


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29 May 1984

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS



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29 May 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MOST CZECHS GIVE COOL RECEPTION TO VIETNAMESE GUEST WORKERS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 7 Apr 84 p 5

[Article by Richard Swartz: "The 'Sister Nation' From Asia Out In the Cold"]

[Text] Prague, Saturday--In a beerhall called "At the Old Synagogue", two Vietnamese are sitting together at a table waiting for a beer. The waiters carry foaming beersteins on round trays through the room and deposit a stein in front of every customer--according to Czech custom, a customer, who may already have had one or more, will automatically get another one, unless he specifically says no.

Only the two Vietnamese are without, they don't get any beer and after about fifteen minutes they get up and leave.

"Well, finally, " says my neighbor at the table, who until now has not said a word to me. "What are they doing here? They ought to stay home in Asia."

Treated As If They Do Not Exist

The Vietnamese are not popular in Prague. You see them everywhere in the streets, almost always dressed in jeans, but seldom or never in company with any of the natives of the city. Czech girls go for walks in the spring sunshine with African or Arab student friends, but it is impossible to discover one of them with a Vietnamese. The inhabitants of Prague seem to treat the Vietnamese as if they don't exist, as they walk through the center of Prague either alone or with their countrymen.

The Vietnamese are here either as students or as guest workers; they gather experience in various industries in Prague or out in the countryside that will qualify them for various skills. All of it is an example of "international cooperation between socialist sister nations," in this case a tradition that goes back to the 1960's. But it was later, actually after 1980, that the Vietnamese arrived in Czechoslovakia in great numbers. Common talk mentions 100,000; a more correct number is probably not quite 30,000.

Accused of Everything

It is hard to find Czechs who have anything positive to say about their socialist brothers from Vietnam. Instead they are accused of black market dealings, of hoarding desired articles, of introducing endemic syphilis and of enjoying various privileges said to be paid from the very pockets of the Czech workers. "Most of them come from Saigon or thereabouts," is the opinion at the beerhall. "They are poor workers and there are fights with them quite often."

All of this is unsubstantiated rumor, often fantastic stories that feed on the information vacuum that has arisen in Czech media concerning the Vietnamese problems in a foreign country. But in December 1982, the Young Communist's newspaper, the "Mlada Fronta", admitted that "a few unpleasant situation had arisen" between Czech nationals and Vietnamese: some guest workers had even been recalled to their country. Furthermore, Hanoi has cautiously suggested that perhaps the best representatives of the Vietnamese working class have not always been chosen for the stay in Czechoslovakia, which often lasts up to six years. From direct talks with the Vietnamese Head of State, Pham Van Dong, it is supposed that criticism has been lodged on the part of Prague.

Semi-officially Prague emphasizes that the primary goal of the agreement of November 1980 with Hanoi is to "train qualified worker units for the economy of socialist Vietnam." It is emphasized that the Vietnamese students and guest workers have the same obligations and advantages as Czech nationals; indirectly then, all rumors that they are especially favored are dismissed. Furthermore, soccer tournaments and tourist trips through Czechoslovakia are arranged for the Vietnamese guests in order to give them an opportunity to get acquainted with the people of the country--therefore, leisure time causes no problems, it is said. The agreement is useful to both sides and this ought to be obvious to the Czech working class: they consider it their international duty to give allround help to their fellow workers.

Still many individual workers seem to think differently. Furthermore, it is often said that the Vietnamese are really here to pay back Vietnam's debts to Czechoslovakia.

"They arrive here as some sort of installment payment for all the help we gave them during the war against the Americans and later during reconstruction," says my neighbor at the table, while the waiter makes another mark on the paper tablecloth and hands him a fourth beer.

"They have no other way to pay but with labor. And there is a shortage of that here."

Will Be Sent To Poland

Evidently both Prague and Hanoi now want to put the brakes cautiously on the influx of Vietnamese. It is also said that they will be accompanied by more of their own party officials, at least one for every 100 guest worker. And if another rumor is true, other socialist sister nations in Europe will be forced to make larger contributions in the future than they have done so far--it is already mentioned in Warsaw that thousands of Vietnamese are now going to be sent to Poland.

12339

CSO: 3650/189

POPULATION GROWTH RATE SLOWING DOWN

Prague TVORBA in Czech 14 Mar 84 p 4

[Article by Milan Ales]

[Text] According to the Federal Statistical Office, Czechoslovakia's population as of the end of 1983 was 15,440,000. This means an increase of 800,000 since 1973. Compared to the initial postwar years, the population of the country has grown by 25 percent. As far as the number of the people is concerned, we rank 10th in population among European countries. However, our population density is slightly above the European average. Also, the ratio of population size to manpower potential, raw material base, and to the acreage of fertility of usable agricultural land is becoming more and more a topic of serious discussion. One question pops up all the time: is it desirable for our economy and social development to have a population growth? If the answer is yes, at what rate? Or, is it in the interest of the harmonious development of our society to keep our population constant and not to be alarmed even if our population gets slightly smaller?

Birth Rate in Europe Declining

The population growth in Czechoslovakia is essentially part of the population growth of the contemporary world and reflects its general trends and laws. World population growth is very often--even if in a simplistic way--characterized as dramatic. Several decades of accelerated population growth in the developing world have seriously endangered the economic and social development of almost all developing countries. In concrete historical and political relationships, the population explosion of the developing countries is, however, a natural and obviously temporary phenomenon. Finally, during the last few years population growth in developing countries has clearly been declining. A much less obvious but significant change in population growth is taking place in Europe--and this directly affects Czechoslovakia, too.

In the capitalist countries of western, northern and more recently also southern Europe, the present population growth is characterized by a sharp decline of newborn infants. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and Italy there are approximately 10 newborn babies annually per 1,000 inhabitants. This is very much below the figure which ensures a natural

population increment. The population prognoses of the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries realistically anticipate a decline in the size of population there by the year 2000 and project that this decline will substantially increase in the 21st century. The old "baby boom" of the postwar period which lasted until the 1960's in Western Europe was replaced by a population dip characterized as "Kinderfeindlich"---a hostile social climate for children when they became a luxury, an obstacle and a hindrance as far as the standard of living was concerned.

The declining trends in the birth rate, however, exist in basically all European countries, including socialist countries. In Western Europe, these trends were obviously strengthened by the overall crisis of the bourgeois social system, and the decline in the number of newly born reached acute proportions. In no European socialist country, including Czechoslovakia, has the birth rate declined as much as in contemporary Western Europe. Nevertheless, all socialist countries show a declining population growth.

Our Population Problems

Postwar Czechoslovakia has experienced several waves in the slowdown of its population growth, the last one occurring in the second half of the 1960's. Fewer than 214,000 babies were born in Czechoslovakia in 1968---the smallest number since 1945.

At the beginning of the 1970's we introduced a complex system of economic and social measures which substantially increased the living standard of young married couples and families with children. At the same time, we witnessed the appearance of an extraordinary favorable demographic situation: women born between 1946 and 1952, i.e., those belonging to the largest postwar groups, reached the age of peak fertility. Thanks to these two factors the number of newborn babies in Czechoslovakia sharply increased in the first half of the 1970's. The peak was reached in 1974 and 1975, when approximately 290,000 children were born annually. Czechoslovakia, which during the 1960's had a birth rate below average in Europe, occupied third place in the middle of the 1970's---right behind Ireland and Romania. It was precisely during this period that our population trend differed from the situation in Western Europe which, at the end of the 1960's and the early 1970's, registered a sharp decline in the birth rate.

However, this high number of newborn infants in 1974 and 1975 did not last. Beginning in 1976, Czechoslovakia again showed a decline in its birth rate. This decline accelerated in 1980 and continued in 1981, 1982 and 1983. Until 1979, the decline in the number of newborn babies was a consequence of the decline in the number of women who were most likely to give birth, and offset the high birth rate of the 1974-1975 period. A sharp decline in 1980 and a more moderate decline in the subsequent years is obviously evidence of the reduced effective fertility of women.

Last year, 230,000 babies were born in Czechoslovakia, i.e., approximately 15 per 1,000 inhabitants. In the Czech Socialist Republic, there were 13.4 babies per 1,000 inhabitants, and in the Slovak Socialist Republic 18.0 per 1,000 inhabitants. The difference between the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic is a result of the less favorable age structure of the former and also of a higher level of fertility in Slovakia. While the overall number of newborn babies in the entire Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has remained above the level of the second half of the 1960's, the number of newly born per 1,000 inhabitants was very close to the long-term minimum of 1968. While it is true that at present Czechoslovakia has a relatively higher number of newly born children than most of the western European and northern European countries--and this difference is quite large--the present number of newborn babies in Czechoslovakia does not suffice to secure the future increment in population, especially in the Czech Socialist Republic.

Two Children Are Not Enough

The evolution in the number of newly born children reflects changes in family planning. Such family planning has been the subject of a number of demographic and sociological research studies. Their results clearly prove that the use of family planning today is basically more widespread than at any time in the past. The former sharp variations stemming from nationality and social differences or from differences between the urban and rural areas have slowed down. For example, there has been a sharp drop in the difference in the number of children planned by young Czech and Slovak couples. The differences between the planned number of children in working class, white-collar and agricultural families have disappeared. This was demonstrated by the results of the 1980 census. In comparison with the 1970 and 1961 censuses, the 1980 census showed a great reduction in the number of childless families. Also, the number of single-child families decreased. However, an even larger drop occurred in the number of families with three children. Families with four or more children are an exception in the Czech Socialist Republic and are rapidly declining in the Slovak Socialist Republic. Families with two children clearly predominate. They are the most numerous in the case of families which do not plan to have any more children. Two children are also planned in most cases by engaged couples and by young childless married couples. While field studies in the 1960's showed that in spite of the fact that most of the families had planned two children they believed that an ideal situation would have been three or more children, similar studies undertaken in the early 1980's show that the "planned" and "ideal" number of children from the viewpoint of young women is more and more often identical. The model of a family with two children clearly dominates the thinking, plans, and concrete family planning of couples.

The ideal of two children per family determines the current trend of the birth rate in Czechoslovakia. According to an analysis of the number of newly born children in relation to the age structure of women, the current fertility of women corresponds to a situation where on the average every woman in Czechoslovakia gives birth to 2.1 children during her childbearing

years. However, to ensure necessary future reproduction, i.e., to ensure at least a minimal increment in the population, it would be necessary that each woman have on the average 2.2 to 2.3 children during her fertile years.

Does Only Slovakia Show an Increment?

The natural increment of the population in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--the difference between the number of newly born and the number of deceased--declined to less than 45,000 in 1983. This is the lowest increment since 1945. Until now, only rarely did the natural increment in Czechoslovakia drop below 100,000 persons; even in the period of the very low birth rate at the end of the 1960's it exceeded 60,000.

An unusually low natural increment in 1983 occurred in the Czech Socialist Republic--less than 5,000 inhabitants. Because everything indicates that in future years the number of the newly born will decline (and we should not expect any significant decline in the number of deceased), the natural increment of the population will continue to flatten out. From 1985 (and probably already in 1984) the Czech Socialist Republic will have fewer newly born than deceased. Not even a migration from Slovakia will offset this natural decline in the population trend in the Czech Socialist Republic, and thus the overall number of the latter's inhabitants will decline. This decline will be with us very probably until 1989, when we can expect for a while and temporarily an increase in the number of newly born as a result of the appearance on the scene of a large number of fertile-age women born after 1970.

According to the projections of future development in the population prepared by the Federal Statistical Office jointly with the Czech and Slovak Statistical Offices, the overall natural increment of the Czechoslovak population is not in any danger before the year 2000. A more favorable age structure of the Slovak population will continue to balance the population stagnation in the Czech lands and in the next two decades will be able to prevent this stagnation from affecting the entire federation. The expected increment will, however, be even smaller than at the present time. Projections show that by the year 2000 the population of Czechoslovakia will be only slightly over 16 million. Consequently, the average annual increment will be under 30,000. The growth rate will be smaller than at any time in this century and the entire growth will basically be accounted for by the Slovaks exclusively.

There Will Be Fewer Children by the Year 2000

The slowdown in population growth is, however, neither the only nor the most important change stemming from the present population trend. Of more significance obviously will be changes in the age structure of our population as a result of the existing and in the future more accelerated aging of our population. True, we do not anticipate any real significant growth in the number of old people by 2000, because men and women of low population growth years born in prewar bourgeois Czechoslovakia will be reaching senior citizen status then. However--and here is the danger--we will see a sharp decline

in the number of children. While at present the children 15 years old and younger form approximately 24 percent of Czechoslovakia's population, the figure for the year 2000 will be only 20 percent and this will be by far the lowest number ever registered on our territory. We are speaking not only of a decline in percentage--we will see a decline of children in absolute numbers by 2000 as well unless we succeed in changing the existing trend in the birth rate, Czechoslovakia will have 500,000 children below the age of 15--fewer than in 1983. The decline in the ratio of children will be naturally followed by a decline in young people, including prospective mothers, which in turn will lead to a further decline of new births--and we will have a spiral effect of the accelerated aging and subsequent absolute decline in the population.

After the year 2000, it is also necessary to expect an accelerated growth in the number of older age groups. From today's large 35-year-old age group born during the first years after the liberation, we will have people in their 60's around the year 2010. We cannot rule out--as a matter of fact it is quite probable--that beginning in 2010 Czechoslovakia will have more people in the postproductive age than children. The aging of the population will thus take upon itself a new dimension and could become a powerful social factor affecting all spheres of social life.

This prospect certainly is not the only possible alternative of future population growth. However, based on today's facts, it is the most probable prospect. There is no doubt that Czechoslovakia is experimenting with changes in family planning, and a decline in the natural growth is their biological consequence.

Can We Influence Future Development?

In the discussions concerning the population trends and population policies, we hear voices which consider the existing trend of the decline in population growth as a natural stage in the creation of a completely new model of family planning which will lead to a necessary decline in the population. A population explosion in the developing countries is a historical parallel of the accelerated population growth in Europe during the period of capitalist industrialization. The current population depression in Western Europe lacks, however, a similar parallel, and many demographers view it as an indication of a population trend which sooner or later will affect all economically advanced countries.

Similar views are so far only hypotheses unconfirmed by demographic, economic, and especially sociological analyses. Obvious, too, is their generality, which does not differentiate between the class prospects of future development in the world. However, the fact remains that the present trends of population development in Czechoslovakia are not good. We have in mind not only the stagnation of decline in the number of newly born. Also disturbing is the development of the second major ingredient of the population situation--mortality. The most unfavorable trend, however, involves changes in the age structure and aging of the population.

It is a peculiarity of population growth that many consequences of existing phenomena affect us only after several decades, in the life of future generations. For this reason the decisions we must make today are very important ones. Our socialist state and its population policies, however, have the prerequisites to affect favorably population development and influence the changes in its basic trends.

1277

CSO: 2400/312

NEW SCHOOL LAW DEBATE AIRS PROBLEMS IN EDUCATION

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 30 Mar. 84 p 3

[Article by Marie Zverinova: "A Law Is Born"]

[Text] We saw them a week ago on television, read about them in the press and heard them on the radio. Deputies of the Federal Assembly have weighed and approved the new law on education. They heard Deputy Premier Martin Lucan justify the government proposal which was also supported by two house committee reporters. Three deputies took part in the discussion, following which the representatives of the people by raising their hands made the decision that our educational system would henceforth be governed by a new legislative adjustment.

The above seems like a fairly routine scene to which we have become accustomed with each new law; however, this one affects almost every one of us. Consequently, perhaps there were some people who experienced doubts. Are 2 hours and six speeches enough for the deputies really to assess the quality of the proposed law?

This was not a matter of merely 2 hours. This final act was but the culmination of several months of meticulous work. As always, the deputies had been thoroughly acquainted with what they were endorsing. Since last September, they have all had the opportunity to comment and make recommendations on the document, and thus become its coauthors. The process was not always simple.

One, Zero, One

In September 1983, the government submitted to the Federal Assembly a draft proposal of a new law on our basic and secondary school systems, a law which was assigned the number 101. It was defended by Comrade Martin Lucan who explained the circumstances which made adjustments in our educational system necessary. He outlined its legislative justification and stated that the aim of the proposal was to replace all present laws and statutes on education with this new law which would represent an organic aggregate,

together with legislation of the republic national councils on the state administration of education.

The deputies had reviewed the draft proposal early in the process and part of the September 1983 deliberations were consultations with educators, both theoreticians and practitioners from the electoral districts, as well as with national committee and enterprise officials. The comments and recommendations addressed to Comrade Lucan and representatives of the Ministry of Education were concrete and to the point. The deputies made use of their authority and asked for clarification of certain provisions. Each house committee considered the new principles from the vantage point of its special responsibility. The constitutional committee dealt with legislative precision, the committee for industry, transport and commerce, along with the planning and budget committee, considered the economic effect of the new law, the defense and security committee focused on the provisions covering military secondary schools, schools of the Ministry of Interior, and national defense instruction in all types of schools.

Specific interests were also voiced in the committees for social policy, agriculture and, naturally, the committee for education and culture which sponsored the new draft legislation.

Many of the comments and queries were on related subjects. Clarification was needed in the area of polytechnic education in secondary schools, notably the gymnasiums, with respect to specific responsibilities of the economic organs in the realm of education. Also unclear was the point at which compulsory school attendance is officially ended. Almost all the house committees voiced the view that attendance should not be governed by its length but rather by the student's age. Yet this proposal could not be adopted, since by law all citizens must complete 10 grades, and those who must repeat any of them due to failure the first time around would end up with a shorter educational cycle. At 16, which was the suggested age ceiling, such students would not have completed the mandatory 10 grades. Moreover, school attendance of children requiring special care begins 2 years later than is the case with others.

Not all the recommendations presented in the debate could be adopted. For example, despite all efforts by the drafters, they were unable to achieve uniformity among the positions of specialized secondary school teachers and the master craftsmen training apprentices, or to equate their social position with foremen in production. The problem of dual management became the subject of a broad discussion among the deputies, since teachers are employees of the educational sector, while foremen belong to individual enterprises. This also affects their social position, since on the average foremen are paid 500 korunas more. Resolution of this problem met with opposition on the part of the economic branches, as well as certain officials who were apparently afraid that this would complicate their lives. They fail to realize that eventually there may be a shortage of qualified master craftsmen who are also able to teach.

The greatest point of contention turned out to be the problem of socially beneficial labor. It so happens that the principles contained in paragraph

11 of the Labor Code, as well as international agreements to which Czechoslovakia is a party, stipulate that such work which essentially represents potato and hops brigades may be performed only by those who have fulfilled their school attendance obligation. What does this mean? Why specifically here do we find such uncertainty? It means that students of a whole year--the 10th grade of the new system (second year of the secondary school)--who previously were able to participate in such brigades can no longer do so. The deputies brought this matter up in all their committees, warning that such assistance would be sorely missed in agriculture. Consequently, the committees approved the proposed law, on the condition that their recommendations would be taken into consideration.

One-Two-Seven

The paragraph tentatively designated 127, along with its implementation directive, was submitted to the deputies at the beginning of this year. They first commented on it in February. Of the 50 comments and recommendations received at the September 1983 deliberations, most were included in the draft legislation. Subsequently, the discussion became more demanding and argumentation more profound. Meanwhile, the October 1983 independent session of the House of Nations on the quality of our education provided more room for research by deputies, and thus the necessary prerequisites for meeting the goals of the new law.

Through concrete arguments, Comrade Matej Lucan again explained that, while some of the recommendations were adopted, others could not be. He reminded the deputies that 269 comments and recommendations on the new law had been received from federal central organs, party, youth and trade unions in both republics, as well as regional, district and municipal organizations. "All those which had a universal character, thus being in the province of this legislation, were adopted," stated Comrade Lucan.

Among those which could not be adopted was a demand that participation in socially beneficial labor be permitted for second-year students in secondary schools, i.e., those who have not yet completed their compulsory school attendance but have reached the age of fifteen.

The greatest defenders of this provision were, not surprisingly, members of the house committee on agriculture and food, who posed the question of whether our agriculture could do without youth brigades.

Discussion on paragraph 23 pushed other problems into the background. Arguments, both pro and con, were heard. The agricultural committee sent its representatives to argue for it in other committees. They certainly have the right to do this. In their presentations they explained why they must insist on their position. They argued that without the school brigades it would be impossible to ensure the harvest of potatoes, hops, fruits and vegetables. They calculated the losses in time if the student brigades did not appear. The reporter for the committee on culture and education, Vera Seidlova, wondered whether age could not be maintained as a determining factor. Consultations with attorneys showed that it would indeed be possible.

Comrade Lucan responded again by stating that, while from the legal standpoint this would be possible, we must not permit a situation where agricultural enterprises "order" by phone to "send so many students," without regard to the school curriculum, a situation where even party organs are involved in support of such requirements.

Discussions in the other committees proceeded in a similar vein, until the respective chairmen closed the deliberations by referring the problem to the constitutional committee.

The latter suspended further debate, including that on paragraph 23. On 15 March it ruled that in exceptional cases 15-year-olds may participate in socially beneficial labor. The committee added that, while enduring a good supply for the population was essential, it must not be done to the detriment of educational programs.

There is a great deal a Federal Assembly deputy must be conversant with. It represents hours, days and even weeks of effort. It is indeed highly responsible work, since to produce and approve a law which will touch each and every one of our families is by no means an easy matter.

9496

CSO: 2400/310

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

POLITICAL EMPHASIS IN NEW CIVIC STUDIES CURRICULA

West German Commentary

West Berlin IWE TAGESDIENST in German No 31, 25 Feb 84 p 1

[Text] Beginning with the 1984/1985 academic year, new curricula for civic studies will be introduced for grades 8 and 10 of GDR schools. As the East Berlin periodical GESCHICHTSUNTERRICHT UND STAATSBUERGERKUNDE explained, they are designed more effectively to impress on the students the conviction of the "historic offensive of socialism." To be strengthened at the same time is "their immunity to hostile ideological influences." This purpose is to be served in particular by the thoroughly revised and expanded study of the topic "The socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG--two states with opposing social orientations," to be taught in the eighth grade. To be acquired here in particular is the "perception that FRG imperialism has pursued an aggressive policy toward the GDR from the very outset, aimed and aiming at the destruction of the socialist GDR." This policy, the periodical continues, must be demonstrated by the persuasive presentation of many historical and topical events and facts. Also to be emphasized are the latest developments. Instructors must therefore stress the "forcefully pursued emplacement" of American missiles by the Federal Government as "another monstrous step in the wave of imperialism's aggression against socialism." The civic studies curricula for grades 7 and 9 were already revised for the current school year.

Bond With Fatherland Stressed

East Berlin PRESSE-INFORMATIONEN in German No 37, 27 Mar 84 p 4

[Article by Dr Ruth Mennel, Ministry for Public Education]

[Text] Civics instruction is most intimately linked with the development of our socialist fatherland. Committed and able teachers, employed in the communist education of our young, encourage their students to perceive the laws of our social development, promote their correct orientation regarding international events and the evolution of class-like convictions and attitudes to the cause of socialism.

On 1 September 1983, new curricula, textbooks and instructional aids took effect for grades 7 and 9. On 1 September this year, new curricula and teaching materials will be introduced for grades 8 and 10. The educational situation for civic studies generally has been decisively improved thereby in the

10-grade general education polytechnical secondary school. Teaching focuses on sound basic knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, in close connection with the policy of the party of the working class. This is a scholarly, party-like and relevant type of instruction, and on its basis we will even more successfully guide our students to well-grounded ideological attitudes and perceptions as well as a firm class standpoint.

Continuing on from the knowledge of the GDR gained in grade 7, the new curriculum for grade 8 focuses on the need to strengthen the students' bond with the socialist fatherland. Concrete knowledge and lively presentation will enable them to perceive the nature of the socialist state, the further development and perfection of socialist democracy and the realization of the working people's living rights as the historic achievements of the socialist society. They will acquire fundamental notions about the class antagonism between the socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG and more profoundly appreciate why a policy of peace and progress emanates from our socialist state, and what is at the base of the aggressive policy pursued by the ruling class in the FRG, threatening peace.

The new curriculum enjoins teachers to soundly ground and deepen significant political perceptions by familiarizing students with concrete facts and enabling them to subsequently recognize basic connections. Very important at this point is the inclusion of the students' own political experiences. The treatment of all citizens' involvement in the democratic organization of daily life and of the actions of the people's representations, for example, is to be linked with the students' experiences in the children's and youth organizations. We must use these direct experiences to demonstrate the opportunities for active involvement in organization and the assumption of responsibilities.

The new curriculum for grade 10 is designed to guide students to an understanding, well-grounded in theory, of the nature of our age, and to equip them with sound knowledge and appreciation of the nature and successful organization of the developed socialist society. In pursuit of the policy and strategy enunciated by the Ninth and Tenth SED Congresses, the curriculum directs us to make the graduates of the 10grade general education polytechnical secondary school conscious of the scope, the historic dimensions and the inspiring prospects of the targets set for the economy, science and technology, the state and society, and to train them to champion the policy aimed at the welfare of the people as well as actively participate in its realization.

Lively Instruction

The new curriculum represents a great challenge to the persuasive and lively organization of teaching. The greater concentration on essential features offers better opportunities for more thoroughly explaining social phenomena and contexts, discuss interesting aspects of various problems, inspire and fit the students to hold their own in independent intellectual disputation with political and ideological issues and problems. An essential element is that of training their logical and dialectical mode of thought and the development of their ability to prove, justify, argue and deal with wrong interpretations.

New textbooks, methodological aids and other teaching materials will be made available for implementing the new curricula. As experiences with grades 7 and 9 show, the qualitatively new textbooks are of the utmost importance. They are distinguished by attractive presentation (adapted to the respective age group), interesting homework and question periods designed to inspire reflection, exact evidential demonstrations, lively and emotionally emphasized descriptions and, not least, many illustrations and four-color print.

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CSO: 2300/447

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG ANALYST ON SED EMIGRATION RELAXATION RATIONALE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 6 Apr 84 p 7

[Article by Joachim Nawrocki, West Berlin editor, datelined West Berlin in April: "'The Good Ones into the Pot...?': Speculations on the Astounding Generosity of the SED Leadership"]

[Text] "Our two Erichs are working against each other in this," comments a GDR citizen. The attempt to reduce internal political developments in the GDR to a common denominator often ends in such dove hawk theories. On the one hand, the GDR leadership whose "liberal" wing is personified by Erich Honecker, permits GDR citizens to settle en masse in the West; the provincial press demands more open criticism and discussion of grievances; and in the magazine SINN UND FORM a comrade may complain about the lack of travel opportunities: "...is distrust stronger than trust?" On the other hand, no-contact policies for bearers of secrets are rigorously extended by the state security service of Erich Mielke; the SED rehearses shooting from the shoulder--"Forward on the successful course of the X. Party Assembly!"; new emigration applicants are usually turned down rigorously by the authorities; and not many of those who had applied years ago really do get out. There continue to be many hardship cases--families who have reached the end of their tether financially, physically and emotionally, and have no chance for emigration, despite the ostensible generosity of the GDR government.

