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CONTENTS

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English Summary of Major Articles [pp 158-159]	1
Journal Views Marxist, Western Ideology [S. V. Pronin; pp 5-15]	2
Post-Ricardian 'Bourgeois' Political Economy Not 'Vulgar' [I. Osadchaya; pp 16-22]	11
'Problem-Solving' Approach to Negotiations Urged [A. Kokoshin, et al; pp 23-33]	18
PCF Needs To Shed 'Mass Party' Image [A. Vitels; pp 52-60]	25
Closer Attention to All Aspects of Soviet-FRG Relations Urged [M. Maksimova; pp 61-66]	33
Friedrich Ebert Foundation Opens Moscow Office [G. Stuenkel; pp 67-69]	39
FRG Payments Surplus Conceals Potential Structural Problems [G. Esters; pp 69-72]	41
U.S. Presidential Election Prospects Assessed [V. Kuvaldin et al; pp 78-97]	44
A Post-Nuclear World Could Prove Unstable [I.O. Polyakov; pp 121-122]	50
Conventional Should Accompany Nuclear Arms Limitation [A. Rassadin; pp 122-124]	52
Political Science Needs To Be Freed From 'Bare Practicalness' [E. Pozdnyakov; pp 125-130]	53
Science's Separation From Practice in Arms Limitation Bemoaned [A. Arbatov; pp 130-134]	58
U.S. Lead Among 'Imperialist' Power Centers Seen Continuing [G. Sevostyanov; pp 146-147]	63
Continued Timidity in the Face of Foreign Policy Cliches Reproached [S. Chugrov; pp 150-152]	64
S&T Progress in Western Countries Poses Problems for Third World [R. Avakov; pp 155-156]	65
Articles in MEMO Journal Not Translated [pp 1-2]	67
Publication Data sl	67

World Economics & International Relations

No 10, October 1988

English Summary of Major Articles

*18160003a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 158-159*

[Text] In considering the relations between socialism and capitalism, between marxism and other ideological trends we have got into the habit of narrowing them down to an irreconcilable struggle, to the formula "who will take the upper hand". S. Pronin in the article "Ideology in the Interconnected World" criticizes such an approach and states that under present conditions the peaceful co-existence of the two social systems cannot but affect ideology as well. This presupposes a wide exchange of ideas, beginning to shape within the framework of the non-marxist and marxist world outlook, their reciprocal enrichment. The author seeks to elucidate how the specification of marxist conceptions on the role of class and ideological struggle under present, highly dynamic and ever more complicated interconnections of the two systems can contribute to the perestroika of our conceptual thinking. The primitive dogma of the unconditional subordination to class antagonism between labour and capital of all other factors of social development and international relations increasingly fails to correspond to many of the realities of life. Moreover, through the efforts of reactionary forces, this ideological dogma is often transformed into a policy disastrous for world civilization for it undermines the two systems' peaceful co-existence. It is becoming objectively necessary to take into account not only contradictions but also the similarity of the personal, social, national and global existence of man. Such a necessity in the author's opinion, poses the question of expanding the sources of marxism. The traditional three sources and three components of our theory of social development at present no longer cover many of the new processes of the interconnected universal world. Such processes generate a vast sphere of universal knowledge and values. Mutually beneficial constructive contacts of the two systems in the noted sphere in place of ideological and political confrontation, an exchange of ideas within the framework of social branch of science should limit anti-communist and anti-soviet activities. The theory of social progress can be perfected on this basis.

New thinking demands a reconsideration of many deep-rooted positions in social science. All knowledge, accumulated by non-marxist economic thought has been beyond the limits of "study". One must be acquainted with the present non-marxist economic thinking, know how to investigate it and only after that criticize it. I. Ossadchaya in the article "Some Notes on 'Criticism' of Bourgeois Political Economy" concentrates on three main issues: the subject of political economy in general, the characteristics of the bourgeois political economy as "vulgar", and the "points of contact" between marxist

and non-marxist economic thought. She proves the groundlessness of the thesis about "vulgarity" of non-marxist economic thought. It is well-known that the economic mechanism and its efficiency is the central object of an analysis of bourgeois political economy. The author notes that marxist political economy cannot disregard this aspect of economic activity either. A critical analysis of bourgeois political economy presupposes the absence of any dogmatic preconceptions when appraising its trends and methodological approaches. The author arrives at the conclusion that the combination of class interests with the possibility of studying economic reality is dialectic. Bourgeois class interests hinder the cognition of the laws of the capitalist mode of production, determined by the nature of ownership and its class character. But the very same interests stipulate the necessity of a scientific examination of economic interrelations, determining the effectiveness and evolution of the present-day capitalist economic system.

In the present day world all kinds of international talks are acquiring a qualitatively new role. They are probably turning into the main instrument for settlement of conflicts and contradictions as well as of the joint solution of problems facing these or other states. Proceeding from the above said A. Kokoshin, V. Kremenyuk and V. Sergeyev in the article "Researches on International Negotiations" pose the question of the need to work out a "theory of negotiations" and methodological and theoretical concepts required for them as well as a new negotiation mechanism. Such a mechanism should correspond to the level and complexity of problems in the domain of international relations. For this purpose it is necessary to tackle the problem not only on an organizational level but also to have methodological and theoretical works, reflecting all peculiarities of the present-day international situation. It is also necessary to show the modern scientific possibilities for guiding social processes, international relations included. Just, equal international negotiations can fully serve as an alternative to military settlements, provide conditions for the solution of disputable economic, human and ecological problems in the system of international relations. Proceeding from the importance of present-day international negotiations and ever growing complexity of the problem the article notes that the elaboration of such a theory is possible only on the basis of a general analysis of the process of international cooperation with due regard to the peculiarities of the political thinking and cultural traditions of the participants of the system of such negotiations. A comprehensive system of international security demands the elaboration of new careful qualitative methods through the joint efforts of scientists and men of practice.

The article "Science under Capitalism: Economic Factors of Development" by S. Nikitin, A. Alyabyev and M. Stepanova gives a comprehensive analysis of the most important economic and organizational factors, determining progress in R and D in leading capitalist countries, the USA in particular. The article considers the

interrelation between the state regulation and the sphere of R and D. State financing covers approximately a half of R and D expenditures. The bulk of the money goes to state laboratories and is spent also on fundamental research in universities as well as on long-term priority fields of scientific and technological progress in the private sector. The system of contracts between government and private organizations is also analysed. The authors lay emphasis on the main lines of intra-firm organization of R and D science. They focus on the fact that competition plays a decisive role in stimulating research and development activities within the framework of firms. It helps to cope with stagnation, inherent in big companies, forcing their leaders to risk for the sake of innovations, to hold or, the more so, strengthen their competitiveness. Companies are progressing in flexible and extensive application of marketing levers for raising efficiency, in particular to subordinate R and D marketing. The authors also consider the role of big and small companies in R and D and the problem of industrial application of R and D results. They write about high degree concentration of R and D activities of large monopolies on the one hand and the formation of a network of small firms on the other, known as successful innovators and developers. Integrations of big and small firms is also taken into account.

The political landscape of the French Republic, of which the socialist party has become the main element, is changing. A rather tough struggle for the post of the President, a key one in the Fifth Republic state institutional system, and for the control over the Parliament lasted for more than two years. I. Yegorov in the article "French Politologists on Election Results" comes to the conclusion that presidential and parliamentary elections of 1988 marked an important turning point in the political life of the country: from "dual power" with its clearly expressed right-wing orientation in internal and external policy to the preponderance of the left majority with President Mitterrand at the head. Having made their choice, the French people directly or indirectly expressed their opinion over a broad range of problems, determining today the evolution of the country, Europe and the world as a whole and gave preference to a socially moral and more humane approach to the solution of these problems over the narrowly professional and technocratic ones. The author cites some prominent French scientists on certain questions, concerning the elections of 1988. He believes that the scientists underestimate the above-mentioned aspect of the problem. As yet the elections have only registered the alignment of political forces and solved the problem of distribution of political power. The concrete content of the state policy will be determined in the course of the clash of opinions and interests both in government and Parliament as well, and in the French society itself.

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Journal Views Marxist, Western Ideology
AU2511195688 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 5-15

[Article by Sergey Vasilyevich Pronin, doctor of economic sciences, acting leading academic in the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Ideology in an Interconnected World"]

[Text] The concept advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress of a contradictory but interdependent and largely integral world confronts Marxist social thought with a considerable number of tasks of rethinking the theoretical aspects of competition between the two systems. The new thinking demands the renunciation of schematic ideas about the most complex processes of our time, in particular the nature of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism in the conditions of their peaceful coexistence. In view of the prospects for a lengthy historical period of such coexistence, it is important to provide answers to such questions as these:

- If the development of social relations becomes increasingly diversified and the global requirements of contemporary civilization give rise to the intensification of a material and spiritual exchange between the formations, should the traditional confrontation between Marxism-Leninism and non-Marxist ideologies not be supplemented by contacts along various lines?
- To what extent does the development of nonclass systems of values fit into the concept of an irreconcilable class struggle, and is there a danger of "ideological convergence" as a result of the exchange of ideas which develop within communist ideology and non-Marxist theories of social development, or will this exchange promote the consolidation of Marxist theoretical positions?

In discussing the specific nature and prospects of the ideological struggle between the two systems we shall attempt to answer the above questions.

The "Common Nature" of Socioeconomic Formations or the Class Struggle

The central idea of Marxism with regard to the prospects for common human civilization can be reduced to the fact that liberated work must bring mankind deliverance from the misfortunes engendered by class exploitation and the antagonisms between nations and states. In other words, Marxism as an ideology claims to be not only the world outlook of one class, but a "common human imperative," and a theory of the development of man and mankind. It is Marxism that assumes the difficult task of seeking interconnections between that "motor" of history which is the class struggle, and the progress of common human civilization.

Historical experience shows how complicated the accomplishment of this task is. First of all, the class struggle itself is far from being a guarantee of inevitable, universal, and immediate progress.

Second, as experience demonstrates, the elimination of class oppression does not necessarily "precede" the solution of common human problems, because the specific national characteristics of countries and the diversity of peaceful and nonpeaceful paths of social development create a complex mechanism of interaction between the class struggle and the historical process. (Footnote 1) (PRAVDA, 13 April 1988)

Third, the well-known tenet according to which capitalism is a brake on social progress, although true in a very general world historical sense, must not be interpreted in an oversimplified manner as some sort of absolute, universally, and permanently applicable truth. The facts show that the development of capitalism can contribute, however inconsistently, to mankind's material and spiritual progress in a number of spheres of social life.

All these contradictions of the contemporary world call for theoretical interpretation. This is all the more true since a considerable number of dogmatic, oversimplified, and one-sided interpretations have accumulated over the prolonged period of stagnation.

An example of this can be provided by the interpretation of class and ideological contradictions within capitalism, and between capitalism and socialism, which was typical of many of our publications from the thirties to the seventies. "In objective reality there is and can be no fusion of interests of exploiters and the exploited, and no combination or synthesis of a society based on capitalist private enterprise with a society where social ownership prevails," noted one of the works from those years. (Ye. D. Mordzhinskaya: "Leninism and the Contemporary Ideological Struggle." Moscow, 1972, pp 29, 31-32)

In general terms this proposition would seem to be correct—the broad historical process whereby capitalist production relations are replaced by socialist ones can be regarded as confirmation of this. Every truth is specific, however. Making even the most rational idea into an absolute, without regard for objective and subjective reality, frequently leads to a dead end. The categorical assertion that the two social systems are incompatible, as is the case here, ignores such a reality of the contemporary world as its integrality. In addition, the incompatibility of two types of ownership leaves a number of important questions unanswered: questions about the multifaceted nature of formations, about the socialization processes taking place separately from forms of ownership or on the basis of private capitalist ownership, and about the possibility of exploitation using social ownership. The further course of reasoning pursued in the work quoted above leads to dubious and often incorrect conclusions. Thus, in order to intensify its journalistic effect it categorically asserts that the socialist

and capitalist "systems of ideas are opposites and consequently irreconcilable in all their content. Whatever urgent and important contemporary issue we turn to..., everywhere we ultimately find **diametrically** opposed class standpoints and assessments which are as irreconcilable as science and pseudo-science, truth and falsehood, progress and reaction." (my emphasis—S.P.) This way of putting the issue contradicts reality. It also lacks theoretical foundation because it ignores the philosophical law that the individual phenomenon is supplemented by the universal, and that these are interconnected. The way this happens can be traced by analyzing the way ideologies are connected with the class struggle and mass consciousness.

There is no doubt that the class antagonism between labor and capital nurtures antagonism between the two ideologies. However, the opposition between social agents and their ideological consciousness is a fairly lengthy process in which classes and ideologies not only negate each other, but also interact, take account of ideas developed by their opponent, and compete in solving the problems of their era.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the arsenal of weapons with which the bourgeoisie maintains its rule not only includes violence toward the sociopolitical forces which resist it but also the suborning of its class opponents. There is also a third condition of their coexistence. The class and ideological struggle unfolds against a background of objective processes which are neutral with respect to class: scientific-technological progress, the progressive development of productive forces, the internationalization of production and social life, the rationalization of social structures and management functions, the aggravation of environmental protection problems, social morality, and so on. The partial, temporary, yet varied coincidence of interests, even of antagonistic classes, in this sphere are evident. "Interaction exists in the international life of peoples, just as it does in their internal life," G.V. Plekhanov noted. (Footnote 3) ("Selected Philosophical Works in Five Volumes." Vol. 1, Moscow, 1956, p 660)

V.S. Semenov formulates this idea, in applying it to the issue of interclass "communities," in the following manner: "...Matters must not be reduced to the simple statement that several types of human community and systems of differences exist in society, but to the revelation of their common basis, which is the method of production.... One and the same basis may lead to the appearance and manifestation of "nonsocial" societal differences in one case, and of "social" societal differences in other cases; "nonsocial" societal associations in one case, and "social" societal communities in other cases." (Footnote 4) (V.S. Semenov: "Capitalism and Classes." Moscow, 1969, pp 31-32)

As is known, in real life ideology is closely connected with mass consciousness. The latter reflects the interests of individuals, families, groups, organizations, classes,

nations, countries, and mankind, and becomes increasingly complicated in connection with the differentiation of economic and political institutions, the stratification of social, ethnic, and sociocultural groups, and so on. In this context the differentiation of mass consciousness moves into the foreground. However, as G.G. Diligenskiy notes, in addition to this there exist "definite common trends, trends in the development of mass consciousness as a whole. They are primarily the result of the unity of that objective social historical reality which consciousness reflects.... Within the framework of a given socioeconomic formation, even the representatives of opposing classes are 'drawn' into the same system of social relations. The demands which each historical type of such relations makes on people's activity produces stable ways, common to that formation, of perceiving and reacting to objective situations...." (Footnote 5) (G.G. Diligenskiy: "In Search of Meaning and Goal." Moscow, 1986, pp 81-82)

While ideologies are class world outlooks, they cannot but reflect the "environment" of the mass consciousness, ideas, behavioral causes, and interests of social agents, that is, the different mass communities, both class and nonclass. On the other hand, the ideology of a particular class itself influences mass consciousness, and "within a given historical period, the trends in mass consciousness which arise on the basis of this ideology frequently assume broader 'intergroup' social dimensions and become indicators of the state of mass consciousness in capitalist society as a whole." (Footnote 6) (G.G. Diligenskiy: op. cit. p 83) The common elements inherent in particular types of mass consciousness or ideology thus have national, state, cultural, political, confessional, economic, and directly ideological foundations.

A considerable part of these elements are neutral with regard to class. This gives rise to the common laws which exist alongside the differences in the development of both systems—capitalism and socialism. They include the need for productive forces to correspond to the nature of production relations, and the laws of value, supply and demand, proportioned production, increasing requirements, and so on. Common laws may be traced in the sociopolitical, cultural and ethnic, and other spheres of life of capitalist and socialist society. In crystallizing class aspirations and interests, ideologies ultimately reflect both the contradictions and the internal unity in a given formation, as well as the contradictions between formations and the community of certain phenomena and processes at a global level.

The above does not mean that the class irreconcilability of bourgeois and communist ideologies is disappearing. In terms of ultimate objectives it continues to exist and is sometimes even intensified by the two ideologies' "competitive" struggle for the most effective utilization of the neutral class factors of socioeconomic and cultural progress to promote their own interests.

At the same time it must be admitted that this irreconcilability is to a considerable extent the result of stagnation in Marxist theory over recent decades. Virtually no use was made of the internal methodological potential of Marxism, which permits an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of new processes and phenomena in social development, of their influence on the position of the workers class and broad strata of the working population, and of ways and prospects of the socialist transformation of society. In the atmosphere of the decades of stagnation, ideology itself was increasingly subordinated to the momentary interests of political struggle, and this predetermined that any social processes would be examined exclusively from the point of view of the antagonism between the formations.

As practice shows, dogmatism in ideology and the underestimation of, or disregard for, the objective causes of various processes and phenomena (specifically the appearance of bourgeois reformism, opportunism in the workers movement, and the concepts of a "class world" and "historical compromise") sooner or later lead the policy of revolutionary world transformation to an impasse. The Pyrrhic victories of revolutionary leaps across historical phases are well-known, as are the failures of political avant-gardism, the pseudo-revolutionary leadership foreseen by F. Dostoyevskiy, and the victims of "personality cults" and "cultural revolutions." Dogmatism brings Marxism down to the level of petit bourgeois ideology, a fundamental feature of which is pursuit of the interests of the moment, and attempts merely to "take over the rhythm of history."

For this reason it is extremely important in the present situation to see the dialectic between the "particular" and the "common" in class interests and ideologies, in social and common human progress, and in socioeconomic formations.

It would probably make sense to make amendments to the scheme of "fundamental" and "partial" class interests which predominates in our research, and according to which "the fundamental class interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are diametrically opposed and cannot be reconciled....," although "mutual concessions are permissible on particular issues in the struggle." (Footnote 7) (See "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy. Historical Materialism." Moscow 1972, p 133) For example, does the prevention of thermonuclear war or global ecological catastrophe not correspond to the fundamental interests of all classes? Excessively categorical assertions that only "progressive classes are interested in society's upward development and in the satisfaction of the urgent requirements of social life" (Footnote 8) (Ibid) acquire a doctrinaire and scholastic coloring against the realities of this life.

As far as the class nature of ideologies is concerned, the well-known Leninist negation of "extra-class or supra-class ideologies" does not at all mean that there is no

objective basis for all of Marxism's contacts with bourgeois ideology, or for its use of various "products" of the latter ideology's historical development in the interests of social progress. Nor does it mean that these phenomena inevitably give rise to "ideological focal points" of convergence and lead to socialism being "swallowed up" by the opposing system. (Footnote 9) (See: Ye. D. Mordzhinskaya, op.cit, p 29)

Such "fears" and "warnings" are the result of the same old "infantile disorder of left-wing communism," the danger of which was pointed out by V.I. Lenin. Unfortunately, it continued to extract its bloody tribute in the subsequent period. The practical implementation of the Stalinist concept of steadily making the class struggle more acute as progress is made toward socialism led to the ideology of the social leadership of the workers class being replaced by a policy of totalitarianism. It was not so much the "class enemy" as socialism which came onto the firing-line, and this slowed down the development of a communist formation on a global scale.

This harsh lesson of history must not be ignored now that the dialectics of life have become much more complicated and it has become lethally dangerous to place the relationships of social classes and their ideologies in the procrustean bed of bipolar approaches.

Peaceful Coexistence Between the Two Systems, and the Components of Marxism

There is perhaps no sphere of social relations in which such an acute need is now being felt for a dialectical approach to the confrontation between the two main world ideologies as in the sphere of relations between states.

An urgent need is appearing for further development of conceptual ideas about the problem of the interconnection between ideological law and interstate political relations, and above all about the question of the correlation between ideology and policy. Until recently our literature has been dominated by the thesis that "the main bridgehead of the world class struggle...is the competition between the two systems of socialism and capitalism, and for this reason the field of ideological battle has also mainly shifted to this plane." (Footnote 10) (V.V. Kortunov: "Ideology and Politics." Moscow, 1974, p 6)

The class and ideological struggle is, of course, "present" at all "stages" of social, national, and interstate relations. This does not, however, mean that an inherent feature of Marxism is that it regards international politics only from the standpoint of class antagonism, which presupposes "a battle for survival."

What this approach leads to in practice is shown by the experience of the seventies and eighties, when attempts were made to implement the concepts of a number of ultraconservative ideologists (Z. Brzezinski, A. Mayer,

and S. Huntingdon). The essence of these concepts is that under present world conditions, ideology must construct "pragmatic" social administration and use political means to help defend the "spiritual values" of capitalism. Already existing canons of the "religious and nationalist" world outlook were proposed as the basis for this defense. To be specific, Brzezinski asserted that anticommunism would successfully develop its "international political function" on the basis of religion and nationalism.

It stands to reason that all this contributed to a significant extent to the destabilization of the already unstable world political and economic situation. The notorious thesis of the "communist evil empire" which was taken on board at the time ultimately threatened the existence of both opposing systems, and simultaneously that of the entire world proletariat. This means, however, that the thesis of the exacerbation of ideological struggle between the systems was now in insoluble conflict with the needs for civilization's survival and the historical progress of mankind and socialism. Nor did this thesis tie up with the theory of Marxism.

The new thinking which is now stimulating communist ideology as a whole reflects the diversity and profound realities of life, refuting the self-deception of those of our theoreticians from the periods of Stalinism and stagnation who imagined that policy, man, and society will always obediently change in the necessary direction under the influence of ideology. A result of the new approaches is that the existence of very complicated direct and reciprocal connections between ideology and social existence is now being taken into account.

This applies above all to the interconnections between the class struggle and international relations. A number of articles which have appeared in our press recently have shown the fallacy of the well-known formula "peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle," according to which the class antagonism of labor and capital and the antagonism between ideologies which is derived from it have been extended to the sphere of relations between states. (Footnote 11) (See, for example: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No. 12 1987, pp 6-9; PRAVDA 28 January 1988; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No. 6, 1988, pp 55-57) As is justly noted in this context, this formula is harmful in both the theoretical and political respects. It is harmful in the theoretical respect because as one author writes, the "'targets' of our policy of peaceful coexistence are states where the bourgeoisie is in power, and the class struggle can only be directed against that same bourgeoisie, if the concept has any meaning at all." (Footnote 12) (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 6, 1988, p 55) In the political respect, this formula put another ace in the hands of those forces in the West who appeal "not to trust the Soviets" and who intimidate with the threat of "expansion of world communism."

There are other factors which give rise to the need to renounce attempts to look at relations between states through the lens of ideological struggle, the need to remove their ideological content. Under the conditions of internationalization of the world, of the growing threat to mankind's existence, and of the entry of the broad masses into the political arena, the dialectic of coordinating class and common human values in world development consists in recognition of the objective role of common human values, and of freedom of social and political choice for each people; and also in the recognition that socialism is the agent of good will, dialogue, and confidence, and that within the other system and its ruling class there is a "party of peace," a "pacifist camp," rationally thinking social circles, and adherents of humanism and democracy.

For this reason it seems to us that the confrontation between the two ideologies does not mean that relations between formations are more antagonistic than those between states, or that the former predetermine the latter. Practice shows that the reverse is true in the majority of cases. First of all, this is to be explained by the powerful influence of nationalist attitudes, engendered by bourgeois society, in a large part of the modern world. National contradictions, sometimes growing into conflicts between states, are intensified in the age of imperialism by the fact that it is not individual classes (the proletariat or bourgeoisie) which participate in them, but more powerful associations—national entities. This situation is a result of the fact that neither internationalism in the form of solidarity between working people in different countries in the struggle against imperialism, nor the internationalization of capital and of the international bourgeoisie have yet reached a stage where class interests clearly prevail in every case and on a global scale. In the mass consciousness, the confrontation between the "aggregate worker" and the "aggregate capitalist" is most often concealed by the conflict between other interests within the framework of worldwide structures.

Second, the relative proportion of those common human imperatives which were mentioned above is increasing in the relations between formations. The objective need for a solution to global problems is in many respects gaining priority over the interests of individual classes for the broadest strata of the population. The historical process whereby the capitalist formation is replaced by the socialist one is a prolonged, stage-by-stage, revolutionary, and simultaneously evolutionary process in which a part is played by non-social factors operating within both systems, as well as by social factors. In the foreseeable future this will lead to a situation where, as socialism's influence grows and the policy of peaceful coexistence is consolidated, the sphere of action of the ideological component in relations between states, which is ultimately dictated by class antagonism, will be gradually reduced because this component will increasingly encompass elements of universal values and priorities, including global ones. The "explanatory," gnoseological

functions of ideology will increasingly, clearly take first place over the pragmatic, "mobilizing" functions which are "attached" to politics. As social rationality and morality grows, the struggle between ideologies will manifest itself not so much in the political struggle between countries, blocs, and formations, or in the propaganda war, as in a dialogue between theories, a search for a balance of interests, and the interaction of mutually acceptable models of progress. (Footnote 13) (In this context one may recall Voltaire, who once remarked that ignorance is the main cause of human misery, and that it is precisely the "spirit of dogmatism" that caused the "madness of religious wars." (See: F. Voltaire: "Annals of the Empire," Paris, Vol. 13, p 303) [title in French])

For the moment this prospect seems a very distant one. Nevertheless, one can predict with a great deal of confidence that the role of ideology as a propaganda weapon in relations between the two social systems will gradually decrease, while its significance as a kind of strategic compass of social progress will increase.

All of this will naturally call for a serious reevaluation of many tenets of specific social-science disciplines in order to achieve an "interface" between the two ideologies (even the fusion of some or other of their elements), which would make it possible to link value concepts of the highest order, the very "philosophies of history" of the two opposing social systems. After all, the stability of their peaceful coexistence depends on this. The common values of the different ideologies, which are obvious to us, at least, call for philosophical interpretation and logical connection with the integral substance of each of them.

There are, of course, a considerable number of obstacles here. For example, it is enough to mention the differences in methodology and social orientation of Marxist and non-Marxist social science. This circumstance must not stop us, however. In the quest for points of contact one can use a considerable number of ideas which were driven into the "secret archives" in the age of Stalinism and the "period of stagnation." It is important to conduct an unprejudiced analysis of the latest achievements of scientific thought in the West. It is possible that this will show that Marxism largely relies on "traditionalist" processes of social development which have been revealed in the past. After all, the ideas which form the basis of its three sources were set out in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. It is obvious that the deep material and spiritual changes which have taken place since then, and which are connected with the internationalization of social relations and the effect of the scientific-technological revolution on the social processes, on the individual, and so on, can no longer be fitted into the three-member structural scheme we know.

There is now an urgent need for an analysis of all this subject-matter in our social sciences, because Marxism is facing the need to encompass the appearance of "those

transitional forms which can be met in all areas of nature and science." (Footnote 14) (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol. 27, p 379) What is primarily involved in this case is the broad "global" currents of moral self-purification, cultural and spiritual development, and historical-philosophical insight which are gathering strength all around the world, and forming a humanist and general democratic consciousness. To negate the existence of this trend is tantamount to ignoring the laws of objective evolution of a living creature—man—which were set out in V. Vernadskiy's theory: the transition of the biosphere, sociosphere, and technosphere to the noosphere, that is, the sphere of reason, creativity, spiritual insight, and conscious physical and moral self-perfection. Vernadskiy noted that the 20th century had already created the preconditions for this transition in the form of the "universality of mankind" (its conquest of the biosphere), the "unity of mankind," the growing influence of the "popular masses" on social processes, and the appearance of a "morally responsible international of scientists." (Footnote 15) (Quotation from ZNAMYA No. 3, 1988, pp 192-194)

In the opinion of D.S. Likhachev, the elements of "mankind's collective consciousness" which arise under these conditions (despite all the entropic forces of disorganization and disintegration of biological and social organisms) are already gathering strength, eliminating the dangerous hypertrophy of man's power over nature and of institutions over man, as well as the professional idiosyncrasy of human thought. The accumulation of a cultural gene fund and cultural environment is laying the way for the establishment of a moral atmosphere and is creating a "normal homosphere" as the basis for an enormous new sphere of global ideology. (Footnote 16) (See INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA No. 1, 1988, pp 212-213) As culture is increasingly integrated into ideology and progresses in step with social sciences, sometimes even outstripping them, it goes beyond national and social boundaries and actively addresses such "eternal problems" of continuing significance as the value dichotomies "life and death," "freedom and oppression," "struggle and reconciliation," "knowledge and belief," "love and hatred." Their hierarchy is mobile within the histories and specific conditions of countries.

It is obvious that for the first time in history, our time has placed the problem of death in the foreground, not in the form of an individual tragedy, but as a concrete possibility that man and the human species will be destroyed. This has become a most powerful stimulus for the recognition of common human unity. New changes in the correlations between these concepts are appearing, as is a new synthesis of global, national, group, and personal significance of all other "eternal problems," which will undoubtedly form global consciousness in the same way. The solution of the problems of the individual personality is increasingly becoming the key to solving "common human" problems. According to the profound idea of D.S. Likhachev, "when we stop noticing the personalities of others, animosity and a lack of understanding of other nationalities appear...." (Footnote 17)

(DRUZHBA NARODOV No. 6, 1988, p 223) It is true that disregard for the personality is the source of the most diverse interpersonal and social forms of alienation, including that between formations.

In recent years there have been considerable advances in the development of the Marxist foundations of globalism, which represents a synthesis of philosophical, economic, ethnic, ecological, and prognostic approaches. Evidence of this is provided by the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress and the work of V.V. Zagladin, I.T. Frolov, G.Kh. Shakhnazarov, E.A. Arab-Ogly, and other researchers. It is clearly here that the first major breakthroughs in Marxist theory may be expected, which will open up possibilities for building bridges to the future of a mankind liberated from exploitation and war; for creating concepts in which social progress will be linked to the class interests of labor, new ideas about the relations between the two systems, and the common human interests expressed in mass ideological and political trends.

It is probable that the oversimplified ideas about the phase of world communism which were formed in the 19th and early 20th century will have to be abandoned in the process of developing Marxist globalist philosophy.

It seems to us that the general theory of the succession of social formations is assuming a more precise and complete nature as it is examined within the framework of Marxist globalist philosophy. Approaches to this can be found in Marx's well-known plan for six books, as well as in the multitude of ideas advanced by the workers and communist movement, especially in the twenties. (Footnote 18) As A.M. Kogan notes with justification, "the methodology of Marx' plan for six books provides an opportunity for a correct approach to the study of still unsolved and topical problems of the general theory of capitalism.... The plan for six books is of great significance not only for political economy, but also for philosophy." (A.M. Kogan: "In the Creative Laboratory of Karl Marx," Moscow, 1983, pp 149, 166)

A methodological basis for the development of Marxist theory is provided by the Leninist idea that "as the ideology of the proletariat's class struggle," communist ideology is "based on the entire substance of human knowledge, presupposes a high level of scientific development, and calls for scientific work." (Footnote 19) (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol. 6, pp 362-363) Such "human knowledge" is far from a monopoly of Marxist social science. Theoretical generalizations arise within the framework of many ideological and political currents of the bourgeois world. For this reason contemporary Marxism, the new thinking, and the policy of glasnost in the USSR are oriented toward the creation of a situation in which there can be a real comparison of views and a free exchange of ideas with these trends.

In which directions can this exchange be at its most productive?

Cutting Away Anticommunism To Find the Rational Core

The development of comparativistics (comparative analysis) and forecasting in the West is based on already accumulated experience of economic and political integration of contemporary capitalism. The methodological exchange of ideas here is of mutual benefit. There is now a more difficult task on the agenda—the expansion of intellectual cooperation in recognizing the latest trends in the internal development of the two systems. This is possible on the condition there are contacts at the level of individual social disciplines. Once again, V.I. Lenin must be recalled here. By appealing for a comparison between the “theoretical foundations of this philosophy (bourgeois—S.P.) and dialectical materialism” he was thinking of the need not only for criticism of anti-Marxism, but also for the revelation of “new issues which dialectical materialism must ‘cope with.’” (Footnote 20) (V.I. Lenin: “Complete Collected Works,” Vol. 6, pp 362-363)

Such an exchange can, of course, be at its widest between Marxism-Leninism and those areas of social thought which determine the ideological basis of the communist and social democratic movements and of radical left-wing circles in capitalist countries. For many decades there was an apparently insurmountable and partially artificial barrier running between our social sciences, on the one hand, and “neo-Marxism,” “Western Marxism,” and social reformism, on the other. This barrier is now being broken down, and prospects are opening up for fruitful discussions which could lend powerful impetus to the theory of socialism and the practice of democratization of social relations.

A more complex issue is that of the exchange of ideas with Marxism's principal opponent—bourgeois ideology. There are a considerable number of obstacles along this road

First of all, it evidently has to be admitted that for centuries our social thought, of Russian origin, has been unable to free itself of the burden of the distant past. It is worth recalling the largely correct observation by V.O. Klyuchevskiy that either “we were slaves to an alien faith under Byzantine influence, and slaves to alien thought under West European influence”; or, incapable of “using alien thought correctly” without harming our “moral community,” we feared them “like sin,” and feared the “curious mind like a temptress”; or else we turned “scientific truths into dogma, scientific authorities became fetishes for us, and the temple of science became a shrine of scientific superstition and prejudice.” (Footnote 21) (V.O. Klyuchevskiy: “Unpublished Works,” Moscow, 1983, pp 308-309) This was naturally characteristic of the “damned” past. Even now, however, it is difficult to eliminate relapses of such traditions, if they manifest

themselves as contemporary modifications of the old arguments between Slavophiles and Westernizers.

Second, as has already been noted, it is necessary to overcome sectarian narrow-mindedness and dogmatic ossification, which are currently typical even of branch social science disciplines. (Footnote 22) (In this context one should note the unfounded nature of the charges made against the above-mentioned work by A.M. Kogan, who is accused of “reproaching Marx for his supposed alleged failure to develop any important problems of capitalism's economy.” (See I.M. Mrachkovskaya: “On the History of the Leninist Stage in Political Economy,” Moscow, 1987, p 200) To negate the need to develop Marxism's special sections is to limit Marxism itself.

