



JPRS Report

East Europe

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20 June 1991

NOTICE TO READERS: Henceforth, the JPRS East Europe report will no longer be published with political, military, economic, and social divisions. Material previously published under these categories will be ordered under country divisions.

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Poll Reveals Differences Between Sofia, Provinces
91P20367A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
3 Jun 91 p 3

[Report by Yordan Venedikov and Ivaylo Parchev on the results of polls conducted in the period 17-19 May: "Political Opinion Poll in Sofia and in the Countryside—New Data"]

[Text] The survey of public opinion on politics that we carried out in cooperation with the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights (partially published in PANORAMA on 27 April 1991 and in DEMOKRATSIYA on 29 April) received a fairly large and complicated response from the public. Some colleagues expressed doubts about its representativeness (see DEBATI, 7 May). For this reason, we welcomed the suggestion of the Association for us to make an even better survey, this time only in Sofia.

The questionnaire was almost the same as in the first poll. Six questions of marginal significance were replaced by new, more timely, ones—for example, attitudes toward the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] deputies who left the Grand National Assembly and Mariya Luisa's visit. The new questions were added at the end of the questionnaire so that they would not influence the answers to the other questions.

The polling was done in the period 17-19 May by volunteers from the association. Their work was impeded by the poor quality of the address lists, from which we had derived samples. We received these lists from the same research center and data for the entire country, but for another time and occasion. It appears that they were written over another, older magnetic tape. Because the

pollsters were forbidden to replace people who could not be found with other individuals, in the final figures, 538 persons, or about 45 percent of the expected survey population, were polled (in the previous poll, two-thirds from the original sample were surveyed, as is customary in our country). This, of course, is very unfortunate, but it is unlikely to be a source of serious systematic error inasmuch as the people are not missing—they did not wish to fill out the questionnaires. Only 43 persons refused to participate; this represents 3 percent of the planned sample as opposed to 6 percent for the previous survey. By the same token, the percentage of people not found at a given address rose from 3 percent in the earlier survey to 17 percent, and invalid addresses increased from 2 to 5 percent. Those who were absent (visiting friends, out in the countryside, on business trips, and so forth) in both surveys totaled about 16-17 percent of the planned sample.

Below we present the complete results of the poll. The questions are given in the same wording, sequence, and presentation as they were seen by the individuals being polled. To the right of each response are three percentage figures. The first percentage is from the new poll (538 persons from 143 locations within Sofia); the second is from our previous poll, but covers only Sofia residents (168 persons from 17 locations); and the third represents the results for the entire country from the previous survey (1,118 persons from 126 locations). A comparison between the first and second percentages gives an idea about the reproducibility of our results, and the juxtaposition of the second and third percentages indicates the differences between Sofia and the country as a whole.

1. Who bears the primary responsibility for the economic situation in which Bulgaria finds itself today? (Please choose only one answer.)

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
The political system, established after 9 September 1944	57	58	45
The leadership, directed by Todor Zhivkov (until 1989)	32	33	36
The one-party government of Andrey Lukanov	4	3	4
The present government of Dimitur Popov	2	1	6
No opinion	5	5	9

2. Today Bulgaria has to pay a large foreign debt. What do you think led to this?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
This is the result of a deteriorating financial condition of the country over the course of many years	81	10	10
This is the result of the financial policy of Andrey Lukanov's government	12	6	11
This is the result of the financial policy of the current government of Dimitur Popov	1	1	5
No opinion	6	4	9

3. Which government can lead Bulgaria out of the crisis in which it finds itself?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
The present government of Dimitur Popov	8	10	10
An SDS government	20	20	22
A BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government	4	2	7

3. Which government can lead Bulgaria out of the crisis in which it finds itself? (Continued)

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
A government led by another party	4	5	5
A government led by a united opposition against the BSP	34	34	23
A coalition government of the BSP and the opposition	24	23	21
No opinion	6	6	12

4. Do you question the certainty that the crisis in which the country finds itself will be surmounted?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
I do not think we are in a crisis	1	2	2
Yes, that can occur soon	16	16	17
The crisis will not be surmounted soon	70	70	67
No, I expect that the crisis will intensify	13	11	14

5. Do you believe that, if the system of one-party leadership of the BKP [Bulgarian Communist Party] (BSP) before 10 November 1989 had regenerated itself, the situation of the country would be better?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
The situation would be better	6	10	14
The situation would be worse	80	77	64
No opinion	14	13	22

6. What is your attitude toward the development of economic activity, especially private ownership, in our country?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
It should develop broadly	73	77	59
It should develop within limits	22	19	25
It is not necessary	1	2	6
It should be banned	1	1	3
No opinion	3	1	6

7. Do you approve of the Law to Return Land from the TKZS [Labor Cooperative Farm] to its owners?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	83	89	70
No	12	8	24
No opinion	5	3	5

8. If you had the opportunity (monetary loan, land, etc.), would you like to become a private agricultural entrepreneur?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	35	44	44
No	54	51	49
No opinion	11	5	7

9. Would you agree to go to work in a private enterprise (company, factory, farm, etc.)?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	69	78	59
No	24	19	35
No opinion	7	4	6

10. If suitable conditions were created for you, would you become a private entrepreneur (of a factory, workshop, farm, etc.)?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	67	71	61
No	26	24	33
No opinion	7	5	6

11. In which of the following politicians do you have the greatest confidence? (Choose only one answer.)

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Viktor Vulkov	3	2	5
Gin'o Ganev	10	14	10
Petur Dertliev	10	11	15
Zhelyu Zhelev	44	44	30
Aleksandur Lilov	4	1	3
Andrey Lukanov	12	10	13
Petur Mladenov	1	1	1
Dimitur Popov	9	3	7
No opinion	9	16	16

12. In which of the following do you have the least confidence? (Choose only one answer.)

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Viktor Vulkov	6	2	3
Gin'o Ganev	2	2	1
Petur Dertliev	6	6	7
Zhelyu Zhelev	8	8	11
Aleksandur Lilov	25	27	23
Andrey Lukanov	36	32	36
Petur Mladenov	3	5	6
Dimitur Popov	2	2	4
No opinion	12	16	9

13. What is your assessment of the activity of the following?

	Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
A. The Grand National Assembly	Good	[illegible]	7	8
	Satisfactory	49	49	47
	Poor	[illegible]	40	39
	No opinion		4	6
B. President Zhelyu Zhelev	Good	54	53	48
	Satisfactory	34	31	32
	Poor	8	12	11
	No opinion	4	4	9
C. The Government of Dimitur Popov	Good	42	40	36
	Satisfactory	44	45	42
	Poor	9	9	13
	No opinion	5	6	9

13. What is your assessment of the activity of the following? (Continued)

	Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
D. The BKP leadership up to 10 November 1989 (headed by Todor Zhivkov)	Good	6	2	9
	Satisfactory	9	13	10
	Poor	80	79	73
	No opinion	5	6	8

14. Do you think that, as president, Dr. Zhelev should more frequently report honestly to the people on the country's situation?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	88	91	87
No	8	6	6
No opinion	4	3	7

15. Do you think that the president should personally meet more frequently with people from different parts of the country?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	85	86	89
No	9	8	7
No opinion	6	6	4

16. In your opinion, how should the president be elected—by the Grand National Assembly or by all of the people through general elections?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
By the Grand National Assembly	9	14	12
Through general elections	89	84	85
No opinion	2	2	3

17. Should Bulgaria have a strong president, with broad powers, or should his powers be limited?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
It is necessary for the president to have broad powers	52	47	49
The president should have limited powers	41	46	41
No opinion	7	7	10

18. Elections are pending. Do you believe that they will be completely free and independent?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	24	28	28
I am not sure	61	60	60
No	12	9	9
No opinion	3	2	3

[Note: Second column figures do not total 100.]

19. If the elections were held today, for which political group would you vote?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
For the BSP	18	12	18
For the SDS	52	51	36
For the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]	5	6	10
For the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms]	2	1	7
For another party (write in which one, if you wish)	5	2	3

19. If the elections were held today, for which political group would you vote? (Continued)

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Undecided	11	13	14
I would not vote	7	15	11

[Note: Last column figures do not total 100.]

20. For which political group did you vote in the last elections for the Grand National Assembly?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
For the BZNS	6	7	13
For the BSP	28	24	33
For the SDS	57	58	42
For the DPS	1	1	6
For another party	3	2	2
For an independent candidate	2	3	2
I did not vote in the elections	2	5	3

[Note: First and last column figures do not total 100.]

21. Will you be voting for the same political group in the approaching elections?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	67	66	64
Undecided	18	17	21
No	13	13	12
I did not vote in the last elections	2	4	3

22. In your opinion, were the last elections for the Grand National Assembly completely free and democratic?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	67	66	64
I am not sure	18	17	21
No	13	13	12
No opinion	2	4	3

23. Recently, Mariya Luisa visited Bulgaria. Do you approve of the visit?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
I approve	64	—	—
Undecided	24	—	—
I disapprove	8	—	—
No opinion	4	—	—

24. What impression did Mariya Luisa make on you?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
A good impression	71	—	—
A poor impression	2	—	—
I feel indifferent	19	—	—
I had no impression	4	—	—

[Note: Figures do not total 100.]

25. What do you think about the return of Simeon II as czar of Bulgaria?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
I approve	37	31	28
I am indifferent	9	13	18
I do not approve	41	43	34
No opinion	13	14	20

[Note: Figures in second column do not total 100.]

26. Do you think it is possible for Bulgaria to become a monarchy again?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	24	18	17
No	54	66	56
I do not know	22	16	27

27. Recently, the Supreme Council of the BSP issued a declaration about the historical responsibility of the party. Are you satisfied with that declaration?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes, completely	13	13	12
No, the BSP's responsibility is far greater	63	64	49
No, the BSP's responsibility is far less	4	2	3
The BSP has no responsibility; the declaration is worthless	3	3	4
I do not know about this declaration	8	7	18
No opinion	9	10	14

[Note: Figures in the second column do not total 100.]

28. Do you believe that, among the central and provincial leaders (former and present), there are people who have violated laws and moral standards? How do you think they should be handled?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
I do not think there are such leaders	2	0	3
They should be tried with the full vigor of the law	64	64	58
They should be tried only for perpetrating major crimes	12	10	10
They should be relieved of leadership positions	8	10	13
Qualified specialists should be retained if they sincerely regret their actions	11	12	10
No opinion	3	4	6

29. Do you think that Todor Zhivkov committed major crimes against the state and the people?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	82	82	76
No	10	8	11
No opinion	8	10	13

30. Do you think that the personal files of informers of the former State Security should be made public, or should they be kept secret?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
The files should be made public	55	72	77
The files should be kept secret	21	5	6
The files should be destroyed immediately	17	15	9

30. Do you think that the personal files of informers of the former State Security should be made public, or should they be kept secret? (Continued)

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
No opinion	6	8	8

[Note: Figures in first column do not total 100.]

31. Recently, some of the SDS deputies left the Grand National Assembly. What is your assessment of that?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
I approve	51	—	—
I disapprove	37	—	—
I am indifferent	6	—	—
No opinion	6	—	—

32. In your opinion, should the Turkish language be offered in schools as an elective?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes, they should study Turkish as a separate subject	31	36	27
No, they should study Turkish outside state schools	47	41	38
There should be schools in which the entire curriculum is taught in Turkish	2	1	3
No, the students should not study Turkish	15	18	26
No opinion	4	4	6

33. There are disagreements between some of the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants in our country. Do you believe that they are a domestic issue for Bulgaria or that their resolution must take into consideration the opinions of the European nations?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
This is a domestic issue	73	81	74
This is an all-European issue	18	13	15
No opinion	9	6	11

34. How do you assess the role played by each of the following in our history?

	Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
A. Russia (before 1917)	Mainly positive	64	—	—
	Mainly negative	17	—	—
	No opinion	19	—	—
B. USSR	Mainly positive	28	—	—
	Mainly negative	59	—	—
	No opinion	13	—	—
C. Germany	Mainly positive	39	—	—
	Mainly negative	25	—	—
	No opinion	36	—	—
D. England	Mainly positive	26	—	—
	Mainly negative	29	—	—
	No opinion	45	—	—
E. France	Mainly positive	47	—	—
	Mainly negative	11	—	—
	No opinion	42	—	—

35. What do you think of Gorbachev?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
I have always approved of him	23	18	19
I approved of him before, but I do not approve of him now	60	56	50
I did not approve of him before, but now I do	1	3	2
I have never approved of him	11	12	10
No opinion	6	12	18

[Note: None of the figures in a given column add up to 100.]

36. Do you attend religious services, ceremonies, etc.?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes, regularly	8	5	14
Comparatively rarely	24	27	18
Only on special occasions	44	42	39
No, because I do not have the opportunity	7	10	13
No, because I do not want to	17	16	16

37. Should there be capital punishment in Bulgaria?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Yes	71	68	64
No	22	25	28
No opinion	7	8	8

[Note: Figures in second column do not total 100.]

38. [For questions 38-45] Here we want some information about you, personally. It is necessary to improve the analysis of the sample data that is drawn from the entire country.

Question	Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Your sex?	Male	44	46	47
	Female	56	54	53

39. Your age?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Under 20	3	1	2
20-29	15	15	16
30-39	20	25	21
40-49	23	21	19
50-59	15	13	17
60 and over	24	24	25

[Note: Figures in second column do not total 100.]

40. Your educational level?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Primary	3	2	11
Basic	9	13	27
Middle-general	19	18	18
Middle-specialized	29	29	25

40. Your educational level? (Continued)

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Secondary	8	10	7
Higher	31	29	11

[Note: Figures do not total 100 in any column.]

41. To which social group do you belong?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Worker (excluding agricultural)	14	19	26
Agricultural worker	2	1	12
Private producer, artisan, tradesman, entrepreneur, etc.	4	5	5
Civil servant	27	24	16
Intelligentsia	21	16	8
Schoolchild, student	4	5	2
Pensioner, housewife	21	22	25
Unemployed	7	8	6

42. What kind of work do you do? (Please write answer.)

43. Do you supervise people as part of your job?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
I do not work	34	—	—
I do not supervise people	45	—	—
I supervise up to 10 persons	9	—	—
I supervise more than 10 persons	12	—	—

44. In what kind of populated area were you born?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Sofia	49	—	—
A former Okrug center	11	—	—
Another town	13	—	—
A village	27	—	—

45. What is your ethnic origin?

Answer	Current Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Sofia	Previous Poll-Country
Bulgarian	97	96	86
Bulgarian Muslim	0	1	2
Turkish	0	0	8
Gypsy	1	3	3
Other	1	1	1

[Note: Figures in first column do not total 100.]

In view of the comparatively large amount of material, we will continue our analysis and commentary on the data in

subsequent issues. We recommend that readers interested in the sociological survey watch for this newspaper.

Results of Poll on Political Preferences

91BA0720A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
16 May 91 p 5

[Report by Vasil Tonchev and Lidiya Yordanova: "Elections in July, Elections in September: Current Trends; Indications of the Study of the Latest Surveys Made by the National Center for the Study of Public Opinion"]

[16 May p 5]

[Text]

From a Potential to a Real Electorate

Monthly results of population studies made by the National Center for the Study of Public Opinion, conducted after the June 1990 elections, have so far enabled us to record relatively identifiable and lasting trends in our public opinion. A comparative study of the data for the period starting with the governmental crisis at the end of 1990 and the subsequent steps taken so far by the new government to stabilize the economy indicate that the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] enjoys a relatively stable advantage of 8-10 percent among the country's voters.

Immediately after the elections, the approval rating of the SDS began to increase, reaching its peak during the governmental crisis and remaining in the range of 57-60 percent until March of this year. In April, we recorded a drop of over 10 percent. By projecting the percentages of approval against the demographic background of the country, it becomes clear that the SDS meets with the approval of some 3.5 million people.

According to data from the last survey, the most noticeable and highest is the approval of the SDS among the electorate in cities of municipal and okrug significance (over 50 percent). In the capital, the SDS rating reaches its maximal value: 68 percent. Preferences for the SDS among young people (over 60 percent) remain clearly predominant. We also note increased approval among the higher age groups. One out of three supporters of radical movements within the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] approves of the SDS, as does one out of eight supporters of the BSP as a whole, expressing a positive attitude toward the SDS.

Monthly surveys show the size of the electorate, bearing in mind specific answers to the question of "for whom would you have voted." At present, 32 percent of the voters would have voted for the SDS, which is 41 percent of those indicating that they would participate in the next elections. Such figures are a quantitative guideline about the actual SDS electorate, which currently amounts to a minimum of about 2.1 million persons.

To obtain an accurate idea of the actual situation, we should also trace the indicator that shows the percentage of people who identify their political preferences with the announced (in this case by the SDS) political platform. In practical terms, one out of three voters at present shares the political views of the SDS. In this respect, we see a certain disparity with the figures we cited concerning the quantitative maximum and the current actual size of the SDS electorate. A coincidence between individual political preferences and

those of a given political force is a quality criterion in evaluating its electorate. This criterion indicates that the SDS electorate has become substantially reduced and fluctuates on the level of slightly more than 2 million persons.

Therefore, the approval figures are, on the one hand, a guideline for the maximal size of the electorate supporting a given political force. On the other hand, lasting political preferences define its minimal size but also provide an idea of the directions along which one could seek a real reserve of votes and earmark the essential outlines of an electoral strategy. The diagrams [not reproduced here] show changes in the SDS electorate depending on the correlation among these three indicators. We know that, during the elections for the Grand National Assembly, the SDS was able to garner a significantly smaller number of votes as compared to the BSP among the undecided electorate, filling the "niche" between those who had stated their approval and who shared certain political views. In the June 1990 elections, this group accounted for about 30 percent of the voters in the country, and it was not particularly difficult to realize that the struggle for votes took place mainly in the form of strategy for winning the trust of these people. During the governmental crisis in the fall, when the SDS showed up as the only legitimate force in the country that could assume responsibility for the economic reform, readiness to vote for it came very close to its maximal amount of sympathizers. Currently, after a certain stabilization of the political situation, the latest survey by the NTsIOM [National Center for the Study of Public Opinion] shows a certain drop in activities leading to showing a positive attitude toward the SDS. This fact, however, is within the framework of a more general trend toward a drop in the share of positive assessments of state institutions, parties, and political leaders.

There are reasons to believe that the shock effect of the economic reform is beginning to act precisely now. This is taking place in a situation characterized by the penetration of the SDS in all areas of power and assumption of a share of responsibility in the implementation of democratic changes. Therefore, voter estimates are also the effect of the paradox that in practical terms the ruling political force is in the minority in parliament. As we have repeatedly had the opportunity to see in our studies, the Bulgarian people respect authority, positions, services, and so on until the moment they hurt their pocketbooks.

Political Self-Identification

At the present time, information on the preferences of the SDS electorate for formations within it is of considerable interest. The most widespread and, at the same time, the most stable in the months that followed the elections are sympathies expressed for the BSDP and the Nikola Petkov BZNS. The electorate of these parties within the SDS has made moderate but steady progress since the beginning of the year. By now, virtually one out of three SDS voters would vote for the BSDP, and one out of four for the N. Petkov BZNS. Despite the widespread approval enjoyed by Ecoglasnost and the Green Party, in future elections, proceeding from the present data, they would obtain a relatively lesser number of votes. Since the beginning of this year and to the

present, the electorate of these four groups within the SDS has accounted for two-thirds of the eventual voters for the union.

The parties that have lately self-defined themselves as right-of-center have an electorate today that is also increasing, having attained 10-12 percent of all SDS supporters. It is obvious that the processes of differentiation within the body of the electorate supporting the SDS are developing quite powerfully and that their redistribution is taking place at the expense of those who have supported, so far, the SDS as a whole, without specifically determining the party or organization they prefer. Nonetheless, one out of four supporters of the SDS supports the union, above all, as an entity. These people either prefer not to have or indeed have no specific preferences concerning the groups included within the SDS.

Assessments concerning the union made by people who do not identify themselves with the SDS electorate are of prime interest in defining any eventual reserve of SDS voters. We are impressed by the complete analogy between the sympathies expressed by these people and the preferences of the SDS electorate. Priority is given to preferences for the BSDP, Ecoglasnost, the N. Petkov BZNS, and the Green Party. This indicates that the right-of-center parties have no chance, for the time being, of increasing their electorate outside the firm supporters and voters for the SDS.

The formation of ideological nuclei with more clearly expressed profiles within the SDS obviously has its foundations both within and outside the SDS electorate. Therefore, the forming of the SDS-center and a right wing is an important fact in the political biography of the union. The fact that the SDS is no longer "evenly blue" is a major effort to avoid the "hardening" of the coalition (something that exists as an unsolved problem for the BSP). Hence, the logic of a preelectoral behavior of the SDS, according to which the emphasis falls on propaganda among those unsure of their choices rather than on a constant proof of unity with already convinced supporters.

In addition to the considerations mentioned so far, the establishment of a separate SDS-center could be a fact of some importance that exceeds the limits of the union, to say the least, as a more serious manifestation of the effort to fill the space marked as "political center."

A specific feature revealed in the studies of public opinion is that, in our country, it is the SDS that is considered essentially and almost exclusively as the representative of the opposition. This largely explains the result obtained in the April study made by the NTsIOM: A united opposition (SDS-BZNS-DPS...) garners fewer votes than the sum total of those who have expressed the wish to vote separately for these forces. Inasmuch as the idea of a united opposition is still quite new and its future is unclear, one should consider these results as being somewhat conventional.

This summation seems not to require any particular stipulations: In the case of a group of parties and organizations within the SDS, a real opportunity exists to attract the potential electorate of the union and to seek reserves mainly among "hard" supporters within. The fact that in this case there is a clear official division among these areas

will play an essential role to the extent that the trends recorded as a result of the sociological studies concerning the attitude toward the SDS are relatively stable.

[17 May p 5]

[Text]

From the SDS to the...BSP, From the BSP to the...SDS

Who is the real electorate of the SDS?

This is a question that, for objective reasons, cannot remain out of the context of another question: What is happening with the BSP electorate?

During the governmental crisis in the fall, the BSP electorate reached its minimal value recorded so far in NTsIOM sociological surveys. It turned out that it had reached its minimal volume of firm supporters. The surveys registered a significant overlap between political sympathies for the BSP and the declared readiness to vote for that party. This indicates a stability concerning the quality criterion of identification with a given political force: a proclaimed coincidence of political preferences with officially proclaimed political positions (in this case the BSP).

What is essential is that, despite the noted overall drop in confidence in the BSP, this party obviously has a steady and unchanging electorate. On the other hand, however, this stable body is continuing to lose "the atmosphere" it was able to establish in the course of the last parliamentary elections.

The withdrawal of the BSP is, in addition to all the other reasons of a moral nature, a consequence of the fact that the BSP, in fact, surrendered the monopoly on power and, thus, to a certain extent, whether expected or not, or approved or disapproved by its supporters, found itself in the opposition.

This placed the BSP in a new and equivocal situation. As in any other crisis, prerequisites appeared for an increase in the influence of the conservative wing.

Until the start of the governmental crisis at the end of 1990, the attitude of the public toward radical movements and platforms within the BSP was fully comparable to the attitude toward SDS parties and organizations. It is an indicative fact that, by the end of 1990, the share of those who preferred the BSP radicals was almost equal to that of those who supported parties and organizations within the SDS, or slightly over 7 percent. After the fall of the Lukanov cabinet, the radical movement melted within the overall BSP process of closing its ranks.

Clearly, the main feature of the BSP electorate is the existence of a firm body of voters and the retention of the chance of winning votes among undetermined voters. Let us recall the fact noticed in preelectoral and postelectoral NTsIOM studies in 1990: Two-thirds of the undecided voters at that time picked the red ballot.

With a thus-outlined situation, it would be logical for the electorate of the basic political forces to follow two main trends:

Compared to the SDS, the BSP is more likely to retain its present electorate and could rely on a considerable increase

in outside support, and the SDS will retain its electorate at the expense of an internal redistribution among its groups, with the eventually centrist formations within the union having the opportunity to attract outside voters.

What is perhaps more important is the conclusion directly based on the fact that one out of three voters who stated that they do not support any given political force finds that there is no particular difference between the BSP and the SDS.

If we link such views also to the substantial disappointment in the main political forces, it becomes clear that it would be quite difficult for any one of these political forces to win over the skeptics and the pragmatists, who have shown a substantial symptomatic increase. Such views are displayed in a variety of topical economic or political problems in one out of three people surveyed in recent months by the NTsIOM. The economic reform and the actual impoverishment of the population, unemployment, and the growth of the crime rate are quite rapidly bringing down to earth those who are otherwise "inspired" by the values of democracy. In that situation, the BSP electorate could not be reduced any more than it is at present, while that of the SDS, which fluctuates within broader limits, as we already mentioned, is, in principle, more open to change.

Trust and/or Disappointment

The April survey made by the NTsIOM obtained data on the extent of confidence in political forces among the presumed supporters (that is, among people who state that they will vote for any specific political force).

One-half of all the surveyed individuals confirm that their attitudes toward their preferred political force has remained unchanged; one out of four has felt disappointed in his party, of late, and only one out of seven believes that his trust and sympathy have increased.

We see an energizing of the spirit affecting all voters in the country in the direction of a critical attitude within the electorate of the political forces. An inevitable consequence of this situation is an increased number of undecided people facing the dilemma of withdrawal or compromise.

The results of the sociological studies indicate that the philosophy of no compromise is countered by the pragmatic awareness of the Bulgarian people. Thus, faced with the threat of unemployment, fear becomes stronger than political confrontation. One should not expect any kind of major success of populist appeals in this respect, regardless of their origin. To clear-thinking Bulgarians, any attempt at politicizing such problems is entirely transparent. Such a trend is already beyond any polarization in society, as a result of which the struggle for assuming the position of a political center is currently being won by the main institutions of the government. By following such a strategy, the government was able to tactically win over the center of the terrain from the very first minutes of the contest, and thus impose its own rules and ways of playing the game.

(There is nothing astounding in the fact that, asked for whom the people will vote, of late we have been receiving an "unserious" answer: "For the government"). As one may assume, this will be the rule that will function in the

forthcoming elections. The political force that is able to identify itself with the governmental team will earn huge dividends from this fact.

Radical Democratic Party Proposals for SDS Unity

AU1306133591 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
10 Jun 91 p 1

["Memorandum of Radical Democratic Party"]

[Text] The National Party Council of the Radical Democratic Party supports the stand of the Radical Democratic Party Executive Committee for the immediate self-dissolution of the Grand National Assembly and the fixing of dates for new elections. Our categorical support for the motives and actions of those deputies who walked out of the plenary sessions remains unchanged.

The draft constitution discussed by the Grand National Assembly is eclectic and does not guarantee the freedom and inviolability of the citizen, property, or personal initiative. The further walkout from the Grand National Assembly by deputies from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms makes it even less representative in character and, in fact, takes from its bills any moral foundation.

With a feeling of responsibility for the fate and future of Bulgaria as a democratic and constitutional state, the National Party Council of the Radical Democratic Party proposes that:

1. Before the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Conference, a meeting be held of the chairmen and leaderships of the SDS parties and organizations to clarify and define more precisely their stands and common practices in the forthcoming elections.
2. There is no party bias or quota for each party when SDS candidates are nominated.
3. Local Radical Democratic Party organizations actively help in setting up civic committees of sympathizers and SDS supporters. For us, they are free ways for all democratic forces to take part in the preelection campaign because they attract people who do not want to become involved with party structures.
4. All democratic parties and organizations that are SDS members be incorporated into the SDS National Movement and, in this way, bring about the existence of a united opposition.

9 June 1991, Pazardzhik, National Party Council

Militia Director Bengarski on Topical Problems

AU1806060791 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
12 Jun 91 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Milcho Bengarski, director of the State Militia, by Aneliya Khristova; place and date not given: "The Militia Is Not a Stepchild of Democracy"—first paragraph is DEMOKRATSIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] In the transitional period from totalitarianism to democracy, the militia is one of the most deeply affected structures. Nevertheless, nothing seems to have changed in

this respect. Whether this impression is correct—that is the subject of our interview with the new militia director, who is so far the only leading official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs' system who has not been a functionary of the State Security Service.

[Khristova] Mr. Bengarski, you were recently appointed to the post of Militia director. Can you describe your feelings in accepting the post?

[Bengarski] I would never have expected to be nominated for such a position. [passage omitted]

[Khristova] How would you comment on the fact that the majority of leading positions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and also in the regional militia directorates are occupied by former officials of the State Security Service and of the present National Service for the Protection of the Constitution?

