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International Affairs

Ze'ev Schiff on EC Role in Multilaterals
92AE0396A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 May 92 p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "European Entry Fees"]

[Text] Where will Europe be more damaging—sitting in on the arms control conference and taking the active role in it that she wants, or on the outside, hostile to Israel because of the latter's insult to her. This is the essence of the question today facing Israel's political leaders on this sensitive issue. It is no wonder that the disagreements are not only between Israel and the European Community but also between the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry.

The debate is thus with the European Community and not with all of Europe, but the trouble is that, despite the seemingly solid stance of the Community, various of her member states are adopting an independent policy. The French position is unlike that of Holland or Denmark, who are more sensitive to Israel's security problems, and London's cold approach and Greece's hostile approach are dissimilar to Germany's considerations. What do the European representatives say? Your position is insulting and ill-considered. You agree to have Russia, which endangered Israel's security for decades, play a respected role in the conduct of the negotiations, while rejecting Europe. You ask us for money to help settle the Mideast conflict, and then ask that we stay out of the conference hall. You must not forget that Europe's security is heavily influenced by events in the Middle East, and we therefore have a direct interest in the discussions and want to have some influence on them. What the Europeans did not say is that it is also a struggle over status. They are unwilling to agree to have the world managed by a single superpower, the United States, with another superpower, Russia, assisting her, while they are on the outside.

Israel was not required to answer, but she raises various points. Indeed, the Mideast conflict is likely to affect world security and Europe's security, as well, but various European countries are contributing to the erosion of stability in the Middle East with huge, uncontrolled arms sales. From that point of view, Europe does not come to Israel with clean hands. England has imposed an embargo against Israel for years, while at the same time selling billions of dollars worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. The British embargo does not hurt us, but it would be better if the British would refrain from preaching and claiming to be objective. Washington stresses that her function in the negotiations is to provide mediation services to the parties, but the European Community talks about her desire to participate in the decisions. That is worrisome, considering her unbalanced positions on the conflict's issues. Her readiness to apply economic pressure to acquire the role of judge in the conflict further increases suspicion of her and disqualifies her.

This is a question vital to Israel's existence, as the head of the Israeli team at the arms control talks, the Director-General of the Defense Ministry GEN (Ret) David 'Ivri, explained to

them. The negotiations must be left, first and foremost, to the parties to the conflict. Exaggerated participation by outside bodies would not only affect the efficiency of the talks but would likely also water down the idea of direct negotiations between the parties. The approach of Defense Minister Moshe 'Arens is very tough. It stems from his suspicion that several European states that aided Iraq in the manufacture of chemical and nuclear weapons intend to divest Israel of her strategic property. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister David Levi shows greater openness in that if Europe were to keep her promises regarding the economic integration of Israel into the Community, that would work toward the achievement of a true compromise.

The Israeli approach must proceed on the assumption that in the end, Europe will somehow find her way to the negotiating table. It would be a mistake to leave her on the outside since she would not only be likely to hurt Israel's interests deliberately, but since it is important to influence her arms sales to the region and her positions in general. While Israeli policy toward the Arabs on the question of arms control is a readiness to talk about everything, although in small steps, with no preconditions and with a basically constructive approach, there is no choice but to impose some conditions on anyone asking to play the role of a mediator, just as is done when swearing in someone in court.

The conditions need not be limited to economic integration. Just as the Soviet Union had to renew diplomatic ties with Israel before getting the role of joint chairman of the conference, so, too, no state imposing an embargo on Israel can be allowed to serve as a mediator or active observer in the arms control negotiations. The European Community has to understand that she has to pay for an entry ticket, and, as the Americans say, there is no free lunch. Europe in its entirety, and not just England and France, has to rein in its arms sales to the Arabs. If it is her desire to play a role acceptable to both sides of the conflict, she must prove objectivity in her political approach, as well. If not, things will merely play out as they do in the Security Council. Israel has already been to that kind of bad performance and has no need for another.

On the other hand, Israel must strive for advance understandings with Europe and not make do with an automatic negative response. In the new world order a strategic understanding with Washington alone is not enough. We must persuade Europe that Israel is subject to unique security pressures and that Europe shoulders the responsibility of not divesting her, even indirectly, of her few strategic possessions. The Israeli concern is justified, and if Europe takes the no road, that will impede the achievement of a stable peace in the area.

Internal Affairs

Likud Use of Propaganda Among Immigrants
92AE0396B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 May 92 p B2

[Article by Lili Galili: "It Really Is Terrible"]

[Text] In the late evening hours last week Dyma sat in the conference hall on the 14th floor of Metzudat Ze'ev and

listened closely to the words of the speakers at the congress of Likud immigrant staff activists. About a year and a half ago Dyma immigrated from Baku, settled in the north of Israel and set up a Russian rock group. Two giant pictures could be seen above the heads of the speakers at the congress. I asked Dyma if he could identify them. With some hesitation he replied: "I think the one on the left is Jabotinsky. I do not know the other one."

The unidentified personality was the architect of the State of Israel, Benjamin Ze'ev Herzl. That may be just one small anecdote, but a significant one in a country that, on the 23rd of June, for the first time in its history, may see immigrants deciding the fate of the elections. In the interest of truth, there is no great loss in the fact that Dyma and his friends cannot identify Herzl. From the Likud point of view, it is sufficient that they recognize the likeness of Yasir 'Arafat. If things should continue to go that way in the future, the end result will be that 'Arafat will demand patent rights from Likud. His threatening image crowns their posters; his name is invoked to arouse terror among the immigrants.

From a starting point of just 14 percent support among the immigrants, barely one seat, and in the short time remaining, threats are the correct tactic. They say here that election propaganda is not a lesson in history. The immigrants recognize Lenin and Stalin and they know Communism. From there, the way is wide open to all possible analogies with the Labor party. In his worst nightmares, Rabin never dreamed he would be portrayed as a disciple of Marx, Engels and Lenin until he saw his likeness floating alongside theirs in a notice published by Likud in the Russian press. After a gesture of contrition at Likud that it went a bit too far, they explained that they had to make some kind of response to a Labor ad that dubbed Shamir a "charlatan."

In the congress of immigrant activists highhandedly led by Mikha'el Kleiner with striking nervousness, he made sure to identify Labor as the "reds." Also seen in the audience at that time were several faces known from stormy immigrant demonstrations against the government. "Now we understand that the Likud is not guilty for the fact that there is no work," explains Dr. David Kaminski, one of those who stood out in the unemployed doctors' demonstration. "It was only at the beginning we thought the government was to blame. Now we know that had there been a Labor government, it would not have been better. It might even have been worse." Dr. Kaminsky did not undergo a deep ideological metamorphosis over the last several months. After all, he found work. Now he can find the time for defense issues and speak about the territories in terms of "only a fool would give someone something that he already has in his pocket."

That is the entire story of these elections among the immigrants. In an absurd fashion the Likud immigrant staff headed by Mikha'el Kleiner is deeply absorbed in territorial problems. Not those of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, but his own. It is very crowded on the ninth floor of the Metzuda. The hordes of Russian activists, the propaganda teams and the election "spin doctors" are all vying with each other for a little bit of space and an empty chair. They are all drowning in piles of posters and brochures to be distributed to activists in the field: a "know how to answer" brochure,

poisonous posters against the Labor party and a map of the area from Morocco to Iraq, in which the immigrant is asked to find little Israel lost in a sea of hostile countries indicated in red. At the top of this poster is the headline: "Territories in Exchange for Peace—that is what Labor wants for you, what do you want?"

Fear is the name of the game. "Not fear, but an explanation of the situation," as I am corrected by Lev Vanditchevsky (43), chairman of the immigrants' propaganda staff. "Labor is now trying to run away from all its symbols, and we have to remind the immigrants of them. One of the important hidden messages is: If the Likud remains in power, there are prospects for replacing them in another four years. If Ma'arakh takes over, there will be no prospect of replacing them for generations. They have their ways." In the face of the surprise of a party seeking your vote to be brought in, Vanditchevsky warns: "They understand this from Russia. There, too, it was as if they had thrown out the Communists, but in fact they remained. This is the same thing."

Vanditchevsky and other veterans of the immigration of the 70's are not only the theoreticians of the immigrant propaganda but also part of the propaganda setup itself. Despite the hostility between the two immigrations, Likud will make use of the veteran immigrants as shortcuts. Their basic job will be to explain to the newcomers how terrible it was to come here in the 70's, at the time of the dictatorial Ma'arakh regime.