Third, there is an unresolved a priori question: Can the anticommunism inherent in bourgeois ideology be confined to the framework of a purely theoretical struggle?

One of the features of the second half of the eighties is that since the 27th CPSU Congress the correlation of forces between the bourgeois and Marxist ideologies has taken a turn for the worse for our opponents and open adversaries. The restructuring process and new thinking which are now establishing themselves in our country are delivering a very powerful blow to the central nerve of anticommunism—anti-Sovietism. While anticommunism has never been able to produce even a remotely coherent “meta-ideology” as a “total” alternative to Marxism, the scientific concepts of historical materialism will now acquire increasing conceptual and real substance. Whereas before the 27th CPSU Congress anticommunism actively used the latest arsenal of empirical research into the social processes for its own purposes, this monopoly has now been broken. Sociology in the USSR is now actively working on political theory and practice.

The anticommunists' calculations on profiting from the glasnost and openness of socialism have ultimately proven unfounded, too. “At least communism talks about problems. All too often we just talk about communism,” U.S. ex-President R. Nixon noted sarcastically when the restructuring process was only just gaining strength. This situation as of 1988 was described even more accurately by retired U.S. Admiral G. LaRocque, head of the Center for Defense Information, a public organization: “In the last couple of years the new Soviet policy of glasnost and restructuring has made an enormous impression on Americans, who are less and less intimidated by tales of a ‘devil's empire.’” West German Sovietologists state that the restructuring process is a “breakthrough in new thinking” and a renunciation of “no-go zones” in the decisive ideological sphere.

The profound changes taking place in various spheres of socialist society's life, as well as the turn for the better in the Western public's perception of the USSR, cannot but have an effect on the tone and arguments of the adherents of anticommunism—at least in the sphere of international relations. In order for the improvement in the international ideological climate to gather strength, however, we too must renounce certain dogmatic approaches and ideas.

First of all, we must renounce the approach which equates bourgeois social science with anticommunist propaganda. This approach clearly does not correspond to reality. Criticism of the theory and practice of socialism in many works by Western researchers is combined with more or less objective analysis of capitalism itself and of global problems. Second, by emphasizing capitalism's ideological crisis we involuntarily lose sight of the cognitive function in bourgeois social science. Yet over the last 2 decades Western researchers have been able to use this to reveal many cardinal changes in the contemporary worlds.

Even in the seventies bourgeois ideologists were beginning to repeat, in their own way but very insistently, F. Engels' well-known idea of the immense role played by social theory in the political, class, and "historical" struggle. Thus in the words of A. Gouldner, a well-known American sociologist, "never before in class society has the security of the ruling class depended to such an extent on a system of ideas justifying its dominance." (Footnote 23) (A. Gouldner: "The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology." New York, 1976, p 231) The reason for this was also given: The historical process has now entered a particularly intensive phase where a common analytic base is being sought. R. Aron, the "patriarch" of West European anti-Marxism who died at the beginning of the eighties, announced that a "new ideological age" is beginning. (Footnote 24) (R. Aron: "Observations on the New Ideological Age." Paris, 1978) [title in French] A British bourgeois sociologist, D. Wilhelm, has proposed the development of an "alternative view of the world," a "flexible" and "integrated" ideological system which encompasses the "new ideas." (Footnote 25) (D. Wilhelm: "Creative Alternatives to Communism. Guideline for Tomorrow's World." London, 1977, pp 56, 76, 155) [title in English]

Sociologists have been unable to create an "integrated" alternative to Marxism-Leninism. It is, however, important to note that the framework of the "subject" of bourgeois ideology is widening, and that there is a transition to methods of detailed interdisciplinary analysis of the problems under examination. This shift is, of course, aimed at the recognition of objective laws of history and the observation of them largely to the extent that this contributes to strengthening the positions of the bourgeois class as it strives to "adapt" to these laws. Ideology has begun to acquire the function of "reviving

spirits" and of strategic "adaptation" to the social situation in the world and to the scientific-technological revolution on the basis of philosophical, political-economic, and political programs. Because any ideology—including bourgeois ideology—is theoretically a systematic class reflection of reality in the form of a multidisciplinary complex of philosophical, political, economic, sociological, legal, historical, and ethical views it is able to pinpoint a considerable number of important trends in the social development of capitalism and the common human civilization of our time. Here it is impossible not to recall V.I. Lenin's well-known statement that in the sphere of political economy and philosophy, for example, "the task of Marxists...is to be able to master and rework the achievements of these 'salesmen' (for example, you will not move one step in the study of new economic phenomena without using the work of these salesmen)." (Footnote 26) (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol 18, p 364.) (Lenin calls the professors—the economists and philosophers—the "salesmen" of the class of capitalists and theologists.—S.P.)

It would seem that it is becoming no less necessary to compare theoretical approaches in an analysis of the trends in development of the socialist countries and the leading capitalist states. The fundamental difference between the two systems is changing with regard to satisfaction of the needs of the working masses, the ideological and organizational orientation toward collectivism and individualism, and so on. The development of scientific-technological progress, internationalization, and the increased role of the human personality are giving rise to trends of either a common or similar nature.

It is now becoming increasingly obvious that many East-West problems are the result of the sharp acceleration in the development of productive forces and the lag of production relations behind them. The change in technology which will take place in industrially developed Western countries over the coming 20 years is already leading to cardinal changes in economic growth rates, to the assignment of priority to qualitative characteristics, and to shifts in the branch structures of production and in the correlations between production and consumption. All this calls for the renewal of state regulatory systems and market relations, for flexibility in production and distribution, and for the solution of problems of the debased work ethic, of employment, social equality, and so on. (Footnote 27) (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA No. 2, 1988, pp 71-7)

The "reform theory" in our country is now faced with a great many problems of a similar kind in connection with the development of a commodity-monetary economic mechanism, the improvement of systems for distributing income and benefits according to work, the decentralization of management structures, the increased priority of consumption and culture, and the analysis of both class and non-class contradictions.

(Footnote 28) (See KOMMUNIST No. 8, 1987, pp 3-14) It is indicative that both the supporters of restructuring within the USSR and many political figures in the West now consider the main objectives to be the struggle against bureaucracy, parasitism, inefficiency, the obsession with large scale, and so on.

Particular mutual benefit may be afforded by a comparison of the methodological approaches of Marxist and non-Marxist social sciences in the sphere of economic and political management. Although the social essence of social production differs under capitalism and socialism, nevertheless considerable similarities may be found in the nature of the present forms of regulating economic proportions: In both cases this is implemented by means of credit and financial instruments, the policy of "in-built tax stabilizers," the state regulation of prices, and the effect of budgetary measures on consolidating the economic interest of economic individuals, groups, and society under the conditions of commodity production, and so on. The existence of points of coincidence is inevitable here, because the scientific-technological revolution at the end of the 20th century confronts socialism and capitalism with common problems connected with the alienation of labor, the decisive role of the skilled work force, the new correlation between work and free time, the new forms of income distribution and personal consumption, and so on. Soon it will no longer do for our country's economic administrative system to brush off these problems and the vital necessity of analyzing and solving them on the basis of the experience of capitalist as well as socialist countries. (Footnote 29) (The constructive approach to bourgeois research was initiated as long ago as the fifties by the thesis advanced by the World Economics and International Relations Institute on the two functions of bourgeois political economy. Ya.A. Pevzner's work "Issues of Political Economy for Discussion" can be regarded as an important methodological step forward in the eighties. It outlines a broad and concrete program of research into the most important theoretical problems (value, price and profit, competition, inflation, the theory of balance, marginalism, and so on) with regard for the most diverse shades and ideas of bourgeois economic thought. In the conditions of the current economic reform in the USSR these ideas may find practical as well as theoretical application.)

A considerable amount of potential for exchanging ideas is also opening up with regard to the need to activate the human factor. What is involved is the increased significance of the individual and of primary social groups, whose ideological values and behavioral motivation are beginning to play an unprecedented large role at both the microlevel and the macrolevel of economic political relations. The opportunities for direct individual and group participation in government [upraveniye] (on the basis of electronic communications, in particular), as well as the unsatisfactory nature of the forms of social representation and state government which exist in both systems, raise the point that socialist democracy must

not ignore the experience of democratic institutions in other countries. The object is not to use everything that makes up the concept of bourgeois democracy as a model and to copy it blindly, but rather to seek optimal demarcations between representative, executive, legislative, and court power, and to develop effective mechanisms of democratic centralism within the framework of social institutions and informal associations. The great attention which the 19th CPSU Conference paid to these issues is well-known.

The problem of personal freedom is closely intertwined with that of political culture, without which social stability and steady economic growth are impossible.

If one turns to "foreign experience" in this context one cannot help noting that Western sociology plays an exceptionally important role in the management of social processes. (Footnote 30) (see, for example, S. Lipset: "Revolution and Counter-Revolution. Change and Persistence in Social Structures." New York, 1980, p 3) [title in English] By revealing the axial principles of socialization of the individual (man and society), of group social relations, and of sociological interpretations of the scientific-technological revolution, it has accumulated very rich empirical material which, as I.A. Butenko correctly notes, makes it possible to pick out certain objective processes, although the conservative justification of bourgeois existence as the only possible one continues to exist. (Footnote 31) (I.A. Butenko: "Social Cognition and the Everyday World." Moscow, 1987, p 10)

To be specific, interesting work has been done by Western sociologists in connection with the study of the first signs of new forms of interpersonal and labor relations, and a "new lifestyle" untarnished by the acquisitive ethic, alienation, individualism, nationalism, corporatism, or degradation of culture. Even if the quest for these new forms and lifestyle take the form of an ideology of non-proletarian protest, a new natural philosophy, existentialism, neo-Freudianism, ecosocialism, ecomaterialism, and so on, Marxism can conduct a productive theoretical dialogue on these issues (not to mention joint political actions), because Marxism cannot conceive of itself without humanism, democracy, ecology, culture, or the elimination from real socialism of the extremely harmful influences of de-ideologization, consumerism, social alienation, relapses of feudalism, and so on. The advance of the so-called "human factor" (which it is better to call the problem of the individual) to the foreground of socialist theory and practice categorically demands the mobilization of all possible resources to ensure the psychological health of the individual, the revelation of its suppressed creative potential, and the definition of its biological limits. For this reason, the search conducted in the West for a new "philosophy of life," for "self-fulfillment" of the individual in its relationship with other people, society, leisure, work, and nature, is far from being merely an abstract object of interest or criticism.

We can also find a considerable amount that is interesting in works by Western sociologists containing sociological generalizations of the laws of stratification, socialization communication in the developed capitalist countries in the sixties, seventies, and eighties, and reveal new forms of conflict and interaction between social group consciousness (of strata, castes, nations, races, religious trends, and professional groups) and consciousness of a political corporative type (liberalism, conservatism, radicalism, social reformism, sociocultural forms of consciousness, and so on). In this context contemporary sociology sets itself the tasks of revealing the specific nature of the correlation between group and class ideological education and the normative value criteria of the ruling social system; of defining the substance of the complex concept of "sociocultural phenomenon," without which it is really difficult to understand the specific nature of political processes under present conditions; and of defining the way in which the scientific-technological revolution is "perceived" not only by social, professional, and cultural strata, but also by different social systems. (Footnote 32) (Here one can use Marxist methodology to detach constructive ideas from the bourgeois interpretation of the idea of "culture," which portray ethnic and institutional characteristics and the "social skills" and customs of population groups as the basis for the ideologies of particular periods, countries, and peoples.) All this is very closely connected with the problem of analyzing mass consciousness and its subsystems, the political consciousness of the masses and the appearance of new sociocultural and functional groups under the conditions of the scientific-technological revolution.

Marxist political science and sociology, which now face the task of developing concepts for the socialist self-management of the people, cannot ignore shifts in the interrelationship between newly forming and traditional social strata and the processes of rationalization engendered by the rising flow of information and "knowledge." The West's experience demonstrates the diversity of social consequences of decentralizing and destandardizing this flow (for example through computerization). Something similar will evidently be inevitable under socialism. All this dictates the need for further development of the Marxist theory of sociopolitical planning and for a reassessment of the essence, role, and interconnection of such apparently indisputably "finished" terms as the family, national entity, the social order, state and social institutions, power, and so on.

The "openness" of Marxism to ideas from a different ideological source is obviously a delicate problem. What is required here is not just the renunciation of dogmatism and the provision of conditions for wide-scale glasnost, discussion, and flow of information. It is no less important to define what does or does not need to be accumulated; what is an instrument of cognition or action and what undermines the prospects for progress. Explanation of the fact that blind anticapitalism and anti-Americanism is just as fruitless as anticommunism

and anti-Sovietism must become a necessary step along this road. In general, ideologies with the emphasis on "anti" lead to a dead end. A clear orientation toward defending the interests of the working masses and universal human values, and toward the solution of global problems by the joint efforts of both social systems, as well as reliance on objective knowledge—herein lies the guarantee that Marxist social thought will exert a greater influence over the subsequent development of human civilization.

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Post-Ricardian 'Bourgeois' Political Economy Not 'Vulgar'

18160003b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 16-22

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences Irina Mikhaylovna Osadchaya, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO: "Notes on 'Criticism' of Bourgeois Political Economy"]

[Text]

"Nonetheless, the most important thing for all of society is overcoming dogmatic thinking because it is to be found in the politician, in the man of letters and in the research associate."

M.S. Gorbachev (PRAVDA, 11 May 1988)

The new thinking demands a reconsideration of many positions which have become firmly rooted in social studies. They have fettered our thinking and have been particularly noticeable in teaching.

If, as A. Yakovlev observes, "the forecasts of the development of the capitalist system, the limits of its viability and its survival potential have also proven simplistic to a large extent,"¹ such a judgment obviously inevitably extends to the established assessments of bourgeois and, more broadly, all of non-Marxist political economy.

Recent familiarization with (and participation in the discussion of) the program of the teaching of the history of economic thought prompted reflection on what contemporary non-Marxist economic thought represents, how to study it, what needs to be known about it and (only after this!!!) how to criticize it.

Unfortunately, this field of learning is, as before, a realm of smug ignorance securely protected by a wall of dogmatic, ideological stereotypes.

After all, to be frank, there is virtually no need now for study and in-depth comprehension of bourgeois political economy. "Criticism" is practiced in the most vulgar

meaning of the word, and just a few marketable label-definitions—"bankrupt," "vulgar," "apologetic," in a state of "permanent crisis" and so forth—have been adopted.

The entire store of knowledge accumulated by non-Marxist economic thought is beyond the pale of "study". Non-Marxist economic thought (like cybernetics and genetics in the recent past) has essentially been excluded from the sphere of scientific knowledge, and if it is recognized as a "science" even, it is done so timidly, *de facto* rather. But not *de jure*!

I must in this connection refer to some statements by Yu. Afanasyev, with which I sympathize entirely: "In defining our attitude toward non-Marxist science we quite often abide as yet by the conviction (not universal, fortunately) that 'their' social knowledge represents some intermediate product, something like a sack stuffed with facts, which only we Marxists, in possession of the philosophers' stone, can convert into truly scientific knowledge...."

"We are now into the third generation of Soviet historians (I would add, economists also—I.O.) starting their careers ignorant, in the majority of cases, of the currents in foreign humanitarian and social thought.... This is a reason for the general 'sclerosis' which is inherent in our social science and for its 50 years plus of relative barrenness."² Cuttingly, but fairly spoken!

Certain breaches were made in this wall of ignorance in the 1960's, when through the joint efforts of Marxist economists of the socialist countries the proposition concerning the two functions of bourgeois political economy came into being. This enabled many economists to switch from an arrogant rejection of all that had been devised by Western economic thought to its highly conditional division into what had been brought about by ideological tasks and the purposes of apologetics and what could be acknowledged and evaluated as practically positive content meriting analysis, recognition and "partial use" even. A step was thus taken toward a critical analysis of non-Marxist economic thought. However, many barriers preventing an impartial, broad and fruitful study thereof persisted. They remained permanent in the teaching process, unfortunately.

I shall dwell on three fundamental issues: the subject of political economy in general, the description of bourgeois political economy as "vulgar" and the "points of contact" of Marxist and non-Marxist economic thought.

Subject of Political Economy

The standard notions concerning bourgeois political economy are based on the premise that the latter is, seemingly, not "real" political economy—it does not deal with an analysis of the **essential relations** of the capitalist mode of production, that is, the true (labor) nature of value, exploitation, the historical evolution of

the capitalist production mode and so on and so forth. And what it does study is intended merely, allegedly, to "gloss over," "muddle" and "veil" these essentials, and for this reason merits no particular attention! This is the basis for the charge against it of "unscientific character," "superficiality" and "vulgarity," and whence the justified reluctance to examine the works of bourgeois economists in substance. The more so in that these works themselves (published in our country in negligible editions) rapidly become a bibliographical rarity. And considerable intellectual effort to understand them is required!

According to the definitions which have been predominant until recently, "truly scientific" political economy was designed to deal merely with people's essential, production or social relations "taking shape in the process of the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of life's benefits."³ From the viewpoint of such a definition Marxist and bourgeois political economy are divided not only by class evaluations and procedural approaches but the **subject of analysis** itself. But is this actually the case? Can the subject of political economy be reduced to so narrow an understanding of it, to such a sterile idea of its content? It can, of course. But life, practice and scientific analysis itself have constantly come up against the narrowness and rigidity of the boundaries of such a definition. This has applied both to study of capitalism and, even more, problems of the political economy of socialism.

The point being that production and social relations do not exist independently. Just as there is no value which cannot be touched (even it is manifested in price), nor are there production relations outside the particular economic mechanism in which they are embodied and expressed.

The economic mechanism is what links the productive forces and production relations. Both relations of ownership and appropriation constituting the essence of production relations and the particular features of the development of the productive forces are realized therein. It represents a sum total of specific forms of the organization of social production, the system of organizational-economic and industrial relations and the forms and methods of the management of production. The goals and tasks of economic policy are realized via the economic mechanism. It determines the efficiency of the economy.

As L. Abalkin, for example, writes, political-economic analysis is designed to study the mode of production in two hypostases—as a mode of appropriation and as a mode of management. "The mode of appropriation or appropriation (ownership) relations characterize the focus of the development of production, its purpose and the social structure of society and determine the content of all social relationships. The mode of management or

management relations reveal the mechanism of the organization of social production, by means of which the given type of appropriation is realized economically."⁴

Without an analysis of the specific economic mechanism, knowing its essential regularities is impossible also.

Let us return once again to Marx. Let us analyze his first steps in the development of political economy.

From its very birth Marxist political economy has indeed been the fundamental antipode of bourgeois political economy: Marx was interested primarily in the intrinsic nature of capitalism concealed by its outer forms and in its evolution. Marxist political economy made it its goal to show the essence of the capitalist mode of production as a system based on the exploitation of the working class and capitalists' appropriation of surplus value and also the regularities of its evolution, on the basis of which the objective prerequisites of its replacement by another system—socialist—mature. Also in keeping with this was the very esoteric, in Marx's words, method of study itself, as distinct from the exoteric method inherent in the economic thought contemporary with him.

However, the latest studies of Marx scholars show that Marx by no means ignored the need for study of specific economic forms and controlling mechanisms. The initial plan of his economic research consisted of six books:

Book I, "On Capital," which contemplated four sections: "Capital in General," "The Competition of Capital," "Credit" and "Share Capital"; Book II, "Land Ownership"; Book III, "Wage Labor"; Book IV, "The State"; Book V, "Foreign Trade"; Book VI, "The World Market".⁵

The plans were not destined to be realized in full but even they testify how broadly Marx conceived of the subject of political-economic analysis.

Study of the economic forms and mechanisms of the functioning of the economic system is not only the point of departure for penetration of its essence but also a most important, independent object of political-economic analysis.

Marxist political economy has as the subject of its study two seams of analysis, as it were, and corresponding theoretical generalizations: (1) an analysis of the economic mechanism (specific institutional forms and instruments controlling the process of the production, exchange, distribution and consumption of products, that is, reproduction as a whole) and (2) an analysis of essential categories and regularities, which are manifested in the economic mechanism and which define the nature of the given social system and the character of its historical evolution.

In addition, as Marxist political economy itself developed, particularly after the socialist system had been formed on the one hand and capitalism had been transformed into a highly efficient mixed system of state-monopoly capitalism on the other, the problems of the functioning of each economic system and its efficiency acquired particular seriousness, relevance and political significance. I shall not say how successfully our Marxist economic science studied these questions—dogmatism did tremendous damage both to a study of capitalism and, particularly, the molding of the Marxist political economy of socialism. But that political economy should involve itself not only with essential categories and production relations but also with a theoretical generalization of actual economic life has become increasingly obvious.⁶

Something else has become obvious also: study of the economic mechanism has set different goals and demanded different methodological approaches. Ya. Pevzner is perfectly correct when he writes about this: "What from the viewpoint of the analysis of exploitation and capital as such looked like 'outward appearance' takes upon an analysis of the problem of the functioning of the economy and efficiency pride of place." And, further: "The founder of scientific socialism was distinctly aware that the approach from the standpoint of the equality of price and value and supply and demand, while necessary and sufficient for revealing the law of capitalist exploitation, is in itself wholly inadequate for an analysis of the entire economic mechanism as a whole."⁷

We need all these arguments in order to approach with the same criteria concerning the subject of Marxist political economy an understanding and evaluation of the subject of analysis of bourgeois political economy, primarily the set of theoretical generalizations which figures under the name "economics" (translated as "the economy," "economic theory" and "political economy"). Bourgeois political economy (like Marxist also) has undergone a lengthy path of historical development. From classical bourgeois political economy with its attempts via study of the factors of the growth of popular wealth to arrive at an ascertainment of the essence of the capitalist mode of production and via the decomposition of the Ricardian school, which became, according to Marx, the "vulgar apologists" of the capitalist economic system, to modern economic theory with its exceptionally developed mathematical instruments of analysis of micro- and macro-economic processes and with specific, albeit ambivalent, recommendations in the sphere of economic policy.

What has been the object of its research? What is at issue in this political economy? May the subject thereof be compared with the subject of Marxist political economy? It may and should be, I believe. Comparing their economic treatises with the findings of the classical authors, Marx rightly accused the epigones of the Ricardian school—Malthus, Bastiat, See—of a departure from an

analysis of the essence of the capitalist mode of production as a system based on exploitation and the appropriation of surplus value by the owners of capital.

Truly, bourgeois economic thought wished neither to study nor recognize the essence of the capitalist mode of production and its exploiter nature. Here it parted with Marxism once for all.

But the development of bourgeois economic thought was not deadlocked here. On the basis of development of the neoclassical school in its Marshallian branch and with the emergence of the theory of general balance and subsequently—with the birth of microeconomic analysis of the economy and with closer investigation of the problems of monopoly and competition and modern forms of the organization of the capitalist economy—bourgeois political economy, in the shape of different schools, gradually attracted increasingly extensively to the sphere of its theoretical generalizations varied aspects of the economic mechanism—from commodity production in pure form through its modern state-monopoly forms.

I shall quote the words of the Polish economist O. Lange describing the general development of bourgeois political economy: "Political economy as the science of economic relations between people cannot be eliminated totally even in the bourgeois environment. The bourgeoisie has been aspiring to this as of the 1830's. Initially vulgar economy eliminates from political economy the problem of production relations, then, in the latter half of the 19th century, the subjective school removes from political economy all social relations, while the historical school eliminates therefrom economic laws. However, the practical requirements of economic policy of the monopoly organizations of big capital and the state intervening increasingly extensively in economic relations and also criticism of the activity of the monopolies coming from the heart of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, the professionalization of economic science under conditions where the university intellectuals involve themselves in its critical study and, finally, the criticism of imperialism on the part of the national bourgeoisie and the professional classes of colonial, semicolonial or recently liberated countries associated with it—all this is contributing to the problem of economic relations between people preventing its inherent cancellation."⁸

To this it should be added that the set of abstract-theoretical constructions which are united by the title "economics" and which have dealt mainly with problems of the economic mechanism and its functional connections and human reactions ("effects") is far from all of bourgeois political economy. It is rather a layer cake. It incorporates also the vast sphere of social and institutional research representing a theoretical analysis of the most important institutions and socioeconomic

mechanisms of capitalism—monopoly, oligopoly, competition, the state and singularities of transformation of capitalist society under the impact of the truly revolutionary changes in the development of the productive forces.

The different schools are different levels of abstraction and formalization of theory, different prerequisites (including limitations) and methodological principles of analysis, different objects and goals and different degrees of approximation to reality and to the demands of economic policy. But they all ultimately deal with the actual capitalist economy and are geared to study of this aspect or the other thereof.

Is Bourgeois Political Economy Vulgar?

The adjective "vulgar" has firmly coalesced in our economic literature with the "bourgeois political economy" concept. In addition, it is not simply "vulgar" but in the course of its development becomes "increasingly vulgar," and a process of "its continued vulgarization" is under way (take a look at the program or any primer of the history of economic thought).

This epithet has two shades of meaning. It is used by some people to provide a destructive description of all of bourgeois political economy (since it is vulgar, it is, consequently, antiscientific).

Others use it more subtly, vulgar, they say, means **superficial**. Vulgar bourgeois political economy is vulgar because it deals with superficial phenomena of economic reality. In this meaning it is even recognized as an "economic science," but second-rate, inferior "science"—after all, it "glides over the surface of phenomena" without penetrating their essence.

I believe that both uses of the word "vulgar" as applied to modern bourgeois political economy are profoundly mistaken.

Let us turn first of all to the dictionary for an amplification of the term itself. Dal's dictionary: "vulgar" means base; trivial; of simple, coarsish, poor taste. Ozhegov's dictionary: "vulgar" means (1) base, coarse, unseemly; (2) simplified to the point of distortion, debasement.

So the doubts disappear, and, to be plain, the word "vulgar" signifies nothing good and is unrelated to "superficial" phenomena.

Marx wrote that as of the time that the bourgeois won political power, "the bell tolled for scientific bourgeois political economy" and that "dispassionate scientific research has been replaced by biased, obsequious apologetics."

He termed vulgar the group of economists who preferred to an analysis of the intrinsic essence of the capitalist mode of production its "vulgar apologetics," that is,

exaltation of capitalism simplified to the point of distortion. It was a question of such economists as F. Bastiat, (Zh.) See and N. Senior, who asserted the predominance of a "harmony of interests" and the independence and eternal nature of the capitalist mode of production (free-competition capitalism).

More than 100 years have elapsed since then. Capitalism, the methods of its apologetics and bourgeois economic thought itself have changed. Modern bourgeois political economy is wrongly described as vulgar, that is, antiscientific and, more, becoming increasingly vulgar primarily because an analysis of essential relations does not exhaust the subject of political economy. Analysis of the economic mechanism, which may be effected essentially by different schools of modern economic thought, is in principle of a scientific nature (although there may also be here, as in every branch of scientific knowledge, impasse directions, mistakes, insufficiency of knowledge, a change in the approach to this phenomenon or the other influenced by a change in the object of analysis and so forth).

Apologetics, which remain a most important social function of bourgeois political economy, does not necessarily have to be based on vulgar methods of the crude, base distortion of actual reality and the glossing over of its contradictions.

Marx also wrote about this. While criticizing the vulgar apologetics of the post-Ricardian economists, primarily See and Bastiat, he nevertheless did not consider the latter an inevitable feature of all of bourgeois political economy contemporary with him. He distinguished in the bourgeois political economy of his time two camps. "Some, prudent men of practice, people of easy profit," he wrote, "have rallied around the banner of Bastiat, the basest and therefore most successful representative of vulgar-economic apologetics. Others, professorially proud of the dignity of their science, have followed John Stuart Mill in his attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable."⁹ But Marx also wrote that these two camps must not be confused: "To avoid misunderstanding I would note that such people as J.S. Mill and his ilk merit, of course, the utmost censure for the contradictions between their old economic dogmas and their current tendencies, but it would be the height of unfairness to lump these people together with the vulgar economists—the apologists."¹⁰

Apologetics, that is, the ideological defense of capitalism, may use science also to achieve its ends, and, furthermore, it is apologetics which is becoming an effective factor of the use of the practical achievements of scientific knowledge to put right the defects of the capitalist system with the aid of practical economic policy. Apologetics in an alliance with the mechanism of state regulation of the economy and a policy of reforms has become an effective force of present-day capitalism precisely because it is based on scientific discoveries, and not on a vulgarization of reality.

Comprehending our evaluations of the history of the development of bourgeois political economy from scratch would seem justified from this viewpoint.

The latter half of the 19th century-start of the 20th century was the period of formation of the neoclassical school. Its central directions were the subjective theory of value and the theory of balance. What are they about? Not, of course, about the essential relations of capitalism and not even about the national economy as a whole inasmuch as these theories viewed the national economy as an aggregate of microeconomic agents (consumers, sellers, firms) pursuing maximum utility and minimum costs.

The point of departure of economic analysis was demand and the requirements of the individual consumer.

Instead of the laws of economic development, its representatives concentrated attention on study of the laws of pricing and the rules of the rational use of resources. Cost became a category of optimization of the specific function of utility given these limited resources.

This reorientation of economic analysis was brought about by both the apologetic and practical requirements of the bourgeoisie, which had become established as the ruling class. By this time its principal task was not struggle against outdated social relationships but determination of the rules of the most rational behavior given the new capitalist relationships. And this required theories which would indicate how optimally to use resources, how to produce more commodities with the least costs and how to obtain the highest profits.

Theory thus acquired a chiefly microeconomic resonance. The neoclassical individualist approach, which laid claim to a more accurate study of economic relationships at enterprise or consumer level, was by its very nature devoid not only of macroeconomic problems but also of socioeconomic relations. It was incapable of explaining the actual contradictions of capitalist production and its protracted development trends and it even left unexplained its own basis—whence derive requirements and what determines them. Nor did it lay claim to this.

But was this an impasse direction in the development of economic thought? By no means. The real significance of the neoclassical school was that it increasingly became the science of rational economic activity. The neoclassical theory of value, price and income distribution essentially proposed the necessary apparatus of analysis of the problem of the optimum use of resources based on the use of marginal values. As the Hungarian economist A. Matyas writes, neoclassical theory contains all the most important components of such an analysis: "...the principle of equal opportunities based on a comparison of obtainable and losable advantages and an evaluation of resources based... on the principles of determination of the factory or shadow prices of the (production—I.O.)

factors. Although the shadow prices of the factors do not express the cost of investment commodities or the cost of manpower, they point to their significance from the viewpoint of the realization of goals under the marginal conditions of their use, bearing in mind the part which they play in the production of use values."¹¹

Yu. Kochevrin recently wrote about this, however: "The question of the correlation of the methodology of neo-classical analysis in the form of marginalism and its ontological foundation is quite complex. The attempt to solve it by way of identification of methodology and theoretical basis in the form of marginal utility theory is not legitimate. But such an attempt has been made repeatedly and has done, in our opinion, great damage to the development of economic thought in the USSR and the correct orientation in criticism of the ideological content of Western economic theories. The methodology of marginal analysis and the mathematical set of instruments associated therewith... is **applicable** to an analysis of a number of economic phenomena, specifically, is undoubtedly applicable for an analysis of the broad class of phenomena in which the laws of commodity-money relationships operate."¹²

The same may also be said about the theory of marginal productivity, which occupies an important place in the neoclassical school.

The set of instruments used by the theory of marginal productivity pertains to an analysis of the process of production as the production of use values. In this process the exponents of live labor (manpower) and labor embodied in the means of production are independent technical-economic factors, on the combination and efficiency of which the volume and rate of the manufacture of output depend.

Therefore in criticizing the theoretical principles of the neoclassical production function it must not be forgotten that the technical-economic relationships of production are studied with their help.

The production function has real meaning (within the framework of the accepted limitations) if it is seen as a model reflecting quantitatively the participation or role of individual production factors in the creation of the sum total of use values, although it is irrational if qualitative characteristics of the production process of the creation of value and surplus value and their distribution are ascribed to it.

Let us take the model of general balance devised by Walras and Kastl. From the viewpoint of a characterization of modern capitalist production the models of general balance proceeded from unrealistic premises: they presumed free competition, the absence of monopoly, timely information, the instant adaptation of prices (with the aid of a hypothetical "auctioneer") to changing market conditions and so forth. With the aid of a system of equations these models embodied the idea of the

interdependence and interaction of the quantitative, price and technological parameters of the capitalist economy. It was possible with them to determine "...how the demand for products affects demand for factor services with given or changing technical coefficients; how realized factor income influences consumer demand; in what way consumer demand is, in addition, dependent on the price of given consumer goods and the pricing of other consumer commodities.... All the price models which wish to answer the question of how to influence the optimum distribution of available resources with the given functions of demand and what prices are to be established with the given magnitude and optimum use of resources regard the 'Walras model' as the starting point,"¹³ A. Matyas, in particular, writes.

There are even fewer grounds for speaking of the vulgar antiscientific nature of such schools of bourgeois political economy as Keynesianism or institutionalism. These currents of Western economic thought, as also the new transformations of the neoclassical school itself, have developed in complex dialectical interaction with the actual development of capitalism itself in the period of its conversion into state-monopoly capitalism. An analysis of the dynamic processes in the economy and their actual and monetary aspects (cycles, inflation, employment, monetary circulation and so forth) and the change of institutions and economic structures (the activity of the major corporations, the state and the unions, current market structures—from monopoly through oligopoly; the new conditions of pricing and monopoly competition) are acquiring immeasurably more importance both from the viewpoint of scientific knowledge and that of practical knowledge.

What we need is not the biased, arrogant castigation of vulgar apologetics but an attentive study of the theoretical wealth which has been accumulated and is offered by the economic thought of the West. We need to rise if only to an understanding of the fact that "economic routine" has the same right to scientific generalization as its "vulgar essence" and that this "economic routine" constitutes the economic mechanism which every social system has and which determines the level of its efficiency.

