

**STRATEGY
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**THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
HOW STRATEGIC LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
DEVELOP AND THEIR LESSONS LEARNED**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The transformation of our military capability to meet the goals of Joint Vision 2010 is termed the "Revolution in Military Affairs". The Chief of Staff of the Army has indicated that a "Revolution in Military Affairs" will not occur until we first have a "Revolution in Military Logistics" with involved leadership of all senior commanders. This paper reviews the past experiences of four strategic leaders in the field of logistics; Generals Brehon B. Somervell, Carter B. Magruder, Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., and Jimmy D Ross, in order to capture their leadership "lessons learned". Recommendations are provided based on these lessons learned to meet the leadership requirements for the Revolution in Military Logistics.

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INTRODUCTION

I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging the future but by the past.

—Patrick Henry

Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010 provide the conceptual template for how the Army plans to conduct operations in the 21st Century. Joint Vision 2010 presents the emerging operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection and *focused logistics* as enablers that allow the United States Armed Forces to dominate the full range of military operations.¹ Joint Vision 2010 asserts that turning this conceptual template into a capability requires strong, innovate leadership.² The transformation of our military capability to meet Joint Vision 2010 is termed the "Revolution in Military Affairs".³ General Reimer in CSA "Yellow" 98-02 "Just in Time Logistics"- Its Time!" said, "You have heard me say on many occasions that we will not have a 'Revolution in Military Affairs,' until we first have a 'Revolution in Military Logistics and Business Affairs.'... Now more than ever, we need the hands-on, involved leadership of all senior commanders to create the logistical systems the Army needs - just in time to face the challenges and opportunities of the next century."⁴ He continues with his leadership challenge by saying "Positive leadership is the best answer to any challenge and transforming military logistics is no exception ... Senior leaders must set and enforce

standards that will move us forward ... Senior leaders must prepare for logistical and business operations in an information age."⁵

If we are to have a Revolution in Military Logistics and turn Joint Vision 2010 into a reality in the 21st Century, change is required. Change may be required in the logistical systems, the logistician's modus operandi and the development and selection of logisticians that hold the highest positions in the Army structure. To determine what to change, we must first review the past and determine the lessons of experience gained from logisticians who performed at the strategic level. To accomplish this purpose, this paper will first define strategic leadership. Secondly, it will outline the methodology of selecting strategic leaders and collecting data on the lessons learned during their career in logistics. Thirdly, it will discuss the lessons learned and their applicability. Finally, it will make recommendations for change to meet the requirements for the Revolution in Military Logistics and Joint Vision 2010. To begin with strategic leadership must be defined.

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

The term "strategic leadership" is evolving within the military, business and academic communities with different definitions and contextual usage. The business community interchanges the term strategic leadership with executive leadership, strategic decision-maker and strategic management. In the business world, strategic leadership means "both the organizational decision making and the role of the top leaders in

making, guiding, and implementing strategic decisions".⁶

Essentially in business, strategic leadership refers both to the seniority of the leader in the organizational hierarchy, and the actions he takes. Retired General Sullivan and Colonel Harper best described this concept to business leaders in their book; *Hope is not a Method*. They wrote:

Thus, "Leading" has three dimensions, and we use the term "strategic leadership" to embrace this gestalt: managing, creating the future, and team building. Strategic leadership is directing and controlling rational and deliberate action that applies to an organization in its most fundamental sense: purpose, culture, strategy, core competencies, and critical processes. Strategic leadership includes not only operating successfully today but also guiding deep and abiding change-transformation-into the essence of an organization.⁷

The U.S. Army has progressively developed a generally accepted working definition of strategic leadership.⁸ The military definition of strategic leadership contained in FM 100-103 (Draft) is:

the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats.⁹

Major General Chilcoat, the former Army War College Commandant, provides another perspective to the broad concept of strategic leadership. He describes strategic leadership as "the effective practice of the strategic art".¹⁰ Chilcoat defines strategic art as "The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and

means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interest."¹¹ From the fact that FM-103 is still after several years a draft field manual and General Chilcoat's article introduces another perspective, it is apparent that the term strategic leadership is still slowly evolving and has yet to become doctrinal in the U.S. Army. Considering strategic leadership from both the business and military perspective, it is multi-dimensional and includes both the art and science of leadership. Strategic leadership encompasses the practitioner and includes the processes he employs at the highest level of the organization. Strategic leadership is simultaneously focused inward to the organization and outward to promote interest nationally, internationally or globally. With this understanding of strategic leadership, a discussion can proceed of the methodology for selecting which strategic leaders to study.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this paper was adapted from a study conducted by the Center for Creative Leadership, which determined how successful executives develop on the job.¹² This paper's methodology consisted of selecting the appropriate strategic leader in the field of Army logistics, determining the correct "lessons learned" to capture, data collection and finally analyzing the lessons to determine if there were commonality.

