Threat Modernization in the Near Term
Abstract
SBIs should be quite effective initially, but continuing effectiveness depends critically on the threat modernization rate. Fast-burn missiles could degrade their effectiveness by 50 percent; fast deployment of weapons and decoys could degrade it by a similar factor. So could reducing the launch area or mobile missiles. Together, they could reduce SBI availability a factor of approximately equal 20, and degrade effectiveness to $ 100 M per missile killed, which is about a draw. None of these developments is particularly heroic, and their incremental costs are essentially those of basing. They would, however, all have to be implemented more or less in parallel for full effect. Only fast-burn boosters would give much of a signal. Mobiles are nominally reassuring, and rebasing into more compact fixed silos could be justified economically. All could be executed in - 20 years at current modernization rates; fast, decoyed mobiles could accelerate modernization to roughly the same time scale as that for deploying SBIs. 16 In any case, the end result would be a SBI defense that could cost about as much as the offense. To have any margin against SBI cost growth or defense suppression, the brilliant pebbles' original cost goals and good discrimination would have The continuing effectiveness of space- based interceptors (SBIs) depends critically on the threat modernization rate. Fast-burn missiles could degrade their effectiveness by 50%; early deployment of weapons and decoys could degrade it by a like factor, as could reducing the launch area or mobile missiles. Together, these factors could reduce SBT availability a factor of 20 and degrade effectiveness. The result could be a SBI defense that cost as much as the offense.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA344735
Entities
People
- Gregory H. Canavan
Organizations
- Los Alamos National Laboratory