

JPRS-NEA-92-089
15 JULY 1992



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Near East & South Asia

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Internal Affairs

Economic, Political Aspects of Severing Gaza

92AE0467A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
18 Jun 92 p B1

[Article by Dany Rubinstein]

[Text] "Taking Gaza out of Tel Aviv" has become one of the Labor Party's most popular campaign slogans. "Let the Gazans stay in Gaza," as Yitzhaq Rabin said during the television debate. The Prime Minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, did not seem disturbed by Rabin's declaration; he may agree with Rabin. In any event, the Likud, apparently sensing correctly that the general public likes such statements, has put nothing contrary in its own propaganda.

But these are equivalent pronouncements. Except at a heavy price, the clock cannot be turned back on Israel's fusion with the West Bank and Gaza 25 years ago. The mutual dependence, primarily economic, between Israel and the territories runs very deep. A hint of the difficulties to come should anyone wish to end it can be seen in the disturbances at the Erez roadblock (once by Jewish employers and once by Arab laborers). Not long afterwards, the government was compelled to remove most of the restrictions on entry of Arab workers into Israel.

Someone who in his time opposed Israel's integration with the territories was Pinhas Sapir (and, to a lesser degree, Yig'al Alon), but Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense in 1967, gained the upper hand. From the start, this economic integration had a political nature. It was designed not only to prevent a return to the "Green Line" but to mount obstacles to the possibility of drawing a political boundary that at some future time would divide the land of Israel west of the Jordan River.

Thus, for example, Dayan precluded the Arabs of the territories from building their own electrical power stations and, practically by force, incorporated most of the territories into the Israeli electrical grid on the ground that this system would provide electricity more cheaply and efficiently. The first political plans (Dayan's) for a functional division of administration in the territories sprang up on the basis of integration between Israel and the territories instead of a territorial division between us and Jordan. The latest autonomy plans also contemplate administrative partition of authority in the territories, not a geographic one, this time between us and the Arab residents.

The economic union has succeeded. It has not actually led to an amicable coexistence but it has put down deep and stable roots. It has two important components: employment of laborers from the territories in Israel and opening markets in the West Bank and Gaza to Israeli merchandise. In recent years, there have been some jolts.

Since the intifadah boycott of Israeli goods, these have been less common in the territories, and since the Gulf

War and the tidal wave of immigration, fewer laborers from the territories work in Israel.

But these upheavals have not extensively changed the picture, because the Palestinians and Israelis have grown used to the advantages and the drawbacks, and even the distortions, that a common economy has produced.

This is true especially for the inhabitants of the territories, whose dependence on Israel is many times greater than Israel's dependence on them. Tracts of land inhospitable to agriculture, particularly on the West Bank, will be abandoned. There has been a rapid process of proletarianization of tens of thousands of villagers, who leave for work each day alongside crowds of refugees from the camps and big-city slums. Half of those employed in the territories have adopted the ways of life of hired laborers who work away from home. A social system with new patterns of income and consumption has arisen. There is nothing for them to return to.

As Salim Tamari, professor of sociology at Bir Zeit, wrote in an anthology on the intifadah that was recently published in Hebrew by "Mifrash," "You can return the land to the peasant but you cannot return the peasant to his land, for we are no longer a peasant society." Even the Palestinian political leadership in the territories and in Tunisia has reluctantly grown accustomed to the situation. None of the bus burnings has interrupted the journeys to the labor market in Israel.

The activists in the territories also have reconciled themselves to their inability to absorb these workers again in the West Bank and Gaza. Aside from some secondary contractor work for Israeli projects, they have no chance of competing with Israeli industry. All men of money in the West Bank and Gaza come from a traditional background in field work and commerce without any experience in modern enterprise. The territories have no capital market, no monetary system adequate for investment, and no communications or transportation infrastructure. And most important of all—there is no state system, no political force to protect them.

To remove Gaza from Tel Aviv someday, Kalkilya from Kafr Saba and Hebron from Jerusalem, the state of Israel will need to pay a political price that entails undoing most of the integration unilaterally forced on the territories. Only if the West Bank and Gaza have a political structure with authority and power will it be able to give local economic interests the protection they need for independent development and to welcome back tens of thousands of workers.

This seems almost impossible even on the Arab side. "Paradoxically, the conditions of life for Palestinians have produced an unprecedented national liberation movement at precisely the moment that their daily activity has become more entwined with that of their occupiers than at any time in the past," Prof. Tamari concludes his article. In these circumstances, the Labor Party, and the Israeli public in general, must realize that

it will be a long time before Gaza, Tul Karem, and Shehem leave Tel Aviv, and that the price will be high.

Palestinian Elections Proposal for Territories

92AE0468A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
22 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Gai Bekhor]

[Text] Working in complete secrecy in Amman over the last three days, senior members of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, along with Palestinian jurists, and the top leadership of the PLO working committee, including Yasir 'Arafat, have put together the first draft of a general election law for the territories-for a legislative body of 180 delegates.

The Palestinians intend to present the version to the Israel delegation as soon as bilateral negotiations begin again in Rome.

The law sets October 1992 as the date for elections. The text that reached HA'ARETZ yesterday includes 10 sections. The first section is an introduction that includes "the main points of the proposal for Palestinian elections." Following are quotes from the clauses (leaving out paragraph numbering and some technical details):

Introduction

The elections are for a legislative body with 180 delegates from all parts of the occupied territories. Political prisoners, to be freed before the elections, and people who lived in the territories before June 4, 1967, will take part in the elections. The Israel Defense Forces [IDF] and temporary security forces will withdraw from populated areas and from transportation routes leading to them. Jewish settlers must not be allowed to interfere with the elections.

The international media must be allowed to cover the elections. The elections shall be held under the supervision of a special representative of the United Nations who will work with the aid of a team which will include military men and civilians. A police force will be created to insure order during the elections. There must be freedom to campaign openly and without interference.

The elections will be in a mixed form. There will be 90 individual delegates, and 90 from party lists.

Goals of the Elections

The goal of the elections is to create a legislative body of 180 members, a Palestinian Transitional Authority to prepare for autonomy. The elections should be an important step on the way to realizing the national and political rights of the Palestinian people. Their goal is to enable the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories to establish responsible, democratically elected, representative institutions.

Insuring the Fairness of the Elections

The elections should be held in all parts of the occupied Palestinian territories, and they should be free, so that the Palestinians can choose their representatives fairly and freely.

To do that, the following steps should be taken:

All laws and military orders should be canceled before the election campaign begins. All Palestinian political prisoners and political detainees should be freed before the election begins, so that they can take part in it fully and freely, without being arrested, threatened or jailed.

All Palestinians who lived in the occupied Palestinian land before 4 June 1967 should be allowed to return (to the territories), without being disturbed, so that they can take part fully and openly in the election process. For this purpose, crossing points shall be set up for their entry.

Units of the Israeli army, the Border Guard, and military and nonmilitary forces shall withdraw from populated areas and from the transportation routes between them.

All necessary steps should be taken to prevent any possible violence, provocation, or intimidation by the Jewish settlers, or their interference in the election process. The international media should be allowed to cover the elections.

United Nations Supervision

The elections shall be carried out under the supervision and surveillance of the United Nations. For this purpose, a UN special representative shall be designated (referred to below as the "special representative") who shall be aided by a support team (referred to below as "the team"). The special representative must watch over each step personally, including checking authenticity of candidate lists, counting votes, and determining and announcing the results.

The team shall include military men and civilians, and be deployed in defined centers in the occupied Palestinian land. Similarly, a police force shall be set up, whose function will be to see to law and order. The tasks that the special representative and team will carry out, and their duties and responsibilities, shall be detailed in the appendix to the agreement concerning the elections for the Palestinian transitional authority.

Freedom of Assembly

There should be freedom to hold nonviolent meetings and freedom of political expression during the election campaign. Freedom to campaign shall include the right to organize open public meetings, including giving speeches, passing out printed material, and putting up posters. No person should be prosecuted for expressing a political opinion, or because of his/her political affiliation.

Election Procedures

Election of members of the legislative body of the transitional authority shall be held in a mixed format that will include a combination of direct personal voting and voting for party lists, or political factions, on the basis of proportional representation. The elections shall be carried out through general, secret voting.

Ninety representatives shall be chosen through direct personal elections, so that one representative shall be chosen from each neighborhood. The winner will be the candidate who wins a normal majority of the votes in the neighborhood. Ninety representatives shall be chosen in party lists according to the method of proportional representation. Electoral districts shall be set, taking into consideration the number of inhabitants, as well as the population distribution before 5 June 1967.

Right To Vote

The right to vote shall be given to every Palestinian, male or female over the age of 18, who is not ineligible for reasons to be specified below, and who fits one of the following conditions:

1. He must be a permanent resident and registered legally in the population register, or have lived in one of the voting areas for at least six months before the date of the elections.
2. An emigrant who was a permanent resident and was registered in the population register, or who is the child or grandchild of a person who emigrated from the territories after 5 June 1967.
3. Those who do not fit the permanent resident requirements because of studies or work abroad.

A person shall be disqualified from voting in the elections for the following reasons:

Mental illness or mental retardation; one who has been convicted of disgraceful crimes and has not received a pardon, or has been sentenced to prison for crimes connected with the elections.

Conditions of Candidacy

Women and men over the age of 21 who know how to read and write shall be permitted to present themselves as candidates in the elections. A public official must go on leave without pay on the day he presents his candidacy; a judge must resign.

A central election committee shall appoint election committees in the election districts. Registration committees shall publish the lists of voters. Every person has the right to protest if he is not on the list of voters (here the procedure for protesting, through the court to be set up to deal with electoral questions, appears in detail.)

Columnist Calls on Israel To Leave Gaza

92AE0444B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
31 May 92 p 23

[Article by Amnon Rubinstein: "All the Roads Lead Away From Gaza"]

[Text] Since the outbreak of the intifadah, there have been 30 cases of stabbing of Israeli citizens. Since the beginning of this year, five Israelis were stabbed to death, most of them in the streets of our cities. Our personal safety has never been as threatened as it is now. A mixture of fear and rage prevails and the Bat-Yam riots were only a "preview" of what might, God forbid, happen if the murders continue. The frightening sight of peaceful Israeli Arabs being stabbed and alarming cries of "Death to the Arabs" pale by comparison to what may come in the future. We have seen how populations more peaceful and quiet than the Israeli population can turn into a rioting mob when it comes to ethnic violence.

The Israeli Government has no answer to this danger. Yitzhaq Shamir and his friends on the right are trapped by their philosophy. Anyone who claims that Gaza Strip is an inseparable part of Israel cannot accept a process of separation from it.

I give up a priori the Gaza Strip, our presence there, and an open border between us and them. The Likud views Gaza as part of our ancestral legacy—the ancestors, by the way, being the British rulers after World War I—and therefore does not know what to do with its inhabitants. The Likud is like someone who refuses to have a malignant growth cut out on grounds that the growth is an inseparable part of his body.

People like me, who want a compromise with the Palestinians, are willing to abandon Gaza for two reasons: for their sake and for our sake. The Likud wants to hold on to Gaza, to confiscate whatever little land is free, and that way even to torpedo the possibility of building housing for its refugees.

The government is incapable of getting out of this trap. It is also failing to provide simple answers to problems of current security. More than one year ago, I approached the defense authorities and called their attention to the fact that most of the murders were committed by young unmarried men, and that restricting their entry into Israel will do more for our security than intermittently closing the border to everyone. I also explained to those in charge of security that putting such restrictions on young men is more just than general blockades because each family will have older, married breadwinners who will be able to make up for the young men losing their employment in Israel.

And now, with tragic delay, the government is probably about to accept my recommendation. Better late than never. I would like to add another recommendation which in the end the government will also accept: Start getting out of Gaza. It is not enough to restrict the exit of

dangerous individuals from Gaza. We need to think in terms of political separation and of putting a border between Israel and the Gaza Strip. There is no need to say that as long as we are in control—and I hope that our control will cease as soon as possible—we are obligated to ensure employment for the inhabitants. However, the primary obligation of the government is to ensure the safety of each one of us, to preempt both murder and incitement, as well as the fear of lynching. The government has failed in each of those requirements both because of its ideology and its clumsiness.

Ge'ula Kohen on Teddy Kollek's Jerusalem Policy

92AE0416B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
5 Jun 92 p 27

[Article by G. Kohen: "Teddy Kollek, There is a Limit!"]

[Text] Any reference to a "border" in connection to Jerusalem is something better not done.

Jerusalem is a borderless city in both space and time; Jerusalem is a never-ending city—not only from the historical aspect, but also panoramically: the mountain descends to the vale that bends toward the valley that makes the spring bubble forth that waters the plain that bends toward the desert that touches the sky that returns and kisses the mountain tops that are around it, to Jerusalem—all these are continuously pulled upward, continuously connect to the heavenly Jerusalem, ceaseless, limitless.

There is no limit to the love that even his opponents feel for Teddy Kollek, the great builder of Jerusalem; and if loving is also forgiving, then there is no limit to the number of people who are prepared to forgive Teddy Kollek even for his mistakes.

But—this is as long as Teddy Kollek does not go beyond all limits. As long as Teddy Kollek remains within the limits of Jerusalem's activity and construction; in Jerusalem's physical activity and construction, Teddy Kollek is a great leader; but when Teddy Kollek crosses over this border to political activity, Teddy Kollek is a small leader, and in debates with his political opponents he is, sometimes, to my sorrow, a very small leader.

There is a limit, Teddy Kollek, to your naive belief that a policy of silence, read as submission, will buy us coexistence in Jerusalem, when the one coexistence that there is in Jerusalem is a coexistence between the intifadah murderers and their Jewish sacrifices.