Vanditchevsky, a successful marketing director who arrived in 1974 from Ukraine, is ready to contribute his personal story for the good of the cause. So, too, Mark Bar-On (46), who immigrated to Israel 19 years ago and now has been appointed to the spokespersonship of the immigrant staff. He, for example, is volunteering to teach the immigrants personally that the Labor party people of today are the same people who cried when Stalin died.

The Likud people are well aware that they have a problem. The defense field is convenient for them, but the focus groups they hold for assessing the pulse of the immigrants show that the problems of unemployment and absorption are more important to the immigrants than the future of Shekhem.

In the focus groups it also turns out that the most problematic age group for Likud is 40-60. The youngsters somehow get by; the pensioners lost very little and may even have improved their situation by immigrating; the 40-60 group are the ones who have lost the most in the absorption process. What, after all, can Likud tell a doctor or scientist who is sweeping the streets?

The future belongs to the children. That is what the immigrants themselves say as the basic justification for their immigration; that is what the Likud will send back to them in exchange. With no present for the parents, they will promise a better future for the children.

A senior Likud person said this week that "the struggle for the immigrant's vote is an almost impossible task." MK [Knesset Member] Mikha'el Kleiner, who replaced Bin-yamin Netanyahu as head of the immigrant staff, has taken

up that task. Still hanging on the office walls in the Metzuda is the old Labor program, where 'Efrayim Gur was put in charge of the Soviet immigrants. They refer to this appointment today as a bad joke. Kleiner is a particularly good choice, not only because of his personal popularity among the immigrants as chairman of the immigrants' absorption committee.

Kleiner is placed 39th on the Likud list for the Knesset, by all accounts, a borderline position. He will probably try now not only for the sake of the people and the nation but also for his own sake. One of his first initiatives upon taking up the job was to introduce order into the Russian press. In euphemistic language the process was described as a "request for more balance in exchange for election ads." For the time being, it is working. As a second step, he moved back the hands of the clock. At a session of the election staff last week, Kleiner told the participants: "Up until now you were in the decade of the 90's. I am going to take you back to the MAPAI decade of the 50's. Remember and remind others."

During a short pause, I sought to take Kleiner himself back to December, 1990, when he sent a widely publicized letter to Shamir, 'Arens, Levi, Nissim, Sharon, Milo and others: "In the faction's session with the Prime Minister I raised my fears that the government will be seen, no matter what, as the one that failed to absorb the immigration. Despite the attention and the head nodding, I do not believe the members understand what it is all about. The poll results and the superficial empathy of the immigrants with Likud as the party against socialism and the red flag, are creating a situation of euphoria among us that prevents us from digesting the electoral and national disaster toward which we are marching. All that Ma'arakh has to do is learn a little Russian, dispatch the Histadrut instigators to preach poison at immigrant gatherings, shake a few hands, and wait for the absorption to fail."

It is hard to say whether Kleiner today would boast of the spirit of prophecy that descended upon him. In a sudden attack of amnesia, he wiped the existence of the letter from his memory. Nevertheless he is quick to recall other events from the distant past. "I know the immigrant community has heard that Likud gave to the settlements and not to them. Now we are going to come and tell them about Kur, about the kibbutzim, about the moshavim, about the real spend-thrifts." Do you realize that you have to start from the beginning and explain to the immigrants what Kur is? "I know this is hard," Kleiner affirms, "the immigrants will have to be filled in. We will try to employ the immigration of the 70's to provide them the background."

For the sake of the cause, Kleiner agreed to participate in a little simulation game. You can see him standing personally among a group of unemployed, frustrated immigrants in a dilapidated caravan. What does he tell them? Here is the gospel according to Kleiner: "You are the victims of Labor agitation. After 15 years they have managed to persuade you that they are in the opposition. That is not correct. They are still in power, which is why they had the money to publish inciting ads for you in the press for a year. Now you are going to bring all this back for a few minutes of anger. You have real ideology, and you are going to vote against it because

they provoke you with the hardships of the absorption. Do you know who you are going to bring back? The party that irresponsibly left the national unity government when there was already immigration. A party you will never be able to get rid of."

After clearing up what the immigrants would hear from Likud during the election campaign, they had only to clarify whom they would hear it from. Internal surveys and focus groups reveal instructive findings: The most popular Likud personalities among the immigrants are David Levi, Bin-yamin Netanyahu, Mikha'el Kleiner, and Beni Begin. Ari'el Sharon is at the bottom of the list. Alongside them, to a limited extent, are also Yitzhaq Shamir and the late Menahem Begin.

From the immigrant perspective, the confluence of the two of them is a kind of spiritualistic seance. Nor have many of them gotten to meet Shamir. Kleiner has already warned them at the congress of activists: "We will have two special large gatherings for the immigrants with the Prime Minister. You must insure that large crowds turn out for the meetings with Shamir. Not a single seat should be left empty." After all, his seat, too, depends on his ability to provide the merchandise.

Local Elections as Tool To Split PLO, Hamas

92AE0364BTelAvivHA'ARETZinHebrew27 Apr 92 p 2

[Commentary by Danny Rubenstein: "Common Interests Between the Government and the Islamic Movement Against the PLO"]

[Text] Suddenly, by Israeli initiative, a proposal to hold elections for the municipal councils in the territories is about to appear on the agenda for the bilateral negotiations with the Palestinians, opening today in Washington. The matter has not been discussed for many years, and the Palestinians first heard about it in a press interview given last week by the head of the Israeli delegation to the talks with them, Elyakim Rubenstein.

In the past, elections for the Arab municipalities have only been held twice and only in the West Bank. They were first held in 1972, when then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in effect forced them upon the residents of the towns. The Palestinians, for their part, reacted by not electing new candidates, but again electing most of the people who had served on the municipal councils. The second time, elections were held in 1976, and the PLO took the initiative, placing a "national bloc" in each town, that won. The results embarrassed Israel and over the following years, one after the other, Israel removed most of the mayors who had been elected. Since then, no elections have been held for the municipalities in the territories. Since the early 1980's, national Palestinian organizations have demanded that municipal elections be held, and the Israeli governments have objected vociferously.

Israeli consent to holding elections just now is no coincidence. The reason for this may be found in what occurred recently in two of the large towns in the territories. In Gaza, the national representative (i.e. the PLO representative), Attorney Fayiz Abu-Rahmah, has been trying for some time

to mobilize agreement of the various political groups for the formation of a municipal council under his leadership. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) opposes this. Its people know their strength and demand that elections be held. In Hebron, the situation is similar. The matter came up in a meeting with the minister of defense, Moshe Arens, some time ago. Hashim al-Natshah, one of the leaders of the movement in Hebron, recently elected by a large majority to head the Hebron Chamber of Commerce, agreed to the idea. Later, Natasha and the public leaders in town stipulated a condition, whereby the elections for the Hebron municipality would be held together with elections for all of the municipalities in the territories.

The picture that is portrayed, therefore, is rather clear: the Muslims, encouraged by their recent success in the territories, are challenging the national leadership and expressing willingness for municipal elections. The Israeli Government is taking advantage of this in order to drive a wedge in the unity of Palestinian support for the PLO. Thus, a quasi-coalition between the Israeli Government and Hamas against a common enemy—the PLO—has been created.

Therefore, spokespeople in the Palestinian delegation and in Tunis have reacted to the initiative with anger. Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, the head of the delegation, said: "Israel is attempting to detract from the credibility of the peace process, and is doing everything in order to draw attention away from the main thing, the political negotiations." Similar things have been said by Hanan 'Ashrawi and the PLO spokesman in Tunis. They are seeking to discuss the future of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, demanding that the settlements be stopped, and seeking to arrive at a settlement regarding the transfer of powers to the Palestinians. And here Israel plays a "trick," the great advantage of which is the agreement of the Islamic Resistance Movement, which is not a partner to the negotiations.

