



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

Daily Report

Supplement

East Europe

19980515 188

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

JPRS-EER-93-023-S
Wednesday
24 March 1993

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

East Europe SUPPLEMENT

JPRS-EER-93-023-S

CONTENTS

24 March 1993

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

HUNGARY

* Szabo Criticizes SZDSZ's 15-Point Plan [168 ORA 9 Feb]	1
* Environmentalist Vargha on Gabcikovo Dam [FIGYELO 28 Jan]	3
* Draft Law on Communist-Era Secret Agents Viewed [168 ORA 23 Feb]	5
* 1992 Record of Bankruptcies Assessed [FIGYELO 18 Feb]	7
* Roundtable Discussion on 1993 Export Prospects [FIGYELO 18 Feb]	8
* Telecommunications Development Status Report [FIGYELO 25 Feb]	12

POLAND

* Controversy Over Proposed 'Euroregions' [POLITYKA 27 Feb]	13
* Poland's Role in West-East Security Stressed [PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY 14 Feb]	15
* Rokita Explains Government's Policy Goals [RZECZPOSPOLITA 20-21 Feb]	17
* Left, Right Political Parties Characterized [SPOTKANIA 28 Jan-3 Feb]	19
* Polish-German Controversy Threatens Relations [TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY 21 Feb]	22
* Radicalization, Populism in Center Accord [POLITYKA 27 Feb]	25
* Precongress ZChN Party Activities Evaluated [POLITYKA 27 Feb]	26
* Army Modernization Hurt by Lack of Funds [POLSKA ZBROJNA 15 Feb]	28
* Prospects for Catholic Press Assessed	30
* Current State Viewed [LAD 21 Feb]	30
* Call for New Daily [LAD 21 Feb]	31
* Need for New Language [LAD 21 Feb]	32
* New Catholic Press Agency [GAZETA WYBORCZA 8 Mar]	32

SLOVAKIA

* Antiterrorist Unit Facing Hardships [PRAVDA 26 Jan]	34
* Indifference to Publicizing Achievements Noted [SLOBODNY PIATOK 19 Feb]	35
* Commentary Views Private Entrepreneurs [SLOBODNY PIATOK 19 Feb]	36
* President Kovac's Wife Talks About Husband [SLOBODNY PIATOK 26 Feb]	36

YUGOSLAVIA

Macedonia

Compromises Among Parties on National Symbols [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 13 Feb]	40
Role, Political Aspects of Military [PULS 11 Feb]	41
General Staff, Civilian Leadership Discussed [VECER 27-28 Feb]	42

it claims that we are slowly arriving at a point where many identify privatization as abuse and corruption on part of those in power. They say so, because the ruling parties' clientele is seated on the boards and supervisory committees, and thus the ruling parties are able to exert partisan influence.

[Szabo] One of the 15 points recommends that National Assembly representatives not be allowed to become directors of state enterprises, and that conflict of interest rules be established in this regard. I am convinced of the opposite. If anywhere, this is the place where parliament could exercise its oversight authority. Because this way, while keeping business secrets, parliament is able to keep its eyes on these state enterprises through its representatives. This is legitimate interference, consistent with law. Serving as a member of the board of a private firm, or participating in some business would be incompatible with the status of a National Assembly representative, in my view. In doing so he would not represent in parliament the interests of his party, of his constituency, but would become a lobbyist for a firm that pays him well. Although lobbying might be a respectable profession, it should not be pursued while seated in parliament.

[Bauer] Our view is obviously different in this regard. I regard as very unfortunate a situation in which National Assembly representatives serve as members of boards of directors, because state enterprises also have their own special interests which they try to enforce vis-a-vis the ministries and the AVU. This is why it is unfortunate when a representative has to play such a "lobbying" role. But I disapprove of this for yet another reason: One cannot avoid recognizing this as a vehicle that provides significant extra income to representatives. And thus, by no coincidence, these positions are occupied by ruling party representatives. Minister Ivan Szabo has asked every party seated in parliament to delegate representatives to serve on such boards. But well before that, several ruling party representatives have already held such positions. I am also aware of the fact that the AVU requested the local government of a city in the countryside to delegate one of its members to the supervisory committee of an enterprise. They also told the local government who that person should be: a member of the ruling party, of course. We regard this as a very unfortunate process.

Breakthrough Points Here and There

[Radai] Do you regard this as unfortunate, despite the fact that opposition representatives, too, comply with such requests?

[Bauer] Things like this happen, but the SZDSZ disapproves of that, too....

[Szabo] This is a matter of perception, if you will. I regard positions held in private enterprises as incompatible. If I may say so, the legal view and practice that prevails in Europe is closer to the way we think and act....

[Radai] The SZDSZ proposal package also deals with unemployment. The free democrats do not dispute the inevitability of unemployment today; moreover, they expect increased unemployment, but they also state that the government could take a number of actions to reduce unemployment. In their view, the unemployment rate could soon reach a stage where it fuels significant social conflict. For example, many people come under the influence of extremist groups.

[Szabo] Unquestionably, unemployment in Hungary is a very cruel experience, mainly because society is not prepared for it spiritually. I regard as the gravest problem the fact that there is a rather great spread in the unemployment rate per the various trades and per regions. In some regions the unemployment rate could rise as high as 20-40 percent. This should, indeed, be countered with regional crisis management programs and with other—retraining, industrial placement, and service development—strategies. On the other hand, I do not believe that paying unemployment compensation for half a year in advance would resolve things. A person finding a job a week later would retain the money. Similarly, providing state salaries for a year to people at the start of their careers does not appear as feasible. We examined this proposal: Implementing this idea would require an additional net amount of 30 billion forints. This could only be financed from taxes or from inflation. I believe that the poor people at the IMF would have a heart attack if we were to place such a proposal on the table.

[Bauer] By all means, our proposal calls for a modest state salary for people starting their careers; they could begin working immediately after graduating from school, and they would not be dependent on whatever opportunities the firms where they work have. This system works in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia, and in Austria. Our proposals do not provide comprehensive solutions, of course, because comprehensive solutions can only be provided by an entire economic policy. In any event, implementing our proposal would alleviate the burden of unemployment, the consequences of unemployment. Unfortunately, an opposition party can only make small proposals like these, small corrections. Implementing these would also cost money, of course; funds would have to be allocated from the budget for these purposes. But such allocations could also turn into savings, because the amount expended for unemployment compensation would be reduced. We rejected the budget submitted by the government to the National Assembly by no coincidence; our priorities are different. We would spend more money for these purposes, and less for other purposes which the government regards as more important.

[Szabo] I have always been an advocate of seeking a compromise, of course. But I would like to see the other side of the paper, and discuss the eight economic policy points that we adopted at the MDF national congress. Those points reveal that we recognize exactly the same points of breakthrough as the SZDSZ....

[Bauer] To the extent that one is able to learn the contents of the MDF proposals from the press—there shall be effective state control over finances; there shall be a land law; there shall be a housing concept; privatization shall be accelerated and rendered more open—I must ask: Have they not taken note of who was governing Hungary? Because if this is what the MDF thinks should be done, these considerations should have already been enforced during their two and a half years in office.

[Szabo] The MDF is not alone in governing; it does so jointly, in coalition with two other parties. Accordingly, it is not always capable of implementing its own decisions, because it has no absolute majority.

[Bauer] Not even Ivan Szabo could be serious about claiming that the Smallholders Party and the Christian Democratic People's Party prevented the MDF from having its government realize the above-mentioned goals....

[Szabo] Both the MDF and the government can agree to anything that does not increase the budget deficit—things that do not require increased taxes, and do not threaten the anti-inflationary policies. Accordingly, we are receptive to any proposal, but we must bear the above responsibility. Even if we cannot provide the most favorable answer, and particularly not if we feel that our action endangers the societal interest. This is our concept. Although far be it from me to presume malice, an opposition party is able to present demands which can cause us to fail if we accept such demands.

[Bauer] I believe that those rather expensive needs that could cause the failure of the government would not come from the SZDSZ, but much rather from ruling party circles.

[Szabo] I would say the same if I were in the opposition.

*** Environmentalist Vargha on Gabčíkovo Dam**

93CH0422A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
28 Jan 93 pp 17-18

[Interview with biologist Janos Vargha, member of the Danube Circle and chairman of the Ister Foundation, by Laszlo Hollos; place and date not given: "The 'Horror Story' of the Bos Dam; Is It an Accomplished Fact? Janos Vargha Believes That the Danube Could Be Returned to Its Basin Within a Month"]

[Text] *The person interviewed in this article (an outstanding expert on the subject) expresses his own view, of course. Since this topic is of national and even international significance, we welcome the expression of concurring as well as dissenting views from persons involved in this matter.*

—The Editor

The last time I conversed with biologist Janos Vargha—a member of the Danube Circle and chairman of the Ister

Foundation—was on 18 October 1992. There still was hope at the time; it appeared that the construction of the Bos [Gabčíkovo] hydroelectric plant—an aggression that threatens with ecological catastrophe—could be prevented. A few days later, however, the robbing of the river began at Dunacsuny [Cunovo], and since then, the Danube has been diverted.

[Hollos] How did we get this far? Could we have prevented the diversion?

[Vargha] They began operating the facilities of the so-called C-Variant in a semifinished condition, in gross violation of permits, quality control, and other rules applicable to investments of a technical nature. We could say that this involved gangster tactics aided by the Czech-Slovak state, but no one would hold anyone to account, because politicians over there were also involved. The purpose of the diversion was to pressure the Hungarian side to agree to the operation of the dam facilities at Dunakiliti. To accomplish this, they cast several "baits." Organized by the Chamber of Engineers in Hungary, a propaganda campaign began to glorify the technical compromise. Meanwhile, the unfavorable effects of the C-Variant—operating at less than full capacity—could be seen immediately in the ground water and the river basin. Many people might have come to understand only at that point what a dam with a side channel really meant.

[Hollos] What do you think of the role played by the government and the Danube Circle regarding Bos?

[Vargha] The Danube Circle had already called for the cancellation of the agreement prior to the 1990 parliamentary elections, but a National Assembly resolution that found the dam to be superfluous and damaging was passed only in April 1991. But still, the government has failed to do everything it could have done to reach a new agreement that would have settled problems arising from not building a dam. To the contrary, government circles constantly encouraged the other side: Let them continue with the C-Variant; Hungary would help reach a compromise. Environmental Protection and Regional Development Minister Sandor K. Keresztes led this chorus, but so far as I know, Minister Csaba Siklos also proved to be very "active." The Danube Rehabilitation Office—previously a government commissioner's office—and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development also hold responsibility for delaying the start of rehabilitation. In the government, Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl and his small staff were alone in representing the position adopted by parliament. Firm diplomatic action on part of the Foreign Ministry was greatly lacking, and so was an alternative proposal the government should have developed by using funds it expended for the dam.

While our environmental protection minister "lobbied" in Europe against supporting the dam, the Slovak party succeeded in "smuggling in" a Danish hydrologist to chair the Common Market expert committee. He had

been working as a subordinate to the Slovak experts for more than a year under the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program.

[Hollos] What have Hungarian professionals and the various interest groups done?

[Vargha] Even the smallest concern of Hungarian professionals dealing with technical-hydrological issues is greater than giving thought to available alternatives possibly eliminating the dam; this "game" involves not only Bos, but also Nagymaros, Adony, Fajsz, and I could go on and on where else they would build dams. People in the government who had previously (and supposedly even today) represented environmentalist views—there were a few of these—became part of a mechanism in which the cause of the Danube no longer appeared as overly interesting. The same way, it is becoming more difficult to judge the operations of various interest groups. Industry policy considerations that view water resource management as an industry branch with many billions of forints worth of assets—one that could also exert significant political influence—is playing an increasing role. At a time when political rivalry is heightening, this view could become more important than environmental considerations from the standpoint of both the opposition and the ruling parties.

[Hollos] So then, is everything lost? Is there no way out?

[Vargha] There is a way out. The only problem is that regulating the river, activities related to the transformation of the river, are running in parallel with technological development toward a dead-end street. This means adding channels to rivers and utilizing the power of rivers by constructing dams. The need to change this outlook is gaining strength elsewhere, but not among Hungarian hydrologists, for now. The signs of a changing attitude can already be seen clearly in West Europe and in the United States, where they are paying increased attention to the rehabilitation of rivers.

[Hollos] So then?

[Vargha] We must try to return to an acceptable equilibrium. This is not impossible; concepts to accomplish this have already emerged. The obstacles are of a political and economic character. We probably need a substantially more democratic political system to get out of the dead-end street. The situation is made more difficult by having to deal with a river that constitutes a border and this provides pretexts and opportunities for fueling political conflicts. Whereas in the early 1950's Slovak and Hungarian engineers had planned the dam "hand in hand," in the framework of the greatest "love affair," and even though Slovak and Hungarian communists had signed the agreement.

The Danube is not the only thing at issue, also at issue is the need to set a precedent in the course of which we take steps that lead us out of the dead-end street. We must do more to call international attention to this matter, and to appropriately pressure Slovakia to return the Danube to

its basin. This, incidentally, could be accomplished in the course of a month. The WWF's (World Wildlife Fund) hydrobiologist and hydroconstruction expert has already prepared preliminary estimates in this regard at the request of the Ister Foundation and the Danube Circle. Any action other than returning the Danube to its basin (such as damming the Danube with bottom thresholds) would only aggravate the situation.

[Hollos] And yet, Julius Binder, the chairman and president of the Pozsony [Bratislava] investment firm Vodohospodarska Vystavba, recently raised the prospect of installing new turbines, dams, spillways, and bottom thresholds. In addition, Slovakia wants to use the new turbines for energy production purposes contrary to the London agreement. How fast do we need to take temporary precautionary steps?

[Vargha] Mr. Binder's plans are unacceptable. What we're dealing with here is their desire to sustain and operate the dam at any price, regardless of costs, and irrespective of the effects of the dam. They should be taking a far more moderate stance. I do not believe that there exist any rational precautionary measures. The Germans tried to take precautionary steps regarding the Rhine and failed. Precautionary, offsetting measures could achieve only one thing: They would demonstrate to the world that Hungary has agreed to the given situation, that it has given up the struggle. Operating the Dunakiliti retainer would have the same effect.

The circular embankment at Nagymaros exists to this date; they are constantly pumping water out of it. This is total nonsense. A private contractor has made an offer to dismantle the industrial railroad tracks in exchange for the material only; this would be the first logical step toward restoration. The Central-Danube Valley Water Directorate prevented this from happening. The private contractor would go as far as paying money in order to receive permission to perform the work. All this is in vain. But the C-Variant is not of the essence. They would like to start up the Dunakiliti dam, then the one at Nagymaros, and so on.

[Hollos] All this is consistent with Mr. Binder's statement according to which he is certain that the Dunakiliti dam is going to be placed into operation and that the one at Nagymaros is also going to be constructed. How come he is so sure about his activities?

[Vargha] Primarily because the Hungarian side is not doing everything it could to change the situation.

[Hollos] Are there still some people who wink from here to over there?

[Vargha] There are some, of course. Most recently I read an article by an engineer named Kortvelyesi, who assured former Austrian Vice Chancellor Hannes Androsch—a successful businessman—that there were, indeed some people in Hungary who supported the construction of the dam, but they did not dare to open their mouths. But they do open their mouths, indeed. For example, a

"jokers' club" called Realist Greens exists which glorifies the dam system under the direction and active leadership of Jozsef Koncz.

An article by Laszlo Koti, one of the division chiefs at the OVF [National Directorate General for Water Power and Hydraulic Engineering], was published in the "Opinion" column of HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in which he reported that water affairs tend to erase from the people's consciousness—in a manner that would "put Orwell to shame"—phobias about Lakes Balaton and Velence, as well as about eels, and tried to make people understand how important the facilities on the Danube and the Tisza were.

[Hollos] As long as you mentioned Orwell: What does the future hold? What is the situation going to be in three or four years?

[Vargha] Things are not moving in the right direction. As Andras Lanyi said: We arrived too late to receive anything. The East European systems joined—are trying to join—the Western world after it has gone bankrupt. This also has an important impact on political processes: It presumes the existence of a strong state far more than a democracy built on a balance between civil society and the state. Under these circumstances the prospects of environmental protection are sad, just as the prospects of all other interest are, which cannot be represented by either the state or by repressive organizations. We may be seeing the signs of a situation like this, here, in East Europe.

Unless we are able to return the Danube to its old basin and restore these areas, the Szigetkoz is going to lose its beauty, ecological richness, and advantages derived from its peculiar hydrological features, just as the Rhine did, as a result of its diversion.

*** Draft Law on Communist-Era Secret Agents Viewed**

93CH0481B Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian
23 Feb 93 pp 8-9

[Interview with Balint Magyar and Laszlo Kover, National Assembly representatives of the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats, respectively, by Katalin Rangos; place and date not given: "Everyone Obligated To Be Sworn In; The Agent Law Is Being Prepared; Does It Affect 30,000 People?"]

[Text] *Are former secret agents—the III/III's—justifiably more nervous these days because an Agent Law is being prepared, one that is very similar to the legislative proposal introduced in the summer of 1990 by the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]? Katalin Rangos interviewed SZDSZ representative Balint Magyar, and FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] representative Laszlo Kover; the latter is chairman of the National Assembly Committee on National Security.*

[Rangos] I understand that about 120 amendments were introduced to the legislative proposal on checking certain important office holders, in common parlance: the "Agent Law." SZDSZ circles expressed satisfaction over the fact that the government had agreed to many of these amendments.

[Magyar] Correct, indeed. The government incorporated almost every essential element of Gabor Demszky's and Peter Hack's III/III legislative proposal submitted to parliament in the summer of 1990. We could have made far more progress in closing this case had they acted on that proposal at the time. Despite this, however, the fact that the government has significantly come closer to our legislative proposal on three points is an important development. First of all, the government narrowed the group to which the proposal applies as compared to its original proposal: simply put, the people to which the law would apply.

Parliament First

[Rangos] What group would have been covered by the government's proposal?

[Magyar] I made an estimate in those days; about 30,000 people would have been investigated based on the government's proposal. This would have meant either the failure to enforce the law, because it would have been impossible to investigate 30,000 cases, or they would have randomly picked from among the people. This would not have worked either. We recommended in those days the investigation of people who were supposed to be sworn in. The present government proposal covers a somewhat broader group than that, but this would be acceptable to us. At the same time, the government proposal would not only apply to the III/III agents and to officers, but on a somewhat broader scale; it would also include the predecessors of this group and the enforcement authorities. This is acceptable from the SZDSZ standpoint. The procedural aspects of this matter are most important. In this regard, too, they have come closer to our view, because the government proposal enables this action not in the framework of some arbitrary proceedings, and from a practical standpoint the legislative proposal could not be used as a vehicle for political reckoning or for political extortion.

[Rangos] What was in the original proposal?

[Magyar] From a practical standpoint: a committee of four, with a majority representing the government. Whether someone's past was examined from this standpoint would have depended on an initiative made by this committee. Based on the present government proposal, the National Security Committee would initiate the process, and a three-judge panel composed of independent judges would examine an entire case. These three judges would be appointed by the presidents of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court respectively, i.e., the proceeding would come close to automatic action, the way we proposed it. This feature guarantees a truly independent approach to the issue.

The present government proposal is subject to strong criticism on two points. First, even if the law were to be adopted relatively soon, the law would not become operational from a practical standpoint prior to the 1994 elections. I believe that particularly in instances when this parliament does justice, it owes the nation this much: to be the first to have itself investigated, and to judge others only thereafter. Other than that, in an odd way, a proposal to amend the Criminal Code of Laws had already been submitted when the government submitted its original proposal. When this proposed amendment was removed from the agenda, the government's originally proposed III/III law also disappeared, but both reappeared once again. That amendment pertains to changes regarding state secrets, and oddly enough, it is being introduced by the Ministry of the Interior, and not by the Ministry of Justice. The essence of the amendment is that no one is authorized to have in his possession documents that constitute state secrets, and failing to hand in such documents within a certain period of time constitutes a crime. The purpose of this amendment is that relative to the III/III law, the original documents of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense could be used as proof. But aware of the conditions in these institutions around 1989, one cannot rule out the possibility that the successor organizations to these predecessor parties hold documents that pertain to this subject.

[Rangos] Accordingly, are you concerned that proceedings could be initiated, let's say, against the officers of the successor parties on grounds of violating state secrets, or are you concerned that later on they would not accept documents emerging from these sources as authentic, even though they could be authentic?

[Magyar] Once we have an evidentiary proceeding in which an independent judicial panel attempts to examine these proofs, it becomes incomprehensible why only the Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry documents could be considered as proof, or, alternatively, if such documents are found somewhere else, why those documents could not be admitted as proof?

A Rather Long List

[Rangos] Let us try to include in this interview all the basic information contained in this legislative proposal, information that's worth publicizing. First of all, to whom does it apply?

[Kover] The legislative proposal includes a rather long list, ranging from National Assembly representatives and persons elected by them and subject to taking an oath of office, all the way to government officials of various categories and ranks, i.e., state secretaries and deputy state secretaries, but it also includes judges, prosecutors, ambassadors, the president and vice presidents of the Hungarian National Bank, department heads at universities, generals, the national police chief and his deputies, the supreme chiefs of police, police chiefs, city mayors and the chairman of city general assemblies, the editors

of the Hungarian Radio, the Hungarian Television, and the Hungarian News Agency [MTI], and the leading employees of newspapers under state majority ownership whose circulation exceeds 50,000.

[Rangos] Does it matter if someone served as an agent if the circulation is below 50,000?

[Kover] One could argue that, and I told you only what the legislative proposal had to say.

[Rangos] By what logic did they establish the 50,000-circulation limit?

[Kover] I have no idea, I must admit. A number of issues remained unclear in the law, even beyond the fundamental problems. This broadcast would not be long enough to enumerate these....