There is a limit, Teddy Kollek, to your political blindness, which does see that a separation between the dwellings of Jews and Arabs has not given us, to date, more security in Jerusalem, but the opposite: according to the testimony of the commander of the border guard in Jerusalem, actually from the very moment that Jews went to live in the village of Shiloah, the activity of Arab

rioters among the inhabitants of this village, which was known for rioters, decreased, and security in Jerusalem increased.

There is a limit, Teddy Kollek, to your preaching on the necessity for upholding the law, when you, on one hand, intentionally ignore the illegal Arab construction that is unrestrained in Jerusalem, truly an "intifadah" of construction, when, on the other hand, you trouble yourself and your honor standing and demonstrating with a big sign in your hand against the Jews who are living in the village of Shiloah, in houses that they legally purchased.

There is a limit, Teddy Kollek, to your practically historical disgracing of the "Jerusalem law," which I succeeded in passing in the name of Hatehiya in the Knesset, the very same law, word for word, that you pleaded among your friends, Knesset members 'Uzi Bar'am and Sholmo Hillel, to pass in the Knesset—only they failed....

By what right, therefore, do you have any pretext here for speaking against this Jerusalem law? Even when I can understand that you cannot understand how this law has strengthened Jerusalem's political position—in the final analysis, political understanding is not necessarily your strongest point—I still cannot keep myself from asking you why, for God's sake, all of this demagoguery—to falsely accuse more than 70 Knesset members who supported this law, among them, many of your friends from the Labor Party, of damaging...industrialists from throughout the world who waited in line to establish industries in Jerusalem, and this law has deterred them...

No less demagogic are your continually repeated declarations, Teddy Kollek, that you do not like declarations, but only actions....

If I had enough space and enough time, I would bring to your attention some words in history, which gave birth, in the end, to real deeds, and, in contrast to them, some deeds in history that became, in the end, empty talk....

And perhaps only one relevant reminder of one Jewish declaration: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem"—this, during many generations in our history, Jews did not actually realize, but merely swore it three times a day—but thanks to that same solemn oath, merely words, words, we also reached Jerusalem today, and today we are also building it.

And I, Teddy Kollek, have no doubt that the fact that we have forgotten today—in the deepest, most spiritual-ethical, most historical-political sense—we have forgotten the words that precede actions, the fact that we have forgotten to remember three times a day, word for word, the oath, "If I forget thee"—I have no doubt that this is the root of our weakness in Jerusalem today, and since Jerusalem has no limit—this is the root of our weakness in everything that we are doing here today.

Not like those who sit in Tel Aviv or Ramat Aviv and bark from there, supposedly in your defense, Teddy

Kollek, when, in actuality, their intention is defending the welfare of Arab Jerusalem (if there is a "national crime," Mr. Kollek—they are the national criminals)—not like those, you are truly the great lover and great builder of the Jewish Jerusalem.

Then why, in your political declarations—words, words, words—are you destroying that which you are building?

Implications of Autonomy for Israeli Arabs

92AE0407B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
1 Jun 92 p B1

[Article by 'Ozmi Bash'ara, lecturer at the University of Bir Zeyt, and researcher at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem]

[Text] Two central distortions accompany the idea of autonomy, when one tries to apply it to the Israeli Arabs. The first distortion has its origin in the Eastern European Jewish experience, where autonomy was a substitute for equality (Yo'av Feld, HA'ARETZ 27 May). The second springs from the debate in the Labor movement between Moshe Dayan and Yiga'el Alon, over functional compromise and territorial compromise. The functional compromise of the Dayan school is a way of solving the dilemma of being torn between the lack of desire to retreat and the lack of ability to annex the property to itself.

Let us start with the second distortion. Modern history knows cases where citizens who constitute a national minority have autonomy within a state that expresses the national character of the majority: Quebec in Canada, for example; or the Basques in Spain. There are also examples of autonomies in multinational states like Belgium or Switzerland. In all of these we are speaking of citizens who were given complete political rights, not of ethnic or national groups under occupation. This autonomy does not interfere with ties to the central government and full partnership in political and social life.

In contrast, self-rule for those who are not citizens has in modern history been part of the decolonization process whose aim was defined from the start: political independence, which turns autonomy into a stage in the gradual transfer of authority, with the end of the process agreed upon from the start. The case of the Bank and the Strip is exceptional: we are not speaking here of citizens with equal rights, nor about a process with an agreed-upon goal.

Whatever the results of the peace talks may be, one side effect is already clear: the meaning of the concept "autonomy" has been distorted. In the mind of the Israeli public, Jewish and Arab alike, the concept of autonomy is seen only in relation to a state of conquest. When it is mentioned in regard to Israeli Arabs, Jews fear that autonomy may be an expression of separatist aspirations, while Arabs fear that they will end up with the status of the residents of the conquered territories.

The first distortion has its origin, understandably, in the Jewish experience, especially in Poland and Russia. In its context, the demand for autonomy arose—and was seen as the best thing available—because of the recognition that complete equality could not be reached. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, opposed it on the basis that energy must focus on the struggle for equality, which when it is achieved makes cultural autonomy superfluous. History has proven both sides wrong. Equality la Lenin demanded absolute identity between national ethnic groups—an impossible task. And autonomy without equality always led to separatism.

The only situation in which autonomy can work without danger of dismantling the central government on one side, or insistence on complete renunciation of special national ethnic identity on the other, is one based on full civil equality. In these cases, the only criterion for equality is citizenship.

Autonomies are not divided into two categories: a substitute for equality on the one hand and self definition on the other; rather, they are divided into territorial and personal autonomy. The model that seems logical to me is the one that defines autonomy as cultural and personal. And not because territorial autonomy would be going too far. It must be remembered that the authority held by local councils can be seen as territorial autonomy. Since the Arabs in Israel are scattered over all parts of the State, territorial autonomy cannot be applied to them, only personal autonomy.

In the framework of cultural autonomy, all the responsibilities that affect the Palestinian national minority should be handed over to the Israeli Arabs' elected council: the educational system; the official Arabic-language media; and also the authority to intervene in development plans in the Arab sector, including return of confiscated lands if the need arises, in consultation with the central government. Cultural autonomy would not involve a separate legal or police system. It would be subject to principles of equality that would be anchored in the constitution (if there is one). Any autonomy proposed as a substitute for equality will be rejected, because it would be based on discrimination. True autonomy is possible only in a state that is for all its citizens.

Columnist Calls For Change in Nuclear Policy

91AE0430A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
20 May 92 p B1

[Article by Re'uven Padhatzur: "To Maintain Superiority"]

[Text] Israel's representatives to the multilateral talks that were held in Washington last week succeeded, as expected, in preventing substantive discussion of weapons' dismantling in the area. It was clear to the participants in advance that the first session of the conference would be academic in nature rather than natural. It was only on the basis of this agreement on the

question of the nature of the first meeting that the head of the Israeli delegation, David Ivri, could say that "Israel would not discuss the issue of weapons dismantling at all except after the implementation of 'confidence-building measures' between herself and the Arab states."

For once the multilateral discussion process had started, Israel was likely to lose control of the pace of the discussions and their direction and in a short time find herself forced to consolidate a clear and comprehensive policy in the area of weapons dismantling. Certainly David Ivri could warn the participants to the talks of "raising difficult questions prematurely," but it is unclear if Israel will also be able to prevent the discussion of those same "difficult questions" in the future.

Convenient cover

While Ivri uses the foggy term "difficult questions," several of the Arab representatives were quick to lift the fog and make clear that all sides, in fact, were concerned with the same problem. They asked explicitly to put on the conference's discussion agenda the question of Israel's nuclear potential.

At this stage in the discussions, the American hosts are also rebuffing the Arabs' attempts to hold discussions on the future of Israel's nuclear potential, since they well understand that if the Arabs persist in discussing the issue now, Israel is likely to walk out on the talks.

But the Americans also understand that the day is not far off when there will be no escape from dealing seriously with the question of Israel's nuclear potential. The first hint of such a stance can be found in President Bush's initiative on Middle East weapons dismantling of May 1991.

Certainly President Bush did not spell out in his initiative the details of the steps in the process to settle the nuclear issue, but a study of its paragraphs shows he is convinced that this is one of the important components in the very complex chapter of inspection, reduction, and dismantling of weapons in the Middle East.

Up until recently Israel has embraced a policy of obscurity in the nuclear area, and it has been very successful. The standard formula, that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region, provided convenient cover to all sides. The leaders of the states bordering on Israel believed that she had nuclear weapons, but had a clear interest in minimizing public discussion of the issue.

They understood that they could go on living with a rational Israel even if she had nuclear capability, they reconciled themselves to the asymmetry between themselves and Israel in the nuclear arena and they played according to the rules of the game established in Jerusalem.

But then came the Gulf War and Israel's trump card fell prey. The Middle Eastern nuclear game spun out of its control. From the moment it became known that Iraq was about to cross the nuclear threshold, without Israel's intelligence being able to pick it up, it has become clear that the previous rules of the game are no longer in force.

The revelations of the UN delegation in Iraq signaled the end of the era of certainty in the nuclear area. It became clear that Israel could no longer be sure of maintaining her potential nuclear hegemony.

The entry of Iran and Algeria into the game, which acquired momentum after the Gulf War, and their attempts to acquire a nuclear capability, have expanded Israel's sphere of nuclear relevance. The placement of nuclear weapons in the periphery states, such as those two or Libya, could be a direct threat to Israel.

Those developments are creating a kind of strategic bear embrace, involving not only Israel and her neighbors, but also the more distant states, which in the past did not figure in Israel's policy-making. Therefore any future agreement must include inspection and control of the nuclear programs of the periphery states.

The need has arisen to change the policy, which, in fact, was very successful, but can no longer be maintained except under the certainty that only Israel has nuclear capability. Israel must therefore prepare for a change in her nuclear policy and for taking initiatives in this area so long as she has hegemony. Once an additional state in the area has nuclear potential, the strategic framework will change completely and be based on a balance of terror. Israel must try to prevent this change by putting together a policy that will prevent the countries of the area from going nuclear. This is a common objective for both Israel and the U.S., and Israel's policy should be based on that fact. Only by harnessing the American government to a far-ranging plan for preventing the nuclearization of the Middle East, will such a plan bear fruit.

After Achieving Stability

Israel must make clear that any such program must be based on an agreement by the parties to freeze the existing situation. That is to say, an agreement by the Arab states to reconcile themselves to Israel's potential nuclear hegemony for a long term. During that period, political and military agreements would be worked out and tested in practice. After they have proved themselves and brought stability to the region, Israel could begin the gradual process of voluntary dismantling of her nuclear property.

High-ranking Egyptian officials have already made clear in off-the-record talks and closed meetings that they are willing to agree to that principle and have suggested beginning to put together a plan for turning the Middle East into a nuclear demilitarization area, with the understanding that the implementation of the principle of demilitarization by Israel will take a long time.

The change required in Israel's nuclear policy is not simple and requires a new mind set. But since the Defense Minister himself avers that "it is doubtful if any kind of inspection could stop the nuclear race in the Middle East," we can no longer continue avoiding the question and sticking with a policy that will likely prove to be irrelevant in the near future. We can continue warning in public against "raising difficult questions prematurely" in the multilateral talks, but we need to begin comprehensive discussions at home and prepare for the future.

Analysis of Begin's Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine

92AE0467D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
18 June 92 p B1

[Article by Reuven Podhoretz]

[Text] In a fashion that is extraordinary but apparently unavoidable, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] once again is publicly engaging in matters of grand strategy while the government continues to shirk its duty to handle these affairs. Three senior members of the general staff have recently warned of the dangers inherent in the introduction of nuclear weapons to the Middle East. One even proposed concrete action to stop this threatening development. The three are the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Chief of Military Intelligence and the Commander of the Air Force, the last of whom pointed out the danger and made clear that it is an existential one. "Such weapons" in the hands of one of the states in the region, argued General Herzl Budinger, "can even lead to a world war."

Formulation of Israel's nuclear policy is not one of the functions of the IDF's general staff. That is clearly the responsibility of the government and especially its chief executive. The IDF can and must provide advice and intelligence data to policy-makers in the government, but it does not determine if and when Israel will attack nuclear installations in a foreign country. By all appearances, what induced the GHQ [General Headquarters] generals to make their opinions on nuclear affairs public was the continuing hibernation of the highest political offices and their exclusive preoccupation with the election campaign while ignoring the need for swift action on nuclear matters.

It seems that policy-makers still do not appreciate how far-reaching and destructive, from Israel's standpoint, it would be for a Middle Eastern state to join the nuclear club. The day that Israel loses its hegemony over nuclear potential, one of the central foundations of the delicate balance between her and her neighbors will collapse. A critical component of Israel's deterrence ability will be lost. It is difficult even to imagine the repercussions on the web of relations between Israel and the region's states.

The top brass understand this very well. In off-the-record discussions, more than a few generals have expressed deep concern over this change in the rules of the atomic

game in the Middle East. Although the IDF's military doctrine does not include a nuclear component, and is based entirely on the use of conventional forces, the background for a nuclear option will change.

The other side, too, understands that when there is no hope left, Israel will still have what they call a "doomsday bomb." That is the firm psychological barrier against contemplation of the destruction of Israel. This defense system will fade away when Israel loses the monopoly it has enjoyed in the nuclear arena. And the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern country will place Israel in a bind whose consequences are not easily foreseen.

Gen. Budinger, Commander of the Air Force, has indicated two courses of action—one political and the other military—that Israel must pursue to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. There seems to be no disagreement with the Air Force Commander over the political route, which includes reliance on international bodies and pressure on the United States to advance the subject of supervision and control to the head of the international agenda. But in speaking of military action, while dropping heavy hints about the strategic attack capabilities of the force he commands, Budinger is planting dangerous illusions among his listeners.

