluctuations as to the desirable size and social composition of the party membership.

Hardly anything documents the complete collapse of the party during the insurrection more clearly than the fact that its membership between 1 January and 1 December 1956 shrank from 871,497 to 37,818, i.e. close to 4 percent of the original strength. The party reconstruction commenced with gathering in the scattered residues of old-time communists not overly compromised by their Stalinist past, which was then followed by a massive recruitment of new members who were inclined to support Kadar's centrist course. These pragmatic and reform-oriented forces have by and by replaced the more conservative old-time communists.

In the early 1960's the shift took place from quantitative to qualitative growth. Whereas between 1958 and 1961 the annual rate of growth had still been 7 percent, it would hover around 3 to 3.5 percent in the 1960's. In 1970/71 an undesirable jump to circa 5 percent occurred, which induced the party executive to take restrictive administrative measures. They were soon lifted again, to be sure, yet the general line of moderate membership recruitment has been maintained since 1975 with the result that the annual growth rate since then has remained around 1.5 percent. That is much more than the general population growth, so that the party-bound organizational density of the population keeps growing--a trend the party leadership is now looking at with mixed feelings. By international comparison of communist parties, the MSZMP, with a barely 8 percent membership ratio of the total population, holds a middle ground. The details of that trend are illuminated by the following breakdown:*

	<u>Number of Party Members</u> <u>of which Candidates</u>		<u>Proportion of Total Population</u>
1 June 1957	345,733	-	3.5%
1 August 1959	437,956	35,500	4.4%
31 August 1962	511,965	-	4.6%
30 June 1966	584,849	37,900	5.7%
30 June 1970	662,397	-	6.4%
1 January 1975	754,353	-	7.1%
1 January 1980	811,833	-	7.6%
1 January 1983	852,000 (rounded off)		circa 7.9%

There are various reasons preventing precise data on the social composition of the party membership. Even if one were to go along with the official party statistics and accept their conceptualizations, the intelligentsia, gaged against the overall population, is undoubtedly overrepresented by a proportion of 40 percent of the social structure and the working class is underrepresented by roughly the same proportion. For that reason the party executive has sought for some time to raise the proportion of workers. That objective, however, is thwarted not only by the party's political leadership claim, with which managerial positions occupied by what must be counted members of the intelligentsia in all public domains conform, but also by the fact that according to official party pronouncements the workers precisely turn out to be the most unstable element of the party membership. Only partial data are published about the number of full-time party functionaries allowing none but a rough estimate at a 10,000 to 15,000 magnitude. Along with the workers, the farmers likewise are underrepresented in the party, but the party executive does not consider that ideologically objectionable. It is trying, however, to increase the proportion of two other class-neutral social groups that are greatly underrepresented, the women and the younger age-groups.

(b) The ninth party congress late in 1966 abolished the candidacy status, which had been introduced in 1957, so that the MSZMP has known only a plain party membership since then--contrary to most communist parties. The increased risk inherent in thus doing without the traditional probation period was supposed to be countered by simultaneously stiffening the admission prerequisites, yet they have subsequently again been relaxed. Right now, an admission

*Data computed from party congress proceedings and statistical yearbooks.

application calls for recommendations in writing from two party members with an at least 3-year membership who are acquainted with the applicant from some joint activity. For members of the KISZ youth association, making up half of the applicants, the recommendation from one of the party members may be replaced by a recommendation resolution from the membership meeting of the competent KISZ basic organization, which is done in circa 90 percent of the cases. The minimum age for party admission was reduced from 21 to 18 years in 1970. Party admission is decided by the membership meeting of the competent basic organization, subject to ratification by the next higher party committee. That ensures the control of the party apparatus over the practice of admission.

Party membership comes of course with rights and duties, which are detailed in the party statute. In an overall rating one can today speak of a substantively well balanced special status providing the party members, compared with the unaffiliated, on the whole with a greater political influence, better advancement opportunities and certain other benefits, but also with extra work, reduced leisure, constraints in their private life and higher duties enforced through discipline. On the whole, however, a full-time function is likely to be more crucial than mere party membership. It may be assumed that the specifics referred to are more typical of a nonparty enterprise director or a senior ministerial official than of a lathe operator or messenger who is a party member. The special status, naturally, shows up most notably in party functionaries.

Functionally speaking, the party member's duty of obedience to party resolutions and directives is the most important. That way the party leadership can make its will prevail over the party members engaged in state, economic, cultural and other public organizations, in institutions where the party resolutions are as such not legally binding. To the outside, the duty of obedience is absolute, but within it has been mitigated for some time in that the party member is permitted a "separate opinion," i.e., that he can in matters that are not of an importance of principle express views deviating from official party concepts within certain limits, even after an intra-party resolution was taken.

Party membership terminates by death, voluntary resignation, cancellation and expulsion. As shown by the following listing, death is of course a natural and relatively the most frequent, but by no means the predominant cause:*

	<u>Deaths</u>	<u>Resignations</u>	<u>Cancellations</u>	<u>Expulsions</u>
1962/66				6,605
1966/70	16,053	4,583	9,611	5,006
1970/75	26,247	7,478	15,474	7,133
1975/80	37,588	22,285	18,032	7,928

When one looks at this table more closely, it becomes apparent that resignations, permitted since 1959 and made slightly more difficult since 1970 by having to submit a written explanation for one's resignation, are playing a considerable and, what is more, an increasing role. Remarkably, the most frequent reason

*Data taken from party congress proceedings and relative to the 4-5 year intervals between the various party congresses.

given for resignations, next to illness, age and family problems, is religion. Compared with a party resignation, which is unilateral and requires no consent, cancellation and expulsion are coercive measures ruled on by the membership meeting of the basic organization of the person in question, but subject to a confirmation from the next higher party organ.

Cancellation is an objective measure by which the party can get rid of passive members who have done nothing worse than failed to involve themselves in party work or to pay their membership dues within 3 months after having been told to do so.

Party expulsion is the heaviest party penalty imposed through formal disciplinary procedure. According to official party pronouncements, the most frequent party infractions are various sorts of corruption and an "unethical private life," which notably includes continued excess indulgence in alcohol consumption. The third position here goes to the politically suspicious group of those "deficient in the implementation of party resolutions." Of other party infractions the following types of misconduct are of notable significance: Violation of work discipline, traffic and foreign currency offenses, abuse of office, regular church attendance, failing to return from western countries. This revealing list is hardly typical of the internal configuration of the Hungarian party, which presumably still differs pleasantly from the conditions in other communist parties, yet if for such reasons eight to nine party proceedings per 1,000 party members have to be started in an average year, it is hardly apt to give credence to the vanguard and model character pretended to.

2. Party Structure

(a) The structure of the MSZMP relies on the general organizational principle of democratic centralism. Of the two antithetic elements in this principle the centralist component has always held sway in practice, expressing itself, in particular, in an unconditional subordination by the lower to the higher party organs and their accountability toward everyone, the unrestrained authority of the higher party resolutions, the Central Committee's authority to disband party organizations violating the statutes, and the party discipline and absolute obedience to instructions by all party members. The democratic component embraces mainly the secret election of leadership bodies and their accountability to their party organization and the party members' equality and their unlimited right of appeal and suggestion through channels, in conformity with the addressee's duty to respond.

Though the party elections are by tradition centrally directed and the hierarchic party apparatus has a firm control over plain party membership, the party executive, in accordance with its centralist general line, seeks to allow certain chances of realization to the theoretically proclaimed principles of intra-party democracy. This has led generally to a fairly relaxed atmosphere and, in particular, to opportunities for discussion within the perimeter of personnel and business-like decisions and to a deconcentration of the hierarchical leadership structure inasmuch as the subordinate party organizations do command some margin of decision of their own in affairs of their local activities and pursuant to central party directives. An almost sensational development of the democratic component showed up in the 1983 party elections when in three

countries two candidates each were nominated for the top post of first party committee secretary. Something like that had happened but rarely before; if at all, only on the lowest management levels.

(b) The combination of the territorial and the enterprise principle, the setting up of party organizations on hierarchically graduated management levels, controls the vertical party structure. On the middle and lower management levels, this combination provides preeminence for the territorial principle, so that party organizations are formed mainly in the country's administrative regional units. On the lowest level, on the other hand, in accordance with the enterprise principle, the various types of working establishments give the most important clues for setting up basic organizations.

This way, the MSZMP obtains a vertical structure on the following management levels:

1. Central Party Executive (cf. below under 3).

2. The middle level is made up of the territorial party organizations in the 19 counties and the capital of Budapest. Then there are an additional four party organizations set up, in accordance with the enterprise principle, in politically highly sensitive institutions, the people's army, the border militia, the ministry of the interior and the foreign ministry.

3. The lower level has been greatly restructured in connection with the regional reform of the state administration, effective on 1 January 1984, not yet completed, however. To the end of 1983, the administrative regional units the party structure leaned on finally came to 96 towns, 83 rural districts and the 22 boroughs of Budapest. To be sure, at that time independent party organizations no longer existed in all these regional units. Since the mid-1970's the party organizations in 26 towns and 26 rural districts forming clearly developed economic units were combined into one party organization each as a measure of urban-suburban integration. Thus, prior to the regional reform there were only 175 lower level territorial party organizations (in the 22 capital boroughs, the 70 towns and 57 rural districts, and the 26 combined urban-rural district organizations). In the wake of the regional reform the rural districts were disbanded and their party organizations along with them, their competencies being transferred, in conformity with the authoritative position taken by the Central Committee on 12 October 1983, to the party organizations of the now 108 towns and their circa 40 large-size communities with a legal status brought in line with that of a town. That should then give us today circa 170 territorial party organizations in the towns, large-size communities and the capital boroughs. On the lower management level there are in addition circa 120 party organizations, in the ministries and county administrations, the higher military units, important large-scale enterprises and state institutions.

4. The lowest level is composed of more than 24,000 basic organizations in enterprises, government offices and state institutions as well as in the communal regional units that have at least three party members. Most basic organizations are in the enterprises of industry, agriculture, commerce and transportation, in state administrative offices, organs of jurisprudence, cultural, pedagogical and medical institutions and the units of the armed organs, set up, in other words, in terms of the enterprise principle. Based on the territorial principle, the basic organizations function mainly in the communities

and urban residential districts. The optimal size of a basic organization is considered to be composed of 70 to 80 party members, which is then further broken down into party groups composed of 5 to 15 members. When a place of work or a community is so large that several basic organizations exist there, they set up a party committee or party executive to integrate their leadership. Most basic organizations today fall directly under the authority of the lower management level party committee by way of such executive bodies.

Special rules are in effect for the party organizations in the people's army and the border militia. They are removed from the general party structure in that they are forming their own hierarchical structure and are not accountable to the territorial party organizations. Next to these party organizations it is mainly the political administration apparatus that ensures the party influence in the army and in the border militia.

The details in the party structure and its most recent changes come down to the following:

(c) Collective leadership and individual responsibility are supposed to control the horizontal party structure. This means first of all that the management of party work on all management levels is supposed to be the responsibility of elected collegiate boards. To implement their resolutions, on the one hand, each party member is individually responsible, yet this individual responsibility, on the other hand, also entails the principle that the management of the given party apparatus and its departments is up to an executive party functionary. Though the collegiate authority has been enhanced, in practice it still is the full-time party apparatus that actually exercises the party power.

On the lowest level of the basic organizations the membership meeting is the supreme decision-making organ; it is summoned every 2 months and appoints every 5 years its party executive organ as its collegiate executive organ with its secretary and his deputy. Smaller basic organizations, with fewer than 10 members, appoint only a secretary and his deputy and, at best together with other basic organizations, a joint party executive organ. The party groups of the larger basic organizations are directed by an elected spokesman. Whether the secretaries exercise their functions full time or part time depends on the size and significance of the basic organization. In large basic organizations with more than 200 members, in exceptional cases also with fewer members, and in the case that one enterprise has several basic organizations, a party committee is set up.

In such cases the internal structure of the basic organization becomes more like that of the party organizations on the lower and middle management level, where the party committee, convening at least once every quarter, is the central decision-making organ. The party committee is chosen every 5 years by a party conference, which in turn is composed of delegates from the subordinate membership meetings or party conferences. Since the party committee cannot direct party work on a continuing basis, it appoints an executive commission composed of the most important party functionaries. As auxiliary organs the party committee appoints advisory working commissions--normally on party structure, agitprop, economic and cooperative policy, and on the middle level also on youth policy--and a disciplinary commission that handles investigations and the preparation of rulings in disciplinary proceedings.

The key figure in each party organization is the first secretary. On the lower management level he is usually assisted by one or two additional secretaries, on the middle level, by three to four. Theoretically, they are chosen by the party committee but are actually appointed by the top secretary. They are running the full-time party apparatus, and its organization becomes more complex the higher the management level is. On the county level there are normally five departments: party and mass organizations; propaganda and education; industry, construction and transportation; agriculture; and party management and business management. In addition, there is an administrative executive official. In the capital's party apparatus there is no agricultural department; the industrial department also takes care of the communal economy.

3. The Central Party Executive

The structure of central party organization mirrors the principles of horizontal party structure described above, but it is of course still much more complex.

(a) According to the statute, the party congress is supposed to be the supreme party organ and, especially, to determine the general political line, make decisions on the party statute, and choose the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. What it actually amounts to is a massive propaganda event for between 600 and 850 delegates dispatched from the middle management level delegates conferences by a specific key. Originally, party congresses had to be held every 4 years but, since the statute change of 1975, are to be held every 5 years. In the Kadar era they were held in November and December of 1959, 1962, 1966 and 1970 and in March 1975 and 1980, taking between 4 and 6 days. Though their decisions may be significant, decision-making is not part of these congresses. Their actual function lies in legitimizing the party leadership by acclamation, its mid-term business program explained at greater detail on such occasions, and personnel changes in the top leadership.

(b) The Central Committee, chosen by the party congress, is supposed to take care of all the party business in the intervals between party congresses and appoint the Politburo, the central committee secretariat, the standing advisory bodies, and the executive personnel of the central committee apparatus. For all that, even the Central Committee cannot fulfil the leadership tasks intended for it simply because it does not have what it takes in working techniques for being a permanent decision-making organ. According to the party statute, the Central Committee is to convene at least once every 3 months. That regulation is observed in practice, so that four to five central committee sessions are held annually that usually take one day and sometimes two or three days. In terms of its personnel, the Central Committee is indicating a continually growing tendency that has not been prejudiced by the elimination of the traditional status difference between full members with the right to vote and the candidates with a voice but not a vote in 1966.*

*Specifically, membership figures developed as follows: 1957: 53 members, 10 candidates; 1959: 71 members, 23 candidates; 1962: 81 members, 39 candidates; 1966: 101 members; 1970: 105 members; 1975: 125 members; and 1980: 127 members.

Even though, in comparison with what other communist parties are used to do, sessions are frequent and the volume of new 127 members is moderate, both factors frustrate its independent decision-making, especially when it is taken into account that central committee membership is no full-time job and that often, by drawing on outside functionaries and specialists, so-called "expanded" central committee plena are held. Though little is known about the process of central committee sessions, it can be assumed they serve mainly the dispensation of information, perhaps party executive discussions and consultations, but not, or only in exceptional cases, any decision-making. Central Committee resolutions are likely to come about normally by acclamation and are meant to assign a higher value by way of propaganda to previously made party executive decisions.

Along with such aid given to the political decision process, the most important function of the Central Committee lies in integrating the country's political elite. An analysis of its composition therefore provides interesting indications about the character and weight of the various functional groups in the government system that can bring some influence to bear, via the Central Committee, on central decisions. Roughly one third of the membership is made up of central and regional party functionaries, the strongest group, followed by a bare 30 percent of the primarily central state functionaries. Among the other, and smaller, groups, the representatives of the technical-economic and the scientific-cultural intelligentsia hold a significant place (together circa 15 percent). Of the social organizations the trade unions are most strongly represented (7 to 8 percent), whereas the Patriotic People's Front and the youth, cooperative and women's associations have only 1 to 3 representatives each. At 3 percent each, the representational quota of the army and the ministry of the interior (police) also is relatively small. The importance of the "working people" (workers and employees) is purely decorative; up to 1966 they were not represented in the Central Committee at all; starting in 1975, they have been admitted in fair numbers, to improve the ideological image.

(c) The Central Control Commission has 25 members. In terms of its function, it is placed rather on the periphery of the political decision processes. As the highest disciplinary body and party court, it controls the observance of party discipline and the party's financial conduct and business management. In the wake of the party reforms its position was strengthened when in 1962 the authority of staffing it was transferred from the Central Committee to the party congress and the Central Auditing Commission, thus far in charge of financial controls, was incorporated in it in 1966. Only the chairman and secretary are full-time officials, while plain membership--much like in the Central Committee, if to a lower degree--mainly provides political prestige and some chances to exercise influence.

(d) The Politburo makes all the important decisions. Chosen by the Central Committee from its midst, it "directs party activity in between the Central Committee sessions," according to statute, but it actually replenishes itself through cooptation. This body constitutes the ruling center of the entire government system. Practically nothing is known about its manner of working, except that it normally meets once a week. Its working and decision-making capability is guaranteed by the small number and full-time top function of its members. In 1962, with 13 members and 6 candidates, it reached its biggest size. Since the candidacy status was done away with in 1970, it has regularly

13 members. Though the various members formally enjoy equal rights, they are de facto of unequal weight which, among other things, is due to their main function and the prevailing power constellation.

First Secretary J. Kadar is undoubtedly invested with the greatest amount of power, the party chief in office since the end of 1956 and a temporary chief of government (1956-1958, 1961-1965). He enjoys an uncontested authority and has managed in the course of time to push back the dogmatic elements and staff the Politburo exclusively with adherents to his centralist course. For the rest, the central party functionaries, especially the central committee secretaries, most of whom also belong to this top body, dominate the Politburo. Of the regional party functionaries none but the party boss of Budapest has frequent access to the Politburo.

The state apparatus is in every case represented by the chief of government and some of his deputies. Departmental ministers could be found only among the candidates up to the time that the Politburo was diminished in 1970 (the ministers of defense and education) and reappeared since only temporarily when a Politburo member took charge of the industrial ministry that was set up early in 1981, holding that function until late in 1983. For the rest, the president of parliament was almost always a member of the Politburo till 1980, whereas the chief of state, the president of the presidial council, was not admitted until 1975.

5885

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HUNGARY

RESERVISTS MOBILIZED FOR EXERCISES NEAR DANUBE

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Jun 84 p 6

[Article by Laszlo Szabo: "Danube Crossing--Reservists at the Sopron 84 Exercise"]

[Text] The current of the Danube "drags" at the 40-50 ton steel hulls so that observers on the bank get the impression that it could wash them out to sea if. . . If the soldiers sitting in the steel hulls did not charge against the current again and again in order to master the elemental strength of the river. And it is just this brave opposition that is the secret of success: the water immediately "feels" an uncertain movement and carries the steel hull in the direction of the current however much the engine roars. With one exception every armored transport vehicle gets to the other side. And the Danube is now in flood, the current is very strong, and 13 hard days are already behind those participating in the exercise with the code name Sopron 84. Thus far they have had to carry out a series of interlinked battle tasks in pouring rain and on sodden hillsides. And in addition they are not professional soldiers but rather thousands of reservists, most of whom got their conscript or reserve officer training 6, 8 or 10 years ago. This is the goal of the exercise called Sopron 84--to test the preparedness, knowledge and devotion of those reservists who will be obliged to put on uniform and take up weapons in defense of the homeland, whenever the need arises.

The Chief Commander's Recognition

But this Danube crossing--which is taking place amidst hypothetical battle events making use of many types of transport and fighting vehicles--is, if possible, an even greater test than the exercises of recent days. Only reserve officers and men sit in the floating hulls and from the bank also reservists guide the maneuvers. The current "got" one of the amphibious armored vehicles, the water carries it down in the middle of the river, but the rescue boat gets out to it quickly and with practiced movements the soldiers fasten the heavy steel hull to the rescue boat. And even this is being done by reservists inducted 13 days ago who have not done anything like it for years. But it appears that they were taught well what they needed to know at that time. As for the conscientious, precise execution of the tasks today Maj Gen Sandor Evin, commander of the Sopron 84 exercise, has this to say in a brief pause as he observes the units maneuvering in the water and the movements of the supporting air force:

"You might think me prejudiced if I say that our inducted reservists are carrying out the tasks suddenly assigned them very conscientiously, at a level high above expectations, as is expected of every Hungarian citizen by the country, the homeland and the socialist community. But perhaps no one would think it prejudice if they heard the same recognition from Marshal Kulikov, supreme commander of the united forces of the Warsaw Pact. But Marshal Kulikov was here, personally followed for days the battle movements of the units filled up with reservists, from the mobilization order to the execution of the tasks, of various degrees of difficulty, of the planned exercise, and he was so satisfied that some got not only verbal recognition but even awards."

General Evin mentioned the names of Col Istvan Focze, Lt Col Tibor Havasi and 1st Lt Jozsef Kovacs, who were awarded by Marshal Kulikov for "moving" so outstandingly the several thousand reserve soldiers and officers brought from Eastern Hungary to the Trans-Danubian region.

Help From Party Organs

Even the mobilization order was carried out with exemplary precision.

"Every regionally affected party committee and council helped a lot in seeing that the Sopron 84 exercise should succeed as well as possible," Sandor Evin added to his earlier statements. "And this aid was needed too, because it was necessary to mobilize not only people but also many transport vehicles. For example, Antal Nemeth, deputy director of the Number 5 Volan Enterprise not only 'brought' himself, as a reserve officer, to take over the post as deputy commander of the battalion serving the units in the exercise, he also brought several dozen trucks from the enterprise and enterprise workers, those who are reserve soldiers."

Bela Sipos, of the daily paper KELET MAGYARORSZAG and a reserve lieutenant, accompanied the units for 13 days so he could write something from his fresh experiences in every issue of the camp newspaper appearing during the Sopron 84 exercise, so he could report on the life of the soldiers exercising in the field as participants in the exercise and publish what could be published about the exercise, because it was not and is not possible to write everything about this exercise, either. For example, the time that the exercise would begin was the greatest secret right up to the last minute. Even those town council presidents and council secretaries--who were kept informed of much and who had to give the orders to appear at the collection points--got the notice in the late evening hours on 21 May. The value of a mobilization is primarily in how much time is needed for the reserve officers and soldiers to reach their units. And the hours of induction indicated the first highly valuable achievements of Sopron 84. For example, reserve Captain Zoltan Garai, who is an artisan instrument maker in civilian life and is here an artillery operations officer, had this to say about this in the swiftly moving events of the Danube crossing:

"No one is happy to jump out of bed to be told that the mobilization order has arrived. Especially since one can never know when it is 'live.' But our commanders could see with what a high tolerance quotient we bear the difficulties and how we give all our knowledge and strength to see that the exercise succeeds as well as possible."

Environmental Protection Also

Despite this the officers and men are seeing not only to the goal of the exercise in the narrow sense, but also to how this exercise should not cause damage to crops and not disturb the accustomed order of nature anywhere. Corporal Sandor Hegedus, a producer cooperative electrician in civilian life and a signal corps soldier here, witnessed how his comrades preferred to go around and undertake extra work rather than disturb the life of a family of birds nesting on a single tree.

"I do not know what kind of birds they were, we didn't have time to delight in that, but we saw how alarmed the mother bird feeding her nestlings was by the noisy presence of the soldiers laying the lines. Someone yelled to go around, so we went around. I believe we were even careful of the grass, insofar as tanks and trucks can look out for the grass in such an exercise. . ."

"But certainly no harm was done to the crops; this was a basic viewpoint in planning this exercise," added a professional officer standing near us.

And he should know, for this is not his first exercise which called for so much strength and energy from the professional noncoms and officers. And adding their many nights and weekend duty it is no wonder if many can hardly wait for their 55th year, the first day on which they can retire.

