

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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INDIA-PAKISTAN—ADJUSTING THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

India-Pakistan--Adjusting the Unified Command Plan for the 21st
Century

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ABSTRACT

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Since 1947, Pakistan and India have been in conflict along their common boundary and the United States has been trying to pursue a policy that would provide stability and prosperity throughout South Asia. The National Security Act of 1947 established joint commands to direct, plan and coordinate worldwide U.S. military operations. Under the current Unified Command Plan dated January 1998, United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) includes Pakistan and the United States Pacific Command's (USPACOM) AOR includes India. This line in the sand is wrong. Two different Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) looking out for each country is ineffective and counterproductive for this region. The Joint Staff has a perfect opportunity to correct this 50-year mistake by revising the UCP. The two countries should be assigned to one regional CINC in order to focus the collective efforts and programs that will promote stability and prosperity in the region into the 21st Century. The best CINC to be responsible for both countries is USCINCPAC.

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INTRODUCTION

... India and Pakistan have long-standing ethnic, religious, and territorial differences dating back to their partition in 1947. These differences have caused them to fight three wars since partition. Today, each of them now has the capability to build nuclear weapons. Because of this nuclear capability, a fourth India/Pakistan war would be not just a tragedy--it could be a catastrophe--so we care a lot about what happens there.

— Secretary of Defense William J. Perry

Over 50 years ago, it was an electrifying moment in South Asia, as the birth of two great nations emerged from the once seemingly invincible power of the British empire; Pakistan and India were free nation-states. There was the joy, excitement, challenges, life and freedom inherent in the creation of any new country. However, freedom had come at a price for the people of Pakistan and India. Conflict and war began almost immediately and for 50 years soldiers, citizens, and children of both countries have been dying. Why? To understand the reason, one must understand the struggle for freedom and the hearts and minds of the people involved. We must ask two important questions: What can the United States do to resolve the conflict between the two nations, and, what can be done to stop the killing?

This paper reviews the United States policy and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to determine if our government is really enhancing regional stability. Do we have the proper approach to the complexities of this region? Are we still approaching India

and Pakistan as separate policies, instead of a coherent, focused regional plan that is forthright, adequate and sensible? Are we engaged effectively in the theater? Has the United States assigned the most appropriate Commander-in-Chief (CINC) to look out for the region's interests? Many of these questions will be addressed and a recommendation offered to change the Unified Command Plan that will bring our policy into the 21st Century and hopefully eliminate the possibilities of a catastrophic fourth war in the region.

BACKGROUND

The struggle between India and Pakistan is rich with ethnic tradition and strife. The region poses a very complex issue and the United States must understand the nature of the struggle in order to optimize the most effective policy and command structure.

The people of India have had a continuous civilization since 2500 B.C. when they were primarily agrarian-based in the Indus and Ganges River Valley. The political maps of ancient India were made up of myriad kingdoms with fluctuating boundaries. In the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., northern India was unified under the Gupta Dynasty. During this period, known as India's Golden Age, Hindu culture and political administration reached new heights. Islam spread across the subcontinent over the next 500 years. In the 10th and 11th centuries, Turks and Afghans invaded India and established sultanates in Delhi. It was from

the 11th to 15th centuries that India was dominated and governed by the Hindu Chola and Vijayanagar Dynasties. In the early 16th century, descendants of Genghis Khan swept across the Khyber Pass and established the Mughal (Mogul) Dynasty, which lasted for 200 years. During this time, the two systems--the prevailing Hindu and Muslim--mingled, leaving lasting cultural influences on each other.¹

The ethnic and cultural differences between the present-day Pakistan and India are significant. However, the influence of the British in the region was equally important to these nations. The first British outpost in South Asia was established in 1619, at Sarat on the northwest coast of India. Later in the century, the East India Company opened permanent trading stations at Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, each under the protection of native rulers. The British expanded their influence from these footholds until, by the 1850s, they controlled most of present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. In 1857, a rebellion in north India led by mutinous Indian soldiers caused the British Parliament to transfer all political power from the East India Company directly to the Crown. Great Britain began administering most of India while controlling the remaining territories through treaties with local rulers. In the late 1800s, the first steps to self-government were taken with the appointment of Indian councilors to advise the British viceroy. Beginning in 1920, Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi transformed the Indian National

Congress political party into a mass movement to campaign against British colonial power. The party used parliamentary and nonviolent resistance and noncooperation to achieve independence.²

On 15 August 1947, two great sovereign states arose when partition and independence arrived together--the one at the price of the other. Many have called it the "Great Divide", which was the simultaneous breach between England and her Indian Empire, and between India and Pakistan.³ However, it was soon evident that as with any birth, there was going to be the pain and suffering that accompanies that joy. This pain and suffering have been manifested by a complex conflict lasting over 50 years and costing hundreds of thousands of innocent lives.

