Soviet Readiness for War: Assessing one of the Major Sources of East-West Instability
Abstract
Two of NATO's greatest concerns are that the Warsaw Pact could achieve a decisive military advantage over NATO by attacking out of a standing start without mobilizing and thus catching NATO completely unprepared, or by attacking after a short mobilization and taking advantage of NATO's failure to respond promptly to warning of Warsaw Pact preparations for war. These concerns are at the heart of NATO planning. They lead to policies requiring the presence in West Germany of active duty NATO forces at near wartime readiness. They also lead directly to development of strategies such as Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA), which is directed at disrupting Warsaw Pact ability to reinforce its forward divisions with forces from the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union. Recognizing the importance of these NATO concerns to the development of the U.S. defense program, the Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee recently held hearings on the readiness of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces for mobilization and war. This Policy Panel report conveys the results of those hearings and begins the process of drawing conclusions for U.S. force planning. The focus of the Defense Policy Panel's questions was on the following issues: (1) What is the Warsaw Pact capability to conduct a standing start attack against NATO? (2) What is the Warsaw Pact capability to obtain a decisive advantage after a mobilization? (3) What are the implications of the answers to these questions for U.S. and NATO force planning?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 05, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA344967