

JPRS-NEA-90-027
16 MAY 1990



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JPRS Report

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Near East & South Asia

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Commissioner Matutes Discusses EC Role in Middle East

90AA0058A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH
in Arabic 28 Mar 90 p 15

[Interview with Albert Matutes, EC general commissioner, by Hadiyah al-Sharbini: "Role of Egypt Important in Peace; Israeli Settlements Illegal; Optimism About Egypt's Success on Road to Economic Reform"; Cairo, date not given; first three paragraphs are AKHIR SA'AH introduction]

[Text] EC General Commissioner Albert Matutes recently paid a visit to the Gulf area and Egypt. He held a series of important talks in Cairo with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister and agriculture minister Dr. Yusuf Wali, and Minister of State for International Cooperation Dr. Maurice Makramallah.

The following interview took place in the context of developments in the Middle East and Europe and from a desire to become acquainted with the EC's common viewpoint about many of the important economic and political issues that concern Egypt and the countries of the region. The interview shed much light on the EC's role and its relations with the Arab and Gulf countries generally and Egypt in particular as the EC strives for the peace and economic stability of the Middle East.

The conversation began with asking the EC general secretary about the results of his visit to the Gulf countries before his coming to visit Cairo.

[Matutes] In Muscat, I attended the first meeting of the Joint Cooperation Council between the Gulf countries and the EC. The main purpose of the meeting focused on an agreement to lay foundations for cooperation between the Gulf and the EC and on defining priority areas for cooperation between us, especially in the areas of investment, energy, agriculture, and economy.

Through this meeting, an understanding was reached on the second agreement, which will be a trade agreement related to the development of bilateral trade. In this area, the Gulf countries indicated their desire to reach a system of free trade. For our part, we stressed the importance of a balanced agreement that includes the protection of the important and sensitive sectors of both sides.

In addition, there was a discussion of important political issues and subjects, such as the peace process, the situation in the occupied territories, and the situation in the Gulf. A constructive exchange of views took place in this regard.

Admiration for Mubarak's Policy

[AKHIR SA'AH] What were the most important issues and subjects raised by your meeting with senior officials in Egypt?

[Matutes] The main purpose of my visit to Egypt is to exchange views about recent events and developments in both our regions.

Thus, Egyptian officials reviewed the economic situation in Egypt and the economic reform plan. For my part, I reviewed the European point of view regarding ways of cooperation, taking into account the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and their effect on the Mediterranean region in general and Egypt in particular.

There also was a discussion of the Middle East political situation, in which Egypt plays a valuable and essential role, especially as regards opportunities to work for the establishment of a just peace, fair to all countries of the region.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What is the position of the EC countries towards Egypt's efforts to advance opportunities for peace in the Middle East?

[Matutes] The EC has frequently and repeatedly made clear its appreciation, support, and backing for all of Egypt's efforts to advance the peace process in the Middle East. This can be clearly seen from the official statements and announcements of the EC countries in the area of political cooperation.

In this area, I want to express my personal admiration for President Husni Mubarak's policy and his active contribution to realizing peace in the Middle East, as well as my admiration for President Mubarak's persistence, open mind, and moderation in this area.

I also want to express my appreciation for the efforts being made by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid to implement this effective Egyptian policy.

On this basis, the EC desires to do its utmost to crown these Egyptian efforts with success.

Solution in Everyone's Interest

[AKHIR SA'AH] At present, Israel is the only country in the region that refuses to enter into a dialogue with the Palestinians, as the Baker plan proposed in one of its points.

What are your predictions for events after the fall of the Shamir government and recent developments in Israel?

[Matutes] Without commenting on the current political crisis in Israel, I firmly hope that the new Israeli government—the coming one—will work to enter into negotiations and dialogue with the Palestinians. The present situation cannot continue. I believe that the political and economic interests of all affected parties require reaching a solution as soon as possible and without any delay or obstruction.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What is the EC's position on the currently proposed plan of American Secretary of State Baker?

[Matutes] Europe of course desires the success of all efforts being made to reach a just and lasting international solution to the conflict. What is important in this regard is realizing the goal of achieving peace and justice for all.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What about holding an international conference on peace in the Middle East, as has been previously proposed? Do the EC countries still support the proposal?

[Matutes] Europe always hopes to arrive at the convening of an international conference on peace in the Middle East under UN auspices with the participation of all affected parties, including the PLO, since its participation is a basic condition for reaching a lasting peace in the region. The PLO cannot be disregarded. It is an important party in the peace talks, inasmuch as it represents the largest part of the Palestinian people.

Settlements Illegal

[AKHIR SA'AH] What is the position of the EC countries on the Israeli initiative to settle Soviet Jews in the occupied territories?

[Matutes] The EC always deems that the building of Jewish settlements in the occupied Arab territories constitutes an illegal and illegitimate activity, since it contradicts the principles of international law in this matter. This applies also to East Jerusalem.

Europe has repeatedly asked Israel that the Tel Aviv government not encourage or allow Jewish immigrants to be settled in the occupied territories.

On the other hand, Europe has always been sincere in defending human rights and has therefore welcomed the Soviet Union's easing of restrictions on emigration from its territory. This, however, must not hinder opportunities for restoring peace to the Middle East.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What is the EC's view of the debt problem, one of the most important problems from which the Third World countries, including Egypt, suffer? Are any solutions being proposed by the EC in this regard?

[Matutes] First, I would like to make something clear from the legal point of view. The EC countries do not have the authority to lay down solutions to the debt problem from which the Third World countries suffer. On the other hand, the 12 member countries of the EC espouse positive positions on this problem within the responsible financial quarters and circles.

The debt problem is especially sensitive and delicate and requires imaginative solutions that will enable the countries to pay their accumulated debts and at the same time continue to promote their process of long-term economic growth. I think the only solution to the problem is to promote economic growth in a healthy atmosphere without the present obstacles. In any event, Egypt's

government is well aware of the importance of laying down programs for economic reform and of adjusting basic structures.

Egypt has in fact started down this path and has implemented a number of related measures in the practical sphere. Personally, I hope that Egypt's efforts will be crowned with success as Egypt tries to reach an agreement with the IMF and World Bank. In this way, Egypt will be able to continue playing its important role as an element of stability in the Middle East.

European Commitment Exists

[AKHIR SA'AH] What are the specific details of your current proposal for helping the Mediterranean countries confront the expected European unity and recent developments in Eastern Europe?

[Matutes] Clearly, recent events and developments in Eastern Europe constitute a "gift of history." Our duty is therefore to work to help our brothers and neighbors in overcoming the obstacles lying ahead of them.

On the other hand, the EC countries are not ignoring or overlooking the problems that our associate countries in the Mediterranean region face. These countries are now facing a difficult period politically and economically.

Thus, the responsibilities of the EC countries now focus on realizing a unified European market during 1992 and on the events in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the Mediterranean countries are linked to Europe by a long common history.

For this reason, the EC countries are committed to promoting and strengthening the means of prosperity and stability for their neighbors; thus the EC Council's proposal concerning the development of the Mediterranean basin countries. This proposal is composed of the following elements:

- 1) Increasing the monetary resources allocated for the Mediterranean basin countries.
- 2) Increasing the means and the level of trade cooperation.
- 3) Making available policies and resources earmarked for promoting opportunities for economic reform, especially for countries that have actually begun the process of reform.
- 4) Offering technical and financial assistance to support regional integration in the area.
- 5) Giving priority to the current policy of encouraging investments and encouraging the private sector. On this basis, new monetary policies are being established to favor direct European investments in countries beginning to develop in the Mediterranean basin and to create joint projects with them.

6) Finally, developing cooperation in environmental protection and joint research, and proposing technical and vocational policies in step with the future.

Optimism About Egypt's Future

[AKHIR SA'AH] What are the ways in which the EC can help Egypt in its effort to progress along the path of economic reform?

[Matutes] The EC countries can help Egypt in the ways just mentioned—i.e., in the framework of the current proposal, whose important points I have presented—especially since Egypt is a country with very strong traditional links to the EC countries. Egypt also plays an important and irreplaceable political role in preserving peace and stability in the Middle East.

But before I conclude my remarks, I would like to mention that foreign aid alone is neither a sufficient nor an effective means to promote the chances for achieving economic reform in any country.

However, I am very optimistic that Egypt, which has begun the path of economic reform, will stay on this path that its government has laid out for strengthening the means for economic growth, freeing the economy from the restrictions that shackle it, and encouraging the private sector and investments.

Senior Soviet Diplomat on Immigration, Relations

44230116A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 9 Mar 90 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Giorgi Martirosov, senior Soviet diplomat in Israel, by Ar'el Gina'i and Noah Kliger; date, place not given; first 10 paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] "It is not Arab pressure, but Israeli statements that are damaging the implementation of the direct-flights agreement and immigration itself," said Dr. Giorgi Martirosov, the senior Soviet diplomat in Israel, whose official title is head of the consular group of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

He was referring particularly to Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir's statement about the need for a big Israel in order to absorb a big immigration. "It is undoubtedly clear that it was not the Soviet Union which created the dangers threatening the big immigration wave."

Giorgi Ivanovich Martirosov, the son of an Armenian father and a Russian mother, 43, broad shoulders, sharp tongue, and a sense of humor, talks like a perfect diplomat. After finishing high school in Moscow, he was accepted at the governmental Foreign Relations Institute of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, where he studied, among other things, political science and languages, especially Arabic and English.

In 1968 he was sent to do his tour at the Soviet Consulate in Alexandria, Egypt, after which he joined the Embassy

staff in Cairo, where he served six years and climbed the ladder to second secretary. He remained in Egypt until 1975; thus, in the last days of September and the beginning of October 1973 he was involved in the evacuation of thousands of family members of Soviet advisers who were at the time serving in Sadat's country. He said that the Embassy had a report that "serious events" were about to break out, and also received a hint that it would do well to evacuate the women, children, and all those who were not vital in various advisory capacities.

After returning from Cairo, he resumed his studies and lectured at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow for three years. During this time he wrote his doctoral dissertation on the Camp David accords. For nine years he worked on the Middle East desk and in the Planning and Evaluation Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. When Moscow decided to send a delegation to "represent its interests" in Israel, whose official job is to look after assets belonging to the Soviet Union and after Soviet citizens permanently residing in Israel, it was only natural to send Martirosov to Tel Aviv.

In January 1988, a few months after the office opened, Giorgi Ivanovich Martirosov arrived in Israel. He enjoys the status of senior diplomat in every respect, including an elegant villa in Kefar Shmaryahu ("I deserve it, after almost two years in hotels") in which he lives with his wife and two young sons.

During his stay here, he developed good relations with many people in many areas, and met for discussions with most official figures. "The prime minister is the only one I haven't talked to," he pointed out. Although he speaks Arabic ("I have forgotten a lot, of course, because I haven't used the language for years"), he didn't develop many connections in the Arab sector, and he does not visit the territories.

The Soviet delegation has established itself next to the Finnish Embassy, in two apartments in a residential building. "We work under difficult conditions, and we also bother the neighbors, to whom I want to take this opportunity to apologize," the diplomat said with a smile. His delegation includes only four diplomats (two of whom speak Hebrew) and two technical assistants altogether. "That is why my time is very precious, not to mention the fact that for some reason, days in Israel have only 24 hours in them, aside from the Sabbath, of course."

The Soviet diplomat is particularly worried about the number of Jews leaving the Soviet Union for Israel. He views the wave of immigration as a "brain drain," precisely at a time when perestroika needs more intellectuals with initiative in the USSR than ever before. But the time of restricted citizens' movements is passed, as those who are requesting Moscow to halt immigration are finding out.

Martirosov hopes that the more successful perestroika becomes, the less people will want to emigrate from the

Soviet Union. Some may even want to return to the USSR to participate in this great reform movement.

"There already are immigrants asking to return to the Soviet Union," he said, "people who support the changes that are taking place there and want to be a part of them. However, most of those who want to return (a few dozen) do so because they failed to adjust in Israel, didn't find work or housing, or miss their friends and family."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why would they want to return when there is anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union?

[Martirosov] "I think that this fear has been exaggerated and that there is no real danger of pogroms. I am not denying that there is anti-Semitism in the USSR—it's a phenomenon with deep, historical roots. Nevertheless, I want to stress that there is something positive in the fact that members of Pamiat and other anti-Semitic organizations are coming out to demonstrate in the open. In so doing they identify with the ultra-conservative, reactionary line of the enemies of perestroika. By fighting against anti-Semites, we fight for liberal reforms that have been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the people, as has been demonstrated in the recent elections."

Martirosov believes that Pamiat should not be outlawed. "The more such organizations begin to come out in the open, the more obvious it will become how weak they are in comparison with the democratic movement that is sweeping the country."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What do you think about the censorship of immigration data?

[Martirosov] "This is Israel's internal problem. I don't want to interfere in internal matters. But I noticed that the entire Israeli press is against such censorship. I read in one of the papers that the only censorship that should be exercised is on leaders' statements. I like that idea."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is going to be the future of the Union? Will it be able to withstand the nationalistic pressures of the republics?

Martirosov is confident that the republics will win greater autonomy, including the right to manage their own economic systems. But he hopes that they will understand that complete independence is not in their interest, because they cannot survive without raw materials imported from Russia, such as oil. And they can hardly depend on aid from the West.

"I do, of course, understand the emotional attraction of nationalism, but I hope that realism will in the end prevail and that they will remain within the Soviet Union, although the union itself will become very different from what it is today. A lot depends, of course, on the economic situation. That is the most important factor. Naturally, we will not put up with a situation in which we have to import potatoes from Cuba and wheat from the United States; (equally unacceptable is the fact

that 25 percent of our agricultural produce perishes in transit inside the Soviet Union).

"Consequently, I believe that the most important reform implemented so far is that which allows individual farmers to lease land. If this reform is successful, it may cure our agriculture of its sad condition."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And what about diplomatic relations? Why does the Soviet Union hesitate to renew its relations with us, while countries like Poland, Hungary, and others are doing so?

[Martirosov] "We have global interests that those countries don't. If we now renew diplomatic relations with Israel, it will look as if we support Israel's policy in the territories. Naturally, we sharply condemn that policy. We made the renewal of diplomatic relations dependent on progress toward settling the conflict in the Middle East."

Moscow has repeatedly emphasized that the Israeli settlement policy violates paragraph 4 of the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that the status quo is not to be changed in "occupied territories." Israel itself, the Soviets claim, is a signatory of that convention.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Will the Cairo meeting be viewed as progress along that line?

Martirosov did not want to commit himself, and he refrained from clarifying what kind of progress can justify renewed relations in the eyes of the Soviets. Nevertheless, he stressed that Moscow is in favor of the American initiative. In point of fact, there was surprising similarity between recent statements made by American and Soviet officials.

"We continue to discuss Jewish immigration with the United States," he said. "Previously, the Americans used to criticize us for not allowing enough Jews to leave the country. Now we criticize them for limiting the number of Soviet Jews they allow into their country. Things really have changed."

About differences inside the government, Martirosov said: "Your history is full of tragedies and I understand your feelings and concerns. But the memories of the past must not overly influence your ability to see things objectively."

Effects of Soviet Involvement in Mideast Examined

44230116B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 12 Mar 90 p 9

[Article by Pinkhas Inbari]

[Text] The Israeli governmental crisis is wreaking havoc with the basic assumption of the political process, and if by the end of the week it will indeed turn out that the election initiative is coming to an end in the national unity government, new formulas and directions will

invade the vacuum. The United State's prestige as a factor that can bring about political processes in the Middle East will suffer a blow, as will Cairo's status as a partner in the failing chances of those moves from the beginning, despite its suspicion of American intentions. More importantly, however, Washington's failure to prompt political developments in the Middle East by itself will restore the Soviet Union's presence in the arena (the Europeans, too, have been waiting in a corner). But this is not the same Soviet Union which tried to block the Camp David process at the time, and it is very important to determine the changes that have occurred in its positions on the Middle East and their impact on its traditional allies—the various left-wing movements.

The USSR's participation had already been a subject of discussion in the concluding chapter of the Baker initiative, and the U.S. secretary of state notified Arens about the agreements he reached in Moscow on Soviet participation as observers in Cairo. According to Kuwait's AL-QABAS (22 February 1990), Baker and Shevardnadze had already discussed the nature of the Soviet involvement in the political process if the election initiative fails, and the topic on the agenda is an international conference or international aegis—with or without the Europeans.

The Americans are now interested in the Soviets joining the processes in the Middle East for three main reasons: out of a desire to help Gorbachev by recognizing Moscow's status as a world power; out of a long-term strategic concept which views the Soviet Union as an ally against a withdrawing Europe; Moscow's success in crystallizing Middle East opposition against Washington's unilateral moves, manifested by the Shamir plan, Baker's plan, and Mubarak's 10 points. Against the Washington-Israel-Egypt-Fatah mainstream axis, another axis took shape with Moscow, Amman, Baghdad, and the PLO as an organization. The Arabic language weekly published in Cyprus AL-UFAQ described the contacts between the PLO and Jordan surrounding 'Arafat's visit to Amman in September last year as a "kartushka" (potato in Russian) on the (Jordanian-Palestinian) confederation table (5 October 1990).

The Soviets' endeavors to join the political processes in the Middle East despite their internal difficulties attest to the importance they attach to it. After realizing that the Soviets no longer threaten their position, the Americans finally agreed to accept Soviet involvement, which can only be an advantage.

In this light, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's statement about a big immigration to a big Israel appears not as an unfortunate slip, but as a premeditated declaration designed to neutralize the USSR's capability to advance political processes, by damaging its status and influence in the Arab world. That was a calculated risk that was justified from this viewpoint.

The big wave of immigration to Israel is the outcome of lengthy American efforts under the heading of "human rights." As long as that was the designation, the Arab world could basically ignore immigration, or at least become aware of its dangers at a relatively late stage. Shamir changed the heading and from "human rights" he transferred immigration to the category of strengthening the settlements, thus creating a serious problem between the Soviets and the Arab world, which made the Soviets become defensive and justify themselves.

Early last month, Baker reached agreements with the Soviets which weakened their link to west Europe and the Amman-Baghdad axis, and strengthened the American-Soviet-Egyptian connection. The agreements were based on a Soviet promise to renew relations with Israel, implement the assurance of direct-immigrant flights, and, more importantly from the viewpoint of relations with west Europe, their agreement to give up the idea of an international conference in order to concentrate on a separate Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in Cairo, and to convince the PLO (as well as Jordan and Iraq) to cooperate with those developments.

Had it not been for Shamir's statement, that development would have enjoyed a far greater strength and intensity than it did after the statement was made. Moreover, the Soviet Union was pushed into an apologetic stance and was forced to use means that contradicted its promises to Baker in order to preserve whatever credibility it had left in the Arab world. Shamir's statement also exacerbated another problem that the Soviets faced in the Arab world without any connection to immigration. The Arabs had begun to wonder about the profitability of maintaining ties to the USSR at all, in view of that country's enormous difficulties at home and its dependence on the United States. On 1 February, Abu-Mazan, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, gave an interview for the Palestinian newspaper SAWT AL-BILAD in which he talked at length about relations with Eastern Europe. At the beginning of the interview he announced that no one had been prepared for the speed with which dramatic events happened in Eastern Europe, and consequently the PLO ambassadors to the Eastern bloc were summoned for special discussions with Faruq Qaddumi. Abu-Mazan did not say what the conclusions of those discussions were, but he expressed his view that the PLO must now focus on making the Eastern bloc adopt the positions of West Europe.

This statement on the part of Abu-Mazan in fact revealed the real debate taking place among the Fatah leadership concerning the changes within the former Eastern bloc; the choice is no longer between East and West, but between the United States and West Europe. Palestinian diplomacy must choose, and it appears that it has not yet completed the process of choosing between persuading Eastern Europe to adopt the positions of West Europe or of the United States. In the terms of the Arab world, those who are in favor of West Europe also

support closer relations with Jordan and Iraq ("international conference"), while those in favor of the Soviet Union would prefer relations with Egypt ("the Cairo dialogue"). In any event, the Soviets are increasingly being perceived as a country entering the American circle of influence, a process that is shaking from the foundation all the Arab parties and movements that had been ideologically connected with the Soviet Union. The very fact of the latter's break with orthodox communism shook the stubborn loyalty of the Arab leftist movements, and when improved relations with Israel and the big immigration were added, all those parties and movements entered into a hard struggle with their traditional rivals.

Abu-Mazan also pointed out in his interview that immigration was a "catalyst in a long-standing debate" with the Soviets. Asked whether he meant "a catalyst for dispute," he answered: "Absolutely."

If a central Fatah figure begins to talk about differences of opinions with the Soviets, the question arises as to what glove the Soviets can now drop for the peace process. Moreover, their participation under such conditions may only stiffen and sharpen the position of those opposed to a political process, and give them additional ammunition to block peace.

The factors that seized the opportunity to mercilessly target the Palestinian left-wing movements because of the above developments in the Eastern bloc were the Islamic movements and parties, and they are increasingly doing so through both leaflets and sermons in mosques. Not only immigration serves as fuel in their hands, but also the suppression of the riots in Muslim Azerbaijan.

Toward the end of February the Popular Front could no longer hold off, and it launched unprecedented attacks against Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement], attacks that may even be viewed as a declaration of war. The leaflet ostensibly opened in the archaic style: "Ah, comrades, the forces of progress and socialism...." It warned the fundamentalist Muslims that if they continue to physically attack the front activists, the nationalist forces will react with force. More to the point, the leaflet attacked Hamas, the Soviet Union, and its supporters in heresy. It recalled the USSR's good days, when it supplied the Arab armies with weapons with which they won in the October war. "Ah, Hamas," the leaflet called, "socialism is stronger than any passing cloud, and the Soviet Muslims are winning greater freedom than the Muslims in several Arab countries...."

The communists, too, have gone to war against Islam. On 19 February, AL-ITTIHAD carried an article by Nazid Majili, whose title said it all: "Will Salvation Come from the Jihad?" The answer, of course, was no. While the Popular Front proceeded to attack Hamas, the Palestinian communists targeted the Islamic Jihad

and...the Popular Front. In other words, even when the left-wing goes out to rescue its lost honor, it still remains split.

What, in fact, are the differences within the Arab left-wing concerning the new goal? We find a hint of the answer to this question in a leaflet of the Popular Front: The present crisis is a "passing shadow." That is to say, the nightmare of the Gorbachev era will pass, and the Soviets will return to their old pact with the Arabs. Thus, George Habash hopes that the conservatives will rally to remove Gorbachev and turn the clock back....

We may as well note that this is a naive approach, and only few of the old Soviet admirers believe in or wish for such a development. Deep crises are at present sending tremors through the Democratic Front between conservative leader Na'if Hawatimah in Damascus, who may share Habash's secret hopes, and his deputy, Yasir 'Abd-al-Rabo, who is in charge of the contacts with the United States in Tunis and is thus in a better position to view developments more realistically. Hard to believe, but the shock waves have also been reaching Ahmad Jibril's general headquarters, too, while his deputy, Talal Nagi, is requesting a thorough reexamination of all the basic principles of the extreme organization, to the point where he might be willing to join with Fatah.... This may be the place to recall that the Popular Front has been suffering with such disputes for a long while now. Basam Abu-Sharif, who is now viewed as one of the purest doves in the Fatah, was at the time Habash's deputy....

The communist parties are not spared such disputes, either, but their option is already clear. Unlike what people like to claim in Israel, the Arab world is being visited by new perestroika winds, in the form of demands for democratic reforms, and the communist party has a vested interest in it, because Gorbachev being the leader of perestroika, the communist parties are beginning to stand out as supporters of democratic changes in the Arab world. Particularly prominent along this line is the Syrian communist leader, Khalid Bakhdash, whose voice is one of the loudest in demanding Syria's democratization. In Jordan, too, following their defeat in the elections, the communists are among the strong supporters of Husayn's democratic reforms and among those pressuring for their implementation.

This line of the communist parties does not exempt them from discussions about their future, and so far there is no agreement about that.

At the beginning of February the leaders of the Palestinian Communist Party in exile, Sulayman Najab and Na'im al-Ashhav called a press conference in Tunis, at which they announced that the party was about to implement extensive structural changes with a view to freeing the party from ideologies and approaches whose "time had past." Najab also said that the party will no longer speak only for the working classes, and even hinted that it may change its name to "People's Party"

(weekly AL-'ALAM, 4 February). The communists in the territories may not be prepared to agree to such far-reaching changes.

At the same time, it must be clear to them that the old situation cannot continue and that recent developments in the territories around the unification of workers' unions are also an indication of things to come. Fatah made considerable efforts to unite its own separate professional unions, the communists, and the Democratic Front. Only the communists agreed to join it, while the democrats kept their organizations apart. There were many considerations for that, but the real reason was apparently the strong desire of the communists to become integrated in the broad framework of Fatah, what in fact Tala Naji is suggesting to Ahmad Jibril and the essence of the still undecided dispute within the Democratic Front between the conservative Hawatimah and Fatah supporter 'Abd-al-Rabo.

What will be the influence of all these things on the political process once the Soviet Union joins in? Shamir's statements caused serious damage, and the Soviets understand that they must first stiffen their stand toward Israel in order to regain some of the credibility they lost, and in order to help their disconcerted allies in the Arab world. The USSR's expected participation in the Cairo talks prompted Mubarak to go to Moscow, and the postponed date of the visit has to do with "second thoughts" at the Kremlin whether the time is indeed ripe for them to join. Indeed, the tougher Soviet stance can

already be felt while, according to reports, immediately after Baker's visit to Moscow, there was talk of renewing relations with Israel, once it agreed to a just peace in the Middle East, and it was agreed that Baker's initiative would be accepted. At present there is talk of waiting after the first round of talks in Cairo. In the meantime, these nuances point to the fact that in principle the Soviets still intend to fulfill their promises to Baker and they are interested in doing so, but a stalemate that will cause the Arab campaign against immigration to intensify will necessarily make Moscow continue its tough line.

Fatah sources are interested in seeing the Soviets involved and in the dowry they will bring along in the form of support from the communists and the Democratic Front for the present processes. The PLO ambassador to Moscow, Nabil 'Amran, said in an interview for Haifa's AL-ITTIHAD (23 January 1990) that, while in the past the Soviet Union showed greater solidarity with the Palestinians but remained outside the framework of political processes, and was thus of no help to them, now the Soviets have changed their style, but not their original positions in support of Palestinian rights, and therefore perestroika will in the last analysis work in their favor when Moscow in effect joins the political process.

This is one view. Others may say about that, happy are those who have faith....

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Sudan Reportedly Dealing With Both Iraq, Iran

Al-Turabi's Secret Tehran Trip

90P40033A London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 26 Mar 90 p 7

[Text] Informed sources have confirmed that the secretary general of the National Islamic Front in Sudan, Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, after leaving the country for Geneva with a diplomatic passport, secretly traveled from there to Tehran, and then to London. They confirmed that from there he left for Tripoli to attend the World Islamic Popular Command Congress and to hold talks with the Libyan authorities.

Iran Assails Sudan for Iraqi Aid

90P40033B London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 2 Apr 90 p 5

[Text] The Iranian press has attacked what it has described as military cooperation between Iraq and Sudan and Iraqi support for Sudan in its war against the rebels in the south.

The Iranian newspapers indicated that Iraq has sent large amounts of weapons to Sudan and that these weapons will be used against the southern rebels.

These attacks against the Sudanese Government coincide with the sources' indications of increased Tehran assistance to the National Islamic Front headed by Dr. Hasan al-Turabi. Moreover, it is known that al-Turabi and some of the Front's leadership secretly visited Tehran during the last few weeks.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Hawatimah, AL-YAWM AL-SABI' Differ on DFLP Elections

AL-YAWM AL-SABI' Response

90AE0035A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'
in Arabic 30 Apr 90 pp 18-20

[Article by Bilal al-Hasan: "Nayif Hawatimah Attacks AL-YAWM AL-SABI' and DFLP Documents Answer Him"; previous AL-YAWM AL-SABI' articles referred to in text: "Split With DFLP Analyzed" JPRS-NEA-90-024 25 Apr 90 p 14-18; "Rift in DFLP Elections Noted" JPRS-NEA-90-021 5 Apr 90 p 14]

[Text] Our tale with Nayif Hawatimah is simple and brief. On 15 February, the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] Central Committee held a special session in Algiers which lasted until 4 March 1990.

For the first time in the DFLP's history, two documents, rather than one, were presented to this meeting for debate.

The first document was submitted by Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah and an opposing document was submitted by Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh, the assistant secretary general.

As a result of the debates, the Central Committee adopted an open resolution (published by AL-HURRIYAH, the DFLP mouthpiece) criticizing the DFLP Political Bureau (also for the first time in the front's history) for the political positions it had taken. The voicing of this public criticism meant irrefutably that the analyses of the majority of the Central Committee members had sided with the critical document submitted by Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh.

We in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' observed the Central Committee meetings and had been aware prior to its convocation of the details of the ongoing dispute within the DFLP. Upon conclusion of the meeting, we wrote a report on what was new in this dispute, and what was new is the document criticizing the DFLP's past policy.

To avoid the numerous harsh characterizations launched against the tendency represented by Nayif Hawatimah, we were content to say that the dispute was between a "conservative tendency" and a tendency that advocates renewal.

To this extent, we thought that we were performing our journalistic duty, considering that the DFLP is a major front in Palestinian national action and that DFLP Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah is a prominent Palestinian political figure. Therefore, what occurs within the DFLP concerns the Palestinian political life in its entirety.

We in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' have noticed that the Palestinian leftist groupings in the Palestinian Communist Party (West Bank), in the DFLP, and even in the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah), whose membership is 90 percent Palestinian, have been the only Arab leftist groupings to be seriously influenced by the perestroika policy, and that they have tried to take practical advantage of this policy through internal change and not just through talk about the developments in Moscow and in Eastern Europe.

We have observed carefully and have published Samih al-Qasim's message to Rakah's leadership.

We have observed carefully and have reported on the Palestinian Communist Party's new program which has opened up democratically to all the Palestinian social forces struggling against the occupation.

In the same manner, we observed carefully and reported on the heated debates which took place within the DFLP (19 March 1990).

It has been our belief that through this, we help and encourage the growth of the tendencies that advocate development, change, and democracy.

But our tendency has not pleased DFLP Secretary General Comrade Nayif Hawatimah.

The first to draw our attention to this pleasure was a prominent Palestinian leader whom we esteem and respect. This leader contacted us by phone and told us: Nayif Hawatimah is very annoyed with what you have published in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' and particularly annoyed with the characterization "conservative" used to describe him. The Palestinian leader expressed the hope that we would stop discussing the DFLP and its issues.

We told the Palestinian leader: We have not meant to offend Comrade Nayif Hawatimah. To confirm our words, we are prepared to conduct a lengthy press interview with him so that all viewpoints may become known to the reader.

The Palestinian leader told us: Nayif Hawatimah is very upset now and he may not wish to give such an interview. The opportunity may arise to conduct it at another time.

We respected the Palestinian leader's wish and decided to stop reporting.

But a few days had barely passed when we received over AL-YAWM AL-SABI' fax machine an article stamped with the DFLP seal and entitled: "In Response to AL-YAWM AL-SABI'." This was on 1 April.

Only a few hours after our offices received the article, dear Colleague Dawud Talhami, AL-HURRIYAH chief editor, contacted us from Damascus to ask whether we were going to publish the article or not. We told him: We will certainly publish it, despite all the accusations it makes against us. We may couple it with a brief response to these accusations. Dawud Talhami thanked us and expressed the belief that we are entitled to respond.

A few more hours had barely passed when we discovered that the response sent to us was not an exclusive response and that it was tantamount to a statement sent to all the Arab papers, to all the news agencies, and to a number of the Palestinian embassies.

At this point, we found ourselves absolved of publishing the response because it was not addressed to us specifically, because some dailies may precede us to publishing it, and because AL-HURRIYAH itself may publish it.

After the article "In Response to AL-YAWM AL-SABI'," we were surprised by an interview given by Nayif Hawatimah to the correspondent of Abu-Dhabi's AL-ITTIHAD in Damascus—an interview in which Hawatimah made a sharp attack full of accusations against AL-YAWM AL-SABI'.

We were also surprised by a statement Hawatimah made to REUTERS, republished by AL-HURRIYAH, in which he denied the truth of what had been reported about the tendencies within the DFLP.

Despite all this, we decided to continue to remain silent.

But on 17 April 1990, we were surprised by Colleague Dawud Talhami contacting us a second time from Damascus and reproaching us for not publishing the response even though we had promised to publish it.

We explained to Colleague Dawud Talhami the considerations which prevented us from publishing it and pointed out to him the campaign Nayif Hawatimah had launched against AL-YAWM AL-SABI', accusing it of calumny and fabrication. But he urged the need to publish it. We said: Well, we will publish your response, but we are entitled to answer the accusations made against us. He agreed to this.

Here we are meeting Talhami's request, publishing the response of Nayif Hawatimah's faction in the DFLP to what we have reported and publishing our response in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' to the accusations Nayif Hawatimah has made against us.

In an interview with the correspondent of Abu-Dhabi's AL-ITTIHAD in Damascus ('Assaf 'Abbud), Nayif Hawatimah said that the report published in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' (No 306, dated 19 March 1990) "speaks of tendencies within the DFLP ranks without relying on a single tangible and actual fact. The report, covering numerous pages and quoted by other papers, did not cite one incident supporting its political and organizational allegations."

What Nayif Hawatimah says here against AL-YAWM AL-SABI' is true. We only attributed "our allegations" on the presence of a "renewal tendency" and a "conservative tendency" within the DFLP to "leadership sources" not out of inability or failure, but out of our eagerness not to publish documents which the DFLP does not wish to publish.

But considering that Comrade Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah accuses others of calumny and falsehood, then we are absolved of our reservation and we will respond with facts and details which are not at all of our making but which come from the DFLP documents submitted to the DFLP Central Committee meeting. All the contents of these documents were aimed against Hawatimah personally and against the "conservative" coalition he heads.

So let the readers read the "facts" whose presence Nayif Hawatimah refuses to acknowledge, taking into consideration that publishing is a democratic issue and that revealing the facts to the masses is the epitome of the democratic process. We reveal the facts so that Nayif Hawatimah may not again accuse our magazine of being hostile to democracy, as he has said in Abu Dhabi's AL-ITTIHAD.

Charge of Submitting to Damascus

Quoting "renewal tendency" sources in the DFLP, we said that Nayif Hawatimah and his faction are accused of subjugating the DFLP's political positions to the interest of the geographic location where he resides, i.e. Damascus, during the period when Damascus was hostile to the PLO.

Here, we support this accusation with documented official statements made within the DFLP Central Committee meeting in Algiers. The "renewal tendency" report said:

"Only one thing has been concluded from the poor assessment with which our Political Bureau dealt with the possibility of Syria's reaction to convocation of the national unity session (of the PNC [Palestine National Council] in 1987) in Algiers and from the subsequent confusion and division among the leadership bodies and their agencies, namely how to try to return these bodies and their agencies to their original center.

"After the eruption of the intifadah [uprising], after the return of our party's leadership positions to Damascus in 1988, and while the Palestinian national movement's circles at home and abroad were deliberating and debating to draft a political program for the intifadah, our party's Political Bureau again confined its concern to how to guarantee the stability of its leadership bodies in Damascus.

"To achieve this stability, our Political Bureau measured all issues, including the position toward the war against our people's refugee camps in Lebanon, against a single criterion, namely avoiding involvement in a policy or in a position that leads to the recurrence of what had happened previously, namely to Syria's adoption of steps and measures against the party leadership.

"A review of our party leadership's positions in that period when the leadership used for the first time the phrase "infighting" between Fatah's two wings in characterizing the attack on the camps and in accusing the PLO leadership of fabricating the 'infighting' to pass a capitulationist plan for the Palestinian issue—such a review is sure to make clear how this leadership came to put the interest of its stability above all else and at the expense of the safety and balance of our national policy."

Is there in what we previously said in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' on this particular issue any defamation of Nayif Hawatimah and of his tendency, which we have politely called the "conservative tendency," just the conservative tendency? What defamation and what accusation is there in this characterization when compared with the decisive position taken by the "renewal tendency's" documents in the DFLP?

In his statement to REUTERS on 26 March 1990, Nayif Hawatimah said: "In all that has been reported, we do not find a single word about the presence of current political differences." Does Hawatimah have the

courage to repeat the same position now, despite the quotation we have just cited?

We hope he will not do so.

Charge of Bureaucracy

We have said in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' that the DFLP's "renewal tendency" accuses the "conservative tendency," led by Hawatimah, of bureaucracy and of burying democracy. Here is Nayif Hawatimah, now accusing AL-YAWM AL-SABI' of being hostile to democracy. But let us hear the voice of the DFLP documents again and find out what they say about this particular issue.

The "renewal tendency" report says:

"At the level of our party, it has become evident that the crux of the crisis of its leadership, which has not been able to keep pace with the intifadah's requirements and with its political and organizational challenges, is found in the growing bureaucracy within this leadership. This makes the leadership refuse to interact actively and creatively with whatever is new, even if what is new is as historic an event as the people's greater intifadah. This leadership's role has declined by virtue of its absence from the immense developments occurring in the homeland and its absence from the center of the Palestinian political decisionmaking. This has been coupled with entrenchment of the tendency to deal with the party agencies and institutions and with some of our party's organizations as local fiefs.

"This resulted in an intensifying conflict. This conflict had to erupt as a consequence of perpetuation of this bureaucratic approach on the one hand and as a consequence of what the intifadah has been pressing for daily and increasingly."

So is there in what we previously said in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' on this bureaucratic phenomenon in the DFLP any fabrication or exaggeration on our part? We only mentioned the headline, refraining from detailing the facts that support the headline out of respect for the DFLP's "internal" documents. But now that Nayif Hawatimah has, as usual, come out, with sword brandished, accusing us of calumny and of not relying on facts, we are absolved. Will Hawatimah be able to stop this habit?

