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Near East & South Asia

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28 September 1990

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Gerasimov Discusses Perceptions of Gulf Crisis

90AE0302A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
31 Aug 90 p 7

[Interview with Aleksandr Gerasimov by Huda al-Husayni: "Moscow Not Informed of Baghdad's Intentions. No Negotiations Before Withdrawal from Kuwait"; date and place not specified]

[Text] As the crisis continues in the gulf, the Soviet role is becoming more active through contacts with all sides, turning Moscow into a point of encounter and departure. It has been visited by Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid; the Yemeni minister, al-Iryani, is expected to visit there; and the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, and before him, Iraqi deputy prime minister Sa'dun Hamadi had been received. Furthermore, the Soviet prime minister held lengthy meetings with Saudi ambassador to Washington, Bandar Bin-Sultan, and Soviet envoys are scattered all over the world carrying messages. Moreover, President Gorbachev has held contacts with the Turkish president, Turgot Ozal, and minister Shevardnadze is getting ready to visit Japan and to meet with Chinese leaders over the weekend.

It was about the active Soviet role and the Soviet leadership's points of view that AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT held its weekly interview with Aleksandr Gerasimov, board member of the Soviet Novosti News Agency and the editor-in-chief of its Arab (Middle East) and African section. He talked about the need for rigorous action toward a peaceful solution to ward off a military flare-up. He also talked about the guarantees the super powers are offering to prescribe a new security order in the Middle East to prevent the occupation of one country by another and rejected potential geographic changes because the new political order prohibits such an action.

He advocated the need for Iraqi withdrawal before any other step, emphasizing that the occupation of Kuwait brought foreign troops to the region and affirming that the Soviets recognize only the Kuwaiti government that was in existence before the invasion as the sole legitimate government.

He also said that 46 percent of the Soviet people support the Soviet government's measures in the gulf against 17 percent who oppose them and 46 percent did not have an opinion. He expected Soviet women and children to arrive in Moscow from Iraq within a week.

Following is the text of the interview:

[Al-Husayni] Does Moscow support the UN secretary general in his mission and does it expect this mission to succeed?

[Gerasimov] Moscow supports the mission of the UN secretary general and the reason is that Moscow feels that political means to solve the gulf crisis have not been used to the fullest. It believes that all sides must do everything in their power to employ these political and diplomatic

means. Therefore, it asks all sides to exert massive efforts because the capabilities are there.

Thus, Moscow greatly appreciates UN efforts to solve this problem, particularly the initiative of Secretary General Perez de Cuellar who decided to come to the region to discuss this conflict with Iraq and all other concerned parties.

[Al-Husayni] Do you feel that Iraq is interested in a peaceful solution now that it has declared Kuwait its 19th province and changed its name?

[Gerasimov] I think that Iraq is now looking for a way out of the existing situation in the gulf and all escalations are aimed at backing its position in the future. I believe that the Iraqi regime underestimated the world community's reaction to its occupation of Kuwait. Right now, Iraq is up against total mutual world community coordination and, in this respect, it is looking for a way out to save face, from the Iraqi point of view. I believe that an agreement with the Iraqi regime is possible.

[Al-Husayni] On what basis can an agreement with the Iraqi regime be reached?

[Gerasimov] The important thing is to achieve the main point that includes Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government. If Iraq agrees to carry out this task, then discussion on certain matters to achieve this basic demand can be held.

[Al-Husayni] Does that mean that discussions can be held before withdrawal?

[Gerasimov] If the Iraqi regime declares its recognition of the UN resolutions and affirms its intention to withdraw, discussions can be held.

[Al-Husayni] What is the story of Soviet advisors in Iraq whom Moscow refuses to pull out?

[Gerasimov] There have been many rumors about this subject in the press. Soviet advisors did not take part in military action and the Soviet Union's priority is the return of Soviet women and children from Iraq. Yesterday, 240 persons returned, and we are expecting over 200 more to arrive today. After women and children come back, we can talk about the advisors who are now in Iraq, in accordance with the exigencies.

[Al-Husayni] How true are the reports about Soviet-American coordination in the field of military cooperation concerning events in the gulf?

[Gerasimov] The Soviet Union supports all UN resolutions. As for its participation in the multinational forces that are present in the gulf, if the UN were to issue a resolution calling for the formation of such forces, we are ready to participate. In other words, everything must be done within the framework of UN resolutions.

[Al-Husayni] It has been said that you have given the Americans details about Soviet weapons owned by Iraq?

[Gerasimov] Soviet defense ministry officials have denied such statements and have said this is not true. But, should such a matter become necessary, the Soviet Union is willing to provide information about Soviet weapons in Iraq to the UN military committee and should the UN Security Council chiefs-of-staff committee request clarifications and details, the Soviet Union will supply them.

[Al-Husayni] Some mass media have accused the Soviet Union of having had prior knowledge of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. How much did you know about Iraq's intentions?

[Gerasimov] That is not true. It has asked many officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, and they rejected this sort of accusation. The Soviet Union was not aware of Iraq's intentions.

[Al-Husayni] In the wake of the Security Council's agreement to permit the minimum use of force to impose economic sanctions against Iraq, why does Moscow prefer to participate on paper and refuses to participate in fact?

[Gerasimov] We have endorsed all UN resolutions, but the Soviet Union does not want to use force or take part in the blockade of Iraq. However, it will do so as part of an UN force or a force operating under the UN flag.

[Al-Husayni] Do you believe that doors have been opened now and the parties are receptive to a peaceful solution in the region?

[Gerasimov] As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we are willing to hold contacts with all the parties: with Iraq and with the other parties. We believe that we can play an important role with the Arab countries. For example, in the next two days, the Yemeni foreign minister will be coming to Moscow, and the Soviet Union emissary paid a visit to Iraq recently. There are other contacts with many sides. We believe that Moscow is an open place for diplomatic contacts, and we welcome such contacts.

[Al-Husayni] Through these contacts, did you get the feeling that all parties are seeking a peaceful solution?

[Gerasimov] All parties, including the Iraqi party, say that they are for a peaceful solution. But we judge the situation by deeds and not by words. Whereas we have perceived a desire for a peaceful solution by certain Arab sides, we do not believe that the Iraqi side is seeking a peaceful solution yet.

[Al-Husayni] Those who know the Iraqi president say that Saddam Husayn cannot back down and should he get the feeling that he is under siege, he would be willing to set the region afire. What steps, in your opinion, would he dare to undertake?

[Gerasimov] I do not agree with this opinion. Recent steps taken by Saddam Husayn with respect to his relations with Iran prove that he can back down on his previous demands because these steps demonstrate that

Iraq has backed down on all the demands it had during the Iraq-Iran war. Naturally, just like any other politician, Saddam Husayn needs to back down, not under pressure or duress, but rather with his dignity intact. Therefore, I am very pleased with the mission of UN Secretary General Perez de Guellar who said that he was carrying proposals to Saddam Husayn in this regard.

[Al-Husayni] Have you seen these proposals?

[Gerasimov] No.

[Al-Husayni] But some people maintain that Iraq has gone into and will not get out of Kuwait. In this case, what can the superpowers do?

[Gerasimov] In this case, the superpowers will have to be patient and refrain from taking any steps that could lead to a military flare-up because the consequences of a military flare-up in the region cannot be foreseen. That is why the superpowers ought to discuss the political means to solve this conflict and use to the fullest the capabilities provided for in the UN resolutions, including the resolution to impose a total economic blockade against Iraq.

[Al-Husayni] Will Moscow be satisfied with Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of Western hostages or are there other conditions?

[Gerasimov] Moscow is demanding an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. That is the key demand put forth by everyone at all levels. Naturally, we are demanding the evacuation of all foreign nationals from Kuwait and Iraq.

Following these key demands, other matters will be brought up for discussion.

[Al-Husayni] The Iraqi president has asked for direct negotiations with the American president, George Bush, and the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. What do you think of this request?

[Gerasimov] I think this request is part of a political game to gain time. We all know that neither Bush nor Thatcher wish to hold negotiations with the Iraqi president before all the hostages are released and, of course, withdrawal from Kuwait is completed, which is a key demand before entering into any kind of negotiations.

[Al-Husayni] What proposals did President Gorbachev's emissary carry to Iraq, and what was the reply that prompted Moscow to vote on the recent Security Council resolution?

[Gerasimov] I know the import of these proposals that call for the use of political means to avoid a military clash. It is known that before the Soviet Union decided to vote on the recent resolution, the Soviet leaders had used all the capabilities at their disposal to persuade Iraq to consider the international community's request. President Gorbachev sent a personal message to Saddam Husayn, but Iraq would not listen. That is why the Soviet Union decided to vote on the recent resolution.

[Al-Husayni] Do you believe that Iraq can divert world attention away from the basic issue, namely its occupation of Kuwait, and can make the American forces look like they are threatening its existence, as President Saddam Husayn has claimed?

[Gerasimov] Iraq is using this excuse, but we all know that the main reason for the American military presence in the region is Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. If Iraqi troops were to withdraw from Kuwait, there would be no justification for a foreign military presence in the region. All these matters are interrelated.

[Al-Husayni] Should Iraqi troops withdraw from Kuwait, and should the foreign forces withdraw from the gulf, what guarantees are there that Iraq would not turn right back and reoccupy Kuwait and, perhaps, occupy other countries?

[Gerasimov] The guarantee that Iraq will not repeat its occupation of other countries lies in the establishment of a security order, not only in the gulf region, but in the entire Middle East region as well, including, among other things, finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as is the case with Europe that is now capable of setting up a new security order without the NATO or Warsaw blocs. This example, the establishment of common security with superpower guarantees, may be followed in the Middle East and the gulf.

[Al-Husayni] You have been accused of evacuating your citizens from Iraq and failing to do anything to gain the release of Western citizens?

[Gerasimov] The release of Western hostages is a demand included in all the requests and statements put out by the Soviet government and Soviet leaders. We do not distinguish between Soviets and foreigners, and we do not favor Soviets over foreigners.

[Al-Husayni] If you condemn the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, why did you close your embassy in this country?

[Gerasimov] Closing the Soviet embassy in Kuwait does not mean the severance of diplomatic relations between Kuwait and the Soviet Union. These relations still exist and the Kuwaiti embassy in Moscow is still open. Moscow is in continual touch with the Kuwaitis in other countries as well, but we decided to pull out Soviet diplomats in Kuwait for their own safety.

[Al-Husayni] If the situation were to flare up militarily, what kind of war scenario do you anticipate?

[Gerasimov] I am not a military expert, and the press has many scenarios for the next war. I believe, however, that all sides ought to be persuaded to do everything in their power to avoid a military flare-up because its consequences would be evil.

[Al-Husayni] Should the situation flare up, could the Soviet Union be affected?

[Gerasimov] Of course. The Soviet Union is a country neighboring on Iraq and the gulf region and a flare-up will have a negative effect on the Soviet Union.

[Al-Husayni] Do you believe that the Iraqi army is capable of withstanding the kind of military strike people are talking about now? And should the army be defeated, what kind of impact would such a defeat have on the political order in Iraq?

[Gerasimov] The Iraqi army is the fourth army in the world in terms of numbers, and it has combat experience. Its defeat would be very dangerous. An Iraqi army defeat would expose the political order to danger. The Iraqi political order would come to an end. That is why the regime in Iraq must take certain measures to rule out a military flare-up. This would be in its interest.

[Al-Husayni] President Gorbachev is calling for additional efforts to ward off a military flare-up. What kind of efforts, and who is required to carry them out?

[Gerasimov] First, the use of political means, and, second, the use of UN capabilities. Besides, Gorbachev believes that Arab efforts ought to be utilized, ought to be pushed forward, and ought to be focused on solving this problem. In some statements, President Gorbachev has emphasized this matter and reiterated that the Arab countries bear the major responsibility for solving this problem because the crisis has been caused by an attack by an Arab country (Iraq) on another country (Kuwait). This crisis has had a negative impact on the Palestinian problem and the Middle East problem as a whole. Therefore, the Arab countries are required to do more, to exert great efforts, and to be more active.

[Al-Husayni] Including Iraq?

[Gerasimov] Of course, including Iraq.

[Al-Husayni] In whose favor is the element of time right now?

[Gerasimov] Right now, time favors the international community, but, in certain cases, time is working against these interests. For example, in the United States, many people support the presence of American troops in the gulf region. But, should this situation become drawn out, some may become uneasy. The number of countries that view occupation of Kuwait as an Arab problem may grow and the number of naive people in the Arab street that are influenced by Iraqi propaganda may grow as well and stage demonstrations in favor of the Iraqi regime.

[Al-Husayni] Does Soviet public opinion support the Soviet leadership in all its measures related to the gulf?

[Gerasimov] The majority of Soviet public opinion supports the Soviet leadership and stands behind these measures. A recent poll showed that 47 percent of the people support the Soviet position, 47 percent had no opinion—in other words, they had no comment—and seven percent were against the leadership's measures.

[Al-Husayni] A Soviet Middle East expert expected an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait within four weeks, saying that Iraq's problem will begin with the next Kuwaiti government. Do you support this view?

[Gerasimov] I believe it is difficult to set a specific date.

[Al-Husayni] Will Iraq face a problem with the next Kuwaiti government?

[Gerasimov] The Kuwaiti government that existed before the invasion is the sole legitimate government, and we all recognize it. It had proposals to submit to Iraq for discussion, and I believe this is the only and proper way.

[Al-Husayni] In this case, all Arab initiatives that have been put forth stray from the main theme because they call for Iraqi withdrawal followed by a referendum in Kuwait to elect a government.

[Gerasimov] The first part of the initiative, Iraqi withdrawal, is acceptable and sound. But, since there is a legitimate government, why hold a referendum in Kuwait to elect a government? This is not appropriate because there is a government that is recognized by the Kuwaitis and the world.

[Al-Husayni] What do you think about Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's media tactics to improve his image in the world? Do you think that such tactics that were practiced during World War II can give the desired

results given the fact that the TV screen showed women and children being used as fuel for this propaganda?

[Gerasimov] I can speak for the Soviet people who have followed these encounters on TV. The day before yesterday we saw a wedding ceremony and Saddam Husayn's meeting with the foreigners. The Soviet people do not approve of such tactics for they consider them exploitive, unhelpful, and immoral.

[Al-Husayni] Could Saddam Husayn's next visit be with Soviet women and children held in Iraq?

[Gerasimov] I do not know, but we expect all Soviet women and children to arrive in Moscow within a week.

[Al-Husayni] What do you think of the role being played by PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat?

[Gerasimov] Now I am giving a personal opinion. I do not approve of the PLO position on this issue. The Palestinians, more than anyone else, know what occupation means. We do not understand how the PLO could hail Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. This will have a negative impact. This stance gave the Israelis a pretext to justify their presence in Palestine. I have heard many comments on Israeli radio in Russian pointing out the fact that "Iraq has occupied Kuwait, and the Palestinians, who talk about our occupation of Palestine, have hailed it." I believe that justice cannot be achieved through unjust methods.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Long-Term U.S. Gulf Interests Analyzed in War Forecast

90AA0309A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
24 Aug 90 pp 14-25, 52-53

[Article by Retired Major General Husam Suwaylim, ex-director of Armed Forces' Strategic Studies Center"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Why do we find the military solution to be 90 percent likely?

We find it 90 percent likely that the military solution will take prominence on the basis of the following:

First, we must be extremely clear and accurate when we define the main objective of the current amassment of the multi-national military force in the region in a manner unprecedented since the Vietnam war. What is the true objective?

I maintain, rather I almost affirm, that the main objective of the mobilization of an "armada" with such strength is not to primarily force Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait and to restore its legitimate government. Even though these objectives are important and even though accomplishing them is considered a great success for the international community which rejects the methods of invasion and of the imposition of a fait accompli with the force of arms in order to realize the dreams of a tyrannical dictator, what is more important is the need to topple a dictatorial regime that reminds us of the images of Hitler and Mussolini and the Nazi and fascist regimes which the two men represented and which employed military invasion as a means to achieve their objectives. It is necessary to topple this regime because it has become obvious that Saddam Husayn has come to represent a danger and a threat to both international and regional security. He is a threat not only to the western interests in the region but also to the ruling regimes existing in the region and accepted by the region's peoples. He is threatening to alter the region's political map to suit his ambitions and dreams to become the Gulf region's sole master and, consequently, the man who inspires awe throughout the world and the man who must be taken into account when peoples' fates are determined. Toward this end, Saddam Husayn relies on an immense military arsenal embodied in one million troops, nearly 472 modern fighter planes, 50 divisions, most of them armored and incorporating nearly 6,000 tanks, 4,000 armored vehicles, 4,500 guns and mortars, 1,500 anti-tank [missile] launchers, 3 brigades of surface-to-surface Scud and improved Scud (al-Husayn, al-'Abbas, and al-'Abid) missiles, and nearly 17 ships of the line armed with missiles, in addition to a vast store of chemical warfare weapons embodied in a variety of fatal war gases, the most significant of which are mustard gas and binary gas.

As for the economic power Saddam Husayn has come to possess since his occupation of Kuwait, it is embodied in

his control of 30 percent of the local oil production of the states overlooking the Gulf (Iraq produces 128 million metric tons, Kuwait 73 million, Saudi Arabia 251 million, Iran 113 million, and the other Gulf emirates 120 million). Iraq's oil reserves amount to 100 billion barrels and Kuwait's reserves to 94 billion barrels. If Kuwait exports 1.5 million barrels daily and Iraq 3.14 million barrels daily, then this means that since occupying Kuwait, Iraq has become capable of exporting 5 million barrels daily, or the equivalent of nine percent the world's production, at a time when the world consumption amounts to 60 million barrels daily.

The axiomatic question that imposes itself here is: Will the United States, which relies on foreign oil imports to meet nearly 50 percent of its oil needs, keeping in mind that the Gulf alone supplies 25 percent of these needs and that Iraq and Kuwait supply together 10 percent of these needs—will the United States agree to see such a vast portion of this important strategic commodity, which has its political, economic, and strategic influences, controlled by such a rash and incredible man as Saddam Husayn who can then control the world oil market by increasing, reducing, or redistributing production, not to mention his control of the prices and the subsequent chaos that will develop in the international oil market and in OPEC in particular? Will the United States agree to see the impact the immense oil revenues will have on increasing and diversifying his military arsenal? Will it agree to see the subsequent domination he will have over the other Arab Gulf states in a vital region that is of international strategic importance and that represents the world's navel, whether in terms of the region's control of the international navigation arteries and other transport routes or in terms of its international economic value, which has already been pointed out?

It is most likely that the axiomatic answer to all these questions is no. No, even if Saddam Husayn withdraws from Kuwait. No, even after the legitimate government is restored to Kuwait. No, even if Saddam Husayn backs down on his conditions and swallows his pride under any justifications.

Therefore, and on the basis of this brief analysis, I assert that the objective of the military action expected upon the complete arrival of the multi-national forces in the region and their deployment in their final strategic positions (the strategic conquest) is to topple the regime that rules Iraq and that is headed by Saddam Husayn and to destroy the infrastructure of Iraq's armed forces on which Saddam relies in devouring the Gulf region to fulfill his ambitions and aspirations and to realize his dreams.

Thus, Saddam Husayn has given the Arab homeland's enemies the opportunity to accomplish the third phase of the scheme of fragmenting the Arab homeland (the first phase in Lebanon and the second in southern Sudan).

Second, the second basis that makes us give preponderance to the military solution is that never in history have

such enormous multi-national military forces been deployed and never have such forces accomplished a strategic conquest similar to the conquest achieved in the Gulf without having strategic military tasks and objectives. Before these forces return to their positions, these strategic tasks and objectives must be accomplished through premeditated military action with well-defined dimensions—action which the international and regional theatres have been prepared to accept. Such an opportunity to topple this dictatorial regime will not be made available again if the forces leave without accomplishing their objective. Saddam Husayn has provided in a manner that surpasses all his enemies' dreams the opportunity for preparing the international and regional theatres for a crushing blow against him and his regime. Had he not invaded Kuwait, his enemies would have exerted enormous efforts to politically prepare the international and regional theatre in order that the international community in general, and the Arab community in particular, may accept dealing a military blow that topples Saddam Husayn's regime. Moreover, an endless stay of these forces in the region, even after Iraq withdraws from Kuwait and after the legitimate government is restored to Kuwait, in order to continue to secure the western interests and the region's stability, is unacceptable. Militarily, the forces cannot remain on alert or in offensive positions for a long period because of the material cost and the subsequent exhaustion of the forces. Therefore, this stay, especially in the wake of the callup of the U.S. reserve forces, is tied to a set period of time. Now that these forces have achieved their strategic conquest, they must deal their blow in accordance with the premeditated plan and must accomplish the objective and the tasks entrusted to them.

It has become obvious to all that in order that the United States may secure the desired stability for the region's states, it needs 45 days to strategically transport enormous land, sea, and air forces and move aircraft carriers, naval units, and bombers from various parts of the United States, from the U.S. bases in Western Europe, and from the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean and that it has to ask NATO members for assistance in completing amassment of the necessary forces. This is a costly and draining condition that is difficult to repeat. Therefore, there are, according to the U.S. vision, only two options to solve this dilemma:

First, permit the presence of permanent U.S. military bases and facilities in the region, which is something that most of the Arab states oppose.

Second, let Israel, the U.S. representative in the region, defend the U.S. interests and secure the stability of the region's states. Neither option is in the Arab nation's interest or in the interest of Arab national security. The region's stability and security, including the security of the international interests, must be defended by the region's citizens only. In the Arab system, we must not allow the emergence of rash and insane tendencies that create threats which require summoning foreign forces to the region, as has happened in the wake of Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait. Sharon exposed the truth of the matter eight years ago. While holding the position of minister of defense in 1982, Sharon said: "If Israel has to defend the west's interests in the region, then it must get a share of the revenues of the Arab oil which it defends." When he made his rash decision to invade Kuwait, did Saddam Husayn realize the depth of the abysses to which he would hurl the Arab nation as a result of this decision?

Third, another important element emanates from the Iraqi side which continues to announce the formation of new military forces and which has been insinuating that it will blow up the oil wells in the region, in general, and in Kuwait, in particular, that it is getting ready and preparing its forces, that it is strengthening its defenses, and that it is equipping its agents and terrorism and sabotage groups abroad to engage in their terroristic activity in the foreign and Arab countries that oppose his schemes. Is the multi-national force expected to stand idle while waiting for Saddam to attack Saudi Arabia and then retaliate, as it is reported? This is something rejected by logic and faulted by the rules of military strategy. This makes it obvious that there is no alternative to the military option. It is not only projected but also dictated. It is expected that this option will be taken swiftly as soon as the multi-national forces that are scheduled to be deployed complete their strategic conquest so that matters may not reach the point at which Saddam Husayn imposes the fait accompli policy or achieves so-called compromises. [passage omitted]

U.S. 'Hegemony' in Persian Gulf Criticized

90AE0243A *Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI' in Arabic*
13 Aug 90 p 5

[Text] The American military buildup in the Gulf to blockade and attack Iraq is the practical result of the new political realities created by the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The new world situation is characterized by:

- 1) American hegemony over the world, rejecting any opposing policy and attacking any party trying to implement an opposing policy;
- 2) the Soviet Union's absence from the international stage, allowing an aggressor to carry out attacks regardless of the Soviet position or influence. In addition, the new Soviet Union emerged not as a partner with the U.S. but as a subordinate blessing American moves and policies and avoiding participation in international decisions while taking comfort in statements pertaining to general principle and the outcome of the new detente era. Furthermore, the Soviet press, using a political language deemed to be too reactionary even to some Western circles, has published numerous articles in defense of the American-Soviet coordination against Iraq.
- 3) Western Europe and Japan's complete subordination to American policy, where even Switzerland has departed from its World War II policy of neutrality to

join the American campaign against Iraq. Faced with these new developments, the belief that a United Europe will not become for many years a power capable of offsetting American might, and the loss of East-West balance as a protective mechanism, the smaller countries found themselves compelled to build their own forces, fight their own battles and stand up to the American giant. This is exactly what Iraq has been trying to do since the declaration of a cease-fire with Iran and this is exactly what the U.S. has been trying to stop Iraq from doing. Even prior to the Kuwaiti issue, the U.S. launched several psychological, political, and economic campaigns against Iraq. The purpose of these campaigns was to prevent Iraq from becoming an independent and decisive regional power. Let us remember how the U.S. made it impossible to reach a peaceful agreement between Iraq and Iran. Let us remember how the U.S. attempted to agitate the Kurds and encouraged them to rise again against Iraq. Let us remember the enormous media campaign the U.S. launched when Iraq declared its readiness to use chemical weapons if attacked by Israel. Let us remember Washington's silence when Israel announced that she also had chemical weapons and was capable of using them against Iraq. Let us remember how the U.S. tried to weaken Iraq economically by encouraging an increase in oil production that automatically leads to a decrease in oil prices. The U.S. fought all of these battles against Iraq long before the Kuwaiti issue. Now she is exploiting this issue not for Kuwait's sake but for the sake of continuing her struggle against Iraq. The reason behind all of this is to prevent Iraq, or any Arabic country, from becoming a regional power. Every country in the region has to remain under the American hegemony in a new international system blessed by the Soviet Union. Taking all of these facts into consideration, we can say that Iraq's battle against Washington's policy is the first serious battle challenging American hegemony and the new world system. That explains Washington's anger, Bush's anger and the unusual military buildup carried out by the U.S. and her allies. The U.S. will strike whoever dares to challenge her or her hegemony. Wars in the past were grounded in the conflict between East and West or their allies. Here, the conflict is new; Iraq's war is the first between a rich "North" and a poor "South." Peoples in other regions of the world will be compelled to fight the same basic conflict. The U.S., beginning with the Reagan administration, has been planning to have a military presence in the Gulf. Now the U.S. is exploiting the new situation in Kuwait to implement that plan. Again, this is not done for the sake of liberating Kuwait, protecting Arab regimes, or enforcing international laws. It is done so that the U.S. can control direct oil production in the 1990s when the American need for oil is expected to increase. In light of this reality, we can say that the Kuwaiti issue or rather the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait can be solved by removing the American military presence from the Gulf, and creating a unified Arab position capable of driving out the Americans. The Kuwaiti issue can only be solved by Arabs, through Arabic means and for the Arab good. The American army and the American fleets are in the Gulf to solve the

Kuwaiti issue; they are here to attack Iraq and to humiliate the Arabs. If Arab leaders attending the extraordinary summit due to convene in Cairo are not able to differentiate between those two issues they will fail twice; first, by not finding an effective solution for Kuwait and secondly, by not finding ways to keep the American military presence out of the Gulf. Defending Kuwaiti sovereignty can be accomplished only by strengthening Arabic sovereignty. Washington will not strike this sovereignty alone; she will seek Israel's assistance. Wait for the Israelis...the beast with its ugly face will appear at the appropriate time.

Phalangist Vice-President Discusses Effects of Kuwait Crisis

*90AE0331A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
17 Aug 90 p 25*

[Interview with Munir al-Hajj: "Kuwait Crisis: Negative Economic and Political Repercussions on Lebanese Arena"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Attorney Munir al-Hajj, deputy chief of the Lebanese Phalange Party, feels that the Lebanese arena always draws the negative repercussions of any event in the region with extraordinary ease and great depth while losing out on the positive ones. He said that the negative repercussions in the wake of the Kuwaiti crisis are threefold: the disappearance and high prices of fuel, the sharp drop in the Lebanese currency's rate of exchange, and the putting on hold the race to settle the issue of authority in East Beirut.

In this interview with AL-HAWADITH, Munir al-Hajj discussed the various aspects of the extraordinary Kuwaiti crisis.

[AL-HAWADITH] Most of the countries of the world, the superpowers in particular, have denounced, condemned, and decided to stand up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. How do you explain this almost unanimous stance by the community?

[Al-Hajj] Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a trial test and a yardstick for measuring the solidity of the new detente between the two global giants in the wake of the political cataclysm sweeping East Europe. It is also a test of the depth of the changes caused by this cataclysm and of the power the Soviet-American detente has on the international decision-making process. This test has been positive on the three above-mentioned levels. For the joint American-Soviet communique signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries on the eve of 3 August was historic in the fullest sense of the word because it is unprecedented. Besides, as soon as this communique was made public, it was followed by almost universal positions of support, beginning with the ECM that decided to impose an embargo on the importation of oil from Iraq and Kuwait to a similar position by Japan that was promptly espoused by China out of its desire to see the normalization of its relations with Tokyo, that have been rapidly moving toward implementation for awhile

now, succeed. Perhaps the most important thing is that these congruent positions all flow into a single legitimate international decision taken by the Security Council to impose a total boycott on Iraq. This phenomenon of near unanimity in dealing with this major incident is a new and unique occurrence in the history of international relations, thus underscoring the fact that the American-Soviet detente, added to the backdrop of basic transformations in East Europe, has given rise to a new world order that will tend to international affairs for quite a long time to come.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some people believe that it is impossible for Saddam Husayn to have undertaken an action as serious as the invasion and annexation of Kuwait without covert international political preparations and without getting, if not the green light, at least the yellow light. What do you think about that?

[Al-Hajj] It is very possible that some sort of preparations were made before Iraq embarked on its action. International political history is replete with examples of hidden policies that often conflict with the declared positions and are shrouded with secrecy, as an essential ingredient for their development, and are later unveiled by historians. We said this is not certain but possible. Similarly, however, it cannot be said that it is impossible for Saddam Husayn to have embarked on this action by a personal decision without prior international consent. Besides, one cannot view every personal decision without prior international consent as a sheer venture and outright risk because such decisions are preceded by a personal agenda that weighs the potentials for success or failure on the basis of certain considerations. I believe that Saddam Husayn, who is known for his courage and ability to read the political climate, must have founded his move on serious calculations based on the following considerations:

The first is the emergence of a supportive Arab popular tendency, a combination of those who hanker after a brave Arab leadership capable of making hard decisions—most of these people are touched directly or indirectly by the Arab-Israeli conflict—and those who yearn to tear down the Arab caste system represented by two extremes: extreme deprivation and extreme satiation.

The second consideration is the belief that, in its war with Iran, Iraq has rendered an almost international service and should be rewarded by forbearance by certain global sides who ought to look the other way with regard to the step it decided to undertake. Add to that the fact that, when it comes to international service at this level, Iraq still has a role to play and the existing balance in the gulf requires that it maintain its strength.

The third consideration is that Iraq owes enormous amounts of money to most of the great industrialized countries that are concerned with the Kuwaiti issue and

have no interest in opposing a step that, in the foreseeable future, may be the only one that enables it to fulfill its obligation.

The fourth consideration is that the Iraqi moves impact on oil prices flow into the core and essence of American global fiscal and economic policy that pivots around support for American industrial production competitiveness with Japanese and European producers who are almost totally dependent on foreign oil. It is a fact that the United States is driven by this policy, in artificially lowering its currency's rate of exchange on grounds that a certain level of inflation is needed to turn the wheels of growth and development.

The fifth consideration is the United States' awareness of the fact that forcing out the Iraqi army from Kuwait militarily is no picnic and may turn out to be a new Vietnam from which it has not yet recovered.

[AL-HAWADITH] But do you not think that the economic blockade is enough to talk Iraq out of taking possession of Kuwait?

[Al-Hajj] The blockade, if firmly applied, can tighten the noose around the Iraqi economy's neck. This is a fact. To verify this fact, it is enough to know two things. First, Iraq pumps oil via two pipelines, one on the Red Sea that passes through Saudi Arabian territory where the American army is positioned, and the other, on the Mediterranean that passes through Turkish territory, i.e., the territory of a NATO member. The second thing is that the countries that are imposing the blockade and complying with the boycott are the same ones that make up the market for Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil.

[AL-HAWADITH] How do you assess the repercussions of the recent crisis on the Middle East problem and on the Arab-Israeli conflict particularly?

[Al-Hajj] The Kuwaiti crisis, I think, will produce results which Israel can use to its advantage in its conflict with the Arabs. These results are:

- First, intervention by pro-Israeli international forces in a direct conflict and direct confrontation against key Arab forces. Some intervention is bound to drain these forces' energies, consequently sapping their military and economic strength that could otherwise be used in their conflict with Israel. After it started out with the backing of certain Arab countries, Iraq is now close to achieving a strategic balance with Israel. It is feared that the new struggle could destroy the fundamental elements of this progress.
- Second, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the West's intervention to repel it will reawaken the Arab national sense of solidarity with major segments of the Arab public, a desirable move in and of itself, but one that could eventually lead to a hardened Arab position toward any plan for peace negotiations in the region. This is the wish of Israel that has been squeezed for some time by peace plans it does not want and has been embarrassed by the flexible and

mellow Arab positions, that of the PLO in particular, toward such plans.

- Third, It is in Israel's interest to establish in the Arab region the reality of movable borders and to violate once and again the sovereignty of this region's entities, thereby demonstrating that everything around Israel is moving and its persistence in refusing to give up the territory it has occupied or territories it hope to occupy revolves in the natural orbit of its surroundings. just as the Lebanese crisis has served Israel in this respect, the Kuwaiti crisis will serve it the same way.

[AL-HAWADITH] What, in your opinion, are the repercussions of the Kuwaiti crisis on the Lebanese arena?

[Al-Hajj] There are two things that are widely known in the Lebanese arena. The first is that the Lebanese arena always draws the negative repercussions of any event in the region with extraordinary ease and great depth while it is denied the positive repercussions. The reason is that, in order to seize the opportunity, there has to be a unified rank, a unified leadership, and a responsible national awareness. This is not available in Lebanon. The second is that the Lebanese crisis is tied to the Middle East crisis and, consequently, is influenced either positively or negatively by any event that affects the latter. We have already talked about the repercussions of the Kuwaiti crisis on the Middle East question, so there is no need to go into that again.

[AL-HAWADITH] You said that the Lebanese arena draws the negative repercussions of any occurrence in the area with easy and tremendous speed but has a very difficult time drawing the positive repercussions without spelling out what these repercussions are.

[Al-Hajj] The negative repercussions that surfaced in the Lebanese arena in the wake of the Kuwaiti crisis are three. The first is represented in the disappearance of fuel from the free market that is being traded on the black market, hence the skyrocketing fuel prices. The second is the drastic drop in the Lebanese currency's rate of exchange and the resultant sharp rise in commodity prices that the general economic and fiscal situation cannot handle effectively. The third is putting on hold the first anticipated step in the race to find a solution to the power problem in East Beirut with a view to spreading the state's authority throughout Lebanon. This is from the negative point of view. As for the positive aspects, there is only one possible positive outcome that is tied to the new world order's ability to solve the Kuwaiti problem. If this order can demonstrate its ability, we can entertain the hope that world interest would apply to all the other international problems, including the Lebanese crisis. We do have to seize the opportunity when it presents itself and should not waste it as we have done so often in the past.

Regional Isolation of Israel Advocated

90AA0237A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
6 Jul 90 pp 14-15

[Article by Mustafa al-Husayni: "Reply to Shamir's 'Dreams': Regional Agreement To Isolate Israel"]

[Excerpt] How are we to understand Shamir's reply to the letter from U.S. President George Bush, in the context of its contents revealed so far?

In order to understand it, we must disregard certain details, such as Shamir's refusal to allow a Palestinian delegation to the dialogue with Israel proposed by the Americans to include Palestinians who are not from the West Bank and Gaza, his refusal to allow Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to participate in the dialogue, and even his refusal to allow the PLO to be a party to the dialogue or to any subsequent negotiations.

Instead, we must concentrate our attention on Shamir's call for negotiations that would include all the Arab countries aimed at reaching a final solution to end Arab-Israeli enmity.

This call cannot be understood in isolation from the statements Shamir made prior to his reply to Bush's letter when he said that Israel would not withdraw from any part of "Eretz Israel"—the West Bank and Gaza.

Thus, what Shamir wants is negotiations with the outcome decided in advance: the Arab countries, along with the rest of the world, would recognize Israel's annexation of this land, and we would establish relations with Israel on this basis.

It may appear to some that this Israeli position is merely a "wild dream" luring deluded people.

However, the true problem does not lie in the characterization. The real problem is that this "wild dream" now appears to Israel as a "rosy dream" that is attainable!

In fact, this "wild/rosy dream" is nothing more than the groundwork for a greater dream!

With the current change in the international order from two axes to multiple poles, Israel sees an "historical" opportunity to be one of these poles, seeing in the current international realignment a vacuum it believes only it is capable of filling: all of Africa, plus West Asia, at present do not fall under any conceivable sphere of influence of the axes of international order which are being formed, and there is no other country or power in the region capable of filling this vacuum, even if it wanted to.

Israel believes, that through "expanding the borders of the state" and filling the territories it will annex—in the framework of the settlement called for by Shamir—with large numbers of highly-skilled immigrants (from the Soviet Union) and tremendous wealth (from South Africa) it will realize this dream.

Thus, Israel will become the leader that controls this vast region.

What will we do?

A possible agenda would be lengthy, complex, and complicated; in other words, there are many possibilities.

This agenda could include attempting to thwart Jewish emigration at the source, hindering it on its way to Palestinian territory, and trying to redirect it to other areas and countries (which is also more in keeping with the wishes of the majority of emigrants).

This would be very difficult, but worth the effort.

The agenda could include strengthening and diversifying the Palestinian intifadah to move toward establishing a "de facto state" in the West Bank and Gaza as the embodiment of the declared Palestinian state.

The agenda could include expanding the scope of the intifadah to include Palestinians living within Israel's pre-1967 borders. In fact, these Palestinians could make the demand they made earlier at a conference in Shefar'am in the late 1970's: "the right of regional self-determination"—the right of areas heavily populated with Palestinians to secede from Israel.

The agenda could include the efforts under discussion to provide protection to Palestinians in these territories.

It could include an effort to place the territories under international administration; i.e., that this arrangement be effected or that the UN bureaucracy administer them until such time that it is affected, as proposed by Australia with regard to Cambodia.

The agenda could include the Arab countries' preparing for a distinct possibility—the outbreak of a new Arab-Israeli war—instead of being lulled into complacency by untrue statements which are not deserving our trust, from "The 1973 war was the last Arab-Israeli war" (particularly since it was followed by another war in 1982, and the succeeding years have witnessed not a few Israeli military operations, from Baghdad to Tunisia) to "The days of dealing with regional conflicts through armed force have passed," since this is simply not true. The super powers say this, however, because they want to disassociate themselves from such conflicts.

All of these are elements of an agenda that must be made into a plan to be carried out.

However, there is a greater task that is the framework for this agenda—the task of "filling the vacuum," as Israel dreams of doing in order to become a world leader.

Specifically, the task is not to "fill the vacuum," but to eliminate the concept of the "vacuum" itself.

Thus, the task is to "achieve a regional agreement" to "isolate" Israel within the region.

This task is the responsibility of the Arabs more than any other party in the region because it is our concern more than that of any other party. [passage omitted]

Media Distortions of Saddam's World Image Criticized
90AA0327A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
31 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Mustafa Amin]

[Text] Saddam Husayn stated that he is prepared to meet with President Bush and Mrs. Thatcher. The gullible ones welcomed this statement saying that it means that peace negotiations are being held secretly. Otherwise, Saddam Husayn would not have endorsed this statement, stock exchanges would not have reacted favorably, oil prices would not have dropped, and stocks and bonds prices would not have risen.

But hardly an hour passed after this statement than President Bush and Mrs. Thatcher said they reject this meeting.

These rumors soon shyly vanished. It then transpired that a journalist asked President Saddam Husayn if he had any objection to a television debate with Bush and Mrs. Thatcher, to which he replied that he welcomes a debate with them and a meeting them.

Undeterred by such a categorical response, the rumors once again surfaced, claiming that the United States has a secret agreement with Saddam and that, according to this agreement, Iraq would become the number one state in the Middle East and that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria would be the lackeys.

It appears that those who unleash such rumors are unaware of the reality of the international situation, which is that nobody wants to become allied with Iraq after one is bitten more than once. The worldwide consensus is that [to have] an adventurer like Saddam Husayn, who plays with fire in the oil-rich Middle East, remain in power is a danger to world peace. The world's major powers believe that if Saddam Husayn could overcome the Kuwait crisis, then he would start another one. They point out the fact that no sooner did he emerge from the war with Iran than he started a fire in Kuwait. It is in the dictator's nature to create disturbances everywhere, for he cannot live calmly. Drum-beating and rocket-firing is a must for him. The Iraqi dictator does not wish to understand these facts.

The disagreement with Saddam is not a personal one. Getting rid of a man who is threatening all the world's countries is what is desired. Saddam Husayn will not be content with Kuwait, for soon he will dig his claws into Saudi Arabia. Once he takes control of Saudi Arabia's oil he will turn toward Syria in order to seek revenge from those who expelled him from the Ba'th Party. Once he is finished with Syria he will swallow up Jordan. The man has imperialist designs; he imagines that his army can

conquer the world and that he will become Alexander the Great or Napoleon Bonaparte.

Washington believes that Saddam has a strong army by Middle East standards, but such an army is of no avail in the face of the modern weapons and electronic devices that will enter battle for the first time. The arm chair generals are now waiting for this to happen and are figuring out imaginary battles. We hope that Saddam Husayn is not one of those generals.

Editor Questions Palestinian Attack on Egypt

90AA0300A Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 2 Aug 90 p 1

[Editorial by Ibrahim Nafi: "Who Wants To Kindle This Flare-up? We Want a Definite Answer From the Palestinian Leadership"]

[Text] The Egyptian people were surprised yesterday by a newspaper telegram from Jerusalem in which leaders of the Palestinian intifadah [uprising] accuse Egypt of being a "puppet" in the hands of the United States! They allege in it that the United States has used President Muhammad Husni Mubarak as an obedient tool in the hands of the American administration to implement its program of propagating the Camp David settlement in the Arab region in what this strange communique called "the Arabization of Camp David."

Granting for the sake of argument that this communique actually came from leaders of the intifadah and expressed their opinion about Egypt and its president, anyone who reads such words abstracted from any previous backgrounds will immediately realize that those who say them are aiming with these rash, wounding, and lying words only at kindling a new destructive flare-up in Egyptian-Palestinian relations and creating new strife between those who stand in a single trench by virtue of Arab affiliation and joint national interest. This fire whose blaze they wish to kindle serves no one but the enemies of the Palestinian cause. It will do untold damage to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, especially its right to self-determination.

It is therefore difficult for rational people to imagine that such a communique would come from a Palestinian official or any individual Palestinian, let alone the Unified National Command of the intifadah. Egypt has stood and still stands with all its popular and official strength behind this command and in its ranks to support it without limit until it realizes its goal of a peaceful, just, and comprehensive settlement under the leadership of the PLO.

Although we have become accustomed to a certain number of off-the-cuff or outrageous statements for which the authors quickly apologize or which they quickly retract, in this particular situation we cannot imagine, whatever differences of opinion there may be about the complex mechanisms and ways to a settlement, that any reasonable, fair, or mature person would accuse Egypt, with its historic weight and role in the region, of being a puppet in the hands of the United

States or any other country. Egypt's nationalist and pan-Arab historical record testifies to this role, especially under the leadership of Mubarak and his well-known moves and positions on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Mubarak's moves and positions on the issue are from beginning to end the result of overall agreement on intentions and implementation between Egypt, the PLO, and the Arab nation.