[Bengarski] I have nothing to say about the leading positions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, I think that well-trained professionals are working there. The activities of the departments in question always were and still are subject to strict regulations.

[Khristova] I understand you perfectly, but several people in that ministry were closely linked to the former leadership....

[Bengarski] They fulfilled their obligations as Ministry of Internal Affairs officials. The rules applied not only to the chief who issued to instructions, but also to the subordinates who carried out the instructions.

[Khristova] Nevertheless, the rules were placed at the service of the privileged, and it is not likely that the Ministry of Internal Affairs functionaries would act against their own interests today....

[Bengarski] Yes, that is so, but their guilt should be proved only by democratic methods—namely, by the courts of justice and the prosecutor's office.

To claim in general terms that someone is responsible for this and that is, to put it mildly, incorrect, in my opinion. We have all, to one or another extent, served the powers that be. This was even legalized by the Bulgarian Constitution, according to which the party was supposed to play the leading role in our society.

[Khristova] Do you not think that the militiamen are the scapegoats of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

[Bengarski] Definitely.

[Khristova] How do you accept the dismissal of militiamen whose only offenses were to have courageously expressed their own political opinions and to be disliked by their superiors?

[Bengarski] This phenomenon was characteristic for 1990 and 1989. Such cases actually occurred. However, not all of them were dismissed for voicing views that differed from those of their superiors.

Colonel Milcho Bengarski does not accept that the militia should be regarded as a stepchild of democracy, despite the increasing crime rate and the accusations that the protectors of law and order are acting almost as passive onlookers. The problems of the police forces will sort themselves out. Both police forces and criminals are going through a transitional period today. They both adjust to the new sociopolitical situation. Nevertheless, the police are the police. They are used to adopting prompt and precise decisions. We are convinced that things will fall into place again.

1973 Anti-Turk 'Atrocities' Disclosed on TV
AU1706203291 Sofia BTA in English 1952 GMT
17 Jun 91

[Text] Sofia, June 17 (BTA)—In March 1973 the Bulgarian authorities cracked down with outrageous brutality on Bulgarian citizens resisting a forcible change of their Arabic and Turkish names, Bulgarian Television disclosed this evening. The case surfaces after it has been carefully suppressed for eighteen years. It was described as "sheer genocide" by one of the eyewitnesses to the drama which unfolded in the village of Kornitsa, southwestern Bulgaria, when five Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarians professing Islam) were killed, another 57 wounded, 70 families forced to move to other parts of the country and ten persons were sentenced to a total of eighty years imprisonment.

The renaming operation started by personal interviews. People were summoned outside the village one by one and returned with their names changed. The people of Kornitsa decided to put up organized resistance: They kept watch in the village square round the clock. Then the authorities used armed force to crush them. Eyewitnesses say bullets were blazing and the square was turned into a bloodbath. Since then it has been dubbed "blood square." Bullet marks are still evident on the house walls.

Two women of Kornitsa still do not know where their husbands were buried. One of the women used to go daily to the police headquarters in the neighbouring town of Gotse Delchev to inquire about her husband, a father of six.

The people of Kornitsa and of a neighbouring village blame the then Minister of Internal Affairs Angel Tsanev, the local chiefs of the Communist Party and the police force, the then Communist Party ideologue Venelin Kotsev, the then Prime Minister Stanko Todorov and the Communist party apparatus. "The entire BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] is to blame," one of the villagers said. They cited classified document No. 549 of the BCP Central Committee.

The TV reporter said the victims' and eyewitness' accounts were aired to draw the attention of the Prosecutor General's Office to the case.

In 1984-1985 the so-called "regeneration process" continued with the change of names of the ethnic Turks. This coercive renaming was also presented as "voluntary" by the Communist propaganda at the time. Today's ethnic problems can be traced back to these campaigns.

Government Committee To Regulate Arms Trade
AU1306185891 Sofia BTA in English 1825 GMT
13 Jun 91

[Text] Sofia, June 13 (BTA)—Today the Council of Ministers decided to set up a governmental committee to regulate and control the production of and trade in military equipment, weaponry, munitions and other materials for military use. The committee will be chaired by one of the deputy prime ministers. The committee will coordinate the activity of the competent state bodies in managing the military and the special-purposes production. It will assign the fulfillment of state military contracts and exercise control over the purchase and sale of military and special products. The committee will also approve the main lines along which military-economic cooperation should be conducted.

Deputy Prime Minister Dimitur Ludzhev explained this decision by the need to change the way in which the Bulgarian organizations carry out armament trade. The reason for Bulgaria's poor image in the West is the mechanism of concluding the deals and not to military production itself which is a sector operating in all developed countries.

According to Mr. Ludzhev it is to Bulgaria's national interests to preserve at least 50 percent of her military production by placing the industrial military complex under governmental control. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations will propose to set up a limited liability company of military producers and merchants by the end of this September.

Exercise Shows Unreadiness for Nuclear Accident
AU1806095191 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 13 Jun 91 p 2

[Report by Vasil Popov: "Civil Defense Cannot Be Separated From the Army for the Time Being"]

[Text] Vice Premier Aleksandur Tomov, chairman of the Permanent Government Commission on Combating the Consequences of Natural Disasters and Major Industrial Accidents (PPK), stated as follows: It is unrealistic to expect that the country's Civil Defense organization can be separated from the Army and be entirely subject to the agencies of territorial administration. This was confirmed by the "Defense '91" exercise, which was held from 28 to 30 May 1991, the results of which were assessed by the Council of Ministers yesterday.

The exercise represented a practical test of the National Plan of action for the event of a major accident at the Kozloduy nuclear plant. It was reported that the exercise contributed to improving the practical experience of specialized agencies, ministries, and departments, and also of the local administration agencies.

The incompetence of some local administrations was clearly highlighted during the exercise, Tomov pointed out. He does not accept their excuse that they are only provisional agencies. The vice premier assigned tasks with precise deadlines. The implementation of these should determine the country's ability to protect its population and material resources.

At present, the necessary readiness and resources to deal with the consequences of a major accident in the country

are lacking. This was the conclusion of a group of nuclear and radiation specialists from the Scientific Coordinating Council of the PPK expressed by Prof. Iliya Belokonski, chairman of the council.

Lieutenant General Mikhail Yovchev, chief of the Civil Defense, analyzed the results of the exercise.

Tobacco Production, Contribution to Budget
91BA0585A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
15 Apr 91 p 6

[Interview with Georgi Petrov, chairman of the Union of Tobacco Producers, by Petko Stamov; date not given: "Tobacco Growers Are the Most Generous Contributors to the State Budget"]

[Text] The restoration congress of the Tobacco Growers Union was held on 16 March in Sofia. Its purpose is to defend the professional and social interests of tobacco producers and to raise the production of this valuable farm crop to the level of the possibilities provided by the soil and weather conditions in the country, its chairman Georgi Petrov stated.

[Stamov] Are there possibilities for increasing the area in tobacco in our country?

[Petrov] Possibilities appear as a result of the skill displayed in organizing the production process. In 1940, tobacco output totaled 52,000 tons. In 1962, when two resolutions were passed by the Council of Ministers to increase purchase prices and award a number of bonuses in kind and facilities for procuring equipment, output quickly doubled and tripled.

[Stamov] As we know, in 1976 a record 164,000 tons of tobacco were harvested. Why is it that every single year since then there has been a decrease? Is this situation continuing?

[Petrov] Everything occurred as a result of the elimination of the additional payments for above-basic production. Someone determined that there was no need for material incentives or rewards for those who worked the hardest. Furthermore, payments in concentrated fodder began to slow down....

[Stamov] Was that the only reason?

[Petrov] The main reason was that the purchase price of the tobacco began to fall behind the other farm products. Some 10 years ago, tobacco was in the leading position in overall output per decare; today it is in 32d place. The people keep making comparisons between what they could buy in the past with the money obtained from the sale of one kg of tobacco and what they can buy now....

[Stamov] It is a question of the price per kg, but what are the earnings of producers based on piecework?

[Petrov] Years ago, payments of piecework producers began with 70 percent of the total output for Turkish tobacco; subsequently, it dropped to 45 percent. For the large-leaf varieties, it dropped from 50 to 25 percent.

Meanwhile, the prices of retail goods rose, and producers justifiably felt impoverished.

[Stamov] Why did earnings suffer?

[Petrov] The standardized system for all types of production was approved by the NAPS [National Agroindustrial Union], and the local leaderships were also to participate in said support. This forced them to change the percentage of payments every year—sometimes even twice a year.

[Stamov] Who benefited from this?

[Petrov] The state and Bulgartabak. Now, after one kg of cigarettes has been sold and costs subtracted, what is left is about 180 leva. Sixty percent of it is excise tax, or 110 leva. In recent years, cigarette sales have averaged 17,000 tons. The remaining profit is easy to compute.

Producers estimate something else, as well. With an anticipated production of 100,000 tons and the price of 16 leva per-average kg, as offered by Bulgartabak, the producers would receive 1.6 billion leva. From cigarettes alone, through the excise fee, the state would earn more than that.

[Stamov] What should be changed, in the view of your union?

[Petrov] Above all, we need a clear economic policy. The bylaws of the union stipulate that it will assist in the production of more and better quality tobacco. This can be accomplished if the producer knows how his labor will be rated in the future. It is precisely at this point that we do not wish to restrict Bulgartabak with endless demands of high prices and would like for Bulgartabak to base its offer on scientific grounds—on the real costs and a minimal percentage of profitability.

[Stamov] Do other problems exist?

[Petrov] To increase production, technological decisions are of equal importance. The best tobacco is grown in the Rila-Rodopi and Pirin areas, in small lots, frequently no larger than several hundred square meters. It is true that Bulgartabak helps in the promotion of specialized equipment (motor sprayers, irrigation pumps). However, this only partially satisfies the needs. At this stage, the tractor and the truck needed by producers in these areas is replaced by the mule with two baskets on its back. Meanwhile, there is a great deal of talk about minitractors and motor cultivators, but they are being sent to the plains, to the cottage areas. It is the task of the union to assist in the production of small equipment in our country, which will become a determining prerequisite in the next few years in tobacco growing.

[Stamov] Are your members interested in foreign exchange?

[Petrov] Our people are not demanding, and, should they take some protective actions, one should know that they have been left with no other choices. They do not wish foreign exchange, provided that their partners supply them with polyethylene, plant protection materials, and other items related to their production activities, or else that all such items be made available on the market so that they can purchase them with leva.

[Stamov] Everything seems to indicate that production is heavily influenced, particularly considering our unstable market relations, by the active involvement of our partners.

[Petrov] At this time, unfortunately, we have only one partner, Bulgartabak, which is a state firm. We support the idea of a tobacco monopoly, but we do not agree for a state monopoly to become the monopoly of a firm. This monopoly is transferred to the enterprises and becomes a local monopoly, which turns the producer into a serf. For example, no farmer in the Petrich area has the right to sell his tobacco to the enterprise in Sandanski, the one in Gotse Delchev to Razlog, and so forth.

[Stamov] Let us conclude with the first assignment that you set yourselves after the congress.

[Petrov] It is to accurately determine what can be produced, what would be surplus profit to the state and to the producers. By such computations, we shall prove to the Council of Ministers that it is necessary to eliminate firm monopoly and provide freedom of choice to the trade partners. We are convinced that tobacco has made and could make an even greater contribution to the state budget.

Export Opportunities for Meat, Livestock

91BA0597A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
15 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Iliya Damyanov, including interview with Aleksandur Goranov, chairman of the Rodopaimpeks state firm; place and date of interview not given: "Scarcity in a Year of Abundant Lamb Meat"]

[Text] During the present period of coexistence between two types of production and trade relations (state and private), we are the helpless witnesses of major economic crimes. Individuals and firms, not without the "invisible" support of the undismantled totalitarian administrative structure, are showing huge speculative profits. Some profitable activities are being quietly taken over by some firms and people. Disloyal competition is spreading with impunity, and the danger of a new monopoly and new reincarnations of yesterday's party bosses is an immediate reality.

During this economic interlude, control and sanctions by the proper authorities become almost symbolic, while the waste of finished products, raw materials, and human labor, for the sake of higher profits and party and personal interests, have taken over our sick daily existence.

We learned that this year is called the year of lamb fertility by the farmers. However, we see no abundance in the stores. There either is no meat on the shelves or prices remain inaccessible. And what about exports?

I discussed these matters with Aleksandur Goranov, chairman of the Rodopaimpeks DF [state firm].

[Damyanov] Mr. Goranov, it seems to me that your firm has currently been handed the opportunity to act as a monopolist.... Your experience is sufficient to prevent what is happening in the meat business....

[Goranov] The monopoly of economic trusts in the country was eliminated with Resolution No. 110 of the Council of

Ministers of 14 October 1990. Actually, however, long before that, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVIV) had issued permits to other firms to export meat and live animals. Some of them had nothing in common with such exported goods and were engaged in speculative profit-making. The unpleasant fact is that such underhanded trade is automatically linked to our firm. We accept legitimate competition. A market economy is incompatible with monopoly.

[Damyanov] The editors are receiving complaints that very frequently producers are paid in leva or that their goods are not being purchased. Is this an extortionist practice?

[Goranov] To be frank, I thank you for this question. It affects the interests of producers and the future of animal husbandry in Bulgaria. Regulation No. 2 of January 1991 stipulates the quantities that may be exported to the members of the EEC: 2,000 tons of lambs and 1,250 tons in slaughtered weight. The distribution of the quotas among Bulgarian firms is based on competition, which is fair. However, instead of one there were four competitions, due to the lack of experience on the part of the MVIV. The best selling time was lost. Bulgaria lost about \$3 million, and our reputation among the Western customers (who were relying on our goods in January) was seriously shaken. These competitions also showed the extreme lack of professionalism of most of the firms. They asked for unrealistically high export prices. They would have been unable to sell even one ton of meat. The MVIV allowed another inaccuracy. It gave export permits to firms that began to sell at prices that were lower than our prices by \$600-1,000 per ton. Even our Italian partners objected to the Bulgarian ambassador in Rome about such disloyal competition.

[Damyanov] I have the feeling that you do not like for other Bulgarian firms to trade on the international market.

[Goranov] Precisely. I am concerned by the lack of experience shown by our Bulgarian competitors. The Western market is like shifting sands. It is difficult to gain trust and easy to lose it. Meanwhile, the losses have become a fact. The goods in which we traded were one of the most important items in Bulgarian foreign exchange earnings. Each single error is costly.

[Damyanov] Unquestionably, exporting lambs and meat is necessary to both the state and the producers. At the present time, however, foreign exchange income going to the treasury is insignificant; the producers are being blackmailed, and scarcity and high prices on the domestic market are facts. What is the reason for this?

[Goranov] The weather conditions during the winter, the increased care and initiative shown by private farmers,

and the personal interests of the latter led to a number of offers the likes of which I, after 17 years of work in Rodopaimpeks, cannot remember.

[Damyanov] Does this mean that there is excessive production?

[Goranov] Forty years ago, Bulgaria's herd was three times its present size. Today, we rather have a disrupted market mechanism and imposed restrictions on exports. Yet the producers expect to obtain for their goods the foreign exchange they urgently need in order to purchase inventory and chemicals.... This means that, from the very beginning, they did not contemplate selling their goods on the domestic market. Meanwhile, we also know that their animals are not being purchased, that they are being paid in leva, that they are being subjected to extortion. However, Rodopaimpeks is only one of the firms marketing their goods. It is true that the offer today exceeds the amount of the allowed quota. As to payment, we are strictly observing the stipulations of Resolution No. 2: 50 percent of the foreign exchange earnings go to the producer, and the rest goes to the Bulgarian Trade Bank, which must give them the equivalent in leva. The farmer is being shamelessly robbed, most unscrupulously, particularly by reselling firms. These firms pay him in leva and pocket the foreign exchange. Their profits are fabulous, but it is the obligation of other authorities to determine whether such actions are criminal.

Today, producers are doing everything possible to sell their livestock. To sell his goods, the producer must offer several weight discounts. A certain quantity is recorded in the documents, while many more tons are exported. Control is impossible because of the lack of scales at the border points.

[Damyanov] Which means that there is an abundance of meat both for export and for the domestic market. But where is it? And why is it that the prices remain inaccessible? Is the surplus being turned into garbage?

[Goranov] That is a logical question. This year a huge number of calves and hogs are being offered for export. The lack of fodder is crucial, yet its price is incredibly high. Exports to EEC countries are fetching prices that are double or triple those at other markets, for which reason they are preferred. However, those countries have quantitative limitations and a 30-percent export fee, which, in practice, is a prohibitive step and makes the producers unable to cover their costs.... There is something absurd in this. There is a domestic market crowded with goods but with low consumption. Exports cannot be used as a safety valve because of restrictions. Meanwhile, the hungry markets, such as those of the USSR and Cuba, are being avoided.... Someone should find the reasons for this.

Establishment of Constitutional Court Delayed

*AU1406135591 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 13 Jun 91 p 1*

[Interview with Professor Jiri Boguszak, adviser to the Federal Government Office, by "luk," under the rubric "On the Telephone"; place and date not given]

[Text] [luk] When will the CSFR Constitutional Court be established?

[Boguszak] It will be established after President V. Havel appoints its 12 judges and, from among them, the chairman and deputy chairman of the Constitutional Court. According to Law No. 91 of 1991 on the CSFR Constitutional Court, which went into force on 1 April, each legislative body, that is, the Federal Assembly, the Czech National Council, and the Slovak National Council, is to submit to the president a list with the names of its eight candidates. The parliaments have not yet done so.

On 8 May the CSFR Government appointed a commission with Deputy Prime Minister P. Rychetsky at its head. The commission is working intensively on the preparation of conditions for the court's operation. V. Mencl, the mayor of Brno, which is to be the seat of the court, participates in the work of the commission.

For the Constitutional Court to be able to make decisions, it is still necessary to pass a law on its organization and on procedures before the court. The working version of the law has been drafted but the law is not likely to be passed before October. The Constitutional Court will therefore scarcely start operating before November this year.

Slovak Government Deals With Ethnic Issues

*AU1506162191 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 13 Jun 91 p 2*

[CTK report: "The Unemployment Rate of Romanies"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Government Council for National and Ethnic Groups dealt at its session yesterday with the critical social situation of the Romanies.

It was stated at a session headed by Martin Porubjak, Slovak first deputy prime minister, that the backwardness of the Romany population in the Slovak Republic is currently a problem of the entire society. The basic principle of Slovak government policy toward Romanies is the guarantee of the same social justice as the other groups of the population enjoy. Individual care will be provided only to the socially endangered and weak groups of the population, in which the largest percentage are Romanies. In comparison with January this year, for example, the unemployment rate of Romanies increased from 8,400 to almost 29,000. The most critical situation is in eastern Slovakia. The ethnic Romanies have a large share in the crime rate—of 250,000 Romanies, 3.1 percent commit criminal activity; however, they are mostly repeat offenders.

The Council also dealt with the report on the opinion polls conducted among Slovaks and Hungarians about the enforcement of the law on the official language. It stated that the level of relations between the citizens of both

nationalities has not changed and that friendly relations mostly prevail. According to Slovaks, problems arise mostly due to the unwillingness of the ethnic Hungarians to communicate in everyday life in Slovak and to use the Slovak language for local names. Above all, ethnic Hungarian citizens point to the bias, increased tension, and deteriorated relations in coexistence with Slovaks. The Slovak Government Council for National and Ethnic Groups also discussed the study on the "Ruthenian" literary language and other issues.

No Criminal Charges on Soviet Nuclear Weapons

*LD1306210791 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio
Network in Czech 1300 GMT 13 Jun 91*

[Text] Ivan Gasparovich and Ludvik Brunner, prosecutors general of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, have clarified in a joint statement the progress in the investigation into the agreements between the Czechoslovak and Soviet governments on the deployment of nuclear weapons on our territory. As they announced, the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak Federation does not provide a straightforward definition of the cause of the action taken as unlawful, as far as the aforementioned agreement is concerned, especially since what was at issue were only the warheads earmarked for delivery vehicles at the disposal of the Czechoslovak army. The agreements of 15 December 1965 and 21 February 1986 were concluded, as has so far been established, on Czechoslovakia's initiative in the interest of improved safeguarding of its defense.

Nothing has been established yet that would testify to the fact that other nuclear ammunition was in the facilities, which were purpose-built and corresponded to all security regulations.

Although it is unquestionable that the endorsement of this kind of agreement should be subject to parliamentary approval, the selected course of action according to legal amendment valid in 1965, or rather in 1986, was not in direct breach with the constitution at the time. It is therefore not possible to conclude that there is cause to open criminal proceedings on the aforementioned agreements between the governments of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, stresses the joint statement of prosecutors general Ivan Gasparovic and Ludvik Brunner.

Military Police Commander Outlines Functions

*AU1406102491 Prague CESKE A
MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY
in Czech 12 Jun 91 p 4*

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Milos Liska, Military Police commander, by Premysl Sramek; in Hradec Kralove, date not given: "The 'VP' Initials on Sleeves"—first paragraph is CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Now, one can meet soldiers in Hradec Kralove who do not differ too much from regular servicemen. The only difference is that on the sleeves of their uniforms there are

the "VP" [Vojenska Policie] initials. We asked its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Milos Liska from the first multi-purpose air force unit in Hradec Kralove, for an interview:

[Sramek] What military component is involved?

[Liska] A Military Police has been established by order of the defense minister. Its main purpose is to fulfill the tasks connected with the protection of human life and health and the protection of property. It also has a special task of participating in the protection—by technical means—of the classified material in the Czechoslovak Army.

[Sramek] Is there, or was there, some connection between the former Military Counterintelligence and today's Military Police?

[Liska] No way. Its tasks significantly differ from those of the former Military Counterintelligence, irrespective of the fact that a new component, Military Counterintelligence Service [vojenske ochranné zpravodajství], has been established. It deals with matters that belonged to the jurisdiction of the former Military Counterintelligence. We deal with criminal activity of the soldiers, that is, by its nature, our activity is similar to that of the civilian police.

[Sramek] What is the composition of the Military Police's personnel? Are your people mostly new people, or do those who returned to active duty prevail?

[Liska] At the moment, the composition of the Military Counterintelligence Service is as follows: On the basis of competence check and reexamination of the former Military Counterintelligence members, people who stayed and are active in the Military Counterintelligence Service are in the minority. They are mostly people educated in law, who were not connected with political education in the Army. Important posts were filled with former Czechoslovak Army members who were fired in 1970.

[Sramek] What technological means are available to you?

[Liska] The Military Counterintelligence Service, as any other new component, begins with the acquisition of new equipment. We are gradually receiving technology for special communication. That is, radio stations, motorized vehicles for the Traffic Police, which is marked similarly to civilian police. Apart from that, we will have more specialized technology. We are also going to equip the criminal department. The Order Enforcing Police needs, for example, manacles and weapons.

[Sramek] Does the Military Police have any jurisdiction over the civilians?

[Liska] Its main task is to check and survey the soldiers in active service. Of course, if there is criminal activity, a Military Police member will intervene in conformity with criminal law, he will apprehend and hand over the person to the civilian police. Or, if the Military Police is asked for help, it will provide it.

Christian Democratic Leader on Constitution Talks

*LD1106222691 Bratislava Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas
Radio Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 11 Jun 91*

[Text] We reported in Radiojournal yesterday about the visit of representatives of the World Congress of Slovaks to Bratislava. They met the Slovak National Council deputies and representatives of political parties and movements today. First they met representatives of the Christian Democratic Movement [CDM]; and although the talks took place behind closed doors, so to speak, Jan Petrik, CDM central secretary, gave Ivan Kosec some information, and not only about this meeting:

[Begin recording] [Kosec] Mr. Petrik, I assume that the central topic of these talks were issues connected with the state setup. What is the view of the World Congress of Slovaks?

[Petrik] Replying to a direct question whether the World Congress of Slovaks is for Slovakia breaking away from the Czech Republic, they replied "No." They strive only for the fulfillment of Slovakia's sovereignty.

[Kosec] How? By what means?

[Petrik] We are presently discussing this. Replies to all these questions will be answered. Journalists will learn all at a news conference to be held by the World Congress of Slovaks on Thursday in the Film Club, and you will possibly be briefed there also on stands of individual political parties on these issues.

[Kosec] My next question concerns the statement issued yesterday by Mr. Kucerak, chairman of the Slovak Council of Public Against Violence, that at the forthcoming talks of political parties and movements about constitutions there should be differentiation—meaning which parties to continue or not continue holding talks with; excluded should be those that reckon with Slovakia as an international legal subject.

[Petrik] I would be more careful in replying to this question, because voices that these parties represent in the Slovak parliament will then be missed when we come to adopting the Slovak constitution, but not only the constitution but also the treaty with the Czech Republic. Ninety-one votes are needed from deputies for this, and for this reason I would like to see them taking part in those talks; although I am aware of the fact that completely opposite views do somewhat prolong deliberations. But good things are born only with great difficulties, and they are the results of tireless deliberations and clarification of views.

[Kosec] You recently singled out September of this year as the latest date for adopting the constitution. Do you think this is still realistic?

[Petrik] I said that at the beginning of April, and then circumstances indicated that this entire process could progress somewhat faster, we wanted to unite views of political parties on the philosophy of the constitution by the end of May. It has emerged that things are a bit more complex, in fact. In the course of June these views should

become more clear and the public should learn the entire philosophy of the constitution and the text of individual paragraphs; and during the summer holiday the people should have time to acquaint themselves with it and make comments. At the plenary session in September it should be discussed, and—God willing and if the Slovak nation is united—it could be adopted. This is now only a question of uniting stands of ours, of Slovaks on this constitution.

[Kosec] Are you not worried that if Mr. Kucerak's idea should be implemented, the work on the constitution should become more difficult yet again?

[Petrik] I think, as I have voiced my view, that it would be good for other parliamentary parties to take part in those talks. Mr. Kucerak has his own view—that this makes talks more difficult. This is perhaps true, but in such matters it is necessary to hold talks with the broadest possible participation of society, and this is in fact represented also by these opposition political parties. [end recording]

Daily Calls for Referendum on Country's Future
AU1206075991 Prague OBCANSKY DENIK in Czech
8 Jun 91 p 3

[Petr Bartos commentary: "The Division of Europe"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] They say that habits are made of cast iron. For Czechs and Slovaks to live in a common state is such a cast-iron habit. We should, however, try to free ourselves from such myths and start slowly getting used to the idea that the Slovaks feel themselves to be a stronger nation than, for example, the Flemish, the Scots, or the Bavarians and that they simply long to prove to the world (to us Czechs) their viability and talents. As the approval of the law on waste, for example, has shown, the disputes about power-sharing would no doubt be permanent and they would constantly slow down and weaken the will of the Czech nation to take a substantially different path from the Slovaks.

The two sides' conception of the common state is quite different. The Slovak representation pushes more and more emphatically for a confederative model (J. Carnogursky even declared that a single currency and financial policy will do). It is therefore becoming apparent that most agreements [between the two republics] would have about as much value as a "state treaty" between Tom and Jerry, the cat and mouse from the cartoon show.... And because when it comes to political negotiations it is impossible to count on the silent Slovak majority, which supposedly does not support an independent [Slovak] state, the only possible discussion is through a nationwide referendum. If it turns out that our coexistence has been a mistake, let us not succumb to needless passions and displays of emotion. Let us trust that the most realistic approach to apply to the current situation is "let them go if they want to." It is possible to break even cast-iron habits....

Foreign Services Gather Information on Army
LD1206152591 Prague CTK in English 1341 GMT
12 Jun 91

[Text] Prague 12 June (CTK)—The director of the Federal Defence Ministry's Military Counter-Intelligence Service (VOZ), Colonel [Duchek] said today that the VOZ has information about intelligence-gathering activities by foreign secret services interested in the Czechoslovak Army.

At a press conference Duchek said that after permanent KGB (Soviet secret service) adviser posts were eliminated from the Czechoslovak Army, "some services" have been trying to build up a network of agents while other services seek to verify the numbers of Czechoslovak-held weapons, stated at the Vienna arms talks.

Duchek said the VOZ operations are confined to Czechoslovak territory but "under certain circumstances which we by no means provoke by any offensive, VOZ activities may go beyond Czechoslovakia's borders".

Comparing the VOZ with the former military counter-intelligence service, Duchek said the VOZ no longer deals with the safeguarding of ammunition or desertions from and crime in the Army.

