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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Bishop Tokes on Eger Conference, Irredentism

91P20348A Budapest Television Service in Hungarian
1855 GMT 10 May 91

["Excerpts" from an interview with Laszlo Tokes, Presbyterian bishop of Nagyvarad [Oradea], Transylvania, by a Hungarian Television reporter on the "Panorama" program in Budapest on 10 May]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] "I thought for a long time about whether to attend the Eger Conference because I really get cold feet at the mention of the question of Transylvanian independence, knowing the historical conditions and the current situation. On the one hand, because I love Transylvania, and on the other, because I am afraid that an unreasonable trend in Transylvania will gain prominence and certain extremist opinions could become dominant. I did go to this conference, but with the intention of adhering to the realistic position that characterizes the policy of the RMDSZ [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] and of trying to argue against any extreme or exaggerated ideas about Transylvania. So after this the series of attacks which were directed against me in connection with the Eger conference by certain elements of the Romanian press felt like a cold shower, especially since what characterized my presence there was precisely not what they emphasized, that is, that I am an irredentist, to oversimplify the charge, this is what they have accused me of and they keep accusing me unceasingly. This is why after the conference I even issued a statement and sent it to many places, for example, to Rompres, that I am not an irredentist, but it seems that this leaves them completely cold. The responsible Romanian press organs are totally ignoring this statement. It is becoming more and more obvious that they are not interested in what the other side is saying, they just keep repeating their unfounded charges.

"What surprised me the most was when I had a chance to see the statement of the Salvation Front concerning the Eger Conference, broadcast on [Romanian] television on 4 May. The fact that the Front saw it necessary to issue a statement in connection with such a third-rate conference in itself is remarkable, the Front normally does not do this.

"I would only like to remark that in connection with Eger, it is unrealistic and outright irresponsible the way certain people talk in the name of maximalism, demanding certain rights for Transylvania, what is more, Transylvanian independence. A speaker even called for complete independence for Transylvania. They are urging us to become radicalized and to achieve everything. They simply cannot understand that they are not dealing with unbroken Magyardom, all ready to fight, but with Hungarians who do not even dare send their children to Hungarian schools, even where they could. And with such a Magyardom that is biding its time to see

whether there is going to be a reversal in the conditions of society, there is still no future for Hungarian education! So it is in vain to urge us on to build barricades, to fight like hussars.

"We have to keep in mind to what depths we have been plunged. We are trying to do something to counter this in the last hour. This is the situation and it has to be understood. On the other hand, I grow desperate and see more and more clearly that all the accusations and reasons of extremist Romanians go up in smoke, since a crime of the magnitude of genocide has been perpetrated continuously for decades against our Hungarian culture and churches. And it is simply outrageous to accuse us of having privileges when our most important institutions have been liquidated, our schools have been almost successfully obliterated, and finally our churches as well. Romanians should be made aware of what happened here; they may not even know what happened." [passage omitted]

"A regular spiritual and cultural genocide has taken place. It has been perpetrated in the long term." [passage omitted]

"What do our exaggerating foreign brothers, friends of Transylvania, expect when we do not even have the fighting spirit? They would like to force their wisdom on us when we are fighting for our existence." [passage omitted]

BULGARIA

Local SDS Coordinating Councils Polled

91P20349A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
20, 21 May 91

[Unattributed report in two installments: "Results of a Survey of SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] Obshtina Coordinating Councils"]

[20 May p 3]

[Text] In connection with the planning for the National Conference of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] on 19 May 1991, the National Coordinating Council prepared a poll of the obshtina coordinating councils on fundamental questions on the state of the country. Each obshtina coordinating council [KS] voted, and, in a statement explaining the manner of voting, gave its own assessment of the political situation.

By 19 May 1991, 196 statements had been received. The responses to these fundamental questions are displayed in the following tables. Note: Some statements did not arrive in time to be processed.

First Question: How do the Obshtina KS and its member organizations assess the work of the Grand National Assembly [VNS]?

		Did Not Partic- pate	Good	Satisfac- tory	Poor	Inconclu- sive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number		2	33	151			10	196
	Percent		1.0	16.8	77.0			5.1	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	1	3	51	99	23	2	1	180
	Percent	0.6	1.7	28.3	55.0	12.8	1.1	0.6	
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number		1	46	108	25	2	1	183
	Percent		0.5	25.1	59.0	13.7	1.1	0.5	
Green Party	Number		2	16	69	10	1		98
	Percent		2.0	16.3	70.4	10.2	1.0		
Democratic Party	Number			6	49	7	1		63
	Percent			9.5	77.8	11.1	1.6		
United Demo- cratic Center [ODTs]	Number		1	1	27	1			30
	Percent		3.3	3.3	90.0	3.3			
Radical Demo- cratic Party [RDP]	Number			2	60	10	1	1	74
	Percent			2.7	81.1	13.5	1.4	1.4	
Ecoglasnost	Number	1		19	53	8		1	82
	Percent	1.2		23.2	64.6	9.8		1.2	
Federation of Clubs for Democ- racy [FKD]	Number			5	49	6			60
	Percent			8.3	81.7	10.0			
Committee for the Defense of Reli- gious Rights, Freedom of Con- science, and Spir- itual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number			1	10	2	1		14
	Percent			7.1	71.4	14.3	7.1		
Club of the Vic- tims of Post-1945 Repression	Number		2	11	38	1	1		53
	Percent		3.8	20.8	71.7	1.9	1.9		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number			5	31	1	1		38
	Percent			13.2	81.6	2.6	2.6		
Christian Demo- cratic Front [KhDF]	Number				5				5
	Percent				100.0				
Federation of Independent Stu- dent Associations [FNSD]	Number			1	4				5
	Percent			20.0	80.0				

First Question: How do the Obshtina KS and its member organizations assess the work of the Grand National Assembly [VNS]? (Continued)

		Did Not Participate	Good	Satisfactory	Poor	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number			2	25	1			28
	Percent			7.1	89.3	3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number			5	41	5	1		52
	Percent			9.6	78.8	9.6	1.9		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number				4				4
	Percent				100.0				
Podkrepa	Number			1	24	2	1		28
	Percent			3.6	85.7	7.1	3.6		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number			1	8				9
	Percent			11.1	88.9				
Republican Party	Number				6	1			7
	Percent				85.7	14.3			
Union of Non-party Members	Number			1	4				5
	Percent			20.0	80.0				
Others	Number				12	1			13
	Percent				92.3	7.7			

Second Question: How does the KS assess the work of its deputy?

Number	Name	Type of Electoral District	Electoral District	Good	Satisfactory	Poor
1	Ivan Kostov	Single mandate	Plovdiv	15	0	0
2	Ivan Pushkarov	Multiple mandate	Sofia Okrug	12	0	
3	Snezhana Botusharova	Multiple mandate	Slivenski	11	0	0
4	Georgi Ignatov	Single mandate	Asenovgrad	7	0	0
5	Ventsislav Medarski	Single mandate	Razlozhki	6	0	0
6	Ilich Tsvetkov	Multiple mandate	Sofia Okrug	5	0	0
7	Ventsislav Dimitrov	Single mandate	Sofia-Lozenets	8	1	0
8	Andrey Andreev	Single mandate	Plovdiv	12	3	0
9	Khristo Markov	Single mandate	Plovdiv	7	3	0
10	Zakhari Karamfilov	Single mandate	Sofia-Iskur	6	4	0
11	Zheko Zhekov	Single mandate	Plovdiv	7	8	0
12	Stefan Stoyanov	Single mandate	Sofia-Podune	2	6	0
13	Edvin Sugarev	Single mandate	Sofia-Krasno Selo	4	3	0
14	Steliyan Stoychev	Single mandate	Sofia-Studentska	4	4	0
15	Viktoria Dimova	Single mandate	Sofia-Iskur	3	6	0
16	Mikhail Nedelchev	Multiple mandate	Burgas	10	4	1

Second Question: How does the KS assess the work of its deputy? (Continued)

Number	Name	Type of Electoral District	Electoral District	Good	Satisfactory	Poor
17	Vulkana Todorova	Single mandate	Stara Zagora	2	2	3
18	Petur Dertliev	Multiple mandate	Burgas	3	7	5
19	Georgi Baev	Single mandate	Burgas	5	3	7
20	Stoycho Donev	Single mandate	Plovdiv	2	4	4
21	Dimitur Ludzhev	Single mandate	Burgas	2	6	7
22	Al. Karakachanov	Single mandate	Sofia-Serdika	1	6	4
23	Dimitur Ezekiev	Multiple mandate	Smolyanski	0	3	0
24	Manush Romanov	Multiple mandate	Sliven	0	5	1
25	Lazar Dulgurski	Single mandate	Plovdiv	0	7	7
26	Konstantin Tsanev	Single mandate	Sofia-Vuzrazhdane	0	4	4
27	Metodi Nedyalkov	Single mandate	Sofia-Oborishte	0	5	5
28	Petko Ogoyski	Single mandate	Sofia-Novi Iskur	0	3	3
29	Manol Zhurnalov	Single mandate	Plovdiv	1	6	8
30	Nikolay Bliznakov	Single mandate	Plovdiv	1	5	9
31	Todor Kolev	Single mandate	Sofia-Vitosha	0	4	6
32	Todor Tashev	Single mandate	Plovdiv	0	5	8
33	Pavel Mazulov	Multiple mandate	Burgas	0	6	9
34	Stefan Gaytandzhiev	Multiple mandate	Pleven	1	3	9
35	Plamen Darakchiev	Multiple mandate	Pleven	1	3	9
36	Angel Akhryanov	Single mandate	Sofia-Ovcha Kupel	1	1	8
37	Todor Kavaldzhiev	Multiple mandate	Stara Zagora	0	2	5
38	Dimitur Kumanov	Single mandate	Sofia-Krasno Selo	0	2	6
39	Krasen Stanchev	Single mandate	Sofia-Triaditsa	0	2	9
40	Petko Petkov	Multiple mandate	Plovdiv	0	2	13
41	Georgi Bunov	Single mandate	Plovdiv	0	2	13
42	Pirin Vodenicharov	Single mandate	Sofia-Ilinden	0	1	7
43	Vladimir Sotirov	Single mandate	Sofia-Mladost	0	1	9
44	Gancho Ganchev	Multiple mandate	Burgas	0	1	14
45	Rumen Danov	Single mandate	Sofia-Kremikovtsi	0	0	6
46	Milan Drenchev	Multiple mandate	Sofia Okrug	0	0	11
47	Rumen Vodenicharov	Single mandate	Sofia-Izgrev	0	0	11
48	Dimitrina Petrova	Single mandate	Burgas	0	0	15

Note: Data are given only for deputies who are specifically assessed in the 196 statements that were processed.

Third Question: Do you believe that this VNS should ratify the new constitution?

		Did Not Participate	Yes	No	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number		23	153		10	10	196
	Percent		11.7	78.1		5.1	5.1	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	1	51	94	23	10	1	180
	Percent	0.6	28.3	52.2	12.8	5.6	0.6	
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number		46	100	25	10	2	183
	Percent		25.1	54.6	13.7	5.5	1.1	
Green Party	Number		10	74	10	4		98
	Percent		10.2	75.5	10.2	4.1		
Democratic Party	Number		3	51	7	2		63
	Percent		4.8	81.0	11.1	3.2		
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number		1	28	1			30
	Percent		3.3	93.3	3.3			
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number		2	59	10	3		74
	Percent		2.7	79.7	13.5	4.1		
Ecoglasnost	Number	1	13	57	8	2	1	82
	Percent	1.2	15.9	69.5	9.8	2.4	1.2	
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number		4	48	6	2		60
	Percent		6.7	80.0	10.0	3.3		
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number			12	2			14
	Percent			85.7	14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number		21	30	1	1		53
	Percent		39.6	56.6	1.9	1.9		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number		1	34	1	2		38
	Percent		2.6	89.5	2.6	5.3		
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number			5				5
	Percent			100.0				
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number			5				5
	Percent			100.0				
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number		1	26	1			28
	Percent		3.6	92.9	3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number		3	42	5	2		52

Third Question: Do you believe that this VNS should ratify the new constitution? (continued)

		Did Not Participate	Yes	No	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
	Percent		5.8	80.8	9.6	3.8		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number			4				4
	Percent			100.0				
Podkrepa	Number		2	23	2	1		28
	Percent		7.1	82.1	7.1	3.6		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number			9				9
	Percent			100.0				
Republican Party	Number			6	1			7
	Percent			85.7	14.3			
Union of Nonparty Members	Number		1	4				5
	Percent		20.0	80.0				
Others	Number		2	10	1			13
	Percent		15.4	76.9	7.7			

Fourth Question: Do you believe that, after the expiration of the political agreement of 3 January 1991, the VNS should be dissolved, and, in what time period?

		Immediately	Should Attempt To Ratify [the Constitution]	After Ratification	Should Not Be Dissolved	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	155	29		1		3	6	196
	Percent	79.1	14.8		0.5		1.5	3.1	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	92	56	3		23	4	1	160
	Percent	51.1	31.1	1.7		12.8	2.2	0.6	
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	97	50	6		25	4	1	183
	Percent	53.0	27.3	3.3		13.7	2.2	0.5	
Green Party	Number	66	21			10	1		98
	Percent	67.3	21.4			10.2	1.0		
Democratic Party	Number	54	1	1		7			63
	Percent	85.7	1.6	1.6		11.1			
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number	28	1			1			30
	Percent	93.3	3.3			3.3			
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number	62	1			10	1		74
	Percent	83.8	1.4			13.5	1.4		
Ecoglasnost	Number	57	13	2		8		1	82
	Percent	69.5	15.9	2.4		9.8		1.2	

Fourth Question: Do you believe that, after the expiration of the political agreement of 3 January 1991, the VNS should be dissolved, and, in what time period? (Continued)

		Immedi- ately	Should Attempt To Ratify [the Con- stitution]	After Rat- ification	Should Not Be Dissolved	Inconclu- sive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Federation of Clubs for Democ- racy [FKD]	Number	45	9			6			60
	Percent	75.0	15.0			10.0			
Committee for the Defense of Reli- gious Rights, Freedom of Con- science, and Spi- ritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number	10	1			2	1		14
	Percent	71.4	7.1			14.3	7.1		
Club of the Vic- tims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	33	16	2		1	1		53
	Percent	62.3	30.2	3.8		1.9	1.9		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number	34	2			1	1		38
	Percent	89.5	5.3			2.6	2.6		
Christian Demo- cratic Front [KhDF]	Number	5							5
	Percent	100.0							
Federation of Independent Stu- dent Associations [FNSD]	Number	5							5
	Percent	100.0							
Independent Asso- ciation for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	24	2	1		1			28
	Percent	85.7	7.1	3.6		3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	44	1	1		5	1		52
	Percent	84.6	1.9	1.9		9.6	1.9		
New Social Demo- cratic Party [NSDP]	Number	4							4
	Percent	100.0							
Podkrepa	Number	24	1			2	1		28
	Percent	85.7	3.6			7.1	3.6		
Bulgarian Demo- cratic Forum [BDF]	Number	9							9
	Percent	100.0							

Fourth Question: Do you believe that, after the expiration of the political agreement of 3 January 1991, the VNS should be dissolved, and, in what time period? (Continued)

		Immedi- ately	Should Attempt To Ratify [the Con- stitution]	After Rat- ification	Should Not Be Dissolved	Inconclu- sive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Republican Party	Number	6				1			7
	Percent	85.7				14.3			
Union of Non- party Members	Number	5							5
	Percent	100.0							
Others	Number	11	1			1			13
	Percent	84.6	7.7			7.7			

Fifth Question: Do you believe that the SDS deputies should carry out the decisions of the National Coordinating Council?

		Did Not Participate	Yes	No	Inconclu- sive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number		145	29		16	6	196
	Percent		74.0	14.8		8.2	3.0	
Bulgarian Social Demo- cratic Party [BSDP]	Number	1	104	37	23	15		180
	Percent	0.6	57.8	20.6	12.8	8.3		
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number		111	33	25	14		183
	Percent		60.7	18.0	13.7	7.7		
Green Party	Number		59	24	10	5		98
	Percent		60.2	24.5	10.2	5.1		
Democratic Party	Number		42	10	7	4		63
	Percent		66.7	15.9	11.1	6.3		
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number		23	5	1	1		
	Percent		76.7	16.7	3.3	3.3		2.4
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number		47	11	10	6		74
	Percent		63.5	14.9	13.5	8.1		
Ecoglasnost	Number	1	52	18	8	3		82
	Percent	1.2	63.4	22.0	9.8	3.7		
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number		40	10	6	4		60
	Percent		66.7	16.7	10.0	6.7		
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Con- science, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number		11	1	2			14
	Percent		78.6	7.1	14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number		39	10	1	3		53
	Percent		73.6	18.9	1.9	5.7		
Civic Initiative Move- ment [DGI]	Number		31	5	1	1		38

Fifth Question: Do you believe that the SDS deputies should carry out the decisions of the National Coordinating Council? (Continued)

		Did Not Participate	Yes	No	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
	Percent		81.6	13.2	2.6	2.6		
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number		2	3				5
	Percent		40.0	60.0				
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number		3	2				5
	Percent		60.0	40.0				
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number		22	5	1			28
	Percent		78.6	17.9	3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number		38	5	5	4		52
	Percent		73.1	9.6	9.6	7.7		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number		3	1				4
	Percent		75.0	25.0				
Podkrepa	Number		18	5	2	3		28
	Percent		64.3	17.9	7.1	10.7		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number		9					9
	Percent		100.0					
Republican Party	Number		5	1	1			7
	Percent		71.4	14.3	14.3			
Union of Nonparty Members	Number		4	1				5
	Percent		80.0	20.0				
Others	Number		10	1	1	1		13
	Percent		76.9	7.7	7.7	7.7		

Sixth Question: Do you believe that the SDS deputies are obliged to follow the policy of the SDS?

		Yes	No	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	176	3		13	4	196
	Percent	89.8	1.5		6.6	2.0	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	138	6	23	12		180
	Percent	76.7	3.3	12.8	6.7		
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	141	4	25	12	1	183
	Percent	77.0	2.2	13.7	6.6	0.5	
Green Party	Number	79	4	10	5		98
	Percent	80.6	4.1	10.2	5.1		
Democratic Party	Number	52	2	7	2		63
	Percent	82.5	3.2	11.1	3.2		

Sixth Question: Do you believe that the SDS deputies are obliged to follow the policy of the SDS? (Continued)

		Yes	No	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number	28	1	1			30
	Percent	93.3	3.3	3.3			
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number	60	1	10	3		74
	Percent	81.1	1.4	13.5	4.1		
Ecoglasnost	Number	71	1	8	1		82
	Percent	86.6	1.2	9.8	1.2		
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number	51	1	6	2		60
	Percent	85.0	1.7	10.0	3.3		
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number	11	1	2			14
	Percent	78.6	7.1	14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	50		1	2		53
	Percent	94.3		1.9	3.8		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number	35	2	1			38
	Percent	92.1	5.3	2.6			
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number	4	1				5
	Percent	80.0	20.0				
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number	4	1				5
	Percent	80.0	20.0				
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	26	1	1			28
	Percent	92.9	3.6	3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	45		5	2		52
	Percent	86.5		9.6	3.8		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number	4					4
	Percent	100.0					
Podkrepa	Number	25		2	1		28
	Percent	89.3		7.1	3.6		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number	9					9
	Percent	100.0					
Republican Party	Number	6		1			7
	Percent	85.7		14.3			
Union of Nonparty Members	Number	5					5
	Percent	100.0					
Others	Number	12		1			13

[21 May p 3]

[Text]

Seventh Question: How do you assess the positions of the SDS deputies who prepared a declaration about leaving parliament after 15 May 1991?							
		We Support Them	They Should Return	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	172	11		4	9	196
	Percent	87.8	5.6		2.0	4.6	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	103	42	23	10	1	180
	Percent	57.2	23.3	12.8	5.6	6	
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	112	36	25	10		183
	Percent	61.2	19.7	13.7	5.5		
Green Party	Number	75	7	10	6		98
	Percent	76.5	7.1	10.2	6.1		
Democratic Party	Number	54	1	7	1		63
	Percent	85.7	1.6	11.1	1.6		
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number	28	1	1			30
	Percent	93.3	3.3	3.3			
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number	64		10			74
	Percent	86.5		13.5			
Ecoglasnost	Number	61	11	8	1		82
	Percent	74.4	13.4	9.8	1.2		
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number	49	3	6	2		60
	Percent	81.7	5.0	10.0	3.3		
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number	12		2			14
	Percent	85.7		14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	32	15	1	5		53
	Percent	60.4	28.3	1.9	9.4		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number	35		1	2		38
	Percent	92.1		2.6	5.3		
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number	5					5
	Percent	100.0					
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number	5					5

Seventh Question: How do you assess the positions of the SDS deputies who prepared a declaration about leaving parliament after 15 May 1991?
(Continued)

		We Support Them	They Should Return	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
	Percent	100.0					
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	25	2	1			28
	Percent	89.3	7.1	3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	41	3	5	3		52
	Percent	78.8	5.8	9.6	5.8		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number	4					4
	Percent	100.0					
Podkrepa	Number	24		2	1	1	28
	Percent	85.7		7.1	3.6	3.6	
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number	9					
	Percent	100.0					
Republican Party	Number	6		1			7
	Percent	85.7		14.3			
Union of Nonparty Members	Number	5					5
	Percent	100.0					
Others	Number	11		1	1		13
	Percent	84.6		7.7	7.7		

Eighth Question: How do you assess the position of the SDS deputies who remained in parliament?

		We Support It	We Favor a Compromise	Negative Assessment	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	9	73	100		3	11	196
	Percent	4.6	37.2	51.0		1.5	5.6	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	31	63	57	23	3	2	180
	Percent	17.2	35.0	31.2	12.8	1.7	1.1	
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	24	67	62	25	3	2	183
	Percent	13.1	36.6	33.9	13.7	1.6	1.1	
Green Party	Number	6	40	40	10	1	1	98
	Percent	6.1	40.8	40.8	10.2	1.0	1.0	
Democratic Party	Number	4	10	41	7	1		63
	Percent	6.3	15.9	65.1	11.1	1.6		
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number	1	7	21	1			30
	Percent	3.3	23.3	70.0	3.3			
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number	2	9	53	10			74

Eighth Question: How do you assess the position of the SDS deputies who remained in parliament? (Continued)

		We Support It	We Favor a Compromise	Negative Assessment	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
	Percent	2.7	12.2	71.6	13.5			
Ecoglasnost	Number	1		39	33	8		82
	Percent	1.2		47.6	40.2	9.8		
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number	2	18	34	6			60
	Percent	3.3	30.0	56.7	10.0			
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number		1	11	2			14
	Percent		7.1	78.6	14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	14	21	16	1	1		53
	Percent	26.4	39.6	30.2	1.9	1.9		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number		6	31	1			38
	Percent		15.8	81.6	2.6			
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number			5				5
	Percent			100.0				
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number		1	4				5
	Percent		20.0	80.0				
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	2	4	21	1			28
	Percent	7.1	14.3	75.0	3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	3	6	37	5	1		52
	Percent	5.8	11.5	71.2	9.6	1.9		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number			4				4
	Percent			100.0				
Podkrepa	Number	1	4	19	2	1	1	28
	Percent	3.6	14.3	67.9	7.1	3.6	3.6	
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number	1		7		1		9
	Percent	11.1		77.8		11.1		
Republican Party	Number			5	1	1		7
	Percent			71.4	14.3	14.3		
Union of Nonparty Members	Number	1	2	2				5
	Percent	20.0	40.0	40.0				
Others	Number		2	9	1	1		13
	Percent		15.4	69.2	7.7	7.7		

Ninth Question: In your opinion, what urgent measures should the SDS take following the recent political developments in the country?

