

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**U.S. MILITARY EXPERTISE FOR SALE:
PRIVATE MILITARY CONSULTANTS AS A TOOL
OF FOREIGN POLICY**

BY

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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This study examines privatized military assistance as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. Corporate military consultant firms may now provide military assistance for profit around the world, specifically, to advise in training of entire foreign armies. With apparent initial encouragement by the executive branch, this phenomenon has developed without traditional congressional oversight or public knowledge. Is this foreign policy by default? This dangerous trend removes military expertise from public accountability and corrupts our military. The unintended consequences of profit-motivated military assistance could detract from U.S. foreign policy objectives, result in tragedy when misused by recipients and leave a dispirited military.

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PREFACE

New actors in peacetime defense engagement are defense contractors who negotiate agreements directly with foreign governments. They typically advertise corporate military expertise in such areas as streamlining security assistance, force management, modernization, training, and military transition assistance programs for emerging democracies. The appearance of these companies is too recent for an informed judgment to be made about impact on defense engagement. But the arrival of such independent parties suggests the direction in which this instrument of U.S. power might travel in the future.

Hans Binnendijk
Strategic Assessment 1996

While all professions are to some extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by the state.

The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services where they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steadying and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence. The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society.

Samuel P. Huntington
The Soldier and the State

mercenary, noun, one that serves merely for wages; esp; a soldier hired into a foreign service.

mercenary, adj, 1. Serving merely for pay or sordid advantage.
2. Hired for service in the army of a foreign country.

Miriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary

INTRODUCTION

Should U.S. military expertise be for sale on the foreign market? Traditionally, the United States has provided military assistance to its friends and allies around the globe under the broad category of security assistance. Security assistance is defined as programs authorized by U.S. law by which we provide defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.¹ Since the end of the Cold War, United States security assistance has been freed from the constraints of the Cold War's superpower rivalry and has found more prospective clients around the globe, especially in former East bloc countries. Additionally, the U.S. success in the Gulf War has served to increase foreign interest in U.S. military doctrine, equipment, and training.

Recently, however, military assistance to foreign nations has taken a fundamentally different form, while at the same time expanding in scope. The U.S. government has permitted and even encouraged private corporations to conduct the training of other nations' armies for profit. As the U.S. defense budget shrinks, the use of privatized military training abroad is quickly gaining acceptance as another means of conducting foreign policy while avoiding the direct use of American forces. David Isenberg,

defense expert and senior research analyst at the Center for Defense Information, observes,

Simply put, at a time when there is a trend toward military downsizing worldwide, coupled with continuing and perhaps more virulent conflicts in developing nations, a global trend towards privatization, and the reluctance of developed states to intervene in troubled areas, there will be a continuing and possibly increased demand for the services of trained military personnel capable of both teaching combat skills and conducting combat."²

THESIS

The employment of private corporations to provide military assistance, specifically the training of other nations' armies to fight wars, should not be an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The military profession should remain a monopoly of the state. Neither Congress nor the public vets, approves, or provides oversight to this new form of security assistance provided under private contract. Freed from traditional, time-tested constraints, foreign policy happens by default initiated by the private business agreement between a foreign government and a corporation. Ultimately, privatized U.S. military services under direct foreign contract corrupts our military both in the eyes of society and from within the ranks. The corruption begins with the executive branch permitting profit-motivated organizations, accountable to neither the government at large nor the people, to sell contracted military expertise to foreign entities. This form of privatization removes military expertise from the realm

of public accountability and upsets the delicate balance of the remarkable Clausewitzian trinity among the government, the military, and the people. It blurs the lines between a military that works for the state and one that works for profit and sells a precious national resource--the professional expertise of warfighting and managing warfighting by the world's best military.

Virtually unregulated privatized military assistance represents a significant departure from the government-sponsored security assistance programs such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) which have traditionally served as the vehicles for U.S. military assistance. In the new paradigm, private firms provide military training under direct contract with a foreign government rather than a government-to-government agreement associated with traditional security assistance implemented by active-duty military members or closely-monitored contracts. These firms train entire armies, beginning with the lowest private and up to the most senior general across the entire spectrum from individual weapons skills through unit operations to international political-military strategy. The consultants actually teach and supervise a cadre of trainers from the foreign army using knowledge and experience gained from many years of active duty in the U.S. armed forces. It is comprehensive training aimed at developing a powerful American-style army.