[Rangos] Accordingly, will these people be prompted to be evaluated by some kind of a committee, and only three people will examine the large group of people you just described?

[Kover] Yes.

[Rangos] The proposal requires the examination of quite a few people. How could a three-member committee perform all that?

[Kover] For now, I do not have an answer to this question either.

[Rangos] On this basis one concludes that those who create this law, the people who have thought through all this, believe that only a very few people would have to be examined.

[Kover] I share this view: Not too many people can be found. I should note that this proposal is an improvement over the previous proposal, because it clearly states that the fact that someone's name is on a list is not sufficient proof to indicate that he was an agent. Evidence must be developed that shows that such person has caused damage to someone else with his activities.

[Rangos] How would such an evidentiary proceeding look like? Would they summon the public office holders and present them with proof, and then the public official would voluntarily resign from his office, or would there be an opportunity to appeal, or to use some other legitimate recourse?

[Kover] The person to be examined or investigated must be invited to appear before the committee, where he has an opportunity to present his view. This, too, would influence the decision, of course. If the person's view is not taken into consideration, and if he does not resign his office, or does not initiate his own relief from his post, a situation arises in which they would publicize his name, and the fact....

[Rangos] That he was an agent?

[Kover] Well yes, that's what it's all about. But the decision could be challenged in court, and a court proceeding like this would have a delaying effect on publicizing the person's name.

Visit to the Ministry of the Interior

[Rangos] In other words, before they would announce to the world that this person was an agent, he would have an opportunity to prove to a court of law that he was not agent.

[Kover] Yes.

[Rangos] Did the National Security Committee of the National Assembly have access to the record on the basis of which they could summon the persons who might be suspected of having been agents?

[Kover] No, the members of the committee did not see the documents themselves; although they visited the Interior Ministry archives twice, they could see only the place where these documents were stored. I regard this as appropriate.

[Rangos] Actually, this entire agent issue had been dealt with on a consensual basis between the opposition and the ruling parties, insofar as everyone has manifested sufficient self-restraint in handling this issue.

[Kover] Yes, and insofar as I am concerned, I am very pleased with that. The work environment at the committee is normal.

* 1992 Record of Bankruptcies Assessed

93CH0429A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
18 Feb 93 p 32

[Article by Ervin Zsubori: "10,000 Liquidation Proceedings; The Year of Bankruptcies"]

[Text] *Last year the courts received about 10,000 requests for liquidation, and more than 4,000 organizations filed for bankruptcy.*

The year 1992 could appropriately be called the year of bankruptcies; in that year the institution of going bankrupt returned to the Hungarian economy, causing no small alarm. The revival of this institution created a rather great impact: A significant part of the enterprises were swept away by an avalanche of bankruptcies in the April sunshine—more than 2,000 businesses were forced to declare bankruptcy.

More Than Half the Number of Bankrupt Firms Are Limited-Liability Corporations

Fortunately, however, things did not continue that way. In May only 200 bankruptcy applications were filed, and from then on, the monthly number of filings stabilized around 150. Thus, according to summary data provided by the Ministry of Justice, the total number of bankruptcy filings during the entire year did not even amount

to twice the number of the April filings: 4,231 declarations of bankruptcy were requested altogether. (Due to the undeveloped state and uncertainty of the statistical system early in the year, these figures should be viewed as 90-95 percent reliable, as good approximations.)

In examining the originators of the petitions we find that mandatory bankruptcy filings clearly led the way: In more than 80 percent of the cases business managers filed for involuntary bankruptcy under legal constraint. More than half the number of businesses involved were limited-liability corporations. The number of bankrupt cooperatives—almost 1,000—is also relatively high. The bankruptcy wave wiped out only 500 state enterprises, and only about a hundred of some other types of corporations.

Considering the capacity of courts, and deadlines delayed by several months in some instances, the fact that 2,699 bankruptcy proceedings were completed in 1992 should satisfy everyone. Less favorable was the fact that in most instances bankruptcy proceedings were concluded as a result of so-called administrative decisions. Considering the completed proceedings on their merits, we find that on an annual basis there is no significant difference between the number of proceedings concluded on the basis of agreements, and others, which continued into liquidation proceedings. (The tendency to reach agreements was high toward the end of summer and in early fall, but unsuccessful negotiations aiming for agreements outnumbered the successful agreements toward the end of the year.) In viewing the types of business organizations that filed for bankruptcy, we find that in cases involving cooperatives the number of bankruptcy agreements was twice the number of liquidations, while the opposite is true in cases involving limited-liability corporations.

Accordingly, the past year was at least as much a year of liquidations, as it was a year of bankruptcies. Moreover, the summary data encompass a rather large field—10,602 liquidation initiatives. In this regard, too, the number of filings peaked in April, but not as much as the bankruptcy filings did.

Liquidation Wave Has Yet To Be Broken

And yet, during the entire year we were dealing more with a liquidation wave than a bankruptcy wave, one that has not yet been broken: Courts receive an average of 700 new requests for liquidation each month, and this figure is five times the average monthly number of requests for bankruptcy declarations received after April. Most liquidated organizations are limited-liability corporations; cooperatives, representing one-fifth of all cases, take second place. The fact that more than 500 stock corporations also "went under the gavel" in 1992 is noteworthy.

In more than 60 percent of the cases liquidation proceedings were initiated by so-called "other creditors" against their debtors. This is also interesting from the standpoint that based on the mandatory sequence of satisfying

claims presently in force, these creditors have the least practical chance of enforcing their claims. In 1,500 instances the managements of firms realized that it was not worth struggling any longer, but state enterprises were not too gentle with their debtors either. Throughout the year, APEH [State Revenue Authority] was by far the harshest claimant among the large state creditors. Only occasionally do we find banks that initiated liquidation proceedings, and no proceedings at all were initiated by the Customs and Revenue Services.

Accurate data concerning the evolution of bankruptcies and liquidation proceedings are not available for this year, but we have no reason to believe that the trend seen during the second half of 1992 has fundamentally changed. Just how this situation is going to continue also depends on upcoming changes in the bankruptcy law (for example, the elimination of mandatory bankruptcies would substantially reduce the number of bankruptcy filings); nevertheless, the most important issue is the same as before: When is the Hungarian economy going to start climbing out of the whole? We find wide-ranging estimates in this regard. This will determine whether 1993, too, will be a year of bankruptcies.

**Distribution of Liquidations Initiated in 1992
(Number of Cases)
Per Type of Business Organization**

Limited-liability corporations	4,511
Other business companies	1,966
Cooperatives	1,790
State enterprises	1,287
Stock corporations	508

Source: Ministry of Justice

**Distribution of Liquidations Initiated in 1992
(Number of Cases)
Per Type of Organization Requesting Proceedings**

Banks	63
Social Security	142
Internal Revenue	784
State enterprise	1,119
Voluntary	1,483
Other creditors	6,471

Source: Ministry of Justice

**Method of Initiating Bankruptcies in 1992
(Number of Cases)**

Voluntary	707
Mandatory	3,524

Source: Ministry of Justice

**Method of Concluding Bankruptcies in 1992
(Number of Cases)**

Agreement	741
Administrative	1,254
Liquidation proceeding	704

Source: Ministry of Justice

**Total Number of Bankruptcies and Liquidations
Initiated and Completed in 1992**

	Liquidations	Bankruptcies
Total number of cases initiated	10,062	4,231
Total number of cases completed	4,963	2,699

Source: Ministry of Justice

*** Roundtable Discussion on 1993 Export Prospects**

93CH0426A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
18 Feb 93 pp 20-22

[Summary of discussions by Lajos Wolff, EGIS commercial director; Zsolt Amon, Finance Ministry division director; Tamas Szatmari, Ministry of International Economic Relations division director; Mrs. Albert Pesti, National Association of Tradesmen Chief Counsel; Pal Gaspar, DUNAFERR Trading Company Ltd. managing director; and Sandor Bordi, MMG Automation Works commercial director, by Robert Becsky: "Roundtable Discussion on Export Incentives; Engine—Without Steam? The Big Question Presented by Economic Indicators Is How Foreign Trade Is Going To Evolve in 1993"]

[Text] Unlike last year, virtually all better-known Hungarian economic research institutes uniformly predict that while domestic demand, and, in some respects, investments, are going to pick up and exceed 1992 levels, the export expansion rate is going to decline further. Signs of exhaustion could already be seen based on last year's statistical data. First-quarter 1992 export values exceeded the 1991 first-quarter values by 18 percent, gradually declining to 16, 12, and 7-8 percent on a year-to-date basis, at the end of each subsequent quarter.

The slower expansion of all exports has to do with the drop of agricultural exports caused by the drought; the presence of the "exhaustion" phenomenon cannot be documented in industry and in fields other than agriculture, according to the Finance Ministry's representative. In the NGKM's [Ministry of International Economic Relations] view, however, foreign trade statistics also indicate a deterioration in the export dynamics of certain key commodity groups, although he acknowledged that the greatest decline in export expansion—from 40 percent at the start of the year to 2 percent at the end of 1992—had occurred relative to food and agricultural

products. He indicated that the expansion rate of consumer goods exports shrunk from 43 percent in the first quarter to 25 percent by the end of the year, from 4 percent to 2 percent regarding materials and components parts export sales, and a 2-percent decline could also be seen in the export expansion rate of machinery and equipment.

We first asked our roundtable guests what export incentives and constraints existed. (We must add here that great differences between various product groups and enterprises exist in this regard.)

Prior to 1992, enterprises prepared several kinds of profitability indexes (i.e., what it cost for an enterprise to earn \$1) based on their financial statements. These showed the profitability of domestic sales and export sales separately, and within the latter, the profitability of export sales paid for in rubles, alternatively, in dollars. It is difficult to make similar calculations for 1992. While prior to 1992 the financial statements of a few hundred exporting enterprises yielded virtually complete statistical data, today's 13,000 exporters form a highly diverse group. In addition, due to the changeover to dollar-based settlement in foreign trade, profitability has also changed to an extent that no realistic basis exists for comparing either the value or the volume of exports. The previous distinction between the profitability export paid for in rubles versus dollars has ceased as of 1 January 1992, because enterprise financial statements no longer distinguish between the two.

On the other hand, it is possible to track the decline in the economy's income-producing ability. Including activities not reflected by statistical data, the GDP declined by about 20 percent during the past three years. Our guests uniformly expressed a belief that income derived from exports has also declined. (According to NGKM calculations, the profitability of exports in 1991 was one-third or one-fourth of the 1989 profitability level.) The Finance Ministry official voiced his belief that this is a natural consequence of an ongoing market and structural change in the Hungarian economy. This, however, should not be understood to mean that the mutual relationship between the incentive to export and to effect domestic sales has changed to the detriment of exports. According to the KSH [Central Statistical Office], the 1992 January-November price index for domestic industrial sales as a whole was 13 percent, while the same came close to 20 percent with respect exports. At the same time, export prices increased in excess of domestic price increases at key exporting industries: by 26 percent in the chemical industry, and 23 percent in the machine industry. Accordingly, on a relative scale, the profitability of exports has improved. One must also consider, of course, that along with a shrinking domestic market, enterprises had no other choice than to export.

The NGKM representative saw the situation differently. In his judgment, external market conditions for sales have improved rather than deteriorated in 1992.

Although global economic conditions were unfavorable, Hungary's share of global trade was still small, and therefore adverse economic conditions outside of Hungary presented smaller obstacles in the path of increasing exports. The association with the EC, the agreement reached by the Visegrad Group of countries, and growing demand manifested by the independent republics improved the market access potential of Hungarian enterprises. This was not the case insofar as domestic conditions were concerned. Based on consumer prices, the forint has appreciated by at least 25 percent during the past two years. (The IMF qualifies exchange rate policies on this basis.) Based on the producer price index the appreciation—the so-called actual effective exchange rate index used by the MNB [Hungarian National Bank]—was smaller, it amounted to only 12-13 percentage points. Irrespective of the method of calculation used, the fact is that the forint has appreciated, and this means that Hungarian exporters have worked under less favorable profitability conditions than importers, whose competitive situation in Hungary has improved. In a drastically declining market the constraint to export dominates, because solvent demand exists only in the external market. In order to avoid liquidity problems, Hungarian enterprises are forced to effect export sales even if they incur losses. But this practice does not resolve the problems in the long term, because long-term losses necessarily lead to new and more deep-seated liquidity crises in the long term. The competitive situation of enterprises is further aggravated by the fact that along with reduced production, the per unit cost of production increases; the previous large markets—like the Soviet Union—that paid for the overhead have shrunk by now.

The same issues were viewed differently by enterprise representatives present. In the IPOSZ representative's view, 70 percent of the export sales effected by their member enterprises produced a loss or broke even. And by now, enterprises whose export value is less than \$3 billion [as published]—typically small and medium-size enterprises—represent almost 24 percent of all exports. The IPOSZ chief counsel went so far as to say that exports produce a loss in any enterprise today, if more than 40 percent of an enterprise's total sales are exports. In the absence of domestic demand, a firm will use up its own assets under such circumstances.

The managing director of the Dunafer trading house viewed the situation from the standpoint of a large enterprise. At one time exports represented 30-35 percent of their total sales. Due to a shrinking domestic market, declining production, and import competition, the ratio of exports in their total sales has increased to 60 percent. The value of their exports amounts to about \$200 million. And the result of this export offensive is that their former profits of 2 billion forints derived along with an annual production value of 50-60 billion forints has shrunk to 300 million forints. On top, they are among the "losers" in the transition to dollar-based settlement due to higher base material prices.

The MMG was more fortunate in this regard. Their previous exports amounted to 60 percent of all their sales, and most of their markets were in the East. Although as a result of the transition to dollar-based settlement their export sales have declined to about 50 percent of their total sales, a solvent demand still exists for oil and gas industry equipment. Their prices did not deteriorate, because they are selling systems and software, not individual, freestanding products.

At EGIS, domestic sales amounted to one third of all sales a few years ago, while two-thirds were export sales. Export sales were divided equally between former socialist and the nonsocialist markets. Since they lost ground in the former socialist market due to a lack of solvent demand, EGIS is selling 60 percent of its pharmaceuticals in Hungary. But their exports produce hardly any losses.

A highly contradictory picture emerges from this very small "sample." Enterprises with relatively low-level involvement in Western markets before were able to increase their prices more when the transition to dollar-based settlement occurred, and even if there was solvent demand for their products, they complained less about a weak export incentive caused by the appreciation of the forint than those who found themselves in a worse situation as a result of the transition to dollar-based settlement. Supposedly, the conclusions they reached also apply to a broader group of enterprises. It is important to note that virtually every enterprise is also engaged in importing, and that as importers they would be adversely affected by a more forceful devaluation policy than we have seen thus far, and, as the Finance Ministry official said, the ripple effects of higher import costs on exports would, in the end, deteriorate the competitiveness of these enterprises. Ten years of devaluations go to prove that the effects of increased costs were immediately felt due to the high level of import intensity, often neutralizing the effect of higher sales revenues achieved. Thus, devaluation served only as a temporary solution, and did not improve the situation of enterprises.

The NGKM official disagreed. He said that it was inappropriate to view the record of the past 10 years, and that instead we should take a look at the record of the past two or three years. Exchange rate policies based on real appreciation severely damaged the competitiveness of exporters, even though they were beneficial from the standpoint of anti-inflationary goals. Based on the Finance Ministry's calculations, on an annualized basis the 1-percent nominal devaluation caused a 0.4-percent annual increase in industrial producer prices, a 0.3-percent increase in material producer prices, and a 0.4-percent increase in consumer prices. Accordingly, the higher costs did not have immediate ripple effects, and income has not vanished either. Accordingly, we are

not dealing with a limitless nominal devaluation of the forint, but with the avoidance of real appreciation.

All the guests agreed that at least in the long term, exports are threatened primarily by the lack of bank financing and development.

An NGKM analysis of 500 enterprises revealed that one of the greatest obstacles in the path of exports was the extremely long, 60-90 day collection period. Enterprises are unable to finance such delays because of the prevailing high interest rates. Moreover, as of 31 March the MNB will permanently remove itself from refinancing short-term, forint-based export prefinancing.

In the longer term, the conference participants regarded as the greatest obstacle in the path of exports the lack of funds for development and investments. In nine out of 12 years since 1980 the volume of industrial investments has decreased. The rate of decrease was 10 percent in 1990, an additional 15 percent in 1991, and a further 4-5 percent decrease in 1992. Along with today's high interest rates, one can obtain short-term loans if necessary, but hardly any medium or long-term loans are available in the present uncertain situation. For example, last year the volume of investment loans on a nominal basis has decreased by between 2 and 3 billion forints.

Three groups of enterprises may be observed. Enterprises privatized by foreigners expend the money they receive to resolve their liquidity problems and for developmental purposes. They seldom seek funds from banks. Firms which became indebted based on their own decisions or decisions made by the state, vegetate in essence, and cannot even think of developmental projects. And finally, we have mostly small and medium-size enterprises which implement their developmental projects by taking small but firm steps, and these also take out small loans.

Here we have the full circle. Credit-financed developmental projects would be needed to improve the ability to export, but banks overinsure themselves. In an odd way, mutual relations among banks are deteriorating; sellers do not trust buyers and often request cash payment for merchandise, according to the conference participants. All this can be seen from a reduced volume of transactions in current accounts.

Disturbances in the technical operations of banks, and the overvalued forint, restrict exports only in the short term. The lack of, or protracted, evolution of means to promote exports in a manner consistent with the marketplace (the institutional system that would provide guarantees), and reduced investments threaten in the longer term that the engine—i.e., exports—is going to run out of steam.

Prognoses for 1992 and 1993¹

	Economic Research Institute	Kopint-Datorg	Finance Ministry	NGKM
1992				
Individual consumption	95	95	96	96-98
Investments	95	95	95-100	95-96
Volume of exports	102	106	105-107	106-107
Volume of imports	97	94	94-96	97-98
1993				
Individual consumption	101	102-103	100	100
Investments	105	102-104	102-106	100-104
Volume of exports	100	101-102	105-107	104-106
Volume of imports	107	100	106-108	105-107

Previous year = 100 percent

[Box, p 21]

Awaiting a Permit To Act as Financial Institutions

Credit and the banking system were frequently mentioned during the Roundtable Conference. The enterprises find the fact that as of 31 March the MNB is removing itself permanently from refinancing export prefinancing loans as particularly dangerous. The MNB argues that commercial banks have enough foreign exchange by now to provide the kind of short-term financing needed for an annual export value of 800 billion forints, of which only 30 billion forints require bank financing, and even of this amount, 20 billion forints require forint financing. In contrast, the enterprises claim that the amount referred to by the MNB moves goods valued at multiples of the amount of needed financing. Based on a joint proposal submitted by the NGKM and the Finance Ministry, the government decided last December to develop a system by 31 March that would take the place of central bank refinancing, and to inform the enterprises accordingly. The basic contours of the new system have already evolved. Although commercial banks are able to use different approaches, the essence of the matter is that commercial banks would only provide foreign exchange loans. Banks would add their interest rate margin to the liberal base interest rate. But the functioning of the system is impeded by certain technical conditions, on the basis of which banks in the countryside do not provide foreign exchange loans. The situation is different regarding long-term loans maturing in more than a year. According to the 1993 monetary and credit policy guidelines, the MNB would continue to take part in refinancing activities until a new institution—supposedly the Export Guarantee Corporation—became capable of performing this function. Medium and long-term foreign exchange loans would also be provided, with interest rates depending on the term of maturity. In determining interest rates, the OECD countries rely on mutually agreed-upon interest rates as the basis, arrived at pursuant to the so-called OECD consensus guidelines. Commercial banks add their margins to these interest rates. And the Export Guarantee Corporation—which today insures only against country and political risks, as well as

exchange rate risks beyond one year—would take part in insuring export credit supportive of such medium-term and long-term loans.

To do this, however, the Export Guarantee Corporations would require a permit to act as a financial institution. The law governing financial institutions specifies that no single owner can hold more than a 25-percent interest in the recorded capital of a financial institution. But the State Property Management Corporation would acquire majority control over the Export Guarantee Corporation, because private banks would hardly be willing to assume the high risk. The law on financial institutions would have to be amended to permit the state to exercise a larger than 25-percent control in a financial institution. This, as well as an increase of the Export Guarantee Corporation's capital by 2 billion forints may take place in February.

[Box, p 22]

It Is Still Not Too Late!

Minister of the External Economy Bela Kadar concluded his news conference last week with this statement. In 1992 the Hungarian external economy has reached a turning point; after several years of decline the volume of exports has exceeded its 1991 level by about 2 percent. Deliveries to developed countries in particular increased rapidly. On the other side of the balance sheet, using comparable prices, imports have declined by 7-8 percent. Altogether, exports amounted to \$10.7 billion, and imports to \$11 billion. The trade balance as shown by customs statistics that resulted in a \$356 million trade deficit represents a \$1 billion improvement over the \$1.5 billion deficit recorded in 1991.

In examining the merchandise structure of foreign trade, however, we see a more varied picture. Last year the fastest increase could be seen in the exportation of energy resources and consumer goods. The former was the result of crude oil and crude oil products imported in the course of barter transactions and re-exported at relatively favorable prices, while the latter evolved as a result of contract work and processing. Machine industry exports increased at a slower pace of 7 percent. Agricultural and food exports present a

different picture. Agricultural exports increased by 20 percent, substantially exceeding the 1991 level of grain exports, while exported food products fell below their 1991 levels by almost 10 percent.

In the framework of imports a decline in all categories of the machine industry is noteworthy. One of the components of this decline is a 20-percent decline in the imported value of cars, but the importation of investment-type machinery needed for the production of products that can be exported also declined. Reduced production can be blamed for a 2-percent decrease in imported materials and component parts. (In addition, the decline is more than 10 percent, if one deducts the value of materials imported for processing under contract.) On the other hand, chemical product imports—crude oil industry products, as mentioned before—have increased significantly. And despite complaints from manufacturers of consumer products, after the rapid expansion of consumer product imports in 1991, the rate of growth amounted to only 2 percent in 1992.