		A New Union Agreement	No Change	Dissolve the SDS	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	85	87	3		13	8	196
	Percent	43.4	44.4	1.5		6.6	4.1	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSP]	Number	79	66		23	12		180
	Percent	43.9	36.7		12.8	6.7		
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	70	75	1	25	12		183
	Percent	38.3	41.0	0.5	13.7	6.6		
Green Party	Number	43	40		10	5		98
	Percent	43.9	40.8		10.2	5.1		
Democratic Party	Number	25	28		7	3		63
	Percent	39.7	44.4		11.1	4.8		
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number	12	16		1	1		30
	Percent	40.0	53.3		3.3	3.3		
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number	33	27		10	3	1	74
	Percent	44.6	36.5		13.5	4.1	1.4	
Ecoglasnost	Number	32	39		8	2	1	82
	Percent	39.0	47.6		9.8	2.4	1.2	
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number	29	23		6	2		60
	Percent	48.3	38.3		10.0	3.3		
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number	8	4		2			14
	Percent	57.1	28.6		14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	23	27	1	1	1		53
	Percent	43.4	50.9	1.9	1.9	1.9		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number	15	21	1	1			38
	Percent	39.5	55.3	2.6	2.6			
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number	2	3					5
	Percent	40.0	60.0					
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number	4	1					5
	Percent	80.0	20.0					
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	14	12	1	1			28
	Percent	50.0	42.9	3.6	3.6			

Eleventh Question: When do you feel is the most favorable time for organizing parliamentary elections in the country?

		Up Until the End of July	In the Fall	After Rati- fication of the Consti- tution	Inconclu- sive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	165	12	5		9	5	196
	Percent	84.2	6.1	2.6		4.6	2.6	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	99	21	30	23	5	1	180
	Percent	55.0	11.7	16.7	12.8	2.8	0.6	
Nikola Petkov Bul- garian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	103	26	23	25	6		183
	Percent	56.3	14.2	12.6	13.7	3.3		
Green Party	Number	72	9	6	10	1		98
	Percent	73.5	9.2	6.1	10.2	1.0		
Democratic Party	Number	52	1	2	7	1		63
	Percent	82.5	1.6	3.2	11.1	1.6		
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number	26	3		1			30
	Percent	86.7	10.0		3.3			
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number	63	1		10			74
	Percent	85.1	1.4		13.5			
Ecoglasnost	Number	55	10	8	8	1		82
	Percent	67.1	12.2	9.8	9.8	1.2		
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number	47	4	2	6	1		60
	Percent	78.3	6.7	3.3	10.0	1.7		
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spi- ritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number	12			2			14
	Percent	85.7			14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	33	8	10	1	1		53
	Percent	62.3	15.1	18.9	1.9	1.9		
Civic Initiative Move- ment [DGI]	Number	35		1	1	1		38
	Percent	92.1		2.6	2.6	2.6		
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number	5						5
	Percent	100.0						
Federation of Inde- pendent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number	5						
	Percent	100.0						
Independent Associa- tion for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	25	1	1	1			28
	Percent	89.3	3.6	3.6	3.6			

Eleventh Question: When do you feel is the most favorable time for organizing parliamentary elections in the country? (Continued)

		Up Until the End of July	In the Fall	After Rati- fication of the Consti- tution	Inconclu- sive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	43	2	1	5	1		52
	Percent	82.7	3.8	1.9	9.6	1.9		
New Social Demo- cratic Party [NSDP]	Number	4						4
	Percent	100.0						
Podkrepa	Number	24		1	2	1		28
	Percent	85.7		3.6	7.1	3.6		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number	9						9
	Percent	100.0						
Republican Party	Number	6			1			7
	Percent	85.7			14.3			
Union of Nonparty Members	Number	5						5
	Percent	100.0						
Others	Number	11		1	1			13
	Percent	84.6		7.7	7.7			

Twelfth Question: How do you assess the readiness of the SDS in your obshtina for parliamentary elections? A) We will win overwhelmingly—by more than two-thirds; B) We will win by more than 50 percent; C) We will get as many votes as the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] does; D) Another organization will win; E) We will lose.

		More Than Two- Thirds	More Than 50 Percent	Tie With the BSP	Another Organiza- tion Will Win	We Will Lose	Incon- clusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	3	91	47	14	15		14	12	196
	Percent	1.5	46.4	24.0	7.1	7.7		7.1	6.1	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	4	68	43	14	12	23	15	1	180
	Percent	2.2	37.8	23.9	7.8	6.7	12.8	8.4	0.6	
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	6	73	40	12	13	25	13	1	183
	Percent	3.3	39.9	21.9	6.6	7.1	13.7	7.1	0.5	
Green Party	Number	1	49	23	2	8	10	5		98
	Percent	1.0	50.0	23.5	2.1	8.2	10.2	5.1		
Democratic Party	Number	7	35	10		1	7	3		
	Percent	11.1	56.6	15.9		1.6	11.1	4.8		
United Demo- cratic Center [ODTs]	Number	2	21	5	1	1				30
	Percent	6.7	70.0	16.7	3.3	3.3				
Radical Demo- cratic Party [RDP]	Number	4	40	13		1	10	5	1	74
	Percent	5.4	54.1	17.6		1.4	13.5	6.8	1.4	
Ecoglasnost	Number	2	39	19	3	8	8	3		82

Ninth Question: In your opinion, what urgent measures should the SDS take following the recent political developments in the country? (Continued)

		A New Union Agreement	No Change	Dissolve the SDS	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	25	20		5	2		52
	Percent	48.1	38.5		9.6	3.8		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number	2	2					4
	Percent	50.0	50.0					
Podkrepa	Number	14	9	1	2	2		28
	Percent	50.0	32.1	3.6	7.1	7.1		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number	4	5					9
	Percent	44.4	55.6					
Republican Party	Number	3	3		1			7
	Percent	42.9	42.9		14.3			
Union of Nonparty Members	Number	2	3					5
	Percent	40.0	60.0					
Others	Number	8	4		1			13
	Percent	61.5	30.8		7.7			

Tenth Question: In your opinion, is the creation of a united opposition necessary?

		Yes	No	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Obshtina KS	Number	176	6		11	3	196
	Percent	89.8	3.1		5.6	1.5	
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]	Number	138	3	23	15		180
	Percent	76.7	1.7	12.8	8.3		
Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS-NP]	Number	137	9	25	12		183
	Percent	74.9	4.9	13.7	6.6		
Green Party	Number	79	5	10	4		98
	Percent	80.6	5.1	10.2	4.1		
Democratic Party	Number	52	1	7	3		63
	Percent	82.5	1.6	11.1	4.8		
United Democratic Center [ODTs]	Number	27	2	1			30
	Percent	90.0	6.7	3.3			
Radical Democratic Party [RDP]	Number	56	4	10	4		74
	Percent	75.7	5.4	13.5	5.4		
Ecoglasnost	Number	69	3	8	1	1	82
	Percent	84.1	3.7	9.8	1.2	1.2	
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number	50	1	6	3		60
	Percent	83.3	1.7	10.0	5.0		

Tenth Question: In your opinion, is the creation of a united opposition necessary? (Continued)

		Yes	No	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number	10	2	2			14
	Percent	71.4	14.3	14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	45	4	1	3		53
	Percent	84.9	7.5	1.9	5.7		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number	36		1	1		38
	Percent	94.7		2.6	2.6		
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number	55					55
	Percent	100.0					
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number	5					5
	Percent	100.0					
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	25	1	1	1		28
	Percent	89.3	3.6	3.6	3.6		
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	43	2	5	2		52
	Percent	82.7	3.8	9.6	3.8		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number	3	1				4
	Percent	75.0	25.0				
Podkrepa	Number	25		2	1		28
	Percent	89.3		7.1	3.6		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number	9					9
	Percent	100.0					
Republican Party	Number	6		1			7
	Percent	85.7	14.3				
Union of Nonparty Members	Number	4	1				5
	Percent	80.0	20.0				
Others	Number	11	1	1			13
	Percent	84.6	7.7	7.7			

Twelfth Question: How do you assess the readiness of the SDS in your obshtina for parliamentary elections? A) We will win overwhelmingly—by more than two-thirds; B) We will win by more than 50 percent; C) We will get as many votes as the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] does; D) Another organization will win; E) We will lose. (Continued)

		More Than Two- Thirds	More Than 50 Percent	Tie With the BSP	Another Organiza- tion Will Win	We Will Lose	Incon- clusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
	Percent	2.4	47.6	23.2	3.7	9.8	9.8	3.6		
Federation of Clubs for Democracy [FKD]	Number	4	29	11	3	4	6	3		60
	Percent	6.7	48.3	18.3	5.0	6.7	10.0	5.0		
Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values [KZRPSSDTs]	Number	1	11				2			14
	Percent	7.1	78.6				14.3			
Club of the Victims of Post-1945 Repression	Number	7	29	9	2	2	1	3		53
	Percent	13.2	54.7	17.0	3.8	3.8	1.9	5.7		
Civic Initiative Movement [DGI]	Number	3	27	5	2		1			38
	Percent	7.9	71.1	13.2	5.3		2.6			
Christian Democratic Front [KhDF]	Number		4		1					5
	Percent		80.0		20.0					
Federation of Independent Student Associations [FNSD]	Number		5							5
	Percent		100.0							
Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights [NDZPCh]	Number	2	22			3	1			
	Percent	7.1	78.6			10.7	3.6			
Alternative Socialist Party [ASP]	Number	4	27	12	1	1	5	2		52
	Percent	7.7	51.9	23.1	1.9	1.9	9.6	3.8		
New Social Democratic Party [NSDP]	Number	1	3							4
	Percent	25.0	75.0							
Podkrepa	Number		14	5	2	4	2	1		28
	Percent		50.0	17.9	7.1	14.3	7.1	3.6		
Bulgarian Democratic Forum [BDF]	Number	1	8							
	Percent	11.1	88.9							
Republican Party	Number	2	3	1			1			7
	Percent	28.6	42.9	14.3			14.3			

Twelfth Question: How do you assess the readiness of the SDS in your obshtina for parliamentary elections? A) We will win overwhelmingly—by more than two-thirds; B) We will win by more than 50 percent; C) We will get as many votes as the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] does; D) Another organization will win; E) We will lose. (Continued)

		More Than Two-Thirds	More Than 50 Percent	Tie With the BSP	Another Organization Will Win	We Will Lose	Inconclusive Response	Abstained	Neutral	Total
Union of Non-party Members	Number		5							5
	Percent		100.0							
Others	Number	1	9	1	1		1			13
	Percent	7.7	69.2	7.7	7.7		7.7			

The statements from the meetings of the SDS Obshtina coordinating councils were received during the period 15-19 May 1991. They were processed by a team of SDS experts. When using the data from the poll, it is obligatory to cite the source.

Todor Zhivkov Defends Past Actions

91BA0636A Sofia *SOFIA NEWS* in English 8, 15 Mar, 12 Apr 91

[Interview in three installments with Todor Zhivkov, former Bulgarian dictator, by Velislava Dureva, Sofia Press Agency political observer, in Boyana between 17 December 1990 and 21 February 1991: "Todor of Pravets Starts Talking"—first paragraph is *SOFIA NEWS* introduction]

[8 Mar pp 1, 13]

[Text] Sofia Press Agency political observer Velislava Dureva interviews former dictator Todor Zhivkov. The trial against Todor Zhivkov, the man who was solo ruler of Bulgaria for 33 years, has already started and will evidently continue for quite some time. Mr. Zhivkov (like his closest associate, Milko Balev) is charged with criminal actions like abuse of power and misappropriation of tens of millions of leva. No one, however, has charged him with the grave political crimes which inflicted irreparable harm on three generations of Bulgarians. In fact, the former autocrat is completely immune to any sense of guilt.

I.

Does the fact that you are outside political affairs depress you?

Well... actually I don't have the time to think about his, for I am constantly surrounded by new situations, unpleasant ones.

(This conversation takes place in the villa of his granddaughter—and adopted daughter—Evgenia. We are sitting in the lounge, by a large French window. One staircase leads up to the baby Lyudmila, another down to the sauna. Ginna, the dog, romps outside. The maid has already brought us fig jam, coffee, soda water, ice and a bottle of Johny Walker.)

Naturally, I follow the development of political affairs through the press, radio and TV, Mr. Zhivkov goes on. I don't have any other contacts, none at all—particularly with those in power...

Why? Did they abandon you or do you refuse to see them?

I think it was they that deserted me, but I have deserted them too. It was they who did not keep their word, not I.

II.

The first thing I want to say is that they treated me like vandals. This is pure van-dal-ism!

What do you mean?

What happened after I was retired. I won't mention all the versions which exist now. They are three in all.

What are the versions?

One is that those who were at the helm were threatened by bloodshed against them, their families or even something worse. The second version is that this was not a coup, but a radical change. And the third, that there were two trends in the party and state leadership: radical and conservative and that, naturally, I headed the conservatives.

Do you have your own version?

Naturally. And one that is documented, too. So there is nothing to hurry about now... There will probably be another two or three new versions sooner or later...

Which one of the hitherto known versions is correct?

None. Neither the first, nor the second, nor the third.

Then what surprised you most on 10 November 1989?

The vandalism which started against me, all that slander... This is something... I think there is no precedent in history! A head of state and general secretary of the Party to be presented as an agent provocateur, to be accused of smuggling abroad billions and building mysterious houses abroad, etc. Anything you can think of was gathered, all kinds of rumours, and was then submitted to the Prosecutor's Office. What is this country, I ask you, that was ruled by an agent provocateur for 33 years!

This was after 10 November. But what surprised you most on 10 November itself?

I was concerned with the actions of the comrades who... I saw in them what I had feared most: presumption and all that. They thought that everything was guaranteed because they had the support of the Soviet Union. This gave them a self-confidence which was in contrast to the trials ahead of them...

Didn't they sense them?

It seems they were more concerned with the... power than with the problems. They forged history!

What forgery do you have in mind?

An enormous one! They commissioned scholars and others who wrote articles... The forgery consists in the fact that they put in the same pot Georgi Dimitrov, Vulko Chervenkov (Editor's note: Zhivkov's predecessor at the head of the party and the state until 1956), Todor Zhivkov, the forced labour camps and the April Plenum (Editor's note: this plenum of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] in April, 1956 actually marked the beginning of Zhivkov's dictatorship). How can anyone compare the periods of Georgi Dimitrov, Vulko Chervenkov and Todor Zhivkov?! Didn't Zhivkov close down the camps?! Why don't they tell the people this? Why do they hide it?

It is true that the model, developed by the April Plenum, and the manoeuvre of Zhivkov and the Zhivkovists over those 30 years did not change the order. In this I do not include the last three years. At the bottom of this forgery stands a man whom history will expose sooner or later (with a threat in his voice).

Who is this man?

Well... don't let's talk about him now (with hate in his voice) because this will make my position even harder. And the matter is not about me alone. I don't want my family to suffer! I am speaking in principle.

Is this man dangerous?

Very (hate in his voice)! Treachery is in his genes!

Is he in the ruling circles?

I don't know where he is... but treachery is in his genes!

Do you mean Andrey Lukanov (Editor's note: Mr. Lukanov was PM until November 1990)?

III.

What happened at the April Plenum? Was it simply a matter of replacing one man with another or...?

What happened? What happened was that at the April Plenum we couldn't come out with a programme. We didn't have that opportunity because we didn't have the time: events quickly followed one another. It could be said that the April course evolved gradually and it was anything but a simple change in the leading circles and the first leader. Far from that. The Stalinist model which had been established in Bulgaria had drained all its resources. A turn had to be taken. True, there were no conditions for a good-quality turn, but one had to be taken. There was no other way. We had to live.

A turn to where?

Not to the West. If we had turned to the West we would have suffered the same as Hungary or Czechoslovakia. In other words, we had to stay in the community we were already in.

To the East, you mean. Further eastward.

To the East, of course. We would have been finished in the West. That was decided by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. And Bulgaria remained with the Soviet Union. This was a historic inevitability... Why didn't the other countries do it?

What do you think of the April Plenum now?

This was a model, a historic manoeuvre which, however, could not change the system. Although it was an important manoeuvre which led Bulgaria out of its backwardness. It was most important, under those conditions, to carry out such a manoeuvre which would facilitate and guarantee the development of Bulgaria for a long period of time. There was no other way. That was why we decided that if we did not establish close relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries we would not be able to develop. And that was so! Why? Because we don't have raw materials. The Soviet Union is rich, the richest country in the world in raw materials. They have everything there. The Soviet Union is also a market. A market!

That manoeuvre was an impressive historical step! Now they are only destroying (firmly)! Nothing is created. Just destroyed. There is no conception now... and I cannot accept this state of affairs: to leave the country without actual leadership for a whole year. Why didn't anyone do something about it? Had I been there I would have done something, I would have devised some manoeuvre.

What would you have come up with? What manoeuvre?

What?... What? How should I know what...

But you are a wizard at manoeuvres!

I would have made such a manoeuvre from which the country would not have suffered (hits the leather armchair)! Bulgaria has never been in such dire straits! We are approaching civil suicide!

IV.

The second question they disgraced was the national problem! And not only that! They even resorted to treason! One day they will be tried for this! For high treason (his voice becomes harsher)! Mark my words... In I don't know how many years, 30 perhaps, they will be tried! There is one pre-condition which, if it is overlooked, results in a total fiasco. This is the fact that during the Ottoman rule the Bulgarian nation was divided into two on a religious principle: into Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians. This is a historical truth which has been proved by Bulgarian science, Turkish sources, travellers, etc. We did not conquer other territories so as to take population from those territories. These are Bulgarians who were assimilated and who accepted Islam.

True, but only partly. There are also ethnic Turks in Bulgaria.

Who are they, may I ask? Now all of them will become Turks!

Don't you think this is the result of your policy?

No, no! Absolutely not!

Then what was the reason?

Everything which is being done now.

Now? Not before?! To put it differently, why were they forced to leave this country? "Go away!" you said. (Editor's note: After Todor Zhivkov's declaration of 31 May 1989, which was actually the green light for the mass exodus of ethnic Turks, a total of 300,000 of them left for Turkey. Later, some 50,000 of them returned to Bulgaria.)

No, no, no! We never intended to drive them away. These are pure speculations! Todor Zhivkov must have been a perfect fool to have an interest in the exodus of the Turks! Some comrades... yes, some comrades were very enthusiastic but we as a leadership, including myself, have never taken the stand of forced exile. There is no such thing. Besides, we mobilized the media—TV, radio, newspapers—and the entire party itself to try to explain to those people that they shouldn't go there because life there was very different.

You said on TV: let Turkey open its borders and everything will be solved!

I was right! Why? Because there was the Helsinki conference and the CSCE in Vienna. They obliged us to open our borders. This was the only correct course and

we strictly followed its implementation. Didn't we amend the law! And we told the people, all the world in fact, that any Bulgarian wishing to travel abroad could do so without any restrictions whatsoever!

But all this divided the people, opposed them to one another!

This situation was not created by chance.

You created it.

No! It is not true that I created such a situation! They say this now, because they take only one element and not the overall process and the situation: both at home and abroad. Todor Zhivkov cannot be guilty, because Todor Zhivkov has committed no crime either under Bulgarian or under international laws.

But you drove citizens of this country away under the banner of the Helsinki and Vienna agreements!

The radio, television, press and the party were mobilized... We supposed—and that was our mistake—Peter Mladenov said that not more than 50,000 would leave. I thought they would exceed 100,000, while actually they were more than 200,000 or 300,000... The situation was highly explosive. Take Kenan Evren, for example. When he resigned as president, he sent me a letter in which he called me "father of the Bulgarian people!" The same Evren with whom we were opponents on the issue of Pan-Turkism which he was spreading in Bulgaria called me "father of the Bulgarian people!"

This was a great compliment.

Naturally (hits the armchair).

Why aren't there such documents in the party archive?

There are such documents! How can you say there aren't!

At a meeting in 1988 you said that the names would not be changed: such a protocol has been preserved. But the names were changed, after all. (Editor's note: what is meant here is the forced replacement of Muslim names with Bulgarian ones, carried out by the authorities under Zhivkov's government during the so-called "regenerative process" initiated at the end of 1984).

Well, now... (hits the armchair). I'm not a supreme deity, after all. I could have made a mistake.

But this mistake cost Bulgaria its international isolation!

When those incidents occurred, those weren't incidents, there were casualties, I summoned the Turkish ambassador and told him about it all. And we took very serious measures. Now those whom they now call the "red berets," we forbade them to carry arms and take part in such clashes with arms. (Editor's note: the clashes between ethnic Turks and the authorities in the spring of 1989.)

But people had already been killed.

And they had to train. I mean after those people had been killed, they had to learn how to handle such collisions without arms.

How many people died?

I don't remember. (Editor's note: The exact number is still unknown.)

Was there anyone to oppose this attitude when these problems were discussed by the Politburo?

No, no one was against.

No one? Not a single one?!

None at all! I was accused of doing everything without taking into account the party and state leadership. Who could have done all that by himself? Only a large forum! But this question was taken out of the indictment.

Why do you think this was done?

Because they have nothing to judge me for! Why should they? I am the last one to have taken part, I am the last one to contribute to the change of names. I have shouldered the entire political responsibility although mine was the smallest part (hits the armchair)! I have given evidence. Let them publish the protocols from the entire investigation. I said that when everything ended we gathered together and ordered brandy—to toast the successful completion of the operation, etc.

This happened in 1989?

Yes, yes, after the campaign was completed.

After the exodus?

Yes. We gathered and ordered a brandy each. We didn't drink at meetings usually, only on special occasions, birthdays or some other occasions. So we gathered and had a brandy each. Ha, ha, ha!

And do you remember that at that time 120 intellectuals signed a declaration against the exodus?

There could have been such a declaration. We, too, were against the exodus. We were against it, too.

Very well... Those 120 intellectuals were called traitors, national apostates and I don't know what else...

I don't remember this case.

I was one of those 120.

Oh!

So you're talking to a traitor and apostate, according to the propaganda of those times.

Did they arrest you?

Then? No.

So tell me whom we have ever arrested? Ha, ha, ha!

[15 Mar p 13]

[Text]

V.

You knew all Soviet leaders—Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev. You outlasted them all, except for Gorbachev...

This has never been my objective.

What were your relations with all these people?

I was Todor Zhivkov in my relations with them all. I argued, I stood my grounds, I defended the positions of my country, etc.

Did you meet Stalin?

I saw him in connection with his 70th anniversary, but I did not talk to him.

Whom of them did you like best?

Silence.

Khrushchev?

Silence.

No?

How could I... (In a very low voice.)

What about Brezhnev?

For seven or eight years Brezhnev was a corpse. A political corpse. (In a low voice.)

Who did you respect most? Or still have respect for?

Andropov. (In a very low voice.)

Andropov?!

Yes. He suffered a heart attack already at the time of the events in Hungary.

Who was the most cunning of them?

Now look, they all treated Bulgaria well, you know. But they knew Bulgaria and Todor Zhivkov were their greatest problem. They knew it.

Problems? With Bulgaria? But why?

It's because I kept arguing with them. And with Khrushchev, when I was summoned to be hauled over the coals by him in the 60s.

And what did Khrushchev tell you then?