YESHA Council Settlement Drive Advancing

92AE0396C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew

15 May 92 p 6

[Article by Nadav Shragai and Lili Galili: "YESHA Council: The Campaign to Populate the Settlements is Advancing Rapidly"]

[Text] YESHA [Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza] Council people are satisfied with the pace of apartment sales in the population campaign "To settle in the heartland—a million people in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza." In response to questions from HA'ARETZ, 'Aharon Dumav, a spokesman for the YESHA Council, reported yesterday that thus far 342 "league" homes have been purchased, which is to say, homes that the settlements themselves as a community or 'Amna are building.

The breakdown is as follows: Qdumim, 20 apartments purchased, 50 under negotiation. 'Ofra, 34 purchased, 10 under negotiation. Mikhmash, 19 purchased, 10 under negotiation. Beit Horon, five purchased, four under negotiation. 'Ofarim, 70 purchased, 50 under negotiation. Barqan, 26 purchased. Pedu'el, 18 purchased, 10 under negotiation. 'AleI Zahav, 18 purchased, 17 under negotiation. Nili, seven purchased,

three under negotiation. Neve Tzuf, three purchased, one under negotiation. Shevi Shomron, 10 purchased, three under negotiation. 'Alon, seven purchased, three under negotiation. 'Eli, 37 purchased, 12 under negotiation.

In addition, over the last three months 1,353 caravans attached to foundations have been populated, out of 1,487 caravans; likewise, 1,394 prefab units out of 1,554 attached to foundations. The settling of the prefabs and the caravans got a boost from the population campaign after many decided to move and settle in temporary quarters until their settlement home was finished.

In the overall campaign about 5,000 apartments have been offered for sale in various stages of completion, or in advanced stages of construction, and there are no data yet on apartments not designated as "league homes." Likewise, there are still no data on sales by construction corporations or on sales in the large urban settlements such as Ma'ale 'Adumim, 'Ari'el, or 'Efrat, where construction is private and the purchaser has no connection with the local council or the settlement secretariat.

Yesterday, 87 buses toured the territories carrying citizens asked to look into the purchase of apartments in the settlements. The buses left Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem and toured dozens of settlements, in accordance with a plan prepared in advance, according to the preference of those interested, on the secular days of Passover.

The Peace Now tracking team claims that only about 500 families (about 900 people) participated in yesterday's population campaign tours of the settlements, mostly Orthodox families and Soviet immigrants. Tracking team members were at the departure points in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Netanya. According to them, the organizers of the campaign had to release about a third of the buses ordered, while most of the others left with only partial occupancy of about 25 people on average.

According to Professor 'Amiram Goldblum, one of the heads of the movement, the movement got its hands on a population campaign document showing the cost of the campaign for vehicles alone as 50,000 shekels plus VAT. The document calls for "investing special effort on Independence Day, and making sure there is at least one bus on each tour." It was stated in the document that only 800 of 1,500 people expected were registered for the tours, and the effort had to be increased.

According to Goldblum, only 10 people left for Qiryat 'Arba', including the escort and the driver; half a minibus went to Beit Haggai, which was offering, in the 'Amna brochure prepared for the campaign, about 120 apartment units. According to him, relatively full buses departed on only two circuits: the 'Eli, Shilo-Ma'ale, Levona circuit, whither two buses and a van departed; and a full bus to Teko'a and Noqdim.

Issue of West Bank Water Sovereignty

92AE0391A 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew

April 92 pp 22-25, 70

[Article by Hayim Gwartzman: "When 'Arafat Will Be Controlling Tel Aviv's Water Faucet"]

[Text] The plentiful rains that fell this winter and the water flowing in the rivers may mislead us. Israel's water economy is still facing two difficult objective problems: small volume and deteriorating quality. Our water resources are limited in quantity and are insufficient to supply the growing needs of the urban, agricultural, and industrial sectors. Public awareness of these problems increased in recent years in the wake of consecutive years of drought. The problem of the "Sea of Galilee level," familiar to the general public (a shortage of three to four meters until this year) is only a small problem, considering that at least 10 meters were lacking from the invisible underground reservoirs which, in contrast to the Sea of Galilee, did not fill up at all even after the abundant rains. In addition, the quality of the water is deteriorating as a result of growing salinity and pollution. The western edges of the underground water reservoirs have become saline as a result of the penetration of sea water, while others are being polluted by waste dumps and industrial effluvia, sewage, excessive fertilizer, and oil leaks.

This winter's abundant rains may have brought a temporary relief from a quantitative point of view, but a new and worse problem is about to emerge in the wake of the peace conference in Madrid. The Palestinian struggle for possession of the water has already begun and the U.S. prescription for resolving water problems in the world, which in principle sides with the Palestinian demands, will exacerbate even more Israel's water problems, to the point of drying up agriculture. If not worse.

The Palestinian Position

The document on the "Water Rights of the Palestinians" is all ready for negotiation. It was hammered out on the basis of scientific articles from international professional literature. The representatives of the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem, the representatives of the European Community, and a representative of the Egyptian Embassy are also lending a helping hand. However, Israeli public figures and scientists have been helping the Arabs no less and perhaps even more than the former.

The document opens with a list of Israel's crimes: Starting in 1952, Israel began stealing water from the demilitarized zone with Syria. In 1967 Israel forcibly occupied territories and water sources that did not belong to it. The document brings up the—indeed—painful problem of the faulty management of the Israeli water economy, which led to the deterioration of the water resources both in terms of quantity and quality, thus causing damage to all area inhabitants. From there to water ownership: The authors of the document believe that the underground water stored in the underground reservoir called the "mountain aquifer"—which is the underground reservoir under the mountain ridge—belongs to the Palestinians, because this reservoir is filled from the rainwater falling in the "territories." In view of the fact that the Civil Administration in Judaea and Samaria does not allow the Arabs to drill and draw water for the Arab population in Judaea and Samaria, state the document authors, the Palestinians demand that the water that Israel draws should be returned to its owners, thus cutting 600 million cubic meters [mcm] out of the 1,400 mcm potable water available to the State of Israel in one year.

Another ownership claim focuses on the water of the Sea of Galilee, Hayarmuk, and the Jordan. First, the Arabs demand that Israel should stop pumping water from the Hayarmuk area. Moreover, by the beginning of March 1992, when the Sea of Galilee threatened to flood the Jordan Valley, Israel stopped the flow of water to the Jordan south of the Sea of Galilee by means of the Deganya Dam, thus drying up "Palestinian lands" in the valley. They demand that the water be allowed to flow to the Jordan on a permanent basis, as it was in the past, in other words, to stop pumping water into the national water pipeline. Similarly, to the best knowledge of the document authors, Israel drilled a number of wells along the border with the Gaza Strip in order to prevent the flow of water westward. According to the authors of the document, Israel thus caused serious salinity problems and the continuing water disaster in Gaza. They request Israel to pay compensation for that damage and to immediately channel 60 mcm water a year to Gaza. The document also wants the Palestinians to be allowed to recycle sewage water from their big cities for local agricultural use. The Arabs ended on an ironical note saying that should Israel end up with a water shortage, it can buy water from Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey, just as it is now buying oil from Egypt.

The claims of the document's authors would mean the end of most Israeli agriculture. According to their view, the kibbutzim and moshavim in 'Emeq Yizre'el, 'Emeq Harod, and 'Emeq Bet She'an, which currently use water from springs and drilling at the foot of Mount Gilboa, are in fact using "Palestinian water," because the water in question comes from the rainfalls over the Nablus and Janin areas. The settlers of 'Emeq Hefer, the Sharon, and the inner coastal plain must also realize that the water they use for their fields belongs to the Palestinians living in Ramallah, Tulkarm, and Qalqilyah. The moshavim and kibbutzim in the Lakhish and Adulam regions also fall into the same category.

There is no doubt that the Arabs' demands to stop pumping water into the national pipeline will in fact destroy the Israeli agriculture. What is more, a considerable number of residents in the central part of the country, Jerusalem, the Dan area, and additional cities all the way to Be'er Sheva are drinking water drawn from the "mountain aquifer." Should that water be transferred to Palestinian authority and should they prevent it from flowing into the plain by unchecked pumping, the State of Israel would have to supply the population in the center of the country with water from the second biggest underground reservoir in the coastal area or from the Sea of Galilee. Replacing the water of the mountain aquifer with water from the coastal aquifer or the Sea of Galilee will have serious effects on public health, to say the least. The quality of the water from the mountain aquifer is among the best in the world and much better than that of the water in the coastal area and the Sea of Galilee. The pollution process in the coastal area is very rapid and considerable amounts of underground water already are no longer drinkable. The water of the Sea of Galilee is also not always up to drinking standards. To put it plainly: Palestinian control of the water sources in the Dan District is a sure way to cause a health hazard.