LEADER SELECTION

The criteria for selecting the logisticians to study were:

1. They have obtained one of the most senior logistics officer positions in the Army (e.g. either Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) or Commander, Army Material Command or the equivalent).
2. They served as the senior logistician during wartime - World War II, Korea, Vietnam or Desert Storm.
3. There are first person accounts available discussing their lessons learned in logistics and leadership.

Based on these criteria, General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces (WWII); General Carter B. Magruder, DCSLOG (Korea), Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, DCSLOG (Vietnam) and General Jimmy D. Ross, DCSLOG and Commanding General, Army Material Command(Desert Storm) were selected.

LEADERSHIP AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPETENCIES

A review of the Strategic Leadership Development Inventory¹³, FM 100-33 (Draft) and General Chilcoat's article provided a framework of the type of experiences to capture from the strategic leaders. From this review of literature a list of 70 competencies, skills or attributes (see Table Two at Annex) was developed. Being fully cognizant of the problems associated with ascribing certain traits, skills or mannerisms to strategic leaders;¹⁴this list of strategic leadership competencies provided a basis on which activities and experiences were judged to be applicable.

DATA COLLECTION

Reviews were conducted of the oral histories, autobiographies, books, articles and professional papers of the four selected leaders. This review provided 399 experiences that related to a theme or lessons in leadership. The 399 experiences were categorized into three leadership themes and 15 leadership lessons shown at Table One.

Strategic Leadership Themes	
<u>Early Development</u>	
◇	Parental Influence
◇	Proclivity to the military
◇	Role Models
◇	Education
◇	Sports
<u>Beginning the Army Career</u>	
◇	Branch of Service
◇	Early Challenges
◇	Work ethic
◇	Values
◇	Peer Group
◇	Relationship with Superiors and Mentors
<u>Leading at the Strategic Level</u>	
◇	Modus Operandi
◇	Vision
◇	The Spouse's Role
◇	Combined and Joint Operations

Table One - Leadership Lessons

DISCUSSION OF LESSONS LEARNED

These lessons did not spring out with great clarity into easily distinguishing groupings. The lessons captured from these strategic leaders are not an unexpected revelation or new discovery. What do emerge are themes of leadership. These leadership themes were incorporated into the strategic leader's modus operandi, validated through experience, refined and re-applied again at the next level of leadership as they progressed and were also passed onto their subordinates. The beginnings of their leadership lessons started at home and it is this early development that will now be examined.

EARLY DEVELOPMENT

Parental Influence. The role of family in leadership development was commented on by all of the leaders. Three of the general officers observed that their parents established a system of beliefs, which included: the importance of setting goals, self-sufficiency and the commitment to always do your best. In contrast General Heiser was a product of a broken home. His mother died when he was age six, and his father was an abusive alcoholic. Up until age 14 he spent much of his time on the streets and at the Boy's Club of Washington D.C. General Heiser system of beliefs and principles were learned from his surrogate parents who were the staff of the Boy's Club, school priests, and from his schoolmates.¹⁵

The common theme with each General Officer was that they learned values early in life from their family or the surrogate family. These values were a foundation that served them throughout life.

Proclivity to the Military. Do strategic leaders in the Army have a natural inclination to join the armed forces? In the case of the four general officers studied, none of them had fathers who were military officers. All of the general officers, except General Heiser, had early aspirations or some fascination with the military. The bearing and commitment of officers and NCOs that they met prior to deciding their vocation captivated them. In contrast to the others, General Heiser during his youth had a passion for sports and did not seriously consider the military until after the attack on Pearl Harbor.¹⁶

To be a successful strategic leader doesn't require a family military lineage or tradition. It does require setting the goal of becoming an officer. Three of the general officers demonstrated an inclination for the military early in life inspired by their casual contact with Army Officers and NCOs. They liked what they saw, and the images intrigued them. General Heiser didn't indicate an interest in the military until after the attack on Pearl Harbor when he joined the Army due to a sense of duty.

Role Models. The general officers in this paper believed that role models were important not only to their early development but also continually throughout their career.

General Somervell, Magruder and Ross all commented on the values, work ethic and ambition learned from their parents. Even General Heiser's alcoholic father can be considered a role model. He provided an object lesson in what not to do. As these leaders continued through school their role models transitioned from school teachers to coaches to ROTC Cadre. Each general officer in the study mentioned numerous role models during their military career. Their role models included both peers and superiors. Of interest, General Magruder mentioned General Somervell¹⁷ and General Ross listed General Heiser as a role model.¹⁸

In the development of strategic leaders role models are significant. Positive role models provide an example that the future leader recognizes as desirable to emulate. As the future leader matured, he chooses role models more compatible with his emerging pattern of leadership. During their Army career the leaders identified object lessons and incorporated them into their modus operandi. When the leader identified a negative object lesson, they cognitively determined not to model the behavior.