When they met me they couldn't outwit me. Khrushchev summoned me and Yugov (Editor's note: Prime Minister of Bulgaria at that time.) And how he attacked us! He was very unrestrained, he didn't care a damn for etiquette. "What you did is a venture! You're surrounded by pro-Yugoslav elements! That must be put an

end to! How could you let yourself be misled!" and so on. That was about the problem of Macedonia. Yugov cut in: "Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Zhivkov gets carried away, but we will help him." I defended myself and said there was nothing of the sort. I gave him a worthy reply. Then Khrushchev invited us to a meeting with some foreigners, a various delegations and suggested to me to say a few words. I asked him to let Yugov make the statement, because his Russian was better than mine. Khrushchev decided I got offended by his criticism, he took me like that and said, "Take it easy (bang!). I know you're surrounded by crooks (hits the armchair) who stand in your way!" (Chuckle)... so they always prepared themselves when I was expected to come. Always—you can ask them (bang!).

Who did you argue most heatedly with?

With Brezhnev, with Gorbachev...

With Brezhnev—because of Japan, with Gorbachev—because of the "mini-Japan"?

Yes, when I visited Japan in the 70's. I was me-re-ly stun-ned! (A pause). I sent a note to Brezhnev from Khabarovsk asking him for a meeting to discuss some ideas that came to my mind after my visit. I wrote that we should make our historic conclusions, that we could not afford to lag behind any more, but I did not think that the system itself should be abolished. Instead of meeting me *tete-a-tete*, he received the whole delegation. And addressed me before them all: "Todor (that's how he used to call me), you have seen only one side of capitalism (he was wild with rage), you haven't seen its reverse." The others got a bit afraid, but in the end he said, "Come on now (bang!), let's have lunch" (bang!). The note is in the Central Committee archives (bang!)... I did not argue with Andropov, because he didn't last long. He made a career after he joined the Interior Ministry. Brezhnev was right to appoint him his successor. If it wasn't for his poor health, he would have made a clever turn in his policy. He wouldn't have let himself be pushed along by events...

You obviously trusted Andropov most. And who of them trusted you?

Well, they all treated me in a normal way.

It was not a secret that you strived to get in the good books of each ascending Soviet leader and keep your post.

Naturally, after Khrushchev was removed I met Brezhnev to discuss some matters of principle with him—I wanted to know if they would stick to the same policy with regard to Bulgaria in the field of the economy, the political sphere, the army... I raised these questions. We talked openly about these things: "If you are going to make changes, let's discuss them first. We want to be informed and discuss it together." He categorically stated that there would be no changes in their attitude towards Bulgaria (hits the armchair). We were the second biggest partner of the USSR in the world?

(bang!). The second trading biggest partner? (Bang!) Just imagine it! (Bang!) What a manoeuvre! (Bang!)

But your survival had always depended on the USSR.

Yes, that's right.

Did they want to replace you? When?

No, at the time of Khrushchev they didn't, neither did they in Brezhnev's time.

Then when?

Well, I don't know... I have no information...

You were never afraid they might want to do it?

No, I never felt threatened, because my relations with them were principled. I wasn't their friend who would sit with them for a drink. Once Khrushchev invited me to a lunch at his home in town... That's why I was not afraid that they would... Although they knew all about me. The name of their last informer is known.

Now there's a question I cannot but ask—your idea about the 16th republic of the USSR.

It's not true that we wanted to become the 16th republic! (Bang!)

Not true?

No, it isn't!

There are documents to prove it!

What documents?! It's just phrases quoted out of context. Now they're looking for such things to calumniate Todor Zhivkov. Documents, indeed! (Bang!) How could we become their 16th republic?!

Wait a minute! Chakurov (Editor's note: Zhivkov's former aide who published his memoirs under the title of *The Second Floor*) writes, "Todor Zhivkov was giving something away, i.e. Bulgaria, which the USSR was neither willing nor could receive." And you did it only to get in the Soviet leaders' good graces.

That's what he thinks. Had there not been things like these in it, they wouldn't have published them.

No, I refer to the plenums you chaired.

Oh, that! (Bang!) The Central Committee had a plenum on drawing closer to the USSR. All documents of the plenum (bang!) are in the CC [Central Committee] (bang!)—everything's there (hits the armchair). There was no talk there about our becoming the 16th republic, it was a manoeuvre because we could not... That's what the situation was...

You categorically reject the charge?

Categorically, of course. There was no such a decision.

Continued on 21 February 1991. The tape recorder is off. I'm taking down notes with Todor Zhivkov's permission.

Have you read the Politika paper?

What does it say?

They've published the letter you sent to Khrushchev in 1963.

About becoming the 16th republic?

Yes, about a unification with the USSR.

I don't remember having written it. There is no such letter! It is a speculation! A letter of mine to Khrushchev! That's what I've lived to learn!

Don't you remember that letter?

One must see this letter, its content what the situation was at that time.

I will read some excerpts to you: "Dear Comrade Khrushchev. On 4 December of this year the plenum of the CC of the BCP considered in detail the question of drawing still closer, and, in the long term, of unification of the People's Republic of Bulgaria with the USSR. The plenum approved unanimously and enthusiastically the considerations of the Politburo on this question. The People's Republic of Bulgaria will draw ever closer with the USSR and its economy will gradually merge with that of the USSR... The CC of the BCP is of the opinion that the future drawing closer and the future unification of the People's Republic of Bulgaria with the USSR will absolutely correspond to the Marxist-Leninist conception of relations and cooperation..." And so on.

One must see that letter. Archive materials should not be taken out. Even if we wanted, who would accept us in such a union!

You turned Bulgaria into a vassal country to the USSR. Can you refute this accusation?

Yes, I can.

How?

We were not a vassal country but as allies we could not but fulfil our obligations of allies.

Czechoslovakia was part of these obligations. According to Peter Mladenov: Editor's note: Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1968; after 10 November 1989 succeeded Todor Zhivkov as Communist Party leader and Head of State the intervention of the Warsaw Treaty troops in Czechoslovakia was your idea. He stated it at a plenum in 1973.

Peter Mladenov lies. It's his own conclusion. I don't want to discuss this now.

Did you ever make an attempt for Bulgaria's leaving the orbit of the USSR?

Yes, I did, but I was found out by the upper echelons. It was in 1987. I tried to make a turn to... But I was immediately reported to Gorbachev. Gorbachev lashed out at me and accused me of wanting to create a kind of a mini-Japan or a mini-FRG which I should admit was true.

It seems you didn't get along with Gorbachev?

Yes, that's right. We didn't hit it off because he hadn't a clear-cut conception. He hasn't it now either. He is pushed by the events. Now he hopes he'd receive help. But it's ruined, the Soviet Union I mean. I'm not a man who'd be satisfied with slogans alone. I think it's more important to get to the core of things. Restructuring is impossible without a clear-cut conception. That's what Gorbachev lacks—conceptual thinking. And I'm not sure he'll last, although I wish he would. I don't want to say anything bad of him I realize what the situation is, but so many years have passed without his having a conception.

What about you? Did you have one?

VI.

Yes, I had a conception. We worked out the conception first, on my own initiative and with my participation, then we had people from different institutes working on it. The so-called July conception (Editor's note: 1988). Then I came to the conclusion that the July conception was not much different from the April conception, that it would not bring about a qualitative change in the conditions of socialism. Anyway, I tried to develop a conception. That is why I submitted a memorandum to the Politburo in 1988 (bang!) saying we should go back (bang-bang) to Marx and Engels, not to Lenin, to Marx and Engels and see where the genesis of their doctrine was. Both Marx and Engels said that socialism (bang!) would emerge, how to put it, in the belly of capitalism, because it is a post-capitalist system, it comes after capitalism. But until the last moment none of them said if the capitalist society in the most developed countries was ready for socialism. Therefore, proceeding from their doctrine, we should analyse contemporary capitalism and if we analysed it, as I did in the memorandum I've mentioned, I came to the conclusion that now the development of the capitalist countries has a new content that emerged in the 70s and especially in the 80s, a new content that affected both the basis and the superstructure, etc. Then I elaborated on the question of the market economy and pointed out that we could not develop socialism further if this new historical content was ignored, if we didn't lean on Marxism, on the genesis of Marxism. After presenting this memorandum I proposed the building up of a civil society. That's what I proposed and it was Item One on the agenda of the plenum.

Which of them?

The plenum (Editor's note: held on 10 November 1989), at which they say I was removed. It was Item I on the

agenda. They didn't publish it. I said that a civil society cannot be established without pluralism, pluralism on a large scale. But! The limits of pluralism should be specified.

Do you think that pluralism can have a framework?

Well... (becoming thoughtful)... there is a framework.

What is it?

Hm... (brooding over it)... society should be preserved.

Pluralism won't destroy it.

Well, now...

If you think it would destroy it, it's your own personal opinion.

Why not take me out somewhere and have lunch or supper together? Ha-ha-ha!

With pleasure.

Ha-ha-ha!

[12 Apr p 5]

[Text]

VII.

"Tell me about the jokes now."

"No jokes about you. There are jokes about other people. About Zhelyu Zhelev for instance. But none about you."

"I think that Zhelyu Zhelev is the most successful President. He is frank. And what is he going to do in this situation? I don't envy him."

"You really don't envy him?"

"Absolutely not! (bang-bang) This problem—Todor Zhivkov—is a historic problem. He, Zhelyu Zhelev, must touch it. Because he is responsible! I am still alive. Listen, if he puts his hand on his heart, he cannot but admit that it was Lyudmila Zhivkova who permitted the publication of *Fascism*. He knows that quite well. My daughter had respect for him. I didn't know him personally."

"Personally not, but it's not possible that you did not have any information about him and the other non-formals—the Rouse Committee, the Glasnost and Democracy Club, Ecoglasnost."

"I have never asked the authorities about their collaborators. I never met that one, the head of Department VI. I had been informed by the Minister of the Interior. But I don't know who has collaborated. And I mean it. I have never dealt with these matters. It has not been my direct responsibility. Every state has the appropriate apparatus. How come the opposition now knows what's going on at the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]..."

"And vice versa..."

"So it is! It used to be so and will be so... I have not been against these clubs. I was against Rouse since it did not help..."

"Do you believe that?"

"It was obstructive!"

"I'm not so sure. Why did you expel the non-formals from the Party then? And why all that pressure—interrogations, detentions, searches, circular letters to the Party organizations, the whole propaganda machine was mobilized?!"

"Whom did we expel? Ha-ha-ha!"

"You don't know who? Sonia Bakish, Georgi Mishev, Hristo Smolenov, then the club people!"

"Eh! (sighs) Well then! How could you become heroes otherwise! It's not that easy to become a hero! Ha-ha-ha! (bang on the armchair).

VIII.

"I'm very curious about one thing. What was it due to: was it the system, the Bulgarian national mentality or the very personality—that Todor Zhivkov has headed one state for 33 long years? How did it happen?"

"Todor Zhivkov could not remain in power without the policy pursued if the political course was not subjected to the social problems."

"So this was the key—social policy?"

"Yes."

"I think there is more to it: dividing the people into parts by all possible signs—social, professional, party, ethnic, geographical—and setting these sections against each other; allegiance to the suzerain and flexibility at the same time; a change of course when necessary and so on. We have already spoken about some of these keys. There is yet another—that you dealt with every runner-up, you overthrew every potential substitute straight away."

"You must be specific. Whom do you mean?"

"I'll tell you, though you know the names very well—Mitko Grigorov, Venelin Kotsev, Choudomir Alexandrov, Alexander Lilov..."

"Well, they were removed for lack of qualities. Mitko Grigorov was inexperienced, he got into a conflict with the team. Venelin Kotsev... there was a scandal with the Soviet comrades. But don't publish that."

"They say 'He considered his judgement as the only right one and no one had the right to oppose him.'"

"Why didn't they resign then? Switch that off!" (I switch off the tape-recorder again).

"Who do you think should have been your successor?"

"It was very difficult to find a Secretary General after me. I saw Lilov and Choudomir Alexandrov as my deputies."

"But you deposed them both!"

"I saw Choudomir in the Third District where I was a deputy. I saw he could work. I took him in the Organizational Department, then sent him to Varna as First Secretary of the town committee, then First Secretary of a district committee, then First Secretary in Sofia, and only then—as CC Secretary and Politburo member. I rotated him a lot, everywhere. But we learned that his wife's father had killed our comrades before 9 September and he said he didn't know, he denied it!"

"And Alexander Lilov?"

"What could Lilov have against me? That I dismissed him! He-he-he! And why did I dismiss him?"

"But when they asked you about the next leader you said Lilov. Why?"

"Because there was nobody else!"

"Was that the only reason?"

"He drew his own conclusions. He and Lukanov are now proving they are different. He-he-he! In character, in humanity..."

"Are they not different?"

"They are."

"And what is the difference?"

Silence.

"It's wrong to think that all the dismissed had a conflict with Todor Zhivkov. They were not suitable, they lacked qualities—so they were dismissed."

"You think that Lilov lacks qualities?"

"Well, yes—then."

"And now—he's got them?"

"Eh, I guess that life has made him wiser. Lilov has always held responsible posts! No one ever impeded him to work. Switch that off!... I proposed him but the Soviet comrades preferred Mladenov... You radicals there, don't you dare touch Sasho! He must lead that Party as long as the healthy forces take the upper hand there! While he, Lukanov, is at the bottom of this dirty trial! He moves everything! His signature lies there. He provoked this trial. He is the dirtiest and most corrupt of all! Lilov is different. Lilov is honest! But he's faint-hearted. Lilov is against what happens! I trust him. Lilov is honest! I can undersign my words 50 times!"

"We have talked so many times and I can't understand, where the roots of your conflict with Lukanov rest."

"He is to blame for this trial."

"Your conflict started before 10 November."

"That's right. For the last two years. Because of his game with the Soviet Union. I answered him to show him that I am not afraid. I answered him but only DEMOKRATSIA published that letter."

"In that letter you put the entire blame on the last year and forget the 45 years before it."

"It's true! Nothing has been done for one whole year!"

"But that year was the consequence of the previous ones! In this way you free yourself from blame!"

"That year was the consequence of the previous two! And Lukanov is chiefly to blame!"

"And why is it that your stand coincides with that of the opposition?"

"Why... because..."

"You are becoming the greatest member of the opposition, aren't you? The next thing to do is perhaps to run for the UDF [Union of Democratic Forces] leadership!"

"Is that what the people think? That I'm a member of the opposition? Well... not bad, not bad. He-he... You get along with Lukanov. Tell him that we have to stop this trial together. This trial must be settled politically. If this trial is not stopped, I will begin each trial with Lukanov and end it with him! If he stops the trial, I'll leave him alone. Tell him that! And no thoughts of poisoning me! I'm on trial for, I don't know, 26 or 30 millions... Lukanov took 300,000 of them. As entertainment allowance! You tell Lukanov, let him come here, let's talk and settle things with him. And you come too. But I'll tell you that Lukanov's got no qualities."

"Lukanov? No qualities? Why?"

Well, Lukanov is clever, intelligent, an aristocrat. No qualities! Lukanov committed big mistakes, big offences! He sold the country to the USSR! If I knew that we had a 10-billion debt, I would have shot myself! There were some speculations with a certain 4 billion!"

"You mean that you only knew about a 6-billion debt?"

"Yes! And that led to making wrong decisions. Georgi Atanassov and Lukanov dealt with these things."

"Does that mean that you had no information or you got distorted information?"

"If someone thinks I was isolated, he's wrong. Till 1988 I held everything in my hands (bang on the armchair)! I knew everything (Bang on the armchair)! I held these things in my hands! And our people rose in number from 7.5 to 9 millions!"

"What happened in 1988?"

"I was taken ill. Here (points behind his ear) appeared a bony outgrowth which was pressing a centre, that of

balance. And I would not have risen on my feet again if one professor from Germany and one from Britain had not come. It was then that I lost hold of many things."

IX.

"The man whom you detest so much says you are the last Bulgarian politician of the Byzantine type."

"And what kind of meaning does he put in it?"

"I think it's clear—while, backstair games, artfulness..."

"No, this is far from real."

"Far?"

"Very far."

"And what is close to reality?"

"I am a product of the time. I headed a system conscientiously, in good faith, and I thought it right I was honest even when I was wrong. There is nothing Byzantine about me! (bang on the armchair). On the contrary! What prevailed was the frankness and faith in the ideal I have stood for. I was a Stalinist. A sincere Stalinist. A fanatic. I was ready to go through fire and water."

"And do you feel—I don't know how to put it—a communist, or maybe a socialist?"

"I do. I have not given up my ideals and I still follow them. When I spoke about a prematurely born child I meant the system set, the model created—it is them that I criticize and not the ideals."

"But we've arrived at this premature birth after 45 years!"

"This premature child was built for 45 years, but my chief responsibility concerns the April line."

"Thirty-three years. The model."

"Well, that's it... The conditions were like that... But Bulgaria was not harmed, it developed all that time and at high rates. Our people used to live well. And they know it. Until the CPSU Congress when the erosion started... I am a communist! But being a communist it strikes me that the communists are the most dishonest people! Some people! Now the prosecutor's office wants to hold Todor Zhivkov responsible for everything that happened in Bulgaria. They will try me for criminal offences, like a criminal! I am not a grocer! I am Todor Zhivkov! The Bulgarian intelligentsia hasn't got the guts to say anything in support of Todor Zhivkov, but the international one will!"

"A lot of people want to derive political dividends from the trial."

"Exactly."

"What stand are you going to take in this situation?"

"I haven't thought about it yet."

"You must have. You are a man who has a conception, you said it yourself. It's not possible that you don't have conception of your conduct at the trial."

"I haven't thought, I haven't... (long pause). And I may not speak at the trial at all."

"But you have to defend yourself, haven't you?"

"I won't defend myself. I leave it to history to judge."

"No. The pose of the defenceless does not suit you and you will not assume it."

"Why, I say! I will protest against all this. And I'm not going to say a word any more... I haven't made up my mind yet. One of the options."

"Now it's you again. You are a man of numerous options. Perhaps the other one is that the accused turns into an accuser?"

"I haven't thought of that (long pause). Throughout the inquest which was mere vandalism I did not discredit anyone. I did not discredit any single person. Besides, I pursued a line of consolidating the BSP because I'm well aware of the situation. So I'm clean before history. One day the records of my testimony will be published and it will become clear that Todor Zhivkov did not discredit any single person and assumed the full responsibility for everything that took place during that stage."

"On 9 September you were 33. Now, that you are 80..."

"Not yet!"

"Okay, excuse me please."

On 21 February we met again, this time at his request. This was our sixth meeting. He read the text of our talk so he was on the alert. He looked displeased for he found that all this was not in his favour. Ill-at-ease, he wanted to know the general mood before the trial.

"In April 1956, did you ever imagine that there would be a 25 February 1991?"

"No, I didn't since Todor Zhivkov was an idealist. I occupied a top responsible position for 45 years and in 45 years I built two villas and two flats. I have no car, no dwelling, no bank deposits... Ask me a question—the proposal came all of a sudden.—Ask me this: "They say that this trial is a put-up job."

"Why do you want me to ask you this question?"

"Ask it and you'll go down in history."

"All right," I said although I was not sure that this was the right way to history. "They say that this is a put-up trial..."

"Yes! This is going to be a farce, a show intended to manipulate the Bulgarian people and the world public. I

am surprised that there will be such a trial. I'm now trying to find a way not to save the party or myself, I have to save the people."

"Do you have an idea how to save the Bulgarian people? And what from?"

"No, I mean that the trial will be a disgrace for Bulgaria. This is a fabricated put-up trial, a trial set up to a prior scenario and staging. Behind it stand certain political forces in this country. The trial is staged and directed from the outside. What is the goal? Is it the political and judicial defeat of Todor Zhivkov and his family? These comrades keep sinking in the mire!"

"What comrades?"

"Your comrades! They are not my comrades any more! I have no support in either opposition or rulers. I have no connections, I'm not meeting with party leaders. My mainstay is the world democratic public. I've been defamed so much at home, and they keep defaming me. You won't make it! You won't succeed in erasing Todor Zhivkov from history!"

"You asked me about the public mood on the eve of the trial. I will tell you the gossip—that many people want to shift their blame to you and you wish to drag them into destruction with yourself."

"Why should I do it? What with? And why should I drag them down? I have assumed the entire political responsibility! What else do they want? Do they want my soul?"

He gradually composed himself. I turned the conversation in another direction. His sense of humour was back. He behaved in a friendly manner. We parted with the agreement to resume our conversations after the trial.

The dog Gina escorted me on the snowy path. I remembered the evening of 17 December—how we wandered about the streets of Boyana, how the little Trabant was choking, how we stopped the passers-by with the same question:

"Excuse me, do you know where Zhivkov's villa is?"

"Zhivkov who?", the passers-by replied...

Before we headed down the driver performed a complicated manoeuvre. Because Sekvoya Street happens to be a cul-de-sac—a one way street.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

New Strategy for CSFR's Security Proposed

91CH0574A Prague TVORBA in Czech 24 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Petr Robejsek: "Security for Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] Among the findings which President Havel brought back from his recent trip to Brussels is the

determination that Czechoslovakia's chances for association with or membership in NATO exist only in the long run and that there currently cannot even be any thoughts of security guarantees being provided by the alliance. President Havel thus only repeated the recent experiences of Hungary. The careful probing by Budapest showed that NATO is not willing in the foreseeable future to integrate the East European nations—among others, even taking into account the Soviet Union—and that the same is true regarding any guarantees for their security.

What can the Government of the CSFR do under the given conditions to fill the security vacuum that has developed? First, a few words regarding the nonrealistic responses to this question.

One of these alternatives is "armed neutrality," as was recently discussed by Polish Minister of Defense Kolodziejczyk. The following arguments speak against this concept. Because of their hybrid nature, neutral countries are more difficult to classify and are a priori suspect of double dealing. Let us recall the problems which neutrality caused Austria when it was trying to enter the European Community. Moreover, neutrality only gave a certain meaning as a position between two blocs. Today, it would act only as an anachronistic form of overcautiousness. And therefore, for countries such as Czechoslovakia, which until recently still belonged to the "enemy camp," neutrality is totally unacceptable. It is precisely these countries with a "doubtful past" which must clearly avow their allegiance to one—the Western—side in their own very most interest.

If we are already discussing unrealistic alternatives, then it is necessary to also mention the possibility of "unarmed neutrality." In addition to the above-mentioned problems of neutrality per se, the following fact also speaks against this variant. Unarmed neutrality could, under certain circumstances, result in Czechoslovakia becoming a sort of "no-man's-land" on which her East European neighbors could fight out their own conflicts of interest. Such an alternative would only increase the security risks for Czechoslovakia.

The prerequisite for a meaningful response to the question of how Czechoslovak security is to be assured in the new situation is a sober analysis of the threat, of the possibilities for defense, and its cost.

Threat and Defense

Despite the fact that the long-term trend indicates a lowering of the importance of security problems in Europe, it is necessary, in the short term, to figure on some security risks. Nonparallel and frequently even contradictory economic and political interests as potential sources of conflicts will characterize mutual relations among the new democracies in East Europe in the most immediate coming years. Security risks will be connected even with the processes of economic stabilization

and with a renaissance of nationalism. Organizational and possibly even territorial regroupings within the individual East European countries and among them will carry with them additional dangers. And the uncertain developments in the Soviet Union are a chapter unto themselves.

There are sufficient reasons for violent conflicts. However, another question involves the kind of intensity these conflicts could attain. Based on empirically documented facts that military conflicts are most likely to occur between neighbors (see, for example: P. Wallenstein, *Structure and War. On International Relations 1920-1968*), we must concentrate, in the first place, upon our East European neighbors.

If we evaluate the situation in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia soberly, we reach the conclusion that while we must figure on the likely attempts by Poland to take over a dominant role in the region, we concede that possible conflicts between these countries will, with the greatest degree of likelihood, not exceed the level of the "game of chicken" (H. Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, London, 1962), that is to say, a level of blackmail-type demonstrations of strength. The strong influence of the West European powers in this region will also undoubtedly contribute to the fact that these conflicts would not reach the threshold of armed confrontation. Substantially more likely armed confrontations in the Balkans only impact indirectly upon Czechoslovakia.