Ultimately, the exclamation by the minister of the external economy as quoted in the title could have referred to needed investments, modernization, and greater incentives in order to improve the competitiveness of Hungarian exports and the merchandise structure. The 1.9-percent devaluation of the forint last week will hardly suffice to accomplish this.

*** Telecommunications Development Status Report**
93CH0429B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
25 Feb 93 p 10

[Article by Janos Budai: "Telecommunications Development; \$500 Million Loan"]

[Text] InvesTel Hungarian Telecommunications Investment Corporation has been functioning for more than a year and a half now; it was established by the Hungarian Telecommunications Corporation [MATAV], the Irish Telecommunications Investment Corporation, the MHB [Hungarian Credit Bank], the OKHB [National Commercial and Credit Bank], and the OTP [National Savings Bank] with basic capital amounting to 1 billion forints. The public at large learned about the existence of this company mostly as a result of the latest—the fifth—telecommunications commercial bond issue.

After breaking up the Hungarian Postal Service into three parts in 1990, the Hungarian Telecommunications Enterprise—the legal successor responsible for telecommunications—had to resolve a financing problem of no small magnitude. Replacing the previously decisive state budget resources, it had to manage the developmental program as a business enterprise and obtain resources from the money market. This task required expertise and connections the previous staff did not have. Initial borrowing was also made difficult by the absence of laws regulating telecommunications, and MATAV's newness.

It became apparent that something new had to be invented, based on foreign—French, Swedish, Irish—

experience, according to Chairman and President Janos Lang. This is how InvesTel came about; its basic functions included the following: acquiring resources at the domestic and international capital markets to finance MATAV's investment program; continuously managing MATAV's indebtedness and constantly improving the composition of the indebtedness consistent with changing market conditions; helping to evaluate individual telecommunications investment projects and choosing the best alternative; and further, controlling the implementation of investment projects, thus providing outside support to enable the service-provider to function more efficiently.

During the past year and a half InvesTel raised about 40 billion forints in exchange for consideration (including short-term loans) to finance MATAV's development program. By now, most of the credit granted to MATAV flows through InvesTel: InvesTel takes out the loans and MATAV guarantees repayment of the loans. This benefits MATAV because InvesTel has a specialized group of professionals familiar with the functioning of the Hungarian and international money markets, borrowing opportunities as well as traps. The functions of this team include improving MATAV's credit rating at the money markets, and enforcing conditions flowing from an improved credit rating in loan agreements.

MATAV's indebtedness amounts to roughly 50 billion forints; a significant part of this debt is in the form of foreign exchange. More than one-third of this amount was borrowed through InvesTel. When it comes to an amount of this size, even a significant devaluation of the forint could strongly influence MATAV's long-term liquidity. For this reason, InvesTel continuously evaluates the prevailing terms of maturity, and changes in interest rates and cross exchange rates at international money markets, and tries to incorporate early payoff provisions in loan agreements.

Laws already enable the establishment of regional corporations for the development of the telephone network, with or without minority control by MATAV. InvesTel also offers its expertise to these corporations. Negotiations are in progress with several corporations now being formed. This, incidentally, is also in the elementary interest of MATAV, the organization that concentrates on building the backbone network. The sooner the local companies become connected to the backbone network, the earlier the backbone network becomes paid for, and this also improves MATAV's financial situation.

Number of Connected Telephone Main Stations

Year	Budapest	Countryside	Total
1987	417,672	395,076	812,748
1988	430,336	427,889	858,225
1989	441,545	474,319	915,854
1990	459,058	536,781	995,839
1991	496,550	632,239	1,128,789
1992	755,739	539,050	1,294,789

Source: MATAV Corporation

*** Controversy Over Proposed 'Euroregions'**

93EP0192A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 9,
27 Feb 93 pp 1, 11

[Article by Witold Pawlowski: "A Partitioned Union: Are Euroregions a New Partition of Poland?"]

[Text] Two years ago when the idea of the Carpathian Euroregion was first conceived on the map in the office of Director Roman Kuzniar at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that region acquired the shape of an irregular ellipse which also included Lwow [Ukraine] and Romanian Transylvania. Later, when the idea had to be materialized in talks with local authorities—and their central superiors—the ellipse grew steadily smaller until it finally acquired its present shape.

Lwow showed no interest in this initiative. It snubbed cities of the size of Polish Krosno and Przemyśl, Slovak Micholovcy, and Hungarian Miskolc. As a result, the Ukrainian contribution to the Euroregion consists solely of the Carpathian district, so that we adjoin Ukraine only along a narrow segment of the Bieszczady Mountains.

The Romanians were hardly inclined to cooperate with the Hungarians, least of all in Transylvania with its large Hungarian minority. They feared (too much, but that is their privilege) that a regional union might detract from the Romanian nature of Transylvania.

In their turn, the Hungarians wanted the common region to stretch farther southward and extend to the Serbian Vojvodina (where many Hungarians also live). The Yugoslav conflict soon torpedoed this plan.

As for Slovakia, it is still building its nationhood. The local authorities there still do not know what powers they are endowed with, which places the Debrecen ceremony in honor of the formation of the Euroregion under a question mark.

The agreement of the local authorities to form the Carpathian Euroregion is open, leaving a place for future inclusion of Romanian areas as well as other districts within the four other participating countries. It was born of a compromise, which does not mean that it is a bad and hopeless agreement.

But before the hopes—and fears—can be discussed, the idea itself of the Euroregion has to be demysticized, especially considering that it proved to be a stumbling block to most deputies in the recent Sejm discussion.

"The fad for Euroregions spread from West Europe. What is more, their exact number is hardly known," said Director Adam Halacinski of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Euroregions there consist of small local Euroregions comprising several small towns on both sides of national borders and often are not based on any inter-governmental agreements. Even their names do not differentiate between cross-border (or transborder, in the

case of areas which are not directly contiguous) cooperation and meetings of local mayors and councilmen, cooperation of local businesses, common sheep pastures, joint investments in building bridges, road segments, liquid waste treatment plants, or agreements on fishing in rivers which are national boundaries. And what about a major Euroregion (or Regio, as it also is called) which drafts far-reaching development plans and has its own regional parliament and bank, with cooperation among regional institutions of higher education?

The Council of Europe (to which 27 countries belong, including Poland as of October 1991) is the patron of several such initiatives. It has developed sample statutes and models, but it is not imposing ready-made solutions or sanctioning "Euroregionality"; there is no such category. The point is that such initiatives be maximally decentralized and free of red tape, that local governments and people reach agreements on their own without the mediation of their distant national capitals.

Thirty regions belong to the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), and a detailed list of the cooperation among varied segments of Europe as published in a bulletin of the Council of Europe takes up 127 pages. Ireland has formed one such region with North Ireland, and there are Spain with Portugal, Denmark with Switzerland, and Switzerland and Austria with Germany. Likewise, there is regional cooperation in the mountainous areas, in the Pyrenees, Tyrol, and Alps. There is also cooperation between and among ancient historic areas separated by borders, hinterlands of Europe whose position relegates them to the margin, and areas of ecological disaster, this last being understandable, since the attendant problems can be resolved only jointly.

Abolition of Barriers but Not of Boundaries

The regions formed by the countries of the European Community are in a class by themselves. They began to arise in the late 1950's and became, so to speak, proving grounds for supra-border unions. Their proliferation peaked in the late 1960's and early 1970's upon substantial financial and political support from Brussels.

As integration within the EC advanced, the formula for cooperation between border regions gradually ceased to be current (although the network of local ties remained useful). Now that the border between the French Upper Alsace and the German Sudbaden can be crossed so readily, it is hard to believe that this was a fragment of the most famous European "Regio," the region of French-German reconciliation. It thus can be concluded that this Regio, which also comprises northwestern Switzerland, has accomplished its purpose. It is precisely the experience of that Regio which should benefit the Carpathian Euroregion.

Also, 30 years of experience with Euroregions has demonstrated that they are not a magic panacea for all aches and problems. Their economic strength varies depending on the national economies of the countries involved and

the efficiency of their management. These regions reflect like a mirror the foreign policies of the central governments—the French-German reconciliation was achieved not just because of a common Euroregion.

All the Euroregions have adopted the following iron-bound rule: Regional agreements may not conflict with the domestic laws of the countries involved or with the system of intergovernmental agreements. Euroregions lack legal entity; they do not abolish borders and are not any supranational organisms exempt from national jurisdiction, administration, or control.

On Own Dunghill

The idea of Euroregions regained favor once the Iron Curtain was lifted. The Council of Europe, which promotes several such new initiatives (including, among others, three German-Czech regions) has recognized this as a way of transmitting West European experience in integration.

The Euroregions are to build bridges between the two halves of a cracked continent (Euroregions of Pomerania and German Mecklenburg, Danish Bornholm, and Swedish Scania), and they are to save the environment in the "Black Triangle" on the border of Germany, the Czech Republic, and Poland (Euroregion Nysa). The union of local governments in four of Poland's southern voivodships and northern Czech Republic harks back to the tradition of the historic Silesian and Moravian area.

Lastly, the most poverty-stricken of them all, the Carpathian Euroregion, which is a cultural crucible, a region of ethnic minorities (Hungarians in Slovakia and Ukraine, Ukrainians in Poland, and Poles in small groups all over), is also a region of such smaller ethnic groups as the Lemkos, Ruthenians, and Gypsies—a region with a difficult past and full of resentments.

"In the Balkans we were too late; here we arrive just in time," said Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe, in Debrecen.

In sum, the festivity in Debrecen was more expansive than the intentions and possibilities. This concerns an area which at its widest stretches for 150 km and which is crisscrossed by five totally closed national boundaries and an absurd system of transportation and communications, and which economically is a basket case. This sum total of local liabilities will be difficult to reforge into an asset. This Euroregion will not change Ukrainian coupons into dollars, and it will not even soon open additional border crossings, of which we have only three with Ukraine, with only one being open on a round-the-clock basis, for example. Roads will not be built, telephones installed, banks opened, or industry started. Unemployment will not be turned into general prosperity.

The joint plans are rather tailored to Sanok, the first of the rotating capitals of the Euroregion, meaning that they are designed to revive tourism, hunting, and fishing,

to create "enclaves of primeval nature" where foreigners tired of civilization would dispense oodles of dollars. There will be a bus traveling to all the capitals of the region with promotional information for those aspiring to enter into joint ventures. There will also be local barter trade (at Uzhorod an excellent cognac is manufactured, and on the Hungarian side we have Tokay).

"Muddy Pan-European Ideals"

Is this really "a way of partitioning Poland," as Deputy J. Lopuszanski argued in a Sejm debate? Is it "an alibi for the Pomeranian region" or "an experimental field for NATO and CEMA encores," as Deputy S. Siwek declared?

"Gentlemen, why do you not experiment at home, in the United States?" appealed Deputy Fraczek from the Sejm tribune to John Mroz, the chairman of the Institute for East-West Studies which has funded many studies of the potential Euroregion and intends to continue doing so. "Dear ladies," he turned to Ms. Lalumiere and advised her to establish her Euroregions in Yugoslavia. Deputy Korwin-Mikke went a step further and described what kind of Euroregions is being prepared by "Serbs with female Croats, Croats with female Muslims, and Muslims with female Serbs." He added that Euroregions were conceived from freemasonry.

Deputy Walerych included Euroregions among "muddy Pan-European ideals" and opposed them to the teachings of the pope, who supports a Europe of fatherlands.

Deputy Pasturzewski concluded his speech with the profound statement, "What a Frenchman thinks up and a German executes, a Pole will like—and be the loser." Therewith, properly speaking, the debate ended.

Inform, Persuade!

The doubts about Euroregions cannot be simply shrugged off if they are based on knowledge of the situation and at least a bit rational. They are absolutely justified, and they are a social fact which should not be contested. The Maastricht debate proved that even the West European public, after years of psychological preparation, still is not receptive to the notion of Brussels Euro-officials. And what about the Polish public, considering that the idea of Euroregions was pulled out of a hat like a rabbit?

Does Euroregion Pomerania threaten the Polishness of Szczecin? Will Euroregion Silesia-Moravia strengthen the Silesians' leanings toward autonomy? Will the Carpathian Euroregion become a convenient open door for masses of refugees? All these are weighty and fundamental questions. A reading of Euroregion documents could answer many similar questions, but first they have to be disseminated, starting at the Sejm.

Everything indicates that the actual threat is precisely the opposite, that many intentions will remain on paper. Euroregion Pomerania has proved to be no incentive at

all to German or Swedish investors. Euroregion Nysa is not garnering the capital needed to save the environment (and that is why every ECU [European Currency Unit] granted by the European Community for that purpose is as precious as gold). As for Silesia and Moravia, the first big hurdle to tightening mutual ties will be the absence of mutual convertibility of currencies. But it is the unfortunate Carpathian Euroregion that is in the worst situation, even despite the support of the Japanese Sasakawa Foundation. At any rate, all these projects are of a long-term nature. However, this does not mean that all efforts are senseless. It is easy to shoot down these projects with the big-caliber cannon of ignorance.

*** Poland's Role in West-East Security Stressed**

93EP0187A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish No 6, 14 Feb 93 pp 1, 14

[Article by Adam Bromke and Andrzej Micewski: "What Would Russia Say to This?"]

[Text] The authors of this article have different ideological backgrounds—Christian-democratic as opposed to social-Christian. In addition to this, we have lived very different lives. One of us was a political scientist at a Canadian university, while the other was an historical writer in PRL [Polish People's Republic]. In the past, we had met occasionally. Now we both live in Poland. However, all those differences in our experience notwithstanding, we share similar views on the fundamental issues of Polish politics, especially with regard to foreign policy and Poland's place in the world.

The public debate on Poland's eventual membership in NATO has picked up recently. The proponents of this argue that the international situation has placed Poland in the "grey zone" between the Atlantic Europe and Russia. While Poland has no security guarantees from the West, one cannot exclude a possibility that she might be threatened from the East.

Interestingly, the two state agencies most competent in this matter—MSZ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and MON [National Defense Ministry]—barely address this issue. In contrast, many politicians, including the high ranking ones, are quite outspoken. Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, having returned from Brussels last Fall, stated that Poland would most likely join NATO even before becoming a member of the EC. In our opinion, there is no reason to believe that.

To be sure, General Secretary of NATO Manfred Woerner said that if his organization expanded its membership one day, Poland would be a leading candidate to join it. While this does not mean "never" in the diplomatic language, it means "maybe" at best; hence, we should not hold our breath.

NATO has good reasons to take this position. One should try to understand them. If Poland accepts those reasons, it may be more beneficial to her than having a superficial, black and white view of Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a complex mechanism with its own historical tradition. While the great powers, especially the United States, play a major role in this organization, the smaller nations have their say as well. NATO decisions are based on a consensus, often reached through an elaborate process. It is more a political than a military alliance. The joint armed forces of NATO first served as a deterrent against an aggression from the East, then as a means to pressure the Soviet Bloc in the direction of reforms. There is no question that the West has won the cold war without even firing one shot.

This subtle game—although adjusted to the new circumstances—continues. NATO's current priority is to draw the post-communist states into the peaceful and democratic world order. Hence, the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council that includes not only the countries of East Central Europe, but also all former Soviet republics. This is also the reason for which cooperation within CSCE has picked up, especially with regard to disarmament and defusing local conflicts.

Russia is the main prize in that game, since it continues to play a crucial role in the former USSR. What matters for the United States is the implementation of the START I and START II treaties by Russia. In turn, Germany has a vast interest in the peaceful withdrawal of the remaining former Soviet troops from the territory of the former East Germany. This is the reason why both Washington and Bonn try to have excellent relations with Moscow.

Of course, the West is aware of the danger of Russia's returning to an imperial foreign policy. At the same time, however, the West attempts to prevent it by supporting moderate forces in Moscow, first Gorbachev and now Yeltsin, the man who contributed tremendously to the failure of the coup in August 1992. Will this policy of the West be successful? Well, it is impossible to predict its outcome today. Yeltsin, for one thing, faces growing pressure from the conservative forces. The West may certainly have input in this game, although a new dictatorship in Russia is not necessarily the only alternative to Yeltsin's presidency.

How is Poland seen in this international context? Most likely, the West appreciates Poland's key role in East Central Europe. It is a fact that Poland occupies a strategic place between the Atlantic Europe and the grand Russian steppe. It is also true that Poland's territory and population are bigger than the territories and populations of Poland's northern and southern neighbors combined. Last but not least, it is also true that Poland's eventual success or failure in the transition to democracy and a free market will affect her eastern neighbors, including Russia.

Despite that, however, Poland—seen in broader terms—is not a desirable partner for NATO. It appears that Poland's membership in this organization is not only

unnecessary, but it may turn out troublesome for both military and political reasons.

Seen from the NATO headquarters, Poland does not face any strategic threat. Certainly, Poland's immediate neighbors do not pose a threat to her at all today. Ukraine, the only country on the Polish eastern border with a comparable status, is still in the process of creating its new state structures and armed forces. Of course, Poland could be threatened by the rebirth of Russian imperialism, but this is exactly what the West is trying to prevent. In the meanwhile, the West is ready to develop military cooperation with Poland as a sort of insurance policy, not at the NATO level, but rather in the bilateral form. Here we are talking about contacts between the high commands, officer training, joint exercises, and even limited maneuvers; these projects are being worked on intensively.

This type of cooperation brings Poland step by step towards the West, but it does not require her formal membership in NATO. This could turn out too complex an operation. It would require the agreement of all sixteen NATO members, which is not a sure thing in the case of a country like Greece, remote from the area in question. Furthermore, it would require that the military strategy be unified and the armed forces posture standardized, which is an arduous and most of all costly process. Poland cannot afford these expenses, and the West does not seem ready to underwrite them.

In the worst-case scenario, that is if Poland were threatened by new Russian imperialism, the West would not make the same mistake for the second time; it would not allow another Yalta, which was the source of the cold war in the first place. It does not have to settle for another Yalta because the international situation is completely different today than in 1945, not to mention the fact that it is much more favorable to Poland.

Thus, the essence of Poland's membership in NATO is not military but political. The West's goal today is not the containment of an eventual Russian aggression but its prevention, preferably by squashing it in its nascent stage, which can be achieved by supporting a democratic and peaceful evolution of Russia. At this point, the goals of the West and Poland coincide.

In this light, however, Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could be beneficial neither to Poland nor to the Western alliance. Russia might perceive such a development as an attempt by NATO to chip away single countries on its borders. The Russians have barely swallowed the fact that East Germany was integrated into NATO. If Poland joined that organization, other countries of East Central Europe would probably like to do that as well, followed by the Baltic states and perhaps Ukraine. We all know how sensitive the Russians are to the danger of being surrounded by external enemies. Living on an endless steppe, with no

natural borders, they would often defend themselves by striking out. They have always been afraid of a so-called cordon sanitaire.

Such a turn of events would only help the postcommunist forces in Moscow, as well as the Russian nationalists who strive to rebuild Russia's imperial position. And if that goal required Russia's abandoning democracy and economic reforms, as well as her returning to totalitarianism, these forces would be willing to accept that. We have already heard that the extreme nationalists would like to see Russia's western border on the Vistula river.

Therefore, the West perceives Poland today not as a beachhead in the operation of surrounding Russia, but as a bridge which connects it with the Atlantic Europe. In this way, the "grey zone" is not a pejorative term; it is a place where West and East meet. This creates a great chance for Poland whereby it can get closer to the West while simultaneously settling its relations with Russia once and for all.

The more friendly Poland's relations are with Russia, the more respect she will have in Brussels, and vice versa.

Let's not miss this historic opportunity. Let's not be misled by ancient grievances. Let's not take foreign policy at its face value. Instead, let's try to join its deeper, more subtle current. The more we are successful in this endeavor, the better it will be for Poland, for the West, and for Russia, with which we want to live in friendship too.

Poland's eastern policy is still affected by the traditional concepts of [Jozef] Pilsudski (the pro-Ukrainian option) and [Roman] Dmowski (the pro-Russian option). However, we live in the era of global politics. Therefore, Poland should be a bridge between the West on the one hand and Russia and Ukraine on the other. We share the view that other countries will take Poland seriously only if she becomes a bridge between them and her eastern neighbors. Therefore, Poland should not join Ukraine against Russia or Russia against Ukraine, but hand in hand with the West she should approach both, Russia and Ukraine. It is obvious that Russia is a little bit more important than Ukraine to the West and to Poland due to its military power. But Ukraine itself will become one of the largest European states and a significant trade partner for Poland. Poland will succeed in its role as a bridge between the West and the East only if the latter has no doubts about the true intentions of Poland's foreign policy.

Paradoxically, Poland's good relations with Germany also depend on whether Poland's eastern neighbors decide to seek Germany as an ally against Poland (as it has happened in the past) or not. All in all, Poland's foreign policy in the era of globalism should involve an effort to bring all her eastern neighbors toward Europe.

*** Rokita Explains Government's Policy Goals**

93EP0184A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Plus/Minus supplement) in Polish 20-21 Feb 93 p 1

[Interview with Jan Maria Rokita, chief, Office of the Council of Ministers, by Teresa Toranska; place and date not given: "The Mission Era Is Not Over Yet"]

[Excerpts] *"In a democracy private citizens see a man of their own rank in life who rises from that obscure position in a few years to riches and power. The spectacle excites their surprise and envy, and they are led to inquire how the person who was yesterday their equal is today their ruler."*

Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*

[Toranska] It is said that it was your idea that Suchocka be selected as prime minister.

[Rokita] No, that is not true. Not mine.

[Toranska] Whose then?

[Rokita] This should be put differently. During the talks in June 1992 among the "Trio," that is, within the Little Coalition consisting of the Democratic Union, the Liberal-Democratic Congress, and the Polish Economic Program, various names were mentioned, including that one.