The divergent cultures of Muslim-based Pakistan and Hindu-based India were evident in the first speeches given by their respective leaders on their Independence Day. Jawaharlal Nehru, in New Delhi's General Assembly Hall, gave an eloquent speech that stated how the hope and service of the millions will build a free India where all her children may dwell.⁴ It was a vibrant and powerful speech, much like the country of India, the world's second largest country and largest democracy.

In Karachi, Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah hailed in less dramatic fashion a nation-state forged out of British India. If unparalleled pomp and ceremony surrounded the Indian independence befitted India's status as the successor state to the British

raj, then the dogged insistence of the Muslim state in Pakistan emblemized that country's awkward status as the seceded state.⁵ This struggle would lead to three declared wars, thousands of dead, and continual conflict in the region. Like the passion and style of their speeches, the new countries assumed a place on the world stage with similar fates.

THE WARS

Word of the 1947 independence had hardly spread throughout the region when deep-seated religious and communal tensions and fears mounted, exacerbated by irresponsible rhetoric of demagogic politicians and arbitrary boundary lines drawn by the reporting British. These tensions led to frequent armed attacks, especially in Punjab. The Hindus killed the Muslims; the Muslims massacred the Hindus, while the Sikhs were massacred by both groups in gross displays of barbarism. An estimated 225,000 to 500,000 people were killed within weeks of independence.⁶

The India-Pakistan dispute erupted into a small-scale war in 1948 and resulted in many more deaths. Again in 1965, the second India-Pakistan War broke out over border skirmishes. Indian perceptions were the same--India viewed the United States policy as pro-Pakistani and hostile towards India. United States policy and the Indian perceptions of it were at odds due to the different approaches to South Asia, specifically Pakistan.⁷

This perceived U.S. anti-India attitude was never so evident as during their third War, the 1971 India-Pakistan War over Bangladesh. India viewed the attitudes of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger and the forward presence of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise in the Indian Ocean as a direct reflection of Pakistan support and a threat towards India.⁸ The three wars resulted in hundreds of thousand dead. The Indian perception of United States policy was further validated by our building up of the Pakistani Army through arms sales. This anti-American sentiment drove India towards the USSR during this period. The Soviet Union provided military equipment and training to India, strengthening the Cold War bloc in the region.

KASHMIR CHALLENGE

Today, battles and loss of life are a reality in Kashmir. Cross-border operations result in bloodshed and death largely ignored throughout the world. Few international problems have been so entangled in prejudice and suspicion as that of Kashmir. In many ways India's effort to occupy the region of Jumma and Kashmir is a product of the political history of the subcontinent and the British handling of the 1947 partition. India's and Pakistan's histories are full of examples of fears, jealousies, and rivalries, between the Pakistan (Muslim) and India (Hindu). The two nation-states have spent their entire free history

fighting and retaining their old ways instead of building bridges through collaboration to overcome poverty, hunger, and disease and learning how to respect and tolerate each other.⁹ As a matter of fact, the war of words that India and Pakistan engage in over Jammu and Kashmir and the level of violent border exchanges have escalated. In January 1996, numerous attacks between the factions killed over 20 civilians and the destruction of important Sufi shrines set back all political efforts to resolve the complex issue. Kashmir continues to be a flash point for the region.¹⁰

As recently as 19 September 1997, at a White House press conference regarding the meeting of President Clinton and India's Prime Minister Gujral, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth responded when asked of the situation in Kashmir,

"No, Kashmir was not discussed. Everyone here is well aware of the sensitivity of the issue. As I said earlier, the President said we do not intend to interfere in this matter, but gave strong support for the two countries trying to address the issue."¹¹

It is evident that Kashmir is a very personal, political, and deep-seated issue for both India and Pakistan. The nature of the issue is long-term and will take time, however the issue is not vital enough to lead these two countries into full-scale war.