The Water Conference, which was to be held in Istanbul last winter but was postponed because of the Madrid conference,

was intended to discuss water problems in the Middle East. The initiator of the Water Conference, Mrs. Joy Starr, is a Washington politician and head of a research institute dealing with water issues in the Middle East. In an article published on the eve of the Istanbul conference, she made an emotional appeal to Bush, Baker, and the heads of the wealthy countries to resolve the water problem in the Middle East by organizing international aid for building large water supply plants, sea water desalination plants, or laying long pipes to transport water from neighboring countries. The Turks, with the help of American academics, have already suggested laying a pipe to convey water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. This has to be seen to be believed: The solution suggested for Israel's water supply should involve a Turkish pipeline passing through Lebanon and Syria!

Aside from the vulnerability of pipelines passing through enemy countries, the agricultural sector can be based only on economic profitability. Even if we were to save on the cost of building such plants, thanks to international aid, we would not be able to foot the bill for operating them. Desalinated water costs twice as much as the water we now use, which is already very expensive. Moreover, the cost of transporting water about 400 km from Turkey to Israel is higher than the desalination. Consequently, relying on such solutions and on international funding is not only ridiculous, but also unrealistic, uneconomical, and dangerous. The conclusion: We must not, under any circumstance, relinquish the actual water rights in our hands and the rights to which we are legally entitled.

Shutting Down Agriculture

For the time being, Israeli policymakers are keeping silent. Palestinian propaganda is exploiting this fact and is very skillfully winning over the hearts of politicians throughout the world. The only Israelis whose voices are publicly heard on the matter are those who, in their ardent desire for peace, are willing to make stunning concessions and, despite their academic background and great experience in managing the Israeli water economy, their advice constitutes a complete surrender to the Arabs. Experience has shown that 15 to 20 years may pass between the beginning, planning stages and the completion of a project, as was the case with the national pipeline and the national sewage project. Therefore, we must now plan for the long term, for a time when some 14 million people will live between the sea and the Jordan river, Jews as well as Arabs. According to the most up-to-date estimate of water potential, in the area between the sea and the Jordan there are 1,400 mcm of drinking water a year, which means 100 cm per capita a year.

And now listen to their "proposal." Such a quantity of water is in fact sufficient only for the urban consumption of the future population. Given the basic assumption for resolving the water dispute, namely that urban consumption has priority over agricultural consumption, drinking water will necessarily be used exclusively for supplying the Israeli and Palestinian population in equal measure. What this means is that Israeli agriculture that uses potable water should be discontinued and that agriculture should be content with recycled waste water. If it wants luxuries like drinking water,

it will have to pay huge amounts of money, disproportionate to its output, for desalinated or imported water.

Our Water

Assuming that the negotiations will not break up at earlier stages and that we do discuss water rights, our national explainers should note that we have many water rights, especially by international law. The area of dispute focuses primarily on the rights over the underground water reservoir in Judaea and Samaria. The Palestinians' claim that the water belonged to those in whose area the rains fall is unacceptable under international agreements. A different approach claims exactly the reverse. According to the latter, the water belongs to the people in whose territory the water is pumped. In fact, it is the Arab countries that support the second system. That is the basis for Egypt's claim to ownership over the Nile water flowing from Ethiopia, as well as the Syrians' and Iraqis' claim on the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris flowing to them from Turkey. Prior to 1967, the Jordanians, too, supported the second system, when they claimed ownership over the Jordan waters flowing south from the Sea of Galilee. In practical terms, the two opposing systems are not accepted under international law. According to the Helsinki Agreements, which are based on international precedents, water is classified according to "needs and means," technological and agricultural potential, and historical law; similarly, urban consumption in one country does not take precedence over agricultural consumption in a neighboring country. Also, the claim that the side that has plentiful water must cede in favor of a needy one is also not admissible under international law.

Besides, even if we accepted the claim that ownership of the area of permeation gives water ownership rights, it must be stressed that the quantity of water pumped from the mountain aquifer, 600 mcm a year, fills up from the rains falling on the eastern side of the Green Line. The aquifer also fills up from rain falling on the western side, such as in the city of Jerusalem and the Jerusalem Corridor, and the edges of the mountains between the Umm-al-Fahm mountains down to the Lod plain. Moreover, according to the Israeli interpretation of the Camp David accords, autonomy refers to people, not territories, and therefore the fact that the Palestinians are sitting on any land does not give them ownership of water. Even if, God forbid, the Arabs should get territorial autonomy, it must be recalled that, according to international law, the State of Israel has a claim for "historical uses" and many other legal claims which cannot be listed here in detail.

The second area of conflict regards water resources, which include, as we said, the source of the Jordan river, the Sea of Galilee, and the Hayarmuk. The water from those sources is currently divided among Israel, Jordan, and Syria on the basis of the 1955 Johnston Agreements. At the time, those agreements were endorsed by the governments of Israel and Jordan but, under pressure from the Arab countries, Jordan reconsidered its decision, while Syria never did endorse them. In practice, however, those agreements have been implemented to this day. According to Johnston's recommendation, Israel gets about 400 mcm from all the sources, Jordan about 770 mcm, and Syria about 130 mcm a year.

The basis for that division served the agricultural needs of the countries as they were perceived at the time. Johnston viewed the Jordan Valley as stretching to the Dead Sea in the south and claimed that that was also potential agricultural land for Jordan. He viewed Israel's agricultural land and water needs as more limited, and Syria's as very reduced. Consequently, the volume of water he proposed to the Jordanians was almost double what he recommended for Israel. The water plants later built by the two countries were in fact built in the same proportion. The Jordanians built the diversion system on the Hayarmuk and the Yi'or Canal, while Israel built the national water pipeline.

After the Six-Day War, the West Bank of the Jordan Valley found itself holding the short end of the stick regarding water rights. Jordan's diversion system was supposed to have included two canals on both sides of the Jordan River, but the western canal was never built. Consequently, after 1967 the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria found themselves lacking water rights to the tune of 250 mcm a year, which they should have obtained from the Jordanian share. The claim of the authors of the document on the "Palestinians' Water Rights" that the "Palestinian lands" in the Jordan Valley were dried up because of the Deganya Dam is, of course, groundless. Their land dried up even before 1967 because of Jordan's failure to act, while the Deganya Dam is an integral part of the national water pipeline in keeping with the Johnston Agreements.

As it was expressed in their document, the Palestinian claim about Israel's pumping water from the Hayarmuk is thoroughly groundless. Israel is pumping about 100 mcm a year from there and that water is from swellings that the Jordanians cannot capture. Israel's current veto against the "Unity Dam" designed as another upriver obstacle on the Hayarmuk is also justified. This veto must be left in place in order to prevent a "claim" loss of some 100 mcm a year.

Similarly, the disastrous quantity and quality of underground water in the Gaza Strip also stems from the fact that under Egyptian rule, the Gaza Strip inhabitants began to pump out too much. This is cumulative damage which caused sea water to penetrate the reservoirs and produce severe salinity. The number of wells that Israel allegedly drilled to prevent the flow were of course a figment of the notorious Arab imagination. Currently Gaza Strip inhabitants use about 60 mcm water a year. The situation there could be improved only by banning all pumping for dozens of years.

Looking to the Future

If we want to promote peace, we must proclaim that, despite the fact that the Palestinians' ownership claims over water sources are groundless, Israel is prepared, as a goodwill gesture, to provide for the Palestinians' urban needs in accordance with the standards customary in the Israeli urban sector. The Palestinians in Judaea and Samaria currently use 105 mcm a year and there are means available to increase this volume. However, Israel will be justified in linking such an increase to peace agreements with the other countries in the area. The Jordanians must provide 250 mcm a year to the Palestinians in accordance with the Johnston Agreements

regarding the western Yi'or Canal, which they owe the area. In addition, the other countries in the area, Lebanon for example, should show goodwill toward the Palestinians. The Litani river currently flows unimpeded to the sea, and if the Lebanese agree to divert it to the Hula Valley, Israel can help convey water to the Palestinians through the existing systems. Simultaneously, they can be helped to build a seawater desalination installation in the Gaza Strip, which can provide 200 mcm a year.