We hope that he will.

Firing Accusations

We have said in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' that one of the major criticisms the "renewal tendency" has addressed to the "conservative tendency," led by Nayif Hawatimah, is the latter's accusation of the Palestinian leaderships of submitting to U.S. policies and abandoning the national principles for a political settlement. Responding to us, Hawatimah says: This fabrication seeks not only to

intensify the disagreements in the DFLP and to distort their nature but also to poison the climate of the national alliance...

"Distorting, poisoning," this is what Nayif Hawatimah says about what AL-YAWM AL-SABI' has reported. Let us listen to what the "renewal tendency" says in a document on this particular issue:

The "renewal tendency" report says:

"Prior to the PNC (which proclaimed creation of the Palestinian state), the adopted policy was to oppose the issuance of a clear and specific political program. When the Palestinian peace initiative was announced, silence was maintained on it. We then moved from opposing issuance of the program to opposing its application by launching major battles against statements made by Fatah and PLO leaders and by intentional exaggeration in depicting the danger of these statements, going to the extent of saying that they threaten national unity and reflect readiness to meet with the hostile plots and schemes...

"Pouncing on statements made by Fatah leaders and exaggerating their significance and danger to the point of depicting them as a retreat from the national line was not intended so much to muzzle those positions as it was intended to justify continuation of the adventurous isolationist policy and justify the polarization calls that we have come to embrace."

After all these clear statements that are contained in an official DFLP report submitted to the DFLP Central Committee and that describe how Hawatimah's anti-Palestinian leadership statements "pounced, exaggerated," and talked of "retreat from the national line"—after all this, can Nayif Hawatimah, if he has a living conscience, still accuse us of "calumny, distortion," and "poisoning?"

We hope he cannot.

Individualism and Dictatorship

We said in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' that the "renewal tendency" strongly criticized the individualism and dictatorship practiced by the majority of the DFLP Political Bureau, led by Nayif Hawatimah, and added that this issue was one of the main points of disagreement. Nayif Hawatimah answered us in Abu-Dhabi's AL-ITTIHAD, saying that AL-YAWM AL-SABI' "has no respect for the democratic tendency within the revolution's, the PLO's, and the people's ranks. Now, the paper alleges that it is jealous about the democratic concepts and the renewal."

Well, let AL-YAWM AL-SABI' be whatever it may be. But the man who makes this accusation against us is accused of what is worse by his organization's leaders. Let us read what the DFLP documents say about Nayif Hawatimah personally.

The "renewal tendency" report says:

"At the organizational level, there have been successive decisions penalizing and warning members of the Political Bureau. What is worse is that expansion of the Political Bureau, said to have been expanded in order to broaden its internal democracy and to pump new blood into its arteries, was immediately followed by the new and expanded Political Bureau's approval of bylaws to regulate its activities. These bylaws are unprecedented, except in the history of parties which suffered and complained for a long time of domination by the individual leader.

"These bylaws empower only the secretary general to make political decisions without consulting anybody. Relying on these bylaws, arbitrary orders have been issued one after the other to boycott certain aspects of participation in the national political action or to dictate caricaturish and unrealistic conditions for such participation.

"That phase witnessed the most uncouth forms of violation of the bases and principles of democratic centralism, which turned in practice into a form of intellectual and political domination."

This is what the DFLP documents say. They speak about Hawatimah by talking of the "individual leader's domination," characterizing his tendencies as "caricaturish." We in AL-YAWM AL-SABI' have not used all these characterizations, but have been content with the "conservative tendency" characterization out of civility. Does Nayif Hawatimah have similar civility toward us?

We hope that he has.

Has the Disagreement Ended?

When AL-YAWM AL-SABI' published the details of the disagreement within the DFLP, Nayif Hawatimah resorted initially to denying the existence of this disagreement. But it seems that he discovered that this logic is not convincing. So he resorted to a more intelligent approach (REUTERS, 26 March 1990) by acknowledging the presence of a past disagreement which was reviewed and criticized at the Central Committee meeting in Algiers. As for the future, "there are no political differences." He proceeds on the basis of this to say that AL-YAWM AL-SABI' lies when it says that there are ceaseless disagreements.

We, in our turn, hope that the disagreement has been ended. We rejoice greatly when we hear that unity has been restored between the DFLP's two factions. But on the other hand, we do not believe that the "ostrich" policy is beneficial in this regard. The disagreement continues to exist. "This is why" [quotes as published] it has been agreed to summon the DFLP's third congress to convene and to act as an arbitrator to settle the dispute. What is more important, it has been agreed to issue an internal paper that presents the various viewpoints so that the congress members may be aware of what they are doing when they convene to perform their decisive task.

Therefore, Nayif Hawatimah's assertion that there are no political differences is an assertion that lacks accuracy and that contrasts with the spirit of "democracy" of which Hawatimah boasts but which he withholds from the others.

Regarding the existing points of disagreement which need to be discussed, the "new tendency" report says:

"Ultimately, this has led to the loss of party criteria, to the prevalence of liberalism under the wing of bureaucratic domination, to the revival of all color and manner of political and organizational opportunism, and to the absence of criticism and self-criticism which represent the spirit and safety valve of the entire party process.

"Our primary and major task today is to protect our party's role, to entrench its organizational unity, and to end all manifestations and forms of the bureaucratic authoritarian domination which has been the root and the cause of all the internal eruptions.

"The manifestations of bureaucratic domination cannot be ended without measures and steps that lead to a real change and renewal in the party's internal life, in the structure and makeup of its leadership bodies, in the role of its party organizations and conferences, and that provide internal guarantees which are capable of regulating the intellectual and political dialogue and struggle."

If, according to the DFLP "renewal tendency's" document, this is what is required, then can one agree with Nayif Hawatimah that there are no "current differences" among the DFLP ranks? Why, then, will the congress be convened? Why, then, the internal publication that is open to all viewpoints? It is "to regulate the intellectual and political dialogue and struggle," as the document says.

May Nayif Hawatimah excuse us for publishing excerpts from the DFLP's internal documents. His daring in offending others and his "odd" courage in making accusations and using descriptions and characterizations is what forced us to do this.

We are greatly hopeful that his daring in offending others will subside a little (not much), and that he will not continue to issue his characterizations and descriptions.

Hawatimah's Accusations of AL-YAWM AL-SABI' **[Box on p 19]**

"AL-YAWM AL-SABI' is a magazine with a tendency that has been historically hostile to the democratic forces in the Palestinian revolution and the PLO. While it has no respect whatsoever for the democratic tendency among the revolution's, the PLO's, and the people's ranks, it now alleges that it is jealous for the concepts of democracy and renewal because its tendency is a flagrantly rightist tendency that is founded on advocating a positive response to many of the U.S. and Egyptian pressures on the PLO."

What has been reported in the magazine speaks of tendencies within the DFLP without supporting the allegation with a single practical and tangible fact. The report, which covers numerous pages and which has been quoted by other papers, does not mention any incident that supports the paper's political and organizational allegations.

From Hawatimah's Interview with Abu-Dhabi's AL-ITTIHAD.

Quoted from AL-ISTIQLAL.

Regarding the current and future political line, a resolution has been unanimously issued by the Central Committee. There are no political differences. This is why we do not find in all that has been reported a single word on the presence of current political differences.

The talk about the presence of disagreement within the DFLP is nonsense that serves suspect objectives.

From Hawatimah's Interview with REUTERS.

AL-YAWM AL-SABI', which is well known for its connections with influential PLO circles, has avoided correctness and objectivity and slipped to join the distortion and deception campaign.

This calumny seeks not only to intensify the disagreements within the DFLP but also to poison the climate of national alliance.

From the article "In Response to AL-YAWM AL-SABI'".

Hawatimah's Response

90AE0035B Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI' in Arabic
30 Apr 90 pp 22-23

[Article: "In Response to AL-YAWM AL-SABI'"]

[Text] In its edition No 306, issued on 19 March 1990, AL-YAWM AL-SABI' published a lengthy report on the activities of the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] Central Committee which convened last February. In comment on this report, we have issued this response which is stamped with the DFLP seal and which reflects the opinion of the faction represented by Nayif Hawatimah, the DFLP secretary general.

A DFLP leadership source has denied the report published by AL-YAWM AL-SABI' in its edition of 19 March 1990 on the outcome of the activities of the DFLP Central Committee which convened in Algiers. The source has asserted that AL-YAWM AL-SABI', known for its connections with influential PLO circles, has avoided correctness and objectivity in its review of the background and outcome of the Central Committee meetings and has slipped to join the distortion and deception campaign launched by certain circles through the media, with the aim of undermining the DFLP's reputation and status and pushing in the direction of

exaggerating the disagreements and differences in a desperate attempt to undermine the DFLP's unity and solidarity.

The DFLP has always formed one of the most significant safety valves guaranteeing PLO unity and the solidity of the Palestinian national movement's ranks. In the period following the invasion of Lebanon, this role figured clearly in the DFLP's adherence to its national unity oriented position and in its determination, despite all the regional pressures to which it was subjected, to renounce all divisive tendencies and to struggle heroically to regain the PLO's unity on the basis of the national consensus program and from both the rightist and the adventurist policies. This role acted as a decisive factor in the PLO's restoration of its unity in April 1987, thus providing an essential objective condition for the eruption of the greater people's intifadah [uprising] in the occupied homeland. Bolstering and protecting the DFLP's unity is not only a sacred duty of the DFLP members and strugglers but a national necessity also.

The resolutions of the Central Committee's latest session confirm that the DFLP is stronger than any division and that its unity is too strong for any sabotage attempts. It has become certain that regardless of the disagreements and differences of opinion, whether on political or on organizational issues, a way is always found to settle these differences through comradely democratic dialogue within the DFLP organizational frameworks and with the comprehensive participation of the cadres and members of all the DFLP organizations inside and outside the homeland.

The Central Committee has adopted the resolutions capable of organizing this comprehensive democratic dialogue in which all viewpoints interact on all intellectual, political, and organizational issues within the context of preparing for the DFLP's third congress which will convene before the end of this year. Unanimous approval has been given to the list proposed by Comrade Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah to form the preparatory committee entrusted with supervising preparation for the congress. The editorial staff of the internal magazine which will form a podium for intellectual, political, and organizational dialogue have also been elected unanimously.

The leadership source has asserted that the allegation that there are two tendencies, one conservative and the other a renewal advocating tendency, in the DFLP leadership, is a groundless allegation that borrows categorizations from other experiences and tries to apply them forcefully to the DFLP conditions. The source has revealed that the organizational resolutions adopted by the Central Committee to release the renewal process and to spread democracy in the organization's ranks have been derived fundamentally from the report submitted by the secretary general and by the majority of the Political Bureau and secretariat members to the Central Committee session.

This report emphasizes that the DFLP internal crisis is essentially the result of the infiltration of the DFLP leadership bodies by the values, concepts, and methods of bourgeois bureaucratic action, and that solving this crisis requires releasing the process of comprehensive democratic renewal and spreading democracy at the broadest level among the organization's ranks, within the context of adherence to the principles of democratic centralism and the vigilant and creative application of this centralism to strengthen the unity of thought, will, and action.

In this regard, the Central Committee resolutions put the emphasis on bolstering control, on electing the bodies from bottom to top, on enabling the elected bodies to exercise their powers in accordance with the constitution, on revitalizing the Central Committee's role in its capacity as the top DFLP leadership body, on bolstering its control of the Political Bureau, and on revitalizing the Central Control Committee's role in watching over application of the constitution.

These historic resolutions guarantee effective participation by the DFLP bases and cadres in drafting the DFLP policies and tendencies in a manner compatible with the requirements of bolstering the DFLP's vanguard role in the intifadah and in the Palestinian national movement generally. The resolutions also guarantee that the DFLP organizational structure will be remolded and renewed and that democracy and base control over the higher bodies will be bolstered to guarantee an end to the individual leadership tendencies, to reinforce the role of the collective bodies and leadership, and to uproot the manifestations of bureaucratic disintegration and opportunist tendencies.

At the same time, the Central Committee has put the emphasis on condemning bloc-forming activities and on terminating the parallel organizational centers. It also underlined the need to adhere to the principles of democratic centralism. Internal democracy is not an alternative to the unity of thought, will, and action but rather entrenches and bolsters this unity. Democratic dialogue in which all viewpoints interact freely is not compatible with the bloc-forming activities and with the unprincipled alignments which distort the strugglers' vigilance and which deprive the dialogue of its objectivity and of its intellectual and political profundity.

The Central Committee approved the proposals contained in the secretary general's report calling for holding the DFLP's third congress and outlining the preparatory steps for this congress so that it may crown the democratic renewal process from bottom to top and may also crown the internal intellectual and political dialogue which guarantees effective participation by the party base in drafting the DFLP tendencies and policy. This is so that this party base may not continue to be just an arena for settling the DFLP leadership bodies' disagreements, regardless of how significant they are.

These tendencies, approved by the DFLP Central Committee, are gaining historic importance and their consequences will be reflected in the development of the entire Palestinian national movement. They reflect the DFLP's ability to assimilate the lessons and experience of the greater intifadah, with its profound democratic character and its reliance on the masses' organized and structured movement which is building its own national authority independently and waging the national independence war in reliance on the people's capabilities and revolutionary initiatives. These tendencies also reflect the DFLP's need to release the renewal process, to spread internal democracy, and to bolster base control, by virtue of the objective development the DFLP has achieved in its internal structure, by virtue of its popular status, and by virtue of its role among the national movement's ranks.

The DFLP is thus underlining a new vanguard experience in the ranks of the PLO and the entire Palestinian national movement. This experience should be an incentive to revitalize the struggle of the DFLP and all the Palestinian national action factions, to release the democratic reform process within the PLO institutions so as to spell out in detail the role of the PLO institutions in aiding the intifadah, and to underline emulation of the successful democratic model offered by the popular intifadah and by the UNC [Unified National Command] inside the homeland. This model is offered by bolstering the national coalition on democratic frontal principles founded on equality, collective leadership, and participation in decisionmaking.

The leadership source has referred to what AL-YAWM AL-SABI' said about the growth within the DFLP of bureaucratic segments that adapt their political vision according to the need to insure stability on the Arab soil. The source asserted that all this allegation seeks is to distort the DFLP status, role, and struggle legacy that is well known for its stubborn defense of the independence of the DFLP decisionmaking and the independence of Palestinian national decisionmaking. The DFLP has derived and will continue to derive its policy from the Palestinian people's higher national interest. The DFLP has proven this at numerous historical junctures, the most significant of which was the DFLP position toward the endeavors to split and divide the PLO and toward the camps war. It also proved it in the direct role it played in restoring PLO unity during the unification PNC [Palestine National Council] session which convened in 1987. At all these junctures, the DFLP adhered to a patriotic and unity oriented position emanating from concern for the Palestinian national interest, disregarding the severe Arab pressures to which it was subjected. If this was the position prior to the intifadah, then this position has been bolstered since the intifadah, which has entrenched the independence of the Palestinian national movement and laid down the material base for removing Arab custodianship from this movement.

The leadership source stressed that the talk about the growth of bureaucratic segments that influence political decisionmaking does not apply to the DFLP conditions by the same degree by which it applies to the conditions of the PLO institutions and to some other Palestinian factions. If this phenomenon has infiltrated the DFLP ranks recently, then its source and its fertile ground is not the veteran DFLP organizations and strugglers who live and struggle under the most difficult conditions inside and outside the homeland, but some leadership and cadre circles that seek comfort and an escape from the regional pressures instead of confronting these pressures.

The leadership source has revealed that excluding the combatants in the armed forces, the DFLP institutions, and central agencies include no more than dozens who work fulltime in the information, political, and administrative area, and that the DFLP conditions in this area cannot be compared with the conditions of the other Palestinian factions.

The source has further asserted that the details of and the conclusions made from information published by AL-YAWM AL-SABI' regarding the election of the DFLP leadership bodies are both wrong and distorted. For the first time in many years, the Political Bureau elections were held democratically and freely and their outcome has been compatible with the spirit of renewal complying with the organizational directions and with the principles approved by the DFLP Central Committee in this regard. The Central Committee had unanimously approved the basis of forming the Political Bureau in a manner that, on the one hand, strengthens the role of the DFLP leaderships in the occupied territories, in harmony with the objective tendency toward shifting the Palestinian national struggle's center of weight to the homeland by virtue of the intifadah. And this, on the other hand, permits insuring the Political Bureau's ability to function as a social organization, a daily leadership, and an actual chief of staff for developing the DFLP role in escalating and supporting the intifadah.

To correct AL-YAWM AL-SABI' information, the leadership source has revealed that comrade Taysir Khalid had withdrawn as a candidate before the start of the first round of elections. As a consequence of the first round of elections, most members of the new Political Bureau, including the most prominent DFLP leaders in the occupied territories who were elected almost unanimously, were able to gain the required majority. As a result, a number of candidates who had failed to win in the first round, including Dawud Talhami, 'Isam 'Abd-al-Latif, Mamduh Nawfal, and Salih Ra'fat, withdrew their names as candidates in the second round of election.

The source has characterized the AL-YAWM AL-SABI' report about the "emergence of some sort of a dual organizational authority within the DFLP" as a falsehood whose source is the fact that the magazine finds it easy to rely on faulty and distorted information from

sources that are ignorant of the DFLP's rules and traditions. The fact is that the Central Committee Secretariat has not been elected yet. It will be elected and completed in accordance with the mechanism unanimously approved by the Central Committee in its Algiers session. According to the constitution, the Central Committee Secretariat is an executive authority assisting the Political Bureau in guiding the internal life of the DFLP organizations. This secretariat is subject to the direction and control of the Political Bureau and is accountable before this bureau.

Politically, the Central Committee deliberations have shown that there have been limited disagreements and differences in viewpoints on the future tendencies and on the tasks the DFLP and the Palestinian national movement have to perform in the current phase to insure victory for the intifadah.

The report submitted by the leadership of the DFLP organization at home played a significant role in approximating and uniting the views on analyzing the current situation and determining the future action tendencies. What confirms this is that the Central Committee unanimously adopted its resolution to entrust the Political Bureau to draft a report defining the options and the struggle and political tasks of the coming phase on the basis of the two reports the committee has discussed in its sessions. It is evident from this that exaggerating the disagreements and trying to fan their fires artificially does not serve the DFLP's unity and undermines the interest of the entire Palestinian national movement, especially in the current phase when the intifadah is forcing its way to victory and when it is in the most dire need of unity and solidity at home and abroad. Disagreements and differences of opinion within the national movement's ranks or within each of the movement's factions are a healthy, normal, and positive phenomenon if the disagreements and differences are settled through democratic dialogue, within the context of unity, and with an objective spirit that steers clear off browbeating, exaggeration, and entrenchment behind preconceived judgments. But it is neither healthy nor positive to fan and intensify the fires of disagreements. Our national movement's experience shows that this conduct ultimately leads to division and fragmentation, regardless of the intentions of those who engage in it.

At the Algiers meetings, a significant part of the Central Committee's discussions focused on a critical review of the DFLP procession and of its role in the Palestinian national movement, especially since the eruption of the greater intifadah in the homeland. The discussions in this area were characterized by a high degree of courage and daring in the exercise of criticism and self-criticism on the part of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee, both as collective bodies and as individuals, and by a thorough examination of all aspects of deficiency in the leadership bodies' role and practices. The results of this examination were crystallized in the resolution adopted by the Central Committee on the critical

political review, published in its entirety by AL-HURRIYAH, organ of the DFLP. This resolution clarifies the positive and negative aspects in the role of the leadership bodies and in the policies these bodies have developed.

The resolution proudly underlines the early call by the DFLP leadership at home for adopting a political initiative that arms the intifadah with a clear program that endorses the elements of the phased program and opens the horizons for achieving the intifadah objectives of freedom and independence. The resolution also appreciates positively the DFLP role in working within the PLO framework for convening the Arab summit in Algiers to reaffirm Arab adherence to the Palestinian national rights and the DFLP role in immediately realizing the significance of Jordan's decision to disengage from the Palestinian [West] Bank, and of entrenching this decision in the interest of embodying the Palestinian national independence option.

The Central Committee pointed out that convocation of the summit and the disengagement decision completed the objective conditions for releasing the required political initiative.

The Central Committee resolution criticizes the failure of the Political Bureau at the time to respond promptly to this need because of the differences of opinion among its members and the subsequent confusion to which this failure led. The Central Committee resolution points out that this difference is a difference of opinion "on the nature and elements of the required initiative" and not a difference on its necessity.

The leadership source has pointed out that this difference involved the viewpoint concerning the importance and priority of proclaiming an independent Palestinian state and the basis for forming its provisional government. The difference further involved the position vis-a-vis the elements of the political proclamation, which defines the PLO stance on the principles and means of a political settlement to the Palestinian issue and to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within the context of the national dialogue which paved the way for the 19th PNC session in 1988, the DFLP Central Committee adopted at the time a tendency which underlines the importance of proclaiming the independent Palestinian state and of determining the basis of forming its provisional government. The committee adopted this tendency as an alternative to the opinions which slighted the importance of this historic step, which considered it a mere formal procedural step, and which expressed fears over the possibility of securing broad international recognition for the young state; a failure which would undermine the PLO's representative status. The DFLP Central Committee stressed at the time that opening the horizons for an intifadah victory dictates that the PNC adopt a Palestinian peace program which defines the Palestinian vision of the principles and means of a comprehensive and balanced solution that guarantees termination of the

occupation and establishment of the independent Palestinian state in the [West] Bank, Jerusalem, and the [Gaza] Strip. The committee further stressed that this [peace] program should reflect and clarify the elements of the phased national program and should not be an alternative that turns the program into a final solution to the Palestinian national issue. The committee emphasized that the PNC should adopt an effective and balanced solution that is based on linking resolution 242 with the other UN resolutions which define and guarantee the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights, especially the right to self-determination and the refugees' right to repatriation in accordance with resolution 194. This is in order to counter the U.S. preconditions, which seek to impose on the PLO unilateral recognition (and not mutual recognition by two states) of Israel's right to exist and unconditional acceptance of resolution 242 as the sole basis for negotiation and a settlement.

This disagreement surfaced at the time and became public through the national dialogue which preceded and accompanied convocation of the PNC session. For the first time, this disagreement led to a disunited DFLP position, because some leadership elements continued to promote their private viewpoints which had not been approved by the front's legitimate bodies. It also caused the DFLP political activity to suffer from evident confusion.

The critical political review which was unanimously approved by the DFLP Central Committee session in Algiers criticized this flaw expressly and asserted that the 19th PNC session resolutions proclaiming the Palestinian state and the session's political declaration embodied the national consensus program for all our people and entrenched the clear basis for the Palestinian peace initiative. The review also asserted that the DFLP had adopted these historic resolutions and took them to the masses as a unified program for all our people.

Within the context of the critical review, the Central Committee pointed out that the DFLP policy, particularly in the period from the convocation of the PNC until April 1989, was characterized by excessiveness and radicalism which reflected themselves in various forms of isolation from the Palestinian political movement and which, in numerous cases, obliterated the distinction between the DFLP position and the vacillating tendencies toward the Palestinian peace initiative. The Central Committee held the Political Bureau, in its capacity as a collective body, responsible for this policy.

The leadership source has revealed that this paragraph in the Central Committee resolution was based on the clear and courageous self-criticism contained in the report submitted by the secretary general and the majority of the Political Bureau members to the Central Committee's plenary session and on the comprehensive dissertation with which Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah concluded the political debate held within the context of the session's activities.

At the same time, the DFLP Central Committee criticized the policy of silence toward the positions of the influential circles in the PLO leadership—positions emanating from illusions and faulty assessments concerning the means of accomplishing a prompt solution to our national issue.

The Central Committee put the emphasis on adhering to the realistic, unity oriented revolutionary national line which has always distinguished the DFLP from all forms of rightist and leftist radicalism. This reference reflects the DFLP's adherence to its criticism of some positions taken by influential PLO leadership circles (the most significant of these positions was expressed in the statement made on 14 December 1988) on the basis of the delusive wager on the possibility of accelerating the political solution process by meeting the three conditions the United States had demanded as of 1975, in the hope that this would "pacify" the U.S. administration's alleged "fears" of the PLO. The latest developments demonstrate how futile these losing wagers are and how harmful their ramifications are for enhancing the peace process and the efforts aimed at holding the international conference.

The DFLP has exercised its criticism within the PLO institutions and among the masses out of its definite concern for Palestinian national unity and for the PLO's unity. Whatever the flawed aspects of this criticism and regardless of whether they are leftist or rightist, they do not undermine the DFLP's adherence to a constant course in its national alliances. This course is founded on strengthening the unity, on clinging to the agreement points crystallized by the national consensus program, on entrenching the spirit of common national action on the basis of these points, and on ceaseless efforts to expand the scope of the agreement points and tackling the disagreement points with democratic dialogue within the PLO institutions and among the masses.

The source has expressed surprise over the allegations that there is within the DFLP a tendency which proclaims the imminent collapse of the Palestinian leadership and its capitulation to the [schemes of the] United States against the Palestinian people, as AL-YAWM AL-SABI' puts it. This lie seeks not only to fan the fires of disagreement within the DFLP and to distort the nature of this disagreement, but also to poison the climate of the national alliance and to sow tension in the relations between the DFLP and the other Palestinian national action factions. The source has reminded that under the most difficult conditions of division and fragmentation within the PLO, the DFLP, led by Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah, opposed the calls for declaring certain tendencies within the Palestinian national movement as "treasonous," even after conclusion of the 1984 Amman agreement. It also mentioned that the DFLP has always struggled for restoring alliance and unity within the PLO on the basis of the joint program—the program of independent representation and of the independent state. Today, the DFLP is profoundly aware that despite all the differences of

opinion within the PLO on the policy that should be adopted vis-a-vis U.S.-Israeli intransigence, the intifadah, with what it means in terms of a growing role by the organized people's masses in the national political decisionmaking, provides the definite guarantee for paralyzing all the tendencies toward truce negotiation and toward vacillation and the definite guarantee for cementing the Palestinian national position on the basis of adherence to the objective of independence and to the right of independent representation through the PLO.

The resolution adopted by the DFLP Central Committee session which convened in Algiers has entrenched this firm and clear DFLP policy for managing the national alliances. The resolution points out that the DFLP's main alliance is with Fatah (leadership, cadres, and bases) and with all the national forces enrolled within the PLO framework. This resolution, adopted unanimously, highlights the importance of the alliance with Fatah as a popular national movement that represents a special role in our Palestinian national movement and in the PLO leadership. The resolution emphasizes that the DFLP is allied with Fatah as a movement which has its leadership, its cadres, and its bases, in contrast with the opinions and practices that are inclined toward alliance with one predominant tendency in Fatah's leadership that slight the importance of the other national tendencies in Fatah's leadership, cadres, and bases, and that are inclined to belittle these tendencies and to deal with them lightly. The resolution also underlines the importance of bolstering the alliance with all the national forces enrolled in the PLO because the alliance with Fatah is not an alternative to bolstering the alliances with the other forces, especially the leftist forces. This means renouncing the naive delusions concerning the establishment of an alliance between the DFLP and Fatah—an alliance that imposes itself and its positions on the other forces—and rejecting the tendencies to act arrogantly toward the other Palestinian progressive forces, to belittle their importance, to exaggerate subsidiary disagreements with them, and, at times, to artificially strain the relations with them.

While seeking to strengthen the national alliances within the PLO framework, the DFLP follows this constant course on the basis of its position and its independent policy which emanates from its visions and its class affiliation. It is here that the DFLP's actual ideological, political, and organizational distinction is found. There is no need to fabricate disagreements with the other forces to superficially highlight and reaffirm this distinction. Thanks to its truly distinguished intellectual, political, and organizational course, the DFLP has opened its special path among our people's masses and within their national movement. The most prominent features and the brightest banners of this course are embodied in the constant eagerness to bolster national unity on the basis of a common program that reflects the interest of all the people in the independence and national liberation battle. The talk about "fabricating disagreements with the other forces to reaffirm the superficial distinction" is

a distortion of the truth—a distortion aimed at camouflaging an intellectual position whose essence is the call for obliterating the features of the DFLP's ideological, political, and organizational independence, and for diluting the DFLP's class identity on the pretext of rejecting "superficial distinction."

There is no doubt that the intifadah has increased the agreement points within the Palestinian national ranks, has reduced the disagreement points, and has, consequently, established an objective base for strengthening national unity. If this is the case insofar as the broad national ranks are concerned—despite the intellectual, political, and organizational disagreements existing among these ranks—then isn't it right to say that it behooves this condition to apply within each of the Palestinian national factions? If the talk about opposition to the approach of fanning the fires of disagreement between the national forces is honest and sincere, then how can this talk be compatible with acts that seek to fan and intensify the fires of disagreement within the DFLP. How can it be compatible with the attempt to block the path of settling these disagreements with the means of honest and upright democratic dialogue that is remote from all slander, superciliousness, falsification, rumor-mongering, and false hearsay?

The past experiences and the present facts confirm that the DFLP has always been one of the most prominent safety vales protecting the unity of the Palestinian national movement and the unity of the PLO. The attempt by any circle whatsoever to tamper with the DFLP's unity and to intensify its crisis is tantamount to playing with fire and it does not reflect any degree of concern for the solidity of the Palestinian national ranks and protecting the intifadah's unity.

ALGERIA

FIS Efforts To Control UGTA Branch Fail
90AA0050A Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE
in French 23-29 Mar 90 p 21

[Article by Chaffik Benhacene]

[Text] Did the delegates to the seventh conference of the Constantine Branch of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] give the first signs of a political battle which will not necessarily await the green light of the electoral campaign before it begins?

Whatever the case may be, the tone was set immediately by the conference office—created by the preliminary conferences in the territorial units and whose delegation had in principle been the object of a predominantly Islamist consensus—which, without any further ado, requested that "those who are not conference members leave the hall." This specifically involved invited guests who represented various UGTA bodies: regional unions (Skikda, Jijel, Oum El-Bouaghi) and members of the National Council.

While, on the second floor of the Union Building, the Mandate Ratification Committee was checking on the representation status of the 252 delegates, tension in the large hall was rising rapidly as the revealing signs of confrontation were accumulating. It was the reading of the moral report of the outgoing regional council—with a very large FLN [National Liberation Front] majority—by its secretary general, Abdelhak Benhamouda, which would cause the first clash.

While he called on those attending the conference to set labor union concerns ahead of partisan commitments, he was interrupted and questioned by an Islamist. The exchange charged the atmosphere at the conference: Benhamouda left the conference hall, the delegates threatened to scuttle the conference and, finally, obtained the return of the secretary general of the Regional Branch who came back to the hall under applause. False exit? In any case, it was a great tactic which rapidly led the Islamists from blunders to mistakes. It is also true that the folkloric approach to the conference taken by the leadership, which literally gave the floor mostly to "the Muslim brothers" but at the same time did not fail to rebuke, through the mouth of their president, those who in his opinion did not seem "Muslim," while it clearly supported the thesis of political preparation for the conference, also clearly demonstrated the low level of culture and trade union traditions of the Islamists.

In the halls, many people talked about a labor meeting which was said to have brought together in one of the city's mosques local leaders of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] and Islamist delegates.

During the afternoon, the reading of the reports from the "sectors"—building and local organizations, finance and culture, education, youth, heavy and light industry, transportation, telecommunications—provided some respite prior to the long-awaited general debate, even though here and there an observer could pick up a few expressions or proposals which, to say the least, did not conform very well to trade union if not constitutional order; such as this proposal for new eligibility criteria within the trade union: "Being a good Muslim and not being communist."

The general debate was taken up largely by Islamists who succeeded each other at the microphone. Essentially, their statements were similar to the kinds of sermons which have henceforth become customary in many of the country's mosques: invectives, curses on the basis of a few countertruths which Benhamouda would make it his duty to reveal. The rise to the top by the secretary general of the Regional Branch marked a turning point at the conference and was followed by a new and long halt in the activities. In his response to his Islamist contradic-tors, Benhamouda repeated, case after case, the facts presented: CMT, PMO, NAFTAL, CIMOTRA, [not further expanded] to stress the trade union option: "Even when I make mistakes, I always find myself on the side of the workers. When the workers were fired, we

were on the side of the workers," he said forcefully to the Islamists. Benhamouda concluded by announcing that, having completed a mandate, which he did not want to see renewed, he was going home. New exit. The hall emptied. The Islamists, who were in the minority, remained virtually by themselves. New development around 2000 hours; Benhamouda came back and made another triumphant entry. More heated exchanges would keep the conference going until the wee hours.

The electoral sanction would give four seats to the Islamists, out of 51, on a trade union council the majority of whose members were largely reelected. Even though everyone agrees that this really represented the failure of an OPA [Political Administrative Organization], inspired if not led by the FIS, the other lesson from this conference is that the local political game surely had a greater impact on the conference than the convulsions currently being experienced by the union movement. At 1700 hours, a few workers got together at the entrance to the conference, in response to a call from an "interunion organization"—which included primarily militants from the PAGS [Socialist Vanguard Party]—to demand the "democratic renewal of the UGTA, more in keeping with the new constitutional order, and which would definitively mark the end of Article 120 and its consequences."

Law on Declaration of Personal Finances Drafted *90AA0050B Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE* *in French 23-29 Mar 90 p 22*

[Text] One of the most "awaited" documents, already approved by the Council of Ministers, is undoubtedly the "bill on the declaration of personal finances by people holding certain official political, administrative, or economic offices or elected mandates."

The wait is justified, not because the document by itself promises to resolve a whole set of problems which were among the detonators of the "October 1988 explosions," but because it gives the representatives and the press an opportunity to discuss, for lack of debate, one of the most immoral "flaws" of the one-party system which has tarnished the relationship with the public good of more than one ruler, concerned primarily with creating, if not general amnesia, at least some form of amnesty on the issue.

The document in question is a first in that, if the bill is approved by the National People's Assembly, for the first time since the country's independence there will be "a declaration of financial situation to which persons holding official political and administrative offices as well as those elected on the basis of a national or local mandate will be subject."

The list of individuals having to provide this statement is significant. Those having to comply with this formality are not only the "representatives of the APN [National People's Assembly], and the members of the APW

[Regional People's Assembly] and the APC [Municipal People's Assembly]," but also:

- the president of the Republic;
- the president of the National People's Assembly;
- the members of the government;
- the secretary general of the government;
- the prime minister and the public prosecutor for the Supreme Court;
- the president of the Revenue Court;
- the presidents and public prosecutors of the Courts;
- the walis;
- agents from the public, civilian, and military sectors, in positions of authority, management, inspection, oversight or investigation, as well as accountants working in public administrations, establishments, and organizations; and finally
- "the president and the members of the Constitutional Council."

Some people will say that this involves only a statement, in addition to an honor system, which does not in any case commit the person making the statement in any legal sense. In principle, no false declaration is sanctioned. This is correct. But the argument does not stand up under scrutiny. The repressive nature of a procedure or a measure is not always the best guarantee for the success of the operation. In this specific case, any voluntary omission could be retained and turned against its author, because the bill also provides that, following the first statement "submitted within 3 months after the person's nomination or election," "the statement provider must, at any time, make public or notify the authority he comes under of any substantial change in his financial situation." He must also submit a statement "in the same form, within 3 months after the effective end of his functions or mandate."

But what is essential is that the bill in question must be understood on the basis of a dual consideration—first, a consideration based on the fact that henceforth the Algerian political system is a multiparty system which means freedom of expression and exposure, and establishes the notions of majority and opposition. And the best control of the management of the public good is undoubtedly the oversight ensured by the opposition and its daily vigilance. The second consideration is that the bill on a statement of personal finances does not translate any intention on the part of the government to abrogate the provisions of Law Number 80.04 authorizing the body which represents the nation, to oversee "the acquisition of illegal wealth." As a matter of fact, it would be hard to imagine, specifically within the framework of a multiparty system, that a body that wants to incarnate national sovereignty, would "reject," "prevent," or "turn away from" exercising the high level function of oversight, as was the case during the one party era which, in fact, generated a double "anomaly." The first, which we refer to as "state capitalism," has turned the political function (a position in the state, the party, the administration, etc....) into a condition and often an opportunity for accumulating capital (!) in a

private form and for a pure and simple diversion of public funds and goods, under various forms. The second "anomaly" resulted from the then prevailing situation of "domination without hegemony achieved by means of an omnipresent and suffocating bureaucracy, which blocked the functioning of any oversight institution and removed all substance from the existing oversight system (the APN never checked the acquisition of illicit wealth, the Revenue Court closed many investigation files prematurely, etc...)." [closing quotes supplied] That is to say that the procedure involved in the bill regarding personal financial statements could produce more convincing results. "As a matter of fact, combined with the rules of the democratic game," this procedure "will not fail to be translated through a strengthening and broadening of clarity in the management and morality of public life." And this for two reasons: in terms of its object and its publicity.

The subject of the statement is very broad. "It must include an inventory of the personal and real estate property of the statement provider, of his spouse, and of his minor children, if applicable." And even though it will be personal, the statement will be the target of remarkable and diversified publicity, depending on the statement provider. The statements submitted by "presidents of the Republic, of the APN, heads of governments, members of the government, the secretary generals of the government, the prime minister, and the public prosecutor for the Supreme Court, the president of the Revenue Court, the presidents and public prosecutors of the Courts, the walis, the presidents and members of the Constitutional Council" will be published "in the official journal of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria." The statements submitted by the presidents of the APWs and the APCs will "be published by all appropriate means, and specifically by means of posters at the headquarters of the relevant body," that of elected individuals will be "sent to the presidents of the assemblies to which they belong." As to the statements submitted by magistrates, they will be "sent to the Superior Council of the Magistrature." And finally, the statements submitted by other agents of the public sector, will be "sent to their main hierarchical superior" and "filed in the administrative file of the interested party." The bill provides each individual who submits a statement the opportunity to "request the publication of the statement through the press."