If, with a good dose of fantasy, we anticipate the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union and the militant nationalism of the "new countries"—the Ukraine, Belorussia, or Greater Romania (Velkorumsko)—then it is not exactly necessary to overestimate the resulting military threat. In the foreseeable future, these countries would not be capable of "fielding" more than inadequately equipped militias. And in the event that, together with inveterate pessimists, we would figure on these "new countries" partially inheriting Soviet nuclear weapons, then Czechoslovakia would, in any event, be left only with the hope of Western assistance.

The far more easily visualized unfriendly policy of a still existing Soviet Union toward its former "fraternal" countries will, with the greatest likelihood, be limited to economic obstruction. A somewhat more difficult visualization is the not completely excludable escalation of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the central European countries—in other words, an escalation which, under certain circumstances, could reach the threshold of military confrontation, that is to say, of a Soviet invasion. In such a case, if the Czechoslovak Army was to be committed, something I strongly doubt, its chances would not be worth talking about.

The likelihood of military confrontation in central Europe is very low for yet another reason. It would have catastrophic consequences even in the case of a "mere" conventional conflict. This was even clearly demonstrated by the conflict in the Persian Gulf. The deterrent

effect of the "television war" against Iraq will have its effect, at least in Europe, for some time to come. Moreover, I am convinced that these very facts would most likely eliminate even self-defense in the classic form of a "decisive battle" in the event Czechoslovakia was attacked.

If we summarize the above contemplations, we reach the following conclusions. Conceivable scenarios for military confrontation in central Europe are, for the most part, highly unlikely for the following reasons:

- their political inefficiency and economic unprofitability;
- the deterring consequences of military confrontations in a densely populated region;
- the pacifying influence of the West upon the central European nations.

In those few remaining cases in which these examples had no effect (for example, in the event of a Soviet invasion), the activation of the Czechoslovak Army is also highly unlikely (for the already given reasons) and, moreover, is hopeless, seen from the military standpoint.

In other words, we find a low likelihood of violent confrontations in the central European region. Similarly, we find that the likelihood and the course of these few remaining conceivable cases of violent confrontation cannot be measurably influenced by the Czechoslovak Army. And, finally, we find that the practically nonexistent opportunities to commit the Army as an effective instrument for the defense of national and state sovereignty fly in the face of the enormous economic, political, and social costs connected with its maintenance and modernization.

Strategies for Czechoslovakia

In the awareness that absolute security cannot be achieved, the search for an effective strategy for Czechoslovakia should focus on not overpaying for realistically attainable relative security. The key question in seeking an effective security strategy can thus be posed in the following variants:

- How to mitigate the consequences of rising costs for the armed services, given the current dramatically declining instrumental value of these forces for the CSFR?
- How could Czechoslovakia, in harmony with the lowered risk of military confrontation in central Europe, and taking into account the limited defensive value of a traditional army, reduce the size of its armed forces without completely renouncing defense?
- How to attain a relatively credible deterrent whose low factual value in the above-listed cases should be primarily reflected in the fact that it should be as inexpensive as possible?
- How can Czechoslovakia optimize its economically, politically, and strategically quite limited possibilities in the field of security policy?

In view of the relative threat, the relative possibilities at the disposal of a traditional military defense, and in view of the absolute limitation of the economic possibilities of Czechoslovakia, defense concepts which are based only on numerically weak armed forces offer themselves as starting points. These so-called alternative defensive military concepts were discussed in the West—naturally, under somewhat different circumstances—and it is only a matter of time before they experience their theoretical actualization with respect to the situation in postcommunist East Europe.

For Czechoslovakia, the concepts put forward by Austrian author E. Spannocchi and by French author G. Brossollet (see, for example, in the work entitled *Defense Without Battle*, Munich-Vienna, 1976) might be considered. Both authors reject the "decisive battle" and replace it with the tactic of "a thousand stabs" which will weaken the enemy and result in his attrition. The combat area is the territory of the assaulted party and, thus, also involves known and preprepared terrain. Here, the use of relatively inexpensive defensive weapons offers itself. The fighting units are only small mobile military components. In this regard, an important contribution is the work of the German theoretician H. Afheldt, who introduced the concept of so-called technocommands (H. Afheldt, *Defense and Peace*, Munich-Vienna, 1977). These units should be equipped with light antitank weapons and should operate more or less independently from positions which would be prepared in peacetime. The geography of Czechoslovakia offers exceptionally favorable conditions for this type of defense.

By reorienting toward a professional, numerically weak, decentralized, and mobile army, Czechoslovakia could achieve a level of defense capability which would be minimally comparable with the current status and which, at the same time, would be incomparably cheaper. And if this army were not to discourage a potential assailant, then we can be sure that a traditional army could also not prove able to do so. But in comparison with a small, professional army, a traditional army would be disproportionately expensive to maintain for the entire period prior to its unrealized or unsuccessful commitment.

Political and Economic Contribution

A decision to field a small, professional, and strictly defensively equipped army would result in a whole series of immediate and long-term political advantages for Czechoslovakia:

- Despite the well-known financial cost of arming and converting, the adoption of this strategy would, in the foreseeable future, free up considerable financial resources. Moreover, it would be possible to offer to sell some of the weapons back to the Soviet Union, as has already been done by the Hungarians. It would be worth trying to have NATO pay for the destruction of weapons as a counterservice for this contribution to stabilization in Europe.

- Other savings would include the costs which we would avoid as a result of adopting the alternative strategy. Let us just contemplate how expensive the standardization of arms would be, which is connected with the longed for integration of Czechoslovakia into NATO.
- Overall, the proposed method of defense would be substantially less expensive than the existing method and would free up resources for the accelerated salvation of the economy and the intensive development of the economic strength of the country, which will play a constantly more important role.
- A small professional army would save time for the male population in their productive years. Months spent rolling about in the mud and, later, training reservists, can be much more efficiently devoted to accelerating and increasing professional qualifications.
- Politically, the adoption of such a one-sided defensive strategy would make it possible for Czechoslovakia to demand security guarantees for itself from the strong and wealthy nations of NATO.
- Politically, the decision to adopt this strategy would, at the same time, be substantially more realistic than the conception of security "master plans" for all of Europe and Czechoslovak foreign policy administration could, to a certain extent even justifiably, play that long sought after role of inspirer and advance guard in assuring security for the European continent.
- By adopting the alternative strategy, Czechoslovakia could gain economic and political advantages over the other East European countries with which it competes with regard to the most rapid entry into Europe. In actual fact, the full effect would only be attainable if Czechoslovakia will act quickly.

Today, Czechoslovak security policy still has the opportunity to make a new beginning, the opportunity to creatively react to a universally unfavorable situation and to select radical solutions. Czechoslovak security policy must free itself from thinking in obsolete categories of military strength and must adapt its doctrine to the fact that the "strength" and "independence" of small nations can, today, no longer be derived from the number and equipment of division, but more likely from their position on the list of "institutional investors" in which the individual countries are arranged according to their economic solvency. On the other hand, Czechoslovak security policy can continue to be fixated on the traditional formulas for "safeguarding" security, without regard to the fact that today this means nothing else for small countries than an intolerable and useless luxury. If this article makes a contribution to stirring up a productive discussion, then it has fulfilled its purpose.

Deputy Kusy on Definition of Nationality

91CH0565A Prague LITERARNI NOVINY in Slovak
11 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by Miroslav Kusy: "What About the Nation in the Constitution?"]

[Text] I am pleased to acknowledge that all the drafts of the Slovak constitution I have come across so far have

adopted from the Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms the provision that "everyone has the right to freely determine his own nationality."

A deputy told me the story of how he discovered six homegrown Swedes in southern Slovakia. They were Hungarians born and bred, a family who in the last census gave their nationality as Swedish. They were simply fed up with the hassle over nationality, and the law allowed them to do what they did.

In my opinion, that is a wise provision. It does not make the nation some sort of mystical body; instead, it defines the nation as an ordinary society, formed voluntarily. Its composition depends on the arbitrary decision of those who want to join it. Just like the association of gardeners or breeders.

There is nothing offensive about this. If there were, the SNS [Slovak National Party] certainly would not have included this provision in its proposed draft Constitution of the Slovak Republic, as its Article 41.

But there is a catch: How is it then possible to claim, in Article 1 of the same draft, that "The Slovak Republic is the independent and sovereign state of the Slovak nation"? What if a significant proportion of the ethnic Slovaks living on the territory of the Slovak Republic become disgusted with knocking heads against a brick wall for the sake of a national identity, refuse to join that nation and profess to be, say, Swedes?

The authors of the SNS draft—Mr. Hrnko and others—were aware of this trap and, to be on the safe side, added Article 5, Paragraph 2, which corrects the shortcomings of Article 1 by declaring that: "The Slovak Republic is a state of free citizens who are equal before the law and constitute the people of the Slovak Republic."

Thus you have a choice: either a state of the Slovak nation, or a state made up of Slovak citizens. According to one and the same constitution!

The draft constitution presented by the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] finds itself in a similar dilemma: It starts out with the Slovak nation in its preamble and ends with the people of the Slovak Republic. Article 1 of that draft declares that "the Slovak Republic is a sovereign state, based on the Slovak nation's right to self-determination." Then it adds that this right of self-determination is a natural right. But how can this be a "natural" right if everyone can freely determine his nationality, as also the KDH's draft allows in its Article 8, Paragraph 2?

Jan Carnogursky, the president of the KDH, underscores this paradox by announcing (in an interview published in *LITERARNI TYDENIK*, 8 Mar 91) that the nation is a natural society created by God. I learned from the Bible how and when God created man: It happened on the sixth day of creation, and man was made of clay. But

where will I find out how God created the Slovak nation? Jan Carnogursky provides no answer to this question. But the conclusion he draws from what he says is that "The starting point of our (i.e., KDH) policy is the nation. The nation and no other social group. In other words, even the state derives from the nation."

Thus, that is the standpoint of also the KDH's draft constitution. But then why have they contradicted their standpoint by including the mentioned provision from the Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, according to which everyone is free to determine the nation he wants to belong to? For it follows from this combination that although God did create the Slovak nation as a natural society, he did not create Slovaks, since being a Slovak is a result of the given person's voluntary decision. Then whom does that natural society created by God comprise? In addition to its "self-professed members," does it have also some kind of "natural" members?

This is where the dilemma inevitably leads when a constitution attempts to combine the nationality principle with one of the basic principles of the Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. That combination has no inherent logic. Or perhaps it does, but only if we perceive it as a camouflaging maneuver, with the help of which someone wants to join Europe. Because he would hardly gain entry there without having recognized in the Constitution that basic principle of the Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

But can someone count on Europe's failure to notice that its king of hearts is being beaten by a national trump card?

Hungarian Minority's Cultural Center Discussed

91CH0500C Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian
15 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Laszlo Honti, secretary of the Hungarian Culture Center in Bratislava, by d-n, at the center on 15 March: "By the Time It Is Finally Built..."]

[Text] This morning, at Somolicky Street 1/a in Bratislava, the temporary building of the Bratislava Hungarian Cultural Center will be dedicated. On this occasion we talked with Laszlo Honti, the director of the institution.

[d-n] Why was it necessary now, just before starting the construction of the planned permanent center, to find a temporary site?

[Honti] When I came to Bratislava, I evaluated the situation. I came to believe that the cultural center could not work under the existing conditions. We had one single room at the consulate of the Hungarian Republic; so I searched for a building, with the permission of the Ministry of Culture and Education, in which we could find temporary home. We were fortunate, because in January the Cuban consulate, due to financial reasons,

vacated the beautiful building on Somolicky Street, and we succeeded in leasing this office.

[d-n] What will you be able to accommodate here?

[Honti] The conditions are not ideal, but we have a relatively large room in which we can seat 50-60 people in civilized manner. It is suitable for lectures, video screenings, or even open discussions. We can organize exhibits or chamber concerts, and we continue to rely on the cooperation of our Slovak partners, as regards to receiving guests as well as in propagating our events.

[d-n] For a little while you can breathe easier. What comes next?

[Honti] We will try to continue the struggle for obtaining a permit to build a center on the banks of the Danube. Our plans are completed, and we have the site, all we need is the permit to build. Now a difficult period is coming, because we have to prove that we are qualified to present the values of Hungarian culture in Slovakia. By this, I understand everything, not only film and theater, but literature, science, politics, and lifestyle. Beyond information, we would like to encourage our audience to actively participate. We would like to introduce the parties of the Hungarian Parliament. As a start, those interested were able to meet the FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth]. Members of the SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats] delegation who were here recently would also be glad to have their party introduced and evaluated. The other parties would follow. This year Bratislava will celebrate the 700th anniversary of its status as a city, and we would like to contribute to the festivities. We are planning an exhibition of works by Odon Lechner, a number of whose secessionist buildings stand in Bratislava. This will probably take place in May and June.

[d-n] Do not you feel that there is the danger that the institution will become a narrowly interpreted Hungarian "affair," even though there is a need to find the channels to convey Hungarian culture toward the Slovak people?

[Honti] I appreciate that question. We often encounter the view which celebrates our existence, because we are able to convey the universal Hungarian culture toward Hungarians of Slovakia. I have often said this, and I repeat it now: Our institution has a license to operate in the whole of Slovakia; therefore, we would like to approach every citizen of Slovakia. This is going to be our primary task; after all, in the recent past (and primarily on account of the linguistic approachability), we have restricted our work to the Hungarian-inhabited regions. We wish to expand our sphere of activities.

[d-n] Do you have a strategy to achieve this goal?

[Honti] Two things have been definitely outlined. We look up the managers of Slovakia's galleries, and offer them our cooperation. We hope to develop strong connections with Slovak film lovers. The film clubs are more

developed here than in Hungary, so this way we could place Hungarian films in a great many locations. We have an opportunity to rent films without cost. Together with the new center's equipment, we received seventy video cassettes with Hungarian films; if there is a call for these, we can also lend them out.

[d-n] Obviously, a discussion of controversial issues existing between the two nations is also a part of this strategy....

[Honti] Undoubtedly; after all, our center will be an open house. Our basic concept is that our lengthy historical coexistence, and our necessity to rely on each other, demands that we get to know each other to the greatest extent possible. If we have a lecture at the center which deals with Hungarian realities, perhaps the Slovak audience will also learn from it. When it comes to developing an intellectual consensus, we would like to contribute to it with the instruments of culture; the rest is up to the politicians.

HUNGARY

Hungarian-German Forum Inaugural Session

*LD0306122991 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 3 Jun 91*

[Text] The Hungarian-German Forum of the European Movement, which has been in existence since 1948, was officially formed today. Our country's highest ranking politicians were present at the inaugural session. Peter Zentai reports from the venue.

The presence of the president of the republic and the prime minister, Gyula Horn and Imre Pozsgay, the most famous personalities from our political life, indicates that the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is hosting an event of great significance. The Hungarian-German Forum of the European Movement, a formation which wants to coordinate the efforts of the two countries for the establishment of a unified Europe, is now officially formed. Both Domonkos Kosary, current president of the Hungarian section of the European Movement, and Jozsef Antall, former chairman of the section formed two years ago, pointed out that it is in our country's elemental interest to participate in a united Europe. However, to achieve this it should overcome plenty of outside difficulties. For this they asked for help from the German participants, among them Peters, vice president of the European Parliament; Wolf von Amerongen, chairman of the economic committee dealing with the east; and several parliamentary deputies from Bonn. The latter greatly appreciated the part of Jozsef Antall's speech delivered in German, in which he converted the thoughts of Jozsef Eotvos from the last century to our time. Eotvos said that no Hungarian independence can exist without German unity. Today, however, the truth is that no German unity would exist without Hungarian independence.

[Announcer] Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who arrives in Hungary this afternoon, is also expected to attend the event, which ends sometime this evening.

Government Resolutions in 'Nonpublic' Category

91CH0548A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 6 Apr 91 pp 81-82

[Unattributed article: "They Sit on TUK [expansion unknown]"—first paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] The parliament made a decision on 20 March that government resolutions in the 3000 category will not be made public in the future either. However, according to official quibbling, this only means that these resolutions are considered "nonpublic" rather than classified....

In March, only 94 parliamentary representatives supported the SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats] proposal that the government make the so-called government resolutions of the 3000 category (which begin with 3000, i.e., 3001, 3002 and so forth) public. The publication of the resolutions, known to the public as more or less classified, was also opposed by Ministry of Public Welfare State Secretary Andras Kelemen, representing the government, and this suggested that the Antall administration, too, makes "3000's." But Kelemen's argument, that these resolutions may involve "perhaps necessarily classified measures...of the Republic of Hungary," also revealed that not the most appropriate person offered advice on the 3000's to representatives.

Gyorgy Muller, the office of the prime minister deputy state secretary, said in reply to our question that "the present administration made 465 "3000" resolutions by the end of March, 123 this year, but only 142 of them are actually classified." Some of these resolutions had even lapsed by the end of last week when 365 such resolutions were in force. Part of these were inherited from the previous administration. But all of this is a natural part of governing, said Muller, because most of these government resolutions regulate internal affairs or contain so-called intermediate decisions or perhaps specify a certain governmental division of responsibilities. (Using a fictitious example, let us say that the government requests the minister of interior to have the plan for the institutional network dealing with compensation affairs worked out.) Certain personal resolutions are also assigned a 3000 code, e.g., requests presented to the president of the republic to appoint one or another ambassador.

"The 3000's that are not expressly considered classified could instead be called nonpublic, because they in fact do not appear in the MAGYAR KOZLONY," said Muller. But not every "3000" resolution is automatically classified although these exist, too, mainly among the military, foreign affairs, and economic subjects. As he said, it can happen that a 3000 code can be almost routinely assigned to a decision about which the press is informed by the government spokesman.

Gyorgy Muller also said that "I can state with certainty that the Antall administration has not made any resolutions which, according to the 1987 act, must be regulated through statutes." In reply to our question, the political and administrative state secretary of the Ministry of Justice, made a similar statement. "A classified statutory government resolution is a product of the earlier decades' TUK [expansion unknown] democracy", said constitution attorney Istvan Kukorelli. It was characteristic of that period to affect the daily lives of groups of people through statutes, perhaps ministerial points of view, and internal memoranda, and confidentiality was carried to an extreme. The government made classified resolutions even in issues such as whether a minister should reply to an interpellation in the National Assembly.

According to the present regulation, government resolutions are divided into three categories: Those in the 1000 category are published in the MAGYAR KOZLONY, those in the 2000 category are published in the Depository of Resolutions, and those in the 3000 category are forwarded directly to the persons concerned. In practice, the latter means that members of the government receive a copy of each one and nonmembers receive a copy only if a resolution directly pertains to them, for example, the director of the Central Statistical Office receives one when the government assigns him a responsibility. Incidentally, these resolutions are also screened from time to time at the office of the prime minister, just like the statutes. (However, they said that most of these resolutions "perish," e.g., a resolution specifying that a task will become obsolete when the goal is reached.)

The parliament's 20 March approval of the proposal to publicize all of the resolutions in the 3000 category, including the legally classified ones, would have created a strange situation. "Every organization, including the government, may have internal confidential affairs," said Gyorgy Muller. Of course, the administration would have found it hard to balk at such a decision of the parliament, but publicizing would have had to be preceded by a government decision to lift confidentiality.

Justice Minister on Expectations for 1991

AU3105204091 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 24 May 91 p 5

[Interview with Hungarian Justice Minister Istvan Balsai by F.A.; place and date not given: "Istvan Balsai Urges Passing of the Statute—Law on the Press in the Second Half of the Year"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Assessing the last year of the Justice Ministry, Istvan Balsai found it a success that the important tasks have become emphasized in the government's program, which, the establishment of judicial councils, the determination of the role of the attorney organization, and the transformation of the legal profession, were set out at his inauguration and which are fundamental factors in

establishing the institutions of a constitutional state. Thus, the program of jurisdictional legislation has not suffered, Istvan Balsai emphasized, furthermore, many elements of it have already been passed by the parliament, for example several, very important laws to do with the courts. The position of judges has also been improved through regulating their promotion and settling their pay. Several bills that would affect the courts have been submitted to the government, and the delegates are discussing the bill on the legal profession and on public notaries. The minister thinks it is important that the parliament passes these bills. According to him it is also a great success that legislation on the ownership issue is also underway. After a long period of gestation, the compensation law was completed so that the diverging interests within the government and the coalition interests were reconciled in the end.

[F.A.] After acknowledging the results, let us talk about the unpleasant side also. What did you perceive as a failure?

[Balsai] Although legislation as we envisaged it was not hindered in any respect, I found it unexpected, not a failure though, that the debate on some of the laws went very slowly. In my capacity as a minister who keeps the parliament most occupied through my position, I think the parliament has a bit of a bottleneck. I am talking about the fact that the constitutional committee, which affects us most, has great difficulty in completing its tasks in time due to its setup, namely that it consists of faction leaders and house committee members among others.

[F.A.] What do you think are the most important tasks from your ministry's point of view in the near future?

[Balsai] It is extremely important to carry further bills on rearranging ownership (of cooperatives, and the privatization bill), and also to modify the law on companies. I also hope that, still in this half of 1991, we will be able to get beyond passing other bills concerning the administration of justice, which we have already submitted to the parliament, like the bill on judicial organization and modifications of the criminal law. For the second half of 1991, I expect it to be a considerable task to enact the laws on the press and media. It is possible that we will be able to submit the data protection bill to the parliament. We would also like to conduct successful negotiations on the acceptance of the concept on legal profession.

Parties React to Compensation Law Court Decision

*LD3105110691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 0445 GMT 30 May 91*

[Excerpts] Yesterday afternoon, the Constitutional Court declared several points of the compensation law unconstitutional. As to what sort of trouble this decision will stir in Hungarian politics, it is difficult to say at the

moment. Anyway, we are going to give you a few opinions from among the parliamentary parties. [passage omitted]

During the night, my colleague Attila Herpai managed to phone the associate chairman of the Smallholders' Party, Jozsef Torgyan.

[Torgyan] The Smallholders' Party does not change its demand, and it will carry out this program.

[Herpai] According to experts, this is only possible if the scope of authority of the law is expanded, which means the law will affect even larger masses and, thus, compensation will cost a lot more.

[Torgyan] The other way, obviously, would be complete reprivatization, which corresponds to the original program of the Smallholders' Party. Complete reprivatization will not cost the state anything and it can be realized immediately.

[Herpai] What is your opinion about the decision by the Constitutional Court?

[Torgyan] A constitutional court only has a right to exist in developed democracies where constitutional courts belong to a division of the branches of state power and to an already formed democratic order. We are only at the beginning of the building of democracy, therefore, conditions that are desirable in the developed democratic regimes are not present. We ought to rethink the scope of authority of the Constitutional Court, as well as the need for a Constitutional Court in our present stage of development.

[Announcer] Finally, let us listen to the opinion of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Following their Presidium meeting last night we asked Laszlo Medgyasszay, a member of the Forum's Presidium.

[Medgyasszay] We had to ascertain that the decision of the Constitutional Court proved that during the debate on the bill the opposition submitted anticonstitutional proposals when the Federation of Young Democrats and the Hungarian Socialist Party as well refused to participate in this issue. The government parties, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, too, wishes to carry out the transformation on the grounds of constitutionalism. We were led by this also during the creation of the compensation law. At any rate, we have to acknowledge, and we do acknowledge, naturally, the decision of the Constitutional Court, which objects to various paragraphs of the law. Thus, it does not object to its content. It only objects to certain paragraphs. To remedy the constitutional objections to the law is up to the parliament.

[Announcer] So, the Hungarian Democratic Forum is willing to revise the bill and debate and vote on it again in the parliament?