At first glance, none of it makes sense. There are many theories and speculations, but even diligent Kremlin-astrologists or ex-comrades with keen insight do not know precisely who in the SED Politburo pursues what line, and why. So speculations run wild, and the list of possible motives is getting ever longer and more impenetrable. The most frequently held theory is that the GDR wants to rid itself of its protest movement in order to tighten all the more its domestic policy reins afterwards. It explains some matters, but not everything. "The good ones in the pot, the bad ones in the crop," [reference to the Cinderella story] opines one emigrant who has inside knowledge of the party apparatus and its frequently irrational course of argumentation--"the comrades are cunning fellows when it comes to prevention." Perhaps a new push towards consolidation is being planned, as has happened before in many domestic policy shifts.

Some outward appearances fit these speculations, such as articles in the LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG and the Rostock OSTSEEZEITUNG. One could read that the

right to be a political person [exists], even if it is sometimes inconvenient and causes annoyance. And: "Things here don't run the way we would like them to, but in the newspaper we only read how good we are." And Minister for Public Education Margot Honecker spoke up in a speech against putting negative labels on young people who hold deviant political opinions. Unclear political points must be eliminated "by clearing matters up." The critical statements of a married couple of comrades in the magazine SINN UND FORM aim in the same direction.

This development is not accidental and uncontrolled, but rather a conscious tactic. In many ways, it reminds one of earlier attempts by Erich Honecker to let off a little steam without opening all the valves. He told artists in 1971 that there must be no taboos in art and literature, always assuming, however, that "one starts from firm positions of socialism." This course had ended by 1977 with the Biermann controversy and the expatriation of numerous writers, actors and stage directors. Something similar occurred regarding church policy, which clearly seemed to relax after a talk between Protestant churchmen and Honecker in March of 1978. The critical position of the churches toward militarization and premilitary training, as well as their protective function for the unofficial peace movement, have led here and there to unmistakable hardenings [of policy]. Other examples are youth policies, economic policy, the attitude towards private artisans and tradesmen, the treatment of conscientious objectors--the SED alternates forever between carefully meted out relaxation and the unchangeable need to keep everything under strict control.

Nevertheless, what is happening in the GDR now is unusual and--from the viewpoint of SED reasoning--also not logical. More than 13,000 emigrations during the first 3 months of this year alone--this would project to more than 50,000 a year--the size of these numbers provoke the question whether the wall is still necessary. On the other hand, every successful exit brings new applications in its wake; many a person who knows friends and relatives in the West now toys with the heretofore unusual thought of also filing an application, before it is too late. He asks around, consults, loses interest in commitment: "Why should I stay on? My daughter won't be allowed to graduate here from high school."

Thus a counterculture comes into being involving hundreds of thousands--people who are in opposition to the state, who live "subject to recall," some of them unemployed, who no longer want to be told what to do and are gaining greater courage to stick their necks out. One GDR citizen says, "things are humming everywhere; people who up to now had been firmly rooted are being dislocated as if by a landslide."

There is the additional factor that the middle and lower echelon of the corps of functionaries is beginning to feel underprivileged. Whoever is skeptical toward the state, or only interested in his own welfare, can manage to pick his way through: He receives visitors from the West, has Western currency, has grandmothers of retirement age who take along long shopping lists on trips to the West, and who will finally get out of the country if he is determined and possesses courage, as well as staying power. Whoever is loyal to the state, is a party member, or holds a leading position, is not allowed to have

Western contacts, has no Western currency in order to shop in the Intershop, and, to top it off, is supposed to believe everything written in the newspapers. "If you don't have West German DM's, you are an asocial element," it is said mockingly in the GDR. Thus there is almost another class society in existence again in which, however, the ruling class is at the same time the under-privileged group.

Undeniably, the GDR leadership is in a dilemma. It observed the appearance of the official peace movement with some tolerance, it treated the emigration wave starting from Jena with some moderation, and was suddenly confronted with a potential of unrest which had grown too big for a hard approach, arrests and sentencing. Fifty thousand emigrations, if they should actually happen, and if the GDR leadership does not close the borders before then, can no longer defuse this problem.

A theory is making the rounds to the effect that state security chief Erich Mielke uncomplainingly tolerates Erich Honecker's policy only because he wants to show the state council chairman that this is not the way to go, either; that in fact, state security deliberately allows the party apparatus to get itself into even deeper trouble. This speculation, however, is just as superficial as the supposition that the GDR is mainly concerned with the exit levy paid by every emigrant, and that they want to create a favorable climate for new credits in the amount of billions, and even closer economic cooperation with the FRG, and for a friendly reception when Honecker visits his old homeland, probably in the fall. Even the communal elections scheduled in the GDR for May 6--in whose context there are often calls for somewhat more open criticisms of grievances--are not an adequate explanation. The SED does not have to fear a visible election boycott or too many "nay" votes. With the stream of emigrants no longer controllable even by Western authorities, speculations that the GDR on the one hand intends to infiltrate its own agents en masse, and on the other hand wants to increase unemployment in the FRG and reduce its own level of unemployment, also do not cover all of the ground. Most of the emigrants are qualified people who are quite useful to the GDR, and many of them find employment very quickly here in the West.

The depth of the problem facing the GDR can perhaps be seen most clearly in the opinion of a former SED man who still has good contacts with the GDR today: "A basic keystone of the GDR is teetering. The compromise of 'goulash for toleration' no longer functions, because the goulash has run out. The pots are empty, and the people no longer shut up." For this reason, the GDR leadership is trying to pacify areas of unrest through "regional rehabilitation." Indeed, most of the emigrants come from the South of the GDR, primarily from Jena, Dresden, Halle, Erfurt, but also from East Berlin. In addition, the SED hopes to receive optimum economic aid from the FRG through its policy, which in Bonn is definitely seen as a success of "humane efforts."

It is uncertain whether this speculation will prove correct. If Walter Ulbricht could still keep a close eye on his successor, he would probably refer to a speech he gave in 1968 at a meeting of the SED Central Committee, shortly after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. At that time, he warned against economic dependence on the West and opined that the socialist states had to take the less convenient way and solve their problems on their own.

Aiming at the CSSR and Yugoslavia, he said: "For this reason they look for backing and aid from imperialist powers. In order to obtain this cooperation, some of them dismiss their knowledge of the true character of imperialism... In a country which imports a number of modern industrial plants from capitalist countries but...neglects societal development, regression may occur."

These words may ring unpleasantly in the ears of some comrades of the old Ulbricht guard in view of present GDR problems. Setbacks, and even a hardening [of the situation], definitely cannot be excluded.

9917

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

EMINENT SCHOLAR'S CRITICAL WRITINGS SCORED

FRG Commentary

Bonn DIE WELT in German 17 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Hans-R. Karutz, Berlin editorial staff: "Prominent GDR Scholar Tells the SED Some Truths"]

[Text] Prof Juergen Kuczynski, one of the GDR's leading economic and social experts, appears to have fallen out of favor with the SED. In his book, "Dialog mit meinem Urenkel," [Dialogue with My Great-Grandson] published by East Berlin's Aufbau-Verlag in 1983 and now out of print, the 79 year-old author denounced the uncritical attitude of the GDR press; remnants of "Stalinist" thinking in the SED; bureaucratism; petty and dogmatic acts and a "growing attitude of consumerism, even among party functionaries." According to reports from East Berlin, a previously planned ceremony honoring Kuczynski, who is a communist and recipient of the Order of Karl Marx, on his 80th birthday on 17 September 1984 will apparently not take place as originally scheduled. DIE WELT herewith reprints a few excerpts from Kuczynski's book:

Real Socialism

"For the very reason that it is our socialism, we want it to drop all of the defects, errors and weaknesses which we ourselves have caused. In other words, we are talking about an entirely personal type of self-criticism when we go about criticizing the real conditions....Some say that it is wrong to adopt a critical attitude toward real socialism. They are continually glossing over things or rather offering apologetic arguments for socialism while believing, for that reason, that they are good socialists themselves. But the fact is they are small-minded people who really do not think socialism grand at all..."

Press and Media

"You may say that you have read very little in our printed media about such controversies [between scientific experts and the bureaucracy]. You are quite right, unfortunately. They do report on—and rightly so—magnificent initiatives helping to raise output which form the basis for our stable price policies; but they fail to report on special commissions and such which have to be sent into this or that plant because production control was scandalous or because production was lagging for some other reason.

"They only report on brigades that overfulfilled their planning goals; but they fail to report on the great efforts of a moral, technological and organizational nature required to build up such a brigade; much less do they report on the brigades that failed and, far more importantly, on the reasons why they failed. They report on important matters which were resolved in an unbureaucratic manner; but they fail to report on the many manifestations of bureaucracy as such. The printed media fail to do a large part of their educational job by not exercising sufficient criticism at all."

Bureaucracy

"...as you can see, life after 1945 was still full of conflict for every communist. These conflicts revolved around the mistakes that were made—and of course we did make mistakes in all areas of social life—and also around absolutely terrible bureaucratic excesses for example...I have already mentioned that the greatest degree of centralization is required in order to wage any kind of a military struggle and the world class struggle as well—and I have also said why centralization has a negative impact in some ways on the social and cultural development of a socialist society. Under centralization, it is initiative and democratic practices that tend to suffer. Those who deny this are either ignorant or hypocritical."

Standard of Living

"If you think there were no tragedies happening in our day—how wrong you would be! They are merely of a different kind. How much misery was visited on many families by an economic policy which paid far too little heed to housing at times and how much happiness was granted to others by the changes...since the 8th party congress...Or just think how many talented scientists in our country, too, were broken or deformed by the "Stalinist era" and how strong and firm others emerged from that era..."

With respect to many material conditions of life I was raised to live the simple life on the one hand...and on the other hand, I can see consumerism spreading among us, even among our party functionaries. Perhaps it is only to me that some things appear modest because others are living so immodestly in this respect; perhaps it is only to me that some things appear luxurious such as our [own] apartment—but only because there are others who still do not have enough space."

"Plugging Up the Holes"

Kuczynski also makes reference to the SED policy decision to hold the line on basic food prices and wages in the GDR and in the process provides an inside look at internal party squabbles on this issue:

"Our basic living costs have remained the same over the past several years while they rose throughout the world, including the other socialist countries...This is an achievement that must be credited above all—and I know this from personal experience—to the firmness displayed by comrade Erich Honecker who carried out this policy decision with an iron will.

"I can tell you with equal certainty that the most intensive debates in the Politburo, inside the government, in the central committee and in the ministries all the way down to the individual departments and brigades were required so that the necessary measures to ensure price stabilization could be implemented. In many instances, holes were only plugged up by opening new ones. Quite often, there were sharp exchanges on how best to accomplish our goals. There were doubts at the top, in the middle and down at the bottom as to how and as to how long we would be able to hold the line on prices."

Victims of Bureaucracy

"On this battlefield and on neighboring ones as well not a few of us were seriously or even mortally wounded...Perhaps some day there will be an investigation into the victims of this battle—those who died too soon of physical exhaustion and those who were pensioned off too early, ground down by those others who are avid about making these necessities come true."

Kuczynski has also been attacked by hard-line SED professors for his stand on the missile issue. In a letter to the editor of NEUE DEUTSCHE LITERATUR, Prof Hasso Lange of Jena University censured Kuczynski for not having distanced himself from the statement by author Christa Wolf and for merely having quoted her without comment. Wolf's statement did not draw a distinction between American and Soviet nuclear missiles. Prof Lange attacked Kuczynski by saying that he would have "expected a clear and convincing statement" from him to the effect "that the existential threat to mankind comes from the reactionary and most aggressive circles of monopoly capitalism."

Last weekend, the party newspaper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND finally took note of Kuczynski's letters to his great-grandson Norbert. In a review entitled "A Special Kind of Valedictory," Harald Wessel, a member of the paper's editorial staff, comes up with a rather acidulous reaction to some of Kuczynski's prose. Wessel speaks of a "philosopher of some note" who told him that Kuczynski's views were "expressed in a far too absolute manner." This also seems to be the general thinking of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND although the reviewer does admit there has been a "great deal of interest after all" as well as some "lively debate" about the book which has long since been out of print.

One would have hoped, Wessel writes, that the author "would have used the present text or some other medium to deal at greater length with the

question of how our struggle for peaceful coexistence serves to enhance socialist society" and of how the "radiating power" of socio-political achievements keeps on growing. For another thing, Kuczynski's support of "communist ideals is somewhat too cool." To be a scholar and to live in a house full of books, says Wessel, cannot "serve as a general-purpose standard for the needs of working people under socialism."

What is more, the letters are "too personal," says the reviewer in an apparent critique of the author's subjectivism. "The letters are a reflection of the individual experiences and the subjective commitment of the author," he writes. "Happily, the conclusions arrived at quite often are openhearted, albeit at times a bit too subjective." The party newspaper fails to go into Kuczynski's views of the GDR media scene; but in commenting on Kuczynski's critique of historians and social scientists, the reviewer says it is "certainly too harsh."

SED Organ Reviews Book

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 14-15 Apr 84 p 4

[Review by Dr Harald Wessel, deputy chief editor, of book "Dialog mit meinem Urenkel—Neunzehn Briefe und ein Tagebuch" [Dialog with My Great-Grandson—Nineteen Letters and a Diary], by Juergen Kuczynski, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin and Weimar, 1983, 286 pages]

[Text] "Dear Robert, there are various reasons for my writing these letters to you," writes Juergen Kuczynski in the introduction to his recently published book "Dialog mit meinem Urenkel" [Dialog with My Great-Grandson]. "My image of you is that you will be an apprentice or student when you sit down to read them. By that time, the sweet, pert little face of the 3 year-old will have changed; the face of that little boy who now cleans out his great-grandmother's refrigerator to get at the finely chopped parsley he wants for his applesauce and who blows into great-grandfather's pipe so he can see the smoke come out..."

I was talking with a philosopher of some note the other day and he said to me: "It seems as though dear old Juergen Kuczynski, too, takes some enjoyment from spreading chopped parsley on his applesauce. For my taste at least, some of the formulations he uses are too absolute." However that may be, there is bound to be a lot of interest in the book. Kuczynski gives rise to some lively debate. Young people, parents, grandparents and even grandparents are reading the book and talking about it. This surely is the type of controversy the dean of our social scientists intended when he wrote the book. He may now take delight "in the smoke" which is rising from the fiery debate about the views he espouses with such fiery passion.

A Revolutionary Thinker in a Time of Strife

Juergen Kuczynski, who was born on 17 September 1904 at Elberfeld, is about to celebrate his 80th birthday. He is a scholar with an international reputation who has written a great many scientific works. By now, Kuczynski has a second great-grandson. It is to his own great-grandchildren and all the other great-grandchildren of our socialist country that the 19 letters by Kuczynski are dedicated.

Those who are familiar with his memoirs entitled "Die Erziehung des J.K. zum Kommunisten und Wissenschaftler" [The Education of J. K. as a Communist and Scholar] may deplore the fact that Kuczynski apparently has no plans for continuing his autobiography. These letters to his great-grandson, Kuczynski says, should be viewed as a "kind of substitute." And so they are. Even if this is not an extensive memoir, the book does present us with the author's life experience—and more. It is an odd and individualistic way of taking stock. In a word, it is a Kuczynskian way of doing just that.

The special thing about economic historian Juergen Kuczynski is that he became a communist at an early age and decided early on to commit his wisdom and expertise, his entire strength and his own individuality to the revolutionary cause of the working class and its party; that he combined his dedication to research with the courage of his convictions at all times and that he has remained true to his revolutionary view of life, to his party and to himself to this very day. This is what invests his books with their specific persuasive power and also turns this summation of his life into a remarkable resume of almost an entire century.

Without a doubt, Juergen Kuczynski's frank response to his great-grandson's fictitious question "Tell me, great-grandfather, when you were young, was the image you had of socialism then like what socialism is today?" represents one of the truly moving passages in the book.

"Of course, exactly the same," is the general response given by the man who has a lifetime of experience behind him—and these are the reasons he gives: "The means of production have been socialized and for this reason we no longer have these various types of continuing crises; we no longer have unemployment and all the fundamental evils of capitalism to contend with. Let me make that statement to begin with. That is the decisive thing. That is the way Marx and Engels and Lenin envisaged it. That proves that our policy is right. It also tells your great-grandmother and me that the struggle to achieve this new society has been worthwhile."

To be sure, Kuczynski does not restrict himself to a mere yes in principle to the achievements of the revolutionary struggle; he goes on to analyze the conditions under which real socialism emerged. He unfolds before us the historical panorama of the whole century: the two barbaric imperialist world wars; the imperialists' threat of a third world war—a nuclear war

this time with the potential of endangering the very existence of mankind. By contrast, the victorious Red October, the world's hope for peace; the revolutionary struggles of the German working class; anti-fascist resistance; the liberation from fascism; the birth of the GDR, the first German state of peace the 35th anniversary of which we are celebrating in 1984.

Juergen Kuczynski does not make any bones about what he thinks of imperialism: "We older party members hated [imperialism] in those days because it was oppressing the working people; because it caused misery and distress; because it persecuted and in many instances murdered those of us who wished to create a new society by bringing it down. That is what it still does in other countries today. But we, in our socialist country, hate capitalism in addition because it hinders us in a good many ways in our building a socialist society."

Telling Young People about the Ideals of Communism

To be sure, one would have wished that Juergen Kuczynski would have dealt in greater detail—at this juncture or elsewhere in the book—with the question of how our struggle for peaceful coexistence acts to foster the further development of socialist society and of how the radiating power of our socio-economic and, in particular, our socio-political achievements keeps growing internationally. Still, it is understandable for the almost 80 year-old communist to say in the face of the confrontation policy fostered by the United States that his "youthful ideals of the years prior to 1933" have by no means been fulfilled.

His great-grandson and the latter's children, Kuczynski believes, will be closer to the realization of the ideal of a world made better through revolution. But he does not envy them for it. "I rejoice in the thought that you will in many ways be better off than my own generation. And yet, my dear child, I did not come into this world, nor did I become a communist in order to be better off but rather to help create a better world. And who can dispute that my comrades and I have won a great victory through our efforts and endeavors...We are around for keeps and forever; we communists who are living in and building a socialist society."

A Better World for Today's Working People

Elsewhere in the book, Kuczynski describes his own, almost Spartan way of life. Here, at this point, his arguments in favor of communist ideals may be a bit too stringent and for all that he knows perfectly well that a scholar's life of untiring intellectual labor in a house almost entirely filled with books cannot serve as a general-purpose standard of the needs of working people under socialism. As is well known, our party's idea of the meaning of socialism is to do everything for the well-being of human beings; for the happiness of the people; for the interests of the working class and of all working people who guarantee a high material and cultural

standard of living today. Communists agree with Heinrich Heine who said:
"Let us attain happiness on this earth..."

Naturally enough, the book deals with the development of the social sciences at some length. Will our great-grandchildren be as interested in controversies among social scientists as Juergen Kuczynski himself is today? Young people these days are more interested in microelectronics, in computer technology, robotics, space travel and other fascinating manifestations of the scientific-technological revolution and its socio-economic implications. It is reasonable to assume that Kuczynski's great-grandson—when he sits down to read these letters of his great-grandfather's some years from now—will regret it even more than some present-day readers that such important themes are missing from the book.

A Fascinating Version of Our History

But leaving that aside—the social science polemics contained in the book are evidence of the fact that Juergen Kuczynski—who always had a great love for dispute—even as an almost octogenarian still has enough fire and passion in him to challenge entire collectives of social science institutions to heated debate by confronting them with a number of intentionally provocative passages. The somewhat pointed comment of the philosopher I mentioned earlier with reference to Kuczynski's little joke about the "chopped parsley" on the applesauce attests to that. Still, there are a great many comrades who—even if they do not agree with him on every point—will take delight in Kuczynski's polemics because they promote debate which is as necessary for science as salt is for soup.

As I said earlier, these letters to his great-grandson are written in a very personal style. They are a reflection of individual experiences and of the subjective commitment of the author. Happily, the conclusions arrived at quite often are open-hearted, albeit at times a bit too subjective. Kuczynski's critique of GDR historiography and GDR historians for instance is certainly too harsh. He himself has been a motor force in the development of this special area on a number of occasions and has been very effective as such. Our historians in particular have made some important progress throughout the seventies and eighties most of all. Well-written history books are by no means a rarity any longer. They are successfully contributing to the development of socialist consciousness among our young people.

Juergen Kuczynski has every right to ask more of our historians and of other social scientists—even more so because his own scientific output has been quite stupendous. But, as he previously did in so many of his other books, he should have paid more generous tribute to the great achievements of his own colleagues in this "Dialog with My Great-Grandson." But all in all it is a book worth reading and by all means well worth debating about.

Professor Criticizes Article

East Berlin NEUE DEUTSCHE LITERATUR in German Vol 32 No 4, Apr 84 pp 169-171

[Letter by Prof Dr Hasso Lange, University of Jena: "Illogical Scepticism in the Language of Peace"]

[Text] Let me quote from a piece by Juergen Kuczynski which appeared in No 1/1984 of NEUE DEUTSCHE LITERATUR, a periodical which is virtually obligatory reading for our German studies students. "When statesmen and scientists...speak of the annihilation of mankind as a result of nuclear war—then it is illogical to continue to go on the assumption of the pre-ordained victory of socialism in the world...Under these conditions, our axiomatically based certainty that socialism will triumph is transformed into optimism, into a belief in such a triumph—into an optimism which at times can also be upset by realistic pessimism." The outbreak of a nuclear war which might annihilate mankind is a real and at present rapidly growing danger. If it were unavoidable, both humanity and the operative conditions of social laws would be extinguished given the global and total nature of such a war. If this is what Kuczynski meant to say, I agree with him. Does it follow that one must no longer go on the assumption of the preordained triumph of socialism in the world and that our prognosis no longer rests on scientific insight but on faith ?

If I follow Christa Wolf's lead and start "thinking rationally, taking into account all the available information about the armaments of both sides and particularly the thought processes behind these armaments," then I certainly do not reach the conclusion which Kuczynski thinks is the only correct one "from a purely rational point of view" which is that Europe and we, all of us, can (probably) no longer be saved. For that matter, I have not seen a word uttered by any progressive statesman or scientist saying that the annihilation of mankind through nuclear war is historically or probably unavoidable.

The historic opportunity for peaceful coexistence has not or at least not yet been missed. If the socialist community in conjunction with all the other forces of peace in the world succeeds in safeguarding peaceful coexistence and making it irreversible—and that can be done—then the operative conditions of social laws will also be preserved. And then even the most advanced capitalist nations will sooner or later turn to socialism as a consequence of their internal contradictions. Through an overall strengthening of the socialist community; through the comprehensive mobilization of all the forces of peace throughout the world; through their unification and their reasonable, resolute and target-oriented action, we must concentrate on and make effective that "critical mass" which can guarantee the survival of mankind and its further progress toward essential history.

Only someone who is convinced of the annihilation of mankind could, strictly speaking, give up on the axiomatic triumph of socialism in the world. As for Kuczynski, he certainly is not. His whole article is full not only of the concern about the need to take courage but also the will to do so. But how? How does he explain what he calls the transformation of the certainty of the triumph into the belief in the triumph of socialism?

His response to Christa Wolf is: "...why do we assume that things proceed only along rational lines within ourselves and in the world?" and then goes on to say: "Anyone who pins his hopes on the rationality of Reagan and the men behind him needs must become a pessimist. Anyone who pins his hopes on the rage and inner freedom of peoples has a right to hope and optimism." In other words, Kuczynski pins his hopes—which is what the article says—on the rage of the peoples and their inner freedom. The rage of peoples can also be a mighty force for progress; but it can also remain dormant. What is meant by the inner freedom of peoples which, along with the rage, is to or is to be able to prevent the catastrophe remains unclear to say the least. Does Kuczynski really no longer pin any hope on the reasonableness of peoples, of the Marxist-Leninist parties or even major segments of the monopoly bourgeoisie? Doesn't he pin his hopes on the reasonable "thought processes" of the Soviet leaders who are capable of soberly assessing the world power relationship and who resolutely reject nuclear war as a means for the continuation of politics?

"If they dare to make the annihilation of this Europe [of ours] a part of their military calculations," Christa Wolf wrote, "we as the dead-to-be in the statistics of the nuclear planning staffs may take some liberties of our own. Under these circumstances, after all, our submission to logic—whose latest manifestation is the missile—has become senseless which is another way of saying that we cannot be radical enough in the questions we raise with regard to this radical threat." Now following her line of argument, is it not necessary to ask whom she is referring to; which nuclear staffs; which logic and which missiles and against whom she means to take liberties? Of Juergen Kuczynski I would have expected a clear and convincing explanation of the answer that the existential threat to mankind emanates from the most reactionary and aggressive circles of monopoly capitalism into whose hands the scientific-technological revolution has anachronistically placed immense powers of annihilation and continues to do so and that they are the "makers of clouds" against whom the "world struggle" of peace must be waged (as he puts it in his "Dialog with My Great-Grandson"). To prevent a nuclear war, the need today is not only to force the issue of holding genuine disarmament talks and to achieve practical successes but also not to leave the warmongers in the least (!) doubt about the fact that they themselves would inevitably perish in case they attacked the socialist community by military means. There is no reason to believe with any assurance that the desire of these circles to commit suicide ("rather dead than red") would exceed their instinct of self-preservation.

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U.S. MILITARY SEEN PLANNING OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL STRIKE

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[Analysis by Wolfgang Schwarz: "Binary Weapons-Chemical Agents in the U.S. Concept for Offensive Military Operations; on Equal Footing with Tactical Nuclear Weapons; Incorporation of Chemical Weapons into the Concept of the 'Integrated Battlefield;' Deployment Planned Already at the Onset of the Attack by the United States"]

[Text] Chemical agents (C-weapons), in particular highly toxic phosphor-organic nerve poisons, are means for mass destruction.¹⁾ Two substances are principally used in the U.S. armed forces--with the designation GB and VX. One liter VX, for example, can kill 65,000 people.²⁾ Chemical weapons "have already cost tens of thousands of people their lives and turned millions of people into cripples. At present the human race is threatened by the danger that even more horrible kinds of chemical weapons will be deployed on a mass basis,³⁾ it said in 1982 in a Soviet memorandum. Consequently, the proposal of 10 January 1984 by the Warsaw Pact member nations to free Europe from chemical weapons is of great significance. At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Forming Measures and Disarmament in Europe the foreign minister of the GDR, Oskar Fischer, stated in his declaration of principle on 17 January this year that such "an agreement would not only remove the anxiety of the peoples over an atrocious form of weaponry, but would simultaneously set an elevating example for other devastating weapons as well as for other regions in the world."⁴⁾

The existence today of a concrete danger of war with chemical weapons is primarily a result of the fact that for more than 10 years militaristic circles in the United States have been conducting a qualitative intensification of U.S. armament with these very nerve toxins. They are doing their utmost to end a production moratorium on lethal or combat-incapacitating C-weapons imposed in 1969 by then President R. Nixon.

