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Near East & South Asia

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UN Security Council's Authority Questioned

90AA0303A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
30 Aug 90 p 7

[Article by Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad: "States' Sovereignty Superseded by Police Force"]

[Text] Security Council Resolution 665, which authorized the use of "appropriate measures" to implement economic sanctions passed earlier by the council against Iraq to force it to withdraw from Kuwait, was a historic resolution. It was a historic resolution not because its provisions contained anything that was new to the UN charter or to the organization's rules and regulations, but rather because it was the first time that all the permanent members of the UN Security Council agreed to authorize the use of force to implement Security Council resolutions. It is thanks to the new harmony between the East and the West, specifically, between the United States and the Soviet Union, that such a resolution became possible.

The language of the resolution, although noticeably ambiguous and vague, was designed to uphold a principle about which there is no uncertainty, namely, that UN member states which have naval forces in the area of the dispute are authorized to use military force to intercept vessels engaged in shipping to inspect their cargo and to inquire about their destination. This can be done to ensure strict compliance with the aforementioned Security Council resolutions regarding the tight blockade which has been imposed around Iraq.

The historic nature of the resolution lies in the new international climate it reveals, a climate which allows the five superpowers, who have the power to veto Security Council resolutions, to resurrect the "military staff committee," which UN rules provide for but which has never met. This new international climate also allows the five superpowers to provide the Security Council with a police force to enforce Security Council resolutions. Commenting on the resolution, Kuwait's representative at the United Nations said, "Now the council has 'teeth'."

This is undoubtedly an extremely significant precedent because it plants the seed for a new international order in which countries will have no absolute sovereign powers. In this new world order, the United Nations Organization, specifically the UN Security Council, would have enforcement powers that supersede the sovereign powers which countries have. This is the first element of a "worldwide authority" that transcends the sovereignty of nations and infringes upon the notion that a nation state is the cornerstone of the international system.

In 1950 the Security Council issued a resolution authorizing the use of force against North Korea under the UN flag. However, that resolution was issued in the absence of the Soviet Union, the only socialist country at the time which could have vetoed the resolution. At that time the

Soviet government was boycotting Security Council sessions, a "mistake" which the government admitted later.

The new element in the recent resolution is the fact that the five countries, which have the power to veto, including the two socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China, voted for the resolution. It is obvious, however, that these countries did not agree on what applying the principle of "using force" meant. A difference of opinion had developed between Washington and London on one side and Paris on the other about the legal interpretation of the two terms, "embargo" and "blockade." This difference of opinion was due to conflicting interpretations of the circumstances under which military force may be used. These conflicting interpretations grew when deliberations were expanded to include all members of the Security Council. Cuba abstained and did not vote on the resolution because the party that would be qualified to implement it was not clearly identified. Schevardnadze declared that the Soviet Union would not send troops to participate in the blockade even though it supported the resolution. This suggests that the purpose of Moscow's support for the resolution was more to curb Washington's enthusiasm and to leave the door open for talks, rather than to take part in putting a "stranglehold" on the Iraqi regime. And yet, the resolution did establish a principle. Regardless of these conflicting interpretations, the resolution did establish a dangerous principle.

The danger of the resolution lies in the fact that it sets a precedent which allows the Security Council to play a policing role in the name of the international community when international law is violated. Violations of international law, however, will not always be as clear-cut as Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. It is being said, [for example], that West Germany annexed East Germany. But German unification is being implemented in accordance with the rules of democracy, and it is being carried out by elected institutions which adhere to the rules of law. This is what the Iraqi regime has consistently failed to do.

The harmony and understanding which made sanctioning the principle of using force possible in the name of the United Nations is basically an understanding between the East and the West more than it is one between the North and South. We cannot overlook the fact that the South, which represents more than two thirds of the human race, is still suffering from chronic, difficult problems, such as debts, environmental pollution, famine, faltering development, and so on and so forth. Nor can we overlook the fact that it is impossible to convince the peoples of the South that solutions to all these problems could be found in the context of new international laws which could affirm "solidarity" between countries and their "mutual reliance" on each other even though so far no progress has been achieved in limiting aspects of inequality between them.

The emergence of a "universal authority" whose power transcends that of a sovereign state, which still is the

cornerstone of the existing international system, is not a problem which can be solved piecemeal. In fact, we cannot avoid paying attention to the fact that the problem has numerous aspects. Nor can we avoid realizing that the problem is an indivisible one which has to be dealt with in one fell swoop.

That is why questions raised by Cuba's representative in the Security Council about who was qualified to use force were well-founded. Cuba, one of the most prominent representatives of the South in the new international equation, asked if the five superpowers would be making the decision regarding the party that is qualified to use force. An entire series of other questions ensued: What special qualifications do these five countries have to justify the fact that the power which has been determined for them is greater than that of all countries? Are they being given this power because they are the five countries which founded the United Nations Organization in the wake of their victory in World War II? Is it possible to say that the countries which were defeated in World War II, specifically, Germany and Japan, are still defeated countries? And now that a multi-polar world system has replaced the previous bi-polar system, have Germany and Japan become the most prosperous leaders of the new system? Now that we have ventured to

reshape the international system, what is the rationale behind not recognizing the prestigious positions of these countries in today's world? Today, business between the superpowers is conducted on the basis of cooperation and efforts to overcome differences, not on the basis of attempts to pursue diplomatic policies whose underlying premise is the inevitability of conflict. Isn't it time to expand the circle of nations whose responsibilities now in fact are global? Isn't it time to demonstrate in concrete fashion the fact that the world is actually well on its way to becoming multi-polar?

If it is true that friction between the leaders of the North is no longer one of the leading aspects of friction on the international scene, but that the leading aspects of friction are those which result from worsening problems between the South and the North, it would be improper for all or most permanent members of the Security Council to be from the North. Instead, permanent membership in the Security Council must be expanded to include countries which are well regarded by the countries of the South: countries with influence in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, countries which can ward off crises before they get worse, and countries which can guarantee that the new laws will fulfill the aspirations of all nations on our planet.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

World Leaders Urged To Use Force Against Saddam

90AE0279B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
6 Aug 90 p 7

[Article by Arye Palgi]

[Text] Gentlemen, leaders of the world!

Stop hesitating, deliberating, and analyzing. Your decision need not wait longer than the few hours you need to read a few chapters of modern history under the heading of tyranny and tyrants. You will become convinced that there is no other way to stop Saddam Husayn but by immediately removing him from power.

Because a tyranny that accumulates power develops an internal dynamics of its own. It needs to have its power constantly reaffirmed. That is the oxygen that keeps it alive. There is nothing like victories to convince a tyrant of his legitimacy. There is nothing like gains due to the tyrant to release those around him from moral constraints and disgust with the personality cult. The more successful the tyrant is, the greater his self-confidence, and the weaker the chances of an uprising against him. Consequently, he must be deprived of victories and successes in order to be stopped. How? By defeating him.

This is possible only through military force. This is a problematic solution, because the use of force involves loss of lives, which are a cheap commodity to a cruel tyrant, but dearer than anything else to a democratic and humane leader. In this respect, dear leaders, your initial position is at a disadvantage. But here is where the history books can be of help, because from them you can learn how relatively low is the price of a military intervention to defeat a tyrant who has just raised his head, and how high is the price of eliminating him after he has become well established.

Yes, indeed, Hitler is the handiest example. He could easily have been stopped in 1936, after the annexation of the Rhineland. His army commanders hesitated and expressed reservations about his adventure in Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, but once his gambles paid off, the road to conquering all of Europe was wide open. It took more than two years for the free world to prepare itself for "the longest day" on the shores of Normandy, after all the suffering endured by the European countries.

True, the Middle East is not Europe and Saddam Husayn is not exactly Adolf Hitler. But, esteemed leaders, do not forget the internal dynamics of every governmental, national, regional, or world tyranny. History may not repeat itself, but human inner processes and the social development of nations change very slowly, if at all. And don't fool yourselves with condemnations and boycotts, embargoes and blockades. Too many people, companies, and nations need the money from the sale of arms and knowhow, and too many are interested in oil in order to

keep Iraq surrounded by an impenetrable cordon. There are few places where such means yielded the results hoped for, i.e., the withdrawal of the tyrant, not to mention his defeat and elimination.

A tyrant who is in control of one million soldiers and warfare materiel that goes with them, a tyrant with a record of a reign of terror internally, and occupation wars against Iran and Kuwait externally, will back down only in the face of actual power. And in international terms, power means an army in operation, nothing less. Naturally, [this means] after an ultimatum is issued, in a controlled manner, and with professional proficiency. But Messieurs leaders, most of whom are also superior commanders of your countries' armies, if a short-term ultimatum brings no results, there is no alternative but to move those armies and order them to fire.

True, in the Middle East, especially where Iraq is concerned, this is very complex and complicated from every viewpoint imaginable: political, strategic, operational, and even psychological, because it may stir colonial memories in several of the peoples in the area. On the other hand, the countries destined to lead the forces in the military campaign have not long been as united as they are now. This is so because of both the international developments of the last decade and their basic common interest concerning the fate of this precious resource in more ways than one, namely oil.

Dear leaders, this is your hardest hour, but it can also be your best hour. Bush may not be Churchill, but Saddam Husayn is not Hitler, either. The similarities are only in the threat to world peace and to the future of the world. If you don't act in the coming few weeks, the rate of casualties that it will take to remove those threats will increase far beyond the price of oil that is so frightening to you.

A solution can be achieved only through military force. Perhaps an effective military threat will suffice, in other words, making Saddam Husayn understand that the guns are loaded and that you are determined. Although even that will surprise me. However, the majority of the leaders, Bush, Gorbachev, Mitterrand, Thatcher, and their colleagues are still "graduates" of World War II, so they should respond to this appeal. They may show a favorable combination of logical judgment and life experience, knowledge of history, and personal memories. That should be a good mixture to fuel a display of leadership.

Balance of Gulf Forces Appraised

90AE0287C London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
20 Aug 90 p 10

[Article by 'Abd-al-Wahab al-Qaysi, reporting from Baghdad: "Three Million Fighters Under Arms"]

[Text] Iraq deployed its missiles and aimed them at American troops in the Persian Gulf and American troops amassing in Saudi Arabia. At the same time Iraqi

pilots stayed in their airplanes, ready to take off in case of any attack on Iraq by America or Israel.

Informed Iraqi sources are saying that Iraq has also deployed its large missiles, which can reach targets 1,000 kilometers away, and aimed them at American bases in the Mediterranean Sea, which are located within range of these missiles. Iraq has also issued the order to respond immediately to any attack without waiting for further orders. Iraqi reconnaissance airplanes have also been watching American and Israeli movements.

An Iraqi military source told AL-DUSTUR, "Should the United States start attacking us, U.S. aircraft carriers in the Gulf would be easy targets for our missiles." On the other hand, campaigns condemning the United States and its allies, America's Arabs, are growing, and appeals to Arabs and Muslims in the Arab homeland and throughout the world are being broadcast continuously by Iraqi television and radio. In those broadcasts Arabs and Muslims are being called upon "to light a fire under the feet of the American aggressors," who are described by the media as desecrating the grave of the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and the graves of his virtuous companions. Commentary aired by the Voice of the Masses Radio described King Fahd, the king of Saudi Arabia, as "the destroyer," [not the custodian], "of the Two Holy Mosques." At the same time the number of people who volunteered to join the ranks of the people's army in Baghdad and in Iraq's governorates amounted to 1.5 million volunteers who have been trained to carry weapons. By the time this report was being prepared for the press, the number of Jordanians only who had volunteered exceeded 80,000 persons. U.S. President Bush conceded that Iraq had a tremendous force, and he called upon Americans to pray for their children. At the same time U.S. Secretary of State Baker said that Iraq had become the third power in the world.

Italy's minister of defense thinks that Iraq is using only 15 percent of its combat readiness.

It is to be mentioned that Iraq has more than 1.5 million fighters in its regular forces, distributed among more than 55 divisions. The Iraqi president, who was seen on television meeting with the commanders of these forces, appeared extremely confident and in good spirits. In fact, his laughter, which was all over the television screen, was a clear indication to the people that threats and the economic blockade which Iraq's enemies are trying to impose on Iraq are useless.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi president called upon Iraqi women, whom he described as illustrious, to ration their consumption of food to confront emergency conditions. According to reports carried by news agencies, the president's recent initiative to establish peace in accordance with successive withdrawals that would include the application of UN resolutions consecutively created quite a stir in the world. Political analysts said that the Iraqi president had achieved an additional victory on the

Arab, Islamic, and international scene and that he had exposed the falsehood of American and Israeli allegations. The analysts added that the Iraqi president had placed King Fahd, who calls himself the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, in an embarrassing position. King Fahd, who considers the Americans his friends, has emphasized the confidence and trust he has in the Americans by inviting them into the holy land. In doing so, he pulled the rug from under the feet of many who would have upstaged him. And yet, the question that is being asked is this: Will the United States take the risk and initiate an attack? No one doubts that such an attack will be destructive, but will the United States take such a risk when the destructive response to such an attack will be tantamount to flinging open the gates of hell? Could this actually be a war of nerves?

U.S. Senator Robert Dole said, "The United States cannot sacrifice Americans for the sake of Kuwait, but it can support them by giving the Kuwaitis what they need." Senator Dole then went on to add that the crucial question was to protect the flow of oil from its sources in the Gulf. Senator Dole said that was the new goal for the United States which is concerned about its interests in the Gulf.

It seems that what prompted the United States to stress the economic blockade rather than the use of force was the earnestness of the Iraqi response. Informed sources are saying that when Iraqi President Saddam Husayn personally summoned the American charge d'affaires in Baghdad, he threatened the United States and informed the charge d'affaires that "Iraq would set fire to the oil wells if the United States were to launch an attack against Iraq." Informed Palestinian sources told AL-DUSTUR that after Iraq exposed Israel's ruse of placing American colors and American insignia on Israeli airplanes, Israel found out that its interests would no longer be served if the United States were to resort to the use of force because Iraq had aimed its missiles at Tel Aviv.

Observers in Baghdad think that the predicament in which the United States has placed itself is one that is perilous economically. It is a situation that will last a long time and will require exorbitant costs. Informed military sources are saying that "America is spending approximately \$500 million a day on its troops stationed in Saudi territory. They say the United States needs \$2 billion a month to cover costs for these troops without operations." Also \$10 million a day are needed for the Arab troops whose presence in Saudi territory is considered to provide cover for the American aggression. That comes to a rate of \$300 million a month, all of which will be paid from the Saudi treasury.

On the other hand, any escalation in the U.S. position and any additional pressure against Iraq will make Iraq use the threat of oil. Iraq would then be the first to break the blockade which the United States has imposed on Iraq.

Iraqi and western economists in the Iraqi capital are saying that strikes against the sources of oil in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf will stop the wheels of industry and the western economy from turning for six months. These economists are saying that Europe's losses would be in the hundreds of billions, not to mention the fact that there will be no source of energy next winter. This is what is prompting the United States and Israel to think twice before going ahead with any military action which could make Iraq carry out a strong strike to defend itself. On the other hand, President Saddam Husayn's initiative ignited the enthusiasm of the Arab masses from the ocean to the Gulf, and it even inflamed the enthusiasm of the Iranian masses against the United States. At a press conference held by Mr. Tariq 'Aziz, Iraq's minister of foreign affairs asked Iran to take a position on the American troops amassing in the Gulf, and he reminded Iran of its positions against the "Great Satan."

Pro-Syrian Palestinian organizations, like the PFLP, which is led by Dr. George Habash; the Popular Front, the General Command; and the Damascus-based Front for the Palestinian Struggle, declared their support for President Saddam Husayn's opposition to the Americans and to Israel. These organizations issued orders asking their members to strike U.S. interests in the area. The orders were issued after these organizations received confirmation that Israel had disguised its troops and was taking part in the forces which were on their way to Saudi Arabia.

Possible Results of Iraqi Attack on Israel

90AE0280A Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
6 Aug 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Alex Fishman]

[Text] The female officer on duty in the KGB situation room in Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow nonchalantly laid the pile of papers on the desk. Major Aleksey Vasilievich didn't need too much scanning to tell that what was resting on his desk was a time bomb. From the moment in which the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait began two weeks earlier on 2 August, the reports hit his desk at a rate of one every hour. Vasilievich had served four years as cultural attache at the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad, but in fact his entire career was spent in the eighth department of the first KGB Section, something that made him, against his will, into the number one expert on the subject of Iraq. This time the Soviet espionage branch in Baghdad had sent in something substantial. It was the transcript of a talk that President Saddam Husayn had held a few hours earlier in his office with a very select group of members of the top Iraqi political and military leadership.

Maj. Vasilievich made two phone calls. The second one was home. "I will have to stay here for a few days," he told his wife.

The report that came from Moscow on 15 August shortly after midnight did not bowl over the team of the

National Security Agency [NSA] in Washington. The information only added another piece to the puzzle that was taking shape. The 5 August reports of the Iraqi army pull-out from Kuwait soon turned out to have been false. Satellite photos of the past 10 days showed increasing build-ups of Iraqi forces on the Saudi border. Last week's reports of Iraq's invasion of the area shared by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait made the barometer rise to new heights, until the CIA station in Riyadh reported that the troops in question consisted of a small unit which went in for 24 hours, then pulled out. What was bothering the team more than anything else was the growing Iraqi anti-aircraft deployment in Kuwait. The mobile anti-aircraft missiles that arrived with the divisions were only one part of the anti-aircraft capability. The later reinforcements, consisting of long-range batteries, were designed to turn the Kuwaiti skies most problematic for the U.S. task force that was still making its way toward the Persian Gulf. For the Americans, it was a race against time.

Precise satellite photos of the Kuwait-Saudi border were once again projected on the screen of the Washington conference room. The statements of the air force officer, who had finished his report some 20 minutes earlier, were still reverberating in the room. His estimate had been unequivocal. The circles he described with his pointer stick on the air photographs marked the size of the troops. "There is no doubt that they are ready to go into action. We are very familiar with this pattern." The CIA was not risking any further fuzzy forecasts about Iraqi intentions, either. The team members had in front of them reports from the espionage service branches in Riyadh and Ankara: Iraqi fighter squadrons had been brought forward to the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. Simultaneously, fighter squadrons had also been massed in the western sectors, H-2 and H-3. The Iraqi air force and the ground-to-ground missile brigades had been put on high alert. The Iraqi armed forces were showing several signs indicating that they meant to go into Saudi Arabia. Now it was only a matter of days or hours, it all depended on one man—Saddam Husayn.

Dark Contracts Being Fulfilled

The economic steps that the NSA had recommended against Iraq had created the the opposite reaction of what was expected. The tougher the embargo became and the more Western embassies closed down one after the other in Baghdad, the more aggressive and nervous the Iraqi leader became. An analysis of his speeches in the past few weeks persuaded the NSA members that the man was on the brink of madness. "Nabuchadnezzar's" name appeared too often in official Iraqi announcements. The Kuwaiti puppet government was not managing to set the government institutions in movement. The economic blockade was creating shortages in Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwaiti citizens refused to cooperate, and the general mobilization in Saudi Arabia prompted Saddam to declare that the Saudi king had stuck a knife in his back and that his day was drawing close.

At 0400 on 15 August, the NSA was convened. Agency members—the board of advisers—presented their conclusions: the Iraqi president has left us no alternative, we have to hit now. The information from Moscow dispelled any last shadow of doubt.

U.S. military deployment in the area was not brilliant. It had one major navy task force, at the center of which was the aircraft carrier *Independent*. As for the two other navy task forces, they needed another two days or so to arrive in the area. Of the fast intervention forces of the airborne divisions, only an advance party had landed on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The military build-up process was only half completed. Every news broadcast in the world was opening with reports on the movement of U.S. transport planes to the area. "If we get another week," the U.S. president said after receiving the conclusions of the NSA, "our situation will be much better." At 1000 the State Department passed on all its information to friendly Western capitals and to Israel. One hour before the Israeli military attache to Washington had been summoned to the Pentagon and had been briefed on the situation. Several of the dark bilateral contracts concerning strategic cooperation began to be implemented. They didn't need to wake up the Israeli intelligence attache in Washington. As it is he had spent the past few nights reading American intelligence reports and passing on reports from Tel Aviv. Jerusalem had already decided on its position a few days earlier. Defense Minister Arens had a hot line to his Washington counterpart, Cheney. The Military Intelligence Branch [AMAN] in Jerusalem had estimated that the Iraqi troop build-up on the Saudi border was meant to deceive. The Iraqis may still want to take care of Saudi Arabia, but at a later stage. The first step would be to hit Israel.

Bush Gives the Green Light

In view of his present situation in the Arab world, only an attack on Israel could restore Saddam Husayn's popularity as the number one pan-Arab leader. The Americans did not dispute this estimate, but they also didn't want to take any chances on the Saudi front. When on 15 August at noon President Bush gave the green light for action, at the Qiryia in Tel Aviv, the top leadership of the defense establishment and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] had already been in a meeting for two hours. The chief of staff reiterated: "There will not be a second Yom Kippur, I demand a preemptive strike." The Ministerial Commission for Foreign Affairs, which in the past two weeks had been repeatedly asked to approve such an action, postponed the decision.

Naturally, the Israeli intelligence community concentrated on collecting information from the western parts of Iraq: Sector H-3, close to the Iraqi-Jordanian border, and H-2 at a somewhat greater distance. The western region contained about ten ground-to-ground missile sites featuring al-'Abbas and al-Husayn missiles (improved Scuds). There were reports of intensified activity at the sites and of the possibility that missiles were being outfitted with chemical warfare heads. The

Iraqis had grouped about 200 attack airplanes, air superiority, and bombers on their western airfields; the Sukhoy-24 squadron that had recently become operational was stationed in sector H-2, as well as several Mirage squadrons, F-1, Mig-23 for attack and Mig-23 for air superiority, several dozen Sukhoy-20 and Sukhoy-22, six of Iraq's eight TU-22 fighter-bombers, and eight of their 14 TU-16 fighter-bombers. Many air fueling exercises were carried out, as well as day and night flights. The profiles of the training flights did not leave any room for doubt: the targets were in Israel. Reports spoke of high morale among the Iraqi pilots. According to one report, one squadron chief ended his instruction session with the words: "We will next meet above Dimona." American satellite photos revealed columns of Iraqi tank transporters moving toward the Jordanian border. Israeli photo interpreters counted two huge convoys with several transporters each in one day. Preparations were observed for accommodating three divisions, two armored and one mechanized. AMAN estimated that the Iraqis needed at least one more week to transfer all the divisions to the deployment site on the Jordanian border.

On 8 August the head of AMAN presented the possible war scenarios to the Ministerial Defense Commission. One: Saddam Husayn attacks Israel in reaction to an American attack on Kuwait, which the Iraqi president will interpret as an Israeli plot, too. Two: Saddam Husayn sends troops against and threatens Israel in order to bring pressure to bear on the Americans not to undertake any military action against him. This situation may deteriorate into armed conflict with Israel. Three: Because of the great nervousness and tension among the top Iraqi leadership, Saddam Husayn may interpret Israeli statements and actions as an attempt to use the newly created international situation in order to hit Iraqi infrastructure targets in the area of unconventional warfare. Consequently, he will try to be the first to act. Four: the Iraqi ruler will attempt to restore the Arab world to his side, and will exploit some dramatic Palestinian action—along the lines of the landing of terrorists from the Abu al-Abbas group on an Israeli beach and some attention-getting attack—in order to join the fray and come through as the defender of the Arab nation. Five: he will attack Israel without any reasonable explanation, and we don't have any idea where he has drawn his line in the sand.

The government meeting decided to instruct the IDF to take out the Gog and Maggog plan out of the safe, dust it up and update it, in order to mobilize a limited number of reservists relevant to the plan, and to start putting it into action. The Air Force was put on high alert. On the same occasion, the Air Force presented the deployment of the Iraqi ground-to-ground missiles and the Air Force's response to them. The chief of staff drew a short summary, and once again requested permission for a preemptive strike. The defense minister silenced him.

U.S. Air Attack

On 15 August around noon, the chief of staff reported to the defense minister that the Gog and Maggog plan was ready and asked to begin partial mobilization of the reserves. The defense minister authorized a limited reserve call-up. In spite of Jordan and Saudi Arabia's quiet protests, the Air Force began to carry out round-the-clock sorties above those countries, too. The chief of AMAN attached great importance to a report from Washington that Saddam Husayn canceled a previous order to his wing and ground missiles commanders to go into action as soon as they felt threatened by any Israeli move. According to the report, Saddam Husayn instructed them to return the decisionmaking authority to him, and stated that he was the only one who could give the go ahead signal. The AMAN chief interpreted this as a possible sign of an initiated Iraqi action. At the time he did not realize that this bit of information had come to him from Aleksey Vasilievich at the KGB.

On 20 August toward dawn, some 100 American fighter planes attacked the concentration of Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. Wave after wave of airplanes took off from the two aircraft carriers, and ran into intensive Iraqi anti-aircraft fire. The Americans lost six fighter planes in the first hour. Surface ships shelled Kuwaiti ports. Close to 1000 in the morning American F-111 long-range bombers came into battle, arriving from Britain. First reports spoke of thousands of surprised Iraqis hit in the air attack. Dog fights began to develop over the Gulf between Iraqi and U.S. fighter planes. The Iraqis didn't stand a chance in the air. Pilots returning to the aircraft carriers reported that Kuwaiti oil wells were on fire and the skies were covered with black clouds fed by millions of gallons of burning oil. At this stage no one could tell what the cause of the fire was—shelling from the sea or an Iraqi initiative.

Toward noon the U.S. 101 airborne division landed on Saudi shores. Within a few hours it was already involved in artillery duels, aided by the Saudi army, across from the Iraqi forces on the border with Kuwait. By evening U.S. forces coming from the sea were in control of the Kuwaiti capital city. The same night, the Pentagon received reports that Iraqi troops had abandoned their positions and were pulling back toward the Iraqi border. During the day's fighting the Americans lost 15 airplanes, 120 soldiers were killed, and 600 wounded. Five pilots were declared missing. One of the surface ships was badly damaged by missiles fired by an Iraqi bomber.

The Iraqi Ruler Seeks Revenge

With the exception of al-Qadhdhafi, the Arab world preserved a meaningful silence. During the night at the presidential palace, the Iraqi ruler, defeated and humiliated, decided to take revenge on Israel. He calculated that a painful blow against Israel would halt the American campaign in the Gulf. The intelligence reports on his desk were more pessimistic than the reality in the field. The Americans were still far from having all of

Kuwait in their control. On the first day they in fact used most of the power they had. A few more days of fighting would have exhausted them. Fresh Iraqi divisions were on their way. Except that the panic had created terrible confusion at the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. Saddam Husayn did not have the patience to wait. At 0400 on 21 August he gave the order.

At 0430 20 ground-to-ground missiles were launched toward Israel. Half of them landed in densely populated areas. The scientists' calculations concerning the destruction power of the chemical weapons turned out to have been correct. Half a ton of the nerve gas "serin" could cause serious injuries to half of the population found within a radius of one km. of the dispersion spot. The Iraqis concentrated four missiles in each area in order to achieve the optimal effect. The people of Israel woke up on the morning of the 21st in the midst of an unconventional war of destruction against Israel. Saddam Husayn had threatened to burn half of Israel, and he was on his way to doing it. The meteorological conditions that morning were ideally suited for chemical warfare. Thousands were injured in the northern Tel Aviv area.

At 0430 the first wave of the Iraqi air armada took off toward strategic targets in Israel: about 200 airplanes of various models, 40 of them armed with chemical bombs. Within a few minutes of take-off, massive dog fights developed over Jordan. Only 20 Iraqi airplanes managed to break through the Air Force's defenses. Iraqi bombs hit the refineries area in Haifa, an Air Force base in the Negev, and the power plant at Hadera. Air-to-surface missiles fired from TU-22 airplanes hit the area of the nuclear reactor in Dimona. The reactor suffered slight damage and there was no radioactive leak.

Simultaneously, three Iraqi divisions began moving toward Jordan. Husayn didn't have a chance to protest.

At 0500 the defense minister gave the signal. An Israeli ground-to-ground missile was launched toward Twita—the nuclear center near Baghdad, the site of the Tamuz-1 nuclear reactor until 1981. The residents of Baghdad saw the huge mushroom and couldn't believe their eyes. The heat wave arising from the explosion site erased everything on a radius of kilometers from it. At 0530 Air Force squadrons took off to attack Iraqi strategic targets involved in the production and development of unconventional missiles and weapons: the Sa'ad-16 Institute in northern Iraq, al-Falluja west of Baghdad, Salman Paq south of Baghdad, and Samarra, about 80 km. north of Baghdad. A special Air Force task force was charged with taking care of the ground-to-ground missile sites. It had exactly one hour to attack before they were ready for an additional launch. At 0510 the commander of the air force reported that 70 percent of the sites had been destroyed.

The World on the Brink of Holocaust

When the planes landed at various airfields in the country shortly thereafter, it was ascertained that the

price paid by the task force was terrible. The sites were defended by intense anti-aircraft fire. In retrospect is looked like a suicide mission for the pilots. The world was stunned. Television and radio stations around the world screamed: nuclear war in the Middle East. The world is on the brink of a holocaust.

In Baghdad, Saddam Husayn refused to take the hint dispatched to him at Twita. At 1000 another small town was wiped off the map, about 100 km. from Baghdad. The world couldn't tell whether Israel had launched another missile or whether the job had been done by Air Force planes.

The Central Command was placed on alert. The divisions were getting ready to cross the Jordan to meet the Iraqi force that had entered the Hashemite Kingdom. The Jordanian army was not given any orders. The fire that met the crossing Israeli divisions was local fire from Jordanian units who were still on the "old plan." No one had bothered to update them. No reinforcements had arrived from the rear. By the night the casualties count, especially among the Iraqis, came to several tens of thousands of dead and wounded. Darkness descended on the first day of the Gog and Maggog plan.

