NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATON: DOE Needs Better Controls to Identify Contractors Having Foreign Interests

Abstract

Foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) over a U.S. company that performs classified work for the Department of Energy (DOE) presents a national security threat because of the potentially uncontrolled transfer of nuclear weapons-related technology or material to foreign entities. In May 1990, The General Accounting Office (GAO) agreed with Senator John Glenn's office to examine whether DOE and its Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia weapons laboratories had complied with DOE's regulations and procedures designed to protect the United States against such a risk when they awarded classified contracts-contracts that require access to classified information or significant quantities of special nuclear materials as defined in 10 C.F.R. part 710.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 1991
Accession Number
ADA344805

Entities

People

  • M. S. Sagalow
  • S. A. Narvaez

Organizations

  • United States Government Accountability Office

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Acquisition
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Department Of Defense
  • Economic Development
  • Employment
  • Government (Foreign)
  • Governments
  • Materials
  • National Security
  • Nuclear Materials
  • Procurement
  • Sampling
  • Security
  • Security Personnel
  • Statistical Samples
  • United States

Readers

  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation and International Security