The reason for this now suspended moratorium was an accident with chemical agents at the Dugway Proving Ground (Utah) in 1968. During an open-air test of VX a toxic cloud drifted far outside the test area and killed more than 6,000 sheep. It was only because of fortunate circumstances that no people were harmed. Coverup attempts by the U.S. military regarding the causes of the catastrophe in turn misfired: For the first time the U.S. public found out about the existence of VX and its effects. This led to strong protests by

the population, and in order to prevent growing unrest--in addition to the anti-Vietnam movement in the United States at that time--Nixon arranged the moratorium, in particular since the U.S. nerve gas stockpiles already amounted to many thousands of tons.

However, as early as 1973 advocates of C-weapons in the United States--military people, politicians and the lobbies of individual groups of chemical companies--began an over the next few years systematically reinforced campaign to "rehabilitate" chemical warfare. That had to do with the circumstance that the first results which could be industrially and militarily evaluated became visible in the U.S. development work on a qualitatively new type of binary application method for highly toxic chemical agents. Since 1975 the U.S. Defense Ministry has applied for annual funds for the construction of a new factory for binary munitions types at Pine Bluff Arsenal (Arkansas). The first installment for this, in the amount of 3.15 million U.S. dollars, was granted in 1980.

The Reagan administration then set about intensifying the chemical armament with particular zeal. The military policy of the present U.S. government is, as is well known, aimed at military superiority over the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact nations--and in such a manner that the United States will reach an extensive warfare capability. The pivotal point is the effort to bring about the opportunity for a victorious military conflict with the socialist countries without the risk of self-annihilation due to resistance by the other side. In order to create the military preconditions for this, the Reagan administration has drastically expanded both the nuclear and the conventional armament of the United States--coupled with the corresponding warfare concepts.⁵⁾ This development is to be significantly supplemented by additional rearmament with new offensive chemical mass destruction means.

As early as 1981, during his first year in office, Reagan forced through an increase in the funds allocated to Pine Bluff by more than 20 million U.S. dollars. Meanwhile, preparations for resuming production of the first assembly line--for binary artillery munition--have largely been concluded. Reagan took the decisive step on 8 February 1982. In an official communication to Congress he de jure authorized renewed nerve gas production and thereby lifted the moratorium--with the motivation that "the production of lethal binary C-weapons are of great importance to the national interests"⁶⁾ of the United States. Since then the U.S. government has been trying to get Congress to allocate money from the defense budget for the startup of actual production at Pine Bluff. However, this has so far (both in 1982 and 1983) foundered on an opposition majority in the House of Representatives, although last year Vice President Bush got himself personally involved in the month-long altercations in Congress and during votes in the Senate twice added his vote for a one-vote majority in favor of the planned chemical armaments. The influential U.S. press noted: "The action by Congress does not end the research and development for binary weapons, and the matter will probably be brought up again next year" (1984--the author).

Binary Weapons--Principle and Program

The focus of the planned intensification of chemical armament is the procurement of weapons, which deploy highly toxic agents such as the abovementioned nerve poisons according to the binary principle. The basic concept of the binary principle consists of "disarming" a chemical agent which is intensely dangerous even for the user in such a way that it is produced, stockpiled and transported in the form of separately kept precursors with relatively low toxicity and then loaded into the corresponding carrier systems (grenades, bombs, missile warheads etc.). The reaction that produces the deadly agent is initiated only after the carrier has been launched. For example, in a 155-mm artillery shell with the description XM 687 the acceleration pressure during the launch destroys a separation membrane between the binary components, which are then mixed by the twisting of the shell and form the nerve poison GB, which is sprayed out by an explosive charge when the grenade hits.⁸⁾

The research work for binary chemical weapons in the United States goes back to 1954. But the decisive technological breakthroughs did not take place until the beginning of the 1970's. At that time the intended military applications of the following advantages, which, according to their U.S. proponents, binary systems possess over conventional C-weapons, moved into the range of feasibility:

--Binary carrier methods considerably reduce the danger to the user himself during production, storage, transportation and deployment of C-weapons. It is the first time that the characteristic of nerve gases such as GB and VX of being able to cover large areas with a relatively limited quantity can be combined with sufficient safety in handling.

--The present security cost for storing C-weapons and for special chemical troops, which is connected with an extremely high financial burden, can be significantly reduced.

--The binary method makes it possible to camouflage very well the extent of the preparations for active chemical warfare, because C-weapons need no longer be stockpiled. Since the basic substances for binary nerve toxins are produced and needed anyway by practically every modern industry--as initial and intermediate products for cosmetic, pharmaceutical and numerous other products--it is possible to inconspicuously divert some for military purposes at any time. And, furthermore, binary carrier systems do not differ in external appearance from conventional munitions.

Against this, the various disadvantages of binary weapons (increased susceptibility to technical disturbances, difficulties in attacking close targets due to the necessary reaction time for the initial substances etc.) are largely "compensated for by corresponding considerations of military planning."⁹⁾ This also applies to the principal problem, which military forces armed with binary weapons face--logistics. The two chemical components of similar systems would have to arrive at the deployment site independent of

each other, that is to say over separate transportation routes, but nevertheless at the same time and in the required quantities. Under the conditions of an ongoing, ground-gaining, military conflict this would be extremely complicated, if not practically impossible. In preparation for an offensive war, however, the problem of previous stationing of binary weapons in the front area would be easily solved, so that at the beginning of the conflict similar chemical warfare agents could be fully integrated into the conduct of offensive operations. The U.S. military anticipates considerable advantages from this in an attack, since they represent the opinion that in "future wars of greater intensity and shorter duration ... one would immediately have to go for victory."¹⁰ Moreover, a solution to the transportation problems would be even more feasible if the individual binary materials and the carrier systems were already stored near the front in peacetime.

In detail, the Pentagon plans for the introduction of binary weapons include principally the following measures. The starting point is construction of the plant in Pine Bluff with several production lines (Integrated Binary Production Facility), which are to complete a 7-year program, according to a four-step plan:¹¹

- Step 1--monthly production of 20,000 155-mm projectiles;
- Step 2--Increase of this rate to 70,000;
- Step 3--Production expansion to 203-mm grenades and 250-kg aerosol bombs of the "Big Eye" type ¹²;
- Step 4--Manufacture of additional types of munitions, among others of missile warheads;

As potential land-based carrier systems with a greater range (as artillery) for binary chemical agents, the 1983 annual report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) mentioned:¹³

--a Multiple Launch Rocket System/MLRS.¹⁴ In one round the MLRS shoots 12 rockets up to 40 km and has two quick-reloading additional munitions cassettes. Its introduction into the U.S. forces began in 1983, other NATO nations will follow (FRG, Great Britain, France, Italy).

--so-called Corps Support Weapon Systems/CSWS. Rocket systems with ranges between 80 and 1,100 km are foreseen as chemical CSWS, which are grouped under the collective name "Assault Breaker" and are primarily derived from existing nuclear carrier systems; the concept of this has already been implemented in the Lance, Pershing II and the booster level of the Trident I.¹⁵

--Cruise Missiles/CM. CM with binary agents--with a range up to 2,500 km--are said to be particularly suitable for bringing chemical warfare deeply into the territory of the USSR.

The total binary weapons requirements of the JCS foresee 30,000 tons of nerve toxins,¹⁶ which could fill several hundred thousand tons of ammunition.

In order to create an effective warfare capability in the chemical area for the U.S. Armed Forces, an extensive defense program, already initiated under the previous administration, is being continued at an accelerated pace. Its goal is to minimize the effect of chemical reprisals on the troops themselves in a conflict. Up to 27 billion U.S. dollars are to be spent in both areas, C-weapons and -defense, by the mid-1990's.¹⁷⁾

The 'Chemical Variants' of the False Threat

In order to start the binary weapons program and then as soon as possible to complete it, interested circles in the United States have been trying since the mid-1970's to create a favorable domestic-political climate for their plans. For that--along the old, familiar pattern--the chimera of an alleged Soviet threat had to serve once more, this time in the chemical sector.

First, the U.S. public and mainly the legislative organs of the United States were confronted with horror stories about "excessive" chemical armament by the USSR, growing Soviet stockpiles of C weapons and a many times greater Soviet superiority.¹⁸⁾ The methodology of this chain of reasoning lay and lies in the sufficiently well-known "re-"armament scheme, which is also followed by the Western attempts to justify NATO's Brussels Missile Decision: The alleged "pre-"armament by the other side justifies one's own "re-"armament. In connection with the U.S. binary weapons plans, however, this scheme was not thought sufficiently attractive. For that reason the lie was brought into play, that the Soviet Union is using chemical weapons in Indochina and Afghanistan and has thereby violated the international agreements it has signed, that is to say the "Geneva Protocol Concerning a Ban on the Use of Toxic Gases ..." of 1925, as well as the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and Concerning Their Destruction" (B Weapons Convention) of 1972. Similar accusations were voiced in September 1981 by the then U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig, for example.¹⁹⁾

It may be noted about this propaganda campaign, that all of these allegations brought up by the United States in order to slander the USSR within a short time turned out to be false--neither is the Soviet Union conducting a chemical "pre-"armament, nor has it used chemical agents against other peoples in past years (as, indeed, never in its history!):

--Assertions regarding alleged immense C-weapons stockpiles in the USSR were spread by the U.S. side without even a hint of proof. This is why the proponents of binary armament, among them even highly regarded politicians, such as the chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, J. Tower, have not refrained from presenting almost silly arguments--with the reference, for example, "that the Soviet Union has a broad industrial base available, which easily could be mobilized to produce toxic substances...."²⁰⁾ The Soviet general A. Kuntsevich declared about the figures disseminated in the United States and NATO: "The assertions and fantastic data ... about an alleged 700,000 tons of Soviet chemical agents are well known to us. All estimates and figures, with which the West operates, are totally fabricated."²¹⁾ This

was practically confirmed as early as 1980 by the then U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown during a hearing in the U.S. Senate.²²⁾

--The lies about alleged Soviet deployment of C-weapons have been decisively rejected by the USSR, and it has been documented by Soviet experts that they cannot be upheld.²³⁾ But more than that--the "proof" presented by the United States (a few dried-up leaves, water samples measured in milliliters, etc.)--found no response in experts of other countries either. Australian scientists, given the task by the U.S. government of undertaking the corresponding investigations, simply described the submitted "evidence material" as falsification.²⁴⁾ An international UN commission appointed at the request of the United States also could not find any kind of proof of the U.S. allegations.²⁵⁾ In this connection it must be noted that proof of chemical or toxic warfare cannot be eliminated for many years: In Vietnam the results of the barbaric use of C-weapons by the United States are still incalculable, although these activities are more than 10 years old!

In the propaganda campaign of the U.S. C-weapons advocates the attempt was and is being made to cover up or detract from various existing factual situations by means of the lies about the "Soviet threat." This applies first to the enormous, already existing, stockpiles of chemical agents in the United States and second to the results of the chemical warfare in Vietnam.

First: C-weapons expert M. Meselon (United States) and J. P. Robinson (Great Britain) reported that between 1953 and 1957 the United States produced 15,000 tons of GB, and between 1961 and 1967 5,000 tons of VX. More than 30 types of nerve gas ammunition were introduced. According to information by the two scientists, the total reserves of lethal chemical ammunition in the U.S. Armed Forces amount to 150,000 tons.²⁶⁾ In 1982 Meselon made the observation that the United States had "sufficient nerve gas projectiles to cover Europe with a regular barrage of chemical weapons for at least 90 days."²⁷⁾ On the basis of these existing quantities, a 100-million-dollar program is presently being realized in the United States in order to substantially replenish the conventional nerve gas ammunition reserves, which are fully ready-to-use. In 1987 the United States will thus--regardless of the intended resumption of binary weapons production--possess more than three times larger reserves of fully ready-to-use ammunition than in comparison with 1982!²⁸⁾

Second: In Vietnam the United States used more than 90,000 tons of chemical warfare agents between 1961 and 1971. Although there were no immediately lethal substances among them, such as nerve gases, and in general it was "only" a matter of plant killers, the delayed effects of these actions are proof that chemical warfare--similar to the use of nuclear weapons--does not only damage the people affected (in Vietnam they numbered 2 million inhabitants and about 100,000 U.S. and Australian soldiers), but also their offspring for several generations--through a sharp increase in cancer, hereditary diseases, miscarriages and still births, nervous complaints etc. The flora and fauna of the chemically diseased regions have been seriously damaged for decades.²⁹⁾

It is thus no wonder that the propaganda campaigns bring the U.S. C-weapon proponents more opposition than success. For instance, it was even confirmed by the General Accounting Office of the United States, when it indicated in a report on a study, that the motivation by the Pentagon for "modernization and expansion of the chemical warfare capability" had too many gaps to justify the expenditure of billions.³⁰⁾

The Role of C-Weapons in the Strategic Plans of the United States

The question arises as to what the motives are for the continuous efforts of militaristic circles in the United States to introduce binary chemical weapons systems, which the Reagan administration is now also pushing for with such vehemence. The immediate external reason is the aging of some of the stockpiles of chemical ammunition. For certain calibers there are no longer any means of deployment, as a result of the elimination of older artillery of the U.S. Armed Forces. This applies to 105-mm shells, for example. Furthermore, there is growing danger as a result of storage damage to chemical agent containers--as early as 1980 the then Senator H. Jackson reported reported up to 4,000 toxic leaks in U.S. depots annually!³¹⁾

But this could obviously be the starting point for the opposite action by the United States, that is to say to get intensely and constructively involved in the international efforts to ban C-weapons and to eliminate them, if the verbally declared intention of the United States to want to reach "a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons"³²⁾ were to tally with its actual intentions. But precisely the opposite is the case, as is shown by the binary weapons plans of the United States.

Thus, since the mid-1970's--based on the advanced development level of the binary weapons and on the military advantages which are seen in particular in the large-scale, relatively safe applicability by regular, non-specialist troops--a clear upgrading of chemical warfare agents in the U.S. military arsenal and a growing integration of C-weapons in the strategic guidelines for the U.S. Armed Forces since the early 1980's can be determined.

U.S. military experts today equate the importance of modern chemical warfare agents with that of nuclear battlefield weapons. J. Douglass, who together with A. Hoeber (in the Reagan administration assistant to the undersecretary of army affairs) for years has been one of the leading ideological trailblazers for the planned binary armament, wrote about this: "According to the standards of military effectiveness, chemical weapons can be compared to low-caliber nuclear weapons."³³⁾ In addition, in a work published as early as 1978, which summed up the opinions of the U.S. advocates of intensified chemical armament downright in the form of a plea, Hoeber and Douglass stressed the "uniqueness" of chemical warfare agents: "C-agents occupy a unique special position in the family of modern battlefield weapons, since they only affect living creatures. They wound and kill, without destroying equipment and installations."³⁴⁾ In this respect, nerve gases, for example, surpass even the neutron weapons, which always leave behind certain explosive and radioactive collateral damage.

According to the same authors, chemical agents are particularly suitable "for employment where the momentum of an offensive was inhibited due to rubble after nuclear or conventional fires."³⁵⁾ The latter applies primarily to warfare in urban areas. In this connection, experts calculate with about 20 times more civilian (unprotected) than military casualties after deployment of C-weapons in Central Europe!³⁶⁾ Moreover, Hoeber and Douglass raised the notion, that it would be more advantageous to take "strategic installations, such as radar, ground control stations, navigational transmitters" as well as "major airports, fuel dumps, traffic centers... intact by means of chemical attacks, instead of destroying them."³⁷⁾ Also, the surface-covering effect of C-weapons--for example against scattered military formations with individual targets which are difficult to fix--extends far beyond the actual death zone: "...effects...are already triggered by weak doses of nerve agents and halt or affect the fulfillment of combat duties such as targets, aiming of weapons, instrument supervision and similar."³⁸⁾

One of the serious difficulties with chemical warfare, which could strongly reduce the effects of deployment even of toxic nerve poisons for the opposing combat forces, consists in the fact that the problems of a successful chemical defense have in principle been solved today. This is valid both for the appropriate protective clothing and for medical antidotes for nerve toxins. In Douglass' opinion, the reduction in effectiveness caused by this might be circumvented in various ways, however, for example by surprising the opponent so that his precautions cannot take effect or by combined use of several warfare agents, in order to break through these measures.³⁹⁾ Besides, apologists of chemical warfare make the claim that even with C-weapon attacks with relatively few casualties among the opponents, combat effectiveness in the enemy units would be greatly affected because of the necessary, cumbersome, defense and decontamination measures.⁴⁰⁾ In their abovementioned work from 1978, Hober and Douglass in conclusion posed this demand for the United States: "What is necessary is a change in the fundamental attitude to the overall question of chemical warfare."⁴¹⁾

The forces that back such a demand have progressed a long way since then. This is reflected above all in the fact that for the first time chemical weapons have been fully integrated into the deployment guidelines for the U.S. Armed Forces in the U.S. Army's new Airland Battle (ALB) doctrine, which is aimed at a military conflict with the Warsaw Pact nations in Central Europe.⁴²⁾ For practical application, ALB was issued in the form of a new edition of the U.S. Army Field Manual for military operations, the so-called FM-100-5, of 20 August 1982. According to this FM-100-5, the core of the ALB consists of two operational concepts--the expanded and the integrated battlefield. Military victory is to be assured by surprising, massive fighting on the battlefield--crushing the Warsaw Pact forces near the front--and, in similar fighting as far as several hundred kilometers deep, by the destruction of the Warsaw Pact reinforcement forces--(expanded battlefield) using simultaneous nuclear, conventional and chemical warfare (integrated battlefield).⁴³⁾ This presumes aiming for a war of attack!⁴⁴⁾

FM-100-5 expresses the distinct revaluation of C-weapons in U.S. military theory by the manner in which operative superiorities, deployment and effectiveness possibilities of means of chemical warfare are extensively treated in direct connection with those of nuclear weapons. It says, for example: "Nuclear and chemical weapons will dramatically alter the possibilities of sudden changes in the battlefield, which can be used by the attacker."⁴⁵⁾ As may further be concluded from FM-100-5, the use of chemical means of mass destruction is foreseen practically from the onset of the war. In Chapter 9, "Offensive Operations," it is pointed out: "With sufficient support by nuclear or chemical warfare, exploitation of the successes of the attack can begin shortly after the attack itself."⁴⁶⁾ Similar guidelines prove official U.S. statements about a "policy of 'no first use' of lethal or combat-incapacitating C-weapons"⁴⁷⁾ to be lies! On the contrary; in FM 100-5 it is expressly pointed out that chemical means of warfare achieve optimum effectiveness when they are used "massively and without advance warning."⁴⁸⁾

The planned binary weapons production is aimed at the military requirements of a warfare doctrine, such as is embodied by Airland Battle. Thus, for the first production phase, 155-mm artillery shells are to be filled with binary GB. GB is easily volatile in the atmosphere--and consequently suitable for preventing offensively advancing U.S. units from being injured in an area contaminated by their own chemical shelling.

Earmarking of Fixed Targets by U.S. Armed Forces in the Warsaw Pact Region

Type of target	Distance from GDR-FRG border in kilometers				Total
	0-30	30-100	100-300	300-800	
Airports					
(main bases)	0	13	31	28	72
Bottlenecks (bridges, railway stations, etc.)	12	10	91	78	191
Bunkers (nuclear weapons, command posts, fuel dumps)	5	27	87	43	162

Source: WEHRTECHNIK, Bonn 2/1983, p 19

The "Big Eye" air-delivered bombs, on the other hand, are to be armed with VX, which has difficult volatility, in order to assure longer effect on the enemy in the hinterland. The Big Eye type belongs to that portion of the binary program, which is given the "highest priority" by the deputy section head responsible for this in the Pentagon, T. Gold, meaning in order to create a "capacity for striking deep blows."⁴⁹⁾ The U.S. Armed Forces target lists for Central Europe contain hundreds of objects in those categories, whose "intact takeover" in war is demanded by U.S. military experts (see table). The already outlined "Assault Breaker" development is primarily aimed at offensive chemical weapons for corresponding combat deployment.

Chemical Weapons and the Attitude of the FRG

That the chief deployment area for U.S. C-weapons is the European continent, is by no means obvious just from the ALB doctrine, but is even expressed quite blatantly in the U.S. political and military theoretical literature. The objective is to bring about the prospective willingness of the Western European NATO partners of the United States to agree to station binary weapons on their territories.⁵⁰⁾ The most important consideration for this is under all circumstances to keep chemical war away from the area of the United States itself. Beyond that, after an introduction of binary ammunition types in the European NATO region the U.S. military anticipates a "multiplication effect" with respect to the ability to use these weapons. For besides the U.S. forces, nearly all other pact nations possess systems, such as 155-mm artillery shells, to launch similar warfare agents. Some NATO allies will soon add MLRS, which has already been included in the plans of representatives of the Chemical Corps, the U.S. special troop for C-weapons.⁵¹⁾ In this respect Douglas stressed that an offensive chemical warfare capability requires "extensive pre-stationing"⁵²⁾, and at the same time he regretted that in the JCS presentations of an announced 30,000 tons of binary nerve poisons, "only" 19,000 tons were intended for Europe.⁵³⁾

On the part of the U.S. government, pressure has long been exerted on Western European states in this matter, whose extended intensification can be expected in case of an actual production beginning of binary weapons. For that purpose the United States uses among other things its capability to influence the NATO command posts it occupies. Thus, the then NATO supreme commander of Europe, A. Haig, demanded as early as 1978 that NATO had to take into consideration "a significant improvement in its own potential of chemical offensive weapons."⁵⁴⁾ Haig's successor B. Rogers continues this policy.⁵⁵⁾ To be sure, after Reagan's order to produce binary warfare agents in February 1982, which took place without previous consultation with other NATO states, the United States first tried to appease them--the decision had been made only to produce such systems and to store them in the United States, not to station them in Western Europe.⁵⁶⁾ That was only a maneuver, however, because "moving effective quantities of ammunition...could in times of crisis be undertaken in a few days or...even more rapidly"⁵⁷⁾.

The realization of these U.S. efforts depends largely on the attitude of the West European NATO allies of the United States, particularly since some of those U.S. parliamentarians, who now as before are opposed to the Reagan administration's binary weapons plans, are making their final decision conditional upon stationing agreements with these nations.

In this respect the key role is played by the FRG; it is today the chief weapons location for U.S. chemical agents abroad and the only stationing area in Western Europe. Between 6,000 and 10,000 tons of chemical ammunition are stored in the FRG, exclusively loaded with the nerve toxins GB and VX.⁵⁸⁾ These stockpiles were brought to the FRG during the fifties and sixties, whereby the United States took advantage of the fact that this--in contrast to all other NATO countries--required no consultation of or even permission from

the FRG government, on the basis of the so-called troop statute of 19 July 1951.⁵⁹⁾ The proponents of binary weapons armament in the United States quite obviously take for granted, that if need be they will also be able to station the new chemical means of deployment in the FRG. Under these circumstances one can agree with an evaluation made by the conservative West German political scientist U. Nerlich as early as 1977: The position of the Federal Government toward similar demands by the United States would "therefore probably be typical of the political reactions of Western Europe toward a modernization of CW (C-weapons--the author)." Nerlich simultaneously gave a reason as to why the FRG would be particularly strongly affected by such a modernization: "First, the FRG would continue to be the main stockpile area in Western Europe despite the increased flexibility of deployment of binary systems." Second, the FRG would be "the most exposed alliance partner and main victim of chemical warfare within the framework of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact."⁶⁰⁾

Of particular importance to the subject under discussion here is of course what opinions are represented by the CDU/CSU as being the leading party group in the FRG government. To that may be said that since the end of the 1970's representatives from the party ranks, as well as political scientists and military people close to them, have made themselves open agents for the arguments and demands of U.S. binary weapons proponents. As early as in 1978 H. Ruehle, at that time director of the Institute of Social Science Research of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the CDU, today the head of the Planning Staff of the FRG Defense Ministry, demanded "the buildup of a potential for chemical offensive weapons;" he assigned "absolute priority," for example over disarmament efforts, to such an option.⁶²⁾ As an effective propagandistic method among the public Ruehle simultaneously recommended: "However, the entire discussion should only begin when the United States has clearly understood its policy in the area of chemical weapons, that is to say as soon as a measured conceptual reaction can be delivered with the announcement of the chemical threat. In order not to be misunderstood: Should it be possible to ... realize the option without public attention, this would be preferable in any case."⁶³⁾

Among the politicians, in particular the present Foreign Minister A. Mertes (CDU) in the past appeared as a proponent of intensifying chemical armament. He declared in 1980: "It cannot be excluded that in the 1980's a similar rearmament decision by NATO might be required in this area (C-weapons--the author) as for the nuclear intermediate-distance missiles."⁶⁴⁾

In March 1982 it was finally Ruehle who expressly greeted Reagan's release of production for binary weapons and did not exclude later stationing in the FRG.⁶⁵⁾

Since the change of government in Bonn in October 1982, the statements by representatives of the CDU and CSU on these problems have become noticeably more cautious, especially since there still has been no final decision about the beginning of binary weapons production in the United States. It seems as if on the part of the FRG government one is presently following the

recommendations suggested by Ruehle in 1978 and trying to avoid an open controversy in the FRG concerning chemical armament. Such a conflict, one fears, might provide yet another motive for the peace movement, which, as an opposition encompassing a majority of the population, has declared itself against the nuclear armament insanity of NATO. Defense Minister M. Woerner (CDU), at least, rejected the problem of stationing U.S. binary weapons in the FRG on 7 October 1983 with the descriptive reference that "this question is not of current importance."⁶⁶⁾ However, the opinions of those circles which advocate an intensification of chemical armament have--according to the evaluation of other political forces in the FRG--found their way into the official so-called Defense White Book in 1983, which was also worked out with considerable participation by Ruehle. The statements made in it about the role of chemical warfare agents⁶⁷⁾ caused Bundestag member K. Kuebler (SPD) to ask the question "whether the Federal Government with its remarks in the White Book wanted to challenge the United States to modernize its C-weapon stockpiles?"⁶⁸⁾

The struggle against the U.S. binary weapons plans, which play an important role in the warfare concepts of the United States, is one of the most urgent problems of the struggle for peace.