Spheres of Contact

I shall turn to a most "tricky problem". While paying increasingly great attention to the problems of the functioning of the economic mechanism both under capitalism and under the conditions of the socialist social system, we are discovering increasingly often that certain regularities and functional relationships do not depend on specific singularities of the system and are of a more general nature. The range of such economic processes and phenomena is quite extensive and associated primarily with the domination of commodity-money, market relations and also with forms of the organization of production.

We have come increasingly to understand and recognize that many economic processes and institutions are of a nature common to different systems and are determined directly by the level of development of the productive forces and requirements common to all mankind.

It has become clear, for example, that commodity production and the market and its singularities are not an attribute merely of the capitalist economic system. That problems of the rarity and scarcity of resources are important not only for capitalism but for socialism also. That "external effects," negative particularly, are engendered not only by capitalist corporations but also socialist enterprises. That command-bureaucratic, administrative methods of regulation from the center are ineffective not only for capitalism but also for socialism and that questions of the optimum correlation of state and market regulation and centralization and decentralization permitting the highest efficiency are pertinent for the economy of all countries. That the monopoly, state included, engenders trends toward stagnation both "there" and "here".

But this means that certain spheres of Marxist and non-Marxist economic thought deal with an identical subject of study. And it is no accident that in these cases an identical methodology of analysis is frequently born also. This was the case, for example, with marginalism, linear programming and optimum planning—generally with a mathematical focus.

I have already written that problems posed by neoclassical theory—determination of price as a unity of costs and utility, achievement of the optimum results given set limitations on resources and so forth—gave rise to the corresponding mathematical apparatus of analysis—marginalism. But as soon as Soviet economists and mathematicians undertook a solution of essentially the same problems, it was ascertained that the method of analysis of these problems was basically identical. The task of the optimum, given these criteria and this system of limitations, was posed in the same way, and the attempt to link centralized management with the action of market mechanisms was made in the same way. The fact that these ideas and the mathematical set of instruments of analysis associated with them were developed in parallel both within the framework of bourgeois political economy and by Marxist economists (proceeding from the requirements of socialist management) of the Nemchinov-Novozhilov economico-mathematical school testifies that in this case it is a question of common regularities of management characteristic of different economic systems. Much was written in the past about the fact that the neoclassical school is primarily the science of rational management in general by O. Lange in Poland, S. Heretik in Czechoslovakia and A. Matyas in Hungary.¹⁴

However, Lange, Heretik and Matyas remove it from the sphere of political economy and attribute it to the science of rational action—praxeology. It seems to me,

however, that collation of the laws (or rules) of rational management is an essential component of political economy in general.

Is it not time to approach such "surprise" discoveries with our eyes open and recognize that, yes, there are common spheres of analysis? Thinking up artificial arguments in order to dissociate oneself at any price (primarily the price of commonsense) from an "undesirable" concurrence of views where it is perfectly logical and natural is pointless.

Footnotes

1. KOMMUNIST No 8, 1987, p 10.
2. NEDELYA, 28 December 1987-3 January 1988, p 15.
3. "Political Economy". Dictionary, Moscow, 1983, p 333.
4. KOMMUNIST No 14, 1983, p 30.
5. "Original Version of 'Das Kapital'," Moscow, 1987, p 308.
6. Stagnation and estrangement from the problems of the actual development of the socialist economic system have their roots in the political economy of socialism also in the narrow definition of its subject which was predominant in the period of Stalinism and which persisted until recently. Analyzing the debate in the political economy of the socialism of the 1950's, T. Dzokayev emotionally exclaims: "Dear colleagues, why did you wrap yourselves in this thinnest outer covering which you call 'production relations'? An outer covering pulled from the living skin of the productive forces? Combine the covering with the body, to which it rightly belongs" (PRAVDA, 6 May 1988, p 3).
7. KOMMUNIST No 11, 1987, pp 51-52.
8. O. Lange, "Ekonomia Polityczna," Warsaw, 1959, p 274.
9. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 23, p 18.
10. Ibid., pp 624-625 (footnote).
11. A. Matyas, "History of Modern Non-Marxian Economics," Budapest, 1980, p 42.
12. MEMO No 10, 1987, p 43.
13. A. Matyas, Op. cit., p 57.
14. See O. Lange, Op. cit.; S. Heretik, "Critique of Bourgeois Theories of Political Economy," Moscow, 1977; A. Matyas, Op. cit.

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'Problem-Solving' Approach to Negotiations Urged

18160003c Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 23-33

[Article by Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and leader of the Scientific Council for Negotiations of the USSR Academy of Sciences Systems Analysis Committee, Prof Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremenyuk, doctor of historical sciences and a leader of the "International Negotiations" project of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenberg (Austria), and Viktor Mikhaylovich Sergeyev, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences and leader of the Laboratory of the Structural Analysis and Modeling of Military-Political and Managerial Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute: "Questions of Study of International Negotiations"]

[Text]

I

The number of negotiations which are being conducted is growing, and their subject range and scale are expanding—such is a permanent trend of the development of the international community, of the system of interstate relations included.

Within the framework of this steady long-term trend there are periods of rise and fall, when some negotiations become almost fruitless, and others cease altogether and are suspended.

The sources of such rises and falls should be sought in the more general trends and patterns of the development of international relations. However, the parties' negotiating activity has its own regularities.

Negotiations are becoming virtually the main (and, sometimes, the sole) method of the settlement of conflicts and contradictions and also of the joint solution of problems confronting this or the other pair or group of states and nongovernment organizations.

At the same time, however, we have witnessed repeatedly how negotiations have been used merely as a tactical subterfuge and represented an attempt to demonstrate to the community an outwardly decorous approach to a solution of complex problems, but in practice, however, have been the cover for an evasion of their solution in the hope of preservation or acquisition of one-sided advantages.

At the end of the 1970's-start of the 1980's considerable numbers of the public in the West, and in our country and a number of East European socialist countries also, repeatedly voiced their unhappiness with the progress of the negotiations on central international problems—

arms limitation and reduction and the solution of military-political conflict situations—and on international trade and economic and financial problems and others.

The state of the negotiations on these problems, military-political particularly, including disarmament issues, in that period did indeed leave much to be desired. The main reason for this was the strengthening of conservative and rightwing trends in the political life of the United States and a number of other developed capitalist states. For many prominent figures of the U.S. Republican administration, which assumed office following the 1980 elections, negotiations based on the principles of the parties' equality and equal security developed earlier within the framework of Soviet-American interaction altogether did not represent a mode of relations with the USSR and its allies.

The intention of achieving military superiority to the USSR recorded in the 1980 U.S. Republican Party platform was manifestly contrary to any serious, constructive approach to a solution of arms limitation and disarmament problems. This intention was a departure from the official line of the preservation of parity and general military-strategic balance proclaimed by the R. Nixon, G. Ford and J. Carter administrations in the 1970's.

It should be mentioned that moderate political forces of the American bourgeoisie, in opposition following the 1980 elections, noted from the very outset the unrealistic and unattainable nature of the intention to restore overall military-strategic superiority to the USSR, which the United States had lost toward the end of the 1980's. But a direct demand for military superiority to the Soviet Union was missing from the 1984 platform of the Republican Party and from public official documents of the administration of this and the subsequent period.

At the start of the 1980's rightwing-conservative forces in the United States not only saw no point in any arms control and reduction negotiations but made persistent attempts to do away with the treaties and agreements which had been reached in the 1970's and 1960's even. The realization of such positions would have cast the system of interstate relations a long way back in the development of the manageability of the international community.

So-called "unilateralism"—the purely autonomous actions of the United States considering to the minimum extent the interests of many other members of the international community—predominated in this period in the activity of the United States—a most important subject of international relations. This approach of U.S. rightwing-conservative circles was manifested not only

in the sphere of disarmament and American-Soviet relations as a whole. It was reflected also in a whole number of most important international-economic and currency-finance problems, the use of ocean resources, the sabotaging of the UN International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development and so forth.

The United States' gamble on unilateral actions directly and indirectly stimulated also the analogous behavior of other states—of a number of developing countries, for example, on problems of their foreign debt.

The early and middle 1980's were marked by a lack of success in the solution of regional conflict and crisis situations and in a halt to small and big local wars (and, frequently, the absence also of the negotiation process itself). There was, as a whole, an increasingly dangerous accumulation of unsettled problems, which led to an erosion of stability in the international community.

The reluctance of the Republican administration in the first half of the 1980's to tackle the majority of urgent problems by means of negotiations gave rise to a search for different paths of a solution. The most interesting in this respect was the example involving tests of antisatellite [ASAT] weapons against real targets in space and the placement of these weapons in space.

At a meeting with a group of U.S. senators headed by C. Pell on 18 August 1983 Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, announced the imposition of a moratorium on the placement in space (in fact on the testing in space) of Soviet ASAT weapons as long as the other side refrained from such actions. This act met with a negative response on the part of the U.S. Administration, the leadership of the Defense Department and the Air Force Command, which was rapidly developing an ASAT system of, in their estimation, a new generation compared with that which existed in the USSR. However, it met with broad understanding and support in the U.S. Congress, which relied on scientists' opinion, and also among a number of professional military men, who believed with good reason that the development of an arms race in this sphere, even if the United States were to have some temporary advantages, would ultimately be equally contrary to the security interests of both parties.

A coalition of supporters of a ban on ASAT systems—primarily in the U.S. Congress' House of Representatives—began to actively take shape under the influence of the Soviet unilateral moratorium.

Every political process has its own dynamics. And this coalition was unable right away to acquire sufficient strength to ban appropriations for ASAT systems before the U.S. Air Force was ready to begin a series of tests against real targets in space. The first such test was carried out, which released the Soviet Union from its unilateral moratorium. However, the Soviet side showed

restraint, and immediate analogous measures did not follow. This permitted the coalition of ASAT opponents in the United States to broaden its base and seek a ban on appropriations for testing, despite the fact that the U.S. Defense Department had launched two special target satellites at a cost of approximately \$30 million (they were not used as intended. This fact points to the significant strength of the ASAT weapon opponents movement). As a result a mutual moratorium on the testing of ASAT weapons has been in effect from 1983 through the present without having been officialized in the treaty-legal sphere and without there having been negotiations. This is undoubtedly an important achievement.

The stagnation phenomena in our state and society could not have failed to have been reflected in the Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy of the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's. A lack of dynamism and the capacity to react properly to the changing situation, not to mention the capacity for looking to the subsequent phase of development of the international-political process, was manifested in a whole number of instances in our diplomacy. We were repeatedly late in putting forward initiatives and paid insufficient attention to directions of our foreign policy other than the American direction. New approaches to negotiations and their subject and tactics proposed by a number of our top diplomats, scientists and specialists had a hard time paving a way for themselves.

Thus for a number of years simplistic, arithmetical ideas concerning military-strategic parity, which emasculated its essence and sharply constricted the field for maneuver, were predominant in political practice in the approach to arms limitation and disarmament problems.

As S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, rightly observed, in the 1970's and the start of the 1980's we responded too rectilinearly to the arms race initiated by the West; we should have been more enterprising in finding political weapons, winning the public to our side and showing the danger of the arms race more honestly. Yu.M. Vorontsov, first deputy USSR foreign minister, said with good reason that in the field of diplomacy we were too taken up with polemics; the propaganda motive frequently got in the way of real work.¹

And although our practice in this sphere has changed appreciably for the better, the question of the optimum correlation between negotiations and the public polemic surrounding these negotiations in the interests of the broad community of all the countries and peoples concerned has not conceptually as yet, it would seem, been adequately resolved.

II

Since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum the Soviet leadership has taken active steps to achieve an appreciable change for the better in the

USSR's foreign policy position and in international relations as a whole. Scientists, of both the social and natural sciences, and specialists in the field of technology have begun to play a considerably more active part here. Diplomacy has turned to face science, in the formulation of negotiating positions on most important problems, in the sphere of disarmament primarily, included. Without fear of their criticism, scientists' opinion has come to be heeded in an evaluation of the results of negotiations also. We may mention from our personal experience the attention which is being paid today by politicians, diplomats and the military to scientists' critical studies pertaining to problems of international conflict and crisis situations, questions of prevention of an arms race in space, problems of ensuring strategic stability given radical cutbacks in nuclear arms and questions of the increased stability of the military-strategic balance at the level of armed forces and conventional arms given a reduction therein.

At the negotiations themselves, active top-level diplomacy included, the Soviet side has come to be characterized by consideration to a fuller extent not only of its own interests and the interests of its allies but also the interests of the other side and a display of flexibility and dynamism. The **problem-solving principle**, as distinct from the principle of maximization of gain, which is still professed by considerable numbers of Western diplomats and politicians, has been made the basis. This is creating an entirely new situation at international negotiations.

The orientation of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy and negotiating practice toward use of the problem-solving principle, which has intensified manifestly in recent years, has a sound basis. Pertaining here are the propositions concerning the growing interdependence and wholeness of the contemporary system of international relations, granted all their diversity, and concerning the fact that under modern conditions security can only be mutual. These propositions are figuring not only in the works of Soviet scholars but also in official documents and the speeches of leading statesmen and politicians, leaders of the USSR Foreign Ministry and Soviet diplomats performing various negotiating functions.

The "balance of interests" concept, which appeared initially simply as a fortunate metaphor, is acquiring ever increasing political-psychological and operational meaning for the new approach to international negotiations.

Consistent realization of the problem-solving principle presupposes the need for additional, at times very extensive, science-intensive preparatory work—on a more precise mutually acceptable definition of the problem and the goals which the parties which have entered the negotiations have to achieve. In fact all these are tasks for classical systems analysis, whose techniques and methodology differ little from one another in the scientific culture of many countries, regardless of their affiliation to this alliance and this system or the other. Prior

to the start of the negotiations the formulation to the maximum extent possible of common views on strategic stability would, in particular, seem highly important as such preliminary work.

It should not, however, be thought that all here is now proceeding smoothly and that complete harmony has been established between policy and diplomacy on the one hand and science on the other. Men of practice still have a utilitarian idea not only of applied (where this is justified, on the whole) but also basic theoretical research.

There has still been no radical change for the better in the provision of scientific research with archive material—from party archives and USSR Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry archives.

For its part, science, affected in many of its segments by viruses of the stagnation period, is far from always prepared to give out important results of an applied and theoretical nature and to determine the character of the relationship between "high theory" and practice, not to mention the fact that by science we often imply that which is not such and which performs other functions, journalistic, for example.

To speak of negotiating tactics, the traditional approach, whereby the initial negotiating position is overstated to the maximum, is present to a considerable extent here. This is done with a view to having in the course of the negotiations by way of hard bargaining room for maneuver and an opportunity for reaching a compromise with the other party. A seemingly correct idea, as a whole. But its embodiment under the new conditions, given the tremendous attention to negotiations on the part of the public, requires the particularly careful development of the initial negotiating position lest it contain barely defensible elements.

In addition, a significant retreat from an original negotiating position is perceived painfully by a certain part of public opinion within the country, which is treating negotiations and all their peripeteias with ever increasing interest, but which is at the same time for understandable reasons not always adequately informed about the particular features of this negotiating position or the other.

III

The speech of USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze at the United Nations in the fall of 1985 posed the task of the elaboration of new negotiating mechanisms corresponding to the level and complexity of the problems being tackled in international relations.

The accomplishment of this task requires not only organizational solutions but also procedural and theoretical studies. It is a question of studies which, with a specific orientation toward the needs of negotiating practice, reflect in full all the particular features of the international situation prevailing as of the present day and also the possibilities which are now at the disposal of the modern science of control of social processes, in the sphere of international relations included. Additional possibilities are emerging also thanks to new-generation computers and simplification of "man-computer" interface methods. This is contributing not only to the accomplishment of tasks of database organization support for the negotiation process but also to the development (with certain assumptions and limitations) of models oriented toward optimization of the solution of contentious problems.

It is becoming the generally accepted opinion in the international community that fair, equal negotiations are perfectly capable of serving as an alternative to military solutions, providing for the settlement of contentious problems in the economic, humanitarian and ecological spheres of the system of international relations and countering its entropy. The further revelation and specification of the concept of the stabilizing function of negotiations and the nature of their interaction with the international environment and the political situation in the participating countries are essential. What is needed is an accurate and adjusted analysis of the main obstacles in the way of successful negotiations and also an elucidation of the propitious factors and, what is most important, the possibilities of their stimulation. An evaluation of the change in the functions of negotiations and the actions of the parties in connection with the transformation of the vast conglomerate of international negotiations into a distinctive system which has come about is essential also.

The new significance which is attached to negotiations in the present international situation and also the ever increasing complexity of the problems with which the participants are having to deal are posing in earnest the question of the need for the creation of elements of a theory of negotiations.

Despite the fact that there is no orderly and generalized theory on this score either in the everyday use of the diplomacy of the socialist states or that of their negotiating partners, an intuitive perception of the need for their theoretical comprehension has, nonetheless, for a long time colored the practice of almost all the participants in international negotiations.

The element of the theoretical approach has been expressed most strongly in American practice in connection with the development of the theory and practice of practical negotiations in the sphere of business and law.

The following may be cited as the distinguishing features of this theoretical approach, which has taken shape spontaneously over long years of practice: negotiations are an instrument of continuation of a state's foreign policy and should therefore serve its goals and interests primarily; negotiations represent a hidden form of conflict, in which the participant's priority goal should be "victory," that is, the conclusion of an agreement on his terms or, on the other hand, a demonstration of the "instability and irrationality" of the opponent; negotiations are directly associated with the partners' correlation of forces, and for this reason it makes sense to consent to negotiations given a correlation of forces which is favorable to oneself, otherwise they should be avoided (the correlation of military forces primarily has been taken into consideration here in the political sphere also). Negotiations have been regarded here as an indicator of diplomatic art, and for this reason they have had to remain the lot of high-class professionals, particularly accredited representatives who have commended themselves with years of impeccable service. Evaluating these views, which are prevalent in the United States and other developed capitalist countries, we may make the following observations.

A whole number of new circumstances has radically changed negotiating conditions. International negotiations are becoming virtually the main form of states' interaction; they are not only (and not so much) recording changes in the correlation of military forces but also actively influencing a lessening of the role of the military factor. The compass and number of negotiations are growing; the sum total of unsolved contentious questions accumulated in the years of confrontation and also problems of an entirely new character (the environment, joint ventures, S&T cooperation) are becoming the subjects of negotiations and, in turn, are giving rise to new subjects. The negotiating role of international organizations, whose functions were for a long time paralyzed by the atmosphere of confrontation, is being stepped up. New masses of people who lack experience of diplomatic work but who nonetheless are called upon to play an appreciable part here are being actively enlisted in the negotiation sphere. Questions of the management of negotiations are arising constantly: reservation of the most important problems for the highest level of leadership of the country, definition of the sphere of competence of various working levels, elaboration of a system of delegation of responsibility, determination of the nature of the coordinating role of diplomatic departments.

Not only specially appointed delegations and diplomatic departments have been enlisted in negotiations on both sides. On arms limitation and reduction and disarmament issues representatives of the defense ministries, defense industry, the security services and other departments participate in them directly. Behind each delegation conducting the negotiations there is always a team consisting of representatives of these departments and also representatives of the country's top state leadership.

Negotiations are in fact conducted between departments and also different groupings within each country. They are frequently of a considerably more complex nature even than the direct negotiations between the delegations and between the heads of the diplomatic departments. Such internal negotiations do not, as a rule, end here by the time the official intergovernmental negotiations start but proceed in parallel with them. That is, internal bargaining continues simultaneously with that under way on the international scene. Consideration of this fact is essential, it makes negotiations as a subject of study an exceptionally complex system and demands, accordingly, a systemic, multifactor approach.

In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the role of the technical components of negotiations, which is once again manifested in most concrete form in the sphere of the limitation of and a reduction in armed forces and arms. The content and subject of the negotiations on strategic arms and nuclear weapons as a whole have become considerably more complex before our very eyes for some 15 to 18 years. It is sufficient to compare the wording of the 1972 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms with the SALT II Treaty signed in 1979, and the latter, in turn, with the INF Treaty signed in 1987. It may be anticipated that an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, if achieved, will prove even more complex than the INF Treaty. But even this would not appear to be the limit of the complication of the S&T aspect of negotiations and potential agreements. Thus negotiations on limiting armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals will evidently reach an even higher level of complexity, by virtue of the fact that these will not be bilateral negotiations but ones involving the participation of more than 30 states included.

The increased complexity of the subject of these negotiations on a strengthening of strategic stability in this sphere, the number of potential participants in these negotiations and the diversity of their noncoincident interests have stimulated a search for extra-negotiation approaches to the solution of this problem. There has been an intensification in the FRG, the Netherlands, Denmark and Great Britain of studies on questions of "nonoffensive defense," "nonprovocative defense," "territorial defense" and so forth. Many of the components of the corresponding principles of the organizational development of the armed forces and changes in their structure, composition, deployment and provision with this weapons system or the other could, the developers of these concepts believe, be adopted by Western countries, primarily the FRG and Great Britain, unilaterally in the hope that the Warsaw Pact states would follow this example.

The role of top state and political leaders in negotiations and the possibility of their personal intervention in the course of negotiations for the sake of the achievement of some radical results and breakthroughs have increased.

The development of communications systems and jet aircraft and a number of other factors are contributing to this to a considerable extent.

It would seem that a developed theory of negotiations could contribute to the accomplishment of the following tasks:

- The elaboration of a common strategy and specification of the system of interests and goals in new areas of negotiations where the situation is not entirely clear. The building of models of political situations representing an instrument for an understanding of conditions of considerable uncertainty and great technical complexity (arms reduction, ecological problems, economic interdependence).
- An institutional analysis of current negotiating practice, the purpose of which would be to contribute to the creation of the most efficient negotiating mechanisms and study of how the forms of the negotiations should depend on the subject of the negotiations, how best to organize the interaction of diplomats and specialists in specific subject fields and on what terms to enlist various state and research organizations in the negotiation process.
- The elaboration of methods increasing the efficiency of negotiations, specifically, an improvement in database organization and support and the creation of methods of the express analysis of negotiating positions; an improvement in diplomatic practice, including the training of diplomats in negotiating tactics. New approaches to the elaboration of a common negotiation strategy have been outlined in the speeches of M.S. Gorbachev and also E.A. Shevardnadze and a number of other leaders of the USSR Foreign Ministry. In particular, they emphasize the role of negotiations as a most important mechanism of the solution of contentious international problems, the need for observance of the principles of equal benefit and mutual consideration of the negotiating partners' legitimate interests and the principles of equal access to the necessary information and the need for the elaboration of mutually acceptable procedures of the negotiation mechanisms based on political accords.

The conceptual basis of this new strategy of negotiations should be not the principle of optimization of unilateral gain but the problem-solving principle. In other words, the basis of the negotiating process should be a search for the optimum solution of the problem formulated on the agenda, and not a complex and costly (in the time sense) "bargaining" process, an exchange of concessions or the formation of a compromise, which often led to unbalanced agreements which failed to stand the test of time. The development of modeling methods and decision-making theory based on positive approaches makes it possible at the present time to approach anew the modeling of negotiating situations.

In practice this approach has already been applied. For example, a model of the optimum solution of the problem of the contemporary law of the sea devised in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (United States) was studied in the United Nations at the time of agreement of the Law of the Sea Convention. There are examples of the development of models of a solution of the problems of acid rain and the monitoring of the pollution of international rivers and seas, which are also essentially becoming subjects of the corresponding negotiations. The "AS" dialogue computer system for an analysis of the stability of the system of military-strategic interaction under the conditions of deep cuts in nuclear arms was developed in the period 1985-1987 in the USSR under the aegis of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Danger in the Laboratory of Structural Analysis and Modeling of Military-Political and Managerial Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute. Several versions of cuts in strategic offensive arms of 50, 75 and 95 percent with regard for ABM factors, strategic ASW forces and weapons and air defenses were studied with this model.² The POST-2 computer model devised by the Disarmament Department of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations in cooperation with the Military-Political Research Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute was also oriented toward the accomplishment of similar tasks.³

The problem of the increased efficiency of a separate component of the system of international negotiations—the negotiating situation—is under current conditions becoming a very considerable aspect of the theory of negotiations. It is a question here not simply of the elaboration of a sum total of rules and procedures which would facilitate the negotiations to the maximum possible extent. For the accomplishment of the general task—an increase in the efficiency of the entire array of negotiations and the creation of a mechanism of the settlement of disputes and disagreements—fundamental changes are needed in the very approach to negotiating: the creation of a hierarchy, echeloned in terms of degree of responsibility and competence, of negotiations and consultations (from unofficial exchanges of opinions between experts through formal negotiations and decision-making), the development by experts of different countries of joint models of a possible solution of problems and the development of the negotiating process from a state of conflict into a state of joint quest for the most optimum solution of contentious problems with regard for the actual possibilities of the parties concluding the agreement and the assistance from the international community.

And, finally, the development of modern information technology, particularly methods of AI and expert systems, should be a boost to a qualitatively new level of the database organization support of the negotiations, which under the conditions of the constant complication of negotiating situations is an essential condition of the effective solution of international problems.

IV

Of course, the creation of a theory of negotiations is possible only on the basis of a wide-ranging analysis of the processes of international cooperation with regard for the singularities of the political thinking and cultural traditions of the participants in the system of international negotiations. Let us now examine in more detail certain approaches to the creation of a theory of negotiations and an improvement in their technical support.

There are at the present time appreciable differences in the approaches to study of negotiations, of which the main ones are historical (with the emphasis on study of specific conditions) and socio-psychological (negotiations as interpersonal relations) and also diverse approaches based on a study of various mathematical models of negotiations, in which the main role is usually performed by games theory. However, the principles of the building of these models remain highly debatable as yet.

The classic example of a negotiating situation in which optimization games theories are inapplicable is the so-called "prisoner's dilemma". Many negotiating tasks result in such a game. This problem has been studied in many works. Numerous experimental studies have been conducted: such a game has been played many times over by specially selected persons. However, the results which have been obtained prove quite contradictory. One has the impression that the very applicability of the classical game-theory approach to a study of the process of negotiations could be a matter of doubt.

The weakest point of this approach would seem to be the extreme rationalism of games theory and the total lack of regard for the structure of the consciousness of the player. All the players are completely depersonalized. It is believed that every person in a specific game situation will behave identically—as prompted by "rational choice" based on the application of games theory.

There are similar shortcomings to the models of negotiations which have been developed in recent years based on study of so-called "concession dynamics". The idea of the progress of negotiations as a reciprocal response to the partner's concessions is made the basis of these models. The main concept of theory is "concession speed". Use of this value makes it possible to describe the process of the negotiations by a system of differential equations. The main and fundamental shortcoming of these models is the same as for the models based on games theory. It is assumed that the participants are essentially identical. It is this assumption which affords an opportunity for speaking of an optimum strategy of the negotiations in isolation from their content. However, attempts to find a universal optimum strategy are obviously doomed to fail since an optimum strategy of negotiations depends on the content of the negotiations and also on the context of the situation in which these negotiations are conducted.

In our view, the building of substantive models of negotiations is associated with the solution of the following problems:

1. The elaboration of methods of consideration of the context, that is, determination of the venue, of the negotiations in the system of the conflict which the negotiations are designed to resolve.
2. The elaboration of methods of analysis of the cognitive structure of each participant in the negotiations. This problem is broken down into two: (a) an analysis of the structure of the conflict and the methods of its solution as it appears to each participant; (b) an analysis of the pattern of decision-making by each participant. The structure of the relations between the delegation conducting the negotiations and the leadership of the organization which this delegation represents is of the greatest interest here.
3. A structural analysis of the negotiation process itself.

Let us now examine the analysis of the cognitive structure of the participants in the negotiations. It is of extraordinary importance to note that each participant in the negotiations has his particular image of the conflict, and these images may not coincide. It is here that additional opportunities for agreement emerge.

The image of the conflict is dynamic, and a solution of the conflict by means of an accord could change the situation completely. It is essential to consider in the negotiation process not only what is now but also what will emerge following implementation of the accord, considering not only the position of the opponent but also external factors, which could change following (or as a result of) achievement of an accord. By virtue of what has been said, the participant who possesses a more developed image of the conflict considering a large number of interconnections and has a better forecast of future events will acquire significant advantages during the negotiations since he could persuade the adversary to accept a proposal of little importance given a superficial view, but in fact of decisive significance for the future.

We thus see that the structure of ideas concerning a conflict is of decisive significance in the choice of the tactics and strategy of the negotiations, and it is for this reason that attempts to formulate universal tactics or a universal strategy of negotiations in abstract terms of the "concession speed" or "carrot and stick" type are absolutely useless. Although useful when analyzing the negotiations, all these concepts may be used only on condition of the preliminary specific ascertainment of the structure of the position and image of the conflict represented in the simplest cases in the form of related target graphs.

Let us now examine the relations between the delegation at the negotiations and the organization which sent it. Negotiations are impossible without certain sets of instructions fixing the maximum permissible concessions. It would seem that the vagueness of the results obtained in psychological experiments pertaining to study of negotiations, specifically during the "prisoner's dilemma" contest, is a consequence of the fact that those being tested were not built into some social mechanism which has strictly fixed their values. Essentially the negotiation model itself in such experiments is inadequate to reality. It is essential that the negotiations presuppose a certain external social reality, which puts pressure on the representatives conducting the negotiations. There is a redefinition here, so to speak, of the "objective" and "rational" utilities with which games theory operates. These "objective" and "rational" utilities are subjective, but truly objective utilities are utilities determined by the social reality in which the participant in the negotiations is immersed, and these utilities take into consideration not only his advantage but also the size of the advantage of the adversary.

Thus cognitive analysis and study of the "world models" of the parties to negotiations could be a principal analytical instrument making it possible to obtain knowledge of the negotiating situation and to "explain" it. It is the structure of the participants' "world models," the system of values, interests and objectives and scenarios of the future development of events which determine to a decisive extent the outcome of the interaction between the parties to the negotiations.

Artificial intelligence methods, which are being developed intensively at the present time, make it possible to realize cognitive models of decision-making by the parties to negotiations in the form of computer programs and afford an opportunity in principle for various versions of the flow of the negotiations to be examined with the techniques of expert systems. It should be mentioned, however, that this direction of negotiation modeling—highly promising—is merely at the start of the way.

Introduction of the new political thinking in the everyday use of international relations together with the existence of a vast amount of contentious and unsettled problems poses squarely the question of a radical increase in the efficiency of international negotiations. It is no longer possible to regard this prospect from the standpoints of traditional diplomacy, which has often been guided by the criteria of "bargaining" and resourceful combinations to the detriment of the balance and efficiency of the adopted decisions. An understanding of the prospects of a complex and fundamental period in human history connected with the advancement of tasks of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security requires the thorough development of qualitatively new means and methods by the joint efforts of men of practice and scientists.

Footnotes:

1. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 June 1988.
2. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms. Concise Account of a Study," Moscow, 1987, pp 23-33, 36-39.
3. See "Disarmament and Security. Yearbook of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations: 1987," Moscow, 1988, pp 283-299. COPY-RIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988.

PCF Needs To Shed 'Mass Party' Image

18160003d Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 52-60

[Report of Aleksey Germanovich Vitels, candidate of historical sciences, research fellow of the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute: "Opinion of Soviet French Experts"]

[Text] A meeting of Soviet French experts devoted to an analysis of the political situation in France following the 1988 presidential and parliamentary elections was held on 21 June 1988 in the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute.

Without pretending to an exhaustive exposition of the content of the discussion and the viewpoints and arguments heard in the course thereof, we shall attempt to distinguish certain common assessments and also points on which the positions of the experts appreciably differed.

The 1988 elections begin a new stage in the country's political life. A process of restructuring of the French political system is actively under way (has been completed, in the opinion of a number of experts). As Candidate of Historical Sciences I. Bunin (USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute) observed in his report, the multiparty feature was practically eliminated in France from 1958 through 1978. Approximately 10 parliamentary groups had disappeared, and 4 large parliamentary groups had arisen—the RPR, the UDF, the PSF and PCF. Society was bipolarized to the maximum, right and left obtaining at the elections approximately 50 percent of the vote each. But in the last 10 years this structure has generally collapsed. A new party—the National Front—which collects about 10 percent of the vote, has emerged, but, what is most important, the balance within the two big blocs—left and right—has been undermined. On the one hand the sharp decline in the electoral authority of the PCF, on the other, the elimination of the hegemony of Gaullism in the camp of the right, have created a fundamentally new political situation in the country. Specifically, whereas formerly the final argument which

made it possible to bring together the right was anticommunism, the "black bogey," which tactically unites the left and splits the right, has now appeared.

The participants in the discussion expressed the following thoughts in this connection.

Prof Yu. Yegorov, doctor of historical sciences (A.I. Herzen Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute): "Although the right has never lost as heavily as on 8 May 1988, these results point more to the mood of the French electorate than to serious changes benefiting the left. The main reason for F. Mitterrand's success was the attraction of votes of the center electorate: whereas in 1981 they had constituted 20 percent of his electorate, in 1988 their share had grown to 30 percent."

Prof V. Smirnov, doctor of historical sciences (Moscow State University): "The Socialist Party has not gained an absolute majority in parliament, but the government which it heads may operate perfectly well by relying in some cases on the support of the centrists from the right, and in others, on the support of the communists from the left."

Doctor of Historical Sciences M. Narinskiy (USSR Academy of Sciences World History Institute): "The processes occurring in French society may, as a whole, be reduced to two features: on the one hand a polarization of the flanks of the political spectrum (a hardening of the position of the Communist Party and the growth of the influence of the National Front), on the other, a move toward the center and a strengthening of the centrist mood in the electorate. The second trend is becoming increasingly decisive here. To judge by sociological surveys, the bulk of the French supports an "amalgam" of the program aims of the socialists and the parties of the right and their mutual "correction".

Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Salmin (USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute): "The experience of 1986-1988 merely made obvious what had existed potentially for some time: the compatibility of the center left and center right in present-day France, given that the common electoral base of these centers had been increasing in recent years. All this testifies to an easing of the tension between the center left and center right."