SECURITY STRATEGY

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

It is important for the United States to look hard at our interests within this complex region and develop a comprehensive approach to its challenges. The President's 1997 National Security Strategy is designed to shape the international environment and assist our ability to prepare for the future. There are some key points of this document that provide particular guidance for South Asia.

The world we face today is as complex and diverse as any period in our history. It is a world where ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability; drugs and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns that transcend national borders; and very large Armies are building military power under the guise of internal security. All these factors are prevalent in the relationship between India and Pakistan. This regional instability does not threaten our vital interests, however, there are concerns that should be addressed. Our responsibility is to build the world of tomorrow by embarking on a period of cooperative engagement and enlargement in order to set the international framework and understanding for real value-added progress.¹²

Since no vital interests are at stake for the United States in the region, it must be an economy of force approach to the challenges of the future. Therefore, an integrated regional

policy is the optimal solution. In time of limited resources, the resources must be applied in the most efficient manner possible to promote regional stability, reduce tensions, and apply all elements of national power--economic, diplomatic, and military. It is imperative that the United States break the historic security paradigm in South Asia. If nothing else, our nation must provide the international leadership that allows each nation-state to discuss the real_core issues in order to make positive progress within their region. This is evident in South Asia.¹³

The direction ahead is clear--remain engaged in the region using all elements of national power and exert our global leadership to deter aggression, foster resolution of old conflicts, strengthen democracies, and open new markets. It is a big world out there; not all players have equal weight on the balance of our interests, so tough choices must be made. These choices will be made in a learning environment where respect and dignity are paramount. We will shape this international environment through diplomacy, international assistance, arms control, nonproliferation initiatives and through military activities.¹⁴

In South Asia, the United States strategy is designed to help the people in the region enjoy the fruits of democracy and secure greater stability by helping resolve long-standing conflicts and implementation of confidence-building measures. The United

States has urged Pakistan and India to take steps to resolve their conflict and bring their nuclear programs into the fold of the international community. We seek to establish relationships that are defined in terms of their own individual merits and reflect a full range of options. Clearly, an integrated consistent policy must be achieved to have success.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Presidential guidance provides the military a vision to apply within a detailed set of programs and objectives. By the President's own admission, the military identifies these objectives much better and more efficiently than most elements of national power. It is extremely true in India and Pakistan, possessing the second and fifth largest armies in the world respectively, that the military provides an excellent common bond to exploit.¹⁵ India and Pakistan's strategic centers of gravity are clearly their Armies, thus U.S. military engagement will have significant impact throughout both nation-states. The military plan is highlighted in the 1997 National Military Strategy (NMS).

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, clearly spelled out that our national military objectives were to promote peace and stability, advance national security by applying military power to shape the international environment (through peacetime engagement activities) and respond

to a full spectrum of crises, if needed, while we prepare now for an uncertain future.¹⁶

The most important tenet of the NMS and where the U.S. Armed Forces can have the most influence in a positive manner is the shaping of the international/South Asian environment. This influence is accomplished through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in alliances. Effective and efficient peacetime engagement is information sharing, contact between our military and the armed forces of other nations, promotion of trust and confidence, and encouragement of measures that support stability and security. By increasing understanding and reducing uncertainty, cooperative engagement builds constructive security relations and reduces tensions.¹⁷ The means (resources) in which the military contributes to the ways (programs) do not have to be big-dollar and massive in nature, but efficient, constructive means that make sense for the partners in the region. Though the military can rarely address the root causes of the tension (usually stemming from ethnic, social issues beyond the core competency of the military) forces can provide fundamental security through presence, activities, schooling opportunities and many others.

Each of the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) for Pakistan and India is given the responsibility to execute our military strategy within his area of responsibility.

USCENTCOM'S ENGAGEMENT POLICY--PAKISTAN

CINCCENT is one of the regional CINCs with a real-world war plan to fight in Southwest Asia. Established in 1983, his command spreads over 19 nations. Considering his entire AOR, it is important to evaluate how much focus CINCCENT places on Pakistan to implement engagement activities as defined in our National Security and Military Strategies.