This being the case, it must be said that a shadow is still hanging over the process. As a matter of fact, it is legitimate to ask oneself whether, once the bill has been enacted by the APN, the law in question will apply to individuals already in office and subject to this procedure which, for all that, is compulsory given that "the failure to submit a statement...brings with it the implementation of loss of elective mandate or end of function?" The principle is that a law comes into force only after it has been published and that it applies only to "new situations" which fall within its jurisdiction. This rule corresponds to the democratic principle of nonretroactiveness of (basic) laws. Therefore, it should not be

applicable to "rulers" in office because the current bill provides that the statement be submitted "within 3 months following the nomination or election of the person involved." However, as with all laws, this law is only applicable within the framework of the object it targets. It does not give rulings, by erasing the past, in areas which are not its own.

EGYPT

Doctor Reportedly Denied Travel for Torture Treatment

90P40036A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 25 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by Muhammad 'Ismat]

[Text] The Doctors' Union has sent a protest to Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, the interior minister, about Dr. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Jawad al-Tuni's being prohibited from traveling to France for treatment of the effects of the torture to which he was subjected in the well-known case of the Armed Communist Organization. The French Government had already agreed to treat Dr. al-Tuni at one of its hospitals. However, airport security took him off of the plane despite his having obtained permission from Justice Jamal Shuman, the prosecutor general, for foreign travel.

Moreover, officials at the passport and nationality authority assured the doctor that there were no objections from any office to his traveling for treatment abroad.

Dollar Development Bond Resistance Reported

90AA0046A Cairo UKTUBAR
in Arabic 25 Mar 90 pp 22-23

[Article by Muhsin Hasanayn; includes an interview with Mahmud 'Abd-al-'Aziz, a member of the Supreme Investment Committee for Bond Administration]

[Text] The following story is related by a senior official in the banking system. As we know, responsibility for the story falls on the storyteller.

It is the story of a "strictly religious citizen," who uncovered some aspects of the fierce war now being waged mercilessly inside Egyptian banks against dollar development bonds!

The citizen went to one of the large banks and told the teller he wished to subscribe to development bonds. The teller only looked at him derisively and advised him, "You mustn't do that. How can you put your money into government-issued bonds! I advise you to put your money into investment certificates!"

The "clever" teller proceeded to enumerate the advantages of investment certificates and other savings instruments offered by the bank at which he works!

The citizen smiled, said nothing, and was satisfied to salute the teller as he left the bank. Instead of going home, as others in his place might do, he went directly to the Central Bank and lodged a complaint against the bank employee.

Officials in the Central Bank acted immediately, transmitting the citizen's complaint to officials in the bank where the teller is employed. Upon being summoned, the teller justified his action as an attempt to promote the savings instruments floated by the bank, maintaining that he should be thanked, not blamed, for being loyal to the bank. The story ended with a light "pinch" on the employee's ear, lest he do it again!

This story is repeated frequently by a many citizens who have attempted to subscribe to development bonds. However, because they are not "strictly religious," they have avoided the headaches, leaving the bonds and the Central Bank to their own devices to face this fierce war being waged by the tellers!

In terms of actual figures concerning the effects of this war on development bond subscription, the yield of the bonds has yet to surpass \$30 million, whereas it had been expected to reach 10 times that figure.

The Yield Does Not Concern Us

However, the weak yield from bond subscription is apparently not causing anxiety among officials in the Supreme Investment Committee for Bond Administration. Mahmud 'Abd-al-'Aziz, a member of the committee, as well as the deputy chairman of the Federation of Banks of Egypt, and the deputy chairman of the Egyptian National Bank, states that the important thing is to develop citizens' awareness and habituate them to the practice of savings, which we have forgotten for more than 40 years, or since the creation of a capital market. The crucial issue is not the amount of funds that are amassed, but the growth of a trend, even if it is slow!

[UKTUBAR] Do you believe that the \$30-million figure regarding the yield of issues made to date is accurate?

['Abd-al-'Aziz] I do not wish to talk about the yield figure, not because it is secret, but because I believe that the yield, be it 5, 7, or 8 million dollars per month, is considered the expression of an additional, new instrument, namely the capital market. This is considered a good trend, and we are satisfied that it is positive and growing daily.

[UKTUBAR] Do your remarks indicate that the yield is weak?!

['Abd-al-'Aziz] My remarks do not indicate anything (laughing). However, I can imply that if we had wanted to cover all the issues, we would have allowed the public banks to buy these bonds. If we had done that, they would have been covered in minutes, because the banks have enormous liquidity exceeding a billion dollars in foreign bank deposits. In other words, they employ a

technique that requires them to deposit their funds abroad on a daily basis to fully benefit from the interest. (The Supreme Committee for Bond Administration wishes the yield of bonds to be a true reflection of the volume of savings of individuals and private institutions).

We did not resort to floating the bonds to meet a need for foreign currency. Rather, we did so to establish and cultivate a new market. Therefore, we are not concerned with the yield. The yield that is realized will be channeled into financing the foreign component of carefully studied investment projects.

The Bonds and the Investment Companies

[UKTUBAR] The timing of the bonds' flotation suggests that they are an attempt to fill a gap left by some investment companies that have left the market. What is your view?

[Abd-al-'Aziz] (Mahmud 'Abd-al-'Aziz quickly answers) The flotation of the dollar development bonds is related neither to the investment companies crisis, nor to the war between the Egyptian banks. This program has been under study for two years and is unrelated to those matters. Actually, contemplation of these bonds coincided with the collapse that occurred in international stock markets and the losses incurred by a number of Egyptians and Arabs who were dazzled by the international capital markets and persuaded by the portfolio management brokers who roam the Gulf.

These brokers enticed them with international instruments. Because they had no experience in dealing with them, they were exposed to major losses. Therefore, we have tried to give them a local alternative having an international modality. This alternative is in the form of a note, to which all international criteria apply, and which serves the national economy at the same time!

[UKTUBAR] That means that the approximately 20 savings instruments currently offered by Egyptian banks have failed to meet the needs of savers!

[Abd-al-'Aziz] There is nothing like the bond except long-term savings certificates in Egyptian pounds, the terms of which reach seven years. These are new certificates. Their term is only one year, and they provide 16 percent in foreign currency [interest]. The market is completely devoid of any capital market instrument. Therefore, we have offered dollar bonds. The bonds do not compete with savings instruments offered by the banks. A client may decide to choose one or the other.

[UKTUBAR] Then what is the secret behind the war started by bank employees, especially those of the National Bank, against the development bonds in favor of investment certificates? Why do some National Bank officials oppose the conversion of bonds into investment certificates?

[Abd-al-'Aziz] No official in the National Bank opposes this matter at all, because we manage the administration of the development bonds. We welcome the conversion of bonds into investment certificates, because that is tantamount to the conversion of foreign currency savings into Egyptian pounds at free bank market rates, which any bank would welcome.

The current competition between the bonds and other instruments is legitimate, and we welcome it. It is giving a large infusion to the capital market.

The volume of all the issues of these bonds is a drop in the sea compared to the approximately 26 billion Egyptian pounds in foreign currency in Egyptian banks! If 10 or 20 percent of the yield of the bonds from the accounts of the banks is converted, this is natural and good. We would be satisfied and proud to attract the remaining 80 percent from outside the banking sector.

Even if the bonds were sold from within the banking sector by means of the conversion of the banking sector's deposits, this too would be a good development that we would welcome; it does not affect the volume of funds in the banks.

It is obvious that any new instrument floated on the market must attract conversions from old, existing instruments. However, at the same time, it attracts new brackets of savers and savers. We welcome any competition in this regard as long as it favors the saver and ultimately the capital market.

It Is Not Only the National Bank

[UKTUBAR] What about the first part of the question regarding the secret behind the war being waged by Egyptian National Bank employees against development bonds in favor of investment certificates?

[Abd-al-'Aziz] It is an exaggeration to describe the competition inside the banks as a war. This competition has occurred not only in the National Bank, but also in several other banks, because of a lack of understanding or awareness on the part of some tellers of the importance and nature of the bonds. However, through continuous explanation and awareness development, it is possible to convince these employees that all instruments flow ultimately into one channel, which is the Egyptian economic development channel.

As I indicated, the banks are benefitting from these issues, because they create new sources that feed the free banking market. The bond and its yield can be sold by its bearer on the banking market. Also the monthly earnings are collected by the banks and entered into the accounts of their clients in hard currency. All of these sources are not apt to yield unless by means of bonds. Bond purchasers differ from people who open bank accounts. They are a new bracket that we are trying to attract. Therefore, the bond's entry into the banking sector is considered a gain for this sector, which, as we know, is complemented by the capital market!

The behavior of some tellers has not affected bond selling operations, because anyone wishing to buy bonds can do so directly from the Central Bank if he encounters any unsound behavior on the part of some bank employees.

[UKTUBAR] However, where is the role of Egyptian banks in making bank employees aware of the importance of these bonds to the economy.

[Abd-al-'Aziz] The Federation of Banks of Egypt has organized a seminar for marketing employees and tellers working in Egyptian banks. The seminar aims to make them aware of the importance of bonds, and the fact that it is in their banks' interest to deal with these bonds as if they were their own issues.

It is well-known that every bank has its instruments, savings notes, and certificates. Thus, it goes without saying that tellers will promote their employers' instruments as part of their jobs. At the same time, they could view the bond, albeit one that was issued elsewhere, as a national bond issued by all the Egyptian banks in the interest of a new system for forming a capital market.

Greater explanation and ongoing awareness development will no doubt make them realize the importance of these bonds. In the near future, the federation will organize many seminars to enhance the awareness of Egyptian bank tellers, because senior bank officials realize the importance of bonds, but lower level employees are not sufficiently aware.

ISRAEL

Peace Initiatives Compared

44230122C Tel Aviv DAVAR (Supplement)
in Hebrew 16 Mar 90 pp 6-8

[Article by Avital 'Inba]

[Text] It is merely fortuitous that the three Israeli peace proposals published over the last 12 months are directly connected to Mosad veterans: the Shamir plan, the research by the team at the Center for Strategic Studies headed by Yosef Alper, and Shmu'el Toledano's private peace plan. There the similarity ends. While the first plan tries to pave an imaginary interim road in which we keep the whole cake and at the same time provide some satisfaction to the Palestinians, the other two proposals are reconciled to the Palestinian desire for independence, but set up conditions and restrictions that blunt the pain of granting self-determination. The Center for Strategic Studies has called for creative thinking to produce new alternatives or, in Toledano's words, "The Israeli-Arab controversy is so complex and complicated that only extraordinary solutions, unprecedented in human history, can solve it." At a time when the government plan is deeply mired in the morass surrounding its launch pad, it seems that the considered principles of the Center and Toledano's revolutionary

proposal contain an opiate of flight and novelty that alone can bring about a breakthrough, and which has been lacking in all governmental attempts at a solution to the problem since its inception. The academic-public discussion of the vital details, as it were, of the new proposals for a peace agreement, facilitate an in-depth examination of basic questions and sensitivities. The reactions, the in-depth penetration, and the involvement with the proposals have occupied broad circles of Israelis, Palestinians, and outsiders. There is peace ferment, an inclination to listen, to examine, and even to accept ideas that up until a while ago were strictly taboo.

Dr. Yosi Alper, 47, Aharon Yariv's deputy at the Center for Strategic Studies, is head of the team that put together the publication prepared in expectation-arousing secrecy, launched in a broad media campaign, and distributed in 13,000 copies in dozens of countries, including Arab states. In Israel it was sent to the top echelons of the three Authorities, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], high school administrators, to anyone who asked. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis were exposed to the program via newspapers and television. Its writers lecture on it incessantly.

[DAVAR] From the point of view of the effect of the program on policymakers in Israel, has the mountain given birth to a mouse?

[Alper] We had no illusions that some major personality would read the program and announce that it had opened his eyes and changed his policy. We deal with politicians who do not appreciate the contribution of academe in the formulation of policy. In addition most of them have security and strategic experience, which only strengthens their belief that they know what they are doing. Our goal was to influence basic thinking over the long haul and public opinion, to enrich public discussion of strategic issues. The day after publication the General Secretary of Tzomet asked for a dozen copies. Afterward that party published ads criticizing it. The willingness of Tzomet to deal with our assertions and enter into polemics with us on the issue of water, for example, which was hardly discussed at all before, is an example of how we have enriched the public debate.

[DAVAR] In what other ways have you enriched the public debate?

[Alper] We influenced the program. Two main issues—whether to talk to the PLO and the possibility that a Palestinian state would arise as a result of the process—have moved from the leftist fringes of the public political debate to the center. We "prepared the way." Today we have a situation that was considered absurd a year ago: What do they talk about within Likud—whether we are already talking to the PLO and if that will lead to a Palestinian state? These issues, after all, were taboo!

[DAVAR] What about the use of the materials you developed?

[Alper] Two paragraphs in the Shamir initiative—the need for close ties with Arab countries, especially with Jordan, and the rehabilitation of the refugees—appeared conspicuously in our program a month before the consolidation of the Shamir plan. To tell you that they took it from us—that I can't say. Motifs from our research serve in all kinds of frameworks. For example on the "Moqed" [Focus] program. Someone, in order to rationalize his remarks, reads from the books without citing the source. Another important effect is on the left: Among the moderates who did not advocate a Palestinian state or talks with the PLO, there has been clear movement. For the more radical left, and they have told us this, it provided material for thought on security needs. We made them more responsible in presenting their positions. The option of unilateral withdrawal from Gaza has disappeared from the agenda since the publication.

[DAVAR] What about the right?

[Alper] The prime minister read an abstract and reacted with scorn. I could describe his reaction to the head of the Center as churlish and crude. He discounted his honesty and credibility. Moshe Arens, when I met him at a cocktail party after the publication, attacked me with horrible anger directed at the Center and the publication. He said we had disqualified ourselves, had lost our credibility. The anger told me we were effective. The chairman of the foreign and defense committee, Ben-Elisar, has banned us. Members of the committee asked to discuss the research and to invite us in for a discussion—he refused. He even avoided accepting a copy. On the other hand, Foreign Ministry officials take me aside and say: "The research is on the table; we use it all the time." Foreign diplomats tell me that Netanyahu, in briefing the diplomatic community, makes use of the research when he wants to bring home our defense needs in the territories. He says: "Even the famed Center emphasizes such-and-such needs."

[DAVAR] The angry reactions of the Likud are very understandable....

[Alper] The research was of great concern to the right. Perhaps more than anything because during the course of the year the English version was distributed throughout the world wherever they deal with the issue, and was widely quoted. Critiques were written. I appeared on American television in a confrontation with Nabil Sha'ath. All of that aroused great interest. There are results. There is no diplomatic mission outside Israel that does not know about the research. They sit with Arens and tell him: "Yes, Mr. Minister, but what about the Center's research?" In a round-about report from his office it was reported to me that he is very upset that every foreign guest lays the book on the table.

[DAVAR] Didn't the Foreign Ministry brief its people on how to "defend themselves" against the research?

[Alper] I don't know, but a book has already been published by some radical right research institute in

Jerusalem, "The Committee for the Defense of the West," with all kinds of American extremists on its board of trustees. They analyze every one of our sentences and try to prove that they are misguided. The degree of their detachment from daily life in Israel is shown by the fact that they published only in English because they didn't know we had put out a Hebrew version and saw no need to react to it. From right-wing circles we have learned of an attempt to raise money to set up a moderate right-wing body to compete with us. That is because the leadership of the right has the feeling that we are filling the entire space. Research is being conducted that will try to prove that our presence in Judaea and Samaria is essential for security. It seems to me that the people who deal with that were selected in advance for their opinions, and that is the great difference between them and us. Our goal is not to encourage multilateral debate but to provide an answer with an ideological bent. When we conducted the research, we, the members of the team, not only had arguments over it but almost came to blows. In the beginning we had doubts about whether it would even be possible to reach agreement among ourselves on such issues. In the end we produced a document acceptable to everyone. Compromises were made in order to achieve a consensus.

[DAVAR] What do compromises have to do with scientific research?

[Alper] This is political science and we are dealing with the future. It is true there is a certain weakness in this, but the effect of 20 Israelis like us being together behind the publication has to be weighed against the possibility that a lone investigator might push one point of view or another. This is the first and only time we have expressed an institutional opinion.

[DAVAR] Were there other reactions on the right besides scorn and derision of your credibility?

[Alper] 'Uzi Landau and Benny Begin were the only ones who tried to confront us publicly in a logical way. Others did the same in private conversations. Right-wing people, even radicals, who value discussion did come to talk to us. I appreciate that very much. It was hard for them to accept our conclusions, but they understood that hurling insults or trying to undermine our credibility is not a solution. Even from MK's [Knesset members] we ran into comments like: "What you describe is the way it will be. We aren't happy about it, we won't support it in public, but...." They were influenced. We had increased the readiness to deal with the question.

[DAVAR] What happened outside Israel?

[Alper] It is in the nature of things that we had more influence outside Israel. First of all, with American Jews. Anyone coming back from the lecture circuit in the United States will tell me: "You cannot imagine. In every Jewish community they show up with the book and ask questions." The Jewish Congress did an excellent job in distributing it among community policymakers and leaders, and the book has changed opinions. There is a

considerable movement to the left in American Judaism. You may agree or not with what the Jews say—I agree. They are involved. They have a right to express their opinion. The U.S. Government has also been influenced. I testified before the House Middle East subcommittee, which devoted discussion to the research. In America they are looking for ideas to advance a solution to the conflict, and there is a lot of openness there to academe. Senior officials in Washington, and I cannot name names, told me that the research directly influenced the formation of policy. Anyone who reads Baker's speech at the AIPAC [American-Israeli Political Action Committee] Congress on 23 May (the speech surprised Arens during his visit there), will find a surprising similarity between the formulation of his demands upon Israel and the Palestinians and our formulation of what has to change on both sides. In Europe we have had less of an influence, but still the European Parliament is discussing the research. That forced a radical right MK, who went there to represent the Knesset in the discussion, to ask for a copy in English—and to study it. There will soon be a translation into German. Every Soviet researcher I meet has read it and knows it. In official circles in the USSR they considered calling a congress to discuss the research and invite us. But today they have other priorities.

[DAVAR] And what about the Arabs?

[Alper] The book reached government circles in Egypt, and there was positive criticism in the press. But we could not have predicted what happened in Jordan. From very senior circles we learned that when Husayn appeared in Washington in April 1989 and declared that Jordan is ready for a security agreement with Israel, that they should embrace a Palestinian entity when it arose, he was basing himself on our research. All echelons of the administration in Amman read it, blessed it and praised it. They see it as a realistic program.

[DAVAR] Then only the Israeli Government does not deal with it and praise it....

[Alper] Nor the PLO. I know that at least Abu-Iyad has read it. In Tunis they said: "This is interesting and could be a good basis for discussion." But that is their standard reaction, and disappointing. I presented the research to intellectuals and leaders in the territories. The general reaction was positive, but it is hard to get a detailed response. What is most encouraging is that the pamphlet was translated by Ahmad al-Taybi and appeared in his quarterly and there will soon appear, under the auspices of the Husayni Institute, a full Arabic version of the book which we have gone over. That is, they consider the research worthy of being read by their people. I see this as a blessing and am inclined to believe that if Husayni publishes the book, it says something about the attitude of the PLO. He does not act without or against the PLO.

[DAVAR] What is their main criticism?

[Alper] About the length of the transition period. One of them says: "How can I tell a 14-year-old who is throwing stones that he has to wait a bit until he reaches his goal?

He can't live with that." Another says: "You say 10 to 15 years. We say 5 to 10. How about compromising?" That is encouraging.

[DAVAR] In summing up, you supplied independent scientific material to influential foreign bodies and, in so doing, hurt the government's staying power.

[Alper] That may be what Arens would say. But we also tried to increase the pressure on the Israeli Government in Israel.

[DAVAR] In so doing you are not acting as a scientific body but as a political one!

[Alper] Not so. Forget that expression. We have tried to enrich public discussion on a central issue. In my opinion we have done the right thing and carried out the objective of the Institute. My colleagues and I have no problem with the Shamir program as an initial basis for implementing the process as we see it. But we found so much negation in the status quo that we thought it important to put together the program. For the Americans this strengthened the need to pressure Israel to present a program. I am not responsible for the fact that we have had more influence outside Israel and that there has been feedback.

[DAVAR] After a year of reaction and feedback, are there any points you would correct or change?

[Alper] Were we to write it today, we would have to take into account the changes that have occurred: What is going on in the Soviet Union with regard to her desire to be involved in the process, the immigration and its effects. The strong Arab reaction shows how important this is. In my opinion, the developments have had no substantive impact. We included demographic calculations that jibe beautifully with the immigration forecasts. We wrote that even if 800,000 immigrants arrive within the next decade, the effect would only be a bailout: They would slow the demographic process but would not overturn it. That has to be emphasized. Today the Jews here are about 60 percent of the population of the Land of Israel. In another 10-15 years there will be parity. Immigration will only maintain the 60-40 ratio, and then we would start the countdown again.

[DAVAR] What has your research done to the Institute's reputation?

[Alper] It raised it into people's consciousness and made it a national and international center on the issue of the conflict and its resolution, and prodded us to continue the momentum with issues that arose in the discussions, that seem to us to demand further scientific treatment. Here's a neat little item: Not a week goes by that I don't receive from someone in the diaspora his own private peace plan. Sometimes amazing things. Furthermore we provided a research push and a methodological model. There are academic bodies in Israel who, following our research, saw a need to jump on the bandwagon with follow-up research of various sorts.

[DAVAR] As a citizen with opinions equipped with serious academic research, will you act in the political arena to advance the Institute's conclusions?

[Alper] I am for thinking, not for persuasion. At the place where we stopped, on the brink of action for a research institute, we wrote that original thinking is needed to propose new alternatives. Toledano has done that. The Institute consolidated the principles; Toledano adopted them as yardsticks to test his proposal. He came and presented us a detailed political program. We told him: "It is nice that you based yourself on us, that is what we wanted, but you are working independently."

Shmu'el Toledano, 67, was born into a religious family long-established in Tiberias, of Moroccan Sephardi origin. The Irgun—"to this day I curse myself for blowing up a truck with Arabs"—intelligence, the IDF. In the Mosad he dealt with catching Nazi criminals in South America, was responsible for organizing Jewish cells to fight anti-Semitism in Latin America, and reached the top. When Me'ir Amit took over his job in 1965, a letter of resignation awaited him on his desk, signed by Toledano and Yitzhaq Shamir, who was his junior. Eleven years he served as advisor on Arab affairs to three prime ministers and abolished the military administration. In 1977 he was an MK from Dash and since 1981 has dedicated himself to lecturing and to sharpening political-security thinking. As a "security person," as a member of the "Sephardi community," and as a "nonleftist," he is quite comfortable, he says, talking now of a Palestinian state.

He had a "flash:" An advance survey he ordered from Mina Tzemah with the aid of a contribution he had received showed that his program is accepted by 60 percent of the public. In light of that and initial reactions, he left everything and devoted himself to spreading his good news and setting up institutionalized PR. A contributor named Yo'el Ro'eh, a television personality who immigrated from the United States, put an office and a clerk at his disposal. There is a 12-man secretariat and they are setting up a public council with people from all colors of the rainbow. They are raising money. Up until now he was very cautious; he sold his merchandise in Israel so they wouldn't say: "He's going to the goyim." Now he also goes abroad—planned meetings with members of Congress, representatives of Arab countries, the media, Carter. The means: A lot of PR here and abroad. The goal: to get on the Labor Party platform. A year from now he will conduct another survey. "A pensioner who fights like a lion," he says of himself. There is both stubbornness and pleasure.

[DAVAR] Is your starting point, then, the research of the Institute for Strategic Studies?

[Toledano] No, because I have been lecturing about the program for four years. I have presented it to about 30,000 people, the IDF, the Border Police, not a particularly dovish group, and it garnered about 60-percent approval. Three years ago I published an article in

HA'ARETZ entitled "Hello, Options"—in their research there are paragraphs "copied" from it. My plan and the research are almost identical from the point of view of the conclusions. There is a difference in the proffered solutions, but both they and I base ourselves on the need to develop mutual confidence between the opposing sides. My ego has swelled: A respected body that investigated for about a year reached exactly my conclusions! That gave me confidence, the push to go public and the hope that if my diagnosis is correct, then my practical solution may also be correct. I met with them and told them jokingly that I wouldn't sue them. In light of their comments, I made some minor revisions in the program, particularly with regard to the military guarantees Israel requires after the establishment of a Palestinian state.

[DAVAR] How did you put together your program?

[Toledano] In my lectures, I ended with the status quo. Thousands asked me: "If you were Prime Minister, what would you do? It is unfair to leave us in the dark." That forced me to think about it and offer a possible solution. An option is what I want—and it is clear that the option of Tehiya is the best, but we cannot thereby make peace. A solution must be acceptable to the other side, as well, and nonlethal to us, and that is the basic question. I build a skeleton which I patched up according to people's reactions. When you speak to tens of thousands and hear exactly the same things—"they want Jaffa, too"—you know what bothers them. Twenty-five percent of the public oppose returning the territories that "God gave us." There is nothing to be done with them. But there is a fair percentage, which has grown in light of the equation "a Palestinian state=the annihilation of Israel," that is truly afraid. I looked for a way to soothe the fears of that group.

[DAVAR] Did any break occur to you that encouraged you to agree to a Palestinian state?

[Toledano] No, I don't speak of a state pure and simple, but only under certain conditions. Without them, I am against it! I am for it when I think that it is Israel's best security. Even the planning branch within the IDF, headed by Avraham Tamir, sent the government a situation report several years ago that says a Palestinian state bound by certain restrictions is the lesser evil.

[DAVAR] What do the Palestinians get in the first five years according to your plan?

[Toledano] Very little. There is an occupation. There is no autonomy. After they are good boys for a year, we will begin to return private lands. There are tens of thousands of dunams the state holds without using them, and the peasants can't work them. In the first year, the settlement policy would continue. After a year, no new settlements would be erected. After three years, there would be free elections to a body that would prepare the state-to-come.

[DAVAR] In your program there is no need for Palestinian representation at the first stage?

[Toledano] I wouldn't sit down with any of them. There is nothing to discuss: Take it or live it [as published]. Only after three years would the government sit with those elected, who used to be PLO—a PLO that for three years has not fired a shot and not killed anyone and recognized Israel. They would begin to work out the details of the agreement, which is also known in advance: It would be impossible after three years to say that we don't accept such and such paragraph. In agreeing to end the intifadah, they would know in advance that the Palestinian state would be subject to restrictions. If they don't want it, they shouldn't accept it from the beginning.

[DAVAR] That sort of "Take it or leave it" approach is not customary in international relations.

[Toledano] It is not customary between equal partners. Faysal al-Husayni mentioned that to me. I answered him: I will tell it like it is. We are not equal partners. We hold the territories. I don't force you to accept my proposal. I make an offer; you will decide whether or not to accept. You can't take the good and leave me with the bad.

[DAVAR] Why wouldn't you, in fact, sit down with them now to negotiations and discuss the principles?

[Toledano] Look what happens: for nine months already they've been talking about one and one-half deported! I proceeded on the assumption that Israel holds the key. You have to find an arrangement that the key will begin to open. The PLO is in an uncomfortable situation; they don't know what will happen to them in 50 years and they accept my program. They need negotiations so that they can achieve their goal at the end of the road—a state. I am giving it to them in advance. There must not be negotiations because then each side will come up and reject one paragraph or another and it will all collapse.

[DAVAR] Where will they establish their capital under your proposal?

[Toledano] The hard nut to crack is Jerusalem. There, too, I acted on the assumption that Israel holds the key, and our good will is of utmost importance. I divided the problem into three parts: Sovereignty is ours. In terms of religion everyone will control his own holy places. In terms of the municipality, it would be divided into two elected townships. The Jerusalem Arabs would choose their citizenship. In my opinion, they will want to be Palestinians.

[DAVAR] You divide the city. That is daring.

[Toledano] The entire program is daring. I divide it the way Nazareth is divided into an upper and lower city. Even so, the Arabs don't accept it. As to the other possibility, to divide the sovereignty and leave the city united, there is no hope for an Israeli partner. You don't feel the power behind this question. Look at what a storm erupted after the American declaration! In a

survey, only 45 percent of the Jews accepted the arrangement I proposed for Jerusalem; 55 percent were against—despite the sovereignty!—as opposed to 35 percent against the whole program. On the matter of Jerusalem I acted like a politician. It was a big thing for me to have the survey show a result different from that in the past, up to 15 percent, when the words "Palestinian state" were uttered. Had I gotten a negative reaction, I wouldn't have gone public. It is very important to me to reach very broad circles, to persuade the groom first.

[DAVAR] How has the groom reacted thus far?

[Toledano] They attacked me less than the rival Alper program despite the fact that they offered less. But I am not naive: No party will change its opinion according to the program. The thought patterns of the leaders is: "If I say such and such, how will the public react?" There is a problem in moving petrified parties that cling to an old platform like to the scroll of the Torah. There were some rather sympathetic reactions from several MK's and Likud personages. In other parties, they asked whether to bring the program before their central committees. I said: "Do me a favor, don't." "Peace Now" proposed signing up hundreds of thousands of Jews and Palestinians. I don't want a leftist tag. The left thinks I am too stubborn, but says: "If the Arabs accept it, we are with you."

[DAVAR] Have there been any reactions from the Labor Party?

[Toledano] "A good program, but not realistic," is what Peres told my nephew, Ehud Toledano, who works with him. In my opinion Peres has reconciled himself to the fact that there is no getting away from talking to the PLO, but he wouldn't dare say it. My objective is the major part in the Labor Party—I want the program to be brought before two fora in the Party. If it gathers public support, there would be a situation in which the "Mashov" circle, for example, will say that the Labor Party has to discuss it. That would really be something!

[DAVAR] What about SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim]?

[Toledano] SHAS is at the top of my list. I will meet with Rabbi 'Obadiah and Rabbi Dra'i. There is some hope with them. Before I went public, I read that Rabbi Rabitz had a program not far removed from mine. But he wants settlements, and that the number of Jews on the West Bank should be like the number of Arabs in Israel and adds that settlement is even permissible in areas not under our control. I said "Thank you" and left.

[DAVAR] Are you trying to sell a "leftist" program with a centrist label?

[Toledano] I want to reach the 60 percent of the survey with Labor, pushed into the hands of the leftist parties and with the aid of moderate fringes of Likud. It is easy to say that! But first of all you have to get the support of public opinion and those who mold it. If the present

peace process should fail—and, in my opinion, that will happen whether we go to Cairo or not—the public will be “fed Up.”

[DAVAR] And then there will even be movement toward readiness for a Palestinian state.

[Toledano] I don't believe a Palestinian state can be forced upon us. It will arise only as the product of an agreement. An important survey done for the Pentagon says that if a Palestinian state arises after wars and fanning the flames of hatred, we will pay for it for a long time to come.

[DAVAR] What does the “bride” say?

[Toledano] My program is rather difficult for her. Her problems center on Jerusalem and the situation for the first five years—how we will act in the territories. I promised that I would add that, but I noted that the minute there was no intifadah and terror, there would be no incentive for the IDF to act. The papers in East Jerusalem published the program. A week ago the PLO's FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH, which we are forbidden to read here, published it in full and averred that the program was one of the important things that has happened here. Another thing that is unprecedented: On 22 January a spokesman for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine called on the PLO to adopt the program as a working paper for talks between Israel and the Palestinians under an international umbrella. Faysal al-Husayni publicly supported it. He would not have dared to say anything without PLO agreement. Thus far I have not stressed these reactions. I don't want over-emphasis on the reactions of the bride out of fear the groom might say that if the program is good for her, it is no good for him.

[DAVAR] Then there is no official reaction from Tunis?

[Toledano] No. The moment I get official sanction from the PLO, the bride's side will be covered. I wrote the Judicial Advisor to clarify whether I am allowed: 1. to send the program to the PLO and if not, 2. to give it officially to a resident of the territories who would pass it along. I want official transmission, but I will not break the law. I want to go to Europe and the United States—to the “best man,” so to speak—who have an important role to play, armed with the reaction of Tunis.

[DAVAR] What about establishing a Party that would put the program on the national agenda with a demand for a nationwide referendum, for example?

[Toledano] That's possible. But it is still too early for that. The objective is to somehow get onto the Labor Party platform. If not, they should at least show they are sympathetic—Father Marcel Dubois said he wants “A Positive Smile” from the Pope. I want more than that from Labor.

[DAVAR] Meanwhile the continuation of the status quo only increases the hostility and mutual fear.

[Toledano] Yes, but the program is good for any situation, and the more the distrust increases, the more the need for it will, too.

[Box, p 7] The Program of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Tel Aviv.

The Program of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Tel Aviv was published exactly a year ago, in the form of a book and pamphlet, at an investment of \$400,000. “Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—Ways to a Peace Settlement” analyzes six alternatives on the national agenda—a continuation of the status quo, autonomy, annexation, a Palestinian state, unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and a Jordanian-Palestinian federation—and discounts all of them while viewing a continuation of the status quo as the most serious danger for Israel. The pamphlet “Toward a Solution” outlines principles, of which the following constitutes an abstract: Creating a dynamic is the most urgent need for Israel, which will bring about a change in the two sides' most basic conceptions—the proposal goes into precise detail—and build mutual trust. After a protracted transition period, during the course of which the violence will stop and true broad autonomy will arise, they will negotiate with the PLO over components of the final peace. This is a path in which “Israel does not discount the possibility that in the end a Palestinian state will arise, bound by far-reaching security arrangements. Even if a trouble-making Palestinian state should arise...it would find itself restrained by an alliance of stronger states surrounding it on all sides—Israel and Jordan and, in the case of the Gaza Strip, Egypt.”

[Box, p 8] The Toledano Plan

The Toledano plan, published two months ago, is based on the principle that “It gives a lot in obligations for the future, but demands a lot in immediate action: It is not a leftist program.” Its essential idea: A truce in mutual suspicion by establishing a Palestinian state that would be “like a snake from which the venom has been removed and a child can now play with.” The “gimmick” in removing the venom is the irrevocable Israeli obligation to agree to establish a Palestinian state at the end of a successful transition period of five years, within corrected 1967 boundaries—the neighborhoods around Jerusalem. The program offers something not given to the Palestinians in the past: A state in the near term. The decision would have irrevocable force and would receive an international stamp of approval. All of this if the other side will agree to conditions: No more intifadah or terror, opening the gates of the Arab countries, renunciation of the state of war, abandonment of the right of return to Israeli territory, recognition of Israel. If that does not happen, the obligation is nonbinding.

Personal Relations Allegedly Affecting Politics

44230123C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 19 Mar 90 p B1

[Article by Ran Kislav: “Politics of Impulses”]

[Excerpts] Anyone who argues that politics can be conducted according to the pure rules of struggle of outlooks and ideals, without connection to personal aspirations of one kind or another, is naive or hypocritical. Politics is conducted by politicians, and politicians are human beings with ambitions, loves, hates, and many weaknesses. Very few, if any, are capable of repressing these feelings for the good of the larger goal. But even in politics there is a problem of proportions.

In the last government—the one which passed from this world over the weekend—there were drives of the strongest kind. In fact, it rose and fell on that basis.

The main drive that dictated the moves in the last 16 months was Yitzhak Rabin's hatred for Shim'on Peres. It seemed sometimes that Rabin's main goal is to prevent Peres from becoming prime minister. This was the main basis for the pact in blood between Rabin and Shamir. Consequently, Rabin aided Shamir in establishing a joint Likud-Alignment government: in order to become number one in the Labor Party and to end Peres' political career.

If he did not succeed in this until the end, that's not his fault. Time after time, he thwarted the efforts of Peres' supporters to bring down the government and establish an alternative government under him. He did this when Shamir accepted the diktat of the constraints in his party. He did this again during the Weizmann crisis. He would have done it again this time, as well, were it not for the too impetuous moves made by Shamir, when he dismissed Peres and caused the resignation of the Labor cabinet ministers.

There is, apparently, some basis for the belief that he would have done this even on Thursday, were it not for the Dar'i-Edri connection, which was carried on behind his back up to the last minute. Had he known this earlier, some assert, he would have convinced Shamir to go for a compromise early on the decisive day.

Also on the other side, in the opposite direction, personal impulses were operating, maybe no less strong. Those who in the end caused Shamir's downfall were the three constraints cabinet ministers, Sharon, Levy, and Moda'i. It is difficult to view precisely this trio as more extreme than Shamir.

What united the three constraints ministers was the personal opposition of each of them to Shamir. Each of them has his own account to settle, but together they brought about the creation of the right-wing front against Shamir within the Likud. In practice, each of them knows that Shamir is no less of a hawk than himself. They understand well that Shamir, in all of his "peace initiatives," operated under constraints and with the intention of torpedoing the whole affair at a convenient opportunity.

But all this understanding was not relevant: As with Rabin, thus also with them, the personal drives were what dictated the ideology and not the opposite. Thus

were created alliances or partnerships of interests that transcend the boundaries of the two camps—not always declared, and not always even conscious—between the haters and the fighters for survival. Between Rabin and Shamir, on the one side, between Sharon-Levy-Moda'i and Peres, on the other.

In the shadow of these great battles of impulses, others with clear personal interests also scurried about in the recent days of crisis: David Magen, for example. The man who grew up in the shadow of Ari'el Sharon, betrayed him, and went over to Shamir's camp, received a decent return for his betrayal after Sharon resigned, and was able to serve for one week in the unity government (and also to be interviewed on television countless times, and even to declare: "My colleagues, the cabinet ministers..."). How he tried to save this government, how he ran between Shamir and Rabin!