It must be clearly understood that neither the Air Force nor the entire Israeli army can, by military means, stop the periphery states from acquiring nuclear weapons. At most, they could slow this process, and only for a short time at that. Whoever says that we must follow Iran's development of nuclear weapons and consider the possibilities presented for military action by the IDF is misleading not only his listeners, the citizens of the country, but policy-makers as well.

Political scientists who have analyzed the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 have constructed an interesting theory centered on what they call "the Begin Doctrine." In essence, this theory posits that, as proved by the Iraqi reactor strike, Israel has adopted a policy whose objective—effected by military means—is to prevent Middle Eastern states from obtaining nuclear weapons. The problem with this theory is that it has no connection to the reality of the Middle East or the world. "The Begin Doctrine" could exist only in the articles of political scientists. In practice, it expired the day it was conceived.

The bombing of the reactor outside Baghdad was indeed a strategic-military step meant as a warning, but it was a one-time action. Israel would be unable to employ similar means against other Middle Eastern states, and not merely because of operational military constraints. Whoever believes that, under current international conditions, Israel will be able to bomb nuclear installations in other states, and pay no price other than condemnation in the United Nations, is not correctly reading the map.

From a military perspective, too, it would be unmerited arrogance to speak of an operation to eliminate Iran's nuclear program or Algeria's. The Air Force undoubtedly has the operational ability to fly 1,500 kilometers to Tehran and hit the nuclear reactor there. But even destruction of the reactor would not mean liquidation of their program for developing nuclear weapons. The Iraqis, whose installations are scattered around the country, have proved that it is possible to develop nuclear weapons even without reactors. What vast armadas of American air power failed to accomplish in more than 40 days of bombardment is unlikely to be within the power of the Israeli Air Force to achieve.

Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is truly a development fraught with risks. The government must stop ignoring it. Still, it would be a mistake to base policy on a doctrine that does not exist and on the assurances of senior officers who may not be able to make good on them. The breathing space that Israel has enjoyed in the nuclear realm is contracting. The government is duty-bound to put the issue at the top of the nation's list of priorities and to harness to this task the international community, above all the United States.

Analysis of SHAS, Lithuanian Branch Split

TA1007171392 Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 10 Jul 92 p 1

[Text] It was the night that SHAS [Torah Observing Sefardim] began its war of independence. The moment SHAS signed the coalition agreement will go down in ultraorthodox history as a new stage in the war of the Sefardim for equality in the ultraorthodox society which has always discriminated against them. This night will be remembered like the split in the kibbutzim. SHAS signed the document against the wishes of the highest sages of the Ashkenazim: Rabbi Schach, Rabbi Elyashiv, as well as the rabbi from Vizhnitz, cast a veto on signing. They claimed that Shulamit Aloni hates religion and must not be allowed to be the minister of education.

It is hard to overstate the importance of the event from the internal ultraorthodox aspect. Throughout the years SHAS has been under the heavy patronage of Schach. Even when he lost in the ballot, he tried to impose his will on the victors. SHAS went to the elections offering the Sefardi ultraorthodox voter independence. It swept the votes of those bitter over the racist speech by Schach, and yesterday, it fulfilled its promise to the voter.

The course of this independence belongs entirely to Rabbi 'Ovadya Yosef. Arye Der'i, who was raised in a Lithuanian yeshiva was unable, to the last minute, to free himself of his fear of Rabbi Schach, despite all the humiliations he underwent at his hands in the last two years. But 'Ovadya Yosef decided that the time had come for the Sefardim to stand on their own two feet.

Only a month ago Schach said that the Sefardim are not worthy of being in the leadership of the country. Yesterday, SHAS joined the leadership, and left the Lithuanian Schach outside.

Avraham Burg Calls on NRP To Be Less Divisive

92AE0474B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
28 Jun 92 p 19

[Article by Avraham Burg: "NRP's Choice"]

[Text] The ways of politics are cruel ways. The NRP [National Religious Party] to the right of me is now stronger than its size, but it is also stuck in a cul-de-sac. Its historical spirit knew only one way—the way of the government. It was only in the corridors of power that the Zionist religious empire could have been built at the time. But now, for the first time, the NRP is faced with the outcomes of its blunders and it no longer knows its mind. On the one side stands religious education and on the other the settlements.

The inner dilemma of the rank and file NPR activist is: If we stay out, we remain faithful to a great idea, but we endanger religious education; if we join in, we rescue religious education and its institutions, but we will be partners to the future impairment of the idea of settling Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.

I do not envy the leaders, ministers, and advisers of religious Zionism, who have maneuvered themselves beyond the pale of Israeli national consensus. A way out must be found, and quickly. It must be clear to every political apprentice that every religious party wants to be in government, but it also wants to be the second religious party to join the marriage. This is as clear as the fact that Labor will be generous to the first joiner on a first come first served basis, while the rest will have only the leftovers. You have to be in government not for Labor, but for yourselves—for the historical way of religious Zionism.

The leaders of religious Zionism must also consider the fact that the historical alliance and cooperation between religious Zionists and free Zionists was responsible for creating a culture of negotiation and dialogue among all categories of the people. But ever since the spirits of settlements and annexation took hold of the NRP, the entire philosophy of religious Zionism was shifted onto a single principle: Greater Israel. All the other principles were pushed to the side. In this manner, religious Zionism lost its best moderates: academics, yeshiva students, and pioneers of religious kibbutzim, along with moshav farmers who were abandoned and forsaken in favor of Judaea and Samaria settlers. Now a decision must necessarily be made this way or that, toward national unity or toward the divisive right corner.

Were it possible for me today to appear before members of the party office, this is what I would say to them: The time has come for spiritual stock-taking. There are no more excuses. The future of religious education in this

state has been secured for generations to come. Not only for the sake of three moderate religious candidates on the Labor list, but for the sake of Labor's promise to the thousands of moderate religious people who found a political home in it, the real decision is whether you—who were partners in the establishment of the state and are bearing the burden of national service—will continue to forsake the responsibility for national peace. The orthodox are looking after their own audience, their own people, and their own courts and that is it. And you, my friends and associates, the religious moderates, also have been dragged into this kind of irresponsibility. Thousands of secular young people can no longer distinguish between you and the orthodox. You have deliberately violated the historical covenant within the Zionist camp.

We all remember how Zevulun Hammer dared to wonder aloud whether the time had come to put the unity of the people before the unification of the country. We will not forget how he got frightened and pulled back. You have done everything possible to emasculate and delegate your political positions, but the people put their faith in the alternative. The next Israeli government will be a government of peace. Out of national responsibility

and military caution the the next government will move toward ending the occupation and implementing a territorial compromise. Where will religious Zionism be then?

Has the time not come to pave the way for joining the peace efforts and to once again fly the flag of national unity, rather than becoming mines on the road to achieving peace?

Adopt the philosophical positions of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. Listen to the moderate rabbis in your midst and pay heed to the scholars of the Zionist synagogues—there are ways to make peace without causing harm to Judaism and its commandments.

You owe it to yourselves to repent and to break up the rejectionist groups and the extremist front in your midst. We need peace and brotherhood in the country, because we have it in our hearts. An NRP to the right of the right wing is a part of the forces of national divisiveness, while an NRP in the government is an embodiment of the historical mission that religious Zionism has been neglecting in recent years.

Bank of Israel Official on Liberalizing Economy*92AE0474A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
23 Jun 92 p 4*

[Interview with Oded Hetzroni of the Bank of Israel by Nehama Dweq; place and date not given; "Hetzroni: No Need for Devaluation"]

[Text] How many senior functionaries do you know who are preaching from every pulpit to close down the department they head, or at least to significantly cut it down? One such exists; he is Oded Hetzroni, the man in charge of MATAH [foreign currency] and of the Credit Department of the Bank of Israel. And he does what he preaches. He has cut the Credit Department down to five employees and he may not be through yet. He plans to reduce the MATAH Department to what he calls "A realistic size, to deal mainly with research and statistics, not with controls."

Hetzroni, 57, holds very heretical views on everything concerning foreign currency supervision. He believes in a completely free market, he does not attribute to each citizen a desire to cheat the authorities, and he does not believe that lifting the restrictions will hurt the state's foreign currency reserves. "If people want to cheat, because the restriction laws are so tough, they will find a way."

He has many supporters in the economic system. They appreciate his frankness, the fact that he stands on his principles, and his capability to work out plans for the future, which are usually ahead of their time but which in the end get implemented.

[Hetzroni] We must end the foreign currency controls. Throughout the world foreign currency control is carried out only in connection with the management of foreign debt. They focus on gathering data for the balance of payments and providing recommendations for the decisionmakers. Some of those things are already being done in the research department.

[Dweq] If so, what is the first step that should be taken now?

[Hetzroni] We must eliminate the whole matter of permits in the foreign currency area and to transfer it to the domain of general authorization, or change the law. The law says that there is a subsidiary legislation containing three authorizations: A general authorization (each citizen is allowed to hold \$3,000 at home), a class authorization (what given companies are allowed to do), and a personal authorization (special dispensations that are individual and secret). The sum total of dispensations is in the thousands. This year the dispensation unit issued 10,000 authorizations. There is no justification for that. All the dispensations must be anchored in a general authorization that will determine what is allowed and what is not, or at least reduce this to a minimum.

Hetzroni believes that a number of steps can be taken now toward liberalization. "From an objective viewpoint, we can take a few additional steps. However, there are delaying factors, such as inflation differences, interest rate differences, and large foreign and domestic debts, and that is why we cannot immediately cancel it. The exchange rate policy is also a part of it. If the public thinks that a devaluation like the one last October is in place, I can go with the situation. And something else—I believe that every mitigation will allow greater freedom of movement for capital and will restrict and give less freedom to politicians."

[Dweq] Instead of talking in slogans, tell us what can be abolished.

[Hetzroni] The business sector must be completely liberalized. In our country its freedom is very limited and needlessly so. An exporter cannot now keep abroad more than 10 percent of his earnings from exports. A business firm cannot buy stock abroad and can invest abroad only up to a certain amount of its capital. Business firms are obligated to work through authorized local commercial banks. They cannot import services, not even through their own subsidiaries. This makes everything complicated and causes harm.

[Dweq] Assuming that you have told the decisionmakers all that, why are these measures not implemented?

[Hetzroni] The Treasury, to which I am actually subordinated, does not always think that it can go at a fast pace, especially when it has to raise money abroad. They think that every liberalization involves a drop in the balance. I do not share this view. Opening up the market does not mean flight of capital, on the contrary. We can see examples of it in the European market, where the opening brought only economic improvements.

And another example: When we lifted the controls from interest rates on credit from abroad, it turned out that it improved the ability of Israeli companies to compete. The various examples, which are many in number, contradict the fears of the Treasury. I also believe that if the business sector was free, it could invest its money better than the people on the third floor of the Bank of Israel (the floor on which is located the MATAH Department that manages the country's reserves and invests them in international money markets. N.D.) I should perhaps go on strike in front of the Finance Ministry. It makes me angry because, if we look at the past five years, we can see the impotence of the system. As soon as a decision has to be made, everyone gets cold feet.

[Dweq] You sound very frustrated.

[Hetzroni] Exactly. As far as foreign currency controls are concerned, we lag behind the countries with which we trade. In many respects we are the last bolsheviks. Even the East European countries have lifted all the restrictions. We are constantly being asked why we still have restrictions. I feel that my time in this department is coming to an end. It is a sapping business. At the same

time, I want to continue applying pressure, instituting some changes, and even seeing them through.

[Dweq] You were talking about the business sector. Do you have any plans in your drawers to make things easier for individuals, too?

[Hetzroni] Certainly. We are lagging behind with respect to the individual sector, too. Some restrictions were instituted in the 1982-84 period, when there was concern about the reserves. Those restrictions have not yet been lifted. That may stem from the lesson learned in the wake of the total opening decreed by Simha Erlich in 1977. At the time the market was not ready for such total liberalization and the reserves were affected. Today I think that the amount of money that an Israeli may take abroad should not be limited to only \$3,000. What is absurd is that this amount is allowed to people whether they go abroad for one day or one year, without any logic. Moreover, people can take out only \$3,000 in cash, but they can purchase here travel services for abroad at the tune of \$100,000 even, if they wish. You can pay for a yacht from here, or hotels, or restaurants, or theater plays for any amount. Is that not ridiculous?

I also think that it is not fair not to allow every emigrating Israeli to take out his property. Today they can take out up to \$4,000 per person per year. I believe that anyone who really needs the money will be able to take it out by fraudulent means. Israelis can bring money in, but not take it out. This absurd situation is creating difficult problems.

[Dweq] We are currently practicing an oblique exchange rate. Is that good?

[Hetzroni] I am a supporter of free exchange rate. On the other hand, the fact is that in most countries the rate does move within a certain range, whereby the central banks get minimally involved. In our country the rate moves around a target aimed at preserving the profitability of exports and the ratio between domestic and international inflation.

[Dweq] At the same time, the oblique rate of exchange determines a 14-15 percent inflation. Is that correct?

[Hetzroni] If the inflation will be lower than predicted by the Bank of Israel, either the system will have to be changed, or decisions will have to be made. I believe that once the Bank of Israel sees inflation dropping, the whole system will be in trouble. Would that the inflation will indeed drop to a lower level.

[Dweq] There is talk of a need for a devaluation. What do you think?

[Hetzroni] There is no need for devaluation, the purpose of which is to help with exports. There is no need, especially in view of the fact that salaries have fallen.

