


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# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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8 May 1984

## EAST EUROPE REPORT

### POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ALBANIA

NEED TO INCREASE TIES BETWEEN MILITARY, CIVILIANS

Tirana RRUGA E PARTISE in Albanian Jan 84 pp 38-47

[Article by Miti Nito, Dhimiter Shandro: "We Must Continually Strengthen the Ties and Cooperation Between the Military and Civilian Population"]

[Text] The establishment, consolidation, strengthening and continual perfecting of ties and cooperation between the military and civilians has been and remains an important and permanent task for the organs and basic organizations of the party and for their levers.

The party and Comrade Enver Hoxha have continually directed and advised that these ties and this cooperation should be understood and treated as indispensable factors for the revolutionary application of the Party line in the area of defense. Led by these directives and advice, and in execution of tasks set by the party at its eighth congress and at recent plenums of the central Committee, the party organs and organizations, in military and civilian life, have accomplished great work, in these last years too, for the strengthening of ties and cooperation between the military and civilians, a thing that has served to strengthen the combat readiness of the people and the defense capability of the country. Everywhere, among communists, cadres and the laboring masses, the work of the party has created a healthy opinion regarding the problems of defense; it has enlarged the scale of their recognition and has increased interest and activity with respect to their solution. The fact is an undeniable reality that defense questions are taking their proper place in the life of the party and the laboring masses in an increasingly better manner. There is increasing interest on the part of civilian organs and cadres in the resolution of problems that disturb the military detachments and units.

A clear expression of this understanding and appreciation of military-civilian cooperation is also the timely and qualified realization of tasks set by the commander in chief of the armed forces of the Socialist People's Republic of Albania, Comrade Enver Hoxha, on orders for the training year 1983. With joint efforts, the military-civilian training of the soldier-people was further perfected, while the combat readiness and defense capability of the country was raised to a higher level. In the meantime, the active cadres and units of the army, being better linked with the civilian population and becoming more closely acquainted with the problems of economic and social development in the districts and zones where they have been placed, give their assistance in solving these

problems. One positive fact, among others, is that the communists and cadres of the army, in the framework of strengthening and perfecting military-civilian ties and cooperation, always feel better about a task where, being specialists in military problems, they stand closer to organs of the party, the government and the economy not only to raise problems of defense, but especially to effectively assist so that defense questions should be understood as thoroughly as possible and should be treated as correctly as possible by the communists and laboring masses of the civilian population too, as well as to assist at close range so that the basic party organizations of the civilian population should conceptualize and lead in problems of defense at the same level and with the same feeling of responsibility that they have in leading problems of production.

Nevertheless, the party instructs us to further deepen and perfect the work done in the area of strengthening and perfecting military-civilian ties in accordance with the new conditions and tasks set for the consolidation of the country's defense capability. This requirement of the party and the time is dictated also by the fact that in the everyday practical activity of the party organs and basic organizations, military and civilian, there are still shortcomings and flaws, the elimination of which requires more diligent ideopolitical and organizational work, as well as better coordination of work by party committees in districts. The realization of current tasks in the area of defense requires a qualitative increase in the work of the party and its levers in order to lead and realize them with competence, by means of a more thorough knowledge of the military line of the party and of its directives in the area of defense.

#### We Must Thoroughly Understand the Political, Ideological and Organizational Content of Party Directives For the Strengthening of Military-Civilian Ties

Our Party, elaborating and following a clear, thoroughly Marxist-Leninist line for the defense of the country, has also devoted particular care to the preservation and continual strengthening of the popular character of our army and defense. All the ideopolitical work with the communists and the working masses has aimed at having this character thoroughly understood, at having the party's military line and policy assimilated as well as possible by the whole people and at having the tasks issuing from them executed precisely by all the defense structures. For that reason, the enemy activity of the insurrectionists and conspirators, Mehmet Shehu, Kadri Hazbiu, etc., who tried to strike at the military line of the party in general and at the popular character of the army in particular, met strong resistance and failed.

The Eighth AWP Congress once again made clear that "for the defense of the fatherland, our party has never relied on outside assistance or on various international conjunctures, but essentially on the internal factor, on the strength, patriotism and heroism of our people, as well as on the universal preparedness and permanent combat readiness of the whole country for its defense" (Enver Hoxha, "Report at the Eighth AWP Congress," pp 95-96).

The glorious period of the War of National Liberation and that of the building of socialism in our country have proved and continue to prove that the strength

of our army and our defense consists in the steel links with the people. Conscious of this, our army and people act jointly as one and inseparable for the continual strengthening of the country's defense capability, closely linked in unity also for the realization of tasks in production and economic and social development.

The broad and decidedly fruitful cooperation between the army and the civilian population is evidence of the understanding and correct application of the Party line in this area. At the same time, the party has called for the attention of its organs and basic organizations in the army and the civilian population in order that they may avoid any narrow and one-sided conception of the nature and of the ways and forms of the concrete realization of ties and cooperation which exist among us between military units and enterprises and institutions, between basic Party organizations and their levers in the army and those in civilian life.

The party has made it clear, above all, that its directive for the continual strengthening of military-civilian ties and cooperation does not exist for the purpose either of applying it in the merely organizational aspect of some rules and norms which regulate relations between civilian Party organizations and those of the military or of utilizing it as an aim in itself of some forms and means of this cooperation. This directive, emanating from the popular character of the army and our defense, and conveying high goals and objectives, such as the unceasing strengthening of the defense capability of the country, the deepening of the popular character of the army and, especially, the continual strengthening of the leading role of the Party in the armed forces, also requires that work for the strengthening and perfecting of relations and cooperation between the military and civilians should be measured at the same level as that which has served and continues to serve for the realization of fundamental tasks set by the Party for the increase of military capability of defense structures and for the unceasing strengthening of combat readiness on the part of the whole country for wartime.

The whole people is interested in and works for the solution of problems regarding the continual strengthening of the defense of our fatherland. For that reason the ties between the military and civilians should not be seen as ties between individuals, between some chief cadres of military units of districts for coordinating some activities or for mutual information on the state of affairs. In the districts of Durres, Gjirokaster, Diber, Shkoder, Lushnje and some others, where the party organs and organizations have done better formative, organizational and leading work for the correct conception and the placing of military-civilian cooperation in continuous operation and on a wide front, results in the execution of defense tasks are also greater. The thoughtful and qualified work of the party and its levers in these and in other districts has caused to prevail, among civilians and in the military, the readiness to solve troubling problems as soon as possible, to profit by the experience of one another's work, to become better acquainted, in a reciprocal manner, with the problems of the military or the civilian population, ever further limiting the place of one-sided views and petty bourgeois concepts that divide tasks into "mine" or "yours" and, consequently, relieve one another of responsibility in cases where shortcomings and nonfulfillments are observed.

The experience of work in the aforementioned districts and in others attests that a thorough understanding of the political and ideological content of military-civilian ties and their application in life greatly depends on a series of factors and, in the first place, on those of a conceptual character. In some cases the lack of a broad concept regarding defense problems constitutes the main factor which reduces military-civilian ties in the joint solution of some purely secondary problems, in the concentration of attention and forces for ordinary questions and for their solution with campaigns. It happens in practice that military-civilian cooperation remains only in the coordination of graphic representations of the exercise, in the security of some material bases or only when a complex tactical exercise is developed with troops. Naturally, these forms of cooperation are also necessary, but the problems of defense include a wide gamut of questions. "The defense of the fatherland," stressed the Eighth AWP Congress, "is strengthened and made invincible when the political, ideological, economic and military tasks in the field are understood and executed closely and inseparably with one another" (Enver Hoxha, "Report at the Eighth Congress of the AWP," p 97).

Where there is such a way of conceiving problems of the fatherland's defense, it is considered normal for the party organs and basic organizations to require and listen to occasional reports and information from the commands of units about the moral and political condition and military preparation of units which they complete, to invite, too, personnel cadres of the military unit which they have nearby to participate in their massive ideopolitical educational activities, as well as even to look after the living conditions of the unit's personnel, considering this personnel as part of the collective of the enterprise or agricultural cooperative.

Such a complex view and treatment of defense problems stimulates the communists and cadres of the army to turn to and require cooperation with the civilian population not only when they need a material base or in order to secure full participation in training, but continually and for many more important problems. The high level of readiness of the people for service in defense of the fatherland and the predisposition of organs of the Party, the government and the economy to fulfill the tasks in the area of defense must be corresponded to by qualified work on the part of the communists and cadres of the army in order that it may also be of value to civilian organs and cadres. It is necessary to generalize the valuable experience of those cadres of military units and of Free Military Schools who, after the development of training or tests of readiness, inform the basic organizations of the party and the worker collectives about the results achieved by their workers and the problems that remain which require further cooperation. In this framework it is also necessary to know and better generalize the experience of those communists in civilian life and in the army, selected at party forums, who, with a feeling of responsibility, raise problems of the defense or economic and social development of the zone.

The strengthening of military-civilian ties and coopertion has as its goal, first of all, that at the base of frequent coordinated political, ideological and organizational work, every citizen and worker should be made deeply conscious that he really has tasks in the area of production, but he also has tasks in the area of military preparation, in the same way as every communist and cadre

of the army is made conscious that the level of readiness of personnel in their units is closely linked also with the combat readiness of enterprises and agricultural cooperatives where these units and platoons have been distributed and with the combat capability and level of military preparation of all structures of defense. This consciousness is concretized up to the level that a good worker must also be a soldier, reservist or volunteer, prepared with all the qualities required for the defense of the fatherland; an enterprise or agricultural cooperative noted for its realization of economic tasks should be so also in terms of the realization of tasks of military service on the part of workers and their readiness for wartime. Generally, it happens this way in our practice.

The correct conception of the universal value of military-civilian ties and cooperation and the most effective realization possible of these ties is achieved by the party's education, formative, and organizational work among the civilian population, but also by the stationing of active army cadres, who have the problems of defense as the main task and object of their work, near civilian cadres. The continual connection with the enterprise or cooperative where the unit or platoon is stationed, their information on the results achieved in exercises or in tests of readiness by their worker-soldiers, the development of joint political and military activities to teach the people the Military Art of the People's War and everything that it requires for the defense of the fatherland are among the main tasks of the organs and organizations of the Party and the cadres in the army.

Besides this, it is necessary that it be correctly understood and always kept in mind that the military units and platoons must deal energetically and systematically with the problems of the socialist building of the country as a whole and with those of the economic and social development of the zone where they have been stationed. This is a question which is fulfilled both by the programmed educational work accomplished in the army and also by continual contacts and ties of workers in enterprises or agricultural cooperatives with platoon personnel, by the obligation of their chief cadres to keep this personnel informed about problems that trouble them and that they resolve, as well as about the perspectives for their development, etc. In this way, the assistance of military units and platoons in the resolution of these problems is also made more natural, especially by means of the participation of soldiers in the actions undertaken by economic enterprises and agricultural cooperatives. In some districts, such as Shkoder, Kukes and Korce, etc., organized and programmed work made in this direction has served greatly to strengthen close links between the military and the civilian population.

As is seen, the military-civilian ties have a broad and universal content among us. They do not have anything in common with the old concept of the barracks army which intentionally separated the army physically from the people. Always keeping in mind the instruction of the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha about unceasingly strengthening the ties of the army with the people leads and will also lead in the future to the natural integration of defense problems into the life of the Party and the masses, to the realization of the party's militant slogan: "The defense of the fatherland is a duty above all other duties."

## The Fruitfulness of Cooperation is Measured Primarily by the Strengthening of the Defense Capability of the Fatherland

At the current stage, the fundamental objective of the party's directive on strengthening military-civilian ties is the timely and correct resolution of basic problems of combat readiness and of the training of all structures in order to further consolidate the country's defense capability.

The party has directed that constant readiness, regular training in the perfect mastery of the arms with which we have been entrusted, as well as in the Military Art of People's Warfare, the taking up to now in peacetime of all measures for state and civil defense in enterprises, villages and city neighborhoods are tasks which must be fulfilled everywhere and by everyone with a high degree of conscientiousness and with full responsibility. In fact, by the great work which has been accomplished until now in this area, combat readiness has become increasingly perfect. Nevertheless, the struggle for there to be a full and universal conception everywhere and by all of combat readiness must keep increasing at all times because cases are also encountered in practice of partial attention to only a few universal elements of readiness, without introducing them into the whole complex of problems which have to be made with them.

Actually, there are some problems which require greater engagement on the part of the basic Party organizations and on the part of the cadres of the government and the civilian economy. It is required from them that they increase and qualify their assistance for the quality of military preparedness of voluntary forces, for an increase in the level of combat readiness of enterprises and agricultural cooperatives, for the preservation and best possible maintenance of the technology, weaponry and material values which the reservists have in use, for the improvement of work in the physical training of workers, especially of the young generation, etc.

These problems are among the most essential for the cadres of the army; it is therefore necessary to pursue them progressively and, together with the organs of the party, the government and the economy in civil life, to struggle to raise the level of readiness of structures in enterprises or agricultural cooperatives, to preserve and treat the technology and weaponry in use in a good manner, to see to the full readiness of fortified objects, etc. In these matters, each has his own tasks. It is important to take concrete measures and to undertake continual actions in order to achieve a full and timely resolution of those problems too where there is observed a deficiency and lagging in their resolution.

Great attention is required for the qualitative increase of military preparation and especially for short-term training, which must be better placed under the direction and control of party organs and basic organizations. In this matter, the army and the civilian population have their particular and joint tasks.

The work of the party has always intended and continues to intend that short-term training be placed on the most scientific base possible. The achievement of this objective requires that more close observations and experiments be organized, that confrontations and generalizations be made, engaging and mobilizing for this purpose the most competent cadres and specialists from all the

structures. This will make it possible to combat manifestations of routine and monotony and to find a wide application of creative thought in training.

The establishment of norms in all the components of short-term training is the most effective means of controlling and evaluating the level of training of each soldier, reservist, volunteer, pupil and student. There is great importance attached also to the task set by the Party for the perfection of training programs, in order to make them as scientific as possible, in accordance with the requirements of the time and with the general level of participants in the various structures of defense, and with the military capability which they gain in secondary schools and schools of higher education, both premilitary and in the training of several years as a reserve soldier and volunteer in the Free Military Schools. Such work will make it possible for programs to be differentiated according to years of service, for useless repetitions to be avoided, etc.

In the application of training programs, an important place is taken by the struggle against partiality and simplification, giving precedence especially to the tactical preparation of the soldier, the platoon and the company, which constitutes the synthesis of all the other types and elements of military preparation, as well as the most important means of combatting monotony and routine. Today, more than ever before, it is required that we understand and evaluate tactical training, as Comrade Enver Hoxha advises, as a complex and scientific matter which tempers the body, which develops the imagination, which stimulates attempts to discover the most feasible variants for assault, for maneuvers and for defense--in short, which stimulates creativeness in the area of training.

In the achievement of these objectives of training, to fully develop them dynamically and energetically, the personnel cadres play an important role, but so do the reservists who come from the civilian population. Here too, therefore, there is another area for cooperation between the Party organs and organizations of the army and those of the civilian population. They must jointly require from their cadres that the level of training be continually raised.