"They wait and wait, but after a few months they come and offer their services. Here, now, in our unit alone, four of our retired officers put on their uniforms again and came with us to help in carrying out tasks corresponding to their training. Do you know what a big help this is?"

Active In Their Retirement

While the amphibious vehicles drive by hundreds of reservists performed their military tasks on the other side of the Danube and special ferries returned again and again to take more tanks across the river, we talked about the career and calling of the officers. We talked again, as we had so often, about how difficult it is to ensure a 42-hour workweek for professional staff in the army, to provide free days on the weekend, because there are assignments where the "operation" cannot stop even for a moment. Could one expect and get more help from fresh, strong retirees who love their calling? More than once I myself have met retired officers who, after a brief rest, bear with difficulty the days of tranquility, the inaction. Perhaps one really could make better use of their preparedness, faithful to the community and fed by so much experience, as is done with retired teachers. But this was

only a detour of a few minutes here on the banks of the Danube, for on this Sunday the observers of the exercise did not have much time to wander with our thoughts if we really wanted to follow the events. And the participants had even less. . .

But we had the satisfaction of seeing that despite all the weariness it was proven that the country has defenders of full value even among the reservists.

8984

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NATURE OF, PROSPECTS FOR SOCIALISM DEBATED

Long Transitional Period

Warsaw PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU in Polish No 3-4, 1983 pp 124-155

[Article by Jerzy Muszynski: "Have the Foundations of Socialism Been Laid in the PRL?"]

1

[Text] The development of events in our country since 1980, beginning with the deep and farreaching socioeconomic, political and moral crisis, the initially spontaneous moves of a large part of the Polish working class through strikes and demonstrations, the coming into being of antisocialist groups and their systematic growth in political and ideological activism, the breakup of the union movement and the gaining control of the NSZZ [Independent, Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity by extremist antisocialist elements and the need to protect the socialist system of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] by extraordinary measures--all these things place on the agenda the question of the state of Polish socialism and the degree to which it has progressed.

Have the foundations of socialism been laid in Poland? This is in no way a rhetorical question, although there were no doubts regarding it yet in February 1980 at the Eighth PZPR Congress. At the Seventh Party Congress 5 years before, the decision made to build the foundations of socialism in Poland was substantiated by economic, political and ideological arguments that were to bolster the status of the statements that had been made by the highest party echelon. It was recognized at that time that, during the 30 postwar years, in the process of socialist revolution, our country had divorced itself totally from the relations typical of the capitalist system, essentially had laid the foundations of socialism and had entered the stage of the creation of a fully developed socialist society that was to be realized over the course of two decades, i.e., by the mid-1990's. While the arguments advanced at the Seventh Congress were both logical and convincing, the general situation in Poland at the time was becoming more and more tense due to the rapidly growing consumer goods crisis, particularly where farm products were concerned. True, just before the congress, the supply of consumer goods in stores improved slightly, but by the beginning of 1976, people were having more and more problems purchasing essentials and their dissatisfaction became more and more

vocal. The situation continued to worsen, while the reaction of workers to official decisions regarding price increases on consumer goods--decisions allegedly preceded by thorough consultation with worker communities--expressed the crisis of public confidence in the political and state leadership. This crisis of confidence embraced various strata, groups and communities within our society and grew to include a very large part of the working class--the prime subject of the working mass authorities. It was both a shocking and disturbing phenomenon. The working class expressed its dissatisfaction louder and louder and more and more resoundingly with regard to the socialism that was its own creation, particularly voicing its disenchantment with economic and political relations. The party and state leadership of the time tried to ignore these reactions of the working class, with whom it had been out of sympathy since the demonstrations of June 1976 and to whom it referred condescendingly more than once as "workhorses" (although such situations were not numerous).

These symptoms had already become evident enough and strong enough to lead to the perception that something was not right with Polish socialism, for both in the economic and political spheres, the basic assumptions of the socialist system had become unstrung. However, the Eighth PZPR Congress, deliberating 6 months before the mass strikes and protests, apparently did not notice these signs, although they were not only readily apparent, but also more and more clearly discernible. The congress, orchestrated to the extreme, as if under a spell, spoke of successes in the creation of a highly developed socialist society, while those that criticized the status quo were either ignored or were treated as unfit to broach the subject by some party leaders. But they were talking about reality and were stating the facts.

The party leadership responded to all shortcomings and obvious distortions publicly by making certain, basically cosmetic, changes in personnel. This was intended by the leaders at the top to quiet and satisfy society (for example, Piotr Jaroszewicz was dismissed from his position as chairman of the Council of Ministers). Meanwhile, society not only was not satisfied, but rather was critical of these changes, particularly the nomination of Edward Babiuch to be government premier.

The gulf between society and the authorities yawned broader and deeper; the economic crisis grew, along with the political and moral crisis; the authorities lost control of the situation, at the same time demonstrating a surprising jauntiness. This was clear in their reaction to the first strikes that erupted spontaneously in some plants. These strikes were economically motivated and we may assume that they were relatively easy to control. The lack of an effective response from the authorities increased the wave of strikes from day to day, broadening its scope and exacerbating social tensions. The strikes swept over more and more communities of working people and other regions of the country, with the result that the authorities were forced to embark on negotiations with the striking workers, that were becoming the subjects of the initiatives of the representatives of antisocialist forces, primarily the KSS-KOR [Social Self-Defense Committee KOR]. In the negotiations that had been forced by the strikers, the authorities wished to achieve calm and to restore the normal labor process, while the strikers demanded what they felt

to be rightfully theirs, not so much due to their subjectivity to the authorities as by virtue of their labor and its end product.

A paradoxical situation for socialism ensued: the workers, the foundations of the system, the subjects of authority and the chief, guiding force of society came out against the political and state leadership that, in their opinion, did not honor the basic assumptions of the socialist system and thrust this leading force of the nation into the background both in the sphere of economic relations and political relations. The government representatives had to negotiate with Interfactory Strike Committees like capitalist businessmen.

In essence there was no paradox here. Soon it became evident, as the Ninth PZPR Extraordinary Congress confirmed, that in Poland of the 1970's, especially in the second half of the 1970's, the basic assumptions of the socialist system had been violated seriously; neither the universal assumptions nor the specific characteristics of the passage from capitalism to socialism had been honored. The practice of directing all fields of life utilized not Marxist-Leninist theory, but endless voluntarisms, and made use of that theory to screen economic, social, political and moral deviations. It was not the conclusions drawn from the theory of the passage from capitalism to socialism that served as the source of inspiration to action, but, it seems, the wanton ambitions of some leaders that desired immodestly to inscribe their names and their deeds permanently upon the pages of the nation's history. Hence the source of the "Second Poland" and of the pronouncements of the moral-political unity of the Polish nation. These same inspirations, ignoring reality, justified the pronouncements that the foundations of socialism had been laid and that the stage of the creation of fully developed socialism had been entered. Voluntarism in practice had to lead, and essentially did lead to breakdown in all fields of existence, it was detrimental to the interests of socialism, it severed the ties linking the working masses and the authorities and it destroyed the confidence of working people in the possibility of realizing the system of social justice.

These observations, confirmed by the findings of the Ninth PZPR Extraordinary Congress, could not but place on the agenda the issue of assessing the degree of advancement of socialism in Poland. If one discards extreme assessments that deny all achievements in the passage from capitalism to socialism, then even the most critical evaluation of our reality finds the transformations of socialism both incontestable and longlasting.

In concretizing the question regarding the state of Polish socialism and the level of advancement of socialist-type transformations, we ought to specify several fundamental problems. We must assess the course of the socialist revolution thus far, the penetration of its processes into the particular fields of life and the scope of socialist-type transformations in the national economy, in political attitudes, the social consciousness and the people's mentality and morality. To put it another way: where, and in what in Poland do we find socialism or at least its foundations and where and why have socialist-type relations not been realized in given fields of life? The answer to this question will enable us to formulate more general theses on such issues as the one embraced by the title of this article.

Before we busy ourselves with tracing the path of socialism in Poland, however, we should call to mind the general assumptions of the theory of the transition of capitalism to socialism, since these assumptions, violated in voluntaristic practice, determine the essence of the revolutionary rebuilding of the socio-economic base and the political-ideological superstructure of Poland.

2

This theory, an integral part of scientific communism, defines the economic, social, political and cultural processes of the revolutionary transformations of the attitudes inherited from capitalism into new values in particular fields of life. These processes break down old, useless attitudes and replace them with new ones. Our interest lies in them, in the creation of these new attitudes, in the elimination of what is useless and in the utilization of those earlier-formed values that can be of service to the new system.

The theory of the passage from capitalism to socialism was developed by the classic Marxists. Its foundations were laid by K. Marx and F. Engels and it was amplified and concretized by V. I. Lenin, who then adapted it to Russian conditions in his numerous works, speeches and letters. This theory was first introduced in the Communist Manifesto, it was developed by K. Marx in his work "The Civil War in France" and it was synthesized by him in "Critique of the Gotha Programme." K. Marx wrote in the latter work: "Between the capitalist society and the communist society lies a period of the revolutionary transformation of the first into the second. A transitional political period also corresponds to this period and the state of this period can be none other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."¹

This synthetic grasp of the transition between the two systems implies three important theoretical ideas upon which the corresponding processes of the transformation from capitalism into communism are contingent:

- that between capitalism and communism, there must exist a period of history during which the shift from capitalism to communism takes place;
- that this period is of a transitional nature;
- that the state of this period will be a revolutionary system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The need for the existence of a transitional period of history was dictated to K. Marx by the logic of social development, particularly by his awareness that new values in the particular fields of life do not arise spontaneously, but must be created by people. K. Marx already understood earlier that the socialist revolution does not occur evenly in all fields of life, that the processes of the transformation of old attitudes in these fields into new ones will not yield the identical results and that it is easiest to change the political attitudes of society, but considerably more difficult to make economic changes and most difficult to transform man himself. Meanwhile, the different ways in which the processes of socialist revolution took place meant that the level of the "advancement of socialism" is not the same in all these fields. Relatedly, the remnants of the old system are various and variously affect the total make-up of the newly formed attitudes. For K. Marx there

was no doubt that communism can be realized as a result of the creation of completely new attitudes in all fields of life, that old attitudes will appear and will influence life for a certain time, treated by him as the transitional period. That is why he wrote that after the overthrow of the authority of the bourgeoisie and its assumption by the working masses "we will be dealing not with the kind of communist society that has developed upon its own foundation, but rather with the kind that has emerged from the capitalist society, that consequently in every respect--economic, moral and intellectual--still bears the signs of the old society that is its origin."²

The position of K. Marx on the question of the essence of the system in the transitional period between capitalism and socialism is clear and consistent. Before new economic, social, cultural and moral attitudes are created, elements of the previous system are retained that determine the character of the socio-economic base and the ideological-political superstructure, first to a great extent and gradually to a lesser and lesser extent. Communist-type relations develop on the old foundations and gradually assume new properties. When all the remnants of the old system have been eliminated in all fields of life, society begins to develop upon the foundation it has itself created, that will enable the realization of full communism. It was no accident that K. Marx conceived of the processes of the creation of the communist system in two phases: the lower phase, termed socialism and the higher phase known as mature communism.

K. Marx defined the essence of social relations in the higher phase of the communist society and defined communism as a socioeconomic system.³ The higher phase of this society was to be characterized by:

- the elimination of the subordination of man to the division of labor;
- the elimination of the conflict between mental and physical work;
- the transformation of work from the source of upkeep to the most important need of life;
- the unprecedented development of production forces leading to the creation of an abundance of social wealth;
- the all-round development of people, their consciousness and their morality.

K. Marx did not even attempt to approximate the amount of time necessary for the attainment of such a society, since he was aware of the enormity of human efforts and the enormity of achievements in all fields of life that must be taken on by the working class gaining political control together with its allies during the socialist revolution. The working class was to realize these tasks within the framework of its historic mission, a mission of worldwide scope.

V. I. Lenin expanded, enriched and concretized the Marxist theory of the transition between the two systems in his numerous works. He paid special note to the phases of the historic mission of the working class, to the possibility of realizing this mission through the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the essence of socialism as the lower phase of the communist system and to the need to perform an enormous range of tasks and to overcome innumerable difficulties. This implied that the mission as a whole

would be extended over time. Following the appearance of the phenomenon of the irregular development of capitalism and of the possibility of the acquisition of power by the working masses first in several countries or even a single country, a number of issues related to the transitional period were placed in a new light. These problems emerged in particular following the attainment of the foundations of socialism in the USSR, i.e., during the mid-1930's, and following the realization of socialism as the lower phase of the communist system, as ascertained by the 23d KPZR [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Congress in 1961. The primary problem was to decide the possibility of realizing communism in one country. We shall return to this issue later in this article.

I mentioned that V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to outlining the phases of the transitional period. In his work "The State and Revolution" he polemicized with the opponents of Marxism, pointing out the need for the existence of the period of transition from capitalism to communism. He stated: "The first thing established with complete precision by the entire theory of development, by all of scholarship in general, which is forgotten by the utopists and today's opportunists that fear socialist revolution, is that circumstance that a separate phase or a separate stage of the passage from capitalism to communism is a historic necessity."⁴

In his analysis of Marx's concepts of the communist system, V.I.Lenin refined the concepts of "socialism" and "communism" and took economic and political factors into account here. Writing about socialism as the lower phase of the socialist system, he stated: "During its initial phase, at the first level of its development, communism cannot be completely mature from the economic viewpoint, or totally free from tradition or the remnants of capitalism. This is the source of the interesting phenomenon of the preservation of the narrow horizons of bourgeois law during the initial phase of communism (...). Meanwhile, the vestiges of the old within the new are demonstrated to us by life at every turn, both in nature and in society. It was no whim on the part of Marx that he tacked on a portion of bourgeois law to communism; he showed what was inevitable in a society emerging from the lap of capitalism from the economic and political viewpoints."⁵

At the same time, V.I.Lenin noted the fact that "The initial phase of communism cannot usher in justice and equality: differences in wealth will remain and these are unjust differences, but it will be impossible for one man to exploit another, since it will impossible to seize the means of production, factories, machinery, land and the like as one's private property (...). Marx presents the course of development of the communist society that is compelled from the outset to eliminate only 'injustice' in which the means of production have been taken over by particular individuals; but it cannot eliminate immediately further injustice based upon the distribution of 'consumer goods' according to labor and not according to need (...). Not only does Marx take into consideration with great accuracy the inevitable inequality of people, but he also takes into account the fact that the mere transfer of the means of production to become the common property of the entire society ('socialism' in the everyday use of the word) does not eliminate the shortcomings of the divisions and inequalities of 'bourgeois law,' that continues to hold sway, since goods are distributed 'according to one's labor'."⁶

V.I.Lenin also pointed out the differences between socialism and communism in the sphere of political relations and stressed the broad scope of these differences. Socialism continues to possess elements of "bourgeois law"; the use of force is still necessary, the state apparatus must be preserved and the functioning of the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat must be retained. In communism, all these phenomena and processes gradually disappear as the level of the economic maturity of communism gradually grows.⁷

V.I.Lenin also discussed the issue of the transition from capitalism to communism following the acquisition of power by the Russian laboring masses, based upon the initial achievements of the Soviet authorities. He gave extensive treatment to the assumptions of socialism as the lower phase of the communist system and to the transitional period between the first and the second systems. He wrote on this subject: "From the theoretical viewpoint there is no doubt that communism is separated from capitalism by a definite period of transition. This period cannot but combine the features or the properties of both systems of social management. This transitional period cannot but be a period of struggle between dying capitalism and the communism that is coming into existence, in other words, between the defeated but not annihilated capitalism and the communism that has already come into the world, but is still very weak."⁸ In the opinion of V.I.Lenin: "Socialism envisages work without the participation of capitalists, social work under conditions of the strictest reporting, control and supervision on the part of the organized vanguard, the leading part of the working masses; at the same time, both the measure of work and of remuneration for work must be defined (...). Thus, we call communism that system in which people become accustomed to performing their social obligations without a special apparatus of coercion, when gratis work for the general good becomes a universal phenomenon. It is understood that with regard to those that take the initial steps on the path of the complete victory over capitalism, the concept 'communism' is a too distant notion (...). The unloading of the landowners and the capitalists has enabled us only to build the most elemental forms of socialism, but there is still nothing communistic in this. If we take our present economy, we will see in it the still very weak seeds of socialism dominated to a very great extent by the old economic forms."⁹

In this statement, V.I.Lenin was speaking of the realities of the Soviet national economy of the first revolutionary years, in particular its division into many sectors. He linked the realization of socialism with the elimination of the antagonistic classes and also with the removal of class-type antagonisms. In his opinion, this task belonged to the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat--the authority of the laboring masses realized under the ideological and political leadership of the communist party.¹⁰

Therefore, polemicizing with the party leftists that wish the expansion of the party following the acquisition of power by the working class, he stated that "to reject party-mindedness from the viewpoint of communism is to leap directly from the eve of the collapse of capitalism (in Germany) to the higher phase of communism, bypassing the lower and intermediate stages. In Russia (in the 3rd year following the overthrow of the bourgeoisie), we are taking the first steps along the road leading from capitalism to socialism,

or the lower stage of communism. Classes remain and will remain everywhere for years after the authority is taken over by the proletariat." 11

In this fragment, V.I. Lenin notes the intermediate phase of the communist system, without defining its essence and without returning to this issue in his later theoretical works and articles. We may presume that V.I. Lenin had in mind a period of the realization of the communist system that, following the attainment of socialism (the lower phase), transformed it into communism (the higher phase). This concept is confirmed in recent KPZR decisions (the June ideological plenum from 1983), in the discussion of the perfecting of mature socialism.

Lenin's contribution to the Marxist theory of the passage from capitalism to socialism added depth to many questions. It enabled the fuller understanding of the economic, political, social and cultural traits of this entire period of history and allowed the communist party to outline concrete tasks in the field of the creation of socialism and its transformation into communism. The implementation of these tasks in practice, initially in the USSR and later in other countries as well, made it possible to make theoretical generalizations about the road that had been traveled, to check the assumptions of this theory in practice, to verify it in life. The creation of socialism brought to light in all countries a series of new problems to be solved theoretically and practically.

Soviet experiences from the mid-1930's placed on the agenda the issue of the entry into a subsequent stage of the realization of socialism following the attainment of the foundations of socialism. The 17th and 18th Congresses of the WKP(b) [Italian Communist Party (bolsheviks)] in 1934 and 1939 treated this, recognizing that the next stage on the path to communism would be a fully developed socialist society. This provided the basis for formulating concrete assumptions for the transition from capitalism to socialism. The 18th Soviet Party Congress established the existence of two phases of development of the socialist state and also discussed the theoretical issues of the death of the state in the transition to communism. The congress recognized as mistaken the assumptions of the atrophy of the state in the lower phase of the communist system, i.e., in socialism. It found the strengthening of the Soviet socialist state to be necessary, substantiating this by the fact that the USSR at the time was the only socialist state existing amid capitalist surroundings.

The Soviet experiences of the subsequent years of the creation of socialism were generalized at the 22nd KPZR Congress and were comprised by the 3rd program of the Soviet party. This congress recognized the realization of socialism to be the implementation of the lower phase of the communist system, and the program it passed envisaged the transition to the higher phase, that was comprised by the concept of the creation of the material-technical base of communism.

The theoretical discussions of this congress touched upon the further concretization of the entire period of history of the creation of the communist system. The paper on the KPZR program stated: "The transition from capitalism to socialism is being made under conditions of the class struggle; it requires

that social relations be destroyed from the ground up and demands a deep social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, the transition to communism takes place under circumstances where there is no longer any class of exploiters, where all members of society--workers, peasants and intelligentsia--are vitally interested in the victory of communism and consciously aim toward this (...). Society no longer will know of the difficulties engendered by the class struggle within the country."

It was stated at the congress that, following the realization of socialism, the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be transformed into an all-national state that would be retained until the complete victory of communism.

In its present form, the theory of the transition from capitalism to communism, based upon the Marxist-Leninist assumptions of the two fundamental phases of this period of history, takes into account that the passage from capitalism to socialism is effected in the stage of the creation of the foundations of socialism and in the stage of the realization of fully developed socialism, while the passage from socialism to communism is effected in the stage of the perfecting of fully developed (mature) socialism and in the stage of the transformation of socialist relations into fully communistic relations.

This periodization yields more than a mere sense of order. It defines the specific degree of implementation of transformations in all fields of life, as a result of which arise specific economic, political, social, cultural and moral values as elements of the new system. It also facilitates programing concrete endeavors whose implementation marks the attainment of a given stage. Nevertheless, this periodization cannot be taken routinely and without giving consideration to the real situation of particular countries, especially since all plans do not always lead to the attainment of the intended goals. The formalistic treatment of this periodization led in the past to the making of decisions ascertaining the degree of advancement of socialism that exceeded the real status quo, decisions that essentially were premature and did not reflect real achievements in the particular fields of life, decisions anticipating growth that sometimes were purely voluntaristic. Such was the case in Czechoslovakia where the 11th KPCz [Czechoslovakian Communist Party] Congress recognized that the foundations of socialism had been laid in 1958, and 10 years later, the situation was one of severe political crisis, a relapse into revisionism in the party leadership and the danger of revolution among workers. Still more extreme decisions contrasted with reality in Poland, where repeated political and economic crises canceled out the earlier voluntaristic assessments of the highest political and state leadership. Life demonstrates that plans and objectives that are not attained cannot be replaced by good intentions, desires or the ambitions of the leadership. Socialism in all its fields is the creation of working people. It is they that transform the reality inherited from capitalism into a new type of socioeconomic and political system. Not all intentions and plans are possible to implement; the most varied sorts of obstacles occur during their implementation, sometimes emanating from incompetent leadership and management, and sometimes from an improper attitude to everyday duties on the part of the very creators of the new system. Truths about reality--about achievements and shortcomings--cannot be replaced by propagandistic

decisions and voluntaristic assessments. Such assessments not only do not hasten the attainment of planned goals, but they deform reality, sometimes creating a threat to the very process of creating socialism.

Inferior practice cannot be adapted to good theory, for the manipulation of such theory does not change the reality. Socialism is the reality of life, the very process of creating new relations in all fields, and not the ambitious assessments of the leadership. This is a truth about which we cannot forget, since it emanates from the essence of communist ideology.

3

The aspects of the periodization of the transition from capitalism to socialism have not been treated in any deeper sense in Poland. This emanates from the fact that the evaluations of the achievements of the Polish socialist revolution were not tied in formally with the degree of advancement of socialism. The Unification Congress of workers' parties in December 1948 created the foundations of socialism following the implementation of tasks emanating from the people's democracy stage of the Polish revolution. This is recorded in the "PZPR Ideological Declaration" that concretely defined the essence of the people's democracy as one of the forms of the revolutionary system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹⁴ The declaration states: "The people's democracy in Poland arose as the revolutionary authority of the working masses, led by the working class."¹⁵

The primary task of the people's democracy consisted of eliminating capitalist elements and of organizing the socialist economy. The implementation of this task required that a number of difficulties be overcome that were inherited from the capitalist system (including the existence of the exploitative classes and their enemy activity directed against the national economy, the working masses and the people's state; the economic backwardness of the country and devastation; low work productivity; an unsatisfactory living standard of the laboring masses; the cultural backwardness of a significant part of society; bureaucratization in the state apparatus; the poor state of health of the people).¹⁶

The declaration considered the elimination of exploitation in rural areas and the mobilization of poor peasants and peasants owning medium-sized farms in the struggle against exploiters.¹⁷

The declaration does not divide the passage from capitalism into socialism into periods, but writes generally of the building of socialism.