On 22 August the Middle East was enveloped in a deadly silence. Iraqi movements in Jordan came to a halt. The skies were almost empty of airplanes. The Middle East and the rest of the world began to grasp what had actually happened. Fighting continued in the Persian Gulf for another two days, but then the fire died down. In Israel, television broadcasts to shelters explained—with some delay—how to protect oneself against serin. Hospital doctors became experts in the matter. In Iraq the government lost control of the frightened population. On 24 August the first international relief delegation arrived in Baghdad to treat radiation victims.

Things could have been different.

Pan-Arab Perspective on 'Gulf Crisis' Offered

90AE0287D London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
20 Aug 90 p 12

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sawi: "The Significance of the 'Gulf Crisis:' an American Attempt To Bring the Second Start of an Arab Awakening to a Standstill"]

[Text] Numerous designations have been used to refer to current developments in the Gulf. While each designation reflects the view and the interests of the party that coined it or is using it, the truth of the matter, which must be the source of accurate designations for these developments among those with a modern Arab consciousness, is this: The leaders of the party and the revolution in Iraq are giving the forces of the Arab future and their public an opportunity to write the last chapter in the epic tale of the Arab awakening, a tale whose events were set in motion and interrupted more than once in recent Arab history.

The 8-year war against Iran was in essence the most recent starting point for this epic tale, which may be defined in this context by saying that it is a tale which chronicled the Arabs' effort to rely on themselves in resisting backwardness and foreign dangers. Although the strategy for a victory at war employed by leaders of the July 1968 Revolution included all the elements that would have helped international, regional, and Arab relations at that time, the decisive role played by the revolutionary leaders' ability to unleash the Iraqi people's own resources in that regard manifested itself quite clearly in the final outcome of this battle and in the attitude adopted by international powers toward that outcome. In Iraq, despite the sacrifices and burdens borne by ordinary citizens, the people became totally united around their leadership. Thus, the most important guarantee was provided that the quest for development would be resumed under the protection of what friend and foe have acknowledged is the best Arab army as far as numbers and condition are concerned. The Iraqi model of constructive application was thereby ready and fit to become a center for attracting overwhelming Arab popular support, and its mere existence would pose a threat to those elements which would hamper and curb the Arab awakening. These elements manifest themselves in the backwardness of the Arabs' material world and in the domination of that world by foreign imperialism working in collusion with Israel and with a group of traditional Arab regimes that appear to be modern.

The fact that Iraq's war victory signified an awakening is confirmed by the course of action taken by the forces of western domination as soon as Iraq's victory materialized. Working in collusion with the ruling family in Kuwait and in the Emirates, they tried to dry up Iraq's financial resources. Then they kindled the fears of Arab regimes and stirred up their dread of the power of Iraq's army and of President Saddam Husayn's leadership qualities. In doing so their aim was to paralyze Iraq's ability to serve as a model of constructive development and to rally the Arabs around it. Iraq's victory would then be stripped of its true meaning.

And yet, the weak point in that plan was the fact that it misjudged the ability of Iraq's party leaders and revolutionary leaders to outdo themselves and to create broad options for moving forward and sidestepping the one option allowed by the plan: that of coming to a standstill and not moving beyond what had already been achieved. In other words, the only option was to regress and to aggravate the situation. This is what happened in the past when the epic tale of the Arab awakening began to unfold in the fifties and sixties (the battle of Suez, the unity between Egypt and Syria, and the socio-economic changes in some Arab countries). At that time the situation could be briefly described by saying that Nasirists, who were the leading players in that epic tale, found in the Soviet Union and in the movement of non-aligned countries whose power had peaked during that period, something to make up for their relatively limited ability to maintain the momentum of the Arab masses' organization and awareness. Nasirists turned to the Soviet

Union and to non-aligned countries for reasons that had to do with the makeup of Nasirism in these respects. Thus, the possibility of raising the stakes after the first series of victories was almost non-existent. That was how the United States, which had replaced traditional British and French colonialism in the Arab homeland, managed to seize the initiative once again. The United States seized the initiative when the ability of the Nasirist July Revolution to augment its development and social buildup capabilities in the country and confront the imperialist blockade outside the country diminished gradually. After all, continuing and growing outside support for the Nasirist Revolution was not a proper substitute for the capability to restore and outdo oneself, which is associated with the ability to strengthen and bend popular support and to unleash its unlimited potential, especially throughout the Arab world.

It seems that planners of current U.S. policy thought that it would be possible on this basis to repeat the experiment and make the scheme to contain the second post World War II Arab awakening succeed by bringing it and its Iraqi Ba'th leadership to a standstill. U.S. policy planners thought that the Soviet Union's shrinking international role meant that the possibility of Iraq's reliance on this kind of help and support would be weak. But U.S. policy planners forgot the fact that they were dealing with a new and advanced kind of leader for the Arab awakening, a leader who understood the lessons of the first test and who realized that raising the stakes in the battles which were imposed on him was the only way to continue carrying out the historic tasks which had to be carried out. And yet, this leader had already proved in practical terms that he understood those lessons. During the 8-year war the level of popular support for Iraq's leaders and for their strategies and responsibilities rose to a level of unprecedented proportions in Iraq's and in the Arabs' recent history.

Seen in this context, what happened between Iraq and Iran would go beyond even that point of view which supports legitimate sovereign rights and the obligation to support the demands of Kuwaiti nationals. After all, what happened between Iraq and Iran was actually a well-aimed blow that was an integral part of the scheme to abort the promising birth of the contemporary Arab awakening movement by applying pressure to it, by bringing it to a standstill, and by containing it. Additional evidence of that lies in the fact that avoiding the consequences of violent American and western reactions would have been in the interests of Iraqi leaders in the short term, given the fact that international and regional circumstances are unfavorable. Iraqi leaders could have been content with solving the problem of financial resources and oil prices by doing what Hafiz al-Asad has always done quite successfully: blackmailing the oil princes. Iraqi leaders could have also relied on the position which supports raising prices within OPEC. Even Iran was supporting Iraq in that regard. But Iraq's leaders, whose sophistication is a product of their awareness, their experience, and their determination, were

certain that neither resources nor prices were the issue here. The issue was rather their role as leaders of the Arab revolution who once again had opened the road to a future of awakening and civilization.

Ba'th leaders were equally confident that popular support for them inside the country was solid. Their confidence was based on tactics, on educational efforts, on actual difficult tests, and on the possibility that this support would spread to the entire Arab world. The best evidence that these calculations were based on a mix of reason and a revolutionary approach lies in what is implied by a news report which appears in this issue of AL-DUSTUR. This report is about the scope and nature of pro-Iraq demonstrations in Sudan, a country where people were always denied a national role because of certain historic and geographic conditions. People in Sudan were denied such a national role until national political forces grew and developed in the country. Then the Iraqi constructive model took hold because Iraq was providing Sudan with economic and military support which served Sudan's supreme interests. Iraq's support was given regardless of the regime that was in power in Sudan.

This then is the nature of current events in the Gulf, and these are their implications. Under the international political and economic balances, which are changing in favor of American and western influence, it is natural that there be a universal and severe storm. Such a storm is raging in the United Nations and on Saudi territory where the forces of western aggression are assembling. The fact that the present leaders of the Arab Revolution would succeed in their first step to raise the stakes opposite the scheme to abort the Arab awakening and set a siege around the course of Arab progress means nothing less than rearranging this balance in favor of the Arab nation and the Third World at the expense of what is almost absolute total American control. The Arab masses have instinctively, spontaneously, and intuitively understood the dimensions of the crucial battle. Most Arab intellectuals and politicians have faced up to their responsibilities in that regard. The rest, particularly a few symbolic figures of the Kuwaiti opposition movement who oppose the Sabah family, have to end their involvement in the superficial debate over international law and other such matters before they miss the opportunity to climb aboard the train of historic progress which does not stop for anyone.

Israeli Arab's Reaction to Invasion of Kuwait

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 8 Aug 90 p 7

[Article by Ahmad Ashkar]

[Text] Since the Yom Kippur war and the Egyptian army crossing the Suez Canal, there has not been such euphoria among the Arab sector as the one that followed the entrance of the Iraqi army into Kuwait.

Young, mature, and old men gathered in the streets and alleys of Arab towns and talked enthusiastically and

joyfully: "The stronghold of Arab reaction has fallen, and whatever happens after that doesn't matter." That was the general feeling, and the agreement with the invasion was complete. The young rejoiced: "Saddam is about to defeat the Arab reactionaries, and Israel, too." A few old men exchanged experiences from the 1948 war, in which they fought together with Iraqi soldiers in the Jinin Valley. [Those men] were "real heroes—Iraqi soldiers never pull back." I heard one highschool student draw a comparison between Saddam and Bismarck: "Bismarck united the 300 German provinces by force through his 'blood and iron' policy. If Saddam follows in Bismarck's footsteps, he will certainly unite the Arab world."

A young economist said: "I am against one Arab country occupying another Arab country, but I'm glad that Iraq occupied the country of the corrupt Sabah tribe. I hope Iraq will occupy the other oil rich countries." He explained that his position was due to his opposition to the oil countries, because they invested their money in the West. "With the money they invested in the West they could have turned the Arab world into a Garden of Eden." Another young man, with an undergraduate degree in political science, said: "I live with a conflict between my national interests and my ethics as an enlightened person. True, Saddam is a fascist and we have to take that into consideration, but I am in favor of Iraq becoming a regional big power capable of dictating the political agenda of the Middle East. I am in favor of anyone who will stand up to the United States and Israel."

The views voiced in the streets were very different from the stated positions of the Arab political parties. The imam who on Friday preached at the 'Umm al-Fahm mosque sharply criticized Iraq: "It is forbidden for a Muslim country to attack another Muslim country," he decreed. AL-ITTIHAD, the newspaper of HADASH [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality], also condemned the invasion and stated that international conflicts must be resolved only through peaceful means. For that reason, the HADASH newspaper expressed support for a Palestinian-Libyan plan to solve the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.

AL-MAYDAN, the newspaper of the Anba' al-Balad Movement, also condemned the invasion. In an editorial article written by the chief editor, the latter admitted the difficulty he had passing judgment on the Iraqi move, but he was nevertheless against it: "Even if Iraq honestly built its armed force as a deterrent to the enemies of the Iraqi nation and in order to liberate occupied land, the path to that doesn't go through Kuwait." In the same article the author stated that although he can understand the feelings of those who support Iraq, "we must not forget the crimes perpetrated by that regime."

The newspaper of the Progressive List for Peace, AL-WATAN (the Fatherland), expressed support for the official Iraqi version of the invasion. Its front page title was: "The Provisional National Government of Kuwait

Requested Iraq's Help." The newspaper's major article endeavored to persuade its few readers that there had been a revolution in Kuwait, while the author of another article attacked the meeting between al-Asad and Mubarak.

The reactions of the Arab political parties in Israel were quite clear, in contrast to the mumbling that characterized the leadership of the Arab world and the Palestinian leadership abroad and in the territories. But after all, what prompted the Israeli Arabs to support a regime and a man that never gave them any support?

The Israeli Arabs feel that they belong to the Arab nation and the oppressed Palestinian people aching for a leader, or at least for a symbol capable of pulling them out of the reality of their lives. It is therefore understandable that they should identify with Saddam Husayn's firm and even aggressive stance toward Israel.

Editorial Considers Moral Context of Crisis

90AE0287B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
25 Aug 90 p 13

[Article: "Shouldn't a Teacher and Mentor Follow His Own Advice First?"]

[Text] If we were to disregard the campaigns of insults and vilification hurled upon Arab kings and heads of state by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn—the same kings and heads of state who until the end of last August were receiving from the same Saddam Husayn the highest decorations and were being spoken of and praised in respectful and glowing terms—we would have to pause at something Saddam Husayn said. We would have to pause at an old expression he borrowed when he said, "Arab oil belongs to the Arabs."

Actually, not one single Arab would reject the notion that Arab oil, from the well to the outlet, belongs to the Arabs. (In saying this we are sidestepping economic considerations which are dictated by the realities and facts of the international economy and by the intricate relationships that countries have with each other.) To us, however, such a statement is a generalization addressed to simple, emotional men who like such off-the-cuff remarks. Such a statement, however, is not addressed to specialists, decision makers, and learned men who understand that the world in which they live is connected, that its interests overlap, and that its relationships are based on compromise.

Nevertheless, we do reject the proposition that statements can be made, particularly those that are made by the Iraqi president himself, without probing the facts behind those statements and establishing those facts as true.

The president who took us by surprise when he showed up with his religious hat, riding two different hobby-horses at the same time, is forgetting the fact that Iraq lost billions of dollars in its 8-year war with Iran, the war

he ended without telling the Arabs or consulting with them. Had these billions of dollars been spent on the Iraqi people, not to mention the Arab nation, Iraq would not have lost its economic capability and its cultural makeup. Had this money been spent on the Iraqi people, Iraq would not have lost its proper presence in the international organization.

There were \$65 billion in the Iraqi treasury when the Iraq-Iran war broke out. Did Saddam spend this money on Iraq's poor or on the poor in the Arab nation? [No, he did not.] Instead, Saddam bought weapons from everywhere in the Arab world and then worked with every foreign expert to bring about his own military victory and glory.

Mr. President, the need which poor Arabs have for money is greater than your need to build statues and memorials to commemorate your exploits. The need poor Arabs have for money is greater than your need for the pictures which can be found everywhere in Iraq, pictures which all citizens are forced to buy or they risk being shot on the spot. There are, furthermore, those cultural, artistic, and people's conferences, where lavish payments are made to run a few publications, to stage demonstrations, and to buy support for Saddam and no one but Saddam. Isn't this wasteful? Isn't this thoughtless and arbitrary use of the Muslims' treasury? We said it before and we'll say it again: we wish from the bottom of our hearts that President Saddam Husayn was being truthful when he made those statements and presented us with those bright ideas. If that were the case, discussing those statements and ideas would at least be possible.

Poor Arabs are on his side. If only he were a simple man, giving Iraqis their right to be free, to live in dignity, and to be treated as human beings! If only he would not favor one group over another and not punish one person because of someone else's guilt! If only he would not shoot those who speak critically of him! Poor Arabs oppose wasteful spending, but they have no specific definition for wasteful spending. Poor Arabs also oppose spending money on hero worship while people die in gas furnaces, in torture chambers, and by chemical weapons. Poor Arabs oppose the spread of chemical weapons in the world's capitals.

Poor Arabs do not wish to interfere in your private affairs, Mr. President, as you interfered in the private affairs of others and as you violated their trust and their taboos. They do, however, offer you, these lines of verse which strike a deep chord in the Arab psyche: "O you, who would teach others, why don't you start by teaching yourself? In other words, start by teaching yourself and members of your family."

Baghdad's Use of al-Aqabah May Be Casus Belli

90AE0279C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
8 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] In his report to the Knesset yesterday, Defense Minister Moshe Arens drew a definite red line: Israel will

put its forces in operation if the Iraqi army enters Jordan.

In the past, too, Israel viewed the deployment of foreign forces in Jordan—particularly Iraqi forces—as a direct threat to itself, but this was never defined as a red line which, once crossed, would elicit a military reaction from Israel.

On the eve of the Sinai Campaign, Ben-Gurion defined the crossing of the Iraqi army into Jordan as "a serious move against Israel." When, just before the 6-Day war, the Iraqis sent troops into Jordan, that was perceived by the Israeli government as an additional reason to stage an attack. The Iraqi division remained in Jordan for a few years after the war, nevertheless, Israel did not send the IDF in to push it back.

The Jordanians have recently said that they will not allow foreign troops in their country, but within the framework of their military cooperation with Iraq, Iraqi officers do visit Jordan—and the area along the border with Israel. Among other things, Jordan allowed Iraqi pilots to fly along the border with Israel.

The questions that now come to mind are: what kind of Iraqi military deployment in Jordan will be viewed by Israel as a crossing of the red line? Does, for example, the fact that Iraqi officers man Jordanian radar stations constitute a crossing of the red line? Will the establishment of an Iraqi communications system in Jordan, designed to serve Iraqi forces in the future, compel Israel to act, or only the arrival of major Iraqi army units? Does the red line mean that an Israeli action will immediately follow the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan?

The defense minister's statement marked a step forward for Israel. What prompted it was not only the anti-Iraqi feeling in the world, but also King Husayn's unequivocal siding with Saddam Husayn, and the fear that despite all his assurances, he may become increasingly involved in growing military cooperation with Iraq.

Husayn's behavior in everything concerning the Iraqi invasion was perceived in Israel as playing with fire. In point of fact, Husayn has indirectly supported the elimination of Kuwait. He is defying both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and he even appealed to world leaders not to cooperate with the embargo against Iraq.

Israel will be faced with a tough dilemma if Husayn allows the Iraqis to use the port of al-Aqabah to ship arms and other equipment, as he did during the Iraq-Iran war. At that time Israel turned a blind eye even on shipments of tanks and other weapons to Iraq through the port of al-Aqabah. It is reasonable to assume that Israel will behave differently now and will prevent Iraqi ships from loading or unloading military or other equipment in al-Aqabah. Anyway, it is clear that it will not be able to remain indifferent while al-Aqabah becomes an

Iraqi port through which Saddam Husayn will attempt to circumvent the maritime blockade against him.

Editorial Addresses Ideological Dimensions of Crisis

90AE0287A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
29 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Mustafa Amin]

[Text] The position taken by Gorbachev in the Gulf crisis is an honorable one. It marks the start of a new policy for the Soviet Union: a policy that puts the Soviet Union with friend or foe on the side of what is right and pits it against friend or foe in its stance against what is false and untrue. This was not the Soviet Union's policy when Stalin or Brehznev was in power. The Kremlin's policy in those days was to fight every issue adopted by the West and to support and enthusiastically fight for every position opposed by the West. When World War II broke out, Stalin joined the Germans and formed an alliance with them. But then the Germans betrayed the Soviets: they invaded the Soviet Union and penetrated Soviet territory. When this aggression against the Soviet Union took place, some people thought that we should sit and watch while the Soviet Union devoured the Nazis. These people thought we should let the two parties fight it out with each other until they consume each other. But Franklin Roosevelt, the president of the United States, and Winston Churchill, the British leader, agreed that Hitler was a greater enemy. They thought an alliance with the devil would serve their interests more than making peace with the tyrant. That was why America offered the Soviet Union weapons so it could remain steadfast in its war against the Nazis. Had it not been for this tremendous assistance, the Soviet Union would have succumbed and collapsed under the feet of the German army.

"Shame on you," say a small number of people in our country. "How can you fight side by side with the American army against Saddam Husayn, an Arab and a Muslim?" In saying this, these people are forgetting that Saddam Husayn, the Arab and the Muslim, is the man who devoured Kuwait, an Arab and a Muslim country. While it is true that one must defend and protect one's brother whether he transgresses or is a victim of transgression, [it must be said that] our brother, Saddam Husayn, is not a victim of transgression. He is rather a tyrant who set out to devour Arab countries and fight against Muslims. Because of his reckless conduct he killed 1 million Muslims in the war with Iran. He led Arab countries to believe that he was protecting the eastern front and was collecting Arab funds for that purpose, but then he turned around and used the weapons he took from us to slaughter the fraternal country of Kuwait. Since the United States fought side by side with Russia against Hitler, then we too have the right to fight side by side with the devil against Saddam Husayn. The real devil, however, is Saddam Husayn. He is the one who used poisonous gas to annihilate Muslim

Kurds, and he is the one who killed his colleagues and friends with his own two hands. The real devil is Saddam Husayn who told his friends that because of their patriotic history, he would honor them by killing them himself with his own two hands.

Our armies are not fighting Saddam Husayn. Instead, they are fighting dictatorship and tyranny everywhere. Saddam Husayn's defeat is the defeat of every tyrant, of every strongman, and of every oppressor. If Saddam Husayn were to score a victory, his victory would encourage a number of naive people who would follow in his footsteps. We would then see more than one Hitler in our country, God forbid. It has been established that if he were not a strongman and a dictator, Saddam Husayn would not have been able to impose his control and tyranny. He would not have been able to create such havoc in the Middle East and pose such a threat to the whole world.

To put an end to Saddam Husayn is not to put an end to a Muslim ruler because a ruler who enslaves and oppresses people is not a Muslim ruler. A ruler who does such things and who hangs innocent people has nothing to do with Islam or with Muslims.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Arabs in Territories Worried About Invasion

90AE0278A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Aug 90 p 5

[Report by DAVAR's Mikhal Sel'a]

[Text] Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was received in the territories with great anxiety and as a step that may have direct economic and political implications for the Palestinians in general and for the inhabitants of the territories in particular.

Iraq's blitz campaign last week caught thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who live permanently in Kuwait, and they of course don't know where to go and are worried about their homes.

Tens of thousands of visitors come to the territories every summer at the invitation of their relatives. Their visas are issued for several weeks.

Thousands of them are regular visitors from Kuwait. For example, two boys from the village Qabatiyah, who were fined about one week ago for throwing stones, were visitors from Kuwait.

The civil administration in the territories yesterday reported that the application of every Kuwaiti visitor who will request to have his visa extended will be regarded in a positive light.

Aside from the few who are happy every time an Arab leader displays strength, most of the population of the territories condemns Iraq's move, said Gasan al-Khatib, a lecturer at the Bir-Zayt University and one of the most prominent political figures in the territories: "Those

among us who are pleased say this proves that no country should put its faith in America, but those are few in number.

"As far as I can tell from the past two days, the overwhelming majority condemns occupation as a means of resolving conflicts between states. Just as we reject the Israeli occupation of the territories, just as we don't approve of the U.S. occupation of Grenada, in the same way we utterly reject Iraq's invasion."

Aside from the occupation itself, people in the territories are very worried that the event will deflect the big powers' attention from the Palestinian issue and from the need to advance the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel, al-Khatib added.

"Israeli propaganda will take advantage of this action. The invasion provides the right-wing government with a strong argument in its discussions with the United States, namely that the Iraqi threat should be given priority over settling the conflict with the Palestinians, not to mention the fact that while the world is busy with the war in the Persian Gulf, Israel can continue to develop its settlements in the territories."

Iraq's move is causing frustration among the Palestinians also because of the atmosphere it creates in the Arab world: "The existence of bloody conflicts between Arab countries leaves feelings of frustration and a bad after-taste," al-Khatib said.

The economic effects of the occupation of Kuwait on the Palestinians' lives may be extensive and immediate. Kuwait was one of the main sources of Palestinian finances in three areas. Thousands of residents of the territories live and work in Kuwait and send money regularly to their families, "and the end of these remittances will have a direct impact on almost every family in the territories," said al-Khatib.

According to standing inter-Arab agreements, the Kuwaiti government deducted five percent from the salary of every Palestinian employed in Kuwait, which it remitted to PLO bodies. The Kuwaiti government directly supported several public institutions in the territories. Every delay in the remittance of those allowances will have an immediate effect on the current operation of those institutions.

For example, most of the budget of the Maqasid Hospital on Mount Olive comes from the Kuwaiti government. The Technological Academy of Abu-Days is also supported by the same government.

In answer to the question: "Why did the PLO abstain from voting on the Iraqi issue at the meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo over the week-end?", al-Khatib said that as far as he understood the position of the organization, it preferred to first try quiet diplomacy behind the scenes. "And only if those efforts failed, is it to be assumed that the Arab world will take more resolute steps against Iraq."

Weapons Use Possible in Support of Iraq

90AE0312A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Sep 90 p 7

[Text] Future relations between countries of the Middle East and the superpowers will be determined by the outcome of the Gulf crisis. Likewise, the political process regarding the Israel-Arab conflict will be based on the obligations which will have been created as a result of the crisis. Jordan is likely to return to a confrontational and threatening position while the Palestinians await further developments.

DAVAR raises the possibility that Palestinians in the territories might, in response to a call from Saddam Husayn, adopt the use of live weapons against the Israeli authorities. This would provide the Iraqi leader with a pretext for sending a military force via Jordan to assist the Palestinian struggle, thus triggering Israeli involvement in an inter-Arab conflict. The paper advises the Palestinians not to delude themselves, adding that there would be a national consensus to fight fire with fire, especially in view of Palestinian support for a leader who constitutes a threat to Israel's existence.

ALGERIA

'Militants' Draft Joint Statement on National Unity

90AA0288A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
19 Jul 90 p 24

[First two paragraphs are EL MOUDJADID introduction]

[Text] Seven well-known activists for the national cause have sent us a statement of opinion on the current situation in the country.

Motivated by the concern to protect the enduring principles and values of the nation, they wrote the following:

"July 1962, days of popular jubilation, of recovered dignity through the independence seized, and days of hope of a radiant future, of liberty and justice.

"Also, days mingled with uneasiness and questions for many patriots regarding the breakup of the FLN [National Liberation Front] leadership and one faction's taking power.

"July 1990, 28 years later, the people are experiencing the anguish of a serious economic crisis and moral crisis, and democratic patriotic activists wonder what means can be used to produce an awareness of the danger of destabilization of the community and the nation."

Analyzing the results of the June 12 vote, the signatories conclude that it was a punishment vote by which the Algerian people protested a number of negative practices, including "fraud, corruption, nepotism, and high-handedness," that have marked the country's political life for an entire period. The FLN has to have suffered

from its effects. They add: "The Algerian people, in their search for an alternative, now find themselves the stake in a vast recovery effort." "The liberty, dignity and democracy for which the youth of October 1988 and their elders of 1954 fell, are once again in danger of being confiscated for a long period of time," the signatories write.

"The respect for Islamic values to which our people remain profoundly committed must not be used for partisan ends giving rise to manipulation of people's beliefs, to the anathemas reminiscent of the 'mob action,' or to exploitation of the confusion of a large part of the youth, to whom school has given little familiarity with rationality and a critical sense."

"This action bears within it the seeds of division, intolerance, and a pernicious form of dictatorship."

"In face of the danger of confiscation of our freedoms, a retrogression of human rights, and a return to obscurantism, it is the duty of all patriots and democrats, wherever they may be, to unite to strengthen the emerging democracy and preserve the nation's unity."

"Meanwhile expressing our support for the appeals by various parties using a variety of titles, 'forums, assemblies, movements, alliances,' to prepare a charter or common platform, and to present a common front against adventurism, obscurantism, and the sowers of hate and division."

"Today it seems to us imperative to avoid confining the concept of democracy in a debate that runs the risk, in the absence of concrete actions, of appearing as pure politicking."

"The serious hour that the nation is now facing requires that all democrats, without any exception, unite their forces to create a broad national democratic movement that will enable preparation of a platform for joint action. "This appears to us to be the most appropriate step in order to confront the reactionary forces and adventurism, and will not fail to reconcile the youth with their too-often-obscured history, by enabling them to take charge of their future in the framework of broader horizons of justice, freedom, progress and dignity."

"All the signatories call on all patriots who are faithful to the November 1954 principles and democracy to adopt a united approach and contribute to the success of all initiatives taken in this direction."

Lakhdar Bouregaa, Boualem Oussedik, Djamila Bouhired, Ali Lounici, Dr. Arezki-Said-Hermouche, Lawyer Haroun Ali, Mohamed-Omar Boudaoud.

Editorial Calls Establishment of Islamic Council 'Urgent'

90AA0288B Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
23 Jul 90 p 12

[Editorial by Dr. Boualem Benhamouda: "The High Islamic Council: a Necessity"]

[Text] The High Islamic Council provided for in the 23 February Constitution is not yet in place.

This consultative institution, located with the president of the Republic, should be urgently established; in fact, decisions interpreting the principles of Islam and having repercussions on the life of society are being taken here and there by individuals or by groups of individuals about whose scientific level or commitment and depth of research we have no knowledge.

On the other hand, the complexity of modern life and the richness of Muslim law derived from the Koran and the Sunna require work carried out by an official institution provided with all the means for analysis and research, as well as contacts with similar institutions in other countries, or with experts having international reputation in the Muslim world, being consulted on particular questions.

Establishment of this institution, which must be independent in its work of reflection, will spare the country from seeing the appearance of an "arrangement" that differs from community to community at the whim of the electoral circumstances.

In short, a state that proclaims that "Islam is the state religion" should itself take charge of the practical consequences of this national abiding principle, through the authorized opinions to be given by the High Islamic Council.

However, there remain certain questions to be settled in order to enable this institution to work in clarity and effectively.

Among these questions is that of establishing the objective and strict criteria for appointing members of the High Islamic Council; although they are appointed by the president of the Republic, it would be advisable, before each appointment, to consult with a general assembly composed of all individuals with higher education and expert in the issues relating to Islam, while at the same time of undisputed moral authority. Also, there is the need to determine the prerogatives of this High Council; in my opinion, in order to clarify all the problems facing individuals and the society, each citizen, institution or organization should be given the opportunity to submit questions relating to application of Islam in new, concrete situations.

The nature of the decisions taken by this High Council is also another point to be clarified, even though it has a consultative role: it seems quite logical that each citizen—including the political leaders—should recognize the moral authority of such decisions. There is another mission, and not a negligible one, that could be assigned to this High Council: it would undertake, with the material assistance of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, continuing publication of books of explanation and clarification of Islamic principles, in the national language and foreign languages; in this way, all citizens would receive a precise and official answer for anything

perplexing them in regard to religion. The absence of such official publications has been the main cause of the observed deviations in daily application of the teachings of Islam.

I, personally, think that there is no other solution to overcome the existing contradiction between the official proclamation of belonging to Islam and the evident ignorance of its principles at both society and individual levels.

It is also the only solution, through establishment of this High Islamic Council, to avoid this political crisis that is poisoning the relations between the Islamic movements and the political authority, and that could cause a permanent instability or lead to a diversion of the collective efforts to the detriment of the socioeconomic development. Finally, it must be added that this High Islamic Council could be called on to maintain continued contact with another, supranational Islamic Council that could be established at the level of the Islamic Community on a worldwide scale, and which would devote its attention to the issues facing all Muslims, whatever their country or rite, while presenting a common position on the major problems confronting the world.

If these frameworks for reflection are not created, the Muslim countries will continue to live in a disarray and contradictions that hinder their progress, a progress that is possible under the banner of commitment to Islam.