As M. Narinskiy observed, it was these neocentrist urges which confirmed the somewhat surprising, but undoubted success, on the whole, of the practice of "cohabitation" of the socialist President Mitterrand and a government formed by representatives of parties of the right headed by Chirac. Despite the increased discontent, "cohabitation" itself enjoyed broad approval. At the same time it demonstrated the absence of an unbridgeable gulf between politicians of left and right in present-day France and contributed to the laying of new bridges between them.

In the opinion of the majority of participants in the seminar, the basis of this phenomenon is the process of the formation of new value orientations in part of the electorate and the appearance of a new type of voter,

which is associated with the changes in the social and occupational structure of the population and in social mentality, primarily with the growth of the social and political influence of the "new middle" strata. As I. Bunin recalled in his report, the so-called University of Michigan paradigm operated in the 1970's. It was based both on Anglo-Saxon and French realities and proceeded from the fact that the voter is virtually unchanging in his political behavior: he votes for the party in which he believes. A new paradigm—the rational voter—emerged at the start of the 1980's. The latter chooses from the candidates the one whose program is of the type more suited to him. This means that there has been a fundamental change in electoral behavior.

A. Salmin: "The election mechanism of the functioning of institutions of the Fifth Republic was in jeopardy altogether. The basis thereof had always been a clear polarization of the bulk of constituencies into traditionally 'right' and traditionally 'left'. The final result of the elections here was determined in the 'swing' constituencies, which more often than not voted with greater or lesser readiness for the 'president's party'. Meanwhile throughout the 1970's-1980's the proportion of constituencies with a clear-cut orientation diminished. The likelihood of an unpredictable election outcome, in particular, such a one as in the party sense counterposes the president to the majority of the National Assembly, accordingly, potentially increased, and continues to increase. This happened, however, at a time when such a possibility had ceased to be seen as an impasse and altogether to be dramatized, like the possibility of the existence of a minority government also."

M. Narinskiy: "A new type of voter has emerged—one who is well informed and oriented toward overcoming the 'left-right' confrontation and a combination of the luggage of both. As a result a neocentrist segment of the electorate has appeared, in which some of the traditional left principles are being superimposed on some traditional right principles. Neocentrism aspires to combine the economic efficiency heralded by the neoconservatives with preservation of the social achievements associated with the parties of the left. True, both are preferred in a moderate version: the functioning of the market economy does not signify the elimination of government intervention in the socioeconomic sphere, and the preservation of social achievements does not presuppose a growth of spending on social needs. It is highly indicative that the Chirac government left practically untouched the social reforms implemented by the socialists when they were in office. As a whole, this is inscribed in the general evolution of the alignment of political forces in postwar France from bipolarity (left and right) toward tripolarity (left, right and center)."

May appreciable changes be expected in the policy of the new government headed by the socialists? In the opinion of V. Smirnov, this is unlikely, the state of unsteady balance in which it finds itself in parliament increasing

the probability of political zigzags. The fact that President Mitterrand remains the key figure of both governments primarily supports the assumption that the socialist government will continue, in the main, the policy of the preceding government of the right. In addition, there is between the leaders of the Socialist Party and the leaders of the "moderate right" (the centrists particularly) a large degree of agreement on the main issues of domestic and foreign policy.

I. Bunin emphasized the fact that the three programs advanced by the main candidates—Barre, Chirac and Mitterrand—were quite close among themselves. They all proposed the same set of slogans: Europe, its modernization, preparation for its unification and the modernization of French industry. A very important place was occupied by problems of education and job retraining. Two candidates, Barre and Mitterrand, were particularly sharp in their rejection of the "exclusion society," that is, a society which excludes the unemployed, immigrants, AIDS sufferers and so forth. On the other hand, spotting the difference between them from the program viewpoint was difficult, although it existed and was manifested in the greater "social" coloration of the program of the Socialist Party. The sole divide in the electorate which was perceived quite distinctly was the attitude toward acute social problems. Thus the majority of supporters of the PSF and PCF supported the granting of immigrants the vote at municipal elections and opposed the introduction of the death penalty and reform of the criminal code in a repressive spirit. The majority of voters of the right adopted the opposite position.

On the other hand, the formula of union of the left is impracticable at the present time. In the opinion of I. Bunin, the paths of the PSF and the PCF have finally parted. They occupy opposite positions on the basic problems of France's development. There can be no program alliance and government agreement between the communists and socialists for the simple reason that the two parties profess different ideologies. Any problem would break the alliance—be it European building or austerity policy. At the same time, however, the socialists and centrists have very different myths and values because some belong to the left faction, others, to the right. The divide between left and right in France is quite clear-cut. But the programs of the socialists and the centrists are very close.

In the process of a lengthy and lively exchange of opinions on the situation in the French workers movement several basic problems crystallized out in the course of the seminar on which the viewpoints of the specialists differed appreciably. These were:

an evaluation of the evolution of the PSF and its development prospects;

the role of the concept of self-management in the activity of parties of the left;

the situation in the PCF;

problems of the formulation of a left alternative to the neoconservative policy.

As Candidate of Historical Sciences E. Drozdov observed, under the conditions of the continuing unstable political situation in present-day France the bourgeoisie sees the solution in the creation of a political system wherein there are two major political groupings replacing one another in power: the bloc of forces of the right on the one hand and the socialists on the other. Attempts to squeeze the Communist Party from political life and isolate it from the working people continue. The PCF's influence has weakened considerably in recent years, but the results of the parliamentary elections show that the communists have succeeded in resisting the pressure and in improving their results somewhat even. A difficult, long struggle for restoration of the influence of the PCF lies ahead.

As Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu. Shchirovskiy (CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute) observed in his speech, the biggest winner, essentially, has been the financial oligarchy and the foreign imperialist forces supporting it—such as the “world finance system” and its numerous tentacle-bodies. Thus to speak of the actual forces which were victorious at the elections, these were the rightwing liberals united on a neoconservative basis. But they did not achieve victory by their own hands but by the hands of the rightwing leaders of the PCF and by means of an amalgamation of methods of social reformism and bourgeois reformism. It is obviously legitimate in this connection to speak of a new phenomenon in the country's political life: the advancement of intermediate reformist doctrines designed to ensure at each stage the necessary opportunistic unions and the merger of social reformism and bourgeois reformism.

Thus at the very start of the 1970's this was “social Delorsism (under J. Chaban-Delmas), which advanced the doctrine of a “new society” for the purpose of beating back revolutionary sentiments by way of an increased dose of social reformism. There arose in the 1980's “social Mitterrandism,” whose mission now included stifling the communists in its embrace and laying a foundation for the new stage of the merger of rightwing liberal parties of various persuasions united on a platform of neoconservatism with bourgeois-technocratic reformism. The latest intermediate reformist doctrine—“social Rocardism”—which is even more technocratic and even more emphatically attuned to the subordination of social reformism to bourgeois-reformist action, is obviously emerging, if it has not already emerged. In a word, everything indicates that under these conditions social reformism will by no means quickly succeed in extricating itself from such “stifling” embraces. Performing the function of sociopolitical shock absorber in the process of the “linkage” of social reformism and bourgeois reformism, “social Mitterrandism” and

“social Rocardism” have certain differences, but they are today united by the most important thing, at which they arrived by different paths: “capitalism is inevitable” (Mitterrand); “capitalism is the future of the left” (Rocard); “France's future may be secured only in the West European community” (Mitterrand and Rocard).

Prof A. Vetrov, doctor of economic sciences (CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute), called attention to the fact that bourgeois liberalism and conservatism permanently coexist, reflecting the objective reality of the competition—both political and economic—within the bourgeoisie, monopoly particularly, which is divided into “two wings”. However, the correlation of forces between them is mobile—sometimes one, sometimes the other moves ahead, creating various combinations in a broad range—from Reagan's America to Mitterrand's France in the period of the start of the 1980's.

In the past decade the socialists themselves have moved strongly toward the right and, since having been in office, have essentially pursued the policy of the ruling class, having taken up the principal weapon from the neoconservative arsenal—a policy of austerity at the expense of the working people with the maximum possible being done to release big capital from the “restrictions”. Such, in brief, are the conclusions characterizing one of the positions ascertained in the course of the discussion.

Suggesting a different system of evaluations, Prof Yu. Krasin, doctor of philosophical sciences (CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute), expressed the opinion that upon assuming office in 1981 the socialists were quite sincere in their desire to pursue a leftwing course of economic policy. But subsequently the objective logic of economic development pulled them toward a neoconservative course. For the socialist party 1981-1986 was a period of coming down to earth and renouncing recent utopias, Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Ushakov (Higher Trade Union Culture School, Leningrad) observed. The experience of running the country proved very bitter and disillusioning for the socialists. Antistatists by conviction, they nonetheless anticipated from the assumption of office the possibility of a sharp acceleration of the process of a break with capitalism, but this proved an illusion.

The main reason for the change of course was the transition from a “culture of opposition” to a “culture of government,” which presupposes an abandonment of former clichés of thinking, the shedding of an outmoded model of social development, the close linkage of program slogans with current reality and the elaboration of practical ways of achieving the set goals via competent management of the country (Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Burlakov, USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO).

The difficulty of the PCF's present position is that it is practically the sole force of the left capable of independently opposing the right and that it is simultaneously experiencing a serious crisis of ideas: the socialists are not in a position to give a clear answer to the question of what alternative to the government of the right they intend to propose.

A number of speeches has emphasized that the direction of the search for ideas by no means testifies to the socialists' shift to the right and their conversion into pure "pragmatists" who have abandoned socialist ideals.

Mitterrand's intentions of improving social relations by way of the development of "contract policy" and contributing to the embodiment in practice of laws governing an expansion of economic democracy (the Auroux laws), Rocard's promises to make better conditions available for state-run organizations of the health service, education and culture than in the private sector, statements concerning a profound attachment to a "particular type of society" (a socialist society) and, finally, poll results testify that socialists have lost their faith not in socialism (80 percent of activists consider it the party's goal, as before) but in the possibility of its immediate implementation—it has become a long-term program, as it were.

Thus it is a question not of a betrayal of ideals but of a more realistic assessment of reality. There has been a demarcation in the camp of the left in the ideological sphere into those who are opposed to the current changes, are afraid of them and aspire merely to preserve what has already been won in the class battles (that is, into conservative—in a "left version"—forces) and into those who welcome the changes, unafraid of radical restructuring. This demarcation is particularly noticeable in the Socialist Party since it runs within the organization itself.

PSF ideologists are actively developing new topics (anti-racism, modernization of society, equal access to information). Such principles as the solidarity of all members of society, the "mixed economy" and encouragement of a spirit of enterprise and personal initiative have been reconsidered and "rehabilitated".

It would be wrong to see this replenishment of the PSF's arsenal of ideas as a surrender to liberal-bourgeois values. It is a question of taking advantage of the ambivalence and contradictoriness of social processes and ascertaining therein what might work for the social democrats, and not the neoconservatives.

In the opinion of some experts, the self-managerial form of socialism "has withered as having been impracticable and utopian" (A. Burlakov) and has disappeared from the slogans of the PSF, which in its present form is not in a position to alter the structure of enterprises and introduce self-management (I. Bunin). Also contradictory in this respect is the position of the PCF. On the one

hand it is advancing the slogan of self-management, which is lacking in specifics, on the other, it is stubbornly championing a policy of nationalization of the major enterprises (Yu. Krasin).

As V. Ushakov observed, the problem of self-management cannot be reduced to enterprise self-management. The idea of self-management means the development of the initiative of the masses and the gradual lengthy preparation, more precisely, the creation of the conditions even for the working people's participation in management.

Self-management is a general concept, which is being developed by all factions of the workers movement. Throughout the 1970's the lead in the development of self-management ideas changed constantly. Sometimes the communists were ahead, sometimes the socialists, sometimes the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), sometimes the French Democratic Labor Confederation (CFDT), sometimes the General Labor Confederation (CGT). Historical experience of the existing models of socialism and its own experience of running the country convinced the PSF leaders that nationalization would not ensure an acceleration of the revolutionary process and would have a strong negative side effect. Nationalization had traditionally been seen as a means of economic liberation of the working class. But transferring property from the private sector to the public sector ("nationalizing") would be costly, while the development of the process of transformations would be sharply deformed; the machinery of state would in fact become economically independent of the civil society; the ruling political party would become a "permanent temporary" manager and cease to involve itself in the training of the masses to run the country and the economy.

A different way, a new experiment, was needed. Judging by the pronouncements of leaders of the Socialist Party, they intend in the period of the 1988-1993 legislature to make the basis thereof the concept they have devised of revolutionary reformism and peaceful transition to socialism under the conditions of the new correlation of class forces. It is a question not of the creation of "islets of socialism" but of imposition on the bourgeoisie, which has no way out other than to go along with this, of their goals of class collaboration. Inasmuch, the socialists believe, as the creation of a socialist society does not require the elimination of commodity production and wage labor, there is no need to hurry with nationalization. The new is born not as the result of a legal instrument but as the result of the slow, gradual, general involvement of the masses in the processes of management, beginning with its simplest forms at the local levels of power and a gradual increase in the complexity of tasks, tackled originally with the assistance of managerial officials (trained personnel). This will make it possible to avoid harmful effects from the "catapulting of the workers into director's chairs" and the creation of a new

managerial elite. In the process of these transformations the bourgeoisie also will gradually become increasingly deeply involved in class collaboration of the new type.

It is most likely that the socialists themselves do not as yet know what will ultimately happen with the bourgeoisie. As far as the economic liberation of the working class is concerned, it will come, they believe, when, attending the school of management at all levels, it feels that it can ensure the no less efficient use of the economic machinery of the country (or region) in the interests of the whole of society than is done by other social groups.

Instead of clamorous revolutionary phrases, about self-management included, which frighten not so much the bourgeoisie as the managerial staff of the major enterprises, the socialists are proposing a specific step toward self-managing socialism (free access for the working people to sources of information and their "right to be heard," creation of a system of vocational training and retraining, reduction in the work week without a cut in wages and so forth).

What the outcome for the socialists will be it is impossible to predict. They do not need the communists as allies at this stage. Their main task in the coming years is to neutralize the political forces which are to the right of them and neutralize, not suppress, the bourgeoisie and incline it toward collaboration. It is precisely the means that they are proposing which are designed to ensure the accomplishment of this task.

A most serious and debatable problem discussed at the seminar was: "what is happening with the illustrious and very strong Communist Party?" (Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Boytsov, All-Union Engineering and Construction Correspondence Institute).

Analyzing the objective and subjective reasons for the weakening of its influence, the majority of speakers mentioned the following points:

the changes in the class composition of society and the "erosion" of the PCF's traditional social base;

the very great "gap in the interests" of various social strata: the communists are not managing as yet in their activity to reflect the interests of the majority or, at least, a particular progressive group of the new working class;

the negative influence of the stagnation period and the decline in the prestige of real socialism in the eyes of the West European public;

the PCF's lag in comprehension of the realities of the modern world and France itself, to which its representatives themselves point;

the insufficient development of party democracy and the "rigid nature" of democratic centralism and control on the part of the center over the activity of the party organizations weakening the party's ideological and educational work;

the abrupt and unexpected changes in PCF policy which disoriented the party's electorate.

At the same time, however, serious differences in the analysis of the situation in the PCF were also manifested in the course of the discussion. Thus the negative results of the policy of the union of the left, which the communists pursued from 1972 practically through 1984, were cited as the principal reason of a long-term nature for the weakening of its influence. The participants in the discussion who defended this viewpoint maintained that this policy, in the form in which it was pursued by the PCF, rebounded against it in practice. In this period the socialists achieved changes in the correlation of forces to their benefit. The communists are now noting self-critically (as the last two congresses have shown) that the policy of union of the left on the basis on which it was pursued was a mistake. Not the idea of the cohesion of the workers and democratic forces and a union of the left as such but the Communist Party's experience within the framework of this union. The entire theoretical and political activity of the PCF was subordinated to the goals of this union. It was in practice very pragmatic and did not touch on fundamental theoretical problems. It was not that general questions of revolutionary theory were ignored, but undervalued. In the opinion of some speakers, serious damage was done to PCF interests by its adoption of the "Eurocommunism" concept.

As Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Perminova (CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences) observed, the Communist Party improved its results at the early parliamentary elections considerably, demonstrating a capacity for mobilizing its electorate in a short time, which is no reason for pessimism. At the present time the communists are relying on a new policy program advancing such new and highly pertinent slogans as social justice, democracy, self-management and peace. New proposals have also been formulated in respect of questions of the environment, S&T progress and others. This program represents an attempt to formulate a democratic alternative to the policy of the bourgeois-right bloc. The PCF is faced with the problem of winning to its side the broad working masses.

A number of speakers (V. Boytsov, Candidate of Legal Sciences R. Matveyev, CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute) cited as a most important factor which led to the weakening of the PCF's political influence on the masses the social strategy of the French bourgeoisie: on the one hand repression of the communists and trade union activists, on the other, an endeavor to knock the ground from under the PCF and CGT, eliminate their social base—the working class of the major enterprises—envelop the new generation of the

working class (of the 1970's-1980's) in bourgeois ideological influence, depoliticize the masses and introduce to the mass consciousness neoconservatism in the form of corporate ideology.

From timid experiments in the sphere of the "humanization of labor" (1970's) French employers switched to the broad implantation of autonomous assembly teams (in place of the production line), quality circles and suggestion and technical progress groups and other organizational structures within the enterprises. Besides ideological goals (fostering in the working people a "spirit of company loyalty"), the task was to replace the traditional channels of social relations (unions, enterprise committees and others) with new ones operating per the paternalism principle. Together with reliance on individualization of wages this entire set of measures was aimed at depriving the working class of the traditional social protection organizations (the CGT, other unions, the collective bargaining system) and replacing them with institutions of direct class collaboration.

The successful and most stubborn social struggle of the PCF at the end of 1987-start of 1988 showed the party itself that the process of the turn to the right of the masses' consciousness could be stopped. The fact that the trend toward a decline in PCF influence in the masses was halted may be considered an important result of the 1988 parliamentary elections (V. Boytsov). Some 40,000 persons joined its ranks in the first months of this year alone. Fr40 million and Fr80 million were donated in the course of the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns respectively (R. Matveyev).

Different viewpoints were heard in the course of the discussion also. Specifically, mention was made of the need for the determination from the very outset of what is more important—the good of individual organizations of the working class or the working class itself. Yu. Yegorov: "We are saying: what clever capitalists, how they expertly think up everything, organize production and contrive to bind the workers to the enterprises. It would seem that it is better for the workers thus, they have begun to work better, production is developing more efficiently. Is this good or bad? Remember how we used to say: a crisis, the workers are becoming impoverished, a revolutionary situation is ripening, as though all this were healthy. And as a result French workers would read reprints from our papers as though we were rejoicing in the crisis phenomena in this same France and in other capitalist countries!"

As far as "Eurocommunism" is concerned, if, as A. Vetrov observed, it did once, evidently, exert some disintegrating influence on the PCF electorate, it was only because it was "ahead" in time of the perestroika in the USSR. In the period of the last two election campaigns it was possible to speak of this only very relatively, as of a consequence which was already weakening. But now, under the conditions of glasnost and ever increasing openness, as of not only a negative but also,

possibly, to some extent positive consequence, as an appropriate response to the negative realities which had occurred in history and in the recent past even and, partly, in the present also of the socialist countries.

The current PCF program has been determined by the decisions of its recent congresses, particularly the 25th and 26th. The main purpose of the party's activity is formulated there as struggle for a democratic path toward a French-style democratic self-managing socialism. The communists propose the creation of a "new association of a majority of the people" headed by the working class and the PCF, but do not explain how this may be accomplished.

Calling on the French to struggle for a way out of the crisis, the communists propose also a whole number of specific measures aimed at the elimination of unemployment and social inequality and a rise in the working people's living standard.

All these demands are justified, V. Smirnov observed, but it needs to be borne in mind that they have long been known to the French and that, as the results of the voting show, they cannot win over a majority of the population. What is evidently needed is a further elaboration of alternative programs and the advancement of new, more popular slogans and also a solution of the question of political alliances, without which the Communist Party cannot win over a "majority of the people".

M. Narinskiy cited as a cause of the PCF's electoral failures the unadaptability of the type of party which it is to the new political culture. The times of the classical "mass party" built according to the principles of strict centralism, with a ramified machinery and network of efficiently functioning cells and based on disciplined activists, the times of such a party are receding into the past. Different principles of party building and methods of its work are required in the modern Western society. As the PSF's experience shows, a party has far more chance of being successful if it operates on the basis of ideological intraparty pluralism, combines within it heterogeneous currents and is geared to the attraction of various social strata and groups of the electorate. It is obvious that without a change in the very type of party and the principles of PFC activity it will hardly succeed in overcoming the serious difficulties which, as the results of the 1988 presidential and parliamentary elections testify, it is encountering. The 2 percent of the vote obtained at the presidential election by P. Juquin, who had behind him neither an established structure nor a staff, indicate the communists' potential and the audience which they could attract. On the other hand, this is an indicator of the scale of discontent with the present state of affairs in the PCF.

The business of Juquin and the "renovationists" has shown that democratic renewal and transition to the internal pluralism of opinion are essential to the party. This business will very likely not be the last, and it is of

fundamental importance to learn to turn such debate not into a factor of the weakness but into a factor of the strength of the party (Assistant Prof B. Komotskiy, Ukrainian Water Management Engineers Institute, Rovno).

In the course of the discussion of the PCF's immediate and long-term prospects A. Salmin called attention to the fact that, according to opinion poll figures, as of mid-1984 the Communist Party's potential electorate has stabilized at the 10-11 percent level. This stabilization has occurred precisely at a time when the most active talk has been about the decline of the PCF, which by 1984-1986 had lost half of its relatively stable electorate of the 1960's-1970's.

It is impossible now to say, of course, how sound and prolonged the stabilization of the Communist Party's positions at this level will be. The social processes which have for a number of years been undermining its political subculture are continuing to develop, and in this sense the possibilities of "freezing" the vestiges of the subculture in their former form are very slight. But there is another circumstance also. It is possible that we are observing right now, in 1988, a process of the structural demarcation of the electorate of the PCF and PSF, the proximity of substantial numbers of which ultimately brought about the strengthening of one party at the expense of the other in the first half of the 1980's.

Having fixed its position in the center left, the PSF is inevitably leaving "uncovered" the zone left of this center, where all who are unhappy with it and centrist consensus in general are gathered. Some such voters are moving, as practice shows, toward Le Pen, but this is an unstable part of the electorate of the extreme right; voting for the National Front is for them a demonstration or gesture of despair.¹ The other part remains in the orbit of the historical left, choosing between the PCF or other groupings left of the PSF, whose role grows relative to the increased weakening of the Communist Party.

It is interesting that the electorate left of the PSF split in April 1988 into three comparably sized groups: supporters of the PCF candidate (7 percent), other left groups not associated with the socialists (4.5 percent) and the ecologists, the bulk of whom is of a left persuasion (4 percent).

In June 1988 the PCF occupied two-thirds of this space. There is obviously an objective need for a pronounced force left of the present-day PSF; it will possibly increase in line with the inevitable disenchantment of part of the fluctuating left electorate with the socialists and simple "tiredness" of them. On the side of the Communist Party in this situation is its infrastructure, which is beyond comparison with the possibilities of the other forces. Working against it, besides the above-mentioned social processes, are organizational difficulties and the problem of its "image" in the mass mind. The absence of a developed ideology, to which reference is sometimes

made in this connection, is not in this case a specific aggravating circumstance. In the sense of an undeveloped program in the conventional understanding the PCF is not alone: in today's "nonideological" France it has rivals "both on the left and on the right flank."

In the opinion of Yu. Yegorov, the main reason for the PCF's difficulties and the difficulties of the communist movement generally is nonetheless separation from the revolutionary perspective. Do we recall how the communist parties emerged? They emerged in the hope that, maybe not at once but within 10-20-50 years the desired revolution would occur. We are now beginning to understand that none of this has been the case. And there arises altogether the question: what type of political organization corresponds today to the interests of the struggle for socialism? What is better for the working class: small parties in the political ghetto or a politically influential force championing its interests? If the second version is preferable, the question of the unification of the communists and socialists will inevitably arise in time.

Summing up the speeches on this topic, Prof A. Galkin, doctor of historical sciences (CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute), said that the question of the PCF's prospects could not yet be answered unequivocally. We lack as yet both the necessary empirical material and sufficient arguments. The work needs to be continued. It is necessary to consider here that the communist movement is in a difficult position not only in France but throughout the zone of developed capitalism in general and beyond this zone even.

We have a right to speak of a precrisis, perhaps, the crisis state of the communist movement in the nonsocialist world. If we proceed from this, it has evidently to be assumed that hard times are ahead for the PCF. How it will emerge from these trials will depend on itself, of course. It is important also when studying the problem to stick firmly, as before, to positions of moral and political solidarity with our communist comrades.

The opinion that the neoconservative wave in France (and in the capitalist world as a whole) is beginning to misfire was expressed at the seminar. Of course, this does not mean that the right has abandoned its plans, but its original projects have been eased considerably, and the more so, the stronger the resistance of the masses has been (R. Matveyev).

As of the end of the 1980's there have been signs of the exhaustion of the neoconservative wave which had led to even greater malfunctions in the mechanism of regulation of international economic relations, which had been influencing national economies increasingly strongly in the direction of a tightening of "austerity" at the working people's expense. The need for a stimulation of tax and budget policy is being perceived increasingly strongly once again. Changes at the electoral level are occurring in

a growing number of countries. And if "neoconservatism" has dealt the public sector a heavy blow, the stock market collapse was heard as an alarm demanding a moderation of the fervor of the supporters of continued denationalization (A. Vetrov).

Issue was taken with this viewpoint by a number of participants in the discussion. "It seems to me," A. Galkin observed, "that the not entirely justified hope of a rollback of the conservative wave has appeared recently among Soviet researchers. I do not conceal the fact that I have big doubts as to such an assessment. The conservative wave in its various forms is a reflection of the deep-lying processes occurring in capitalist society. At the same time it is the result of the weakness which has been displayed by forces of the left in the developed capitalist countries. Neoconservatism (or, to put it more broadly, the forces which reflect the conservative system of values) has been able to intercept and divert into its own channel the interests of broad strata of the population born of the technological revolution. No one can say whether this is for the long term or not. But this is a general phenomenon. And its prospects can hardly be judged on the basis of the outcome of elections in this country or the other. Electoral results may fluctuate. But the conservative wave will most likely remain a stable phenomenon. But this is my personal viewpoint, which should be underpinned by empirical material."

It would be a mistake to view neoconservative policy only from the angle of negative social consequences of a short-term nature, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Kuznetsov (USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO) emphasized. Social policy and, on a broader plane, the position of the working people and their living standard are connected not only with the distribution and redistribution of income. In the long term they are determined by the conditions in which income is produced and the level of social labor productivity. Consciously or otherwise, this connection is recognized and accepted by the majority of the working population, and it would be politically myopic not to consider this circumstance. M. Thatcher's popularity among the working people and the share of the vote obtained by the conservatives at elections in other countries, in France included, testify that open discussion on this topic is now politically preferable to the most wide-ranging promises of a social nature if they are not backed up by a convincing demonstration of how it is contemplated finding the sources of the promised benefits.

What has been said pertains directly to the principles of the formulation of the forces of the left's socioeconomic alternative to conservative policy. The alternative cannot be understood as a mechanical set of formulas the opposite of the formulas of the conservatives. The conservative formulas need preliminarily to be subjected to sober scientific analysis from the viewpoint of their solvency and correspondence to the given specific situation in the world economy and the given specific stage

of society's development. With regard for such an analysis an alternative to the economically and socially unacceptable provisions of conservatism may be advanced. Simultaneously an avowedly left alternative is obliged to recognize the rationality of other parts of the program of its political opponents (this applies particularly to the focus on the S&T revolution and the strengthening of the competitiveness of national forms) and to propose its own way of tackling these tasks or use methods already available.

The main problems now confronting the forces of the left were touched on in his speech by Yu. Krasin. He called attention to the process of the workers movement's assimilation of the new political thinking, the basis of which is a perception of the wholeness of the contradictory world. This wholeness of the world was not born yesterday. But recognition of its significance has been belated. The communist movement has lagged behind greatly in this respect. It linked its identity immediately following the victory of the October Revolution with class confrontation with other social and political forces. At the stage of "breach" of the capitalist system this was justified. However, as if by inertia, this perception of realities continued even after the situation had changed. In the last years of his life V.I. Lenin brilliantly caught the strong new trend—in the economy and in trade relations, in any event—toward the formation of the wholeness of the contradictory world which had been broken up by the Great October.

Unfortunately, Lenin's thoughts on this question were not subsequently developed. The communist movement continued to sharply counterpose itself to other social and political forces. As a result many parties found themselves in some isolated niche and besieged fortress, whose walls fenced them off from other social forces.

Yet the seriousness of the global problems of the present day, primarily problems of the survival of the human race, pose the question of the very broad cooperation and the interaction of the broadest forces, including not only the left and democratic forces but also part of the center. The communists of capitalist countries have proven to be unprepared for such cooperation and interaction.

Another topical problem is the technological revolution with all its economic and social consequences. The workers movement—both communists and social democrats—simply cannot adapt to the consequences of the technological revolution. First, profound changes are taking place in the nature of labor itself, which is being reflected in the composition and very character of the workman employed in the production sphere. These changes are of a qualitative nature inasmuch, evidently, as K. Marx's prediction is beginning to come true: a "combination of social activity" incorporating the entire vast scientific potential of society and, consequently, people who are employed in the sphere of spiritual production and who are the exponents of a somewhat

different system of values from that which has taken shape historically in the channel of traditional worker culture is becoming the subject of social production.

And the structure of the working class itself is changing very considerably, as are its requirements and value orientations. New strata, which are the exponents of more progressive values, are emerging. And, what is most important, the composition of the forces capable of resisting the power of capital has expanded. The working class does not, I believe, under present conditions possess a monopoly of revolutionary character. Other forces, which are capable of upholding socialist values, but, perhaps, on a somewhat different basis from the traditional workers movement, have taken shape also.

Here also the communists have been slow to appreciate the new situation. They are as yet only fumbling their way toward a path to find their fitting place in the broad interaction of the old and new forces. Reorientation toward the new forces and the renewal of program goals are proceeding slowly and with great difficulty.

Second, the problem of formulation of a democratic alternative to conservative policy has arisen. It is clear that the reorganization of the structure of social production based on new technology is an objectively necessary process and imperative demand of the revolution occurring in the productive forces. But the restructuring is proceeding as yet in a conservative form, given the hegemony of the conservative forces. A democratic alternative to the "conservative wave" has yet to be found.

There are many problems here. A fundamental and most difficult one concerns the role of government intervention in the economy. It has to be stated that, given the new technology, direct government regulation of social production has proven ineffective. The structural reorganization of social production is being accompanied by denationalization and privatization of the enterprises. Only in this case is the efficiency of an economy based on flexible and mobile techniques secured.

If we take the communist parties' programs, they are, in accordance with Marxist tradition, oriented toward the nationalization and government regulation of the economy. It is evidently necessary when formulating the democratic alternative to combine the use of government levers with development of the self-management infrastructure. Such a combination of government and self-managerial principles has not been found as yet in the program of democratic transformations.

The international parameters of the democratic alternative are of exceptional significance. The opinion that a democratic alternative to neoconservatism is altogether impossible within a national framework is quite widespread. According to this viewpoint, no government, if it operates in national soil, will be able to resist neoconservatism, which has an international logic of development.

It is therefore necessary for formulation of the democratic alternative to go beyond the national framework, into the West European arena at least. Only then might it be possible to break with the logic of neoconservatism and counterpose to it the logic of a democratic course. In any event, France's experience speaks in support of this opinion.

It is likely that a joint search for a democratic alternative by European forces of the left will come onto the agenda. The communist parties are lagging behind social democracy considerably on this issue.

Criticism was heard in the course of the seminar of the illustration of international life in the Soviet press, and the desire for the greater independence of our press in its assessments of events and its explanation of the processes occurring in France was expressed.

Footnote

1. In I. Bunin's opinion, the National Front is taking over from the Communist Party its traditional function in the French political system—that of protest and political expression of feelings of discontent and despair.

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Closer Attention to All Aspects of Soviet-FRG Relations Urged

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[Article by Prof Margarita Matveyevna Maksimova, doctor of economic sciences and chief scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO: "Revealing the Potential of Cooperation"]

[Text]

FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl will visit the USSR this month. In this connection we continue the publication of material concerning various aspects of the FRG's development (see also Yu. Yudanov, "The FRG in the Latter Half of the 1980's—Basic Problems and the Search for Their Solution"—MEMO No 9, 1988). The section begins with an article by M. Maksimova, in which the author expresses her viewpoint on the paths of development of Soviet-West German relations.

The postwar history of Soviet-West German relations is far from straightforward. There have been therein surges and upturns, the most important of which was the signing of the 1971 Moscow Treaty, which laid the foundations for the peaceful cohabitation of the peoples of the two countries. But there have also been, unfortunately, periods of stagnation, deceleration of cooperation and, at times, a winding down of contacts also.

The political barometer of the relations of the USSR and the FRG reflects quite accurately changes in the overall climate of East-West relations and in the international situation as a whole. But the state of international affairs also, in Europe particularly, is determined to a considerable extent by the level and quality of the interaction of such countries as the Soviet Union and the FRG.

Turning to the present and attempting to look into the future, we inevitably encounter the question of what lies in store for Soviet-West German relations. Will they remain in the Procrustean bed of traditional notions concerning the strict limits of the contacts of states with opposite social systems? Or will a different concept prevail—that of advancing emphatically, granted social differences, along the path of a deepening of trust, a rapprochement of the peoples of the two states, joint quest for effective ways of solving urgent international problems and transition to profound forms of relations, contacts and interaction between the governments, the business world, political and public organizations and simply the citizens of the two countries?

It would seem that it is such an approach which corresponds to the spirit of the times. It has been dictated by the unique nature of the military-political, economic and ecological situation in Europe and the world as a whole, the movement to the fore of values and interests common to all mankind and the urgent need for the renovation of the entire system of international relations. Practical prerequisites are taking shape also for the gradual transition to a new level of development of Soviet-West German relations.