Conclusion: Water rights in a climatic region like ours, on the edge of the desert, are a vital asset and a subject of serious conflict among states. Within the framework of goodwill toward the Palestinians and in the interest of promoting peace, we must not in any way impair the few water resources we have, and certainly not endanger public health. Dreams of water desalination for agricultural purposes, transportation from great distances, and brotherly gestures toward other nations are uneconomical and unrealistic inventions worthy only of the Americans. We are compelled to struggle for each cubic meter that is legally ours; at the same time, we must understand the vital interests of the Arabs. We must not dry up Israeli agriculture, which has attained achievements on an international level after long years of hard labor. And if no position papers have yet been hammered out on the water issue, such papers must be prepared immediately. It is clear beyond any doubt that the Palestinians are already doing so very skillfully, helped along by their Israeli colleagues who, in their enthusiasm for peace, may deprive the State of Israel of its water rights.

[Box, p 24]

Territorial Waters

Following the start-up of the project to divert the Jordan waters in the area of the Benot Ya'aqov Bridge, as part of the national pipeline in 1953, the Syrians lodged a complaint with the Security Council. The Israeli ambassador to the UN at the time, Abba Eban, stood up to the Syrians in the ensuing dispute, and the occurrence was described by Simha Blas, the founder of Meqorot and TAHAL [Israeli Water Planning] and the initiator of the national pipeline:

"The Syrian claimed rights to the Jordan water, because Syria was abutting the Jordan and Israel could not touch it without Syria's agreement. Abba Eban quoted the peace contract signed after World War I between the British Government, whose successor is Israel, and the French Government, whose successor is Syria. The contract states that the Jordan sources belonged to us alone, including those originating outside our country, and that the Syrians do not abut the Jordan for even one meter.

"The Syrian then cited a precedent regarding the drying up of the Hula and claimed that Israel did not have a right to work in the demilitarized zone on land belonging to Syrian subjects. Abba Eban proved that the land did not belong to Syrian subjects. The Syrian furiously burst out that all of Israel's land was Arab land, which earned him a dismissive smile.

"He also claimed that the diversion of the Jordan will deprive the Batiha area of irrigation water. Abba Eban

quoted from the British-French contract, which stated that the water for the Batiha area was awarded only for reasons of good neighborliness, but that Batiha did not have any legitimate claim to Jordan water. It was clear to everyone that the Syrian complaint was without foundation, and just as Syria does not border the Jordan, so is there no limit to its hatred and nastiness.

"It turned out that the majority of Security Council members were persuaded that we were right. Negotiations began for formulating the decision. The United States requested that the matter be placed into the hands of General Beneke, who receives the UN Secretary General's decisions and who cannot ignore the U.S. view (that is how the situation was in those days). The Syrians and their associates demanded that the continuation of the work be made conditional on their agreement. They will, of course, never agree, but the phrase 'mutual agreement' is a strong attraction.

"Johnston, the American mediator, said that the quantity of water should be divided among the areas located in the drainage basin of the Jordan and that Israel would be entitled to transfer its share to any place of its choosing. He thought that he was thereby doing us a favor. But we need no favors and we do not need the Arabs' permission to convey our water.

"At the beginning of the second meeting Johnston suggested with an endearing smile that 'the performance will begin,' meaning that the experts will talk and the politicians will observe. Engineer M. Jones opened up and said that the water should go to the country in which it originates. According to this philosophy, all of the Jordan water belongs to Syria and Lebanon and all of the Hayarmuk water to Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan. The meeting exploded after I pointed out loudly and very emotionally (the prime minister immediately sent me a note: 'Do not raise your voice') that according to this philosophy the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates should go not to Syria and Iraq, but to Turkey and Armenia, and the Nile waters belong to Ethiopia and Sudan, not to the Egyptians. Jones was nice and frank and said that all the possible additions are due to the Arabs. We put him into 'splendid isolation.' He failed to appear on following visits, no doubt thanks to me.

"Upon being asked, before the diversion work began, what would happen if we were not able to work on the diversion because of political reasons, I answered (grinding my teeth): Then we will pump water out of the Sea of Galilee. They looked at me as if I were talking nonsense. What? Pump millions of cubic meters to such a height? They thought I was pulling their leg..." (Simha Blas, "The Waters of Strife and Action," Massada Publishing House, 1973)

[Box, p 25]

A Water Jungle

From the American viewpoint, the Israeli-Palestinian "water war" is a small, simple war. Their approach to international or interethnic conflicts is sharply reflected in this issue, too. As far as they are concerned, since there are a number of focal points in the world where war may break out because of water disputes, and since, as it happens, half of those points

are in the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian problem will be resolved within the framework of the overall solution that they recommend.

First focal point: Egypt. In 1979, after the signing of the peace accord with Israel, President al-Sadat announced that the only factor that may bring Egypt back into the war circle was water. He was referring to the war between his country and Ethiopia, from whose territory come 85 percent of the Nile waters; his demand was that the Ethiopians should not dare to divert the water for their national needs. The reason for Egypt's sensitivity was the continued drop in the Nile water flow in the wake of the protracted drought in Ethiopia. That development seriously harmed Egypt's agriculture, tourism, and electrical power production.

The second focal point involves Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf Emirates. Some 60 percent of the desalinated water in the world is produced in that area. The desalination installations are exposed and are most vulnerable in time of war. Their destruction would strike those countries with thirst and bring about their utter disappearance within a short period of time. This existential threat is serious and oppressive, and it will not stop until the rulers of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have made peace among themselves.

The third and worst focal point of all is in Syria and Iraq and is an outcome of the new water plants that the Turks are building on the Tigris and Euphrates. The Turks are planning to turn 120,000 square km in the dry southeastern part of Turkey into irrigated land. For that purpose they are building 21 dams on the Euphrates and the Tigris, the proudest of which will be the Ataturk Dam, which will store 48,200 mcm (for comparison purposes: Israel's entire yearly consumption of fresh, saline, and artesian water is 1,800 mcm). That is in addition to 17 hydropower plants that will produce 24,000 mw an hour. The construction of those plants began in 1983 and completion will take 50 years. The Turkish project will cut 40 percent of the Euphrates water available to Syria and 90 percent of the Euphrates water currently used by the Iraqis. The yield of the Tigris will also be affected. In Iraq alone, one-half of agricultural lands will dry up; as early as January 1990 the Euphrates stopped flowing south after being diverted to fill the Ataturk reservoir, and that was only the beginning.

The fourth focal point is Jordan. Israel's current veto on building the "Unity Dam" on the upper course of the Hayarmuk at the border between Jordan and Syria is seriously hurting them. The Unity Dam is expected to provide an additional volume of water to the Kingdom of Jordan and power to Syria. According to the World Bank Charter, loans are not granted for building water plants when the states in the area do not agree among themselves about their construction. The Jordanians cannot get the project going without a loan from the World Bank, and the Israeli veto still stands, because the plant will cut off 100 mcm water from Israel, not to mention the fact that the Syrians still refuse to talk to us at all.

In the final analysis, the Americans see a general shortage of water in all the countries in the area. From this viewpoint, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is relatively the smallest among the disputes.

In contrast to all the examples of each Arab country stealing as much water as it can from the next, and against all the international charters and mutual considerations, Israel is interested in conforming to the international standard. This standard was established according to the 1966 Helsinki Agreements regarding shared surface water reservoirs (lakes and rivers) and the 1986 Seoul agreements regarding underground water reservoirs. According to these agreements, the water should be divided based on the basic needs of both sides, historical claims, and industrial (for example, electrical power plants) and agricultural development opportunities.

According to every criterion of international law, Israel has a strong claim to the control of its water sources.

As we said, in this area Israel is the only country that observes international law, while its neighbors remain faithful to the basic law of the jungle: Might makes right!

Water Commissioner on Desalination, Distribution

92WN0582A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 26 May 92 p 4

[Article by Nurit Arad]

[Text] When Professor Dan Zaslovsky left the ivory tower of academe to become Water Commissioner on 19 August 1991, the Sea of Galilee was three meters below the mark and the Israeli consumer was being asked to install "water savers," shower in pairs, let their gardens go dry, and wash their cars with a bucket. There was even talk of importing water from Turkey.