EGYPT

Trends in Islamic Movement Questioned

90AA0266A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic

1 Aug 90 p 56

[Article by Hamid Sulayman: "The Islamic Awakening and the Outside World"]

[Text] The stand of the Islamic movement in Egypt comes from the outside world. It is a stand that needs review both in relation to the Islamic movements in the Islamic World and in relation to the Western World.

Regarding the Islamic World, the Islamic movement in Egypt must bear the following in mind: although Muhammad's mission was revealed outside Egypt, an understanding and an interpretation close to the essence of this message exist only in Egypt. The understanding of Islam in Egypt is the moderate understanding that Islam brought. It is an understanding that no Shiite sectarianism has distorted, as happened in Iran; nor have special political circumstances subdued it, as happened in India at the hands of al-Mawdudi, or personal caprices in application, as happened in the Sudan at the hands of Numayri.

But the Islamic movement in Egypt sometimes made mistakes when it was influenced in thought or deed by Islamic trends, currents, and experiments abroad.

The first time this influence became apparent was when some of the thinkers of our movement, such as Sayyid Qutb, were influenced by the attitudes of the Indian thinker Abu-al-A'la al-Mawdudi, whose ideas were influenced by the English presence and the feelings of a Muslim minority living in a sea of Buddhist [as published], non-Islamic rule. This led him to the theories of sovereignty and declaring the society to be pagan. These theories spread into the thinking of Sayyid Qutb and then into the books of Shukri Mustafa and 'Abd-al-Salam Muhammad.

Influence became apparent a second time when certain groups of the Islamic movement rushed to support the Khomeini revolution in Iran merely because it raised the slogan of an Islamic state—even though Khomeini's was a sectarian Shiite revolution foreign to the essence of Sunni Islamic thought to which the majority of Muslims in the Islamic World adhere.

Influence became apparent a third time when the Islamic movement in Egypt was deceived and supported Numayri's Islamic experiment in the Sudan—even though it was an experiment in defiance of the Islamic method of application, which mandates implementing social justice first, before applying the Koranic punishments and penal laws.

Therefore, before the Islamic movement rushes off to support Islamic movements anywhere, it must use a measure of deliberateness, study, and caution before announcing its support, lest the errors of these Islamic "experiments" be afterwards charged to the account of the Islamic movement in Egypt. The latter is a leading and pioneering movement whose course will determine the destiny of the Islamic movement in the entire world. This is Egypt's fate, with its location, its Azhar, and its history. When the drums beat here, the echo—be it political, military, or religious—inevitably resounds throughout the world. The echo coming from Egypt must therefore be the reflection of correct, dignified, and mature drumbeats—not imitated or spurious ones.

Regarding the non-Islamic world, the matter is more dangerous, profound, and important. Some groups here are declaring a broad war of words against the Western World. They say that there will be a threat to this "pagan" world as soon as the Muslims are united. They say this without having anything in their hands but a thin stick—facing all the tanks, rockets, airplanes, and submarines of the Western World. It is an absurdity that raises more laughter than regret. Before I expatiate too much: I am not holding anyone back, but I think too much of the Islamic movement for its steps to follow a path paved with deception and full of mines, especially since this path leads only to stirring up latent old hostility in the Western World. It may hasten another "crusade" for which we would not have a full hand of weapons, as we did in the days of Saladin.

One would assume that the Islamic movement is more intelligent and objective—that it would not add enemies

abroad to its enemies at home. It should deal with the outside not through narrow-minded ideas that see in this external entity only paganism, sin, and decay, but on the basis of the tragedy of the cultural gap that separates us from them. Islam never commanded that the door be opened to the wickedness and sin in that world, but to the science, technology, and secrets of political, economic, and military progress.

I say that at present all we can do is to follow a policy of quietness and tranquillity—I do not say subjection to the Western World—even though they reject the Islamic presence both on the doctrinal level and on the level of a movement in the shape of an Islamic cultural project.

At a time when Islam is recognizing Christianity and affirming the possibility of coexistence with the Christian World, the Vatican refuses to recognize Islam and insists on "a state of nonrecognition." This could lead to a situation of collision. At a time when Muslims see the possibility of coexistence between the Islamic cultural project and the Western cultural project through a policy of cooperation and a philosophy of cultural contact, the West sees in the Islamic project a kind of rebellion against the hegemony and domination that its higher economic interests impose. Nevertheless, the Islamic movement must disregard this hostile spirit. It must not allow the West to hasten its collision with it at a time and place convenient to the West. It must be patient until it has the cultural strength that will enable it to address and confront [the West] on equal terms. The day we possess such an equivalent force, the possibilities for a clash will diminish, and the possibilities of our being crushed and eliminated will disappear. I can find no better understanding of this reality to present than the acute answer of Dr Abbas Madani, head of the Islamic Salvation Front. Asked about Western fears that the Islamic awakening would extend to North Africa, he said:

"We do not propose ourselves as leaders of Africa or Arab North Africa. We lean toward realism. We are not deluded about ourselves. We prefer to swim in our little pool and not throw ourselves into the ocean. We know well the difference between swimming in a pool and swimming in an ocean. Swimming in a pool demands only the strength of our arms. Swimming in the ocean requires a submarine. We do not have them, nor do we have the secrets of building them yet."

Missing, Injured, Dead Since Invasion Number 379

90P40144A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 7 Sep 90 p 4

[Text] Cairo AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Comprehensive reports received by the Egyptian Government about the conditions of the Egyptians in Iraq and Kuwait since the beginning of the Iraqi invasion on 2 August have indicated that there are 270 missing Egyptian workers in Kuwait and 56 injured and undergoing medical treatment in the Kuwaiti hospitals, among them a number of women and children. The number of Egyptian victims

killed during the first few days of the invasion was 44 and the number of dead Egyptians in the area of al-Ruwayshid at the Iraqi-Jordanian border was nine. The total so far is 379.

Reports from the Egyptian Embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait mentioned that, immediately after the invasion, the Iraqi authorities arrested a large number of Egyptians and imprisoned them, most of them in Abu-Gharib Prison, in addition to Egyptians imprisoned under other charges. [The reports said that] Iraq did not fulfill the agreement signed with Egypt within the framework of the Arab Cooperation Council regarding the exchange and extradition of sentenced individuals to serve their sentences in their native countries in spite of the fact that [Iraq] had previously promised to do so. Egyptian sources affirmed that the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdad requested the pertinent Iraqi authorities to provide a complete list of the arrested Egyptians who are in Iraqi prisons and of the missing who were working in Kuwait and were transferred to Baghdad by force, along with medical reports to show the reasons for the deaths of several Egyptians. [The reports added that] Cairo is now studying the possibility of issuing a warning for Egyptians not to travel to Iraq at the present time. At the same time, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Iraqi ambassador in Cairo of the government's extreme alarm concerning the circumstances of the Egyptians who are working in Iraq and the deaths which have occurred recently. Medical reports accompanying a number of corpses [returned to Egypt] have indicated that they were in car accidents or were shot in the head.

Transportation Minister Approves Bus Line to Libya

90P40145A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
6 Sep 90 p 5

[Report by 'Atif al-Maj'awi]

[Text] Marsa Matruh—Engineer Sulayman Mutawalli, minister of transportation, communication and maritime transport, has decided to put into operation a daily bus line to Tripoli, Benghazi, and Tubruq.

This line, which will start from the International Station in Cairo, will use deluxe buses equipped with video sets, a canteen, and restrooms. The minister requested that the presidents of the companies that work on that line apply the system of comprehensive international insurance to the passengers.

Mr. Hammudah al-Hawshani, secretary of the People's Committee of the Libyan Rapid Transit Company, said that he will coordinate with the customs [authorities] to establish a special customs gate for these buses and to facilitate measures to encourage movement between the two countries.

Converting Sinai to Free Zone Explored

90AA0244B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
17 Jul 90 p 5

[Article by Muhyi-al-Din Fathi]

[Text] Recently, there has been a growing interest in developing the Sinai to exploit its potential in agriculture, industry, tourism, mining, oil and other areas.

In the scope of efforts to develop the Sinai, the governor of North Sinai, Major General Munir Shash has proposed transforming the Sinai into a free economy zone. What is the intent of this idea, and how can this system be applied in the Sinai?

According to Maj. Gen. Munir Shash, the state is making great efforts to achieve economic reform, including the pursuit of many means to defray the balance of payments deficit, create solutions to indebtedness problems, and increase production by concentrating on the availability of natural resources, financing for investments, and the availability of manpower and its organization to increase production. If these three factors are present in Sinai, and if the free economy system is prescribed for Sinai, it would be possible to boost production and thereby generate wealth for all of Egypt.

The governor of North Sinai adds: The idea of applying a free economic system in Sinai differs completely from free zones in Egypt, inasmuch as a free economy in Sinai would entail: the subjection of prices in this zone to international supply and demand; the harmonization of a given individual's income with the volume and quality of his output and with the general international living standard; the absence of any governmental subsidy system in the zone; full freedom to engage in currency transactions; complete permission to export and import with neither restraints nor narrow, protectionist customs regulations; the establishment of customs regulations that provide for reduced production costs and consequently a greater export capability and increased state tax revenues; limitation of the role of the governmental administrative apparatus to planning and supervising general policy, and surmounting difficulties facing investors; the protection of the state's rights to revenues; the formulation of a special wage system; special labor regulations suited to the nature of a free economic system; the giving of priority to the investment of Egyptian capital, while also providing investment opportunities for Arab and foreign capital; and the use of the most modern technology in the zone and the transfer of successful working experiments to it.

Maj. Gen. Munir Shash stresses that there are many potential resources in the Sinai for agriculture, industry, and tourism. However, the main obstacle to exploiting them is the scarcity of water, which requires bringing fresh water to the Sinai, mainly Nile water, and intensifying field studies on the exploitation of rain water, the construction of dams to block flood waters, and the maximal use of ground water. Also, the Sinai's unique

geographical position as a connecting link between the East and the West, its infrastructure of roads, airports (seven airports), and ports, and possibilities of building new airports and ports—all of these factors can help stimulate different import-export trade activities. Moreover, the Sinai, with its population of .25 million spread over 61,000 square km, provides the basis for building a new, uncongested society.

The governor of North Sinai adds that the development of the Sinai in this way, and the formation of a sophisticated economic society can be a cultural front for Egypt on its eastern border, a guarantee of its security, and an attraction, especially for youths, that will help relieve population pressure in the Nile valley.

Regarding the method of applying the free economic system in the Sinai region, Maj. Gen. Munir Shash states that, initially, the state must assume the task of developing the infrastructure that will serve this area after the conveyance of Nile water. The state would achieve this by building large industrial areas or new industrial cities, adding several new roads, and increasing the effectiveness of wire, radio, and other communications. The state could bear the costs of land and productive services for these works. For example, appropriate portions of the cost of electricity stations can be born at the cost of energy. Likewise, appropriate portions of the cost of transporting water to these regions can be born at cost, which will facilitate agricultural activity on large holdings of 500 to 1,000 feddans of the Sinai's land reclamation and cultivation companies, which use modern farming technology. The state would also have to be concerned with building different research centers, and canning and packaging plants inside the farms to facilitate export activities.

The establishment of large industrial zones in the Sinai will no doubt aim to exploit the mineral wealth available in this area, which will lead to the establishment of other industries that depend on resources that might not be available in the region, but could be imported from other parts of Egypt and other countries. The development of such industries can be aided by the region's character, its lack of environmental pollution, its climate, its expansiveness, and the its favored geographical position. Also, production units, whether industrial or agricultural, can establish, in their geographical areas, services needed by their workers, such as housing, schools, and hospitals, which will ease the state's task of establishing these services. Some public services can be free, such as medical care and basic education, while others, both governmental and national, would require a fee.

The governor of North Sinai adds that this plan can be based on a study conducted by working groups that are outside the functional structures of the different ministries (far from the committees), after a general plan is drafted for transforming all the various activities in Sinai into working programs and well-defined projects by means of benefit analyses and the input of experts in agriculture, industry, mining, mines, quarries, oil, and

fish. Working groups of economists and legal experts would also be formed to formulate the foundations for applying the proposed free economy system in the Sinai.

ISRAEL

Shamir Discusses His Government Line

90AE0223A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
13 Jul 90 p 1B

[Interview by Yo'el Marcus; place and date not specified]

[Text] Is he calm I wondered? The ritual was being repeated. For the third time, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir was getting up from his desk, which is several sizes too big for him, a large smile on his face. He shakes hands warmly. We sit in deep chairs in the salon corner of his office and hold an hour-long heart-to-heart talk over Esivol water.

[Yo'el Marcus] Will the territories be annexed (now that the nationalist camp is alone?)

[Shamir] (Surprised) I never said that this had to be done. Aside from that, we committed ourselves in the Camp David agreement not to take any unilateral step without negotiations.

[Marcus] Now that the nationalist camp is alone, why does it not undertake a grandiose settlement campaign?

[Shamir] The Camp David agreement indeed does not prohibit us from settling. Surely the demand to refrain from [establishing] settlements contains a racist defect—the Arabs can settle here, and we are prohibited from settling there. Also, in general, the settlements do not change the political status quo in Judea and Samaria.

[Marcus] So why do you not establish settlements?

[Shamir] Our efforts are now focussed on absorbing immigration.

[Marcus] Why do you not direct immigrants to the territories?

[Shamir] We do not prohibit them from settling wherever they wish. However, we are not directing them to the territories due to political constraints. We do not wish to create a pretext for the cessation of immigration.

[Marcus] (Shamir, who understands where I am leading him, says with a smile:)

[Shamir] I know that we have disappointed many people who expected many troubles from this government, and now these troubles are late in coming. They said that the Shamir government would be a war government, but we have yet to declare a single war. We are not obliged to fulfill the expectations of our rivals. In general, we are not a government of the extremist right.

[Marcus] What are you?

[Shamir] We are a government that has a majority in the Knesset, a government of the central current. We are in fact the same government, minus the Labor Party. I am sorry if we have disappointed our rivals.

[Marcus] (Shamir sees himself as the heir of the Shamir of the previous government.)

[Shamir] I see no reason to change my opinion from what it was several months ago. I stand by the same positions that caused the government to fall.

[Marcus] (One could understand from this last remark that he opposes the participation of deportees and residents of East Jerusalem in talks. However, in his long note to President George Bush, Shamir expresses willingness to form a delegation on a name basis. This is a "yes" to Baker's question, but an absolute rejection of the "assumptions" that accompanied the question.)

[Shamir] It is easier for us now. At least, we are not constantly involved in settling disputes within the government.

[Marcus] (Is he calm we wondered? Yes, calm, but concerned.)

[Shamir] "I am concerned about the erosion in the United States. I did not expect sympathy in the United States to last forever. But no mood or policy lasts forever. There is a large Arab lobby there now, and American public opinion has been influenced by the media, which is against Israel. It could be that we did not do enough on this front....The impression is that there are elements in the administration that do not like us. However, if they disagree with us, this is a cause for concern. The tone of their threats is not useful. Speeches and threats against us are not beneficial. The state of Israel is unable to act contrary to its understanding of its interests.

[Marcus] Are you seeking a formula to prevent a rupture?

[Shamir] There are currently no discussions with the Americans. We want to first hold discussions, because without discussions, it is impossible to reach an agreement. I imagine that at some stage, we will hold discussions with them.

[Marcus] They say that you led them astray.

[Shamir] God forbid.

[Marcus] In the meantime, Europe is imposing sanctions on us.

[Shamir] The differences with Europe are long-standing, dating back to the Venice declarations (1980). They are impatient, because we are insisting on our opinion. There once was a British ambassador who resigned because, he claimed, we were not accepting his directives. So what happened? Someone replaced him.

[Marcus] If you have not changed your positions, what in fact did you have to explain in the seven-page note to Bush?

[Shamir] During the Lebanon War, the administration presented to us, as a joint problem, Israel's declining prestige. At that time, they said that they too were interested in improving public opinion of Israel and that this should be achieved jointly. I am in favor of exhaustive discussions with the administration if our common objective is to reach a mutual understanding. I explained to them in the note what they must know, but they have different views. Our peace initiative, to which I adhere, has no alternative. It is a good plan. They have different interpretations of it. However, we are more qualified to interpret our plan. For example, the disagreements over the PLO. Some think that no movement is possible without the PLO. It does not interest me whether the Palestinians want to consult with the PLO; the problem is that they want the PLO to conduct the entire matter.

We have information that the PLO is not interested in peace, which is why it is continuing with terror. It wants to destroy Israel. That is its philosophy. Whereas we maintain that if less importance is ascribed to the PLO, independent Palestinian elements will arise in the territories....In the note to Bush, I explained that all of the components of the initiative must be applied simultaneously, and that a settlement with the Palestinians must not be viewed as a pre-condition for a settlement with the Arab states, nor vice versa. There must be no deviation from the foundation of the Camp David agreement. We are interested in all of the parties accepting it. This is the only realistic basis for a settlement. The participation of the deportees and residents of East Jerusalem is a detail that is derived from a desire to give the PLO the role of 'director.' What is important is that we reach a full understanding with the Americans about where we are going. It must be clear between us what each stage will entail.

[Marcus] Is it perhaps worthwhile to concede the idea of elections?

[Shamir] I see no alternative to elections, because if a local delegation is not elected, it would mean that the other party [facing us in negotiations] would be the PLO.

[Marcus] Is the exclusion of the PLO realistic?

[Shamir] We know from discussions with the Palestinians that they are willing to accept our ideas, but they are frightened of the PLO. The international recognition that the PLO is receiving makes it more difficult for them.

[Marcus] Would you not want a new initiative?

[Shamir] No. This is the only realistic initiative for moving forward.

[Marcus] How do you explain that you have not yet received a response to the note?

[Shamir] I do not expect an immediate response. The Americans are talking about holding meetings with us. They have invited [Foreign Minister] Levi, but his physician has doubts.

[Marcus] Is his physician by chance Dr. Shamir? (I gape)

[Shamir] No, no. If he does not travel now, he will travel later. The administration is talking about meetings. Everything that happens in the future will be part of the response to the note.

[Marcus] (I understand from his remarks that he expects the administration to abandon the "understandings" paragraph in the Baker question that brought the government down.)

You have always maintained that the intifadah must be routed. Is that realistic?

[Shamir] The intifadah must come to a close. It will come to an end. They will reach the conclusion that this suffering is not worthwhile, not producing results for them, and not bringing them nearer to any goal. They have one alternative: Talks with us. I am sure that they will reach this conclusion.

[Marcus] Is that practical?

[Shamir] Yes. Everything is possible. However, there is no possibility of submission to violence. Submission would be the end of the state of Israel. Now they want to transfer the intifadah into within the borders of the green line. They do not wish to be satisfied with what they say they want.

[Marcus] Is it possible to rout the intifadah by force?

[Shamir] There is no universal solution to such a situation. Neither a strong hand nor submission is a solution. The goal is to achieve quiet in order to permit orderly discussions. Force will not help them budge us one millimeter. I have the feeling that the Arabs in the territories accept this view.

[Marcus] (It emerges from the conversation that, despite the change in the government, Shamir is the faithful heir of Shamir. He is satisfied with the results of the no-confidence vote, and says that there is a chance that the government will very shortly rest on 66 votes.)

[Shamir] This government has a chance of remaining in office until the end of its tenure.

Is he calm we wondered? Yes, but we also recorded, for the first time in all of our conversations with him, the deletion of an expression from his lexicon and the addition of another: The word "concern" has been added, and the phrase "not burning" has been dropped.

Shamir's Political Objectives Interpreted*90AE0226E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Jul 90 p 7*

[Article by Hami Shalev]

[Text] Yitzhaq Shamir is not, to say the least, a fan of the current American administration, and it seems that the feeling is mutual. Nonetheless, the two sides are making efforts to bridge their political differences, which are expressed in the latest question posed to the Israeli Government by U.S. Secretary of State Baker, a question that has not merited, nor will it merit, an explicit response.

Since the establishment of the government, Shamir has been occupied with sketching his final parameters regarding the composition of the Palestinian delegation for a dialogue with Israel. The American administration, for its part, is showing a willingness to continue to disregard the claim, which is not without grounds, that Shamir is deceiving it, and it is giving the new Israeli Government another chance, while signalling that if Shamir does not dispel its doubt, it will turn toward new horizons, which are more dangerous from Israel's standpoint.

Based on the letter to Bush and his public statements, Shamir's position regarding the Palestinian delegation can be described as follows: Israel is willing to respond affirmatively to the official part of the Baker letter provided that the American administration abandons the "assumption" that accompanied it (the participation of deportees and residents of East Jerusalem who also maintain a second address). Israel is willing to immediately begin discussions with the United States and Egypt on the composition of the delegation on a by-name basis. Israel will not agree in any way to the participation of Palestinians proposed for participation because of any affiliation, directly or indirectly, with East Jerusalem. Israel opposes in principle the participation of deportees, but will not exclude from consideration the possibility that, in the course of the discussion on names, Palestinians would be found who would be regarded as deportees by the Americans but would nonetheless be acceptable to Israel.

It seems that Shamir took another small step in an interview published in HA'ARETZ last Friday, in stating that: "It does not interest me if a Palestinian wishes to consult with the PLO. The problem is that they want the PLO to conduct the entire matter." The prime minister's advisors claim, as expected, that Shamir's remarks do not represent any new development, and that they were intended to belittle the PLO, not to recognize, even by implication, any role for it. Nonetheless, it should be assumed that the remarks were recorded as positive nuances in Washington.

Shamir is seeking to keep open the channels of communication with the administration and to prolong negotiations on his peace initiative to the extent possible. The objective, as always, is to gain time. However, unlike the past, this is not the goal in itself. At present, it is also necessary to gain time to assure the continued immigration of hundreds of thousands, if not more, of Jews from the Soviet Union. Shamir has talked about immigration for years as a key to

a fundamental change in the state's strategic and political standing, and as a significant factor in bolstering the shattered—according to his reasoning—self-confidence of Israeli citizens.

In order to achieve this goal, Shamir is willing to forget the settlements and is willing to give the Americans "the end of a thread" and more of "the end of a thread" to play with them. Shamir hopes to prolong this game until most of the immigrants arrive, and willy-nilly, without the government's intention, the Jewish population in the territories doubles and triples.

The joy in the prime minister's bureau over the suspension of the U.S.-PLO dialogue was short-lived. After several moments of a feeling of "we told you so," it was understood in Jerusalem that the reasons for the suspension of the dialogue inhere more in an American idiosyncrasy than in a fundamental change in their policy thinking. The PLO did not fulfill the conditions that were agreed when the dialogue was started, and the Americans hate nothing more than a breach of contract. In recent days, Shamir again expressed his exasperation with the United States' adherence to the approach that political movement is not possible without the PLO, and with the administration's efforts to motivate the PLO to fulfill its obligations.

Nonetheless—although Shamir acknowledges that the American administration is on the verge of being defined as "hostile," and although U.S. intentions regarding the initiative are very far from what Shamir intended when he proposed the initiative—Shamir prefers continued U.S. engagement in the initiative. The alternative of Bush and Baker frightens Shamir more: An association with the Soviet Union, Europe and the Western countries to renew support for an international conference on the Middle East. Such cooperation harbors the supreme danger of conditioning continued immigration—and this time, by an agreement—on progress in the political process.

Several factors are working in Shamir's favor. There is much complaining among us that the winds of glasnost, perestroika, democratization, the breaking down of walls, and concern for human rights, are skipping over Israel in particular and the Middle East in general. But there is a tendency to forget that these winds have yet to fully penetrate Washington's corridors. Bush's Republican administration is filled with policymakers who seek to see the "evil empire" collapsed on the floor, and do not want to allow it to acquire diplomatic legitimacy in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Bush and Baker are also not glad to acknowledge the bankruptcy of the policy that they have pursued for the last year and a half. Changes have indeed occurred in American public opinion, which only a peace process, an oil embargo, or a new war could reverse. However, the deterioration is still far from supplying a sufficient political basis for an open, all-out confrontation with Jerusalem.

Shamir will therefore continue to play for time with his loyal, devoted ally. The administration is continuing, at this stage, with efforts to split Shamir's bunker, and it is not abandoning the playing field. As the joke goes, both the owner and the dog are liable to die, and not just they.

Al-Husayni Calls for Talks With Shamir

90AE0224C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
10 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by 'Oded Lifshitz]

[Text] On the Sunday after the Nitzanim operation [the attack attempt by the Abu-al-'Abbas group], I explicitly and unequivocally denounced the attempt to attack innocent civilians," stated Faysal al-Husayni, who is considered the "foreign minister" of the residents of the territories and who is also accepted by the PLO leadership, in a meeting with members of kibbutzim in the Negev last Thursday at Nir-'Oz.

"On Monday," al-Husayni added, "the PLO denounced any attack against civilians. On Tuesday, I could not again repeat the denunciation. The United States submitted an ultimatum to the PLO to denounce Abu-al-'Abbas and take punishment measures against him, and it threatened to suspend the dialogue with the PLO if its demands were not fully met immediately.

"In order to understand why [I could not repeat the denunciation], it is necessary to recall the background. Before the American dialogue with the PLO began, the Americans tested the organization for a year. At the Algiers conference, the PLO announced its acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, its renunciation of terror, and its support of a solution calling for two separate states. But this was not enough. The Americans required that 'Arafat read, at the U.N. meeting in Geneva, word by word, the wording that they dictated to him. It was not easy for 'Arafat to appear in public as a student repeating his teacher's lessons, and it was not easy for those who view him as their leader to accept this demand. 'Arafat waived his dignity and read the dictate. This time, he was not willing to repeat such a humiliation. If the United States had been satisfied with asking the PLO to investigate the incident within a certain period and to report the findings and conclusions of their investigation, without an ultimatum, the PLO would have done so.

"The operation is essentially harmful, and it only damaged the PLO. The PLO is investigating the Nitzanim operation, after having rejected the American dictate for reasons of principle and conscience. The position of Abu-al-'Abbas in the PLO is very difficult, and he has already been compelled to commit himself to accepting the conclusions that will be drawn."

About 250 persons were present at the conference. After brief opening remarks, al-Husayni responded to questions. We cite here some of the central responses.

The Intifadah and Public Opinion

The first two years of the intifadah were exploited, according to al-Husayni, to consolidate Palestinian public opinion and to mobilize world public opinion in favor of the Palestinian struggle. The third year of the intifadah is intended for activity to influence public opinion in Israel. This activity has been partially successful. Its success lies in the clear separation that has developed only in recent months between the two main camps in the Israeli public, the moderates, who have become more moderate, and the extremists, who have become more extremist. Many in Israel have reached the conclusion that the intifadah is not only a confrontation with Palestinians, but also a danger to the future of democracy and the character of society in Israel.

The failure of public opinion activity is that the positive message of the intifadah, while having an influence, did not penetrate sufficiently into the heart of Israel's Jewish public. One of the reasons for this failure is that the Israeli Government has, by means of the elections and autonomy plan as it were, managed to convince Israelis that it is offering the Palestinians something real, and that it is the Palestinians who are rejecting what is being offered.

The Possibility for an End to the Violence

Al-Husayni argues that the basic premise in the intifadah has been that Israelis who have supported the continuation of the occupations' status quo—on the assumption that the quiet, undisrupted traffic, and settlement activity in the territories testified to the Palestinians' de facto consent to the existing situation—will not change their opinion without there being a violent uprising. Nonetheless, it was clear that a high degree of violence—the use of firearms—would only be damaging. The stone and gasoline bomb were chosen as the minimum for an effective struggle.

In the course of the intifadah, this assumption has proven correct. Villages that were satisfied with demonstrations and marches were punished more than villages that harbored stone-throwers. In Bayt Sahur, there was an attempt at a non-violent civil tax rebellion, and the response was a harsh, protracted Israeli siege and particularly painful economic punishment.

It thus emerges that the Israeli administration is more opposed to political and civil disobedience than to violence. There is a chance to end the violence in the intifadah only if the Israeli administration permits political organization and political demonstrations, and responds with reasonable restraint to civil disobedience measures.

Chances for Peace

Each party is obliged to make peace with the authorized representative of the other party. Therefore, al-Husayni believes that the Palestinians must agree to negotiations

with Shamir, and the Israelis must recognize 'Arafat as the representative of the Palestinians.

Regarding the Labor Party, al-Husayni stated that there is no party that has damaged peace and served the interests of the Likud more than this party. In the last elections, it presented the "generals' plan," namely withdrawal, the erection of an electronic, electrified fence around the state of Israel, and emphasis on reliance on a strong, deterring army.

"As I watched television, I asked myself: What kind of peace is this? Peace needs to be built on a common interest based on an aspiration for co-existence and a common market made up of all the countries of the Middle East. If I were Israeli and were offered the generals' plan, I would run to vote for the Likud," al-Husayni stated.

A call from the audience: That is what happened.

The Peace Camp in Israel

The Palestinian public is very impressed with the activity of the women in black. "We are jealous of them, that they have such women as these. Their struggle strengthens the image of the Israeli people as being composed of people of different types, good people as well as others," stated al-Husayni.

He added that "the improvement in the image of Israelis in the eyes of Palestinians was accelerated by the huge demonstration of 'Peace Now' after the Sabra and Shatila massacre. In irony, we said that Israel is the only Arab state that held a large public demonstration against the massacre in the refugee camps."

'Arafat's Two Voices

It is true that 'Arafat and other Palestinian leaders speak with a more moderate style at the United Nations and a more extreme style in their meetings with Arab leaders. Nonetheless, in al-Husayni's opinion, there is no deviation from the principles. There are expressions such as "it pains my heart to concede Haifa and Jaffa," or "what do you think, that it is easy for me to agree to two states?" However, at the Baghdad summit as well, 'Arafat did not declare that he is against peace or wants to destroy Israel. "The same happens with you," stated al-Husayni, "even Yosi Sarid and Ya'ir Tzaban sometimes feel a need to prove their patriotism to the Israeli public by delivering statements that are difficult for us to listen to."