This privatized military assistance has emerged quietly without much fanfare or publicity, but through aggressive marketing has grown to meet demand on the international market. Whether through accident or design, the U.S. Government has seized this alternative as an expeditious means to accomplish policy and bypass Congressionally mandated law, regulation, and budget as well as the seemingly impenetrable bureaucracy that so often slows traditional security assistance actions.

TRADITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Security assistance is a potent tool of foreign policy that enables the United States to pursue its national interests and shape the international environment. Congressional security assistance legislation provides the legal basis for assistance agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries.³ Current authority includes both the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.⁴ Congress limits security assistance through Federal regulations and budget restrictions that prohibit the unlimited provision to foreign powers of military hardware and training. Security assistance programs, coordinated between the State and Defense Departments as well as through the resident U.S. ambassador and country team, receive congressional oversight and public exposure. Of all the security assistance programs, only Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) specifically

provide for the training of foreign military personnel, training that is now also provided by the U.S. private sector.

Both FMS and IMET programs allowing the export of U.S. military training to foreign nations represent upfront, official commitments of U.S. prestige and policy. Under FMS, the Department of Defense sells training to other nations along with the military hardware or even the training as a commodity itself. For example, the U.S. Government has sold M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Saudi Arabia along with the requisite equipment-related training, which is conducted by private contractors working through the U.S. Government and supervised by Defense Department personnel. Under IMET, the U.S. Congress has recently provided \$15 million in funding to the African Crisis Response Initiative to train eight battalions from seven different countries in central Africa to respond to regional hostilities.⁵ Government-sponsored security assistance programs such as these represent a clear U.S. foreign policy commitment to very volatile areas of the world.

FMS and IMET security assistance programs promote military-to-military contacts, establish economic ties to the receiving nation, and allow U.S. military access to foreign soil. They have enabled our allies to better defend themselves against regional threats, have precluded the deployment of U.S. forces, and have generally enhanced the ability of the U.S. to conduct successful coalition operations when required. For example,

during Desert Storm, U.S. forces fighting side-by-side with the Saudis benefited from relationships forged during the long-standing FMS program with the Saudi Arabian military. Additionally, security assistance complements our diplomatic efforts in shaping the world environment to meet U.S. national interests.

THE NEW CORPORATE MILITARY CONSULTANTS

Who are these new private players in the security assistance arena and what do they do? They are U.S. corporations which can muster thousands of highly experienced former U.S. military personnel with the expertise to train foreign armies. From a U.S. security assistance perspective, these corporations are new actors who negotiate directly with foreign governments to provide specific services.⁶ They typically advertise corporate military expertise in such areas as streamlining security assistance, force management, modernization, training and military transition assistance programs for emerging democracies.⁷ Their business relies on their recruitment of a highly professional cadre of retired soldiers who provide expertise across the spectrum of military training. The major U.S. firms involved in selling military expertise on the international market include Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI); Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC); BDM International; Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.; and Vinnell Corporation. Of these, BDM International, SAIC, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., and Vinnell are

relatively large, diverse, transnational corporations which have historically provided technical expertise on military hardware and have expanded their international operations to include military training. MPRI, driven by market demand, is perhaps the first to focus on international military training and claims to have "the world's greatest corporate military expertise."⁸

Recently included, however, is the capability to train entire armies. In fact, in the last three years MPRI has begun to train the armies of other countries to fight wars.⁹

What these corporate military consultants do is market military battlefield skills which either help improve or substitute for regular military forces.¹⁰ In its own words, "Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) is a professional services company engaged primarily in military-related contracting in the U.S. and international defense markets. The company's business focus is on military matters, to include training, equipping, force design and management, professional development, concepts and doctrine, organizational and operational requirements, simulation and wargaming operations, humanitarian assistance, quick reaction military contractual support, and democracy transition programs for the military forces of emerging republics."¹¹ The kind of comprehensive military training provided by such a firm enables the foreign nation to augment its military capabilities in a short time by training and organizing its armed forces into a more effective

combat force and a more potent instrument of power. Furthermore, imparting high-level military skills, conducted by former general and field grade officers under for-profit contracts outside the direct supervision of the Department of Defense (as in FMS and IMET training), marks a fundamental change in the way the United States provides security assistance. This change marks a disturbing trend for the future.