[Medgyasszay] This is not a question of willingness. It is a natural obligation based on constitutional law. We

acknowledge it. The parliament is going to examine this with its proper methods and means. [passage omitted]

SZDSZ Leaders on Compensation Issues

*LD0106124991 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 31 May 91*

[Text] One of the most important subject of the press briefing given by Alliance of Free Democrats leaders was the situation that evolved after the decision of the constitutional court on the compensation law. Edit Schrank reports.

Those who in connection with the compensation issue have come to the conclusion that the work of the constitutional court should be limited are not willing to acknowledge that power has constitutional limits, said Janos Kis at today's SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] press briefing. The Free Democrats are of the opinion that the government was aware of the stance of the constitutional court when it accepted the bill on compensation, for the constitutional court, in reply to the government's questions, already drew up in a resolution in October 1990 what was unconstitutional and what was not regarding the compensation. Therefore, the SZDSZ blames the government for the situation that evolved.

Referring to yesterday's statement by the spokesman, Janos Kis opined that if the Hungarian Democratic Forum returned to its preelection stance, which the politician reckons was close to the SZDSZ views in many respect, i.e., that land should be returned to those who would cultivate it, and in other material and moral compensation cases the extent of compensation should be established on the basis of uniform principles, then this would be a constitutional reason for positive differentiation.

There is an urgent need to amend the preprivatization law toward ownership, SZDSZ deputy Karoly Lotz said. For according to signs, the planned accelerated privatization of the 8,000 shops within three years will not succeed by leasing. Only one percent of the target could be leased during three-quarters of a year, which is an appalling result, the deputy said. Especially if we take into account that the government wanted to use the sum from the reprivatization for paying part of the state debt, and instead of the 8.5 billion forints expected for 1991, so far only 350 million have been collected.

Serious Tensions Plague Budapest Government

Capital's Unity 'in Danger'

*91CH0552A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 13 Apr 91 pp 5-6*

[Unattributed article: "The Capital Versus the Districts: Catch 22"]

[Text] Only a few months ago lawyers cracked their favorite joke about the frequently used constitutional

amendment process: a single sentence remained unchanged in the old basic law: "Budapest is the Capital of Hungary." With little exaggeration one could say nowadays that seemingly even this secure point has become shaky. The existence of Budapest as a unified city is in danger from the standpoints of law, the economy, and the city's autonomy.

It may seem surprising today that the almost forgotten, primeval variety of the capital city legislative proposal introduced last October by then Interior Minister Balazs Horvath conveyed the image of a strong capital. Consistent with the Alliance of Free Democrats' anticoncentralization stance, this proposal was most vehemently attacked by Gabor Demszky, who has since become lord mayor of Budapest. At the time Demszky probably did not have the faintest idea that his action would later be viewed as an incorrigible political mistake, because it was he who had to wear the suit he himself tailored too tight. Since the preponderance of Free Democrats became evident in the local elections, the Interior Ministry has adopted the former SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] view and has produced an entirely new concept centered around the administrative districts of Budapest. The SZDSZ quickly responded to this action: Maria Korodi and Balint Magyar submitted an amendment to the parliamentary committee on autonomous local government providing for a strong capital city. The committee dominated by the Hungarian Democratic Forum did not support the amendment but signalled instead to the various district mayors that it would consider their proposals in the event that they managed to reach an agreement with the capital city. An agreement was quickly reached, at the Svek beer hall, between the mayors and the mayor, and the Korodi-Magyar couple which introduced the SZDSZ amendment offered to withdraw the same if indeed the committee accepted the agreement.

But the committee on autonomous local government did not keep its word. In response, Korodi and Magyar introduced under their own name, the agreement reached by the mayors concerning greater autonomy for the districts. Nevertheless, they did not feel that it was necessary to withdraw their own proposal which was in conflict with the agreement reached by the mayors. This contradiction provided an opportunity for the district mayors to intentionally misunderstand the situation, because they were aware of the position taken by the committee. This was followed by the highly publicized "insurrection" which conveyed the sense of a rift between SZDSZ headquarters and the district mayors who regarded themselves as "second line SZDSZ members who have been treated with a lack of confidence." Two weeks ago an agreement based on renewed negotiations, and celebrated by popping champagne bottles, promised peace, nevertheless, concerns were raised that the armistice would be short lived.

Allegedly at last week's cabinet meeting the "pact" between Demszky and the mayors was part of the agenda and the cabinet accepted changes which would make the concept that favors the districts even more strong. Based on these changes the districts would clearly be regarded as settlements with autonomous governmental bodies. Corresponding with this concept, the districts would be entitled to exercise the authority of autonomous governmental bodies, while the capital would function as some kind of federal autonomous government which derived its power from the districts, with authority and jurisdictions strictly limited by law. And what is even more important, the capital would be totally deprived of its financial independence. This is because according to the cabinet concept, the districts would be entitled to all but a few assets transferred from state ownership to local governments. The fact that only 40 percent of the revenues derived from the sale of housing units, and only 20 percent of the proceeds from the sale of other real property would be allocated to the autonomous government of the capital appears as very little even as a consolation, let alone for the development of the capital. But the autonomous government of the capital is not free to allocate even this small share of the proceeds. The power to allocate such funds rests with "the federation of the autonomous local governments of the capital and of the various districts."

As a result of all this, the capital finds itself in an unavoidable financial trap. Provisions of the budget law exert a rather unfavorable effect on Budapest. As compared to the previous year's 100 percent, this year all autonomous local governmental bodies will receive only 50 percent of the personal income taxes generated within their jurisdiction. The rest will be distributed in the form of standard subsidies. Thus, on a nationwide scale settlements will receive between 25 and 26 percent more money in 1991 than in 1990, but the increment in Budapest amounts to only 0.4 percent. Moreover, reversing its previous position, the cabinet no longer finds it necessary to fully finance out of central funds, in reality out of personal income taxes, the basic service functions of local governments. Instead, the cabinet budgeted a deficit for local government management nationwide. From a practical standpoint, this will force local governments to assess local taxes.

In Budapest the autonomous governmental bodies of the capital and of the several districts divided among themselves the 13-percent deficit in the financing of basic service provisions expected in 1991 in a way that each of these governmental bodies incur a 13-percent cost proportionate deficit. The trap created by the capital's lack of funds manifests itself in this context: While the districts will be able to cover their respective deficits by selling one or two lots each year, the capital itself will have no other alternative but to assess local taxes, in the present case, trade taxes. But the districts immediately questioned the authority of the capital to assess taxes, so much so that the 8th and the 11th districts announced that they themselves would like to collect trade taxes,

and the central government executive responsible for the affairs of Budapest challenged in court the capital city's decree by which it assessed taxes.

It seems that the districts are trying to live up to their new independence. Each district is different except in one respect: All districts claim power and funds for themselves. Opinions are divided regarding the utilization of funds by the districts. While the mayor of Kispest envisions the sole obstacle to selling rental housing units at 100 percent of their market value in an earlier decree promulgated by the capital city council, the mayor of the 13th district regards the practically free of charge transfer of housing units to present occupants as the appropriate realization of Liska's ideas about social inheritance. In Jozsefvaros, whose mayor Zoltan Koppany became the leader of district mayors struggling for independence, the sale of housing units came to a virtual halt. The 12th district found the "most original" solution: It fully adopted the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party's method used in regard to NEXT 2000, and established a limited liability corporation with 1 million forints of capital stock, then went on to contribute 8 billion forints worth of real estate located in the district within the next few months. The firm was registered by the Court of Registry with unprecedented expediency. Although the mayor constantly underscored that he did all this in the interest of the district's residents, long lines of 12th district residents who feared that the roof would be sold from over their heads to others awaited to see the mayor.

Laszlo Baan, the Budapest General Assembly representative of the Association of Young Democrats attacked the pact between the capital and its districts in an open letter claiming that Gabor Demszky exceeded his authority without first asking the General Assembly, i.e., that he reached an agreement with the districts contrary to law. In Baan's view the General Assembly controlled by the SZDSZ and FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth] would not have permitted the lord mayor to agree to a fund distribution by which the capital received nothing. Under these economic conditions the capital will not have an opportunity to develop. It may vegetate at best and beg for state subsidies, e.g., to prevent the collapse of mass transportation.

The question is this: In whose interest is it to render the functioning of Budapest impossible? In principle, this is in the least interest of the SZDSZ, because by having a paralyzed Budapest under Free Democrat leadership the SZDSZ would manifest its own incapacity before the next parliamentary and local elections. At the same time it seemed that the manifestation of party unity by way of a pact was much more important to the SZDSZ than the interests of the capital. The MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] may appear to be counter interested in this matter, because the opposition could forge political assets out of a flourishing Budapest. At the same time it is equally true that the government could not emerge unscathed from "under the ruins" of a capital whose functioning has been rendered impossible. Nevertheless

the real question is this: Who will prevent further deterioration as long as political forces regard as most important the search for an answer to the question of who can be faulted for the bad situation?

Lack of Experts Criticized

91CH0552B Budapest *BESZELO* in Hungarian
30 Mar 91 p 10

[Article by Gyorgy Kollar, 2d District local government representative: "Are There Any Experts Here?"]

[Text] The relationships between the autonomous local governmental bodies of the capital and its districts have become totally poisoned. As far as one could tell, lord mayor Gabor Demszky sought out the prime minister, while the district mayors turned to the public for help to resolve the conflict between the various parties.

The fratricidal struggle within the SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats] was not prompted by some internal party dispute the way many hoped this to be, but by the government itself, or more accurately, by the budget, which, perhaps by no coincidence, endeavored to place local governmental bodies into impossible situations. The substantial budget deficit which threatened the functioning of local governmental bodies made the differences of opinion as to finances between the capital and its districts appear as particularly magnified. In addition to earlier disputes concerning jurisdiction and ownership, most recently a conflict evolved regarding the authority to levy taxes. The districts defend their local interests and primarily their financial independence, while Gabor Demszky is justly concerned that the city as a whole will fall apart, a situation that would be unprecedented on a global scale.

The trap in which the capital finds itself as a result of the budget has been open for long. Local governments alone must not take the blame for the fact that the capital walked into that trap, it was a mistake made jointly by several persons. The districts were the primary culprits who made the big mistakes. From the beginning they manifested excessive ambition in taking the city apart. These are the districts whose mayors invoked their voters' interests and demanded for themselves both funds and authority.

One must not assign all the blame to the districts, of course. After all, lacking other direction, they did none other than to take the letter of the law seriously. This is because the local government law adopted last summer envisioned a two tier local government in Budapest, granting identical rights to the capital and its districts. The original sin of establishing an opportunity has been committed by parliamentary representatives when they failed to recognize the trap implicit in a two tier autonomous local government. The SZDSZ parliamentary faction should also be blamed for having failed to think through the peculiar public administrative features that exist in the special situation of the capital, at the time they supported the local government law.

Even last summer, in the course of preparing for the local elections, it would not have been too late to develop a comprehensive autonomous government concept for the capital. Unfortunately, the need to do so was not recognized by the managing body, which handled the development of a program, together with other local government issues, in a casual manner. The SZDSZ political leadership once again made a mistake when it failed to seek a professional as well as a political solution to the adverse situation even after it recognized the evolving jurisdictional dispute between the capital and its districts. This, despite the fact that it was apparent to everyone that the SZDSZ was offering a well-functioning autonomous local government alternative to the electorate as contrasted to governmental inability to act.

In the present situation Demszky and the SZDSZ parliamentary faction may easily become the subjects of ridicule in the course of debating the capital city law in the parliament, where chieftain Koppany and his vassals will try to protect their perceived interests as champions of the ruling coalition. Beyond causing immeasurable harm to the SZDSZ as a whole, a debate like this would also call attention to the fact that the cadres of the Free Democrats were no better than the relatives of the prime minister.

If ever, this would have been the time for the SZDSZ experts to speak out firmly, offering a solution to the crisis situation that evolved. Instead of doing so, however, the political leadership of the party was trying to perform a goodwill mission suitable to cover up the scandal, but not to resolve the crisis. We must still wait for the SZDSZ program concerning the capital's local autonomous government. Aside from a weak attempt made during the campaign, we continue to lack a program for the capital, just as no general concept for local government has been prepared aside from a few partial programs that exist.

After all this we may ask the question: Is this the extent to which the talents of experts reached? Did anyone seek advice from the experts? Are there experts at all? Well, if there are, they should present themselves as soon as possible. If there are no experts we should find some quickly, otherwise the famous/infamous prediction made by Miklos Tamas Gaspar at Mucsa in the spring of 1990 may easily be fulfilled (also) within autonomous local governmental bodies.

Gyorgy Kollar, local representative (2d District)

POLAND

RZECZPOSPOLITA on Relations With Israel

AU2905143691 Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
25-26 May 91 p 7

[Commentary by Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk: "Poland-Israel: Will There Be a Breakthrough?"]

[Text] Will there be a breakthrough in relations between Poland and Israel? That questions was on the lips of

everyone who monitored President Lech Walesa's visit to Israel. None of his previous visits were as difficult and controversial as this one, as illustrated by press reports and the 24 April news conference by Andrzej Drzycimski, the presidential spokesman. It is no secret that there were major fears of demonstrations and other forms of protest during this visit.

It is already certain that Lech Walesa's presence in Israel broke the ice and initiated a thaw after a long period of freezing temperatures in mutual relations. After Walesa's speech in the Israeli parliament, interest in the visit increased daily, but a part of Israeli society still fails to understand why the Knesset passed a special resolution permitting Walesa to address their parliament, and in Polish, too. The Israelis consider it the ultimate accolade to be able to address the Knesset. Why had the Polish president been accorded such an honor? Some Israelis still remember the gaffes committed by Walesa during the election campaign. In turn, Poland possesses different connotations for many Jews. Older Jews harbor one set of convictions, and younger Jews a different set.

Many Poles are also wondering why the Polish president apologized to the Jews inside their own parliament. They cannot understand it.

Although the two nations have been bound to each other by 1,000 years of history, something referred to by both sides, this coexistence has not always been good. This history contains good and bad chapters, and there is much similarity between the two peoples. Both nations have suffered great losses during the struggle for their independent statehood. The links between the two countries are also illustrated by the fact that many Israeli politicians, including two presidents and four prime ministers, come or came from Poland. It is they who made Israel turn into a modern prosperous state.

Therefore it is now time, and the Polish president also said this, to forget about mutual grievances and the settling of scores, and utilize instead those values that have permitted a rapprochement between the two peoples and establish favorable economic and political relationships between the two countries. It is in this context that one should view the following excerpt of the Polish president's speech in the Knesset:

"We have helped you as much as we could. There have been many righteous Poles among the peoples of the world. These have their own trees along the Avenue of the Righteous. The Talmud says that he who saves one human life will save the whole world, and he who destroys one life will destroy the whole world. There have also been evildoers among us. I am a Christian, and I must not weigh 20 centuries of grievances of both nations on a pair of human scales. Here, in Israel, the country of your birth and rebirth, I ask for forgiveness."

These are the only words that could possibly have been uttered in the Knesset if we want a genuine breakthrough

to occur in mutual relations, and not just between the two countries themselves. One need not expect any improvement in relations with the Jews in the United States, Canada, Australia, or Europe if there is no improvement in relationships between Poland and Israel. This is a matter of supreme importance for Poland, which wants to be a democratic country and base its economy on a free market and free trade principles. It was necessary to take a step that would cleanse the air and erase the bad things of the past. Such a step was Lech Walesa's speech in the Israeli parliament.

But after this speech there was major consternation. Part of the speech of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, [which followed] immediately after Walesa's speech, seemed to come from another time. Apparently he said that it is not without reason that there were concentration camps in Poland. That is what the Polish journalists heard through their earphones, but later the Israelis gave an official explanation that the interpreter had made a mistake. (During the 24 April news conference in the Belvedere, Drzycimski said that the official texts of the speeches, i.e. the texts that were read out, would be available soon, and only then would it be possible to take a stance).

An important circumstance for the visit was the fact that the Israeli prime minister, whose entire family perished during the war because a Pole betrayed them to the Germans, has altered his initially dry attitude toward the Poles, and so have many other Jewish figures. Shamir has begun to understand what the Poles are saying. He said he does not need an interpreter any more, and even spoke to some nuns in Polish. Thus the atmosphere warmed up during the visit, which was a great help for the talks and objectives Walesa wanted to attain, and that is what matters.

Of course one cannot omit the Arab and Palestinian aspects of this visit. The Arab press took a hostile view of this visit. Another misunderstanding occurred. This time Yitzhaq Shamir is supposed to have persuaded our president to close down the PLO representation [office] in Warsaw. This problem has not been fully resolved, but what is important is that, in the words of Vice Minister Jan Majewski, "it has never been our intention to repair relations with Israel at the cost of relations with the Arabs." According to well-informed sources, the Israeli side accepted this statement.

A more exhaustive assessment of this visit will not be possible until a few more days or weeks have gone by. Only then will we know whether the visit augurs a breakthrough in mutual relations. In this case, words like "breakthrough" or "new state" should be interpreted as a simple intention, without exaggeration, of having normal relations between the two countries and peoples.

Center Accord, Christian Union Hold Conferences*AU0406070791 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
27 May 91 p 2*

[Article by 'PS, ba': "The Center Accord and the Christian-National Union—The Struggle for the Committees"]

[Text] On Saturday [25 May], the Center Accord and the Christian Citizens Movement, which is linked to the Christian-National Union, held two rival conferences for representatives of citizens committees. Both meetings were about forming election alliances.

The conference organized by the Center Accord was attended by about 70 delegates from the committees and the majority were also Center Accord members. They set up a program council, which is to draw up the provisions of a program and is to be the nucleus of what will later become the election campaign headquarters of the "Center" Citizens Coalition.

Jacek Maziarski, chairman of the Center Accord's Main Board, attended the conference. He said: "Currently, the same process that led to the collapse of the Mazowiecki government has started up in the country. Chaos, corruption, and bureaucracy are all increasing. We are dealing with a crisis in Polish statehood. People are asking whether anyone is still governing the country."

According to Maziarski, the present government has been able to survive, because no political force has an answer to the question of what would happen if it were to collapse. The only majority that could be formed in parliament would be a postcommunist one.

The hopes that were pinned on the Presidency have been dashed, because the head of state has too few constitutional powers. The Polish revolution has been stopped halfway, and the result of that is that it is generally believed that the state does not belong to anyone.

Rescuing the state is to become the pivotal element in the election coalition being organized by the Center Accord. The coalition should appeal to patriotism in its election program.

"In the program, patriotism should be translated into the concrete interests of individual communities. Otherwise, we will not win the elections," said Jan Olszewski.

The conference participants decided to create "personal banks" in individual regions. They are to take the form of lists of persons who, if the Center Accord wins the elections, will replace nomenklatura officials in enterprises and regional administration. As Center Accord Secretary Stanislaw Rojek said, "it is not a question of people who are loyal to the party, but of a data bank listing specialists and nothing more."

The meeting of citizens committee activists connected with the Christian-National Union had a working character and was closed to the press. It was attended by

representatives of voivodship citizens committees—about 20 people altogether—who are linked to the Christian Citizens Movement.

In the election bloc that is being formed, citizens committees with a Christian character are to have the same rights as Christian parties in entering the elections. It was declared that the "citizens committee movement is not to be treated as a passive means to an end." In contrast to the Center Accord conference, Saturday's [25 May] meeting of the Christian Citizens Movement did not result in the formation of any kind of working commission. The date of the next meeting was all that was announced. It will take place following the papal visit.

Both Jacek Maziarski of the Center Accord and Wojciech Bogaczyk of the Christian-National Union told journalists that they thought it unlikely that a broad election coalition embracing the two parties could be formed.

Silesian Autonomy Movement Leader on Party Goals*PM0306154691 Opole TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish
27 May 91 p 3*

[Interview with Pawel Musiol, leader of the Silesian Autonomy Movement, by Marek Brodowski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Brodowski] Your movement's activity is regarded as highly controversial by some, and it invites a variety of contradictory opinions. People have even charged you with striving to achieve complete secession for Silesia....

[Musiol] These accusations are formulated mainly by people who either are unfamiliar with our organization and its activities or belong to the category which I call "birds of passage," that is, those who live in Silesia, but do not treat the problems of this region seriously. In the past such people often held high offices here, and even today there is no shortage of them, though many things have changed in Silesia recently. Even as we talk about the tragedy of our region—the erosion of the soil, the exploitation of its resources, the abuse of the ethnic Silesians' traditional traits of industry and reliability—all they do is heap calumnies and aspersions, because they are sitting pretty here and have made themselves very comfortable nests indeed. However, when the time comes to tackle all these tough and painful problems they will soon fly away.

[Brodowski] This being so, how do you see the people who came here to Silesia 30-40 years ago? Do you also count them among the "birds of passage?"

[Musiol] You are talking about the expatriates from beyond the River Bug and those elements in the settlers' communities here who have already made their permanent home here and become a part of our regional landscape. These are the people whom Silesians call

"rooted shrubs," because they have already struck root here, in our soil. We welcome such people in our movement very happily, too, provided, of course, that they themselves do not regard their sojourn here as something temporary. And this can be very easily ascertained, because Silesian neighborhood communities are very quick to recognize people who are hardworking, responsible, and prudent, in contrast to those who only try to make a superficial good impression here. The latter will find it difficult to "strike root" here, and even more difficult to secure the approval of the "ancient trees," that is, the native Silesians, who were the first hosts and stewards of these territories....

[Brodowski] But here in Silesia the criteria for such divisions are even more complex. For example, we have the German minority here, or the Slovak population. What about them?

[Musiol] We do not recognize such distinctions. Our Movement for Silesian Autonomy only disowns those people who take advantage of Silesian opportunities for the sake of their own particular interests. Thus, provided that the German minority shows itself to be law-abiding and is prepared to act in Silesia's best regional interests, I do not see why it should be prevented from operating in an alliance with us. I see the fact that recently political life in Silesia has blossomed and a great many different groups and associations have sprung up as a very positive development. In any case, everything Silesian is always very complex—hence the great diversity.

[Brodowski] What is the difference between your organization and the Upper Silesian Union? The latter promotes many slogans in its program which are very similar to your own tenets.

[Musiol] To begin with, we are more radical. We talk loudly and openly about everything that a great many Silesians discuss among themselves in everyday conversations. Besides, the Upper Silesian Union stipulates the principle of self-government for all Polandish regions, whereas we concentrate our attention exclusively on the Silesian perspective and demand autonomy for this region: an autonomy modeled on the autonomous status which was accorded to Silesia by the law of July 1920. We believe that this is the only way in which Silesia can be salvaged and restored to its former significance. Because at the moment the situation is as follows: Silesia remains Poland's richest region, and one which supports the greater part of the country with its work, but the voivode of Katowice is still obliged to go begging to Warsaw to ask for a share of what belongs to us already.

[Brodowski] What would be the limits of this autonomy?

[Musiol] Exactly the same as in the interwar period. Let me remind you that they were based on the institution of the Silesian Parliament and the Silesian Treasury. The former gave the region legislative autonomy in matters pertaining to Silesia; the latter gave us financial independence. And, as we know, this model worked well, resulting in a short time in a vigorous expansion of

Silesia's economic potential. Therefore, since we know that this model of autonomy was tried and tested and gave good results within the framework of the Second Republic, why should we doubt whether it would give good results today?

[Brodowski] What about the stipulation to introduce official Silesian citizenship?

[Musiol] This point would have to be put up for discussion by all the inhabitants of Silesia. I would like to emphasize here that it is not our aim to break all ties and relations with the rest of the country and that we would willingly allocate funds to boost the progress of the less well developed regions—but only on condition that we ourselves will decide how to dispense what we ourselves have produced. Because at present the economic circulatory system as a whole is a closed one, but its life blood flows in only one direction: away from Silesia.