But he was dealt a wild card. After nine months in his post and a rainy winter, the Sea of Galilee is full and it is difficult to recall a more encouraging water state of affairs. Still, Zaslovsky blames himself. "I have been lax in getting out the word; the Israeli people mistakenly believe that there is no further need to save water. We have to get used to the fact that water is a scarce resource that we will always have to use sparingly. Do not deprive yourself, just do not waste." He promises to return soon with a new "water savers" campaign.

He recently came home from the multilateral talks in Vienna, where he represented Israel on the regional water panel. Zaslovsky lowers his voice when speaking about water and the neighboring countries, as though afraid of impeding the momentum. He chooses his words carefully; he would prefer that the entire subject stay out of the press.

"We will not get more water by cooperating with Jordan," says Professor Zaslovsky, "but it is a matter of neighborly relations. Most of the representatives, Israelis and Arabs alike, do not understand what is at stake. They falsely assume that there will be peace if we redistribute water as they did with the Nile, the Euphrates, and other sources. But that is not the situation.

"West of the Jordan River, there are 370 cubic meters of water per person per year, compared to less than 300 in Jordan, 2,000 in Syria and Lebanon, and 4,000 in Iraq. Egypt has 1,200 cubic meters per person per year, more than triple what is available in Israel and Jordan. And what was the first subject the Syrian delegate raised at the start of the multilateral talks? That the Nile was off-limits for discussion.

"Israel and Jordan are pushing their water supplies close to the limit; some places are even over-exploited. So what do they want us to do, slide into deficit? Better that we jointly use the little there is."

Zaslovsky cynically adds, "We are truly ready to share water with our neighbors—Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. Syria, for example, has an agreement with Jordan permitting them to draw up to 90 million cubic meters of water from the Yarmuk [River]. But they have taken 200 million cubic meters so far, so they are actually stealing water from Jordan and Israel."

[Arad] What was the joint plan that Israel brought to the talks?

[Zaslovsky] In the bilateral talks, we are looking for common projects that one country could not carry out or that would not be worthwhile for it to do alone, such as, for example, capturing flood waters that drain from the Jordan into the Dead Sea or building a canal from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. We have no plan for Syria just now. In theory, we could work with Lebanon but we do not have a plan because the two sides are not talking to one another.

From reading the newspapers, I have learned that the Lebanese have proposed selling Israel water from the Litani [River]. I do not know whether its a serious offer or worth pursuing. Anyway, I have not heard anything about it.

[Arad] If the talks are not leading to any decisions, what is their importance?

[Zaslovsky] Mostly in regional cooperation in scientific and technological matters. We are talking about joint projects to build model installations for desalinating water and creating a data bank for exchanging information. The importance of the talks lies in getting together and exchanging information.

[Arad] Do you have a plan for next winter?

[Zaslovsky] No. We have draft plans for rainy, average, or dry conditions. But who is talking about winter when it still is not clear to me what this summer will be like? Evaporation, which is directly related to the weather, is the gravest problem in the summer. Until this summer is over, we will not know our water balance for going into next winter.

When Zaslovsky joined the Water Commission, he says, he found no general plan for solving Israel's water problem. Such a plan is now in the works. It will have three main features:

1. Restoring the coastal aquifer and distributing its water.
2. Implementing the plan for recycling used water, which is still an unexploited source of water for the state and the greatest source of pollutants. Despite the rains, water quality has not improved this year except in the Sea of Galilee.

3. Desalinating water, which is inevitable. At this stage, the Commission is conducting a study of brackish water, the first in line for desalination. This water will cost less than half the price for desalinated sea water. Water for desalination is boundless, but the plan is restricted to desalinating water for household and industrial use. Other plans on the table at the Water Commission call for desalinating water at 65 cents per cubic meter for delivery from the plant.

According to the plan drawn up by the Commission, offers will be tendered to private contractors for construction of the desalination plants and sale of the water produced. "The current cost of transporting a cubic meter of water to Be'er Sheva is comparable to that for desalinating it," says Zaslovsky. He will present his desalination plan next week to the Prime Minister, who also serves as Minister for Agriculture. The first glass of desalinated water could be drunk three years from now.

Farmers, who were prepared to mount the barricades on behalf of Tzemah Yishai, the previous commissioner, bear no love for Professor Zaslovsky. Zaslovsky may be a professor, farmers contend today, but he is destroying agriculture. Zaslovsky tried to cut their water quotas despite the rainy winter but was forced to retreat under pressure from his superior, Michael Deqel.

[Arad] Why did you not fight for your position?

[Zaslovsky] I have no quarrel with the Ministry of Agriculture. It was decided that the cuts in high quality water for agriculture would be smaller than what I wanted but I preferred to accept the decision and carry it out with a minimum of harm. Agricultural production has not tailed off this year despite the cuts of last year. A special division of the Water Commission is now engaged in mapping agricultural fields so we can know which are irrigated and which are not.

[Arad] Are you aware that water allocations are bought and sold?

[Zaslovsky] Certainly. There is a black market for water and I am not doing anything to change the situation. Prices on the black market are approaching one NIS [new Israeli shekels] per cubic meter (as opposed to 36 agorot) and anyone who can pay does so. The situation will change the moment that there is enough water for all who request allocations.

[Arad] Why did the agricultural lobby fight you?

[Zaslovsky] The agricultural lobby did not fight me; it fought the quantity of water and its cost. They want 80 percent of water to be very cheap and only 20 percent very expensive. The task for us is to prevent excessive consumption of water even in a good year like this one. We need to conserve water for drier times.

[Arad] Is it really possible to save water?

[Zaslovsky] We can save limitless volumes of water in the coastal aquifer. Even today, the aquifer has a deficit of 750 million to 1.5 billion cubic meters.

[Arad] Are you in favor of agricultural growth in Israel?

[Zaslovsky] I have no doubt that Israel must produce all fresh agricultural products for daily consumption. Imported vegetables will always be more expensive than local produce, but we must reduce commodities such as wheat, cotton, and the like. The problem is that farmers are demagogic in their use.

[Arad] Do you sometimes get the itch to chuck it all and go back to academic life?

[Zaslovsky] When I left the Technion to become chief scientist of the Ministry of Energy, and again when I established the brain trust of the armored corps, and again when I went on to the Water Commission, everyone thought I had taken leave of my senses. So I went into public service. They were right, of course. But so long as I feel I can do something here, I will stay.

[Arad] What if, after the elections, a new Minister for Agriculture arrives who does not get along with you?

[Zaslovsky] Then I will really think about retirement.

Sharon's Plan To Rent Empty Apartments

92AE0398A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
20 May 92 p 19

[Article by Dov Ganhowsky: "Yes, to Rent"]

[Text] The Finance Ministry has an almost Pavlovian system of automatic response to proposals coming from the Ministries of Housing or Industry and Commerce, which is to say No with a capital N. It is hard to fault the Finance Ministry, having for so long been trained for such a reaction. Nevertheless, the reaction is not always right.

This week the housing minister suggested putting 13,000 government-owned apartments up for rent. The reaction was immediate and automatic: No, as usual. It is true that the housing minister accompanied his proposals with a few of his customary threats, such as: "I will do it at any cost," "I will do it if it is the last thing I do," which is indeed riling. But as far as the topic itself was concerned, the reaction should have been something like, "Let us talk."

Now that the Housing Ministry has already built all these houses and apartments that are standing empty, it is of course possible to continue keeping them empty until buyers are found. The chances of selling those apartments in the near future are negligible. If they did not sell at the peak of the market, they will not sell after the peak, unless heavily subsidized. And if it comes to subsidizing, then it might as well be rent, not purchase.

One can argue against Sharon's plan regarding its scope, area, and management. It is doubtful whether the management of the project should be awarded to Amidar as long as the company is still starring in the state comptroller's reports. It may be worth examining a different system. But in principle, the response should have been positive.

Empty buildings fall apart. Hastily built empty apartment houses not of northern Tel Aviv quality fall apart even sooner. Such apartment houses, which are not properly reinforced, fall apart in record time. Also, the time has come to thoroughly study whether apartments can be rented in this country and in what form. This is just such an opportunity. The state has become the owner of thousands of apartments that are standing empty and disintegrating. Rent them, and fast, even if the rent is below what is known as "real," as Sharon suggested. Even subsidized, but on condition that in exchange for the subsidy, the tenants pledge to maintain the buildings, the apartments, and the yards.