USCENTCOM's theater strategy contains five tenets: power projection, forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance and readiness to fight.¹⁸ This command contains a region where vital American interests are at stake with the continued free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf region. This command is extremely busy and focused on the warfighting capabilities of its headquarters. USCENTCOM's three-tiered approach to regional defense includes self-defense, regional collective security, and essential access through forward presence, combined exercises and security. Naturally, in a region encompassing both Iraq and Iran, and the potential for conflict these nations bring, resources must be assigned realistically in accordance with real-world threat. Pakistan, by necessity, has been relegated to a lesser priority. Therefore, Pakistan is only a minor player in the region compared to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. CINCCENT's major programs are focused on enhancing his warfighting capability and deterrent measures, such as show of force, and large-scale multinational

exercises. Real-world operations in 1996 included operations such as: Operation Desert Strike, Operation Desert Focus, Operation Southern Watch, numerous Maritime Interceptions Operations, and implementing United Nations Security Council Resolutions 986.¹⁹

It is evident and reasonable that Pakistan, a country with no vital interest to the United States, would be an economy of force-type country. Small-scale military exercises, visits, and military-to-military contacts are the extent of CENTCOM's engagement with Pakistan. The command's keystone exercises were ULTIMATE RESOLVE, BLUE FLAG, ROVING SANDS, BRIGHT STAR, and INTERNAL LOOK. In 1997, Pakistan participated in three low-level exercises called INSPIRED ALERT (AIR), INSPIRED SIREN (Surfex), and INSPIRED VENTURE (SOF ex).

Various congressional legislation has been enacted to shape our policy with Pakistan. One such act of legislation that has affected Pakistan is the Pressler Amendment. The Pressler Amendment greatly restricts the amount and type of military sales and influence within the region.²⁰ The Amendment was in response to Pakistan's policy on the nuclear issue. Due to Pakistan's initiatives to achieve nuclear capability, it is unlikely this amendment will be rescinded in the near future. The Brown Amendment presented a one-time solution for our failure to meet our commitments of security assistance to Pakistan, however it is unlikely further legislation will be passed to rescind the

Pressler Amendment. It is evident that CENTCOM's priority for engagement is clearly on military readiness and warfighting capabilities, and focused towards Southwest Asia and not South Asia. This priority, while necessary in light of dwindling resources, has the potential to be a destructive factor in regional tension between India and Pakistan rather than a constructive program for stability.

USPACOM'S ENGAGEMENT POLICY--INDIA

United States Pacific Command consists of an area of responsibility that covers 50% of the earth's surface; 60% of the world's population, 44 countries and 20 territories, and seven of the world's ten largest Armies. It also has a real-world threat of war on the Korean Peninsula from North Korea and China.²¹ Like CINCCENT and all CINCs--busy is the norm, not the exception. However, USPACOM is extremely different and unique in its approach to strategy and engagement. Though USPACOM clearly puts readiness to fight and win wars as its top priority, the peacetime cooperative engagement strategy clearly consists of steadfast and credible forward presence, strong bilateral relationships, and active participation in military exercises and dialogue. The strategic concept has three goals:

- 1) In peacetime, make conflicts and crises less likely;
- 2) In crises, respond in a timely manner and resolve situations on terms that advance U.S. interests;
- 3) In war, win quickly and decisively, with minimal loss of life and resources.²²

The preponderance of all USPACOM resources is put into engagement and preparedness. Engagement is the security dialogue with all nations.

USPACOM has an extremely large staff and headquarters with actual assigned forces, large sub-unified commands and service components, and three pre-designated Joint Task Forces (JTFs) Headquarters and one Contingency JTF. USPACOM, like USCENTCOM, has an OPLAN to fight a war, but CINCPAC has the sub-unified commander of US Forces Korea to fight the campaign on the Korean Peninsula. Clearly this additional command structure eliminates some of the pressure on the USPACOM staff and allows engagement to flourish. It is evident that the confluence of security, economic, and diplomatic interest in the Asia-Pacific region requires security issues to be worked concurrently.