[Brodowski] Officially, the Silesian Autonomy Movement has been active only since last February....

[Musiol] Yes. That was the date of the registration of our movement by the Voivodship Court in Katowice, following a great many difficulties. But in practical terms we have been active for over two years now, and at present the Silesian Autonomy Movement has 11,000 members. However, you can safely multiply this figure by a factor of three, because when a Silesian man decides to be active in any given movement, his wife and child will join it too.

[Brodowski] Thank you for talking to us.

Kaleta Criticizes Government Economic Policies

*PM0406152991 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA
in Polish 28 May 91 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Prof. Jozef Kaleta, Wroclaw Academy of Economics, by Malgorzata Sadowy-Piatek; place and date not given: "I Reject the Balcerowicz Program"]

[Text] [Sadowy-Piatek] Professor, during a recent meeting of economists at the Belweder Palace the government's economic program was criticized most severely and comprehensively, and no agreement was reached on any major question on the agenda. In this situation the government's proposal to refrain from placing economic problems in the foreground of the forthcoming parliamentary election campaign has quickly become mere wishful thinking. Almost all parties are drafting alternative economic programs and these are certain to become the pivotal points of the election contest.

[Kaleta] Well, what other basis is there for assessing the various individual parties and making a choice between them? Obviously the criteria on which we will make our

decisions will be economic programs and political personalities who command exceptional authority and prestige—but the latter are becoming increasingly thin on the ground recently.

[Sadowy-Piatek] But it would seem that the experience of the past years has taught us Poles the lesson that “how you see depends on where you sit”

[Kaleta] This is true. Election promises, especially those given without concrete backing, are very difficult to put into practice. Hence the increasing public frustration, the complaints, and the fall in the popularity ratings of those in positions of power. And this, in turn, is inevitably followed by a lack of political stability, a tendency to conduct witch-hunts, to seek scapegoats, and to concentrate on substitute subjects to complain about.

[Sadowy-Piatek] But do you not believe that in order to rescue the Polish economy from falling into ruin it will be necessary to rise above party, or doctrinal, divisions?

[Kaleta] Proposals for a new social contract have been formulated and put forward by various groups—for example, the Democratic Union. Such compromise solutions formulated with the aim of realizing the overriding reasons of state and nation are widely practiced throughout the world. However, I am forced to form the impression that here in Poland all proposals for such a pact are reduced to attempts to persuade the public to accept the government's moves and refrain from criticizing the Balcerowicz economic program.

Unfortunately, in my opinion, the public refuses to accept this program. Therefore it will be impossible to achieve a consensus on the basis of a social contract within the existing framework. We cannot approve an unrealistic program which has brought us a dramatic recession, large-scale unemployment, and a drastic fall in the living standard. The parameters originally set by the government have already been exceeded several times over. Consequently, we must assume either that the government is incompetent and has proved itself patently unable to foresee the development of the situation or that it deliberately misled public opinion. In both cases, such conduct is blameworthy.

[Sadowy-Piatek] As the saying goes, gentlemen do not discuss facts. But it seems that in our situation the same facts are used to formulate diametrically opposed conclusions.

[Kaleta] The government even questions the statistical data provided by its own agencies—the Central Office of Planning the Main Office of Statists—with respect to, say, the extent of unemployment, the negative balance of payments, the scale of the recession, or the productivity figures. On what grounds?

[Sadowy-Piatek] The public has the right to complain and criticize. The government should listen carefully to the voice of public opinion. We have many economists

on the side of the opposition, and every now and then yet another party announces that it is in opposition.

[Kaleta] There will always be plenty of economists who criticize the government. But if there is no genuine political opposition in parliament, then economists can complain, criticize, and discuss their grievances to their hearts' content, and still the authorities are not obliged to take any notice of their complaints. True opposition would not permit such an arrogant stance. And yet, when the Sejm approves a totally unrealistic budget and economic experts duly criticize it, nevertheless all parties still vote in its favor....

[Sadowy-Piatek] Well, what else can they do? Change the government just before the parliamentary election campaign?

[Kaleta] We already heard what Jerzy Urban had to say about not changing your horses in midstream. But we should change them: A change would at least give us a new chance

[Sadowy-Piatek] Despite the many loud complaints against it, in practice the government still has a carte blanche to do what it wants, and it certainly intends to use it. For example, there is the recently announced acceleration program for the privatization of state enterprises—a program which already received much criticism.

[Kaleta] True, privatization is seen as virtually the essential precondition for overcoming the economic crisis. But I believe that this assumption is erroneous. I am truly horrified to see that the value of the state assets has been estimated to amount to 100 trillion zlotys [Z], which represents only about 15 percent of the annual national income. Are we, then, to sell our assets for next to nothing?

[Sadowy-Piatek] But privatization is intended to act as one of the principal motors of the planned restructuring of the economy. Furthermore, economic recession, which will eliminate all nonprofitmaking industries, is viewed as yet another contributory factor in the restructuring process.

[Kaleta] The official view is that economic recession is a cleansing, revitalizing, corrective process. I disagree. It is not the poorly managed and badly performing enterprises, such as steelworks, cement plants, and so on, which go under. On the contrary, the enterprises which are collapsing all around us now belong to the light, textile, ceramic, or housing construction industries which produce essential consumer goods. Thus, recession does nothing to improve the structure of our economy; indeed, it aggravates its condition even more.

[Sadowy-Piatek] The prevailing view is that this situation is caused by the government's discriminatory policy toward state enterprises—a policy designed to force them to opt for privatization and adjustment to market mechanisms.

[Kaleta] If most state companies, which are the principal source of the State Budget's revenues, collapse and go bankrupt, where will the government find the resources to finance major investment projects or the privatization operations, to say nothing about the funds needed for unemployment benefits, the health service, education, and culture? Ministers complain that state enterprises fail to respond to market mechanisms and do not adapt to the institutional changes being introduced in the economy. Well, how are they supposed to react if they are forced to turn over 80-90 percent of their profits to the State Budget, have limits imposed on the bank loans they are allowed to take, and have to face a great many other similar restrictions? What chance have they of investing in the necessary adaptation projects? Ryszard Bugaj [Sejm deputy and joint founder of Labor Solidarity] applies a vivid metaphor to describe the situation: If you tie 10 millstones around a man's neck, then he will surely drown, no matter how hard he may try to keep afloat. And our state companies find themselves in precisely this kind of situation.

ROMANIA

Minority Paper Comments on Vatra Conference

91BA0495A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO
in Hungarian 19 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Lajos Sike: "National Vatra Meeting in Szatmarnemeti"]

[Text] This is the kind of affair that is said to be less than it appears. As early as the evening of the 13th, there were dozens of automobiles bearing the license plates of 10-12 counties lined up in front of the downtown hotels. Even the distant Botosani and Slobozia sent delegates to the national conference of the Vatra Romaneasca. Why not? After all, by now everyone in this country is an expert on Hungarians, even if they never shook hands with one in their lives.

We learned from the Vatra's local newspaper that the truce is so complete between us that the Vatra and the RMDSZ [Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania] "celebrated together" on 15 March. Well, at least they celebrated in the same town; only they celebrated different things. They celebrated the fact that their cultural organization was exactly one year old. We observed the 143d anniversary of a time when we showed the world that we, Hungarians, cannot be simply defeated! Of course, we cannot be fooled easily, either. We know full well why the Vatra chose to address us. Last year it was here that the prelude of the Marosvasarhely events took place. This was where the Hungarians of this country received their first slaps in the face. We had to be reminded to be careful, so we would not get too big for our britches...and so no one would display the red, white, and green colors, like it was done last year, even though nobody but Vatra members saw any such flags in Szatmarnemeti.

At noon on 15 March the leadership of the cultural organization dedicated a memorial cross (troica) symbolizing national unity and continuity in Szatmarnemeti's main square, right next to the cathedral, perhaps not least of all, as an "answer" to the presence of the beautiful twin-towered Roman Catholic church. Their president made a speech, and when he reminisced about the history of the organization, he let this remark slip: "When we saw that there would be big trouble in Szatmar, we ran to Bucharest, and proclaimed that we must establish the Vatra!" We need not elaborate on to whom they ran in the capital city.

Preceding the dedication of the memorial cross, the Vatra Romaneasca held a leadership meeting from which the press was excluded. However, a few items were leaked by "our informers." One of these is that the conflict among the leaders still exists. Although this could be a charade to create the impression that the organization is weakening, it could also be a tactical move, which is what may have been alluded to by the president of the PNDR [expansion unknown], a Mr. Ioan Crisan, at the afternoon open session, where he announced: "Until now we have been on the defensive, but from now on we will attack because it is common knowledge that the best defense is offense." We wonder, in which direction will they attack? Perhaps toward the Tisza river; after all, Mr. Crisan ceaselessly proclaimed that "de la Nistru pina la Tisa," the unified nation of 30 million Romanians, must be created as soon as possible! It could even be part of their tactics (we are becoming suspicious) that this time they did not denounce Hungarians as fiercely as on previous occasions because the Vatra wants to pursue a more respectable, one might say more European, course of action. However, that reserve was less noticeable during the afternoon meeting, because there, Mr. Ceantea uttered these words of wisdom: "Romania is the only European country that still has subtenants!" After which he let the audience know that it was high time to cancel the sublease....

It was also leaked out that the participants criticized the government, and asked the Front to allow the Vatra to follow its own course. Supposedly they also harshly criticized Mr. Magureanu, the leader of the SRP [expansion unknown], because his "boys" interfere with matters, and spoil the Vatra's good name, even though good name and cultured image are important. This is what was implied by Senator Mois Vasile during the afternoon session, when he emphasized that the Vatra is a purely cultural organization, which should remain aloof from political action. Why? Because "politics divides, while culture unifies." Therefore, according to the senator's iron logic, members of the Vatra should infiltrate all political parties! It appears, that even a cultural organization cannot sustain itself on culture alone!

All in all, the V.R.'s two-day review in Szatmar, this loudly proclaimed national conference, was a failure. The goal was to attract 4,000-5,000 people for the dedication of the cross, and they expected 10,000-15,000 participants for the afternoon session to respond to the

Hungarians' 15 March celebration. However, there were barely 300 of us at the dedication, and about 500-600 at the "great convention." Mr. Ceantea was upset about this, and asked, "where are the rest of the people, why did not they show up?"

They did not show up because in Szatmar not even Romanians are attracted by such watered-down fare! Instead, they decided to stand in line for eggs, or went over to Hungary to drink a few beers!

YUGOSLAVIA

Tudjman's Problems With Regional Chiefs

91BA0789A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
17 May 91 pp 20-21

[Article by Dragan Belic: "Troubles With Parish Priests"]

[Text] The lucid Dr. Slaven Letica, now no longer Tudjman's adviser, attempted on one occasion to draw parallels between his chief at that time and Josip Broz, his great predecessor at the level of Yugoslavia. To do this, he took the example of proper attire, shading his piece with a simple homespun line of the Zagorje sense of proper measure, but not going a step further than that (if we overlook a few peripheral details concerning the idea of a statement's pomposity meant to serve political advancement). But actually we are dealing with a much more complicated phenomenon, one that takes us to the very heart of the current Croatian drama.

There can hardly be any doubt that Dr. Tudjman has been perceiving power in Croatia in almost the same way as Broz did in Yugoslavia. Seeing himself, then, as a statesman who spreads his wings over all the pores of public and political life, keeping a close watch on his comrades-in-arms so that they do not take a step out from under the umbrella of the cult. Accordingly, of course, he must be sufficiently flexible so that the comrades-in-arms and associates believe in their own greatness, small as it is, even giving them (as Broz did Kardelj) Slovenia as a personal province, or allowing Bakaric supposed independence as the monitor of Croatia (when the so-called Serb cadres attempted to install Rankovic in a similar position in Serbia, they had to give their mouths a good washing out with soap at the Brioni Plenum).

Tudjman seems to have attempted something similar. He has allowed the informal installation of regional chiefs, although Croatia still has not officially established its administrative regions. But that is where his oversight begins (we will be talking about that later); like every good nationalist, he has perceived present-day Croatia as much more unitary than unhappy Yugoslavia. (Incidentally, Broz was no nationalist, much less a hard-bitten nationalist, since he was interested only in power.)

Tudjman's troubles with his regional chiefs began shortly after he came to power. When he rather wisely selected Dalmatia to be the most "unitary province," and did not allow the possibility in that space of a strong man emerging, i.e., the dangerous kind of "fellow fighter" (Is that the reason for the frequent change in the leadership positions of Antun Vrdoljak, from Imok, who has probably held more posts than anyone else in the history of the young Croatian democracy?), but the relation toward the other regional chiefs points up all Tudjman's troubles. First of all, he never managed to even conquer Istria and Rijeka, and in that sense has been unable to build any long-term strategy until he achieves his primary goal. His native Zagorje was not a politically attractive area because of the calm currents of public life and the absence of passion in these docile people for engaging in affairs of state with particular excitement (it is interesting [to note that] Tudjman has never delivered any rousing speech in his native region). Hastily, taking a page from the former Croatian Communists, he attempted to install Martin Spegelj as the Drava region chief, but the troubles of the retired general with his former comrades from the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] restricted his field of activity, and Tudjman had to rely more directly in operational matters solely on Josip Voljkovac, Karlovac regional chief, a valuable and devoted man, but also an operative with a narrow outlook and limited political intelligence.

Glavas's Chief

But it has been the Slavonian chief, Vladimir Seks, who has given him the greatest trouble, apparently having even literally conceived his native region as a private Croatian province. After all, absolutely every one of Tudjman's political actions in this region—the most drastic example is the attempt to drive little Branimir Glavas [the surname Glavas means chief] from power—has been doomed from the outset. Seks has ruled his region like a sovereign, more like the "ban of Slavonia" than an ordinary chief, even so sovereign that Tudjman, say, has hardly ever even appeared in these parts of Croatia, never attempting to deliver speeches in which he would lift the fighting morale of Croats, whose region is intersected by increasingly troublesome Serbian enclaves of eastern Slavonia and western Srem. Even Seks's protege Glavas has been able to calmly continue his provocative activity, going even so far as to push a sizable group of special policemen into the arms of death, leaving someone like Degoricija to justify with the public an insane escapade which obviously has no very direct relation to the coordinated and planned actions of the political headquarters in Zagreb, and even to imagine members of the Romanian Securitate in an ordinary Slavonian village.

On the other hand, the heads of local "sheriffs" have rolled for much smaller mistakes (just recall the fate of Ante Bujas, the Sibenik police chief). In actuality, that was the natural thing in an area where Tudjman, by virtue of normal bureaucratic procedure, had the kind of support which would not allow local leaders to set

themselves up as despots. Dalmatia, where what Tudjman said, in the absence of a local governor, was carefully heeded, was a pronounced example of this (even the popular mayor of Sinj, Jerko Vukas, who has the status of an HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] dove, had to take a police post in Zagreb—so that he did not grow to become a stronger political figure).

Trouble With the People From the Dinarids

It is precisely Tudjman's relationship to Dalmatia, in that entire context of insufficiently "homogenized Croatia," that has the most to offer to analysis. It was on the Dalmatian coast that Tudjman delivered his most militant speeches, including the last one in Trogir. There might be a peripheral reason for his ties to Dalmatia in the fact that the intellectual group of "Croats from the coast" (Letica, Nobilo...) represent a sizable portion of his team of advisers, but that certainly is not decisive. We believe that actually something much more important is involved: "The Mediterraneans from the stony terrain," which is how one might refer to that large number of "incendiary Croats" from the Krajina opstinas of the Dalmatian hinterland (people from Imok, Drnis, Sinj, and in addition a portion of the very militant Croatian population from western Hercegovina), are certainly, when they come down into the "Roman cities" on the coast, the most suitable "national dough" for expression of the ambitions of a great statesman.

In his dealings as commander in chief with that delicate relation between the militant mountain people from the Krajina and the Mediterranean charm of the "red cities"—Tudjman at first achieved quite noticeable results, and it is no wonder at all that he nurtured such a subtle and regionalistic approach to southern Croatia—from enthusiasm over the "1,000-year-old culture," in Dubrovnik, of course, to the particularly fierce threats to a certain kind of populace, always somewhere within range of Knin, it is precisely in that region that his greatest troubles have recently begun [as published].

Put simply, it is precisely in this region that Tudjman overlooked growing militants, that is, failed to see that his post as statesman would no longer be able to keep up with the growth of the mood of the people.

The Lid on the State

At the moment, then, when he had lost the last strong political point of support, that is to say, at the moment when the Dalmatian coast began to boil to such an extent that he could not control it from his position as commander in chief, Tudjman had to listen carefully to Adzic for all of two hours, and then Markovic came to explain to him the protocol on the "sovereignty of the relationship" between Croatia and Yugoslavia. In other words, if we really wanted to be cynical: The "ban of Croatia" appealed to the JNA to straighten out the situation in sovereign Croatia.

Witnesses say that Broz had the custom of delivering rather clear threats to his insubordinate comrades-in-arms, sometimes in anger, that one day he would get them by "bringing in the Russians." It has, of course, turned out that that was only a threat. By all appearances, Tudjman has not uttered similar threats to his associates that he would put the JNA in a position to regulate political relations in Croatia. There was no need for that. Lulled by the rapid advancement of his cause and by the image building of the Croatian media, and content to the point of intoxication with the instant cult of the "father of the homeland" (many things in the Croatia of the HDZ can now be confidently prefixed by cynics with the word "instant," from sovereignty and the national state to the special police and statesmen), it seems he took that as a sign of uncivilized and unstatesmanlike wisdom.

In the Croatian national-historical nomenclature, the position of Franje Tudjman as the "enlightened ban," is now being sketched out much more clearly. Relying solely on the "Slavonian water carrier" Mesic, who in terms of political operations could not have a more important role among the powerful regional chiefs, Tudjman has for quite some time now been in the position of the "lid on the state" beneath which the steam was swirling up from nonhomogeneous, local political passions. The explosion of that steam in the form of uncontrolled national energy forced him to consent as honorably as possible to the help of the federal authorities, so that he could somehow remain at the head of Croatia. As a national historian, we believe, he must have been disappointed by the historical situation: that Croatia is not so homogeneous on a cultural and natural basis as it seemed to him from the position of commander in chief.

Actually, the commander in chief overlooked several key things—that Istria, Rijeka, and Baranja became part of Croatia only after the war, that Dalmatia and Dubrovnik have been under Zagreb's jurisdiction since 1939, that the ties between Slavonia and southern Croatia are very weak with respect to culture, transportation, and everything else (and they also pass through Knin), that the Pannonian and Mediterranean Croats have not achieved an enviable level of national homogenization, and particularly that the "Dinaric world" (as the Serbs have already seen) is not the most suitable for achievement of elevated national and particularly democratic goals. Incidentally, and we will end with this, a spicy detail which historians frequently mention in their internal Yugoslav discussions is that the ban of Croatia has almost as a rule effectively ruled only when he relied on some powerful, so-called external, factor.

But also with the hope that Croatia will be one day [be] "historically more mature."

Slovene Police Coordinating Body Scored*91BA0792B Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE
in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jun 91 p 3*

[Article by Zoran Odic: "The Policemen Are Waiting for the Deputies"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 31 May—There are 26 days left before Slovenia's O-Day (secession) unless an agreement is reached in this country on the verge of explosion on how to live together, but the wrong people are obviously searching for the agreement, because there is none on the horizon. And while Europe is sending its delegations not because it is worried about Yugoslavia, but because it is worried about itself, on the eve of proclamation of independence and sovereignty in Slovenia absurd things are happening which are more covered up than spoken about and which confirm what we have been writing for the last three months: Slovenia is moving closer and closer to a military-police regime. In just the last 10 days or so, something has happened which no normal person would have expected. Students are being moved out of high school dormitories to make room for members of territorial defense and the special police; at the last session of the Assembly on Thursday, police were waiting for the deputies and newsmen within the assembly building. This has never happened in European parliamentary life, because the police have no business in the parliament, just as they have no business at the university. The deputies were read a justification to the effect that this was to "protect and guarantee the safety of the session," but they wondered: From whom, and why right at this point?

The only answer was offered by the Liberal-Democratic deputy, Janez Zlobec, who entered the assembly wearing the cap of Slovenian Territorial Defense and shouting: "We are Jansa's, Jansa is ours!"

At this point, we also need to refer to the existence of the notorious Coordinating Group of Republic Authorities, whose reports for the public have announced all manner of dangers threatening the young Slovenian state and its independence and have really been causing public alarm. For all our efforts, we have been unable to obtain answers and decisions which would make it clear who formed that coordinating group and what its duties and powers are, but one thing is obvious: This is a group that is supposed to publish (dis)information whose purpose is to cause panic and deprive citizens of a peaceful night's sleep. It would be logical if this group had been established by the republic Presidency, as the commander in chief of Slovenian Territorial Defense under the republic Constitution. The Presidency did not form it, or at least there is no written document to that effect, nor was it formed by the government, nor was it formed without a written document, nor was it formed by the assembly. It turns out that the group formed itself and consisted of two people, the ministers of army and police, who sign all the communications, and who plan the actions such as the one of seizing someone else's property (it is not

important that it was the property of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and personnel carriers). Yet the most important thing is simply that in spite of all the legal authorities in the republic which are called upon to make decisions at the moment in Slovenia, it is this coordinating group that has the greatest authority, which disposes as it pleases with the entire repressive apparatus of the republic and uses it at its own discretion, from occupying the assembly to evicting high school students from their dormitories, to shutting off the electric power to military facilities (which might even be met with understanding), but it is intolerable that in its statements it falsely asserts that power was not shut off to the medical institutions of the JNA.

It was also shut off there; a surgeon from the Ljubljana Military Hospital confirmed to this newsman that the power was shut off while he was performing a serious operation—he had on the operating table a woman who was not even in the military, but was a civilian patient.

When the military and police have the greatest powers anywhere in the world, then that country is called a military-police dictatorship.

When a city is blocked by an army which says that it is protecting it from another army, then there is a state of emergency in that city. If the police are in the parliament of one republic, then that is a quiet military-police takeover in that republic. If the territorial defense forces have turned their guns on the JNA (and vice versa), then this is an undeclared state of war. If for the last five years a few people have been talking about a military putsch in Slovenia when there was no military putsch, and when they came to power then they use that power to establish repression over the students, the parliament, and citizens whom they call up into the reserves on the pretext that they are threatened by military intervention, then that is actually a state of emergency. It would be tragic if the JNA actually bore out the expectations of Jansa and Bavec, that is, of the coordinating group. It is a sad day when Jansa and Bavec invent a danger that threatens from the JNA in order to establish a complete system of a military-police state in Slovenia that is only 26 days away from sovereignty. It is no wonder that a normal man must ask what he is to do in a state in which only the army and police are sovereign, which spends more money for its army and police than for its schools, health care, culture, highways, and social welfare put together.

Differences Among Ruling Bosnian Parties*91BA0792A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
1 Jun 91 p 2*

[Article by D.K.: "Partnership on the Wrong Road"]

[Text] The talks among the representatives of the three parties in power about finding a political solution for the governmental crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, to which newsmen are not being admitted, so we have learned, still have not made any progress, will continue until the session of the Assembly of the

Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina scheduled for 4 June of this year, and, if necessary, will continue even after that. The negotiators from the SDA [Democratic Action Party], the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] are in agreement that the delicate issues, and there are several of them in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be resolved peacefully and without violence. Everything else is very much in dispute at present.

In the opinion which Dr. Radovan Karadzic expressed in the press conference of the SDS, there will be no peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina until certain key issues are resolved, and one of them is certainly the position and character of Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the question of the attitude of the SDS toward Chetnik ideology, Dr. Karadzic answered that the party which he heads is nonideological and that there are neither Chetniks nor partisans in it, because the ideology of the Serbian Democratic Party is democracy.

