

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**SHAPING THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL THEODORE S. RUSSELL, JR.
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.**

19980522 021



USAWC CLASS OF 1998

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Shaping the Future Security Environment
in Sub-Saharan Africa**

by

**Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Russell, Jr.
United States Army**

**Colonel George Barber
Project Advisor**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**United States Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Theodore S. Russell, Jr.

TITLE: Shaping the Future Security Environment
in Sub-Saharan Africa

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 1 March 1998; 42 pages

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The nearly 40 year process of decolonization and the end of the Cold War have helped create major transformations in Sub-Saharan Africa. The challenges of extreme poverty, civil war, crime, cross-border interventionism, terrorism, outflows of refugees, environmental degradation and the spread of pandemic disease threaten the region's security environment and could threaten global stability. A contradiction exists between the United States government's stated foreign policy of engagement and its involvement in Africa. While stability is arguably its most important national interest, America does little to shape the security environment of this troubled region. If the United States is going to shape Africa's security environment, political leaders must become the visionaries of, and the advocates for, a more sophisticated foreign policy for the region. They must gain consensus on national interests in the region, and formulate a coherent set of policy objectives which will focus future engagement strategies. Through selective engagement the United States can help Africans solve African problems while shaping a security environment favorable to United States interests.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Africa, A Land of Paradox	4
United States National Interests in Africa	9
America's Lessons Learned in Africa	12
Visions of a Future Policy	18
Conclusion	24
Endnotes	29
Bibliography	37
Appendix 1: Conceptual Framework for Analyzing State Collapse and Internal Conflict	1-1
Appendix 2: Illustrative Components of a Political- Military Plan for Complex Contingency Operations - Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56	2-1

List of Figures

Figure 1	Reference Map of Sub-Saharan Africa	3
----------	---	---

Shaping the Future Security Environment in Sub-Saharan Africa

"Without peace [in Africa] development is not possible;
without development peace is not durable."

UN Secretary Kofi Annan¹

Although 40 years of decolonization and the end of the Cold War have provided Africans more opportunities for peaceful development; a new set of challenges threatens the future stability, sovereignty, and growth of African states.² Today forces of poverty, ethnicity and nationalism replace ideological struggles of capitalism and Marxism. Threats to future regional and perhaps global security include: civil war, cross-border interventionism, international crime, terrorism, dire poverty, massive outflows of refugees, environmental degradation and the spread of pandemic disease.³

Since the end of the Cold War era there has been a contradiction between the United States' foreign policy of engagement and it's involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Today, many Americans view problems in Africa as "peripheral" to national interests.⁴ Treating Africa like a strategic slum has its consequences. Security threats that appear marginal today can fester and grow -- threatening global stability and requiring costly interventions. Despite pessimistic forecasts there is reason for hope. Some African leaders are more receptive to American interests today than

at any other time in recent history.⁵ Hopefully the United States will not squander this opportunity to shape Africa's security environment and will encourage the region's peaceful development in the 21st century.

This paper reviews United States' strategic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, examines lessons learned from past experiences in the region and recommends a revised set of policy objectives that focus on shaping Africa's security environment while protecting United States interests.

Figure 1: Reference Map of Sub-Saharan Africa



Jim Kistler, USAWC

* Reproduced with permission of Parameters, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997)

Africa: A Land of Paradox.

Understanding Sub-Saharan Africa's security environment requires an appreciation of the complex and contradictory interaction of social, economic, political and military forces in the region. Unfortunately sporadic American media coverage tends to portray distinctly negative images of Africa. War and famine provide more dramatic stories than free elections and functioning economies. Robert Kaplan, in "The Coming Anarchy and the Nation State Under Siege," presents a discouraging image of a continent threatened by war, crime, the spread of disease and environmental degradation.⁶ Like other regions of the developing world Africa does have acute problems, but there are also positive trends and events occurring across the continent. In reality Africa is a land of paradox, where the future hangs in a fragile balance between chaos and development.

One paradox is revealed in an assessment of economic development among African countries. Africa currently accounts for only a fraction of world trade and investment. Any chance for macro-economic growth is frustrated by a stagnant or declining quality of life for the majority of Africans. In 1996, the United Nations (UN) classified 33 of the 54 African states among the least developed in the world. Of the more than 600 million inhabitants of Sub-Saharan Africa, 262 million live on less than one (U.S.)

dollar a day. It is estimated that 290 million Africans are illiterate. Some 200 million Africans lack access to health services and 274 million have no access to clean water.⁷ A land of vast, unrealized potential, Africa has every possibility of becoming a solid pillar in the global economy, but the desperation of too many Africans belies this hope.

Despite Africa's troubling economic statistics there are positive trends that cannot be ignored. Africa's economic growth is stronger than at any time since the early 1970's.⁸ Although wracked by war and despotic governance, countries like Ethiopia and Uganda have posted impressive growth rates of 9.4 and 11.9 percent respectively.⁹ South Africa has every possibility of becoming an engine for economic development throughout the region.¹⁰ In 1996, 21 percent of all United States crude oil imports came from Africa; and the region accounts for roughly half of the world's production of strategic metals like platinum, cobalt, and chromium.¹¹ While there are prospects for economic development in the region, future economic growth is inextricably linked to transparent, accountable governance.