The significance of the FRG in the Soviet Union's European policy will, we profoundly believe, objectively increase. This is connected primarily with the fact that in the future the FRG will reserve for itself first place in West Europe and third place in the capitalist world after the United States and Japan in terms of level of economic and S&T potential. And although in recent years the West German economy has been noticeably inferior to that of the United States and Japan in growth rate, the FRG has retained its main advantage—its high level of competitiveness on world markets. Having invested in the last year alone more than DM50 billion in the development of research and new technology, it has been ahead of other countries in terms of level of spending on R&D per capita. Together with the intensive structural reorganization of the economy, this has enabled it to move into first place in the world in terms of the scale of exports. The FRG will evidently in the immediate future also remain our leading trading partner among the capitalist countries.

The FRG's position in the North Atlantic alliance is changing. The new situation which is taking shape in the world in connection with the INF Treaty, the Soviet-American strategic offensive arms talks and the prospects of a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe affects the defense interests of the FRG

to a considerably greater extent than the other European NATO participants. There is therefore reason to believe that under the changed conditions there will be a sharp increase in the FRG's role in the shaping of the future policy of this organization. The appointment as NATO secretary general of former FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner is a highly significant symptom in this respect.

Account has to be taken also of the new alignment of forces in the European Community. The transition of the EC countries to the creation of a single internal market in the 1990's, the increase in elements of supranationality, the strengthening of political cooperation and, finally, the plans for West European military integration—all this directly corresponds to the FRG's aspirations and will be used extensively by its ruling circles to further consolidate authority and influence both in West Europe and beyond.

Recent facts have shown convincingly that West German political leaders are attempting to assume the role of main "integrators" in the Community, speeding up the realization of plans and programs connected with the adoption of the Single European Act. The unprecedented activity of H. Kohl and his associates during the FRG chancellor's recent tenure of the presidency of the EC Council—this organization's highest body—was understandable. The West German Government is displaying no less diligence in the creation of a "European economic area" among the EC countries and the attachment of other countries to the future single market.

Granted all its devotion to allied commitments to the United States and NATO and also its EC partners, the FRG will continue to distinguish its particular interests in Ostpolitik, primarily in relations with the USSR and the GDR. They ensue from the division of Germany into two states and the geostrategic position of the FRG, whose eastern borders are directly contiguous with the Warsaw Pact countries. Well known also is the role which the European socialist countries perform in its foreign trade and the credit sphere, the support for certain sectors of West German industry and the easing thereby of problems of unemployment, which have become exceptionally serious.

It ensues from all this that the prospects of East-West relations, of the all-European process included, and the development of cooperation between CEMA and the EC will depend to a considerable extent on the position of the FRG.

The domestic political alignment of forces should be put among the particular features distinguishing the FRG among Western countries. It is distinguished, first, by the uniqueness of the government coalition, within the framework of which the political course of the leading conservative party—the CDU/CSU—is constantly subject to correction on the part of its junior partner—the

FDP—which occupies a more realistic position in international affairs. Second, the presence of a strong opposition in the shape of the influential Social Democratic Party, which plays a leading part in the Socialist International. Third, the powerful antinuclear and also ecology (the Green Party) movements, which have supporters in the CDU/CSU and FDP ruling parties also, and well-organized unions.

The perestroika and democratization in the USSR, the Soviet peace initiatives and the Soviet-American accords and summits have exerted a strong influence on the political situation in the FRG, set in motion significant masses of the West German population and forced the ruling leaders to reconsider former conservative hard-line positions on a number of aspects of military and foreign policy.

There has been a certain change in the FRG's official position on questions of arms reductions and the monitoring of disarmament. As is known, the H. Kohl government performed a positive role in preparation of the INF Treaty, supports plans for a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive arms and is expressing the intention of joining actively in the negotiations on conventional arms. West German political leaders support a settlement of regional conflicts by political means.

Bonn's estimates of the Soviet Union are changing also. For many decades the FRG had stubbornly clung to the decrepit idea of the need to weaken the USSR economically and thereby undermine its military potential and international positions also. It is now coming to understand that it is in the fundamental interests of the FRG itself, as, incidentally, of the entire rest of the West also, to have in the shape of the USSR not an illusorily weak enemy but an actual strong partner. It is immeasurably more beneficial and, what is most important, safer dealing with such a partner. It is more open to the outside world, its behavior is more predictable and fundamentally new opportunities are afforded in alliance with it for an outlet onto the important Soviet market and the development of wide-ranging economic relations and for the joint search for constructive ways of guaranteeing dependable mutual security.

Recently FRG ruling circles, including their conservative representatives also (R. [sic] Strauss, H. Kohl), have put forward a number of initiatives pertaining to the development of relations with the Soviet Union. For several months Moscow has literally been "under attack" from prominent West German politicians. The FRG, like our country also, attaches great significance to the exchange of visits of FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Of course, the change in the FRG's foreign policy has shown itself as yet merely as a trend. It is taking shape in an acute struggle between progressive and rightwing,

including revanchist, forces, with Bonn constantly looking over its shoulder at the United States and the other main NATO allies. It is well known that out of specific and other considerations certain circles in the West are by no means interested in an accelerated development of Soviet-West German relations which goes beyond the existing framework.

Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious that it is in the interests of the USSR and the FRG, and the entire international community also, not only to consolidate the positive changes which have come to light in Soviet-West German relations, specifically concerning the greater readiness of the FRG than its Western allies for constructive dialogue with the USSR, but also to reveal as far as possible the available potential of cooperation. This will require the appropriate initiatives on our part also, in whose formulation scientific forces could be enlisted.

The disarmament process. As a whole, a unique situation has been taking shape in the FRG following the signing of the INF Treaty. Whereas its government officially continues to adhere to the NATO concept of nuclear deterrence and flexible response strategy, advocates the preservation of tactical missiles and the French "nuclear cover" and so forth, considerable numbers of the population are demanding the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. The Social Democratic Party here, according to the platform adopted on 19 April of this year, has in practice supported all the Soviet initiatives in the disarmament field.

The SPD has moved forward in the elaboration of a defensive doctrine based on the principles of sufficiency; it has presented specific proposals concerning a change in the structure of the Bundeswehr and the country's naval and air forces; and a reduction in and reorganization of the structure of the FRG military budget for the 1990's. An in-depth study of the principles and stages of the creation in Central Europe of a nuclear-free corridor, zones free of chemical weapons and confidence zones is being conducted. Considering the complexity of the practical realization of the said plans, the SPD has proposed the establishment of a transitional period, in which the West would change its strategy of deterrence to one of general security.

The Soviet peace offensive program and the quite precise reference points of a cardinal restructuring of the conceptual principles of FRG military policy proposed by the SPD are encountering the broad support of the West German public. It sees them as a practicable way of countering the large-scale modernization of weapons which is under way in NATO and the danger of a new slide toward escalation of the arms race connected with this.

At the same time we should hardly ignore the criticism on the part of peaceable forces of the FRG of our military. This concerns, in particular, the need for the

speediest elaboration of the criteria, principles and content of Soviet nonoffensive doctrine and specific proposals concerning a reorganization of the structure of the armed forces and arms of the Warsaw Pact countries and glasnost in questions of military programs.

We cannot agree with all the critics' arguments, but it is obvious that vigorous efforts in this area on the part of our military departments could put the corresponding pressure on NATO generals and accelerate a reciprocal search for alternative solutions. It would seem expedient in the interests of development of the disarmament process to make more active use of the FRG's antinuclear potential and the growing popularity in the country of the idea of defensive strategy and the need for a qualitative reorganization of the structure of arms and armed forces and their reduction to a level of sufficiency.

A broadening of contacts between the military departments and staffs of the two countries, representatives of various arms of the service, including the rank and file, and between members of parliament and government experts on military issues would evidently correspond to these goals. There has, incidentally, long been a need for the creation of a military commission in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The creation also of joint study groups with the FRG from the ranks of international affairs scholars with the enlistment of military experts could be one measure. The purpose of these groups would be a comparison of existing and the development of new concepts pertaining to a wide spectrum of disarmament problems. The results of the studies could be of the nature of open joint publications and also material specially earmarked for the governments of the two countries.

Building of the "all-European house". Recently the FRG Government has noticeably stimulated efforts within the framework of the all-European process, which is broadening the field of our interaction. At the same time FRG political and scientific circles are expressing the opinion that, while supporting the development of the all-European process, the USSR is confining itself mainly to proposals pertaining to the "first basket". Our present "second basket" position, which contains practically nothing that is fundamentally new compared with what was formulated in the Final Act, is being criticized. New initiatives pertaining to humanitarian contacts are expected of us.

The main thing, however, is that a sufficiently clear scientific concept of the "all-European house" and a constructive action program for realization of this idea are as yet lacking. Many questions remain open. What, for example, should the level of security on the European continent be? What role in the "all-European house" will be assigned the United States? How to "mesh" in the future the single internal market of the European Community and the proposed common market of the CEMA

countries? What kind of institutions and mechanisms will regulate and direct the process of building the "all-European house" and so forth?

As is known, the scientific school of "Europeism" is quite extensively represented in the FRG. For many years it confined itself to West European countries, but now its representatives are displaying great interest in all-European problems. It would be desirable to establish with them close contacts for the purpose of using the rational principles of this current in the interests of the development of all-European cooperation and the joint elaboration of urgent European problems. It would also be advisable, in our view, to accelerate the cooperation with the CPSU begun on the initiative of the SPD for elaboration of the "all-European house" concept, associating leading research centers of both countries with this.

Trade and economic cooperation. This sphere of Soviet-West German relations has traditionally been the most developed. But although the FRG remains our leading trade partner on the capitalist market, economic relations with it leave much to be desired. The volume of Soviet-West German trade has diminished sharply in recent years (by a factor of more than two in 1985-1987) and continues to decline. The reasons are well known. They amount to the unsatisfactory structure of Soviet exports and the low competitiveness of many of our commodities. A serious impediment to the development of trade is the inadequately organized system of management of foreign economic relations, the process of whose restructuring has been considerably delayed owing to the slow pace of implementation of the entire economic reform in the country.

If the current approaches on the part of the corresponding departments toward Soviet foreign trade persist, the process of its recovery could drag on for many years. We would be clearly letting slip here a propitious opportunity since the FRG is, for a number of reasons (high level of unemployment, large-scale investments in R&D and new technology, low dollar exchange rate and reduced demand on the part of developing countries in view of their high debt level), acutely in need of foreign markets and is interested in the extensive development of relations with our country.

The surmounting of the current inertia in our relations with the FRG is connected, naturally, with the further restructuring of our entire system of foreign economic relations, primarily with an extension of the list of state enterprises and associations and also cooperatives availing themselves of the right of direct outlet onto the foreign market, with a real increase in their interest in exports by way, specifically, of the granting to them of earned currency resources and the purposeful enlistment of foreign firms in the creation in the USSR of joint enterprises (including pilot and venture firms), the assimilation of forms of industrial and S&T cooperation which are new to us and so forth.

However, even now, considering that in respect of a number of areas of economic relations with us the FRG is displaying relatively greater interest than other countries, it might be possible to proceed toward the large-scale development of a number of new forms of cooperation. Thus, we believe, it would be expedient to set up in our country at two or three major universities and industrial centers (Leningrad, Minsk, Riga, for example) "technology parks" with the participation of West German firms with the appropriate experience. The purpose of the creation of such "parks" is unification of the efforts of scientists and innovator specialists of the appropriate enterprises (including those working in the most progressive sectors—electronics, information science, biotechnology and so forth) in specialized firms operating on a cooperative basis in accordance with contracts with the universities and enterprises.

A form of enlistment of West German firms could be free foreign trade or economic zones created within certain territories of the western part of the USSR (in areas of seaports, preferably) or within the framework of individual sectors and subsectors (electronics, machine-tool building, textile and footwear industry and so forth). According to the information available, West German firms are displaying a particular interest in investing capital in these zones provided that there is an increase in the share of ownership from 49 to 70-80 percent, an abolition of taxes (for 3-5 years and more), the foreign partner's far broader participation in management and so forth.

We could also, evidently, by way of experiment create in certain subsectors in need of the speediest modernization (particularly in science-intensive sectors and consumer goods production) syndicates and trusts, with the participation of FRG firms included, operating fully on a financially autonomous basis. Such syndicates and trusts were once created on the initiative of V.I. Lenin and operated in the 1920's with great effect. Of course, these would be largely different associations operating on the basis of modern methods of intra-firm organization and management of economic activity and only where dictated by the need for the speediest updating and reorganization of production management at the enterprises.

The solution also of such an important question as the training of Soviet specialists in the practice of foreign trade transactions by way of a training stint at West German enterprises could be accelerated appreciably with the aid of relations with the FRG. Cooperation in this field is as yet of an extremely limited nature and simply cannot be compared, for example, with the Chinese experience (over 3,000 foreign trade officials of the PRC undergo industrial training annually at FRG firms). In addition, the FRG's proposals concerning its participation in the creation on USSR territory of joint centers for the vocational training and retraining of specialists of various fields, of the S&T component included, merit attention.

A strong impediment to the development of Soviet-West German relations is, as is known, the extremely low level of organization of information services in the USSR. Not individual units but a network of information and advice centers supplying Soviet enterprises and foreign firms with regular information on specific opportunities for the development of trade and economic relations.

The list of West German firms cooperating with us needs to be appreciably updated and extended. The major steel, power engineering and chemical concerns of the FRG, which profited hugely from the "gas for pipes" deal and other compensation projects, are attempting to "hold prisoner" the corresponding Soviet ministries and departments, foisting on them increasingly new costly contracts, many of which are dubious from the viewpoint of national economic efficiency.

It is necessary, it seems to us, to think seriously about conceptual support for our foreign economic activity in respect of the FRG. Elaboration of a strategy of our economic cooperation with this important trade partner for us has in practice not been undertaken in the country. Also lacking is a strictly considered concept of the development of such relations based on consideration of the particular features of this country, its position in Europe and the modern world and its growing role in our foreign policy. Thus, for example, there is a commonly acknowledged need for a reorientation of our relations with the FRG from the primary fuel and raw material sectors to the sectors of the heavy processing of raw material, science-intensive types of production, including the latest types of machine-tool building, environmental protection equipment and space equipment and technology, and also sectors producing modern types of machinery for consumer goods manufacture. However, not only objective difficulties but also the force of inertia and the largely preserved bureaucratic style and methods of management of our foreign economic activity are preventing this.

The time has come, it seems to us, to take a fresh look at the current practical activity of the USSR-FRG Intergovernmental Economic and S&T Cooperation Commission. It has done much to develop the relations of the two countries. But many of its recommendations remain, for all that, on paper. The machinery of the Soviet part of the commission is not in a position to provide the necessary information and assist enterprises in the organization of contacts with West German firms. And the longer it goes on, the more serious the problem will become inasmuch as an ever growing number of Soviet enterprises will be availing themselves of the right of independent outlet onto the world market. It is evidently essential to create specialized financially autonomous intermediary firms affording enterprises and associations chargeable services in the search for the right West German partner in accordance with the recommendations adopted on an intergovernmental basis. Incidentally, such problems arise for the West German part of

the intergovernmental commission also. The mechanism of its interaction with FRG firms could be more efficient, and their database support far more prompt.

The FRG's efforts could be considerably more energetic on the question of the lifting of restrictions on technology exports to the USSR connected with the CoCom lists. The anachronism of such "bans" is obvious. West German business circles also have an active interest in their removal. The FRG Government, unfortunately, has yet to say the decisive word.

Problems of study of the FRG and the "German question". The radical development of relations with the FRG, whatever sphere they concern—military-political, economic, ideological—presupposes the elaboration of scientific principles of our relations with this country for the foreseeable future. Such an elaboration will only be effective given comprehensive study of the FRG, bearing in mind its history, current domestic and foreign policies, its economy, the alignment of the main social forces, the activity of political parties and social movements and organizations and the FRG's relations with various countries and groups of states.

These questions are being studied in various academic institutes and certain departmental research institutes, but their scientific forces are disconnected. The Soviet school of "Germanistics" which existed in the past has practically disintegrated. The circle of research workers engaged in our country in study of the two German states has narrowed sharply in recent decades. Nor are there regular contacts between specialists on the FRG and the GDR; these countries are studied in different institutes.

As far as relations between the FRG and the GDR are concerned, Soviet international affairs experts are manifestly in arrears here to the scientific community and our foreign policy practice. Yet an analysis of the profound changes which are occurring in the leadership of the leading West German parties, and in the FRG Government itself, in respect of the so-called "German question" merits attention, in our view. They are no longer advocating a revision of the borders, as was the case recently and as from this reactionary representatives of the "exiles from the homeland" are still unwilling to desist. The change of generations in the FRG, the recognition by increasingly broad strata of the population of the irreparability of the consequences of the outbreak of any military conflict in Central Europe, their profound understanding of the need to preserve the status quo in questions concerning state borders in Europe—all these are new realities which have to be taken into account.

The defensive doctrine, the elimination of foreign bases and other initiatives which we propose cannot, naturally, fail to exert an influence on the future development of the two German states and relations between them. In which direction? It is this that has to be studied. As a whole, however, there is evidently an acute need for

unification of the scattered efforts of Germany scholars, the organization of the close coordination of research and the joint elaboration of the most contentious and topical aspects of a scientific direction.

An analysis of the changes which are occurring in the mood and behavior of various social and political groups in the FRG—from the government through ordinary citizens—in respect of our country and their evaluation of perestroika and the reforms in the Soviet Union merits particular attention. There arises in this connection the question of our attitude toward West German Sovietology, which plays a considerable part in the shaping of public opinion in the FRG concerning the USSR.

A dogmatic view of Sovietology as a tool in the hands of foreign intelligence authorities, source of disinformation and hotbed of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism persists as yet. Yet under the influence of the profound changes which are under way in our country a trend toward a more objective analysis of the situation in the Soviet Union has prevailed in West German Sovietology. Considerable numbers of Sovietologists in the FRG have a sincere interest in cooperation between our countries. The development of contacts and relations with this group of West German specialists is useful not only as a source of information on the evaluations of the Soviet Union which exist in the FRG and which, as is known, are used extensively by parties, the government and the press of the FRG but also for a mutual exchange of opinions and a search for common approaches in questions of the development of Soviet-West German relations.

The author has expressed her personal thoughts, many of which, naturally, are in need of careful study. The solution of some questions may perfectly realistically be started right now, others will take time. Besides, we have touched on only some aspects of Soviet-West German cooperation, understanding full well that its potential—in the development of comprehensive and profound contacts at all levels—from the contacts of ordinary people—representatives of different generations, occupations and philosophies—through meetings at the highest level—is considerable. There are tremendous unused possibilities in the mutual exchange of accumulated knowledge, spiritual values and both countries' experience in the field of science and the ecology, culture and education, health care and youth education. But sound work needs to be done for the realization of all these possibilities.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

Friedrich Ebert Foundation Opens Moscow Office
*18160003f Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 67-69*

[Yu. Yudanov interview: "The Friedrich Ebert Foundation"]

[Text]

In connection with the opening in Moscow of an office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FRG) our Bonn correspondent, Yu. Yudanov, met with G. Struempfig, director of the foundation's Research Institute, and interviewed him. We publish G. Struempfig's replies to our correspondent's questions and also an article by Dr G. Esters, head of a department of the institute.

Question. What does the Friedrich Ebert Foundation represent and what is its mission?

Answer. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation is a socially useful private cultural establishment devoted to the ideas and basic values of democratic socialism. The foundation operates in the spirit of Friedrich Ebert, first president of the German Republic, and in accordance with whose bequest it was founded. The foundation's mission is the political and social education of the most varied people in a democratic spirit; the promotion of mutual understanding and partnership with developing countries; the encouragement with the aid of grants of particularly gifted students and young scientists with a capacity for scientific activity both from the FRG and from abroad; scientific research in our own establishments and assistance to foreign scientific establishments; encouragement of art and culture as elements of living democracy.

Question. In what main spheres does the Research Institute of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation operate and what is its structure?

Answer. Our institute works in three major fields: 1. History of the Workers Movement (Social and Modern History Department, Social Democracy Archives, the Social Democracy Library and Karl Marx House in Treves); 2. International Relations (the developing countries, foreign policy and study of the GDR); 3. Topical Economic and Sociopolitical Problems of the FRG (economic policy, study of manpower problems, foreign citizens in the FRG and policy in respect of them, the position of women and policy in this field). The institute has a staff of 180 approximately working in the FRG and abroad.

Question. Could you briefly describe the main areas of the work?

Answer. I shall attempt to do so. The Department of Social and Modern History studies the history of the SPD and the trade union movement. More general

subjects are not lost sight of here, however. The department staff endeavors to study political, organizational and ideological problems within a broad historical framework. It participates in the debate which has developed in the country in recent decades on questions of social and historical methodology.

It would take me too long to list the multitude of studies, the vast proportion of which appears, incidentally, in our series "Politics and Social History" (published by Neue Gesellschaft). I would like to mention merely that a number of works has been written in cooperation with other institutes or scholars working outside of the institute.

You might possibly be interested in this connection to know that the department is directing the preparation of an important publication whose purpose is to provide the complete history of the workers movement in Germany from the end of the 18th century through 1933. We have succeeded in enlisting as editors or authors four scholars of international renown. The first results of the study have been published in three volumes devoted to the Weimar Republic period.

The Social Democracy Archives continue the traditions of the social democracy archives which were founded by the emigres in Switzerland in the years when the special law against socialists was in effect (1878-1890). True, it has expanded considerably in volume and content since its reestablishment. The archives' mission is to collect and competently systematize and describe documents and material on German and international social history with particular emphasis on the history of the workers movement.

The archives collect material of the SPD Federal Board and its faction in the Bundestag and the parliaments of the federal lands and Berlin (West—Ed.). The affairs of other, not social democratic, organizations and establishments and also numerous photographs (approximately 500,000), leaflets and brochures, posters, films and video cassettes and also newspaper cuttings are concentrated therein.

The library has approximately 250,000 volumes. Its collection is made up of literature on the German and international workers movement and questions of the economic, social, political and cultural situation of the working class past and present. The library has a large quantity of primary sources and literature on the history of the Weimar Republic, the Kaiser empire and the early history of the workers movement. Mention should be made primarily among the primary sources of brochures published by organizations of the German workers movement. Periodical publications—journals, newspapers and minutes and reports of congresses—pertain here.

On 5 May 1968, the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx's birth, the house in which the founder of modern socialism was born, which had belonged to the SPD since 1928 (with a break in the Hitler times), was handed over to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Together with a historical and political museum a center for the historical and critical study of the works of Marx and Engels under the jurisdiction of the Research Institute has been created in this house. There is a specialized library here also. The restored Karl Marx House participates actively in national and international debates pertaining to the legacy of Marx and Engels and the socialist movement in the 19th century. It publishes its own series—"Works of Karl Marx House"—in which 36 studies have already appeared.

The Developing Countries Department is involved in study of topical economic and social problems of this group of states. The department aspires to help the community of the "third world" in the study of urgent problems and to promote the formulation of ways of solving them. Together with research establishments, parties, unions, management and other social forces, the mass media, for example, are partners in cooperation. Cooperation is practiced with approximately 20 countries of the "third world". Approximately 30 academic departments work abroad. The department publishes its own series, which appears in the FRG and overseas. It issues the quarterly journal PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION and the journal NEW SOCIETY, which appears bimonthly in Caracas (Venezuela).

The Department of Foreign Policy and Study of the GDR deals with problems of security and disarmament and the foreign policy of East European countries, including the GDR, elaborates problems of the security of the FRG, makes a scientific analysis of relations between the FRG and the GDR and organizes international conferences on questions of European security. It publishes the "GDR: Realities, Arguments" series.

The Economic Policy Department deals with an analysis, interpolation and assessment of new problems and long-term structural changes in the economy and on the labor market. Periods of a rapid growth in government authorities' demand for scientifically substantiated information and interest in advice on questions of employment, city planning and economic and infrastructural policy have alternated with periods when government regulation has been confined merely to the creation of a "propitious climate" for economic activity and the government authorities have had no need of prognostic information. The emphases in the content and subjects of the department's research have changed accordingly.

Whereas previously it was a question of ascertaining the causes of the employment crisis which arose in the 1970's and study of the level and structure of unemployment, at the center of attention today is the elaboration of more active, aggressive concepts in the sphere of economic policy and regulation of the labor market.

They are intended to provide recommendations on the ways of overcoming unemployment, adapting working hours, implementing technological policy and protecting the environment. The department is constantly putting out publications on these questions.

The Department for Study of Manpower Problems concentrates on three areas: the sociology of labor and industrial sociology; study of the unions; vocational education and improvement. Essentially, all these areas are connected with technological change and its impact on the labor process. For example, the department is now analyzing the socio-technical changes occurring at the enterprises. Numerous surveys are being conducted here whose purpose is to ascertain the contribution of various groups to the elaboration of a concept of regulation of the socio-technical changes. The proposals of firms' workers, engineers, work councils, middle management and the executives are being analyzed.

Originally the subject of study of the Department of Foreign Citizens in the FRG and Policy in Respect of Them was the economic and social position of foreign workers. Now the department is increasingly studying problems of the integration of second- and third-generation foreigners, that is, problems of their children. The main emphasis is put on study of the opportunities for vocational training and mastery of a trade. Particular attention is paid to the most deprived group in this respect—young foreign girls. In addition, the department constantly conducts representative surveys of the living conditions of foreigners in the FRG.

The Department of the Position of Women and Policy in this Sphere organizes national and international seminars and also the corresponding work among women with regard for the growing interest which they are displaying in political subjects. The political aspect of women's equality is studied in cooperation with political, scientific, journalist and union experts. The emphasis here is put not so much on a description and analysis of the difficult situation for women in the labor market as on proposals pertaining to a lessening of the current difficulties.

Question. What are the particular features of your institute compared with other research establishments?

Answer. If there is indeed some particular feature, it is that our institute addresses itself not only to the scientific community; it aspires also to contribute to social and political practice. For this reason we also publish, for example, together with conventional scholarly works short articles which expound the essence of a problem concisely and also popular material for a wide readership.

There are debates for us almost every day at conferences, seminars and other such sessions. For example, there were 120 such activities on the calendar for the past year.

We do not confine ourselves here to a national framework but seek out and maintain contacts with foreign establishments also. I would like in this connection to mention that our relations with Soviet organizations have strengthened particularly in recent years. We have long been involved in exchange with the corresponding history institutes, archives and libraries. In addition, fruitful contacts have been established with individual institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, particularly with the Africa Institute, with which we regularly conduct joint scientific conferences.

Question. Please name the most important publications of last year and also those planned for this year to which you attach particular significance.

Answer. As far as history is concerned, I would like to name our yearbook "Social History Archives". In 1987 its general theme was unemployment and partial employment, in 1988, technological changes and their influence on the labor market. In the sphere of international relations I would mention two works in preparation: "The FRG's Foreign Economic Policy Since the War" and "East-West Relations at a Turning Point".

Problems of a more general, theoretical nature are examined in the study "The Effectiveness of Neoclassical Theories of the Labor Market" (1987). The work "Influence of Wage Agreements on Employment," which will be out soon, would seem topical. Mention should also be made of our yearbook "Labor and Technology," which in 1987 was devoted to problems of the relationship between new equipment and policy in the field of labor relations and participation in management. The themes for 1988 are labor, the environment and employment.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

FRG Payments Surplus Conceals Potential Structural Problems

18160003g Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 69-72

[Article by G. Esters: "Structural Adaptation of the FRG Economy"]

[Text] Only brief periods may be distinguished in the history of the FRG when foreign economic problems were not at the center of public attention. The dynamics of the country's balance of trade surplus in recent years has been a cause of unconcealed joy. But simultaneously voices have been heard concerning the fact that the stability of the Deutschmark, achieved with such difficulty, could be in jeopardy on account of the unfavorable impact of fluctuations on the world market.

Fears in connection with an inflationary growth of prices are not unfounded. For many years the exchange rate of the Deutschmark has been artificially low. This has led to the emergence of a surplus balance of trade and payments on current transactions and an increase in the danger of a gradual reduction in the purchasing power of money. All this, in turn, has reawakened memories of the collapse of the financial system, which Germany has already experienced twice this century.

Fears have arisen also in connection with the decline in the international competitiveness of the FRG's products. The opinion that the palm in this sphere has passed to Asian countries of the Far East has become widespread. The world economy has become a kind of Olympics, in which the strongest win. It is easy to understand, therefore, what an increase there has been in the FRG in fear and apprehension caused by the growing pressure of formidable competitors on world markets.

Consequences of the Underpriced Exchange Rate

In the 1960's it was considered perfectly reasonable to maintain an artificially low Deutschmark exchange rate. We did not have to wait long for the consequences of this policy. The FRG's products were sold overseas at relatively low prices, which led to an expansion of overseas demand. The level of loaded industrial capacity in the country increased. An opportunity for the speedier buildup of production capacity presented itself. Under these conditions the mass attraction of foreign manpower to the country began. This process was thus a consequence of an incorrectly determined Deutschmark exchange rate. As a result changes appeared in the FRG whose significance goes far beyond the framework of the economy.

Had the Deutschmark been revalued at that time, the balance of trade surplus would have been less appreciable. Exports would not have developed as rapidly, and the increase in imports would have been more considerable. There would then have been no reason for the use of additional foreign manpower. From a long-term angle firms would have endeavored to have replaced the increased cost of labor by way of the active investment of the available capital, of which there was a relative surplus. There would have been an increase in the amounts of fixed capital, which would have created the prerequisites for the speedier growth of per capita income. But it hardly occurred to anyone at that time that the active importation of foreign manpower and all the social problems associated with this had been caused by the currency's exchange rate.

However, the economic consequences of the understated Deutschmark exchange rate were not confined to this. To stabilize exchange rates the Bundesbank was forced to purchase foreign currency. A period of an ever growing increase in West German capital investments overseas began. The net "claims on foreign countries" (that is, foreign currency reserves) were to perform roughly the

same function as an automobile's spare gas tank. But this is prudent only in certain amounts, and when they are exceeded, national prosperity is jeopardized.

A surplus trade and current payments balance is achieved by way of actual exports of commodities abroad, but in exchange for the acquisition of "claims on foreign countries". In this case the national private sector agrees to limit consumption or investments, and the public sector (via the Bundesbank) invests capital overseas. It is surprising that in the 1970's, under the conditions of bitter struggle for distribution of the social product, the said processes did not attract close attention. It is perfectly possible that they were seen as being positive since they had led to the formation of "currency reserves".

The longer the Deutschmark remained undervalued, the more difficult it was to implement structural changes in the economy. Gradually its export orientation became a burden, which, together with other factors, automatically, as it were, engendered a surplus trade and current payments balance and thereby limited the growth of national prosperity.

For imports the underpriced Deutschmark meant a kind of protectionist impost. Under these conditions foreign firms cannot assimilate the domestic market on a significant scale. Even then many local companies cease to be competitive. But this is revealed only upon revaluation of the national currency, which is what happened at the start of the 1970's with the Deutschmark. It was then established that there were many firms in the country which were not competitive on the international market.

What has been said testifies that the FRG had underestimated the impact of an artificially low exchange rate of the currency on the rate of growth of national prosperity and the possibilities of the national economy's adaptation to the new conditions of the world economy.

The revaluation of the national currency is by no means exhausted in the fact that exports decline, and imports grow. The change in the currency exchange rate is reflected not only in the balance of trade and payments. Far more important is the fact that there is a general change in the conditions for the profitable activity of individual sectors of the economy.

In production for export oriented toward the acquisition of components and services from overseas the possibilities of obtaining large profits grow appreciably inasmuch as imports become cheaper. There is also a considerable improvement in the positions of firms supplying products to the home market, but with a high proportion of imports. National firms' direct investments overseas become the more profitable, the greater the revaluation of the national currency. At the same time, however, representatives of the sectors whose possibilities of profit deteriorate begin to actively appeal to the public with

complaints about the consequences of the revaluation, wishing thereby to create the prerequisites for the adoption of protectionist measures in their support.

Thus the mechanism of currency exchange rates makes it possible to influence appreciably the profitability of the functioning of certain sectors of the economy and the efficiency of their adaptation to the new structure of the world market.

How diverse in this respect is the experience of individual industrial countries was ascertained at the end of the 1970's-start of the 1980's, when there was a significant revaluation of the American dollar and an appreciable devaluation of the Deutschmark and the Japanese yen. Japan's Central Bank deemed it necessary to permit a sharp devaluation of the national currency and reconcile itself to the growth of prices in the country brought about by the "increased cost" of imports in the hope that Japan's unions would not seek full wage compensation. The country was able to take advantage of this devaluation relatively rapidly to switch to an export offensive and thereby increase employment.

The FRG Bundesbank placed no particular hopes in the possibility of reaching an agreement on this issue with the unions and for this reason agreed to significant expenditure of foreign currency to slow the rate of devaluation of the Deutschmark. The Bundesbank is able via the currency exchange rates mechanism to contribute to an acceleration of the processes of structural reorganization of the economy, but can hold them back also. Flexible currency exchange rates enable it to determine the intensity of the national economy's adaptation to the new requirements.

New Priorities

Prior to the introduction of flexible exchange rates there had been no complete clarity in the FRG concerning the impact of exchange rates on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. Over a number of decades of fixed exchange rates the opinion that fiscal policy was very effective, but that monetary policy was appreciably inferior to it had taken shape. Given flexible exchange rates, the opposite picture was revealed: fiscal policy proved doomed to virtually total ineffectiveness, whereas monetary policy has acquired unprecedented efficacy (particularly for stabilizing the level of prices).

The change in the exchange rate posture led in the FRG to appreciable changes in the evaluation of the importance of the private and state sectors in the accumulation of national prosperity. Whereas at the time of fixed exchange rates it was believed that the decisive contribution to employment could and should be made by the state's economic policy, other priorities have now clearly come to light. This has been ascertained and confirmed in a short time by the behavior of the electorate, which,

given the high rate of unemployment, no longer regards the democratic and socialist parties as political forces capable of resolving the employment problem.