The concept of the "foundations of socialism" was introduced officially in the draft 6-year plan whose guidelines were established by the Unification Congress. They were called the "Guidelines of the 6-Year Plan of the Development and Economic Rebuilding of Poland." The Legislative Sejm passed a law on the plan entitled the "Law on the 6-Year Plan of Economic Development and the Building of the Foundations of Socialism From 1950-1955."¹⁸ This law defined in detail what is meant by the building of the foundations of socialism and specified concrete tasks (in 17 points) in the fields of economics, the

social protection of working people, sanitary conditions and culture, education and science.

The Second PZPR Congress, deliberating from 10-17 March 1954 on the resolution concerning the attainments in the execution of the 6-year plan and the major economic tasks for 1954-1955, ascertained that the building of the foundations of socialism in Poland will mean: the significant development of socialist industry with the especially high rate of development of the industry of the means of processing as the foundation of the development of the entire national economy (the goal was the "socialist industrialization of the country"); the development of agriculture through the utilization of the existing possibilities for increasing production on small and medium-size farms as well as the gradual expansion of the socialist sector in the farm economy; the expansion and strengthening of socialist production relations in all sectors of the national economy; the further increase of the living standard of rural and urban people; the cementing of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracy.¹⁹ These assumptions were based on concrete indexes and on figures illustrating the scope of tasks in the particular fields of life.

The congress, assessing the results of the 4 years of implementation of the 6-year plan, ascertained that considerable development and strengthening of the socialized sector had occurred, and that the socialist sector had attained near exclusivity in industry, transport and construction, had gained a decisive advantage in trade and had made significant progress in agriculture. At the same time, the congress noted the appearance of significant disparities in the development of the national economy, particularly the serious weakness of the rate of farm production development.

Thus, serious disproportions had arisen already during the first years of the creation of the foundations of socialism that essentially were not corrected in full during later years and that had a marked effect not only on economic and social relations but also on political relations. It was no accident that the Second Congress discovered that these disproportions and the neglect, the shortcomings and the distortions in the farm economy had disrupted the economic bond between the city and village and had hampered the deepening of the worker-peasant alliance.²⁰ In the political sense, the weakening of this alliance was the cause of serious abuses of power, of the breakdown of law and order and of the lack of sympathy for the rural population, as well as the bureaucratism applied to them. This gave rise to their mistrust of the authorities and weakened interest in farm production development as well as commitment to social and political issues. Thus, the Second Congress had observed a phenomenon that gave evidence of the essential breakdown of the practice of creating the foundations of socialism, the violation of the assumptions of the passage from capitalism to socialism, the failure to abide by the objective truths of the transitional period between the two systems and the disregarding of the specific situation of agriculture in our country.

It is clear that the program for creating the foundations of socialism was unfeasible, given the potential. It failed to give sufficient consideration to our economic reality and the level of commitment of society, in particular the state of human awareness. The program was prepared under the influence of

dogmatic-sectarian tendencies, during a period of the unbridled practice of the personality cult of Stalin, in the atmosphere of the artificial battling of rightist-nationalistic deviations, under conditions of the severe class struggle and the weak perception of Marxism in the consciousness of the vast masses of working people.

That is why the theoretically valid assumptions of socialist industrialization became a goal in and of themselves in practice, for they failed to consider the needs and the potential of society. While it is true that the international situation had an effect upon the development of certain branches of industry, especially defense, the failure to take into consideration the national realities, a sign of dogmatic deformation, not only hampered the attainment of intended goals, but evoked more and more universal dissatisfaction among society. Society became disenchanted with socialism. It felt disappointed despite its sacrifices at work and no longer experienced vital satisfaction. Between society and the authorities, a gulf arose that threatened more and more serious political consequences. The atmosphere of the cult of personality masked this gulf; punitive measures taken against the dissatisfied did not resolve this problem.

The revisions of the assumptions of the 6-year plan made by the Second PZPR Congress had only a minor effect upon the general direction of the creation of the foundations of socialism, especially since they made no improvements in agriculture. The collectivization of agriculture in Poland was unsuccessful; the work of the State Farms [PGR's] did not moderate the problem. The support of the congress for private farms was primarily verbal and essentially did not change the situation that had developed earlier in this sector, through the conclusion of the implementation of this plan.

The "thaw" processes in the sphere of political relations that were initiated shortly after Stalin's death, particularly in the mechanism and methods of governing, gradually created an atmosphere of the restoration of the Leninist norms of state and party life. This was of vital importance for the verification of the concepts and assumptions of the creation of the foundations of socialism in Poland. This atmosphere prevailed beyond the 20th KPZR Congress and cleared the way for the processes of the democratization of political relations. Nevertheless, our political and state leaders of the time had not yet dropped old habits on the issue of their attitude to society. They were unable to repair broken social ties and could not cope with the enormity of tasks amid the complex sociopolitical situation and the perceptible increase in the activism of workers. In June 1956, the authorities could not defuse the mounting conflict in some fields of the national economy and regions of the country. In Poznan this led to tragic events in which there were human victims. The way that the officials reacted to these events showed that not only did they fail to understand the working class positions, the interests that it stood for and the needs it had to be satisfied, but they were unable to enter into a dialogue, to embark upon negotiations, or to treat this class not only as a constituent, but as a partner. At the same time, these events showed that the process of creating the foundations of socialism is not only a road that leads forward, but it is sometimes a step backward, and even a breakdown. In particular, the moral values of socialism collapsed when the authorities raised

an armed hand against the class whose interests it was supposed to realize. A paradoxical situation ensued in Poland.

The effects of the Poznan events were more symptomatic than the direct consequences showed. The lack of trust between the working class and the authorities deepened. The political and state leadership of the time felt offended by the workers' advances and could not bring themselves to assess these outbursts as their own defeat, the failure of the line implemented by them, and particularly of the methods and means of its implementation. One cannot resist such a conclusion if he reads the materials of the Seventh PZPR KC [Central Committee] Plenum that deliberated from 18-28 July 1956.

The party leadership submitted its self-criticism of the practices of the cult of personality, admitting that there had been deviations from the Leninist principles of party and state life, that democracy had been restricted and that law and order had been violated.²¹ On the other hand, it did not evaluate the direct causes and course of the Poznan events. The plenum resolution stated that "the tragic events in Poznan, that deeply jolted the entire party, the working class and the nation, placed a new light on the political and social situation in Poland. The fact is that in Poznan, demagogues, dissenters and enemy elements succeeded in taking advantage of the special dissatisfaction of the workers of ZISPO [expansion unavailable] and a series of other plants who had valid demands; they provoked strikes and street demonstrations. The fact is that this situation was used by underground counterrevolutionary groups that drew their inspiration for committing acts of criminal provocation and for making armed advances against the people's authority from foreign sources inimical to Poland (...). The fact is that the bloody provocation directed against the people's state brought home to the workers that had taken to the streets the basic goals of the provocateurs; it was not supported by the working class in Poznan, was isolated throughout Poland and was censured by public opinion." ²²

These were assessments "in the old style," shallow and ineffectual. "Provocation," "counterrevolutionary groups" and "advances against the people's authority" all were concepts drawn from the practice of the cult of personality, concepts serving as arguments justifying the actions of the authorities. While the plenum acknowledged the workers' arguments, it did not understand the sense of the mechanism of the deepening sociopolitical conflict, within whose framework the worker outbursts in Poznan were merely one of the elements of a desperate group of people that questioned in this way its position within the socialist system. The worker outbursts were not treated as a kind of indication of the class struggle in socialism, by means of which the working class, having no other real possibilities for acting, wished to regain its political identity and its rightful position in society whose leadership force it was to be.

From the viewpoint of this study, the second resolution of the Seventh PZPR KC Plenum, a resolution on the results of the execution of the 6-year plan and the basic assumptions of the 5-year plan for 1956-1960, is a valuable document. It presents quite a thorough assessment of the course of the implementation of the 6-year plan and its results. The resolution states that "over the past 6 years, People's Poland has taken a huge step forward in the development of production forces and in the socialist transformation of the national economy.

The monumental tasks placed before the First PZPR Congress and then expatiated on in the law passed by the Sejm on the 6-year plan--tasks of Poland's transformation into an industrial-agricultural country--essentially were realized." ²³

The following were recognized as the achievements of the 6-year plan: the expansion of the entire national economy; the rebuilding of Warsaw and the bringing into cultivation of regained lands; an increase in political, economic and cultural activism among small peasant farmers and medium-sized farmers; a significant increase in numbers among the working class and the upgrading of its technical qualifications and cultural level; an increase in the numbers of the working intelligentsia.²⁴ The plenum stated that all plans had been implemented, including the most important one, namely, the increase in the average real wage of workers and the average per capita income of the rural and urban population. The housing construction and farm production plan had not been fulfilled; nor had the plan for supplying the population with consumer goods been fulfilled as a consequence of the failure to execute the farm production plan. Likewise, the mining, power, chemical fertilizer, construction materials and textile industries did not fulfill their plans entirely.²⁵

The plenum blamed this situation both on severe objective difficulties that emanated from the sudden sharpening of the international situation and on serious errors ascribed to distortions and disproportions in the execution of planned tasks in the field of increasing the living standard.²⁶

The plenum did not assess the degree of advancement of the building of the foundations of socialism. However, the fact that basic tasks were not accomplished proves that the building of socialism had advanced only minimally. The considerable reconstruction of the national economy and other changes in social relations alone could not be the measure of the building of the foundations of socialism, although they indicated clearly that socialism was being developed in Poland.

The Eighth PZPR KC Plenum, deliberating from 19-21 October 1956, under a situation of severe political crisis and social tension, was highly critical of the first half of the 1950's and more sharply accented the distortions and errors committed by the previous leaders. The plenum asserted that the "party must be consistent in overcoming conservatism and cowardliness in its own ranks, its fear of the new, its spasmodic adherence to obsolete doctrines and established patterns and its attempts to regress and return to old methods of leading and governing, weighed down both by Stalinist and home-grown perversions."²⁷ The plenum outlined tasks in the field of the democratization of life in Poland, of the restoration of the proper proportions in farming and in the establishment of cooperation with other socialist countries.

The change in a part of the political leadership and state leadership and the processes of democratization that were underway had a vital impact upon the attitude of society to socialism. While the post-October situation was characterized by a sharpening of antagonisms and of the class struggle due to the large-scale activation of revisionist and anti-Soviet forces,

the authorities gained the real support of most of society, in particular the working class and a large part of the peasantry. The effect of this support and its institutional aspect was the National Unity Front [FJN] created in December 1956. The program document of the FJN outlined political, economic and cultural goals as well as the social goals whose meaning accorded with the assumptions of the foundations of socialism that took into account the Polish reality.

Aware of the importance of the development of agriculture for the implementation of tasks in the field of the creation of the foundations of socialism, the PZPR KC and the ZSL NK [Supreme Committee] passed guidelines on the farm policy issue on 9 January 1957.²⁸ These guidelines became an important document of the farm policy of the socialist state, for they had a political aspect as well as an economic aspect and envisaged the strengthening of the worker-peasant alliance and the molding of the peasant consciousness in the area of the socialist rebuilding of rural areas.²⁹

The implementation of these guidelines yielded definite positive results, but did not resolve the essential problem, a farm production increase that would guarantee in full the nation's needs. Polish agriculture, very widely differentiated from an economic viewpoint, became more and more obviously the proverbial "Achilles heel" of Polish socialism. This issue was reflected in the 5-year plan for 1956-1960, whose assumptions were revised many times before the 12 July 1957 Sejm finally passed it.

The introduction to this plan states that it is a stage in the creation of socialism insuring the further transformation of Poland into a country with an economy that is fully developed in all areas and that has a constantly growing living standard among its people. "Hence, the development of the production of goods and services and the resulting attainment of the maximum possible improvement in the material and cultural situation of the people under present conditions should be recognized as the basic task of the 5-year plan (...). At the same time, radical changes are being implemented in the country's economic model, in its system of management, planning and coordination and in its system of economic incentives (...). In insuring a more proportionate development of industry and the increased growth of farm production, particularly on peasant farms, the 5-year plan should increase the living standard of the people through wage increases and increases in real income. The development of industry, trades and agriculture likewise must guarantee the employment of the labor force surplus and must prepare work stations for the new, more and more numerous graduating classes of youth."³⁰

The assumptions of the 5-year plan recognized the country's economic, social and political realities. In this way, it coordinated the general, universal assumptions of the passage from capitalism to socialism with the specific characteristics of Poland, in particular the fact of the existence of an extensive small-scale production sector in agriculture.

The Third PZPR Congress (10-19 March 1959) had the task of assessing the implementation of this plan for the 1956-1958 period. It adopted two resolutions: the first set up the guidelines for national economic development from

1959 to 1965 and the second set up the guidelines of rural party policy.³¹ In the first of these resolutions, the congress stated that the attained level of production forces represents a strong foundation for Poland's future economic and cultural development. At the same time, the congress was critical of deformation and neglect throughout the entire period of the existence of the PRL that have caused serious disproportions to arise reducing the level of real wages. The resolution states: "These disproportions and difficulties emanated primarily from excessive investment pressure alongside the failure to perform tasks increasing farm production, and therefore also tasks in the field of increasing the supply of consumer goods available to the populace. This situation was exacerbated by errors in farm policy, insufficient aid for farming development and the assumptions of too-low costs for particular major investments."³²

It was no accident then that the congress passed a special resolution on the guidelines of rural party policy that envisaged a considerable farm production increase from 1961-1965. All these decisions in the field of farm development were confirmed in a PRL Sejm resolution dated 17 February 1961, concerning the 5-year plan of national economic development for 1961-1965.³³

The 4th PZPR Congress, deliberating from 15-20 June, recognized that the implementation of the plan generally was proceeding successfully, particularly in the industrial sphere. The results that had been attained meant an improvement in the material, social and cultural circumstances of the population. This was supposed to be an important element of the commitment of the working masses to the processes of creating the foundations of socialism. Whatever shortcomings were noted were to be eliminated in the next 5-year plan for 1966-1970. The congress passed the corresponding guidelines that stated that: "The directions and proportions of national economic development during the next 5-year plan emanate from the attained level of production forces and social relations and from the expected domestic and international conditions that will accompany the implementation of the plan."³⁴

The congress noted the need to take into account the population explosion and, relatedly, to insure the necessary number of positions for workers. The plan envisaged an increase in the national income by about 30 percent, an increase in the private consumption fund by 25 percent, an increase in per capita income by 18 percent, an increase in gross output by 45-47 percent and an increase in agriculture by 14-15 percent. The PRL Sejm resolution dated 11 November 1966, concerning the 5-year plan of national economic development from 1966-1970, raised some of these indexes, including that of the growth of the national income, setting it at 34 percent (6 percent per annum). An increase was anticipated in the share of industry and trade in generating national income (by 56 percent) alongside some decline in the share of farming and an increase in the private consumption of consumer goods and services of 27 percent. The Sejm resolution stated: "The improvement in the standard of living should be achieved not only through the expansion of the consumption fund, but likewise through the fullest possible adaptation of the total amount of goods and services available to consumer demand, with special consideration for changes in demand related to the increase in income and to changes in the age structure of society."³⁵

The assumptions of the plan were constructive and were in touch with the essence of the socialist system, the needs of the working masses and the real potential of the country. The Fourth Congress did not assess the level to which the creation of the foundations of socialism had advanced, nonetheless achievements in all fields during the first half of the 1960's were especially great.

The implementation of this plan did not proceed with success. The Eighth PZPR KC Plenum, deliberating from 16-17 May 1967, stated that the implementation of the building of socialism is successful only when all party echelons and organizations coordinate economic and political activity. The Politburo report stated: "Economics and politics cannot be separated and have a mutual effect upon each other, like two members of the same organism. If, in the practice of one or another party element, these two aspects of our work are separated, the work becomes less effective both on the political front and on the economic front, restricting and deforming the Marxist-Leninist content of the building of socialism." 36

This valid thesis was not merely hypothetical. Voluntaristic practices began to crop up in the party's economic policy, the farm production increase was not realized, nor was the increase in the living standard. The country's economic situation during the second half of the 1960's was alarming in some fields. Not only did this affect the flow of consumer goods to the marketplace, but it was also expressed in the growing market crisis. Once again, the "Achilles heel" of our socialism was exposed--the farm economy had not entered the right path, which was implied in the low rate of food, fodder and farm raw materials production that did not meet our needs.

The plenum noted the shortcomings of the party's ideological and political work. However, the party leadership did little to coordinate economic and political work and to eliminate the economic voluntarisms and political deformations that arose. Social tensions grew in Poland, the party lost its link with the working masses and the gulf between the authorities and society deepened and broadened.

In March 1968, young students rose up. This made the situation in Poland even more tense. The assessment of these events made by the party leadership was quite superficial and was done "in the old style," via an attempt to point out the causes outside the party and independent of it. A thorough analysis was not made of the economic and political causes of the March uprisings; there was no desire to be shown that they were important signs of the growing social crisis in Poland. The speeches of Edward Gierek in Katowice (14 March 1968) and Wladyslaw Gomułka in Warsaw (19 March 1968) demonstrated this type of approach to those events.

The Fifth PZPR Congress (11-16 November 1968) made a deeper analysis of the situation. In his reports paper, Wladyslaw Gomułka stated that the 24 years of the building of socialism had produced dynamic economic development and had led to farreaching social transformations of the Polish people, and that it was the socialist structure that enabled the people to draw the country out of its backwardness and poverty, to make tremendous advances as a nation and to increase

their economic potential considerably. Gomulka stated that: "A new, just socialist society is being created in whose consciousness deep changes are being effected that are a reflection of the changes in the system and the advancement of working people. The forces of socialism dominate the structure of political forces in Poland."³⁷

These were optimistic assessments that in truth ignored the existing status quo in Poland and failed to take into account the growing economic and social crisis. While the political situation in the country returned to normal after the March events, society's dissatisfaction with the worsening market crisis continued to grow. The congress noted an improvement in farm production and its continued growth, but it also observed that the market did not meet the growing demand for meat and processed meat products in particular.

The March events troubled the party and state leadership of Poland. Thus, it was no accident that the congress noted a sharpening of the class struggle, the activation of rightist forces and revisionist groups and the aim of these forces to create unrest and to undermine the socialist social order. It appears, however, that the assessment of these events was simplistic and failed to correspond to reality. "The March events showed once again, in an emphatic way, that the working class is performing its leading role in the nation, that it is a decisive political force in the country and the chief mainstay of the people's authority. Thanks to the support of the working class, our party is decisively resolving its severe class struggles with the forces of the social right in favor of socialism."³⁸ Less than 2 years before, this "leading force" had taken to the streets in protest against the authorities and had questioned the validity of the internal policy approved--on its behalf--by the Fifth PZPR Congress.

Certainly, the working class as well had changed over these 2 years. It seems, however, that the gap between the class and its party had already arisen before this, only deepening after the Fifth Congress, assuming a violent nature and leading to tragic events.

From the viewpoint of the present study, the statement about the essence of socialism as a socioeconomic and political system is important. The congress resolution states that the essence of socialism is the authority of the working masses through the hegemony of the working class, as well as the planned economy with the socialized means of production. Recognizing that our state, as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is implementing the principles of socialist democracy, the congress asserted that this is expressed in the exercise of authority by the masses working under the leadership of the working class, in the socialization of the means of production and in the running of the planned economy.³⁹ The Fifth Congress added nothing new to this subject, but merely reiterated the familiar ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Nor did the congress assess the degree of advancement of the foundations of socialism, but limited itself to noting its successes and to pointing out the shortcomings that still existed.

The December events disclosed more than the severe economic, social and political crisis. They also revealed the conflict between the working masses and the

authorities, the isolation of the authorities from the masses, their contempt for these masses and their failure to appreciate them. Life has not borne out a single statement made by the Fifth Congress on the subject of the role of the working class implementing its class rule under the party's leadership.

The working class, by means of its attitudes and its outbursts, was not questioning the assumptions of the socialist system, but was protesting the method of government, the representation of its interests, the implementation of its aims and the realization of its life aspirations. The working class was not concerned only about the price increase of meat and processed meat products--this increase was merely the drop that caused the cup of bitterness to overflow. Workers were concerned about their class dignity and about regaining their political identity and their right to full decisionmaking about the country's affairs. These aims were the impulse for worker protest. Nevertheless, this protest meant that the working class was questioning the methods and results of the creation of the foundations of socialism in Poland, that it did not agree with the actions of the leadership and that it refused it the mandate to represent its aims and desires.

The Eighth PZPR KC Plenum (6-7 February 1971) had the task of assessing the December events on the Coast. In his address, the new PZPR KC first secretary made the following analysis: "The crisis had been growing for a number of years and had deep-rooted causes. As we stated at the Seventh KC Plenum, its primary cause was the weakening and finally the severe breakdown of the link between the party leadership, the working class and the other strata of working people, necessary to our system. For some time, dissatisfaction with economic and social policy was increasing and expanding; people were more and more unhappy with the way party and state affairs were being handled. This dissatisfaction was transformed into a crisis of confidence in the party and state leadership. That is why the December crisis may be called above all a crisis of confidence."⁴⁰

Two years earlier, the Fifth Congress did not perceive any symptoms of this type of phenomenon, although the Eighth Plenum stated that the crisis had been growing for a number of years. It evaluated the actions of the leadership and ascertained its responsibility for what had happened in Poland in December 1970.

Recognizing that the aim to meet the needs of society better and better was the primary goal of the socialist economy and the fundamental assumption of the policy of the party and the people's state, the plenum found the principal error to be the failure to observe these assumptions in practice, the violation of the socially indispensable proportions between the increase in the means of production and the means of consumption, the neglect of the production development of consumer goods, the lack of increase in real income, the failure to execute the assumptions of the 5-year plan (1966-1970) and the improper attitude to the essential affairs of people. "All the causes and sources of recent events--it was ascertained at the plenum--"regardless of the severity of their assessment, reduce themselves only and exclusively to departures from the proper political line of the party, from the Leninist norms of its operation. The general line of the building of socialism in Poland under the leadership of the party, assessed from the historical perspective of the fortunes of our nation, remains the correct, inviolable line."⁴¹

The plenum also outlined the most important and most urgent party tasks, namely: guaranteeing production development, an increase in work productivity and the improvement of the living conditions of working people and improving their social situation. The Sixth PZPR Congress, deliberating from 6-11 December 1971, dealt with the expansion of these tasks and with the evaluation of the economic, political and social situation of Poland.

This congress was marked by the downplaying of former assessments of deformation, calling them "difficulties and errors," on the one hand, and by the formulation of a concrete program for continuing the building of socialism in our country, on the other.

The new party leadership under Edward Gierek, after gaining control of the political situation in Poland, found it inadvisable to "grovel in the past," defending its position by citing the findings of the Eighth Plenum, in particular the results of the commission that studied the determinants and the course of the December events. In the PZPR KC report for the Sixth Congress, the errors that had been committed were discussed: "During the first 2 years after the Fifth Congress, the results of this work (i.e., the production and the social activity of the party--J[erzy] M[uszynski]) were minimized in many regards through errors in socioeconomic policy and in methods of managing party and state affairs. The accumulation of difficulties and errors in socioeconomic policy became the foundation of severe social conflict at the end of 1970."⁴²

These assessments were a step backwards from the Eighth Plenum. They showed that the December events had been treated episodically by the leadership. It was felt that personnel changes in several of the highest positions (the first secretary, the KC secretaries and several secretaries of voivodship committees as well as the chairman of the Council of Ministers) were enough of an accounting with the past, that the evaluations made once (at the Eighth Plenum) were quite sufficient and that the party congress need not return to these matters in official documents. Consequently, it was no accident that the congress resolution stated that "the PZPR is currently opening a new chapter in the history of our country that corresponds to the mature aspirations of society emanating from the development of production forces and from the growing material and spiritual needs of the nation."⁴³

While the congress set up ambitious tasks for the years 1971-1975, it did not assess the degree of regression of the process of creating the foundations of socialism caused by the economic and social crisis and by the political conflict that had assumed the form of the tragic December 1970 events. But the regression was evident and was most greatly felt in the sphere of the human consciousness, in the field of the attitude to socialism and the motives for acting on behalf of its realization. The response to the slogan "Help us" truly demonstrated the spontaneous support of the new leadership, but it was support contingent upon various conditions relating to the sphere of material and social relations. As long as the leadership honored its obligations to working people, the situation in Poland did not grow tense. However, the year 1976 brought the authorities a grim reminder, forced them into a disgraceful retreat, revealed their weaknesses and laid bare the inconsistency of their actions. Following the June events it became clear that the party and state leadership did not

have the support of the working people, that the tie between the leadership and the working masses, effected with difficulty after December 1970, had been severed, that the gulf between the interests of the authorities and society was deepening and that the unquestionable successes in the field of the creation of the foundations of socialism were in no way satisfying society.