All of Mubarak's positions and all his moves on the issue have aimed and still aim at the welfare of the Palestinian people with its central and field leadership. At many times and at many stages, it has become clearly evident to everyone that there is a difference in opinion and positions between Egypt under Mubarak's leadership and the United States, and between Egypt and the Soviet Union and other countries regarding the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of their state, the need for the United States to change its traditional positions toward Israel, and the need to protect the Palestinian people from the barbaric repression of the Israel Defense Force.

We do not boast or brag about this, because in it we seek guidance from our principles and give expression to Egypt's importance, role, and historical weight. Given these things, Egypt cannot be anything but what it is: a Arab state in the vanguard of defending the Arab claim and confronting its enemies. We ask no one for a testimonial on our behalf in this regard or concerning our pan-Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause; for in this regard we start fundamentally from the position that the issue, besides being a fateful issue for the Palestinian people and a pan-Arab issue for the Arab nation, is equally a fateful issue that touches the heart of Egyptian national security. Our record on the issue testifies to all this. Those whose cause it is know this best of all. How then can we imagine that such a communique might come from a national leadership in the occupied territory, a leadership for which we harbor respect and to which we always offer support?

The PLO knows that for us the Camp David agreement has completely exhausted all its objectives and that, as President Mubarak has put it, "it died with full Israeli evacuation from every inch of Egyptian land that we liberated with our blood and wealth. We have very clearly rejected and still reject the imposition of the so-called 'Palestinian Camp David' on the Palestinians—people, intifadah leadership, and leadership of the PLO." Were this not the case, how would it harmonize with our having taken the initiative in recognizing the resolutions of the 19th PNC session concerning the independence of Palestine and the Palestinian peace plan?

We still do not believe that a responsible Palestinian leadership could have issued such stupid, untruthful, and biased statements about the so-called "Arabization" of Camp David and its universal application to the Arab region. Even if they do not grant the truth of Egypt's sincere Arab attitudes to which everyone bears witness, there are many other reasons. The first of them is that no

one can "Arabize" Camp David and no one has the right to try it. This is Egypt's firm line of principle. It is clear to the whole world and to the United States of America before everyone.

Such being the case, may we ask for the truth about this communique: Who issued it? Whom does it express? In particular, during the experience of the popular intifadah in the occupied territory many communiques have been forged by forces hostile to the Palestinian people and attributed to this leadership. Guarding against this possibility, and convinced that such a communique serves only the goals of these hostile forces, we will get right to the point and try to head off this flare-up in its beginning. We ask for a definite and speedy answer from the intifadah's national leadership and from its central leadership in the PLO about the truth of this conspiratorial communique and about what it really means, if it is genuine. We want a decisive and clear answer: Did this communique really come from the Palestinian leadership of the intifadah or not?

Egypt's attitude toward the communique and toward the consequences and effects of the communique will be defined in light of this answer. When I say "Egypt," I imply that I am giving expression in this to Egypt as a whole under the leadership of President Husni Mubarak. When I say "Egypt's" position, I clearly mean that Egypt can expose and lay bare—and even cut off—every sinful hand that casts aspersions on Egypt's patriotism, its Arab nature, its international personality, its free and independent will, and its weight as a leading nation in the Arab region. Egypt cannot be a puppet in anybody's hands, no matter how important or strong he may be.

We are waiting for this speedy and decisive answer. The situation has reached a point at which an unimaginable explosion might take place. The matter concerns the honor of Egypt, its people, and its leaders. It concerns Egypt's historic weight. These things cannot be sullied or placed in doubt whether by foes or by those who stand in the same trench and work for a single common goal.

Our message is clear. We address it to certain responsible parties. We cannot wait long, lest we allow those who like to fish in murky waters and traffic in spurious slogans to try to kindle raging fires that will not spare anything or stop at the sacred Egyptian-Palestinian relationship.

Who is it who wants open to the Arab world a new gate of hell—and at this critical moment in its history?

Editorial Discusses Turkey's Regional Role

90AE0272A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
15 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Samir 'Atallah: "The Turkish Role"]

[Text] Whether it likes it or not, Turkey has a certain role to play in the Middle East in this or that direction, whether its status is a colony, an independent state, an empire, or a small European or Atlantic country.

Turkey today seems concerned with the Gulf crisis as if it is still in the empire era. While George Bush took his administration with him to his vacation place, Turgut Ozal interrupted his vacation and returned to Ankara a few hours after Iraq's entry into Kuwait. Within a short time he was having telephone conversations with King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, President Hafiz al-Asad, President Husni Mubarak, Iranian President Rafsanjani, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and U.S. President Bush.

Turkey's geographical position has given it this political importance from World War I to this day. It is the line dividing Europe and Asia. It is a country neighboring two of the biggest Arab states, namely Syria and Iraq. It is also neighboring the Soviet Union. During the famous Cuban missile crisis Nikita Khrushchev demanded the reduction of the number of NATO bases in Turkey. Turkey has critical relations with Greece because of Cyprus. It also has extremely critical relations with Bulgaria because the Muslim community there.

The bases that in the past were used to monitor movements in the Soviet Union are now being used to monitor movements in the Gulf during the crisis. The Turkish government has asked the parliament to authorize it to declare a state of war "not because we intend to go to war, but because we cannot remain indifferent should war break out near us."

It appears that Turkey during these critical moments decided to move according to its strategic position both in Europe and in the Arab world. Ankara does not want to be remembered only during times of crises when more than one party is in need of it, but also wants to be remembered during normal peaceful times.

Consequently, it wants pledges both from the United States and Europe. It also wants economic pledges from the Arab world, particularly the Gulf states. In a recent interview President Turgut Ozal said: "This crisis proves that Turkey is of extreme importance for Europe," and therefore he wants an almost categorical pledge from Europe that Turkey will be accepted in the Common Market.

He says: "Although they do not say this publicly, Europe does not want us because of our Islamic identity. Turkey has influence in the Islamic world and, therefore, our presence in the EC will help it to avert serious events. We are a bridge between the two."

But Mr. Turgut Ozal certainly knows that [securing] a European pledge is difficult. In the meantime he obtained from U.S. Secretary of State James Baker a pledge for financial assistance, most part of which will be provided by the government of Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah from Kuwaiti investment funds abroad. The Turkish opposition stands against Turgut Ozal on this matter. But the Turkish president is telling himself: If Ankara does not benefit from this situation when will it benefit?

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Dynamics of Palestinian Economics Explored

90AE0321A London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic
5 Sep 90 p 5

[Interview with Samir Halilah, economics scholar, by Dawud Kitab: "Economics Scholar Samir Halilah Tells AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI, 'Private Sector Was Main Contributor to Investment Activities during the Intifadah [Uprising]; in 3 Years We Were Able To Produce the Milk, Meat, and Eggs We Need for Our Consumption,'" in Jerusalem; date of interview not specified]

[Text] A group of new, young, and intelligent individuals who give expression to a new approach in the occupied land emerged during the intifadah [uprising]. One of them is Samir Halilah, an economics scholar, who worked as director of student affairs and professor at Bir Zayt University. Mr. Halilah also works as an economics scholar at the Institute of Cooperation, which concerns itself with Palestinian development. Together with a group of Palestinian economists and businessmen, Halilah formed the Economic Development Group, a non-profit corporation in the occupied land, which offers assistance and loans to Palestinian industrialists and businessmen. This group is an important alternative to other institutions that offer assistance to businesses because there are no Palestinian banks in the occupied land.

The interview with Samir Halilah was conducted to shed light on what was accomplished in the economy during the 1,000 days of the life of the intifadah. The text of the interview follows:

[Kitab] What have been the most important characteristics of the Palestinian economy in the occupied land during the past 1,000 days?

[Halilah] As a political event the intifadah was a blow to elements of the Palestinian economy during the first months of its life. This is because the intifadah and the political activity which is associated with it—the strikes, the curfew, and the economic measures against the residents—created a climate which worried economists: a climate that prevented maximum capacity production and created a state of confusion. When we add to that the fact that Israeli authorities prohibited the transfer of funds from abroad and attempted to prevent PLO funds from getting in, we would conclude that the first six months of the intifadah were difficult for the local economy. Approximately 40 percent of Palestinian workers in Israel missed work during that period, and even those who did not were unable to work regularly.

If we think the Palestinian GNP was \$2 billion before the onset of the intifadah, it would be my estimate that the GNP declined during the first year of the intifadah by 50 percent. That is, it fell to about \$1 billion.

This situation reinforced what we call a defensive approach in the Palestinian economy. A defensive approach was reinforced among investors, and that meant that the issue which was being presented for consideration was not that of expanding the sectors of production, but rather that of reinforcing a separation from the market and from a market economy. It also meant relying on a regional rather than a central economy and reinforcing economic modes like home economics. After all, this was a strategy for survival based on helping the family, the people on the street, and those in the village withstand a long-term climate of siege.

This economic mode, which was shaped by our people and adopted by the unified command then as its slogan, was not studied in detail, and many modern economists mistakenly thought that it could become a special, new Palestinian mode that would counter the market economy. Experience affirmed, however, in a manner that can be neither doubted nor misconstrued, that this economic mode is a defensive one based on or existing only in difficult political times when market forces cannot operate as they usually do because of transportation difficulties, for example. Al-Junaydi Dairy Plant, for example, cannot deliver its products to Nablus or to Janin when there is a siege. The regions, therefore, have to be served by small plants.

In addition, the unified command declared that it would boycott Israeli products. That created a climate in which Palestinian consumers in general were subjected to temporary economic pressure due to the voluntary siege which was imposed on them under these circumstances by a decision made by the Palestinians themselves.

Although that decision was the basis for the subsequent development of economic relations and of the Palestinian market, for Palestinian residents then, it was a self-imposed element of pressure. What minimized its importance, however, is the fact that most of our imports from Israel were non-essential, manufactured and consumer products. We were not importing from Israel food or principal materials which were indispensable to the Palestinian people. Adequate resources to cover purchases of these principal materials were not available anyway.

The rent-reduction decision made by the unified command was a very important and a very positive measure that favored tenants. At the same time it was not a major blow to landlords who do not have a cohesive organization in the West Bank because Palestinians in general own their own homes. While the number of people who rent their homes in an area like Nablus is limited, a rental system in areas like Hebron and Gaza is non-existent. A rental system does not exist in villages in the Palestinian countryside. Rent then is a limited phenomenon. Basically, the rent-reduction decision helped those

who make up the foundation of the intifadah—the people in the National Movement, the young staff, and university graduates—confront the difficulty of life during that period.

A decision was made to allow the industrial sector to run its production operations non-stop around the clock. This is because the boycott decision would become meaningless if there were no alternatives. The strike days were actually long days, and the statements which were being issued every week, not every month, not to mention Israeli harassment, prevented even ordinary people from planning a work program and a production plan. The intifadah attempted to reduce the number of strike days and to allow the industrial sector to operate non-stop around the clock. Since people in the agricultural sector were voluntarily working non-stop around the clock, people in the industrial sector took advantage of the opportunity and followed suit.

[Kitab] What is the effect of the Israeli boycott on the development of the national industry?

[Halilah] The Israeli boycott gave the local sector an opportunity to take a risk without fearing competition and to produce products to meet the needs of the local market. It's not that we don't like competition, it's rather the competition we had was primarily dishonest and unfair. Israeli markets or Israeli factories had the right to sell their products in our markets. At the same time, we did not have the right to sell our local products in their markets. While the Israelis' market grew, ours remained limited to our local market. In addition, Israel's industry and the Israeli market are subsidized, but our industry and our market receive no subsidy. Instead, we receive military orders which control production.

Alternative Palestinian production could not have been set up by political decree, and a political decree could not have made this alternative production continue or open markets for its products. It was the existence of this protection factor that upheld and sustained alternative Palestinian production. What was more important, however, was the fact that we found out we had sufficient investments and technical know-how and we could produce. We also found out that our products could compete in international markets and in Israel. Such cumulative issues, which grow every year as the intifadah grows, are reinforced by the establishment of consumer societies or consumer advocacy societies which are themselves a product of the development of this industry and its superiority over Israeli production. It seems to me that four years from now, Palestinian goods will be able to compete with Israeli goods even if more Palestinian markets were opened once again to Israeli markets [as published] and the boycott were brought to an end.

Investing Palestinian Capital

[Kitab] What is the reason for blocking investments in training and gaining expertise made by Palestinians

outside the occupied land? What is the reason for blocking a greater financial partnership with those Palestinians?

[Halilah] Serious attempts were made by Palestinian businessmen abroad to set up an investment mechanism in the occupied land in light of the fact that concrete improvements had occurred unexpectedly in investments which had been made in the occupied land. The first hurdle, however, was that of identifying the mechanism (a remote control device) by means of which investment agencies can control investments from a distance. How can a Palestinian investor contribute \$1 million when he can neither enter the occupied land nor send his representative there? How can such an investor who does not reside in his own country take such a risk with his funds? How can he risk his capital when he doesn't know his country's relationships and problems and when he doesn't even know the economic condition of the market? The fact that he hears and reads about these matters is not enough to justify taking such risks. At any rate, such a mechanism did take shape, and a number of businessmen met more than once in Britain and Switzerland in an attempt to get a group together and lay the foundation for such an idea. So far, however, nothing serious has materialized, and I doubt that anything concrete will materialize later.

What did materialize recently, however, is the idea of establishing a local bank. The establishment of a local Palestinian bank would constitute an important link for relationships with Palestinian investors abroad, who would then be able to invest in what is a licensed, legal bank. Officials at such a bank would be people with experience in the country who can invest funds in good projects.

Exporting

[Kitab] What about world markets? What role do Palestinian communities play in providing new markets? Do Palestinian embassies abroad play a part in opening such markets?

[Halilah] The problem has always been the absence of a locally and internationally acceptable specialized agency. For example, Palestinians were permitted to export to the European market under one condition imposed by Israel: they could export their products through cooperatives. These cooperatives, however, do not constitute the best Palestinian mechanism for exporting goods. If Israel were to allow the general public to export goods, several private exporting firms would be established, and a better outcome would be possible.

The cooperative relationship between Palestinian embassies abroad and the cooperative setup is weak, particularly with regard to political matters and matters which have to do with persons employed by cooperatives.

Building such a relationship will be difficult in the future without the presence of a specialized Palestinian agency.

But the PLO's Economic Department abroad provided assistance in the export of oil and cheese and also in the export of other ethnic Palestinian items. This economic department, however, is not exactly a ministry of the economy, and it was not able to tie goods coming in with goods going out. Its activity was limited to foreign matters. Thus, the gaps and problems we have in exporting goods are those which undergo change year in year out, just as the Palestinian view of development in the occupied land underwent change over the past years.

[Kitab] Recently, a big increase has been noticed in the number of so-called economy shops which were opened. Is an attempt being made to prevent duplication and devise a central plan for the Palestinian economy?

[Halilah] When the call to boycott Israeli goods was first made, Palestinian politicians and Palestinian figures tried to fill the vacuum which was occurring in the local market. Some of these Palestinians set up cooperatives as a model, but most Palestinians worked through their popular organizations and set up cooperatives everywhere in the occupied land. These new informal cooperatives which became a new, trailblazing experiment in cooperatives did not succeed in setting up an alternative to a market economy.

Women's action committees, for example, set up cooperatives which were not called cooperatives, but these organizations tried to fill the local market with goods. The Palestinian Women's Committee established production cooperatives, and the project, "What is our pride," was established as a model for these production cooperatives.

Numerous seasonal cooperatives were set up, and all such popular cooperatives created and shaped a new method of production in their attempt to develop new forms of production. Women's action committees, for example, saw their production projects as a framework for the capitalism of the coming Palestinian state. This meant that these popular organizations themselves would own all the factories and everyone else would be employed by them. Such a system would be different from the Arab socialist system which is employed in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.

Organizations like the Palestinian Women's Committee can be seen as socialist-model cooperatives. The women who worked in that cooperative owned the means of production, and they owned their cooperative and contributed to it. There was thus a variety of merchants. It is my judgment that this experiment to begin with did not even come close to being successful in placing its products in the local market because the quantity of goods it produced was marginal as far as the market was concerned. Not only did these organizations not succeed in realizing profits for those who were running them, but they also failed to develop an administrative alternative for existing cooperatives, particularly official cooperatives.

It was only the private sector, which was undoubtedly the principal contributor to investments during the period of the intifadah, that managed to establish itself and to do so in a strong way. This private sector did not rely on bank loans to establish itself. It established itself without bank loans, and it built scores or hundreds of factories and workshops by relying on its investments of private family funds.

Charitable societies are the only remaining form of popular organizations. They were affected by the boycott slogans, and they tried to change their organizational goals to become more self-reliant and turn to production projects. In general, however, charitable societies were more successful in setting up popular, political organizations, but they were much less successful than the private sector. This is basically due to the fact that it is difficult to structure a charitable organization in a way that would make it turn a profit.

Economic Lessons

[Kitab] As far as the economic map of the Palestinian state is concerned, what are the economic lessons which have been learned during the past 1,000 days?

[Halilah] The lesson that has been learned can be seen in the concrete results we achieved. In the agricultural sector it has been established that as a result of a political decision to mobilize people, we managed in less than three years to become self-sufficient in our production of milk, beef, poultry, and eggs. This is an important lesson for us. The situation requires, on the one hand, a political and popular collective decision, and it also requires the ability to carry out such a decision. And that ability has to be based on the strength of the intifadah and its ability to enforce the boycott. This is an important lesson in building the state. It is a lesson we learned from Vietnam, Algeria, and from other experiences which proved that the will of nations is more powerful than anything. These experiments proved that a state's economy is built by the will of its people, not by the market. These experiences also proved that the Palestinian people have lots of energy which they were able to put to good use in exploratory, economic businesses. We found out there are problems, and we also found out that the will to overcome problems is there.

This brings us back to the subject of the economy shops. In my opinion, the experiment in local investments has been a multi-directional and a multi-level experiment. When political forces make the decision to invest, they have to set up their own shops, and they have to mobilize their economy to make their experiment successful.

With regard to the private sector, many organizations and institutions were actually established in an attempt to do without a Palestinian bank that would extend credit in the area of agriculture and industry.

In this regard I don't think that the presence of a large number of such institutions constitutes a mistake or

creates confusion because the experience of the Palestinian economy must be a collective one, and it must not be limited to a small number of academicians. It was not possible in the past to determine the shape of the coming Palestinian economy, nor was it possible to determine an ideology for the future Palestinian society—socialist, capitalist, or a capitalist state. Now, however, we are facing a critical test in which each party would be setting forth its ideas, depending upon conditions, and these ideas would be evaluated in accordance with their practical results.

EGYPT

Ministers Urged To Cut Red Tape for Returning Workers

90P40151B Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic
12 Sep 90 p 53

[Editorial: "Stop"]

[Text] A terrible battle between the returnees from Iraq and Kuwait and the surly bureaucracy has begun behind the desks of the ministers and the undersecretaries. The directives which are issued are not implemented. The facilitation that is talked about in the newspapers is in reality nonexistent. Mistreatment prevails and dominates the attitudes of senior officials who must ease and relieve the suffering of returnees. Can you believe that? The order comes to a senior official in the Ministry of Education who says loudly, "You [returnees] disgust us with your traveling and returning. All of you stand outside until the undersecretary returns." In the schools, it is worse. The school directresses and their principals have turned into male and female 'Saddams.' Unfortunately, Dr. Surur [minister of education], I have already heard with my own ears some returnees say that "we have come out of a smaller battle into a bigger battle." Along with them we hope, Mr. Ministers, that you take it easy on the returnees by issuing sincere directives and implementing what has been stated in the newspapers. If we are asking Saddam Husayn to withdraw unconditionally, then we also must ask that you give your attention to the returnees' problems unconditionally. We hope that you do not wait until the president issues his directives.

Authorities Report 108 Returnees From Iraq Arrested

90P40146A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 10 Sep 90 p 13

[Text] The Egyptian authorities at the port of Nuwaybi' have arrested 108 Egyptians who were returning from Iraq via the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah. The pretexes were that they participated with the Iraqi Army in its war against Iran, that many of them joined the Iraqi Ba'th Party; and that they stayed in Iraq for more than 10 years in a row. National security investigators detained [the returnees], interrogated them for 10 hours, and then transferred them under close guard to Suez public prison

after receiving an urgent cable from the security authorities in the port of al-'Aqabah in Jordan reporting the appearance of these returnees from Iraq without passports. It is worthy of mention that military intelligence insisted that these returnees be released because they committed no crime that would harm the security of Egypt or its leadership. [The national security investigators] requested, in an urgent cable, that military intelligence offer the required explanation for these Egyptians to have stayed in Iraq for 10 years without a single visit to Egypt. Military intelligence answered the national security investigators that [arresting these individuals] would be considered clowning and playing with Egyptian lives, not security work, and then sent an urgent request up to the political leadership concerning these returnees asking for their quick release.

Liberal Party's Election Platform, Strategy Explained

90AA0285A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic
23 Jul 90 pp 46-48

[Interview With Mustafa Kamil Murad, Liberal Party Chairman, by 'Abd-al-'Azim Darwish; "Parties and People's Assembly Marathon; Liberals and Strangest Election Platform; Mustafa Kamil Murad: Raising Prices of All Essentials and Other Goods Is Must; We Are Nobody's Lackeys; Brotherhood Is Strongest Party Now; I Am Veteran Electioneer; Failure and Success Are Part of Nature of Life; Alliance Will Remain as It Is and We Will Form Liberal Government; Yes, Islam Is Solution, not Political Program;" date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

Four People's Assembly Elections and Two Consultative Assembly Elections

[Darwish] The Liberal Party will wage the coming People's Assembly elections amidst changing circumstances that are different from its past experiences with elections. Do you think that the party can score better results in these elections?

[Murad] [Passage omitted] Regarding the coming elections, we want to wage them with a new method and tactic that are different from those of past times. What we mean is that we have our candidates. We reviewed all the candidates the moment we felt that the Constitutional Court commissioners were not going to decide in favor of the election law. We want to wage the coming elections in the majority of the districts, expected to increase to nearly 248 districts instead of the currently existing 175 districts. There is no doubt that a certain form and manner of coordination exists between us and the other parties, even though it is different from the coordination existing under the lists format and law. Coordination under the lists may be easier. In the (one-representative) districts, there is some difficulty. However, the principle of coordination is present.

Call for Raising Prices

[Darwish] What will the Liberal Party's platform be?

[Murad] The election platform will focus on the Liberal Party principles which the government has embraced recently without announcing that what it has adopted represents the liberal platform. This represents a major victory for the party. "Currency market...Streamlined subsidy..." The next platform will focus on our call for raising prices in an organized and gradual manner so that the prices of essentials whose production or importation is controlled by the government can rise by five percent annually. The outcome of this increase is estimated at 1.5 billion pounds for the state's general budget. As for the semi-luxury goods, their prices can be increased by 10-15 percent annually. This will yield a revenue of one billion pounds. The final outcome of these increases will be to provide 2.5 billion pounds without making the citizen feel their weight. The required wage increases can be then calculated by dividing this revenue of 2.5 billion pounds over the (currency turnover rate) of 2.2 [as published]. Prices must not rise in a disorganized manner or in leaps. We believe that prices must be increased and wages raised, meaning that both wages and prices must be controlled with a sound economic process. There is absolutely no constancy in the world. There is absolutely nothing "static." There are ongoing dynamic processes.

The other point we will advocate is to (dig a new branch of the Nile) in order to increase the area of cultivable land. This branch should emanate behind the High Dam to make it possible to cultivate the New Valley lands and should flow into al-Qattarah Depression. It will be nearly 1,000-km long.

The third point in our election platform is to open the free zones east of the Suez Canal to Egyptian, Arab, and foreign investment so that unemployment may be absorbed. The other point that our platform will advocate is to offer all lands targeted for reclamation for international bids so that they may be reclaimed all at once. What I mean is that 1.5 million feddans must be offered for international bids in the form of parcels, each with an area of 50,000 feddans, to be reclaimed simultaneously so that the reclaiming party can obtain organized financing from an international financial institution.

Regarding the industrial aspect, we call in our platform for establishing a genuine steel industry. Regrettably, no steel industry has yet been established in Egypt because Egypt's steel needs amount to just 80,000 tons whereas the smallest production by any plant is nearly 140,000 tons. This means that the surplus of 60,000 tons has to be exported in competition with the major powers, such as West Europe and the United States. So expansion of the Arab market may enable Egypt and the Arab countries to set up a large-scale steel industry and other industries.

On the Arab side, we call for laying down the foundations of Arab unity on the basis of a single parliament, a

single cabinet, and a single judiciary court, meaning an Arab parliament in which each state is represented by about 10 members and which convenes once every three months to boost the unity process, to propose certain viewpoints, such as integration, a unified Arab market, unified education, the poverty issue, and other matters. This parliament is to be supported by a unified Arab council of ministers so that there may be no bilateral meetings between such and such a minister and his counterpart but in order that there may be one minister, let us call him the minister of unity, who represents his state in the unified council of ministers. The same applies to an Arab court so that it may settle whatever disputes arise.

Amendment of Constitution

[Darwish] Regarding the domestic political aspect, what will the Liberal Party demand in its election platform?

[Murad] We believe that the constitution must be amended through the election of a constituent assembly outside of the party [system]. It must be elected from among those who wish to run for election. Let the assembly have 150 members, for example. This assembly will consider amending the constitution within one year. During this period, a coalition government is formed, this assembly is elected, and the constitution is amended to make it compatible with the numerous international and local developments that have occurred since 1971. We certainly appreciate President Husni Mubarak, and we do not want to amend the constitution in order to create any problems. No. We want to amend the constitution so that we may strengthen his position as president of the republic. When the constitution is amended and when the institutions—the parliament, the cabinet, and the judiciary—perform their duties as they should, Egypt's democratic and economic action will be strengthened. The president and the vice president will be elected and the parliament will have the right to amend the state's general budget and will not be denied this right. This means that a part of our emphasis is on honest and impartial elections serving the masses' interest. The judiciary should head all the general election committees, totaling nearly 220 committees, in addition to 22,000 subcommittees. If there isn't a sufficient number of magistrates for the purpose, then the election can be held in stages, provided that they are held on the basis of the voter's personal identity card. The voter must sign or stamp his thumbprint next to his name in the voter lists.

As for the second point in our political election platform, we demand judiciary reform, even though we are confident that Egypt's judiciary [system] is just. However, we want further independence [for the judiciary] so that we may remove any psychological influences on judges, such as the (influence of promises) to appoint them legal advisers in the cabinet ministries or government agencies. This is totally rejected. We want to secure financial and administrative independence for the judiciary, in addition to their independence in implementing the

provisions of the law, by abolishing the position of minister of justice and transforming it into the position of a minister of state for judiciary affairs, provided that the higher judiciary assumes all the powers connected with appointing and promoting judges, determining their salaries, and distributing the judiciary budget which should be appropriated by the People's Assembly, with the higher judiciary taking charge of dividing this budget between the budget's various sections.

Our Position Toward Independents

[Darwish] Do you think that the Liberal Party has enough cadres with which to wage the election in all the districts, as you have said? What I mean is: Is consideration being given to enlisting the help of a number of independents to wage the election?

[Murad] There is nothing to prevent enlisting the help of independents if they join the party at election time. But the Liberal Party has 15 years of experience in the Egyptian popular arena, and it has waged three People's Assembly elections and two Consultative Assembly elections. It has three weeklies and three monthlies, meaning that the Liberal Party represents a party that has struck roots in the Egyptian popular base and that has its well-known leaderships. I believe that we will have the opportunity to wage this election in all districts.

[Darwish] Do you think that the coming election will drop the opposition parties' allegations that they are not involved in any national activity or project?

[Murad] We have never been prevented from participating in any project. Inversely, our papers and our deputies in the People's and Consultative Assemblies show that we represent a constructive and objective opposition. We criticize and give our reasons and we offer and explain solutions in all areas. We have never been tardy in this regard. The issue is that we insist on honest elections and on controls that ensure such elections. Why? Because a strong parliament means a strong government and a weak parliament means a weak government. We always participate in national action.

Alliance Will Continue

[Darwish] You have said that the Liberal Party's relationship with the other opposition parties will take the form of pure coordination if the election is held according to the individual districts. But what if the election is held according to the relative party list system?

[Murad] If the election is held according to the relative list, then we will stay as we are at present. We will gather under the canopy of certain lists and will form blocs as we did in the 1987 election.

[Darwish] Does this mean that the liberals will stay in their alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Labor Party in the coming election?

[Murad] Yes, the alliance will certainly continue to be present because this alliance is intended to strengthen

the opposition action and not for any other purpose that stops short of waging the general elections. The alliance is founded on 10 points meant to strengthen the opposition's stance and not to stand against the government, as some people think.

[Darwish] But wasn't the past election enough to be a convincing lesson for the liberals and the communists, considering that the Liberal Party got whatever was left in the unified list after the Muslim Brotherhood and the Labor Party made their [candidate] selections and considering that the Liberal Party got less than 20 percent the unified list?

[Murad] These were the estimates we were able to get because the Muslim Brotherhood is actually a strong party. Rather, it is the strongest existing party. It is stronger than the Labor Party and stronger than the Liberal Party. This is a fact that we must acknowledge. It is no disgrace for a party to be small because the world has the big and the small. But each party has a role. It is true that certain results depend on the small. Today, Israel represents a model for us in this regard. The small parties are the ones that determine the structure of the Israeli cabinet. So the issue of the big and the small is an abstract issue.

We Are not Lackeys

[Darwish] You have stressed that the alliance will stay as it is. But what is the position of your party's leaderships that have said that this alliance has succeeded in making the Liberal Party a mere lackey of the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Murad] We are nobody's lackey. We the liberals are tantamount to the Free Officers who staged the July revolution and launched its six principles. We belong to the revolutionary system, and we participated in all its phases, whether the phase of establishing the revolution or the later phases. We are not opposed to the regime. We were with this regime, and we want it to turn into a completely democratic regime. As for our contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, we are not its lackeys. Politics require flexibility. There is no disagreement on the continued presence of the alliance. It is true that some members have been expelled because of their objection to the alliance. This is normal because we are a democratic party. The majority approved the alliance and a minority rejected it. So this minority was expelled from the party.

Disagreement Is Normal

[Darwish] Don't you think that the time is right for mending the rift in your party's ranks in preparation for the election?

[Murad] There is no rift in the liberals' ranks. If disagreement develops at one phase or another, then this is something normal and an extremely ordinary political matter. But if disagreements recur, then it is normal for whoever tries to create these disagreements to break away and attempt to establish a new party, as 'Ali-al-Din Salih, chairman of the new Young Egypt Party, has done. Salih was a member of the Liberal Party and then of the

Labor Party. He then founded his new party. Shaykh Yusuf al-Badri, founder of al-Sahwah [Awakening] Party, which is "in the process of being founded," has done the same. Shaykh Ahmad al-Sabahi, the Ummah Party chairman, was a member of the Labor Party. This is normal. Politics are tantamount to society's interaction with thought and opinion. There are parties that rise and grow, parties that shrink and vanish, and parties that split. Except for some narrow disagreements in viewpoints, the Liberal Party has experienced none of the preceding.

Islam Is Solution

[Darwish] If the alliance is going to continue to exist, as you have asserted, then what do you say to the criticism addressed to the slogan of "Islam is the solution"—a slogan on whose basis the alliance waged the previous elections. This criticism has reached the extent of characterizing the slogan as an attempt at concealment that offers a general slogan that does not harbor in its folds any features of a practical and executive program?

[Murad] "Islam is the solution" was a slogan and a declared general principle. But policy does not take this form. Policy is a program with clearcut features to deal with the problems of transport, communications, customs, education, and all other issues, whether at the domestic level or the level of foreign and Arab relations. In this, we must enlist the help of the Islamic Shari'ah. The constitution states that the "principles of the Islamic Shari'ah are a main source of legislation." When we say that Islam is the solution it does not mean that we have renounced the state. The Islamic Shari'ah is the main source of legislation. What we say is the same. All we say is that any party must have a platform. Islam is the solution, so what is the platform? The platform must be presented and it must deal with the people's issues without discrimination between Muslim, Christian, or Jew. In our platform, we follow the light of the general principles of the Islamic Shari'ah in the area of legislation. This is normal. But there is another matter connected with the system of government. We do not object to having in Egypt a regime in accordance with the constitution, with the laws, and with the system of the separation of powers. We are not advocating religious states or anything of the sort. This is the correct way to understand the slogan of "Islam is the solution."

We Hold Dialogue With Islamic Groups

[Darwish] If these are the limits of the relationship between the liberals and the Muslim Brotherhood, then what are the limits of the relationship between the liberals and the Islamic groups other than the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Murad] Some of these groups have actually joined the Liberal Party. We hold dialogue with them but we cannot force anybody to join us. When one finds any radical, one should hold dialogue with him, debate him, and try to persuade him. One should not deal with this issue from the

security aspect solely. The (danger) to security begins with aggression against others and with the prevalence of the principle of violence and radicalism. We try to understand the viewpoint of the youth of the religious groups and we try to hold dialogue and debate with them and to convince them that violence does not solve any problem.

[Darwish] Does the Liberal Party chairman believe that the opportunity is right for him to wage the election personally? What I mean is: Does the painful 1984 experience stand as an obstacle preventing the Liberal Party chairman from waging the next election?

[Murad] To the contrary. I am an experienced veteran politician. We hope to get the majority and to form a Liberal Party government. As for me, as a veteran electioneer, coordination may dictate that I personally take part in this election. As for my experience of failure in the 1984 election, I say that failure and success are a part of life's nature, even insofar as the prophets are concerned.

Businessmen Warn Against Misusing Economic Relaxation

90P40151A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 11 Sep 90 p 2

[Report by Zakariya Fikri]

[Text] Alexandria—Economic experts and businessmen have warned against abusing the partial relaxation to which Egypt's economy is currently being exposed. The experts stressed that relaxation leads to adverse results so long as the government does not adopt positive steps toward readily implementing political and economic reform. The businessmen emphasized that previous experience has proven that temporary pacifiers have not succeeded in correcting the economic imbalance and ending unemployment and rising prices. The businessmen also indicated that the primary cause for the Gulf crisis stems from a lack of democracy, as political reform is a definite necessity.

This was said at a businessmen's association conference two nights ago in Alexandria. Muhammad Rajab, the association president, chaired the conference. It was attended by Dr. Usamah al-Ghazali Harb; Dr. Mahmud al-Hadari, former president of the University of Alexandria; and Usamah Saraya, economic editor for the newspaper AL-AHRAM.

Laser Wheat Farming Raises Production 50 Percent

90AA0272A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 25 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by 'Abd-al-Wahhab Hamid]

[Excerpts] In the two governorates of al-Daqahliyah and al-Sharqiyah, the first experiment has been carried out for growing wheat mechanically using laser equipment to till the soil, then to level it in preparation for planting it mechanically with row making machines. The purpose of the experiment was to escape the bottleneck that

occurred after wheat came to represent a political and economic dimension in light of changing international circumstances. Population density is increasing, mouths are open demanding food, the area is essentially limited, and even though there are projects to reclaim and cultivate land, they do not come under the plan of wheat production.

Statistics state that Egypt grows 1.6 million feddans of wheat a year, the production of which covers only 25 percent. In other words, we import about 4 million tons of wheat a year.

At the start of the experiment, Egyptian experts who were overseeing the project expected that production would increase by about 30 percent, but results turned out to be more than many expected, since it increased in some fields by more than 50 percent. This means that the project must be expanded without delay, so that some day, hopefully soon, we may attain self-sufficiency in wheat.

Building on the encouraging results, several governorates were nominated for the experiment to be applied in them. Governorates that have large areas will be selected, which was the basis on which al-Daqahliyah and al-Sharqiyah were chosen, since they grow 12 and 11.5 percent of the total wheat area of Egypt, respectively. Governorates that are candidates for application in the coming year include al-Buhayrah, which grows 10.5 percent; Sawhaj, which grows 10 percent; then al-Minya, eight percent; Asyut, 7.7 percent; and Qina, seven percent. Once the experiment has been applied successively in them, we will have introduced mechanized agriculture to about 66.7 percent of the total wheat area in Egypt.

The mechanized wheat cultivation project is being implemented in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture and by way of the agriculture development banks, and through the project of agricultural production and credit which is financed by the American Development Agency, with one hundred percent Egyptian control and expertise. How is that?

Engineer 'Adil Husayn 'Azzi, chairman of the board of the principal bank for development and agricultural credit and director of the project of agricultural production and credit said: "The two governorates al-Daqahliyah and al-Sharqiyah were selected for the application of the state of the art project for mechanized wheat production in an area of 6,500 feddans that include 100 villages in the two governorates. This area is owned by 7,000 farmers who participated in the project. The experiment has achieved results that were greater than what was expected, since the expected increase was 33 percent, but production results went beyond that to over 50 percent, which makes it essential that the project be expanded to include other governorates, especially since the experiment has turned out to be encouraging, and there are large numbers of farmers who are demanding that it be generally introduced into their fields."

350 Row Makers Is Not Enough. The solution: Agricultural Banks.

The question now is: How can the production of wheat with laser be expanded so as to increase production?

Engineer Muhammad Nur, executive director of the project, said: "The row makers currently available at the level of the republic number 350, and it is known that the row maker works 200 feddans in a season, therefore there is a need for new row makers so that the area can be served. This area is up to 1.6 million feddans in the valley, and it is expected to increase as a result of the increase in the income of the new producer through the use of tractors in the process of making rows with laser. There is also the possibility that they might be used in rice production, and this would provide the opportunity to increase the number of days of operating the tractors and making additional profit after they have been paid for. The experiment has also reported that there has been savings in the amount of seed of up to 25 kilograms per feddan, with a value of 15 pounds, as well as an increase in production of no less than six ardebs per feddan."

Dr. Mahmud [as published] Nur said: "The agricultural banks are fully prepared to finance the purchase of row makers, whether from the suppliers to import them, or from the distributors to sell them to the tractor owners, along with granting loans to the farmers to carry out the job of making rows. Thus the bank offers financing to all the links necessary for the operations pertaining to mechanizing wheat or rice cultivation, in addition to operations pertaining to other jobs, most important of which is mechanizing seed bed preparation and leveling using modern machinery such as the laser, making judicious use of water and increasing production as a result of controlling the number of plants in a feddan." He said, "There are three links that are firmly connected to increasing wheat production, namely preparing the seedbed and making the rows, mechanized harvest, and winnowing." He stated that the bank is financing all the operations with the goal of increasing production and cleanliness of the seed, and reducing the amount lost.

Availability of Row Making Machines Problem That Confronts Experiment

What do those responsible for financing in the two governorates, the site of the experiment, say?

Mr. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Basit, chairman of the board of directors of the Development and Agricultural Credit Bank in al-Daqahliyah, said:

"The experiment has been carried out thorough the project for crop production and credit, whereby 5,000 feddans in 50 villages were chosen to introduce mechanization in the cultivation of wheat. That was the plan, but in view of the lack of technical capabilities of the machines needed to mechanize this area, it was decided to apply it on 3,900 feddans for 5,400 farmers, with concentration on the small farmers. Why? Because they are unable to do these jobs by themselves. Before the

experiment wheat production varied between 12 and 16 ardebs a feddan, and the results were reassuring since production increased by about 55 percent. All these results made the climate conducive for expansion, especially since when the farmers saw the increase in yield for themselves, they rushed to demand the service, and this means that necessary machinery must be provided. Since the machine service stations were not adequate, the situation requires that the private sector, whether individuals or companies, be encouraged to acquire these machines to offer them to farmers at appropriate prices."

The chairman of the al-Daqahliyah Bank said: "Our plan is to encourage the private sector, and we are providing it with the necessary loans and creating the climate for it by awarding loans to the farmers for dealing with the machinery owner so that we will enable him to repay and make a suitable profit. Agreement has been made with companies on training the farmers who own machinery. If the ministry's plan were to endeavor to make the mechanization of wheat cultivation general in all the governorates that would require an ambitious plan to provide the row-making machinery."

Sharqawis Quick to Respond to Modern Technology

In al-Sharqiyah, Mr. Nabil Khalifah, chairman of the board of the Development and Agricultural Credit Bank in the governorate, said: "The implementation of the experiment in its first year met with problems, such that we were unable to apply it in the targeted areas since they included only 3,600 feddans in the centers of Bilbis, al-Zaqaziq, Hahya, and Abu-Kabir, due to the lack of enough of the needed machines, especially laser leveling equipment, in spite of assistance from three companies specializing in this field, because they were committed to work in other regions. The experiment proved that the Egyptian farmer is quick to respond to the implementation of technical recommendations, in addition to his confidence in mechanical operations. We now face the problem of providing the machinery in the face of strong demand from the farmers that the experiment be implemented in wheat areas in the upcoming season because of the increase in crop productivity, which varies between five and six ardebs a feddan."

Dr. Jamal Sharibah, the Egyptian-American expert in the project for agricultural production and credit, said: "There is an urgent need for attention be paid to increasing wheat production as a strategic crop because the international situation could have an impact on obtaining this commodity. There are several factors that we must consider as we discuss the wheat production plan, factors such as loading and unloading at ports, and what might result if any delay were to occur, and also if any war were to break out, for that would have an effect on wheat supplies. Moreover, the importer falls under the mercy of changes in the weather and world economic conditions, and he is subject to all the circumstances imposed on him by fluctuations in world prices and by

international cartels that could place Egypt outside the priorities of wheat importing states." [passage omitted]

According to Figures: Results are Encouraging 50 Percent Increase in Production

Dr. Ibrahim Sadiq, the project's economic adviser, said: "Production results at the end of the first year of mechanized wheat cultivation are considered encouraging. In the two villages of al-Ibrahimiyyah and al-'Asluji in the al-Sharqiyah governorate, production varied between 18 and 19.2 ardebs a feddan, whereas in traditional cultivation it varies between 11.9 and 12.8 ardebs; in other words there was an increase of up to 50 percent. In fact, there are villages in the al-Daqahliyah governorate that exceeded that figure and reached a production of 27.5 ardebs a feddan, while it was not less than 20.4 ardebs a feddan, and in traditional cultivation in these villages it did not exceed 15.2 ardebs a feddan."

Concerning the economics of the experiment from the point of view of the farmer:

Dr. Sadiq said: "The increase in the cost per feddan is estimated at about 54 pounds, while the minimum increase achieved is not less than five ardebs. If we assume the price of an ardeb to be 70 pounds, the total would be 350 pounds, and by any standard of assessment this project is considered to be very profitable to the farmer, at a profitability rate that exceeds that of any alternate opportunities. This is in addition to the increase in straw and the reduction in the amount of seed, which increase returns by another 100 pounds. That means that the total increase in returns is up to 450 pounds. Based on the figures we say that each additional pound in costs gives nine pounds over six months, and this is the individual economic dimension from the point of view of the farmer.