For years Washington has been blocking international negotiations concerning a ban on C-weapons, and the bilateral talks with the USSR on this, which have been conducted since 1976, were unilaterally broken off by the United States in 1980. After all, at the 37th UN general assembly in 1982 the United States was the only country which voted against an appeal to accelerate the draft and passage of a C-weapons convention and to refrain from producing new chemical warfare agents!

The position of the Warsaw Pact nations on these issues is a result of their decades-long consistent struggle for a ban on chemical weapons. It is again clearly evident in the most recent proposal by the socialist countries for a conversion of Europe into a C-weapons-free zone, which is aimed at "not allowing the start of a new, dangerous cycle of chemical armament race."⁶⁹⁾ Corresponding steps, regionally limited to Europe, could effectively contribute to a global solution of a ban on chemical warfare agents, which remains the unchanged "principal goal of the socialist countries."⁷⁰⁾

The conclusion of similar international agreements becomes increasingly urgent, for the actual introduction of binary weapons by the United States would set the disarmament efforts in the chemical area far back and confront the world with a situation of a much more complicated nature.⁷¹⁾ The Warsaw Pact nations have therefore proposed that "a meeting of empowered representatives should take place in 1984 ... in order to undertake a first exchange of views with the NATO member countries and the other interested European nations on the issue of liberating Europe from chemical weapons."⁷²⁾

FOOTNOTES

1. In treating the C-weapon problems, the following analysis is limited in a narrow sense (types, modes of action and application methods) to highly toxic ones, which have as their objective the immediate death of people, since the intensification of chemical armament planned by the U.S. government is concentrated on such substances--in combination with a qualitatively new application method (binary). The broad palette of other lethal, combat-incapacitating, irritant as well as environment-destructive C-weapons will thus remain largely left out.--See also: H. G. Brauch, "Der chemische Alptraum oder gibt es einen C-Waffen-Krieg in Europa?" [The Chemical Nightmare or Will There Be a C-Weapon War in Europe?], Bonn 1982, p 124 ff.
2. Calculated after: R. Trapp: "Wie sicher ist der Frieden?" [How Safe Is Peace?] "Massenvernichtungswaffen und Abruestung" [Mass Destruction Weapons and Disarmament], Leipzig-Jena-Berlin, 1983, p 38 (table).
3. Basic elements of a convention regarding a ban on development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as regarding their destruction (USSR memorandum to the UN secretary-general on 16 June 1982) in HORIZONT, Berlin, 33/1982, p 25.
4. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 18 Jan 1984.
5. See also: M. Schmidt: "Freiheit zu einem offensiven Atomschlag" [Freedom for an Offensive Nuclear Battle], in IPW-BERICHT, 9/1983, p 1 ff.; same author: "Kriegfuehrungsdanken, Kriegfuehrungsdoktrinen und Superruestungsprogramme der USA" [Warfare Ideas, Warfare Doctrines and Superarmament Programs of the USA] in IPW-BERICHT, 10/1983, p 1 ff.; H.-J. Giessmann: "Militarisierung des Weltraums und atomare Erstschlags-Konzeption" [Militarization of Space and the Nuclear First Use Concept] in IPW-BERICHT, 12/1983, p 1 ff.; W. Schwarz: "Airland Battle--die neue Heeres-Doktrin der USA und ihre Umsetzung innerhalb der NATO [Airland Battle--the New Army Doctrine of the United States and Its Realization Within NATO], in IPW-BERICHT, 9/1983, p 10 ff.
6. "Reagan Outlines Program on Chemical Weapons" in WIRELESS BULLETIN FROM WASHINGTON (publ. by USIS), Bonn, 29/1982, p 9.
7. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 19/20 Nov 1983.
8. For more detail see R. Trapp: op. cit. p 60.
9. Ibid., p 63.
10. Airland Battle 2000. Internal working paper of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), in BLATTER FUER DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, Cologne, 10/1983, p 1379.

11. See also: G. M. Burck, "Old Fears, New Weapons: Brewing a Chemical Arms Race," in DEFENSE MONITOR, Washington, 10/1980.
12. The development of this bomb was originally to have been concluded by 1986, but has been delayed until 1987 due to technological difficulties --On that: FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Frankfurt/Main, 9 May 1983.
13. See: "United States Military Posture for FY 1983," prepared by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, no year, p 80.
14. See: W. Flume: "Artillerieraketensystem MARS/MLRS. Ein Schritt in eine neue Dimension" [MARS/MLRS Missile Systems. A Step in a new Direction], in WEHRTECHNIK, Bonn, 11/1983, p 19 ff.
15. See: M. Hewish: "Das Assault-Breaker Programm. US-Abstandswaffen-technologie der Zukunft," in INTERNATIONALE WEHRREVUE, Geneva 9/1982, p 1207; E. Heckmann, "Wirken in die Tiefe--Das neue Verteidigungskonzept" [Operating in the Deep--the New Defense Concept], in WEHRTECHNIK, 2/1983, in particular p 15 ff.
16. Information according to: J. D. Douglass, "Chemical Weapons: An Imbalance of Terror," in STRATEGIC REVIEW, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 3/1982, p 40.
17. Information according to: J. P. Robinson, "Chemische Kriegsfuehrung--Plaene und Wirkungen" [Chemical Warfare--Plans and Effects], in H. G. Brauch/A. Schrempf: "Giftgas in der Bundesrepublik. Chemische und Biologische Waffen [Toxic Gas in the FRG. Chemical and Biological Weapons], Frankfurt/Main 1982, pp 9 and 12.
18. Representative of this: A. M. Hoeber/J. D. Douglass, "Das Problem Chemische Kriegsfuehrung" [The Problem of Chemical Warfare], in EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE, Munich, 10/1978, p 489.
19. See for example: INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 16 Sep 1981.
20. J. Tower: "The Politics of Chemical Deterrence" in THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Washington, 2/1982, p 27.
21. DER SPIEGEL, Hamburg, 15/1982, p 185.
22. See: Hearing. Chemical Deterrence, US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, 4 Sep 1980, p 13.
23. See for example: B. N. Antonov: "Bluff des State Department" in NEUE ZEIT, Moscow, 27/1982, p 18 ff.
24. See: "The Examination of 'Yellow Rain' Specimens. Technical Report." Department of Defense. Material Research Laboratories, Melbourne, August 1982.

25. See: "United Nations Report of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, 26 Nov 1982," in UN DOCUMENT A/37/259, New York, 1 Dec 1982.
26. Here after: H. G. Brauch: "Mitteleuropa--das naechste chemische Schlachtfeld oder Wie ernst ist die sowjetische Bedrohung?" [Central Europe--the Next Chemical Battlefield or How Serious Is the Soviet Military Threat?], in: *ibid.*/A. Schrempf, *op. cit.*, p 194 ff.
27. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 May 1982.
28. Information according to: J. P. Robinson: "Chemical and Biological Warfare: developments in 1982," in *WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT, SIPRI YEARBOOK 1983*, London 1983, p 402.
29. See also the arguments of FRG physician K.-R. Fabig on the results of an international symposium (160 participants from 21 nations), which from 14 to 20 Jan 1983 in Ho Chi Minh City focused on long-term effects of chemical warfare by the United States in Vietnam, in *HORIZONT*, 8/1983, p 25.
30. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 9 May 1983.
31. Here after: Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst [Social-Democratic Press Service], Bonn 13 Oct 1983.
32. "Reagan Outlines ..." *op. cit.* p 9.
33. J. D. Douglass, *op. cit.*
34. A. M. Hoeber/J. D. Douglass, *op. cit.*, p 490.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Compare "Vorschlag der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages an die Mitgliedstaaten der NATO zur Frage der Befreiung Europas von chemischen Waffen" [Proposal by the Nations Participating in the Warsaw Pact to the NATO Member Nations on the Question of Liberating Europe From Chemical Weapons], in *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, 11 Jan 1984.
37. A. M. Hoeber/J. D. Douglass, *op. cit.*, p 491.
38. *Ibid.*, p 492.
39. See: J. D. Douglass, *op. cit.*, 38.
40. See: J. Hackett, "Welt in Flammen. Der Dritte Weltkrieg, Schauplatz Europa" [World in Flames. World War III, Showplace Europe], Munich 1983, p 71.

41. A. M. Hoeber/J. D. Douglass, op. cit., p 495.
42. The corresponding military-theoretical development process is outlined by: W. G. Hanne: "The Integrated Battlefield," in: MILITARY REVIEW, Fort Leavenworth (Kansas), 6/1982, p 36 ff.
43. See: Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, 20 Aug 1982, pp 1-5.
44. For more detail see: W. Schwarz, op. cit., p 11.
45. Department of the Army, op. cit., pp 8-6.
46. Ibid., pp 9-19.
47. "Reagan Outlines ..." op. cit. p 8.
48. Department of the Army, op. cit., pp 7-13.
49. T. S. Gold, "U.S. Chemical Warfare Policy and Program," in "NATO's Sixteen Nations," Brussels, 1/1983, p 70.
50. See: J. Tower, op. cit., p 34; J. D. Douglass, op. cit. in particular p 40; A. P. Bambini, "Chemical Warfare and the NATO Alliance," in MILITARY REVIEW, 4/1981, p 27 ff.
51. See: A. P. Bambini, op. cit., p 31.
52. J. D. Douglass, op. cit., p 46.
53. Ibid.
54. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7/8 Oct 1978.
55. See: SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Munich, 18 Mar 1980, 20 Oct 1983.
56. See: "Reagan Outlines..." op. cit., p 12.
57. T. S. Gold, op. cit.
58. Statement after J. P. Robinson, "Chemical Weapons and Europe," in SURVIVAL, London, 1/1982, p 11.
59. The status of forces agreement regulate the stationing of armed forces of other NATO countries in the FRG (United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada) and limit the rights to national sovereignty of the FRG insofar as it has no formal legal influence on the nature and extent of the stationing of troops and their armament.

60. U. Nerlich, "Die Bedeutung chemischer Kampfmittel fuer die Verteidigungs-Konzeption 1980-90 aus der Sicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" [The Importance of Chemical Warfare Agents on the 1980-1990 Defense Concept From the Viewpoint of the FRG], in EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE, 7/1977, p 338.
61. Representative of the military on this: G. Hubatschek/D. Farwick, "Die Strategische Erpressung--eine Sicherheitspolitische Analyse" [Strategic Blackmail--a Security-Political Analysis], Munich 1981, p 41.
62. H. Ruehle, "Chemische Waffen und Europaeische Sicherheit 1980-1990" [Chemical Weapons and European Security 1980-1990], in EUROPAEISCHE WEHRKUNDE, 1/1978, p 9.
63. Ibid.
64. GENERALANZEIGER, Bonn, 26 July 1980; also: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, Frankfurt/Main, 25 Feb 1981, BONNER RUNDSCHAU, Bonn, 26 Aug 1981.
65. See: H. G. Brauch, "Chemische und Biologische Waffen--Zum aktuellen Bezug einer vernachlaessigten politischen Diskussion" [Chemical and Biological Weapons--On the Current Procurement of a Neglected Political Discussion], in: same/A. Schrempf, op. cit., p 76.
66. Here according to: Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, op. cit.
67. See: The Federal Defense Minister (publisher), 1983 White Book. "Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" [On the Security of the FRG], Bonn, 1983, p 154 f.
68. Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 14 Nov 1983.
69. Proposal by the Nations Participating in the Warsaw Pact . . . , op. cit.
70. Ibid.
71. For the negative effects of an introduction of binary weapons on disarmament policy, see: K. Lohs/R. Trapp. "Die Einfuehrung chemischer Binaerwaffen in den USA und die Abruestung im Bereich chemischer Waffen," [The Introduction of Chemical Binary Weapons in the United States and Disarmament in the Area of Chemical Weapons], in DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, Berlin, 10/1981, p 63 ff.
72. Proposal by the Nations Participating in the Warsaw Pact . . . , op, cit.

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PARTY JOURNAL ADDRESSES DANGERS OF 'SYNDICALISM'

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 2, Feb 84 pp 79-91

[Article by Wacław Mejbaum: "Remarks on the Syndicalist Concept of Socialization"]

[Text] The issue of self-government--the issue, as is commonly described, of direct democracy--designates a particularly ideologically and theoretically sensitive area of studies on historical materialism. Two facts should always be kept in mind here:

--the fact that the concept of the "fading away of the state" and, therefore, the concept of the gradual replacement of the state apparatus with social self-government is a prerequisite for socialist development on the soil of Marxism-Leninism. This thesis was formulated frequently throughout the entire history of our movement, in the works of Marx devoted to the Paris Commune, in his "Critique of the Gotha Program," in Lenin's "State and Revolution" and, finally, in Andropov's last statements; and

--the fact that anticommunist ideology always made references to this thesis in order to discredit so-called "genuine socialism." The main contention of these criticisms may be expressed as follows: in socialist countries the dictatorship of the state apparatus over the proletariat has established itself; the labor class is deprived of both political rights (lack of representative democracy) and economic rights (lack of "economic subjectivity") and in spite of declarations about the "fading away of the state," there is a systematic growth of the role of the state apparatus both in the economic sphere ("bureaucratic centralism") and in the political sphere ("totalitarian state").

The picture would not be complete if we were not to add that the above-described type of anticommunist criticism has always echoed the factional movements within the communist and labor parties. Inasmuch as external criticism, which originates in urban communities which are naturally hostile to socialism, can be disregarded in certain situations, the rise of revisionist groupings within the party which are frequently inspired by this criticism poses a deadly threat to our political system every time.

I will continue to concentrate my attention here on the critical syndicalist analysis of the concept of economic subjectivity.

1. Socialization and Nationalization

In publishing in 1851 the third part of his "Common Concept of 19th-Century Revolution," Pierre-Joseph Proudhon presented the bases for the syndicalist concept of the socialization of the means of production. Taking into account later modifications, the essence of this concept may be formulated as follows. All production plants become the property of the workers employed therein. This is how independent and self-governing enterprises are created. Those enterprises which in accordance with later terminology may be described briefly as "social enterprises," are interrelated economically solely by relations involving the exchange of consumer goods. For the purpose of coordinating economic activity on a national scale, enterprise self-governments delegate their representatives to the central council of producers which is called differently in each of the various variants of the discussed concept. The powers of the central council can be specified in various ways depending on the role attributed to this council within the entire scope of the system of state authority. There exist two basic possibilities here. Some people maintain that a self-governing society can do without a separate state and administrative apparatus. In this variant, syndicalism is tied to anarchy (thus the frequently occurring term "anarchosyndicalism"). In the tradition of Polish political thought, this concept issues from the works of Edward Abramowski. There is also a less radical variant which assumes the maintenance of separate organs of state authority which will be independent of the central council of producers. In accordance with the concept of this moderate syndicalism, the role of the state apparatus in a self-governing society should be limited to assuring public safety, and in the area of economics to the organization of banking, customs policies and communal management. The funds necessary for maintaining the state apparatus are to come from taxes determined in agreement with the central council of producers. So much for the required terminological determinations.

The question regarding the political evaluation of syndicalism is by no means as simple as it would seem to some theorists. In accordance with the Leninist principle of the concreteness of truth, the answer must, therefore, take into account the specificity of the social situation in which syndicalist trends come into prominence.

During the 19th century, syndicalism undoubtedly constituted a faction of the socialist movement. The classicists of Marxism did not devote very much attention to this issue—it should be kept in mind that the criticism of Proudhon formulated in Marx' "Poverty of Philosophy" concerns the early works of the French thinker (in which the syndicalist concepts are not yet completely formulated); however, it is possible to find in their [classicists] work a series of basic established ideas. What I have in mind here are Marx' "Civil War in France" and Engels' "On the Housing Issue." It is sufficiently clear that in Marx' opinion the weak point of syndicalist utopia is the lack

of understanding of the complex character of industrial production. In the present-day economy, the separation of an independent enterprise constitutes an artificial procedure similar to the raising of individual production departments in a large factory to the rank of enterprises. The reactionary character of syndicalism, therefore, reveals itself in its tendency to break up national production into a large number of completely sovereign organizational units, which signifies regression to the early capitalist phase of social development.

In polemicizing between 1872-1873 with the German syndicalist Mulberger, Friedrich Engels formulated a concise diagnosis:

"Because Mulberger rejects all responsibility for Proudhon, it would be useless to continue to debate here how the Proudhonian reform plans aim at turning all members of society into members of the lower middle class and into insignificant peasants. It would be equally unimportant here to bring up the issue of the alleged synonymity of the interests of the lower middle class with those of workers. That which is of importance on this subject may already be found in the 'Communist Manifesto.'"¹

Proudhon is a "representative of socialism of the insignificant peasant and of the craftsman."² His syndicalism is the doctrine of lower middle class socialism. Such is the quintessence of the theoretical evaluation of syndicalism contained in the works of Marx and Engels. This evaluation, as I will attempt to show, remains valid for contemporary forms of syndicalism.

Moreover, political evaluation requires taking into account the current situation in the labor movement. What is of essence is whether in a given specific situation syndicalists present themselves as a separate faction or as a party which opposes the influence of communism, and whether and on what conditions they are inclined toward compromise. Of particular importance is whether the problems of syndicalism appeared under conditions of capitalism before the workers' revolution or under socialism following the revolution.

The possibility of a temporary compromise with syndicalism stems from the fact that syndicalism like Marxism advances the program of expropriating the great bourgeoisie (although on the basis of buying it out) and aims at destroying the bourgeoisie state or at least toward limiting its power. In revolutionist situations, syndicalists much like communists favor a political system of workers' and peasants' councils as a new form of direct democracy. That is why, without abandoning sharp theoretical criticism Marx did not dispute the fact that Proudhon's followers played a partially positive role in the history of the Paris Commune. That is why, despite a crushing criticism of anarchy in "The State and Revolution," Lenin saw the possibility of cooperation with anarcho-syndicalistic groups in the struggle with counter-revolutionary parties of social revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Immediately after the October Revolution a considerable segment of anarchists stood in Soviet ranks while opposition by anarchists against the new authorities

occurred only in rare cases. (...) Later on, however, as the Soviet state system began to establish itself, certain groups of anarchists returned to the former propaganda of statelessness and opposed the Bolsheviks as "revivers of state oppression."³

Under conditions of present-day capitalism, syndicalism is not a dead trend. It is enough to remember here that current program assumptions of Swedish social democracy have a manifestly syndicalist character. Thus, there is no doubt that Olof Palme's party finds itself on the left wing of the socialist internationale and there are sufficient reasons to treat this party, from the communist point of view, as the mouthpiece for the historically progressive movement. The syndicalization of Swedish industry would not make Sweden a socialist country; however, it would undoubtedly be a step in the direction of socialism. In any case, the issue requires further analysis. I am only bringing this up here to confirm the importance of the postulate which requires concrete historical and political evaluation of syndicalist trends which appear in various social contexts.

Let us, however, return to the issues involving theory. At the outset, I presented the position of syndicalism in its pure form. We will now examine the modifications which syndicalism undergoes in combination with other trends in the labor movement. To present this issue in its entirety would require a book. It is appropriate to limit myself here to a closer look at one example. Due to theoretical as well as historical and political reasons, I have chosen Karl Kautsky's concept.

In 1919, Karl Kautsky formulated the following opinion of socialism: "As can be seen, socialism signifies not just the expropriation of capitalists. This would be a very simple process. Socialism signifies the organization of production and marketing with the cooperation of organized workers and organized consumers on the basis of scientific knowledge."⁴ In this same work, Kautsky defined specifically his concept claiming that the nationalization of industry alone does not satisfy the aspirations of workers. What is needed is the development of various forms of self-government.

The quoted statements made by Kautsky ought to be understood within the context of the polemics conducted by him with the position of Russian communists, above all with Lenin. In effect, it is not clear how according to Kautsky the socialized economy is to function. It is only known that Kautsky excluded all forms of compulsory work and favored the maintenance of a free market work force; that he demanded that socialized enterprises be subject to strict control by elected central administrative organs; and finally, that he clearly contrasted the interests of workers with those of "consumers" under the assumption that a socialist society should effectively provide for the latter.

By comparing this point of view with classical syndicalism it is easy to notice certain common assumptions. In Kautsky's doctrine we find the equivalent of the syndicalist concept of the "central producers council." Self-governing organs (workers councils) ought to oppose the lawlessness and callousness of state bureaucracy. The concept of interest by workers in the growth of labor

productivity while assuring them participation in enterprise profits is approved of. Moreover, we have adopted from syndicalists the concept of maintaining free market exchange in relations between enterprises and in the enterprise-consumer relationship.

There are also substantial differences. The central self-governing organs are supposed to represent not only the producers, as assumed by syndicalism, but citizens in general. This is essential for ensuring the interests of consumers. As a further consequence, self-government by a social enterprise can be subject to substantiated restrictions dictated by considerations of the interests of society as a whole.

Ultimately, Kautsky's standpoint may be expressed as follows: It is necessary to exclude the subjection of the economy to "state bureaucracy" by admitting various forms of socialization which will become crystallized during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. This is what Kautsky wrote in 1922 in his work "Proletarian Revolution and Its Program" (Warsaw 1924): "The system of production can be viewed in various ways but one thing is certain, namely that state bureaucracy because of its history and its being is the least appropriate element for the creation of socialist production."⁵

Thus we see that Kautsky's position is far removed from theoretical precision. It embodies a kind of fusion of particular concepts from Marx' thoughts (for example, the concept of the fundamental meaning of various forms of workers self-government in a state during a period of transition) with the doctrine contained in the theoretical tradition of syndicalism. There exist circumstances which explain this lack of precision. In his entire socio-political doctrine during the years following the October Revolution, Kautsky made the assumption that the proletariat would gain power by way of parliamentary elections while socialist economic reforms would be introduced gradually with concurrent regard for the interests of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes. Given these assumptions, it becomes clear that in the program activity of the centrist wing of German social democracy (USPD) it was possible to dismiss as premature the discussion on the economic structure created by socialized enterprises. It was assumed, overtly or covertly, that for a long period of time the economy would function according to mechanisms characteristic of capitalism, while the socialist government would only modify these processes and at the same time care for the interests of "workers and consumers."

It is more difficult, from a theoretical point of view, to explain the fact that these same ambiguities which weigh down on Kautsky's doctrine are perpetuated in the works of his modern followers. I am thinking in particular of Wlodzimierz Brus' work entitled, "Socialization and the Political System" published in 1975 in Uppsala. I believe that describing W. Brus' current views as Kautskism is essentially accurate. Brus continues the basic thought trends of Kautsky's work, at the same time inheriting all of the misfortunes which bear down on the work. From Brus' point of view, the measure of the degree to which the economy is "socialized" should be sought in the answer to the following question: "Is society an effective manager of the means of

production, in other words, an effective subject of property?" As in Kautsky's work, clarification is lacking as to what the "effective management of the means of production" is based on. Brus is hesitant about accepting a definite thesis of syndicalism in which socialization is simply based on handing over to workers their workshops to become their property. For all intents and purposes, he does not go beyond the ideological profession of faith which dictates the subjection of the social economy to the effective supervision of elected organs which represent producers as a whole. Inasmuch as this type of vagueness manifested itself in the work of Kautsky, who assumed, as the point of issue, an efficiently functioning economic system of fully developed capitalism, it [vagueness] is inexcusable in the works of the theorist [Brus], who since 1956 has been coming out with draft plans of reforms of the socialist economy.

On the other hand, the political meaning of Brus' statements is fully defined. The heart of the matter comes down to depriving the party and the socialist state of the possibility of effectively managing the economy. It is possible that the system of central planning and management which is practiced in Poland and in other socialist countries is in many ways defective. The entire history of socialism is a history of unrelenting attempts at improving the system of management in a way that would make it possible to increase efficiency, reduce personal costs and consequently increase net output with the active participation of workers in management. It does not appear that Brus' proposals are aimed at this same goal.

The basic problem that arises in honest discussions related to the issue of workers self-government comes down to the question of how to reconcile the independence of socialist enterprises with the obvious requirement of socialism of coordinating and harmonizing production plans. I am purposely using here the term "socialist enterprise" and not "social enterprise" because in accordance with the terminology adopted at the outset, the concept of a social enterprise was defined in terms of the concept of syndicalism. It would, therefore, be an enterprise which constitutes group ownership by its workers and is tied to other enterprises solely by relationships of consumer goods exchange.

At the basis of the Marxist concept of the socialist enterprise lies the conviction that every such enterprise is common and not group property and that in connection with this, economic subjectivity of the labor class must be implemented through the socialist state and not against it. A description of the methods in which this subjectivity manifests itself in planning and management is the subject of a complex theoretical and political discussion. In the opinion of this author, this article constitutes a small contribution. In order to move ahead it will be necessary to assume an attitude toward certain trends of the discussion which has been carried on in our country for the past 30 years on economic reform and the models of the functioning of the socialist economy. I am devoting the second half of the article to this problem.

2. Syndicalism and Problems of Socialist Growth in the PRL

During the turbulent years of 1980-1982, NSZZ Solidarity was born. Built by experts, this was a contemporary version of the syndicalist concept of a social

enterprise. In June 1981, the Information Bureau of NSZZ Solidarity published a brochure entitled "Social Enterprise" which was authored by the "Network of leading plant organizations." In this brochure, we find the "Draft Plan for the Law on Social Enterprises," made up of 63 articles. We shall quote three of them:

Article 47. Enterprises have at their disposal all rights to their assigned property.

Article 52 § 1. The state acts on the enterprise by means of the rules of the law and specific economic parameters (taxes, tariffs, credits) established in a general manner.

§ 2. The fixing of unrestricted prices for the approval of state organs belongs to the power of enterprises.

Article 55. An enterprise has the right to submit within 7 days an objection to the decision made by state organs. Submitting an objection delays the carrying out of a decision (compare quoted brochure, pages 40-41).

As opposed to the concepts proposed in Wlodzimierz Brus' book, the draft plan of the "Network" constitutes the implementation of the doctrine of syndicalism in nearly pure form. Any deviations from syndicalism are solely based here on the fact that enterprise property, although "allocated" to the workers, does not become from a formal-legal point of view their group property. The state founding organ maintains the right (compare Article 49 of quoted brochure) to close down an enterprise. However, in such an instance the state organ is obligated to consult with the enterprise commission (it has not been specified whether in such cases the outcome of the referendum or the opinion of experts is binding).