At the end he said in a resolute voice: "At one rate or another we will come to lifting the main foreign currency restrictions. It will be done on a reciprocal basis with the countries with which we trade. The present situation cannot continue for long. Those who fear that lifting the restrictions will bring about a drop in reserves and a general regression, are grievously mistaken."

Chief of Staff's Remarks on Jerusalem Day*92AE0416A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
2 Jun 92 pp 23,36*

[Article by Major-General E. Baraq: "The Greatest of Our Victories"]

[Text] Twenty-five years is not a short period of time, neither in the life of an individual nor in the life of a young country. The young men of today's general staff were cadets in '67, sometimes sergeants, and the most senior staff members were MP's when you, 25 years before '67, were young fighters in Palmah [Striking Force of the Hagannah], in the brigade, and some of you, perhaps, were still school children, just as whoever will be on the general staff in the year 2017, are now, at most, young division commanders. We are links in a chain, links that are deeply intertwined with one another. There are those among you who left the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], and were discharged immediately following the Six-Day War, and there are those who have remained with us until now, really within the direct act of defense. And all of us are links in the chain that is charged with the more essential activity that is being carried out in the State of Israel—ensuring its very existence.

The distance in time gives a perspective, and having then been under your command and now being the ones who have filled the positions that you held then, enables us to tell you some things that were, perhaps, hard for you to say to yourselves.

You have won the right to stand at the forefront of the IDF's greatest of victories ever. And our wars since then, and, in a certain sense even our wars before that, make this uniqueness stand out. The uniqueness of the Six-Day War focuses on two things: first, on the unprecedented military victory, whose smashing character, its speed, its magnitude, and, to a certain extent, also the reasoning rolled up, at least looking back, in the waiting: deducing the political potential before squeezing the trigger made it possible to interpret a military victory as a political achievement. That is: the opportunity to shape, from a position of strength and choice, the continuation of our path and the foundation of relations with our neighbors, while in the background there is a political payment and the payment of a supply of combat means from a superpower, a payment which to a significant extent was the fruit of waiting, whether it was done intentionally or by the necessity of the circumstances. And history is still adjudicating the judgments that you made, when we had the strength and choice to consolidate these matters.

Second—we did not have a war that we started, or, more correctly, that strategically was forced upon us, although technically and tactically we initiated, and together with this was carried out with the sense of total national consent through its entirety—even afterward there were no doubts, not even from external considerations for the military act—for its necessity.

In a certain sense, the feeling of distress and the widespread public anxiety with which you, as the general staff, had to deal on the eve of war, this feeling also constituted a source of recognition for the clarity of the threat that is rolled up in the possibility of war and the "no choice" recognition that moved the IDF's directed outbreak of force when, in the end, the signal to act was given.

I said earlier that "you have won the right to stand at the forefront of the IDF's greatest of victories ever," and the phrase "you have won," has the connotation, in Hebrew, of something dependent on fate or luck alone. Something like a prize. And it is not. Essentially, you made sure, ahead of time, that you would win. All of you, each one in his place, and at your helm, the chief of staff of the Six-Day War.

First of all, you intelligently prepared the force ahead of time, years ahead of time, with little means, and who more than we, the young soldiers and officers of the time, can recall what a poor army, in many senses, the IDF was then. But you prepared the force while maintaining a sharp and deductive distinction between the essential and the secondary, between that which would influence the outcome of the combat and that which would remain on the shelf or in the cellar or on the drawing board.

You intelligently brought together the concept of combat in face of the enemy's strengthening and manner of fighting, which underwent deep changes in the years near the war. You did this in good time, on a vast front, while revealing an understanding of the mutual relations between the branches and a systematic assimilation of the conclusions across the board.

You intelligently brought original and unique solutions together to activate air power and to sow the beginnings of the modern operational concept for the navy.

You prepared a demanding system of debriefing and learning lessons from mistakes, of which you made continuous use in the IDF's operational conflict, both in the struggle over water and the struggle against terrorism, in order to whet the operational capability of units and to impart the achievements and lessons learned to all IDF units.

You invested the greatest efforts in resources as well as operational dangers, in the creation of a basis for information and sounding the alarm for war, which did not help deter it, but significantly helped the war, itself.

You created an advanced foundation, with very meager means, of a maintenance and control system.

And last, but not least, even before going to battle—and I say this with caution, because I cannot attest to this from any knowledge other than sensing it after the fact—you intelligently brought together, through dialogue with the political echelon, a concept of war, separate from the concept of combat, that was agreed upon, even if it was not explicitly written down, that

determines that, in certain situations, the State of Israel is conditionally committed to our initiated response, due to the fact that these situations compel the State of Israel toward a massive and protracted draft of the reserves. Even with this understanding, as it was implemented, it was not easy to accept the decision to order a departure to war. Without it, it is easy to guess how the face of things would have appeared.

And the main part—the combat. The story is known. The air force, Ariq's and Taliq's groups, Dado and El'ad in the north, and the brigade of Mote and Uri Benner in the center, Golani and Albert in the north. We, as young officers, recognized the obstacles and the bedlam that the general staff had more than once. And we heard here, too, even today, about misunderstandings, obstacles, and differences that you had, up above. But, in the end, when looking at the general picture, it was a miraculous precedent of the activation of force, in the center of which was getting the enemy off balance and breaking their will to fight even before they began to exploit the success and extract anything they could get from it.

The strategic importance of air superiority was emphasized and clarified to us, too, as a result of the war, and more than a few difficulties accompanied the extraction of this lesson later on, facing the ground-to-air missiles systems, through attrition, for the enemy understood this, too.

We identified the importance of the armored multimilitary formation, in the center of which was the tank in the land battle; on this subject we also met with considerable difficulties later on, because, in some of the subjects we drew conclusions that were too wide, and the enemy also understood this.

We saw the importance—I do not know whether we fully digested it, but we recognized the supreme importance of opening conditions, at the center of which was the question of initiative: who starts the fighting according to his plans, with the partial compensation that there is for initiating the action in exchange for the inequality in the ratio of forces. And we won, in the wake of the war, for great stretches, primarily in the Sinai, a sort of "strategic depth" opposite the central enemy of that time, a depth which for various reasons we did not make use of in such a way later.

We saw the Arabs perceive the Israeli might with growing awareness. Nevertheless, it should be said with honesty that an understanding of the Israeli might did not give the Arabs the perception of deterring us, but, rather, paradoxically, of seeking Achilles heels in our capabilities: from the length of our all-inclusive breath and our sensitivity to ground-to-air missiles that the enemy tried to test in the War of Attrition, to the use of

its full force for limited ground targets, taking advantage of surprise, and application, on a tactical level, of an infantry rich with antitank missiles in the course of the Yom Kippur War.

The war liberated Jerusalem, Gush 'Etzion, and Judaea and Samaria toward the Jordan, and thus removed from you, fighters of the TASHAH [expansion not given], some of the foolishness of the "weeping for generations" of '48. Again, we conquered the Sinai, and some of the deposits that had remained when we retreated from the Sinai under political pressure in '56 were liberated. And we went up to the Golan Heights, and the wrath and anger that had amassed among us during the years of continuous wrestling was reduced, the plea of the burden of the settlements, with the Syrians—on the division of cultivation, tractors, and diversion attempts.

And the war established Israel's position, raised the stature of Jews throughout the world, from New York to Leningrad, and positioned Israel as the local power that no element, neither in the region nor outside of it, could ignore.

The Six-Day War created a deep international difference of opinion over the significance of our domination over the territories that we captured in '67, but almost totally stopped the contention throughout the world over the accomplishments of the War of Independence as a secure, international convention.

All of these things are not insignificant. Not to your general staff, which was, without doubt, one of the State of Israel's most distinguished general staffs ever (and I use this expression only in order not to offend the representatives of the previous and later general staffs who are not here), and they are not insignificant to you, either, as Israelis and human beings. And for all of these, our thanks, both as your subordinates in the past, as citizens of the state, and as those who continue in your path.

In our profession there is nothing more dangerous than embracing the achievements of the past, and there is nothing worse than blindness to the conditions that constantly change and loss of the sense of reality and a distinction of the fine points—which are all so essential to the operation of war. We have learned lessons from all of our wars since then, are aware of conditions and data that are changing in all of the realms—in structure, the manner of fighting, combat means, in evaluating the enemy, as well as the political data. And we are aware of the complication of systems with the passing years and of the complication of the internal processes of their operation. And, together with this, we are trying to learn lessons from the method, the process, and the approach, which enabled you to build this capability and to operate it in such a way in the time of trial. And with these lessons we look forward, certain—Onward!

Home Front Commander on Defensive Preparations

92AE0468B Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew
3 Jun 92 p 11

[Interview with Major General Z'ev Livne, Home Front Commander, by Yanki Galanti; place and date not given]

[Text] Major General in command of the home front: "I was surprised at the willingness of battle officers to join the rear formation," newly-appointed Major General Z'ev Livne, in his first interview since taking over as head of the new command.

It will take 20-30 years, he estimates, until the entire population of Israel is protected by a combination of shelters and protected spaces.

[Livne] Establishment of the Home Front Command constitutes an important organizational reform, and, as Defense Minister Moshe Arens has defined it: "establishment of the command is the most meaningful change since the establishment of the Field Corps Command." The Home Front Command was established on the background of the Gulf War. In this war, the home front turned into the main target of the confrontation states. The basic assumption is that every future war will take place at the rear and the front simultaneously, and the rear will continue to be a target.

[Galanti] What goals were set when the Command was established?

[Livne] In effect, with the creation of the Home Front Command we hope to achieve three main goals. The first: to free the major generals of the fighting commands at the front from responsibility for the rear, and allow them to concentrate on controlling the enemy at the front. If we take, for example, the major general of the Northern Command: his front will be the Golan Heights, while at the same time—missiles are liable to fall on Haifa. By establishing the command, we free the major generals from responsibility for the crowded urban areas of the State of Israel, and neutralize their responsibility for 85-90 percent of the strategic targets in the State of Israel.

The second goal we have set ourselves rises from the background of the Gulf War. In the wake of the war, we reached the conclusion that the deployment in the rear must be seen as part of the broader national picture. That is, to utilize, in an integrated fashion, all of the emergency organizations the State of Israel has. It will be possible to do this only when there is a national organization that focuses all of the home front's preparations for war.

The third goal is to unify authority and responsibility. The organizations active at the rear before the Gulf War had budget, resources, and supplies, but no command authority. In effect, we have succeeded in creating a single organization, which receives allocations, is responsible for setting strategy and setting regulations, and also has command responsibility for the rear zone.

[Galanti] How did the concept of the "protected space," that you have called for, come about, and how is it being carried out today?

[Livne] In February, 1991, a committee, to be headed by the deputy head of the Planning Branch, was appointed and given the job of examining the subject: providing air-raid shelters for the 21st century. After six months of comprehensive research, the concept of "shielding" was consolidated, with the "protected space" its main element.

The protected space is meant to help the home front defend itself against potential threats existing today, that is to say, surface-to-surface missiles with nonconventional warheads, with which the Arab states are equipping themselves. The threat of surface-to-surface missiles has a central characteristic which had to be responded to by consolidating the concept of "shielding": that is, the very short warning period, if there is any at all, between firing and landing. All the old perceptions about shelters, including public shelters, depended on a warning time of 20-30 minutes, but today this perception is not valid or applicable. By the way, at the end of the war, we tested what would have happened if we had recommended running to shelters during the Gulf War. The test results showed that we would have caused dozens of deaths and injuries.

The main conclusion is that it is best for the protected space to be set up within the citizen's apartment or on the floor he lives in the building so that it will be possible to gather all the family members within a minute or two and give them reasonable protection against a conventional attack or a chemical strike.

As for applying the conception, actually the orders requiring that every new building have protected spaces, (two apartments or two floors), were signed and distributed about a month ago, and the policy is being carried out in the field. Concerning old construction, the Minister of Defense has authorized several recommendations made by a committee headed by former managing director of the Ministry of Interior, Dov Kahat, for giving incentives to citizens who improve the shielding of their apartments and create protected spaces.

It is important to emphasize that the protected spaces do not completely take the place of shelters. That is to say, anyone who can reach a shelter within a short time from the moment the warning sounds, should do so. Shelters prepared beforehand, properly sealed, or having gas filters are an excellent solution, assuming that they can be reached, and quickly.

The combination of the protected space, existing home shelters, and the protected spaces to be built in existing houses, will bring us, at the end of a long-range process, to a situation where the population will be well-protected. I estimate that most of the population of Israel will be protected under this format within 20-30 years.

[Galanti] In the State Comptroller's latest report, topics within the responsibility of the Rear have again become targets of the Comptroller's arrows. Have you studied the report's findings concerning the atomic-biological-chemical masks, the siren system...and have you learned anything?

[Livne] I do not think that on the subject of protective masks, we have faced harsh criticism. We should remember that for the first time in history, a multiyear budget of 520 million shekels was allotted for protective systems, and the State Comptroller's report mentions this in a very favorable light. Similarly, the report relates positively to the project for renovating protective systems, that will begin in October. Altogether, we can say that authorization of the multiyear budget and the "Ra'am" project (the project for renovating protective systems-Y.G.) will provide a full resolution to any difficult problems that the comptroller's report raises.

When it comes to the siren system, I completely accept the findings of the Comptroller's report; and we are working on the problem, although we have still not found the resources necessary to solve the problem. Right now, there is a certain budget problem, and when the problem is solved and the budget put through, the old sirens will be replaced with electronic ones and a control and inspection network will be set up to cover the siren system throughout the country.

[Galanti] The command was set up three months ago. How is suitable manpower being found for it?