In order to raise the scientific level of short-term training, the organs of the party and the commands of units must cooperate more with the organs of the Party, the government and the economy to combat several manifestations of one-sidedness and undervaluation in training which are observed in some workers. With joint work it is possible and necessary to perfect, maintain and make good use of the material base of Free Military Schools in such a way that training may be made comprehensible and more diversified. Without a full material base, it is impossible to have intensive tactical training. In addition, the Party organs of civilian life must view as one of their important matters not only the participation of all able-bodied individuals in training, because every citizen must be trained militarily, apart from the function and task that he has in civilian life, but also the close pursuit of all work that is accomplished for the assimilation of the program, for the perfecting of all elements of combat readiness, as well as for the patriotic and revolutionary education of the people.

There are many examples for the great role played by ideopolitical formation and patriotic education in the increase in fruitfulness of training. The Youth Committees of districts, in cooperation with the commands of units and Free Military Schools, have developed and continue to develop diversified activities for the masses, such as marches, excursions, visits to historic centers, conversations with veterans of war and labor, competitions in the knowledge and use of technology and weaponry, etc. There are possibilities for such activities to be organized everywhere. With more diligence and with better cooperation between civilian and military forces, the content of these activities may be deepened and enriched, as may be their effectiveness in the whole process of training and readiness for the defense of the fatherland.

One of the concrete objectives of military-civilian cooperation is also the consolidation and further raising of the level of military preparedness of those workers who take part in Free Military Schools; they represent the basic centers of the people's preparation for the defense of the fatherland and an important link between the army and the civilian population.

In fact, time and practice have fully confirmed the correctness of decisions and measures taken by the party for the increase and consolidation of Free Military Schools. Nevertheless, the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha have directed and have continually drawn the attention of communists and cadres of the army and civilian life to the facts that, with joint work, the level of work in these schools should be raised ever higher, that the commands of units and platoons should have a higher regard for them in order to further perfect the organization and direction of all the work in them, as well as to increase, in the cadres of these schools, the feeling of responsibility for the productive and intensive development of short-term training, according to definite programs.

The time appointed for the training of participants in Free Military Schools is fully sufficient to retain new military knowledge and to further develop and perfect it. The point is that this time should be utilized in a highly productive manner. We stress this after practice has indicated that there are also cases of simplifications and concessions--up to the point of nonfulfillment of the time planned for training. In addition, those opinions and practices are false and must be strongly combatted which state that the gaps created by programmed training may be filled by training outside the designated time. Naturally, this does not mean that additional training will be renounced in particular cases. But in every case, this additional training should be accomplished after having effectively utilized the reserves of the legally designated time and after the necessity of additional training has been well confirmed.

The elimination of shortcomings observed in the work of some cadres in Free Military Schools requires that the party organizations and the commands of military units and platoons remain closer to commands and cadres of these schools, assisting them to better organize their work and qualitatively develop their training, but also demanding more of an accounting when they do not realize their tasks.

The progression created by Free Military Schools must also be better utilized as a connective link between the military and the civilian population. With their military organization, with their extension into every work center, with the form of construction of party and youth organizations in these schools, they have created all the possibilities for military-civilian ties and cooperation to be further deepened and perfected. It is a fact that there are now many Free Military Schools where the problems of preparation and combat readiness have been better taken in hand by the Party bureaus, by the directorates of enterprises and by the heads of agricultural cooperatives, and there is frequent activity in the patriotic and military education of participants in these schools. Examples of these are the SHLU /Free Military School/ of Sukth, in the Durres district, the metallurgical combine Steel of the Party in Elbasan, the automobile and tractor combine Enver Hoxha in Tirana, etc. The military cadres of these schools maintain close ties with their civilian comrades, inform them about the problems they have and coordinate work for their resolution.

In order to raise the level of work in the Free Military Schools, particular attention must be given to strengthening the leading role of Party committees in them. It is therefore required that the Party committees of districts, but also those of military units, assist at close quarter in increasing the quality of work of party committees in Free Military schools, in order that they may occupy themselves with the major problems of the content of the training program of all structures and better realize cooperation with the basic party organizations and their levers in work centers where schools are distributed. The party committees in districts and their apparatus must view and treat the Party committees of these schools as an inseparable part of the organizational structure of the party in a district, as well as accomplish special work for the training and qualification of their secretaries.

There are many areas of military-civilian connection and cooperation. The point is that on the basis of deep convictions regarding the necessity of frontal, coordinated and qualified work, and combatting every manifestation of spontaneity, superficiality and one-sidedness, the party committees in districts and the party bureaus of military units must define concrete measures for every object for which work will be cooperated upon and coordinated not only at the district level but even up to that between party bureaus of military units and party bureaus of economic enterprises and agricultural cooperatives. The compilation and responsible pursuit by every communist and cadre of the civilian and military population of programs of cooperation, as life itself is also indicating, constitutes one of the basic factors for the successful solution of tasks which have to increase the level of military preparation and readiness of the people, for the further strengthening of the defense capability of our socialist fatherland.

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DAILY DISCUSSES INTRAPARTY DEMOCRACY, FORMALISM

Conduct of Party Meetings

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 21 Nov 83 p 3

[Article by Nikola Dimitrov, instructor at the interokrug party school in Burgas: "When the Meeting Goes Smoothly"]

[Text] The theme of the meeting, which this newspaper has been discussing within the framework of a seminar conducted by correspondence, evokes a justified interest. It is well known that constantly increasing activity on the part of our party members, their increasingly comprehensive and creative participation in discussing and carrying out resolutions that have been made, is the essence of intraparty democracy. The letters addressed to the editors, which we received after the publication of the primary materials, speak about well-prepared, meaningful, effective conversations of communists, about the courageous, concrete examination of the current problems of our development. In addition, some negative facts and phenomena have also been taken into consideration--the trend simply to hold a meeting, just to "write it off," avoiding arguments, critical notes, a tense atmosphere, all of which engender passivity, indifference. It is the duty of the primary organizations to create a relaxed atmosphere at the meeting, so that each communist can express his thoughts, show creativity and initiative, discipline and responsibility, and have his own active position.

It is all too "easy." You give someone the floor, you suggest that all discussion should stop, a vote is taken. You might have been against it, but once a decision has been made, you should go along with it. The plan is about to be elaborated; what questions should we include?

I would also like to take a stand on the subject of party meetings, a topic that has been discussed in the correspondence seminar on intraparty democracy, organized by this newspaper. I have attended many open and closed meetings of primary organizations, I have discussed this question with many party secretaries and ordinary communists. Everyone is convinced that this is the point where we discover if intraparty democracy exists or not, if it is genuine or only formal.

I would like to give some examples of well-organized meetings, where there was a lot of active participation on the part of communists and non-party members in studying, discussing, and solving the problems examined. At some places, they appoint commissions which include a broad range of specialists and workers, for elaborating draft decisions or for executing them after they have been made. I have, however, also attended meetings which have obviously been called quickly, which were held only for the sake of reporting them to the committee. There are always the same people who express their opinions, the same people who chair the meetings, the same who give papers, the agenda is announced at the beginning of the meeting, people have to listen to very long reports. Some of the meetings are held according to a script prepared in advance, and they go very "smoothly," they are easy to lend. You give the floor, in order, to those who "signed up"; after the last one has read his speech, you suggest that all discussion should cease, a vote is taken, and that is it. I asked a certain comrade after such a meeting had ended: "Is everything okay in the organization, are there no problems?" He answered: "What could I say? We have had stormy meetings too, but now they warned us that there would be some 'highly placed' representatives, so we should try to do our best not to make a bad impression."

The worst is that sometimes such meetings are evaluated highly. They say that there was an absolute majority in the organization concerning the question examined, and so forth. In the case of arguments, sharp criticism, a struggle of opinion, the meeting is unfavorably evaluated. Of course, we should approach each case concretely, but I personally favor those meetings at which there is a clash of opinion, rather than the smooth meetings where there is no conflict.

The question of intraparty democracy should not be separated from party discipline. It often happens that at the high levels of the primary organization, there are quite a few absences for "emergency reasons." In many cases, these are responsible comrades who are on a business assignment, or entertaining guests at the enterprise, and so forth. Once at a party meeting half of the communists were absent, though this was not mentioned in the minutes. There are party members who vote for a suggested resolution at a meeting; however, they do not participate in its execution afterwards. Others, who held a different opinion, say: "I was against it; whoever voted for the resolution should work toward its implementation." Of course, these are rare examples, but we do encounter them. It is not always understood that this is a flagrant violation of democratic centralism. Great efforts are being made on the part of party committees and the primary organizations to promote the role of party meetings in order to expand intraparty democracy. I would like to share some of my experience working with two committees in Burgas Okrug, where my observations and impressions are more direct.

In Pomorie, each primary organization has its own well-furnished club and a room for the party secretary. The establishment of the material base and conditions for effective work has been a big success for the communal organization. The meetings take place in a pleasant setting, not in administrative offices or workshops as they had before. There is a sign there, placed so that everyone can see it, which says that the organization will have a meeting on such and such a date, with the agenda to be announced, and all communists and non-party members are urged to participate with their questions and

suggestions should be dropped in the appropriate box. In some clubs, the following announcement can be read: "The organization's plan is about to be prepared. Please give your suggestions for discussion at the party meetings." The purposeful ideas and opinions are taken into consideration by the party bureau.

The coastal rayon committee in Burgas held a special plenum on the problem of party meetings and the development of intraparty democracy. A great deal of preparatory work was done: sociological study, many visits to meetings by committee workers, appointments with party bureaus, analyzing positive experiences in primary organizations on this matter. There was no report presented at the plenum itself, only an introductory speech by the committee secretary. The main directions of the rayon party organization for raising the level of party meetings as a factor in developing intraparty democracy were discussed. A much greater number of members than usual expressed opinions.

Many meetings of the primary organizations in the rayon are held in this way--without long reports, with only a short presentation of the resolutions to be made and the activities to be planned. In some cases, there is an oral presentation. The rayon committee urges and stimulates any initiative and activity of the party bureaus in this direction. At their gatherings, the party groups make evaluations of the activity of each communist. Individual work is reinforced. In some larger enterprises, general or delegated meetings of communists are held, in which problems of party organization and workers' collectives are discussed. I think that this is the only true path--to raise the level of communists' activity, to expand intraparty democracy.

#### More Stimulating Party Meetings

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 19 Dec 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Tsvyatko Uzunov: "To Make It More Interesting"]

[Text] Why do we go to a meeting? To discuss a question that concerns everyone. To develop collective opinion and decisions. To share our thoughts. And more--to learn something: what is happening in our country and worldwide. Does this always happen, however? No. Sometimes formalism and cliché, which at first sight appear insignificant, transform political interest into obligation mandated in by-laws.

Since the beginning of the correspondence newspaper seminar on the subject of intraparty democracy, I wait impatiently for each issue. I look first for a publication on this topic. I was very impressed by Nikola Dimitrov's article entitled "When the Meeting Goes Smoothly," published in No 325. I think that cliché and formalism in intraparty democracy are the biggest obstacle in preventing meetings from being more interesting and effective.

I have been a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party for many years. I have organizational experience. I have been secretary of a Komsomol organization, president of a trade union organization, member of the party bureau at the enterprises where I have worked, and I am now retired. I can make the

following conclusions and recommendations from my years of membership in various party organizations.

It is not good that the same people take the floor in party meetings most of the time. There are other comrades, however, who do not take the floor for 4 or 5 years, and still others who wait for the annual meeting, when they can speak up, but only about production matters, without taking into consideration that the report examines ideological and organizational activities as well. Thus the meeting turns into a production conference. The party bureau and party meeting do not neutralize this phenomenon. The director of the enterprise also takes the floor, but usually at the end, by making an evaluation of what the other comrades have said beforehand, whether their opinion was right or wrong.

I have asked many the following question: "Why do you not take the floor at a meeting and express your position on the questions that are raised?" The answer is that those who talk a lot and criticize the enterprise's leadership will be put in their place sooner or later. I believe that such a philosophy, which is unfortunately becoming established among many members, does not help in creating good conditions for developing intraparty democracy.

Why is it that in the reports read at our meetings we try hard to mention only the good things and often keep silent about the shortcomings and those who bear responsibility for them?

Does anyone really need this? No one does. We act that way because it is easier. If I do not criticize, then I will not be criticized either. The example set by the Central Committee, by Comrade Todor Zhivkov, requires precisely the opposite, because without criticism and self-criticism, there is no movement forward.

What should we say about some party members, whose speeches are filled with ingratiation? I attended a plenum of the rayon committees of the Bulgarian Communist Party several years ago, at which the director kept pointing to the secretary's positive characteristics, and because of this the audience burst into laughter, including the secretary.

There are cases where the instructor from the rayon or city committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party has not attended a meeting of the party organization for a whole year, and the communists do not even know him. The party secretary, who did not invite him, is of course responsible for this--not wanting someone to take the floor and speak up harshly, because then the instructor would learn that not everything was going well there.

Very often the director of the enterprise takes part in leading the meeting without any reason. In my opinion, he is an ordinary member and his place is among the other members. Otherwise, he could prevent the party members from expressing their opinions. At some places, either at open or at closed meetings, the director and deputy director take their seats at the presidium and the secretary announces the agenda. People begin to think that it would be humiliating for these comrades, especially the director, not to be sitting among the active presidium.

A few words about the evaluations of the economic and administrative manager, which are made each year by the party bureau and are given to the committee. In my opinion these evaluations should be prepared by the party bureau but should obligatorily be examined at the meeting. Only then will the meeting have the authority of the highest leading organ of the party organization.

It is correct that the reports should be distributed among the members prior to the opening of a meeting, plenum, etc., and then the person presenting the report should give only an introductory speech. Thus there would be more time left for lengthy discussion. Of course, the discussion should not be conducted according to a "script," as happens at many places, by preparing and appointing in advance those comrades who would express their opinion; at other places they even check on what these people will say. Every communist has the right to express his opinion honestly, whenever he wants.

I would like to say at the end that, in order to achieve true intraparty democracy, it is very important always to promote honest and principled secretaries and members of the party bureaus who do not stand above the party organizations.

#### Formalism in Party Activities

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 23 Jan 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vasil Zangov, director of the Trud factory in Ruse: "With Reference to the Article 'Quantity's Clothes Have Become Tight'"]

[Text] Formalism in party activity. We still speak often about this phenomenon. What is its nature? Briefly, it is contained in the tendency, the attraction, the momentum toward complying with the external forms and rules, to the detriment of the essence of things, of social and collective needs. It happens that we continue to use forms which bear the sign of the old, but we do not add to them, we do not adjust them according to the new requirements. We often measure the activity of party organizations by the number of meetings and conferences held, and by other visible manifestations, not by their quality, by the results. Formalism diminishes the interest in political, ideological, and organizational activity.

Our party has always viewed the development of intraparty democracy as an obligatory condition for the success of its activity as the political avant-garde of the working class and leader of the people. This is why I have been following, with unceasing interest, the seminar on intraparty democracy organized by RABOTNICHESKO DELO and conducted by correspondence.

The problem is very complex and timely. It is determined by the concrete contents of the principles of intraparty democracy at the current historical stage.

In my opinion, the meaning of intraparty democracy is the conscious activity and struggle of each communist to achieve the party's historical goals.