Privatized military assistance to foreign armies as it is evolving, while currently restricted to training, qualifies by definition as a mercenary activity because of the foreign clients to whom it is provided under direct proprietary contract and the for-profit nature of the enterprise. Although corporations such as MPRI do not actually engage in combat on behalf of foreign powers, the skills they impart can prove just as deadly.¹² Nevertheless, the corporations involved in this business consider themselves military consultants engaged in the patriotic endeavor of furthering U.S. foreign policy rather than in a modern day adaptation of classic mercenary activity. What pushes it into the mercenary category is that it contracts, on a proprietary basis, with a foreign power rather than being provided under contract with the U.S. government, including direct oversight by DOD managers and Congressional visibility.

CURRENT POLICY

According to the National Security Strategy, the U.S. military helps shape the world's security environment by promoting regional stability in ways that protect and promote U.S. interests through forward stationing, defense cooperation, training and exercises with allies, and security assistance.¹³ Yet, many of the conditions that formerly guided the way we provided military assistance have changed. Since the mid-80's, Congressional funding of military assistance programs has steadily declined while FMS has increased.¹⁴ More than ever before, foreign governments now shop around on the international market for the best deals in equipment and training.¹⁵ As the U.S. defense budget has decreased, so has our ability to leverage government dollars and government personnel to provide military assistance to our allies.

The downsizing of the U.S. military, the drawdown of U.S. troops stationed abroad, and the reluctance of the United States to commit troops overseas have changed the way we look at security assistance and have increased the attractiveness of contracting out military services. Increasingly viewed as a cost-effective alternative, privatized assistance provides an expedient foreign policy tool for the President. It helps an administration stretch a shrinking budget while avoiding troop deployments where risks are high and national security interests may be low.¹⁶ The crux of privatization is the transfer of a

heretofore closely held policy instrument from the government to the private sector and permitting it to be accomplished for profit. Current policy with its reshaping of accountability and lack of public visibility on security assistance, greatly influenced by budget constraints and a smaller military force, fosters privatization.

Since 1995, however, the U.S. Government has allowed private corporations to train foreign armies outside the umbrella of official security assistance programs. This represents a fundamental change. Now privatized military assistance can be provided under the terms of a private contract negotiated between the military consultant firm and the foreign government, all with minimal oversight or control by the U.S. Government.

For example, in 1995 the Republic of Croatia hired MPRI to train its army under a private contract between the firm and the government. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also contracted MPRI to train its armed forces as part of the "Equip and Train" program. The basis for this program was President Clinton's promise of training programs and provision of non-lethal assistance for the Bosnian Federation in his letter to then-Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole.¹⁷ In this letter he stated, "First of all, the United States will take a leadership role in coordinating an international effort to ensure the Bosnian Federation receives the assistance necessary to achieve an adequate military balance

when IFOR leaves."¹⁸ He continued, "Training programs and provision of non-lethal assistance can begin immediately after the peace agreement enters into force..."¹⁹ In order to keep the American contingent of uniformed IFOR peacekeepers impartial and minimize U.S. military involvement, the U.S. Government encouraged private firms to offer their services. BDM, SAIC, and MPRI all bid on this contract and MPRI was selected by the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Muhamed Sacribey, at the time Bosnian foreign minister, said his government selected MPRI because it was the next best thing to U.S. military assistance.²⁰ (To be noted, up to this time in the Balkans, MPRI has worked very closely with the U.S. Government and adheres to the government prescribed guidelines for contracting.)

In yet another non-U.S. Government security assistance program, MPRI has secured a military assistance contract with Angola. It has received a license to provide training to the army and police forces of Angola. As of April 1998, this contract was in the last phase of negotiations.