[Livne] I have to point out that in that area, a pleasant surprise awaited me. One of my first goals was to try to bring commanders and staff officers on a high level to the rear formation. In the past, this whole formation was secondary, and not all the manpower in it was skilled. We were surprised at the willingness of officers from field units, both regular and reserve, to join the rear formation. For example, I can point to Brigadier General Yishai Dotan (now Chief Engineering Officer—Y.G.) who will soon be appointed chief of staff of the command, or to the latest three regional commanders who have joined the rear formation, all past brigade commanders. All this points to a change in perception and to more awareness of the importance of the home front.

Future Challenges of Engineering Corps

92AE0467B Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
10 Jun 92 pp 20-22

[Article by Anat Balint]

[Text] The Engineering Corps became a part of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] only 10 years ago. Many will take issue—rightly so—with this simplistic statement; still, those who know will find in it more than a grain of truth. Even the chief of the Engineering Corps, Brigadier General Yishai Dotan, who is now concluding his three years of command, strengthens this impression when he says, "The turnabout in the Corps' position began these past 10 years. Since the war in Lebanon, the IDF has granted 'recognition' to the Engineering Corps and admitted that it had invested almost nothing in it for many years." As a result of this conceptual revolution, funds and ideas have been lavished on the Corps during the past decade. "Today," says Brig. Dotan, "we are

receiving a relatively bigger cut of the pie, which are the fruit of those efforts, while looking ahead to the battlefield of the future."

[BAMAHAHE] Gen. Dotan, what is the significance of the future battlefield for the Engineering Corps?

[Dotan] In the past, ground obstacles were such that it took a lot of time to set them up. In the past 10-15 years, a situation has developed in the world in which it is possible to build and erect obstacles against an advancing army very quickly and very easily. For example, mine laying dispersed around the world.

Today, there is the opportunity to lay mines from airplanes, helicopters, rockets, and artillery. We can seed a field with mines with five minutes of shooting, something that in the past would have taken many hours. As a result of that, it is expected that the battlefield of the future, and the future is already here, will be much more treacherous. If there was a time when people said, "We will bomb the front line, cross the obstacles, and then be able to fight unhindered," the situation now is different. An enemy who can sow mines can create a host of minefields over our forces' travel routes. We must be ready to overcome such obstacles, not just one time, as in the past, but 10 times.

Worldwide, we are speaking of mines, but not only mines. For example, methods exist today for rapid construction of antitank ditches. You put in the ground a pipe that can lie there for years; then, in an emergency, you fill it with liquid explosives. When it blows up, you have an antitank ditch.

Avenues of activity of this sort have increased the importance of combat engineering. The need for engineering has grown in every sphere.

[BAMAHAHE] How are we preparing for a battlefield strewn with obstacles?

[Dotan] We are now absorbing a large infusion of new equipment that gives us capabilities we never had before. Even so, the gap between the Engineering Corps and the others services is so wide that this process still has a ways to go.

We have received equipment in recent years that provides us a more effective means of breaking through obstacles, minefields in particular. We have also received heavy vehicles on which engineering personnel can ride. That is an important point because it constitutes a real step up for us. We have been outfitted with new mechanical engineering equipment—the D.9.N. and D.9.L. bulldozers. A large shipment arrived five years ago and an additional consignment last year.

An important step we took for mechanical engineering equipment was to develop an armored cabin. The machines were originally designed for civilian use and we came to the conclusion that they had to be adapted

for combat. The cabin was developed in recent years and it makes the machines much safer for the operator and the bulldozer systems.

[BAMAHANE] If we take the Gulf War as an example of future warfare, how would you define our level of readiness?

[Dotan] I would say that we have a response to every challenge but that not all the responses are good, certainly not as good as I would like them to be. There is no problem today for which I can say that we lack an answer; it's just that our answer sometimes is not as good as it should be.

[BAMAHANE] Where are we better and where are we worse?

[Dotan] We are better at breaching obstacles. We have put a heavy emphasis on that in recent years. An obstacle like the Golan Heights is good but it was built over a period of time with mine laying, the construction of ditches and the investment of a lot of money.

The Gulf War proved to us that we were thinking along the right lines. But there were certain matters we had slighted that deserve more of our thought. For example, our army does less digging in for taking shelter and protecting equipment.

We saw in the war how the Iraqi Army buried its equipment three, four, and even five meters into the ground, which saved a large part of it from damage. Losses in equipment when all was done were much smaller than expected because of the ability to make things relatively simple—placing equipment in trenches or shielding it with sandbags.

Another area that fits into a discussion of future warfare, although just a year and a half ago we saw that it is already a matter of warfare today, is chemicals. Our equipment and means for NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] warfare are good. Our NBC systems have received more money in the last three or four years than in the past. During the war, for example, we introduced new equipment called "Sigal," a very sensitive device that knows whether or not there are chemical warfare agents (CWA) in the area. The decision to develop it was made in recent years and the fact that we introduced the first units during the Gulf War is the result of work done in previous years. This was not something done at the last minute.

Ten years ago, the IDF's capabilities for NBC warfare were much lower. We spoke then about "survival" on the battlefield. It was only six years ago that the concept became "survive and continue to fight," which is altogether different. In other words, it is not enough to put on a mask and stand by, you have to continue fighting under NBC conditions.

This approach teaches that you have to know how to perform all the drills even under CWA conditions with a mask on your face and protective clothing. I think that

the army has gone through a real revolution in this field in recent years. We will be adding a lot of equipment in the near future.

[BAMAHANE] How is this revolution taking shape on the ground?

[Dotan] Soldiers now have better masks than they did before and the charcoal protective clothing necessary for certain types of CWA, which did not exist in the past. Our detection and identification systems have changed a lot. We have equipment now that can detect CWA's and report it as troops are on the move.

[BAMAHANE] In your opinion, what does our NBC system lack?

[Dotan] When it comes to the equipment and means at our disposal, we are among the most advanced in the world. Still, there are areas in which I would be interested in improving another grade. An enemy who knows that we are protected and will continue to fight under CWA conditions will think five times before using it. It may be that only by virtue of that ability will we avoid any fighting under CWA conditions.

[BAMAHANE] What about protecting civilians? In the wake of the State Comptroller's report on NBC masks, many civilians live with the feeling that they were sold a bill of goods and that the masks would not have protected them had they been needed.

[Dotan] It is worth making something clear on this topic. On the whole, the State Comptroller's remarks dwelt not on the quality of the protective devices but on how well they fit the wearer's face.

There is a difference between a mask that is defective, for example, its filter does not screen out CWA's, and a mask that does not fit right.

When the masks were handed out before the war, people were asked to go to the distribution centers with the intention that each, so far as possible, would personally measure the mask. A large part of the public instead sent only a single member of the family, so it was decided to distribute the masks by age group. As a result, a situation was created in which people opened the boxes and saw that the units they had received did not fit. It must be remembered that civilians also had a sealed room that effectively blocked CWA's, which also explains why civilians can get by with masks that fit less exactly than those for soldiers, who must carry out combat operations outside of a secure place.

[BAMAHANE] Does what the civilian has today really protect him?

[Dotan] It protects him to a great extent if it fits his face well. The army is currently getting ready to provide an orderly solution for the entire civilian system. All civilians who have a mask, and even those who have nothing, such as new immigrants and newborn infants, will personally receive a working device that has been inspected

and fitted. If war breaks out before that, civilians will use what they now have while the IDF is ready to make a rapid distribution for those who have nothing.

The project for replacing and distributing new masks is supposed to start in October-November and continue for 10 months. Under this program, which will be conducted at regional distribution centers, each civilian will return the protective device he received during the war and in its place get a unit that has been tested, that is in order and that fits. The mask filters will be refreshed with new ones and any part that is not working will be replaced. Children under three will receive a new unit—the “babysitter”—and children ages three to seven will receive an active hood. The rest of the public will get standard masks but each will be marked with the date on which it must be replaced with a new one.

As soon as the program ends, we will begin what is called the “support process,” in which dozens of distribution centers will remain open at all times so that anyone who needs a mask for a newborn or who has complained of a problem—burning, a crack, or anything else—can come in and get new equipment.

[BAMAHANE] There have been reports that the mask replacement program may be dropped for lack of a budget.

[Dotan] That is simply untrue. This project is so important that money will be found for it.

[BAMAHANE] Is there a possibility that it will be done by the army and not by a private corporation?

[Dotan] There is a possibility that it will be conducted under military auspices. That would be less expensive but the army has other responsibilities and a project like this requires diverting soldiers, full-time staff, and resources. It may be that if they reach the conclusion that this is much more economical, then it will be done by the military. Both possibilities are open and the decision will be made in the near future.

[BAMAHANE] General, does another war necessarily mean chemical warfare?

[Dotan] We have no choice but to assume that the enemy will use chemicals. We do not have the right to make an assumption for soldiers and civilians that it seems like the enemy will not use NBC. Whoever thinks chemicals will not be used in the next war is liable to conclude that there is no need to do anything about it. It is a great threat. We already know, now that the UN teams have been in Iraq, that at least 30 of the SCUD's aimed at Israel carried chemical warheads.

Gen. Dotan was drafted into the IDF in 1964. He returned to his kibbutz, Yad Mordekhay, but was recalled to create an obstacle crossing system and since then has held various posts in the Corps.

In his next assignment, Gen. Dotan will continue to deal with some of the issues he has addressed as Chief of the

Corps, such as gas masks and NBC warfare. Meanwhile, it seems that his thoughts still turn more to the Corps in which he grew up than to the new homefront command. He is worried, for example, by the thought of an additional cut in the authority of the service commands as was carried out under the Lara-ground forces command plan or plans for total elimination of the services. In his opinion, there is no substitute for service headquarters and any such attempt will reflect a lack of understanding of the service's function and lead to unfortunate results.

The most important function of the Corps is to look ahead, and still further ahead, at all times, to think of the long-term and prepare the service accordingly. When he made a farewell visit to his units, Dotan said, “It is not enough today to walk forward, you have to run just to stay even; to progress, you must run fast. Whoever is satisfied with what he has, who is not forever pushing forward and trying to see what is happening around the corner, will find himself falling behind in the years to come.”

Ordnance Corps Chief on Education, Technology

92AE0467C Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
10 Jun 92 p 36

[Interview of Ordnance Corps Chief Brigadier General Ami'az Sagis by Yo'av Kaspi, Le'ah Eshet, and Sharon Solomon; place and date not given]

[Text] [BAMAHANE] Ordnance Corps Chief Brig. Gen. Ami'az Sagis, what is your assessment of the level of technological education today?

[Sagis] Technological instruction must keep up with technological advances. I think that a country without technicians or professionals in all strata—beginning with operators, engineers, and technicians and including doctors or scholars of the highest level—cannot meet technological challenges. Respect for professions, I regret to say, has declined over the years. One can see advanced countries such as Germany where people still use the honorific mister, that is, a senior professional on whom one can rely. To be a mister is a great honor. In my opinion, we have invested fewer resources over the years in technological instruction and, correspondingly, are receiving less from it.

[BAMAHANE] Is the State of Israel neglecting technological instruction?

[Sagis] I do not know whether neglect is the right word, but I would say that Israel must invest more resources in technological education. If the institutions of higher learning, the Technion and the universities, would give fair credit to graduates of vocational schools, the motivation to study in those schools would be much greater. The Technion, however, does not recognize these studies. The average Jewish mother says, “If that is how things are, why should anyone waste two years of his life studying for a vocation? My son is too talented for that.” We need to look into what has happened to our culture as

a nation. I am a graduate of a vocational school. In my time, many more of us studied in these schools. Students streamed into such schools as the ORT [Organization for Rehabilitation through Training] Singelovsky and the Givatayim Techniqom. The desire for these schools today is ebbing in comparison to academic schools.

[BAMAHANE] Are you satisfied with the level of the people now entering the Corps?

[Sagis] There are areas in which the people I am receiving from school bring a level of knowledge adequate to the Corps' needs. But there are more than a few areas in which their level is not satisfactory and requires extensive remediation from us. We are making contact with the vocational schools with the hope of engaging in joint action with them. We have instructional facilities, test equipment and advanced laboratories, and are interested in having their students use our installations so they are familiar with us, acting in partnership and improving their knowledge.

[BAMAHANE] Is a technological institute the answer?

[Sagis] That is one of the solutions. That way, we can make sure that we receive people with a good technical background. While acquiring a technical trade, the student also gains knowledge in a technical area that I would like him to know. If, for example, he becomes an electronic technician, I will introduce him to the secrets of a missile and control technician even while he is in school.

[BAMAHANE] What you are really saying is, "The educational system is not good so I will do the job."

[Sagis] What I am saying is that the educational system is not fully adequate for the IDF's needs. That is why I am obliged to complete their studies in school for our purposes.

[BAMAHANE] Would you like your teachers to study, for example, in the ORT system?

[Sagis] I do not think the problem is the quality of the teachers. I think that we need to look at the resources that the state devotes to technological education.

[BAMAHANE] What part has the Ordnance Corps played in the multiyear project and what part by the private defense industry?

[Sagis] We are working together, so you cannot say that one side alone has done something. The project is always administered by the office of the Chief of the Ordnance Corps. On every project, we thoroughly discuss whether the planning should be done here or by outside industry. If industry has the capability in a certain area, there is no reason for us to develop a parallel ability. This is our advantage over the defense industry—the ability to provide a rapid answer and at low cost. There are instances in which private industry is less expensive, mostly in fields in which it has expertise and equipment.

In every instance in which there is a possibility of developing something well and cheaply, we follow that path.

[BAMAHANE] What are the future lines of development?