Or, in contrast, the two rabbis who dictated the moves. Rabbi Shakh, who established Degel Hatorah in order to punish Agudat Yisra'el (as, earlier, for the same purpose, he had established SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim]), ruled, in fact, against his political inclinations and imposed on Rabin a vote for the government, only because Agudat Yisra'el, his pet hate, was in the other camp. And Ovadia Yosef, who organized that nocturnal trick that brought down the government, knew well the extent to which it was possible to rely on his personal feeling of honor. It was only necessary to get Shamir to insult that honor, for the government to fall. [passage omitted]

But in all those calculations, in addition to the evaluation of the party map, it is necessary to take into account also Yitzhaq Rabin's drives. It may be assumed that one failure will not deter him from his war against his enemy. And, perhaps, another version of "unity government" will arise?

Obstacles To Settling Jordan Valley Presented

44230122A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Mar 90 p C5

[Article by Hayim Be'or]

[Text] "The Jordan Valley really can't absorb new immigrants because it is based only on agriculture and the purchase of means of production. For those who want to work in agriculture, it has become almost impossible." That is what Israel Nadivi, the chairman of the Jordan Valley regional council, warned yesterday.

Nadivi, who spoke during a press tour of the Jordan Valley, reported that the average cost for purchasing production means per family amounts to about 100,000 new Israeli shekels. Sixty percent of that sum is provided as a loan from the Agriculture Ministry, and the rest, as a grant.

According to him, the average family is almost unable to put up the security for a loan.

As for the grant, Nadivi said, it is provided only after the hothouse has been set up or other infrastructure work carried out, which requires a considerable expenditure of money. According to him, grant monies arrive, at best, only after six months.

The chairman of the regional council noted that in the Jordan Valley, about which there is consensus as to its strategic importance, there are only about 2,750 Israelis. Because of the exclusive reliance on one sector, agriculture, the population of the region is not growing. This affects the stability of the educational system and the implementation of cultural activities.

Because of the freeze in developing the area, said Nadivi, it is impossible to achieve any long-term program to turn the Jordan Valley into the "European vegetable silo."

It was recently decided to abandon part of the vegetable plots and develop 4,000 dunams of vineyards in the 'Arava areas. Emphasis has also been placed on developing a flowers-for-export sector.

Soon the Jordan Valley will see an attempt at raising tropical aquarium fish of the cichlid family because of the increasing demand for them in the United States and Europe. For that purpose a group of aquaculture experts has been brought to the area from a central African country.

Crocodile breeding has also begun, according to information gathered from Kibbutz Gan Shmu'el. The first export of crocodile skins and meat from the Jordan Valley will begin in about a year and a half.

New Police Commander in Galilee Appointed

44230122B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Mar 90 p A3

[Article by Zohar Eisenberg]

[Text] Assistant Commander Rami Rahav, the new commander of the Galilee Police Zone, said yesterday that he intends to try ways to bring about a change in the image of the police among Galilee Arabs. "I want to change the perceptions and behavior of the Arab population," Rahav told a news conference at the conclusion of the installation ceremony for the new commander.

At the ceremony he was handed his position by Deputy Commander Ganot, who received appointment as Deputy Commander of the northern police district and thereby yesterday completed five years of command over the Galilee Police Zone.

According to Assistant Commander Rahav, who is soon to make Deputy Commander, the policemen of the Galilee zone will try by various means, including persuasion, to change the prevailing perception in the Arab sector that the police operate against the Arab community.

Among other things, the new zone commander intends to meet with council representatives and elected public officials among the Galilee's Arabs in order to explain to them, as he puts it, that "the police serve the entire public including the Arab residents." It should be pointed out that during the last several months, following a series of actions by the patrol units and particularly the special patrol unit that was set up by the zone's outgoing commander Deputy Commander Ganot, many Arab residents of the Galilee complained about heavy-handed tactics of the Galilee zone's police, which were characterized more than once as brutality against the Arab community.

Persons from within the Arab community claimed that hundreds of Arabs were hurt by the actions of the patrol unit "that imposes terror on the Arab street." Many police officers, including the designated general commander, Commander Tarner, have confirmed that they are aware of the police image in the eyes of the Arab community because of "physical friction" resulting from the unit's assignments to impose order. But until now no senior police officer has taken any real action to change the police image or to calm the existing tension between the Arabs and the Galilee Zone police.

Additional actions which the new commander Rahav intends to take are: community-police days in Arab villages, lectures in Arab schools and villages, and the hosting of school children at the police station.

Mutiny Reported in Golani Brigade

44230112I Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 28 Feb 90 p 21

[Interview with Me'ir 'Amor, former Golani company commander, by Ya'el Gvirtz; place and date not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] At the end of last week, a sort of company mutiny in one of the Golani regiments became known. The mutiny, in the form of organized absenteeism, reminded some of a similar incident about 10 years ago. Captain (reserves) Me'ir 'Amor was then a company commander of a Golani company that staged an organized desertion. Company G in the Baraq Regiment voted with their feet by walking out on the new regimental commander, Efi [Efrayim] Fine, who is currently testifying in the Giv'ati B trial. For the third successive time, Fine had stolen 2 days of leave from the soldiers. The event was perceived at the time as most problematic in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], especially since 'Amor's company is considered one of the best in the Golani Brigade. 'Amor completed his military service and left the company about 2 months before the incident. He describes relations between the officer's cadre and soldiers in the Golani Brigade as a china shop, which Fine entered clumsily.

[HADASHOT] Me'ir 'Amor, do you remember the incident in the Golani Brigade in 1979?

[Amor] I commanded this company, which was a good, consolidated company. This is called a rifleman company in the Golani Brigade. They start in the company after induction and training and remain in it for their entire length of service.

[HADASHOT] Which social nucleus makes up such a company of rifleman?

[Amor] Almost all of them are eastern [Afro-Asiatic]. Usually, those who become rifleman are in a low quality group according to the Army's criteria. Company commanders and officers are selected according to their quality grouping. Whoever enters the paratroops is at or above a certain quality grouping level. Here, it is low.

[HADASHOT] A. T. Writes in a letter to HADASHOT that you raised the company to operational excellence, and that it is considered the best in the Golani.

[Amor] I very much loved the soldiers and the company. I did my work as I understood it at the time.

[HADASHOT] How do you explain the organized absenteeism?

[Amor] Whoever knows a Golani soldier knows that relations between officers and soldiers is often like a china shop. They are not really structured on the basis of formal Army codes, but codes that are formulated through people who experience the situation.

[HADASHOT] What is the importance of the regimental commander in these relations?

[Amor] The regimental commanders in the Golani Brigade strive to be very close to the soldiers. In sum, a Golani is really someone who reaches a high level contrary to the entire ideology and logic of the quality grouping [evaluation system]. Soldiers defined in school as rowdy failures have come to the Golani Brigade and withstood the toughest missions. This began in the war over water against the Syrians in the 1960s, the Six-Day War, when unit pride began to develop.

[HADASHOT] Was your regimental commander Efi Fine?

[Amor] Three weeks after I left, the regimental commander was replaced.

[HADASHOT] Was this case connected to that?

[Amor] Connected to Efi Fine. Whoever was in the Golani heard about Efi Fine in that period, just as one hears of him now on a wider scope. Efi Fine is apparently a very opinionated, resolved person. As a regimental commander, he came with the halo of a reconnaissance company commander. He tried to introduce a certain system which he thought was the correct one. In the Golani Brigade, the soldiers' way of life is training/line [training/service on the front-line or border]. Usually, there are leaves between training and [serving on] the line. The poisoned company commanders usually sought

to use any time segment, no matter how small, to instill more soldiership in the soldiers. He attempted to make the soldiers train just before their leave, thereby reducing it. The training was very difficult and took place in unpleasant conditions. The leave period was reduced, and when the soldiers returned, their company had to be on alert. So, the soldiers, most of them veteran soldiers, decided to do justice for themselves.

[HADASHOT] Is this part of their consolidated nature?

[Amor] Yes, the soldiers knew that they would be subject to court-martial, but they nonetheless did it. For example, entire Golani companies shave their heads, or suddenly adopt a certain style of organizing their personal equipment to create a kind of very special company life-style. If the atmosphere is positive, the company becomes a very consolidated social framework.

[HADASHOT] What is the direct significance of such an organized desertion?

[Amor] First, it has a military significance. It can be handled in a formal, regular framework. Soldiers who deserted can be incarcerated. This is what was done. Harsh treatment.

[HADASHOT] What would you do as a regimental commander?

[Amor] It is entirely clear that further action would be needed. It would be necessary to understand exactly what happened. I would invest greater thought in the motives and try to understand them. Soldiers feel very wronged if their leave is curtailed. Three years in a line/training army is very depressing.

[HADASHOT] There was a credibility problem with Fine, because he told them that whoever returned and participated in the exercise would not be tried for absenteeism. Ultimately, they performed the exercise, and half the company was tried for absenteeism.

[Amor] The details are somewhat problematic. I know that they had to appear at some very important exercise. Efi took the whole story personally, and I think that he had reasons. I do not think that it would be such a pleasant experience to tell the brigade commander that 30 soldiers from one company are absent because they are engaging in absenteeism. It could be that he simply created an exercise for them. He promised, but he did not promise to keep the promise. There are all kinds of methods.

[HADASHOT] So far, we have dealt with the regimental commander. What happens to the company commander after such an incident?

[Amor] Here, there is always the problem of being accepted by the soldiers on the one hand, and doing the job on the other hand. One walks a tightrope. Frequently, it is a matter of how you find your way to the

soldiers' hearts. It is a fact that this was a good company. It was in training. It was also in good shape from an operational standpoint.

[HADASHOT] Do you have any idea what happened to the company?

[Amor] Only a year and a half ago, we had a very large reunion in Jerusalem. This is very, very untypical of a rifleman company in the Golani brigade. I maintain contact with the soldiers to this very day.

[HADASHOT] Did you subsequently hear any reference to Efi Fine from the soldiers?

[Amor] I do not think that they liked him very much. He distances himself from others, and he does so very consciously. To the extent that I know him, he is very stubborn. We both performed reconnaissance in the Jordan Valley in 1979, on a very hot summer day. The jerrycan was really boiling. At one point, our jeep was parked next to his jeep, and one of the officers said [Russian expletive] how hot it was there. Fine asked why he was complaining, and he told him that the land must be accepted with love. He made all sorts of strange comments like that. Soldiers used to say that he was poisoned. Many of them caught him bluffing. Along with the halo of Efi Fine, there was the other side, part of which is bluff and bravado.

[HADASHOT] How did you respond at the time when you heard about the incident?

[Amor] I was very satisfied with the soldiers, because it is impossible to push people to an extreme that causes people to say: Look for another wall to climb. Thirty men from one Golani company in jail. This is really great—2 weeks of sitting and doing nothing.

IDF Endeavors To Make Young Officers Stay

44230122E Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 18 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by 'Avi Benayahu]

[Text] Next year, too, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] General Staff intends to invest sizable sums of money, tens of millions of shekels, as part of the general effort to compensate junior officers in the field corps. The goal is, of course, to try to keep the officers in military service.

Those sums of money, which were authorized by the relevant bodies, are intended to serve as material benefits for the young officers. This year the IDF is starting a new program for new officers the IDF wants to keep. The PSS ("Permanent Service Stipend") program provides the sum of 18,000 new Israeli shekels to each young officer 22 years of age who accepts the appeal of the Manpower branch to stay in permanent service two more years. Three hundred young officers are already included in the program this year, and it is the IDF's intent to increase it to 750 officers.

The Manpower branch's PSS program is actually copied from the Air Force, which gives its young pilots a sign-up incentive of 33,000 new Israeli shekels, in addition to regular pay, for their agreement to sign up for five more years in the squadron. Right now the Air Force is carrying out a follow-up program called "Challenge," which covers 15 percent of the outstanding young pilots in the Force's air corps. These are set to enjoy, in exchange for signing up for career service, a varied job path, a housing program, academic studies, etc.

The head of the Manpower branch, General Ron Goren, himself an Air Force man, sees advantages in this program and is moving quickly to integrate it into the IDF ground forces under the name "PSS-B."

Accomplishments Right Now

The struggle for the young officers in the IDF began about three years ago following what was termed "the company commander crisis." Military commanders turned up a number of conditions that are vital if their young commanders are to stay in service. Among them: Improvement in salary and service conditions, a relationship on the part of the system to the young officer that will garner his full confidence and, at the same time, improvement of the image of the officer and of the IDF in general.

The Manpower branch, with the backing of the Chief of the General Staff and the Defense Ministry, has been adopting this policy over the last three years, and, according to its commanders, the results can already be felt. The target population is officers between the ranks of Lieutenant and Lt. Colonel (ages 22-40). Along the optimal service path (about 18 years), the IDF pads their way with many benefits, most of them material. This sort of young officer, in a field unit, will get a relatively high salary, for example, as compared to his fellow on the outside, lengthy academic studies in any area he chooses at IDF expense, a personal vehicle to use for service purposes, a year of "finishing school" in R & D, a tempting housing program (the Modi'in project, etc.), an officer's trip abroad organized by the Manpower branch, weekends in hotels and the assurance of an increased pension after the age of 40.

Through this method, which is already in place, the IDF will be able to show results right now. But the military commanders must act with their "fingers on the pulse" and feel the sensitivities and problems of the young commanders who constitute the target audience, and find the right balance of things to do.

Thus, for example, it turns out from unofficial surveys taken in military units and from conversations by senior commanders with the officer population between the ranks of Lieutenant and Major, that the material benefits really are very attractive and the economic security provided by the military organization really is persuasive. But the company commander's decision on whether to re-up or to get out depends on totally different problems and on daily environmental factors faced by

the officer at the company commander level. There is no assurance that these considerations of the heart, voiced by the junior officers in the field units, have floated up to the upper echelons that are, in fact, "locked into" the benefits program being implemented in the field.

A Surfeit of Missions

These officers complain, for example, of a surfeit of duties that they and their units are tasked with; they cavil about a lack of planning and a lot of uncoordinated activity, especially in everything having to do with duty in the territories; about small problems and important ones such as a lack of vehicles for carrying out company missions, the lack of a fixed base for infantry forces, the inferior quality of soldiers' lives in field service, etc.

The young company and battalion commanders also complain about the lack of time to assimilate vital values, the lack of time for talks with the commander, and for educational and promotional activity. Some of them complain about a lack of backing by the senior commander in certain situations, and a small group of these even struggle with moral-ethical dilemmas that the IDF has encountered over the last two years.

In the final analysis, the young commanders display a good bit of satisfaction with their jobs, see them as challenging and feel their work is important. On the other hand, a significant portion of them feel that they are not sufficiently appreciated by their senior commanders (brigade and task force commanders), they don't have much appreciation for their commanders, and they tend to see the IDF as a system characterized by mediocrity. This assessment provides them food for thought when it comes time to re-up.

No air-conditioned car, no villa in Modi'in, and no academic studies can solve these problems. Salary and service conditions in 1990 turn out to be a less important factor among the young officers.

Rapid Turnover

The statistics of the IDF administration corps indicate that in the coming year 44 percent of all career servicemen will face the dilemma of whether to re-enlist in the IDF. The best and most suitable among them constitute the target population for IDF and Manpower branch activity.

IDF data in fact point to a tendency for improvement in the area of lengthening service time. Last year 21 percent of all officers increased their period of service by more than 6 months, as compared to 18 percent the previous year. In the job of company commander (Lieutenant-Captain), 54 percent are staying on in the IDF, as compared to 49 percent the previous year. The data do, in fact, indicate a trend toward improvement, but the picture is still not particularly rosy. 77 percent of those filling the position of Captain are actually Lieutenants and Second Lieutenants who come to the job with less

experience and cause rapid turnover in their jobs because of the short sign up for career duty.

The problem for the head of the Manpower branch, for the Chief of Staff and, in fact, for all IDF commanders is how to educate a young generation of commanders who will see the army as a way of life and an honorable career. The solution apparently lies in a career path that is attractive and optimal from the point of view of the young officer, but, in equal measure, listens to his problems and provides the full backing and involvement of senior commanders in day-to-day problems. Money in this case will not solve everything.

Aviation Industry To Update Foreign Planes

44230112E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 27 Feb 90 p 1C

[Article by Re'uven Pedhatur]

[Text] The aviation industry signed a \$200-million agreement with a foreign country to update U.S.-made F-5 fighter planes. The update package includes, among other things, the installation of a central computer, new avionics systems, an advance overhead display in the pilot's compartment, and an advanced doppler radar made by Elta.

The contract to upgrade the F-5 planes, which are made by the Northrop Company, of the United States, was recently signed after the aviation industry competed with other countries that offered that same country their own bids to upgrade the planes.

The aviation industry recently presented its F-5 upgrade package at the air salon held this month in Singapore, arousing great interest among representatives of countries that use these planes.

Next month, Singapore intends to invite bids for the upgrading of its Air Force's 46 F-5 planes, a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

It should be indicated that Jordan's Air Force employs 73 F-5 planes.

The upgrade work on the planes is done by the aviation industry's overhaul plant, which has considerable experience in upgrading French and American fighter planes for the Israeli Air Force, including, among others, Mirage and Skyhawk aircraft. Also, a project to upgrade the Air Force's Phantoms, designated Qurnas [sledgehammer] 2000, is in full swing.

Aviation Industry Forced To Import Labor

44230112G Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 27 Feb 90 p 3B

[Article by Zohar Blumenqrantz]

[Text] The somewhat sensational news item about the firing of two British workers from the aviation industry

for excessive drinking illuminated a more interesting fact: Although the aviation industry hired hundreds and thousands of aircraft assemblers several years ago, it presently cannot obtain an adequate supply of assemblers in Israel and must import workers from abroad.

The need for aircraft assemblers arose after the aviation industry made a commitment to overhaul two Lufthansa cargo transport planes under a \$12-million contract. The chief of the overhaul group in the aviation industry, Avner Raz, expressed hope that the successful completion of the task would bring additional orders from Lufthansa and other companies, and that this field would be an important area of activity for the company in coming years.

The deputy chairman of the board of directors of Lufthansa, Avraham Rheinhart, stated that if the task is carried out to his company's satisfaction, it would expand the project.

The aviation industry was quite surprised, upon approaching implementation of the overhauls, to encounter difficulties in recruiting aircraft assemblers. Aircraft assemblers are actually rank-and-file blue-collar production workers that perform the manual labor of assembly—screw tightening and rivetting, i.e., the heavy physical labor. During and before the Lavi' aircraft project, the aviation industry employed many hundreds, even thousands, of such workers, many of whom were dismissed when the Lavi' project was terminated.

The company retained only a relatively limited core of workers of this type. It did not expect to encounter great difficulty in fulfilling its need to recruit workers in this field, thinking that many who had been dismissed would return. For a long time, the aviation industry advertised for workers. It also turned to private recruitment companies.

The company experienced great disappointment, because only a handful of workers willing to retrain and work as aircraft assemblers responded to its demand, even after it turned to the Air Force to examine the subject of aircraft assemblers about to be discharged. To solve the problem, 50 aircraft assemblers were transferred from the flight instruments group to the overhaul group, and five accelerated courses, each lasting 1 month, were held to qualify the workers as aircraft assemblers. Nonetheless, production workers were still lacking.

A senior aviation industry source believes that the difficulty is also apparently related to "Israelis' dislike for getting their hands dirty in manual labor." According to him, many former production workers in the aviation industry, who received generous indemnities when the Lavi' project was cancelled, opened private businesses or transferred to other fields of activity. In his opinion, wage problems did not really deter workers from this work.

The aviation industry found itself facing a problem. It was obliged to complete the overhaul within 6 months, the delivery date for the first overhauled plane being at the end of May. According to the contract, the aviation industry would pay a fine of \$15,000 for each day it exceeded the delivery date.

It had no choice but to recruit workers from abroad. For this purpose, it was aided by the ORS company [nor further expanded], which, for its part, was aided by three British recruitment companies with prior experience in recruiting 250 aviation industry professionals. Doron Segev, the manager of ORS, states that the wage offered by the aviation industry is lower than the current wage in Britain (he supposes that the aviation industry was careful about not paying them more than it pays to its workers in Israel), which made it difficult to find workers.

According to him, the average wage offered by the aviation industry was about \$14 per hour, compared to \$17 in Britain. However, unemployment in Britain made it possible to recruit workers. A senior aviation industry official refuted Segev's arguments, stating that the industry offered a reasonable wage. Instead of paying the workers directly, the company pays the recruitment companies.

According to Segev, his company operates on the basis of cost plus recruitment commission. This is a matter of 20 percent of work wages, including the cost of flying the workers from Britain to Israel.

One hundred and eighty British aircraft assemblers presented themselves as candidates. After a strict selection process in both England and Israel, including a security check, 29 were selected. Despite the strict selection process, the aviation industry has so far sent back five recruited workers (two because of excessive drinking, two because of health problems, and one for professional reasons).

Segev of ORS thinks that the aviation industry probably exaggerated a bit regarding the intoxication of the two who were dismissed. According to him, they did not exhibit drunkenness, but their breath emitted the odor of alcohol. However, the client's wishes must be respected, and he was compelled to finance their return to Britain. Segev stated that employment agencies in Britain are responsible for investigating the medical statement of recruited workers. An aviation industry source stated that most of the foreign workers have a good work ethic, are professional, and have extensive experience. They pose no difficulty regarding the need to work overtime or in shifts. Nor do the foreign workers absorbed as temporary workers have social problems, according to him. He added that the few workers who exhibit abnormalities were handled unambiguously. The workers from Britain were recruited for a period of only 3 to 6 months. They are housed at the Ora Hotel in Tel Aviv and are transported in an organized manner to and from work.

In the aviation industry, they reject the possibility that the industry will not comply with the timetable for the delivery of the two Lufthansa planes. It is reported that the general manager, Moshe Qeret, is in the habit of making surprise inspections at the work place and he personally monitors the progress of the work.

Oil Drilling To Begin at Dead Sea

44230123H Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 21 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by Gabi Baron]

[Text] The Oil Infrastructure Company won a contract of approximately \$30 million for drilling a series of oil wells in the Dead Sea region.

There were eight foreign competitors—five of them from the United States, two from Hungary, and one from Yugoslavia.

The drilling project is to begin in the coming summer, and it will continue for about two years. This will be a series of deep and technologically complex wells, which are to penetrate the thick layer of salt.

Agreements With East European Banks Signed

44230122D Tel Aviv DAVAR
in Hebrew 18 Mar 90 p 10

[Text] Over the last two months the heads of Bank Le'umi succeeded in making the contacts and signing the special agreements for financing exports with six banks in various East European countries.

The goal is to encourage mutual trade and to facilitate interbank cooperation and the granting of credit. The agreements are very important because of foreign currency problems in these countries and the existing expectations, among local economic bodies, of increased exports.

Below is a list of countries with which Bank Le'umi has signed agreements:

- Hungary: "Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank" and "Hungarian Credit Bank." Where needed, the two banks will provide credit for a period of up to 180 days to exporters in their country. It should be noted that toward summer Bank Le'umi, together with "Credit Bank," will set up a local bank to encourage trade with Hungary in particular and with Eastern Europe in general.
- Bulgaria: "Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank." The agreement relates to financing the purchase of equipment and investment properties originating in Israel, and for their acquisition documentary letters of credit were opened by the Bulgarian bank for the benefit of Israel.

Within the framework of the agreement, Bank Le'umi is prepared to provide the Bulgarian bank with credit for a

period of up to two years and at a sum of between \$50,000 and \$1 million. With another bank, "Commercial Bank Transurtana Technika," a further agreement was signed, by which every deal with Israel will get preferred treatment and will be handled separately.

Poland: "Polska Kasa Opieki" [Polish Security Bank] of Warsaw. In the framework of the agreement, Bank Le'umi will put credit at the disposal of the Polish bank for a period of up to three years. The agreement limits the size of the deals to between \$50,000 and \$300,000 and relates exclusively to the purchase of export products originating from Israel.

USSR: "Bank of Economic Affairs." Lately mutual correspondent accounts were opened between the Israeli bank and the Soviet bank. By means of these accounts, it will be possible to implement all the financial arrangements connected with deals between the two countries.

Unemployment Expected To Rise

44230123E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 19 Mar p 1

[Article by Gad Li'or]

[Text] Not only is unemployment not declining, but there is a danger that it will even increase—especially within the context of the great wave of immigration from the USSR. The most recent data, which were presented to the government yesterday by the new Minister of Labor and Welfare, Roni Milo, are given below:

- The number of unemployed in the economy now stands at approximately 140,000.
- More than 50 percent of the unemployed worked up to less than a year ago—and were laid off.
- 78 percent of the unemployed sought work for more than five weeks.
- The unemployment rate reached 8.9 percent in 1989, in contrast to 6.4 percent in 1988—an increase of 39 percent.
- The first estimates for 1990 show that there has been no change in the level of unemployment in Israel: In the last quarter of 1989, unemployment reached 8.7 percent, which was exactly its rate at the beginning of 1990.

The data presented by Minister Milo, which surprised some members of the government by their severity, imply that the demand for workers is very limited—which indicates that the economy is still in a deep recession, and that the hoped-for growth has not yet begun.

Employment Service figures show that in the last few days there were 86,300 job seekers, to whom only approximately 17,000 jobs were offered. In the last month, 93,100 job seekers applied to the Employment Service, compared to 69,400 last February.

Minister Milo stressed that in the last month, the Employment Service issued 53,100 unemployment confirmations to the National Insurance, in contrast to a monthly average of only 16,100 in 1987!

Minister Milo also revealed that most of those hurt by the difficult unemployment are young populations—first and foremost discharged soldiers. The unemployment rate for women is higher than that for men.

It was also found that the unemployment rate for youths aged 18 to 24 is more than twice as high as the average unemployment rate for the population in general.

A document that was presented to the ministers also indicates that 40 to 45 percent of the unemployed are heads of households. More than 40 percent of the heads of households do not have children, and more than one-fourth of them have three or more children. Only about a third of the households whose head is unemployed have another earner.

Population Transfer Presented as a Necessity

44230123D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 19 Mar 90 p C4

[Article by Tzvi Shiloah]

[Text] The writer is a former Knesset member.

We are finally arriving at an understanding of the real essence of our existential problem. In one issue of HA'ARETZ (8 March), two articles appeared, one by Yosef Alper, the deputy-director of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, the other by the geographer Arnon Sofer. While there has been no change in their practical political conclusions, they make a contribution to an understanding of our real situation by emphasizing the right things.

Alper states correctly that even if 800,000 Jews immigrate to Israel and remain here during the coming decade, the Arabs of the Land of Israel will still comprise 40 percent of the country's population in the year 2000, and will be a majority in approximately another 15 years. This is because the Arab population is growing at a rate of approximately 50 percent within a decade. It's only unfortunate that the aforementioned does not reveal to us figures on the demographic situation that will occur in Israel within the Green Line—perhaps not in the year 2000, but in the year 2040—according to that birthrate among the Arabs.

The holders of the dovish view have a good reason to hide such a quantitative forecast, which implies one thing: the demographic-ethnographic problem, the foremost problem of Israel, will not be solved by withdrawal.

Even if the number of Jews in Israel following withdrawal reaches four and a half million, two million Arabs, who regard themselves as Palestinians or as

Jordanians or as Southern-Syrians, are also a demographic-ethnographic danger for our state, which is surrounded by Arab states.

Twelve years after peace was obtained with Egypt, through the Camp David Agreements, Yosef Alper admits that all the experts on the question of the Israeli Arabs agree on the estimate that after the beginning of the peace process for resolving the problem of the Arabs of the territories, a demand is liable to develop among Israeli Arabs to receive an autonomous status, or even more than that in the Galilee and the Negev—and then, we not only will have achieved intifadah in the territories, but an intifadah in post-peace Israel will soon await us. In order to make a preemptive move, Yosef Alper and Arnon Sofer propose that Soviet immigrants be directed to the Galilee and the Negev. But if the aforementioned believe that this task will not encounter, objectively and subjectively, difficulties and even opposition, they err severely. Objectively—due to the necessary and unconscious tendency of immigration to concentrate in the center of the country. Subjectively—due to the opposition of the Israeli Arabs, whose strength will have increased after the peace that was obtained by withdrawal.

Therefore, there is no remedy for the demographic problem, either in what is mistakenly called The Entire Land of Israel or in what is called Israel within the borders of the Green Line, aside from a population transfer in order to create a homogeneous Jewish state. This solution is liable to follow a Lebanese-style civil war, or by a peace agreement, for only on condition of a separation of the Arab and the Jewish populations can there be true peace.

In the new era in Eastern Europe, the lie that the Soviet Union had solved the national and ethnic questions has been proven false. A population transfer is on the agenda in Ngorno-Karabakh, in Latvia, in Kirghizia, and also in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo. The relinquishing of the Kosovo province by Belgrade would be less dangerous for Yugoslavia than the relinquishing by Israel of the heart of the country in Judaea and Samaria. And, nevertheless, due to the historic value of Kosovo province to Serbia, Yugoslavia will not give it up, but will instead seek a solution through population transfer.

Population transfers in the Land of Israel will also have to be carried out in a broad regional context. This is the most realistic forecast. The question is, why did academics in the world and in Israel, which includes the writers of the abovementioned articles, not foresee its development either in Europe of the '30's, or what occurred in the USSR in our time. Here, they did not foresee the flight of the Arabs during the War of Liberation, the establishment of the State of Israel, and in our time they did not foresee either the excessive concessions by the leaders of Herut at Camp David nor the intifadah. The statesmen who followed Ben-Gurion display their wisdom by saying that policy is the art of the possible, while the history of Zionism proves that great policy is

the achievement of the impossible. In their eyes, a mass population transfer is an unrealistic idea. But the State of Israel will have to think how to become part of that process, and it may well be that due to its severe existential situation, it is likely to be the pioneer.

Demographic Ratio Not Expected To Change

44230120B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR (Supplement)
in Hebrew 9 Mar 90 p 11

[Article by 'Amiram Cohen]

[Text] The hysterical reactions of Palestinians in the territories and their leaders in the face of the present wave of immigration and, on the other hand, the shouts of victory from the Right and the Judaea and Samaria Council given the collapse of the Left's "demographic demon"—which, they say, has become a "paper demon"—have elicited a response from Prof. Sergio Della Pergola, the head of the Jewish Demography Section at the Hebrew University.

"I think that some air has to be let out of everyone's tires," he says. "All in all, even if this turns out to be a very large wave of immigration, its impact on the overall Jewish-Arab demographic balance, between the sea and the Jordan, will not be impressive. The settlement of the new immigrants in the territories is also completely marginal (the breakdown is: 57 percent to the center; 15 percent to Haifa and the north; 10 percent to Jerusalem; 5 percent to the south; 1 percent to the territories). That is, there is no connection between the uproar and the figures.

"If the expected wave of 230,000 immigrants actually comes, I assume that they will go to wherever there are housing solutions. Until now, there was no directing by the Ministry of Absorption in any direction. I propose that we all not mobilize demography, as well, in our controversies over politics and values. Immigration is important in itself, and it does not have to be a tool."

Prof. Della Pergola recently conducted a statistical exercise concerning the possible influence of the immigration from the Soviet Union on the demographic balance. "We conducted an exercise that includes three alternative figures for immigration in relation to the 'zero alternative'—that is, no immigration. The exercise assumes the rate of natural increase that was obtained in Israel up to the end of 1988.

"By the way, while there was a positive balance of Jewish migration in the decade that has ended (there was a surplus of 25,000 in the course of the decade), in the final analysis it was very marginal in everything concerning the increase in the Jewish population. However, it is important to me to be exact, and to say that the myths that developed in recent years that emigration from Israel exceeded immigration—these also are without foundation. In 1975, between "the sea and the river," there were 65 percent Jews, as opposed to 35 percent non-Jews. In 1990, in the same area there live 61 percent

Jews and 39 percent non-Jews. That is, the number of Jews declined by four percent. This says that there is a slow but considerable change in the balance between the two components of the population. This change is due to the considerable difference in the level of fertility between the two components of the population, under conditions of low mortality, which is today almost the same for both components.

A Secondary, but Not Marginal Influence

"In the first alternative that we examined, we assumed a migration balance—that is, immigration less emigration—such as was obtained in the last decade. That is, a zero balance. Accordingly, in the year 2000, there are expected to be 55 percent Jews and 45 percent non-Jews; in the year 2010, 52 percent Jews as opposed to 48 percent non-Jews; and in the year 2015 there will be a balance: 50 percent Jews and 50 percent non-Jews. In the year 2020, according to this forecast, the non-Jews will become a majority: 48 percent Jews vs. 52 percent non-Jews.

"We examined three additional alternatives, in which we added to the Jewish migration balance 500,000, 1 million and 1.5 million Jews. The calculation shows that an addition of 500,000 Jews (which is also the number of emigration requests that were submitted to the Soviet emigration authorities) would move the balance by only two or three percent. That is, if today there are 61 percent Jews, in the year 2000 they will be 58 percent instead of 55 percent, and the balance will shift to the year 2020.

"In simple language: Every increment of 100,000 Jews will shift forward, by one year, the point of balance.

"If we assume an immigration of one million Jews, the point of balance will shift 10 years, and the addition of 1.5 million Jews will shift it by 15 years. It is, perhaps, a little strange, but the immigration of Jews on a scale that is almost unknown will have only a moderate impact on the demographic balance. That is because, in the population figures that are being discussed here, of Jews and Arabs together between the sea and the Jordan (in 1990, 6.1 million; in the year 2000, 7.5 million; in the year 2010, 9 million; in the year 2020, 11 million), a few hundred thousand more will have only a secondary, if not a marginal, impact.

"The exercise assumed with regard to the Jewish population in Israel a fertility rate (the number of children per woman) of 2.7 to 2.8, which is a very high rate in Western terms and has been constant in Israel over the last 20 years. Among the Christian Arabs in Israel the rate is 2.4 to 2.5, and among the Muslims within the Green Line the rate today is about 4.5, which is much lower than in the 60's (when the rate was about 10.5 children, which had no counterpart anywhere), but still much higher than that of the Jewish sector.

"The data that we have from the territories, as regards statistical quality, are not as good, but it can be assumed

that fertility in Gaza is 7.0 to 7.5, and in Judaea and Samaria from 6.0 to 6.5. Here, the downward trend in fertility is very slow, and the general tendency is for a great acceleration in the rate of natural increase."

Emigration From the Territories Has Stopped

[AL-HAMISHMAR] Isn't it going a bit too far to make a demographic forecast for 30 years from today?

[Della Pergola] It is definitely going too far. Therefore, I would present this not as a forecast but rather as a statistical exercise that assumes a model of stability in the rates of natural increase—because, in my opinion, there are likely to be contradictory trends here. The processes of modernization in Muslim society are likely to reduce the rate, but, on the other hand, opposite processes are possible in connection with the strengthening of fundamentalism.

It is important to me that I say that there is also a certain measure of uncertainty regarding the data that we have on the population in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. The last census was carried out there in 1967. Since then, aside from East Jerusalem, there have been no censuses there. While there is a population registry, I suspect its reliability and, for example, I am not sure if all the deaths were recorded properly. Therefore, part of the processes according to which we carried out our calculations were according to research assumptions, and were not a real counting of inventory.

On the other hand, from the side of immigration, I do not believe that these numbers on paper are entirely realistic. We add on paper very large quantities of immigrants, the likes of which we haven't seen since the great wave of immigration of the early 50's, and this seems to me to be a bit detached from reality.

An improvement in the conditions of Jewish culture and the possibility for real organization in communities may make the Soviet Union more similar, from the viewpoint of immigration pressures, to the Western countries.

[Al-Hamishmar] There are reports that since the intifadah there has been a new wave of emigration of Arabs from the territories.

[Della Pergola] Since the beginning of the intifadah, there has been a small departure of persons of certain economic means, who could exist somewhere else, as well. In my estimation, that has no great significance from the viewpoint of natural increase. I want to say that there were many "hopes" placed on the estimate that emigration from the territories would prevent the demographic balance. It is true that, during a certain period, the territories had a negative migration balance, and those leaving were mainly young and with higher education. But this process almost ceased as a result of the oil crisis of the mid-70's, and it did not resume in a significant way.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] That is to say, the new demographics need not provide anyone with the reason to change his weltanschauung?

[Della Pergola] I would present it in the opposite way: a weltanschauung should not be founded upon demographic processes, but rather upon ideas and principles. In the final accounting, the demographic element in the subject of decisionmaking is vital, but not sufficient. Additional components and elements are necessary to make decisions. In my opinion, the possible welcome addition [of Jewish population] need not change anyone's political principles. Demography as an instrument will not solve the problems.

No Proletariat, No Farmers

[AL-HAMISHMAR] What characteristics does this wave of immigration have in comparison to others?

[Della Pergola] This is clearly not an ideological wave of immigration. It is a very pragmatic wave of immigration, and therefore is very different from the wave of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union in the 60's and the 70's.

The Soviet Union is, after all, one case in a general model of Diaspora. There are no significant differences on this subject between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Jewish immigrant from the Soviet Union is urban, secular, has a higher-than-average education—about 30 percent are university graduates—and he works in fields appropriate to a public with a high level of education. It is also very similar in its internal demography: marriage practices, mixed marriages, birth rate, and age. The processes are very similar in all the European [Jewish] communities in Central Europe, Western Europe, North and South America. There is a demography of a Jewish community, a "Jewish model," with very small variation between the West and the East.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] I have heard that if the Russians were allowed to leave, masses of them also would come to us.

[Della Pergola] The truth is that at the margins of this wave of immigration there are many non-Jews. About one month ago, there arrived in Haifa a family of 29 souls, not one of them Jewish. There is a problem of mixed marriages. The estimate is that among young persons in the Soviet Union, the rate is about 50 percent. Among the immigrants who come to us, this is apparently lower, for whoever truly was very assimilated is less likely to come. I would not be surprised if the percentage of non-Jews in this wave of immigration were found to be between 20 percent and 30 percent. This is a very large public, which from the administrative viewpoint must go through all kinds of processes, and simple problems of identity are not possible among them.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] Regarding the subject of employment, in the final analysis, how many doctors and piano teachers are needed?