Education. The purpose in reviewing the educational background of the leaders was to determine if the source of their degree or the type of degree related to their success as strategic leaders and logisticians.

Generals Somervell and Magruder graduated from West Point in the top ten percent of their class with a degree in Engineering. General Ross was a Distinguished Military Graduate and received a

baccalaureate degree in physical education from a state college. General Heiser did not have the opportunity to earn a baccalaureate degree. Generals Magruder, Heiser and Ross all earned Master degrees. Magruder's Masters degree was in Engineering and Heiser's and Ross's were in Business. General Heiser also had the opportunity to train with industry while completing his master's degree at the University of Chicago.¹⁹ All of the strategic leaders did well academically. Generals Somervell and Magruder highlighted the significance of a West Point education over the state or private college. West Point provided a solid basis of analytical skills in engineering and mathematics. It enabled them to start developing the network of classmates. Those friendships become of much greater importance later in their career. They learned what it meant to be a soldier and the privileges and responsibility of rank.²⁰ General Magruder believed that West Point impressed the importance of integrity and the value of a honor system on cadets.²¹

There are several lessons that can be drawn from these varied educational experiences. First, the source of degree, military academy or state college, did not determine career success. However, West Point provided an environment to inculcate the officer tradition. Second, a Master's Degree in a hard discipline versus a social science provided the analytical and conceptual skills required to solve problems of more cognitive complexity, which the officers encountered later in their

careers. And finally, the officers were ambitious and all did well academically.

Sports. Each officer in the study emphasized the influence of sports and competition to their career in the military. General Magruder said, "any type of competition whether it's to stand well in class or to be a member of a team is a good thing."²² General Heiser was especially emphatic regarding the influence of sports on his career. He felt that sports provided an opportunity to gain the respect of his peers and superiors and demonstrate his leadership potential.²³ General Heiser believed that "some ability at sports and a willingness to get out there and play can help a commander at almost any level of command."²⁴ General Ross also agreed that sports had a positive influence on his Army career.²⁵ He believed that the competitive environment of the military was an extension of the competitive sports environment experienced in college.²⁶

The commonality in the response of the four strategic leaders was the importance they placed on sports. Sports provided a venue for competition and camaraderie, to develop friendships and practice leadership skills. The competitive spirit of the strategic leader was nurtured on the field of sports at an earlier age.

BEGINNING THE ARMY CAREER—DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

SKILLS

This section of the paper concentrates on the lessons learned by the strategic leaders during approximately their first 10 years in the Army. It is during these formative years that skill sets are developed, values are challenged, *modus operandi* is refined, and the warrior ethos is inculcated. It is during this time that the future strategic leaders learned the lessons of leadership: the toughness and independence to make decisions; the interpersonal skills to get cooperation from people; enough knowledge into the intricacies of the Army to take intelligent action; and the stamina to cope with ambiguity, stress and complexity.²⁷

Branch of Service. Generals Magruder, Heiser and Ross all believed that an officer should have an initial assignment in the combat arms prior to being assigned to a logistics branch. General Magruder and Ross began their career in a combat arms branch. However, only General Heiser began his career in one of the logistics' branches. General Somervell, Magruder and Ross served in the combat arms during a war. The strategic leaders reasoned that combat arms duty for young logisticians provides them the knowledge to provide "optimum logistics support."²⁸ Consequently, they believed that all logisticians needed an initial combat arms tour. General Ross best expressed the sentiments when he offered that there was no better training mechanism for the logistics officer.²⁹

The consensus of the strategic leaders is that to be able to provide the best support to the combat arms you need to have combat arms experience. Experience with the combat arms provides the logistician with creditability and allows better understanding of their priorities and decision making process.

Early Challenges. The general officers considered early challenges developmental to their embryonic career. The fact that they still reflect on experiences that occurred 25-30 years ago testifies to the importance they place on these early "tests by fire" to the realities of the Army career. In each case they built on the skills gained from the experience and applied them when in positions of greater responsibility.

The leaders in this paper, while in the rank of Captains and Majors, learned how to command soldiers, direct large-scale construction projects, develop decision-making skills, and handle crisis and cope with uncertainty. They developed creative solutions for providing logistical support during the adversities of war, and they learned to deal with fear.

These early challenges were defining moments in the lives and careers of the strategic leaders in this study. These moments determined if the leader had the persistence, ambition, intellect and desire to continue in the Army and differentiated leaders from managers. These early challenges were the start of the developmental process where the future strategic leaders accomplish the challenging task, gain confidence, incorporate the

lessons learned into their modus operandi and move on to higher levels of responsibility.

Work Ethic. Inextricably linked to performing well in challenging assignment is the ethos of work ethic. As previously mentioned, parents provided the earliest example of work ethic. The general officers indicated that a strong work ethic is necessary to propel a person through the junior leadership ranks to the senior leadership ranks. The concept of work ethic is inseparably linked to ambition and the concept of selfless service.