The Pacific Command strategy pursues the enhancement of security with the concept of preventive defense. It works closely with others to establish the conditions for success. On a day-to-day basis, the strategy focuses on peacetime engagement activities. Through these efforts the end-state is regional stability. USPACOM reassures and reinforces friends and allies through various military-to-military contacts, multinational training, exercises, exchanges, visits and discussions. The most mature of these engagement programs is the Expanded Relations Program (ERP) of the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), the Army Service Component Command of USPACOM. It focuses on the Army

core competencies that allow peace and stability to flourish. All forces in the Pacific are focused on promoting stability, working all elements of power concurrently, and engaging at the lowest level. It is a proven example of the President's intent of efficient, effective use of resources in order to promote our national interests.

THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

HISTORY

The United States has maintained major unified commands to control its operational forces since World War II. The Services recognize the importance of a unity of military effort, however, over the last 50 years, the struggle and debate continues. The process is dynamic, structured, and allows the unified structure to adapt to the changing strategic environment and great advances in technology.

The first plan was established in 1946, called the Outline Command Plan, now known as Unified Command Plans (UCPs).²³ Over a dozen such plans have been developed in the following subsequent fifty years. Since 1979, the UCP has been reviewed biennially.²⁴ The latest version was published in January 1998. Numerous factors weigh into the development of the plan and cover the full spectrum: be logical and unambiguous, minimize duplication, balance responsibilities, have clear objectives and allow manageable span of control, be cost effective, flexible, and adaptable, all the way to the low end of the

spectrum such as the influence of personalities of the Commanders.²⁵ All of these factors weigh equally into the process.

Interestingly enough USPACOM is one of the oldest theater commands and USCENTCOM was born more recently from the REDCOM structure in 1981-82. Traditionally Pakistan was associated with the Middle East, and thus USCENTCOM, while India was grouped with the East under USPACOM.²⁶ There was no real examination or evidence that the initial command structure was based on the historical ties between Pakistan and India, but a functional determination along ethnic lines and war plans. The political maps and boundaries of the UCP were mere lines of convenience.

CURRENT STRUCTURE

USCENTCOM's general geographic area of responsibility includes Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Republic of Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and Pakistan, plus the Gulf of Eden, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean from 68 degree E, south to 5 degree S., and west to Kenya/Tanzania coastal border, including the Seychelles Islands.²⁷ In 1 October 1999, the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union which includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan will be assigned to the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility.²⁸




Figure 1 1998 UCP of CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility

USPACOM's geographic area of responsibility is the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degree W, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degree W and east of 100 degree E, the Indian Ocean east of 17 degree E (excluding the waters north of 5 degree S and west of 68 degree E), Japan, the Republic of China, Mongolia, the countries of Southeast Asia and southern Asian land mass to the western border of India, Madagascar, and other islands in all assigned water areas, and for other than air defense, Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.²⁹

COMMANDERS' AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY




Figure 2 1998 UCP of Commanders' Areas of Responsibility

CHALLENGES

Today the complexities of the UCP truly need to break away from the Cold War mentality and realistically look at the real intent of the UCP. During the most recent Congressionally-mandated Commission on the Roles and Missions (CORM), it clearly addressed the complexity of the issues and highlighted that the Unified Command Plan should reflect a regional focus and the new missions emphasized by the National Security Strategy.³⁰ The adjustments should add agility and flexibility required for the changing threats, and different commands AORs should be adjusted to eliminate seams. This is extremely evident in the current alignment between CENTCOM and PACOM.

The biennial review is reinforced and the CORM recommended the following six broad principles to be utilized:

1. Correspond to areas of recognized or likely strategic interest to the United States.
2. The size of each AOR should accommodate the CINC's representational obligations and other responsibilities. Consider the number of countries for "span of control" issues.
3. Seams between the CINC's AORs should be reviewed to ensure they do not split areas of strategic interest or exacerbate existing political, economic, religious, or cultural differences.
4. Sufficient land area, sea area, and airspace should be included to carry out assigned missions, and if necessary wage war.
5. The distinction between geographic and functional CINCs should be preserved.
6. Responsibilities for functional CINCs should be reviewed periodically for overlap and consolidated.³¹

There is clearly no perfect solution when dealing with so many diverse, and broad principles, however the message is clear: the UCP should provide regional focus, support the national security strategy, and posture ourselves for the future. The 1997 National Defense Panel clearly set the azimuth for the future. The Panel endorsed the 1995 CORM principles for UCP and established that the needs for regional stability will demand continued interaction with regional partners and alliances through diplomatic efforts and will require the constant integration of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military activities.³²