Intraparty democracy is a form of the real manifestation in practice of the equal opportunities of each communist, and it provides coordination and purposefulness to the communists' activities.

Comrade Tsvyatko Uzunov (RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 19 December 1984) shares his very interesting thoughts about the negative limitations within intraparty democracy.

I have also been a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party for many years. I have been secretary of a factory party committee, I have worked within the trade union system, have been the department head of the okrug committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, have worked for the organs of state and people's control, and am now director of a factory. I have drawn the following conclusion: everything is much more complex than what we accept and explain from the level at which we work.

In many cases, the meaningfulness of intraparty democracy is narrowed by the framework of quantitative factors--the number of people who have spoken up, meetings held, number of assignments--whereas the quality aspect is being overlooked or rather becomes simplified by formal considerations and arguments. It seems to me that there is an element of formalism even in Comrade Uzunov's thoughts. The essence is not in the fact that "the director kept pointing to the secretary's positive characteristics," but why he was doing this. Why not try to find the reasons for the praise of the secretary? And why not assume that such a phenomenon might be a sign of intraparty democracy violated at other levels. Unfortunately, I have found that there are quite a few secretaries of factory party committees, of primary party organizations, who outclass the representatives of my "profession" in this respect.

I think that formalism definitely has its most negative influence when applied to the principles and norms of intraparty democracy. There exist, in reality, secretaries of primary party organizations who have not been replaced for 15-20 years. I consider this a negation of intraparty democracy.

The entrenchment of the same secretary of a primary party organization over the course of 15 or 20 years makes the very election within the organization a formal act. This entrenchment smothers any activity because the secretary surrounds himself with his own most active members; he imposes an organizational stereotype, which is much more negative than the habit some directors have of speaking up at the end. The essential thing is the motives, the class-party position of the communist.

In my opinion, the permanent membership of some party bureaus and the entrenchment of party secretaries is one of the most serious violations of intraparty democracy, a precondition for suppressing criticism, for overlooking the principles of working with party members. These phenomena cause indifference and apathy in communists, which is transferred to non-party members. Consequently, Lenin's principle of removability of the members of a party bureau should be applied unconditionally in practice as being the reality of intraparty democracy and the condition for its constant extension.

The objective evaluation of the contribution and deeds of each communist is an extremely important condition and factor in intraparty democracy. In many

cases, instead of objective evaluation there is artificial praising, exaggerated "merits," which create the atmosphere of "ours" and "theirs." In this case it might seem that all external requirements for collectivism have been observed; in reality, however, intraparty democracy has been violated in its essence.

I definitely consider that scripts are negating intraparty democracy in the primary organization. The election of a chair is determined according to the script of the secretary of the primary party organization and he is "nominated" by a communist he has chosen himself. This is called not only formalism but one-man will as well and one-man evaluation of communists, which negatively affects intraparty democracy. Such is the nature of a scripted speech. After all, all of this is a negation of the principle that each communist should participate in the establishment and realization of the party line.

The "staff" activists also have a negative influence. It is well known that the secretary of the primary organization, as a human being, favors some and "forgets" others, or has doubts about their capacities. In order to develop intraparty democracy, each communist should be given real and concrete assignments, should be helped in fulfilling his organizational tasks. Otherwise, there is a narrow circle of "very active" communists who take over almost all leading functions within the collective. Here we are with a very serious problem--secretaries or party bureau members should not be placed above the primary organization. The control and help on the part of the party committee and its representatives, which should be more systematic, and the evaluations, which should be more critical, is an important condition for the development of intraparty democracy.

Insufficient knowledge of the meaning and principles of intraparty democracy, of the rights and obligations of communists, is also the reason for the presence of formalism in intraparty democracy.

#### Party Punishment of Communists

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 28 Mar 84 p3

[Article by Yoto Patsov, RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondent in Ruse: "Justified Strictness, Friendly Concern"]

[Text] A punishment imposed, no matter how timely and fair it may be, does not in itself resolve the question of directly influencing the guilty communist. Would anyone -- left alone by himself -- find enough strength to overcome all that has caused his comrades' censure?

It is obvious that the concern of the members of the party bureau, the party committee, of each communist, is needed in order to help the person punished to overcome his weaknesses, to be aware of the justice of the punishment imposed, to feel the friendly concern of those around him. Of course, this help should be based on principle, without permitting any underestimation of the reasons for imposing punishment as an act of influencing.

This is precisely why the experience of the Ruse communal party organization deserves attention. As a result of the measures outlined and put into practice, according to the requirements of the Bulgarian Communist Party for imposing, removing, or repealing party punishments, a steady tendency toward improving the organizational, political and educational activity in this respect has taken shape. The interrelation between factory party committees and the factory revision commissions has been improved; the punished communists are given lectures, positive experience about working with them is exchanged, and so forth.

The substantial checking that was conducted last year is a legitimate expression of the increased attention that the communal commission for revision and control has devoted to working with punished communists. In addition to the satisfactory work of most of the party organizations in the community, disturbing shortcomings were noticed. They are mostly related to the preparation for and conduct of meetings on discussing the party position with regard to those found to be at fault. For instance, during the first 8 months of last year, less than 80 percent of the communists attended meetings of the communal organization, at which 35 percent of the total number of those punished received a punishment. Written information on them is not always prepared; in many cases the punishment is not very well justified.

Not all organizations do systematic work with punished communists. During 1982, 40 percent of them were not evaluated on the implementation of their party assignments. In some cases, no individual conversations are conducted with them. There are also cases in which the question of repealing the party punishment, after the 1-year term has expired, is raised -- for example, in some primary organizations in the Gavril Genov economic chemical combine, the Arda plant, and others. It is disturbing that during the last academic year, 21 percent of the punished communists were not included in some form of party education. Sometimes the announcement of a punishment imposed on a communist who is transferred from one primary organization to another is overlooked. The membership cards of some who have been punished are not regularly signed, and so forth.

It is evident that such failings diminish the role of party punishment; they do not contribute to its full influence, either on the person being punished or on his comrades; they weaken its educational effect.

The facts that have been established with regard to unsatisfactory work with communists punished by some organizations have in fact caused the extensive checking, mentioned above, the results of which were discussed at the plenum of the communal commission for revision and control.

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REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO MILITARY ACADEMIES IN 1984-85

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 12 Mar 84 p 2

[Text] Admission Requirements for Students Applying to Higher Military Academies of the Ministry of National Defense in 1984-85

A. Student Admission at Higher Military Academies

V. Levski National Higher Military Academy

The school has command, command-engineering, non-combat, and political programs.

1. The command program requires 4 years of education and offers the following specialties: motorized infantry, border troops, armored combat troops, and motorized infantry for the People's Militia.
2. The command-engineering program requires 4 years of education and offers the following specialties: signal troops, chemical troops, automobile troops, and engineering troops.
3. The engineering program requires 5 years of education and offers the following specialty: armored technical troops.
4. The program for non-combat troops offers the following specialties: provisions and warehouse, and fuels and lubricants. The period of education is 4 years.
5. The political program requires 4 years of education.

Georgi Dimitrov National Higher Military Artillery Academy

The academy has command, command-engineering, engineering, and political programs.

1. The command program requires 4 years of education and offers the following specialties: field artillery, technical artillery, and antiaircraft artillery.

2. The command-engineering program requires 4 years of education and offers two specialties: instrumental artillery reconnaissance and geodesy, cartography, and photogrammetry.

3. The engineering program requires 5 years of education and offers the following specialties: artillery equipment, radiotechnical radar troops, computer technology, automated control systems of the Bulgarian People's Army, and anti-aircraft troops.

4. The political program requires 4 years of education.

Georgi Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy

The school has command-engineering and engineering programs.

1. The command-engineering program offers the following specialties: pilot, navigator-vectoring, and air force headquarters.

The period of education is 5 years.

2. The engineering program requires 5 years of education and offers the following specialties: operation and repair of aircraft, operation and repair of aircraft navigation equipment, operation and repair of aircraft radioelectronic equipment, operation and repair of signal and radiotechnical devices, and operation and repair of aircraft armament.

N.Y. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy

The school has command-engineering and political programs--both require 5 years of education.

1. The command-engineering program offers the following specialties: ship navigator for the navy, ship navigator for the merchant marine.

2. The engineering program offers the following specialties: ship machines and mechanisms for the navy, ship machines and mechanisms for the merchant marine, radiolocation and hydroacoustics.

3. Political program.

\* \* \*

Graduating from military academies is considered regular military service; those who graduate will receive a commission as a lieutenant-engineer (lieutenant) and a higher civil education and training which correspond to the specialty in which they graduate.

The young people who apply for admission to higher military academies are admitted under the following conditions: they should have completed their high school education; they should have proper political orientation; they should be Bulgarian citizens; they should take military service to heart;

they should be active members of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union; they should be physically healthy; they should not be more than 23 years of age, and for those who apply to become pilots--21 years of age (the age is determined on 1 September of the year of qualification); they should not be married, not have been convicted, on trial, or under investigation; they should have been designated by the commander of the detachment (for those who are members of the armed forces); those who have re-enlisted and have graduated from a military high school should have an average grade no lower than "very good" (5.00) and no less than 1 year of service in the Bulgarian People's Army.

Every young person has the right to apply, for all specialties (arranged according to preference), at three higher military academies. He should list as his first choice either the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Academy or the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy, and as second and third choices--the other two academies (V. Levski Higher National Military Artillery Academy and G. Dimitrov Higher National Military Aviation Academy), according to the applicant's preference.

If the candidate is applying to two higher military academies, he can list, as the first and second choices for a higher educational institution, the V. Levski Higher National Military Academy and the G. Dimitrov Higher National Military Aviation Academy or the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy, and, as a second choice, one of the other two academies (V. Levski Higher National Military Academy and G. Dimitrov Higher National Military Artillery Academy).

Each candidate sends the following documents, which first go to the military district chief to whom he reports and then to the chief of the appropriate higher military academy: a standard application form for admission to a competitive examination (if the candidate is applying to more than one military academy he fills out an application for each one of them, according to the order of his preference); a competitive standard card on which the candidate is obliged to list the desired specialties in the order of which he would like to be accepted; if the candidate is applying to more than one higher military academy, he should fill out a separate competitive card for each one of them; an autobiography (the forms for the three documents mentioned above may be obtained from the military district); a diploma showing the completed high school education or an officially certified transcript; birth certificate; a certificate showing no previous convictions; a pedagogical record for applying to a higher military academy; an affidavit that he will serve no less than 10 years in the Bulgarian People's Republic Armed Forces or in the appropriate administrations for which he is to be trained; documents showing that the candidate can use a certain privilege (if he has the right to use one).

Applicants in the military service present the above-mentioned documents to the detachment commanders.

The documents of those who have been designated for applying to a military academy, together with the health records, excerpts from the military record

concerning praise and imposed punishments and the personnel record are sent to the military district commanders to whom the military servicemen report.

When applying to more than one higher military academy, the applicant sends all documents to the academy of first choice, and his application and competitive card to all the rest.

Candidates' applications which lack any necessary document or are not filled out legibly are not accepted.

Deadlines for presenting documents by the candidates are as follows: by 4 June for those who have graduated before 1984 and for military servicemen, and 16 July for those who graduate in 1984.

After these deadlines, new documents or any presented late are not accepted.

There will be 30 days of preparatory courses for the candidates who are serving their term as soldiers, and soldiers and cadets from the National Academy for Officers in the Reserve; these are held at the higher military academies where the applicants have presented their documents. The preparatory course for the candidates applying to the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy and the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy will begin on 9 July 1984, and at the V. Levski Higher National Military Academy and the G. Dimitrov Higher National Military Artillery Academy on 16 July 1984.

The competitive entrance exams and the examination of the candidates' physical and psychophysiological traits will take place at the higher military academies to which the candidates have sent their main package of documents.

Candidates applying to the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy and the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy should present themselves no later than 2:00 pm on 5 August 1984, and those applying to the V. Levski Higher National Military Academy no later than 2:00 pm on 12 August 1984.

The candidates for the specialty of pilot should present themselves at the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy no later than 2:00 pm on 23 July 1984.

Those young people who have applied to the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy and the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy, but have not been accepted, may present themselves at the V. Levski Higher National Military Academy or the G. Dimitrov Higher National Military Artillery Academy no later than 8:00 am on 17 August 1984.

The candidates for all higher military academies take two written competitive entrance exams--one special topic exam, and one general knowledge exam.

The special topics for exams are as follows: for the political orientation program--the history of Bulgaria and, for the political orientation program

at the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy, mathematics; for the specialty of chemical troops--chemistry; for all other specialties--mathematics.

The entrance exams are conducted according to programs established by the Ministry of National Education and are designed in accordance with the syllabus at the integrated secondary polytechnical school (for the specialty of chemical troops--the chemical syllabus for application to universities and chemistry-technological higher education institutions).

The candidates applying for the specialty of pilot will have to pass a psychophysiological test whose methods have been specifically developed by the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy. The psychophysiological qualities of the candidates are evaluated according to the scheme of rating based on six as the highest score.

The period of time for evaluating the qualities of the candidates and for rating their written test is as follows:

For the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy and the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy:

--from 6 to 10 August 1984: examination of psychophysiological qualities, physical and medical examination (for the specialty of pilot, these activities will take place from 23 July to 10 August 1984);

--on 11 August 1984: written mathematics entrance exam;

--on 13 August 1984: written general knowledge entrance exam.

For the V. Levski Higher National Military Academy and the G. Dimitrov Higher National Military Artillery Academy:

--from 13 to 17 August 1984: examination of psychophysiological qualities and medical examination;

--on 18 August 1984: written mathematics entrance exam;

--on 19 August 1984: written history entrance exam (for the political orientation program);

--on 20 August 1984: written general knowledge entrance exam;

--on 21 August 1984: written chemistry entrance exam (for the specialty of chemical troops at the V. Levski Higher National Military Academy).

The psychophysiological test for the candidates for the specialty of pilot, the check of psychophysiological and physical qualities and the medical examinations take place according to schedules prepared by the higher military academies.

The physical qualities of the candidates will be tested according to the following events and norms: horizontal bar--no less than 6 lifts; 100 meter dash, standing position start--no more than 15.5 seconds; 1000 meter cross country race--no more than 4 minutes, 10 seconds; 100 meter swimming--no more than 3 minutes (only for the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy).

The athletic uniform (supplied by the candidates themselves).

The physical qualities of the candidates are evaluated as follows: "fit for a higher education institution" or "not fit for a higher education institution."

The latter is given to a candidate who has not met the norms on two or more of the examination events.

The psychophysiological examination of the candidates is carried out according to a special method developed by the higher military academies. The psychophysiological qualities of the candidates are evaluated as either "fit for a higher education institution" or "not fit for a higher education institution."

The medical examinations take place according to the requirements of the "Descriptive Table of Diseases and Physical Defects." The candidates for the specialty of pilot are required to take a special aviomedical examination.

A candidate who has received a "not fit for a higher education institution" evaluation at the psychophysiological and physical or medical examination drops out of further participation in the entrance exam for all higher education institutions. Those who were evaluated as "fit for a higher education institution" are admitted to the written test on the special topic.