"An increase of only five ardebs, which is a very modest supposition, means a potential increase of 8 million ardebs, or more than a million tons; in other words, it would reduce the volume of imports by 25 percent. Based on the latest world prices for American wheat, the price of a ton delivered at American ports was up to \$165 a ton, in addition to the cost of shipping, insurance, and unloading, which brings the cost of a ton up to \$200. Moreover, there is the potential for expanding wheat acreages and developing new varieties that can give greater returns, which will soon enable us to attain a 50 percent level of self-sufficiency, since current production covers only 25 percent." [passage omitted]

Government Streamlining Urged To Cut Expenses

90AA0329A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 9 Sep 90 p 5

[Article by Lama'i al-Muti'i: "Crisis and Developing Homeland"]

[Text] The longer the Gulf crisis lasts and the more it escalates, the more necessary it becomes to devote attention to our country's problems at international, Arab,

and domestic levels. If it is Egypt's fate to be saddled with the burden of the crisis at the Arab level by virtue of its being at the vanguard of the Arab states, then Egypt is the country most strongly exposed to the negative consequences of this crisis, not only from the angle of the expatriate Egyptians returning from Kuwait and Iraq but also from the angle of the war of nerves which our people are living day and night.

All are preoccupied with seeking answers to numerous questions. Will the United States strike or will it be content with the blockade? Will Iraq strike or will it be content to deliberate and wait? Will the Arab solution succeed? Is there a deal between Bush and Saddam? In today's meeting, will Bush and Gorbachev succeed in developing a solution to this catastrophe that is about to fall on everybody's head? Tension is preying on our nerves, anxiety is controlling our souls, and fear of the future is encroaching upon us. To the conventional problems of housing, transportation, unemployment, schools, and excessive inflation have been added the problems of the Egyptians returning from Kuwait and Iraq, and the fear of chemical warfare and of reckless blows that may come from any direction. The shortage of foodstuffs and of essential supplies preoccupies the people's minds. The accumulation of problems in this manner and by this degree under the umbrella of the climate of the psychological warfare that is generated by the crisis and by the information media of the various states is something that dictates a prompt tackling of these problems because they may lead to grave consequences.

It is our country's good fortune that all the conditions are conducive to developing solutions to such problems. At the international level, the strategic role being performed by Egypt for stability in the region is already acknowledged and is the subject of noticeable appreciation by all international tendencies. At the Arab level, Egypt has assumed its vanguard position and has become the port [of safety] for numerous Arab countries. Domestically, the majority of the people have received the role played by President Muhammad Husni Mubarak with sincere support, and some sort of a bond has developed between the people and the political leadership, especially in the wake of the firm position taken by the new al-Wafd Party and by its newspaper in condemning the Iraqi occupation and expressing friendly sympathy for the Arab states threatened with Iraqi invasion. This position has turned the opposition stance taken by some religious political forces into a marginal stance. So the circumstances are opportune for solving our country's problems at international, Arab, and domestic levels.

If it is some details that we want, then we find that Egypt's status in the international community is excellent. This has encouraged the United States to decide to relieve Egypt of its military debts, which amount to \$7 billion, and of the interest on these debts, which amounts to nearly \$750 million annually. This is an opportunity for us to take a breather.

In this period, Egypt must try to have all its debts, amounting to nearly \$50 billion, canceled. I believe that the Soviet Union may agree to this idea in order to keep pace with the United States. It is not difficult to convince the other debtor countries that as a result of the crisis, Egypt's losses amount to nearly \$2 billion in lost remittances from Egyptian workers in Iraq and Kuwait, in a smaller number of ships crossing the canal, and in reduced tourism activity as a consequence of the Gulf crisis.

This is in addition to the loss of \$13 billion in dues belonging to Egyptians in Kuwait. This is a historic opportunity and if the government can exploit it, then it will have accomplished something valuable in its executive life.

As for the position at the Arab level, an independent Egyptian policy is required. Recently, experience has demonstrated clearly that a number of Arab countries have not been reluctant to take positions convenient for their economic interests.

Nobody can censure Egypt because its vanguard position has been confirmed through the crisis. Numerous Arab states have come to trust Egypt and its leadership because in its dealings, Egypt has followed a civilized course that is remote from individualism and from blackmail. This is why some countries have declared that their gates are open to Egyptian labor. Despite our approval of these new gates, what has happened to our citizens in Iraq and Kuwait, and previously in Libya, dictates that a complete plan be formulated for Egyptian expatriates.

As for domestic problems, it will take long to explain them. The economic issue is blind and its fodder is smallpox. What is blind is the economic crisis. The smallpox is the return of the Egyptian labor from Iraq and Kuwait and the resulting increase in unemployment, confusion in labor, and the loss of savings. We need a clearcut labor and emigration policy. Added to this are the vast numbers [of graduates] which the universities hurl annually [into the market] where no work is available. All these are elements which pose a major political danger. In a short time, we will be facing the elections. The Islamic tendency is preparing and has vast funds at its disposal, and terrorist groups are waiting for the government to get preoccupied with raging foreign, Arab, and domestic problems. All these elements are trying to exploit the tense psychological climate and the ceaseless war of nerves.

In the issue of labor and unemployment, we must acknowledge the inability of the state agencies and the absence of sound planning. We must acknowledge the heavy burdens shouldered by the security agencies. We must also acknowledge the shortage of foodstuffs and of essential and strategic goods. We must acknowledge all the aspects of deficiency when we ask the people to confront this crisis. This confrontation begins with the government itself which must reduce the number of

ministries and abolish the ministries that perform no serious task. The expenditures on propaganda, extravagance, luxuries, and false appearances must be eliminated. Any official who spends funds allocated for his field of activity on false propaganda so that he may personally shine and rise to prominence must be brought to account.

Economic measures must be taken to bolster the domestic situation for the longest time possible and large quantities of goods must be promptly imported. What is more important than all this is to reveal the truth to the people because they are the state's true support in past, present, and future crises. May God grant Egypt safety and health.

Plan To Employ Gulf Workers in Farming Sector Detailed

90AA0329B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 10 Sep 90 p 5

[Article by Ahmad Fu'ad and Usamah Haykal: "Egyptian Has Returned to Good Earth; Cultivable Land Needs Sweat of One Million Egyptians Returned From Gulf; What Has Government Done to Exploit Repatriated Agricultural Labor; Agricultural Economy Incurred Heavy Losses Because of Emigration of Farmers to Oil States"]

[Text] Workers in the Gulf states have begun to flow into Egypt. The most optimistic projections estimate their number at 1.5 million Egyptian workers, the majority of them agricultural sector workers. Economic and political experts expect the current Gulf crisis to result in a recession in the Egyptian labor market and in a major increase in unemployment. Logic confirms decisively that the labor returning from Iraq and Kuwait can contribute seriously to increasing Egypt's cultivable area and to enhancing development by reclaiming more new cultivable lands. This is in addition to providing agricultural labor in the Nile Valley. Through this report, AL-WAFD asks: Has the government drawn up an urgent practical plan to absorb the returning agricultural labor? Has the government planned to exploit this vast labor or are the government efforts to end all the repatriates' problems and to settle their conditions confined to ministers' and officials' statements?

The agricultural economy has incurred a heavy loss as a result of agricultural labor's emigration to the oil states since 1973. A number of studies conducted by the National Planning Institute in 1987 made it clear that cultivable land has decreased by nearly one million feddans as a result of the emigration of agricultural labor and of a number of other factors in the years preceding the study. In 1982, the Central Management and Organization Agency conducted a study on the phenomenon of the movement of Egyptian labor to Arab countries by analyzing a sample comprising 265 emigrants from the village of Dafrah in Tanta District. The study made it clear that 93 out of the total number of emigrants, or 35.1 percent, were agricultural workers. As for the village

women, a sample comprising 25 of those women showed that 10 of the emigrant women were the wives of emigrating agricultural workers, 10 were the wives of farmers with small agricultural holdings, and five were hired laborers in the agricultural sector. As a result of the study, it became evident that agricultural labor's emigration was coupled with a change in the wage structure favoring craftsmen at the expense of agricultural vocations. The emigration was also coupled with a decrease in the number of workers employed in agriculture for cash wages, with intensified speculation in cultivable land, with the emergence of social differences within the ranks of hired workers, and with a change in some of the roles of village women.

A study conducted in 1986 by Ahmad Husam Najati, a researcher at the National Planning Institute, on the social and economic consequences of Egyptian labor emigration demonstrates that the majority of repatriate workers do not return to the main craft in which they were engaged prior to their emigration. The study also shows that Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia were recipients of emigrating Egyptian farm workers and that the majority of these workers ranged in age from 16-45 years. When this farm labor emigrated, most of the workers were employed in other fields. A total of 37 percent were employed in the construction sector, eight percent in the service sector, 14 percent in the farming sector, 11 percent in restaurants, and 20 percent in other crafts. When these workers returned home, they channeled their spending toward the purchase of household appliances, repayment of travel debts, and purchase of homes and livestock.

Regarding the impact of emigration on the farming sector, the study says that the agricultural sector was the Egyptian economy's mainstay in supplying food and in providing some hard currency by exporting the surplus farm production to the outside world. The farm labor's emigration to the oil states resulted in the shortage of agricultural labor and in changing the Egyptian countryside's consumption pattern. The farm worker's wages rose from 25 piasters [daily] in the 1960's to 125 piasters in 1974-75, to 3-4 pounds in 1980-81, and to 5 pounds in 1984. During harvest time, the wages rose to 8 pounds [daily].

We went to the Ministry of Agriculture. There, an authoritative source emphasized that the ministry has decided to immediately reinstate the workers returning from Iraq and Kuwait in their jobs and to accept their applications without any conditions. The ministry is currently considering the formulation of a long-range plan to absorb farm labor in land reclamation projects. It has also been decided to make a complete count of the farm workers returning from Iraq and Kuwait in order to assess the number and quality of the jobs they can occupy.

We have also interviewed Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid Wahbah, a professor at the Cairo University School of Veterinary Medicine and the Veterinarian Union deputy chairman,

who has said that what is required is comprehensive development in order to solve the numerous problems experienced by the country, to create prosperity, to solve the unemployment problem, and to fill the food gap currently experienced by Egypt, especially since it is expected that remittances from Egyptians will decrease as a result of their return and that the Suez Canal revenues will diminish. Therefore, it is necessary to provide labor, financing, and top-level expertise that is embodied in advanced technology, scientific planning, and executive expertise.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid Wahbah has proposed several ideas for utilizing farm labor returning from the Gulf. International firms possessing advanced technology, vast capital, and ideas for major projects that absorb large numbers of these workers must be brought into the country.

Moreover, large tracts of cultivable land ranging from 100,000-1,000,000 feddans in al-Matariyah, the western desert, Wadi al-'Uwaynat, the New Valley, the north-western coast, and the Sinai Desert must be offered for bids by major international land reclamation firms.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid Wahbah added that the Ministry of Agriculture must make efforts similar to those of the Ministry of Petroleum which offers tracts of land for oil prospecting in return for a grant and for partnership in the oil produced after the costs of prospecting and drilling are covered. The Ministry of Agriculture must offer the lands to land reclamation firms and must supply the lands with the infrastructure, divide them, prepare them for cultivation, build the installations needed for cultivation, and determine the crops required by the state within the framework of an agricultural plan so as to meet food, agricultural, and industrial needs. For example, oil and fodder crops, sugarcane, and crops on which industries may be established in Egypt can be developed by way of these firms which will employ large numbers of Egyptian farm workers. Requirements should be set for these firms, including the requirement that Egyptian labor constitute no less than 80 percent of these firms' labor. These firms should also be required to prepare training programs for the various job levels so that we may have the opportunity to form skilled cadres in all areas of land reclamation and cultivation. Plans must also be made for major agro-industry complexes that absorb large numbers of workers, not to mention livestock production complexes. Utilization periods of 15-20 years should be set for the firms. Ownership of the reclaimed lands can be then turned over to the workers employed in these firms and to Egyptian expatriate workers wishing to own such lands. This is better than turning land ownership over to young university graduates who experience countless problems and who are compelled to deal with the situation without experience or capital. Thus, no development is accomplished and the youth's capabilities are not exploited as they should be. Inversely, the government will acquire cash liquidity from the grants to be made by the executing firms [if major international firms are invited to develop the lands].

Locations in Which Returning Capabilities Are To Be Utilized

Dr. Wahbah 'Abd-al-Majid further added that scientific research confirms that there are east of al-'Uwaynat more than 14 million feddans of cultivable land containing the necessary water. There are also hundreds of thousands of feddans of reclaimable and cultivable land in the New Valley. As for the Sinai Peninsula, it contains more than 200,000 feddans of cultivable land where water resources are available. If these lands can be reclaimed and cultivated with the help of these returning workers, then there is no doubt that they will lead to self-sufficiency in food and in agricultural crops needed for industry, not to mention the fact that they will eliminate a large degree of the unemployment which will grow if sound and prompt decisions are not made in connection with this repatriate labor.

Organizing Return

We have also interviewed Engineer Sa'd Hajras, the Agronomists Union chairman and chairman of the Consultative Assembly's Agriculture and Irrigation Committee, who has said: Regarding the Egyptians present in Iraq and Kuwait, their numbers vary. There are nearly 1.5 million Egyptians in Iraq and about ¼ million Egyptians in Kuwait. However, there are fundamental facts which we can note. The first is that this large number of Egyptians has played a primary and fundamental role in the various areas of economic and social development in Iraq and Kuwait. Rather, great credit goes to the Egyptians in militarily supporting Iraq's battle against Iran. The second fact is that these Egyptians are highly-skilled workers.

The third fact is that the overwhelming majority of these Egyptian workers is tantamount to a mass of farm and construction workers.

It is my estimate that farm workers constitute more than 70 percent of the Egyptian labor in Iraq. This is why it is expected that the majority of the workers returning to Egypt will go to the countryside where they lived and worked prior to their emigration. This is why the farming sector will shoulder a responsibility in providing work opportunities and in resettling these workers among their kinsmen in the Egyptian countryside.

IRAQ

'Secret Weapon' Reportedly in Military Arsenal

90AE0346A London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic
5 Sep 90 p 1

[Article by Basim Sakkijha: "Iraqi Secret Weapon Turns Aircraft Carriers into 'Floating Coffins'"]

[Text] A Jordanian military analyst said Iraq possesses deterrent weapons other than those it has disclosed so far and will use them should it become the target of a major military strike.

The military analyst, who declined to give his name, told AL-QUDDS AL-'ARABI that aside from the talk about Baghdad being in possession of certain types of nuclear weapons, something which nobody can be sure of, Iraq possesses oil that could be a major deterring weapon that is in no way less than the other strategic weapons.

The analyst stressed that the Iraqis have a plan that they have studied and that they are ready to implement in case it is necessary. The plan calls for pumping millions of barrels of oil in the Gulf both from Iraq and Kuwait. This would lead to:

- Navigation in the Arab Gulf for ordinary ships and even battleships coming to a halt and aircraft carriers movement being reduced by 70 percent.
- The destruction of water desalination plants, which would make thirst a life problem in the Gulf countries and would lead to stoppage of work in many factories on the Gulf coast.
- Setting fire to these vast quantities of oil if they are pumped into the waters in two stages separated by a certain period of time.

Explaining this, the analyst said that the first quantity would float on the surface and after some time it would harden, becoming a solid matter. This would enable pumping another quantity of oil on top and setting it on fire.

Cleaning the waters of oil will require a long period of time, perhaps years. He noted in this regard the oil spill in Alaska where cleaning 150,000 barrels took about three years.

As to how far the Iraqis would suffer from this, he said the strength of the water flow from the Shatt al-'Arab would push the great quantities of oil toward the south in the direction of the Gulf's southeastern coast and away from the Iraqi and Kuwaiti coasts.

With regard to Iran, the analyst said that not a single drop would touch the Iranian coasts in view of the longitude and latitude lines and the high and low tide being confined to the Arab coasts, and the Gulf position being parallel to the longitude lines which makes it impossible for the oil to move away from the middle of the Gulf longitudinally.

This, he added, is a strategic option which Iraq has not yet disclosed, but keeps it as a last resort in case the United States and its allies resorted to weapons of mass destruction and the war, should it break out, reached a critical point.

Recalling what Iraqi President Saddam Husayn said on several occasions, that "he will burn the Gulf if Iraq is attacked", the Jordanian analyst said that probably he meant resorting to this option.

The analyst said that Iraq possesses a Soviet missile with a 400-km range specially for the destruction of aircraft

carriers. The Soviet strategy, he added, always said that "aircraft carriers are no more than floating coffins." It appears that this might come true in the Arab Gulf! In any case, the military analyst precludes the break out of war because the options that have become available [to the sides] would result in the stoppage of oil exports for many years. Finally, he wonders whether the fleets that have come to defend the oil will fight while realizing that this could mean the stoppage of 55 percent of world oil exports.

Saddam Accused of Serving Israel's Interests

90AE0301A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
4 Sep 90 p 17

[Article by Muhammad Hashim al-Mujaddidi: "Saddam, Mosad's Number-One Agent"]

[Text] I am greatly amazed when I read what newspapers and magazines write about the Gulf developments. My amazement intensifies when I find that some writers continue to mention Saddam's name with the same attributes they bestowed upon him during the Iraq-Iran war. It greatly angers me that they think that Saddam wishes the Arabs and Muslims well.

Why don't we list Saddam's acts, examine them, and conclude the results which demonstrate to us the true nature of what Saddam has done and is doing?

Did not Saddam take the lead in the issue of freezing Egypt's membership in the Arab League? Why?

Did he not take a neutral stance when Israel invaded Lebanon? Why?

Did he not evoke fear of Iran in the Gulf States? Why?

Did he not abrogate the Algiers treaty which he had concluded and did he not declare war on Iran? Why?

There are very many questions, but I will content myself with the above and will try to find some answers.

The purpose of freezing Egypt's membership in the Arab League was to weaken Egypt economically and militarily vis-a-vis Israel because for a period of time, this resolution deprived Egypt of the aid provided by the rich Arab states, especially since Egypt had been denied its revenues from the canal and from the Sinai oil from 1967 till the end of the 1970's.

Saddam is now urging the Egyptian people to close the canal anew.

Freezing Egypt's membership weakened Egypt politically vis-a-vis Israel because the Arabs denied Egypt their aid and their investments.

When Israel invaded Lebanon, Saddam did not take part in defending Lebanon. Prior to the invasion, when the Arab Deterrence Forces were formed to rescue Lebanon from its civil war, Saddam did not participate and did not move a finger. After 14 years of obstinacy, fighting, and destruction, Saddam now opposes the al-Ta'if accord and provides 'Awn with generous aid and encourages him.

Saddam evoked fear of Iran in the Gulf states during the shah's reign and then during Khomeini's era. This fear has encouraged the rulers to proceed to purchase exorbitantly expensive weapons and to spend vast sums on instructors and on defense complements.

Saddam abrogated the Algiers treaty, aroused racism among the Muslims and divided them, provoked Arab superciliousness, and drained the billions that had been saved for development and for a catastrophic day.

Who has benefited from all of Saddam's moves? The primary beneficiary is Israel. I do not think that I would be revealing a secret when I declare that Saddam Husayn is Israel's number one agent in the Islamic world.

This is because closeness and solidarity among the Muslims and agreement among the Arab states frighten Israel. Israel knows that the Muslims will not forget Jerusalem and the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque and that when they rid themselves of their problems, they will channel their efforts, armies, and money to liberate Palestine.

Was not Israel's invasion of Lebanon intended to oust the Palestinians from Lebanon and to drive them away from Palestine's soil?

The Islamic and Arab nation's enemies have drawn up a tight plan to perpetuate troubles in the Middle East and to provoke hostilities between the countries surrounding Israel so that they may not find the opportunity to unite their ranks and turn them against the enemy existing among them.

The Gulf states possess large assets generated by oil revenues. When the situation in the region stabilizes, this asset will be channeled toward developing the region and bringing it prosperity and a flourishing economy.

This asset will provide the weapon which will make it possible to confront Israel and to rescue the holy land and the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque.

A condition has to be created in the region to cause this asset to be drained and to try to bring about economic stagnation. So a dispute has to be invented, an aggression has to be launched against a neighbor, and Arabs have to be aroused against Persians to drain this money.

The proof that the objective of Iraq's war with Iran was not to rectify the borders and to regain rights, which is what Saddam declared after invading Kuwait, is that Saddam has acknowledged the Algiers treaty. Saddam

has done his job. He drained the Muslim money, provoked hostility between brothers, destroyed good intentions, eliminated the dependence on neighbors, and pushed Iran to deal with Israel.

He has done all this on the precise instructions of an institution that is deep-rooted in intrigue, deception, and espionage. Who denies the Mosad's intelligence? The Mosad has been able to raise Saddam and to steer him from the day he became a member of the Ba'th Party to this day.

Saddam has closely surrounded himself with people who believe and support him and who censure Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for enlisting the help of a force from Islamic and friendly countries. With the money he saved during his war with Iran (considering that he did not spend a single penny from Iraq's revenues on the war but used for that purpose the Muslim money supplied by the Gulf states), Saddam has used these hired trumpets which seek to upturn the facts and to depict him as the defender of Arabism and Islam. The Gulf region was liberated from colonialism, and no military bases belonging to either the eastern or western bloc have existed in it. This region has an unmatched strategic position, and it possesses a vast wealth in energy. The major powers need anything to which to cling as a justification to return to the region with their hordes. Who can arrange the preludes for them? The Mosad is the region's strongest espionage institution. So the Mosad has to instruct its number one agent to create the condition, the causes, and the climate which gives the western and eastern countries the opportunity to return to the region.

Saddam has invaded Kuwait, threatened Saudi Arabia, and instructed some rulers in the region to raise issues forgotten in the corners of history. The threatened countries call for help while the cause of the call boasts over his brothers and tries to declare himself as innocent as the wolf was of Joseph's blood. He wants the Islamic world to shut its eyes and not to think rationally. He wants the Muslims to hear the sound of his deceitful trumpets only, to follow behind him, and to believe his lies. It is regrettable that the hired trumpets have been able to drag behind them the naive who have been shouting slogans and staging demonstrations without realizing the truth of the matter. What is more surprising than all this is the position of some Islamic organizations that have been deceived by what is disseminated by Saddam's trumpets. Why don't these naive people allow their insight and their mind be the judge? Is it a part of Islam to attack neighbors? Is it a part of Islam to counter a good deed with an offense? Is it a part of Islam to provide the opportunity for the Soviet Jews to immigrate to Palestine and to preoccupy the Arabs and the world with the fire ignited by Saddam?

I would like to ask Muslim brother Abu-'Ammar if he will accept in Palestine the same solution which he has offered for the Kuwaiti problem and which was published in AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT a few days ago?

The United States supports Israel with money and weapons and the Soviets support Israel with men and brains.

Who is responsible for the U.S. presence in the first place? Did the Americans come before the invasion of Kuwait and before the threat? Did they come before the Jeddah meeting? Did they come before the Egyptian president went to Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia?

The entire world is aware that they came after Saddam perpetrated his heinous act and after he refused to listen to reason. Saddam's decision is individualistic. His deputies and his council of ministers cannot disagree with him and can never forget how Saddam shot and killed one of their colleagues in the council of ministers during a council meeting.

As for the Iraqi people, they are a hostage in the hands of Saddam and his gang. They must be considered the same as the western hostages, with one difference, namely that Saddam visits the western hostages and televises his meetings with them, whereas the Iraqi people cannot raise their voice in complaint for fear of the violence of the iron grip.

I saw Saddam on television and remembered the story of Dorian Gray whose ugly crimes were reflected in the portrait a painter had painted of him while his real face continued to maintain its freshness, its youth, and its beauty with which people were deceived. The novel is well known.

I saw [a similarity] between Saddam and a movie maker whose film I saw on German television. This movie maker loved to see fear and horror in his victims' faces. His means was to tempt some women to act in movies. He photographed them while concealing a dagger in his camera bag. He would then brandish this dagger, approach his prey slowly, photograph her state of fear and horror, plant his dagger in her throat, and then escape while pretending to be completely innocent in front of people. Saddam also likes to see fear and horror on the faces of those around him.

I advise newspapers, magazines, and the other media not to couple Saddam's name with the title of excellency and not to characterize him as intelligent and heroic. They must show Saddam as he truly is: The number one agent of the Mosad.

The greatest service the world can do the Iraqi people is to rescue them from Saddam's gang. This service will have a great impact on the future relations between the region's peoples. Security will be established when the agent is eliminated.

We must learn the lesson, must not repeat the mistakes in the future, and must not be deceived by resounding hollow words.

Planning Minister Discusses Future Challenges

90AE0254B Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
22 Jul 90 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Samal Majid Faraj by 'Asad al-'Aqli; place and date not specified]

[Excerpts] The planning process usually rests on three foundations: A survey of the visible and invisible human and material national abilities and capabilities; the formulation of realistic, achievable goals; and the determination of the means and methods through which the best use of available resources, capabilities, and abilities can be guaranteed to achieve established goals. One can thus imagine the nature and size of the difficulties and obstacles that the revolution has faced as it applies itself to the task of achieving economic and social development and scientific and cultural advancement based on sound foundations and a firm material and technical base. In this connection, it suffices to stress that the talented planning thinking of Commander Saddam Husayn has, over the years, provided for a growing conviction on the part of broad circles of state officials, experts, and specialists of the importance of transforming planning effort into tireless work that in turn contributes the foundation for stimulating centralized and sectoral developmental, economic, and social advances.

Perhaps our planning experiment is distinguished by not being limited to a specific economic sector. On the contrary, it includes all economic, productive, and service sectors, and it covers aspects of the people's social life. In addition, the planning process acquired an outstanding special character as a result of being applied to development tasks during the war period with a high degree of flexibility, competent effort, and notable success, thanks to the singular effort and sound directives of President Commander Saddam Husayn.

AL-JUMHURIYAH spoke with Planning Minister Dr. Samal Majid Faraj about different aspects of the revolution's planning experiment, its interaction with economic and social development issues, its most recent basic indicators, and the planning directions that are expected during the 1990s.

Planning Process Inputs

[Al-'Aqli] The planning process depends on many prerequisites and basic inputs. How do you determine them in order to formulate the most suitable and effective plan?

[Faraj] The 1980s witnessed serious, active attention to developing the planning process, deepening its scientific and realistic aspects, expanding the collective base that drafts development plans, monitoring the implementation of development plans, and evaluating their results. There was also an intensification of efforts to develop and perfect all dimensions of the planning process to

serve effective participation in the achievement of balanced development for Iraq.

The prerequisites and inputs of the planning process are very important. They determine the formulation of clear conceptualizations of current and projected human and material capabilities during the years of a plan, such as oil resources, agricultural resources, and the surplus of economic operations and human resources. The planning process is effected through the preparation of studies and documents that analyze the economic and social reality and identify the main problems and directions of national economic activity. These studies provide the basis for proposing development projects to be incorporated in a plan. These proposals in turn require additional economic and technical benefit analyses in order to prioritize projects according to criteria derived from general policy, developmental approaches, and overall basic indicators.

Therefore, the ministry has sought not to incorporate a project in a plan unless an economic and technical benefit analysis has been performed regarding it, so that the necessary basic aspects of a project can be perfected. This is accomplished through coordination and continuous dialogue between the Planning Ministry and the relevant sectoral ministries.

Other prerequisites of the planning process include: the existence of a plan aimed at administering and using economic resources and production means with a view toward achieving the goals of the plan; the availability of technical cadres to the planning bureaus at different production levels, who can outline plans and formulate alternatives to them; the cost [and] return of each plan; the availability and required quality of sufficient information that can be used to draft a plan, starting with data and ending with the results of the plan's implementation. The Planning Ministry constantly seeks to employ scientific, objective bases in drafting development plans and programs that achieve a high degree of planning efficiency. [passage omitted]

Developments in Planning Activity

[Al-'Aquli] The Planning Ministry has accomplished important achievements in the area of developing and improving the performance of its administrations and agencies, using modern techniques, and ensuring adequate, accurate information inputs for approved plans. What are the achievements made in these areas during the revolution's two decades?

[Faraj] The Planning Ministry's activities are intended to help achieve comprehensive, economic and social development through scientific, balanced plans based on: the optimal exploitation of financial, material, and human energies and abilities; monitoring of the implementation and evaluation of the results of plans; and participation that ensures the rapid, balanced development of the national economy.

Thus, the ministry devotes its main attention to activities related to drafting annual and long-range five-year plans,

monitoring activity, and studies that feed into plan preparation. Accordingly, the ministry strives to strengthen efforts aimed at adopting and drafting plans as precisely as possible. Therefore, it has sought to reinforce its organizations, agencies, centers, and bureaus with skilled, competent, technical cadres. It has also attempted to support the statistical effort that is handled by the Central Statistics agency, which includes activities related to gathering, classifying, and analyzing data; issuing informational and statistical publications concerning different economic and social activities in Iraq; and employing the most, up-to-date technological and scientific means in this field.

The ministry has also achieved much in the area of developing authorized Iraqi measurement criteria references and methods of verification [of weights and measures of capacity], the derivation and provision of Iraqi measurement standards, the improvement of productivity in state institutions and the private and mixed sectors through quality control, and the monitoring of the quality of domestic and imported goods and products by the Central Measurement and Quality Control Agency.

Regarding training in statistical and planning methods and administrative development, the ministry has drafted planning, economic, technical, administrative, and vocational studies related to: national development operations; administrative development; the preparation of competent planning cadres; the promotion of technical and administrative skills at different levels in all productive and service sectors; the strengthening and development of the scientific administration profession; efforts to prepare administrators and leadership professionals; the promotion of self-development to enable these professionals to keep pace with new theories being applied in administration, and to participate effectively in national development projects; and the formulation or improvement of operating methods in the productive and service sectors to ensure their increased production efficiency and optimal exploitation of available resources for developing indigenous capabilities to expand, develop, and entrench scientific and technical planning methods.

Regarding computers, the work of the National Computer Center has aimed to provide a computing capability in Iraq to support the needs of administrative, accounting, and engineering activity. The center also arranges consultations and provides computer services to different public and private bureaus so as to ensure good organization and prevent redundant operations. The center has been able to participate effectively in implementing many of the aforesaid activities.

Using all of its scientific and technical abilities, the Planning Ministry has sought to lay the clearest foundations for the achievement of the targeted development model. During the last two decades of the revolution, the development and planning process has been the focus of much concern and attention regarding both the planning and implementation of development plans and programs.

[Al-'Aqli] In recent years, the Planning Ministry has completed hundreds of economic and social studies through weekly seminars that it holds. What are the most important returns and benefits realized by the establishment of this positive tradition?

[Faraj] The Planning Ministry has used the principle of applying itself to development problems. This includes its distinguished activity in the area of drafting various reports and studies dealing with economic, social, administrative, and technical issues. These reports and studies serve planning and development processes in the country. In addition, there are studies and research reports that serve the purposes of the Planning Ministry's activity that relates primarily to the tasks of formulating development plans and programs based on an annual plan to prepare them. Development studies are considered primary foundations. The ministry devotes care and attention to them, because they are among the most important prerequisites of planning activity. These studies have helped to create suitable solutions to remedy numerous problems related to development in Iraq.

Coordination of Planning Efforts

[Al-'Aqli] Fruitful results have been achieved regarding cooperation and coordination in planning fields between the four countries making up the Arab Cooperation Council. What are the main facts regarding the agreements that these countries concluded on the coordination of planning efforts and activities?

[Faraj] The countries of the Arab Cooperation Council have made efforts to translate their agreements into implementation measures and measures to be applied to multiple levels and purviews. Meetings were held on the level of the member-countries' planning ministers, as well as on the level of technical agencies and centers in their respective planning ministries, in which vital, purposeful discussions were held to coordinate efforts and activities in the areas of statistical information exchanges, training, measurement, quality control, the use of computers, and the exchange of planning expertise. Many of these activities have actually been implemented.

[Al-'Aqli] Iraq authorized Arab Investments Law No. 46 of 1988 during an important time in the history of burgeoning relations on the national level, and amid increasing calls for the return of Arab capital to be invested inside the Arab world. What is your appraisal of the results achieved in the context of the application of this important law?

[Faraj] The Arab Investments Law includes many concessions and facilities that distinguish it from other investment laws. As is well known, Iraq embraces and protects Arab investors, because Arab investment activity represents common Arab ground for achieving joint Arab development. Despite the importance of this matter to Arab investors, we find that they still refrain from investing, because they do not have a sufficiently clear picture of investment fields in Iraq. Also, Arab investors continue to seek large, fast profits and investments outside

the Arab world, when investment opportunities are available in the Arab countries, including Iraq.

Planning and the 1990s

[Al-'Aqli] In the 1990s, which are filled with extreme changes and startling international developments, what are your predictions regarding the future role of planning? What will its contributions be in embracing possible changes and exploiting them to serve national development?

[Faraj] Planning is a scientific means, not an end. Even if international developments prompt the adoption of new, diverse planning methods and means, planning will remain an orderly, continuous process that guides the economic and social course. In recent years, Iraq has enjoyed serious and active attention to the development of the planning process and the deepening of its scientific and realistic dimensions. There has been an increase in intensive, sincere efforts to help achieve balanced development. These efforts have striven, and will strive, to employ all new factors to the advantage of development activity at different levels.

Housing and Construction Minister Discusses Future Plans

90AE0254A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
19 Jul 90 p 5

[Interview with Tahir Muhammad Hassun by Sina' Khalil al-Naqqash; place and date not specified]

[Excerpts] The Housing and Construction Ministry has provided outstanding services to the Iraqi citizen. It achieved notable progress after the revolution and has made a clear contribution to the housing and construction field.

The ministry has enjoyed the concern of the commander and his frequent tracking, which has greatly affected the development of the ministry's activities, especially in the time of victory and peace, and after the great administrative revolution led by President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God preserve him.

On the occasion of our ceremonies commemorating the July Revolution, we conducted this interview with Housing and Construction Minister Tahir Muhammad Hassun regarding the ministry's achievements in the time of the revolution and the significance of the human contribution that is translated daily into tireless programs of action.

Housing Units for Citizens

[Al-Naqqash] The minister begins by recounting the achievements accomplished in the time of the revolution:

[Hassun] The ministry took the initiative in developing modern methods for implementing housing projects and expediting their completion, such as the use of prefabricated buildings, expendable molds [qawalib nafaqiyah], and substitutes to cope with the scarcity of building

materials, such as bricks and other materials. The ministry also built factories to produce some building materials such as kashi [as published], blocks, iron lattice-work, and insulators. It has also used the method of direct implementation to carry out some projects assigned to it in addition to projects that do not fall into these specializations, such as two housing projects for citizens in al-Zayunah and al-Sayidiyah.

More than 51,500 housing units were constructed between 1968 and 1988.

Among the most important projects that the ministry has implemented in this field are:

1. Complex No. 10 at al-Salihyah, which includes 2,100 housing units with sufficient services.
2. Two housing projects in Saddam City, which include 1,630 housing units with services.
3. The Upper Euphrates housing project, which includes 2,200 housing units with services.
4. The Hayy al-Khalij housing project, which includes 527 housing units, of which 84 were built with prefabricated components.
5. The al-Batawin housing project.

In addition, many housing complexes were built in numerous governorates, including the governorates of Dahuk, Ninawa, Irbil, al-Ta'mim [formerly Kirkuk], al-Najaf, Wasit, Babil, Salah-al-Din, Dhi Qar, al-Basrah, Maysan, al-Qadisiyah, and Diyala.

Regarding service projects in the era of the party and the revolution, the ministry has taken broad steps to implement projects directly related to the provision of services to citizens, especially health projects. It has incorporated in its programs the planning and construction of advanced hospitals throughout the country.

Among the most important projects that it has implemented throughout the country are: the Medical City in all of its stages, including specialized, advanced hospitals considered the first of their type in the Middle East region; the construction of advanced 400-bed hospitals in the governorates' centers; the construction of 260-bed obstetrics and pediatrics hospitals in the governorates' centers; the Saddam Children's Hospital in Baghdad, Karkh, and al-Rasafah; the Ibn-al-Haytham Eye Hospital; the University of Baghdad in all of its phases; the cabinet building; the Transportation and Communications Ministry building; the Higher Education and Scientific Research Ministry building; the Finance Ministry building; the oil complex, which includes buildings of bureaux subordinate to the Oil Ministry; the large ceremonies arena; the al-Karkh water project; the two al-Karkh sewage treatment projects in al-Dawrah; the sewers of al-Rasafah in al-Rastamiyah along with the main sewage system; water projects in a number of governorates, including al-Sulaymaniyah, al-Diwaniyah, Karbala', and al-Fallujah; and the construction of technical institutes, agricultural institutes, advanced agricultural schools, numerous commercial schools, and

modern primary, intermediate, and secondary schools that were built using the prefabricated construction method.

Advanced Roads and Bridges

The minister pointed to the ministry's most recent important road and bridge projects, emphasizing the ministry's outstanding role in the implementation of strategic projects in the country. The ministry has come to have specialized cadres [malakat], modern construction equipment, and maintenance centers. It was able to establish the direct implementation process in the country, which greatly affected its speed in carrying out its duties regarding war effort activities on the eastern front. The ministry has built roads, defensive lines, and earth screens [sawatir]. The ministry built roads totalling 6,000 km in length, bridges with a total length of 8,675 meters, 42 gradient crossings with a combined length of 5 km, and earth screens and obstructions totalling 280 km in length.

The ministry implemented the first and second stages of the Saddam International Airport; the al-Basrah International Airport; the al-A'azamiyah and al-Sank bridges and their approaches; the al-Jadiriya Bridge and its approaches; the Great Saddam Bridge in al-Dawrah and its approaches with a length of 14 km; different bridges in the governorates, including in Kirkuk, al-Mawsil, Ba'qubah, and Samarra'; the Damascus square intersection; and the Abu-Gharib expressway with a length of 23 km.

[Al-Naqqash] Does this mean that roads and bridges have become an indicator of progress in the country?

[Hassun] Yes, the field of housing and construction was an indicator of progress in the era of the revolution. For example, there were only six bridges in Baghdad before the revolution, whereas in the time of the revolution, we built seven, new, advanced bridges whose workmanship and specifications are comparable to those of world bridges. Before 1968, there were 141 bridges in the country with a combined length of 17,495 meters, compared to 59,460 meters, the combined length of bridges in the revolution era until now.

[Al-Naqqash] Regarding consulting services, the minister states:

[Hassun] A national construction laboratories center was established in 1976 as the first governmental center specialized in building materials inspection, quality control, and soil testing for this and other ministries.

This center's activities have expanded greatly: In 1976, 20,000 tests were performed, compared to 690,000 in 1981. The number of excavation crews also increased from two crews in 1976 to 30 crews in 1982. In addition, the number of branch laboratories in the governorates has reached 60.

The National Engineering and Construction Consultations Center was attached to the ministry after having

been subordinated to the Planning Ministry. It engages in planning activities for important projects. Among the most important projects undertaken by the center are the cultural complex project, the oil complex project, the planning agencies project, and the silos.

The Idrisi Engineering Consultations Center was also introduced after the promulgation of the New Ministry Law in July 1987. The ministry commissioned this center to fulfill the same functions as the National Engineering Center, so as to open the door to competition for work. Among its most important works are the historical city of Babil, the Saddam Medical School, and the Saddam Law School. [passage omitted]

Race With Time

[Al-Naqqash] After our just war, you began a new work plan. What are the achievements accomplished in the time of victory and peace?

[Hassun] Our ministry's activity is great and visible, both in a time of war and in a time of victory and peace. The companies subordinate to our ministry carry out different types of construction contract works. As of the end of 1989, these companies were commissioned to perform 544 projects costing 1,569,788 thousand dinars. Of these projects, 244 have been completed through the workers' desire to perform their jobs and establish President Commander Saddam Husayn's program and directives as their daily work program.

One of the most important strategic projects that the ministry is currently implementing is the National Will Program. This program is a source of pride for Iraqi workmanship, and it is considered a challenge, inasmuch as Iraqi companies are completing a section of the al-Diwaniyah-al-Basrah expressway that a foreign company could not complete. Another strategic project is the al-Mawsil silo, which is located in the al-Wa'iliyah/Tall'afar District area. With a total area of 400 dunams, the capacity of this storage project in its first phase is 187,500 tons, and its capacity in its second phase is 112,500 tons annually. The total cost of the first phase is 23,477 thousand dinars, and that of the second phase is 11,500 thousand dinars. The implementation period of the first phase was 18 months, and that of the second phase was 12 months. Work on the first phase was begun on 1 January 1989 and completed on 30 May 1990. Work on the second phase was begun on 15 December 1989 and was completed on 15 December 1990. Another strategic project is the construction of 13 piers at the Umm-Qasr Port in al-Basrah.

Also, we must not forget the ministry's role in the campaign to develop al-Basrah, al-Faw, and al-Mawsil, which has taken place in the time of victory and peace. The Housing and Construction Ministry was among the first agencies to take up the implementation of its assigned task in these development campaigns. Its cadres [malakat] and machinery were in a race with time, in which they completed their tasks in record time, becoming regarded as a model to be imitated. They,

along with other building and construction workers, have proven that the Iraqis are as strong and heroic in peace as they are in war. In the campaign to develop the city of al-Basrah, our ministry carried out paving and surfacing [iksa'] works, extended curbs and sidewalks, erected platforms [in memory] of those killed in action and murals [jidariyat], built pedestrian and vehicle bridges, refurbished old bridges in the city, planted green areas, and erected shelters for buses—all of which it did in three months. In the campaign to rebuild the city of al-Fida' and the gateway of the great victory, al-Faw, the Housing and Construction Ministry built 24 buildings, including schools, governmental buildings, a playing field, an arena for ceremonies, a party headquarters, a headquarters for the popular army sector, and residential buildings. It carried out the work in four months. As for the building and development campaign for the city of al-Mawsil, our ministry participated in surfacing [iksa'], improving, and paving the main and secondary roads of the city; extending the drinking water and rain-water drainage networks; forestation; and sidewalk paving—all of which it completed in four months.

Large Projects

The Housing and Construction Ministry's accomplishments are many and gladdening, inasmuch as their goal is to serve the people and provide for their comfort.

[Al-Naqqash] What are the most outstanding large projects that the ministry has carried out to provide extensive services to citizens?

[Hassun] (smiling) The ministry strives to provide the best performance for the Iraqi citizen, who has given much to al-Qadisiyah, who has spared nothing for the fatherland, and who is appreciated by President Commander Saddam Husayn, who has placed the citizen in his heart and mind.

Regarding roads, Expressway No. 1 is a large project that provides extensive services to citizens, inasmuch as it links the Iraqi-Jordanian border and the Iraqi-Syrian border in the west with the Kuwaiti border and the Arab Gulf in the south. With a length of 1,200 km, it is considered a vital artery that links the cities of al-Rutbah, al-Ramadi, al-Fallujah, Baghdad, al-Hillah, al-Diwaniyah, al-Samarra', al-Nasiriyah, and al-Basrah. This expressway includes a large bridge that crosses the al-Tharthar, two large bridges that cross the Euphrates River in al-Ramadi and near al-Batha', and a drawbridge over the Shatt al-Basrah that features an automatically opening navigation opening.