Meciarites Accused of Plotting Military Coup
AU1406144791 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak
13 Jun 91 pp 1, 2

[Eva Bombova report: "What Do the Voters Know?"]

[Text] Spisska Nova Ves—At Tuesday's press briefing in Kosice, journalists were informed of former Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's views concerning the article entitled "Slovakia Wants Meciar" published in the weekly SPISSKE HLASY on 5 June. Among other things, Slovak National Council [SNR] Deputy Frantisek Javorsky wrote the following: "It is understandable that in his speech he [Meciar] devoted a great deal of time to slinging mud at the current government and especially at its prime minister, Dr. Jan Carnogursky. He made him out to be an anti-nationalist and incompetent politician. It is just as well that he did not make him out to be an unscrupulous politician. However, it is necessary to be frank and say that Mr. Meciar is probably grateful to J. Carnogursky for complying with his request that all the advantages which a prime minister has for a period of six months be left to him, despite the fact that he has a legal right to them for only three months. That is, for a period of six months Mr. Meciar has a guaranteed income of 15,000 korunas per month, a Tatra 613 limousine at his disposal, a bodyguard.... Under such circumstances, it is easy to be an anti-government politician."

In his reply to this part of Deputy Javorsky's article, Vladimir Meciar conceded in Kosice that, in addition to the three months guaranteed by law, he accepted from Prime Minister Carnogursky a further three months. He explained that he receives 16,000 korunas per month, part of which he gives to the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia.

The following extract from Frantisek Javorsky's article in SPISSKE HLASY caused a storm: "We also have our own opinion about the strike on 6 May 1991, which should

have been a strike with political overtones. On that day Mr. Meciar was undergoing medical treatment in Trenčianske Teplice where Mr. Svehota, a former state Security [StB] officer and Slovak first deputy interior minister, visited him. We do not know what they talked about during their three hour confidential meeting following the refusal of Czechoslovak Army officers to support activity leading to the overthrow of the new government and SNR Presidium. Perhaps the only positive outcome was that the next day Mr. Meciar informed the press about the file belonging to secret StB collaborator No. 20 275. Whoever goes to Trenčianske Teplice for a cure today could come across very interesting company there. Apart from Colonel Svehota, Mr. Bercik (Slovak first deputy interior minister), Mr. Stern (Slovak Interior Ministry personnel deputy), and Mr. Borodovcak (former head of the Prime Minister's Office—Mr. Meciar's) came for a cure. They are all people who received their high ranking posts thanks to Mr. Meciar. Therefore, the question is, what kind of surprise are these gentlemen preparing for us?"

On Tuesday in Kosice Vladimir Meciar told journalists that he met Mr. Svehota—who was also in Trenčianske Teplice for a cure—at lunch. Of course, during his treatment, several people visited him. For example, Alexander Dubcek was one of them. He stated that they did not contact Army officers and that they were not preparing a rebellion by using the Army. He described the military conspiracy as lies and disinformation intended to whip up fear and uncertainty and to discredit the opposition.

Yesterday we asked Frantisek Javorsky, an SNR Presidium member and a Christian Democratic Movement deputy, for his view of Vladimir Meciar's reaction in Kosice:

"My article published in SPISKE HLASY was a reaction to the speech made by Vladimir Meciar at a meeting with citizens in Spisska Nova Ves. I was reacting to his statements, which I have documented very carefully. The article in the weekly SPISKE HLASY will have another installment.... I would just like to emphasize that the contents of the first installment do not proceed from the results of the SNR Defense and Security Committee's investigation, which has still not been completed. When writing the article, I used background material that citizens and my voters (also from among the ranks of Army officers and the police force) had placed at my disposal."

Daily Predicts Major Role for Republican Leader
AU1406184891 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE
in Czech 10 Jun 91 p 1

[Helena Bastlova commentary: "Who Profits From Discontent?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Mr. Sladek, chairman of the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC], is touring the country, organizing rallies, criticizing the government, the president, and parliament, and leaving behind hundreds of mostly young people whose aspirations he expresses. The ruling political forces have so far failed to produce any concrete response. [passage omitted] The media treat the SPR-RSC virtually in the same

way as they did the dissidents of the past. When several thousand people gather at a Republican rally, the official agency turns them into several hundred, if it mentions the rally at all. On Czechoslovak Television dialogue is being conducted with almost anyone nowadays but, so far, Doctor M. Sladek has not been allowed to appear there.

They say that our people always need a martyr. I would not be surprised if, a few months from now, Dr. Sladek became such a martyr. The conduct of the official political representation and of the information media help him create that image already. We should not forget that former martyrs often become leaders.

The renewed [illustrated periodical] SVET V OBRAZECH recently published an exclusive interview with Dr. M. Sladek. It portrayed him as a fantastic family father who speaks several languages, is religious, paints, and loves children.... The idea occurred to me that this might be an overture to his future role as the darling of the nation. The Saturday demonstration, which can be seen as the first great eruption of discontent with the government since the elections, indicates that this future need not be far away. The growing discontent of the people with the results of the economic reform may topple the government but it may also put a totalitarian leader in its place.

Klaus Defines Relationship Between Party, Paper
AU1406140091 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 11 Jun 91 p 1

[Interview with Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus by Jiri Leschtina; place and date not given]

[Text] [Leschtina] Last week there appeared the first issue of the new weekly "SOBOTNI TELEGRAF" about which you said at a news conference that this paper was "close to the Civic Democratic Party." What is the difference between a paper that is "close to a party" and a party paper?

[Klaus] Unlike a party paper, there is no close link between the SOBOTNI TELEGRAF and the Civic Democratic Party. The party leadership was not informed about the paper's content in advance, not even in the case—for example—of the relatively aggressive article—published in the first issue—on the voting practices of the Civic Movement in parliament. Authors having various opinions will be admitted to publish in the paper. We are not even against criticism, by the way. This would be absurd, since the Civic Democratic Party chairman himself is a target of permanent polemics in the other communications media. On the other hand, it is necessary to say that the Civic Democratic Party has great problems when it wants to gain access to the communications media, the state run media in particular. This is why we must, undoubtedly, try to create a paper that would express our standpoints and opinions. Today, it is in vogue to be "ashamed" if this or that paper or magazine is close to this or that party. That way, one makes a virtue out of necessity, since many papers began falling mainly because the pertinent party had begun to fall. Therefore, it would be hypocritical to say that the Civic Democratic Party somehow distances itself from the SOBOTNI TELEGRAF.

Hungarian Bishopric Cause for National Frictions *AU1306122391*

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SMENA (SMENA NA NEDELU supplement) in Slovak on 7 June on pages 1 and 4 carries a 3,000-word Eva Cobejova article entitled "Will There Be a New Bishopric at Komarno?" The article deals with the latest cause of "unrest in southern Slovakia"—the demand of Hungarian Catholics for their own bishopric in Komarno. The demand for a separate Hungarian bishopric in southern Slovakia is also the subject of an 800-word "excerpt" from a Roman Kalisky article, entitled "Whitsun Storm at Komarno," carried by Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 11 June on page 13. The excerpt is reprinted from issue No. 23/1991 of LITERARNY TYZDENNIK, a Slovak cultural weekly.

The SMENA article discusses the background and course of the "Second Sunday of Prayers for a Komarno Bishopric" held at Komarno on 12 May. (The first Sunday of prayers in support of Hungarian Catholics' demand for a bishopric at Komarno was reportedly held in 1990 and was attended by 17,000 people). As the author points out, the 12 May rally—which was organized by the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement—was "ignored by the Slovak press," including CTK. Only Slovak National Party deputies raised the subject in the Slovak National Council, charging that the event was a "political action" and a "violation of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic." According to Cobejova, there is a "fear among Slovaks" that, once the bishopric is established, the "Hungarian side might endeavor to subordinate the Komarno Bishopric to the Esztergom Archbishop, which would indeed violate our state sovereignty."

The author explains that the official Catholic Church dissociated itself from the "Sunday of prayers." One week before the event, the Catholic weekly KATOLICKE NOVINY and the Hungarian-language religious weekly REMENY published a brief statement by Jan Sokol, archbishop of Trnava and metropolitan of Slovakia, stating that "the Sunday of prayers for the establishment of a Komarno Bishopric to be held at Komarno on 12 May is not taking place on church initiative, nor has its holding been approved by the church." Because of the Slovak metropolitan's stand, none of the invited official guests and no Catholic bishops attended the event. The mass was celebrated by Kristof Hites, "a priest from Canada to whom the Trnava archbishop's instructions do not apply." When Laszlo Tokes, the reform bishop from Romania who had come to Komarno at the organizers' invitation, "discovered that he was, in fact, the only church dignitary present, he refused to participate in the mass and sent a letter of explanation to the praying crowd. In the letter he said that, in view of the complicated situation of Hungarians in Romania, a speech by him at Komarno would harm the cause of the Hungarian minority in Romania, as well as Czechoslovakia."

Turning to the course of the event itself, Cobejova says that attendance fell short of expectations. The organizers speak about 20,000 to 25,000 participants but "Slovak activists from the Komarno organization of the [Slovak] Christian Democratic Movement put the number of participants at 3,000 to 4,000." Speaking about the demands voiced at the

rally, the author says: "In a petition [signatures for which were being collected at Komarno] Hungarian Catholics demand that a new diocese be established in southwestern Slovakia, with seat at Komarno. They demand that, in order to enhance the religious life of Hungarians falling under the jurisdiction of the Roznava Bishopric, the resident bishop of Roznava be chosen from among Slovak and Hungarian priests on a rotating basis. And they propose that the relatively small but compact bloc of Hungarian believers living in the eastern part of the state (around Kralovsky Chlmec and Velke Kapusany) be annexed to the Komarno Bishopric as an extraterritorial area."

In a brief interview with the SMENA correspondent, Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, denies that the Hungarian Catholics' aim is to subordinate the Komarno Bishopric to the Archbishop of Esztergom: "We want a bishopric that would be subordinate to the Trnava Archbishopric, not the one at Esztergom. The bishop at the head of the Komarno Bishopric should, above all, attend to the education of new Hungarian priests, of whom we have very few. If the present trend continues, there will be no Hungarian priests in Slovakia 10 or 20 years from now." Bugar also rejects the charge that the 12 May rally was "political in nature." He says that priests were forbidden to organize the "Sunday of prayers" and that, consequently, it had to be organized by his political movement. No other Hungarian organization in Slovakia would be credible to Hungarian believers as organizer because CSEMADOK [Hungarian People in Czechoslovakia Cultural Union] is a cultural organization, the "Coexistence" movement has in its ranks many former communists, and the Hungarian Independent Initiative is "liberal oriented." Bugar deplores the Trnava archbishop's opposition to the event, saying that "people were disappointed by it."

The Roman Kalisky article in Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak describes the atmosphere at the 12 May Komarno rally, which it calls "a perfectly staged political action." The author objects, above all, to the display of Hungarian flags and to the singing of the Hungarian national anthem in the main square of the Slovak town.

In concluding, Kalisky says: "This was the third time this year that the Hungarian national anthem was sung at Komarno. The first time, it was sung on 15 March [national day in Hungary] and for the second time on 5 May, while a statue of General Klapka, a Kossuth supporter, was being unveiled.

"On my way home I pondered what can and should be done about this, whether the highest bodies of the Slovak Republic are blind and deaf, or whether they are powerless. My, and not only my, questions and doubts were 'dispelled' a few days later by Minister of Interior Mr. Pittner when he said in the Slovak National Council that we do not have any legal regulations for such cases. I am grateful for that explanation. But I can vividly imagine what would happen if thousands of Germans started to regularly congregate in, for example, Cheb, Karlovy Vary, or Liberec [towns in northwestern Bohemia that used to be inhabited mostly by Germans] with 'Deutschland, Deutschland ueber Alles....' on their lips. I

already know the official Slovak reply. It would be: That is something completely different...."

Law on Religion Drafted, Sect Outlawed *AU1206075791*

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech and Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 7 June both publish reports on a joint meeting of the Federal Assembly's Social Affairs and Culture Committees held in Prague on 6 June. The meeting debated the government-sponsored "draft law on the freedom of religion." The draft was explained by Cyril Svoboda, "adviser to Federal Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Miklosko on church affairs."

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 7 June on page 2 carries a 250-word "nig"-signed report on the meeting. According to the report, the draft law does not provide for the separation of church and state. Svoboda is quoted as having said that "the separation of the church from the state is outdated and exists only in two states in the world—the United States and France. Not even the church seeks separation from the state in our country today." Besides, separation would require the restitution of all church property, including property confiscated under the first land reform after World War I. The "crucial reason" is, however, that the state depends on the church for the provision of some social services.

Svoboda also discussed religious instruction in schools: "He told the deputies that in the Czech Republic religion is an elective subject for which no grades are given. In Slovakia there is a tendency to introduce religion as a compulsory subject. But in view of the fact that even a strongly Catholic country such as Italy does not have compulsory religious instruction, everything suggests that these demands are not likely to succeed."

Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 7 June on page 2 carries a 300-word CTK report on the meeting. According to the report, the draft law "defines conditions under which a church can be registered in our country. The main condition is compliance with the Constitution and valid laws. This is also one of the reasons why Jehovah's Witnesses have not been registered in our country thus far."

Slovak Church Loses Out to Greek Catholics *AU1306194091 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak* *12 Jun 91 p 2*

[CTK report: "The Decision Caused a Commotion in the Orthodox Church"]

[Text] Presov—There is still no let up in the dispute surrounding the property and legal settlement between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches in East Slovakia. On the basis of a decision made by the government plenipotentiary with responsibility for this issue, court proceedings were initiated. On the basis of these proceedings, the Orthodox Church had to hand over keys from rectories and churches to the Greek Catholics even in communities where the majority of believers are of the Orthodox faith. In some cases they have refused to accept the court's decision for which they have been financially penalized. The Orthodox

Church Council of Archdeacons also expressed its indignation at this situation at its meeting in Presov yesterday. Imrich Belejkanic, director of the Orthodox Church's Presov eparchy, said the following about the situation: "Government Plenipotentiary Adolf Smolik's decision is at variance with Paragraph 2 of Slovak National Council legal measure No. 211/1990 and virtually means the destruction of the Orthodox Church and the 75 so-called majority communities in it, for example, Ublo, Ulic, Vyrava, Vydran, and others. This parallels the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church by the Communist regime in 1950, but this time in a declared democratic state."

First Professional Border Guards Deployed *AU1406163191 Prague CTK in English 2109 GMT* *12 Jun 91*

[Text] Zelezna Ruda 12 June (CTK)—The first 15-km section of the Czechoslovak state border is being patrolled by professional troops from today.

The 20-man unit of professional border police guards is based at Debrnik near Zelezna Ruda on Czechoslovakia's western border with Germany.

Until now border duty has been performed by soldiers doing their regular military service. A retraining center is being simultaneously opened for Border Guards in the area.

"The present mixed system of defense by professionals and army recruits should turn fully professional within two years along the entire Czechoslovak border," said Border Guard Commander Major-General Karel Rysavy. "We intend to replace three soldiers doing obligatory military service with one career soldier," he added. One professional unit will replace two or three platoons, each guarding a 4-km section at present.

Public Confidence in Army Seen Rising *LD1406111391 Prague Federal 1 Television Network* *in Czech 2005 GMT 13 Jun 91*

[Text] While 43 percent of our adult population trusted the Czechoslovak Army in May last year the number increased to over 55 percent in April this year. This is mentioned in the part made public of an answer sent by Defense Minister Lubos Dubrovsky to Michal Maly, deputy of the Federal Assembly, to his 23-page interpellation. Unequivocal distrust in our army was expressed by less than one fifth of our population.

The report also says that almost 90 generals and several hundred other officers with the closest links to the totalitarian regime have left the army. This year alone, over 150 army regiments were disbanded or relocated. Basic national service should be shortened to 12 months as of the 1 November 1993. This information has been earmarked for publication.

Nevertheless, when we visited the Federal Assembly today we were more interested in a more extensive, secret part of Minister Dobrovsky's answer to the deputy's interpellation.

[Unidentified speaker] My personal view is that about 5 percent of the 60-page answer deserves its strictly secret stamp but employees of the 8th department of the Defense Ministry said that the answer as one entity was subject to state secrecy. This more or less means that we are unable to publish even answers to questions about the sale of the army's property, about sport activities in the army, etc., which I asked about.

Finance Minister Klaus Defends Policies

*PM2305085191 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 19 May 91 p 5*

[Interview with Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus by Richard Swartz; place and date not given]

[Text] [Swartz] Herr Klaus, what are you really today—an economist trying to play politics or a politician who must also devote time and energy to the economy?

[Klaus] Probably neither the one nor the other. I am this country's finance minister, that much is very clear—someone who is trying to fundamentally reshape the Czechoslovak economy and replace the old planned economy with a market economy. In that sense I am an economist.

But this enormous transformation cannot be carried through in a purely technical manner, simply by making decisions about things like tax rates, exchange rates, and base rates. In order to build a new economic order you have to make sure of winning the necessary political support. That is the reason why I happen also to have become a politician.

[Swartz] Were you forced to become one?

[Klaus] Yes, I was forced. I would have been happy if there had been one strong politician in Czechoslovakia on whom I could have relied; then I would have been able to make do with the role of expert or economic technocrat. But there is no such politician in this country. That is why I was forced to take on that role myself.

[Swartz] Not an entirely risk-free role, I would guess. For people here in Czechoslovakia you are now not only an economist, but also a politician, in actual fact the leader of the biggest party in parliament. Is there not therefore a great risk that your party will be the loser in the elections next year if you as finance minister cannot point to economic successes before then?

[Klaus] I do not take as pessimistic a view as you. You ought to know that there is no possibility at all of achieving those major economic successes you are talking about in the space of a year. I try to tell people this—I make speeches, write articles, give interviews, and travel back and forth across the country with this very message. No one else in Czechoslovakia is doing anywhere near as much as I am to get people to understand that the changes will not come overnight, but that we must march on in one and the same direction nevertheless.

[Swartz] Would you agree that what is paradoxical in the present situation is that people are aware of the need for changes, but are not ready to give them the time needed for their implementation?

[Klaus] No, I do not think that the situation in Czechoslovakia is as bad as that. People are always discontented. It is the same everywhere: Man is by nature critical. But this does not mean that people here reject the reforms—I would really like to emphasize that. You only hear such a line from a section of the press and from leftwing intellectuals, not from the man in the street. And the critics in the press exaggerate his fears.

[Swartz] But the man in the street is often afraid of the unknown. There you stand—the man who will lead Czechs and Slovaks into the modern Europe, into postmodern Europe, yet I wonder whether it is not possible to detect, at least among the Slovaks, a national policy emerging which prefers the old and familiar to the unknown and which will therefore reject your grand design?

[Klaus] Yes and no. I think that people in Slovakia are making use of economic arguments for their nationalist goals, not because they actually really believe in what they say. People claim that Slovakia is suffering economically in comparison with other parts of Czechoslovakia, and they do so because it suits them and sounds good, not necessarily because it is true. And it is not! Also, I think it would be difficult to claim that the resistance to the reforms has increased in Slovakia. Strong and firm resistance there is, but has it increased? It is certainly the case that those who oppose the reforms are no more numerous than they were at the outset.

[Swartz] Perhaps the Slovaks' resistance is less about the economy and more about the fact that the Czechs, often unconsciously perhaps, insult their national pride? Perhaps it is more about psychology than the economy....

[Klaus] Possibly, but I at least am not one of those who insult them. Also, my wife is a Slovak.

[Swartz] But they are very critical of you in particular. Perhaps in your capacity as minister?

[Klaus] In my capacity as minister I have done more for Slovakia than anyone else in this country. It is true that some public figures and Slovak politicians abuse my name: They have made me the scapegoat for everything between heaven and earth. But the fact is that I have to spend more time fighting the Czech than the Slovak government, that on the Czech side people have made more of an effort to try to block the reforms and grab a bigger share of the joint budget. This means that I have fought more against the Czechs, and I believe that the majority of Slovaks are aware of this.

[Swartz] Are you not really rather alone in your fight? Czechoslovakia is after all a state with very strong—shall we call them social democratic?—traditions, and it now has a strong social-liberal wing within the government: It is

perhaps enough to mention Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier's name. And President Havel does not understand economics that well. Also, he is not exactly a man of quick decisions, is he?

[Klaus] A lonely struggle.... That was nicely put; I must admit I like your description. But the question is whether it is correct. In a certain sense I am alone and isolated within this country's leading elite, and this makes my task terribly difficult, but I am not alone in the country. It is out there among people that I have my support; but still, some of what you say is correct—I do not think that even in the future I will be able to count on real support from the political establishment.

[Swartz] And what about the support from the West? Are you satisfied with the material aid Czechoslovakia has received so far?

[Klaus] First, we are not begging for any material aid: We have to help ourselves, and this is the sermon I always preach when I address my fellow countrymen. Second, there is an enormous gulf between ceremonial speeches in the West and what people there are actually doing for my country. An enormous and, for me, depressing gulf! But I am not complaining....

[Swartz] Unlike some other East Europeans....

[Klaus] ...You live in Vienna, don't you, and Western aid is like the whipped cream on the Sacher torte. It is merely a dollop on top. We Czechs and Slovaks have to bake the cake itself without any help, by ourselves.

[Swartz] Is it really only a matter of whipped cream, now that Poland has had a large part of its foreign debts remitted? Is it a case of help for self-help or is it perhaps a case of cream which could turn sour later?

[Klaus] What has happened is very depressing. Depressing because it is completely the wrong signal to give to other countries in debt.

[Swartz] Is it not just that you are jealous of the Poles?

[Klaus] Not at all. I simply do not understand it. I am very surprised.

[Swartz] But the Poles are happy. Your counterpart, Leszek Balcerowicz, is hailing it as a real step forward.

[Klaus] Of course! But I consider it wrong, precisely because there are many other countries around the world which have much bigger problems with debt than Poland. Why favor one country when there are ten others which have much greater problems? We know that the Poles have a very strong and active lobby in the United States. We do not work like that. And on this point we want to remain different.

[Swartz] You are touching on what is probably really a question of mentality. Perhaps Czechoslovakia—or the Czechs at least—has a slight advantage over other nations in East Europe because it was so clearly and for so long a part of urban, industrialized Europe? At least if we accept that people are shaped in part by their culture and history?

[Klaus] I am convinced that there is a *homo economicus* in each and every one of us; if we create new frameworks and tear down old obstacles, our behavior changes as a result. But I do not believe in some sort of *homo Sovieticus* who is supposed to have developed at least partly here in Czechoslovakia and who is now supposed to be acting like a brake on developments. There is no such creature. I cannot see him, but I can see the daily changes for the better in people's behavior in this country.

[Swartz] In Czechoslovakia's day-to-day life you are probably the one who carries the greatest practical responsibility for the change of system here in this country. What would you describe as your greatest success and what your greatest defeat?

[Klaus] My greatest success is that I—and I really can say "I"—have succeeded in convincing my fellow countrymen of the necessity of reforms, of a change of system.

[Swartz] Was that difficult?

[Klaus] Yes, it was difficult. But I would dare to assert that I succeeded. It is my name that is associated with this policy, whether people admire or hate me. And this policy which my name represents is already a part of our country's history.

On the other hand I have been less successful when it has come to persuading other leading politicians to support my policy. Take, for example, the "little privatization," the sale of small and service companies to the general public! The initial results are encouraging, but now President Havel is worrying that everything is moving too slowly for his taste. Things are going more slowly than he had thought. But what can I do about it? I myself am satisfied. After all, I know that things take time. Nothing in this world can be changed overnight.

South African Business Delegation in Prague

AU1206134191 Prague CTK in English 1246 GMT
10 Jun 91

[Text] Prague 10 June (CTK)—A delegation of South African business representatives met today with Czechoslovak partners to discuss possible contacts especially in the paper, chemical, food, mining, engineering, and building industries.

The meeting was organized by the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Federal Ministry for Foreign Trade in cooperation with the South African General Consulate in Prague.

The delegation, which arrived in Czechoslovakia last week, is led by Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Stef Naude.

New State Oil Pipeline Company Founded

LD1406193391 Prague CTK in English 1718 GMT
14 Jun 91

[Text] Bratislava 14 June (CTK)—A new state-run joint-stock company Transpetrol to manage oil pipeline systems in Czechoslovakia was founded today when Slovak

Industry Minister Jan Holcik and director of the "Benzina Praha" state enterprise Jiri Hrdy signed the relevant agreement.

Benzina Praha has thus far administered the oil pipeline network at the federal level.

The board of directors of the Bratislava-based Transpetrol will have six members representing the Slovak Republic (the smaller of the two constituent republics which make up the Czechoslovak Federation), three representing the Czech Republic and two representing the Federation.

Holcik said that in view of the fact that 73 per cent of the oil pipeline network in Czechoslovakia runs across Slovakia, the Slovak Industry Ministry will have a share of 2,020 million crowns of the 2,755 million basic capital of the company.

Transpetrol will receive oil from foreign suppliers and distribute it to Czechoslovak refineries. It will also maintain the oil pipelines in Czechoslovakia and build strategic oil storage tanks.

Holcik said oil pipelines in Slovakia have not been reconstructed since 1962 though about 13 million tons of oil flow through its territory annually. Czechoslovakia also serves as a transit territory for Soviet oil. All profits from this service have gone to Prague, Holcik added.

He said that this year, the Soviet Union will supply to Czechoslovakia 7.5 million tons of oil. Another three million will be brought to Czechoslovakia through the Adria pipeline from Iran, and also from Nigeria according to a preliminary agreement. The agreement was signed during the visit of Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa to Nigeria earlier this year.

Slusovice Cooperative Ceases Operations

*AU1206132391 Prague CESKE A
MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY
in Czech 8 Jun 91 p 1*

[Report by (mak): "Instead of Slusovice, Bratislava...."]

[Text] The MOVA Slusovice Agricultural Cooperative ceased to exist as of yesterday. Discussions at ad hoc members' meetings in approximately 40 centers preceded this decision. More than 56 percent of the original agricultural combine's almost 7,000-strong membership base decided to establish an independent enterprise. A committee of DAK MOVA representatives decided to change its articles and designated Bratislava as the agricultural combine's headquarters. The new cooperative was registered at the municipal court in the Slovak capital yesterday. In other words, from yesterday on DAK MOVA Bratislava will divert a substantial part of its profits into the Slovak Republic's budget.

Sharply Differing Views on Compensation Law
 91CH0588A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
 in Hungarian 29 Apr 91 p 13

[Unattributed article: "Pro and Con; Excerpts From Published Statements and Views in the Wake of the Compensation Law's Approval"—first paragraph is UJ MAGYARORSZAG introduction]

[Text] The parliament's approval of the compensation law elicited unparalleled sharp statements from various political and trade union organizations. The final results of the vote were received with perceivable relief by members of the government coalition, and triumphantly by members of the FKgP [Independent Smallholders' Party]. Here we provide excerpts from opinions that welcome the legislation, support its implementation, or oppose the new law. A certain amount of time will probably be needed for angry feelings connected to the compensation to subside, leaving room for sensible arguments.

Head of the Government and MDF Chairman Jozsef Antall:

"In legislating the compensation law, a very significant statute was created from the aspect of ownership in Hungary, for the possibility of reprivatization, i.e., the reclaim of earlier property, was completely and unequivocally eliminated. From now on, no old property can be reclaimed in the future; in accordance with the law, only the form of partial compensation can be applied. At the same time, the legal uncertainties originating from the lack of regulations regarding property were eliminated through the legislation of the compensation law, resulting in greater confidence in Hungary by foreign investors.

"The legislation of the compensation bill proposal contributed not only to Hungary's political stabilization but also to the improvement of cooperation between the coalition partners. Both the debate on the bill and the parliament's vote proved again that the government's camp is solid, maintaining its approximate 60-percent majority in legislation. The law created after the debate reflects the views of all three coalition partners. At the same time, the parliament's debate also showed that the coalition has a solid opposition, in legislation."

FKgP Chairman Ferenc Jozsef Nagy:

"The legislation of the compensation law is an unequivocal success, especially with regard to the land issue. It is due to the party's consistent work, to the faction's new type of working methods, to the decisiveness of the new leadership that has been working since December, and to the fact that the experts also grew to the task. We could not have achieved more with our 12 percent in the parliament, and we certainly could not have achieved this at all by siding with the opposition. The FKgP's most important demands were also approved by the other coalition parties and, thus, 90-92 percent of those concerned will get back all of their land."