[Della Pergola] This is a general problem of the employment structure of the Diaspora, and the Soviet Union, as we have already seen, is only one case of the Diaspora. This, in the classic sense, is the inverted pyramid. There is no proletariat, there are no farmers. Someone else there, not the Jews, cleans the streets, and someone else is engaged in fishing and in agriculture. Mainly managers, clerks, and members of the free professions are coming. There are a few skilled workers, but in comparison to the West there are more technicians, graduates in engineering technology, and engineers, because technological education, in comparison to the West, is more developed in Eastern Europe. The technical stratum is very important, and here there is a useful potential. The question is the extent to which it is possible to absorb professional persons, such as piano teachers and clarinet professors. Persons are coming with a very developed musical culture, and there is a large supply of artists, many of whom are on a high level. I have no doubt that there is a problem here, because only a few of them will find employment in their previous occupations.

Their age composition is interesting, and we have compared it to previous waves of immigration. The immigration today is quite clearly not selective, and it is characterized by family immigration, where all age groups are represented. Entire families are coming, with a high proportion of the elderly and of children.

The average age of Soviet Jewry is generally very high, and the percentage of Jewish children there is very low. It seems to me that the percentage of children among the immigrants is a little higher than the percentage of children among the Jews that dropped out. This means that the immigration is, nevertheless, somewhat selective—that is, there is a high percentage of elderly Jews that remain.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] What is expected regarding the balance of those [Jews] of Asian and African origin vs. those of European and American origin?

[Della Pergola] Those of Asian and African origin and their descendants comprise 52 percent of the Jewish population in Israel. The wave of immigration, doubtless, will include a large Ashkenazi component (I prefer to use the term "European"), but, all in all, the shifts will be small, and the existing balance will persist.

Housing Shortage Expected

44230112B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Efrayim Davidi and Ofer Ariyan]

[Text] "According to the findings of the Bank of Israel Research Department, a housing shortage of 30,000 to 60,000 apartments is expected within 2 years," stated Bank of Israel Governor Michael Bruno yesterday in an appearance before members of the United Construction Branch Organization in Tel Aviv.

Bruno thinks that it is necessary to allow the import of workers from abroad to accelerate the rate of construction because of a "serious shortage in building starts" that has developed. Every immigration wave, Bruno stated, has been accompanied by a wave of building starts. However, unlike the past, "the new immigrants began to arrive about 6 months ago, but the number of building starts has been declining." Bruno further argued that foreign building contractors must be allowed to build and compete on equal terms in Israel.

Indifference to Israeli Arabs' Plight Viewed

44230112F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 24 Feb 90 p 1B

[Commentary by Uzi Benziman]

[Text] Let us acknowledge: We, the Jewish citizens of the state, are not aroused by the protests that Arab leaders in Israel have been making for more than 2 weeks. Nor are we excited by the general strike they held yesterday. As long as the signs of bitterness are concentrated in the Galilee and the triangle, as long as the distress that generated this bitterness is appreciable in Umm-al-Fahm and in al-Taybah, the manifestations of its victims' frustration and anger do not penetrate to us. In our consciousness and perception, the Arab citizens of the state live beyond the dark mountains, and what is happening with them does not interest us. (Consider the great tumult generated here several weeks ago only because of the egg quotas of Jewish settlements in the north).

Actually, what happens in the Arab sector should be of great concern to us, not only because it is appropriate for an enlightened public, which inscribed in its declaration of independence the principle of absolute equality between all citizens and residents of the state regardless of race and religion, but also because hearkening to the inner feelings of the Arabs of Israel touches on our very existence, quality of life, and peace of mind.

The protest by the leaders of the Arab public in Israel, which (temporarily) peaked in yesterday's strike, was caused directly by the nonimplementation of an agreement to inject 100 million shekels into the Arab municipalities in the framework of an arrangement to spread out debts among all the local authorities. The governor of the Bank of Israel has still not approved the arrangement, and the banks are deterred from allocating the funds, mainly to the Arab authorities, because of concern about their financial credibility. However, taking root, within the framework of the protest by the leaders of the Arab minority, is the perception that they are being discriminated against regarding state-supplied services and resources. A recent illustration to that effect is supplied by the fact that the banks transferred funds to local Jewish authorities, although the general arrangement had not been signed. The local Jewish municipalities and councils could thus continue operating, while the financial distress in the Arab sector is desperate.

The Arab minority has not succeeded in establishing for itself a lobby with influence over the Israeli Government. Representation in the Knesset is scattered in different parties and is therefore diffuse. It does not have an authentic advocate in the government, and the senior administrative echelon is closed to it. For these reasons, it does not have an adequate presence in the Israeli public's awareness and on the national agenda, which is commensurate with its size and importance. Therefore, its cry is not heard when it goes out to demonstrate, and it continues to lag behind the Jewish majority. It has been deprived for 42 years, and no one in the majority population cares.

Far-reaching and profound processes are actually occurring in the Arab villages and cities of the Galilee and the triangle. As a result of the degrading attitude of Jewish society and its government, the Six-Day War, and social, cultural, and economic changes, the Arabs of Israel are currently an aware, organized public that views itself as a consolidated national minority within the State of Israel. It also behaves accordingly, as reflected recently in its warning that it would appeal to international elements with a request for aid. It is still punctilious about observing the law and emphasizes that it perceives itself as part of the State of Israel. However, fermenting within it is a mood that aspires to assert its special identity.

As long as Shamir hesitates over whether, what, and how, to decide on a framework for negotiations, whose function would be to create the conditions for discussions on establishing autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the future, the Jewish public in Israel is likely to be introduced, within several years, to a demand for autonomy of another type on the part of the Arabs of Israel.

Traditionally, the governments of Israel have attempted to counter this development with money. Since 1948, Israeli governments have understood that the Arab minority in Israel posed a latent threat to the national character of the State. They believed that constant improvement in the standard of living of the Arab population (in addition to employing various means of governing) would neutralize the Arab population's natural tendency to express its desire to be considered a defined national minority. The disbursement of resources to Arab citizens was intended to make it in the interest of each one of them to be satisfied with their lot instead of engaging in defining their national identity. The absurd in this is that everyone now recognizes the crying inferiority of the level of governmental services in the Arab sector.

Whoever declares his recognition of the wrongs done to the Arab public (as did the prime minister, the interior minister, and the minister for Arab affairs recently), whoever continues to believe that the state treasury is the most efficient instrument to appease the bitterness of this population, must immediately supply sufficient budgetary answers to blunt the pretexts for fomentation.

'Irreversibility' Theory in Territories Attacked

44230112C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 22 Feb 90 p 1B

[Commentary by Yosi Sarid]

[Text] There are people who have angered and aroused me more, but no one has disappointed me more than Dr Meron Benvenisti, the originator of the theory on the irreversible situation in the occupied territories. This theory has caused more damage than any other theory despite its absurdity and refutability. We have stood powerless before it for many years.

This theory is known to have unique power because of its originator's special, unique identity: A man of peace, a loyal friend, an intellectual, and an unrivalled expert who has determined authoritatively that what has been done in the territories cannot be reversed, and that the facts there are accomplished. It is only we unreformed doctrinaires who continue to climb the walls. In Israel, but mainly in American study and research circles, they have treated us as a group of Don Quixotes waging a pathetic rearguard war whose results were long ago decreed. We have eyes. Yet we refuse to honestly see the new reality. Yes, it has been very bewildering and frustrating to fulfill the role of the people of yesterday, who are unable to prepare appropriately for tomorrow.

Like one finding a great spoil, the right rebukes Benvenisti and his theory. The dovish left is also beginning to finally understand that time is working to our advantage and is firmly establishing the occupation. What have we been able to argue in the face of Benvenisti's constructive realism and "the hard facts" in the field?

We have argued that there is no such thing as "an irreversible situation." Only death is irreversible, and this applies only until the resurrection of the dead. Everything else can be reversed. What seems to be the end in certain circumstances is only the beginning in changing circumstances. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an active volcano. Therefore, it is absurd to speak of hardened lava. The complex connection between interests, constraints, and costs is never fixed and permanent. It is a dynamic connection. Accordingly, the Israeli occupation in the territories will change form.

We have further argued that one hundred settlements and tens of thousands of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not becoming a critical mass that is changing the demographic situation substantially. The current 80,000 settlers are about 5 to 6 percent of the population in the territories; the 90-percent plus Palestinian population therefore tips the scales. Would matters be reversed if settlers comprised another 5 percent of the population in the territories in another 10 years, which represent an eternity in our world? Certainly not. Not long ago in this column, we asked: Of what use are the Russian settlers to Russia? Millions of Russian settlers were transferred to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the Asiatic republics. We emphasized that this

helped the Kremlin like glasses of vodka for the dead. These many millions did not erase the national identity of the Baltic and Transcaucasian states. Will several tens of thousands of Jewish settlers erase the Palestinian national identity in the territories? Is this serious?

In its time, the Benvenisti theory, which is virtually deterministic, rested on the assumption that what existed in the 20-year period since 1967 will continue to exist, namely: Most of the Palestinians in the territories have collaborated with the occupation and have not attempted to shake it off, as if they accepted it. The United States and the Soviet Union became reconciled with the situation, paying lip service here and there to the Palestinian problem, but actually enabling Israel to do what it pleased regarding the territories. Benvenisti and his followers simply did not understand the triviality demonstrated by an argument that maintains that nothing will change for another 20 years, another year, and another day, because nothing has changed for the past 20 years.

Truly, after 20 years exactly, the volcano erupted, and the boiling lava buried Benvenisti's theory like Pompeii under mountains of dust. If it is rediscovered sometime in the future, it will arouse interest as an antiquity. The intifadah, which Benvenisti did not predict, has put an end to a bad, difficult, and expensive occupation. If we are dealing with accomplished facts, the intifadah is also an accomplished fact. It is part of the new reality, a part that Benvenisti did not see at all.

Two years have elapsed, and Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union is revealing the settlements' nakedness. For many years, supporters of the whole-land-of-Israel based the future of the settlement enterprise on a large wave of immigration, which, while it might be delayed, would eventually come. They believed wholeheartedly that the immigrants would accomplish what the Israelis did not accomplish, that they would flow in the hundreds of thousands to the regions of greater Israel. The virgin, primeval areas of Judaea and Samaria would become the "new frontiers, the new horizons" of the state and society. None of this materialized. The new immigration wave disappointed the settlements and removed them from the field. Immigration, in the form of hundreds of thousands of witnesses, provides evidence that the entire future of the settlements is behind them. Whoever wants to protect immigration from the evil eye, is now distancing it from the settlers as if they were lepers. It is not only the intifadah that is reversing the irreversible situation, but also immigration. What appeared to Benvenisti to be the pillars of his theory were in fact flimsy props.

These two main events kill the Benvenisti theory and bury it for good. However, the events in the world, especially in Eastern Europe, really mock the corpse. To speak of an irreversible situation when everything is changing fundamentally is truly a joke. During the 70 years since the October Revolution and the 45 years since the Second World War, "the accomplished facts"

in the Eastern Bloc were even more accomplished and lasting than several of our settlements, and a thousand times more decisive and determining than several expropriation orders and even than the Jerusalem Law. All of these accomplished, lasting, decisive, and determining facts are now evaporating and dissolving before our eyes, as if they never existed. The Soviet Union is losing its "security belt." Its satellites have broken away from it, and its very own republics are announcing their intention to seek independence. Everywhere, the Communist Party is declaring bankruptcy and conceding its power monopoly. The Warsaw Pact is being dismantled and NATO's days are numbered as well. Germany is reuniting. Only Dr Meron Benvenisti believes that the situation continues to be irreversible.

The period of public confessions is in the past. Therefore, my friend Meron, you are not being asked to confess regret, or, God forbid, beat your chest in contrition. However, a small correction of your theory would in any case be accepted with appreciation.

New Study on Israeli Reaction to Territories

44230123B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 18 Mar 90 p 12

[Article by 'Amiram Cohen]

[Text] The continued silence of Israeli society in the face of events in the territories has caused intellectuals, academics, journalists, and educators to seek its spiritual sources.

In a very modest pamphlet ("Comments About Silence", published by the Peace Center and edited by Hagit Ziv-Av), the writers examine the deepest sources of that complete lack of concern shown by the majority of the people for the suffering beyond the Green Line. Even if it is clear that any discussion and commentary depend on the spiritual world and the values of the reader, on his weltanschauung and the structure of his personality, it is our duty, say the editors, to continue to tell.

We give here a small selection from that pamphlet—one more publication of the kind that those who are called refined souls insist on publishing again and again.

'Atar Ornan and Itamar Lurie (psychologists): The ability of all of us to pass over to daily routine, and to continue with our ordinary pursuits, is influenced to a great extent by our ability to "file away" the events as isolated things. What happens in the territories is far away, over there. It is not happening among us (whence comes the tremendous shock when it indeed happens among us). What happens to the Arabs is happening to someone else, a foreigner, someone different.

Stan Cohen (psychologist): Many decent Israelis are not able to understand that one of them—sons, husbands, neighbors, friends—could, for example, drag a 15-year-old boy from his house, blindfold him, lean him against a wall, and then systematically break his hands

and legs. This information is too threatening to be acceptable, and, indeed, it is "repackaged," so as to become acceptable by the method of "Yes, but": "Yes, but these were exceptions," "Yes, but the media always inflate such cases," "Yes, but only primitive soldiers do such things," "Yes, but they (the Palestinians) must have done something that justified the response." [closing quotes supplied]

Hagit Ziv-Av(educator): The word is—consensus. The subject of endangering the life of a (Jewish) child on the road (roulette on the road) is a subject within the consensus. Therefore, the system can take an unequivocal stand, and the cabinet minister asks all the teachers to devote the first lesson in the morning to the subject. But if it is about the eye of a one-year-old girl (Palestinian), injured by an Israeli bullet, then it is a controversial subject, and it is not possible to take a clear position on it, and, therefore, it is not a subject for discussion in the first lesson.

Gabi Nitzan(journalist): And also when the ultimate victim (us) conquers with violence, expels unfeelingly, kills women and children, pillages, burns, represses, destroys, and devastates—he remains a victim.

Rani Talmor(editor of "In the Image"): More than 350 houses have been destroyed and sealed in the territories since the outbreak of the intifadah, generally before the suspect, one of the house's inhabitants, was convicted, and sometimes even without one having been apprehended. On the average, 11 persons lived in each such house. The HA'ARETZ Supplement published a report on the damage that was inflicted on nearby houses under the headline "Misses."

Lili Galili(journalist): Two years of the intifadah (according to studies by Professor Ya'ar) have had the most marginal social influence on the individual and on his basic positions. It is still seen as the result of a higher force, and, as such, does not require from us a significant change.

Tanya Reinhardt(professor of linguistics): The Palestinians are not exactly an enemy on the battlefield, and for them a different system of descriptions is required. They are not individual human beings, rather "an incited mob." They are not demonstrators, rather "rioters," or "fomentors of disturbances." Their political expressions are "incitement" and the call for a strike is "an attack." They do not live on streets, but in "alleys." No wonder, then, that any organization of Palestinians, including a political organization, is described as a "terrorist organization" or a "hostile organization," while a Jewish terrorist organization is an "underground."

Avigdor Feldman(lawyer): The High Court has laid down that the destruction of a person's house (in which members of his family also reside) is not a collective punishment; the High Court has laid down that the expulsion of persons from the territories is not forbidden; the High Court has ruled that a resident of the territories, from one village or another, who lived in the United States for

about five years, had lost his connection with the territories and was no longer a resident, and he is to be treated as a tourist.

Even if we do not have to agree with every word in this instructive pamphlet, we find it to be an unflattering mirror of the Israeli countenance, but mainly of the face of the Israeli intelligentsia, whose inclination "to protest and to stay alive" has been greatly sharpened by the intifadah.

Life in Territories Increasingly Militarized

44230112A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 22 Feb 90 p 1B

[Article by Re'uven Pedhatzur]

[Text] A salient negative effect of the intifadah on the defense system is the severe blow it has dealt to the prestige of the only professional body that deals with civilian aspects of the lives of residents in the territories, the Unit for the Coordination of Activities in the Territories. The events of the intifadah have caused a continuous erosion process in the defense system that can be called the "militarization of activity in the territories." The defense system's policy is based increasingly on purely military and operational considerations. At the same time, there is a decline in the influence of civilian aspects relating to citizens' lives on decisionmaking procedures.

In the defense minister's bureau, the generals have taken the place of civilian advisors—those who are supposed to influence policy determination regarding the territories. Activity in the territories is no longer gauged in political terms in Yitzhaq Rabin's bureau, but in terms taken from the battle field. According to the terms that have taken root in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and the Defense Ministry, the intifadah is a war for all intents and purposes, and policymakers treat it as such.

Because of the intifadah, the Coordinator of Activities in the Territories, Shmu'el Goren, has lost his professional seniority to military personnel. The devaluation of his status and that of the Coordination Unit is obvious in the weekly discussion that the defense minister holds in his bureau. Goren is indeed a regular participant in this discussion, which is called the "territories forum," but his influence on policymaking in the forum is declining.

The intifadah has caused the coordinator to lose almost all of his assets. In an unflattering comparison, a senior defense source likened the coordinator to the president of Lebanon: The Lebanese president rules with difficulty over the palace at Ba'bda, whereas the only field of action remaining to the coordinator, who is supposed to be responsible for defense policy in the territories, is the corridor leading to Rabin's office in a building in the general staff's camp.

This comparison is greatly exaggerated, but it also indicates the mood in the immediate environment of the

minister responsible for making the government's policy in the territories. Persons close to Rabin's bureau claim that Goren's status has declined sharply during the many months of the intifadah. The direct result of this development is that the heads of the commands set the tone for decisionmaking in the Defense Ministry.

To Goren's merit, it should be said that he continues to wage a rearguard war against the growing militarization of decisionmaking. It is precisely Goren—the man who matured and formed his world view in many years of activity in the Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence]—who takes into account the viewpoint of residents of the territories. Goren understands well that more than a million civilians are not stone-throwers, and that Israel must continue to co-exist with them in the future.

The problem is that he is the only one in the defense minister's immediate environment who is trying to block insufficiently weighed decisions made by the generals, who sometimes see no great difference between an operation in the alleys of Nabulus and one in South Lebanon. The coordinator infrequently manages to influence the operational decisions of Rabin, who has called for "breaking their hands and legs."

Goren fought a request by the [central] regional commander to close the bridges over the Jordan River to prevent combat means from being smuggled into the West Bank. He managed to convince the defense minister that a disruption of regular traffic to and from Jordan would seriously damage security. Goren also thwarted a proposal by the commander that would have prohibited local trucks from the territories from crossing the Jordan River eastward with agricultural produce, and would have required them to instead transfer their produce to Jordanian trucks on the bridges.

The coordinator acted emphatically in successfully thwarting ideas put forward by senior commanders which would have completely prohibited workers from exiting the territories to work in Israel and would have closed the Cairo-Amman Bank. Sometimes, he manages to convince others that the destruction of a particular house would not contribute to increasing the level of security, but rather the opposite. However, these are all tactical successes that do not change the fundamentals of IDF policy in the territories. Nor are they leading to any real change in the approach of Army personnel.

Officers of the civil administration, who, before the intifadah, constituted the operational arm of the coordinator in the territories, were transferred from Goren's bureau in Tel Aviv and are now working under the direct subordination of the regional commanders. The heads of the civil administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Brigadier Generals Erez and Ramot, operate according to instructions and orders from the bureaus of the commanders. In this way, the coordinator of activities lost a substantial portion of the influence that he had in the past over developments in the territories. The

heads of the commands are unwilling to allow a civilian body based in Tel Aviv to determine policy or the lines of its framework. Against this background, there is open tension between the heads of the commands and the coordinator's bureau in the Defense Ministry building.

The coordinator's range of action has become limited to dealing with health, agriculture, and education. At his disposal are a budget of about 450 million shekels, 400 civilian workers, 200 officers, and 18,000 Arab administrative workers. These purviews are doubtlessly important areas. However, more than once, they have been irreversibly damaged by IDF actions and decisions, over which the coordinator has no control.

As long as Goren represents, in the Defense Ministry, areas of current activity designated to represent the needs and interests of Arab residents of the territories, Minister Rabin gains the coordinator's full professional backing regarding all that relates to overall policy and the essential political aspects of this policy. This apparently was Goren's true downfall. He was one of the first to make clear to Rabin that the PLO is the ruling political power in the territories, and that there is therefore no reason to seek "independent" local leaders who do not identify with the PLO in Tunisia, because they would not be able to advance the process without 'Arafat's blessing.

However, Rabin concluded from these correct appraisals that Israel must not enable the PLO to take part in the political process. In discussions in the minister's bureau, Goren is quoted as saying that "if the PLO is in Nabulus, we will not live in peace in Tel Aviv." Therefore, he thinks that it is better to adhere to the current policy and wait until the PLO changes its skin; nothing is on fire, we must have much patience. The problem is that these positions help Yitzhaq Rabin to continue adhering to his policy of maintaining the status quo.

Increased Use of Firearms Reported in Gaza

44230112D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 25 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Eytan Rabin]

[Text] Senior military sources in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] are pointing with concern to attempts last week to attack the IDF in the Gaza Strip. Military elements estimate that there is an escalation in the level of attacks and a worrisome increase in attack attempts involving firearms, roadside explosive devices, and extraordinary actions involving shots being fired at IDF forces.

According to these sources, a meeting has yet to be held with the head of the southern command, Major General Matan Vilna'i. However, if the attack attempts with firearms continue, the IDF will no doubt deploy accordingly to prevent attacks against its forces. The military sources pointed to a number of attack attempts employing explosive devices against IDF forces. Last week, for example, two pipe bombs were activated at

Bani Sawalah as an IDF patrol was passing, and another charge was activated in Gaza. Miraculously, there were no injuries. There was also an ambush firing incident against an IDF patrol in the Bayt Lahiyah area, on the Gaza bypass highway. There too, none of the four soldiers in the patrol were injured.

Last week, three explosive devices were activated. They were thrown at an IDF patrol in Police Square in Gaza—Medina Square: A young male approached an IDF patrol point and threw an explosive device composed of a pipe. One of the devices exploded in the hands of the youth, injuring him. Military sources indicated that, according to intelligence estimates, the different organizations in the strip intend to escalate the struggle and to use firearms and explosive devices. This intention is explained in view of the freeze in the political process and the encouragement derived from the attack in Ismailiya.

A senior military source reported yesterday to HA'ARETZ that it is currently very difficult for single patrols to move about the strip. Therefore, vehicles patrol in pairs on all arteries and at all points in the strip. He stated: "It is difficult to know from where a grenade or gasoline bomb will be thrown today, or where an improvised explosive device will be detonated. Many elements have combat means and weapons, and it is necessary to deploy accordingly." As stated, according to the appraisal of IDF elements in the strip, residents there have many combat means, from grenades to IDF weapons that are stolen or lost.

LEBANON

Central Bank Statistics on National Debt Discussed

90AE0013A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 16 Mar 90 p 49

[Article by S. Dh.: "Lebanon Sinks Under the Weight of Its General Debt"]

[Text] There was great hope that 1990 would point to Lebanon's emergence from the political, economic, and security facets of its crisis, in that order, or in the reverse order, namely security, political, and then economic. However, that hope has dissipated, not only because of the inability of Lebanese legitimacy to extend its control over Beirut and all of Lebanon, but also because of the explosion of the fierce, destructive conflict in the eastern areas.

Many believed that reaching this level of exhaustion meant reaching a kind of limit, and consequently the beginning of emergence from the war in general. If this view is permitted regarding military and political aspects of the crisis, it is not permitted regarding its economic aspects. Each day that Lebanon's current situation continues is another day of lost revenues on which the state's

balance depends, especially the deficit that has been accumulating during the war years.

A positive political step might ease the people's daily lives, but would accomplish nothing on the level of the economy, or at least its effect would not be directly visible. Many economic burdens have accumulated. The fact that all or most of them are borne by the state limits any chance of the implementation of the Ta'if Agreement pertaining to Lebanon if the Arabs do not accompany that agreement with the financial assistance which they previously announced their willingness to provide to the fraternal country.

The gravity of the economic aspect of Lebanon's problem is revealed by figures regarding the burden of the general debt on the Lebanese state. These figures, which are indicated in official and unofficial studies, including studies prepared by the agencies of the Central Bank of Lebanon, especially its Research and Studies Department, make it clear that the interest on the general debt has become a significant burden, making the general debt itself all the more burdensome.

These figures indicate that the interest payable by the state on its general debt exceeds 95 billion Lebanese pounds for 1989. The general debt's gravity is further increased by the fact that most of the debt stems from state expenditures for consumption that are not offset by any general income. Such expenditures are for the state's subsidization of the consumer sectors, such as loans to cooperatives or loans totalling close to 2 billion Lebanese pounds alone to cover the fuel fund deficit, and the wheat subsidization policy, which costs the treasury 40 billion Lebanese pounds annually.

Figures announced by the Central Bank of Lebanon show that the net, internal, general debt totalled 898 billion and 795 Lebanese pounds, i.e., about 900 billion Lebanese pounds for all of 1989 (\$1,808.8 million according to an average dollar exchange rate of 470 Lebanese pounds), whereas this debt totalled 499 billion and 465 million Lebanese pounds, i.e., about 500 billion Lebanese pounds, at the end of 1988 (\$786 million according to an average dollar exchange rate of 400 Lebanese pounds).

This shows an enormous increase in the general debt of almost \$1 billion in one year. Economic experts consider this figure an extremely serious increase that would be difficult to bring down with limited, regular measures, especially since the increase exceeds any volume of state revenues in the state's current situation.

The figures of the Central Bank of Lebanon indicate that the general debt catastrophe began to emerge in 1983, when the debt totalled about 21 billion and 163 million Lebanese pounds (\$1,574 million at an average dollar exchange rate of 4.53 Lebanese pounds). In 1984, the general debt totalled 31 billion and 397 million Lebanese pounds (\$1,572 million at the average dollar exchange rate at the time, 6.51 Lebanese pounds).

It seems that the increase in the general debt was 10 billion Lebanese pounds during 1984, but that there was no increase in dollar terms owing to the start of the collapse of the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound. In 1985, the general debt was 54 billion and 368 million Lebanese pounds (\$1,399 million at an average dollar exchange rate of 16.42 Lebanese pounds.) In 1986, it increased to 81 million and 719 million Lebanese pounds (\$713 million at an average dollar exchange rate in 1986, 38.38 Lebanese pounds.) In 1987, the general debt totalled 185 billion and 465 Lebanese pounds (\$462 million at the dollar exchange rate, which had become 224.74 Lebanese pounds according to Central Bank figures.)

These figures indicate that the general debt was gradually increasing in Lebanese pounds, but that the increase is not evident when the debt is calculated in dollars. In 1987, the value of the general debt declined in dollars to its lowest level, \$462 million. This demonstrates the collapse of the Lebanese pound, which nonetheless gave the state a large profit at the expense of the drop in value of the Lebanese pound in relation to the dollar, since the state's general internal debt is calculated in Lebanese pounds, while its reserve is calculated in hard currency and its gold cover.

It is also to be noted that 1989 witnessed an increase in the general debt in Lebanese pounds to about 900 billion Lebanese pounds owing to an increase in expenditures following the establishment of two governments and the new costs entailed by the division of administrations and organizations. As indicated above, the general debt was \$1,808 million in 1989. This figure assumes gravity if we know—according to approximate figures—that the Lebanese state's foreign currency assets and the value of its gold reserve total about \$5 billion. In other words, the general debt is about \$2 billion on account of the \$5 billion, i.e., it [increased by] close to 37 percent compared to only 10 percent in 1987.

Even if the Lebanese state recovers somewhat, how can it repay this debt and stop the deficit from increasing? The state's reported revenues, according to Finance Ministry figures, total 6 billion Lebanese pounds annually from customs. Taxes and other state revenues bring this figure to 30 billion Lebanese pounds, which is negligible compared to the debt in 1989, 900 billion Lebanese pounds. Moreover, interest on the debt for 1989 totals 95 billion Lebanese pounds, i.e., 65 billion more than the state's revenues. How can the Lebanese state face all of that?

Most maintain that a year of quiet and stability, a year without war under the auspices of a single legitimate Lebanese authority, would be guaranteed to push the wheels of the economy forward, away from a great collapse. Such a development would still not suffice to cope with the large burden that the state—specifically the Lebanese treasury—has come to bear during 15 years of war and the deficit years, if we do not curtail the economic collapse that began to be acute in the mid-1980s.

Therefore, all parties that are concerned with a resurgence and new beginning for Lebanon must take the economy into account. If action is aimed at the political aspect and then the security aspect, the economic aspect is also most important. The state is not accorded legitimacy on political bases alone. This legitimacy is also supported by the aptitude that the state demonstrates in diverse areas of concern for citizens' lives, which include, in addition to security, food, employment, health, and the general quality of life. All of this is the state's responsibility.

If the Ta'if Agreement was a moment of decision to make an Arab economic effort that accompanies political and security efforts, this effort must be represented by no less than \$3 billion. This amount would be a balance with which the state can unleash and begin a reconstruction period entailing reconstruction and reactivation of all economic sectors in the hope that another year will not elapse without the crystallization of an economic resurgence. In any calculation of a resurgence, or at least emergence from Lebanon's critical situation, it is very important to take numbers into account, specifically numbers pertaining to the general debt of the state. The desire is for the state to undergo a resurgence. Bets are on a resurgence starting in all of Lebanon. Anything to the contrary is swimming in a sea of failure and collapse!

QATAR

Impact of Natural Gas Project Discussed

90AE0007A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'
in Arabic 12 Mar 90 p 24

[Article by Muhammad Qawas: "The North Field, the Largest Field for Natural Gas in the World; From Income Economy to Production Economy"]

[Text] What is the meaning of Qatar owning the largest natural gas field in the world? This small state, which relies on the oil trade to get 90 percent of its revenues, will begin, early next year, to exploit the first stage of the North Gas Field, which will guarantee it a steady income for about 150 years. The North Field lies 40 miles off the coasts of the Qatar Peninsula, and its reserve is estimated at about 380,000 billion cubic feet of natural gas. (The definite reserve is 150,000 billion.) Therefore, it is considered the largest field for the production of gas in the world, which puts Qatar in the forefront of the Arab gas-producing countries and in fourth place on the international level.

Implementation of the first stage was begun the middle of 1987 and is to be completed at the end of this year. The Qatar General Petroleum Corporation issued a report about the details of the plan in its first stage and said that the field will produce, as of January of next year, about 800 million cubic feet of gas a day. To date, 70 percent of all the plan's actions and 95 percent of the work of drilling the gas-producing wells has been carried

out. The first stage covers construction of two platforms for drilling (eight wells per platform) and another for accommodation and facilities and maintenance, in addition to a network of pipelines to transport the product from the offshore wells to the industrial and domestic consumption sites.

Qatar pins great hopes on the North Field project, because, in addition to its being a new source of income, it will at the same time provide Qatari industry with a new factor in the production operation, whether because of its being an efficient fuel of high economic value (especially in the aluminum industry), or its being a primary raw material in some chemical industries (fertilizers, ammonia, urea, methanol, and ethylene). The numbers indicate that the industry sector presently consumes about 46.6 [as published] percent of the gas output, distributed in the following way: fertilizers 1.4 percent, petrochemicals 20 percent, iron and steel two percent, cement six percent, the refinery two percent, the two gas liquids units in the Umm Sa'id area 16 percent, the production of crude oil (in the Dukhan field) 20 percent. These percentages break down Qatari industry's consumption of gas, which amounts to 185 million cubic feet a day.

From another standpoint, the authorities concerned in Qatar intend to increase the part of natural gas as fuel in projects to generate electrical power and desalinate water and in household use. The discovery and exploitation of this field are impetuses toward the creation of a new industrial area in the northern areas lying near the offshore site of the field (the area of Ra's Laffan), and accordingly the industrial circles are devoting themselves to studying the horizons of industrial development in the country and beginning to pursue new industries by enabling them to make maximum use of the gas output which the North Field provides.

There is now active interest in completing the first stage of this plan. And providing the means of more advantageous exploitation on the local level is not remote and is being planned for within the framework of operations to export and distribute natural gas, whether in regional circles (the states of the Cooperation Council especially/ see the box) or in international circles. Some industrial sources expected that a long-term contract would be reached with the Japanese importers within six to nine months, since Qatar is trying to penetrate this market in the hope that Qatari gas will be able to occupy a basic sphere in the Japanese consumption market.

It is worth mentioning that the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation said in a previous report that the confirmed reserve of natural gas which can be extracted in Qatar exceeds 160,000 billion cubic feet (150,000 billion in the North Field alone), and the report added that associated gas is now being produced from the onshore and offshore fields in average amounts of between 250 and 300 million cubic feet a day, in keeping with the rates of production of oil during the period 1981-1988. As for the production of natural (that is nonassociated) gas, it

began in the Dukhan field (western Qatar) in 1978, and the production of gas from this field has increased continually to 374 million cubic feet a day. Some information indicates that the output of this field has begun to fall off in recent times, which increases the importance and role of the North Field as a substitute source and promising resource.

A Plan To Transport the Gas to the Gulf States [Box, p 24]

Dr. Jabir 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Mari, Director General of the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation, announced that his country is studying, with the rest of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a plan to set up a network of pipelines to distribute Qatari natural gas with the aim of supplying the markets of these states with quantities of the gas extracted from the North Field. He added that these states want natural gas to take the place, in relative proportions, as a fuel, of whatever oil and associated gas they use. He asserted that a study of this plan will be ready for submission to the Gulf authorities concerned the middle of this month.

Al-Mari had delivered a lecture entitled "The Horizon and Potential of the North Gas Field in Qatar" at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris during the "Qatar in Paris" week which the institute organized last 22-28 February.

Al-Mari emphasized in his lecture the horizons of the gas trade in the world because of the rise in the level of environmental awareness in the world and the anxiety which is gripping the industrial nations, especially regarding the problems of pollution. He said that natural gas, with the peculiar qualities it offers, can be a substitute in the future, as a clean fuel material which will not affect the purity of the environment. And he expects this material to become a basic fuel whose use by the big industries will gradually increase, and to even include consumption by ordinary vehicles.

Concerning the plan for the North Field, al-Mari revealed that what this field provides will require the construction of a network of pipelines about 570 kilometers long to supply the traditional industrial areas and the areas which will be created subsequently. He added that the product will be transported from the offshore field to land through a pipeline from which a line will branch out overland, connecting it to the liquefied natural gas extraction plant and the concentrates stabilization installations in the Umm Sa'id industrial area in the south of the country.

Some information has indicated that the cost of this plan in its various stages may reach about \$5 billion, and it is rumored that this enormous cost may exceed Qatar's own financial capabilities. In his response to a question by AL-YAWM AL-SABI' about this, al-Mari replied that it is premature to estimate the total cost of the plan in its various stages. He added that the first stage, which will be finished the end of this year, has cost about \$1300 million, stressing that \$800 million of it was provided

from Qatar's own resources, while the government earmarked profits from the sale of 40,000 barrels of oil a day to cover the rest of the costs.

SUDAN

Public Service Officials Criticized for Ineffectiveness

90AA0051B Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI
in Arabic 23 Feb 90 p 3

["Echoes" column by 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Awad: "Problem!"]

[Text] People's business is often paralyzed at public service departments for the simple reason that some of our officials have an internal automatic censor that makes them hesitate a thousand times before issuing a simple decree that could put an end to a problem which in time could grow and multiply to the point of becoming intractable.

Another type of official takes a negative attitude toward problems and they neglect to solve them until they

receive instructions or directions from higher authorities, whereupon they immediately set out to resolve and tackle them. Those people could have taken positive steps to solve the problems on their own and without directions out of an inner feeling dictated by their conscience and responsibility to their jobs, or out of loyalty and national affiliation.

This widespread negative attitude in government agencies may be triggered by closed minds left behind by bygone misguided regimes and complicated laws and procedures overtaken by the fast tempo of the times. Therefore, we expect the revolutionary movement, which is now running the public service, to review all laws that restrict freedoms and movement, to adopt swift effective decisions, to facilitate public service procedures, and to remove all obstacles and impediments. This is in order to eliminate complaints and problems and to achieve the progress we are looking for in all the various sectors, thereby freeing senior officials from such matters so that they may devote their full attention to more important and more serious problems related to the country's interest.

And yet, if we fail to put the right person in the right place, these laws will remain mere ink on paper.

BANGLADESH

Ershad Signs Cooperation Pacts With Italy

46001458A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 22 Mar 90 p 10

[Text] Rome, Mar. 21:—Official talks between President Ershad and Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti here yesterday yielded signing of three agreements providing for necessary framework of wideranging cooperation between the two countries, reports UNB.

The talks were held at Prime Ministers office, Plazzo Chigi, in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, officials said.

The three agreements—technical cooperation, investment guarantee and cooperation and avoidance of double taxation—were signed by Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud and Deputy Foreign Minister of Italy Claudio Le Noci. They were among those who assisted President Ershad and the Prime Minister in their talks lasting for more than an hour.

An official close to the talks told UNB the agreements signed will lead to greater cooperation between the two countries.

This will give impetus to the ongoing intensification of bilateral cooperation, the official added.

Both sides at the talks noted that trade was one particular area where the interaction was growing very well. The two countries have been actively discussing a range of areas of joint ventures both in public and private sectors. Both sides showed interest in strengthening cooperation in this fields.

Officials said the meeting noted that relations between the two countries had been developing steadily and prospects of their future deepening and enlargement were promising.

President Ershad told Prime Minister Andreotti various efforts of his government to build a better future for the people with special reference to population control, universal primary education, administrative reforms and the liberal industrial policy.

Officials said President Ershad spoke of severe problems facing the Least Developed Countries. He expressed the hope that Italy being [a] leading industrial power would play an important role in easing the problems.