The candidate's results of "fit for a higher education institution" on the psychophysiological and physical examinations, and the medical examination, and the evaluations from the written tests on the special topic and on general knowledge received from the higher military academy of his first choice are taken into consideration, if positive, for the other higher military academies indicated on the candidate's application.

A candidate who has not been accepted at his first-choice military academy (the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy, the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy) may take a written competitive exam on the special topic and on general knowledge at the second-choice higher military academy; thus, the evaluations received at the first-choice higher education institution are not taken into account. The evaluations received at the second-choice higher education institution, however, are taken into account for the third-choice higher military academy, which has been indicated on the application.

Young people who are applying to a civil higher education institution and a higher military academy at the same time are obliged to take an entrance exam at the military academy as well.

The sessions of the admission commissions for the G. Benkovski Higher National Military Aviation Academy and the N. Vaptsarov Higher National Naval Academy will take place on 15 and 16 August 1984, and for the V. Levski Higher National Military Academy and the G. Dimitrov Higher National Military Artillery Academy on 23 and 24 August 1984.

If the accepted candidates do not present themselves at the appropriate military academy on the appointed date, their places will be filled by candidates from the waiting list in order of their acceptance.

#### B. Student Admission at the G. Dimitrov Higher Physical Education Institute

Young people who are applying to the G. Dimitrov Higher Physical Education Institute in the specialty of physical education in the Bulgarian People's Army should fulfill the requirements for students at the higher military academies. They should send their documents to the G. Dimitrov Higher Physical Education Institute according to the regulations of the Student Directory for 1984-85.

The following documents, certified by the military district in which the candidates report, are presented to the chief of the Chavdar Army School for Higher Sports and Medicine: an application, an autobiography, birth certificate, a certificate showing no previous convictions, a document showing that a privilege can be used, a transcript of grades for completed education, and an affidavit stating the applicant will serve in the Bulgarian People's Army for no less than 10 years after graduating from the institute. The documents should reach the military district prior to 16 July 1984.

The conditions and order of conducting the entrance exams are indicated in the regulations of the G. Dimitrov Higher Physical Education Institute for student admission for 1984-85. Those who are serving their regular term and who will not be discharged by October 1984 do not have the right to apply.

Those accepted in the specialty of physical training in the Bulgarian People's Army have the rights and obligations of students at the higher military academies.

#### C. Admission of Students with Scholarships from the Ministry of National Defense

The scholarship students supported by the Ministry of National Defense are accepted in the following specialties: medicine--at the institutes of medicine in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Pleven, and Stara Zagora; physics--in Kl. Okhridski University in Sofia, for meteorologists in the Bulgarian People's Army.

The scholarship students supported by the Ministry of National Defense who are applying for these specialties should satisfy the requirements for higher military academies. They send their documents, without exception, to the appropriate higher education institutions according to the regulations established for student applicants. Those who have passed successfully at the

respective civil higher education institutions (with a total of grades exceeding the established minimum for the given higher education institution) need to present the following documents at the military district no later than 10 days after the results of the entrance exams have been announced: application, autobiography, medical certificate from the military hospital (for those who have completed their regular military service), medical conscript record (for those drafted), certificate showing no previous convictions, certificate showing the examination evaluation from the corresponding higher education institution to which they have applied, and an affidavit stating that they will serve in the Bulgarian People's Army for no less than 10 years after completing their education.

Those who have been granted scholarships from the Ministry of National Defense but have not yet completed their regular military service will begin their education after completion.

The Ministry of National Defense scholarship students will be accepted for active service and will be assigned to detachments of the Bulgarian People's Army.

Additional information on applying to higher education institutions can be obtained from the military academies, military districts (from the outfit commanders, for those on regular term service), and from the Students Directory for 1984.

12334

CSO: 2200/94

## TANK GUN STABILIZATION DISCUSSED

Prague ATOM in Czech No 2, 1984 pp 4-5

[Article by Engineer-Colonel Libor Podzimek]

[Text] Successful completion of an offensive operation by a tank depends on its high maneuverability, and on its continuous and effective firing. Tanks that fail to meet these requirements are not sufficiently effective in overcoming modern defenses that are saturated with antitank weapons. Therefore the basic mode of firing the tank's weapons must be firing on the move that permits maximum utilization of the tank's speed and maneuverability.

In the case of moving fire, however, it is much more difficult to hit the target than with stationary firing during brief stops. For a moving tank's hull describes complex three-dimensional motion that can be broken down into a system of sliding and rotary motions about the center of oscillation (center of gravity). If we draw a system of coordinates whose origin is the center of gravity  $O$  (Fig.1), we can determine separately the effect of the individual components of oscillation. The parameters of linear and angular oscillations are determined experimentally for each type of tank, under normal running conditions. The results of these tests, processed by the methods of probability theory, are given as mean parameters (see table). From the table it is evident that the accuracy of moving fire is affected the most by longitudinal oscillations (about the  $x$  axis) and horizontal oscillations (about the  $z$  axis), significantly reducing the probability of hitting the target. Dispersion of the points of impact is influenced considerably also by the firing lag (defined as the time from completing the aiming of the gun at the target to the moment that the shell leaves the gun barrel). For a given mean angular velocity of the barrel's motion (obtained from the table), and for the appropriate muzzle velocity of the shell and the firing mechanism's lag, for example, it can be demonstrated by computation that the direction of a given tank's gun line (line of fire) differs from the direction that the gun director sets, by 1.370 or 23.9 milliradians in the perpendicular plane, and by 0.260 or 4.6 mrad in the horizontal plane. If 1 mrad represent a line segment 1 m long at a distance of 1 km, then at that distance the deviation in height due to the firing lag from a moving tank is 23.9 m, and the lateral deviation is 4.6 m. It has been determined experimentally that the percentage of hits from a moving tank without a gun stabilizer does not exceed 5 to 7 percent.

Hence it follows that moving fire from a tank without a gun stabilizer is not expedient.




Figure 1. System of coordinates for determining the motions of a moving tank's hull, with the origin at the tank's center of gravity.

Table. Parameters of the Tank Hull's Oscillations When Traveling Over Terrain of Average Roughness, at Speeds of 1 to 20 Kilometers/Hour

| Kmity<br>(1)     | (6) úhlové    |            |              |      |                |     | (7) lineární   |                   |
|------------------|---------------|------------|--------------|------|----------------|-----|----------------|-------------------|
| Druh<br>(2)      | (8) amplituda |            | (9) rychlost |      | (10) frekvence |     | (11) zrychlení |                   |
|                  | (12) ozn.     | (13) stup. | (14) ozn.    | o/s  | ozn.           | Hz  | ozn.           | m.s <sup>-2</sup> |
| Podélné (3)      | φ             | 2,5        | φ°           | 8,25 | f <sub>φ</sub> | 1,1 | a <sub>φ</sub> | 1,4               |
| Příčné (4)       | γ             | 1,8        | γ°           | 6,3  | f <sub>γ</sub> | 0,8 | a <sub>γ</sub> | 0,4               |
| Horizontální (5) | ψ             | 1,2        | ψ°           | 1,6  | f <sub>ψ</sub> | 0,6 | a <sub>ψ</sub> | 0,82              |

Key:

- |                 |                            |
|-----------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Oscillations | 8. Amplitude               |
| 2. Type         | 9. Velocity                |
| 3. Longitudinal | 10. Frequency              |
| 4. Transverse   | 11. Acceleration           |
| 5. Horizontal   | 12. Symbol                 |
| 6. Angular      | 13. Degrees                |
| 7. Linear       | 14. Revolutions per second |

But stationary firing during brief stops reduces to about half the tank's average combat speed, and the probability that the tank will be hit by the enemy rises sharply.

This indicates the need to use automatic fire control systems that are based on the tank gun stabilizer.

Gun stabilizers are special-purpose automatic control systems intended to aim the gun at the target and to maintain (stabilize) the assigned gun direction in space, despite the oscillations of the hull of a tank that is firing while moving. Gun stabilizer systems on modern tanks reduce the longitudinal angular oscillations' amplitude to between  $1/30$  and  $1/40$ , and their angular velocity to between  $1/8$  and  $1/10$ ; the amplitude of the horizontal angular oscillations of the turret and gun to between  $1/10$  and  $1/12$ , and their angular velocity to  $1/3$  or  $1/4$ . As a result, the use of gun stabilizer systems provides better conditions for monitoring the battlefield, increases severalfold the range within which the targets can be observed and distinguished, enhances the accuracy of aiming the gun at the target and reduces the dispersion of the points of impact. Under the same conditions as with nonstabilized tank guns, the percentage of hits increases seven- to eightfold (to between 35 and 55 percent).

All of our tanks and most modern foreign tanks have guns stabilized in two planes (the gun in the plane of longitudinal angular oscillations, and the turret with the gun in the horizontal plane). The sighting device's field of view may be fixed to the gun, and stabilized with the gun or separately.

Although stabilizers for, respectively, the gun and the turret differ significantly in their design, the same functional diagram applies to both. The stabilizers on most modern tanks are closed-loop automatic control systems that respond to the gun's aiming error (so-called directional systems).

The required gun line is assigned by a directional gyroscope that is mounted directly on the stabilized system (gun). This permits continuous measurement of the gun line's angular error from the assigned gun direction. When a moment of disturbance (moment of external forces)  $M_v$  (see Fig. 2), due to the oscillations of the tank's hull, causes the stabilized system to deviate by some angle  $\phi$ , at the output of the directional gyroscope there appears a voltage  $U$ , whose value is proportional to the error. After amplification in amplifier  $Z$ , this voltage is fed as a control signal to the input of the servo (servomechanism). The servo generates a torque (stabilizing moment)  $M_s$  that counteracts the moment of disturbance  $M_v$  and narrows the angle of deviation  $\phi$ . The more completely the stabilizing moment compensates for the moment of disturbance, the smaller will be the deviations of the line of fire from the assigned direction, and the more accurate will be the gun's stabilization.

For more accurate stabilization, the amplification coefficients of the amplifier and servo are increased. At certain values of these coefficients, however, there arise spontaneous oscillations that considerably increase fire dispersion. Elastic negative feedback from the angular velocity of the stabilized gun's movement is introduced into the system to dampen these oscillations. This feedback is provided by the rate gyroscope (gyrotachometer, Fig. 2) that is mounted on the gun, in the same way as the directional gyroscope. Voltage

$U_r$  at the output of the rate gyroscope is proportional to the derivative of the gun's angle of rotation  $\dot{\phi}$ . This voltage is added to the directional gyroscope's voltage  $U_u$ , in add circuit SO.

After amplification in the amplifier, the total voltage  $U_c = U_u + U_r$  is the servo's control signal.




Figure 2. Functional diagram of a tank's stabilizer.

Key:

- |                                      |                          |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Servo                             | 3. Rate gyroscope        |
| 2. Controlled system (gun or turret) | 4. Directional gyroscope |

To aim the gun at the target (when the stabilizer is functioning), the position of the free directional gyroscope's axis of rotation is changed by means of control signal  $U_{NA}$  (channel A, Fig. 2). In addition to the A (automatic) channel, the system of turret stabilization usually employs also the mode of direct aiming, by disconnecting the gyroscopes and supplying signal  $U_{NP}$  to the servo's input (semiautomatic channel PA, Fig. 2).

The gunner S controls the stabilized system through control panel PU that generates the  $U_{NA}$  and  $U_{NP}$  control signals. Although the gun stabilizer system itself increases considerably the probability that the target will be hit, it is unable to fully ensure the basic requirement of hitting the target with the first shot from a moving tank.

Solution of this requirement depends primarily on the skill of the tank's crew and on the further perfection of the automatic fire control systems. As mentioned earlier, the gun stabilizer is merely the basis of such systems.

For highly effective fire control, modern stabilizers are supplemented with highly accurate range finders.

In view of the high combat speed of modern tanks, there is a relatively long time lag between finding the range and the moment of firing. Therefore the fire control system includes also equipment that continuously alters the set range as a function of the traveled distance and direction relative to the target's position. There is also equipment that permits firing at only a very small deviation of the gun line from the stabilized position. To speed up the firing of the next shot, the system also has loading equipment that eliminates heavy physical labor and considerably shortens the reloading time.

The tank commander's task is to find the targets and to assign them priorities in accordance with their importance. Therefore many modern tank guns have dual controls (for the gunner and the tank commander, respectively) or provisions for aiming the gun in the horizontal plane at a new or more important target. In this case the tank commander overrides the gunner in controlling the gun.

The development of automatic fire control systems, including tank gun stabilizers, is continuing incessantly. A further step in this development is the introduction of minicomputers that are able to evaluate within a very short time a considerable amount of information and to automatically set the elements of the trajectory. This again significantly increases the probability of not only hitting the target, but of hitting it with the first shot as well.

1014

CSO: 2400/289

## MORE WORK FOR JUDGES, COURTS

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 Mar 84 p 5

[Article by Acs Gyorgy: "The Work of Judges Is Becoming Harder"]

[Text] An increasingly greater burden is falling on the courts and judges, and more and more it is said that sooner or later this will endanger the level of judicature. That is why the presidium of the Public Employees' Trade Union put on the agenda for yesterday's meeting a discussion of the living and working conditions of court workers.

Almost 386,000 contested and uncontested cases came before local courts last year. This is a considerable increase as compared to the figures for 1980. In the same time period the number of contested cases also increased by 13.4 percent. The presidium of the Public Employees' Trade Union discussed yesterday the living and working conditions of court workers. Dr Imre Markoja, minister of justice, also participated in and spoke at the meeting.

### More Complicated Cases

Despite the reduction in the hours of work per week, the number of days for hearings did not change, and in fact the number of cases per day also increased. Because of the increase and the more complicated nature of the cases, it will hardly be possible to increase the burden on judges. It can also be predicted that the work load and the backlog of cases will continue to increase this year. With the new BTK [Penal Code] legal institutions, the role of the criminal court judges was strengthened. In the past 3 years the number of cases under their jurisdiction increased by almost 13 percent. At the same time the number of cases relating to firm registration rose from 628 to 17,312. Both in civil and criminal cases the greater ratio belongs among the more simple judgments, but the number of more complicated cases requiring more work keeps increasing. To mention only several: Among the family rights disputes, which make up a significant ratio of lawsuits, the increase in property wealth plays a role in the fact that marriage and property rights are growing more difficult. In child support lawsuits, an increasingly wider scope of proof is needed to clarify the source of incomes. Discovery of the exact facts in lawsuits regarding trespassing and property rights relations is made difficult by unregulated use and property relations, and sometimes by fictitious contracts and errors in real estate registration.

We cannot ignore the large number of relatively small courts. Even after the most recent consolidation, one-third of the local courts have only one or two judges besides the chief judge. But many difficulties arise from the fact that these courts did not originally have general jurisdiction. Specialization is impossible; it occurs that one and the same judge may hear both civil and criminal cases; the temporary leave of one judge from duties may cause basic problems.

#### Males Given Preference

The increasing work load, the more complicated nature of the cases and the inadequate apparatus replacements resulted in the fact that despite the greatest efforts the level of judicature did not improve in recent years, in general it remained unchanged but in certain areas retrogressed. As Imre Markoja said: Would that such a high-level apparatus were working everywhere!

But as compared to its own standard the administration of justice shows a less favorable situation. And if it does not improve, the judicial body will find it difficult to meet requirements.