[Sagis] We will work hard on precision and guided weapons, on developing and improving ammunition, and on developing future technology. We are completing development of a machine gun called the "Negev," which is to replace the MAG [expansion not given]. We are studying a new Jeep, the "Storm," and a main tank carrier, the "Oshkosh." We are working on improving tank armor and tank fire control systems, long-range target acquisition systems and a primary shell for all tank models. We are also trying to improve tank mobility, mine laying equipment and power units. We also would like better, more sophisticated night-vision capabilities in most of our equipment.

[BAMAHANE] All development done as part of the multiyear plan is based on budgetary assumptions of which it is unclear how many will turn out to be true and how many will not. Even now, there is a gap between what you have received this year and what you thought you would get.

[Sagis] At present, we are continuing all development projects established by the multiyear plan. Should there be a change in the budget, development and particularly armaments will continue even longer. We have yet to interrupt a project we have undertaken and we still have not begun projects that we know will continue much longer than was planned. For now, the plan is being executed as established.

[BAMAHANE] The Ordnance Corps has an image problem. The public often thinks of it as a service with grease on its hands.

[Sagis] We have a problem. People do not know what the Corps is like. The image issue is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Maybe we are not so good at marketing, but I do not think that the army needs to go into marketing.

There is also a problem of exposure. We have developed a broad variety of munitions but they get showcased in the end by the service that uses them. I cannot show off what I have developed, and that may be the problem.

[BAMAHANE] What is your dream for the 21st century?

[Sagis] I would like to see the Ordnance Corps of the future as a technologically advanced service with modern means for carrying out its assignments. We lack such means today for execution and maintenance. We still use an old vehicle for moving munitions. I would very much like to see this situation improve. Likewise, I would like our personnel to improve technologically and professionally, so that we will be the technological flagship of the IDF and, in some areas, even of the state.

[BAMAHANE] How does it make you feel to know that the new Chief of the Quartermaster Corps, for the first time in 10 years, is someone who comes out of the Ordnance Corps and not from the combat units?

[Sagis] Every new Quartermaster Chief brings his own personal contribution, although someone who comes from Ordnance will be more familiar with it and will need less time to learn. It is very important, in my opinion, in a technological world and a technological army, that a technologue sit on the general staff.

Profile of Undercover Unit in Janin

92AE0444A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 12 Jun 92 pp 9, 20

[Report by Ron Ben-Yshai, who spent a day and a night with an undercover unit in Samaria: "Undercover Assault in Janin"]

[Text] "One is located north-east of the complex. Once we stop, A. will be slightly to our right..."

Amir, a stocky young man of average height from Rishon Leziyyon, returned to the unit after a short course for seamen. Before the action, during the long hours of preparations, he spoke fondly of his team. "The most aggravating thing is that they call us 'killers.' What killers do you see here? Who? Tzafrir, Ofir, Avishay?

"Not long ago in the Gaza Strip, near Khan Yunus, they sent us to look for a wanted man. He escaped and we chased after him. Suddenly he pulled out a gun and fired it. Avi shot back and wounded him. Not only was I not ashamed, I was proud. I knew that if we had not stopped him he would have made it to [illegible word]. We get a lot of experience from undercover actions, and with experience comes confidence. And people who know what they are doing and who feel confident, do not tend to pull the trigger for no good reason. We are engaged in a small-scale war against armed squads. What is wrong with that?"

[Ben Yshai] Do you tell your parents what you do?

[Presumably Amir] "My parents are on a tour of duty abroad. I talk to them on the phone. I do not go into details because I do not want them to worry. My mother is terribly concerned."

[Ben-Yshai] Would you like to talk to someone older and more experienced about what you do? To a psychologist, for example?

[Amir] "What for. I have no problem about what I do. Some of the guys would like us to get out of the territories. But there is no dispute about what we are doing."

Tzafrir is crouching over the communication set and listening, while watching the road with one eye. Shabak [General Security Service] received information that one of the Black Panthers squads active in the Janin area

were visiting a group of [illegible word] houses located on one of the hills. They came there regularly to get food and vital provisions and sometimes spent the night there.

Those violent squads do not have a hierarchical structure or clear organizational lines. They were formed as local teams, and the links between them are loose, but they all recognize the authority of a veteran, cold-blooded murderer called Muhammad 'Awwad, and their members have killed Israeli soldiers and civilians and dozens of locals. Recently Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah took them under its wing. [Abu-Tayyb], the commander of "Force 17," sends them instructions from Jordan and even claims responsibility on their behalf for their attacks.

According to various estimates, there are now about 600 "hard-core" wanted men in the territories, members of squads such as the Black Panthers. A considerable number of them carry weapons and most of them have already participated in actions and in killing collaborators.

In the Nabulus area, for example, particularly active at this time is a group calling itself the "Revolutionary Security System," which also belongs to the Fatah. In Ramallah the most active are members of George Habash's Popular Front, who operate as proper urban guerillas. Their actions are characterized by greater sophistication than those of the other groups. The most dominant in the Gaza Strip are the Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] members, who now prefer to act in isolation. Aside from them, however, there are a number of squads made up of members of the Popular Front (Habash), and the Gaza Black Panthers, connected to the Fatah.

It is against this hard-core nucleus of armed intifadah activists that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has pitted its special forces. Undercover assault [hista'arvut] is only one of their means of tracking down wanted men. And indeed, in the past six months some 750 hard-core offenders were caught, 20 were killed in encounters with the security forces, about 60 surrendered, and many fled the country. Judging by all the signs, the number of youths joining them has dried down to a trickle, and they come under harsh criticism from the people for the killing of locals. They are desperate and that makes them even more dangerous than ever in the past.

The rumor that special IDF units are trying to eliminate them has become an axiom for them. A few days after the first report about the undercover assault units appeared on television, 12 wanted men gave themselves up. However, those who did not flee abroad or surrender are ready to fight to the death and also to terrorize the population so that no one would dare turn them in.

The briefing for the action was given the night before. A small group of officers from one of the reconnaissance units attended, as well as the commanding officer of the reserve battalion in charge of current security in the area.

Hung on large cardboard sheets were maps, air photographs of the area in which the squad was assumed to be moving, diagrams, and white cards carrying the main orders and the timetable.

Painstaking preparatory work had obviously been done. Later in the evening I participated in simulated exercises. Again and again we were turned back to the point of departure, until the commanding officers were satisfied with the execution. There was no "close enough" and no "it will be OK."

Avi from Dimona, the second in command of the patrol unit, was going to command the forces active in the field. "As long as we are here, in the territories, there is no other way to handle the problem," he told me later that evening, "we have to go after the hard-core offenders and catch them. We must also make sure that none of us is injured." During the briefing, he lingered on the topic of opening fire. He consulted his notebook and the notes he had prepared for himself, then he began to exactly list, one after the other, all the various situations that could emerge during the encounter with the terrorists and how the men were to conduct themselves in each situation. He recalled at great length when it was permitted and when it was forbidden to use weapons; and if weapons were to be fired, where they were to be aimed in each of the situations in which the force men might find themselves; he also explained in what situation the men were to stop firing and when to continue the pursuit firing.

Also, during the simulated exercise, the commanding officers placed the team members in situations in which they had to decide whether or not to open fire. At the end of the exercise there was a short discussion on the lessons to be learned.

"Today I have no problem about serving in the territories and about the new instructions for opening fire," Tzafrir said shortly before we went to lie down in ambush for the night near the group of houses. "Now we work against armed squads, rather than disperse demonstrations of women and children.

"In the beginning, when we began working here with the new methods, there were all kinds of rumors about what they wanted us to do here. I knew that we were dealing with murderers. But if a murderer comes to court, he gets a prison sentence. I thought something was not right about the fact that if someone attacked us in the field, he was going to die without a trial. Later they explained that we would fire only if he was indeed threatening us. That is how we work, so I do not have a problem with it. I do not know what other units do."

We took off close to midnight. We drove up to a certain point, then continued on foot to the location of the ambush, careful not to kick any stone so as not to be discovered. For hours we laid among thorn bushes, but the wanted Black Panther men did not show up. Towards morning we went back, sweating, exhausted,

and scratched by the thorns. We spread margarine on a few slices of bread and put on makeup for daytime pursuit.

"There is the group of houses," Amir said motioning to the spot where the wanted men were hiding on the opposite hill. He was careful not to point with his hand, while we turned our heads slowly and casually. By daylight the houses looked smaller and much less threatening than at night.

A tractor dragging a large water container was driving slowly ahead of us. There was no way to pass it. On our left was the precipice and on the right a tree grove. Palestinian villagers are never in a rush and we had to act like them. Wild driving would have revealed our identity and the primitive but efficient alarm system of the wanted men would have gone into operation.

The previous evening, during the briefing, one of the senior commanders told us that the squad was led by an experienced, "heavy" wanted man who had managed to escape several times after his tracks had been picked up. Later he came back with his mates, caught, tortured, and murdered the locals whom he suspected of having turned him in to the authorities. It was clear to us that if he was in the group of houses and if he sensed something, he would jump into the thick vegetation and ruins surrounding the houses. Finding him there would be like finding a needle in a haystack.

The tractor finally went off the road and let us pass. Another 200 m separated us from the group of houses. We were holding our weapons. "You see the green gate? Run straight toward it and enter house No. 1," Tzafrir said in a low voice throaty with excitement. "I am reminding you, no one opens the safety and no one fires. Only if the terrorist is armed and threatens a life, yours or someone else's in the team, only then you fire to hit. If anyone runs away and is not presenting a life threat, you follow the normal procedure for apprehending a suspect: Warning, firing in the air, and if the escapee does not stop, then you shoot only at the legs."

We jumped out of the car, skipped over a low stone fence, broke through the gate, and flattened ourselves against the wall of one of the houses. Within seconds we were inside. Amir spotted a young man in the kitchen, jumped on him, twisted his arms behind his back, and pulled him to the ground—exactly as he had learned in the antiterrorist warfare class. Two women were screeching in one room, and a child was crying. No trace of terrorists.

One of the team members rifled through a closet and found an IDF uniform, shirt and pants. "Oh-ho," said Avishay waving the uniform under the nose of one of the women, "What is that?"

Black Panther squad members have often disguised themselves as IDF soldiers or as settlers when going out on attacks. The fastidious among them even put on a skull cap. For the sake of historical truth we must point

out that they were ahead of the IDF in using Jewish disguises for operational purposes.

The women looked at the khaki uniform with amazed eyes as if seeing it for the first time, then suddenly stopped wailing. In low voices they swear not to know how the uniform came to be in the closet in their house.

Additional forces had in the meantime arrived in the area and spread among the heat-radiating rocks. They searched the evergreen grove and entered every cave. Every thicket that could provide a hiding place was carefully investigated. Nothing doing—no trace of terrorists, although by all the signs at least one of them was in the house shortly before our arrival.

Some time after 1200 Avi gathered the troops together and told them to put down their arms and drink water. "Never mind," he says in my direction as we get into the car, "next time."

[box, p 9] SHABAK Requested, Baraq Agreed

The use of elite IDF units for intensive actions in the territories became necessary because of the change that occurred in the nature of the intifadah. The mass demonstrations almost stopped, and there was a sharp decline in the incidence of stone throwing and fire bombs. Daily life in the territories became more normal: the stores kept longer hours, the number of days of strike dropped, and the population showed far less readiness to obey the leaflets of the intifadah command.

The heads of the Civil Administration are endeavoring to encourage this trend. They are easing the bureaucratic pressure on the population: Opening universities (in the meantime, al-Najah in Nabulus was closed down again) and issuing mounds of permits for opening new industrial enterprises in the territories.

However, at the beginning of 1991, when it seemed that the area was quieting down, the "hard" violence escalated sharply. Members of the "popular committees" and the "shock squads," which previously had mostly served to forcibly implement the orders of the political command of the intifadah, now began acting as terrorist groups for all intents and purposes. Not only did they murder increasing numbers of locals, but they also turned their guns on the Israeli security forces and civilians, something they refrained from doing in the first years of the intifadah.

Violent groups of activists sprung up like mushrooms after rain, usually around one or several veteran, armed wanted men. They perfected their means of concealment and survival. Additional weapons were procured for the

new members especially from Arab Israeli arms dealers who bought them from criminal sources in the country.

The IDF had to shift from general area actions to precise single targets. Already two years ago Shabak claimed that the regular and reserve units were unable to make the most of the intelligence they got. Those claims found an audience with Chief of Staff Ehud Baraq. Shortly after he came into office he toured Judaea and Samaria disguised as a local resident with men from one of the underground assault units. He was impressed by the actions staged by the units, which were then just beginning their activities, and he became persuaded.

After a series of consultations and staff work, the IDF changed its strategy: The number of strongholds, regular patrols, blockades, and mass arrests was reduced to a minimum; the emphasis was placed on intensive intelligence gathering and special operations.

The new method began to yield results last October, when all the organizations opposed to the peace process—especially Hamas and the Popular Front—opened an intensive campaign of shooting, road mines, and firebombs. The purpose was to heat up the territories and to drag Israel into responding violently, thereby forcing the Arab countries to abandon the process.

Defense Minister Moshe Arens summoned the chief of staff, his deputy, and the commanders of the regional commands and asked them to swiftly put an end to the wave of armed terrorism, before it got out of control. Arens requested that all the reconnaissance and elite units be brought into the area, as well as "all the targeted intelligence gathering technology available."

And thus, since the beginning of the year the number of attacks and incidents involving explosive charges dropped considerably. Dozens of "hard-core" wanted men were caught, surrendered, or escaped across the borders. The number of new recruits greatly dropped. The active wanted men are mostly busy hiding and settling accounts with the locals.