Africa's complex and at times bewildering array of political actors reveals another paradox.¹² Shifting coalitions and the personalization of power among political

elites are best exemplified by leaders like Uganda's Youreri Museveni, the Congo's Laurent Kabila, Rwanda's Paul Kagame and Sudan's John Garang. Their relations are a reflection of the violent and uncertain political transformation taking place today in Central Africa.¹³ Greed and nepotism of ruling elites often result in endemic corruption at the expense of legitimate governance. The late Mobutu Sese Seko was the archetype of this syndrome. His three decades of exploitative authoritarian rule in Zaire (today the Democratic Republic of Congo), left social and economic chaos in one of Africa's richest countries.¹⁴ In Kenya, Daniel arap Moi's single-party apparatus continues to stir severe social and political tensions.¹⁵ The complexity of interaction among political actors and institutions makes it difficult to make generalizations or predictions about stability in the region. As countries like France, Great Britain and the United States disengage from the region, their prospects for shaping Africa's security environment appear dubious.

In sharp contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed numerous experiments in democracy, some quite successful. In 1990, Namibia achieved a cease-fire agreement among insurgent parties, held successful elections and moved from South African colonialism to democratic majority rule.¹⁶ Agreements in 1993 among Mozambique's political parties

ended nearly two decades of armed conflict, encouraged the return of 1.5 million refugees and created the conditions for substantive economic development.¹⁷ In Southern Africa Senegal, Mauritius, Seychelles and Botswana also subscribe to democratic governance; strengthening an emerging democratic bloc.¹⁸ These examples of democratization reflect unique opportunities, "critical moments" in time when African political leaders, supported by the international community, have succeeded in implementing political change in their countries.

Another paradox is reflected in the legitimacy of African militaries. Africans have every right to be skeptical of the military's role in preventing or resolving conflict. History is replete with examples where armies have been used as a tool of repression and genocide rather than as an effective means to defend a nation.¹⁹ In Rwanda, elite military units, militia and national police were largely responsible for the early stages of the massive genocide in April 1994.²⁰ In Nigeria, intellectuals and human rights activists are demanding sanctions against the seemingly entrenched military, which corruptly receives wealth from public oil revenues.²¹ Private security firms, like "Executive Outcomes" provide services by para-military specialists to multinational firms, governments or warlords.²²

While many are skeptical of African militaries, some African leaders are willing to employ indigenous capacities to solve regional security threats. Despite its operational failures, the intervention in 1990 of a West African monitoring force (ECOMOG) represents a clear example of African resolve to deal with conflict situations.²³ A multinational peacekeeping exercise, named "Blue Hungwe," hosted by Zimbabwe in 1996, serves as a model for training African militaries in peace operations.²⁴ A similar international exercise hosted by Senegal in March 1998, called "Guidimakha," tested a French inspired concept known as the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP).²⁵ The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) reflects a commitment by the United States to train and support an African peacekeeping capacity. Currently seven African countries have committed a total of eight battalion-sized units to this initiative. Once trained these units could respond on short-notice peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the (UN) or regional organizations.²⁶

The African security environment is filled with contradictions. In fact, there is a widespread perception among African leaders that former colonial powers and Cold War adversaries are essentially disengaging from the continent.²⁷ For example, the United States' 1997 National Security Strategy outlines a policy of "effective, sustained

engagement in Africa." Unfortunately America's involvement in the region since the end of the Cold War hardly reflects a policy of sustained engagement. Resources once devoted to "engagement" have fallen to the point where the United States is perceived as a minor player compared to other donor nations.²⁸ Embassies and consulates, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) have severely down-sized throughout Africa.²⁹ United States assistance to Africa has dropped from \$1.72 billion in 1985 to \$1.2 billion in 1992. As globalization continues to link the economies and societies of the Americas, Europe and the Pacific Rim, the United States gives the appearance of leaving rather than engaging the African continent.³⁰

United States National Interests in Africa.

The United States has sent a contradictory message to Africa since the end of the Cold War. The contradiction between its foreign policy of engagement and its apparent marginalization of Africa can be attributed to a lack of consensus on United States interests in the region. As a result America inconsistently applies ways and means in attempts to shape Africa's security environment. A noted scholar, Peter Schraeder observes that American policy makers tend to ignore events in Africa until they reach

crisis proportions. The result is a foreign policy that often becomes driven by events as opposed to a policy that shapes events.³¹ While there is a lack of consensus on national interests; continued involvement by American and multinational corporations, special interest groups and the military confirm there are interests in Africa worth pursuing.

If the United States is going to protect its interests and shape the security environment in Africa, the Administration must define its national interests, determine the intensity of those interests and weigh the acceptable costs in securing or protecting them. Dan Henk, Director of African Studies at the United States Army War College, offers a set of American interests in Africa which could be focused into coherent foreign policy objectives. These interests include: regional stability; access; information and warning; safety; a region free of sponsors or havens for trans-national threats; comity and cooperation; freedom from egregious suffering; humane, managerially competent and accountable governance; sustained economic development; and an unthreatened natural environment.³²

Of these interests, three must be addressed. First, stability is an essential condition for the pursuit of all other regional interests. Second, access relates to economic partnerships, information sharing and unrestricted use of

African ports, airfields and lines of communication. Unlike the exploitative relationships of the Colonial Era or the Cold War, comity and cooperation among African nations and the United States encourages international partnerships to deal with the issues of humanitarian emergencies, transnational threats and economic development.³³

While regional stability is arguably the most salient of United States interests, Africa's security environment cannot be shaped solely by the imposition of military power. Today, long-term stability within a weak or failed state is achieved through the processes of internal development and growth. Economic opportunities which improve the quality of life for Africans are inextricably linked to security and stability.³⁴ Scholars also suggest that stability is achieved through the development of civil society, the rehabilitation of the family, the cultivation of community and social elders and the restoration of traditional "African" values.³⁵ These changes are of necessity long-term processes.