Current policy also directs firms desiring to provide privatized military assistance to submit to a formal approval process by United States government agencies. The Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulation detail the procedures implemented by the Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC). After first registering with ODTC as a private company desiring to export, the firm must

apply for a Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA), essentially a license, to provide a defense service. Then the private firm can negotiate a contract with the foreign government for services to be rendered, the final version of which the firm must submit to ODTC for approval. ODTC staffs it through the State Department's country desk and, finally, to the Department of Defense. The final approval for this contract rests with the SES-level chief of ODTC. Under this process, the State Department must notify Congress of any contract exceeding \$50 million. Despite these specific controls, private firms may first solicit business, then apply for a license from the State Department to conduct training or other military expertise abroad. This administrative process takes place without any Congressional oversight or even a report to Congress for all contracts under \$50 million.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Continuing a trend that began in the 1970's, Congress has increased its oversight of national security policy including security assistance programs.²¹ The Senate and House use legislation to delimit and guide implementation of military assistance programs.²² They include or exclude specific nations and designate the level of funding for each.²³ The role of Congress is to act as a check and balance on the Executive branch for foreign policy through lawmaking, funding, confirmation of personnel, oversight power, war power, or treaty power.²⁴ This

ever-increasing congressional oversight, as perceived by the Executive Branch, has made it so cumbersome for the U.S. Government to provide security assistance as a tool of foreign policy that, as a result, the U.S. has opted, in part, for privatized alternatives. Thus, the unintended consequence of increased oversight has in fact moved a critical element of foreign policy to a private, pay-as-you-go affair. Recognizing a post-Cold War world, increased regional instability, and a downsized U.S. military, the privatized alternative is an attractive foreign policy tool.

The real problem is that privatized military assistance does not receive the same scrutiny, as do government security assistance programs. Congress reviews FMS and IMET programs and they become a matter of public record. However, once the process starts down the private path, Congress receives notification only if the contract is greater than \$50 million. As lethal or consequence-laden as they may be, most service contracts for training a foreign army not involving the sale of military hardware cost less than this. In fact, MPRI contracts for training foreign armies, with the exception of the most recent renewal of the Bosnia contract, have all been for less than \$50 million. Consequently, a private firm can train another nation's army without congressional notification, much less congressional approval. Thus, significant foreign policy actions related to

foreign security assistance do not receive the benefit of the checks and balances system inherent in our system of government.

One can argue that avoiding congressional oversight is not all bad. It provides privatized assistance some significant advantages. The U.S. can pursue its geopolitical interests without deploying armed forces into harm's way. When budget constraints and political sensitivities make it imprudent to overtly commit the power, prestige, and tax dollars of the United States directly, an administration can still implement foreign policy through private contracting. Thus removed from the purview of Congress due to the proprietary nature of the contract, international military assistance stays out of the political and public arenas. Additionally, congressional oversight and approvals take a great deal of time and often become mired in the politics of the moment. The private nature of this outsourcing effectively end-runs the Congress but does increase the President's ability to react and implement policy in a rapidly changing world.

Privatization, it can be argued, is also a much more cost-effective way for the U.S to implement policy and influence actions. The deployment of U.S. armed forces to support security assistance programs represents a significant expense to U.S. taxpayers. Since contracting shifts the cost to the recipient, the U.S. can help an ally and improve stability without committing forces or directly spending U.S. dollars.

Furthermore, when a private company commits to a contract, it will not have another military commitment in another part of the world arise to pull it away. Private firms also have access to a large pool of highly qualified military members. For example, a private firm like MPRI can afford to send 20 former U.S. Army colonels to Bosnia, while the U.S. Army would have to strip more than an entire combat division to muster that many.

Yet, cost effectiveness is not always the best and certainly not the only criterion on which to base policy. The United States has the best military in the world; our soldiers' commitment to democratic values serves as an example to all. With the power and prestige that comes with being the world's only superpower, the U.S. should influence global security through closely controlled and government-monitored policies. Why should we have to allow private corporations to accomplish what is certainly more appropriately and legitimately in the government domain? The U.S. can reinforce its place in the world community and bolster its relationship with allies by committing armed forces. More importantly, unintended consequences of security assistance programs can be better managed if they remain under government control. In this uncertain world with its shifting alliances, the U.S. should stand strongly and visibly behind its commitments, or not undertake them in the first place. Moreover, we should not forget that the Constitution intended for the Congress to be a constitutionally independent, coequal, and

democratically rooted voice in shaping US foreign policy.²⁵ This includes routine oversight of Defense Department activities.²⁶ The use of privatized assistance circumvents time-tested congressional and public reviews which are integral to the system of checks and balances that makes the United States government unique. Privatized assistance represents a course of least resistance, which is not the best way to conduct foreign policy in the long run.