The challenges facing the United States in the next 20 to 25 years are likely to be even more complex and multi-dimensional than those of the last 50 years. While some may challenge United

States interests directly, many will test U.S. diplomatic, economic, and intellectual resourcefulness indirectly. This is clearly true with the challenges presented by the continuing tension between India and Pakistan. The United States can act more efficiently and effectively in this region by re-aligning the UCP now.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

NEW UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN CHANGES -

The present approach to the Pakistan-India combatant command structure is basically a product of World War II. It is imperative that the United States Department of Defense (DoD) adjust its combatant commands' areas of responsibility to address the South Asia region. This change will not alter the U.S. policy-making procedures, but rather increase the effectiveness of U.S. policy implementation in accordance with the National Security Strategy, our National Military Strategy, and our CINC engagement plans.

Any recommendation or revision to the UCP must address three tenets for an effective South Asian region. First, the revised UCP must look at the deep-rooted history that Pakistan and India share. These countries are historically linked to their colonial beginnings with the British empire. The Muslim cultural ties are very strong and their inherent tensions must be addressed if stability has any possibility of existing in South Asia. Second, it must look at the present and address

which combatant command truly possesses a functional engagement and enlargement strategy for the challenges of both India and Pakistan. The revision must address the reality of diminished resources while shaping the region in order to address our important interests. Finally, the new UCP must posture us for the future and the reality of integrated interagency approaches to the future challenges of the 21st century.

The stubborn historical and cultural hostilities between India and Pakistan are real, concerning, and clearly documented. Furthermore, the India-Pakistan rivalry over the Kashmir has been complicated by each side's implied threat to the legitimacy of the other's territorial claims and very national identity.³³ The cultural fault line and tension caused by the religious differences of the primarily Muslim Pakistan and the predominantly Hindu India are very clear. However, it is of interest to note that India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh together are home for more than 350 million Muslims--by far the largest concentration of Muslims in the world. Hindu-dominant India is home to over 110 million Muslims (12 percent of her population) making it the fourth largest Muslim country in the world after Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.³⁴ PACOM, already adept at dealing with the Muslim issues of India, Indonesia, Brunei, and Bangladesh, would have the ideal resources and programs to deal effectively with Muslim Pakistan. Memories of three wars keep the fire of hatred burning, but they also serve as a common bond.

India and Pakistan understand this reality and have taken small steps for economic cooperation through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The SAARC consists of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives and aims primarily at stimulating regional economic cooperation.³⁵ India and Pakistan, though occasionally adversarial, are clearly connected by their rich past, proactive economic cooperation forums, and religion. The most effective approach is to leverage these diverse tensions into positive pillars of regional stability.

Secondly, the revised UCP must address the real present-day challenges of the South Asian region and realistically evaluate the engagement policies of the different combatant commanders. As Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl F. Inderfurth, stated,

"For many years South Asia has been on the back side of every American diplomatic globe. No longer. At the direction of the President and Secretary of State, the Clinton Administration has adopted a policy of greater engagement with South Asia."³⁶

The changes in South Asia indicate new attitudes, new approaches, and a new openness to ideas. Numerous high-level diplomats will travel to India and Pakistan to engage the region with broader, deeper dialogue from one voice, and establish strong, long-term relations that both sides can depend on. Next year, President Clinton will travel to India and Pakistan; the last U.S. President to visit was President Carter in 1978.³⁷

The Clinton administration and diplomats are definitely engaging the region with renewed interest. The CINCs are continuing to engage their respective areas of responsibility. PACOM continues to be a model for cooperative engagement and confidence building measures. Its mature programs focus on efficient, low-cost programs such as port visits, Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), reciprocal visits by high ranking military leaders, staff information exchanges, and small unit exchanges. PACOM is ubiquitous throughout Asia-Pacific and can address the concerns of Pakistan, as it is responsible for its strongest regional players, China and India. While PACOM flourishes with engagement success, CENTCOM continues to focus its energy on rogue states such as Iraq and Iran. Effective 1999, the new UCP gives CENTCOM the responsibility for the Caspian Sea nations of the former Soviet Union.³⁸ More responsibility, more challenges for a combatant commander that has very little forward presence in the region.