There is no certainty that this will work. But it is certainly "worth trying," as they say. If the ministers of finance and housing can indeed reach a compromise in the matter, let it be a fair compromise, just not a political one. After establishing the principle, which appears to be positive, the details are to be established not along the lines of the permanent

competition among the ministries, but to the point of the principle. That is of course difficult and perhaps not customary, but as we said, it is worth trying.

Housing Ministry Offers Settlement Loans

92AE0392A 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew
Apr 1992 pp 40-41

[Announcement placed by the Government Publicity Bureau: "The Ministry of Construction and Housing Announces: Available! Locality-Related Loans"]

[Text] In many settlements throughout the country where expanded construction is now under way on the initiative of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, you will be able to purchase an apartment with increased and unprecedented assistance.

The assistance will be granted to eligible persons who sign a loan agreement with a bank between 22 March 1992 and 30 June 1992. Eligible persons who signed a loan agreement beginning 1 January 1992 and are requesting the balance of the locality-related aid also will be able to do this under certain conditions.

"Locality-related loans" will be granted to "nonowner" eligible persons, including "new immigrants," and to "apartment owners," in addition to their personal eligibility.

"Nonowner" eligible persons including "new immigrants" will receive the "locality-related loans," which are composed of a loan and a grant (according to the following list) for the purchase of an apartment that is being built within the framework of the program of the Ministry of Construction and Housing.

Eligible persons who are "apartment owners" will be given the full amount of the assistance solely as a loan.

Those who are not eligible under the assistance plans of the Ministry of Construction and Housing also will be given the full amount of the "locality-related loan" solely as a loan, if they do not own more than one apartment at the time of registration and on the condition that they sell it within one year of receipt of assistance. (These borrowers will be required to meet the banks' criteria for mortgages.)

Pay attention!

Those who purchase new apartments that were not built within the framework of the program of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, or apartments that were built within the framework of societies, in the places that were specified above, will receive the full amount of the assistance in the form of a loan only.

Eligible persons who purchase existing apartments in the abovementioned settlements will be eligible for loans in the amount of IS [new Israeli shekels] 35,000, with a monthly payment of approximately IS 221.

A list of the settlements where locality-related loans will be granted is given below (the assistance is in new shekels):

Urban Settlements			
Name of Settlement	Total Assistance, Loan and Grant	Of This: Grant	Initial Monthly Payment on Loan
Eylat	59,500	29,500	189
Or 'Akiva	49,500	34,500	95
Ashqelon	49,500	34,500	95
Ofaqim	49,500	29,500	126
Efrat	49,500	29,500	126
Ari'el	49,500	29,500	126
Ashdod	49,500	19,500	189
Alfey Menashe	49,500	9,500	252
Or Yehuda	49,500	0	312
Beyt She'an	49,500	39,500	63
Beytar	49,500	34,500	95
Be'er Sheva	49,500	34,500	94
Beyt Shemesh	49,500	19,500	189
Benev 'Ayish	49,500	19,500	189
Binyamina	49,500	9,500	252
Be'er Ya'aqov	49,500	0	252
Gan Yavne	49,500	19,500	189
Giv'at 'Ada	49,500	9,500	252
Gedera	49,500	9,500	252
Dimona	49,500	29,500	126
Herzliya	49,500	0	312
Hazor	49,500	34,500	95
Hadera	49,500	0	312
Teverya	49,500	29,500	126
Tirat Hakarmel	49,500	19,500	189
Yerushalayim-Pisgat Ze'ev	79,500	24,500	347
Yerushalayim-Neve Ya'aqov	79,500	24,500	347
Yerushalayim-Rekhes Shu'afat	64,500	0	406
Yeruham	49,500	39,500	63
Yokne'am	49,500	29,500	126
Yavne	49,500	0	312
Yahud	49,500	0	312
Karmi'el	49,500	29,500	126
Kefar Yona	49,500	9,500	252
Lod	49,500	0	312
Metula	49,500	39,500	63
Mizpe Ramon	49,500	39,500	63

Urban Settlements (Continued)

Name of Settlement	Total Assistance, Loan and Grant	Of This: Grant	Initial Monthly Payment on Loan
Ma'alot	49,500	34,500	95
Migdal Ha'emek	49,500	29,500	126
Ma'ale Efrayim	49,500	29,500	126
Ma'ale Adumim	49,500	24,500	158
Nazeret 'Eylit	49,500	29,500	126
Nahariya	49,500	29,500	126
Netivot	49,500	29,500	126
Nazeret Tahtit	49,500	24,500	158
Nesher	49,500	9,500	252
Netanya	49,500	0	312
'Ako	49,500	29,500	126
'Afula	49,500	29,500	126
'Arad	49,500	29,500	126
E'manu'el	49,500	24,500	158
'Atlit	49,500	19,500	189
Pardes Hana	49,500	9,500	252
Petah Tiqva	49,500	0	312
Zefat	49,500	34,500	95
Zofim	49,500	19,500	189
Qiryat Shmone	49,500	39,500	63
Qiryat Arba	49,500	34,500	95
Qarney Shomron	49,500	29,500	126
Qiryat Gat	49,500	29,500	126
Qiryat Malakhi	49,500	19,500	189
Qiryat Sefer	49,500	9,500	252
Qadima	49,500	9,500	252
Qiryat Ata	49,500	0	312
Qiryat Bi'aliq	49,500	0	312
Qiryat 'Eqron	49,500	0	312
Qiryat Yam	49,500	0	312
Qiryat Motzkin	49,500	0	312
Rosh Ha'ayin	49,500	0	312
Rishon Leziyon	49,500	0	312
Rehovot	49,500	0	312
Rekhasim	49,500	0	312
Ramle	49,500	0	312
Shlomi	49,500	39,500	63
Shederot	49,500	29,500	123

Rural Settlements			
Name of Settlement	Total Assistance, Loan and Grant	Of This: Grant	Initial Monthly Payment on Loan
Adora	49,500	39,500	63
Avney Eytan	49,500	39,500	63
Ortal	49,500	39,500	63
Itamar-Tal Hayim	49,500	39,500	63
Ani'am	49,500	39,500	63
Alon More	49,500	39,500	63
Aloney Bashan	49,500	39,500	63
El Rom	49,500	39,500	63
Aspar (Meyzar)	49,500	39,500	63
Afiq	49,500	39,500	63
Amnon	49,500	34,500	95
Avshalom	49,500	34,500	95
Alon Shevut	49,500	29,500	126
Avney Heyfez	49,500	29,500	126
Adam	49,500	29,500	126
Aley Sinay	49,500	29,500	126
El'azar	49,500	29,500	126
Ashhar	49,500	29,500	126
Ashrat	49,500	29,500	126
Avi'ezer	49,500	24,500	158
El'ad (Mazur)	49,500	9,500	252
Berakha	49,500	39,500	63
Beney Yehuda	49,500	39,500	63
Bedolah	49,500	39,500	63
Bar Yoha'i	49,500	34,500	95
Barkan	49,500	29,500	126
Beyt El B	49,500	29,500	126
Hayat Horon	49,500	24,500	158
Beyt Rimon	49,500	19,500	189
Beyt Arye	49,500	9,500	252
Giv'at Yo'av	49,500	39,500	63
Gedid	49,500	39,500	63
Gan Or	49,500	39,500	63
Ganital	49,500	39,500	63
Ganim	49,500	39,500	63
Geshor	49,500	39,500	63
Gita	49,500	29,500	126
Gan Ner	49,500	29,500	126
Dovav	49,500	39,500	63
Hamesh	49,500	39,500	63
Had Nes	49,500	39,500	63
Hermesh	49,500	39,500	63