If we were to refer to the discussion concerning social enterprises conducted by theorists of Solidarity, it would turn out that even those rights of state organs which were acknowledged in the quoted draft plan ("Laws...") may prove to be deceptive. In the monthly NSZZ SOLIDARNOSC, from 1 June 1981 for the region of Mazowsze, there were published "Theses for the Law on Workers Self-Government." Let us quote the first of these theses:

"A second Sejm chamber should be established, a so-called Chamber of Self-Government, created by democratic elections and based on the representatives of workers self-government, consumers federations, scientific-technical associations, environmental protection movements and representatives of people's councils and trade unions. The Chamber of Deputies, which represents the political interests of the country, would have a primary role. The Chamber of Self-Government could also fulfill the role of a central mediator. The Chamber of Deputies would have the right to step in only in cases where the resolutions of the Chamber of Self-Government violate the primary political interest of the country. The Chamber of Self-Government would fulfill the

function of a true social proprietor of the means of production of the entire country, expressed in an indirect manner. There would be a separation of political and economic functions in the Sejm. The proposal of socializing management, i.e., the elimination of pressure groups and of forcing through individual economic concepts, would be implemented. The Chamber of Self-Government would fulfill the role of a coordinator of the activity of workers self-government on a nationwide scale. This chamber would primarily establish the directions of development of the national economy in the form of long-term prospective and strategic plans. It would serve as the highest social supervisor." (quoted brochure, page 17)

There is no doubt that the creation of the said Chamber of Self-Government--or in other terms of a Chief National Economic Council, which would fulfill the role of a "true social proprietor of the means of production"--would lead to further limitation on the powers of government organs which function as the executory apparatus of the Chamber of Deputies. In this regard, the activity of the Chamber of Self-Government would make illusory the right of state organs to dissolve social enterprises and to exercise control over their insolvent assets.

The authors of the draft plans under discussion here as a rule maintained discretion on the issue of the theoretical inspirations which they used to their advantage. For a Marxist theorist, however, this issue is not without significance. It is interesting, for example, that the thesis about the Chamber of Self-Government essentially repeats the ideas of Karl Kautsky discussed in the preceding part of this article. Like Kautsky, the authors of the draft plan deviate from pure syndicalism by advancing the postulate that the Chamber of Self-Government should represent not only the interests of producers but also those of consumers. Much the same as Kautsky, they are not clear as to how the distribution of influence between the representations of producers and consumers would be arranged.

We shall fall back now a quarter of a century to the discussion which was conducted in Poland between 1956 and 1957 on the model of the national economy. It is astonishing that the results of these discussions have been almost entirely forgotten. As a result, the reading of current polemics on the issue of economic reform gives the impression that for some reason or other today's discussants do not know or do not want to know the history of the analyzed problems.

The issue becomes all the more disconcerting if we notice that scholars of the caliber of Michal Kalecki and Oskar Lange took part in the discussion of the 1950's. Without questioning the merits of contemporary experts, it is difficult to deny that Polish economic thought would gain quite a lot by referring more often than is the case currently to the works of old masters. Of course, we cannot assume that in the works of Kalecki and Lange we will find ready answers to current problems. However, we may and should look for theoretical inspiration in them.

One of the main controversial subjects in 1956 was the issue of choosing the right system of so-called "economic incentives." In accordance with the proposal presented by Wlodzimierz Brus, profit was to be the only measure of the effectiveness of management; making the wage fund (that part of it which is made up of bonuses) contingent upon profit was to create incentives leading to increased production, improvement of quality and the lowering of prime costs. It will be interesting to recall the reservations which Professor Michal Kalecki formulated with regard to this concept:

"Does the awarding of bonuses according to profit solve the problem of quality? It would seem that it cannot have the same affect on this matter that it does on the regulating of production quantity. Experience shows that when there is sufficiently strong dominance of demand over supply, consumers will not complain about quality.

"In principle, the awarding of bonuses on the basis of profit triggers the lowering of prime costs. However, a new problem appears here. Profit can be achieved both by increasing production and by lowering prime costs. This universality of the incentive, which allows a certain spontaneity in decision-making on the part of the enterprise in the matter of choosing a line of conduct can be a drawback. In certain cases, an increase in production even with high costs can be of greater importance for the national economy, while in others it is above all the lowering of costs even with a concurrent stabilization of the level of production that matters. In such cases, the incentive effect of awarding bonuses on the basis of profits is not selective."⁶

Such reasoning is worthy of deeper thought. It is fitting to begin with the observation that the selection of profit as a universal economic indicator must have different effects in different economic situations. An enterprise which maximizes profit will function differently under conditions of "pressure" (to use a term introduced by the Hungarian economist, Janos Kornai), thus, under conditions where supply exceeds demand, and differently under conditions of "suction" where supply does not make it possible to satisfy demand. Kalecki's remark about consumers who "do not complain about poor quality" concerns the second of these economic situations.

Under conditions of "pressure" the maximizing of profit becomes possible mainly through the improvement of product quality. Simply stated, the consumer will not buy junk. However, it should be kept in mind that neither in the Poland of 1956 nor the Poland of 1983 are these conditions fulfilled. In such a situation, in accordance with M. Kalecki's suggestion, a trend of increasing profit by lowering quality is bound to appear. This is essentially the most serious argument against the myth of profit in our specific economic conditions.

Yet, Kalecki's reasoning makes it possible to perceive still other drawbacks related to the strategy of maximizing profits. A serious peril, ignored by Brus and his followers, arises from the trend of not fully utilizing production potential. In our economic situation production is limited above all by raw material supplies and lately in some branches of industry by a shortage of manpower (especially in the textile industry). In order to achieve the full

potential of machinery, it is necessary in many cases to increase the prime cost by using more expensive raw materials and by increasing the wage fund. However, this will cause the lowering of profits. In short, the maximization of profits requires in certain situations the lowering of production. This effect can hardly be considered desirable in a country suffering from the lack of basic goods.

In conclusion, Kalecki is convinced that there is no universal gauge which would give the basis for a rational assessment of economic activity. What is required is a complex evaluation based on many different indicators. This is an important argument for the centralization of the management of the social economy. Kalecki writes: "In countries where capitalism is fully developed, there exist considerable production reserves, and as a result, in the process of balancing demand and supply, the increase of supply plays a decisive role. However, when this mechanism fails due to a large deficit of basic materials, as was the case during World War II or even during the period of the great increase in armaments between 1950 and 1953, modern capitalism also resorts to administrative distribution according to the hierarchy of need determined by the government" (compare M. Kalecki, quoted publication, page 98).

The problem studied by Michal Kalecki was recently taken up by Bronislaw Minc. In a series of articles published in *NOWE DROGI* and in *SPRAWY I LUDZIE* (I am thinking in particular of the essay "Reform and Economic Law" published in issue No 33/1983), the author [Bronislaw Minc] reminds us of the well-known theoretical fact of the impossibility of programming production in a way that concurrently maximizes profit and the final product. From the point of view of economic theory this is obvious. Therefore, it is all the more surprising that it was not accounted for in the original July 1981 draft plans of our economic reform. I see no other explanation here than that which may be assumed: that at that time our economists demonstrated excessive submission to the syndicalist concepts of Solidarity experts--concepts formulated aggressively and propagated in all union activity.

In referring once again to Michal Kalecki's theoretical output, I would like to mention that this scholar never believed in the "miraculous" power of model solutions. He expressed this point of view in the article "Do Not Overestimate the Role of a Model Solution" published in *TRYBUNA LUDU* (No 33/1957). In 1962, he again expressed himself on this issue in *NOWE DROGI* (No 2/1962). Let us try to recall the premises of this outlook.

It is necessary to begin with the fact that in a socialist economy, the government always has the capability of effectively regulating the activity of independent enterprises. I will leave out the most obvious means which is the conducting of appropriate cadre policy. In a purely economic field, we also have the possibility of exerting influence over an enterprise by setting prices for transportation, energy and material, by granting bank credits, and finally by the system of government-placed orders for final products. In this way, even if overlooking tax policies, the amount of profits earned by an enterprise must depend directly on economic conditions specified by the state in which the enterprise will function. Consequently, by conducting rational policies, the state has the chance to counteract maximizing profit under conditions of a free market economy.

In the opinion of the author of this article, the extensive intervention of the state in the process of consumer goods exchange is not only a temporary measure whose aim is to overcome the economic crisis; it also belongs to the very essence of the functioning of a socialist state. It is possible, although I would not want to express myself too pragmatically in this matter, that a successful solution to the problem of the controlling role of the state in the Polish economy may turn out to be the expansion of the current practice of government-placed orders. Theoretically speaking, this type of system appears to be favorable also from the point of view of the interests of the enterprise which receives the guarantee of supplies of raw materials and a market for its products within the bounds determined by the placed orders. It is also a positive system in view of the general public interest which requires that the central planner be able to ensure the fulfillment of the country's needs within a specific time period. A system of cooperation conceived in this way between the state economic headquarters and enterprises does not exclude the possibility from somewhere else of leaving up to the enterprises the entire decision concerning the exploitation of a part of their production potential to an optimal degree because of the profits to be made or the possibility of implementing this profit by way of trade between enterprises and through free market turnover in the retail sphere.

It is possible that yet another comment is necessary here. Beginning with the first months of 1957, the thesis which proclaims the need for "independent planning on all levels" (its advocate was, among others, Stefan Kurowski) reappears in Polish economic discussions. Thus, inasmuch as there is no doubt that the draft plans of the economic program can and should be worked out independently in all socialist enterprises, the postulate of developing a central program by simply putting together local programs seems unfounded. The final version of a production plan, affirmed at least in part by government-placed orders, should be the result of negotiations conducted by a socialist enterprise's management with a higher agency. The syndicalist solution of this issue leads to the replacement of central planning with central forecasting and ultimately rules out the effective coordination of socialist enterprise activities.

It is easy to notice that the more scrupulously we take into account inevitable complications resulting from the necessity to coordinate the common social interest represented by the state with the interests of individual socialist enterprises, the harder it is to construct a satisfying formula of the functioning of workers self-government. We can include among fairy tales the syndicalist illusion that under conditions of present industrial production, workers self-government can lay a claim to complete independence in managing enterprise assets.

In December of 1981, syndicalism in Poland suffered a setback as a political group, i.e., as a group claiming to capture state authority. However, it would be self-deceptive to speak of the ideological conquest of syndicalism. The point is that in our country syndicalism has maintained considerable influence on social awareness. It is impossible to fight this phenomenon without clearly picturing it in one's mind.

On the foundations of the Leninist theory of socialism the basic element of self-government is the workers collective. Let us recall here the main theses of this theory as opposed to the theses of the syndicalist program.

The workers collective in its simplest form is equivalent to a work brigade in a plant. In a socialist society such a collective should be a body of workers mutually concerned with carrying out production tasks to the best of their ability, promoting work competitiveness and, finally, acting on the policies of plant management in a way that would contribute to the creation of optimal conditions for the work of the group. Therefore, if in syndicalist thought the workers of an enterprise are regarded as a throng of individuals in which every person is concerned, above all, with his own financial interests and which evolves into a self-governing organization by way of settling upon a given range of common interests through the creation of a self-governing or union organization, then at the very foundations of Leninist thought lies the concept of a team of people integrated through its social role in the production process.

This seemingly abstract theoretical difference has its directly practical consequences. The development of socialist democracy is based on the proper functioning of collectives of the lowest rung. Crudely put, in a factory in which a worker does not have any influence over occupying the post of foreman, "democracy" remains a fiction regardless of the worker's formal rights with regard to appointing or recalling managers, councilors and delegates, or approving production plans on an enterprise scale. This does not mean that we wish to make light of these workers' rights of "a higher order," but it does mean that they cannot be implemented without the democracy of workers collectives.

It is not by chance that in all of the documentation concerning Polish syndicalism of the 1980's which I have at my disposal, the problem of workers collectives does not have any kind of reflection. We all remember how much time was lost on debating the appointment and recall of an enterprise manager. Indeed, this is a key issue from the point of view of a political organization (as was Solidarity) which is geared toward taking over cadre policy into its own hands. However, this is not an issue of vital importance for socialist democracy. What is important is not what procedure is followed in appointing a skilled workman nominated for a manager's post but what type of social mechanism determines cooperation between a managerial team and workers collectives.

Under Polish conditions, the activation of basic and branch party organizations takes on particular meaning. Through party members employed in workers collectives, it is possible to assume work on the integration of collectives to give them the rank of active elements of a system of workers self-government. In my opinion, there also exists here a real chance of strengthening the party's political authority and increasing its membership.

It would not be a bad thing if in the near future we could succeed in bringing the organization of the workers class to that stage in Poland where production plans and the distribution of profits would also become the subject of legitimate

discussion in a relatively small percentage of groups made up of the representative of particular workers collectives along with the active participation of the PZPR plant organization. Let us add: under the condition that the results of such a discussion will not be disregarded by administrative organs but used as a point of departure for competent decisions. Every member of the party who is informed about the actual situation knows perfectly well that this modest postulate is not at all easy to implement. However, there is no other way. The rebuilding of the workers aktiv around the party is a necessary (and perhaps even adequate) condition of socialist self-government and of finding appropriate organizational structures for it.

I am far from suggesting that the above presented observations give anything more than a sketchy outline of a certain important issue. Finding satisfactory solutions requires serious theoretical work based on a thorough analysis of all the experiences to date concerning socialist self-government. It should be remembered in particular that the experiences of the past 30 years demonstrate poignantly the harm caused by creating fictional forms of self-government; therefore, the creation of institutions which are formally appointed to monitor production and social activity in a socialist enterprise while in reality approving only decisions made on higher levels of management.

In conclusion, let us return one more time to the basic theoretical determinations. I wrote in the beginning that in accordance with historical materialism, the process of socialist growth is aimed at replacing the state with social self-government. The two theses which follow concretize this assumption:

1. Throughout the history of socialism we are obligated to seek and strengthen in social practice such forms of workers self-government which, in proportion to the existing level of class awareness, will be helpful in releasing workers initiatives and in the political and economic activation of the working masses. Any and all neglect in this regard causes bitterness among working people, is conducive to the activity of antisocialist forces and strengthens bureaucratic tendencies in the state apparatus.

2. Throughout the history of socialism, there has been a need for persistent battle with syndicalist trends. These trends are reborn constantly and draw strength from the workers' protest against bureaucratic deviations of the socialist state. They lead, as the events of recent years have shown, to inexpedient projects for the immediate elimination of the state apparatus and of the economic base of socialism which is represented by state ownership of the means of production. From a sociological point of view, contemporary syndicalism is the ideology of the lower middle classes (accepted temporarily by a part of the labor class only in particular social circumstances). In the history of ideology it appears as a continuation of certain 19th-century doctrines (Proudhon, Sorel, Abramowski) which are vital for the shaping of the sociopolitical thought of the Second Internationale.

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Engels, "On the Housing Issue" in Marks, Engels: "Selected Works," KiW [Book and Knowledge Publishing House], [date illegible], Vol 1, p 578.

2. F. Engels, "Introduction to 'The Civil War in France,'" *ibid.*, p 452.
3. "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," Moscow 1926, Vol II, p 644, quoted in M. Waldenberg's "Revolution and the State in Lenin's Political Thought."
4. K. Kautsky, "Was Ist Sozialisierung?" Berlin 1919, p 14.
5. *Ibid.*, p 140.
6. M. Kalecki, "Works," Vol 3, PWE [State Economic Publishers] 1982, p 90.

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PZPR ACTIVITIES SINCE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS DESCRIBED

Central Party Control Commission

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 64, 15 Mar 84 p 3

[PAP Report: "Information on the Activities of the PZPR Central Party Control Commission" under the rubric "In the Period Since the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] /Summary/

/In the report presented to the delegates to the National PZPR Conference the Central Party Control Commission (CKKP) states that it has been primarily focusing on combatting the forces striving to weaken the party by undermining its Marxist-Leninist identity and loosening internationalist bonds. The CKKP has been untiring in its efforts to provide effective support to the measures being taken by the Central Committee and the Politburo to consolidate and strengthen the party, broaden its bonds with the working people and implement the program for rescuing the country from its political, social and economic crisis. At the same time, it has been reacting resolutely to the deviations from ethical and moral principles reflected in the behavior of certain party members./

The granting of much broader rights to the party control commissions and the restructuring of their role within the party's framework by the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress created more favorable conditions for the proper exercise of their statutory duties. The commissions gained greater autonomy in reacting to improper behavior by party members regardless of their rank and duties. At the same time, their responsibility for availing themselves properly of the rights granted to them, bearing in mind solely the party's good, has markedly increased.

/Discussing the main directions of activity of the CKKP, the report states that an uncompromising struggle against ideological-political views, both revisionist and dogmatic, that are alien to the party as well as against

ethical-moral deformations within its ranks, is an inseparable element of socialist renewal./

Proceeding from this premise, the CKKP regards as one of its urgent tasks the completion of the measures initiated even before the Ninth Extraordinary Congress with the object of thoroughly investigating accusations that certain party members, including those belonging to the leadership cadre, have violated ethical-moral principles.

These measures were summed up in the "Declaration of the CKKP Presidium" of 28 January 1982, published in the party press. The assessments and recommendations contained in that declaration were accepted by the Seventh Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. They also were reflected in the report of the commission appointed by the PZPR Central Committee to clarify the causes and course of social conflicts in the history of People's Poland. As ensues from these documents, those who have perpetrated deeds unworthy of a party member have not avoided--regardless of previous merit and rank--exemption from accountability before the party.

In view of recent experiences, the CKKP pointed to the need to revise certain government regulations with the object of imposing more severe penalties for violations of the duty of adhering to the principles of socialist social justice, especially when committed by the leadership cadre. This was reflected in the new normative acts as well as in the main assumptions of the PZPR's cadre policy adopted by the 13th Plenum of the Central Committee.

As a result of these measures, beginning in 1982, instances of exploitation of rank privileges for unjustified personal gain became a rarity.

The CKKP has also been combatting other manifestations of demoralization such as favoritism, privatism, improper attitude toward public property, alcohol abuse and social attitudes manifested in other forms.

The introduction of martial law, which put an end to anarchy and counter-revolutionary threat, prompted many local party control commissions to act more energetically. They combatted ideological-political tendencies harmful to the party as manifested in the behavior of a part of the party membership in the presence of a growing political struggle and the attendant ideological weakening and relaxation of party discipline.

/Special attention was paid to the ideological and political self-evaluation of party members, in accordance with the resolutions of the Fourth and, especially, Seventh plenums of the Central Committee. The principal criterion adopted for evaluating the ideological-political attitude of individual party members was their active support for the Program Resolution of the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress, as reflected in the active implementation of that resolution within the member's community and a close adherence to ideological and organizational statutory principles./

The CKKP has been paying much attention to combatting the attacks being made here and there against the party's Leninist organizational principles. These

attacks consisted in attempts to artificially separate or even oppose intra-party democracy to democratic centralism.

The CKKP has also alerted the party leadership to the appearance of tendencies and phenomena menacing to the party's ideological-political and organizational unity. In this sense the CKKP has participated in the decisions of the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee to disband various extra-statutory structures--the so-called horizontal agreements, clubs, seminars and forums operating not within the framework of party echelons but side by side with them.

/As the country's stabilization progressed, guiding themselves by the principle of the unity of ideology, politics and economics, the party control commissions have expanded the measures directed against manifestations of poor management, waste, neglect of professional and occupational duties and prioritizing parochial interests instead of general social interests./

The party control commissions acted on the premise that instances of poor management can be effectively counteracted by making accountable not only the direct perpetrators but also those PZPR members who are responsible by virtue of their supervisory duties. Hence also, the Ninth Plenum of the CKKP [as published] placed party control commissions at all levels under the obligation of guiding themselves in their activities more rapidly, broadly and consistently by the decisions of the organs of state control, as well as of the organs of law enforcement, concerning various economic irregularities perpetrated by party members.

At the same time, party control commissions counteracted measures to distort the economic reform, and especially the exploitation of enterprise autonomy with the object of introducing chaos into economic activities; the exploitation of the principle of enterprise autonomy for parochial purposes conflicting with general social interests; and the exploitation of the principle of enterprise self-financing for price manipulations unjustified by production cost.

An important front of the struggle waged by party control commissions is a more resolute response to manifestations of the reappearance of an arrogant attitude toward working people, corruption, high-handedness, nepotism, cronyism and various bureaucratic practices. The commissions support the measures initiated by the party leadership to combat deformations of this kind, although it has to be stated critically that in this struggle they do not always receive adequate support from certain basic party organizations and local party echelons.

/The commissions attach great importance to a serious and businesslike treatment of the opinions of working people--whether or not party members--as reflected in letters and complaints addressed to the party control commissions./

Between mid-1981 and the end of 1983 the CKKP had received 2,500 written complaints. In addition, province party control commissions (WKKP) received

15,880 complaints whose proper consideration is promoted by spot checks performed by the CKKP. It must be self-critically stated, however, that the commissions are not displaying sufficient resoluteness in response to improper attitudes of the party members--employees of various offices and institutions--whose position toward the grievances and letters of working people has been irresponsible, bureaucratic and often simply soulless. In such instances, too few party penalties are imposed, and proposals to withdraw party support for the administrative post occupied are made too rarely.

/Assessing the verdicts and preventive-educational activities of the CKKP, the report stresses that, in accordance with the requirements of the PZPR statute, verdicts are considered as an instrument for regularly purging the party and strengthening its ideological-political and organizational cohesiveness./ Proper verdicts promote disciplining the party membership and sensitivity to any attempts to violate statutory principles, and thus they perform an important educational function.

The CKKP has drawn the attention of local party control commissions to the need for principled yet deliberate and responsible verdicts. The problem lay in that--especially following 13 December 1981 and in accordance with the resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee--attempts at retaliation should be prevented and various accusations made against party members considered objectively. Emphasis was placed on the need to give a chance to those comrades who grasped the mistakenness of their previous attitude and self-critically expressed this at party meetings or in front of party control commissions.

The verdicts of the commissions were systematically evaluated and perfected. In the course of the training and instruction of the commissions' members, attention was drawn to the necessity of eliminating shortcomings and sometimes also mistakes in the verdicts made by party control commissions and POPs (basic party organizations).

Most often, these shortcomings and mistakes consisted in reliance on one-sided opinions, subjectivism and sometimes also susceptibility to community pressure.

The CKKP does not regard the process of purging the party's ranks exclusively in terms of the number of persons justifiably expelled from the PZPR or subjected to party penalties. Equally important are instances demonstrating that, owing to a principled yet deliberate consideration by the party control commission of every individual case of improper attitude by a party member, many comrades could be won back to the party's cause.

One aim of the CKKP is, in measure with the ideological, political and organizational strengthening of the POPs--as confirmed by the reports-elections campaign--to markedly broaden the further participation of the POPs in party verdicts through their direct response to instances of improper unstatutory behavior of their members. In the last 2 years more than 9,300 cases of this kind were transmitted by party control commissions to POPs for further action on providing them with assistance as needed.

/A major form of activity of the commissions is the repeated inspections they perform, intended primarily to evaluate the ideological and moral attitudes of party members and the consonance of their behavior with the principles of the PZPR Statute./

During the period covered by the report the CKKP reviewed the verdicts made by a majority of the WKKPs, numerous basic-level party control commissions, many plant party committees and POPs operating in various communities--including certain ministries and central offices. The CKKP also reviewed the procedure followed by province, city and city-district party control commissions in examining and settling complaints and grievances. Furthermore, the CKKP Presidium evaluated the overall performance of many WKKPs.

These reviews, performed according to plan, revealed, among other things, marked differences in the activism of individual basic-level, and especially gmina-level, as well as province party control commissions. The defects found in their performance reduced chiefly to a passive attitude and confinement of attention solely to cases submitted to them for consideration. They have not displayed the needed initiative, activism and aggressiveness, especially as regards preventive action.

Pointing to various major elements of activity of the CKKP, the report states that an important domain of activity of party control commissions is their participation in implementing the /"Main Assumptions of the PZPR's Cadre Policy," confirmed by the 13th Plenum of the Central Committee./

As part of the rights granted to them by that document, the commissions submit to party echelons comments, assessments and recommendations concerning representatives of the leadership cadre who occupy their posts or exercise their functions upon the party's recommendation.

A proper meshing of party verdicts with the whole of the cadre policy followed by party echelons should promote more objective personal assessments and counter-measures in cases of by-passing the mandatory criteria and hence also in cases of attempts at favoritism and cronyism.

/Implementing the tasks ensuing from the resolutions of the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress and the successive sessions of the Central Committee, the short- and long-term directions of work of the CKKP, which comprise verdicts, reviews and preventive-educational measures, will be concentrated on the following problems:/

/1. Strengthening the PZPR's ideological and organizational cohesiveness by:/

--combatting any activities that weaken the party's ideological-political and organizational unity, and especially counteracting any attempt to sow ideological confusion and obscure class-oriented appraisal of events, as well as schismatic tendencies, whether their basis is opportunistic-rightist, capitulationist or dogmatic-leftist;

--promoting the growth of party membership and improving its class composition by broadening the party's political influence among the working class;

--promoting the development of a scientific world outlook among PZPR members by, among other things, resolutely reacting to any attempt to transplant clericalism onto the party's soil;

--implementing statutory requirements with regard to both the rights and the duties of party members, with special allowance for the principle of democratic centralism as an indispensable condition for the united and disciplined action of the entire party;

--creating the proper climate for criticism and self-criticism in intra-party life with the object of spurring the activism of party members and counter-acting manifestations of unjustified complacency or return to harmful practices in style and methods of party work;

--resolutely counteracting violations of the ethical-moral norms mandatory to party members, and especially any manifestations of privatism, opportunistic tendencies and petit-bourgeois mentality;

--increasing the responsibility of party members for a proper exercise of duties toward the family, and especially for bringing up children in accordance with principles of socialist morality, in the spirit of patriotism and internationalism.

/2. Increasing the discipline and feeling of responsibility of party members, whatever their post, for the implementation of economic and social tasks, by:/

--reacting with special sharpness to the attitude of those comrades exercising party functions and holding leading posts in state and economic administration whose activities are found to display manifestations of a return to arrogance toward the public, divorcement from the working class or supplanting, in party work, the method of persuasion and discussion with attempts at mechanical order-giving. Severe party consequences will be drawn with respect to individuals culpable of such behavior;

--combatting any attempt to violate the principles of social justice, and combatting as well instances of bureaucratism, cronyism and soullessness toward working people;

--intensifying, jointly with party organizations and echelons, the struggle against instances of poor management, waste and parochialism in preference to general social interests, perpetrated by party members;

--prompting party members to be more responsible for their occupational or professional performance, in accordance with the requirement that every party member lead in his community. This concerns much more strongly those comrades who hold managerial posts on the party's recommendation;

--increasing the effectiveness of state and social control by expecting of party members that they implement rapidly and completely the control findings made known by state and social organs.