Prime Minister Andreotti appreciated the view points of Bangladesh. He gave his analysis of the recent developments in East Europe and his assessment of the evolving trend.

Officials said the two sides shared the perception that these change were of a positive nature and it was important that they be so directed that they would contribute to world peace and stability.

The talks also covered regional conflicts as in Afghanistan, Kampuchia, Middle East, South Africa and development in Eastern Europe and were marked by common perception and understanding, officials said.

Earlier, before going for official talks President Ershad called on Italian President Francesco Cossiga at Qaurinale palace.

They discussed matters of mutual interest and regional and international issues of common concern.

Ershad, Opposition Leaders' National Day Messages

Ershad Message

46001461A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 26 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] President Hussain Muhammad Ershad said in Dhaka on Sunday that the present government was working relentlessly to establish a prosperous and democratic society based on justice and to achieve people's economic emancipation—a major target of political freedom, reports BSS.

In a message on the eve of Independence and National Day, President Ershad said it was a day for taking pledge of build a strong and prosperous Bangladesh, a dream of lakhs of Shaheeds. He said, during the last eight years, remarkable progress had been achieved and new momentum was infused in the national economy despite various constraints and recurring natural calamities.

He said food autarky was no more an imagination only. He said Inshah- Allah the country would be self-sufficient in food by 1992 if the present rate of growth sustained in the agricultural sector.

He said positive changes had taken place in the industrial sector with the introduction of the new industrial policy and formation of the Investment Board to attract more foreign investment.

He said the present government, relaxing its control in the industrial sector, had taken different motivation programmes to ensure increased private initiative in industrialisation of the country.

The President said the process to remove poverty had been strengthened by establishing cluster villages for the rehabilitation of the landless, forming the Rin Shalishi Board and giving extended facilities to the marginal farmers.

He said the nation was progressing fast on the path of development to achieve the real fruits of independence.

He said the world community had taken up an integrated work plan to control floods in Bangladesh which had helped strengthening our own endeavour and which would make a far reaching positive impact on the national economy.

Hasina for Awami League

46001461B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 26 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Awami League chief and the leader of the Eight-Party Alliance Sheikh Hasina called upon the nation to be imbued with the spirit of the Liberation War and intensify the present mass movement to oust the present regime which she said had distorted the history of the Liberation War, usurped the democratic rights of the people and destroyed the national economy.

In a statement on the eve of the Independence Day the Awami League chief recalled the supreme sacrifice of the Freedom Fighters and people of all walks of life in 1971 Liberation War in wresting the national independence from the occupation army. She said that the nation fought the Liberation War for political and economic emancipation. But, she regretted, even after 19 years of independence people were deprived of their democratic and fundamental rights under successive Martial Law regimes since the killing of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975.

The Awami League chief pointed out that those who opposed the War of Liberation were now active under the patronage of the present regime in distorting the history of the Liberation War. She asserted that the nation would one day try those who were trying to destroy the spirit of the liberation war and who killed Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Referring to the present political and economic situation in the country Sheikh Hasina said that democracy was the pre-condition to national development. She blasted the Martial Law regimes after 1975 for snatching the democratic rights of the people, destroying the election system and bringing the national economy to a critical state through unabated corruption. She pointed out that the Finance and Planning Ministers had resigned which proved the deplorable economic situation in the country. She urged all patriotic public servants and businessmen to stop flight of capital and plundering of the country's economy by the present government and their "favoured persons."

Zia for BNP

46001461C Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 26 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] Chairman and Seven-Party Alliance leader Khaleda Zia in a message on the eve of 20th anniversary of independence called upon the people to launch united movement against which snatched power in 1982, from an elected government the undemocratic regime to establish peoples rule in the country.

Begum Khaleda Zia noted with concern that in the absence of representative government in the country for long time the economy is now in deep crisis, peoples

right has been taken away and the people are denied of Justice in the absence of a free judiciary in the country.

BNP chief recalled the independence struggle in 1971 when Ziaur Rahman called the people to take part in Liberation War. She regretted that at the dawn of independence the then ruling party killed democracy by introducing one party rule in the country thereby destroying the ideals of liberation struggle.

Begum Zia called upon the people to get united for intensifying the democratic movement and to renew the pledge to topple the undemocratic government.

Ershad Tells Stand on University Troubles

46001473A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 6 Apr 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] President Hussain Muhammad Ershad said in Dhaka on Thursday that the Government would do its best to contain terrorism in the Dhaka University and thereby help restore academic atmosphere on the campus, reports BSS.

Talking to the Members of the Dhaka University Syndicate when they called on him, the President assured the University authorities of fullest cooperation of the administration in this regard.

"My Government has no political stake on the campus nor we wanted to establish sphere of influence there and that was made obvious, through dissolution of the student front of the Jatiya Party", he said.

Vice-Chancellor of the Dhaka University Prof. M. Maniruzzaman Mia led the delegation of the Syndicate Members when they called on President Ershad who is also Chancellor of Universities at the international Conference Centre on Thursday afternoon.

Education Minister Sheikh Shahidul Islam, State Minister for Education Manur Ali Sarkar and Education Secretary A. N. M. Yusuf were present.

President Ershad said that his Government never interfered in the affairs of the universities and would not like to do so in the future.

Noting that awareness for restoring the academic atmosphere on the campus was increasing, the President said that if the present situation continued the nations would be the ultimate loser and its image in the international community would also suffer.

The President expressed optimism over the statement issued by the leaders of the 22 students organisations in favour of working for restoring normal atmosphere and containing armed terrorism on the campus.

President Ershad welcomed the steps taken by the new Vice-Chancellor to solve the problems by keeping the university open. We wish all concerned would join to make the move a success, he said.

He also exchanged opinion with the Members of the Syndicate on how to stop terrorism on the campus and other issues of the university.

Speaking on the occasion, Vice-Chancellor Dr. Maniruzzaman Mia sought all-out cooperation of the administration to fight back armed terrorism on the campus and said active assistance of the law enforcing agencies would be needed most in this regard.

There was a new realisation regarding the presence of police on the campus, he said.

The Vice-Chancellor held out the assurance that his administration was determined to exercise its moral authority and ensure neutrality.

Dr. Maniruzzaman called for building up public opinion against terrorism on the campus and added that parents should also be involved in such campaign.

Speaking on the occasion, Education Minister Sheikh Shahidul Islam also gave the assurance of fullest cooperation of his ministry to help restore academic atmosphere and wipe out terrorism from the campus.

Prof. Vice-Chancellor, Prof. Emajuddin Ahmed, Syndicate Member Dr. Abdullah Al Muti Sharfuddin and others also spoke on the occasion.

Finance Minister Munim Also Named Planning Minister

46001460A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 24 Mar 90 p 3

[Text] Finance Minister M. A. Munim will also hold the charge of the Ministry of Planning, according to an announcement in Dhaka Thursday night reports BSS.

Paper Reports Visit of Delegation to Beijing

Meeting With Environment Minister

46001471A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 5 Apr 90 p 10

[Text] Beijing, Apr 4—Forest and Environment Minister Zafar Imam said here today that Bangladesh could gain much from China's experience and added that adoption of appropriate afforestation technology from China would contribute greatly towards accelerating country's afforestation programme, reports BSS.

Zafar Imam who is visiting China leading a five-member delegation called on his counterpart Gao Dezhan.

The Chinese Forest Minister warmly welcomed Bangladesh delegation which called on him, at his office and said there exist excellent relations between the two countries, a PID [Press Information Department] handout said. He said the close cooperation between the two countries could profit enormously.

While detailing the forest and environment policy of the Chinese Government Mr Gao said there could be meaningful and fruitful cooperation between the two countries in this sector.

Recalling the visits of two Chinese delegations to Bangladesh in 1980 and 1982 to conduct research in silk and bamboo leaves in Bangladesh, Mr Gao said China has learnt much from Bangladesh. He said both countries would be benefitted in forestry and environment if research and cooperation could be further strengthened and expanded.

Reciprocating the sentiments of his host, Mr Zafar Imam said the two countries have traditional forests and that the problems and goals of afforestations are almost identical, the handout added.

Zafar Imam invited Chinese Forest Minister to visit Bangladesh and informed that the government of President Ershad had attached top priority to environmental questions notably afforestation for maintaining ecological balance.

Later, the delegation was taken round the Asian Games villages nearing completion in Beijing for the Asian Games meet scheduled to be held in September.

The delegation arrived here yesterday on a week-long visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party.

Meeting With CCP Leader

46001471B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 7 Apr 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Beijing, Apr 6—Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin has said China hopes to see continuous economic growth in other third world countries, especially in the countries of south Asia, reports PTI.

Mr Jiang made the remark yesterday to a delegation of the ruling Jatiya Party of Bangladesh, led by Environment Minister and party Joint Secretary General, Zafar Imam. Mr Jiang noted that both China and Bangladesh belong to the third world.

Mr Jiang said, exchanges between the peoples of China and Bangladesh have lasted more than 1000 years and in recent years the frequent exchanges of visits of the leaders of the two countries and delegations have further enhanced mutual understanding and promoted the development of friendly relations and cooperation between the peoples of the two countries.

China and Bangladesh established diplomatic relations in October 1975.

Mr Zafar Imam was reported to have briefed Mr Jiang on economic development and the unity of nationalities in Bangladesh and expressed gratification over the rapid development in China in recent years as well as the present stable political situation here.

Mr Imam expressed the belief that good relations between Bangladesh and China as well as his party and the Chinese Communist Party would further develop.

Bangladesh ambassador Farooq Sobhan and the head of the Chinese party's international liaison department, Zhu Ling, were present at the meeting.

The delegation, which arrived in Beijing on April 3, held talks with the international liaison department and with Forestry Minister Gao Dezhan and is to leave on April 11 after visiting Shanghai and Guangzhou.

Paper Reports on Visit of Pakistan Foreign Minister

Dhaka Talks

46001456A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 8 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Bangladesh and Pakistan at formal talks in Dhaka on Wednesday reviewed their bilateral relations and discussed the regional situation, with special focus on the stalled SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] summit.

Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud led a seven-member Bangladesh delegation to the 45-minute talks, while the Pakistani delegation of the same number was headed by the visiting Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yakub Khan.

Before the formal talks at the Foreign Office, the two Foreign Ministers held an about 40-minute exclusive meeting.

There was no official Press briefing on the talks.

But sources close to the meeting told UNB the two sides discussed the "entire gamut of the bilateral relations" and exchanged views on the 5th SAARC summit, which was due in Colombo in December last year.

They said the two Foreign Ministers found Bangladesh-Pakistan relations "friendly and good" with scope to promote it further, particularly in the field of trade and economic cooperation.

At the formal talks Mahmud was assisted by Foreign Secretary Abul Ahsan, Bangladesh High Commissioner to Islamabad C. M. Shafi Shami, DG South Asian Desk Mostafa Mohammad Feruk and DG SAARC Shamser Mobin Chowdhury.

The sources said Mahmud and Yakub Khan during the exclusive talks also touched on the issue of the repatriation of the stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh. But details on this subject were not available.

On the regional plant, Yakub Khan briefed the Bangladesh Foreign Minister about the situation in Kashmir and the Pakistan's point of views.

The sources said both sides agreed that the SAARC countries should work together to make the forum more dynamic.

Bangladesh and Pakistan agreed that a consensus should emerge about the holding of the pending summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

The forum, launched in its first summit in Dhaka in 1985, comprises Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives.

The 5th summit ran into trouble after Sri Lanka refused to host it until India withdraws its peace-keeping forces from the island nation.

Diplomatic sources in Dhaka say, Colombo is now prepared to host the summit in April after India pulls out its troops by the March 31 deadline.

Meanwhile, the Maldives is looking forward to the holding of 6th SAARC summit in November this year.

Diplomatic sources said India is now in favour of the Maldives summit more than the Colombo one.

The SAARC leaders will now have to decide whether they will go ahead with the Colombo summit as well as another meeting in Male this year, the sources said.

Foreign Minister's Interview

46001456B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 9 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Article by Iqbal Sobhan Chowdhury: "Dhaka-Pindi Ties To Grow: Yaqub"]

[Text] Pakistan Foreign Minister Shahabzada Yakub Khan gave a broad hint at more closer cooperation between Islamabad and Dhaka in the coming days saying that a militarily strong, independent and prosperous Bangladesh is a great source of inspiration to Pakistan.

In an exclusive interview with the Bangladesh Observer at the state guest house 'Padma' on Thursday before leaving Dhaka at the end of his three-day official visit Shahabzada Yakub Khan said "there is already a sizable degree of cooperation" between Pakistan and Bangladesh. He referred to the recent visit of Pakistan Air Force chief Air Marshal Hakimullah to Dhaka and said even the Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg was scheduled to visit Bangladesh. "General Beg has postponed his visit for the time being due to urgent matters at home," he added indicating the escalation of tension between Pakistan and India over the separatist movement of the Muslims in the Indian-occupied Kashmir and the coup attempt in Kabul to overthrow Najibullah's regime.

Talking about the existing broad spectrum of Islamabad-Dhaka bilateral relations Shahabzada Yakub Khan said that the visit of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to Dhaka last October had given "fresh impetus" to the friendly relations between the two countries.

He added that the Joint Economic Commission had already met and reviewed the bilateral cooperation and evolved ways to boost it further. He also mentioned about the frequent exchange of visits by Ministers and top ranking officials between the two countries.

Pakistan Foreign Minister said that his country was the largest importer of Bangladesh jute. Pakistan, he added, had agreed to provide two container ships, a sugar and a cement plant and trucks to Bangladesh. He considered these steps as "practical demonstration of close economic cooperation" between Pakistan and Bangladesh. He also stressed the need for frequent exchange of visits by representatives of chambers of commerce and industries to explore joint ventures between the two countries. He mentioned about the goodwill among the Pakistani entrepreneurs in investing in Bangladesh. We look forward to contribute to help development in Bangladesh and Pakistan will give anything that Bangladesh wants for her development," the Foreign Minister of Pakistan told this correspondent with intense interest recalling his nostalgic feeling for Bangladesh reminiscing his memories of the days when he was the General-Officer-Commanding of the Army and Martial Law Administrator in Dhaka in early 1971.

The Pakistan Foreign Minister who visited Bangladesh and Bhutan as the special envoy of current chairperson of the seven-nation SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto during his current tour of the SAARC capitals said that though his visit was primarily linked with SAARC matters he had discussed bilateral and regional issues with the leaders here. He said that during his meeting with President Ershad, Vice-President Moudud Ahmed, Prime Minister Kazi Zafar Ahmed and his counterpart Anisul Islam Mahmud he briefed them on the situation in Kashmir and Pakistan's stand on the issue. He added that he discussed with the leaders here about the recent developments in Afghanistan.

Najib's Claims Fall Flat

The Pakistan Foreign Minister preferred not to comment on the coup attempt against the present Kabul government saying that he was yet to receive full information from his Ministry as he was now out of Islamabad. He, however, pointed out that the claim of President Najibullah's regime of political stability and people's support had been proved wrong following the coup attempt by Afghan Army. He observed that the statement of the Afghan Interim government about the illegitimacy of Najibullah's regime had been proved true by the recent development in Kabul. "We hope this will help the transfer of power to a rightful and legitimate government ending the legacy of foreign occupation in Afghanistan," He sounded his optimism.

Asked why Pakistan is yet to accord recognition to the Afghan interim government Shahabzada Yakub Khan who is known as one of the architects of Pakistan-backed Afghan Muslim resistance against Soviet occupation in

Afghanistan said that the recognition involved various international criteria. He observed that before the endorsement of the Afghan people through a genuine election in Afghanistan recognition by Pakistan to the interim government which operate from Peshawar would not be in the "interest and credibility" of the Afghan interim government.

He praised the interim government formed by different factions of Afghan Mujahideen who are involved with the "heroic struggle" for Afghan people. "We are taking efforts to give broader base to the Afghan Interim government", he said referring to allegations that the provisional government did not include all the Afghan Mujahideen groups involved in the fight against Soviet-backed Najibullah regime.

Turning to SAARC matters Shahabzada Yakub Khan who is the current chairman of the SAARC council of Ministers expressed his firm conviction that only mutual trust and confidence among the SAARC nations could ensure meaningful regional cooperation. Referring to the thorny bilateral issues among the SAARC countries he said that SAARC summit provided opportunity to the leaders of the seven South Asian countries to meet frequently that help discuss bilateral issues informally.

Asked whether he foresaw an immediate summit between Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh to diffuse Indo-Pak tension arising out of the popular uprising in the Kashmir valley the Pakistan Foreign Minister said that there was no such move at this moment.

Asked whether he is optimistic about the future of SAARC in view of the challenges and risks stemming out of issues like Kashmir between India and Pakistan, withdrawal of Indian peace keeping force from Sri Lanka, sharing of Ganges water between Bangladesh and India the Pakistan Foreign Minister said that SAARC provides opportunity for dialogue among the member countries and "one should not spurn the chance for dialogue to resolve bilateral issues", he stressed.

Pakistan High Commissioner in Bangladesh Mr Anwar Kemal was also present during the interview.

The sharp-nosed agile Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who is widely acclaimed for his "clean diplomacy" praised Bangladesh for its role in promoting peace in this region. He talked about his good feelings for the people of Bangladesh.

He particularly expressed his personal regards for Mr Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan and the founder of the Observer Group of Publications and told this correspondent that he regretted for not being able to see Mr Chowdhury this time but hoped that during his next visit he will pay his regards by meeting him.

Minutes before the interview with this correspondent the Pakistan Foreign minister received Mr Nasim Khan, the

leader of 2.5 lakh stranded Pakistanis who had been demanding their repatriation from Bangladesh to Pakistan. Mr Khan gave a memorandum to Shahabzada Yakub Khan urging the Pakistan government for immediate repatriation of the stranded Pakistanis.

Report on Annual Border Conference With India

46001468A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 30 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] New Delhi, Mar. 29:—Bangladesh-India annual border conference has discussed in detail various border problems including the return of Chakma refugees now in Tripura camps, problems in the undemarcated stretch of border in Assalong area and major irritants due to adversely possessed land like Tin Bigha, Baru Bari (Kurigram) and Chandan Nagar (Moulvi Bazar).

Both the delegations held the formal talks for the second day on Wednesday in a cordial atmosphere and mutual understanding and agreed to curb the excess by the border security forces. The two sides also agreed to stop trans-frontier crimes like dacoity, cattle lifting and others with joint efforts and to hold regular meetings at battalion and sector commander levels, delegation sources told BSS.

Major General Sadequr Rahman Chowdhury, Director General of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and Mr H. P. Bhatnagar, Director General of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) are leading the respective delegations at the conference.

Bangladesh delegation told the conference that complete congenial atmosphere is prevailing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts areas following steps taken in pursuance of the policy adopted by the government. As a result many Chakma families who left for India had returned to their ancestral homes and settled down there peacefully. The Bangladesh delegation presented documents and photographs in support of their contention that the Chakmas were leading a peaceful life there.

The leader of Bangladesh delegation urged the Indian authorities to send back those Bangladeshi Chakma refugees who still remained in the Indian camps. "Bangladesh is always ready to take them back", he reiterated.

Earlier, the Indian side raising the Chakma issue claimed that exodus was still continuing but admitted that their number was "now less", Bangladesh, on this point said the misguided miscreants might try to take some Chakmas forcibly taking advantage of the vast border.

Dhaka Denies Training Tripura Guerillas

Bangladesh flatly denied the Indian allegation that Indian insurgents belonging to Tripura are being trained inside Bangladesh territory as "Bangladesh does not believe in such things". On the other hand Bangladesh pointed out that India was harbouring the miscreants (so called Shanti Bahini) in the Indian territory and causing casualties in Hill Tracts. Bangladesh in this connection

referred to March 14 incident in which three BDR personnel were killed and two wounded including an officer by the miscreants who opened fire from across the border in Thega Khal area of Mizoram-Bangladesh boundary.

The conference discussed the pillar issued and both sides agreed to take up the matter with the respective governments to expedite the maintenance of those pillars which have been unseated or broken due to natural phenomenon like floods, erosion of rivers and passage of time.

The Bangladesh delegation pleaded to its Indian counterpart to pursue their government for early ratification of the Indo-Bangladesh agreement and its implementation would help remove major irritants between the two countries due to adversely possessed land like Tin Bigha, Baru Bari (Kurigram) and Chandan Nagar (Moulvi Bazar).

The Indian side agreed to undertake measures to resolve problems existing in the undemarcated stretch of border in Assalong area.

Teh leader of Indian delegation committed that BSF would not allow the Indian nationals of Assalong to temper with the course of Feni river by erecting bridge and digging canals to divert the course of the river, which they made several attempts earlier but foiled by the BDR.

The BSF Director General also agreed to allow free float of bamboos along the Dhalai Khal in Kulaura area which the BSF used to stop earlier.

Infiltration Into W. Bengal Denied

Bangladesh denied the Indian claim that 45,000 Bangladesh nationals have infiltrated into India through West Bengal border and said some cases might take place due to the agents who allure the innocent people with jobs in the middle eastern countries. Bangladesh informed the conference that the authorities have already apprehended over 700 agents.

Bangladesh delegation took up the case of Nilufar, a student of class nine kidnapped by Prabhunath Karmakar (domestic servant) and now staying in Malda (West Bengal) and another girl kidnapped by her private tutor Netal from Moulvi Bazar and demanded that they must be sent back to Bangladesh.

The Indian side raised the case of Srimati Swapna Laskar, a married woman of Bongao, 24-Pargana who along with her two sons eloped with one Anwar Hossain of Jessore in June last year. Bangladesh side told that they were apprehended by BDR and sent to court custody. The trial of Swapna Laskar ended on March 15 in Jessore when her husband, Santosh Laskar was brought to the court from India where Seapna had refused to go with her husband. Santosh also refused to take his wife and he finally left along with his two sons.

Officials Report on Conduct of District Elections

Chief Election Commissioner

46001455 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 27 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Chief Election Commissioner Justice Sultan Hosain Khan on Tuesday re-iterated the determination of the Election Commission for holding proper, free and impartial polls at any cost to uphold the democratic tradition of the country, reports BSS.

In a message on the occasion of conclusion of the 12-day Upazila Parishad Chairmen election the Chief Election Commissioner congratulated the people for making the election a success.

Expressing his satisfaction at the success of the election Justice Khan said this proved that for the success of any national activity sincere goodwill, united efforts and sincere cooperation of the people were essential.

He said the success of this election had already been appreciation at home and abroad.

Justice Khan said though Upazila Parishad chairmen election was held on non-party basis most of the candidates at the polls were the supporters of different political parties and many political parties became interested in it.

He said due to this involvement of the political parties with this election the acceptability of the election had been increased and at the same time it became easier to conduct the whole election in proper, free and impartial way. Largescale participation in polls was one of the important matters for holding free and impartial election, he added.

Home Minister

46001455 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 27 Mar 90 p 10

[Text] Home Minister Mahmudul Hasan on Tuesday said the holding of free fair upazila elections in the country proved that the Government of President Ershad was committed to seeing democratic institutions function independently and neutrally, reports BSS.

"The example set in the just concluded elections has amply proved that the Government believed in the functioning of the Fundamental Rights of the people," he told BSS in an interview at his office in Dhaka.

Mr Hasan said the elections results as reported in newspapers also bore the testimony that elections were held in a free and fair atmosphere where the government machinery remained absolutely neutral.

He emphatically said "not a single person had died in police firings during the two weeks of polls." Elaborating he said six persons were alone killed while making bombs.

He said another person was killed by a bomb, kept in his pocket. Besides, he said, some other had died when their opponents attacked victory processions and projection meeting and because of personal enmity.

The Home Minister said since all these killings took place during the election period it should not be attributed to the upazila elections. Citing an example, he said one person was killed while going to attend a "salishi" (compromise) meeting. "How can you say he was killed in the election violence" he wanted to know.

He said the Government under the dynamic leadership of President Ershad had taken all precautionary measures to thwart any untoward incidents in the centres and around. "This is a unique achievement of the present Government" he maintained.

Mr Hasan said holding of free and fair election depended on three factors namely the Government, the political parties and the voters. All these factors worked with complete harmony and made the election a total success, he said.

The Minister particularly lauded the role of the voters as they did not allow any untoward incidents taking place in the centres. The voters had rejected those who indulged in corrupt practices and violence during the polls, he said.

Referring to the first upazila elections in 1985, the Home Minister said, "we had to hold the elections in the face of many odds from the Opposition political parties." Firstly, they had totally rejected the upazila system itself. They resorted to gherao[?] the Deputy Commissioner's office throughout the country so that nobody could submit nomination paper. Besides, he said, they also called country-wide hartal on the polling day.

Bhashani Awami Party To Reorganize in August

46001477 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 29 Mar 90 p 10

[Text] The Coordination Council of the followers of Bhashani will hold a two-day convention beginning from 2 August at Santosh for reorganisation of National Awami Party [NAP] (Bhashani) as a national democratic political party. All the factions and their front organisations of the party would be dissolved latest by 15 July, the Council decided.

The last convention of the Coordination Council stressed the need for revival of the spirit of struggle of late leader Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani.

The Coordination Council decided to form a 151-member national steering committee with Alema Bhashani as the chief patron while Mr Golam Kabir as the convener.

UNB adds: The 2-3 August convention, scheduled at Santosh, political headquarters of charismatic leader

Maulana Bhashani, is expected to be participated by more than 4,000 followers, organisers said.

The move to unify the Bhashani followers and various factions of NAP (Bhashani) was first taken on 17 January when a coordination council was formed after a meeting at Santosh.

Then a national conference of Bhashani followers was held on 1-2 March, also at Santosh, which was presided over by Begum Alema Bhashani, wife of the late leader, best known as "Majlum Janoneta" or leader of the toiling masses.

A.K.M. Golam Kabir, Convener of the Council, said they felt the need for reorganising NAP (Bhashani) to safeguard national independence and sovereignty and to fight against imperialism and autocracy.

"The absence of the great leader is being badly felt as there is a vacuum in the political leadership," Kabir said.

He said there has been encouraging progress in their efforts to reunify the Bhashani followers.

The organisers will undertake tours of different districts from first week of April to mobilise Bhashani followers under one banner.

National Awami Party, founded in 1957 by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, suffered its first split in early 60's when Prof Muzaffar Ahmed deserted him to form his own.

After the death of Bhashani in 1976, his faction of NAP started disintegrating and currently it has splintered into eight factions.

Bangladesh Communist Party Central Committee Meets

Elections Reviewed

46001462 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 31 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) on the third day of its 4-day Central Committee meeting discussed the party's performance in the upazila polls, reports UNB.

Sources close to the meeting said the participants expressed disappointment at the party's poor results in the 14-25 March elections.

The speakers, however, agreed that the upazila elections proved a united opposition can topple the present government through ballots, the sources said.

They said the general mood of Friday's meeting was in favour of preparing the party both for movement and possible national elections.

Presided over by Dr Wajidul Islam, a Central Committee member, the discussion was opened by Shekhar Dutta, another central leader.

Party Congress Planned

46001462 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 31 Mar 90 p 3

[Text] The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) will hold its 5th congress in the last week of October, reports UNB.

This was decided on the second day on Thursday of the party's 4-day central committee meeting with Dr Sarwar Ali in the chair, party sources said.

The CPB central body also discussed on the day the report submitted by the commission formed to examine the necessity of a review of the party declaration and manifesto.

The meeting decided that the commission report be discussed in all district committees and that it will also be thrown in an open discussion through newspapers.

In a resolution, the meeting expressed concern over a sharp rise in the prices of essentials from the first day of Ramadan.

It demanded that the government take proper step to arrest the price spiral to keep the prices of daily necessities within the reach of the people.

Meanwhile, Nurul Islam, a Secretary of CPB's central committee, in a statement on Thursday condemned arrests and repressions in Sylhet. He demanded release of all the arrested persons, withdrawal of warrants and cases and acceptance of the demands of the people of Sylhet.

He said the government's statement on Sylhet incidents issued after the ruling party leaders' talks with the President was only to evade the just demand of the local people.

Economic, Other Resolutions

46001462 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 2 Apr 90 p 10

[Text] Communist Party of Bangladesh expressed grave concern over the economic situation in the country.

In a resolution adopted at the end of the four-day central committee meeting of the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) on Sunday chaired by Comrade Mohammad Nurul Islam, the meeting noted with concern that foreign exchange reserve of the country has come down to almost zero level. In financial administration, the government was following corrupt practices and wasting huge amount of money in unproductive sector it alleged.

In another resolution, the meeting held the capitalist system responsible for continued looting of the government property, use of luxurious goods and their wastage, disruption in agricultural and industrial production, etc.

It has become now necessary to establish a truly democratic and patriotic government replacing the present autocratic regime, the meeting observed. It called upon all the progressive and democratic forces to unite to unseat the present Government.

GDP Growth Rate of 5.8 Percent Predicted for 1989-90

46001474A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 6 Apr 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Bangladesh is expected to achieve a growth rate of 5.8 percent in its Gross Domestic Products (GDP) at the end of the current fiscal year, an increase of nearly four percent over the last fiscal year.

The increase in GDP was attributed largely to bumper cereal harvest, mainly rice, this year throughout the country. Some 19.5 million tons of foodgrains have been harvested this year after two years of colossal crop damage due to unprecedented floods and drought. Agricultural growth has been estimated at 13 percent, the highest ever in Bangladesh.

Agricultural experts believed that though the rice production this year was by far the highest since the country's liberation, potentials in the sector have not been explored fully. There are a wide range of scopes to sustain the economic growth through considerable agricultural development, they added. The irrigation network should be expanded by taking more areas under it. The total crop area has risen to 11 million hectares but only a small part of it has so far been covered by irrigation.

According to statistics, the total irrigated area was merely 1.44 million hectares in 1980 which rose to 7.3 million in 1987. BADC [Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation] had sold 10,000 low-lift pumps, 2,600 deep tubewells and 8,000 shallow tubewells in the same year, but the demand for more irrigation equipment could not be met as yet.

The Government has claimed to have adopted a liberal credit policy in the agricultural sector simplifying the loan disbursement procedures.

Use of Fertilizer

The use of fertilizer has been doubled over the years. In 1988, the quantity of fertilizer use in the country rose to 1.4 million tons which was apparently rising every year. The experts have observed that there was initial inhibition towards the new methods of cultivation, but once results from modern inputs were proved as beneficial the farmers adapted themselves to the changing methods. About 30.8 percent of Aus, 36.5 percent of transplanted aman and 88 percent of Boro rice belong to the High

Yielding Varieties [HYV]. Besides, 1.5 million tons of wheat, hitherto unknown in fields here, are being produced each year.

The agriculture contribution to the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) is nearly 50 percent. Agriculture accounts for 80 percent of the total national export earnings.

HYV Seeds

The Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI) has released nine high yielding varieties of rice which have boosted the production considerably. BRRI has also discovered 11 high yielding varieties of wheat. The yields from the new varieties exceeded the production from the old varieties by nearly 20 percent, the experts said. Meanwhile, improved varieties of millets, potato, and mustard seeds have been introduced in the fields successfully.

Paradoxically when Bangladesh achieved the highest growth rate this year, the economy slipped out of the rail due to mismanagement in certain sectors. The rising balance of payment gap, budget deficit by about 900 crore Taka and cut in development expenditure reducing it from Tk.5,803 crore to Tk.4,900 crore, caused concern in the economic and trading circle. The macro-economic mismanagement has resulted in price spiral of essential commodities, restrictions on imports and decline in foreign exchange reserves. The Government has taken up austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit.

Bangladesh Bank Reports Drop in Foreign Reserve

46001467A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 7 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves stood at about 500 million U. S. dollars at the end of February, Bangladesh Bank officials said in Dhaka on Tuesday reports BSS.

They said that a huge amount of foreign exchange was spent last year for importing increased volume of consumer goods and construction materials, among other things.

"We have relatively low reserve this time but it is a very temporary phenomenon and there is nothing to be worried", they opined.

The officials told BSS that with the fresh flow of aid soon the situation would change and the reserve would go around last February's level.

The sliding of reserves is not a new phenomenon and, they said, we learnt to live with it when we saw the reserves being dropped to 14 million dollars in 1974.

He attributed the lower reserves figure to mostly higher consumer goods and construction materials imports.

Commercial imports grew at an estimated 43 percent in seven months (July to January), he added.

The official said imports in the seven months stood at 1,422.5 million dollars compared with 994.4 million dollars in the corresponding period in fiscal 1988/89.

He said imports of pulses were estimated during the period at 34.6 million dollars against 4.8 million, cement 49.7 million dollars against 29.4 million, oilseeds 25.2 million dollars against 6.4 million and onion 5.5 million against 1.9 million.

The Bangladesh Bank official said besides, about 38 million dollars worth of same products were in pipeline January.

"I don't find any reason why the the prices of commodities, which remain in huge stocks, have gone high in the market", he said.

He said the decision on Letter of Credit (LC) margin was taken to stop excessive growth in Imports.

The Bangladesh Bank has advised the commercial banks to ask 50 percent margin against LC for imports.

The percentage of the margin has been revised downward from 100 percent after commercial circle made an outcry saying the decision would hurt the country's industrialisation and make consumer goods costlier.

Requirement of 100 percent LC margin is not a new one and the banks had the option to ask for the margin previously, he said adding the Bangladesh Bank in October last year clarified through a circular that banks were free to ask for 100 percent margin in respect of LC which were to be opened under the secondary exchange market scheme.

Paper Reports, Comments on Developments in Economy

Taka Devaluation

46001457A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 6 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] Bangladesh Taka was devalued to the extent of 4.99 percent against U. S. dollar on Monday. The devaluation will result in the rise in valuation of the dollar by Taka 1.61.

A Bangladesh Bank directive sent to all banks and financial institutions on Monday said the middle rate of dollar will now be Taka 33.88 as against Taka 32.27. the rate for the wage earners has also been adjusted with the devaluation. A remitter will now get Taka 34.54 for a U. S. dollar against Taka 32.90.

The Bangladesh Bank announcement ended a long standing speculation over an impending devaluation. There was a mad rush for opening Letters of Credit (LCs) with the banks before the devaluation took its effect. The importers, mostly holding black money and having prior

knowledge about the devaluation, rushed to the bank countries for opening LCs for import of commodities during the last few days.

The financial analysts believe that the decision to devalue the currency was taken on advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF advised the Bangladesh Government that if taka was devalued, the export earnings would get rise and unproductive import sector would be sufficiently discouraged. In fact IMF had pressed for a 15 percent devaluation, according to knowledgeable circles. But the Finance Ministry was reluctant to take such a major step at a time but had made a commitment to complete the process of devaluation by June 30, 1990, it was learnt.

The trends suggest that imports this year are likely to surpass those of last year. This is expected to leave a negative effect on the country's ailing economy.

The foreign currency reserve of Bangladesh is dwindling alarmingly due to widespread opening of LCs. In the first six months of the current fiscal year, LCs for imports to the tune of Taka 6,132 crore were opened which accounted for 73 percent of the total expenditure earmarked for imports. The gap between imports and exports was widening even after the government imposed a 100 percent cash deposit against the value of LCs. The decision was later revised to 50 percent. The rate was only 10 percent earlier.

Chamber's Reaction

UNB adds:—Reacting to the Government step, business community leaders said it would result in price inflation.

"Ours is an import oriented country and by devaluation we are importing inflation" said President of Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry Syed Manzur Elahi.

Elahi told UNB on Monday night that instead of devaluation of the currency the government should have gone for cash subsidy or raised the XPB benefit to the exporters.

He said our imports are four times higher than the exports. Devaluation will cause price inflation affecting the poor consumers.

Dhaka Chamber

Expressing similar views President of Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry Abu Sayeed Mahmood said our exporters will not gain much for devaluation.

"Government should go for drastic cut in import of unnecessaries. We cannot afford import of luxuries", Mahmood said "our foreign exchange reserves came down to all time low, half of the last July's level".

Foreign Exchange Problems

46001457A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 11 Mar 90 pp 1, 10

[Article by Reazuddin Ahmed: "Strain on Foreign Exchange Reserve To Persist"]

[Text] Strains on foreign exchange reserve is likely to persist until Bangladesh signs Enhanced Structural Adjustment facilities (ESAF) agreement with International Monetary Fund (IMF) for disbursement of 100 million U. S. dollars initially.

According to highly placed official sources the negotiation for ESAF will not be concluded before next July when an agreement will be signed for 250 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights) equivalent to 300 million U. S. dollars for the fiscal 1990-91.

The agreement which was due to be signed by the end of last year has been delayed following disagreement between the IMF and Bangladesh Government on certain issues. The World Bank is delaying disbursement of 160 million U. S. dollars energy credit and 175 million U. S. dollars industrial credit for non-fulfillment of their conditions. The financial sector loan amounting to about 175 million U. S. dollars is likely to be released within April as the basic conditions of interest rates adjustment has been fulfilled by Bangladesh Government.

IMF extends ESAF facilities to those countries which can manage the economy well. Some mismanagement surfaced in Bangladesh since November last year when the current expenditure started moving upward with corresponding fall in revenue collection. Although the Finance Minister envisaged about 750 crore take revenue surplus to finance the Annual Development Programme in the budget, the revenue earnings ran into huge deficit which is now estimated at about 900 crore taka. The import has substantially increased without corresponding rise in customs revenue.

The official sources told Bangladesh Observer that the duty adjustment resulted in lower revenue collection which was announced in the last budget to improve the economic activities in the country. The officials, however, admitted that the import was unplanned and there was no sense in allowing import of pulse for an amount of 34 million dollars which was only four million dollars last year. They also suspect that the importers resorted to over-invoicing to transfer foreign exchange to take the advantage of currency depreciation. Besides, according to Fund the Bangladesh currency lost competitiveness as taka remained over-valued for quite sometime.

The IMF and World Bank also noted with concern that the development expenditure had been slashed down and part of the donors' money was spent for meeting the current account deficit.