Between the beginning of 1991 and the end of last May, four soldiers, 12 Israeli citizens, and 133 Palestinians were killed by wanted men in the territories. During the same period, 18 wanted terrorists were killed in the territories. By the way, most of the firearm attacks occurred in Judaea and Samaria, not Gaza.

The IDF continues to exercise pressure by means of special units, clearly aware that if the pressure was eased, the security situation would almost immediately worsen. Hundreds of violent, armed wanted men are still moving in the territories and it has also become known that Palestinian organizations abroad have established special training camps whose purpose is to "recycle" the wanted men who escaped and return them to field action.

Mental State of Rami Dotan Examined

92AE0478A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 3 Jul 92 pp 4-6

[Article by Yehudit Yehezq'eli: "Rami Dotan: I Am a Finished Man"]

[Text] On election day, prisoner Rami Dotan woke up early in his solitary cell in the military jail and looked for his identity card. Unable to find it, he asked the warden to inquire about his identity card with the prison management. The jail commander's office clerks began to search, but Dotan's identity card could not be found. The police unit in charge of investigating serious crimes, where Dotan was questioned before his trial, and the Military Police [MP] investigation offices also failed in their searches. When the prisoner was told that he would not be able to vote, he turned inwards, more dejected and depressed than ever. It was as if an invisible hand had wiped him off as a citizen and a person.

The lost identity card served as perhaps the best illustration of the present situation of Rami Dotan, former brigadier general and head of the Air Force Procurement Group, who was sent to prison for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Almost completely isolated from society, lonely, sick, and abandoned, he is now very far removed from the all-powerful senior officer who ruled over his subordinates haughtily, who with a wave of his hand decided how many millions will go to what project, and who in the process slipped huge amounts of money into his own pocket.

Prison No. 4 consists of a collection of old one-story buildings, most of which were built at the time when Zerifin still served as a British Army base. The prison is surrounded by a fence and well guarded by the MP. Rami Dotan is locked up in a building isolated from the rest of the base. His room is a small rectangle. All that is visible through his small, barred window is the top of a tall eucalyptus tree. The toilet is in a corner. No shower. At the end of the building there are communal showers, to which Dotan is escorted under guard. This is the cell imprisoned which Izz'at Nafso, who was accused of treason and espionage and was in the end cleared by the Supreme Court. Nafso was jailed there for 7 and 1/2 years. Before him, the same cell housed several prisoners together. When Nafso was brought in, all the beds but one were taken out and the cell was set up for one solitary prisoner.

The prison routine is determined by a strict military regime. Reveille is at 0530-0600 in the morning and the lights are out by 2100. Before the lights are turned out the sergeant on duty goes from one cell to the next and counts the prisoners. A shout of "Attention!" is heard and the prisoners jump to their feet. The sergeant on duty asks the prisoners if they have any requests, jots them down, and goes on to the next cell.

A little more than one year has elapsed of the 13 years of imprisonment to which Rami Dotan was sentenced and

as Dotan told a visiting friend, to him it has been eternity. "I, who was used to work 24 hours a day," he said, "feel here like climbing the walls with inactivity. Time simply does not move. Each hour crawls by like a tortoise. This kind of life is a nightmare to me."

Dotan's lawyers claimed in court that if he were sent to a civilian jail, criminals there may attempt to force military information out of him. That claim, reinforced by the argument that in a civilian jail Dotan's life would also be threatened by violent prisoners who would also try to punish him, led to the decision to leave Dotan in the military prison. The decision then was to let Dotan serve the first years of his 13 years' sentence in a military jail and then, when the affair was forgotten, to transfer him to a more open and more comfortable prison like Ma'assiyahu or Ayyal.

In the meantime, as we said, he sits in his cell doing almost nothing. He was allowed a television set and books, but he may not associate with other prisoners. "When all is said and done, who are his friends there?" said one visitor, "The wall on the right side, the wall on the left side, the window, and the ceiling. He has been seen more than once talking to himself."

The week that the U.S. authorities once again requested the Israeli Government to retract its refusal to allow them to personally question Dotan and the other people involved in the corruption affair, Dotan sat in his cell in Prison No. 4 in Zerifin seemingly indifferent to all the stir around him. "As far as he is concerned," said a close acquaintance, "it makes no difference either way whether they come to question him or not. After all he has been through and is going through, he has simply become a broken reed."

The Israeli Government's official position is that it cannot respond to the American request for reasons of national security and sovereignty. Israel suggested passing on written questions to Dotan, to which he would answer, and which would then be handed to the Americans after the military authorities had deleted anything that could harm Israel's security. Congressman John Dingle, chairman of the commission that investigated the Dotan affair, requested from Defense Secretary Richard Cheney a report on means that will ensure that Israel will nevertheless acquiesce in the U.S. request. Dingle even demanded that if Israel did not allow the American investigators to do their job unhampered, the military aid to Israel should be suspended. The Americans, however, said that if the Israeli law restricted the questioning of Dotan, they will respect those restrictions.

The army legal adviser consulted with Attorney General Yosef Harish in this matter. In the reply sent to the United States a few days ago it was said that indeed the Israeli law does not allow public officials to reveal information acquired in the exercise of their duties; therefore Dotan may not share with the investigators any information he acquired by virtue of his job. The Pentagon's legal adviser did not accept those arguments. The fact is, he wrote in his opinion to Congressman Dingle, that through its procurement delegation in the United States, military aid, and Defense Ministry bodies the Israeli Government already has supplied a lot of material

to the U.S. Department of Justice about the Dotan investigation. Many documents were also passed on to the Americans.

In about three weeks the Congress commission dealing with the Dotan affair will meet to plan its next move. It is clear to both the Americans and the Israelis that in this respect Dingle will make every effort to carry through the idea of having Dotan questioned by Americans.

The number of people allowed to visit Dotan can be counted on the fingers of one hand. One of them is his 84-year-old mother Rivka (Becca), an ailing woman who makes sure she comes once a week to jail to see her son. "It is very difficult for me," she told me this week, "it is difficult to get there by bus. It is tough on me to see Rami in his condition, but I have to give him a bit of strength." She will never say a bad word about her son and she will not accuse him, but his bad luck. "Who put the banana peel under his feet?" she sighed.

Dotan, now 47 years old, was born in Bucharest, Romania. His sister Aviva, born a few years after him, is now a lawyer, married, with children. When Rami Dotan was five years old, the family immigrated to Israel and settled in Holon. Rami was a polite boy, mama's good child, almost the only one among his Israeli-born group to display any European manners. He met Mikhal, who was later to become his wife, at the Holon High School, where he was enrolled in the science track. They married when he was graduated from the Tekhnion as a mechanical engineer. In the early 1980's he went with Mikhal and their three sons to Dayton, Ohio, where he got his master's degree in aeronautical engineering.

That move marked the beginning of the change that was later to split the Dotan family. "There we became friends with Ella-Yehi'ela Karmon and her husband," Mikhal said a year ago in an interview for YEDI'OT AHA-RONOT. "Both our husbands were engineers and majors in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. Ella and I became very close friends. Later I was told that Ella and my husband already had begun their affair."

In 1988 Rami Dotan returned to Israel. The couple were on their way home to Holon when Rami announced to Mikhal, still on the road, that he had decided to leave home. After recovering from the unexpected announcement, Mikhal gave him a divorce and he moved to live with Ella. When the fraud was uncovered Mikhal found herself starring in the affair as one who had been with Rami for at least part of the period in which the wrongdoings were committed. Throughout the trial and even after it she refused to say anything against her former husband. This week she said that she had not visited him in jail even once. She has erased Dotan as if he had never existed.

"I find it difficult to express exactly what I feel. Of course I am sorry about what happened to him. It is nothing but sorrow for a man who went wrong. I do not love him. Not anymore. I do not visit him in jail because I do not think that I should go there. But the children go.

There was no rift between them and their father. I did a good deal to ensure that the children go visit him in jail. He is their father and a complete break with him could cause them to suffer the rest of their lives. As it is, they are already paying a price because of him. That is why I strongly encouraged them to stay in touch with him."

When the affair exploded Mikhal made every effort to escape the media; she refused to give any interviews or to be photographed. She continued to teach first class in an elementary school and she slowly, slowly regained the anonymity she so much desired. Today, after two difficult years of fighting alone against the humiliation of being left and against the degrading publicity, Mikhal said she was happy. "I started a new life. I changed my life. I found a life companion. I am now recovering and I am doing well," she said in a voice to which the joy of life was returning. "I have a wonderful friend, divorced with two children. Any comparison between him and Rami would be out of place. Immediately after we met I told him everything about myself. Like everybody else he reacted with amazement, but he very soon became used to the fact and the subject was dropped from the agenda. We have a good life together. My children accepted him with understanding and I am doing well."

Aside from his children and his mother, his wife Ella also visits Dotan every week. She now lives in a neighborhood of villas in Ra'ananna and calls herself Yehi'ela Karmon, her previous married name. Ella married Rami about six months before the investigations against him began. Her husband, Rami Dotan's friend, committed suicide. His elderly and ailing parents never forgave her for marrying Rami Dotan and forbade her to come to their house. Ella Dotan was not found implicated in Dotan's fraud and he made sure of securing her position in the pleading deal so that she would not suffer.

Dotan meets his visitors in the visiting room during regular visiting hours, along with the other prisoners. In such circumstances, private conversations are difficult. Talks with Rami Dotan usually deal with his health. He suffers from high blood pressure and gets special diet food. At times he needs to be treated in the prison infirmary. Whenever his condition deteriorates he is taken to the Tel-Hashomer Hospital. He has to take a high dosage of medicine to regulate his blood pressure. His medical condition is described by the attending physicians as "very difficult." They think that his difficult emotional condition is definitely contributing to the deterioration of his ailment.

Not everyone can get permission to meet with Rami Dotan in jail. Journalists were and still are absolutely unwanted there. The prison management and the wardens were ordered to keep silent about anything concerning Rami Dotan. But even persons who are not journalists have difficulties gaining access. G.B. (who asked to remain anonymous) had to wait two months from the moment he requested to visit Dotan until he received permission. The man, who is in a senior administrative position, was a high school friend. "To me

Rami is still my good friend, and one does not abandon a friend in crisis. He sinned, he is paying for what he did, but that is certainly no reason to abandon him. We were together in high school, Rami and I, Mikhal and my wife. We were together with Mikhal from fourth grade.

"I usually join his mother and sister on their visits about once every three weeks. We never met in his cell. To this day I have not seen his cell. The meetings with Rami in the prison visiting room last altogether 5-10 minutes. That is the time allotted for family visits. We are forbidden to bring him anything. Once I asked if I could give him some chocolate and was told no."

[Yehezkel] What do you talk about?

"Usually impersonal things: What is new, Rami, how do you feel, and that is it. I pass on greetings to him, ask no questions about the affair, why he did what he did, how he feels about it, and so forth. I do not want to embarrass him or to lecture him. I look at him sitting across from me, dressed in a khaki uniform without a cap, and the MP's next to us never take their eyes off him. He looks bad. It is not the Rami I remember from the good days. His health is obviously not good. I look at him and at the bags under his sagging eyes and my heart tightens every time I think how he got himself into that hole. He tells me that they are not harassing him in jail, he is left alone, in consideration of his illness. When I am there with his old mother I can feel her enormous pain. Who knows whether she will live to see him come out of jail."

When the Dotan affair was uncovered the State of Israel managed to lay its hand on about \$10 million that Rami

Dotan had managed to conceal abroad through the intermediation of Attorney Harold Katz. Did Dotan manage to hide away a few other millions somewhere? If the Americans question him he will say: I did not hide any other money. A few months ago, the penthouse (150 square meters) that Dotan bought through a Belgian subsidiary called Tradebar in Anderson St., Ramat Aviv, was confiscated and transferred to the state. The apartment is locked and no one lives in it. As far as it is known it has not yet been put on the market. The supposition is that it will fetch at least \$600,000.

People close to Rami Dotan say that if there is one thing that weighed on him, it was the pleading deal he signed. According to that deal he was to get 10 years imprisonment. To that were added another three years for his attempt to dispatch his confidant, Sergeant Major Ya'akov Frank to New York to secure the silence of Ofer Pa'il, the man whose testimony triggered the investigation against Dotan. Now Dotan said that his illness, his weakness, and his dread of the media prompted him to end the affair quickly and to sign the pleading deal. He is persuaded that had he gone to court, the proceedings would have lasted for many years and it is not at all certain that the prosecution would have been able to uncover everything that he revealed himself by dint of the deal.

Dotan claims that when he comes out of jail he will be completely destitute. According to the sentence, not only was he cashiered from the army, he was also deprived of all the pension rights he had accumulated in the IDF. "I am a finished man," he keeps telling the few people close to him.

Demographic Overview of Jerusalem

92AE0407A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
31 May 92 p B2

[Article by Nadav Shragai]

[Text]

Demography Above All

Today there are 135,000 Jews living in the 12 new neighborhoods the Israeli Government has built in the territory which was annexed to Israel in 1967. "East Jerusalem" is what this territory is called, but actually the neighborhoods spread south, north, as well as east, of the old jurisdictional limits. From an area of jurisdiction of 38,000 dunams, Jerusalem has tripled her territory to about 110,000 thousand dunams. On the initiative of the Ma'arakh governments about 17,000 dunams were annexed, on which Ramat, Neve Ya'akov, Ramat Eshkol, Sanhedria Hamurhevet, Giv'at Hamivtar, French Hill, Armon Hanatziv were built in the 1970's, and over the last few years Pisgat Z'ev—which is filling up at an amazing pace right now—1,500 new residents a month—has joined them. David Ben-Gurion showed the way. "At any price," he said to Teddy Kollek and Pinhas Sapir, "Jews must be brought to East Jerusalem. Thousands of Jews must be settled within a short time...." Kollek and government officials spoke openly of "the demographic balance in the capital."