Regarding housing, the al-Dawrah housing project is a large housing complex that provides services. It is planned to be an integrated housing quarter comprising 3,861 housing units in the al-Dawrah/Baghdad area on land with a public area of 544 dunams. The project entails the construction of residential buildings and the necessary services, such as internal road networks, parking places for cars, a sewage system, and telephone, electricity, and water services. This project was carried

out with the prefabricated method, which involves the production of concrete slabs in the al-Taji factory that are transported by vehicle to the site and installed by cranes, at which point the finishing work is done.

Other large projects serving citizens are the construction of 600 housing units at the oil complex at Bayji, the housing project for the paralyzed, and the al-Mawsil silo project.

Prominent Role for Companies

[Al-Naqqash] What are the important broad lines of your plan for the 1990s?

[Hassun] Due to the administrative revolution experienced by the country, which is led by President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God preserve him, the nature of our ministry's work has undergone a great change in which most of the ministry's supervisory apparatuses have been transformed into executive apparatuses that operate on a profit-and-loss basis. On that basis, our ministry is striving to deepen and stimulate the role of contracting companies and consulting centers to enable them to competitively implement executive and planning operations that had been contracted to foreign companies. It is also attempting to develop operations that match those of the developed countries in terms of reducing the time factor and improving quality. Approval has also been obtained to establish organizations subordinate to this ministry that operate abroad. This is being done because the extension of the activity of the ministry's organizations abroad can return many positive benefits and yields to our great Iraq from an informational, economic, and political standpoint. It also clearly demonstrates the scientific and technical progress achieved by Iraq in the era of the victorious commander, Saddam Husayn. At the same time, it is one of the goals decreed for the ministry's subordinate centers and companies under the laws by which they were established. Because movement in the aforesaid direction must rest on sound, correct foundations that ensure the continuation and continual growth of this process, the ministry has initiated the drafting of a working paper regarding foreign markets and gaining a foothold in them. The paper was discussed in detail with the organizations in coordination with the Iraqi Central Bank, which believes that the plan will help our ministry's planning and executive organizations compete with Arab and foreign organizations and that it will create many employment opportunities abroad.

In this connection, the Iraqi press has a prominent role in introducing, through newspapers or publications, the ministry's subordinate planning centers and executive companies in different fields, and in apprising representatives of Arab unions and federations of the activities of the aforesaid centers and companies.

[Al-Naqqash] What are the new approaches of the Housing and Construction Ministry regarding the contents of its activity?

[Hassun] The administrative revolution that occurred in the second half of 1987 led to a change in the ministry's system and the reorganization of this system based on a new structure that grants the ministry freedom of action and movement. This was done to increase and improve production and productivity, enhance performance, achieve the best use of economic and human resources, and to eliminate unnecessary links that adversely affect decisionmaking and the formulation of plans and solutions required for the work of the ministry.

The ministry has also employed the principle of self-financing and profit-sharing with affiliates, which gives them impetus and enthusiasm to perform tasks. The first signs of success in this experiment have appeared in the size of the tasks that the ministry and its organizations have been commissioned to implement, and the level of their performance in readjusting services in a balanced manner to enhance operating methods in the direction of the desired aim with enterprising effort that is in keeping with the goals of the revolution and the party under the auspices and directives of the president commander, may God preserve him. This effort is embodied by national development campaigns that transcend the traditional time framework for construction tasks, especially in our current period of transition to post-war construction. [passage omitted]

Breast Feeding Advocated During Blockade

90AE0349A

[Editorial Report] Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic on 23 August 1990 published an article on page 12 advocating breast feeding. The 400-word piece included brief interviews with physicians on the advantages of breast feeding and the proper procedures to use. The article opens with a two-paragraph call to mothers to breast feed if possible. In an apparent reference to difficulties related to the blockade, the article recommends that "In view of the circumstances under which we are currently living, in which we are asked to reconsider many of the pursuits in which we engage which fall under luxury, tradition, or sin, we must be more rational and informed in our daily lives." Breast feeding will also "lead to other medical advantages for their children," the article explains.

Escaped Soldier Interviewed

90P40140A

[Editorial Report] Istanbul GUNES in Turkish on 24 August 1990 published a report on page 16 by writer Sait Cek about an Iraqi soldier, Isma'il Ahmad, who escaped from Iraq into Turkey. Ahmad says that Saddam [Husayn] is "pushing the country into chaos," and that "everyone is looking forward to Saddam's fall."

The soldier, who asked the Turkish Government for asylum, made the following statement: "I have been serving in the army [of Iraq] for three, five years. I risked my life just to run away from Saddam's torture. Turkish

soldiers have treated me very kindly. Military service never ends in Iraq. Some soldiers have been serving for 13 years. Everyone is tired of Saddam's regime. He is a proud man but he is destroying people for his pride. This last incident [the Gulf crisis] has proven just that. Do not believe what you see on the TV. People are forced to cheer for Saddam. If they don't, they are thrown into prison."

Israeli Press Profiles Broadcasters

90P40133A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by Shafi Baba'i]

[Text] The man who reads Saddam Husayn's statements on Iraqi Television was nominated from among the ranks of Ministry of Information workers, who are under the control of the Iraqi Ba'th Party. He works as an emissary in the psychological war being waged by the Revolutionary Command Council. This is why his name is unknown.

Arab journalists following Iraqi television broadcasts do not recognize him as a professional broadcaster who appeared regularly on the TV screen. In their opinion, his confident, profound, serious, and arrogant broadcasting style is not exclusive. His is the accepted style of Iraqi television broadcasters.

Ordinarily, regular broadcasters appear on TV without moustaches, or with a thin moustache. However, broadcasters from the Ministry of Information are known by the thick, rectangular "Ba'thist moustaches," which identify them as Ba'thist officials.

An Arab journalist, who spent a long time in Iraq, relates that he remembers such broadcasters appearing for surprise visits on the Iraqi TV screen, turning to the Iraqi public, in times of crisis, such as the Iran-Iraq War. "I did not know them to be professional broadcasters or journalists, and I know all of the Iraqi journalists," he said. "The man who reads Saddam Husayn's speeches is about 30 years old and is from that same group of trusted, well-polished broadcasters."

In Iraq, there is an accepted system for reading presidential announcements, sometimes even entire speeches, because it is not appropriate for Saddam Husayn to appear on the television screen every day.

ISRAEL

Economics Adviser to Moda'i Profiled

90AE0226A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 17 Jul 90 pp 5, 10

[Article by Gid'on 'Eshet]

[Text] If Shlomo Ma'oz had been asked to serve as economic advisor to the previous finance minister,

Shim'on Peres, it is very reasonable to assume that he would have responded negatively. If there is a gut feeling that guides Ma'oz, now the economic advisor to the current finance minister, Yitzhaq Moda'i, it is resentment to what he calls "Israeli Bolshevism." Shlomo Ma'oz, 45, born in Iraq, has strong memories of those cadres. The government, the Histadrut [labor federation], the Jewish Agency all think that they know what is best for the citizen better than the citizen himself. Shim'on Peres and his party are the authentic representatives, in his view, of governmental paternalism, and Ma'oz would reject them; however his political outlook is closer to the "left" than to the "right." It is true that the Israel Workers Party [MAPAI] established the golem of the paternalistic cadres. But it is also true, according to Ma'oz, that the Likud eliminated them.

Not long ago, he was quoted as proposing the unilateral return of the Gaza Strip to its residents. His friends claim that, if he was ever caught voting Likud, it happened much before 1977. The feeling is that his position in the Shinuy camp is to the left of Peres and very much to left of Yitzhaq Moda'i.

However, Shlomo Ma'oz is not a political person. He lives and breaths economics. When he returned four years ago to the JERUSALEM POST, he requested and received a year off to study in London. In that same year, he completed his master's degree at the London School of Economics, an institution with a leftist leadership that influenced his outlook considerably.

The dominant figure there was Suzanne Strong, the author of "Capitalism as a Casino," a socio-economic essay whose gist is that the world financial casino finances the world money printer, the economy of the United States.

Just as the entire world moves to American economic music, so do individual states dance to the tune of the multinational companies, especially those of American origin. Against this backdrop, Ma'oz waged one of his greatest press campaigns against Intel, and its small prestigious subsidiary in Jerusalem.

It is well known that multinational companies seek to concentrate their revenues and earnings in countries with low tax rates. The problem is in identifying the process. In the Intel affair, Ma'oz came upon a big story: According to the law, Intel's Jerusalem subsidiary must pay a 25-percent tax on the royalties that it transfers to its parent company. In order to circumvent the tax, wrote Ma'oz, Intel signed an agreement with another subsidiary company in the Netherlands. Because, there is a covenant with the Netherlands to prevent double taxation, royalties can therefore be transferred to the Netherlands without having to pay taxes on them in Israel. In the same investigation, Ma'oz also disclosed several other practices that had been agreed between Intel and the Finance Ministry, and he showed that all of them were financed by the Israeli taxpayer. Ma'oz secretly hoped that Intel would sue him for libel. It is

said in the trade that he has documents that he would be happy to present in court. However, Intel did not sue, thus depriving him of that pleasure.

Although he loves to hate comprehensive companies, Ma'oz has never recommended closing Israel off to them. He maintains that it is necessary to learn to contend with them. It is forbidden, and also impossible, to flee from the world economy, even though it sits in the shadow of the world printer. However, the Americans, contrary to a prevalent in Israel, are not the correct model for us. If one must study a model, one should study small countries, especially in Europe, perhaps Denmark or the Netherlands. The wheel does not have to be invented again. One can learn, but one must do so with intelligence.

Intelligence was the central weapon that Ma'oz tried to use as an economic reporter for MABAT [television news], HA'ARETZ, THE JERUSALEM POST, and GLOBUS. He belongs to a small group of reporters in Jerusalem that, using intelligence and intuition, figured out the economic plans of Finance Ministry leaders.

He was among the first to understand that the bank shares were collapsing. He was the first to recommend to everyone, in July 1985, to quickly invest in shekels because of the high interest rate. He made this recommendation despite his personal opinion that the interest policy being followed then by the Bank of Israel would bring a major economic disaster upon us.

In the past three years, his treatment of the Bank of Israel has been the toughest of that of any reporter. It is no wonder that his appointment to the Finance Ministry was received with dread in the central bank. The difficulties presented by his appointment were not smoothed over even after his heart-to-heart talk with Mordekhai (Mama) Frankel, the right-hand man of the governor of the Bank of Israel. Today as well, Ma'oz thinks that the Bank of Israel is damaging the economy in the area of interest and inflation.

Regarding interest, Ma'oz has written: "It is true that the Bank of Israel seeks to lower interest and is doing something in this direction. However, it has failed to move with the necessary speed to lower the interest rate." The slow rate, according to Ma'oz, stems from a faulty understanding on the part of the banking system: This is not a free market, but a cartel. Increasing the money supply reduces interest in a free market, but increases bank profits under cartel conditions. With a cartel, one must go as with a cartel: With orders. Whoever does not do so, increases financial earnings at the expense of the productive sector.

Regarding inflation, Ma'oz has two central explanations to the question of why we became stuck with 18-percent inflation in a period of 10-percent unemployment. The first explanation inheres in the measurement method: If income tax is lowered and the property tax rate, for example is raised, the real net will not change, but

measurements will indicate an increase in prices, because property taxes are included in the measurement, whereas income tax is not.

The second explanation that Ma'oz gave inheres in the policy of the Bank of Israel: In order to lower interest, the bank increased the money supply. Interest declined a bit, but the money that was poured into the economy financed an increase in prices. In other words, the blame for inflation lies mainly with the Bank of Israel. When the government stopped printing money, the Bank of Israel assumed the task.

Some maintain that Moda'i appointed Ma'oz mainly because of his position on the monetary policy. This is the explanation given in the Bank of Israel to his appointment, which has contributed in no small way to the great chilling in relations between the Bank of Israel and the Finance Ministry, at least compared to Peres' tenure.

This is also perhaps the reason why Ma'oz (who was unemployed after he resigned from the JERUSALEM POST) previously received an offer to serve as advisor to another minister, Moshe Nisim. That offer was made during the political crisis that preceded the establishment of the current government, and Ma'oz, fearing that he would find himself unemployed again, refused the offer. Having been acceptable to Nisim also qualifies him to serve now in the sensitive position of coordinating between the two ministers, relations between whom are more frozen than the land at the south pole.

In the early 1980s, Ma'oz became acquainted with an extraordinary personality in our public administration, Ya'qir Plessner. Plessner was brought to Aridor's finance ministry on the advice of his director general, 'Ezra Sadan. Ma'oz and this man with unusual views developed a relation that transcends the normal relation between an economic reporter and a senior government official. Under Plessner's influence, Ma'oz sharpened his view of the inflationary process, and he was recruited to support dollarization. Ma'oz currently supports a fixed exchange rate, or at least a stable exchange rate.

Regarding inflation, Ma'oz has since, in addition to the increase in prices, become upset by the real sources that the economy has set aside to cope with inflation, i.e., the substantial expansion of the banking and financial intermediary system, which is composed of people who have in mind financial manipulations rather than productive work, and the distension of the accounting system and its ancillary professions. Ma'oz has called this phenomenon "false activity of the economy."

Ma'oz regards the vehicle tax as a classic example of such false activity. A high tax is assessed on private vehicles. Consequently, there is a high premium on vehicle insurance, the greater part of which is insurance tax. Wage-earners request and receive a return for expenses, part of which is a return of insurance tax, and part of which is a return of taxes. Income tax is assessed on this entire return.

Hundreds of clerks and computer hours are engaged in these circular dealings "which nonetheless do not produce a single highway or sewage pipe."

Therefore, Ma'oz's method would be to lower the tax on vehicles, and reduce insurance payments, reimbursements for expenses, and the tax. The system would not change. However, the "falsehood" would be shattered.

Ma'oz is also a great proponent of lowering taxes. According to his logic, the government collects and distributes too much money. If income tax is lowered, if the Interior Ministry's grants to the local authorities are lowered, and if property taxes are increased, the entire system would remain the same, except that the bureaucracy of the Interior Ministry would be reduced. However, when the Finance Ministry considered lowering taxes on the one hand and cancelling the children's allowances on the other, Ma'oz rebelled.

During the first month following his appointment, the new advisor seems to have maintained a low profile. One of the main topics in which he has nonetheless intervened is the debate over allowances for children and the elderly. As has been its custom in recent years, the Allocations Branch recommended another cut in the allowances. Ma'oz did not like this in the past, and would gore the Finance Ministry for mistreating the needy in press conferences.

Nor does he like it now. Several days ago, he told his friends in the Finance Ministry: "The determination of how much national insurance each child is to receive is acceptable to me, but I do not accept that you know how to distribute this money."

He recommended redistributing the allowance pie so that parents of a first-born and a second-born would also receive allowances, whereas others would perhaps receive less. In recent days, he has adopted a variation of the same topic: After the redistribution of the allowances to each child and elderly person, the allowances would be increased by 20 percent and taxed immediately, with a deduction at source at an identical rate. The result would be that the poor would receive the same amount, whereas the rich would receive much less, because of a high marginal tax.

One of the ways to damage the raptorial cadre so despicable to him is to reduce the money at its disposal. A reduction of taxes is not only necessary to prevent the flight of capital and people, but also to reduce bureaucratic excess on the back of the economy. "In the name of socialism and equality, they took advantage of the poor," Ma'oz was heard saying recently, because the poor person did indeed receive an allowance, but the senior official arranged for himself vehicle expenses, trips abroad, and administrators' insurance—all at our expense.

Last Friday, Shlomo Ma'oz was almost the only official at the Finance Ministry. He shows up each morning at 8:00 and leaves at 10:00 in the evening. Instead of

writing articles, he is now writing memorandums to the finance minister. Ma'oz may not be aware of the fact that most of his work is drudgery. Those who know him, discern in him, already at this early stage, a number of characteristics that are weaknesses in a senior official and that will make matters difficult for him in the future:

- He works too hard, too many hours, and on too many subjects. Whoever works too much finds it difficult to find free time to think. His tendency to work hard on a wide variety of subjects leaves him little time for his family and contemplation, which is certainly not a positive trend.
- Whoever deals with many subjects finds it difficult to identify the three main topics to which all consideration must be given. Yaqir Plessner was effective in the Finance Ministry not only because he had a doctorate in economics, but because he knew how to focus his efforts on one topic: Inflation.
- Ma'oz was tried by the trauma of unemployment for a half year. After he resigned from the JERUSALEM POST, he found it difficult to find work. Whoever has no employment alternative is liable to err by giving advice that will please those who receive it. Even in front of friends, Ma'oz has refrained from criticizing Moda'i. Based on his past views, for example, it is possible to understand that Moda'i's policy of appeasing the Histadrut is not to the liking of Ma'oz. Responding to the demands of the Histadrut bureaucracy would not give the workers a voice. Ma'oz was chosen to advise because of his unusual views.

The risk of unemployment must not spare Moda'i from Ma'oz's sharp tongue.

[Boxes on p 5]

On the Finance Ministry and the Press

"My greatest surprise in the Finance Ministry is the absence of surprises. As a journalist, I had excellent information about what is happening in the Finance Ministry. To date, I have not heard anything that I did not know before. The press deserves high marks for supplying information about the Finance Ministry."

On Lands and Administration

One of the state's most nerve-wracking bureaucracies is the Israel Lands Administration. Not long ago, Ma'oz asked a senior official in that administration why no more land for construction existed. The senior official responded: "The Housing Ministry has not managed to produce plans for the land in its possession." Ma'oz responded angrily: "That is your job!" He explained: "Unlike capital and labor, which can immigrate to California, the land remains here." Ma'oz would want the administration to flood the market with land to reduce the cost of apartments and to eliminate the officialdom that "supervises" the land.

On Banks and Cartels

Regarding one issue at least, Ma'oz approves of the Bank of Israel. While the M. I. Assets Company is seeking to sell the banks at a maximum price, Ma'oz thinks that it is more important to break up the banking system. As an old enemy of monopolies and cartels, Ma'oz maintains that transferring the ownership of the banks from the government to private hands will be futile. "The banks have to be broken up," he was heard saying, "to create competition in the financial market."

On Israeli-Produced Products

If we had chosen to be Albania, we would have been able to disregard the world at the cost of having to accept an Albanian standard of living. Once there is an opening to the world, we have no choice but to be like it. Therefore, the economy must expose itself to competition and be much more liberal.

The Barefoot Shoe-maker

Like several of his former colleagues, Ma'oz is more successful at policy analysis than taking care of himself and his family. About a year ago, he sold an apartment he owned, and he is now paying an exorbitant amount in rent. His salary, which is 20 percent less than what he was earning as the JERUSALEM POST's economic editor, is also not great.

Escalation of Intifadah Predicted

90AE0198C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
4 Jul 90 p 1B

[Article by Dan Rubenstein]

[Text] The notable increase in the number of attacks, especially in the Jerusalem area, and the detection of weapons smuggling from Jordan, confirm a prevalent feeling in the territories that something is changing in the atmosphere of the intifadah. It is becoming more violent. There are more fliers being issued by Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement], the Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine], which call for escalating the armed struggle. Slogans filling the streets of the cities and villages are now worded in more aggressive language, and incidents in the neighborhoods of Jerusalem are more severe than in the past. (East Talpiyot, Sur Bahir, Neve Ya'akov, Dahiyat al-Barid, and the incidents in Silwan and Abu-Tur).

About six weeks ago, a detonation charge exploded in the Mahane Yehuda Market in Jerusalem in response to the murders in Rish'on Letziyon. Faysal al-Husayni, a prominent supporter of 'Arafat in the territories, hastened to denounce the act. Such a denouncement has in recent years been routine on the part of political activists in the territories, and it seems that the broad Arab public supported them. This time, however, the response to the denouncement made by al-Husayni was different. His friends say that he himself was surprised by the large

number of people who turned to him in anger and said that it was forbidden for him to denounce the attack. Subsequently, after a detachment belonging to the Abu-'Abbas organization attempted to attack Israel's beaches, Faysal was wary and refrained from coming out clearly against the operation.

The feeling that the atmosphere in the territories is changing is also shared by key figures from East Jerusalem, who held a continuous hunger strike about a month ago in the offices of the International Red Cross in the Shaykh Jarah neighborhood. The masses came to identify with them, and many, particularly youths, demanded that they demonstrate more energetic activity. As supporters of the central current in the PLO, these figures, at the end of the hunger strike, made a sufficiently radical decision: To end all meetings and contacts with the Americans. Radwan Abu-'Ayyash, Sari Nusaybah, and others disclosed that their decision was received with cheering.

The public in the territories is indeed demanding an escalation of the struggle in all areas. Al-Husayni, who visited Washington some days ago (in the framework of his lecture tour with Ya'el Dayan), carefully adhered to the decision. Persons from the leadership of the American administration asked to meet with him, and he refused. Several weeks earlier, he would have happily responded to such requests. He now understands the heartfelt feelings in the territories and is acting according to them.

The feelings of bitterness and frustration in the territories that are impelling the intifadah to be more violent originate beyond the border, in the general atmosphere in the PLO and the Arab world. In the Palestinian and Arab view, Israeli policy has been dizzyingly successful in recent months. Substantial immigration from the Soviet Union, a renewal of relations with East European states and several African states—all these gains seemed imaginary even to us Israelis just a short time ago.

The crises in Israeli-U.S. relations do not seem especially serious to the Arabs. The dialogue with the PLO was suspended, and an American veto was imposed in the Security Council on the dispatch of a U.N. mission to the territories. Even regarding Israel's shaken relations and the European states, it seems that the situation is not so terrible, as anti-Israeli decisions and declarations by the common market states have been mixed with other phenomena as well. A day after the students of the 'Ateret Kohanim Yeshiva entered the Greek Orthodox hospice next to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, when everyone expected an angry Greek reaction, exactly the opposite occurred. The government of Greece decided (for other reasons of course) to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel and to open an embassy in Israel.

In view of all of that, what can the PLO and the Arab states do? Not much. The Arabs have lost their great economic power that served them well during the 1970s. The PLO's calls to the Arab states to return to a policy of

economic pressure on the United States were received this time with contempt. The Arab states are now subject to a series of difficult crises, including a crisis involving attempts at democratization that are destined to escalate. First attempts at quasi-free elections in Algeria and Jordan have advanced the Muslim fundamentalists.

What appears to Palestinians as a lack of Arab strength in the face of Israeli successes is what is pushing the PLO increasingly toward the inflexible positions of Saddam Husayn, the president of Iraq.

There is a thread that connects the popularity of Baghdad's policies among Palestinians with a trend toward extremism in the territories. The two phenomena are the result of frustration with a political course that has resulted in only Israeli successes. Perhaps that is why 'Arafat's close adviser, Bassam Abu-Sharif, announced last week that the PLO decided to escalate the struggle against the Israelis in the territories. He did not convey details regarding directives to plant detonation charges, but the atmosphere in the territories is compatible with such directives.

Those who can be satisfied with the new situation are the supporters of the whole land of Israel, who would constrain the political process. Their dark predictions of an Arab trend toward extremism, and of the intifadah's slide toward violent means, are becoming closer to reality. When the way to political negotiations is blocked, it is the bomb's and the rifle's turn to speak.

Israeli-Arab Aspirations for Autonomy

90AE0232A DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by Israel Landers]

[Text] Approximately five years ago, I heard about the idea of autonomy for the Arab minority in the State of Israel for the first time, from an Arab-Israeli intellectual. In great honesty, Dr. 'Adal Ma'na, from the Department of Islamic History of Hebrew University, explained to me that he cannot identify with a state whose symbols are Jewish. Therefore, it is not sufficient to do away with the social and administrative deprivation of the Arab citizens, in order to guarantee them the full equality which they deserve. His words implied that the inferiority of their status is a result of the Jewish character of the state and the Zionist ideology that guides it. If, in the distant future, the state does not change its name and its symbols (flag, symbol, national anthem) it will become necessary to think about autonomy for its Arab citizens.

When 'Adal Ma'na said this, the idea of autonomy was but a heartfelt dream, or a vocal contemplation by an Arab intellectual. Lately, it has become a topic for public debate and a declared goal of a future political struggle. In December 1989, the magazine "Al-'Arabi," which is published in Nazareth, printed an article by Dr. Sa'id Zidani and Dr. 'Azami Bashara on autonomy for the Arab citizens. The authors of the article, Israeli Arabs,

lecturers in the philosophy department of Bir Zeit University, "broke the taboo" on the issue and, since then, several conventions have been held in the Arab sector which have discussed this. Proponents of the idea are not sufficing in the struggle to realize their rights as citizens, but aspire to self-rule within the State of Israel to direct their own internal affairs. In an interview with Michal Sela'(Davar, June 22, 1990), Dr. Zidani said that he refers to autonomy "that contains, first of all, a territorial aspect, self-rule in all domains except for foreign and defense issues, and one Knesset. Everything else is separate."

It is hard to determine with certitude the degree of support for this idea among the Arab minority. But its ascent to a public debate and the great interest which it raises in Arab circles are among the signs of the accelerated Palestinization of the Arabs of Israel. During the first years of the state, when an Arab from the Galilee or from the triangle was asked who he was, he would respond: "I am an Arab-Israeli". In the mid-1980's, several experts on Arab affairs still estimated that Arab-Israeli nationalism was growing in the Arab sector, distinct from Palestinian nationalism. Today, there is no doubt about the strengthening of the Palestinian element in the national consciousness of the Arab citizen, who no longer identifies himself as an Arab Israeli. Dr. Alexander Blay, deputy adviser for Arab affairs, says that it is still possible to hear the expression Palestinian Israeli, but it too is disappearing. Today, all the Arabs from the west of the Jordan see themselves as members of one people, with a shared fate and a single mission—they are all Palestinians. On this background, it is worthwhile to examine the slogan of autonomy for the Arab citizens, which has recently been presented to us as an equitable formula of compromise of educated Arab moderates who seek to rectify the years long deprivation of the Arab minority in Israel.

We will be naive should we presume that the demand for autonomy is the final objective of its proponents. A few of them do speak of limited autonomy, personal rather than territorial, that would deal only in internal matters, such as education and sewage, and would not try to sever itself from the State of Israel. But it seems that this does not reflect the true intention of those who say it. And, even if they currently mean it, the trend of their activity and the course of events is sowing the ground for the growth of a separate political entity, with clear characteristics of irredenta, that will threaten the existence of the State of Israel. For many years the premise was widely accepted that the Arabs of Israel would come to terms with minority status in the state, as long as they were guaranteed true equal rights and a Palestinian state was established in the territories. People dealing with the subject say that this premise is deteriorating.

The process of the crystallization of the Palestinian identity of the Arabs of Israel began subsequent to the Six Day War, and accelerated in the 1970's and 1980's. Among other things, this process manifested in the organization of separate bodies for the leadership of the

Arab sector. In the beginning, these bodies purported to act toward the improvement of local and social services, but they rapidly widened the domains of their activity and started to lead a national political struggle. In 1974, the National Committee of the Heads of the Arab Councils was formed and, in 1975, the Committee for Protection of Arab Lands and the National Association of Arab Students organized. At the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981, there were two attempts to convene a congress of Israeli Arabs in Nazareth in order to form their national leadership. Prime Minister Menahem Begin, who was then also minister of defense, prevented the holding of these conventions by an administrative order. In spite of this, that was not sufficient to prevent the growth of a recognized national leadership. In October 1982, the Supreme Monitoring Committee was established. It includes the secretariat of the Committee of the Heads of the Local Arab Councils and the Arab members of the Knesset and the steering committee of the Histadrut. The name of the committee is likely to be misleading. It does not deal only in monitoring the provision of services to the Arab sector, but has gradually become a national political leadership whose authority is recognized by the Arabs of Israel. When it declared strike days in the Arab sector (and it has done so eight times since the outbreak of the intifadah), the response was almost complete. The monitoring committee acts toward aid for the Arabs of the territories and identification with their national struggle. Toward the equalization of services for Arab citizens to the level prevalent in the Jewish population, the committee established subcommittees for education, health, and other matters. These operate like small scale ministries. The activists of these committees claim that they have no political intentions and that their only goal is to guarantee equality for the Arab sector within the domain of the sovereign State of Israel. They can claim this from here until further notice. Actually, all of these bodies serve as an infrastructure for a parallel system of government. We know well what the tools and frameworks are for a state on the way. We have seen that show before they did and have even played a leading role.

The decisions of the education committee are indicative of the far-reaching intentions of the separate organization. These call to change the content of studies in the educational system of the Arab sector in order to develop Palestinian identity. For example, the ministry of education determined that 1990 would be the year of the Hebrew language and, out of consideration for the Arab sector, it was decided that in its educational system it would be the year of the Hebrew language and the Arabic language. A national minority who sees itself as part of the state in which it resides would not find fault with a decision that emphasizes the importance of the language of the majority, which is one of the official languages of the state. However, the Monitoring Committee for Educational Affairs in the Arab sector decided upon the year of the Arabic language only. This committee also seeks to change the perspective of the instruction of history in the Arab schools. The war of 1948 will be portrayed as the

Holocaust of the Palestinians, and one can imagine how the teachers will explain Zionism and Jewish settlement in Israel. When these are the contents of study and this is the spirit that will guide their designers, it is clear what generations of citizens will grow up there. The education that will form their personalities certainly will not encourage them to become integrated in the State of Israel.

On the other hand, it is possible to claim that many Arab citizens, and perhaps the majority, wished to become integrated in the life of the state, but the gates were closed before them. They were discriminated against in the allocation of resources, employment, education, and other social and welfare services. It was because they failed in their struggle to eliminate discrimination that the idea of autonomy was raised as a means of improving the status of the Arab sector. The claim of deprivation of the Arab minority is an accurate one, and it is likely that if infuriating manifestations of discrimination were promptly eliminated, it would be possible to slow the process of Palestinization. It is largely doubtful whether it would be possible to curb it entirely. Shmuel Toledano, who was the advisor for Arab affairs, once estimated that it is possible to eliminate or to reduce only a small portion of the elements of friction between Jews and Arabs. Sixty percent of these factors derive, according to him, from objective circumstances that we are not capable of changing. The culpability for discrimination does not lay entirely with the Jews. The standard of living in the Arab villages was lower than that of the Jewish population even prior to the establishment of the state. The Arabs fought with all the means available to them against Jewish immigration and settlement; when the state was established, they went to war in order to destroy it. Was it possible to expect that immediately following the termination of the battles the state would relate to its enemies of yesterday as if they were loyal citizens? Was there not a reasonable basis for fear that they would not accept their defeat and try to undermine the Jewish rule? And when masses of refugees streamed to Israel from the extermination camps, along with the immigrants from the Islamic countries, was it not incumbent upon the young state to devote the majority of its meager resources to the absorption of immigration, rather than the advancement of the Arab sector?

Indeed, the state should have acted earlier and at a more rapid pace in order to equate the level of services in the Arab sector to those provided to Jewish settlements. But he who struggles for equal rights is not exempt from equal obligations. As known, the Arab citizens until this day do not fulfill the most difficult and dangerous obligation imposed upon the citizens of Israel: military service and the willingness to fight for the defense of the homeland. From this perspective, the Arab minority in Israel cannot be equated with the Jewish minorities that suffered deprivation in the Western countries. The Jews wanted to become integrated in the non-Jewish society and took all of the obligations of citizenship upon themselves. They were inducted into the army and sometimes were even killed in their war against enemy armies,

in which their brothers served, as Tchernikovsky so aptly described in "Between the Straits." This is not the case for the Arab citizens in Israel. It is possible to understand their natural distress and their inability to fight against their brothers. But this does not change the fact that their integration has always been on a limited basis. They sought to be members of a club without paying the full dues. Professor Yoav Gelber termed them "Palestinians deluxe," who do not pay the price of being Palestinians, and "Israelis deluxe," who do not pay the price of being Israelis (Ha'aretz, June 15, 1990).

The claims of deprivation, particularly when they are just, need not disguise the real intention of those who request autonomy. They will not be happy, even if all of the manifestations of discrimination are eliminated, because this will not satisfy their national aspirations. They want to hold the stick by both ends. On the one hand, they are Israeli citizens and, therefore, demand full personal, social, and political rights. On the other hand, they are members of the Palestinian people and, therefore, are entitled, in their opinion, to self-rule that will express their national distinctiveness. Dr. Zidani even speaks of civil revolt and lengthy strikes to achieve the goal, and the Monitoring Committee for Educational Affairs decided to turn to representatives of foreign countries and international organizations hostile to Israel in order to mobilize their support for the struggle. The seekers of autonomy still do not represent the majority of the Arab public, but there are grounds to the fear that they are the pioneers before the camp. Autonomy will not be their final stop. They will still speak of the right to self-determination, and the annexation of the Galilee and the triangle, where the majority of the residents are Palestinians, to a Palestinian state. Ultimately, we will have to struggle for Jewish autonomy within the great Palestinian state throughout the entire land of Israel.

It is possible to understand why several Arab spokesmen have raised the idea of autonomy on the agenda, as it serves their national goals. It is more difficult to understand why a reaction of unequivocal rejection has not been heard from the Israeli side. Instead, the idea of autonomy is presented not as a dangerous threat to the State of Israel, but as a possible outlet for the distress of the Arab minority. As long as the Arab citizens are struggling for equal rights out of willingness to bear obligations, including military service (it is possible to agree to an transition period of national service), their struggle is deserving of support. (Certainly full equality must be guaranteed immediately for the Druze and Bedouins who serve in the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces].) When they do not suffice in this and speak of autonomy and of the need to change the Jewish character of the state, the requisite answer is: there is a limit. The right of the Jewish people to a Jewish state is no less than the right of the Arab nations to countries with a clear Arab character, with the title "Arab" as part of their official names, and with the crescent moon flying on their flags. The State of Israel will not change its character and will

not commit suicide in order to placate its resident minority. It will continue to be a Zionist, Jewish state, the homeland of Jews throughout the world, and its flag will be blue and white with a star of David in its center.

Moledet Publicizes Transfer Policy

90AE0291A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Weekend Supplement)
in Hebrew 24 Aug 90 pp 10-12, 42

[Interview with Rehav'am Ze'evi, head of the Moledet Party by Michael Capra; date, place not given]

[Text] Where are our troops, Gandhi asks, combing the area with his eyes? The troops, it turns out, are slowly spreading out from the parking lot of the commercial center in Lod, and Gandhi is losing patience. There they are. Nice. Gandhi demands full attention and briefs them. "Pay attention," Gandhi tells the troops standing at the ready: "We will walk together, even if that wastes manpower. 2. We don't hand out newspapers to Arabs. 3. We don't enter into provocations; remember this is a mixed town. Is that clear?"

The troops, two teen-age girls, a skinny boy wearing a skullcap, a less skinny boy without a skullcap, Ya'el Ze'evi, Gandhi's wife, in a broad-rimmed straw hat, and the General Director of the movement Beni ben Tzur, nod their heads and move out with piles of Moledet newspapers called, for some reason, in party slang "The Air Force."

The air campaign has not yet begun and there is already a casualty. Beni ben Tzur, who took a pocket knife out of his pocket to cut the string holding the piles of newspapers, cut his finger. Blood gushes out and, since he has no other choice, ben Tzur retires from the fray and stays in the car.

It's the month of August. It's very hot. Gandhi walks in front. Big steps, American sneakers. His wife Ya'el, who is also used to commercial center sidewalks, chose comfortable sandals. There is a drill. "Run out and give a newspaper to that lady there," he occasionally orders.

Suddenly there is a shout: "Gindi, Gindi." Gindi-Gandhi, what difference does it make, stops. "You are a big man," the man with the poor memory for names announces and embraces the chairman of the Moledet movement with a bear hug. Gandhi, also in an unrestrained motion, strokes the stubble of his admirer's beard. Why don't you shave, he chastises him, as an officer would admonish a soldier, "The end will be that your wife will trade you in for a brush."

Gandhi, it seems, displays unusual sensitivity to the dress habits and esthetics of the residents of Lod. After the activity of stroking the stubble of the citizen admirer, he takes time out to improve the appearance of a female soldier whose blouse has slipped down exposing the strap of her bra. Gandhi firmly pulls her blouse back into place. The shock of the foreign contact was only the first stage. At the next stage he announces to the aghast

soldier in an unequivocal tone that she cannot walk around in so slovenly a way when she represents him and the people of Israel. That female representative, it seems, is having a hard time digesting the magnitude of her mission and shows clear signs of being about to faint.

MK Rehobo'am Ze'evi, nicknamed Gandhi—a nickname he would give up with a sweep of the hand considering the thin, pacifist, in his opinion, tasteless, Indian association—moves out with impressive energy to conquer the Israeli street, armed with the transfer solution. "Two years ago," he says, "'transfer' was a dirty word, while today there are even people in other parties who say it is the only solution." Gandhi waves the rehabilitation of the concept as proof of his party's accomplishment. And the street in Lod, for example, does not deny it. "Well, when are we getting rid of them already," one impatient woman asks him seriously?

His party activists who are less educated about the language of politics explain that the goal now is the markets. "We are trying to reach all the markets," a movement spokesman says. "The market in Jaffa, the Carmel market, Hatikva market, everywhere we feel our message is heard."

Gandhi is less satisfied with the exposure of the market strategy.

[Michael Capra] Why precisely the markets?

[Gandhi] Because there you meet the people, he says innocently. I also go to department stores, soccer games and the beach.

[Capra] How do you explain the growing popularity of the transfer solution?

[Gandhi] With two thousand years of persecution, riots and pogroms, the Jewish people have developed survival genes. Everyone has those genes, not just the academics but also the simple man in the market place. Those genes say that in order to survive we have to have transfer, which is the only solution.

[Capra] Do you think the man in the street understands your philosophy of transfer?

[Gandhi] It is true that they don't understand all the implications of my transfer philosophy with its subcategories and difficulties, but they know in their hearts it is right.

[Capra] When exactly did you espouse the idea of transfer?

[Gandhi] Gandhi laughs at the ignorance. "The idea began with the matriarch Sarah who told Abraham our Father to take the stranger and Ishmael and get rid of them."

[Capra] But when did the political solution gel with you?

[Gandhi] The day I insisted on it.

[Capra] When did you insist on it?

[Gandhi] In the days of the youth movement.

[Capra] You supported transfer back then?

[Gandhi] Of course. Berl Katnelson, the teacher of that generation, preached it and the generation of Ben Gurion preached it. For a time even the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] carried out transfer, and that was a much stricter transfer, forced transfer.

Thus, driven by the energy of matriarch Sarah's envy, the teaching of Berl Katnelson, a personal interpretation of the political philosophy of Ben Gurion and the braying of the street for a quick, forceful solution, Gandhi began to gather political confidence. So much so that when he sat down with the Prime Minister for the coalition negotiation, he told him the day would come when they would change places. He would be in his shoes, and vice versa.

[Capra] You told him that?

[Gandhi] I don't say anything I don't believe.

A shout: "Hey, Gandhi." A taxi driver excitedly approaches the "transfer man" and begins recounting his woes. It goes like this: "Arabs from Gaza come here and take our work away. Nothing is left. Once we would pick up people from the street, today the Arabs do it. We can't go on like this." The taxi drivers gather round and lead Gandhi respectfully to the taxi station booth. Gandhi listens, nods his head and says in frozen silence: "If I were in your place, I wouldn't allow this to happen."

Across the street an excited woman runs toward him, really bending under the burden of complaints against Arab restaurants that are taking away her livelihood. Why do all the Jews go to eat by the Arabs? Gandhi, as befits an advisor for Arab affairs, is all ears, nods his head as a sign of understanding and sadness and tries to enlist the group with genes like his into Moledet.

On the radio they announce the death of the Arab whose car was attacked with stones by Israeli rioters in the disorders in Jerusalem, after the murder of the two boys.

[Capra] Should they be brought to trial?

[Gandhi] In my opinion they won't be able to prove who threw the stone that killed that Arab. How can you prove it? It is impossible to prove that a specific stone killed him. It would be a case the state would lose. In order to prove murder, you need proof, and it is not worthwhile for the prosecutor to lose a case.

[Capra] In other words, you have to get back to business as usual?

[Gandhi] I don't have precise information and I don't want to give an irresponsible opinion, but maybe they could be brought to trial for illegal assembly. Not for

murder. In order to prove murder, you have to have proof, and it is not worthwhile for the prosecutor to lose the case.

Such lack of confidence in the ability of the police shows who conditioned his participation in the Likud government on the job of Minister of Police.

[Capra] If you were Minister of Police, how would you behave with the rioters in Jerusalem?

[Gandhi] If I were the Minister of Police, it wouldn't come to riots because they wouldn't kill Jews in Jerusalem. There wouldn't be terror anywhere in the Land of Israel. At the time of the incident, the present minister was abroad.

[Capra] How would you prevent someone from kidnapping two boys and murdering them?

[Gandhi] I come with receipts. I am not a braggart, in the army I already proved that I can prevent terror. There was no terror around me.

[Capra] Maybe you could explain how?

[Gandhi] I have no intention of revealing how in the press since I would thereby be selling the information for free to the enemy.

A car pulls up. Gandhi stands alongside it, sticks his head in the window and just like that there are already two newspapers inside. "You are big, you are big," yells a Vespa owner, who almost overturns from excitement. They get to the supermarket. "Go in with them," he tells the girls, "at the supermarket they don't like you to distribute newspapers." Gandhi is already in a brassiere shop. A young woman looking over a black muslin bra is astonished to see him walking in with sure steps, a bra in one hand, a Moledet newspaper in the other. You get the impression that Gandhi is not flustered by graceful lines of women. "We have to save the motherland," he will sigh later in his office. "I have no political ambition, but somebody has to save the country." On the way to saving the country, what can you do, there is no choice but to ford a pile of brassieres.

They go back to the street. A dark-skinned young man arrives on the other side. Now how can you tell if he is an Arab or a Jew? Gandhi hesitates. Tension. To give him or not to give him a newspaper? Whoops, no. He didn't give him a paper.

Gandhi's hatred of the media is boundless. Had his advisors not gone to the trouble of explaining the importance of press exposure to him, he would have kicked the female reporter across from him at least five times during the course of the conversation. Once he even banged his hand on the table and shouted: Either you apologize or the interview is over. Why to such extremes? He said: "In our great stupidity we hand out unemployment compensation to youngsters whose place of work is taken by an Arab from Bethlehem or Gaza." I said: That is cheap demagoguery. In any case there was

no apology and the interview did not end. Perhaps in order to calm himself and erase the media fata morgana sitting in front of him, he chose to announce that all his efforts were now directed at persuading me of his views. Period.