Ministry of Finance Deputy State Secretary Jozsef Thuma:

"It cannot yet be exactly assessed what effect the compensation law's implementation will have on state debt or on

inflation. Compensation is expected to transfer state assets worth about 100 billion forints into private hands, and this sum, earmarked for paying state debts, will no doubt be missing from the national budget. This means that state debts will remain higher by this amount, burdened with an annual interest of 9 percent. This interest will have to be continuously paid by the budget, i.e., tax-paying citizens and entrepreneurs. The present state debts are estimated to amount to almost 1,300 billion forints, and the government wants to pay back these debts primarily through incomes stemming from privatization. These incomes do not replenish the present budget; instead, they are earmarked for decreasing state debts that have swollen to a significant amount during the course of the past years.

"The administration connected with compensation will be expected to increase budget expenditures by hundreds of millions of forints. Compensation offices must be set up, the compensation vouchers [bonds] will also cost money, and extra staffing of land offices will also be needed.

"It is still difficult to assess today what effect the present form of compensation will have on the increase of inflation; the danger exists at any rate. Conceivably, some personal deposits in the banks and at the OTP [National Savings Bank] will be used for purchasing compensation vouchers, and the sellers of bonds will use the money to buy various consumer goods. This may elicit an extra increase in total consumption that is not included in the plan, and this may become a significant factor of inflation. At present, the total amount of personal expenditures is about 1,000 billion forints annually. If, for instance, bank deposits worth 20 billion would be used for consumption in this way, that could increase the rate of inflation by 2 percent annually.

"Compensation vouchers will also be marketed at the stock exchange so that its rate of exchange can be continually registered. This will reduce the danger of exchanging compensation vouchers way below price. Incidentally, the government consciously wants to protect the bonds' exchange rate by offering state property for privatization."

National Nature Conservation Office Director Janos Tardy:

"Adopting the proposal of the parliament's Environmental Protection Committee, the compensation law puts a limit on returning protected nature reserves."

Quotation from the lead article, *The Celebration of Land Repossession*, published in the FKgP's HETI KIS UJSAG [Small Weekly Newspaper]:

"The opposition almost unanimously rejected the idea of compensation, including that of returning land. The vote unequivocally showed on what side everyone stood, for no matter who says what, the compensation law, despite its many contradictions and questionable details, is a real achievement. It completely returns the land to more than 95 percent of the 1947 land owners and their descendants and spouses.

"Thus, those who in the end voted against the compensation law, voted against returning the land!"

"After the preprivatization law, which was voted on in a treacherous way, the ideal of reprivatization and the returning of lands had to be brought back from the grave through relentless political struggle."

SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] Chairman Janos Kis:

"We think the Constitutional Court was justified earlier, and we accepted it with understanding, in not wanting to take a stand regarding the compensation bill, no doubt because it did not want to become part of legislation and, thus, overly politicized. At the same time, the SZDSZ thinks that it is extremely important to eliminate any doubt as to the new compensation law's constitutionality. Thus, in case the president does not wish to exercise his right to appeal to the Constitution Court, the SZDSZ will request a review of the law."

"The SZDSZ reckons with grave economic and social consequences in the aftermath of the passage of this law. It must accept this new legislation but it feels responsible for directing attention to the difficulties and for calling the government to account regarding their solution."

FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth] Parliamentary Representative Bela Glattfelder:

"The FIDESZ continues to think that the compensation law will precipitate extremely disadvantageous processes in Hungary's economy. The compensation law's legislation was motivated not by real economic factors but much rather by the need to keep the coalition together. Under the present economic conditions, the circulation of compensation vouchers should by all means be kept within limits. It would be sensible to make the exchange of bonds received as compensation possible only if inflation stays below 15 percent."

MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] Parliamentary Representative Laszlo Bekesi:

"The expected effect of the compensation law is an economic catastrophe. Stirring up a new social unrest in a country already burdened with internal social tensions is not the only danger; the primary danger is the economic consequences which no one is really willing to face."

"We are throwing out the window not 100 billion but 150-200 billion forints worth of state property value. Most compensated people need money. The stock exchange is expected to be flooded with compensation vouchers, and that will drastically suppress the exchange rate of state property as a whole. The equivalent of bonds purchased at a lower exchange rate will be manifest in a strong demand on the domestic market but without the backing of goods or services. The new runaway inflation so generated will only supplement the agricultural price increase originating from the sales or leases of returned lands. These consequences, even by themselves, may turn the year 1991 upside down as the economy is already being threatened by dangers such as a dramatic increase in unemployment, the expected bankruptcy of the local governments of towns with more than 12,000 inhabitants, and the domino effect of central price increases."

National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives and Producers Secretary General Dr. Janos Eleki:

"The passing of the now-familiar compensation bill elicited great response in the circle of members and workers of agricultural cooperatives. The membership perceives this legislation a justification of its fear, repeatedly expressed earlier by the trade union organizations, that legislators wish to remedy the earlier injustices and grievances at the expense of the membership's living conditions, with another unjust regulation that violates owner's rights of cooperatives and their members."

"The legislative solution related to arable land not only represents an intolerable reduction of living space but also undermines the citizens' trust in the constitutional state. The method of compensation related to arable land turns those qualified for compensation against the one million co-op members who cultivate the land at present; this may become another permanent source of social tensions. The reorganization of the structure of ownership and use of arable land without reckoning with realities jeopardizes the country's continuous food supply and, thus, social stability."

MSZP Chairman Gyula Thurmer:

"With this step, the government coalition crowned its activity which has not been too positive until now. The MSZP continues to maintain that this law opens up old sores and inflicts new ones. The government coalition 'sowed wind and is reaping the whirlwind' through the compensation law. And the MSZP would like to protect society from this storm. This is why we agree with the FIDESZ that the president should initiate a normal control at the Constitutional Court in connection with the compensation law. Beyond all this, the MSZP thinks that implementation of the law should be suspended at least until the completion of the fall work in agriculture."

Union of the Defrauded Executive Chairman Zoltan Somogyi:

"As an organization of interest representation, we were shocked in seeing that legislation reached the bottom in its one-year activity. The so-called compensation law, passed on 24 April, divides Hungarian society and turns citizens against each other to an unprecedented extent. In addition, the desirable regulation of ownership has not progressed either, for onetime owners will not accept the humiliating compensation vouchers and, thus, investors will continue to face legal uncertainties."

"We trust that the president will have the wisdom to exercise his right to norm control and will not allow this parliamentary decision, which is detrimental for everyone, to go on its destructive way. We also trust that the FKgP membership will sober up from their euphoria its opportunistic leaders who place their individual interests before the membership. We continue to have confidence in the emergence of a constitutional state and in a government and Parliament that will not be indifferent toward the country's interests."

Alliance Warns Against General Strike

*LD0906072191 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 8 Jun 91*

[Text] The SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] warns that calling for a general strike can only be a last resource even amid the increasing social tension. As known, the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions called for a national strike to be held on 13 June. However, neither the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions nor the National Association of Workers' Councils would lend their support. In its now published statement, the SZDSZ also warned that strikes should not become a means of competition between trade unions. However, in its statement, the biggest opposition party noted that there is no progress in the management of the economic crisis and that the number of families on the brink of impoverishment and that of the unemployed in Hungary is continuously increasing.

Torgyan Allegedly Financed by Communist Interests

*91CH0599A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
3 May 91 p 824*

[Article by Gyorgy Kakukk reprinted from KURIR 24 April; page not given: "Torgyan and the Communists; Who Is Financing the Smallholders Chief?"]

[Text] Jozsef Torgyan is preparing to become party chairman. The closer next weekend's general steering committee meeting gets, where they will decide who the number one person of the Smallholders Party will be, the more intensely he campaigns. He wants desperately to become chairman.

He uses the simplest way to accomplish this: going around, calling people communists left and right, lashing out at the political survivors and the plunderers of the people. And the people who fill the public auditoriums and sports halls believe him. His popularity remains undiminished. Yet if they only knew that Mr. Torgyan is bankrolled by the very people he never neglects to mention—in a rather negative light—in his speeches... Yes, it seems that Jozsef Torgyan is sponsored by former communists.

The story began—in public, at least—when, to everyone's great astonishment, following his speech at the Physical Education Teachers' University, Torgyan hopped on a plane and flew off to Gyula. This happened at the beginning of March, and immediately there were speculations about where the money had come from for such expensive travel. Torgyan himself was quick to announce that his little "flying getaway" had not been financed from party coffers. An interview published in the 11 Mar issue of NEPSZABADSAG unveiled the mystery. It revealed that Thermos Aero, Ltd., was treating the Smallholders boss to flying accommodations, sparing no expense. The managing director—and only member—of the one-person partnership, Jozsef Vanyo, himself a former pilot, explained: "We only operate the plane; it is owned by Thermal Invest, Inc., whose vice president is Mr. Andras

Kocsis, who is also a consultant to Kockazat, Inc. It is at his request that we are transporting deputy Torgyan."

Well now, so it is Andras Kocsis who is pulling the strings from behind the scenes. He, the former KISZ [Communist Youth League] functionary-turned-manager, and owner of several companies! The man, who after the enactment of the partnership law, and upon identifying its loopholes, proceeded to "launder" various state holdings, including of course those belonging to the former MSZMP [Hungarian Workers Socialist Party]. In 1988, he founded the already mentioned Kockazat, Inc., a joint American-Hungarian enterprise.

He holds 51 percent of the company's fixed assets, and thus is the majority shareholder. The company was registered in Kecskemet, where it continues to maintain a phantom office, from where the lady answering the phone immediately refers me to a Budapest address in the 11th district. This is where the company actually conducts business from. We should mention here—for this will become important later—that the foreign partners in Kockazat, Inc., is a gentleman by the name of Charles McFerren, based in Vienna, who has business connections in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Well, one of Mr. Kocsis' other firms, Thermal Invest, specializes in buying old castles and "sanitizing" former party resorts. Thermal Invest's shares are held by various local agencies and several dozen private persons, members of the Bekes county party and KISZ elite and associates of the former local council organs. They, of course, have only invested a token sum of a few ten-thousand forints in the business. So it looks like state property was in fact brought into the company, and people became equal partners, who should have been looking out for the interests of the state. The Chief Prosecutor's office, incidentally, challenged the validity of Thermal Invest's registration records, but after a half year of give and take, the matter was satisfactorily resolved for Kocsis and his associates. After all, they had only been taking advantage of loopholes, which was not illegal. This was further underscored by Supreme Court decision number Cg. tov. 30.316/1991/3/I, which upheld the validity of the registration.

One of Thermal Invest's affiliates is a firm called Ban-Union, in which Mr. Kocsis is also majority owner, under the name Produktorg. The picture there is the same as at Thermal Invest. Thermo Aero, as I have already said, is a one-person partnership. Through various foreign trade enterprises, it has bought aircraft from the army, as well as the MEM [Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry] Aviation Service.

Mr. Kocsis' next venture was Danube, Inc. In this company Kockazat, Inc., i.e., Mr. Kocsis, holds 83 percent of the shares. Danube, Inc., is in the publishing business, and its greatest feat has been the purchase of VASARNAPI HIREK. The scandal broke into the open last year with a debate over who should own VASARNAPI HIREK. The seller of the paper was the other big "money launderer" Imre Nagy, the former communist youth leader, who since then has become an entrepreneur of the new era. He is

actually in control of several papers which his one-person partnership had bought for 1.5 million forints. These included NEPSZBADSG, ESTI HIRLAP, FIGYELO, and VASARNAPI HIREK. First he sells the paper to Mihaly Vicsotka, a kind of a strawman in this case, for 12 million forints, making him majority shareholder in the newly formed Vasarnap Publishers, Inc. Vicsotka thinks he owns the paper. The problem is that the managing director of Vasarnap Publishers, Inc. is Imre Nagy, who in effect has sold the paper to himself. Subsequently Imre Nagy announces: he never intended to sell his proprietary rights, only the publishing rights. One without the other, of course, is worthless. Then when he does decide to cash in his proprietary rights, he sells them not to Vicsotka but to his old acquaintance, Danube, Inc.

And now it appears that Imre Nagy, who is working as a manager overseeing publishing activities at Danube, Inc., will be the director of the company, starting in May. In other words, the paper will still be his, while in the meantime he has laundered a barrel of money and even profited from the deal. Getting back to Danube, Inc.: It is the company that is feverishly working to publish a book about Jozsef Torgyan in record time, before the general steering committee convenes. According to the company's present director Gabor Belan, purely business, not propaganda considerations are behind their efforts. Nor is it true, insists belan, that they are planning to give the books away for free. It is certain, however, that the author of the book is Miklos Tarjan, editor in chief of Danube's newly acquired weekly A VILAG, who comes with outstanding KISZ credentials of his own. It was on Andras Kocsis' personal orders, incidentally, that he replaced the founding editor in chief, reportedly with the instructions to popularize the world exposition in the papers columns.

In an interview he gave NEPSZABADSAG on the VASARNAPI HIREK acquisition deal last December, incidentally, he professed to be a member of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and an economic advisor to the Smallholders Party.

Well, it is impossible to tell who actually is advising the Smallholders Party, for rumor has it that Torgyan has his own economic advisor, in the person of Gabor Nikhazy. Yes, the same Nikhazy, who has earned a rather dubious reputation from his association with Lenia-Wawel, Ltd. They got caught up in a multi-million forint customs fraud scheme, connected with the certain Sopiane cigarette scam; but that is really beside the point. Torgyan must have rather close ties with Nikhazy, as the latter too was among those invited to attend Wawel, Ltd's general meeting, all expenses paid. There are rumors, furthermore, that Torgyan's trip to Taiwan had also been paid for by Nikhazy. Nikhazy, by the way, has been under indictment since 1988, which was only temporarily suspended once to allow the accused to petition for procedural clemency, a request that was immediately rejected by Arpad Goncz. Not even Jozsef Torgyan's personal intervention has made any difference.

When he does not fly, Torgyan travels by car. For a while he had the use of government vehicles, but after objections

were raised by members of his own party, suddenly he appeared driving an Audi with private plates. Paid for by Mr. Kovacs, of course. Also recently, body guards have begun to shadow him everywhere he goes. It is not hard to guess: They are also Kocsis' men.

National Security Officials on Agent Lists

AU1406092591 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
12 Jun 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Vilmos Bereczky, representative of the Independent Smallholders Party and secretary of the Hungarian Parliament's National Security Committee, and with Internal Security Group leader Jozsef Horvath, by Ildiko Saman; place and date not given: "Bereczky: This Is How To Destroy Parliament!"—first three paragraphs are NEPSZAVA introduction]

[Text] Could it be that old lists of people under observation have been mixed up with those of agents? If so, who was it that mixed up these files, and why did they do it? How many lists of agents are in circulation, and which one is authentic? Whose names should be on an list of agents, and why?

Vilmos Bereczky informed both NEPSZAVA, NEPSZABADSAG, and Radio Free Europe that he was the person behind the Palotas code name.

Indeed, in a recent article entitled "Document Shredder...." a former secret agent informed the Hungarian daily KURIR that a parliamentary delegate who had promised several revelations in the recent past was not at all an innocent angel: This delegate had in fact acted as a III/III [Interior Ministry department for domestic intelligence] agent under the code name Palotas. This man was responsible for the split in the Smallholders Party. Moreover, he had played an active role in the former opposition.

[Bereczky] I was given the name Palotas as an observed person, at the time when I joined the opposition movement. Indeed, it was not only people from the III/III network who were given code names; they also gave code names to people who were under observation. I found out later that I was given the name Palotas [castle owner] because we lived in temporary accommodation.

[Saman] When did you find out about your "nickname?"

[Bereczky] After the parliamentary elections and prior to the distribution of committee memberships, I unexpectedly received a list that had been drafted during the change of regime. To my astonishment, I found my own name on this list, as well as the names of several opposition members whom I could not possibly imagine as members of the III/III network; I still cannot visualize them as such. For example, Ferenc Koszeg was listed as "Szeges" [nailed], and Imre Mecs was known as "Mernok" [engineer]. I thought that it was my moral duty to do everything in my power to clear up this matter. That is why I applied for membership in the National Security Committee which continued with the work and hearings of the former committee led by Miklos Gaspar Tamas. That is how I came to meet with Ferenc Pallagi, Hungary's former

deputy interior minister, and former internal security group leader Jozsef Horvath. I also met with deputy heads of department and operative officers. Furthermore, I had access to files.

[Saman] Your previous statements show that you gathered precise information on the organization's functioning. Your statements also indicate that no reliable documents were left after the shredding.

[Bereczky] I have moral grounds for saying this: Everything is true and the opposite of everything might also be true. That is why I thought I should act. We were told that Miklos Nemeth [Hungary's former prime minister] had handed documents over to Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, and we also knew that these lists had been typed in triplicate. My fellow representative Pal Dragon (Dragon and I founded the first smallholders' organization in Szentendre) was the first to broach this subject with Miklos Nemeth. In October and November 1990 respectively, I informed Jozsef Antall and President Arpad Goncz that my name was on the list. I also told [Interior Minister] Peter Boross about this. Boross was also of the opinion that manipulation had taken place. What basis is there for this statement? If everything was destroyed, including the electronic data storage, and if a list still appeared after that, then there must be a reason for it, and manipulation cannot be excluded. As this dawned on me, I began to fear for Parliament and for the Hungarian Republic's system of political institutions. If nothing else works, then an opportune time bomb and the discrediting of our politicians could definitely blow up our system of institutions.

[Saman] Who drafted the list?

[Bereczky] Deputy Interior Minister Sandor Ilcsik and Jozsef Csikos drafted the list, and the files still belong to Csikos. It is from this list that names are being "leaked."

[Saman] What did Miklos Nemeth say when the list was mentioned to him?

[Bereczky] Nemeth told Pal Dragon that he had found a copy of this list on his desk and that he did not know where it had come from. He told me that Interior Ministry employees had put it on his desk, but that it was definitely a forged list. Nevertheless, he gave the list to Jozsef Antall.

[Saman] How many names are on this list?

[Bereczky] The number of parliamentary representatives on the list is irrelevant: The rumor that our Parliament houses secret agents is quite enough to destroy it. I think that people were put on the list because somebody wanted to get even with them, because they were seen as extremists. I also have an increasing tendency to believe that there is a group in Parliament that wants to use the III/III bill to conceal Hungary's domestic crisis and break up Parliament.

[Saman] Jozsef Horvath, is Vilmos Bereczky an acquaintance of yours?

[Horvath] The first time I met with Bereczky was when the National Security Committee called me in for a hearing. Incidentally, Bereczky was part of the opposition group

that we knew about. He was under observation, together with Ferenc Koszeg, Janos Kis, and Gabor Demszky, primarily because of the publication and distribution of samizdats.

[Saman] What kind of files were kept on people under observation?

[Horvath] The same kind of files as for network agents. They had cards, dossiers, and code names.

[Saman] Would you be surprised if the two registers had been mixed up?

[Horvath] No, not at all—on the contrary. It may well be that during the change of regime, they mixed up the cards. Thus, a network agent could be turned into person under observation, and vice-versa. Incidentally, I said this at my hearing.

[Saman] Could Bereczky possibly have been a secret agent?

[Horvath] I can only base myself on the fact that we did not even know about the creation of a smallholders' party branch in Szentendre. If we had had an agent there, it would have been impossible for us not to know about the creation of this branch in time. Furthermore, agents were not allowed to launch any kind of party or association, and they were not allowed to take up leading posts in new parties or associations—failure to comply with this rule would have led to immediate expulsion.

Csurka Attacked in Youth Organization Paper

*91CH0548C Budapest MAGYAR NARANCS
in Hungarian 4 Apr 91 p 1*

[Article by Andras Lanyi: "Istvan the Editor Sent the Word: Should We All Really Join?"]

[Text] "....Populist writers began with loyal service to the people, continued with the proclamation of a separate populist education, and ended with middleclass popularity." (Zoltan Szabo)

Istvan Elek tried to find out the meaning of words his fellow politicians were throwing around. Istvan Elek was silenced. First he was said to have assisted in the Napzarta [End of Day] which was actually about him. The next day he was put in the right place in the MAGYAR FORUM's columns. There Elek is said to be not only in league with the SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats] conspiracy which is aimed at dividing the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] but also Janos Kis' agent (together with Pitt's agent, CIA agent, KGB agent, Jewish agent, and a Pan-Slavic agitator). The BESZELO speaker only shrugs its shoulders. Did it take this guy this long to notice with whom he associates? Jozsef Revai is sitting on the edge of a cloud, rubbing his hands with satisfaction; so, you see, I told you that party truth is the only truth.

In his "Reply" published in the MAGYAR FORUM's 15 March issue in answer to Istvan Elek's writing, Istvan Csurka talks about "the ultimate defenselessness of the Magyar nation...in Hungary, the Magyars' central living place." Thus, a life-and-death struggle is going on between Magyar and non-Magyar Hungarians in the middle of the

Hungarian Lebensraum. But how can one differentiate between the opponents on a racial basis?

The present Hungarian nation has been molded together from many nationalities throughout the history it has lived through and the common culture it has created within the national framework. If the Magyar nation "does not completely fill the Hungarian nation," then what else besides Magyars does fill it, and how can the true Magyar stock be differentiated from the other races? Who is the opponent in the struggle between ethnic groups?

For, clearly, there must be an opponent. What else could be the basis for the demand for power by the historic class if there are no foreigners within the nation, against whom it can guard the interests of pure Magyars?

At this point the author of "Reply" that was published in the MAGYAR FORUM throws suspicion on Istvan Elek, claiming that the latter threw suspicion on him, i.e., accused him of anti-Semitism. But why would someone be labeled an anti-Semite for the mere statement (referring to the testimony of an oil sheik, a creditable source in all respects) that Hungary's Jewish party, colluding with the United States of America, which is lead by the interests of pure Jews, which, at this time, happens to camouflage itself as not communist but liberal, deceived its electorate of 1 million people and now blackmails it with the financial power of international Jews and throws the Magyars at the mercy of foreign (Jewish) interests? No! Anyone who says such things in all seriousness and discovers the secret driving force of world history in the form of international Judeo-bolshevik-plutocrat conspiracy is not necessarily an anti-Semite, but he must certainly be paranoid. But I do not suppose that this applies to Istvan Csurka. A key sentence of his article, written in italics, puts me at ease: "Thus, the issue here is the struggle for power." And nothing else.

The purpose of the theory that creates a Magyar ethnic group that is more Magyar than the nation is not to exclude fellow citizens, who are Jews by blood but Hungarians by nationality, from something that is Magyar. Its purpose is only to expose its political opponent, a Hungarian who thinks differently, as an enemy of authentic Magyars. To convince us that it is not principles and interests having equal rights that confront each other in the political arena but that standing on one side are the only authentic representatives of the clan that has been exercising its "natural historical right" in leading the nation since the Occupation of the Land, and standing on the other side is the stranger. If you want Hungary to continue to belong to Magyars, vote for the MDF!

I believe that this is not the way most MDF members think, they do not govern and vote on the basis of protecting ethnicity. It is probably more important for them to continue clarifying the basic principles, initiated by Istvan Elek, before the public.

In his writing, Csurka emphasizes two additional characteristics of the group destined by historical right to lead: it

must be Christian and middle class. He does not take a stand with regard to various possible interpretations of these concepts.

The moral and political meaning of Christianity is clear. The principle of the individual's moral responsibility and the ideal of fraternity between people, i.e., the two fundamental pillars of European thought, are very closely connected to the Christian tradition. This is also true of the liberal principle of freedom as well as of the socialist principle of solidarity. Confronting the two resulted in catastrophic consequences. It seems that freedom and solidarity are possible only together, not separately. It is a matter of life and death today to restore the harmony between the two. This is what makes the redefinition of the European Christian tradition timely. Every revival is a return at the same time.

However, a program that is both aggressively antiliberal and antisocialist cannot be Christian. It is Christian values that such a program denies or relinquishes to its opponent. Still, there is an entirely different political definition of Christianity as well which indeed rejects all kinds of liberalism and socialism. It is clericalism which questions the separation of church and state, religious life and political public life, limiting in this way the freedom of conscience; it demands a special role for the church in secular matters, and provides an ideology for the exercise of power based on authority. This was not the basis on which the present renaissance of western Christianity unfolded. It is not an accident that its representatives at home and abroad protest against the monopolization of Christian values by certain political forces against others. Hungary's political factions that proclaim to be Christian should at least take a clear stand between these completely opposing political concepts.

I am not sure I understand completely what is meant by middle class, not only with Csurka but generally in the way the MDF uses the term. I read that it has not yet congealed. This I understand. Still, what part of unspoiled Magyars are they counting on? What kind of social movement will bring the new Christian national middle class to the surface?

However, the past two decades raised a large and relatively affluent middle class, which was characterized by a strong bureaucratic dependence and selection of the unfittest. The present government is trying to put this middle class at ease and to keep it in fear at the same time. It puts it at ease by speaking of the power of the middle class. It puts it even more at ease by discretely allowing the retention of privileges, offices and assets acquired during the previous regime. True, the party state is responsible for everything, but the strata which operated the party state and which made its bundle by serving—and cheating—the regime are allowed to further increase their benefits in direct proportion to the impoverishment of wage earners.

The upper-middle bureaucracy stayed in place. More new administrative positions are being created than eliminated. Their loyalty is constantly questioned but only to increase their willingness by keeping them in fear. And

uncertainty not only stabilizes the traditional system of collective irresponsibility but also makes it totally uncontrollable, and this permits all kinds of improvisations by voluntarist politicians. In general, the old bureaucracy fits well into the new system of national leadership which does not differ as much from the old in its operation as in its ideology.

The transfer of state property into private hands has been going on for two years in such a way that in practice the small owner, the private entrepreneur (not to mention employees) is not allowed to have a share. Only the management bureaucracy of large enterprises and financial institutions has been able to become a true owner of capital within the framework of new pseudoassociations or by transferring state property into joint companies. Most of the national economy's wherewithal still belongs to those whose rule lead to the bankruptcy. Insolvent large enterprises are beginning to lay off their workers while the middle class of poststate owners provides great benefits for itself as an incentive for conducting profit-making business.

Thus, the new middle class has already emerged, but the only trouble is that it is old. It willingly makes place for the politicians of the new parties although it is also apparent that creating committee, supervisory and other sinecures for the clients of the six parties is more expensive than the single party was.

Although the existing middle class is rather historical indeed in that it is the product of the past historical period, but perhaps it is not the one to which the MDF staff in good conscience would assign the mission of saving the race in a Christian national spirit. But they are incapable of starting the processes that would foster the real transformation and restratification of society. Therefore, they are forced to accept a compromise. They do not entrust leadership to the middle classes. Instead, for the time being, leadership is entrusted to the more self-respecting part, the political vanguard, so to speak, of the future middle class. This objectively represents and embodies the interests of the Magyar ethnicity that is in extreme peril. The mission of the nonexistent historical middle class will be carried out not by the middle class but by the middle-class party that has been organized specifically for this purpose: the Hungarian Democratic Forum. By exercising its natural and historical right.

Quod erat demonstrandum. (Which was to be proved.)

State Accounting Office Controversy Discussed

91CH0643A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 6 May 91 p 8

[Interview with Katalin Rempert, Hungarian Democratic Forum member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Budget and the State Accounting Office, by L.F.; place and date not given: "The State Accounting Office Must Be Reorganized"—first six paragraphs are MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] The ASZ [State Accounting Office] Vice Chairman Laszlo Nyikors unearthed the hatchet. On the pages of UJ MAGYARORSZAG he wrote an open letter of a highly

personal character to Atilla Soos, the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] representative and chairman of the parliamentary committee on the budget. In essence Nyikos attributed to Soos the criticism leveled against ASZ.

The dispute became extremely tense after the committee chairman's 16 April questioning of the ASZ chairman in the parliament. The SZDSZ representative claimed that several recent investigations of the ASZ revealed grave abuses and irregularities. "This greatly deteriorates ASZ' prestige which has not even evolved yet," the representative said. His specific questions focused on finding out who was responsible.

At the hearing, ASZ Chairman Istvan Hagelmayer answered these questions. Part of the information implicit in the questions was received by Soos in his capacity as committee chairman, not as a simple representative. Hagelmayer denied the claim of grave abuses at the ASZ, and said that "mistakes stemmed from the fact that part of the operations were not regulated and from less than fully controlled internal operations," he said. Hagelmayer informed the representatives that responsible leaders have been subjected to disciplinary action, and he took necessary action to enable the organized functioning of ASZ.

In response to questions concerning the responsibility of leaders, Hagelmayer said that he did not feel competent to judge his deputies because they were elected by the parliament. He said that he would discuss his own activities after the ad hoc committee, which has been dealing with the ASZ, completed its investigation.