The Israeli policy in the territories annexed to Jerusalem rests mainly on a clause in a decision by the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, which set as a "national goal" the guarding of the existing ratio between the Jewish and Arab populations: about 78 percent Jewish to 22 percent Arab. Application of this clause comes, and comes knowingly, at the expense of the Arab population. And so, although its growth rate has been greater than that of the Jewish population, many fewer units of housing have been built for it.

From Jerusalem's unification to the end of 1990 (as reported only this week at a press conference called by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies) approximately 72,000 units of housing were built in the city, 54 percent by the public sector. The scope of all building starts reached 11.7 million square meters, of them about 8.5 million square meters for dwellings. From the total of all construction in the city, the Arab sector received only 12 percent, of which 82 percent went to build dwellings and about six percent to public buildings.

This tremendous discrepancy also shows up in a study carried out by Dr. Israel Kimhi, Professor Shalom Reichman, and Yosef Schweid. In the years 1977-1983, the researchers found, approximately 390,000 square meters were built each year by Jews, 70 percent of the space being for dwellings; while the average yearly construction among the Arabs was about 43,000 square meters, of which about 85 percent was for dwellings. The yearly average of apartments which were built during these

periods was about 2,170 for Jews and about 230 for Arabs, that is, nine apartments per thousand people each year for Jews, and only 1.9 apartments per thousand for Arabs.

The policy's framers wanted Jerusalem to be a Jewish city, of course, and this is why there was such vigorous implementation in the Jewish sector, and in contrast—the crawling implementation on the Arab side. An example is the construction in northern Jerusalem. In 1981, the State expropriated, in the northern part of the city, east of the Neve Ya'akov-Ram'allah highway, about 6,000 dunams which had until then been owned by Arabs. The territory west of the highway was designated for Arab construction, and they meant, in this way, to appease this population. Planning for northern Jerusalem, both in the area expropriated for Jews and the area designated for Arab construction, was done almost simultaneously, but that has not been the case for the construction that has come since. And if the Jewish construction between Neve Ya'akov and French Hill is moving fast, and East, West, North, and South Pisgat Z'ev are all going up right now—four construction plans for the Arab population were approved only recently, after 10 years of discussions and endless debates between the municipality of Jerusalem and the Ministries of Housing and Interior.

They agreed that there is a need to build for the Arabs too, but their "demographic assessments" differed. Representatives of the Ministries of Interior and Housing claimed that creating too great a supply of apartments for the Arab population within the territory of Jerusalem will encourage the migration of Arabs from the region of Judah into the city, and so the proportion of Jews would go down from 72 to just 66 percent. The municipality gave in with time and agreed to lower the number of units of housing in the plan from 18,000 to 15,000, and later to 10,000 and to 7,500. Now local councils in the new Pisgat Z'ev are opposed to creating an Arab neighborhood near them, for security reasons, and the Arabs themselves, too, it must be noted, are not hurrying to take advantage of their right to build there, because of procedural and ownership matters.

Avraham Kahila, deputy mayor and the person responsible for planning and construction in Jerusalem, has pointed out more than once that according to his reckoning, within a few years Jews will be a majority not only in Jerusalem as a whole, but also in the eastern part. Simple arithmetic shows that Kahila is right, although it is possible that the process will take much longer than he expected.

Today, there are already 135,000 Jews living in an East Jerusalem that has 155,000 Arabs, (about 370,000 in the total area of the city); and on the various ridges of Pisgat Z'ev, Gilo, Ramat, the Shu'afat range, and Mt. Homa, new Jewish neighborhoods are planned, or expansion of existing ones, that together will house another 60,000 Jews. A Jewish majority in East Jerusalem as well is therefore only a question of time.

The government's readiness to invest in the Arab side of the city, both during the period of Ma'arakh rule and of Likud rule, sprang from the need to present receipts for some kind of action on this side too. In the Jerusalem municipality there was much good will, but little

capacity to act. Yet nevertheless, one positive point can be given the authorities: if before 1967 there was no infrastructure at all in most of the rural areas of East Jerusalem, today they do have water, electricity, and plumbing infrastructures, and telephone lines.

Investments of the Sanitation Department in the Arab Neighborhoods [and] in the City as a Whole in the Years 1985-1990
(replacement of old pipe, laying new pipe, developing the drainage systems)
(in thousands of shekels)

This Year	Investments in Arab Neighborhoods	Investments in the City as a Whole	Investments in Arab Neighborhoods out of the Total Investments in the City (in percents)
1985/86	264	5,850	4.5
1986/87	670	4,172	16.0
1987/88	843	5,786.5	14.5
1988/89	1,367	8,874.5	15.4
1989/90	917	4,221	21.7
Five Year Total	4,061	28,904	14.0

Note: Added investment supported by fees (in the Jewish sector, development is based on fees collected from the residents)

Investments in Development of the Water Works in the Years 1985-1990 in the Arab Neighborhoods and in the City as a Whole
(Replacement of old water mains and laying new mains)
(in thousands of shekels)

This Year	Investments in Arab Neighborhoods	Investments in the City as a Whole	Investments in Arab Neighborhoods out of the Total Investments in the City (in percents)
1985/86	300	3,701	8.1
1986/87	1,498	5,701	25.8
1987/88	2,889	8,494	34.0
1988/89	5,393	11,022	48.9
1989/90	764	2,790	27.3
Five Year Total	10,844	31,799	34.1

Data from Jerusalem Institute for Jerusalem Studies

Netanyahu Calls for Easing Weapons Accessibility

92AE0407C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
25 May 92 p 23

[Editorial by Binyamin Netanyahu]

[Text]

The Right Response to the Knife Attacks

How can we stop the wave of murders in our cities? The dreadful murder yesterday of a young woman in Bat Yam at the hands of a knifer from Gaza raises this painful question again. In the past, I argued in the pages of this newspaper that foiling these attempts requires a series of activities of deterrence and punishment; expulsion of instigators, refusal to make exchange deals that free terrorists; introduction of the

death penalty for exceptionally cruel crimes—and above all—**simplifying the process citizens must go through to get a license to bear arms.**

Since I wrote those words, many murder attempts have been thwarted by resourceful armed citizens who performed well at the scene of the crime. There is no other country in the world like Israel, whose citizens are so skilled in using arms, and what is no less important—in **not using arms.** Service in the IDF (Israel Defense Force) has taught a large proportion of the population responsibility and discretion when carrying arms, an advantage not found in any other country. Doubling or tripling the number of people carrying personal weapons in Israel will suitably raise the prospects that armed citizens will thwart attacks in real time. It is not possible to station a policeman at every corner, nor is it necessary, when we are equipped with an excellent reservoir of manpower like the IDF reserves.

But there are some among us who do not believe that we can fight the Arab terror. On the contrary, the Leftists, who today make up a majority in the Ma'arakh: the "sane" way to fight terror is to give in to its political demands. Of course, these people are always ready to wholeheartedly deprecate the murders, but also always quick to add: "How long? We will live forever under these threats, unless we surrender to the demand to create a Palestinian state in the "territories."—This line of reasoning is erroneous, and dangerous, for several reasons:

1. The Left refuses to recognize a simple fact: the reason for the attacks on Israel is not that a Palestinian state does not exist, but that a Jewish state does exist. Terror attacks, including knifings by Fedayin, were already directed against the State from Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza when those territories were still under Arab rule. Today, too, many of the attackers are not motivated by aspirations to free Gaza or Samaria, but rather by the Islamic agitation for a holy war against our very existence here.

2. Through the very raising of the question, "How long?," the members of the Left send a signal to those perpetrating the Arab terror that we can be forced into submission through attacks of this kind. What the tank in the field of battle could not achieve will be decided by the knife in the city park. An Israeli Government that is seduced into "exchanging territories to avoid knifings," will give tremendous encouragement to extremists in the Arab population within the green line. What constitutes a tiny minority today will become an influential power that will act according to clear irredentist logic: if the knives tactic succeeded in removing us from "control over the hostile Arab minority in the territories," why should it not succeed in removing us from "control over the hostile Arab minority in the territories" of the Galilee and the Negev? After all, you do not argue with success!

3. Instead of fighting the threat of the knife attacks, the Left is ready to add a strategic threat to the security of the entire country. The desire to be rid of the knifery by "Zwang (Let us do what has to be done), and good riddance," leads the lighter-headed members of the Left to advocate a solution that will tear down the protective wall of the Judaeen mountains and Samaria. But in this way, not only will we not be rid of the knives, but we will bring the lances of the Arab armies to the east to the gates of our cities—or more exactly, the mortars, short-range missiles, artillery, and all the rest of the weapons that an independent Palestinian state, which would certainly arise in the territories we would vacate, would be able to muster. How can we ensure demilitarization of an entire state? Such a thing has never happened in history, nor will it happen here.

The diplomatic process is certainly a necessary condition for achieving peace and security in Israel. I believe that from Camp David to Madrid and on, this process will be a rough and thorny path of negotiation, in which Israel

must guard her vital assets, in open discussions with the Arabs. This is a long journey with many [possible] paths. But panicked surrender to the Arab-Islamic murder tactics is not one of them.

Loss of Terror Deterrence Capability Noted

*92AE0430B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
3 Jun 92 p B1*

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Loss of Deterrence Capability"]

[Text] The important security lesson that sticks out from the wave of stabbings—in the streets of Israel as well as in the territories—is that Israel has, in fact, totally lost her deterrent capability against such acts of terror. Except for reactions of anger and revenge, she has no real security response to this phenomenon. In her entire history it never happened that Israel has stood so powerless before such a troubling security problem. And this is precisely when her overall military power is large and impressive.

That is the reason for so many expressions of frustration and anger after every attack on children and the elderly. The Palestinians are, of course, sensitive to that, and even those who oppose the acts of murder believe that they will bring home to Israelis the need for a political compromise. The weakness of the Palestinians emphasizes our own vulnerabilities despite our military strength.

In contrast to other acts of terror, Israeli intelligence is powerless in the face of the wave of stabbings. With other acts of terror, connected in general with advance planning by the terrorist high command echelons, like the planning of strikes, the transfer of information, and the mustering of weapons, it is easier to contend with the other side. The most secret cells can be infiltrated and acts of terror prevented. It is certainly possible to unravel many terrorist acts and catch those who carried them out and those who sent them.

But everything is different when it comes to the stabbings. A man gets up in the morning full of hatred and frustration, not only for nationalist reasons, takes a knife, and goes out to murder a Jew as an act of vengeance. For the most part, he acts alone. Only in a very few cases is there advance information on the man and his fundamentalist leanings. Radical Muslim leaders see the Israeli reaction and characterize the murderers as heroes in the mosques.

The fruit of this frustration can be seen in the pogroms that Jews carry out against Arabs, including Israeli Arabs, in contravention of the fundamentals of law and order and to the loss of our divine image. Against this background the weak leadership, drawn after the crowd, is strikingly bad. The only ones who profit from this are the radicals among us, as if there were some kind of hidden balance agreement for the elections between them and the murderers, who come from the Muslim

fanatics. But there is also unseen frustration—the frustration expressed in the Cabinet sessions. It was even more striking recently in the Cabinet sessions [sic].

The Ministers know they have no satisfactory answer to the acts of murder, but some of them and their advisors act as if they are part of the incited mob. They call for closing the Arabs off, for closing ourselves off, for creating two ghettos, Jewish and Arab, but, of course, they want to control the Arab ghetto they set up.

The police are interested in the problem from a very narrow perspective—with what happens within the borders of the Green Line. What happens in the territories, to the Arabs and the Jews living there, does not interest them. The proposals to close off the Gaza Strip are, of course, temporary, and were intended only to release a little of the steam.

With the upcoming Muslim holiday they will reopen the Strip. The proposal not to allow youths to enter Israel may reduce the problem somewhat, but who will supervise it? So long as there is no alternative to employment in the territories for the masses who would be prohibited from entering Israel, the situation is likely to become even more complicated from a security perspective. This is not only because Israel is the ruler and must be responsible for her inhabitants. Mass unemployment in the territories would turn them into a dangerous pressure cooker. That may be of no interest on the Israeli streets, but so long as we are in control there, we must understand that famine and despair can be extremely dangerous things.

The violent outbreaks and angry reactions will ultimately bring about the intervention of an international

force in the territories, which is what the Palestinians are aiming for. That is why the Shin Bet and the coordinator of activities in the territories oppose a total closing. The Qol Israel report that the Shin Bet had changed its mind on that issue was incorrect.

The situation is particularly serious in the Gaza Strip, where the intifadah began. Before the uprising broke out, a study had been circulated on what the Gaza Strip would be like in the year 2000. The seriously negative data impelled me a month before the intifadah to say in HA'ARETZ that the time would come when we would beg to be relieved of the Strip and all its sickness, but no one would be found to do it. Despite what has happened since, Israel is acting with regard to the Strip as if compelled by a devil.

In off-the-record talks, some of the Likud leaders are willing to admit that we have nothing to do there, but in practice they are captives of the pressure of the Jewish settlers and the parties that support them.

The Jewish settlers are under pressure because of the murders, but the responses they propose are mass expulsions and further Jewish settlement in the narrow Strip. That is to say, to take from the Gaza masses who increase from month to month (a natural one month increase that exceeds the number of Jewish settlers in the Strip) the few remaining land reserves. Thus those who make this suggestion are seeking to increase even more the despair among the inhabitants of the Strip and to push them into a situation in which they will have nothing to lose. Our deterrent ability cannot be restored in this area with draconian measures but rather with an agreement with the Palestinians that will also be based on security arrangements.

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