Long-term stability in Africa will require American foreign policy makers to consider an integrated approach. Conflict prevention and resolution, economic development and the strengthening of civil society become important policy objectives. These objectives then describe the end-states

whereby appropriate ways and means are applied to shape the African security environment.

America's Lessons Learned in Africa

America's recent experiences in Africa provide some instructive lessons about shaping the region's security environment. Reactive military interventions have not served our national interests. Most of the developmental aid donated to weak or failed states has been squandered or stolen by corrupt elites. In light of recent failures to resolve conflicts in places like Somalia and Rwanda, political leaders in America are hesitant to include African issues in their agendas.

Peace and stability are pre-requisites for development and economic growth. Resolution of intrastate conflicts may require external assistance before the internal condition of long-term stability is achieved. If the international community wants to shape the security environment of a weak or collapsed state, an in-depth understanding of the political, economic and social dynamics of the conflict situation is required. Intimate knowledge of interactions among influential actors, ethnic groups, communities and factions can reveal the sources which prompt or fuel conflict.³⁶ UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggests creating an international network of capacities that gather

and analyze intelligence on conflict situations. Situational assessments then become the object for formulating or adjusting UN Security Council Mandates or peace agreements. This knowledge assists participants of multidimensional peace operations in understanding the conflict environment and in making predictions of future events. This network also provides an early warning capability, enabling the establishment of a credible presence before a conflict situation deteriorates.³⁷

Unfortunately, the international community lacked an accurate assessment of the conflict situation in Rwanda in 1993. Internal political conflicts within the government of Rwanda, evidence of politically motivated assassinations and human rights violations prior to the 1994 genocide were either ignored or not explored. As a result, the lightly armed UN peacekeeping force dispatched to Rwanda was incapable of mounting a credible response to egregious human rights abuses.³⁸ The lesson learned in Rwanda is the importance of having a detailed understanding of the environment before formulating a strategy that seeks to prevent or resolve conflict.

Another important lesson involves the development of clear, achievable policy objectives. Sir Brian Urquhart, a United Nations peacekeeping specialist, has developed a set of criteria for conducting peace operations. His criteria

suggest that a clear, achievable mandate increases the chances for unity of effort among diplomatic, humanitarian and military agencies.³⁹ The United Nations Mission in Somalia authorized under U.N. Security Council Resolution 814 (UNISOM II; 1993-1994), suffered because of unrealistic, poorly coordinated objectives; such as the capture of General Mohammed Aidid and "...the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia."⁴⁰ These operational objectives were not linked to a clear, achievable set of United States policy objectives in Somalia. The resulting rise in violence became the wages of a wastefully mismanaged set of tasks expected of a peace-enforcement mission with limited capabilities.

The third lesson involves having the political will to apply appropriate means in accomplishing the mandate or mission. These means include the provision of both credible incentives and coercive inducements.⁴¹ Positive incentives are rewards that encourage consent and cooperation with a peace operation and the long-term processes of reconciliation and nation building. The threat of coercion by a credible force intimidates recalcitrant parties or factions unresponsive to positive incentives. Policy makers must be willing to commit these means to accomplish foreign policy objectives.

In October 1993, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) lacked the means to accomplish the many tasks outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 872.⁴² By the Spring of 1994, the lightly armed, 2,548-member peacekeeping force became a vulnerable target in the escalating violence, rather than a credible force capable of peace-enforcement. Realizing the serious situation on the ground, the commander of UNAMIR, Canadian General Dallaire, requested a brigade-sized force of 5,000 trained soldiers. His request was never implemented. The escalation of violence within Rwanda in April 1994 caused some troop-contributing countries to unilaterally withdraw their contingents from UNAMIR. By the end of April 1994, the remaining 400 peace-keepers were operating without a clear, achievable mandate.⁴³ As the death toll climbed beyond 500,000 lives, the international community faced a human tragedy of catastrophic proportions and has been criticized for its slow response in stopping the violence.⁴⁴

United States' experience in the aforementioned situations underscores the importance of understanding the strategic environment, identifying clear, achievable objectives and having the will to apply appropriate capabilities. Scholars propose models that explain conflict situations and predict state collapse. Pauline Baker and John Ausink have developed a predictive model that analyzes

the evolution of conflict through five stages; root causes, immediate causes, transition, transformation of the state and outcomes.⁴⁵ Potential responses by the international community are recommended at each stage based on whether events take a violent or non-violent path (Appendix 1).

The Baker/Ausink model also provides indicators of observable symptoms and provides insights into the root causes of conflict. These indicators are useful in forecasting the collapse of a weak nation state. While no model "fits" every situation, the authors of this model highlight the importance of early warning and of taking preventive action before a crisis reaches catastrophic proportions. These models identify the sources of conflict, but other methodologies are needed to determine an integrated, multidimensional response.