[Toranska] And your own name, too.

[Rokita] Yes, mine, too. But at the time we within the Democratic Union had a problem to overcome, because all this time, by tradition every since 1989, to us only three persons mattered as possible candidates for prime minister.

[Toranska] Mazowiecki, Geremek, Kuron, in that order.

[Rokita] And these candidates were so strong that no one dared to propose a fourth out of the fear of challenging the authority of those great names, even though only one of these had not been previously tested. (laughter)

[Toranska] But you dared to do it, didn't you?

[Rokita] I dared at a crucial political meeting of the Little Coalition, when we had to decide whom to nominate. Yes, I openly nominated Suchocka, because a couple of other persons did not want to say it in public. And then it turned out that many people had been thinking about nominating her, that Suchocka's becoming prime minister was something obvious, that there was nothing extraordinary about this idea and everyone had wanted to propose precisely this scenario much earlier. [passage omitted]

[Toranska] Is the mission era in Poland over?

[Rokita] No, but I will discuss that in a moment. Another issue is decisiveness. Under Polish conditions this means much more than in a normal, stable country. Decisiveness in Poland means readiness to take a great many

decisions above one's threshold of competences, which is something that a person acting at one or another level of power is aware of to a greater or lesser extent. There is also the readiness to discipline the personnel of the entire machinery of administration, because they are reluctant to execute decisions and are not accustomed nor prepared to execute them. Therefore, any person in an executive post must demonstrate the strength of will needed to risk making a decision and thereupon ruthlessly prosecute its execution. That is another reason why I genuinely admire Suchocka. I say this with absolute sincerity. Suchocka is a person who not only has the inner discipline and knows how to discipline others but also demonstrates a firm determination of having the decisions taken executed in their entirety irrespective of who might criticize her for them and how. Consider that the sharpness of political attacks in this country often exceeds the limits of decency and, it seems to me, it is harder for a woman to adapt herself to such situations.

[Toranska] Or perhaps easier, because, as is known, a woman does not listen.

[Rokita] Suchocka is a person who dominates the present Council of Ministers, even though its members include such high-ranking and popular politicians as Kuron, Skubiszewski, and Bielecki.

[Toranska] Perhaps because she is the only woman there!

[Rokita] She has imposed her style of action on the Council of Ministers and developed the ability to push through her decisions. That is so even though, unlike her predecessors, she has to deal on a daily basis with the heterogeneity of views of the political parties composing the governing coalition, which is an additional obstacle to be surmounted.

[Toranska] But you know, gentlemen—and we here all pretend that we are—find it difficult to be subordinate to a woman.

[Rokita] True, true. And this may affect me, because I often have the impression that politicians who basically loathe Suchocka and fear attacking her because she is a woman and an unusually popular person, instead attack, e.g., me.

[Toranska] But you enjoy that.

[Rokita] No. You asked whether the period of fulfilling a mission is over and you expected me to say yes, but let me surprise you: No, it is not over, and I think that is good when I look at my close associates.

[Toranska] Like your assistant who has not left us yet although it is nearly 2300.

[Rokita] Precisely, considering that my close associates agreed to work in this office for only a fraction of what they could be earning in the outside world, and that they are working 16 or 18 hours daily. I feel gratified that many people still have retained their sense of fulfilling a mission.

[Toranska] Are you speaking of yourself?

[Rokita] Yes. I must admit that I definitely feel like fulfilling a mission in working here and, had it not been for this feeling I would have quit this work long ago and left to study more philosophy at some Western university. My job is terribly hard, because all the time it requires overcoming various barriers, resistance, and opposition. Mine is a position in which executing any decision is terribly difficult. This kind of work basically stultifies a man intellectually. And were it not for my feeling of a clearly defined goal and belief in what I am doing, that is, what you term a mission, I would not be able to do what I am doing.

[Toranska] Does this mean that you do not enjoy your job?

[Rokita] That too is not true. Because it is, properly speaking, my sole source of satisfaction to observe how my desire to change something in Poland is being translated into reality. In other words, it is the possibility of influencing and shaping the ambient reality that I find gratifying. This is to me the most interesting aspect of my job, because, probably unlike you, I am a political animal and can say without exaggerating that politics has been my ruling passion practically since childhood. [passage omitted]

[Toranska] What specifically would you like to accomplish?

[Rokita] The most important, crucially important matter at present, not just in this country but throughout Central Europe, is to define the overall qualifications expected of high government officials. We in this country still have not answered this question, yet this is a problem for the civil service. Until this issue is resolved, our government administration and public life will both remain anarchic. I am trying to find such a definition, because nowadays anybody can become a government official if he is, for example, a friend of a minister of state.

[Toranska] And his name and telephone number figure in that minister's address book.

[Rokita] Precisely.

[Toranska] How does one become a minister of state in this country?

[Rokita] There are various ways.

[Toranska] Under the Polish People's Republic it sufficed to be a mediocrity so long as one was loyal.

[Rokita] I think that in communist Poland it was much more difficult to become a minister than at present. To reach the ministerial level one had indeed to serve the Communist Party or the appropriate party secretary for many years.

[Toranska] Even though in those times to be a minister meant being sidetracked.

[Rokita] Sure, but still to the average man this meant such great advancement as required years of devoted and loyal service to the Communist Party in its successive incarnations. Nowadays it is much simpler to become a minister. In the case of the Suchocka government, which was formed pursuant to a previously formed parliamentary coalition of seven political parties, first the ministries and ministerial portfolios were summarily distributed among the individual parties and thereupon the parties sought for appointees to ministerial posts among their own members. As known, and here I may be painfully honest about the Suchocka government, some of these appointees are not that good, and if there are in Poland, say, 20 individuals fit for a given ministerial position, it is the 21st individual that becomes the minister just because he happens to be the best available candidate nominated by a party under the agreement to distribute ministerial positions.

[Toranska] Meaning that once again qualifications are a secondary issue.

[Rokita] Please consider that this is parliamentary democracy, which is something quite distant from Plato's vision of the Republic governed by the best and most qualified individuals, or, to use present-day language, by experts in particular domains. Democracy presupposes that power is exercised not by the best individuals but by those to whom the people entrust the mandate in democratic, political, or partisan elections. Now as it happens, political parties in Poland do not abound in professionally highly competent experts. In their turn, professionals in Poland have little enthusiasm for political parties. Thus, democracy bestows power on average individuals rather than on experts, not just in Poland but throughout the democratic world. Actually then, this being the nature of democracy, high government positions fall to those who were elected, and it is basically a misunderstanding when the public elects its representatives to the parliament precisely because of who they are and thereupon demands to be governed by experts. Thus in practice, any member of the parliament can become a minister of state, especially given the present-day rotation of governments.

[Toranska] Especially when every other parliamentarian can become a political appointee. (laughter)

[Rokita] Yes, thus in practice any member of the parliament has a great chance to become at least a deputy minister in some or other government if he wants it hard enough and becomes re-elected to the parliament several times.

[Rokita] Unless, of course, he belongs to the Parliamentary Caucus of SLD [postcommunist Alliance of the Democratic Left] Deputies. Right?

[Toranska] But please, there is no clear dividing line, really.

*** Left, Right Political Parties Characterized**

93EP0194A Warsaw SPOTKANIA in Polish No 4,
28 Jan-3 Feb 93 pp 11-16

[Article by Ewa Wilcz-Grzedzinska: "The Left Is on the March"]

[Text] *It is hard to estimate unambiguously whether a thesis advanced by right-wing politicians, to the effect that a left-wing coalition will secure a majority in the next parliamentary election, is supposed to play the role of a bugaboo, or whether it is a political prediction.*

Leszek Miller (SdRP [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland]) maintains: "It is the right flank that is swelling. It is uncrowded on the left." Wladyslaw Frasyniuk (UD [Democratic Union]) is of the same opinion. However, he adds: "The multiplicity and haziness of the right-wing forces make a true definition of the Polish right-wing difficulty. It is easier to say what the left wing is, or at least, what the left wing is not."

However, if we take a closer look at the Polish political scene, it may easily appear that Frasyniuk's opinion is too rash. The division into the left and the right may be accomplished quite clearly in the ideological aspect. This is true. Stefan Niesiolowski (ZChN [Christian National Association]) drew this line quite drastically: "The left wing engages in fighting Christian traditions and the national tradition; it is for the freedom of abortions and against legal protection for conceived babies." None of the left-wing politicians will go along with this description. However, it is quite certain that there are disputes between the left wing and the right wing over the role of religion and the church in the life of the state and about "Polishness" and "Europeanism." There are differences in their views on the issue of ethnic minorities. The pitch of the battle over the character of the state—a state neutral in terms of a view of the world or a denominational state—is particularly high. In Miller's opinion, the attitude toward these issues is indicative of political orientation. However, for their part, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Professor Zofia Kuratowska (UD), and Donald Tusk (KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress]) maintain that it is more indicative of tolerant or intolerant attitudes, open-mindedness or a parochial way of thinking.

Real difficulties with classification into the left and the right begin only when economic, social, and political issues are considered (the attitude toward privatization, the role of the state in the economy, unemployment, international policy principles, and so on). Many politicians believe that attempts at such a classification of political entities are pointless at the stage of transformation which Poland is experiencing. Przemyslaw Hniedziejewicz (RdR [Movement for the Republic]), who has been asked several times whether his economic program is left-wing or right-wing, responded with impatience: "Why am I supposed to accept your criteria? In Poland, they are as mystified as can be."

A Play of Half Tones

The Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland are the strongest group on the left flank of the political arena. This party, which is an outgrowth of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], is not monolithic. It embraces social-democratic and liberal orientations, as well as supporters of socialism. It is cemented by history, the ill will of other political entities, and, SdRP members add, a program adhering to the framework of left-wing ideas. However, some politicians point fingers at the SdRP for its departure from leftist ideas. Niesiolowski maintains: "They do not defend the working people. They defend their electorate, hence their desire to sustain state enterprises which are going under and resistance to privatization." Piotr Ikonowicz (PPS [Polish Socialist Party]) launches an attack: "The SdRP pursues a conciliatory strategy in voting, thus supporting all mistakes which the liberals have made in the economy. As far as I am concerned, Kwasniewski is not left wing at all. Building capitalism with a human face is the objective of the right."

In turn, here are the words of Waldemar Pawlak (PSL [Polish Peasant Party]): "There are groups which raise the colors of the left wing high but act in a completely opposite manner. For example, I am surprised by the actions of the SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left] (a parliamentary group of which the SdRP is the backbone—note by Ewa Wilcz-Grzedzinska), which supports Lewandowski's privatization projects." The parliamentary club of the SdRP and its allies, despite being the largest in the Sejm, has no representatives in the Presidium, nor do its members chair any commission. Therefore, we have a situation in which there is a parliament... and then there is the Alliance of the Democratic Left.

The isolation of the club is slowly becoming less complete. Nonetheless, the past of the SdRP and a failure to distance itself from this past render this group untrustworthy as far as most politicians and a large segment of society are concerned. After all, this group is rooted in a system which reduced the values hailed by the left wing to a caricature.

The Union of Labor is trying to become a counterbalance to this "unclean" left wing. This is a weak group. Besides, it likewise is not acceptable to all, despite coming from a legitimate Solidarity background. Niesiolowski passes judgment: "To my mind, Bujak and Bugaj do not differ from postcommunists in any way. They are betting on the destabilization of the country, which we cannot say about the left-wing segment of the Democratic Union." In turn, to Ikonowicz, Ryszard Bugaj is too much of an advocate of a strong state, "which weakens the left wing. He managed to voice a fervent criticism of the budget in order to state at the end: However, for the good of the cause I will vote in favor." In his opinion, the leader of the Union of Labor is making a fundamental mistake: He is building his left

wing in a dogmatic manner, on Western patterns. Frasyniuk stated the same: "Bugaj is a textbook case of an idealist. If he were to become prime minister, it would quickly turn out that he could not be as much of a socialist as he would like to be. Therefore, he would first take away his travel allowance, then his salary, and finally he would have to take his life."

Is the **Polish Peasant Party** a left-wing party? Waldemar Pawlak himself rejects this label vehemently. To him, it is unimportant whether he is placed on the right flank or the left. At the same time, he said: "Our stance is geared toward a search for solutions which would create an income distribution such that social justice would be upheld, and that a majority of our society would have opportunities to participate in this distribution."

At the same time, the party seeks state intervention and the creation of currency, talks about exploitation, defends PGR's [state farms] and agricultural circles, and agrees to income being drawn from capital only on the condition that "it will promote employment and opportunities for the advancement of those who support themselves by working."

CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center] respondents placed Pawlak in the center-left column. This is also where Leszek Miller places the PSL. In turn, Janusz Piechocinski defined his party as being Christian center-left. Niesiolowski stressed the heterogeneity of the PSL: "It has a respectable Christian faction and a ZSL [United Peasant Party] faction. This group has not voted together on any issue." However, in votes critical for the government, the position of the PSL is consistently oppositional (just like that of the PC [Center Accord], the RdR, the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], and the SLD).

The PSL is the largest political group in Poland; it has a definite electorate, which keeps growing, and well-established local structures. It is so bland that it may be a desirable ally for many. Pawlak counts on this. He said: "Please recall that before the war, the PSL belonged to various coalitions, right and left of center. Therefore, we are back in our place." This means that Pawlak is waiting for offers, and he knows his strength.

The **Democratic Union**, though labeled pink, does not unequivocally fit the notion of the left wing, even after the departure of Alexander Hall's group (currently the Conservative Party). After all, there are Tadeusz Syryczyk and Hanna Suchocka, who are Christian democrats, and there is the liberal Karol Lutkowski. However, there indeed is a socio-liberal faction (10 to 20 percent of the members of the Union) as well, which Professor Zofia Kuratowska, its leader, places between social liberalism and social democracy.

Andrzej Urbanski (PPL [Polish Liberal Program]) admits: "I do not like this left wing. I do not like the views of Mrs. Kuratowska. They are an example of hysterically moralistic views, which irritate me. They are an example of thinking about the state as one grand,

continuous train of assistance. This is not a task of the state but precisely of such people as Jerzy Owsiak."

The **Democratic Union** in its entirety is frequently referred to as a party of the advocates of a strong state. In the West, they are considered Social Democrats. Domestic politicians mostly resort to descriptive definitions. Ikonowicz stated: "The Union supported those who have not built anything but have destroyed a lot."

Zofia Kuratowska and Andrzej Urbanski both said: "After the death of Jan Jozef Lipski, it is no longer the same **Polish Socialist Party**." Now, under Ikonowicz, social democratic and trotskyite elements are blended in it. Miller says contemptuously: "The PPS is a group which is dreaming of being to the left of us. It is treating us as an inconsistent party, as soft opposition. The PPS stands for a return to self-government and cooperatives. These are very noble ideas and goals, but they are hardly realistic at present."

The **Federation of Anarchists**, the largest group of this kind, and also the recently formed **Socialist Solidarity**, represent the extreme of the left wing. These movements like to make a lot of noise about themselves, but these are politically marginal forces.

The **Movement for the Republic** and the **Christian National Association** carry the colors of the right wing and are outright allergic to the words "the left wing," which does not prevent Hniedziewicz from sharing the economic views of Bugaj. These entities have not produced a markedly right-wing economic program. However, they certainly identify with the social teachings of the church. Meanwhile, as Andrzej Topinski explains, the church, "through its socioeconomic doctrine, leans toward solutions which were once considered the program of the non-communist left wing, especially in its view of the issues of social justice and the role of the individual as a subject of the process of production."

No category describing the political scene fits the **Confederation for an Independent Poland**, at least this is what Tusk maintains. According to Urbanski, it represents left-wing populism. For his part, Krzysztof Krol described his group as follows: "It is a party with a right-wing, capitalist system of values, but with social sensitivity." This sensitivity makes it possible for the party to demand that the recession be combated by way of the unrestricted printing of extra money, comprehensive state assistance, and protection for state enterprises so that the state will be the generator of the welfare of its citizens. However, their attitude toward the left wing is like that of the devil toward holy water. They accuse even the liberals of being leftists: "Comprehensive privatization is an idea so utopian that it could have only occurred to an extreme leftist who, in addition, is a speculator, and wants to become a capitalist quickly." This is what I heard from Krol.

Points of View

The left wing is classified (also self-classified) as post-communist or post-Solidarity. However, this division has nothing to do with views on economic and social issues. Depending on the origin of a given left-wing group, at most, the evaluations of its activities differ. These evaluations usually have political underpinnings. To Ikonowicz, the SdRP is a party that is too procapitalist, whereas to Hniedziewicz, "despite progressive poetics, the postcommunist structure blocks reforms and safeguards the status quo." Niesiolowski observes that the left wing, with the exception of the leftist segment of the UD, is a destructive and destabilizing force. "Its strategy is to maintain areas of social discontent. Therefore, it would be best if it did not exist at all." Aleksander Hall passes a merciless judgment: "The rhetoric of the SLD is supposed to bring out a nostalgia for the welfare state and create the impression that such a state is possible." Tusk believes that "the leftists from the Union are a responsible force; the rest of the left wing has claim-oriented attitudes." Yet, he sees many consummate politicians in the SLD.

As far as economic programs are concerned, the left-wingers differ on nuances. First of all, protection for state industry is sought. Both Miller and Bugaj want to make all forms of property equal, maintaining that economic efficiency hinges on qualifications and management techniques rather than the form [of ownership].

The left wing does not assail privatization directly. Ikonowicz argues that Poland just cannot afford privatization; therefore, it is better to use Polish experience in self-management and cooperatives. Bugaj and Miller opt for reducing the pace of changes. In Tusk's opinion, this postulate in and of itself poses a danger to reforms in Poland. However, Bugaj keeps his point of view: "Had the left-center been in power, reforms would have taken a quieter course. Perhaps, we would not have privatized 1.5 million enterprises, but just 500 and their performance and effectiveness would have been greater."

The left-wingers are against comprehensive privatization because it promotes speculation (Bugaj), and also poses a threat to the self-government option. They come out in favor of a greater emission of currency, viewing it as a path toward overcoming the recession. Jozef Oleksy (SdRP) stresses: "Additional printing would be restricted and controlled." They are against reducing budgetary expenditures. They would like to replenish the budget with revenues from taxes, which they would levy to a greater degree on the private sector and more affluent social groups. Bugaj agrees to raising the tax on the highest remunerations to 50 percent. In his opinion, this is what the principles of social justice require.

The left-wingers favor a protectionist customs policy of the state. The PPS goes the farthest. Ikonowicz explains: "Opening up to the West amounts to eliminating many areas of economic life. For the duration of the restructuring of industry, we should close the Western border to

defend industry, while opening up to the East. Let us learn regional cooperation from the West."

Cimoszewicz, Pawlak, and Kuratowska, talk about a social market economy, that is, with strong state interventionism. Urbanski maintains: "They want a pervasive state, or a large machine which intervenes at the lowest level." Ikonowicz even avoids notions such as capitalism and the market. He wants to "build an economy which meets the needs of the people."

The left wing is brought together by the view that Solidarity governments to date have ruined the country, that it is necessary to start everything anew and to put an end to "this right-wing madness" (Cimoszewicz), and that Poland needs a left-wing concept.

The liberals defend their policy as the only possible one, despite the high social price which had to be paid. Tusk argues that "in Poland, the left-wing point of view is antimarket and anticapitalist. Dreams about a third way are in the back of their minds, if not verbalized. What is particularly dangerous is the belief that we, the Poles, may succeed at it, and that those 40 years were a totalitarian, rather than a socialist, experience. Therefore, the socialist way of thinking about the economy is legitimate."

In the opinion of many right-wing politicians, the left wing is responding to the challenge from another era as it refers today to its fundamental values—equality and social justice. The time of transformation calls for emphasizing other values, such as resourcefulness, enterprise, and productivity. The attachment to egalitarianism, to the fact that all of us have the same appetites, and that everyone should get an equal share, which communism has left behind, is too strong in our society, and it does not facilitate the reforms in the least.

Tusk stresses: "The left concentrates on distribution." Cimoszewicz corrects him: "On fair distribution." However, in the absence of a market economy and a budget, the dispute about distribution appears pointless. Even the left-winger Frasiuk asks: "What is to be distributed fairly? Poverty? The left wing should consider first what is to be done in order to get this economy going, and to have something to distribute." Zofia Kuratowska does not want to talk about fair distribution; she prefers to refer to social solidarity.

Election Prospects

"The sentiment of society is moving to the left, whereas the political arena is moving to the right." This prediction by Piechocinski portends a favorable environment for the left wing in Poland. This is why it is getting ready to do battle.

The PPS looks to trade unions for support; it wants to replicate the model of the Labor Party. It seeks cooperation with the PSL (it has even begun). In turn, the SdRP has invited all left-wing communities to begin a great debate on alternative economic concepts. Talks have

been held with Ikonowicz and functionaries of the Union of Labor. Of course, all attempts to unify the left-wing movement are out of the question. This is impossible at present. The PPS is too strongly attached to its identity. Besides, as its leader stresses, they are only talking with the Social Democrats, but not coming to agreements. For his part, Ryszard Bugaj is not even thinking about cooperation with the SdRP as a whole. However, if "decent social-democratic groups" separate from it he would eagerly take them in.

The SdRP counts on the PPS and the Union having to opt for something before the elections, as they want to be represented in the parliament. In Oleksy's opinion, developing a joint electoral platform would be a smart move. The increasingly conciliatory gestures by the left wing toward President Lech Walesa indicate that it is also developing an appetite for playing the Belweder card. The left wing understands that the Belweder center, which has been on the outs with its political base dating back to the time of the presidential election, will have to enter into an alliance with someone in order to not end up isolated. This would be all the more likely in the event of a possible early presidential election, which politicians from the entourage of Jan Olszewski, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, or Jan Parys are beginning to bring up.

