Managing Uncertainity: Soviet Views on Deception, Surprise, and Control.

Abstract

This document, prepared for the Director of the Countermeasures Office of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SD 10), presents three separate discussions of how Soviet military and political leaders deal with the issue of uncertainty. In the first two cases (deception and surprise), the emphasis is on how the Soviets seek to sow uncertainty in the minds of the enemy and how the Soviets then plan to use that uncertainty to gain military advantage. The third case focuses on Soviet views of control and how they use control to minimize the deleterious effects of uncertainty on their own operations.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Aug 01, 1989
Accession Number
ADA344746

Entities

People

  • Andrew J. Aldrin
  • Andrew W. Hull
  • Peter B. Almquist

Organizations

  • Institute for Defense Analyses

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Air Force
  • Combat Readiness
  • Command And Control
  • Countermeasures
  • Deception
  • Detection
  • Employment
  • Military Operations
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Second World War
  • Strategic Weapons
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare
  • Weapons Effects

Readers

  • Adaptive Control and Estimation with Uncertainty in Dynamic Systems.
  • Strategic Security Studies