The Clinton Administration has recently developed a framework to assist in policy development, planning and execution of complex multidimensional contingency operations. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 outlines a process that integrates the informational, diplomatic, economic and military instruments of national power at the policy level. PDD-56 facilitates interagency coordination through the creation of political-military (pol-mil) plans.⁴⁶ These plans require comprehensive situational assessments and integrate interagency objectives

toward a unified set of tasks. These tasks then become the basis for UN mandates or operational missions for U.S. unified commands. Pol-mil plans also provide a means for synchronizing interagency efforts in developing strategies for early resolution of conflicts. By identifying preparatory tasks as well as major functional tasks, pol-mil plans can be rehearsed during the conduct of interagency exercises. The after-action review process captures issues and lessons learned for refinement of future contingency plans (Appendix 2). Both predictive models and improvements in the interagency process assist in developing coherent policy objectives, and help focus strategies that prevent or resolve conflict situations.

Early warning networks among civil society, academia, regional organizations and the United Nations seek to minimize loss of life and enable the establishment of reconciliation and nation building activities. Recent UN reforms include development of an early warning capability, improvements in management and coordination and formation of a rapid reaction capacity specializing in peace and security matters.⁴⁷ Proactive strategies that prevent conflict could avert deployment of costly, large-scale peace operations. These capabilities could make a difference in shaping the security environment in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Visions of a Future Policy

The United States has an unprecedented opportunity to help shape the security environment in Sub-Saharan Africa, while securing and protecting its own interests in the region. A more sophisticated regional policy is needed that encourages international engagement.

The first policy objective focuses on strengthening African capacities for cooperative security. Regional and sub-regional organizations have the potential to broaden their role in creating indigenous capacities for conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Some African leaders are seeking African solutions to regional security challenges. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is developing a formal Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In 1997 the OAU received funding from the United States for creation of an early warning capability at its General Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.⁴⁸

Sub-regional organizations are also strengthening their roles in conflict prevention and resolution through cooperative security agreements. Though lacking resources, two sub-regional organizations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have acknowledged the need for regional security in their protocols.⁴⁹ Historically, strengthening of African militaries resulted in security for

a regime at the expense of human rights. For this reason, sub-regional organizations have adopted more informal security arrangements that rely on dialogue and preventive diplomacy to achieve political consensus and reconciliation. A recent example of this sentiment was the pressure placed on Lesotho in 1994 to restore democratic rule by governments of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe.⁵⁰ South Africa's "White Paper on Defence," drafted in 1995, clearly demonstrates the country's commitment to national reconciliation and unity, and reflects a national consensus on defense policy. For the first time in South Africa's history; this defense policy has been shaped by substantial inputs from Parliament, the public, non-governmental organizations and the Department of Defense.⁵¹ These insights are critical in understanding African sensitivities in developing future capacities for cooperative security.

Despite its current shortfalls, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) offers a framework for strengthening select African militaries through professional training, participation in multi-national peacekeeping exercises and exchanges on common peacekeeping techniques and procedures.⁵² This initiative does not seek to create large standing African armies. Instead, the ACRI creates standby capacities that are deployed to prevent or resolve conflicts under the auspices of UN or regional

organizations. Unit training completed in Senegal, Malawi and Uganda in 1997 is scheduled to continue in Ghana, Mali, Ethiopia and elsewhere.⁵³ When the United States pledged \$20 million for the ACRI in September 1996, a number of African countries showed an interest in how the force would be organized, controlled and funded. Their reactions suggest that the United States has an opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue with African leaders about strengthening African capacities for conflict resolution.⁵⁴

Another proposed policy objective focuses on efforts supporting economic reconstruction and development. Specific areas include key transportation and communications infrastructures. This policy provides assistance to select African nations in development of economic market sectors and institutions for education and job training. Cooperative investments through the World Bank, World Trade Organization and other international organizations also fund projects that improve health care and establish vibrant civil organizations. Economic development focuses on expanding commercial trade relationships and export markets for African goods. Countries making progress in economic reforms improve their eligibility for relief from foreign debts.⁵⁵

Unfortunately the vast quantity of foreign aid provided to Africa in the past has not succeeded in promoting growth or economic reform. A number of African states are actually

poorer today than they were before receiving financial aid decades ago.⁵⁶ This trend will change when future assistance is linked to the achievement of measurable goals in areas like literacy and employment. Unlike financial aid, economic assistance is offered as an incentive that encourages the privatization of economic enterprise, improves educational opportunities and helps establish an African middle-class.

Much of Africa's traditional economic activity has focused on extracting and exporting raw materials from the continent. Focusing future economic development programs creates more employment opportunities for Africans by building indigenous manufacturing capacities that process raw materials. African infrastructure such as roads, electricity and communications become objects of future capital investments and civil work projects. Equally important are investments in Africa's vast, undervalued human capital through improvements made in health care and education. All of these investments seek to alleviate endemic poverty and accelerate Africa's integration into the global economy.⁵⁷

The Clinton Administration has recommended broad incentives for African nations committed to making economic and political reforms. In May 1997, Congress drafted legislation that would authorize new trade and investment partnerships. The African Growth and Opportunity Act

provides incentives, investment opportunities and programs that stimulate private sector growth in African states making measurable progress in employment, education and public health. Additional incentives include duty-free exports on goods and greater access to international markets.⁵⁸ The Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC) has pledged \$750 million to encourage direct equity and infrastructure investment in the region.⁵⁹ As United States' foreign policy in Africa evolves, the Clinton Administration appears willing to secure American interests in the region primarily through economic reforms.