The other two parties in the coalition reproach the Serbian Democratic Party for its friendly attitude toward the Chetniks, taking the view that it should distance itself from that. Incidentally, the president of the Democratic Action Party, Alija Izetbegovic, has announced that "the SDA will dissolve the partnership unless the SDS renounces the Chetnik elements in its ranks." It is assumed that the representatives of the SDA will insist on this point in these talks.

Stjepan Kljuic, president of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was still more definite in speaking about the conditions for further collaboration among the three ethnic parties. In a statement for OSLOBODJENJE, he said: "The leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina must decide either to renounce the Chetniks or to renounce partnership in the three-party government in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Talks among the parties are superfluous until they take a position on that. I say that everyone should distance himself from the extremes in his own people. We in the HDZ have nothing in common with the Croatian Law Party precisely because of its ideology, which is based on hatred. The HDZ is a peaceful organization and opposes conflicts and violence. Peace is what Bosnia-Herzegovina needs most now."

In the further development of these meetings among the three parties, the issue will certainly be raised of which option Bosnia-Herzegovina will favor, the federal, the confederative, or some third option, a combination. The parties in power, as it is well known, have differing views on this.

And although the talks continue among representatives of the SDA, SDS, and HDZ, it is very difficult at present to forecast their outcome.

Platform on Future Yugoslav Community

91BA0794A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
4 Jun 91 p 10

["Abridged text" of the Platform on the Future Yugoslav Community, proposed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia: "For Five or Ten Years"—first four paragraphs are BORBA introduction]

[Text] Ilija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia, informed the public a few weeks ago of their joint "Platform on the Future Yugoslav Community," with which they hoped to overcome conflicts between the western confederal and eastern federal options for arranging the Yugoslav community.

BORBA is publishing with slight abridgments the text of the Izetbegovic-Gligorov platform, which (on the basis of the introductory remarks) arose out of the conviction of the two presidents that "insistence on the governmental and legal form of Yugoslavia as a federal state that would not be premised upon the sovereignty of the republics could lead to the definitive disintegration of Yugoslavia." The authors of the platform feel that the real situation must be taken into account, "that is, the present constitutional and actual position of the republics as states."

Izetbegovic and Gligorov, then, say that the Yugoslav community can be preserved only if it is redesigned as a Community of Yugoslav Republics (Alliance of Yugoslav Republics, Alliance of Yugoslav States) that would have the features of a community of states. The presidents of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina emphasize that their platform needs further work through "joint effort and a willingness for compromise," and it is to be expected that this might happen at the summit meeting of republic leaders on 6 June in Sarajevo.

Finally, Izetbegovic and Gligorov feel that peaceful changes of the governmental and political form of Yugoslavia and the international-legal stability of the process of change into the Community of Yugoslav Republics ought to be conducted by means of the simultaneous regulation of the mutual rights and obligations "arising out of life together up to this point" and the "establishment of the joint functions of the future community."

I. Human Freedoms and Basic Civil Rights

1. The interrelated group of human freedoms and basic civil rights as well as the collective rights of minorities and ethnic groups constitute the basic tissue linking or confronting the republics in Yugoslavia (the nationalities in them and citizens in general).
2. All European conventions and political agreements concerning protection of human rights are explicitly accepted, above all the European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms with all nine protocols.

Preparation is also to be made for acceptance of the European Social Welfare Charter. It is also indispensable to accept in legislation the principle of direct application of European standards in disputes and in national legislation in the republics and in the Community, and these internal systems would be subject to the direct monitoring of international authorities in this area. This presupposes acceptance of the appropriate powers of institutions such as the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe, the European Court, and appropriate institutions and mechanisms of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. This also presupposes appropriate monitoring by nongovernmental organizations in this area.

3. Agreement is also necessary on a detailed and more strict procedure and protection of human and collective rights of minorities at the level of the Community of Yugoslav Republics. This can be ensured by an appropriate judicial body composed on a parity basis.

4. In this context, solution should also be sought for exercise of the rights of peoples to determination, which also includes the right of secession.

It is our premise that the exercise of this right is possible only as the right of a people organized in one of the existing republics relative to the broader community, not as the "right" of an entire "divided people" which exercises its sovereign rights in more than one republic. The latter would imply an altogether anti-European trend and would open up a permanent conflict between essentially intermingled nationalities in the republics (which is the case with practically all peoples making up present-day Yugoslavia). The situation is similar in a large number of countries in Europe. We therefore feel that even the referendum as a means of exercise of that right can be organized only as the expression of citizens at the level of the republics.

II. Common Economic Interests

1. The Community's basic economic interests are an achievement of a common market, and there is also a common interest in inclusion in the integrative processes of Europe, and to that end the republics, as members of the Community, will gradually bring the elements of the common market into conformity with the norms and standards of the European Community.

2. The territory of the Community constitutes a common market, and the flow of goods, services, capital, and manpower is free on that territory.

3. All forms of ownership and all economic entities are equal on the common market.

4. The establishment of enterprises and branches is unrestricted, and they operate under equal conditions on the territory of the Community.

5. There are no customs duties between the members of the Community, and a uniform joint tariff system exists toward third states.

6. Development policy may be a joint policy in certain areas. It also includes regional developmental policy, with particular emphasis on the economically underdeveloped areas, on the principles of the policy of the European Community.

8. [numbering as published] Within the Community, policy is coordinated in the sectors of transportation, communications, energy, and agriculture, and technical and technological systems are coordinated in the sectors of transportation, communications, and energy.

9. A single common currency is valid on the territory of the Community, and there is a single, central note-issuing bank. That common currency is to be firmly pegged to the ECU [European Currency Unit]. Accordingly, insofar as it is possible today, international payment transactions should be related to that monetary unit, and the stability of the dinar, viewed over the long term, should abide by the rules of behavior of the European Parliament.

10. On the territory of the Community, there would be a single monetary system, banking system, foreign exchange system, foreign trade system, tariff system, and system of foreign credit relations. On the joint territory, a uniform monetary policy, foreign exchange policy, foreign trade policy, tariff policy, and policy of foreign credit relations would be conducted. The tax system is based on uniform foundations. Decisions on all these matters are made as a rule on the basis of consensus of the members of the Community.

11. Protection of the environment is in this era a new dimension and a vital necessity from the standpoint of joint interests within the Community.

III. International Legal Entities and Foreign Policy

1. The original sovereignty belongs to the republics. They transfer a portion of their sovereignty to the Community.

2. It is in the common interest of the republics that the Community be an entity under international law and the successor to Yugoslavia in international law and guarantor of obligations which Yugoslavia has assumed in the international community, including all bilateral and multilateral documents concluded and ratified.

3. The republics would be entities in international law in accordance with recognition under international law, recognition of the international community.

4. The Community could conclude treaties under international law and other treaties under condition that through a specific procedure the republics grant the Community a mandate to conclude such a treaty. The republics will ratify every treaty or international legal act concluded by the Community.

5. The republics will show concern for and protect their citizens living outside the Community, develop political, economic, cultural, and other relations with countries which are of particular interest to those republics, will conclude and ratify international treaties, and will join international and regional organizations on the basis of their own interests and in keeping with the level of their international recognition.

6. The republics will not be able to conclude treaties contrary to the interests of the Community or the interests of one of the republics. The republics will conduct an independent foreign policy and will take part in establishing the Community's overall policy. The Community's foreign policy is based on the interest of the sovereign republics in becoming part of integrated European groups and in cooperating with countries with which they pursue political, economic, cultural, scientific, and other interests.

7. As Yugoslavia's successor in international law, the Community will be a member of the organization of the United Nations. Every republic, consistent with its international recognition, may also be a member of the United Nations and other international organizations.

8. The Community will have diplomatic and consular missions in those countries and with those international organizations which are of interest to the republics. The personnel in those missions and also in the agencies of the Community must conform to the principles of proportional representation of all republics.

The republics may have their own representative offices (including diplomatic and consular missions) in other countries, but the character of those representative offices will depend on the interests and capabilities of the republics and on the level of their recognition under international law.

IV. Defense

1. The republics have an interest in organizing common defense in order to preserve the territorial integrity and to protect the Community's external and internal borders. A joint decision establishes which arms and services would be organized in what units as joint armed forces. The joint armed forces would be depoliticized by law and in actuality and would be optimally organized, and the personnel of their top command would be ethnically balanced. A process would also be initiated to professionalize the joint armed forces.

2. The republics will also have their armed forces. Territorial defense and other forms of the armed forces (militia, police, etc.) as well as civil defense are in the jurisdiction of the republics.

3. In case of external aggression, the armed forces of the Community and of the republics will operate together and will be placed under a joint command.

V. Position, Structure, and Decisionmaking Procedure of the Community's Bodies and Agencies

1. In their position, structure, and decisionmaking procedure, the bodies and agencies of the Community must ensure full equality of the republics, that is, preclude any possibility of majority rule and outvoting.

2. The bodies and agencies of the Community (parliament, the Community's collective chief of state, council of ministers, and other joint institutions) would be constituted on the parity principle—an equal number of members from each republic. They would be elected in the republics by a uniform procedure and on the basis of generally accepted principles of a democratic electoral system and multiparty parliamentary democracy.

3. Decisionmaking in these bodies and agencies is based on the principle of consensus of the republics and, with precisely stated exceptions, adoption of temporary measures by a qualified majority (for urgent matters of defense, discharge of international obligations assumed, etc.).

4. The most important bodies, agencies, and institutions of the Community would be moved to all the republics in order to eliminate the adverse effects that arise from the concentration of federal bodies and agencies in only one community, which has been the case up to now.

5. All bodies, agencies, and institutions of the Community may enjoy extraterritoriality. Only the statutes of the Community apply to them, so that the influence of the domicile republics and local authorities is precluded.

6. In order to perform the joint functions established by the agreement, the Community will have bodies, agencies, and instruments for effective and uniform performance of joint functions in all republics.

VI. Revision of the Agreement

The agreement drawn up on the foundations set forth above is concluded for a period of five (alternative 10) years and will be examined again in the spring of 1996 (alternative 2001).

VII. Guarantee of Performance of the Agreement

1. The signatories of the agreement on regulation of relations in the future Yugoslav Community assume the obligation to consistently, completely, and effectively carry out all provisions of the agreement. In order to resolve controversial situations and to carry out what has been agreed, the republics accept the successive, alternative, or cumulative application of the following guarantees:

a) Jurisdiction of the Community's parity court.

b) Commitment of the joint armed forces referred to in Point [Section] 4 of this platform.

c) Application of the mechanisms of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation to resolve the conflicts of the corresponding European institutions.

YUGOSLAVIA

Position of Slovene Assembly on Military Service Law*91BA0752A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 24 May 91 p 3*

[Statement by Slovene President Lojze Peterle; place and date not given: "The Yugoslav People's Army Is Aggravating Things Unnecessarily"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Lojze Peterle answers the Federal Secretariat for National Defense: "The military delegation said that it would respect Slovenia's verified decision on independence."

The Executive Council of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, at its 84th session on 23 May 1991, discussed the proposals and positions that were offered in connection with implementation of the amendments to the federal Law on Military Service by a delegation from the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the ZSLO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense] led by the commander of the Fifth Military District, Lt. General Konrad Kolsek, at talks in Ljubljana on 21 May, and in connection with them adopted the following positions:

1. The competent authorities of the Republic of Slovenia have attempted for several years already, and very intensively ever since July 1990, to reach compromise solutions, which were and still are possible and feasible even within the framework of federal legislation, by which a majority of the recruits from Slovenia could perform their military service in JNA units on the territory of their native republic. In spite of many talks at different levels, and in spite of suitable legislative initiatives from Slovene delegates in the SFRY Assembly, the proposals were not accepted. Only minimal progress was achieved in increasing the proportion of recruits that could perform military service in their native republic. No consideration was given even to such simple proposals as, for example, the one for reestablishing the reserve officer school that had already operated for many years in Ljubljana, and was unnecessarily eliminated years ago.

2. For these reasons, the Slovene Assembly, after its proposals did not encounter a favorable response from the federal authorities, regulated military service itself by means of a constitutional amendment, constitutional laws, and a systemic law on military service. After the increased tensions in several parts of Yugoslavia and the use of JNA soldiers and recruits who were performing military service to neutralize interethnic conflicts, the Slovene Assembly adopted a resolution on a moratorium on performing military service in the JNA.

3. The performance of military service in Slovenia is proceeding in accordance with the constitution and the laws adopted by the Slovene Assembly. The Slovene Assembly did not ratify the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Law on Military Service (URADNI LIST SFRJ No. 30/91), and consequently, in accordance

with Amendment 96 of the Slovene constitution, it is not valid in Slovenia and should not be applied.

The Executive Council of the Slovene Assembly has been informed that the government of the Croatian Republic has also proposed to the Assembly that it not ratify the above-mentioned Law on Military Service.

Regardless of this, however, the Executive Council of the Slovene Republic notes that the previously cited federal law requires the competent federal authorities, i.e., the JNA, to take over implementation of the obligations arising from it by 30 June 1991. Consideration of this deadline coincides with the deadline set for the competent Slovene authorities by the Law on the Plebiscite on the Autonomy and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia (URADNI LIST RS No. 44/90), and consequently the Executive Council of the Republic of Slovenia does not see any real need that would compel the JNA authorities to attempt to take over authority in connection with military service ahead of time, since the federal law allows them to wait for a final decision by Slovenia concerning independence. Since that decision will be adopted by 26 June 1991, there is no sense in having the civil authorities in Slovenia turn over the corresponding documentation to the federal military authorities for one month. This is even more unnecessary, since in the talks on 21 May 1991, the military delegation emphasized that the JNA would respect Slovenia's verified decision on independence.

4. The amendments to the federal Law on Military Service should apply to all of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, on the basis of information from the above-mentioned talks and on the basis of verified information from other republics, the Executive Council of the Slovene Assembly justifiably concludes that the JNA is only demanding that Slovenia turn over the documentation before the final deadline set by the federal law. Insistence upon such a demand could cause unnecessary conflicts, which would force the Republic of Slovenia to shorten the independence process. At the same time, insistence upon such a demand, despite the formally different position of the military leadership, would mean that there is a desire to aggravate the security situation in the Republic of Slovenia deliberately.

5. On this occasion the Executive Council of the Slovene Assembly also expresses once again, and emphasizes, the Slovene Republic's willingness to resolve the issue of military service during the independence process gradually, without the use of force, and while ensuring the social and status rights of active and retired members of the JNA on its territory. In connection with this, it repeats the proposal made at the meeting on 21 May 1991 on the possible suspension of certain specific activities in connection with the performance of military service in Slovenia, and above all, its proposal for further talks, at which, in addition to the problems associated with military service, several overall issues from Federal Executive Council letter 6979 of 9 May 1991 could also be discussed.

[signed] Lojze Peterle, President

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Renault Negotiating Truck Production With Avia

91CH0561B Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 4 Apr 91 p 15

[Interview with Claude Francois, representative of Renault Vehicules Industriels for international relations, by Jiri Nesnidal; place and date not given: "Renault's Interest in Operating in Czechoslovakia: Entering Clear-Eyed"—first two paragraphs are HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The Galimpex commercial firm of Prague presented on 18-22 March in Prague, Brno and Bratislava state-of-the-art products of French manufacturers of equipment for truck transport who are now busily engaged in cooperation with Czechoslovak production and commercial partners.

Many interested visitors from among the state, cooperative and private transport sectors focused their attention primarily on the latest trailer tractor Renault AE 380 which was exhibited with a large-capacity refrigerated trailer built by the firm of Lamberet. Another Renault product which surely found admirers was the FR1 GTX bus equipped with everything that the heart of the more demanding travelers may ever desire.

[Nesnidal] Mr. Francois, as a partner in many years of commercial dealings with representatives of our enterprises you must surely have a clear vision of further cooperation with Czechoslovak entrepreneurs.

[Francois] I see prospects particularly in renewing cooperation with the Avia Praha-Letnany company. It ought to pick up on the 22 years' tradition of relations between Avia and the former French Saviem company. Renault's principal interest is in linking Avia up with an international group of truck manufactures. In what form is something that depends on how the large privatization will come out.

[Nesnidal] We are talking about privatization in regard to the present state enterprise Avia. Is Renault counting on entering this process?

[Francois] Of course. We count on capital participation. In our opinion Avia in the current situation has no prospect other than availing itself of the offer to join the international group of manufacturers of cars and equipment for freight transport which presently consists of Renault, Sweden's Volvo and in the nearest future also DAF of Holland. At present Renault-Volvo is working together with DAF to produce a light truck which is still absent from our product range. It is a vehicle that would sell well not only in East Europe but also offer competition to Japanese trucks in Western markets as well. And it is precisely on this product that Avia should have a significant participation. In the first stage of Renault-Volvo relationship with Avia it would be cooperation in

development, purchasing and completing primary production. The second stage would mean already assembling the vehicle from the best products of both manufacturers.

[Nesnidal] What is it actually that attracts Renault to cooperation with Avia?

[Francois] We naturally want to have the widest possible international reach. The velvet revolution has opened the road to Czechoslovakia which needs Western help. We want to participate in bringing your country to a higher stage of economic development. I don't want to make a secret of our intentional preference for Czechoslovakia ahead of other countries which have thrown off the totalitarian shackles. For there is an ancient historical link in both politics and economics including its concrete expression I had mentioned earlier. Secondly, even as I am aware of the poor state of your economy, I still rank Czechoslovakia with the economically advanced countries.

[Nesnidal] And what about the labor force? Isn't that precisely one of the principal motives for the cooperation which we are talking about?

[Francois] This is undoubtedly an important issue for us. The labor force here is substantially cheaper than in the West. That is certainly a significant aspect. But what is more important are the very good professional qualities of your technicians and workers. Unfortunately you don't have available such equipment, machinery, technology which would permit it to show. Under these conditions you have a hard time to meet requirements for instance in respect to tolerances in engine manufacturing. This of course does not affect Avia alone but virtually all suppliers—Motorpal Jihlava, Autobrzdý Jablonec and others. So the primary requirement is a general upgrading of quality.

[Nesnidal] What you have said so far makes evident a sincere effort to initiate cooperation with Avia. Yet there remains the open question in what legal form of organization this would take place. There is still concern in our entrepreneurial circles that Western companies are out mainly to gain control based on majority capital share.

[Francois] As we have discussed, Avia must get an infusion of foreign capital, or else it could not modernize production. This is the point of departure. Afterward it matters little in what form—by financing, technology transfer, or in other ways—it is carried out. But I can assure you that in no case it will be a merger. Avia's identity, if only in consideration of the good name of its trademark, must be preserved. But there is one more thing. From past experience we know how unrewarding and in fact impossible it is to merge commercial networks. For this reason even in such a close partnership that Renault has with Volvo the original commercial networks of both have been preserved. From this vantage point it is evident that Avia must remain Avia.... Our intention is to make Avia an equal partner in an

international family of truck manufacturers. Fears of some sort of an absorption are therefore unfounded.

[Nesnidal] You are exhibiting your products here by arrangement through Galimpex, a Czechoslovak company. What is its place in the cooperation plans you have just outlined?

[Francois] For many years we have been doing business with Motokov. We are not cutting it out, but at the same time in view of the changes in Czechoslovakia we have felt the need for having an exclusive representation here. And this is how Galimpex came about, a company which in respect to trucks has the exclusive right to represent Renault interests. This is merely a first step; for the future we plan moving from representation to an accredited importer with exclusivity. But this is of course a long-range plan. The prerequisites for putting it into effect include a marketing network, service facilities, spare parts.

[Nesnidal] If you were to spell out the credo with which Renault intends to enter upon our present economic scene...

[Francois] It was never our intention to somehow or other impose on our Czechoslovak partners but rather to seek out the most suitable forms for mutually beneficial cooperation. And please do underline the little word mutually.

[Box, p 15]

Claude Francois is a commercial director of the Renault Vehicules Industriels company based in Paris. Born on 2 August 1936 at Lisieux he is married, childless, with a technical degree education, residing in Paris, Avenue G. Pompidou. He has been with Renault for 32 years, originally working in the area of industrialization and introduction of production lines abroad. In the last 15 years he has been responsible for commercial contacts with East European countries, especially with CSFR.

New Commercial Code To Be Published Soon

91CH0561D Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 4 Apr 91 p 18

[Article by Frantisek Faldyna: "Legal Basis for Commerce and Enterprise"]

[Text] At this moment legislative work is about to be completed on a draft commercial code which will not be just a wholly new law (for more than 40 years no law of a similar kind existed in Czechoslovakia) but will also represent a law of the codification type, comprehensive as to material and content as well as in legislative terms. Its nearly 800 sections represent the Code from the systemic as well as functional point of view.

The commercial code will signal a fundamental break in the legal regulation of economic relations. The old Economic Code expires, replaced with a new code—commercial. The old administratively centralized and

command type of the economy is being replaced by a market economy and this fundamental economic change is finding its legislative and legal expression in the commercial code and further related statutes.

Safeguarding Freedom of Enterprise

These further, closely related statutes will include particularly the civil code, distinct from the commercial code as a general statute—in other words, in relation to the civil code the commercial code will be a special statute. Commerce and enterprise are actually only a special yet indivisible component of the citizen's status in a democratic society based on the freedom of the market. Both are a part of the sphere of private law in which the individual acts as a citizen as well as an entrepreneur. In this sense the commercial code and commercial law by itself as a traditional specialty constitute a broader extension of the civil code and a subbranch of civic rights. At the same time there is no need for a separate Czechoslovak code on foreign trade which will be subsumed in the commercial code.

This concept is not substantially affected even by the fact that certain aspects of enterprise and commerce need to be regulated also by public law norms by means of which the state must intervene in commercial legal relations in order to safeguard the "rules of the game." In the interest of freeing entrepreneurs and business people from unwanted state interference and providing them with mutual equality of rights with all economic entities (especially state organizations), as well as giving equal status to all "kinds and forms" of ownership (in reality there is only one ownership but many kinds of owning entities), commerce and enterprise must be essentially a matter of free contracting on the basis of the commercial code. Hence it is also necessary to separate in principle the private and public law regulation of enterprise and commerce, so as to assure maximum freedom of enterprise and free exercise of the entrepreneur's will.

For these reasons the commercial code draft proposes the largest possible number of prescriptive provisions and the smallest possible number of prescriptive provisions. It will usually depend on the partners' contractual intent what conditions of the trade or enterprise they agree on, with the prescriptive provisions as a support.

The code's drafters have also taken account of internationally unified regulations, particularly within the framework of the United Nations and the European communities.

In the Sphere of Commercial Law

Together with amending the civil code and the new commercial code preparations have progressed in drafting a related law on small business, so as to provide the most complete legal foundations for business activity in the emerging Czechoslovak market economy. The entire complex of these basic commercial-law statutes should be put in effect simultaneously, probably in the second half of 1991.

The commercial code draft, together with other legislative proposals mentioned above, is now under consideration by the Federal Government and also has been passed on to the republic governments for their review. It is divided into four parts each of which, especially if substantial in extent, is further divided into heads and sections, in some cases also subsections.

Part one comprises general provisions applicable to enterprise and commerce in general (basic regulations, business conducted by foreign nationals, commercial register, business accounting and economic competition).

Part two deals with entities conducting entrepreneurial activity which means commercial companies and cooperatives. Regulated as commercial companies are public corporations, limited partnership companies, limited liability companies, and joint-stock companies.