The ministry of justice report presented to the presidium of the trade union dealt also with the personnel composition of the courts. The worst situation is in the capital, the Pest Megye and the Hajdu-Bihar Megye courts. In addition, 10 to 12 courts in the country are facing serious difficulties, while in 5 or 6--mainly in smaller megyes--the situation is relatively balanced. Fifty percent of the local judges have 5 years or less of judicial practice. Even in the first level of the administration of justice this may over the long term obstruct the development of a stable, high level body of judges. The inverse ratio would be better, for under balanced conditions judges with more than 10 years of practice should provide the chief judges, and judges working in the second level would provide the replacements. It is already a common matter for judges with less than 5 years of practice to receive higher judicial assignments. This is indicated by the fact that 46 percent of the chief judges and 44 percent of the megye judges and council chairmen have not had 5 years in their present assignment. This trend toward a younger age is accompanied by a trend toward a greater number of women. As the minister of justice and others who commented said, no one has any objection to women but the figures simply show that the balance has tipped in their favor. For example, two-thirds of the judges in the Capital City are women. In 1982 women were absent from work for gyas /childcare benefits/ or other reasons so often that it amounted to the full year's work of 78 judges. Because of the large-scale generation change, the age group is lacking which would be capable of handling rapidly and well the mounting number of cases of greater complexity. It has been a long-time subject of discussion, one which also came up at yesterday's trade union meeting: The situation could be temporarily improved if it were possible for retiring judges, who are otherwise available, to accept judiciary work on a reduced-time basis.

It is now evident that the replacement problem is becoming increasingly harder to solve by means of the application system and incentive grants. While in 1979 the number of applicants was 6 times greater than the number of positions advertised, this year only 87 applications were submitted for the 61 junior

positions. Most of them were young people with medium preparation, and none asked for an appointment to the body of judges that is struggling with so many personnel problems. As was stated at the meeting of the trade union presidium, the decline in the prestige of a judgeship career can be attributed mostly to material causes, for those starting on a career choose positions with the lure of better income. Despite the sometimes unprincipled preference given to male applicants, the ratio of women is again increasing strongly.

Among the 127 with incentive grants the ratio of males is very significant, since they enjoyed an application advantage. And still--particularly in recent years--the number of those breaking their contracts has increased by leaps and bounds, and they are without exception males.

#### More Recognition

Jolan Kovacs, secretary of the Veszprem Megye trade union, told of an example in which a judge with great experience quit his calling and accepted work as a legal adviser at three times greater pay. Dr Klara Szocs, Budapest secretary, emphasized how administration can help improve its situation with its own resources, for over the long run it will still have to count on the same body of judges.

The presidium of the Public Employees' Trade Union agrees with the efforts of the Ministry of Justice to press for the mobilization of internal reserves, and greater moral and material recognition for judges and auxiliary personnel at the courts.

| <u>Cases appearing before courts</u> | <u>1980</u> | <u>1983</u> |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Criminal                             | 86,021      | 93,484      |
| Civil                                | 146,736     | 159,933     |
| Economic                             | 3,238       | 3,181       |
| Labor                                | 23,331      | 20,867      |
| Civil uncontested                    | 98,483      | 139,583     |
| Notarial                             | 290,280     | 346,304     |
| Executory                            | 87,081      | 109,133     |
| Firm cases                           | 628         | 17,312      |

6691

CSO: 2500/309

CULTURAL MINISTRY CREATES NEW COUNCIL TO OVERSEE ARTS

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 30 Mar 84 p 2

[Text] The Art Council of the Cultural Ministry was created to help the minister of culture in his work as the Council for Coordinating Research in Instruction, Science and Education and the Council of International Relations do.

In the first meeting of 21 March, Minister Bela Kopeczi described the Ministry's most immediate tasks in art policy and ideology, and then State Secretary Jozsef Drecin described the new economic and organizational regulations, and the improvements thereof to date, in the field of the arts. On the basis of the opinions and recommendations that followed the reports it was found necessary to keep the council informed on a regular basis concerning all general questions involving all branches of the arts. At the same time through thorough discussions of these questions the council should help the work of the Ministry of Culture and should play a role in clarifying views that are necessary for decisions in important matters.

On the basis of the council members' opinion, the agenda of the next meetings will be the discussion of the relationship between culture and economy; the questions of an artistic value system, creativity, propagation and acceptance; the relationship between art and art critics; and generally the essential and actual problems of educational policy.

At the request of the minister the following persons will participate in the work of the Art Council:

--Peter Agardi, literary historian, deputy chief of the MSZMP's Central Committee;

--Miklos Almasi, esthetician, professor, department chairman;

--Lorand Bereczky, art historian, general director of the Hungarian National Gallery;

--Bela Borvendeg, architect, president of the Association of Hungarian Architects;

--Janos Brody, composer and performer;

--Lajos Farkasinszky, vice president of the Budapest Capital City Council;

--Tamas Fener, photographer, general secretary of the Association of Hungarian Photographers;

--Istvan Gergely, architect, rector of the College of Industrial Arts;

--Laszlo Gyurko, writer, director of the Jozsef Katona Theater of Kecskemet;

--Miklos Hubay, writer, president of the Association of Hungarian Writers;

--Miklos Jovanovics, writer, general secretary of the Association of Hungarian Writers;

--Ferenc Kallai, actor, president of the Association of Hungarian Theater;

--Jozsef Kerenyi, architect;

--Istvan Kiss, sculptor, president of the Association of Hungarian Artists and Industrial Artists;

--Kalman Kiss, vice president of the Hungarian Radio;

--Zoltan Kocsis, pianist;

--Dr Geza Kortvelyes, esthetician, secretary of the Association of Hungarian Dancers;

--Andras Kovacs, film director, president of the Association of Hungarian Film and Television Actors;

--Istvan Lang, composer, general secretary of the Association of Hungarian Musicians;

--Laszlo Lugossy, film director, general secretary of the Association of Hungarian Film and Television Actors;

--Mate Major, academician, professor emeritus;

--Ivan Marko, ballet dancer, director of the Gyor Ballet;

--Pal Miklos, art historian, general director of the Muscum of Industrial Arts;

--Emil Petrovics, composer, professor at the College of Theater and Film;

--Eva Ruttkai, actress, member of the Vigszinhaz [Comedy Theater];

--Tibor Simo, general secretary of the Association of Art Unions;  
--Jozsef Somogyi, sculptor, rector of the Hungarian College of Art;  
--Laszlo Soos, graphic artist;  
--Istvan Szerdahelyi, esthetician, chief editor of KRITIKA;  
--Akos Szilagyi, esthetician and writer;  
--Miklos Szinetar, director, vice president of the Hungarian Television;  
--Tamas Tarjan, critic;  
--Dr Jozsef Ujfalussy, music historian, rector of the Franz Liszt Academy of Music;  
--Imre Varga, sculptor;  
--Laszlo Vamos, director, general secretary of the Association of Hungarian Theater;  
--Ferenc Veszits, director of the Art Foundation of the Hungarian People's Republic;  
--Eva Zsurzs, director, chief of department at the Hungarian Television;  
--Dezso Toth, deputy minister, the council's co-president;  
--Andras Pandi, chief of main department, the council's secretary.

9414

CSO: 2500/297

MARXISTS EVALUATE POLITICAL PLURALISM

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish Nov-Dec 83 pp 146-165

[Article by Grazyna Ulicka: "A Marxist Appraisal of Political Pluralism"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text]

I

The concept of pluralism sometimes crops up in the scientific and political discussions recently taking place in this country, on the pages of NOWE DROGI as well. It is employed both by authors who attempt to answer the question as to the manner in which we should refine the mechanisms of socialist democracy and by our political enemies who openly reject socialist relations or speak of a unique Polish model outside the general laws of socialism. At the same time, bourgeois science and propaganda have been attaching tremendous importance to the question of pluralism, particularly in recent years. This warrants analyzing the problem of political pluralism and defining its genesis and primarily its class function.

The term "pluralism" was introduced in the political lexicon by bourgeois social sciences. Although it reflects certain objective processes occurring in the capitalist society, it has always been not just a descriptive concept but also a value concept. It was and remains a distinctive slogan whose more developed form is a systemic concept that justifies the "superiority" and "democratism" of the bourgeois political system and at the same time is critical of the system of socialist democracy. Most of the orientations of contemporary bourgeois thought, with the exception of ultra-conservative and neo-Fascist trends, accept the concept of political pluralism construed as the existence of many political parties competing for power while following the rules of the game defined by the bourgeois constitutional law and complemented with principles based on tradition. The most distinguishing aspect of pluralism is viewed as the legality of the political opposition and its freedom of action./1/

The above definition of pluralism applies to the formal side of the problem: it is a general definition of the operating mechanism of political forces in the system of bourgeois democracy. Bourgeois ideologists regard pluralism as a

manifestation of the natural evolution and refinement of democracy as such. West European communists point out that the pluralist operating mechanism of bourgeois democracy, and especially the possibility of operation of the political opposition, arose as a result of a struggle for democratic rights led by the working class and reflects the concessions of the bourgeoisie. /2/ The bourgeoisie had to accept the changes due to the class struggle, and in effect it was compelled to explore new justifications for its class reign that markedly diverge from or even contradict the assumptions of the classical liberal doctrine.

The classical model, based on the Enlightenmentist concept of sovereignty of the people, representativeness and the division of powers, recognized two subjects in the political sphere: the individual, or more exactly the citizen, and state power. The possibility of admitting to political life mediating bodies such as political parties was regarded as an encroachment on the freedom and natural rights of the individual, a return to medieval corporatism. /3/ In this sense, the formula of pluralism /conflicts/ with the classical conception of democracy. A typical example of this may be the Le Chapelier decree, proclaimed in 1791, which prohibited the formation of workers' associations.

Once political parties, trade unions and other social organizations began to play an increasingly greater role, the traditional concept had to be revised. The transformations in the sphere of the class structure, that is, the growing separate identity and consolidation of discrete strata of the bourgeoisie as well as the numerical growth and qualitative transformation of the working class owing to the development of industry and the proletarianization of the middle strata as well as owing to the growth of the struggle between these two principal social classes, resulted in undermining the thesis of the existence of a popular will that is not reducible to particular interests. It was precisely the rise of the aforementioned "mediating bodies" standing between the individual and the state that reflected the differences and contradictions between these interests. As a result, Western political theory also underwent the evolution from liberal individualism to the recognition of a genuinely existing party-political mechanism or, more exactly, to an attempt to meet the new conditions for the interpretation of classical solutions.

That evolution was based on the bourgeoisie's acknowledgment of the new realities consisting in both the development of new economic operating mechanisms of capitalism, requiring intervention by the state, and the existence of political parties, including mass parties, and organizations of the working class. Consideration of the realities required, in its turn, the elaboration of new operating mechanisms of the state that would, on the one hand, assuage the conflicts among different segments of the bourgeoisie and, on the other, assure adaptation to not only the political forces representing the interests of the working class but also their demands in such a manner that the bourgeoisie could satisfy them without relinquishing its position as the ruling class.

Thus while the principal aim was to preserve capitalist social relations, the means of accomplishing it became the new interpretation of the functions of

the state and the attendant reinterpretation of the concepts of civil rights and freedoms. /4/ The new and markedly different solutions in both these spheres laid the foundations for elaborating a new interpretation of bourgeois democracy with allowance for the formula of political pluralism. In the classical interpretation, the rights of the individual demarcated a fundamental and inviolable boundary between the domain of action of citizens and the sphere of activities of the state. These rights guaranteed to individuals a domain of action permitted by the common good, with the state having solely to adhere to the duty of not violating the boundary defined by the rights of the individual, as well as the duty of safeguarding these rights /5/; by the same token, the catalogue of civil rights determined the scope of functions of the state.

The economic and political transformations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries necessitated broadening the catalogues of both civil rights and functions of the state as a prerequisite for preserving the reign of the bourgeoisie. The demand of the working class for broader and more genuine civil rights (the right to associate, universal suffrage, social rights) had to be satisfied. /6/ The bourgeoisie accomplished this, however, in a manner protecting its interests and, what is more, perpetuating its political and ideological reign. Despite protests by adherents of the liberal doctrine, the concept and hence also the practice of the state as the "night watchman" was gradually supplanted by the theory and policy of a state playing an active role in the economic and social fields. At the same time, the relationship that had applied during the initial stage of existence of capitalism became reversed: at present the functions of the state have become the determinant of the scope of civil rights and freedoms. By the same token, the concept of the rights of the individual also has changed. /7/

The classical rights continued to be safeguarded by the state. In addition, new rights were introduced through legislation--rights whose exercise required the state's activity in selected spheres. Parallel to this, specific rules of the game assuring the exercise of both traditional and new political rights of the individual were elaborated. Of the political rights added with time to the catalogue of civil rights that have markedly influenced the evolution of the contemporary systemic mechanism of the capitalist state, mention should be made of the right to free association and universal suffrage. Aside from other factors, the legislative and subsequently constitutional safeguarding of these rights contributed to sanctioning the principle of political pluralism./8/ The recognition of these rights meant that not only the political groups supporting the capitalist system but also those opposed to that system were afforded the possibility, often curtailed in various ways, to exist and nominate their own candidates for authorities in the state.

The legislative safeguarding of these rights is regarded by Marxist science as a manifestation of the growth of the democratic nature of the bourgeois (and not only the bourgeois) political system, and at the same time as an indicator of the bourgeoisie's strengthened standing in that system. /9/

The constitutional acknowledgment of the right to free association revealed an essential contradiction in the bourgeois legal-political doctrine: on the one

hand, the subject of sovereignty remains the people, which in accordance with bourgeois doctrine consists of individuals who are identical and equal under the law, but on the other, owing to the existence of parties and other socio-political organizations and their appropriate positions within the political system, these individuals actually have varying possibilities for articulating their will. An attempt to resolve this contradiction, and at the same time an example of a further formal sanctioning of the principle of pluralism, is represented by the legal-constitutional definition of the place of political parties in the systems of society in the West European countries following World War II. This problem is most broadly regulated by the Basic Decree of the FRG. As a result, the concept of the "party state" has arisen in the constitutionalism of the FRG. This term is defined as: /"a qualitatively new form of contemporary liberal-representative democracy, in which the parties are entrusted with a special role in mediating [between] society [and the state] and ruling the state through their far-reaching identification with it."/ /10/ Under this concept, a party participating in the formation of the political will of the nation (participation in elections) exercises the functions of a constitutional organ of power. The will of the party majority in the government and the parliament is identified with the will of the nation. At the same time, as specified in FRG legislation, the conditions that must be met by the parties participating in the mechanism of rule discriminate against the revolutionary forces. /11/

The introduction of the formula of political pluralism in the theory of bourgeois democracy has been chiefly linked to acknowledging the decisive role of the parties in the political system, and it consisted in defining their role in that system and adopting principles that they should respect in their struggle for power: the principle of the free interplay of political forces, the principle of alternation of power, granting specific rights to the opposition, etc. /12/ But this occurred once the bourgeoisie was certain that the adoption of the principle of pluralism was not a direct threat to its reign but on the contrary a kind of "valve" for venting social discontent and--what is more--that this solution could promote preserving capitalist relations. For, under the rules of pluralism, freedom of action is granted only insofar as a given political force pledges itself to operate within the framework of the so-called bourgeois "legality."