A segment of the left wing (especially in the SdRP), fascinated with various polls which are favorable toward it, is betting on an early parliamentary election. To be sure, Oleksy believes that Poland needs a left-of-center government (the SdRP; the UD, at least its left-wing segment; the PSL; and the Union of Labor); however, for now, he does not consider the emergence of a clear-cut array of the government and the opposition after the elections possible. Meanwhile, an election would only make sense if this were the case. However, most of his colleagues maintain that the time is coming when they can have it all.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski (PC) fears that this is precisely what may happen. An SdRP-PSL coalition, which was inconceivable as recently as one year ago, but is highly likely now, may gain an absolute majority in the Sejm after the election.

*** Polish-German Controversy Threatens Relations**
93EP0193A Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 8, 21 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by Wojciech Pieciak: "The Dispute Is Not Only About Asylum"]

[Text] Recently, at the end of January, we celebrated the 30th anniversary of the signing of the German-French treaty, a treaty that is to serve as a model for the relations between Poland and Germany. But now we face the first serious Polish-German dispute in two years. Serious, because it concerns not some stereotypes or fears but a specific problem: Should Poland receive refugees expelled from Germany?

Well, it can be said that disputes, and even very sharp ones, are normal even within the "family" of the twelve countries of the European Community. What matters is that mechanisms for their solution should exist, because this is certainly not the last specifically Polish-German dispute.

And it can be said that the mechanism for resolving disputes has operated well in this case. To be sure, finding a solution satisfactory to both parties will be very difficult.

What Happened, or the German Rationale

Last December all the big German parties reached the so-called asylum compromise. This concerned finding a way of curtailing the German asylum law so as to halt the sudden inundation of applicants for political asylum while at the same time satisfying all those parties. That was necessary because the right to asylum is guaranteed by the FRG Constitution (Article 16: "The politically persecuted have the right to asylum") and amending it requires the agreement of the opposition.

The adopted amendment, which will probably take effect this coming April or May, is truly Solomonic. The right to asylum is in theory to be retained (this being demanded by the social-democratic Left), but in order to apply for asylum in the FRG at all the applicants probably must—as somebody maliciously pointed out—arrive in the FRG either by parachute or by plane, and that directly from the country in which they were persecuted, without even stopping over in any other country.

But jokes aside....

The amendment denies the right of asylum to persons arriving in Germany through the countries of the European Community and through "third countries," which are classified as Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Switzerland, as well as to persons from the countries in which there is no political persecution (for the time being Romania and Bulgaria are included on the list of such countries).

If these revisions are consistently applied, the consequence will be unequivocal: The number of asylum seekers will fall practically to zero. That is what the conservative parties intended.

Why did the Germans adopt such a radical solution?

To put it briefly, because they felt themselves pushed into a corner. In 1992 some 450,000 refugees arrived in Germany. More eloquent than this dry figure is the information that once every hour, day and night, 50 new candidates for asylum arrive in Germany. Most are refugees from Third World countries (Asia, Africa), the former Yugoslavia, countries of the Community of Independent Countries, and Romanian Gypsies (the latter numbering several tens of thousands). Considering that the German asylum laws are the most liberal in all of

Western Europe, those arriving there include persons who were refused asylum in other European countries.

A foreigner applying for asylum receives—as yet, for the time being—free housing, food, and clothing. He has the right to work, and in effect many of these aliens earn only a little less than the Germans. Every individual application must be separately considered. This takes as long as several years because the appropriate German offices are literally “clogged” with piles of asylum applications.

If after some time an asylum application is rejected, that is not the end of it. The applicant has the right of appealing to a court and the case begins anew. It is said that in some cases the proceedings are drawn out over more than 10 years.

And here the vicious circle begins.

First, until recently, were a Polish citizen to apply for asylum in Germany, under the law he would have to be treated on par with, say, a refugee from Afghanistan or Somalia.

Second, such a protracted procedure leads nowhere. Over all these years the potential asylum recipient becomes integrated within society and his bonds to his former homeland become ruptured. If his application is ultimately rejected, the problem arises: How can such a person, with his family, be expelled, and where?

The situation of the German legislators is made worse by the negative impact on both the neighboring countries and the more “left-oriented” segment of society produced by measures intended to curtail the rights of victims of persecution or refugees. Germany is burdened by the history of World War II, by the memory of the extermination of the Jews and Gypsies.

What happens if the problem of asylum seekers is not resolved within the next two years? This is an urgent deadline, because in 1994 there will be elections to the Bundestag and, in addition, in the eastern states (the former GDR) there will be elections to local governments and state governments. Unless both big parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, control the flood of refugees within the next two years, it can be seriously assumed that attacks on foreigners will increase and the current political system will be undermined, because then the party of rightist radicals, the Republicans, will sit in the Bundestag. That is because the problem of asylum seekers will become a major topic of the electoral campaign in 1994, and it will be precisely the Republicans who will gain from it, since one of their principal planks is sharp criticism of the refugees.

Owing to an Oversight...?

The problem is that the asylum compromise was reached so suddenly, surprising even the German mass media, and, most importantly, without any previous consultation with the neighboring countries. Yet these decisions affect the countries adjoining Germany. Thus, when

Germans turn back new refugees at their borders, or expel those already in the FRG, these refugees will chiefly enter Poland or the Czech Republic. The absence of such consultation can only be attributed to haste, unless the other countries were simply forgotten, which of course is no justification.

The problem was realized after the fact, and as early as last December the Bonn minister of justice appeared in Warsaw. However, that visit served mostly to counteract the bad impression. The sides were not yet prepared for specific negotiations, and because of this nothing was determined. The next negotiating rounds were held in February, first in Warsaw then in Bonn. One of the accomplishments was the formation of a joint working group which is to define more precisely the rationales of both sides. There is plenty to discuss. As rightly stated by our Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Jerzy Zimowski early in February in an interview that gained broad publicity in the FRG, “Bonn’s intention to expel refugees who came to the FRG via Poland is unacceptable to us. Our country is incapable of hosting 50,000 refugees, and the Germans should themselves drink the beer that they have brewed.”

What May Happen, or the Polish Rationale

The aforementioned Polish-German negotiations (and to a smaller extent, German-Czech ones) have, of course, drawn a response from the media. And it has to be stated that the response of the Polish media was much more moderate and objective than that of the German media. In Germany, unfortunately, a segment of the (conservative and sensational) press adopted a special tone in commenting on this conflict.

Thus the daily DIE WELT, commenting on Minister Zimowski’s statements, stated on its first page that Germany is exposed to Polish blackmail, that Poles are chiefly concerned with extracting from Bonn as much money as possible as part of the assistance in establishing camps for the expellees, and that, I quote, “Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks smell big money and are pressuring Bonn.” The topic was treated in a similar style by the popular press, especially by the daily BILD, which is read by 15 million Germans.

At such a level discussion is difficult. This is a bit dismaying, considering that such arguments had not been used by the German press concerning Poland for some two years. It seemed that such a tone of discussion was a thing of the past, meaning the winter of 1990/1991 when Polish border guards detained trains carrying [ex-Soviet] troops being withdrawn from the FRG [as published] on the western border on the grounds that their transit across Poland was not coordinated with Warsaw. At the time the German press had commented that those nasty Poles were blocking the trains in order to extort money for their transit, and that in general this concerned transports carrying aid to starving Russia.

Fortunately, serious newspapers such as the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, and FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, behaved differently (the last-named newspaper's correspondent in Warsaw, Edith Heller, even wrote that the article in DIE WELT was "perfidious"). And Juergen Wahl of the weekly RHEINISCHER MERKUR wrote, after visiting Warsaw: "The problem is complicated because Poland is incapable of effectively preventing refugees from southeastern Europe from continuing on to Germany. The Polish minister of the interior recently tried again to have visas introduced for the countries adjoining Poland from the east, but Minister of Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski keeps rejecting such proposals. Also controversial is the number of refugees who have been living in the FRG for a long time now and who should be sent to Poland. But Poland is not wealthy enough to provide the needed hospitality. Besides, for 40 years the Russians forbade the Poles to build barracks on the eastern border. Thus, what is needed is a solution that would be both realistic and potentially effective. Bonn either must pay several million [currency not specified] or await 'an integral all-European solution' to the problem, a solution which the Germans have been waiting for for years."

Wahl's suggestions are reasonable. First, what matters to Poland is not money but a political solution to the problem. Second, creating some "integral all-European solution" to the refugee problem is certainly necessary. But in the short term it is simply unrealistic, because for the time being every country rejects the refugees.

The proposed new language of the German asylum law would mean that anyone who enters Germany via Poland will be sent back to our country. What is more, people who are already living in the FRG but who will be denied asylum—and their number is estimated (depending on the interpretation) at 30,000 by Poles and 100,000 by Germans—will also be sent back. This also signifies that if a wave of refugees floods in from the former USSR—which in theory can happen any time now—the Germans will simply refuse to admit them and we will have to host them in one way or another.

What can we do? It is in our national interest to reduce to a minimum the number of asylum seekers and economic emigrants. Of course, Poland should not accept the so-called "old cases." Too bad—the Germans have let them in and registered them, so it is their problem. We cannot accept them, for both economic and psychological reasons.

Consider that since 1 June 1991 Poland has been bound by the readmission protocol appended to the agreement concluded with the "group from Schengen." Under this agreement Poles nowadays travel without visas almost anywhere in Europe. At the same time, also under this agreement, we are obligated—and in the spring of 1991 hardly anyone had realized the importance of this—to receive refugees who had illegally entered the West through our western border. On this basis, the Germans

are returning to us the refugees caught on the Odra. This agreement obligates us, and therefore, *pacta sunt servanda*.

So then, should we in the future agree to receive the refugees who transited Poland with valid visas to the FRG but were not granted asylum there? In this case our room for maneuver is bigger, though also limited, and we can say no (and we will be the "black sheep," because this is an unsolved problem of all the Western countries).

One thing is certain: We cannot become the "cordon sanitaire" of Germany or the West. On the other hand, since we are to join the European Community some day in the future, we are already its future borderland country, like Spain, France, or Italy. Of course, this matter cannot be approached as in France, where for the time being people who were refused asylum wander on to Germany. But this means conflict, especially with Germany, and some—what?—complications, because the Germans will not agree to letting the situation remain as is.

And if that is so, this means that our eastern border has to be tightened. Not by introducing the visa requirement (which the Christian-National Union wants) but by tightening the regulations on the issuance of invitations. A recent decision by Prime Minister Suchocka, on which the Ministry of the Interior is working at present, follows this line of thinking. As we were told by the prime minister's press assistant Zdobyslaw Milewski, within the next few days this matter will be deliberated by the government and it is practically certain that it will adopt precisely this idea. The fee to be charged per invitation still is not known. But the person or institution extending the invitation will be obligated to defray the expenses of extradition of the invitee if the latter gets into a conflict with the law or wants to illegally enter Germany. This will dispense with the argument of the border guards, who claim that they cannot, e.g., implement the extradition of Romanians because the Czechs and Slovak refuse to admit them and because the Polish budget lacks the funds for their plane fares.

We are facing a choice between leaving open the western border, where the Germans are said to have already started installing electronic sensors, or the eastern border. The choice is obvious. The eastern border must be tightened, because in fact it has already become the outer boundary of West Europe.

We can thus exploit this situation in our arguments for a speedier rapprochement—at least on the political plane—to the European Community.

That is why this is not just a dispute about the asylum but part of a broader discussion about Polish policy between our neighbors to the West and to the East.

*** Radicalization, Populism in Center Accord**

93EP0191 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 9,
27 Feb 93 p 7

[Article by Andrzej Urbanski, Sejm deputy from Polish Liberal Program: "After the Long March: What Happened to Center Accord?"]

[Text] POLITYKA's articles on Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Center Accord, and the new pressures on the Belweder, demonstrate that both columnists and politicians lack a code to follow, a language in which diverse and diversified facts would compose a single whole. This lack is directly mentioned in the article by Janina Paradowska and Wieslaw Wladyka who, in dealing seriously with the problem of another political "revolt," seem to succumb to the principal mystification being spread by the "Left June" [a reference to leftist gains in June elections]—the attempt to demonstrate that between 1989 and 1993 the issues fundamental to democracy have not changed.

That is not so, as demonstrated by a brief history of Center Accord itself.

The Center Accord party was conceived for many reasons, but also with the object of subdividing the entire—not just Solidarity—political scene. A modern centrist bloc formed by liberals, promarket activists of the peasant and worker opposition (from peasant Solidarity and worker Solidarity), and lastly by Christian democrats and the members of Citizens' Committees, was to bring about a roughly tripartite division of the political scene. The center, strengthened by Lech Walesa, as the presidential party, was able to prompt such a division. Thus, in the presidential elections only three groupings, those of Walesa, Tyminski, and Mazowiecki, counted. Ideological radicalism, both leftist and rightist, suffered a resounding defeat. In the next elections Tyminski's electorate would switch. Thus, two centrist groupings, those of Walesa and Mazowiecki, dominated the scene. Such was the political plan, but real life made a mockery of it.

Lech Walesa did not want a political party of his own. Jaroslaw Kaczynski did not want a joint party with the liberals of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. In the spring of 1991, after the Solidarity faction was eliminated at the First Congress, the Christian-democratic Center Accord party was established on the basis of an uneasy alliance among Jan Olszewski, Jerzy Eysymontt, Lech Kaczynski, and many other politicians, with the new party proclaiming both internally and externally its "genuine" Christian-democratic nature. In addition, ever since its formation, while adopting the tone and style of center-right behavior, Center Accord tried to reconcile two other tendencies: that of political radicalism vis-a-vis the old system of government, ownership, and social structure, and that of ideological moderation, the refusal to let ideology prevail over pragmatism in political conduct. The former tendency assured political dynamism and

ease in organizing the structures of the new party, while the latter served to exploit political flexibly and occupy a strategic centrist position.

The contest for the political center was not just between the Democratic Union and Center Accord parties; it was also a dispute over which social forces would be in the camp of political and economic reforms. Center Accord was conceived not so much owing to political juggling, ambition, frustration, or desire for power as in its capacity as a political form of the still live force of Solidarity rebellion. Hence, Center Accord also derived its clout from Solidarity as the trade union which had supported Walesa's presidential aspirations and from the mythology of Solidarity as a social movement of common people. Solidarity has practically never, and certainly never after 13 December 1981 [date of imposition of martial law], been divided into the elite and the masses. It was a movement for rebirth at workplaces, schools, and big and little towns, conceived in opposition to the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] establishment.

Had Solidarity been strong only in the salons or only among the masses, the December 1981 coup would have strangled it. As things were, martial law actually strengthened it while at the same time making it necessary to ask political questions which transcended the horizon of Solidarity as a social rebellion. That is why in 1990 there was no "war at the top" in Solidarity salons, and instead there came about a normal, democratic division [into political parties with a common Solidarity origin] running through factory committees, families, and academic and other communities. The very slogan of "war at the top" was an instrument of struggle and not a means of description. Had it been merely a quarrel "between older and younger brothers" (as Jacek Kuron wrote), or between "frustrated failures and lofty idealists" (Adam Michnik), the menacing populism of Stan Tyminski would not have been defeated [in the elections]. What is more, the SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left], the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] and the SD [Democratic Party]—the parties of the old system—would not have been defeated a year later.

Kaczynski is a consummate strategist, but it was not he alone, with the assistance of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, who moved people to act. The reason why Kaczynski was so feared was not because he shouted more loudly than the others but because at the time we were right. We were right because we knew more about the social structure than our adversaries. When we asked for the participation of principal social groups in the reform, for equal opportunity in private enterprise, for employee and public stock ownership, and for equal social security for both the defenders and destructors of the old order, we were not just being rhetorical. We had a better ear for the needs and wants of the people. And when we warned against a rebellion, we did more to save our country from Tyminski than our adversaries, who accused us of every possible fault. Center Accord reflected the unrest of the society but would not let mob

rule be the form of Polish politics. Except that in time the Solidarity-based civic rebellion of the public began to give way to a complacent mood.

The success of Walesa's presidential campaign, which was conceived by Center Accord strategists, the ability of Center Accord to participate in the government while at the same time being a critic of the government, and the success of Center Accord in getting its own candidate [Olszewski] appointed prime minister despite the opposition of the president and the Democratic Union at a time when the party received 8 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections was all due to combining two tendencies: the utilization of social dynamism and orienting it in a pro-reform direction. But the price which Center Accord had to pay for those two years of successes proved to be big. Following the collapse of Jan Olszewski's government Center Accord increasingly became a party of political action. Political struggle increasingly relegated this party to a secondary plane.

From the moment the government of Hanna Suchocka was formed Center Accord began to face a dramatic choice between two alternatives—strengthening the independent right or building a great center-right in which it would not be the dominant party. The choice was up to Jaroslaw Kaczynski.

Before he made that choice we, as the intra-party opposition, asked about the premises and consequences of radicalizing Center Accord, about a definition of the new political objective, and about the party's position on the existing system of government and ownership resulting from three years of Solidarity power. We argued that before Kaczynski launched another political campaign it would be worthwhile to know what troops were to be introduced onto the scene, what would be the slogans of the struggle, and what would be the formula for capitulation in the event of a defeat.

As early as last summer it became clear to us that Kaczynski opted in favor of a new radicalism, a political radicalism which questions the pace of changes in the system of society, opposes the new social hierarchy arising as a result of economic and ownership transformations, and treats the presidency not as a constitutional fact but a social faux pas. Such radicalism is bound to negate the economic program. To make a political program popular it is necessary to identify the reasons for the discontent of those whom the reforms make losers, who do not see a place for themselves in the reforms, and who are unable to define their present and future prospects. It would have to be claimed that capitalism has lowered living standards, threatened unemployment, and deprived the neediest of care by the government. This is not true, but without these falsifications another campaign could not be launched.

It would be a mistake to believe that we are concerned solely with organizing a bloc of adversaries of the president, and that the dispute concerns only the evaluation of former communists. To be successful, political

struggle for a new economic and social system that would not be burdened by compromises with the old power structures, would have to be based on arguments destroying the foundation of the reforms. There is no other way, and it is no accident that within Center Accord "the Eysymontt Plan" was replaced by "Glapiński's visionariness." The economic arguments used differ in no way from those being propagated for the last two years by the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland].

Thus, while three years ago we campaigned for making employee stock ownership part of the privatization program, nowadays this is a fait accompli and can be obtained without needing a demonstration in front of the Belweder. While three years ago the point was that the market should not be dominated by *nomenklatura*-owned companies, nowadays the one and one-half million businessmen are of every conceivable social origin. Still, a revolution was not accomplished and it was not Solidarity people who replaced the "Reds." The revolution of 1980 exhausted itself in the course of its "Long March," and the revolutionists changed not only themselves but their adversaries. The new system is generating not only new beneficiaries but also completely new groups of enemies.

These days Jaroslaw Kaczynski is leading more types of people than in 1990. He himself, surrounded by Switon, Morawiecki, Parys, and Glapiński, remains the politician par excellence, but his politics is now of a different hue compared to the past when, without the knowledge of the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] presidium, he garnered support for the first Solidarity government. At that time he used to be a politician who favored compromise and, instead of eliminating adversaries, forced on them a consensus on terms of equal partnership.

In present-day Poland stoking social rebellion means that it would be a rebellion against the new system rather than against the remnants of communism. Such is the truth of the new social structure, of new apprehensions and hopes, of fears of the future and faith in a better future. Jaroslaw Kaczynski is no worse at analyzing this situation than I am. He knows what he is doing, but this time [he will do it] without us.

[Box, p 7]

Andrzej Urbanski, deputy, elected to the Sejm on behalf of Center Accord. He was a member of that party's leadership and editor in chief of EXPRESS WIECZORNY. He resigned from the Center Accord Caucus of Sejm Deputies in order to establish, together with liberals, the Polish Liberal Program Party.

* Precongress ZChN Party Activities Evaluated

93EP0191B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 9,
27 Feb 93 p 7

[Article by Mariusz Janicki: "Poor but Pure: Nearly Every 100th Member of the ZChN Is a Member of Parliament"]

[Text] As a party the ZChN [Christian-National Union] is slow and patient, like a turtle. It was formed quietly and unobtrusively in October 1989, when concord and harmony still reigned at the "top" among Solidarity leaders and the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] still had thought that it would somehow survive. The party is led by the quiet and affable Wieslaw Chrzanowski, a man who is not charismatic and rather resembles a modest professor with a beautiful past and a small old-fashioned apartment in the Powisle section of Warsaw with pictures of ancestors hanging on the walls.

The party's membership grew slowly; at the end of 1990 it numbered 3,000 and now it is about 6,000. This is a workable number, because it has sufficed for the party to be represented in the government by several ministers, a deputy prime minister, and the speaker of the Sejm. Nearly every 100th member of the ZChN has a seat in parliament. But within the party itself the belief is that the prestigious Democratic Union has in reality even fewer than 6,000 members.

The ZChN is a party of town and small-city dwellers, but it is not ashamed of it. As known, it is precisely in the provinces and not in the big cities that elections are won. The regions in which the party has its strongholds also are not big: The Lomza-Ostroleka-Ciechanow triangle, which will hardly lose its rural status soon; Bialystok Voivodship, where this nationalist party skillfully exploits Polish-Belorussian relations (acting on a similar principle, it interceded with the president about the Germans living in Opole region); Lodz, where the anti-abortion decree may not be especially popular but the party's members occupy the most important municipal posts; and, for some unknown reason, Gdansk. The ZChN is not represented at all in Sosnowiec, which has always been "Red," and in the "uprooted" Koszalin-Slupsk region. But that does not matter much because the party is strong in the places where it counts. In Warsaw the party has 700 members, and a particularly large proportion of ZChN members are lawyers and engineers.