Expenditure on Food Stock

A source in the Finance Ministry told this correspondent that the revenue expenditure increased due to building up of huge food stock this year apprehending another flood. the revenue deficit in food sector stands at Taka 750 crore which included payment of 600 crore taka for last year's import bill and 150 crore taka for procurement of Aman crop. Besides, there is no off-take from the godowns which resulted in shortage of cash flow. The officials ruled out the allegation that the expenditure rose due to unplanned expenditure in unproductive sector.

IMF and World Bank missions are negotiating with Bangladesh to improve macro economic management for better utilisation of aid money. The Fund is learnt to have been further pressuring Bangladesh to devalue the currency. But the move is being resisted on grounds that currency depreciation increases inflation as the country's economy is import-oriented.

IMF Policy Creating Problems

An official regretted the piecemeal prescription by IMF for higher growth. He said the fund rebounds its policy on certain occasions creating problems for the developing countries. He preferred a 'basic need package prescription' by IMF for stable growth.

The energy sector loan to the tune of 160m dollars has been held up as the World Bank is not happy over reduction of petroleum prices. The Bank has suggested to raise the price of diesel and gas and reduce the system loss. Banks condition also includes readjustment of petroleum price, which according to World Bank, is well below international price. Bangladesh Government reduced the price of petroleum to increase the sale of the product as the Chittagong refinery produces enough surplus. Besides, the enhanced gas price will increase the cost of fertilizer which will act as a deterrent against food self-sufficiency programme. The raising of diesel price will affect the irrigation and public transport system. These are the sensitive areas where fund, World Bank and Bangladesh Government could not come to an agreement as yet.

IDA Clears \$175m Credit

The International Development Association (IDA) is learnt to have cleared the 175 million U. S. dollars industrial credit as the recovery is satisfactory according to a World Bank Dhaka Office source.

After two years of depression Bangladesh is likely to achieve about 6 percent growth rate this year with 13 percent spectacular growth in foodgrain production. Although World Bank is happy over performance in agricultural sector the Bank is worried about the macro level mismanagement in the economy. The project pipeline is about 5.5 billion U. S. dollars and the utilisation

is poor because of the shortage of matching local currency fund. The local currency portion is only 13 percent of the total cost of the aided projects.

Bangladesh Government will apprise visiting World Bank President Barber Conable about the realities of Bangladesh economy. the officials will explain to him the difficulties of fully meeting the IMF conditionalities for concluding ESAF agreement.

Interregional Trade

46001457A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 10 Mar 90 p 5

[Text] SAARC—The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation—came into existence at the initiative of Bangladesh in the year 1985 with the adoption of the Dhaka Declaration. Trade within this region assumes the nature more of bilateral trading than a firm regional policy and has so far varied with each country, but overall trade during the year 1984-85, the year of its birth, was more or less even with exports to SAARC nations at par with imports. During the year under study there was no trade with Bhutan. The main items of export to SAARC countries during that year were hides and skins, textile fibres and paper and paperboard, although chemicals also accounted for a substantial amount. Considering our special interest in this region which is home to about one billion people the majority of whom are poor the need to increase inter-regional trade particularly in view of the rising trend for economic alliances around the globe it may be that soon we may also feel the urgent necessity to align ourselves economically for our communal benefit.

So far SAARC has not succeeded in laying the foundation of a proper economic regional grouping it can confidently present to the world and more the pity, for with the rise of an Asian market almost at our door steps we shall be very amiss if we, as a region forum, fail to evolve fast enough to be able to tap this market for our combined goods. It well may be that only through such alignments we shall be able to prosper. SAARC very much needs to present a strong unified image to the outside world but inner squabbles between member states appear to be having the effect of stabbing ourselves in the back.

For the moment concentration should be on counter-trade between member states for example importing one item from one country and in exchange exporting another separate item to a different country. In this way no actual cash need change hands but a degree of co-ordination would be needed to focus on the requirements of each without being detrimental on each other. If this type of trading can be organised it may be possible to supply most of our essentials within the boundaries of SAARC.

Foreign exchange problems coupled with problems of debt are conditions which create favourable climates for counter-trade and no country within the region of

SAARC is free from that condition. Counter-trade can, wherever necessary, be a vehicle for the servicing and repayment of debt or for building up a cash base for the future financing of some essential item.

Another aspect which can easily be explored by member countries particularly India who is far ahead in the technology than other member states and that is to supply complete plants and equipment under a 'buy-back' system where India for example would purchase goods produced in the plant supplied. This type of deal has worked successfully in Eastern Europe and China and might work well here too. Such exporters often provide the back-up services necessary to assure quality control of the times produced and to make sure the plant runs efficiently.

Although the flowering of SAARC forum is still to come a start could be made for the eventuality. Faced with the formidable spectre of the EEC economic grouping and the North American alliance plus the opening up of the Eastern European countries to free market forces with the added spectre of the Asia-Pacific entity it could be that by the encouragement of an economic group representing SAARC we shall have found the one way to eventual salvation. Considering all the facts increased trading within SAARC and presenting a united face with which to compete in world markets we may yet be able to improve our economic lot.

Paper Reports Problems Concerned With Ganges Flow

'Graver Crisis Coming'

46001459A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 23 Mar 90 pp 1, 12

[Text] A spectre of salinity is stalking country's 11 south-western districts covering an area of nearly 11.5 lakh acres and experts say it has destroyed crops worth more than two crore Taka this year, reports UNB.

Water Development Board (WDB) officials said on Wednesday their records showed a high rate of salinity in 11 south-western districts including Bagerhat, Khuina, Sathkhira, Jessore, Magura and Gopalganj.

They said the intrusion also showed an upward trend moving north towards Jhenidah, Rajbari, Kushtia, Meherpur and Chuadanga districts through 13 rivers of the region.

WDB experts identified dwindled flow of water in the Ganges due to Farakka in dry season besides drought and deforestation as the causes of the increasing hazard of salinity in the area.

According to official records an area of 9,54,880 acres of the coastal region became salty in 1989 alone WDB experts told UNB that the salinity affected land in the region had so far stood at 37,76,000 acres since 1975.

Sources said the salinity took a heavy toll in the agricultural sector of south-western part of the country, which is gradually, turning into a one-crop from being the usual two-crop zone.

They also feared that the northward trend of salinity might substantially reduce the capacity of food production of the region.

Sources said rice worth TK 1.25 crore was damaged in the fields in the current year due to high rate of salinity exceeding 3,500 micro mohs.

Officials, who preferred anonymity, said besides rice, salinity has also hampered production of robi crop, sugarcane, potato and other non- food crops.

Industrial installations in the Khulna Division have also been adversely affected by it.

Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) sources said the increased rate of salinity had posed a serious threat to the Khulna Nesprint Mills, Khulna Hardboard Mills and the Khulna Power Station.

A BCIC official said maintenance and production cost of the Khulna Newsprint Mills had increased for want of sweet water in the adjoining area.

Sweet water is being carried from upstream by barge to the mills which needs 25.10 million gallons of water a day, he said.

A water expert said the rate of salinity in the region recorded the highest 8,200 PPM last year as against the usual 40 PPM in the rainy season.

Salinity in Southwest

46001459A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 5 Apr 90 p 7

[Text] The northern region will have to face a graver water crisis in the peak of the current dry season than last year, predicted experts monitoring the fast falling Ganges flow and simultaneous draw down of ground water level, reports UNB.

Symptoms of desertification are already, visible in all the 21 northern districts with downstream flow of the Ganges falling fast and ground water level also depleting gradually, according to experts at the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB).

The country's largest Ganges-Kobadak irrigation project is threatened with closure as the flow of its feeding sources, the Ganges dwindled to 25,000 cusec down the Farakka Barrage at Hardings Bridge point on the 15th of this month, BWDB sources said.

Only three days before on March 11, the flow was 31,128 cusec.

Velocity of the flow is also abnormally low causing rapid siltation in the river at Hardinge Bridge point and

consequent disruption of ferry services between Paksey and Gheramara, the sources said.

Unprecedented situation in the mouth of the intake channel that feed three main pumps and 12 other subsidiaries forced project authorities this season to spend Taka one lakh everyday for dredging.

The current capacity utilisation was less than 50 percent although the irrigation period had reacted its peak, sources said.

An early shower in late February, however, eased the pressure on the G- K which feeds three-and-a-half lakh acres in five north-western districts during March-April period.

Unilateral Withdrawal

Experts feared the peak mid-April flow might go down to an "all time low". Unilateral withdrawal of the Ganges water was expected to be much more this year to meet India's additional requirements with the commissioning of new water projects in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal, they said.

India has been unilaterally withdrawing the Ganges water since its water sharing agreement with Bangladesh expired in November 1988.

The last dry season flow at the Hardinge Bridge point came down to a record low 15,000 cusec causing an unprecedented water crisis and the collapse of irrigation system in the entire northern region.

BWDB experts also cautioned about further expansion of the salinity range in the rivers of south-western region this season.

"We even, fear intrusion of saline water into the Gorai beside Kushtia town in the upstream Ganges discharge really come down to the predicted level", a water expert at BWDB said.

In last dry season, saline water came up to Kamarkhali ferryghat on the Madhumati badly affecting surface water irrigation in the region and also took a heavy toll on a number of major industries in Khulna.

Further Reportage on Communist Party Activity

General Secretary on Polls

46001466A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 6 Mar 90 p 3

[Text] General Secretary of the CPB [Communist Party of Bangladesh] Saifuddin Ahmed Manik on Monday said his party in participating in upazila elections to build public resistance against vote-piracy and "foil the government's design to perpetuate power". [sentence as published]

"Knowing well that the upazila elections may not be free and fair, we are into it to thwart the government's design

to monopolise the upazila system to perpetuate power and resist vote-piracy", Manik said in Dhaka in an interview with the UNB.

He said his party's participation in the March 14-25 upazila polls does not mean that it has changed its stand of not going to any national level voting under President Hussain Muhammad Ershad.

"It (upazila) is a local body election and it has no bearing on national elections", said the leader of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, a component of the Eight-Party Alliance.

Asked if his party will reverse its stand on national polls if the upazila elections are free and fair, Manik said, "it will depend on the situation at that time".

Manik alleged that the "autocratic regime" is trying to use the upazila system as its power-base.

42d Anniversary Observed

46001466B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 7 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] General Secretary of the Communist Party of Bangladesh [CPB] of failure to plug the loopholes through which money is being funneled out of the Country, reports UNB.

Presiding over a discussion meeting marking the 42nd founding anniversary of the Party, the CPB leader expressed his surprise at the Finance Minister's statement admitting the fact but ignoring the way it was done.

He called upon all socio-political organisations and individuals to unite against "autocracy" and safeguard people's right to food and franchise.

Manik apprehended that the ensuing upazila elections might be marred by Massive riggings in favour of the ruling party-backed candidates and called for resisting any design to perpetuate "autocratic ruled [sentence and punctuation as published].

Had the opposition waged a one-to-one fight the government could be routed from the upazilas, Manik said, criticising the opposition parties for not taking a clear and united stand regarding the upazila polls.

Concern Over Economy

46001466C Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 20 Mar 90 p 10

[Text] The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) Monday expressed deep concern at the state of national economy and said prevailing conditions were affecting all areas of people's life, reports BSS.

The present economic conditions only confirmed fears in different quarters that people's miseries would be on the increase and country suffered most, party leaders told a Press conference. [sentence as published]

Mr Ajay Roy and Mr M. M. Akash of the economic wing of the party, gave a detailed account of the scenario and said they found little possibility that the situation could improve in the near future.

For the first time a yawning gap had been created in the revenue budget not to speak about the development budget and this spoke of the shape of things, they said.

The CPB considered this situation as a logical corollary to the "economic mismanagement and wrong policies", that not only resulted in pushing the poor in to further distress and making the rich more affluent but also retarded national progress.

The party believed that democratic and patriotic forces should discuss how to formulate a broad economic policy that could show upswing in national economy.

The recent devaluation of the Taka had been done to encourage export and discourage imports but there was a lot of loophole in the decision making it was uncertain whether the desired results could be attained. The party said, it suggested cost reduction policy, political stability, policies to increase in productivity etc, to enhance the growth in economy.

IRAN

Four International Exhibits To Be Held in Tehran

90AS0037C Tehran ABRAR in Persian 15 Apr 90 p 3

[Text] In order to advance the goals of the five-year plan for economic, social, and cultural development, from 26-31 Khordad [16-21 June] of this year, four specialized international exhibits will be held in the international exhibits building in Tehran.

According to a report by the public relations office of the center for the development of Iranian exports, these exhibits will be on: oil, natural gas, and petrochemicals; electricity, electronics, and computers; communications, long-distance communications, and transportation; and educational tools and aids.

The public relations office added: So far, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Finland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Holland, and Spain and various companies and establishments have declared their interest in participating in these exhibits, and this number is expected to increase.

Also, from the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ministries of Petroleum; Energy; Roads and Transport; Industries; Education; and Post, Telegraph, and Telephone, in addition to other organizations and centers, such as the organization for national Iranian industries, educational industries, the Martyr Kolehduz computer center of the Guard Corps, the International transport company of the organization for expansion and new construction,

Iranian industries, the Iran Arqam company, and the Iran Dadehpardazi company, will participate in these exhibits.

New Attache to Syria Said Connected With Intelligence

*90P40035C London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
26 Mar 90 p 7*

[Text] Iran has appointed Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Shari'ati, the former deputy interior minister for security affairs and advisor to the intelligence minister, as cultural attache in Damascus in the place of Mohammad Salar, who has decided to return to Tehran soon. AL-DUSTUR has learned that Shari'ati is charged with managing affairs connected with intelligence and security in both Syria and Lebanon.

Italian Company Reportedly To Sell Submarine to Government

*90P40035B London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 26 Mar 90 p 7*

[Text] Iran has decided to buy a used submarine from the Italian Barzini Company. This company is concerned with buying used American and European submarines and converting them to submarines for tourist entertainment. According to AL-DUSTUR's sources, Iran will pay four million dollars for an American submarine which was built before World War II.

Commercial Relations With USSR Expanding

*90AS0011M London KEYHAN
in Persian 15 Mar 90 p 6*

[Text] A Soviet economic delegation which had traveled to Tehran to participate in the 12th session of the Permanent Commission for Economic Cooperation between the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union left Iran after conducting economic and trade discussion with officials of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. The dispatched Soviet delegation was headed by Konarev, minister of roads of the Soviet Union, and the Iranian delegation participating in these negotiations was headed by Mohsen Nurbakhsh, the minister of economic affairs and finance of the Islamic Republic.

According to dispatches received from Tehran, the participants in the sessions of the Permanent Commission for Economic Cooperations between the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union discussed and exchanged views on matters of mutual interest such as completion of the Esfahan steel mill, the export of natural gas to the Soviet Union, and also the method of cooperation of Russian experts in implementing the five-year plan's reconstruction projects.

In the first session of this commission, Mohsen Nurbakhsh, the minister of economic affairs and finance of the Islamic Republic, said: "As a friend and a neighbor and considering the Islamic Republic's standards, the Soviet

Union enjoys a special priority for cooperation in the five-year plan's reconstruction projects." He pointed out the cooperations between the two sides in regard to sea transportation and especially last year's crossing of the Iranian ship "Iran Bashir" through Soviet waters. He said: "The Islamic Republic is keen on establishing a joint shipping line to be equipped by ships purchased at reasonable prices from the Soviet Union.

The minister of economic affairs and finance of the Islamic Republic told the participants in the sessions of the said commission: "We hope that with the cooperation of the Soviet Union construction of the Mashhad-Sarakhs-Tajan rail line can be completed expeditiously." In a news report from Tehran it is indicated that by the beginning of October of the current year the Soviet Union will sign the final agreement for the completion of Esfahan's 1.9 million ton capacity steel mill.

With the resumption of natural gas exports to the Soviet Union within the next two months, the Islamic Republic will be able to annually import considerable amounts of goods and agricultural and industrial machinery from that country. According to the agreement recently signed for the export of natural gas to the Soviet Union, in return for the natural gas, this country will sell goods and industrial machinery to Iran and Soviet engineers, technicians, and experts will be dispatched to assist the Islamic Republic in implementation of some of the reconstruction and industrial projects.

According to the FINANCIAL TIMES of London, in addition to assisting Iranian experts in the areas of steel mill and electrical power plants, the Soviet Union intends to participate in the Tehran Metro Project and the expansion of domestic rail lines which are presently under way with the participation of foreign companies.

IRI Second Largest Buyer of Canada's Wheat

90AS0041G London KEYHAN in Persian 19 Apr 90 p 4

[Text] Last year the Islamic Republic became the second largest buyer of wheat produced in Canada.

The level of wheat sales by Canadians to the Islamic Republic in the current agricultural year will be about 10 times that of the year 1988-89, and based on the statistics published by the Canadian Wheat Commission, currently, the Islamic Republic is the largest purchaser of Canadian wheat in the world after China.

An analysis of the official statistics published by the Canadian Wheat Commission shows that in the last six months (from September 1989 to the end of February this year) the Islamic Republic has purchased a total of 1.2 million tons of wheat from Canada. The newspaper KEYHAN of Tehran—which published the above statistics in a recent issue—wrote in part of its report that wheat purchased by the Islamic Republic from Canada in the same six months in 1988 did not exceed 110,000 tons. A comparison of the two above figures shows that

the Islamic Republic has increased its wheat purchases from Canada 11-fold in this one year.

Demonstrations Reported in Kordestan, Esfahan, Khorasan

90P40035A London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 12 Mar 90 p 4

[Text] In spite of the fact that the Iranian leadership has imposed absolute secrecy on news connected with the demonstrations hostile to the regime which continued all last week in the provinces of Kordestan, Orumiyyeh, Esfahan, and Khorasan, and in a number of regions of the Iranian capital, Tehran, reports of these demonstrations have been leaked by foreign news agencies and Iranian visitors who have arrived in European capitals during the last month. AL-DUSTUR has learned that there was a demonstration at the beginning of the week in the city of Esfahan where the demonstrators burned pictures of Khomeyni, Khamene'i, and Rafsanjani, and raised a picture of Montazeri. According to AL-DUSTUR's sources, the regime has cut off direct international telephone communications with foreign countries. It is considered to indicate confirmation of the fears of the regime's leadership about the effect of internal disturbances on the decision by some Western countries, primarily America, to repair their relations with Tehran.

On a different note, the Iranian opposition last week staged large processions in front of Iranian embassies abroad to announce their solidarity with the demonstrators in Iran. In London, a large crowd of Iranians gathered on Tuesday evening in front of the Iranian interests section, criticized the repressive practices of the Iranian regime against the demonstrators, condemned the silence of the West toward these practices, and demanded the establishment of a democratic regime in Iran which respects the sovereignty and legitimate rights of the people.

Potato Price Declines in Ahvaz

90AS0037I Tehran ABRAR in Persian 15 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by ABRAR correspondent in Ahvaz]

[Text] After the potato hoarders realized that the potatoes in their warehouses were rotting, they put them on the market, and now the price of this item has decreased in Ahvaz from more than 60 toman per kilo to 30 toman.

But the market did not allow this decrease in price to threaten their interests, as tomatoes immediately replaced potatoes.

Now the price has increased so much that low-income people have boycotted tomatoes.

Ordinary people are getting used to having to use either potatoes or tomatoes in their food. It appears that fate will not allow them to use both items at the same time.

The people of Ahvaz say: Our revolutionary patience requires us to tolerate all the problems and shortages. But is it right for the market to decide every day to raise some price without anyone preventing it?

Gas Coupon for Pickup Trucks Announced

90AS0037H Tehran ABRAR in Persian 15 Apr 90 p 1

[Text] Rations for gasoline coupon Number 365 for pickup trucks with white and red plates were announced at 30 liters for 15 days of use.

According to the public relations office of the national company for the distribution of oil products, the above-mentioned coupon will be valid from 27/1/69 through 1/3/69 [16 April-22 May 1990].

Gas, Oil Coupons for Vehicles Announced

90AS0025H Tehran ABRAR in Persian 29 Mar 90 p 7

[Text] Blue colored gas coupon Number 127 for large automobiles with 30-liter gas tanks and green colored gas coupon Number 160 for small automobiles with 20-liter gas tanks have been duly assigned.

According to a report by the public relations office of the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, the above-stated coupons will be valid from 10/1/1369 until the end of the day 11/3/1369 [30 March 1990-1 June 1990].

Similarly, gas coupon Number 377 for small pick-up trucks, each for 30 liters of gas for a period of 15 days, were duly assigned. The aforementioned coupons will be valid from 12/1/1369 until the end of 11/2/1369 [1 April 1990-1 May 1990]. The public relations office of the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company announced: Oil coupon Number 57 for pick-up trucks and coupon Number five for taxi-cabs, each for four liters of oil for one month, have been assigned. These coupons will be valid from 12/1/1369 until the end of the day 7/3/1369 [1 April 1990 until 28 May 1990].

On the other hand, blue colored oil coupon Number 125 for large automobiles for six liters, and green colored oil coupon Number 164 for small automobiles for four liters, and oil coupon Number three for motorcycles each for one liter of oil for a period of two months, have been duly assigned for such vehicles. These coupons will be valid from 12/1/1369 until the end of the day 8/4/1369 [1 April 1990-29 June 1990].

Suggestion To Improve Distribution of Coupon Goods

90AS0037G Tehran ABRAR in Persian 16 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Employee Gholamhoseyn Taheri]

[Text] After a long wait, at last, several coupon numbers for employees and workers were announced, and I was happy that finally we would be able to buy some (even if

an insignificant) part of our basic needs for the New Year. I went to the cooperative store of the ministry. However, I faced a line that was even longer than the rice lines (for which the coupons are announced once every few months). We were stuck with several coupons from the third, fourth, and fifth phases (which had just been given to us). The announced rations were for oil, rice, sugar, and butter. The fourth phase was the meat and powder ration, and the third phase was for such items as shampoo and toothpaste.

After taking our place in line, we were advancing little by little when they announced that the meat and oil rations were finished. We waited a little longer (about an hour) when they announced that rice and butter were also finished. In short, when it was my turn and that of those behind me, they said that they only had sugar and toothpaste left. Probably when it was the turn of my colleagues, who were standing behind me, these few items were also finished. In any case, I went to the cooperative many times, and each time, after waiting one or two hours, unfortunately, I was able to get only one item, and sometimes I returned home empty-handed.

Considering the time constraints on the employees who go to the cooperatives (because the hours the cooperatives operate coincide with the office hours) and the low capacity of the cooperatives for receiving the needed rations of the employees, and in order to prevent long lines in such stores and the waste of time of so much manpower, and considering the conditions of those who go to such places (employees and workers), with concern for the condition of the elderly (the retired) and ladies with babies in their arms, I request of the related officials that they issue instructions that, firstly, rationed goods for employees and workers be announced sooner and, secondly, that these items be distributed through stores, supermarkets, and even small grocery stores in the neighborhoods along with the rationed goods for the economic mobilization. When it is announced, for example, that a particular coupon number for economic mobilization is for 450 grams of oil per person, it can also be announced that coupons with a particular number for employees and workers of a particular phase can receive their ration of oil from the same small grocery store, supermarket, or store.

Such a procedure would be very beneficial, as I am sure the officials are aware, [for the following reasons]:

1. The cooperatives, with their limited capacity, would not be crowded.
2. The traffic resulting from clients (with coupons) stopping at particular stores would be reduced.
3. Time would be saved. (An employee can go to his neighborhood grocery store rather than the special cooperative store and save a great deal of distance and time.)
4. After two hours have been wasted, they would not then announce that the food items are finished.

5. Employees would go to work on time rather than being in the cooperatives, in addition to many other positive results that I will not mention here.

God willing, the officials (particularly the economic mobilization headquarters and the headquarters for the offering of foodstuff and the needs of employees and workers) will pay attention.

Extension of Chicken Coupons Announced

90AS0025G Tehran ABRAR in Persian 18 Mar 90 p 8

[Text] The urban coupons Number 442 from the eight series, pertaining to principal protein products, each batch consisting of 48 coupons—for 700 grams of chicken each, have been considered for distribution among four-member and five-member families who are residents of Tehran Province. These coupons will be valid from 26/12/68 [17 March 1990].

According to a report by the public relations office of the State Economic Mobilization Staff, the aforementioned coupons for one-member to five-member families will be valid until 26/4/69 [25 June 1990] and the shop owners or other merchants who are the recipients of such coupons will be allowed to turn in their coupons to one of the branches of Saderat Bank until 27 July 1990 and obtain proper bank receipt.

The Period for Returning Chicken Coupon Number 435 has been Extended:

The urban coupon Number 435 from the eight series, pertaining to principal protein products, each batch consisting of 48 coupons, have been considered for distribution among Tehran Province residents, each for 700 grams of chicken.

According to a report by the public relations office of the State Economic Mobilization Staff for afore-stated coupons for one-member to five-member families will be valid until 22/1/69 [10 April 1990] and the shop owners or other merchants who are recipients of such coupons will be allowed to turn in their coupons to one of the branches of Saderat Bank until 22/1/69 [10 April 1990] and get a proper bank receipt.

Bushehr Province Port Income Increases

90AS0037F Tehran ABRAR in Persian 16 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with general manager of customs of Bushehr Province by IRNA; date and place not specified]

[Text] More than 66,000 tons of goods valued at 2.3 billion rials were exported through the customs of Bushehr Province last year.

The general manager of the customs of Bushehr Province announced this statement in an interview with IRNA and said: These goods increased in terms of value by 263 percent and in terms of weight by 53 percent compared to the previous year.

He added: During this period, more than 1,000,621,000 tons of goods valued at 54 billion rials have also passed through customs, which marks a decrease of more than 81 percent compared to the previous year.

He added: The major export items last year consisted of green caraway seeds, pistachios, coriander seeds, various kinds of construction stone, confections, lemon juice, and rose water.

Also, the imported goods included wheat, rice, chemical fertilizers, iron ware and raw materials for factories. The general manager of the customs of Bushehr Province added: The general revenues of this customs office in 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] amounted to more than 10 billion rials, which marks an increase of 225 percent compared to the previous year.

In conclusion, he said: At the present, the customs offices of the Ports of Bushehr, Gonaveh, Deylam, Rignegan, Khark Island, Delvaz, Deyr, Bolkehr, and 'Aslaviyeh are active. Of course, in Gonaveh, because of the dredging operations in the entry and exit canals, only low-tonnage vessels are able to load and unload.

Shortage of Medical Doctors, Specialists Noted

90AS0037D Tehran ABRAR in Persian 15 Apr 90 p 6

[Interviews with rural patients who had come to the Khatam al-Anbia' hospital in Zahedan and with Dr. Sobhkhiz, deputy director for health and treatment of the health, treatment, and medical education organization of the Province of Sistan and Baluchestan, by IRNA; date and place not specified]

[Text] Most hospitals in Sistan va Baluchestan Province are either only partially operational or closed due to the lack of general surgeons and operating room and anesthesia technicians and specialists.

According to a report by IRNA, with the exception of the hospitals in the city of Zahedan, the rest of the hospitals, including the 25-bed hospital of Zahak in Shahraki and Naru'i District of Zabol, with a population of more than 60,000 people, are closed and only general practitioners and a small health and treatment center are in operation.

The hospitals of Zabol, Khash, Iranshahr, and Saravan at the present time lack orthopedists; eye, ear, nose and throat specialists; gynecologists and obstetricians as well as anesthesiologists and operating-room technicians. In addition, two newly-built 25-bed hospitals in the cities of Kenark and Nikshahr in Baluchestan have not opened due to the lack of physicians and specialists.

This report indicates: The only 50-bed hospital of Zahedan, due to the number of patients that come from various cities of the province, cannot respond to the needs of the people, who have to wait their turn for days behind the doors of the hospital. In addition, most rural patients who need surgery refuse to be hospitalized, due to the high cost of treatment, and hence have to return to

their village in pain and suffering. In an interview with IRNA, several rural patients who had come to the Khatam al-Anbia' hospital in Zahedan for treatment expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of necessary treatment facilities, especially specialists, in other cities of the province: We villagers, who don't even have bread to eat and cannot afford the bus fare from the village to the city, how can we pay the tremendous costs of treatment in the hospitals? An old villager who had just arrived, tired and sunburnt, showed his calloused hands and said pleading: For God's sake, tell the officials to come to the aid of us, the poor and oppressed. I am not even able to buy a small pill. How can I pay for hospital costs and an operation? I and those like me have to leave themselves to their fate and return home untreated.

Dr. Sobhkhiz, deputy director for health and treatment of the health, treatment, and medical education organization of the Province of Sistan va Baluchestan, said in an interview in regard to treatment resources and the existing problems: At the present, 13 hospitals with 200 beds are operational throughout this province, of which 50 percent are in the city of Zahedan and the rest in the cities of Zabol, Khash, Iranshahr, Saravan, and Chahbahar.

He added: We face many problems in trying to provide physicians and specialized cadre for all the hospitals throughout the province. In this regard, so far, no positive steps have been taken by the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education. We request that the officials resolve the problem of the oppressed people of this region as soon as possible.

He said: The medical and specialized cadre of the hospitals of Sistan va Baluchestan were previously provided through the one-month physicians plan. Unfortunately, with the abolition of this plan by the Council of Guardians, this province has faced a great problem, such that most hospitals have now stopped functioning.

He added: The people's expectations are justifiable, and in areas where hospitals have been built, hospital treatment resources must also be offered. At the present, in areas such as Zehak, we do not have such resources.

Mentioning another problem, the high cost of hospitals, he pointed out: Because of the poverty of the people of this province, they are unable to pay the hospital treatment costs, and in this connection the government must make some fundamental decisions.

In conclusion, we asked the officials of the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education to take steps to put the hospitals into operation again and also to open the two new 25-bed hospitals in Nikshahr and Kenarak, the construction of which has been completed, as well as to provide physicians and specialized cadre and permits to employ service cadre in the province.

Ahmad Khomeyni on Solving Problems of Society

90AS0037A Tehran ABRAR in Persian
16 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] News service.

The representative of the vali-ye faqih [supreme jurisconsult] in the Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution, accompanied by the president and the vice presidents of this foundation, met with Hojjat ol-Eslam Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni yesterday afternoon. In this meeting, first Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Rasuli presented a detailed report on the activities of the Housing Foundation.

Then Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni, while expressing his appreciation for the services of the representative of the vali-ye faqih in the Housing Foundation and thanking him for the activities of that foundation in the area of building housing for the oppressed, said: Today, with 10 years of experience, the foundation can be useful in all areas, in the reconstruction of the country, in economic affairs, and especially in the housing construction sector.

Criticizing the temporary and unsystematic handling of cultural and social problems, the memento of the imam said: After 10 years of experience, we should have learned how to confront the problems, both the economic and social problems and the cultural and political ones. We must not deal with problems in such a way as to suggest that we have no program. For example, every once in a while the Hezbollah nation, upset with the problems of improper veiling or unveiling, engages in protests and actions which are followed by judicial, executive, and legislative authorities making speeches and strongly attacking those who have engaged in improper veiling or unveiling. But the issue ends without any results, and no clear program is offered to resolve this problem.

On another day, everyone is mobilized against radio and television, saying radio and television are spreading Western ideas and broadcasting obscene movies. Everyone just says this, makes speeches, and then it all ends. Is this the way to do it? Or should we not improve the programs, identify the problems, and propose plans?

Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni continued:

The officials of the Voice and Vision must be asked to organize round-table seminars concerning the problems of the radio and television programs at which they can be asked the reason for showing certain films and why they are repeated, so that they can explain the problems and clarify the hardships they face. Then we can judge them or ask them for better programs. In other words, general and vague attacks do not solve any problems.

In another part of his speech, he said: Recently, the issue of economic disruptions has been raised. Suddenly, we all cry out that leech-like capitalists should be executed,

the hoarders must be destroyed because they are the causes of poverty, and that if their warehouses were auctioned off a few times the problem would be resolved, and offer other such analyses, articles, and speeches. But can economic problems be resolved by executing a few hoarders? Can the economic situation be improved with lashes and threats?

The problem is lack of a precise economic system. Production solves the problem of demand, and the government must make a fundamental decision about production, a decision that will not change as the result of speeches and a policy that high political minds will not shake and various opinions will not alter.

Referring to the economic policies of the government, Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni said: For the policies of Mr. Hashemi to achieve results will take at least two or three years. Without a strong policy and until this tree has blossomed, executions, beatings, and whippings can neither put veils on those who do not veil nor make the poor rich and the rich poor. It will only punish a number of people who deserve to be punished for their filthy actions, which is what it should be and what we all agree to.

Today, no Muslim wishes to see improper veiling in the society. But the issue is, how should the person who veils improperly be dealt with in order to achieve the desired results? The purpose is desirable results. Today, no revolutionary Muslim can be found who does not suffer as a result of hoarding. But hoarding is itself the result of the economic ailment of a society that has not been able to overcome its economic problems. Today, no Muslim can be found who would not suffer upon seeing a non-educational or evil-teaching film. But the issue is that we should not keep our distance from the fire. If we all join hands and sincerely, without any egotism or self love, work for our people, the same people whom our beloved imam considered his authority, we may be able to make some changes in the economic situation within the next three or four years.

In another part of his speech, Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni considered the policies, planning, and movement towards the determined policies and adherence to the principles and correct policies in all areas including foreign policy vital to and the secret of success and said:

In foreign policy, as well, the situation is that we must have planning. The experts must take on the difficult task of clarifying thoughtfully and unemotionally, for instance, how we should deal with the sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. When we have achieved such a desirable result, the domestic and foreign policy problems must not then force us to deviate from the principles that have been determined. This does not at all mean that we must give up the principles that our beloved imam had outlined. But being steadfast in policy is the main requirement for success in all areas.

New International Airport Project Progress Report 90AS0011N Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] Laying the foundation of the north runway of the Seventh of Tir International Airport is under way and by Ordibehesht [21 April-21 May] of next year its initial paving will be completed. With a credit of between five to six billion tomans a township with 6,000 housing units will be built near this airport.

At the present time, accommodations have been made for the participation of the national banking system in projects such as construction of the township, hotel, shop, parking, warehouse, and cold storage at the airport. Also, the creation of a public corporation is planned to absorb the investment funds of the private sector and the public at large for utilization in the said projects.

Dr. Seyyed Gholamreza Shirazian, the Executive Director of the Seventh of Tir International Airport project, and Dr. 'Ali Khoda'i, the Deputy for Engineering Programs of this project, revealed this information in an interview with KEYHAN.

In this interview, Dr. Shirazian stated that the cost of construction of the Seventh of Tir International Airport at the Saveh road will be about 14 billion tomans and said: About 15,000 hectares of land in this area have been purchased and several consulting companies have been contracted for providing architectural design, HVAC [heating, ventilating, and air conditioning], facilities, green space, accounting, and other services. Recently two contracts totaling about 1.2 billion tomans have been awarded to two Iranian contractors, and the implementation phase has begun for the construction of a runway and taxiways in the northern section of the airport, 10 bridges within the interior of the project grounds and two overpass bridges over the Saveh-Qom Expressway.

He then stated the following as the special characteristics of the Seventh of Tir International Airport: Providing services for Tehran and the industrial townships of Arak and Saveh, solving flight problems and difficulties at Mehrabad Airport, expansion of air transport, conducting solely passenger flights, design of a metro system inside the project, and its proximity to the Imam [Khomeyni] shrine. He stated: Due to the special affection of world Moslems to His Holiness the Imam, the government has approved plans for the construction of a road for the purpose of connecting the Seventh of Tir International Airport to the holy shrine of His Holiness the Imam. It has also been decided that foreign passengers can visit the Imam's shrine by way of the transit road without any visa requirements.

In this interview Dr. Khoda'i indicated that the first phase of the Seventh of Tir International Airport will be ready for service in the year 74 [21 March 1995-20 March 1996] and said: This airport will have two 45 meter wide north-south runways of 4,200 meters long,

two terminals for domestic and international flights each with an area of 130,000 square meters and buildings for support facilities, cargo and hangers with a total area of 600,000 square meters which will be adequate for handling eight million passengers annually. The decision has been made to utilize this new airport for flights of over one hour. Flights of less than one hour will be initiated and terminated at Mehrabad Airport.

PAKISTAN

Sindh: Action Urged, Not 'Statements'

90AS0024B Karachi AMN in Urdu 27 Mar 90 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] Sindh Chief Minister Shaban Mirani has stated clearly that we are political people and the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] is also a political force and contacts between political institutions and personalities are never broken. The government believes in talks and is keen for talks with the MQM so as to eliminate any political and social problems. Sindh belongs to all of us, and if the conditions here continue to deteriorate, all of us stand to lose. We want to resolve the political problems on a political level.

On the other hand, the MQM leader, Altaf Hassain, has said that we support the rights of Sindh and, in Punjab, we have raised our voice for the rights of Sindh, before millions of people and the national leaders. The Sindhis are our brethren. Because we are citizens of Sindh, we will continue to struggle for the rights of Sindh as well as for national unity and the country's integrity. He called upon the poor and patriotic Sindhi people, particularly Sindhi intellectuals, journalists, and politicians to come and give a hand. Try to understand us and do not buy into the negative and one-sided propaganda against us. We are not the enemies of Sindh. Our doors and hearts are open to Sindhis.

The question is that when the elected chief minister of Sindh considers the MQM a political force and also believes in contacts and talks with it, and the MQM leader, Altaf Hassain, is also a supporter and champion of the rights of Sindh and the Sindhi people, who are the people or elements who do not support contacts and talks between the two parties, when the worsening situation in Hyderabad demands that to control it the city's political and social leaders, along with the administration, should join to bring the situation under control as soon as possible because, according to the chief minister of Sindh, the situation in Hyderabad has nothing to do with politics. This is the action of purely criminal minded people, and according to him the government will deal firmly with these elements.