This all happened after the Seventh Party Congress that made historic decisions asserting the building of the foundations of socialism in Poland during the 30 postwar years and the entrance into the stage of the creation of a fully developed socialist society. Economic, social and political reality was clearly in conflict with these statements that somewhat later proved to be entirely voluntaristic and expressed the overblown ambitions of some members of the party and state leadership.

The first years of the 1970's were favorable for the development of Polish socialism. The development of production forces on the basis of new investments and modernized factories, the improvement in work organization and labor productivity in industry and related fields, the successful implementation of tasks by all agricultural sectors and the increase in market production--all this not only led to an improvement in the working and living conditions of workers but it also created a sense of vital stability and was an important impulse for increasing efforts toward the implementation of the tasks established by the Sixth PZPR Congress. Therefore, the Seventh Party Congress, deliberating from 8-12 December 1975, was not casual in its assessment and proudly stated the successes that had been achieved. The PZPR KC report stated: "Thanks to the achievement of a high rate of development in all fields of social and economic life, the serious problems that arose during the 1960's have been surmounted effectively, and Poland of the 1970's has become a developing country in all regards that has made significant progress along the path of socialism."44

Achievements in the various fields of life were unquestionable, although many important problems had not been resolved successfully. These include the issue of the farm production increase and the flow of consumer goods to the market. In the second half of 1975, the market situation declined drastically, causing consumer discontent to grow.

These important social issues were not covered in the Seventh Congress documents. Apparently, some members of the party and state leadership had had their heads turned by success. On the one hand, this led to their optimistic forecasts for the future and on the other it caused them to shut their eyes to any irregularities, shortcomings or glaring neglect that occurred.

This exaggerated optimism validated what is for me a voluntaristic decision on the part of the Seventh Congress regarding the building of the foundations of socialism in Poland and the entrance into the stage of the creation of a fully developed socialist society, a decision already announced at the First National Party Conference in October 1973.

The Politburo program report "On the Future Dynamic Development of the Socialist Structure--on Higher Work Quality and Quality of the People's Living Conditions"

stated: "Our homeland, People's Poland, is entering a new, higher stage of socialist development, the stage of the building of a fully developed socialist society. This opens broad perspectives and expands our horizons. Over the course of three decades, the majority of tasks of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism have been implemented. Today our state has a fully socialist character, the authority belongs to the working people and the leadership role of the party has become an unshakable principle. Socialism is filling the political life of the Polish people with rich content (...). More and more consistently we are realizing the principle of socialist social justice and we are disseminating socialist social awareness. We have the right to assert that we have /substantially/ (emphasis J.M.'s) built the foundations of socialism in our country and we have preserved its socioeconomic and political structure. Modern Poland is among those countries in which, in the words of Marx, socialism has acquired its permanent foundation."⁴⁵

At the same time, the congress synthesized the major tasks in particular fields of life toward the creation of the fully developed socialist society and described the essence of this stage of the passage from capitalism to socialism.⁴⁶

A characteristic trait of these Seventh Congress statements was its self-assurance manifested in the statement that the foundations of socialism had been built substantially. Substantially--that means not totally, meaning that something was not realized. The program report explained that the entry into the stage of the building of fully developed socialism is marked in Poland by the unequal level of the particular fields of socioeconomic life, that in many fields, the tasks of the new stage have already been implemented, while in others--particularly in agriculture--the tasks of the previous stage are being implemented. This position led to the following general conclusions of a theoretical nature: industry and related fields are already socialist, while agriculture and services are not yet fully socialist. The report found this situation to be normal and the implementation of the tasks of the preceding period during a later period to be completely possible.⁴⁷

A basic question arises here, however: given the lack of achievement of socialist relations in all fields of life, including such critical fields in our country as agriculture and human services, is it possible to set up tasks for the stage of the creation of a fully developed socialist system? The report correctly stated that there are no rigid boundaries between the stages of the building of the foundations of socialism and fully developed socialism. Nonetheless, if the foundations of socialism are not created in agriculture, a very important field in the national economy, then is it possible to implement tasks in this field that are typical of a higher stage, the stage of fully developed socialism? It seems that the position of the congress on this issue was imprecise, insufficiently motivated and characterized by obvious voluntarism.

From a theoretical viewpoint, the position of the Seventh Congress could be considered accurate, had it been based on real, reliable data on the actual status quo in our country. Both the KC report and the program report of the Politburo seem to be devoid of characteristics of realism, are not based on correct, reliable facts and are exaggeratedly optimistic. Soon

problems regarding the flow of consumer goods to the marketplace, especially meat products, forced the authorities to undertake a price operation to improve the consumer goods flow. This decision caused mass worker protests. The government had to rescind its decision. This did not mean, however, that the growing social conflict was de-fused; on the contrary, it gradually exacerbated it. The situation became more and more complex, particularly regarding the activation of the work of antisocialist forces. In many fields of the national economy, the signs of stagnation and even of regression appeared, and the conflict between the authorities and society grew.

The political leadership appeared not to perceive this situation and made light of it. This was proved by its assessments made at the Eighth PZPR Congress that met from 11-15 February 1980. In contrast to the obvious facts, the congress report spoke of the continued increase of the living standard of society, of the strengthening and expansion of the material foundations of life and of the further step forward on the road of the building of the fully developed socialist society.⁴⁸ The report stated that these successes were all the more noteworthy since they had been attained under difficult international circumstances, including the deepening worldwide fuel and raw materials difficulties and the disruption of international economic cooperation. Domestic conditions were also noted, in particular the unfavorable weather conditions that brought down the performance record of farming and caused considerable losses in the economy.⁴⁹ In spite of this, the successes that were achieved were, in the opinion of the party leadership, the result of the appropriate regrouping of forces and means in the economy (a so-called economic maneuver).

All these assessments were considerably far from the reality. For example, wage increases were discussed (of about 34 percent over 1975 levels), but market difficulties and growing inflation were not noted. The increase in income of private farmers was asserted, but the fact that production costs, in particular the price of the basic means of farm production, had risen, was ignored. The strengthening of the socialist state was emphasized, but the fact of the isolation of the political and state leadership from working people was not mentioned. The development of the socialist democracy was reported, at a time when the Leninist norms of intraparty relations and relations between the organs of authority and citizens were being violated more and more broadly and clearly. The growing activity of antisocialist forces was understated, being limited to the hurling of epithets at some of its representatives. The hegemonistic position of the working class in society was stressed, while the opinions of the communities of working people on issues of most vital importance to the country were ignored. Social consultations were introduced, while the opinions of both social communities and specialists were downplayed. Committees of social control were set up, but they were not assured the mechanisms of effective action and performance of their duties. The Sejm organ of state control--the Supreme Chamber of Control--was subordinated to the chairman of the Council of Ministers. The KC report accented the growing role of trade unions in the communities of working people while shamefully shutting its eyes to the fact that in reality they were subordinated to party echelons and organs of the economic administration.

There are many more such examples of the discrepancy between the assessments made at the congress and the actual reality in Poland.

However, it is worthwhile to point out the most characteristic fact, that of the attitude to the June 1976 events. It is clear that the scale of these events, i.e., of concrete incidents, was not great, and was itself not a problem of the highest state importance. Nonetheless, the conditions underlying these incidents and their causes and course were such a problem. They were the manifestation of worker protest evoked by the dissatisfaction of working people both with their living situation (that the leadership assessed as continually improving) and with the way society was governed and led, as well as with the actions of some prominent persons in the party and state leadership. And they were a reaction to the worsening flow of consumer goods to the marketplace and to the propaganda of success, to the increase in the costs of living and to the frittering away of foreign credits. The working class demanded that its full role in governing the country be restored; it clamored for real participation in the making of the most important state decisions--present and future.

The KC report considered the increase in its ranks to be a tremendous success: from the Seventh Congress (1975) to the Eighth Congress, approximately 650,000 persons joined the party and the congress represented a party that numbered 3.08 million members and candidate-members.⁵⁰ However, no mention was made of the fact that the vast majority of these people were not communist either by conviction or in their views or actions and did not really know what a real communist is. No mention was made of the fact that the party apparatus was expanding continually and that it was being transformed from a team of real political and social workers into elements of the party bureaucracy doubling the organs of the state apparatus.

Accents similar to those of the KC report likewise appeared in the Politburo program report and in the Eighth Congress resolution. Instead of analyzing thoroughly the growing conflict between working people and the authorities, manifested in the June 1976 events, the KC report limited itself to the laconic statement that the proposals in the field of changing the price structure submitted by the authorities could not be implemented /for well-known reasons/ [under emphasis]. These "well-known reasons" were the spontaneous June outbursts of the working class that demonstrated its negative stance toward the actions of the authorities. The judicial and administrative punitive measures used by the authorities against the participants in the uprisings not only did not restore society's trust in the authorities, but on the contrary, increased its discontent, provoked more bitterness and facilitated the work of antisocialist forces that took advantage of this breach between the working masses and the authorities.

In this context it should be realized that the Eighth PZPR Congress, apart from its excessive orchestration, did not fulfill the most important task, that of making a thorough, objective analysis of the real status quo. It did not perceive the growing economic crisis and social conflict and, in conjunction with this, it did not foresee the need to take the appropriate preventive measures in the interest of defending the foundations of the

socialist system. The course of the congress, and particularly its official documents, were full of voluntaristic, optimistic assessments, unreality and lack of judgment.

Thus, it was no accident that 6 months after the congress, the worker strikes clearly confirmed both the economic crisis and the sociopolitical conflict. The authorities found themselves at an impasse and were forced to negotiate with the striking workers.

4

The situation that developed in Poland as a result of the August strikes and the agreements concluded with the strike committees, the coming into being of NSZZ Solidarity and its activity as well as the activation of antisocialist forces--all this reflected not only the deep economic and moral crisis and the growing sociopolitical conflict, but it also had a significant impact upon the processes of creating socialism. The economic crisis caused serious losses to the national economy, worsened the flow of indispensable consumer and industrial goods to consumers and led to consumer dissatisfaction and bitterness. The continual strikes paralyzed the normal activity of a large number of industrial plants, led to anarchy in production and worsened the already severe problems.

The continuing social conflict, exacerbated by the work of antisocialist forces in Poland and by anti-Polish propaganda in the West, seriously disrupted the functioning of the political system in all its basic elements: the party, the state, social organizations, trade unions and self-government organs. The party underwent a severe internal crisis; party echelons and organizations could not resolve the increasing chaos. The organs of authority and the state administration were paralyzed severely by the destructive activity of Solidarity extremist elements and various antisocialist organizations. The anticommunist propaganda increased. Broader and broader attempts were made to tie in Poland's prospects with Christian-democratic and social-democratic ideologies. Appeals were made calling for the destruction of socialism and the restoration of capitalist relations, for Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and for Poland's joining with the capitalist West. The socialist system was in deep danger.

The Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress, meeting from 14-20 July 1981, assessed this complex situation. The KC report stated that "a severe ideological and political class struggle is taking place in Poland over authority, over our country's face and over its place and political orientation in the international arena." 51 The report said that the situation in Poland following August 1980 was characterized by: "the mounting dangers to socialism, the growth of counterrevolutionary phenomena, the widespread economic crisis, the collapse of social discipline and the paralysis of the work of state institutions." 52 This situation endangered the existence of the state, placing on the agenda the task of saving the nation and directing the country along the proper path of continuing the building of socialism.

The report assessed the sources of the economic crises and sociopolitical conflicts occurring in our country. However, the assessments were too generalized and improperly examined the sources of these events as having emanated solely from the mistakes of the supreme state authorities. But it was not only a question of the mistakes of the authorities.⁵³ The "theory of errors" does not hold up when confronted with reality, especially since "it is human to err." The political and state leadership of the 1970's and earlier consciously or unconsciously diverted the creation of socialism away from the established path and distorted this path, made voluntaristic moves, did not reckon with the realities of life in Poland, consciously violated the Leninist norms of party and state life and failed to respect the obligatory laws and the moral standards. These were not mistakes, they were the activity of incompetent, greedy individuals that did not have the proper knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory.

The general atmosphere of the Ninth Congress, the concrete, substantive plenary discussion and the same kind of discussion occurring in the 16 issues groups made it possible to reach deeper and to make a more thorough assessment of the distortions that had been committed than the assessment presented in the official report. These assessments later were included in the congress resolution. The first part of the resolution "Sources and Character of the Crisis" includes the statement: "The present crisis has resulted both from the actions of faulty mechanisms within the party, state and society and from the mistakes and due to the fault of specific individuals exercising authority. Those guilty of wrong decisions and violators of the law must be held fully accountable. However, this cannot obscure the need to restore mechanisms to good working order, since the human errors were a sign, and frequently also the effect, of the deformation of sociopolitical life."⁵⁴

The congress resolution found the source of the last crisis to be departures from the principles of socialism in political practice that began with the shift in PPR [Polish Workers Party] policy made in 1948, deepened in 1949 and continued the centralist and antidemocratic tendencies that conflicted with the spiritual traditions and political culture of the nation. The other causes of this crisis were: the lack of a unified concept for resolving the conflicts arising in sociopolitical relations, the restriction of democracy and the gradual liquidation of self-governing systems and institutions, the assumption of real authority by the executive party, state and economic apparatus, the breakdown of law and order, the deepening of the gulf between the authorities and society, arbitrariness in economic policy and the failure to reckon with the real needs of society and with economic realities, including the irresponsible policy of negotiating credit with capitalist countries, and the actions of the party leaders rendering the party helpless along with the resultant loss of society's confidence in the party.⁵⁵

The resolution recognized the worker protest from July and August 1980 to be valid, for it was a protest against the departure from the universal principles of socialism on the part of the party leadership.

The Ninth Extraordinary Congress did not assess the degree to which socialism had progressed in Poland, nor did it take a stand on the Seventh Congress

resolution concerning Poland's entry into the stage of the creation of fully developed socialism. There were too many complex current problems to solve, including the problem of establishing the directions for continuing the socialist renewal and for directing the country along the proper road for continuing socialist systems-type transformations. However, the congress noted that an assessment of the status quo and a socialist program of renewal should not ignore the genuine attitude to the real and unquestionable achievements of People's Poland. The congress resolution stated: "In a relatively brief period of history, we have pulled the country out of its ruins and backwardness and Poland has become an industrially developed country. As a result of agricultural reform, the living conditions of the rural population have changed radically. Despite the present difficulties, the social situation and the level of education and culture of society have changed, its sense of dignity has increased and the awareness of the citizen's right to participate in managing state and local affairs has grown."⁵⁶

An important achievement of the congress was the establishment of the principles of the socialist renewal of life in Poland. The program of this renewal set up such fundamental undertakings as: the development of the socialist democracy, the strengthening of the leading role of the PZPR in building socialism and the socioeconomic stabilization of Poland. The implementation of this program was to direct the country along the proper path for implementing real socialism and was to create the mechanisms for counteracting effectively all deformation and departures from its fundamental assumptions in the future.

Subsequent events occurring in Poland, in particular the strike campaigns and the aims of the NSZZ Solidarity extremist forces to take over the authority, prevented the effective implementation of this program. The issue of the struggle for power, the issue of "who over whom" was placed on the agenda in Poland. In the interest of socialism, in the defense of its systems-type foundations and its unquestionable revolutionary achievements, martial law was imposed--an institution that is atypical for the political relations of socialism, but is indispensable in extreme situations. And the situation really was quite extreme. The danger of civil war was imminent. Social and political tensions had reached a critical point. The defense of socialism became the duty and the most grave necessity of the party, the socialist state and its armed forces, as well as of the organs of security and public order.

The imposition of martial law did not lead to the suspension of the work of the major elements of the political system--the party and state apparatus, although it did suspend the operation of numerous social organizations, above all, trade unions. It prevented the activity of antisocialist groups, scattered counterrevolutionary forces and created the indispensable premises for the gradual stabilization of all fields of public life. This was of critical significance to the /continuation/ [under emphasis] of the processes of creating socialism in our country.

It is clear that both the improper actions of the authorities in the 1970's, particularly in the second half of the 1970's, the economic, social, political and moral consequences of the deformations that occurred and the destructive activity of NSZZ Solidarity extremist groups and other counterrevolutionary

groups, as well as its effects had an impact upon the processes of creating socialism and on the level of its advancement. The combination of these negative phenomena halted the building of the system and destroyed some of its achievements in the particular fields of life. A step backwards was taken not only regarding the plans laid at the Seventh and Eighth PZPR Congresses, but also regarding part of past achievements: the implementation of the party program of socialist renewal passed at the Ninth Extraordinary Congress came to a halt.

The failure to implement the program of the creation of a fully developed socialist society means that we are still in the stage of building the foundations of socialism, for even the voluntaristic statement of the Seventh PZPR Congress on this issue assumed that the failure to implement the tasks of this first stage would mean that they would be executed during the implementation of the higher stage.

The destruction of the "material and spiritual substance" of socialism requires the development of activities toward its recovery and the determination of which fields of relations were affected adversely by the previously noted events, causing the regression of the effects of the creation of the foundations of socialism. A very general assessment leads to the conclusion that there is no field that either was not destroyed or that did not have its socialist assumptions seriously endangered as a result of the destruction that was perpetrated or due to the destructive activities of Solidarity extremist forces and other antisocialist groups.

Economic relations were affected by the widespread crisis that caused not only the disorganization of the market but also the disruption of many fields of the national economy--the decline in work productivity, the decline in production organization and raw materials and energy problems. The economic reform is proceeding with difficulty and thus far has not yielded the expected results. Not only is this reform supposed to guarantee the effective surmounting of the economic crisis and the stabilization of the entire national economy, but it is also supposed to rebuild several basic assumptions of its operation in the future so that they correspond better to the economic sense of the socialist system. In spite of the negative phenomena, economic relations have preserved their socialist character both in the structural and functional sense. The regression in evidence has not changed substantially the essence of these relations, although it has restricted their effectiveness. These relations were not fully socialist in the past, since they were based on a multi-sector system; the small-scale production sector in agriculture and services played a vital role in the total make-up of the national economy. The economic crisis did not bring in structural changes, it did not lead to the expansion of the nonsocialist sector and it did not threaten a relapse into capitalism. Nonetheless, this crisis did limit the effectiveness of the socialist sector, causing the ability and the potential for meeting social needs and preserving socialist relations to be taxed considerably. With such a situation there is no doubt that economic relations in our country are still at the stage of the building of the foundations of socialism and that they require both normalization and stabilization, as well as thorough modernization in light of the economic reform assumptions, if the system is to be fully effective.

Serious damage was done in the sphere of political and social relations. The revolutionary system of the dictatorship of the proletariat was perceptibly shaken. The activity of all fundamental elements of the political system--the party, the state, trade unions, social organizations and production and residents' self-governments became disorganized. This disorganization emanated from their earlier bureaucratization, from the isolation of the party and state leadership from society, from the communities of working people and from the boycott or the pressures of Solidarity extremist forces and other counter-revolutionary groups. The authority of working people was threatened by anti-socialist forces that reportedly acted on their authority and in their interest. Consequently, a paradoxical political situation ensued: the working people rose up against its own authority and undermined its own interests in order to realize them! While it is not at all ironic, it is difficult to resist the impression that this situation occurred in Poland, and that it was paradoxical. How, then, does one evaluate this situation? Did the working people that rose up against their own authority strike out at their own interests?

After August 1980, the political situation in Poland became much more complex, causing a heightening of the class struggle and the endangering of the stability of sociopolitical life, leading to its anarchization.

The notion that the worker protest in the form of strikes was merely economic in nature is unfounded, if only because those that instigated the various outbursts and demands made on the authorities were the avowed enemies of socialism--the members of KSS-KOR, the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], the RMP [Polish Youth Movement] and others acting as advisors to the striking workers. At the same time it is true that the workers did not demand that their leaders be replaced, but rather conducted negotiations with them, set forth economic, social, political and cultural demands and insisted upon their acceptance and implementation.

The striking workers were not concerned with changing the authority in the sense of changing the principles upon which the authority was based. In the political sphere, they were concerned about increasing the possibility of pressuring the authorities, and even applying pressure for the creation of such institutions, that were to be the NSZZ Solidarity organizations and various other groups. However, following the signing of agreements, political actions developed very rapidly, and the NSZZ Solidarity organizations that arose and their work attested to the fact that the forces controlling them wish to transform them into a mass political movement. The entire year of 1981 was a period of the growing escalation of various kinds of political activities, of the differentiation of society both into macrostructures and microstructures, of continual pressure on the authorities and of difficulties in the performance of statutory and legal functions by party and state organs. The result of this activity was a severe threat to the PRL political (and socioeconomic) system, the possibility of an outbreak of civil war and the danger of the further class and ideological division of society. Extraordinary measures had to be used to counteract this effectively.

All these events, however, weakened the political foundations of socialism in our country and struck at the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A large part of society, including the working class, the leadership force

according to the assumptions of the system, turned away from socialism. Some assumed enemy positions while others became "neutral," chose "internal emigration" and thus abandoned all political activism, not supporting either the authorities of the working masses or antisocialist forces actively. Objectively speaking, however, such a stance serves the interests of the enemies of socialism that depend on a rift between society and the authorities.

The fact that the political, ideological and moral crisis did not bypass the party and some of its leaders had a vital impact then, as it does now, on the positions of some social milieus with regard to the processes of stabilization, and in particular with regard to the future processes of socialist renewal. Such attitudes emanate less from the crisis of confidence in the party, its ideology, program and position in society and in the political system than from lack of trust in some members of the party and state leadership and from the way former prominent persons that, in the eyes of society, had been humiliated, were treated.

That is why the notion is valid that the worker protest itself was not a campaign directed at the political foundations of the socialist system, the PRL political system, and thus at the party, the organs of the state apparatus and social organizations. Aside from the workers' economic demands, their demands for essentials and their social, health care and cultural demands, they struck because they wanted these elements to work not for themselves or for a small group of leaders, but for the interests of the working class, the lawful and most important subject of political relations in the socialist system. Thus, this protest was not aimed against "themselves" but was manifested in the form of "calling the authorities to order." That is why during this initial period, and in this form, it did not threaten the political foundations of socialism, it did not have the aim of changing the authorities and it did not violate the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it aimed at making suitable revisions in its operation.

Only later, when the enemies of socialism took the initiative in the new unions and when they imposed their own goals and methods of operation on the union, calling them worker interests, the "Polish reasons of state," the "national good" and when the enemy forces succeeded in driving a wedge between the party and the organs of authority versus the striking workers, did the danger to the systems-type foundations of socialism become more real and perceptible from day to day.

The present situation in the sphere of political relations and the tasks that must be implemented in this field to attain full stability and the substantial political differentiation of society--all this substantiates the idea that our country, as in the field of economics, is at the stage of the creation of the foundations of socialism. Although martial law and other actions have resolved the issue of "who over whom," of authority, in favor of the forces of socialism, political relations are not fully socialist in Poland and the revolutionary processes in this field are not yet complete. The class struggle in Poland continues, at times becoming more intense, and it calls forth from many people a sense of the lack of stabilization and a sense of guardedness about the efforts undertaken by the authorities.