Finally, the revised UCP must address the future challenges and environment the CINCs will encounter: first, the threats to our regional stability and; second, structural optimization and alignment so as to facilitate the interagency process.

Harvard Professor Sam Huntington hypothesizes that a fundamental realignment of strategic forces was underway in the post-Cold War world, and that future great divisions among mankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.

The clash between civilizations will dominate global politics and the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. There are seven or eight widely acknowledged and recognizable civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African.³⁹ Using this characterization, a fault line can clearly be seen between India and Pakistan as well as India, Pakistan, and China. The CORM states that the UCP should minimize the seams, or faults between commands, therefore one CINC should be responsible for this strategic fault region. The most reasonable CINC would be PACOM, who already maintains responsibility for India and China.

The National Defense Panel Report focuses on the long-term challenges facing U.S. defense and national security. It looks out to the environment in the year 2010-2020. In order to meet those challenges, the panel believes the United States must undertake a broad transformation of its military and national security structures. Recognizing the need to maintain regional stability, the panel states that all agencies of the national security apparatus must work as an integrated team and be incorporated into the CINC's regional engagement plan. The panel suggests that PACOM would maintain its current responsibilities and assume responsibility for Pakistan.⁴⁰

Predicting the future and its threats can be extremely difficult and not very accurate; however the alignment of the UCP

in order to facilitate interagency is much more predictable. Currently, the Department of State is organized with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs Group responsible for integrating political, economic, global, and security issues into the United States' bilateral relationships. This group possesses six geographical bureaus: African, East Asia and Pacific, European and Canadian, Inter-American, Near Eastern, and South Asian. The South Asian Affairs bureau is responsible for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.⁴¹ The United States must enhance its influence and power through the integrated and synergistic use of all elements of national power. If the United States is to enjoy a measure of stability and order on world affairs this interdependence and synergism must be routine, especially in crisis.⁴² Therefore, the Department of Defense should where possible align its combatant commanders' areas of responsibility to the Department of State. Now is an opportune time to begin the restructuring of America's national security apparatus, because there is no superpower threat to the United States and the potential for saving resources is enormous. Perhaps, most importantly, the need to increase the interagency coordination to meet the challenges of the 21st Century is apparent.⁴³

IMPLICATION

The implication of the proposed change is minimal. USPACOM would assume the responsibility of Pakistan. The United States

would have a UCP structure that clearly promotes our national interests in the most efficient and effective manner, facilitates the link between the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region, and assists CENTCOM as it assumes additional responsibility for five new nations around the Caspian Sea.

COMMANDERS' AREAS' OF RESPONSIBILITY

95° W BY ITSELF THIS MAP IS UNCLASSIFIED 100° E




Figure 3 Proposed UCP of Commanders' Areas of Responsibility

CONCLUSION

The United States is clearly the world's only credible and legitimate superpower. America possesses the potential to address the future threats and security issues in South Asia. To safeguard America's important and peripheral interests in the region, we must translate today's unknown into our nation's strategy and our Unified Command Plan should reflect this vision. Clearly, America's national security strategic focus is a strategy of adaptive, flexible, and selective engagement. This shift is extremely apparent in South Asia.

Our National Military Strategy reflects the more uncertain global environment in which the armed forces must be ready and able to safeguard America's worldwide interests. To remain effective and efficient, the U.S. must have an engagement plan that optimizes the interagency resources and support, and a Unified Command Plan that is aligned for the future.

It is evident within South Asia, that Pakistan and India are irrevocably linked. One Unified Commander should shape the environment for this region and prepare for its challenges. Clearly, CINCPAC possesses the correct engagement policy, has the resources and focus, and will prepare the United States for success. The alignment of the UCP along the lines of the Department of State organization towards the region will facilitate the interagency process.

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, countries were often simply labeled as either pro-American or pro-Soviet. However, today we find the world to be much less black and white. If it is important to remain a viable influence in this region, the United States needs to bridge the fault between the Middle East and Asia-Pacific in a manner that recognizes the rich past of India and Pakistan, addresses the present, and postures us to remain a player into the 21st Century in South Asia. The line in the sand was wrong some 50 years ago, let's get it right now.

Word Count: 5880 words

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