FOREIGN POLICY BY DEFAULT

As private military consultant corporations seek out business opportunities around the world, they are essentially making foreign policy without involvement of our elected officials or the public. The nature of the contract and the fact that it is between the private firm and the foreign government shield it from public view. The State Department does not have to disclose any information about contracted operations on the grounds it is considered proprietary information.²⁷ When the executive and legislative branches are marginalized from the dynamics of providing military assistance, foreign policy is made by default. In short, business interests motivated by profit are shaping foreign policy by hiring out military assistance. Hence, governmental transparency in foreign policy is lost to the privatization process when the public is not aware of major

government-inspired operations because there is no U.S. troop deployment or monetary cost.²⁸

The major example of foreign policy by default is privatized military assistance provided to Croatia. The State Department issued a license to MPRI and approved its contract in 1995. At this time, Croatia had been independent for only three years during which it had been engaged non-stop in a civil/cross-border war within the former Yugoslavia. With training and consultation from MPRI, the previously incompetent Croatian army was transformed into a modern fighting force which surprised foes and observers alike with quick choreographed movements of combined artillery, armor, and infantry to flank the Serb forces in August 1995, just a few short months after MPRI began reshaping Croatian forces.²⁹ The entire operation bore the stamp of the minds that had orchestrated "Desert Storm."³⁰

This Croatian blitzkrieg, "Operation Storm", resulted in a victory which displaced over 100,000 Serbs and drastically changed the map of the Balkans; it probably also brought the Serbs to the peace table. It is widely perceived that Croatia launched this attack with the tacit approval of the United States. Given the close ties of MPRI to the U.S. government, one might well conclude that the U.S. "unofficially" encouraged this measure as a means to reach a peace. At best, the Croatian experience depicts foreign policy without involvement of U.S. troops or money. It produced favorable, if unintended,

consequences. At worst, it is backroom foreign policy manipulated by the U.S. Government with the complicity of a private military consultant corporation.

Angola is another case of foreign policy by default. In Angola, MPRI is planning to train the forces of Eduardo dos Santos despite his government's abysmal record on human rights. The administration would have a hard time selling the Congress or the public on the policy of sending American troops to Angola to train its army. Unstable politically and with a recent history of both sides hiring mercenaries to fight a bloody civil war, Angola is clearly not a model candidate for U.S. security assistance, but it seems the Angolan government will be receiving the equivalent in the form of privatized assistance. If this attempt to reform its military fails, the U.S. can distance itself from any official involvement. This is an illustration of how the lack of accountability allows foreign policy makers to support causes in a less than transparent manner. The aim appears to permit the administration to have the influence it wants without the political fallout and economic costs incurred from sending in U.S. armed forces. This trend seems to justify what has become, in effect, the policy of giving increased military strength to those who can afford it.³¹

There is a fundamental difference between conducting foreign policy and running a private international business. In international business, investors seek to make a profit. Their

attractiveness to potential clients is in the promise of economic growth and development for the foreign nation. With privatized military assistance, corporate military consultants sell improved military power as a product to their customers. This kind of product can rapidly change the balance of power within a country or region. Despite the rhetoric about training and integrating a disciplined military into society, most governments in developing countries see an improved military first as a way to control internal politics better and only second as a way to be more independent regionally. Improvement of an army means the potential for better management and application of violence to achieve political ends, first domestically and then internationally. Despite what the trainer may impart, from the recipient's point of view, military expertise is quite divorced from democratization, human rights, and free economic practices.