Rural Settlements (Continued)			
Name of Settlement	Total Assistance, Loan and Grant	Of This: Grant	Initial Monthly Payment on Loan
Hisfin	49,500	39,500	63
Hani	49,500	39,500	63
Hananit	49,500	39,500	63
Halmish (Neve Zuf)	49,500	29,500	126
Talmon	49,500	34,500	95
Tefahot	49,500	29,500	126
Yonatan	49,500	39,500	63
Yizhar	49,500	39,500	63
Yavni'el	49,500	29,500	126
Yakir	49,500	29,500	126
Yovlim	49,500	19,500	189
Yad Hana	49,500	9,500	252
Yarhiv	49,500	9,500	252
Karmey Zur	49,500	39,500	63
Kadim	49,500	39,500	63
Kanaf	49,500	39,500	63
Kefar Darom	49,500	39,500	63
Karmel	49,500	39,500	63
Kefar Tapuah	49,500	34,500	95
Karkus	49,500	34,500	95
Katal	49,500	29,500	126
Levanim	49,500	29,500	126
Lapid (Kefar Rut)	49,500	9,500	252
Mevo Dotan	49,500	39,500	63
Ma'ale 'Amos	49,500	39,500	63
Migdalim	49,500	39,500	63
Ma'on	49,500	39,500	63
Ma'ale Levona	49,500	39,500	63
Ma'ale Gamla	49,500	39,500	63
Mezudat Yehuda	49,500	39,500	63
Marom Golan	49,500	39,500	63
Ma'alot	49,500	34,500	95
Masad	49,500	29,500	126
Mitpe Yericho	49,500	29,500	126
Ma'agalim	49,500	29,500	126
Menahemya	49,500	29,500	126
Mevo Horon	49,500	19,500	189
Mevo'im	49,500	19,500	189
Matityahu	49,500	14,500	221
Na'ot Golan	49,500	39,500	63
Nov	49,500	39,500	63

Rural Settlements (Continued)

Name of Settlement	Total Assistance, Loan and Grant	Of This: Grant	Initial Monthly Payment on Loan
Ne'omi	49,500	39,500	63
Neveh Dekalim	49,500	39,500	63
Netzer Hazani	49,500	39,500	63
Nahli'el	49,500	34,500	95
Nisanit	49,500	29,500	126
Neve Dani'el	49,500	29,500	126
Nili	49,500	24,500	158
Na'ale	49,500	24,500	158
Nehora	49,500	19,500	189
Susiya	49,500	39,500	63
Sapir	49,500	39,500	63
'Otni'el	49,500	39,500	63
'Aley	49,500	39,500	63
'Eyn Zivan	49,500	39,500	63
'Eyn Yahav	49,500	39,500	63
'Eyn Tamar	49,500	39,500	63
'Ateret	49,500	34,500	95
'Anav	49,500	29,500	126
'Aley Zahav	49,500	19,500	189
'Ofarim	49,500	14,500	221
Faran	49,500	39,500	63
Pat Sade	49,500	39,500	63
Peney Haver	49,500	39,500	63
Falakh	49,500	29,500	126
Pisgot	49,500	29,500	126
Padu'el		19,500	189
Zofar	49,500	39,500	63

Rural Settlements (Continued)

Name of Settlement	Total Assistance, Loan and Grant	Of This: Grant	Initial Monthly Payment on Loan
Zohar	49,500	29,500	126
Zur Yig'al	49,500	9,500	252
Zuran (Holot Ge'ulim)	49,500	9,500	252
Qidmat Zvi	49,500	39,500	63
Qeshet	49,500	39,500	63
Qatif	49,500	39,500	63
Qazrin	49,500	34,500	95
Qazir	49,500	34,500	95
Qiryat Netafim	49,500	34,500	95
Qedumim	49,500	29,500	126
Qoranit	49,500	24,500	158
Ramot	49,500	39,500	63
Ramat Mag-shimim	49,500	39,500	63
Refiah Yam	49,500	39,500	63
Revava	49,500	29,500	123
Shilo	49,500	39,500	63
Sha'al	49,500	39,500	63
Sham'a	49,500	39,500	63
Shaked	49,500	39,500	63
Shani	49,500	34,500	63
Shavey Shomron	49,500	29,500	123
Shorashim	49,500	24,500	158
Shekheniya	49,500	24,500	158
Telem	49,500	39,500	63

Description of IAI Missile Production Facility

92AE0398B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
12 May 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Arye Egozi: "MABAT Plant at First Glance"]

[Text] The fact that the U.S. Air Force purchased the Popeye air-to-ground missile manufactured by the Arms Development Authority (REFAEL) proves that Israel has something to offer the Americans even in the area of guided weapons. The Americans do not buy abroad what they have at home. Arye Hertzog, 51, general manager of MABAT (initials of Plant B) of Air Force Industries [IAI], would have liked to talk about how advanced Israel is in the area, but he cannot. The weapons systems offered by the plant, he said, are of the kind that will decide the fate of every future war.

Hertzog studied aeronautical engineering at the Tekhnon and began his career at REFAEL. He has been associated with the IAI for 21 years. Before becoming head of MABAT's missile management in 1989, he was a party to the decision-making regarding the development of any weapon that homes in on targets with great precision and from a great distance. Asked whether Israel had the means to take care of the Iraqi Scud missiles, Hertzog reacted with frustration. "If the Air Force had been allowed to get into action, it would have had the means to succeed pretty significantly in destroying the missiles."

A few years ago, the plant, home to the IAI weapons systems, also began working on the development and manufacture of satellites, but sophisticated weapons, those that destroy targets with lethal precision, remained the dominant preoccupation for its 1,600 engineers and technicians. The plant and its personnel have already won many prizes for Israel's security, all of them in recognition of the intelligence and technological skills they put into developing special weapons systems.

The series of tests on the Baraq antimissile missile is coming to its conclusion these days. The missile was developed by MABAT and REFAEL in cooperation. The Baraq will be installed on Navy missile boats, including the Sa'ar 5 missile boats that are now manufactured in the United States. At least one country recognized the importance of the project at its inception and invested money in it. Other countries are negotiating to purchase the system. Hertzog hopes for a repeat of the success of the Gabri'el missile, the sea-to-sea missile in use by the Israeli and foreign Navies. Such revenues, which flowed into the IAI coffers from the sale of the Gabri'el, are now very much needed.

Today even good, special weapons systems do not have assured markets. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the international arms market has become populated only by sellers, because "Almost all the countries in the world have stopped buying arms. I think that it will take another year or two before the countries will sort out their military needs in the new international reality," Hertzog

said. "And then chances are that they will actually buy sophisticated weapons instead of regular ones, which need to be used in large volumes."

However, even if his prediction should come true, Hertzog will not be able to get together many potential buyers. MABAT is manufacturing primarily for the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. "We develop a weapons systems for the IDF and sell it at a price that usually does not leave us any profit. In a few instances, after the IDF bought the quantity it needed, we simply closed down the production line. This kind of approach is not always justified. At times we insist, we oppose the decision of the apparatus, and at times we even win, but certainly not enough," said Hertzog, who navigates along the thin line between the need to preserve the element of surprise for the next war and the important need to sell and make money in order to develop new generations of weapons, whose rate of obsolescence increases in direct proportion to their sophistication. As an example he cites one weapons system in which a foreign customer was very interested, but the defense apparatus refused to authorize its export. The decision was reversed a few years later, "But I am not sure that the customer is still interested," he says disappointedly.

Israel is one of the leaders in the area of precision guided weapons. The general manager told us very carefully about two weapons systems that were authorized to be revealed in order to allow their export. The two systems—the Griffin air bomb and the Nimrod antitank [AT] missile—were based on technologies that were widely revealed during the Gulf War. The target is lit up by means of a "marker" laser device. The homing head of the bomb or missile locks on to this light spot and hits the target with the precision of an expert marksman. MABAT began developing the laser-guided weapons after the lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, when it was realized that regular bombs were not enough.

The Griffin, a laser-guided bomb, is designed to destroy command positions, bridges, armored vehicles, ships, and any other important targets. The Nimrod AT missile, whose picture appears in the plant's advertising brochures in bold colors, can hit a target at a distance of 25 km with a precision of 1/2 m. "It is a smart weapon that can make its way under the clouds and is thus less sensitive to weather influences," Hertzog said.

Smart weapons are in a never-ending race. As soon as a smart system appears in the arena, someone begins to develop an antidote, and so on ad infinitum. "The one who will be half a step ahead on the day the weapons come out of storage to fight, will be the winner of this never-ending race," Hertzog said, adding that in this area, too, Israel is in an excellent place on the international scale.

MABAT developed and manufactured the weapons systems that are expected to take the enemy by surprise and to change the face of the battlefield. The achievements to date are excellent, but not sufficient. Only the one who will be at least half a step ahead of the enemy, as Hertzog said, regarding the precision and intensity of destruction, will win the fateful race. The people at MABAT are striving to maintain an edge in this never-ending race.

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