The aforementioned open letter by Laszlo Nyikos to the committee chairman was the next scene. In it Nyikos greeted Soos primarily as a member of his former academic class and charged Soos with continuous interference with "the affairs of a sovereign state institution."

We talked to MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] Representative Katalin Rempert, a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Budget and on the ASZ to clarify the dispute.

[L.F.] If the ASZ deputy chairman was correct, this would also mean that the committee chairman acted above the committee's head.

[Rempert] The interpellation must be dealt with separately from the criticism leveled against the ASZ. The fact is that at the end of last year the ASZ' report was not accepted because in practice, as a result of the applicable laws, ASZ' functioning conflicted with the Constitution, and therefore, the entire ASZ organization and its rules must be reviewed. I felt that it would have been better for Soos to argue the ASZ related issues within the committee. The way it happened there may indeed be confusion as to whether Soos spoke as an individual representative or on behalf of the committee. Similarly, Nyikos should not have gone public with his personal problem. The ASZ is essentially a nonpolitical organization; it is unfortunate to provoke a political dispute relative to this organization.

[L.F.] Nyikos claims that the ASZ is a sovereign state institution. As far as I know, the ASZ is subordinate to the

parliament, it is the controller's arm of the parliament. Why should the parliament not interfere? What is the limit of interference?

[Remport] This is precisely the issue we are debating in the Ad Hoc Committee. The whole thing is hanging a bit in the air since the authority and supervision of the ASZ, the question of who may give directions to the ASZ, has not been accurately defined. We want to clarify this matter now. And for this reason, it is premature to argue whether the ASZ is a sovereign state institution.

At present, the ASZ maintains relations with the Committee on the Budget, it submits its proposals to that committee, and for this reason the ASZ is not a sovereign state institution. Even their preliminary plans are subject to comment, and we may propose specific investigations they should conduct.

[L.F.] The fact that ASZ' 1991 budget has not been approved is painful to ASZ. Has this decision been reached by the chairman of the committee acting on his own, or by the committee?

[Remport] This was entirely a committee decision. Since then we authorized funding only until the end of the second quarter. We did not go further because we are waiting to see how the new regulations will look like. It is possible that the ASZ will need even more money, but before it receives these funds it must restructure itself and accurate rules must be established concerning its functions and authorities.

[L.F.] How do the various parties cooperate with respect to the ASZ?

[Remport] I believe that the majority feels that the state needs an independent control organization which determines whether or not the state functions well. It is yet another matter that the executive power could also establish a control organization.

[L.F.] Numerous criticisms leveled against the ASZ also emerged in the Budget Committee.

[Remport] The fact that we did not authorize the ASZ' final budget proved that the Committee also believed that the organization had to be restructured. We accepted the report filed in December which said that the ASZ' operations were not fully consistent with laws.

[L.F.] Could personnel changes at the highest level of the institution be expected as a result of the new organizational structure?

[Remport] I cannot answer this question at this time. But having only one vice chairman would be conceivable. The parliament as a whole must decide whether there will be a change regarding the chairman's person. As far as I can see, no particular objections were raised by the ruling party against Istvan Hagelmayer. Whether the ASZ should be managed collectively or by a single person, and what exactly the vice chairman's functions should be were argued even within the Ad Hoc Committee. This week the committee voted that the ASZ be managed by a single person.

Statistical Office Plans, Problems Described

91CH0600G Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian No 15, 11 Apr 91 p 9

[Article by the head of the Central Statistical Office (KSH): "Statistical Mess"]

[Text] The data content and the entire system of data collection pursued by the Hungarian statistical service must be adapted gradually to the needs of the various users of statistical data (the state, the rest of the political sphere, firms, etc.), to the growing number of data providers and to the increased ability of organizations to provide data, organizations involved in the developing Hungarian market. The situation is also made more complicated by the fact that we must adopt most of the rules established and the methodology used by EUROSTAT, the statistical institution of the United Nations and of the Common Market. Doing so is one of the conditions for becoming associated with, and subsequently joining the Common Market.

By now the 1973 law concerning statistics has become obsolete. Accordingly, a new law is needed which places the activities of the statistical service in the framework of the constitutional order and of the new institutional system.

Provides a Service

The KSH [Central Statistical Office] has developed a comprehensive work program. It has been reconciled with various international statistical organizations and with experts from the Common Market and from the OECD, as well as with the statistical offices and some central banks of quite a few countries. Providing a service will be the fundamental purpose of statistics from now on: the KSH must become a fundamentally independent information service supported by the government, without which the government and the economy cannot function.

—The transfer of international statistical norms and methodical requirements has already begun. One of the initial tasks involves the review and changing of the various branches of the Hungarian economy in a way that in its basic structure it corresponds with the EUROSTAT system, while necessarily retaining certain aspects of the system in order to permit the performance of statistical activities consistent with Hungarian conditions. Reclassification of the branches is in progress and will take effect next year.

—Data collection for statistical purposes at the retail level has changed: the gathering of sales data is based on a 15,000 unit sample taken from 100,000 shops and restaurants, including private merchants. Data collection takes place on a monthly basis.

—An increasing proportion of production is performed by companies which do not operate as legal entities, and by individual entrepreneurs. For this reason, in 1992 we also intend to expand our data collection efforts to this sphere within industry and to the construction industry.

Data collection will take place on a quarterly basis. Here too, we may count on between 14,000 and 16,000 data providers.

—Thus far, financial statements prepared by enterprises served as one of the most important economic statistical information sources of the KSH. On this basis we developed national level financial statements which provided the most comprehensive and most reliable information for the examination of real processes (e.g., gross production values, revenues, added values).

The new accounting law expected to be implemented in 1992 presents a new situation. We must somehow recover the information which will no longer be available to us. A separate data collection program will be needed to accomplish this. It may be based on representative sampling and this will have obvious financial implications. There will be no European statistics, moreover, there will be no European economic policy unless we regularly prepare a national account.

Common Interest

Data collection cannot be organized in the absence of an accurate, nationwide record of data providers. These are economic units in our case, (individual firms as well as firms which operate as legal entities).

Presently, the KSH deals only with units organized in the form of legal entities (about 30,000 units). The KSH intends to cover the data flowing from units not organized as legal entities and from individual entrepreneurs, more than 100,000 of them, by transferring and integrating data that already exists elsewhere, rather than collecting data independently.

The preparedness to provide data of small enterprises, irrespective of whether they are legal entities, and of individual entrepreneurs is extremely low, particularly in cities. Some of the entrepreneurs requested to provide data fail to return questionnaires, others outright refuse to provide data or simply fail to fulfill the request. For this reason, one of the strategic tasks of the KSH is to place its relationship with data providers on new foundations. Our goal is to make them understand that we are creating statistical data jointly, and that entrepreneurs have at least as much at stake in having statistical data of an appropriate quality as do the KSH and other users. Quite naturally, information pertaining to individual units of business will never be released by the KSH for any reason.

Increasing the computer base of statistical work is extremely important. Our present computers do not permit improvements in the currentness of statistical data, with respect to increasing the number of data providers, the transfer and further processing of data established by other institutions, and in regard to advancing deadlines. A visiting delegation of Common Market experts found last year that our level of computerization (including software) was about 10 years behind current requirements, and that it was an actual miracle that the KSH functioned at all.

For this reason, the Common market fully recognizes and supports our needs, moreover, regards our needs as an

important condition for developing a statistical system responsive to their needs. They would contribute to our system in the framework of the Phare program, but this hinges on a position to be taken by the Hungarian cabinet. Such a decision is pending.

On a Nonpartisan Basis

As soon as the needed conditions exist, very shortly I hope, we will publicize important data in the course of the year according to a predetermined schedule. This information will be made available to everyone at the same time, of course. The idea of having privileged users is inconceivable in modern, democratic countries. Not even the cabinet may be privy to learn about for example the monthly consumer price index, unemployment data or about the value of production before anyone else does. We have introduced a policy of providing information on a nonpartisan basis several months ago, all our reports are received at the same time by government organizations, parties seated in parliament and interest groups.

Methodological and organizing work is also pursued regarding standard of living, housing, social, health, and population statistics.

In this regard I must particularly emphasize the representative sampling of the labor force beginning in 1992. It will regularly provide data concerning the labor force situation, unemployment, and the structure of unemployment.

Based on a cabinet determination we will further develop our calculations and methodology applied with respect to the consumer price and wage indexes. In this context our primary task is to transform our present year/year index into an optional month/month type index. In the course of this effort we will also expand the structure and the control system of our price monitoring system. As far as wage indexes are concerned, we must calculate monthly indexes which represent the entire business sphere. Price and wage indexes thus formed will better satisfy the requirements of a market economy.

The method for calculating the existential minimum is also subject to further development. We will issue a public report concerning this effort shortly. We must also transform the system of housing statistics, which is an important branch of social statistics. Our primary task in this regard is to organize the thus far missing observation of housing market processes and their relationship to each other.

Despite the fact that in the course of reorganization late last year we reduced our workforce by more than 20 percent and as a result we increased the average wages by 20-30 percent, it is virtually impossible to hire experienced economists and other professionals due to the extremely low wages (we rank second to the lowest in the state administrative wage scale). Among the offices that I know of, the KSH receives the least amount of funds, and in recent years it is the KSH whose financial situation deteriorated most.

Some disturbances occurred recently in the course of publicizing data and information, primarily as a result of

time delays. These delays were incurred as a result of a changeover to new data collection methods that began last January. This changeover is taking place not only within the KSH, but also for example, with respect to foreign trade statistics. The method of foreign trade statistical data gathering is changing from observing enterprises to checking customs transactions, as that is customary in Europe. Data providers are not experienced with this new practice, and, as I said, their willingness to provide data is not always appropriate either. Within a short period of time people will become accustomed to data collection, and timeliness will be restored in the provision of data.

Financial Statements Reflect Turnaround

91CH0600H Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian No 15, 11 Apr 91 pp 1, 10

[Article by Dr. Dezso Suto: "The Signs of Economic Turnaround: Bulletin Based on 1990 Balance Sheets"]

[Text] Selective processes within the economy have accelerated, according to 1990 financial statements filed by firms. Both the profits and losses of enterprises were greater than in any previous year. The large number of small businesses increasingly becomes part of the economy. Virtually all of their economic indexes are better than those of large enterprises.

1990 Revenues Versus Net Income in the Individual Branches of the Economy in Percentages (1989 = 100%)

Economic Branch	Revenues	Net Income
Industry	112.3	76.8
Construction industry	106.1	28.2
Agriculture	109.2	65.8
Transportation, Communications	116.4	86.9
Commerce	114.0	120.4

In the national economy as a whole, twice as many firms prepared financial statements in 1990 than in the previous year. The number of "larger" firms with so-called dual accounting systems (firms with annual revenues in excess of 250 million forints) and of "smaller" firms with so-called simplified dual accounting (firms with annual revenues between 25 million and 250 million forints) was divided as follows:

Designation	Number of Firms Preparing Financial Statements	Increase as Compared to Previous Year	
		Number of Firms	Percentage Increase
"Larger"	5,665	+ 672	+ 13.5
"Smaller"	22,176	+ 12,717	+ 134.4
Total	27,841	+ 13,389	+ 92.6

From among the firms with sales revenues exceeding 25 million forints (which prepared financial statements)

7,510 were traditional firms previously managed in the enterprise or cooperative forms, while 20,292 firms were companies (mostly limited liability corporations), and 39 were individual entrepreneurs.

The weight of smaller business organizations became significant in the 1990 economy not only because of their number. Their performance also influenced revenues favorably in several branches of the national economy. Virtually every index (sales revenues, exports, profits, assets owned, etc.) applicable to small businesses showed more favorable results than those related to large businesses. The rapid increase in entrepreneurial ventures enhances the transition to a market economy, and at the same time shows the effects of benefits related to their establishment.

Market Switch

At current prices the net revenues of entrepreneurial ventures increased by 15.5 percent in 1990 as compared to the previous year. The rate of increase was 10.9 percent at larger firms and 91.4 percent at smaller firms. The ratio of revenues recorded by small firms shows a significant increase of 3.7 percent, representing 9.4 percent of the revenues recorded by all firms.

Inflation has accelerated, and the rate of producer price increases significantly exceeded the rate by which revenues increased. The net revenues of industrial firms exceeded the previous year level by 12.3 percent, while the price index of industrial sales increased by 20.9 percent. At the same time, however, the volume of production dropped by 8.5 percent.

Acceleration of price increases in the course of the year is indicated by the fact that while average price levels related to the domestic sale of industrial products were 24-percent higher than in 1989, the year-end price level exceeded the 1989 level by 38 percent.

The direction of export sales changed significantly in 1990. Ruble export revenues declined by 30.8 percent as compared to the previous year. (The volume of ruble exports decreased by 26 percent, while export prices increased and the exchange ratio improved by 3.2 percent.)

Despite a significant export surplus incurred in the final weeks of 1990, total export trade subject to settlement in rubles leveled out and produced a near zero balance. Differences between individual countries were significant nevertheless. Contrary to the objectives established in the economic program, accounts receivable in Soviet trade relations increased further in 1990.

The decline in exports subject to settlement in rubles is decisively the result of a constraint created by the change in the former CEMA partners' ability to deliver, receive and make payments.

Shrinking ruble exports created crisis situations primarily in processing industry firms. Plummeting export sales shook in their foundations machine industry enterprises which manufacture vehicles and instrumentation. A

number of products produced by the light industries (shoes, textiles, furniture) could not be sold.

Sales to developed industrial countries increased substantially. Firms received 22.4-percent more in revenues than they did in 1989. Although the volume of exports expanded only by 9.5 percent, export prices increased and as a result of a higher forint exchange rate (mainly the average exchange rate of currencies most heavily involved in exporting) sales revenues increased significantly.

The increased convertible currency export may be attributed to a significant extent to the greater sales volume of finished industrial goods and products having the character of materials. The fact that machinery and equipment exports increased to a greater extent, by almost 20 percent, indicates a favorable structural change.

Decline

According to the financial statements issued by firms required to prepare such statements, actual profits amounted to 355.3 billion forints, 13.8-percent more than in the previous year. Losses amounted to 75.6 billion forints, which exceeded all previous losses. The balance of profits and losses fell short of the 1989 balance by 2.2 percent.

The net income of firms amounted to 27.6 billion forints less than in 1989. This represents a 12.4-percent decline. Not including financial institutions, within larger firms using the dual accounting method the reduction in net income was even greater, which amounted to 17.9 percent.

Except for commerce and the nonmaterial branches, net income in the individual branches of the national economy declined in varying degrees. (The most significant decline in net income occurred in the construction industry. But only within the large enterprises of the construction industry. The profits of smaller construction firms exceeded the profits of large construction firms by 1.3 billion forints, or 36 percent!)

Organizational changes must be regarded as increasingly significant factors influencing the way net income takes shape. Within the "smaller" and "larger" firms which may be distinguished from each other based on their respective accounting systems one finds that while the net income of the larger firms declined by 17 billion forints or 6.3 percent, while the net income of smaller firms amounted to 10.8 billion forints, or 74.2-percent more than in the previous year.

The drastic decline in the net income of larger firms was based on increased losses amounting to multiples of the 1989 loss figures. In previous years the traditional large enterprises did not experience the kind of economic constraint they did in 1990. The total amount of losses shown in financial statements amounted to three times as much as in 1989. The number of enterprises which became loss operations also tripled.

Evolving differences between firms are also indicated by the fact that one-third, or 9,129 firms providing financial statements accounted for losses. Eleven percent of these, or

1,003 enterprises, were larger firms. Losses were recorded by 17.7 percent of the larger firms.

The net income versus revenue ratio of firms, not including financial institutions, dropped significantly by one percentage point (from 4.4 percent to 3.4 percent).

From among the factors affecting net income, varying increases in individual cost centers may be pinpointed, along with the already mentioned price indexes and sales volumes. Increased energy price levels represented great burden to a majority of the firms. Wage expenses increased by 16.4 percent, but it is noteworthy that from among all other expenses, expenses having the character of wages increased by more than 44 percent. The greatest cost increase occurred with respect to the banking expenses of firms. In 1990 these costs increased by 45.1 billion forints or by 49.2 percent as compared to 1989.

Inventories

A majority of the firms reacted in an increasingly sensitive manner to the restrictive effect exerted by inflation on solvent demand. This is shown by the fact that in general, monthly price indexes dropped following central price increases, yet some of the firms did not enforce their intent to raise prices.

As a result of the decline in domestic solvent demand (and in solvent demand payable in rubles) signs of over production appeared in certain instances. The closing inventories of larger firms increased by 4.5 percent in 1990. Sales concerns were also indicated by the fact that the inventories of self manufactured industrial products increased by 15.3 percent. In several branches inventories were significantly devalued or scrapped.

In 1990 the gross value of fixed assets was 4.9-percent higher than at the end of the previous year. The gross value of fixed assets at smaller firms increased by 53.5 percent and amounted to 120 billion forints.

The utility rate of fixed assets (net/gross value) improved from 56.9 percent to 58.2 percent at larger enterprises. Within industry the improvement amounted to 2 percentage points. At smaller firms the net/gross value of fixed assets improved from 67.9 percent to 74 percent, at smaller industrial firms the improvement amounted to 6.4 percent. Part of this improvement may be attributed to the fact that in general, at times when new companies are formed, a higher value is established for fixed assets.

On the other hand, the fact that 1990 year-end closing data for incomplete investments showed 164.4 billion forints, 12.3-percent more than in 1989 indicates the difficulties of doing business. Within industry this growth amounted to 23 percent. The total amount of short-term obligations increased by 19.4 percent. Within this ratio the total amount of short term obligations with respect to domestic transportation increased significantly by 21.9 percent.

Assets owned by firms increased by 13.4 percent in 1990. Within this percentage the assets owned by smaller firms

increased by 72.6 percent, and were valued at 220 billion forints. These increases may be credited primarily to organizational changes.

Foreign investment as part of capital stock invested in 1990 increased by 63.2 billion forints—three times as much as in the previous year. Within that, foreign investments in smaller firms multiplied by almost five times.

According to the financial statements state budgetary support provided to firms in 1990 was 12.8 percent, or 18.2 billion forints less than in the previous year.

Report on General Meeting of Major Banks

91CH0598A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
3 May 91 p 847

[Article by Tamas G. Koranyi reprinted from A VILAG, 24 April; page not given: "Bank Scandals"]

[Text] Stormy scenes were reported from last week's general meetings of two major banks. Using methods reminiscent of the plan-controlled era of economic management, the state's representative—Lajos Csepi—got his way over the protest of several hundred bitter shareholders, which will not only mean much lower dividends than planned, but also the virtually complete—and difficult to justify—decapitation of the Budapest Bank.

The commercial banks created four years ago by government decree (the Hungarian Credit Bank, which held its general meeting at the end of April, the Commerce Bank and the Budapest Bank) had inherited tens of billions of forints in more than dubious assets even before they started up.

In dividing up those assets at the end of 1986—in accordance with considerations influenced by the political connections of the then still only aspiring bank directors—Budapest Bank inherited the mountains of debts accumulated by the coal mining industry and by Ganz-Mavag; OKHB [National Commercial and Credit Bank] received the similarly difficult to collect billions of agriculture and the hospitality enterprises, and the largest of the new banks, the Hungarian Credit Bank (headed by Sandor Demjan, known back then for his outstanding party connections), ended up with the remaining bad assets of the metallurgy and machine industries.

Their inherited problems have since been compounded by new ones, as following the collapse last year of the Soviet market new, previously dependable debtors were moved over to the high-risk column of the ledger. To the delight of their shareholders, between 1987 and 1989, the commercial banks were giving out real high dividends, ranging from 12 to 17 percent. In the last couple of months—as the first figures reported according to Western norms, showing significant discrepancies between bank assets and liabilities, began to leak out—the ticking of the debt bomb has been getting increasingly louder...

All banks have bad collectible debts; in the West there are appropriate regulations prescribing the percentage (usually one to five, but in extreme cases as much as 20-50 percent) by which a bank must increase its reserves upon granting

credit to an above-average risk debtor. The problem is that Hungarian banks had no reserves when they started out, only 350 billion forints in collectible debts of various levels of risk. In foreign countries, reserves are put aside by banks from their profits before taxes, while in our country they are computed on the basis of earnings already taxed.

In the past few weeks, there have been repeated suggestions in the press and in government circles that of the three major monetary institutions, Budapest Bank (BB) is in the most critical position. At its public meeting, BB (unlike OKHB) even made public a report by the Ernst and Young company, hired to audit its books, stating that on the basis of collectible outlays it should be keeping 11.9 billion forints in reserve, while in reality it only has 6.5 billion forints in fixed assets and 1.5 billion forints in reserve capital.

It was this 11.9 billion-forint figure which the Director of the State Property Office Lajos Csepi used to protest the announced distribution of 10-percent dividends and free shares worth another 10 percent, and to go even further: he claimed that these numbers only underscored the inability of the bank's present management to help BB become a part of international finance. This is why the bank's principal proprietor, the state, has lost faith in the present board of directors, and is in the process of calling a special general meeting within 30 days to elect a new board of directors.

The barely 60-second long verdict announcement—with which the proprietor embarrassed the reputation of its own bank both at home and abroad—neglected to mention the fact that 10 billion of the 11.9 billion forint reserve requirement was actually covered by the bank's own property generated from last year's profits, or that the bank holds some 5 billion forints in securities and real estate that may serve as collateral for its collectible debts. He also failed to explain why Budapest Bank was singled out as the black sheep when the other two giants were struggling with similar problems.

After several hours of debate and compromise seeking by small shareholders, the general meeting took a vote on the dividend issue. No one had any doubt what the outcome would be, as Lajos Csepi had rejected all suggested modifications—making it clear that he had come with a specific mandate, and had no intention to change the government's decision one iota—and together with the social insurance sector and the two state-controlled trusts (the OKGT, owning 240 million forints, and the Electric Works, controlling 190 million forints worth of the shares), he held 66 percent of the total shares. So Budapest Bank will only be paying out 8-percent dividends and 7 percent in shares to its shareholders.

The scene was repeated the next day, at OKHB's general meeting, where the original 15 percent suggestion was watered down to 10 plus 5 percent (which falls far short of the original proposal, for when resold free shares issued as part of a fixed capital expansion drive, cannot fetch more than 70 percent of their face value at best.)

The lesson of the meeting was best summed up by a BB share holder enterprise director, who said: why bother next time to lease the congressional center for our general meeting, when all we really need is the room of the property office director....?

Following that dramatic general meeting, we asked Oszkar Hegedus, president and director general of that institution, to comment on the background of the personnel decision. He told us that he, too, had only heard that day about the decision, which apparently had been made the day before by the economic cabinet (Mihaly Kupa, Katalin Botos, and MNB [Hungarian National Bank] President Gyorgy Suranyi.)

He rejected the offer to resign, for he is convinced that while he may not enjoy the confidence of the state, his other shareholders have complete faith in him. He did not wish to elaborate on the possible political motivations behind the personnel decision. (As it is well known, not only did Budapest Bank invest 30 million forints in the company that publishes the progovernment daily UJ MAGYARORSZAG—as did the other major banks—but it also set up a foundation in the same amount to benefit Budapest. Katalin Botos, the minister without portfolio overseeing the banking system, did not even try to hide her views about this decision.)

Nevertheless, during the general meeting rumors began to circulate in the halls that the government already had a candidate for the bank president's post: Dr. Sandor Csanyi, the present deputy director general of the Commerce Bank. How a banker, "imported" from the competition, will be able to hold together an internationally well-connected team that had taken BB four years to build, is questionable. One thing is certain, however: The state is fortunate that the major banks' shares are not traded on the stock market, for otherwise it would take but a few days to assess the magnitude of the market losses caused by state interference.

Privatization of Book Trade Discussed

Deputy Director Interviewed

91CH0597A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
3 May 91 pp 847-848

[Interview with Istvan Fuzer, deputy director of State Book Distribution Enterprise, by (Peter); place and date not given: "Peep Show or Bookstore?"—article reprinted from ORSZAG-VILAG 24 April; page not given]

[Text] These are the final days of the State Book Distribution Enterprise; according to one of its top managers, it has only a few more weeks left at the most. What will happen after that? Today it is still difficult to really tell. It seems certain, however, that in the book trade, too, privatization is inevitable.

If the old system remained intact, the mammoth enterprises now dominating the book trade would sooner or later collapse, taking the whole profession under with them. Rumor has it that more than 60 book stores are now on death row.

"That rumor is true to the extent that under the provisions of the privatization law, businesses employing less than 10 people must be placed in private hands," explains Deputy Director of the State Book Distribution Enterprise [AKV] Istvan Fuzer. "Last September, when the parliament adopted the preliminary privatization law, we looked at our network of outlets, and identified the 64 stores that would have to be privatized. They are the ones on 'death row.'"

[Peter] Is the situation indeed that serious?

[Fuzer] Privatization does not mean that these stores will necessarily have to be closed. A network of retail stores cannot be privatized at the market price, as there is a certain threshold of profitability beyond which a book store cannot be operated as a business. To avoid having to do this, last year we worked out a modernization plan under which the AKV was to form a joint corporation with its employees. Initially the enterprise would have remained majority owner, but as the corporation proceeded to establish itself over the next two to three years, the stores would have been gradually transferred to their employees. The reason why such gradual privatization would have been considered necessary was because their workers did not have the several million forints it would have taken to buy the stores. Although they were eligible for the Existence Fund credit, they would not have been able to generate enough profit both to keep the business running, and to repay the loan.

[Peter] Is this idea no longer feasible?

[Fuzer] No, because according to the law the state cannot obtain proprietary interests in businesses employing less than 10 workers.

[Peter] Is it conceivable that we might have beer halls, peep-shows, and who knows what other kinds of profitable businesses opening up in the place of these bookstores?

[Fuzer] It is conceivable, but I very much hope that this will not be the general rule. In the privatization process book stores are considered exceptions in a certain sense, as local governments can compel new owners to retain the original profile of their businesses for up to five years, in other words, to continue selling books in places that used to be book stores.

[Peter] But will the local governments actually enforce this rule? After all, they are also short of money, and could expect greater tax revenues from more profitable businesses.

[Fuzer] We have a written statement from the 1st District municipal government, pledging to enforce the profile restriction rule. Others have made similar verbal commitments. This, of course, does not mean that all book stores will remain in business. Perhaps we do not even need all of them. In those cases, however, where we want to retain the original profile, the bidding price for the store must be determined with the understanding that in the book trade profit margins are smaller than in other businesses. And at a lower price presumably those already in the profession will also be able to make a bid.

[Peter] Isn't there a danger that in the wake of privatization bookstore selections might deteriorate, with more trash novels, thrillers, and perhaps even porno becoming available?

[Fuzer] I do not like to make predictions but I am convinced that if people in the book trade get control of these businesses there will be no such danger. There will also be trash and porno, of course, but these will be sold in special stores. In my opinion, however, in order to increase profits most businesses will move to emulate the Western book retail system. What do I mean by that? I mean that the book stores will keep their current selections, in other words, the shelves will still be stocked with technical books, dictionaries and encyclopedias, but they will be augmented by various book-related products. In other words, book stores will also be selling stationery and office supplies, depending on what the given district needs. It is also conceivable that the selection of dictionaries and language books will eventually also include electronic dictionaries.

[Peter] How do the sales clerks and managers feel about privatization?

[Fuzer] We have discussed the new situation with them. I admit that everyone is a bit apprehensive about the future for there are still many uncertainties, but most of our managers are ready to make the investment and to take the financial risk. If in addition they are also offered easier terms of payment and other allowances, then perhaps there will not be beer halls opening up in place of our existing bookstores.

First Phase To Start

91CH0597B Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 20 Apr 91 p 11

[Article by (-anyi): "Privatization of Bookstores To Begin"]

[Text] Only a few days are left before the beginning of privatization of the book trade, in the first phase of which 10 Budapest, and 15 provincial book stores are scheduled to go up for bid. This is all that one can say for certain following the Friday morning press conference at the Ministry of Culture and Education. Contrary to normal practice, the first questions did not come from the journalists present; the experts involved in the reorganization of the book trade took the lead in outlining some of the questions to which today there are still no precise, satisfactory, and most importantly from the point of view of culture, reassuring answers. While it is certain that under the rules of preliminary privatization bookstores employing 10 workers or less must be placed in private hands, there are no guarantees whatsoever that following privatization these book stores will continue to sell books. There are conflicting interests at work as there are no established statutes stating that the stores to be privatized must retain their profile. Although local governments do have the right to add such stipulations, there are questions about how low-profit operations such as book stores can compete with other business ideas, not to mention the fact that local governments are also not swimming in money.