The third proposed policy objective promotes and supports transparent and accountable governance in select African countries. Support of democratization must be linked to the respect for human rights, evolution of the rule of law, the establishment of civil organizations, fair electoral processes, and a broader participation in political activities. These are long-term processes that require patience and encouragement. Democracy not only creates the condition for economic growth, it promotes the stability necessary for development. History suggests that democratic nations are far less likely to engage in conflict than authoritarian regimes.⁶⁰

If the United States purports a foreign policy of selective engagement in Africa, there are opportunities

where a small commitment will create positive change consistent with its values and interests. Past examples of such opportunities include Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents an opportunity for future engagement, becoming a source of stability and economic growth for the Central Africa sub-region. With its size, vast resources and central location, the DRC holds a key for transforming a sub-region mired in endemic poverty and violence. A comparison can be made between the departure of long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko from the former Zaire and the end of apartheid in South Africa. Just as South Africa was transformed from a destabilizing force into an engine for growth and development in Southern Africa, the DRC could become a positive force for change in Central Africa.⁶¹

The international community has an unprecedented opportunity to engage with African leaders of the DRC and Central Africa. For the United States, a more sophisticated foreign policy includes creation of a secure environment for the people of the DRC, reconstruction of the country's potentially dynamic economy, and promotion of a legitimate process that establishes accountable governance. These policy goals must be born and developed from within; if positive, long-term change is expected in the DRC and the nine neighboring states that share its borders.⁶²

Given its national interest in regional stability, the United States could become a key actor that chooses to engage with a country like the DRC, coordinating the ways and means among a consortium of international actors. By taking advantage of this opportunity the United States accomplishes two tasks. First, the United States demonstrates the positive value of international cooperation in shaping the security environment in this troubled region. Second, acting on its policy of engagement prevents the likelihood of costlier humanitarian interventions in the future.

Conclusions

Sub-Saharan Africa faces many difficult challenges to its regional security. Governments of former colonial and Cold War powers are not likely to commit more resources into the region, but they still have genuine interests in long-term regional stability. Unlike past "hand-outs" of developmental aid squandered by African elites, there are alternatives that would help selected African leaders solve African security challenges. Strengthening African capacities, investing in African infrastructure, improving education and health care, offering technical assistance and coordinating efforts of international organizations are ways

to focus resources--helping selected African leaders put their countries on a solid path of growth and development.

Analysis of United States national security interests and regional policy objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa produces three conclusions. First, the United States has interests in Africa; but it has failed to achieve national consensus on those interests, their intensity or acceptable costs for protecting them. Past administrations have done little to build such consensus, and have not developed coherent foreign policy objectives for the region. America's recognition of its interests in Africa will evolve in coming decades, as the global economy seeks and opens markets in the region and the search for scarce resources intensifies. Stability, arguably our most important regional interest, creates the best conditions for securing virtually all other national interests.

Second, our recent experiences in Africa reveal important lessons. These include the need to understand conflict situations, establish clear and achievable policy objectives, and resolve to commit adequate means to achieve those objectives. Predictive models and methodologies that improve the interagency process offer ways to integrate informational, political, economic and military instruments of power in achieving our foreign policy objectives. These developments represent significant progress.

Finally, coherent strategies are products of focused and consistent long-term policy objectives. This has not been the case with America's regional policy in Africa since the end of the Cold War. As former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has observed, "the United States cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis; it must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crisis."⁶³ Focused policy objectives can shape the future security environment in Africa through a set of patient, proactive strategies, which use available ways and means to build new partnerships with selected African states. These partnerships turn mutual interests into reality--effective capacities that prevent, manage and resolve conflict, create sustainable economic growth and development, and establish systems of accountable, transparent governance.

The United States must be engaged in Africa if it hopes to shape the region's security environment in the 21st Century. Rhetoric must be supported by action. Political leaders must become the visionaries and advocates of a revised regional policy; by gaining consensus on national interests in the region, applying lessons learned from recent experiences and formulating a more sophisticated set of policy objectives which reflect America's position on selective engagement and focus future strategies. The question remains: Will the United States seize this

opportunity, leading the international community in shaping the future security environment of this region ?

Word Count: 4,715

ENDNOTES

¹United Nations Security Council, Press Release SC/6420: Security Council Requests Secretary General to Submit Concrete Recommendations on Ways to Address and Prevent Conflicts in Africa, 25 September 1997; available from <<http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl?4387>>; Internet, accessed 29 October 1997. In his address before the Security Council ministerial meeting, UN Secretary Kofi Annan made this statement to describe the linkages that exist between the prevention, management and resolution of conflict and economic/political development among African nations. Africans, he asserted must take responsibility to develop new capacities for solving African problems.

²William G. Thorn, "An Assessment of Prospects for Ending Domestic Military Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa," CSIS Africa Notes 177 (October 1995): 1-5.

³Regina C. Brown, "Is There Still a Foreign Policy of the U.S. Toward Africa?" remarks, Salzburg, Austria, International Seminar for Diplomats, 2 August 1996; available from <<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/brown.html>>; Internet; accessed 18 October 1997.

⁴Richard W. Hull, "The Challenge to the United States in Africa," Current History 90, no. 556 (May 1991): 193-196.

⁵Chester Crocker, "Why Africa is Important," Foreign Service Journal 72, no.6 (June 1995): 24-33.

⁶Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: The Nation State Under Siege," The Managing Chaos Conference (Washington, D.C., U.S. Institute of Peace, August 1995), 7-10.

⁷Bureau of African Affairs, "U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa," 2 October 1996; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/us_policy_subsahar_africa.html>; Internet; accessed 18 October 1997; and UN Security Council Press Release SC/6420.

⁸Africa Policy Information Center, "Africa: Policy Outlook 1998," 28 January 1998; available from <<http://www.africapolicy.org/docs98/afpo98.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 March 1998.