In our opinion, the time for statements has passed. In this regard, statements have been issued before. The "iron hand" of the former chief minister of Sindh, Qaim 'Ali Shah, has become a joke in private parties. The

situation in Sindh has now gotten so bad that even the chief minister of Baluchistan, Akbar Bugti, is inciting and tempting industrialists to set up industries in Baluchistan on a large scale, by arguing that the conditions in Karachi and internal Sindh are not congenial and that, in Baluchistan, both the money and life of industrialists will be safe. If the conditions in Karachi, Hyderabad, and internal Sindh remain as they are, one cannot rule out the possibility that native and foreign capitalists and industrialists will prefer to set up industries in Baluchistan instead of Sindh, as a result of which employment opportunities in Sindh will diminish and the income of Sindh will also suffer.

These conditions dictate that law and order in Sindh should be ensured and incidents of intimidation, dacoity, and kidnapping should be checked. Severe action should be taken against persons responsible for such criminal activities and the people who patronize them, directly or indirectly, however influential they may be and whichever political party they may be connected with. Unfortunately, in Sindh, a major hindrance in the way of restoring law and order has been that here, certain influential vaderas and landlords have, on the one hand, been providing direct or indirect patronage to dacoits and robbers, and, on the other hand, by obtaining nominations from influential political parties, they enter assemblies and there they use their influence to protect criminals from the arm of the law. The result is, as Altaf Hassain observed, that a two percent minority, consisting of vaderas, landlords, capitalists, and bureaucrats, controls the country's authority and administration, and the 98 percent of the masses are being ground in the mill of oppression. This practice is common in the four provinces of the country—Punjab, Sindh, the Frontier, and Baluchistan, somewhere less, somewhere more. In Sindh, vaderas, landlords, and bureaucrats are especially very powerful. Genuine democracy cannot be established in this country as long as the country's 98 percent poor majority does not have control over the country's authority and administration.

Since the Peoples Party is the country's biggest political party, it has its representation in every racial, linguistic, and religious grouping in all the four provinces. It is also a party of the country's poor masses, workers, middle and lower middle class, and it has come to power through the votes of these very people, and similarly, the MQM is also a representative party of the poor masses, workers, and middle and lower middle class. Both parties believe in the establishment and strengthening of genuine democracy in the country. Thus both of them are philosophically akin parties. It is another matter that certain politicians, oblivious of consequences, have made these philosophically akin parties into rivals. Meanwhile, as a consequence of the statements of the chief minister of Sindh and the MQM leader, Altaf Hassain, prospects of contacts and fruitful talks between the two parties have brightened. Under these conditions, it would not be wrong to hope that by taking advantage of this opportunity without wasting any time, Sindh will

be made the house of peace. However, what is needed is for the leaders of both parties to refrain from charging each other with patronizing those who levy allegations and commit intimidation.

Sindhi Politician Hamida Khoro Interviewed

90AS0013A Rawalpindi NAWA-I-WAQT
in Urdu 16 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Hamida Khoro, Sindhi politician; by Ataur Rahman; in Lahore on 29 Feb 90; on Sindh situation, separatism; first paragraph is introduction.]

[Text] Dr. Hamida Khoro belongs to a very distinguished Sindhi family. Her late father, Ayub Khoro, was the first chief minister of Sindh after the establishment of Pakistan. In the decade after the 30's, he led a very successful war for the separation of Sindh from Bombay. Shahnawaz Bhutto, the late grandfather of prime minister Bernazir Bhutto, was Mr. Khoro's rival. In 1937, there was a memorable contest between the two over the election of the seat for Larkhana, in which Ayub Khoro came out with flying colors and Shahnawaz went into the background. Twenty-three years after the establishment of Pakistan the situation and conditions had changed so much that in 1970, not only in Sindh but in the whole of West Pakistan, the son of Shahnawaz Bhutto acquired authority and power and the political influence of the Khoro family diminished considerably. Hamida Khoro was studying at Oxford University for a Ph.D. on the history of Sindh. Upon returning to her homeland, she became involved in the teaching profession at Karachi University. During Zulfikar 'Ali Bhutto's regime she was removed from there. Later, she got a job at Sindh University, and during the regime of the late Ziaul Haq she became a member of the Sindh University Grant Commission. In 1983, after the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy], she left the University and in 1984 she made her debut into the political arena and joined the "Jiye Sindh" movement. It was then that she made the acquaintance of high ranking Sindhi personalities. In 1988 she joined the Sindh National Alliance, formed under the leadership of G. M. Syed, and these days she is the vice-chairperson of this Alliance. Dr. Hamida Khoro has written and compiled a number of books on the history of Sindh. These books were published by the Oxford University Press. Among these books, "Sindh Through History" is of special significance. Hamida Khoro enjoys a unique position in the galaxy of our politicians because she happens to be a scholar, an intellectual, and a practical politician all at one time. Her personality in Sindh is that of an intermediary between elements of the extremist disposition and supporters of a federation with Pakistan. She is a renowned member of a Mehran Valley family, which during the past 50 years defeated the Bhutto family in elections as well as was defeated by them. Dr. Khoro had come to Lahore on 28 February to attend a Peace Conference under the auspices of NAWA-I-WAQT. A day later, I interviewed her on the political situation of

Sindh. My questions and Dr. Hamida Khoro's replies are being given here for the attention of the NAWA-I-WAQT readers.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] The very first question that comes to one's mind while considering the situation in Sindh is that, despite the restoration of democracy and democratic government, why are the people shouting slogans of "Sindhudesh" given welcome. This question is important also from the point of view that despite the imposition of martial law whenever the Sindhi speaking people got the opportunity to go to the polls, especially after One Unit in 1970 and after a lengthy period of martial law, they voted for the party which openly supported a federation with Pakistan, whereas in the speeches given during meetings and processions and public demonstrations the impression created was that in the interior of Sindh the separatist movement is on the rise. Will you please explain this inconsistency?

[Khoro] In Sindh there never was a separatist movement of the kind that started in East Pakistan. The geopolitical situation in Sindh is quite different from that in East Pakistan. Separatism is something quite remote. The slogan-shouters of the supporters of confederation did not achieve any success worth mentioning. We were in the forefront of the Pakistan movement. My father worked very tirelessly and very successfully to rid Sindh of the economic and social domination of the Hindus. The dispute that arose between my father as the first chief minister of Sindh and the central government was of an administrative nature. My father wanted Karachi to be the capital of Sindh province as well as of Pakistan at the same time, whereas the views of the officials of the central government differed from those of my father. This led to my father's removal from Office. But we never once thought of seceding from Pakistan. The movement that started in Sindh after this was that against One Unit, but this movement too was directed against the special arrangement, never in favor of secessions. General elections were held in 1970. In 1971 the country was divided into two parts. In 1972 G. M. Syed, taking advantage of the political situation and the special kinds of emotional and psychological conditions in Sindh, started the slogans of "Sindhudesh". Really speaking even at this time no one was seriously planning secession. The slogan-shouters of Sindhudesh thought that by doing so they could achieve maximum autonomy. Then in 1977 martial law was imposed and the execution of Mr. Bhutto was carried out. This in turn strengthened the emotions of secessionist elements, but because of all this the separatist could not become a big and effective power to be reckoned with. In 1983, the MRD started in full force. In the interior of Sindh it was welcomed with open arms, but this movement too ended after two to three months. The impression of the people of Sindh was that unless the people of other provinces come out openly no clear-cut success can be achieved.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] The reason this movement was not started in Punjab was that the very next day after this

movement was started Mrs. Indira Gandhi issued statements supporting this movement. The people thought that any movement which the Indian government supports can never be in the best interest of Pakistan. What was the reaction of the people of Sindh with regard to this statement?

[Khoro] This statement causes the people of Sindh to be frightened to some extent. They were suspicious that this outside force may be behind this movement for achieving their own interests. Frankly the people of Sindh, despite their anxieties about the protection of their linguistic and cultural identity, did not ever think of seceding from Pakistan and joining India or become a province under its domination, or that Indian soldiers ever cross the borders and enter Sindh for their sake. All these actions did not go further than raising slogans. Or at the most, you may say that the political parties of Sindh used these slogans as a barking counter. The people of Sindh have always demanded equal political rights for themselves, in this respect they are very sensitive and will continue to struggle for these rights.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] After the movement of 1988 you ended your academic career and entered the arena of practical politics. What were the reasons that were responsible for taking such an action?

[Khoro] After the failure of the 1983 movement, I strongly felt that to reinstate the political rights of the Sindhis, whatever can be done must be done by remaining within the framework of Pakistan and by convincing the Sindhi leaders of the need to do so. I believed that G. M. Syed was a prominent leader of the Sindhis, and that if somehow he could be convinced to make demands for the Sindhis by remaining within the framework of Pakistan the efforts made would prove successful. This is my family background. I have worked on the history and culture of Sindh, and as such I believe that I should fulfill my mission.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] Did you contact G. M. Syed?

[Khoro] Yes, I met him and held lengthy discussions with him. I tried hard to convince him that much can be achieved by remaining within the framework of Pakistan. In my opinion, the establishment of Sindhudesh and the possibility of its remaining as an independent state is practically impossible. Secondly, the Bangladesh experience too has made the Sindhi intellectuals more realistic. As such, I believed that if G. M. Syed could be made to understand this point then our task would become much easier. One basic obstacle or conflict that exists between Sindh and Punjab or let us say between Sindh and the center would have been overcome. G. M. Syed's reply was that he had come a long way on the Sindhudesh issue and that it was impossible for him to turn back. He told me to go ahead and work on these lines and that he will not raise obstacles in my way. I became a member of the working committee of "Jiye Sindh" and I established contacts with other influential

politicians. Then somehow G. M. Syed met with president Ziaul Haq. G. M. Syed was very much impressed by the character of the late Ziaul Haq. Perhaps President Ziaul Haq was the first Pakistani ruler who created a soft spot in G. M. Syed's heart and its effects started to be felt.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] What were those effects, because G. M Syed said that if Ziaul Haq is a good person then he would undo Pakistan.

[Khoru] He always talked in this fashion but the fact is that a change began to appear in his thinking. I worked quite a lot on him. the pleasant effects of the meeting with Ziaul Haq brought about softness in his heart. We were gradually coming to the joint conclusion that any permanent work for protecting the rights of the Sindhis could only be accomplished by remaining within the framework of Pakistan. G. M. Syed never openly admitted this. In his statements he had gone so far that it was practically impossible for him to turn back. He had reached so to say a point of no return in his approach towards "Sindhudesh." But a gradual change could be seen in his thinking. So much so that in May of 1988 when besides the leadership of the People's Party, several of the high ranking Sindhi personalities rallied to hold a conference in his village. He said during the course of a speech that even though he supported Sindhudesh he believed that a solution can be worked out by remaining within the framework of Pakistan. Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto, during his speech, proposed that Sindhis should demand a confederation instead of freedom. But his proposal too was rejected and it was decided to support the inclusion of MRD's four point plan for provincial autonomy in the 1972 constitution. All these proceedings were published in the national newspapers. At the end of the conference, the Sindh National Alliance was formed. In my view this conference is a milestone in the history of Sindh and Pakistan. During this conference the Sindhi leaders expressed their views that Sindh and Pakistan are inseparable. But after this meeting we did not get the opportunity to approach the people and work with them openly. Two and a half months later the Bahawalpur tragedy occurred and three months thereafter general elections were held and the whole nation passed through an emotional crises. The People's Party came into being as the single representative party of the people of Sindh and has eleven years of struggle to its credit and here we are just embarking on this mission, because of which we could not come up as a parallel organization that has deep roots in Sindh and at the same time supports a federation with Pakistan which are most essential.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] But now you have plenty of time till the next elections. Are you and your organization actively working towards this goal?

[Khoru] Yes. I believe that if we were to keep on working at this rate then by the next elections we should achieve satisfactory success.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] If mid-term elections were held do you think you will be able to win some seats?

[Khoru] Yes, certainly.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] How many approximately?

[Khoru] Approximately 10 seats in the National Assembly

[NAWA-I-WAQT] Do you think there is any other party in Sindh with which you could form an alliance and which also shares your views about Pakistan?

[Khoru] In my view, the Muslim League is such a party in Sindh which has these possibilities but which is the victim of administrative shortcomings. Maintaining party discipline has always been a big problem with this party and this is why it has been faced with political failures. But in the interior of Sindh the Muslim League is still popular. If the Muslim League leadership were to be well organized, then we could enter into an alliance with this party.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] Has there been any progress in this direction because if this could be accomplished then a very big alternative force could emerge.

[Khoru] Until now the discussions have not proceeded beyond the initial exploratory level and we are still dwelling in the realm of possibilities.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] In Pakistan provincial autonomy has always been a constitutional and political issue. There has never been a national consensus on this question, and it was on this issue that the country was divided into two parts. Today, whenever discussion is held on Sindh it invariably is deadlocked on the provincial issue. Punjab has always been considered as an obstacle in the way of provincial autonomy. But now in the field of action a new event has emerged and because of this event a solution of this problem can be seen. In the history of Pakistan for the first time now there are two opposing governments, in the center and in Punjab. This situation has given rise to an atmosphere of conflict. But at the same time a positive aspect of the situation can also be seen. Some actions of the Punjab government have proved that by remaining within the present Constitution if one acts with courage and authority then practical provincial autonomy can be achieved. Practically speaking, there is room for this in the Constitution. This can give rise to the thinking in small provinces that provincial autonomy can be achieved by the acting of Constitutional guarantees and remaining loyal to Pakistani ideology, not by merely putting forward new demands and or raising slogans of confederation?

[Khoru] But this has been made possible because Punjab is the largest and the most powerful province.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] But because of this, some new aspects have come before us. If any provincial government so

desires, then by remaining within the bounds of provincial autonomy provided by the present constitution can take advantage.

[Khorro] Yes some new aspects have come before us and there should be some positive effects too.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] Let us now talk about another influential force, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement—National Muhajir Front]. Do you think that Sindh has already become a bilingual province?

[Khorro] Practically speaking this is what the present situation is all about. Urdu should be the language of communication on the national level and Sindhi should be used as the official regional language which has never been the case so far. Really speaking in Sindh besides Urdu speaking people there are people speaking other languages like Memon, Kachchi, and Gujrati which are close to Sindhi and as such they do not influence the demographical situation in Sindh. So much so that the present generation of Punjabi settlers are teaching the Sindhi language in the Sindh University. But the Urdu speaking people could not come close to Sindhi language and culture, which has been the root cause of all the problems.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] But in the initial stages of the progress of MQM, it appeared that G. M. Syed was very pleased with the progress of the movement and from reports published in the newspapers MQM had the blessings of Syed.

[Khorro] The MQM did not have the blessings of G. M. Syed, but he did not object to it.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] But what about the meeting that Altaf Hussain had with G. M. Syed and which became so famous?

[Khorro] Yes the meeting did certainly take place, but it was at Jinnah Hospital where G. M. Syed was under treatment. First Sawar A'wan came to see him and then Altaf Hussain. The reporters pounced upon this piece and capitalized on it.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] What about the meeting at Sun?

[Khorro] No meeting took place at Sun. It was just a rumor. The fact is that MQM has a lot of influence on the Karachi press. When Altaf Hussain met with G. M. Syed it was called a very big success for MQM, and when a treaty was signed with the People's Party, the MQM was delighted and the impression was one of victory. And now when an agreement was reached with IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad—Islamic Democratic Alliance] the occasion was celebrated with festivities.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] But you have to create an atmosphere of understanding with the Urdu speaking people.

[Khorro] Yes. Let us see how things turn out.

[NAWA-I-WAQT] The Kashmir movement is at its height. You know very well that this region is of vital importance to Pakistan. Especially in Lahore, the people think that in Sindh there is not much enthusiasm over the Kashmir issue similar to the demonstrations seen in Punjab. Irrespective of Pakistan's stand, even if we look at it purely from an economic stand point, the rivers that water the farms of Sindh and Punjab originate in the Kashmir valley. If Kashmir joins Pakistan or it gets independence from India, then Sindh can benefit from its economic advantages as much as Punjab. Then after all what is the reason for there being a lack of enthusiasm in Sindh over the Kashmir issue?

[Khorro] There never is a different thinking in Sindh over the Kashmir issue compared with Punjab. Never was there any difference in the past nor is there any difference at the present time. During the first Kashmiri war of liberation, my father was the chief minister of Sindh. He had sent people to purchase arms from Europe on his own account. Just hold on and I will show documented proof (she showed me the photo-copy of a document in English which she gave me. This contained some memorandum about a person Ayun Khorro had sent to Europe for this purpose.) After this, in the 1965 war the people of Sindh were not behind anyone. But after 1971, you know for yourself the whole situation had changed. The whole country had become the victim of indifference towards Kashmir. Sindh too had become indifferent. Now the people of Kashmir have risen on their own to fight the war of independence. We fully sympathize with them and our sentiments are with them. On 5 February, a general strike was declared to express unanimity with the Kashmiri people's war of liberation and all business in the towns of the interior of Sindh came to a standstill. Articles were also published on this subject in the Sindhi language papers.

Government Said Shedding Crocodile Tears Over Kashmir

90AS0032A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Apr 90 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] All the world is fully aware of the facts about the Kashmiri people's movement for freedom, and the foreign news media has given testimony that the determination of the people of Kashmir has defeated Indian aggression. Kashmir is practically under cruel and despotic martial law. Six lakh [600,000] Indian soldiers stationed in Kashmir are perpetrating every kind of despotism and cruelty imaginable against the people who are being victimized like the birds. Brutal Indian soldiers have gone so far as to abuse the women in Kashmir, for which they had separate protests, and everyone in Kashmir is determined to achieve freedom. But the question that arises is how long can the people of Kashmir fight for their freedom all by themselves. When will the conscience of the democratic people awaken. When the Afghan people declared Jihad [holy war] against the Soviet forces, all the Muslim countries,

Europe, and the United States were ready to support them. At least they all gave them their moral support. Even at that time, India sided with the Soviet Union and helped the puppet government of Afghanistan. Despite all of this, the Afghan Jihad had the support of many countries. Whatever Pakistan did for them became history. As for Kashmir, the world has come to know the facts. But what is most surprising is that no country made any effort to help it. The only country to take a strong position in support of Kashmir has been Iran. The rest of the world, except for saying that India and Pakistan should resolve their differences with the help of the Simla Agreement, are keeping quiet even though there is a strong wave of freedom throughout the world. This wave of freedom has given a serious blow to the rigid and despotic systems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. We should have taken advantage of this opportune moment to represent the freedom and self-determination of the people of Kashmir in the country of nations in a much more effective manner, but our attitude has been one of formality and custom. The world can never be impressed by such formal methods. Instead, we should be resorting to startling and revolutionized tactics and expressing our unanimity in a concrete and solid manner. If we cannot do anything, we can at least protest and ask the Indian Ambassador to leave the country. This way the world would know that we are serious, and secondly we would save ourselves from being guilty in our own eyes. At this time the situation is such that, despite its committing endless atrocities against the Kashmiris, we are doing business as usual with India and its atrocities have not affected our relations with them one bit, but on the contrary negotiations are proceeding to widen our relations much more. If for the sake of the Kashmiris we cannot recall our ambassador to India and ask the Indian ambassador to leave Islamabad, then our support and sympathies for the Kashmiris is far from real. When we are not prepared to take a simple and practical step, how can we expect the world to take decisive steps. In order to arouse the conscience of the world and bring it into action, first of all we will have to take a very big step forward which will prove to the world the importance we place on this issue. Under the circumstances, the least we can do is to break diplomatic relations with India. If we cannot do this, it is no use shedding crocodile tears.

Naming Train After Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Criticized
90AS0032B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 2 Apr 90 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] Very strange things are taking place these days. Buildings, trains, and other institutions are being named after a person who has never been a national hero, who has never accomplished any great performance, and who was never applauded by a majority of the people of this country. But what actually happened is that the person concerned was convicted by the supreme court of this country as a criminal and was hanged. But just because the daughter of this controversial person has become the

prime minister of this country, it is not correct and in any way proper to name everything of our dear motherland after her father. The respected prime minister by so doing is creating a negative reaction towards her party. The people usually make fun of such actions. But perhaps their feelings and emotions do not reach the people dwelling in the huge mansions. But the people in their servitude create an impression that the people are very pleased by their decisions everywhere, but this is not the case. The people keep a very close watch over the rulers. They are alarmed whenever they see the husband of the prime minister welcoming foreign delegations, and he is compared with the husband of Margaret Thatcher, who is never seen during official functions. But now preparations are underway to celebrate the anniversary of the former prime minister, the father of the prime minister, on an official scale. The federal cabinet has no other work but to hold meetings to consider the ways and means for this anniversary. If this process continues, then bills will be forwarded in the national assembly in order to make preparations for birthdays and anniversaries, for naming buildings, trains, institutions, settlements, streets, and roads after the family members of the prime minister. Now the name of Tezrao train has been changed to Zulfiqar Express. Its route and directions have been changed. After the Shahnawaz Bhutto Express, the government is now thinking of running the Zulfiqar Express, and after that the Murtaza Bhutto, Sanam, or Nusrat Bhutto passenger train. No one should have any objections, because in this way perhaps the people will have greater travelling facilities. But as far as the naming is concerned, it is a strange thing that names are changed in every period. Tomorrow if a new government is formed, then the names will be changed again. Whatever it may be—buildings or something else. It deserves consideration that where was the need for making changes in a train which was already running. Then again the new coaches that have been added to the Zulfiqar train are heavier, and on the routes on which they are being run, the railway lines are not suitable for heavier trains. These lines are the same ones installed in 1947 and there have been no changes since then. These lines could be uprooted at a moment's notice. The new coaches were built for Tezgam, Tezrao, and Khyber Mail. Then it must also be stated that the route on which the Zulfiqar is being run has never been a profit making one. Very few people travel on this route, especially these days when trains are being attacked and there are few travellers and more losses.

Increase in Gasoline, Diesel Prices Protested

90AS0035B Lahore SIYASI LOG in Urdu 6 Apr 90 p 5

[Editorial: "What Is This Punishment For?"]

[Text] The Benazir Government has increased the price of gasoline, diesel, kerosene oil, and chemical fertilizers from 10 to 15 percent overnight, according to some well-planned conspiracy and without any discussion. This is the third time that the price of these items has

been increased since the establishment of this government 15 months ago. The price of electricity and natural gas also has been increased thrice. It is unfortunate that the Benazir Cabinet made this decision when the National Assembly and the Senate were both in session. She did not give the Parliament members an opportunity to discuss this issue.

Everyone knows that the excuse of the increase in oil prices in the international market is a white lie. Actually, prices have decreased since this government was established. Earlier, the government had explained that these price increases were made, despite the rate decrease in the international market, to pay off our debts to other countries.

This decision, which hurt the common people, was made by a government which has been mercilessly abusing the national treasury in the areas of energy and production for the last 15 months. Every person in the nation is aware of the way in which the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] government squandered money blindly on electricity and natural gas when it was trying to win voters in various state and national assembly by-elections. Billions of rupees were spent in making electricity and natural gas available to the subdivisions which were not ready to receive these utilities and nobody had expressed any need for these. Natural gas connections were issued without any application or charge to the PPP supporters in Area 99 of Lahore. What is more? These people were given free two-burner gas stoves!

After wasting the national wealth recklessly just to win some assembly seats, this government is punishing the poor people in the whole country with increases in the price of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and chemical fertilizers. Why this punishment? Their only "crime" could be that the PPP had to face embarrassing defeats in these by-elections, despite using all kinds of political ploys.

In a democratic country, this price increase three months before the budget for the next year is presented to the National Assembly is nothing more than a conspiracy and deceitful act. Last time, they had increased the prices after the budget was passed. The prime minister and her associates had given the impression that no increased burden was put on the people. They are trying to fool us again by increasing prices three months before the budget is presented, so that the finance minister can announce at the time of the budget hearing that the government is not increasing prices!

If this government still claims to be the benefactor of the poor, after committing such trickery in the name of democracy, it should not fool itself by believing that the people will continue to be fooled by it. The Benazir government should understand that the system it has started to loot the national treasury will prove the end of its tenure. This government will be brought to justice by the people soon, and then it will have to answer to its dishonesty, fraud, and extreme actions.

Commentary: President Answerable for Government Corruption

90AS0027A Lahore SIYASI LOG
in Urdu 22-28 Mar 90 p 5

[Editorial]

[Text] Speaking at the foundation stone laying ceremony of the All Pakistan Newspapers Society building in Karachi, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan called upon the newspapers, among other things, to ask governments what calamity will befall if organizations like the National Finance Commission and the Common Cause Council are permitted to function? Drawing the newspapers' attention to their responsibilities, the President said, "Ask them if the Public Works Program has become a matter of dispute, why aren't the authority and jurisdiction of the federal and provincial governments settled according to the Constitution?"

Referring to the destruction and vandalism of national resources, the President of the Nation said.

You too have been saying that the curse of corruption, bribery, and recommendation has paralyzed the administrative structure, and you have also been asking how long will national resources and government favors continue to be exploited for the sake of political favoritism, instead of being distributed fairly, and how long will political influence continue to be exploited for personal gain?

We welcome President Ghulam Ishaq's blunt remarks. Undoubtedly, other newspapers have also contributed, but as far as the SIYASI LOG organization is concerned, every issue of this paper, and every page of every issue, and every line of every page, and the readers will vouch for it that, since the start of our publication to the present day, we have raised these issues and we have inquired from every politician, leader of every party and every government, what is going on after all and why?

We have repeatedly taken courage to submit to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan himself that, after all, you are the guardian of the Constitution of Pakistan and that, under the Constitution, you are so responsible for the country's administration and that everything is done in your name and you have the authority to return for reconsideration the decisions of the government and law-making assemblies if you are not satisfied with their soundness, purity of motives, and consequences, how is it that you are tolerating all these things and how long will you continue to tolerate?

The sympathetic manner in which the nation's president has now expressed his sorrow over corruption, bribery, and reckless vandalism of the national resources for the sake of political connections and present gain—let us remind him in this regard that we have raised our voice at every step and we have pointed out how, by secretly accepting kickbacks running into millions of rupees or

rather dollars from foreign transactions involving Pakistan's various official departments, people from the ruling family and the ruling party have done double damage to the national treasury.

Readers of the SIYASI LOG are witness that we have exposed cases of fraud and kickbacks in the purchase of airplanes for the PIA [Pakistan International Airlines], in the export of Pakistani rice, in the purchase of manufactured satellites, in the purchase of other equipment for the PIA, in telecommunication system transactions, in the sale of the PIA hotel in New York, and other similar transactions.

It is not necessary for any newspaper to write or point out the manner in which, in the name of the People's Program, the huge amount of three billion rupees is being gobbled up among the ruling party and its workers and the workers appointed in the name of this program. Two provincial governments of the country are raising hue and cry over it, and they are repeatedly drawing the attention of not only the government that is perpetrating this plunder but also the nation's president toward it.

There are several facets of bribery and corruption to which attention has not been drawn. The reckless manner in which plots are being distributed and bought and sold in order to reward political allies and to fill the coffers of self-serving and profiteering people and the manner in which the elements developing and distributing these plots are enriching themselves. What has not been published in the newspapers is that the prime minister herself forced the Islamabad Development Authority to carve out nine big plots in a special area earmarked for an educational institution and later these plots were given as bribes to the People's Party members of the national assembly.

Mr. President! The newspapers have done a lot and they are doing a lot. We can vouch for ourselves that we have described fraud, corruption, and this rape of the national resources by name and number, but what has been the good of it? Is there any office, any person, any personality, any ruler, any judge, who may take notice of these matters and thus call these robbers to account and ask them why they are doing this?

The president has rightly remarked that like "Watergate" and "the Bofors Scandal", newspapers should themselves take up the responsibility of investigative reporting of these issues. But Mr. President, please inform us, what has been the effect of such efforts on anybody in this country. Did anyone take notice of these matters? In this country there is a high court and a supreme court, there is a chief justice, and there is President Ghulam Ishaq Khan himself, who has full powers under the Constitution, to take effective action in any matter and at any time. So how is it that no notice was taken of the fraud unearthed as a result of the newspapers' investigative reporting?

The president remarked very correctly: "Angels will not descend from heaven to eradicate these evils."

Mr. President! We have already posed this question to members of parliament, judges of the superior courts, chiefs of the armed services, and your own good self, and today, once again, we return this question to Ishaq Khan, president of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and ask whether angels will descend from the heaven to eradicate these evils?

Commentary: Tax Thievery Impedes Progress

*90AS0024A Rawalpindi NAWA-I-WAQT
in Urdu 21 Mar 90 p 3*

[Editorial]

[Text] The federal finance secretary, A. R. Akhona, has said that, in the next budget, consideration is being given to withdrawing tax exemptions from limited sectors, but the danger is that this could open up endless possibilities of tax thievery. The finance secretary further said that, if the Pakistani nation wants to free itself of foreign debt, the influential and the rich classes will have to pay their taxes honestly. Once tax fraud is eliminated, the nation can free itself from the World Bank and the IMF. The secretary's remarks point to the situation which is casting its dark shadow on the tax business. Talking on a wider and broader plane, our tax system is basically the source of all the evils. Tax laws are so strict and unrealistic that everybody looks for ways to avoid paying taxes while tax collectors, adopting a "foreign mentality" attitude, mete out to the industrialists such a treatment as is not even accorded to criminals in religious societies. This strictness could be defended if it were in the interest of the department. But, in fact, its object is to strengthen one's position in the matter of haggling with the victim. The tax system has been overrun by so much corruption that only a nominal portion goes to the official treasury, while the major part goes into the pockets of tax collectors, and the lion's share remains with the tax thief. On the face of it, everywhere in Pakistan you see a splendor of wealth, but the national exchequer remains in poor shape. Unfortunately, no one has the time to look into its causes. Dr. Mahboob Alhaq is the only finance minister in the history of Pakistani finance who, very courageously, started a campaign against tax dodging and, describing tax thieves as national criminals, announced severe penalties for them. The doctor also threatened that if the tax dodged is not deposited within a specified period, a list of these black sheep will be published in the newspapers. Charging these people with "sucking the blood of the nation," the doctor also threatened them with sentences like imprisonment with hard labor, but Dr. Mahboob could not implement any of his threats. It is possible that he was paralyzed by the long arms of tax dodgers but, subsequent to this, the popularly elected government also could not spare any attention to it. Therefore the plunder continues unabated. Anyone who gets in the grip of the tax department is made to go through hell. Those who have vowed not to pay any taxes live happily on account of the complicity of the tax people. The big industrialists have started buying farming land, in order to save on taxes. Therefore, the

industrialists' demand for imposition of agricultural tax is also getting muffled. Agriculturists were already against this tax. The Punjab assembly has even passed a resolution against this tax. The prime minister owns huge ancestral lands. The opposition leader and her real political opponent, the chief minister of Punjab, is, on the one hand, under pressure from members of the assembly, and on the other hand, he is also trying to become as big a landlord as he is an industrialist. Therefore, he too cannot be expected to raise his voice in favor of agricultural tax. Between them, these people have left the treasury empty. Dr. Mahboob Alhaq used to claim that taxes worth 70 billion are being stolen and Air Marshal Asghar Khan used to back him, but it did not have the slightest effect on the concerned government departments. What remains finally is the salaried class that is caught in the vice of taxes. Salaries are not keeping pace with the rate of inflation in the country. On top of it, government corruption, allotment of plots, buying and selling of members of the assembly, expenditure of millions in elections, and earnings from illegal transactions in heroin and Kalashnikovs, have taken the form of a parallel economy and this has broken the back of the salaried class. On top of it, the burden of taxes is becoming unbearable. What is needed is an overhauling of the entire tax system and the creation of such a system which, while being practicable and realistic, may also be in a position to end corruption in the country. This corruption is not justified either on the grounds of Islamic principles, nor does it go well with Western liberal and free moral values. If Pakistan is to enter the 21st century as an advanced Islamic state, we will have to fulfill the dictates of an advanced era and we will have to fulfill, at all costs, the responsibilities that the state imposes on the individual and the citizen. Pakistan has had to suffer heavy losses in every sphere, and commendable progress has not been made on the road to national progress. At least, while observing the golden jubilee of the Pakistan Resolution, we should vow that we will not repeat our shortcomings and that we will adopt a responsible attitude in every walk of life. There is nothing new in the information that the federal secretary has provided to the country. Who is unaware of it? He should not stop at this. Rather, he is duty bound to plug the holes of tax thievery. Merely running a commentary won't be enough.

Commentary Views 'Misery' of Landless Peasants in Sindh

90AS0035A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 2 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by A. H. Khanzada: "Problems of Sindhi Peasants Being Ignored"]

[Text] It appears that the whole Sindh state is being ill treated. Over 80 percent of Sindh's population is made up of farmers, especially those who work the land themselves. They are facing problems from all sides. Sindh's farmers are suffering badly and the greatest hurdle in the efforts to solve their problems are Sindh's landlords. A farmer tills the land with his sweat and buys

the seeds with his own hard earned money. He suffers in summer and winter and irrigates the land. When the harvest is ready, he reaps and winnows it. However, he is never able to make both ends meet as he has to pay the landlord's debt and interest to the moneylender. The poor farmer remains poor and the rich people, who live on his hard work, become richer.

The greatest problem Sindh's farmers face is their landlords. They cannot communicate or associate with them as their equals. One can see the farmer addressing the landowners in a very humble fashion with his hands clasped in prayer. Anyone who challenges the rules made by these "land gods" either becomes a Ghulam Mohammad Khokhar or takes the character of Parochandu. Notorious robbers like Karotheber and Abbas Khaskheli were farmers once. They raised their voices against the traditional persecution and were sent to jail by the police controlled by the landlords. They became what they are now because of this system. We are not justifying their being robbers here because these robbers cause problems for the farmers along with the landlords. These robbers actually have helped to strengthen the landlords indirectly.

The main reason why a poor Sindhi farmer's son is deprived of education is the fear that once educated, he will not stay there to serve the landlords of the area. A farmer's pregnant wife suffers from labor pain because the hospital might be miles away. The landlord's car might have room for his dogs, but would not accommodate the farmer's wife even in such a painful condition. A poor farmer's son is programmed early in life to make sure he does not become a successful member of the society. He is used as cowherd or a domestic servant. The farmers have become immune to considering this oppression as unjust. Most of the landlords make sure that no young farmer joins military service as the whole family comes under the protection of the army once a youth has enlisted. Therefore, the landlords keep the farmer's sons from joining the army by various means. To get their minds away from military service, they are told lies about the abuse they have to suffer from Punjabi sergeants.

Sindhi farmers have to give up their share of the harvest in paying loans and interests. This is the same system that was practiced by the Hindu moneylenders with the Sindhi Muslim farmers before the establishment of Pakistan. The whole crop used to go into the payment of interest and the principle would still remain the same. The account would remain open and the loan would continue to increase for generations. This system is still being practiced by the Sindhi landlords and Hindu moneylenders. You will find at least one moneylender in every Sindhi village and town who after loaning a small amount of money to farmers takes away all their income year after year. Then, these farmers have to pay the loan taken from the landlord for various reasons. The farmers are usually happy at harvest time as they hope to pay off part of their loans. They have to borrow more to live on. Neither the Sindhi Hari Sangat [Sindhi Farmers Union]

nor the so-called heralds of social equality can do anything about the problems of Sindhi farmers. The landlords who had promised food, clothes, and a house in the name of agricultural reforms did not solve this problem. The late president of Pakistan, with his rhetoric of an Islamic government, did not do anything either. The prime minister, who was educated in British universities and who only recently was losing weight, worries about the problems of the farmers and laborers but has not done anything to help them. The farmer in Sindh has problems. When he goes to irrigate his land, he is accosted by robbers to feed them or be killed. The farmers feed these robbers at gun point, and after these robbers have returned to their hide-outs, the police surrounds the villages. Whole villages, including women, are driven like animals to the police stations where they are kept in custody until they pay bribes for their freedom. A farmer would live in fear even in his own house if he refused to feed the robbers. He would not be able to go out to irrigate his fields, to drive away the birds eating the ready crops, or to weed. The poor farmer of Sindh is helplessly caught between these robbers in uniform and in civilians clothes. They go to the landlords for protection, even though they are already tired of being used by them.

Another problem the farmers of Sindh have is that the landlords get government loans worth millions of rupees for improving the lot of the farmers. The farmers, however, never benefit from these loans. The landlords benefit from all the government schemes started to help the farmers. This helps the landlord enjoy a more luxurious life, but the farmers continue to suffer as before. There is no program for teaching our farmers new agricultural methods. I have seen nicely built offices and homes for field officers and field assistants working for

the Department of Agriculture, but have not observed any positive result from their appointments. What can these officials teach the farmers about new technology when they themselves are totally ignorant? They might advise the farmers to use the chemicals meant to kill cotton pests for diseased wheat. This would neither make the what grow better nor change the farmer's fate. He will suffer losses and would not bet his livelihood on their advice again. It is imperative that we take advantage of the new graduates of the agricultural colleges and also help the traditional farmers develop faith in the new agricultural technology. Thus, the solution to all of the problems of the Sindhi farmer is that he should be educated enough not to fall prey to the landlord's schemes and increase his and the nation's wealth by utilizing new agricultural technology. The government of Sindh has to work with the farmers if it wants to solve their problems. It is stupid to hope that the farmers' problems will be solved by giving cabinet-level positions to the landlords. We will learn about a lot of irregularities if we check on how much taxes the farmers paid as compared to the landlords during the tenure of Mr. Sitar Bachani as revenue minister. Not only the farmers, but other people also had to join their hands in prayer and touch his feet first when talking to Mr. Makhdum Rafiq, the first agricultural minister. Improving the lot of the farmers, efficient administration of agriculture, and increasing agricultural production were all illusory goals. There will be no increase in agricultural production until the farmers learn new technology, and they will not learn new technology until they are educated. We cannot solve the farmers' problems until we educate them. The heartless landlords are the major hurdle in improving the farmer's social, economic, cultural, educational, and morale problems. Sindh and the farmers of its golden land will not prosper until the policy of protecting the landlords is eliminated.

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