Intifadah Violence Said To Permeate Entire Society

90AE0224A Tel Aviv 'Al HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
6 Jul 90 pp 12-13

[Remarks by Dr. Mordechai Kaufman at a seminar on "The Israeli Family in the Period of the Intifadah—Pressures and Influence," organized by the Israeli Family Treatment Association and the Kibbutz Child

and Family Treatment Station, where the author serves as the medical-psychiatric director]

[Text] A well-known Nicaraguan poet, Ruben Dario, wrote a wonderful poem in which he describes a terrible, flesh-eating wolf, who, under the influence of a righteous man who had mastered the language of animals, agreed to change his wild, violent ways and attempt to co-exist peacefully with man. The wolf lived for a long time in a village, peacefully and quietly, as the leader of the dogs. However, one day, the wolf returned to his wild ways. The good righteous man was surprised and asked for an explanation from the ingrate wolf. The wolf, with deep feeling and defiance, told how he became convinced that human beings are contentious and quarrelsome and involved in unending disputes, with neighbors attacking each other in cruel wars, and not because they are hungry, in physical distress, or in danger of destruction. The wolf added that he had tried in vain to understand why men attack each other. Not succeeding in solving the riddle, and having been the target of blows and rocks in his searches for food, he decided to flee, fearful of being infected by the evil inclination of the human species. The righteous man listened, not responding, and when the wolf went away, he continued to meditate, still with no answer....

Is there any doubt that the wolf is right? The aggression of man is not a singular phenomenon. It can be analyzed from different angles. However, it is difficult to understand how a man in the 2000s is still unable to control it and limit it to rational proportions.

Apparently, as Freud assumed, there is an inherent aggressive tendency that accompanies us throughout our lives, an active tendency that incessantly seeks to vent its latent energy. Based on this assumption, Freud expressed pessimism in his correspondence in 1933 with Albert Einstein regarding the possibility of preventing wars, which are the clearest manifestation of man's destructive aggression. Freud's only suggested solution related to the possibility of diverting aggressive energy to alternative objectives. "We are very far from the day when people will view war as a crime," Einstein responded to him. "You are basing all of your hope on a change in the psychological structure of humans, by which they will not only reject war emotionally and intellectually, but also have a constitutional aversion to it. I rely more on changes on the moral level."

Violence by a "Normal" Person

There is virtually no doubt that aggressiveness is a phenomenon of childhood. Observations of children from the age of one onward show that, parallel with motor development, clear manifestations of aggression appear, when the child forcefully takes a toy from another child, pushes, pulls hair, and bites. Indeed, it is necessary to begin at this early age with "moral" socialization, in the sense of restraining aggression that harms others. Thus, it can be hoped that, in appropriate environmental conditions, a clear, consistent educational

process will succeed in internalizing the norms that distinguish between permitted and forbidden aggressive behaviors. The task of socialization is assisted by another development in normal young child that occurs simultaneously with the aggressive tendency. This development is the dialectal opposite of the aggressive tendency, namely, the tendency to form associations, or to seek out a peer group and contacts and play opportunities with other children. There thus develops in the majority of cases from age two, a reasonable balance between expressions of aggression that are restrained due to educational influences and improved reality testing on the one hand, and expressions of closeness, satisfaction, and enjoyment that accompany social contact with peers. It is clear that this is only a schematic picture. Different biological, constitutional, family, educational, environmental, and political factors combine and influence the strength and channeling of aggression. Indeed, regarding each abnormal case, it is necessary to examine a totality of specific reasons that disrupt the customary and expected process of socialization.

I do not mean clinical, pathological situations, but cases in which the individual lacks an internal restraint mechanism because of a constitutional abnormality, or because he grew up with violent family-environmental models, unable to cope with frustration or resolve conflicts except by externalization. The question that interests me pertains to the unrestrained violence of a person perceived as "normal" by himself and by those in his environment. I mean what we see daily on the television screen.

Not long ago, a television news report showed a shocking picture of a nationalistic incident carried out by Romanians against members of the Hungarian minority. The footage showed a man being beaten into senselessness and thrown into the middle of the road, powerless, almost lifeless. For many minutes, the camera focussed on a great number of people, all of them certainly "normal" (with or without quotation marks), who approached the inert and unprotected man to strike him, one after another, in his head and body.

What is the difference between this picture and the pictures, with which we are so familiar, of the beating of bound people to the point of breaking their bones? In the trial of Colonel Yehuda Me'ir, a sergeant who participated in incidents in the villages of Bayta and Hawarah admitted to breaking the arms and legs of bound detainees. The sergeant detailed with simplicity: "This was an eruption of anger and frustration....I was supposed to have been discharged and released [from military service]. Therefore, I went around and beat them with my weapon. They screamed, wailed, and cried....To this day, I am unable to comprehend how I carried out these terrible acts.

In the present reality, sadistic violence is a phenomenon that many astonishingly defend and justify with a two-fold argument. The first part of the argument seeks to

understand aggression as being motivated by psychological pressure under frustrating circumstances. The second part of the argument—which is repeated in every trial in which the defendants are accused of "deviant" acts, i.e., the excessive, unjustified use of violence—is a claim well known from other historical contexts, which states that the individual must not be blamed for his actions, because he acted according to the orders of his superiors.

It is clear that, regardless of the difficult environmental circumstances and the psychological justifications, there is no moral justification for the use of sadistic violence. Situations of frustration and powerlessness, and authoritative environmental models, cannot supply an alibi for the failure to use the moral inhibitors that each person is obliged to internalize as a permanent mechanism for distinguishing between good and bad, between permitted and prohibited, and between moral and immoral. I am well aware that it is not possible to generalize, but it seems to me that, judging by the common deviant acts, and judging by the climate of collective justification, we currently find a rupture in moral and humanistic education in the home, in the street, in the Army, and in a certain segment of Israeli society. These are difficult, painful remarks. However, violence is violence is violence, whether or not the perpetrator is a private or a colonel, a religious or a secular person, or the resident of a development town or a kibbutz.

Basic Error in Conceptualization

The question is asked: Is there indeed no way to obtain immunity from outbreaks of inhumane violence? Certainly required are people with personalities embodying psychological maturity and ego powers, who absorbed strong human values from their families and immediate environments that protect them from being swept away by stressful conditions in a wave of violence. In the absence of these basic conditions, especially in times of war, violence becomes normative and infectious, spreading like wildfire.

After two and a half years of the intifadah, which is defined by Major General (reserve) David Ivri, the director general of the Defense Ministry, as a war/non-war situation, it is difficult to disregard two facts. First, the two-way wave of violence has not stopped. The number of injuries, including a great number of children, has reached proportions that no one predicted. The second fact is that deviational phenomena on both sides of the barricade are not declining. Initially, there were cases that were uncovered by chance, usually by foreign television crews that disclosed a bit of what was happening. At present, when organizations such as Betzelem, which documents and publicizes complaints and attacks, are active in the field, it is more difficult to maintain a conspiracy of silence.

Indeed, contrary to all forecasts, it is impossible to speak of success in suppressing the intifadah. Yitzhaq Rabin erred when he assumed, at the start of the intifadah, that

the uprising could best be routed through the use of punishment and physical injury. Any psychologist could point out the basic erroneousness of this conceptualization. Violence does not stop or resolve a conflict, not between a married couple, not within a family, and not between peoples.

It is customary to point out that the children of the intifadah have lost their childhood during long periods of curfew inside their homes, the closure of the schools, frightening races to hide from soldiers, and the arrest and injury of members of their families. The children of the intifadah were punished, and did indeed miss a valuable part of their childhood, but it is clear that violence in their environment did not pacify them. Rather, the contrary is the case. They increasingly identify with and accompany their heroes, the ones with masked faces, on all of their activities, primarily stone-throwing and the yo-yo game of displaying the PLO flag on electricity wires. This is an example of how violence, perpetuates, exacerbates, and complicates problems. We have known for some time, regarding family treatment, that as long as violence exists, there is no chance of solving the conflict.

Another error, which we also know from our experience in treating couples and families, is to assume that the prolonged use of violence results in adaptation to it and its legitimization. Many point out the fact that, in Israel, and in the entire world, news of victims of the intifadah has stopped being highlighted in the media for some time. Not long ago, in the third year of the intifadah, a number of local residents were killed, and at least 150 Arabs were injured, 30 seriously, in the Jabaliyah Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip. The incident occurred at the end of the Feast of the Breaking of the Ramadan Fast in the mosques. The official announcement of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] spokesman stated that "the soldiers acted properly and according to procedures and orders." This serious incident, in which 150 were injured, merited almost no publicizing or reaction in Israel. The general public was apparently satisfied with the calming announcement that "the IDF acted according to procedures and orders." However, this feeling of adapting to violence is a false feeling that disregards the simple fact that there is another side in this dance of swords. The dehumanization of the side being attacked and disregard for its injured fuel the perpetuation of this problem. The injured party can never adapt to trauma, just as we will never move on to our daily agenda over the body of an innocent Jewish victim, because there is no adaptation to trauma. It is frightening to consider the repercussions to be expected from the victimization of 150 people in Jabaliyah in the not so distant future, even if the hurt was inflicted, as reported, "according to IDF procedures and orders."

Fear, Depression, Feelings of Guilt

It seems to me that, among the public at large, and even among professionals, there is not enough awareness of the great psychosocial damage that we are incurring as a result of the widespread, escalating use of violence.

Actually, this is a boomerang phenomenon that is coming back to strike us. Violence in the territories does not stop at the green line. It penetrates deeply like a spreading cancer. Each one of us is in danger. Weak strata of society are likely to easily absorb the oversimplification of the message of forceful solutions on different fronts, such as: in the national conflict, in struggles with political rivals, and in confrontations within the family. It is very likely that there is a connection between the lowering of the threshold regarding the use of violence in the territories and the spread of aggression inside the green line. Parallel with the taking root of the intifadah as a permanent institution, there has been a clear shift toward the expanding use of threats and acts of terror by individuals and by fanatic organizations, such as the sicarii [Jewish terrorists named after Jewish terrorists in the late Second Temple period] and followers of Kahana, who favor silencing political rivals with forceful means.

It seems to me that there is a place for examining a possible connection between the prolonged use of violence stemming from the intifadah, and worrisome statistics showing a steady increase in violence within the family, such as the physical abuse of children and women, the sexual abuse of children, attacks against the elderly, and so on. The annual report of the military courts that was published several weeks ago shows an increase, compared to the previous year, in offenses involving the illegal use of violence by soldiers against soldiers and by soldiers against civilians.

In Martin Walkers's book (1985), "The Hitting Man," the authors indicate that in 70 percent of the cases, a man who is violent toward members of his family witnessed violence against his mother, or was himself physically abused. However, in almost of the cases, the abused man himself became violent after participating in violent incidents outside the framework of the family. We should always remember that not all family problems or the problem of violence within the family are caused by complementary interactions between members of a family. It is certain that many social factors, such as a macho upbringing and violent environmental models, play a non-negligible role in creating the phenomena of violence in the family.

I imagine that the day will come when objective factors from representative samples of soldiers who served in the territories will be examined. Will they exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic psychological disturbance? Will they, in comparison to the period before their service in the territories, exhibit manifestations of fear, depression, guilt feelings, health complaints, and especially aggression? It is unfortunate that the results of studies on the effect of the Vietnam War on the mental health of thousands of American soldiers, the damage it caused to the stability of the family, and its effect on the crisis in the rear were published after a delay of years. We now know, based on verified studies, that more than a quarter of the soldiers who served in the Vietnam War present

different clinical forms of post-traumatic stress syndrome. Moreover, in a high percentage of the cases of afflicted soldiers, their wives and children also became psychological victims of the Vietnam War.

The intifadah has produced an essential change in the challenges and missions of the Army. This is not a push-button war waged at a distance against an anonymous enemy. There is face-to-face contact. You see, you hear, and you know the results of your actions. The psychological pressure is great, and there are many violent environmental role models.

At the beginning of the intifadah, dozens of kibbutz members were organized to volunteer to serve in the territories with the goal of serving as models for other soldiers regarding the application of moral norms for preserving humaneness and exercising maximal restraint in the use of force. This operation ended in a complete failure. It seems that, under conditions of pressure, a model of restraint (maintaining reality testing of course), does not have a sufficient impact. By contrast, violent role models have a considerable effect and are infectious. In conversations with dozens of soldiers, members of kibbutzim and people who grew up on a kibbutz, as well as in many reports and videos produced by the kibbutz media, we have seen the phenomenon of being dragged into participating in violence, sometimes actively, but usually in the form of passive collaboration. The soldier returns and repeats in great detail the terrible sights that he witnessed, the wailing and curses that he heard, harsh descriptions of collective punishment, night searches of houses, chases, and the humiliation of parents in front of their frightened, crying children.

Some of these soldiers present a clear, clinical picture of post trauma distress. The traumatic memory returns frequently in waking and in dreams, as if everything were recurring. They experience sleep disturbances, concentration problems, and feelings of guilt over their active or passive role and lack of assertiveness in intervening to change the course of events. Indeed, it is surprising to realize that there is not enough concern with preparing the soldier for this difficult mission, especially preparation and protection against impulsive, unrestrained violent reactions in response to provocations and frustrations in the field. This is dangerous neglect, not only on the front, but also, as stated, from the standpoint of its impact on the rear.

Stopping the Violence

In November 1989, a soldier, Eli Shahar, from the Giv'ati Brigade, committed suicide after he felt humiliated and hurt in a nocturnal "trial" that was initiated and carried out by his commander and comrades-in-arms. With masked faces, they accused him of a minor disciplinary infraction in a cruel verbal assault. The phenomenon of suicide in the IDF has increased substantially since the outbreak of the intifadah, specifically since the suicide of Eli Shahar. The number of

suicides last year increased by at least 50 percent above the IDF's annual average of suicides.

Not long ago, a case was published in the professional literature that occurred at a high school in Pittsburgh, United States, with 1,500 students. The case involved the suicide of two boys within four days of each other. Eighteen days after these two suicides, 23 other students expressed, in interviews with professionals, worrisome suicidal intentions or thoughts. This is a concrete example of the effect of the environmental model regarding externalized violence and self-inflicted damage. Is it possible to help a soldier in this prolonged state of distress? Indeed, we have delayed much, but better late than never. It is necessary to urgently seek the organization of workshops to prepare soldiers and officers in the career army, the regular army, and the reserves by reinforcing their level of patience and tolerance in coping with stressful situations, frustration, and anger. It is amazing how such a great mechanism as the IDF is not organizing workshops in which professional experts prepare the soldiers using group techniques, including role-playing, the presentation of examples from the field, analysis of alternative solutions to expected occurrences in the field, simple relaxation techniques, and so on. Is it feared that the combative spirit will be weakened? I believe, and am convinced, that workshops of this type will only strengthen and protect our soldiers.

We must be aware of the factors in the system that maintain the violence, of which there are not a few. One is the governmental institution with legal authority, that gives legal sanction and legitimacy to violent acts. Another is the environmental model of the commander. Bandura and Milgram et al have proven the great effect of the authoritative model. The personality that serves as a model can be a weak person, with a low frustration threshold. Or, God forbid, he could be a disturbed sadist who wraps himself in a mantle of imagined power, like the crazed guru, Jim Jones, who, 12 years ago, led 900 followers of his sect, "the People's Temple," to acts of murder and suicide that included a great number of infants and children.

The length of time of exposure to environmental aggression is of course an important factor that affects the degree to which the phenomenon penetrates. Two and a half years of experiencing the intifadah no doubt changes the judgement and appraisal of at least some of the people involved in events in the territories. I accept the assumption that prolonged exposure to violence reduces sensitivity to the pain of others and causes a dulling of the senses. This emotional dullness develops among persons directly involved in the violence and among those watching from the sidelines, who tend to respond each act of violence with increasing indifference and numbness. Of course, this phenomenon is not our exclusive province. However, this does not release us from repeatedly examining ourselves. We must not hide behind the claim that the opposing side is solely responsible for our behavior. The phrase "I hate them, because

they force me to kill children" is dissimulating. But we use it to diminish our responsibility for our actions.

The order of the hour is to seek every realistic way, every possible opening, to put an end to the conflict, and, through dialogue, to end the violence, not only because of the heavy price being paid at the front, but also for the sake of ourselves in the rear. Violence produces violence with a rippling effect. A great responsibility rests on us as professionals who search for solutions based on dialogue and compromise to the conflicts that are paralyzing the life of the family. We must create general awareness of the confirmed fact that violence and fear of dialogue are evil council and a certain recipe for the perpetuation of the conflict.

Generals and politicians who constantly order us to focus on suppressing violence with violence will not find the key to a constructive solution to the conflict. Not only the poet, but also the professional who deals with mental health and inter-personal conflicts must repeat to himself the message of Hayim Hefer, which is intended for all of us: "let us know to go toward peace, just as we went to wars without choice, with the same courage, resolve, knowledge, morals, and wisdom...."

Sharon Calls for Immediate Crushing of Intifadah

90AE0290B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
8 Aug 90 p 17

[Text] Minister of Housing and Construction Ari'el Sharon yesterday urged the government to immediately deport the Palestinian leadership from the territories.

The minister told a meeting of the Likud Foreign and Defense Committee at Metzudat Ze'ev in Tel Aviv: "We should have deported the Palestinian leadership last night, and I'm talking about some 150 people active in Jerusalem. The army should be ordered to end the terrorism—not to pacify, not to tone down, and not to bring about a bearable situation or a situation that enables us to live with this phenomenon, at a lower level of violence, but in one word, eliminate it, and deport the leadership. And whoever doesn't know how to do it, should go home."

Sharon pointed to a link between Palestinian terrorism and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait: "Palestinian terrorism contributes decisively to the tension in the area, and tension leads to war. Terrorism, which generates war, must be eliminated. We are not much feared anymore, and that's why Saddam Husayn feels more confident."

Minister Sharon stressed that this is the time and that the opportunity exists for eliminating the terrorism. "The fake unity governments are responsible for the situation that has been created, but now we are at the head of a national government. The restrictions and chains of the Alignments are no more. Now we have a unique opportunity to end the violence and terrorism."

The Tehiya Party yesterday decided that it will leave the coalition if the government does not change its defense policy in the near future. The party's secretariat emphasized that the deterioration of the defense situation is most serious, and that if the government won't deal with it, Tehiya wants nothing to do with it. It was agreed that Deputy Minister Ge'ula Kohen and Knesset Member Elyakim Ha'etzani will soon meet with the prime minister to explain to him the significance of the decision of the Tehiya Secretariat.

Arab Militias Proposal for Territories Debated

90AE0226G Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
18 Jul 90 p 2B

[Article by Yizhar B'er]

[Text] When the Arab magistrate finished reading aloud his decision, Sadiq Bilah (48), who is known as a collaborator in the Tulkarm area, withdrew his pistol and prepared to shoot the attorney representing his adversary. Another lawyer managed at the last moment to divert the pistol, but Bilah attacked both of them fiercely causing one of them to be hospitalized. After the incident, which occurred last week in the magistrate court in Nabulus, several dozen Arab lawyers decided to stage a spontaneous strike in the military and civilian courts. The lawyers also sent a letter to the head of the civil administration, in which they strongly protested the immunity granted to collaborators under the Israeli administration's protection.

Bilah, from the village of al-Funduq, is a so-called open helper. He has an unsavory past. In November 1988, he killed a woman in Nabulus, a by-passer named Siryal 'Abd-al-Nabi', after his car was pelted with rocks. In the village of Immatin, in 1988, he injured two residents with his personal firearm. Nonetheless, he has never been sentenced to prison as far as is known, although he was investigated in the past by the police for forging documents in connection with a land purchase. His weapon was not confiscated from him, even after he injured unarmed people.

Armed Rovers

Dozens of armed people like Sadiq Bilah are roaming about the territories. Last week, a known collaborator in the Ramallah area, Muhammad Shamasinah, killed a young man from Bayt Ijza during a reconciliation celebration meal that took place in the nearby village of Qutanah. The gunfire that killed the young man was aimed at someone else, but it missed its target. Shamasinah continued to circulate in his village after the murder without being arrested and without his weapon being confiscated. The Israeli administration has a problem: Whoever takes the weapons in the possession of the helpers and the village heads sentences them to a cruel death.

People like Bilah and Shamasinah are likely to get a boost if a plan is approved that was submitted recently to

Defense Minister Moshe Arens. The central line of the new plan being advanced by the Judeaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council and the Hatehiya [Party] to "handle the intifadah," which was published this week in HA'ARETZ, proposes "imposing order in Judeaea, Samaria, and Gaza with the aid of Arab security forces." The plan's drafters argue that an Arab armed force must be established in the same way that Israel wisely built a successfully functioning 2,500-man armed force in south Lebanon. "There are several times more Arabs licensed to carry arms for their personal security in Judeaea, Samaria, and Gaza than in the SLA [South Lebanon Army]. Some of them are really begging for permission to act, within the law of course. Instead, Israel is abandoning them to the cruel fate of being brutally murdered, night after night," write the settlers who originated the plan.

According to the proposal, "a police and/or a civil guard force should be established within the villages, neighborhoods and cities. This force would be armed with automatic weapons and equipped with communications equipment. There is no need for the presence of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], which would continue to patrol on the roads." Those who conceived of the proposal (most of the recommendations were formulated by Knesset Member Elyakim Ha'atzni) maintain that "the Arab force could be financed by savings on the costs of reserve forces. The role of the force would be to eliminate manifestations of the open control exercised by uprising forces on the Arab scene, inasmuch as the IDF has in effect abandoned the field and withdrawn to the roads leading to settlements and army camps."

A Failed adventure

The settlers' new plan is, in effect, an attempt to resuscitate one of the greatest failed Israeli political adventures in the territories. In 1981, Professor Menahem Milson, then the Arab affairs advisor to the coordinator of government activities in the territories, began to establish the "village leagues," which were actually armed militias that supported Israel. The idea of the leagues was to establish a loyal organization that would be strong enough to be a counterweight to the mayors of the cities and the urban population, who were perceived as PLO supporters.

According to its originators, the village league initiative sought "to give representation to 70 percent of the residents of the West Bank, who are a silent, moderate, and cooperative majority, to be distinguished from urban residents, who have radical tendencies. Because PLO supporters in the territories frequently used terror, a kind of ethical justification was felt to exist for establishing, in the form of the village leagues, a body that actually engaged in terror.

The leagues that were established were based on the model of the League of Villages on Mt. Hebron under the chairmanship of Mustafa Dudin, which existed as early

as 1978. The establishment of the leagues was accompanied by birth-pangs that testify to the nature of the leagues. In some areas, the authorities had difficulty finding persons to fill the position of league head. In Bethlehem, for example, a local taxi driver named Bisharah Qumsiyah was appointed to the position. He organized around him a band of hoodlums and thugs who engaged in extortion and committed other crimes, until the Israeli governor revolted against his acts, and Qumsiyah was sent to prison. In Ramallah as well, the Israeli administration had difficulties finding a suitable candidate. The village head who finally agreed to accept the position was murdered. A former security prisoner, who was imprisoned in the [illegible] prison was made the head of the village league of the Nablus area.

Despite the difficulties, by 1982, leagues were operating in seven areas: Hebron, Bethlehem, Tulkarm, Nablus, Qabatiyah, and Silat al-Dahr. Between 1981 and 1982, financial assistance totalling \$8.8 million was put at the disposal of the league, and a year later, the amount of assistance increased to \$12 million. Meron Benvenisti, the director of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Project, estimated that, at the peak of their activity, 166 village leagues and sub-leagues were operating in the West Bank, and that more than 68,000 residents enjoyed favors connected to them.

The civil administration granted broad authorities to the leaders of the leagues. Anyone seeking a licence, an exit visa, unification of families, and so on, was referred by the administration to the heads of the village leagues. In exchange for any service provided by the leagues, recipients of services paid a fee to the league, and in some places, they were also forced to join the leagues. The Israeli administration also placed at the leagues' disposal allocations for development, and it allowed the leagues to recruit armed militias. Most of the residents in the territories viewed league members as collaborators with Israel and their leaders as corrupt.

A Death Sentence

In March 1982, the Government of Jordan sentenced to death any league member on charges of treason. At that time, the leagues began to deteriorate. Splits occurred within them. Some of their leaders were arrested. The Israeli administration also began to sober of the idea. Murders, rapes, extortion and robbery had become commonplace, and some of the leaders of the leagues, such as Qumsiyah, were arrested and ultimately sent to prison as felons. The failed attempt of the village leagues severely damaged the image of Israeli rule in the perception of residents of the territories. However, in selecting "friends of Israel" in the territories, the Israeli administration could not be too selective. Many of the open collaborators, who are armed with Israeli weapons, are semi-criminal, trigger-happy elements. Anyone talking today about the establishment of armed militias in the territories based on the model of the SLA is talking about the establishment of militias of armed hooligans and thugs who are on the margins of Palestinian society.

An expert on the territories described the idea as insane foolishness: "This would be a minority group that lacks popular support and a common interest with us. Such a group would act against its own people's consensus. Without appropriate popular support, they would be no more than mercenary groups that would escalate the bloodshed in the territories, plot against residents, and kill them."

[First box]

Sneh: The Lebanonization of the Territories

While serving in south Lebanon, Brigadier General (reserves) Efrayim Sneh acquired considerable experience in establishing militias that support Israel. Under his leadership as head of the civil administration in the West Bank, the "village leagues" idea was finally buried. Sneh sees no logic in the plan to establish a Palestinian police force in the territories on the model of the SLA. According to him, such a force "is neither logical nor practical from an operational standpoint. The idea stems from its originators' interest in causing internecine killing among Palestinians and escalating the violence in the field to a level that would justify more extreme punishment measures on the part of the IDF."

"Any comparison between the SLA and the proposed police force demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the reality in south Lebanon and the West Bank. The secret of the SLA's success is that its existence is based on common interests shared by Israel and the general south Lebanese population, and on a broad consensus within the south Lebanese population that supports the SLA. It is no coincidence that a measure of the SLA's strength is the enlistment of many Shi'ites in it. An Arab police force in the West Bank would be based on a very small, despised minority that would be unable to play any positive security role. The IDF forces in the field would have another client to defend and save from distress."

Sneh does not believe that any professional element would treat the proposed plan seriously: "To the best of my knowledge, there are no irresponsible elements in the system who would support this proposal," he states. Sneh sees a major difference between the village leagues at the start of the 1980s and the idea now being proposed. "The idea of the village leagues was based on the delusion that it was possible to establish an alternative leadership to the PLO based on Uzis, jeeps, and special privileges, instead of national gains. The idea of a police force is based not on a delusion, but on a plot."

How does he view the scenario of a West Bank in which a Palestinian police force is operating? Sneh: "The soldiers of the police force would be hated and isolated, and therefore threatened and frightened. An armed man, when he is threatened and frightened, tends to use his weapon. They will fire at other Palestinians and will quickly become the target of firearms themselves. There would be an escalation of the violence in the field and

internecine killing, and a need for the IDF to use more force, and to intervene. Ultimately, we would also have to rehabilitate these "policemen" and their families. Ha'atzni and his friends would argue that these policemen spilled their blood 'for the sake of the state.' In summary, this is another recipe for the Lebanonization of the territories."

[Second box]

The Plan Will Not Work

Muhammad Nasir (Abu-Sufyan), an electrician, served as the head of the village leagues on Mt Hebron after Mustafa Dudin. He said that he severed his links with the leagues in 1983.

"This will not work," he said decisively regarding the settlers' plan. "They are not talking about something along the lines of the village leagues, but something completely different. The village leagues were involved in politics, but they were not political organizations. They dealt mostly with development. From this standpoint, their existence helped the Palestinians, even though they failed politically."

"However, in this case, the settlers are talking about Palestinian militias that would be established for security objectives. This is not a national civil guard, and it has no chance of receiving the support of any serious person. However, the settlers can dream. That is their right."

Islamic Movement Trends in Arab Sector Noted

90AE0226C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
17 Jul 90 p 7

[Article by Avner Regev]

[Text] On the last Feast of Immolation, the bedouin municipality of Tel-Sheva' in the Negev became a meeting place and pilgrimage destination for tens of thousands of Muslim believers from the Negev, the triangle, the Galilee, and the territories. The Islamic movement held a nation-wide meeting, under the name "Islamic Art Fair," in the town. The event, which marked the peak of the movement's activities this year, was approved by the town's summoned committee [a committee appointed by the Interior Ministry to manage a settlement]. The committee committed itself to supplying water, electricity, and trash collection services for the event. The organizers of the event also requested 240,000 shekels in financial support, but the request was denied.

The Islamic movement chose to hold this event in Tel-Sheva', because it is still managed by a summoned committee headed by a Jew, and because this settlement boasts the largest number of supporters of the Islamic movement in the Negev. The municipality is also the home of the movement's leader in the Negev area. Additional reasons for the location of the event are the feeling that support has declined for Knesset Member

Darawishah, who received most of his votes from the Bedouins in the Negev, and because the town does not have a great number of RAKAH [New Communist List] or Labor Party supporters who would be liable to spoil an event of this sort.

The security system and the civilian system connected to it were surprised by the size of the gathering and the number of participants who came from the territories. The event proved the ability of the organizers to carry out their plans and promises without difficulty. It also indicates the power of the movement and its ability to mobilize its followers. The fact that many of the participants came from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza demonstrates the strong link between the Hamas [Islamic resistance movement], which operates in the territories, and the Islamic movement. It is worthwhile to pay attention to that link when analyzing the links of the Arabs of Israel as a whole with the residents of the territories.

A Rostrum for Extremist Positions

More than a year and a half ago, the Islamic movement began to issue a newspaper, which, according to its definition, was supposed to give expression to the positions of Islam. Gradually, the newspaper became a forum for the dissemination of invective remarks against Judaism and the state of Israel. The newspaper even served as a rostrum for writers from the territories, who exploited it to express extremist positions. On 4 May 1990, the newspaper published an article, which contained, among other things, such statements as: "...I swear to avenge the occupier on the holiday. The monster, longing to slaughter, does not skip over our elderly and children, and it kills wildly and out of resentment.... The blood of the sons of our people drips daily from the punishment of the occupier, from his hands and his feet.... It seems that the killing of children has become easier for them than drinking water, they besiege the worshippers in the mosque and fire on them indiscriminately..." and more.