"As a cautious and anxious step toward privatization," announced Deputy State Secretary Gyorgy Fekete, "we are—after consultation with the book distribution enterprises—opening the first 25 stores up for bid. It will be on the basis of the experiences of this first phase that we will decide how to proceed further."

Also discussed at the conference was the future of the book trading profession as a whole; it was announced that by the end of May, a decision will be made about the fate of state-controlled book publishers, and that—in order to "rescue" and preserve some of those with a distinguished past—in the interim, the larger state publishers would be given one or maybe two book stores to operate as "trade mark outlets."

Acceptance to Pentagonal Group Set for Summer
91P20353B Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
 20 May 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Poland in the Hexagonal Group, Cooperation of New and Old Democracies"]

[Text] "We have achieved one of the tasks of our foreign policy, toward which we have been systematically striving since last year. We will become part of the Pentagonal Group, consisting of Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia."

Poland is to be accepted in summer, even though her entry was decided at the current session, according to Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who informed journalists of this on 19 May at the Warsaw airport upon returning from the latest meeting of the Pentagonal Group.

"Poland is viewed by the Pentagonal Group as a country of a certain international position. We are perceived as the northernmost point of the Pentagonal Group and the stability of our position was the deciding factor in our being accepted to this organization," said Skubiszewski.

The Pentagonal Group is a regional understanding that is very important because its particular feature is the cooperation of new democracies—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and now Poland—with older democratic states that are part of Western Europe. Poland now completes this union on a north-south axis, opening new possibilities for cooperation.

The Pentagonal Group concentrates on social and economic problems, and to a certain degree, on cultural issues. There are, of course, political consultations; there are no military issues, however, but in matters of defense, only common propositions are presented.

Skubiszewski added that the acceptance of Poland into the Pentagonal Group will bring about a change in the name to Hexagonal Group.

Debate on Trans-Olse Ethnic Poles Revived
PM1706093091 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA
 in Polish 4 Jun 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Leszek Mazan: "The Trans-Olse: Lest the Arguments Over Yesterday Become Arguments Over Tomorrow"]

[Text] Bohumil Muron, mayor of Cesky Tesin, addressed a letter to Czech National Council deputies and the National Assembly Foreign Commission, and sent several more copies of the letter to Czech Prime Minister Peter Pithart and several ministries. In the letter, while protesting his respect for freedom of the press, Muron voices a sharp and resolute protest against a series of articles carried by GLOS LUDU, the Polish language paper published in the Trans-Olse region, which, he claims, "could lead to a state of destabilization in the region." As an example, he quotes from a "pseudohistorical" article by Professor Wieslaw Balcerak of the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of History.

Prof. Balcerak recalls in his article that on 23 January 1919 "Poland's exposed southern border came under an armed Czech attack, which violated an agreement reached by the two countries a little earlier, on 3 November.... Thousands of Poles were killed, and tens of thousands more were forced to emigrate to Poland." The Czech seizure of the Trans-Olse was made possible by Poland's involvement in a war against Bolshevik Russia.

Prof. Balcerak goes on to say that discrimination against the Trans-Olse's Polish population continued until 1938, when these territories were returned to the motherland, and he argues that the time has come to finally lay the ghost of "the myth" that Poland supposedly dealt a "knife-in-the-back blow" to Czechoslovakia. Contrary to the widely held popular belief, not only was the issue of the Trans-Olse region not on the agenda of the Munich conference, but its cession to Poland was actually proposed by President Benes in a letter written to President Moscicki on 22 September 1938, that is, a week before the Munich conference. The Polish ultimatum of 30 September 1938, demanding an immediate return of the Trans-Olse region (instead of allowing for a two-month delay, as the Czechs had suggested), was the result of their concern that the Germans might invade the area.

Further on, Prof. Balcerak states that those Czecho-Slovak citizens who were ethnic Polish nationals paid for all this with the loss of their confiscated property and by being forced to suffer repressions, the denial of their ethnic and national status, and various forms of persecution, which became particularly intensive after the 1948 communist accession to power and which were, in any case, a continuation—in a much more brutal and uncompromising mode—of the persecution they suffered before the war. The professor quotes a number of concrete and distressing documented cases of such persecution. None of these examples are news to the Trans-Olseans, whereas to the Czechs—who, even today, are brought up in the hatred of "the policy perpetrated by Beck and that Fascist, Pilsudski"—they are a shocking revelation.

Mayor Bohumil Muron reminds the Prague authorities that these kind of facts cited "out of context" are quoted and printed at the Czech taxpayers' expense (since Polish-language press publications are subsidized by the state). He also proposes that the government and parliament, assisted by historians and other scholars and with the participation of the Polish side, should publish an official, definitive historical interpretation of the history of the Trans-Olse region. Mayor Muron also points out the damage—moral and material—which Cesky Tesin will suffer as a result of a ministerial decision which granted the Polish Culture and Education Center the right of preemption over the sale of the Piast Hotel (first confiscated by the Germans and then classified officially as "post-German" property). "We do not begrudge the Poles this right, just as we do not begrudge them the multimillion subsidies they receive for the support and development of culture and education—provided that the outcome and consequence of these efforts on our part will be a friendly attitude by our ethnic Polish citizens toward our state."

Mayor Muron's protest (and also the reaction to it from the 65,000-strong Polish minority group) confirms the difficult and extremely complex nature of interethnic relations in postcommunist countries. This is the price we have to pay for that particular lesson in democracy. A very difficult and very expensive lesson.

The program of musical and literary contributions prepared for the grand occasion of graduation day at Cesky Tesin's Polish College never mentioned the word "Czechoslovakia," though every one of the school's 92 graduates are citizens of that country. The only non-Polish accent was provided by a rendering of a Bulgarian folk song.

Mayor Muron was not sent an invitation.

Electoral Districts for Parliamentary Elections

91P20353A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
27 May 91 p 2

[Article by J.F.: "How Many Electoral Districts"]

[Text] On 25 May, the Deputies' [Sejm] Constitutional Commission accepted a draft of the Sejm resolution governing the division of Poland into electoral districts and subdistricts, in which the parliamentary elections will be conducted.

It is anticipated that the resolution will pass during the upcoming, 62nd plenary session [of the Sejm], which will take place 6-7 June. The publication of the resolution would remove the last reason for doubt as to the dates of the fall elections.

As noted previously, the commission proposes a division into 35 electoral districts. Only a few corrections were made to the draft of the proposal published in RZECZPOSPOLITA, 23-24 April of this year. These corrections refer to the Katowice Voivodship (districts: in Sosnowiec—11 mandates, in Katowice—16 mandates, and in Tychy—14 mandates).

During the commission session, Deputy Jozef Oleksy (PKLD) [Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left, headed by Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz] announced that he will present a competitive draft for the demarcation of the districts. He suggests creating 26 electoral districts. The larger districts would indicate an increased minimum number of mandates within the districts. This method would give candidates of smaller parties a better chance of having representation in parliament, while a 35-district organization would present a rather large electoral barrier to these smaller parties. The PKLD draft will be presented to the Sejm as a minority motion of the Constitutional Commission.

Bujak Rejects Links With Social Democracy

LD1406155491 Warsaw PAP in English 2311 GMT
13 Jun 91

[Text] Zyrardow, June 13—Former boss of the Solidarity Mazowsze Chapter and now leader of the Democratic-Social Movement Zbigniew Bujak rejected an offer from leader of the Social-Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP) Leszek Miller for the two groupings to unite.

The two met at a gathering in Zyrardow [Skierniewice province, southwest of Warsaw] devoted to positions and programs of the Polish left wing.

Both expressed their anxiety over the presidential veto against the electoral law and considered as inadmissible the interference of ideology in the economy of the state.

According to Bujak, the construction industry should be the locomotive of Poland's economy, while Miller gave priority to the trade with the Soviet Union.

The two leaders said that they were in a position to form governments in case of electoral victory and present specific economic program, each of them on his own.

Umbrella Organization Youth Council Formed

91P20372A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
27 May 91 p 5

[Article by (dem): "The Polish Youth Council: We Youth, Communism Is Still Getting in Our Way"]

[Text] The Polish Youth Council, consisting of over 30 social and political organizations, were bound together on Saturday [25 May] in the Kazimierzowski Palace at the University of Warsaw. "We young people were united in the struggle against the communist system," said the representative of the Catholic associations at the opening of the meeting. "We cannot allow our solidarity to become weak in the face of the threat [caused by] the remnants of this system."

Youth groups from such parties as the Democratic Union [UD], the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD], and the Democratic Party [SD] have entered the Council, as have the NZS [Independent Association of [University] Students], the Association of Young Christian Democrats, several Catholic and scouting (other than ZHP [Polish Scouting Union]) organizations, the Academic Athletic Union [AZS], and the university circle of PTTK [Polish Tourist and Local Studies Society]. The following groups were not invited to join: ZSP [Polish University Student Association], the Union of Socialist Polish Youth [ZSMP], and the Rural Youth Union [ZMW].

Pawel Piskorski initiated the creation of the Polish Youth Council. Piskorski is an adviser to Prime Minister Bielecki for youth affairs, and is a member of the KLD and also of the NZS. "We are creating an organization on the model of Western youth councils," said Piskorski, "its task will be to evaluate changes in the educational system, and to make it easier for the recently formed youth organizations to start up."

As one of its tasks, the council will also resolve the question of the conversion of part of the property of the post-communist [as given] youth groups.

A Foreign [Affairs] Commission was also established, which is to maintain contact with the youth groups of the Council of Europe.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup:**28 Apr-4 May**91EP0476A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 18,
4 May 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

"The time has come," says a communique of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate, "to reject a mistaken and damaging simplification, which has unfortunately become grounded in society's consciousness, according to which the secular nature of the state is presented as the basic and practically the only guarantee of freedom and equal rights for citizens." The bishops are demanding that the new constitution of the Republic of Poland remove the phrase of the division of the Catholic Church from the state since "it arouses negative associations from the period of totalitarianism when it was exploited for state domination of the church." The constitution, the bishops write, should confirm the natural inalienable rights among which are: the right to life from conception; equality before the law; freedom of conscience and religious conviction; freedom to express one's thoughts, views, and feelings; freedom to display and practice religious ceremonies; the right to property and its guarantee; the right to work and an education; and the right of parents to raise their children in accordance with their convictions, especially the right of their children to receive religious instruction in school. [passage omitted]

A decree signed by the prime minister introduces new customs duties for agricultural products, which the farmers have been demanding for some time. The highest duties—30 percent—apply to butter, sugar, and tomatoes. The 25-percent duty applies to salted meat and salted meat products, ham, and canned goods. The 20-percent duty applies to beef, pork, and vegetables.

A survey by the Center For Research on Public Opinion: In April 1991 society's optimism rose slightly. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents think that in three years the situation will improve (in March—34 percent; in January, 1991—35 percent; in January, 1990—59 percent). In comparison with March 1991, trust in the military rose to 74 percent from 69 percent (first place on the scale of trust); trust in the police increased to 64 percent from 54 percent; trust in the government increased to 56 percent from 51 percent. The number of supporters of Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki rose to 58 percent from 43 percent. There was a further decline in the rating of the church to 69 percent from 71 percent; of the Senate to 37 percent from 40 percent; and of the Sejm to 34 percent from 38 percent.

A survey by the Public Opinion Research Center on the rankings of politicians established by a survey done in the middle of April 1991: Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki (+ 53, the difference between positive and negative evaluations), President L. Walesa (+ 50); Sejm Marshal M. Kozakiewicz (+ 27); Senate Marshal A. Stelmachowski (+ 24); Solidarity Chairman M. Krzakiewski (+ 23); Deputy Prime Minister L. Balcerowicz (+ 13); OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement] Chairman A. Miodowicz (- 22).

Among the respondents, 68 percent judged that "the actions of the prime minister serve society well and are in accord with the social interests" (in January 1991, 35 percent).

In accordance with a decision of Gdansk Cefarm, pharmacies in the Gdansk, Elblag, and Slupsk Voivodships have stopped providing drugs for free and at 30-percent subsidized prices. Reportedly, the cause is that the health services are in arrears on the refund payments for drugs provided for free and at a discount; the health service in turn explained that it has budget problems. After consulting with the voivode, the protest action was suspended.

In accordance with a decision of Krzysztof Zabinski, the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, government telephones have been taken away from the political parties that had them until now: Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SdRP), Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Democratic Party (SD), and the Christian Social Union (UCHS). The members of the government, higher state functionaries, and the leading members of the president's office are entitled to these telephones. The members of the previous cabinet have been deprived of these telephones. Primate Jozef Glemp, as *KURIER POLSKI* reported, has kept his.

The situation at Polish Radio and Television [PRiTV] has provoked protests by deputies of the Democratic Party ("with deep concern I have observed the growing unreliable and slanted reporting of political life in the country to society, which is particularly dangerous in view of the approaching parliamentary elections") and by the Main Board of the Association of Polish Journalists (the quality of the television and radio programs is falling, the working conditions are worsening, "the constant personnel changes indicate the deepening chaos and crisis in the system of PRiTV"). The deputies have proposed that PRiTV be subordinated to the Sejm in order to ensure the pluralism of reporting; the journalists are demanding that PRiTV be made a public institution, i.e. autonomous, independent of the government, and apolitical.

In a lead article, *KURIER POLSKI* reports "panic in the education offices"—schools are losing buildings, "evictions of schools are going on all over Poland." It is simply the church taking back its property. The Salesians are taking [back] the Medical High School in Oswiecim. So far, they have taken the dormitory; they will take the other buildings in September 1991. The brothers of the Community of the Resurrection want to evict the Krakow Postsecondary Medical School. A notarial act deeds the Automobile Technical School to the Church of St. Jozef; the General High School No. 6 in Krakow (the only one in which three languages are learned, including Hungarian and Swedish) uses a building of the Order of Paul; the school on Wilcza St. in Warsaw is in a building of the Assembly of Nuns (they will take the building back in 1992). The daily concludes: "property rights are holy, and the right to an education has not yet been beatified by anyone."

The president has vetoed the law governing work on commercial maritime vessels and has asked the Sejm to

examine it again. The president questioned the constitutionality of the possible 16-hour work day on a particular ship in light of the constitutional provision for an eight-hour work day.

Janusz Maksymiuk, the chairman of the Union of Farmers, Agricultural Circles and Organizations, has opposed the argument that an increase in the price of alcohol is to serve agriculture. It should be regarded "as an attempt to arouse an antifarmer mood." The farmers' leader emphasized that the communique about the price increases does not speak of increased funds for agriculture from this source. [passage omitted]

The Supreme Chamber of Control has confirmed the objections of the Szczecin voivode, who has questioned the purchase of a historic country house and 140 hectares of land by Piotr Baumgart, a well-known agricultural activist in Solidarity, and his son Pawel for nearly nothing in 1990. They paid about 97 million zlotys [Z] in all, and they were granted subsidies of Z600 million. (A second appraisal in January 1991 valued just the buildings and other fixed assets at Z800 million.) The prosecutor is conducting an investigation into voiding the contract (the house which belonged to the State Treasury was sold without the agreement of the minister of culture).

J. Korwin-Mikke, the leader of the Union for a Real Politics, declared that in his opinion Party X of S. Tyminski will win the upcoming parliamentary elections with 40 percent of the vote. The Union is counting on "at least three percent of the vote."

A legislative initiative to prohibit smoking in plants, institutions, and other public places has been introduced by 37 senators. They are also demanding a prohibition on tobacco advertisements, etc.

The Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) called a press conference under the heading "a continuation of the activities of the postcommunist conspiracy in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the failure to settle accounts with former employees of the Security Office, and the cooperation of the new leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the old apparatus of the Security Office and the Citizens Militia." The details concerned the investigation into the arms found in the apartment of a former functionary of the Security Office in Bytom. The Confederation for an Independent Poland announced other places where weapons are supposed to be stored. The Committees for the Defense of Legality state that the reports by the Confederation for an Independent Poland are undocumented.

American billionaire Herbert Herman Haft, founder of one of the largest chains of supermarkets in the United States, visited Warsaw and met with central officials. He has said he intends to begin doing business in Poland in banking, trade, and construction.

Credit costs have declined: beginning on 1 May 1991, the annual interest rate on refinancing loans will be lowered to 59 percent from 72 percent.

Who's Who

Jacek Maziarski resigned from the position of head of the Political Service Department the president. He will devote himself exclusively to political work in the Center Accord as chairman of its Main Board. Jerzy Stanislaw Sito, writer, head of the Czytelnik Publishing Cooperative, has been named ambassador to Denmark replacing Janusz Reszkowski, former president of PAP and the Radio and Television Committee. Wieslaw Panter, chairman of the board of Krosno, Inc., has resigned his position because of the situation at the Krosno glass factory and the low stock prices of this privatized enterprise.

From the press market

Two new magazines have appeared: the weekly RACJE published in Katowice by the Association of Friends of the Social Press and the Self-Managed Press (Stanislaw Zielinski is the editor in chief—price Z2,500) and the monthly DALEJ, a socialist journal, published by the Current of the Revolutionary Left—cost: Z3,000. The Confederation for an Independent Poland has bought MOTOR for Z450 million. [passage omitted]

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Krzysztof Kozlowski, former minister of internal affairs:

(Interviewed by Izabella Bodnar, TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA 14 April 1991)

[Question] In the fall of 1989, no one was able to prevent the destruction of many documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. General Kiszczak reportedly told you that the records of the Fourth Department, which dealt with the church, were burned for fear that "if society learned the truth about its priests, it would experience a shock." Do you know anything on that subject?

[Answer] We should not deceive ourselves. There were secret collaborators of the Security Office, priests who took on such a role consciously in the church community, too priests. But in comparison with Czechoslovakia or the GDR, there were few of them in Poland. The Solidarity elite was resistant, although there were exceptions.

Alfred Miodowicz, chairman of the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement]:

(Interviewed by J. Klich, NOWINY 16 April 1991)

[Question] Within the OPZZ itself there are pressure groups, occupational groups (for example, the miners) who attack you and say that you should resign.

[Answer] Yes, it is abnormal that the OPZZ has existed for six and a half years and not collapsed while every other structure is shaking in its boots or has completely fallen apart. (Look at what has happened and is happening to the core of Solidarity!) And the OPZZ and Miodowicz have outlived five governments and six premiers. That sticks in your eyes. But I do not agree that there are occupational groups demanding my resignation, because the miners—the ones in the mines—told me to return to the OPZZ.

There are conflicts within a small group of leaders which occur everywhere where something is happening.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 5-11 May
91EP0496A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 19,
11 May 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

From the communique of the 246th Plenary Conference of the Polish Episcopate: The conference "issued an extremely important document, an appeal on the impropriety of a referendum on the murder of a conceived child. There are values which cannot be settled by plebiscites; no referendum can sanction racism, violence, theft, or terrorism." In a separate appeal, the bishops write: "voting on the legalizations of the destruction of human life not only violates human rights, but also threatens the entire natural order. Any potential authorization for such a vote could as a consequence lead to other disreputable acts, for example, euthanasia or depriving the sick of life as socially useless. The most radical form of questioning the right to life based on the above criteria would be, as we know, concentration camps. In conjunction with the preparation of the new constitution, the bishops call both for autonomy and cooperation of church and state in the service of the same individual human beings.... The adoption of the Vatican doctrine recognizes the specific delimitation of church and state. The bishops drew attention to the fact that the principle of the separation of church and state formulated in our postwar history in a general manner led in practice to painful consequences." The communique says, in part: "The artificial publicity in the mass media, devoid of all proportion, of opinions opposed to the church bears signs of a struggle with Christian values. Lay Catholics should call for respect for those values and give witness to their religious convictions in social and political life. The people in the press, radio, and television have an obligation to serve the truth and the common good of society. Promoting myths and concentrating attention on subsidiary subjects, for example, the threat of supposed clericalism, and the distribution of pornography and a pro-abortion atmosphere constitute an impermissible manipulation of society and a violation of professional ethics."

The annual session of the Synod of the Reformed Lutheran Church in the Republic of Poland was held in Warsaw. In conjunction with parliament beginning work on the law on the protection of conceived life, the synod issued a declaration that states that no one has the right to abort human life formed in the mother, perform experiments on fetuses, or use them instrumentally for other purposes. In the opinion of the synod, spouses "responsibly planning their families have the right to use contraceptives in order that forced abstinence does not lead to the destruction of the marriage and in order that abortion not become a way of limiting births." The synod admits that "social anomalies such as wide use of abortion, must be regulated, but," it emphasizes in its document, "exerting pressure on the legislative body to introduce severe legal regulations and criminal penalties for the guilty is not among the duties of

the Christian church. Forcing a solution through an anti-abortion law is a sign of defeat for the church as a moral force." The declaration forcefully emphasizes the joint responsibility of men for the conception of a child. The entire burden cannot be put upon the woman. "The Christian community is obliged to care for the weak...show the way to the lost, teach how to distinguish good from evil...call for repentance and announce God's mercy. That is an incomparably more difficult task that establishing laws and then punishing the guilty," the Reformed Lutherans state.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the president of the USSR, has sent a letter to Lech Walesa, president of the Republic of Poland, congratulating him and the entire Polish nation on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Constitution of 3 May. "I frankly support the development of relations between Poland and the USSR, which are entering a new phase, on the basis of good neighborliness, legal equality, and mutual respect while preserving the valuable and positive things, and which, regardless of everything, have accrued in relations between our peoples over the centuries."

The first woman general in the history of the Polish military is Maria Wittek. Lech Walesa awarded the title of General Brigade to the 92-year-old Col. Maria Wittek.

The longest holiday celebration in many years: It began on Wednesday, 1 May and ended on 5 May 1991. On the first, the church celebrated Saint Joseph, the worker. The demonstrations and parades were organized chiefly by members and sympathizers of Social Democracy, the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Union Agreement], and the PPS [Polish Socialist Party]. In Warsaw, more than 10,000 participated in the parade, according to *GAZETA WYBORCZA*; lesser demonstrations were held among other places in Tarnow, Lodz, Poznan, Katowice, Szczecin, Gdansk, and Plock. The students of the schools for the arts in Lodz raised cries of "We do not want a tax on excessive wage increases. We want two beers" [a pun based on word play]. They carried old May Day signs and portraits of Lenin. This time 3 May was associated with the 200th anniversary of the constitution. President Lech Walesa participated in church ceremonies on Jasna Gora; his absence during the session of parliament was noted; in the evening, he gave a reception at the King's Palace in Warsaw. On 1 May, during the demonstration at the Nike monument, the following were observed: Edward Osobka-Morawski, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Leszek Miller, and Jerzy Urban.

Lower interest rates at the General Savings Bank will go into effect beginning 1 May 1991: Demand accounts, 20 percent; three-month time deposits, 45 percent; six-month time deposits, 54 percent; one-year deposits, 60 percent; three-year time deposits, 64 percent; and deposits to housing accounts established before 1983, 68 percent.

Cardinal J. Glemp, primate of Poland, in his pastoral message for the 200th anniversary of Constitution of 3 May recalled the decision of the constitution's framers to build a church to be called Divine Providence as a thanksgiving offering. "The shrine still remains to be built as the fulfillment of the national offering," the Primate said.

President Lech Walesa on the antiabortion law in a television interview with Monika Olejnik and Tomasz Lis: "I frequently discuss the subject of abortion from a medical point of view with blacksmiths or cabinetmakers. Thus: more wisdom and understanding in these issues. If we want to discuss the subject at all, then let us divide it into three: medical, moral, and economic (living conditions). And in every area, it is possible to consider whether to murder and how. And today there are shouts. Not this way. You cannot kill this way. As regards people's conscience, nothing can be done with laws. I do not believe that a woman consciously and wisely would want to kill, when it is possible to choose a solution before and after. There is only a lack of culture, awareness, and responsibility."

Who is right? In response to a question posed by the Public Opinion Research Center about who is right in the dispute between the government and the farmers about agricultural policy, 83 percent of the rural residents said the farmers were right and only four percent said the government was right; on the other hand, 49 percent of the residents of small and medium-sized cities said the farmers were right, and 25 percent, the government; in large cities, the figures were 40 percent and 33 percent. Blockading roads as a form of farmer protest is supported by 36 percent of the respondents and rejected by 57 percent. But 75 percent of the farmers support blockades. [passage omitted]

Beginning 10 May 1990, a Fiat 126p will cost 30 percent more. The new price is 33.8 million zlotys; the old price, 26 million zlotys. The B model will cost 27 percent more (36.8 and 29 million zlotys). The Cabriolet model will cost about 55 million zlotys.

Who's Who

Krzysztof Lis has been removed at his request from the position of secretary of state in the Ministry for Ownership Transformations. Jacek Siwicki, the current secretary of Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki and previously his coworker at the consulting firm Doradca, will replace Lis. Jacek Merkel, former minister of state in President L. Walesa's chancellory for national security affairs, has been offered the position of president of the Polish-American bank Solidarity Chase Bank. Krzysztof Zareba (age 52), the former voivode of Gorzow Voivodship, has been elected deputy chairman of the council and president of the Main Board of the Democratic Party at the first plenary meeting of the Main Council. At the congress of the International Pen Federation in Paris, Artur Miedzyrzecki was elected vice president of the Federation of Pen Clubs from more than 100 countries. He was nominated by the French Pen Club.

Opinions

President Lech Walesa:

(Interviewed by E. Smolar, director of the Polish section of the BBC as printed in RZECZPOSPOLITA 30 April)

[Question] The next topic: the [tasks of the] Presidency include representing the state to the outside world, abroad. But in Poland itself, it includes conducting a policy in

Poland that goes beyond group, class, or party politics. One encounters critics' objections that although President Walesa has not yielded to similar tendencies so far, nonetheless, some people in his entourage, some people representing your office, have acted in a way that forced you personally to withdraw from a series of actions with damage to the prestige of the president. How do you explain that? For example, recently you had to explain relations with the government and telephone its spokesman and say that you support the current economic policy. That is probably not particularly auspicious.

[Answer] Yes, but again—what am I doing, what is my opinion? I am searching for opportunities for new solutions in Poland, departing from communism. The Presidency—I myself created it—is a flower on the overcoat of the communist system. And there are no recipes and no one knows how to do it. I am searching. And, obviously, in this search I bounce from wall to wall. But again I do not worry about it. Many say to me: choose wise people and they will let you act wisely. That is true. I chose wise people, and if they were lawyers, I would be unable to do anything. I must disjoin, I must initiate, I must push forward, I must break open.

Krzysztof Kozlowski, senator:

(From a comment during a meeting with the residents of Krakow, GAZETA KRAKOWSKA 10 April 1991)

[Question] The Swiss ambassador asked me recently which of the Polish foreign ministers is more important—Krzysztof Skubiszewski or Janusz Ziolkowski (secretary of state in the Belweder for international affairs—editor's note). In fact, they say things that are not completely coordinated with one another. For me, the situation is very dangerous when a foreign diplomat from a country important to Poland does not understand what is happening here and who is exercising power.

[passage omitted]

Jacek Merkel, former minister of state:

(Interviewed by Jacek Lindner, GLOS WYBRZEZA 16 April 1991)

[Question] We learned from your Sejm-deputy bench mates that you had to resign because you had committed a serious "noncriminal" offense.

[Answer] That reminds me of a story told by one woman to another, and I am not in the habit of commenting on the rabble. Besides, I would love to hear these accusations said publicly in order to take a position on them in a similar fashion. But what are you thinking of when you say a "noncriminal offense"?

[Question] I would not want to repeat....

[Answer] Go ahead.

[Question] It is said you cooperated with the Security Service.

[Answer] That's ridiculous. The entire opposition and the underground, even the president himself, have been besmirched with identical insinuations.

Jacek Maziarski, chairman of the Main Board of the Center Accord (PC):

(Interviewed with Lukas Walczak, *DZIENNIK POLSKI* 25 April 1991)

[Question] What role do you play in your party?

[Answer] Perhaps I will attempt to present the Center Accord first as a state? In the Center Accord, we had something on the model of the Sejm—the Political Council. There was someone in it who performed the job of president (I am thinking of our leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski). We did not have, however, an executive body or government. The board is to play precisely that role, and I am to be its prime minister. Perhaps that is not the best comparison, but I want to present my post in a vivid manner.