Likewise in the sphere of ideological relations, the events of the 1970's (the distortions committed by the authorities, the inauthentic assessments of the real status quo and the moral downfall of some members of the leadership team) and the beginning of the 1980's (the anticommunist work of internal forces and the escalation of external forces) led to a serious regression of the socialist components of the social consciousness. After August 1980, the position of socialist ideology in Poland became seriously endangered, and its influence on society was curtailed. Various ideological currents inimical to socialism began to spread rapidly. Social democratism, christianism, nationalism and antisovietism played a more and more important role in molding the human awareness. The anticommunist propaganda of the enemies of socialism gained strong support from foreign centers of ideological diversion. The so-called propagandistic aggression of the enemy aims at preserving the ideological and world-view divisiveness of our society, at instilling in it antisocialist intellectual values, cultural values and moral values and at leading to the withdrawal of the endorsement of socialism.

The socialist revolution in the sphere of ideological relations always implements the most difficult tasks, and its results in the socioeconomic and political spheres are less obvious and less permanent. Earlier statements (from the Seventh PZPR Congress) on the moral-political unity of Poles were the most obvious sign of voluntarism, the "wishful thinking" of some of the leadership team and a self-deception. This is especially so since these assertions were not based on any solid scientific studies. Thus, they were apriori judgments, not verified by any concrete findings and facts.

The August and post-August 1980 events deepened the ideological split that had previously existed in society. At the same time, the related emotions led to serious opposition within particular classes, strata, groups and social milieus, in factories and even in families.

The existing situation in this sphere is especially unfavorable to the stabilization of economic, social and political life. Success in other spheres is contingent upon the normalization of relations in this sphere.

In the sphere of ideology, the Polish socialist revolution found itself at the very beginning of the stage of the creation of the foundations of socialism, following the events discussed previously. Consequently, the tasks to be implemented in this sphere and the distance to be traveled in the field of molding the socialist consciousness of Polish society are extremely difficult and long-term.

5

The previous analysis and assessments of the processes of Poland's passage from capitalism to socialism substantiate the claim that our country is still in the stage of the laying of the foundations of socialism. On the other hand, it is difficult to determine the degree to which the socialist transformations characteristic of this stage have progressed. The obvious successes in the national economy, in science, culture and education, on the one hand, and the obvious breakdowns in other spheres do not balance each other out at all.

The destruction caused in various fields of life has a negative impact now on the process of the continuation, the creation and the preservation of the foundations of socialism, and it will continue to do so in the future. Of course, this destruction does not mean that capitalist relations will be restored in any of the fundamental fields of life. The preservation of non-socialist sectors in the national economy, and even their activization and increase in importance do not mean, in and of themselves, a step backwards, the relapse into capitalism. The system of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been preserved in the PRL, if in a somewhat enervated state; socialist forces have preserved their authority; the working masses, while not uniform ideologically and politically, have not renounced socialism--they identify with it, at the same time aiming to renew and fundamentally improve it.

In this situation, the thesis of the Seventh PZPR Congress regarding the building in Poland of the foundations of socialism and the entry into the stage of the creation of a fully developed socialist system cannot be upheld, since it is both out of harmony with the theoretical assumptions of scientific communism on the issue of the transitional stage between the two systems and conflicts with reality in our country in all fields of life.

Relatedly, let us propose that the national party conference and the Tenth Party Congress, when setting up tasks for the 1980's, both within the framework of the socialist renewal and when it has been achieved, be directed by the fact of the need to continue and complete the building of the foundations of socialism. Under Polish conditions, in our country's concrete situation, these are difficult and time-consuming tasks that in no way are facilitated by voluntaristic ideas about our entry into a higher stage of the realization of socialism as the lower stage of the communist system.

Poland of the 1980's remains a country that is still creating the foundations of socialism in a series of important fields of social life. In the Politburo program report given at the 13th PZPR KC Plenum (14-15 October 1983), the following was said on this important issue: "A simple formula cannot exhaust an assessment of the complex reality of our country. One thing is certain: we have implemented in Poland most of the tasks of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. (...) However, there are also areas in which changes have not gone very far or have been delayed. The remnants of antagonistic class conflicts exist in our reality. Thus, we are dealing with signs of unevenness in socialist development."

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," Selected Works, Vol 2, Warsaw 1949, p 23.
2. Ibid., p 14.
3. Ibid., p 15.
4. V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," Warsaw 1972, p 133.

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6. Ibid., pp 141-142.
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8. V. I. Lenin, "Economics and Politics in the Epoch of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Works, Vol 30, Warsaw, 1957, p 93.
9. V. I. Lenin, "Paper on Voluntary Saturday Work Presented on 20 December 1920 at the Moscow RKP (b) [Russian Communist Party--bolsheviks] Conference," Works, Vol 30, pp 284-285.
10. V. I. Lenin, "Economics and Politics..." op. cit., p 101.
11. V. I. Lenin, "The Childhood Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism," Works, Vol 31, Warsaw, 1955, p 29.
12. "22nd CPSU Congress. Papers and Resolutions," Warsaw, 1961, p 204.
13. Ibid., p 602.
14. See: "Podstawy ideologiczne PZPR" [The Ideological Foundations of the PZPR], Warsaw, 1952, pp 129 and ff.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See: "Plan szescioletni" [The 6-Year Plan], Warsaw, 1951.
19. See: NOWE DROGI, 1954, No 3.
20. Ibid.
21. "Uchwały KC PZPR od II do III Zjazdu" [PZPR KC Resolutions from the 2nd to the 3rd Congress], Warsaw, 1959, pp 135-164.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp 165-208.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., pp 211-224.

28. TRYBUNA LUDU, No 8, 9 January 1957.
29. Ibid.
30. DZIENNIK USTAW PRL, No 40, 1957, item 179.
31. "III Zjazd PZPR. Stenogram" [3rd PZPR Congress. Stenographic Report], Warsaw, 1959.
32. Ibid.
33. DZIENNIK USTAW PRL, No 11, 1961, item 58.
34. "IV Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe materialy i dokumenty" [4th PZPR Congress. Basic Materials and Documents], Warsaw, 1964.
35. DZIENNIK USTAW PRL, No 6, 1967.
36. See: NOWE DROGI, No 6, 1967.
37. "V Zjazd PZPR. Stenogram" [5th PZPR Congress. Stenographic Report], Warsaw, 1969, p 31.
38. Ibid., p 133.
39. Ibid., pp 964 and ff.
40. "VIII Plenum KC PZPR 6-7 Luty 1971" [8th PZPR KC Plenum, 6-7 February 1971], NOWE DROGI, special issue, p 14.
41. Ibid. p 19.
42. "VI Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe materialy i dokumenty" [6th PZPR Congress. Basic Materials and Documents], Warsaw, 1972, p 9.
43. Ibid., p 227.
44. "VII Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe materialy i dokumenty" [7th PZPR Congress. Basic Materials and Documents], Warsaw, 1975, p 3.
45. Ibid., p 111.
46. Ibid., pp 112-116.
47. Ibid., p 113.
48. "VIII Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe dokumenty i materialy" [8th PZPR Congress. Basic Documents and Materials], Warsaw, 1980, p 13.
49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., p 60.
51. "IX Nadzwyczajny Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe dokumenty i materialy" [9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress. Basic Documents and Materials], Warsaw, 1981, p 20.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p 21.
54. Ibid., p 102.
55. Ibid., pp 102-104.
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Democratic People's Republic

Warsaw PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU in Polish No 1, 1984 pp 61-75

[Article by Artur Bodnar: "Between History and Doctrine"]

[Text] For more than 2 years, statements devoted to the theoretical description of the state of our society have been multiplying. Many differing viewpoints are examined in these statements that include judgments and assessments that often are diametrically opposed. Such is the case regarding the judgments and assessments made with regard to the question: have the foundations of socialism been laid in the PRL?¹ That is the title of J. Muszynski's article in which he answers the question in the negative. I have taken up this issue because I am of the opposite opinion.

Questions for Study

First let us look at the text of the question itself: have the foundations of socialism been laid in the PRL? In the first place, this question asks whether all of the social changes in the PRL can be measured as socialist changes. As a historian, J. Muszynski answers yes to this question, although he has some reservations in this regard (more on this later). In the second place, the question asks how far the process of social change has progressed in the PRL. The author substantiates his answer by citing statements from the Seventh PZPR Congress documents that say that "we have substantially built the foundations of socialism in our country and we have preserved its socioeconomic and political structure. Modern Poland is among those countries in which, in the words of Marx, socialism has acquired its permanent foundation."² At the same time, the congress formulated the goals whose realization would create a fully developed socialist society in Poland. Then the Eighth PZPR Congress recognized the social achievements from 1976-1979 to be vital to the building of a fully developed society.³ J. Muszynski asserts that the assessments of the Seventh PZPR Congress, which he calls decisions, "were devoid of characteristics of realism, were not based on correct, reliable facts and were exaggeratedly optimistic."⁴ He assesses the evaluations of the Eighth PZPR Congress in the

same way. In this author's opinion, Poland is still in the stage of the building of the foundations of socialism, while "in the sphere of ideology, the Polish socialist revolution found itself...at the very beginning of the stage of the creation of the foundations of socialism."⁵

The search for answers to the questions that plague the researcher of the various aspects of the history of People's Poland may be made by various methods. If this researcher is a historian, he will make use of several kinds of knowledge and related assessments. In the opinion of J. Topolski, these will include at least the three following types of knowledge (and their related assessments):⁶

- a view of the historic process envisaged by the historian (although not always in a conscious manner),
- the ideal of historic study envisaged by the historian,
- the personal view of the historic process and historic study envisaged by the individual that is expressing his procedure for explaining history.

In seeking answers to the questions of how things are (how they were), why they are so or why they were so, the historian will, for example, study the course of the process of social changes and its determinants and will recreate events illustrating these processes or expressing their turning point. Thus, he will explain the continuity and disruption of the lines of history and the factors causing this continuity or disruption. He makes use of the directives of the historical-dialectic method for this purpose.

The View of the Process of History

The view of the process of history envisaged by the historian is usually molded by two factors, namely, by his own vision of the world and man, to use J. Topolski's words, or by specific cognitive assumptions that express the directives of historical and dialectical materialism and specific ideological assumptions on the basis of Marxism. Based on Marxism, the two groups of assumptions are, or at least ought to be, identical. Ideology, however, is usually a farreaching, aggregate, very evaluative vision. In other words, "it is not merely a passive forecast--as W. Kula wrote--or a modest tailoring of plans to strengths, but a vision of a highly desirable state for whose realization we must amass our own strengths."⁷ That is why ideology, or more precisely, its framework assumptions, are adapted to the concrete conditions of the history of a given large social group or social movement and then are translated into the language of macrosocial activities, or political actions.

The framework assumptions of a given ideology adapted to the conditions of an epoch and especially to the concrete historic conditions that make up an entire fragment of this epoch represent the contents of sociopolitical doctrine. In our opinion, sociopolitical doctrine is a collection of views of the social and political structure of a given nation or society, particularly including views of the question of property and authority as means of implementing the total ideological vision under given conditions of history. We have used the term sociopolitical doctrine, since communist ideology, in view of its holistic character, cannot be applied empirically to only one or several selected spheres of social practice. Communist doctrine applied only to the political sphere of social practice would apply to views of the political structure of society, including views of the state above all (and the forces running it) as the most important phenomenon of this structure.⁸ Under current practice of communist

and workers parties, the custom of using the term "program" to refer to documents that have doctrinal value, i.e., to documents that outline the principles, the directions and the ways of acting that have the goal of implementing ideological assumptions over the long term (for example, more than a dozen years), has been dropped.

The vision of the process of history set up by the historian from the viewpoint of several decades, i.e., over a relatively short time period such as is the 40-year history of the PRL, naturally confronts him with a difficult problem of selecting a theoretical model for this vision, as well as of the level of its essential state. J. Muszynski writes of several levels of the essential state in his vision of the process of history.

First, the author makes reference to the framework laws of the communist system, in particular its first phase, socialism, and also alludes to Marx's ideological vision of "full communism."

Second, the author cites the laws and/or generalizations referring to the period of transition. He understands this period in two ways, either as the period of transition from capitalism to communism, during which period the state will be the state of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat (Marx), or as the period when, according to V. I. Lenin, "(...) we take the first steps on the road leading from capitalism to socialism, or the lower stage of communism."⁹ Lenin also divided the communist system into three phases: the lower, the intermediate (socialism) and the higher (communism).¹⁰ In the work cited, V. I. Lenin used the concept of the lower phase in a dual sense: once as the phase directly following the acquisition of power by the proletariat and the second time as the lower stage of communism, i.e., as socialism. It is unfortunate that J. Muszynski did not note this fact, since for V. I. Lenin it was not ready-made formulas that were important, but the creative search for the theoretical expression of real reality. In this way, what was for K. Marx only a prognostic hypothesis (a theoretical hypothesis) was for V. I. Lenin in part an empirical hypothesis verified in the experience of Soviet Russia. "For the present at least, the concept of 'socialism' can only be explained if we take into consideration the extremely rich practical experiences of the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. These experiences show how very complex are the many problems that arise along the road of the creation of socialism."¹¹

In light of these considerations, it is worth remembering that in the historiography of the USSR, there is distinguished not only the phase of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, but likewise the phase of the building of socialism and the phase of fully developed socialism.

Thus, it is not, as J. Muszynski says, that the 17th and 18th WKP(b) [Italian Communist Party (bolsheviks)] Congresses in 1934 and 1939, asserting that the foundations of socialism had been laid in the USSR, recognized "that the next stage on the road to communism will be the fully developed socialist society."¹² Meanwhile, at the time, there was discussion¹³ of "the substantial building of the socialist society," and thus of the "building of socialism in the USSR," of "the victory of socialism," of "the development of socialist society" and the like.

Then and later, the assertion of the building of socialism in the USSR ("in substance") was understood as the building of socialism in the basic fields, after which a certain period is necessary for its consolidation and development.¹⁴ This was the building (the victory) of socialism in the USSR from the viewpoint of internal conditions, and thus the liquidation of the forces interested in restoring capitalist relations. Meanwhile, from the viewpoint of external conditions, it was the 21st KPZR [Soviet Communist Party] Congress (1959) that stated that "socialism in the USSR has gained a complete, decisive victory."¹⁵ A dozen or so years later (in 1971), the 24th KPZR Congress stated the thesis that a fully developed socialist society had been built in the USSR.¹⁶

Third, in his article J. Muszynski frequently refers to various documents of our party--the PZPR, in particular to statements of a doctrinal nature that relate to the periodization of the building of socialism in Poland. Alluding to the documents of the PZPR congresses (from the first to the sixth inclusive) and to the documents of KC [Central Committee] plenary meetings, he states that the "PZPR Ideological Declaration" adopted at the First Party Congress formulated the general objective of the "building of socialism" without defining the stages of the transition from capitalism to socialism.¹⁷ This was first done in the Sejm law of 1951 concerning the 6-year plan, entitled "Law on the 6-Year Plan of Economic Development and the Building of the Foundations of Socialism From 1950-1955." This approach was retained for nearly a quarter century, although various events in the history of our country over such a long period, as J. Muszynski correctly asserts, were of "(...) vital importance for the verification of the concepts and assumptions of the creation of the foundations of socialism in Poland."¹⁸

The Seventh PZPR Congress (1975) asserted that the foundations of socialism were substantially laid in Poland, i.e., its socioeconomic and political structure had been consolidated and the country was entering a new, higher stage of socialist development, the stage of the building of a fully developed socialist society. At the same time, the congress documents pointed out the uneven development of some fields of socioeconomic life, and consequently of the advancement of the building of socialism as well. The documents stated that in many fields, the tasks of the new stage were being implemented, while in others (e.g., in agriculture), the tasks of the previous stage were being implemented.¹⁹ As is known, the Eighth PZPR Congress confirmed these theses.²⁰

J. Muszynski refers to the assumptions of PZPR sociopolitical doctrine and relates particular events and historical processes to them, showing where these assumptions were not fulfilled or where they were unfounded. His ideological vision of the socialist society envisages fully harmonious and proportionate development, both within the particular spheres of social practice and between these spheres, making use of a closed model. At the same time, J. Muszynski interprets his thus understood ideological vision of society as the framework laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism and of the development of socialism. For him they are laws of normative and predictive value. Of course, every macrosocial theory has within it a specific ideological level that points out more or less clearly how things ought to be. The theories, limited, at least directly, to answers to the questions of how things ought to be and of

how to achieve the desired situation become a collection of hypotheses that are verified by social practice, which also supplies statements explaining why reality has taken on one form and not another, and thus why the particular desired states have been attained and/or not attained within the context of the given ideological, and above all, doctrinal assumptions.

Marxism-Leninism is primarily a macrosocial explanatory theory. Its explanatory statements have led to the general assumptions of communist ideology. These statements, when applied to the data of historical conditions, are concretized in the form of indirect statements and factual statements. On this basis, party intellectuals formulate detailed theories, verify the assumptions of current party sociopolitical doctrine and the like. Meanwhile, if the scholar or the journalist is motivated by an ideological or doctrinal vision alone of the process of history in the description of social reality, he is not in a position to read this reality correctly. In this case, departures from the line of the process of history from his ideological (doctrinal) vision are translated--as is done by J. Muszynski--on the one hand, as the voluntarism of the authorities, and on the other, as social disenchantment. Several times J. Muszynski states: society has become disenchanted with socialism.²¹ "In particular, the moral values of socialism collapsed when the authorities raised an armed hand against the class whose interests it was supposed to realize," writes J. Muszynski about the Poznan 1956 events.²² Then the author has this to say about the December 1970 events: "Life has not borne out a single statement made by the Fifth Congress on the subject of the role of the working class implementing its class rule under the party's leadership."²³

An analysis of reality in ideological-doctrinal categories leads directly to an assessment of social phenomena on the moral plane and to treating opinions, and particularly society's moods, as determinants of permanent social states. On the moral plane, we censure the Poznan 1956 events or the 1970 events on the Coast. On the other hand, on the plane of historical-sociological analysis, we assert that the political representatives of the ruling class more than once caused the sons of this class to be repressed during various epochs, when they questioned the existing manner of the exercise of authority, its organization, distribution ratios and the like. After this, we explain the causes of the conflicts that arise and the political struggle.

The analysis of the process of history made during the times of great social change (such as the 40-year history of the PRL) conducted in moral categories leads to the perception of these processes as a series of ceaseless regresses,²⁴ since the basis of evaluation is psychosocial phenomena alone. J. Muszynski sometimes realizes the limited cognitive value of perceiving the processes of history and the events that accompany them in the categories of group (political) psychology. At such times, he recalls the unquestionable successes of the building of socialism in Poland--successes that nonetheless do not satisfy society.²⁵

The Authorities and Society

The concepts of the authorities and society and the concrete-historical relations between the authorities and society are the categories that organize the historical

narrative of J. Muszynski's article. By the authorities, the author understands the party leadership, sometimes the party as a whole and sometimes the state leadership. "The political and state leadership of the 1970's and earlier consciously or unconsciously diverted the creation of socialism away from the established path and distorted this path, made voluntaristic moves, did not reckon with the realities of life in Poland...",²⁶ governing society autocratically and amorally, says J. Muszynski. This is an example of a doctrinal perception of the course of historical processes that explains little but is striking as journalism. In essence, however, the author accuses the entire party. He writes that in 1975, the party numbered 3.08 million members and candidate-members, but "(...) the vast majority of these people were not communist either by conviction or in their views or actions and did not really know what a real communist is."²⁷ These are the personal feelings of the author. The course of preparations and the course of the Ninth PZPR Extraordinary Congress itself strongly refute such an assessment.

The historical narrative contained in J. Muszynski's article is related to doctrinal statements of the party or to the author's moral assessments; thus, it is superficial.²⁸ The theoretical considerations brought into this narrative impoverish the content of these considerations, sometimes making them totally misleading. For example, the author writes that "In spite of the negative phenomena, economic relations (in our country--A[rtur] B[odnar]) have preserved their socialist character both in the structural and functional sense. The regression in evidence has not changed substantially the essence of these relations, although it has restricted their effectiveness. These relations were not fully socialist in the past, since they were based on a multi-sector system; the small-scale production sector in agriculture and services played a vital role in the total make-up of the national economy."²⁹ Thus, the reader may ask whether economic relations in Poland have a socialist character, or whether they do not. Elsewhere the author states³⁰ that under the impact of the crisis there occurred the "regression of the socialist components of the social consciousness." Once again, the reader has the right to ask what is meant by a regression of components. Another example. The author writes that "the August and post-August 1980 events deepened the ideological split that had previously existed in society" and says: "In the sphere of ideology, the Polish socialist revolution found itself at the very beginning of the stage of the creation of the foundations of socialism, following the events discussed previously." Unfortunately, the author identifies social consciousness with ideology. J. Muszynski writes that "the currently existing situation" causes our country to remain in the stage of the creation of the foundations of socialism, both in the sphere of political relations, in the field of economics and in the ideological sphere.³¹ Meanwhile, it is known that an analysis of the status quo is not a strong enough cognitive instrument for explaining the stages of development of a socioeconomic system, since it generally leads to superficial generalizations.

The views of J. Muszynski are not unique. For example, A. Lopatka writes that "changes in the social consciousness take place at a considerably slower rate than changes in the material and political conditions of the life of society. As was demonstrated by events from 1980 to 1982, the process of building socialism in this sphere of life is considerably less advanced than in the sphere of property, authority or labor."³² In the opinion of this same author,

"(...) the level of advancement of socialist changes in the sphere of the social consciousness, and in some parts of the sphere of agriculture as well has caused the country as a whole not to be mature enough to enter the stage of the building of a fully developed socialist society. Poland continues to find itself in the lower stage of the building of socialism--in the period of the building of the foundations of the socialist society (...)."33 Elsewhere we read: "the current tasks of the PRL as a state of the dictatorship of the working class are defined in the PRL Constitution."34 As we read these statements, we cannot help having the following questions:

first, must we, notwithstanding the experience of other socialist countries, cling so tightly to the statements of the Seventh and Eighth Congresses of our party on the issue of the stages of development of socialism?,

second, if the state of social consciousness is so unfavorable, then the preservation of socialist-type relations in the spheres of property, authority and labor is possible in principle only based on coercion and the apparatus that serves it, but this is not true,

third, the author defines the Constitution as a statement of tasks and not as a document that reflects the political and socioeconomic systems that really exist. What then should a teacher do, for example, whose duties include helping young people to assimilate the contents of this Constitution?35 Should this document be interpreted as a statement of intentions, since social life proceeds according to another set of rules and standards? Should it be explained to children and young people that the language of constitutional law is not and cannot be identified with the language of working class party doctrine and the theory on which this party bases this activity?

The Constitution states that the PRL is a republic of working people, or a people's republic, while the foundation of the current people's authority in Poland is the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry, in which the former plays a leadership, leading role. Meanwhile, in the language of our doctrine, this is the state of the dictatorship of a single class, not only in the sense of rule but also in the sense of the political regime. According to the Constitution, Poland is a socialist state, while according to many authors, it is a state devoid of formed systems-type foundations (the foundations of socialism should be understood as the foundations of the system). A. Lopatka sees no contradiction here, but the ordinary citizen may begin to wonder about the sense of permanency of the existing social order in Poland and about the achievements of several generations of people during the last 40 years. The citizen may ask where the truth lies, since he is not accustomed to indulging in lofty theoretical-ideological ponderings. Thus, collective thinking must be ordered in such a way as to reflect real phenomena and processes in their entirety, and as to be systematic, verifiable and mutually communicable (interpersonally). To this end, the preservation of faithfulness to the Marxist rules of the cognition of social reality is necessary.