This type of policy can raise suspicions in the minds of allies. They will inevitably question the true commitment and intentions of a nation, which speaks out of both sides of its mouth. In a multinational peace mission, it can disturb our partners and may even put U.S. troops at risk because of the appearance of partiality. Bosnia is a perfect example of this dichotomy. NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops, including Americans, serving there since 1995 seek to keep the peace and appear impartial. Yet the private firm providing military assistance to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina comprises

Americans, including retired generals. These private, contracted ex-soldiers hired to train send a mixed signal. On one hand, active duty U.S. uniformed soldiers serving in SFOR must maintain impartiality as peace enforcers among the former warring factions. On the other hand, however, the U.S. allows its private citizens to train one side to become more effective warfighters from the individual soldier's skills to the country's national integrated strategy.

CORRUPTION OF THE MILITARY

Private military consultants who train foreign armies outside the umbrella of official security assistance programs unwittingly undermine and corrupt the American military institution. Despite their apparent legitimacy based on their increased use as an informal foreign policy tool, consultants, in selling military expertise to other nations, taint basic American military ethics and blur the distinction between active duty soldiers and private consultants working for profit. The corporate appearance of these consultant firms, their connections with senior Defense Department officials, many of whom are life-long colleagues, and their locations in Washington, D.C., seem to add respectability to the selling of warfighting skills. Nevertheless, these military consultants remain officers and soldiers, despite the fact that they have retired from active military service to their

country, because they continue to participate and train others in the art of war.

Retired and ex-military who work for private corporations no longer owe formal allegiance to the U.S. in the same way as active duty soldiers. They are not bound by the codes, rules, and regulations which make the military services unique. As these private firms seek to improve militaries around the world, we are left trusting the moral conscience of a profit-motivated corporation for the actions of private citizens in their capacity as trainers of a deadly profession. In essence, we have soldiers who have taken off the American uniform performing soldier tasks without the traditional rules, sanctions, or restraints imposed by a responsible government.

The U.S. military holds a special place in the hearts and minds of the American people, a bond as unique as America's civilization. This is jeopardized by the participation of former U.S. military officers and noncommissioned officers in international privatized military assistance. Both commissioned and noncommissioned officers are entrusted with the lives of their soldiers and employ them to fight and win the nation's wars. Among professionals in the United States, military officers consistently rank among the ten highest on the scale of most respected. This stems from the integrity and values of the officer corps and the spirit of selfless service as embodied in the duty, honor, country creed. Moreover, "his (the military

professional's) behavior in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state."³²

Samuel Huntington, in his classic work concerning the soldier and his relationship to society, also noted, "The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society."³³ These words describe the way society feels about and interacts with the military. When former officers sell their skills on the international market for profit, the entire profession loses its moral high ground with the American people.

The new paradigm of privatized international military assistance has far reaching implications in the American democratic culture. It can profoundly change how we as a society interact with our military. The delicate balance among the military, the government, and the people, the Clausewitzian trinity, is essential to our democratic culture.³⁴ This invaluable relationship has allowed us to successfully fight and win wars and provide a preeminent, effective foreign policy that coordinates ends, ways, and means in the overall grand strategy. However, this balance depends on the premise that our nation's military expertise is truly a servant of the nation and its people. As we blur the lines between corporate private military contracted by a foreign nation and our uniformed services, this premise becomes suspect and unbalances the trinity. The public

may well begin to rely on the outsourcing of private military consultants to perform tasks traditionally done by the active duty uniformed military. Soon, the public and the government could feel that they could hire out military missions as if they were commercial enterprises. This fundamentally redefines the military within society. Public trust would become a thing of the past.

As the use of private military consultants becomes increasingly acceptable as a means to implement foreign policy, the public will associate the military with the profit motive. Admittedly, private firms are motivated by financial reward, while duty, loyalty, and allegiance to the country motivate the uniformed soldier.³⁵ Additionally, the American public's faith in their military leaders will surely deteriorate when the public realizes that despite paying the military relatively well during active service and providing a generous pension, the retired military seek to cash in on their skills in foreign lands. It is hard to understand how one day the general in uniform is a selfless servant of the state who is motivated by love of country and dedicated to soldiers, and the day after retirement is selling his services to the highest foreign bidder. This contradicts the military ethic of selfless service and cheapens the profession of arms in the eyes of the public. The same is true for all the other ranks as well. The public will eventually replace the trust it places in the hands of our military leaders

to lead and care for the sons and daughters of America with the cynical belief that they are only in it for the money.