Opportunities for Officers To Study in West *91EP0487A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish* *17 Apr 91 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel Dr. Jozef Buczynski, employee in the Personnel Department of the Ministry of National Defense, by Stanislaw Lukaszewski; place and date not given: "Who Will Go Abroad and Where Will They Go?"]

[Text] [Lukaszewski] How will the system for training officers outside the country be modified?

[Buczynski] To date this system was directed primarily toward the military academies of the USSR and the other socialist states. Now it will be re-evaluated and it will be open to all doctrinally strong states, those states that manifest a high level of military know-how and technology.

[Lukaszewski] What has already be done on this score?

[Buczynski] Consultations have been held in France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the United States during "getting acquainted" visits to determine the potential and training structure of cadres in the armies of other states. A meeting was held with the Italian military attaché—at his request. We have also made analyses of all the available materials regarding the higher military education of selected states. In May our representatives will visit Austria and Italy. The purpose of their visit will be to determine the conditions and possibilities for the training and professional upgrading of our officers in military academies.

[Lukaszewski] What has been the result of the consultations and analyses of the officer training systems in other states?

[Buczynski] We have concluded that our officers should be sent abroad for so-called comprehensive studies: command-staff and postgraduate studies at the operations level; studies of a technical and humanistic nature; professional (academic) training in academic institutions and

scientific-research centers and tours of duty on staffs and units; and also for short-term specialist's courses.

[Lukaszewski] Is the sending of personnel for such studies and courses abroad correlated with officer training at home?

[Buczynski] Yes, and it derives from projected needs in the specific specialties.

[Lukaszewski] Can you expand on this?

[Buczynski] The knowledge one acquires during the course of the various forms of training should correspond to the most current trends in the field of military science and art. Transferring this knowledge to our soil should enrich the WP [Polish Armed Forces] with new kinds of solutions. I have in mind here primarily the command (direction) of armies as well as their schooling and training. We are also trying to adapt training structures to our plans for the future in the area of equipping our Army with new kinds of equipment and armaments. We are sending our officers who go to foreign institutions primarily into those directions of study (military specialties) in which we do not train in our own institutions. For example, an offer was made by the Royal Military Technical Academy of Great Britain regarding the possibility of holding annual master's level courses in the area of the safe delivery of military equipment. Our officers will be able to train in the Bundeswehr universities both in technical areas and in the humanities. We want our officers training in operations-level postgraduate studies, both in Western states (the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain) and in the USSR to take advantage of the wealth of the achievements of these armed forces in the development of military know-how and doctrinal solutions. The knowledge our officers acquire should help them in the future to work out systems solutions in our military. Professional tours of duty and practical training in the armies of other states should make it possible for our officers to expand their range of experiences and to become familiar with new solutions for organizing staff work under various conditions and in various situations.

[Lukaszewski] What about the academic training—course work?

[Buczynski] These courses would make it possible for our officers to become familiar with modern methods of didactic and scientific-research work in scientific-research institutions (centers) and in the academies of other states with a view to writing their doctoral and habilitatus dissertations in direct contact with the most modern solutions in the field of the technique, the technology and the methodology of scientific studies. The purpose of specialist's courses is to prepare the cadre to service (utilize) equipment which is currently being used as arms or is planned for introduction into our army's store of equipment.

[Lukaszewski] How many of our officers could study in foreign military institutions?

[Buczynski] Taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, i.e., needs and possibilities, we estimate that there will be about 15-20 (each year, of course).

[Lukaszewski] What will be the procedure for officers to qualify for study in military academies abroad?

[Buczynski] Those officers will be qualified who obtain the best grades on the entrance examination to the National Defense Academy [AON]. Study abroad will normally take place one year after selection. This will allow the qualified officers to learn the foreign language well enough to be able to study effectively. Language training for candidates for study will be conducted at the Military Department for Foreign Language Study in Lodz.

[Lukaszewski] Do you already know how much such study abroad will cost? Has a cost analysis been done?

[Buczynski] Some states, Germany for example, have proposed to accept us gratis for study in their academies. However, we expect that in the future we shall have to pay for such studies.

Preliminary calculations show that the cost will be high. But meanwhile we are taking advantage of the friendly gestures that have been made toward us.

[Lukaszewski] Who may compete to study in a foreign country?

[Buczynski] I have really already answered that question. Those officers who have distinguished themselves in service, those who show the most promise within their groups (service positions), may compete. The prerequisite for applying to study abroad is to obtain outstanding results on the AON entrance exam. And, as you already know, there are many countries from which to choose—from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Italy to Washington's country—the United States of North America.

[Lukaszewski] Thank you for the interview.

Retirements, Dismissals To Create New Slots
91EP0487B Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
15 Apr 91 pp 1, 5

[Article by S. Lukaszewski: "Who Is Turning in His Hat?"]

[Text] Following the publication of a report from the MON [Ministry of National Defense] Personnel Department entitled "A Smaller Army, but Are There Fewer Worries?", the telephone calls came pouring in. The contents of the report aroused a great deal of interest and provoked many questions. We promised to return to the matter. Today we are attempting to reply to these questions. How many of us will have to enter the reserves? Who? Why?

As we learned at the MON Personnel Department, this year approximately 10,500 professional soldiers will be dismissed from professional military service, including approximately 6,500 officers. Of this number, about 2,000 officers will leave due to the modifications made in the principles of dismissal, while approximately 4,500 will take their normal retirement.

About 2,500 ensigns and about 1,500 professional non-commissioned officers will leave the ranks of the military.

By the end of this year, those soldiers who have exceeded the "age limit of the service" (this is 60 years of age for officers and ensigns and 55 years for noncommissioned officers) [will leave], with the exception of officers who hold the academic title of professor or the academic degree of doctor habilitatus and officers who serve in those corps which have a shortage of personnel, i.e., justice and the legal service, the medical corps and the pastorate, if they have received approval to extend their military service.

Generals (admirals) and officers who hold the academic title of professor or the academic degree of doctor habilitatus will be retired during the year in which they reach 62 years of age.

Personnel who remain on temporary rolls for a period longer than 12 months and personnel at the disposal of the appropriate commanders (chiefs) who have no prospects of being appointed for official positions will be dismissed from professional military service. This will occur when such personnel have fulfilled the terms for dismissal defined in the binding legal regulations contained in the 30 June 1970 law on the military service of professional soldiers.

The intent to dismiss soldiers who exceed the age limit for their particular rank will be discussed with them and the dismissals are to take place by the end of the year. Whom will this affect? Senior officers who have not completed at least higher professional studies (thus, WSO [Higher School of Defense] graduates will not be affected).

Professional soldiers who have received a satisfactory, fair, or unsatisfactory grade for the way they performed their official duties in the periodical evaluation done last year or the evaluation from the cadre survey and who have exceeded the age limit for their military rank are subject to dismissal.

The plan is to dismiss the following senior officers by the end of 1991: majors over the age of 50; lieutenant colonels over the age of 55; colonels over the age of 58.

In special (individual) and officially warranted cases, the chiefs of central institutions as well as the commanders of military districts and branches of the Armed Forces may make a recommendation to the national defense minister via the chief of the Personnel Department to continue in service those officers who exceed the age limit for their particular rank for a maximum period of one year.

In order to put the guidelines into practice properly, the national defense minister has ordered official briefings to be held with the entire staff of the cadre at all levels. At these briefings, the purposes for modifying the principles of dismissal will be discussed.

In order to streamline the procedure for dismissing soldiers in professional military service who have reached their age limit in the service, the minister has recommended that the interested parties be informed of the date

of their upcoming release from professional military service during the cadre review conducted in the year preceding their dismissal from service.

The guidelines went into effect on 2 April 1991.

When is a soldier released from professional military service? He is released when the Military Medical Commission has established his inability to perform professional military service; when he has reached the following age limit: age 55 for noncommissioned officers, age 60 for ensigns and officers up to and including the rank of colonel (commander); age 65 for officers holding the rank of general (admiral); age 50 for female soldiers; upon receipt of a disciplinary penalty of removal from professional military service; and for the loss of military rank.

A soldier may be released from professional military service if he has acquired the right to receive a pension by virtue of the number of years he has served and has reached the following age: a junior noncommissioned officer—age 40; a senior noncommissioned officer—age 50; an ensign, regardless of rank—age 50; a junior officer—age 40; a major (second lieutenant commander)—age 45; a lieutenant colonel (lieutenant commander)—age 50; a lieutenant (commander)—age 55; a brigadier-general (rear admiral)—age 58; a division-general (vice admiral)—age 60; a general of arms (admiral)—age 62. He may be released upon his own request, which should be examined within three months from the time that application is made. He may be released at the recommendation of the supreme state organs or the chief officials of political or social organizations in the event that he has agreed to be appointed to another field of public service. He may be released in the event that he has not agreed to be appointed to a lower official position. He may be dismissed if he has received two subsequent periodical evaluations which attest to his failure to perform official duties. He may be dismissed if he has been sentenced by means of a legally valid pronouncement of the court depriving him of his freedom (this likewise includes the penalty of military arrest) or if he has received the penalty of a reduction in military rank.

A soldier who has received the right to a pension by virtue of his years of service may be released from professional military service through his consent, even though he has not received the age defined by law.

A soldier may be released from professional military service in the event that he has failed to give his consent to taking another equivalent or higher position for important personal reasons, if the military unit in which he serves is being disbanded in conjunction with the restructuring of the Armed Forces or if its staff is being cut back.

The new face of the military corresponding to the adopted model of the Armed Forces must be re-evaluated. Thus, the internal structure of the Army is changing, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Life has made it necessary to modify former solutions with regard to dismissing personnel from professional military service. The purpose of the cadre dismissal actions which have been embarked upon was to create service positions, to "free up" positions

and to improve the staff for the young prospective cadre. But now the important thing is to make the operation as painless as possible.

Information Agency Initiative: Promoting Poland

91P20371A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
11-12 May 91 p 2

[Article by (rh) with box by (pjw): "Media for Poland Replaces Interpress: Meeting in the Press Center"]

[Text] Media for Poland is a new initiative of the director of the Polish Information Agency [PAI] (formerly Interpress), Jacek Zakowski, who was named to this position several months ago. Director Zakowski intends to conduct such activity that will propagate Polish foreign policy, Polish culture, and Polish economy throughout the world.

The Media for Poland group intends, in the future, to establish an institution with the character of a foundation, or a club, whose goal would be to support actions that will create a new image of Poland abroad. Financial activity will be conducted with the help of resources collected from among private entrepreneurs.

Among those who took part in the meeting held in the Press Center at Pilsudski Place were representatives of: Westa, PKO [General Savings Bank], Chemobudowa, Electromis, ArtB, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, the National Chamber of Commerce, as well as the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tomasz Drzewosowski. PAI director Jacek Zakowski, and a representative of the government's press office also took part.

[Box, p 2]

After the meeting Jacek Zakowski told ZYCIE WARSZAWY: "We've entered a new and difficult path to promote Polish culture and economy abroad with the help of private and state entrepreneurs. We want to create a lobby that will financially restore the publications POLAND or CONTEMPORARY POLAND. Of course these publications will give us a chance to advertise ourselves, but I think that this will be a good advertisement for the new Polish economy—enterprises, people, products, and market possibilities. Both private and state entrepreneurs took part in the meeting which is for me a good sign of the possibilities for cooperation. I think that for others this will be an encouragement to cooperate with Media for Poland. I hope that the next meeting will be as successful as today's, and that our circle will be enlarged by new sponsors."

Privatization Plans of State Banks Revealed

LD1406152991 Warsaw PAP in English 2315 GMT
13 Jun 91

[Text] Warsaw, June 13—The Silesian Bank of Katowice and the Wielkopolski Credit Bank of Poznan will be the first bank[s] to get privatized in Poland, after which seven remaining commercial banks will undergo ownership transformation, Vice [Deputy] Minister of Finance Stefan Kawalec said at a press conference Thursday.

The first two banks will be privatized in a different way than state-owned enterprises. They will first choose a foreign strategic investor guaranteeing their appropriate development, and then shares will be sold at public offering addressed to small and big domestic investors.

Privatization of commercial banks is only part of building a good banking system in Poland, while the existing one is an obstacle to economic development.

RSW Continues Liquidation; Prices Given

*91EP491A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
10 May 91 p 2*

[Article Tomasz Roguski: "Workers Publishing Cooperative Bargaining: Dealing at the Highest Level"]

[Text] The Liquidation Commission of RSW [Workers Publishing Cooperative] decided on 9 May to sell the Press Graphics Plants (Prasowe Zakłady Graficzne) in Lodz to the Rok Corporation for 81.5 billion zlotys. This is the highest sum paid so far at auction to buy an RSW company.

Three publications, PRZYJACIOLKA, PRAWO I ZYCIE, and ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE were sold together to the "Oferta dla kazdego" company, which has held them on lease since April 1990. This company is backed by employees of the companies on the block, along with two journalistic associations. "Oferta dla kazdego" assumed the obligation of supporting DRUZYNA, a scouting journal published by the group, of assisting one of the local publications (probably the SULEJOWSKI 91 newspaper), of supporting the "Wyjsc na Prosta" Foundation, and of preparing to issue a publication for Poles in the USSR. Work is still in process on this publication, which is to have a run of 100,000 copies.

Higher competitive offers were turned down, Universal's offer of 12 billion zlotys and the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] offer of 8.5 billion zlotys. In announcing its preference for "Oferta dla kazdego," the commission based its decision on endorsement by journalists and a Council of Ministers resolution dated 29 October 1990.

The winning bid was also supported by 74 deputies and senators from various clubs, including Ryszard Bugaj, Jerzy Osiatynski, Anna Dynowska, Jozef Slisz, Jan Rokita, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Henryk Wujec, Zofia Kuratowska, and Leszek Piotrowski. These members of parliament were especially troubled by the possibility that Robert Hersant might buy up more and more publications, "Not only because his political biography contains details we are unable to approve of," but also because of fears that he could create a new monopoly on the Polish press market. Robert Hersant's firm did not contest the issue.

FANTASTYKA, MALA FANTASTYKA, and KOMIKS FANTASTYKI were sold to a single bidder for 70 million zlotys. The amount the company paid RSW for past FANTASTYKA leases is to be deducted from the price.

The monthly OPOLE was sold for 10 million zlotys to the Opolpress Company, made up of the Commercial Credit

Bank in Katowice, the reporters' cooperative of TRYBUNA OPOLSKA, and the Solidarity enterprise, which is owned by NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity's regional administration in Opole. Opolpress also paid \$10 million to buy the biweekly GAZETA GORNOSLASKA—OBERSCHLEZISCHE ZEITUNG, previously published under the title WIADOMOSCI GORNOSLASKIE. The victorious company also entered into an agreement with the Sociocultural Association of the German Minority in Opole Silesia which plans to create a joint company, Silesiapress, to publish the biweekly. The two parties are to have an equal share in Silesiapress, and representatives of the German association are to hold most of the positions on the program council.

The commission also decided on Thursday to cancel a previous agreement to turn over the Wroclaw daily newspaper GAZETA ROBOTNICZA to a journalists' cooperative, because a condition between the cooperative and Wroclaw Voivodship had not been fulfilled. GAZETA ROBOTNICZA is to go on the auction block.

This will be one of the final auctions for an RSW publication. Besides GAZETA ROBOTNICZA, KURIER LUBELSKI is also to be sold. It is not possible at the moment to make any judgment about it. Nearly all the publications that the RSW elimination plan allocated to employee cooperatives have already been transferred as well. The last such agreement, which is with the TYGODNIK CIECHANOWSKI cooperative, is to be signed next week. The prime minister is waiting for the Liquidation Commission's decision about changing the RSW liquidation plan and transferring six Upper Silesian publications, TRYBUNA SLASKA, DZIENNIK ZACHODNI, ECHO TYSKIE, NOWINY GLIWICKIE, NOWINY RYBNICKIE, and PANORAMA, as well as the assets of the Silesian Press Publishers to the State Treasury.

Residents Threaten AIDS Center in Piastow

*91P20374A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
31 May 91 p 3*

[Article by Piotr Najsztub: "Piastow Burns Out AIDS"]

[Text] The first time they tried to burn them down was the night of 17-18 May. The gasoline-filled bottle missed the open window by about ten centimeters. The second time, two weeks later, a neighbor of the center burned the fence [between him and the center] using gasoline. This was less threatening because he was drunk and was less accurate.

The building of the Camillian Fathers [order founded in the 16th century to care for the sick] can hold 15 patients at most—these patients are carriers of the HIV virus. At this moment there are eight patients, as well as an 11-month-old infant who is not infected. The Piastow building is a branch of the center in Konstancin [both located in the Warsaw Voivodship, near the city of Warsaw], and both branches are run by Father Arkadiusz Nowak. The center has had police protection for some

time now, with the only radiocar in the city watching over the center from midnight to five in the morning.

The center opened on 13 April after having notified the mayor and the Piastow City Council. The Order of the Camillian Fathers provided the building and for this reason, in accordance with the property law and the law on local self-government, it was not necessary to have the agreement of the city residents and authorities.

The mayor of Piastow tried to convince the Ministry of Health of the inappropriateness of the decision to place the center in his town. In his letter the mayor argued that there is a "weak, poorly invested infrastructure," that the region is "one of the most densely populated in Poland (4,000 people per one square kilometer)," and that there are "serious social pathologies in Piastow, alcoholism and recidivism, in which case the radicalization of the social moods could actively threaten those under the care of Father Arkadiusz Nowak."

There immediately began a petition drive demanding the removal of HIV carriers from the city. The Social Protest Committee printed a leaflet which says: "The sick will use the health center, the schools, the preschools, and the stores, endangering the lives of all of us, because this illness is still untreatable." Almost all of the city residents found this leaflet in their mailboxes.

On request of the mayor, Father Nowak wrote a three-point explanation and asked two pastors to read this letter from the pulpit. One pastor did so.

A meeting was held on 27 May with city residents, organized by the city authorities, with the participation of the deputy ministers of health and social care, Krystyna Sienkiewicz and Zbigniew Halata, with [Sejm] deputy Zbigniew Janas, and with Father Nowak. The meeting took on, in the words of some of the participants, the character of a lynch mob. Black banners with white lettering hung in the movie theater hall: "Experiments on our life with our agreement"; "Don't force our children into drug addiction"; "Don't spread AIDS"; and "Can healthy decisions come from a sick ministry?". Older women screamed hysterically, "Get out of Piastow!", while the men were more threatening: "Watch out, because we're no longer responsible for ourselves." Many in the crowd threatened to burn the center or hang the priest.

Father Arkadiusz Nowak, who has been caring for drug addicts for seven years, observed: "These people will hear the words of the greatest moral authority, Pope John Paul II, during his pilgrimage to Poland. Maybe his voice in defense of those sick with AIDS will calm the vehemence of these inhuman protests."

Iliescu on Situation One Year After Elections

91BA0805A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 21 May 91 p 3

[President Ion Iliescu response to ROMPRES: "We Are All in the Same Boat"—first paragraph is ROMANIA LIBERA introduction]

[Text] One year after the elections, ROMPRES asked President Ion Iliescu to comment on the situation at the end of a year of a life marked by the results of the free election of 20 May 1990. This is the reply received:

First, as I said before, last year's election in itself marked a turning point in the process that followed the December events. It marked the end of a period. The previous stage had been dominated by convulsions and by overt and tense—at times even violent—political confrontations, which also had a delayed reverberation in the events of June, which I link to the character of the previous period and view as a kind of outburst by the people who were dissatisfied with the results of the elections.

I think that the period that followed the elections marked a continuous evolution in Romanian politics. And if we want to describe the current general situation of our society in comparison with that prior to December 1989, I think that the area that has undergone radical changes in the Romanian society is that of the political freedoms won, the area of a political life based on new foundations, as a democratic and pluralistic society in which the freedom of organization, expression, and choice is unlimited. All internal or external critics must admit this reality—the fact that the Romanian society has stepped out along a fundamentally new path and that this year marked substantial progress toward both asserting individual freedoms and in social life.

Second, this year was a period in which the country's democratic institutions were consolidated. The Parliament, as the embodiment of the legislative power, asserted itself as a stable institution that carried out a wealth of activities. In spite of the many comments and criticisms, it has to be admitted that this has been a period of intensive parliamentary activities that served to impart a new coloring to this political reality. I must add the institution I head, the Presidency, which is an essentially new institution compared to anything our country experienced in the past. Its novelty stems even from its main trait: election by a free, universal ballot. It also stems from the functions of the president as a factor of equilibrium between the three political powers in the conditions of the separation of those powers in the state—which is another defining trait of our political life. We are at an important stage in the drafting of the country's new Constitution, which is one of the main tasks of the new Parliament. Actually, the debates on the Theses ended this year and now comes the second phase of final drafting of this fundamental act, and I think that there is a clear chance that the Constitution can be adopted even before the deadline established.

All the above outline a period that I think was rich and was marked by radical changes in the aspect of the Romanian society.

On the other hand, the start was sounded for the economic reform and the transition to a market economy, which I think is the most difficult and complex area. From this viewpoint, as I said several times, this year was dominated especially by economic issues. While 1990 was the year of political confrontations and essential changes in the organization of political life, 1991 is being marked particularly by economic activities and difficulties. This is the year of major trials in this area. The transition itself is generating convulsions, difficulties, and obstacles in the economy, and the government's main task is to find the best means to first normalize the production, which is a key and fundamental issue for being able to promote economic reform.

As I said, this is a particularly complex process and we cannot hide the fact that several years will be affected by these processes of restructuring the national economy. The year 1991 is perhaps the most difficult. I think that 1992 will probably also experience a continuation of the difficulties we encounter today. These difficulties are also compounded by an unfavorable international situation—the world economy (especially the U.S. economy) is itself in recession—and by the reservations of various political circles that block our access to banking and financial bodies. And although we have all these difficulties, we regrettably have not managed to create a climate of unity among all the social and political forces in the country with a view to removing these barriers. Some of our conationals seem to rejoice at the country's troubles, which they blame solely on the leadership. Allow me to say that I, for one, do not understand what they find to be so smug about. After all, we are all in the "same boat," we are all interested in the changes that the country must experience regardless of the political forces responsible for managing these processes. I believe that at times like these anyone who has any feelings for this country must be interested in overcoming the difficulties. The discord among the country's political and social forces is a source of weakness. The difficulties that the country is experiencing naturally feed discontent, dissatisfaction, disappointment, and confusion. But all those who are following this path, all the neighboring countries, are going through very similar convulsions, hardships, and difficulties. We must find the strength to overcome the present disagreements and struggle together to overcome the domestic and international difficulties. One important line of action is to continue working on the legislation program with a view to placing all socioeconomic activities in a new framework; this is obviously a very complex process since it is a matter of changing the country's entire legislation. At the center of this work is the drafting of laws concerning the program of economic reform.

One of the most basic, but also most complex elements of the reform is privatization; it has broad implications for the socioeconomic life and it requires moderation and farsightedness both in hammering out the legislative framework and in implementing it. In this area haste may result in a high social cost and serious consequences. It is not a coincidence that this process is taking a long time in other countries, too. If we could have carried out the price liberalization over a longer period of time, that would of course have been an advantage. Unfortunately, however, on this point our hand was forced by the reality, by the fact that we were no longer

able to subsidize certain activities from the budget. This no doubt started a chain of phenomena that reflect negatively on the people's purchasing power.

Thus, from this viewpoint, the end of one year since the elections finds us at a difficult economic and social point marked by numerous complications and by the complexity of the process of change in a decisive area of our social life. More than a few people have become discouraged by the hardships that our society is facing. Criticisms are often voiced of the government and the capability of the executive power to deal with and resolve the major current problems. Unfortunately, there are difficulties against which we have to struggle and against which we will continue to have to struggle. Many of them are only now beginning. One of them is unemployment, which so far has only bared its fangs, but which is an inevitable process. Inflation will also continue. But I think that we must view these things realistically. There are evidently subjective issues, too, having to do with each person's capabilities and with the persistence of many aspects of inertia, but we do have real, objective difficulties. I think that we must have understanding for the situation we are experiencing, seek the roots of the various situations, openly reveal the inevitable hardships we have to face, and begin to create a climate of understanding and involvement among all the factors and all the social categories, so that we can confront these difficulties with dignity. In this respect I want to point out that there are also encouraging elements which we must use to better advantage in our practical activities, even in industry, which will probably face the greatest difficulties and where the transition will take longest because the structures are more cumbersome. That is precisely why we already have examples of units and people that are beginning to find solutions to their problems. I noted that also during my recent visit to Gaesti and Tirgoviste, Dimbovita County. Wherever people make efforts, show skill, and seriously and practically work on the problems, in the end they find solutions. That can be said, among others, about the refrigerators enterprise in Gaesti, where production did not drop like in other enterprises, although it had the same problems about technical and material supplies. The bulb plant in Tirgoviste managed to restore the production by reinstating the management that had been abusively replaced at the beginning of last year, something that demonstrates the importance of the human factor and the role that can be played by competent leaders, organizers, and managers who are correct and responsible. We have other positive examples, too, that are unfortunately not sufficiently publicized. Good examples have always had a good impact. In the final analysis, the decisive element is that in every enterprise both the management and the working teams, the technical, economic, and labor cadres begin to think and set in motion their own potential and strive to find the most appropriate solutions.

What do I note in my daily contacts with representatives of the various social categories and economic sectors? There are managers who on the one hand request the government to resolve various problems, while on the other they demand a bolder decentralization. Along this line one notes a certain incoherence in the way of thinking and understanding the processes currently occurring. We are still slaves to the old

mentalities. The government does not have miracle solutions and it lacks even the levers of the former centralized system; all it can do is coordinate with various degree of proficiency certain activities at the central level. The government must also act more efficiently to improve its economic and financial levers. But to a great extent, the key to resolving most of the problems is in the hands of the economic units and factors and of the basic links of the economy. Competent people with initiative must be encouraged and stimulated at those levels. If I had to anticipate the situation at the time of the next general elections in Romania and the conditions at the time when we will end the office we assumed through last year's popular vote, I would not risk to assert that by that date we will have made some recovery, not to say more than that. We may still be on the downward slope, only slightly better off than we are now. The situation could still be difficult especially in the social area. In the productive area we may begin to recover. I hope that by the end of this year we will begin to make some recovery in this respect. However, developments concerning people's lives are unpredictable and we cannot exclude the possibility of increased unemployment and difficulties in people's living conditions. The ratio between prices and incomes will remain unfavorable. We must also not forget that we are all at a stage at which the entire world economy is in decline. The economists predict that the world economy will begin to recover only in 1994, something that will affect us, too. From this viewpoint it is possible that the next elections will come at an unfavorable point with few certain positive elements. But I hope that at least as a general trend, we will by then have a better legislative and organizational framework to help us relaunch the national economy and to allow and promise more dynamic activities.

In this context we must pay greater attention to involving and stimulating the activities of the technical intelligentsia in the process of managerial and technological rejuvenation, in which they must find a wide open field of manifestation, as must the youth, who should find a stimulating environment in which to utilize their potential, skills, and knowledge.

Of course, the main mission—adopting the country's new Constitution—will have been fulfilled by then. That will lay the basic foundations for the state of law and for the democratic development of the Romanian society.

I also want to express my optimism about our opening to the world, about the development of our international relations, and about overcoming certain misunderstandings that followed us in the course of this year.

In spite of all the shortfalls and troubles that will continue to dog our steps, we can hope to obtain a certain satisfaction from the fact that at the difficult moments in our history we managed to contribute something to the foundation of Romania's future progress upon which our successors could then expand upon.

Criticism of Eger Conference, Tokes' Role

91BA0726D Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian
7 May 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by Florin Radulescu-Botica: "God Is Not a Hungarian, Pastor Tokes!"]

[Text] I have never been to Eger, but from now on, even if life guided my steps to that burg, which I suspect is restful and colorful, I will avoid it at any cost, as a symbol of evil or, more correctly, of its omens. Of course, neither the town nor its residents are to blame because a group of Hungarian irredentists desecrated here—in a manner incredible for the end of the second millenium—yet again and with a coarseness and insolence typical of pathological nationalism, Romania's dignity and the most sacred representations that, as sons of a nation not better but not worse than others, we have of our past, our present, and the future we have in store. So I swear I will never set foot in Eger! This may be a passionate oath, but I may be forgiven; no one would want to visit the operating room where he had one arm amputated. But as we know, comparisons sometimes distort the essence of the facts, so we must clearly stress that everything that occurred at the "international convention" of the Hungarian world held in Eger was most literally an operation in which truth was mutilated, as were the already fragile relations—to our mutual detriment—between Hungary and Romania.