Levels of Reality

For a long time, two approaches to the issue of interpreting the principles of the building of socialism have collided. One of these approaches said that

as this structure takes shape in socialist countries, the unification of the "base and superstructure" of socialist countries should and will occur. This was the unification approach. A second approach, the antideterminist approach, is prevalent today. It bases its view of the world socialist system on another assumption. It states that as this system is strengthened, conditions are created for ever richer forms of the socialist organization of society, since it is a hard fact of history that the form of socialism in the formative stage and the form of developed socialism cannot be identical in different countries.³⁶

As we study the social reality of the socialist countries, we can isolate three levels of this reality.³⁷

First, there is the constitutive level, made up of the most general systems-type rules that organize the main spheres of social life, in particular economics and politics. These rules are subject to specific changes as the given society develops. To be more specific, as we study the social reality of a given country, we ask what mode of production is the dominant mode that shows whether the given society belongs to one socioeconomic system or another. The logical consequence of the answer will be a question about the method used to safeguard politically the particular mode of production.

Some writers include a very wide range of issues in the constitutive level that defines whether a society belongs to one system or another. For example, according to A. Lopatka, the extensive influence of the idealistic world view and the prevalence of various utopian and reactionary concepts attest to the incomplete socialist character of social relations in Poland.³⁸ This does not prevent him from saying, however, that in Poland "socialism has won the decisive victory."³⁹ If, in a given country, socialism has won the decisive victory, this is tantamount to saying that the foundations of socialism have been laid. For A. Lopatka, however, the two are not equivalent. Indirectly, this stems from the author's arguments that, as socialism is built, its historical foundations laid in previous epochs should disappear, even if they do not conflict with the socialist mode of production.

Second, in the social reality of socialist countries, one ought to differentiate the level of the historical foundations, i.e., the traits of the national economic complex, traditions and historical consciousness from the characteristics of social and political organizations and the like, which characteristics frequently emanate from the former. The level of social work productivity, the kinds of image-making groups and many elements of civic and political culture--all this is rooted in the historical foundation. Of course, the historical foundation is also subject to specific changes, but it is a group of elements that fundamentally comprise the so-called specific traits of the given society. Many characteristics related to the organization of authority and the way in which it is exercised grow out of the historical foundations of the given socialist society.

Third, in every socialist society, we perceive a concrete-situational level "with the naked eye." This level is composed of various kinds of elements characterized by randomness, or at least by the extensive changeability of the force impacting on the course of social processes in the given country.

Under the impact of concrete-situational determinants, marginal phenomena may assume the form of phenomena that have a strong impact on the previously noted processes. Such was the case in Poland in 1976 and from 1980-1982. It happens that phenomena occurring in the concrete-situational level continue over many years (e.g., the phenomenon of the cult of personality and its consequences, or the crisis of confidence in various political institutions). Some of these may enter the layer of the historical foundation permanently.

The Need for the Stabilization of the System

In my opinion, an analysis of social reality in Poland allows us to assert that the foundations of socialism have been laid in Poland. On the other hand, the socialist system must be stabilized and it must be developed consistently according to the socio-historical characteristics particular to Poland. The widespread economic and political reforms initiated by the Ninth Party Congress have the purpose of stabilizing the system and developing it according to the Polish path.

In the course of stabilizing the socialist system, we ought to aim at conquering those phenomena and processes that are not in essence appropriate to the nature of the socialist system, but that have become passed down or have resulted from the need to surmount the developmental conflicts in our country. Thus, while we consider the period of the building of the foundations of socialism to be over in substance, we must also be aware, I think, that we are only at the beginning of this road that we may define as that of true, developed socialism. On the other hand, the stage of fully developed socialism in Poland in the broad sense should be understood as the next stage. In no way does making such a statement demean the importance of evaluating the past; however, such evaluations may not replace an analysis of the major determinants of the contemporary face of our society conducted in theoretical-ideological categories.

What do we have at our disposal within the system's scope? In essence, our authority is the authority of the working people of cities and villages. The nucleus of this authority is the worker-peasant alliance, in which the working class is the leading class, while it is the ruling class of the entire society. The working people of the cities and villages have their own party and allied parties and associations of secular catholics. Their interests are defended and organized by the people's state, and within its framework by the institutions of self-government, trade unions and other organizations of political and social life. In the system of these organizations, the Marxist-Leninist working class party plays a leadership role. Almost all the means of production and trade are state-controlled or socialized, except for land, whose real production utilization remains under state control; the entire economy is steered by the state in a planned way. Our state is a permanent element of the socialist community.

Thus, we are developing along a general current marked by the universal laws of the socialist system.

At the same time, a vital trait of the face of our society is the irregular development of the particular spheres of socioeconomic life and the social

conflicts that develop on this basis. This unevenness is expressed in the widespread differences in the level of labor industrialization and in the broad diversity of forms of ownership relations that are nonetheless controlled by dominant state possession by entirety and the production and trade regulators based on this. There are generational differences among Polish men and women. Alongside these and other differences and irregularities, we are also dealing with the fact that in many fundamental fields of life, in the latter half of the 1970's and the first years of the 1980's, a sharp regress occurred that emanates from the crisis from which we are slowly extricating ourselves.

Thus, an entire epoch of the historical development and improvement of the stage that I define as developed socialism, both in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical sphere, awaits us. It is a long-term period that requires development that skillfully unites the ideas and aspirations of the social masses with the material and social potential for meeting these aspirations and also for strengthening and enriching the principles and values of the system.

Our society /is a society based on the industrial type of production forces./ [in boldface] It is an industrial society, both in terms of its dominant structures and its aspirations. In the structure of the material base of society, 80-90 percent of the national income is generated based on industrial technologies. The best illustration of this fact is the dependence of our agriculture on industry, on industrial technologies of transport and services rendered to agriculture, a dependence that determines the extent to which society is fed.

It is a well-known fact that 60 percent of our society is made up of workers and their family members; meanwhile, an extensive bi-occupational layer has developed between the peasantry and working class.

/In the economic sphere,/ [in boldface] the state and social possession by entirety of the means of production and trade dominates. In agriculture, the second most important sector of our economy after industry, trisectorial ownership relations occur. Private peasant ownership is served comprehensively by the cooperative and state sector, while the state, via the instruments of the planned economy, procurement, prices, trade and legal regulation particular to it, control the private peasant farm, closely coordinating it with the entire national economy. The PGR [State Farm] plays an important role in this policy and work of the state.

As a result of 40 years of the development of state control of the rural farm economy, it would be unfounded to view the farm system as a dichotomy between the vital peasant farm and the state farm as unnecessary. Hence the birth of the ZSL and PZPR initiative to include a statement in the constitution about the permanency of peasant farms.

The need to feed the nation and the need to restore Poland's position as exporter of farm products necessitate the continual ordering of land management and of the instruments of influence upon all sectors of agriculture, not excluding the private peasant farm. Our private peasant farmer is surrounded by a network of relations and interdependencies that as a whole strengthen the

state and social ownership of the means of production and trade on the national level; our agriculture will remain this way for a long time. The contemporary make-up of the worker-peasant alliance also rests upon this. Of course, the development of socialist forms of linking the peasant economy with the entire economy should be fostered, as should the development of socialist forms of tying in the peasant economy with socially economical and efficient forms of group management in rural areas, always keeping in mind our experience in this regard and the ineffectiveness of overtaking social processes.

In our economy, in the sphere of production, trade and services, there are also small-scale capitalist relations that are nonfundamental or marginal phenomena, although they are vexing to the public in the sphere of distribution and consumption. The production-services functions performed by the small-scale capitalist sector are subject to state control and are regulated by the state. In such decisionmaking, the private owner is clearly limited by the state apparatus and by the totality of his social surroundings. The fact of the matter is that state control and the state regulation of this sector should be effective and its existence and development should be useful for society.

At the present time, there is no modern day society that could build its prosperity on the basis of small-scale ownership alone. However, it should also not be abandoned within reasonable bounds, if this is required by society's needs, particularly in the secondary fields of the socialist economy, where state and public forms of management are unproductive and wasteful.

/In the social sphere,/ [in boldface] as a result of industrial progress made in Poland and as a result of the realization of systems-type principles, many vital transformations have taken place that have totally changed the social face of the country. In spheres of social life that are of critical importance to the system, there is evidence that many fundamental differences among classes and strata are being eliminated and that the index of universal post-elementary education among society is high, as well as that 98 percent of urban society makes its living in the state and cooperative sectors. On the other hand, in rural areas, 80 percent of the population makes its living by working on family farms, 18 percent works in the socialized economy and 2 percent works in the small-scale capitalist economy.

We are a society that provides young people with very equalized conditions to get their start in life and that has greatly equalized living conditions. At the same time, the wage policy in effect since the mid-1970's, and especially the present crisis have radically differentiated society in terms of per capita income. It is estimated that more than 20 percent of families live at the borderline or below the modest social minimum. Until recently, pensioners and annuitants have made up a considerable percentage of this population. The processes of the progressive differentiation of society likewise are observed in rural areas. To the extent that this is possible, the state is trying to counteract these negative processes. Universal health care and a universal pension system serve this purpose, as do the continual increases in the lowest pensions and annuities, the expansion of the social minimum compensation fund, the social welfare fund and the like. In recent years, the public consumption fund has also increased considerably.

The processes of the progressive leveling of class-strata differences are occurring most vividly between the stratum of the intelligentsia versus the working class and peasantry. This is the result of industrialization and the cultural advancement of workers' and farmers' cadres, but likewise of the drop in status of various professional groups that traditionally have been ranked among the intelligentsia (in particular the workers of the industrial administration). As a result of these processes, the social rights of blue-collar and white-collar workers have become equalized, as executed by force of a Sejm law from the mid-1970's.

/In the political sphere,/ [in boldface] in my opinion, Poland has completed the phase of the dictatorship of the proletariat understood not only as the rule of the working class but also as the political regime.⁴⁰ Therefore, I believe that the political reforms written of by J.J. Wiatr, stuffed into the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, reach far beyond this concept and deprive it of historical sense.⁴¹

The political reforms embarked upon by the party in conjunction with the allied political parties and with the cooperation of catholic groups have yielded new solutions that are stabilizing and developing our political system, and will continue to do so. Gradually, as provided by the Ninth Congress resolutions and as allowed by our concrete situation and power structure, we are eliminating all the drawbacks to the democratic character of our system that are left over from the severe political struggles of the period of the constitution of the people's authority and the use of decisions proper to the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, developed in our part of Europe. These limitations remain, although society and its social structures have changed. This was the result of voluntarism in politics, in essence conservatism, the failure to take into account the need to adapt production relations to qualitative changes in production forces and the failure to realize the need to adapt the political-legal superstructure to changing structures of the socialist mode of production.

I believe that at present we have the right to call our state a /democratic people's republic./ [in boldface] My thesis is that this is a type of worker-peasant state that occurs as an intermediate element in the historical development of the socialist state, between the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the all-national state. The people's republic, like every state, must sometimes preserve extensive elements of coercion, but its socio-economic and sociopolitical system is formed as a result of the radical expansion of the principle of democracy in our state. It is the result of the aspirations of the popular masses that expressed this both in social contracts from August 1980 and following the imposition of martial law in December 1981 and in the indirect support of this situation by the vast majority of society, when it became clear that the Solidarity leadership betrayed the trust of the masses and wishes to make use of it to take over the control of authority in the state in the name of utopic and reactionary slogans, while it is clearly supported in these actions by the social right in the West.

As we assess the political struggle we have undergone and compare the state of our sociopolitical system before August 1980 with the present state, following the lifting of martial law, as smooth in its course, we should disseminate the

truth about the deep and irreversible changes that have been made and are still being made in the development of the system of self-governing institutions, in the real powers of trade unions, in the party and allied political parties and in the institutionalization of the church-state dialogue. Many of these changes correspond directly to the economic reform assumptions, guaranteeing its further development from the political aspect. We treat this reform as a necessary means leading to radical economic improvement and a growth in social labor productivity. Although this is an extremely complex matter, we likewise aspire toward the indispensable dissociation of the powers and responsibilities of the economic and administrative authorities from the representative and political authorities and toward the radical strengthening and expansion of representative and social control over the work of all executive and management organs. These far-reaching transformations take time and necessitate a skillfully conducted political struggle, favorable attitudes and approaches, positive commitment and the support of the masses. We are creating and expanding the institutions and mechanisms of the socialist democracy that we now must learn to use and from which we must gain experience. We wish all PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] elements as well would become the plane of dialogue and universal civic education. Thus, we are determined to continue the line of the worker and peasant democracy initiated by the Ninth PZPR Congress.

In the sphere of the /social consciousness/ we can assert the universality of the socialist system of values. This is a great achievement of People's Poland. At the same time, we ought to keep in mind continually that the values of socialist ideology are interpreted in different ways in our society. This fact emanates from several causes, but above all from the different situations people find themselves in during the process of social renewal, from differences in social relations, from conflicts in the process of the development of socialism and the like. There are also in Poland people that are openly disinclined or inimical to socialism. This does not mean that the authorities must make use of political terrorism against them, as some would like. On the other hand, it is a clear sign of the ongoing class struggle taking place in Poland between capitalism and socialism on the worldwide scale.

Socialism has not been created and developed in Poland in an ideological void, nor has it grown up under conditions of the lack of extensive international experience. Like all former presocialist systems, socialism is based on its own foundations. These include the social ownership of the basic means of production, the planned character of the formation of economic and social relations, the decisive role of the working class in the political relations of society and a system of values of scientific ideology with first place given to such values as social justice and human dignity. Thus, socialism is that negation of the capitalist system that enables the continuation of the development of man and production forces through the establishment of social relations that are free from economic exploitation and political alienation.

These universal principles of socialism are concretized in the social and national conditions of each country. They also mark out the strategic directions of the work of the working class party, as the ruling class party. Our party's ideology is based on these foundations that are expounded upon theoretically through history in the works of the classic Marxist-Leninist writers.

At the same time, in concrete matters, our party's ideology draws upon the practical recommendations made by V.I. Lenin, creatively adapting them to the experiences and circumstances particular to the Polish working class and our nation. This applies to such fundamental, but concrete issues as the principles of operation of the working class party, the obligations of the party in view of its responsibility for the issues of the popular nature of state authority, to the approach to the peasant question and to many others.

In the recommendations of V.I. Lenin regarding all-party and all-state issues, we always find new sources of inspiration for properly adapting what is general and universal in socialism to what is national, not only in form but also in the content of sociopolitical and systems-type solutions. No theoretician or leader of the international proletariat was as sensitive as was V.I. Lenin to all the signs of the diminution of the national element in the affairs of the communist and workers' movement and the socialist system.

The questions treated polemically in the preceding article surely will be reflected in the sociopolitical thought of the PZPR, whose horizons ought to outline the real problems of the Polish society that will arise over the course of the next dozen or so years.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Muszynski, "Have the Foundations of Socialism Been Laid in the PRL?," PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU, 1983, No 3-4, pp 124-155.
2. "VII Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe materialy i dokumenty" [7th PZPR Congress. Basic Materials and Documents], Warsaw, 1975, p 3.
3. "VIII Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe dokumenty i materialy" [8th PZPR Congress. Basic Documents and Materials], Warsaw, 1980, p 13.
4. Muszynski, op. cit., p 146.
5. Ibid., p 154.
6. J. Topolski, "Teoria wiedzy historycznej" [Theory of Historical Knowledge], Poznan, 1983, p 371.
7. W. Kula, "Historia, zacyfanie, rozwoj" [History, Regression, Development], Warsaw, 1983, p 316.
8. K. Grzybowski, "Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych" [History of Political and Legal Doctrines] UJ [Jagiellonian University] duplicated lecture, Vol 1, Krakow, 1959, p 5; quoted from H. Olszewski, "Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych," Warsaw-Poznan, 1973, p 6.
9. V. I. Lenin, "The Childhood Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism," Works, Vol 31, Warsaw, 1955, p 29.
10. Ibid.

11. Y. Andropov, "The Teachings of Karl Marx and Some Questions Regarding the Socialist System in the USSR," *KOMMUNIST*, 1983, No 3, pp 20-21.
12. Muszynski, op. cit., p 131.
13. "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Moscow, 1959, pp 474, 486, 514.
14. "Zarys historii Komunistycznej Partii Związku Radzieckiego" [Outline History of the Soviet Communist Party], Warsaw, 1975, p 247.
15. Ibid., p 321.
16. Ibid., p 394.
17. Muszynski, op. cit., pp 131-132.
18. Ibid., p 135.
19. "VII Zjazd PZPR..." op. cit., p 113.
20. "VIII Zjazd PZPR..." op. cit., p 13.
21. See: Muszynski, op. cit., p 135.
22. Ibid., p 136.
23. Ibid., p 142.
24. Ibid., pp 136, 143 and ff.
25. Ibid., p 144.
26. Ibid., p 149.
27. Ibid., p 147.
28. J. Topolski, "Prawda i model w historiografii" [Truth and the Model in Historiography], Łódź, 1982, p 32.
29. Muszynski, op. cit., pp 151-152.
30. Ibid., p 154.
31. Ibid.
32. A. Lopatka, "The Current Stage in the Development of the PRL," *IDEOLOGIA i POLITYKA*, 1983, No 5-6, p 34.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p 30.

35. "Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej" [Constitution of the Polish People's Republic], Warsaw, 1979, pp 5, 6.
36. See: A. Butenko, "Socialism as a Social System," Moscow, 1974, p 241.
37. See: A. Bodnar, "Społeczne uwarunkowania polityki" [Social Determinants of Politics], Warsaw, 1980, p 67.
38. Lopatka, op. cit., p 33.
39. Ibid., p 29.
40. See: M. Waldenberg, "Rewolucja i państwo w myśli politycznej W. Lenina" [Revolution and the State in the Political Thought of V. Lenin], Warsaw, 1978, pp 281-285.
41. J. J. Wiatr, "Political Reforms and the Structure and Consciousness of Polish Society," PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU, 1983, No 3-4, pp 7 and ff.

Socialist Revolution, Communist Civic Education

Warsaw PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU in Polish No 1, 1984 pp 76-86

[Article by Stanisław Cieniawa: "Achievements, Dangers, Expectations"]

[Text] Jerzy Muszyński's question: "Have the foundations of socialism been laid in the PRL?" may be answered by saying that it depends upon what area of social reality we take into consideration and what criteria we use. It would seem that for the Marxist, the statements of the classic Marxist-Leninist writers are the best criteria. However, these writers, by their very example, have taught that practice and not theory is the real point of reference in resolving all problems. Whoever forgets about the world in which he lives when he begins studying theoretical issues stands aloof from Marxism.

All those stand aloof from Marxism that criticize V. I. Lenin for supposedly "rushing" with the revolution. One may also wonder whether they are Marxists that understand communism as... a paradise of every sort of abundance, that dismiss it as something for the distant future and fail to perceive that communism (properly understood, of course) is not only a plenitude of material goods but is first of all a new character of interpersonal relations and ties.

V. I. Lenin once wrote: "If man were completely deprived of the capacity for dreaming in this way, if he could not run ahead sometimes and imagine the complete, finished portrait of that same article that is just beginning to be fashioned in his hands, then I absolutely cannot imagine what incentive would bring man to initiate and complete major projects that exhaust his powers in the fields of arts, science and everyday life."¹ Do not our failures emanate from the fact that we do not think about building the house, that we stop with the foundation itself--"the foundations of socialism?" Moreover, we frequently question what we have built over the 40 years.

In his work "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," V. I. Lenin wrote: "The purpose of socialism is not only to eliminate the breaking up of humanity into small states and the separation of nations in general; it is not merely the rapprochement, but also the fusion of nations." ² Statements of this sort polemicize with the idea that J. Muszynski substantiates diligently, that the classic Marxist writers clearly separated socialism, as a long and difficult transitional period, from communism. Obviously, we cannot quarrel with J. Muszynski's facts: such a period does exist and denying it would lead to new disillusionments. But this period will last forever if we question the foundations of socialism and if we do not see the goals that are included in the ideas of communism. Whoever fears communism, whether unconsciously or in secret from himself, cannot consider himself a communist and Marxist.

Communism is a spectre for a considerable number of people, for it threatens their egoistic interests. They do everything possible to disparage, destroy and remove it from the face of the earth. That is why Marxists ought to be bolder in calling themselves communists and ought to defend it more boldly. It is very much in order that the members of the Leninist party in Russia called themselves communists and continue to do so until today. If communism, properly understood, is the solution to all basic human problems and the elimination of the dangers that threaten humanity, then only the communists that struggle over a better future for the world cannot feel free of guilt for what may happen under the enemies of communism. Were there no other motives, this alone would be enough to state that it is worthwhile to be a communist.

Communists have two great, strictly defined tasks for today and tomorrow: to set the embracing of the entire world by the socialist revolution as their goal and then to be concerned over the communist upbringing of socialist societies. The socialist revolution and communist upbringing are their two mainstays.

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V. I. Lenin had to wage a difficult struggle with the opposition that was incapable of creatively applying Marxism and said that socialism, like former systems, would arise on the foundation of a ripe conflict between highly developed production forces and the production relations that hamstrung their further development; consequently, it would come to being in the most highly developed industrial countries. V. I. Lenin noted the uneven development of particular countries in the era of imperialism and asserted that the capitalist system was ready for revolution as a whole; however, he said that this revolution would begin in the countries that were the "weakest links" of the entire capitalist system.³ The economic exploitation of underdeveloped countries by developed countries eases the conflict within developed and wealthy countries and sharpens it in economically weak countries. That is why a revolutionary situation arises in the latter and not in highly industrialized countries. The primary element of the revolutionary situation is the rebellion against this increased injustice and exploitation, backwardness and poverty, a rebellion directed against existing economic relations. This rebellion is the seed of a new superstructure that does not function on the old base.

In conjunction with this, the socialist revolution has four specific traits that distinguish it from other revolutions:

--first, it is a conscious, planned coming forward conducted according to scientific theory. Scientific socialism arose when their observation of the proletarian struggle and their analysis of the functioning of the capitalist system led K. Marx and F. Engels to formulate its principles;

--second, it begins with the superstructure,⁴ or more precisely with the peaks of social structure, in the course of the ideological struggle, in the course of great organizational activity. In the process of the political struggle, a political upheaval takes place and the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is created that, as the socialist center for coordinating internal and external work, ushers in the socialist social order. Finally, the dictatorship enables the revolutionary forces to nationalize the large-scale private ownership of the means of production and to wage the struggle over greater economic efficiency and the improved meeting of the needs of working people, over the final victory of the socialist mode of production;

--each subsequent form of the struggle includes earlier forms; therefore, the struggle over the increase in labor and production productivity is the most complex, the most long-lived and the most difficult. Here we perceive a third feature of the socialist revolution: this revolution in the field of production relations takes place only after the political coup. In contrast to former revolutions (e.g., the bourgeois revolution), the political coup does not end the revolutionary changes, but only begins them;

--finally, the fourth characteristic feature of the socialist revolution is that what is involved is not a change in form but the total elimination of the private ownership of the means of production. Such ownership, requiring that foreign wage earners be employed and thus leading to exploitation, should not be confused with the private ownership of the means of consumption, or especially with the private ownership of the means of production (family farms) that are, as a rule, small properties that do not require the use of foreign wage earners. Due to the fact that the private ownership of the means of production has become a practice that has continued for centuries of the existence of class systems, the end goal of the socialist revolution is very difficult to realize and is therefore a long-term process. If we keep this historical perspective in mind, it is easy to understand the current problems faced by real socialism.

Finally, we must reiterate Lenin's emphatic statement that apart from these specific traits and a series of universal principles, the socialist revolution progresses in each country in its own way, depending upon the existing economic structure, culture and national traits.