The "neoconservative" or "neoclassical" concept has begun to win the affections of the population. Its basic propositions are as follows: responsibility for the level of employment can be entrusted to the employers and the unions; the central bank should aspire to achieve price stability and maintain a particular currency exchange rate; the government exerts by its policy only the most general influence on economic development, contributing to the structural reorganization of the economy and the preservation of the necessary rate of national economic growth rate.

It would seem that West European social democratic and socialist parties have as yet adapted themselves insufficiently to the changes brought about by the switch from fixed to flexible currency exchange rates. The electorate perceives this as a lack of economic competence on the part of political parties of the left. In addition, right until most recently social democracy was putting the emphasis on economic reforms via government authorities, finding a natural ally in Keynesian theory.

Such an orientation enabled the conservatives to broaden their influence among the electorate considerably, although a known contribution of political parties of the left to social development has been struggle for a lessening of society's dependence on government authorities. After all, the liberal content of the "neoclassical concept" is far closer to the ideas of social democracy than appeared to certain of its leaders imbued with the ideas of Keynesianism. It will evidently take considerably longer for the theoretical notions of West European social democrats and socialists to be brought more into line with current realities.

Current Balance of Payments Surplus: 'Sign of Quality'

The current balance of payments surplus continues to cause exultation not only in the FRG but also in Japan and other states. It is believed that countries which have for a long time had a substantial surplus are able to produce highly competitive products. This indicator is frequently seen as a kind of "national economic sign of quality".

This idea proceeds from the fact that individual items of the current balance of payments may be isolated as independent items and that they may be actively influenced. Specifically, extensive use is made of various political actions which set as their goal an acceleration if only of the growth of exports as an important component of the current balance of payments. The prime ministers of individual FRG lands willingly travel abroad to advertise the products of their regions and have a positive impact on the overall climate of economic negotiations. It is believed that each order obtained from abroad

helps create jobs in the country. At first sight all this appears very convincing. Nonetheless, there is serious reason to doubt the soundness of this notion.

Classical theory substantiated back in the 1930's the impossibility of isolated influence on individual items of the current balance of payments. According to this theory, the leading role in the formation of the final result falls most probably to the balance of the movement of capital. Given the mobile international capital market and differing conditions for obtaining profit in individual countries, there is a constant outflow of capital from some country or the other overseas. This leads to the formation of a current balance of payments surplus. Under these conditions the appearance of a surplus in the migration of capital is no longer a positive "sign of quality," it points, on the contrary, rather to a threatening situation in a country's economy.

At first sight the need to limit the freedom of the international movement of capital would seem obvious. However, such measures may at best have a short-term or auxiliary effect. Measures geared to an improvement in the conditions for an increase in profit within a country would seem more successful in the long term. Only thanks to the combined use of such political and economic measures can the level of real income be raised. Then the export of capital will decline. There will be a reduction also in the current balance of payments surplus.

Debate is being conducted in the FRG currently on its place in the world economy. Comparisons of the levels of competitiveness, economic growth prospects and the economic policy of individual countries are being made. It is being revealed that states with an inefficient economic policy experience a constant threat of an outflow of capital to other countries. Whence the need for the elaboration for the FRG of a new concept of economic adaptation to the current system of the international division of labor.

The country's economic policy should be based on mechanisms of the freest possible regulation of economic processes taking into consideration the population's interest in a growth of income by way of increased productivity. In other words, the FRG's economic policy should be geared essentially to securing an economic growth rate which corresponds to society's basic requirements. Such a focus also creates general conditions conducive to economic activity. Flexible regulation of the commodity market and production factors facilitates structural reorganization. The possibilities of obtaining steady profits from investments increase, and the danger of large-scale exports of private capital diminishes.

Within the framework of such a concept foreign economic adaptation will not represent so insoluble a problem. The country has no need to resort to protectionist measures, and it will be able to leave to the developing countries the production which is most profitable there.

An effective solution of the problems of structural adaptation to the requirements of the world market is possible only when economic policy is geared to stable national economic growth based on an expansion of domestic demand.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

U.S. Presidential Election Prospects Assessed
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[Excerpt] 1. United States: From the Primaries to the Presidential Election

Local elections ("primaries") and party caucuses were completed in the United States in June. In the brief, but bitter skirmish of 13 contenders Vice President G. Bush and M. Dukakis, governor of the state of Massachusetts, became the Republican and Democratic party nominees. As always, the primaries provided a wealth of material for an analysis of the political situation in the country. What did the primaries show and what is the political character of the America of 1988?

It should be mentioned primarily that, despite the abundance of candidates and the nonparticipation in the struggle of the parties' official leaders, the primaries in fact ended long before the appointed time. For the Republicans they ended at the 8 March "superelections," when more than one-third of the delegates to the party conventions were elected on a single day, for the Democrats, at the end of April. Reality confounded forecasts predicting a long and stubborn fight right down to the party conventions. An "early warning" system, when the bulk of the delegates was elected in the initial period of the campaign and which had been created for the first time, came into play. In the battles of the start of the presidential marathon, which were as cramped as could be, particular significance was attached to the manifest advantage of G. Bush and M. Dukakis in terms of money and organization and their capacity for conducting a national campaign.

But something else was of importance also. America is in no hurry to awaken from the "golden sleep" of the Reagan years, look reality in the eye and embark on a solution of accumulated problems. People sense that the "Reagan holiday" has gone on too long, but are afraid of a leap into the unknown. The uncertainty of the electorate's positions and the desire for and fear of change made the primaries a minefield, where one wrong step could cancel out the results of many months' toil.

The early end to the primaries indicates that a process of consolidation of forces around the new figures is under way in both parties and that they are entering a post-Reagan era. The political portraits of the new leaders help us understand the nature of the changes taking place in American society. As distinct from J. Carter and R. Reagan—"outsiders" whose very appearance in the White House seemed an anomaly associated with the particular circumstances of the actual period—G. Bush and M. Dukakis are "natural" candidates representing the country's main ideological and political currents, which contend permanently between themselves in the struggle for power.

The nominations of G. Bush and M. Dukakis—moderate pragmatists gravitating toward the center—in whose positions there are more similarities than differences, indicate that there is a high degree of agreement in the country in the overall assessment of the situation. Opinion polls show that the bulk of the population is more or less satisfied with the present, but anxious about the future. It wishes to adjust the general direction of development, but without risky experiments.

The movement to the fore of G. Bush and M. Dukakis portends a stabilization of American political life on a center basis. In this year's election campaign they have been presenting themselves as pragmatists, and not ideologues aspiring to reform society. During the primaries they tried not so much to win over new voters as not to scare anyone off. Following such ideologically committed "amateur politicians" as J. Carter and R. Reagan, they are endeavoring to appear to the country as manager professionals geared to the solution of specific problems.

Of course, this assiduously created image of the main candidates does not smooth out the particular features of their political character. Among this year's Republican hopefuls, G. Bush was the most moderate, center-leaning candidate. His facile victory in the primaries indicates that the party has moved on considerably from the Reaganism of 1980 model. G. Bush's nomination means that moderate Republicans, who have for a long time vegetated in secondary roles, are taking control of the party.

Determining the precise position of M. Dukakis among the seven contenders who fought for the Democratic Party nomination is considerably more difficult. But, undoubtedly, in the main battle which developed in the Democrats' camp—the duel with J. Jackson—M. Dukakis represented the center of the party against the left wing. "He is beginning the presidential campaign far closer to the center than any Democrat since Kennedy," the NEW YORK TIMES affirmed. The correlation of forces within the party (the percentage of the vote cast for M. Dukakis—43—is appreciably less than his share of convention delegates) and the awkward rivalry-cooperation relations taking shape between M. Dukakis and J. Jackson indicate that the Democrats have yet to

overcome the ideological and political disorder of the 1980's. An intensive search for its own character and the formulation of a strategy for the future are under way in the party.

The rapid culmination of the primaries struggle meant that this year the duel of the two main contenders began exceptionally early and will have dragged on for 6 months. Long before the end of the primaries they had switched fronts abruptly, rallying the party ranks and taking aim at one another. It was necessary following the bloody fratricidal struggle to ensure the strong unity and active support of the whole party in the presidential election. Although it might have seemed that, owing to a number of factors (the lightning convincing victory in the primaries, the support of a very popular president and the not-that-wide and relatively homogeneous social base), tackling this task would have been far easier for G. Bush, this has not proven to be the case in reality. The party's right wing, which has always viewed him with mistrust, is deeply hurt that the Reagan inheritance is slipping through its hands. For his part, G. Bush can do little to appease the right without running the risk of alienating the center electorate. But to win he needs the active support of conservative Republicans. In conversation with the vice president his very experienced predecessor, R. Nixon, formulated the conditions of the task as follows: "B. Goldwater showed that it is impossible to win by relying only on conservatives. But I know from personal experience that you cannot win without them either."

At the same time, on the other hand, M. Dukakis managed without any particular effort to conclude a mutually profitable deal with J. Jackson. The latter is 47 years old, he has time. He made a big surge forward in the 1988 primaries. The success, which yesterday seemed an impossible dream for a black American, is kindling his ambition and calling for responsibility. He has become a pillar of the Democratic Party, and his fate will be inseparably tied to it in the foreseeable future. Without putting party unity in jeopardy, he is squeezing from the party leadership the maximum in the way of concessions for his supporters. In turn, counting on M. Dukakis adjusting government policy appreciably in the desired direction, J. Jackson's mass base will evidently actively support the former at the elections.

The formation of strong party groupings on the right and left edges of the American political spectrum puts certain limits on the Republicans' and Democrats' drift toward the center. To judge by everything, the country's two main parties will in the foreseeable future preserve the allocation of roles which crystallized out in the turbulent collisions of the 1960's-1970's: the Democrats will remain the party of liberal reforms, the Republicans, the banner of economic and social conservatism.

Having secured their nomination, G. Bush and M. Dukakis immediately embarked on the search for a vice presidential running mate. American political pundits

and the media usually stress the necessity for victory of a regionally balanced tandem of the presidential and vice presidential candidates representing different parts of the country. To a certain extent this is true, but the significance of the vice president's regional affiliation should not be exaggerated. An analysis of presidential elections shows that various regions (the Northeast, Mid-West, West and South) do not act as a single whole, and even less are the positions of the corresponding states determined by who the vice presidential candidates are. In this respect the most that a vice presidential candidate can secure is the support of his own state, and then not always.

Something else is of far more importance. The choice of running mate is the first responsible political decision of the future president. Many demands are made of the second person in the country: he must make a significant contribution to the victory at the upcoming election, help in running the country and be ready, if need be, to take over as president. He is intended to emphasize the strong aspects of the president and compensate for his weaknesses. This is simultaneously a signal to the electorate of the kind of ideological and political coloration which the presidential candidate wishes to add to his image which has taken shape in the mass mind. The voters evaluate by the choice that is made the depth and soundness of the presidential candidates' judgments.

Each candidate has his problems here. There is in the public mind a fixed stereotype of the Republicans as the party of the rich, and they are constantly trying to show that this is not so. An important ingredient of the party's success at elections is the selection of candidates who do not evoke unpleasant associations with society's privileged elite. It is no accident that all three Republican presidents since the war (D. Eisenhower, R. Nixon and R. Reagan) grew up in families of modest means and that two of them (D. Eisenhower and R. Reagan) joined the party when they were more than mature. Although Bush is not a multimillionaire, he is perceived as coming from the East Coast elite, before whom wealth and family connections have opened all doors, which is by no means a virtue in the eyes of Americans. The perception of the vice president's close ties to the world of big money is reinforced by the fact that he is identified with an administration which openly defends the interests of the rich. G. Bush has by astute choice of partner to ease the suspicion that he would continue the same policy.

M. Dukakis' "Achilles' heel" is his reputation as a liberal, which his political opponents are trying to create for him in every possible way, knowing that a liberal democrat from the Northeast cannot be elected the country's president. There is much that is working for this image—a Harvard graduate, governor of the most liberal state and a person close to the Kennedy clan. True, he did not appear as a liberal in the primaries inasmuch as his principal opponent was J. Jackson. But in the duel with G. Bush it will be difficult for him to

preserve his reputation as a moderate. Another weak spot of M. Dukakis, which his running mate could conceal, is his lack of experience at the federal level.

As always, a central event of the election campaign were the party conventions. The Democratic Convention, which took place from 18 through 21 July in Atlanta, capital of the state of Georgia, turned into a demonstration of party unity. Having acquired a taste for power, the Democrats forgot their old divisions for a while. At a price of concessions on secondary issues, the new party leader obtained the full support of the left wing. It was essential for the Democratic candidate to reliably cover his left flank since he had clearly moved toward the center. Specifically, this was manifested in the choice of running mate. It was the conservative democrat from Texas, Sen L. Bentsen.

M. Dukakis confirmed by this choice his reputation as a sober, shrewd politician. Since the state of Texas showed up in America, in 1845, no democrat has managed to win the White House without having won the former. The country's third most populous state, Texas is too big and diverse to be the monopoly of one party. Its 29 Electoral College votes could tip the scales either way, and a real race for them is on this year.

In the spring, when the presidential candidates were determined, it seemed that the Democrats would have to resign themselves to losing Texas. R. Reagan had won the state with large majorities in 1980 and 1984. G. Bush's political career began here, and he has strong ties to the local bigshots. It is with good reason that he is called Texas' "favorite son," while he calls the state his second home. In having resolved to fight the vice president in his citadel the Democratic candidate could not have chosen a better ally than L. Bentsen.

Since 1970 he has three times been elected to the Senate from Texas. At the 1976 election he received 57 percent of the vote, at the 1982 election, 58.6 percent. By American yardsticks this means that the wins were lopsided. The senator's almost automatic reelection is secured by the "Bentsen machine," a highly efficient organization which garners votes over the vast territory of the state. Inasmuch as Texas has a special law permitting a person to run simultaneously for the Senate and for vice president, this year the "Bentsen machine" will pull the whole Democratic team. Well lubricated by the money of the oil industrialists, it could steal the state from under the Republicans' nose. The more so in that the "second home" has three times turned its back on its "favorite son": at the 1964 and 1970 Senate elections and in the 1980 primary. The situation is lent added piquancy by the fact that at the 1970 Senate election G. Bush was defeated by L. Bentsen. Regardless of the outcome, the difficult battle in Texas will tie down the Republicans' forces and limit their freedom of maneuver.

The alliance of the Massachusetts governor and the Texas senator, repeating the 1960 winning combination of J. Kennedy and L. Johnson, synthesizes the Democrats' strategy in the presidential campaign. It is spearheaded at the South, primarily the neighboring states of Oklahoma, Louisiana and Arkansas. At the focus of attention is the conservative white population of the region, which in the past two decades has turned its back on the Democrats, for which it had voted from generation to generation. Known for his conservatism, L. Bentsen is called upon to bring back the "prodigal sons" of the South to the ancestral home. By casting doubt on M. Dukakis' liberal reputation he will help him pull over to his side conservative Democrats in other regions also.

The particular interest in the giant of the American South and the choice of a conservative Democrat indicate that the Democrats are concentrating their efforts on the country's biggest states—Texas, California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan and Ohio—which could provide more than half the votes necessary for victory. These are "swing" states, they lean toward the Republicans, but could vote for the Democrats also. Any winning coalition has to include some of the big "soft Republican" states.

M. Dukakis needs L. Bentsen not only to attract particular categories of voters. The senator serves as an assurance of the governor's political maturity in the eyes of the ruling elite. A former businessman, multimillionaire and their man in the world of big capital, L. Bentsen is called upon to prevent a Democratic administration's strong tilt toward working America. Big business awaits the impending elections with trepidation inasmuch as the "Reagan revolution" laid bare the power of money.

In order not to show their hand prematurely the Democrats made their party platform as brief and vague as possible. Inasmuch as the election of their candidate would in itself mean change, they have tried to gloss over the differences with the Republicans. They proceed from the fact that much in Reagan's policy has firmly become a part of practice and is essential. "It is a fact that Reagan has won," Congressman T. Coelho summed up the convention. "We are fighting on his ground."

The Republicans assembled for their convention almost a month later than the Democrats (15-18 August, New Orleans) and in building their strategy took account of the actions of the adversary. Specifically, G. Bush was guided in his choice of running mate by considerations quite different from those of M. Dukakis. These did not amount to an endeavor to enter on the credit side a fluctuating state. Since the war Indiana has always voted at the presidential elections for the Republicans, other than in 1964, when the party, having nominated as its candidate the rightwing extremist B. Goldwater, suffered a crushing defeat. They were not a desire to obtain a sizable package of votes; the state's share of the Electoral College is small—12 seats. They were not a search for the key to the entire region: Indiana could in no way be

called the flagship of the Mid-West. They were not a need to diversify his political palette: the little-known senator would hardly add striking colors to the familiar portrait of the vice president.

The reason for the surprise choice of the Republicans' candidate, which took many people aback, lay elsewhere. It was an attempt to kill two birds with one stone. In adopting as his running mate (and probable successor) a convinced conservative, the vice president gave the right hope of a restoration of its positions within the party. At the same time, on the other hand, he appealed to the huge masses of voters insufficiently involved in the political process. D. Quayle is 41 years old, this says a great deal. The Republicans have put up against the veteran L. Bentsen a young player personifying the future of the party and the country. They wish to fill in the yawning gaps in the election campaign, which were pointed out by the well-known polling specialist P. Caddell, who summed up the primaries: "What we have now is a quasi-election with a quasi-agenda. There is no talk of the future."

In moving to the forefront the 41-year-old senator, the Republicans are appealing to the 1946-1964 "baby boom" generation, which has become the backbone of American society. Lacking firm party affiliation, the 75 million Americans born in these years are a force capable not only of deciding the outcome of all elections but also of determining the direction of the country's political development for many years to come. But, like the unbroken mustang, they are stubbornly unwilling to accept a party harness. True, in the 1980's the Republicans have managed to establish themselves as the party of young people, including considerable numbers of the "baby boom" generation. In 1980 some 39 percent of the United States' white population aged 18-29 supported the Democrats, 22 percent, the Republicans, in 1984 the figures were 30 and 39 percent respectively. In 1987 voters aged 17-24 clearly preferred the Republican Party to the Democratic Party (46 and 37 percent). The Republicans are trying in every way possible to develop and consolidate their success among the young people inasmuch as the prospects of their becoming the country's leading party depend on this. The 1988 presidential election is practically the first opportunity for the postwar generation to make itself heard at the top of its voice. Its very successful representative D. Quayle is called upon to impress upon his peers the fact that their future is firmly linked with the Republican Party.

Party cohesion, choice of running mate, the creation of the candidate's appropriate image are merely a weapon in the struggle for the White House. The contenders' possibilities of victory will be determined primarily by the extent to which the Republicans can hold together the broad election coalition created by R. Reagan. Clearly, they will not succeed in holding it together entirely, but accurately determining the scale of the losses is impossible. At the same time, however, certain assumptions may be made.

It should be noted first of all that, as the 1986 mid-term elections showed, R. Reagan is not capable of "handing over" to anyone his great personal popularity, and it will hardly help his party at the elections.

At the 1984 presidential election R. Reagan secured 54.455 million votes, W. Mondale, 37.577 million. The Republicans' almost 17 million majority came about thanks to two components: approximately 60 percent came from Democratic crossover votes, the rest, from independent voters, two-thirds of whom voted for the President. Accordingly, this year the Democrats' strategic task is to restore their supporters and level the correlation of forces among the independent voters, which could give them more than 10 million new votes.

This is a difficult task. The point being that as of the latter half of the 1960's the Democrats have lost the presidential majority. From 1932 through 1964 the broad election coalition created by F. Roosevelt enabled them to gain 7 out of 9 presidential election victories. From 1968 through 1984 they were successful only one time out of five. At the presidential elections of this period the Republicans obtained on average 53 percent of the vote, Democrats, 42 percent. An alliance of Western states and the states of the South which have crossed over to them, which altogether (excluding Minnesota and Hawaii, which support the Democrats) account for 290 Electoral College votes, that is, 20 more than are needed for victory, has become the strategic base of the Republican presidential majority. An entire block of states regularly voting for Republican presidential candidates has taken shape. Twentythree states, which will this fall elect 202 electors, have voted for the Republicans five times in succession. For the Democrats such constancy distinguishes only the federal District of Columbia, which has three Electoral College votes. Two hundred and two against 3. The theory that the Republicans have a "lock" on the Electoral College was born and has become widespread on this basis. And the Democrats could in the foreseeable future force their way into the White House only given an exceptionally favorable concatenation of circumstances.

One further circumstance needs to be mentioned. As is known, in America the president is elected not by direct ballot but with the aid of an electoral college representing all states of the country. In the college the states with a small population enjoy a particular advantage. Thus in 1984 the election of a single elector in Alaska took 33,000 votes, in California, 100,000. Inasmuch as the Republicans are particularly strong in the states with a small population, the Electoral College gives them a head start. According to the calculations of the American political scientist S. Rosenstone, the Democrats need for victory approximately 52 percent of the vote.

In order to create such an army they must make skillful use of the enemy's weaknesses. The prosperous facade of Reagan's America conceals many problems. The mood of the electorate reflects a growing disenchantment with

Reaganism, with Reaganomics primarily. It is born of both objective and subjective factors. In 1987 the growth rate of the population's real income—a key indicator from the viewpoint of the electorate's attitude toward the ruling party—had declined more than threefold to 1.2 percent. It will hardly be much higher this year.

The "Reagan revolution" has led to an appreciable redistribution of national income in favor of the well-to-do strata of the population. According to official data, from 1979 through 1986 average family income grew by \$1,000 to \$34,924 (with regard for the increase in prices). This slow (less than 0.5 percent per annum) growth conceals a process of the socioeconomic polarization of society and an increase in the gap between top and bottom. Whereas the income of the upper 20 percent of families increased from \$70,260 to \$76,300, that of the bottom 20 percent of families declined from \$8,761 to \$8,033.

The proportion of blacks, Hispanics and other minorities, which are discriminated against, is inordinately great among the destitute population. A report of the highly representative commission with the name "One-Third of the Nation" published this May says: "In education and employment, in terms of the level of income, state of health, life expectancy and other basic indicators of personal and social well-being there is a gap, expanding in some cases, between the representatives of minorities and the majority population." They actively supported J. Jackson in the primaries and will vote for M. Dukakis in November.

Women are another weak component of the Republicans' electoral base. In the 1980's they have become an independent force in American politics. From the very outset Reaganism encountered the stubborn resistance of the "weaker sex". Largely as a consequence of women's opposition the Republicans have been unable to become the majority party. The difference between administration policy and the hopes and aspirations of American women has been too great. Polls show that on all the main issues of national life women are considerably more liberal than men: they support government regulation of the economy, increased social spending, measures to protect citizens' health and safety and a peaceable foreign policy.

In this year's election campaign women's preferences are for the Democrats. Whereas no candidate has a clear preponderance among men, among women M. Dukakis is ahead of his rival by 20 points on average. The gap is particularly large among working women and specialists with higher education, that is, among those who are more active at the elections. Constituting approximately 55 percent of the electorate, women could prove very awkward for the Republicans.

G. Bush has other points of support—people with an income in excess of \$40,000 a year, white Protestants, fundamentalists particularly, the South and young people.

If we abstract ourselves from individual voter categories, the main battlefield unfolding between G. Bush and M. Dukakis is the American "middle class". This vague concept unites huge masses of the working population living on their wages. Reaganomics has intensified the differences in this sphere and led to its internal differentiation. For example, in the 1970's a 30-year-old specialist with higher education earned 15-20 percent more than his worker coeval. This gap has now increased to 49 percent. In the past 2 years workers' wages have not been keeping up with inflation. At the same time, on the other hand, their contributions to a variety of social funds—hospital, pension and so forth—have been increasing. The growing strain on the family budget is causing disgruntlement among workers. In 1980 and 1984 many workers who had traditionally been supporters of the Democrats voted for R. Reagan. This year they will obviously not vote for G. Bush.

Following a long interval, it is not only workers who are returning to the Democrats. A very representative poll conducted by the Gallop service showed that the Democrats are no inferior to the Republicans in terms of degree of cohesion. This is a considerable achievement for a party known for its internal discord. Inasmuch as there are about 10 percent more Democrats, their newfound unity affords them a considerable advantage. In this situation decisive significance will be attached to the votes of the independent voters constituting approximately one-fourth of the electorate.

The demarcation in respect of Reaganism has not only run along social and ideological-political lines. The administration's economic policy has intensified the differences at the level of the well-being of individual regions. Whereas the Atlantic and Pacific states have grown wealthier, the central, southern and southwest states have been running in place or have lost ground.

Of course, the fruits of Reaganomics have reached more than just the 20 percent wealthiest families. The stabilization of the economy has been in the interests of the whole of society. The bulk of the population is living better than 8 years ago. But the social and psychological effect of the lengthy economic upturn is far weaker than it was in the past. For example, the voters who believe that their financial position has not changed either for better or worse are usually inclined to vote for the president's party. But a poll conducted by CBS this May showed that among this category (half of the registered electorate, the backbone of the "middle class") M. Dukakis was ahead of G. Bush in a ratio of 52 to 34 percent, that is, by more even than the average for the country.

The solution of this phenomenon could explain much in the political situation in the country. A most important socio-psychological change of the Reagan period has been the fact that government activity is not perceived in the public mind as the basis of the functioning of the economy. At the same time, on the other hand, under the

conditions of lengthy economic upturn many people, those with a high income particularly, take favorable conditions for granted. In addition, the stabilization of the economy has moved to the forefront a whole set of social problems—drug addiction, growing social inequality, poverty, race relations, housing, health care, education, environmental protection. In these spheres the results of the activity of the Reagan administration would seem at least dubious.

The positive evaluations of the present state of the economy do not mean that people believe that all is as it should be here. There is growing disquiet in the country in connection with the future consequence of the enormous national debt, the influx of foreign commodities and foreigners' purchases of American property. A poll conducted by CBS this February showed that for the first time throughout the Reagan administration's term in office people are more pessimistic about the future than the past and present. The feeling of potential danger has assumed a general nature and become widespread. At the present time more than 60 percent of Americans believe that the country is headed in the wrong direction. Emphasizing the significance of the theme of the future at the forthcoming elections, the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT wrote: "Today we are eating well, but cannot sleep easy. We are haunted by a nightmare vision of our children's tainted future in a decayed America. This widespread feeling affords Dukakis his opportunity."

A reason for the formation of so large a gap between objective reality and its perception in the public mind is the government's moral turpitude. A long train of scandals and exposures stretches out after the administration. They have broken all records in the postwar period in this respect. For this reason the Iran-Contra business is potentially far more dangerous than might have been thought on the basis of the affair itself. The increased public attention to this scandal could evoke very unpleasant associations in the minds of the American electorate.

In this year's election campaign foreign policy issues have receded far into the background. In all polls foreign policy subjects are confined to a list of the most important problems confronting the country. The muffling of the sound of international topics in the election campaign does not mean that Americans are losing interest in the outside world. Rather the opposite. National polls regularly conducted by the Chicago Council for International Relations show that in the 1980's there has been slowly, but surely, a growth of interest in the United States' relations with other states.

At the center of Americans' foreign policy interests are, naturally, problems of national security. The basic tendencies of the mass consciousness in this field, which took shape in the first decade after the war, remain unchanged. They represent a contradictory combination

of emphasis of military power, nuclear weapons particularly, and an aspiration to curb the arms race. Within the framework of this dualist approach the emphasis shifts sometimes toward the one, sometimes toward the other, depending on circumstances.

According to polls of the Gallup service, in 1982 some 40 percent of Americans believed that the Soviet nuclear arsenal was stronger than the American arsenal, and 17 percent, the contrary, in 1987, some 26 and 28 percent respectively. Having rid themselves of the military inferiority complex, they have no wish to throw money to the wind. Numerous opinion polls show that approximately 80 percent of Americans advocates a reduction in the military budget or its freeze at the present level. In the Reagan period the problem of military spending has clearly assumed a party coloration. And as distinct from the 1950's-start of the 1960's, what is more, in the 1980's the Republicans have been campaigning for an increase in the military budget, the Democrats, for a reduction.

In the choice of means for ensuring national security a most important part is played by the "image" of the USSR which exists in the public mind.

There has been a considerable improvement recently in the attitude toward the Soviet Union under the influence of the Soviet foreign policy initiatives and the new style of Soviet diplomacy. According to a poll conducted by CBS, in the past 3 years some 44 percent of Americans have begun to see the USSR in a more favorable light, and only 5 percent, in a less favorable light. It is not surprising that a majority of Americans is once again in favor of cooperation with the USSR on a broad range of problems.

Recognition of the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war has contributed to the reorientation toward political means of ensuring national security. The peace movement has made a considerable contribution. The change in the system of national priorities in support of a variety of social programs has been a powerful stimulus.

Finally, the idea of the foundations of national security has changed. A representative poll commissioned by the Institute of World Politics conducted at the end of last year showed that the majority of Americans see as guarantees of the country's strong position in the modern world a strong economy, domestic cohesion and high moral attributes, and not military power.

In this year's election campaign the Republicans and Democrats are emphasizing and developing different aspects of foreign policy intentions. The Republicans see as the main guarantee of lasting peace American military power. The Democrats are paying considerably more attention to the economic and political aspects of ensuring national security.¹

Whether it be a question of domestic or foreign policy, Americans sense that an entire period in the country's political life is coming to an end. A new one, whose essential characteristics are still very uncertain, is beginning. The Reagan presidency has clearly marked the boundaries of the "conservative revolution". In what direction and how vigorously movement away from these boundaries will be will depend on the election of G. Bush or M. Dukakis.

For this reason the past—primarily the positive results of the present administration's activity—are not of decisive significance in the voters' eyes. The main criterion is something else—the capacity of this candidate or the other for tackling the problems of the America of the 1990's. At this point Americans believe that the Democrats are better prepared for the new agenda. Responding to the question of which party would be more effective in tackling the country's most important problems, 40 percent cited the Democrats, and only 29 percent, the Republicans. The Democrats have not had such an advantage since 1980, when this question was asked for the first time. The restored reputation of the "party for everyone" which has a better understanding of the needs and aspirations of the "ordinary individual" is helping the Democrats. Working for them also is the strengthening belief in society that it is essential to extend the government's field of activity for a solution of the accumulated problems.

The candidate's party affiliation is just one element of the voter's assessment. And its significance, moreover, has declined appreciably in recent decades. On the other hand, there has been a pronounced increase in the role of another factor—the candidate's personal attributes. The advantage here lies with Dukakis. The voters believe that G. Bush has more experience than M. Dukakis. As far as such characteristics as concern for people and a capacity for adopting difficult and unpopular decisions, resisting special-interest groups and remaining cool under the conditions of a serious international crisis, in greater or lesser numbers they prefer M. Dukakis.

There are certain grounds for such an assessment. In the past 20 years G. Bush has not won a single election campaign. His entire service record in this time has consisted of political appointments. The facile victory in the primaries has not allowed him to show himself in action. Although those who know him describe the vice president as a good man and experienced politician, he lacks spontaneity in dealing with the public and on television and perpetrates flagrant gaffes from time to time. At the same time, on the other hand, M. Dukakis was able to recover from the heavy defeat sustained at the 1978 elections and to win two victories in a row. Far from everyone considers him an inspiring candidate, but he gives an impression of composure and confidence in his abilities.

The "average American's" contradictory attitude toward R. Reagan is manifested in a certain preconception in

the assessments of the candidates: the President is considerably more popular than his policies. There is evidently in the public mind a kind of "substitution reaction": unhappiness with the head of the White House is being projected onto G. Bush. The lowered assessment of his possibilities is the obverse of the President's great popularity, and the irritation intended for his boss is being vented against the former.

The voters' perception of the candidates could change in the course of the fall campaign. But changing it is difficult once it has taken shape, for G. Bush particularly. Like many vice presidents before him, he has vegetated in the shadow of his boss, who has been accustomed to be the center of attention. Bush has a difficult task: showing himself to be a strong political leader, but in such a way as not to alienate the fervent supporters of the President.

Summing up, it may be said that on the side of the Republicans is the objective state of affairs in the country as of the present time, on the side of the Democrats, the fears and hopes of the electorate. The complexity and contradictoriness of the present political situation portend a stubborn struggle. Many leading political pundits in the United States believe that victory in November will be won with a small, perhaps minimal, majority. In a search for analogies with the present situation they are frequently turning to the election campaign of 1960, when the main contenders were the Republican Vice President R. Nixon and the Democratic senator J. Kennedy. As is known, the winner at that time by a negligible majority was J. Kennedy.

Footnote

1. For more detail on the foreign policy views of G. Bush and M. Dukakis see MEMO Nos 2, 5, 1988.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

A Post-Nuclear World Could Prove Unstable
18160003i Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHUDNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 121-122

[Letter from I.O. Polyakov: "Would a Post-Nuclear World Be Stable?"]

[Text] Dear Comrade Editor,

This note is most likely the result of perplexity, for which our press is partly to blame. It is hard to believe that no one has studied the simple mechanism of strategic instability at issue. However, in the domestic literature available to me there are not the least signs of doubt as to the incontestable beneficence of immediate and complete nuclear disarmament. This letter is for me the sole

possibility of ascertaining the true state of affairs. I hope that this brief note indicating the main flaws of the arguments which have been adduced will not burden your advisers unduly.

Examined below is an aspect of the problem, which has become topical recently, of the conclusive elimination of nuclear weapons. There is reason to believe, evidently, that a simplistic interpretation of the nuclear disarmament concept admits of criticism, whose possible arguments should be either taken into consideration or refuted. Decisions in this sphere should exclude all versions of a development of events which would mean a destabilization of the world situation. This is an essential and very strong requirement. The numerous merits of a specific plan of disarmament are meaningless if, given its realization, there arises the possibility if only of a single scenario of a victorious war being unleashed.

Such a possibility could arise given achievement of the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. We would note that we have in mind genuine disarmament backed up by the proper verification. A switch under these conditions to the rebuilding of nuclear potential and its use would afford an aggressor decisive advantages.