⁹Lynne Duke, "Africa Inching to Renewal From Economic Stagnation," The Washington Post, 15 August 1997, A,1:2.

¹⁰Lynne Duke, "South Africans Look North, Invest in Neighbors," The Washington Post, 6 November 1997, A,19:1.

¹¹William H. Twaddell, "Why Africa Matters," remarks at a Department of State Town Meeting, New Orleans, LA, 7 April 1997; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/Twaddell_979497.html>; Internet; accessed 18 October 1997; and Regina Brown, "Is There Still a Foreign Policy of the U.S. Toward Africa?"

¹²The whole notion of democratic government in Africa is a relatively new phenomenon to many parts of Africa that have known nothing different than colonial or dictatorial rule. Prospects for democracy and economic development require a long-term, patient view. See David L. Peterson, "Debunking the Ten Myths About Democracy in Africa," The Washington Quarterly 17, no 3 (Summer 1994): 129-141.

¹³Johanna McGeary, "An African for Africa," Time, 1 September 1997, 36-40; and Phillip Gourevitch, "Letter From the Congo, Continental Shift," New Yorker, 4 August 1997, 42-55.

¹⁴Peter Rosenblum, "Endgame in Zaire," Current History 96, no 610 (May 1997): 200-205; and Garrick Utley, "The Roots of Zaire's Unrest," 2 April 1997; available from <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/02/zaire.essay/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 13 December 1997.

¹⁵Frank Holmquist and Michael Ford, "Stalling Political Change: Moi's Way in Kenya," Current History 94, no. 591 (April 1995): 177-181.

¹⁶Virginia P. Fortna, "United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia," in The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, ed. William J. Durch, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 353-375.

¹⁷Kate Dunn, "Hoes and Hope Turn Around a War-Wracked African Nation," The Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 1998, 7; and Robert B. Lloyd, "Mozambique: The Terror of War, the Tension of Peace," Current History 94, no. 591 (April 1995): 152-155; and a paper presented by the Project on Peacekeeping and the United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Success Stories;" available from <<http://clw.org/pub/clw/un/unsuccess.html>>; Internet; accessed 3 December 1997.

¹⁸Crocker, "Why Africa is Important," 26.

¹⁹Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons From Nigeria and South Africa (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 9 January 1996): 37-39.

²⁰Milton Leittenburg, Rwanda 1994: International Incompetence Produces Genocide," Peacekeeping and International Relations 23, no.6 (November/December 1994): 6-10.

²¹Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 28.

²²Herb Howe, "South Africa's 911 Force," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1996, 38-39; and Kevin Whitelaw, "Have Gun, Will Prop Up Regime," U.S. News and World Report, 20 January 1997, 46-48.

²³Ademola Adeleke, "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia," The Journal of Modern African Studies 33, no. 4 (1995): 569-593.

²⁴George Thiart, "Africa's Eagle of Hope Has Landed," Salut June 1997, 12-17.

²⁵The "Guidimakha" exercise involved four African battalions with troops from Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissan, Ghana and Guinea. The approximately 3500 troops participated in a 10-day combined arms peacekeeping training exercise supported by French, British and U.S. observers and trainers. Reuters, "French Help Africans Test Peace Force;" available from <<http://msnbc.com/news/147861.asp>>; Internet; accessed 3 March 1998.

²⁶Ambassador Marshall McCallie, "African Crisis Response Initiative," a hearing given before the Committee on International Relations, House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 October 1997. African states which have agreed to commit forces to the ACRI include: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia, and Uganda. While Ethiopia has agreed to provide two battalion-sized units, all other participating nations have agreed to provide one each; and Ambassador Marshall McCallie and Colonel David McCracken, "African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)," a State Department on-the-record briefing on the ACRI; available from <<http://www>.

state.gov/www/regions/africa/acri_briefing_970728.html>;
Internet: accessed 30 September 1997.

²⁷"Richardson Outlines U.S. Cautious Engagement in Democratic Republic of Congo," 5 November 1997, remarks by Ambassador Bill Richardson to the House International Relations Committee regarding the current situation in Central Africa; available from <http://www.africanews.org/usafrica/stories/19971105_feat3.html>; Internet; accessed 25 October 1997; and "The U.S. Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa," a report to the U.S. Institute of Peace Symposium; available from <<http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/USContr1.html>>; Internet; accessed 25 October 1997.

²⁸The White House, A National Security Strategy For a New Century, (Washington, D.C., May 1997): 28; and Carol Graham and Michael O'Hanlon, "Making Foreign Aid Work: No Pain, No Aid," Foreign Affairs 76, no.4 (July/August 1997): 96-104.

²⁹ USAID had, in 1994 alone, closed eight of its 35 African missions. Felix M. Edoho, Globalization and the New World Order (Westport CT: Praeger, 1997), 15.

³⁰U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report, "Future U.S. Engagement in Africa: Opportunities and Obstacles for Conflict Management;" available from <<http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/USAfrica2.html>>; Internet; accessed 25 October 1997.

³¹Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2.

³²Dan Henk, "U.S. National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa," Parameters 23, no. 4 (Winter 1997-1998): 92-107.

³³Ibid., 96-100.

³⁴Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The Premature Burial of Global Law and Order: Looking Beyond the Three Cases From Hell," Washington Quarterly 17, no.3 (Summer 1994): 145-161.