Thus, Hungarians living in Hungary and in the diaspora, and of course representatives of our conationals deemed that the time had time to issue a pronouncement on "The Past and Future of Transylvania." God knows enough centuries have passed over us and all mankind for us to know our country—at least that!—and for the international community to "recognize" it. Is it a fact that the Romanians have one of the most ancient national homes in the history of the continent, that the heart of Dacia Felix and Transylvania are one and the same, that we never abandoned our land, that others kept invading us and, after getting land for a house, a well, and a field they turned against the lawful owners? Not in the least! The "historians" present in Eger never heard any of that! You could probably learn more true facts about the history of Romania and the Romanians in Honolulu... Because the cosmopolite Hungarians simply do not accept history; they want to reconstruct it according to their interests, and they sure are interested in the sweet land of Transylvania! And putting lies at the service of such a goal is perhaps the most innocent thing that ever happened and that unfortunately may happen.

As a first string leader of the nefarious "scientific" meeting, Pastor Laszlo Tokes once again revealed himself as a great and ignoble enemy of our people. Much has been said about his statements and actions, all of them aimed at creating tension in ethnic relations in Transylvania. Perhaps at times, blinded by our proverbial good faith, we didn't even believe everything we heard along this line. This time, however, there could be no incorrect translations, possibly distorted summaries done by press agencies, or falsifications by some foreign newspaper. This time we ourselves saw and heard... "The Hungarians are leaving Transylvania" and therefore, the honorable pastor said, for us the problem is whether "to be or not to be!" (Sounds harsh, like a declaration of war, doesn't it?); "Transylvania is in mortal danger!" (What does it mean, Transylvania, after all we're talking about a part of Romania's body, not about some Hungarian "property?"); "its loss (Loss for

whom, good people?) is imminent!" All of which made it necessary—Mr. Tokes continued from the pulpit of lies—to "adjust our policy," and "accept the problem of Transylvania." But Pastor, Transylvania accepted you and your faithful, meaning your ancestors, who were looking for a place under the sun, not the other way round! And to make sure that everything was sealed by the Lord above, Laszlo added that the right to his native land was sanctified under the 5th Commandment. As if God had given that commandment only for the Hungarians in Transylvania, while the Romanians were born somewhere else and didn't have their land.

Forgive me, Mr. Tokes, but I have to warn you that you must beware of becoming ridiculous; if you continue in this strain, it won't be long before you claim that God is descended from the Hungarians and will want to write a new Bible, perhaps in Eger, that He Himself will dictate. In Hungarian, of course, because as you hinted, the Hungarians are the chosen people and you are the spokesman of their faith.

In fact, the situation is not at all complicated. The irredentist guild is insatiably exploiting the situation created by the alleged Russo-American pact of Malta. Had the "chiefs" of the world agreed that among all former socialist countries only Romania and Bulgaria would remain under Moscow's red influence, then the issue of Hungary abducting Transylvania, or rather its autonomy or self-determination would have been infinitely more complex, once again involving a confrontation between the two superpowers. But as long as the situation has not yet crystalized in Europe and the USSR is on the brink of disintegration, well, this is the time to attack. It's now or never! The irredentist Hungarian world, falsifying the past, the present (according to them the martyr Cofariu was an... oppressor and one of the heads of the "pogrom" staged against Hungarians in Tirgu Mres), and the future, is playing a decisive card: Romania had allegedly no right to declare itself a national unified state in the Constitution that is in the process of being drafted! And consequently, "they" were appealing to CSCE and other European fora.

These expressions of totalitarianism practiced by a minority against the majority are incredible! But we are convinced that not many of the 2.5 million Hungarians living in Transylvania will be so badly blinded by the aberrations claimed in Eger as not to notice the 6 million Romanians around them or their more than 2,000 years history in the region. But even so, the Romanian public is entitled to request the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania to clarify its position in connection with the inflammatory "scientific" meeting held across the Tisa and in connection with the scandalous views expressed there by its honorary chairman. Until we hear their answer—which we think is also a matter of honor—we will dare address Mr. Laszlo Tokes directly with a simple question, but one that contains our entire pain, perplexity, and hurt from the slap received:

Pastor, is there no fear of God in you?

Bosnian Croat Leader on Situation in Bosnia

91BA0800A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 91 pp 14-16

[Interview with Stjepan Kljuic, leader of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Fahrudin Rad; place and date not given: "Bosnia Is Next"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Stjepan Kljuic, journalist and dissident who soared overnight into the sphere of high politics, uses keen and sharp words in his speech and has a clear political stand. The interview for DANAS began with Kljuic's remark about the media blockade in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and the improper attitude of VJESNIK and the weekly which you now hold in your hands toward the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] for this republic, an organization which has the "best economic program, ideas, and concept of development." Nevertheless, we turn from those problems which are truly important to this party to the crucial issues of Bosnia-Herzegovina reality today and ethnic tensions.

[Rad] The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is becoming more and more dramatic every day. It seems that Mesic's warning "Bosnia is next" is being confirmed.

[Kljuic] That statement was obviously irritating to some people. In fact, for a long time now hotbeds of crisis and incidents have constantly and alternately been shifting from Croatia to Bosnia and back. After all that happened in Borovo Selo following the most loathsome atrocities which were committed there, it would have been logical to expect that type of action to be halted a bit in Croatia, but in the meantime the hotspot is cast back to Bosnia. For a long time, we were convinced that nothing serious would happen in Bosnia. After all, in the final analysis there are three ethnic parties in a coalition here. However, what happened was the very well-known phenomenon of people saying one thing in politics, just as they do in life, and doing something else. Today, Bosnia is truly a hotbed of crisis, and I think that the equilibrium of fear which prevails among all three nationalities is perhaps the last guarantee that there will not be larger incidents.

[Rad] The relations among the ruling parties are becoming critical. At the same time, the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and the HDZ are declaring themselves to be advocates of a sovereign and equal Bosnia-Herzegovina, while on the other hand the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] is operating very destructively against that sovereignty and the republic's territorial integrity.

[Kljuic] I must say that we won the election at the point when we demonstrated to the people that we could live together. That was in fact our conception, to turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into a modern state. And my personal position was that in its ethnic composition, in the arrangement of its ethnic equality, it should be similar to Switzerland, but similar to Austria as a legal state. It was our intention to replace the system which is historically spent with a new and modern one, to put the most competent people in the most important posts, for the prosperity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the SDS supported that at the outset,

I was convinced that Bosnia-Herzegovina would greatly prosper in two or three years. At the point when the SDS received the orders to destroy Bosnia, and the range of opportunities is immense, things began to sour. However, I am still profoundly convinced that the Serbian people as a whole do not think like that. But, unfortunately, no one in Bosnia-Herzegovina has so far spoken up, as have a certain number of Serbs in Croatia, to point out the destructiveness of the present SDS policy. I also think that the Croatian Democratic Community has not given any occasion for any misunderstandings whatsoever. We have been consistently conducting our own programmatic policy, and I think that the SDA has also been quite correct. When they fly the flags of those two parties at various meetings, people ask: Where is the third one?

[Rad] There is no shortage of comment to the effect that the SDA and HDZ are part of an unscrupulous anti-Serb coalition, that is, that this is a dangerous "Ustasha-fundamentalist tandem".

[Kljuic] Those are the most loathsome lies and remarks without any political basis whatsoever. First, I do not see Ustashi anywhere, I see only Chetniks. Even on television, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Belgrade, unfortunately, I see them. There is no coalition of Muslims and Croats against Serbs at all, but a naturally created and identical position because those two parties favor a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina for life together in these parts and for prosperity. What joins these two nationalities today is not merely the historical continuity of good relations, but also the present situation, in which the Croats and Muslims are forced to be together against those who are destroying Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Rad] The other day you had joint talks among the leaders of the HDZ, SDA, and SDS at the level of party presidents. In one statement, President Izetbegovic said that he would seek a clear statement that would distance the SDS from the Chetnik movement. How are those talks going, and is there a possibility of an agreement concerning the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Kljuic] I think that there are no negotiations with the SDS at all, and I do not accept them until the people in the SDS get rid of Vucurevic (president of the Trebinje Opstina Assembly and Regional Committee of the SNV [Serbian National Council], whom YUTEL filmed singing Chetnik songs in Niksic), and until a parliamentary commission is formed [to investigate] the agent Kozic, who was in the truck with the smuggled arms, and who also said that the police center in Mostar was Ustasha-oriented, and so on. "Fundamentalists" and "Ustashi" have been talked about the whole time, which is unacceptable for a completely objective public, because there is nothing to that, and it does not exist.

At the same time, the Chetniks are marching, and worst of all, they are not doing so as a Chetnik organization, but they are marching as part of the SDS. With its aggressive policy, the SDS has made things so much more acute that within its ranks, at least in the field, it is the most extreme right-wing elements that have the advantage. Today, of

course, they have lost control of them, and to some extent I understand Karadzic when he says that he can no longer control the situation. They should have thought of that earlier, and that can be seen in the views expressed by the Croatian Democratic Community. We could have responded still more aggressively to every aggressive attack of the SDS, but we did not. We simply made our contribution to stabilizing the situation. Incidentally, it is quite clear today that the hotbeds of crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina are where the attempt is being made to shatter the republic's legal system with the methods and aggressiveness of the SDS, by bullying.

[Rad] The facts indicated that the SDS is in many respects a political organization that serves as a branch for a parent political organization. Do not get me wrong, but there is criticism to the effect that the case is similar with the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kljuic] All those who criticize the HDZ in that manner fail to use arguments and analysis. We are not a branch party. We do not hide the fact that we belong to the worldwide HDZ, but in the politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where we operate we are completely on our own and altogether free, and we make the decisions about that. At the same time, the SDS receives directives, and this is evident from the identical approach of all currents within that party, from the politicians to the journalists, they all operate in keeping with the proposition they have been given. Incidentally, we are in favor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they are not. That is the essence. Let those critics tell us of any move that has been against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Rad] Nevertheless, there has been a great deal of equating of the Serbian and Croatian integralism and aspirations toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that sense, people are warning more and more of alleged Croatian disloyalty toward the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kljuic] Charges of that kind are made daily from Serbian expansionist circles. They have their own press. Unfortunately, we do not—neither in Croatia nor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the media are pronouncedly anti-Croat. That is why we cannot defend ourselves against such attacks. However, we have what we say, and that is how we behave politically. Look at our people in the Presidency, in the government, in the assembly....

[Rad] The argument about the Croatian readiness to separate from Bosnia-Herzegovina is partly built on the shouts that were heard in Listica in connection with the serious incident with the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], for example: "This is Croatia," and in that context it is quite often mentioned that Paraga's party is enjoying ever greater popularity in eastern Herzegovina.

[Kljuic] We cannot and should not generalize about what kind of shouts there were. All of 30 people from the Movement for Yugoslavia were sent to Listica at that time and they said the ugliest things. Accordingly, why do you not turn your question around and ask yourself how Alija Izetbegovic was received among those people? Izetbegovic

was received in Listica as the real president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That being the case, do not take those hasty slogans or something that occurred there as something marginal and extreme. Look at the overall behavior. We are also accused of waving the flags of the Republic of Croatia. That is not the truth. We wave the Croatian national flag; the Republic of Croatia has a tricolor, the chessboard, and five crests, and we have only the traditional Croat flag from the time when the Croat people arrived here.

As for Paraga and his party, as I see it they are not serious elements in political life. They sit on pure Croatian soil and issue the most right-wing statements. Paraga's emergence and the people whom he has assembled are politically marginal and unacceptable for us Croats. One should distinguish the traditions of the Law Party from these current interpreters. Perhaps in my heart I am more for the law than all of them, but my good sense tells me to behave the way I am behaving now.

[Rad] You are supposed to be a politician representing the Croat option, but also one with a pronounced pro-Bosnian orientation. In the political backbiting you are even being reproached for being a Muslim son-in-law. What is the essence of your pro-Bosnian orientation?

[Kljuic] There are a number of motives behind such attacks. I am a Croat, and I did not become one yesterday. I expressed my ethnic identity in the most difficult periods of the repression. I can say that I am proud to say today what I said almost 30 years ago as a dissident. In my internal makeup, then, intellectual and political, ethnic consciousness emerged still earlier on positions of what today is the program of the HDZ. I once said that I was born a member of the HDZ. We all felt the injustice of the former regime and were its victims. As for any kind of criteria about who is the bigger Croat, the one from Croatia, from Bosnia, from Backa, and so on, I do not accept that, and it cannot be normal. We are all Croats, and I see the totality of Croat interests in my advocacy of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I think it is strategically very important to the Republic of Croatia that there be a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. In all of that, there is no partner on the Serbian side who would be tolerant and reasonable toward Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Croats. For example, Micunovic, supposedly a democrat, and the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], and the SPC [Serbian Orthodox Church] all think the same thing about us Croats and render the same judgment concerning us. They offer us western Herzegovina without Mostar, that is what they recognize as ours. They know that they will never rule those areas, because they cannot rule a people that does not tolerate force.

At the same time, when we look at the entirety of Croat interests, I think that the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina is indispensable. Another thing: We traditionally achieved a good community life with the Muslims. It is now destroyed with the Serbs, but, objectively speaking, we in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not had extensive contact with the Serbian population. There are only a few opstinas

where we live in the same community with them. So, when you look at my political concept, I am a Croat just as I have always been. And the charge against me that I live with a Muslim woman, that is mainly a question of personal life which has nothing to do with politics. Would those critics who persistently concern themselves with my private life be happier if I had married a woman from Sweden or Norway? I think it is disgusting to talk about that in public.

[Rad] A little while ago you spoke about your dissidency and the repression of the communist system. It is interesting that Broz' picture is still in your office. Why?

[Kljuic] First of all, you must realize that when you enter political life, especially by the front door, as was my case, a man must thrust certain of his personal views into the background. There is no room for vanity and personal identifiers, because we are talking about behavior that is based on a civilized system. Until a decision is adopted in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina which signifies the removal of Tito's pictures, I simply do not wish to personally make any demonstration here. I think that time should make the final evaluation of Broz. He certainly did not do for Croats what he could have. And those for whom he did most are today casting him out of his grave. You must realize that that grave of Tito's brought \$2.5 billion of benefit to the people of Belgrade and Serbia. The large number of people who come, the nights spent in hotels, the time spent in Belgrade by several hundreds of thousands and a million people have brought in an immense amount of money.

[Rad] While you still hold on to Broz' picture, some of your colleagues in the republic Presidency have not been showing even a modicum of respect for the constitution and laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kljuic] Back at the beginning of the new government I proposed that we get together and ascertain which communist laws do not suit us and replace them through a democratic procedure. The new government cannot function effectively with communist laws including the decision on the eve of the election which gave judges a new term of eight years. However, we did not do this in good time, and that was the first mistake. But until we adopt new laws, we must respect the existing ones.

[Rad] Nevertheless, there are people sitting on the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina who do not even recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and for all practical purposes are picking the state apart.

[Kljuic] To be sure, they can do damage to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in the last analysis, failure to respect the law will come down on everyone's head, regardless of who it is. Someone may obtain temporary advantage from that kind of behavior, because we are dealing with the concept that the worst possible atmosphere should be created so that some element of the Yugoslav repressive apparatus could then come onto the scene. The essence of the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina lies in the fact that we have attempted to reach agreements by consensus. Much is said about the coalition, but we do not need any coalition. Today, the HDZ and SDA, not to mention certain other

parties, have a majority at all levels in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the government, and in the republic's Presidency. This means that we could pass any law. But we have said that there is to be no majority rule and outvoting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are three nationalities living here. We would get nowhere if someone was dissatisfied. We have sought a modus vivendi with which everyone is satisfied and through which the three nationalities jointly pursue their vital interests.

[Rad] But in connection with the decisions about regionalization of Bosnia-Herzegovina there was a great deal of outvoting at the opstina level.

[Kljuic] The Serbian Democratic Party, failing to honor that principle, used a most brutal majority in certain opstinas. It completely ignored the principle of respecting the interests of all nationalities and of reaching agreement through discussion. They can do it that way, I told them, but then they will have a system which they are the first to apply. And that at all levels in the republic, and then let them weigh the consequences themselves.

[Rad] For months, the SDS leader has been traumatizing the Bosnia-Herzegovina public with suspicions about the arming of political parties. In response to the stubborn insistence of the public that he say to what parties he is referring, Karadzic has maintained a persistent silence. However, the incident in Bileca shows that the SDS is arming itself. In your statements, you have refused any greater politicization of that case.

[Kljuic] I am a democrat by conviction and a man who would be the last to take up a weapon. I knew nothing about weapons until the truck and the arms smugglers were seized. To be sure, a truck of weapons is seized, and a truck of ammunition is not seized. However, we in the HDZ want to be proper in dealing with the SDS and are [not] politicizing this case. They politicized the "Ostojic case" in an insolent manner—especially Ostojic himself—but from the beginning I did not accept Karadzic's style in dealing with the public. He has treated everything that is Croat so brutally, especially the democratic government in Croatia, that if we had accepted that kind of public attitude in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the crisis would have heated up six months ago. Of course, everything has its limits. We have proven once again that we do not want to politicize this case of weapons for those reasons, and not because we do not know what was really involved....

[Rad] What actually was involved?

[Kljuic] I cannot tell you. I do not want to prejudice the case, because I am demanding that the legal inquiry go to the end and the court render a verdict and punish the offenders. Then we will have our comment to make.

[Rad] Were there one or three trucks of weapons involved, as asserted by the MBO [Muslim Bosnian Organization]?

[Kljuic] The MBO is well informed.

[Rad] You are leaving everything to the legal state concerning this case. However, you recently declared that the

Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina could not establish law and order over its entire territory. Is that not a contradiction?

[Kljiuc] It is truly tragic for a man who, as you see, is involved in politics and in addition holds a place in the highest leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina to declare that it is a law-governed state and does not have power over its entire territory. However, I do not [word illegible] that statement. It is reality. Now we have the question of whether those who have violated the legal system are aware that a stick has two ends?

[Rad] You recently came forth with the idea of forming a front for defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What does that idea look to: military, police, or political forces?

[Kljiuc] I had in mind creating a political front. As for military and police forces, I no longer know whether that can function at all. We have a number of policemen of Serbian nationality, for instance, who have been removed and who do not want to turn in their weapons and disarm themselves. We have chaos with respect to defense, a chaos that has not yet taken on the interethnic intensity that the rabble-rousers would like. The people are still wiser than they are. But in any case, if there is to be a Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think that the great majority of people of all nationalities, including the Serbs, are ready for something like that.

We know that there are two possible outcomes in Bosnia: The first is dependent upon the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis and then on the agreement among the ethnic parties. In one of the meetings, the Serbs have said that we would work that out together, and would remain together or would part. However, the historical experience of the Croats is that they have never held to anything they signed, beginning with the unification in 1918, because the country was unified as a democratic kingdom, and then came the dictatorship.

[Rad] You are referring to the Serbs?

[Kljiuc] Yes. Nothing they sign has any validity. But I think that the Serbian situation today, precisely because of that policy, is far more difficult than it otherwise would objectively have been.

[Rad] Nevertheless, what will happen if Serbian extremism is stronger and amputates a portion of territory from Bosnia-Herzegovina and attaches it to an expanded Serbia?

[Kljiuc] First, I think that the Serbian Government is too intelligent to accept that division. After all, if it accepts it, then Serbia can count on losing a part of its territory: Serbia is one of the rare countries in Europe which has absolute [word illegible], yet only 64 percent of the population is Serb. Accordingly, what it would take on the one hand from Bosnia it would soon lose in a much broader proportion. In addition, it will be clear to everyone that Yugoslavia can no longer survive as it has existed for more than 70 years. This is historically untenable. As a man, I can understand the Serbs who are now against reorganization of Yugoslavia. After all, they are losing the imperial status which they have had for 73 years.

Kosovo Albanian Pupils To Boycott Serb Exams

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[Article by Slobodanka Ast and Bajram Kabasi: "Dangerous Games"]

[Text] A stormy debate lasted more than five hours in the Serbian Assembly on whether or not academic high schools would remain in nine little towns in Serbia, that is, whether several hundred pupils would be able to enroll in an academic high school in their town. The deputies first voted to close these uneconomical schools (like in the joke about the church and the bell, there are 40 reasons, and the first among them is that—there are no children!), but after a recess and another vote was taken, they voted to keep the high schools open. Officially, this was a violation of operating procedure, but, as one of the deputies said, emotions prevailed.

The future of more than 250 students who are ethnic Albanians who will perhaps lose a year of school or even the right to further schooling has been arousing far less interest of the Serbian Assembly. No point in even mentioning emotion.

That is, between 9 June and the end of the month thousands of elementary and secondary schoolchildren are to take examinations for promotion to the next grade in Serbo-Croatian language and literature, Albanian language and literature, history, geography, and music arts because they did not study according to syllabi adopted by the Educational Council of Serbia, but those of the Educational Council of Kosovo, which has now been suspended.

Loyalty Oath

Students who do not report for the examinations, and there is every likelihood that the boycott will be massive (as indicated by what has been written in SKENDIJA, the Albanian-language newspaper of Kosovo's educators), will be held back a year.

In an interview for our newspaper, Besim Gasi, Sabrije Krasnici, Drita Abdulj, and Medrije Pacoli, fourth-year students in the "19 November" Technical High School in Pristina, do not hide their bitterness because the new criterion of selection has been introduced. The school year ended three weeks ago, and now all of a sudden the news about examinations for promotion. They will do like all the others, they say. Which means that they will not go to the examinations. To the remark that they will lose a year, they answer sharply that even those with a university education have lost their jobs.

Ethnic solidarity, but also injured ethnic pride, we were told by one parent, will result in a massive boycott of the prescribed examinations.

The signing of an oath of loyalty to the Croatian supreme command is judged to be "pure fascism," in any case a political move unheard of in postwar Europe. However, those employed in the Kosovo schools must also sign a similar statement of loyalty to the Republic of Serbia. The parent who spoke about the boycott of the examinations

calls this act "breaking the back." His child, he says firmly, will not take the examinations for promotion, even if he loses a year.

Never Worse

Is this actually the logical end of a school year in Kosovo, where the "state of general distrust and ethnic division are graver than ever?" as a report of the Government of Serbia observed in February. On this point, the Government of Serbia openly admitted the complete failure of its policy in Kosovo. To be sure, the culprit is to be sought exclusively on the other side, which did not accept the uniform educational policy. Nothing is said about the policy which in Kosovo first instituted "apartheid" by floors, entrances, or schools, and then also—for "security reasons" separated children of Serbian and Albanian nationality by shifts. There can be no doubt about the move whereby at the beginning of the year, "to serve as an example," secondary schools attended by 5,500 pupils were closed in Podujevo, Lipljan, and Obilic. In Podujevo Opstina, all teachers who did not work according to the curricula and syllabi of the Educational Council of Serbia have been denied their pay since the beginning of the school year, and the vertical-horizontal personnel restructuring has been radical: several hundred teachers have been laid off, more than 100 principals, everyone employed in the Provincial Bureau for Advancement of Upbringing and Education, and many other educational and pedagogical institutions.... Financing has ceased for all schools which have not been applying the official curricula and syllabi; all personal incomes have been stopped. Officially, "because of the erroneous employment policy," another 2,000 teachers who are ethnic Albanians will be discharged.

In many schools in Kosovo, instruction is taking place in an almost improbable atmosphere. School principals and some teachers (Serbs and Montenegrins, of course) are armed with walkie-talkies so as to be in constant communication with the police; in other schools, instruction always takes place in the presence of the police. The many demolished schools are the most dismal paradigm of the chaos and ethnic tensions in this region.

Arrangement of a uniform educational system in Kosovo has experienced a total failure. The competent educational authorities in Serbia say that Kosovo's representatives did not take up the initiatives for joint agreements concerning teacher training for the new uniform curricula and syllabi adopted in the fall. Hundreds and thousands of orders, decisions, and warnings had no effect whatsoever. Elementary and secondary schools continued to use the curricula and syllabi adopted 24 August 1990 by the Educational Council of Kosovo under the laws and statutes in effect at that time.

The Disputed Syllabi

The Naim Frasheri Federation of Ethnic Albanian Teachers judges that the examinations for promotion which are supposed to be taken by about 250,000 pupils in Kosovo have no legal basis whatsoever. Zecir Demi, suspended secretary of the Educational Council of Kosovo, briefly said in a statement for VREME that the curricula

and syllabi adopted by the lawful educational authorities of Kosovo are the legal ones. Kalim Hiseni, former director of the Bureau for Advancement of Education and Upbringing of Kosovo (now unemployed), believes that educational policy should be conducted by personnel and institutions in Kosovo. This way, which consists of imposition from outside, the consequences are unforeseeable, he warns.

Formally, the curricula and syllabi are the main bone of contention. Anka Budimlija, counselor for minority education in the republic Bureau for Advancement of Upbringing and Education, says that the syllabi adopted in Kosovo do not include, for example, writers from Yugoslav literature; the culture, history, and literature of the nationalities with which the Albanians live is mentioned, she says, incidentally and fragmentarily. There is better representation of writers from world literature, although not enough even of them. The Educational Council of Serbia has proposed that the literature syllabus have a 30-percent Yugoslav content. Similar arguments explain the unacceptability of the history syllabus.

The other side sees the syllabus of the Educational Council of Serbia as "discriminatory and assimilative": The objections range from fundamental—to the effect that "Albanian culture and history are ignored,"—to bizarre details ("scientific falsehoods are offered, and it states that the ancestors of the Albanians were Slavs" and "98 percent of the songs in music arts are non-Albanian"). There are no official figures on how many young ethnic Albanians are not going to school, on how many of them are in the streets because the schools have been closed; on what the quality of instruction is in the schools using the unofficial curricula and syllabi, nor what children are studying in private schools.

There are officials in the educational system who assert almost with satisfaction that some ethnic Albanian pupils do not know how to read and write even in the third grade of elementary school. The competent authorities are not greatly worried that there are as many as 20 children in some classes, that four are sitting on one bench. Careful statistics are now being kept on how many teachers do not have adequate professional training; in other words, how many teachers should be fired. But that is how it has been in Kosovo, and indeed in many schools in the south of Serbia, for years now.

The announced "efficiency" measures have also certainly helped to draw the Kosovo knot tighter: Under a decision of the Educational Council of Kosovo, all of 70 percent of Albanian-language secondary schools are planned for "rationalization." Representatives of the Naim Frasheri Federation of Ethnic Albanian Teachers say that the level of inequality can be best illustrated by the fact that for the 36,000 elementary school students who finished the eighth grade (provided they take the examinations for promotion!) only 6,000 places are envisaged in secondary schools, while for the 4,000 pupils of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality exactly that number is envisaged in secondary schools. This measure of enrollment policy alone envisages that 26,000 pupils cannot cross the

threshold of secondary school. Theoretically, to be sure, Albanians can attend school with instruction in Serbo-Croatian from elementary school to the university, where very narrow doors again await Albanians. The quota for enrollment of nationalities and ethnic minorities in this region actually means that some will not attend the university simply because they are Albanian.

And while the experts of the international public are attempting to establish whether human rights are being violated in Kosovo, it is certain that the highest price for the conflict of political interests of the adults will be paid by those least to blame—the children.

The deputy education minister for Serbia announces with self-satisfaction that Serbia can look the world's public in the eye without shame, because members of the ethnic minorities have been granted rights to the highest degree. Is that arrogance or ignorance of the authorities?

In Kosovo, the conditions for enrollment in certain schools are unequal; the decision was made with the well-known "thoughtless speed" that about 250,000 pupils should take examinations for promotion, while at the same time neither the social nor the pedagogical prerequisites have been

brought about for Albanian children to learn Serbo-Croatian. It is actually both sides, both the Serbian authorities and the so-called Kosovo alternative, who are violating the human rights of ethnic Albanian children, because hundreds of thousands of school-age children are going without education.

For that official who is "without shame," a more difficult one than the predicted fiasco with the examinations for promotion is this: How will the Republic of Serbia solve the problem of Kosovo with another million young ethnic Albanian fanatics (literate, semiliterate, and illiterate)? And the other side confronts an equally difficult problem: What is it going to do with them? Lobbies out there in the world somewhere will not provide money enough to help the hundreds and thousands of semiliterates to equip themselves for a normal life in which the main coordinates will not be fear and hatred, distrust, and ethnic and political exclusiveness. The way things stand now, the youngest have become cannon fodder in the merciless political games being played by the two sides. The children are not to blame, although the authorities have been giving them Draconian punishment for years.