/3. Developing the bonds between the CKKP and local party control commissions, echelons and POPs, by:/

--promptly alerting party echelons--in accordance with Point 80 of the PZPR Statute--about facts and phenomena observed during reviews and inspections and constituting a danger to the party's unity and cohesiveness, as well as strengthening the party's bonds with working people;

--cooperating with party echelons in the consistent implementation of the "Main Assumptions of the PZPR's Cadre Policy," adopted by the 13th Plenum of the Central Committee;

--strengthening supervision over the verdicts resolved upon by the POPs, with the object of enhancing their independent influence on the shaping of ideologically-politically committed and disciplined attitudes in party members;

--providing training and instruction assistance to the local party control commissions elected during the last reports-elections campaign, with the object of preparing them rapidly for engaging in correct, energetic and effective activities.

Central Review Commission

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 64, 15 Mar 84 p 3

[PAP report: "Information on Activities of the PZPR Central Review Commission" under the rubric "In the Period Since the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] /Summary/

/In its report to the National Conference of Delegates the PZPR Central Review Commission (CRK) stated that the PZPR Central Review Commission elected at the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress based its audit activities on the principle of irreversibility of the changes established by the Statute and the congress resolutions. As a party organ appointed to monitor and evaluate various sectors of intra-party life, the CKR has monitored adherence to the PZPR Statute and the implementation of party resolutions. In dozens of the reviews it carried out, the CKR has been paying special attention to the methods and style of party work, and particularly to the effectiveness of action of party organs. Directly after the Ninth Congress the CKR also took many measures to reestablish the place and role of auditing organs in the party's organizational structure./

/The first chapter of the report discusses the nature and extent of the reviews and the manner in which their findings were utilized./ In the period since the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress, the CKR reviewed 46 topics, some of them repeatedly.

A total of 102 findings of these reviews was processed in the form of reports, evaluations, opinions, analyses and summaries. The reviews also encompassed departments and bureaus of the Central Committee as well as province, gmina, city-gmina, city-district and plant [party] committees. Numerous audits were similarly carried out in basic party organizations as well as in rayon centers of party work. Also audited were the inter-province party schools. The Higher School of Social Sciences and the Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism also were audited. The CKR investigated and evaluated the implementation of party resolutions, the application of statutory principles to the activities of party echelons and organizations, the style and methods of the work of discrete party elements and the adherence to the principles of a purposeful and efficient management of the party's assets and funds. Most topics pertained to the handling of letters and complaints from citizens, the handling of proposals made through the intra-party procedure, the performance of the ideological education system, the implementation of intra-party tasks in the work of the party echelons and organizations as well as the party apparatus, and the activities of the institutions directly managed by the party. In addition to verifying the implementation of specific plan tasks, many spot checks were carried out. A fixed principle of the CKR's operating practice is publicity about the findings of inspections and audits as well as intra-party discussion of these findings. The findings have always been due to the work of the broad aktiv of review commissions, analyses of party documents and direct talks and opinion surveys.

/Subsequent sections of the report describe the activities of the Commission itself as well as of its bodies, and also the nature of the work with cadres and the audit aktiv./

The report states that the CKR PZPR held nine plenary sessions dealing with the planning of audit activities and analysis of their findings. The Commission's Presidium held 17 sessions.

In their activities the CKR, its Presidium, its problem-oriented audit teams, and its political workers have been paying considerable attention to providing direct instruction-and-training assistance to the newly elected review commissions at all levels. To this end, conferences and training sessions were organized for the audit aktiv and staff of the province review commissions. The instructions and guidelines of the CKR Presidium as well as materials contained in the BIULETYN INFORMACYJNY CKR PZPR were helpful to the day-by-day activities of local review elements. The inspiration and instruction guidance provided to the lower review bodies influenced greatly the level of monitoring and auditing activism attained at present within the party. But in addition to positive accomplishments there still exist many shortcomings. The disproportions still existing between the activism of the province review commissions and that of many of their basic- and plant-level counterparts have

to be viewed critically. Too little attention is being paid, e.g., to the cogency of audit findings as well as to monitoring the implementation of adopted proposals and recommendations.

/The section dealing with the activities of the CKR PZPR on behalf of a complete and proper implementation of resolutions states that the commission has been focusing its attention on monitoring and evaluating the implementation of mandatory resolutions by party organizations and the executive bodies of party committees./

Jointly with the province- and basic-level review commissions, a review of the implementation of resolutions of the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth plenums of the Central Committee, as well as of the instructions and guidelines issued on the basis of these resolutions by the executive bodies of the PZPR Central Committee, was carried out. In addition, spot checks were carried out with respect to many sectors of party life decisive to restoring the cohesiveness and effectiveness of party action under the country's complex socio-political conditions.

As conducted in all the provinces, a survey of the implementation of the resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee revealed that the decisions of that plenum provided a major momentum to reviving party activity. The implementation of that resolution contributed--even if slowly and not uniformly in every community--to the political-organizational strengthening of the party's ranks and the growth of the faith of party members in the effectiveness and expediency of the measures being taken by the party. The revival of intra-party activism the party is primarily evident within the province party echelons; it also is perceivable within the basic party echelons and organizations in work establishments; but it still is weak within rural party organizations. Effective forms and methods of party action in order to increasingly assure the implementation of the resolutions and decisions of party authorities have made their appearance.

/The CKR and local commissions have monitored the responses to the recommendations and postulates submitted to party echelons and organizations. In the second half of 1981 the CKR carried out a comprehensive inspection of the extent of the implementation of the proposals and postulates submitted during pre-congress discussion as well as at the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress./ In the course of this monitoring, which extended to nearly 3,000 basic party organizations operating in various communities, more than 200 plant party organizations and more than 450 basic-level party echelons, throughout the country, the overall response to recommendations and postulates was found to be unsatisfactory.

An important source of information on everyday realities is letters and complaints addressed to party echelons and organizations. The resolution of the Ninth Congress stressed the need to steadily strengthen the bond with the society and react effectively to criticism by, among other things, showing sensitivity to signals received from the public. The CKR has devoted considerable attention to shaping the proper attitude toward matters specified in the letters and complaints of citizens. The performance of Central

Committee departments, province party committees, basic-level echelons and basic and plant party organizations was reviewed. The party leadership displayed unrelenting concern for a proper solution of the complaints and problems of working people reported in the form of letters, complaints and [requests for] intervention. This is reflected in the fact that these problems were considered by the Central Committee and the related tasks defined at the Ninth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee.

/The CKR also examined complex problems of the economic reform./ The basic goals and directions of that reform as defined in the resolution of the Ninth Congress were elaborated and determined more precisely in the resolutions of the Eighth and Tenth plenums of the PZPR Central Committee. Jointly with the Economic Department of the Central Committee and the party aktiv of central offices, the CKR had during the second quarter of 1983 monitored and evaluated the manner in which party elements were implementing their basic inspiring and monitoring functions with respect to reforming the economy, as viewed from the standpoint of the resolutions of the Eighth and Tenth plenums of the PZPR Central Committee. The findings of that evaluation--chiefly with respect to training, the mobilization of resources needed to surmount the crisis, the application of the economic reform, strengthening the principles of enterprise autonomy and self-financing, developing worker self-governments, and working with cadres--pointed to a highly variable participation of discrete party elements in these processes. The still relatively ineffective conduct of explanatory work is a weakness of party activity. Analysis of the party's actions with respect to the application of the economic reform revealed that the development of more effective methods for cooperation between party elements and the broad party and worker collectives should be approached with greater care and attention.

Evaluating the work of party echelons with worker movement veterans, the CKR monitored the activities of the Commission and Section for Worker Movement Activists at the PZPR Central Committee as well, as jointly with province review commissions, the local commissions and sections for worker movement activists and certain basic-level party echelons. The inspections revealed that the basic tasks ensuing from the mandatory resolutions of the PZPR Central Committee Secretariat regarding the work of party echelons with the veterans are basically being implemented in the presence of considerable involvement of the veterans themselves as members of the commissions and teams as well as of the appropriate executive bodies of party echelons. The need to continue this work, which is consonant with the feelings and postulates of the veteran community, was also affirmed. In the operating practice of party echelons much attention is devoted to the problems of special pensions, which are the principal source of income to about 15,000 worker movement veterans and the family members of deceased activists. Party echelons were found to show considerable interest in the health and other problems of the veterans.

/The next section in the report deals with monitoring the performance of party elements./

It states that, during the period covered by the report, the CKR paid much attention to the performance of discrete party elements and especially to

their proper implementation of the resolutions, guidelines and instructions issued by the Central Committee and its bodies.

During the first half of 1983 the performance of basic and branch party organizations and plant party committees was comprehensively monitored: altogether, more than 12,000 basic party elements in all of the country's provinces were investigated. The findings warrant the conclusion that, following a period of political-organizational decline, many basic party elements gained in strength. An ideological-political consolidation of the party's ranks took place and the activism of party members has grown. Their influence on the communities in which they are active is rising. Improvements in documenting the activities of party organizations and their plant committees are noticeable. On the other hand, record-keeping within the party still has to be improved. The inspections also revealed considerable differences in the organization and level of the forms of training within different party organizations. The CKR believes that concern for elevating the level of ideological knowledge and political argumentation should lie in the focus of attention of all party elements.

An important factor in energizing the activism of party echelons and organizations was the comprehensive inspections conducted by the CKR in six provinces. Inspection teams investigated and analyzed the operating style of party echelons and organizations, the manner of task implementation and, primarily, the correctness and effectiveness of the implementation of resolutions.

The commission devoted much attention to problems of the functioning of regional centers of party work as well as to problems of monitoring the system of party education. The system and effects of ideological education within the party and the problem of training the party cadre were investigated. The need to improve the effectiveness and organization of training and upbringing activities was pointed out.

/Farther on, the report describes the CKR's work to evaluate the management of the party's finances and assets as well as the financial activities of the institutions directly managed by the party./

Implementing its statutory activities as regards financial and economic matters, the CKR has performed fractional audits of discrete organizational units as well as yearly audits of their balance sheets and financial reports. The fractional audits as well as audits of balance sheets showed that the party's funds and assets are being managed in accordance with the confirmed yearly budget. The comments, suggestions and proposals formulated in the CKR's post-audit reports have most often been of a procedural nature, or providing advice on how to bring order into certain of the fields analyzed. During its present term of office the CKR has twice examined and analyzed the yearly financial reports and balance sheets of the central rest and recreation base, the Higher School of Social Sciences and the PZPR Central Committee for 1981 and 1982. The CKR found no reprehensible instances as regards the management of budget funds and other party assets by the Central Committee and lower party echelons.

The CKR periodically analyzes the implementation of the statutory duty of the punctual and complete payment and crediting of membership dues. This matter is invariably investigated in the course of inspections and audits performed in party echelons and organizations by the CKR and the local review commissions, irrespective of the principal purpose of these inspections or audits. The findings then made by the CKR as well as periodic analyses of the related reports warrant the assessment that the the situation as regards dues payments still remains unsatisfactory. Dues still are not regarded within the party as an essential educational factor and a reflection of party discipline.

In evaluating the financial activities of the institutions directly managed by the party, the CKR has been paying special attention to the monitoring and assessment of economic performance of of the Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch RSW [Press-Book-Movement Worker Publishing Cooperative]. In the period between the Ninth Congress and the end of 1983 a total of 102 unit audits was carried out at the RSW, on analyzing the principal problems relating to streamlining the organization, management and economic performance of the enterprises, plants and other elements of that cooperative. The broad scope of the audits performed by the CKR at the RSW warrants a generally positive evaluation of the performance of that cooperative, and especially it warrants stating that both the main board and the various component units of the RSW are implementing their statutory political, social and economic tasks in a manner that is correct and consonant with public interest and the party's needs.

/The next section of the report describes the participation of the CKR PZPR in improving the style and methods of operation of the party./

The whole of the monitoring activities of the CKR during the period covered by the report warrants--the report states--a broader view of problems of the style and methods of operation of party echelons and basic party elements. Systematic monitoring of the implementation of party resolutions provides a picture of the activism of party elements, and it also is a good source of information on existing shortcomings and deficiencies.

At most party echelons and organizations the process of the transmittal of resolutions and decisions from the central level as well as of the drafting and adoption of own programs and resolutions has generally been progressing well. The exploration of increasingly more effective ways and means of implementing them also is perceptible. On the other hand, the lack of consistency in implementing the adopted resolutions and recommendations is a shortcoming of the work of some party echelons and organizations. It still happens too frequently that a basic party organization or a plant party committee takes no position on important and particular issues of concern to the community in which it is active, confining itself instead to reporting on the situation at the enterprise or institution. The systems for assigning responsibility to persons at organizations or institutions whom the decisions and determinations of party authorities affect do not function adequately.

/One of the report's sections concerns the interest of the CKR PZPR in the system of controls within the state./

This is because the congress resolution stressed the need to restructure the system of controls within the state and to link closely state control to social control as a requirement for strengthening socialist democracy. To this end, control bodies are being strengthened and modified, with the object of creating a coherent and efficient system of controls within the state.

The CKR has actively joined in in the work serving to develop such a system.

The CKR collaborated closely during the martial law period with the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces and established cooperation with the Main Local Inspectorate, the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers] control bodies, and the NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control]. Despite the measures taken to bring order into the system of controls within the party and the state, so far no clear principles for the cooperation between control bodies and party echelons have been developed.

/The report describes the cooperation between the CKR PZPR and the review commissions of the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and the SD [Democratic Party]./

As the report states, the idea of this cooperation is based on the assumption that joint programming of the principal directions of action would contribute to spurring the activism and extent of conscious participation in the country's political and social life among members of the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD. On the initiative of the Presidium of the CKR PZPR, the first joint session of the presidiums of the central review commissions of the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD was held in June 1982. Directions of joint undertakings were discussed at subsequent joint sessions of the presidiums of these bodies.

As part of its integral treatment of the system of intra-party controls, the CKR has undertaken to cooperate with the Central Party Control Commission and its local counterparts. This was reflected in joint discussions, joint resolution of particular matters ensuing from letters and complaints, and jointly programmed and conducted thematic inspections and audits.

During its current term of office the CKR has continued and developed its contacts with the review commissions of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries--the CPSU, the SED the Czechoslovak CP and the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party.

/At its close the report states that, fulfilling its obligations toward the party, the CKR will continue to focus its efforts on the complete implementation of statutory rights and duties./

/The report also contains an appendix listing the principal post-audit reports, on specifying audit schedules, membership rosters of problem-oriented audit teams and statistical data in a breakdown by province./

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CSO: 2600/877

BASIC PARTY ORGANIZATION GOALS OUTLINED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 16 Mar 84 p 3

[Interview with Wladyslaw Bienek, first secretary of the Plant Committee in Bielsko-Biala's Welux, and Tadeusz Kawalec, second secretary, by Tadeusz Strumff: "We Have This Compass"]

[Text] It was not a boisterous meeting, but neither was there gratifying self-congratulation. The first point of the resolution reads, "On the basis of discussion, the conference declares that many failures have emerged in our work which require drawing some conclusions about the further activity of the basic party organization."

The elections have quite solidly changed the make-up of the Plant Committee [KZ]. The first secretary, Wladyslaw Bieniek, is new, although experienced and mature. The second secretary, Tadeusz Kawalec, is also new.

Almost 4 months after the conference, we are reading the text of the resolution with the secretaries.

In reading, we pause at each of the 11 points: how does action follow on the words? What and how much have they already managed to do? What is going smoothly, what is tough?

The party organization in the Bielsko-Biala Welux wool industry factories is not large. After numerous personnel losses, it numbers 330 members (approximately 90 of them retirees)--not many for a staff of more than 1300 individuals.

"But we consolidated internally," says W. Bieniek. "And with a diminished body, today we count more, perhaps, than formerly with a larger group, but one not as unified, not as aware of political tasks."

[Question] The second point of the resolution expresses the most important tasks in intraparty activity:

"The continuation of work in the direction of improving party discipline in accordance with statutory principles."

[Answer] Work in the factory is in shifts. A great many people arrive from far off, from the country. Often they own some patch of field, some small farm. The women, who are the majority on the staff, are burdened beyond measure with various responsibilities. All this makes it difficult to get good attendance at the meetings which take place in every departmental party organization [OOP]. What can be done to remedy the situation? How are we to improve discipline? With patient persuasion, discussions, reminders of duty. At the outset of the term, we already made a plan of such discussions, we drew up a list of "absent" comrades, and the secretaries of the OOP, as well as the members of the executive board of the Plant Committee KZ systematically spoken with them. Is there any result? Yes, we have better attendance at meetings than previously, almost always in the 60-70 percent range. This is far from ideal, but there is nothing else for us to do except continue this "system of persuasion" patiently and according to our plan, since we are rejecting other means. To get rid of someone is easy--to persuade him or her to give participation in a meeting precedence over some personal affair is much harder, but that is just the route we have chosen.

[Question] "The steady implementation of assigned party tasks and their settlement by the executive boards of the OOP's."

[Answer] We have adopted the principle that once every 6 months the OOP meeting will be devoted to party tasks. Each comrade among us has concrete tasks: if someone has already accomplished his, then new work is immediately assigned. One could speak at length on the matter of tasks; they have to do with party instruction, activities in the workers' council, in the trade union, the Union of Socialist Polish Youth [ZSMP], and so on. Presently we are trying to formulate tasks so that everyone will understand precisely what he or she is to do, and when.

[Question] "Conducting the routine work whose aim is getting the best workers into the ranks of the party."

[Answer] We discussed this subject a great deal during the conference. Over the last 3 years barely a single individual has joined our party. This is a difficult matter: on the one hand, we want to enlarge our ranks; on the other, we are becoming significantly more rigorous in our criteria and are rejecting old methods of selection. We are concerned not with numbers but with quality. We don't want anybody saying, "Look at whom they're taking into this party!"

We refused admission to several individuals who recently applied. Why? It is a matter of what reputation they have in their circles. Sometimes these are even issues long out of date: for instance, someone once drank severely, now doesn't touch a drop, but his reputation drags on. So we are careful, we prefer to "incline" in one direction rather than the other. We want to accept people who are decent in every respect, with disinterested motives for joining and with a good reputation.

How, then, do we carry out the subsection of the resolution? Recently we appointed several party groups in individual departments: these

"trios"--the secretary of the OOP, a worker with authority, someone from the management of the department--will be conducting discussions with people, especially young ones, whom we would sincerely like to see in our ranks. The trios are most well-informed about the people concerned--about who could in no circumstances be detrimental to our party if they wanted to join us.

And will they want to? We shall see. We make the offer, and explain the party's ideas and politics, without pressure.

We like to conduct such talks without hurry, over the course of several months. From the entrance trials, it appears that we are concerned with 20 to 30 individuals with real usefulness to our organization who could be allowed in our midst.

[Question] The next, third point of the resolution "counsels all members of the party to support with activist behavior the functioning and development of the trade union in our factory."

[Answer] Here the matter is especially difficult. The union is developing very slowly, it comprises only a relatively minor part of the staff, it is functioning quite weakly. A great many people are waiting, postponing their entrance. Also, the party members have rather a passive attitude: apart from the retired members, hardly 20 percent or so of the party members belong to the union. Many comrades from the management of the factory have not yet joined the union, and their example counts for a lot.

There have been no meetings at which we have not recalled the resolution of the 13th Plenum of the Central Committee and not emphasized that the more active work of the union, its position, depend too on our--the party members'--affiliation with the trade union. The results of this agitation continue to be moderate. But we think that persistent "wearing away" at the subject and patient explanation will bring about a change in attitudes after a while.

[Question] In the next points of the resolution, the conference recommended to the newly elected authorities "close cooperation with the workers' council and all the social organizations functioning in the factory," and if it is a question of economy, then we are discussing "the consistent implementation of economic reform and of a conservation program," as well as "consistent activity aimed at an analysis of such motivational systems as would closely link remuneration with work performance."

[Answer] Even a cursory discussion of what we are doing in all these matters would be an entire lecture.

[Question] Please be as brief as possible.

[Answer] There have been a host of analyses, appraisals, studies, propositions--everyday work in special party groups, discussions at meetings, steady and good contacts with the workers' council, with the administration.

Certain things are working out, but with others we continually have to make an effort, as is normal in life. Our main concern is that everybody, and now especially the party member, should understand the principle of reform, its demands and advantages.

[Question] The next point of the resolution reads: "The conference recommends that the newly elected committee offer lasting help to the ZSMP youth organization and be the inspiration of its activity."

[Answer] Speaking succinctly, the ZSMP is almost dead among us, for various reasons. We have begun to discuss these reasons with our young comrades, to stimulate them into more lively activism, to question them about difficulties. Some party members have been assigned the task of working in the youth organization, of helping with its branches. The ZSMP has begun--still timidly but already, nevertheless--to do something, to increase its numbers. This is a question of time and also of our party's inspiring it, not by holding it "by the hand" but in a friendly way, with concern and support for every initiative of the young people.

[Question] "The newly-elected Plant Committee commits itself to take steps toward the goal of reorganizing the division of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON] in the factory."

[Answer] Such a proposition was announced at the conference and found its way into the resolution. But up until now we have not "taken steps." Speaking frankly, even in the group of members of the KZ we have doubts whether the PRON branch is so very necessary, whether it will find a true sphere of activity, whether it will not enter into competition with organizations and structures already in existence. In very large production factories this matter may appear differently. But we here are hesitating, discussing. We would not want to set our hands to something which might later live "on paper," half fictitiously, just to be able to write in some report that it exists. We are still going to think this point over. If we discover an actual need, an actual willingness among at least a part of the staff, then assuredly we will become co-initiators of the rise of the cell of the PRON--but for its life, not its vegetation.

[Question] Point 10: "The conference obligates all party members to maintain and develop an active attitude which raises the authority of the party and of individual members among the staff."

[Answer] Is this not too vague? How can one translate such words into practical activity?"

In truth, this does sound rather vague. But it came out of discussion, out of an appraisal of concrete facts and attitudes. It is something of an obligation directed at every member of our organization. And this point--like the entire resolution--was presented before everyone. We quote this point often--in various situations, in many discussions--when we evaluate the behavior of comrades, their activity, their demeanor in contacts with non-party members, their frequently insufficient courage in publishing our truth, in countering attacks.

[Question] Point 11, the last: "The conference commits the newly elected executive board of the KZ to submit propositions announced during discussion to interested branches, and also to submit at party meetings, the means for implementing these propositions."

[Answer] Again, this would require a lengthy exposition. For there were many propositions, from various spheres: from the matter of our production for exportation to the matter of town and railway communication. The recipients are various institutions as well as party echelons. Let us say just this, then--that all the propositions were well worked out and transmitted where they were supposed to go. For most of them we already have a response, mostly favorable, particularly in the matters which could have been taken care of in the factory itself or by the town authorities. We give very precise information about this at the OOP meetings and, as for what is still moving at a snail's pace, we are trying to speed it up.

(At this point, the secretaries show me a bulging briefcase full of documents, correspondence in the matter of the propositions. But there is no way of indicating here even a fraction of these matters, so complicated as usual.)

* * *

This is how the resolution of the factory party conference in the Welux Wool Industry Plants looks. This, roughly speaking, is how the means and state of implementing these decisions look a few months after their adoption.

"We have this compass and are acting according to it," says Comrade Bieniek. "Do our efforts suffice? Perhaps we, the secretaries, are too impatient, but we continually feel that things are not going as they ought, considering the input of work."

"What would satisfy you?"

"There is a certain calculable matter: new members. If a group of decent people joined the party, then we would have proof that we are following the right path and that the efforts of the whole organization are producing results."

"Perhaps you are indeed too impatient. But this is probably better than if you were to think that everything is in perfect order and that nothing more remains to be done."

12460
CSO: 2600/869

PZPR DELEGATES CONFERENCE PANELS ADDRESS ECONOMIC ISSUES

Economic Reform

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Mar 84 p 4

[Article by Andrzej Leszczynski: "The Reform Compels Progress"; additional dispatch by Polish Press Agency (PAP)]

[Text] The uplifting of the economy and putting it on the growth track presently constitute fundamental political tasks and, at the same time, a condition for the successful attainment of all other goals. This was the statement by Stanislaw Opalko, member of the Politburo and first secretary of the PZPR Tarnow Provincial Committee, who opened the discussion of the Task Force 3 for Economic Reform and Economic Policy.

This was the largest group of all, with 211 delegates signing up to participate; about 80 guests were also invited. Also present were government members, among them the deputy prime ministers Manfred Gorywoda, Janusz Obodowski and Zbigniew Szalajda. The chair alternated between Stanislaw Opalko and Marian Wozniak, members of the Politburo.

The discussion focused on the functioning of the economic reform, recognized as the driving force for the reconstruction of the economic potential.

It is worth remembering, said S. Opalko in his introduction, that at the conclusion of the Ninth Congress there were only hopes, surrounded by a sea of fears and distrust among those who doubted that the party would actually implement the reform. Today we can see the first results of the reformed system. Generally speaking, they are positive. But the weaknesses are also clearly visible.

This view was confirmed during discussion. No one questioned or criticized the general premises of the economic reform. However, quite a few critical remarks were expressed in the discussion, as well as a variety of views and opinions prompted by concern for the state of the economy.

The attention of the discussants was most frequently focused on the question of financial management of enterprises. Concerns about the rigorous rules dealing with accounting payments for time, changes in the schedule of foreign currency deductions, distribution of amortization, etc., were voiced several times. These remarks were coupled with suggestions to expand the system of discounts and preferences.

Delays in conveying information to enterprises with regard to corrections of the reform, premises for planning, and changes in the price of delivered supplies were commonly criticized.

Hopes arising from the introduction of new systems of compensation in the enterprises were mixed with apprehension about the growth of wage differentials among enterprises, and the disparities ensuing from the different wage scales in various trades.

The supply of parts and raw materials is also a cause for serious concern. It was said that inadequate deliveries diminish economic effectiveness, depriving work crews of profits. In this context, the remarks by Wlodzimierz Kubiscik from the Otmec shoe factory were interesting. He described concrete moves intended to increase exports that could enhance the possibilities of importing raw materials.

Two persons devoted their speeches to industrial structure. Czeslaw Mularski from Lubin emphasized the advantages of a combine system, tested in the local Enterprise for Mining and Metallurgy. Jan Kolodziejczak from Poznan was against the attempts by the ministry to integrate enterprises from above. These are two different views which need not be contradictory.

This is due to the fact that the economic reform does not adopt rigid schemes, but aims instead to create structures which entice economic effectiveness, as Minister Wladyslaw Baka, government plenipotentiary for economic reform, stressed in his speech.

Replying to comments about financial rigors, Minister W. Baka stated that they have been acutely felt by the enterprises because the mechanisms of the reform were finally adapted to a difficult economic reality. It is necessary to obey consistently the hard rules of management, effectiveness, and the principle of tough credit, in order to achieve progress.