³⁵Maurice Marnika, "The Challenge for Peacemaking in Africa: Conflict, Prevention and Conflict Resolution," Peacekeeping and International Relations 24 (July/August 1995): 5.

³⁶Herman J. Cohen, "Conflict Management in Africa," CSIS Africa Notes 181 (February 1996): 1-7.

³⁷Kofi A. Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing For the Next Century," an unpublished paper prepared by the U.N. Secretary General, February 1996.

³⁸Gerard Prunier, "The Great Lakes Crisis," Current History 96, no.610 (May 1997): 194-199.

³⁹Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the Sheriff's Posse," Survival 32, no.3 (May/June 1990): 196-205.

⁴⁰Horace Hunter, "An Analysis of the Application of the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in Somalia," a White Paper Prepared for the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, (February 1994), 7; and Michael Maren, "Somalia: Whose Failure?" Current History 95, no. 601 (May 1996): 201-205.

⁴¹Annan, 4.

⁴²The first mandate of UNAMIR, authorized by the UN Security Council, 1 October 1993, included the following tasks: (1) to contribute to the security of Kigali, Rwanda, *inter alia*, within a weapons secure area established by the armies in and around the city; (2) to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement; (3) to monitor the security situation during the final period of the traditional government's mandate, leading up to the elections; (4) to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance; and (5) to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police. "Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned From UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)," a UN Peacekeeping Operations Publication, Part Two, pp. 2-8; available from <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/rwanddisc.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 January 1998.

⁴³Feil, Scott R. "Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans? Early Intervention Reconsidered," Institute For the Study of Diplomacy 3, no.2 (April 1997): 2-4.

⁴⁴Alex De Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," Current History 94, no.6 (April 1995): 156-161; and Leitenburg, "Rwanda 1994: International Incompetence Produces Genocide," pp.6-10.

⁴⁵Baker and Ausink. P. 22.

⁴⁶National Security Council, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," Presidential Decision Directive 56 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 1-7.

⁴⁷"General Assembly Takes Decisive First Step on UN Reform;" available from <<http://www.un.org/reform/focus.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 February 1998.

⁴⁸Sam G. Amoo, "Role of the OAU: Past, Present and Future," David R. Smock, ed., Making War and Peace (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 4; The OAU and the UNDP signed an agreement in Addis Ababa on 11 June 1997 under which the UNDP would fund \$3 (U.S.) million to strengthen the OAU's Division of Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution through the establishment of an early warning center at its general headquarters, a program that trains mediators and the networking of a 100-person mediation capacity to be placed on stand-by to respond to political crises before they deteriorate into conflict situations. See "UNDP Assists OAU Conflict Prevention Division," available from <<http://search.nando.net/plweb-cgi/fastweb.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 November 1997.

⁴⁹"Strengthening the OAU's Capacity for Peace-Building," a UN special initiative on Africa; available from <<http://www.synapse.net/~acdi20.html>>; Internet; accessed 29 November 1997; and "The U.S. Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," 2-6.

⁵⁰Gavin Cawthra, "Sub-regional Security: The Southern African Development Community," Security Dialogue 28, no.2 (1997): 207-218.

⁵¹"Draft White Paper on National Defense for the Republic of South Africa," May 1996; available from <http://www.policy.org.39/govdocs/white_papers/defencewp.html>; Internet; accessed 18 June 1997; and John P.J. Brooks, "A Military Model for Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa," Parameters 27, no.4 (Winter 1997-98): 108-120.

⁵²Dan Henk and Steven Metz, The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 5 December 1997): 22-30.

⁵³Susan E. Rice, "A New Partnership for the 21st Century," remarks made before the African Studies Association, Columbus, Ohio, 14 November 1997; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/rice_971114.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.

⁵⁴"NGO Statement to the Denver G7 Summit: Conflict Resolution;" available from <<http://www.africapolicy.org/denver/deconfl.htm>>; Internet; accessed 1 February 1998.

⁵⁵The White House, President Clinton's Strategy for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa, (Washington, D.C., Office of the Press Secretary, 17 June 1997).

⁵⁶Graham and O'Hanlon, p. 98.

⁵⁷Interview with Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson, IV, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs, 30 January 1998.

⁵⁸Library of Congress Legislative Records, "African Growth and Opportunity Act'" H.R. 1432 / S. 778, introduced 5 May 1997; available from <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?.../temp/~bdaLvL:@@L/bss/dl05query.html>>; Internet; accessed 29 January 1998.

⁵⁹"President Clinton's Strategy for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa," p. 3.

⁶⁰The United Nations System-Wide Special Initiative on Africa, "Peace Building, Conflict Resolution and National Reconciliation," a UNDP Report; available from <<http://www.synapse.net/~acdi20/reports/un.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 October 1997.

⁶¹Salih Booker, "Soldiers Without Borders: Crisis in Central Africa," a statement to the House Committee on International Relations, Congress of the United States, 5 November 1997. This statement proposes a strategy for reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. Although there are those who have focused on the UN investigation into alleged massacres during the struggle that led to the overthrow of the Mobutu regime, the author proposes that the progress of this investigation should not be the major determinant for U.S. policy toward the Democratic Republic of Congo; available from <<http://www.foreignrelations.org/studies/fellows/booker/statement.html>>; Internet; accessed 30 January 1998.


⁶² Ibid, 6.