These and other remarks caused the state attorney's office, after repeated discussions and warnings, to issue an order closing the newspaper. The order was given during the festival in Tel-Sheva', during the Feast of Immolation. Security elements, who have monitored publications for a long time, felt great frustration at not being able to act against the gathering, and it seems that the closure of the newspaper was some kind of compensation for them.

The gathering in Tel-Sheva', and the closure of the newspaper came against the backdrop of a certain degree of political tension within the leadership of the Arabs of Israel. Recently, a sharp debate has developed between the Hamas movement and FATAH [Palestine Liberation Movement and its head, Yasir 'Arafat. The debate is over the control and leadership of the intifadah. Hamas is undermining 'Arafat's leadership and is calling for giving him a different place within the PLO and the

leadership of the intifadah. 'Arafat strongly opposes such moves and warns that the PLO under his chairmanship is Palestine, and whoever opposes the PLO opposes Palestine. In this way, 'Arafat is confronting Hamas with a very serious problem. It should be understood that this movement is based on the idea of establishing a state based on Islamic law, as opposed to the secular state that the PLO is interested in establishing.

The Debate Has Crossed the Green Line

This debate has also crossed the green line and is influencing the status of the Islamic movement in Israel. The position of this movement is ideologically identical to that of Hamas. Opposition to the PLO and 'Arafat is making the movement the target for the anger of many Arabs of Israel, who are not willing to shift their support from the PLO to the Islamic movement. This debate, which has also spread to the Palestinian press and the fliers that are distributed in the territories, is likely to reduce support for the Islamic movement, which has recently gained support.

In a survey published recently in an East Jerusalem newspaper, it is argued that if elections were held today in Israel, the Arab vote would break down as follows: Two mandates for the Islamic movement, three for RAKAH, and three for the Progressive List for Peace and Darawishah. RATZ [Citizen's Rights Movement] and MAPAM [United Workers Party] would win two mandates and the Labor Party would win one mandate. The rest of eligible voters polled would abstain from voting. These results are not flattering to the Islamic movement, and they are certainly a result of the debate between the PLO and Hamas. This survey resulted in, among other things, a renewal of the dialogue between Mi'ari and Darawishah on the one hand, and Islamic movement activists on the other, with the goal of establishing a political bloc for the coming elections.

An Alternative to RAKAH

The Islamic movement has yet to decide if it will contend in the next Knesset elections. The leaders of the movement are waiting for a formal legal opinion from Islamic law experts in Egypt, Jordan, the territories, and Israel, which would decide whether the movement is permitted to run in elections and to swear oaths to the Jewish state and the Israeli flag. If the legal opinion determines that the movement is not permitted to contend in elections, and the Islamic movement obeys and does not compete, the political map will be somewhat different. If it is allowed to compete in elections, the movement will attempt to consolidate a central force in which it would be an important component. Together with Mi'ari and Darawishah, such a bloc would constitute an alternative to RAKAH, which has been losing power in the Arab sector. A number of unaffiliated heads of local councils would also join this bloc, such as Rafiq Hajj Yayha, the head of the Tira local council, and Muhammad Zaydan of Sakhnin.

Running together will be possible if the Islamic movement refrains from making its primary demand a state based on Islamic law, and if it refrains from attacking the PLO. Such a political bloc, if it is established, would oblige the Islamic movement to compromise its principles and to find a golden mean between its religious demands and the political reality. Such a combination, between religion and nationalism will confront Israel with difficulties that have not tested it before.

Territories Prepare To Declare Independence

90AE0223E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Jul 90 p 16

[Article by Mikhal Sela']

[Text] Stone-throwing and other plots of Palestinians in the territories against the security forces, settlers, and citizens are still frequent occurrences in the territories, although they are not carried out on a massive scale as they were two years ago. Nevertheless, the intifadah is firm and abiding, even if its significance for Palestinians has changed. At present, the intifadah is not exhausting itself in direct attacks against symbols of the military administration or the occupation.

Most Palestinian efforts in the territories are now being made quietly. Some are behind the scenes, others are at center stage, but the echoes of rolling rocks are absent. These efforts involve a collective, national effort to build an infrastructure in preparation for the day when an independent Palestinian state will be declared.

"We are attempting to build all of the systems of life in preparation for the day when we will need to manage society with our own abilities," states Hashim Zu'aybi, a public relations employee of al-Najah University in Nabulus. "Just as you established the 'hope of Israel,' the Hebrew University, and an educational infrastructure in the days of British rule, we too are preparing for the future."

"As part of a fixed strategy that aspires to develop the structure of the national authorities of our occupied state, the national unified leadership calls on the broad public to engage seriously in the construction of all popular, professional committees." This is the call made by the most recent flier of the "unified national leadership," flier 59. The flier adds that the unified national leadership "will work to establish a supreme legal council...a supreme steering committee, in addition to other committees whose establishment will be announced." A call is also made to the strike forces to establish security committees to defend the property of residents and the holy places.

This call of the national unified leadership is an accurate reflection of the approach currently accepted by the Palestinian leadership in the territories, in full coordination with the national leadership in Tunis.

The idea to build independent living systems was raised at the start of the intifadah. However, since then, it has

not been crystallized sufficiently, given that the increase in mass incidents has overshadowed the ability to move in this direction. The military administration also made many efforts to break up any framework for independent organization activity. Even the organizers of household gardens were sent to administrative detention.

During the 19th convocation of the Palestine National Council in Algeria, in November 1988, the topic was discussed explicitly.

Among other things, the idea came up again to establish a Palestinian government-in-exile on the one hand, and to build systems of government in the territories on the other hand. Dr. Sari Nusaybah from Jerusalem gave public expression to this idea when he spoke, after the meeting, of the need to establish in the territories the ministries that are needed for the administration of a modern state.

As a first step in the framework of this concept, all workers of the civil administration were called on not to resign from their jobs. At the start of the intifadah, a contradictory call was issued to resign, as a symbol of the desire to break away from the military government. Only policemen and a few tax workers resigned, who work in two areas of life in which contact with the military administration is most painful. In all other areas of life in which the dimension of service to society is positive, there were almost no resignations. Now, state workers are being called on expressly not to resign.

There is also an attempt to intervene in other official living systems by the popular committees. The popular committees are supervising in some governmental hospitals, to the annoyance of the military administration. Because of the underground method by which this supervision is carried out, it is frequently difficult to prevent it.

The military administration attempted to forcibly prevent the establishment of independent educational frameworks, at a time when all of the schools were closed. At present, the fliers also express a preference for the normal operation of official educational systems. "The national unified leadership calls on the High Student Council and the special committees to supervise matriculation examinations," states flier 59. "The weapon of knowledge is the basis on which we must stand against the enemy."

This same world view influenced all of the universities in the territories to make many efforts to continue to maintain their academic programs despite their closure, by holding limited courses in private or rented homes. For some reason, after a brief attempt to prevent this activity, the military administration decided to disregard it, especially inasmuch as the work of the universities in this framework did not entail disruptions of order, which were a daily occurrence until the start of the intifadah.

The book fair that was recently held in Jerusalem gave public expression to the universities' activity. Concurrently, the Council for Higher Education renewed its activity.

The main, customary frameworks in the territories, which are in the scope of what are called "national institutions," are the workers' organizations and the various professional associations. A re-organization is being carried out among these groups on a broad national basis in order to unite the separate organizations affiliated with each political organization.

The first framework that was organized on the basis of "national unity" was the Comprehensive Council of Women's Organizations. This organization unites within it all of the women's organizations that are operating in the territories. It is headed by Zahirah Kamal, the representative of the Democratic Front [for the Liberation of Palestine]. The degree of coordination among the women is great. They hold joint activities, the most recent being a fair for local products held not long ago. Far from the eyes of the media, this council holds joint activity with the Women's Network, a comprehensive organization of Israeli women who are working for mutual understanding with Palestinian women. In this framework, mutual visits and primarily home circles are held, in which Palestinian women make presentations before Israeli women. The demonstrations of women on the International Day of the Woman in March were organized in this framework.

The workers' organizations are also in the process of unifying their activity. The establishment of a comprehensive organization was announced. It is headed by Shahr Sa'd from Nabulus, who is known as a supporter of FATAH [Palestine Liberation Movement]; his deputy is George Hizbun, a communist from Bethlehem. This organization has still not managed to bring to its ranks representatives of the Popular Front, but the first steps in this direction were a gain in the opinion of its activists.

Initial steps were similarly made to unite other organizations. The Red Crescent in the West Bank, which is headed by 'Izz-al-Din al-'Aryan, a long-standing supporter of FATAH, and its counterpart organization in the Gaza Strip, which is headed by Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi, a leftist, have also declared their cooperation with one another. However, full unification of the two organizations is more difficult. Other professional organizations have also stepped up their cooperation with each other, but full unification is difficult at present, because of the differences between the legal systems in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The religious institutions are also being recruited, and they are becoming national institutions. It is no coincidence that Faysal al-Husayni, who for many years has served as a member on the Supreme Muslim Council, was recently appointed deputy chairman of the council.

The churches are also being recruited for the national cause. A photograph in the official weekly of the PLO, *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*, shows a group of persons with masked faces holding sticks and axes in front of the only church in Gaza. Pictures of Muslim and Christian religious figures appear frequently in this weekly.

The churches' support of the Palestinian struggle is natural, even if their leaders are sometimes foreign residents, inasmuch as their flocks are entirely Palestinian. What was still lacking in the mobilization of the churches was contributed by the Government of Israel with its insensitive behavior in the episode of the Saint John's Hospice, which belongs to the Greek Orthodox Church. The visit by the Greek Orthodox archbishop to the tent of the hunger strikers after the massacre in Rish'on Letziyon was a public expression of the church's enlistment in the national cause.

The efforts to build an independent infrastructure are also reflected in the economic sphere. Flier 59, for example, calls on the public to establish consumer committees to inspect the quality of local products and to monitor prices to ensure fairness. Merchants are also called on to establish a special committee to examine tax problems.

Farmers have also been won over to the foundation for independence during the last two years. Because of the heavy pressure exerted by the European common market on the Government of Israel and agricultural marketing elements in it, citrus exporters in Gaza and vegetable exporters in the West Bank have begun to market their produce directly in Western Europe.

In an issue of *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*, there appears a picture of 'Afif Safiyah, until recently the PLO's ambassador in the Netherlands, enjoying an orange from Gaza. The leaders of the European market visited Tunis several times this year. The involvement of the PLO in obtaining this kind of independence does not require further hints.

This internal organization activity has won backing from PLO institutions in Tunis. The committee for the occupied lands, which is headed by Muhammad Milhem, the mayor of Halhul who was deported in 1982, prepared a document that was submitted to the Palestine National Council in November 1988, in which the skeleton of the infrastructure in the territories is outlined. PLO funds for financing activity in the territories are flowing and cannot be stopped.

In view of these developments, Defense Minister Moshe Arens is recommending the paving of by-pass highways to solve the problem of stone throwing.

This solution, more than anything, symbolizes our illogical approach to relations with the Palestinians. The slogan is circumvent the problem—circumvent the problem on the roads and in the wording of letters to the

American administration. A response is also not provided by the sweeping method, which means initiated activities in military slang.

The question, of how to cope with a society becoming increasingly consolidated as a national collective with an independent existence, requires a political decision. Whoever thinks in terms of "routing and elimination" will continue efforts to break the residents of the territories. It seems that this system is like mowing wild grass that grows as fast as it is cut.

Military Intelligence Unsuspecting of Iraqi Invasion

90AE0290A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
5 Aug 90 p 18

[Article by Smadar Peri]

[Text] The Israeli defense establishment doesn't buy the "crazy" label stuck to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. The proof is that for three weeks the Iraqi president managed to "lull to sleep" all the reconnaissance factors that stalked him with photographs from the air, the ground, and observation from the sea, while he pretended that he was willing to negotiate a reconciliation through the mediation of Arab world leaders.

And thus, at the peak of all the mediation contacts and the efforts to bring the Iraqi president to Cairo (Saddam Husayn made sure he sent Deputy Prime Minister Sa'adun Hamada to Egypt), Iraqi divisions invaded Kuwait in an absolute surprise move. It is important to note that only the Saudis tried to sound a warning and convened King Fahd's close circle for urgent consultations concerning fears of an "extensive military invasion."

Three weeks ago, when signs of tension surfaced and the Iraqi president publicly threatened Kuwait in sharper "practical" terms than his threats to destroy "half of the State of Israel," Chief-of-Staff Dan Shomron appeared before the Knesset Foreign and Defense Commission and stated that "there is a reasonable chance" that Iraq may invade Kuwait. We may assume that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] was put on a certain level of alert in view of that "chance."

One week ago, at another meeting of the Foreign and Defense Commission, Brigadier General Danny Rothchild, a senior AMAN [Military Intelligence Branch] officer, presented a similar picture of the situation. Our defense apparatus continued to stand by the estimate of a "reasonable chance" of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in spite of the inter-arab mediation efforts to calm down the spirits.

Was there or was there not an intelligence oversight on the part of the defense establishment, which heard of the Iraqi military invasion from our ambassador in Washington?

The IDF is not yet talking of an oversight and there has been no demand to establish, for example, a commission

of inquiry. These were the facts: The IDF intelligence branch estimated that, despite the efforts to allay the tension between Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq was going to "do something," but the intelligence service was not able to pinpoint the "D-day." A massive Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not featured in intelligence reports either here or in the United States, not before and not during the invasion. It is very important to note that the Iraqi higher command officers kept the secret this time, too, and no information leaked out. This is a point that should be given greater attention in the future.

It is also reasonable to assume that Israel, like the American espionage services, has "eyes" in Iraq, and there is intelligence cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem in view of their common caution and suspicions. Notably, the United States has open sources and masses of nationals who live in Kuwait. They, too, this time failed to feed the White House sensitive information, as in the case of the Shah of Iran.

Another reasonable assumption is that among the U.S. sources of information that are also "citizens of the Middle East," who more than once expressed apprehension about Saddam Husayn's intentions to "take care of the Kuwaiti problem," and who expressed special fears for the future of other Arab countries (Saudi Arabia or Jordan) in the face of the aggressive intentions of the Iraqi president. They pointed out that since 1971 Kuwait has been "an open wound" for the Iraqi president, but they were not willing to believe that Iraq would go as far as a military invasion and ousting the local government. By the way, also worth noting is that even Egyptian President Husni Mubarak was surprised by the move of the Iraqi president, who took care to "lull him to sleep," too.

Our defense apparatus devotes special intelligence efforts to Saddam Husayn, especially since he began to threaten Israel; nevertheless—and this is probably the reason that lack of information on the timing of the invasion was not described as an oversight—he is not suspected of wanting to attack Israel any time soon: "Saddam Husayn knows very well that his first hit against Israel may hurt us, but the reaction that will immediately hit Iraq will hurt them twice or three times as much."

After the strategic bluff—and that is a good description of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—it is not believed here that Israel may be Saddam Husayn's next target, despite his "large appetite." "He would have to cross too many red lines dangerous to Iraq if he decided to attack Israel," said one Israeli in the know.

On the other hand, it is believed that the Iraqi president will not be content just with Kuwait, but that he will put in motion additional plans. Not against Saudi Arabia, because of the holy Islamic sites, and not against Israel because of fear of a strong IDF military reaction, and possibly a reaction from the United States, too.

So against whom? Perhaps against Syria, whose president refuses to make peace with him. And, because of Baghdad's great economic problems, Iraq may try to conquer the oil reserves of one of the emirates in the Persian Gulf.

Was there an intelligence oversight or not? It is difficult to say for sure. In itself, the fact that the H hour of the invasion of Kuwait was not known, is an oversight. At the same time, the defense apparatus continues to stand by its "low probability" estimate that Saddam Husayn may send his army against Israel. "And if the Americans, with all their multitudes in the Persian Gulf, could afford not to know, it's not so terrible for Israel, and it is even more understandable how shared ignorance reinforced the feeling of mutual vigilance and our alliance with the Americans." The question that remains is, who is feeding whom, [are the Americans feeding Israel], or was Israel the one that failed this time to feed the American information pool?

And then there was another planned or accidental coincidence that may have something to do with the investigation of this oversight. A few hours before the invasion of Kuwait, the Israeli media carried an interpretation of Saddam Husayn's handwriting by Israeli graphologist Hana Qoren, who plainly and without any hesitation warned about the danger of Saddam Husayn and said he should be hospitalized without delay. Was the timing of the wide circulation of that item intentional and planned, or was its only purpose to later allow people to say, "We told you so?"

New Ambassador to U.S. Profiled

90AE0223C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
13 Jul 90 pp 8-9, 11

[Article by Ronit Vardi]

[Excerpt] Nothing bad can be said about Zalman Shuval, 60. He is charming, solid, intelligent, fair, not brilliant, a survivor. He has considerable luck. His luck has wafted him above political vicissitudes unharmed. Luck was with him in his marriage into one of the richest families in the world. Luck is now sending him to Washington as ambassador. Shuval will like this post.

He is erudite, loves opera, and is an intelligent host, a family man, a man of substance, and open. He is polite, not cunning, and fair. He does not eclipse the stars, as they say. He says what is most acceptable. He is an establishment person. As far as can be recalled, he has not said anything particularly surprising, and there is no evidence of special inspiration on his part regarding any matter. He is a man of salons—tall, tan, thin, clear eyes, a full head of hair. This past year, he has walked with the aid of a cane, because of an injury received, not in a campaign to collect evidence at Dehayshah [Refugee Camp] or in Nabulus, but in a skiing accident in Switzerland. Someone young and muscular fell on him there.

Zalman Shuval has passed through many political rolls and twists and survived. He has never been near drowning and rescued at the last minute. He has always floated, bobbing up and down and drifting, the water always carrying him forward.

His most important trait is luck. Luck connected him by marriage to a wealthy family, a nice wife, and wonderful children. Enormous good fortune led him to Washington in the wake of Moshe Arad, after whom it would be hard to fail in Washington. Everything else is seen, open, and known.

If they wanted to send a mouthpiece to Washington, they chose neither the best nor the worst in the market, i.e., they made a reasonable appointment.

When Hayim Hertzog was appointed president of the state, I asked him in an interview: Why do you need all of this? All the cocktails, the people, the need to always smile and be a representative.

Hertzog responded: I like to represent.

This is also the story of Shuval.

In his youth, he worked in the Foreign Ministry, in the North America Department of the late Ya'aqov Hertzog. "I did not want to go in shorts to conquer the Negev. I saw myself in the public arena and in foreign policy." That was in the 1950s. Israel's embassy in the United States had just began pick up speed as it moved toward the position it was to occupy within a number of years among the five most important embassies in Washington, those of the Soviet Union, Britain, China, and Canada, as witness the status enjoyed by Aba Eban and Yitzhaq Rabin. Shuval disseminated various indications of his hope to be appointed ambassador to an important European country. Perhaps he dared not talk about the United States.

Until Shuval's recent arrival in Washington, the Israeli embassy in Washington, particularly the ambassador's post, had become a lightweight. The status of the Israeli ambassador in Washington is at an unprecedented nadir. When Jerusalem wants to talk with Washington, it can do so via telephone, facsimile machine, or, within several hours by plane, through Elyaqim Rubenstein, Yosi Ben-Aharon, and Dan Meridor. When the Americans want to talk with Jerusalem, they publicize, as is known, their telephone number in public. Zalman Shuval has only to become accustomed to the facts. He must work on the periphery, i.e., the crumbs, and move quietly into the center of pond.

And this is still the ambassadorship of Israel to Washington, a coveted post.

Zalman Shuval (Finkelstein), 60, was born in Danzig, a port city in which the influence of German culture is prominent. Danzig, now Gdansk, the stronghold of Lech Walesa, was then flourishing under international rule. Shuval's parents came to the city from Russia and were involved in commerce. They attached great importance

to education, a knowledge of languages, and cultivating an appreciation for music. Their bourgeois household was managed according to correct values: method, discipline, music, and sports. The adults are always correct and your ability to dispute your destiny is limited.

In his childhood, he drew caricatures of Hitler while a gentile, German maid circulated in the house. Shuval grew up in a non-religious home, in the Jewish meaning of the word.

He enjoyed a protected childhood. The language spoken at home was German. His older sister studied in a Jewish gymnasium where the language of instruction was German. When he began school in 1938, Nazi processions in the streets and other signs of the future had begun to appear. The family decided to immigrate to Israel. His father visited Israel, returned, and took the family to Italy. Only there, were the children told that they would not be returning home, and that they were travelling to Tel Aviv, Palestine.

Shuval did not grow up with the mentality of a refugee or a holocaust survivor. Incidentally, he has not returned to Danzig-Gdansk since being spirited away from there. He is, however, particular about using the name Danzig rather than Gdansk.

His family settled in Tel Aviv on Gordon Street, next to the sea. They hired a Hebrew teacher and tried to become integrated in local commerce. When he was 12, he chanced into the junior youth movement headed by Benyamin Elyav. Elyav, Ya'el Lotan's father, had previously been Jabotinsky's secretary. When Elyav left BEITAR [Yosef Trumpeldor Covenant sport and youth organization], he established this youth movement, and from there, he moved on to what is called the fascist left. The emphasis in the movement was on politics—political activism, as was the case in BEITAR—with care being taken to maintain the Zionist consensus.

Elyav served for his charges as a father figure and leader. The Israeli press likes to depict Shuval as moving from one father figure to another. From Elyav to Ben-Gurion, to Dayan, to Hurvitz, and now, perhaps, Shamir. According to the same psychological profiles sketched here, Shuval has a tendency to maintain relations of absolute trust with these father figures, and these relations are tightened through minor rebellions.

Shuval studied in the Ge'ula Commercial High School. He then served in intelligence in the Israel Defense Forces. He received a Bachelor's degree and a Master's degree in economics and political science. He then went to work in the Foreign Ministry. Finally, he earned a doctorate degree in a correspondence program offered by an American university.

Shuval was among the first assistants who were accepted into the foreign ministry after a careful selection process by the State Service Commission. At that time, Moshe Sharet boasted in the Knesset that people were being recruited based on correct criteria. Shuval's cohorts who

survived in the ministry now hold top posts as ambassadors to European states. Shuval is remembered in the Foreign Ministry as a talented young man. As evidence of this, it is said that he was chosen to escort the Baron de Rothschild when he came to Israel in the 1950s.

Shuval knows the foreign Ministry better than Arens. He did his internship with Ya'akov Hertzog. Hertzog used to send him Shuval to Ben-Gurion, who liked to mock Sharet by going around him. [passage omitted]

Shuval's political foundation was carved out, as stated, in his youth movement days with Elyav. He was far enough away from the revisionists to be accepted into the foreign ministry, but he was never a member of MAPAI [Israel Workers Party].

Shuval came to politics through the dealings of his father-in-law, attorney Moshe (Moyshe) Haviv.

Moyshe Haviv was a brilliant young attorney who had a flourishing practice in Tel Aviv. Haviv was born in Turkey, educated in Jerusalem, was a major in the reserves, and was known as a charismatic figure and a strong leader. Moyshe Haviv was one of the lawyers who represented Ben-Gurion in the trial of his dismissal from MAPAI. Two of his young friends from MAPAI were Shim'on Peres and Gad Ya'aqobi. Haviv also worked for the Me'ir brothers, where he became acquainted with his future young son-in-law, Zalman Shuval.

Haviv brought Shuval to the political bon ton of that period, the young members of MAPAI (then RAFI [Israel Workers List]). This was the start of Shuval's political path. Haviv, a battalion commander, was killed in the Golan Heights in the Six Day War.

RAFI represented a young generation of leaders who staged a youthful rebellion under the wings of a charismatic patron who was pushed out by the golem that he created. They were fresh men of action who sought to gain control of ruling positions held by veterans. Shuval joined the party, but he was never in its central institutions.

General ability helped him on his political path. However, as stated, he was not part of the party's inner circle.

When members Dayan, Peres, Ya'aqobi, Navon, and Almogi and partners returned to the mother party, Shuval did not go with them. He is simply not a Labor person, he does not belong there. Thus, he remained with Ben-Gurion. In Shuval's large work room (a penthouse apartment on Hamedinah Square) are hung photographs that immortalize him and Hurvitz sitting on the edges of their seats in front of the hut at Sde-Boqer. The old one [Ben-Gurion] is in front of them. Then, and only then, when Ben-Gurion lost his boys, did Shuval become close with Ben-Gurion and run on his list for the Knesset in 1969. Hurvitz, Me'ir, Avizohar, and Issar Har'el were elected as Knesset members. Shuval remained outside, until the old one left the house and vacated his place for him.

Issar Har'el: "Zalman is charming, and he can be relied on. He is loyal to the end. He was in the first group. However, it cannot be said that he was very close to Ben-Gurion, certainly not as close as Hurvitz and myself. However, politically, he was closer to Ben-Gurion than me."

Shuval then became close to Dayan. Ya'el Dayan [Moshe Dayan's daughter]: "He was a consistent Dayanist, which is far from saying that Dayan was a Shuvalist. According to him, Dayan used to behave like a Likudnik. This is unacceptable to me and many researchers."

The Dayan that Shuval met was a sick, deposed prince (the Yom Kippur War). Only then, in the political desert, did Hurvitz and Shuval become Dayan's confidants. In 1977, when Dayan entered the Foreign Ministry, Shuval was given the position of special advisor for information regarding U.S. affairs. Yosi Chahnov, then Foreign Ministry director general, states that Shuval performed his duty successfully.

However, Shuval was not the man that Dayan took to Camp David. Elyaqim Rubenstein was taken there on Dayan's quota. Shuval came to Washington as a public relations official and was situated at the embassy, where a story unfolded that has since grown whiskers:

Shuval was in the bureau of Ambassador Simha Dinitz, when suddenly, he saw a buzzer. He pushed it. Our courageous boys burst into the room, their weapons drawn. Yo'el Marcus, the HA'ARETZ correspondent in Washington added a point: Dinitz returned to his room, looked at the boys for a long moment and asked: Why did you not shoot? [passage omitted]

[Box p 11]

Advice for the Ambassador During His First Week in Washington

Work relations: In general, the office is breathing easier. From their standpoint, you are their hope for a change. You are an extroverted person who has political status. These are good people, professional and intelligent. Work with them. They have become fed up with the conflicts in the embassy. Give them some slack, you will see.

'Oded 'Aran, the envoy: It is rumored that you requested his recall to Israel. If you dismiss 'Aran, you will gain the dismissal of someone who caused problems in human relations, but you will lose the most experienced diplomat in the house. His relations with the Americans are astounding.

Yoram Ettinger is a long-standing political appointee. He is embroiled with his deputy. It is rumored that he has a direct channel to Bibi Netanyahu. He will report to him over your head.

Avraham Ben-Shoshan, the military attache. A strong man. Like his predecessor, he sees himself as the sole ruler in his kingdom. With the exception of Rabin's

tenure as ambassador, the military kingdom has chafed against the ambassador. A frontal war will fail. If you succeed in subordinating the military attaches and other attaches who are trying to imitate it, you will have achieved the impossible.

Secretary: Your secretary is named Iris. But you will also have to get along with Orit, the secretary of 'Oded 'Aran, the envoy. You and 'Aran are on the same floor, in the same wing. Your secretaries see each other. They have a key role in the ambassador-envoy wars.

Bureau chief: Yosi 'Amrani, is a diplomat in his thirties, and a good person. He is also the advisor for Latin American affairs. Your rumored intention to bring in Ayal Arad to replace him will not contribute to good working relations in the future. You know that the Foreign Ministry workers committee will fight for 'Amrani, even if it means drawing blood.

Ruth Yaron, your spokeswoman: She is diligent, 31, the mother of two, and has enjoyed a meteoric rise. True, previous ambassadors have brought with them senior reporters from Israel, such as Dan Patir and Nahman Shay. In your case, it would be difficult to install someone from outside to replace Yaron. She obtained her post in a Foreign Ministry tender. The workers committee will fight for her. Incidentally, in Washington, it is said that Ehud Ya'ari confirmed that you invited him to work beside you, but that he refused.

Home: It is in a good area, pretty and wealthy, in Northwest Washington. A large house, but far from seeming like the homes of the rich of Washington. There is a problem with the hospitality budget. They are waiting for your money. Filipino maids are employed, mainly at receptions.

Work hours: These are official. Work is finished at 5:00. Some finish before that. Only a few stay until 7:00 p.m. or later.

The Americans: Detailed reports regarding you have already been sent to them from the embassy in Tel Aviv. They will receive you well. However, it is doubtful that they will treat you seriously. They are used to a direct line to Jerusalem.

You will find several figures in Washington without titles. They have great power. It is important to identify them. Through them, you will be able to perform the bulk of your work. They have friends in Israel. You should be working on this now. Another thing, circulate a lot. In Washington, it is important to know who is doing what to whom and where. In this city, supreme importance is attached to personal relations. Afi 'Evron, for example, was a friend of Lyndon Johnson, which was very helpful to the state of Israel.

Regarding the Jews, the Conference of Presidents [of Jewish Organizations], and AIPAC, if they are in Israel (they come frequently), meet them here. This will prove itself. [passage omitted]

'Dark Horses' in Labor Party Examined
90AE0223F Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
 13 Jul 90 p 6

[Article by Hanan Crystal]

[Text] In addition to the main contenders, Rabin and Peres, there are many other candidates who are entering their names now so that they will be remembered in 2000.

The Peres-Rabin contest is obliging about a dozen candidates to decide, under time pressure, what their courses will be. These candidates are divided into a number categories.

The dark horses: In this category are those that are likely, if Rabin and Peres eliminate each other, to emerge in 1992 as compromise candidates, such as Mordekhay Gur. As Rabin's staff chief, Gur consolidates the number-two position in Rabin's coalition. Gur, who in the past declared his candidacy for the premiership, is currently betting, and rightly so from his standpoint, on the defense portfolio in a Rabin government, if and when it is established.