Here we can formulate an answer to J. Muszynski's question. If, in a given country, a revolution is effected that is marked by the preceding four specific traits, then in that country the foundations of socialism have been laid. There is no doubt that these foundations exist in the PRL [Polish People's Republic] and there is no need to question them. Nor did the Ninth PZPR Congress question them, even though it took place during a very difficult time. The documents from this congress assert: "In a relatively brief historical period, we have pulled the country out of ruins and backwardness and Poland has become a developed industrial country. Rural living standards have changed

radically as a result of farm reform. Despite the present difficulties, the social situation has changed as well; the level of education and culture of society is different; its sense of dignity and of the awareness of the civic right to participate in managing state and local affairs have increased."⁵

The 13th PZPR KC [Central Committee] Plenum, devoted to party ideological tasks, likewise stressed the fact that the foundations of socialism have been laid in the PRL. We find the following statements in a report given by Jozef Czyrek: "Our unwavering party task is the historical solution of the dramatically difficult and lengthy struggle over social justice in Poland, permanently inscribed into the shape of Europe. The Polish Workers Party and the progressive democratic forces that work with it have managed to read accurately the direction of the course of history; they have discovered and outlined the only right road of the liberation and rebirth of independent Poland, within just and safe bounds--a Poland developing in the systemic form that ensures the revolutionary transformation of society and the progress of civilization, a Poland that plays an important role in the socialist family of nations and in the system of postwar law and order in Europe."⁶

However, the foundations of socialism are still not full socialism; they are still not the stage that directly precedes the communist phase. Thus, to question the existence of the foundations of socialism in Poland is to prove that quite fundamental concepts have not been differentiated. But even greater confusion occurs when the terms "scientific socialism" and "scientific communism" are not only used interchangeably, but moreover refer once to the theory that traditionally has been the third component part of Marxism (besides philosophy and political economy) and another time to socialism or communism as a social fact. Jerzy Muszynski tries to avoid this duplicity of meaning by using "the theory of scientific socialism" for the former concept. However, this author, in defining scientific socialism developed in opposition to utopian socialism, does not include or emphasize clearly enough those contents that would truly differentiate fully developed socialism from its foundations. Nor is J. Muszynski able to find such distinguishing characteristics in his article on the subject of political pluralism in which he writes: "Political pluralism can occur in the socialist system only during the initial period of the creation of the foundations of socialism, when some political forces that represent the interests of the strata and communities promoting certain systems-type changes temporarily come out in favor of the side of the anticapitalist revolution. However, if political pluralism /really/ [in boldface] exists, then it is impossible to speak of the realization of socialism."⁷

The author states correctly that political pluralism cannot occur in socialism, but his statement that "political pluralism can occur in the socialist system only during the initial period of the creation of the foundations of socialism" and not during the "realization of socialism" is overly exact and explains nothing. We have five terms here that are not clearly defined: "political pluralism," "socialist system," "the initial period of the creation of socialism," "the realization of socialism" and "real socialism" and they are linked together unfortuitously in such statements as "political pluralism can occur in the socialist system" and the like. That is why it is difficult to draw from this anything more than muddled intuitions.

More informative, but still controversial is Jerzy Muszynski's concept of "socialism as a lower stage of the communist system" that "will become realized only when, as a result of transformations in all fields of life, all economic, social, political, ideological and cultural determinants of the division of society into classes, strata and antagonistic groups will become totally eliminated, when class conflict will disappear, when the real moral-political unity of society will be established and when a homogeneous type of society, integrated in every regard, will develop." ⁸ K. Marx wrote: "(...) One worker is married, another is not; one has more children than another and so on and so forth. With equal labor productivity, and thus an equal share in the social consumption fund, one actually receives more than another, one is richer than another, etc. (...) However, these shortcomings are inevitable during the initial phase of the communist society, in the form that has been born of the capitalist society, after long labor pains." ⁹

If we adopt as the basis for the differentiation of socialism and communism the fact that in socialism the principle "to each according to his labor" is binding and in communism the principle "to each according to his needs" applies, two kinds of undesirable phenomena must exist: insufficiency that is no one's fault and wealth unwarranted by one's work. The insufficiency that is no one's fault sometimes may be felt by those that cannot work, and society, whether because of the rigidity of regulations or because of sheer oversight, is not concerned enough over these. Others that may suffer blamelessly from want are those that are dependent upon private means of production, such as peasants, for example, for whom natural disasters and other accidents of fate reduce their means. These same accidents of fortune may, in turn, bring people wealth that is unwarranted by their work: children will always take advantage of enterprising parents, and heirs will always benefit from the estate of the deceased. At least, this will always happen as long as the distribution of goods "according to labor" exists. It is inevitable that socialism will contain vestiges of the phenomenon or the immoral acquisition of the fruits of someone else's labor. In view of this, is it possible for socialism to have a "homogeneous type of society, integrated in every regard?" Likewise the statement concerning the leveling of social strata is controversial, but this is a separate issue.

Not only K. Marx but also V. I. Lenin had a considerably less idealized concept of socialism treated as a transitional period. In his article "Have the Foundations of Socialism Been Laid in the PRL?," Jerzy Muszynski correctly quotes the opinion of the author of "What Is to Be Done?" [Chto Delat'?): "Socialism envisages work without the participation of capitalists, social work under conditions of the strictest reporting, control and supervision on the part of the organized vanguard, the leading part of the working masses; at the same time, both the measure of work and of remuneration for work must be defined (...). Thus, we call communism that system in which people become accustomed to performing their social obligations without a special apparatus of coercion, when gratis work for the general good becomes a universal phenomenon." ¹⁰ The upshot of this is that, in the opinion of the creators of the Soviet state, coercion must exist in socialism, i.e., the rule of some people over others with all of the necessary consequences of this.

Jerzy Muszynski's article is useful and valuable in those fragments that contain his insightful criticism of departures from the principles of socialism in Poland, his criticism of the bureaucratic distortions of socialism. Until now, we have had a serious shortage of such criticism. Such constructive criticism should always exist and should foster the development of the new system. However, the article also contains a certain suggestion that the author did not intend: it is a paralyzing statement that questions the foundations of socialism on the one hand and idealizes it on the other. This leads to the conclusion that socialism will be difficult to build at any time. What we have built over 40 years is crumbling to ashes and the ideal of socialism is dissipating, being carried off.

This does not mean that we ought to indulge in easy optimism and delude ourselves with slogans of the sort: "communism is easy to achieve." We should assume a soberminded, critical attitude, not falling into extremes and not trying to blacken what is not totally black. Above all, we should think constructively. First, we must ask boldly: why do many people continue to be skeptical about progress in the implementation of socialist principles, even though this system has the welfare of these people in mind? It seems that there are two reasons: specific theoretical errors in interpreting the ideas of the creators of scientific socialism in practice and the weakness of ideological-upbringing work.

Among those errors that have caused us the greatest harm, the first and foremost is that the principle of social justice has been stressed in the development of socialist production relations to the neglect of an extremely important principle of Marxism--the principle of motivation. It is known that production relations are determined by three different aspects: the ownership aspect, the organizational aspect and the occupational aspect. The most important differentiation is that of the ownership aspect. In Poland, four types of ownership exist: state, cooperative, individual and private. The place and role of private ownership determines the difference between capitalism and socialism. In capitalism, private ownership plays the decisive role, while in socialism it occupies the last place. Its limitation and supplantation are dictated by the need to implement the principle of justice. Private ownership is tantamount to the buying of manpower and enables the exploitation of those selling manpower. That is why socialism transforms such ownership into state, cooperative or individual ownership. K. Marx realized that individual ownership (that he called "small-scale private ownership") gives the working man great freedom and considerably motivates him to work productively. The possession of freedom, initiative and inventiveness in the practical process of goods production is indispensable for man; he also aspires towards independence in the disposal of the goods he has personally produced, and he is best served by all this when--as K. Marx observed--he is the "proprietor of the working conditions that serve him; thus, the peasant is the proprietor of the field he tills and the craftsman is proprietor of the tools that he wields like a virtuoso."¹¹ Unfortunately, "this production mode is premised upon the parceling out of land and the other means of production. It excludes both the concentration of the means of production and coproduction, the

division of labor within the compass of these same production processes, the social control and regulation of nature and the free development of production forces." ¹² Therefore, this production mode "at a certain level of development itself gave to the world the material means of its own annihilation."¹³

When K. Marx stresses the need for the independence and freedom of the peasant and the craftsman, he has in mind the principle of motivation, and when he criticizes the excessive parceling out of land that excludes the full use of the achievements of technology and the replacement of human labor by machine labor, he emphasizes the principle of functionality. It is evident that K. Marx did not make a fetish of the principle of justice. Production relations are properly developed only when these three different principles are regarded jointly, when they form a unity. Consequently, it is a mistake to make an absolute of one of these principles or to ignore another. Most often, the principle of motivation is ignored: too little is done to increase motivation significantly. Naturally, much depends upon organizational and occupational relations and on the moral climate as well. Thanks to these relations, there are many state and cooperative enterprises that work well--people work productively, earn a decent living and are satisfied. The economic reform that is underway intends for such relations to prevail in all socialist enterprises. However, the reform is not able to guard against various irregular practices if the principle of motivation is not observed. This principle requires that individual ownership be maintained and protected wherever it does not violate the principle of functionality (e.g., small farms on hilly terrain), but above all it requires that the economic reform continue in that direction that enables state and cooperative ownership to be treated by employees as an individual, personal thing, in accordance with what K. Marx wrote in "Das Kapital": "The mode of ownership that emanates from the capitalist mode of production, i.e., capitalist private ownership, is the first negation of individual private ownership based on one's own labor. But capitalist production, like a process of nature, inevitably produces its own negation. It is a negation of negations. It restores not private ownership, but individual ownership, based on the achievements of the capitalist era, on cooperation and on the joint possession of land and the means of production produced through one's own work."¹⁴

Regardless of the conclusions we draw from the polemic between F. Engels and E. Duhring on the subject of the preceding statement of Marx,¹⁵ there is only one solution: private ownership must be eliminated due to the principle of justice and state or cooperative ownership must be introduced where the principle of functionality warrants this. On the other hand, the requirements of the principle of motivation demand that in all sectors, that organizational framework and those working conditions must be created that enable people to feel that they are working for themselves and on their own. It is not necessary for every worker to have land or an industrial plant for his own private property, but it is necessary that at every level and in every position, he be remunerated for inventiveness and ingenuity that brings profit to the enterprise or protects it against losses, that he be rewarded for identifying with the goals of the enterprise and the good of the country and that in the area of those matters that are entrusted to him, he have the right to make decisions freely and even to take a calculated risk, if the general welfare and good

of society are at stake. Only then will the expressions "socialism" and "communism" become rehabilitated, since we will then have begun to treat not man in the abstract, but man that works solidly, as the highest good, we will not only equalize people where necessary, in the name of social justice, but we will also differentiate them where necessary, according to their labor and services for the country, and people will become persuaded that our system rewards socially valuable activism, enterprise and initiative.

From the days of the Greek and Roman philosophers, through the most recent achievements of psychology, knowledge of the truth that man develops the most fully and most intensively when he gives his best and achieves his best work has gained ground. Man, in his desire for social recognition, tries to distinguish himself, to show his potential and to be a master, an artist in his own area. The social system serves the comprehensive development of man only when it notices and rewards these achievements. And when people give their all, the country becomes wealthy and blossoms; they themselves are happy and are ready to really defend its systemic principles. The state most completely reveals its socialist character and its strength when it in no way limits the aspirations of honest working people, but comes out with total severity against those that clash with socialist morality and law. When exploitation, parasitism and speculation are discovered, it applies administrative and penal sanctions, confiscates the accumulated goods and limits inheritance rights. The socialist system in and of itself ought to educate people toward socialism, and it begins to do this only when it treats those that work hard or have worked hard with every consideration and those that shirk work and take advantage of others with full severity.

The creators of Marxism, living in an unjust system, had to take the side of the poor and the wronged. However, in socialism, the situation is changing radically: the exploiter may be a squanderer that has nothing and the exploited may be someone that earns a good salary, and often works for two or three. Can this well situated man identify with socialism, can he take the side of those that work poorly, squander public property and live at his expense? These questions are rhetorical. The people are correct that blame our Polish crises not only on certain centers of authority, but also on all those that shirk work, abuse alcohol and are wasteful, and for whom a caretaker state, identified with its socialist character, is very convenient.¹⁶

Let us reiterate: the deepest root of our crises is the breakdown of the Marxist principle of activism. In social practice this has a manifold, complex shape.

J. Muszynski questions the Seventh Congress statement concerning the building of the foundations of socialism in Poland, pointing out the fact that the rural farm economy still does not have a socialist character. But are we correct to equate the socialist character of the farm with the simple integration of small farms? Zenon Kierul writes the following: "One of the premises that, in its time, condemned peasant farms was the conviction about the economic superiority of large-area farms. Now there is a great deal of proof showing that this connection is of a historical nature and at present it is at least controversial."¹⁷ This author points out that small farms are more profitable.

This is determined by the specific nature of farm production. "In farm work, what is indispensable is the coalescence of complete and speedy information about the status quo with the right choice of methods and rapid execution. In the large enterprise and under the division of labor into management and production, disruptions occur in the circulation of information and the decisionmaking process is too time-consuming. Therefore the decisions that are made are often inept." Moreover, as K. Marx observed, small farms are better adapted to the needs of the working man. "Oneness of thought and execution interwoven with full responsibility is the only road to the attainment of solid work results and the sense of satisfaction with one's creative participation in life." Z. Kierul writes that "recognizing the peasant farm as a permanent of the socialist economy does not mean freezing the status quo. The socialization of production processes in farming and rural life is necessary and must follow."

It becomes apparent that the socialist revolution is extremely difficult and risky work, demanding of heroism. This revolution is the deep transformation of the entire social structure and of all social processes and the development of four forms of struggle: ideological, organizational, political and production. And because, in the Marxist, activist conception of society, the substance of the social structure is not people themselves by the very fact of their existence, but their social activism based on the implementation of economic, political, organizational and cultural values, the foundations of socialism are not static structures that slavishly imitate the theoretical model, but dynamic, changing structures. J. Kurowicki is quite correct when he writes that the situation with regard to social development is completely different from the acquisition of scout proficiency that one gains once for his entire life.²¹

What distinguishes the socialist structure is the fact that it is a movement in a direction that accords with the direction of fundamental dependencies. It starts out by expanding and strengthening socialist production relations. The consistent application of the principles of justice, functionality and motivation determine the success of this structure. We know that until now, the structure has not succeeded primarily because the principle of motivation has been stubbornly ignored.

3

When we study the "Report on the Work of the KC Commission Called to Explain the Causes and Course of Social Conflicts in the History of People's Poland," we arrive at the conclusion that, alongside errors in the structuring of socialist production relations, shortcomings in the sphere of communist upbringing stand as a major cause of our problems and failures. The existing state of this upbringing has meant that society has put into office people that are unsuitable to lead it, according to J. Muszynski, people that are "incompetent, greedy and do not have the proper knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory." Thus, the writers of the report state correctly in their conclusions that: "An objective fact of the socialist structure is the growing role of the element of awareness and conscious choice in the formation of developmental processes. The guiding of social processes understood thus, as analyzed by

Marx and elaborated by Lenin, is a historical necessity."²² But it is not only a question of knowledge here. As J. Ladyka writes correctly, socialism "by nature requires that the ideological activism of people as conscious creators fashioning their own fate and their own world be unleashed."²³ If we recognize the fact that socialism depends upon the ideological, organizational, political and production activism of our country's every citizen, upon activism that is in harmony with the spirit of Marxism, then we must recognize the need for communist upbringing to be indisputable.

The backbone of communist upbringing is issues training beginning with the statement of the most general philosophical problem--the problem of the meaning of life. Only such an education can be comprehensive and searching, taking in all fields of life and all forms of activism indispensable to comprehensive development. The greatest mistake made by previous concepts of communist upbringing is the restricting of its scope to sociopolitical affairs. The problem of the meaning of life leads to the problem of the scientific world view. This world view requires that materialist and dialectical ontology be taken into account and this in turn leads to questions of methodology, gnosiology and philosophical anthropology. These divisions of general philosophy may be tailored for introduction into the programs of elementary schools. Upon this foundation, the study of the branches of practical philosophy may and should be offered: the study of religion, the philosophy of work and the philosophy of social activism as the crux of communist education and upbringing; next ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of leisure time, recreation and play.

The goal of the ideological struggle is also socialist science and education, morality and culture. Only someone that understands that these values are indispensable to his development and that they are substantially above all ideology, morality and culture that is inimical to socialism can be really committed to this struggle. Consequently, one's independent consideration of all the "pros" and "cons" followed by a decisive declaration in favor of socialism is a necessary condition underlying effective social activity and personal development in the course of this activity. The basic structural transformations were made long ago; in my opinion, progress has been stymied by a lack of socialist convictions and a lack of ardent ideological commitment.

Ultimately, however, the production struggle is the most important front of struggle. We note the growing examples of honest work and the drive for learning and participation in social life, but we also observe the contrary: the disinclination to work and learning and the tendency to depend on shrewdness or "luck" and even the tendency toward parasitism and transgressions of the law. The major cause of this is that the production process is an area of dogged class struggle.

We find the growing dangers unsettling and we would like to avert them with all our might, but we do not always know how to do this. The best path of victory for our ideas is the effective building of such a system in which ideologically committed and active individuals find success and happiness. We must assess our socialist achievements from this perspective and decide whether we have built the foundations of socialism in Poland.

FOOTNOTES

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4. J. J. Wiatr, "Marksistowska teoria rozwoju społecznego" [Marxist Theory of Social Development], Warsaw, 1973, p 68.
5. "IX Nadzwyczajny Zjazd PZPR. Stenogram" [Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress. Stenographic Report], Warsaw, 1983, pp 101-102.
6. "Referat Biura Politycznego KC PZPR" [PZPR KC Politburo Report], TRYBUNA LUDU, 17 October 1983.
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12. Ibid.
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14. Ibid., p 905.
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17. Z. Kierul, "What Is Profitable for Us?," ODRODZENIE, 25 October 1983.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.
21. J. Kurowicki, G. Zwolinska, "W ktorym miejscu jestesmy" [In What Place Are We?], Warsaw, 1982, p 11.
22. "Report on the Work of the KC Commission Called to Explain the Causes and Course of Social Conflicts in the History of People's Poland," NOWE DROGI, Warsaw, 1983.
23. J. Ladyka, "Some Remarks on Culture and Cultural Politics," NOWE DROGI, 1983, No 9, p 48.

National, Historical Characteristics

Warsaw PROBLEMY MARKSIZMU-LENINIZMU in Polish No 1, 1984 pp 87-99

[Article by Jerzy J. Wiatr: "The Current Stage and Prospects of the Socialist Structure in Poland"]

[Text] Poland's socioeconomic and political crisis, in particular the level of social conflict and tension and the state of the consciousness of the working class and other social strata revealed during the crisis period, place on the agenda the issue of determining the stage of the socialist structure in our country, its tasks and its prospects for the near and distant future. The party's ideological and political opponents have set up generalizations negating all achievements of the socialist system thus far; embittered and experiencing difficulties, many members of the working class and other workers' strata, as well as some party members, have adopted these views. Consequently, it is of vital ideological-upbringing importance that we clarify these questions. The significance of this matter for properly defining the current and future strategy of the socialist system in Poland, in accordance with reality, is no less important. That is why Jerzy Muszynski's article that discusses a number of important controversial issues of the current stage of the socialist system in our country has been received with interest. In continuing the discussion on this subject, I have decided to refrain from addressing in detail the particular ideas expressed by J. Muszynski; instead, I would like to present my own view of the questions brought up in his discussion. At the same time, I am aware that my statements are of a hypothetical nature and that my choice of problems itself reflects my viewpoint and is controversial.

Both the general rules of the building of socialism and their particular form under the conditions of People's Poland, as well as the question of the special national characteristics of the socialist system in Poland, require theoretical analysis. The issue of the periods and stages of development of the socialist system, as well as a redefinition of the stage in which Poland finds itself and, emanating from this, the specification of the tasks of the socialist system in Poland for the near and distant future, must be explained theoretically.

Characteristics and Tasks of the Transitional Period

The victory of the socialist revolution is a decisive turning point in social development. It represents the end of the capitalist system and the beginning of the birth of the socialist system. Like every previous system, however, socialism does not arise immediately in its finished, mature form. Between the fall of capitalism and the assumption of a mature form by the socialist society, there exists a long period of the transformation of economic relations, the class structure, culture and the social consciousness and the legal-political superstructure. History teaches us that in the past, transitional periods between socioeconomic systems extended for many centuries. Due to the higher level of socioeconomic development and the conscious, intentional molding of the process of the transition from capitalism to socialism by the communist party and by the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of the birth of the new system has been shortened considerably. However, the assumption that this period can be shortened to several or a dozen or so years is a serious theoretical mistake. The transitional period is an entire epoch in the development of socialism.

In the literature on these complex questions, usually the following basic tasks of the transitional period stand out: the total liquidation of exploitative classes (the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy); the socialization of a fundamental part of the means of production in all production sectors; the industrialization of the country and the penetration of the entire economy with modern technology; securing the working class in alliance with the peasant class and the working intelligentsia the position of ruling class politically and ideologically; the strengthening of the leadership and leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party that joins the interests of the working class and all working people in its activities; the creation, and then the strengthening of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the development of socialist education, science and culture ensuring the historical advancement of the working class and peasantry in this field.

These tasks of the transitional period have been implemented to date almost exclusively in countries that before the victory of the socialist revolution lagged far behind in development by comparison with highly developed capitalist countries. Czechoslovakia and the GDR are exceptions in this regard, but in the case of the latter, considerable wartime destruction caused the repeated regress of the economic level at the threshold of the socialist system. As a consequence of the delay in economic development, the transitional period in essentially all socialist countries was and is a period of stepped-up capital stock formation effected under highly unfavorable conditions of competition with more highly developed capitalist countries.

This competition was of fundamental importance to the selection by the Soviet Union of that variant of transitional period policy as it entered the 1930's that could ensure the most rapid possible industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture, both considered to be indispensable for preparing the USSR to defy imperialist aggression. The selection of the variant of stepped-up industrialization and collectivization bore consequences in the field of economic development (industrialization financed out of funds

diverted from agriculture and private consumption), in political milieus (a considerable increase in the degree and scope of the use of state pressure) and in the sphere of the social consciousness. Under the specific historical conditions of the USSR--given its isolation amid a capitalist environment--the choice of this variant was necessary and set up conditions for victory during the years of World War II.

As a result of this war, capitalism was overthrown in East Central Europe, and shortly thereafter in North Korea and China as well. New nations and states entered the path of socialist transformations. They all faced the necessity of implementing the tasks of the transitional period, but under new conditions, changed by the fact that socialism was being built not in a single state surrounded by capitalism, but in the entire community of socialist countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union had won for itself the position of great and mighty world power and its strength was an effective support and shield for all other socialist countries. This set before them the task of choosing such a strategy of the transitional period as would enable them to take into consideration concrete historical conditions and to implement the tasks of the transitional period in the best possible way. These tasks are of a universal nature. They emanate from the essence of socialism as a system. The transitional period in every country must lead to the implementation of the previously listed seven universal tasks. Selectively choosing some for implementation while ignoring others is not possible. The tasks of the transitional period are a whole that emanates from the characteristics of the system that has been created. The fact that under specific historical circumstances some tasks may be implemented more quickly and more fully than others is a separate issue. However, such unevenness lengthens the transitional period.

From the Transitional Period to the Fully Developed Socialist Society

Following the implementation of the tasks of the transitional period, the building of socialism enters a new phase known as the period of the creation of the fully developed socialist society. The 24th KPZR [Soviet Communist Party] Congress (1971) discussed the issues related to this period, as did the congresses of a number of other communist and workers' parties, including the 7th PZFR Congress. It also provoked a lively discussion among Marxist authors.¹ This discussion particularly covered the definition of the "fully developed socialist society," the periods and stages of development of the socialist system and queries regarding the stages of development at which particular socialist countries are found.

Of late we observe in Poland a tendency for some Marxist writers to reject the very concept of a "fully developed socialist society" and related subject matter. This is wrong and harmful. The apologetic manner in which this subject was treated in the 1970's is one thing, and the question itself of stages in the development of the socialist system is another.