⁶³"As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy,"
New York Times, 7 February 1993, E1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adeleke, Ademole. "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia." The Journal of Modern African Studies 33, no.4 (1995): 569-593.
- "Africa Growth and Opportunity Act: H.R. 1432/S. 778." Legislation introduced into Congress 5 May 1997, Library of Congress Legislative Records. Available from <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?.../temp/~bdaLvL:@@1?bss/d105query.html>>. Internet. Accessed 29 January 1998.
- Africa Policy Information Center. "Africa: Policy Outlook 1998." 28 January 1998. Available from <<http://www.Africapolicy.org/docs98/afpo98.html>>. Internet. Accessed 7 March 1998.
- Amoo, Sam G. "Role of the OAU: Past, Present and Future." Making War and Peace, ed. David R. Smock, 239-261. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995.
- Annan, Kofi. "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century." An unpublished paper prepared by the UN Secretary General, February 1996.
- "As Ethic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy." New York Times, 7 February 1993, sec E, p.1.
- Baker, Pauline H., and John A. Ausink. "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model." Parameters 26, no.1 (Spring 1996): 19-31.
- Bloomfield, Lincoln P. "The Premature Burial of Global Law and Order: Looking Beyond the Three Cases From Hell." Washington Quarterly 17, no.3 (Summer 1994): 145-161.
- Booker, Salih. "Soldiers Without Borders: Crisis in Central Africa." Available from <<http://www.foreignrelations.org/studies/fellows/booker/statement.html>>. Internet. Accessed 30 January 1998.
- Brooks, John P.J. "A Military Model for Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa." Parameters 27, no.4 (Winter 1997-1998): 108-120.

APPENDIX 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING STATE COLLAPSE AND INTERNAL CONFLICT



* * * * *

TWELVE INDICATORS OF STATE COLLAPSE AND INTERNAL CONFLICT

SOCIAL INDICATORS:

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures

- Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources.
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity; including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship, etc.
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings; including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards.

* Reproduced with permission from Dr. Pauline Baker, President, Fund for Peace

**APPENDIX 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING STATE COLLAPSE
AND INTERNAL CONFLICT**

**2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons
Creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies.**

- Forced up-rooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression; causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries.

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia

- History of aggrieved communal groups citing injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries.
- Pattern of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups.
- Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression.
- Institutionalized political exclusion.
- Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

- "Brain-drain" of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression.
- Voluntary emigration of the "middle class," particularly economically productive segments of the population; such as entrepreneurs, businesspersons, artisans and traders due to economic deterioration.
- Growth of exile communities.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS:

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines

- Group-based inequity, or perceived inequality, in education and economic status.
- Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels, etc.
- Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequities.

APPENDIX 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING STATE COLLAPSE AND INTERNAL CONFLICT

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

- A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, etc.
- Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue or foreign investment.
- Collapse or devaluation of the national currency.
- Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs.
- Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling and capital flight.
- Increase in levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace.

POLITICAL / MILITARY INDICATORS:

7. Criminalization and/or Deligitimization of the State

- Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites.
- Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation.
- Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes; e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies.
- Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites.

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

- Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services; such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation, etc.
- State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, the diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies, etc.

**APPENDIX 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING STATE COLLAPSE
AND INTERNAL CONFLICT**

**9. Suspension of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of
Human Rights**

- Emergence of authorization, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.
- Outbreak of politically-inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians.
- Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices.
- Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of the military for political ends, public repression of political opponents).

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"

- Emergence of elite or praetorian guards which operate with impunity.
- Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported "private militias" that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition.
- Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique.

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites

- Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines.
- Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism (e.g., "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., ethnic "cleansing" or defending "the faith").

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

- Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside militaries, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of power, or resolution of conflict

Appendix 2: Illustrative Components of a Political Military Plan for Complex Contingency Operations - Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)- 56.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)- 56 requires that a political-military implementation plan (or "pol-mil plan") be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government responses in a complex contingency operation. With the use of the pol-mil plan methodology, the interagency can implement effective management practices that centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation. The components of the pol-mil plan are in accordance with the following methodology:

1. **Situation Assessment.** A comprehensive assessment of the situation to clarify essential information that, in the aggregate, provides a multi-dimensional picture of the crisis.
2. **U.S. Interests.** A statement of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis and the requirement to secure those interests.
3. **Mission Statement.** A clear statement of the U.S. government's strategic purpose for the operation and the pol-mil plan mission.
4. **Objectives.** The key civil-military objectives to be accomplished during the operation.
5. **Desired Pol-Mil End State.** The conditions the operation is intended to create before the operation transitions to a follow-on operation and/or terminates.
6. **Concept of the Operation.** A conceptual description of how the various instruments of U.S. government policy will be integrated to get the job done throughout all phases of the operation.
7. **Lead Agency Responsibilities.** An assignment of responsibilities for participating agencies.
8. **Transition/Exit Strategy.** A strategy that is linked to the realization of the end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of diplomats, military leaders and relief officials of the U.S. government and the international community.

Appendix 2: Illustrative Components of a Political Military Plan for Complex Contingency Operations - Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)- 56.

9. **Organizational Concept**. A schematic of the various organizational structures of the operation, in Washington and in the area(s) of operation, including a description, including a description of the chain of authority and associated reporting channels.

10. **Preparatory Tasks**. A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken before the operation begins (congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media coordination, etc).

11. **Functional Tasks / Agency Plans**. Key operational and support plans written by U.S. government agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social development, public information, etc).

* Reproduced from a National Security Council White Paper: Presidential Decision Directive 56 (Washington, D.C., 1997): p. 7.