The topic—how Arabs take over Jewish work places—turned up, to his great regret, in the incident of his son Palmah, the director of a factory that dismissed a female Jewish employee when the latter refused to sit next to a female Arab worker. "Look," the father explains, "my son appealed to all the unemployed, but they don't want to work; they would rather get destructive unemployment compensation. Therefore, having no choice, he hired Arabs from the Zuwayb tribe, who have been our friends since before independence. He took only them as workers. Yes, it is true that they live closest to the plant. Then they come in and tell my son there had been a scene where a female Jewish worker expressed disgust and unwillingness to sit next to an Arab woman in the dining room. The son Palmah did what his father would have done. He called her and gave her the opportunity to get off her high horse and apologize. But she vehemently repeated her racist remarks, and then my son told her to leave. When they asked him how he, Gandhi's son, could do that, he told them that's how his father taught him to behave.

Lod, it turns out, does not live up to expectations. The commercial center does not have a lot of people. Maybe we should go to Ramle, his wife Ya'el suggests. Gandhi sighs. That's not good, he says. We decided to hit Lod today, and we are not standing firm in our mission. In the end he is persuaded to go to Ramle. They travel. They stop. Where else if not the market. Where are our troops, he asks again, and calls for a second quick briefing. They enter the market. Hey Gandhi, they call to him, come, come here, we'll give you some Uzis. Gandhi says no, no, no with his hand. A day worker carrying three egg crates pushes toward him. "With so many eggs [a pun on 'balls' in Hebrew], you should join Moledet," he tells him and places a newspaper on the round symbols of power.

"Well, let's go, chase them out, chase them out," a homeowner urges Gandhi. Not "chase out" but "take out," Gandhi chides him in a fatherly tone. "That guy's from Likud," an Arab worker asks his friend? "He's worse," explains the friend.

They go into the Fellow Cafe. Table upon table with card players sitting around them. The poker game demands maximum attention and Gandhi's greetings are distracting. "What's his cut," a nervous card player asks? "Shhh," the shop owner tells him. "What's the matter with you, show some respect."

"In our own way we pursue peace," Gandhi stresses. "Isn't it a fact that when you came in, what did I tell you? I told you Shalom." Iron-clad logic. Peace a-la-Gandhi is the term that forms the basis of the Moledet slogan: "We are here, they are there and PEACE be to Israel."

In short, transfer. He has several basic premises: First premise. "Of the fact that there is a serious demographic problem by which the Jews and Arabs are marching toward balance in the year 2,000, there can be no doubt. True, the immigration from the USSR has slowed the process down, but the fact that they will be the majority is axiomatic. We have not paid a price in blood for this to become the 23rd Arab state. They won't defeat us with the intifadah, but with the 'Babyfadah,' they will."

"I once went to the town of Rahat and came to the home of one Arab who was married to six wives and had 60 children. Every year he would go to Gaza and bring back a new wife. We support him, give him childbirth grants, national insurance, and with 60 children he is a wealthy man. Afterward we went to the house of another Arab and found he had 9 wives and 76 children, and who did he get money from? From the Jewish state. Not only that, we also build them schools and day care centers, and afterward they get subsidized for the universities because they come from families blessed with children."

[Capra] Don't you have any ethical problem with the transfer solution?

[Gandhi] Ethical? Nothing under the heavens is more ethical than giving the Jewish people a homeland of its own without partners. I am not causing genocide to another people. I am doing everything within the framework of Jewish ethics.

[Capra] What is "Jewish ethics?" There is ethics and there is ethics.

[Gandhi] No. The ethics of the Germans is different from the ethics of the Jews. With us it is "Love thy neighbor as thyself."

[Capra] So that's how you love your Arab neighbor?

[Gandhi] The term "neighbor" only applies to my own countrymen. Look, this morning I put up a 10,000 shekel bond for a friend. When they asked me why, I said that's the way it is among friends, comrades in arms. That is ethics. Mutual liability. Your "neighbor" means a member of the Jewish people.

[Capra] We have never heard you condemn Rabbi Kahane.

[Gandhi] Right. I also didn't condemn MK's Dudi Tzuqer and Darawishah. I have more manners and debate breeding than all the MK's put together.

[Capra] What do you think about Kahane?

[Gandhi] I don't know the man. I ran into him once at a TV station in New York. It was just a few minutes total. That's as far as I know him.

[Capra] I don't mean the man, but his views, his activities.

[Gandhi] Did you ever see us doing things like that? We don't. Why do I have to condemn him? We are a

cultured, solid movement. You never heard us going around yelling "Death to the Arabs." I know we are going to lose votes because of that, but we are not that kind of people.

[Capra] What's your definition of racism?

[Gandhi] They once wrote in the paper that I was a racist. I ran to the 'Even Shoshan dictionary and read that racism is the view that the peoples of the world are divided into a prestige race, a race of lords, and other lesser races. If that is the agreed upon definition, then it does not apply to me. So anyone who calls me a racist has to explain what he means. I do more for the Arabs than all of Mapam put together. But for those Arabs who deserve it. Arabs who are loyal to the country. There is even a street named after me in an Arab village in the Galilee.

Two weeks ago there was a dinner at the Knesset in which MK Hasan Fars of Acre also participated. He didn't feel well. All of the participants passed him by, including the Arab MK's, and no one felt they had to take care of him. I took him to the hotel in my car with my wife driving behind me and waited for the Knesset doctor to arrive. And, yes, he says with a sigh, I know that will also cost me votes.

Here is Gandhi's explanation of transfer. "There are three kinds of transfer: transfer by agreement, voluntary transfer and forced transfer. My movement and I recommended the first two. Transfer by agreement is carried out between governments when the people don't necessarily agree. We saw examples of that between Turkey and Greece, where three million people were transferred against their will. It is natural that a person would not want to leave his home and land, but governments have to have a broad view, national and regional. Another example: We decided on transfer by agreement between Begin and Sadat. For peace Begin carried out transfer for two cities—Yamit and 'Ofira and 14 settlements. That is the kind of transfer we are recommending.

The second kind of transfer is voluntary; i.e., the individual decides to emigrate voluntarily for all kinds of reasons, like the Israeli who travels to Los Angeles; and we can be a catalyst in that process. The third kind of transfer is expulsion, and that we don't recommend. But look at how whenever they talk about transfer on the news on TV, they always put up slides of a truck. Maybe it will be a Cadillac?

[Capra] Of those that you mentioned, it is precisely the first two kinds that are not the most practical.

[Gandhi] Look, what is practical? All of Zionism is impractical. When Ben Gurion declared the state, they told him not to declare it because the time was not right. But he declared it and the state came into being. The War of Independence was also impractical. We were a barefoot army against divisions. But we believed and we therefore won that impractical war. The development of

agriculture was also impractical. But with the help of belief and Jewish talent everything is practical.

[Capra] That is to say, you only need belief?

[Gandhi] Well, I won't lie and say that today there is a leader ready to discuss agreed upon transfer with us, but what other Zionist program are they willing to discuss? The Labor program? The Labor program is an illusion. My program provides a solution. Maybe a week from now and maybe 40 years from now an Arab leader will come to talk peace with us, and we will tell him to take them. They are talented, reliable manpower; it will give the Palestinians a homeland.

[Capra] A homeland?

[Gandhi] Yes, the real land of their fathers. Someone who is born in Jordan and goes to Kuwait, that's the same thing. The Arab leader will understand that the Middle East under conditions of peace can flourish and prosper because it has everything. There is sun and there is Jewish technology, and together that make a Garden of Eden, one of the prettiest in the world. The rulers of the Arab peoples will one day understand the happiness and blessing implicit in Jewish existence.

[Capra] What will you give them in exchange besides happiness in Jewish existence?

[Gandhi] We are already giving up three-fourths of the Land of Israel, the patrimony of Menasseh, Gad and Reuben. Weren't they legitimate sons of our nation?

Gandhi is also a big believer in voluntary transfer. When you read closely between the lines, you actually find an elegant expulsion, what is not recommended. "Before the Six Day War, at the end of the period of Husayn's rule in Judaea and Samaria, the dimensions of Palestinian emigration to Arab countries got as high as 600,000 per year. Why did they emigrate? Where was the contagion? Husayn was a smart ruler. He did not allow them to set up universities, while we have established six universities and 10 colleges in which they study hatred of Zion. Husayn didn't allow them to set up industry, while we supply them labor. If we take what I call the 'negative magnet' approach, we can match those accomplishment and perhaps even triple them. There won't be universities, and we won't encourage industry or supply labor to all the Arabs and that way they won't kidnap our children.

[Capra] And what about the Israeli Arabs?

[Gandhi] In order to have the rights of citizens, they have to fulfill all the obligations. That is the condition. They don't serve in the IDF, they don't pay full taxes, they don't build according to code and they thereby destroy the landscape of the motherland. In order to be citizens with equal rights, they have to fulfill all the obligations. If not, they will only be residents, and then they won't get driving permits or go to the universities or vote in elections. Most of them won't accept my version and will have to draw certain conclusions. Either they

will accept residency status or they will voluntarily emigrate. I, for example, without a driver's license, would not stay here.

[Capra] Could you finally clarify for us whether you did or did not say that one Jew is worth a thousand Arabs?

Gandhi fidgets. "Why do we have to go over that again." He shifts. "Look, how does that become an issue?" He moves. "How they stick to me," and almost spits at the media. In that incident he accused the TV network VisNews of recording him saying that sentence while counterfeiting his voice and inserting the word "equal"—a serious charge without precedent. Then, a little while later, it was learned that he made an apology to Yosi Sarid and the TV network. So?

"Darawishah was giving a speech in the Knesset and talked about the victims of the intifadah, and I called out to him 'What about the Jewish victims?' and he answered 'There aren't any,' and I said 'There sure are' and then shouted 'Every Jew is a thousand Arabs.' The entire media jumped on me and claimed I said the word 'equal.'"

[Capra] Did you say "equal?"

[Gandhi] No.

[Capra] Then why did you apologize and not even ask for an investigation?

[Gandhi] I had to go abroad, so I said "Let's get it over with," and in my announcement I sought to clarify that if the concept "A Jew is equal to a thousand Arabs" escaped my lips, it was null and void.

[Capra] So you yielded?

[Gandhi] If I had held out and stayed, I would have proved it.

The Ministry of Police was Gandhi's preferred position in the coalition negotiation, but he did not rule out accepting the Education portfolio.

[Capra] Let's say you are Minister of Education. Well?

[Gandhi] Education has to undergo a revolution in order that three topics become the main focus: 1. The Torah of Israel, 2. The history of the people of Israel and 3. Homeland studies. Only the integration of those three will get us a good Jew and a loyal Israeli. My generation got a better education than my son's did, and a year ago I read that Bible studies were reduced. That is a scandal. And with homeland studies, there isn't even anything to talk about. Today in geography they learn about the monsoons and the North Pole. In Israeli schools they know the Pythagorean theorem and cosines and Shakespeare as well as they do in Western schools, but they know nothing about our homeland. There are no roots.

Gandhi is also dissatisfied in particular with the national anthem 'Hatikvah.' "They should change it," he sighs.

"Neither the melody nor the lyrics express the Zionist revolution, but 'Hatiquvah' was sanctified in ceremonies in Auschwitz and in the capture of the Hermon so it has become holy and untouchable. A national anthem is a symbol, and we educate by symbols."

[Capra] What bothers you about it?

[Gandhi] The melody is not Israeli and the words—forgive me, Naftali Hertz 'Imber was not exactly the national poet—there are stronger words and ideas. Much stronger.

Government Charged With Ignoring Minorities

90AE0277A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
24 Jul 90 p 7

[Article by 'Avner Regev]

[Text] The position of Minister of Minority Affairs has been left unfilled in the new government. Minister 'Olmert moved to Health and left behind him an advisor on Arab Affairs. For the last month the advisor has been working without an appointed minister and is subordinate, to some degree, to the Prime Minister.

For the first time since 1984 there is no minister responsible for the Arab population. The advisor, 'Eli'ezer Tzafrir, has really been working without guidelines. His independence results from the fact that the Prime Minister is occupied with other matters. Tzafrir sees the essence of his function as an attempt to coordinate government activities in the Arab sector, especially in the area of infrastructure development, and not as a policy maker and implementer. Successful coordination between government ministries is a result of good will shown or not shown by the various ministries involved.

It is clear to all now involved in the issue that the status of the present advisor represents a downgrading from the status of those who served in the past as advisors without ministers above them. Those who held the position in the past initiated and pushed through their own ideas and in several instances even got to see the results.

The Prime Minister would do well to consider that and look into the change in mission of the advisor for Arab affairs. It would also be worthwhile to look into the possibility of setting up a coordinating body instead of that office. The job as presently set up requires substantive change to meet the demands of the 90's. Coordinating activity in the Arab sector would give the job equal status with the coordinator for activities in the territories and the coordinator for activities in southern Lebanon. The person in the job is also important, and it would be nice if it were a government person. The advisor should be someone with authority for decision making and implementation, and that means broader authority than the advisor has today.

A Person of Authority

The status of the coordinator of activities in the Arab sector has to be equal to that of those holding senior implementation jobs, so as not to be beholden to the good will and readiness to cooperate of the various ministries. He should have the authority to decide upon budget allocations, contacts and consultations with politicians and upon the implementation of policy requested by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. That way he will also be able to influence government positions in his area.

The present advisor does not see his job as leading to a change in policy, and he accepts the government course. The latter merely continues the previous policy in everything having to do with the Arab sector. Minister 'Olmert's papers, which deal exclusively with municipal matters in the Arab sector, serve as the advisor's guide, and he has no intention of deviating from them in the direction of substantive issues in the political-diplomatic arena.

Today these issues do not appear on the advisor's table, and that is the root of the problem. Despite the importance of the municipal question, it is pushed aside today because it is impossible to ignore the burning political questions. The attempt to view everything through the periscope of the municipal problem only exacerbates the misunderstanding between the establishment and the Arab population.

Disconnect and Disregard

The present government continues the course of its predecessors in disregarding the heads of the Arab community and its organizations. 'Eli'ezer Tzafrir, the advisor, avers that he does not intend to consult with them as community leaders, but rather according to their specific functions (council heads, Knesset members, etc.). By so doing, a disconnection is created between the implementation echelon in the establishment and the Arab leadership. Tzafrir recognizes the fact that the Arab leadership has not violated any law or accepted norm of behavior in any of its activities thus far, but despite that he does not think it correct to consult with it on the worn-out pretext that it is a "radical organization." That position cannot hold water. The day will come when the defense establishment and the government establishment will understand that there is no other way but to hold consultations with the Arab community leadership. And those talks will not be just on municipal issues but also, and especially, on political and diplomatic questions.

If the change should come about and instead of an advisor there would be a coordinator, he would find the Arab population different from what the advisor sees in his field of vision. Lately we are witness to joint activity by the six Arab Knesset members (Darawishah, Mi'ari, Muhamid, Na'fa, Fars and Masallah) [as published] in everything having to do with the two main issues: The

demand for equal rights for Israeli Arabs and for self-determination on the part of the Palestinian nation. This cooperation has been expressed in joint visits by these six to the various prisons in Israel and the territories, aimed at looking into the detention conditions of the Palestinian prisoners. Two events led to this cooperation—one was the disregard of the Arab MK's at the time of the last coalition negotiations (to the point of delegitimization), and the other is the immigration from the USSR. This joint activity shows that in many areas what these MK's have in common among themselves is greater than what they have in common with their various parties.

Competition Between Extreme Reactions

The claim that the immigration from Russia will lead to growing unemployment in the Arab sector, to the renewed expropriation of lands and to housing problems has aroused deep fears in the Arab sector. One of the Arab MK's was supported by the remarks of Likud MK 'Ovadia 'Ali that the immigration would first hurt the Arabs and then the Sephardi communities. The result of that could be competition between extremists in the Arab sector, especially between the nationalists among them, for a sharper reaction. That competition could increase as the coming elections approach, and the declarations of RAKAH [New Communist List] might come to seem relatively moderate. Extreme pronouncements would increase ferment in the Jewish community against the Arabs, and that might even lead to real violence.

What was good and correct for the beginning of the country's existence is not appropriate for the 90's. The job of coordinator of activities in the Arab sector and his overall responsibility will force him and the government to examine the situation carefully and present appropriate responses. That kind of coordinator will not be able to make do with minor, limited activity as the present advisor does.

Deportation of Foreign Workers Demanded

90AE0226B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
16 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by Avraham Dishon]

[Text] The Employment Service is demanding the immediate deportation of hundreds of workers from Thailand, who arrived in Israel on the pretext of being "volunteers" for work on kibbutzim and moshavim.

The Employment Services claims that these Thais are employed under difficult terms in the moshavim. They work many hours, including on Saturdays and holidays, all in exchange for a low wage of 600 shekels per month and housing on the moshavim that employ them.

According to an inspection performed by Employment Service inspectors, there are currently about 1,500 "volunteers of this type, mainly on moshavs in the 'Arava, in the Jordan Valley, and in Nahal Lakhish.

The general director of the Employment Service, David Mena', maintains that it is prohibited to regard these workers as "volunteers"; rather, they should be regarded as unlicensed foreign workers and should therefore be deported immediately.

The Employment Service is willing to supply the moshavim with unemployed Israelis willing to work in agriculture on the moshavim as replacements for the Thais until permanent employment can be found.

The moshavim are not very enthusiastic over this idea, because they would have to pay Israeli workers the minimum legal wage, 985 shekels per month, and the number of working hours would be much lower.

The general director of the Employment Service also stated that the current situation cannot continue.

"It is inconceivable that the government would allow the import of cheap labor from abroad, while tens of thousands of Israelis are unemployed," added Mena'.

Plan To Move Jews to Jaffa Reported

90AE0223D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by Natan Ro'i]

[Text] Tel Aviv Mayor Shlomo Lahat has consolidated a plan with Housing and Construction Minister Ari'el Sharon to Judaize Arab Jaffa. A document in this regard was submitted to Minister Sharon after being formulated by the Halmish Company, the governmental, urban company for reconstruction in the city.

In a conversation with Sharon, it was stated that the goal is to Judaize Jaffa, to settle new immigrants there in place of the Arabs, and to return the Jewish population to Jaffa. It was stated that the municipality is seeking to conduct a survey to ascertain the number of Arab residents in Jaffa with the intention of channelling new immigrants to Jaffa.

Lahat was asked to clarify his position on the report, which will be published tomorrow in the TEL-AVIV newspaper. The following is the gist of his remarks: The state of Israel is a Jewish state and the majority of its residents are Jewish. It is necessary to act in terms of Jaffa to the exact same degree in which I support populating the Galilee and Negev with Jews.

The reconstruction of the 'Ajmi neighborhood in Jaffa was done at my initiative to improve the Arabs' quality of life. It is a fact. Go to the 'Ajmi neighborhood and see how the neighborhood appears and how the Jews and Arabs are living together as equal citizens.

The idea of directing Jews to Jaffa was raised more than 10 years ago by the then Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Housing Minister David Levi. However, nothing substantial was done. At present, with the appointment of Ari'el Sharon as Housing and Construction Minister, there is a chance that matters will move quickly.

In Jaffa, there are hundreds of empty housing units owned by 'Amidar. There are also open fields, and a total potential of about 5,000 apartments, of which about 500 can be built immediately.

Building Upsurge Planned for Jerusalem

90AE0224D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
11 Jul 90 p 3B

[Article by Nadav Sarga'i]

[Text] David Levi was housing minister for a full decade, and when a meeting ended this week between Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek and incoming Housing Minister Ari'el Sharon, people breathed easier. The municipality's relations with Levi and his director general, 'Amos Unger, were filled with disagreements, and personal relations between Kollek and Levi were non-existent.

Kollek believes that the Housing Ministry has built too little too slowly in Jerusalem in recent years. In the 1970s, the rate of construction in Jerusalem stood at several thousand housing units per year. During the 1980s, only several hundred housing units per year were built. This gap caused apartment prices in Jerusalem to skyrocket. After several balanced years, the balance of Jewish immigration to and from Jerusalem declined again. Thousands of Jews left the city in 1989 as a direct result of the housing squeeze and headed for the inexpensive periphery in the territories—Ma'ale Adumim, Pisgat Ze'ev, Beytar, and Efrat. Last year, after several positive years, more Jews left than came to Jerusalem.

Jerusalem municipality personnel brought this information to the meeting with Sharon this week. The meeting's outcome provides a basis for hopes that Jerusalem will return to the days of construction upsurge of the 1970s, and will even surpass the peak of that period. The deputy engineer of the Jerusalem municipality, Eleanor Barzqi, reported last week that 36,000 housing units are in different planning phases. This number was translated into detailed plans in Kollek's meeting with Sharon. Kollek, and his alternate, 'Amos Mar Hayim, presented their papers, and the members of the Housing Ministry came with their own plan. Their goals were almost the same, namely to build much quickly.

The usually critical Kollek did not hide his satisfaction with the new minister at the end of the meeting. Housing Ministry personnel stated at the meeting that construction will begin this year on 5,000 housing units in Pisgat Ze'ev, the new neighborhood now under construction between Neve Ya'akov and French Hill. Housing Ministry personnel hope that 8,500 apartments will be completed within two years in Pisgat Ze'ev, East Neve

Ya'akov, Ramot, Gilo, Talpiyot, Rekhes Mleha, and Giv'at Mashu'a. Earthworks and road building have already been started in the undeveloped part of Pisgat Ze'ev. The building plans for the rest of the sites are in the completion stages.

Commitment To Purchase 70 Percent of the Apartments

The municipality is seeking to advance plans for the construction of a new neighborhood on Mt. Homa southeast of the city. The intention is to build about 4,000 housing units on Mt. Homa, which is on the other side of the green line. Sharon stated that he views this project positively. He promised that the Housing Ministry would make a commitment, regarding Mt. Homa and other neighborhoods to be built in the capital, to acquire from contractors 70 percent of the apartments that they build instead of the usual commitment to acquire 40-50 percent of such apartments. Personnel in the city planning department of the Jerusalem municipality hope to complete planning tasks related to the new neighborhood within several months.

Another agreed construction site in Jerusalem is the Shu'afat ridge, the site on which the Jerusalem municipal stadium was supposed to have been built years ago. At that time, Kollek swore that he would not give the Haredim [ultra-orthodox religious community] a prize for thwarting his plan to build a stadium on the site, a prize in the form of the construction of housing units on the ridge. It turns out that time works wonders, and after 11 years, the Reichman Brothers will build 2,000 subsidized housing units for the Haredim at Shu'afat. The Housing Ministry will finance the infrastructure, including public institutions, as it is doing for Pisgat Ze'ev.

Not only has the municipality given its approval for the project, it is even encouraging it. In the Kollek-Sharon meeting, the housing minister asked the municipality to relay a message to the Reichmans that if they do not give an affirmative answer within several days, another firm would implement the project.

Another new neighborhood scheduled to be built on land north of Kibbutz Ramat Rahel, in an area of about 370 dunams, is supposed to create territorial contiguity between Talpiyot and East Talpiyot. In contrast to other plans, the implementation range of this project is not immediate, and more than a few obstacles are expected to block its implementation. The great advantage of the area is the infrastructure lines that surround it from all sides. However, the area is currently being used for fruit orchards, and it does not lie within Jerusalem's jurisdiction, but in the jurisdiction of the Mate Yehuda Regional Council. Changing its jurisdiction would be a precedent. Also, it would be necessary to change the land use designation from agricultural to residential, and to see to it that Kibbutz Ramat Rahel receives compensation.

Older neighborhoods, mainly those built after the Six Day War in the area that was annexed to Jerusalem, will also be thickened. There is an intention to add 1,000

apartments to the neighborhood of Ramot, 500 to French Hill, 700 to the Haredi neighborhood of Har-Nof, 800 housing units to Gilo, 1,000 housing units to Qiryat Menahem, and another several hundred units to Ramot Eshqol.

The significance of the addition of tens of thousands of apartments in the coming years is that apartment prices will return to their real level. Young and established couples seeking to remain in the city will be able to fulfill their desire and acquire an apartment at a reasonable price. There will be more places of employment in the city as a result of the many projects, and the rate of inflation will perhaps decline. The building upsurge in Jerusalem also has political significance. Most of the construction is planned for the area that was annexed to Jerusalem after 1967, which is two thirds of present-day Jerusalem. The upsurge will add about 18,000 housing units to the eastern part of the city, and these new units will house an estimated 60,000 Jews, including immigrants, and young and established couples.

If all of the plans are implemented, a Jewish majority will be created in East Jerusalem within a number of years. At present, there are 120,000 Jews in East Jerusalem compared to 140,000 Arabs. Without immigration, and taking into account old construction projects alone, Jews would have constituted a small minority within several years. Under the new plans, this will occur at a faster rate.

Building plans for Arabs in Jerusalem are proceeding slowly. In recent years, a yearly average of about 390,000 square meters have been built in the city for Jews, of which 70 percent is residential, compared to 43,000 square meters for Arabs, of which 85 percent is residential, i.e., 1.3 square meters per person per year for Jews, compared to an average of 0.4 percent square meters per person per year for Arabs.

Triangle Residents Instructed on Gas Masks

90AE0313A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 4 Sep 90 p 5

[Article by Hayim Broide]

[Text] IDF [Israel Defense Forces] commander of the Sharon region Lieutenant Colonel Barukh Tessler yesterday met with leaders of the Arab sector in the Triangle and instructed them on the subject of gas masks, in case it is decided to distribute these to the public. Participating were the heads of the local councils of al-Tayyibah, al-Tirah, Jaljulyah, Kafr Qasim, Qalansuwa, and Kafr Bara. In the coming days, in coordination with the IDF, the councils will distribute leaflets to the public, presenting necessary instructions. Yesterday, teachers from the Arab sector also participated in ABC (atomic, biological, chemical) defense instruction which took place at schools in the Sharon region.

Arab Village Names No Longer Broadcast

90AE0313B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
4 Sep 90 p 16

[Text] Staffers report that beginning today [4 Sep 90] Israel Radio and Television will no longer broadcast reports about Silwan and Anatah. The Arab names of the villages will no longer be heard on state-run radio and television. Broadcasting Authority Director-General Arye Mekel accepted the opinion of Authority Deputy Chairman Shlomo Kor, and instructed the directors of state-run radio and television to use only the Hebrew names of places in Israel from now on. Kor noted at the last meeting of the administrative committee that the names "Nabulus" and "al-Khalil" are not used in broadcasts, but rather "Shechem" and "Hebron." "Shafa' 'Amru" is referred to on radio and television by its Hebrew name, "Shefar'am." According to Kor, Jews lived in the village of Shiloah until the riots of 1936 and the village should not be referred to as Silwan; a Greek corruption of its name. From now on, therefore, broadcasts will use "Kfar Hashiloah" and not "Silwan"; "Anatot" and not "Anatah"; "Shilo" and not "Saylun"; and "Naftoah," not "Liftah."

JORDAN

Corruption Cases Referred to Parliament

90AE0209A London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic
30 Jul 90 pp 13- 14

[Article by Faysal al-Shabul: "Trial of Four Jordanian Ministers"]

[Text] Cases of corruption and embezzlement of public money again occupy the center of attention in Jordan, after the Public Prosecutor's Office charged four former ministers with crimes stemming from their performance of duties and misuse of authority. This resulted from only three of the nine corruption cases that the Chamber of Deputies referred to the Public Prosecutor's Office for investigation.

In accordance with the Jordanian constitution, ministers (active or former) cannot be tried in ordinary courts, but rather, must be tried before the Supreme Council, which is composed of the president of the Senate as chairman, three members from the Senate, and three senior judges. The Chamber of Deputies, which has the right to bring charges, has the job of prosecuting ministers brought to trial.

In implementation of the constitution's provisions, the Public Prosecutor's Office returned the three cases to the Chamber of Deputies, after studying their various aspects and hearing testimony of witnesses concerning them. The Public Prosecutor's Office obtained the requisite documents and depositions and, because of its lack of jurisdiction, referred them to the Senate, which does have jurisdiction.

A tumultuous session of the Chamber of Deputies occurred, when the public prosecutor's letter was read in the Jordanian Parliament. The three cases that had been studied over the period of the first four months were returned, because the Chamber of Deputies must restudy the cases and bring charges against those ministers responsible for corruption, and then refer them to the Senate for trial.

The chamber decided to form a committee of seven members, representing various parliamentary blocs, to study the dossiers of the three cases and investigate them, if that was required, and submit the results to the Chamber of Deputies. The chamber will then form a committee of charges, which will submit the names of the accused ministers for trial. The chamber—with a two-thirds majority required—would then vote to submit them for trial.

Despite the fact that all members of the Chamber of Deputies agreed on the need to prosecute anyone responsible for corruption, most of them obviously began to waver when the matter was in the chamber's hands alone. One of the deputies said: "The government has put the Chamber of Deputies into a trap," causing it to investigate and bring charges, while the government has played no part.

Prime Minister Mudar Budran expressed his satisfaction with the investigation, and stressed the need to prosecute anyone, "no matter who," if corruption and abuse of office is proved. However, he also emphasized the need for certainty and evidence, before accusing any person, no matter what his status.

In general, the committee of seven deputies has begun to study the three cases, and it is expected that the study and investigation will continue over the next few weeks, before its decision is reported to the Chamber of Deputies. The committee is composed of Dr. 'Abdallah al-Nasur, Husayn Majali, Salim al-Za'bi, Dr. 'Abdallah al-'Ukayali, Layth Shubaylat, Dr. Muhammad Abu-Faris, and Ahmad al-Azayadah.

Cases and Ministers

The three cases referred to the Chamber of Deputies, after investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office, are the case of the al-Azraq-al-Jafr road, the issue of the Ministry of Supply's imports of barley, and the Sawaqah Prison construction case.

The Public Prosecutor's Office heard testimony of those concerned, including former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa'i, and a number of ministers and senior officials of the ministries involved. It is worth pointing out here that Mr. Rifa'i appeared before the Public Prosecutor's Office more than once to give his testimony concerning most of the cases.

The Public Prosecutor's Office has charged four former ministers in these three cases. They are Mahmud al-Hawamdah, a former minister of public works, concerning the al-Azraq-al-Jafr road; 'Abd-al-Salam Kan'an and Dr. Fayiz al-Tarawnah, with regard to the Ministry of Supply's imports of barley; and Mahmud al-Hawamdah and Sa'id Baynu, two former ministers of public works, for the Sawaqah Prison construction case.

AL-TADAMUN has learned from prosecution sources familiar with the investigation that at least one of the four ministers mentioned will in fact be brought to trial.

The following is AL-TADAMUN's account of the details of these three cases, which have leapt to the forefront of events in Jordan, because they are the initial results of the prosecution of corruption, especially since holding those who caused the economic collapse—or some of its aspects—accountable is the Jordanian people's first priority after the new democratic changes.

Al-Azraq-al-Jafr Road

The Public Prosecutor's Office's investigation showed that the Indian company, Samarat, submitted a bid to build the road on 15 September 1986. The bid contained two options: the first, to pave the road with pliable asphalt material, at a cost of 21,402,660 Jordanian dinars; and the second, to pave the road with hard concrete material, at a cost of 40,803,220 Jordanian dinars.

A technical committee from the Ministry of Public Works reached the conclusion that the cost of the first bid should total 14,155,400 Jordanian dinars, but the Indian company rejected that cost. The technical committee recommended disapproval of that company's bid on the project, adding that the company's bid contained provisions that contravened the general stipulations in the contractor's contract.

A second technical committee was formed of engineers from the ministry to continue negotiation with the Indian company, but no agreement was reached. Furthermore, the advisory office responsible for determining the road's construction recommended use of pliable pavement (asphalt) and advised against use of concrete, because of its high cost, lack of available Jordanian expertise in maintaining the road, and the unsuitable climate in that area.

However, former minister Mahmud al-Hawamdah, acting on his own, insisted on constructing the road with concrete at the cost specified in the Indian company's bid, which resulted in burdening the Treasury with the cost differential between asphalt and concrete, a total of 20 million Jordanian dinars.

The investigation showed that the then minister of public works told the cabinet, during its session on 3 January 1987, that this price was the best that could be obtained through negotiation, and the cabinet issued an

order awarding the bid to two Indian companies, Samarat and M.M.T.B., to build the al-Azraq-al-Jafr road with concrete.

The investigation also revealed a number of other violations in this case, leading to the following results:

The total losses incurred by public funds to the benefit of the Indian Samarat Company amounted to nearly 27 million Jordanian dinars, i.e., 20 million in price differential between concrete and asphalt, and 7 million Jordanian dinars difference in the cost estimated by the ministry's technical committee and the price quoted in the bid.

These facts, which were gleaned through submitted statements and testimony, and whose substantiation is assumed, constitute the crime of profiteering from office, in violation of the provisions of Article 175 of the penal code. These facts that form the crime of profiteering from office, represented by the loss of public funds, resulted from noncompliance with the valid laws and regulations pertaining to the minister of public works at that time. By referring to the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 of the constitution, we find that prosecution of ministers for crimes, resulting from performance of their duties, falls within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council, and that the Chamber of Deputies has the right to charge those ministers and refer them to the Supreme Council for trial.

Imports of Barley

With regard to the case of the Ministry of Supply's imports of barley for fodder, the Public Prosecutor's Office's investigation showed that on 16 April 1988, the Iraqi Trade Center in Amman obtained an import license from the Ministry of Supply, in accordance with the commercial protocol signed between the Jordanian and Iraqi governments, to import 50,000 tons of black barley to Jordan. Since importation of barley was restricted to the Ministry of Supply and the price of barley set at 42 Jordanian dinars, the Iraqi Trade Center advised the Ministry of Supply that it would be necessary to discuss the fixed price, since it would supply that amount of barley to the merchant, and it would be difficult to sell barley at that price.

The Ministry of Supply referred the purchase of this amount to the cabinet, and the purchase was approved on 13 June 1988. Accordingly, an agreement was signed between the Ministry of Supply and the Iraqi Trade Center to import 50,000 tons of black barley at a price of 58 Jordanian dinars per ton.

The investigation showed that the barley deal was originally sold to one merchant, who agreed with the Iraqi Trade Center to sell the amount to the ministry, as he stated in his testimony. The merchant was Ziyad al-Shuwaykh, currently a member of the Chamber of Deputies.

A few days later, the then minister of supply, 'Abd-al-Salam Kan'an, changed the agreement (at the direction of the prime minister, according to the minister's testimony), so that the price of barley for 15,000 tons became \$153 per ton upon arrival at al-Juwaydah (the supply center near Amman), and \$125 per ton for 35,000 tons delivered in the northern area of Iraq. This change resulted in the Ministry of Supply bearing transportation expenses for 35,000 tons of barley to Jordan, amounting to 15 Jordanian dinars per ton. The ministry also had to bear the results of tying the price to the U.S. dollar, instead of the Jordanian dinar, with the price differential of the dollar on the date of payment. After the agreement was changed, the Ministry of Supply paid 3,702,740 Jordanian dinars, a difference of 802,740 Jordanian dinars.

When questioned about the change in the agreement, the then minister of supply, 'Abd-al-Salam al-Kan'an, stated that he changed the agreement at the direction of former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa'i, in the presence of the finance minister at that time. However, Zayd al-Rifa'i denied that he issued any instructions to the minister of supply in this regard. He added that this change should have been made by order of the cabinet. The former minister of finance (Hanna 'Awdah) also denied any knowledge of this matter.

Another fact is that on 11 April 1989, former minister of supply Dr. Fayiz al-Tarawnah asked the cabinet for approval to purchase 5,000 tons of black barley from the Iraqi Trade Center at a cost of \$175 per ton delivered in the northern region of Iraq. The cabinet order was issued approving his request. Furthermore, on 15 April 1989, he asked for approval for the purchase of 25,000 tons of black barley from Syria at a price of \$120 a ton delivered on Syrian territory. The cabinet approved. This means that the ministry bought barley at two different prices during the same period.

Sawaqah Prison

On 2 December 1975, a bid to finance and construct the Reform and Vocational Center, Sawaqah Prison/first phase, which was the responsibility of and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works, was granted to the General Construction Company, Inc., as contractor, in accordance with the decision of the Central Bids Committee. This occurred after a study was made by a technical committee. This report was used as a basis for part of the bid documentation, which stated that the guaranty for good performance was 10 percent of the bid value, as cited in the contractor's tender. The bid's value was 5,186,207 Jordanian dinars. When the agreement was signed between the company and the ministry, however, the good performance guaranty in the contractor's contract was changed from 10 percent to five percent, by the former minister of public works, Mahmud al-Hawamdah. This caused the Treasury to suffer losses, since it was weaker than the ministry's guarantees and benefitted the contractor.

According to bills of exchange that the Ministry of Public Works made out to the order of the company, payment for the work, which was to be accomplished in six years, was calculated in installments beginning in 1979 and ending in 1984. The cost was to include finance interest, which meant that the contractor undertook to find sources of finance for the project.

Despite the cabinet's lack of approval, the construction method for the project at the outset was changed to pre-manufactured concrete. The Ministry of Public Works gave the company an advance to purchase a concrete plant for 500,000 Jordanian dinars, in exchange for mortgaging the plant to the ministry. Monthly payments were made to the contractor, and an assistance loan was made to pay for labor.

Work on the project progressed very slowly, despite the project's director calling the contractor's attention to this, through 35 letters and reports, until the contractor had exceeded the stipulated performance period of 1,100 days, with only 35 percent of the work accomplished. By this time, the contractor had received all the value of the bid.

The contractor had been warned twice; once on 22 April 1981, and again on 24 June 1981. The delay amounted to 715 days, with a delay penalty of 200 Jordanian dinars per day.

The then minister of public works decided to step into the situation by applying the provisions of the contract, and the Ministry of Public Works sued the General Construction Company in Amman lower court for 2,268,519 Jordanian dinars. Technical committees were formed to estimate the value of the work accomplished and the materials at the site. The estimated value was approximately 4 million Jordanian dinars. There were no objections to the reports by any ministry official. The former minister of public works then went to the cabinet, and it approved a settlement with the company.

The Public Prosecutor's Office report concluded that these facts, as arrived at, constitute crimes of profiteering from office and are presumed substantiated relative to the two former ministers of public works.

One Case Dropped, and a New Charge

The Public Prosecutor's Office has decided to suspend the case of al-Malahi-al-Jabihah City because of a lack of evidence that a crime was committed by anyone.

On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor's Office has directed a new charge involving profiteering from office at the former secretary general of the Ministry of Supply, 'Abdallah al-Hawamdah, the brother of Mahmud al-Hawamdah, who has been charged in two cases in his capacity as former minister of public works. It is worth noting that the Amman lower court is still trying 'Abdallah al-Hawamdah on a charge of misuse of office in the case of the Ministry of Supply's imports of rice.

KUWAIT

Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad Discusses Crisis

90AE0273A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 Aug 90 p 4

[Interview with Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad by Qasiy Salih al-Darwish in Paris; date not specified]

[Excerpt] When Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti prime minister and foreign minister, was asked in a press conference that he held yesterday, Saturday, in Paris about being the target of attacks by the Iraqi media, the media subordinate to it, and some Iraqi politicians, he responded: "One day, President Saddam Husayn told me: You are our foreign minister, not Tariq 'Aziz. I was surprised to hear that he stripped me of my Arabism and said that I am an imperialist and an agent of Zionism."

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT asked Shaykh Sabah whether he had information on the situation of the Arab emigre communities in Kuwait, and what would be their fate in the event of the return of legitimacy. He responded: "The Arab emigre communities have a right like the right of the Kuwaiti. I want to assure every Arab brother who was in Kuwait that he will [be able to] remain in Kuwait as long as legitimacy returns. There has been some talk of the conduct of Palestinians in Kuwait, and I want to emphasize that the Palestinian community, which is the largest emigre community in Kuwait, cooperates with the Kuwaitis. Hence, I want to salute them for their position."

Regarding the lack of food in Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah stated: "There is no stinginess toward the Kuwaiti people regarding subsistence. Committees have been formed to provide the food and medicine needed by the Kuwaiti people. If any shortage occurs, food will reach them. Someone will deliver food to them."

Shifting to another topic, he disclosed that he will soon visit Iran, either before or after his upcoming visit to Moscow. He added that relations were not broken between Iran and Kuwait even during the war. Following these remarks, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah granted an interview to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, which he began by saying: "First, I thank AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, because it has always sided with the truth."

[Al-Darwish] According to all indications, the situation is moving toward a military clash that might be destructive for all, and the prevailing mentality is a nihilist mentality that moves from escalation to escalation. Would you say that a last chance [for avoiding a clash] no longer exists?

[Shaykh Sabah] Do you believe that we would neglect any opportunity if it existed? We have provided every opportunity to Arab leaders, the Arab League, and the Islamic Conference [Organization]. The question that needs to be asked is: Who brought about our current

situation? Did not a person cause this situation and the massing of all of these armies in the region?

[Al-Darwish] If time could be turned back a bit, is there anything that Kuwait would do that it has not done, or something that it would do differently? Would there be self-criticism for example?

[Shaykh Sabah] Of course. In any case, our political relations would be different from our current relations. As long as there remains in Kuwait a people that has taken this stand, Kuwait will return to its former state. Nonetheless, there is self-criticism, whose adherents want to mend their relations, even abroad. We will assess our foreign policy. You know that Kuwait has supporters, thank God, not only throughout the entire Arab world, but also the Islamic world and the non-Islamic countries. Therefore, we will assess our foreign and domestic policy.

[Al-Darwish] According to reports, Kuwait refused an offer for the entry of the Marines before the invasion?

[Shaykh Sabah] This never happened, because we did not expect, and it did not occur to anyone, that Iraq, which Kuwait has supported all of these years, would do what it did. Moreover, we are now discovering that Iraq's greed is not only for Kuwait, but also for many Arab parts.

[Al-Darwish] In the press conference, you deigned to say that there is a consensus on the condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait. However, this consensus has not precluded the existence of a breach in the Arab body and in Arab ranks. Some views and positions are at odds with each other. For example, how do you explain the position of President Yasir 'Arafat?

[Al-Darwish] I would like to separate the Palestinian leadership from the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people has a special place in our hearts that will not change. Regarding the leaders, as I said, we will, at a later time, have a political assessment of all that has transpired.

[Al-Darwish] Nonetheless, is there not some problem regarding some matter between the Palestinian leader, Yasir 'Arafat, and the Kuwaiti leadership?

[Shaykh Sabah] By God, there is no other matter. Three days before the invasion, he came to us to stress that Iraq would not undertake any military action. Why did he change? The Palestinians people must ask this question to itself, i.e., its leadership,

[Al-Darwish] Are you agitated by this position?

[Shaykh Sabah] Not personally. Rather, the entire Kuwaiti people is hurt by his position. We must be extremely candid. However, we are not hurt by the Palestinian people who are in their country, Kuwait, living as do their Kuwaiti brothers.

[Al-Darwish] Are there contacts between you and King Husayn?

[Shaykh Sabah] There has not been contact to the extent that there was at the last meeting in Cairo. I regret that King Husayn has placed himself in a dilemma that can...may the lord indeed protect him.

[Al-Darwish] Do you not fear that a military confrontation will push President Saddam Husayn to destroy the oil wells and installations?