Moshe Shahal: Shahal, manipulator number two in the party, whose personal relations with Rabin are at a low point, has formed a tactical alliance with manipulator number one, Peres. Shahal will help Peres in Peres' struggle to resist being pushed out. If Peres fails, he will support Shahal in a personal contest with Rabin. Shahal is thus adopting the Dayan-Peres model of 1973-74. At that time, Peres supported Defense Minister Dayan in Dayan's battle to survive after the Yom Kippur War. In exchange, Dayan transferred his support to Peres in Peres' contest with Rabin for the premiership in April 1974, a contest in which Peres ran not to beat Rabin, but to consolidate his position as number two in the party and to obtain the defense portfolio. In light of this precedent, Shahal is currently supporting and helping Peres. Even if Shahal loses, as is expected in a vote that would pit him against Rabin, he would establish himself as number two in the Labor Alignment with the support of a significant minority faction.

Gad Ya'aqobi: Ya'aqobi, the only Labor minister who supported Peres in the second Peres-Rabin contest in 1977, has abandoned Peres. However, he is still having trouble deciding between running and reaching an agreement with Rabin.

Yisra'el Qaysar: The general secretary of the Histadrut [labor federation], in his last term at the Histadrut, is remaining silent. In the current contest, he is quietly supporting Rabin, apparently based on an agreement between them, according to which Qaysar would be inserted into the number two or three spot in the beehive that would be established under Rabin.

In addition to the black horses, there are those who are setting their sights on 1996. They know that they have no

chance in 1992, but they are nonetheless throwing in their names so that they will be remembered in 1996, or even 2000.

'Uzi Bar'am: He is betting on a senior ministerial position in a Rabin government. By joining Rabin, Bar'am, who favors negotiations with the PLO, lends political legitimacy to the former defense minister, and prevents the Rabin-Peres power struggle from becoming an ideological contest between doves and hawks.

Ora Namir: She is disappointed with Rabin and Peres, because they left her out. She is staying neutral in the current contest, sometimes publicly contemplating submitting her candidacy.

Hayim Ramon and Nisim Zavili: This pair of radical doves is known for its great appetite. Zavili is garrisoned as Peres' staff chief, while Ramon, a central supporter of the failing power exercise, has abandoned Peres, but has not joined Rabin. Zavili and Ramon are therefore taking advantage of the contest between Peres and Rabin in the course of the 12th Knesset to establish their candidacy for the 14th and 15th Knesset.

Behind them are the visionaries, such as 'Ezer Weitzman, for example, who is refraining from becoming involved in the current contest, and Lova Elyav, who supports Rabin. Weitzman and Elyav know that running on the Labor list for the premiership is outside of their range. However, in interviews with the media, they do not conceal their good opinion of themselves.

Behind them are the media gimmicks. Rafi Edri, Benjamin Ben-Eli'ezer, and Mikha'el Bar-Zohar have jumped on Rabin's winning bandwagon. The three of them have declared to the media that they see themselves in the future—not exactly in 1992—as contenders for the leadership. Their declarations are perceived as media gimmicks that are liable to boomerang against them in the vote just before elections for positions on Labor's list. Edri, Bar-Zohar, and Ben-Eli'ezer will almost certainly compete to be in the top tenth, but if they are elected to the second tenth, and do not roll, like Shevah Weiss, into the third tenth, they will have cause to celebrate.

Schiff Interprets Recent Attacks on Hizballah

90AE0224B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
 10 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] What is the reason for the wave of intensive attacks by Israel in recent days against targets of Hizballah and Ahmad Jibril's organization in south Lebanon and other parts of Lebanon?

The official explanation is that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is seeking to pre-empt Hizballah attacks. However, among foreign elements, there is a widespread opinion that Israel is escalating its attacks against the extremist Shi'ite organization, because it is seeking to

spoil the possibility that was raised of a hostage release deal that does not include IDF prisoners.

Israel has indeed made efforts to conduct negotiations with Shi'ite elements holding the Israeli navigator and two soldiers that were seized. However, these efforts have so far been unsuccessful, and no negotiations are actually being held at present. It is also true that Israel was willing for any hostage exchange deal to also include its imprisoned soldiers, but it is inconceivable that Israel would intentionally spoil the hostage release deals of others.

It has been a long time since Israel attacked targets of Hizballah and Jibril on such a large scale—from the air, and with artillery and tank fire. Since the end of last week, the Air Force has made almost daily attacks in south Lebanon, the Biq'a, and even next to Tripoli in the north. The Hizballah organization has not recently escalated its attacks against the South Lebanese Army or against the IDF in the security strip, and the last time that Hizballah attacked IDF soldiers—with Katyusha rockets in the security zone—was in April. Nor has Israel initiated many attacks outside of the security zone, even though, in recent months, the military dispositions of the Palestinians and Hizballah have thickened. It is very probable that the IDF's relative military restraint in recent months is based on political reasons. It should be assumed that Israel will, as of now, cease restraining itself in its activity against military targets of Hizballah.

It seems that the reason for the wave of attacks is information that reached Israel regarding intentions on the part of Hizballah to wage a new offensive. It is known that the organization has stepped up its cooperation with Palestinian organizations that dispatch cells to infiltrate into the territory of Israel to attack civilian targets. Thus, Israel's objective is to pre-empt and thwart the activity of Hizballah and Jibril, damage their dispositions, and undermine the confidence of their people in the field. It is reasonable to assume that Moshe Arens' coming to the Defense Ministry will make it easier for the IDF to obtain approval for offensive activities if Arens is presented with information concerning enemy intentions to attack Israel.

Levi Crony Appointed Ambassador to Cairo

90AE0290C Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
1 Aug 90 p 17

[Interview with Efraim Dubeq, Israel's ambassador designate to Egypt by Hana Kim; date, place not given]

[Text] Two days ago David Levi appointed Efraim Dubeq as Israel's ambassador to Cairo. The two, Levi and Dubeq, know each other from Bet She'an. Dubeq was secretary of the Workers' Council and head of the council, while Levi was actively involved with the Development Fund of the Workers' Council and established

the local Herut branch. And thus, with his first appointment at the Foreign Ministry, Levi closed the circle and appointed the MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party] member who took him in.

Dubeq, 60, was born in Cairo and was one of the founders of Kibbutz Kfar-Aza. At the time he was a prominent MAPAI figure, who then chose to transfer to the foreign service. He served as Israel's ambassador to Chad and as first consul at the Israeli Embassy in Cairo under Ben-Elisar. His current position is as the number two Israeli representative at the United Nations.

[Hana Kim] Tell us about some joint memories with David Levi.

[Dubeq] "When David Levi came to Bet She'an in 1955 I helped him get acclimatized, just as I did for others. I was then secretary of Bet She'an's Workers' Council, and he became actively involved with the construction workers' development fund."

[Kim] Why did he shift from MAPAI to Herut?

[Dubeq] "He quarreled with somebody, banged the door, and left. The quarrel was only marginal at that time."

[Kim] Do you remember him as a construction worker?

[Dubeq] "I do. I also remember that we demonstrated together. There was social unrest in Bet She'an because not enough was being done to deal with the unemployment problem. That was in the 1950's. I marched in the front lines of the demonstration, and David Levi was there, too. I wrote then an article in which I said that in fact, the Black Panthers had their beginnings in Bet She'an. During that period there were demonstrations about ethnic problems, but they didn't receive much national attention, because they weren't taking place on the Karmel, like Wadi Salib."

[Kim] Did you dream then that you would one day serve the country abroad?

[Dubeq] "I didn't dream of becoming a diplomat, and I assume that neither did David dream of becoming deputy prime minister and foreign minister. He was not among the most active in the area. Herut was not represented at the Town Hall. But ever since I began watching him I believed that he would go far. I chose another track, namely the Foreign Ministry. I left the political arena. I think that he has arrived very far and it is all due to himself. At the time he wanted to struggle for both status and principles."

[Kim] When you were council head, David Levi was a construction worker. You were not even on the same side of the table.

[Dubeq] "No, but there was no problem about it. I was above all that; I was elected with a 92 percent majority to the Workers' Council. Herut and the General Zionists were minor parties."

[Kim] Have you not heard it said that you, as head of the Bet She'an Council for MAPAI, may have been responsible for the fact that David Levi left MAPAI?

[Dubeq] "MAPAI lost Moshe Dayan, too, as well as many others. No one criticized me because David Levi left the Development Fund and established the Herut branch. I have also experienced many changes since Bet She'an. That was another time, much has changed in the country since then."

[Kim] Have your views changed since then?

[Dubeq] "The Alignment is currently very complex and is split along various dovish and hawkish lines. Today I am a Foreign Ministry functionary, a professional diplomat with 26 years of experience, and I represent the positions of the government, not my own."

[Kim] Were you surprised by your appointment?

[Dubeq] "I was not surprised because, modesty aside, I think that I have the requirements for the job. The fact that I served in Egypt at the beginning of our relations made me a natural candidate for the position. Not to mention the fact that I was born in Egypt. I served there three years."

[Kim] Where echoes from the past heard when David Levi broke the news of your appointment to you?

[Dubeq] "I asked him why he wanted to begin his term as foreign minister by favoring the people of Bet-She'an. He said it was legitimate. The truth is that I am convinced that the Bet She'an factor had nothing to do with it, even though the minister knows me from that time."

[Kim] Will the fact that Levi opposed the meeting in Cairo make your job as ambassador to Egypt more difficult?

[Dubeq] "I will represent whatever line the Israeli government decides."

[Kim] And what is this line?

[Dubeq] "I don't know yet. When the government has mapped out its line, and I am confident that it will take into consideration all the aspects of our relations with Egypt, the Arab countries, and the advancement of the peace process, I will faithfully represent it. I'm not going there to represent my own line."

[Kim] Is there a gap between those two lines?

[Dubeq] "I don't know yet what line the Israeli government will adopt."

Labor Faction Leader Ramon Proposes Split

90AE0226D Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
17 Jul 90 p 17

[Interview with Hayim Ramon by Ya'el Gvirtz; place and date not specified]

[Text] The chairman of the Labor Alignment faction, Hayim Ramon, yesterday requested the faction's approval to submit a draft bill on his behalf that would prohibit residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from entering into Israel. In doing so, Ramon seemed to go beyond Yitzhaq Rabin's position to a position as extreme as that of Moledet and Hatehiya. Ramon rejects the claim that his proposal is racist or discriminatory, stating that it would entail a two-sided disconnection between the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the one hand, and Israel on the other, a process that would ultimately prepare the ground for a political and cultural split as well.

[Ya'el Gvirtz] When did this idea occur to you?

[Ramon] It did not occur yesterday. I think that the daily friction between us and the 120,000 residents of the territories who come into Israel daily is causing hatred and the destruction of Israeli society as well as Palestinian society. Actually, the reality of the whole land of Israel exists now technically, although it has not been declared officially.

[Gvirtz] If I understand correctly, you are seeking to prohibit the entry of Arabs from the territories into Israel, and not vice versa. How does this change the reality of the whole land of Israel?

[Ramon] I am proposing the barring of movement from both sides. I am proposing a disconnection.

[Gvirtz] What type of disconnection?

[Ramon] First, an economic disconnection, because only this would ultimately bring about a cultural, political, and demographic disconnection.

[Gvirtz] How could such a disconnection be effected in a practical manner?

[Ramon] For many years we have prevented development and investments in the territories, because such activities threatened Israeli industry. If we invest the sum that residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip earn in Israel, which is \$350 to \$400 million, in creating sources of employment there, we will ultimately reach the point of disconnection from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The false co-existence that exists now must end, because it is the greatest cause of hatred between us. We must remember that only a third of the residents of the territories, 50,000, are employed legally in Israel, and the rest work in the black economy, which is a problem that a disconnection would solve.

[Gvirtz] How would you create jobs for 120,000 people?

[Ramon] It could not be done overnight. With a correct policy, we would be able to achieve it within three years. At present, we need de-annexation. I agree that the law poses problems, which are mainly humanitarian.

[Gvirtz] Will your party support the proposal?

[Ramon] I want to believe that my party, which speaks against annexation, would support a development that conforms with its basic world view.

[Gvirtz] [Gundi] could be a partner.

[Ramon] I do not believe that [Gundi] can join in, because the draft law certainly talks about disconnection within the land of Israel, not a transfer. We would say to them: You are not citizens of the state of Israel, and just as I do not provide employment here to a Portuguese citizen—and no one is accusing me of racism—so do I not provide employment to you.

[Gvirtz] However, if I understand correctly, you are seeking to prohibit not only employment, but also any possibility of entry into the state of Israel, which you allow to a Portuguese.

[Ramon] The problem is that they enter freely, and a Portuguese does not.

[Gvirtz] How would they enter according to your proposal?

[Ramon] With a visa, as would any foreign citizen.

[Gvirtz] Another party called for disconnection after the massacre in Rish'on Letziyon.

[Ramon] I made this proposal some time ago, and the Palestinian side is also interested in it.

[Gvirtz] In other words, they are not raising an eyebrow now and saying: Ramon?!

[Ramon] On the contrary, the leadership of the intifadah has issued a flier that calls for disconnection. A model of the disconnection that I am advocating is the example of the residents of Rafiah, who in the past entered freely, but now enter on Egyptian passports.

[Gvirtz] Have you discussed this proposal with Rabin?

[Ramon] At one time, Rabin opposed the proposal, based mainly on the argument that Palestinian residents of the territories do not have other sources of employment at present, and a disconnection would damage the economy, or Palestinians in the territories. I said that it is clear to me that there would be difficulties in adapting and problems. However, I said that I would prefer such problems to the daily problems stemming from the continuing reality, problems that are trying us.

[Gvirtz] The instinctive reaction to the meaning of the definition of this law in your context is amazement. Are you aware of this?

[Ramon] Yes, people react instinctively, and they try to ascertain whether the law is aimed at deportation. I hope that I have convinced you in this interview that the proposed law is not racist. Whoever favors annexation must oppose the law and vice versa.

Arab Unrest in Jaffa Toward Soviet Immigration

90AE0226F Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Jul 90 p 2B

[Article by Yerah Tal]

[Text] "It would be a great loss for me if there were no Arab color here." With this argument, architect Eylan Pivqo sought to explain why he wants the Arab community in Jaffa to continue existing. Looking out from the heights of the third floor of the Arab house that he renovated for his residence, on one side, one sees the sea, Jaffa Port, and part of the Jaffa slope—to be more precise, the large trash dump that has transformed a sea inlet into dry land on which the construction of dozens of luxury town houses is planned. On the other side, one sees the houses of the 'Ajmi neighborhood, which are to be gentrified as part of the Jaffa Slope project. In this project, the Arabs are perceived as a decoration, because many of them obviously cannot afford the large sums that will be required to buy these prestige apartments.

The "Jaffa Slope" project is included in a document submitted by Tel Aviv Mayor Shlomo Lahat last month to Housing Minister Ari'el Sharon, a document described by the Arabs of Jaffa as the Lahat-Sharon project for the "Jews of Jaffa." Lahat indicates in that document that about 6,098 housing units—the entire housing potential in Jaffa—can be renovated and built in Jaffa to house new immigrants, young couples, and the homeless. The plan has provoked the residents of Jaffa, who view it as an attempt to evict them from their homes. "Lahat is trying to submit the transfer plan of his protege, Rahav'am Ze'evi," said an Arab public activist in Jaffa. What the Arabs of Jaffa failed to achieve over the course of years, Lahat managed to do overnight. For the first time, all of the committees representing different segments of the city's Arab population united in one committee that has pushed aside all of the disagreements and rivalries that have split them until now, and has harnessed itself to a single cause, namely to frustrate Lahat's plan and to assure the "continued existence of the Arab community in Jaffa."

The response of the Arabs of Jaffa included threats to appeal to elements abroad and to world public opinion, and to arrange demonstrations and protest gatherings. Lahat's clarifying and calming remarks to the effect that the plan was not intended to evict a single Arab from his house in Jaffa did not calm them. They are convinced that the plan aims to force them to uproot and move to concentrations of Arab populations in Lod, Ramlah, peripheral areas of the city, and elsewhere.

Only a Wall Remains of the Neighbor's House

Just before the state's establishment, about 74,000 Arabs lived in Jaffa. When the War of Independence broke out, about 70,000 of them immigrated abroad. Their assets were declared absentee property and transferred to the state. The Arabs who remained in Jaffa were mainly poor.

The Arabs of Jaffa have previously absorbed large waves of Jewish immigration. After the establishment of the state, thousands of immigrant families were settled in Jaffa, including immigrants from Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and North African and Asian countries. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghani (50) still remembers well the Bulgarian family that lived across from him on a narrow street in the 'Ajmi neighborhood. "We had excellent relations. We sat together in the evenings and drank coffee. However, it is different now. They want to settle immigrants here, when there are no apartments for our own children. I have three rooms and we are seven people, including my married daughter, her husband, and her child. They live with us because they cannot get an apartment. Another daughter has twice postponed her engagement because there are no apartments." Only the remnant of a wall remains where the Hungarian neighbor's house stood, behind which is a field of thorns and grass, one of the open areas that have been designated potential construction sites for immigrant housing. "Whoever is here first has a right. As citizens that were born here, do we not deserve help" asks Muhammad al-Ghani's wife.

Half of the adjacent house is boarded up and the other half is occupied by an Arab family, a situation that exists throughout the Arab neighborhoods of Jaffa. Over the years, most of the Jewish population left "Arab" Jaffa upon being offered housing outside elsewhere, mainly in Bat Yam and the two public housing projects that were built south of Giv'at 'Aliya (Jaffa B and Jaffa C). All of these housing opportunities were offered only to Jews. The houses vacated by the Jews were returned to 'Amidar and to the Halmish Company. Some of the houses were boarded up and remain so to this day, despite the housing straits of the Arabs of Jaffa. Jewish and/or Arab residents of other houses were evacuated based on the argument that they were unsafe and slated for demolition. "Miraculously," these houses stopped being dangerous and were sold to all types of "close friends and persons" who refurbished them, increasing their value thousands of times.

Non-Establishment Reconstruction

In the last four decades, the Arab population of Jaffa has grown. Surprisingly, state authorities lack accurate statistics on the number of Arab residents of Jaffa. Estimates fluctuate between 14,000 and 18,000. Most of the population increase is due to a relatively high rate of natural increase, and the rest is due to the immigration of Arabs from such cities as Lod, Ramleh, villages in the Galilee, and from the territories, who move to Jaffa because of marriage or other reasons, including illegal immigration, whose dimensions are unknown. Arab residents now make up about a third of Jaffa's population.

"The Judaization of Jaffa is actually occurring now," states Muhammad Zubdah, the principal of an 'Amal [vocational] school in Jaffa who has been harnessed to public action in the Committee for the Survival of the Arab Community in Jaffa. Another activist in the new

committee, Nakhlah Shakir, was once the focus of a public struggle waged on his behalf. In 1983, the Tel Aviv municipality opposed the appointment of Shakir, a 40-year-old engineer, to represent the Transportation Ministry in the Urban Transportation Committee, because—according to municipal sources—of his "PLO" views. Shakir was ultimately appointed to the position, but the mayor and those who do his bidding continue to view Shakir as a "provocative and hostile element." Shakir is a central activist in the "Rabitah" [meaning association in Arabic], which is the Association of the Arabs of Jaffa, which is headed by his brother, attorney Nasim Shakir. The association was elected in 1972 by several hundred residents of Jaffa. It is one of a number of organizations seeking to supply the non-Jewish residents of Jaffa with what the establishment has not been enthusiastic about giving it. The Rabitah, or association, is the only secular organization among the public organizations that are active among the Arabs of Jaffa.

The Israeli establishment perceives the association as the most extreme element among the Arabs of Jaffa. The aim of this body, which is led by young intellectuals in the liberal professions, is to contend with the neglect of Arab neighborhoods in Jaffa in a manner that does not seem very acceptable to the establishment, namely reconstruction works, education, etc., which are funded by contributions. Some of these contributions are solicited abroad, and some come—according to establishment elements—from the PLO. Activists of the association identify Arab families that were offered money to vacate their homes in Jaffa. They then attempt to convince these families to refuse to be uprooted, among other things, by offering them financial aid and help in improving their apartments. Those who merit assistance sign a document in which they make a commitment to the association not to sell their homes for a long period. "The enticement to sell is great," states Nakhlah Shakir. "All types of Jewish intermediaries with financial means circulate in the neighborhoods seeking to acquire apartments from Arabs by offering them a lot of money. I know of cases in which they have offered \$200,000 for a house." He too has been made offers of this type. His house in the Giv'at 'Aliya neighborhood (Jabalayah), which is located on the top of a hill overlooking the sea, has attracted many. Shakir, who studied for seven years in Milano Italy, renovated an old dilapidated house, sculpting it into a modern home equipped with all the conveniences. His house competes with the luxury villas of Jews who have settled in Jaffa, but it stands in stark contrast to the thousands of dilapidated apartments which most Arab residents of Jaffa occupy.

This backwardness does not pertain solely to housing. It is also part of a cycle of poverty and distress which Arab residents of Jaffa find difficult to break. Zubdah, the principal of a school, testifies that a substantial part of the children in Jaffa complete public school without learning to read and write. Virtually every Arab family in Jaffa has a member who is a drug addict or dealer. Lahat,

who is strict about being called by his full title, "the mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa," does not deserve, in the opinion of Shakir and Zubdah, to have Jaffa included in his title, because he has done very little for its Arab residents. However, Jaffa is a regular stop on the tour that Lahat arranges for donors and VIPs who are guests in the city.

"He takes them to one street, Lotus street, to show them the physical reconstruction that has been done there. This is the showcase that he presents. However, he does not show the backyard—the neglected neighborhoods in Jaffa, the dilapidated apartments that endanger the lives of their inhabitants, the apartments that house seven to ten people crammed into three rooms, the abandoned houses that have become drug lairs, and entire areas without a single road or street light.

Lahat is proud to be the first in Israel to include an Arab neighborhood in a neighborhood reconstruction project. Three years ago, the 'Ajmi neighborhood, in which most of the Arab population of Jaffa is concentrated, was included in the reconstruction project. To date, 230 apartments have been renovated, of which 180 belong to Arabs. An average of 50,000 shekels have been invested in each apartment. Twenty-five percent of this sum is provided by the residents themselves, who receive no-interest loans for 30 years, 25 percent is contributed by the Housing Ministry and the Israel Lands Administration, and the remaining half is invested by the municipality. The municipality has also invested in replacing water and sewage pipes in the neighborhood, installing lighting, paving roads, building sidewalks and promenades, and more.

Ahmad Mashrawi, the brother of "police informant" Sulayman Mashrawi and the owner of the local AL-'AJMI newspaper, acknowledges that the municipality has invested large sums, perhaps too much, in a small segment of the neighborhood. According to him, only 20 percent of the area of Jaffa in need of renovation is included in the reconstruction project. "Lahat has built a showcase, and is always polishing it. However, he has no concern for what is happening inside." Activists argue that residents of Jaffa, especially young couples and the homeless, require about 1,000 apartments immediately.

'Adil Dari'i, 24, married, is an automotive electrician. He shares a two-room apartment with his brother, also married, and his parents. "We are unable to afford a mortgage. Nor are there any rental units here." This week, he will perhaps join the first tent camp to be established by Arab residents in Jaffa. When Lahat proposed his plan to settle immigrants in Jaffa, Arab public activists hastened to remind him and the public that the government has yet to implement its plan to build 750 housing units for Arabs in Jaffa.

Fear that the Arabs will Conquer Jaffa

Following one of the previous waves of fomentation, in 1982, the government decided that it would build 750 apartments for Arabs within five years, after hundreds of

apartments had been built to solve the housing problems of Jews residing in Jaffa. To date, only 80 apartments have been built. Fifty-two have been occupied by Arab families, and the other 28 have been frozen and will apparently be given to immigrants. The municipality claims that this was done in the absence of a demand among the Arabs for the apartments. Lahat even argued that extremist organizations active among the Arabs of Jaffa pressured residents not to acquire these apartments.

Nahlah Shakir rejects these claims and points out that Arabs did not purchase these apartments because of the high prices demanded for them, about \$70,000 for a four-bedroom apartment, which most of Jaffa's Arab public cannot afford. It is suspected that there is a pre-meditated process aimed at preventing Arabs from acquiring these apartments so as to create a pretext for giving them to new immigrants.

To Lahat's credit, it can be said that he never concealed his intention to increase Jewish settlement in Jaffa. In 1986, he expressed fear that "Jaffa would be conquered by the Arabs without a single shot being fired" after it was disclosed that Arabs from the territories were acquiring apartments and settling in Jaffa.

These statements even won Lahat the admiration and encouragement of Yuval Ne'eman. Lahat declares the need to talk with the PLO, but he attacks public activists in Jaffa who are demanding their rights by presenting them as "hostile, provocative elements sympathetic to the PLO." He speaks about renovating Jaffa to the good of both its Jewish and Arab residents. However, in the field, it is known that he is partial to Jews. His thesis is that developing Jaffa and attracting well-off Jews to settle there will also improve the position of the Arab residents. The Arab residents see matters differently. "Perhaps, this will sound like a paradox," states Muhammad Zubdah, "but development in Jaffa and the growing demand for apartments on the part of Jews has put Jaffa residents into a more difficult position. Gentrification has caused apartment prices to skyrocket, and it is now almost impossible for Arabs to be able to acquire apartments up for auction." In the two auctions held to date by the Jaffa Home Sales Administration, about half of the homes were acquired by Jews.

Fellowships have been organized among Jews belonging to the liberal professions who are bidding in the auctions. In one auction, a lawyer acquired, on behalf of a Jewish investor from abroad, 13 homes that he is now offering for sale at high prices. It is known that radio and television employees have established a fellowship that seeks to acquire homes in Jaffa. In Jaffa, it is related that people representing the wealthy are circulating in the neighborhoods with a list of addresses of houses scheduled to be included in auctions, but not yet put up for auction.

"This Should Flatter Them"

Activists of the Arab Public Committee stress that they do not oppose immigration. However, they are demanding that the problems of Arabs and Jews currently living in Jaffa be solved together. In this regard, they identify with the tent city demonstrators throughout Israel, and they are also about to join them. "This time, I hope that they understand our intention and do not smear us by saying that we are acting out of nationalistic and PLO-slanted motives," states Ahmad Mashrawi. Architect Eylan Pivqo is one such person who maintains that the protest of the Arabs of Jaffa is motivated by political motives, not by practical motives, because, otherwise, he finds it difficult to understand how Arab public activists can oppose the Jaffa renovation plans, which will suffice to push them forward a generation. "They should only be flattered that people like myself have abandoned the northern part of the city and other spacious areas to invest the better part of our money in renovating houses in Jaffa," he states.

"I took a house in which two Arab families lived, turned it into a house in which six families live comfortably, and also earned not a little money in the process. No one helped me, and I did it without the favors of anyone. The Arabs of Jaffa can do the same." In his opinion, there is no justification for such a small number of residents to be distributed over such a large area. He believes that the Arabs can exploit combination deals, renovate their apartments, and even profit from it.

Arabist Tzvi El Peleg, who has accompanied the Arabs of Jaffa through his research and personal contacts for decades, believes that a plan that is only concerned with solving the housing problem of immigrants and that ignores the housing problems of Arabs is a time bomb. He believes that Lahat will achieve success if he exploits this opportunity to once and for all solve the problems of the Arabs of Jaffa.

He stated that he proposed to Lahat that the housing problems of Arabs in Jaffa could be solved by transferring [some of] the assets of the Muslim religious endowment (Wakf) to Arab residents of Jaffa and using the remaining assets as a lever to improve the infrastructure and promote housing solutions for the residents. Lahat, as is his custom, welcomed the idea, but did not mention it at all in his appeal to Sharon.

William Saba', 29, is a fisherman at the Jaffa Port. He lives with his family in a leaky two-room apartment. Some time ago, he was offered \$8,000 to vacate the premises. "I heard that the manager was turning around and auctioning off apartments such as mine for \$40,000 and more. So why should I agree? Aside from that, what could I buy for the \$8,000 being offered me? Saba' remains in his apartment. He is not a nationalist. He simply has no alternative.

KUWAIT**Exiled Ministers Discuss Current Problems, Future Plans****Minister of Information**

90AE0281A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
22-28 Aug 90 p 69

[Interview with Information Minister Shaykh Jabir Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah, by Matar al-Ahmadi: "I Lived in Kuwait Days After the Occupation Began"; Jeddah, date not given; first two paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] The State of Kuwait was known for its distinguished press that enjoyed a large degree of freedom for which it was envied by many newspapers in the Arab homeland. Kuwaiti newspapers achieved a high level in terms of reporting and technique and attracted a wide readership throughout the Arab world. As a result of the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, all the Kuwaiti newspapers ceased publishing; however, two of them have in recent days begun publishing again—AL-QABAS from London, and AL-ANBA' from Cairo.

Kuwait's information minister, Shaykh Jabir Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah, remained inside Kuwait for 10 days after the attack before reaching Saudi Arabia to begin rebuilding the Kuwaiti Information Ministry. He spoke to AL-MAJALLAH about the ministry's information plan in this period and about his personal experience and the Kuwaiti resistance.

[Al-Ahmadi] How were you able to leave Kuwait for Saudi territory? What were the difficulties that faced you?

[Al-Sabah] I remained in Kuwait several days after the treacherous Iraqi attack and saw with my own eyes the conditions that our brave people are suffering there as a result of the savage practices of the occupation forces. I thought it best to leave Kuwait so as to be able to participate in the Kuwaiti government's efforts to liberate our beloved country from the clutches of the aggressor. Of course, the process of leaving the country was not easy. Iraqi inspection points were located at many points on the roads and intersections. Iraqi soldiers were making inspections with a great deal of harshness and rudeness. But God, who is praised and exalted, allowed me to leave the country across the barriers that the treacherous occupation forces had erected.

[Al-Ahmadi] Having lived through the first days of the terrible occupation, how did you [Kuwaitis] deal with it? How did its soldiers deal with the people of Kuwait?