We would point to circumstances confirming the justice of this claim. A most precise plan of the rebuilding of nuclear arms is possible for an aggressor. The vast experience of foregoing development would spare him the uncertainty and lack of confidence of the first years of the nuclear era. The use of newly acquired nuclear potential against an enemy's most important targets (the bombing of nuclear industry enterprises, space-flight centers and so forth) would ensure victory in a race for restoration of nuclear power, even if the other side had time to react. Attempts at resistance on the part of conventional armed forces under the conditions of an enemy's rapidly growing nuclear power would be hopeless. We would note that the existence of a developed monitoring system created for the purpose of disarmament and the exhaustive information obtained thereby would be conducive to the success of the attacking side. Also important is the fact that the use of nuclear weapons could be kept to the minimum necessary for preventing restoration of the opposite side's nuclear potential. That is, there would be a real possibility of a truly limited victorious nuclear war not involving an inevitable ecological catastrophe.

International supervision is not an insurmountable obstacle for a possible aggressor. A far more important goal than achieving the secrecy of operations would appear to be the securing of a maximum rate of deployment of nuclear weapons and the exclusion of pauses in the engineering processes of the production of munitions and their immediate use against the facilities of an enemy participating or capable of participating in a race to rebuild nuclear potentials.

The strategic situation of a post-nuclear world would incite preventive actions as the sole possibility of avoiding defeat. Analogous strategic instability is known from study of the consequences of deployment of broad-based ABM systems.

Let us formulate the main conclusions:

A post-nuclear world would be unstable since victory in a new round of the nuclear arms race could secure for an aggressor decisive military advantages. In addition, for some parties to the agreement general and complete nuclear disarmament could be merely a component of a plan whose ultimate goal is the achievement of victory on the battlefield.

A truly stable nuclear-free world is possible given an appreciable limitation of the sovereignty of all states without exception and given the existence of an effective international body, a world government, possibly, capable of actually limiting the actions of national governments in their own countries.

What follows from the said arguments?

At the present time, when all countries of the world react very painfully to any encroachments on their sovereignty, the tenable political goal may be not conclusive nuclear disarmament but the creation of the most stable, "impasse" strategic situation. This may evidently be achieved by the creation of symmetrical forces with a simple structure and reduced counterforce possibilities.

The minimum scale of such forces is determined on the one hand by the maximum quantity of nuclear weapons concealable from inspection and, on the other, the maximum possibilities of the creation of new arms upon one party's sudden withdrawal from the limitations mode, until such an act is detected. Obviously, the size of such forces is the less, the more effective the supervision. It is no less obvious that the necessary quantity would constitute a very small proportion of modern arsenals, and the simplification of the mission and the reduced demands on the combat readiness of the nuclear forces would make it possible to ensure far sounder guarantees than at the present time against the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

Conclusive nuclear disarmament is a task of the more distant future and is connected with a radical change in the political structure of the world.

Thanks in anticipation,

I.O. Polyakov (Chernovtsy).

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

Conventional Should Accompany Nuclear Arms Limitation

18160003j Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 122-124

[Article by Anatoliy Viktorovich Rassadin, senior research fellow of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO: "There Are Grounds for Cautious Optimism"]

[Text] Responding to this interesting letter, it should be mentioned right away that the problem raised by the author is extremely complex in both the practical and theoretical planes. It is essentially a question of the extent to which a "breach" in the settled political thinking confined to the traditional idea of "nuclear deterrence" is possible. The main argument of the supporters of this concept is a world without global military cataclysms achieved as a result of a "stalemate" strategic situation associated with the appearance and buildup of the potential of nuclear weapons. The acquisition by the United States and the USSR of the possibility of assured mutual annihilation serves, it is believed, virtually as the sole and principal obstacle to any possible aggression within the framework of East-West relations.

It would seem that the total denial of the "contribution" of nuclear weapons and strategic parity between the USSR and the United States to the current stability at the strategic level would be wrong. Wrong since this development of the military-strategic situation has been dictated by its logic and the conscious use and upgrading of the nuclear component for the purpose of preventing the possibility of one side's acquisition of military superiority. A paradoxical situation wherein the assignment of guarantor of peace has been entrusted to a most dangerous source of the arms race has taken shape. With the growth of its destructive potential and the appearance under the influence of the S&T revolution of real possibilities of a destabilization of the situation and also in line with the sober recognition of all the possible consequences of a nuclear catastrophe has come also an understanding of the utter futility of the search for security in this direction. Thus the "nuclear deterrence" concept has entered into insoluble contradiction with military-engineering development even.

It is important, it would seem, for an understanding of the current situation to ask the following question: what is the ultimate goal of policy and of which processes of world development is it a sum total?

If it continues to reflect the stereotypes of the long period of confrontation, when the rule in relations between states was the use of power pressure and when the competition of the two social systems has developed primarily into dangerous military rivalry, in this case the

"nuclear deterrence" concept could, like any other security concept in the past built on the permissibility of the use of military force, continue to be of significance for some time to come, right up to the ultimately inevitable fatal finale.

If, on the other hand, the modern world is seen in all its most intricate relationships and dependencies which have encompassed practically all spheres of human activity, it becomes clear that the endeavor to entrust only to military power and its most destructive nuclear component the role of "stabilizer" of the entire system of international relations is quite a hopeless exercise. For this reason, as practice shows, ever increasing significance in the solution of current problems of world development is attached to political and economic methods of the settlement of contentious issues.

In studying the purely military aspect of the balance of forces and the impact thereon of the disarmament process in the strategic arms sphere we should emphasize once again the extreme importance of the questions enumerated by the author inasmuch as the problem of the creation of a nuclear-free world is in fact appropriate for the building of a new all-embracing system of international security, without which nuclear disarmament is hardly practicable. This will undoubtedly be a lengthy process, and an acceleration of its ultimate solution without the creation of the appropriate conditions can hardly be considered possible. This means primarily that together with the destruction of the stockpiled weapons of this type the creation of a permanent international mechanism of collective responsibility for the cause of peace qualitatively superior in terms of the dependability of guarantees to all that has existed hitherto is contemplated. For this reason it is perfectly obvious that, guided by the principle of equal security, agreeing to the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons only of the USSR and the United States is not possible. The other nuclear powers also will at a particular stage have to join in the negotiations. The elaboration of additional specific measures to step up verification of compliance with the practice of nuclear nonproliferation, whose significance increases sharply as the denuclearization process in the military sphere develops, will be essential also.

Much attention is paid perfectly justifiably in Comrade Polyakov's arguments to a most important component ensuring compliance with the agreements which have been reached both directly in the process of the elimination of the weapons and in the subsequent period—verification measures. The Soviet-American INF Treaty demonstrates convincingly enough the parties' confidence in the possibility and effectiveness of such verification not only of the destruction of available weapons but also, which it is very important to note in connection with the misgivings of the author of the letter, directly of the industrial facilities capable of creating such systems. It should be stressed that the formula of verification involving on-site inspection which was worked out at the negotiations affords extensive opportunities for the

refinement and development of such measures. This will undoubtedly be necessary as the entire process of disarmament becomes more complex and expands geographically.

As far as the author's proposition concerning the appearance of a "real possibility of a truly limited, victorious nuclear war not involving inevitable ecological catastrophe" is concerned, it is, in my view, inapplicable both at the present time and in the future not only in respect of this hypothetical "limited nuclear war" but also under the conditions of more or less large-scale military operations on the territory of highly developed countries with the use of conventional arms even. For example, it has been fully proved that fighting a war with "conventional weapons" in Europe, considering the inevitable destruction of nuclear power stations, chemical enterprises, dams and so forth, would in fact be just as ecologically unacceptable as with the use of nuclear weapons.

Nor should it be forgotten that progress in the military-engineering field is rapidly "pulling up" the destructive potential of conventional toward nuclear arms. This fact most emphatically puts on the agenda the question of a halt to the arms race in this area also.

Nuclear weapons are the "great leveler," as H. Kissinger once called them. For this reason their destruction will inevitably entail the emergence of new problems connected with the balance of forces and a certain asymmetry at nonnuclear levels. The linkage of nuclear disarmament and the negotiations on conventional arms is obvious, which, of course, introduces additional difficulties to the cardinal and rapid accomplishment of a priority task. Possible progress at the negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe should serve as an accelerator of the process of the creation of a nuclear-free world and establish the basic principles of a new system of security.

It would seem that all that has been said is to a large extent an answer to the question concerning the stability of the "post-nuclear world". It may be achieved only by a set of measures encompassing all aspects of security, and, what is more, the solution of contradictions and the formulation of common approaches and criteria for a correlation of forces in the nonnuclear sphere should be undertaken in parallel with or ahead even of the process of nuclear disarmament. In fact this means a radical change and improvement in the entire structure and atmosphere of international relations.

The process of negotiations which has begun at the present time is geared not only to a reduction in the means of armed struggle which are already stockpiled but also to erecting effective barriers in the way of new twists of the spiral of the arms race and its breakout into space. This may be achieved with measures to impart a defensive nature to the doctrines of the opposed blocs and the building of armed forces on the basis of the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

This is the point of the proposals of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament in the nuclear and nonnuclear spheres and the new Soviet concept of international security put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress and developed subsequently.

We are witnessing profound objective changes encompassing all spheres of international relations and making the world tightly interdependent in the political, economic, military and other spheres. In solving the problems of this interdependent world, which in an ever multiplying number are assuming a global nature, the use of military force with inevitable, essentially fatal consequences becomes insane. Thus its significance, which was predominant in the recent past even, is diminishing increasingly, which is grounds for quite justified, albeit cautious, optimism in respect of the stability of the post-nuclear world.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

Political Science Needs To Be Freed From 'Bare Practicalness'

18160003k Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 125-130

[E. Pozdnyakov rejoinder: "With Whom, How and For What Reason Is A. Arbatov in Dispute?"]

[Text] Reading some articles in our newspapers and journals today, you find out for yourself not only much that is new but sometimes what is simply a surprise, what you yourself would never have guessed.

A. Arbatov's article carried in MEMO Nos 4 and 5 for the present year is no exception in this respect.¹ I and many of my colleagues learned from it with amazement (although not unprofitably, it should be said) that there are in "Soviet political scientist circles" two schools, two currents, between which a dispute, sometimes latent, sometimes manifest, has allegedly long been under way, a highly fundamental dispute, what is more. According to the classification of the author himself, this is the dispute between so-called "lyric poets" (they are the "politicians" or "political lyric poets") and "physicists" (they are the "technocrats"). Is there such a division into "physicists" and "lyric poets" in Soviet political scientist circles, is there really a dispute under way between them—it is about this that I would like to speak.

But to take things in order. Upon reading A. Arbatov's article one cannot fail to be struck by the fact that it contains two themes or two lines, as it were: one is denoted by the title of the article, but the second, parallel to it, although ostensibly totally unconnected with the first in terms of content and secondary, seemingly,

nonetheless creates the impression of being the main one for the author. He starts with it and finishes with it, and it surfaces several times as he sets forth his first theme, suddenly and by chance, as it were, but, judging by the emotional and expressive content of the words and expressions employed by the author, it seriously disturbs him and constantly prompts him to return to it. It is on this second theme that I will dwell, in the main.

Speaking on behalf, as it were, of one of the two camps, namely, the "physicists" ("technocrats"), A. Arbatov is very energetic in aiming critical barbs at the camp of his "ideological" enemies—the "lyric poets" ("politicians").

Well, scientific discussion and high-minded argument between different viewpoints in our press can only be welcomed, and in this sense we have to subscribe to A. Arbatov's words concerning the usefulness of an open struggle of opinions and constructive debate. However, both an open struggle of opinions and constructive debate should unfailingly presuppose also the candor of the persons participating in the debate. If, on the other hand, the opponents are anonymous, if the above-mentioned "critical barbs" have no specific address and if these opponents are accused of God knows what mistakes and transgressions and reference is not made to their corresponding works here, such a debate could hardly be called open and high-minded. The "barbs" in this case fly in disorder in all directions, either hitting no one or wounding people other than those intended. This approximately is what happened in the article in question, and for this reason the reader has no alternative but to himself guess whom A. Arbatov has in mind and with whom he is conducting his argument.

However, it was difficult for me to imagine even that A. Arbatov is in dispute with some invented characters. For this reason I carefully reread the article in search of an addressee of the criticism, and my labors were rewarded. One place in the article contains a more or less clear indication of whom he has in mind. Taking issue with my viewpoint concerning the correlation of policy and its means and not agreeing with it,² on page 19 of issue No 5 A. Arbatov notes that E. Pozdnyakov's pronouncement which he has quoted is "highly typical of the 'political school' and for this reason merits more detailed analysis" (my emphasis—E.P.). I will dwell on the essence of this analysis later, but I would like now to say something else.

So the "lyric poets" have acquired, albeit not without effort, some flesh and blood: they are, at a minimum, myself and those who in one way or another share my viewpoint. Inasmuch as there are in the article no other pointers as to whom A. Arbatov has in mind by "lyric poets," I have every reason to take as being addressed to me all the unaddressed charges with which he so generously bestrewed in his article the "lyric poets" in general.

I am, to be honest, little, if at all, embarrassed by the fact that I have come to be in the "lyric poets" category (there is even something flattering in this), but inasmuch as I have been put there not per my own wishes, then, as a meticulous individual, I would like to investigate the grounds in accordance with which this was done and which prompted A. Arbatov to publicly maintain the existence in our political science of two seemingly contending schools.

We find in the article three groups of arguments confirming, in the author's opinion, the existence of these different currents and the dispute between them. These are they. "The representatives of one of them (the "physicists"—E.P.) believe that study of these topics (problems of security and disarmament—E.P.) requires in-depth knowledge of military strategy, weapons systems and the military balance of forces." The adherents to the other (the "lyric poets") not only maintain that the main thing is policy and that military-technical details, the "pieces of iron," so to speak, divert analysis from the main issues but altogether "deny the need for study of military specifics" (No 4, pp 11, 21). Where do they maintain and deny all this, I would like to know?

I can in respect of this argument express an opinion which coincides entirely with that which is commonly accepted and for this reason cannot fail to be banal, for which I apologize.

The point being that the existence of varying schools of research in any science, international relations included, is a perfectly natural thing for any object of investigation is multifaceted, and each such facet could serve as a special subject of study. Altogether they afford broader and deeper knowledge of the subject, complementing one another. Counterposing some schools to others is not only futile but also simply harmful, and whoever does so undoubtedly merits censure. A. Arbatov, to judge by everything, believes that it is the "lyric poets" who are guilty of such a counterpoise for it is they, according to him, who deny the need for study of military specifics, that is, that in which he himself is involved.

But one wonders: who has denied this need where and when? It needs to be pointed out, reference needs to be made, otherwise such an unaddressed accusation against one's opponents of things which they have not maintained (publicly, in the press, at least) would seem improper (given such a mode of debate, one could ascribe to one's opponents whatever one wished: it is impossible to either confirm or deny this, and everything depends on the scrupulousness or, on the contrary, unscrupulousness of whoever does this).

But, to continue. We find in the introduction to the second article (No 5) a different cause of the disagreements: "the subject of the differences between them (the "physicists" and "lyric poets"—E.P.) is rather," the author continues, "what kind of theory is needed here, in what way to elaborate it and how closely it should be

linked with practice. The 'technocrats,' in the main, advocate the inductive method.... Representatives of the 'political' school adhere, for the most part, to the deductive method..." (p 18).

It is extremely surprising for me to read all this. At the end of the 20th century, given the mass of accumulated and largely generalized scientific material, it could occur only to a person far removed from philosophy to counterpose, as in Bacon's times, the inductive method to the deductive and believe that it is the inductive method which is closest to practice (if, of course, the reference is not to the practice of primitive man), not to mention the fact that there is in practice simply no such separation in respect of these methods: depending on the specific scientific ends and tasks, scholars employ one method or the other, not even aware of this frequently. Incidentally, about methodology: A. Arbatov's assertion that the "technocrats" are endeavoring with the aid of the inductive method to find the "political 'philosophers' stone" of the problems of international security" (my emphasis—E.P.) sounds quite curious inasmuch as he puts this search on the same footing as alchemy, as it were, and thereby condemns it to failure in advance. Although it is understood, of course, that the expression "philosophers' stone" is used by the author for effect.

Finally, right at the end of the article the author—quite unexpectedly and in defiance of the first two arguments—makes a statement which cannot fail to dismay: "The dispute between the 'politicians' and 'technocrats' (the latter-day 'lyric poets' and 'physicists')," he writes, "is more often than not without a real basis." It is, the author continues, "caused for the most part not by different approaches to the problem" (at this point one begins to wonder in bewilderment: but what about the differences in induction and deduction and the approaches which were outlined in the first argument?). This dispute, we read further, "reflects the endeavor of some to avoid systematic study of extremely complex military-strategic subject matter... and a willingness of others to undertake this painstaking and interminable labor" (my emphasis—E.P.) (No 5, p 29).

Here, as anyone can see, the notorious dispute among political scientists is caused, it transpires, not by differences in scientific principles and methods of research but a simple division between the lazy and unscrupulous "political lyric poets" shunning difficulties and the diligent and industrious "technocrats" selflessly prepared for "painstaking and interminable" labor. This argument goes altogether beyond the framework of science, and therefore let us leave it without the attention which it would merit in some other case unrelated to science.

Were I to confine myself merely to showing the inconsistency in A. Arbatov's arguments, their contrived nature and artificiality and the unlawful division of political scientists per the characteristics which the author of the article proposes, I would not be accomplishing my mission in full. The point being that this

division itself is not as inoffensive as might appear. The artificial division and counterpoise of some scientists to others and some scientific schools to others has itsgnoseological, so to speak, and practical roots. I shall dwell on them briefly.

One line in A. Arbatov's arguments is perfectly clearly aimed not only at showing but also publicly deriding the barrenness, futility and pedantry which exist, in his opinion, in the studies of the "political lyric poets". Although, I would note, this is not buttressed in documentary form anywhere in the article, and all the charges are of purely rhetorical nature. In fact just look at the inexpressible sarcasm with which he inquires: "...perhaps diplomats and the military should be allowed to deal with the 'pieces of iron' and tedious specifics, and the scholars left to decide the truly major problems: inasmuch as peace is better than war, disarmament preferable to an arms race and policy, from the security viewpoint, more important than military hardware?" (No 4, p 21).

Who are these dimwits who propose dealing with such pedantic problems, which are altogether divorced from reality? It is not difficult to guess here: they are, of course, the same "political lyric poets". It is at them that A. Arbatov hints when maintaining that, instead of "serious scientific analysis," they offer "streamlined formulas fit for all contingencies of life and handsome in their infallibility and inutility" (No 4, p 21).

He writes about them at the end of the article: "The 'political scientists,' appealing (where? when? who?—E.P.) for people not to preoccupy themselves with 'pieces of iron' and for them to be above prosaic details, are by no means helping the development of the scientific base in this sphere...." And for this reason, evidently, their "streamlined glowing sententious utterances, not suffused with objective content, frequently burst like soap bubbles when they encounter the sharp edges of military-strategic reality and negotiating practice" (No 5, p 30).

And, finally, having, evidently, exhausted his own emotion, he brands them with a quotation from Klyuchevskiy, likening therewith the "lyric poets" to "an empty vessel traveling without a genuine valuable cargo (whose vessel travels with a "genuine valuable cargo" in this case needs no explanation).

Scientific arguments and debate on any issue are understandable and close to me, if the argument is substantive and proper. But I can neither understand nor accept an argument, not an argument even but an unsubstantiated charge leveled at this scientific school or the other or anonymous scientists, scientists in general, and advanced in the guise of an argument. Disagreements and differences of opinion are natural for science, but they should be resolved with scientific arguments, and not the arrogant nonacceptance of another's views merely on the grounds of their being disliked by some

people. These are extra-scientific methods in science which are no less harmful and dangerous for its development than extra-economic methods in economics.

A. Arbatov raises his voice repeatedly in the article in support of the usefulness of science and in support of it being brought closer to practice. He desires science to be useful. An excellent desire! But for it to be such it is necessary primarily to afford it an opportunity to be science, that is, to liberate it from tutelage on the part of practice, which under our conditions is nothing other than tutelage on the part of government officials and bureaucrats of various departments.

And, indeed, there is no point being specially concerned for a scientist to be useful. If he is really a scientist, and not a person on the make from science, he is the first, concerned with a search for the truth and the ascertainment of objective relationships and regularities, to discern the practical requirements of the times, when no man of practice, perhaps, is as yet even thinking of this. Only he should not be hindered and commanded. Whoever, on the other hand, wishes to impose on scientists bare practicalness, bare utility, utility of the moment, risks getting, instead of a scientist, a phrasemonger, a person pursuing his own interests or a doctrinaire. Have not too many of them been cultivated with us as it is? And all thanks to the ineradicable desire to bind science to practice by tight bonds and make it directly dependent on the latter.

Becoming in this case a simple underling of practice, science ceases to be science; practice, on the other hand, not being enriched with genuinely scientific ideas, revolves in a vicious circle of customary ideas and becomes an impediment to its own development. In turn, the utilitarian requirements and ideas born of limited practice, invading scientific and theoretical research, only falsify it. Was it not such a relationship of science and practice which we had for decades? Did it not engender malicious dogmatism on the one hand and moldiness, stagnation, inefficiency and a complete unwillingness for change on the other?

In order for science to develop and enrich practice with new ideas it is necessary to free it from direct dependence on the latter. I am convinced that only given the conscious and full implementation of this principle may science be secured that inner freedom which is a basic condition of its development. And only given such independence may science and practice profitably interact with one another and fertilize one another.

I absolutely cannot accept also the idea perfectly definitely permeating A. Arbatov's "argument" with the "lyric poets" concerning the inutility and barrenness of the ideas and research of the latter. For me this attitude toward one's scientific colleagues is a symbol of the past: it has a particular tradition not only in our comparatively recent but also distant history. The fallacious opinion that there are good and bad, useful and inutile,

necessary and unnecessary sciences and that the first, together with their representatives, are deserving of praise and every encouragement, whereas the second, of censure, abolition and extirpation even, was gradually cultivated and, finally, firmly established with us. This was the case in the distant past, but was the case also in the not-too-distant past: the tradition has proven durable also in the soil of the socialism which is being built.

Such divisions of sciences into useful and inutile are ultimately a sign of the mental, moral and cultural decline of society. Such divisions have caused our science not only direct and largely irreparable losses expressed in the defamation and extermination of scientific personnel and a lagging behind the West in most important scientific spheres but also indirect damage, having created a type of scientist in whom a readiness for and love of search for the objective truth and universal values has been killed off and who has aspired to catch merely the nuances of the subjective opinions of the "authorities" in order, employing the words of the quotation cited by A. Arbatov, to serve them somewhat more dexterously and thereby distinguish himself and who has consciously confined himself to the accomplishment of narrow practical tasks fully in accordance with the traditionally and wrongly understood role of science and "state" need.

I do not believe that A. Arbatov consciously shares these ideas and traditions. But in maintaining the existence of two "currents," two "schools" in our international policy studies, in fact counterposing them to one another, and propounding the idea of the questionable value and virtual inutility of one of these currents he is, whether he wishes this or not, in practice serving as a conduit of such ideas and introducing needless discord between closely related and mutually complementary schools of scientific research. And inasmuch as the basis of this "argument" contains, as shown above, neither substantive nor methodological grounds, the position adopted by A. Arbatov involuntarily prompts the thought that he is concerned not so much for scientific interests as a desire to establish the priority nature merely of his own school over others and to the detriment of others. Also testifying to this is, specifically, the unimportant fact that A. Arbatov attributes the sphere of his research to "true science" which does not tolerate, in his words, "verbiage, careless formulas and rash ideas" (No 5, p 30). The latter, one has to think, characterize the "political" school. However, I would note that no one, including A. Arbatov himself, is insured against careless formulas and rash ideas: I have already partially shown this, I will partially further show it below.

Now a little on A. Arbatov's specific objections to my viewpoint concerning the correlation of policy and its means. What is the essence of the dispute? I maintained in my article (MEMO No 10, 1987) that there is a close interdependence between policy and its means and that ultimately policy has primacy over means. Means are policy in action, policy being manifested in no way other

than via them. If we take as such a means, for example, nuclear weapons, they are nothing other than policy in action or, if you wish, "embodied policy". "This level of arms or the other," I wrote, "is a direct effect of states' corresponding policy and political relations between them. In order, consequently, to do away with the effect it is necessary to begin with the removal of the causes giving rise to this effect. The causes, however, are always political and cannot be otherwise."

Translating this opinion into the language of metaphor, I would add that to cure this disease (social or physical) or the other we need to treat not its symptoms or effects but to treat its causes, in which the disease is concealed. Thus the arms race is a **symptom and expression** of the disease whose name is the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems and the military-political groupings of states corresponding thereto intensified by ideological intolerance in respect of one another. For this reason it is necessary in order to do away with the arms race, if not to remove it altogether, to at least appreciably undermine its political foundation.

A. Arbatov believes that the "merit of the adduced syllogism is that it is utterly incontestable, but only at a very high level of generalization." Its shortcoming, on the other hand, is that, upon its practical application "a multitude of questions arises" (No 5, p 19). If one takes as a shortcoming of this syllogism or the other the fact that it gives rise to a multitude of questions, and as a merit, the fact that it does not give rise to questions, let it be as Arbatov says, although I am of a different opinion. But what are these questions? A. Arbatov believes that the direct linkage of policy with arms levels "gives rise in a number of cases not only to theoretical objections but also leads directly to an impasse from the viewpoint of practical recommendations" (No 5, p 19). What are these cases and what kind of theoretical objections may there be here? What he went on to write caused me the greatest amazement.

"In fact," he inquires, "is there between the USSR and the United States a single **political conflict** which justifies the stockpiling of approximately 50,000 nuclear weapons and the continued buildup of the potentials of destruction? Is there a single intelligible explanation of the **political factors** in respect of which the Warsaw Pact or NATO would resolve to attack one another? But 3 million-strong groupings of the armed forces of the two alliances, up to 80,000 tanks and approximately 6,000 attack aircraft are in confrontation on the continent" (my emphases—E.P.) (No 5, p 19).

In fact, where has all this sprung from: there are no political factors, but armed forces fantastic in terms of their quantitative and qualitative parameters confront one another? Did the words quoted above not belong to a well-known political scientist, it might have been thought that they had been written by a dilettante. I cannot imagine that A. Arbatov has let escape his attention the entire postwar history of the rigid opposition

and confrontation of the two blocs and the world's militarily most powerful states at the head of them: primarily the "cold war," packed with numerous conflicts, in which both powers and both military-political groupings sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly participated (the Korean War, the Near East conflict, the Caribbean crisis, the events in Hungary, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Angola, Afghanistan, the deployment in Europe of Soviet and American missiles and so on and so forth). If all this does not pertain to political factors of the spurring of tension and, correspondingly, the arms race, to what, I venture to ask, does it pertain?

If there indeed were a division in our science between "lyric poets" and "physicists" and if the above-quoted assertion of A. Arbatov were the platform of the latter, this in itself would impel me to unhesitatingly take the side of the "lyric poets".

I would note that A. Arbatov is altogether not entirely consistent in his arguments: at one time he acknowledges the influence of political factors on the arms race, then he suddenly denies them. Evidently recognizing this entire contradictoriness, he introduces the **first cause** concept, by which, incidentally, he understands the "cold war" (No 5, p 21). I emphasize this specially in order that it not be thought that this term belongs to me, which might have been thought by proceeding from the logic of A. Arbatov's arguments. I speak of the **political causes** of the arms race, but by no means of its first cause. This is a fundamental difference. I affirm loyalty to my proposition concerning the primacy of policy over its means by the fact of the conclusion of the INF Treaty, as, equally, the negotiations which are under way on a 50-percent reduction in SOA. A. Arbatov believes that this treaty testifies, on the contrary, not in support of my proposition for the reason that "no political first causes of the arms race were preliminarily removed" (No 5, pp 20, 21).

The "first causes" were, perhaps, not removed, but many political factors impeding the conclusion of such an agreement had been removed: it was for this reason that it was concluded. Today's easing of tension in relations between the USSR and the United States and the disarmament negotiations accompanying it have basically no causes other than political. They have been embodied most fully in what we today call the **new political thinking**. "Only the transfer of foreign policy activity to a new system of coordinates," A. Bovin writes, "enabled the Soviet political leadership to reconsider the state of affairs and adopt the sole correct decisions—to accede to the 'zero option' in respect of the 'Euromissiles' and withdraw the forces from Afghanistan."³ Precisely. If A. Arbatov has proof of the reverse, it would be interesting to hear it.

And, finally, I do not doubt in the least the importance and necessity of the research in which A. Arbatov is engaged. Nonetheless, I have to note that in this research

military means, primarily nuclear weapons, are accorded manifestly exaggerated and at times self-sufficing significance and a role reaching at times the point of their counterpoise to policy. A. Arbatov's entire article actually testifies to this.

It is my profound belief that any distortion in the correlation of military means and policy in favor of the first (whether in theory or, even more, in practice) and any preponderance of military parameters over political, economic and cultural parameters are dangerous for the development of interstate relations. Both East and West contributed to ensuring that the military balance of forces acquired exaggerated significance in these relations, as a consequence of which there was even more of an exacerbation of the already serious contradictions and problems dividing us; a false importance has been (and continues to be) accorded modernization of the armed forces, and at the same time the opportunity of understanding what common interests unite everyone and how much worthier are efforts to coordinate differing interests than to separate them has been lost. In our day the most dangerous course of development which could possibly be imagined is the subordination of policy to the logic of the arms race, the logic of the military balance of forces, that is, the logic of the "embodied" policy of the past. All our hopes are connected with a policy which, on the contrary, subordinates to itself the menacing means, tames them and ultimately does away with them.

Policy in the process of its realization creates the means required by circumstances; but policy gets rid of these means given a change in circumstances, which change, what is more, under its influence. We see this clearly and graphically today: under circumstances which have changed thanks to the new policy what yesterday was a menacing means in the hands of policy (intermediate- and shorter-range missiles) is being converted at its wishes before the eyes of the whole world into a pile of metal, thereby ceasing to be a means. And we hope that, thanks to prudent policy, all the remaining nuclear weapons will also in time be converted into such a pile of metal, having accomplished thereby a wondrous metamorphosis—from means into non-means.

If all the arguments which I have set forth here put me, in A. Arbatov's opinion, in the "lyric poet" category, then I myself may openly declare: yes, I am a "lyric poet"!

Footnotes

1. A. Arbatov, "Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms" (MEMO Nos 4, 5, 1988).
2. E. Pozdnyakov, "Relationship of Economics and Politics in Interstate Relations" (MEMO No 10, 1987).
3. IZVESTIYA, 15 June 1988.

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Science's Separation From Practice in Arms Limitation Bemoaned

181600031 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 130-134

[A. Arbatov rebuttal: "Is There Really Cause for a Dispute?"]

[Text] Although my respected opponent himself describes himself as a "meticulous" individual, he has evidently overlooked one fact of considerable importance. Otherwise our debate would have been more objective and clearly drawn. The foreword to the first of my articles in question (MEMO No 4, 1988, p 11) speaks of two currents engaged in a polemic between themselves not among Soviet political scientists in general but in circles of "Soviet political scientists dealing with problems of international security and disarmament."

What disputes are under way in other spheres of political science is a separate discussion. In the disarmament sphere the said currents exist, and the polemic between them is frequently very acute. It unfolds more openly at practically every relatively broad scientific conference and is being conducted secretly in the press. Many names and the corresponding quotations may be recalled in confirmation of this. E. Pozdnyakov's pronouncements were quoted merely as an illustration since one school here appears in the "purest" form.

In responding to E. Pozdnyakov's letter we might, actually, have let it go at this. His militant arguments, roaming over the whole field of international-political science, fight an imaginary enemy and frequently do not reach the subject that I raise—the state of affairs in the disarmament sector of the scientific front. Frequently, but not always. He puts forward a number of opinions directly on the said subject, which prompts me to further express certain thoughts.

I agree fully that the existence of various schools in any sphere, including study of the problems of security and disarmament, is a phenomenon which is entirely natural and necessary for harmonious scientific development. But scientific polemics should reflect really different opinions and alternative approaches to problems, and not a differing level of knowledgeability and professionalism in the knowledge of this question or the other. This applies particularly to military-political problems, which are profoundly interwoven with security and disarmament subject matter. The amount of specialized knowledge needed here not entirely fitting within the framework merely of the humanities is extraordinarily great

and encompasses many disciplines: historical-political, technical, military-strategic, international-legal, economic and socio-psychological.

No one is counterposing different scientific schools to one another. And all the more groundless are E. Pozdnyakov's suspicions concerning someone's attempts "to deny, abolish" and, even more, "extirpate," as he writes, some sciences for the good of others. But criticizing the "barrenness, inutility and pedantry" of certain approaches (to use his words once again) is, in my view, entirely permissible and useful.

Now about methodology. I cannot agree with the assertion of my respected colleague that in the sphere of present-day problems of security and disarmament we have a mass of "accumulated and largely generalized scientific material." This is as yet desirable rather than actual. And the point is not only that the subject of research itself is comparatively new and numbers, particularly with reference to nuclear weapons, only two or three decades of really serious scientific study. The root of the problem lies in the consequences of the long period of stagnation, when the acute shortage of accessible factual material was reflected, viewpoints differing from the official viewpoint were not encouraged and scientific publications were seen chiefly as a means of propaganda.

Information concerning the West's military policy was drawn mainly from Western sources. But in respect of the military doctrine, strategic concepts, armed forces and military programs of the Soviet Union also use was made mainly of overseas information, using which in open publications was not, it is true, allowed. The odd dozen figures, several streamlined doctrinal propositions—this was the entire sparse ration which our sources issued the science on these problems. Economists complain about the lack of an adequate statistical base in their field, but compared with specialists on security and disarmament issues they are simply "swamped" with the necessary facts and figures (which does not mean, of course, that all is well with them).