The ZChN stays away from scandal. It is pure and poor. Monthly dues are 10,000 zlotys, but university students and pensioners—and their numbers among the members are growing—may apply for special cut-rate dues of 5,000 zlotys. The party's financial situation is shored up by donations from patrons (such as subscriptions to RES PUBLICA) in addition to the nominal dues. These include ZChN deputies who are expected to contribute 10 percent of their salaries, about 400,000 zlotys. All in all, this is a survival budget, and it is distributed fairly, with one-half going to the head office, one-fourth to local branches (240 in this country, compared with only about 100 two years ago), and one-fourth to regions (25).

There is no problem with office space. It is provided to the party, as to practically everyone else, in the local offices of parliamentary deputies.

The party also avoids scandals because it selects its members carefully. To be admitted an applicant needs recommendations from two regular members and from a Catholic priest, the latter being optional but, as it turns out, willingly provided by the clergy. Besides, the party's program is so explicit that inappropriate applicants for membership, such as people without a church wedding, are not knocking at its doors ("Although we don't operate a 'Deuxieme Bureau'"). So far no motion has ever been proposed to deprive any ZChN deputy of parliamentary immunity.

The ZChN is watching the youth movements, but not obtrusively. It is the young people themselves who are drawn to it, on their own. Although ZChN members of parliament recently hosted a group of sympathizers from the Catholic University of Lublin, the party is not strong in the other institutions of higher education.

Schisms within the ZChN are also, fittingly enough, hardly a big deal. In Wroclaw 10 persons headed by Macierewicz resigned from membership; in Poznan, five; in Czestochowa, two; and in Warsaw, 30. That is not many, but in Wroclaw, after those 10 had left, only 10 remained.

The ZChN does not fear new elections. Its members openly declare that it has won credit with the Catholic Church. Just as it did earlier as a member of the WAK (Catholic Election Campaign) coalition, it won the church's support in the last elections. ("The church looks on and draws conclusions.") The ZChN will remain a member of the governing coalition, although many activists wonder where the boundary lines of compromise can be drawn and what should be the terms posed for the ZChN to remain in that coalition. The greatest doubts are expressed by J. Lopuszanski. Wieslaw Chrzanowski remains officially the unquestioned leader and at the coming congress he is to be the sole candidate for the post of party chairman. He is assisted by a strong leadership group consisting of the historian Marek Jurek, 38 years old; zoologist Stefan Niesiolowski, 49 years old; lawyer Jan Lopuszanski, 38; reporter Andrzej Czarnecki, 30; and [Deputy Prime Minister] lawyer Henryk Goryszewski, [age illegible]. Of this group only Niesiolowski and Goryszewski are vocal at times; the others keep to themselves.

There are not many other well-known members. As St. Niesiolowski once put it, the Left has more intellectuals because leftists used to travel to foreign universities on scholarships in times when rightists were persecuted. Nevertheless the ZChN resolutely rejects accusations that it has too few intellectuals among its members. One member, Jan Bleszynski, had been nominated for minister of culture, but he fell ill and was to be followed by Jerzy Goral. When the latter declined the nomination, the party offered it to "a well-known artistic director" and "a well-known musicologist," who, however, viewed their own jobs as more interesting. Thereupon it offered the post to Professor Klajnert, but the president did not want him. Finally Goral, who this time did not decline

the nomination, became the minister. Thus, the appointive process was slow but effective, like everything else at the ZChN.

Diligence and patience pay. The ZChN may be a B-grade Polish party (according to one member), but it plays in the championship class. It is a Catholic-nationalist party, the party of traditional large families where "the wife's purpose is to bear children" (M. Jurek), the party of the silent Poles with a prayerbook in their hands who are worried by the country's Europeanization, a party which warns against the release from jail of conscientious objector Galuszka and which campaigns against rude songs and improper wall posters. Its strength lies in that it does not pretend to be "politically correct" [preceding two words in English] and is not embarrassed that it does not view democracy as the politically most important good (thereby differing from Western Christian democrats). There is no winking, no quotation marks. The party is sincere. Unlike most other political parties, the ZChN is a faithful reflection of its electorate, of a real electorate rather than of some expected future electorate such as the mythical "middle class."

Therefore, one can engage in combat with the ZChN but cannot expect a victory, because this party reflects an option that is not so much political as cultural and that has a religious foundation. This has always been the hardest amalgam, one much stronger than all democratic liberalisms. The public may complain about the clergy, but it invites priests inside after the Christmas carols are sung and listens to their sermons; it may criticize the priests for being greedy but it donates money to the collection plates being passed around in churches; it may practice abortion but it protests when someone criticizes pro-life; it does not want the cross to hang in public buildings, but once it is there nobody removes it. Well, the ZChN acts precisely on this principle. It quietly hangs conventional crucifixes in public buildings and elsewhere and looks on, not without some gratification, while others fidget impotently.

Various adjectives may be appended to the word "Poland," but this does not change the fact that these various Polands lie just around the corner. That is why the ZChN, a slow-moving and poor party resting on the tranquil bedrock of dogmas, led by a 70 year old man, still has much to accomplish. It will never be the country's biggest party, but it will be strong and will not float away with the first spring rains, contrary to what some people predict. The common consensus is that the ZChN scored its electoral success (the third-ranking party in the last elections, 8.3 percent of votes) thanks to the support of the Catholic Church. Of course, but it also is a party of people who listen to the priests, regardless of whether they do so out of respect for or fear of their authority or both. It would be a misunderstanding to criticize instead of acknowledging this fact.

Were the clergy to campaign in favor of the Liberal-Democratic Congress and were the faithful to be obedient, they would still remain the ZChN's electorate, except that it would be a deceived electorate.

The Christian-National Union was originally conceived by Chrzanowski as a combination of Christian-democratic and nationalist orientations, with the chairman himself to this day remaining probably the biggest supporter of Christian democracy (that is, of democracy). Now, however, the nationalist-Catholic orientation predominates within that party. Even so, Macierewicz and other individuals resorting to extremist anti-communist rhetoric resigned from it. Since the party has joined the governing coalition, it has been less outspoken on economic issues, and its comments have been more moderate. On the other hand, it is more free to comment on customs and has focused its attention on them.

The nationalist-Catholic tradition dates from before the war on our political scene. It has to be recognized as a fairly stable factor. The only question is, when will other political forces learn to contest the ZChN so as to stop losing to it?

* Army Modernization Hurt by Lack of Funds

93EP0186A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
15 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by Col. Pawel Nowak: "How To Share the Poverty"]

[Text] Noninvestment expenditures including the maintenance of personnel, training, and use of the equipment and facilities will probably amount to nearly 90 percent of the budget of the Ministry of National Defense in 1993. Such a structure of expenditures is not encountered in other armies; in this respect, we are a special case on a world scale.

The Defense Ministry budget has been called various things, but the core of the issue does not lie in the name. Today the budget situation has reached a critical point, and crossing it can lead to the complete disassembly of an already strained system of state defense. It is not necessary to justify this statement. It suffices to analyze the expenditures of the Ministry of National Defense, especially to look at them during the last few years. It is also apparent that there is in practice no way to maneuver the financial resources within the budget to change the structure of the expenditures unless one resigns from maintaining unnecessary infrastructure no one wants, ceases repairing military equipment and buying spare parts for it, withdraws all out-dated equipment, significantly reduces personnel below planned levels, and limits training to basic training, which will lead to the collapse of the defensive forces of the state.

There are, however, some actions among those listed above that do not dismantle the defensive system of the

state. An example is the shedding of unwanted infrastructures that require significant financial investments for maintenance or renovation. We have received a significant number of barrack facilities from the Soviet Army that have increased our inventory and are burdening us financially. The principle here should be that a facility is worth as much as there is interest in it. Perhaps some facilities, especially the smaller ones, can be given to social organizations.

It is also possible to cease repairing military equipment, but in this case it is necessary to decide on withdrawing it later knowing that new equipment will be introduced. That will determine how intensive military training can be and what level of battle readiness can be maintained.

Today the state of the state defense is determined by, among other things:

- the defense industry, which currently has the lowest financial indexes in domestic industry, huge debts, and a lack of exports and of orders from the defense ministry
- the low purchasing power of the budget of the Ministry of National Defense which in 1993, for example, in its first version included the purchase of military equipment from domestic industry valued at about 5 percent of the budget and expenditures for research and development valued at about 0.7 percent
- a declining fighting value of the military because of declining personnel levels, aging of military equipment, a lack of modern equipment (not to be confused with new), limited training, etc.

It is necessary to realize that the rebuilding of the state defensive system is not a short-term action or a small financial project, especially since the system is in serious disarray. That is why no state, other than ours, has permitted large, rapid financial reductions in the area of budget expenditures.

It is not necessary to convince anyone that we cannot count on the philanthropy of foreign arms producers or similarly on the military aid of other states if Poland's security is threatened.

Analyzing the planned budget of the Ministry of National Defense for 1993, it is worth looking towards the future and imagining the effects of the budget on the basis of current actions. There is no doubt that a budget for the defense ministry built in this fashion will only worsen the defense of the country, without giving hope for a better future. Financial resources will only suffice for maintaining personnel and training on out-dated equipment and its use.

It is not news that the value of every army depends mainly on its equipment. What we have, given the rapid rate of development in battle equipment, will only be suitable for scrap in a few years. Without a constant supply of modern equipment for the army, its fighting value will fall rapidly, making it a facade.

In this situation, it is essential to expand investment expenditures, chiefly for research and development work. This produces a doubly profitable benefit for the military and for the armaments industry, which is simply waiting for such financial resources. These resources will permit new projects to be started and others, which are underway, to be finished and will provide an opportunity to enter into new production for the arms market.

Our problem is that programs and proposals for action are prepared and implemented very slowly. A lack of decisiveness, the greatest shortcoming of our times, has made itself felt. Years ago in the military, a saying took root that the worst decision is better than no decision. And it is true because one can always make many changes in the course of implementing it. We should expect greater effort in this area from the Sejm.

Many examples of decisive action by parliaments on behalf of their military forces can be found. For example, the three "special laws" adopted by the Italian parliament in 1975-77 aimed at overcoming the difficulties in defense resulting from the rampant inflation which was severely impacting the budget of the armed forces. The three laws adopted—one for each branch of the military—constituted the foundation of state policy in the development of the armed forces based on long-term planning and financing with particular emphasis on industry.

These laws made it possible for the various branches of industry engaged in implementing long-term plans to invest large sums in research and development and in the modernization of enterprises. In effect, new generations of armament systems appeared which were capable of meeting the demands of the armed forces as well as effectively competing on world arms markets. Currently, that industry is able to meet most of the larger needs of the Italian armed forces.

One can also put into place the institution of a "government arms program," which should be an inseparable element of the restructuring of the arms industry and of its research and development facilities. Such a program should be built on a perspective of at least 10 years to permit the industry to begin production of modern arms able to compete on arms markets and also to make Poland independent of foreign supplies. That is one of the realistic variants of action permitting and facilitating at least a part of the industry to restructure and to change the quality of production.

There are also other systematic solutions that require surmounting legislative obstacles, which should not be a problem if reason plays a role. Solutions of this type are used in many countries around the world; they depend on joining the defense ministry with the production and sales of military equipment. At the beginning of 1992, a new plan for organizing the institutions under the deputy ministers of national defense for arms and military infrastructure was prepared at the Command for Technical Services. The plan proposes forming an agency of

military property (as a holding company or stock company) that embraces the executive tasks in the financial and economic area, such as producing modern military equipment, selling (imports and exports), and investing. A state bank (for example, an incorporated defense bank) would service the defense minister and the arms industry.

Some institutions would obviously remain under the deputy ministers of national defense, but they would be seriously reduced and basically perform planning and coordination functions and supervisory functions. This solution would permit rapid improvement of the defensive ability of the state without increasing expenditures for defense. The agency would be an executive body of the Ministry of National Defense, fully commercial, and operate outside of the structure of the defense ministry.

This proposal was produced in consultation with representatives of the arms industry and the defense ministry and received a positive reaction and there it ended, unfortunately. Currently, similar proposals are appearing in civilian arenas. May they have greater staying power to the benefit of the Republic of Poland. Similar solutions are in operation in many militaries around the world.

Analyzing the principles of operation in the arms industry in the developed countries, we clearly see a policy of government stimulation and protection for the domestic producers. It is also apparent in various kinds of preferences and exemptions, including voiding and reducing various taxes, for example, the turnover tax. The military-industrial lobby is not without influence on such government actions in any country. I do not need to explain how things are in our reality. We are only beginning to think about it. Obvious examples of a lack of understanding of defense issues are the duty imposed on imports of military equipment by the Ministry of National Defense, a value-added tax, and a lack of protection for arms producers by the state.

The planned budget expenditures for the Ministry of National Defense in 1993 are lower than for 1992, but no one reduced the tasks assigned to defense. In order to meet them, it will be necessary to reduce expenditures for equipment. We have reached a situation in which nearly the entire budget of the Ministry of National Defense will be earmarked for maintaining the army, practically halting its development (this process has gone on for several years now.)

*** Prospects for Catholic Press Assessed**

*** Current State Viewed**

93EP0204A Warsaw LAD in Polish No 8, 21 Feb 93
pp 1, 4

[Passages from speech by Bishop Jan Chrapek: "Status of Catholic Press in Poland"]

[Text] On 21 January 1993 the Warsaw Branch of the Catholic Association of Journalists organized a panel discussion entitled, "Status of the Catholic Press in Poland at Present: Diagnosis and Perspectives." The panel participants were the Reverend Bishop Jan Chrapek, chairman of the Commission for Mass Media, Second Plenary Synod in Poland; the Reverend Stanislaw Tkocz, editor in chief of GOSC NIEDZIELNY; Marcin Przeciszewski, editor, SPOTKANIA; and Tomasz Wisnicki, editor, POWSCIAGLIWOSC I PRACA. The moderator was the chairman of the branch, Cezary Gawrys.

Below we present what we consider to be the most important excerpts from that discussion. We hope that they will enable us to better understand the problems of not just the Catholic press.

Bishop Jan Chrapek: Let Us Help To Understand

I shall try to share with you my reflections on the tasks currently facing the mass media. It seems to me that these tasks in particular should be accomplished by the Catholic press and the Catholic mass media, which.... are to inspire the public with a feeling of responsibility for what is happening around us.

The process of change in our country certainly needs informed support. Thus, first of all we should—this being unusually important—help each other shake off the bad experience of the past and attempt to calmly examine our conscience about the times past and the causes of the then present evil. An extremely calm, objective examination of conscience is needed. People who work in mass media have a great role to play. Unless we perform that examination of conscience, we cannot creatively exploit the new opportunities.

But if an effort of this kind is to succeed in some way, the litterateurs and other intellectuals should rid themselves of the temptation of personally participating, as it were, in political life and focus on helping others understand the reality.

They should, through their efforts, help the public look at the wellsprings of a system of society which not only failed to prove itself but also destructively affected many peoples and societies. It seems that reflections of this kind are unusually needed, and I think that the mass media, especially the Christian, Catholic ones, should undertake such efforts so that we may not again smell the stench of slavery and be tempted to return to Egypt—a strong temptation, given the weariness of the people. An attempt should be made to understand what has happened, what was the cause of the evil which has been and is to this day wreaking havoc.

Yet, instead of calm reflection and joint action, we perceive that something quite the opposite is happening. To be sure, this is often a corollary of the first stage of transformations in public life, but that makes it all the more necessary to curb manifestations of relatively unconstructive behavior based on the rule, "Eve

writhing is permitted, nothing is taboo, and the constraints of good taste and good customs do not exist."

It seems to me that these are times when people are weary; they are weary personally and of what is happening around them. They would like to be helped to understand the reality. I think that this is precisely where our great task lies.

It is in the nature of the mass media to act on behalf of forming a community, to build unity, and to consolidate solidarity and mutual enrichment. It appears that people are increasingly weary of the frivolities of free speech, of the disregard of important matters. In the last few months this weariness has become increasingly common; the need of the hour is for us to be able to speak out.

It should also be borne in mind that the new era in civilization harbors a hunger for metaphysics and spurs a leaning toward teleology. We must realize this; we should not succumb to the complications imputed on us. I think that this is probably the only time in modern history that the hunger for metaphysics and teleology is as great as it had been in the times of Christ. I may be wrong, but it seems to me that this is the common hunger for God. It is important for us to be aware that this represents a unique experience which transcends time and space and is potentially inherent in the influence of the mass media.

All that is happening defines the tasks facing the mass media, including—and perhaps above all—Catholic mass media. Why do I single out Catholic media? Because ours is, as it were, a special kind of responsibility for the bounties received from God.

The first task which seems to me to be the most important is to teach the audiences to understand the ambient reality, events, and each other. We are living in a kind of Tower of Babel. We utter words in the same language without understanding each other. Yesterday I took part in a discussion at the University of Warsaw on the subject of Christian values, a stirring, agitating topic. The discussion was stormy. I was preceded by Mr. Editor Adam Michnik, who outlined a picture of a present-day Poland in which an ecclesiastical inquisition will soon begin to chop off the heads of certain newspaper editors while demoting others to digging ditches. I tried to show how Christian values are to be perceived most deeply. In the conversations following that discussion it turned out that these people said, yes, they understood this. It simply turned out that a special kind of Tower of Babel exists. Why is it that we, the Roman Catholic Church, are not trying to demonstrate and explain the meaning of, say, Christian values? Hence the paramount task is to teach, humbly teach, the audiences to understand the ambient reality without being obtrusively pedagogical about it.

The next most important task is to encourage interpersonal solidarity, to promote a feeling of creative responsibility here and now for the common good, to stimulate

an awareness of one's own identity and collective identity such as would have room for respect for those who are different, to demonstrate the good, which ultimately always wins. We are people of faith and people of the victory of the Christian cross. I think that above all at present we should demonstrate, try to demonstrate, that good which always wins.

I recall the times of my work at the newspaper POWS-CIAGLIWOSC I PRACA, when we also perceived certain errors within the framework of the institutional Roman Catholic Church. The church is great not because it is infallible but because sin ultimately loses out.

The interest of the audiences in the history of their own nation and its literature should be encouraged.

The meaning of genuine tolerance should be demonstrated and a continual effort to learn throughout one's life and acquire new intellectual, artistic, and spiritual experiences should be encouraged, because apathy is a stumbling block which we have all encountered.... We also have to work on the language we are using, so that our press may be free of hatred and contempt.

* Call for New Daily

93EP0204B Warsaw LAD in Polish No 8, 21 Feb 93 p 4

[Compiled by Zbigniew Bradel: "On Certain Snares"]

[Text] Speech by Tomasz Wiscicki:

What is our Catholic press like at present?

We all assume that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland needs a daily newspaper of its own. We take it as a given. I do not want to question this. I would merely like to point out that this has not been preceded by any public discussion at all. Neither has it been preceded—whether in the Catholic press or anywhere else—by pointing to certain snares that may be inherent in establishing a national Catholic daily.

What I am saying does not mean that there should be no such daily. My doubts concern something else: If it is to have a chance to survive in the foreseeable future, there can be only one major national Catholic daily in Poland. Yet the Polish Roman Catholic Church is so diverse so pluralistic, and it harbors a multiplicity of views. The question then is, how to edit a single daily which is to reflect the multiplicity of these views in the church's bosom?

The existing weeklies face certain snares. There is the snare of a onesided political stance. While is not possible to publish a daily which takes no definite [political] position, the Catholic marque means an obligation to keep a healthy distance from politics. I can hardly conceive of the possibility of reconciling the Catholic nature of a periodical with the adoption of a specific political stance. Unfortunately, we are dealing with such cases. (To Editor T. Wiscicki the cases he refers to are TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY and LAD—Z.B.)

The next question is the snares harbored in language. How can the values close to us be defended without now and then becoming involved in a conflict? How can the truly important issues be defended and falsehoods shown up without becoming involved in quarrels? (To Editor T. Wiscicki the periodical which crosses this line is the weekly NIEDZIELA—Z.B.)

Another issue concerns the local press. If we are to spread ourselves much too thin given the modest resources available to us, every diocese will have its own amateurishly published bulletin.

Monthlies, which are not profitable anywhere in the world, require above all a expert technical handling.

* Need for New Language

93EP0204C Warsaw LAD No 8, 21 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by Marcin Przeciszewski: "To Perceive Anew"]

[Text] I would like to begin my reflections with a rather saddening connotation. Namely, at a time when the whole country is changing, when everything simply looks different, the Catholic press is the same as it was five years ago. It employs the same style, the same printing type, the same grade of paper, and it publishes the same blurred photographs. This is indeed a very saddening reflection. We have not perceived the new situation; we have not interpreted anew the calling of Catholic press.

Here I wish to congratulate our colleagues at SLOWO POWSZECHNE, because this is probably their big day. After 45 years of existence both this periodical and the constituency which publishes it are becoming an element of the Roman Catholic Church, as acknowledged by assigning an ecclesiastical assistant.

To return to the new perception of the calling of the Catholic press in the current changing situation, it should be stated that the present era is one of special influence of the mass media on the awareness of the common man. There has been no other era like this in the thousand years old history of Poland. If we tolerate the exclusive domination of media hostile to Christianity on the press market, the future of Christianity itself and our national identity and culture will indeed be threatened. Hence the great challenge to the Catholic press, to us all, to each of us.

What should the Catholic press be like, given that it is a press openly following a specific ideological option? What should this press be like in the era of an encounter with the most primitive forms of publishing in Europe?

In answering I wish to express my belief that the Catholic press should above all be a meeting-ground and not, as usually is the case, grounds for division. It hurts me greatly, for example, that [the Catholic] TYGODNI K. POWSZECHNY has become the periodical of a political group with which I do not identify myself.