[Al-Sabah] I do not think contemporary history has seen anything like what is happening now on the territory of Kuwait. The aggressor Iraqi forces are doing things that are sinful and detestable. This is no reward for somebody

who helped Iraq in its trial. Kuwait suffered a great deal for standing on the side of Iraq, and as a reward Kuwait is attacked and its territory is occupied! What is even more painful is that the attack came from a brother country. The least that can be said about the acts that the attacking Iraqi forces perpetrated is that they were barbarous and based on the law of the jungle. How can an Arab willingly spill the blood of his brother or dishonor him? These outrages are worse than what the Nazi troops did. While I was in Kuwait, I moved a lot from place to place in order to be able to communicate and direct citizens to form ranks to oppose the aggressor. When I found that the occupation forces had begun to take strict measures to prevent free movement and communication, I was forced to leave. God alone knows how much the people of Kuwait are suffering because of this brutal aggression. I pray that God Almighty will help them, give them patience, and quickly bring this affliction to an end.

[Al-Ahmadi] What effects has the aggression left on the Kuwaiti information structure? Is there a new information plan to fit the emergency?

[Al-Sabah] The Iraqi forces have spared nothing in Kuwait from destruction. They have given their members free rein to cause havoc, loot, plunder, make armed assaults, and terrorize peaceful unarmed citizens. One shudders to recall the actions of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. I do not think that any occupying army throughout the ages has ever come and done such actions. Usually, civilians are not harmed, but what happened in Kuwait was the opposite.

Naturally, the Iraqi regime was trying hard to destroy the basic structure of the State of Kuwait, including, of course, the information structure. Despite what the occupying forces have done, the Kuwaiti people have insisted on making their voice heard to the entire world. The radio station can be heard in spite of jamming by the attacking forces. Two Kuwaiti newspapers—AL-ANBA' and AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI—have published abroad, not to mention the activities of the Kuwaiti news agency KUNA. We have plans to increase the number of Kuwaiti newspapers, as well as for information cooperation with the GCC countries and Egypt. Whatever the aggressor does, God will be with us, and we shall make our voice heard to the world.

It must be mentioned here that the information media that the aggressor has seized inside Kuwait have become Iraqi media and are not being followed by citizens living in Kuwait; indeed, they have been completely rejected. The Iraqi authorities are publishing a daily newspaper that they have named AL-NIDA'. You will find no one reading it except the attackers themselves. Our local newspapers have refused to publish while the attackers are present on the territory of Kuwait. This rallying by the local information media is complete and decisive proof of how the official and popular information media have rallied around the legitimate leadership of Kuwait led by His Highness the Emir of the country, Shaykh

Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah—God save him—and the government headed by His Highness the Crown Prince, Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah—God preserve him.

[Al-Ahmadi] What is the ministry's plan at the present time for informing Kuwaitis inside the country about the real situation and for infusing a spirit of morale among them?

[Al-Sabah] We are now in a phase of reorganizing the structure of the Information Ministry. During the first phase, we equipped the transmitter so that the voice of legitimacy and truth would be able to reach the ears of the world as a whole. In this regard, we must praise the facilities that Saudi Arabia has offered by directives from the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, from Crown Prince Emir 'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the head of the National Guard, and from the wise government of Saudi Arabia.

During the second phase, two newspapers appeared—AL-ANBA' from Cairo, and AL-QABAS AL-DUWALI from London. The stand taken by the Egyptian leaders was very effective in overcoming the difficulties of publishing AL-ANBA' from Cairo.

There are plans and studies for publishing other newspapers. The GCC information ministers agreed at their emergency meeting last week in Jiddah to devote a television message by the State of Kuwait to be broadcast on the stations of the GCC countries. The information media will concentrate on our people inside Kuwait to raise their morale to defend the soil of the homeland, reject the occupation, and continue acts of resistance.

Minister of State for National Council Affairs

90AE0281B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
22-28 Aug 90 p 19

[Interview with Minister of State for National Council Affairs 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Awadi, by 'Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi: "We Have Contacts Inside the Country; Confrontation Will Not Be to the Benefit of Our Nation"; Cairo, date not given; first paragraph is AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] In Cairo, the Kuwaiti minister of state for National Council affairs, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Awadi, was participating in a conference of foreign ministers of Islamic countries when Iraq occupied Kuwait. He was officially asked to remain in Cairo to follow coming steps. AL-MAJALLAH met him and asked him about the Kuwaiti resistance and contacts with inside the country.

[Al-Minawi] It seems that you have begun to gather Kuwaiti soldiers outside Kuwait and have opened the door for Arab citizens to volunteer. Where will they go?

[Al-'Awadi] We are now in an occupied country. We appreciate that the Arab resolutions and positions are with us, but the responsibility lies primarily on the

shoulders of Kuwaitis at home and abroad. Arab and Islamic support is needed so that we can liberate our country with the help of Arabs and Muslims. Where will they go and how? There are many borders between us and a number of countries. It is not difficult for someone to enter his country by sea or air at any place. There must be an attempt to strengthen the resolve of our people inside the country. Iraq should not think that force subjugates people. We are not a country of luxury, as people say about us. We are a country of prosperity. We are honored by the fact that while there are about 700,000 Kuwaitis, there are more than 1 million Arabs in Kuwait. We are a model for the real Arab homeland.

[Al-Minawi] You speak of steadfastness at home. Are there contacts between you and inside the country?

[Al-'Awadi] We have continuing contacts. Iraq cannot control every inch in Kuwait. There are contacts and they will continue.

[Al-Minawi] Have resistance forces been formed inside the country?

[Al-'Awadi] There are organizations. I cannot talk about the details.

[Al-Minawi] Is there a possibility that this force you are now gathering will participate in the framework of the Arab force now present in the Gulf?

[Al-'Awadi] Naturally, all of us are ready to participate. Kuwait must have a vanguard role in this operation. Every Kuwaiti soldier and citizen must serve in this force.

[Al-Minawi] Do you believe that the goals of the Arab and international forces can go beyond defending Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to the further step of realizing your goals of liberating Kuwait?

[Al-'Awadi] I believe that this is the first goal according to the summit resolution and the international resolutions. All the forces that come to Saudi Arabia—the purpose of their presence there is to liberate Kuwait. Although they are now in defensive positions, the issue is to liberate Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia.

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Praises Israel for Bombing Osirak

90AE0313C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 4 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Re'uven Padhatzur]

[Text] An official Saudi representative at the Farnborough air salon told HA'ARETZ that Israel is the only country in the region capable of contending with Saddam Husayn in a proper fashion. "You did the most correct and important thing for the entire region when you bombed and destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981," he said.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Party Statements on Democracy, Need for Dialogue

90AE0204C Aden AL-THAWRI in Arabic
16 Jun 90 p 3

[Statement issued by the Nasirist Popular Unity Organization; the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party Organization; the Popular Organization of the Liberation Front Revolutionary Forces; the Revolutionary Rectification Front; and the Sons of Yemen Confederation Party]

[Text] A number of political parties and organizations in the Yemeni arena issued an important political statement that includes a position on the call made by the Political Dialogue Committee for discussion of the proposed basic lines of the draft Political Parties and Organizations Law. Based on AL-THAWRI's belief in the need for respect of the opinions of others, and for the spread of democracy and openness in society and in the political, economic, social, and cultural activities of society's different individuals and groups, and in view of the importance of the content of the statement, we are publishing its text in full:

In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate

To the masses of our Yemeni people, and to all political parties and organizations, and Yemeni national figures:

Based on our realization of the importance of the phase through which our country is passing, and based on the need to absorb democracy and apply it to reality in order to help consolidate and implant democracy as one of the great gains that has been achieved for our Yemeni people, and based on the call of the Dialogue Committee regarding the proposed basic lines of the draft Political Parties and Organizations Law, which we see as a call that stems from a desire to strengthen the democratic process, it is necessary for all political forces, including parties, organizations, and national personalities, to evaluate, respond to, and enrich these basic lines with different opinions and recommendations, so as to help achieve, through dialogue, the goals that are sought.

Inasmuch as we urge all national parties to develop an awareness of the importance of participation, we emphasize that we do not understand opposition to mean being opposed to the unification process and measures. Rather, it means striving to achieve the goals of the Yemeni people and revolution in the scope of this democratic, unification process.

We stress the importance of positively interacting with this call to achieve the aspirations of all national forces and the masses. This is a responsibility that we all must bear for the sake of establishing and spreading a democratic climate and upholding this right, which is conducive to making democracy an effective, popular option.

Accordingly, the democratic unification tasks that fall to the national movement necessarily require a dynamic

understanding that is compatible with the nature of the dangers that surround the unification process of the Yemeni people. The unity of the national movement and its responsible interaction with new democratic developments is the primary condition that must be met for the success of the democratic process. Without it, the practice of democracy will remain a prisoner of past maladies and complications that prevailed within the national movement.

A dynamic, joint understanding on the part of the good parties of the national movement, which takes into account the importance and crucialness of the phase through which our unity experiment is passing, will contribute decisively to rectifying the relation between the government and its organizations on the one hand, and the rest of the national action groups on the other, based on participation and integration, not conflict and contradiction, as desired by forces hostile to unification and democracy.

In order for us to acquire the constants that consolidate the democratic process, we must take into account the following factors:

First: The national movement does not understand its position as being adversarial toward the government's political organizations. As one of the national movement parties, inasmuch as it (i.e., the government) is taking the lead in carrying out democratic unification tasks, it requires the mobilization of all capabilities to implement these tasks and to create a mechanism that forms the basis for the national government, protects it, and creates a suitable climate for using these capabilities.

Second: The opposition, at this stage, is not that force that the unification plan is aiming and attempting to uproot.

These above-mentioned factors form the basis of our understanding of why it was necessary to issue this call. They also underlie our understanding of the importance of responding to the call through participation based on integration, not conflict, between the parties of the national movement and the government, which is a national extension of the national movement, with a view toward consolidating the well-being of the democratic process, so as to strengthen and implant the democratic unification process in its entirety.

Because we announce our support and sanctioning of this call, we stress the assimilation of the following options:

1. Our understanding of the call for dialogue is based on adherence to the principle of democratic practice stipulated in the constitution.
2. As long as democracy is not legitimized within legal regulations arising from a general national consensus and a fundamental commitment to respect for the rights of democratic practice, democracy will be transformed into a state of chaos that, in most cases, will be a natural

extension of the pathological relations that dominated national action parties in the past. Any inadequate understanding of the practice of democracy does not prove the inability of the national forces to transcend the reality of past pathological relations. Rather, it casts doubts on their credibility as vanguard forces that are capable of carrying out their current and future tasks.

3. We must rise to the level of the challenge posed by our new reality, so that we can deal with this new reality in a spirit of democratic unity that assimilates the lessons of the past and encompasses hopes for the future, our people's aspirations for a flourishing and developed Yemen, and the desire for the values of freedom and democracy in the tomorrow that we all seek.

Long live Yemeni unity, long live democracy and the unity of the national movement. Glory and eternity for our innocent martyrs.

Issued by:

1. The Nasirist Popular Unity Organization
2. The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party Organization
3. The Popular Organization of the Liberation Front Revolutionary Forces
4. The Revolutionary Rectification Front
5. The Sons of Yemen Confederation Party

Muslim Cleric Jurist Discusses Islam, Politics, Society

90AE0204A Hadramawt AL-SHARARAH in Arabic
6 Jun 90 p 4

[Interview with Shaykh al-Jalil 'Abdallah Mahfuz al-Haddad, part four of a series by 'Ali al-Kuthayri'; place and date not specified]

[Text] Shaykh al-Jalil 'Abdallah Mahfuz al-Haddad is a national, religious figure who is well known in Hadramawt and in Yemen in general. He held numerous positions before independence and was appointed a shari'ah [Islamic civil law] judge in 1946. After completing his university studies at the University of Khartoum in the Shari'ah Department in 1959, he held the post of president of the Court of Appeals in al-Mukalla in 1960. He assumed the post of president of the court in Hadramawt in 1965. After independence, he was responsible for delivering sermons and teaching at the al-Akbar University in al-Mukalla. In 1976, he was appointed lecturer at the University of Aden in the School of Education in al-Mukalla, Arabic language section.

Through the mosque and the university, he has been able to help increase Yemeni national and Islamic religious awareness among the people.

We met with him in his modest home, and interviewed him regarding many issues, including unification, the unification constitution, peace, equality, the nationalization and transfer of ownership of housing units from the

standpoint of the Islamic religion, and other issues that you will find in this interview, which we publish fully in serialized segments.

[al-Kuthayri'] Some youths are administering religious study circles in the mosques. Is this not a matter of concern, inasmuch as some of these youths lack the qualifications to undertake this difficult task of teaching these students, most of whom are small children? Do you not agree with me on the need for the ulema [cleric jurists] to supervise these circles?

[Shaykh al-Jalil] We demand this supervision. We demand that the justice administration fulfill its duty regarding the mosques. There are many [unacceptable] behaviors, either on the part of some youth who lack qualifications, or on the part of [Koran] reciters who recite what is at variance with Islamic doctrine and the people's belief and worship. We now are trying to remedy these problems through sermons and other means. However, we are taken aback by the reaction of these youth, who view anyone who confronts them as an enemy, rather than as someone who is concerned for them and the entire nation. This problem requires supervision. However, by whom? Our ulema do not have a recognized organization. When Shaykh al-Shamsi visited the governorate recently, he indicated an intention to open a branch in the governorate of the Religious Council in Aden. However, there is neither a law that stipulates the functions of this organization, nor an authority that recognizes it. I discussed this matter with the governor when he summoned us to a meeting to discuss this topic some months ago. However, it is necessary to organize this organization, establish regulations for it, and to determine its identity or purview. It is important that this organization be linked to the justice administration, so that it can guide the administration.

It is well known that the justice administration has employees in the mosques, and that they, not the ulema, have the right to prohibit and proscribe in the mosques. In my capacity as a preacher in the 'Umar Mosque, I do not have the right to prevent unqualified teachers from teaching, because I am not an imam.

We have told many aware youth of the need to remove these young people who are not knowledgeable or qualified enough to teach. However, they informed us that such youths are imposing themselves because they want to show off. They are compelled by an ardent wish to teach. Therefore, we stress that this problem can only be regulated by organizing the ulema and establishing an organization for the ulema that is connected to the justice administration or the religious endowments administration in the future. We will not be hasty, because the establishment of such an organization is only acceptable if it is accompanied by the establishment of regulations. Otherwise, we will remain on the margins as ineffective guides.

[al-Kuthayri'] Progress in scientific and social development in our contemporary era has created many complications that cause the ordinary Muslim to be at a loss when he does not find texts in the noble Koran and the sublime Sunnah that eliminate this uncertainty. What is your opinion regarding doubtful bank transactions, artificial insemination, which blasphemes God, and birth control?

[Shaykh al-Jalil] Islam absorbs all of the achievements of scientific and social development, everything that benefits people and society in the medical and social domains, and dealings that Islam does not reject. However, there are limits. Interest is forbidden, and the state must not push the people toward it by opening banks that engage in such dealings. When the state does that, it drives a wedge between the Muslim and his creed. The Muslim thus becomes hesitant, because there are no means other than those forbidden by Islam. Hence, there must be Islamic banks with which the Muslim can deal and thus avoid falling into forbidden practices. Whoever wishes to engage in forbidden practices—the field is open to him to deal with other banks. We must distance the Muslim from falling into what is clearly forbidden.

There are always some judgments based on interpretation which in no way represent Islam. Rather, they restrict Islam in a way that has absolutely no basis in the shari'ah. Such interpretations are idiosyncratic. They are issued by people who believe that anything new violates the shari'ah, based on the argument that the shari'ah did not stipulate such and such a thing. Islam, as we said, absorbs everything new. However, sometimes, we are forced to deal with something that is forbidden. God the sublime said "what has been forbidden to you has been made clear to you, except that which need compels." Sometimes, we need what is forbidden, in which case it is not forbidden. The problems posed by such contradictions are of concern to Muslims and must be reconciled. The ulema must meet to discuss such matters, the needs they create, and the texts that pertain to them. On that basis, a decision can be made on a particular issue, and the people would be bound to it. Freely forbidding is idiosyncratic and not at all Islamic. Islam has taken into account all that concerns Muslim. In matters open to interpretation, we must adopt decisions that ease the people's lives. As for scripture, there is absolutely no escape from it. If a Muslim fulfills parts of the scripture and violates other parts of it, the statement by God the sublime regarding the Jews applies to him: "You believe in some of scripture and disbelieve other parts of it. The share of those of you who do so is only shame in this world; on the judgement day, they are severely punished."

[al-Kuthayri'] Our current age is characterized by difficult living conditions and an increase in the gap between the rich and the poor. How is it possible to apply and execute the punishment stipulated by Islamic law of "cutting off the hand of the thief, flogging the adulterer, and the noose?"

[Shaykh al-Jalil] A primary command in Islam is the need to reduce the gap between different social layers closer and to end poverty. Before achieving that, it is impossible to apply the punishment for theft absolutely. Islam desires the execution of punishment to protect the legally acquired property of people, in consideration of the fact that Islamic society is a cooperative, collectively responsible society in which charity is given under the auspices of the state, charity which the state distributes to the poor, to the needy who can work, and to those who cannot work. Our religion is concerned for society's purity and the protection of the people's property, just as it is concerned for their physical well-being, particularly that of their hands. However, if the people's condition does not compel them to steal, or a sick person begins to steal, the punishment of hand amputation must be applied. The history of the Islamic state confirms that, during the 23 years of Islamic rule, only one person's hand was cut off, that of al-Makhzumiyah, who stole. Some people tried to prevent that punishment from being carried out, because al-Makhzumiyah was from a well-known family of a great house. However, regarding this, the prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, stated:

"If Fatimah the daughter of Muhammad commits theft, Muhammad will cut off her hand."

The punishment was applied to this woman because she was from a rich family, and her motive for theft was love of the acquisition of wealth. Regarding adultery, when we compare the legal punishment for adultery with that for murder, we find that God stipulated many conditions for the execution of the punishment for adultery. In order for the punishment for killing to be carried out, it suffices if two witnesses testify that a killing was committed intentionally, at which point, the murderer is punished with death. In contrast, the application of the punishment for adultery requires fulfillment of a group of conditions. First, four witnesses must testify that the woman who was seen is a foreigner, and that they saw one of her legs clearly. This condition cannot be met unless the incident takes place in public. Therefore, this legal punishment aims at preventing openness regarding these foul matters and preventing the outbreak and spread of corruption. The sublime said "that a painful punishment is in store for those who like to spread abomination among those who believe." Therefore, this severe punishment was instituted for adultery. It is related that in the era of 'Umar, may God be pleased with him, some accused al-Mughayyarah Bin-Shu'aybah of adultery. It was known that al-Mughayyarah frequently married and that the woman in question could be his wife. Three persons, including a companion, alleged that they saw Abu-Bakr with the woman. However, a fourth person hesitated in his testimony. Therefore, 'Umar nullified al-Mughayyarah's punishment, and instead punished the witnesses for defamation with 80 lashes each to deter them from these matters, because God commanded fear.

Punishment is not an end in itself. Rather, its purpose is to purify society and prevent the spread of crime and corruption in society.

The people must not fear the punishments of the shari'ah. They are as remote as can be from being applied. The hand of the thief is not cut off unless many conditions are fulfilled, including that the thief was not needy. It is said that 'Umar suspended the punishment for theft in a year of loss. The truth is that he did not suspend it. A needy man was brought to him, from a group called the lads of Hatib. Hatib was famous for his stinginess, and he was among the richest of the Muslims. These lads went out in a time of famine. They found a camel, slaughtered it, ate it, and were sated. When al-A'rabi, the owner of the camel found out what happened, he informed 'Umar. 'Umar summoned the lads, and he found that they were needy, because their father starved them. He said to their father: "If I had [not] known that you were starving them, I would have cut off their hands. But I indeed did not cut them off. I will impose a painful fine on you. He said to al-A'rabi: What is the value of your camel?! He said 400. 'Umar said: Pay him 800. And he paid the fine for them because of doubt. The prophet, may peace be upon him says "eliminate punishment in cases of doubt. "Umar states: It is better for the imam to err in pardoning than to err in punishing. There is no grounds to fear the punishments. They have been instituted to deter the thief from stealing and the adulterer from a public display of depravity. We induce fright in them more than we apply the punishment. The punishment of the adulterer was not applied on the basis of the testimony of witnesses in the era of the prophet and the upright caliphs. At that time, there were very strong religious motives that made the people seek to purify themselves. Our time is completely different. One acknowledges his vile deed to become pure. If testimony arises, it originates with people whose testimony is unacceptable.

[al-Kuthayri'] Many Islamic countries have positive laws, including our countries. Is this considered a dimension of Islam?

[Shaykh al-Jalil] Some positive laws permit that which is forbidden. This is not considered a dimension of Islam, but heresy, because these laws come between the Muslim and his religion. What is your opinion of a society that permits prostitution or usury in some dealings? The Muslim becomes separated from his religion in this way. He enters the mosque to pray, and after leaving the mosque, he deals with forbidden matters. This causes the Arab and Islamic world to decline. These laws must defer to what God has forbidden. This does not contradict progress. The important thing is for these laws not to permit that which is prohibited. These matters are all circumscribed. These positive laws must be Islamic. However, our misfortune is that most of our laws are taken from the European countries and applied verbatim. I maintain that it is erroneous for us to imitate the West regarding all that our religion allows and prohibits. This will not help us to advance. We all know that

Turkey has been secular for almost 60 years. Has Turkey benefited at all from its secularism?

In no way does Islam lead to backwardness. It brings stability to the people's lives and it gives them confidence in their religion, so that they think, produce, and advance the fatherland. The West does not at all not have a shari'ah. People there have become separated from the church, because it has suppressed them and suppressed knowledge and progress. They want to apply this suppression to Islam's domain. We have reiterated that Islam does not reject knowledge and progress. It absorbs all of the sciences. It is the first to advocate them. The noble Koran enjoins knowledge, thought, etc.

Editorial Compares Yemeni, German Unification

90AE0204B Hadramawt AL-SHARARAH in Arabic
6 Jun 90 p 8

[Article by Ra'uf Shahuri, based on an article in AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI]

[Text] Yemeni unification is a great national event comparable only to German unification.

These two cases, the Yemeni and the German, are initial responses or reactions to the fundamental changes that have been witnessed by the world since the perestroika theory began to be applied in the Soviet Union and the communist bloc.

The dream of unification in Yemen and Germany of course predates perestroika and in fact accompanied it. However, until a short time ago, it remained a dream and a cherished aspiration, and discussion of German unification was merely theoretical foolish talk and political heresy, while Yemeni unification was merely a slogan in whose name many coups, massacres, and civil wars were perpetrated.

The desire for German unification assumed enthusiastic, popular dimensions in the scope of the general scenario that we have been following in East Europe. Whereas the desire for Yemeni unification appeared at a moment of national clarity that took hold of the political leadership in Sanaa and Aden.

We maintain that the Yemeni unification process is more difficult than the German unification process and requires a more resolute will and greater giving.

The separation between the two Germanies was clear and palpable. West Germans and East Germans were reminded daily of this reality by the accursed dividing wall, the famous Berlin Wall.

As for the wall that separates the two parts of Yemen, it has been more vile and persistent, because it exists within the mind, frequently hiding behind a veil of mutual political hypocrisy and deception!

Led by America, the allies that were victorious over Nazi Germany in World War II were more "merciful" with Germany. True, they built the Berlin Wall, splitting the Germans into two states—one capitalist and Western, the other communist and Eastern—whose respective dogmas, ideologies, and policies were at odds. However, in exchange, they gave them the enormous Marshall plan to rebuild what was destroyed by the war.

These allies, led by America, are the ones who have established the wall of separation in Yemen and everywhere they are permitted to implement their sabotage plan on Arab land. To this day, they have continued their work with zeal and vigor to establish a wall that divides the Arab capitals, create conflicts between them, and destroys and fragment them if possible, as happened and is happening in Lebanon. Then, in addition to all of that, they do not allocate a Marshall plan, neither to Yemen, nor to Lebanon or Palestine. Rather, they apply pressure to prevent capable Arabs and non-Arabs from undertaking such a task.

Yemeni unification, like German unification, is an historical event whose effect is not limited to the present time. Rather, its importance also comes to light in the effects that it produces in its milieu in the future.

Thus, German unification will have direct, fundamental effects on its milieu in the European continent and will affect the world political course. Likewise, Yemeni unification will affect its milieu on the "continent" of the Arabian Peninsula and will also affect the Arab political course in its national context.

This similarity exists even though the international winds are rapidly hastening unification in Germany, whereas, regarding Yemen, they are blowing in a completely unpropitious direction in the international, party, and Arab spheres.

Germany does not share Yemen's modern and contemporary history of having its southern part colonized for more than 133 years. Nor has Germany known Yemen's factional, sectarian, tribal, and regional conflicts, which have not lacked provocateurs in the Yemeni context.

Both the German and Yemeni situations are similar in that the physical areas and populations of their respective divided parts are unequal, and in that they have had contrasting doctrinal identities and regimes. In both cases, an attempt is being made to overcome the ideological contradictions through dialogue, democratic means, and through demonstrated acumen.

If Germany has depended on the "weapon" of the mark to entrench unity, the Yemeni "mark" is a most troublesome weak point. However, it is not everlasting.

In Yemen, the "weapon" in history has been the Yemenis themselves. Were not the Yemenis the spinal column of the armies of the Islamic conquest?!

IRAN

Religious Leaders Warn of U.S. Intentions To Create Bases

90AS0424A Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
14 Aug 90 p 3

[Text] Political Service—Following Iraq's military invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the crisis arising from the extensive presence of American aggressive forces in the Persian Gulf, a statement was issued by the Tehran Combatant Clerics Association condemning Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and America's military mobilization in the area. The full text of this statement follows.

Aggression is rejected and condemned. This is a principle the Islamic Republic of Iran has stood by from the beginning. It has always regarded the great and bullying powers as the cause of aggression in the world, and it has reprimanded the international organizations for not being able to confront this ugly and inhumane phenomenon.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which suffered a savage military attack at the dawn of the splendid Islamic revolution during a filthy international plot led by criminal America, where parts of the sacred soil of Iran were occupied by Saddam's aggressor forces, from the very beginning has stood with all its ability against aggression as a great Islamic and humanitarian mission, and with the help of God it emerged from this fracas with dignity.

Although we are not yet finished with Saddam and we still have not obtained our clear rights, with the help of God we will go the rest of the way with strength and power and we will obtain the rights and interest of the revolution and the people in the framework of Resolution 598 and the 1975 Algiers Accord, and close the book on the black pages of Saddam's aggression. Indeed, the world has witnessed that the great nation of Iran has paid the heaviest price in modern history for standing against aggression, and it is the most credible and serious nation in condemning aggression and standing against it. The rousing call of His Holiness Emam Khomeyni (May His Grave Be Sanctified), which exposed the essence of Saddam's regime and called upon the nation of Iran, in the name of God and for Islam and the glory of the Muslims, to fight against the aggression by this regime and its shameless supporters, still rings in the ears of the world, and the memory of the epic struggles, valor, and heroism of this Imam's great nation has not left our minds. The aggression by Saddam's regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran was a great crime, but a greater crime was the deathly silence or the irresponsible and mercenary approach taken by many groups and nations in the face of this aggression, and the secret and open support given to it by the powers, especially criminal America.

A comparison of the world's reaction to the Iraqi regime's aggression against Kuwait today with the reaction given by the bullying and hypocritical world to this same regime's savage aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran shows the height of viciousness, deceitfulness, and filth that governs international relations and it reveals the ugly essence of imperialism and its agents in contemporary life.

Today the soil of Kuwait has been wrongfully occupied by Saddam's regime, and the Muslim nation of Kuwait has been savagely insulted and molested. Saddam's opportunism and criminal behavior have created a great crisis in the area and in the world, although there are significant indications that there was a prior plot by the leaders of America in this incident, with the result of strengthening America's disastrous presence in the Persian Gulf region and a blow against the Islamic revolution and the movements for independence and dignity in the area, but what meets the eye in this incident is indifference to humanity and self-determination by the nations in the region on the part of all parties to the conflict.

What has emerged today in the area is unfortunate, but not unexpected. The government of Kuwait, which was so disgracefully overthrown, deserves to be reprimanded in two respects. One is, why did it stand with Saddam against Islamic criteria and against the desires of the Muslim nation of Kuwait during Iraq's savage aggression against Iran ordered by America, and become a flame in support of the aggression, and why did it shamefully open the door to American forces in the region?

The other is, today why and how has it not stood against aggression for even one moment, why has it abandoned its oppressed nation and taken refuge with its masters? America also, which has made the Iraqi regime's aggression against Kuwait the pretext for its extensive military presence in the area, if it is really disturbed by aggression, how can it allow Panama to be occupied by its swordsmen, overthrowing its lawful government? How could it mercilessly occupy Grenada, and why does it belligerently intervene politically and militarily in Liberia and other crisis areas of the world?

Why did it stand with the aggressor during the imposed war, and why did it impose the harshest military, political, economic, and terrorist pressure on the oppressed Islamic Republic of Iran, the victim of the aggression?

It is clear that for the origins of aggression and crime, the principle of crime is not condemned, but the important thing is who did the aggression and where, and what nation's government and interests are threatened?

It is not acceptable for America that its largest surrogate in the area should be threatened, when it has not only shackled the pillar of the glory of the Islamic nation, meaning the Kaabah, in the chains of America's un-Islamic policies, but has also served as the fulcrum of reaction in the area and has used all the resources of the oppressed nation of Arabia to achieve and expand the

policies of America and Zionism in the region and in the world and to promote Americanized Islam, not even by this threat, although it comes from another regime that at a sensitive time has sacrificed all its false claims to compromise and deals with America and other bully powers to achieve its illicit desires.

Today if America comes to the area it is not to fight aggression nor to defend the Muslim people who have been attacked, it is the pretext for voluntary presence in the area and to legitimize the establishment of bases in some nations of the Persian Gulf and for the official and long-term guardianship of the fate of this sensitive area, and especially to control the situation for the export and sale of oil and to achieve its imperialist aims by abusing the weakness Soviet Russia has developed in recent years because of its involvement in crushing domestic crises resulting from the fall of the Marxist system.