One purpose of introducing the pluralist mechanism was to integrate the political forces representing the working class with the bourgeois state. This was, unfortunately, partially successful as demonstrated by the case of the social democrats. This was also intended to integrate discrete individuals and social groups with the capitalist state "directly," so to speak, and not only through the mediation of the political parties. For the pluralist mechanism compels individuals and social groups to demonstrate appropriate--especially political--behavior. At the same time, availing itself of the political-ideological system of influence created by the bourgeoisie, this mechanism represents an attempt to prove that this behavior is not forced and, what is more, it demonstrates the respect of the political system for the natural rights of man. At the same time also, there is the distinctive requirement of consonance between that behavior and the bourgeois ideals and hierarchy of values. Multi-faceted pressure is exerted on the forces which reject it, as

demonstrated by the attitude of the bourgeoisie toward communists and their political supporters.

Bourgeois ideology stresses that the political pluralist mechanism should be a stimulus of integrative processes in the capitalist society. /13/ Although that ideology divorces political activities from economic processes and regards them as autonomous--acknowledging pluralist rules of the game at the same time it demands respect for the socio-economic relations which determine those rules of the game.

The relatively stable operation of the principle of pluralism in many Western countries is possible in a situation in which the actual decisionmaking centers are gradually moving outside the parliament and at the same time an extra-constitutional, informal system of pressures assuring that the actual ruling majority would make decisions meeting the interests of the bourgeoisie has taken shape. In the presence of such "safeguarding mechanisms," party systems in the capitalist countries can operate in accordance with the principles of the free interplay of political forces without any fundamental detriment to the class interests of the bourgeoisie. /14/ So far this has been happening not only in a situation in which the principal government-forming parties accept capitalist relations but also when a strong communist party with a program that undermines these relations operates in a given country.

## II

In contemporary Western political science political pluralism is regarded as a basic criterion of the democratic nature of a given political system. Often the concept of pluralism is identified with the category of democracy. In accordance with the views proclaimed by bourgeois ideology, a system that is not based on the principle of pluralism cannot be regarded as a democratic system. In effect, in Western interpretation, the contemporary model of bourgeois democracy is becoming an ideal and transcendent model of a political system. /15/ Such an approach is of an ahistorical nature, for it makes no allowance for the fundamental difference in the operation of political mechanisms under capitalism and under socialism.

Yet in a situation in which socialism has become the victor in a large part of the world, we are dealing with the parallel existence of different systems each of which exists in a different stage from the standpoint of the development of history and mankind. At the same time, the fact of the simultaneous existence of these systems results in that in non-Marxist science we are dealing with the formal comparison of discrete elements or mechanisms of their operation. In such comparisons no allowance is made for the differences in the principal characteristic features of each system, and primarily for the circumstance that the socialist system represents the next rung--higher than the capitalist system--in the ladder of societal development.

Polemizing with the bourgeois interpretation, Marxist scientists usually analyze two aspects of the problem of pluralism:

--from the standpoint of the objective causes linked to the nature of the capitalist society that accounted for the rise of the bourgeois multi-party system, as well as of the subjective causes of the acceptance of this solution by the bourgeoisie;

--by posing the question of whether objective conditions exist for the existence of a system of competing parties in the socialist system of society, and whether this would be subjectively justified from the standpoint of the interests of the working class.

Among the objective conditions decisive to the existence of competing parties under capitalism, the class division of the society is named first. It is on this basis that parties representing the interests of mutually struggling social classes arise. Another important factor is the internal conflicts existing within the ruling class itself, against whose background parties representing particular segments of the bourgeoisie arise. /16/

In addition to its own parties, the bourgeoisie has at its disposal another mighty political force, namely, the social democratic parties, which being by tradition a worker movement and leaning largely on the social base of workers in reality fulfill the function of a protector of the long-range interests of the bourgeoisie. This also objectively justifies the existence of an opposition party in the bourgeois society that represented by party linked to a different segment of the bourgeoisie--a party that is opposed to the party or coalition of parties that happens to be ruling at the moment because its contemporary interests may not be fully satisfied for the time being. At the same time, there exists a qualitative difference between the political opposition which accepts capitalist relations and the opposition parties which reject them, that is, the communist parties. The latter are in society not just an opposition force but a revolutionary force.

When considering this issue, West European communists point to two of its interrelated aspects. On the one hand, the communist parties are part of the political system. The political system of France or Italy would not have been operating in its present manner had not it been for the existence of strong communist parties in these countries. These parties do not, however, play a role analogous to that played by the forces which accept capitalist relations, that is, they do not contribute to perpetuating the reign of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, it is incorrect to ascribe to them a distinctively construed integrative role as is being done by, e.g., the functionalists. The activities of the communists within the framework of the bourgeois political system are intended to undermine it from the inside. On the other hand, the bourgeois system also combats and accepts at the same time the communist parties without, however, being capable of integrating them with itself. /17/ A separate question is the existence in the capitalist countries of the illegal opposition represented by certain Leftist groups, including the terrorist groups engendered as a result of the deep crisis in capitalist relations. Their activities consist not in participating, even for tactical reasons, in the bourgeois political game but in paralyzing the system of power at selected

points. These groups are combatted by the bourgeois state with the aid of legal and political methods and often by resorting to force.

The operating practice of bourgeois democracy confirms the thesis that--regardless of which party or coalition of parties is in power at any given moment--the basic interests of the bourgeoisie are protected. The system of competing parties is safe to the bourgeoisie, on condition that the communist party does not gain, as a result of elections, a position enabling it and its allies to undermine the basic interests of the bourgeoisie. Should such a situation arise, the bourgeoisie brings into action various instruments to preserve its reign. The Chilean experience in the early 1970s confirms the thesis that in critical moments the bourgeoisie resorts to force and violates laws. Considering that objective foundations for the existence of the political opposition are present in the capitalist society, suppressing that opposition is a move made in disregard of these conditions and, as demonstrated by Chile's example, it always is an undemocratic measure that involves resorting to force.

In addition to the objective conditions there exist subjective causes decisive to the bourgeoisie's support of political pluralism. This concerns producing on society the impression that there exists an unconditional freedom of proclaiming any views whatsoever and engaging in political actions in order to implement these views. Exploiting the external and often seeming signs of bourgeois democratism, and especially the formula of pluralism, attempts are made to influence through the modern system for indoctrinating society the awareness of individual social classes and strata, including the working class, in order to shape attitudes that not only accept capitalist social relations but also even consider them superior to the socialist solutions. By way of an example, there are the mythic aspects that have been superimposed on certain institutions and procedures. For example, there is the myth of "free elections." Many studies, including those conducted by non-Marxist scientists, reveal that, in particular situations, despite the existence of parties competing for power, the actual possibility of choice is only seeming. /18/ The programs of the various parties that successively form the government often differ only on secondary questions. They do not emphasize ideological divergences. These programs are increasingly becoming pragmatic in nature. In such a situation it is increasingly difficult to define the differences between the ruling majority and the opposition party. The absence of these differences may be demonstrated by the fact that--under certain circumstances--the competing parties form coalition governments (e.g. the great coalition of the CDU/CSU-SPD [German Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists during the years 1966-1969).

In certain situations the principle of the alternation of the ruling parties may be "blocked" (e.g. in France in the years 1958-1981). /19/

Thus, when analyzing political pluralism in the capitalist countries, one should bear in mind its objective conditions and consider as well, as emphasized by S. Zawadzki that /"political pluralism is...a form of political organization of the capitalist society adopted under the pressure of the laboring masses but adapted to the needs of the bourgeoisie."/ /20/

The existence of the system of competing parties, on the other hand, cannot even be a formal criterion of the democratic nature of the socialist political system.

For it is not possible to interpret in an abstract and transcendent manner the principles of functioning of the bourgeois party and political system, absolutize them and relate them to the functioning of the socialist systems with their completely different class nature, structure and principles of social organization.

Under socialism, after the bourgeoisie is defeated and antagonistic classes no longer exist, there exist no objective premises for the existence of a system of competing parties. The interests of the peasantry and the lower middle classes can be represented by the parties existing in an alliance and cooperating with the communist party, which exercises the leading role. As ensues from historical experience, any attempt to form opposition organizations in a socialist state is de facto an attempt to establish organizations that represent interests conflicting with the interests of the working class. Such organizations objectively represent the interests of the bourgeoisie from the standpoint of the class struggle being waged on the international scale. Any such attempt is tantamount to the mobilization of counter-revolutionary forces. J. Kowalski states: /"In a situation in which a classless society is being built, the opposition system would be an instrument...for recreating the antagonistic social structure--maintaining and prolonging its existence. The opposition, even if it were to call itself socialist, would be a magnet attracting the entire social reaction. That reaction...at first would not propose programs for the restoration of capitalism but would promote antagonistic social relations and the operation, in various domains of life, of rules of action termed the free interplay of forces; it would cause social processes to become elemental [uncontrolled]. It would begin to translate its aims into reality only after it brings about anarchy in social relations. The opposition party system would operate in a direction diametrically opposite to that required by socialism and by the property relations under socialism."/ /21/

It is thus no accident that bourgeois propaganda is concerned with the problem of the absence of legal political opposition under socialism. It realizes that that opposition could play only one role--that of operating in behalf of restoring capitalist relations. Since in the socialist countries there is neither a social base for forming a legal opposition nor forces interested in forming it, the Western centers sponsor with propaganda and funds illegal anti-socialist groups such as the former KSS [expansion unknown] KOR [Committee for the Defense of Workers]. The strategy employed in the 1980s against Poland indicates that the West had counted on the possibility of exploiting the crisis situation to transform the anti-socialist illegal opposition into a legal opposition and overthrow the socialist system with its aid.

Marxist doctrine rejects the formal determinants of democracy adopted by bourgeois political science. It has formulated its own criteria on this

subject: genuine participation of working people in directing social and economic processes; the formulation, by a given country, of domestic and foreign policies that are in accord with the interests of working people; and the development of creative proactivism of the working people, contributing to social progress in all domains of social life. /22/

This has a bearing on the discussion of this question being waged on the pages of NOWE DROGI and other socio-political periodicals, e.g. TU I TERAZ. /23/ In connection with this discussion, noteworthy is the interview, published in that periodical, with Stanislaw Ehrlich, the author of the book "Oblicza pluralizmow" [Faces of Pluralisms]. The interview deals with many obvious problems which no one questions, but it does not shed much light on the author's attitude toward the supposition of resurrecting the organizational forms of the mechanisms of political pluralism that have already been sufficiently lived down and compromised in the history of bourgeois thought and practice.

### III

In addition to the interpretation of pluralism presented above, which can be conditionally termed traditional, bourgeois science has begun to employ a somewhat different connotation of the concept of political pluralism, particularly after World War II and in propaganda works of an anti-communist nature. This demonstrates that in Western political science the point of gravity has shifted from analyses of a legal-normative nature to sociological studies and generalizations. The formula of political pluralism that has been developed in this direction of bourgeois science or, more broadly speaking, the concept of pluralist democracy, is based on regarding the state as a mechanism of the struggle for power in which varied social groups and organizations are taking part. The very concept of pluralism has begun to be applied to rivalry among various social strata and groups and the various organizations that they have formed--rivalry in the struggle for power or influence. The premise for this interpretation was the thesis of the dispersion or "diffusion" of power among the various competing forces. /24/ Analyses of this type have, of course, been made even much earlier in bourgeois science, but the novelty of the approach presented here consists in that it was used as a basis for formulating an integral concept of democracy. Of course, this position is not a departure from the traditional interpretation of pluralism but rather its elaboration and sociological justification.

That is so because this approach presupposes that the activities of and relations among the various social strata and groups are based on "general rules of the game" by the state with the object of properly meshing varied interests. These rules are mandatory to all groups and constitute a distinctive mechanism of the "free interplay of forces" corresponding to the economic mechanisms of supply and demand. /25/

An important thesis from the standpoint of protecting capitalist relations is the claim that this mechanism assures the equilibrium of the system. In addition, emphasis is placed on its democratic nature--in competing with each

other these groups, in the final analysis, balance each other, thereby safeguarding the unique "democratic nature" of government and at the same time precluding the possibility of establishment of a dictatorship by any one of these groups. /26/ The adherents of the theory of pluralist democracy interpret variously the role of the state. Some stress the satisfaction of the interests of discrete groups by means of direct or indirect pressure on the organs of state power. Others, in their turn, emphasize the broadening of the range of satisfaction of interests of the diverse groups and of the system of their mutual contacts outside the mechanism of state rule. This alters the position of the state as the traditional power center. Mention has been made, for example, of the drafting of collective bargaining and other agreements between trade unions and employers, etc. In such a situation, the state defines the rules of the game binding on the different groups. It may also act as an arbiter or coordinator of varied interests and as a body safeguarding the protection of "general social interests." In addition, certain authors regard the organs of the state themselves as interest groups. /27/ This concept also involves a distinctive interpretation of sovereignty as a distributed sovereignty rather than an attribute of the state alone. Democracy, the people's rule, is practiced both by the state and by associations of citizens outside the state. By the same token, governing powers belong de facto to both the state and all social, economic, political, religious, etc. organizations. /28/

The concept of pluralist democracy is most broadly developed on the soil of Anglo-Saxon political science. It represents, next to the theory of elites, a fundamental interpretation of the mechanisms of bourgeois democracy in Western science. Views combining elements of the theory of elites and the pluralist theory (e.g. the concept of "democratic elitism") can also be encountered /29/. Beginning with the 1960s the concept of pluralism has become very popular. The attendant model for explaining the problems of democracy and terminology have penetrated the political language and begun to play an important role in ideological struggle. The concept of pluralism has been approved by various social and political forces of the bourgeois state. /30/. The ideas of pluralism are popular for various reasons--among other things, because they are perceived by the various social groups and political orientations present in the capitalist society as the justification of the legitimacy and need for existence of varied social and political organizations and their influence on government policies. They are supported by the progressive circles (particularly the bourgeois centrist parties and the non-communist left), which view the formula of pluralism as a safeguard against an authoritarian evolution of the bourgeois political system (e.g. in the neo-Fascist direction).

The acceptance and practice of pluralist democracy was and remains championed by the social democrats, especially by their right wing. Being, in a sense, a co-creator of this concept (e.g. H. Laski), the social democrats view it as a confirmation of their earlier forecasts of the evolution of the bourgeois society, particularly as regards such questions as the recognition of the supra-class nature of the state and the evolution of the capitalist economy in the direction of the "mixed economy." The concept of pluralist democracy has

also gained the support of the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the lower middle class, which see in it a counterpoise to the influence of the big bourgeoisie. This approach has also met with a favorable reception in the circles of the liberal-democratic intelligentsia, which regards the model of pluralist democracy as a confirmation of the evolution of the capitalist society which, in its opinion, reduces to eliminating the reign of the big bourgeoisie. This theory primarily meets, however, the interests of the big bourgeoisie, or at least of a considerable segment of it which views a democratic justification of its own dictatorship as suiting it in a situation in which political institutions function in consonance with its long-range interests. For the concept of pluralist democracy is based on the assumption that all the groups and organizations existing within a state accept the systemic principles of the bourgeois state and capitalist relations. In such a situation, the development of democracy is to consist in elaborating increasingly refined methods of coordinating and meshing diverse interests. Some authors admit that this is a difficult task, because not all the groups share equally in power and, as a corollary, the interests of some cannot be adequately considered.