The competitiveness of the military provided the crucible to forge a strong work ethic. General Somervell was characterized as having a driving ambition directed toward receiving the next promotion. The competitive nature of being an Army officer, the long hours, hard work and tough assignments were the venue in which General Somervell thrived.³⁰ General Magruder recognized that a strong work ethic was important to progressing in the Army.³¹ He valued hard work not only from himself, but officers whose careers he influenced. He sought to assign promising logisticians to "challenging assignments so they would work hard and develop."³² General Heiser believed that hard work, which he termed "hustle" provided him opportunity.³³ General Ross incorporated the idea of "work ethic" into his command philosophy and the speeches that he presented to officer classes. He challenged officer to "become a student of their job." That

really means learn as much as they can of their job and not make it a eight to five..."³⁴

These strategic leaders realized that to be successful you must have a strong work ethic. They acknowledged that it took hard work to accomplish the mission and to have opportunities for further advancement. They recognized the work ethic in their peers and rewarded hard work in their subordinates through promotions. However, both General Ross and Heiser cautioned that it was important to balance hard work with family time.³⁵ General Ross believed that the family directly impacted on wartime readiness.³⁶ Good strategic leaders understand that a strong work ethic is important as long as it is balanced with family and personal needs.

Values. The Army's leadership field manual discusses what a leader must "be" by discussing values. The argument of the field manual is that values are the foundation for service to the nation. Army leaders have a responsibility to transmit these values to their soldiers.³⁷ The subject of values was discussed directly and referred to repeatedly by the general officers with the value of integrity mentioned with the greatest frequency. Each general officer mentioned experiences when their integrity was tested or when there could have been a perception of conflict of interest. They believed that integrity was taught at West Point and integral to being an officer.

There is a not so noticeable theme in their approach to values from the four strategic leaders. The theme from Generals

Somervell and Magruder is that values are intrinsic to being an officer and a leader. They felt that values do not need to be discussed since they are inherent to the position. General Heiser and Ross spoke more to the necessity of maintaining values. General Heiser provided examples of times that his values could have been compromised. General Ross incorporated the need to discuss values into his command philosophy. The need for strategic leaders to discuss values with the organization is a paradigm shift that must be recognized.

Peer Group. As the strategic leaders discussed their careers, the role of peers was woven throughout their life history. This section focuses on the role that peers played in the development of strategic leaders. Peers have a significant role in the Army. General Sumervell knew every name of the seven graduating classes from West Point from 1911-1917 and established many friendships. These friendships provided him "substantial value in later years."³⁸ He also used his peer's influence to assist him in getting a better job and was accused of crawling "up over the bodies of some very fine officers" to advance his own career.³⁹

Many of General Magruder's classmates at Command and General Staff College, Generals Mark Clark, Matthew Ridgeway, and Maxwell Taylor held extremely responsible positions during World War II and Korea. General Magruder noted the value of having such a uniformly high quality peer group. "I would accent that being with this high class group of people, I feel was my greatest

fortune ... Such associations tend to raise your standard to as high a level as can be sustained."⁴⁰

It is of interest that peer group networking was both social and professional. General Maxwell Taylor and Magruder were young artillery lieutenants together. The Magruder's were the Godparents for General Taylor's oldest child. It was also General Taylor who requested that General Magruder come to Korea and command the 24th Division and then the IX Corps.⁴¹ When General Taylor became the Chief of Staff of the Army he selected General Magruder to be the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics⁴².

General Heiser discussed many peers who impacted on his career. He illustrates the power of the peer group and networking. For example, General Heiser gained instant creditability when he reported into the 7th Infantry Division in Korea due to three-quarters of the battalion commanders in the division being his Leavenworth classmates.⁴³

The importance of peers is indicated by the frequency that General Ross's discusses them in his oral history. He speaks to the importance of his peers over 15 times. He attended Officers Basic Course with Generals Powell, Stiner and Nydam.⁴⁴ His 1967 CGSC class produced 15 General Officers including General Maxwell Thurman.⁴⁵ As an action officer in the Pentagon he noted the high quality people that he worked with such as future Generals Farnen, Solomon and Honor.

Within the Army, peers have a significant role. The Army ranks an officer in comparison to his peers from his initial

entry into West Point or ROTC through his career to retirement. Peers are not only measuring sticks to compare performance, but they are also the source of competition in advancement and performance at Army schools. Peers also become the network to determine the best assignment, assisting in completing a task or mission and a source of support in times of crisis.