Another issue which should be treated seriously by the Catholic press concerns a reform of the language by means of which journalists are in contact with their readers. A challenging and commendable example to us could be the weekly POLITYKA. Consider how hard its reporters work on changing language! Should not we likewise change fundamentally our writing style? Should not we, for example, attend to providing our readers with a greater amount of positive information on the life of the church? Thus, instead of, say, waging often futile combat with opponents of the teaching of religion in schools, we should focus on providing the public with reports stressing that religion is taught in the schools of every civilized country in the world.

I believe that nowadays we need two kinds of Catholic press in Poland: The kind spreading the Gospel and the kind focusing on church news. Thus, I perceive a need for establishing in Poland a Catholic [television] news program. Why should we view the world through the eyes of the editors of lay television newscasts or, for example, GAZETA WYBORCZA? Their eyes are different from ours; they refract the light at an angle different from that given to us.

There is a great future in the offing for church press of the POWSCIAGLIWOSC I PRACA or LIST kind, which helps Christians to become more Christian and is addressed to specific constituencies.

An absolutely fundamental issue to our media is the need to open a Catholic press agency. From observation I know that in Poland it is often very easy to become an anti-Church reporter and very difficult to become a pro-church one, simply because adequate information on the nature of religious life is very difficult to obtain. Unless one is friends with three bishops or an hundred priests, it is hardly possible to write sensibly about the church.

* New Catholic Press Agency

93EP0204D Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
8 Mar 93 p 5

[Article by Grzegorz Polak: "Providing Information About the Church Without Gaffes: Catholic News Agency To Be Established"]

[Text] The Catholic Information Agency (KAI) will probably start operating at Advent time or some time at the end of November and beginning of December. It is to employ almost exclusively lay reporters. The director of a similar agency in the United States believes that the KAI should provide impartial and credible information based on facts alone.

The KAI will be established thanks to sponsorship by the Catholic Church of the United States. Substantive assistance, e.g., in training reporters, is being provided by the largest Catholic news agency in that country, the Catholic News Service. In its turn the Office for Aid to the Catholic Church in Central and East Europe, attached to

the Conference of the United States Episcopate, is to provide at least \$500,000 for the needs of the KAI.

The Americans proposed that the KAI be not directly dependent on the Conference of the Episcopate of Poland. Thus, the church will establish a foundation which will be directed by a council consisting of five bishops and, probably, two lay journalists. The Primate of Poland has appointed the youngest members of the Episcopate to that council, namely: the eminent media expert Jan Chrapek, Jozef Zycinski, Stanislaw Gadecki, and Jan Tyrawa—all 43 or 44 years old—and the 57-year-old Deputy Secretary of the Episcopate Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek. The lay members of the council have not been appointed yet.

By now an organizing committee of several Catholic journalists (including Marcin Przeciszewski, until recently in charge of the religious section of SPOTKANIA, and two editors of the monthly POWSCIAGLIWOSC I PRACA, Lukasz Malachowski and Tomasz Krolak) is working on establishing the agency.

The agency will probably employ an office staff of 10 plus eight local correspondents. It also is considering hiring several correspondents from the territory of the former USSR.

The Director of the U.S. Catholic News Service Thomas L. Lorusung stressed in the proposal presented to Polish bishops that the information provided by the KAI will be valued if it is impartial, credible, and focusing on facts. "It is the customers and not the bishops who pay for the work of such an agency," Lorusung said.

In an interview granted to Radio Vatican Bishop Jozef Zycinski, who is responsible for establishing the agency, stressed that it is needed because, among other things, the reporters working for the Polish mass media "often make mistakes when referring to the Catholic Church." In the bishop's opinion, this is often due to incompetence, and sometimes to program manipulation.

One of the reporters organizing the agency told GAZETA WYBORCZA that the KAI will try to "break the vicious circle separating the Catholic Church from the lay media.... It will do everything to surmount mutual illwill and biases. We want to show that the church knows how and wants to cooperate with them," said the reporter.

Before World War II the Catholic Press Agency (KAP) used to operate in Poland. It was headed by two famous clergymen: The Reverend Jozef Gawlina, later a field bishop, and, after him, the Reverend Zygmunt Kaczynski, who after the war became an editor of TYGODNIK WARSZAWSKI.

*** Antiterrorist Unit Facing Hardships**

93CH0416A Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Jan 93
pp 1, 5

[Report by Marian Moncman: "We Are Not Killers"]

[Text] "A lot of people have reproached us for not shooting the escapees when we went into action in Leopoldov against the convicts who had murdered five guards and badly wounded four people," says the commander of the section of the Bratislava Alert Police Unit. He is named Milan (he does not want to give his last name). "Our mission is to apprehend the perpetrator and to turn him over to the competent authorities, not to kill him. It is not such a simple matter to kill a person. We are also people; we are not lacking in conscience. One has to be aware of the fact that the perpetrator is also a person. We cannot condemn him to death without knowing what led him to commit the action."

According to international agreements, the buildings of the foreign representation must be provided with protection by antiterrorist units. The reason for this is mainly political terrorism, whose attacks are carried out mostly against radio and television stations, the government, and embassies.... With the creation of the Slovak Republic there was supposed to be a special service created in Slovakia designated to operate throughout its territory. (Until 1 January 1993 this operation was performed by a rapid response unit of the federal police corps.) The unit is trained for combat against dangerous and particularly dangerous perpetrators. It is put into action in those cases which are too risky for the other police elements.

It is not possible to train all policemen up to the required level in a short time, as there is not enough time, money, or competent people.

Hard on the Training Ground (Easy on the Battlefield)

"Many aspirants think that they will train, shoot, and only do interesting things," Mr. Milan continues on. "Our training consists, however, of repeating each thing a thousand times, even the most simple things. Professionalism is not a matter of someone knowing how to dive off a bridge on his head, but knowing how to do each little thing perfectly and not making a mistake while doing it. We are sent into action on an average of four or five times a month in cases where the perpetrators are not only expected to use weapons, but where shots are also being fired."

"We have not yet used our weapons against anyone. So far we have been able to take care of things without them. We have to date kept 100 percent to the principle of doing the least possible damage, even to the perpetrators. There have just been some bruises, a broken nose.... We have used our weapons only against vehicles, to shoot out the tires. The perpetrators against whom we were deployed were mostly just brutal blockheads, rather than professionals. Raw force was enough against them.

This is not yet true terrorism, but it is starting to be. Bombs, burned-out store windows, shots fired...."

The tactical training is not that much fun. For example, to safely get to a building means repeating that move 20 times during the course of the training day. A person does it five times and he is already tired of it, but he must continue with the whole program. This is often the reason for personnel turnover. Young men think that they will be Rambos. The first two months they stick it out, but then they leave. On the other hand, the best stay with it. For them, it is not work, but a lifestyle. When someone "grasps" a relationship to this work, he will not give it up even when it changes his life.

After Tests in the United States

"Practice and a visit to the U.S. company Marshall Service, which is set up to fight terrorism, have convinced us that what we are doing, we are doing well and at the right level," Milan states further. "There is not a great difference in the level of training. We are comparable to them with no problems in many respects, in self-defense, shooting, rappelling, climbing techniques... or we are even better because we do not depend on equipment as much as they do. The company that I mentioned carries out a lot of operations all over America. It analyzes and evaluates all operations using a computer. We are also headed in that direction; you cannot do it any other way. The greatest difference is, however, in the false idea which the old system created for us. According to it a policeman is supposed to take care of others first of all, and then himself. In the United States this is not the case. In an action each person primarily protects his own life. Indeed, when the Americans saw the conditions that we work under, they shook their heads and said, 'Either you are heroes or you are crazy...'"

"At the present time we are also 80 to 90 percent armed with high-quality weapons," we are told by Jozef Majtan, doctor of law and commander of the Bratislava PPU PZ SR [Alert Police Unit of the Police Corps of the Slovak Republic]. "We have bulletproof vests, shotguns, pistols, radios... basically at the world-class level. It is, however, hard to say when we will get up to that level in all aspects. High-quality training takes three to four years. The annual expenses for the training of one person fluctuates from half a million to a million korunas. This includes flight hours, ammunition, uniforms, training... However, today we can definitely state on the basis of the operations carried out that society gets a return on these costs. There are a lot of problems with which we still must wrestle. We are in a situation where we even have to take in young men 19 to 21 years old. The ideal age, however, is 26 or 27 years old. After the training one is in his 30's, he is already settled in from the psychological standpoint, knows police work, has enough experience with criminals...."

Who Pays Them Better?

The commander fears that, if he cannot stabilize his personnel and stop the turnover, there could be a problem with the quality of the unit, especially if its members continue to be paid as they have been so far. By way of comparison, in the United States they earn twice as much as normal policemen. For each free spot in the special unit there are 300 interested people.

Our "specialists" get the same pay as a normal policeman, about 6,000 to 8,000 korunas. The risks are also equal... When a Dutch special unit policeman heard what the difference is, he laughed and said, "That is just two packs of the best cigarettes...."

And what about the lack of housing? It is simply unthinkable that in the case of need these fellows would rush into duty from around Bratislava.

A broader problem is the presently applicable law on keeping weapons. "What is being done with weapons is far from normal," says Dr. Majtan. "I read in the newspapers recently that some dealer in eastern Slovakia is selling Scorpion submachine guns. This, while all antiterrorist units who have experience with real terrorists clearly maintain that the Scorpion is the best for terrorist acts...."

Borders mean nothing to terrorists. They push in where there is a weak point and retreat from where it is stronger. What kind of point will Slovakia be?

* Indifference to Publicizing Achievements Noted

93CH0428A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak
19 Feb 93 p 1

[Commentary by Daniel Borsky: "Picture of a Couch Potato"]

[Text] I was turning the pages of THE FINANCIAL TIMES one day, a newspaper probably read by every real businessman in the world, when all of a sudden, wham! I was hit in the eye by the huge headline "The Czech Republic." Ah yes, I remind myself of the well-known fact; we are in fact divorced. The eight pages of the "special advertisement section," as announced in the subhead of the section, included almost everything—politics, economy, business, geography, history, culture, sports. Photos of the crown jewels, the Hradcany Castle, the Charles Bridge.... One gets the impression, willy-nilly, that we have here an economically, politically, historically, and culturally developed country. Never mind that in the economic section the Czech Republic to some extent brags about achievements that are not solely its own. It lists important—by the way, very good—economic indicators (inflation, budget deficit, cost of one working unit) from 1992, from the time of the common state.

I read on about brief portraits of the most successful corporations in the Czech Republic. Not forgotten, of course, are Czech beer, Bata's Czech shoes, Czech...

everything. Truly, after reading this advertisement section, one gets a picture of the Czech Republic, which, although incomplete, is definitely an attractive one. And although someone may object that this is merely government propaganda, someone else may retort that, after all, the end justifies the means. We must admit that in international business and politics that happens to be something of a *modus vivendi*. A British businessman is not very likely to go and ask Vaclav Klaus how much this advertisement section in THE FINANCIAL TIMES cost him.... I was not surprised at all when a few days later I found a similar advertisement section in the international magazine NEWSWEEK, which has a truly worldwide circulation. And not only that.... Already in November last year that same magazine gave 12 insert pages to Poland (in December Sudan even took over eight pages!) A little later another world magazine, TIME INTERNATIONAL, gave space to Romania. In other words, since the end of last year East Europe has been on the move....

Unfortunately, it was only the Slovak advertisement section which I just couldn't find. The youngest East European republic gives the impression even today that it has not yet recovered from its New Year's independence hangover. Given such a situation at home, it is not surprising that in its relations with the outside world, Slovakia reminds one of an empty barrel. When someone knocks on its door with good intentions, only a muffled rumbling is heard from within. Who would be interested in an empty barrel? But forget the similes, the fact is that if anyone on the outside wants to learn something about Slovakia they must read articles by Czech journalists (in the better case) or articles by British journalists with names that smack of the Lower Province (in the worse case). Whether that is a good thing, let the reader judge for himself. On the global information market it is essential to attract attention at all costs. It seems that the Czech Republic follows the old, well-known principle "just as long as they are talking about us." The Czechs have always been better at this sort of thing, I say to myself pensively, remembering THE FINANCIAL TIMES from a year and a half ago, when the federal government also financed a similar advertisement section—with one difference; the one of a year and a half ago was about CSFR.

Today we do not have the federal government, and the Czech Government will obviously not act as our benefactor, no matter how great a love our prime ministers may have pledged to each other. Today it is no longer enough to merely observe that they always used to be better at some things. Today we have capitalism, which we all wanted three years ago. We have competition (maybe not in the domestic economy, which is too overcrowded with monopolies, but as a result a much greater one in international politics and business), which we also wanted. There is only one thing to do—get used to it as quickly as possible. How many empty words have been wasted about the need to attract foreign capital? How many fists were shaken angrily at Prague where the

flow of money from the West dispersed and soaked into the fertile Czech lands? Today the federal irrigation system, which distributed this flow unequally, no longer functions, but the flow continues to disappear into the "Czech forests and meadows." No wonder that Slovakia is even more forgotten and out of sight than Romania or the Sudan.

Despite the "true picture of Slovakia for the world," the result of this aspect of the undoubtedly extensive activities of Prime Minister Meciar was a kind of newspapermen's club for providing true pictures. A group of maybe four or six Czech newspapermen did more honest work for the Czech Republic in two or three weeks than this club did in the entire year of its existence, spent by living off the popularity of someone else.... But maybe I am mistaken. Maybe with its performance this marvellous club actually succeeded in giving the most truthful picture of Slovakia to the world—the picture of a couch potato.

* Commentary Views Private Entrepreneurs

93CH0428B Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak
19 Feb 93 p 2

[Commentary by Marian Sklenka: "Cost of Entrepreneurship"]

[Text] Friday's spirit of protest among entrepreneurs spread on Saturday from Lucenec to Banska Bystrica. At least 5,000 entrepreneurs demonstrated in Lucenec, calling for the creation of a healthy environment with normal legal and economic conditions for doing business. On Saturday a district-wide convention of entrepreneurs was held in Banska Bystrica; it approved the January Bratislava petition as well as the appeals from Lucenec and other Slovak towns.

If anyone expected that the district convention would be over-politicized, full of aggressiveness and attacks on the top state agencies, they would have been mistaken. The entrepreneurs of this district exhibited an educational and moral level worthy of their class. They did not go to extremes. They talked about what hurts them the most: the nonsensical and illogical burden of taxes and fees weighing on the small and medium-sized entrepreneurial class, which already is on its knees and does not need much more before it falls on its face. That would spell its total demise.

It is sad, but entrepreneurs are beginning to not believe the politicians' sweet talk. In fact, they think of it as a kind of sleeping pill. The unfulfilled pre-election promises of a tax moratorium, relief in the cost of fringe benefits and in the conditions for investing in the development of enterprises, especially for the small and medium-sized businesses, opened their eyes. The entrepreneurs documented this with many examples. Let's mention at least one: Since January, for some the cost of an employee with a net monthly wage of 5,500 korunas increased totally beyond belief. If a worker is employed by a private entrepreneur, the amount of fringe benefits

the employer has to pay for that employee are 1,000 korunas higher than last year. In state enterprises and state-established companies, however, these amounts have been reduced. For them such an employee became cheaper. He even became cheaper for the fat cats, that is those who in the course of a year—as private entrepreneurs—have a turnover of tens or hundreds of millions of korunas. These entrepreneurs are apparently—as was noted at the convention—satisfied with things the way they are.

In spite of this truly less than ideal situation, the Bystrica entrepreneurs declared that demonstrations, strikes, confrontations, and tensions are the last thing that the young Slovak republic needs. It is surely impossible for the government to continue treating entrepreneurs like enemies of its policies, to offer them to the incensed public as sacrificial lambs for the current prices. Most of the small and medium-sized businessmen want to serve the citizens and fulfill their obligations to the state, but they are suffocating under the burden of taxes and fees. The entrepreneurial community distances itself from thieves, swindlers, and all kinds of cigarette smugglers. It cannot accept being branded as thieves, a brand some would like to put on the entire entrepreneurial class.

The Bystrica convention also came out in favor of establishing a strong party of entrepreneurs. The participants noted that, unfortunately, in these over-politicized times they can foster their interests only through politics. And because they detect a suspicious interest on the part of the opposition as well as the governing parties in somehow holding down the entire entrepreneurial class, they became even more cautious. They do not trust those parties; they are afraid that they want to disunite the coalescing entrepreneurial movement. They all welcomed the announcement that on 11 February 1993 the Ministry of Interior registered the Party of Slovak Entrepreneurs. The party wants to establish its secretariats in all Slovak districts in the very near future. It is planning a Slovakia-wide founding congress in Prievidza in March.

* President Kovac's Wife Talks About Husband

93CH0443A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak
26 Feb 93 p 3

[Interview with Professor Emilia Kovacova, wife of President Kovac, by Ruzena Wagnerova; place and date not given: "Mr. and Mrs. Kovac Are Knocking at the Door"]

[Text] The First Lady does not like to cook the president's favorite dish, stuffed dumplings.

On 15 February 1993 an inconspicuous blonde woman sits on the balcony in the hall of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. She tries to control her excitement, which she betrays only by rubbing her hands. After the announcement that Michal Kovac was elected president of the Slovak Republic, she accepts the first congratulations from her acquaintances; some of them offer them

because it is a proper thing to do, others with sincerity. It was precisely at this solemn moment that she promised our readers an interview. She is Emilia Kovacova, candidate of sciences and professor of engineering at the Department for Social Development and Labor of the College of Economics in Bratislava.

[Wagnerova] Professor Kovacova, in view of the current unsettled political atmosphere in our country, to what do you attribute your husband's success in the elections?

[Kovacova] First of all, to the traits of his character, his determination to treat his partners with tolerance and understanding, to the fact that he does not respond angrily to anger, and also to the patience with which he deals with people who hold different views, as well as to his willingness to accept the views of his opponents, if he can identify with them. I think that he has learned a lot while serving as the last chairman of the Federal Assembly where he could put his human and political skills to the test and where he proved capable of communicating equally well with the coalition as with the opposition. This is not widely known in Slovakia, and it certainly was not easy.

[Wagnerova] Are you interested in politics?

[Kovacova] I personally would never have chosen this road, but since 1989, when Michal first entered the political scene, I have followed everything intensively because it is traditional and natural for our family to be interested in one another's problems; we experience them together to such an extent that sometimes I wonder whether this isn't already too much for me.

[Wagnerova] However, now you have entered politics as the partner of the head of State.

[Kovacova] Yes, but I look at my task realistically. Most of all, I would like to create conditions in which my husband can responsibly, honestly and conscientiously fulfill the duties he has taken upon himself.

[Wagnerova] Do you expect to continue teaching your students in addition to fulfilling the obligations of protocol as the president's wife?

[Kovacova] That is another problem that has affected my life. I have already heard it clearly stated by my husband. A new semester has just begun at our college, and I would like to give it a try and continue teaching. However, if I feel that something is going wrong there, I would give priority to the duties stemming from my position as the president's wife.

[Wagnerova] In other words, let us take advantage of the time you're still in the classroom. Tell us about your professional activities in the field of employment theory and social policy in which you have been involved and done research for a long time.

[Kovacova] In brief, I published four books, all of them dealing with the problems of quality and efficiency of labor. I took part in scientific conferences. During our

stay in London in 1968-1969, I spoke at Oxford University at an international conference of university faculties from the United States and various European states. Soon thereafter Michal was expelled from the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which greatly limited our opportunities for communications with other countries. I was much less affected by that penalty than my husband, but I had to wait for my appointment as university professor for 19 years after defending my post-graduate thesis. It was not until after the revolution in 1990 that I could present my introductory lecture as a university professor. My husband was forbidden to publish, to speak in public, and above all, to aspire to any scientific or teaching degrees. Thanks to the congenial climate in our department, I was able to publish several papers, many of them inspired by the stimulating and daring ideas which characterize Eugen Loeb's book *Mental Work—Wealth of the Nation*.

[Wagnerova] Thus, you specialize in the research and study of labor. If it is correctly focused, it may become the springboard for an advancement of Slovakia's economy at this very time. How do you deal with it at this particular stage of our economic transformation?

[Kovacova] Problems are affecting, above all, large state-run enterprises. Although capable enterprise managers are already emerging, they do not predominate. Inflexible managers are trying all they can to maintain an unhealthy social attitude toward employment. I know that this is no music to their ears but they will have to adapt to the new system. Small- and medium-sized businesses that intend to survive are already thinking in terms of the market in this area.

[Wagnerova] But people have to cope with increasingly serious existential anxieties that continue to proliferate.

[Kovacova] This is a particularly serious question. In my view, the solution of our economic transformation will depend on how we focus our attention on the creation of a stable stratum of small- and medium-sized businesses. Although they do not produce such impressive assets as large enterprises, they offer job opportunities that are nothing to sneeze at. Furthermore, they represent an important factor from the political point of view because the existence and expansion of the middle class guarantee democratic development. We know that every advanced market economy pays attention to the development of medium-sized businesses.

[Wagnerova] Although you recommend support for this class, it is squeezed hard by our new laws, particularly those on medical insurance.

[Kovacova] I cannot believe that this was done intentionally by the drafters of the laws you mention. Rather, I see a lack of experience with the formulation of laws. However, every shortcoming can be corrected, and that is already being done. I think that at this stage this group of entrepreneurs should be given some tax relief.

[Wagnerova] You are working with a team of economists; together you are following the procedures and economic concepts of the government which is criticized, as it should be, by the opposition as being more concerned about the operational than conceptual aspects. What would you say about it?

[Kovacova] Many unforeseen new problems have emerged following the introduction of the economic reform plan. I am inclined to think that in the current situation the government must deal with them also by applying administrative measures that do not always seem to jive with the initial "Programmatic Declaration" of the government. The specifics of our time demand specific decisions and solutions. Concepts for an independent economic policy are now being elaborated in greater detail to suit our conditions. This policy will be extremely important.

[Wagnerova] Both of you are graduates of the department of finance; both of you were employed for a while in a bank. Was that where you first met?