The theory of pluralist democracy does not, however, allow for a situation in which groups or even powerful organizations rejecting capitalist relations might exist. Thus, this theory attempts to prove that, despite the existence of private ownership of means of production, the contemporary bourgeois society is becoming increasingly egalitarian and libertarian. In this connection, the manner in which proofs in favor of this thesis are adduced is highly important. Here the basis is extensive empirical studies serving to determine the nature and methods of action of actually existing organizations and interest groups. In accordance with the bourgeois interpretation of social structure (e.g. theories of stratification), these organizations represent diverse social strata. In addition, they represent various occupational, religious and age groups. No distinctions are made among them. Such an approach may engender the conviction that the principles of the scientific method have been observed. This is confirmed by public awareness of the actual existence of various groups of this kind. This facilitates absolutizing analyses of this type and using them as the sole explanation of the mechanism of power in the bourgeois society. By the same token, it is possible not only to refrain from analysis of the actual conditions underlying the investigated processes and stemming from the division of the society into antagonistic classes, but also, and what is more, to demonstrate that, even if class divisions existed during certain development stages of capitalism, they are now a thing of the past in the modern industrial society based on mass consumption. Herein lies the special danger of these concepts and of the ideological justifications substructured on them.

In assessing critically these concepts, Marxist scientists point out that the existence of different interest groups does not nullify the existence of the fundamental class difference in interests between the bourgeoisie and the working class. They distinguish between the plane of contradictions in interests among groups representing different segments of the bourgeoisie and the plane of contradictions in interests between antagonistic classes. Marxists point out that strategic political decisions always are taken in the

interest of the bourgeoisie, and most often of its strongest segments, while decisions that allow for the interests of the other classes are intended to preserve capitalist relations. Furthermore, Marxists reject the view proclaimed by the adherents of pluralist democracy that the state has supposedly ceased to be the main power center. Despite the attempts made recently to curtail the role of the state, it continues to play the decisive role in sustaining the economic, political and ideological reign of the bourgeoisie. /31/

According to A. A. Fedoseyev /32/, the class nature of the theory of pluralist democracy consists in that this theory:

--camouflages the real nature of political power under capitalism by presenting it as a result of "participatory politics" while at the same time divorcing power from its economic conditions. This theory creates the illusion of the integration of all the classes and strata of the bourgeois society with the socio-political system of the contemporary capitalist state;

--presents incorrectly the nature of the relations among the discrete classes, strata and groups of the capitalist society. Making no allowance for the class struggle, it interprets relations among discrete groups in terms of a struggle in the sphere of politics, reducing that sphere, in its turn, to competition among the main bourgeois parties. Neither is there any justification for the conclusion of the admissibility of class compromises, of the mutual equilibrium of the interests and power of discrete groups and of the possibility of their regulation by the state independently of the economic interests of the bourgeoisie;

--interprets incorrectly as well the changes occurring within the ruling class itself. Although the structure of that class indeed is changing, all segments of that class struggle to defend the positions of capitalism and preserve a system of socio-political relations based on the exploitation of hired labor. Therefore--regardless of the competition existing among various segments of the bourgeoisie--the fact that they exercise different functions is coupled with the coordination of their activities in the struggle to preserve capitalism.

While its approach toward concepts of this kind is generally critical, Marxist science does not deny the fact that studies of the operation of different groups and the manner in which they influence the political process can be useful for selected analyses and a better understanding of the new mechanisms being created and utilized by the bourgeoisie to consolidate and at the same time camouflage its reign. They must, however, always be presented in the context of the basic laws governing the socio-political life of the capitalist society. Thus, in the sphere of the protection of capitalist social relations the theory of pluralist democracy fulfills a dual function: on the one hand, it offers a justification of the thesis that, supposedly, the bourgeoisie is not the ruling class in the modern capitalist state, and on the other, (on the basis of analysis of particular phenomena occurring in modern Western societies), it provides theoretical and practical indications of the nature of the mechanism of the exercise of power by big capital. In connection with that latter function, this concept may be considered from the standpoint of

capitalism's creation of new adaptive mechanisms for preserving the reign of the bourgeoisie under new changing conditions. It is precisely to this aspect of the theory of democratic pluralism, and to other concepts developed by bourgeois social sciences as well, that attention should be paid in order to avoid simplifications consisting in focusing on explaining their ideological function alone.

#### IV

The concept of pluralist democracy not only fulfills the functions mentioned above but also is one of the main tools exploited by Sovietology and bourgeois propaganda in their struggle against socialism. /33/ This is linked to a change in the tactics of that struggle. For while during the "cold war" period the main emphasis was on the need to destroy the socialist system by resorting to force, now--along with the development of the policy of detente--a plan has been elaborated for the long-range disintegration of socialism from inside, by means of a system of ideological pressures, psychological warfare and the softening and attacking of so-called "weak points" in the socialist system. In this connection, the criticism of socialism in totalitarian terms, or in terms of pure negation, has been relegated to a secondary plane while at the same time expanding the concept of the possibility of the "democratization" and "liberalization of socialism." It was precisely the formula of pluralist democracy that became the theoretical basis for this concept. By the same token, the bourgeois model of pluralism, as also interpreted in the aspect presented here, and the associated model of social relations became acknowledged, like the principle of pluralism itself interpreted in the formal-institutional sense, as the model and symbol of genuine democracy. Although it was denied the features of democracy, the socialist system was acknowledged--and that is a change compared with previous anti-communist interpretations--to be capable of autonomous evolution in the so-called "democratic" direction. At the same time, at least in theory, that evolution was linked to internal socio-political processes in the socialist society (in practice the intent was to accomplish it through a system of pressures exerted on the socialist countries). For it was found that, along with the development of the socialist society and its economy, the introduction of modern technologies, etc., the differences in group interests would deepen and there would set in a process, analogous to that supposedly observed in the Western societies, of the rise of various discrete groups desiring to articulate their particular interests. As a consequence, this is supposedly to lead to a diffusion of power analogous to that occurring in the West. By the same token, pluralist structures would also arise in socialist societies, which would be linked, as, e.g., Z. Brzezinski states, "to the transformation of the party into a much less monolithic entity along with its ideological erosion." /34/

Some proponents of this concept view this process in terms of the future, while others believe that pluralist elements already exist in socialist societies and will grow markedly with time. /35/ Discrete social strata, occupational groups and social organizations as well are considered to be interest groups that already exist under socialism and the supposed conflicts of interest among them are thought to be the basis for actions leading to the

breakdown of monolithic state power. Searching in the socialist society for examples proving their concept, Sovietologists attempt to prove that such groups indeed exist and represent conflicting interests. The concept presented reflects a new approach of bourgeois science to the analysis of the socialist society, also in the sense that while previously specific analytic tools serving exclusively to "research" the problems of the socialist society have been developed, in this case ready-made tools developed for research into the capitalist societies have been used. /36/

Marxist scientists reject this pluralist vision of the development of socialism and point out that, by analogy with its use in evaluating the functioning of the bourgeois society, the pluralist interpretation does not allow for the class nature of the socialist society, for the fact that antagonistic classes do not exist in that society. For the admission of this fundamental fact results in the adoption of the theoretical justification according to which the principal factor in the socialist society is the convergence of the fundamental interests and aims of the classes and strata composing that society. /37/ Marxist science does not deny but on the contrary attaches great importance to the question of non-antagonistic differences in interests among discrete strata, occupational groups, etc. Both in the programs of the communist parties of the socialist countries that outline main directions of development and in the specific policies of their governments great emphasis is placed on meshing these interests while at the same time giving priority to the current and long-range interests of the working class. The necessity of this meshing--difficult as this task is--is demonstrated by Poland's experiences in recent years.

In this connection, a close relationship exists between successes in building socialism and the existence of a strong communist party that properly promotes the interests of the working class. Contrary to what the proponents of the concept of pluralism desire, the party does not become weak in the presence of evident progress in the economic and social spheres. What is more, it is then that the party's authority and strength grow. At the same time, any weakening of the party may lead not only to a crisis but also to energizing counter-revolutionary forces inspired and supported by the imperialist countries. Hence also, on the basis of the experiences of the socialist countries, it can be stated that their correct development hinges on the existence of a strong communist party that is properly fulfilling its leading and guiding role. Any weakening of the party's leading role is a symptom of a crisis situation and may aggravate that situation. It thus never happens that, contrary to what is claimed by the Sovietologists championing the pluralist concepts, the party's weakening leads to the rise of "a multiplicity of centers of socialist power." It rather leads to the rise of a counter-revolutionary center.

The pluralist vision of development of the socialist countries as presented by bourgeois political science conflicts with the specific features of the development of socialist democracy and is not corroborated by the real processes occurring under socialism. The nature of this vision essentially consists in exploring new justifications for weakening the party's leading role in the socialist countries and thereby also in making a country in which such a situation might arise susceptible to attack by imperialism-supported

counter-revolutionary forces. Both the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Polish crisis in the 1980s confirm this view.

V

While it indicates the class conditions underlying the genesis and operation of the pluralist model of the bourgeois political system, and rejects the possibility of its adaptation to the socialist countries, Marxist science considers it in a broader context, e.g. by comparing it with another solution that is possible in theory and practice--the system of authoritarian rule of the bourgeoisie. In this interpretation the principal criterion is the suitability of a given system of bourgeois rule for waging the struggle for socialism. Hence also the functioning of communist parties within the framework of the system of bourgeois democracy, and thereby also the acceptance by communists of the rules of the game mandatory within that system, is considered in the strategy of the struggle for socialism as a condition favoring the conduct of that struggle. In adopting this starting approach, West European communists formulate a broad program of struggle for the democratization of political life, because they believe that it is precisely within the framework of democratic structures, on adhering to democratic procedures, that they have greater chances for struggling against monopoly bourgeoisie for progressive transformations. /38/ By the same token, West European communists acknowledge that, when the principles of bourgeois democracy actually are respected, they have a chance for broadening their influence and gaining public support. They treat the struggle for a genuine implementation of the principles of pluralism as a weapon against the bourgeoisie. This may be exemplified by:

--the demand to cease discriminatory activities against communists, made by the Danish Communist Party;

--the postulate of introducing proportional suffrage, made by, among others, the communist parties of France and Great Britain;

--the successful struggle of French communists for participation in the government, demonstrating that they were granted the same right in the political game as the other parties struggling for power.

The respect for the principle of political pluralism shown by the communist parties of the capitalist countries in their struggle for anti-monopoly democracy is not subject to discussion in the international communist movement. On the other hand, some controversies are generated by the strategic program offered by certain communist parties (in Italy, Spain, France, Great Britain), which presupposes the possibility of acknowledging the bourgeois principle of pluralism also in the socialism-building stage. Assuming that a number of program and theoretical solutions are of a hypothetical nature and that certain issues are raised in the form of slogans and could be elaborated as communists strengthen their positions in the class struggle and gain new experience, Marxist scientists, including West European Marxists, put forward by way of polemics certain theses formulated by some communist parties in the capitalist countries.

The most important thesis proclaimed by certain communist parties of West Europe, and ensuing from the acceptance of the pluralist rules of the game of bourgeois democracy, is that universal suffrage is the principal factor in the public support of the political program of communists. In this connection, on respecting the results of every election and demanding that similar respect be shown by bourgeois forces, it will be possible to accomplish basic social transformations and convert to socialism. /39/ This attitude is based on the assumption that the rules of the pluralist functioning of the political system are a highly important instrument in the struggle for socialism. This approach involves a somewhat oversimplified and distinctive "extrapolation" of existing institutions and forms of political action to the period of transition to socialism. For historical experience so far demonstrates that political mass organizations representing the interests of the revolutionary majority (e.g. the soviets in the Russian Revolution, the committees of popular unity in Chile) always arise at the grassroots level, outside the system of traditional institutions, in the presence of revolutionary situations. /40/ As for their operating mode, it lies outside the confines of the rules of the game formulated by the bourgeois democracy and is rather a reflection of the formulation of new rules proper to the socialist democracy. Among other things, it is owing to these new organizations that a genuine expression of the will of the majority favoring the changes becomes possible. Hence also, while universal suffrage can be regarded as one of the instruments of struggle and acquisition of new influence by the forces desiring to eliminate capitalist relations in the initial stages of the struggle, at decisive moments this is not an adequate criterion. The very activities of the revolutionary parties transcend the domain of the partisan-parliamentary game. They must always be supported by a mass grassroots movement, as emphasized by the West European communists themselves.

Analysis of the dialectics of the process of transition to socialism (which is by the nature of things based primarily on the experience of the revolutions so far, but which also allows for the actual conditions of the struggle) leads to the following conclusions:

--the socialist revolution, and this applies to /all/ socialist revolutions that took place so far, is always carried out by a majority and in behalf of the interests of that majority; /41/

--universal suffrage cannot be the sole recorder of the will of that majority and sometimes even, owing to the specific laws governing it, it may reflect that will in a distorted manner. /42/

On regarding this matter from a somewhat different point of view it should be stated that a social revolution represents the culminating point of the class struggle within a society. This struggle has a logic of its own. It comprises a much richer arsenal of actions, including legal actions, than the arsenal afforded by the formula of political pluralism and electoral struggle. A social revolution thus cannot be accomplished solely by means of universal suffrage, regardless of the importance attached to that institutional form. /43/ A penetrating analysis of these problems is presented by Ya. A. Krasin,

who states: /"the mechanism of the formation and manifestation of the will of the people is much more complex than the simple result of voting in elections. The results of elections should be assessed jointly with other elements characterizing the position of the progressive forces in society, the political and economic development trends, international factors, etc."/ /44/

The range of problems considered also includes various other issues regarding which some differences of opinion exist within the international communist movement. The questions concerned are chiefly: what should be the conditions and stages of struggle in which communist parties can accept the principles of political pluralism? To what extent does this acceptance promote the struggle waged by communists? When would this acceptance become an obstacle to the growth in the influence of communist parties, the development of the revolutionary awareness of the masses and further progress on the road of struggle for socialism? Discussions of the question of pluralism cannot be regarded as discussions concerning forms of the implementation of democracy. For democracy is not a neutral concept from the class standpoint. Individual forms of democracy always are subordinated to its particular content. There have never been any transcendent forms of democracy. All the more so, the forms that arose within the framework of bourgeois democracy and are a function of its content cannot be considered transcendent.

Here a distinction should be made between the position assuming the utilization of pluralist mechanisms in the struggle for anti-monopoly democracy in the capitalist countries and the position taken by certain communist parties of West Europe on the events in Poland in the early 1980s. The socio-political processes that took place in Poland between August 1980 and December 1981 were considered by the Italian, Spanish and English communist parties as proof of the evolution of the socialist political system in the pluralist direction. The introduction of martial law was regarded by these parties as a rejection of that direction of evolution and they assessed it negatively.