The military is very different from any other profession. The military professional is unique specifically because he is an expert in war making and in the organized use of violence.³⁶ As a professional, the military officer is bound by a code of ethics, serves a higher purpose, and fulfills a societal need. His craft sets him apart from other professionals in that the application of military power is not comparable to a commercial service. The military professional deals in life and death matters and the application of his craft has potential implications for the rise and fall of governments. The means of managing violence must therefore never be released from service to the state, even for the most appealing of international situations. As Huntington so accurately summarizes, "Society has a direct, continuing, and general interest in the employment of this skill for the enhancement of its own military security. While all professions are to some extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by the state."³⁷

CONCLUSIONS

The United States must be very careful to whom and under what conditions we sell the expertise to manage violence. Providing without strings the training to organize and wage war is much like letting the genie out of the bottle. We cannot predict how,

when, or why it will be used. The unintended consequences of widespread privatized military assistance around the globe could be disastrous. A better-trained army may just be enough to trigger a regional war or power struggle, not to mention the possibilities of internal repression. Despite well-intentioned instruction on primacy of civilian rule, rule of law, human rights, and democratization, building better armies around the world will not necessarily lead to stability or peace. The bottom line is: U.S. military expertise should not be for sale by private military consultant firms on the international market.

The United States of America should not employ private military consultants as a tool of foreign policy to train other nations' armies to fight wars. Private military assistance provided under contract between the firm and the foreign nation is not subject to congressional oversight or public scrutiny since the contents of the contract are considered proprietary information. Thus, privatization is a way of going around Congress and not telling the public. Foreign policy is made by default to private military consultants motivated by bottom-line profits. Current policy allows and even encourages this new type of outsourcing as shown in Croatia, in Bosnia, and soon in Angola. It has become an attractive, no-risk alternative in an era of shrinking resources.

Despite State Department licensing and approval procedures for privatized assistance; implementation is effectively removed

from the purview of both Congress and the public. Despite the apparent benefits of cost effectiveness and lack of risk, private military assistance will always lack the power and legitimacy required of U.S foreign policy in the world community. While privatization may be touted as reform, it serves as a device to remove military expertise from the realm of public accountability.³⁸ It allows the President and his administration to conduct foreign policy without the costs or the commitment of U.S. troops and to distance themselves should the policy not work.

If left to free market forces, privatized military services provided for profit to the international community corrupts our military by undermining faith in the institution and lessening public trust. It also creates a private organization of military expertise motivated by profit and neither employed by nor accountable to the government. Further, it upsets the delicate balance between the government, the people, and the military by blurring the lines between a military that works for the state and one that works for profit through the sale of military expertise. When military personnel, albeit retired, switch allegiance from the state to the private sector and the almighty dollar, they destroy the credibility of our uniformed forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States must change the current policy that allows for direct private military assistance to foreign armies. The U.S. Department of Defense should be the only agency allowed to provide or contract for this type of assistance. The U.S. Government must control the contracts for military services. Huntington had it right. The provision of military services, especially the training of foreign armies, must remain a monopoly of the state. This will ensure the appropriate level of oversight and integration into foreign policy, as well as retaining our military's integrity as an institution and accountability to the public.

If an administration cannot gain the backing of the American people to send uniformed forces, then the U.S. should not send its private citizens to do soldierly chores. A shrinking budget cannot be an excuse to privatize military assistance either. Moreover, if we lack the military resources to conduct policy through our legislated security assistance programs, we must suppress our appetite for military engagement around the globe or find alternative non-military substitutes. Our nation must decide whether to increase our armed forces to carry on this type of foreign policy or just not do it. Our leaders must make these tough choices; otherwise we will surely slide down this slippery slope and continue to employ private military consultants to perform missions best left to our uniformed armed forces. We

should not allow our leadership to elude direct responsibility by allowing the private sector to do what the public sector is unwilling or unable to do. Political expediency is not an excuse.

(Word count is 5,974 excluding preface, endnotes, and bibliography)

ENDNOTES

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