The situation in our field has recently been rapidly changing for the better, but the lacunae are still very large, and an immense amount of work remains to be done to do away with them. Glasnost in the field of foreign policy is still lagging considerably behind glasnost in the sphere of the economy and domestic policy, and questions of security, defense capability and disarmament have, in turn, been affected by glasnost least as yet among other foreign policy subjects.

Whence the preference in the present phase for the inductive method and the need for a great deal of painstaking work on the collection, systematization and analysis of a vast amount of factual information. Without this basis we cannot elaborate a substantiated scientific theory in respect of such key problems as "equal security," "balance and parity," "defensive doctrine and

strategy," "reasonable sufficiency" and "military stability" and the relationship of disarmament processes at the global and regional levels, in nuclear and conventional arms and in quantitative and qualitative parameters of the military balance. Employing the deductive method right away is possible in far from all spheres of the said problems, and attempts to do this nonetheless frequently lead to incongruities and expose the yawning gap between theory and practice.

True, E. Pozdnyakov sees nothing wrong in this. He advocates science being liberated "from tutelage on the part of practice, which under our conditions is nothing other than tutelage on the part of government officials and bureaucrats of various departments." He is against the direct dependence and rigid attachment of science to practice and against the "imposition on scientists of bare practicalness, bare utility," which make science an underling of practice, and the scientist, "a phrasemonger, a person pursuing his own interests or a doctrinaire."

Well, strongly put, but inaccurately. For our main problem (in disarmament science, in any event) amounted in the years of stagnation not to the excessive dependence of science on practice, not to excessive tutelage on the part of government officials and not to bare practicalness but precisely the opposite. That is, to science's total separation from practice. It was simple for bureaucrats and government officials to just spit on what scientists thought and wrote at that time. This was totally unrelated to the needs of practice and did not influence practical policy in the least. This applied even more, I believe, to E. Pozdnyakov's subject matter—international relations theory. This situation could not have suited better those same "government officials and bureaucrats" inasmuch as no one was able to call in question their departmental approaches to the accomplishment of practical tasks, which led our policy into serious problems and failures. And science under these conditions became at best abstract pedantry, an "exercise for the mind," and at worst, servile propaganda prepared to "scientifically" substantiate any "historic initiative" and each "wise and farsighted step".

The times are different now. The interest of the practical departments in the opinion and recommendations of scientists is unprecedentedly great. And this has nothing in common with "tutelage," "dependence" and "command," which my opponent so fears. The practical organizations are now prepared to discuss seriously and take note of the most critical and impartial opinion on the part of scientists. There can be no question of any servility. That far from all scientists are up to the high demands being made of them is another matter. Not all are capable of providing specific recommendations, from whatever theoretical heights their deductive process may condescend.

Lest I afford an excuse for criticism for the advancement of "an unsubstantiated accusation leveled at this scientific school or other or anonymous scientists," I shall try

to confirm this conclusion in the example of the statements of my opponent. Let us examine the question of the cause-and-effect connection of policy, the arms race and disarmament.

E. Pozdnyakov considers the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems and the military groupings of states corresponding thereto exacerbated by ideological intolerance in respect of one another the cause of the arms race, which appears as a consequence or "symptom" of the said political "disease". In order to do away with the arms race, he writes, "we need, if not to eliminate it altogether, to at least appreciably undermine its political foundation."

Analyzing such syllogisms is not easy. They truly evoke a multitude of questions, but only owing to the extremely free use of the terms "disarmament," "arms limitation," "elimination of the arms race," "pacification of the means (arms)," "destruction of the means"—all these are employed not as scientific concepts but as symbols which may be used without thought being given to their practical meaning. It is for this reason that for those who conceive of the essence of the question it is frequently difficult to understand what specifically E. Pozdnyakov has in mind. I would not like to think that it is this which he considers a merit of his syllogisms.

If by "elimination of the arms race" general and complete disarmament is understood, immeasurably more is obviously required for this than "at least, undermining" and even "doing away with" the said political causes of the arms race. A fundamental rearrangement of international relations (including the relations of the developing countries, and not only of the two socioeconomic systems), the complete abolition of the power factor, the creation of universal supranational structures of the regulation of interstate relations, a profound change in states' rights and duties and so on and so forth would be essential.

If, however, the reference is to more modest tasks and closer prospects, arms reduction and limitation could hardly be brought about by the "doing away with" or, at least, "undermining" of the current division of the world into opposite systems and military-political groupings. Given this approach, neither the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in three media, other treaties of the 1960's-1970's nor the INF Treaty would have been possible. Given this formulation of the question, any agreement on limiting the arms race would have to be postponed to the indefinite future. Thank heavens, the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, on preventing a race in space-based antimissile arms, on deep cuts in the armed forces and conventional arms of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, on the banning and elimination of chemical weapons, on the further limitation of underground nuclear testing and many other measures are not linked with the doing away with or undermining of the political realities whose elimination E. Pozdnyakov advocates. Otherwise, I fear,

we would have to wait until the second coming for both arms reduction and limitation and an easing of tension and a lessening of the danger of war (I am convinced that E. Pozdnyakov sincerely advocates disarmament. But many other people, in the United States particularly, are knowingly resorting to superficial, primitive slogans of the "it is not weapons which give rise to mistrust but mistrust which gives rise to weapons" type to relegate disarmament to the background and allow neither a reduction in arms nor a lessening of mistrust).

So, apparently, we are fighting the effects without removing the causes, the symptoms, and not the disease? Yes, in a certain sense precisely so. And a contradiction can only be seen here if we do not recognize the dialectical interaction of causes and effects, ends and means. If metaphysics are substituted for dialectics, and theory high-handedly divorced from practice.

Developing the medical metaphor of my respected colleague, I would note that his approach to the treatment of the disease, and not its symptoms, is right only within certain limits. If a person is in a pre-infarction condition, he is put in the resuscitation unit and spared a heart attack: the clot is dissolved, the heart muscle is stimulated and an emergency operation is performed even. In this situation, taking abstract theory as the basis, regaling the patient with advice concerning removal of the causes of the disease—do not drink, do not smoke, take walks in the fresh air—would be a cruel mockery. All these pious admonishments are good when the crisis is passed, when the immediate threat has been postponed or appreciably reduced. In the struggle for a reduction in arms the first important steps have already been taken, but a breakthrough has not yet arrived.

But what, for all that, permits a hope for serious arms reduction and limitation if the political causes of the military rivalry which E. Pozdnyakov cites have not been removed? The division of the world into two socioeconomic systems and two military-political alliances truly formed the basis of the postwar arms race. But in 40 years this arms race, multiplied by intensive S&T progress and the interests which took shape around it of immense military-industrial complexes, acquired apowerful intrinsic inertial force and logic of development. Primarily in the nuclear-space sphere, it has become considerably separate (although not isolated, of course) from the political conflicts which engendered it and has far outgrown states' political stakes and interests in these conflicts.

The formal logic of my opponent: causes engender effects, consequently, it is necessary initially to remove the causes, and then, the effects, might have been applicable, with reservations even then, to the prenuclear era. But it is even less suitable for the present situation than Newton's classical laws for the nuclear physics and quantum mechanics of the present day. The colossal destructive power of nuclear weapons has disrupted the traditional cause-and-effect connection of policy and

military power. War has ceased to be a continuation of policy by other, forcible means, whose kill potential has outgrown states' all in any way rational political ends and made war suicidal and therefore unthinkable, regardless of the seriousness of this political conflict or the other.

But this far from exhausts the issue. War has "avenged itself" on policy for its practical unacceptability. In the past 40 years the latter has to a tremendous extent come to be subordinated to military-strategic considerations and the struggle for more advantageous geostrategic positions in regional conflicts in anticipation of a probable global confrontation (this has always been justified, of course, by the need to "deter" the other side and prevent war).

Subsequently, by way of "compensation," the arms race assumed to a large extent the functions of war as the continuation of policy by other means, that is, the arms race became the waging of war by other means. And, as is frequently the case in war, particularly total war (and the race in nuclear-space arms corresponds precisely to this), the means became an absolute, an end in themselves, prevailed over policy and began to interact in accordance with their own laws, having lost the direct connection with the political interests and ends which engendered them. Like war also, the arms race and geostrategic rivalry undermine states' economic power, exhaust them morally and psychologically and paralyze their political will. Occurring perhaps more slowly and with less bloodshed than in previous wars, but nonetheless unswervingly and under the constant press of the catastrophic nuclear danger, these processes, if not stopped, will ultimately inevitably lead to the disintegration of even the strongest powers, as the empires of Caesar, the Habsburgs, Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm collapsed in the past.

My respected colleague evidently cannot or is unwilling to see all of this. He enumerates as the political causes of the arms race the Korean War, the Near East conflict, the Caribbean crisis, the events in Hungary, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Angola, Afghanistan, the deployment in Europe of Soviet and American missiles and so on and so forth. International conflicts, particularly the Korean War, the Caribbean crisis and the events in Afghanistan influenced the arms race, of course—after all, the latter does not occur in a vacuum. These events brought about an **additional** (compared with what had been planned prior to then) increase in military budgets and the acceleration of a number of military programs. But, of course, these conflicts were not the cause of the arms race, nuclear particularly. Other events, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, exerted no pronounced influence on the arms race, the U.S. military budget began at that time to rapidly diminish (in the course of the winding down of the war in Vietnam) and the SALT I negotiations between the USSR and the United States were, following a certain holdup, nonetheless resumed a year later.

As far as the "deployment in Europe of Soviet and American missiles" is concerned, such an example would puzzle the dilettante and utterly confuse the specialist. After all, one does not have to be a professional to know that the deployment, that is, the fielding, of any weapons is the main phase of their development, in other words, the material embodiment and apotheosis of each cycle of the arms race. It transpires that the arms race, as my critic writes, "pertains to the political causes... of the arms race."

These examples, it would seem, testify primarily that in addition to the terminological vagueness we are encountering real theoretical confusion. This is to what "lyric poetry" is reduced when it is unhesitatingly set in train on such issues. This cannot but be regretted inasmuch as E. Pozdnyakov's previous theoretical works not devoted directly to security and disarmament had accustomed the reader to expect from him profoundly considered logical constructs, a complete absence of incidental generalizations and examples and meticulously whetted terminology.

In reality, it would seem, international conflicts, global geostrategic rivalry, the nuclear arms race, the confrontation in nuclear and conventional forces in the European theater and much else—all these are different manifestations in terms of form of the political confrontation and struggle of the two coalitions of states headed by the United States and the Soviet Union (for simplicity's sake we shall leave aside third forces for the time being). Regional conflicts primarily spur the rivalry in peripheral areas: naval forces, means of strategic mobility and others. Arms limitation measures here are impossible without removal of the political causes and the settlement of regional conflicts.

But the nuclear rivalry and the buildup of the military confrontation in Europe have become a more or less separate sphere of East-West relations expressed in a specific form and developing in accordance with specific laws. Whence the seeming irrationality of the situation in this sphere and incommensurability with political first causes and the new political conflicts arising in parallel. The arms race in the central areas has itself become a most serious source of political tension and most important conflict of states' political interests (in fact, what event on the international scene could create such a threat to your interests as the physical capability of the other power, as it chooses, to totally annihilate you as a nation and state within half an hour?). Consequently, this conflict needs to be settled directly without waiting for the removal of other political conflicts and without postponement until the "doing away with or, at least, undermining" of the political causes which my opponent makes paramount in the business of "doing away with of the arms race" (whatever is meant by this).

Progress in arms reduction and limitation is in itself the way to ease political (more precisely, military-political) tension and gradually settle this central conflict—also in

an inherently specific form, that is, in the form of the corresponding treaties, verification system and so forth. The INF Treaty provided graphic confirmation of this. The journalist A. Bovin, whom my colleague quoted, is absolutely right: for accession to the "zero option" a profound rethinking of the entire approach to security and the formulation of new political thinking, and not simply a recalculation by the appropriate department of the military balance, as a result of which, instead of what was earlier deduced as NATO's double superiority in terms of delivery systems and triple superiority in terms of nuclear warheads, parity was suddenly achieved, was required.

The new attitude toward questions of security played a decisive part, and the former mechanical and narrow departmental approaches were boldly cast aside—and as a result the main breakthrough was accomplished directly in the sphere of disarmament. That is, per E. Pozdnyakov, it was decided to do away with the "symptoms" and "effects," which intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are. But in what way was what he considers the causes: the division of the world into two systems, into two military-political alliances of states done away with or undermined and what international conflicts were preliminarily settled? (The Afghanistan agreement was signed later).

In accordance with my thinking, the INF Treaty resolves the parties' political conflict in one sphere: in their military-political and military-strategic relations at the intermediate- and shorter-range missile level. The effect of this solution goes, of course, far beyond the framework of this fragment of the global political-strategic picture.

In dealing with questions of disarmament I am far from making an absolute of the significance of my subject and reducing thereto the entire problem of security and prevention of war. No less important is the settlement of regional conflicts and the creation of regional collective security systems. After all, weapons in themselves will hardly start a war, even considering the danger of technical malfunctions and unsanctioned use. The escalation of a local crisis combined with an unsteady military balance not stabilized by agreements on arms reductions and a limitation of military activity—this is the mixture which could explode and trigger a catastrophe. And recently problems of the ecology, which, in my opinion, demand an immediate start on negotiations at just as high a level and with the same degree of priority as disarmament negotiations, have inexorably been moving to the fore.

"We hope," E. Pozdnyakov writes in conclusion, "that, thanks to prudent policy, all the remaining nuclear weapons will in turn also be converted into the same pile of metal, having accomplished thereby a wondrous metamorphosis from means into non-means." The major key of this finale very much raises the vital tone, of course. So I would like to take up the words of a song

which was once popular: "How fine it would then be living in the world, let us be friends forever, boys!" I and those who think as I do, incidentally, the so-called "physicists" or "technics" (although these relative names are unfortunate, perhaps), also hope that the disarmament process will develop progressively. The whole question is how to secure this in reality, how science and theory may help practice.

The sinister destructive arsenals will not, I fear, crumble into dust from fervent slogans, as in the fable, when the hero's magic words overwhelm the evil spells. On the contrary, these arsenals will continue to grow, however much one exposes the political causes at the basis thereof. And those who are directly involved in the multiplication of the lethal potentials will go about their business mocking the "lyric poets" and rejoicing that they are not encountering less exalted, but more objective and professionally substantiated counterarguments.

One can say "sugar" ten times, but this does not make one's mouth sweet. One can utter "political approach" as many times as one likes, but it remains a fine phrase until expressed in categories of ceilings and limits of arms reduction and limitation, alternative levels and structures of armed forces and prudent strategic concepts.

In life, unfortunately, "wondrous metamorphoses" are an extremely rare phenomenon. Instead of this, there is hard work, interminable struggle and difficult dilemmas. Success is always of a compromise nature, and the accomplishment of immediate tasks confronts us with new problems. The arms race is by no means a passive subject of negotiations but a highly dynamic phenomenon actively adapting to agreements, getting round them by flanking maneuvers and seeking out any loophole in order to outpace and emasculate the disarmament process. Dismantling the destructive arsenals is essential, but this needs to be done with a knowledge of their structure, laws of development, reserves of strength of their supports and the location of weak joints. Otherwise, in removing some parts one will cause a dangerous tilt in another direction or bring down upon oneself the whole caboodle.

Lyric poetry has a right to exist, of course, and if my respected colleague declares: yes, I am a "lyric poet," no one would dare reproach him for this. But "lyric poetry" and science have (in the sphere of security and disarmament, in any event) different ends and methods, and the audience is different also. The main thing is not to confuse the genres, there will then be fewer reasons for disagreements.

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**U.S. Lead Among 'Imperialist' Power Centers
Seen Continuing**

18160003m Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 146-147

[G. Sevostyanov review: "Dynamics of the Correlation
of Forces"]

[Text] Since the time of the formation (by the start of the 1970's) of the three main centers of imperialist rivalry a number of monographs, other studies and popular science articles devoted to mutual relations and the juxtaposition of economic forces has appeared. The actual content of the problem is constantly being enriched and changing. All the greater is the relevance and interest both for international affairs specialists of various disciplines and for the readership at large attached to the book in question,* which has been written professionally and with a clear understanding of the dialectics of the subject and its inseparable connection with the general conditions and regularities of world development and the political, social and military aspects.

While tracing the dynamics of the correlation of forces of the three centers through the postwar period, the author pays particular attention to the changes in the 1980's. Considering the increased unevenness of the capitalist countries' economic development and the emergence of increasingly new spheres of the competitive struggle and new criteria of the correlation of forces, it is very important that the monograph examines the problem comprehensively. The assessments and conclusions would seem sufficiently cogent and convincing.

The main proposition—concerning the relative weakening of the international economic positions of the United States and the strengthening of the influence of West Europe and, particularly, Japan since the war, their reduced dependence on America and the undermining of its economic and, to a certain extent, political hegemony in the capitalist world, given preservation of its military hegemony—is legitimate. "In comparison with the first postwar years Japan and West Europe, particularly the EC grouping of countries, have appreciably raised their ranking in the economics and politics of world capitalism. They have squeezed the United States in international trade and the export of capital and in the currency sphere also to some extent. ...A process of equalization of the levels of economic power and economic development, and somewhat more slowly, of the efficiency of production and S&T development, of the United States and the other capitalist powers and an equalization of management conditions is under way" (p 182).

At the same time the scholar rightly believes that the changes in the correlation of forces of the three centers of imperialism "are not a rectilinear but zigzag process, and the offensive and elevation of some countries and centers of rivalry are being accompanied by the counterattacks of the other countries—their competitors—which

may even switch to a counteroffensive for this period or the other" (ibid.). We would point, for example, to the fact that in the mid-1970's and, particularly, in the 1980's, when an international economic situation comparatively more propitious for the United States has temporarily taken shape, it has succeeded in strengthening its position somewhat in a number of areas of rivalry with the other centers of imperialism (certain spheres of international currency and financial relations, S&T progress and, primarily, in the military sphere). And in individual important areas of the competitive struggle the United States had not retreated earlier either. It can be seen from the monograph that the possibility of elimination of the general economic lag of the competitors behind the United States in the next few years is unrealistic in practice.

The book observes that the process of changes in the balance of forces of the three imperialist centers is leading to an exacerbation of the contradictions among them, and at times, to acute conflicts and crises. At the same time the author justifiably warns against an exaggeration of this "separating trend". We would note that in the postwar decades our science has frequently exaggerated its significance compared with the opposite "unifying or centripetal trend" presupposing the coordination and cooperation of "national imperialisms". A. Sutulin reasonably believes that in the modern era it is the latter which prevails in interimperialist relations. A relative strengthening thereof and the expanded coordination and interaction of the three centers not only in the political and military spheres but also in the economic sphere, where contradictions among them are manifested far more sharply, have been observed here as of the mid-1970's (see pp 16-18). Thus he correctly concludes that the said varidirectional trends exist "in dialectical, increasingly complex unity" (p 22).

We also have to agree with the proposition (p 184) concerning the unrealistic nature of the prospect of replacement of the United States as leader of the Western world, in the 20th century, in any event. This evaluation is supported if only by such incontrovertible facts as the great military predominance of the United States over its allies, the existence in America of major economic reserves and potential for maneuver, Washington's considerable political influence in the West's ruling circles under the conditions of the continuing "threat from the East" syndrome, which it itself cultivates, the problematic nature of the EC's growth into a "European union" and the limited nature of Japan's military-political status. The United States is making use of these and other factors to secure from the other capitalist states decisions which are favorable and profitable to itself with considerable effect.

Concerning certain shortcomings of the work. Too scant mention is made of the possible correlation of forces among the three centers (in respect of the most important indicators) by the start of the 21st century. The evaluation of the place of Canada in the North American

center of imperialism would seem arguable and insufficiently full (pp 44, 50 and elsewhere), the more so in that this question has as yet been insufficiently elaborated in scholarship. It would have been logical to have specifically also compared the positions of the three centers of imperialism in important developing regions, not stopping at global data, disguising them, on the export of capital and world trade; this would have reinforced the author's correct conclusion concerning the significant improvement in the positions of the EC and Japan in the third world.

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Continued Timidity in the Face of Foreign Policy Cliches Reproached

18160003n Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 150-152

[S. Chugrov review: "Seeking Nonstandard Approaches"]

[Text] The study* presents a scrupulous register of numerous events, large and small, and facts and figures allowing us to see the distinctiveness of the historical destiny of the Northern Pacific and the dynamics of its development over four decades. What is this distinctiveness?

First, contrary to the "Eurocentrist" cliches, which took shape long since, the Far (in relation to Europe) East can in no way be considered a "backwoods" of world development. Forty years ago even, and in recent years all the more, it was, possessing entirely self-sufficient internal relationships and logic of development, integrated in the main world processes. In our present-day interrelated and integral world this truth has merely shown itself as clearly as could be.

Second, the Far East possesses unprecedented development dynamics. The data adduced in the book persuade us that a region which, it is believed, spent a long time in a state of somnolence and contemplativeness has discovered powerful interior springs and has every reason to become the most dynamic center of the economy and policy of the 21st century.

Third, it is distinguished by an unusually complex coupling of various varidirectional interests, trends and traditions.

In Europe we observe a relatively symmetrical picture, which, with certain reservations, could be designated the "confrontation" of the blocs. Political processes occur in a single plane here, as it were. And the possibility of compromise, granted all the complexity of its achievement, exists in linear space.

In the Far East the vectors of allied and national interests sometimes lay in different planes or intersect at the most varied angles. The task of building systems of international security here is, consequently, even more difficult.

In order to evaluate the entire confusion of the interweave of interests and find the optimum solution of problems a "snapshot" of the present state of the political process in the region in question is insufficient. The author of the monograph has "set himself the task of making a historical analysis of the Soviet Union's foreign policy activity in the Far East" (p 14). And he is undoubtedly right: only thus is it possible to see the roots of the majority of difficult problems and their entire contradictoriness. "Whoever knows the past will control the future".

How has the scholar coped with the set task? To avoid drowning in an ocean of facts and figures he superimposes on the problems a grid, as it were. The period in question is broken down into six stages: 1945-1949, 1950-1954, 1955-1960 and subsequently in decades. There are reasons for this breakdown. However, we would note, separation of the 1960's on the grounds that "our country embarked on the stage of developed socialism" (p 15) would appear dubious, at least. The factological analysis is conducted in four directions: the USSR's relations with the United States, China, the DPRK and Japan.

The abundant factual data arranged thus (tribute should be paid to the author here for the great efforts invested in the laborious business of the informational yield) enable us to view certain aspects of Soviet policy in the region anew, in nontrivial manner. For decades, for example, the gratis aid to other countries was extolled proudly and in every which way in the press and political science works. There is no doubt that assistance should be disinterested. But disinterest is by no means a substitute for mutual benefit. And we are now forced to sorrowfully acknowledge that in the 1960's the principle of mutual benefit was subject to deliberate deformation to suit propaganda tendencies. But, what is even more astonishing, unintelligible situations arose where the benefits from cooperation were shamefully glossed over.

The granting to Korean workers of the right to procure timber for the DPRK in the timber establishments of Khabarovsk Kray is a well-known fact. But on what terms only specialists know. The agreement, we read in the book, provided for compensation "by way of the procurement, removal and loading onto freightcars for the Soviet Union of 1.33 cm of timber per cubic meter of timber procured and delivered to the DPRK border for Korea's needs" (p 110). Considering the complexity of the demographic and economic problems in this region, this was truly a decision of zealous propriety. However, to what source does the author refer in adducing this eloquent fact? Material of the archives of Khabarovsk

Kray! It is just as little known that Soviet wheat has traditionally been exchanged for a quantity of Korean rice of equal value, and potassium fertilizer, for nitrogen fertilizer.

To the author's credit is attention to a new range of problems, which previously had been examined either quite superficially or only in narrowly specialized works. They include, specifically, problems of the environment and the dangerous "overcatch" of certain types of commercial fish which has come to light. "The extensive assimilation of the natural wealth of Chukotka and Alaska has put on the agenda the need for the formulation of scientifically substantiated limits of economic activity and a solicitous attitude toward nature, which is particularly sensitive to technogenic and anthropogenic influences," the book rightly observes (pp 165-166).

Unfortunately, the emphasis is put on factology. Does this reflect the customary timidity of our social scientists in the face of nonstandard conclusions and a fear of deviating from intellectual official standards? Possibly. Let us cite two typical examples. "Availing itself of the fact that as of 13 January 1950 the Soviet Union had ceased to take part in the work of the Security Council and other UN bodies as a sign of protest against the refusal of the pro-American majority to accord the representative of the PRC his rightful place in this international organization, on 25 June the United States pushed through the Security Council a resolution which accused the DPRK of 'aggression'..." the scholar writes (pp 63-64). It is incomprehensible to what extent the demonstrative refusal to participate in the work of the UN bodies corresponded to the interests of the USSR and its allies. Or was there no other way of acting? Why? Keeping to the beaten track, the author bashfully avoids an assessment.

Several pages of the book are devoted to an analysis of the events surrounding the peace treaty with Japan signed on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco. But it is not a question of the fact that "the head of the Soviet delegation, A.A Gromyko, resolutely exposed the insidious designs of American ruling circles" (p 80). In the historical perspective the question is of a larger scale: how justified was the USSR's refusal to append its signature to the treaty? The consequences of this step included an end to the existence of the Allied Council for Japan, via which the USSR had exercised relations with this country; the Japanese Government's refusal to recognize the special status of Soviet diplomats; an exacerbation of relations all along the line; considerable efforts spent on the restoration of diplomatic relations; the absence still of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. The list could be continued.

Reading the monograph, which appeared in 1988, one involuntarily catches oneself thinking that many of the just as customary and formerly unshakable evaluations can no longer be considered a standard of scientific logic. It can hardly be disputed that the "all-around growth and

strengthening of the positions of the world socialist system and the general weakening of the forces of imperialism" (p 157) were the objective prerequisite of the transition to detente in the world. But the following explanation is no longer satisfactory today. The author maintains that "the White House cherished the dream of holding up the course of history," although "it cannot be held up by any intrigues of reaction" (p 178).

It cannot be denied that there were, are and will evidently continue to be for a long time to come "intrigues of reaction". But how many times we find in them virtually the sole explanation for all difficulties and setbacks! The more so in that the thought of the author just quoted pertains to the period of the 1970's, when the "holding up of history" occurred for reasons of a different kind also. And this is not so much to reproach the author as to regret the continuing sluggishness of thinking still typical of our historical science and timidity in the face of a reconsideration of the cliched evaluations which have for decades wandered from book to book.

As we can see, B. Slavinskiy's study is a reflection of both the strong and weak aspects of domestic works on the history of international relations. At the same time it provides a wealth of food for thought and clearly outlines the range of most complex problems of the political and economic development of the Far East. And this is the scientific value of the monograph in question.

Footnote

* B.N. Slavinskiy, "Vneshnyaya politika SSSR na Dalnem Vostoke. 1945-1986" [The USSR's Foreign Policy in the Far East. 1945-1986], Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp335.

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S&T Progress in Western Countries Poses Problems for Third World

18160003o Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 88 pp 155-156

[R. Avakov review: "External Factors in the Economy of the Young States"]

[Text] The internationalization of production and the intensive shifts in the international division of labor have strengthened the interconnection of the national economies of the developing countries and the world capitalist economy and made the process of the surmounting of their lag an inalienable part of world development. Importance is attached to a balanced assessment of the role of external factors in the formation of economic independence, to an analysis of which the book in question* is devoted. It provides a multidimensional picture of the changes in the main groups of

countries within the framework of the world capitalist economy and analyzes their relations and contradictions. The author has succeeded in ascertaining certain most important trends in the strategy of imperialism in the third world.

The disintegration of the metropolis-colony political system made possible, as G. Shirokov shows, a change in the traditional functions of the developing countries in the world capitalist economy and transformed the forms of their dependence. New relations emerged between the center and the periphery, the basis of which was transition chiefly to economic methods of exploitation, a consequence of which was the young states' expanded participation in the international division of labor. This, in turn, created imperialism's objective interest in pulling up a number of former colonies economically to the level of the industrially developed West.

These changes were reflected most fully in the implementation of industrialization and in a strategy oriented toward a strengthening of economic independence, which, despite appreciable differences in different groups of countries, was marked by many similar features. The author's line of argument concerning the reasons for this approach based on a comparative historical analysis is of undoubted interest (p 24). But for brevity's sake I shall dwell merely on the conclusions projected onto the position of the developing countries in the world capitalist economy (WCE). It is a question of the link between industrialization and the potential opportunity for the developing countries to change their unequal position in the WCE and broaden their participation in a mutually profitable international division of labor (p 40). Truly, as a result of the creation of national industry certain changes have occurred in their position within the framework of the WCE, but the predominantly extensive nature of the industrialization has meant a slow expansion of effective demand on the home market given limited export opportunities. This unpropitious correlation of external and internal factors has inevitably reduced the economic growth rate of this group of countries.

Studies on the developing countries sometimes question the economic expediency of the policy of the preferential development of industry, particularly in connection with the pronounced deterioration there of the food situation. The book analyzes the impact of the said policy on other sectors and the possibilities of balanced growth or, on the contrary, the objective regularity of a disturbance of this balance. In the course of economic growth there necessarily arise imbalances between sectors of the economy, and their leveling and upward adjustment with controlled and spontaneous mechanisms are the essence of ongoing development. The author has displayed, it would seem, a certain inconsistency here, believing that the possibilities of unbalanced growth in the developing countries, particularly at the initial stages, were exaggerated in connection with the uncritical transference thither of the criteria of the industrial revolution in the

West (p 116). However, the experience of the young states demonstrates precisely a pronounced takeoff of the rate of growth of industry, particularly of sectors which are new to its structure, and the scale of the changes compared with the rate of development of the economy as a whole, not to mention agriculture. True, noting the "pressed nature" of the development of third world countries, the author emphasizes somewhat further on the objective normality of the disruption of balanced growth and the increase in disproportionality in their economy (p 120). This position would seem more justified.

The formulation in the work of such a problem as the particular features of the developing countries' industrial exports—a qualitatively new function for them in the WCE—merits attention. The vast amount of statistical material processed by the author and the calculations he has made enable us to imagine the scale of the changes in their position on the world markets of finished industrial products. Of course, these indicators are dissimilar for different groups of countries. Whereas in the exports of the "new industrial" countries products of the so-called nonresource sectors accounted (in the 1970's) for two-thirds of their value, in the others, for only one-third (p 143). Noting the increased role of the TNC in the production and exports of finished products from the developing countries, G. Shirokov calls attention—and this should be emphasized—to the active participation in this process of small and medium-sized foreign firms, Japanese particularly, and this trend is clearly strengthening (p 159).

However, the expansion of the developing countries' positions on the world capitalist finished products market has been impeded by the policy of new protectionism of the West based primarily on the imposition of nontariff barriers. An even more appreciable inhibitor of their industrial exports, in the future particularly, will be the increased proportion of science-intensive products in international commodity exchange, in which the developing countries' participation is negligible owing to the lag of the industrial base and national S&T potential. We would note that the problem of the organization of local R&D and its influence on the acceleration and diversification of industrial growth merits a more detailed description than the book provides.

In his evaluation of the prospects of industrial exports G. Shirokov emphasizes the expediency of their growing reorientation toward markets of the developing and socialist countries (p 169). I believe that this idea merits more detailed study and further investigation with reference to the realities of the modern world. But the fact that the book poses the problem is important.

What has been the result for the developing countries of the contradictory changes which have occurred within the framework of the WCE as a result of the cyclical and structural crises of the past decade? G. Shirokov believes that their further differentiation is under way,

but in a specific form—given a sharp stratification into two unequal groups. One, declining constantly in terms of numbers, is participating increasingly in the international division of labor, the other, which includes the vast majority of developing countries, is being pushed out of the international division of labor under the impact of S&T progress and the policy of imperialism (p 170).

How far may this process go? The author believes, and we agree, that "...the trend toward the reduced participation of the developing countries in the international division of labor is not of a universal nature" (p 224). However, it is hard to expect changes for the better in the immediate future in the young states' position in the WCE inasmuch as the lack of correspondence of their economic structures to the new technological model of production in the imperialist states is growing. Consequently, their opportunities for accustoming themselves to the new forms of the international division of labor are limited, and for a large group, constantly diminishing. In order to change the situation concentrated investments and the assimilation of modern technology are needed, which would seem problematical under the conditions of the developing countries' growing debt, whose repayment has now become a principal instrument of their exploitation (p 226).

G. Shirokov's work is distinguished by clarity of position, soundness of the statistical material employed and, what is most important, novelty in the formulation of a number of complex urgent problems of theoretical and practical interest. This is particularly important since the book is devoted to a subject which has long been extensively researched in Soviet "third world studies".

Footnote

* G.K. Shirokov, "Razvivayushchiyesya strany v mirovom kapitalisticheskom khozyaystve" [The Developing Countries in the World Capitalist Economy], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatelstva "Nauka", 1987, pp 239.

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Articles in MEMO Journal Not Translated
18160003p Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian
No 10, Oct 88 pp 1-2

[Text] Russian summary of major articles pp 3-4

Science Under Capitalism: Economic Factors of Development (S. Nikitin, A. Alyabyev, M. Stepanova) pp 34-42

French Political Scientists on the Election Results .. pp 43-51

Laying the Foundations of a New International Community (Y. Nakasone) pp 73-77

Food: Consumption and Prices (A. Sizov) ... pp 98-102

Structure and Functioning of Modern Finance Capital . pp 103-106

Conference in Kabul pp 107-112

Japanese Capital Export Trends (S. Kharlamov) pp 113-116

The World's Political Elite Confers in Moscow (V. Popov) pp 117-120

American Sovietologists on our Economic Restructuring (A. Izyumov, V. Popov) pp 135-138

When Commonsense Acquires the Status of Theory (K. Nikolayev) pp 139-144

'Mechanism Qua Mechanism' (L. Nochevkina) pp 144-146

Problem of the Youth—Economic Aspect (A. Salmin) . pp 148-150

Western Scholars on the 'Qadhafi Phenomenon' (D. Malysheva) pp 152-154

From the Presses p 157

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