The PZPR and a majority of the communist parties took a critical stand on the position of the parties named above (especially that of the Italian Communist Party on the introduction of martial law in Poland), stressing that, in guiding themselves by their own vision of the processes of democratization, a vision that does not apply to the socialist countries, they appraised the situation in Poland erroneously, failing to perceive a threat to socialism in the unfolding of the events. In this polemic, most of the communist parties objected to the questioning of the democratic nature of the socialist societies, to the claim that their developmental capabilities were being deformed, and to the thesis of the possibility of the legal existence of forces of the political opposition in the socialist state. The need for a class approach to evaluating socio-political phenomena, including the question of democracy, was pointed out. /45/

The authors analyzing the problem from the Marxist-Leninist positions have always pointed out and continue to point out that discussions of the question of pluralism cannot be regarded as reflections on forms of translating democracy into reality.

# FOOTNOTES

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2. "Revolution and Democracy. International Scientific Conference," PROBLEMY POKOJU I SOCJALIZMU, No 8, 1979, p 78, No 9, 1979, pp 49-50.
3. M. Sobolewski, "Zasady demokracji burzuaazyjnej i zastosowanie" [Principles of Bourgeois Democracy and Application], Warsaw, 1969, p 20.
4. Cf. M. Prelot, "Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel," Paris, 1978, pp 73-77.
5. Cf. M. Sobolewski, "Bourgeois Democracy and Civil Rights," KAPITALIZM, No 4, 1978, pp 9-11.
6. Cf. Z. Kedzia, "Bourgeois Concepts of Civic Freedoms and Duties," in "Prawa i wolnosci obywatelskie w panstwach kapitalistycznych" [Civil Freedoms and Rights in the Capitalist Countries], Warsaw, 1979, pp 50-52.
7. Ibid., p 36.
8. E.g. Article 18 of the Italian Constitution, Article 9 of the Fundamental Decree of the FRG.
9. M. G. Farukshin, "Sotsialisticheskaya demokratiya i burzhuaznaya 'sovietologiya'" [Socialist Democracy and Bourgeois 'Sovietology'], Moscow, 1976, p 21.
10. W. Goralski, "The Concept of the 'Party State' in the FRG," STUDIA NAUK POLITYCZNYCH, No 1, 1977, p 59.
11. L. Janicki, "Partie polityczne w systemie prawnym Republiki Federalnej Niemiec" [Political Parties in the Legal System of the Federal Republic of Germany], Poznan, 1975.
12. R. A. Dahl, "L'avenir de l'opposition dans les democraties," Paris, 1966.
13. K. J. Karpinski, "Ideological Functions of the Bourgeois Concept of the Rights of Man," KAPITALIZM, No 4, 1978, p 76.
14. Cf. F. Burlacki and A. Galkin, "Socjologia, polityka, stosunki miedzynarodowe" [Sociology, Politics, International Relations], Chapters 3 and 4, Warsaw, 1978.
15. G. Sartori, "Theorie de la democratie," Paris, 1973, pp 369 ff.

16. E. L. Kuzmin, "Ideynoye bankrotstvo burzhuaznoy demokratii" [The Ideological Bankruptcy of Bourgeois Democracy], Moscow, 1977, p 124.
17. M. G. Farukshin, op. cit., p 22; A. and E. Demichel, "The State and Political Parties in France," CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, No 2, 1977, p 90.
18. R. G. Schwartzenberg, "Sociologie politique," Paris, 1977, pp 360-361.
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22. "Burzhuaznoye gosudarstvo i ideologicheskaya borba" [The Bourgeois State and Ideological Struggle], Moscow, 1975.
23. "A Way of Thinking: They Walked Shouting: Pluralism, Pluralism...", TU I TERAZ, No 42, 18 Oct 1983.
24. Cf. in depth: V. E. Guliyev and E. L. Kuzmin, "Gosudarstvo i demokratiya, kritika antimarksistikh teorii" [The State and Democracy: A Critique of Anti-Marxist Theories], Moscow, 1975, p 79.
25. Cf. in depth: "V poiskakh ideologicheskogo obnoveniya" [In Search of Ideological Renewal], Moscow, 1982, p 148.
26. Ibid., p 147.
27. Kuzmin, "Ideynoye bankrotstvo...", op. cit., p 81.
28. Guliyev and Kuzmin, "Gosudarstvo...", op. cit., p 79.
29. Ye. K. Ashin, "Pluralisticheskaya demokratiya, ili vsevlastiye monopolisticheskoy elity" [Pluralist Democracy or the Supreme Reign of the Monopoly Elite], SShA, No 4, 1983, pp 18 ff.
30. Farukshin, op. cit. p 99.
31. Cf. in depth: "Burzhuaznoye gosudarstvo...", op. cit., pp 86 ff.
32. "V poiskakh ideologicheskogo...", op. cit., pp 143-149.
33. An extensive attempt to analyze the problems of pluralism is the work of S. Ehrlich, "Oblicza pluralizmu" [Faces of Pluralisms]. It should be noted even if many of the appraisals it formulates are unacceptable. Integral polemics with these appraisals would require a work as extensive

as the one presented by Ehrlich. In the sketch presented here I am trying primarily to stress an appraisal that differs from that of S. Ehrlich regarding the cognitive and ideological function of the concept of democratic pluralism present in Marxist doctrine.

34. Z. Brzezinski, "Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technocratic Era," New York, 1970, p 174.
35. Farukshin, op. cit., p 113.
36. Ibid., pp 116-117.
37. "Burzhuaiznoye gosudarstvo....," op. cit., pp 382-383.
38. Cf. in depth: "Komunisci Europy Zachodniej" [The Communists of West Europe], Warsaw, 1983, pp 95-136.
39. Cf. E. Balibar, "Sur la dictature de proletariat," Paris, 1976, p 56.
40. "Revolution and Democracy," cit. discussion in PPIs, No 8, 79, pp 79-80.
41. J. Thorez-Vermeersch, "Vers quels lendemains," Paris, 1979, p 74.
42. Cf. B. Chantebout, "Droit constitutionnel et science politique," Paris, 1978, p 205.
43. Ye. A. Krasin, "Revolutsionnyy protsess sovremennosti" [Contemporary Revolutionary Process], Moscow, 1981, pp 52 ff.
44. Ibid., p 54.
45. Cf. PRAVDA, 24 Jan 82; RUDE PRAVO, 8 Jan 1982; TRYBUNA LUDU, 10 Feb 82; J. Pawlowicz, "The Italian Communist Party and the International Communist Movement," IDEOLOGIA I POLITYKA, No 5-6, 1982.

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SOCIOLOGIST EXPLORES ASPIRATIONS OF YOUTH

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish No 48, 25-26 Feb 84 p 3

[Interview with Professor Wieslaw Wisniewski, director of the Institute of Sociology at Warsaw University, by Ewa Wilk; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Professor, we have written recently in ZYCIE WARSZAWY about the aspirations of youth. It appears from our research that youth values and respects something else and also aspires to other things in life. Can you, as director of the Institute of Sociology at Warsaw University and a researcher of aspirations tied to education, confirm this view?

[Answer] It is very difficult for me to confirm or to deny this view, as I do not have suitable data. Besides, this appears to me to be an apparent contradiction. We can attempt to explain this through two types of theoretical statements. The first is the division of recognized and perceived values advanced by Professor Stanislaw Ossowski. Recognized values are those that are valued only within certain surroundings and set as examples within that environment. For example, a child from a white-collar family may not value education and have no desire to study. He can even say that education for him has limited value. However, he wants to finish even higher education, because in his environment education is highly regarded. If he does not complete his education, poverty may await him. On the other hand, perceived values are those that we value personally and wish to attain independently of the environment. Therefore, both recognized and perceived value can dictate our behavior.

The second way to explain the inconsistency you have asked me about is to rely on the theory of "perceived dissonance." Among other things, this theory states that it is not pleasant for one to acknowledge how much he needs or desires something. Good research should catch these contradictions.

[Question] I understand that we have to approach the research results very carefully. But going back to my original issue: is not education falling too quickly from the hierarchy of values among today's youth?

[Answer] I think that the natural result of all crises is that perceived values take precedence over recognized values. Besides that, we always adapt ourselves to existing conditions and possibilities. Realities are more

important than dreams, but even dreams become realities if society wants very badly to accomplish something. It is worthwhile to research aspirations, as they have a prognostic value. In a short time, they can become a reality. In our research, we consider aspirations on three levels. The first level is the dream level. We then ask the following question to the person under investigation: what level of education do you wish to have? The second level is called non-frustration. We ask the following of the person under investigation: what is the lowest level of education satisfactory to you? And the third level--the real one--asks the question: what kind of education do you want to have?

[Question] And thus a warning before proceeding with a bit too mechanical reading of the results of the research. I shall take this into consideration and--if permitted--ask you: what is the level of educational aspirations among youth?

[Answer] Generally, it is very high, although many researchers like to prove that educational values are not as high as they should be in our society. We shall repeat some numbers already cited in some of your articles: around 60 percent of those who did not receive a high school diploma now wish they had one; around 90 percent of the students in technical schools would like to have finished high school; almost 100 percent of the high school students want to start university studies; a similar phenomenon exists among 75 percent of post-high school students and 60 percent of students in technical schools; around 16 percent of the students want to obtain a university degree or some education after a diploma. Very interesting are the results of research conducted among adults. Around 12-15 percent of persons aged 35-45 want to obtain a university degree. But the highest aspirations exist among people who have or plan to have children: 65 percent of those examined want their children to have a university degree.

The level of aspiration is varied. Economic status is not important; the greatest influence comes rather from family or community factors (on the level of dreams or planning). The simplest example is farmers' children. They want a level of education lower than the children of workers or the intelligentsia but not because of lower material status. Why, then? It appears that the children aspire to the level of education attained by their parents. Whatever the educational level of the parents, it appears that the children also wish to reach that level.

[Question] Then from your point of view the material situation does not have a deciding influence on aspirations. How, then, do we explain what we can see now: a decline in the number of university students and a lower popularity of the high school diploma?

[Answer] I feel that a second factor affecting aspirations--aside from community patterns--is the economic situation. Not too long ago, for example, people could build upon their career (I am thinking about middle-level positions, not great social or political ones). This possibility no longer exists today. A lot also has to do with propaganda: we have been stating during the last few years the lack of positions for specialists and the

cutting of employment in certain ministries. The situation today is not too good for youth to think about obtaining a university diploma.

[Question] We can say then that youth is treating education only as a tool for a professional career.

[Answer] I do not see anything wrong with this. But there are very few people who treat education instrumentally or few who view it only as an end in and of itself.

...We have to deal with the need to develop and enrich one's personality. The following dependence is observed: if someone wishes to continue to educate him/herself, then he/she wishes to have new knowledge or to refresh his/her former knowledge.

Stated simply, there is a difference in the understanding of education by the intelligentsia versus the other classes of society. But in some aspects the intelligentsia does not prize intellectual level of professional knowledge but rather the ennoblement granted by a degree or the protection it gives from lowering one's position in society. A great deal of influence on this view of education has come from the incorrect educational policy that for many years popularized the premise that social and class--not educational--factors led to intellectual advance, i.e., a move from the country to the city. This has brought about a deepening of social and community inequalities. Today, the policy is guiding a number of young people from workers' and farmers' families into technical schools. We do not educate in the liberal tradition, but rather we teach people for the job market. The average worker and farmer in our country do not have an education beyond that required by law. Another error of our educational policy that lowers the aspirations of youth in the professional world is diploma popularization with distinction without recognizing full privileges associated with it. Distinguished students have been promised an apartment and their choice of place of work, but the workplaces and the apartment associations are not fulfilling their promises. Therefore, it does not seem to pay off for academic youth to aspire to perfection.

[Question] Are you saying that the instrumental relationship to education is not a reason for alarm again?

[Answer] I think this issue is not just an academic problem. In the situation of a blockaded economy, and in turn blockaded careers, it is easier to call forth the frustrations of people who are working but not benefitting from their education. This is thus the fundamental issue from the point of view of social policy.

[Question] Since we have begun to discuss professional frustrations of education and work, can you give us some concrete figures on this matter?

[Answer] More or less one-third of those surveyed in Poland do not use their educational qualifications on the job. Often, the one with education is not utilized to his/her potential. The greatest number of persons not satisfied with their job are general high school graduates: 18 percent of the men and

40 percent of the women. Around 16 percent of the men and 18 percent of the women with education have jobs requiring no professional training. Women in general feel especially victimized, and even those with a specific occupation or high school or university educations complain that 47-70 percent of women are satisfied. People also evaluate the usefulness of their knowledge in certain areas of the country differently: in Biala Podlaska, Chelm, Siedlce and Zamosc provinces, over 50 percent of those working state that their professional training is not utilized. The same situation exists in cities with between 100,000 and 200,000 inhabitants. It was surprising to us how close the subjective feelings of the people equated with statistics from GUS [Main Office of Statistics] on lack of job placement for specialists. These are the results of research from the end of the last decade. Today, however, there are no indices to judge that the economic crisis has influenced a radical change on this phenomenon or even on weakening it.

[Question] What is the situation in Polish schools and in the entire educational system in the country?

[Answer] The schools are evaluated chiefly as educational institutions and they are criticized frequently from this standpoint. Considerably fewer of those researched observe their educational function. They are viewed more and more negatively. It is worthwhile here to evade the aspirations of those researched and ask whether the level of education is sufficient for the majority of youth in Poland. Most often there is the following view: the best education for boys is technical training (50 percent of the responses) and for girls--post-high school study (32 percent). Almost 2 percent feel that general high school is where boys can be confined and around 15 percent feel that it is the last stage in girls' education. Only around 5 percent of the respondents feel that vocational schools are necessary for girls and around 11 percent suitable for boys. Around 16 percent of those researched feel that the majority of contemporary youth should finish higher education (the same number of girls as boys). Let us remember: 65 percent of the parents plan to send their children on to higher education.

[Question] I propose that we return to the issue of education as a recognized value. Does an educated person have prestige in our country?

[Answer] Despite the generally high prestige of education, only one-third of those surveyed have high regard for the educated person. The research subjects have other values for the educated person: ambition, intelligence, being well read, wisdom, politeness, ability to make it through life and ability to handle a given situation. It was frequently stated that "an educated person is one who has the ability to live with other people."

[Question] Several times you have emphasized the meaning of education. Educated people have higher ambitions and seem to value education...

[Answer] There is more dependence between the level of education and the level of aspirations, desires and values. Educated people support democratic slogans and the need to implement programs of social justice. Generally speaking, it is more difficult to govern educated people. Together with

achieving education, many values only recognized up to now become felt. Let us take the example of the desire to find an interesting job. One already can see the difference between those with elementary education and those with professional education. For the latter, social recognition for work and interest and pride in one's accomplishments are important in life. The higher the education, the higher the values. The needs of education themselves also are specific. Achievement of a goal automatically does not reduce the needs, but rather it awakens further aspirations for a higher level.

[Question] It seems to me that you are an optimist and do not share the fears of contemporary youth and its educational aspirations.

[Answer] The educational aspirations of our society are high, even a bit too high for the present possibilities of the educational system. Moreover, shortly there will be a new standard in our post-elementary schools. It already exists in the elementary schools. Our educational policy must adapt itself to the new standard, as we already have problems at the lowest levels. We must think of education in the long term. The years 1986-87 will bring new candidates for higher education and the institutions must be ready for them.

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