Talking about the market and prices, Minister W. Baka rejected suggestions that our reform was based on free market principles. He also stated that the law on enterprise failures does not lead to bankruptcy in the capitalist sense. Above all, it aims to improve the economic situation of the threatened enterprise. If a loss-making enterprise must be closed, the state will offer its workers other jobs.

The government plenipotentiary assured that after this year's changes the mechanisms and solutions of the reform will be stable for several years. Only the instruments and indices may be subject to change, according to the economic policy adopted in the Central Annual Plan.

The debate was rich and varied, comprising 463 proposals submitted from the floor and in writing. They contain not only practical suggestions, but also broader reflections concerning social attitudes, civic responsibility, and perspectives for the economic policy.

In all, 22 persons spoke in the discussion and 42 submitted comments for inclusion in the minutes.

* * *

(PAP) The participants in the discussion included: Minister Wladyslaw Baka, government plenipotentiary for economic reform; Eugeniusz Kwiecien, first secretary of the Plant Committee of the Oswiecim Chemical Factory; Jan Skarbowski, member of the Central Audit Commission, deputy director of the Bus Factory in Sanok; Tadeusz Pierwocha, first secretary of the branch party organization, machinist in the locomotive depot in Lazy, Katowice Province; Wlodzimierz Kubiscik, director of the Otmec Silesian Leather Industry Enterprise; Jerzy Kestowicz, member of the Central Audit Commission, engineer in the Pokoj Steelworks (Katowice Province); Stanislaw Oczkowski, director of the Hydroma Construction Machines Factory (Szczecin Province); Czeslaw Mularski, chief engineer for investment, Lubin Mining Enterprise, Legnica Province; Stanislaw Bukowski, deputy director of the Passenger Automobile Factory in Warsaw; Antoni Wrobel, secretary of Plock Provincial Committee; Jan Kolodziejczak, candidate member of the Central Committee, director of the Telekom-Telettra Wielkopolska Factory in Poznan Province; Zdzislaw Stefanski, secretary of the Plant Committee, department manager at the Lower Silesia Foundry in Szprotawa, Zielona Gora Province; Karolina Murzynska, first secretary of the Plant Committee at the May Day Factory in Lodz; Stefan Sawicki, ceramics artisan, first secretary of the Plant Committee at the Artisan Chamber in Krakow; Wojciech Komorowski, executive director of the Sanitation Enterprise in Pultusk, Chiechanow Province; Ryszard Czechowicz, member of the Central Party Control Commission, 22nd of July Factory in Warsaw; Mieczyslaw Cygan, Governor of Gdansk; Lucyna Cwiek-Iwaniec, deputy chairman of the provincial branch of Spolem in Bydgoszcz. Stanislaw Bozek; secretary of the Radkow City-Gmina Committee; Walbrzych Province; Jan Biela, engineer at the Cooperative Maritime Enterprise in Kolobrzeg; Jadwiga Szczepanska, department head in the Poultry Enterprise in Tomaszow, Piotrkow Province; Eugeniusz Bula, pensioner from Tarnowskie Gory; Maciej Auguscik, member of the Central Committee, director of the Central Administration of the Regional Directorate of Railroads.

Coal Industry

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Mar 84 p 7

[Article by Mieczyslaw Wodzicki: "Coal--the Foundation of the Economy"; additional PAP dispatch]

[Text] "A common view in Poland has held that energy and fuel are plentiful and accessible," said Jerzy Romanik,

member of the Politburo, miner in the Siemianowice coal mine and chairman of the Task Force 14 for Coal Mining, in his opening remarks. "This view still lingers, especially since the economy has not experienced difficulties with respect to coal and energy supply during the last 2 years."

However, other speakers stressed that this is a simplistic view. It is not recognized that the present level of coal production has been achieved with great difficulty, and that investments in fuel and energy industry constitute a great burden for the economy.

The cost of fuel and mineral extraction is constantly growing. The situation is made even worse by the fact that over one-half of our fuel needs must be met by imports of gas and oil. This is only a fraction of problems facing our entire economy.

Therefore, it was emphasized, we must be especially careful in planning new projects and opening new objects on time. Financial means for this purpose are limited; the building cycle for coal mines or electric power plants is very long. Construction projects are meanwhile being delayed, and this is very costly for the whole country.

In light of this situation the high energy consumption rate in manufacturing and creating national product is worrisome. Its continuation may cause fuel deficits and the necessity to set aside ever larger means for the development of fuel and energy infrastructure. This, in turn, would reduce the possibility of investment in other areas of the economy, especially those which have a direct impact on the supply of consumer goods.

These conditions and interdependencies point to the strategic necessity of setting the development program for fuel infrastructure until the year 2000. Attention must also be paid to rigorous improvements in fuel consumption, waste, as well as the elimination of energy-intensive products.

It was stressed that the need to create a national raw materials policy and a long-range program of extraction and management of mineral resources is an urgent matter. Although last year the mining industry, with the exception of lead and zinc, set a record, in the immediate future some deposits will become exhausted. Among others, the maintenance of the present level of sulphur production is an urgent matter.

As a result of mineral discoveries a large extraction industry has been built in Poland. So far, however, we have not created a manufacturing industry adequate to the level of mining. Unprocessed raw materials and fuels constitute a large fraction of exports. Today they are necessary, in the future they would be an extravagance. We must aim to develop manufacturing in order to sell processed goods abroad.

Working conditions in mining are becoming more and more difficult; the growing dangers are due to the greater depths at which extraction takes place. More complicated conditions of work demand that management and scientific-

technical support exercise constant care over the conditions of work and the safety of miners. We have had considerable successes. Last year the number of mining accidents was the lowest on record. However, accidents did happen; it is therefore necessary to strive for further reductions.

This topic was a subject of a particular interest of the Central Committee's Mining Commission. Its work has been highly regarded by the delegates.

The delegates praised the degree to which decisions of the Ninth Congress and the 10th Plenum dealing with mining and energy have been implemented. The panel found that thanks to the party and government efforts most of the decisions have been carried out, and others are being put in effect with constant consultation with the work crews and interested institutions. This fact contributed to the improvement in the sociopolitical atmosphere in the mines, and it influenced improvements in the conditions of work and lives of the workers. As a result, the mining and energy industries quickly rebuilt their situation after 1981, making possible the production of 191.3 million tons of coal and almost 126 billion kilowatt-hours of energy, 8.5 percent higher than in 1978.

Much attention was devoted to the systems and organization of work in mining. Full utilization of productive capacity in the mines, as well as a gradual limitation of miners' working hours, depend on them. The last question is particularly controversial among the work force. It is necessary to think today about staffing the coal mines on free Saturdays. This question must be solved in accordance with the law and the interests of the miners.

The delegates submitted many questions and suggestions to Czeslaw Piotrowski, minister of mining and energy, and to Chief Inspector of Energy Management Jerzy Wojcicki, who responded fully and comprehensively.

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(PAP) Participating in the discussion were: Feliks Rozanski, member of the Central Committee, shift foreman in the Pstrowski Mine, Katowice Province; Stanislaw Gajewski, chief engineer in the Zabrze Mine in Bielszowice; Wlodzimierz Szemraj, deputy director of the Nowiny Cement and Calcium Enterprise in Kielce Province; Mieczyslaw Kryczka, director of sales in the Coal Industry Repair Enterprise in Dabrowa Gornicza, Katowice Province; Stanislaw Woloszyn, member of the Presidium of the Central Party Control Commission, director of the Electrotechnical Porcelain Enterprise in Boguchwala, Rzeszow Province; Marek Jaczewski, director of the Energy Institute in Warsaw; Aleksander Gasowski, a mining supervisor in the KGHM Coal Mine Construction Enterprise in Lubin, Legnica Province; Zbigniew Abramowicz, member of the Central Committee, mining supervisor for safety in the Makoszowy Hard Coal Mine in Zabrze; Wlodzimierz Olszewski, crane operator at the Rock Highway Materials Mine in Gracze, Opole Province; Zbigniew Hanf, member of the Central Committee, president of the trade union local in the Staszic Mine, Katowice Province; Antoni Kedra, lathe operator and brigade chief at the Sanok Oil and Gas Enterprise, Krosno Province; Tadeusz Aniolkowski, brigade

chief at Electromontaz in Warsaw; Marian Aksamski, member of the Mining Commission of the PZPR Central Committee, director of the Siemianowice Coal Mine; Jan Klimek, director general of Siarkopol in Tarnobrzeg; Henryk Niedzwiedz, electrical engineer, specialist at the Regional Inspectorate of Energy, Gdansk Province; Robert Borowy, shift foreman of the Gottwald Coal Mine, Katowice Province; Edward Winnicki, retired mining measurement specialist in the Jankowice Coal Mine, Katowice Province; Rajmund Moric from the Wujek Coal Mine, chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions in Coal Mines, Mining Construction Enterprises, and Shaft Construction Enterprises, Katowice Province; Leszek Grajek, mechanical engineer, director of works in the Electric Power Plant in Poznan; Stefan Kozlacz, electrical engineer at the Emag Scientific-Production Center in Katowice, chairman of the Federation of Miners' Trade Unions; Jan Pojda, supervising foreman in the Siemianowice Coal Mine, Katowice Province; Maj Gen Czeslaw Piotrowski, minister of mining and energy; Jerzy Sojcicki, chief inspector of energy management.

Maritime Industries

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Mar 84 p 7

[Article by Urszula Wodzicka: "Time Was Not Wasted"; additional PAP dispatch]

[Text] The problems of the sea and maritime economy have finally achieved their due high rank. This fact was emphasized by all discussants participating in Task Force 15 for Maritime Issues. Stanislaw Bejger, candidate member of the Politburo and chairman of the Maritime Commission of the Central Committee, who also chaired the panel, began by recalling that the governmental maritime policy program was established on the initiative of the party.

Stanislaw Kalkus, member of the Politburo, also took part in the meeting.

The Ninth Congress emphasized the necessity of dealing with maritime issues in a comprehensive manner, not only as an economic matter but, more broadly, as a question of the state maritime policy. This topic was discussed at the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee, which put the congress resolution into effect and established the Maritime Commission.

The minister of maritime economy, Jerzy Korzonek, reporting on behalf of the government on the implementation of the resolution by the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee, said: "We can state that after 3 years we have worked out a realistic plan which takes into account all contingencies, external as well as internal, a flexible plan that is oriented toward the future."

The mere fact of having a program does not by itself solve anything, although it is without precedent in our history. The time has come to carry out the real tasks set for the economy by political resolutions. All speeches were marked by concern that the plan should not remain just a plan.

It was stressed that actions on the central level are still too slow in reaching the lower level, i.e., the workplaces. Lack of systems-type solutions and slow--in the delegates' judgment--decisionmaking were pointed out. Such decisions are needed now, immediately. They are required by the future of the shipping fleet and the need to renovate it. The shipping fleet is shrinking, there are fewer ships; this may necessitate the abandonment of several traditional sea routes.

Such decisions are also needed to renovate the fishing fleet, especially deep-sea fishing. Lack of these decisions now will lead to having nothing to ship or fish with by 1990.

Repair and construction shipyards also demand immediate decisions. The time needed to repair the shipping fleet is still very long, and the lack of repair facilities lowers the technical readiness of the fleet, worsening the safety of work at sea. Delays in the fulfillment of contracts signed by the shipyard in 1980 are well known. We have also computed the losses brought about by these delays. The shipyards, facing the choice of paying contractual penalties in dollars to foreign ship-owners or in zlotys to domestic shippers, opt for the latter and thus delay fleet repairs even more. But this is not the only reason for the reluctance to cooperate. The problem of accounting needs a solution. Polish shippers must not pay more for a ship than foreign customers, as is presently the case.

The maritime economy cannot tolerate short-sightedness. Decisions that are not made in proper time may cause irreversible losses. The ore storage facility in the Northern Port has already become a legend, despite the fact that it is 80 percent finished. Meanwhile, it may turn out that 2 years hence we will not be able to import ore because there will be no place to unload it.

However, not all decisions require the commitment of appropriate means. The lack of those decisions caused astonishment among the delegates. The work on the Maritime Labor Law has already lasted 12 years. The preparation of the new Maritime Code has not taken significantly less time, either.

The 1975 resolution of the Central Committee Secretariat concerning ideological training on Polish ships has never really been implemented and, moreover, it needs updating. Incidentally, the necessity to pay the Union of Artists and Theatrical Composers for every videotape, not just copyrighted ones, makes it impossible to have TV at sea, thus eliminating this method of conducting educational work. Participants in the discussion demanded that relevant regulations be changed.

The time since the Ninth Congress has not been wasted. The mentioned shortcomings have accumulated over the years and are impossible to make up in a short time. Nevertheless, during the last 3 years, in spite of these deficiencies and complaints, it has been proven that some areas not only survived the time of crisis, but also were able to develop without budgetary aid, and contributed to the state balance of payments in terms of foreign currency. This can be said to tramp shipping, some ports, and Baltic fishing.

Moreover, in the last few years all branches of maritime economy exceeded the targets of the Central Annual Plan.

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(PAP) The participants in the discussion included: Jerzy Korzonek, minister of maritime economy; Ryszard Borowski, candidate member of the Central Committee, chief navigator for the Polish Ocean Lines in Gdansk Province; Romuald Waga, rear admiral, deputy commander of the Navy; Jozef Rynkiewicz, mechanic at the Polish Baltic Shipping in Kolobrzeg; Tadeusz Lodykowski, chairman of the Sejm Commission for Shipping and Maritime Economy; Marian Otawa, member of the Central Committee, captain at the Polish Shipping Company at Szczecin Province; Jan Ciechanowski, director of the Lubmor Lubusz Ship Enterprise, Pila Province; Jerzy Perkowski, first secretary of the Plant Committee at the Odra State Maritime Enterprise in Swinoujscie; Karol Hajduga, chief of the Lenin Shipyard's Development Office in Gdansk; Boleslaw Slepowski, director of the Administration of Shipping Industry Enterprises in Gdansk; Henryk Pietraszkiewicz, chairman of the Presidium of the Sea League; Ryszard Karwat, chief of the Pipe Division in the Northern Shipyard in Gdansk; Wojciech Przywieda, first secretary of the Plant Committee at the Port Administration in Gdansk; Zbigniew Kuzniewski, director of the Crane Factory in Minsk Mazowiecki; Stanislaw Swiader, welder at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk; Urszula Tomaszewska, member of the Central Audit Commission, senior controller at the northern Regional Railroad Directorate in Gdansk; Jan Rzeminski, member of the Central Audit Commission, economist at Rybmor in Leba; Kazimierz Lewandowski, foreman at the Dzierzynski Steelworks in Katowice Province; Witold Biem, deputy minister of finance.

12503

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ACTIVITIES OF POLITICAL OFFICERS DURING MILITARY EXERCISES

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 3 Apr 84 p 5

/Article by Capt Marek Sieniawski: "Bridging Every Gap"/

/Text/ During the recently concluded "Friendship-84" allied maneuvers, I had the opportunity to examine the work of political officers in each of the areas of combat operations. Young political officers, who also work full time at being the deputy commanders of subunits, often passed their first combat test in various situations, both in the defense, as well as in the offense.

The First Situation: When the Picks Were Breaking

Lt Jacek Tomaszewski led his tank subunit to the designated defense area at nightfall. Defense preparations along specific boundaries began, as well as the activities associated with them. There were briefings for the officers, tasks assigned to the subordinates and concern with how best to keep the subunit supplied. A few degrees of frost annoys everyone the same way, both soldiers and commanders. Perhaps those who work at the field kitchen have it a little bit warmer....

After the main and reserve tank positions have been designated, the soldiers proceed with excavations for cover. It is not easy work. Picks and shovels bounce off the frozen ground. After several blows, even the handles on some of the tools break. Still, every soldier would like to fulfill his task as best as possible.

Second Lt Tadeusz Plucinski, the subunit deputy commander for political affairs, spends the entire night on the front line of defense. He talks to the soldiers, encourages them to go on with their effort. He takes a stab at it himself, and not only just to warm up, trying to break up the frozen earth. He realizes that it is difficult and that almost superhuman effort on the part of everyone involved will be necessary. But no one holds back anything on the front line of defense. Such a person could not hide here. The deputy helps with the digging, he also supports the tankers with a good word, which encourages their effort. He knows that he cannot feel for all their efforts by himself, or praise briefly their efforts, or walk off without a word. His presence,

however, when the soldiers' sweat is literally pouring, is indispensable. He is able to convince people that now is the time, during these exercises, that they have the opportunity to show their strength, character, fortitude and ability to work hard.

His words, spoken during this frozen night, get through to the soldiers. These words are as necessary to them as a drink of hot coffee.

When at dawn one can see that a trench of several dozen centimeters has been dug out of a layer of frozen ground and the outline of a defense line is visible, a new zeal takes hold of the people. But this is not the end of the deputy's work. His role is only now beginning because the subunit commander is very busy the whole day. He works on his map and defense plan, and has only a short time to inspect the work of his engineer troops. He assigns tasks to his subordinates and reports to his superiors. When something is not "working out," he becomes nervous, says something nasty sometimes, or responds in a loud voice.

"Jacek, take it easy, that's not allowed," says his deputy, quieting him. Both understand each other well and complement one another.

Actually, the deputy commander for political affairs gets involved in everything here. He looks into the field kitchen, keeps an eye on the receipt of ammunition, and checks to see if the soldiers understand their missions, have had a hot meal to eat, and are washed and shaved. Finally, he sees to it that conditions allow them to do all of the above. He is quiet and in control.

Even though he is unhappy with the final decision from higher headquarters, inasmuch as they have been ordered to change the deployment of several fire positions (dug out with such great effort), he must defend this decision from criticism. Off he goes to the soldiers of the front line. But what is he going to tell them? As far as they are concerned, all that they have done until now was for naught. Some are bitter. They hate to hear this news. But Second Lieutenant Plucinski succeeds in convincing them.

There are many difficult situations during the several days he spends on the front line. For instance, while he was on inspection once, one of the soldiers complained that he had not received a hot meal. As it turned out later, he was one of the subunit's worst soldiers; what he said was done in spite. These are, however, legitimate "gripes" along the line. It takes time to clear everything up....

Infantry and engineers had been attached to the tank subunit. Also attached were new people to be cared and provided for, including scouts who had their observation points on the front line. The mess point had to be operational almost 24 hours a day. Although it was great that Warr Off Wladyslaw Kordek and his mess personnel were understanding, it was still necessary to take several people away from digging and assign them to work in the field kitchen in order for the subunit's provision to operate effectively. Obviously, such a decision is necessary, but it can cause new conflict situation.

Actually, the appeal here to help the collective and your buddies is the best way to go and also the most effective. In these difficult situations, the party and young people's aktiv make their worth felt. Agitators carefully selected and prepared while still in garrison can also come in handy. Without their help, even the deputy would not be able to reach every soldier quickly and with the specific information.

Regulations, orders from the organizations, obligations, and all the great objectives designated early are implemented here by, among others: Corp Wieslaw Zrebiec, Corp Jacek Krok, Corp Jacek Rychta and Sr Sgt Ryszard Janowski. Even the basic party organization first secretary, Lieutenant Guzinski, who has many command responsibilities, mobilizes the party aktiv for action. He leads them to act by his own example.

The Second Situation--The Night Before the Attack

Lt Roch Sobieszczyk's tank unit is preparing for an attack from where it is concentrated; Edward Zawisza, the deputy commander for political affairs, can allow himself a bit more political activity, inasmuch as his tankers are not required to prepare cover for their equipment because of considerations for forest conservation. Difficult situations, however, are also not lacking here.

The second lieutenant has the additional responsibility of ensuring the efficient operation of the subunit's supply. While spending time in the area of troop concentration, he takes an interest in practically everything. The soldiers complain about a shortage of water to wash with. That is how things really are! The lieutenant informs his superiors about this. As a result, a water-cart with warm water is brought up.

Many soldiers have wet footwear. But the supply officer will not distribute felt boots without the permission of his boss. Intervention is again required.

The deputy also monitors the preparation and distribution of meals, the quantity and quality of which will cause soldiers to react most quickly, and has the most direct impact on the mood prevalent in their ranks. For this reason, the deputy is constantly in contact with the mess supervisor and heads of the subunits.

Working with the agitators is also not the easiest thing to do. Of course, everything in garrison is easy. But when people are tired, one needs to check up on them more often to encourage them a bit more to carry out their social tasks. It is necessary to see that leaflets and field newspapers get to everyone, to be certain that soldiers in the tanks know what the real mission is; the soldiers need to know their mission and comply with safety regulations.

In the field newspapers, delivered twice daily, the names of the best soldiers are listed, of those, for instance, who best camouflaged their equipment, executed their duties in an exemplary manner, or knew their mission exceptionally well. Because of an initiative on the part of the deputy, soldiers almost on the front line who distinguish themselves do not have to wait for a special occasion or the conclusion of the exercises for recognition. For those soldiers who have found themselves at the bottom of the competition list in garrison,

the exercises offer the opportunity to improve their standing. The second lieutenant tries as much as possible to reach such soldiers, as well as the propaganda-agitator aktiv. Candid conversations with tank crew members and around other pieces of equipment, during a meal, before moving out on patrol and many other issues, which make life easier, build up the reputation of the deputy. For this reason, even his influence is becoming more effective. This political officer takes an interest in almost every triviality which can often become a great problem for the individual soldier. Subunit commanders, occupied with other matters and preparing the details for the offense, do not always have time to think about these detailed matters, and cannot claim to do so in view of the fact that there are no permanent company commanders. The commanders worry mainly about accomplishing the missions assigned to them by their superiors on time.

The Common Denominator

Military exercises which took place in difficult weather conditions, where the situation changed as often as in a kaleidoscope, caused many difficult reactions on the part of the soldiers and their commanders which were hard to forecast. Gaps appeared in the conduct of systematic training on the part of the commanders. It was the political officers who skillfully filled these gaps.

They were concerned with maintaining the best moral-political state of individual soldiers and collective units. The hours they spent working during the night in the cold among the soldiers, their personal example of dedication and involvement, their ability to work hard, and even their reaction to the inappropriate behavior of some soldiers, were all actions of immeasurable worth, but which greatly strengthened motivation with regard to the exercises and encouraged people to an even more intense effort. These were actions dictated by the conviction that they were purposeful, even though they usually brought more glory to the commanders because of the exemplary accomplishment of their missions.

What is important is that these two young men, the political officers, but not only these two, really know and implement their tasks under combat conditions. They did not limit their activity during the exercises only to special problems and their own area of expertise. They felt equally responsible for the accomplishment of the whole subunit's mission.

12247

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JARUZELSKI, OTHER LEADERS MEET WITH YOUNG S&T WORKERS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Apr 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by Jotka: "Reform as an Opportunity for Young Engineers"]

[Text] On the third of this month a working meeting was held at the Office of the Council of Ministers between government representatives and the technical youth intelligentsia, representing the infrastructure of scientific research bodies in several of the technical institutes.

The purpose of the meeting was the discussion of the young technical intellectuals' role and responsibilities in improving productivity and the modernization of our economy. The chairman of the Council of Ministers, General of the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski, attended the meeting.

Several directors of large production establishments were invited to the meeting. Representing the government in the discussions were: Deputy Premier Zbigniew Szalajda, who chaired the deliberations; Edward Dlugosz, minister of metallurgy and machine industry; Jerzy Wozniak, minister of materials economy; Andrzej Ornat, minister for youth affairs; and also representatives of other ministries.

Deputy Premier Zbigniew Szalajda briefed those present on selected economic problems and the tasks facing the technical-scientific community of our country.

The economic development of Poland continues to be too costly in energy and material consumption. The deputy premier emphatically stressed the fact that without radical elimination of these conditions, we will be unable to keep pace with the economies of other countries. The resolution of basic industrial problems will be impossible without a substantial increase in productivity, organizational improvements and the replacement of people with mechanized equipment.

There are tasks that will be difficult to implement without the cooperation of the cadre of young engineers. The deputy premier brought attention to the fact that up to the present time, the scientific-technical branch's contribution to the stimulation of national economic growth has not met society's expectations or the potential of modern-day science and knowledge. In Poland,

although we have a substantial number of engineers and technicians (a million and a half), we produce inferior products at a high cost and an excessive consumption of materials and energy.

Among the problems which face the scientific-technical community in the years 1985-1995, Deputy Premier Zbigniew Szalajda mentioned progress in the production of space-age materials and electronic circuitry, microprocessors and telecommunications; to establish without delay the development of biotechnology and genetic engineering, the clean-up of water pollution and elimination of waste materials; the development of nuclear energy and the improvement in metallurgical processes. As he emphasized, there are a great number of responsibilities for the whole Polish scientific and engineering community. Scientific and technical advancement is the only way to achieve improvement in our economy. Those, then, are the most important contingencies which are required for us to retain a reasonable share of the foreign market.

In discussions lasting several hours, it was emphasized a number of times that it is important to elevate the professional position of the engineer and establish comprehensive methods which would provide incentive and at the same time lend support required in instances where ambitious and risk-laden explorations and initiatives are attempted. To a greater degree than heretofore we must direct our engineering expertise toward the streamlining of new product development programs and toward finding practical industrial applications for new problem-solving approaches--from both in-house and outside sources--that reflect advances being made in the fields of engineering, technology and management.

The question of professional ethics was approached by Eng Marek Chyla of the Transportation Equipment Plants in Swidnik, who pointed out the virtues of dependability, diligence and responsibility of one's obligations. Eng Jacek Stach, of the Electric Motor Works in Tarnow, discussed inventions and innovations, and emphasized the necessity for the involvement of the young engineering cadre in these activities. Eng Dr Ludwik Pokora of the Plasma Physics and Thermonuclear Synthesis Institute stressed the fundamental importance of the moral satisfaction connected with research and development work. The senior foreman for equipment maintenance at the electric power plant in Kozienice, Eugenjusz Iskra, brought attention to the fact that reductions in production costs should be the only way to achieve maximum profitability. This topic, incidentally, was mentioned by several speakers. Eng Leszek Kapusta of the Stalowa Wola Iron and Steel Works talked about the urgent need to establish methods that would substantiate the standing of the engineering force in public opinion. He emphasized the vital need for stimulating creative motivations within the young engineers' group, which is frustrated at the present time but remains a very gifted and creative body. There is a need for a system which would classify and reward creative engineering efforts and could be expressed by means of an appropriate remuneratory system. General of the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski participated in the deliberations. He affirmed his satisfaction in meeting the young inventors, indicating that a mandatory requirement for a young person to find his niche within society is the creation of proper conditions where he is able to perform above average work for the country.