I have proposed the following categories for analyzing the question of the periods and stages of the socialist system:²

- the transitional period from capitalism to socialism:
 - a. the stage of the struggle over authority and the elimination of capitalism,
 - b. the stage of the creation and strengthening of the foundations of socialism;
- the period of the creation and existence of the fully developed socialist society:
 - a. the stage of the creation of the fully developed socialist society,
 - b. the stage of the functioning of the fully developed socialist society;
- the communist period of the socialist system (whose stages and forms Marxist-Leninist theory cannot yet define in detail).³

Essentially this corresponds to the periodization used by other Marxist writers,⁴ although the details differ. However, it is not the periodization itself that is particularly subject to controversy, but the derivative determination of the stage in the socialist structure in which particular countries are found. The sometimes stated view⁵ that all European socialist countries have already achieved the stage of the fully developed socialist society has not met with widespread approval. Official party documents, outside the KPZR, have spoken only of the need to implement the tasks of building the fully developed socialist society, which assumes the completed implementation of the transitional period tasks. Only in Poland has it been asserted that some tasks of the transitional period have still not been implemented (particularly in farming); however, this has not hindered the formulation of the thesis that Poland as well has entered the stage of the fully developed socialist society.⁶ It is this thesis that is currently the subject of widespread criticism.

The critics advance two different arguments. The first is that in Poland, the transformations of the transitional period still have not been fully completed; relatedly, it was premature to declare the transition to the tasks of building the "fully developed socialist society." The second argument is the claim that from the theoretical viewpoint of the definition of "fully developed socialist society," the policy of the 1970's was in no way the path for realizing this phase of socialist changes in Poland.

What, then, should the "fully developed socialist society" be, in order to imbue this term with real meaning so that it signifies a higher phase of the development of the socialist system? In my opinion, the fully developed socialist society exists only when basic kinds of technical-economic changes have been realized (an increase in labor productivity based on the most modern technologies, on the organization of work and on high level qualifications); and when fundamental transformations have been effected in the following fields: socioeconomic (the development of fully socialized means of production, i.e., not merely the replacement of private ownership by public ownership, but also the creation of the real control of manufacturers over the labor process and its results, the overcoming of class divisiveness and the farreaching fusion of all working classes and strata), political (the shrinking of the function of the state as an organ of rule and class coercion, the development of socialist self-government) and ideological (the development of the socialist way of life and socialist value patterns, the victory of the socialist principles of co-existence and of the ideological content of socialism in the consciousness of virtually the entire society).

The transition to the thus comprehended fully developed socialist society is a universal truth. However, the rate and forms of this process in particular countries differ widely. This is related to the more general problem of the universal truths and the particular national conditions of the socialist system.⁷

The Universal Principles of Socialism and the Historical and National Conditions of Their Realization

The following theoretical categories must be distinguished:

- the universal principles of socialism, i.e., the basic values and goals whose implementation serves the socialist system;
- the universal laws of the socialist system, i.e., those social laws that occur universally in all countries building socialism and that represent an indispensable condition for the success of the building of socialism;
- the national conditions and particular traits of the socialist system, i.e., those conditions and traits that occur only in some socialist countries or even in only one country.

The universal principles of socialism were formulated by Marx and Engels, and then were elaborated by Lenin and through the development of the theoretical-program thought of the workers' movement. It is a basic universal principle of socialism that socialism is a system for liberating man from all exploitation and pressure, that it is a system for comprehensive development and for more and more completely meeting the material and spiritual needs of man. The major ideological principles of socialism emanate from this basic principle of socialism. These major principles are: the principle of social justice, the principle of the ever greater freedom and dignity of man, the principle of the liberation and humanization of work and the principle of proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism. The entire strategy and tactics of the struggle for socialism and the socialist system must always serve the implementation of these principles. Marxism-Leninism firmly rejects all departures from these universal ideological principles of socialism. Not only is socialism different from previous modes of production, it is also a different, incomparably more humanistic, moral order. However, the moral content of socialism is not implemented automatically, as an automatic consequence of systems-type changes. A decisive and conscious struggle to incorporate the universal ideological principles of socialism into life is necessary. This is the historical duty of the Marxist-Leninist party, that not only must promote these principles, but above all must oversee their incorporation into life. Without this, the struggle for socialism would lose its moral sense and would not be in a position to draw the masses.

The Polish United Workers Party was highly critical of the practice of departing from the universal principles of socialism. It pointed out that departures from the universal principles of socialism committed in the past became a source of crisis phenomena and were used by the opponents of socialism. According to Wojciech Jaruzelski, "What has happened in Poland confirms in full the thesis that the departure from the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism as well as the lack of a creative, responsible approach to particular national conditions result inevitably in distortions and problems, problems that are eagerly taken advantage of by the internal and external enemies of socialism."⁸

It is necessary that all the party's ideological work be permeated by the development of views that accord with the fundamental, universal principles of socialism. Equally necessary is continual care taken to ensure that the practice of the building of socialism complies with these principles.

Alongside the universal principles of socialism exist the universal laws of the socialist system that were formulated by the creators of Marxism-Leninism and continually have been redefined and developed through the theoretical thought of the workers' movement on the basis of the generalizations of the historical practice of the struggle over socialism. These laws include above all: the law of the class struggle of the proletariat that states that socialism is realized through the struggle of the working class as leader of the working masses, against the bourgeoisie to overthrow capitalism and build socialism; the law of proletarian revolution that states that the overthrow of capitalism is accomplished via the victorious revolution of the working class that leads to the crushing of the political rule of the bourgeoisie, next enabling the overthrow of its political and ideological rule; the law of the dictatorship of the proletariat that states that the state of the transitional period is the revolutionary dictatorship of the working class; the law of the socialization of the ownership of the means of production; the law of the worker-peasant alliance that states that the victory of the revolution and the realization of the socialist system are possible only when the working class works in alliance with the working peasantry; the law of the leadership role of the new type of party that states that the new type of Leninist party as the leadership force of revolution and the socialist system is an indispensable condition for the victory of socialism; the law of the internationalist solidarity of the proletariat and the workers' movement that states that the struggle for socialism is of an international nature, since the working class can achieve a total and conclusive victory only by acting with solidarity on an international scale and by strengthening the unity of the workers' movement on the worldwide scale; following the creation of the community of socialist states, this law likewise is manifested in international solidarity and in the unity of action of socialist states.

These are the universal, fundamental laws of the struggle for socialism and the socialist system. Clearly, history has recorded departures from these laws, for example, in the form of the weakening of the worker-peasant alliance and the party's leadership role and in the form of the party's lacking Leninist characteristics, as well as in the weakening of the unity and solidarity of the states of the socialist community. All such departures from the universal laws of the struggle for socialism always have led to regresses in the socialism system and have worked in favor of the enemies of socialism. This likewise occurred in Poland, since the political practice of former years--especially the 1971 to 1980 period--was characterized largely by a supercilious and superficial attitude to these universal laws of socialism and the socialist system.

It is necessary to study thoroughly the historical experiences of the USSR and all other socialist countries in order to determine how these universal laws are implemented under specific historical conditions and, on the basis of comparative scholarly analysis, to establish which other features of the socialist system have a universal character.

In this context, several especially controversial questions must be analyzed.

The first of these is the /method of political and economic organization/ [under emphasis] of the socialist society. Within the framework of the implementation of the universal laws of the struggle for socialism and the socialist system, various solutions are possible in this area (e.g., a multi-party system or a one-party system) depending upon the specific historical conditions in which socialism is implemented.⁹ An important task of Marxist-Leninist theory is the study from this viewpoint of the experiences of all real socialist countries, the study of both the similarities and the differences in the political and economic solutions adopted by them, the explanation of the historical sources of the differences that occur and the objective assessment of the weaknesses and strengths occurring in the reality of the methods of the political and economic organization of the society building socialism.

The second question is that of the /rate of socialist changes/ [under emphasis] and the consequences of the fact that this tempo is not identical and cannot be identical in different countries. A comparative analysis of the processes of building socialism ought to be the foundation of generalizations that define the determinants for selecting the most appropriate rate of change under specific historical conditions. The building of the new system cannot be speeded up or delayed voluntaristically without having serious negative consequences. An example of this was the "great leap forward" policy in the People's Republic of China that yielded disastrous consequences.

The third question for comparative analysis is the issue of the /forms of socialization/ [under emphasis] of property. It is a universal characteristic of socialism that it encompasses the socialization of the means of production; the point of departure of this process is the nationalization of the basic sectors of the national economy. Within the framework of this law, however, there are various forms of the socialization of the remaining fields of the economy, and different ratios of state-owned and cooperative property. The direct control of manufacturers over the labor process and its results likewise assumes various forms. All this must be analyzed carefully.

As we looked at the question of the differences that occur in the way the universal laws of the socialist system are implemented, we touched upon the question of particular national conditions, and consequently, the characteristics of this process as well.

As is known, Marxism-Leninism often has stressed the need to take into account the national differences and the specific historical conditions in which the struggle for socialism occurs. At the Eighth RKP (1) [Soviet Communist Party--leftists] Congress, V. I. Lenin stated that "on the issue of the self-determination of nations, the heart of the matter lies in the fact that various nations move along the same historical path, but in zigzags and alleys that are highly different, and in the fact that more cultured nations obviously move differently than less cultured ones."¹⁰ At the same time, in the work "The Childhood Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism," V. I. Lenin wrote: "As long as national and state differences exist among nations and countries--and such differences will continue to be extensive, and for a long time, even after the dictatorship of

the proletariat is realized on a worldwide scale--the international unity of the tactics of the communist workers' movement of all countries demands that diversity not be eliminated, that national differences not be obliterated..., but that application of the fundamental principles of communism (Soviet Authority and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat) that would modify these principles in detail in the proper way, that would adapt them properly and adjust them to national and national state differences."¹¹

Just as a departure from Marxism-Leninism negates or demeans the importance of the universal principles of socialism and the laws of the socialist system, it is also the negation or the scorn of the particular national conditions of the socialist system in a specific country and in a specific period.

The history of socialist countries through the present reveals four basic causes for differences in national conditions and, consequently, for differences in the characteristics of the socialist system.

The first of these lies in the fact that particular countries have entered the path of the building of socialism at various levels of the previously attained level of economic and educational-cultural development.

The second cause is that particular countries enter the path of socialist development during different phases of the international struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, i.e., in different international situations.

The third cause is the existence in each nation of specific traditions and a specific culture, mentality, ethical structure, national character and the like, that have grown up over centuries. After Ludwik Krzywicki, we call the totality of such phenomena the "historical groundwork."¹² There are no two nations that have the same historical groundwork; however, there are greater or lesser similarities and differences between the historical groundwork of particular nations, which is an important subject of comparative sociological and politological analysis. The considerable permanence of the historical groundwork means that, as a rule, a policy that ignores this aspect of social life is not successful.

Finally, the fourth reason for the different conditions of the socialist system is the fact that the acquisition of power by the working class has taken place by various methods, which has had important consequences in the field of national differences in conditions, and thus in the characteristics of the socialist system. Likewise in the future, we will have to consider the fact that more and more different types of nations will enter the path of socialism. Their historical experiences will enrich the past variety of the roads to socialism. If, for example, the communists of the highly developed capitalist countries of Western Europe succeed in realizing their program of the peaceful road to socialism, conditions will arise for the manifestation of many new, never before occurring, characteristics of the socialist system in these countries.

The dialectical principle of the mutual interrelationship of what is general and what is specific and individual is the guiding principle for the study of

the question of the universal principles and laws of socialism, as well as their specific national determinants and characteristics by Marxism-Leninism. S. Widerszpil aptly writes: "What is specific in particular socialist countries ought to include what is general in the building of socialism, what has been confirmed and verified by the experiences of other countries."¹³ The Marxist-Leninist social sciences must embark upon a thorough analysis of the experiences of all socialist countries and of the entire rich and varied experience of real socialism of the 20th century, in order to define precisely both the general, universal and the particular, specific national aspects of the socialist system.

The Achievements and the Problems of the Socialist System in People's Poland and a Definition of the Character of the Present Stage

Poland entered the road of the building of socialism under extremely difficult conditions that emanated from a series of circumstances.

The country that before the war belonged to the more economically backward states of Europe was monstrously destroyed as a result of wartime activities, and still more as a consequence of the extermination policy of the Hitler occupation. Due to the scale of biological losses (taken as the percentage of the total population) and material losses (compared to the total existing national wealth), Poland emerged from the war as the European nation that had been hit the hardest. The changes in the borders of the Polish state--the most extensive territorial changes in Europe following World War II--combined with the displacement of the population, were attended by quite considerable organizational and social problems that likewise absorbed much of the energies of the state and the people. The history of Polish-Russian and Polish-Soviet relations, full of complications and tragic entanglements, made a significant portion of society susceptible to the anti-Soviet propaganda disseminated persistently by the camp of the bourgeoisie. At the moment of the acquisition of power, the camp of the people's democracy was in the minority and had to gain the support of the working class, the peasant class and the working intelligentsia. The position of the Catholic Church in Poland was always strong; however, population changes emanating from the war made Catholicism a religion that had almost a monopolistic position. Traditionally strong, especially, although not exclusively, among the intelligentsia were ties with the West, including the ties with the United States that were positively tinged emotionally. Finally, Polish political culture, formed over history and to a great extent the result of the influence of the nobility, extremely strongly affirmed the principles of an individualistically conceived freedom and did not foster the general recognition of the need for the existence of a strong and effective state authority.

There were also circumstances that facilitated the struggle over socialism. The first and the most important was the fact that Poland's liberation came from the East, that it was brought by the Soviet Army together with the People's Polish Army. This set up indispensable conditions for creating the people's authority and paralyzed the possibility of imperialist intervention. The aid of the USSR was an important factor in the rebuilding of the country, and later in its economic development. Another factor that facilitated the building of socialism in Poland was the existence of socialist allies on all borders of

the PRL and, emanating from this, its geographical isolation from capitalist states. Finally, the third circumstance favoring socialism was the fact that the bourgeois Polish state had fallen short of the expectations of the people in 1939 and that, as a result of the September defeat, a sort of political-ideological void was created (that was, however, considerably filled by the underground structures associated with the emigre government). Generally, however, it must be said that the building of socialism in Poland was undertaken under very difficult conditions.

As a result of the building of socialism in Poland, historical transformations of an irreversible nature were effected: the landed aristocracy and capitalist classes were eliminated; a radical agricultural reform was conducted; non-agricultural large and intermediate-size properties were nationalized; we rebuilt the country up from wartime destruction in record time; we implemented the tasks of the socialist industrialization of Poland, changing it from a formerly backward agricultural country to a moderately developed industrial-agricultural country; we reconstructed the educational-cultural system and expanded it to unprecedented proportions; we eliminated illiteracy among the Polish peasantry and created an army of people with a higher education that was a million strong; we opened broad possibilities for the social advancement of workers and peasants, we created a cadre of new socialist intelligentsia that emanated primarily from these very classes; we regained for Poland and for its identity the former western and northern lands, we effected their full repolonization and unification with the rest of the country; due to a consistent and wise foreign policy, we achieved the international recognition of the postwar borders of the Republic; in the spirit of cooperation, we established relations between the socialist state and the Catholic Church, in this area offering our own, pioneering contribution to the experiences of socialism on the worldwide scale.

Capitalism was overthrown in Poland and many tasks of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism were realized. In a Politburo report presented by Jozef Czyrek at the 13th PZPR Central Committee Plenum, the following was stated on this issue: "A simple formula cannot exhaust an assessment of the complex reality of our country; however, one thing is certain: we have implemented in Poland the majority of the tasks of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. This signifies the existence of a permanent socialist structure in economic and sociopolitical life. In many fields, social solutions and social guarantees have been introduced that could be considered part of the phase of highly developed socialism." And elsewhere: "In the attempts to define the stage of socialist transformations that have been achieved, it is often forgotten that one of the most important criteria of mature socialism is high social work productivity and an efficiently organized economy." 14

Consequently, the transitional period has still not ended in Poland. Thus, it is necessary to revise the Seventh Congress resolution and the conclusions contained in the scholarly works inspired by the resolution that say that Poland has entered the stage of the building of the fully developed socialist society. This statement assumes the completion of the transitional period and that does not correspond to the state of socioeconomic relations and of the social consciousness in Poland.

Let us turn our attention to the major areas in which the phenomena and conflicts characteristic of the transitional period are still present.

In agriculture, nonsocialized ownership encompasses about 75 percent of all land under cultivation. In 1956, the party drew valid conclusions from the failure of the policy of accelerating rural cooperative farming under Polish conditions and dropped this policy. However, during the entire quarter-century that followed, there was a lack of a positive strategy of the socialist transformation of rural areas based on voluntariness and the state's respect for the inviolable character of peasant family property. This meant the preservation of the dominance of the private farm, poorly integrated with the socialist economic system, neglected from the viewpoint of technologically advanced equipment and characterized by a declining farm structure.

In the nonfarm economy, the lower middle class sector, often tied in with speculative groups on the fringes of the socialized economy, was preserved and even strengthened during the 1970's. Parallel with this there occurred the ruination of individual craftsmanship without its replacement by state or cooperative enterprises.

In the sphere of class-strata relations, during the 1970's the situation regressed to the formerly achieved level of implementation of socialist tasks. This was expressed in the creation of a quite significant and clearly privileged neo-bourgeois class that took in the top reaches of the private economy as well as the related elements of the economic and political apparatus of the socialist state, corrupt and making use of unlawful privileges.

In the sphere of political relations, oppositionist centers continued in the form of organized antisocialist groups. Under the economic crisis conditions of 1980, they stepped up their activities and gained the temporary support of a part of the working people, including the working class as well. During the 1980/1981 period, a serious weakening of the socialist state occurred and the real threat of counterrevolution arose.

In the sphere of the social consciousness, quite considerable layers of bourgeois and lower middle class ideology and consciousness were preserved. During the second half of the 1970's, and particularly during the 1980/1981 period, the social consciousness regressed especially sharply. The influence of Marxism-Leninism declined (on the working class as well); antisocialist moods and views gain strength, as did nationalistic and anti-Soviet moods and attitudes. The always strong religious convictions in Poland became based throughout much of society on militant clericalism that was obviously antisocialist. In the area of social consciousness, the regress was especially great.

In the economic sphere, considerable disproportions and errors occurred. Despite significant achievements, the Polish economy was unable to move successfully from the stage of extensive growth to the stage of intensive growth. The voluntaristic policy of the 1970's, combined with the worldwide recession and the struggle to destroy the national economy by the extremist forces of the former Solidarity led to a severe economic regression--both in the spheres of consumption and investments. This means a backward move in the field of the

tasks of the transitional period of about 10 years, as well as the appearance of significant economic and social disproportions requiring a number of years to overcome.

Therefore, our present task is not only to surmount the current crisis, but also to embark in a conscious, planned way upon measures enabling us to conclude the transitional period from capitalism to socialism victoriously. While we may be able to surmount the crisis in a relatively short time, the full completion of the transitional period will take many years of struggle and work. The more important thing is for us to enter into the theoretical questions related to the preparation of a strategy for this phase of the building of socialism. This strategy must be guided toward solving the previously noted conflicts of the transitional period. Thus, it must be a strategy that combines the rebuilding of socioeconomic relations with the struggle for the socialist consciousness of our nation. Its foundations are the principles defined in the PZPR Ninth Congress resolution and developed and specified in the resolutions of subsequent Central Committee meetings.

Foremost in this strategy are the following questions: 1) the economic reform and the creation of conditions enabling intensive economic growth based upon better work organization and greater productivity; 2) the program of the socialist transformation of rural Poland founded upon the recognition of the peasant's inviolable right to his land and upon voluntariness in the creation of the socialized economy; this should be premised upon that sort of technical-economic development of all farm sectors that would convince the private farmer, through his own personal experience, that only cooperative farming (in forms that farmers must work out themselves) can guarantee him better economic results and thus a better life; 3) the struggle for social justice, against overt and covert exploitation (speculation, accumulating wealth that is not justified by one's labor, privileges); 4) the restoration of a high growth rate of the process of educational-cultural development, the increase of the real access to learning on a higher level for worker and peasant youth; 5) the strengthening of the state dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the development of the institution of socialist democracy (the self-government, representative organs); 6) the undertaking and implementation of a broad offensive toward the socialist upbringing of the masses, particularly the working class, against the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie.

The implementation of these tasks will require the fundamental and detailed analysis of our past experiences in each of the fields listed. It also will require that we study more closely the experiences of our fellow socialist countries and take a deeper and more careful look at the entire picture of the particular historical conditions under which Poland is building socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. I write about this more extensively, presenting the major theoretical positions, in one of the chapters of my book, "Przyczynek do zagadnienia rozwoju społecznego w formacji socjalistycznej" [A Contribution to the Question of Social Development in the Socialist System], Warsaw, 1979, pp 69-79.

2. Ibid., p 76.
3. In "Critique of the Gotha Programme," Marx writes expressly of socialism and communism as developmental phases of the same system (See: "Works," Vol 19, Warsaw, 1972, pp 23-24) and this system is spoken of interchangeably as the "socialist system" or the "communist system."
4. I. V. Dudinskiy, "The Communist and Workers' Parties on the Economic Problems of Fully Developed Socialism," VOPROSY ISTORII, 1971, No 10; "On the Stages of Development of the Communist Mode of Production," VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, 1971, No 7; N. Iribadzhakov, "Razvitoe socialisticeskoe obscestvo" [The Fully Developed Socialist Society], Moscow, 1974; S. Widerszpil, "Theoretical Problems of the Building of the Fully Developed Socialist Society, PANSTWO i PRAWO, 1975, No 12 and other writers.
5. K. Hager, "Die entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft," EINHEIT, 1971, No 11, pp 12-13.
6. "VII Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe materialy i dokumenty" [Seventh PZPR Congress. Basic Materials and Documents], Warsaw, 1975, p 113.
7. We have discussed this group of question more extensively elsewhere (A. Wajda and J. Wiatr, "Uniwersalne prawidlowosci budownictwa socjalizmu i ich narodowo swoiste uwarunkowania" [The Universal Truths of the Building of Socialism and Their Specifically National Determinants], First All-Poland Party Ideological-Theoretical Conference, 2-3 April, 1982, Warsaw, 1982, pp 183-213. Here I refer to the statements made therein.
8. W. Jaruzelski, "Przemowienie inauguracyjne na I Ogolnopolskiej Partyjnej Konferencji Ideologiczno-Teoretycznej" [Inaugural Address at the First All-Poland Party Ideological-Theoretical Conference], op. cit., p 10.
9. Wladyslaw Gomułka expressed this idea at the Eighth PZPR KC Plenum, saying: "What is unchangeable in socialism amounts to the elimination of man's exploitation by man. The roads toward the achievement of this end can be and are various. They are determined by various circumstances of time and place. The model of socialism may also differ. It may be the model that was developed in the Soviet Union, it may take the form we see in Yugoslavia or it may be still different. Only through experience and through studying the achievements of the various countries building socialism can we arrive at the optimum model of socialism for the given conditions," NOWE DROGI, 1956, No 10, p 38.
10. V. I. Lenin, "Works," Vol 29, Warsaw, 1956, p 185.
11. V. I. Lenin, "Works," Vol 31, Warsaw, 1955, pp 78-79.
12. L. Krzywicki, "Studia socjologiczne" [Sociological Studies], Warsaw, 1951, p 111.
13. S. Widerszpil, "Prawidlowosci budowy socjalizmu a sprzecznosci rozwoju spolecznego" [Truths of the Building of Socialism and Conflicts of Social Development], in: First All-Poland Party Ideological-Theoretical Conference, op. cit., p 243.

14. Ideological tasks of the party in implementing the line of the Ninth Extraordinary Congress. PZPR KC Politburo report made by Politburo member, KC Secretary Jozef Czyrek. 13th PZPR KC Plenum, NOWE DROGI, 1983, p 14.

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