[Shaykh Sabah] What is oil in relation to the state if the state is destroyed? What is oil in relation to the people if the people is destroyed? We existed before there was oil. Therefore, we are not concerned with oil to the degree that we are concerned that our people obtains its freedom and country, and that it lives in its country.

[Al-Darwish] Regarding your visit to France, despite your gratitude for France's position, it is noted that French, British, and American positions differ. Did you discuss this matter?

[Shaykh Sabah] Actually, during my meeting today with the prime minister and the foreign minister, I did not encounter this inconsistency that I hear from many people. Rather, I encountered insistence on the return of legitimacy to Kuwait and the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

[Al-Darwish] If the situation continues in the present manner for a long time, would you discuss the possibility of unblocking frozen Kuwaiti funds and investments?

[Shaykh Sabah] I believe that this action favors Kuwait, not Iraq.

[Al-Darwish] However, do not the leadership of the resistance and diplomatic and media efforts require possibilities now?

[Shaykh Sabah] The possibilities exist, thank God, and matters are in excellent order.

[Al-Darwish] How do you view the position of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the invasion of Kuwait, and its role in the Arab and gulf framework at this stage?

[Shaykh Sabah] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fraternal country and a neighbor of Kuwait. At the same time, it is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. As you heard, King Fahd's speech focussed more on Kuwait and the liberation of Kuwait than on the defense of Saudi Arabia. If this indicates something, it indicates solidarity between Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

[Al-Darwish] What cards do you aim to show in the Kuwaiti diplomatic campaign that you are undertaking with Prime Minister and Crown Prince Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah?

[Shaykh Sabah] Actually, it is a diplomatic tour of the five countries that are permanent members of the Security Council. We are very much interested in hearing their views and in having them hear our views. Concurrently, there are visits to Arab countries, regardless of whether they have shared our view, remained aloof, or have been wary. We want them to understand the facts now, which have unfortunately become muddled and distorted. These visits thus aim at explaining the circumstances to brothers in the Arab world and the countries that are permanent members of the Security Council, which have taken an unprecedented position in the history of the United Nations that brings together the East and the West in one view.

[Al-Darwish] Has the Iraqi leadership attempted to insinuate and generate suspicions that there are differences of opinion and differing positions within the Kuwaiti leadership and the ruling family?

[Shaykh Sabah] I regret that you are asking me this question. I want to emphasize that there is no disagreement within the family. How can there be a disagreement when their country is occupied? What would they disagree about? Regarding a difference of opinion in relation to the Kuwaiti, you know that they [the Iraqis] have been unable to find one person to collaborate with them. The Kuwaitis are calling for legitimacy and the presence of their emir and crown prince. You find them hoisting pictures of his excellency the emir and the crown prince in Paris, London, and even inside Kuwait, over the enemy's tanks. The Iraqis said that the prime minister is 'Ala'-al-Din. The name 'Ala'-al-Din does not exist in Kuwait. In any case, you have heard the Iraqi propaganda. It contradicts itself daily. Such contradiction indicates a loss of timidity, a loss of prudence, and the loss of the ability to distinguish between the truth and falsehood. [passage omitted]

Crown Prince Discusses Growing Nationalist Movement

90AE0282A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
24 Aug 90 p 4

[Text] Al-Ta'if (KUNA)—Kuwaiti Prime Minister and Crown Prince Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah accused the Iraqi regime yesterday of organizing and planning the occupation of Kuwait for a long time. Nonetheless, the Kuwaiti people is sparing no effort to liberate the homeland, which has been occupied by the invaders' talons.

Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah emphasized that the Kuwaiti resistance against the occupation will continue and intensify, and that the Kuwaiti people, with the help of friends, will fight mercilessly to reclaim Kuwait and drive out the occupiers.

The crown prince made these statements at an international press conference that he held yesterday in al-Ta'if after completing a wide-ranging tour that included Syria, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt,

where he discussed with the leaders of these countries the world crisis that the Iraqi regime unleashed by its occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

He stated that the perfidious aggression against Kuwait "highlighted for peace-loving peoples the Iraqi regime's intentions and ambitions.

Kuwait's crown prince stated that the Iraqi aggression had been prepared and planned for a long time, despite promises given to the custodian of the two holy places, King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, Egyptian President Muhammad Husni Mubarak, King Husayn, Yasir 'Arafat, and [Yemen's] President 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salih, promises which essentially said that Iraq had no intention of committing an aggression against Kuwait.

In his press conference, the crown prince reviewed events, starting with the Iraqi concentrations on the border with Kuwait, followed by Arab efforts to find a suitable, comprehensive, just way out of the crisis, up until the beginning of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwaiti territory, and the escalation that followed the aggression against the gulf region.

Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah stated: The people of Kuwait cannot submit to threats. With the help of our friends and brothers, we will combat, fight, and drive out the invaders from our land.

The crown prince then answered journalists' questions. Responding to a question regarding the measures that will be taken to resolve the crisis, he said: Economic measures are not enough. All countries must implement the Security Council's resolutions. I cannot predict the measures that will be adopted. If these measures fail, it will be necessary to return to the Security Council.

He added that the president of the Iraqi regime must apply the resolutions of the Arab League and the Security Council, and he must refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of any country in the region.

Responding to a question about how to avoid war, especially as no means have been successful with Saddam Husayn, he answered: This depends on the steps and measures taken by the Iraqi president to implement the resolutions of the Security Council.

He said that Kuwait is a member of the United Nations Organization, and if it is exposed to any danger that threatens its security, existence, and independence, it is entitled to request aid from friends and brothers to liberate its occupied lands.

Regarding the intention to reconstitute the Kuwaiti armed forces, Shaykh al-'Abdallah said: We will re-equip, retrain, and rearm our forces, so that they can play their role in liberating Kuwait.

He added: It is no secret that the Iraqi regime has hostile intentions toward the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as indicated by the Iraqi forces' density and the nature of their weapons, especially long-range missiles, and the

speed by which Iraqi forces moved to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. All of these indications point to the Iraqi regime's intentions to carry out an aggression against Saudi Arabia.

Regarding Iraqi initiatives and statements, the crown prince said: They aim to buy time and cause confusion. If Saddam is genuine regarding his statements and initiatives, he must implement the resolutions of the Security Council. I hope with all my heart that the picture has become clear to some, so that they recognize that Saddam has deceived them more than once.

Regarding the Kuwaiti resistance, he said: It has begun, and it will intensify during the next few days. Regarding the number of Kuwaitis abroad, he indicated that a committee is counting those who left Kuwait as a consequence of the Iraqi forces' aggression, oppression and terrorism. He said that we will not spare any effort or our lives to liberate Kuwait, and this is what has compelled many Kuwaitis to secure the safety of their families abroad and then return to Kuwait to take their places in the ranks of the resistance.

LEBANON

Deputy Shaykh Butrus Harb Discusses Beirut Plan

90AE0319A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
10 Aug 1990 pp 22-23

[Interview with Shaykh Butrus Harb, member of parliament: "Deputy Butrus Harb Tells AL-HAWADITH, 'What Is Happening in Lebanon Is Dangerous; It Is a Threat to the Lebanese State';" in Beirut, date not given]

[Text] Shaykh Butrus Harb said that the step of declaring an administrative plan for Beirut was taken at the request of the Tripartite Arab Committee. The step was taken because of the government's inability to find a solution to the problem of General Aoun.

Shaykh Butrus Harb added, "If the administrative plan for Beirut succeeds, and I doubt that it will, any faction can throw a monkey wrench into that plan. If it fails, then nothing will have changed. In fact, light military skirmishes may return in the eastern zone."

According to Shaykh Butrus Harb, impeding the Tripartite Arab Committee's peace initiative was the purpose of what was happening in al-Tuffah District. Mr. Harb said the United States was not interfering in the Lebanese question directly because it did not want to get burned again as it did in the past.

Shaykh Butrus Harb added that parliament would ratify the al-Ta'if Agreement and amend the constitution in two months. He thought the major battles in the eastern zone were over but that skirmishes could take place. Fears could also develop about expatriating Christians to settle Palestinians in their place.

[AL-HAWADITH] What do you think about the step taken by the government in declaring an administrative plan for Beirut? What are the chances of success or failure for this plan? How will the situation in Beirut be affected if the plan fails?

[Harb] I do not share the opinion of those who say that it was the Lebanese government that took the step of declaring an administrative plan for Beirut. The Lebanese government's plan is an integrated plan whose aim is to implement all stages of the al-Ta'if Agreement. Although it would implement the agreement in stages, the government's aim is to implement the plan and bring to an end the abnormal condition which exists because Gen. Aoun continues to occupy the presidential palace and the Ministry of Defense. The government would then draw up the security plan which is stipulated by the al-Ta'if Agreement. The government, which had been making an effort to start implementing this plan, was trying to implement the so-called plan for Greater Beirut which, as far as I know, would include the administrative district of Beirut and surrounding areas and extend geographically from al-Damur in the south, to 'Alayh in the east, and to al-Kalb River in the north. That is the goal the government wanted to achieve. It wanted to achieve that goal by finding a solution to the question of Gen. Aoun, by restoring power to Gen. Lahud's legitimate army command, by uniting the army's brigades, and then by taking over this greater area which is called Greater Beirut.

My personal opinion about the administrative plan for Beirut, which is the plan that the government came up with recently, is that this plan is the product of international and Arab contacts. I think the Lebanese government was asked to break down the solution into its component parts, to divide it into two stages, and to start by taking the first step, which is an administrative plan for Beirut. The first stage, that of an administrative plan for Beirut, would allow the government to separate the combatants in Beirut in particular, to take over the offices of approximately seven or eight ministries, and then to take over al-Mathaf crossing point. This would create a new atmosphere of openness, and that would allow the search for a solution to continue.

These are the reasons why the Lebanese government proposed the administrative plan for Beirut. But my personal evaluation of this plan is this: First, proposing an administrative plan for Beirut was not a government decision, and the aim was not to devise a security plan. This was rather a declaration of a political position which would allow an atmosphere of openness to be created. It was a step, albeit a modest one, toward starting a serious dialogue about achieving other things like Greater Beirut. Given that premise, I think this step was a modest one, but it was a step that had to be taken because the government was unable to do what had to be done about Greater Beirut. This step was necessary because no solution had been made available and none has been made available to date. If the question of Gen. Michel Aoun had been solved, Greater Beirut would

have been implemented as a first step. But since mediators failed to find a solution to the question of Gen. Aoun, a decision was made to divide the problem and to solve it piecemeal, one step at a time. A few matters pertaining to security could occur, and that would create a political openness which could facilitate dialogue calling for the achievement of a Greater Beirut. On that basis, this step is a modest one, indicating that although talks to find a solution to the Gen. Aoun question are faltering, these talks are important because they represent a positive approach to the existing problem. They represent a kind of determination to get some movement on this matter even though the steps might be slow.

The method which is being followed in dealing with the existing problem is not the one that is required. It is time for all local and regional factions to put an end to the existing situation. It is time for each faction to clarify its positions and to deal with the other faction on the basis of that faction's position and its attitude toward the al-Ta'if Agreement. The al-Ta'if Agreement Plan, which is the national reconciliation plan for Lebanese deputies, is based on rebuilding institutions, restoring policy, and having Lebanon's own legitimate agencies exercise the authority of the legitimate government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory.

[AL-HAWADITH] Don't you expect the failure of this plan, if it fails, to affect security conditions and to result in new conflicts, particularly in the eastern zone?

[Harb] The conflicts which occurred in the eastern zone were not the result of a decision made by the two factions. They were rather the result of the fact that the position of each faction precluded either from undertaking any successful military operation. One may describe this situation by calling it a standoff or a case in which the two factions were worn out. I think we could go back to an atmosphere of military skirmishes if this thing fails. I can affirm, however, that neither faction from the eastern zone can do anything decisive against the other in the existing climate. Any military operation will prove to be futile and will result in casualties and losses. It will destroy what is left of Lebanon, it will increase the worries of the Lebanese, and it will force them to emigrate. I do not believe that the interests of either faction would be served if these matters should happen because if they did, citizens will lose faith once and for all, and all existing leaders in the eastern zone would see that as a major lack of gratitude. They would then assume a hostile posture which would have no effect on the principals whose lack of interest in what people think has been established recently.

[AL-HAWADITH] What do you think about Dr. Samir Ja'ja's declaration of support for the council of ministers' statement? What do you think about the fact that he gave his blessings to the effort made by the envoy, Ibrahim, who was representing the committee?

[Harb] I am in no position, first of all, to offer an objective evaluation of that. Despite the big difference

between us and the Lebanese forces, at least in style, what I am trying and will try to do is evaluate this matter in the context of existing facts on the ground. My recollections affirm that the Lebanese forces had invited the government to take over the eastern zone and then to seize it and restore the legitimate government which would then undertake to carry out its duties. But circumstances at the time prevented this from happening, and the legitimate government, for many reasons that we need not mention here, was unable to do that. Today, the position taken by the Lebanese forces is after the same thing. It indicates that the Lebanese forces are making an international, Arab, and Lebanese commitment to give the legitimate government the support it needs to establish the administrative plan for Beirut. Such a commitment has to bring about certain results, or rather, a positive position on the plan set forth by the Council of Ministers. I believe that even if we were to take this position as a political maneuver, it would still be a positive position. And if Gen. Aoun were to counter this position with a positive one of his own, positive objectives serving everyone's interests would have been achieved. But if Gen. Aoun rejects this position, then the record will show that the Lebanese forces took a positive position in the face of Gen. Aoun's negative position. In either case the record will show that the Lebanese forces lost nothing in taking this position. What I'm saying about this initiative applies to giving my blessings to the Arab initiative and to the committee's activities. The Lebanese forces expressed support for these Arab efforts in this positive climate. They expressed support for what the Arab committee is doing to translate this position into declared positions, which could indicate, at least politically, that the forces are willing to make a positive contribution to the Lebanese peace plan.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that the battles which are being fought in al-Tuffah district are sending a clear message from Hizballah to oppose the administrative plan for Beirut and the government's decrees? How would you explain Palestinian involvement in this matter in spite of the fact that no one asked the Palestinians to get involved?

[Harb] I must add information to this question. Guns were fired from the southern suburb, where Hizballah's strong, military quarters are located, against what is left of the presidential palace in B'abda where Lakhdar Ibrahim was meeting with Gen. Aoun. The guns were fired while the meeting was being held. The fact that fighting broke out between Amal and Hizballah in the south at that time indicates that the factions did not want that one modest step to be taken which, as I mentioned, was the least that could be done in the attempt to start the quest for peace. It indicates that whenever a certain plan is proposed, someone will always come along and interfere with the plan if it does not agree with his interests. I believe that what is happening today is no coincidence. I can, however, see it as part of the effort which is being made to create a new climate. It could also be an attempt to turn attention

away from efforts which are being made to achieve an administrative plan for Beirut and to turn that plan into a disaster that would happen simultaneously so that not all the efforts that are being made to find a political solution would be devoted to the administrative plan for Beirut. Instead, new elements capable of interfering with the existing political proposal would emerge on the scene. Seen from that perspective, who stands to benefit from what is happening, and what is his motive? These are matters to be determined at a later time in light of information which we may receive in the next stage and which we will then have to confirm.

I do not like coincidences, and I do not believe in them. I believe, and I say this emphatically, that what is happening is part of the effort to interfere with the peace initiative.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that Washington has washed its hands of the Lebanese crisis and that it will do nothing beyond expressing its support or opposition? Has Washington turned the Lebanese crisis over to the Arab Tripartite Committee? Is the Lebanese crisis no longer a matter of priority for Washington?

[Harb] Based on the facts that are available to me and those which became available to me from my previous official contacts in Washington, specifically my contacts with American officials, I can summarize the American position as follows:

The United States tried to solve the Lebanese question in the past by utilizing its private means and a so-called personal involvement, which is a kind of personal commitment. What happened in Lebanon, however, shocked the United States. The United States was shocked by strikes and explosions against its embassy and by the explosion at the marines' headquarters where many people lost their lives. These events induced the American administration then to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and, as it's being said, to stay out of harm's way and avoid tempting fate. The United States or the American administration did, of course, live under the cloud of this nightmare. Whenever the question of Lebanon would come up, the United States would indicate that it did not want to interfere because it was influenced by what had happened in the past. That is why any initiative made by anyone who can deal with a solution to the Lebanese question and make an effort to find that solution without involving the United States is something the United States would encourage. The United States would give its blessings to such an initiative, and it would support it without getting involved. In other words, the United States is not willing to get burned. Thus, the United States is dealing with the Lebanese question on the basis of offering the Arab committee the required political support. If the committee that is devoting its attention to Lebanese affairs succeeds, U.S. support for the committee would have helped bring about that success. But if it fails, then only the committee would be blamed for the consequences of its efforts.

In my opinion, this is the present American position. I have a personal observation about the United States: I think the U.S. position is not that of a spectator because now, with the Soviet Union out of the international picture, the United States is in a position to take an interest in all the affairs of the world. It is the country that can make decisions and exercise influence. The Lebanese people think, of course, that Lebanon is the most important spot in the world. They believe that if Lebanon is in trouble, the whole world will also be in trouble. And that is a big mistake. Let's be realistic, and let's be serious when we deal with politics. Historical and international events prove that small countries, regardless of their size, cannot change international equations. They may, however, bring about change in these equations if their interests coincide with international interests. Anyone who relies on the opposite of that and argues on that basis is making a mistake. And yet, this is a common mistake. Lebanon's geographical location could be influential. Being located in this hot spot of the world where U.S. policy is significantly affected by considerations of the Palestinian problem, by the Middle East problem, and by threats to many interests in the world, Lebanon can, I believe, have influence on major international politics. Let's admit that the United States sees itself as a country that takes an interest in all locations of the world and particularly Lebanon. But to claim that the Lebanese question is number one on the U.S. scale of priorities would be a grievous mistake. The United States takes an interest in what happens in Lebanon, but the particulars which some people take stock in and consider very important do not even occur to American officials and are not mentioned in American policy positions. Many matters which are major and important to us have no effect whatsoever on the interests of the superpowers. There are, however, fundamental points in international politics where interests are separate and other points where they converge. Such points do affect the U.S. international position. I believe that the common mistake in our part of the world is that we think that the world is being threatened by major and important issues which ultimately threaten nothing but the peace of the unfortunate people of Lebanon who are paying the price for the struggle to gain influence. The Lebanese people are the ones who, according to the saying, are getting lost in the shuffle of international conflicts.

[AL-HAWADITH] How would you comment on the establishment of the international subsidy fund which has been determined for Lebanon?

[Harb] The subsidy fund puts into action the Arab nations' support for Lebanon and their commitment to help it stand on its feet and rebuild its economic infrastructure so that its return to normal life can be made possible and easy. The establishment of this fund is an

old idea, and the fact that it is being proposed today under this situation only confirms the commitment by Arab countries and by the Tripartite Committee—with whom the idea originated—to continue the quest for peace in Lebanon. On this basis, I find that this fund has one important significance: it signifies the Arab and international commitment to help Lebanon. This is a very important point, especially under present circumstances which forced many of us to despair and to lose hope that Lebanon will regain its vigor and will move in a normal fashion toward peace and sovereignty. Inviting the countries of the world to contribute to the fund is also significant in a positive way. It means that the world will not abandon Lebanon and that it considers the survival of Lebanon as a vital, sovereign state as something positive we must strive to achieve. On that basis I find the subsidy fund to be something positive. I interpret the subsidy fund and its formation as something good. When the subsidy fund becomes a reality, the Lebanese will have proof that they have not been left alone to fight fate. The Lebanese will know that although there are a few forces trying to destroy Lebanon, major international powers who are extremely effective can help Lebanon and are determined to help it. It is that which is giving the Lebanese hope that Lebanon can rise once again and can regain its vigor and its sovereignty.

[AL-HAWADITH] The sum which has been set for this fund is \$2 billion. This is not much at all when we consider that over \$10 billion are needed. What do you think?

[Harb] The \$2 billion which is being proposed to establish this fund represent the sum which will be paid up front. If the fund is established, that figure will be increased.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some people fear that the fund is being established not to rebuild Lebanon but rather to settle Palestinians and pay them reparations in compliance with Article Four of the Fez Summit Declaration. It is also being said that this money will be used to compensate those who do not wish to return. What do you think about that?

[Harb] I believe this is a pessimistic theory that raises many questions about the credibility of major countries and the credibility of leaders who are credible and who enjoy considerable respect. I do not believe that the world would agree that Lebanon would be thrown away and Palestinians would be settled and compensated under the guise of helping Lebanon. Of course there are fears about a settlement process, but I cannot link this question with that of the fund, nor can I allow myself to link these two issues together. That is why I think such fears are out of place.

[AL-HAWADITH] The Soviet ambassador said that Lebanon was moving away from being divided and partitioned and that it was moving toward unity. He is also optimistic about the future of Lebanon. What do you think?

[Harb] I would like to share the Soviet ambassador's optimism, particularly since the Soviet ambassador has many of the facts about the battle in Lebanon. He is also an esteemed friend and someone I respect. He is not one of those who make statements without backing them up with serious facts. What I can say, however, is that the mere fact that Lebanon's members of parliament got together over a national agreement to reform the domestic and political formula and the fact that they agreed on a way to regain sovereignty and rebuild institutions are very important indicators. The fact that Lebanon's members of parliament want to put an end to the futile war that is being fought in Lebanon and the fact that at the same time they are getting support and backing from all the countries of the world are also very important indicators despite the unexpected setbacks we are experiencing. These indicators show that Lebanon will move away from the danger of being partitioned and will regain its vigor.

[AL-HAWADITH] When will the al-Ta'if Agreement be ratified in parliament? Will that be after the constitution is amended?

[Harb] It is known that the government referred the proposed constitutional amendment to the Chamber of Deputies, which has been busy studying many existing bills that are pressing. At the same time parliament is putting itself on a schedule so it can apply itself to the task of studying the proposed constitutional amendments and ratifying them as it sees fit. I do not believe that there is any obstacle to that or that there is any hesitation on the part of members of parliament who are the only ones entitled to consider such amendments. The question, however, is one of time: the time required by parliament to do its work of drafting these bills, setting a time and a schedule for their consideration, and then referring them to a general session of parliament. I believe this can be accomplished in the next two months.

[AL-HAWADITH] In your opinion, the al-Ta'if Agreement is still the most appropriate solution to end the crisis in Lebanon, is it not?

[Harb] In my opinion it is. When we wrote the agreement, we found no other means to a solution. I would have hoped that any group could have come up with a better plan, but since we have no alternative to it, we are trying to carry it out.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you share the opinion expressed in some statements made by politicians that Lebanon will cease to exist if the al-Ta'if Agreement is not carried out?

[Harb] Of course if the al-Ta'if peace plan fails, I think the dangers to Lebanon will increase. And yet, I believe that Lebanon is too strong to be removed from the map. If we are persistent [in our desire to] implement this agreement, it is because Lebanon is tired. The Lebanese people are also tired, and they need a solution. The al-Ta'if Agreement is one formula for an appropriate solution that would stop what is happening in the

country and restore sovereignty. If we are persistent about this agreement, it is because we have not found anything better.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you think the Vatican initiative is a failure? Is there any follow up to it, or is it being reconsidered?

[Harb] I do not think that what the Vatican's ambassador did was an initiative. He did make an effort, but it was not an initiative. What the vatican's ambassador did was not compatible with the existing situation and with existing events. As a result, the effort was suspended.

[AL-HAWADITH] President Franjiyyah is still pessimistic. He thinks the Kissinger plan is being implemented, especially the part of the plan which has to do with the expatriation of Christians from Lebanon. Do you share his opinion?

[Harb] There have been times in my life when I did not share President Franjiyyah's pessimism, but what is happening today impels me to agree totally with President Franjiyyah. I may not do what President Franjiyyah does and describe what is happening as the Kissinger plan, but I am certain that what is happening in Lebanon is a major threat to the Lebanese state. Its aim is to expatriate the Lebanese, particularly Lebanese Christians; to settle Palestinians; and to have Israel occupy a large part of Lebanon. I share President Franjiyyah's fears on that account. I hope he is wrong, and I hope I am wrong. I hope that what is happening in Lebanon is not part of this major conspiracy even though a realistic look at what is happening in Lebanon makes me more suspicious and more apprehensive. Everything which is happening in the area and in the world—things like the immigration of Soviet Jews, the return of Palestinians to south Lebanon, the events in the south and in Beirut, the events in the eastern zone, the state of division, the al-Ta'if Agreement which is receiving universal support, as well as the existing emigration of Christians—is making me apprehensive and suspicious that this could be the conspiracy which is to be carried out.

[AL-HAWADITH] How can it be confronted?

[Harb] I believe that carrying out the al-Ta'if Agreement, ending the abnormal condition that exists in Lebanon, putting an end to the futile fighting and killing, and stopping the expatriation which is going on in Lebanon constitute a serious beginning to bring about the failure of this conspiracy, if such a conspiracy does in fact exist.

[AL-HAWADITH] It is being said that President Harawi makes no decisions on any important subject until he discusses the decision with Shaykh Butrus Harb. Is that due to the friendship between the two of you or to other matters?

[Harb] To say that President Harawi is my friend is to overstate the case. I have the honor of being President Harawi's friend and of working with him every now and then. It is not true, however, that President Harawi

makes no decisions until he consults with me. There are many matters that are decided by the president. He makes decisions about important matters and all I know about them is what I read in newspapers. There are some matters on which President Harawi does ask my opinion, and I, as his friend and member of the same assembly which brought him to the presidency, devote myself and all my energies to serving him. I do this not because he is a friend, but because I think President Harawi's success means the success of Lebanon. Should he fail in his mission, Lebanon will have a major crisis on its hands.

MOROCCO

Mouvement Populaire Leader Discusses Party Views

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[Interview With Mahjoubi Ahardane, Leader of Moroccan Mouvement Populaire, by Abu-Bakr al-Sharif in Rabat; "Moroccan Berber Mouvement Populaire Leader Who Has Returned to Political Arena Tells AL-TADAMUN: We Support Union, But for Greater Maghreb; Human Rights Consultative Council Is Intended To Make State of Law Complete;" first five paragraphs are AL-TADAMUN introduction; date not given]

[Text] Rabat—Mahjoubi Ahardane is a brilliant Moroccan political figure. He was a member of the Moroccan Liberation Army which fought colonialism and is founder of the Mouvement Populaire, mouthpiece of the Imazigh—the Berber.

Recently, he rose in an interesting manner in the artistic forefront. He is an (impressionist) painter and a veteran poet who has made more than one poetic endeavor in French and in the Imazigh language. Last June, Ahardane organized his latest impressionistic art exhibit at the Hayat Regency Hotel hall in the city of Rabat. He considers marriage between artistic and political creativity a normal thing. He even believes that a politician cannot be successful if he does not possess the artist's delicacy and his talent for exploration and prediction.

Ahardane's latest artistic activity coincided with his return to the political limelight after an absence connected with attempts by the Mouvement Populaire Party to find a substitute for him. But the members of this party, which Ahardane has led since 1958, have tacitly recognized Ahardane's strong personality. Eight secretaries have been appointed to perform the task he performed. Political observers in Morocco view Ahardane's sudden return very much like a coup attempt against what has happened. This return also falls within the space of reorganizing the Mouvement Populaire structures on a new basis.

The Mouvement Populaire Party continues to have an influential presence in the Moroccan political arena.

Most of its members come from the Berber tribes which have a broad cultural and social presence in Moroccan life. Because the history of Mahjoubi Ahardane, the movement's historical leader, includes his enlistment in the Liberation Army, this has gained him the approval of King Hassan II who recently appointed him a member of the Human Rights Consultative Council, which was created in Morocco on 8 May 1990.

In Rabat, Abu-Bakr al-Sharif, AL-TADAMUN correspondent, has conducted a comprehensive interview with Mahjoubi Ahardane. Following is the text of that interview:

[Al-Sharif] After a long absence from the political arena, the Mouvement Populaire leader has returned to the limelight through his appointment to the Human Rights Consultative Council. Does he return as chairman and leader or as an ordinary citizen honored by King Hassan II with the council membership?

[Ahardane] In all my life, I have never surpassed the level of ordinary citizen. In my view, the ordinary citizen is the citizen who understands his rights and duties well, who is proud of his genuineness and dignity, and who moves in the arena in any direction he wishes. This is the ordinary citizen named Ahardane. As for my return to the limelight, I have not left the political arena and have not been absent from it. It can be said that there was some sort of ambiguity and silence, and perhaps of official concealment, in the past few years. As for the political arena where action, not clamor, exists, I have continued to work silently for the country's interest and nothing else. I have remained loyal to my principles and objectives and to my enthusiasm to see Morocco strong and prosperous.

Imazigh Are Morocco's People

[Al-Sharif] Your absence from the arena has been tied to a premature perestroika within the Mouvement Populaire Party. It is said that the disagreement between you and your adversaries in the party is due to your clinging to the Berber character of the party at a time when the other side believes the opposite?

[Ahardane] The truth that must be told is that there is no disagreement, conflict, or racism in the Mouvement Populaire. There are no Arabs and no Shluh (Berber) in it. Only Moroccans are found in it. What has happened is that some people who tried not to acknowledge that Morocco's earliest inhabitants are the Berbers have become the mere memory of a racist tendency. Morocco's reality says that Morocco is a Muslim country and that its official language is Arabic. However, it cannot be denied that the Imazigh embraced this religion and gave this language strength it had not possessed before. The Imazigh also gave Islam a strong boost. Perhaps the best testimony to this boost is Tariq Ibn-Ziyad and the Andalusia conquests. I personally am honored to be able to speak Arabic with the same fluency as I speak Berber. Therefore, I do not believe that there is justification for the development of a conflict between

the Arabs and the Imazigh in the Mouvement Populaire. Any words to this effect can be considered a scheme perpetrated by the Mouvement Populaire enemies, even the enemies of this country and of its history.

[Al-Sharif] Disagreement within any party is a healthy and normal manifestation. During its life, the Mouvement Populaire experienced in the 1960's a disagreement which caused Dr. (Abdelkarim el Khatib) to break away and form another Mouvement Populaire party. It is said that there were behind that split secrets that have not been made public yet. What are they?

[Ahardane] The talk about el Khatib presumes my emphasizing a historical fact, namely that I consider el Khatib my brother and a patriotic figure. There was disagreement between us and we did not dot the i's and cross the t's of that disagreement when it developed, and I see no reason to do so now. What can be said is that that disagreement was a plot perpetrated by other circles. This is what we belatedly realized.

With Maghreb Union... But

[Al-Sharif] The presence of cabinet portfolios that have been designated for the Mouvement Party in every Moroccan Government for a number of years has led to your being viewed as a quasi-governmental party. How do you see this matter?

[Ahardane] You must know that my principle and the Mouvement Populaire Party principle is that Morocco must be in the vanguard through the immortal slogan "God, country, king." I have personally held several cabinet portfolios, some of which I should not have accepted. But I continue to be loyal to the throne and to this immortal slogan. As long as the cabinet is the cabinet of his majesty the king, regardless of who chairs it and who has the majority in it, loyalty to the throne and to he who sits on the throne compels me to participate. Perhaps it is Ahardane's adversaries who have allowed matters to reach the point they have reached. What is important is that my principle and the Mouvement Populaire principle is loyalty to the throne and the country.

[Al-Sharif] During your absence from the limelight, there have been developments in the political arena, perhaps the most important of which is the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union [UMA]. What is your assessment of this accomplishment and what is your vision of its future horizons?

[Ahardane] I have been tied to the political arena since the days of colonialism and I have been tied to the 'Alawite throne as of the time when I was a member of the resistance. From this starting point, I understand well that the union of the Greater Maghreb countries has always been the concern preoccupying His Majesty King Hassan II. Rather, his majesty has been working for the unity of all the Islamic, as well as Arab, countries. Therefore, we have all been happy with the creation of

this union. It is my opinion that this contact is considered in itself a positive step in the interest of the region's peoples. But what arouses anxiety and apprehensions is that the wish of his majesty the king, and along with it the wish of the Moroccan people in their entirety, will not receive the desired response and will not be countered by the other parties with the same determination to sacrifice and to undertake commitments.

It remains to be said that the UMA must not rise at the expense of the Imazigh and of their culture, cultural heritage, and genuine character. We consider the Arabs our brothers and we should receive the same consideration from them.

[Al-Sharif] How is this done?

[Ahardane] Insofar as Arabic is concerned, we consider Arabic a fundamental language by virtue of its being the language of the Koran. We are Muslims. We did not embrace Islam under the threat of the sword but voluntarily. Nobody has Arabized us forcefully. Rather, we have Arabized ourselves. Therefore, it is our right to see our Imazigh language getting its due in use and in performing the task of shedding light on and reviving the Imazigh cultural heritage and of concluding examples and lessons from this heritage. This can be accomplished only if this heritage and culture are given the same degree of attention given the Arab culture and language. Only in this way will there be a strong fusion and a strong national unity.

[Al-Sharif] During the period of your absence from the limelight, there has been a Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement that has made it possible to be optimistic that the issue of the Western Sahara conflict will find the ground from which a peaceful solution can emanate. How do you view the matter?

[Ahardane] The truth is that Algeria has done us an injustice insofar as the Sahara is concerned. It is true that Morocco spent a period of time under colonialist protection. Before Morocco's independence, the French rulers sought to consult with Morocco regarding its land borders. The late King Mohamed V refused any agreement with France on this issue so that the agreement may not be concluded at the expense of the struggle of Algeria which was colonized at the time. The king declared his eagerness and the eagerness of all Moroccans to provide the Algerian revolution with aid until Algeria attained its just right to independence. For this reason and because France was annoyed with this position, it annexed a part of the Moroccan Sahara, such as (Tindouf) and other areas, to Algeria. The purpose of this step was to torpedo the cooperation relationship between the two countries.

[Al-Sharif] And then...?

[Ahardane] We demonstrated our goodwill toward Algeria. But instead of cooperating with us to liberate the Sahara from Spanish colonialism, it created another problem for us, namely the so-called Polisario. Yet, I say that our relationship with Algeria remains strong and

distinguished. There is no circle that can divide us. This relationship is intricate, even at the tribal level. A number of Algerian tribes live with us here in Morocco. What is more, the Moroccan (Dahaja) tribes, as well as the (Zanata and Mesmouda tribes) are found in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania. Therefore, Algeria is our sister and it is Morocco's and Algeria's fate to be united.

Old Choice

[Al-Sharif] Morocco has made a decision to transfer public establishments to the private sector. As the leader of a party that incorporates nearly 60 percent of Morocco's population, what is your assessment of this decision and of the other decision to establish free zones in Morocco?

[Ahardane] This is a difficult question. But liberalism is an old Moroccan option. What can be said is that the state must establish firm bases for this major economic transformation in a manner that ensures Morocco's public interest, regardless of anything else. The Moroccan people in the various sectors have cadres capable of achieving success. So there has to be a clear vision through laws and regulations that organize the work, define the duties, and preserve the rights of all the social factions and classes.

[Al-Sharif] How about the free zones?

[Ahardane] Tangier used to be a free zone. Regrettably, it has not been left as it was. I believe that free zones are an important experiment. The only thing is that they should not come at the expense of other areas. I have followed the meeting that was held recently in this connection in the city of Agadir. I believe that the submitted studies have been good and I hope that implementation will be at the same level.

Open-Minded Islam Is Needed

[Al-Sharif] The Arab Maghreb region is experiencing the growth of the Islamic tendencies. Perhaps the outcome of the Algerian municipal and provincial elections is the most obvious evidence of this fact. The same applies to Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania, even though the means by which this growth is demonstrated are different. What is your assessment of these changes in the Maghreb arena?

[Ahardane] For years, the Algerian Liberation Front had control of power and of all the means to establish its philosophy. Perhaps it has not succeeded in accomplishing this. As for the Islamic tendencies—the "fundamentalists"—we are all Muslim and all Muslims are brothers. What we hope is that the Islam of those who have chosen Islam as their faith and their secular law is an open-minded, realistic, and sound Islam. Islam is not just women's veils and men's beards. It is the strength of faith and action. A venerable hadith of the prophet says: "Religion is intercourse." In our Maliki creed, we find nothing but sound religion and strong action. I have

always said that we are Muslims. If this Islam that is sweeping the Maghreb area is an open-minded Sunni Islam, then welcome. What we do not accept is fanaticism and the turning of the wheel of history backward.

[Al-Sharif] The address delivered by the Moroccan monarch on the occasion of the formation of the Human Rights Consultative Council made it clear that what is required is to make the state of laws complete and to deal with the disagreement with Amnesty International and the controversy it has provoked abroad. What are the aspects of the disagreement between Morocco and the organization, and how can they be dealt with?

[Ahardane] What can be said is that Amnesty conducted an investigation. We cannot accuse it of hostility towards Morocco. Amnesty is an international organization and it determines whether there is oppression in a given country. Insofar as Morocco is concerned, Amnesty issued a report which is available to us now. In the next meeting, we will examine this dossier so that we may clear Morocco's reputation, as his majesty the king has asked us to do. But I have an observation that must be recorded, namely that what is important is to examine this matter promptly because none of us accepts oppression. It is true that it is difficult to find countries where oppression does not exist. I believe that Morocco can live without oppression because we, from the top of the pyramid to its bottom, tasted the bitterness of oppression from the colonialist and had our fill of it. This experience taught us how to cling to justice. His majesty the king has asked us to explore the facts and to point out to him where oppression exists so that he may eliminate it. In this regard, the council shoulders the responsibility before all the Moroccan people for the objectivity and credibility of our activities to complete the state of laws as his majesty wants it.

[Al-Sharif] It is said that at the first council meeting, disagreement erupted over the language with which the members should address each other and over whether it should be Arabic or French.

[Ahardane] What happened is that the dossier submitted to us was written in French whereas the overwhelming majority of the council members speak Arabic. Some members registered their observation on the issue and demanded that Arabic be used. In my intervention on this issue, I said that what was required was to solve the pending problems, adding that I was a Berber and that I was entitled to speak in Berber and that, yet, there I was talking to them in Arabic.

Let Us Take a Lesson From Berlin

[Al-Sharif] There are those who say that the important developments in the eastern camp are due to the fact that the eastern camp peoples have recently discovered that race, ethnicity, or tribal affiliation is the strongest weapon for their unification and their attainment of their aspirations. What is your opinion?

[Ahardane] I believe that man, whoever he is and wherever he is, is eager not to shed his skin. Every man believes that his identity is the most important. It is a foregone conclusion that man is proud of his social ties and genuineness. I believe that we in the Mouvement Populaire consider what is happening in East Europe the revival of awareness and of the commitment to genuineness. It is on genuineness that values and traditions are built and additions to civilization are made while one keeps up pace with the spirit of the age and with all the political, economic, social, cultural, and practical developments the age experiences.

A final word. It is my firm conviction that tribes are the fundament of the social structure. A tribe is nothing but a group of families that will not let one of their members fall. Perhaps the fall of the Berlin wall is an irrefutable proof of this conviction. Here is communism, which was very much like a demon one day, vanishing. This confirms that all things revert to their base and origin. We in the Maghreb must not let matters reach this point.

Scholar Discusses Potential Economic, Political Changes

90AA0276A Casablanca AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI in Arabic 9 Aug 90 p 7

[Interview with Dr. Idris Ben Ali by 'Umar Ben Ayyash: "Morocco, Where Is It Going?"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Ben Ayyash] Many indications suggest that Moroccan society is in a state of transition and, indeed, appears to be paving the way for its succession at all levels. Some members of the original elite that gained prominence in and before 1956 have disappeared and other members will disappear shortly before or after the year 2000 due to old age or time. With them, certain "pacts," mentalities, and practices will also disappear, to be replaced by "pacts" of a new kind and by new mentalities and practices.

Many givens lead us to believe that Moroccan society is in a state of transition and that it will definitely move to another stage. In order to view the next stage, however, we have to consider the founding stage: what it has offered and what it has failed to offer.

[Ben Ali] There is no doubt that Moroccan society has gone through several basic evolutions. No one disputes the fact that today's society is different from yesterday's and that evolution is one of the laws of nature because society cannot survive without change. But, evolution can be for the better as well as for the worse.

I will begin with an observation that I consider the key to the total sum of observations I have on the subject. It can be said that, by and large, Moroccan society in the last period witnessed a significant buildup from the economic point of view and a weak buildup from the political point of view in the sense that the Moroccan elite remained captive to its initial starting point.

Between 1959 and 1965, Moroccan society gave a strong impression of being a vital and dynamic society destined to play leading roles at the intellectual and political levels, domestically and regionally. It seemed as though there was an urban society independent of the state. But, in the midst of its emotional exuberance, this elite was oblivious to the fact that the economic base for building a strong urban society was not available then. During that period, only 20 percent of Moroccans were living in cities compared to 80 percent living in the desert, and 80 percent were illiterate! And since the political game was confined to the cities, only 20 percent of the population took part in it. It failed to include society as a whole. The Moroccan elite was faced with the same fate as La Fontaine's frog that wanted to grow as big as a bull, so it kept blowing itself until it exploded.

The elite's ambition was greater than the real world could support. Naturally, there were regional, national, Arab and Third World influences that could not be overlooked. The elite believed that it had an unmistakable rendezvous with history. At that time, it had raised some unrealistic slogans that compelled it to retreat and its failure and retreat led to the failure and retreat of Moroccan society. It lacked social forces standing behind it to defend it and make restitution in the event of its ultimate failure.

This is with respect to the sixties. As for the seventies, they took off in another direction. The state had sought to use the national forces' slogans, particularly those pertaining to the fulfillment of liberation (liberation of the national soil), to industrialization (the 1973-77 plan), and to the formation of cadres, etc.

The government adopted some slogans, raising them in its own special way that impoverished the program of the national forces, prompting them to turn to critical speech.

The danger of the critical-political speech lies in the tacit message it carries to others, for it seems to be reminding the ruling elite of the existence of a non-ruling elite seeking power as well.

Critical speech alone is not a shame, but becomes a shame when it lasts for a long time. It should represent only a short transition period in the life of any movement. This is what enables some of our elements to cross to the other side, and we are unable to stop them. This is what opens their doors to the wind, rendering commitment to principles nothing but a moral issue and the movement between one side and the other an acceptable and desirable relative issue. Even when we are forced to punish "one another," we do that only as a symbolic gesture to stop the others and cut our political and moral losses.

Therefore, we must not be too pleased with our critical speech and must not mobilize the people on this basis for a long period of time. When given a chance, each of us can say this is good and this is bad, but finding an alternative remains one of the basic tasks of the elite.

Thus, we are in need of an alternative societal plan and I can go so far as to say that we are in need of a great visionary able to go against the current if necessary. When we go back in history and to events in history, we find that the people who built modern Moroccan society were 18th century intellectuals who swam against the current with all their might. This cultural elite (from Descarte to Rousseau to Voltaire, etc.) was not seeking the rulers' attention or approval, but rather was searching for what Machiavelli called "the Prince's favors." Indeed, these people were preoccupied with their glorious work, building an intellectual strategy, the only lasting strategy.