CONFERENCE ON NIGHTTIME COMBAT CONDITIONS HELD

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 6 Apr 84 pp 1, 5

[Article by Col Franciszek Goral: "Action and Military Training in Nighttime Conditions"]

[Text] "The night is an ally of a well-trained soldier"--this was the theme of a scientific-methods conference organized by the Silesian Military District Command. Its purpose was to describe the conditions and the possibilities of using modern combat techniques in nighttime conditions, the use of different types of troops in night combat and their security, and to present applications of organizational forms and methods of night training.

Representatives of all command levels, from the company (or its equivalent) up, from all types of troops and services, as well as representatives of military academies in the district, were present at the conference. Also participating were the representatives of the Main Administration of Combat Training, including its head, Lt Gen Wojciech Baranski.

The presentation which began the discussion of organizational problems and techniques of nighttime combat, as well as the military training in this field, was delivered by the deputy chief of the Silesian Military District for line command, Brig Gen Zenon Bryk. Drawing on the training experience in the district, he undertook a comprehensive analysis of the influence of night on soldier psychology, and the consequent possibilities existing on the modern battlefield.

The analysis of certain battlefield phenomena and the behavior of soldiers at night leads to important conclusions with regard to training practices. Thus the purpose of nighttime military training is the appropriate preparation of soldiers for the changed conditions of perception and interpretation of events, and the disturbance of biological rhythms in the functioning of human organism. The point is to devote greater attention of commanders to the shaping of considerable stamina and psychological efficiency among soldiers, supported by a whole spectrum of means and technical equipment facilitating "vision" and the command of troops at night. Night is scary only for an untrained soldier.

One must agree that military training problems cannot be separated from the psychological preparation or equipment at one's disposal. Better techniques are helpful but they also demand properly trained users. Therefore, the military training in the use of expensive electronic and night-vision equipment must insure that soldiers will be able to overcome the difficulties created by nighttime conditions.

The preparation of troops for nighttime action must be approached from the point of view of learning the rules of action, organizing combat, and practical preparation of the troops for combat. The discussion, which included Col Wladyslaw Sujecki, Col Henryk Janusek, Mjr Waldemar Czarnecki, Cpt Zenon Siejka, Lt Edward Majewski and others, was chiefly dominated by the problems of organizing and conducting combat at night, organizational difficulties of nighttime training in garrison conditions, during training exercises, and during the stay on the training range. Less was said about the organizational and methods experience provided by the employed forms and methods of training.

The district cadre felt that a significant share of difficulties connected with the conduct of nighttime classes and exercises in subunits lay in the imperfections in the training system on the unit level--in connection with program requirements, the material basis and the time available to use it, and the possibilities of comprehensive securing of the training process. The last problem mainly concerns combat equipment, material resources, cadre and instructors, and also the fact that they are contingent on the working hours of the operators of tactical fields and firing ranges.

Speaking in the discussion, the chief of the Main Administration of Combat Training expressed thanks to the command of the Silesian Military District for organizing a useful exchange of views. At the same time he stated his position with regard to some problems brought up during the conference. He emphasized the purposefulness of such training and methods with respect to the new aspects of conducting combat without regard to the hour of the day, as well as the necessity of acquiring the full ability to use excellent combat equipment which practically erases the difference between night and day.

He also specified some educational tasks in this area. The preparation of troops for nighttime action should be analyzed in several aspects. With regard to the preparation of the cadre, the most important is the achievement of the ability to organize combat and command troops at night. This takes place through commander group exercises which are staged in the field at night.

Soldiers and subunits must learn without fail the ability to use the instruments permitting one to "see" at night, they must learn how to service and maintain them in constant readiness. Tests for the subunits may include marksmanship exercises at night, marches guided by compass, using guns and other equipment, and the ability to prepare for nighttime combat.

The preparations for the exercises should be carried out in nighttime drills, and later through day-and-night training sessions with individual subunits, taking partly into account the organizational work of combat commanders. Every 24-hour and comprehensive tactical exercises should also include a nighttime firing exercise. All night training programs are organized during the day and begin at various times during the dead of night.

12503

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INSTITUTE HEAD SAYS SOCIALISM MUST HAVE PRO-WORKER ORIENTATION

Warsaw TYGODNIK ROBOTNICZY in Polish 29 Apr 84 p 6

[Interview with Prof Dr hab Przemyslaw Wojcik, PZPR KC [Central Committee] Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism, by Bogumil Holda; date and location of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] Comrade Professor, the crisis leaves us with a multiplicity of views and feelings regarding the present and future of our country. Quarrels and differences of opinion are arising with regard to the topic of socialism in Poland. These emanate not only from different ideas about the future of the economy, policy and culture, but also from the quite different situation of the particular strata of society. Hence the question--for whom is socialism?

[Answer] This is a basic question, since the various groups and strata have their own ideas, their own vision of socialism. Marx distinguished state socialism from technocratic socialism, lower middle class socialism, utopic socialism and working class socialism. He called state socialism bourgeois socialism, the daydreams of the bureaucrats about their exercise of uncontrolled authority over society. Technocratic socialism was to ensure people economic well-being without subjectivity, i.e., they were to be made happy without being asked their opinion. Lower middle class socialism, or eclectic socialism selected what was "good" from everything, from the various extremes, without regard for the logic of the system. Utopic socialism drew its concept of society from a system of values without taking into consideration economic realities. Finally, working class socialism...

It is no accident that I have listed five varieties of socialism, since times have changed but the tendencies have continued, and we have in Poland the same number or even more different concepts of socialism. Thus, we must decide: what kind of socialism are we building, in whose interest?

[Question] It is a timely point. The working class accepts the universal values and principles of socialism. For example, I have not heard these communities proposing that the factories, the mines and enterprises ought to be given over to the capitalists or that the idea of social justice ought to be abandoned. On the contrary, they are making definite demands regarding the observance of socialist rules. The fact is also being underscored that socialism is being built primarily through the efforts of the working class, of manual laborers, but not only through their efforts or in their interest.

[Answer] This is a problem of allies in the proletarian revolution, of allies of socialism in general. Socialism is primarily a class issue of workers, an opportunity for resolving worker problems. But socialism cannot be built with the help of workers alone, hence the need to enter into compromises and to take into account the interests of other strata and sociovocational groups. However, one question must be rendered clear: the point of reference must be worker interests coordinated with the interests of other sociovocational groups. In other words, worker interests must be the fundamental plane. If they are lost sight of or forgotten, an eclectic mass develops and the various interests become muddled. This eclectic socialism gains the upper hand and the interests of the leading social classes are lost along the way...

[Question] Comrade Professor, listening to the working people, one arrives at the conclusion that the compromises made during the current period of the building of socialism in our country are too numerous and too farreaching. Sharks, millionaires, Polonia-type firms and the enormously lucrative business deals of privateers are mentioned. It is believed that under capitalist conditions, they would not find it so easy to line their pockets and make the piles of money they do here. While it is perhaps not a question of enormous amounts that threaten the system, these people prod and offend, sometimes calling forth fear and protest. After all, who benefits from all this?

[Answer] I would treat the work of Polonia-type firms and the activity of the entire speculative stratum primarily in terms of the effect of a show of feelings. Given the difficult situation of working people, the extravaganza of upstarts and accumulating wealth offends and cannot but do so. I believe that in every normal system, small enterprises of the type mentioned would be of secondary importance. The general rule is that the larger and the more highly organized the enterprise, the higher the wages. The smaller and the less productive, the lower wages. With us this principle has become totally reversed.

It can be said that the burden of our emergence from the crisis has fallen mainly on the employees of the socialized sectors of the economy, people that work for the state and live by working for the state. And private initiative does business. Peasants, especially the most powerful groups of the rural population, feel the effects of the current situation to a lesser degree. This situation is intolerable over the long term. Responsibility cannot lie with officials, i.e., supervisors or the leadership stratum alone, but must also include peasants and private initiative. If national understanding is to be a reality, it cannot be implemented without the active participation of the working class.

[Question] The key to the solution of our difficult problems, however, is the economy. The so-called spheres of economic democracy and economic stabilization are the foundation of solutions. Moreover, the interdependencies are many: the development of democracy and of workforce self-government are to serve economic solutions and the economic reform. What is the real interrelationship of the reform and the workforce self-government? What are the real chances that the transformations of the socialist renewal will take place?

[Answer] Obviously, the economy is the key, with the reservation, however, that it be a socially oriented economy. We can say that the primary cause of all the other crises is the fact that this economy somehow became autonomous and served its own ends. It was not tied in with serving the needs of working people, especially the working class. Unless we solve the problem of the living standard, unless we solve the problem of the economic well-being of society, I believe that all these solutions in the social sphere and the political sphere will be ineffectual. People must have something for their hard and honest work.

According to Karl Marx, the primary condition for the building of socialism is to create an abundance of goods. Unfortunately, we lag far behind in this field. This is the most important problem. The sluggishness with which it is being resolved gives us cause for concern. There is another side to the question, however--that of bringing society into the picture...

The issue of the workforce self-government is a fundamental doctrinal question of scientific socialism. More than once Karl Marx stressed that it is not enough if the proletariat gains political control of the power if the people are not involved, including on the enterprise scale and the level of employee groups. He warned that if the autocratic system of power in enterprises is retained, this will end in the defeat of the socialist revolution, since (and I quote) "the political rule of producers cannot coexist with their social bondage."

The development of the employee self-government was to be the method for eliminating factory despotism, factory bondage, as Marx said, or the unlimited power of management over workers. According to Marx, in practice this meant that workers, employees should have the right to make choices for all management positions, they should have the right and duty to define working conditions and wage terms--their own and management's and, finally, they should be endowed with the right to make decisions regarding work discipline.

Under Soviet Russian conditions, Lenin restricted this self-government concept to a sort of "triangle of power," namely, the authority of the administration, the authority of trade unions and the authority of the party. Thus, he shrank back from the Marxist concept of the employee democracy with regard to management. The power was returned to management, but trade unions were endowed with veto power.

All decisions assumed legal force when the trade unions approved them. The trade unions were to defend employees, while the economic administration was to intensify labor productivity. Against the background of this conflict, the role of arbiter was necessary to decide who was right in each case.

Lenin's concept of the party's role in the enterprise was related to this. Lenin justified it by saying that under Soviet Russian conditions, where 80 percent of the peasants and about 50 percent of the workers did not know how to read and write, to award them such broadly conceived rights would be beside the purpose. Transferring the leadership to professional management personnel would lead to fewer errors.

However, the question of trade unions as a school of communism remains. Lenin did not send the masses to school and ordered that they be taught, but the "school of communism" was a school of joint rule, where workers learned government in the course of decisionmaking, partly through their own mistakes. The concept of sending the masses "to the school benches" to learn was a Stalinist idea.

Here is the question: is the Polish working class less mature than the French working class from the 1840's, when Marx set forth his ideas, is it less mature than the Russian working class of the 19th and early 20th centuries?

[Question] Comrade Professor, you have treated these issues interestingly in your book entitled "Marksowska koncepcja wyzwolenia pracy i jej antagonisci" [The Marxist Concept of Liberating Work and Its Antagonists]. However, you focus on the Leninist "triangle of power." The course of later events proves the need to verify this topic, to research the original sources...

[Answer] Yes, that is the Marx-Engels concept of authority. "Marksowsko-engelsowska koncepcja dezalienacji pracy" [The Marx-Engels Concept of Work De-alienation] is my later book, in which I fully developed the subject that has proven to be not only very apropos in present terms but also in future terms.

The arousing of aspirations for involving society is irreversible. Our studies show that 70 percent of the workers entertain manifold, broad hopes related to the work of the self-government. The complex truth is that the self-government enjoys the greatest authority at this time among the workforce, greater than the party and the trade unions. This holds an element of optimism regarding the self-government, an opportunity that cannot be wasted.

[Question] Comrade Professor, social activists and journalists hit upon the disturbing facts that the working class and its self-government are assessed entirely differently. Against this background, many polemics have arisen, in the columns of TYGODNIK ROBOTNICZY as well. Often one hears directorial-official opinions (as was the case in Lodz) to the effect that workers are still too untrained in the workings of the economy and the government. Therefore, the self-government in its present form as envisaged by the 1981 law has no raison d'etre--not only is it not a help, but it is a nuisance.

[Answer] We are implementing the reform concept in a slightly different manner than in Hungary. However the three "S's" are obligatory in both cases. We are less far along in the process of implementing this reform, but the existence in Poland of an employee self-government is a new element over the Hungarian system. It can be said that the Hungarian variant is a technocratic variant, the variant dreamed of by some of the directors mentioned in our discussion. Certainly Hungary has achieved a number of successes via the implementation of this reform, nonetheless--the Hungarian debt is significant and debt servicing absorbs 50 percent of export revenues, and now the Hungarians will have to begin repaying credits.

Recently when we were in Hungary we asked how this happened, who was responsible for such an enormous debt. They told us that it was the fault of enterprises that gobbled up credit and used it for consumption and producer goods import. We should learn from this!

It is a myth that the self-government will hinder the administration. Instead I would say that, in its 40 years of operation, our administration has taken on such a mentality that it treats social and self-governmental control as an offense to authority. As a result we have had and even still do have an economy without a proprietor, so to speak. For who performs the function of real proprietor, who is the check on supervisors, on management? According to Lenin's concept, this was to be the party. In capitalism the situation is clear: the capitalists appoint their management and they are accountable to them for efficient operations. In Poland, the control function has merged with the production-task function of management, the function of supervision within the party framework. Essentially those that were to be controlled have become their own supervisors. We have the results of this in the given attitudes.

Unless the self-government is developed, I do not think we can eliminate the arrogance of management, its incompetence and irresponsibility. And without the self-government, we cannot organize control over management. It is evident that even the party previously was mistaken on this issue.

[Question] Then the criticism of workers that working people still have too little impact upon what is going on in the party and the state is not without justification, and not merely historical justification. This is attested to by the special PZPR KC [Central Committee] plenum on the subject of the working class and the strengthening of its leading role in the socialist state that is now in the planning stages. However, one likewise notes a self-contained conflict: on the one hand the workers say that they have too little control over the authority, while on the other, when the time comes for them to take the "scepter" of authority into their own hands, sometimes they cede this prerogative to the representatives of technical supervision, representatives of the engineering-economic element. This was observed during the last reports-elections campaign in the PZPR and also earlier, during the period of employee council elections.

[Answer] That is a fact! Our studies show that 70 percent of those responding are in favor of the operation of the self-government and have many expectations tied in with them, but only 25 percent express the desire to participate in some form of self-government work. The discrepancy is clear. Why does it exist? The unwillingness of workers to participate is also evident in other organizations, including the party. The issue is quite complex. I would venture to say that it is an expression of the lack of trust of workers in the possibility of acting effectively. Several times, and even several dozen times in my generation, people have been stung by activism. Most people are very suspicious. They are afraid of the game of appearances, ineffectiveness, low efficiency and empty chatter. They are prepared to risk if they can be 70 percent assured that their work will be effective. It is a question of a regain of social trust by the party, the authorities and the self-government.

However, this cannot be resolved by appeals. People must be shown clearly that their initiative for something will produce something. It is taken into consideration that just demands are implemented. I see no other way to settle these problems.

[Question] Comrade Professor, here we come to more practical questions. Must these daily proofs of the usefulness of the voice and remarks of the working class, of their usefulness in participating in the authority be evident only at the highest levels? On the occasion of the elections to the people's councils, we are brought to reflect upon the vast field of operation of the territorial self-government. Would that this opportunity would not be wasted or ignored again.

[Answer] I believe that on the scale of the entire 40 years of People's Poland, we have not resolved the problem of articulating the interests of workers or of representing their interests. It fills me with dismay that, during the PZPR reports-elections campaign, there were various commissions, but there were no workers' commissions. There was no place for workers, delegates of the workers' community, to meet and discuss the issues that affect them. These issues were reflected, but indirectly through subbranches and ministries. But past and present common problems were not revealed. This problem has still not been resolved--either in the functioning of the party or in the functioning of trade unions, that have adopted a subbranch structure. It would be good if, during the course of the elections to the people's councils, we would begin to solve this problem, giving the workers their own representation that could articulate their interests.

What is the extent of this problem in the workers' view? In the studies that we conducted in September 1982 among workers alone, we asked two questions: do you agree that workers in Poland have no exclusively worker organization? Of those responding, 79 percent said yes.

The second question was this: do you agree that workers in Poland should have their own, exclusively worker organization? Of those responding, 81 percent said yes. This account is presented to the party, the former Solidarity and all trade unions.

This issue of creating organizational frameworks to involve the classes is still an open question.

[Question] Comrade Professor, I know of examples, such as that of Pruszkow near Warsaw, in which workers, by statute, have guaranteed for themselves at least a 50-percent share in the government of trade unions.

[Answer] It is a very positive sign! However, let us take another look at the visions of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Were they merely utopic daydreams, noble but unrealistic? I would like to say that history has canonized founders more than once in order not to implement their ideas, since the very act of canonization has something contrary in it: it is not for ordinary people. Thus, I see a departure in a return to the sources, for socialism in the minds of its creators was socialism for the people, above all for the workers.

Returning to the topic of our conversation, its guiding idea, I would like to note that the following pattern has always been evident in history, from which Marx drew his logical consequence: Those that hurried to socialism were those that had it worst in life, they were the poorest, the most humiliated, the most exploited. When I hear the voices of the various apologists today, I get the impression that this tendency has reversed itself--supposedly those that have it best are those that are the most interested in socialism. This is not true. Socialism was, is and must remain an opportunity for those that are under the yoke.

[Interviewer] Thank you very much for the interview.

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CSO: 2600/961

ROMANIA

RULES REGULATING TRANSFER OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 28, 29 Mar 84 p 1

[Council of State Decree Amending Article 44 of Law No 59/1974 on Land Resources]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:
Sole article--Article 44 of Law No 59/1974 on land resources, published in
BULETINUL OFICIAL, Part I, No 138/1974, is amended and will read as follows:

"Article 44--Agricultural land can be acquired only through legal inheritance
and the transfer or acquiring of this land by juridical acts is prohibited.

"Under exceptional circumstances, private agricultural producers in non-cooperativized zones can transfer to their children a part of the agricultural land which they own if the children live or will be establishing their residence in the same commune and if they assume the obligation to ensure that the land is cultivated under good conditions, to obtain the yields specified in the crop and animal-breeding plans and to contract for and deliver to the fund for self-supply and the state fund the quantities of products specified by law.

"The transfer of the land under the conditions stated in paragraph 2 is approved by the executive committee of the county people's council."

Nicolae Ceausescu
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 29 March 1984
No 112

CSO: 2700/191

BRIEFS

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ion Tesu is relieved of his position as minister of agriculture and the food industry. Comrade Gheorghe David is appointed minister of agriculture and the food industry and is relieved of his position as minister state secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry and head of the Department for State Agriculture. Comrade Tradafir Cocirla is relieved of his position as minister of electric power. Comrade Nicolae Busui is appointed minister of electric power and is relieved of his position as deputy chairman of the Central Council for Worker Control of Economic and Social Activity. Comrade Ilie Radulescu is relieved of his position as director general of Romanian Radiotelevision. Comrade Constantin Petre is appointed director general of Romanian Radiotelevision. Comrade Traian Vladimir Constantinescu is appointed deputy minister of electric power. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 28, 29 Mar 84 p 2]

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY APPOINTMENT--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Cpstel Eremia is appointed minister of state secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry and head of the Department for State Agriculture. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 28, 29 Mar 84 p 2]

BUCHAREST APPOINTMENT--On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Nicolae Croitoru is delegated to fill the position of deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Bucharest Municipality Peoples Council. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 28, 29 Mar 84 p 2]

CSO: 2700/191

DJILAS DISCUSSES ARREST IN AUSTRIAN WEEKLY

Vienna PROFIL in German No 18, 30 Apr 84 pp 46-47

[Interview with Milovan Djilas by Erhard Stackl in Belgrade; date unknown:
"They Want to Block Criticism of the System"]

[Text] [Question] Mr Djilas, how did you come to be arrested ?

[Answer] On the evening of 20 April, after 8 pm, I was speaking at a meeting on the national question, its history and prospects when the police came and broke up the meeting.

[Question] What kind of a meeting was this ?

[Answer] There is a group of people in Belgrade which, strictly speaking, cannot be called a group at all, since it is neither a political, nor an activist group but rather a loose collection of inquisitive intellectuals of varying persuasions who meet from time to time for discussions—among other things of political issues in the broadest sense of the word. On the average, these are people between 25 and 35 years of age; some are older. No one is obligated to come or not to come. In other words, this is not an organized unit. Ideologically, these are people whose views range from the left to liberal conservatism. In the main, they come from Belgrade. They are Serbs in other words; but they are not nationalists and in no sense do nationalistic views predominate—or rather they are emphasized somewhat less.

[Question] You are considered something of a loner.

[Answer] I had never attended a meeting of this group before; this was the first time. The group has been meeting for several years and with greater frequency during the past three. The police are familiar with the group. Some of the members were called in and told that [their activities] would no longer be tolerated. But although the police did not take favorably to the meetings, they did permit them to go on. The meetings were held in someone's apartment; it would not have been possible to hold them elsewhere. But my appearance on the 20th at 7 pm brought the police into action.

[Question] What actually happened ?

[Answer] The police put on quite a show. There were a good many of them, well-organized, in cars. They blocked off the courtyard and the street. It was all very efficient, prepared and planned in advance.

[Question] Did you get to give your talk ?

[Answer] It was about half an hour long; but it was more of an introduction to the discussion than a real lecture. I submitted a number of theses and raised some questions--basic questions in my view--and then the police broke in.

[Question] And what happened then ?

[Answer] I was taken to a large police building and what happened to me also happened to the others who were arrested. I was led into a small office where two policemen proceeded to search me. I stayed there throughout and that is also what happened to the others. But I did not know that because I was completely isolated. At about midnight--I had been sitting on a chair all this time--five policemen came to take me here, to my apartment, in order to conduct a search which lasted until 4 am.

[Question] And what was the result ?

[Answer] The search was conducted in a proper manner according to law in the presence of witnesses--citizens. They took a large number of my books published abroad along. Some of these were in Serbian which (the exile periodical) NASA REC and my son Aleksa put out in London. They also took some Serbian books as well as a number of my manuscripts and all the documents and letters of my son Aleksa who has sought asylum in London and is currently working on his doctorate at the Institute for Sociology in Cologne. They also displayed some interest in his articles which have been published in NASA REC and in the foreign press. [They took] a whole suitcase full of books and materials and a plastic bag about the size of half a suitcase on top of that.

[Question] Where were you taken after that ?

[Answer] Back to the same building and the same room where I was released at 3 pm. They did not return the books to me but promised to look through the materials and to decide later which of them they would return to me. At 10 am, two policemen came in to conduct a brief interrogation. They asked me who brought me [to the meeting], whom I knew and what I had talked about. It was quite formal; it was a brief interrogation; the protocol took up only one typewritten page. On the following day, seven or eight others who had been arrested were released just as I had been. The rest were taken to the central prison in Belgrade where some were held

for 2 days and others for three. On the evening of the 24th, the final two were released so that now no one is in prison any longer.

[Question] Did your nephew, the psychologist Stoyan Cerovic, also attend the meeting ?

[Answer] Yes. He, too, was arrested and his house was also searched. They also took a large number of his books. He was released after 3 days.

[Question] Srdja Popovic, the human rights lawyer, was also arrested. Is there a connection there ?

[Answer] Popovic is the best known lawyer in political cases in Yugoslavia; he also has a reputation in international human rights organizations. He was surely arrested in connection with the group although he has no ties to it at all. He was arrested on the evening of 23 April and after his apartment and office were searched he was released at 9 am the next morning. I have no explanation for it; nor have the authorities offered one. In my view, the only explanation is that they meant to prevent him from taking part in the defense of the others who were taken into custody. But while he was in jail someone must have changed his mind or else they decided they could not pin anything on him. So they released him.

[Question] There is a great deal of criticism appearing in the Belgrade papers and on television. The general atmosphere appears to be quite liberal.

[Answer] Yes. For the past 2 years, Belgrade has certainly been the most liberal city in Yugoslavia. The action taken against me and this group represents an effort of certain factors to smash these liberal trends in Belgrade. It is not the only action of its kind. There are also some taken against individual periodicals, individual journalists, individual theatrical productions and individual books. From time to time, attacks against such books appear in the press. The police operation certainly is part of a complex of efforts designed to reestablish the state of affairs which existed prior to the liberalization process.

[Question] How does that jibe with the liberal impression we have of Yugoslavia ?

[Answer] You are saying that Yugoslavia looks liberal from the outside; that it looks more liberal than other East European countries. That is a relative kind of liberalism. Yugoslavia still has not gone beyond the limits which existed in Tito's time. It still holds to the basic patterns—in the sociological and political sense. To be sure, Yugoslavia is different; it certainly is more liberal; but these days, all the East European countries differ among themselves.

[Question] There is a play running in Belgrade just now which is called "The Abortive New Year's Party." It deals with the time around Stalin's death and your role then is portrayed in a positive way in it.

[Answer] The play has been shown. I do not know whether it will keep on running. I was the subject of the play; but the play deals with it in an objectivist manner by focusing on a moment in which the party experienced a crisis of conscience. Like other plays, this one is being tolerated; but I do not know for how long.

[Question] Is the current critical wave putting the system itself into question ?

[Answer] The criticism is not only coming from the outside but also from inside the system, even from the very top—with regard to the situation, to the system and its inefficiency—from the LCY central committee on down to the lowest echelons.

[Question] Is the criticism leveled by you and the group of intellectuals that much more dangerous ?

[Answer] I believe it has not threatened the system; they exaggerated that. In most instances, I think, it has not gone beyond the scope of the system and even where it has it has not posed a substantial threat to the system. We are dealing here with tendencies toward blocking criticism /as such/; toward thwarting any sharper critique of the system whatever. But there also are tendencies toward not letting the situation deteriorate even if it cannot be substantially improved. In other words, [there is a tendency] to proceed more prudently, sympathetically and moderately.

[Question] Can these groups of persons be distinguished from one another ?

[Answer] I could not tell you exactly who belongs to which group. It is a fluid situation; but one can tell from the actions being taken. The fact that the press has become more liberal and even more liberal in Belgrade than elsewhere—that is evidence of a trend. And the attempt to block that is evidence of another trend. But real confrontations within the political system, within the political structures between these two trends are neither sharp, nor visible enough. One cannot discover any major programmatic, theoretical or ideological differences.

[Question] Can you still see a chance for improving and consolidating Yugoslavia's situation within the system ?

[Answer] This question goes beyond the scope of this interview; but let me briefly state my personal view which is that consolidation does not seem likely in the foreseeable future.