Relations with the Superiors and Mentoring. Superiors in the Army are both mentors and responsible formally for the development of their subordinates. General Somervell enjoyed great latitude in his relationship with his superiors. His "disregard for red tape disturbed his superiors. But they also marveled at his ability to get hard things done quickly and well without close supervision."⁴⁶ Sumervell was extremely loyal to his superiors.⁴⁷ When General Somervell was assigned to work for a boss that he strongly disliked, instead of changing his manner of operating and learning from the boss he used his connections to get transferred.⁴⁸

General Magruder's philosophy was never to seek a job. He believed in going where he was sent and doing the best job that he could. No matter the type of boss, good or bad, he would make the most of the assignment and learn from it.⁴⁹ As a superior, he felt that it was his responsibility, not only to develop his subordinates and officers of the technical services, but also to ensure that they got promoted.⁵⁰

General Heiser mentioned over a dozen superiors and the lessons that he learned specifically from each boss. General

Heiser's bosses recognized his potential and ensured that his career moved forward.⁵¹

General Ross named over ten superiors and the lessons that he learned from them.⁵² General Ross credited General Heiser with playing a critical role in his development to become a general officer.⁵³ General Ross consistent theme was that we should watch and closely observe our bosses, pick up their ideas and concepts and incorporate them into our style of operating.⁵⁴

There are several lessons learned from the careers of these four strategic leaders. First, subordinates learn leadership and management skill by emulating their superiors. The greater the exposure to a variety of bosses the more leadership skill the subordinate is able to observe. The number and variety of bosses also facilitates the subordinate ability to adapt to different leadership styles. Mentoring was never mentioned as a formal program but was important in the promotion of the strategic leader. Superiors groom promising officers for positions of greater responsibility by preparing them to perform at the strategic level.

LEADING AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Strategic leadership is both art and science; there is no truth with a capital "T".

—General Gordon R. Sullivan⁵⁵

Leading at the strategic level focuses not just on the skills and competencies that the leader possesses, but also includes the influence that the leader has on the organization. Strategic

leadership is concerned with how a leader guides the organization into the future. To fully understand strategic leadership, the modus operandi of the strategic leaders in this paper will now be reviewed.

Modus Operandi. General Somervell employed a direct, entrepreneurial style of leadership. "Distinguished by ambition, energy, and managerial brilliance, Somervell was a formidable figure who reveled in big tasks and was 'enough of an S.O.B.' to get them done."⁵⁶ When he made a decision he expected that his orders be carried out immediately and without question. He provided his subordinates the latitude to make decisions and supported them even when they were wrong.⁵⁷ General Somervell's method was to ensure that competent organizations were in place, and then he would provide the drive and energy keep the organization focused toward task completion.⁵⁸ He was legendary for his short temper and was unwilling to suffer fools gladly or tolerate mediocre performance.⁵⁹ General Somervell established a "control division" in each of his headquarters to measure the organization's success in meeting objectives and to provide feedback. The control division's liaison visits provided General Somervell information on each of the theaters and also assisted in problems solving.⁶⁰

General Magruder's modus operandi was expectably similar to his mentor - General Somervell. General Magruder believed that decisions should be made at the point where there is the most understanding and would attempt to force the decision making to

lower echelons in the organization. He had a reputation for being hard on his staff and severely cross-examining staff officers to ensure that both he and the presenter understood the problem being considered.⁶¹ He believed in making timely decisions from approximate data; rather than waiting for more precise data to make what may or may not be the best decision. General Magruder displayed a healthy skepticism for the Army's growing dependence on computers.⁶²

General Heiser's writings portray him with a direct, hands on approach to leading at the strategic level. Even though he held the DCSLOG position he believed that he "needed to simple go out and 'kick boxes' to get accurate information."⁶³ He was a disciple of the "management by objective" philosophy and employed this management style at all levels of command.⁶⁴ He firmly believed that at all levels of leadership teamwork was essential. General Heiser contended that communication with both the boss and the organization was essential.⁶⁵ He encouraged logisticians to leverage the computer as a tool to better manage logistics.⁶⁶ Selflessness marked General Heiser's modus operandi.⁶⁷

General Ross's modus operandi can best be described as transformational leadership. His was able to motivate the organization to have a shared goal, and they collectively worked to achieve it.⁶⁸ General Ross was unpretentious. His focus was not just on the mission but also the soldier or civilian and their family. He manifested this transitional leadership style as a battalion commander in Vietnam even before the term

"transitional leadership" appeared in leadership lexicon. He set goals for his battalion, received ideas on how to do the job better and rewarded the soldiers with innovative programs and incentives.⁶⁹ He continued to refine this leadership style throughout his career. This was best exemplified toward the end of his career. As the Army Material Command commander he was able to meet the organizational goal of reducing the workforce by 20,000 without a major reduction in force (RIF).⁷⁰ One of the hallmarks of his style was initiative and keeping a forward focus. At each level of leadership he demonstrated an ability to analyze the problems and develop practical solutions.⁷¹ For example, during his tenure as the DCSLOG he effectually tackled many emotion-laden problems such as field feeding and battle dress uniforms (BDU) improvements.⁷²