Part three is the most extensive section of the draft commercial code and deals with commercial liabilities. It comprises first of all regulations on the types of contracts, securing and expiration of liabilities, violations of contractual obligations and their consequences, as well as statutes of limitation. Among the types of contract which are regulated is the sales contract, contract for the sale of enterprise, credit contract, license contract, storage contract, work contract, shipping contract, delivery contract, intermediary service contract, commercial representation contract and many other contracts. A separate head deals with special provisions on liability relations in international trade. Lastly, part four of the draft commercial code contains common, provisional and concluding regulations.

Foreign Trade Minister Baksay on His Tasks
91CH0564A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
11 Apr 91 p 7

[Interview with Engineer Jozef Baksay, federal minister of foreign trade, by Petr Husak; place and date not given: "I Am Building a Modern Office"]

[Text] Engineer Jozef Baksay, the "almost new" minister of foreign trade, arrived in Prague from Bratislava with one suitcase and is living in an apartment of a building assembled from prefabricated elements. He has decided to rebuild his ministry from its very foundation, and 68 employees have left so far. "I am giving young people an opportunity who speak foreign languages. I am building an office that will implement very progressively the modern concept of foreign trade. If the office does not prove suitable and becomes an encumbrance to traders, then I will dismantle it." When asked whether the federation would survive beyond the year 2000, he replied that if he were not convinced of the federation's survival, he probably would emigrate from Slovakia now, despite having lived through 40 years of totalitarianism in his country.

[Husak] Minister, you recently returned from a visit to the countries of West Europe. With what results?

[Baksay] The talks of the president and his entire delegation have been very successful. So far as economics is concerned, from the European Investment Bank we obtained a pledge of financial assistance totaling one billion dollars, to support important economic programs. We are now closer to Europe. How soon we will enter it is up to us. Europe is also aware of the economic problems with which we are struggling in the course of the changeover to a market economy, and it is striving to help us.

[Husak] The treaty granting us associate-member status is the first step in our drawing closer to Europe. Have you any idea when, and under what conditions, will that treaty be signed?

[Baksay] Preparations for the treaty on associate membership have been in progress for some time. The first two rounds of talks centered on political issues. The third round, which took place during President Havel's just completed visit to West Europe, can already be characterized as the experts' round. The fourth round of out-and-out professional talks will take place at the beginning of May. We expect that the treaty on associate membership will be signed in 1991. Then it will have to be ratified by the parliament of each EC country. The treaty will become effective probably at the beginning of next year.

[Husak] Is Europe still prepared to invest in Czechoslovakia?

[Baksay] I am convinced that favorable conditions for Western capital are already in place in our country. With a number of industrialized countries we have concluded treaties protecting investment. Our prices and foreign trade have been liberalized, and we have legislation that permits the transformation of state ownership into private ownership. These prerequisites tell a good businessman that he may invest his capital without fear. Unfortunately, the confusing political situation is playing a very negative role in decisions on whether or not to invest in our country.

[Husak] In this context you have announced abroad that the Slovak prime minister's resignation could be expected soon, and that the situation in Slovakia would quiet down.

[Baksay] That was not an official statement at the press conference in Luxembourg. But the situation in Slovakia is very serious. If the prime minister of a democratic country announces that he brought 100,000 jobs from the Soviet Union, but actually had not signed even a single line, that is cause for his resignation.

[Husak] One of the biggest problems burdening your ministry is to hang on to the Soviet market, while flexibly seeking new markets.

[Baksay] Yes. We are still tied by a puppeteer's strings to the Soviet Union. Our industry is specialized to supply the Soviet market's needs. The delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Vales accomplished a lot of work in the Soviet Union recently. We have agreed on a method of payment in national currencies (instead of in dollars), and have created room to sell most of our output. At the same time, we are also seeking new markets. We are creating conditions that will enable our firms to participate in the reconstruction of Kuwait. We are also striving to win additional markets: Malaysia, Thailand, Qatar, the Republic of South Africa, etc. It will depend on how the individual enterprises respond. They will have to undertake extensive restructuring. If they continue to manufacture and work the way they have been doing up to now, they will have no chance whatsoever.

[Husak] Soviet Prime Minister Pavlov allegedly said that he would not be helping Czechoslovakia on its way to the West.

[Baksay] I personally have no knowledge of that statement of his. Our delegation did not meet with Prime Minister Pavlov, because of the very serious political situation in the Soviet Union. But in the talks we held with other representatives of the Soviet and Russian Governments, a political motive was not mentioned.

[Husak] In that context, what is your assessment of Prime Minister Meciar's visit to the Soviet Union.

[Baksay] The Ministry of Foreign Trade has enough highly trained experts who are thoroughly acquainted with Soviet law and the Soviet market's possibilities. In personal letters to Prime Ministers Meciar and Pithart, I offered them very close cooperation in preparing their trade-related visits. Subsequently I repeated my offer to Prime Minister Meciar when we met in Bratislava. I expected him to take advantage of the advice our experts could have offered. Especially since Minister Knazko, whom the Slovak side had not even introduced to me as an official partner, probably does not yet have an adequate staff of his own. And, more importantly, does not yet have experience of the Soviet market. Regrettably, Prime Minister Meciar requested neither help nor cooperation. I learned of his trip to the Soviet Union from the media. To secure 100,000 jobs for Slovakia, he would have had to sell 20 billion korunas' worth of goods to the Soviet Union. During the period of greatest mutual trade, Slovakia's export totaled Kcs13 billion. But populism and nationalism are a shortsighted policy that usually ends in an economic crash or disaster. Specifically in the talks with Mr. Delors and other EC officials, I was amazed how readily great powers, such as France or Germany, surrender their national currencies in favor of a common European currency, the Ecu, merely to secure higher living standards for their citizens in the future. Whereas we are arguing over having one or two central banks, and whether Slovakia will have a Janosik koruna.

[Husak] Do you regard as realistic the plans of Martinex to export tanks to the Soviet Union?

[Baksay] I consider those plans to be entirely unrealistic.

[Husak] Can those products be exported to other markets?

[Baksay] I am very much afraid that they cannot. Tanks and other heavy combat materiel are produced under a Soviet license. To sell off the production lines, we would have to obtain permission from the Soviet Union. We are bound also by certain political agreements. We could disregard specific resolutions of the United Nations or of the European Community and sell certain items of military equipment to anyone we wished. That way we could earn a few million dollars. But, in the long run, that would prove a shortsighted policy.

[Husak] Our accounts receivable from a number of countries are frozen. From Iraq, for instance. Is it realistic to expect to be paid?

[Baksay] I am not a prophet. There are only two possibilities. Either to cancel the frozen accounts receivable or to explore all possible ways of collecting them. I am pursuing this latter alternative. We must approach each debtor nation very individually. We have been successful recently in Egypt. There accounts receivable totaling \$25 million have been unfrozen. But Iraq specifically is lost for the immediate future.

[Husak] How much does Iraq owe us?

[Baksay] About \$4 billion, of which around \$2.6 billion is past due.

[Husak] Minister, how satisfied are you with the liberalization of foreign trade to date?

[Baksay] The laws we enacted have liberalized foreign trade completely. I personally have submitted a proposal to allow even private entrepreneurs not entered in the register of firms to engage in foreign trade, under certain conditions. The Czech government has accepted that proposal, although with certain comments. The Slovak government has rejected it.

[Husak] And what about the surtax on import?

[Baksay] That is the concern of the minister of finance. It provides protection of sorts for foreign-exchange equilibrium, and for our enterprises. We have to make sure that external convertibility, supported by the IMF, is in equilibrium. A number of enterprises would go under if we were to abolish the surtax on import entirely.

Interaction Council Recommends Mixed Economy
AU0406133791 Prague CTK in English 1831 GMT
2 Jun 91

[Text] Prague 2 June (CTK)—Czechoslovakia and other East European countries should substitute their former command economies with mixed economies, not a completely capitalist market system, former Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid told journalists today.

He was speaking at the close of the 9th session of the Interaction Council (IAC), a group of some thirty former presidents and prime ministers from five continents.

De la Madrid said that each country must find its new economic system. In his opinion, a mixed economy should combine a market system with state intervention.

Former German Chancellor Helmuth Schmidt, IAC chairman, warned against a rash joining of the Czechoslovak economy with the European Community market. Czechoslovak industry, which is unable to compete with far more developed Western companies, could collapse.

Schmidt believes that it will take 10 to 15 years before Czechoslovakia achieves the Western level of quality, productivity, and enterprise. "At least another two or three phases are necessary before the country can be fully integrated into the West European market," Schmidt said.

He spoke about the nexus of population growth and deterioration of the environment, a major subject at the meeting, and said that sufficiently strong tools must be found to solve this problem. He hoped that at the IAC session next year its members will be able to submit a blueprint of such measures.

Commenting on security issues, Schmidt said that no comprehensive security concept so far exists for Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other European states. The implementation of the intentions of some European politicians to join their countries with NATO would be a provocation of the Soviet Union, according to Schmidt.

He said that the session was attended by 18 former heads of state or government who are IAC members, and prominent guests who included former U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara.

In a final statement on the session the IAC said that during the economic transition process the countries of Central and Eastern Europe must accomplish three key tasks: the adoption and implementation of appropriate macroeconomic stabilization policies, the introduction and guarantee of property rights and a phased process of privatization and commercialization of trade, industry and services.

The statement urges the governments of these countries to "re-examine their pertinent legislation and policies" on restitution of property to ensure a favorable atmosphere for private investment. They should "study the lessons to be learned and mistakes made in the case of East Germany."

The Central and East European countries "cannot expect to reap immediate benefits. Transformation does not happen overnight," the IAC said.

It appealed to "entrepreneurs in Japan, the republic of Korea, United States, Canada, Australia, and other countries to invest in the Central and East European

economies. Furthermore, the Council enjoins all countries to reduce substantially their military expenditures" thereby releasing resources badly needed for transformation and development purposes.

In a part called "Stabilizing Global Financial Markets" the IAC statement says that central banks and other regulators should intensify their efforts to deal with crises in the new financial environment. It said that "the move toward a single European currency....should pave the way for a tripolar international monetary system (U.S. dollar, yen and ECU)."

"This would imply a move from the current G-7 grouping to a G-3.... In this connection, the role of the international monetary fund (IMF) should be re-evaluated and reinforced with a view to ensuring an adequate surveillance of the economic policies of richer countries," the statement said.

In a part on population growth it noted that world population has doubled in the last forty years and stands at 5,300 million. If the present trends continue, the world of 2025 could be populated by twice that number. As the present use of energy cannot be doubled, the world is currently "on a path of unsustainable development," the IAC warned.

HUNGARY

Discriminatory Investment Rules Challenged

91CH0600D Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
18 Apr 91 p 15

[Text] The National Association of Entrepreneurs regards as unconstitutional the fact that while foreigners do not require permission to invest in Hungary, investments by Hungarian entrepreneurs abroad are subject to the issuance of foreign exchange permits. In its letter to the Constitutional Court, VOSZ [National Association of Entrepreneurs] contends that this kind of discrimination violates Paragraph 9 Section (2) of the Constitution.

Moreover, the decree, with the force of law governing foreign exchange management, also draws distinctions between Hungarian citizens, placing permanent residents of Hungary at a disadvantage. The decree states that Hungarian citizens residing abroad may invest anywhere in Hungary, while Hungarian residents residing in Hungary are not permitted to do the same. VOSZ claims that it would be in the national interest to increase foreign investments by Hungarian citizens, because the profits of such investments would be used in Hungary.

Commercial Television To Begin 6 June*LD0106210591 Budapest MTI in English 1126 GMT
31 May 91*

[Text] Budapest, 31 May 1991 (MTI-ECONews)—A commercial television channel is to start broadcasting in Hungary on 6 June, and this despite the fact that a frequency moratorium is still in force in the country.

The station plans to put out four hours of programs a week for a start.

At the moment, close to 100 applicants are eagerly waiting for the frequency moratorium to be lifted so they can launch new radio or TV stations here.

Telesystem plc, the firm responsible for launching the new commercial channel, will not be in violation of the moratorium, since it will not use a new frequency for broadcasting its programs.

It has concluded agreements with 48 local studios and cable television networks, under which these will simultaneously broadcast cassettes received from Telesystem.

A potential 1.5 million viewers in more than 450,000 households nationwide will thus be able to receive the new channel.

Ten per cent of the four-hour magazine program will be made up of commercials.

These will cover the 2.5 million forints Telesystem's four hours of programs will cost.

Telesystem programs will go out on Thursdays, and be repeated on Sundays.

Telesystem plc, was set up in September, 1990, with an equity of 16 million forints.

General Banking and Trust plc, and Marco Vision ltd. hold equal shares in the company.

POLAND**Official Comments on Agreement With IMF***91EP0470B Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
25 Apr 91 p 4*

[Interview with Stefan Kawalec, under secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance, by Malgorzata Pokojaska; place and date not given: "Agreement With the IMF and the Club of Paris: 'Polish Risk' Is Decreasing"]

[Text] [Pokojaska] The signing of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which occurred on 18 April, was conditioned on the acceptance of a three-year economic program by the IMF Board. On 21 April, an agreement with the Paris Club was reached. The sequence of events is quite logical.

[Kawalec] The three-year economic program is nothing but a continuation of the stabilization and transformation program developed in 1989 and implemented since January 1990. It is supposed to bring about the creation of a healthy economic system and the introduction of Poland to Europe as a partner on an equal footing.

[Pokojaska] However, the coordination of the programs makes it possible for IMF and World Bank experts to examine our economic situation.

[Kawalec] This is true. All member countries of the Fund—there are 154—furnish such information. An agreement with the IMF signed last year bore fruit in the form of, among other things, \$1 billion. This was a reserve, securing the rate of exchange after the introduction of the internal convertibility of the zloty.

[Pokojaska] We have never made use of it.

[Kawalec] However, it was psychologically significant for the government and economic entities. The convertibility of a currency is always based on trust.

[Pokojaska] What other benefits did last year's agreement with the IMF result in?

[Kawalec] Due to the agreement, we were able to sign favorable agreements with creditors. We coordinated the nonpayment of debts. To be sure, last year's interest increased capital debt, but Western institutions resumed the issuance of credit guarantees, and due to that some foreign capital could flow to Poland.

[Pokojaska] Very small capital....

[Kawalec] This was a temporary solution. We did not feel the burden of debt in everyday life but we did very much in economic operations. It was difficult for foreign entrepreneurs to secure credit for investments in Poland. Their own banks turned them down citing "the Polish risk."

[Pokojaska] The situation should be better this year.

[Kawalec] The agreement signed several days ago with the IMF is indeed a seal of approval of reliability. After all, this was a preliminary condition for reducing indebtedness.

[Pokojaska] A consensus was reached by the Paris Club as early as mid-March. We knew the terms of reduction before Sunday's agreement was signed. What novelties did it introduce?

[Kawalec] In the course of the current negotiations, precise guidelines for the reductions were coordinated, as well as the schedule for the repayment of the Polish debt remaining after the reduction. The agreement on the issue of a 50-percent reduction by the Paris Club, with an opportunity to change a further 10 percent of the debt into zloty funds, consists of two parts: a 30-percent

debt reduction until 1994, and a 20-percent reduction in 1994, if the implementation of the economic program proceeds successfully.

[Pokojska] ...the program which we just coordinated with the IMF.

[Kawalec] The IMF accepted the three-year program, and in addition to the confirmation of reliability, which was helpful in negotiations with the Paris Club, we also received \$2.5 billion in credits to support the balance of payments in the three years to come.

[Pokojska] However, going back to Sunday's agreement with the Paris Club, I still fail to see new elements. What does it mean—"precise guidelines for the reduction?"

[Kawalec] This means that the agreement also includes the technology of debt reduction. There are various methods and opportunities; a 50-percent reduction may be interpreted variously. However, without dwelling on details, we will pay \$600 million annually for three years, i.e., 20 percent of interest without principal payments. In 1994, we will begin to pay full interest, and, in 1995, we will begin to gradually repay the principal, in small installments at first. We expect to complete the repayment of the debt in 2013. We expect, because actual reductions will depend on bilateral agreements. Each of the 17 creditor countries has a right to make a deeper reduction than envisaged by the agreement. The United States has set a good example.

[Pokojska] Is this to say that annual payments will begin to grow after three "preferential" years?

[Kawalec] Not drastically. However, the debt will drop as a result of the reduction. Besides, the economic situation should improve as time goes by, which is to say that even greater payments should not be that much of a burden anymore.

[Pokojska] Therefore, the IMF credit secures payments for the Paris Club until 1994.

[Kawalec] Not only that. As I have already said, this credit amounts to \$2.5 billion, whereas the total of payments over this period of time comes to \$1.8 billion. The difference may serve as an addition to the balance of payments after the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union and the need to pay world market prices for fuels.

[Pokojska] Despite the fact that foreign experts have accepted the three-year program, domestic experts believe that numbers included in it are too optimistic. For example, this is the case with the rate of economic growth and inflation.

[Kawalec] The three-year program is rather a forecast. Specific statistics are given only for this year. As far as the rate of inflation is concerned, it is not of a mandatory nature but is rather resultant.

[Pokojska] Which indicators are mandatory?

[Kawalec] Wage indexing—at the highest, 60 percent—a stable exchange rate of the dollar, the budget deficit as envisaged in the law adopted by the Sejm, credit from the banking system for the budget, as well as the principle that the rate of interest will be higher than the rate of inflation. The pace of ownership transformations may also be decreed. The intention is to privatize 15 percent of the state assets (in terms of book value) this year, and to convert 1,000 large and medium-size enterprises to commercial operations.

[Pokojska] However, judging by the results of the first quarter, strains in the budget will be greater than planned, and the 30-percent growth of prices in the course of this year is, perhaps, unrealistic as well.

[Kawalec] Reality will probably be worse than we expected due to the dramatic collapse of exports to the USSR and the former GDR. We did not expect the difficulties on the part of our partner to the east to be this great, and the flexibility of our enterprises to be so small. Of course, this compels greater moderation in financial and monetary policy and the acceleration of structural changes. Under the circumstances, credit from the IMF may be helpful indeed. We also count on a greater influx of foreign capital in conjunction with the debt reduction by the Paris Club and the expected reduction by the London Club.

[Pokojska] How do the prospects look? After the visit to Great Britain by the president, everybody's expectations are high.

[Kawalec] Private banks should not offer worse conditions than governmental financial institutions. Let me recall that we owe private banks about \$11 billion, or one-third of what we owe creditors from the Paris Club.

Issue of Food Import Tariffs Discussed

PM2905105291 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA
in Polish 21 May 91 p 3

[Article by Jolanta Talarczyk: "Farmers Stick to Their Guns, the Government to Its"]

[Text] Seasonal work in the fields is claiming more and more of farmers' time. Consequently, it could be that the feverish protests which we have witnessed over the past few months will abate somewhat for the time being. By now, the government's agricultural policy is under criticism from literally everyone who depends on food production for their living, including the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Sejm Agriculture Commission.

The latter even went so far as to threaten during its recent sessions that deputies would bring forth a motion calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's unless the government introduces measures—promised a while ago in the prime minister's inaugural speech—designed to "protect the agricultural market against dishonest competitors and excessive imports of subsidized agricultural produce." According

to deputies on the commission in question, the country is being swamped by cheap foodstuffs subsidized by Western states, while there is no hope that the new import tariffs on these goods, which were introduced on 1 May, will change the situation in any way. The government maintains that the farmers' lamentations are unjustified.

In Two Directions

The town dweller who has been following the conflict on his TV screen or in newspaper columns is likely to be anxious about the last bottle of sunflower oil running low in his kitchen pantry. Well, he is simply an ordinary consumer, who fails to see the reason why inferior quality Polish food products should be protected by import tariffs when he is prepared to opt for buying the cheaper and better stuff made in the West.

So what is the real situation regarding food imports? Who is right? It is difficult to sort this out in this conflict. In grocery stores and in street markets we can see colorful arrays of attractively packaged products with labels in a foreign language. On the other hand, reports submitted to the Sejm speaker and deputy speaker in late March insist outright that Poland is an exporter, not an importer, of agricultural produce. Concrete examples are given to substantiate this claim. For instance, in 1990 we imported about 25,000 tonnes of meat, while meat exports were more than two times higher (to provide a scale for comparison, as recently as 1989 our meat export figures were comparable, whereas imports were four times as high.) Last year we exported 356,000 tonnes of sugar and bought only 5,000 tonnes abroad. The year before that, our sugar imports were six times higher, whereas exports equalled almost half the above value. At that time we sold no butter abroad at all; by contrast, last year we exported 17,800 tonnes of butter and imported only 4,200 tonnes (in 1989 we imported 11,500 tonnes of butter). Whereas in the years 1988-89 we imported about 3 million tonnes of grain and grain products per year, in 1990 grain imports amounted to no more than 144,000 tonnes, and at the same time Poland began to export grain and grain products.

An Avalanche of Consequences

There is much more similar data used by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation to substantiate the thesis that, since last year, Poland has become a net exporter of staple agricultural produce. The credit balance in our international trading relations has also remained stable in the first months of this year. The surplus of food exports over imports for the first quarter of the year amounted to more than \$100 million. In this context it is, of course, quite obvious that if we gain wider access to Western markets (and relevant negotiations with the EEC are currently under way), our agriculture will benefit from more extensive development opportunities and a chance to expand its potential and take advantage of existing efficiency reserves. If this does not happen, then agricultural production will have to be reduced to a level

dictated by domestic demand and the modest exporting possibilities with respect to non-European countries. In the meantime, given the current price levels, expenditure on food represents as much as 50 percent of total living expenses in average households, and still more in certain nonaverage households. If the government were to tighten the protective, anti-import "cordon" around the market, it is quite likely that the prices of domestic products would rise very sharply. And an avalanche of further consequences would then inevitably follow, including a deterioration of the population's living standard.

The government tries to soothe farmers' moods and ease emotions through other arguments, too. It argues, logically enough, that while we demand that foreign markets open up for Polish agricultural produce, we cannot at the same time close our own market to foreign goods. This is because such moves usually provoke retaliatory action on the part of foreign trading partners, and this would have negative consequences for the costs and the quality of the domestic agricultural production, which in turn would damage its competitive potential in international markets and, consequently, reduce its export potential.

At the same time, the government issues assurances that it is in favor of introducing a "protection system" designed to defend our market against imports of certain agricultural produce [sold] at deliberately lowered prices. This is because it cannot exclude the possibility of dishonest competition trying to "muscle in," especially with regard to such products as grain, butter, meat, and sugar—that is, all the most vital products from the viewpoint of the interests of Polish agriculture. A special intersector commission has been appointed and given the task of determining the ratio by which the prices of agricultural products imported into our country are artificially lowered in relation to world prices. This value would then be accordingly balanced out by the application of correspondingly higher import tariffs.

Farmers Have No Confidence

The reaction by farmers to all these proposals put forward by the government is common knowledge. Deputies serving on the Agriculture Commission insist that the figures quoted by the government are not credible and that the government simply does not have any idea of what goes on at the border customs and excise posts. According to their own figures, the value of imported foodstuffs and agricultural products exceeds the value of imported goods by at least \$800 million. In their opinion, exports of Polish foodstuffs will not be profitable unless the dollar goes up in relation to the zloty by at least 30 to 40 percent. They demand higher customs tariffs for foodstuffs and agricultural produce, including cultivated mushrooms, smoked and cured meats, margarine, asparagus, edible oils, and potted plants. They asked Prime Minister Bielecki outright whether the government signed a letter of intent addressed to the IMF, undertaking to maintain an unchanged rate of exchange for the dollar and to cut by half our exports to the countries of the so-called former East bloc. The

prime minister did not deny that such an undertaking was made. He restricted his reply to stating that "what the deputy sees from his own perspective is not necessarily convergent with the state's interests."

So far, there are no signs to indicate that the conflict over our food exports, imports, and prices has already reached its critical point. It is reasonable to assume that it will continue to intensify.