[Kovacova] No, we only continued dating while we were working in the bank. We met in college where we both studied by correspondence; we used to see each other mainly during exams. Before our graduation we began seeing each other more often, and after a couple of years we would meet every day.

[Wagnerova] Woman, as well as man, is an enigma. What attracted you most when you tried to figure out the enigma of Michal Kovac?

[Kovacova] His modesty, responsibility and conscientiousness, his nice smile and good voice, and at that time, also his slim figure. His diligence is evident from the fact that during his college studies, he also worked for his teaching certificate. He earned extra money as a teacher at the elementary school at Jilemnicky Street in Bratislava. As a novice, he had to tackle several subjects, even physical education, which for him was the worst torture. In the evening he had to exercise painstakingly on parallel and horizontal bars to avoid embarrassment in front of his students. I'd like to add that we have two sons; Juraj, our 32-year old, has a degree in chemical engineering and is a candidate of sciences in biology. Because of his father's political problems, he was not admitted to the College of Music and Arts even though he passed the talent test with flying colors. After he tested for the MBA program, he was offered an opportunity to study abroad. He is now completing his courses in order to change his specialization. Our younger son, Michal, an economist, is 30 years old. He is currently in business for himself. Our family's pride and joy are our two granddaughters, Michaela and Kristina.

[Wagnerova] Michal Kovac has already experienced many twists and turns—support and dirty tricks—in his personal life and political involvement. How does he deal in the political arena with punches below the belt?

[Kovacova] Perhaps it is not proper to talk about one's husband, but although Michal is robustly built, his soul is very sensitive; he is strong-willed and self-controlled. He keeps his feelings of injustice and insults he encounters to himself. I don't think that I want to glorify him, but revenge is not in his character. On the contrary, he has a code of high moral values which he also follows in his own life. This perplexes some of his partners who tend to deal not quite fairly, because they haven't expected this quality in him. He does not bang on the table, nor does he raise his voice. He makes his own judgment about people.

[Wagnerova] You have implied, albeit indirectly, that politics is deceitful. Did you try to talk your husband into staying out of high politics, and to convince him to work in the economic field?

[Kovacova] My husband's entry into politics was so sudden that I hardly realized it. When he became finance minister in the Government of National Understanding, I accepted that rather as a recognition of his qualities, skills and professionalism. Later it was no longer possible to talk about his staying with it or quitting. And in fact, there were some pleasant moments over the past three years, but it is better to forget some of our experiences. I admit that on some occasions I thought that it would be better to quit.

[Wagnerova] Tell me, can he manage to be attentive in such a whirlwind?

[Kovacova] Before he got into politics, he used to manage. Today he forgets birthdays or name days. Then he tries to make up for his slip because it always was and still is our unwritten law that our family must live in harmony.

[Wagnerova] If harmony goes through the stomach, what do you do to please your husband?

[Kovacova] His favorite food is dumplings, sweet or savory, filled with cabbage and cottage cheese; that is what his family in East Slovakia, where Michal comes from, treats him with.

[Wagnerova] Both of you are financial experts. Whose position prevails when you make financial decisions for the family?

[Kovacova] No one's. Money is pooled together and allocated according to needs.

[Wagnerova] In your office, Professor Kovacova, I see a painting by Jaroslav Votruba and an etching by Frantisek Jurik. Are you personally attuned to art?

[Kovacova] I love everything beautiful—paintings, concerts in the Reduta Hall where I used to go in my student days. Music gives us a feeling of happiness and relaxation, as it does to anyone who appreciates art and cultural values.

[Wagnerova] Let us stop right here. The presidential quarters are now being prepared in the Bratislava Castle. This has made some prominent personalities of Slovak culture very apprehensive because of reckless administrative and political interventions and because the plans for a functional remodeling of exhibits submitted by experts to the National Council of the Slovak Republic have been disregarded. Are you aware of that?

[Kovacova] Yes, I am, but so far only from the press. As far as I am concerned, I haven't even seen those quarters. I would not consider it wise if it involves inappropriate interference with our national cultural treasures. But the president should have a residence somewhere.

[Wagnerova] Some experts suggested the Archbishop's Palace as a temporary solution.

[Kovacova] I am not acquainted with that plan, but I'll be glad to call attention to it. There is some talk about adding a wing to the Castle. To be sure, my husband thinks that the Castle should serve this state and not an institution. Should the location of the presidential office disturb the collections of our treasures, we'll plead for maximum sensitivity.

[Wagnerova] How do you think the relations between the president and the prime minister will develop in the future?

[Kovacova] I believe that both the prime minister and the president feel a deep sense of responsibility for the further development and advancement of Slovakia and for the fulfillment of its statehood. I see no other alternative but a continuous, patient dialogue and goodwill which will lead to their effective cooperation and genuine achievements to the benefit of our citizens.

[Wagnerova] There was not enough time to think about some more specific concepts, nonetheless, could you try to outline the focus of your activities?

[Kovacova] In addition to my tasks stemming from my husband's program, I see the range of my activity in efforts to get involved in certain foundations which focus on arts and culture, health care as well as on social programs. I regard aid to abandoned and handicapped children as my priority. However, I will need a bit more time to work out the details of my program.

[Wagnerova] As a specialist in the field of labor and social issues, how can you help mitigate the increasing dissatisfaction with social conditions on the part of our citizens?

[Kovacova] The concept of our social policy, as I know it, agrees with the principle of a market economy, but so far it hasn't found any consistent support in the legislation and isn't being implemented. However, we must get used to a simple fact of life: First of all, everyone must take care of himself. If he is incapable of doing so, then his family, his nearest and dearest, must help. If the family cannot do it, it must be done by the community where the citizen lives. If even that option fails, it is the duty of the state not to let the citizen fall below the poverty level. At this juncture, the interpersonal relations in our country are affected by our economic and therefore, our social situation. Their intrinsic value stems from the first stage of this particular system that has been accepted all over the world. As the stratum of indigent citizens has grown, so have apathy and a lack of mutual consideration. Although I am not an advocate of state controls and interventions, until our economy recovers we cannot summarily dismiss their occasional application. I am certain that my husband, with his experience in economics, will also knock at the doors of the prime minister and of the bank council.

[Wagnerova] Thank you for the interview.

Macedonia

Compromises Among Parties on National Symbols

93BA0641A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 13 Feb 93 p 14

[Article by Zoritsa Darkovska: "Bargaining About the National Emblem"]

[Text] *Some (un)wanted parliamentary compromises.*

Who will give in about the lion, and who about the courts, and finally pass the two fundamental laws? And is it possible to bargain concerning such significant national matters?

The prospects for adopting the new national emblem of the Republic of Macedonia at this moment are the same as they were six months ago, when the parliament discussed this law the last time. This means that there are not any! Because of the division of the deputies in the Republic Assembly between the sun and the lion, and thus the division of the votes, so that no version could muster at least 80 votes in August of last year the debate about this contentious issue was postponed until some "better time." That is, until a consensus concerning one symbol, whichever it might be, would be obtained. Up to now this has not happened. Not that there were no interparty meetings within the parliament, but because no one is ready to concede. What is new during these six months is the "bargain" publicly proposed by the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] parliamentary group to the other parliamentarians in which the former expressed an inclination to make certain concessions concerning the likewise controversial law concerning the courts, in return for accepting the lion as a national symbol, which they again in no way reject.

The bargaining that is being discussed publicly this time (which does not mean that there was none up to now), so far has not produced results, but evidently it is continuing. What will come of it perhaps will be seen soon. There are only two possible outcomes—either the miracle will take place and the law will pass at the continuation of the legendary 41st Session (which will have to meet, whether they wanted it to or not) or it will "fall," and put to rest the last six months. This will not be tragic for us since such "resting" has already taken place. Let us remember only that the anniversary of the public announcement of the competition for ideas about the symbols is approaching. And, the final resolution of the uncertainty concerning this law, in any direction, perhaps will make it possible to begin a new proceeding, of better quality and more accurate for many people, which would mean a referendum declaration of the citizens.

Two Versions

At a time when everything is coming at a rush, and there are some serious and urgent matters that are thrust upon

the Assembly, and then do not leave it to complete work recently begun, several months ago we turned to Tito Petkovski, vice president of the Assembly and directly responsible for conducting the proceedings concerning the symbols, with the question of "where is the new Macedonian emblem?" He said that the last agreement of the Constitutional Committee was to make an effort to achieve a consensus concerning the appearance of the emblem.

From the last session of the committee up to now there have been several meetings of the coordinators and representatives of the deputy groups, but no agreement has been reached for the simple reason that, as he said, the deputy group of VMRO-DPMNE categorically maintains the position that it can vote only for an emblem with a lion and for no other version. There have been individual meetings of the coordinators with their deputy groups, but there is no majority around the proposal of VMRO-DPMNE. Possibly, among certain representatives from SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-National Democratic Party], RS-LP [Reformist Forces-Liberal Party], and SPM [Socialist Party of Macedonia], Petkovski says that there is a disposition to accept the lion, but this is absent in the groups as a whole. According to this, as he emphasizes, there are two versions. It is possible to proceed to a session of the parliament with the proposal from the Constitutional Committee for an emblem with a sun with two rows of rays—16 plus 32—together with all the proposed amendments for the sun with the flag, for the lion, for the existing emblem without the five-pointed star, and for an emblem with the first letter of the Glagolitic alphabet. These are amendments that the committee rejected, but the Assembly has to decide if they are to be withdrawn (and this has not been done). The proposals would be considered at the continuation of the 41st Session, and if one of them gets a two-thirds majority of the votes at the session, the law will be passed. If not, it will rest for six months. According to Petkovski, the second version is as the coordinator of the VMRO-DPMNE deputy group already proposed—the laws for which (in this case the emblem and the courts) require a two-thirds majority and will be considered in a package, and a compromise decision will be sought here. It was openly stated that if the others support the emblem with a lion, then the representatives of VMRO-DPMNE will support the law for the courts.

Different Preoccupations

Tito Petkovski suggested the possibility of a session for these outstanding questions in the near future, but did not fail once again to make arrangements for the possibility that an agreement may not be reached. The "last" hope is for the session itself, when the deputies will be dealing with the fact that we remain without an emblem, which is not terrible, in general, and will agree on something. Even more they will deal with the fact that the law for the courts cannot be passed (which it seems is the subject for bargaining), and the development of the

judicial authority will proceed even more slowly. In this case individual constitutional regulations will have to be called upon in order to encompass this third power.

In the meantime, the representatives of PDP-NDP do not accept the proposed bargaining. The coordinator of this party group, **Muhamed Halili**, says that they are not preoccupied with the law concerning the emblem; they even think that it is possible to do without it. But, if the symbol already is being decided upon, it must not contain party signs. The bargaining concerning the emblem and the courts does not interest them because they say that they obtained nothing with this second version and will not vote for it. Again, if only one question is to be adopted, they would vote for the law the same moment. Halili said that VMRO-DPMNE proposed to PDP-NDP that they accept the lion, and they will vote for the law for the courts, which the Albanian deputies consider to be unacceptable for them since the lion is a Bulgarian symbol and there is no reason for them to vote for it. However, on the other hand, the emblem with the sun is perfectly acceptable for them since, as Halili said, the sun is an Illyrian symbol.

The opposition conditions the passage of the national emblem with the lion as an official emblem of the Republic of Macedonia in return for passage of certain fundamental laws and certain staff decisions in their behalf, says **Zoran Krstevski**, coordinator of RS-LP. These discussions, this political bargaining, has not been concluded and the outcome remains to be seen. However, until a compromise is found, according to its personal conviction, the Assembly has to state that there is no decision about this matter, which ultimately is not tragic for the existence of the country. However, since according to the Constitution we have decided to have an emblem, then this action has to be completed. If there is no other way out of this cul-de-sac, then it is necessary to support an initiative for calling a referendum and the people will choose between the lion and the sun, says Krstevski.

The Seats and the Positions

One more coordinator—this time **Ljupcho Popovski** from SDSM, also mentioned the offer of VMRO-DPMNE concerning the bargaining about the emblem and the courts. He said that this offer was accepted with reservations, primarily because there is a question if, in general, it is possible to bargain about such important national documents, that it would be unseemly. Although, within the SDSM deputy group there are individuals who perhaps would vote for the lion, as a group, Popovski says, they have not discussed to see if they have made any changes in connection with this question. According to him, up to now there has not been a compromise, but a new chance will come from the personnel questions which soon have to come before the parliament, in particular the Republic Judicial Council, the Customs Service, deputy ministers.... Someone's desire for acquiring a certain position may easily influence the positions concerning the emblem of Macedonia.

Tomislav Stefkovski from VMRO-DPMNE, who maintained that he wanted laws which are passed with a two-thirds majority (the emblem and the courts) to be examined in a package, but also that there is no progress in the agreement, was very terse in his evaluation of the success of the discussion concerning the emblem up to now. He accused the SDSM deputy group of not wanting the law for the emblem in general to pass and that it is blocking the entire operation. In the meantime, Stefkovski declares that his deputy group again will activate the question concerning acceptance of the new emblem of Macedonia.

This means that the time given to discussion between the deputy groups has not produced results. Instead of achieving unity concerning the new symbol, we have unity in everyone's evaluation that there is no agreement. However, there is the probability that the seats that will be "divided up" will change somebody's position. Again, if 80 of the deputies have enough indecision concerning one of the proposed appearances of the emblem, it may be seen only when the 41st Session finally continues with the discussion about this law. Until then the guessing and bargaining will continue.

Role, Political Aspects of Military

93BA0643A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 11 Feb 93 p 9

[Article by Aleksandar Comovski: "Bon Appetit"]

[Text] *Are the fears that the army leadership wants to promote itself to a political factor justified?*

The following dilemma has been heatedly forced upon the public these days: a military academy, yes or no?! According to the old patterns of obscuring the essence behind the veil of some sort of scientific and expert analysis of an independent military educational system, processes are taking place which can reveal two tendencies: First of all the army leadership is promoting itself to a political factor; in the second place, the political authorities are losing control of the Macedonian army, which is thus detaching itself as an autonomous system with a tendency toward self-perpetuation.

Here are several current situations, as confirmation of these ideas.

The conceptual differences between individual high-ranking officers and the Defense Ministry over implementing the legal provisions are threatening to grow into open intolerance. In contrast to the coordinated model for the classification of jobs in the ministry and the army that was accepted by the minister's staff, a parallel one was offered that basically sponsored the idea of directly linking the General Staff to the commander in chief of Macedonia's armed forces. It is a concept that implies a general as minister, and an administration that would be transformed into just a financial conveyer, assuming administrative and legal responsibilities.

One year after the passage of the Law on Defense, part of the General Staff is insisting on a fairly radical amendment to it. In conditions in which the process of realizing and determining the elements of Macedonia's defense strategy has not even begun, the tendencies toward a change in the mechanisms for coordination and subordination in the military leadership are very directly manifesting the Yugoslav Army syndrome of political potentates. That could promote the tendencies of the South American systems, with an army being formed for the state president in Macedonia, and the General Staff being the authorities' instrument in the area of defense.

Several specific steps that have demonstrated the "disobedience" of Chief of the General Staff Mitre Arsovski toward the defense minister are not just part of some sort of someone's offended vanity. Not even 10 days after returning from Canada, the minister did not know whether the chief of the General Staff was at work. The General Staff's insistence that the defense minister announce his visits to military facilities, even though inspections are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the ministry, is an unprecedented practice in the mutual relations that have been established and developed.

The army's expenditures are a chapter of their own; the financial expropriation in the conclusion of contracts and the signing for military expenditures, by transferring authority from the military supply officers to the ministry, "angered" precisely those officers who, along with the army's "bottomless purse" and the new property relations in Macedonia, also accepted the principle of "legal" racketeering.

The financial speculations and transactions with private firms and purchasers are eroding the fabric of the so-called well-known "army honesty." We have been told by some army circles told us that some private suppliers of clothing, food, and raw materials never leave the officers' offices. During that period of financial independence the army quartermasters, according to the Defense Ministry's information, have concluded dozens of harmful contracts. It is estimated that interventionary imports of fuel oil for the military reserves cost over 120 million denars more because of transactions with the so-called "private sector." In one deal for juices from Gevgelija's Vinojug, the middleman was a private businessman who bought the total production of nonalcoholic beverages, the expiration date for which was in about 30 days. The calculations for this deal show a "profit" of about 20-30 million denars more than if the contract had been signed directly between the producer and the army supply services.

The tendencies toward autonomy in part of the military leadership do not end with just the financial sphere. On the contrary, after the period of gracious adaptation from the Yugoslav to the Macedonian army, the political aspirations of the chief of the General Staff are not ceasing. A few days ago rumors were circulating among a narrow circle of the political public about a possible meeting between him and the Serbian chief of the

General Staff, Zivota Panic, somewhere in southern Serbia in the Nis-Vranje region. It did not occur because of energetic intervention by the commander in chief of the armed forces and the republic president. In a period of Serbian expansionist policy, thinking of a meeting with Yugoslavia's military leadership, much less agreeing on one, reminds us of the old and constant concepts of creating conditions for the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] to return to Macedonia's soil someday. A milder variant of this possible speculation has to do with the public views of the chief of the General Staff, stated at several gatherings, that Macedonia is not threatened by any danger from its northern neighbor. If those military assessments of his at that time contradicted the official political analyses, including the president of Macedonia, it becomes somewhat clearer after the conclusion of several statements by General Arsovski: at the MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action] Center for Demilitarization (what did he want at a party's headquarters?), among reserve military officers in Tetovo, and in the recent public debate on a Macedonian "West Point" center. In doing so, his views and assessments were characteristic: "We are not threatened by a direct military danger from Serbia," or "An UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] convoy would be needed for possible internal ethnic conflicts." This could coincide with the spread of the idea among part of the army leadership of not sanctioning the boycott by recruits of Albanian nationality, as a possible "defense mechanism" against the disloyalty of young Albanians. That distrust of their own recruits directly hurts the start of an elementary formulation of the state's defense strategy. Contrary to known logic, guard posts are not manned with soldiers from the local population, and there are no Macedonian Albanians on the border with Albania. This, of course, plays into their hands, just as it is also the fault of the hard-core wing of the PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-National Democratic Party], but it does not relieve the Defense Ministry, within which there are punitive and misdemeanor procedures, from its responsibility either.

In addition to what is happening in and around the General Staff, the lack of a formulated strategy for defending Macedonia's territory will probably initiate a meeting of the Security Council, headed by the president of Macedonia—especially since the crossing of the threshold of neutrality by part of the present officer corps threatens to nullify the embryonic ideas of depoliticizing army personnel and officers.

General Staff, Civilian Leadership Discussed

93BA0706A Skopje *VECER* in Macedonian
27-28 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by B. Geroski: "Umbilical Cord With the Command"]

[Text] *How the generals envisage the functions of the General Staff.*

The generals' corps envisages that the General Staff will be directly subordinate to the president of the Republic, and the ministry will amuse itself with the civilian structures of defense.

The battle for supremacy in the area of defense, concealed behind the ongoing problems with the systematic decisions concerning the Law for Defense, obviously is far from over for the generals. Irrespective of how many attempts have been made to maintain peace at home, the General Staff endures them as a tactical exercise, playing on the card of the still publicly unannounced sympathies on the part of the Supreme Commander; it is obvious that for these people this is a battle for everything or nothing.

That this is not just a matter of individual opinions concerning the position of the General Staff here is indicated by a report with a long title ("Concept—Definition, Historical Development, Constitutional-Legal Decisions, and Responsibilities and Functions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces"), dated January 1993 with the inevitable marks "military secret" and "confidential." The "most confidential" thing that may be read in this material is that "the members of the General Staff are of the opinion that it is necessary to adopt the second version, that is, the General Staff will be directly subordinate to the president of the Republic as Supreme Commander, and have its autonomy with clearly defined responsibilities and functions." The first version is the current one—the General Staff is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

If the first version is accepted, the generals insist that the responsibilities and functions of the ministry and of the General Staff be delimited with special regulations. However, if the solution that the General Staff prefers is accepted, then it is necessary to change the Law for Defense where the responsibilities of the General Staff are defined. In general, the people of the generals corps think that "everything that is connected with the preparations for and use of military forces must be the responsibility of the General Staff, and the Ministry of Defense will perform tasks relating to those problems

connected with the civilian structures in the defense system." Thus, according to the generals, the training and the development of the conception, the doctrine, and the strategy for defense, and conducting armed battle, as well as the evaluation of the military and other (this is interesting: "other"!) dangers and threats to the country, must be the responsibility of the General Staff, which, in addition to this, will play the role of staff of the Supreme Command in conditions of war, which now is held by the ministry.

The material itself needs explanation for those who are not clear as to what this means. It must not be asserted that in all countries in the world the general staffs are connected with the Ministry for Defense, the generals say. Well, here is the historical examination that confirms it. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century the General Staffs of Austro-Hungary were connected with the chief of state, but in other countries with the Ministries for the Armed Forces. In Germany in 1935, Hitler tied the General Staff directly to himself. In World War II, the General Staffs of Russia, the United States, and France were included in the Ministries of Defense, while in Germany, Italy, and Japan they were subordinate to the chiefs of states... In each case, interesting factors for comparison.

If to this we add the fact that the generals want the minister of defense to be a nonparty man, as well as the fact that they want him to change the constitutional "abnormality" according to which the officers cannot be chosen to direct government agencies in the area of defense, then it becomes clear where and from which staff the nonparty man to direct defense will come. Thus, it is clear that this is a matter of a closed concept according to which the generals would assume all areas of defense, and the ministry would assume itself with civil structures.

Finally, according to who knows what way, we will raise the true question: How can one think of solving the dispute in the area of defense when the actors occupy such diametrically opposite positions? Is this at all possible given the current (staff) disposition of the forces?

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103

2

5285 FORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

22161

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTS may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTS or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTS and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.