Moroccan society does not have a cultural message to offer. It does not have great cultural and intellectual value. We must not forget, however, Europe was built on this very basis.

Against this absence, however, we notice the supremacy of other values. Ask any Moroccan citizen about the foremost value in society and the immediate answer would be the value of money! True, the same value is found in Europe and elsewhere, but Europe has societal control capable of curbing the value of money. It has a strong civil awareness. In our country, however, the power of money is almost boundless.

Naturally, the predominance of "crude" values like the value of money begets desperate and obscure extremisms because it is the overwhelming majority that is so overpowered by money and thrown out of the affluent society, leaving it with only a "spiritual affluence," thus prompting it to renounce all those who play outside its realm and to charge them with unbelief. Therefore, I believe that Morocco will always be threatened with "extremism" because we have failed to defuse it in society. On the contrary, we are kindling its fire, even when we think we are controlling it. All we are doing is delaying its outbreak for a little while.

Of course, the only solution is democracy, but government intervention, unfortunately, has rendered it nothing but a hollow slogan. Democracy is ideology and practice. This kind of "hollow" democracy compels the Moroccan people to deal with the local groups—and with the authorities as well—as though they were the administration or as a broker or mediator between the citizenry and the administration.

[Ben Ayyash] I understand from your statement that the basic problem that branded the last stage was the problem of the elite and the relationship between urban society and the state.

[Ben Ali] I will give you an example. The Moroccan economic elite has become very powerful. There is no doubt about that. It has accumulated considerable capital, but it is not independent of the state. Although it is a "lobby" able to extract certain gains and privileges through pressure, it is unable to impose its opinion on

the state. Rather, the state is the one that imposes its orientation on the economic elite, an orientation that is often political.

The same goes for the political elite. I believe that this elite is required to produce intellectuals long term, intellectuals concerned more with strategy than tactics.

Even if the last stage had certain historical interactions that rendered our politicians the image of craftiness or guile, such interactions are no longer valid.

[Ben Ayyash] Mr. Ben Ali, it seems that talk about the elite evokes talk about fundamental problems such as the problem of education.

[Ben Ali] I think the greatest problem Morocco has experienced in the last 34 years is the problem of education. It will continue to experience it so long as it continues to think about it in a haphazard and offhanded way, the way of tactics. The lack of a clear strategy in education has put us in the same situation as our neighbor, Algeria. In Algeria, the National Front believed that the values of modernization ought to be manifested in the production sector, so all attention was focused on this sector and the education sector was neglected and left to the archaic elements that control it. So what happened next? A rift developed between the production sector and the education sector and the two sectors became incompatible. Indeed, the production sector was besieged by the educational sector. That is why I think the problem of the relationship between the two sectors is one of the major difficulties of our Algerian brothers.

By contrast, in our country, the state was able to establish such a relationship and maintain it for some time, but it has turned against it the last 15 or 20 years when it embarked upon a program without a strategy, a purely demagogical program. That is why I say that what is happening in education today is a serious turning point in the country's societal life. What we are doing now is sitting on the periphery and this is incredible!

[Ben Ayyash] But the educational system in Morocco has always produced people on the periphery.

[Ben Ali] Yes, but the periphery of today is different from that of yesterday. Today, the periphery is being presented in a different light. Twenty years ago, people on the periphery lived in a kind of familial solidarity and communal unity, whereby they were only partially aware of their peripheral status that very often was attributed to personal failure. Today, things are completely different because if an individual or a group is relegated to the periphery, they will be in the same or worse situation in their families, among their people, in their neighborhoods, and, indeed, in their cities in some cases. They are aware of their deprivation and peripheral status 24 hours a day.

The fear of this frightful status is one of the factors of religious or social extremism. Such fear is bound to

compel people to search for a "safety group" whose members are bound by strong relations bordering on "sacredness."

Naturally, it is difficult to talk about stability and extremism together, albeit ideologically. A society such as Moroccan society must preserve its stability because it is still young. I am amazed at the state's conduct with regard to education and how it has failed to heed the lessons of history. All countries that have and are still in the process of building have invested in education.

[Ben Ayyash] But how can Arabization be a demagogical issue?

[Ben Ali] The way in which Arabization is being handled, besides its timing and horizons, makes it a hollow slogan, a demagogical slogan that seems to flirt with the masses' "pride" while pulling the rug from under their feet simultaneously. An Arabization that sanctifies what is called in French a "dual track education." An Arabized education for the masses and a bi-lingual and, indeed, multi-lingual education for the elite. It is demagogical at this level. What kind of Arabization is the ruling elite talking about when it is intent on educating its children at foreign missions that are still flourishing in Morocco? Indeed, it insists that the children learn several foreign languages.

What kind of Arabization is it when the job market in Morocco demands for clerical jobs proficiency in French and English in addition to a university degree. Those who are courting our "pride" with Arabization are the same ones who advertise in their newspapers vacant positions only for the "Frenchified," in addition to English. Let these demagogues tell us: where are the vacant jobs for the Arabized? Let them tell us where their children are right now. Look around you and you will find that the age of a clerk with an elementary or even high school degree is gone. A clerk nowadays has to have a diploma and proficiency in foreign languages and even be literate in new office technology such as word processing, computer programming, etc.

The politicians are "artful" and "wily." We should not be ashamed because they stole our slogans and we should not be afraid to go against the current. Did I not tell you that we need people who can go against the current?

[Ben Ayyash] Persistence in such irresponsible practices is attributed to the fact that the officials cannot see beyond the end of their noses and are sowing what their children will reap tomorrow. Unfortunately, they are planting their children's future with mines.

[Ben Ali] Yes, this is a very serious matter. More serious, though, is keeping silent about it. The ruling elite stole a National Movement slogan and made a terrible hole in it.

Look what happened in Lebanon!

In Lebanon, the elite comprised Maronites and Christians and the rest of the population made up the rank and file, thus causing civil war to break out with incredible ease at first.

Again I say that the strength of society also lies in the strength of the middle class in small economic differences. The smaller the economic differences are the stronger the stability is. One of the reasons for inequality today is inequality in education.

Unquestionably, the Moroccan elite's problem is an intertwined problem. Had this problem not been broached with such intensity, a researcher like the American, Waterbury, would not have written a whole book on this subject about 20 years ago. The strange thing is that both sides kept quiet about this "banned" book even though it was not partial to either side. Perhaps this is the secret to the consensus to blot it from memory, notwithstanding our disagreement with it.

The Moroccan elite used to be linked to education. School children are the ones who led the national movement. As an extension of this situation, the University of Morocco in the seventies offered a distinct and advanced ideology. It gave a push forward to culture and ideology in Morocco, but it stopped shortly afterward. The university stopped playing this role completely and no longer nurtured the elite with new elements save for some technocrats that were polarized by the ruling elite. As for the political parties, there was almost nothing. All the political and intellectual leaders in Morocco today belong to a pre-seventies generation, keeping in mind that the seventies generation today consists of people in their forties.

It is a situation that makes one think and ponder.

By and large, I believe—and this is my personal opinion—that the Popular Democratic Labor Organization developed as a response to this need, the need to create a cadre to express the options, positions, and ambitions of the new (on-the-periphery) elite.

This experience, I believe, was marked by two things:

First, it remained a captive of the seventies ideology, at least up to the recent conference, during which certain questions, put off from the founding days, were raised. The second thing is this strange "feeling" of a need for legitimacy derived from the past.

[Ben Ayyash] How successful has a movement, whose primary motivation was to make the voice of the new on-the-periphery elite heard, been in actually making its voice heard away from what I called the "old non-commissioned officers'" tutelage over the new "second pig [duziyam halluf]?"

These are questions I am raising in response to what you have said about the elite, not because I would like to go into them but only because I would like to point out that the elite problem is a complicated problem that requires much analysis.

That is why I agree with you that the intellectual and political (progressive) elite in Morocco must more than ever before produce intellectually. We have no time to "raise chickens," to print, to publish, to speculate in real estate, etc. This is not the work of intellectuals. This is for people who have nothing on their minds and in their hearts but "material gain."

[Ben Ali] I also agree with you that we should push the analysis to its limits. Otherwise, what good would it do to take it only one-third or one-fourth of its strength!?

I would like to add a basic comment that is that, first and foremost, we used to be a verbal society and the Moroccan people of the fifties and sixties were yearning for knowledge. But we quickly switched to an audio-visual society and to superficial pictures whose credibility lasts only as long as it takes us to see them on TV.

This is a serious matter, but the ruling elite seems satisfied with the ease with which it distracts the young people. Superficial thoughts, however, can only produce superficial people you can manipulate today and your enemy can manipulate against you tomorrow. Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was a great politician, but he chose to make political pygmies (mere zealots) of his people. The outcome was that he failed, and his people failed with him.

[Ben Ayyash] I really cannot resist adding one more question to conclude this interview. It pertains to the Moroccan economy. Where is it going? [Ben Ali] It is certain that the only given that is forcing itself on the Moroccan arena is the IMF plan on which there are two stances: The elite (opposition) stance that is a critical one that does not have an alternate plan, a critical speech that offers no solutions; and the ruling elite stance that appears to be unwilling to implement the IMF plan to the letter because such a plan invariably tends to undermine stability. Therefore, it is dealing with IMF measures with utmost caution.

The government is completely right in this regard. Moroccan society is not sufficiently qualified to implement the IMF recommendations. The IMF is different in that it adopts a purely economic logic that does not consider the state's political logic. The Moroccan state, however, does not accept the economic logic and neither does urban society itself, as evidenced by the fact that when the people took to the streets during the 1981 and 1984 events, they didn't raise slogans against the state, but rather asked the government to intervene to curb the economic logic or, in other words, to put a stop to speculation, inflation, fraud, etc. The government's first reaction was to appoint an "auditor" for each city. This means that it wanted to assure the people that it was still willing to play its former roles.

Everyone agrees nowadays that the market is the only situation to a healthy economy. The big problem, however, is the relationship between Moroccan capital and the state. Moroccan capital is not yet ready to swim on its own. Whenever anything happens, it runs to hide

behind the state's cloak. But the state is also the protector of the underprivileged classes and the problem is that it will not be able to unravel easily this pact because this will inevitably cause much pain and suffering and many changes.

SAUDI ARABIA

Editorial Probes Justification for Iraqi Invasion

90AE0289A Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 14 Aug 90 p 1

[Editorial: "Is Kuwait Israeli Territory for Saddam To Barter With"]

[Text] Mature awareness, wise political action, and realistic behavior are what numerous Arab regimes lack, as proven by the fact that our losses in political wars have exceeded the losses of any other country. At the United Nations, we speak with as many tongues as there are Arab states. At the Arab League, we speak with still more tongues, especially those who speak on behalf of 'Antar Ibn-Shaddad, of the (noble character), and of the Kremlin, those who bring with them a long record of accusations and disputes, and those who seek the privilege of raising the flag of one hero over that of another in the big hall and on the international and Arab scene.

This matter and this reality lead us to Iraq's situation. Does Iraq need to ration food when it sits on the biggest water store in the Arab homeland? Are there inevitable reasons to make drugs disappear? Must people wear the same clothing summer and winter? What is more dangerous than all of this: Should the Iraqi dinar drop in value to become a mere piece of newsprint just because a leader is controlled by his instincts and by the illusion of a power that challenges the entire world?

The ramifications of the crisis to Iraq have begun to surface even before the lapse of two weeks following the invasion of Kuwait. The coming days may have an even heavier impact when a series of difficulties begin to leave their imprint on the Iraqi family. How will the family secure milk for infants and drugs for the sick? Amidst this madness, Saddam Husayn stands to announce a ridiculous and deceitful initiative intended to mislead the entire Arab public opinion.

Naive circles are confronted with naive proposals whenever any mention is made of Palestine the same way certain positions and statements are expressed when the talk is of freedom in Uruguay and Guatemala. But to be very honest, is Kuwait an "Israeli" territory whose occupation is permissible in order that Iraq may negotiate for withdrawal from this Arab territory which paid its money and suspended its development plans to finance Iraq's war with Iran and to provide for the PLO?

Is it permissible, for example, that Syria occupy Jordan in order to demand the liberation of Palestine, is it permissible that the Sultanate of Oman occupy the UAE territories or that Egypt, which is in greater need of

material resources, attack Libya's territories, pronounce the same justifications, and make the same demands?

What Saddam Husayn has done, whether among his own people and within his own country or at the level of the Arab nation in general, cannot be condoned rationally. It cannot be condoned even by the naive because the legal arguments that Saddam cites from his own viewpoint cannot enter the lexicon of international principles and do not agree with the logic which he has devoted to entrench his occupation of Kuwait and with which he has threatened pan-Arab security.

We say very calmly that Saddam who is trying to spread his severe crisis in all directions in order to divert attention from the domestic situation in Iraq may not be saved by these tricks. It is possible to confiscate the liberties and any dictator can prevent the movement of his citizens and can reject any opposition inside his country. All these are extremely influential factors. But their influence does not reach the point of threatening the fate of every citizen, unlike the disappearance of foodstuffs which causes the onset of starvation which will exert its influence among a people who are a rich people by all material criteria.

At this point we will find that Iraq will move, leaving behind allegations and calls. This is what Saddam fears but what he wishes to ignore, ignoring its consequences at the same time. But whereas the first adventure was an allegation and a propaganda act, the second adventure is deadly and fatal. History has its lessons for those who wish to learn and understand.

SUDAN

Writer Calls for More Political Openness, Pluralism

90AA0315B Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI in Arabic 12 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Fath-al-Rahman al-Nahhas in "Roadblocks" column: "Pluralism and Singularism"]

[Text] Multiplicity of opinion is a human characteristic that is classified as a healthy phenomenon. God's will determined that humanity would disagree, that its opinions would be many, and that man would be granted reason, which distinguishes him from other creatures and enables him to discuss and propose views, propagate and understand ideas, and thus either absorb or reject them.

A multiplicity of opinions has many advantages. The most important is that it allows an opportunity to read a given issue from many sides. It also contributes to the analysis of subjects. It provides options around them as the initial basis that leads to the best and most suitable solutions.

Opposed to pluralism stands singularism of opinion. It at once indicates isolation, monopolization, and concealment—the suppression of human reason.

It is the unhealthy door to the ruin of societies, the spread of dictatorships, the decline of nations, and the thwarting of peoples.

We are now living with the problem of pluralism and singularism in thought and politics. We are trying to arrive at a formula that does not hurl us into pluralism or make us swerve toward singularism.

Ostensibly, the proposal to end political pluralism and confiscate its cards was made after a defective and crippled experiment in democracy. Inwardly, however, political pluralism has remained, and with it the cardholders have remained.

Ostensibly, we are raising the slogan, “No to an absolute single [party] system,” and we are supporting this by engaging in varieties of dialogue in the form of special general conventions. Inwardly, however, there remains the charge that what is now being proposed politically and intellectually is merely a form of arbitrary single-party rule.

The final result of this silent struggle between the legal [government] and those who press the charge is the creation of a state of complete lack of agreement at the grass roots. This will produce even more debate and skirmishing about the importance or unimportance of political pluralism in the Sudan.

To move beyond this feverish struggle, the conference on a political system was organized to discuss and decide the form of government and polity in the Sudan.

The conference has included almost all political shades, so that the government can avoid the charge of leaning toward one side.

Thus, the disagreement is sure to be large. Some people will call for pluralism; others will call for a single organization summing up all political shades in a single focus.

It think it will be impossible to convince the majority to join under the banner of a single organization or regime. It will be difficult to impose one umbrella to unite all previous political colorations. The fundamental condition in the Sudan is pluralism, not singularism. The supporters of pluralism are much more numerous than the supporters of singularism.

If we approve a one-party system, all we gain is going in circles around ourselves. The sun of unity will not shine on us, nor shall we enjoy the moon of stability or days of serenity.

We need more political openness. We need to invent a form of political pluralism under which national organizations with national roots and enlightened positions will move.

If liberalism is scanty in its yield, this does not prevent us from granting to others free pulpits, so long as these are not surrounded by the odor of disloyalty and not occupied by the enemies of God and humanity.

TUNISIA

Former Union Leader on Party Politics, Iraqi Invasion
90AA0314B Tunis LE TEMPS in French 8 Aug 90 p 2

[Interview with Taieb Baccouche, academic and former leader of the Tunisian National Labor Federation, by Mouldi M'barek; date and place not given]

[Text] How does the political situation in our country look? How can the democratic process be perfected? Has the RCD [Democratic Constitutional Rally] successfully led the transition? Does the opposition have credibility?

What is the future of the tripartite initiative? Does fundamentalism respond to the concerns of our societies or is it playing into the imperialists' hand?

Is the Arab world keeping pace with historic trends or is history still passing it by? What explains the many recurring fratricidal conflicts?

Mr. Taieb Baccouche, an academic and former secretary general of the UGTT [Tunisian National Labor Federation], agreed to give LE TEMPS his thoughts on all of these questions.

[M'barek] What is your analysis of the political situation and how can the democratic process be perfected in your opinion?

[Baccouche] I believe the political situation is going through a period of stagnation. The mechanisms of the democratic process appear to be grinding to a standstill. In order for change to preserve its initial dynamism and become an irreversible fact, the various positive measures taken to improve the overall climate had to reach the foundations of political life, but they do not seem to have done so. To illustrate this state of affairs, let me cite as examples the impression given by the government that it is overly cautious—excessive caution breeds hesitation and leads to immobilization—and the impression that it is guarding the political initiative too jealously, resulting in a more or less conscious desire to dominate and control political life in every detail.

This is best illustrated by the realm of information, which—despite certain efforts—remains closed to differences and intolerant of the opposing point of view.

On this subject, I believe we must move beyond the limited framework of the Higher Council of the National Pact, which seems to have had its day. The democratic process under way must move into higher gear. It needs a more fitting framework, a sort of blue ribbon council that would debate the important problems facing our society. Specialized committees could be set up under

this council. Public debate would be enriched and broadened by it, moving beyond the confines of day-to-day problems and politicking on the important choices facing society. Separately, if community life were more encouraged and developed, Tunisian society would make a very promising qualitative leap forward.

[M'barek] The so-called democratic opposition seems weak and its message does not always seem to find an audience. Where, in your opinion, do its weaknesses lie?

[Baccouche] Its weaknesses lie primarily in the breakup into small groups characterized by cliquishness and yet, a close look would show that objectively the differences between them amount to little in comparison to the common ground that should unite them.

These weaknesses are also to be found in hesitancy with respect to certain fundamental problems, which casts an ambiguous veil over the important strategic choices when they are not obscured by political tactics.

In difficult times when determinant choices are to be made, clarity is all-important and positions must be defined and shouldered squarely. The dynamic phase of transition in which our society finds itself requires such clarity so that the positions of all players can be identified. Without it, there is marginalization.

[M'barek] Has the RCD handled the transition successfully?

[Baccouche] In my opinion it has not, because it seems to me that the RCD has forgotten the language of change and—even more so—the political practice of change, change having become more of a slogan or catchword. The RCD has failed to set itself apart from the State or the government, preferring to be indistinguishable. This lack of distinction is one of the primary obstacles to the democratization of our society. I believe that the RCD's great, and possibly fatal, error lies in confusing its own existence or survival with its hold on power. Its obsession with remaining in power is such that it has lost sight of two facts: first, that power cannot be retained eternally, and second, that one of the conditions necessary for true democracy to exist is the possibility of a change of governing parties. It follows that it would be in the RCD's interest to foster the conditions that would allow for a changeover of parties in power without a fundamental dismantling of the progress and accomplishments it takes pride in.

[M'barek] What is your analysis of the fundamentalist phenomenon? Is it a reflection of the true concerns of our societies?

[Baccouche] Fundamentalism is not a new phenomenon. Generally, it is associated with social crises. To the extent that it is representative of a school of thought, its participation makes for a richer public debate. I believe that if the fundamentalists were to emphasize the cultural dimension of their work, they would serve Islam

and society well by discussing the true problems confronting our Arab-Muslim world. By real problems, I do not mean the wearing of the veil or coeducation, but all the manifestations of underdevelopment that make "subcountries" or "subsocieties" of us.... Instead of reviving Ijtihad [individual interpretation of the tenets of faith] or debating the ways in which Islam could be made to contribute to development (because objectively, it could do so by stimulating critical thinking and fostering freedom of thought, freedom of initiative, tolerance and an enriching diversity), they are doing more to draw us deeper into ignorance, regressive thinking, and fratricidal hatred. In so doing, they are playing into the hand of imperialism, which makes no secret of its support for these movements, aimed at saddling us with a mess. Fundamentalism's handling of the Palestinian question is just one link in this chain. Rather than taking on an eminently constructive role, the fundamentalists are playing at politics in the least noble sense of the word, lapsing into the opportunism of shortsighted, petty politics. Unless they abandon that path, they will—I am convinced—do great harm to society and to Islam.

[M'barek] There is a tendency to compare Algeria's political situation to that of our own country. Is the comparison a valid one?

[Baccouche] In my opinion, the Algerian situation does not resemble our own. Colonialism's impact and the degree of alienation are not the same, nor is there the same degree of homogeneity in the social fabric of the two countries. It seems to me that the mistakes committed in all areas by the FLN [Algeria's National Liberation Front] are relatively more serious. But that does not mean the two countries do not mutually influence one another.

[M'barek] The Arab countries do not appear to be keeping pace with the changes taking place in the world, because there seems to be a sense of resignation, of being on the sidelines of history.

[Baccouche] That is my feeling as well, unfortunately. Yet they do not need to ponder the upheavals in East Europe or the 25-year-old effort to build Europe. They need only look at the Israeli-American politics in their region to be enlightened as to the fate imperialism is preparing for them. People are generally aware of this, but certain leaders persist in ignoring the obvious out of selfish and base considerations.

[M'barek] What do you make of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict?

[Baccouche] However well founded, Iraq's accusations against Kuwait in no manner justify an armed intervention, which is the logic of survival of the fittest and the law of the jungle. Iraq's charges could have been discussed and dealt with by the Arab League. Such conflicts in the Arab world are not explained solely by economic factors, but also by the authoritarian and undemocratic nature of most Arab regimes. As a matter of urgency,

Iraqi troops must withdraw and the League of Arab States should seize the opportunity to prove that the Arab nation is capable of solving its problems alone without allowing the imperialists to continue to police the region and impose their policy through their pawns in the region. It is unfortunate to see brotherly peoples pushed into a fratricidal war without consultation.

[M'barek] What is the thrust of your participation at the recent meeting on the tripartite initiative on 31 July and what do you make of it?

[Baccouche] I accepted the invitation to speak at the meeting because I believe that the country needs initiatives of this kind. It also needs a truly democratic force capable of surmounting cliquishness and the small-group mentality. I believe that if all parties are well intentioned, this initiative could result in something useful for the country. I think that the government would be well advised not to sabotage the initiative or bar anyone from participating, because if the government tries to force everyone to choose between itself and the fundamentalists, it would be committing an unforgivable strategic error. The forces of democracy would be ill advised to maintain political relations with fundamentalism, even at the tactical level as a way of exerting pressure on the government. That is why I stressed in my remarks the need to draw a line between holding a debate of ideas with the fundamentalists and entering into political relationships with them. Debate is beneficial to everyone and it contributes to the shaping and enlightenment of public opinion, but political relations are detrimental because there is a fundamental contradiction between those who define themselves in terms of secular legitimacy based on popular institutions and those who lay claim to divine legitimacy by invoking holiness. When so vast a difference exists, ideological debate is the only possibility.

Bank Official Discusses Export Policy

90AA0293B Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE
in French 15 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by Ezzeddine Saidane, banker: "An Export Dimension"]

[Text] Tunisia has made substantial progress in the field of economic development. A viable, diversified economic base has been built. Furthermore and even more importantly, the Tunisian people are now thinking in terms of development and the creation and accumulation of wealth, but at what price?

The price may at first seem high. The foreign debt that has accumulated (nearly 60 percent of the GNP) and the service on that debt (over 25 percent of net export receipts) undeniably constitute a heavy burden that renders future development of the Tunisian economy more difficult and risks comprising it.

Emigration of a substantial portion of the population to countries where problems of adaptation are still acute has always been among the government's main concerns.

The environment has suffered considerable damage.

A regional imbalance and relatively acute unemployment among young people and new graduates characterize modern Tunisian society.

In addition, in order to ensure its development, Tunisia has had to commit natural resources such as oil and phosphates that are by definition nonrenewable.

And yet, while the price Tunisia has paid for economic growth and the level of development achieved initially seems high, what it all comes down to is whether or not Tunisia will be capable of deriving maximum benefit from that effort, meaning making it profitable. One of the ways to achieve that objective seems to be by exporting.

Exports: A Viable Path

The consensus is clear: Exporting seems to be the only viable way to enable the Tunisian economy to continue to develop and make the aforementioned effort profitable.

It must also be clearly accepted that exports cannot be measured in tons or physical units or even in dinars.

We can only have a true measure of our exports in terms of the Tunisian added value exported and expressed in foreign exchange, the American dollar, for example.

If we do not proceed in such a manner, it will be difficult for us to come close to optimum allocation of our limited resources, to mete out the effort in terms of the yield, and the squandering of our nation's means will be inevitable. Indeed, one cannot continue to encourage (or "dope") real exports and pseudo [as published] exports in the same manner.

It is an economic aberration to continue to subsidize activities whose foreign exchange balance by and large shows a deficit.

Our current policy of encouraging exports does not always combine the interests of the enterprise and the national interest as well. Is it not in fact true that certain enterprises now sell abroad 15 percent or somewhat more of their turnover at a loss for the sole purpose of gaining easy access to advantages offered by the nation, among which one might cite: tax benefits, the freedom to import raw materials, professional accounts in foreign exchange, a professional file, subsidized financing, and so on?

Let us take the simple example of an enterprise that exports 15 percent of its turnover and that has a 40-percent rate of integration (already substantial). This

enterprise actually exports only 6 percent Tunisian added value (15 percent times 40 percent equals 6 percent).

Of this 6 percent, the enterprise gets back the following in foreign exchange: 1.5 percent (15 percent times 10 percent) for its professional fee, essentially used to finance business trips, and 3 percent (15 percent times 20 percent) for its professional account in foreign exchange, exclusively used to finance the enterprise's imports.

Of the 6 percent, only 1.5 is left (6 percent minus 1.5 and 3 percent), for which the community pays the price several times in terms of fiscal advantages, subsidized financing, the freedom to import, without forgetting that exports themselves often involve a loss, the difference being paid by the local consumer.

The community does not have the means to continue to justify something irrational indefinitely. Exports, like any economic activity, have an economic and social cost, as well as a cost in terms of opportunity. Export incentives are granted at the expense of other activities and investments that we can ill afford to sacrifice to promote pseudo exports.

Indeed, we must export, but specifically Tunisian added value. We must encourage, but such encouragement can only be in terms of a true export effort or even a true effort to sell, for the key word today is actually no longer "export," but "sell."

Sales Dimension

With markets now becoming universal, the driving force behind economic activity and international trade in particular is no longer production, but sale.

The act of production is becoming standardized, normalized, mechanized, "robotized," in short, popularized. Exports themselves are increasingly affected by sales. It may seem trite to say that, in order to export, one must first sell, but such is in fact increasingly the case. Indeed, the one who exports today is not always the one who produces, even if he is competitive in terms of price and quality, but rather, the one who has the ability and capacity to sell. Furthermore, the supply is increasingly ensured by high-volume purchasing centers. For example, shirts are no longer bought by the dozen or the hundred. High-volume purchasing centers that must sometimes supply several distribution networks at once order by the tens or hundreds of thousands.

The export mentality now being created in Tunisia should rapidly metamorphose into a mentality of a seller on a world scale. It is orders won by Tunisian salesmen that will enable the Tunisian production apparatus, among others, to operate and develop. Is it not trade and this dimension of trade in particular that generates nine-tenths of all wealth?

Regulating exchange and foreign trade, fiscal regulations, and the banking and financial system and administration should pave the way for Tunisia to embark on real integration into the world market.

Scientific Society Seeks Transfer of Western Technology

90AA0314A Tunis LE TEMPS in French 27 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by H. El Bour: "A New Approach to Technology Transfer;" first two paragraphs are LE TEMPS introduction]

[Text] The transfer of technology from North America to Tunisia is the primary mission of the Tunisian Scientific Society (TSS), an independent organization of Tunisian students and researchers created in 1986 in North America.

A majority of the association's members are in Tunis at this time, preparing their fourth yearly conference, which will be devoted to the theme of "Introducing New Technologies into Tunisian Industry."

Nearly 400 of the Tunisians who have studied or are now studying scientific research in North America are members of TSS.

Its main objective is to contribute to technology transfer in Tunisia by providing a basis for cooperation and exchange in experimentation between educational and industrial entities in Tunisia and in North America.

The association's activities are varied. It publishes a quarterly journal containing general information about TSS as well as analyses and articles written by members of the association.

Another review, "The Tunisian Scientific Magazine," published twice yearly, offers articles and studies concerning such sectors as engineering, economics, agriculture, and management.

TSS also publishes two separate directories: The scientific directory is a collection of abstracts on research performed by association members and is distributed to Tunisian students, researchers, and companies.

The second, a student directory, consists of resumes intended to acquaint Tunisian companies and institutions with Tunisian students and researchers in North America.

A Formative Colloquium in Tunisia

In addition to the mechanisms listed above, TSS has created an industrial consortium, which Tunisian companies may join. It currently boasts 25 members and its purpose is to establish contacts between TSS members and Tunisian companies to effect the actual transfer of technology. Among its activities, the association periodically holds regional conferences in the United States and Canada.

A yearly conference held in Tunisia is another tradition, now entering its fourth year. The next conference, on the theme of "Introducing New Technologies into Tunisian Industry," will take place on 1 and 2 August.

The members of TSS invite all interested students and all those concerned in industry and the academic community to take part in the proceedings.

Panel discussions on data processing, industrial electronics and electro-mechanics are scheduled and an eminent Indian professor from the Montreal Polytechnical School, Mr. Dinkar Mukhedkar, will make an address on the contribution of North-American know-how to the development of Tunisian industry.

In addition, the TSS science library, made up of scientific works donated by students, is open to students and industrial consortium members in Tunisia.

Nearly 200 recent titles, including very costly reference works, will grace the shelves of the TSS library to be found at ENIT [National School of Engineers and Technicians?]

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Deputy Director Discusses Military-Economic Agency

90AE0309A Aden AL-THAWRI in Arabic
4 Aug 90 pp 4, 5

[Interview with Major 'Ali al-Kahlani, deputy director general of the Military-Economic Agency, by Majid Muhammad: "Military-Economic Agency—Broad Duties Including Service and Production, Importing and Exporting"; in Sanaa, date not given; first two paragraphs are AL-THAWRI introduction]

[Text] The Military-Economic Agency is an agency with broad economic activity. It does not rely on specialization; rather, it aims at comprehensiveness and diversity, with duties and activities ranging from importation and distribution to production, service, and marketing. In the economic activity that it undertakes, the agency has no relation to the private sector as a partner. Rather, it is an agency belonging to the armed and security forces. It is considered a public sector that works alongside the private sector and that becomes involved with it as a neutral competitor.

After a quick tour of the agency's installations, during which we learned about the activity and extensive facilities of agency centers and branches in Sanaa and Dhamar and about the care, system, and orderliness with which these branches and centers operate, we decided to meet with Major 'Ali al-Kahlani, the agency's deputy director general. He spoke to us from the agency's general headquarters in Sanaa, giving details and explanations. Here is the text of the interview:

[Muhammad] When was the agency established? What was its initial capital, and what is its present capital? Is it public sector or mixed sector?

[Al-Kahlani] The agency was established in 1973 with a capital of 5 million riyals. In 1979, the Military-Consumer Agency was merged with the Economic Agency, so that the capital at that time became 17 million riyals. The present capital of the agency amounts to 200 million riyals. The agency is considered a public agency, and its ownership belongs 100 percent to the armed and security forces.

[Muhammad] What activities does the agency perform? How many branches and centers does it have? In which governorates of the republic is its activity centered?

[Al-Kahlani] The agency carries out its activity through the following sections:

1. The Commercial Section: This section serves the public throughout the republic, as well as the armed and security forces, in all requirements of daily life. The agency's commercial activity involves importing basic food items, clothing, meat, furniture, household appliances, and building materials. These are made available to all citizens in all governorates, cities, regions, and districts of the republic by opening main branches and smaller agency centers, as well as showrooms, exhibitions, and groceries. Agents for the agency are appointed in remote areas, and merchandise of good quality and appropriate, reasonable price is offered on a continual basis.

2. The Industrial Section: This section includes a number of food plants and specialized factories. The agency has the Bajil food-packing plant and a freezing plant in Ma'rib. The agency concentrates in this section on industries that process local raw materials.

3. The Agricultural Section: This section includes a number of agency-owned plant and animal farms, as well as cold storage warehouses. The agency's activity in the agricultural section involves managing and directing the agricultural production section, procuring its requirements, and marketing its products. Many production farms belong to this section, and their product is increasing every year. Also, there are central stockyards, refrigerated warehouses to store agricultural products when they are seasonally plentiful, heavy agricultural machines such as diggers, plows, planters, harvesters, and other machines.

4. The Marketing and Agricultural Services Section: This section is concerned with marketing agricultural products to keep pace with developments in growth. It works to lighten the burden on farmers by offering necessary marketing services. It provides the inputs for agricultural production. In order to link farmers with the agency and eliminate middlemen, it contracts directly with producers, providing them with agricultural production inputs—improved seeds, chemical fertilizers, and insecticides—and giving them low-interest loans.

5. The Transportation Section: This section provides transportation services for material belonging to the agency and rental service to others.

6. The Refrigeration Section: This section stores agricultural products, meat, etc.

All these sections offer their services according to programs and plans that realize the goals for which they were established.

As for the other part of your question, the agency offers its services to citizens through its more than 67 branches and centers located throughout the republic, as well as six centers in Aden and the consumers' cooperative opened late this June in al-Mu'alla in Aden governorate.

This vanguard agency carries out its duties in various fields with 100-percent Yemeni personnel, numbering over 2,600 men and women employees. Computers are used in the general administration centrally and in the Bajil food-processing complex. Work is now being done on their use in Aden governorate and in the other governorates.

[Muhammad] What facilities does the agency have for importing, marketing, distribution, and storage?

[Al-Kahlani] The agency has commercial relations with many countries of the industrialized and producing world. It likewise has relations with international markets.

The agency imports its needs according to appropriations approved for it by the Ministry of Trade and Supply and according to government economic policy that guarantees that the agency will be able to carry out its duties.

The agency's marketing, distribution, and storage facilities have already been indicated. The agency offers broad services through its various sections. Agency sales exceeded 3 billion riyals in 1989. The wide deployment of the agency's services helped in this, as did the transportation section, with its agency-owned land fleet capable of bringing food and other products to all areas of the republic, and the agency's abundance of storage space located in governorate capitals. This ensures that any shortage at any branch can be covered from nearby warehouses in the governorate.

The agency's marketing activity has not been limited to domestic marketing, but has extended to foreign marketing. The agency exports surplus fruit and vegetables to neighboring markets and exports coffee and hides abroad.

[Muhammad] Do you intend to open new branches in the southern governorates, following the opening of a new branch in Aden?

[Al-Kahlani] The political leadership, represented by State Council Chairman 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and the

members of the State Council and government, is certainly giving maximum attention to the southern governorates and their people. The people of these governorates have great hope that the unity government will accomplish the services and needs that they require.

Since the Military-Economic Agency is the arm of the government that assures citizens' needs in all parts of the republic and through all supply agencies, the agency's administration has had the honor of priority in looking for sites for agency branches in the southern governorates. Even before a united country was proclaimed, the agency took over some branches and worked to repair, maintain, and equip them. Thanks be to God, six agency branches have been opened in Aden Governorate to sell food—Aden, Khawr Mukassar, Shaykh 'Uthman, al-Mansurah, and Salah-al-Din. Preparations are under way to open branches in al-Tawahi and al-Burayqah.

Late last month, the governor of Aden Governorate and the director general of the agency opened the consumers' cooperative in al-Mu'alla.

I think that the agency's offerings in this cooperative are so well known as to need no mention. Virtually every citizen in Aden Governorate has visited it and purchased his household and family needs—especially what was needed for the Feast of Immolation.

The director general and a number of officials are continuing their visits to the remaining governorates and population centers to choose sites where the agency can open branches and service centers for citizens and members of the armed and security forces. Work is under way to outfit and equip the al-Mukalla consumer's cooperative for completion and opening.

Since the proclamation of a united country, the agency has been working to go into areas with population concentrations and sell the citizens various food items from cars (mobile markets). Needed additional branches have been established in all the governorates, cities, and remote areas. The agency's plan includes all parts of the republic.

[Muhammad] Does the agency have production and service projects within the republic? What is the importance of these projects?

[Al-Kahlani] We have already indicated that the agency has specialized sections which include industrial and agricultural production sections. These agricultural, industrial, and supplementary industrial projects have great importance in building the national economy. The agency has the following projects with economic and service importance:

1. The Bajil food processing complex, comprising the following [production] lines:

- Tomato canning lines with a capacity of 1,400 tons of raw material a day.
- Vegetable canning lines with a production capacity of 10,000 cartons a day.

- A preserves and (babay) line with a production capacity of 24 tons a day.
- A (sahawiq) line.
- Empty can lines.

On this basis, the country has been able to become self-sufficient in [tomato] sauce from the Bajil complex and export surplus production abroad. The Ministry of Supply has issued an order prohibiting the importation of [tomato] sauce, relying on local production from local raw materials.

We have been able to reduce importation of canned beans gradually over the past four years from 4 million cartons to 900,000 cartons in 1989—this in addition to the importance of employing Yemeni labor, providing jobs for the people of a united Yemen, and benefiting other service companies.

In the area of producing industrially required agricultural raw materials, the area planted in tomatoes increased during the period from 1984 to 1989. The number of farmers benefiting from the factories rose for the 1984-89 period from 500 to 5,000. The agency provides farmers with seeds and fertilizer at favorable prices and also provides them with food and low-interest paid-in-advance loans, with the sums to be repaid from production.

These services have encouraged farmers to return to the land and reclaim it.

2. Production farms and refrigerated fruit and vegetable warehouses: As explained above, these production projects are no less important than industrial production projects, since they have supported the country's national economy and gradually helped toward self-sufficiency.

[Muhammad] How do you evaluate the level of services that the agency provides to citizens?

[Al-Kahlani] The agency with all its personnel is working hard to make citizens happy and provide them with the best services at identical prices in all governorates of the republic for all commodities, foods, clothing, etc.

It is working to develop and broaden the industrial and agricultural production base, using all available resources.

The tasks before us and the future plans we are working to accomplish have not been completed yet. We leave the evaluation of what we offer to the citizens who frequent the agency's branches in all parts of the republic.

[Muhammad] Don't you think that pricing of the agency's goods is relatively high and approaches that of private-sector goods? What kinds of protection do you provide so that agency merchandise is not exploited by

the private sector? Are there domestic producers with whom the agency deals, buying their production?

[Al-Kahlani] Prices for goods that the agency offers to citizens are set according to standards and bases that vary for different kinds of goods, as follows:

- Basic food items are priced centrally by the Ministry of Supply at the governorate center level. In light of this, the agency has worked to sell at identical prices in all parts of the republic.
- Locally manufactured goods and requisites are priced by the Ministry of Supply for producers, middlemen, and consumers.
- Other imported goods are priced by the administration on the basis of cost factors and study of the market.

I do not at all think that agency prices are high. They are very reasonable, since the agency makes a field study of the market. The agency's prices need not be much lower than those of the market as long as the cost factors are the same. In fact, costs in the agency sometimes exceed those in the private sector generally.

The agency's role lies in price equilibrium and stability. The existence and availability of goods in the agency prevents any attempt to raise prices above the reasonable limit that consumers accept. Thus, the agency can be considered a safety valve for price stability and steadiness.

Furthermore, supply oversight works to stop ways of speculating with commodity prices and quantities. This phenomenon and its effects occur only as a result of scarcity of goods. The only way to eliminate the phenomenon is to provide basic goods and unify their prices in all areas. This is the way in which the agency protects its commodities from speculation, and it has been relatively successful.

In short, the agency as public sector works alongside the private sector and competes fairly with it.

As for the products of other factories, the agency works to market the products of many local public- and private-sector factories, such as the spinning and weaving factory, the cement factory, and the factories for [cooking] oils, dairy products, furniture, and plastics. The agency enters into partnership with the private and mixed sectors in many industrial, touristic, and investment projects.

[Muhammad] What kinds of cooperation and coordination exist between you and the Ministry of Trade and Supply?

[Al-Kahlani] Naturally, the Ministry of Trade and Supply is directly responsible for all supply agencies. The agency operates according to ministry-approved and recommended plans and programs in everything related to commercial activity.

IRAN

Justice Minister, Deputy Comment on Public Courts*90AS0353A Tehran RESALAT in Persian 24 Jul 90 p 5*

[Interviews with Hojjat ol-Eslam Shushtari, the minister of justice, and Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Reza 'Abbasifard, deputy to the head of the judicial branch; interviewer, date, and place not specified]

[Text]

Views of the Minister of Justice

Hojjat ol-Eslam Shushtari, the minister of justice, responded to the following question: What is your opinion about the public courts bill? He said:

The issue of the public courts bill goes back to the first Majles, in which I was a member of the judiciary committee, where a judicial organization in line with the Islamic regime was discussed. This resulted in a joint meeting of the Supreme Judicial Council and the judicial committee, in which a number of the representatives of the judicial committee and the representative of the Supreme Judicial Council participated. For months, this discussion was pursued. I also participated in these meetings as a representative of the judicial committee. Essentially, the discussions centered on several issues, the first of which was that the judicial organizations in the Islamic Republic must be appropriate and in keeping with the goals of the Islamic regime. Hence, some judicial principles in Islam were stated as absolute principles and were followed up.

The public courts bill was prepared on the basis of these principles and offered to the Majles. In any case, if there are minor problems in the bill, they must be eliminated in the stage of the second round of discussions.

In response to the question, What do you think are the distinguishing features of this bill? the minister of justice said:

Certain points have been taken into consideration in this bill. The first point concerns the principle of the court. In Islam, the idea of two phases in examining judicial issues does not exist; cases are handled in one stage. The present organization, which is taken from the judicial system of Europe, has two stages. One stage is investigation in the Prosecutor's Office and the next stage is in the court. We decided that they should go to the court and if the court determines that investigation is necessary, it will be done by whatever replaces the present Prosecutor's Office, where the case will be referred, and naturally lengthy adjudications will be prevented.

The second point is about overturning rulings. Again, in Islam, the principle is the decisiveness of the judge's rule, unless in exceptional cases which must be enumerated, including murder, the death penalty, dismemberment, or

divorce requested by the woman. At any rate, the cases of overturned rulings have also been determined.

Not all the rulings of the courts are overturned, but this is also a major factor in long adjudication.