There are many commonalties and differences in the modus operandi of the strategic leaders. The general officers in this study all emphasized the importance of integrity in all aspects of an officer's career. The officers demonstrated the capacity for hard work, long hours and performing under stress. They were ambitious and sought positions of increased responsibility. They understood the informal system of networking, and although they adamantly indicated that they did not seek specific jobs, their mentors and superiors ensured that their career progressed. The general officers had the ability to develop and refine the skill set that they needed for each position.⁷³ The strategic leaders had the ability to transition from the specific technical problem

and details to the strategic application. While these are the major areas that the leaders held in common, there were also several distinctions to their approach to strategic leadership. Generals' Somervell and Magruder were task oriented and directive while Generals' Heiser and Ross used a more collegial style to accomplish the mission. General Somervell used his strong personality to force decisions. General Ross used others to build consensus. The apparent fact is the modus operandi of the strategic leader must be consistent with his personality.

Vision. Each of the leaders in the study demonstrated the capacity of stepping back from the immediate and doing the hard work of creating a vision for the future. The other important aspect linked to vision is the ability to communicate that vision to the organization. To be a strategic leader requires the organization to understand and share the vision. The vision of the general officers in this paper equipped and supported the Army during WWII, built the Pentagon⁷⁴, caused diesel engines to be placed in tanks and trucks⁷⁵, initiated the concept we know of today as In-Transit Visibility⁷⁶, started the Logistic Executive Development Course and placed over 76 contractors in Saudi Arabia supporting Desert Storm.⁷⁷ Their vision was futuristic. They envisioned the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline⁷⁸, nuclear powered tanks and locomotives⁷⁹, and multi-national logistics for NATO⁸⁰.

While each officer identified the importance of vision, they used different approaches to communicate it to the organization. If General Somervell could not get the organization to share in

his vision, he would drive the vision to reality by sheer force of personality.⁸¹ Most of General Ross's visions for the future of the Army came to fruition through his ability to communicate the vision and build consensus.⁸²

The Spouse's Role. The role of the Army spouse is not mentioned in FM 22-103 or discussed in leadership research. However each strategic leader indicated that their spouse was important to their career and the completion of their responsibilities. General Magruder said that choosing a wife is "probably the most important decision that a Regular Officer makes, other than to stay in the service. If he gets a wife who keeps up with him as he goes higher in rank, she becomes more valuable instead of less." He further elaborated, the spouse is an asset when entertaining diplomats and other strategic leaders.⁸³ General Heiser commented that his spouse was instrumental in organizing essential volunteer activities, provided a source of information and her influence turn the military community into a better place to live.⁸⁴ General Ross provided that the spouse has always been a good critic and a source of support for the strategic leader.⁸⁵

Strategic Leadership in Joint and Combined Operations. The strategic leaders in this study participated in the largest joint and combined operations in which the Army has ever engaged. However, their writings and oral histories are relatively brief on the subject. General Somervell's had a vast amount of experience in combined and joint operations. His record is

mixed. He demonstrated brilliance in logistical planning, shifting priorities, using local resources and devising innovative concepts for logistical support of World War II. In multi-national negotiation General Somervell drove a hard bargain. He was "Highly nationalistic and determined not to be taken in by anyone..."⁸⁶ This attitude was shortsighted and did not facilitate developing coalition policy.⁸⁷ In the joint arena his reputation with the Navy was adversarial. General Marshall reprimanded him for his public statements insulting the Navy.⁸⁸

The lessons learned from the other general officers are few. As a consultant, retired General Heiser advocated multi-national logistics for NATO⁸⁹. General Ross expressed caution and skepticism for the Defense Logistics Agency assuming functions previously administered by the Army⁹⁰.

The silence on the subject of joint and combined logistics indicates that these strategic leaders did not have the incentive of the Goldwater-Nichols Amendment moving them to joint operations. They didn't wrestle with the problems associated with combined and joint operations to the same degree that will confront strategic leaders in the 21st Century. The strategic leader with the most experience, General Somervell, proved at times to lack the collegiality that is needed to build teams with sister services or allies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Leadership for the twenty-first century is about intervention and change, to be successful, leaders must

have the skills, confidence, and intuition to create a degree of stability out of apparent chaos.⁹¹

—General Gordon R. Sullivan

The strategic leader and logistician of the 21st century will find as many if not more challenges than those of the general officers examined in this study. With the revolution in military logistics, the necessity to project forces around the world, the tempo of operations, the increased expenditures rate of supplies and the need to conduct operations with coalitions; strategic leaders development is a requirement that cannot be neglected. Based on the lessons of experience gained from examining the careers of the four logisticians in this paper, the following recommendations are provided.