In the midst of this there is no doubt that the Iraqi regime is to be condemned as a bully aggressor and must be pressured to abandon this crime, but more than that it must give an answer as a government that served as the deputy for world infidelity to strike against the Islamic revolution during the eight years of the imposed war, and as a government that, by occupying the Islamic revolution of Iran, served to retard the Islamic liberation movement in the world, and especially obstructed the rapid growth of the Islamic revolution of Palestine, and at the most sensitive time came to the aid of the Zionist regime, and it must answer to history and to freedom-loving nations, especially to the Iraqi nation, as a power whose aggression and bullying caused the presence of foreign forces, especially America, in the region. Now not only must its aggression against Kuwait be condemned, it must be called to account as the primary agent creating the crisis and preparing the way for the renewed and much more extensive and dangerous presence of America in the region. People of good will must make every effort so that with the unconditional departure of Iraq from Kuwait every pretext for further and more extensive presence in Saudi Arabia and the area will be removed, and so that with the removal of the roots of the current crisis all the nations of the region, led by the free Muslims, will be mobilized against the military presence of America and other powers in the area. For the revolutionary nation of Iran, which still has in its mouth the bitter taste of aggression by Saddam and the crimes of America, neither the Iraqi regime's invasion of Kuwait nor the shameless and usurper aggression by criminal America are tolerable. Naturally the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the strongest power and the most populist government in the area, miraculously ended the extensive aggression by Saddam's people despite the comprehensive support he received from the imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary powers, and made the aggressor regret his deeds, as a government which considers America the greatest enemy of itself and all mankind, cannot remain indifferent to recent events and abandon the area and allow conditions to move in a direction that damages Islam and the Islamic revolutionary nation in

the dangerous games being played by America and Saddam, both of whom are aggressors and both of whom have acted against Islam and the interests of the nations of the area.

Under the guidance and leadership of His Holiness Ayatollah Khamene'i (May God Prolong His Life), at this sensitive moment the great and noble nation of Iran must retain the utmost alertness and readiness, and it must be prepared to defend the exalted aspirations of the Islamic revolution and its national interests, and it must not forget that it is the nation of an Imam whose greatness and divine firmness humbled and repelled America and the other bullies, and his uncompromising stance gave glory and pride to Islam and the Muslims in a world afflicted by imperialism.

Increase in Prices of Certain Consumer Products Seen

90AS0402E Tehran RESALAT in Persian 6 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] Tehran, Islamic Republic News Agency: A comparison of the retail prices for 20 consumer goods and foodstuff items in Tehran indicates a general rise in the prices of most items compared to last month.

The statistical report from major purchasing centers in the city of Tehran indicates that the prices of 12 items in this study rose between eight to 33.3 percent.

Base on this report, the prices of five of the items declined between 2.6 to 33.3 percent, while the prices of three items remain basically unchanged. According to this report, eggs and Gilan's non-brand rice were at the top of the list of increases with 33.3 percent and 30.5 percent accordingly. They are followed by an increase in the price of imported cheese, sugar, imported butter, Tabriz cheese, [green] peas and split peas of Tabriz, lambs meat, and lentils. The increases for the listed items were: 23.1, 22.3, 14.2, 13.2, 11.4, 11, 10, and 9.6 percent, accordingly.

Also, the following is a list of the items which dropped in price and the rates of decrease of their prices: Tomatoes, 33 percent; washing detergent, 6.9 percent; vegetable oil, three percent; onions and potatoes, 2.6 and four percent accordingly.

Based on this report, the price of chicken, rice imported from Thailand, and canned tomato paste remained unchanged.

This report indicates that, apparently, the reason for the increase in the price of Gilan rice has been the earthquake that hit Gilan Province and caused damage to the rice fields. On the other hand, it seems that the rise in the price of protein, dairy, and cereals was due to the decrease in the supply of rationed meat during the past month and the undesirable distribution of meat at coupon prices.

The issue of a decrease in the supply of coupon meat also affected other food products such as frankfurters and bologna, and the prices of these two items on the free market increased as well.

According to this report, the reasons for the decline in the prices of potatoes and tomatoes can be a result of the seasonal harvesting of these produce items and the desirable production of these items. Presently, in Sush Circle [farmers market], the price of potatoes in jute bags is 50 rials per kilo and tomatoes in boxes are being sold at 40 rials per kilo.

Although this is the harvest season for fruits and the quantity is abundant, fruit prices are still high. The price of apples at 600 rials per kilo is the most expensive and supplies are low.

Students Abroad Must Study Fields Beneficial to Country

90AS0402C Tehran RESALAT in Persian
7 Aug 90 p 11

[Text] Tehran—Islamic Republic News Agency: The seventh gathering of students studying abroad was inaugurated yesterday morning at Tehran University's Alameh Amini [Conference] Hall with speeches by Dr. Hasan Habibi, the first vice president, and Dr. Mostafa Mo'in, minister of culture and higher education.

During this ceremony, while emphasizing that sending students abroad must be done with consideration of national requirements, Dr. Habibi in his speech analyzed the difficulties which students abroad face.

In addressing the students who study abroad he said: In addition to learning, the students abroad must familiarize themselves with new methods in research and the technologies associated with it. They must also try to enrich the country in this area of research methods by finding access to the latest information.

By indicating that presently many Iranian experts live abroad, Mr. Habibi said: By identifying these experts, students who study abroad can establish a connection between them and the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and prepare a footing for their return to the country.

Mr. Habibi also added: Iranian students abroad must prepare their thesis and dissertations in connection with issues concerning Iran.

In conclusion, Mr. Habibi pointed out the collapse of the materialistic regimes of Eastern Europe and the resulting void in western countries and said: It is certain that western countries will not go toward spirituality in order to fill this void. They will, however, tend to move toward oblivion. Therefore, Iranian students abroad must pay attention to this issue.

According to this report, also during this ceremony Dr. Mostafa Mo'in, minister of culture and higher education,

in a speech emphasized that it is the duty of every regime to train an expert work force, and he compared the philosophy of establishing universities in the previous regime and the Islamic Republic regime.

In this connection, he said: In the previous regime the philosophy behind creating universities was to train managers and experts with unjust tendencies and a total lack of consideration for the national needs and cultural-religious heritage. However, the philosophy and mission of the universities in the educational system of the Islamic Republic is to train an expert work force in harmony with the needs of the society.

He also pointed out the issue of mixing science with sacrilegious and inhumane principals in western countries and said: Iranian students abroad must be aware of the cultural identity of the society in order to be immune from worthless aspects of science.

This report adds: 521 students from universities inside and outside the country have registered to participate in the seventh gathering of the Iranian Students Abroad which will continue its work for 10 day. These students are within the cross section of senior experts and doctorates.

Commentary Views National Security, Price of Oil

90AS0357A Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 9,
15 Jul 90

[Article by 'Ali Shams-Ardekani entitled "Iran-Iraq Negotiations and the Reconstruction of the Price of Oil"]

[9 Jul p 4]

[Text] It seems that the government of Saddam Husayn has been caught in the web of regional financial and economic policies and, in order to prevent a break in the balance, requires calm in its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The propaganda war with the West, the inability to pay its heavy international debt, the conspiratorial acts of Israel and the reactionaries in the region, the self-alienation of Saddam and his supporters from the Iraqi people and the alienation of the countless ideologies of the Ba'thists from the Islamic culture of the region increase Saddam's need for oil cooperation, for more revenues and having peaceful relations with Iran. In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran is about to get out from under the problems due to the war and the economic problems due to nonproductive policies. The implementation of the five-year plan for economic development and its financial needs puts the policy of peaceful coexistence and regional harmony towards better oil revenues at the top of the government agenda. The interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran in having peaceful relations with Iraq and other neighbors is based on our fundamental beliefs and our Constitution. In contrast, Saddam's pretending to want peace is based on not wanting to be engaged on two fronts.

In the present policies, the only tangible interest and wish the two countries hold in common regards the increase in oil prices. This increase in revenues is only possible through reconstruction of the price of oil. This reconstruction must be a serious precondition for talks in other areas and at the same time is a good means to test the true intentions of Iraq and its ability to cooperate with Iran in regional policies.

On the other hand, the growth in demand on the world oil market makes practical the cooperation between Iraq and Iran in the reconstruction of oil prices. Unfortunately, this growth in demand has resulted in increased production by many members of OPEC, especially those who need less increased revenues, mainly Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Since these countries spent a part of their oil revenues during the war on fueling the fire, now, as well, the coordination between the oil policies of Iran and Iraq must explicitly make them understand that their oil policies cannot be devised against the economic interests of Iran and Iraq.

Victory in the economic policies of the government of production and hope is dependent on this point. Hence, their implementation is the essential function of the domestic and foreign policy of the country, the main burden of which is on the shoulders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for protecting the interests of the Islamic Republic on the international scene. There is not a great deal of time left between now and the next OPEC meeting. During this interval, the two governments must coordinate their foreign policies, particularly the regional policies, in order to reconstruct the price of oil in such a way that the oil ministers of the rulers of the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf come with the explicit instructions of their governments and know that if such is not the case, then what else. [Arabic phrase].

Fortunately in recent days, the Iraqi minister of oil announced that the price of oil must be set at about \$25 a barrel. This statement must be the basis for cooperation in the reconstruction of the price of oil, so that by the end of 1993, when the world oil market enters the new period of a seller's market, "we can make up for part of the revenues lost since 1986.

[15 Jul p 4]

[Text] In the first part of this discussion, we called cooperation in the reconstruction of the price of oil a precondition for the success of the Iran-Iraq negotiations. We said, if Iraq is unable or does not want to cooperate in the reconstruction of the price of oil, which is in the best interest of both countries, it will be apparent to the Islamic Republic of Iran that it does not want to or is unable to take a step towards creating a favorable and appropriate economic, political, and regional climate for achieving peace, and a lasting peace for that matter.

Reconstruction of the price of oil is for both Iran and Iraq a national issue, one which goes beyond the daily

issues of commerce and technology. Hence, it is related to and dependent on national policy making. Today, none of the economic factors affect national ability as much as the price of oil. National ability influences the major economic, military, and political sectors which are the fundamental pillars of the national security of every country. Therefore, at this time, the price of oil is one of the pillars and major variables in the balance of our national security. Since the balance of the price of oil has many variables which often are outside the internal control of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to ensure our national security, we must not be removed from these variables or be indifferent to them, but must pursue them on the international scene.

Because other decisions of the oil exporting countries are the basis for determination of the price of oil on the world market, besides the supposed or existing political relations with these countries, special relations in the interests of national security must be taken into consideration. In such relations, for example Iran's relationship with Nigeria, which is an effective member of OPEC, must have a special place in our national policy when compared to the rest of black African countries. Obviously, such relations cannot be hostage to the usual decisions of the foreign policy makers or oil experts, because this relationship will affect our national economic and defensive programs. For example, success or failure in the implementation of the five-year economic plan depends on such a relationship. In other words, every policy which is worthy of large countries in Africa such as Nigeria, must generally be influenced by our national oil policy specifically and not vice versa. Unfortunately, at the present time, there is lack of attention to this point in our policy making. For example, there is no difference in our relations with the countries of Nigeria and Zaire or Zambia and Burkina, and there is a lack of qualitative difference between the officials involved. Hence, a rapid revision of this issue is necessary for national security.

Also, in regard to Venezuela in Latin America, the relations between the two countries must be determined and implemented in connection with the balance of national security. For example, there must be a great deal of difference between our relations with Venezuela and Columbia. Likewise, we cannot make equal decisions about these two countries in terms of the quality of officials sent to them.

Aside from the oil-producing countries of the region which are influential in the balance of the price of oil, the major countries outside the region are Algeria, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia, for whom the reconstruction of the price of oil, in addition to cooperation between Iran and Iraq and our neighbors in the Persian Gulf, requires close relations with the four above countries.

Therefore, the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran requires strategic and close cooperation and coordination in the foreign policy of the country with

those three groups of countries. And this national security balance cannot be related to the technical and daily implementations of executive organizations. The particularities of this balance of national security in connection with the oil-producing countries of the southern shores of the Persian Gulf within the framework of the balance of regional security will be the subject of the next section.

Writer Gives Impressions on Decline of Society in Iran

90AS0424B Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
15 Aug 90 p 6

[Article by 'Ali Akbar Kesma'i, "Undated Notes"]

[Text] Note: "Undated Notes," which will henceforth appear on this page from time to time, is neither for condemnation, exoneration, nor any person, nor is it intended to impose a view or diminish a value. These things are no more than expressions of the heart with paper and pen, mostly emotional writings about feelings and special poetic thoughts, whose description or explanation may not be in tune with the times. One point is clear, however, and that is the writer's sincerity in expressing himself and searching for a better world and clearer times for a more worthy life. These come from the writer's pain, not only from his sincerity, and this in itself is not without value.

Sometimes private letters are included in these notes that were never intended for publication, to illustrate anecdotes from life or explain the states of people. Sometimes also great men are quoted, or translations and quotes from a book or books being studied constantly by the writer are given, from which the readers may profit.

The Construction Disaster

I write these notes with fatigue and without desire. I feel that that inner flame has died and that the connection with transcendent inspiration is broken.

A fish dies on land, and every active living being expires in a polluted atmosphere! The atmosphere of Tehran becomes more polluted every day.

I did not sleep last night. Yes, the lightning that split open several old trees in a few minutes has struck me, and shattered my nerves. After that, the loaders and the bulldozers came and leveled the villa to the ground. Now, in place of that living home, which stood like a living being for years with people living in it, there has appeared a huge pit that until yesterday looked like ruins caused by aerial bombing and rockets or the northern earthquake. Today, instead of the old and green trees of yesterday, from the bottom of that huge pit they have erected thick steel columns, and instead of the soft breeze that caressed the people yesterday through the branches and leaves of those fruitful trees, instead of the fragrance of flowers and plants, today the burning

summer sun beating down on the iron and bricks and reflecting from the earth and cement has thrown my neighbors into a hellish fire, and their nerves and senses receive a smell like sulphur and burning welded iron. Neither for the eyes, the ears, or the sense of smell is there a moment of respite from the pain of offensive sights, discordant sounds, and debilitating stench.

At night relentless caravans of earth-crushing trucks go into operation, just when the weary people are going to bed, as if it is Saddam's motorized army going into action to rattle the nerves of God's people!

During the day, in this area that once was all gardens and villas, all is now fields and ruins. The grating sounds of loudspeakers on the mini-vans, with roving junk sellers and buyers of old and dilapidated items, used clothing and worn-out things sitting on the back, invite families fleeing from the building disaster and the destruction of gardens, in a voice reminiscent of the verse from the Koran, "the harshest of sounds is the braying of the ass," to sell their furniture and possessions, trade their villas for apartments, and flee the garden for the field. There is no need for them, they should sell them for a low price to lighten their load, so they will be lightly loaded and fleet of foot as they move from the old neighborhood to the new one!

During the day also, we get no peace from the disturbing sound of the builder.

I do not know what happened to the builders of the past who sang beautifully while working, and if they are still around and working, why others do not hear their pleasant melodies: the same pleasant melody for which Iranian builders have always been famous, and several great and famous Arab musicologists, as has been noted in reputable books such as *Aghani* by Abol-Faraj Esfahani, after hearing the warm singing of the Iranian builders who had been invited to build buildings in the Arab world, became known as a part of Iranian music.

Why have our builders sealed their lips? Is it that now that most construction is done by machine, the builders themselves have become machines? Or is it that their warm melodies, like the nightingale who falls silent when ravens are in the garden, are no longer heard in the coldness of the times or because of the vexation?

Life in Tehran becomes more debilitating every day. This year fall has come early in the heart of summer. In the month of Mordad [23 July-22 August] fall has begun. This coloration is meaningless. The more they dress up ugly and filthy Tehran the uglier and filthier it gets. I do not know why every old shoe and every bit of trash ends up in the gutters of Tehran. Of course it is too early to judge the work of the hard-working mayor of Tehran, but what he did in the last few months raised the hope that these problems would be solved.

Quickly and easily they tear down the old trees, with no fear or hesitation, without any sense of mercy or compassion, either for themselves or others. In their place it

is steel beams that they put up to the sky: steal beams that are dumped on the ground at night with a rumbling roar like a squadron of bombers, robbing our neighbors of their sleep.

These are the "cash cows" that they put up over the gardens and trees so that instead of the greenery, multi-story apartments are erected and the unproductive currency in circulation in the nation's ailing and war-stricken economy is converted to mushrooming real estate, raising the prices of homes and land to astronomical levels.

Children wander aimlessly in the streets and alleyways, and since they have no place to play, they are scattered everywhere in the city, and they make any place in the city their playground. By the way, even if a school does not teach, just the fact that it collects the young generation together in one place is itself beneficial!

Under the wall of the former arsenal, which is now a huge station for the metro annex, men and women sit begging on the dirty sidewalk with their wailing children, holding them semi-conscious or sleeping in their arms or on their laps. Their palms outstretched, they plead with their eyes to those passing hoping someone will have mercy and put a coin in their bony hands, or throw it in their beggar's cup. The amazing thing is that this disturbing scene is right in front of a bank where the value of that coin is found in multiples of millions or billions in a single deposit!

Tehran is one of the ugliest and most nondescript cities in the world. If it were not for the beautiful sight of the Alborz Mountains overlooking this ugly city, what would the eyes be able to see, weary from the ugliness, when we look up to find a patch of sky in the smoke-filled horizon?

When I look at the Alborz peak, that quicksilver snow flows like water over my burning heart. Only the silver peak of Mount Damavand laughs at me when I look at it every morning, and after that whatever is in the city is angry, dark, and frowning.

Before Tehran can be made beautiful, it must be washed for a long time. Paris, with all its beauty, was washed for months after the war and under DeGaulle, and it was after that long washing that the gray faces of many of the buildings of Paris were made bright and cheerful under layers of plaster.

I do not know if Tehran can be made clean or not. Do people who dump their garbage in the streets in front of their neighbors, or a few steps further away, a few meters from their homes, dump sacks of garbage in front of a neighbor's house, give Tehran a chance to be cleaned up? Do the people deserve a clean Tehran when they throw fruit peelings and seeds out the windows of moving automobiles?

When I pass in front of houses, I can tell how the people live and even their status by the way they tie up their

garbage, and in this regard their social conscience and individual taste is reflected in the level of cleanliness and how they respect others. This has nothing to do with financial means. A family may not even have the money to buy a garbage sack, but if it has the slightest sense of cleanliness and order, they will tie the garbage up in a package obtained by any means available instead of scattering it in front of the house, hiding it from the view of neighbors, as well as keeping it away from dogs, cats, and stubborn and rapacious crows. To cover the garbage of a house is to cover the honor of those living in it.

On some streets and in some gutters, one cannot help but notice items and implements that were once procured for hygienic needs, threatening to cause disease and endanger public hygiene.

I do not know when and how these long and filthy gutters, full of the stink of this city, will be removed from the pox-like face of Tehran. What happened to the Tehran project, and how far did it go? Will the day ever come when Tehran will not have open sewers and this flowing stench will be taken out of the body of this laboring city?

Will the day ever come when the discordant sound of peddlers and itinerant vendors in the day and the roar of trucks and steel beams at night will cease to torment the ears of the weary people of Tehran, leaving their frayed nerves in peace, leaving them with a moment of peace in the afternoon or at night in this city?

Will the day ever come when the people of Tehran themselves understand the requirements for ease and peace in the city, and the factors for cleanliness and order, and will themselves, more than the mayor's office, take the initiative in observing these things, when they will not only stop crowding and dirtying the city, but they will strive to make it clean and peaceful, to the point that is understood to be the duty of a city, and the citizens of Tehran, as well as those of other cities in the nation, will voluntarily, with personal initiative and humanity, help and cooperate with one another in this critical individual and social responsibility, and in this area also become concerned about order, discretion, and sound and pure good taste?

Will the day ever come when the mayor's office will properly and with zeal and good taste fulfill just one of its major responsibilities, keeping the city clean and free of pollution and ugliness? Will it ever stop allowing construction for the profit of one person at the expense of others, so that this "bird," like a buzzard or unleashed carrion-eater, will not descend upon our villas, gardens, orchards, and trees and change the greenery in the cities to burning treeless areas, adding to the ugly and offensive sights of the city, sacrificing the interest of the people to the profits of a handful of people with ready cash, so that the person who has permission to put up a necessary building will not have the right to torment the people with his building, and he will have to do his work

within limits, without aggravating and tormenting neighbors? Will the day come when the building disaster will turn into the building blessing?

First Stage of Economic Talks With Australia Started

90AS0402F Tehran RESALAT in Persian
6 Aug 90 p 11

[Text] Tehran—Islamic Republic News Agency: Australia's minister of trade, Mr. Neal Blewett, who is in Tehran at the head of a delegation for participation in the third session of the joint economic commission, began his talks with Engineer Kalantari, minister of agriculture, before noon yesterday. In these talks, participated by delegations from both countries, overall expansion of relations was emphasized.

In this session, Dr. Kalantari in his speech stated that the visit to Tehran of Australia's minister of trade will result in greater expansion of ties between the two countries. He also noted that expansion of commercial and economic ties will also result in strengthening the political ties between the two countries.

He noted the successes in Iran-Australia cooperations in the past and asserted that implementation of the first national economic expansion plan can be helpful in the success and productivity of the ties. Concerning the commercial ties between the two countries, the minister of agriculture said that, presently, commercial relations between Iran and Australia are mostly one-sided and in favor of Australia and expressed hope that the outcome of the third session of the joint commission will result in more balanced ties.

In conclusion of his speech, the minister called for cooperation between the two countries in the fields of research, culture, education, and social sciences.

According to this report, Mr. Neal Blewett, the Australian minister of trade, in his speech stated that Australia greatly values the expansion of ties with Iran and added: in view of this, the government of Australia would like to expand its commercial cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He emphasized that the government of Australia can purchase Iranian manufactured goods at competitive prices. The Australian minister of trade also said that the value of trade between Iran and Australia is over 450 million AUD, a major part of which is wheat, wool, and some industrial products—such as steel.

Australians Meet With Minister of Mines, Metals

90AS0402G Tehran RESALAT in Persian
7 Aug 90 p 11

[Text] Economic Division: Mr. Neal Blewett, the Australian minister of trade, who is in Tehran at the head of a delegation to participate in the third session of the joint

economic commission, before noon yesterday met with and held talks with Engineer Mahluji, minister of mines and metals.

According to reports by the public relation office of the Ministry of Mines and Metals, during this meeting Eng. Mahluji stated that good relations between Iran and Australia will result in expansion of cooperation in the area of mines and metals. He added: Australia's cooperation to implement the Islamic Republic of Iran's economic expansion plan in the area of mining and investment in non-ferrous metals can be helpful to the productivity of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Later in a speech, the Australian minister of trade stated: Australia places a high value on the expansion of its ties with Iran and, in this regard, it is interested in future cooperation with the Islamic republic of Iran in the areas of mining, industrial products such as steel and non-ferrous metals, and also in the exchange of experience, the transfer of technology, and other mining and industrial activities.

PAKISTAN

President Warned on Accountability, His Responsibility

90AS0417B Lahore SIYASI LOG in Urdu
25 Aug 90 p 5

[Editorial: "If the Guilty Are Not Punished, the Nation Will Not Forgive You"]

[Text] On 6 August the nation finally got rid of the 20-month long torture that it suffered under the Benazir government. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan announced suspension of the National Assembly and dismissal of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government. He appointed Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi the caretaker prime minister. Later, he suspended all state assemblies and appointed caretaker chief ministers. The whole nation was happy and satisfied with the president's announcement. Everyone welcomed Benazir's dismissal because this inept and corrupt government had not only made everyone's life miserable but also jeopardized national security. Instead of establishing peace in Sindh, it has patronized robbers, killers, and secessionists and had created such anarchy that no one's property or life was safe.

Benazir Bhutto not only encouraged political friction, but also had started bickering with state governments. Instead of creating an atmosphere of unity and love, she had spread hatred and prejudice. She gave a free hand to her husband, father-in-law, mother, ministers, and advisors to loot the national treasury and resources. The SIYASI LOG had not only identified the illegal, anti-Islamic, unconstitutional, and immoral acts of this government from the very day it came to power after a conspiracy, but also openly pointed out its corrupt

practices and cheatings. We have also published documents proving the black deeds such as looting the national treasury, selling government land, transferring money belonging to the nation to other countries, and conspiracies against the nation in which Benazir, her husband and family, her ministers and advisors were involved. Keeping in mind the interest of the nation and in support of the patriotic citizens and political leaders, we had repeatedly appealed to our president to use his constitutional power and help the nation and the people to get rid of this anti-islamic and anti-national government. We are thankful that he took this right step even though he did after a long wait. He decided to suspend the assemblies and dismiss Benazir's government after very carefully analyzing the deeds of this government's 19-month rule.

The charge sheet that the president read to the nation after suspending the assemblies included all the allegations that the SIAYSI LOG had identified earlier. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan clearly told the nation that some elected representative had disappointed the nation because of their inefficiency, had blemished the Senate, freed thousands of criminals in the name of political freedom thus ridiculing justice, did not pass any bill except the budget in the National Assembly, appointed favorite people to 26,000 positions without any system, and caused death of 1,187 persons in Sindh's communal riots and massacres. The situation had become so serious that the government and the law enforcement agencies had become helpless. All records of corruption were broken and the government treasury was used as if it was personal property, and the national resources were looted in such a way that the word "corruption" had become the trade mark of Pakistan's politics. Loans worth billions of rupees were approved for distribution among friends and relatives and loans worth millions of rupees were waived without any system or required paper work. As a result, there were rumors about some banks becoming bankrupt and millions of rupees that were earned in commission over deals involving rice and cotton. The president systematically investigated this corrupt government. The details of all this have been published in newspapers, therefore, it is not necessary to repeat those here.

Now that the federal and state governments have been dismissed and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the caretaker prime minister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, have declared investigation against the government and holding elections as their top priority, we are demanding that not only Benazir Bhutto and her associates, but also opposition members in the national and state assemblies be fully investigated. No important person or external pressure should be paid any heed to. We believe that keeping in view how Benazir Bhutto, her family, the cabinet, and her advisors looted the nation, were involved in the Sindh massacre, and brought the nation to the brink of extinction, they should be tried immediately and given heavy sentences. They should be hanged for murders, terrorism, and their efforts to break up the

country. The nation will never forgive you if you did not take the miscreant to task and showed any leniency toward these people who looted the country in the name of politics and democracy. The people will lose faith in political leaders for good. We just do not want even to think of the catastrophes that might happen in such a situation!

Report Alleges Benazir Was To Share State Secrets With India

90AS0417A Lahore SIYASI LOG in Urdu
25 Aug 90 pp 1, 8

[Article: "Benazir Was Planning to Send Important Documents to India"]

[Text] The way in which the PPP [Pakistan People's Party], the self-proclaimed champion of the poor people and democracy, destroyed all democratic institutions during its 19 month rule, broke all records of corruption, looting, and graft in the country, forced not only the people in our country to lose faith in democracy, but also shocked the foreign news media over the deeds of Benazir's family, her cabinet, and their advisors. In addition to being involved in corrupt acts and spreading unrest in the nation, especially the massacre in Sindh, Benazir took some extremely sinister steps toward pushing Sindh toward secession. Just like her father, she had started working with India in this context. Before her nomination to prime ministership, she had threatened to do whatever she could if she was not appointed prime minister. She claimed to have the support of then India's prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in her threats. Rajiv Gandhi had given help to Benazir Bhutto, the PPP, and its terrorist group in the past too. After becoming the prime minister, Benazir had accepted India's supremacy so much that she had removed the Kashmir House sign board from a building in Islamabad. Later, when Rajiv Gandhi had announced in a joint press conference that the Kashmir issue was resolved, Benazir as Pakistan's prime minister and its people's representative should have objected to it. She, however, just smiled to show her agreement with him. The patriotic people and the opposition parties had strongly objected to this attitude.

Benazir Bhutto did not only ignore the Kashmir and Afghanistan issues in her foreign policy, but also had put our country's pride on the stake. She had started conspiracies against our nation in order to finish what her father had started. These include sending a list of Kashmiri freedom fighters and those who were involved in the Khalistan movement. Former internal minister Aitzaz Ahsan played a very suspicious role in this context. He handed over special secrets to India, acting as Benazir's special courier. That is why Aitzaz Ahsan requested court protection soon after the fall of Benazir's government, claiming that some plain clothesmen were shadowing him.

Patriotic circles and the opposition wanted Benazir ousted because of her deceitful role and her propaganda

against the armed forces. They were demanding of the president to get rid of her government which was an enemy of Islam and the people. The people were very puzzled and upset at the president's silence. According to informed sources, the president was already considering suspension of the Assembly and removing Benazir's government. The emergency measures taken on 6 August had resulted from the military intelligence's timely discovery of Benazir's abominable conspiracy against our nation.

According to informed sources, Benazir had sent mangoes as a gift to India's president, V.P. Singh, and foreign minister, Gujral. However, these boxes contained important national documents instead of mangoes. These were being sent for India's benefit. An alert special agency learned about this affair and confiscated the boxes containing these documents. They informed General Aslam Beg, chief of army staff, who had an emergency

meeting with the president and showed him proof of Benazir's treachery. It was impossible to keep Benazir in her position after this secret had leaked. The president consulted military leaders and announced the suspension of the National Assembly and Benazir's government. This was the reason why Benazir has been very critical of the armed forces and the military intelligence after her government was dismissed. She is accusing the military intelligence of being after her. This agency, however, has served the people and the country well by exposing this conspiracy. It is important to mention here that the Bangladesh soothsayer Chishti, who had predicted her father's hanging, later had predicted that "Benazir will become prime minister when mangoes will explode." It is a strange coincidence that it was bombs planted in boxes containing mangoes that resulted in Ziaul Haq's death and brought Benazir power, and now boxes of mangoes played an important role in Benazir's fall!

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