The third point which has been anticipated in this bill is putting together the expansive judicial system. Naturally, in small centers and small judicial units under the present conditions, we have the public Prosecutor's Office, the revolution public prosecutor's office, the special penal two and Penal one civil courts, and legal two, legal one and military courts. Naturally, with such expansion in organization, we are unable to provide the needed personnel, and people are confused when they go to the judicial courts. If a judge is qualified to examine penal and legal issues, he must do both, and if there are too many cases, numerous branches must be established. These are the main points that are projected in the bill. We believe that both in terms of preventing lengthy adjudication and from the perspective of people's comfort and not being confused, it is an appropriate bill.

In response to the question of whether a judge who works in the public courts, in accordance with Article Three of the bill, can work in penal, civil, and other cases as described in the duties of the judge in the bill, Mr. Shushtari said:

In fact, there is an abrupt answer and a conclusive answer. The abrupt answer is, do the legal independent-two courts at the present not investigate penal and legal cases on behalf of the Prosecutor's Office?

At the present, in practice, we have many units throughout the country which are legal independent-two courts operating in the same manner. These exist now in practice. The second point is that instead of immediately implementing this bill, a timetable of 10 years has been determined, during which period we can give the necessary training in various penal and legal areas to the judges in order to replace the existing system. Therefore, a brand new judge who has just started will not get involved in this issue. Naturally, he will have to go through stages, and the experienced, expert judges must be used in these areas. When a judge studies his specialized field, he does not get training exclusively in one particular field. In practice, when he becomes active and competent in legal courts, the same judge will also go and learn the penal courts thoroughly. He will also gain a thorough knowledge of the special civil courts. His education will not be merely in one particular field. If these judges work on numerous and varied cases, they will acquire the expertise, and there will be no problem in this area. This bill does not address one single branch; the public court may have many branches, at least in most places. In these branches, the penal issues are referred to one branch and legal issues to another, in which case this point will also be observed and will not prevent the court from being specialized horizontally. There shall be no reason for such a problem.

The question was asked: In this bill, can the ruling issued by a fully-qualified religious jurist be overturned by a judge in the Supreme Judicial Council? The minister of justice responded:

In Islam, the principle is that the judge must be a religious jurist. But at the present, we do not have access to so many fully-qualified religious jurists. We have judges who have been granted permission, or are partially qualified. In other words, our judges have been given permission to act according to these regulations. It is not possible at the present time to find so many religious jurists to serve as judges, at least for the time being. But this is our principle. In practice, however, when they do not exist, judges with permission are appointed, and the rules and regulations are all observed.

In continuing, he responded to the following questions: Did a belief in expediting the cases and crimes existing on the part of those who proposed this bill not almost eliminate the Prosecutor's Office? Is it not true that the investigative branches of the courts are the same as the Prosecutor's Office? He expressed his views and said:

In fact, as you said, the investigation takes the place of the Prosecutor's Office. But this bill is different from the present situation in several areas. The first difference is that at the present in the existing organization, the Prosecutor's Office goes to work prior to the court, and what the Prosecutor's Office comes up with is handed to the court in the form of a bill of indictment. This is never sufficient for the judge and the court, because there are still vague points which often may not have been investigated by the Prosecutor's Office. And there are cases that are investigated by the Prosecutor's Office which the judge does not find necessary. Secondly, all the penal cases, both minor and major ones, come to the Prosecutor's Office, go through stages, and then go to the court. The bill for public courts anticipates that the bill [as published] will first go to the court. If the court does not see any need for investigation, it will issue a verdict, which it will do in most cases. Minor penal cases require the Prosecutor's Office and investigation, it is clear, but if there is need for investigation in special important cases and, firstly, the judge specifies that a point needs investigation, the volume of cases will be reduced. Secondly, in cases when the judge sees the need for investigation, it will be sent to the investigators' branches, but not all the cases. This will reduce many of the problems and achieve the goal. Our goal is not to eliminate the Prosecutor's Office altogether, but, rather, the two stages and the lengthy adjudication process.

Views of the Deputy to the Head of the Judicial Branch

Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Reza 'Abbasifard, the deputy to the head of the judicial branch, first said:

I will first speak about the public court and then express my views. In the public courts, the long course of stages will become shorter and shorter. Some think that with the public courts, the Prosecutor's Office and the supervision by the Supreme Court will be eliminated and a

series of judges will be appointed without being qualified to give opinions about all cases and the judiciary. In regard to public courts, two important issues exist.

The shortening of the process while maintaining accuracy in combining the Prosecutor's Office and court and maintaining close ties between the court and the Supreme Court. Another issue is that at the present, the cases which come from the Prosecutor's Office are divided into legal, penal, and civil cases. Besides the revolution courts, military courts, or other special courts that exist, in the Justice Department we now have penal-one and penal-two, legal-one and legal-two, and special civil courts which deal with particular cases and issue rulings. For the public courts, judges with the necessary scholarly qualities, practical experience, and the ability to render opinions and rule in such issues must be identified and trained to be able to deal with legal, penal, and civil issues.

Another message of the public courts is that the stages of the Prosecutor's Office and the court will be combined and bring the court somehow close to the Supreme Court to expedite the task.

This question was posed: To what degree can judges cited in this bill possess the necessary competence? He responded: In this regard, many believe that many problems will arise from giving the legal and penal cases to one person in the public courts. Every person has gained experience or is an expert in one area, and this may ultimately cause problems.

In other words, if a new judge with a few months of training were to be put in charge of a branch of the public courts and entrusted with various legal and penal matters, I do not think the bill for public courts would be successful.

But we must understand that within the 10 years mentioned in the bill for the establishment of the public courts, we must progress on a trial basis, identify the forces and provide classes to prepare individuals and very cautiously and carefully, sufficiently and fully advance stage by stage. We must introduce the issue through identifying and attaining the necessary capabilities. The deputy of the head of the judicial branch said in response to a question of a reporter about the elimination of the Prosecutor's Office: To say that we will eliminate the Prosecutor's Office or change it to a court is quite different from saying that we want to reduce the distance between the Prosecutor's Office and the court and for the Prosecutor's Office to function as the tool of investigation and not as a separate investigation tool. In other words, the investigating attorney will work with the court so that it takes a long time between the process in the Prosecutor's Office and the court, during which period disruptions occur and the case becomes a target for influences before it reaches the court. Not all these decisions are made by the court and the Prosecutor's Office. The accused, the complainant, the witnesses, and many people can play a role. But whether they come on

time or not, bring the evidence on time or not, and show good will and be truthful in their opinions and responses to investigations or not are determining factors. Therefore, to say that we will eliminate the Prosecutor's Office will create a major problem, that is, in order to increase the speed, we will compromise the precision, investigation, two stages of investigation or its strength.

If we think that the Prosecutor's Office and the court simultaneously want the agents to be at their own disposal in order to adjudicate within a short period of time between investigation and decision, in this case, it is acceptable. After the court's ruling also it will be the same. If we keep the cases that have come to a ruling for a while in this room and that office or go between cities to reach a proper branch where they must await their turn for a final decision in the Supreme Court, such stages take a rather long time and result in wasted time and lengthy adjudication. If such becomes the case, neither the dispute in the court nor the implementation of justice can show their true value in the society and in defending the people's rights.

In Islam, when a ruling is issued as the ruling of a religious magistrate, it is necessary and compulsory for this divine ruling to be carried out. If you pay careful attention to the statements of the great Imam and the statements of the grand leader of the revolution (Ayatollah Khamene'i), you will detect a special sensitivity which stems from divine law involving carrying out the punishments of criminals and the speed of action which exists in this punishment. In writings and speeches, one sees the emphasis that rulings must be carried out rapidly. This is a positive principle and such a serious issue in Islam and the regime of the Islamic Republic that it has also been announced to the judges. So, the procedure is that when something can be overturned and may be discussed again, they do not issue a ruling but make a suggestion concerning the existing issues in the case, and punishment must be taken into consideration for them. And if it comes to a ruling, and this is issued by a religious magistrate and fully-qualified judge, such cases will not occur. But now, because the judges are appointed and given permission, rulings can be discussed again. But if a judge who is a fully-qualified religious jurist makes a ruling, it cannot be overturned. In response to the question of whether or not in Article 15, in which in some instances the case can be discussed in the Supreme Court, there is any difference between those judges who are fully-qualified religious jurists and those who are partially-qualified or permitted judges, he said:

Yes, the law states that if the judge is a fully-qualified religious jurist and issues a ruling, no one can overturn it. However, some cases have been made exceptions, due to the extreme importance of these cases, such as those involving capital punishment, stoning, retribution, and rulings in a divorce requested by the woman.

Unless it is sent as a suggestion. If he makes a ruling, there is no ruling higher than that of a religious jurist.

Therefore, this closeness between the Prosecutor's Office and the court and the reduction between the Prosecutor's Office and the court and the stages of investigation and decision cause the volume of cases to decrease significantly, and the period of dispute can be carried out in the shortest possible time.

Continuing his various views about the public courts, Mr. 'Abbasifard divided them into two groups and said:

There is a group which thinks that with the ratification and implementation of this bill everything will fall apart, the judicial system will change, problems will increase, and investigation and precision will be replaced with premature programs with possibly harmful consequences, and they do not consider this a service to justice and are quite concerned and upset.

Another group thinks that with the ratification of this bill and its implementation, all problems will be resolved and the period of dispute will take place in the true sense of the word, justice will be carried out and utopia will be created.

The deputy head of the judicial branch then explained his view in connection with this bill and said:

I think that both views can neither be rejected nor accepted absolutely. Rather, we must see from which angle we are looking at it, how we understand the public courts, how we evaluate them, and with what goals we look at them. If we look at them from the angle of the elimination or combination of the Prosecutor's Office, that its distance from the court will reduce and investigations and decisions will be made simultaneously, they think the elimination of the Prosecutor's Office means making use of the officers instead of the Prosecutor's Office. This would be a police state. All the officials are sincere, good, self-sacrificing, and dedicated to serving, but their views are different from that of the judge. For this reason, they think it is dangerous and it will become a police state. Another group says that instead of the cases being delayed for years and years in the Prosecutor's Office, interrogation and investigation, while the oven is hot, the evidence of the crime exists, everything is clear, and the judge is both legitimate and Islamic and powerful, he will receive the case and achieve results. In that case, there will be utopia and God will be content.

The fact is that the absoluteness of this bill cannot be understood, neither by the first nor the second group, that is, the opponents and the supporters.

I think the length of adjudication in this bill will become minimal and it will be closer to Islamic adjudication than the present situation, of course, with the necessary caution, precision and use of the element of time, collection of forces and moving forward slowly.

But it is not without its problems. In other words, we must be careful that the elimination of the Prosecutor's Office does not result in a police state. We must move slowly and use the forces within their competence and

ability, and individuals must not be given unlimited authority before their competence is sufficiently proven. In other words, if we practice caution, everything will not fall apart, even though utopia will not be created by our accepting and ratifying this bill. We can place precision and speed side by side and move forward cautiously.

Of course, in regard to length of adjudication under the present conditions, I must point out that at the present the average case takes no less than five years. There is much coming and going by people to and from the Justice Department and often suffering much damage, many problems and much indecision during this period. Some give it up and leave. Certainly this is a tragedy for the Justice Department, which wants to advance justice.

Kho'iniha Discusses Assembly of Experts With RESALAT

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[Two-hour interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Musavi-Kho'iniha, a member of the Assembly of Experts, by RESALAT concerning the ratifications of the Assembly of Experts; first paragraph is introduction; date and place not specified]

[28 Jul p 5]

[Text] News division:

Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Musavi-Kho'iniha, a member of the Assembly of Experts, responded to questions about the recent ratifications of the Assembly of Experts in an interview with RESALAT. In this interview, he emphasized: "In the regime of the Islamic Republic, all decisions are based on public opinion. The recent ratifications of the Assembly of Experts received a majority vote, and therefore what has been ratified is a legal ratification."

Below is the first part of this interview.

[RESALAT] Thank you for the opportunity that you have provided us. As a member of the Assembly of Experts, please tell us your views about the ratifications of the recent meeting.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] In the regime of the Islamic Republic, decisions are mainly based on public opinion (whether directly or indirectly). Since the recent ratifications of the Assembly of Experts are based on the majority of votes of the Experts, in terms of laws and regulations they are legal and must be implemented. From this perspective, there is no room for discussion or opinion, and in this respect there is no doubt, and all is very clear. But the question is whether or not the ratification was necessary. Could it be a useful ratification?

Could the goals that this ratification pursues have been achieved in another way?

Essentially, a law which is being implemented and has been implemented for some time can be amended or changed if it is ineffective in practice, or in practice has undesirable results, or the goals intended are not accessible. Hence, we must look at the previous law concerning the election of the Experts which was prepared by the Council of Guardians and approved by the Imam. (Of course, the Experts had the right to change it in accordance with the Constitution.) The Assembly of Experts was established accordingly and worked for eight years. Among the most important tasks was the selection of the leader. Well, what was ineffective about that law? Did those who believed that the law had to be amended mean that based on the previous law proper members were not elected? I find it unlikely for anyone to claim that this was not a good Assembly.

I think with another Assembly of Experts or a law other than this one, even the new law, they could not have chosen a better leader than they did. If the most distinguished sources of emulation of Shi'ism, both within the country and abroad, were to assemble somewhere to elect someone as the leader of the Islamic Republic, they could not have chosen anyone better. Hence, when there is no convincing reason to change or amend the law, naturally, this action appears to be unjustifiable.

If some say we did it so that in the future Assemblies of Experts not even one or two percent of the unqualified individuals will participate, the response is that no human law can guarantee the goals of the legislators, and ultimately it will some day fail.

[RESALAT] Were these problems posed in the recent meetings and did they remain unanswered or are you posing them yourself (regardless of whether or not they were discussed in the Assembly of Experts)?

[Kho'iniha] During the discussions on this issue, I was not present at the Assembly of the Experts. I heard about the discussion and what the supporters and opponents said from others. On the same day that it was ratified, after learning about it, I wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamene'i stating that this ratification is not in the interests of the regime. There is nothing beneficial in this action, but it will create political tension in the society.

[RESALAT] The philosophy behind legislation does not always relate to problems that existed in the past. Rather, it is sometimes related to the conditions and situations of the present or those that we will face in the future. Some of the articles of the bylaws of the Assembly of Experts that were recently amended were devised in 1361 [21 March 1982-20 March 1983] and reflected the conditions of that time. Do you believe the present conditions are similar to those of 1361 [1982-83]? Would you not agree that they are not? (We can talk about what conditions are like now.) Hence, the principle behind the change in the bylaws was legitimate. Furthermore, usually when a law is ratified, there are a number of reasons which supporters use as evidence and a number of reasons that opponents state, and then votes

are taken and it is ratified. Is it proper for us to start a new wave and create a new incident because we do not agree with the ratification? Is it in the interest of our regime to deal with accepted regulations properly, whereas we do not know of anyone having dealt with the ratifications of the Majles in this way? Is it proper, for instance, for a number of people whose intentions have been thwarted to come and once again bring up their own reasoning and discussions in the press, on the pulpit and in the mosques, given that the people know nothing about the reasoning of the supporters on the basis of which this ratification received a majority vote? Is this procedure essentially a reasonable way for people to reach some sort of overall conclusion?

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] Concerning the change in conditions, you did not explain whether or not these conditions have changed and what those changes were that caused us to consider the old law ineffective so as to warrant a new law. What does it mean that a law is not always looking at the past but the future? There is a time to write a law for the future and not for the past. This is among the certain principles of legislation and has been stated in the Constitution. But we never in life and social issues have a future separate from the past. We always devise laws for the future on the basis of past experiences. At least when I talked to some members of the board of directors of the Majles and also those with whom you conducted interviews, none said that the conditions have changed or that the conditions require that the authority for determining the competence of the candidates must be the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians.

[RESALAT] You argued that when a law has provided a positive response in the past, why should it be changed? We responded that the law provided a positive response to the conditions of 1361 [1982-83] and it is not clear whether or not it would do the same today. The basis of change and amendments of any law in addition to its past function is also the conditions of the present and future.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] It is easy to claim that conditions have changed. You might say because the conditions have changed, the Assembly of Experts ratified this, whereas those who were there did not say this. And Mr. Mo'men also said in an interview with you that teachers have said that they will be under pressure. If this is the case, there is no difference between now and the past.

[RESALAT] Our argument is fundamental. Essentially, in order to amend a law, should the past be looked at or must the present and future conditions also be taken into consideration?

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] When you ask whether or not it is proper to deal with and criticize the ratified law, I must explain that we are prepared to discuss our differing views. (I do not want to name names or talk about a particular group being guilty.) We must not confine the atmosphere in such a way that if someone has something

to say against a ratification and contrary to the valid and important opinion of the majority, we respond that it will have unfavorable consequences and that it is improper. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong with a law (even laws of the Majles after ratification) being criticized in the society. Even at the time when the law is being implemented, there is nothing wrong with criticizing it.

This is true of the ratifications of the Assembly of Experts. If a person criticizes them, it might suddenly result in an unpleasant political situation. This is not the problem of the person who poses the opposite view. This is a problem which results from the fact that we did not join hands to train the society to accept that when an assembly, the most important of which is the Experts or the Majles, ratifies something, everyone is allowed to speak. Of course, criticism is different from insult. One of the revered brothers, a member of the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians, had stated that protesting the ratifications of the Assembly of Experts is either the result of ill will or deviation. Now, it is possible for someone or for me to protest out of ill will, but another person should not say that one person or another has done so out of ill will. A person who in the future will be the authority for determining the competence of the candidates must not make such judgments. Of course, I read his response to the critics, which was very good.

Some have asked: Is there any problem with the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians who are religious jurists and are just being the authority for determining the competence of the candidates?

The error stems from the fact that we are supposedly arguing about individuals or whether or not, God forbid, it is said that the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians are incompetent. A person may be both a religious jurist and just yet think in a particular way due to his ideological and political leanings. In organizing a regime, one should not say that, for instance, one should not be worried about them being just or not.

I do not know how you justify the fact that a group of people who themselves supervise elections are also the authorities to determine the competence of the candidates and are themselves also candidates in the election. It is fine to make a system based only on the fact that they are just and that no problems will occur. But this does not conform to the systems that we have followed and used as a model, the parliamentary system and the majority vote. Should we do things in this system that can only be comprehensible to us but not to the people or to others abroad? Let us remember that we do have enemies. We must not say: To Hell with the enemy; let them say whatever they want.

[RESALAT] You spoke about the necessity of criticism. It is true, but provided that what you say employs only criticism. If we say something which is immediately repeated on the U.S. radio broadcast the same night, stating that, "The most powerful extremist politician of

Iran strongly attacked the leader of the Islamic Republic," obviously it is not a simple criticism.

You said, "For instance, it is comprehensible for our people inside or outside the country," but we have not seen any criticism or protest from the people. Only Mr. Mohtashemi has made some statements and then not in the form that you describe, and then Mr. Khalkhali, Mr. Karrubi, and Mr. Bayat. In other words, the society of combative clerics apparently objects to these ratifications.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] (Smiling) Are we not among the people?

[RESALAT] On the other hand, various groups supported these ratifications, including the society of teachers of the theological center of Qom, the administrative office of the Friday imams, and so on.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] I accept what you are saying.

[RESALAT] In other words, do you not like the angle from which Mr. Mohtashemi, as you say, raised his objections?

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] I have no argument about Mr. Mohtashemi. I have no personal argument. Go and speak to Mr. Mohtashemi and get your answer. After all, I am not Mr. Mohtashemi's defense attorney. I say, if you are talking about criticism of Mr. Mohtashemi on the U.S. radio, then Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani has no right to make a speech in this country, because regularly when he speaks, they say, for instance, on foreign radios, "Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani showed what he wants to do with the West" or "Mr. Hashemi has eradicated all of his opponents."

[RESALAT] But Mr. Hashemi has not so far said anything for the U.S. radio to say that he has strongly attacked the leader of the Islamic Republic. Mr. Mohtashemi must be careful of what he says.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] That he attacked the leader is certainly false. In other words, Mr. Mohtashemi has never taken a position in opposition to the leader. We must not believe a lie told by the enemy. We must not commit this mistake, such as the mistake that we made in regard to the Hajj issue. Suddenly, some ignorant person said, "The leader wanted the Hajj issue to be rectified, but some of the representatives did not allow it." And we fail to notice that we are suggesting to Saudi Arabia that our leader wanted to have a Hajj pilgrimage different from what the Imam said. In other words, just what they would wish, but it was the fault of the representatives who did not allow it. In fact, why should we make this great mistake? At one time, we reveal our ignorance and say something. We think that 140 representatives are opposing the leader. Why should we indicate such a thing to the society? I want to say it is a lie and it is not so at all. An experienced and sincere cleric who supports the leader and guardianship of the religious jurisconsult

is said by the enemy to oppose the leader. We say he supports the leader and does not oppose him.

[RESALAT] Of course, the individual himself must also not be susceptible to the enemy taking advantage of him. He should act in a way so as not to be a target of such an accusation by the enemy who opposes the leader. This depends on words and deeds.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] Because they know that Mr. Mohtashemi is affiliated with the combative clerics, they presume that this society opposes the grand leader. Well, this is a lie. Do we not have a few enemies intending to create opponents for the leader domestically? This is injustice towards an individual, an individual who truly supports guardianship of the religious jurisconsult. In fact, it is not a proper thing for us to continually create someone to oppose the leader and then attack him ourselves.

[RESALAT] We do not do this. The enemy does it. Since the beginning of the revolution, this has been the propaganda method of the enemy, which has worked on occasion. For example, during the events of Mr. Montazeri, no one would believe that someone who was so favored by the Imam would ultimately end up in a movement which separates him from the leader. In any case, this depends on the individual not being susceptible to being taken advantage of by the enemy.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] The method of the Imam was not like this. The last action should not be the beginning. Look at the attitude of the Imam about Bani Sadr and how he treated him. He did not treat him like that from the beginning. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that he used to watch the foreign media and they cannot sleep well one night if they do not say that there are conflicts in Iran. Well, when the enemy wants to show this, we ourselves must not escalate it. In fact, you should go and ask Mr. Mohtashemi (instead of saying in his absence that he opposes the leader).

[RESALAT] And he does not respond to us. He calls us the "new hypocrites."

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] I have seen hints in the expressions of Mr. Mohtashemi about you that I have not liked. I told him that this should not be so and said that opposing someone does not mean that we use a language which is beneath our own stature, let alone saying it about a Muslim and a faithful person. I, too, in this country oppose some people politically. I must not insult their reputations or speak in a way that if I were the target of such statements I would be upset. If we are an Islamic regime, we must resolve our problems on a friendly basis, like two friends. We should say, You are a Muslim and I am a Muslim. We accept the Imam. We both accept the revolution. Now, you think differently from me. If this is not effective, we should take another step, on the path of instruction to do good and prohibition from doing evil. We must advance step by step. You cannot suddenly slap the opponent on the face to stop his ugly actions.

[29 Jul p 5]

[Text] Yesterday you read the first part of a two-hour interview by RESALAT with Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi-Kho'iniha, a member of the Assembly of Experts. In this interview, Mr. Kho'iniha expressed his views about the recent ratifications and emphasized the necessity of criticism of the votes and various opinions in a sound environment. In the continuation of this interview, which you will read in this issue, our reporters spoke.

The issues that were raised during the statements of the representative of the Assembly of Experts yesterday will be examined and criticized today.

[RESALAT] Discussion and creation of a proper atmosphere for the expression of expert views is a reasonable matter, but here several issues are worthy of note. First, in dealing with an issue, the manner of expression and the use of words are good indicators of whether the person is approaching the issue from the standpoint of criticism and expertise or acting to destroy it. Secondly, judging whether or not a person has approached an issue critically or destructively must be done by taking into consideration all the actions and attitudes of that person. In other words, if a person approaches the existing issues in the society in various forms so as to cause despair and hopelessness for the people and nothing else, we cannot say that this person should be given the opportunity to discuss things with the press and the society. Therefore, if Mr. Mohtashemi approached the issue of the Assembly of Experts questioning the legitimacy and acceptability of the present Assembly of Experts as well as the future elections, the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians, and so on, should we still say that "it is necessary for the climate of the country to be prepared for criticism of the experts"?

Another issue is the use of the name of the Imam. You see that the fact that the bylaws were approved by the Imam is constantly emphasized. In other words, the Experts of the nation have changed something that the Imam has verified to be correct.

Does creating such doubt not mean the weakening of the Experts, even though the Constitution and the Imam permitted the Experts to write the bylaws as they saw fit? But when the approach is not an expert, critical one, this is not told to the people so that deviation from the views of the Imam by the Experts becomes a factual matter.

Another issue is that you said: Can a unit be an observer, an authority for determining the competence of candidates and also be a candidate in the election? We respond: If the problem concerns how the competence of this Assembly of six is determined, the Constitution has already specified it. In other words, the scholarly and political competence of these individuals has been approved by the leader. Besides, the law has not said that these individuals must be candidates.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] I did not mean they determine their own competence. Rather, I said that nowhere in the world do persons who have an interest in the matter become candidates.

[RESALAT] What in practice resolves the contradiction in the many issues of supervision, candidacy, and being a determiner of competence is the justice of the religious jurists in the Council of Guardians.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] You and I are both candidates and, God willing, we are both just. In an election, everyone (directly or indirectly) tries or hopes to get votes. Is it proper that in addition to being a candidate you should also supervise the elections so that no cheating occurs?

[RESALAT] Yes. It is true that every candidate tries to be or at least is interested in being elected. But if we accept that the candidates who have the duty to supervise the elections are just, in other words, they will not use whether or not they received votes as a yardstick during verification, the problem will be resolved and there will be no conflict.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] It seems that in regard to this problem, we will not get anywhere. Let us move on to another matter.

[RESALAT] You said that discussions should not be about individuals, which is true in its own place. Incidentally, if Mr. Mo'men says that someone or other has ill will, it is because precisely that person has protested the ratification of the Assembly of Experts with regard to individual religious jurists on the Council of Guardians and said that this establishes the foundation of one faction taking over power in the Assembly of Experts.

Another issue is that the system of our government is unique in the world and, therefore, its decisions are made on the basis of the system of government administration.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] How is it unique?

[RESALAT] Nowhere else in the world have we a government system of guardianship of the religious jurisconsult [velayat-e faqih].

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] The term guardianship of the religious jurisconsult, yes, but in fact, our government is like that of any place else in the world. Of course, what we value, others may not. But in any case, they have certain values, even if we do not accept them.

[RESALAT] Of course, it is possible that our system in terms of decision making is similar to some others in the world, but what is important is that the basis of and motivation behind the establishment of the government in our society is quite different from that of the rest of the world. In other words, here the motivation for the establishment of the government is purely divine, and in this connection, the administration of the society becomes meaningful. But elsewhere in the world, this is

not true. Government is merely in and of itself important to them, and they work for it in any way they can.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] Yes, this is true, but what protects this divine motivation? We wrote a Constitution because we cannot stop merely at the divine motivation of individuals. We designed a system to guard these motivations. For this reason, it has not been considered enough for the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians to be just, and laws and regulations have been forged to govern their actions.

[RESALAT] Precisely. Because firstly they are just and secondly they must act within the framework of regulations. Hence, you should not have any objections. They are just, that is, they do not act contrary to justice. For example, some of those who are now in the Majles are not, in terms of their line and thought, in harmony with the Council of Guardians and even have insulted the Council of Guardians. But the competence of the same individuals has been verified by the Council of Guardians. In other words, if someone is qualified, the Council of Guardians would not say that since he has insulted this body, his qualifications will be rejected.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] You have confused justice with infallibility. Justice means not sinning, and to determine that something is a sin or not a sin is the duty of the same individual, even though the same just individual might commit a deed which is considered by others to be sinful. At the same time, he will not be unjust, and we say that it is not proper for the supervisor and the candidate to be the same person. This does not mean that the gentlemen are not just. Incidentally, I must make it clear that because one of the qualifications of leadership is being able to make decisions and show initiative, he knows that there are various viewpoints in the country, and he elects the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians taking all the aspects into consideration. And it does not concern us whom he selects. I do not want to say that since the Council of Guardians is thus and so, they should be given the authority to determine competence. Rather, on the contrary, I say that if there are some who believe the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians act on the basis of a particular political line, the issues should be compiled and presented to the leader so that he can make a decision. There is no other solution.

[RESALAT] Certainly infallibility and justice are two different issues. But do you not see that if we cannot attain infallibility, we must resort to the next best thing, that is, justice? In accepting this, the main argument is should we give the authority for determining competence to a large number of people whose being just has not been verified by any institution (even though almost all are just) or to a group of six people whose being just has been verified by the religious guardian?

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] If the problem is that there are unjust persons among the teachers, we must see in whose opinion they are not just, and who is the authority to determine whether they are or are not just. In my

opinion, here, one trusts that there is a theological center and that qualified individuals are teaching a large number of seminary students. Yes, it is possible for someone like Shari'atmadari to come out of it, but this is not something that you can prevent by legislation. Another thing is that in the Assembly of Experts, there are individuals, three-fourths or four-fifths of whom are at the level of religious jurists of the Council of Guardians and do not need to be approved for scholarly qualifications. And those who needed verification for scholarly qualifications went to qualified teachers in the previous elections, and the signature of a person who was deemed unqualified from several schools was not valid.

[RESALAT] Then, in this case, the religious jurists in the Council of Guardians becomes the authority for determination?

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] No, they are not the authority for determination. The Council of Guardians would see these documents and also see that the person was a counterrevolutionary....

[RESALAT] Then your honor's proposal is that the Council of Guardians should have been the authority to determine the verification?

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] No, I do not propose this. I want to say that there is nothing wrong with the past procedure, and there are ways other than those ratified which would not subsequently result in such discussions.

[RESALAT] Then the bylaws have problems, but you do not agree with this method of eliminating the problems.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] No. There were no problems.

For instance, it is said: A gentleman in the Assembly of Experts began to speak and say some bad things.

In other words, we wrote the law to prevent that person from entering the Assembly. Raising the issue of weakening the regime, the leader, and the Assembly of Experts is not proper either. In other words, is our regime so weak that for a few people to talk will weaken it even more? For instance, if we have an Assembly of Experts which votes 100 percent for a person as the leader, do we appear more weak in the eyes of the world, or if there is a 10 percent opposition in that Assembly? If 100 percent vote for him, first it will be interpreted that it was predetermined. Also, if in an assembly in which a few people did not vote for Ayatollah Khamene'i as leader we do something to make the few who did not vote for him decide to finally vote for him, this is not a good thing. For some people not to vote for him is sometimes the result of internal problems.

[RESALAT] In verifying the qualifications, if it had been enacted according to the previous bylaws and, for example, Mr....would approve of someone....

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] As the Imam said, he must not interfere in political affairs.

[RESALAT] Then some authority must say that this individual is not qualified to verify others.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] If you are worried about the future, why did they not now dismiss the person who is in the Assembly of Experts whom the Imam said must not interfere in political affairs?

[RESALAT] You could have raised this issue in the Assembly of Experts in order to find a solution.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] I would like to say that if you are so concerned about the future, why are you not worried about the present, while this individual is in the Assembly of Experts?

[RESALAT] Then you agree that the bylaws have problems, that is, the conditions of the society and the individuals have changed in a way that someone must be dismissed from the Assembly of Experts and it is necessary to amend the bylaws.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] Then why did the Assembly of Experts not do it? Of course, I do not want to say that, God forbid, the Experts have anything specific in mind. Neither would I say such a thing nor would I like others to say it. But in any case, it raises the question.

[RESALAT] In any case, precision in future elections is not contrary to precision for the present representatives. Moreover, the present Assembly is at the end of its work. The main issue is, is it not possible to find three persons in all the theological centers which the Imam addressed and alerted of the danger of the stone-age traditionalists to receive their approval and become candidates for the Assembly of Experts? This was a preventative and very interesting measure in support of the Imam's views, a decision made by the experts. Hojjat ol-Eslam Kho'iniha: No. In fact, in legislation, this is quite wrong. We must recognize the double-edged sword. One edge of the sword is that we now ratify something so that the future Experts say, Ayatollah Khamene'i is the leader, which is a good thing. But the other edge of the sword is that the present Assembly of Experts approves of a particular action that it supports and which others cannot change in the future. This is not good legislation.

Do you think that some people can go and collect three signatures from unqualified teachers, take part in the elections, receive more votes than the present individuals who are qualified, get elected, and change the leader in the next Assembly? This would bring about the distrust of the people. In other words, people would vote for people who are counterrevolutionary or unqualified! I do not believe, by any means, such a thing. If, God forbid, one day we reach such a point that people approve of something other than what exists now, then by what religious authorization can we block this?

[RESALAT] First of all, the discussion is not about quantity. If even a few people receive verification from three unqualified teachers and through pretense receive votes, in your opinion, is the regime not responsible

before the people as to why the candidacies of such individuals were not blocked? Secondly, in your opinion, given the fact that people are able to make a distinction, is there no need for deciding upon an authority for determination (either three teachers of the theological center or the religious jurist of the Council of Guardians), and will the people themselves determine the scholarly and moral competence of the candidates? This seems more in line with democracy as well.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] Nowhere in the world is the result of democracy to have indiscriminate qualifications for candidates and leave it to the people to determine the competence of candidates. If we decide the requirements in a way that only a select number could participate in the elections, this would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. Then in the Assembly of Experts, instead of the present qualification, you could have determined harder ones and said, for instance, that candidates must be independent religious jurists.

[RESALAT] In fact, the Experts did not change and did not make the conditions of the candidates harder but have given attention to it, so that being an independent religious jurist is not a requirement but only being a partially-authorized religious jurist is a requirement for candidates. (In other words, familiarity with the principles of religious jurisprudence is changed to partially-authorized religious jurist.) Hence, we conclude that conferring the authority to determine competence on the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians is not changing the requirements of the candidates.

[Musavi-Kho'iniha] In any case, in my opinion, the bylaws of the Assembly of Experts (before amendments) were not problematic, and the condition of the society is such that a decisive majority of the present individuals would have been elected to the future Assembly of Experts under the same bylaws, and changing the bylaws is (perhaps) not very useful. Of course, I must emphasize again that this ratification is a law, and criticizing it does not mean that the law should be set aside on a shelf. Rather, it must be implemented.

[RESALAT] In conclusion, because in your statements you pointed out that an ignorant person must not accuse 140 Majles representatives of opposing the leadership, we must say that it is not as you said. That gentleman had a discussion about guardianship of the religious jurisconsult, as to whether or not a religious guardian must have an extension of authority. Then he said that if, for example, a leader decides certain policies should be implemented and someone would not want or allow its implementation, is such a person a criminal? His example was that if this is true, in the opinion of the author of "Javaher," such persons are "criminal," but did not explicitly state that 140 persons opposed the leader.

Even though many questions remain unanswered, since the interview has become lengthy, we would like to thank you for having given us this opportunity.

Reportage on Situation of Earthquake Victims

90AS0360V Stockholm NAMEH-YE MARDOM
in Persian 31 Jul 90 p 6

[Text] "They gave us a tent for all of us to live in. My husband's sister is here. We all gathered together."

(ETTELA'AT, 9/4/69 [30 June 1990])

"There are still insufficient resources. For example, four families now live in the tent they have given us. We have shortages of quilts and blankets."

(Same source)

"Concerning how he, his wife, and two children were rescued, Kuchek Heydari said: I was under the rubble up to my shoulders. My hands were free. In that condition, I could hear the voices of my children calling me for help. With much difficulty, I freed myself and first went to the one closest to me, that is, my daughter here. From under the rubble, she said: Father, I am choking, save me. First, I took out my daughter from under the rubble and then her sister and then their mother...it was just us. We had no help. Everyone looked out for himself and.... We took out my sons one by one. Their bodies were still warm. Perhaps if there had been any equipment, artificial respiration or help, we could have saved them but there wasn't any.... All of our belongings are buried under the rubble.... Now we live in the tent of a relative. Of course, we went to get a tent. They said it is on the way and will get here soon.... My daughter is upset about the shortage of some things, about why help is not given to everyone equally...." (ETTELA'AT, 9/4/69 [30 June 1990])

"In my opinion, many are still buried under the rubble...but with the simple equipment that the people have, clearing away all the rubble and taking out those who are still buried under the rubble is not an easy task.... It is natural that some of the most essential primary needs should be sent to the earthquake-hit areas...." (Same source)

"We have shortages of resources. If we had a power shovel, we could get results much faster."

(ETTELA'AT, 7/4/69 [28 June 1990])

"Tents have been distributed, but they are too few. Every five families received one tent. Here is a village which is very dark at night. They should give us light and heaters. You saw yourself the bad condition of the roads. We cannot regularly go back and forth to the city." (KEYHAN, 6/4/69 [27 June 1990])

"We need a lot of things. For example, we have no matches to light a lamp." (Same source)

"In our shelter, there are a lot of snakes which become very active when it is windy. The officials must do something for the inhabitants and instead of erecting tents, settle the inhabitants in camps." (KEYHAN, 7/4/69 [28 June 1990])

"Here we lack good hygiene. They need to build field baths." (Same source)

"We received some help yesterday (eight days after the earthquake), but here we have a shortage of water. We receive food, but we have shortages of water and ice. We dug out the corpses ourselves with the help of the people here and buried them." (Same source)

"We lack tents and primary needs here. We only receive food. There is no water. We need field baths and milk for our children. Because we still have no hygiene resources and shelter, at night we go out to the desert." (Same source)

"The point that is obvious from the very beginning is the shortage of tents. The particular condition of the region and its cold nights make it urgent to have tents." (KEYHAN, 7/4/69 [28 June 1990])

The official of the aid headquarters said on the fourth day after the earthquake:

"There may be areas that the rescue forces have not accessed yet and which need help." (Same source)

Musavi-Ardabili, the temporary Friday imam of Tehran:

"The high figures for casualties and property damage in the provinces of Gilan and Zanjan...are due to the lack of a proper construction system and the lack of attention on the part of the previous regime to this important matter."

(KEYHAN, 2/4/69 [23 June 1990])

"The studies published about the earthquakes which have occurred in Iran show that most areas where earthquakes have occurred have had large human casualties and this is simply because of the construction situation of these areas...." (ETTELA'AT 10/4/69 [1 July])

A guard said:

"There are still bodies buried under the rubble in the lower areas and surrounding villages. In order to dig out the corpses, we need power shovels and heavy equipment...there is still no coordination, and what arrives here is not distributed well among the people. We have shortages of tents, and many survivors of the earthquake still have no shelter in which to spend the night. There are several people, that is, several families, in every tent. The situation must be improved by bringing in more tents...also, steps must be taken in terms of hygiene. Here and in other earthquake-stricken areas we do not have proper hygiene. In many areas there are still corpses on the ground. The earthquake-stricken people have not yet been able to find the bodies of their loved ones...." (ETTELA'AT, 7/4/69 [28 June 1990])

The speaker (representative of Zanjan to the regime's Majles) considered the reasons for the late arrival of the rescue teams to the Tarom 'Alia areas which had the

highest casualties, the bad and difficult mountain roads, lack of transportation, including ambulances, and lack of equipment treatment centers in the remote and oppressed areas of Tarom 'Alia, lack of readiness of the rescue teams and their having been taken by surprise. He said: "These factions caused damages and casualties to reach this point."

Concerning the shortages, he made reminders to the Islamic government of Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani involving among others the shortage of tents for temporary settlement, the collection of corpses of animals and people, disinfecting the region, anti-rabies injections, irrigation of rice fields, orchards, and farms, harvests and appropriate purchase of products by the government and related organization. (KEYHAN, 6/4/69 [27 June 1990])

A soldier said:

"Most children were suffering from jaundice. Some of them have caught dysentery and vomit because they are not used to these foods (meaning canned foods), and some of them have swollen arms and legs because the tents are damp." As he said, his five-year-old child caught jaundice five days ago, but there is no means to transfer him to a medical center. When we reach the rescue tents of [Bareh Sur], he gets off. Here, a fifth-year medical student of Babol University is practicing medicine. He tries for several minutes to administer an IV [intravenous] to an old man who is lying down on the field bed and ultimately does not succeed. Our driver does it. When he sees the jaundiced girl we have brought along, he says: "This is not an illness. This is a deep wound that has become infected because it has not been treated in time and it is dangerous." He considers the main problem of the region to be shortage of clean water and says: "Eighty percent of our patients suffer from dysentery and vomiting. There has been a problem of water before as well, but now because the sewage has mixed with the water supply, this problem has escalated." (KEYHAN, 14/4/69 [5 July 1990])

The director of the Red Crescent of Hamadan said:

"The most important problem that exists in the Kalishom area now is the severe cold weather which has arrived early. The situation of the region is such that from mid-Mehr [October] there is snow and then tents are no longer suitable for settlement. We should resolve the problem of a permanent settlement by that time."

Right now, too, it is hard to sleep even with several blankets. The seasonal winds are so harsh that one cannot stand them. On the other hand, the situation of the region is such that in addition to cold weather, other dangers threaten the people's lives in the tents. In the course of the past few days, we have had several instances of snake bites. (KEYHAN, 16/4/69 [7 July 1990])

Applicants To Receive Trucks, Passenger Cars

90AS0360P London KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 90 p 4

[Text] Pick-up and passenger Paykans for applicants with delivery dates of 1365 [21 March 1985-20 March 1986] and later will be delivered during the third quarter of this year.

Engineer Ja'fari, the general manager of Iran Khodrow Company, announced some time ago that based on plans carried out by the industrial organization, by the end of 1371 [20 March 1993], every year 3,500 city and travel buses, 5,000 minibuses, and 10,000 taxis for public transportation will be needed.

He pointed out that this year, in an effort to create urban transportation facilities, a significant number of buses will be placed at the disposal of urban busing companies.

The general manager of Iran Khodrow Company said to reporters: "This year, about 10,000 pick-up trucks and passenger cars with Peugeot 504 engines have been produced and will be placed at the disposal of applicants in two stages."

The above-mentioned official announced that recently Iran Khodrow factory has successfully designed a new model of urban bus with a 100-passenger capacity. He added: "The test model of this bus was placed at the disposal of the Tehran bus company."

Foreigners Charged in Dollars in Tehran Hotels

90AS0360I London KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] The hotels of Tehran are filled with foreigners in Tehran for commercial trade purposes. Among the foreigners in Tehran these days are more Koreans and Japanese. The hotels of Tehran have few vacancies. Foreigners must pay in dollars (government rate); their bills (even for breakfast) are calculated in dollars.

If Iranians take foreign guests to the Tehran hotels, they pay their own bills in rials, but the bills of the foreign guests must be paid in dollars.

Postage Stamps for Overseas Mail Increase

90AS0360E London KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] The Ministry of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone increased the price of stamps for mailing letters abroad without any prior warning. According to the new rate, since last week, the price of stamps for regular letters to the United States has increased to 28 tomanis.

The regime of the Islamic Republic has increased the price of postage several times in the past few years, such that at the present Iranian postage is one of the most expensive in all the world.

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