1. Formalize the mentoring process at the field grade and general officer level. The strategic leaders in this paper identified that mentoring and networking were vitally important to their careers. Currently mentoring in the Army is unstructured and informal. To better develop future strategic leaders mentoring should be a formal part of the officer development program.⁹²
2. Pro-actively promote virtue, morals and values in the Army. The Army should promote it in recruiting, teach it at basic training, reinforce it during the career, encourage strategic leaders to speak on it, and make it part of the Army's history and mores. Personal values

were determined by the strategic leaders to be of vital importance to their success in leading organization.

3. Continue branch detailing logistic lieutenants to the combat arms branch. The strategic leaders all identified that assignment to the combat arms prior to being assigned to a combat service support branch provided excellent training for the logistician. This initial assignment provided the logistician creditability, insight into the combat arms decision cycle and facilitated providing optimum support.
4. Continue to teach and discuss strategic leadership at the U.S. Army War College. This paper identified that leadership at the strategic level involves different skill sets and modus operandi. The AWC provides future strategic leaders an opportunity to discuss and reflect on the skill sets that they possess and those they need to develop.
5. Continue to provide opportunities for spouse development when their husbands attend the U.S. Army War College. Each strategic leader identified the importance of the role that the spouse performed in strategic leadership by organizing volunteer activities, providing information on the community, entertaining high level guest and providing support to their spouse. The AWC year provides an ideal opportunity for spouses to focus on the skills they will need to support the strategic leader.

ANNEX

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP COMPETENCY, SKILL OR ATTRIBUTE	
1.	Able to inspire great effort
2.	Advocate for legitimate requirements of the organization
3.	Allocates Resources
4.	Bridges the future with strategy and plans
5.	Bridges the gap between political decisions, the military organization and service member
6.	Builds consensus
7.	Builds the organizational culture on essential values
8.	Capitalizes on command and peer leadership skills
9.	Communicates internally and externally
10.	Compromises as necessary
11.	Conceptually envision a desired end state
12.	Creates, resources and sustains the organizational structure
13.	Demonstrates a capacity for hard work and long hours
14.	Demonstrates an appreciation of functional relationships outside of the organization
15.	Demonstrates the ability to operate in a multi-cultural (Joint and Combined) environment
16.	Demonstrates the ability to recognize and avoid irrelevant and marginal issues
17.	Demonstrates the capacity to receive and analyze information and take timely action
18.	Develops an association and knowledge with the network of knowledge
19.	Develops and improve operating doctrine and associated training
20.	Develops competitive strategies
21.	Develops effective feedback systems
22.	Develops the ability to influence the multiplicity of external elements within the federal government
23.	Directs the flow of internal and influence of external events toward the desired end
24.	Displays a sound frame of reference
25.	Empowers Subordinates
26.	Ensures that subcultures are compatible within the strategic culture
27.	Ensures that the leadership of the organization understands national security policy
28.	Envisions the future
29.	Experts in the bureaucracy
30.	Experts in their domain
31.	Has a supportive spouse
32.	Has knowledge of the broader political and social systems within the organization
33.	Identifies and assigns strategic and operational roles and missions
34.	Identifies the necessary force capabilities to accomplish the national military strategy
35.	Interacts with private organizations within the parameters of policy guidance and ethical conduct
36.	Interprets national policy guidelines and directives
37.	Is Personally empowered by technology
38.	Maintains effective leader development and human resourcing programs
39.	Makes assessments of personal strengths and weaknesses of the main players
40.	Manages change
41.	Manages change effectively
42.	Manages Joint, Combined and Interagency relationships
43.	Manages national level relations

44.	Manages through policy and directives
45.	Master of information and influence
46.	Negotiates with external agencies and organizations
47.	Operates within the boundaries established by the Army, government and the people
48.	Participates in the interagency and interdepartmental process
49.	Perpetuates organizational goals and the strategic vision
50.	Plans for the maintenance of the military capability
51.	Prepares strategic plans
52.	Presents the organization's requirements for resources and capabilities
53.	Pro-actively involved with the executive, legislative and judicial organizations
54.	Provides advice and counsel in national policy formulation
55.	Provides candid assessments of risk and consequences of budgeting alternatives
56.	Provides counsel to civilian executive authorities
57.	Represents the organization
58.	Represents the organization in its relationship with the large society
59.	Sees beyond the immediately obvious information and knows what is missing
60.	Sensitive to public opinion and the media
61.	Sensitivity to host nation
62.	Sustains trust and confidence both vertically and horizontally
63.	Teaches and develops subordinates
64.	Understands and plans for second- and third order effects of actions to implement change
65.	Understands organizational systems
66.	Understands the environment
67.	Understands the human dynamics of combat
68.	Understands the relevance military technologies and how to incorporate them into the organization.
69.	Understands the role he plays and the boundaries of the roles
70.	Understands what shapes the organizational culture (strategic culture)

Table Two - Strategic Leadership Competency, Skill or Attribute

ENDNOTES

¹ John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff, undated), 25.

² Ibid., 27-28.

³ William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), 39.

⁴ Dennis J Reimer, "Just in Time Logistics" - Its Time!" (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, CSA "Yellow"98-02,1998), 1.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Stephen J. Zaccaro, *Models and Theories of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual/Empirical Review and Integration* (Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1996), 237.

⁷ Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is not a Method, What Business Leaders Can Learn From America's Army* (New York: Time Business Random House, Inc, 1996), 44.

⁸ Robert A. Fitton, *Development of Strategic-Level Leaders* (Alexandria: Defense Technical Information Center, 1993), 10. LTC Fitton succinctly traces the evolution leadership definitions in the U.S. Army on pages 10-13.

⁹ U.S. Army War College, *Leading and Managing in the Strategic Arena, A Reference Text 1996-1997, "Draft FM 22-103 Strategic Leadership"* (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1997), 45.

¹⁰ Richard A. Chilcoat, *Strategic Art: The new Discipline for 21st Century Leaders* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 1.

¹¹ Ibid., 4.

¹² Esther Lindsey, Virginia Holmes, and M.W. McCall, Jr., *Key Events in Executive's Lives, Technical Report No. 32* (Greensboro: Center for Creative Research, 1987)

¹³ U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *Strategic Leader Development Inventory* (Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences, 1995) 31.

¹⁴ Zaccaro, 71.

¹⁵ Joseph M Heiser, Jr., *A Soldier Supporting Soldiers* (Washington D.C., Center of Military History, 1991) 8.

¹⁶ James Tussing and William D. Wilson, *Conversations with LTG Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., USA-RET for the US Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officer Debriefing Program* (Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, 1996) 12.

¹⁷ Charles E. Tucker, *Summary Report of Conversation with General Carter B. Magruder, USA-RET for Senior Officer Oral History Program 1972-1973* (Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, 1973) 44.

¹⁸ Thomas W. Sweeney, *Summary Report of Conversation with General Jimmy D. Ross, USA-RET for the Senior Officer Oral History Program 1994-4, Unedited*, (Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, 1994) 373.

¹⁹ Heiser, 98.

²⁰ John Kennedy Ohl, *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII* (Dekalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1994) 10.

²¹ Tucker, 10.

²² Ibid., 12.

²³ Tussing, 19.

²⁴ Heiser, 122.

²⁵ Sweeney, 14.

²⁶ Ibid., 39.

²⁷ Lindsey, 5.

²⁸ Heiser, 182.

²⁹ Sweeney, 51.

³⁰ Ohl, 11.

³¹ Tucker, 38.

³² Ibid., 41.

³³ Heiser, 2.

³⁴ Sweeney, 245.

³⁵ Heiser, 175.

³⁶ Sweeney, 248.

³⁷ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 July 1990) 22.

³⁸ Ohl, 10.

³⁹ Ibid., 45.

⁴⁰ Tucker, 15.

⁴¹ Ibid., 27.

⁴² Ibid., 36.

⁴³ Heiser, 69.

⁴⁴ Sweeney, 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 109.

⁴⁶ Ohl, 11.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 20.

⁴⁹ Tucker, 36.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 40.

⁵¹ Heiser, 117.

⁵² Sweeney, 37.

⁵³ Ibid., 373.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 375.

⁵⁵ Sullivan, 236.

⁵⁶ Ohl, 4.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 30.

⁵⁸ Ohl, 17.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 68.

⁶¹ Carter B. Magruder, *Recurring Logistic Problems As I Have Observed Them*, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991) 69.

⁶² Ibid., 70.

⁶³ Heiser, 131.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 152.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 78.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 176.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 265.

⁶⁸ Bernard M. Bass, *A New Paradigm of Leadership: An Inquiry into Transformational Leadership* (Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences, 1996) 4-7.

⁶⁹ Sweeney, 166.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 338.

⁷¹ Ibid., 259.

⁷² Ibid., 259-313.

⁷³ Ibid., 322.

⁷⁴ Ohl, 47.

⁷⁵ Magruder, 33.

⁷⁶ Heiser, 157.

⁷⁷ Sweeney, 139.

⁷⁸ Ohl, 161.

⁷⁹ Magruder, 33.

⁸⁰ Heiser, 228.

⁸¹ Ohl, 251.

⁸² Sweeney, 271.

⁸³ Tucker, 44.

⁸⁴ Heiser, 207.

⁸⁵ Sweeney, 385.

⁸⁶ Ohl, 128.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 137.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 197.

⁸⁹ Heiser, 302.

⁹⁰ Sweeney, 318.

⁹¹ Sullivan, 219.

⁹² Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another "Bridge Too Far?," Parameters 28, no.1 (1998): 22. LTG (Ret) Ulmer provides insight on how to formalize the mentoring of officer in the U.S. Army.

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